



governmentattic.org

"Rummaging in the government's attic"

Description of document:	Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) correspondence with the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) 2004-2011
Request date:	26-June-2011
Released date:	19-November-2014
Posted date:	15-December-2014
Source of document:	Freedom of Information request Director, Information Management Division Office of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20511 Fax: (703) 874-8910 Email: dni-foia@dni.gov

The governmentattic.org web site ("the site") is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

NOV 19 2014

Reference: ODNI Case # DF-2011-00111

This is in response to your 26 June 2011 letter to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) (Enclosure 1), in which you requested, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), "a copy of the correspondence with the Intelligence Science Board since its inception in 2002, including requests by ODNI and other agencies for studies currently underway by the Board" (Enclosure 1).

Your request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. A thorough search of our records and databases located documents responsive to your request (Enclosure 2).

Information has been withheld pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:


- (b)(3), which applies to information specifically exempt by statutes, specifically, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m)(1), which protects, among other things, the names and identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(5), which protects privileged interagency or intra-agency information; and
- (b)(6), which applies to records which, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals

If you wish to appeal our determination on this request, please explain the basis of your appeal and forward to the address below within 45 days of the date of this letter.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Information Management Office
Washington, DC 20511

If you have any questions, please email our Requester Service Center at DNI-FOIA@dni.gov or call us at (703) 874-8500.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jennifer Hudson", is written over a printed name and title.

Jennifer Hudson
Director, Information Management Division

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

1

ENCLOSURE

2



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 6, 2008

Dear

We would like to thank you for discussing the findings from ICDO Study 18 at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your discussion of an analyst-driven collection program to focus tracking efforts provided Board members with a deeper understanding of lifecycle monitoring of nuclear materials. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in ways to address the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Sincerely yours,

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)


(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

26 October 2005

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Washington, DC 20511

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(3)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum III on "Biological Threats, Intelligence, and Relationships." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new networks for early indicators of biological threats, improve the timeliness and quality of our intelligence on these issues, and work collaboratively to protect our nation. I hope you found it time well spent and that you will think of the individual participants and of the Intelligence Science Board as ongoing sources of useful ideas and counsel.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America – government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. In our sessions we explored the intersection of medicine, technology, information, organization, and social relationships and suggested how collaborative relationships might operate and succeed in the protection of the nation and its citizens. Perhaps the most important point we raised is the opportunity that exists to leverage existing knowledge, networks and relationships.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this Forum a success.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chairman



Chair

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Members

[Large redacted block]

12 October 2007

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up, so I would like to recommend your re-appointment for another three-year term to expire December 31, 2010.

Please let me know if this is agreeable to you.

Many thanks for your collaboration up until now. I trust I may look forward to keeping it up in the service of our country.

All the best,

[Redacted signature]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

Put classification markings here
(Unclassified upon removal of appendix)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 25, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

Washington, DC 20511

Dear [redacted]

(b)(3)

The Intelligence Science Board (ISB) devoted its winter quarterly meeting (held on December 11-12, 2007) to the topic of "Countering Nuclear Terrorism through Intelligence." The extent of interest in this topic was evidenced by the at-capacity audience, the largest turnout yet for an ISB quarterly meeting. Not only was this meeting informative for the ISB members, but it fostered interaction among a wide array of people who are working this topic area representing the IC, DOD, DOE, DHS, and coalition partners, as well as the national laboratories and the private sector.

Government presentations addressed key policy and preparedness issues in characterizing the threat at "the nexus of counterproliferation and counterterrorism." They also extended to a wide variety of ongoing activities in mitigating the threat through collection, analysis, outreach, and special operations. Unclassified luncheon and dinner sessions addressed some of the initiatives of the not-for-profit world to monitor global nonproliferation progress and to raise public awareness of this issue.

The ISB has identified five areas that might be worthy of a "deeper dig" – should you agree:

1. **S&T Gaps** – where is the IC not investing, but they should be;
2. **Areas of S&T Underinvestment** – where some investments are being made, just not enough;
3. **Agency Interconnectivity** – does information and data flow between agencies well enough for them to function optimally;
4. **Coordination between IC and DOD or Other Communities** – is it sufficient?
5. **Coordination among IC Agencies** – is it sufficient? Is it being hampered by inadequate technologies? Is it hampered by over-compartmentalization?

Put classification markings here

Put classification markings here
(Unclassified upon removal of appendix)

• Additionally, in the attachment are some specific comments and suggestions from individual ISB members. These comments range across clandestine sensing technology and enabling global psyops endeavors, to reinvigorating national initiatives to address science education, and the application of behavioral science to understanding terrorist motives and methods, among other suggestions.

The detailed minutes of our December meeting exhibit an unusually high level of interesting and potentially valuable discussions among the members and the government. The key elements of the meeting discussions are captured in the attached Executive Summary included as a classified appendix to this letter.

The details of precisely how the ISB might best be involved in any of these potential study areas remain to be determined. We could, for example, charter a task force led by one or more ISB members, or some of our members might participate in a government study group led by others (e.g., the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee - JAEIC) – or both. Either way, the ISB offers to participate with the Community in furthering progress in this rapidly evolving area so critical to our national security.


Following on the success of this meeting's overview of the topic area, the ISB may wish to devote a future meeting to a similar exploration of Countering Chemical and/or Biological Terrorism through Intelligence. As always, we will keep your office informed of our future meeting and study plans.



(b)(6)

Attachments: As stated

cc:



(b)(3)

Put classification markings here


Put classification markings here
(Unclassified upon removal of appendix)

Attachments – Comments from ISB Members

From ISB Member

(b)(6)

(b)(5)




Put classification markings here

Put classification markings here
(Unclassified upon removal of appendix)

From ISB Membe

(b)(6)

(b)(5)




Put classification markings here

Put classification markings here
(Unclassified upon removal of appendix)

From ISB Member

(b)(6)



(b)(5)

Put classification markings here



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 13, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

We would like to thank you for describing open source collection efforts at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks on developing novel methods to utilize new media formats provided the Board with a deeper understanding of the far-reaching effects of web-based social networks. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in ways to address the challenges that lie ahead in combating terrorism.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to identify new threats our national security.

Very truly yours,

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

[Redacted]

April 4, 2005

[Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

The Intelligence Science Board is conducting a Study on Educating Information (EI), designed to review what is known about educating information from persons who appear uncooperative or unwilling to reveal what they know. This study is sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Intelligence Technology and Innovation Center (ITIC), and the DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA). We are conducting reviews of the science, training, and practice of educating information, with the goal of recommending research and training activities that might improve the Intelligence Community's knowledge base in these areas.

As part of our work, [Redacted] and I had the privilege of visiting [Redacted] several weeks ago and being briefed by [Redacted] on the work that you and your colleagues have done and are doing. In addition, we visited the [Redacted] library and learned about the archival information that the library holds. Also, [Redacted] kindly joined us last week at a meeting of the Study's Government Experts Group and participated in discussions following presentations of a social science review of EI and a review of what is known (and not known) about detecting deception.

I write today to request permission to review a number of files of debriefings of U.S. prisoners of war. We have been encouraged to do this by [Redacted]

[Redacted] and a current member of the Intelligence Science Board. [Redacted] who serves on the Senior Advisory Committee of the Study on EI, has suggested that there is much to be learned from review of debriefings of captured U.S. military personnel (especially during the Vietnam War) who were subjected to coercive interrogations. We would welcome the opportunity to review a number of these files in order to assess whether it is feasible to recommend a more thorough study of these data from an educating information perspective.

If you wish more information about the ISB Study on Educating Information or have any questions about this request, I would be glad to respond.

In advance, thank you for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

January 28, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

Dear :

We would like to thank you for describing the intelligence perspectives on nuclear terrorism at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding the importance of identifying intention in addition to tracking and locating threats provided Board members with a new perspective into the distributed model of terrorism. Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added a new member from the nuclear energy field and look forward to supporting the DNI in this and all other intelligence community issues.

Sincerely yours,

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for describing NCTC's role in responding to a nuclear terrorist event at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding emergency response and threat protocols provided Board members with a deeper understanding of collection coordination. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in ways to address the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

[Redacted]

Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc: [Redacted]

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102

Chair

August 25, 2004

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(3)

Members

Dear Mr. Goss:

As the chair of the DCI's Intelligence Science Board (ISB), I write to offer you whatever assistance you might wish from us in preparing for your confirmation hearings.

foreshadowed the ISB by standing up his Advanced Technology Panel in 1995. In 2002 George Tenet chartered the ISB's present mission to "provide expert advice, unconventional thinking, and early notice of advances in science". The unusually varied expertise of the ISB's membership (Attachment A) reflects that charter's uncommonly broad definition of "science" as all aspects of knowledge with a bearing on successful intelligence provision and use.

(b)(3)

My colleagues and I would be happy to talk with you about the full range of the Board's activities – some of them requested by diverse leaders across the IC, others initiatives of the Board itself. Attachment B presents thumbnail sketches of five studies whose results we think may be particularly relevant to you at this juncture.

By copy of this message I am requesting
 to learn from your staff if you wish to meet with any one or group of us and, if so, to collaborate with your staff to set something up.


(b)(3)

(b)(3)


Sincerely yours,

(b)(6)

12 October 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)


This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. The ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

I would like to offer you Emeritus status effective when your term expires as scheduled on 1 January 2007, so that the ISB may continue to call on you for special projects. You will continue to be invited to attend our Quarterly Meetings. MITRE will continue to hold your clearances.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past nine years as a founding member of the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) and its successor, the Intelligence Science Board. The "big ideas" that you have contributed over the years, such as your paper on the formation of an Intelligence DARPA (IARPA), and your recent thoughts on technology to resolve IC collaboration barriers have resulted in significant actions and policy changes by our sponsors.

I am at your disposal for any questions. I very much look forward to continuing collaboration.

Sincerely yours,




(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment


cc:



(b)(3)

Elissa R. Allen, MITRE Program Manager
Cynthia A. Daigneau, MITRE Contracts
Ruth French, Security Officer

12 October 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)

This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. The ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

Effective when your term expires as scheduled on 1 January 2007, I would like to offer you Emeritus status, so that the ISB may continue to call on you for special projects. You will continue be invited to participate in our Quarterly Meetings. As your clearances are not held by MITRE, your Sponsor would be asked to certify them to enable you to attend future ISB meetings..

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past eight years as a member of the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) and its successor, the Intelligence Science Board. Your presentation and technical insight into the challenges facing the IC research and development community made a significant contribution to the recent Quarterly meeting. I trust that you will elect to continue as an ISB Emeritus member.

I am at your disposal for any concerns you may have..

Sincerely yours,



(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment

cc:



(b)(3)



(b)(6)

June 15, 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Thank you for your fresh insights and for your most helpful assistance as a group facilitator in stimulating your group's ideas.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

All the best,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102



Chair

Vice Chair

Members

December 29, 2004

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

I write to inform you about an Intelligence Science Board (ISB) study and to invite Department of Homeland Security participation.

Recently the ISB initiated a project to review what is known about educating information. The study is being sponsored by the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Counter Intelligence Field Activity. Under the direction of ISB member [redacted] a team is reviewing scientific literature about interrogation, meeting with national and international experts, and examining relevant training and practice. The *Study on Educating Information* is being conducted in concert with [redacted] (also an ISB member) and the [redacted]

We would welcome participation by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in these efforts, especially from persons knowledgeable about the DHS's efforts to train agents in interviewing and interrogation.

Might it be possible for you to put us in contact with someone whom Dr. Fein and his colleagues could talk with in order to explore ways the DHS might wish to be involved with this work? [redacted] e-mail address is [redacted]
His phone is [redacted]

Attached is a brief summary of the status of the project.

In advance, thank you for your attention and your cooperation.

Best personal regards and wishes for the New Year,

cc:

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

Attachment



Chair

Vice Chair

Members

October 17, 2007

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

(b)(6)

I would like to thank you for presenting research and findings from Mobilizing Minds at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on September 18, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks about the levers for change and techniques in releasing talent provided the Board members with a deeper understanding of how to effect transformative change in mega organizations. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in describing the challenges that lie ahead in building a truly integrated IC to address this complex problem space.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added members from the social sciences to address the organizational, policy and cultural issues that the DNI is addressing in the 500 Day Plan to foster IC collaboration and integration.

Your remarks and experience added to our knowledge base as we move forward in support of the DNI and his transition endeavors.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

(b)(3)

December 5, 2005

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Washington, DC 20505

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(3)

When we met in September you asked me to think about ways in which intelligence professionals could establish ongoing relationships with the most qualified persons having expertise in relevant areas.

The suggestions that follow are not novel, and I suspect that some may have been tried sporadically. If several of your best people were strongly encouraged to try these approaches over a reasonable interval and if they turned out to be useful in establishing relationships that were seen as valuable, they might be adopted more broadly.

- 1) Consider sending select staff to short summer courses offered at many universities. Such courses, ranging in duration from a week to a month or two, often address new developments in technologies that could be of interest. Such an activity would put a staff member in contact not only with the sponsor of the course but with the other attendees as well.
- 2) Arrange to have a staff member seconded to a university or business research laboratory or group for a reasonable interval (three months to a year?) to work with a particular expert.
- 3) Academic investigators occasionally take leaves (sabbatical or otherwise) to spend time in a commercial organization to gain new experience or to establish new relationships. Consider inviting an individual with interests related to intelligence efforts to make such a temporary move.
- 4) Invite one or more individuals of specific interest to an afternoon meeting attended by several staff members for discussion of a specific area of science or technology, and follow it with a dinner. This could be an opening for ongoing relationships. And I suspect that the National Academies might well be willing to arrange and host such meetings (with funding of course).

I do believe that some combination of these activities might go some distance toward meeting your needs.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for describing the broad government efforts in nuclear forensics and attribution at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks provided Board members with a deeper understanding of the National Technical Forensic Center. Moreover, your observations and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for describing the IND Steering Group and Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP) at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding the need for a common analytic work plan, metrics, and IC-wide access compartmented information provided Board members with a deeper understanding of the challenges that lie ahead in developing a single, cohesive response to current threats.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)


(b)(6)

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

(b)(3)

June 15, 2006



(b)(3)

Dear 


(b)(3)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

January 9, 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(3)

I would like to thank you for being our dinner speaker at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 13, 2005. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks certainly provided the Board members with a deeper understanding of the issues the nation faces in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in describing the challenges that lie ahead in building an Intelligence Community organization to address this complex problem space.

Since you also participated in our October Highlands Forum, you know that Bio-security is one of the key areas that the ISB is studying and that we have highlighted the significance of threats in this area in a letter to the DNI. Our December agenda also included a presentation and discussion of findings from an IC study on an aspect of nuclear terrorism, and a discussion of ISB members' proposals to [Redacted] of "big ideas" for addressing IC problems.

(b)(3)

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. The ISB membership is in transition, and we have recently added new members from the nuclear, information assurance and legal fields who have had extensive experience working in the IC.

The ISB offers its services and its commitment to working with you and the Community on this, your vital area of national and international need. I am available at your convenience to meet with you in the New Year to discuss how we should proceed.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc: [Redacted]

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

members

[Redacted]

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Dear

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for describing the SIGINT collection posture at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your discussion of the nexus of materials, expertise, and intentions necessary for a plausible threat provided Board members with a deeper understanding of terrorist tactics and procedures. Moreover, your insights into the challenges of program vulnerability, insider threat, and smuggling networks, increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

[Redacted]

Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)


P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.


Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. We benefited greatly from your leavening the conversation with "big ideas" that carried over to our concluding session when the forum cast its net for big ideas that we should strive to realize.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman.

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your presentation on wild cards addressed all those issues and greatly stimulated the group's thinking; it pushed us to consider our assumptions and enabled us to compile a number of potential courses of action for the S&T leadership of the intelligence community.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

All the best,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

November 17, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up. As you know, I have recommended your re-appointment for another three-year term, which will expire December 31, 2011. I am very happy to inform you that ODNI has accepted my recommendation.

Many thanks for your contributions to the ISB over the past years. I very much look forward to our further collaboration in the service of our country.

All the best,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



Chair

[Redacted]

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

[Redacted]

Harvard University

October 22, 2007

[Redacted]

Dear

[Redacted]

I would like to thank you for describing the strategy and innovation that built [Redacted] at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on September 18, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks about the importance of communication and approaches to leading talent certainly provided the Board members with a deeper understanding of new perspectives for achieving transformative change. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in providing us with your insights on ways to address the challenges that lie ahead in building a truly integrated IC.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added members from the social sciences to address the organizational, policy and cultural issues that the DNI is addressing in the 500 Day Plan to foster IC collaboration and integration.

Your remarks and experience added to our knowledge base as we move forward in support of the DNI and his transition endeavors.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

P.S. [Redacted] asked me to send you a special token of his personal appreciation. This item will be sent separately.

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

31 October 2005

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Via:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

Washington, DC 20505

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(3)

The ISB's task force on privacy reviewed the regime that governs the interplay of technology and privacy in a certain realm we consider to be especially critical for national security.

The attached memorandum finds that, in current practice, this interplay is constrained – to the detriment of timeliness and effectiveness – solely by executive regulations tailored for an era long past, not by constitutional limits nor by judicial precedent or legislative decisions. The “fixes” that exist rely on slow, cumbersome retail processes more suitable for prosecution after the fact than for providing comprehensive preventive intelligence.

Mindful that a change in these regulations likely impacts policy and public perceptions of policy, we recommend conducting an experiment intended to evaluate the risk/benefit tradeoffs of a proposed change in regulations, a change that lies within accepted judicial and legislative protections of civil liberties; a change tailored for the potential for effectiveness and timeliness of the digital world we live in and tailored for the national security environment we must deal with in the here and now.

We attach great urgency to conducting this experiment, in the belief that the greatest threat both to national security and to privacy/civil liberties will most likely ensue from another attack on the US homeland that better intelligence might have forestalled.

We are at your disposal to help see this through. By way of enabling this, we shall schedule a conversation between your own General Counsel and us to explore additional subtle details.

Yours truly,

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Enclosure

cc: [Redacted]

~~FOUO~~



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for your extraordinary efforts in facilitating the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Winter Meeting. The primary purpose of these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. You unified extraordinary speakers within a cohesive and rational structure that became one of the most well attended and discussed meetings in the history of the ISB.

We truly appreciate your energy, patience, and endurance.

Sincerely yours,

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board


(b)(6)

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

(b)(3)


25 September 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. As you may recall, the ISB Charter of 26 August 2002 specifies that "the Vice Chair and all other members of the ISB shall be appointed by the Director of [National] Intelligence (D[N]I) on recommendation of the ISB Chair," and that "members shall serve for a term of three years that may be extended by the D[N]I on recommendation of the Chair."


After consulting with  I recommended the partition of the twenty-four members into four groups whose terms would expire 1 January, beginning January 2006 through January 2009. This plan provided for an orderly transition based on length of tenure, including membership in the ISB's predecessor Advanced Technology Panel. The plan specified that terms expire as follows:

(b)(3)

1 January 2006: 

1 January 2007: 

1 January 2008: 

1 January 2009: 

In accordance with this plan, I would like to confirm that your term will expire as scheduled on 1 January 2007.

I especially appreciate your forbearance during our difficult transition period, your unflagging willingness to participate in this demanding form of public service, and the contributions you have made to the U.S. government through your service on the ISB.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past six years. Your task force report on Trusted Information Sharing (TIS) and concept paper for a TIS Institute are valuable background documents for the DNI/CIO as he lays out his program for enhancing information sharing across the government. The "big ideas" you presented at the December Quarterly became part of an ISB report to the ADNI/S&T.

I am at your disposal to explore with you any concerns you may have that stem from my actions.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted Name]


(b)(3)

[Redacted Name]

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

September 28, 2007



(b)(3)

Dear 


Thank you for your response, dated September 13, 2007, to the draft *Terms of Reference* for a proposed *Biointelligence Study* by the Intelligence Science Board (ISB), both attached. It came as a welcome surprise to the ISB membership to learn that you are preparing a biological topography of the Intelligence Community and therefore have no need for our assistance.

We believe that your success – especially as it regards best practices in collection – deserves wider recognition. Therefore, I would like to invite you to present the results of your efforts at the next meeting of the ISB on December 11–12, 2007. We suggest December 12 at 1:00 p.m. as the time for your presentation, but would happily accommodate your schedule on either day and would, of course, welcome your attendance throughout the meeting.

As you know, our members also serve on myriad other advisory boards and panels in both the executive and the legislative branches with which they could share our common concerns. Your presentation would not only assist our members in these additional roles, but would also be of great value as we consider the four topics suggested in your memo.


Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to seeing you in December.

All the best,



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

12 October 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)

This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. The ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

By this letter, I am requesting that you extend your term on the ISB for three more years until 1 January 2010. I trust that you are willing to serve.

I want to thank you for all your contributions during the past three years, and your exceptional performance in developing and managing the September 2006 ISB Quarterly meeting agenda, "Speed, Surprise and Synergy: Achieving Information Advantage Through Science and Technology." I have heard nothing but praise for the presentations, panel discussions and organization, a tribute to your perseverance in seeking out the most relevant and qualified IC scientists, researchers and program directors. I especially appreciate your gracious forbearance during difficult times.

I am at your disposal for any questions you may have.

Sincerely yours,




(b)(6)


Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment

cc:



(b)(3)




(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~


Attachments

cc:



(b)(3)


bcc:



(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

June 15, 2006



(b)(3)

Dear 


(b)(3)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your leadership, enthusiasm and openness to the possibilities motivated the plenary discussions and made a real contribution. I hope that you found value in the ideas raised and can take some of them away in addressing the challenges in your work at ODNI.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

All the best,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

June 15, 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. We greatly appreciate your ability to join us on short notice and make such an impact with your sobering and stimulating remarks on environmental pathogens.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

October 16, 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the Intelligence Science Board (ISB). I am very pleased that you have chosen to accept a position as a member of the ISB and know that this is the beginning of a mutually beneficial association.

[Redacted] Program Manager and she will be your focal point for all interactions with the [Redacted] [Redacted] will manage your contract and security considerations while you are a member of the ISB.

(b)(6)

As a Board member, you will be compensated for your time and for expenses via a contract with [Redacted] Invoices should be submitted to:

(b)(6)

The MITRE Corporation

Attn. [Redacted]


(b)(6)

In addition, I have enclosed some ISB materials and the member directory, which should prove useful to you while working with the ISB:

- Intelligence Science Board Charter
- Executive Summary
- Vision Statement
- Summary of the Studies
- 2006-2007 Quarterly Meeting Dates

Once again, welcome to the Intelligence Science Board.


Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Enclosure

cc:



(b)(6)



Chair

Vice Chair

Members

October 17, 2007

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

15

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

I would like to thank you for describing your re-engineering strategy and measures for improving [redacted] at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on September 18, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks certainly provided the Board members with a deeper understanding of the importance of corporate principles and processes and their effect on changing organizational culture. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in describing the challenges that lie ahead in building a truly integrated IC to address this complex problem space.

(b)(6)

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added members from the social sciences to address the organizational, policy and cultural issues that the DNI is addressing in the 500 Day Plan to foster IC collaboration and integration.

Your remarks and experience added to our knowledge base as we move forward in support of the DNI and his transition endeavors.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

(b)(3)

PS: Got your letter and much appreciate your interest in joining the Board. I'll phone you shortly to explore that further with you. [redacted]

(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear :

We would like to thank you for describing the HUMINT collection posture at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks provided the Board with a deeper understanding of the need for creativity and adaptation in collection efforts. Moreover, your observations and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board


(b)(6)

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:


(b)(3)

26 October 2005




(b)(3)

McLean, VA 22101

Dear :

(b)(3)

Many thanks for staying the course at St. Michaels – almost to the end! As I've written to the other government participants, I hope that you found it time well spent. I know that you will think of the individual participants and of the Intelligence Science Board as ongoing sources of useful ideas and helpful counsel. We're working on follow-up with  and I will keep you apprised of progress.

(b)(6)


FYI, the following is the letter that went to the other participants:

"It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum III on 'Biological Threats, Intelligence, and Relationships.' I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new networks for early indicators of biological threats, improve the timeliness and quality of our intelligence on these issues, and work collaboratively to protect our nation. Your participation made a real contribution – the Forum benefited from the infusion of such informed and diverse points of view in our communities of interests and practice."

"This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America – government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. In our sessions we explored the intersection of medicine, technology, information, organization, and social relationships and suggested how collaborative relationships might operate and succeed in the protection of the nation and its citizens. Perhaps the most important point we raised is the opportunity that exists to leverage existing knowledge, networks and relationships."

"I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success."

All the best,



(b)(6)

Chairman



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

November 13, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up on December 31, 2008. At the December meeting I will express my formal thanks to you in person for your service to our country, but I want to take the opportunity now to tell you how much I have enjoyed collaborating with you. I especially appreciate your initiatives and good works in launching the Board's efforts on the nuclear threat and organizing the December 2007 Quarterly Meeting, as well as helping the ISB to understand R&D efforts in the national labs.

We expect to keep your clearances active for at least a year to facilitate any ad hoc contributions you care to make to ISB tasks. I look forward to our continuing association in the years ahead.

All the best,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "J. [unclear]".

cc:

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



Chair

[Redacted]

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

October 17, 2007

[Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

I would like to thank you for describing how you successfully transformed an engineering company into an information company at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on September 18, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks certainly provided the Board members with reasons for a leadership focus on customers and ways to stimulate innovation to achieve real transformative change. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in describing the challenges that lie ahead in building a truly integrated IC to address this complex problem space.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added members from the social sciences to address the organizational, policy and cultural issues that the DNI is addressing in the 500 Day Plan to foster IC collaboration and integration.

Your remarks and experience added to our knowledge base as we move forward in support of the DNI and his transition endeavors.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102

Chair

22 November 2005 **DRAFT**

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(3)

Members

Dear [redacted]

A sub-committee of the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) was convened on 25 October 2005, to recommend candidates for ISB membership and identify current members whose terms should be allowed to expire. [redacted]

[redacted] chaired the sub-committee of [redacted] and myself. In addition to membership, we have made several minor recommendations regarding membership policies. These are provided for your approval in the attachment.

In accordance with the ISB Charter, the Vice Chair and all other members shall be appointed by the DNI on recommendation of the ISB Chair. Based on the deliberations of the sub-committee, I recommend that the memberships of [redacted] and [redacted] be allowed to expire in January 2006. I further recommend that the terms of [redacted] and [redacted] be allowed to expire as early in 2006 as additional new members can be cleared and brought on board, and that they be offered Emeritus status, reserved in the Charter for long standing members who continue to participate periodically in ISB deliberations.

For the remaining members, I recommend that their terms be allowed to expire as follows:

1 January 2007: [redacted]

1 January 2008: [redacted]

1 January 2009: [redacted]

The subcommittee identified several areas of expertise as important to maintaining the ISB's cross disciplinary nature and selected several candidates in each discipline. No priority is implied by the order of the categories but within each category, candidates are listed in order of preference. I recommend the following individuals for ISB membership:

Cultural Anthropology
(Names and Bios)

HUMINT
(Names and Bios)

Information Assurance
(Names and Bios)

Neuroscience/neurobiology
(Names and Bios)

Nuclear
(Names and Bios)

Other Specialty Areas: Economics, Risk Management, Innovative
Technologies
(Names and Bios)

The ISB offers its services and commitment to working with you and the Community on vital subjects of national and international need. I am available at your convenience to meet with you about these recommendations in person.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)

[Redacted Title]

Chairman
Intelligence Science Board

Attachment:
Proposed ISB Policy/Procedural Statements

Concur: _____

[Redacted Name]

[Redacted Title]

October 12, 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

For the last several years, [Redacted] has been a co-sponsor of the Intelligence Science Board's Study on Educating Information. The Intelligence Science Board (ISB) consists of a group of distinguished and experienced professionals, appointed by the Director of National Intelligence to advise him and various intelligence agencies about research and other matters of interest to the Intelligence Community. The Study on Educating Information, chaired by [Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

We have completed Phase 1 of the Study and are embarking on Phase 2. As part of our work, we have created a Phase 2 Working Group on the Application of Negotiation Theory to Educating Information. The Working Group (WG) is composed of military and intelligence experts, together with several distinguished subject matter experts who serve as consultants. The tasks of the WG involve efforts to develop a framework for future USG efforts in the area of custodial information education.

I write to request [Redacted] grant Interim Secret Clearances to our four Phase 2 senior academic consultants. These persons are:

(b)(6)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(6)


As part of their work, on an occasional basis, I expect that the team will meet at [Redacted] as well as at other sponsor and IC facilities). Accordingly, I would like to request that our consultants be granted privileges to access NIPR and

(b)(6)

SIPR systems, as needed. I anticipate that the Working Group will be involved in this activity for between eighteen months and two years.


Thank you very much for your attention to this request. I would be glad to respond to any questions you may have.

Sincerely,

A large rectangular box redacting the signature and name of the sender.

(b)(3)

cc:

A rectangular box redacting the list of recipients in the carbon copy field.

(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for providing the intelligence lessons learned from smuggling case studies at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding source issues and inter-organizational partnerships provided Board members with a deeper understanding of the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats.

Moreover, your observations and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

(b)(3)



Chair

[Redacted]

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

[Redacted]

12 October 2007

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]:

(b)(6)

The end of your current three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board is coming up on December 31, 2007.

I look forward to an opportunity to thank you in person at the December meeting both for your service to our country and for the personal pleasure of collaborating with you. I especially appreciate your suggestions for integrating modeling and simulation tools and proposed innovations in remote sensing for improved intelligence analysis.

We expect to keep your clearances active for at least a year, to facilitate any ad hoc contributions you care to continue to make to ISB tasks.

All the best,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board


cc:

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. I join with our forum participants in thanking you for your memorable presentation on innovation and for raising a number of possibilities for the intelligence community's S&T leaders to take into account as they move forward with their strategy. I hope that we can continue to call on you and your creative energy as we move forward on a variety of fronts in the Intelligence Science Board.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

All the best,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

June 3, 2009

[redacted]

(b)(3)

Washington, DC 20511

Dear [redacted]

(b)(3)

The Intelligence Community (IC) and the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) have long wrestled with how best to balance the needs of national security and intelligence collection with privacy and civil liberty concerns. The enclosed paper by [redacted] provides an uncommonly lucid and well-reasoned framework for examining the complex and intertwined legal, technical, political, and practical factors at play in striking this balance in today's cyberspace environment.

(b)(6)

I heartily commend [redacted] paper to you, your staff, and the senior leadership of the IC. Based on his analysis of the facts available to him, I recommend that you establish an appropriate (perhaps novel) body with the access necessary to form well-grounded conclusions about striking a balance suitable for the 21st century. Such a body must necessarily include all three branches of government and, to the extent possible, should also engage the public.

[redacted] paper gives us a primer on the technological, legal, policy, and practical constraints associated with intelligence activities in cyberspace. It highlights the debilitating mismatch between the electronic speed of events in cyberspace and the bureaucratic pace of most current IC practices. It then offers a roadmap for addressing these constraints. In particular, [redacted] argues that the tension between intelligence capacity and privacy is not a zero-sum game – technological advances can be privacy-enhancing even while resulting in more efficient and effective IC capacities.

The paper poses two fundamental questions and a host of ancillary questions, to wit:

1. **Should the legal and political frameworks that restrain IC activities be reformed in light of changing technological and strategic circumstances?** That is,
 - Has the IC *already* sufficiently reoriented from the analog (paper-based) world to the digital era?
 - Do the substantive standards or the sheer logistics imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) under some circumstances *in fact* cause the IC to fail to collect important communications?
 - Should the FISA system be modified in order to *automate the process of approving surveillance* as to new targets under certain circumstances in which a FISA order already exists?

- Does the existing system permit the government adequate flexibility to conduct *pattern-based inquiries*, as opposed to inquiries in which it has a specific individual target in mind?
- Do the existing rules employ *categorical distinctions* that no longer make sense, such as a formal distinction between the foreign and domestic realms?
- Do the existing rules employ *technologically contingent* concepts that over time may have become unmoored from their original purpose?
- What are the unappreciated gaps involving *international cooperation* in the realm of information collection and exploitation?
- Are there unwarranted gaps between the formal legal framework(s) that are meant to constrain the IC and the *actual beliefs and practices* that exist within agencies?

2. If reforms are required, how should they be pursued in order to reflect a reasonable balance between security and privacy values?

- Would a *general shift toward ex post supervision* (and away from *ex ante* authorization) provide a more satisfactory resolution of the tensions among efficacy, efficiency, and preservation of privacy?
- Can *immutable audit trails* and other forms of accountability-enhancement measures make a switch to post-hoc oversight more attractive from a privacy perspective?
- How can *data-anonymization practices* help to overcome privacy concerns?
- Is the current regime *too complex* to permit adequate training (and therefore more prone to mistakes or abuse)?
- What, if anything, should be done to police the *migration of information* from intelligence uses to other uses, such as criminal law enforcement?

As [redacted] asserts, these questions for the most part turn on empirical facts regarding the actual practice and implementation of status quo rules and practices – facts that are not available to the public and not generally available even within government. While there is good reason for such secrecy, we must not permit reflexive secrecy to prevent vigorous investigation of the issues presented in [redacted] paper.

(b)(6)

Orchestrating a multi-branch (and beyond) body such as the one recommended may be particularly challenging. The ISB and its members have had some experience in dealing with such complex structures. To the extent we can be helpful to you and the IC in characterizing or forming such a body, we stand ready to offer our assistance.


With best regards,

[redacted]
[redacted]

(b)(6)

Enclosure: As stated

cc:



(b)(3)

**Intelligence, Privacy, and the Challenge of Rapid Technological Change:
Framing the Issues
Striking a Balance**



(b)(6)

The Intelligence Community (IC) today faces increasing pressure to enhance its ability to collect information in real time, to aggregate and mine that information expeditiously, and at times to do so in contexts where the existence of a threat is known but the particular persons, entities, or facilities associated with that threat are not.¹ Whether the IC can respond appropriately depends in significant part on the hard restraints associated with finite technical capacities. But let us assume for the sake of discussion that existing or emerging technologies are adequate to the task. Two pressing questions arise.

First, would the exploitation of such technologies be compatible with what might best be described as the IC's "regulatory environment"—i.e., the laws, bureaucratic practices and beliefs, and competing policy considerations that collectively function to constrain the IC above and beyond merely technical limitations. Second, if the answer to the first question is no, can and should the regulatory environment be modified? Such questions of course are entangled with privacy and related civil liberty considerations, and appropriately so. Any effort to optimize the IC's use of technology must account for such matters, as recent experience amply demonstrates. It may be, however, that technology can provide Pareto-superior solutions that improve the IC's effectiveness while simultaneously reducing privacy and civil liberty concerns.

This paper does not aspire to answer these ultimate questions. Rather, the goal is to establish that these questions should be rigorously examined, and to provide a roadmap for such an investigation. Toward that end, the paper proceeds in two stages. Part I provides context for the discussion that follows by surveying the evolution of the "regulatory environment" described above. The survey, which follows a historical progression, provides a brief but nuanced account that may be particularly useful for those seeking an accessible introduction to key legal considerations and case studies. Building on that foundation, Part II outlines a research agenda for further study.

**PART I—A PRIMER ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS ASSOCIATED WITH IC
ACTIVITIES**

We cannot address the challenges described above without a shared understanding of the complex legal and policy considerations that provide the "regulatory environment" for the IC's activities. This section sketches the historical development of those considerations, focusing on IC activities that impact persons in the United States and hence give rise to particular legal and policy concerns.²

¹ In terms of the strategic environment, the IC must account not just for the overt threat posed by rival states but also for the threat posed by terrorists and other clandestine actors—a context in which the particular persons and assets to be targeted may not be known even though the threat itself is. At the same time, technological change has produced an increasingly rapid and diversified global communications network as well as exponential growth in the variety and amount of data in existence. These trends oblige the IC to act ever more quickly, and to make use of ever more sophisticated technologies, in order to maintain its edge.

² Traditionally, IC activities impacting non-citizens overseas have been understood not to give rise to similar concerns. It bears mentioning that some recent developments in the law, such as the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in *Boumediene v. Bush* (holding that non-citizens held in U.S. military custody at Guantanamo may invoke the Constitution's Suspension Clause), place pressure on that assumption.

A. From the Founding to 9/11: The Emerging Legal and Political Environment

The current, deeply-contested political and legal climates relating to intelligence activities did not emerge from a vacuum. They are instead the product of a long history involving the evolution of complex and technologically-contingent conceptions of privacy. This section provides a thumbnail sketch of key events in that process, emphasizing the mediating role played by judges.

At common law in England, the primary legal restraint on the investigative powers of government officials was an indirect one: In the event of an unjustifiable intrusion, a government official faced civil liability for trespass. This prospect of course could have a chilling effect if officials were left to predict as best they could how a jury might subsequently evaluate the search. Officials did not have to run such risks, however, thanks to the institution of the judicially-issued search warrant. Obtaining a warrant in advance of a search served not just to protect the private citizen from unwarranted intrusions but also to shield the government agent from the threat of litigation in the event of a close call. The judge, from this point of view, played an *ex ante* mediating role balancing the government's need to investigate with society's interest in preserving some degree of privacy. Not all warrants, however, are equal.

In the period leading up to the American Revolution, the practice of issuing "general" warrants generated fierce resentment from American colonists. General warrants did not specify a particular premises to be searched or a particular item to be seized, but rather purported to grant search and seizure authority (and hence civil immunity) on a generalized basis. This episode, memorialized in American mythos via its inclusion as a prominent grievance in the Declaration of Independence itself, served to entrench the notions that privacy is a central element—perhaps even a precondition—of political liberty and that warrants must be focused narrowly in order to perform their mediating function properly.

The Fourth Amendment proceeds directly from these concerns. It forbids the federal government from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures. It also specifies that warrants may be issued only where the government can demonstrate "probable cause," with probable cause ordinarily demonstrated to a judicial officer through a sworn statement. The resulting warrants must contain particularized descriptions of the specific places to be searched or items or persons to be seized. The warrant model thus assumes that the government already possesses some amount of information drawing its attention to a particular person or location—an assumption that works reasonably well for the conventional law enforcement scenario, but which encounters problems if applied to, say, an untargeted effort to collect and mine large-scale datasets in search of patterns that might themselves produce more targeted suspicions.

What precisely does the Fourth Amendment mean when it refers to probable cause? The Fourth Amendment does not answer that question explicitly, but the language has long been understood to refer to whether a search will produce evidence that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Not all government investigative activity, however, is directed toward enforcement of criminal law. The government might investigate in furtherance of a public health measure, for example, or to take a more pertinent example, it might collect intelligence in furtherance of its national security and foreign affairs responsibilities (something that I will refer to simply as "intelligence gathering" for ease of reference). And, of course, it might carry out investigations that relate simultaneously to such functions and *also* to criminal law enforcement. Complicating matters further, these interests may not be mutually exclusive (e.g., an espionage or terrorism investigation might sound in both criminal law enforcement and intelligence-

gathering), and even when they are distinguishable their relative weight may shift back and forth in the course of an investigation. These considerations greatly complicate the question of how the Constitution constrains investigative behavior.

These issues were not particularly prominent in the 1800s. A pair of trends that began to accelerate in the 19th century ensured, however, that they would become so. First, the revolution in communications technology associated first with steam-powered transportation and then later with the telegraph and the telephone created new opportunities for information collection while at the same time reducing the amount of time required for communications to pass over distance. Second, the emerging role of the United States in international affairs—and the increasingly perilous nature of geostrategic circumstances—increasingly incentivized the federal government to collect information for intelligence purposes. Information had become relatively exigent, in the sense used in this paper, and for much the same reasons. The interesting question was how our legal and political cultures would respond.

The short answer is that both law and politics throughout the 20th century oscillated between the concerns of privacy and security, employing categorical distinctions such as geography, purpose and method in order to distinguish zones of relative discretion from zones of relative restraint. These distinctions came under pressure by the end of the century, however, paving the way for the disputes that have characterized the post-9/11 period.

Initially, technological change seemed likely to outstrip the constraining impact of law and politics. In 1928, the Supreme Court in a case called *Olmstead v. United States* addressed whether Fourth Amendment restraints applied to government agents who sought to listen in on phone calls. The question arose in the context of a criminal investigation with no overtones of foreign affairs or national security concerns (the defendants were bootleggers during Prohibition), and it involved activities and communications occurring solely within the United States. The government had tapped the defendants' phones without a warrant, prompting the defendants to object on Fourth Amendment grounds. Drawing a sharp distinction between physically-intrusive measures (such as rifling through a person's papers or invading their home) and the new realm of electronic surveillance, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment had no application at all in the latter setting.

The government's victory in *Olmstead* was short-lived. The decision drew the public's attention to the prospect of unregulated wiretapping, generating political backlash. As a consequence, Congress in the 1930s passed a statute criminalizing all wiretapping (though not bugging, which could be viewed as a separate form of collection made possible by changing technology), and by 1940 Attorney General Robert Jackson had forbidden the FBI from employing wiretaps under any circumstances (thus eliminating any concerns regarding the speed with which such operations were conducted, of course). The pendulum, in short, had swung quickly from complete discretion to complete prohibition. But further change quickly followed, largely as a result of World War II.

With the onset of war, the notion of a distinction between criminal investigations and national security investigations became more significant. Not long after Attorney General Jackson forbade the FBI from engaging in wiretapping, in fact, President Roosevelt directed the FBI to conduct extensive investigations of potential national security threats within the United States, including through the use of wiretaps. Privacy protection continued to be robust in the context of mere criminal investigations, but the executive proceeded on the assumption that post-*Olmstead* restraints had no bearing when the purpose of an investigation—even a domestic investigation—involved national security. As a result, the speed with which such investigations

could proceed was left to the discretion of the executive officials involved, subject as always to technical and logistical constraints.

The security-crime distinction soon became an entrenched feature of the legal and political cultures of investigation, at least within the executive branch. Whether the emerging role played by the security-crime distinction also reflected an informed assessment by the public or by Congress, at that time, is a more difficult question. The answer may differ depending on whether we are speaking of investigative activity within the U.S. or abroad. In the latter case, it is fair to say that the public understood that the government engaged in overseas collection activities for security purposes and by and large did not expect those activities to be subject to the sorts of legal and political constraints that might apply domestically. As to the former, however, it is much less clear that the public or members of Congress in the 1950s and 1960s appreciated the nature and scale of the government's domestic security activities.

In any event, change was on the horizon. On one hand, the realm of privacy gave way to a degree in connection with criminal investigations. Pressure on the government to take a tougher line toward crime led Congress, in 1968, to authorize a warrant regime through which the government could obtain permission from a judge to use electronic surveillance for purposes of criminal investigation. On the other hand, the government's discretion to act domestically in the name of security came to an abrupt halt in the early 1970s. While much good had been accomplished through security investigations, many abuses had occurred as well—and these abuses became public knowledge in the 1970s thanks to a combination of investigative journalism and formal investigations conducted by the Senate's Church Committee and the House's Pike Committee. Coming at a time when trust in the government already had collapsed as a result of Vietnam and Watergate—and contemporaneous with growing political interest in the general concept of privacy—these disclosures entrenched a still-influential segment of opinion holding that investigative powers are prone to misuse against political opponents and that the national security establishment accordingly must be subjected to checks and balances in the form of congressional oversight, transparency, statutory regulation, and judicial supervision—at least in its domestic operations.

Given this shift in the political culture, it is little surprise that the legal environment shifted at this time as well. In a case known as the *Keith* decision, the Supreme Court in the early 1970s held that the Fourth Amendment does apply to national security investigations carried out in the U.S. where there the security threat is purely domestic in nature (i.e., where the threat has no tie to a foreign power). The Court did not require the government to employ only criminal investigative methods in such cases—it explicitly stated that the government could satisfy the Fourth Amendment by obtaining a warrant predicated on a showing other than probable cause to believe a crime has been or is going to be committed—but combined with the political blowback discussed above, the net impact was to steer the government towards a criminal law enforcement model of purely domestic security threats.

The security-crime distinction in our legal and political culture thus collapsed, at least to a degree, insofar as purely-domestic security threats were concerned. Insofar as *foreign* security threats were concerned, however, the distinction did not so much collapse as grow more complicated.

In 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, better known as "FISA." In brief, FISA created a special warrant regime for electronic surveillance directed at agents of foreign powers, with the government's application presented to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") (the membership of which consists of federal judges

picked to serve terms on the FISC by the Chief Justice of the United States). There are several keys to understanding FISA. First, the government's application occurs in a classified setting without any opposing party, and without disclosure to the target then or later (unless and until the government elects to prosecute the target). Second, a FISA warrant does not require probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is going to be committed. Instead, the government's obligation simply is to show probable cause that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, without respect to any potential crime. In some respects, this may indeed be an easier showing than producing probable cause to believe a crime has been or is going to be committed—though it is worth emphasizing that this still requires a *targeted* showing. Third, the FISA system as framed originally did not apply to *all* or even most foreign intelligence-related surveillance. Instead, FISA offered a complex definition in which the warrant obligation depended on the particular communication technology at issue, the citizenship of the parties to the communication, and the physical location of the parties and of the acquisition device. Generally speaking, this made FISA applicable for wiretaps and bugs employed in the U.S. or in connection with the international communications of U.S. persons, but not for purely extraterritorial communications involving noncitizens. Eventually, FISA expanded to provide for pen registers, trap-and-trace devices, and physical searches as well.

The FISA system, by introducing a formalized gate-keeping process, necessarily imposed temporal delay on the ability of the government to employ covered methods of foreign-intelligence gathering—though the statute has always contained emergency procedures pursuant to which senior Justice Department officials may authorize resort to such methods on a rush basis, subject to post-hoc review from the FISC. Over time, the system grew more complicated. The Justice Department established the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) in order to, among other things, screen and present FISA applications to the FISC. As the system eventually developed, FISA applications ordinarily had to run a gauntlet of internal and external reviews—including first the investigative agency's own general counsel's office, then the OIPR, and finally the FISC itself. FISA does provide emergency procedures through which the Attorney General can approve surveillance on his or her own authority in certain circumstances, subject to FISC approval within seven days. Even then, however, some lapse of time still will occur before the Attorney General can render that approval. The system, in short, necessarily entails some degree of time lapse even in exigent circumstances—a circumstance that would come to be in contrast to the increasing speed with which communications take place in the emerging realm of cyberspace.

Complicating matters, both courts and the Justice Department in the 1980s and 1990s were grappling with the questions that arise when a foreign intelligence investigation might have criminal consequences. Shortly after FISA was enacted, for example, an influential court of appeals decision held that surveillance evidence obtained without a criminal warrant was compatible with the Fourth Amendment only if at the time the "primary purpose" of the investigation was intelligence collection rather than criminal law enforcement; once the primary purpose shifted to the latter, the government must obtain a criminal warrant in order to continue its collection activity. Partially as a result, a "wall" began to emerge in both formal and cultural terms within the executive branch, separating criminal and intelligence investigations so as to reduce the risk of running afoul of the primary purpose test.

In addition to the establishment of the FISA system, the emergence of the "wall," and the collapse of purely domestic security investigations, the revelations of abuse in the 1970s engendered many other pro-privacy developments in our political culture. Perhaps most notably,

- “Sneak and peak” search warrants: the PATRIOT Act codified existing caselaw permitting criminal investigators to conduct physical searches pursuant to warrants but without immediate disclosure of the search to the target.
- “Library records”: the PATRIOT Act empowered the FISC to issue orders compelling the production of “any tangible thing” (including, famously, library records) in connection with foreign intelligence investigations, with the recipients of the order forbidden to disclose the existence of the order to others.
- “The wall”: most notably, the PATRIOT Act sought to tear down the criminal-intelligence “wall” by altering the “primary purpose” test. Going forward, investigators could employ FISA so long as foreign intelligence-gathering was a “significant” purpose, even if criminal prosecution was the primary purpose.

These changes met with resistance both from some segments of the public and from some judges. Public resistance culminated, arguably, in a nearly-successful bid to prevent renewal of many of these authorities when they came up for reconsideration in 2004 (the PATRIOT Act had included a “sunset” provision in many instances). The effort to derail or limit renewal failed, but it demonstrated that the privacy lobby is quite well-organized, well-funded, sophisticated, and politically-effective. Legislators going forward would be sensitive to the likelihood that support for a measure raising privacy concerns would generate significant criticism and opposition. As for the judiciary, the FISC initially objected to the effort to lower the criminal-intelligence wall, forcing the government to make the first known appeal to an obscure appellate body known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (“FISCR”). Eventually, the FISCR overturned the decision of the FISC, concluding that the “wall” had not been required as a constitutional matter in the first instance (in part because criminal and foreign intelligence investigations are not mutually-exclusive categories) and that the PATRIOT Act settled the question as a statutory matter. Notwithstanding that opinion, however, a federal district judge in Oregon last year reached a contrary conclusion—finding that the Fourth Amendment does compel use of a “primary purpose” test such that the government cannot employ FISA procedures where its primary aim is prosecution—raising the prospect of the wall’s reemergence should the opinion not be reversed on appeal.

2. Total Information Awareness

No episode better illustrates the perils of underestimating the political salience of privacy concerns than the Total Information Awareness (“TIA”) debacle. In 2002, DARPA consolidated several research programs under the “Information Awareness Office,” with the general aim of cultivating information technologies that would exploit datamining as a means to identify potential terrorists. When the public became aware of the program, it proved deeply controversial. To some extent, this reflected political ham-handedness: Admiral John Poindexter (a figure associated with unlawful executive branch national security actions thanks to his role in the Iran-Contra affair) ran the office, and the very seal of the office (with its all-seeing eye) had Orwellian connotations that played directly into the fears of privacy advocates. But the opposition was not merely a response to cosmetics. TIA increased awareness of a critical change brought about by changing technology. In the past, the limits of technology provided a de facto constraint on the ability of the government (or anyone else, for that matter) to exploit the vast

amount of information about us that arises from our endless exposures to the public world—what some have described as practical anonymity. The existence of practical anonymity in the past had alleviated the need for formal legal constraints on the exploitation of such data, but database technology ensured that practical anonymity was decreasingly effective. The private sector already had made substantial inroads on practical anonymity by the post-9/11 era, of course, but the public by and large had not come to grips with the government's inevitable attempt to follow suit. TIA crystallized the issue in a manner that—fairly or not—conveyed the message that the government was not particularly sensitive to privacy concerns. In February 2003 Congress responded to concerns over TIA by passing legislation suspending IAO operations pending further review, and then in May 2003 by defunding the IAO.

The media have reported that at least some technologies and programs associated with TIA have migrated to other institutional sponsors. Even if true, however, it does not follow that the privacy-based backlash against TIA ultimately was ineffectual. On the contrary, the backlash was sufficiently potent to force Congress at least to appear to denounce the effort, a step which tends to affirm in the public's mind the notion that the effort was indeed inappropriate. Some media reports suggest, moreover, that lingering elements of the program have been sustained in the classified budgets only upon condition that the technologies involved not be employed in connection with U.S. persons. The manifest lesson of the episode, in any event, is that political constraints associated with privacy concerns can be fatal to efforts to exploit technology for informational advantages—at least when handled with inadequate attention to the public's sensibilities on such matters.

3. Warrantless Surveillance and FISA Reform

The most complex—and most ambiguous—post-9/11 episode involving the interplay of collection, privacy, and technology concerns President Bush's decision to direct NSA to conduct warrantless surveillance within the U.S.—potentially in violation of FISA—and subsequent efforts to reform FISA's triggering conditions. A precise account of these events is beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, the following summary suffices:

- After the 9/11 attacks, the President directed NSA to collect international communications coming into or going out of the United States where one party to the communication was linked to al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization—without seeking a FISA order first. The administration reasoned that FISA either did not apply to wartime intelligence gathering, or in the alternative that it could not constitutionally be so applied. Many of the arguments in support of this viewpoint emphasized questions of speed and exigency.
- The existence of the program was leaked to the press, prompting an array of objections and criticisms. Some critics focused on the privacy aspect of the issue, while others were more concerned with the president's implicit claim that as commander-in-chief he could in some circumstances act contrary to statutory commands.
- Allegations that various telecommunication companies had participated in the warrantless surveillance program led to numerous lawsuits seeking potentially-crippling damage awards. This in turn led to a controversial effort in Congress to provide the companies with post-hoc immunity. Recent legislation granted such immunity, though some amount of litigation continues at this time.

- Eventually, the President announced that the surveillance program had been brought within the existing FISA framework. Precisely how this was achieved was not made clear at the time. But whatever agreement had been struck with the FISC initially ultimately broke down, prompting a rushed effort to amend FISA itself.
- FISA has since been amended in a manner that permits the Attorney General and DNI jointly to authorize, for one year's time and without further FISC involvement, the targeting of non-U.S. persons "reasonably believed to be outside the United States," so long as the authorization complies with "minimization" procedures previously approved by the FISC ("minimization procedures" aim to reduce or eliminate incidental and unnecessary collection of the communications of U.S. persons, and to limit retention and dissemination of such communications). The reformed version of FISA also authorizes the AG and DNI to issue such authorization on an emergency basis when necessary (i.e., if the FISC has not already approved minimization procedures and there is no time to seek such approval). In practical terms, the most recent reforms mean that the AG and DNI jointly may draft minimization procedures, have them approved by the FISC for general use, and then issue orders directing collection at specific non-U.S. targets subject to those procedures but without further FISC involvement—including in circumstances that might otherwise have triggered FISA (e.g., a wire communication to or from the United States where the collection will take place in the U.S.).

Like the other episodes discussed above, the FISA reform process—and most certainly the debate regarding the warrantless surveillance program—has demonstrated that Congress is very responsive to privacy concerns, though not to the point of being unwilling to authorize changes to the legal framework governing collection activities that tend to enhance the government's freedom of action. Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from these events is that well-reasoned explanations of why a particular reform is warranted can succeed, though not without substantial opposition from those who feel the government already enjoys authorities that are too robust.

* * *

These post-9/11 vignettes did not directly implicate efforts to increase the speed of intelligence collection, but they nonetheless proved controversial in a manner that serves as a cautionary tale for efforts to reform IC capacities in order to account for the exigent information concern. These post-9/11 changes proved controversial in part because they were portrayed and perceived as enhancing executive branch discretion to determine when and how to gather and use private information. Efforts to reform IC capacities in order to respond to the demands of exigent information are likely to involve a similar move in the direction of relative discretion on the executive's part, and hence we can anticipate similar concerns arising. But it may be that such concerns need not blossom into the full-scale opposition seen in the case studies above. Technology not only motivates and makes possible speed-oriented reforms, but it may also generate new solutions designed to guard against misfeasance and malfeasance—thus ameliorating privacy concerns while improving the IC's efficiency and efficacy

PART II – IS REFORM NEEDED? FRAMING A RESEARCH AGENDA

The events described in Part I make clear that further reform of the IC's capacities would provoke controversy. Some such reform may be necessary, however, in light of the strategic and

technological trends mentioned in the Introduction. The task at hand is to determine—with as much empirical rigor as possible—whether these trends do in fact call for reform.

This Part aims to advance that inquiry by framing a pertinent research agenda. Subpart A begins by specifying a series of general principles and insights (many derived from the events described in Part I), and subpart B concludes with a series of specific questions that ought to be answered in the course of the investigation.

A. Background Principles

- The government's ability to collect and exploit information is constrained and regulated by many factors beyond technological feasibility, including law, bureaucratic culture and practice, policy, and politics. Note that the perception of legal constraints, even if inaccurate, can have a significant impact.
- As technical constraints erode, the question arises whether these other constraints should be enhanced (to preserve the status quo level of protection for privacy in the face of increasing government capacities) or reduced (to permit the government to obtain the full benefit of such increased capacities). Note that some such constraints can have a self-adjusting quality, including a tendency to become more robust when other constraints weaken, in balloon-squeezing fashion. Some, moreover, may be resistant to intentional modification efforts.
- The case for enhancing the IC's capacities in connection with cyberspace and related data-oriented media associated with the modern communications system is strong. Technological change has produced: (i) a vast increase in the volume and variety of potentially-relevant data; (ii) a growing divergence between the speed with which data moves and the amount of time required by non-automated procedures for obtaining ex ante permission for acquisition (whether permission is sought from judges or more senior officials within an organization; and (iii) an increasing need to engage in pattern-based and other relatively untargeted collection and analysis strategies.
- Efforts to reform the IC's capacities in order to account for these trends (i.e., the increasing exigency of information) nonetheless run the risk of encountering significant legal and political opposition, particularly in relation to privacy concerns.
- Privacy is a deeply-entrenched value in our politics and law, but its impact is complex. It provides benefits in that it enriches democratic self-governance—and the social fabric more generally—by preserving space for political dissent and for individual self-definition. It imposes costs insofar as it leads to constraints upon the government's capacity to collect and exploit relevant information for appropriate purposes.
- Where government programs that tend to reduce privacy are handled in a manner that suggests a lack of concern for privacy values, it becomes far easier to characterize them as abusive or potentially abusive and to draw attention away from the potential benefits of such programs. Such opposition can be fatal as a political matter, or at least debilitating. The post-9/11 era is replete with examples, as discussed in Part I.
- Many commentators have observed that the current generation may have a weaker commitment to privacy than past generations, citing the proliferation of private information being displayed openly via social media and the prevalence of private-sector entities engaged in data-collection and aggregation activities. This may be true, but it does not follow that the politics of privacy have changed to the same extent when it

comes to *government* action. A vast amount of personal information—some of it quite sensitive—already finds its way into private hands as a result of technological change, but the public reacts differently—and more negatively—to the same or similar data coming into the government’s possession. This reflects the strength of what we might call the “Big Brother” narrative in our political culture: the view that political liberty depends in part on limiting the government’s access to information about individuals. The phrase “knowledge is power” has positive connotations for some, but disturbing connotations for others—a duality demonstrated by the political firestorm ignited by the Total Information Awareness program.

- The political and legal debate relating to government and privacy often treats the tension between capacity and privacy as a zero-sum game. *It is not clear, however, that it must be so. Technological advances do not necessarily come at the cost of privacy. They can also be privacy-enhancing, even while resulting in more efficient and effective IC capacities.* Anonymous data, immutable audit trails, and similar methods may permit the enhancement of *post-hoc* accountability mechanisms that minimize the risk of abuse or misuse, for example, thus making more tolerable the notion of increased collection and exploitation capacities on the front end.

B. Key Questions to Be Answered

The overarching questions raised by these background considerations are (i) whether the legal and political frameworks that restrain the IC’s activities ought to be reformed in light of changing technological and strategic circumstances, and (ii) whether, if so, such reforms can be designed in a manner that sufficiently accounts for privacy concerns. Both inquiries depend, however, on obtaining well-founded answers to a host of subsidiary questions.

1. Should the legal and political frameworks that restrain IC activities be reformed in light of changing technological and strategic circumstances?

The IC once operated in a regulatory climate that developed against the backdrop of an analog world (or even a paper-based world). Have we *already* sufficiently reoriented for the digital era? Answering this question requires a comprehensive grasp of the legal frameworks that constrain IC activities, the political realities that sustain those limitations and that have their own direct constraining impact, and—especially—the precise details of how specific programs and policies operate in actual practice. More specifically, one might ask the following questions in the course of such an investigation:

- Do the *substantive* standards imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) as a precondition to obtaining a surveillance order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) in some circumstances cause the IC to fail to collect important communications? If so, the question arises whether the substantive standard should be adjusted (and also whether the substantive standard *can* be adjusted, bearing in mind the possibility that a less-restrictive standard might precipitate constitutional objections under the Fourth Amendment).
- Setting aside the substantive standards for obtaining a FISA order, the question also arises whether the sheer *logistics* of obtaining a FISA order might cause the IC to fail to collect important communications. More specifically, one might ask whether

opportunities for collection are missed due simply to the difference in speed between events in cyberspace and the amount of time associated with the non-automated, real-world process of obtaining an order. The existing FISA regime does provide emergency authorization procedures, of course, with the Attorney General having the power to authorize surveillance measures in certain circumstances (subject to an obligation to seek post-hoc approval from the FISC within 7 days). But does the time required to obtain the Attorney General's (or any other person's) permission nonetheless permit some communications to escape collection? Even if the emergency procedures work reasonably well in individual instances, are they sufficiently scalable? If either scenario is a problem, what are the plausible remedies?

- Should the FISA system in any event be modified in order to automate the process of approving surveillance as to new targets in certain circumstances in which a FISA order already exists? For example, assume we have a FISA order in place in connection with a particular foreign target. If that target makes a new contact, should the government automatically have authorization to extend surveillance to that new contact's other communications, subject to post-hoc review and approval?
- How well do the modifications introduced by the Protect America Act, and then by its successor the FISA Amendments Act, respond to these concerns?
- Does the existing system permit the government adequate flexibility to conduct pattern-based inquiries, as opposed to inquiries in which it has a specific individual target in mind? For example, does current law interfere unduly with data-aggregation and -mining solutions by unnecessarily forbidding them, imposing inappropriate political costs in order to pursue them, or simply delaying resort to such tools?
- Do the existing rules employ categorical distinctions that no longer make sense (or as much sense), such as a formal distinction between the foreign and domestic realms? Note, in this regard, that the current FISA regime in many respects depends upon a determination of the physical location of a participant in a communication—a question that technology makes much more difficult to answer in some cases.
- Do the existing rules employ concepts that are technologically-contingent such that over time they become unmoored from their original purpose, covering too much or too little ground?
- Does the increasing difficulty of identifying the parties to a communication, letting alone locating them in the physical world, require reform?
- Are there underappreciated gaps or problems involving international cooperation in the realm of information collection and exploitation, perhaps resulting from distinctions between the US approach to data privacy protection and that of other entities (especially but not only the EU)?
- Are there unwarranted gaps between the formal legal framework(s) that are meant to constrain the IC and the actual beliefs and practices that exist within agencies? Are there managerial solutions in place to periodically seek out such gaps, and to take corrective managerial action if so?

2. If reforms are required, how should they be pursued in order to reflect a reasonable balance between security and privacy values?

Improving the efficacy and efficiency of the IC's activities does not necessarily require decreased protection for privacy.

- The current regulatory regime often is described as involving ex ante authorization rather than ex post supervision and oversight. Would a general shift toward the latter provide a Pareto-optimal solution to the tension among efficacy, efficiency, and preservation of privacy?
- Can immutable audit trails and other forms of accountability-enhancement measures make a switch to post-hoc oversight more attractive from a privacy perspective?
- Can data-anonymization practices help to overcome privacy concerns?
- Is the current regime too complex to permit adequate training, such that in actual practice a simplified model would prove less prone to mistakes or abuse even if it appeared on paper to provide fewer restraints?
- What if anything should be done to police the migration of information from intelligence uses to other uses, such as criminal law enforcement or enforcement of the immigration laws? It often is tempting to justify use of a privacy-diminishing method of collection or data-processing by citing the special concerns of the IC, but at the same time one of the most prominent criticisms of the pre-9/11 era was the relative lack of information sharing among agencies. The desire to disseminate information widely, in short, is in tension with the desire to cite special justifications in order to obtain additional authorities.

A concluding thought: These questions for the most part turn on empirical facts regarding the actual practice and implementation of status quo rules and practices, facts that are not available to the public and not generally available even within government. There is good reason for such secrecy as a general proposition, but we must not permit reflexive secrecy prevent vigorous investigation of the issues presented in this paper. An appropriate body can and should be tasked with this inquiry, and can and should be given the access necessary to form appropriately-grounded conclusions.



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Members

[Redacted]

Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. [Redacted]

The Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is pleased to submit the enclosed concept paper on Trusted Information Sharing (TIS). The ISB's study leading up to this report has been under the direction of [Redacted] with considerable input of ideas received from across the Community.

The study concludes that information sharing is more than just a technical problem to be solved by a single technological advance; rather, it is a broad field of study integrating aspects of technology, policy, organizational culture, and the law. Any meaningful and lasting solution will require the collaborative contributions of many participants from across the Government as well as the private sector. Toward this end, the report recommends the establishment of a Trusted Information Sharing Institute to provide a forum for continued exploration of this field.


As a first step toward achieving the institute, the [Redacted] has designated five DCI Post-Doctoral Research Fellowships in fiscal year 2005 to bring together multi-disciplinary research in trusted information sharing. The ISB intends to take an active role in the guidance of these fellows and their research.

Through [Redacted] we were recently introduced to [Redacted] [Redacted] resonated with the Board's suggestions and is currently pursuing the tasks necessary to define a joint, not-for-profit institute for trusted information sharing.

ISB Concept Paper on Trusted Information Sharing, page 2

We understand that the Government is making strides toward balancing the sharing of intelligence information with the need for information protection. The ISB will work with your office as we continue our exploration into the whole trusted information sharing field, and we remain available to discuss the conclusions and recommendations contained in this interim report.


Sincerely yours



(b)(6)

Enclosure: As stated

cc:



(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(6)

Members

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for discussing the findings from ICDO Study 18 at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your discussion of an analyst-driven collection program to focus tracking efforts provided Board members with a deeper understanding of lifecycle monitoring of nuclear materials. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in ways to address the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Sincerely yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc: [redacted]

(b)(3)



Chair

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

12 October 2007

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Members

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up, so I would like to recommend your re-appointment for another three-year term to expire December 31, 2010.

Please let me know if this is agreeable to you.

Many thanks for your collaboration up until now. I trust I may look forward to keeping it up in the service of our country.

All the best,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

26 October 2005



(b)(3)

Washington, DC 20505

Dear



(b)(3)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum III on "Biological Threats, Intelligence, and Relationships." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new networks for early indicators of biological threats, improve the timeliness and quality of our intelligence on these issues, and work collaboratively to protect our nation. I hope that you found it time well spent and that you will think of the individual participants and of the Intelligence Science Board as ongoing sources of useful ideas and helpful counsel.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America – government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. In our sessions we explored the intersection of medicine, technology, information, organization, and social relationships and suggested how collaborative relationships might operate and succeed in the protection of the nation and its citizens. Perhaps the most important point we raised is the opportunity that exists to leverage existing knowledge, networks and relationships.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this Forum a success.


Sincerely,



(b)(3)

Chairman

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.


I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action. I hope that you found it useful and that there are ideas that prove useful to you in your agency.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman



Chair

Vice Chair

Members

12 October 2007

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)
(b)(3)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up, so I would like to recommend your re-appointment for another three-year term to expire December 31, 2010.

Please let me know if this is agreeable to you.

Many thanks for your collaboration up until now. I trust I may look forward to keeping it up in the service of our country.

All the best,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Members

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for discussing policy perspectives on nuclear terrorism at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your discussion of the development and implementation of U.S. counter terrorism strategic plans provided Board members with a deeper understanding of joint counterterrorism and counterproliferation policy. Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added a new member from the nuclear energy field and look forward to supporting the National Security Council in this and any other national security issues.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc: [redacted]

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

November 13, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

Members

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted],

The end of your current three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up on December 31, 2008. I hope that I will have the opportunity at the December meeting to express my formal thanks to you in person for your service to our country. Meanwhile, I want to thank you for the personal pleasure that our collaboration has given me. I especially appreciate your initiatives and good works in launching the Board's efforts on biosecurity, chemistry, and materials science.

We expect to keep your clearances active for at least a year to facilitate any ad hoc contributions you might care to make to ISB tasks. I look forward to many more years of association and friendship.

All the best,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(6)

members

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for detailing DOE national laboratories' efforts supporting IND/RDD threat characterization and mitigation at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your overview of DOE national laboratory activities in nuclear forensics and countering nuclear terrorism provided Board members with a deeper understanding of DOE's role in combating nuclear threats. Moreover, your insights and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board


Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc: [redacted]

(b)(3)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. You brought a completely unique perspective to this conversation as a global businessman, a Presidential advisor, and a concerned citizen. Your participation and insights made a real most valuable contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

June 15, 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Between your experience-based commentary in the forum plenary and your suggestions in your breakout group, your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Vice Chairman



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

Members

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you sharing your insights on preventing nuclear terrorism through strengthening intelligence support to reducing the risk at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for thought leaders in the Scientific and Intelligence Communities to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your discussion of a multi-layered defense provided Board members with new perspectives on cooperative threat reduction, particularly the role of the nuclear industry in securing nuclear materials and technologies. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in ways to address the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc [redacted]

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

November 17, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up. As you know, I have recommended your re-appointment for another three-year term, which will expire December 31, 2011. I am very happy to inform you that ODNI has accepted my recommendation.

Many thanks for your contributions to the ISB over the past years. I very much look forward to our further collaboration in the service of our country.

All the best,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

November 17, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

It is a great pleasure to inform you that the Membership Committee of the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) has voted to upgrade your status from associate member to full member of the ISB. Your term would run from January 2009 through December 2011. Please let me know if this is agreeable to you.

Many thanks for your contributions so far, in particular for your excellent work in organizing the December 2008 Quarterly Meeting. I look forward to our continuing collaboration in the service of our country.

All the best,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]



October 17, 2007

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

Members

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

I would like to thank you for being our dinner speaker at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on September 18, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks certainly provided the Board members with a deeper understanding of the issues the Intelligence Community (IC) faces in achieving transformative change. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in describing the challenges that lie ahead in building a truly integrated IC to address this complex problem space.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added members from the social sciences to address the organizational, policy and cultural issues that the DNI is addressing in the 500 Day Plan to foster IC collaboration and integration.

Your remarks and experience added to our knowledge base as we move forward in support of the DNI and his transition endeavors.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

12 October 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. The ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

By this letter, I would like to confirm that your term will expire as scheduled on 1 January 2007. We have instituted the practice, when MITRE holds the clearances of a member whose term expires, to continue holding them for one year, to enable the member to wrap up ongoing ISB projects. Since MITRE does not hold your clearances, you will have to achieve the same effect by having your Sponsor pass clearances as needed.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past seven years as a member of the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) and its successor, the Intelligence Science Board. The Board and IC leadership have benefited from your contributions to the current Study of Globalization and Information Operations, the Assessment of Quantum Cryptography Program and from your specialized knowledge on advanced computing in support of numerous ISB and DSB studies.

I am at your disposal for any questions you may have.

All the best,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment

cc:


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear



(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.


Sincerely,




(b)(6)

Vice Chairman


25 September 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. As you may recall, the ISB Charter of 26 August 2002 specifies that "the Vice Chair and all other members of the ISB shall be appointed by the Director of [National] Intelligence (D[N]I) on recommendation of the ISB Chair," and that "members shall serve for a term of three years that may be extended by the D[N]I on recommendation of the Chair."


After consulting with  I recommended the partition of the twenty-four members into four groups whose terms would expire 1 January, beginning January 2006 through January 2009. This plan provided for an orderly transition based on length of tenure, including membership in the ISB's predecessor Advanced Technology Panel. The plan specified that terms expire as follows:

(b)(3)

1 January 2006:



1 January 2007



1 January 2008:



1 January 2009:



In accordance with this plan, I would like to confirm that your term will be renewed for three years until 1 January 2010.

I especially appreciate your forbearance during our difficult transition period, your unflagging willingness to participate in this demanding form of public service, and the contributions you have made to the U.S. government through your service on the ISB.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past ten years as a founding member of the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) and its successor, the Intelligence Science Board. You have played a significant leadership role in the ISB through your contributions to the 2004 Study of Radar Applications, your leadership role in the 2003 Interference Study and on your current study, The Effect of Globalization on Information Operations. Your leadership and technical insights have contributed over the years to the government's investment decisions and focused research programs on areas of particular technical merit.

I am at your disposal to explore with you any concerns you may have that stem from my actions.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted CC List]

(b)(3)
(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

December 29, 2004

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Members

[Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

I write to inform you about an Intelligence Science Board (ISB) study and to request the participation of [Redacted] as government expert consultant to the study.

Recently the ISB initiated a project to review what is known about educating information. The study is being sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Counter Intelligence Field Activity, and the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center. Under the direction of ISB member [Redacted] a team is reviewing scientific literature about elicitation and related investigational strategies, meeting with national and international experts, and examining relevant training and practice. *The Study on Educating Information* is being conducted in concert with [Redacted] (also an ISB member) and the [Redacted]

We would welcome participation by [Redacted] especially given his expertise in resistance training effects, a key area of our interest.

If you have any questions about this study, [Redacted] and his staff would be glad to answer them. You may contact him at [Redacted] or at [Redacted]

(b)(6)

In advance, thank you for your attention and your cooperation.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)



Chair

[Redacted]

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

October 17, 2007

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

I would like to thank you for describing the 9/11 Commission's deliberations and the resulting legislation that created the DNI at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on September 18, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks certainly provided the Board members with a deeper understanding of the background for the current IC structure and the need to develop an integrated intelligence enterprise that is nimble in addressing the new threats.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added members from the social sciences to address the organizational, policy and cultural issues that the DNI is addressing in the 500 Day Plan to foster IC collaboration and integration.

Your remarks and experience added to our knowledge base as we move forward in support of the DNI and his transition endeavors.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

December 6, 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Dear [Redacted]

I write to transmit to you the ISB's report entitled *The Challenge of the New S&T Landscape*.

This report responds to your tasking of the ISB through your memo to me dated June 9, 2006.

[Redacted] the ISB's vice-chair and ISB member [Redacted]
[Redacted] authored the report, supported by [Redacted] and
[Redacted] both of The MITRE Corporation.

All of us are at your disposal for any questions you might have.

With my best personal regards,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Chairman, Intelligence Science Board



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

February 6, 2008

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Members

[Large redacted area covering the list of members]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(3)

logy
logy
We would like to thank you for describing efforts to organize and enhance IC nuclear forensics capabilities at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks provided the Board with new perspectives on the need for an integrated collection architectures as well as insight into the effects of compartmented access on nuclear forensics. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in ways to address the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted signature]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board


Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc [Redacted]

(b)(3)

June 15, 2006



(b)(3)

Dear 


(b)(3)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. I hope that a number of the ideas we raised and catalogued in our finale will be useful to you in the near term to make some real impact.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.


Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your presentation was a highlight of this forum and graphically demonstrated the rapid pace of change in new fields of study and the possibilities and challenges for the intelligence community.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.


Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your opening remarks were thought provoking and "spot-on," serving as a reference point to return to throughout the forum.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

All the best,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

February 13, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

We would like to thank you for describing DOE's Office of Nonproliferation research and development efforts in developing technologies to counter nuclear terrorism at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your overview of DOE research thrusts in proliferation and nuclear detonation detection provided Board members with a deeper understanding of the technology and data fusion challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats. Moreover, your insights and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]


Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc: [Redacted]

(b)(3)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)


Dear 

(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. I join with our forum participants in thanking you for your memorable presentation on innovation and for raising a number of possibilities for the intelligence community's S&T leaders to take into account as they move forward with their strategy.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Members

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(3)

We would like to thank you for detailing the DNI WMD T Steering Group initiative at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding the need for both metrics and fusion of the intelligence streams provided Board members with a deeper understanding of the challenges in both collections and analysis. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in ways to address the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats.

Moreover, your observations and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc: [Redacted]

(b)(3)



Chair

Vice Chair

Members

October 18, 2007

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

I would like to thank you for presenting your ideas about interagency transformation at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on September 18, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks certainly provided the Board members with a deeper understanding of the issues the Intelligence Community (IC) faces in achieving horizontal collaboration. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in describing the challenges that lie ahead in building a truly integrated IC to address this complex problem space.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added members from the social sciences to address the organizational, policy and cultural issues that the DNI is addressing in the 500 Day Plan to foster IC collaboration and integration.

Your remarks and experience added to our knowledge base as we move forward in support of the DNI and his transition endeavors.

All the Best,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

Vice Chair

Members

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for describing the DOE efforts to secure foreign fissile and radiologic dispersion devices at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding the shipping and monitoring of nuclear materials provided the Board members with a deeper understanding of security culture required to overcome these challenges.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

November 13, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

Members

Dear

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up on December 31, 2008. At the December Quarterly Meeting I will express my formal thanks to you in person for your service to our country, but I want to take the opportunity now to tell you how much I have enjoyed collaborating with you. I especially appreciate your initiatives and good works in launching the Board's efforts on strategic communications and creativity and your contributions to our September 2007 meeting on transformative change.

We expect to keep your clearances active for at least a year to facilitate any ad hoc contributions you care to make to ISB tasks. I look forward to our continued association.

All the best,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



Chair

October 17, 2007

Vice Chair

Members

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

I would like to thank you for leading us through an effective organizational change management strategy based on your own experiences at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on September 18, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your description of the process for rebuilding companies, and lessons learned from private industry certainly provided the Board members with a deeper understanding of the issues the Intelligence Community (IC) faces in achieving transformative change. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in describing the challenges that lie ahead in building a truly integrated IC to address this complex problem space.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added members from the social sciences to address the organizational, policy and cultural issues that the DNI is addressing in the 500 Day Plan to foster IC collaboration and integration.

Your remarks and experience added to our knowledge base as we move forward in support of the DNI and his transition endeavors.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

(b)(3)



ATTACHMENT A: Meeting Agenda

ISB Quarterly Meeting Achieving Transformative Change 18-19 September 2007

The MITRE Corporation
7594 Colshire Drive, Room 0T325
McLean, VA 22102

Change happens. But change almost never happens in isolation, i.e., one change often leads to another – some foreseeable, some surprising. Change can happen in world events and organizational relationships, in governing laws and internal policies, or in resource priorities and public opinion. Our response to change can be *reactive* (depending on our ability to recognize and respond to changes that occur around us), or it can be *proactive* (identifying specific changes we want to happen and taking deliberate steps toward making it so).

Some proactive organizational or business process changes may only be *cosmetic* (i.e., giving the appearance of change) or *fleeting* (i.e., dependent on the leaders then in place or on local circumstances and likely to revert when the leaders or circumstances, themselves, change). *Transformative* change implies more substantive changes in policy or business practices and carries with it a sense of “temporal permanence” – at least until there is a compelling need for the next set of changes.

A primary purpose of intelligence is to *anticipate* change, recognize when it is happening, and alert decision-makers in time to make a difference. To perform this alerting mission, the Intelligence Community must continually monitor and assess the behavior of our adversaries (and potential adversaries) as well as evaluate its own internal processes and methods. Transformative change can be enabled by (or even driven by) scientific or technological breakthroughs and often entails a *paradigm shift* or a change in the way a need or practice is perceived and thought about.

Of interest to the ISB is how to achieve truly transformative change in the business of intelligence, i.e., what are the conditions necessary for meaningful and lasting change? At this meeting the ISB will explore both the need for transformative change throughout the Intelligence Community and the mechanisms by which transformative change is being implemented. Current goals for transforming intelligence missions, agencies, processes, and relationships will be examined along with plans for achieving those transformations. Earlier experiences with pursuing transformation will also be discussed. Comparisons will be drawn with transformative change in the private sector, and some academic theories of change management will be introduced.

**TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18**

Time	Event	Key Participants
0830-0845	WELCOME [U//FOUO]	(b)(3) (b)(6)
0845-0915	RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ODNI [S//NF]	
0915-0930	INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION [S//NF]	
0930-1030	TRANSFORMATION GOALS IN THE IC [TS//SCI]	
1030-1045	Break	
1045-1215	CHALLENGES OF CHANGE IN THE IC [S//NF] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observations on Change in the IC • The Project on National Security Reform • Introduction to an Analytic Case Study 	(b)(6)
1215-1245	Working Lunch	
1245-1345	TRANSFORMING [] [U]	
1345-1515	TRANSFORMATION EXAMPLES IN INDUSTRY [U] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repairing Mid-sized Companies • Business Transformation and Risk 	
1515-1530	Break	
1530-1700	TRANSFORMATION EXAMPLES IN INDUSTRY (cont'd) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizational Change • Transforming [] 	(b)(6)
1700-1730	ISB ADVICE ON ANALYTIC CASE STUDY [TS//SCI]	
1800	DINNER [U]: Café Renaissance	

**WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19**

Time	Event	Key Participants
0830-0915	VIRTUAL GAMING REAL WORLD ATTACK [TS//SCI]	
0915-1215	ISB DISCUSSION [TS//SCI] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISB Member Experiences with Transformation • Is there a "science" of transformation? • How can it apply to the needs of the IC? • Should the business of intelligence be reinvented for the modern threat? • What should be the role of the ISB in this process? 	
1215-1245	Working Lunch	
1245-1430	ISB DISCUSSION [TS//SCI] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISB Initiatives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Cybersecurity R&D ○ Educing Information ○ Risk Management ○ Emerging Sensors ○ Integrated Collection ○ Biointelligence ○ Suggestions for new initiatives • December Meeting: Nuclear Terrorism • March Meeting: Operational Support • ISB impact, outreach, reporting, topics, membership, and direction • Contract funding status and plans • Summary of meeting actions 	
1430	Adjourn	

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

ATTACHMENT B: Summary of ISB Meeting Discussion

To explore how organizations actually achieve meaningful transformation, the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) devoted the fall 2007 quarterly meeting to the topic "*Achieving Transformative Change*." The Board focused on how instituting enterprise-wide changes in policies, business practices, and employee attitudes can result in **changes that stick**, i.e., changes that overcome normal organizational inertia and that persist across leadership transitions.

The meeting took place September 18–19, 2007 in McLean, Virginia, with invited participation from across the public and private sectors. We heard from current and former Intelligence Community leaders who described the need and current plans to transform the IC to address modern threats; innovators and CEOs from industry who have led transformations; consultants and academics who have studied transformation methods across a wide population; and the ISB members themselves who related their own experiences with transforming organizations.

In particular, we heard about the DNI's 100- and 500-day plans for transformation; emerging plans for standing up IARPA; and approaches to improving analytic standards and practices. In addition, invited guests described such experiences as turning around the major retailer Sears, forming the commercial geospatial company GeoEye, and implementing Walt Disney's dream in a Florida orange grove, among other topics.

The bulk of the presentations from the private sector focused on anecdotes about attempts to transform large and mid-size organizations – including both successful and failed endeavors. Speakers identified several factors that enable or obstruct enterprise transformation, but overall the presentations did not adequately address how these somewhat generic factors might specifically apply to the IC.

No general-purpose recipe for achieving transformation was defined, but several key contributing success factors were identified, including:

- ◆ The primary role of charismatic, visionary, passionate, optimistic, confident, and authoritative (but not dictatorial) **leadership**; the role of organizational structure and process definition is secondary but supportive.
- ◆ The strategic advantage of **being prepared** and waiting for the right opportunity to implement change – including the ability to recognize the enabling conditions as they develop and establishing a sense of urgency in the need for change.
- ◆ The tactical advantage of separating disruptive change organizations (**pilots**) from day-to-day operations to provide flexibility to sustain rapid change, and of visibly reinforcing (rewarding) desired behaviors while discouraging undesirable behaviors.
- ◆ The critical importance of clearly (and repeatedly) **communicating**: shared core values, the need for change to enable those values, a concept of operations for the desired end-state, and specific expectations for behavioral alterations in an empowered and motivated workforce.

Conclusions from the Meeting

One critical end-state for intelligence that needs greater clarification is achieving **broader and more permanent interaction with the private sector**, within which will reside much of the deep technical expertise and understanding of foreign cultures that will characterize intelligence in the 21st century. To stay abreast of rapid developments in an increasingly globalized economy, the Intelligence Community must transform itself to move away from just thinking about *outreach to industry* and toward establishing a practice of *inreach by industry* – of facilitating public-private partnerships to ensure our national strategic advantage.

Another opportunity area to enable transformation lies in changing the business model from intelligence providers serving intelligence customers to a more complex **environment of continuous provision and consumption throughout a broader collaborative network**. Transformation to such an environment will also require concurrently transforming the consumers of intelligence products outside the traditional borders of the Intelligence Community.

In the quest to obtain the efficiencies of establishing common procedures and practices, however, the Intelligence Community must not lose sight of **the central role of a culture of risk**, encouraging imagination in recognizing the unusual, and the need to rapidly capitalize upon serendipity in novel ways. Recent experience with a continually co-adapting adversary has shown that it is precisely those threats that we are least focused upon that may do us the most harm. Organizational conditions must be maintained to consider novel approaches and alternative points of view, while avoiding immediate “reflexive rejection” of any new idea.

A repeated theme in the ISB discussions was **the pivotal role of information systems** in achieving transformation. Not only are information systems central to communicating and conveying the vision for the desired changes, they are also central to *implementing* the changes necessary for any modern organization. In the words of one participant, “We transformed an engineering company supported by information systems into an information company supported by engineers... We listened to our customers and focused on what their *information needs* were, not on our own systems and what we had to offer.” To paraphrase another, “The IC cannot solve tomorrow’s problems using yesterday’s (collection and analysis) techniques.”

Despite the important role of technology, **talent will remain the key to the future success** of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The hallmark of success in the 21st century will be a business model designed to unleash the latent potential of an intrinsically talented workforce. Such business models revolve around the concept of a network of communities of interacting knowledge workers operating in a knowledge-sharing marketplace. Whereas, in industry the goal of profitability and increased revenues is obvious and easy to measure, in the Intelligence Community the metrics are less clear. One presenter drew the analogy that: “Intelligence is for the government what finance is for private industry; that is, improving the timely flow of accurate and usable intelligence

is as central to effective decision-making in the U.S. government as improving cash flow and bottom-line totals is to industry.”

In the end, the ISB concluded that **the primacy of achieving the mission is critical to defining overall success** in any transformative initiative. Having strong leadership is important, but so is the external context of circumstances surrounding the change. There are times when transformation just cannot take hold; and the enterprise may just have to wait until these external conditions, themselves, change. Anticipatory changes rarely take hold; most transformative changes require a crisis to get everyone on board; but anticipating a crisis and having a plan for what changes are then needed can be critical to the eventual outcome.

Implications for the Intelligence Community

From the discussion several implications may be drawn for possible use by the Intelligence Community.

1. *Refrain from appointing more czars and creating more overlay organizations.* When separate organizations are duplicating efforts or, worse, when they fall into a competitive dynamic that inhibits sharing, it is tempting to create a higher-level office to sort things out and promote collaboration. It rarely works: more bureaucracy and overhead are created, and problems of coordination among units persist. Experience (both in government and in the private sector) suggests that a frontal attack on the coordination problem itself, although managerially and politically challenging, is a preferable strategy.
2. *Exploit emerging collaboration technologies.* We are in the midst of revolutionary technology-driven changes in how people, groups, and organizations coordinate their activities in pursuing collective objectives in real time. Some units within the intelligence community are exploiting these developments; many others are not. A focused and well-resourced DNI initiative to track, deploy, and develop information-sharing and collaboration technologies could significantly enhance regular intelligence work—and, in the process, generate transformative changes in how that work is carried out, both within and between agencies.
3. *Commission research on effective strategies and tactics for transformative change.* Research conducted within the intelligence community on the following three topics could generate findings that are especially useful in strengthening our intelligence capabilities.
 - (a) What are the major blocks to collaboration within the community, and what strategies and tactics have been successful in circumventing them?
 - (b) What specific levers for change (that is, beyond such nostrums as “top management commitment”) have been found to be most feasible and powerful in improving the functioning of intelligence organizations?
 - (c) What times and occasions offer the greatest opportunities for transformative change, and when should leaders wait for more propitious circumstances before taking change initiatives?

4. *Hold line managers responsible and accountable for the transformation of their own units.* Resist any temptation to create an "organization development" group that would have responsibility for developing and implementing change programs. Such groups allow line managers to view change as someone else's responsibility. It must be their own, and they must be personally accountable for it.

5. *Invent it here.* More than a few observers have suggested that the intelligence community invest heavily in adapting for intelligence work the models and methods of business organizations. That strategy is risky for two reasons. One, businesses themselves rarely operate anywhere near as well as observers in government think they do. Two, the nature of intelligence work really is unique. Some commentators draw parallels between business objectives, such as competing for market share or maximizing profitability, and the objectives of intelligence agencies. Those parallels are forced and misleading. Intelligence organizations should be designed and led in ways that explicitly address the specific and unique challenges and opportunities of intelligence work.

Additional Key Ideas from the ISB Meeting – September 2007

Strategic Planning and the Need for Transformation

1. Perhaps intelligence is as central to the U.S. Government as finance is to private organizations. Intelligence is the basis for key government decisions; it is the linchpin that connects national security activities.
2. There appears to be a substantial disconnect between the IC and the broader scientific communities. The IC and its transformation plans must emphasize outreach and relationships with external organizations to avoid creating a transformed organization that is even further isolated.
3. The DNI's 500-day plan as presented appears overly "top-down." Establishing common fundamental core values across all the competing functional and organizational stovepipes might improve the ability to apply solutions across the IC while preserving special expertise.
4. The purpose of a strategic plan is to develop ownership in the changes needed. One must generate a common sense of urgency for change; do not be afraid of *not* having a complete plan before you start.
5. Legislation alone will not produce transformation; you must sell the ideas throughout the bureaucracy to convince them that changes are essential. Do not start making changes at the top; instead, change one manageable key area and then use it as an example for others.
6. You must be able to implement and adapt quickly; the U.S. Government has a cumbersome infrastructure that must be updated, but our adversaries do not. Any consideration of transformation must take into account how the adversary is also transforming. The IC should study foreign intelligence transformation initiatives.
7. Do not spend too much time on just creating the vision. Reorganization per se is not paramount; process and a common basis for data *are*. Behavior will revert unless the right process structure is in place. To achieve lasting change, redefine processes first, but base the processes on principles rather than on rules to allow flexibility. Shared services and information technology are critical to process execution. The plethora of information systems throughout the enterprise should be consolidated into just a few. Organizational changes can follow more gradually.

Leadership and Vision

8. The organizations that most need transformation are often the ones least likely to have the resources necessary to achieve it. But anything can be accomplished if a capable champion wants to make it succeed.
9. Getting people to change requires leadership, and the key is the vision expressed by leadership. Vision is hugely important; communicating the vision is critical, and must happen much faster in today's world. Usually it is one individual with a vision who creates a culture that lasts even after the pioneer is gone.
10. Improved management alone cannot produce success. Changing organizational culture is essential. Middle managers focus on staying on time and on budget, but

success depends on producing a product that people want. First you need the great idea; then you pursue the funding. You must not allow the process to overwhelm the mission.

The Importance of Stories in Conveying the Vision

11. Any transformation effort must include a clear statement of what needs to change, why, and how you will know when you get there. Understanding the mission and culture of the group you lead is critically important. It is vital to support transformation efforts with sound theory, and that employees understand what senior management really expects of them.
12. Changing before problems arise can be very difficult. Leadership is key, and stories can help; evangelists are important to "keeping the cultural flame." The IC got out of the business of telling stories at the same time as it got out of the business of building knowledge (in large part because of personnel reductions in the 1990s). Neuroscience research confirms the importance of stories as a way to pass on knowledge. Stories must be readable and must flow. You need to give people some time off to actually study and learn, not merely report facts.

The Role of Customers

13. Successful transformations require that management take into account the customers and their values and then harmonize the story so that it hangs together consistently. Focus on your customers, even though they often cannot imagine or express what they might actually need; sometimes you have to challenge them.
14. However, operators should not dictate the product – they will not go beyond what they normally do. In fact, the IC may need to reconsider its concept of "customer." If unchecked, the customers will drive the IC toward a focus on specific tactical data and away from meeting its national security objectives. Customers (outside the IC) should be considered as targets for transformation as well.

The Value of Risk and Novelty

15. Intelligence involves taking risks and recognizing the inevitability of occasional failure. The IC must be willing to accept risk – and the risk of not changing can often be as great as the risk of actually executing some change. Insistence on achieving consensus can lead to organizations that will give you only what you are looking for, but precisely those things that you do not focus on can do you the most harm. You need to account for serendipity and the unusual.
16. A companion volume to Rob Johnston's *Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community* should be written on the ethnography of the operational community. Successful transformation is all about passion, eccentricities, and attitude. It requires a flash of insight, a receptive audience, and people with less to defend. *More* formal HUMINT is not necessarily better; more *creative* approaches are

needed. Central to successful transformation is dealing with *reflexive rejection* – immediately discarding a new idea because it seems counter to business as usual.

17. Turn-around is really a cultural revolution; it is better – and cheaper – to re-educate employees than to terminate them, and incentives can help. You also must challenge your people to provide a solution even when it may be outside their comfort zone; you sometimes need to push them to try innovation. Competition is a great way to discover and learn about talent and imagination.

It's All About Managing Talent

18. The United States needs a centralized ODNI, but centralization often has unintended consequences. Centralization tends to produce standardization and regimentation, but the best intelligence professionals are often somewhat unusual and non-conformist. The real goal is competitive analysis, rather than just collaboration. You need people to argue over issues, rather than just trade data. The IC seems to be writing off its senior analysts. The young expect mentors, and the IC has failed badly at mentoring.
19. Humans are more important than hardware. You cannot mass produce a competent workforce, and you cannot create a competent workforce after the fact. You must spend both money and effort to keep your competent people; they do not want trinkets. But you also must be able to fire people who refuse to change. Being part of a winning organization is critical to morale and continued success; if you show people you care about them, they will follow you anywhere.
20. Talent has become the source of differentiation among mega-institutions. 20th century organizational models make it difficult to mobilize intangible assets and increase returns from talent. The 21st century model should be designed to unleash the latent potential of intrinsically talented people.
 - a. Focus on building a formal network rather than a formal structure.
 - b. Create a talent marketplace to enable people to move around conveniently.
 - c. Establish knowledge marketplaces.
 - d. Empower front-line managers with accountability and authority.
 - e. Share some utilities.
 - f. Embrace a much shallower structure.
 - g. Standardize roles and positions and make performance evaluations role-specific.
 - h. Develop single-enterprise governance.
 - i. Rethink how strategies are made (revisit them over time).
 - j. Consider organizational design as a tool for implementing strategy.

An Emerging Approach

21. Sometimes the times are just not right for change, and you have to wait until there is a possibility that transformative change can take hold. Leaders should:
 - a. Be prepared – have a clear shared vision and develop a coalition of leaders with shared values that support the vision.

- b. Lie in wait – don't pursue continuous change, but wait for the right opportunity (a crisis), whether it is internal or external.
 - c. Force the balls into the air – optionally create a crisis to disrupt "business as usual" while they dismantle the enterprise and start over.
- 22. In pursuing transformation leaders must *not* do the following:
 - a. Exhort.
 - b. Embrace "organizational development."
 - c. Bring in "Chainsaw Dunlap" to cut everybody loose.
 - d. Bring in some kids to see what they might try.
 - e. Create an overlay organization that merely adds a new layer bureaucracy.
 - f. Change the culture first.
- 23. The ISB (as "outsiders") might be able to help by:
 - a. Defining areas where transformation is actually needed.
 - b. Defining what changes, in fact, should be pursued.
 - c. Describing what the IC would be like when the change was achieved.
 - d. Identifying serious metrics for analytic standards.
- 24. The ISB should identify some kind of CONOPS for how the IC might operate five years from now. This may be formed around the open (volunteer) approach, which may well provide a model for 21st century intelligence gathering.
- 25. The IC should be preparing *now* for the transition to the next Administration. Perhaps this might include defining a non-uniformed Intelligence Service with its own culture, and leveraging the Center for Excellence in Education to nurture interest among top-quality high school students. The ISB could help explore some of these more novel ideas and approaches.

ATTACHMENT C: Thoughts on Organizational Transformation

Remarks at a meeting of the Intelligence Science Board

September 19, 2007

(b)(6)

The focus of most research and writing about organizational transformation is on the actions taken by senior leaders. That is unsurprising since we all tend to over-attribute to leaders responsibility for organizational outcomes. Yet research on transformation suggests that the state of the external context, and the organization's relationship with that context, also are highly consequential for the success of such initiatives. In these remarks, I summarize some research-based observations about transformational processes, and I append a brief and selective list of potentially informative books and articles about organizational change.

I address three questions. One, under what conditions is transformational change possible? Two, when transformation is possible, what factors increase the chances that it will succeed? And three, what are the implications for those who initiate or lead transformational organizational changes?

When is transformational change possible?

Let me begin with an example far removed from the world of intelligence—professional symphony orchestras in the former East Germany. What happened to those orchestras turns out to have some provocative implications for transformational change efforts in the intelligence community.

East German symphony orchestras historically have been state-supported and widely recognized for their commitment to music in the "classical" tradition. Moreover, symphonic music traditionally has been widely available throughout the land (in 1990, for example, there was one symphony orchestra for every 220,000 citizens, a higher density than in any other country in the world). What is informative is what happened to East German orchestras at two times of great societal disruption: the advent of the socialist state in 1945, and the collapse of that state in 1990.

Shortly after the socialist regime took power in East Germany, two major policy changes were made. One, the resources available to orchestras no longer were contingent on their actions. Orchestras were partitioned into three "classes" and all orchestras in a given class were treated essentially the same: Orchestras could not improve their standing, nor was there any real risk of demotion to a lower class. Two, orchestras no longer had operational autonomy. All major decisions about artistic and operational matters were made by a central arts authority.

When that regime collapsed in 1990, these two policies were reversed. Now an orchestra's actions were enormously consequential for the level of resources it could obtain, and each orchestra had almost unlimited autonomy to decide how to it wanted to

operate. This dramatic increase in both resource contingency and operational autonomy made it quite likely that some orchestras would find a way to prosper whereas others would fail. And that is what happened.

Orchestras' responses to the 1945 and 1990 changes in their context could not have been more different. In 1945, orchestras responded to the dramatic reduction in resource contingency and operational autonomy by more tightly embracing their long-standing traditions. "Tradition is all we have left," one local manager concluded, "so we must do what we can to affirm it." One way that was done was in choice of repertoire. Central authorities had mandated that henceforth East German orchestras would emphasize in their programming works by contemporary composers from socialist states. Analysis of concert programs, however, showed that only 8 percent of the works performed by East Germany orchestras were by composers born in the twentieth century, compared to 20 percent for West Germany, 24 percent for the United Kingdom, and 32 percent for the United States. In this case, a politically imposed cultural system generated behavior opposite to that which was sought—a phenomenon not unknown in the recent history of some intelligence organizations.

The early 1990s, by contrast, generated an enormous number of transformational initiatives among East German orchestras. Now, for the first time in decades, orchestras could take initiatives to secure external resources and, because of the chaos of reunification, they had nearly complete control over local operations. The result was a rapid and striking sorting of orchestras: Many high-standing orchestras became increasingly strong, whereas numerous weaker orchestras entered into a downward spiral from which they never recovered.

When both resource contingency and local autonomy are high, transformational change is at least a possibility. When they are quite low, as was the case for East German orchestras in 1945, it is nearly impossible. Under such circumstances, transformation-minded leaders must either (a) take political action to alter the environment in which they operate before launching change initiatives, or (b) wait for the environment itself to change, which eventually it will, and in the meantime do whatever they can to keep their organizations alive.¹

What Affects the Success of Transformational Change Initiatives?

When transformational change is at least possible, what conditions affect the likelihood that it actually will succeed? Exactly that question is addressed in numerous management books and articles, some of which are included in the appendix to these

¹ The worst case of all is when resource contingency is high but operational autonomy is low. That is, the fate of an organization depends greatly on what it does—but leaders have little latitude to make the changes that could make a difference. In these circumstances, ecological dynamics dominate in determining which organizations will survive and which ones will not. For a more complete analysis of when transformational change is possible, as well as details about the experience of East German orchestras, see Allmendinger and Hackman (1996).

notes. Here, I single out two conditions that appear to be especially potent in distinguishing transformational changes that "take" from those that do not.

1. The degree to which senior change leaders are both competent and embedded in external networks of relevant others. Because transformational change always requires juggling the often-conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders, extraordinary managerial competence is a must. And because transformational change always requires cooperation and support from external entities, change leaders must be well-linked to outsiders who can provide what is needed.

All the East German orchestras that successfully transformed themselves in the early 1990s, for example, had managers and music directors who were both competent and deeply embedded in relevant international networks. Those orchestras that floundered in this period tended to have marginally competent local leaders who were not well-connected in the symphony orchestra world. This is not just about symphony orchestras: Having competent, network-embedded leaders also is critical to the success of transformational changes in other types of organizations.

2. The prior strength of the organization. Even competent leader initiatives help only when the organization is already relatively strong. When the organization is weak, leader initiatives may be ignored or coded as mere rhetoric and not taken seriously. Alternatively (and even worse) is when the leader is viewed by organization members as a savior who personally will fix everything. When that does not happen, as it cannot, organization members may take things into their own hands in hopes of accomplishing what their savior could not.

To illustrate, consider a failing small business. After it becomes clear that the owner is unable to turn things around, rank-and-file members sometimes buy the owner out and convert the enterprise into a worker co-op. It almost never works. The track record of employee takeovers of troubled large businesses is just as dismal. Whether you are talking about a local hardware store or United Airlines, giving employees a significant ownership stake, by itself, rarely generates substantial and enduring improvements in organizational viability.

This phenomenon also was seen in East German orchestras. Almost none of the orchestras that were relatively weak when the socialist regime collapsed were able to reverse course. And they, like orchestras elsewhere that come to the brink of bankruptcy, tended to do even worse when the players took over. Players are great musicians, but they are no better as managers than most professors are as deans.

It is a perverse state of affairs. When transformational changes are needed, already-strong organizations whose leaders are competent and well-connected have a reasonable chance of becoming even stronger. Weak organizations, however, the ones most in need of transformational change, rarely are able to command and deploy wisely the resources needed for successful change. And under conditions of hyperturbulence, when the environment is changing both rapidly and unpredictably, this incapacity can be fatal.

What's a Leader to Do?

This is going to seem too simple to be credible, but my sifting of the literature on organizational transformation surfaced just three imperatives for change-minded leaders. Each of the three imperatives focuses mainly on creating conditions that increase the likelihood of meaningful change. None is about specific change programs or techniques. If change-friendly conditions are in place, then there are many different ways to move forward competently. But if they are not, even superb execution will make little difference.

1. The first imperative is from the Boy Scouts: *Be prepared*. When a usually-closed door opens, one must be ready to walk through it without delay. The doors of organizational change do open on occasion, but they may not stay that way very long. Therefore, those who aspire to transformational change must prepare both themselves and their organizations to initiate action swiftly and competently when the time is right.

Personal preparation involves study, to be sure—thinking, reading, visiting other organizations, and doing other things that enrich one's perspective on the organization and its socio-political context. It also involves imaginative work—envisioning the shape and dynamics of the transformed organization. And it involves persuasion—sharing widely one's vision for change, and creating a shared sense of urgency about the transformation process. And, finally, it involves political action—building a coalition of people who are prepared to support the leader's vision for change, and taking initiatives to align the interests of powerful and potentially skeptical stakeholders whose cooperation will be needed.

Organizational preparations for change must also be made. As we have seen, transformational initiatives have a much higher probability of success for already-strong organizations whose leaders are both competent and active in relevant external networks. Organizational preparation, therefore, almost always involves significant changes in both staffing and systems—getting the right people on board and in the right roles, encouraging them to forge links with others, both inside and outside the organization, who can provide ideas about and support for the anticipated changes, and bringing basic operating systems and technologies up to an at least minimally acceptable standard.

When change leaders have done their preparatory work well, the organization and its people will be ready to engage with the changes when they come, rather than be thrown into disarray by yet another set of unexpected and unwanted perturbations. One does not set out on a planned sailing trip without preparation. Instead, one makes sure that the boat is ready, the crew is ready, and the intended course and destination are understood by all. And then, when the time is right, one can say, "O.K., we can go now" and get underway without delay.

2. The second imperative is to *lie in wait*. All systems move back and forth between periods of relative stability and periods of turbulence, and it is during the turbulent times

that transformational changes occur. Such changes almost never occur gradually and continuously, with each small step followed by yet another small forward step. Instead, an extended period when nothing much seems to be happening is followed by a period of rapid and multidimensional change, and then by yet another period during which no visible changes are occurring. This pattern is called "punctuated equilibrium" and it characterizes the evolution of species, human development, adult learning—and organizational change.

Wise leaders recognize that change initiatives during periods of equilibrium almost always require so many compromises and concessions that they have little chance of making much of a difference. They also know that during turbulent times major interventions have a greater chance of success and that even small changes may yield disproportionately large effects. So they watch and wait for the times of punctuation.

Transformation-minded leaders can be reassured by the fact that it rarely is a long wait for *something* to happen that destabilizes the system and, thereby, offers an opening for change. Sometimes turbulence is predictable, as when a new administration replaces large numbers of senior officials, or when a disruptive technology is about to be introduced. Other times it is not so predictable, as when the organization enters into an unanticipated period of rapid growth or belt-tightening, or when a dramatic exogenous event renders standard operating policies and practices irrelevant. All of these offer opportunities for change: The balls go up in the air, and the prepared leader brings them back down in a fundamentally different—and hopefully better—configuration.

Waiting is hard. One feels as if nothing is happening and, worse, that no one is doing anything constructive to stem organizational deterioration. Anxious leaders initiate change too soon and usually fail to achieve their aspirations. Change-savvy leaders wait for the right time.

3. The last imperative is to *kick the balls into the air*. It is addressed to those leaders who are unwilling or unable to wait, who feel they must make their move *now*. These leaders personally manufacture a bit of chaos in hopes of creating just enough instability to give change a chance.

Political revolutionaries regularly adopt this strategy to accelerate the fall of a regime they view as undesirable. Organizational leaders would never condone subversion or the promotion of violence to bring their enterprises to a state of readiness for change, of course. But they do the managerial equivalent when they take actions that cannot be ignored and that make it literally impossible for the system to continue on its present path.

Examples abound. One senior manager eliminated a significant number of jobs and then allowed incumbents to apply for newly defined roles in a reconfigured organization. The senior leadership team at another organization, after a series of frustrating and failed attempts at transformational change, started a "skunk works" far from headquarters and gave it virtually unlimited autonomy and resources. The existing operation struggled and

atrophied even as the new unit prospered and grew. Over time, these leaders accomplished a transformational change without ever having announced that one was underway. In another organization, the chief executive imposed a substantial across-the-board budget cut. Although purportedly done to achieve cost savings, the more important function of the cut was to force everyone to rethink how they did their business. An extreme version of this strategy was used by a private sector management team that chose to deliberately increase the firm's debt burden, and used the proceeds to pay a substantial dividend to shareholders. That action, which was taken when the firm's financial performance was fully satisfactory, forced managers to find ways to improve internal control mechanisms that they almost certainly would not otherwise have considered.

Draconian change strategies such as these make it literally impossible for a system to continue operating in its traditional ways. Because they introduce turbulence that cannot be ignored or waited out, they offer wide-open opportunities for constructive change. But as many political and organizational revolutionaries have learned the hard way, such strategies by no means guarantee that transformational changes will turn out to be good for the organization, for its people, for those it serves, or for the leaders who fomented the revolution. People get hurt in revolutions, even those who lead them, and even when they are successful.

What Not to Do

The three imperatives just sketched—be prepared, lie in wait, and (perhaps) kick the balls into the air—derive from my reading of the research evidence about leadership actions that foster transformative change. Here, for balance and in a light-hearted spirit, is a short list of what actually *is* done in many change initiatives, actions leaders sometimes take that are guaranteed not to have their intended effects.

1. Issue exhortations to change in hopes that people will hear, understand, and act in accord with them. You can get two out of three on this one: They will hear and they will understand. But you will not observe many differences in actual behavior. Alternatively, engage a Famous Speaker (a distinguished scholar, perhaps, or a retired senior government official) to give a speech laying out an exciting vision of what your organization could become. Same outcome. Mere exhortation does not create change.
2. Launch a change program that involves extensive use of flipcharts, subgroups, timelines, and perhaps even project management software. There are lots of consultants out there who will design and execute an "organization development" change program for you. In its early stages, the program is sure to generate flurries of activity and interest. But then the sharp edges of participants' ideas will be sanded off as discussions go on and on, and eventually the program will wind down leaving behind many sheets of newsprint but few meaningful changes.
3. Bring in the chainsaw. Hire someone who is well-known for slashing through bureaucracies, taking no prisoners, and salvaging failing organizations. Ideally, this should be someone who has been profiled in a national magazine so organization

members will know what they're in for. Once the chainsaw has arrived, the fun begins: The more venturesome members of the organization find covert ways to undermine or counter the new boss's initiatives, while their more timid colleagues find places to hide until the chainsaw is gone. Which, sooner rather than later, he or she will be.

4. Send people off on benchmarking trips, sponsor outdoor team-building experiences, and spawn lots of focus groups. These are fun. They can be wonderfully engaging alternatives to the hard work of creating real organizational change.

5. Bring in a large number of fresh faces, and rely mainly on them to inject new ways of operating into the old system. New arrivals really do have new perspectives and ideas, especially those who come directly from school or from wholly different kinds of organizations. They also have a strong need to learn the ropes so they can be comfortable and productive in their new work setting. The veterans are more than happy to help the newcomers learn "how things work around here," because that will make life easier for everyone. The result: Standard routines are not disrupted, everyone is reasonably comfortable, and no transformative changes occur.

6. Create an overlay organization. Sometimes separate organizations that are supposed to be working cooperatively to achieve a larger purpose ignore, duplicate, or undermine each other. So they are herded together under the same organizational tent. A new level of management is created to run the overlay organization and to smooth inter-organization relationships. You know what happens next.

7. Engage the services of a consulting firm that promises to "change the culture" of your organization. But organizational culture is more an effect than a cause. It emerges from how the work is designed and managed. To try to change the culture without first (or at least simultaneously) changing how the organization operates is an exercise in futility.

Conclusion

This commentary reflects my idiosyncratic views about what it takes to transform an organization. Although it is true that I have been around the organizational block a few times, I do not study transformational change. And I'm betting that many of those who do would find what I have said here naïve and, perhaps, heretical.

But I stand by my main points, as conservative about organizational transformation as they are. For one thing, transformative change sometimes is simply not possible. Organizations whose resources and operations are mainly determined by others, for example, are poor candidates for locally initiated change. And even when the possibility of such change exists, attempts to transform the organization are unlikely to succeed unless it already is reasonably strong and has leaders who are competent and well-embedded in relevant external networks. In such circumstances, change-minded leaders would be well-advised to defer launching their initiatives until they have first created the conditions that increase the likelihood of success.

Even when prospects for transformative change are reasonably good, success depends heavily on the amount and quality of the preparatory work leaders accomplish, on the proper timing of change initiatives, and on the degree to which leaders have either created a shared sense of urgency for change or have taken actions that make it impossible for the organization to continue to operate as it traditionally has.

What is a leader to do if there is no real prospect of creating favorable conditions for change? When this is the case, it may be worth considering what happened to German and Japanese steel plants after World War II. Because the old plants had been destroyed, there was no option other than to start over from the beginning. The same strategy may have merit for organizations for which the conditions for transformational change cannot be met: Kill them off and literally start over afresh. As painful as that can be, my guess is this most-draconian-of-all strategy is more likely to turn out well for those the organization serves than what typically results from timid or misdirected change initiatives that nibble at the periphery of the organization's mission rather than strike boldly at its core.

Selected References

- Allmendinger, J., & Hackman, J. R. (1996). Organizations in changing environments: The case of East German symphony orchestras. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 41, 337-369. A detailed account of the two major transformations of East German orchestras, and a conceptual framework for analysis of the conditions under which transformational change is possible.
- Demers, C. (2007). *Organizational change theories: A synthesis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Comprehensive description and analysis of the major theories of organizational change.
- Hansen, M. T., & Darwall, C. (2003). *Intuit, Inc.: Transforming an entrepreneurial company into a collaborative organization*. Boston: Harvard Business School (Case 403-064). How the CEO of Intuit sought to transform the company from a highly "siloe" culture into a more collaborative organization.
- Herold, D. M., Fedor, D. B., & Caldwell, S. D. (2007). Beyond change management: A multilevel investigation of contextual and personal influences on employees' commitment to change. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92, 942-951. How individual and contextual attributes interactively shape commitment to organizational changes.
- Kelman, S. (2006). *Unleashing change*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. The author's findings about the conditions that promote change in public sector organizations.
- Kotter, J. P. (1996). *Leading change*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. This is the classic (and best-selling) practitioner-oriented book on organizational change.

- Kotter, J. P., & Cohen, D. S. (2002). *The heart of change*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. A nice supplement to the *Leading Change* book that gives detailed accounts of transformational change initiatives from the perspective of those who launched them.
- Luecke, R. (2003). *Managing change and transition*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. A practitioner-oriented review and assessment of the major strategies for organizational change.
- Miller, D., & Friesen, P. H. (1984). *Organizations: A quantum view*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. See especially Chapter 8 on "Quantum structural change in organizations." A scholarly book with provocative action implications.
- Nadler, D. A., Shaw, R. B., & Walton, A. E. (1995). *Discontinuous change: Leading organizational transformation*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. Presents a diagnostic framework for leading organizations through periods of radical change, and illustrates with accounts from the authors' consulting clients.



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

January 15, 2009

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(3)

Members

(b)(3)

Dear

Enclosed is a summary document highlighting what we consider a topic of fundamental importance to the Intelligence Community (IC): the need for new practices to balance the equally vital imperatives of national security and civil liberties. Many laws and practices that govern intelligence gathering have become anachronistic in the 21st century, where information travels through cyberspace at almost the speed of light, or resides in databanks susceptible to attack or exploitation by our nation's foes. We believe that both privacy and national security would be better served by legal and procedural structures aimed at prohibiting misuse of information rather than restricting acquisition of information, as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) does today. Equally important, these new structures must enable the IC to capture intelligence at 21st century speeds – impossible under a FISA process designed to guide 20th century "wiretapping."

While the necessary changes would require action by all branches of the U.S. government, these linked issues are sufficiently urgent that the IC should take steps now to initiate a national dialogue regarding both goals and possible approaches. Therefore, we respectfully request that you bring this document to the attention of the presidential transition team and the incoming Director of National Intelligence. We, and other members of the Intelligence Science Board, will gladly provide further information or assistance in crafting specific proposals to launch productive discussions in this complex and challenging area.

Thank you very much for your consideration.

Best personal regards,

(b)(6)

Chair
Intelligence Science Board

Vice Chair
Intelligence Science Board

Enclosure

cc:

(b)(3)

University of Virginia

Bringing Intelligence up to Cyber Speed


The United States must seek to acquire and apply intelligence speedily and effectively enough in cyberspace to better inform decisions and ensuing actions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Technology, policy, and politics all play key roles in enabling or disabling both the intelligence activities needed to identify and counter foreign and domestic threats to the nation and the concomitant means for protecting the privacy of U.S. persons. Both the threats and the protective means rely to various extents on information moving at lightning speeds within the global cyberspace or hiding in increasingly vast data repositories.

The very public debate in 2008 over granting immunity to telecommunications carriers for their roles in government intelligence-gathering processes highlighted the unavoidable necessity of tradeoffs between security and privacy. The United States must balance concern for national security – as embodied, for example, in the Constitutional authority of the president as commander in chief – against concern for protecting U.S. persons from unchecked U.S. government power – as spelled out, for example, in the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable searches and seizures” and its prescription that “no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.” Thus, the nation must both protect the privacy of U.S. persons who use cyberspace facilities against violations of their Fourth Amendment rights and at the same time allow reasonable and timely intelligence gathering by the U.S. government.

One important but not unique index of the present balance between these sometimes incompatible concerns is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Many believe that the FISA balance adequately accounts for the erosion of the boundaries between the foreign and the domestic within the global cyberspace. However, the undersigned believe that, in practice, the well-intentioned FISA processes actually take place at the scope and speed of retail paper-shuffling in the Industrial Age. Meanwhile, thanks to the 21st century Internet and similar technologies, wholesale quantities of data potentially valuable for intelligence purposes will have flashed by at nearly the speed of light. If U.S. intelligence fails to capture these data constellations in transit, they either vanish into the ether forever or else get buried in public and private databanks. These databanks, of ever-expanding scale and scope, have become the targets of the arcane offensive measures and defensive countermeasures characterizing 21st century cyber warfare – the current mother of all “wiretapping.” Compounding the difficulty of capturing these sources is the need to reduce the probability of analytic error by ensuring adequate correlation of multiple observable phenomena.

The United States must therefore work out a fresh balance between our equally cherished imperatives of national security and of civil liberties – concepts that are themselves evolving in response to evolving technology, policy, and politics. The real challenge in doing so is to increase and apply the nation’s understanding of these rapidly evolving 21st century capabilities and concepts. In the contemporary environment, it seems imperative to generate and evaluate alternative practices that emphasize *prohibiting the misuse of information rather than limiting its acquisition*. Such alternatives might prove more

effective than present practices in both safeguarding civil liberties and improving intelligence collection and analysis. As the U.S. Supreme Court has reminded us repeatedly, "the Constitution is not a suicide pact."




**Chairman
Intelligence Science Board**



**Vice Chairman
Intelligence Science Board**

(b)(6)

November 14, 2005



(b)(6)

Dear 

Attached is an Interim Report from the Intelligence Science Board Study on Educating Information (EI). Given the intensity of current discussion and debate about interrogation, I thought it timely to provide this report to you.

The Study on EI has been examining the current state of scientific knowledge regarding interrogation and learning about IC training in areas involving educating information. We are looking to the future, with the goal of aiding the IC to develop and utilize the best possible knowledge in this important area. The Study on EI is **not** conducting a policy or legal analysis. Nor do we plan on making legal or policy recommendations.

The Interim Report describes the study, presents the major findings from Phase I, and recommends that the DNI appoint a senior mission manager with requisite authority, responsibility, and accountability for developing a centralized Intelligence Community capability for educating information.

We anticipate that the full Phase I Report will be available early in 2006.

Please feel free to forward this report to the DNI for his consideration.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Attachment

Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102



Chair

Vice Chair

Members

Dear (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(U//FOUO) In response to your tasking, the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is pleased to provide you with this report on the impact of globalization on foreign information operations. The study was conducted by an *ad hoc* ISB task force under the leadership of

(U//FOUO) As the report explains, the ISB is concerned with the shrinking disparity between the ability of the world to mount cyber-based information operations against the United States and the ability of our nation to defend against such attacks. Contributing to this situation are the globalization of information technology - the unstoppable sharing of basic IT knowledge and manufacturing worldwide - and the uncontrollable global proliferation of the tools and techniques of offensive information operations.

(U//FOUO) The threat to our nation from information operations targets not only our national security systems but also our critical infrastructure and the systems supporting basic commerce and our modern way of life. Cyber-based attacks, alone or in concert with other forms of attack, have the potential to create massive societal disruption, undermine public confidence, or even render temporarily impotent our military's ability to respond with precision and with alacrity.

(U//FOUO) The ISB urges the Director of National Intelligence, and the Intelligence Community at large, to improve the rigor of *all* our cyber defenses, to improve methods of collecting, assessing, and sharing information about the threat of information operations against our national security systems and our critical infrastructure, and to institute processes whereby the Federal Government can more effectively engage the private sector in monitoring and defending against information attacks and the exploitation of automated information.


(U//FOUO) The ISB appreciates the broad support of the Community in the conduct of this study and offers its continued support to you, the Director, and the entire Intelligence Community as you consider the recommendations of this report.

Very truly yours,

Chair

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your opening remarks were thought provoking and "spot-on," getting us started on stimulating conversation. Throughout the forum, your experience and sage guidance were of major value in informing the conversation.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.


Sincerely,



(b)(6)


Vice Chairman

May 26, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear




Many thanks for taking the trouble to meet with the people at Headquarters last Tuesday. I greatly appreciate this further contribution of your time and your thought.

Very truly yours,




(b)(3)

(b)(6)



Chair

cc:



(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

October 1, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(3)

Members

Dear [redacted]

(b)(3)

The Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Charter specifies that the Vice Chair and all other members of the ISB shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on recommendation of the ISB Chair.

On 18 July 2008 I convened a subcommittee of the ISB to identify candidates for ISB membership, as well as current members whose terms should expire. [redacted] chaired the subcommittee, which consisted of [redacted] and me. The subcommittee identified several areas of expertise as being especially important to maintaining and strengthening the ISB's multi-disciplinary makeup and selected outstanding candidates in each discipline. The subcommittee then conducted interviews with these individuals and peers in their respective fields to ascertain the candidates' suitability and their willingness to serve.





Acting on the results of this vetting process, I recommend the following individuals for ISB membership:

Full Membership

(b)(6)






(b)(6)




]



(b)(6)



Associate Membership



(b)(3)
(b)(6)



Also acting on the deliberations of the subcommittee, I recommend that the memberships of [redacted] [redacted] expire in January 2009 as scheduled. The number of departures is based on the assumption that several of the recommended candidates will be approved, cleared, and serving by January 2009.

(b)(6)

Additionally, based on the subcommittee's review, I recommend that memberships for [redacted] and [redacted] be extended for another three-year term, which would expire on 1 January 2012.

Finally, I recommend that [redacted] currently an associate member, be granted full membership, with a term to expire on 1 January 2012.

Terms for the remaining members are scheduled to expire as follows:

1 January 2010: [redacted]
[redacted]

1 January 2011: [redacted]
[redacted]

As you know, the ISB Charter stipulates that I serve as Chair at the pleasure of the DNI. I have offered to resign "whenever a new DNI takes office." I recommend that [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED] continue as Vice Chair.

Should you wish, we would be glad to detail the rationales for our recommendations and to address any other questions that you might have.

Best personal regards,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b)(6)


Chairman

cc:


[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b)(3)


25 September 2006



(b)(6)

Dear :

This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. As you may recall, the ISB Charter of 26 August 2002 specifies that "the Vice Chair and all other members of the ISB shall be appointed by the Director of [National] Intelligence (D[N]I) on recommendation of the ISB Chair," and that "members shall serve for a term of three years that may be extended by the D[N]I on recommendation of the Chair."

After consulting with  recommended the partition of the twenty-four members into four groups whose terms would expire 1 January, beginning January 2006 through January 2009. This plan provided for an orderly transition based on length of tenure, including membership in the ISB's predecessor Advanced Technology Panel. The plan specified that terms expire as follows:

(b)(3)

1 January 2006:




1 January 2007:



1 January 2008:



1 January 2009:




In accordance with this plan, I would like to confirm that your term will expire as scheduled on 1 January 2007. I would like to offer you "emeritus" status so that the ISB may continue to call on you for special projects. You will always be invited to attend our Quarterly Meetings.

I especially appreciate your forbearance during our difficult transition period, your unflagging willingness to participate in this demanding form of public service, and the contributions you have made to the U.S. government through your service on the ISB.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past nine years as a founding member of the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) and its successor, the Intelligence Science Board. Your team's study of the Quantum Cryptography Research Program at the Advanced Research and Development Activity (now the Disruptive Technology Office) is often cited as a high point in ISB collaborative projects. Your leadership and technical insight contributed to the decision to continue the government's investments in this technology area and focused research programs on areas of particular technical merit. The "big ideas" that you have contributed over the years, such as your paper on the formation of Intelligence DARPA, your link analysis proposal and your recent thoughts on technology to resolve IC collaboration barriers have stimulated lively discussions at ISB meetings with senior IC policy-makers.


I am at your disposal to explore with you any concerns you may have that stem from my actions.

Sincerely yours,




Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:



(b)(3)

12 October 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)


This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. The ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

I trust you are willing to extend your term on the ISB for three more years until 1 January 2010.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past three years, not only to the needs of the analytical cadre in the IC, but for your suggestions of ways to improve programs and human talent across the IC disciplines. Your "Study on Analytic Team Effectiveness" is one of the most popular ISB publications and continues to be cited as an important benchmark for improving collaboration across the IC. I appreciate your efforts to mentor new ISB members as they assimilate to this environment.

I am at your disposal for any questions you may have.

Sincerely yours,



(b)(6)


Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment

cc:



(b)(3)



(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

November 13, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

Members

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up on December 31, 2008. At the December meeting I will express my formal thanks to you in person for your service to our country. Meanwhile, I want to take this opportunity to thank you for the personal pleasure that our collaboration has given me. I especially appreciate contributions the Board's efforts in cybersecurity and computer science

We expect to keep your clearances active for at least a year to facilitate any ad hoc contributions you care to make to ISB tasks. I look forward to our continued association in the years ahead.

All the best,

[redacted]
Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc: [redacted]

(b)(3)

July 31, 2008

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

May I ask your assistance in delivering thank you letters and copies of the "Educating Information" book to our colleagues in [Redacted]

(b)(6)

I tried to mail the enclosed letter and book to [Redacted] of [Redacted] using UPS but UPS was not able to deliver them to the address I had. The letter and book sent to [Redacted] is likewise being returned to us, and we will forward it to you once we get it back.

We are grateful for the assistance provided to us by senior [Redacted] and [Redacted]s and hope to be able to be in contact with them in the future.

Thank you very much for your help.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chairman, ISB Study on Educating Information



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(6)

Members

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. [redacted]

(b)(3)

We would like to thank you for addressing the threat perspective on nuclear terrorism during the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding the importance of balancing short and long-term terrorism issues provided Board members with a deeper understanding of the [redacted] role in intelligence analysis and coordination. Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

(b)(3)

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added a new member from the nuclear energy field and look forward to supporting the NCTC in this and all other counterterrorism issues.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc: [redacted]

(b)(3)

this may be
deliberative/internal?

26 July 2005

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Via: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Washington, DC 20505

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(3)

In March 2001, then-DCI George Tenet tasked the Intelligence Community (IC) to "break the back of BW (biological warfare)." The Intelligence Science Board (ISB) devoted its recent meeting of 15 June 2005 to reviewing the status and progress of the IC's efforts on this task.

Presentations were made from the IC, listed in Attachment A. Attachment B documents a key aspect of what the ISB believes to be a serious situation: the inadequacy of reporting, including marked gaps in current knowledge for selected targets of serious interest.

In sharp contrast, the briefing by [Redacted] of the ITIC, presented details of an IC focus on BW that the ISB enthusiastically recommends to you for implementation in a pilot project to counter offensive BW. A great deal more needs to be done.

(b)(3)

A critical aspect of this activity is teamwork that includes diverse disciplines and professions, across both the IC, academe and the private sector. Because this effort requires strong collaboration among all elements of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the ISB believes firm and steady endorsement by the DNI is *sine qua non* for success of the recommended approach.

The ISB membership has expressed great concern about the seriousness of the threat from BW and the need to improve intelligence production on this threat. While fully supportive of the ITIC program, we believe the ISB can contribute further by participating in evaluating strategies for strengthening collection and analysis, in exploring strategies for more effective coordination and partnership

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

with the private sector and non-traditional communities, and in assessing the capacity of the IC's infrastructure and expertise to achieve the strongest of coordination and communication – both within the IC and with external partners.

The ISB offers its services and commitment to working with you and the Community on this vital subject of national and international need. In particular, [redacted] and [redacted] have indicated specific comments they would convey to you in person. (b)(6)

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

(b)(3)


Chairman
Intelligence Science Board

Attachments:

A. Agenda for the ISB 15 June 2005 meeting

B. [redacted] (b)(5)

August 19, 2008



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)


I enjoyed our recent discussion after your dinner talk at the ISB Quarterly Meeting. As you requested, I have enclosed several ISB study and task force reports to give you a better sense of our previous activity. The ISB charter is also included as the first document.

I can't imagine your reading all this material but the variety of titles should give you a sense of the range of issues that have been addressed and the books will give you a sense of the depth and range of insights provided.

The transformation you have envisioned for the NRO will have to succeed along multiple dimensions including strategy, structure, people, processes and technology – a profoundly wide range of issues. As you can see from the ISB membership directory, the ISB is comprised of a very broad range of experienced IC advisors. It is the integration of these sorts of diverse knowledge dimensions that is critical to achieve your vision and objectives. We think your success is absolutely and profoundly relevant to our shared national security objectives.

I hope we could spend a few minutes together, as we discussed, after you have had an opportunity to look over the material.

All the best,


Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)

cc: 

(b)(6)



(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

February 6, 2008

Vice Chair

Members

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]:

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for describing the issues surrounding the nexus of counter terrorism and counter proliferation at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding the integration of the nuclear community across intelligence and policy provided the Board with a deeper understanding of the policy challenges that lie ahead. Moreover, your observations and experiences increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Our goal continues to be to provide linkages between the Intelligence Community and the scientific community. We have recently added a new member from the nuclear energy field to address national science policy issues and look forward to supporting NCPC in this and other counter proliferation issues.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

January 21, 2005

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Washington, DC 20528

Members

[Redacted]

Dear Secretary [Redacted]

(b)(6)

The Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is pleased to forward for your consideration the enclosed concept paper on trusted information sharing. This paper is offered in partial response to your request of the Director of Central Intelligence for the assistance of the Board in addressing matters pertaining to information management and especially as regards improved information sharing with the Intelligence Community.

As you will see from the concept paper, the ISB has recognized that trusted information sharing is not a single issue with a single solution, but rather is a broad topic that should be treated as an integrated field of study engaging multiple disciplines. These disciplines encompass many social as well as technical aspects which must be addressed together to resolve the complex issues of sharing intelligence information in a trusted environment.

The ISB believes that the Intelligence Community and its customers are not doing a sufficient job of sharing information *about* information sharing, despite ongoing individual sharing initiatives. As a consequence, the Board suggests that you join with the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties in establishing a trusted information sharing institute to provide the long-range research and experimentation needed to address the inter-relationships of all these multiple disciplines to achieve workable and lasting solutions.

In the course of our exploration of this rapidly evolving topic, the ISB conducted several discussions with [Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted] The guidance we received from those individuals greatly contributed to our understanding the complexity of the issues involved and the importance of defining a comprehensive approach.

Through [Redacted] we were recently introduced to [Redacted]
[Redacted] resonated with the Board's suggestions and is currently pursuing the tasks necessary to define a

ISB Concept Paper on Trusted Information Sharing, page 2

joint, not-for-profit institute for trusted information sharing. As a first step toward achieving the institute, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has designated five DCI Post-Doctoral Research Fellowships in fiscal year 2005 to bring together multi-disciplinary research in trusted information sharing. The ISB intends to take an active role in the guidance of these fellows and their research and we welcome the participation of appropriate members of your Department.

The Intelligence Science Board appreciates the opportunity to be of service to the Department of Homeland Security, and we look forward to continued interaction with the Department in this area. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me on [REDACTED] or the ISB's study leader for trusted information sharing, [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]

Yours truly,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(6)

Enclosure: As stated

cc:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

December 29, 2004

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

I write to inform you about an Intelligence Science Board (ISB) study and to invite Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) participation.

Recently the ISB initiated a project to review what is known about educating information. The study is being sponsored by the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Counter Intelligence Field Activity. Under the direction of ISB member [Redacted] a team is reviewing scientific literature about interrogation, meeting with national and international experts, and examining relevant training and practice. The *Study on Educating Information* is being conducted in concert with [Redacted] (also an ISB member) and the [Redacted]

We would welcome participation by the FBI in these efforts, especially from persons knowledgeable about the Bureau's efforts to train agents in interviewing and interrogation.

Might it be possible for you to put us in contact with someone whom Dr. Fein and his colleagues could talk with in order to explore ways the Bureau might wish to be involved with this work? [Redacted] e-mail address is

[Redacted] his phone is [Redacted]

Study on Educating Information, page two.

Attached is a brief summary of the status of the project.

In advance, thank you for your attention and your cooperation.

Best personal regards and wishes for the New Year,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Chair

cc:

[Redacted]


(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Attachment

12 October 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)


This letter is a follow on to our phone conversation and to the membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. The ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

I greatly appreciate your willingness to extend for a year, to January 1 2008, your term scheduled to expire on 1 January 2007.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past six years, particularly in the area of Trusted Information Sharing (TIS) and your initiative in linking the ISB to the IC Post-Doctoral Fellows Program. The "big ideas" you presented at the December 2005 Quarterly became part of an ISB report to the ADNI/S&T and raised the level of IC focus on the discipline of Trusted Information Sharing.

I am at your disposal for any questions you may have.

Sincerely yours,



(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment

cc: Roy Pettis, Executive Secretary



(b)(6)

18 January 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

I would be grateful if you were willing to prepare a paper for the Intelligence Science Board's Study on Educating Information. This ISB study is reviewing what is known about educating information in order to support the development of next generation approaches.

Given your vantage point as someone who, as an educator and a practitioner, has worked with the theory and practice of negotiation for many years, we would welcome your thoughts and reflections about how negotiation ideas and experiences might be incorporated into educating information activities. We would be grateful for a paper grounded in research and theory that is also "hands-on" and pragmatic, one that might help and guide information educators to use concepts and perspectives from the field of negotiations.

I am at your disposal for any questions you may have about this request.


In advance, thank you very much.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

January 7, 2008

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Dear [Redacted]

Thanks, again, for coming to speak to the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) at our quarterly meeting last September which was devoted to the theme of "Achieving Transformative Change." Your explanation of the need for transformation in the IC and the objectives of the DNI's 500-day plan set the tone and direction for a very productive meeting.

As a result of our meeting, the ISB has prepared the enclosed package for the DNI that conveys some of the insights derived from the assortment of speakers who addressed the meeting.

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

Best wishes for the New Year and for continued progress in transforming the business of intelligence. As always, the ISB stands ready to help, where feasible. If you would be interested, we could arrange another, less formal meeting for you with some of our members who have expertise in enterprise transformation.


Best personal regards,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Enclosures: As stated

26 October 2005



(b)(6)

Dear 

Thanks a million for joining us at St. Michaels and for your rousing performance there.

No good deed goes unpunished – so, we are grateful that you are willing to accept the multiple jeopardy and do it again for the ISB as well as for my spring seminar. By the time you read this, I'll likely have had chance to thank you virtually face to face on October 27.

All the best,



Chairman



Chair

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

12 October 2007

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Members

[Large redacted area covering the list of members]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up, so I would like to recommend your re-appointment for another three-year term to expire December 31, 2010.

Please let me know if this is agreeable to you.

Many thanks for your collaboration up until now. I trust I may look forward to keeping it up in the service of our country.

All the best,

[Redacted signature]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc: [Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

December 5, 2005

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Dear

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted] the chair of the ISB's *Study on Educating Information*, has just sent me the attached *Interim Report* from his group.

(b)(6)

I forward it to you to advise you to give your urgent consideration to the group's single and strong recommendation, namely that you "appoint a senior mission manager with requisite authority, responsibility, and accountability for developing a centralized Intelligence Community capability for educating information."

[Redacted] his colleagues and I are at your disposal or your staff's for any additional information you might wish.

Best wishes for the season and the New Year,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

23 November 2008

Chairman
Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)

Dear

I want to update you on recent activity regarding the ISB Study on Educating Information.

To review where we are:

Over the last four years, with the support of Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement, and Military organizations, we have examined what is known about interrogation of persons seen to have critical national security information.

In Phase I of the study, sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center, and the Counterintelligence Field Activity, we examined what is known scientifically about interrogation and reviewed a range of USG training activities. We presented three major findings to the DNI and to the study sponsors in December 2006:

- The study team's extensive investigations determined that the U.S. government had funded significant research efforts on interrogation during the 1950s, but revealed no government research programs on interrogation-related topics in the past forty years.
- The study team could not discover an objective scientific basis for the techniques commonly used by U.S. interrogators.
- The study team could not find an Intelligence Community organization with the current responsibility, authority, capability and accountability to develop the range of intelligence interviewing operational, training, and research activities needed in the near and distant future.

The Deputy DNI for Collection asked the ISB to continue the study into Phase II. In Phase II, we are:

- developing case studies about approaches used by the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Israel, Australia, Germany, and Spain to gather information by interviewing suspected terrorists.
- writing a series of teaching papers about key topics in intelligence interviewing. These topics include stress, persuasion, memory, resistances, interests and social identities, and sources of power.
- collecting a number of teaching case studies and assisting ODNI to build an IC case study research and teaching program in this area.

In October, 2007, [REDACTED] and I were asked by the Deputy DNI for Policy, Planning, and Requirements to offer recommendations for future USG consideration. We agreed that we would submit these recommendations in November, 2008.

(b)(6)

Last week, we gave a letter to ODNI that spoke to two questions:

- Where should the USG be in policy and practice in intelligence interviewing (interrogation) in five years?
- How should the USG proceed in intelligence interviewing (interrogation) in the near future?

Our primary recommendations are three:

1. The next President should set the goal that the USG will become the world leader in non-coercive intelligence interviewing in three to five years.
2. The USG should create a specialized capacity, consisting of a cadre of intelligence interviewers located in a justice organization.
3. In the short term, the next administration should make the Army Field Manual 2.22-3 the law of the land (either by Executive Order or by Act of Congress). This action will serve as a "placeholder" while a professional cadre of intelligence interviewers is organized, and during the time that a robust platform of ideas and practices that may serve to guide policies and operations in non-coercive intelligence interviewing in the future is developed.

The USG cadre of intelligence interviewers should be:

- Small, elite, career
- Professional
- Utilizes the best world-wide knowledge available, including from behavioral and social sciences
- Government operated
- Joint—shares the best people and ideas from intelligence, law enforcement, and military organizations
- Operates within a clear legal framework

This cadre should have four functions:

- operational responsibilities for intelligence interviewing with persons believed to have critical national security information both within and outside the US;
- development of new knowledge concerning intelligence interviewing through operational and academic research;
- teaching and training; and
- liaison with foreign organizations and professionals with intelligence interviewing responsibilities.

In the short term, we believe that the next administration should give serious consideration to making Army Field Manual 2.22-3 the law of the land (either by Executive Order or by Act of Congress). While the Army Field Manual has, in our view, serious long-term limitations, making it the law of the land as an early action of the new administration would clearly indicate that the USG is committed to non-coercive interrogation and would send a significant message to US allies who are concerned with preventing terrorist violence.

The new administration should make it clear that the Army Field Manual is a "placeholder," at least for strategic intelligence interviewing, and that significant efforts will be undertaken immediately to develop a robust platform of ideas and practices that may serve to guide policies and operations in non-coercive intelligence interviewing in the future. This new platform, which would replace the Army Field Manual, at least for strategic intelligence interviewing, should ultimately, in our view, be codified into law.

In the near term, we recommend that the DNI establish a working group with representatives from the NCS, DOJ, FBI, DIA, JSOC, and other key organizations with responsibilities and experience in this area. The working group should be charged to plan development of a USG intelligence interviewing cadre. Such planning should include consideration of oversight of intelligence interviewing activities and organizational placement of such a capacity. It should also include a detailed implementation plan to insure achievement of the goal: that the USG will become the world leader in non-coercive intelligence interviewing in three to five years.

As ever, I would be glad to talk with you more about our work and recommendations at your convenience.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,


[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your opening remarks on Monday were exceptional and thought provoking. They stimulated conversation and resulted in giving the remainder of the forum a key path to examine.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for describing the Air Force activities on deterring nuclear terrorism at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding IAEA benchmarks, sample analysis, and improved technologies provided Board members with a deeper understanding of the challenges that lie ahead in the early detection of nuclear threats.

Moreover, your observations and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc: [redacted]

(b)(3)



Chair

12 October 2007

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

Members

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

The end of your three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) is coming up on December 31, 2007.

I look forward to an opportunity to thank you in person at the December meeting both for your service to our country and for the personal pleasure of collaborating with you. I especially appreciate your initiatives and good works in organizing and managing the June 2005 BioSecurity Quarterly meeting, your participation in the Highlands Forum on Biosecurity, and your contribution to the memo to the DNI on the importance of BioSecurity.

We expect to keep your clearances active for at least a year, to facilitate any ad hoc contributions you care to continue to make to ISB tasks.

All the best,

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Harvard University



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

January 25, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

Members

(b)(3)

Dear [redacted]

Attached is the Intelligence Science Board's (ISB) "quick look" technical study in response to the Congressionally Directed Action which was addressed to the DNI.

We understand that a technical review of greater depth for a specific aspect of the program in question may be requested by the HPSCI, with a desired completion date of May 1. If so, the ISB can either perform this review or advise any other body that might be tasked with the review.

We would, however, caution that if this deadline is to be met by whomever undertakes the review, the decision to proceed should be forthcoming no later than February 1.

Yours truly,

(b)(6)

Chair

Vice Chair

cc:

(b)(3)

25 September 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. As you may recall, the ISB Charter of 26 August 2002 specifies that "the Vice Chair and all other members of the ISB shall be appointed by the Director of [National] Intelligence (D[N]I) on recommendation of the ISB Chair," and that "members shall serve for a term of three years that may be extended by the D[N]I on recommendation of the Chair."

After consulting with [Redacted] I recommended the partition of the twenty-four members into four groups whose terms would expire 1 January, beginning January 2006 through January 2009. This plan provided for an orderly transition based on length of tenure, including membership in the ISB's predecessor Advanced Technology Panel. The plan specified that terms expire as follows:

(b)(3)

1 January 2006:

[Redacted]

1 January 2007:

[Redacted]

1 January 2008:

[Redacted]

1 January 2009:

[Redacted]

In accordance with this plan, I would like to confirm that your term will expire as scheduled on 1 January 2007.

Thank you for your contributions during the past nine years as a member of the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) and its successor, the Intelligence Science Board. I especially appreciate your forbearance during our difficult transition period, your unflagging willingness to participate in this demanding form of public service, and the contributions you have made to the U.S. government through your service on the ISB. The Board and IC leadership have benefited from your contributions to the Study of Globalization and Information Operations, the Assessment of Quantum Cryptography Program and from your specialized knowledge on advanced computing in support of numerous studies. Your leadership and technical insight contributed to the government's investment decisions in technology and focused research programs in areas of particular technical merit.

I am at your disposal to explore with you any concerns you may have that stem from my actions.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

[Redacted Name]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)

cc:


[Redacted Name]

[Redacted Name]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

March 7, 2007

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(3)

At our last meeting, you recommended that the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) work with [Redacted] to develop an ISB approach to risk that would produce a prototype method of risk management.

(b)(6)

a

[Redacted] ISB member and former [Redacted] [Redacted] has agreed to lead this effort. He drafted the attached TOR, which has been coordinated with [Redacted] and awaits his signature.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

We suggest that, subject to comments, you sign as well. If possible, we want to present a signed TOR at our quarterly meeting next week.

Best wishes,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)


Chair

cc: [Redacted]

(b)(6)

Attachment

June 15, 2006



(b)(3)

Dear 


(b)(3)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

We would like to thank you for describing the British perspectives and efforts to counter the nuclear terrorism threat at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding source term characterization, materials detection, and non-ideal explosives provided Board members with new perspectives on the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats. Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

In your remarks, you mentioned an interest in continuing a relationship with the ISB, particularly in the area of biological threats. The ISB, in cooperation with the several agencies in the intelligence community, is undertaking an examination of contemporary collection practices within government and non-government sectors, including, but not limited to, biointelligence. For the non-government sector the study will place specific emphasis on commercial intelligence collection models and practices that recruit targeted professionals and knowledgeable insiders from within a specific industry to answer customer-generated questions.

The study will explore how collection is targeted, how it is connected to and filtered by organizational and individual inputs, how collection activities are and/or should be measured, and how collection efforts are recognized and rewarded. The final report will outline current gaps in

biointelligence efforts and relevant best practices, provide actionable recommendations to narrow or close those gaps, and suggest a structure to enhance collection and analytical efforts across the IC.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact the ISB study lead [redacted] for more information.

(b)(6)

Very truly yours,

[redacted]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

[redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc:

[redacted]

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

(b)(6)

Members

(b)(6)

Dear [redacted]

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for providing the intelligence lessons learned from smuggling case studies at the Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting on December 12, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for Intelligence Community leaders to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your remarks regarding source issues and inter-organizational partnerships provided Board members with a deeper understanding of the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)
(b)(6)


Chair, Intelligence Science Board

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.


cc: [redacted]

(b)(3)

12 January 2006





(b)(6)

Dear 

As I mentioned at our December Quarterly Meeting, I had met shortly before it with 

(b)(3)

 to consult with him on institutionalizing ISB membership policy. As you may recall, the ISB Charter of August 26, 2002 specifies that "the Vice Chair and all other members of the ISB shall be appointed by the Director of [National] Intelligence (D[N]I) on recommendation of the ISB Chair", and that "members shall serve for a term of three years that may be extended by the D[N]I on recommendation of the Chair."

Planning for rotation of ISB membership actually began several years ago, but I put the process on hold to maintain the Board's stability and its productivity, first through the transition to a new Director of Central Intelligence, and then through the transfer of the Board to report to the newly established DNI. After consulting with  I recommended the partition of the twenty-four members into four groups whose terms will expire 1 January, beginning January 2006 through January 2009. This plan aims to avoid the chaos of a wholesale turnover of all members by providing for an orderly transition based on length of tenure, including membership in the ISB's predecessor Advanced Technology Panel. The plan specifies that terms will expire as follows:


(b)(3)

1 January 2006

1 January 2007:

1 January 2008:

1 January 2009:



(b)(6)

During the course of 2006, I will discuss possible term extension with each ISB member individually. This applies especially to all those whose terms expire 1 January 2007, whom I hereby invite to stay particularly flexible as to an exact departure date from

the Board in order to accommodate the clearance process and the availability of new Board members during 2007.

I especially appreciate your forbearance during our difficult transition period, your unflagging willingness to participate in this demanding form of public service, and the contributions you have made to the U.S. government through your service on the ISB.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past three years as a member of the Intelligence Science Board. Your special efforts to chair the 2005 Membership Committee and meet with the ADNI/S&T to understand his technical interests, and your 2004 Study on the Intelligence Applications of Radar have made significant contributions to the Board's credibility and impact.

I am at your disposal to explore with you any concerns you may have that stem from my actions.

Sincerely Yours,

[Redacted Signature]

Chair
Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)

CC:

[Redacted Name]

(b)(3)

[Redacted Name]

(b)(6)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your presentation was essential to our understanding of how other countries see this issue and what they are doing about it. Your insights made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.


I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

Sincerely,




(b)(6)

26 October 2005



(b)(3)

Dear 

Thanks for staying the course at St. Michaels, for your help in getting us there, and for your further collaboration with  as she maps out the follow-up. I think you share my belief that, as far as the IC goes, the buck stops where you guys are – and I see that as a great opportunity to serve our country extraordinarily well.

FYI, the following is what I wrote to the non-government participants:

“It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum III on ‘Biological Threats, Intelligence, and Relationships.’ I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new networks for early indicators of biological threats, improve the timeliness and quality of our intelligence on these issues, and work collaboratively to protect our nation. Your participation made a real contribution – the Forum benefited from the infusion of such informed and diverse points of view in our communities of interests and practice.”

“This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America – government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. In our sessions we explored the intersection of medicine, technology, information, organization, and social relationships and suggested how collaborative relationships might operate and succeed in the protection of the nation and its citizens. Perhaps the most important point we raised is the opportunity that exists to leverage existing knowledge, networks and relationships.”


“I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.”

All the best,



(b)(6)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 


(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your thoughtful comments throughout the session, particularly as they related to possible innovative approaches to the people of the intelligence community, made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.


Sincerely,



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman

12 October 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)


This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. The ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

I trust that you are willing to extend your term on the ISB for three more years until 1 January 2010.

Many thanks for your contributions during the past six years, not only to the needs of the scientific programs in the IC, but for your suggestions on ways to improve collection, analysis and human talent across the IC disciplines. Your recent paper on Bio-security issues and the IC was well-received and is the basis of a request by IC principals for additional ISB activity in this field.

I am at your disposal for any questions you may have.

Sincerely yours,




(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment

cc:



(b)(3)

(b)(6)

12 October 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. The ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

I trust that you are willing to extend your term on the ISB for three more years until 1 January 2010.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past ten years as a founding member of the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) and its successor, the Intelligence Science Board. You took on an especially difficult task this year in suggesting and then leading a study on "The Effects of Globalization on Information Operations." Your exceptional perseverance in managing the individual perspectives of IC and ISB contributors in your efforts to clarify the issues has the admiration of your ISB peers, myself included.

I am at your disposal for any concerns you may have. I am looking forward to working with you for another membership term.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)



Intelligence Science Board
7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

February 6, 2008

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

We would like to thank you for speaking on open source findings at the recent Intelligence Science Board (ISB) dinner on December 11, 2007. The primary purpose for these events is to provide a forum for thought leaders from the Scientific and Intelligence Communities to meet with ISB members and share diverse perspectives on topics of mutual interest. Your discussion regarding open source monitoring of illicit nuclear trade, specifically the loss of manufacturing assistance in identifying purchase of nuclear production components, provided Board members with a new perspective in monitoring. We appreciate your candor and enthusiasm in ways to address the challenges that lie ahead in combating nuclear threats.

Moreover, your sagacity and experience increase our awareness on this issue and, in turn, our ability to support the Intelligence Community in its efforts to deter nuclear terrorism.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted]

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

[Redacted]

Intelligence Science Board

(b)(6)

P.S: A special thank you gift has been sent separately and should arrive within a few days of this letter.

cc: [Redacted]

(b)(3)



Intelligence Science Board

7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102

Chair

[Redacted]

Vice Chair

[Redacted]

Members

[Redacted]

September 15, 2008

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

Dea [Redacted]

(b)(3)

Having read "Vision 2015" and heard [Redacted] briefing about the vision, the Intelligence Science Board respectfully offers the following observations.

(b)(6)

The Intelligence Community must operate in a world that has changed rapidly over the past decade, due in part to the forces of globalization and in part to the technologies that drive rapid change. The pace of change will only accelerate in the coming decades. To fulfill its mission of protecting our country, *the Intelligence Community must anticipate and take advantage of change, not merely respond to it.*

Specifically:

- The Intelligence Community can only act quickly and effectively if the Director of National Intelligence has authorities over missions and budgets that the office currently lacks.
- Advanced technology not only drives U.S. economic growth, but also provides some of the most effective means for intelligence collection and analysis. Yet the United States has lost its lead in science and technology, and is barely keeping pace with progress in some of the emerging and potentially disruptive technologies. The Intelligence Community must envision, and take an active role in, a national effort to reverse the catastrophic collapse of U.S. government investment in science and technology and in human capital.
- The global-scale Intelligence Enterprise needed in today's interconnected world must develop and exploit truly effective strategic partnerships with a wide range of entities: domestic and foreign, public and private. Such partnerships merit emphasis at least comparable to that placed on the transformation of internal processes, yet they receive only brief mention in the "Vision 2015" document.

- To realize its vision, the Intelligence Community must always act in ways that are clearly and powerfully consistent with the values of civil liberties fundamental to our national security arsenal.

Should you wish, we would be glad to detail the rationales for our conclusions and to address any other questions that you might have.

Best personal regards,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Chairman

(b)(6)

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

12 October 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. The ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

I trust that you are willing to extend your term on the ISB beyond its scheduled expiration on 1 January 2007 for three more years until 1 January 2010.

I want to thank you for your contributions during the past three years, not only regarding the needs of the technical cadre in the IC, but also for your suggestions on ways to improve programs and human talent across the IC disciplines. As you know, there is significant interest in looking at new ways of attracting and retaining talent in the IC. I look forward to your participation in ISB studies and to your leadership in this area. Thank you for your efforts to mentor new ISB members as they assimilate to this environment.

I am at your disposal for any questions you may have.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

June 15, 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)

It was a pleasure to have you with us for our recent St. Michaels Forum IV on "The Future of Science and Technology: Implications for Security." I believe that the ideas we discussed will prove to be important if we are to move quickly in building new processes and capabilities in science and technology for our intelligence community. The high level of networking and connectedness; death of distance; and diffusion of knowledge, offer us significant challenges and opportunities. Your participation and insights on networks and terrorism were precisely provocative and valuable, and you made a real contribution.

This Forum was a vehicle to engage distinguished thinkers on issues of importance to all of America—government, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens alike. Our exploration of the intersection of science, technology, information, organization, and methods of innovative collaboration should help us to assist the S&T community with interesting new ideas to turn into action.

I want to thank you for joining us and for making this forum a success.

All the best.



(b)(6)

Vice Chairman



Chair

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Vice Chair

12 October 2007

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Members

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

As you know, the end of your current three-year term on the Intelligence Science Board is coming up on December 31, 2007. Following up on our prior conversations, I am recommending your appointment to emeritus membership.

I look forward with great pleasure to our continuing collaboration in the service of our country.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair, Intelligence Science Board

cc:


[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

12 October 2006



(b)(6)

Dear 

(b)(6)


This letter is a follow on to our membership policy discussions at the December 2005 Intelligence Science Board (ISB) Quarterly Meeting, and my letter to you of January 12, 2006. As you know, the ISB Membership Committee met on 13 September to advise me on membership transitions.

I greatly appreciate the willingness you expressed to serve for one more year, namely until 1 January 2008.

Many thanks for your contributions during the past three years as a member of the Intelligence Science Board. I also appreciate your prospective efforts to mentor new ISB members as they assimilate to this environment and to support a new look at improving technical talent in the IC.

I am at your disposal for any questions you may have.

Sincerely yours,




(b)(6)


Chair, Intelligence Science Board

Attachment

cc:



(b)(3)



(b)(6)

April 20, 2006

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Dear [Redacted]

(b)(6)

I would like to invite you to take part in a very timely two-day forum under the auspices of the Intelligence Science Board on June 4-6, at the Inn at Perry Cabin in St. Michaels, MD.

The purpose of this forum is to support the Director of National Intelligence and the leadership of the Intelligence Community as we consider the future of science and technology diffusion, assimilation, and innovation in a globalized, connected and transparent world. We will ask what those conditions mean for the United States, for security writ large, and the intelligence community in particular. We will suggest actions that the community might take and identify issues for greater attention.

This ISB Forum will include concerned seniors from the intelligence community, experts on science and technology diffusion, and others from a variety of fields in this cross-disciplinary forum. Your views on these and other related issues would be a most essential part of our discussions. I believe that the ideas we discuss at St. Michaels will prove to be important if we are to stay ahead of the global changes in science and technology which are, and will be, confronting the intelligence community.

We very much hope that you or your designated senior for science and technology issues will join us in St. Michaels [Redacted] is the director of this session; your staff may coordinate with him by email at [Redacted] or by telephone at [Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Chair