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**WASHINGTON DC 20330-1000**

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY**

November 12, 2014

SAF/ AAIL (MDR)  
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This is in response to your 7 September 2008 Mandatory Declassification review request.

The appropriate agencies conducted a review of documents 1, 3, and 5 and recommend withholding portions of these documents (redacted) from public disclosure under Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4 (c) and 3.5 (f).

The document responsive to #4 is withheld in full the information is properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. The documents response to #2 the Air Force conducted a search for the document and no was found therefore a no record determination is made.

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Secretary of the Air Force  
THRU: SAF/AAIL (MDR)  
1000 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1000

Address Questions concerning this review to the undersigned at (703) 693-2560 and refer our case number 09-MDR-007.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "PJ", written over a horizontal line.

PENNY JENKINS  
Mandatory Declassification Review  
Program Manager

Attachment:  
1, 3 and 5

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USAF REVIEWED 22 OCT 2013 NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED

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ESC HISTORICAL OFFICE

SPECIAL HISTORY OF THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

23 JANUARY - 1 MARCH 1968

Volume I - Narrative



SPECIAL HANDLING  
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29 APRIL 1968

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SPECIAL HISTORY OF THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

23 January - 1 March

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Prepared by

MSgt Joseph L. Dean

&

Sgt Le Baron Anderson

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
MAP OF KOREA--USS PUEBLO CAPTURE . . . . .	V
ROUTE <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 5px;">25x6</span> . . . . .	VI
I. THE PUEBLO INCIDENT . . . . .	1
PROJECT 53M2A8 . . . . .	2
II. MISSION TASKING . . . . .	6
III. COMMANDO ROYAL RESPONSE . . . . .	24
CREW ALERT . . . . .	24
MISSION SCHEDULING . . . . .	25
COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS TERMINATED . . . . .	25
COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS RESUMED . . . . .	26
EMERGENCY KORCOM COVERAGE IMPLEMENTED . . . . .	27
PERSONNEL . . . . .	29
IV. ROUTES . . . . .	32
<span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 50px;">25x6</span> . . . . .	32
<span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 50px;">25x6</span> . . . . .	35
V. FIGHTER COVER . . . . .	37
VI. <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 5px;">25x6</span> OPERATION ESTABLISHED . . . . .	39
MISSION STATUS . . . . .	40
VII. PERSONNEL . . . . .	43
LOGISTICS . . . . .	44
EQUIPMENT . . . . .	45
TRANSPORTATION . . . . .	48
VIII. HOT ROD COURIER SERVICE . . . . .	50
IX. DIRECT SIGINT SUPPORT . . . . .	52
COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY . . . . .	53
COMMANDO SMOG COORDINATION . . . . .	53
BORDER VIOLATION REPORTS (BOCOVIRs) . . . . .	54
TACTICAL REPORTS (TACREPs) . . . . .	55
SIGINT INFORMATION TO SPECIFIC PACOM COMMANDS . . . . .	56
X. COLLECTION AND PROCESSING . . . . .	57
COMMANDO ROYAL TRANSPORTATION AND TAPES . . . . .	57
<span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 50px;">25x6</span> . . . . .	57
TRANSMISSION SECURITY (TRANSEC) . . . . .	57
POST MISSION FLIGHT REPORTS (PMFR) . . . . .	57

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(d)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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IV

	PAGE
SIGNIFICANT INTERCEPTS . . . . .	58
XI. RELATED ITEMS OF INTEREST . . . . .	60
XII. SUMMARY . . . . .	62
SUPPORT . . . . .	62
OPERATIONAL CONTROL . . . . .	63
DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS ORDER . . . . .	64
CONCLUSION . . . . .	65
<del>SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS . . . . .</del>	<del>67</del>
DISTRIBUTION . . . . .	67

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SEA OF JAPAN

COORDINATES

33°00'N-129°49'E
37°42'N-129°17'E
37°42'N-129°00'E
38°00'N-128°45'E
37°25'N-126°56'E
37°15'N-126°00'E
37°02'N-129°19'E
36°35'E-126°00'E

FALLBACK

BB  
BC  
BM  
BN  
BO  
BP  
BQ  
BR

Ullung Do 3228  
Takeshima 515

ON GUNTŌ  
Dōgo 1995



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CHAPTER 1

THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

(SCW) THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE NORTH KOREAN SEIZURE OF THE USS PUEBLO AS REPORTED IN 25x1 FOLLOW-UP  
NUMBER 6 TO CRITIC 1-68. THE USS PUEBLO, WHILE CONDUCTING ROUTINE OPERATIONS OFF NORTH KOREA, ENCOUNTERED ONE SO-1 CLASS NORTH KOREAN PATROL CRAFT AT 230300Z, POSITION 3925N-12755E DIW (DEAD IN WATER). SO-1 PENDANT NUMBER (PN) 35 APPROACHED THE USS PUEBLO AND CIRCLED ONCE. ON THE SECOND TRIP AROUND, PN 35 HOISTED FLAG CODE REQUESTING NATIONALITY. THE PUEBLO ANSWERED BY HOISTING US ENSIGN AND THEN THE FLAG CODE MEANING "HYDROGRAPHER." ON THE THIRD SWING, SO-1 HOISTED FLAG CODE MEANING "HEAVE-TO OR I WILL OPEN FIRE ON YOU." THE PUEBLO ANSWERED, "I AM IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS." THE SO-1 CONTINUED TO CIRCLE THE PUEBLO. THE PUEBLO INTENDED TO REMAIN IN THE OPERATING AREA IF CONSIDERED FEASIBLE, OTHERWISE TO WITHDRAW. AT 230400Z SO-1 PN 35 WAS JOINED BY THREE OTHER CRAFT. THE USS PUEBLO WAS REQUESTED TO FOLLOW. TWO MIG AIRCRAFT THEN APPEARED AND BEGAN TO CIRCLE THE PUEBLO. THE NORTH KOREAN PATROL CRAFT THEN BACKED TOWARD THE BOW OF THE PUEBLO AND ATTEMPTED TO BOARD WITH ARMED LANDING PARTY. THE PUEBLO PULLED AHEAD ONE THIRD, ATTEMPTING TO DEPART THE AREA. AT APPROXIMATELY

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2

230428Z, POSITION 3912N-12821E, THE USS PUEBLO REPORTED NORTH KOREANS WERE PLANNING TO OPEN FIRE ON HER. A FEW MINUTES LATER SHE REPORTED THAT BOARDING HAD COMMENCED AND SENT SOS. EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL WAS UNDERWAY. SHE REPORTED THAT SHE WAS "DESTROYING ALL CRYPTO KEY LISTS AND AS MUCH ELEC EQUIP AS POSSIBLE." THE PUEBLO REPORTED THAT FOUR MEN SUSTAINED INJURIES, ONE CRITICALLY.

(SCW) FROM INFORMATION RECEIVED, IT APPEARED THAT THE USS PUEBLO DID NOT USE ANY WEAPONS IN HER DEFENSE. AT APPROXIMATELY 230532Z THE PUEBLO WAS DIRECTED TO STOP AND REPORTED SHE WAS BEING BOARDED. THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME THE PUEBLO REPORTED BEING BOARDED. IT IS POSSIBLE SHE WAS NOT BOARDED UNTIL 0532Z AFTER COMING TO A FULL STOP. AN ALTERNATE POSSIBILITY IS THAT NORTH KOREANS ENTERED SECURE SPACES AT THIS TIME.

(SCW) COMMUNICATIONS WITH USS PUEBLO CEASED AT 230532Z.<sup>1</sup>

PROJECT 53M2A8

(SCW) FORTUITOUS SCHEDULING AND AN UNEXPECTED MAINTENANCE PROBLEM WHICH DELAYED THE SCHEDULED TAKE-OFF RESULTED IN COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT 53M2A8 ORBITING ON ROUTE BETWEEN 3900N-12949E AND 4130N-13148E OFF THE EAST COAST OF NORTH KOREA AT THE TIME OF THE NORTH KOREAN SEIZURE OF THE USS PUEBLO.

25x1

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(SCW) THE COMMANDO ROYAL AIRCRAFT WAS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 110 NM EAST OF THE PUEBLO AT 0501Z WHEN NORTH KOREAN NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS WERE DETECTED ON 132.00 Mcs. INTERCEPT OF THE ACTIVITY WAS CONTINUED UNTIL 0529Z. THE COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION THEN ADVISED [REDACTED] 25x1 VIA URC-53 SYSTEM THAT SIGNIFICANT INTERCEPT HAD BEEN OBTAINED. [REDACTED] 25x1 IMMEDIATELY FLASHED THE FOLLOWING REPORT RECEIVED FROM THE COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION TO NSAPAC REP KOREA: QUOTE, HAVE PROBABLE "HOT STUFF" INTERCEPTED ON KORCOM NAVAL FREQUENCY 132.00 Mcs. TAKEN BTWN 0501Z-0529Z. IF WANT COURIER TO [REDACTED] 25x1 UPON OUR RECOVERY, PLS ADVISE [REDACTED] 25x1 WILL RECOVER AT APPROX 0640Z. UNQUOTE. 2

(TSCW) ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE DETECTION OF THE KORCOM NAVAL ACTIVITY, AN EXTERNAL CONDITION FIVE WAS RECEIVED BY COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT 53M2A8, [REDACTED] 25x1 (OSAN, KOREA) HAD INTERCEPTED NORTH KOREAN RADAR TRACKINGS OF KORCOM FIGHTERS INITIALLY REPORTED AT 3912N-12723E AT 0448Z. SUBSEQUENT TRACKING DATA REFLECTED THE FIGHTERS ON AN INTERCEPT COURSE WITH THE COMMANDO ROYAL AIRCRAFT. AT 0501Z THE KORCOM FIGHTERS WERE REPORTED AT 3942N-12958E WHILE PROJECT 53M2A8 WAS LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 3938N-13018E RESULTING IN A CONDITION FIVE BEING GENERATED BY [REDACTED] 25x1 A CONDITION FIVE (IN THIS CASE INDICATION OF KORCOM FIGHTERS WITHIN 50 NM OF THE MISSION AIRCRAFT) IS A MANDATORY ABORT CONDITION. THE CONDITION

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4

WAS RECEIVED BY THE COMMANDO ROYAL AIRCRAFT AT 0530Z AND THE MISSION WAS IMMEDIATELY ABORTED. THE AIR DEFENSE NET BEING MONITORED BY THE COMMANDO ROYAL INTERNAL WARNING OPERATOR AT NO TIME HAD REFLECTED THE KORCOM FIGHTERS WHICH GENERATED THE EXTERNAL CONDITION FIVE.

(SCW) PROJECT 53M2A8 RECOVERED AT [25x1] AT 0645Z. IT WAS SOON RECOGNIZED THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE HIGH QUALITY TRANSCRIPT OF THE KORCOM NAVAL ACTIVITY WHICH THE SITUATION DEMANDED.<sup>4</sup> THE 347 TACTICAL FIGHTER WING WAS CONTACTED TO PROVIDE "HOT-ROD" DELIVERY OF THE INTERCEPT TO [25x1] HOWEVER, NSAPAC OFFICE JAPAN CALLED AND ADVISED THAT THEY WOULD BRING ONE OF THEIR KOREAN LINGUISTS TO THIS STATION TO ASSIST IN TRANSCRIPTION. HOT-ROD DELIVERY WAS, THEREFORE, DELAYED. HOT-ROD SERVICE, HOWEVER, WAS AGAIN REQUESTED WHEN THE NSAPAC LINGUIST ALSO DETERMINED THAT HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE A HIGH QUALITY TRANSCRIPT OF THE ACTIVITY. HOT-ROD SERVICE WAS IMMEDIATELY PROVIDED AND THE INTERCEPT WAS DELIVERED TO [25x1] KOREA AT APPROXIMATELY 1400Z.

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(SCW) AT 231745Z, [25x1] ISSUED THE FOLLOWING REPORT DERIVED FROM THE COMMANDO ROYAL KORCOM NAVAL INTERCEPT:<sup>5</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

REFLECTION OF THE CAPTURE OF A US VESSEL BY KORCOM NAVAL VESSELS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN COMINT BETWEEN 230501Z - 0529Z JAN 68. AN UNIDENTIFIED PERSONALITY AT POSSIBLE WONSAN NAVAL BASE INSTRUCTED AN UNIDENTIFIED NORTH KOREAN NAVAL (NKN) VESSEL(S) THAT ONE OF THEIR

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5

CREWS WAS TO IMMEDIATELY BOARD THE (SAID BOAT) SO THAT IT COULD BE BROUGHT TO PORT. THE NKN VESSEL REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO BOARD THE BOAT, BUT THE BOAT WOULD BE BROUGHT TO PORT. THE PROBABLY WONSAN NAVAL BASE THEN INSTRUCTED THE NAVAL VESSELS TO MANEUVER ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE BOAT AND PULL IT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE NAVAL VESSELS WERE ALSO TOLD TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE BOAT BY HAND SIGNALS. SUBSEQUENTLY, AN UNIDENTIFIED NKN VESSEL REPORTED THAT IT WAS INCREASING SPEED TO CATCH UP WITH THE BOAT WHICH WAS ALSO INCREASING SPEED. ANOTHER NKN VESSEL THEN REPORTED THAT THE BOAT WOULD HAVE TO BE WATCHED CAREFULLY TO SEE IF ANYTHING WAS THROWN OVERBOARD. LATER, PROBABLE WONSAN NAVAL BASE QUERIED IF AN NKN VESSEL COULD GET CLOSE ENOUGH TO SEND A BOARDING PARTY OF ARMED PERSONNEL ON THE US BOAT. WONSAN NAVAL BASE THEN RECEIVED A REPORT THAT US PERSONNEL ON THE BOAT WERE BURNING THINGS ABOARD THEIR BOAT AND THROWING UNIDENTIFIED OBJECTS INTO THE SEA.

COMMENTS: THE ABOVE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THE US VESSEL HAD NOT BEEN BOARDED AS OF 230529Z JAN 68

~~(SCW)~~ ONE AREA OF VITAL CONCERN REMAINED TO BE ANSWERED - HOW DID THE KORCOM FIGHTERS EFFECT A SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPT OF THE COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION WITH ABSOLUTELY NO REFLECTION, VOICE OR AIR DEFENSE TRACKING, OBTAINED BY THE MISSION AIRCRAFT. THIS WAS RESOLVED ON 28 JANUARY WHEN 25x1 ~~ISSUED~~ B.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c) THE FOLLOWING REPORT AS A FINAL WRAP-UP TO THEIR RECON REACTION REPORT ON PROJECT 53M2A8:

FURTHER ANALYSIS HAS REVEALED THAT THE KORCOM FIGHTER REACTION TO THIS MISSION WAS SIMULATED AND NOT AN ACTUAL REACTION AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. A STUDY OF ALL ASPECTS OF THIS ACTIVITY INDICATES THAT THE EAST COAST FILTER CENTER SIMULATED THE AIR SURVEILLANCE REFLECTIONS OF KORCOM FIGHTERS REACTING TO THE ACRP MISSION DURING THE TIME FRAME OF THE KORCOM ATTACK/ CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO.<sup>6</sup>

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# CHAPTER II

## MISSION TASKING

~~(TSCW)~~ NUMEROUS TASKING INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSAL WERE PASSED WITHIN AND BETWEEN ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND DURING THE INITIAL REACTION TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT. THE FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY RECAPS THE VARIOUS TASKING INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED. TIMES INDICATED ARE DATE TIME GROUPS OF PERTINENT MESSAGES UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

<u>DATE-TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
230550Z (JANUARY)	REPORT RECEIVED FROM NSAPAC OFFICE JAPAN THAT USS PUEBLO BEING TAKEN TO WONSAN UNDER ESCORT. <sup>7</sup>
230600Z	NSAPAC OFFICE JAPAN CONTACTED OPERATIONS OFFICER BY TELEPHONE TO ADVISE HIM TO STAND-BY FOR IMPORTANT MESSAGE OF IMMEDIATE SIGNIFICANCE. THIS WAS IN REFERENCE TO DTG 230550Z.
230653Z	NSAPAC OFFICE JAPAN REQUESTED CONTINUED COVERAGE OF THE PUEBLO SITUATION. <sup>8</sup>
231005Z	DIRNSA STATED REQUIREMENT TO JCS FOR CONTINUOUS ORBIT <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 5px;">25x1</span> COVERAGE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY WITH DROP-OFF OF MISSION MATERIALS AT <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 5px;">25x1</span> KOREA TO EXPEDITE PROCESSING. <sup>9</sup>
231058Z	ADMNO CINCPAC ADVISED CINCPACAF THAT ROUTE 5C3222 WAS TO BE FLOWN ON AS NEAR CONTINUOUS BASIS AS POSSIBLE WITH OTHER COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS CANCELLED AS NECESSARY. <sup>10</sup>
231238Z	PACAF ADVISED 5 AIR FORCE TO TAKE ADMNO CINCPAC 231058Z FOR ACTION. <sup>11</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
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231242Z

WE ADVISED USAFSS AND PACSOTYRGN THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO LAUNCH NEXT MISSION AT 1500Z; HOWEVER, 5 AIR FORCE HAD INSTRUCTED 6091 RECON SQ NOT TO LAUNCH ANY MISSIONS UNTIL SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED.<sup>12</sup>

231330Z

RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM USAFSS (TAD) QUERYING STATUS OF AG-118 PORTABLE TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS. THE FIVE AG-118s ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT WERE ON LOAN AS FOLLOWS: ONE TO PROJECT [REDACTED] AND FOUR TO 6924 SOTY SQ.

231545Z

USAFSS ADVISED DIRNSA THAT A COMMANDO ROYAL AIRCRAFT WAS CURRENTLY ON ORBIT [REDACTED] (PROJECT 53T1A8) AND INDICATED JCS/JRC WAS CONTEMPLATING USE OF FIGHTER CAP FOR THIS PARTICULAR ORBIT. WE WERE ADVISED TO ENSURE NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN TO LAUNCH ADDITIONAL MISSIONS OTHER THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED AND APPROVED UNTIL AUTHORITY WAS GRANTED BY JCS AND TO ENSURE THAT NO DROP OFF OF MISSION MATERIALS WAS MADE AT [REDACTED] KOREA UNTIL FURTHER DIRECTED. USAFSS ALSO STATED PREFERENCE FOR RECOVERY OF MISSION AIRCRAFT AT [REDACTED] VICE OSAN DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TRANSCRIPTION FACILITIES AT THE LATTER BASE.<sup>13</sup>

231615Z

NSAPAC REP KOREA TASKED [REDACTED] WITH TRANSCRIPTION OF ACRP TAKE DROPPED OFF AT OSAN AND REQUESTED ACTION BE INITIATED TO IMPLEMENT ACRP PROGRAM SOON-EST.<sup>14</sup>

231705Z

WE ADVISED USAFSS AND PACSOTYRGN THAT A MISSION (PROJECT 53N5A8) HAD BEEN LAUNCHED TO RELIEVE PROJECT 53T1A8 TO ENSURE CONTINUING COVERAGE AND THAT THIS MISSION WAS COMMITTED TO STOP OFF AT OSAN BECAUSE OF FUEL REQUIREMENTS. IN VIEW OF USAFSS 231545Z, WE ASKED IF SUBJECT MISSIONS SHOULD BE RECALLED AND IF PLANNED DROP-OFF AT OSAN BY PROJECT 53T1A8 SHOULD BE CANCELLED.<sup>15</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
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231935Z

PACSCITYRGN 232028Z QUOTED ADMINO  
CINCPAC 231935Z WHICH CANCELLED TASKING  
CONTAINED IN ADMINO CINCPAC 231058Z  
AND DIRECTED RECALL OF COMMANDO ROYAL  
MISSION CURRENTLY AIRBORNE ON TRACK  
[25x1] (PROJECT 53N5A8) AND TERMINATION  
OF ALL COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS UNTIL  
FURTHER NOTICE.<sup>16</sup>

231953Z

NOT BEING IN RECEIPT OF ADMINO CINCPAC  
231935Z, WE QUERIED STATUS OF OUR 231705Z  
AND INFORMED USAFSS THAT A MISSION WAS  
SCHEDULED FOR A 232230Z LAUNCH.<sup>17</sup>

232046Z

CINCPAC DIRECTED RECALL OF ALL PERIPHERAL  
RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS IN THE SEA OF  
JAPAN, YELLOW SEA, OR OVER KOREA WITH  
STAND-DOWN OF RECON FLIGHTS INTO THESE  
AREA UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED AND PENDING  
DECISION CONCERNING FIGHTER ESCORT.<sup>18</sup>

232100Z

DIRNSA STATED THEIR MINIMUM REQUIREMENT  
FOR ACRP COVERAGE TO JCS AS ONE TEN HOUR  
SORTIE PER DAY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ON  
ORBIT. [25x1] FLYING LEGS BRAVO-BRAVO  
THRU BRAVO-DELTA (3900N-12949E THRU  
3715N-12600E) WITH TAKE-OFF FROM [25x1]  
AT APPROXIMATELY 0600 LOCAL AND RECOVERY  
OF MISSIONS AT [25x1] VICE 03AN.<sup>19</sup>

232101Z

DIRNSA ADVISED USAFSS THAT JCS HAD  
AUTHORIZED LAUNCH OF PROJECT 53N5A8  
WHICH DEPARTED [25x1] AT 231630Z WITH  
REQUIREMENT THAT THE AIRCRAFT DEPART  
THE ORBIT AREA BY DAYBREAK IF NO FIGHTER  
CAP PROVIDED.<sup>20</sup>

232135Z

PACSCITYRGN ADVISED THAT THE RECALL OF  
THE COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS WAS DUE TO  
THE HIGHLY VULNERABLE POSITION OF MIS-  
SION AIRCRAFT WITHOUT FIGHTER CAP AND  
INDICATED THAT COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS  
WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED WITH FIGHTER CAP  
IN THE NEAR FUTURE.<sup>21</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
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240430Z

WE QUERIED PACSCITYRGN IF CONSIDERATION  
HAD BEEN GIVEN TO FLYING COMMANDO ROYAL  
ROUTE [25x1] WITH MISSION  
AIRCRAFT HOLDING OVER SOUTH KOREAN LAND

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MASS BETWEEN POINT BC-BD (3742N-12917E THRU 3715N-12600E). FROM THIS LOCATION WONSAN AND PYONGYANG AREAS WOULD BE WITHIN INTERCEPT RANGE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THE MISSION AIRCRAFT COULD REMAIN OVER FRIENDLY TERRITORY. THIS WAS PRESENTED AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO A COMPLETE STAND-DOWN OF COMMANDO ROYAL PENDING RESOLUTION OF DIRNSA REQUIREMENT STATED IN THEIR 232100Z AND FIGHTER CAP REQUIREMENT.<sup>22</sup>

240515Z

DIRNSA 241956Z QUOTED JCS MESSAGE TO CINCPAC AUTHORIZING RESUMPTION OF COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS WITH EXCEPTION OF ROUTE 25x1 <sup>P.L. 86-36 EO 1.4.(c)</sup>

241529Z

WE ADVISED USAFSS AND PACSCTYRGN THAT 24 HOUR CREW ALERT WAS BEING MAINTAINED. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PLANNING AND COORDINATION WITH 6091 RECON SQ. WE REQUESTED ESTIMATE OF PROBABLE TASKING.<sup>24</sup>

242015Z

USAFSS ADVISED THAT JCS HAD INFORMED CINCPAC TO RESUME COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS WITH EXCEPTION OF ORBIT 5C3222 AND REQUESTED PACSCTYRGN TO TAKE ACTION TO DETERMINE WHAT ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN TOWARDS RESUMPTION OF COMMANDO ROYAL.<sup>25</sup>

242025Z

PACSCTYRGN RETRANSMITTED ADMINO CINCPAC 241625Z TO THIS UNIT WHICH STATED CINCPAC 232046Z RECALLING ALL PARPRO FLIGHTS WAS CANCELLED. APPROVED PARPRO SCHEDULE WAS TO BE RESUMED WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT ROUTE 25x1 WAS NOT TO BE EXECUTED UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED. SUBJECT MESSAGE ALSO DIRECTED DEVIATION FROM STANDARD TRACK AS APPROPRIATE TO COMPLY WITH ADMINO CINCPAC 240340Z.<sup>26</sup>

242330Z

PACSCTYRGN RETRANSMITTED ADMINO CINCPAC 240340Z TO THIS UNIT. SUBJECT MESSAGE DIRECTED AIRBORNE UNITS TO REMAIN OUTSIDE OF THE AREA WITHIN 80 NM OF THE COAST OF NORTH KOREA NORTH OF A LINE EXTENDING EAST FROM THE DMZ.<sup>27</sup>

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242331Z

PACSCITYRGN REQUESTED USAFSS TO PROVIDE FURTHER GUIDANCE RE SPECIFIC ORBIT REQUIREMENTS IN VIEW OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRNSA TASKING (NSA 232100Z) AND CINCPAC TASKING (PSR 242025Z). PENDING RECEIPT OF FURTHER GUIDANCE PACSCITYRGN REQUESTED THAT WE INITIATE ACTION TO SCHEDULE AND IMPLEMENT DAILY MISSIONS ON ROUTE [25x1] IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN OUR 240430Z.28

P.L. 86-36  
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251745Z

JCS REQUESTED CINCPAC TO INITIATE 24 HOUR PER DAY ACRP COVERAGE OF THE EAST COAST AND DMZ AREA OF NORTH KOREA. FIGHTER ESCORT FOR ALL FLIGHTS WAS DIRECTED. COMMANDO ROYAL WAS RESTRICTED TO FLYING ONLY THAT PORTION OF TRACK [25x1] BETWEEN POINT BRAVO-BRAVO (3900N-12949E) AND BRAVO-DELTA (3715N-12600E).29

252010Z

IN RESPONSE TO JCS TASKING REQUIRING 24 HOUR COVERAGE, USAFSS PRESENTED SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES WHICH INCLUDED FLYING [25x1] MISSIONS OR FLYING MISSION FROM [25x1] [25x1] RECOMMENDED [25x1] THE FINAL ALTERNATIVE, AND THE ONE CONSIDERED TO PROVIDE THE MOST SATISFACTORY SOLUTION, WAS TO STAGE ALL MISSIONS FROM [25x1] USAFSS REQUESTED PACSCITYRGN TO "GIVE EVERY CONSIDERATION POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISHING THIS OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THRU COORDINATION WITH PACAF."30

252131Z

USAFSS CONCURRED WITH 6988 SCTY Sq 251941Z WHICH PROPOSED SUSPENSION OF ALL OTHER COMMANDO ROYAL FLIGHT ACTIVITY EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY DUE TO 24 HOUR COVERAGE REQUIREMENT.31

252220Z

WE ADVISED PACSCITYRGN THAT CREWS HAD BEEN ALERTED TO COMMENCE [25x1] COVERAGE AS SOON AS OPERATING PROCEDURES CLARIFIED. WE ANTICIPATED APPROXIMATELY 50 PERSONNEL WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH OPERATION OUT OF [25x1] IN ACCORDANCE WITH USAFSS 252010Z.32

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

~~TOP SECRET TRIANGLE~~

11

252235Z

JCS ADVISED CINCPAC THAT DUE TO OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 24 HOUR ACRP OPERATION DIRECTED IN THEIR 251745Z WAS AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR ACRP FLIGHTS ONLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. REQUIREMENT FOR FIGHTER ESCORT OF ALL ACRP FLIGHTS FLOWN IN AREA OF KOREA AT ALL TIMES WAS REITERATED.<sup>33</sup>

260035Z

USAFSS AGAIN STATED THAT COLLECTION AND PROCESSING OF THE KORCOM ACRP MISSIONS REQUIRED STAGING FROM 25x1 AND REQUESTED PACSCTYRGN TO COORDINATE WITH PACAF TO ESTABLISH THE 25x1 OPERATION. USAFSS ALSO REQUESTED ACTION BE TAKEN AS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE 25x1 WITH SUPPLEMENTARY TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS.<sup>34</sup>

PACSCTYRGN RECOMMENDED ESTABLISHMENT OF ACRP OPERATION OUT OF 25x1 BE DELAYED WITH IMMEDIATE PLANS GEARED TOWARD A 25x1 OPERATION WITH HOT-ROD SERVICE TO 25x1. THEY EXPECTED REQUIREMENT STATED IN JCS 252235Z WOULD REQUIRE TWO SORTIES PER DAY.<sup>35</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

WE ADVISED PACSCTYRGN THAT 6091 RECON SQ HAD CANCELLED ORBIT 25x1 MISSION SCHEDULED FOR 252100Z TAKE-OFF AND THAT NO MISSIONS WERE NOW SCHEDULED TO PROVIDE KORCOM COVERAGE. 6091 RECON SQ HAD BEEN DIRECTED BY 5 AIR FORCE TO LAUNCH NO MISSIONS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED BY THAT HEADQUARTERS. WE WERE NOT AWARE OF ANY REASONS OR AUTHORITY FOR THIS HOLD ON MISSIONS AND REQUESTED PACSCTYRGN ADVISE OF STATUS.<sup>36</sup>

CINCPAC DIRECTED CINCPACAF TO COMMENCE IMMEDIATE COMMANDO ROYAL FLIGHTS ON TRACK 25x1 MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS: STRAIGHT LINE FROM 3715N-12600E TO 3742N-12917E TO 3900N-12949E (POINTS BRAVO-DELTA, BRAVO-CHARLIE, BRAVO-BRAVO, RESPECTIVELY). COMMANDO ROYAL WAS NOT TO FLY NORTH OF 3900N-12949E. THIS ROUTE WAS TO BE FLOWN ON AS NEARLY A CONTINUOUS BASIS AS POSSIBLE, DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY, WITH FIGHTER ESCORT

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12

REQUIRED ON ENTIRE TRACK. AT THE SAME CINCPAC REQUESTED JCS AUTHORIZE DEPLOYMENT OF COMMANDO ROYAL TO KOREA.37

260624Z

BEING IN RECEIPT OF CINCPAC 260436Z WE WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND ABSENCE OF ACTION BY 6091 RECON Sq/5 AIR FORCE TO PLAN FOR LAUNCH OF SPECIAL MISSIONS. AT THE TIME OF THIS MESSAGE 6091 RECON Sq WAS PLANNING FIRST MISSION TO BE LAUNCHED AT 261815Z. WE QUERIED PACSCTYRGN IF THEY WERE AWARE OF WHAT FACTORS WERE CAUSING THIS FAILURE TO REACT TO WHAT APPEARED TO BE CLEAR TASKING.38

260730Z

PACSCTYRGN STATED THAT PACAF HAD ADVISED THAT DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ACRP SCHEDULE WAS DUE TO NECESSITY TO COORDINATE FIGHTER ESCORT REQUIREMENT AND THAT PACAF WAS WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME PACSCTYRGN ADVISED THAT THEY WOULD MOVE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF OSAN OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MEAN WHILE, ACRP OPERATIONS WERE TO CONTINUE FROM [25x1] UNTIL FINAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE FOR [25x1] STAGING.39

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

262040Z

CINCPACAF DIRECTED 5 AIR FORCE TO TAKE ACTION TO IMMEDIATELY COMMENCE COMMANDO ROYAL FLIGHTS ON TRACK [25x1] AS MODIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CINCPAC 260346Z. FIFTH AIR FORCE WAS ADVISED TO RESTRICT LENGTH OF MISSION TO TIME OF FIGHTER ESCORT AVAILABILITY.40

270140Z

PACSCTYRGN ADVISED THAT MEETING AT CINCPAC JRC HAD CONFIRMED THAT LACK OF FIGHTERS WAS PRIMARY REASON FOR HOLD ON COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION IN KOREAN AREA. FURTHER, JCS HAD EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS TO FLY [25x1] ROUTE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS WHILE FLYING OVER LAND WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT. SINCE REQUIREMENT WAS FOR DAYLIGHT COVERAGE, THIS CONCESSION PROVIDED NO IMPROVEMENT IN COMMANDO

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13

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

ROYAL MISSION HOLD. CINCPAC JRC INDICATED THEY WOULD REQUEST JCS TO ESTABLISH A ROUTE SOUTH OF THE DMZ ON WHICH COMMANDO ROYAL COULD FLY WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT IN ORDER TO SATISFY DAYLIGHT COVERAGE REQUIREMENT. PACSCTYRGN FURTHER ADVISED THAT UPON RECEIPT OF FORMAL JCS AUTHORIZATION FOR OPERATION, IT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS CONDITIONS ALLOWED. IN THE MEANTIME, COMMANDO ROYAL WAS TO CONTINUE STAGING OUT OF YOKOTA WITHIN THE FIGHTER ESCORT LIMITATIONS OUTLINED IN CINCPACAF 262040Z.<sup>41</sup>

25x1

270413Z

CINCPAC ADVISED CINCPACAF THAT JCS 270044Z MODIFIED CINCPAC 260346Z ESCORT REQUIREMENT AS FOLLOWS:

A. ALL COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS TO HAVE PROTECTIVE COVER BY EITHER FIGHTER ESCORT OR COMBAT AIR PATROL DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.

B. MISSIONS AUTHORIZED DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT OR COMBAT AIR PATROL PROVIDED:

(1) MISSION AIRCRAFT COVERED BY FIGHTERS ON STRIP ALERT.

(2) MISSION AIRCRAFT REMAIN AT LEAST 25 NM SOUTH OF DMZ AND REMAIN OVER THE KOREAN LANDMASS.

(3) ENTRANCE TO AND EXIT FROM THE ORBIT IS ACCOMPLISHED FROM/TO THE SOUTH.

(4) TRACKS MAY BE MODIFIED TO REMAIN 25 NM SOUTH OF DMZ WHILE OVER KOREAN LANDMASS. OVER WATER PORTION OF THESE TRACKS TO REMAIN UNCHANGED.<sup>42</sup>

25x1

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

270553Z

WE ADVISED PACSCTYRGN THAT 6091 RECON SQ WAS PREPARED TO FLY NIGHT MISSION ON THIS DATE AS RESULT OF AUTHORIZATION

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~~TOP SECRET~~

14

TO FLY DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS; HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF DAYLIGHT TASKING ONLY WE PROPOSED TO HOLD FOR DAYLIGHT COVERAGE.<sup>43</sup>

270858Z

PACSCTYRGN CONCURRED WITH PROPOSAL OUTLINED IN OUR 270553Z TO TAKE NO ACTION TO FLY OTHER THAN DAYLIGHT HOURS.<sup>44</sup>

270930Z

PACAF DIRECTED 5 AIR FORCE TO TAKE CINCPAC 270413Z FOR ACTION WITH EXCEPTION THAT OVER WATER PORTIONS OF 25x1 86-36  
1.4.(c) WOULD BE AS MODIFIED BY CINCPAC 260346Z. OVER WATER PORTION OF WESTERN LEG OF 25x1 TO HAVE SAME RESTRICTION AS MODIFIED TRACK 5C3222.<sup>45</sup>

271517Z

ADVISED PACSCTYRGN THAT 6091 RECON SQ HAD CONCURRED WITH OUR PROPOSAL TO LAUNCH THREE MISSION A DAY TO PROVIDE 20 TO 21 HOURS OF COVERAGE AS FOLLOWS: ONE MISSION LAUNCHED AT 1400Z WITH ONE TO FOLLOW AT 2000Z AND ONE AT 280200Z. NEXT MISSION THEN PROGRAMMED FOR 281800Z TAKE-OFF FOLLOWED BY LAUNCHES AT SEVEN HOUR INTERVALS THROUGH 0800Z EACH DAY. THIS PROPOSED SCHEDULE, ALTHOUGH AGREED UPON BY 6091 RECON SQ, HAD NOT BEEN VARIFIED BY 5 AIR FORCE; THEREFORE, WE REQUESTED PACSCTYRGN TO SECURE PACAF APPROVAL TO ENSURE SCHEDULE COULD BE MET. THIS ACTION WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY IN VIEW OF PAST RELUCTANCE BY 5 AIR FORCE TO RESPOND TO TASKING REQUIREMENTS RECEIVED BY THIS UNIT WHICH WERE NOT ADDRESSED TO THEM.<sup>46</sup>

280110Z

PACSCTYRGN ADVISED THAT PACAF SUPPORTED SCHEDULE AS OUTLINED IN OUR 271517Z AND WOULD ADVISE 5 AIR FORCE VIA TELECON. PACAF HAD ALSO AGREED THAT FORMULATION OF SCHEDULE SHOULD BE PRIMARILY BASED UPON REQUIREMENTS RECEIVED BY THIS UNIT.<sup>47</sup>

280114Z

PACSCTYRGN RETRANSMITTED FOLLOWING MESSAGES TO 6988 SCTY SQ: JCS 270034Z,

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~~TOP SECRET~~

15

EO 1.4.(G)

USAFSS TDC 270458Z AND TAD 270307Z.  
THE JCS MESSAGE CONTAINED THOSE INSTRUCTIONS PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED IN CINCPAC 270413Z. USAFSS 270458Z INDICATED SUBJECT JCS INSTRUCTIONS WOULD NOT PROVIDE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF ACRP RESOURCES AND URGED RECLAMA ON JCS DECISION TO ENSURE THAT STAGING FROM [25x1] WITH A FULL LAUNCH, RECOVERY AND PROCESSING CONTINGENT BE ESTABLISHED. USAFSS TAD 270307Z PROVIDED ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS INCLUDING:

- A. OPERATION STRICTLY FROM [25x1]
- B. OPERATION FROM [25x1] AND
- C. OPERATION FROM [25x1] AND [25x1]

PREFERENCE WAS FOR FULL LAUNCH, RECOVERY AND PROCESSING CAPABILITY AT [25x1] PROVIDED FOR IN CONCEPT B AND C WHICH WAS FULLY ENDORSED BY DIRNSA.48

280337Z

CINCPAC WENT TO JCS INDICATING THAT [25x1] OPERATION WAS DESIRED FOR MOST EFFECTIVE KOREAN ACRP COLLECTION. CINCPAC REQUESTED AUTHORITY TO DEPLOY FOUR C-130 AIRCRAFT TO [25x1] TO MEET 24 HOUR COLLECTION REQUIREMENT OR TWO C-130S TO MEET TWELVE HOUR REQUIREMENT. UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED, CINCPAC STATED THAT, DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS, ONLY THE OVERLAND PORTION OF MODIFIED TRACK AUTHORIZED WITH MISSION TO BE COVERED BY FIGHTERS ON STRIP ALERT. DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ALL MISSIONS ON MODIFIED TRACK TO HAVE EITHER FIGHTER ESCORT OR CAP.49

280640Z

FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVISED THEY WERE IMPLEMENTING A THREE MISSION PER DAY SCHEDULE WHICH WOULD PROVIDE ORBIT TIMES AS FOLLOWS:

281800Z THRU 2400Z  
290100Z THRU 0700Z

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

16

290800Z THRU 1400Z (REPEAT EACH 24 HOURS).

FIFTH AIR FORCE INDICATED THEY WOULD CONTINUE THIS SCHEDULE INDEFINITELY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AIRCREW AND AIRFRAME CAPABILITY.<sup>50</sup>

281552Z

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

DIRNSA WENT TO JCS RE CINCPAC 280337Z AND NSA 231200Z RESTATING REQUIREMENT FOR NORTH KOREAN COVERAGE ONLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS WITH ACFT STAGING FROM

[25x1] DIRNSA REQUESTED ACTION BE TAKEN TO DEPLOY ACRP AIRCRAFT FROM OSAN FOR FLIGHTS ON MODIFIED ORBIT [25x1] WITH AIRBORNE COVERAGE CONFINED TO DAYLIGHT HOURS (APPROXIMATELY 10 HOURS). ALL REMAINING AIRCRAFT TIME WAS TO BE APPLIED EQUALLY AGAINST [25x1] ORBITS.<sup>51</sup>

282225Z

PACSCITYRGN STATED THAT UNTIL JCS APPROVAL FOR STAGING OUT OF [25x1] RECEIVED, THE [25x1] DROP-OFF WAS TO BE DISCONTINUED WITH KGC COM COVERAGE CONTINUING WITH [25x1] MISSIONS. FURTHER, PACSCITYRGN DIRECTED THAT WE FLY MINIMUM NUMBER OF MISSIONS NEEDED TO PROVIDE DAYLIGHT ONLY ORBIT TIME. WE WERE REQUESTED TO ESTABLISH SCHEDULE WITH 6091 RECON SQ ALONG ABOVE LINES.<sup>52</sup>

290801Z

WE ADVISED PACSCITYRGN THAT 6091 RECON SQ AND 5 AIR FORCE HAD REFUSED TO CHANGE ESTABLISHED SCHEDULE. 6091 RECON SQ ADVISED THAT PACAF AND 5 AIR FORCE WAS CONSIDERED TO BE THEIR SCHEDULING AUTHORITY AND THEY WOULD RESPOND ONLY TO TASKING RECEIVED FROM THEM. WE, THEREFORE, ADVISED PACSCITYRGN THAT WE WOULD MAN SCHEDULED MISSIONS UNTIL THIS PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED.<sup>53</sup>

290806Z

WE ADVISED PACSCITYRGN THAT THE [25x1] DROP-OFF OF MISSION MATERIALS WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN CONJUNCTION WITH [25x1] REFUELING STOP WHICH THEREBY ELIMINATED

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~~TOP SECRET~~

17

THE REQUIREMENT FOR HOT-ROD SERVICE. WE FURTHER ADVISED THAT WE WOULD ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT TWO MISSIONS PER DAY SCHEDULE. WE ANTICIPATED, HOWEVER, THAT INSTRUCTION TO 5 AIR FORCE FROM PACAF CHANNELS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF TWO PER DAY SCHEDULE WAS TO BE ESTABLISHED.<sup>54</sup>

290845Z

PACSCITYRGN CONCURRED WITH ACTION TO MAN SCHEDULED MISSIONS AND INDICATED THAT PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOLVED WITH PACAF AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.<sup>55</sup>

292225Z

PACSCITYRGN INDICATED SCHEDULING CONFLICT INDICATED IN OUR 290801Z WAS DISCUSSED WITH PACAF AND THAT PACAF HAD AGREED THAT SCHEDULE WAS TO BE BASED ON SIGINT COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON 6988 SCTY SQ IN CONCERT WITH AIRFRAME AVAILABILITY. PACSCITYRGN ALSO ADVISED THERE WAS A JCS MESSAGE 291633Z THAT AUTHORIZED TWO AIRCRAFT TO STAGE FROM 25x1 TO FLY TEN HOUR ORBIT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY. WE WERE DIRECTED TO TAKE NO ACTION ON THIS ITEM UNTIL ADVISED THRU NORMAL CHANNELS ON IMPLEMENTATION.<sup>56</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

310025Z

PACAF ADVISED 5 AIR FORCE THAT CINCPAC HAD RECEIVED CLEARANCE AND AUTHORITY TO DEPLOY TWO COMMANDO ROYAL C-130 AIRCRAFT TO 25x1<sup>57</sup>

310310Z

WE PROVIDED PACSCITYRGN WITH CONOP FOR 25x1 STAGING AND AT THE SAME TIME ADVISED THAT THE TWO MISSIONS SCHEDULED FOR 1 FEBRUARY WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE AT 25x1 ALSO, 5 AIR FORCE HAD INDICATED THEY DESIRED COVERAGE EARLIER THAN THE DAYLIGHT HOURS AND WOULD SEEK TO HAVE THE TEN HOUR REQUIREMENT INCREASED. THIS WOULD REQUIRE TWO MISSIONS PER DAY FROM 25x1 VICE THE ONE MISSION PRESENTLY PLANNED.<sup>58</sup>

310450Z

WE ADVISED PACSCITYRGN THAT 6093 RECON SQ INTENDED TO RECOVER 1 FEBRUARY MISSION

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~~TOP SECRET TITAN~~

AT OSAN.59

310619Z

PACSCYRGN ADVISED WE WERE AUTHORIZED TO STAGE COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS OUT OF [25x1] IN ACCORDANCE WITH PACAF 310025Z.60

310811Z

PACSCYRGN CONCURRED WITH OUR 310310Z AND REQUESTED WE IMPRESS UPON 5 AIR FORCE THE NEED TO CONSERVE AIRFRAME HOURS TO FULFILL COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS AGAINST [25x1] TARGETS. WE WERE REQUESTED TO ADVISE 5 AIR FORCE THAT, IF THEY INTENDED TO PURSUE COLLECTION OUTSIDE OF THE AUTHORIZED DAYTIME COVERAGE, THAT THEY SHOULD SUBMIT REQUIREMENT TO PACAF FOR VALIDATION AND FORWARDING TO CINCPAC FOR SUBMISSION TO DIRNSA FOR VALIDATION AND TASKING.61

311843Z

USAFSS OUTLINED IMPACT OF 5 AIR FORCE PROPOSAL FOR TWO MISSIONS DAILY OUT OF [25x1] 62

010128Z (FEBRUARY)

THE 6091 RECON SQ PROVIDED FOLLOWING CONDITION FOUR EXCEPTION FOR 503222M ENTER 3730N-12700E, EXIT 3750N-12855E THEN RETURN, ENTER 3750N-12855E, EXIT 3730N-12700E AND THEN RETURN SAME ROUTE AS APPROPRIATE.63

010134Z

PACSCYRGN REQUESTED WE DETERMINE 6091 RECON SQ PLANS TO CONTINUE [25x1] EFFORT AS RESULT OF PLANNED OSAN DEPLOYMENT.64

010635Z

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

WE ADVISED THAT 6091 RECON SQ HAD TERMINATED MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AT [25x1] AND MOVED IT TO [25x1] TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT THERE. AS A RESULT OF THEIR INABILITY TO SUPPORT FURTHER [25x1] DEPLOYMENTS WE ADVISED THAT WE WERE PLANNING ON FLYING A MODIFIED ROUTE [25x1] NORMALLY [25x1]

020610Z

WE SUBMITTED REVISED SCHEDULE INCLUDING PROVISION TO FLY ROUTE [25x1]

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~~TOP SECRET~~

19

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

[25x1] WITH ENTRY POINT AT BRAVO-GOLF (ENTRY POINT SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED TO BRAVO-KILO). IN ADDITION WE ADVISED THAT ORBIT [25x1] WAS MODIFIED TO FLY ONLY THAT PORTION OF THE ORBIT OUTSIDE THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY CINCPAC 280337Z WITH BRAVO-FOXTROT ENTRY POINT. ORBIT [25x1] MODIFIED TO EXCLUDE THAT PART OF THE ORBIT WEST OF 132121E WITH ENTRY POINT CHANGED TO ALPHA-LIMA VICE ALPHA-MIKE.<sup>66</sup>

030048Z

PAC SCTYRGN QUERIED SCHEDULING OF MISSION FOR 9.5 HOURS ON 2 FEBRUARY VICE FULL TEN HOURS.<sup>67</sup>

031446Z

USAFSS ADVISED THAT MODIFIED [25x1] ORBIT UNSATISFACTORY AND REQUESTED EITHER [25x1] ROUTE BE USED WITH ENTRY BRAVO-GOLF AND BRAVO-FOXTROT RESPECTIVELY.<sup>68</sup>

042354Z

WE ADVISED USAFSS THAT [25x1] WOULD NOT BE FLOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH 031446Z.

070145Z

WE ADVISED PAC SCTYRGN THAT 6091 RECON SQ DESIRED ALL MISSIONS TO BE FLOWN ON [25x1] MODIFIED ORBIT TO BE SCHEDULED FOR 9.5 HOURS. WE HAD STATED REQUIREMENT FOR TEN HOUR MISSIONS; HOWEVER, 6091 RECON SQ INDICATED THEY WOULD SUBMIT SCHEDULE TO 5 AIR FORCE FOR 9.5 HOURS.<sup>69</sup>

082115Z

PACAF ADVISED THAT 5 AIR FORCE ADVON CONCERNED THAT ANY HOSTILE ACTION ON PART OF KORCOMS WOULD PROBABLY OCCUR DURING FIRST LIGHT IN THE MORNING OR LAST LIGHT JUST PRIOR TO DARK. THEY, THEREFORE, REQUESTED CINCPAC TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO CHANGE COMMAO ROYAL SCHEDULE ON [25x1] TO ACCOMMODATE TACTICAL REQUIREMENT FOR ON ORBIT COVERAGE A MINIMUM OF TWO HOURS PRIOR TO DAWN AND MINIMUM TWO HOURS PRIOR TO AND THRU LAST LIGHT EACH DAY.<sup>70</sup>

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

20

090325Z

PACSCTYRGN REQUESTED WE PROVIDE CONCEPT TO SUPPORT REQUIREMENT STATED IN PACAF 082115Z WITH MINIMUM IMPACT ON OTHER ORBIT REQUIREMENTS.<sup>71</sup>

090411Z

CINCPAC REQUESTED CINCPACAF TO PROVIDE CONCEPT OF OPERATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN TO PROVIDE COVERAGE REQUESTED IN PACAF 082115Z.<sup>72</sup>

090757Z

WE ADVISED PACSCTYRGN THAT TWO KORCOM MISSIONS DAILY WOULD ALLOW FOR MAXIMUM OF TEN MISSIONS TO BE USED TO COVER OTHER ORBIT REQUIREMENTS.<sup>73</sup>

100336Z

PACSCTYRGN OUTLINED OPTIONS TO SATISFY PACAF 082115Z WHICH INCLUDED:

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4. (c)

A. TWO FIVE HOUR SORTIES DAILY FROM 25x1 TO COVER DAWN AND DUSK REQUIREMENT. THIS WOULD SATISFY THE TACTICAL REQUIREMENT AND PARTIALLY SATISFY THE NSA REQUIREMENT OF APPROXIMATELY TEN HOURS PER DAY.

B. COVER BOTH PACAF REQUIREMENT AND NSA TEN HOUR DAYLIGHT COVERAGE WITH ONE TEN HOUR AND ONE FIVE HOUR SORTIE PER DAY.

C. TWO TEN HOUR MISSIONS PER DAY.

D. VARIATIONS OF OPTIONS B AND C ABOVE TO INCLUDE PORTIONS OF ROUTE 25x1 TO PERMIT THE REMAINING AIRFRAME/CREW AVAILABILITY TO MEET OTHER OUTSTANDING NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.<sup>74</sup>

102235Z

PACSCTYRGN ADVISED USAFSS THAT OPTION ALPHA CONTAINED IN THEIR 100336Z APPEARED TO BE BEST CONOP TO SATISFY PACAF REQUIREMENT WITH MINIMUM IMPACT ON NSA REQUIREMENT AND CURRENT RESOURCES AND THAT THIS UNIT WOULD BE DIRECTED TO IMPLEMENT OPTION ALPHA UPON CINCPAC VALIDATION OF PACAF REQUIREMENT.<sup>75</sup>

102317

AFSSO PACAF PROVIDED FOLLOWING CONOP

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~~TOP SECRET TRITE~~

21

FOR MINIMUM COMMANDO ROYAL COVERAGE OF TWO HOURS PRIOR TO DAWN AND TWO HOURS PRIOR AND THRU LAST LIGHT EACH DAY. PACAF PROPOSED TO LAUNCH TWO SORTIES PER DAY WITH EACH PROVIDING FIVE HOURS ON ORBIT FOR DAILY TOTAL OF TEN HOURS. THE MORNING SORTIES WILL BE LAUNCHED TO BE ON ORBIT TWO HOURS PRIOR TO DAYLIGHT FOR TOTAL OF FIVE HOURS WHILE THE AFTER-NOON SORTIE WOULD BE ON ORBIT FOR FIVE HOURS TO INCLUDE COVERAGE THROUGH LAST LIGHT. PACAF FURTHER STATED BOTH FRONT AND BACK END CREWS WERE ADEQUATE FOR TASK AND COULD IMPLEMENT THESE REQUIREMENTS IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF APPROVAL.<sup>76</sup>

110741Z

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

WE PROPOSED THAT PACAF/CINCPAC REQUIREMENT FOR COVERAGE TWO HOURS BEFORE DAY BREAK AND TWO HOURS AFTER SUNSET COULD BE SATISFIED WHILE AT THE SAME TIME FULFILLING DIRNSA REQUIREMENT FOR TEN HOURS OF DAILY COVERAGE ON <sup>25x1</sup> ORBIT BY LAUNCHING <sup>25x1</sup> MIS-  
SIONS ON ROUTE <sup>25x1</sup> TO ARRIVE ON STA-  
TION AT POINT BRAVO-CHARLIE TWO HOURS BEFORE DAYBREAK LOITERING BETWEEN BRAVO-  
BRAVO AND BRAVO-CHARLIE UNTIL AFTER DAYBREAK AT WHICH TIME IT WOULD PROCEED NORTH TO POINTS ALPHA-LIMA AND ALPHA-  
MIKE. AN <sup>25x1</sup> MISSION THEN TO BE LAUNCHED ON <sup>25x1</sup> FOR A TEN HOURS SORTIE TO PROVIDE THE TEN HOUR COVERAGE TO INCLUDE TWO HOURS AFTER SUNSET.<sup>77</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

111925Z

CINCPAC TO JCS RECOMMENDING APPROVAL OF PACAF 082115Z AND PACAF 102317Z.<sup>78</sup>

120239Z

PacSCTYRgn ADVISED THAT PACAF 102317Z MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN PROPOSAL OUTLINED IN OUR 110741Z AND REQUESTED ACTION OUTLINED BY PACAF BE ACCOMPLISHED UPON RECEIPT OF AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT BY 5 AIR FORCE.<sup>79</sup>

130150Z

CINCPAC APPROVED PACAF 082115 AND 102317.<sup>80</sup>

~~TOP SECRET TRITE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

22

132110Z

AFSSO PACAF INFORMED 5 AIR FORCE OF CINCPAC APPROVAL OF PACAF 102317Z AND REQUESTED 5 AIR FORCE TO INITIATE COVER-AGE AS REQUESTED.<sup>81</sup>

140215Z

AFSSO 5 AIR FORCE STATED OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATION ON 25x1 RESTS WITH FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVON.

ON 12 FEBRUARY, 6091 RECON SQ INDICATED THAT COMMANDO ROYAL WOULD FLY OVERLAND PORTION OF PRIMARY ROUTE 25x1 DURING TIMES WHEN FIGHTER CAP NOT AVAILABLE PROVIDING STRIP ALERT AVAILABLE IN SUPPORT OF COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS AND FURTHER STATED THAT IF STRIP ALERT IS NOT AVAILABLE, MISSION AIRCRAFT TO ABORT. FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVON IN RESPONSE TO THIS MESSAGE ADVISED THAT ESCORT OR CAP WAS TO BE PROVIDED DURING ALL PORTIONS OF COMMANDO ROYAL ROUTE OF FLIGHT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS AND FURTHER THAT FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVON OR HIGHER AUTHORITY RESERVED THE AUTHORITY TO CHANGE THIS MISSION. (DET 1, 6922 SCTY SQ 130845Z)<sup>82</sup>

160605Z

WE ADVISED THAT PACAF 102317Z CONOP WAS IMPLEMENTED 16 FEBRUARY AND ADVISED USAFSS THAT DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION WAS DUE TO 5 AIR FORCE/6091 RECON SQ DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING THE NEW SCHEDULE.<sup>83</sup>

200230Z

25x1 QUOTED 5 AIR FORCE ADVON DO 170720Z:

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

COMMANDO ROYAL AIRCRAFT WILL FLY ROUTE BETWEEN 3900N-12949E, 3742N-12917E, 3742N-12900E, 3756N-12848E, 3712N-12648E, AND 3710N-12600E UNDER THESE CONDITIONS: POPEYE, NIGHT, AND NON-POPEYE DURING DAYLIGHT WITH FIGHTER ESCORT. POPEYE IS DEFINED AS IN CLOUDS, IN AND OUT OF THE CLOUDS EVERY 13 SECONDS, OR IN VISIBILITY OF LESS THAN ONE MILE.

COMMANDO ROYAL AIRCRAFT WILL FLY ROUTE BETWEEN 3702N-12917E TO 3635N-12600E

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

23

DURING NON-POPEYE DURING DAYLIGHT  
WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT, REPEAT WITHOUT  
FIGHTER ESCORT. GP-3 END QUOTE.

THIS ROUTE WAS INITIATED WITH COMMANDO  
ROYAL PROJECT [25x1] ON 20 FEBRUARY, 84

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

212054Z

ADMINO CINCPAC ADVISED THAT 5 AIR  
FORCE REQUEST TO ASSIGN A NEW TRACK  
NUMBER TO THE MODIFIED [25x1] ORBIT  
HAS BEEN APPROVED BY JCS 192012Z  
AND THAT THE [25x1] HAD BEEN  
ASSIGNED NUMBER [25x1] NEW ROUTE  
NUMBER WAS AUTHORIZED TO BE IMPLEMENTED  
IMMEDIATELY.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

24

CHAPTER III

COMMANDO ROYAL RESPONSE

~~(SCW)~~ THE 6988 SCTY SQ RESPONSE TO THE USS PUEBLO CAPTURE AND THE SUBSEQUENT KORCOM EMERGENCY TASKING WAS ESSENTIALLY A "TWO-PHASE" ACTION. THE FIRST PHASE COVERS THE PERIOD 23 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY DURING WHICH TIME COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS CONTINUED TO BE STAGED FROM YOKOTA. THE SECOND PHASE, THE 25x1 OPERATION, BEGAN ON 1 FEBRUARY WHEN COMMANDO ROYAL C-130B AIRCRAFT AND CREWS WERE DEPLOYED TO 25x1 KOREA TO PROVIDE REQUIRED KORCOM COVERAGE.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

~~(C)~~ THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE "FIRST-PHASE" REACTION TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT.

CREW ALERT

~~(SCW)~~ IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF A MESSAGE REPORTING THAT "THE PUEBLO BEING TAKE TO WONSAN UNDER ESCORT," ACTION WAS TAKEN TO FORM AND ALERT CREWS IN ANTICIPATION OF EMERGENCY ACRP TASKING.<sup>6</sup> ALL AIRBORNE OPERATORS WERE PLACED ON ALERT AND TWO CREWS WERE ALERTED TO PREPARE FOR IMMEDIATE LAUNCH. IN ORDER TO ENSURE POSITIVE CONTROL AND TO MINIMIZE CONFUSION, AN OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER WAS ESTABLISHED TO COORDINATE ALL CREW SCHEDULING AND TO REVIEW ALL MESSAGES PERTAINING TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT. THE CONTROL CENTER WAS MANNED BY AN OFFICER OR SENIOR NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ON A 24 HOUR BASIS UNTIL 1 FEBRUARY.

~~SECRET SAVIN~~



25

~~SECRET SAVING~~P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)MISSION SCHEDULING

(SCW) COORDINATION WITH 6091 RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON WAS EFFECTED TO PROVIDE A MISSION TO FLY ROUTE [25x1] UPON RECOVERY OF PROJECT 53M2A8 WHICH WAS RETURNING FROM ORBIT DUE TO A CONDITION FIVE. IMMEDIATE ACTION INCLUDED THE RESCHEDULING OF PROJECT 53T1A8 (ORIGINALLY PROGRAMMED FOR ROUTE 5C3222 ON 30 JANUARY) FOR A 230830Z TAKE-OFF. THIS MISSION WAS LAUNCHED AT 0912Z AND REMAINED ON-WATCH FROM 231134 TO 231829Z. IN ADDITION, ACTION WAS TAKEN TO ADD THE FOLLOWING PROJECTS TO THE SCHEDULE TO FLY ROUTE [25x1] 53N5A8, TAKE-OFF 231630Z; 53N6A8, TAKE-OFF 232230Z; [25x1] TAKE-OFF 240430Z. PROJECT 53N5A8 WAS LAUNCHED AS SCHEDULED AT 1630Z AND, AS DID PROJECT 53T1A8, LANDED AT [25x1] KOREA TO DROP-OFF KORCOM INTERCEPT

[25x1]

COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS TERMINATED

(SCW) ON 24 JANUARY, CINCPAC RECALLED PROJECT 53N5A8 ON ROUTE [25x1] AS WELL AS PROJECT 53N4A8 ON ROUTE [25x1] DUE TO DIRECTIVE TO TERMINATE ALL COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 13/15/16/18/20/21 AS A RESULT OF THE DIRECTED STAND-DOWN, THE FOLLOWING MISSIONS WERE CANCELLED: 53N2A8, TAKE-OFF 232100Z, ROUTE [25x1] [25x1] TAKE-OFF 240800Z, ROUTE [25x1] PROJECT 5301A8, TAKE-OFF 242100Z, ROUTE [25x1] AND PROJECT 5302A8, TAKE-OFF 242200Z, ROUTE [25x1] IN ADDITION, THE SCHEDULING ACTION TO ADD PROJECTS 53N6A8 AND

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26

5303A8 TO FLY ROUTE [25x1] ON 24 JANUARY 1968, WAS CANCELLED AND SUBJECT MISSIONS WERE NEVER OFFICIALLY ADDED TO THE PARPRO MONTHLY SCHEDULE.

COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS RESUMED

-(SCW) THE LAST ACRP COVERAGE OF NORTH KOREA WAS PROVIDED BY PROJECT 53N5A8 WHICH WENT OFF-WATCH AT 232107Z. ON 25 JANUARY WE WERE ADVISED THAT NORMAL COMMANDO ROYAL SCHEDULING COULD BE RESUMED WITH EXCEPTION OF ROUTE [25x1] WHICH WAS NOT TO BE FLOWN UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED. 25/26 AS A RESULT, PROJECT 53T3A8 WAS RESCHEDULED TO TAKE-OFF AT 250335Z ON ROUTE 5C3121 IN ORDER TO PROVIDE COVERAGE OF POSSIBLE SOVIET SURVEILLANCE OF THE ENTERPRISE TASK GROUP AND/OR OTHER SOVIET ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT. COLLECTION OF [25x1] COMMUNICATIONS BY THIS MISSION WAS HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE (36.4 HOURS VHF R/T COLLECTED); HOWEVER, [25x1] INTERCEPT WAS NEGLIGIBLE (0.3 HOURS).

-(SCW) PROJECT 53P1A8 ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR ROUTE 5C3220, TAKE-OFF 250800Z, WAS LAUNCHED AT 250335Z TO PROVIDE COVERAGE DURING A MORE FAVORABLE TIME FRAME. THIS MISSION PROVIDED THE FIRST WORTHWHILE COVERAGE OF NORTH KOREAN COMMUNICATIONS SINCE 232107Z. THE ONLY OTHER MISSION FLOWN BEFORE TASKING AGAIN CHANGED WAS PROJECT 53P2A8 WHICH FLEW ROUTE [25x1] ROUND-ROBIN FROM [25x1] ON 25 JANUARY.

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P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

~~SECRET SAVI~~

27

EMERGENCY KORCOM COVERAGE IMPLEMENTED

(SCW) ON 26 JANUARY A JCS REQUEST TO INITIATE 24 HOUR ACRP COVERAGE OF KORCOM TARGETS RESULTED IN THE CANCELLATION OF ALL OTHER COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS IN ORDER TO ENSURE AIRFRAMES WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE PROPOSED COVERAGE.<sup>29/31</sup> THIS ACTION RESULTED IN THE TERMINATION OF ALL COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS OTHER THAN THOSE TRANSITING TO AND FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THOSE IN SUPPORT OF THE KORCOM TASKING. COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS IN OTHER AREAS WAS NOT RESUMED UNTIL 5 FEBRUARY. DUE TO OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, HOWEVER, JCS REDUCED THE KORCOM COVERAGE REQUIREMENT TO DAYLIGHT COVERAGE ONLY.<sup>33</sup>

(SCW) IN ORDER TO ENSURE AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE SPECIAL KORCOM TASKING, THE COMMANDO ROYAL AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED 25x1 TO PROVIDE ROUTE 25x1 COVERAGE WAS RECALLED TO YOKOTA ON 27 JANUARY. IN ADDITION, THE FOLLOWING MISSIONS WERE CANCELLED (READ PROJECT NUMBER, ROUTE, TAKE-OFF TIME)

53P3A8	25x1	252100Z
53P4A8		252200Z
53Q1A8		260400Z
53Q2A8		262100Z
53Q3A8		262200Z
53Q4A8		262200Z
53J1A8		272100Z
53S2A8		282100Z
53S1A8		282200Z
53S3A8		282200Z
53N1A8		290330Z

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

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28

ALSO, THE FOLLOWING MISSIONS WERE CANCELLED BY 5 AIR FORCE AS  
A RESULT OF THEIR INTENTION TO PROGRAM THREE KORCOM MISSIONS  
DAILY:

53U3A8	25x1	292100Z
53T2A8		292200Z
53U1A8		302100Z
53L2A8		302200Z
53V1A8		310800Z

(SCW) ON 27 JANUARY, TWO COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS WERE  
FLOWN ON MODIFIED ROUTE 5C3222 (TAKE-OFF: 270800Z AND

25x1

36  
(c)

(SCW) DURING THE PERIOD 28 THRU 31 JANUARY MODIFIED ROUTE

25x1 MISSIONS WERE LAUNCHED AS FOLLOWS: 272000Z; 280200Z;  
281500Z; 282200Z; 290545Z; 291500Z; 292200Z; 300505Z; 301830Z;  
302345Z; 311815Z; AND 312355Z. THE MISSION LAUNCHED AT  
292200Z WAS FORCED TO RECOVER AT 25x1 DUE TO A PARTIALLY IN-  
FLATED LIFE RAFT WHICH CAUSED WING VIBRATIONS. THIS MISSION  
RETURNED TO ORBIT AFTER REFUELING AND WAS, THEREFORE, ABLE  
TO PROVIDE COVERAGE UNTIL DARKNESS. AS A RESULT THE MISSION  
LAUNCHED AT 300505Z RETURNED TO 25x1 PRIOR TO REACHING ORBIT.

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

29

THE MISSION LAUNCHED AT 300505Z WAS ADVISED TO RETURN TO BASE THROUGH COORDINATION BETWEEN THE AIRBORNE MISSION SUPERVISORS OF THE TWO MISSION AIRCRAFT VIA URC-53 COMMUNICATIONS.

PERSONNEL

(SCW) THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY THE INCREASED ALERT POSTURE RESULTING FROM THE PUEBLO INCIDENT WAS THE A203X1MI (KOREAN LINGUIST) AND A292X1 (MANUAL MORSE) PERSONNEL SHORTAGE. THE EMERGENCY KORCOM TASKING WAS EXPECTED TO BRING THE KORCOM INTERCEPT BACKLOGGED TO UNACCEPTABLE PROPORTIONS UNLESS PROMPT MANNING RELIEF WAS PROVIDED.

25x1

(SCW) ON 23 JANUARY, 15 A203X1MI PERSONNEL WAS ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT INCLUDING ONE TDY TO PROJECT RIVET TOP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ON 24 JANUARY, WE ADVISED PACSCTYRGN THAT A SERIOUS KOREAN LINGUIST SHORTAGE WAS ANTICIPATED AS A RESULT OF THE EMERGENCY TASKING. IN ADDITION, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT, IF COVERAGE WAS TO BE PROVIDED ON A THREE MISSION DAILY BASIS, EACH MANNED WITH THREE A203X1MI OPERATORS, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TERMINATE VIRTUALLY ALL KORCOM TRANSCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS AT THIS UNIT.<sup>86</sup> PACSCTYRGN REQUESTED WE REEVALUATE THE A203X1MI REQUIREMENT BASED ON DIRNSA REQUIREMENT FOR ONE TEN HOUR SORTIE PER DAY DURING DAYLIGHT

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P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

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HOURS WITH PROCESSING [25x1] IN ADDITION PACSCTYRGN DIRECTED THE RETURN OF THE A203X1MI ASSIGNED TDY TO PROJECT RIVET TOP.<sup>87</sup> WE DID NOT REQUIRE EMERGENCY A203X1MI MANNING ASSISTANCE UNDER THE ONE SORTIE PER DAY DIRNSA CONCEPT; HOWEVER, THE BACKLOG OF KOREAN INTECEPT WAS EXPECTED TO BECOME AN INCREASING PROBLEM.<sup>88</sup> THE REQUIREMENT FOR 203X1MI MANNING ASSISTANCE WAS RENEWED ON 26 JANUARY WHEN JCS DIRECTED CINCPAC TO INITIATE 24 HOUR ACRP COVERAGE OF NORTH KOREA.<sup>29</sup> WE INFORMED PACSCTYRGN THAT THE JCS REQUIREMENT WOULD VIRTUALLY ELIMINATE THIS UNIT'S KORCOM TRANSCRIPTION EFFORT AND THAT A292X1 MANNING WOULD ALSO BE CRITICAL WITH ONLY EIGHT QUALIFIED A292X1 PERSONNEL AVAILABLE. TO RESOLVE THE MANNING PROBLEM, WE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS BE TAKEN: 1. RECALL OF AIRCRAFT AND CREW DEPLOYED TO [25x1] 2. RECALL OF 292X1 OPERATOR TDY TO PROJECT RIVET TOP IN ADDITION TO THE A203X1MI TDY TO THAT PROJECT. 3. SUSPENSION OF ALL COM-MANDO ROYAL MISSIONS NOT BEING FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE EMERGENCY KOREAN TASKING. THE A292X1 AND A203X1MI OPERATORS TDY TO RIVET TOP RETURNED ON 1 FEBRUARY.

(SHVCCO) ON 26 JANUARY PACSCTYRGN REQUESTED USAFSS TO PROVIDE AVAILABLE CONUS 203X1MI RESOURCES TDY TO THIS UNIT.<sup>89</sup> USAFSS THEN QUERIED UNITS ON AVAILABILITY OF PERSONNEL POSSESSING A SECOND LANGUAGE CAPABILITY OF KOREAN FOR TDY TO THIS UNIT AND AT THE SAME TIME ADVISED PACSCTYRGN THAT NINE KOREAN

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31

LINGUISTS WERE AVAILABLE IN THE CONUS AND READY FOR SHIPMENT AS SOON AS A BASE OF OPERATIONS 25x1 WAS DETERMINED.<sup>90/91</sup> ON 27 JANUARY, USAFSS IDENTIFIED EIGHT 203X1M1 PERSONNEL WHO WERE BEING SENT TDY TO THIS UNIT FOR 60 DAYS.<sup>92</sup>

~~(SHVCCO)~~ TWO OF THE 203X1M1 AUGMENTEES ARRIVED ON 27 JANUARY, FIVE ON 28 JANUARY AND ONE ON 30 JANUARY. THESE AGUMENTEES WERE:

NAME	RANK	PARENT UNIT
LONGSTREET, JOHN M	SSGT	6948 SCTY Sq
TOUCHBERRY, THOMAS	SSGT	6948 SCTY Sq
GANOS, MICHAEL C	Sgt	6948 SCTY Sq
GRAYSON, DANIEL J	Sgt	6948 SCTY Sq
CLINTON, HENRY M	SSGT	6993 SCTY Sq
LUKE, CHARLES F	SSGT	6993 SCTY Sq
TILLMAN, TERRY W	SSGT	6940 TECH TNG GP
SMITH, CAMILLE L	Sgt	6940 TECH TNG GP

~~(SCW)~~ DUE TO THE TENSE POSTURE RESULTING FROM THE PUEBLO SEIZURE, WE MANNED ALL COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN TARGETS WITH TWO 292X1 OPERATORS TO ENSURE OPTIMUM INTERNAL WARNING CAPABILITY. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT 292X1 MANNING RELIEF COULD BE PROVIDED BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF SUCH OPERATORS ON EACH MISSION TO ONE; HOWEVER, IT WAS DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO USE TWO 292X1s PER MISSION AT LEAST UNTIL THE SITUATION STABILIZED. TWO 292X1s WERE ASSIGNED TO EACH MISSION UNTIL 14 FEBRUARY WHEN WE RETURNED TO THE NORMAL ONE PER MISSION.<sup>89/93</sup>

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32

CHAPTER IV

ROUTES

<sup>3</sup>  
530222

(SHVCCG) ROUTE [25x1] RECEIVED CLOSE ATTENTION AS A  
RESULT OF THE EMERGENCY KORCOM TASKING. THIS ROUTE INCLUDES  
THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

BRAVO ALPHA 4130N-13149E  
BRAVO BRAVO 3900N-12949E  
BRAVO CHARLIE 3742N-12917E  
BRAVO DELTA 3715N-12600E  
BRAVO ECHO 3715N-12450E  
BRAVO FOXTROT 3618N-12400E  
BRAVO HOTEL 3503N-12123E  
BRAVO ITEM 3425N-12149E

THIS ORBIT WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE BOTH KORCOM AND [25x1]  
COVERAGE WITH THE BULK OF THE KORCOM COVERAGE BEING PROVIDED  
BETWEEN POINTS BA AND BE. THE SECOND MISSION FLOWN ON THIS  
ROUTE ON 23 JANUARY HELD BETWEEN POINTS BB AND BD AS REQUESTED  
BY DIRNSA IN THEIR STATEMENT OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TO JCS.<sup>19</sup>

(SHVCCG) DURING THE PERIOD OF THE "HOLD" ON ALL [25x1]  
MISSION, FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON THIS ORBIT WERE IMPOSED. ON  
JANUARY, ADMINS CINC PAC DIRECTED AIRBORNE UNITS TO REMAIN  
OUTSIDE OF THE AREA WITHIN 80 NM OF THE COAST OF NORTH KOREA NORTH  
OF A LINE EXTENDING EAST FROM THE DMZ.<sup>27</sup> THE JCS REQUEST  
OF 26 JANUARY FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOUR COVERAGE OF NORTH KOREA  
ALSO INCLUDED THE RESTRICTION TO FLY ONLY THAT PORTION OF  
TRACK [25x1] BETWEEN POINTS BRAVO-BRAVO AND BRAVO-DELTA.<sup>29/37</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)



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33

CINCPAC THEN AUTHORIZED MODIFICATION OF TRACKS 25x1 AND 25x1 TO PERMIT AIRCRAFT TO REMAIN 25 NM SOUTH OF DMZ WHILE OVER KOREAN LAND MASS. AS A RESULT, WHEN OPERATIONS ON ROUTE 25x1 WERE RESUMED ON 27 JANUARY, THE FIRST TWO MISSIONS HELD 25 NM SOUTH OF POINTS BRAVO-CHARLIE AND BRAVO-DELTA.

(SCW) ON 27 JANUARY DIRNSA REQUESTED AN EVALUATION OF ROUTE 25x1 AS MODIFIED BY JCS (ORBIT BETWEEN BRAVO-BRAVO AND BRAVO-DELTA ONLY).<sup>94</sup> WE ADVISED THAT THE TRACK BETWEEN POINTS BRAVO-BRAVO AND BRAVO-CHARLIE OFFERED ~~ON~~<sup>NO</sup> COVERAGE NOT AFFORDED BY THE TRACK BETWEEN POINTS BRAVO-CHARLIE AND BRAVO-DELTA. IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT FUTURE MISSIONS BE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD BETWEEN POINTS BRAVO-CHARLIE AND 12800E IN ORDER TO PROVIDE OPTIMUM INTERCEPT OF THE WONSAN AREA TARGETS.<sup>95</sup> DIRNSA CONCURRED WITH THIS PROPOSAL AND BEGINNING 28 JANUARY ROUTE 25x1 WAS FLOWN BETWEEN THESE POINTS.<sup>96</sup>

(SHVCCO) ON 28 JANUARY CINCPAC AUTHORIZED ROUTE 25x1 TO BE FLOWN AS FOLLOWS: A. MISSION AIRCRAFT TO REMAIN AT LEAST 25 NM SOUTH OF THE DMZ WHILE OVER KOREAN LAND MASS; B. ENTRANCE TO AND EXIT FROM ORBIT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED FROM AND TO THE SOUTH; C. WESTERN POINT OF TRACK: 3715N-12600E; D. NORTHERN POINT OF TRACK: 3900N-12949; AND E. MODIFIED TRACK FROM WEST TO EAST AS FOLLOWS: (1) COMMENCE AT 3715N-12600E; (2) THEN EAST ALONG AND AT LEAST 25 NM SOUTH OF DMZ TO EAST COAST; (3) THEN SOUTH ALONG COASTLINE TO 3742N; (4)

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34

THEN DUE EAST TO 3742N-12917E; AND (5) THEN NORTH ON ORIGINAL TRACK TO 3900N-12949E.<sup>49</sup> THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTION TO THE CONDITION FOUR WARNING LINE WAS ESTABLISHED AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE MODIFICATION: ENTER 3730N-12700E; EXIT 3750N-12855E, THEN RETURN, ENTER 3750N-12855E, EXIT 3730N-1200E.<sup>63</sup> A FALL-BACK ROUTE WAS ESTABLISHED TO BE FLOWN WHEN FIGHTER COVER WAS NOT AVAILABLE ON [25x1] WITH COORDINATES AS FOLLOWS: 3702N-12917E TO 3635N-12600E.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

(SHVCCO) ON 16 FEBRUARY A NEW MODIFICATION TO ROUTE 5C3222 WAS IMPLEMENTED AT THE DIRECTION OF 5 AIR FORCE ADVON. COORDINATES FOR ROUTE [25x1] (MODIFIED) WERE NOW AS FOLLOWS: 3900N-12949E; 3742N-12917E; 3742N-12900E; 3756N-12848E; AND 3712N-12648E. THIS ROUTE TO BE FLOWN UNDER FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: POPEYE, NIGHT, AND NON-POPEYE DURING DAYLIGHT WITH FIGHTER ESCORT. A POPEYE CONDITION WAS DESCRIBED AS IN CLOUDS, IN AND OUT OF THE CLOUDS EVERY 13 SECONDS, OR IN VISIBILITY OF LESS THAN ONE MILE. DURING NON-POPEYE CONDITION DURING DAYLIGHT WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT COMMANDO ROYAL WAS REQUIRED TO FLY ON THE FALL-BACK ROUTE (3702N-12917E TO 3635N-12600E).<sup>84</sup>

(SHVCCO) ON 26 FEBRUARY, ADMINO CINCPAC ADVISED THAT JCS HAD APPROVED 5 AIR FORCE ADVON MODIFICATION TO ROUTE [25x1] AND HAD REQUESTED THAT THE MODIFIED TRACK BE ASSIGNED A NEW ROUTE DESIGNATOR. THE MODIFIED ROUTE [25x1] WAS THEREFORE, REDESIGNATED ROUTE [25x1] AND WAS FLOWN FOR THE FIRST TIME

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~~HANDLED BY CHANNELS ONLY~~

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35

UNDER THIS DESIGNATION ON 25 FEBRUARY.<sup>85</sup> THE FOLLOWING DIAGRAMS WERE ASSIGNED TO ROUTE 503223:

BRAVO BRAVO 3900N-12949E  
BRAVO CHARLIE 3742N-12917E  
BRAVO MIKE 3742N-12900E  
BRAVO NOVEMBER 3756N-12848E  
BRAVO OSCAR 3712N-12648E  
BRAVO PAPA 3710N-12600E

25x1

(SHVCCO) DUE TO THE NECESSARY KORCOM TASKING AND SUBSEQUENTLY FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED UPON AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER KOREA, SEVERAL ADJUSTMENTS TO OTHER ROUTES WERE REQUIRED.

UNABLE TO SUPPORT BOTH THE 25x1 AND 25x1 DEPLOYMENT, THE 6091 RECON SQ TERMINATED OPERATIONS OUT OF 25x1 (ROUTE 503340). WE, THEREFORE, PROPOSED TO MODIFY ROUTE 25x1

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

25x1

GOLF. IT WAS ALSO PROPOSED TO MODIFY ROUTE 25x1 TO FLY THAT PORTION OF THE ORBIT OUTSIDE THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY CINCPAC WITH ENTRY POINT BRAVO-FOXTROT.<sup>49</sup> ROUTE 25x1 WAS MODIFIED TO EXCLUDE THAT PART OF THE ROUTE WEST OF 13212E WITH ENTRY POINT ALPHA-LIMA VICE ALPHA-MIKE.<sup>64/65/66</sup>

USAFSS DID NOT CONSIDER THE MODIFIED ROUTE 25x1 TO BE SATISFACTORY AND DIRECTED USE OF ROUTE 25x1

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS~~  
~~CLASSIFIED ONLY~~

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36

TO PROVIDE [25x1] COVERAGE UPON RESUMPTION OF COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS IN THAT AREA.

—(SHVCCO) SUBSEQUENTLY COORDINATION WITH 6091 RECON Sq RESULTED IN ENTRY POINT FOR ROUTES [25x1] BEING CHANGED TO BRAVO-KILO (3120N-12400E) AND BRAVO-FOXTROT (3618N-12400E) RESPECTIVELY. FOLLOWING IS STATUS OF THESE ROUTES WHEN RESUMED ON 5 FEBRUARY:

[25x1] - ENTER ALPHA-LIMA. EXCLUDE PORTION OF ROUTE WEST OF 13212E.

[25x1] ENTER BRAVO-FOXTROT. FLY [25x1]  
NO MISSIONS TO BE FLOWN ON THIS ROUTE UNTIL

FUTH

[25x1] ENTER BRAVO-KILO. FLY [25x1]

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37

CHAPTER V  
FIGHTER COVER

~~(SCW)~~ ON 24 JANUARY, PACSCTYRGN ADVISED THAT THE RECALL OF THE COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION ON ROUTE 25x1 THE PREVIOUS DAY WAS DUE TO THE HIGHLY VULNERABLE POSITION OF THE AIRCRAFT WITHOUT FIGHTER CAP.<sup>21</sup> COMMANDO ROYAL KORCOM COVERAGE WAS TERMINATED AFTER RECALL OF MISSION ON 23 JANUARY UNTIL THE FIGHTER COVER PROBLEM COULD BE RESOLVED. ON 26 JANUARY, JCS DIRECTED THAT ACRP COVERAGE OF NORTH KOREA BE RESUMED WITH ALL FLIGHTS TO BE ESCORTED BY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AT ALL TIMES.<sup>29/33</sup> CINCPAC WAS AUTHORIZED TO INCREASE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT STRENGTH IN SOUTH KOREA BY A TOTAL OF TWELVE AIRCRAFT TO PROVIDE ACRP ESCORT DUTY.<sup>33/37</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4(c)

~~(SHVCCO)~~ ON 27 JANUARY CINCPACAF OUTLINED FIGHTER COVER REQUIREMENTS IN DETAIL WHICH INCLUDED: A. COVER TO BE PROVIDED BY F-4C AIRCRAFT BASED AT KUNSAN, KOREA; B. MINIMUM OF TWO OF FOUR F-4 AIRCRAFT TO BE AIRBORNE AND IN POSITION TO PROVIDE ESCORT FOR COMMANDO ROYAL AT ALL TIMES WHEN MISSION OPERATING ABOVE 37 DEGREES NORTH; C. MINIMUM OF TWO FIGHTERS TO REMAIN IN POSITION TO INTERCEPT HOSTILES WHILE OTHER ELEMENT OF TWO FIGHTERS IS WITH TANKER; D. IF LESS THAN FOUR FIGHTERS AVAILABLE, MISSION TO ABORT OR BOTH COMMANDO ROYAL AND TANKER WILL WITHDRAW TO A POSITION SOUTH OF 37 DEGREES

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38

NORTH UNTIL FIGHTER FORCE IS RECONSTITUTED.<sup>40</sup>

~~(SHVCCO)~~ ON 27 JANUARY, PACSCTYRGN REPORTED THAT CINCPAC JRC WAS REQUESTING JCS TO ESTABLISH A SPECIFIED DISTANCE SOUTH OF THE DMZ AT WHICH COMMANDO ROYAL COULD FLY WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT WHILE REMAINING OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND MASS. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT JCS HAD AUTHORIZED COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS 25 NM SOUTH OF DMZ DURING NIGHT HOURS WITHOUT FIGHTERS.<sup>41</sup> CINCPAC, THEREFORE, AUTHORIZED COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT OR COMBAT AIR PATROL PROVIDED: A. MISSION AIRCRAFT COVERED BY FIGHTERS ON STRIP ALERT; B. MISSION AIRCRAFT REMAIN AT LEAST 25 NM SOUTH OF THE DMZ AND REMAIN OVER THE KOREAN LAND MASS; AND C. ENTRANCE TO AND EXIT FROM THE ORBIT ACCOMPLISHED FROM AND TO THE SOUTH.<sup>42</sup>

~~(SHVCCO)~~ ON 16 FEBRUARY, THE FIGHTER COVER REQUIREMENT WAS AMENDED TO ALLOW COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS TO FLY THE MODIFIED ROUTE 25x1 WITHOUT FIGHTER COVER DURING THE DAY UNDER IFR CONDITIONS.<sup>84</sup> ON 1 MARCH, 5 AIR FORCE ADVON PUBLISHED OPERATIONS ORDER 501-68, COMMANDO ROYAL ESCORT, WHICH PROVIDED DETAILS OF FIGHTER ESCORT REQUIREMENT. THIS PUBLICATIONS CONSOLIDATED THAT INFORMATION ON FIGHTER ESCORT REQUIREMENTS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED IN VARIOUS MESSAGES. IT DID, HOWEVER, REQUIRE THAT COMMANDO ROYAL REMAIN AT LEAST 30 NM VICE 25 NM SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4(c)

~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLING VIA COMINT~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

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39

# CHAPTER VI

## OSAN OPERATION ESTABLISHED

~~(SHVCCO)~~ ON 26 JANUARY, USAFSS PROPOSED THAT AN OPERATION LOCATION BE ESTABLISHED AT 25x1 KOREA TO SUPPORT JCS REQUIREMENT FOR 24 HOUR DAILY COVERAGE OF THE EAST COAST AND DMZ AREA OF NORTH KOREA.<sup>29/30</sup> THIS UNIT ADVISED THAT APPROXIMATELY 50 PERSONNEL WOULD BE DEPLOYED IF 25x1 OPERATION WAS ESTABLISHED.<sup>32</sup> USAFSS THEN REQUESTED PACSCTYRGN TO COORDINATE WITH PACAF TO ESTABLISH THE 25x1 OPERATION AND TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION TO PROVIDE 25x1 OSAN WITH SUPPLEMENTARY TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS.<sup>34</sup> THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A CINCPAC REQUEST TO JCS FOR AUTHORIZATION TO DEPLOY COMMANDO ROYAL RESOURCES TO KOREA AS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT TASKING.<sup>37</sup> ON 27 JANUARY, PACSCTYRGN INDICATED THAT, UPON FORMAL AUTHORIZATION BY JCS, AND 25x1 OPERATION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SEVERAL MESSAGES ON THIS SUBJECT WERE RECEIVED CONCERNING CONCEPTS AND REQUIREMENTS AND THEN, ON 30 JANUARY, PACSCTYRGN INFORMED THIS UNIT THAT JCS HAD AUTHORIZED TWO AIRCRAFT TO BE DEPLOYED TO 25x1 TO PROVIDE TEN HOURS OF DAILY DAYLIGHT COVERAGE.<sup>39/48/49/51/56</sup> THIS WAS SOON FOLLOWED BY A MESSAGE FROM PACAF TO 5 AIR FORCE PROVIDING CLEARANCE TO DEPLOY TWO C-130 AIRCRAFT TO 25x1<sup>57</sup> PACSCTYRGN THEN ADVISED THAT WE WERE AUTHORIZED TO STAGE

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)~~SECRET~~~~HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS~~~~CLASSIFICATION~~

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EO 1.4.(c)

40

COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS OUT OF OSAN AS DIRECTED BY PACAF.<sup>60</sup>

~~(SHVCCO)~~ ON 31 JANUARY, ONE OFFICER AND ONE NON-COMMIS-  
SIONED OFFICER FROM THIS UNIT WERE SENT TO [25x1] TO PREPARE FOR  
THE IMPENDING DEPLOYMENT OF COMMANDO ROYAL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS.  
A PRELIMINARY CONCEPT OF OPERATION WAS FORMULATED AND FOR-  
WARDED TO PACSCTYRGN OUTLINING PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS, REPORT-  
ING AND TRANSCRIPTION PROCEDURES, AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE  
AT [25x1] ~~AVAILABLE~~ TO SUPPORT THE COMMANDO ROYAL DEPLOYMENT.  
BILLETING AND TRANSPORTATION FOR CREWS AND PROJECT PERSONNEL  
WERE EXPECTED TO BE ESPECIALLY CRITICAL PROBLEM AREAS.<sup>59/97/98</sup>

ON 1 FEBRUARY TWO MISSIONS WERE LAUNCHED [25x1] TO FLY  
MODIFIED ROUTE [25x1] DAILY MISSIONS WERE  
THEN IMPLEMENTED ON 2 FEBRUARY FROM THAT BASE.<sup>59/99</sup> EFFECTIVE  
010800Z THE 6988 SCTY SQ ELEMENT DEPLOYED TO [25x1] ASSUMED  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION, TRANSCRIPTION, AND REPORTING  
OF ALL ACRP KORCOM TACTICAL VOICE INTERCEPT.<sup>100</sup> ON 4 FEB-  
RUARY THE COMMANDO ROYAL OFFICER (CRPO) AT [25x1] IMPLEMENTED  
A DAILY STATUS REPORT TO THIS UNIT.<sup>101</sup> THE 6091 RECONNAISSANCE  
SQUADRON ESTABLISHED A DETACHMENT (DETACHMENT 3) AT [25x1] TO  
CONDUCT COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS AND ON 14 FEBRUARY, 5 AIR  
FORCE ADVISED THAT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE [25x1] COMMANDO  
ROYAL ELEMENT RESTED WITH 5 AIR FORCE ADVON AT [25x1].<sup>82</sup>

#### MISSION STATUS

~~(SHVCCO)~~ WHILE THE [25x1] OPERATION WAS ESTABLISHED ON THE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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41

BASIS OF PROVIDING ONE MISSION DAILY FOR DAYLIGHT COVERAGE, WE WERE AWARE, AS EARLY AS 31 JANUARY, THAT 5 AIR FORCE DESIRED EXPANDED COVERAGE WHICH WOULD REQUIRE TWO MISSIONS DAILY.<sup>102</sup>

THIS PROPOSAL GENERATED SOME CONCERN ON THE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON OTHER COMMANDO ROYAL COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.<sup>61/62</sup>

~~(SHVCCO)~~ THE EXPANDED COVERAGE REQUIREMENT WAS FORMALLY STATED BY PACAF ON 9 FEBRUARY WHEN THEY REQUESTED IMMEDIATE ACTION TO CHANGE THE COMMANDO ROYAL SCHEDULE TO PROVIDE COVERAGE A MINIMUM OF TWO HOURS PRIOR TO DAWN AND A MINIMUM OF TWO HOURS PRIOR AND THRU LAST LIGHT EACH DAY. PACAF STATED THAT THIS REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON 5 AIR FORCE ADVON CONCERN THAT ANY HOSTILE ACTION BY THE KCRCOMS WOULD PROBABLY OCCUR DURING FIRST LIGHT.<sup>70</sup> SEVERAL MESSAGES WERE EXCHANGED ON THIS PROPOSAL WITH PACSCTYRGN RECOMMENDING TWO FIVE-HOUR SORTIES BE LAUNCHED DAILY FROM 25x1 TO MEET THE DAWN AND DUSK REQUIREMENT.<sup>71/72/73/74/77</sup> PACSCTYRGN ADVISED USAFSS THAT,

EO 1.4.(c)

UPON VALIDATION OF PACAF REQUIREMENT BY CINCPAC, THE 6988 SCTY SQ WOULD BE DIRECTED TO IMPLEMENT THE TWO SORTIE DAILY PROPOSAL.<sup>75</sup> ON 11 FEBRUARY, PACAF PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING CONCEPT OF OPERATION TO CINCPAC: TWO SORTIES PER DAY TO BE LAUNCHED WITH EACH OBTAINING FIVE HOURS ON ORBIT TIME; THE MORNING SORTIES TO BE LAUNCHED TWO HOURS PRIOR TO DAYLIGHT WITH THE LATE SORTIES ON ORBIT FIVE HOURS TO PROVIDE COVERAGE THROUGH LAST LIGHT. PACAF ALSO ADVISED THAT THIS

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42

REQUIREMENT COULD BE MET WITH THE AIRCRAFT (TWO) THEN IN  
PLACE AT 25x1<sup>76</sup> USAFSS CONCURRED WITH PACAF CONCEPT AND  
CINCPAC RECOMMENDED TO JCS THAT THE PACAF PROPOSAL BE  
APPROVED.<sup>78/79</sup> ON 13 FEBRUARY APPROVAL OF THE PACAF REQUIRE-  
MENT WAS PROVIDED BY CINCPAC.<sup>80</sup> ON 14 FEBRUARY PACAF  
DIRECTED 5 AIR FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THIS COVERAGE.<sup>81</sup> TWO  
DAILY SIX-HOUR MISSIONS WERE BEGAN ON 16 FEBRUARY.<sup>83</sup> ✓  
COMMANDO ROYAL WAS INITIALLY SCHEDULED TO TAKE-OFF AT  
1930Z AND 0430Z; HOWEVER, TAKE-OFF TIMES WERE ADJUSTED  
TO 1900Z AND 0500Z ON 18 FEBRUARY.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

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~~HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS~~  
~~CHANGING CHAIR~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

## CHAPTER VII

## PERSONNEL

~~(SCW)~~ AS INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, THE INITIAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE 25x1 OPERATION WERE PROVIDED ON 31 JANUARY WHEN A PROJECT OFFICER AND PROJECT NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER WERE DEPLOYED TO 25x1 FOLLOWED BY TWO CREWS ON 1 FEBRUARY. ON 2 FEBRUARY, THE EIGHT 203X1MI AUGMENTEES TDY TO THIS UNIT FROM CONUS RESOURCES, ALONG WITH FOUR ADDITIONAL 6988 SCTY Sq A203X1MI PERSONNEL, WERE DEPLOYED TO 25x1 TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPTION AND REPORTING SUPPORT. <sup>102</sup>

THE STATION BACKLOG OF KORCOM INTERCEPT (87 TAPES) WAS ALSO FORWARDED TO OSAN TO BE TRANSCRIBED ON A TIME AVAILABLE BASIS. THIS BACKLOG WAS COMPLETELY ELIMINATED BY 12 FEBRUARY.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

~~(SHVCCO)~~ AS OF 2 FEBRUARY THE PERSONNEL STATUS AT OSAN WAS AS FOLLOWS:

E8035	1 (PROJECT OFFICER)
A203X1MI	14
203X1MI	8 (CONUS TDY AGUMENTEES)
A203X1MB	9 (INCLUDES ONE PROJECT NCO)
A203X1MA	4
A292X1	4
A294X0	4
A301X3	7
TOTAL	49

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COMMANDO ROYAL CREW COMPOSITION ON MISSIONS STAGING FROM OSAN WAS AS FOLLOWS: A203X1MI - 3; A203X1MB - 3; A203X1MA - 2; A301X3 - 2; A292X1 - 2; AND A294X0 - 1. THE FIRST CREW EXCHANGE WAS EFFECTED ON 13 FEBRUARY WITH THE NUMBER OF A292X1s PER CREW REDUCED FROM TWO TO ONE. ON 14 FEBRUARY AN ADDITIONAL CREW WAS DEPLOYED TO 25x1 DUE TO INCREASE TO TWO MISSIONS DAILY BEGINNING 16 FEBRUARY. ON 31 JANUARY PACSCTYRGN ADVISED THAT USAFSS HAD REQUESTED THE 6922 SCTY Wg TO ALERT TWO A203X1MIs FROM THE 6990 SCTY Sq FOR DEPLOYMENT TO DET 1, 6922 SCTY Wg. PACSCTYRGN INDICATED THEY INTENDED TO ASSIGN THESE PERSONNEL TO THE 6988 SCTY Sq VICE DET 1, 6922 SCTY Wg SINCE THEY WERE AIRBORNE QUALIFIED WITH TWO OF THE NON-CREW AUGMENTEES TDY TO THE 6988 SCTY Sq TO BE REASSIGNED TO DET 1, 6922 SCTY Wg AS REPLACEMENTS.<sup>108</sup> THE 6990 SCTY Sq INDICATED THAT DEPLOYMENT OF TWO A203X1MIs FROM THEIR LIMITED RESOURCES COULD CAUSE FLYING HOUR PROBLEMS. WE, INFORMED PACSCTYRGN THAT TDY ASSISTANCE FROM 6990 SCTY Sq WAS NOT REQUIRED AND THIS ACTION WAS, THEREFORE, CANCELLED.<sup>104/105/106/107/108</sup> ON 28 FEBRUARY, 6948 SCTY Sq CONCURRED WITH OUR REQUEST TO CHECK-OUT ONE OF THE 203X1MI AUGMENTEES TDY FROM THEIR UNIT FOR AIRBORNE DUTIES.<sup>109/110</sup>

LOGISTICS

(CHVCCG) THE RAPID AND LARGE BUILD UP OF PERSONNEL AT

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45

[25x1] PLACED A SEVERE STRAIN ON BASE SUPPORT FACILITIES, PARTICULARLY BILLETING AND TRANSPORTATION. THE OUTSTANDING COOPERATION AND SUPPORT PROVIDED BY DET 1, 6922 SCTY Wg SERVED TO LESSEN THE IMPACT OF THE LIMITED BASE SUPPORT AVAILABLE IN THESE AREAS. THE EXPANDED MISSION AT DET 1, 6922 SCTY Wg PLUS COMMANDO ROYAL PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS ALSO REQUIRED THAT SUPPLEMENTARY EQUIPMENT BE PROVIDED.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

~~(SHVCCO)~~ EQUIPMENT. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS AT [25x1] REQUIRED THE TRANSFER OF ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS TO DET 1, 6922 SCTY Wg. ON 26 JANUARY, USAFSS PROPOSED THAT TWO MOBILE TY0018 HUTS BE FURNISHED BY [25x1] OR, AS AN ALTERNATIVE, FOUR AG-118s BE PROVIDED BY 6990 SCTY Sq PLUS ONE HUT. EITHER ALTERNATIVE WAS TO PROVIDE A CAPABILITY TO HAVE A MINIMUM OF NINE TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS AVAILABLE AT [25x1]<sup>34</sup> ON 27 JANUARY, PACSCTYRgn DIRECTED 6990 SCTY Sq TO PLACE FOUR AG-118s, TWO SPARE KITS AND FOUR PORTABLE MC-88s ON 180 DAY LOAN TO 6988 SCTY Sq WITH IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT OF THIS EQUIPMENT FROM 6988 SCTY Sq TO [25x1] IN ADDITION, 6924 SCTY Sq WAS REQUESTED TO DETERMINE IF ONE OF FOUR AG-118 POSITIONS ON LOAN FROM 6988 SCTY Sq TO THAT UNIT COULD BE RELEASED FOR RETURN TO 6988 SCTY Sq.<sup>111</sup> THIS ACTION WAS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE TO SATISFY THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE COMMANDO ROYAL [25x1] OPERATION WITH ADDITIONAL PROCESSING CAPABILITY TO BE PROVIDED AS NECESSARY.

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~~CLASSIFIED ONLY~~

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46

THIS UNIT WAS ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT OF THE [25x1] OPERATION TO INCLUDE THE FOUR AG-118 POSITIONS ON LOAN FROM THE 6990 SCTY SQ.<sup>112</sup> ON 28 JANUARY, PACSCTYRGN DIRECTED 6922 SCTY Wg TO MOVE TWO COMFY CARD HUTS AND GENERATORS TO [25x1] AND THE 6990 SCTY SQ TO PLACE THE AG-118s ON LOAN AS DIRECTED. THE AG-118s WERE TO BE RETURNED TO THE 6990 SCTY SQ AS SOON AS THE COMFY CARD HUTS WERE IN PLACE AND HAD PROVEN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.<sup>113</sup> THE 6924 SCTY SQ WAS DIRECTED TO RETURN ONE AG-118 WITH PORTABLE MC-88 AND ONE G-276 DEMODULATR TO THE 6988 SCTY SQ. THIS POSITION WAS RECEIVED ON 5 FEBRUARY; HOWEVER, DUE TO CONDITION OF POSITION, IT WAS RETAINED AT THIS UNIT FOR REPAIR. WHEN REPAIRED, THIS POSITION WAS TO BE SHIPPED TO

EO 1.4(c)  
P.L. 86-36

[25x1]

(SHVCCO) ON 2 FEBRUARY, THE COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT OFFICER AT OSAN ADVISED THAT THE COMFY CARD HUTS COULD NOT BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED SINCE ONLY ONE POSITION IN EACH HUT WAS CONFIGURED FOR TRANSCRIPTION AND THAT OTHER POSITIONS HAD BEEN MODIFIED SO THAT FOUR COULD BE USED. ON 3 FEBRUARY, IT WAS REPORTED THAT FIVE TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS IN THE COMFY CARD HUTS WERE BEING FULLY UTILIZED FOR TRANSCRIPTION AND THAT, UPON RECEIPT OF THE AG-118s, THE COMFY CARD POSITIONS WOULD BE TAKEN OVER BY [25x1] AS A RESULT OF THEIR EXPANDING REQUIREMENTS.<sup>101</sup> ON THE SAME DAY THE

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E.O. 1.4(c)

FOUR AG-118 POSITIONS ON LOAN FROM THE 6990 SCTY SQ WERE RECEIVED. ON 6 FEBRUARY THE COMMANDO ROYAL OSAN PROCESSING CAPABILITY CONSISTED OF EIGHT POSITIONS. THIS INCLUDED FIVE COMFY CARD POSITIONS AND THREE AG-118s (ONE AG-118 AT [25x1] WAS OUT FOR A POWER CABLE WITH THE FIFTH AG-118 PROGRAMMED FOR [25x1] STILL AT [25x1] AWAITING PARTS).<sup>114</sup>

~~(SHVCCO)~~ ON 13 FEBRUARY, PACSCTYRGN QUERIED IF THE TWO COMFY CARD HUTS WOULD SATISFY COMMANDO ROYAL PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS AT [25x1] AND, IF NOT, HOW MANY AG-118s WOULD BE NEEDED TO SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.<sup>115</sup> THE COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT OFFICER AT [25x1] INDICATED THAT BOTH COMFY CARD HUTS WERE BEING UTILIZED FOR TRANSCRIPTION OF COMMANDO ROYAL INTERCEPT. OF THE EIGHT POSITIONS AVAILABLE, FIVE WERE BEING USED FOR TRANSCRIPTION WITH THE THREE REMAINING POSITIONS USED BY [25x1] IN SUPPORT OF THEIR TRANSMISSION SECURITY EFFORT. WITH THE FOUR AG-118 POSITIONS OPERATIONAL AND THE FIFTH PROGRAMMED TO BE FORWARDED FROM [25x1] AFTER REPAIR, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT ALL KORCOM INTERCEPT COULD BE PROCESSED ON THESE POSITIONS.<sup>116</sup>

~~(SHVCCO)~~ ON 15 FEBRUARY, USAFSS REQUESTED THAT THE AG-118 POSITIONS ON LOAN TO [25x1] OPERATION BE RETURNED TO 6990 SCTY SQ AND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO PREPOSITIONING THE AG-118s AT 6922 SCTY WG TO BE USED DURING UNEXPECTED COMBAT APPLE RECOVERIES AT THAT LOCATION.<sup>117</sup>

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48

THE CRPO OBJECTED TO THIS PROPOSAL POINTING OUT THAT THE AG-118s WERE BEING UTILIZED APPROXIMATELY SIXTEEN HOURS DAILY.<sup>118</sup> THIS PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED ON 24 FEBRUARY WHEN PACSCTYRGN DIRECTED 6924 SCTY SQ TO RETURN THE THREE AG-118s ON LOAN FROM THE 6988 SCTY SQ IMMEDIATELY. FURTHER, WE WERE ADVISED TO HOLD SHIPMENT OF THE AG-118 PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED FROM THE 6924 SCTY SQ FOR SHIPMENT TO [25x1] UPON RECEIPT, INSPECTION, AND REPAIR OF SUBJECT POSITIONS BY THIS UNIT WE WERE THEN TO SHIP THE FOUR AG-118s TO 6990 SCTY SQ AND 6922 SCTY Wg AS REPLACEMENTS FOR THE FOUR AG-118s PROVIDED BY THE 6990 SCTY SQ TO THE [25x1] OPERATION. ACCOUNTABILITY WAS THEN TO BE TRANSFERRED WITH THE FOUR AG-118s AT [25x1] ON LOAN FROM 6990 SCTY SQ BECOMING THE PROPERTY OF THE 6988 SCTY SQ AND THE FOUR AG-118s RETURNED FROM THE 6924 SCTY SQ TO THIS UNIT FOR SHIPMENT TO 6990 SCTY SQ (TWO EACH) AND 6922 SCTY Wg (TWO EACH) BECOMING THE PROPERTY OF THE 6990 SCTY SQ. THE THREE AG-118s RETURNED BY THE 6924 SCTY SQ WERE RECEIVED ON 3 MARCH. ON 13 MARCH, TWO AG-118s WERE SHIPPED TO 6922 SCTY Wg. SHIPMENT OF THE REMAINING TWO POSITIONS TO THE 6990 SCTY SQ WAS DELAYED PENDING COMPLETION OF INSPECTION AND REPAIR AND RECEIPT OF PARTS FOR SPARE PARTS KIT.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

(C) TRANSPORTATION. DUE TO A VEHICLE SHORTAGE AT OSAN, DET 1, 6922 SCTY Wg SHARED A STEP VAN WITH THE COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATION. THIS WAS AN INTERIM MEASURE UNSUITABLE FOR

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CHANNELS ONLY~~



ANY LONG TERM OPERATION. A TRANSPORTATION REPRESENTATIVE FROM PACSCTYRGN VISITING OSAN INDICATED THAT AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO GET ADDITIONAL VEHICLES WITH THE AIR LIFTING OF VEHICLES TO OSAN FROM THE 6922 SCTY Wg OFFERED AS A POSSIBILITY. COMMANDO ROYAL TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS WERE ESTABLISHED AS ONE CREW BUS, ONE SIX PAX CREW CAB, AND ONE METRO VAN. THIS REQUIREMENT WAS PARTIALLY SATISFIED WHEN WE WERE PROVIDED ONE THREE PAX PICKUP AND ONE SMALL METRO. WHILE THIS PROVIDED SOME RELIEF, IT WAS BARELY ADEQUATE FOR OUR NEEDS. THE VEHICLE CONTROL OFFICER AT [25x1] ADVISED THAT A LARGE STEP VAN WOULD BE ISSUED TO THE COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATION WHEN AVAILABLE.<sup>120</sup> A STEP VAN WAS PROVIDED BY 14 MARCH. CONTINUING EFFORTS WERE MADE TO OBTAIN A 29 PASSENGER CREW BUS FOR [25x1] [25x1] HOWEVER, AS OF 15 MARCH THE VEHICLE PROBLEM APPEARED TO BE ONE WHICH COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.<sup>121/122</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

50

~~SECRET~~ ~~SAVIN~~

CHAPTER VIII

HOT ROD COURIER SERVICE

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

~~(SCW)~~ THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE [25x1] ACRP OPERATION REQUIRED A MEANS OF PROVIDING TAPES AND MISSION MATERIALS TO THE OSAN ELEMENT AS WELL AS A MEANS FOR THE TIMELY DELIVERY OF MISSION INTERCEPT (NON-KORCOM) TO THIS UNIT. FREQUENT C-130 TRAINER AIRCRAFT SUPPORT FLIGHTS TO AND FROM [25x1] PROVIDED A CONVENIENT MEANS FOR EXCHANGE OF MISSION MATERIALS AND WERE UTILIZED WHENEVER POSSIBLE. A SUPPLEMENTARY COURIER SYSTEM, HOWEVER, WAS REQUIRED. ON 3 FEBRUARY, THE COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT OFFICER AT [25x1] REPORTED THAT REGULAR COURIER ARRANGEMENTS FROM OSAN WOULD BE TENUOUS WITH THE ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE REQUIRING AT LEAST ONE WEEK.<sup>101</sup>

~~(SCW)~~ ON 11 FEBRUARY, WE REPORTED THAT [25x1]

[25x1]

LINGUISTS HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO OSAN TO ACCOMPLISH

[25x1]

[25x1]

[25x1]

TIMELINESS OF THESE ROUTINE REPORTS WAS BEING EFFECTED DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF TIMELY COURIER SERVICE FROM OSAN.<sup>77</sup> ON 15 FEBRUARY, PACSCTYRGN REQUESTED PACAF ASSISTANCE TO ESTABLISH DAILY HOT-ROD

~~SECRET~~ ~~SAVIN~~

51

SERVICE BETWEEN [25x1] DAILY HOT-ROD SERVICE WAS  
ESTABLISHED ON 20 FEBRUARY; HOWEVER, DUE TO [25x1]  
[25x1] INTERCEPT FROM THE KORCOM ORBIT A DAILY HOT-ROD  
SERVICE WAS NO LONGER REQUIRED. HOT-ROD SERVICE WAS COORDI-  
NATED WITH [25x1] PERSONNEL AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS SERVICE  
WOULD BE PROVIDED ON AN AS REQUIRED BASIS. 123/124

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHAPTER IX

DIRECT SIGINT SUPPORT

~~(TSCW)~~ ON 26 JANUARY, PACSCTYRGN DIRECTED THAT THE USAFSS AND PACSCTYRGN SIGINT SUPPORT PLAN 27-66 FOR KOREA BE REVIEWED WITH VIEW TOWARDS POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PLAN OR SIMILAR PROCEDURES.<sup>125</sup> ON 29 JANUARY WE RECEIVED A USAFSS DRAFT OF A PLAN PROVIDING FOR DIRECT SIGINT SERVICE FOR US FORCES OPERATING IN KOREA SHOULD HOSTILITIES DEVELOP. THIS PLAN WAS SIMILAR TO THE PACSCTYRGN OPERATIONS ORDER 101-66 PRESENTLY IN EFFECT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING DIRECT SIGINT SUPPORT POSSIBILITIES WERE DISCUSSED WITH 5 AIR FORCE AT FUCHU, JAPAN AND 314 AIR DIVISION AND 5 AIR FORCE ADVON AT OSAN, KOREA. THESE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WERE FOCUSED ON THE CAPABILITIES AND POTENTIAL OF SIGINT SUPPORT.<sup>100/126/127</sup> WHILE THIS PLANNING WAS BEING CONDUCTED PRIMARILY TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, SOME PROCEDURES WERE IMPLEMENTED TO PROVIDE SIGINT INFORMATION AND SUPPORT TO THEATER COMMANDERS. THESE ACTIONS CONSISTED OF ISSUING BORDER VIOLATION INFORMATION, TACTICAL REPORTING (TACREPs), INITIATION OF THE COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY (CRMRS) AND COORDINATION OF COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS WITH COMMANDO SMOG (C-47 PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE) MISSIONS FOR ADVISORY WARNING.

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY

~~(SCW)~~ THE ACRP MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY, IMPLEMENTED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TO PROVIDE SELECTED CONSUMERS WITH TIMELY, PRELIMINARY, MISSION RESULTS AND AN AUTHORITATIVE SUMMARY OF ACRP CONTRIBUTIONS, WAS RECOGNIZED AS A REPORTING VEHICLE APPROPRIATE TO THE KOREAN OPERATION. WE, THEREFORE, PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY REPORTING WITH THE FIRST MISSION TERMINATING AT 25x1 ON 1 FEBRUARY; HOWEVER, PACSCTYRGN REQUESTED IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS REPORT BE DELAYED UNTIL FURTHER COORDINATION WAS EFFECTED.<sup>128/129</sup> ON 2 FEBRUARY, USAFSS APPROVED COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY IMPLEMENTATION TO BE LIMITED TO INTERCEPT DERIVED FROM KOREA DEPLOYED MISSIONS.<sup>130</sup> PACSCTYRGN PROVIDED DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS REPORT PENDING DIRNSA ACTION ON ESTABLISHING A NEW CAG. THE FIRST COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY WAS ISSUED ON 3 FEBRUARY.<sup>131/132</sup> ON 8 FEBRUARY, A CAG (VALON) WAS ESTABLISHED BY DIRNSA FOR THIS REPORT. IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY TO ~~PACAF~~ THE PRECEDENCE OF THE REPORT WAS UPGRADED TO "IMMEDIATE."<sup>133/134</sup>

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)COMMANDO SMOG COORDINATION

~~(TSHVCCO)~~ ON 1 FEBRUARY, 5 AIR FORCE INQUIRED IF WE HAD CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE AIR-TO-AIR ADVISORY WARNINGS TO C-47 PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS (COMMANDO SMOG) OPERATING OUT OF OSAN, KOREA ALONG THE DMZ. THE ACRP AIRBORNE ADVISORY

~~TOP SECRET~~

WARNING CAPABILITY WAS DISCUSSED AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT

[REDACTED] 25x1

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

FIFTH AIR FORCE DIRECTED THAT LOSS OF CAPABILITY OF COMMANDO SMOG AIRCRAFT TO RECEIVE WARNINGS AND/OR RECEIPT OF A CONDITION [REDACTED] 25x1 WAS TO

BE IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR ABORT OF THE COMMANDO SMOG MISSION. ON 2 FEBRUARY, THE COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT OFFICER CONTACTED 312 AIR DIVISION AND 5 AIR FORCE ADVON REPRESENTATIVES AT [REDACTED] 25x1 TO ESTABLISH COORDINATION PROCEDURES. THE FIRST CO-ORDINATED MISSION WAS FLOWN ON 4 FEBRUARY.

BORDER VIOLATION REPORTS (BOCOVIRs)

(SCW) ON 18 FEBRUARY, THE COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT OFFICER AT [REDACTED] 25x1 ADVISED THAT DUE TO INCREASED EMPHASIS ON BORDER VIOLATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, 5 AIR FORCE ADVON, HAD REQUESTED THAT A REPORT BE IMPLEMENTED TO PROVIDE 5 AIR FORCE ADVON WITH ANY INFORMATION COLLECTED BY COMMANDO ROYAL CONCERNING BORDER VIOLATIONS. FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVON DID NOT WANT A FORMAL END PRODUCT REPORT BUT A TIMELY INPUT WHICH WOULD AMPLIFY GROUND STATION BORDER VIOLATION REPORTS (BOCOVIRs). IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS REPORT WOULD BE SIMPLE AND ESSENTIALLY NARRATIVE IN FORMAT. REPORT WAS TO BE ISSUED WHEN ANY SIGINT GROUND STATION INITIATED A BOCOVIR WHICH TOOK PLACE WHILE COMMANDO ROYAL WAS AIRBORNE OR WHEN COMMANDO ROYAL


P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

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55

PROVIDED INPUT TO A GROUND STATION BOCOVIR. A REPORT WAS ALSO TO BE ISSUED UPON REQUEST OF 5 AIR FORCE ADVON. NEGATIVE REPORTS WERE TO BE REQUIRED ONLY IF ABOVE CRITERIA WAS MET. THE FOLLOWING IS A SAMPLE FORMAT OF THE COMMANDO ROYAL REPORT:



P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

TACTICAL REPORTS (TACREPs)

(SCW) TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO TACTICAL COMMANDERS TACTICAL REPORTING (TACREPs) CONTINGENCY PLAN WAS ESTABLISHED ON 6 MARCH. THE TACREP WAS DESCRIBED BY DIRNSA AS "A SHORT SIGINT REPORT DESIGNED TO PROVIDE DESIGNATED OPERATIONAL COMMANDS WITH INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE SAFETY OF THEIR FORCES, OR ON FAST-MOVING ENEMY ACTIVITIES WHICH DIRECTLY RELATE TO THE COMMANDER'S TACTICAL OPERATIONS." DIRNSA PROVIDED DETAILS ON SELECTING

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~~SECRET SAVIN~~

56

SUBJECTS FOR TACREPs, DISTRIBUTION, HANDLING PROCEDURES, AND  
EXAMPLES. 137

SIGINT INFORMATION TO SPECIFIC PACOM COMMANDS

~~(SHVCCO)~~ ON 3 FEBRUARY, DIRNSA ADVISED THAT [25x1] <sup>P.L. 86-36</sup>  
[25x1] <sup>EO 1.4.(c)</sup> HAD  
BEEN DIRECTED TO RESPOND FULLY TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TIMELY  
KORCOM AIR SIGINT OF PACOM COMMANDS AS DESIGNATED BY CINCPAC. 138  
AFSSO 314 AIR DIVISION AND 5 AIR FORCE ADVON QUERIED IF THIS  
INSTRUCTION APPLIED TO DEPLOYED ACRP RESOURCES OF [25x1] AS  
WELL AS [25x1] AND WERE ADVISED THAT THE ACRP RESOURCES DE-  
PLOYED TO [25x1] WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO SIGINT REQUIREMENTS  
LEVIED BY SPECIFIED COMMANDS. 139/140

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P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(d)

57

P.L. 86-36

CHAPTER X  
COLLECTION AND PROCESSING

COMMANDO ROYAL TRANSCRIPTION AND TAPES

25x6

~~(SCW)~~ DURING EARLY FEBRUARY PROCEDURES WERE COORDINATED TO ROUTINELY PROVIDE [REDACTED] COM-  
MANDO ROYAL TRANSCRIPTS AND SELECTED TAPES. IT WAS INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT FOLLOWING PROCESSING OF COMMANDO ROYAL TAKE BY [REDACTED] OF NORTH KOREAN AIR AND NORTH KOREAN NAVY AND MILITARY, RESPECTIVELY THAT THESE UNITS WOULD PREPARE DUPE TAPES ON ALL NORTH KOREAN ENTITIES [REDACTED]

25x6

IT WAS DETERMINED, HOWEVER, THAT PREPARATION OF TAPE DUPES WOULD BE TIME CONSUMING AND THAT PROVIDING TRANSCRIPTS OF NORTH KOREAN ACTIVITY WOULD BE ADEQUATE. 141/142/143/144

TRANSMISSION SECURITY (TRANSEC)

~~(SHVCCO)~~ ON 8 FEBRUARY, PACSCTYRGN ADVISED THAT HIGH INTEREST IN THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) POSTURE OF USAF ACTIVITIES IN KOREA MADE COVERAGE OF VHF AND UHF COMMUNICATIONS, NOT OBTAINABLE BY TRANSEC UNITS, HIGHLY DESIRABLE. 145  
WE, THEREFORE, TASKED THE OSAN ACRP OPERATION TO DESIGNATE ONE POSITION FOR COMSEC COVERAGE ON A FULL TIME BASIS WHEN PRIORITY OF INTERCEPT PERMITTED. 146

POST MISSION FLIGHT REPORTS (PMFR)

~~(CHVCCO)~~ ON 17 FEBRUARY, PACSCTYRGN POINTED OUT THAT THE PMFR WAS THE ONLY TIMELY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON MISSION

58

STATUS. THEY, THEREFORE, REQUESTED THAT SECTION ONE OF THE PMFR WHICH PROVIDES PARTICULARS ON THE MISSION BE FORWARDED AS A SEPARATE REPORT AT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE WITH DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO PACSCTYRGN, USAFSS, AND 6988 SCTY SQ.<sup>147</sup> THE COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT OFFICER ADVISED THAT EFFECTIVE WITH MISSION ON 16 FEBRUARY, THE PMFR WAS BEING RELEASE AT "IMMEDIATE" PRECEDENCE.<sup>148</sup> IN VIEW OF INCREASED PRECEDENCE, PACSCTYRGN DELETED THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR A SEPARATE REPORT OF THE PMFR DATA.<sup>149</sup>


SIGNIFICANT INTERCEPTS

~~(TSCW)~~ THE FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACRP INTERCEPT OBTAINED BEGINNING WITH THE CAPTURE OF THE USS PUEBLO.

23 JAN - REFLECTION OF THE CAPTURE OF THE USS PUEBLO BY KORCOM NAVAL VESSELS.<sup>5</sup>

25x1

P.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)



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CHAPTER XI  
RELATED ITEMS OF INTEREST

~~(TSCM)~~

- 23 JAN - SIGINT READINESS ALPHA DECLARED BY DIRNSA DUE TO CAPTURE OF USS PUEBLO BY NKNF.<sup>161</sup>
- 23 JAN - DIRNSA ADVISED THAT CTF 77 HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DIVERT TASK GROUP 77.5 TO 3230N-12730E. TASK GROUP EXPECTED TO CONSIST OF ENTERPRISE, TRUXTON WITH COLLETT JOINING AS FEASIBLE.<sup>162</sup>
- 23 JAN - DIRNSA ADVISED OF POSSIBILITY THAT ALL OF THE COMINT MATERIAL ON BOARD THE USS PUEBLO MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND DIRECTED UNITS BE PARTICULARLY ALERT TO POSSIBILITY OF KORCOM COMM CHANGE PRECIPITATED BY COMPROMISE OF PUEBLO MATERIALS.
- 23 JAN - DIRNSA QUOTED CINCPACFLT DIRECTIVE TO PLACE AND SUPPORT DESTROYER OFF WONSAN IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE TWELVE MILE LIMIT AND DIRECTED UNITS TO BE ALERT TO ANY SIGINT REFLECTIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY.<sup>164</sup>
- 23 JAN - DIRNSA SPOT REPORT FOLLOW-UP PROVIDED LIST OF NORTH KOREAN VESSELS INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES SURROUNDING THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO.
- 25 JAN - 25x1 CRITIC RE-<sup>P.L. 86-36</sup>  
<sup>EO 1.4.(c)</sup>  
PORTED DETAILS OF AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY NORTH

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~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~  
KOREAN AREA.<sup>167</sup>

26 JAN - [25x1] EXTENDED SIGINT READINESS ALPHA TO ENSURE OPTIMUM  
ATTENTION GIVEN TO [25x1] ACTIVITY OCCURRING IN THE  
AFTERMATH OF THE PUEBLO INCIDENT.<sup>168</sup>

21 FEB - DIRNSA TERMINATED READINESS ALPHA EXTENSIONS FOR  
THOSE UNITS IN THE FAR EAST INTERCEPTING SOVIET  
[25x1] ENTITIES. THE DECLARATION FOR UNITS  
COVERING KORCOM ENTITIES REMAINED IN EFFECT.

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EO 1.4.(c)

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~~SECRET~~

62

## CHAPTER XII

## SUMMARY

SUPPORT

~~(SHVCCO)~~ LIMITED BASE SUPPORT, PRIMARILY IN THE AREAS OF TRANSPORTATION AND BILLETING, MADE THE COMMANDO ROYAL DEPLOYMENT TO 25x1 CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN AND TENDED TO IMPAIR OVERALL EFFICIENCY. FROM THE OUTSET OF THE DEPLOYMENT, THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY DET 1, 6922 SCTY Wg WAS NEVER LESS THAN OUTSTANDING. THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM WHICH OTHERWISE MIGHT HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE WAS RESOLVED ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS ONLY THROUGH THE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT PROVIDED BY DET 1, 6922 SCTY Wg. WE DO NOT FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT ACRP DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON HOST SECURITY SERVICE UNITS TO SATISFY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS DURING DEPLOYMENTS OF THIS NATURE. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT A BASIC ACRP DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS ORDER BE PUBLISHED BY HQ USAFSS TO OUTLINE BASIC SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR ACRP DEPLOYMENTS. THESE REQUIREMENTS WOULD THEN BE PRESENTED DIRECTLY TO THE HOST BASE BY THE COMMAND DEPLOYING THE ACRP AIRCRAFT. IN THE CASE OF THE OSAN DEPLOYMENT, PACAF, UNDER THIS CONCEPT, WOULD HAVE COORDINATED ALL COMMANDO ROYAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BOTH FRONT AND BACK-END CREWS DIRECTLY WITH THE HOST BASE. SECURITY SERVICE UNITS, LOCATED ON THE HOST BASE, WOULD BE

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63

EXPECTED TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL SUPPORT, WORKING AREA, AND COMMUNICATION FACILITIES ONLY. MORE ADEQUATE SUPPORT COULD BE ANTICIPATED IF THE REQUIREMENTS WERE BASED ON AN INTEGRATED CREW CONCEPT (SECURITY SERVICE AND FRONT-END CREW MEMBERS) RATHER THAN EACH ELEMENT OBTAINING NECESSARY SUPPORT THROUGH SEPARATE CHANNELS.

#### OPERATIONAL CONTROL

(SHVCCO) DIRNSA, USAFSS, PacSCTYRgn, JCS, CINCPAC, PACAF, 5 AIR FORCE - DIRECTIONS OUTLINING ACRP RESPONSE TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT WERE BEING PROVIDED BY EACH OF THESE HEADQUARTERS TO THIS UNIT, RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTING, AND 6091 RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON, RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE TRANSPORTATION. THE INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE PUEBLO SEIZURE WAS HANDLED IN A ROUTINE MANNER WITH LOCAL COORDINATION EFFECTED BETWEEN THE 6988 SCTY SQ AND 6091 RECON SQ TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUOUS ACRP COVERAGE AS REQUESTED BY DIRNSA AND CINCPAC.<sup>9/10</sup> FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS, HOWEVER, CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION AT THIS LEVEL RESULTED FROM VARIOUS TASKING MESSAGES AND INSTRUCTIONS BEING RECEIVED. WE FREQUENTLY RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE 6091 RECON SQ/5 AIR FORCE AS ADDRESSEES. THE 6091 RECON SQ, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO THIS UNIT. BRIEFLY, THE ENTIRE EXERCISE EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY FOR ONE CHANNEL OF DIRECTION TO

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BOTH THE 6988 SCTY Sq AND 6091 RECON Sq WHEN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO AN EMERGENCY SITUATION BECOMES NECESSARY. AT THE VERY LEAST, ALL SECURITY SERVICE DIRECTION TO THIS UNIT SHOULD INCLUDE THE 6091 RECON Sq AND THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND AS INFO ADDRESSEES WITH SECURITY SERVICE UNITS INCLUDED AS INFO ADDRESSEES ON DIRECTIVES PASSED TO 6091 RECON Sq/5 AIR FORCE BY THEIR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

~~(S)~~ AS THE PUEBLO INCIDENT DEVELOPED, CLOSE COORDINATION WAS NOT A CRUCIAL ELEMENT; HOWEVER, IT WAS APPARENT THAT NEEDLESS CONFUSION COULD BE ELIMINATED IN THE FUTURE IF A SINGLE OPR WAS DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE ALL TASKING CONCERNING MISSION OPERATION (HOW MANY, WHERE, WHEN, ETC) WITH THE 6988 SCTY Sq AND 6091 RECON Sq RESPONDING ONLY TO TASKING RECEIVED FROM THE DESIGNATED OPR.

DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS ORDER

~~(C)~~ SHOULD THE PUBLICATION OF A HQ USAFSS ACRP DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS ORDER BE CONSIDERED FEASIBLE, RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS BE CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION:

1. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
  - A. TRANSPORTATION FOR CREW AND PROJECT PERSONNEL
  - B. BILLETING
  - C. MESSING
2. REPORTING
  - A. AUTOMATIC UPGRADING OF PRECEDENCE OF ESTABLISHED

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~~HAZARD AREA COMINT~~  
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65

REPORTS, E.G., PMFR

B. AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIAL REPORTING,  
E.G., MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY

3. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY SERVICE UNIT IF  
LOCATED ON HOST BASE

A. COMMUNICATION FACILITIES

B. TECHNICAL SUPPORT

C. WORKING AREA

D. PERSONNEL SUPPORT

4. OPERATIONAL CONTROL

A. DESIGNATION OF UNITS TO BE INCLUDED AS  
ADDRESSEES ON ALL MESSAGES INVOLVING TASKING AND POLICY

B. DESIGNATION OF A SINGLE UNIT AS OPR TO CO-  
ORDINATE AND CONSOLIDATE TASKING.

5. DOCUMENTATION

A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY TO BE PREPARED AT CONCLUSION  
OF DEPLOYMENT OR AS DIRECTED

CONCLUSION

BY MARCH, THE KOREAN ACRP DEPLOYMENT HAD SETTLED INTO  
A ROUTINE OPERATION AND THE INCREASED COMMANDO ROYAL COM-  
MITMENT FOR PROVIDING KORCOM COVERAGE WAS BEING REASSESSED.  
ON 19 MARCH, USAFSS REQUESTED ASSESSMENT OF PLANNED REDUC-  
TION OF 5 AIR FORCE ADVON ON 1 APRIL 1968 AND IMPACT OF  
WITHDRAWAL OF ERU FORCES/EQUIPMENT FROM

25x1

IN ADDITION R.L. 86-36  
EO 1.4.(c)

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EO 1.4.(c)

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USAFSS REQUESTED ESTIMATE OF WHEN COMMANDO ROYAL ELEMENT DE-  
PLOYED TO [25x1] COULD BE RETURNED [25x1] WITH NORMAL SCHED-  
ULING RESUMED.<sup>170</sup> DURING A VISIT TO THIS UNIT BY PACSCTYRGN,  
PERSONNEL, WE SUGGESTED CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO CONTINUING  
NORMAL COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS OUT OF [25x1] UPON TERMINA-  
TION OF THE PRESENT COMMITMENT. IN VIEW OF THE ABILITY TO  
GO "ON-WATCH" WITHIN 30 MINUTES FOLLOWING TAKE-OFF FROM  
[25x1] IT WAS FELT THAT A CONTINUED OPERATION FROM THAT BASE  
WOULD PROVIDE CONSIDERABLY MORE COVERAGE THAN PROVIDED BY  
MISSIONS [25x1] ON 20 MARCH,  
PACSCTYRGN REQUESTED WE PROVIDE DETAILS OF A COMMANDO ROYAL  
OPERATION FROM [25x1]<sup>71</sup> A SUMMARY OF BENEFITS  
AND SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR AN [25x1] OPERATION WAS PROVIDED ON  
22 MARCH.<sup>172</sup> ~~IN ANY EVENT, IT APPEARS,~~ BARRING UNFORESEEN  
CIRCUMSTANCES, ~~THAT THE~~ [25x1] DEPLOYMENT AND INCREASED ACRP  
COVERAGE RESULTING FROM THE INCREASED DEFENSE POSTURE IN  
KOREA MAY SOON BE TERMINATED. WHILE THIS NARRATIVE IS  
INTENDED PRIMARILY TO DOCUMENT THE ACRP RESPONSE TO THE  
PUEBLO INCIDENT AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS, WE BELIEVE THAT  
A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE ENTIRE OPERATION MIGHT SERVE TO  
ENSURE THAT BASIC PROCEDURES ARE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT  
FUTURE ACRP DEPLOYMENTS OF THIS NATURE ARE EFFECTED WITH  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED IN  
ADVANCE.

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67

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