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Description of document: Records indicating the impact of federal budget sequestration upon the US Marine Corps (USMC) operations and functions, 2013

Request date: 27-April-2013

Released date: 28-January-2015

Posted date: 16-February-2015

Source of document: Headquarters US Marine Corps
Attn: FOIA/PA Section (ARSF) Rm 2B289
3000 Marine Corps Pentagon
Washington DC 20350-3000
Fax: (703) 614-6287
Email: hqmcfoia@usmc.mil

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

5720
ARSF
January 28, 2015

SENT VIA EMAIL

SUBJECT: YOUR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST, FILE NUMBER USMC-HQ 2013-000107 (2013-000542)

This responds to your April 27, 2013, FOIA request for records created during 2013 and related to the impact of federal budget sequestration. Your request was controlled under file number **USMC-HQ 2013F0000107 (2013-000542)**.

We initiated a search of the files maintained by the Headquarters, Marine Corps, Programs & Resources Branch (P&R), which identified a collection of records responsive to your request and organized by 'tabbed' dividers. The 'titles' refer to the way the records are described on the tabs where they were located.

1. Weekly schedules. These are provided in full.
2. Briefs. These are withheld pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(5).
3. Internal Prep. These are withheld pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(5).
4. Letters. These are provided in full.
5. Planning. A redacted version is provided. FOIA exemption (b)(6) applies.
6. RFIs. These are provided in full.
7. QFRs. These are provided in full.
8. PAE. These are withheld pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(5).

The redactions in item 5 above consist of individual names of Marine Corps personnel, with the exception of one person who, as a member of the Senior Executive Service, enjoys a diminished privacy interest. The records withheld in items 2, 3 and 8 consist of briefing materials and internal preparation materials designed to advise, inform and make recommendations to leadership regarding sequestration-related decisions and potential courses of action. FOIA exemption (b)(5) protects these sorts of communications to encourage the free and candid exchange of opinions and advice during the decision-making process. There is also ample support in case law for the notion that briefing materials used to prepare senior leaders for such events as congressional testimony are appropriately withheld under (b)(5).

Because some information has been withheld, you may consider this to be an adverse determination that may be appealed to the Judge Advocate General (Code 14), 1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Suite 3000, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066. Your appeal, if any, must be


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ARSF
January 28, 2015

postmarked within 60 calendar days from the date of this letter and should include a copy of your initial request, a copy of this letter, and a statement indicating why you believe it should be granted. We recommend that your appeal and its envelope both bear the notation "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

We have categorized you as an "other requester" for the purpose of assessing FOIA processing fees. As such, you are entitled to two hours of search time and 100 pages of duplication free of charge but are responsible for the payment of any fees beyond that. In this instance, however, all fees are waived in light of the length of time it has taken for us to provide you with a response.

I am the official responsible for this determination. Should you have questions or concerns, please contact Ms. Barbara Gonzalez of my staff at (571) 256-8636 or (703) 614-4008, or via email to foia.hqmc@usmc.mil or fax at (703) 614-6287. Please reference the file number in the subject line above. You may also contact me directly at (703) 614-3685, or sally.hughes@usmc.mil.

Sincerely,



S. A. HUGHES
Head, FOIA/PA Section

Enclosures

2

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14 January 2013

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The readiness of our Armed Forces is at a tipping point. We are on the brink of creating a hollow force due to an unprecedented convergence of budget conditions and legislation that could require the Department to retain more forces than requested while underfunding that force's readiness. We ask for legislative action that adequately resources readiness while granting the Department the authority and flexibility to shape the force to new budget realities.

Budget conditions unfolding right now are causing this readiness crisis. The timing and magnitude of Sequestration under the 2011 Budget Control Act along with the 2013 Defense Budget Continuing Resolution—if carried through the end of the fiscal year—will trigger a cut in operating budgets of more than 20 percent across the Joint Force compared with the President's budget. The compelling need to fully fund preparation for and execution of combat operations and care for our wounded warriors allocates this cut across a smaller portion of the force, exacerbating the readiness decrease for forces that may need to respond to a contingency.

Troops on the front lines will receive the support they need, but the rest of the force will be compromised. Should this looming readiness crisis be left unaddressed, we will have to ground aircraft, return ships to port, and stop driving combat vehicles in training. Training will be reduced by almost half of what we were planning just three months ago. We are also now planning for the potential to furlough up to nearly 800,000 defense civilians who are essential to critical functions like maintenance, intelligence, logistics, contracting, and health care. We will also be unable to reset and restore the force's full-spectrum combat capability after over a decade of hard fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

To avert this crisis, we urge you to take immediate action to provide adequate and stable funding for readiness. We need a legislative solution that provides the time and flexibility to properly shape the best military force in the world. This means prioritizing warfighting readiness, appropriately sizing our military and civilian workforce and force structure, and reducing overhead costs. We must also be given the latitude to enact the cost-saving reforms we need while eliminating the weapons and facilities we do not need.


Even if Sequestration is de-triggered, but the Continuing Resolution remains in effect through FY 2013, we will require transfer authority and support for follow-on reprogramming authority from investment accounts to readiness in order to help meet readiness concerns.

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
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The combination of capabilities and capacities of the Nation's military force required to defend our national security interests with an acceptable degree of risk is a separate issue. However, the force we choose to resource must be ready to fight. Under current budgetary uncertainty, we are at grave risk of an imposed mismatch between the size of our Nation's military force and the funding required to maintain its readiness, which will inevitably lead to a hollow force.


We willingly bear the burden of responsible stewardship for the resources entrusted to us by the American people, and stand ready to provide additional information that will help resolve this budget crisis in a way that preserves the near and long-term readiness of the Joint Force.




JAMES A. WINNEFELD
Admiral, United States Navy
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff




MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
General, United States Army
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff




RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff of the Army




JAMES F. AMOS
General, United States Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps



MARK A. WELSH III
General, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff of the Air Force



JONATHAN GREENERT
Admiral, United States Navy
Chief of Naval Operations



FRANK J. GRASS
General, United States Army
Chief, National Guard Bureau





Dear Senator Inhofe,

Thank you for your letter and for your continued advocacy for both the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps. Like you, I am deeply concerned about the current fiscal situation and its potential impact to the nation's military readiness. As outlined in your letter, the reduced funding levels in the Continuing Resolution (CR) coupled with the severe funding reductions of sequestration implementation will significantly degrade both near term readiness and our long term capability to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance.

The United States Marine Corps is our nation's insurance policy. We mitigate the risk inherent in an uncertain world by being ready to meet today's crisis – with today's force – today. In order to respond anywhere on the globe with a capable force and buy decision space for our nation's leadership we must – and do – maintain a high state of readiness – direction mandated by the 82d Congress.

The Defense Strategic Guidance remains a relevant articulation of America's security role in the world – and I continue to support its full implementation. In the event of an annualized CR, the Marine Corps faces a \$406 million reduction in its Operations and Maintenance budget in FY 13. This will create immediate challenges in maintenance, training, and base operations accounts. Given the specter of sequestration and/or CR, we face an extended period of severely constrained spending driven by rules that provide little flexibility to efficiently apply the mandated reductions. Should sequestration and an annualized CR happen, in the next six months we will be able to continue meeting Marine Corps deployed warfighting needs and the training of next-to-deploy forces. Between six and twelve months we'll continue to experience an ever increasing erosion of home station unit readiness and force modernization, and begin to show small impacts in next-to-deploy forces. Beyond 12 months we will see a real impact to all home station units (e.g. fixed wing squadrons will have on average only two of twelve assigned aircraft on the ramp due to necessary aviation depot shutdowns) and the beginning of impacts to our next-to-deploy and some deployed forces – in all a slide to a hollow force we have fought so hard to avoid.

Despite sequestration's compounding impact, I am determined to ensure our Marines, Sailors, and civilians deployed to and in support of Afghanistan operations are properly trained prior to deployment, and fully supported while deployed – this is my number one priority. For forces not deploying to Afghanistan, the fuel, ammunition, and other support necessary for training will be reduced precluding our ability to provide fully trained individuals and ready units to meet emerging crises – ultimately impacting even our Marine Expeditionary Units. Additionally, many current and emerging operational initiatives will be unfunded or underfunded given our current fiscal situation. These new operational initiatives include the regionally based Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, an innovative approach to support Combatant Commander's needs in the "New Normal" world we find ourselves living in, and the recently mandated Marine Rotational Force – Darwin Australia supporting partnered training in the South and Southeast Asian littoral.

It is important to note that sequestration has significant impacts well beyond this current year. We must ensure long term health and readiness of the force. The Marine Corps manages the long term health and

readiness of the force by balancing its monies across five broad pillars: high quality people, near term unit readiness, capability and capacity to meet Combatant Commander requirements, infrastructure sustainment, and equipment modernization. Maintaining balance across all five of these pillars is critical to achieving and sustaining our nation's sole "Expeditionary Force in Readiness," both today and tomorrow. Actions we are being forced to take to ensure our short-term readiness (e.g. transferring facilities sustainment funding to support operations and equipment maintenance) are creating an imbalance across these pillars and will result in both near and far term readiness shortfalls. Any adjustments to FY14 funding below CR and sequestration levels will cause us to continue to invest more heavily in manpower and near-term readiness at the expense of infrastructure, sustainment, reset, and modernization.

Being forced to fund near term readiness above all else due to CR and sequestration impacts comes at the expense of sustaining recently built barracks and headquarters, results in our parking over eighty tactical fighter/attack aircraft as they await the funding necessary for depot-level work, and discontinues our efforts to reset equipment returning from the combat theater which would otherwise increase readiness in non-deployed units critically short of essential equipment. Some essential programs at our bases and stations (e.g. Wounded Warrior programs) will continue while other, less critical programs (e.g. Tuition Assistance) are reduced or eliminated as the resources necessary to maintain faith with our Marines and their families are used to fund readiness. In very real terms tradeoffs caused by CR and sequestration will deliver the following impacts:

- We will be unable to complete our rebalancing of Marine Corps forces to the Asia-Pacific region.

- Facilities sustainment will be funded at 71% of the requirement, reducing the effectiveness of home station training and quality of life for our Marines and their families.

- Depot maintenance will be reduced to 27% of the baseline requirement, delaying our ability to reset our war worn equipment by 18 months or greater, while reducing readiness of non-deployed forces in both the near and long term.

- Critical to our future readiness is our ability to re-set our equipment from ten years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We've been running hard in tough conditions for a long time. As you know, much of our equipment was moved directly from Iraq to Afghanistan in 2008. The cost of reset currently sits at 3.2 Billion dollars. Sequestration would significantly degrade our ability to reset this equipment for further operations.

By the end of calendar year 2013:

- Over half of all ground combat units, to include combat support and logistics units, will not be trained to the minimum readiness level required for deployment and crisis response.

- Over one third of all aviation combat units will not be trained to the minimum readiness level required for deployment and crisis response.

- These readiness challenges will continue to increase for calendar years 2013, 2014, and beyond.


Beyond Operations and Maintenance impacts, and given the reductions projected through 2021, I am concerned about how I can maintain limited essential modernization of the Marine Corps (e.g. continuing our Ground Tactical Vehicle modernization strategy). Your Marine Corps' annual material modernization investment accounts total only \$2.47 billion and comprise a mere 12% of our baseline budget – further reductions in these accounts, although perhaps proportional to the other services, will have disproportional impact on Marine Corps modernization.

To maintain a balanced portfolio and a capable force we need to arrest extra inflationary personnel cost growth. Recently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff offered a number of well developed and thoughtful proposals to slow or reduce the growing cost of our personnel accounts. I urge you and the committees to review these proposed adjustments to pay raises, housing entitlements, tuition assistance and TRICARE premiums. We must consider these critical cost reducing actions in order to continue to meet the nation's defense requirements, take care of our people, and do so in a manner that retains the most ready, sustainable and capable all volunteer force we have had across the proud history of this nation.

In addition to personnel cost growth actions in FY 14 and beyond, we will need immediate help to align the monies currently appropriated in the CR. While many of our accounts as currently appropriated are below the required FY 13 levels, some are higher. As we address FY 13 funding beyond March 27th and the end of the current CR, we will need your help in realigning funding in the form of increased transfer and reprogramming authorities. Additionally, I need the authority to start MILCON projects planned for FY-13 as they are critical to our MV-22 and F-35B modernization plan. Maximizing our flexibility in dealing with CR and sequestration impacts and meeting head-on the challenges of growing personnel costs are vital to achieving the most capable force possible in these challenging fiscal times. I am committed to building the most ready Marine Corps now and in the next decade that the nation can afford. The current fiscal uncertainty and implementation restrictions prevent realizing this commitment and threatens to force our retrenchment from those global issues and areas that are still of critical importance to America.

Thank you for your continuing leadership in the Senate and for your continued concern for the health and readiness of the Marine Corps. My staff will be glad to discuss this in greater detail should you desire more information. I assure you that I am committed to offering practical solutions to address the hard decisions necessary in this period of uncertainty for the nation, its Armed Forces, and for the Marine Corps.

Semper fidelis,



Copy to:
Senator Carl Levin
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Navy
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

P



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

IN REPLY REFER TO:
CMC
2 Mar 13

WHITE LETTER NO. 1-13

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps

To: All Marines

Subj: SEQUESTRATION


1. Marines and Civilian Marines...the sequestration provision under the Budget Control Act is in effect as of today. In short, this means a reduction of roughly \$1.4 billion dollars to the Marine Corps for the remainder of the current fiscal year, with reductions of slightly more than \$2 billion occurring in each of the next nine years. As I testified before Congress last month, cuts of this magnitude, due to their timing and methodology, will significantly impact Marine Corps readiness, both short and long term.

2. The Marine Corps plays a special role in protecting our Nation - we are America's Crisis Response Force, the Nation's insurance policy; we have a statutory responsibility to be the most ready when the Nation is least ready. As such, we will preserve the readiness of our Marines engaged in combat, we will keep deploying units fully manned, trained and equipped, and we will do our best to ensure that units preparing to deploy have the resources and training necessary for their next mission. The Marine Corps will remain ready to meet today's crisis, with today's force...today!

3. In order to ensure our continued readiness, we must make sacrifices in other areas. As we adjust to the realities of sequestration, I am very concerned about the impact of such cutbacks on our active duty and reserve Marines, our civilian Marines, and our Marine families. While we are working hard to balance our myriad requirements, I want each of you to know that keeping faith with you and your families is a top priority of mine - I consider this a sacred responsibility. We are already a lean and frugal Service, thus every reduction that we make from this point forward will cut into bone - we are beyond muscle.

4. I want to assure each of you that despite today's fiscal challenges, we will remain the Nation's "911 Force." I ask that you stay focused on the mission while we work our way through the uncertainties of the future. Sergeant Major Barrett and I will release a short video next week with the latest and most up to date information available. In the meantime, I thank you for the sacrifices you and your families make every day on behalf of our Nation and our Corps. In its truest sense, I remain...

Semper Fidelis



JAMES F. AMOS





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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

IN REPLY REFER TO:
7000
BE
22 Jan 13

From: Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps, Programs and
Resources Department, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
To: Distribution

Subj: GUIDANCE FOR SEQUESTRATION AND CONTINUING RESOLUTION PLANNING

Ref: (a) DepSecDef memorandum of 10 Jan 13: Handling Budgetary
Uncertainty in Fiscal Year 2013
(b) DoN Budget Guidance Memorandum BG 12-3A
(c) P&R Marine Corps Action Tracking System Task #2013-1-190.X
(d) Fiscal Director ltr 7000/RFE of 1 Oct 12

1. Purpose. The Department of Defense continues to operate under a Continuing Resolution (CR) that currently runs through 27 March, but could possibly be extended to cover the full fiscal year. Further, the potential sequestration under the Budget Control Act was delayed but not eliminated under the 2012 American Taxpayer Relief Act; this Act also made additional topline reductions. The confluence of these events has presented the Marine Corps with a great deal of fiscal uncertainty and may adversely impact readiness due to the possibility of smaller budgets in both the current FY as well into the foreseeable future. Accordingly, it is prudent that the Marine Corps begin immediately to pursue reversible/recoverable actions to reduce expenditure rates and mitigate budget execution risks. This letter explains the steps the Marine Corps has taken to date and directs additional budgetary actions (in accordance with reference (a)) that will be undertaken in support of the overall Marine Corps effort.

2. Background. For initial planning purposes, the Marine Corps has made the assumption that it will be operating under the constraints of an annualized CR for FY13. This means that during FY13 there may be no new starts (including military construction (MILCON)), multi-year procurements, and no quantity increases from the FY12 enactment to the FY13 CR level - we will be executing to the lower of either FY13 annualized CR or the PB13 amount.

In addition to the impact of the annualized CR, the Marine Corps has also begun planning in anticipation of reductions associated with the sequestration, which further compounds the already adverse effect of the CR. The sequestration base is calculated by adding the annualized FY13 CR (rate of operations of base FY12 enacted plus the FY13 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request) and FY12 and earlier prior year unobligated balances for active prior year

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Subj: GUIDANCE FOR SEQUESTRATION AND CONTINUING RESOLUTION PLANNING

accounts. A 9% reduction was then applied to this base to arrive at projected sequestration reductions. It is important to note that the full extent of the law encompasses sequestration-related cuts through FY21; as a result, commanders and activity heads need to take a long term view toward sequestration and understand the future impacts of decisions made today.

3. Initial Actions

a. Rebalancing to Address Continuing Resolution Shortfalls. The manner in which the CR must be implemented had a disproportionate effect on some elements of the Marine Corps' Operation and Maintenance appropriation, in particular the operating forces and ground depot maintenance. Accordingly, the Commandant directed the rebalancing of \$392M to offset shortfalls in Marine Corps Logistics Command, Marine Corps Forces U.S. Cyber Command, and in the operating forces; this funding shift is reflected in the controls promulgated in reference (c).

b. Slow Down of Spending. Due to the uncertainty described in preceding paragraphs, the Commandant has authorized steps be undertaken immediately to slow spending in the 2nd Quarter of FY13. Accordingly, the Deputy Commandant, Programs and Resources will not allocate \$150M originally planned for distribution in the 2nd Quarter in order to aid in mitigating the longer term uncertainty of an annualized CR and sequestration. Should sequestration be averted, this action is reversible, and the funding will then be allocated in accordance with the Commandant's priorities.

c. Civilian Personnel (CIVPERS)

(1) Manage to Payroll (MTP). The Marine Corps will not immediately implement an across the board hiring freeze; however, MTP controls have been adjusted, and commands and activities must manage their respective payrolls within these reduced levels. Commanders must understand that additional CIVPERS actions (such as a hiring freeze) may ultimately be directed.

(2) Civilian Furloughs. The Marine Corps will not implement furloughs in the near term. Commands and activities are directed to assess the potential impact of furloughs, but this is contingency planning only. Accordingly, commands and agencies may plan for furloughs, assuming one furloughed day per week for all employees starting on or about 27 April 2013 and continuing for 22 weeks. Commands and activities will develop contingency/continuity of operations plans to address the potential impact of furloughs and will provide the ramifications of such furloughs in their impact statements (reference (c)). Commands will assume that any savings associated with civilian furloughs will be held centrally and managed by Programs

Subj: GUIDANCE FOR SEQUESTRATION AND CONTINUING RESOLUTION PLANNING

and Resources Department to offset Service-wide shortfalls as directed by the Commandant.

(3) Temporary Employment. Commands and activities are authorized (but not directed) to reduce temporary employee levels, and should consider such reductions consistent with current requirements and projected workload. Commands and activities will provide Programs and Resources Department with their plan for reducing temporary employees and the associated impact of this decision.

(4) Term Employment. Commands and activities may, but are not directed to, release term employees when their current terms expire, consistent with current requirements and projected workload. Early release of Marine Corps term employees prior to expiration of their term is not authorized at this time, but planning for the possibility of such a future decision should be undertaken. Commands and activities will provide their plan for reducing term employees and the associated ramifications of this decision in their impact statements (reference (c)).

(5) Depot Maintenance. No action that involves cancellation of depot activities may be taken prior to 15 February per references (a) and (b).

4. Near Term Actions and Planning Guidance

a. Operation and Maintenance Accounts

(1) Commands and activities have already assessed the impact of sequestration and CR cuts and submitted both impact statements and implementation plans in PBDD. Reference (c) provided revised controls for commands and activities and is intended to support refined planning and analyses with more detailed fiscal controls. These controls are based on the rebalancing of funds directed by the Commandant and assume an annualized CR and a 9% sequestration reduction. Commands and activities will analyze these refined controls and will provide implementation plans to Programs and Resources Department Coordination Branch (RFC) in PBDD as directed in reference (c).

(2) Commands and activities should consider the following guidance when preparing implementation plans:

(a) Travel. Per references (a) and (b), non-mission essential travel activities should be postponed or cancelled, and in cases where this is not possible due to mission requirements, travel will be approved by the first general officer/flag officer in the traveler's chain of command. Postponement of travel incurred in the execution/planning of combat operations and associated training is

Subj: GUIDANCE FOR SEQUESTRATION AND CONTINUING RESOLUTION PLANNING

excepted. In all cases, travel expenses should be minimized to the greatest extent feasible.

(b) Conferences. Per reference (b), any government-sponsored conferences scheduled from January to March should be moved to April or beyond. For those conferences that cannot be easily delayed or are considered mission essential, the conference will be reviewed and approved by the first general officer/flag officer in the chain of command and resubmitted for final approval in accordance with current directives. For non-government sponsored conferences, U.S. government participation is not prohibited, but should contribute to the Marine Corps' mission and be adjusted to minimize costs. Invited speakers should seek approval of the first general/flag officer in the chain of command to ensure that participation is essential to the outcome of the conference. Every effort should be made to consider alternatives to formal conferences to include venues such as VTC, teleconferences, etc.

(c) Administrative Support/Information Technology. Commands and activities should review costs associated with printing and reproduction, review legal requirements for printing, limit purchase of promotional items not directly associated with the Marine Corps' recruiting mission, review the use and assignment of employee IT devices, and reduce participation in ceremonies, commemorations, etc. where possible.

(d) Contracting. Where possible, all contract awards should be postponed beyond 1 April to preserve fiscal flexibility later in the year. Commands and activities should discuss significant contract obligations with Programs and Resources Department personnel prior to committing the Marine Corps to such contract obligations.

(e) Studies and analysis efforts. Commands and activities should review the need for contracted studies and analyses and postpone studies that are not critical to mission accomplishment.

(f) Facilities Sustainment. Commands and activities should slow facilities sustainment expenditures, postponing these commitments to later in the fiscal year in cases where safety and life support are not in jeopardy. Note that current sequestration/CR planning projects the possibility of a reduction of Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) funding to as low as 60% of the requirement.

b. Investment Accounts and Military Construction

(1) Reference (c) promulgated updated annualized CR and Sequestration controls for Procurement, Marine Corps (PMC), Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps (PANMC), Research,

Subj: GUIDANCE FOR SEQUESTRATION AND CONTINUING RESOLUTION PLANNING

Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy (RDT&EN) and Family Housing Operations (FHOPS). These controls have been updated to reflect the most recent sequestration and CR reductions as well as estimated prior year unobligated balances (updated to reflect actual execution through mid January and projections through the end of February).

(2) Based on these new controls, Marine Corps Systems Command will update/revise its sequestration impact statements, develop PBDD loads for the CR13 and sequestration undistributed amounts (spread to the MCPC level and appropriate fiscal year), complete PBIS loads in the specified format, and submit these in accordance with the timelines promulgated in reference (c).

(3) Construction accounts. Investment Branch (RFI) will work with Installations and Logistics Department (I&L) (LFL) to develop CR and sequestration impacts by project and year.

c. Military Personnel Accounts. While military personnel accounts are exempted by sequestration, they are affected by the CR. Manning Branch (RFM), Programs and Resources Department will submit revised implementation plans for military personnel accounts to account for the impacts of the CR. On a monthly basis, RFM will provide assessments of funding shortfalls or assets against PB13 and against an annualized CR.

5. Coordinating Instructions

a. New Starts (including MILCON), Quantity Increases, and Multiyear Procurements. In accordance with references (a) and (d), while under a CR, the Marine Corps does not have the authority to initiate any FY 2013 new starts or multiyear procurements nor may it contract for increases in procurement over FY 2012 quantities or planned PB13 or OCO13 levels (whichever is the lesser amount). These limits must be considered by commands and activities when developing implementation plans.

b. Control of Pre-decisional Information. All personnel are reminded that discussion of sequestration information outside of DoD is prohibited. Further, this information may not be shared with contractor personnel.

c. Congressional and Public Affairs Guidance. The Department of the Navy is the central control authority for messaging and the narrative related to either the CR or sequestration. Requests for information from any organization on these topics should be coordinated with Programs and Resources Department.

7. Points of contact. Points of contact in this matter are as follows:

Subj: GUIDANCE FOR SEQUESTRATION AND CONTINUING RESOLUTION PLANNING

- (b)(6) Budget and Execution Division,
(b)(6) @usmc.mil, (b)(6)
 - (b)(6) Budget and
Execution Division, (b)(6) usmc.mil, (b)(6)
 - (b)(6) O&M Execution Branch,
(b)(6) @usmc.mil, (b)(6) or (b)(6)
(b)(6) @usmc.mil, (b)(6)
 - (b)(6) O&M Formulation Branch,
(b)(6) @usmc.mil, (b)(6)
 - (b)(6) Investment Branch,
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QFRs

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-008
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Hagan
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #8

Effects of Reducing and Canceling Maintenance

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, reducing maintenance during the remainder of the year is a central part of DOD's response to sequestration. All of the Services have plans to defer or cancel maintenance. For example, in North Carolina, the Navy and Marine Corps propose canceling \$81 million in aircraft maintenance at Cherry Point during the 3rd and 4th quarters of this fiscal year. While the Services are attempting to protect deployed units and those preparing to deploy, I am deeply concerned about how sacrificing maintenance will affect our military's readiness. What is your assessment of the longer-term effects of deferred and canceled maintenance? a. General Odierno. b. Admiral Ferguson. c. General Amos. d. General Welsh

Answer: While short term adaptations are possible, the short-term readiness of our current forces comes at the expense of those who will follow in their footsteps. Deferring or cancelling planned maintenance will cause long-term effects that will directly and negatively impact readiness and operational capability.

For ground equipment, depot maintenance requirements include both repair of weapon systems being retrograded from Afghanistan and scheduled maintenance on home station assets both required to maintain readiness of the force.

In the near-term, reduced funding results in reduced capability to respond to contingencies. A high percentage of our overall inventory of critical weapon systems, such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, were used heavily in Afghanistan. Delays in repairing them causes immediate shortfalls throughout the Marine Corps that reduce our ability to deploy fully capable forces.

In the long-term, reduced funding results in declining readiness that compounds over time as we are forced to compromise sustainment plans required to maintain critical weapon systems. Most of our depot funding supports key weapon systems, such as M1A1 tanks, Amphibious Assault Vehicles and Light Armored Vehicles, that comprise our core capability, and are aging platforms that are our most expensive to maintain. Reduced funding requires us to defer maintenance of key systems such as these. For example, an M1A1 Tank should be rebuilt every 10 years of its lifecycle. This requires the Marine Corps to fund rebuild of 40 tanks per year. Deferring rebuild of 20 tanks this year would degrade readiness and require funding the rebuild of 60 Tanks next year to recover. Over time, this key system repair pattern will create a hollow force. Without additional funding in future years, maintenance intervals will continue to extend. This results in equipment failures becoming more frequent.

For Aviation, the Marine Corps will have 107 scheduled depot inductions that will not occur as a result of CR/Sequestration. This will result in less aircraft available for tasking to each squadron and reduce the assets available for training and operational support. As an example, in the F/A-18 community; squadrons are equipped with 12 airplanes. Reductions to depot throughput will cause squadrons to each have ~5 aircraft available for each non-deployed squadron. The long term effect to non-deployed F/A-18 squadrons operating with a diminishing number of aircraft is the inability of the unit to achieve and maintain minimum combat readiness required for follow-on deployments.

Impacts

- Today 110 of 254 USMC F/A-18s are “out of reporting” status.
- Each year an additional 8 F/A-18s go “out of reporting” because the depots currently lack the capacity to induct all aircraft requiring depot level maintenance.

USMC F/A-18 Laydown (1 Jan 14)	
Total F/A-18 Inventory	254
5 Squadrons Deployed	- 58
1 Training Squadron	- 33
Out Of Reporting (Depot Maintenance)	- 124
Aircraft on Flight Line for 7 Squadrons	= 39
Number of Aircraft per Squadron (7)	5.6

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-009
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Hagan
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #9

Effects of Reducing and Canceling Maintenance

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, what effect will this reduced maintenance have on the ability of our military to respond to unforeseen contingencies that might arise? a. General Odierno? b. Admiral Ferguson? c. General Amos? d. General Welsh?

Answer: Today, with the majority of our standard equipment forward in combat and overseas contingency operations (OCO) dollars spent on theater specific requirements, our home station units are hard pressed to achieve levels of readiness necessary for crises and contingencies. They continue to train with the small pool of equipment they have on hand. With this equipment, Marines are able to maintain a basic level of proficiency that enables them to respond quickly to crisis when the Nation calls. However, without sustained funding, lower maintenance levels will

begin to degrade quickly these small pools of equipment, leading to degradation in training readiness. Eventually, the equipment needed at home station will wear out; when it does, our Marines will lose associated training and therefore the proficiency necessary to keep these units ready to respond.

Our amphibious core capabilities rely on operationally available amphibious warships to conduct training, exercises, and deployments. Any reduction in amphibious ship maintenance will directly limit operationally available amphibious warships and erode readiness. Our ability to deploy to meet Combatant commander timelines will be impacted adversely.

As America's Force in Readiness, our Marine Aviation Units maintain a high state of readiness at all times to respond to contingencies and commitments throughout the globe. At any given time, 1/3 of Marine Aviation Units are deployed, 1/3 of Marine Aviation Units are preparing to deploy, and 1/3 of Marine Aviation Units have just returned from deployment. Deployed units will maintain the highest states of readiness, but units preparing for deployment will need additional resources and/or time to undertake their wartime mission. A cancellation of depot level maintenance for the 3rd and 4th quarters of this fiscal year will result in a substantial decrease in our readiness to respond to unforeseen contingencies and future deployments. The Marine Corps will have 107 scheduled depot inductions that will not occur as a result of CR/Sequestration. This will result in less aircraft available for tasking to each squadron and reduce the assets available for training and operational support. The best example is our F/A-18 community; squadrons normally equipped with 12 airplanes. Reductions to depot throughput will cause FA-18 squadrons to each have ~5 aircraft available for each non-deployed squadron. The effect of reduced aircraft in these non-deployed squadrons is less aircraft to train with, resulting in the inability of the unit to achieve and maintain minimum combat readiness required for deployment.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-053
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #53

National Security Impact

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, Admiral Winnefeld recently stated that he was aware of "no other time in history when we have come potentially down this far, this fast, in the defense budget." He continued that "there could be, for the first time in [his] career, instances where we may be asked to respond to a crisis and we will have to say that we cannot." Do each of you share Admiral Winnefeld's concerns? a. General Dempsey b.

General Odierno. Admiral Ferguson d. General Amos e. General Welsh f.
General Grass

Answer: As Commandant, I do share Admiral Winnefeld's concerns, but I assure you that we

will do everything in our power to protect enduring U.S. global interests that underpin our prosperity. We will meet our responsibilities for rapid response to crises wherever they may occur. Still, the Marine Corps' ability to execute our expeditionary crisis response role is based upon one word—READINESS. This requires trained Marines, ships at sea, and aircraft in the air. These assets are the foundation of our forward deployed and rotational forces. Without them, not only will our forces become hollow and unable to respond as we are accustomed to, but we will make enduring national interests hollow as well. If insufficient maintenance and operating resources are available, our Marines will not be located forward, poised to intervene when our citizens, diplomats, allies or interests are threatened. We will be able to respond to crisis as a nation, but our response options will be limited, and our response times dramatically slowed. When crisis erupts unexpectedly, especially if this occurs far from existing bases or stations, our threatened citizens may have to wait longer for help to arrive. The risk of small-scale crises escalating is increased without forces that can rapidly contain them at their lowest levels. Without ready amphibious ships and well-trained Marine units, there will be less engagement with allies and partners, leading to decreased deterrence for small scale conflict. American leadership in response to unforeseen natural and man-made disasters will be sporadic. Without ready Marines, our Nation will forfeit a primary political-military tool that helps to protect U.S. interests, prevent conflict, and enable our joint forces in war.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-054
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #54

National Security Impact

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, what short term and long-term risks do you see to our national security interests around the world?
a. General Dempsey b. General Odierno c. Admiral Ferguson d. General Amos e. General Welsh f. General Grass

Answer: As a steward of the nation's resources, I will continue to do everything in my authority to maintain a forward deployed and ready force. First and foremost, this means that the units we deploy or rotate forward will be trained and ready for a wide range of military operations. Unfortunately, if sequestration is allowed to proceed, short and long term impacts on our national security are unavoidable.

In the short term, risks in our ability to respond to crisis are the most troubling. Our allies and partners understand the tremendous, sustained investment in training and maintenance that empowers our world-leading capabilities, and they understand the damage we will do to those capabilities with what must appear to them as capricious reductions. Because of the magnitude and inflexibility of proposed cuts to defense resourcing, there is a disproportionate impact on operations and maintenance funding. The ability to project forces forward, where they provide visible reminders of American strength and commitment, will be reduced. Without forward

deployed Marine and Navy forces, our diplomats, citizens, allies, and national interests will be held at-risk for longer periods as response times are slowed. When innocent populations are threatened by armed violence, we will be able to intercede with words alone. When our allies are directly threatened, they may be asked to do the best they can while we gather the elements of our response. When our embassies or diplomats are threatened, they may be asked to wait. These are the short term risks created when ships are not maintained, aircraft are unavailable, and Marines are not trained and ready. In non-priority theaters, our ability to respond to unexpected crises will be reduced by lack of strategically mobile forces. In natural disaster, devastated populations may have to wait weeks before assistance arrives. As we scramble to preserve short-term readiness, they will begin to doubt our willingness to sustain that readiness in the places that matter most: forward, in the contested areas of the world.

Over the longer term, these short term risks erode the credibility of American security assurances and the security of the global order upon which our prosperity and security rests. Allies and partners, without the reassuring physical presence of US forces, even on a rotational or transitory basis, will consider their options for dealing with regional threats. In regions where our influence is contested, our partners may believe their own national interests are best protected by reaching accommodations with our competitors. Others may feel it necessary to develop weapons that can be wielded independently of the US or take more severe measures such as militarizing disputed areas. US ability to encourage and develop partners to invest in collective security efforts will be dramatically reduced, shifting much of that burden onto our own shoulders. US weakness and unresponsiveness in natural disaster or man-made catastrophe will further undermine our credibility. Confidence in the survival of a collective world order based on shared interests will be shaken. Unchecked, the forces of extremism, nationalism, and selfish exploitation are likely to fill this void.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-055
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #55

National Security Impact

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, how would sequestration redefine the United States' national security role in the world?
a. General Dempsey. General Odierno. Admiral Ferguson.
 General Amos. General Welsh. General Grass

Answer: The United States remains the recognized leader in the collective security arrangements that underpin the stability of the global order. The U.S. relies on its military to provide a visible and credible deterrent to individuals, groups or states who would otherwise attempt to undermine the peace and security that the current global system provides. Erosion of the credibility of American leadership fundamentally threatens the security of the global order upon which the continuance of a just order and global prosperity rests. Global economic growth, the rising of

billions from poverty, and decline in major world conflict are all derivatives of U.S. security leadership. The pillar of U.S. leadership in the advocacy and protection of this benign global order is irreplaceable. Our security absence from the world's most critical regions begins a process of a thousand cuts to our nation's credibility, and the gradual decline of this order.

The role of the U.S. in this world would, of necessity, change. Rather than shaping the conditions that preserve order, the U.S. would find itself increasingly reacting to the potential disorder that would ensue. Without a stabilizing U.S. presence forward, our ability to prevent and contain crisis would be greatly reduced. The U.S. would increasingly be forced to react to higher levels of violence and instability as regional competitors, extremists, and even criminal networks seek to exploit a perceived security vacuum. Without a stabilizing presence forward, the U.S. may find itself without security options in crisis, leading to larger, more expensive security interventions when the nation's interests demand a response. The U.S. may find the expense of a reactive role to exceed that of a preventative one. It may find that the cumulative economic impact of global instability vastly exceeds that of preserving its stability.

The role of the U.S. in this national order will be fundamentally redefined, devolving from "leader" to "participant."

In this reduced role, the moral authority of our ideals and values would suffer a corresponding decline. No longer the ideals of a global leader and powerful advocate, there is significant risk that these would become perceived as only the selfish interests of just another participant in a series of regional challenges.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-057
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #57

Long-term Impact of Sequestration

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, we in Congress need to know what's at stake if the budgets proposed under sequestration are allowed to proceed. Can you provide your view of the impact of 10 years of budget caps from sequestration? a. General Dempsey b. General Odierno c. Admiral Ferguson d. General Amos e. General Welsh f. General Grass

Answer: The impacts of the full weight of the Budget Control Act (Sequester Provision) over ten years have the potential to force a fundamental change in today's Marine Corps. While most discussions to date have focused primarily upon FY13 and the readiness implications therein, the size of the annual reduction (in excess of \$2B/year) to the service top line will demand a complete redress of the Marine Corps size, organization, readiness levels, and infrastructure. The one thing that will remain intact will be a Marine Corps that is the nation's crisis response force – ready to meet today's crisis, with today's force, today.

In the early years of this nine year period (less FY13), there will be significant reductions to all

acquisition programs and O&M accounts in order to fund immediate combat requirements and support our forward deployed forces. These reductions will negatively impact service plans to modernize equipment hard worn during eleven years of combat operations. Further, it will slow reset of equipment returning from Afghanistan. This will, in turn, disrupt the plan to source this equipment to support units and Marines as they perform their mission around the globe in uncertain, dangerous times, and will adversely impact the rebalance to the Pacific. Additionally, there will be an erosion of home station/crisis response force readiness that will grow worse over time, and will certainly begin to affect our "next to deploy" units. Despite the constrained funding resulting from the CR and sequestration, in the next six months we will be able to continue meeting Marine Corps deployed warfighting needs and the training of next-to-deploy forces. Between six and twelve months, however, we'll continue to decrement readiness accounts with ever increasing degradation of home station unit readiness and force modernization, and begin to show small impacts in next-to-deploy forces. Beyond 12 months, we will see a real impact to all home station units (e.g. fixed wing squadrons will have on average only five of twelve assigned aircraft on the ramp due to aviation depot shutdowns) and the beginning of impacts to our next-to-deploy and some deployed forces to include our Marine Expeditionary Units aboard amphibious ships – in all a slide to a hollow force we have fought so hard to avoid.

Sequestration cuts will also create an immediate reassessment of programs that are underway as a result of the lessons learned during the hard fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, due to the suddenness and size of the reductions, the first years of the sequestration will generate requirements to fund the additional costs of what could be a significant and difficult reduction in both the civilian work force and military end strength on top of our ongoing current reduction of 20,000 personnel. Certainly we will have to make hard decisions about eliminating entire procurement programs due to reduced resources over a 9 year period.

Such reductions would not be the result of a change in national strategy or policy, but simply because of these traumatic cuts to funding; such measures are sure to break faith with thousands of Marines and civilian Marines whose heroic service over the past decade deserves better. The perhaps unintended consequence will be a budget driven change to our strategy and our place in the global community.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-058
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #58

Long-term Impact of Sequestration

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, in your opinion, what will be your end strength?
a. General Dempseyb. General Odiernoc. Admiralf. General Amosed. General Welshf. General Grass

Answer: It is difficult to assess, without detailed analysis against our strategic guidance, what end strength reduction will result from sequestration. There is little doubt that the over \$2B annual reduction to the Marine Corps' top line authority will cause fundamental change across the service. As we analyze sequestration's impact across our five pillars of readiness; High Quality People, Unit Readiness, Capacity to meet Combatant Commander Requirements, Infrastructure, and Modernization, we face an immediate imbalance when focusing on near term readiness – our Congressionally mandated responsibility. Fully three fifths of the Marine Corps' Total Obligation Authority is dedicated to funding personnel. While the President chose to exclude military manpower from sequestration related cuts in FY13, this is not the case over the following nine years. As we begin to apply the reductions in a way that balances readiness, end strength, and modernization, there are significant, hard choices required, one of which may well be a reduction to our final end strength. Such a step may well result in reductions to both the number and seniority of our military personnel as well as cuts to our civilian Marine work force.

This condition is further exacerbated by the fact that the Marine Corps is already in the first year of a four year effort to reduce its end strength by 20,000 military members from our wartime footing of 202,100. That drawdown, while challenging, benefitted from both prior planning and the resources required to ensure that we kept faith with those affected Marines and their families. In the case of sequestration, these conditions of planning time and resources do not exist. The cost savings associated with manpower reductions will not immediately achieve sufficient savings to offset the magnitude of reductions required by sequestration, and if immediately implemented, the size of these reductions will break faith with Marines that have been at war for eleven years. Ultimately the Marine Corps is committed to producing a Marines Corps that balances manpower, readiness, and modernization to provide the most capable Marine Corps that the nation can afford.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-059
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #59

Long-term Impact of Sequestration

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, what capabilities, missions, and responsibilities that your Service conducts today will be sacrificed in the next 10 years?^a General Dempsey^b General Odierno^c Admiral Ferguson^d General Amos^e General Welsh^f General Grass

Answer: The size, focus, and capabilities of the Marine Corps will directly reflect adjustments to the national military strategy and the commensurate roles and missions assigned to the service as the nation adjusts to the realities of the funding reductions mandated by the sequester. As in the past, the Marine Corps will adjust and evolve to balance its five pillars of readiness: High Quality People, Unit Readiness, Capability and Capacity to meet Combatant Commander

Requirements, Infrastructure, and Modernization to provide the most capable and ready Marine Corps that the nation can afford.

Based on the extent of the sequestration reductions (over \$2B/ year), the restrictions in applying these reductions in FY13, and the extended period in which they are implemented, this adjustment will not be smooth nor efficient. While the discussions surrounding current year impacts provide substantial examples of readiness shortfalls that will lead to future degradations in crisis response capacity, the longer term issues center on the substantial effort that will be required of the Marine Corps to adjust structure, balance tradeoffs, and right size enduring programs to conform to an annual reduction of over \$2B/ year over the next nine years. The entire procurement account for weapons and ammunition, to include research, development, test and evaluation, is only \$2.47B in FY13 after sequestration. This will require a comprehensive assessment of national priorities and goals and a subsequent review of the Defense Strategic Guidance; there is no question that we will collectively not be able to do all the things we are doing today, and this requires a thorough review of ways, means, and ends to arrive at an optimal solution that meets our national security goals in this uncertain and unstable world.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-060
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #60

Long-term Impact of Sequestration

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, what will the risk be over 10 years to the readiness of your forces? a.

General Dempseyb. General Odiernoc. Admiral Fergusond. General Amose.
General Welshf. General Grass

Answer: The Marine Corps, throughout its modern history, has been the nation's force in readiness, forward deployed and ready to respond in the world's critical littoral regions to meet any crisis – helping friends and allies, responding to emergencies, and providing the nation's leaders decision space. This role is central to our organization, ethos, and training and it will remain a focus as we deal directly with the impacts and challenges brought about by the Budget Control Act.

Marine Corps readiness is measured primarily in terms of five pillars of readiness: High Quality People, Unit Readiness, Capacity to meet Combatant Commander Requirements, Infrastructure, and Modernization. Each of these pillars incorporates all the organizations, activities, and programs that make up the service and each, and when optimized, represents a sensitive balance between resources and requirements - the sequester threatens to create a significant imbalance across these pillars.

These imbalances will not necessarily occur simultaneously nor can they be ameliorated

concurrently due to the specific elements within each. Short term readiness issues are impacted by the availability of resources in the operations and maintenance accounts that fund unit readiness and equipment maintenance. Over time, reductions in this funding generate significant backlogs and additional requirements for depot maintenance, further driving up depot requirements with reduced resources. Similarly, deferral of maintenance to our infrastructure reduces the overall life of barracks, hangers, motor pools, etc., which then generates the need for early replacement. The most significant long term impact to future readiness will be centered on our ability to modernize the force with significantly fewer resources and numerous competing demands. Modernization is the process by which our less capable systems or those exceeding their current programmed life are replaced - preserving resources in the amount necessary to affect the progressive accomplishment of our modernization plans is most at risk as these longer term resources are reduced to fund the most pressing short term readiness impacts.

Underpinning all of this is our most valued asset, the individual Marine – and his/her retention, training, education, Any manpower reductions will necessitate the use of costly separations incentives that require additional resources that would normally resource the training and readiness accounts and which can require such funding over an extended period of years depending upon the authorities granted by the Congress.

The cuts imposed as part of an annualized continuing resolution and sequestration result in a \$1.2B reduction to O&M in FY13 alone and don't account for evolving requirements above current resource levels. The Marine Corps prides itself on being a frugal service that asks only for what it needs and not what it wants. Any cut to our \$10B O&M budget will entail risk in either the near or long term. A cut of \$1.2B will immediately affect every aspect of Marine Corps operations and readiness. The long term cuts associated with sequestration will erode readiness, limit crisis response capacity, and adversely affect our active and reserve Marines, our civilian Marines, and their families.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-066
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #66

State-by-State Impacts (see attachment)

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, please provide State-by-State information similar to what the Air Force provided to the committee on February 11, 2013 (pasted below).a. General Odierno?b. Admiral Ferguson?c. General Amos?d. General Welsh?*NOTE*: The State-by-State diagram mentioned in this QFR will be provided in the "Tasked QFR" email as an attachment. PLEASE CHECK THE TASKED EMAIL FOR THIS ATTACHMENT. THANKS.

Answer:

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-071
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #71

Written Testimony for this Hearing

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, I've had the opportunity to read each of your written statements and I appreciate your candid assessments. As you know, this committee expects our Nation's military leaders to be able to provide us with honest and complete testimony without political interference. Each of you during your confirmation hearings assured us that you would give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power. I'd like to know from each of you (yes or no) whether the substance of your written statements were edited or altered by the OMB and if so, can you summarize for me the qualitative parts of your statement that were edited?a. General Odierno?b. Admiral Ferguson?c. General Amos?d. General Welsh?

Answer: As you know, we prepare our responses with assistance from many sources. Yes, OMB reviewed my statement and provided input. I assure you that I would not, will not, and did not provide you anything that I believe was not my best military advice. Any OMB suggestions I received were evaluated by me and either accepted, modified, or rejected. My testimony is my best military advice.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-081
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #81

Risk Wasting More Than We Save

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, I understand that because of the indiscriminant way that sequestration will be applied and the lingering impacts from the CR, DOD may be forced to take many actions - including canceling contracts, decertifying capabilities, and foregoing training - that will result in short-term cost-savings but will have adverse long-term budgetary consequences. The Navy has provided the example that it will be forced to shut down all flying for four of nine carrier air wings in March, which will take 9 to 12 months to restore normal readiness at 2 to 3 times the cost. Do you agree that the hidden costs of sequestration may actually nullify any savings anticipated to be gained through a sequester on DOD?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: Yes, we foresee numerous costs that will result from the implementation of sequestration both now and in the future.

Any interruptions during program acquisition will ultimately increase the total program cost, as schedule slips and delays result in longer contracts, loss of efficiencies, negative impacts on development and production schedules, program restructures and potentially cause Nunn-McCurdy breaches. In procurement, existing contracts will have to be renegotiated which will prevent the Marine Corps from receiving the Economic Order Quantity pricing, especially those that result from multi-year procurements such as MV-22. Loss of the MV-22 multi-year procurement will add \$1 Billion to total program cost and increase H-1 unit costs as well.

We will also have to sustain legacy systems longer than planned, which will ultimately drive up current operation and support costs. We will have to shift our attention to developing/replacing obsolescent parts for legacy systems that are no longer available in the market place, which will shift the workforce to a focus of reengineering old and inefficient technology. (e.g. sustaining 5 legacy radar systems will cost more than employing one new Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR)). Finally, technologies designed to improve efficiencies (fuel, lightweight armor, etc.) will have to be postponed, preventing the Marine Corps' from reaping planned savings while simultaneously driving up costs due to the use of older, more expensive technologies.

We also expect to see significant equipment backlogs at our depots, which, unless additional funds are applied, will be impossible to overcome. Similar to the acquisition of new systems, delays at our depots will result in lost efficiencies, delays in conducting necessary maintenance on legacy equipment, and disrupt maintenance timelines throughout the Marine Corps. Further, we expect that reductions in force and furloughs of our civilian workforce will result in loss of unique skill sets as highly skilled, highly trained civilian Marines leave the workforce. Should this occur, we will be required to rehire and retrain new personnel, resulting in additional cost and delays.

In the area of operations and maintenance, the Marine Corps will have to mortgage the future to pay for readiness today – we will have to forgo necessary modernization and sustainment to support our forward deployed forces. We are tasked by the Congress to be the most ready when the Nation is least ready. In order to accomplish this, we have been forced to make sacrifices in our modernization and infrastructure sustainment accounts to pay for the readiness of today's force. This will mean that we will be forced to delay the purchase of new equipment and maintain legacy equipment for longer periods of time, incurring greater maintenance cost. Further, our facilities will not be sustained at planned rates, meaning that maintenance will be delayed or omitted, hastening the deterioration of buildings and driving up long term costs and the ability to properly train our force.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-082
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos

Question: #82

Risk Wasting More Than We Save

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, please provide some other examples of the hidden costs of sequestration.a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: The hidden costs of sequestration are manifold and not merely limited to funding. They include the qualitative costs to operational readiness, forward presence, training, and building partnerships.

For the Marine Corps, sequestration cuts will result in \$2.4B of reduced economic opportunity in FY13 for local communities as we cut military construction contracts, facility restoration contracts, procurement of equipment, recruiting advertising contracts, tuition assistance, and implement furloughs. In these fiscally uncertain times, this will dramatically impact the bottom line of local small businesses, disrupt well-established community partnerships, and have an adverse impact on the economy of the communities that surround our bases and stations.

Cuts to our operations and maintenance funding will delay necessary maintenance and reset of our aging equipment that is returning from 11 years of combat overseas. Commanders will be forced to forgo necessary maintenance as they selectively apply their limited resources. This will result in the elimination of some preventive maintenance, which will cause a higher failure rate to equipment and less equipment available for training. This will increase depot requirements where we have already sustained significant reductions. Supply, training, and maintenance are key aspects of readiness and it can readily be seen from this example that all will be affected by sequestration. We predict over 55% of USMC forces (ground combat, logistics, and combat support) will have unsatisfactory readiness ratings, which will have a dramatic impact to respond when called upon by the Nation.

Numerous contracts have Foreign Military Sales partners, and a reduction in support for a particular weapon system will cause our FMS partners to look to other countries to acquire like type capabilities due to increases in cost or schedule slips. This will result in lost revenue for US companies, a loss of trust with our partners and allies, and a lack of compatible equipment should we deploy to a conflict with these partner nations.

Sequestration will also force prime contractors to pass the cuts directly to their supplier base, many of which are small businesses. Small businesses provide essential and unique skills such as military-grade precision tooling and advanced composites manufacturing that are critical to the procurement of our weapons systems. As a result, these small businesses will be forced to either increase unit costs or pull out of defense work and look to the commercial sector to remain viable.

Under the cuts imposed by sequestration, we will have to reduce our civilian workforce which

will further chip away at our readiness; our civilian Marines make a significant contribution in all aspects of Marine Corps operations, from family readiness to maintenance to command and control. Over 95% of civilian Marines work outside the National Capital Region. We expect we will potentially have to eliminate thousands of positions across the Marine Corps in order to meet the long term budget reductions mandated by sequestration, and as such, the services that our Marines and their families rely upon will also be reduced or eliminated. This will have a detrimental effect on the local communities surrounding our bases and stations, many of which rely heavily on DoD for employment. We also expect that we will have to cut or curtail many family readiness programs to include eliminating paid family readiness officers in some units, cutting teen and youth programs, and closing morale, welfare, and recreation facilities. This will have an adverse impact on our families at home station and will negatively affect their personal well being and stability.

Sequestration is driving the DoD to a level of funding that will affect all aspects of our operations. The cuts to O&M will have a widening ripple across all aspects of readiness hindering the Marine Corps' ability to respond to crises, take care of its families, preserve our relationship with our local communities, and support a strong economy.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-085
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #85

Current Readiness

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, your letter to this committee dated January 14, 2013, a copy which is attached, stated the following: "The readiness of our Armed Forces is at a tipping point....Under current budgetary uncertainty, we are at grave risk of an imposed mismatch between the size of our Nation's military force and the funding required to maintain its readiness, which will inevitably lead to a hollow force." Can you describe for me the risk to the warfighter by underfunding readiness this year and over the next 10 years? a. General Dempsey? b. General Odierno? c. Admiral Ferguson? d. General Amos? e. General Welsh? f. General Grass?

Answer: Over the past 10 years, the Marine Corps has been able to maintain a high state of readiness in our forward deployed units supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. We have been able to do this through our responsible use of the overseas contingency operation (OCO) dollars provided by the taxpayer. The Marine Corps is extremely grateful for this; the OCO money provided has allowed us to purchase equipment specific to the missions for those operations and to purchase equipment to protect our Marines against the types of unique and emerging threats that exist in these environments. However, much of this equipment purchased to sustain the National Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan does not meet the future strategic and operational requirements that we see for the Marine Corps. Furthermore,

much of our standard equipment sets are deployed forward supporting the theater of operations, leaving home station units with an equipment deficit. At current funding levels, we expect it will take up to 18-24 months after forces have left Afghanistan to reset the equipment through our depots.

Our Marine Aviation Units maintain a high state of readiness at all times to respond to contingencies and commitments throughout the globe. At any given time, 2/3 of Marine Aviation Units are committed: 1/3 are deployed and 1/3 are preparing to deploy. The effects of sequestration and the Continuing resolution equates to an approximately 20% reduction in flight hours, curtailment of depot maintenance throughput, and fewer spares due to decreases in Aviation Depot Level Repairable funding (AVDLR). Limited flying hours and available mission ready aircraft creates a negative effect on readiness. In addition, lack of operational funds, i.e. training range support, ordnance, TAD for training directly impact readiness.

In December 2012 73% (38 of 54) of all our flying squadrons met the COCOM minimum deployable combat readiness level of C2. By December 2013 (if sequestration is enacted and we remain under a CR), only 66% (35 of 53) of our flying squadrons will meet the COCOM minimum deployable combat readiness level of C2.

In December 2015 (if sequestration is enacted and we remain under a CR), we anticipate seeing a reduction in aviation readiness to 47 % (25 of 53) of Marine Aviation flying squadrons meeting the COCOM minimum deployable combat readiness level of C2.

Looking ahead to the next 10 years, underfunding readiness this year will challenge our plans to reset and reconstitute the force. The Marine Corp planned to focus fiscal resources on non-deployed unit training and equipment readiness. The effects of sequestration on the warfighter may not be felt immediately, but will delay the depot reset of equipment by at least 18 months.

Sequestration will also affect our funding for critical training exercises such as our Integrated Training Exercise at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, and pre-deployment training and deployment certification exercises for our Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) as well as other units deploying to meet geographic combatant commander requirements. Exercises such as these are critical to maintaining our unique Marine Air Ground Task Force forward presence and crisis response capability. Sequestration will also affect long-term readiness by forcing us to reduce equipment purchases and curtail modernization programs. Ultimately, shortfalls in funding will impede the Marine Corps from executing the aforementioned large exercises, degrade the ability of the Marine Corps to meet readiness standards, impede reset and modernization, and create a negative readiness trajectory that would require ever-increasing resources to reverse.

Finally, limited operations and maintenance (O&M) funds will impact our rotational forces' ability to conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) exercises and build partner capacity, reducing our Allies interoperability and eroding confidence in U.S. commitments abroad.

Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #86

Current Readiness

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, how would you assess the readiness of your combat forces right now? a. General Dempsey? b. General Odierno? c. Admiral Ferguson? d. General Amos? e. General Welsh? f. General Grass?

Answer: Readiness of our deployed forces remains at the highest levels and is my number one priority. However, high readiness levels for our deployed force come at the expense of our non-deployed forces. Equipment and personnel have been sourced globally from non-deployed forces to support deploying units and theater manning requirements, resulting in reduced readiness of the non-deployed units. Almost two thirds of non-deployed units report significantly degraded overall readiness in executing their core missions. Sixty-five percent of the non-deployed units report equipment shortfalls and thirty-four percent of non-deployed units report personnel shortfalls.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-087
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #87

Current Readiness

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, how close are we now to a hollow force? a. General Dempsey? b. General Odierno? c. Admiral Ferguson? d. General Amos? e. General Welsh? f. General Grass?

Answer: The continuing resolution and sequestration will immediately begin hollowing the near- and long-term readiness of the Marine Corps. To keep Marines in the field, we are already being forced to reduce depot maintenance of equipment, reduce participation in training exercises, reduce equipment buys and curtail modernization programs. Within six months of sequestration implementation, there will be increased degradation to home station unit readiness. These units are the "bench" that the Marine Corps pulls from for contingency response and execution of Combatant Commanders' operational plans. Beyond twelve months, there will be adverse readiness impacts to all home station units, to include next-to-deploy and some deployed units. Additional, detailed near-term impacts are cited in my written statement. The Marine Corps' readiness is already at a tipping point, because the ability to rebalance funding from long-term investments to short-term readiness is becoming unsustainable.

While the primary effects on short-term readiness are already observable, the longer-term effects may be even more damaging and not readily reversible. The realignment of funds to adjust to the continuing resolution has already begun to degrade activities necessary for the long-term readiness of the force, such as the maintenance of equipment returning to theater. The Marine Corps manages its long-term health and readiness by balancing monies across its five readiness pillars of high quality people, unit readiness, capability and capacity to meet Combatant Commander requirements, infrastructure sustainment, and equipment modernization. Sequestration will unbalance the Corps' institutional readiness by forcing investments in manpower and near-term unit readiness at the expense of infrastructure, sustainment, reset, and modernization.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-088
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #88

Current Readiness

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, even before sequestration, what percentage of your non-deployed major combat units are trained and ready today for their full spectrum of assigned missions?a. General Dempsey?b. General Odierno?c. Admiral Ferguson?d. General Amos?e. General Welsh?f. General Grass?

Answer: The abilities of the Marine Corps to operate across the full spectrum of warfare, especially at the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) level and major subordinate command level, have degraded due to a necessary focus on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare mission requirements for Operation Enduring Freedom. Training limitations in core mission capabilities such as MEF-level combined arms, anti-air warfare, amphibious operations, and repositioning operations have accordingly degraded the Marine Corps' ability to respond to other operational plans, contingencies, and activities. Moreover, high readiness of the deployed force comes at the expense of our non-deployed forces. Equipment and personnel have been sourced globally from non-deployed forces to support deploying units, which had the causal effect of reducing the readiness of non-deployed units. More than half of the Marine Corps' combat units report limitations in achieving readiness levels required for deployment.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-089
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #89

Current Readiness

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, if sequestration were allowed to occur, how quickly would your force start to go hollow? a. General Dempsey? b. General Odierno? c. Admiral Ferguson? d. General Amos? e. General Welsh? f. General Grass?

Answer: Sequestration would produce irreversible impacts to readiness. We already are seeing indicators of a hollowing of the force; over half of our Marine Corps units are at unacceptable readiness levels to meet core mission requirements. Although we are able to mitigate immediate challenges to readiness in the near term, there will be a steadily increasing degradation to readiness as sequestration unfolds. To keep our Marines in the field, we are being forced already to reduce depot maintenance of our equipment, reduce our participation in training exercises, reduce necessary equipment buys, and curtail force modernization programs. Furthermore, over the next six to twelve months, we will see a continued decrement to readiness accounts with an ever-increasing erosion of home station unit readiness and force modernization. This will manifest itself in small impacts in next-to-deploy forces readiness. Beyond 12 months, we will see a real impact to all home station units (e.g. fixed wing squadrons will have on average only four of twelve assigned aircraft on the ramp due to aviation depot shutdowns) and the beginning of impacts to our next-to-deploy and some deployed forces. Ultimately, this will result in a compounding and escalating slide to a hollow force, some of which will be irreversible.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-090
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #90

Current Readiness

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, will you please provide your assessment promptly to this committee when you have determined an unacceptable risk to the readiness of your forces? a. General Dempsey? b. General Odierno? c. Admiral Ferguson? d. General Amos? e. General Welsh? f. General Grass?

Answer: If ever I determine there is an unacceptable risk to the readiness of my Marines or their ability to accomplish the mission, I will promptly take action to include providing that assessment to this Committee. As I have testified this week, I am very concerned that an annualized Continuing Resolution (CR) and subsequent Sequestration reductions could create unacceptable risk in the Readiness of the Marine Corps.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-094
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC

Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #94

National Security Impact

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, if sequestration is allowed to occur, what do you foresee as changes to our National Military Strategy (NMS)?a. General Odierno?b. Admiral Ferguson?c. General Amos?d. General Welsh?

Answer: Sequestration is a fiscal choice that will incur a strategic risk. The DepSecDef stated that if sequestration is allowed, the Department of Defense must then consider changes or adjustments to the current Defense Strategic Guidance. The National Military Strategy will also require review in light of this new fiscal reality. If sequestration is allowed, it will require the Marine Corps to adjust and reassess the way in which we employ our military capabilities and capacities to defend the nation. Fiscal decisions will invariably create strategic consequences with implications for our National Security interests.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-114
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #114

Impact of Sequestration on the Marine Corps

Question: General Amos, how would you express, in terms of risk, the effects of sequestration over 10 years on the capabilities of the Marine Corps?

Answer: The Marine Corps' ability to respond to and contribute to the achievement of our national security interests will be the greatest risk imposed by sequestration. The Marine Corps is currently capable of meeting ongoing operational commitments, but is challenged to man, equip, train, and sustain the force to meet strategic objectives. The effects of 10 years of sequestration, in addition to 11 years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, could jeopardize the institutional health of the Marine Corps. Over the long-term, without adequate funding, the readiness and institutional health of the Corps will suffer, eventually leading to a hollow force. Although the capabilities of the Marine Corps will remain relatively constant over these 10 years, it will be the capacity of the Marine Corps to provide capable and ready Marine forces to influence the accomplishment of our vital national security interests that will be challenged. Additionally, the Marine Corps' reliance on the U.S. Navy to support operationally available amphibious warships and aviation related maintenance and support, further degrades our ability to project, support, and sustain forces abroad.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-115

Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #115

Impact of Sequestration on the Marine Corps

Question: General Amos, you have warned of a hollow force. What does that specifically mean for the Marine Corps?

Answer: Readiness is the aggregate result of balanced investment in the pillars of high quality people, well-trained units, functional facilities and modernized equipment. Together, these ensure that units are prepared to perform assigned missions at any given time. A 'hollow force' is one that is not ready in one or more of these pillars.

By the will of Congress, the Marine Corps is mandated to be the nation's expeditionary force in readiness. Deployed forces and units in training alike are poised to swiftly respond to crisis and disaster, giving immediate options for strategic decision-makers, while buying time for the generation of the larger joint force. Even when not deployed, Marine units are required to maintain higher levels of readiness, so they can deploy on short notice. *Tiered readiness*, is a concept whereby resources from non-deployed units are paid-forward to ensure that deployed and next-to-deploy units have sufficient personnel, equipment, and training to accomplish their mission. Over time, tiered readiness leads to an unacceptable degradation in unit readiness. Tiered readiness for the joint force as a whole may be warranted, but it is not compatible with the ethos, role, or missions of nation's immediate crisis response force.

The below are specific examples of current actions made necessary in response to the combined effects of the CR and sequester. These actions will degrade the pillars of force readiness, leading the force down a path that leads to a hollowing of the force:

- Reduce through-put of depot level maintenance for organizational equipment, delaying our ability to reset war-torn equipment by eighteen months or more
- Park over eighty aircraft as depot maintenance schedules are stretched out
- Reduce support to theater geographic combatant commander requirements for shaping their theaters, responding to crisis, and preventing conflict
- Reduce participation in multi-national training exercises, degrading one of the most effective investments in building partner nation capacity
- Degrade training for units in training due to lack of fuel, equipment and spare parts
- Cut ammunition allocations for gunner certification and training
- Cut flight hours available for pilot proficiency and certification
- Reduce facility maintenance to 71% of the level required
- Delay Marine Corps contributions to joint special operations and cyber forces
- Furlough or reduce an already thinned civilian workforce
- Severely curtail or extend acquisition programs
- Reduce organizational activities including recruiting, range-maintenance, family-housing maintenance and quality of life enhancements for military families

- Curtail energy-efficiency, safety, and base security investments
- Cut educational investments in the human capital of our uniformed and civilian workforce

Early Marine Corps readiness is at a 'tipping point' toward a hollow force in the sense that our ability to rebalance funding from long-term investments to short-term readiness is becoming unsustainable. Given the combined trajectory of the continuing resolution and sequestration, the symptoms of a hollow force will begin to emerge between six and twelve months from now. By the end of CY13, less than half of our ground units will be trained to the minimum readiness level required for deployment. Only 2/3 of our aviation combat units will be at readiness levels required for overseas deployment. Beyond 12 months, our fixed wing squadrons will have on average only five to six of twelve assigned aircraft on the ramp due to aviation depot shutdowns. These immediate readiness reductions are accompanied by facilities that have fallen into disrepair, training ranges that are no longer adequate for the demands of modern combat, and aging equipment for which modernization has been deferred or cancelled. Our ability to attract high quality volunteers to our ranks will be reduced. Together, these symptoms are the very definition of a force that has become 'hollow'.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-116
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #116

Impact of Sequestration on the Marine Corps

Question: General Amos, it is my understanding that the United States no longer maintains an amphibious ready group in the Mediterranean Sea, and this is before sequestration. How will sequestration affect the Marine Corps' ability to respond to crises in North Africa, conduct non-combatant evacuations, deploy FAST units, and maintain a rapid response capability with forward deployed forces?

Answer: Prior to 9/11, the Navy and Marine Corps team provided a sustained Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) presence in the Mediterranean with forces from the east coast and another in the Pacific/Indian Ocean with forces from the west coast. Over the past decade, the number of amphibious ships has dropped below the 38 required ships to the current inventory of 30. Traditional amphibious ship availability rates of approximately 70-75% due to ship maintenance, leaves only 22-25 ships available at any time for operations and sustainment training. The Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan grows the amphibious force to a maximum of 34 ships, but that level is only maintained three years the mid 2020s.

Over the past decade, ARG/MEUs from both coasts have deployed in an alternating rotation specifically to fill a continuous presence in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), providing only transitory presence to USEUCOM or USAFRICOM. Amphibious forces have

responded to crises in these theaters, but at the expense of force presence in the USCENTCOM AOR. Given the low numbers and operational availability of amphibious warships today, along with a potential reduction in force or curtailment in operations, the Navy-Marine Corps team will be challenged to provide a sustained presence, capable of responding to crisis in the Mediterranean without accepting risk elsewhere.

If sequestration occurs, the Department of the Navy may be forced to gap the required USCENTCOM AOR presence. Response to crises in the Mediterranean might have to rely on the global response force ARG/MEU, which would take 10 days for transit (following equipment/forces onload) if an east coast ARG/MEU responds, and 28 days for transit if a west coast ARG/MEU responds. Maritime Prepositioning Squadron-2 (MPSRON-2), located in Diego Garcia and assigned to USPACOM, would take 10 days to sail to the Mediterranean Sea. The equipment prepositioned on the MPSRON is optimized for major combat operations, but is capable of supporting events across the range of military operations. However, unlike US Navy amphibious ships, MPSRON ships operate only in permissive environments and have no forcible entry capability.

In response to the Secretary of Defense's direction to the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Services to develop crisis response options to be deployed to USEUCOM or USAFRICOM, the Marine Corps developed a concept for a Marine Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response; a self-deployable unit capable of conducting limited crisis response missions to include embassy reinforcement, limited NEOs, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, and fixed site security. However, fiscal constraints imposed upon the Marine Corps as a result of sequestration will have a direct impact on the Service's ability to initiate this capability while maintaining the support it provides to all other global demands.

Finally, sequestration would reduce already limited crisis response capacity and capability in the Mediterranean while effecting a concomitant reduction in theater security cooperation (TSC). For instance, sequestration will affect Naval independent, single-ship deployers that support Africa Partnership Station TSC, which in turn also reduces crisis response capability in USAFRICOM. Sequestration would also affect SPMAGTF-Africa's support to the African Union Mission in Somalia and its support to African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance missions. In Europe, sequestration could affect Black Sea Rotational Force deployments to the Black Sea/Caucasus regions in Eurasia. Each of these deployments utilizes intra-theater lift to move forces to remote locations from a forward base. Sequestration will reduce the intra-theater lift provided by all the Services, thus affecting the Marine Corps' ability to respond to crises and to support Combatant Commander TSC priorities.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-117
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #117

Impact of Sequestration on the Marine Corps

Question: General Amos, the Marine Corps has been designated by Congress as the Nation's force-in-readiness. How will the anticipated cuts affect the Marine Corps in terms of its ability to respond not only to the previously mentioned rapid response incidents, but what about its ability to respond to larger contingency operations?

Answer: The Marine Corps takes its mandate to be the Nation's force-in-readiness seriously and fields ready forces to meet National Military Strategy demands. It fully resources Marine units in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and other forward deployed requirements. However, the cost of fielding ready forces comes at the expense of home station units. Accordingly, the combination of sequestration and an annualized continuing resolution will further degrade both near-term readiness and the Corps' long-term capability to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance. In Fiscal Year 13, this resultant degradation will begin to set conditions for a "hollow" Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps manages readiness across five broad elements or pillars: high quality people; unit readiness; capability and capacity to meet requirements; infrastructure sustainment; and equipment modernization. Maintaining balance across these pillars is critical to achieving and sustaining the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness for today and tomorrow. If the cuts associated with sequestration are implemented, the Corps would not be able to maintain balance across those pillars due to the nature and relative size of its budget. The Corps crisis response ability and readiness would suffer accordingly. Actions the Marine Corps is being forced to take today to ensure short-term readiness will create both near- and far-term readiness shortfalls within the next year. Any further reductions in Fiscal Year 14 funding, below Fiscal Year 12 and 13 budget levels, would cause the Corps to invest in manpower and near-term unit readiness at the expense of infrastructure and sustainment.

For forces not deploying to Afghanistan, the fuel, ammunition, and other support necessary for training will be reduced, thereby affecting the Corps' ability to provide fully trained individuals and ready units to meet emerging crises. Sequestration will require tough solutions in terms of idling hundreds of aircraft as they await the funding necessary for depot-level work. Without aircraft, critical readiness training will degrade and require ever-increasing resources to reverse. Sequestration will also require discontinuing efforts to reset equipment returning from the combat theater, which would otherwise increase readiness in units critically short of essential equipment. Shortfalls in equipment will negatively affect pre-deployment and collective training, deployment timelines as unit readiness degrades, and essential forward deployed missions – including Marine expeditionary units, single ship amphibious deployments, and maritime prepositioning force exercises. Again, home station units would be the "bill payers" as limited resources will be allocated to those identified for upcoming deployments. Many are already in a degraded status after a decade of war, and these cuts would further exacerbate deficiencies in home-station unit readiness. These same units impacted by resourcing shortfalls are the foundation for responding to large-scale contingencies.

The Marine Corps is committed to building the most ready force that the nation can afford. The current fiscal uncertainty puts the Corps at risk in realizing this commitment.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-118
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #118

Impact of Sequestration on the Marine Corps

Question: General Amos, how would sequestration affect Marine Corps end strength?

Answer: The Marine Corps is on its way down to 182,000 - as planned and agreed to. The Marine Corps has no plans to decrease its end strength below that number, even with sequestration. As of now, the President has exempted the manpower accounts from sequestration. Thus, sequestration cuts will come from O&M, which impacts training and readiness, and procurement, which impacts modernization and reset.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-119
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #119

Impact of Sequestration on the Marine Corps

Question: General Amos, from your perspective, how would sequestration impact the rebalancing of Marine Corps forces in the Pacific theater?

Answer: We are concerned that sequestration, when applied in the midst of our planned redistribution of forces in the Pacific, will impose significant impacts to our operational readiness and responsiveness, and hinder our ability to maintain deterrence, project power, respond to crises, and contribute to stability in accordance with combatant commander requirements and timelines. Our rebalance to the Pacific faced a significant challenge with the planned downsizing of the Marine Corps to 182,100. We mitigated this by pacing the reconstitution of the III MEF Unit Deployment Program (UDP) commensurate with our force requirements in the CENTCOM AOR and by accepting the impacts of the downsizing in other commands in favor of sustaining, and in some cases increasing, our III MEF force levels under the distributed laydown. Sequestration will reduce the operational readiness of those Pacific-based forces while also incurring a proportional delay in executing the facilities and force posture restructuring necessary to achieve the distributed laydown plan. Extending the already protracted timeline for the distributed laydown increases risk for III MEF due to disruption of operational capabilities during the transition and relocation process.

Sequestration may affect USMC participation in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events across the Pacific, to include Phase II of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) and the

III MEF UDP. MRF-D Phase II, the growth in Australia from a company to battalion sized SPMAGTF, may be impacted by sequestration. Initial FY-13/14 costs related to site preparation for the larger unit, and the costs associated with moving the gear set, agricultural inspections, and unit movement, as well as regional TSC strategic-lift expenses could be at risk. III MEF UDP is the Marine Corps' method to project Marine forces forward in the PACOM AOR and may be affected adversely by sequestration if funding is unavailable for deployment.

The significant impact to USMC equity in the Pacific due to sequestration is the effect on strategic mobility. Intra-theater lift is a requirement due to the distances in the PACOM AOR. USMC ability to participate in TSC events could be impacted if US Navy ships are less available due to maintenance and other forms of Intra-theater lift become too expensive. While the Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV) is not currently available, sustained sequestration may impact USMC capacity to fund JHSV use when the asset does become available.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-120
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #120

Impact of Sequestration on Special Operations Command

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, SOCOM will be especially hard hit by the impacts of sequestration and a year-long CR. In addition to their annual budget of approximately \$10.5 billion, SOCOM is heavily dependent on roughly \$7 billion annually in direct support from the Services - including the provision of Service-common equipment like the Army's Blackhawk and Chinook aircraft as well as enabling support for deployed forces, such as air mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Have you conducted an assessment of how sequestration will impact your ability to continue providing direct support to special operations forces? a.

General Dempsey? b. General Odierno? c. Admiral Ferguson? d. General Amos? e.
General Welsh? f. General Grass?

Answer: An assessment of how sequestration would affect the Marine Corps' ability to continue providing direct support to Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) has been conducted. Lower funding rates across the budget, in this case Major Force Program-2 funding, would reduce resources for manpower, recruitment, purchase or replacement of critical equipment, maintenance and sustainment activities.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-121
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos

Impact of Sequestration on Special Operations Command

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, have you spoken with Admiral McRaven, Commander of SOCOM, about how sequestration would impact your ability to provide support to special operations forces? a. General Dempsey? b. General Odierno? c. Admiral Ferguson? d. General Amos? e. General Welsh? f. General Grass?

Answer: An assessment of how sequestration would affect the Marine Corps' ability to continue providing direct support to Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) has been conducted.

MARSOF is still growing in end-strength to meet its commitment to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). This vital growth is composed of combat and combat service support structure that both provides the proper balance of operator to supporter and facilitates sufficient forces to reduce wear and tear on some of the busiest Marines in the force. Sequestration has the potential to delay this manpower build.

MARSOF recruiting and initial training efforts in fiscal year 2013 -- which are paid for with Major Force Program-2 (MFP-2) funding -- directly impact MARSOF's operational capability in 2014 and beyond. Lower funding rates across the budget, again including MFP 2, would reduce resources for recruiting, and ultimately reduce throughput of new critical skills operators (CSO) in the military occupational specialty 0372. These "operators" are the cornerstone of MARSOC force capability. MARSOC is also still growing operators to meet its commitment to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Continued aggressive recruiting is absolutely critical in meeting its force growth goals and USSOCOM operational requirements. While detailed projections are still being refined, some rough projections can be made already. I believe that any reduction in CSO recruiting would prevent the creation of as many as three special operations teams' worth of critical skills operators. This shortfall will incur a high risk to MARSOC's future assigned missions and would induce increased operational tempo and a resultant stress on the remaining MARSOC Marines and families.

Sequestration would also hamper my ability to buy or replace critical equipment for MARSOF. Furthermore, shortfalls in funding for intermediate and operational maintenance activities would reduce equipment readiness below 90%. These equipment readiness rates would negatively affect availability and support for essential training, exercises, and other pre-deployment activities. Delayed ground equipment repairs would ultimately affect adversely our MARSOF warfighting capability as forward deployed units would begin to suffer lower equipment readiness rates. Finally, sequestration will impact sustainment activities such as inspections and classifications; servicing, adjustments, and tunings; testing and calibrations; repairs; modifications; rebuilding and overhauling; reclamation; and recovery and evacuation. These related activities are essential to supporting MARSOF equipment and Marines.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-123
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #123

Status of the F-35 Lightning Acquisition Program

Question: Secretary Carter, will there be a potential for higher costs and further delays? General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, what will be the impact to your military capabilities if the F-35 program is significantly delayed? a. General Odierno? b. Admiral Ferguson? c. General Amos? d. General Welsh?

Answer: The Marine Corps continues to adjust TACAIR transition plans as F-35 procurement ramps are flattened, extending the sundown of our legacy fleet seven years in the last two Presidential Budgets. Any further delays in procuring the F-35 for the Marine Corps will not only result in increased unit recurring flyaway costs but will also create gaps in our operational capabilities due to the service life expiring on our legacy TACAIR inventory.

Currently, 80% of Marine F/A-18s have surpassed the designed service life limit of 6000 hours and 110 of the Marine Corps' 256 will reach an extended service life authorization limit of 9000 hours by 2020 equating to nearly half (43%) of the operational F/A-18 inventory. Successful achievement of the 9,000 hour service life is predicated on an intense depot level, High Flight Hour inspection process. Sequestration and the CR impact the ability to perform these High Flight Hour inspections through reduced funding and the furlough of specialized artisans. The ability to extend the F/A-18 beyond 9,000 is unknown. Even if technically feasible, the extension beyond 9,000 hours would require significant investment in both manpower and materiel.

Scheduled AV-8B to F35B transitions in 2016 and 2023 are required to account for attrition losses and ensure available inventory meets flight line requirements. Any delays will create a shortfall in the AV-8B community and a delay in the fielding of F-35 squadrons, thereby reducing MEU capable squadrons to meet COCOM requirements. Additionally, extending AV-8B beyond 2030 incurs a significant cost with regard to capability upgrades for the aircraft to successfully operate in the future threat environment.

Relevancy, sustainment, and life extension issues for AV-8B and F/A-18 would be compounded by the delay of the introduction of F-35's fifth generation combat capability. This capability is critical to execute the National Security Strategy and our rebalance to the Pacific.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-138
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos

Question: #138

Effects of Sequestration on Family Support Programs

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, the Services are in a budget bind and I am worried that morale will suffer with cuts to important military family support programs - child care centers, youth programs, recreation programs, commissaries, exchanges, and others. While dodging bullets and bombs, deployed service members want to know that their family members are well cared for at home. What will you do to minimize the impact of budget cuts on morale of our Armed Forces? a. General Odierno? b. Admiral Ferguson? c. General Amos? d. General Welsh?

Answer: Marines and families are no different than their fellow citizens. Talk of looming budget cuts and the possible impact those cuts will have on their quality of life, their families, their children, their jobs all take a toll. Marines and families are resilient and morale remains high. They have proven that over the past decade of fighting two wars. Even though they have concerns, your Marines continue to thrive while training hard and fighting hard. They stand ready to contain the crisis, fill the gap, and hold the line. They don't know when they will be called, but you should know that your Marines, with their families standing behind them, are ready to leave tonight.

The Marine Corps' approach to potential sequestration cuts to our Marine and Family support portfolio is focused on preserving programs that support the health, welfare and morale of our Marines and their families while taking acceptable levels of risk in lower-priority programs.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-139
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #139

Effects of Sequestration on Family Support Programs

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, how will you shield family support programs from the cuts you expect to happen under sequestration? a. General Odierno? b. Admiral Ferguson? c. General Amos? d. General Welsh?

Answer: The Marine Corps' approach to potential sequestration cuts is focused on preserving programs that support the health, welfare, and morale of our Marines and their families while taking acceptable levels of risk in lower-priority programs. These protected program areas are considered most essential in meeting the organizational objectives of the Marine Corps. They collectively promote the physical and mental well-being of Marines and families, a requirement that supports the accomplishment of our operational requirements.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-140

Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #140

Effects of Sequestration on Family Support Programs

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, how are services, such as child care support and family readiness programs, affected by sequestration?a. General Odierno?b. Admiral Ferguson?c. General Amos?d. General Welsh?

Answer: Programs such as child care and other family readiness programs were not part of the exempted personnel costs. However, the Marine Corps' approach to potential sequestration cuts to our Marine and Family support portfolio, to include our child care and family readiness programs, is focused on preserving the programs that support the health, welfare and morale of our Marines and their families, while taking manageable risk in lower-priority programs such as our youth and teen and recreation programs. These services may be impacted by fewer support staff, shorter hours of operation, imposition of user fees, or termination of the program.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-141
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #141

Effects of Sequestration on Family Support Programs

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, what is the projected impact on housing entitlements and tuition assistance?a. General Odierno?b. Admiral Ferguson?c. General Amos?d. General Welsh?

Answer: The Marine Corps' approach to potential sequestration cuts is focused on preserving programs that support the health, welfare, and morale of our Marines and their families while taking risk in lower priority programs such as Tuition Assistance (TA). These protected program areas are considered most essential in meeting the organizational objectives of the Marine Corps. They collectively promote the physical and mental well-being of Marines and families, a requirement that supports the accomplishment of our operational requirements.

Based on the impact of sequestration, the Marine Corps will only be able to offer TA to eligible Marines for the first through third quarters of FY13. While a Marine's educational goals are a priority, Marines have other tools at their disposal to achieve their goals. Marines interested in pursuing higher education after the expiration of TA funds will still have their GI Bill benefits to fund higher education needs.

Because the military personnel accounts have been expressly exempted from sequestration spending cuts for this fiscal year, pay and allowances, including housing entitlements, for our Marines should be unaffected during 2013. However, if not exempted in FY14 and beyond, the level of these benefits will need to be re-evaluated and may be negatively impacted.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-142
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #142

Effects of Sequestration on Family Support Programs

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, as we see this looming threat just over the horizon, can you say how a sequestration is affecting the morale of our service members? a. General Odierno? b. Admiral Ferguson? c. General Amos? d. General Welsh?

Answer: Marines and families are no different than their fellow citizens. Talk of looming budget cuts and the possible impact those cuts will have on their quality of life, their families, their children, their jobs all take a toll.

Marines and families are resilient and morale remains high. They have proven that over the past decade of fighting two wars. Even though they have concerns, your Marines continue to thrive while training hard and fighting hard. They stand ready to contain the crisis, fill the gap, and hold the line. They don't know when they will be called, but you should know that your Marines, with their families standing behind them, are ready to leave tonight.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-143
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #143

Effects of Sequestration on Family Support Programs

Question: General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, how is this uncertainty affecting their families?

Answer: Marines and families are no different than their fellow citizens. Talk of looming budget cuts and the possible impact those cuts will have on their quality of life, their families, their children, their jobs all take a toll.

Marines and families are resilient and morale remains high. They have proven that over the past

decade of fighting two wars. Even though they have concerns, your Marines continue to thrive while training hard and fighting hard. They stand ready to contain the crisis, fill the gap, and hold the line. They don't know when they will be called, but you should know that your Marines, with their families standing behind them, remain your expeditionary force in readiness.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-144
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #144

Effects of Sequestration on Civilian Personnel

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, the Services have told us they will furlough civilian personnel for up to 22 days under sequestration. This will result in a 20 percent pay cut for thousands of workers across the country, and many of them will not be able to make ends meet. Their families will suffer unnecessarily, and the President has shown no inclination to work with Congress to stop this devastation to families. How are you planning to minimize the financial impact of sequestration on civilian personnel?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: The current plans of discontinuous furlough is the most viable means of curtailing negative financial impact on families by *spreading the pain* across multiple weeks rather than bundling all 22 days together and creating a full "work-month" where employees would go a full four weeks without pay. Although still negatively impacting our civilian workforce, this is the best way to minimize the financial impact of a 20 percent pay cut over a six-month period. By law, such furloughed employees cannot receive severance pay; they cannot substitute paid leave or other time off for furlough time; they cannot earn overtime to compensate for furlough days off; and, they may not be able to receive unemployment compensation depending on state requirements.

While we would like to believe that a discontinuous furlough will reduce the impact on our employees, most will not be able to easily absorb this sudden loss of income. Overall, employee stress will increase; morale will decline; productivity will suffer; commitment to federal service may decrease; and military missions will suffer.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-145
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #145

Effects of Sequestration on Civilian Personnel

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, civilian personnel faithfully provide many of the clinical and support services our Active Duty service members and their family members need. Just last Friday, I visited Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and witnessed the outstanding care that our wounded warriors are getting there. Civilian employees at Walter Reed make up 43 percent of total employees. They are the doctors, nurses, records clerks, pharmacists, mental health counselors, and lab technicians caring for our nation's heroes. How do you plan to maintain the critical clinical and support services civilian workers provide to our wounded warriors and other beneficiaries while you furlough thousands of them across the country? a. Secretary Carter? b. Secretary Hale? c. General Dempsey? d. General Odierno? e. Admiral Ferguson? f. General Amos? g. General Welsh? h. General Grass?

Answer: The impact of sequestration will be felt throughout the Navy and Marine Corps, including Navy Medicine. Our wounded and injured Marines and their families receive outstanding care through Navy medical treatment facilities. The Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) recognizes that any potentially directed furlough of civilian employees will have some impact on health care services at medical treatment facilities. Navy Medicine plans to carefully assess mitigation strategies to minimize impact on all beneficiaries; however, care for wounded warriors will remain Navy Medicine's highest priority.

BUMED plans to ensure continued care to wounded warriors as they are identified in the patient population through the case management programs and specialty care treatment they receive. If furlough occurs, Navy Medicine will be able to carefully track our wounded warriors and ensure their continuum of care is uninterrupted. In the event of furlough, Navy Medicine is prepared to shift military assets as required to ensure uninterrupted care to wounded warriors and their families. This action, however, may require Navy Medicine to divert non-wounded warrior patient care to the private sector network.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-146
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #146

Effects of Sequestration on Civilian Personnel

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, many healthcare providers and support personnel in DOD facilities are civilians - Navy (18 percent), Army (60 percent), and Air Force (18.5 percent). When you furlough civilian employees in military hospitals and clinics, it seems to me that healthcare for wounded warriors will suffer. Many of the healthcare providers that I saw treating our wounded warriors at Walter Reed were caring, dedicated civilians, not

military personnel. DOD has said that it will protect wounded warrior programs from sequestration, but I find this hard to believe if DOD plans indiscriminant civilian furloughs. How will wounded warriors stay on their treatment and rehabilitation plans if you furlough civilian employees that are providing those services?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: The impact of sequestration will be felt throughout the Navy and Marine Corps, including Navy Medicine. Our wounded and injured Marines receive outstanding care through Navy medical treatment facilities. Civilian health care providers are important to the Navy Medicine work force and the capability to deliver services to beneficiaries. The Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) recognizes that any potentially directed furlough of civilian employees will have some impact on health care services at medical treatment facilities. Navy Medicine plans to maintain the continuum of care via the clinical case managers who have established care plans for our wounded warriors. These plans include shifting military assets to address those needs as required. BUMED acknowledges this action, however, may require Navy Medicine to divert non-wounded warrior patient care to the private sector network.

The Marine Corps provides non-clinical support for our wounded warriors through the Wounded Warrior Regiment. Although DoD guidance states wounded warrior programs are protected, should the Wounded Warrior Regiment ultimately be impacted by furloughs, we will mitigate risk by staggering civilian furloughs associated with sequestration, whereby there would be reduced instances that would allow for a wounded warrior service or support mechanism to cease operation. A sufficient number of multi-disciplinary team members would remain available for care coordination actions in support of individual wounded, ill and injured Marines. Operation under this scenario, while allowing services to continue, is not sustainable over time as there is high potential that compromised staffing will eventually lead to the delayed delivery of services (i.e., transition support, therapy and reconditioning, and administration support).

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-147
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #147

Effects of Sequestration on Civilian Personnel

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, how will you ensure that wounded warriors will not suffer under sequestration?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: The Marine Corps will continue to maintain its stance that keeping faith with our wounded warriors is a top priority. Wounded Warrior Programs, under their protected status (as

indicated by DoD's statement that limitations on sequestration include the protection of wounded warrior programs), would not be impacted. However, a pragmatic view of this fiscal crisis indicates that the responsibility to care for wounded warriors could eventually be placed at risk. A risk mitigation strategy would be to manage civilian furlough schedules. Operations under this scenario, while allowing services to continue, are not sustainable over time as there is high potential that compromised staffing will eventually lead to the delayed delivery of services (i.e., transition support, therapy and reconditioning, and administration support).

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-164
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #164

Impact of Sequester on Operation and Maintenance

Question: General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, and General Welsh, overall, sequestration in FY13 will result in a \$46 billion reduction, but as we all know, the impact on our military goes well beyond \$46 billion. For example, of that \$46 billion, \$13 billion will be axed from O&M accounts. But as I understand it, that \$13 billion cut will be exacerbated by an additional \$5 billion cut to protect ongoing operations in Afghanistan, and is already \$11 billion below the level required because DOD has yet to receive a FY13 appropriation. Once you account for other unfunded or higher than anticipated execution issues, in O&M alone, DOD as a result of sequestration and the CR will be \$35 billion in the red, a deficit that cannot be absorbed in 7 months without taking dramatic and unprecedented actions. Please provide specific examples of how this shortfall in O&M will impact your respective Service.a. General Dempsey?b. General Odierno?c. Admiral Ferguson?d. General Amos?e. General Welsh?

Answer: The impact of shortfalls in O&M funding will have a severe impact on the Marine Corps in both the short term and the long-term. Because of our special role as America's crisis response force, the Marine Corps places a high premium on readiness, and we have made every effort to protect our forward deployed forces from the impact of these budget cuts. However, this has come at a cost to our crisis response units at home station, and as the full impact of sequestration is realized, we will see an exponential degradation of readiness that will ultimately affect every aspect of Marine Corps operations.

Under the current continuing resolution, I have been able to ensure the readiness of our deploying units, but only by decrementing the long-term readiness of the total force. Our forward deployed Marines and our Marines engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan will continue to be our top priority, and we will also work to ensure that our units preparing to deploy have what they need. However, due to \$1.2B in CR and Sequestration-induced cuts to O&M and over \$500M in new requirements in FY13 alone, this readiness will come at the expense of our units at home station, our families, and our crisis response capacity.

For example, we have already slowed our efforts to rebalance to the Pacific, and should sequestration go into effect, we will be forced to significantly curtail our plans for shifting additional forces into this region. While we have resumed our Unit Deployment Program to Okinawa, Japan, we currently have insufficient funding for the latest deployed battalion to return from deployment on time. Additionally, aviation units required to support this increase in ground combat capability will be unable to deploy. This will reduce the nation's forward presence, and limit our ability to interact with our partners and allies in the PACOM area of operations. Our absence will create gaps in forward presence, slow crisis response times, and reduce our ability to conduct theater security cooperation by over 30%. We will be less capable to respond to natural disasters such as Operation Tomodachi, typhoons in the Phillipines, or floods in Thailand, and participate in Joint and combined exercises. Our absence will create a void that will quickly be filled by others. In the Asia-Pacific region, this could very likely be China, as ASEAN nations will likely interpret our absence as a lack of commitment to the region and will thus seek to form bi-lateral partnerships with China in order to hedge against China's rising power in the region.

Additionally, the Continuing Resolution has already had a significant impact to the readiness of our home station units, and sequestration will only serve to exacerbate this problem. Further, as the full 9-year impact of sequestration is realized, this erosion of home station/crisis response forces will worsen and will certainly begin to affect our "next to deploy" units. Despite the constrained funding resulting from the CR and sequestration, in the next six months we will be able to continue meeting Marine Corps deployed warfighting needs and the training of next-to-deploy forces. Between six and twelve months, however, we'll continue to decrement readiness accounts with ever increasing erosion of home station unit readiness and force modernization, and begin to show small impacts in next-to-deploy forces. Beyond 12 months we will see a real impact to all home station units (e.g. fixed wing squadrons will have on average only five of twelve assigned aircraft on the ramp due to aviation depot shutdowns) and the beginning of impacts to our next-to-deploy and some deployed forces – in all a slide to a hollow force we have fought so hard to avoid. Our Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) will be forced to postpone or cancel preventive maintenance and selectively replace replacement equipment with reduced readiness in the last half of 2013, with a ripple effect on training, negatively impacting readiness. We predict over 55% of USMC forces (ground combat, logistics, and combat support) will have unsatisfactory readiness ratings, which will have a dramatic impact to respond to crises outside of Afghanistan when called upon by the Nation.

In partnership with the Navy, we will cancel 3rd and 4th quarter inductions of aircraft into depot maintenance cycles parking over 80 aircraft awaiting critical maintenance. Our forward deployed squadrons will have what they need, but our next to deploy squadrons will begin to experience reduced aircraft availability, which means our pilots will not get the training they require in order to maintain currency and proficiency in their respective aircraft. For example in the F-18 squadrons, by January of 2014, the Marine Corps will still be able to source the required aircraft to meet operational commitments, but the squadrons that are preparing to deploy will only have five of the twelve aircraft that compose a squadron available for training. Additionally, each of the pilots in those squadrons preparing to deploy would complete approximately seven hours of training per month when the minimum deployable readiness requires approximately seventeen hours per month. For the individual aircrew, this equates to

greater personal risk due to less experience—for the Nation, it means we will respond with less ready forces, and we will pay a price in terms of lives and equipment.

Depot maintenance will be reduced to 27% of our baseline requirement, delaying our ability to reset war torn equipment for a period of 18 months or greater; this will reduce the readiness of non-deployed forces in both the near and long term, and means we will not be able to accomplish our planned reset of equipment returning from Operation Enduring Freedom. Accordingly, the Marine Corps will not be able to reconstitute a ready force by 2017 as originally planned. Further, we will not have the funds to work down a backlog of equipment returning from 11 years of combat, and we will have to lay off many of our skilled workers and artisans who are the key to revitalizing equipment at our Depots. Even if funding were to be restored at some point in the future, we will not be able to reconstitute this labor force quickly or regain the expertise that can only be developed over time.

Under the cuts imposed by sequestration, we will have to reduce our civilian workforce which will further chip away at our readiness. Our civilian Marines make a significant contribution in all aspects of Marine Corps operations, from family readiness to maintenance to command and control and intelligence operations. We expect we will have to eliminate thousands of positions across the Marine Corps in order to meet the budget reductions mandated by sequestration, and as such, the services that our Marines and their families rely upon will also be reduced or eliminated. We expect that we will have to cut or curtail many family readiness programs to include eliminating paid family readiness officers in some units, cutting teen and youth programs, and closing morale, welfare, and recreation facilities. This will have an adverse impact on our families at home station and will adversely affect their personal readiness when spouses and parents leave their families in order to execute routine deployments or respond to crisis.

The cuts imposed as part of an annualized continuing resolution and sequestration result in a \$1.2B reduction to O&M in FY13 alone, and does not address the additional requirements levied as a result of the current Defense Strategic Guidance and the security situation around the globe. The Marine Corps prides itself on being a frugal service that asks only for what it needs and not what it wants. Any cut to our \$10B O&M budget will entail risk; a cut of \$1.2B will immediately affect every aspect of Marine Corps operations and readiness. The long term cuts associated with sequestration will erode readiness, limit crisis response capacity, and adversely affect our active and reserve Marines, our civilian Marines, and their families.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-167
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #167

Review of Same Sex Spouse Benefits and Impact of Defense of Marriage Act

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, do you agree that extending

benefits to same sex spouses of military members will increase costs and create increased demand for limited resources for all military families during a time when this administration has imposed drastic budget cuts to DOD?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c.

General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g.
General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: Supporting Marines and their families is extremely important to me; this support allows my Marines to focus on their missions in support of our nation. I do not believe we should create separate classes of Marines – we only have one type of Marine; a United States Marine. When single Marines become married, our Marine Corps family grows – as it does when Marine families add children or, for that matter, add any other dependent. Increasing numbers of dependents, regardless of their orientation or gender, tends to increase family support costs. Budget cuts will, of course, tend to adversely impact our support programs and we are working hard to mitigate those potential adverse impacts.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-168
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #168

Review of Same Sex Spouse Benefits and Impact of Defense of Marriage Act

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, do you agree that extending benefits to same sex spouses is currently prohibited by the Defense of Marriage Act?a.

Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e.
Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: Supporting Marines and their families is extremely important to me; this allows my Marines to focus on their missions in support of our nation. My understanding is that under the law, for the purpose of any ruling, regulation, or interpretations of various bureaus and agencies, the word “marriage” means only the union of one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife. There are some benefits that hinge on the use of these terms, such as access to housing and healthcare, and other benefits that do not, such as designation of life insurance beneficiaries.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-169
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #169

Review of Same Sex Spouse Benefits and Impact of Defense of Marriage Act

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, do you support the administration's decision to not defend suits in Federal courts, challenging the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: The decision whether to defend certain legal cases in the Court system is not within my purview as a Service Chief. Because the constitutionality of DOMA is an issue that has broad impacts across the Federal government, I believe other agencies within the Executive Branch are better positioned to provide comment. I understand that DOMA is currently the law, and I will follow the law.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-170
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #170

Women in Combat

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, I am concerned about the potential adverse impacts to readiness resulting from Secretary Panetta's announcement to rescind the 1994 rule that prohibits women from being assigned to smaller ground combat units, and his plan to potentially open more than 230,000 combat positions to women. Women have made incredibly valuable sacrifices in service to their country. One such example is Oklahoman Sarina Butcher who was killed in combat - a position she volunteered for - while serving in Afghanistan for the Oklahoma National Guard. We are forever indebted to her and others like her, who have given their lives in defending our Nation. My concern is DOD is pursuing this major policy change during a time when every branch of the armed services has consistently met recruitment goals, is attracting and retaining high quality of skilled personnel at record rates, and recently requested Congress to provide authority to reduce Army and Marine Corps end strength by 100,000 ground troops over the next 4 years due to high retention rates and drawdown in Afghanistan. What is the compelling national security interest in opening up more positions to women at this time?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: The decision to rescind the combat exclusion policy has not yet resulted in opening additional positions to women in the Marine Corps. The administration's policy decision provides the Services the ability to focus on the capability requirements for any individual to serve successfully in any unit. The Marine Corps has been on a path for some time to deliberately and methodically study these requirements in an effort to ensure that we are properly

focused on capability. The recent change in the combat exclusion policy has not altered or deterred the Marine Corps from this path. Accordingly, I am confident that any decision we make as a Service pursuant to the ongoing research will, in fact, be based on capability, and will occur only after the required notifications to Congress.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-171
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Inhofe
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #171

Women in Combat

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, what assurance can you provide that decisions to open positions will be based on bona fide military requirements, and will not result in needlessly exposing any American service member, men or women, to more risk of death or serious injury, than is absolutely required by military necessity? a. Secretary Carter? b. Secretary Hale? c. General Dempsey? d. General Odierno? e. Admiral Ferguson? f. General Amos? g. General Welsh? h. General Grass?

Answer: I am confident that any decision we make as a Service pursuant to the ongoing research will, in fact, be based on capability, and will occur only after the required notifications to Congress. The Marine Corps is focused on the capability requirements for any individual to serve successfully in any unit. The Marine Corps has been on a path for some time to deliberately and methodically study these requirements in an effort to ensure that we are properly focused on capability. The recent change in policy has not altered or deterred the Marine Corps from this path.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-180
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Chambliss
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #180

Depots

Question: General Amos, the possibility of sequestration along with the year-long CR will severely affect our ability to conduct maintenance in the coming year. The Marine Corps plans to reduce depot maintenance to 22 percent of the baseline requirement. How does this translate into specific impacts for Marine Corps depots, in particular, Marine Corps Logistics Base-Albany, GA?

Answer: Funding at this level would force us to assume significant risk in mission-essential

weapon system readiness and would delay our reset from operations in Afghanistan an additional 12-18 months. We estimate that reset would be complete 2 years after the last equipment leaves Afghanistan, which is projected for early FY 15. This delay translates to reset completion in FY 17 or 18. We expect that contractors would release 723 employees, and the government would layoff 122 federal term employees, a total of 845 workers, or 1/3 of the combined government and contractor workforce. Once this workforce is laid off, and assuming funding is available, it would take 1-2 years to fully re-establish this maintenance capability, further delaying reset. These depot workforce reductions would affect both Albany, GA and Barstow, CA personnel.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-181
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Chambliss
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #181

Depots

Question: General Amos, how will the Marine Corps recover from this reduction, and at what cost?

Answer: If reductions in funding are permanent, the Marine Corps would not be able to provide the capabilities that the nation requires and expects. Marines would deploy without all equipment required for the mission, or with equipment that does not perform to required standards; resulting in risk to the safety of personnel and their ability to respond quickly and decisively to crisis. Even with short-term reductions, we would be forced to assume risk in mission-essential weapon system readiness.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-183
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Wicker
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #183

Power Projection

Question: Admiral Ferguson and General Amos, the Navy recently released a CR and sequestration impact statement that primarily focuses on the impacts to fleet operations such as the Navy's decision to reduce our carrier presence in the Persian Gulf from two carriers to one. This reduction in deployed naval forces will have a negative impact on our ability to respond to global crises promptly and decisively. Can you briefly elaborate on how sequestration would threaten the Navy and Marine Corps' ability to decisively project power abroad? a. Admiral Ferguson? b. General Amos?

Answer: The impacts of sequestration can be looked at in terms of immediate effects (current

fiscal year) and effects over time (future years), both of which have significant effects on the ability of the Marine Corps to project power. The Marine Corps relies heavily on amphibious shipping to project power and maintain presence. Sequestration measures the Navy may implement can have second and third order consequences on the Corps' ability to meet its core missions, particularly with respect to degraded unit training and reduced support to theater geographic combatant commander requirements for shaping their theaters, crisis response, and deterrence. Immediate steps the Navy might take:

- Cancelling all fiscal year 2013, 3rd and 4th quarter ship maintenance availabilities which would affect the following amphibious ships: WASP, PELELIU, GREEN BAY, and RUSHMORE.
- Cancelling or deferring essential maintenance would adversely affect the ships' ability to deploy, either independently or with amphibious ready groups (ARG)/Marine expeditionary units (MEU), and decrease their service life.
- Cancelling independent deployers to the Caribbean and South America, providing no support to USSOUTHCOM amphibious ship and associated MAGTF requirements.
- Cancelling independent deployers that support combatant commander engagement priorities, specifically Africa Partnership Station, which in turn reduces the Marine Corps' ability to project power and respond to crisis in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR).

The long-term effects of sequestration include the cancellation of ARG/MEU deployments. Beginning in fiscal year 2014, the BATAAN ARG and 22 MEU deployments could be cancelled, followed by two more ARG/MEUs scheduled to deploy in fiscal year 2015. This will cause a gap in presence in the USCENTCOM AOR for an undetermined amount of time, depriving 5th and 6th Fleets of a theater strategic reserve and a sea-based crisis response capability. Further reduction of ARG/MEU deployments limits forward presence in flash point regions from North Africa to the Levant, and throughout the Middle East and South Asia.

Outside the realm of amphibious shipping, the Marine Corps provides strike aircraft in support of carrier battle group deployments and as part of forward-based formations in Japan and Bahrain. Reduced Navy carrier strike group presence in support of operations in the Persian Gulf forces the Service to focus on one theater over others with regard to Marine Corps F/A-18 deployments.

The Marine Corps provides other deployed forces ranging from the Black Sea Rotational Force in USEUCOM AOR, to SPMAGTF Africa in the USAFRICOM AOR, to Marine Rotational Force-Darwin in the USPACOM AOR. These rotations would be impacted as the Marine Corps would be forced to prioritize among multiple combatant commander requirements. In the Asia Pacific alone, reduced presence would potentially decrease theater security cooperation and multi-national training participation, degrading one of the most effective investments in building partner nation capacity. This puts U.S. credibility at risk with allies and partners. Lastly, the Marine Corps decisions to reduce support to theater geographic combatant commander requirements negatively impact shaping activities within theaters, responding to crisis and

preventing conflict.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-184
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Wicker
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #184

Power Projection

Question: Admiral Ferguson and General Amos, what is your assessment of the impact sequestration would have on the Navy and Marine Corps' ability to execute DOD pivot to Asia? a. Admiral Ferguson? b. General Amos?

Answer: We are concerned that sequestration, when applied in the midst of our planned redistribution of forces in the Pacific, will impose significant impacts to our operational readiness and responsiveness, and hinder our ability to maintain deterrence, project power, respond to crises and contribute to stability, in accordance with combatant commander requirements and timelines. Our rebalance to the Pacific faced a significant challenge with the planned downsizing of the Marine Corps to 182,100. We mitigated this by pacing the reconstitution of the III MEF Unit Deployment Program (UDP) commensurate with our force requirements in the CENTCOM AOR. and by accepting the impacts of the downsizing in other commands in favor of sustaining, and in some cases increasing, our III MEF force levels under the distributed laydown. Sequestration will reduce the operational readiness of those Pacific-based forces to conduct their assigned missions. Sequestration will also incur a proportional delay in executing the facilities and force posture restructuring necessary to achieve the distributed laydown plan, inducing further risk for Marine Corps forces in the Pacific. Extending the already protracted timeline for the distributed laydown increases risk for III MEF due to disruption of operational capabilities during the transition and relocation process.

Sequestration may affect USMC participation in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events across the Pacific, to include Phase II of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D), and the III MEF UDP. MRF-D Phase II, the growth in Australia from a company to battalion sized SPMAGTF, may be impacted by sequestration. Initial FY-13/14 costs related to site preparation for the larger unit, and the costs associated with moving the gear set, agricultural inspections, and unit movement, as well as regional TSC strategic-lift expenses could be at risk. III MEF UDP is the Marine Corps' method to project Marine forces forward in the PACOM AOR and may be affected by sequestration if funding is unavailable for deployment.

The significant impact to USMC equity in the Pacific due to sequestration is the effect on strategic mobility. Intra-theater lift is a requirement due to the distances in the PACOM AOR. USMC ability to participate in TSC events could be impacted if US Navy ships are less available due to maintenance and other forms of Intra-theater lift are too expensive. While the Joint High-speed Vessel (JHSV) is not currently available, sustained sequestration may impact USMC capacity to fund JHSV use when the asset becomes available.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-195
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Ayotte
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #195

Marine Expeditionary Unit

Question: General Amos, is it accurate to say that before September 11, 2001, the Marine Corps regularly had an East Coast Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in the Mediterranean?

Answer: Prior to 11 September 2001, the Navy and Marine Corps provided a sustained Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) presence in the Mediterranean with forces from the east coast. At the time, the U.S. Navy had over 40 amphibious ships in the inventory; that number of amphibious warships supported a greater global presence. Overtime, the number of amphibious warships has declined significantly: 1990 (64); 2000 (41); and 2013 (30).

Since 11 September 2001, ARG/MEUs from both coasts have deployed in an alternating rotation to fill specifically a continuous presence in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), providing only transitory presence in the Mediterranean. Amphibious forces have responded to crises in these theaters, but at the expense of presence in USCENTCOM AOR. Given the low numbers and operational availability of amphibious warships today, along with a potential reduction in force or curtailment in operations, the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team would be challenged to provide a sustained presence, capable of responding to crisis in the Mediterranean without accepting risk elsewhere.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-196
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Ayotte
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #196

Marine Expeditionary Unit

Question: General Amos, did the Marine Corps have a MEU in the Mediterranean on September 11, 2012?

Answer: 24 MEU was deployed in the USCENTCOM area of operations (AOR) on 11 September 2012, fulfilling the USCENTCOM theater reserve mission.

The 24 MEU had previously transited the Mediterranean Sea from 5 April to 1 May 2012 on its way to the USCENTCOM AOR.

The 24 MEU subsequently redeployed to the Mediterranean Sea on 6 November 2012 during its out-bound transit and remained there until 11 December 2012.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-197
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Ayotte
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #197

Marine Expeditionary Unit

Question: General Amos, would you agree that under current spending reductions, and certainly under sequestration, we are likely to have more incidences in which the Marine Corps will not be able to respond in a timely way to save American lives?

Answer: Given the low numbers and operational availability of amphibious warships today, along with a potential reduction in force or curtailment in operations, the Navy-Marine Corps team will be challenged to provide a sustained presence, capable of responding to crisis without accepting risk elsewhere.

If sequestration occurs, the Department of the Navy may be forced to gap the required USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) presence. Response to crises in the Mediterranean might have to rely on the global response force Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU), which would take 10 days for transit (following equipment/forces onload) if an east coast ARG/MEU responds, and 28 days for transit if a west coast ARG/MEU responds.

In response to Secretary of Defense's direction to the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Services to develop crisis response options to be deployed to USEUCOM or USAFRICOM, the Marine Corps developed a concept for a Marine Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response capable of conducting limited crisis response missions to include embassy reinforcement, limited noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, and fixed site security. The Marine Corps would have to rely on a combination of land-based and maritime platforms, based on availability, to sustain and employ this force. The MV-22B would be the primary aviation asset due to its range and flexibility. However, fiscal constraints imposed upon the Marine Corps as a result of sequestration would have a direct impact on the Service's ability to initiate this capability while maintaining the support it provides to all other global demands.

Despite the constrained funding resulting from a combination of the continuing resolution and sequestration, in the next six months the Corps would be able to continue meeting its deployed warfighting needs and the training of its next-to-deploy forces. In the next six to twelve months, however, the Corps will see degradation in home-station unit readiness, impacts to force modernization, and impacts to next-to-deploy forces. Beyond 12 months, it will see a real

impact to all home station units (e.g. fixed wing squadrons will have on average only four of twelve assigned aircraft on the ramp due to aviation depot shutdowns) and the beginning of more severe impacts to next-to-deploy and deployed forces.

Finally, sequestration would reduce already limited crisis response capacity and capability in the Mediterranean while effecting a concomitant reduction in theater security cooperation (TSC). For instance, sequestration could affect Naval independent, single-ship deployers that support Africa Partnership Station TSC, which in turn also reduces crisis response capability in USAFRICOM. In Europe, sequestration could affect Black Sea Rotational Force deployments to the Black Sea/Caucasus regions in Eurasia. Each of these deployments or deployers utilizes intra-theater lift to move forces to remote locations from a forward base. Sequestration might reduce the intra-theater lift provided by all the Services, thus affecting the Marine Corps' ability to respond to crises and to support Combatant Commander TSC priorities.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-216
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #216

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, in a December 2012 interview, Senator Hagel was asked about defense sequestration. In response, he stated he feels DOD is bloated and needs paring down. He said: "DOD, I think in many ways has been bloated... It has gotten everything it's wanted the last 10 years and more. We've taken priorities, we've taken dollars, we've taken programs, we've taken policies out of the State Department, out of a number of other departments and put them over in DOD... The abuse and the waste and the fraud is astounding... I think DOD needs to be pared down. I think we need DOD to look at their own priorities." Do you agree with Senator Hagel? Please provide a yes or no answer along with your explanation.a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: I do not have enough information about Sen. Hagel's views to agree or disagree with him. Certainly I would agree that the Congress has supported DoD's requirements in recent years as we have fought the Nation's wars. I do believe that the organization under my charge, the Marine Corps--the smallest and the leanest of all Services--has maintained its traditional focus on combat effectiveness and readiness.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-217
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee

Witness: Gen Amos

Question: #217

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, in Secretary Carter's testimony he states, "[O]n January 10 I authorized all defense components to begin taking immediate actions to slow spending in order to prevent even more dire consequences later in the year. I directed each of the defense component heads to report back to me by February 1st with a list of proposed actions and an implementation plan." January 10, 2013, was approximately 1 year after the "Supercommittee" failure that forced budget sequestration. It was also after the date budget sequestration was originally supposed to begin. Why were these steps taken so late, and why did preparation not occur earlier? a. Secretary Carter? b. Secretary Hale? c. General Dempsey? d. General Odierno? e. Admiral Ferguson? f. General Amos? g. General Welsh? h. General Grass?

Answer: This question asks me to speculate about the thought processes and actions of Secretary Carter or others in the administration. I cannot answer for him, and therefore I defer to Secretary Carter for a response. However, the Marine Corps commenced formal sequestration planning as directed. This should not imply that significant work had not previously been undertaken to prepare for a fiscal environment characterized by declining resources. Since the passage of the Budget Control Act in 2011, we have worked to assess the potential impacts, optimize our force structure and prioritize our requirements in order to meet what we acknowledge will be significantly reduced funding. Additionally, we have also had to assess the potential impact to mission readiness should we be faced with an annualized Continuing Resolution and should the Congress fail to reach an agreement and sequestration commence. These are exceptionally complex problems, and we have invested significant time and analysis to understand the problem, frame our assumptions, assess impacts against our mission, and determine what we could and could not accomplish within these funding constraints. Despite these upfront efforts, we could not assess the detailed impacts until we executed detailed planning as opposed to higher level assessments. The Marine Corps maintains a long-standing reputation in the Department of Defense as being a frugal, lean Service that delivers the best value for the defense dollar. As such, the Marine Corps has worked to adapt to budgetary reductions by continuing our tradition of pursuing ways to streamline operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings in order to get the most out of every dollar. It is this mentality that has allowed us to continue to provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan, even in this era of constrained resources.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-218

Hearing Date: February 12, 2013

Committee: SASC

Member: Senator Lee

Witness: Gen Amos

Question: #218

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, were any of you told to not prepare for sequestration?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: This question is difficult to answer as asked. As I recall, the Marine Corps was permitted to begin to "assess" the effects of sequestration around September 2012. I did not receive direction to not "prepare" for sequestration. However, my recollection is that I did receive direction not to "plan" for sequestration until December 2012, when we received permission to begin "early planning."

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-219
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #219

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, were you told that the cuts would not take place?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: I do not recall ever being told that the cuts would not take place. However, beginning in approximately September 2012, I do recall hearing much speculation about the possibility and likelihood of sequestration.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-220
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #220

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, if either or both of your answer above to this question were "yes" or some other affirmative response, please also reply who told you these things and when were you told these things?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary

Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General
Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: I do not recall ever being told that the cuts would not take place. However, beginning in approximately September 2012, I do recall hearing much speculation about the possibility and likelihood of sequestration. As I recall, the Marine Corps was permitted to begin to "assess" the effects of sequestration around September 2012. I did not receive direction to not "prepare" for sequestration. However, my recollection is that I did receive direction not to "plan" for sequestration until December 2012, when we received permission to begin "early planning."

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-221
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #221

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, if either or both of your answer above to this question "no" or some other negative response, also please explain why you did not fully prepare for sequestration?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: I do not recall ever being told that the cuts would not take place. However, beginning in approximately September 2012, I do recall hearing much speculation about the possibility and likelihood of sequestration. As I recall, the Marine Corps was permitted to begin to "assess" the effects of sequestration around September 2012. I did not receive direction to not "prepare" for sequestration. However, my recollection is that I did receive direction not to "plan" for sequestration until December 2012, when we received permission to begin "early planning."

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-222
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #222

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, do you acknowledge that budget sequestration is current law?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General

Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: My understanding is that the process of sequestration is provided for by law, but the conditions requiring its implementation have not yet been fully triggered. The Budget Control Act (BCA) is law. Sequestration is required when triggered by the conditions established by the BCA. Briefly, that Act established a savings target of 1.2 trillion dollars, to be achieved based on the adoption of recommendations to be made by the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (the "Super Committee"). It is my understanding that these conditions were not realized, and therefore, the sequestration provisions of the BCA would have become operative on 1 January. However, additional legislation, i.e., the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, was passed delaying the potential implementation of sequestration until 1 March 2013, upon which date an order may issue from the President of the United States implementing sequestration.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-223
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #223

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, do you feel that DOD should follow every law?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: I believe the Marine Corps, including its Marines and attached Sailors and Soldiers, must follow the law.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-224
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #224

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, are there any exceptions?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: I have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. I have

done so for virtually all of my adult life. I understand that oath to mean that I must also obey the law. I am unaware of any exception that I could make regarding my obligation to follow existing laws.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-225
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #225

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, in his testimony, Secretary Carter wrote: [T]he CR plays a deleterious role in shaping the FY13 budgetary landscape... [T]he current CR directs that the base budget remain at the level enacted for FY12. That provides sufficient total base budget dollars to DOD, but the dollars are in the wrong appropriations. Compared to our needs for FY13, the CR provides too much funding in most investment accounts and insufficient funding in the O&M accounts that sustain day-to-day operations and military readiness... The impact of these [sequestration] cuts will be compounded by the misallocation of funding under the CR. Do you think it is fair to say that the lack of a functional Senate budget and appropriations process has denied the DOD opportunities to request that Congress calibrate its funding priorities to current military needs, conditions, and missions?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: The Marine Corps has had opportunities, and will continue to pursue opportunities, to provide our best information to the President and the Congress regarding our budgetary requirements. Having an approved FY 13 appropriation that considered the requirements outlined in our budget submission would significantly help ameliorate the challenges of operating under a Continuing Resolution. We have provided detailed information about our current and future military requirements, and I along with others, have had opportunities to communicate the current and projected condition of the force. Although we may face difficult fiscal challenges, those challenges will not deter me from articulating the information necessary to resource the Marine Corps this Nation deserves.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-226
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #226

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, are current missions identical to what they were expected to be in August 2011 when the BCA was passed?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: The current missions of the United States Marine Corps are identical to what was expected in August of 2011. Our forces remain committed to the Afghanistan mission and CENTCOMs commitments in the region. Our forces continue to provide a ready response to emerging threats globally. Additionally our force remains uniquely postured to support humanitarian and disaster relief worldwide at the direction of the President.

With these global roles in mind however, the nature of operations and our nation's security outlook has evolved since 2011 along with changes around the world. Our ability to meet those challenges will be affected by sequestration. Sequestration will affect the planning and sourcing of future missions across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) especially with respect to the Asia-Pacific rebalance and Theater Security Cooperation to include bi-lateral and multi-lateral security training and exercises.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-227
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #227

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, are current missions identical to what they were expected to be in December 2011 when the Consolidated Appropriations Act that initially set funding levels passed?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: The current missions of the United States Marine Corps are identical to what they were expected to be in December 2011, taking into account the draw-down to counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. The DoD Strategic Guidance emphasizes a smaller and leaner force that will no longer be sized to support long-term stability operations that have dominated the past decade. As such, the Marine Corps has worked diligently to prepare for this future security environment by designing a tailored force that ensures a sufficient type and quantity of forces to meet the forward presence, engagement, and crisis response requirements of the Combatant Commanders, while maintaining the capacity to respond to additional major contingencies within planned timelines.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-228

Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #228

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, did the process by which the BCA passed allow sufficient input from and consideration of military needs?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: My understanding is that the BCA was passed according to our legislative processes. I am not aware of the information submitted to or considered by any individual legislator or Committee and I would prefer not to speculate about whether the Congressmen and Congresswomen or Committees would have considered that information sufficient.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-229
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #229

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, do you feel that a BRAC will be required in the next 5 years given the projected drawdowns in both force structure and manpower?a. Secretary Carter?b. Secretary Hale?c. General Dempsey?d. General Odierno?e. Admiral Ferguson?f. General Amos?g. General Welsh?h. General Grass?

Answer: Yes, it is impossible for me to see how any aspect of the Department of Defense budget would not have to bear some of the burden of sequestration. While I see this as essential for the Department, I do not foresee a requirement to reduce the Marine Corps base and station footprint. The magnitude of the fiscal reduction to DoD necessitates a look at every aspect of our operations, and in order to achieve some degree of balance, a reduction of bases and stations will likely have to occur. The Marine Corps represents a very small fraction of the overall Department of Defense budget, and our expeditionary nature has resulted in a very lean footprint when it comes to bases and stations. For the Department of Defense as a whole, I think we must undertake a holistic review of the entirety of the Department of Defense budget, and the closure of bases and stations must be a part of this review. Sequestration is driving the DoD to a level of funding in which nothing can be considered sacred and withheld from consideration; in an era of

cuts to personnel, readiness, infrastructure, modernization, and forward presence, we simply cannot eliminate a reduction to bases from consideration.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-230
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #230

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, what impact does the sequestration of the defense budget have on the F-35? a. Secretary Carter? b. Secretary Hale? c. General Dempsey? d. General Odierno? e. Admiral Ferguson? f. General Amos? g. General Welsh? h. General Grass?

Answer: Immediate reductions in procurement will delay the Marine Corps' ability to transition out of legacy aircraft which extends the burden of their sustainment costs. Reductions in research, development, test and evaluation funding will impact the integration and development of critical combat capabilities, to include Small Diameter Bomb II, Electronic Attack enhancements, deployable ALIS support system, and air-ship integration activities. For the Marine Air Ground Task Force, our nation's force in readiness, diluted and degraded aviation capabilities will negatively impact the Marine Corps' ability to support the National Security Strategy as the country's crisis response force.

CHARRTS No.: SASC-02-231
Hearing Date: February 12, 2013
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Lee
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #231

Training

Question: Secretary Carter, Secretary Hale, General Dempsey, General Odierno, Admiral Ferguson, General Amos, General Welsh, and General Grass, what will the shift to the Pacific mean for your forces?

Answer: The Marine Corps is adjusting its force lay-down in the Asia-Pacific region to support the President's Strategic Guidance for the Department of Defense issued in January 2012. As our nation is shifting its strategic focus to the Pacific, in many ways the Marine Corps is returning home to our historic backyard. We have a long history in the Pacific replete with many hard-won victories, so this area of the world is in our institutional DNA.

The Marine Corps is the premier expeditionary force in readiness - "the most ready when the Nation is least ready." We have begun our rebalance to the Pacific. As the Marine Corps draws down its forces in Afghanistan, we are resetting in stride, strategically balancing capabilities in Hawaii, Guam, Japan and Australia so that we can train, exercise, and operate with allies and partners, and to be able to respond to crises and promote security cooperation across the region. Inter theater lift is an essential requirement for mobility in the Asia Pacific Region. Given the vast distances in this area of the world, strategic maritime lift is necessary to provide our forward deployed forces with the required mobility and force projection to meet Combatant Commander requirements.

No forces are more suitable to addressing emerging strategic needs in the Pacific than naval amphibious forces. Naval amphibious forces can station off the coast and leave a temporary and light footprint when partnering or conducting humanitarian operations, or they can serve as an enabler for a larger joint force effort. A resumption of the Marine Unit Deployment Program in the Pacific has reestablished a key component of the nation's stabilizing presence in the Asia Pacific region. The establishment of a rotational presence of Marines in Darwin, Australia has already had a positive impact on the confidence of our allies and our ability to respond to crises in the South and Southeast Asian littoral.



· CHARRTS No.: HASC-04-017
House Armed Services Committee
Hearing Date: February 13, 2013

Hearing: The Impacts of a Continuing Resolution and Sequestration on Defense
Member: Delegate Bordallo

Witness: Gen Amos

Question: #17

P&R lead.

Business Practices

Question: I believe that these challenging times present us with an opportunity to review how we do businesses and find ways to improve our processes. The effects of sequestration are obviously detrimental to the readiness of our Armed Forces; I would like to know examples of how any of the services and OSD have made fundamental changes to your business practices in light of the austere fiscal times.

Answer: The Marine Corps maintains a long-standing reputation in the Department of Defense as being a frugal, lean Service that delivers the best value for the defense dollar. As such, the Marine Corps has adapted to budgetary reductions by continuing our tradition of pursuing ways to streamline operations, identify efficiencies, and reinvest savings in order to get the most out of every dollar. It is this mentality that has allowed us to continue to provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan, even in this era of constrained resources.

The Marine Corps recognizes the fiscal realities that currently confront the United States, and we are already making hard choices inside the Service and ensuring that we ask only for what we need as opposed to what we may want. We understand that the nation will face difficult resource decisions in the future, and these difficult times will undoubtedly have an impact on the manner in which we address the challenges presented by an uncertain and ever-changing world. The Marine Corps has aggressively sought and found efficiencies in how we spend our scarce resources, and these efficiencies have saved precious resources while ensuring the Marine Corps remains America's "Force in Readiness." Savings have been found through reductions in basic allowance for housing costs, more efficient use of energy, greater use of simulators/reduction in training ammunition, and more efficient procurement practices. Additionally, we have undergone extensive audits for the past three years with ever improving results.

However, the lack of an appropriations bill and the implementation of sequestration has had a negative impact on the Marine Corps' ability to reap the savings we initially expected. For example, under the CR, new starts are prohibited without specific approval. This means that existing contracts will have to be renegotiated, which will prevent the Marine Corps from receiving expected Economic Order Quantity pricing. This is especially true of savings that were expected to result from multi-year procurements such as MV-22. Loss of the authority to enter into a multi-year procurement for the MV-22 will undo months of tough negotiations that would have resulted in approximately \$1 billion in cost avoidance and reductions in total program cost.

Sequestration threatens our efforts and will impact all of our investment programs through increased unit costs, schedule delays, and slowing of necessary research and development. For example if sequestration occurs, the Ground/Air Task Order Radar (G/ATOR) program will likely have a Nunn-McCurdy breach. The potential impact of such a breach will include a restructuring of the program and a delay of initial operational capability by two years. The G/ATOR's production transition, including timely semiconductor technology insertion, will also be significantly impacted leading to a loss of planned cost savings and misalignment of funding due to a shift in schedule.

In the area of operations and maintenance, the Marine Corps will have to mortgage the future to pay for readiness today – we will have to forgo necessary modernization and sustainment to support our forward deployed forces. We are tasked by the Congress to be the most ready when the Nation is least ready. In order to accomplish this, we have been forced to make sacrifices in our modernization and infrastructure sustainment accounts to pay for the readiness of today's force. This will mean that we will be forced to delay the purchase of new equipment and maintain legacy equipment for longer periods of time, incurring greater maintenance cost. Further, our facilities will not be sustained at planned rates, meaning that maintenance will be delayed or omitted, hastening the deterioration of buildings, and driving up long term costs and the ability to properly train our force.

The Marine Corps prides itself on its “get by with less” mentality, and we have always sought more efficient ways of fulfilling our mission. We clearly recognize that we and the Nation are entering a period of austerity, and we have identified numerous efficiencies and reductions – we will continue to deliver the best Marine Corps the Nation can afford. Unfortunately, the current fiscal uncertainty will likely undo a number of these initiatives, which will result in further setbacks and exacerbate the effects of the CR and sequestration-induced reductions.

CHARRTS No.: HASC-04-043
House Armed Services Committee
Hearing Date: February 13, 2013
Hearing: The Impacts of a Continuing Resolution and Sequestration on Defense
Member: Congresswoman Walorski
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #43

P&R lead with PP&O and SIG in support.

Risk

Question: Do you believe the \$487 billion in cuts and the FY13 budget request represented the limits of the acceptable degree of risk? If so, can you please speak to the additional risks presented by the following scenarios? a. Sequestration and a Continuing Resolution at FY12 levels. b. A partial mitigation of sequestration or CR.

Answer: Yes, the \$487 billion in cuts and the FY13 budget request represent the limit of our acceptable degree of risk. As stated in the February 2012 Posture of the United States Marine Corps report to this committee, the four priorities for the Marine Corps are: (1) provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan; (2) rebalance our Corps, posture it for the future and aggressively experiment with and implement new capabilities and organizations; (3) better educate and train our Marines to succeed in distributed operations and increasingly complex environments; and (4) keep the faith with our Marines, our Sailors, and our families. Those priorities can be accomplished at requested FY13 budget levels, albeit with some degree of risk.

Assuming sequestration and a full year Continuing Resolution, the risk to our ability to accomplish these priorities increases exponentially, and cuts of this magnitude, due to their timing and methodology, will have a devastating impact on our readiness, both short and long term. The combined effects of an annualized continuing resolution and sequestration pose a severe risk to our national strategy, our forces, our people, and to the United States of America. While the Marine Corps may be able to mitigate the near term effects on our deployed forces, it will be at the expense of home station units and our long term readiness – we are mortgaging long term readiness to form a short term capability to address immediate priorities.

Despite the constrained funding resulting from the CR and sequestration, we expect we will be able to continue meeting Marine Corps deployed warfighting needs and the training of next-to-deploy forces for the next six months. Between six and twelve months, however, we'll continue to decrement readiness accounts resulting in an ever increasing erosion of home station unit readiness and force modernization; we also expect that we will begin to see small impacts to our next-to-deploy forces. Beyond 12 months, we will see a real impact to all home station units and more substantial impacts to our next-to-deploy and some deployed forces – in all, a slide to a hollow force we have fought so hard to avoid. Our Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) will be forced to postpone or cancel preventive maintenance and selectively replace replacement equipment with reduced readiness in the last half of 2013, with a ripple effect on training,

negatively impacting readiness. In aviation, the Marine Corps' F/A-18 squadrons, as an example, will still be able to source the required aircraft to meet operational commitments, but the squadrons that are preparing to deploy will only have five of the twelve aircraft that compose a squadron available for training by January of 2014. Additionally, each of the pilots in those squadrons preparing to deploy would complete approximately seven hours of training per month when the minimum deployable readiness requires approximately seventeen hours per month. For the individual aircrew, this equates to greater personal risk due to less experience—for the Nation, it means we will respond with less ready forces, and we will pay a price in terms of lives and equipment. We predict over 55% of USMC forces (ground combat, logistics, and combat support) will have unsatisfactory readiness ratings, which will have a dramatic impact to respond to crises outside of Afghanistan when called upon by the Nation.

A partial mitigation of sequestration or CR, depending on how it would be implemented, could serve to lessen the risk to our ability to meet our four priorities and could slow the rate of readiness deterioration. However the cumulative effect of multiple years of cuts will cause the Marine Corps to re-evaluate current plans and make difficult decisions regarding which missions would continue to be supported. Depending on the manner in which a partial mitigation would be implemented, the Marine Corps may still have to mortgage the future to pay for readiness today, forgoing necessary modernization and sustainment to support our forward deployed forces. This would mean that we would be forced to delay the purchase of new equipment and maintain legacy equipment for longer periods of time, incurring greater maintenance cost. Further, our facilities would likely not be sustained at planned rates, meaning that maintenance will be delayed or omitted, hastening the deterioration of buildings and driving up long term costs and the ability to properly train our force.

CHARRTS No.: HASC-04-045
House Armed Services Committee
Hearing Date: February 13, 2013
Hearing: The Impacts of a Continuing Resolution and Sequestration on Defense
Member: Congresswoman Walorski
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #45

P&R lead with MCCDC, M&RA, Aviation, and PP&O in support.

Professional Military Education and PCS Costs

Question: Will Professional Military Education and Permanent Change of Station (PCS) costs be reduced at the same or greater rate as readiness-related activities such as ship deployments, flying hours, and training center rotations?


Answer: Permanent Changes of Station and Professional Military Education for our Marines are, in and of themselves, readiness related activities and are critical to our ability to accomplish our mission. Without the ability to move Marines to the correct unit, units will not be sourced with the proper personnel prior to deployment; without the ability to provide Professional Military Education, Marines will not have the necessary training prior to deployment. These two components are key aspects of overall readiness.

The Marine Corps uses a framework by which it can manage its readiness as an institution. Called the Five Pillars of Institutional Readiness, this framework seeks to ensure that Service-wide activities lead to the proper balance among five categories (i.e. pillars) that underpin the readiness of the Marine Corps. These pillars capture the Marine Corps' approach for generating ready forces today and informing an investment strategy that will ensure the future readiness of the Marine Corps and enable it to meet the tenets of the Defense Strategic Guidance. Maintaining balance across these pillars is critical to achieving and sustaining the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness for today and tomorrow. The five pillars are:

- High Quality People (*Recruiting, training, educating and retaining high quality people plays a key role in maintaining our high state of readiness*).
- Unit Readiness (*Maintaining readiness of the operating forces, including appropriate operations and maintenance funding to train to core missions and maintain equipment*).
- Capacity versus Requirements (*Force-sizing and naval capabilities to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements with the right mix of capacity and capability*).
- Infrastructure Sustainment (*Investing in real property, maintenance, and infrastructure*).
- Equipment Modernization (*Ensuring ground and aviation equipment matches the needs of the emerging security environment*).

Sequestration, compounded by a full year Continuing Resolution, will result in across the board reductions that will affect all of the Marine Corps' readiness pillars, will allow for little to no flexibility in how the cuts are applied, and will mandate reductions in accordance with the law without regard for requirements and priorities. In the case of permanent change of station

funding, the President exempted military personnel funding from sequestration cuts in FY13, and as such, PCS is not subject to a sequestration-induced reduction. The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation is subject to sequestration reduction and will be reduced by the amount prescribed by the law. Within the O&M appropriation, the Marine Corps will reduce programs such as professional military education such that we achieve the best balance possible among our pillars of readiness.



CHARRTS No.: SAC-01-006
Committee: Senate Appropriations Committee
Hearing Date: February 14, 2013
Hearing: The Impact of Sequestration
Member: Senator Cochran
Witness: DepSecDef Carter
Question: #6

Question. Secretary Carter, I have been informed that depot maintenance for the Marine Corps F/A-18 aircraft is already significantly backlogged, with approximately 110 out of 254 aircraft in an "out of reporting" status, which means the aircraft are in depot maintenance. The large number of aircraft in depot maintenance has resulted in the lack of aircraft on the flight line which is causing a downward trend in Marine Corps aviation readiness. The Navy indicated it would suspend 3rd and 4th quarter depot maintenance. Mr. Secretary, if sequestration is implemented and if the Department does not get a regular fiscal year 2013 appropriations bill, what will be the impact on Marine aviation readiness and on depots in general?

Answer. While short term adaptations are possible, the short-term readiness of our current forces comes at the expense of those who will follow in their footsteps. Deferring or cancelling planned maintenance will cause long-term effects that will directly and negatively impact readiness and operational capability.

For Aviation, the Marine Corps will have 107 aircraft scheduled for depot inductions that will not occur as a result of CR/Sequestration. This will result in fewer aircraft available for tasking to each squadron and reduce the assets available for training and operational support. As an example, in the F/A-18 community; squadrons are equipped with 12 airplanes. Reductions to depot throughput will mean squadrons have ~5 aircraft available in each non-deployed squadron. The long term effect to non-deployed F/A-18 squadrons is the inability of the unit to achieve and maintain minimum combat readiness required for follow-on deployments.

Impacts

- Today 110 of 254 USMC F/A-18s are "out of reporting" status.
- Each year, an additional 8 F/A-18s will go "out of reporting" because the depots currently lack the capacity to induct all aircraft requiring depot level maintenance.

Projected USMC F/A-18 Laydown (1 Jan 2014)	
Total F/A-18 Inventory	254
5 Squadrons Deployed	- 58
1 Training Squadron	- 33
Out Of Reporting (Depot Maintenance)	- 124
Aircraft on Flight Line for 7 Squadrons	= 39
Number of Aircraft per Squadron (7)	5.6



House Appropriations Committee
Subcommittee on Defense
Hearing Date: February 26, 2013
Hearing: Fiscal Challenges facing the Defense Department
Member: Rep Kingston
Witness: Gen Amos
Question #: 3
Approved by:

Transfer Authority

Question: If the services were given increased transfer authority as a way to lessen the impact of the sequestration by moving funds from procurement accounts to operations and maintenance accounts, what would be some of the lower performing or lower priority systems that could be delayed or cut to ensure a more fully trained and equipped military force?

Answer: Recognizing the fiscal realities that confront the nation, the Marine Corps has already made hard choices in developing our FY13 budget, and as such, the Marine Corps' budget ensures the Marine Corps remains the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness and is fully capable of executing all assigned missions in the new Defense Strategic Guidance with capabilities optimized for forward-presence, engagement, and rapid crisis response. Any transfer of funds between appropriations is not a decision taken lightly and must be weighed carefully in order to ensure the needs of today do not overly jeopardize our long-term readiness.

The Marine Corps uses a framework by which it can manage its readiness as an institution. Called the Five Pillars of Institutional Readiness, this framework seeks to ensure that Service-wide activities lead to the proper balance among five categories (i.e. pillars) that underpin the readiness of the Marine Corps. These pillars capture the Marine Corps' approach for generating ready forces today and informing an investment strategy that will ensure the future readiness of the Marine Corps and enable it to meet the tenets of the Defense Strategic Guidance. Maintaining balance across these pillars is critical to achieving and sustaining the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness for today and tomorrow. The five pillars are:

- **High Quality People** (*Recruiting, training, educating, and retaining high quality people plays a key role in maintaining our high state of readiness*).
- **Unit Readiness** (*Maintaining readiness of the operating forces, including appropriate operations and maintenance funding to train to core missions and maintain equipment*).
- **Capacity versus Requirements** (*Force-sizing and naval capabilities to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements with the right mix of capacity and capability*).
- **Infrastructure Sustainment** (*Investing in real property, maintenance, and infrastructure*).
- **Equipment Modernization** (*Ensuring ground and aviation equipment matches the needs of the emerging security environment*).

When developing its FY13 budget, the Marine Corps worked to build a comprehensive program that achieved balance between these pillars. Any transfer of funds requires carefully scrutiny as it will not come without risk to this balance. For example, moving funds from procurement to

operations and maintenance could result in increased unit readiness in the short term, but could mortgage our equipment modernization program and thus pose risk to our long term readiness. All Marine Corps appropriations are continuously reviewed as the year progresses, and should we identify a critical unfunded operating requirement, we will assess options to resource that shortfall with the levels of reprogramming authority provided to us.

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-001

Hearing Date: February 28, 2013

Committee: HASCTALF

Member: Congressman Turner

Witness: LtGen Wissler

Question: #1

Question: Are any PPAs exempt from sequestration and on what grounds?

Answer: No Programs, Projects Activities contained within any investment appropriation are exempt from sequestration. Only military personnel accounts have been exempted.

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-002

Hearing Date: February 28, 2013

Committee: HASCTALF

Member: Congressman Turner

Witness: LtGen Wissler

Question: #2

Question: How will the CR and Sequestration impact your major defense acquisition programs and will these reductions require a change in national military strategy?

Answer: In the near-term, sequestration should not have a negative impact to our ground combat and tactical vehicle strategy. These reductions were mitigated by current and prior year assets.

In the long-term, sequestration will have a negative impact on our warfighting investment portfolio, including several critical vehicle modernization and sustainment programs. We have mitigated some of the impact by prioritizing and sequencing our investments. For example, we are investing in the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle now because it is the most mature capability, followed by investment in the Amphibious Combat Vehicle program. These measures, however, cannot fully mitigate the negative effects of sequestration. Our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV), Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), and tank modification programs, which are critical to maintaining the operational availability of these vehicles, will likely be slowed significantly. Critical survivability and mobility upgrades to the AAV and LAV fleets will be delayed. These delays will ultimately impact our ability to provide Marines with ready, relevant and capable combat systems.

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-003

Hearing Date: February 28, 2013

Committee: HASCTALF

Member: Congressman Turner

Witness: LtGen Wissler

Question: #3

Question: Please describe how the effects of sequestration differ for major defense acquisition programs in different stages of development and fielding? For example, would it be less disruptive for programs still in development, which are primarily based on a level of effort, than those in production?

Answer: Sequestration will be disruptive during every phase of the acquisition process. Examples of these disruptions include:

- Slowing the development and procurement of acquisition programs, increasing the total life cycle program cost.
- Slowing the sundown process on legacy systems, which will ultimately drive up current operation and support costs. Sequestration would require investment to replace obsolescent parts for legacy systems which are no longer available in the market place, further driving up sustainment costs.
- Investments in new technologies designed to improve efficiencies, such as fuel efficiency, lightweight armor, and information technology consolidation, would be delayed, negating their corresponding savings and capabilities.
- Initiatives to increase buying power in all phases of the acquisition process will likely be negated by schedule slips.
- Contraction of the small business industrial base is likely to occur as larger firms keep more work in house.

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-004

Hearing Date: February 28, 2013

Committee: HASCTALF

Member: Congressman Turner

Witness: LtGen Wissler

Question: #4

Question: Will the potential effects of sequestration differ for major defense acquisition programs using different contract types and acquisition strategies (fixed-price v. cost-reimbursement; multi-year procurement v. annual procurement)?

Answer: Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), like any other program, would be affected by sequestration. Firm-Fixed Price (FFP) contracts would already be fully funded, but options may need to be re-negotiated to buy a lesser quantity. Under Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts, the Marine Corps would buy fewer items. This may require a program extension in order to buy the total Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) if additional funding is received. Cost type contracts are incrementally funded. If the funding falls short, the contract would have to be modified to either extend the schedule or de-scope the statement of work.

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-006

Hearing Date: February 28, 2013

Committee: HASCTALF

Member: Congressman Turner

Witness: LtGen Wissler

Question: #6

Question: Please provide details on the major defense acquisition programs that would experience any delays in fielding needed capabilities to the warfighter as a result of the effects of sequestration and yearlong CR?

Answer: There is no impact of a continuing resolution given the President's signing of the FY13 DoD appropriations bill.

Potential long-term sequestration impacts specific to Marine Corps programs include:

Ground Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) (ACAT 1C)

- Delays Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of Block 2 software (SW) counter battery development and delays start of Block 4 SW Air Traffic Control development
- Transition to gallium nitride (GaN) at risk which would negatively impact cost, i.e. "should-cost"
- Reduced system procurements increases production cost, scheduled to end in FY20, into FY21
- Industrial Base: Potential impacts to the GaN supplier base when G/ATOR funding is taken in context with other DoD investment reductions in advanced radar technologies

Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) (ACAT 1AM)

- Negative impact on Limited Deployment Unit (LDU) production, and testing
- Delays Full Deployment and stretches completion of procurement into FY19

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) (ACAT 1D)

- Delays USMC IOC, Milestone (MS) C, and Full Operational Capability (FOC)
- Extends USMC procurement past currently scheduled attainment of Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO)
- Army sequestration impacts may contribute to Marine Corps delays

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-007

Hearing Date: February 28, 2013

Committee: HASCTALF

Member: Congressman Turner

Witness: LtGen Wissler

Question: #7

Question: What measures will you take to mitigate the impact of sequestration on counter-IED efforts that could potentially diminish the Department's flexibility and increase risks to rapidly respond to unanticipated requirements?

Answer: Countering IEDs will remain a priority for the Marine Corps. Inherent flexibilities provided under the Budget Control Act will allow the Marine Corps to mitigate impacts to CIED programs in FY13 by using available prior and current year funding. However, we will not have these same flexibilities in FY14. Prioritization and risk reduction decisions on counter-IED efforts in the long term will be made in the context of the discretionary cap reductions in the Budget Control Act and their impact on the Marine Corps' entire procurement portfolio and associated priorities.

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-016
Hearing Date: February 28, 2013
Committee: HASCTALF
Member: Congressman Turner
Witness: LtGen Wissler
Question: #16

Question: According to the Commandant's planning guidance, the Marine Corps seeks to develop an expeditionary force capable of forcible entry to support the National Military Strategy during emerging conflicts and instabilities. The guidance also indicates that the Marine Corps desires to be a "middle-weight force... light enough to get there quickly, but heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival, and capable of operating independent of local infrastructure." How would sequestration and a year-long CR scenario affect this planning guidance? What additional risks would the Marine Corps have to assume given this budget uncertainty?

Answer: Despite the effects of sequestration, the Marine Corps will do everything in our power to protect enduring U.S. global interests that underpin our prosperity. We will meet our responsibilities for rapid response to crises wherever they may occur. Still, the Marine Corps' ability to execute our expeditionary crisis response role is based upon one word—READINESS. This requires trained Marines, ships at sea, and aircraft in the air. These assets are the foundation of our forward deployed and rotational forces. Without them, not only will our forces become hollow and unable to respond as we are accustomed to, but we will make enduring national interests hollow as well. Insufficient maintenance and operating resources may limit the presence of Marines forward, and therefore the ability to intervene when our citizens, diplomats, allies or interests are threatened. We will be able to respond to crisis as a nation, but our response options will be limited, and our response times dramatically slowed. The risk of small-scale crises escalating is increased without forces that can rapidly contain them at their lowest levels. Without ready amphibious ships and well-trained Marine units, there will be less engagement with allies and partners, leading to decreased deterrence for small scale conflict. Without ready Marines, our Nation will forfeit a primary political-military tool that helps to protect U.S. interests, prevent conflict, and enable our joint forces in war.

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-019

Hearing Date: February 28, 2013

Committee: HASCTALF

Member: Congressman Turner

Witness: LtGen Wissler

Question: #19

Question: How would sequestration and a year-long CR scenario impact the procurement of F-35Cs and F-35Bs? Would lower procurement numbers affect the strike fighter shortfall?

Answer: Sequestration will cause a fiscal and operational environment of “haves and have-nots” – the F-35 is no exception. Reducing the funding of the F-35 program will impact the development of the combat capabilities the Marine Corps needs from the aircraft and/or limit the number of aircraft and related equipment needed to meet operational requirements. For the Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force, the nation’s force in readiness, overall integrated aviation capabilities will be degraded in terms of overall survivability, tactical agility, and strategic flexibility due to a diluting of capabilities from a decrease in procurement, sustainment, and operational funding.

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-021

Hearing Date: February 28, 2013

Committee: HASCTALF

Member: Congressman Turner

Witness: LtGen Wissler

Question: #21

Question: How would sequestration and a year-long CR scenario impact your ground combat and tactical vehicle strategy? What programs will be delayed or impacted by this budget uncertainty?

Answer: In FY13, sequestration should not have a negative impact to our ground combat and tactical vehicle strategy. These reductions were mitigated by current and prior year assets.

In the long-term, sequestration will have a negative impact on our warfighting investment portfolio, including several critical vehicle modernization and sustainment programs. We have mitigated some of the impact by prioritizing and sequencing our investments. For example, we are investing in the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle now because it is the most mature capability, followed by investment in the Amphibious Combat Vehicle program. These measures, however, cannot fully mitigate the negative effects of sequestration. Our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV), Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), and tank modification programs, which are critical to maintaining the operational availability of these vehicles, will likely be slowed significantly. Critical survivability and mobility upgrades to the AAV and LAV fleets will be delayed. These delays will ultimately impact our ability to provide Marines with ready, relevant and capable combat systems.

CHARRTS No.: HASCTALF-01-022

Hearing Date: February 28, 2013

Committee: HASCTALF

Member: Congressman Turner

Witness: LtGen Wissler

Question: #22

Question: What programs do the Marine Corps anticipate it will have to cancel or extend due to the budget uncertainty?

Answer: If sequestration were fully implemented, the Marine Corps would have to assess every program. Sequestration will cause interruptions during program acquisition that increases the total program cost, as schedules slip and delays result in longer contracts, loss of efficiencies, negative impacts on development and production schedules, program restructures and potentially cause Nunn-McCurdy breaches. In procurement, existing contracts will have to be renegotiated which will prevent the Marine Corps from receiving Economic Order Quantity pricing.

The Marine Corps will also have to sustain legacy systems longer than planned, which will ultimately drive up current operation and support costs. We will have to shift our attention to developing and replacing obsolescent parts for legacy systems that are no longer available in the market place, which will shift the workforce to a focus of reengineering old and inefficient technology (e.g. sustaining 5 legacy radar systems will cost more than employing one new Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR)). Finally, technologies designed to improve efficiencies (fuel, lightweight armor, etc.) will have to be postponed, preventing the Marine Corps from reaping planned savings while simultaneously driving up costs due to the use of older, more expensive technologies.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-01-022
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE

Hearing Date: March 05, 2013

Hearing: Force Structure Issues and Impact on Military Construction

Member: Congressman Farr

Witness: Gen Amos

Question: #22

On March 1, 2013 sequester went into effect, totaling \$1.2 trillion over 10 years, in across-the-board cuts on defense and domestic discretionary spending to government agencies. Additionally, only 22 days from now on 27 March, the CR expires.

Question: How will sequester by itself effect your service sending personnel to DLI and NPS?

Answer: The Marine Corps does not pay tuition at either Defense Language Institute (DLI) or Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) as they are centrally funded through the DOD and the Navy, respectively. As such, the primary cost driver for the Marine Corps' participation at these schools is permanent change of station (PCS), which is funded in the Military Personnel appropriation and is exempt from sequestration in FY13. However, in FY14 and beyond, the Marine Corps is still assessing the impacts of lower discretionary budget caps on programs such as DLI and NPS.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-01-024
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 05, 2013
Hearing: Force Structure Issues and Impact on Military Construction
Member: Congressman Farr
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #24

Question: What are the potential effects from furloughs and layoffs of civilian personnel on uniformed personnel in your services?

Answer: Furloughs of the civilian Marine workforce are detrimental not only to the affected employees and their families, but also to uniformed Marines and the mission and readiness of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps assesses the impact of a 22 work day furlough in the latter half of this fiscal year will result in an approximate 20 percent pay reduction for affected employees during this period. Sixty-eight percent of our civilian Marines are veterans that have chosen to continue to serve our Nation, and of those, a full 16 percent have a certified disability. While we would like to believe that a discontinuous furlough will reduce the impact on our employees, most will not be able to absorb this sudden loss of income. As a result, employee stress will increase, morale will decline, productivity will suffer, and the burden on military personnel will increase—all of which translates to reduced readiness. Active-duty Marines have already seen the impact of the prospect of furloughs on former Marines and wounded warriors, and this unquestionably has a negative effect on their view of the Marine Corps.

Civilian furloughs also impact the Marine Corps bases and stations with a commensurate reduction in services to our personnel, as these civilians provide critical functions that supports our Marines and Sailors, as well as the Marine Corps mission. With a ratio of 1 civilian to every 10 Marines, the Marine Corps already maintains the leanest civilian workforce – each of these civilians are an integral part of our total workforce. 95% of this workforce support our depots, bases, and stations and fulfill a multitude of roles that serve our active duty personnel and their families. Missions such as depot maintenance and training range operations directly support the warfighter and the Marine Corps' mission to provide the best trained and equipped Marines to Operation Enduring Freedom. Additionally, furloughs impact vital “keep faith” programs such as Wounded Warrior care, Family Readiness, and Transition Assistance. These programs allow Marines to focus on their mission because they know that the Marine Corps will keep faith with them at home.

The potential impacts resulting from civilian Marine furloughs are significant and will directly reduce readiness and uniformed Marine morale and mission focus.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-01-037
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 05, 2013
Hearing: Force Structure Issues and Impact on Military Construction
Member: Congressman Young
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #37

Question: Given the inability to consistently and adequately train flight crews, conduct long-term depot level maintenance, and execute critical multi-year procurements of advanced platforms such as the MV-22, what long term aviation capabilities will you actually be able to provide as the services look to concentrate on an area as massive as the Asia-Pacific region in the future?

Answer: The Marine Corps meets its aviation mission requirements by providing adequately trained flight crews and operationally capable aircraft to all theater combatant commanders. Any inability to conduct long-term depot level maintenance and execute critical multi-year procurements of advanced platforms such as the MV-22 is temporal in nature. Over the long term the Marine Corps will continue to provide aviation elements sufficient to support Marines forward deployed in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Marine Corps is aware that fiscal realities and subsequent budgetary changes may necessitate adjustments to U.S. global defense posture and future Marine Corps aviation lay-down in the Pacific in the coming years. However, the Marine Corps continues to plan for a transition from 13 to only 6 types of aircraft throughout the next decade. The modernization of Marine aircraft and enabling systems will result in improved capabilities and additional employment options for the Pacific Command (PACOM) commander. Additionally, service decisions on basing locations of Marine aviation assets will result in enhanced support to the Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Japan, Australia, Guam, and Hawaii.

As part of the MAGTF, the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is responsible for fulfilling the six functions of Marine Corps aviation. The six functions are Offensive Air Support, Anti-Air Warfare, Assault Support, Aerial Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Control of Aircraft and Missiles. Through our modernization effort and in support of the MAGTF, long-term ACE capabilities will include, but are not limited to, the following: the CH-53K providing increased lifting power and range; the RQ-21A Integrator providing a shipboard UAS capability that will transform command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and the F-35B Lightning II providing a transformational leap spanning numerous capabilities. Additionally, our continued transition to the MV-22 Osprey, the UH-1Y, and the AH-1Z will provide for increased payloads, range, and time-on-station in the Asia-Pacific region.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-01-038
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 05, 2013
Hearing: Force Structure Issues and Impact on Military Construction
Member: Congressman Young
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #38

Question: As we look at the remainder of this calendar year, at what point do you believe we start putting Marine flight crews at risk while also doing a disservice to our allies and partners in the region who rely on your leadership and experience so heavily?

Answer: As America's Force in Readiness, Marine Aviation Units maintain a high state of readiness at all times to respond to contingencies and commitments across the globe. We will therefore preserve the readiness of our Marines that are forward deployed; continue to deploy units that are fully manned, trained, and equipped; and do our best to ensure that units preparing to deploy have the necessary resources and training.

For the remainder of the calendar year, the Marine Corps will manage and leverage training opportunities to maximize the proficiency of flight crews prior to deployment. Our allies and partners can count on our forward deployed Marines to be adequately resourced while maintaining a high-level of proficiency and dedication to the mission.

Beyond calendar year 2013, the effects of sequestration and the CR equates to an approximately 20% reduction in flight hours, curtailment of depot throughput, and fewer spares due to decreases in aviation depot level repairable funding. The negative effect on readiness is caused by reduced flying hours and available mission ready aircraft. Reduced aircraft on the flight line will reduce service life for those aircraft in use, and ultimately challenge the smooth transition to the F-35B. Additionally, the lack of operational funds for training support (e.g. training range support, ordnance, TAD for training) directly impacts readiness.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-01-006
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 05, 2013
Hearing: Force Structure Issues and Impact on Military Construction
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: Gen Amos
Question: #6

Question: General Amos, in Marine Corps briefing materials it was stated that the CR coupled with sequestration could cause lasting damage to Marine Corps infrastructure. Can you explain what the Marine Corps meant by that?

Answer: An annualized continuing resolution (CR) coupled with sequestration would have resulted in the loss of all new FY13 Military Construction (MILCON) projects as well as a significant reduction in sustainment and restoration of existing facilities—the combined effect of these two issues, had HR933 not been passed, would have caused irreversible long-term impacts to facility readiness.

While the passage of HR933 will allow the Marine Corps to begin new military construction, \$761M in projects were delayed for nearly six months due to the FY13 CR. This prevented the commencement of MILCON projects that support training, force protection, transition to the JSF, and the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region – this is lost time that cannot be made up.

Further, our FY13 MILCON budget is approximately one-half of what we were appropriated in FY12. When coupled with sequestration-induced cuts to our facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization accounts, we are seeing a cascading effect. The Marine Corps has less money for new construction, which means that buildings must last longer; however, we have less money for facilities sustainment, which means minor maintenance may be delayed or simply cancelled. The cumulative effect of these difficult choices will result in a gradual erosion of our facilities, increasing repair costs, requiring earlier than planned replacement, and degrading our overall readiness. Buildings in disrepair affect our ability to both train and house our personnel and result in a commensurate negative effect on the morale and welfare of our most precious asset – our Marines.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-01-007
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE

Hearing Date: March 05, 2013

Hearing: Force Structure Issues and Impact on Military Construction

Member: Congressman Bishop

Witness: Gen Amos

Question: #7

Question: General Amos, the April 2012 announcement de-linked the move of Marines with the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) which will now lead to an investment in the current Air Station over the next decade since the FRF is at least 10-15 years from being completed. The move has already been delayed due to political issues in Okinawa and funding budget constraints, could sequestration end this endeavor?

Answer: The United States and Japanese governments are still committed to the Guam relocation. The President has made clear that the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, including re-stationing within and off Okinawa is a whole-of-government effort that supports our enduring U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. As the westernmost U.S. territory in the Pacific, Guam offers a strategic location to address emerging challenges in the region: piracy, terrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Our commitment to the rebalance to the Pacific remains a national imperative and as such we will not waver. Our movement to Guam provides the nation a long-term enduring presence in the Pacific. This allows the United States to quickly respond to military and humanitarian crisis as well as sustain vital partnerships through Theater Security Cooperation activities.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-024
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #24

Sequestration's Indirect Impact on Military Personnel Questions

Question: While servicemembers will not see a reduction in income, as MilPers accounts are exempt from sequestration, many services their families rely on for quality of life will be impacted by the civilian furloughs. For example family readiness centers, sexual assault prevention and response programs, suicide prevention programs, substance abuse programs, and base education centers. Further, teachers at Department of Defense Schools, both domestically and abroad, will be subject to civilian furloughs. Starting with the Army, do you expect major disruptions in these vital programs as a result of the furloughs?

Answer: Although family programs will be protected to the greatest extent feasible, sequestration will impact these programs. The Marine Corps' approach to potential sequestration cuts will be focused on preserving programs that support the health and welfare of our Marines and their families. These programs collectively promote the physical and mental well-being of Marines and families and are considered most essential in meeting the operational objectives of the Marine Corps. We will prioritize our resources to ensure we maintain these programs while taking risk in lower priority programs in the near term.

Our highest priority family programs – Sexual Assault, Behavioral Health, Combat Operational Stress Control, Suicide Prevention, and, above all, the Wounded Warrior Regiment – will be protected to the greatest degree possible at the expense of those lower priority programs such as morale and recreation programs.

Furthermore, any actions that impact our civilian workforce will directly impact our capability to provide essential support services to Marines and their families. A furlough would impact our direct-care service, decreasing service hours across Behavioral Health, Family Readiness, Personal and Professional Development, and Family Care programs, including child care.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-026
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #26

Women in Combat Questions

Question: How will this expanded role benefit your service?

Answer: It is too soon to predict how the new SECDEF policy will benefit the Marine Corps. We will closely monitor our recruiting and retention numbers, as well as unit and personnel readiness, in order to continually assess any impacts that may occur as the result of the new policy. The Commandant and I remain committed to maintaining the combat effectiveness of our total force, while also providing maximum opportunity for individual Marines.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-027
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #27

Women in Combat Questions

Question: How much did the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan contribute to this change in policy and can you give us an idea of what duties female servicemembers performed and how close to combat were our female servicemembers?

Answer: The former SECDEF made this change in policy and it would not be appropriate to comment on what factors played into his decision.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), female Marines performed superbly in many support specialties throughout the theaters of operation. They also played a critical role in their capacity as members of the Lioness program in Iraq and the Female Engagement Teams in Afghanistan as the Marine Corps realized the culture-based need for female teams.

The nature of the wars in OIF and OEF was asymmetric; there were no clearly drawn front and rear lines. Female Marines were exposed to danger alongside their male counterparts and several female Marines were killed or injured in the line of duty in both theaters of war. Additionally, many female Marines have been awarded the Combat Action Ribbon in recognition of performance under fire.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-028
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #28

Women in Combat Questions

Question: Do you think we'll see women in Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) like infantry or Special Forces one day? And if so, what is the plan to get make that happen?

Answer: It is too early in the process to speculate whether female Marines will be assigned to the infantry or Special Forces. The Congressionally-directed implementation plan is still in its draft, pre-decisional stage, and it would be inappropriate to provide further comment.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-030
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #30

Sexual Assault in the Force Questions

Question: Can each service please describe the policies and programs currently in place to combat sexual assault and provide immediate care and assistance to victims of sexual assault? What new programs are being implemented to combat this issue?

Answer: The Marine Corps' Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program charges leadership with establishing an environment that is non-permissive to any misconduct or crime and is receptive to victims reaching out for help, providing the best possible care for Marines in need. In addition to its many prevention training initiatives, the Marine Corps has worked to improve its response systems from both a legal standpoint and in terms of victim services. The Marine Corps has implemented several program improvements to reinforce the Marine Corps ability to ensure that all victims receive the kind of service and justice that preserve their dignity and safety:

- In step with the Commandant's three-phase 2012 SAPR Campaign Plan, the Marine Corps implemented large-scale, Corps-wide training initiatives, utilizing a top-down leadership model. SAPR's training message charges leadership with establishing an environment that is non-permissive to any misconduct or crime – especially sexual assault – and making certain that the Marine Corps' high standard of discipline is maintained.
- The Marine Corps has reorganized its legal community in such a way that increases the training and expertise available for prosecuting complex cases such as sexual assaults.
- Victim response systems have also been strengthened through intensified credentialing requirements for SAPR personnel, as well as through an increased number of Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) and Victim Advocates (VAs) in the field.
- SARCs, VAs, and Uniform VAs staff the 24/7 Sexual Assault Helplines, established at every Marine Corps installation. In addition to internal audits conducted by Installation SARCs, the Headquarters Marine Corps' SAPR office conducts monthly audits of all helplines to measure accessibility and the quality of information relayed through the helplines.
- Currently in the process for the development and implementation of the Sexual Assault Response Team (SART). SARTs work together in a collaborative effort with Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), legal, medical, and other entities to protect the victim.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-031
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #31

Sexual Assault in the Force Questions

Question: Incidents of assault appear to be highest among the 18-24 year old, junior enlisted population. Starting with the Army, what are we doing to teach our newest servicemembers about the military's no tolerance policy for sexual assault and the programs in place should they experience such an assault?

Answer: Sexual Assault Prevention and Response training has been incorporated into the Delayed Entry Program, Recruit Training, and at Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) schools. Prior to attending either Recruit Training or Officer Candidates School (OCS), all selectees receive newly developed values-based training. The training focuses on the "whole of character" and ethical behavior as a Marine, instilling a refined and sustained understanding of the core values of honor, courage, and commitment. The training teaches that the success of the Marine Corps is founded on the character of all Marines, on their ability to make sound ethical decisions in any situation, and includes scenarios that address sexual assault, sexual harassment, racial discrimination, alcohol abuse, and hazing. Upon completion of the training, recruits and candidates are required to sign a Statement of Understanding, affirming their transformation and acceptance of the Marine Corps ethos.

Recruits and candidates receive sexual assault training within the first 14 days of both Recruit Training and Officer Candidates School (OCS). This training provides them a general overview of the program, reporting options, available resources, and the principles of bystander intervention. Later in the training, Senior Drill Instructors discuss sexual assault with all recruits.

After Recruit Training and OCS, Marines receive sexual assault prevention and response training at Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) schools. This training is provided by Uniformed Victim Advocates and reinforces the values and instruction they received during Recruit Training and OCS.

A comprehensive assessment of Marine Corps Recruit Depots and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) schools has been conducted. In addition to the evaluation of SAPR training for instructors and leaders, assessments included evaluation of timing, content, and delivery of SAPR training for students, as well as student accessibility to SAPR services. Results of the assessment have been released and were very positive.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-032
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #32

Sexual Assault in the Force Questions

Question: Is there any concern that the expanded role our female servicemembers will soon be taking on could lead to an increase in sexual assaults?

Answer: Sexual assault is a crime that is incompatible with the core values of the Marine Corps. We remain dedicated to maintaining the high standards of the Marine Corps and to combat sexual assault through education, accountability, and – most importantly – through engaged leadership, our greatest weapon in this battle. Leaders are held responsible for establishing a climate and setting the conditions in which all their Marines, both male and female, can succeed and serve in their units with dignity. This includes units that were once closed to females. To date, there have not been any reports of sexual assaults by females in those units. We will continue, however, to monitor this transition as we further integrate females into previously closed Military Occupational Specialties.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-033
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #33

Sexual Assault in the Force Questions

Question: What programs are in place for both our recruits and at our service academies to raise awareness of this issue? What programs are in place to train our commanders and senior non-commissioned officers how to handle such cases?

Answer: Sexual Assault Prevention and Response training has been incorporated into the Delayed Entry Program, Recruit Training, and at Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) schools. Prior to attending either Recruit Training or Officer Candidates School (OCS), all selectees receive newly developed values-based training. The training focuses on the “whole of character” and ethical behavior as a Marine, instilling a refined and sustained understanding of the core values of honor, courage, and commitment. The training teaches that the success of the Marine Corps is founded on the character of all Marines, on their ability to make sound ethical decisions in any situation, and includes scenarios that address sexual assault, sexual harassment, racial discrimination, alcohol abuse, and hazing. Upon completion of the training, recruits and candidates are required to sign a Statement of Understanding, affirming their transformation and acceptance of the Marine Corps ethos.

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The Marine Corps provides Sexual Assault Prevention and Response training to Sergeants Major and Commanders during the Commander’s Course and newly instituted Sergeants Major course. Training for prospective commanders and senior enlisted leaders was updated to meet all core

competencies and set learning objectives as defined by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and in accordance with the Secretary of Defense Memo signed 25 September 2012, and further training direction from the Commandant. The training is conducted in four phases which include: a read ahead, lecture, practical application, and designated brief by the Installation SARC within 30 days of assuming command. The first three phases of this course were conducted at the Commander's Course on 28 January 2013.

The Marine Corps also conducts training for Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) at the Career Course, Advanced Course, Senior Enlisted Professional Military Education, and the First Sergeants Course. Additionally, the Marine Corps will begin conducting Sexual Assault Prevention Training focused on leadership for Captains and Majors at Expeditionary Warfare School and Command and Staff College. Training programs at these levels identify leadership roles and responsibilities, including the importance of program and policy awareness and knowledge of available resources for victims.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-034
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #34

Suicide Prevention Questions

Question: Language was included in the FY 2013 Defense Authorization bill that would reshape the DOD's behavioral health and suicide prevention programs, compelling each service to adopt common practices. The language called for the DOD to standardize the Services varied suicide prevention programs. Have you all been working together to provide some standards that are consistent across the Services?

Answer: The Marine Corps is in full support of the Suicide Prevention Response General Officer Steering Committee and the Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) in addressing many of the recommendations from the Department of Defense (DoD) Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces. The Marine Corps works closely with the DSPO in the strategic development, implementation, standardization, and evaluation of DoD suicide and resilience programs.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-038
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #38

Suicide Prevention Questions

Question: As you know well the Marine Corps is the youngest Force and the 17-25 age demographic seems to be the most at risk age. Please describe what the Marine Corps is doing to target this particularly vulnerable demographic of Marines?

Answer: The Marine Corps consistently track suicides through the Department of Defense Suicide Event Reporting surveillance system and have partnered with several research agencies to further explore the underlying reasons of suicide. Marine suicides and attempts resemble our institutional demographics: Caucasian male, 17-25 years old, and between the ranks of Private and Sergeant (E1-E5). Based on our analysis, the primary stressors and risk factors associated with Marine suicides and attempts are relationship problems, legal or disciplinary problems, behavioral health diagnoses, financial problems, and substance abuse.

The Marine Corps is committed to consistently and aggressively identify sources of suicide risk and ways to approach and increase effectiveness of our training and support efforts. All Marines are taught to recognize the warning signs of suicide, ask if a Marine is thinking of suicide, express genuine care and concern for the Marine, and immediately escort the Marine to help. Further, Marine Corps leaders are taught and make it a priority to know their Marines on a personal level and show genuine compassion and concern for them. Leaders are also taught that they serve as models to show Marines that it takes a strong, committed person to ask for and receive help.

To efficiently manage behavioral health risk, protective factors, and ultimately prevent suicide, the Marine Corps combined all related programs under a new Behavioral Health Branch. The reorganization synchronized program functions such as research, policy, training, prevention, and treatment. The Marine Corps is developing prevention activities to mitigate the risk across behavioral health.

Behavioral Health Integrated Training is being developed which addresses common risks and protective factors across all behavioral health domains. The training, built on the Institute of Medicine Prevention Continuum, supports universal awareness and selected and indicated training for certain high risk Marines populations. Our Never Leave a Marine Behind Suicide Prevention Training series focuses on key learning objectives including seeking help early, before a situation becomes a crisis, and how to help your fellow Marine. The training requirement reinforces that Marines are alert to those at risk for suicide at all times and take immediate action to help Marines address the hard times or pain in their lives.

The Marine Corps is implementing a Case Management System (CMS). The CMS reaches across multiple programs to provide the most suitable information and analysis, greatly enhancing appropriate treatment planning and assisting with addressing the Marine's needs. The system assists in the identification of at-risk Marines and improves appropriate service delivery as well as aftercare efforts. The CMS better equips the Marine Corps to closely monitor Marines at risk for suicide to ensure they receive appropriate care. Plans are underway to streamline access to care to highlight community counseling capabilities of improved screening, preventive and treatment services. Community counseling will improve tracking of referrals to specialty care.

The Marine Corps is expanding the Military Family Life Consultant (MFLC) Program, which provides confidential counseling by licensed clinical providers. The addition of embedded MFLCs as part of the behavioral health services provided to Marines and their families will be seamlessly woven into the larger support network of command structures, and will enhance unit cohesiveness and health and human services across the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps DSTRESS line, which expanded worldwide in early 2012, provides anonymous, 24/7 counseling services to any Marine, Sailor in a Marine unit, or family member. The line is staffed by veteran Marines and Fleet Marine Force corpsmen, Marine family members, and civilian counselors. The counseling provides any Marine, Sailor in a Marine unit, or family member "one of their own" to speak with about everyday stress or their heaviest burdens in life.

Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) team training builds teams of Mentors (selected unit Marines and leaders), Extenders (unit medical and religious personnel), and Mental Health Professionals who work together to provide a network of support. This model empowers Marines with leadership skills to break stigma and act as sensors for the commander by noticing small changes in behavior and taking action early. This supports the commander in building unit strength, resilience, and readiness as well as keeping Marines in the fight. Further combat and operational stress control training and education is expanding across the Marine Corps to provide targeted knowledge, skills, and tools to Marines and families.

Additional on-going or new prevention efforts include: the appointment and training of Suicide Prevention Program Officers for each battalion and squadron to essentially serve as the "eyes and ears" of the suicide prevention program for the commanding officer; implementation of the Columbia Suicide Severity Rating Scale to assess and evaluate for suicide; continuing dialogue with Marine Corps Defense Counsel to address the number one stressor for Marines – legal issues; force-wide dissemination of reintegration and postvention plans aimed at reintegrating Marines following a suicide-related event and for command postvention plans following a death; and partnering with weapons and field training battalion to gain insights into reducing access to lethal means.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-039
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #39

Suicide Prevention Questions

Question: What mental health services are available to Marines prior to deployment, while in theater, and then at home upon returning from deployment? What mental health services are available to their families?

Answer: Marines have access to a full spectrum of medical support for mental health services, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Marines are screened before deployment and at 1, 6, 12 and 24 month intervals following return from deployment for physical and mental health conditions. During deployment they have access to health care from Navy Medicine assets assigned to the USMC and to behavioral health support from the Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) Program. Marines who are exposed to blast are screened and treated as necessary for TBI before being returned to duty. After redeployment Marines have access to preventive and counseling services from Marine Corps Behavioral Health and to the full spectrum of treatment from the Military Healthcare System (MHS). Marines with complicated cases of TBI can receive treatment from the National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICOE) for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. Marine Corps leadership at all levels actively seeks to eliminate barriers to Marines' seeking physical and mental health care, including eliminating the stigma which may be associated with treatment for health issues including TBI, PTSD and other mental health conditions.

Medical treatment for diagnosable mental health conditions is available to family members through the TRICARE system (either military treatment facility or network providers). Should specialty care not be available within the system, patients may be referred to non-network providers. Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) offers non-medical, short term counseling programs to Marines and their family members for problems such as anger management, coping with loss or separation, parenting, etc. Family members also have access to counseling from Military OneSource, where they can speak with a credentialed counselor over the telephone or in person with a geographically local counselor. Both MCCS and OneSource ensure a warm handoff to the medical system should the family member's condition warrant a medical referral.

Project FOCUS (Families Overcoming Under Stress), initiated by the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) in 2008, provides state-of-the-art family resiliency and psychological health services to military children and families at over 20 Navy and Marine Corps sites and online for those in remote locations. FOCUS is a family-centered resiliency training program developed from evidenced-based interventions that enhance understanding, psychological health, and developmental outcomes for highly stressed children and families facing challenges related

to multiple deployments, combat operational stress, and physical injuries in a family member. FOCUS promotes a culture of prevention and the reduction of stigma through a family-centered array of programs to include community briefings, educational workshops, individual and family consultations, and resiliency training. This approach teaches military members and their families to understand their emotional reactions, communicate more clearly, solve problems more effectively, and set and achieve their goals throughout the deployment cycle. Feedback on the program has been very positive. Participants report high levels of satisfaction with the services provided, reduced psychological distress, and improved individual and family functioning.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-040
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #40

Transition Assistant Programs (TAP)

Question: With the Army and Marine Corps both currently drawing down forces as we close out combat operations and as you know the unemployment rate for Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans has been stubbornly high. In response the Congress passed H.R. 2433, the VOW Act, which made TAP Programs mandatory for most service members transitioning to civilian status, starting with Sergeant Major Chandler what have your services done to implement the mandates set forth in the VOW Act?

Answer: Marines must complete Transition Readiness Seminar (TRS) within 12 months of separation or within 24 months of retirement, but no later than 90 days prior to separation or retirement. All Marines are expected to meet career readiness standards established by the Veterans Employment Initiative (VEI) taskforce and in accordance with the Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) issued in November 2012. For example, they will complete the TRS with a budget for the 12 month post-separation period and develop an Individual Transition Plan that provides a framework to achieve realistic career goals. Other career readiness standards include a family issues webinar that discusses family support structure and interpersonal relationships (during and after transition) and a personal assessment that determines areas of interest to the transitioning Marine.

We are VOW to Hire Heroes Act (VOW Act) compliant. We meet the requirements of the VOW Act within the core and four pathways of the TRS. These requirements include Pre-separation Counseling, Department of Labor Employment information, and the Department of Veterans Affairs benefits brief.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-041
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #41

Transition Assistant Programs (TAP)

Question: What are the Air Force and the Navy doing to help your enlisted personnel with transition from military to civilian life and what actions have your services taken to comply with the VOW Act?

Answer: Marines must complete Transition Readiness Seminar (TRS) within 12 months of separation or within 24 months of retirement, but no later than 90 days prior to separation or retirement. All Marines are expected to meet career readiness standards established by the Veterans Employment Initiative (VEI) taskforce and in accordance with the Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) issued in November 2012. For example, they will complete the TRS with a budget for the 12 month post-separation period and develop an Individual Transition Plan that provides a framework to achieve realistic career goals. Other career readiness standards include a family issues webinar that discusses family support structure and interpersonal relationships (during and after transition) and a personal assessment that determines areas of interest to the transitioning Marine.

We are VOW to Hire Heroes Act (VOW Act) compliant. We meet the requirements of the VOW Act within the core and four pathways of the TRS. These requirements include Pre-separation Counseling, Department of Labor Employment information, and the Department of Veterans Affairs benefits brief.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-042
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #42

Transition Assistant Programs (TAP)

Question: Are your Services seeing positive results as a result of the VOW Act or is it too early to say?

Answer: The Marine Corps has been involved with revitalizing our transition assistance program over the past several years. Our goal is to ensure that all Marines participate actively in their own transition process. Anecdotal input from Marines indicates that our training is useful.

The VOW Act's requirement for mandatory participation helps us ensure that Marines take this effort seriously. Since the VOW Act has only been in effect since November 2012, we are unable to quantitatively evaluate the results.

House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs

Hearing Date: Mar 19, 2013

Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military

Member: Congressman Nunnelee

Insert: (Page 61, Line 1477)

Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett

File Name: HACMILCONVA-02-003-IFR

(The information follows): The Marine Corps commenced formal sequestration planning as directed. This should not imply that significant work had not previously been undertaken to prepare for a fiscal environment characterized by declining resources. Since the passage of the Budget Control Act in 2011, we have worked to assess the potential impacts, optimize our force structure and prioritize our requirements in order to meet what we acknowledge will be significantly reduced funding. These are exceptionally complex problems, and we have invested significant time and analysis to understand the problem, frame our assumptions, assess impacts against our mission, and determine what we could and could not accomplish within these funding constraints. Despite these upfront efforts, we could not assess the detailed impacts until we executed detailed planning as opposed to higher level assessments. The Marine Corps has worked to adapt to budgetary reductions by continuing our tradition of pursuing ways to streamline operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings in order to get the most out of every dollar. It is this mentality that has allowed us to continue to provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan, even in this era of constrained resources.

House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs

Hearing Date: Mar 19, 2013

Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military

Member: Congressman Bishop

Insert: (Page 38, Line 911)

Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett

File Name: HACMILCONVA-02-001-IFR

Question: Can you estimate how many families in the Marine Corps will have spouses who will be likely furloughed under the sequester?

Answer: If furlough occurs, employed military spouses will experience one day per week across 14 weeks in a furlough status, suffering a 20% reduction in their pay during that time, along with others in our civilian workforce who work in positions not excepted under the furlough. As of 28 February 2013, the Marine Corps has 1,678 civil servants who are also dependents of military personnel.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-025
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #25

Sequestration's Indirect Impact on Military Personnel Questions

Question: Several media reports on sequestration have alluded to the high percentage of military spouses who are civilian employees of the federal government or employees of DoD contractors. While the Military personnel accounts are exempt under sequestration, families who are federal employees will possibly see their incomes reduced. Starting with the Army, do you have estimates on how many families in your Service have spouses who will be furloughed?

Answer: If furlough occurs, employed military spouses will experience one day per week across 14 weeks in a furlough status, suffering a 20% reduction in their pay during that time, along with others in our civilian workforce who work in positions not excepted under the furlough. As of 28 February 2013, the Marine Corps has 1,678 civil servants who are also dependents of military personnel.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-002
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member:
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #2

Amidst cuts to Operations and Maintenance funds it seems to me your Services must prioritize accounts under that Title.

Question: Under Operations and Maintenance funds, what are you going to give top prioritization in your Service?

Answer: The current strategic guidance provides a framework by which the Marine Corps will balance the demands of the future security environment with the realities of the current fiscal constraints. Though the choices of the last year have been difficult, we are confident that we have carefully managed risk by balancing capacity and capability. To that end, each part of the Marine Corps' Fiscal Year 2013 Operation and Maintenance budget request is important, and as a whole, ensures that we maintain the high levels of readiness the Nation has come to expect of its deployed Marine forces.

The shortfalls in O&M funding will have severe impacts on the Marine Corps in both the short term and the long term. Because of our special role as America's crisis response force, the Marine Corps places a high premium on readiness, and we have made every effort to protect our forward deployed forces and those next to deploy from the impact of these budget cuts. However, this has come at a cost to our home station units, and as the full impact of sequestration is realized, we will see an exponential degradation of readiness that will ultimately affect every aspect of Marine Corps operations.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-015
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Nunnelee
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #15

Question: Given the amount of the cuts required by sequestration, do you feel the decisions to cut the areas that are being cut were made in the best interest of our nation?

Answer: The Marine Corps uses a framework by which it can manage its readiness as an institution. Called the Five Pillars of Institutional Readiness, this framework seeks to ensure that Service-wide activities lead to the proper balance among five categories (i.e. pillars) that underpin the readiness of the Marine Corps. These pillars capture the Marine Corps' approach for generating ready forces today and informing an investment strategy that will ensure the future readiness of the Marine Corps and enable it to meet the tenets of the Defense Strategic Guidance. Maintaining balance across these pillars is critical to achieving and sustaining the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness for today and tomorrow. The five pillars are:

- High Quality People (*Recruiting, training, educating and retaining high quality people plays a key role in maintaining our high state of readiness*).
- Unit Readiness (*Maintaining readiness of the operating forces, including appropriate operations and maintenance funding to train to core missions and maintain equipment*).
- Capacity versus Requirements (*Force-sizing and naval capabilities to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements with the right mix of capacity and capability*).
- Infrastructure Sustainment (*Investing in real property, maintenance, and infrastructure*).
- Equipment Modernization (*Ensuring ground and aviation equipment matches the needs of the emerging security environment*).

Sequestration will result in across the board reductions that will affect all of the Marine Corps' readiness pillars, will allow for little to no flexibility in how the cuts are applied, and will mandate reductions in accordance with the law without regard for requirements and priorities. For the Marine Corps, sequestration's cuts translate to irreversible impacts to readiness. There is no question that we will collectively not be able to do all the things we are doing today, and this requires a thorough review of ways, means, and ends to arrive at an optimal solution that meets our national security goals in this uncertain and unstable world.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-016
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Nunnelee
Witness: SgtMajMC Barrett
Question: #16

Question: Could you each tell me how much planning your Services conducted leading up to sequestration and how far in advance your Service started this planning?

Answer: The Marine Corps commenced formal sequestration planning when directed. This should not imply that significant work had not previously been undertaken to prepare for a fiscal environment characterized by declining resources. Since the passage of the Budget Control Act in 2011, we have worked to assess the potential impacts, optimize our force structure and prioritize our requirements in order to meet what we acknowledge will be significantly reduced funding. These are exceptionally complex problems, and we have invested significant time and analysis to understand the problem, frame our assumptions, assess impacts against our mission, and determine what we could and could not accomplish within these funding constraints. Despite these upfront efforts, we could not assess the detailed impacts until we executed detailed planning as opposed to higher level assessments. The Marine Corps has worked to adapt to budgetary reductions by continuing our tradition of pursuing ways to streamline operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings in order to get the most out of every dollar. It is this mentality that has allowed us to continue to provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan, even in this era of constrained resources.

CHARRTS No.: HACMILCONVA-02-021
Committee: HAC, MILCON SUBCOMMITTEE
Hearing Date: March 19, 2013
Hearing: Quality of Life in the Military
Member: Congressman Bishop
Witness: SgtMaj MC Barrett
Question: #21

Sequestration's Indirect Impact on Military Personnel Questions

Question: It is my understanding the Marine Corps will be taking a similar actions as the Army in regards to canceling training activities as well can you explain how sequestration will affect Marine Corps readiness?

Answer: Training is essential to the fielding and maintenance of ready forces. As the Nation's Expeditionary Force in Readiness, the Marine Corps remains committed to fielding highly trained, ready forces. Marines in Afghanistan, those Marines forward deployed aboard amphibious ships, Marines providing security to our overseas diplomatic missions, and countless other Marines worldwide supporting combatant commander requirements, are deployed from their home stations, fully trained and ready to meet their assigned missions. Ensuring that these forward deployed Marine units receive the necessary training and that they are properly equipped and manned prior to, and throughout their deployments, requires that tough choices be made to guarantee their high state of readiness. The Marine Corps will protect the high readiness levels of forward deployed Marines, and these high readiness levels of our forward deployed Marine units comes at the expense of non-deployed Marines. Over 50 percent of non-deployed Marine units are in degraded states of readiness. Sequestration will make more problematic the prioritization efforts currently in effect. We will be forced to make even tougher choices as we continuously re-examine our priorities and resource levels so that our forward deployed Marines remain highly trained and fully ready.

As the Nation scales down its military effort in Afghanistan, the Marine Corps will continue to focus more on its amphibious and full spectrum combined arms competencies that have competed with the counterinsurgency skill sets required of Marine units in Afghanistan and Iraq. Transitioning from counterinsurgency-focused missions to full-spectrum operations requires resources. For Marines, that means we need amphibious ship availability, we need sustainable, modernized training ranges, we need our equipment back from Afghanistan, and we need repair parts, fuel, and ammunition with which to train. Sequestration will exacerbate shortfalls for our non-deployed units.

RF1s

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Due Outs from Senate Armed Services Committee Engagement on Sequestration

1: Please provide the breakout of civilians vs. contractors for the 845 employees at the depots mentioned on slide 4 of the presentation.

A1: The breakdown is as follows: 723 contractors and 122 civilian Marines.

2: Please provide examples of impacts broken down between the Continuing Resolution and Sequestration.

A2:



Operational Impacts Due To CR/Sequestration

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- **Unable to complete rebalancing of Marine Corps forces to Asia-Pacific region; initial impact due to CR, exacerbated by sequestration.**
- **Defer organizational maintenance for non-deploying/dwell and next to deploy units; initial impact due to CR focused primarily on home station units, will be exacerbated by sequestration affecting next to deploy units.**
- **Depot maintenance will be reduced to 27% of the baseline requirement, delaying our ability to reset war worn equipment by 18 months or greater, while reducing readiness of non-deployed forces in both the near and long term; reduction to 27% a result of the CR; situation will be worsened under sequestration.**
- **Marine Corps will not be able to accomplish planned reset of equipment returning from OEF (Unable to reconstitute a ready force by 2017); initial reduction of \$112M to depot due to the CR; CR shortfalls will limit our ability to fulfill reset workload. This situation will push work into later years and will be severely exacerbated under sequestration.**
- **Over 55% of USMC forces (combat, logistics, and combat support) will have unsatisfactory readiness ratings; initial impact due to CR, exacerbated by sequestration.**
- **Less than 50% of the Marine Corps' Aviation squadrons in a ready-to-deploy status; majority of impact will be felt as a result of the CR, but will be further exacerbated by sequestration.**
- **Unable to maintain all currently planned deployments and exercises; initial impact due to CR, exacerbated by sequestration.**
- **Facilities sustainment will be funded at 71% of the requirement, reducing the effectiveness of home station training and quality of life; USMC slowed FSRM spending under the CR; reduction to 71% due to sequestration.**
- **Reduce Off Duty and Voluntary Education; USMC protected this under the CR, but will be impacted by sequestration.**
- **Reduce Recruiting and Advertising activities; USMC protected this under the CR, but will be impacted by sequestration.**
- **Cancel Marine Battle Color Detachment events starting 1 April and reduce scope of 95th Anniversary Belleau Wood Ceremony; USMC protected this under the CR, but will be impacted by sequestration.**
- **Possibility of civilian personnel furloughs; USMC protected CIVPERS under the CR, but will be impacted by sequestration.**

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A full year Continuing Resolution (CR) will primarily impact the operating forces and depot maintenance for the Marine Corps' Operation and Maintenance appropriation. The operating forces would receive \$280 million less than planned in the FY13 budget and would be unable to fully support Combatant Commander requirements to include exercises and theater security cooperation. Ultimately these reductions if left uncorrected would degrade the Marine Corps' ability to sustain its high level of forward deployed unit readiness.

Total CR reductions to the depots results in a \$112 million cut; additionally, the Marine Corps has had \$120 million in workload growth, for a total shortfall of \$233 million. The Marine Corps has realigned \$112 million, which delayed the release of 845 workers. The Marine Corps is currently attempting to identify funding and obtain the necessary transfer authorities to realign sufficient funds to meet organic and non-organic maintenance requirements for the rest of FY13. If this shortfall is not funded the Marine Corps will be required to re-examine its depot maintenance priorities and take actions to properly resize the depot workforce

Marine Aviation squadrons' readiness ratings would decrease due to the shortfall in aviation depot maintenance and flying hours caused by a full-year Continuing Resolution and would further exacerbated by reductions due to sequestration.

Military construction for the V-22 and F-35 hangers, movement of aircraft to Hawaii and Iwakuni, and resumption of the Unit Deployment Program will all be negatively impacted under a full year CR. Ultimately, the Marine Corps will be unable to complete rebalancing of Marine Corps forces to the Asia-Pacific region.

Further reductions to Marine Corps' Operation and Maintenance funding due to sequestration include a \$15 million reduction to tuition assistance. Additionally, sequestration will result in a \$15 million cut to recruiting and advertising, eliminating opportunities for new media campaigns and partnerships and a decrease in marketing opportunities in targeted areas that support all recruiting and the Commandant's Diversity Campaign Plan.

Due Outs from House Armed Services Committee Engagement on Sequestration

1: Please provide a comprehensive list of impacts to USMCR.

A1: The CR and Sequestration negatively impact a variety of critical Reserve functions including equipment and facilities maintenance, training, family services, and civilian support staff. Because the Reserve force is distributed across the nation at 180 separate sites, small budget cuts have a disproportionate impact as units have no depth in staff or resources.

Recent budget reductions have reduced the Reserves of funding that would have mitigated deficiencies. Specifically, the Marine Corps kept the baseline Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve (OMMCR) appropriation flat between FY12 (\$271M) and FY13 (\$272M). Projected inflation was mitigated by restricting spending in travel, individual equipment replacement and maintenance, combat vehicle equipment replacement, communications systems repairs, facilities services, MWR program support, and recruiting/advertising support. Concurrently, the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget was decreased from FY12 (\$36M) to FY13 (\$26M). This puts pressure on intermediate and depot level equipment maintenance of training assets supporting OEF.

Sequestration exacerbates the Reserves' long-term challenges in maintaining organizational and intermediate ground equipment, communications gear, and ordnance items at more than 180 Reserve sites throughout the United States. It will create maintenance and sustainment backlogs, delay reset strategies, and reduce corrosion efforts. For example, the Reserves will shut down one of three Corrosion Service Teams (CSTs) and cease the execution of one of the four Logistics Mobile Maintenance Teams (LMMTs) that support overflow maintenance on various weapon systems and equipment. These actions will create equipment readiness shortfalls in the 4th quarter of FY13 and carryover issues into FY14.

Sequestration will also impact facilities sustainment and infrastructure repairs at all Reserve sites. This will create backlogs and require additional funds to recover from maintenance deficiencies in the long-term.

Finally, the Reserves' Civilian Marines support key missions at Reserve centers and are an integral part of the total force. Due to the unique nature of the Reserves and the distributed laydown across many sites, unit billets are often manned by a single civilian who performs many jobs. A potential civilian furlough caused by sequestration would significantly degrade the Reserves' ability to support exercises because there is limited ability to offset any lost civilian work hours with military personnel. Furthermore, family readiness programs, which often times are manned with only one civilian depending on the subordinate command, would require reduced hours or a complete shutdown during certain days.

2: Please provide the dollar value of the "must protect" wedge on slide 2 of the brief.

A2: The "must protect" wedge on slide 2 represents USMC core competencies and as such, is the last place in which we would look to when considering areas for reduction; however, "combat operations" and "forward deployed readiness" are representative of "must protect"

capabilities vice simple budget line items to which a single dollar value could be applied. Rather, these areas are placed at the top of the triangle to show that they are core competencies that must be preserved and, as such, must be guarded against erosion that could result from 2nd and 3rd order effects of cuts to other areas.

The Marine Corps has built its \$10B O&M budget to support these core competencies, and as such, we see this entire budget as critical to our ability to fully support the conduct of combat operations while simultaneously ensuring our forward deployed readiness. Accordingly, any reductions to our O&M funding cannot be taken in isolation and must be viewed holistically through the lens of combat operations and forward deployed readiness; while such reductions may ultimately become necessary, it must be understood that each cut entails a greater degree of risk to these “must protect” areas – damage to these core competencies is irreversible.

While resources will always be prioritized to support currently deployed units and those next to deploy, cuts under the CR and sequestration will result in an ever increasing erosion of home station unit readiness and force modernization. Short term actions to sustain near term readiness will ultimately create imbalances across the five pillars of Marine Corps Institutional Readiness: high quality people, near-term unit readiness, capability and capacity to meet COCOM requirements, infrastructure sustainment, and equipment modernization.

3: Please provide the dollar value of reductions to Recruiting and Advertising.

A3: Recruiting & Advertising decreases:

Advertising: \$11 million

Recruiting: \$4 million

TOTAL: \$15 million



Question: For the Guard and Reserve specifically, please also address the [Continuing Resolution and Sequestration] impact in the near term and long-term on the Operation and Maintenance accounts. It appears that most of the information that we've received thus far is geared more towards the impact on active duty O&M accounts and not necessarily Guard and Reserve accounts.

Answer: The CR and Sequestration negatively impact a variety of critical Reserve functions including equipment and facilities maintenance, training, family services, and civilian support staff. Because the Reserve force is distributed across the nation at 180 separate sites, small budget cuts have a disproportionate impact as units have no depth in staff or resources.

Recent budget reductions have reduced the Reserves of funding that would have mitigated deficiencies. Specifically, the Marine Corps kept the baseline Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve (OMMCR) appropriation flat between FY12 (\$271M) and FY13 (\$272M). Projected inflation was mitigated by restricting spending in travel, individual equipment replacement and maintenance, combat vehicle equipment replacement, communications systems repairs, facilities services, MWR program support, and recruiting/advertising support. Concurrently, the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget was decreased from FY12 (\$36M) to FY13 (\$26M). This puts pressure on intermediate and depot level equipment maintenance of training assets supporting OEF.

Sequestration exacerbates the Reserves' long-term challenges in maintaining organizational and intermediate ground equipment, communications gear, and ordnance items at more than 180 Reserve sites throughout the United States. It will create maintenance and sustainment backlogs, delay reset strategies, and reduce corrosion efforts. For example, the Reserves will shut down one of three Corrosion Service Teams (CSTs) and cease the execution of one of the four Logistics Mobile Maintenance Teams (LMMTs) that support overflow maintenance on various weapon systems and equipment. These actions will create equipment readiness shortfalls in the 4th quarter of FY13 and carryover issues into FY14.

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Finally, the Reserves' Civilian Marines support key missions at Reserve centers and are an integral part of the total force. Due to the unique nature of the Reserves and the distributed laydown across many sites, unit billets are often manned by a single civilian who performs many jobs. A potential civilian furlough caused by sequestration would significantly degrade the Reserves' ability to support exercises because there is limited ability to offset any lost civilian work hours with military personnel. Furthermore, family readiness programs, which often times

are manned with only one civilian depending on the subordinate command, would require reduced hours or a complete shutdown during certain days.



Marine Corps Impact Under Annualized CR and Sequestration

Total Economic Impact = \$2.4B



**Total Civilians Affected:
19,675 Civilians**

MILCON/Procurement Total: \$1,129M
\$667M MILCON
\$462M Procurement (INV)
\$322M PMC + \$140M undistributed; will be Competitively Awarded

O&M Total: \$1,271M
\$130M Lost Pay
\$207M Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
\$30M Undistributed (Recruiting and Advertising, Tuition Assistance)
\$903M O&M (not including Civilian Lost Pay, FSRM, Undist.)

California
5,034
Total Civs
\$33.311M
Lost Pay
\$46M INV

MWTC Bridgeport
80 Civs
\$3M FSRM
\$15M O&M

MCBL Barstow
1,267 Civs
\$2M FSRM
\$14M O&M

MCAGCC 29 Palms
974 Civs
\$3M FSRM
\$76M O&M
\$47M MILCON

MCB Pendleton
1,900 Civs
\$19M FSRM
\$111M O&M
\$88M MILCON

MCRD San Diego
339 Civs
\$1M FSRM
\$12M O&M
\$12M MILCON

MCAS Miramar
417 Civs
\$10M FSRM
\$23M O&M
\$28M MILCON
57 Civs not on major bases.

Overseas
Germany: 24 Civs \$0.159M Lost Pay \$20M O&M
Guam: 1 Civ \$0.007M Lost Pay \$4M O&M
Korea: 2 Civs \$0.013M Lost Pay \$4M O&M

Japan
673 Total Civs \$4.630M Lost Pay
MCB Butler
484 Civs \$10M FSRM \$73M O&M
MCAS Futenma
22 Civs \$1M FSRM \$18M O&M \$13M MILCON
MCAS Iwakuni
167 Civs \$20M O&M

Hawaii
660 Total Civs
\$4.367M Lost Pay
MCB Hawaii
660 Civs
\$20M FSRM
\$54M O&M
\$97M MILCON

Georgia
2,304 Total Civs
\$15.246M Lost Pay
\$4M INV
MCLB Albany
2,300 Civs
\$8M FSRM
\$51M O&M
4 Civs not on major bases.

Florida
2,304 Total Civs
\$1.608M Lost Pay \$9M INV
MCSF Blount Island
75 Civs
\$2M FSRM \$14M O&M
MacDill AFB
11 Civs
\$47M O&M
157 Civs not on major bases.

South Carolina
802 Total Civs
\$5.307M Lost Pay
\$23M INV
MCAS Beaufort
339 Civs
\$8M FSRM
\$16M O&M
\$82M MILCON
MCRD Parris Island
444 Civs
\$9M FSRM
\$21M O&M
\$10M MILCON
19 Civs not on major bases.

North Carolina
3,206 Total Civs
\$21.215M Lost Pay
MCB Lejeune
2,198 Civs
\$15M FSRM \$100M O&M
\$78M MILCON
MCAS Cherry Point
844 Civs
\$14M FSRM \$20M O&M
\$46M MILCON
MCAS New River
159 Civs
\$13M FSRM \$11M O&M
5 Civs not on major bases.

Virginia
5,391 Total Civs
\$35.673M Lost Pay \$16M INV
MCB Quantico, JB Myer-HH
5,204 Civs
\$27M FSRM \$115M O&M
\$59M MILCON
NWS Yorktown, NS Norfolk
176 Civs
\$21M O&M \$49M MILCON
11 Civs not on major bases.

Washington, DC
50 Total Civs
\$0.331M Lost Pay
MARBKs Washington
50 Civs \$2M FSRM \$6M O&M

Maryland
36 Civs
\$0.238M Lost Pay
\$9M O&M \$74M INV

Connecticut
1 Civ \$0.007M Lost Pay

New Jersey
9 Civs \$0.060M Lost Pay

Delaware
1 Civ \$0.007M Lost Pay

Rhode Island
3 Civs
\$0.020M Lost Pay

New Hampshire
3 Civs
\$0.020M Lost Pay

Massachusetts
5 Civs
\$0.033M Lost Pay

New York
30 Civ \$0.199M Lost Pay \$4M MCON \$6M INV

Pennsylvania
23 Civs \$0.152M Lost Pay \$19M INV

Michigan
12 Civs
\$0.079M Lost Pay \$21M INV

Ohio
3 Civs
\$0.020M Lost Pay \$3M INV

Indiana
244 Civs
\$1.615M Lost Pay \$8M INV

Kentucky
3 Civs
\$0.020M Lost Pay

Tennessee
3 Civs \$0.020M Lost Pay \$17M INV

Alabama
6 Civs
\$0.040M Lost Pay \$1M INV

Mississippi
1 Civ
\$0.007M Lost Pay

Louisiana
290 Civs
\$1.919M Lost Pay \$17M O&M

Texas
29 Civs
\$0.192M Lost Pay

Oklahoma
2 Civs
\$0.013M Lost Pay

Kansas
1 Civ
\$0.007M Lost Pay \$1M INV

Nebraska
4 Civs
\$0.026M Lost Pay

Iowa
3 Civs
\$0.020M Lost Pay \$1M INV

Illinois
4 Civs
\$0.026M Lost Pay \$1M INV

Wisconsin
3 Civs
\$0.020M Lost Pay \$55M INV

Minnesota
3 Civs
\$0.020M Lost Pay

Washington
2 Civs
\$0.013M Lost Pay

Oregon
1 Civ
\$0.007M Lost Pay

Nevada
1 Civ
\$0.007M Lost Pay

Utah
2 Civs
\$0.013M Lost Pay


Colorado
3 Civs
\$0.020M Lost Pay

Arizona
477 Total Civs
\$3.156M Lost Pay \$16M INV

MCAS Yuma
477 Civs
\$40M FSRM
\$14M O&M
\$35M MILCON

New Mexico
1 Civ
\$0.007M Lost Pay

Alaska
\$1M INV





FY13 Operational Impacts Post HR933 Approval

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HR 933 had a positive impact on Marine Corps O&M, mitigating most of the operational impacts of sequestration in FY13

- **The Marine Corps is able to meet near-term readiness commitments for deployed and next to deploy forces**
- **Allows for continued rebalance to the Pacific; supports Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) and Unit Deployment Program (UDP) rotational deployment to Okinawa in FY13**
- **Funding levels for Depot Maintenance will allow the Marine Corps to continue planned reset activities in FY13**
- **Supports Recruiting and Advertising efforts in FY13**
- **Funding for tuition assistance reinstated**

However, sequestration reductions negatively impact future readiness; the Marine Corps is able to protect forward deployed forces, but only at the expense of longer-term readiness areas

- **Facilities sustainment reductions will degrade home station training and quality of life for Marines and their families; FY13 level reductions unsustainable in FY14 and beyond**
- **Curtailment of training and maintenance for home station units degrades readiness of non-deployed crisis response forces**
- **Nearly half of Marine Corps tactical units and 1/3 of the Marine Corps aviation combat units will remain below acceptable readiness levels required for deployment**
- **Not all exercises and partner building operations were executed as planned in FY13, and sequestration will impact operations and exercises in FY14 and beyond.**

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SAG	FY 13 PBUD Request	Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)	Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)	Sequester	Other (please footnote if applicable)	FY 13 Current Estimate
OMMC Baseline							
1A1A	788,055	54,400		(216)			
1A2A	762,614			(548)			
1A3A	168,447		(6,800)				
1B1B	100,374			(11)			
BSM1	825,039			(6,220)			
BSS1	2,188,883	(800)		(1,278)			
3A1C	18,251			(5)			
3A2C	869						
3B1D	80,914			(52)			
3B3D	42,744			(31)			
3B4D	292,150			(98)			
3C1F	168,609	10,000		(35)			
3C2F	56,865			(7)			
3C3F	19,912			(4)			
4A3G	39,962						
4A4G	346,071	(5,000)		(2,192)			
4B3N	83,404			(94)			
	5,983,163	58,600	(6,800)	(10,791)		-	
OMMC OCO							
1A1A	1,921,258	(70,000)					
1A2A	1,094,028						
1A3A	222,824	120,000					
BSS1	88,690						
3B4D	215,212						
4A3G	512,627						
4A4G	11,701						
	4,066,340	50,000	-	-		-	
Grand Total	10,049,503	108,600	(6,800)	(10,791)	(752,180)	-	9,388,332

SAG	FY 13 PBUD Request	Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)	Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)	Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)	Sequester	Other (please footnote if applicable)	FY 13 Current Estimate
OMMCR Baseline							
1A1A	89,690			(5)			
1A3A	16,735						
BSM1	37,913	3,791		(89)			
BSS1	103,746	1,301		(302)			
4A3G	873						
4A4G	14,330			(12)			
4A6G	8,998						
	272,285	5,092	-	(408)		-	
OMMCR OCO							
1A1A	22,657						
BSS1	2,820						
	25,477	-	-	-		-	
Grand Total	297,762	5,092	-	(408)	(23,290)	-	279,156

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (1-22 March)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
AR	OPERATIONS	2013/03/11 -15	4A4G	OMMC	Military Justice Organizations Marine Corps-wide	2013	100	Multiple	Multiple	Multiple	Trial Counsel Assistance Program "Prosecuting Sexual Assault Cases"--Week long course. Two-day regional "Prosecuting Sexual Assault" Mobile Training Team.
LOGCOM	OPERATIONS	03/18/13	1A3A	OMMC	MCLBs Albany and Barstow	2013	35000	MCLB Albany	Albany	GA	Marine Corps will monitor strategic reset efforts at the Marine Corps Depots and depending on the results of ongoing Congressional actions and current execution status, will begin to notify Contractors and Terms as early as 18 March of the intent to cancel contracts. These cancellations will result in the lay-off of as much as 845 artisans and depot workers at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow (276 personnel) and Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany (569 personnel).
LOGCOM	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A2A	OMMC	Marine Corps Logistics Command -HQ	2013	858	Marine Corps Logistics Base	Albany	GA	Delayed travel
M&RA	OPERATIONS	03/12/13	3C2F	OMMC	USMC Personnel in the TA Program	2013	15000	Various	Various	Various	Policy actions underway to cease new enrollments using Tuition Assistance.
M&RA	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MF)	2013	0	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Travel delayed (no savings, just delays)
M&RA	OPERATIONS	03/10/13	4A4G	OMMC	M&RA (MP)	2013	0	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Joint Women's Leadership Symposium was delayed until June 5-7, 2013 (no savings, just delay)
M&RA	OPERATIONS	03/14/13	4A4G	OMMC	M&RA (MP)	2013	8	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Women in Aviation Conference USMC/NAVY participation was denied approval by Director of Navy Staff
M&RA	OPERATIONS	03/03/13	4A4G	OMMC	M&RA (MP)	2013	1	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Cancelled TDY trip to Force Synch Conference
MARFORCOM	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	300	NSA Hampton Roads	Norfolk	VA	MARFORCOM G-6 deferred the purchase/upgrade of (4) VTC suites to upgrade existing suites.

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MARFORCOM	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	0	NSA Hampton Roads	Norfolk	VA	LFORM management will yield no savings/cost reductions during the identified period due to ongoing POL cleanup efforts. However, improved LFORM management practices have yielded a 70+% overall FY13 cost reduction compared to this point in FY12.
MARFORCOM	CONTRACT	03/01/13	1A1A	OMN	MARFORCOM	2013	237	NSA Hampton Roads	Norfolk	VA	Deferred AirSpeed contract support services to 2D MAW
MARFORCOM	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	8	NSA Hampton Roads	Norfolk	VA	Per DSD memo dated 10 Jan 13, TAD has been deferred and limited to mission-essential travel only. MARFORCOM expects to recoup any savings associated with TAD and re-apply it to mission essential requirements.
MARFORCOM	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	0	NSA Hampton Roads	Norfolk	VA	Per OMB Memo M-13-05 dated 27 Feb 13, discretionary monetary awards to civilians should be issued only if legally required. Potential savings will be captured in future reports.
MARFORCOM	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	4A5M	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	0	Ft Benning		GA	Tanks/Amphibious Armored Vehicles/LAR T&R Conference. Impact: Delayed integration of individual and collective intel related training requirements into unit T&Rs.
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	1A1A	O&M	MARFOREUR G2	2013	4	MCB	QUANTICO	VA	Did not participate in SNCOA 1stSgt/MSgt Regional Seminar
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	O&M	MARFOREUR G2	2013	3	JAC Molesworth	Cambridgeshire, U	OCONUS	CoS, G2 visit to Marines assigned to JAC Molesworth not executed
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/11/13	INAL (EUCOM	O&M	MARFOREUR G3	2013	6	Partner Nation	Yerevan, Armenia	OCONUS	Kansas National Guard participant travel for NCO workshop in Armenia canceled (MARFOREUR is event OPR)
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/07/13	1A1	O&M	MARFOREUR G3	2013	2	Partner Nation	Sofia, Bulgaria	OCONUS	Did not participate in Bulgaria Executive Committee

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MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/06/13	1A1A (EUCOM)	O&M	MARFOREUR G3	2013	3	Partner Nation	Baku, Azerbaijan	OCONUS	Did not participate in M2M Agreement Conference in Azerbaijan
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	O&M	MARFOREUR G4	2013	4	Panzer-Kaserne	Munich, Germany	OCONUS	Armorers Toolkit and Vise required, not ordered
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	O&M	MARFOREUR G4	2013	3	Panzer-Kaserne	Munich, Germany	OCONUS	Hazmat declarations course, transportation and certification of hazmat via ground trans, etc. not executed
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	O&M	MARFOREUR G4	2013	3	Panzer-Kaserne	Munich, Germany	OCONUS	Ammo shipping, such as label and scanning items required, not ordered
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	02/25/13	1A1A	O&M	MARFOREUR G4	2013	4	Panzer-Kaserne	Munich, Germany	OCONUS	Postponed Contracting Conference with HQMC
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	O&M	MARFOREUR G4	2013	7	Panzer-Kaserne	Munich, Germany	OCONUS	MFE SMO has two Marines that are not trained or certified to build, complete, or certify aircraft load plan for U.S. Military or chartered civilian aircraft as per their MOS and job requirements
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	O&M	MARFOREUR G4	2013	3	Rose Barracks	Worms, Germany	OCONUS	MFE SMO has one Marine that is not trained or certified to inspect or sign off on the proper packaging of HAZ MAT for transportation aboard aircraft as per their MOS and job requirements
MARFOREUR	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	O&M	MARFOREUR G4	2013	8	As required	As required	OCONUS	MFE SMO tasked by CENTCOM (via EUCOM) for Unit Movement APOE/ Joint Inspection support for coalition partners movement to OEF/ISAF aboard US Military aircraft but MFE unable to fund
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	1A1A	OMMC	III MEF, G3	2013	6000	Camp Courtney	Okinawa	Japan	Descope exercises across the Asia Pacific Theater with degradation and risk to the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plan
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/07/13	1A1A	OMMC	I MEF	2013	500	MCB Camp Pendleton	Camp Pendleton	CA	Deferred Corrosion Prevention and Repair for Tactical Vehicles and Equipment.

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MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/07/13	1A1A	OMMC	I MEF	2013	13000	MCB Camp Pendleton	Camp Pendleton	CA	Deferred Secondary Repairables will severely slow 4th and 5th echelon maintenance resulting in a large backorder and significant wait time for OPFOR commands.
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D Marine Division	2013	75	Camp Butler	Okinawa	Japan	Postponement of mission essential assist visit to geographically separated commands until future FYs
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D Marine Division	2013	175	Camp Butler	Okinawa	Japan	Reduction, rationing, curtailment and economizing of GSA Mart Items for the rest of the FY.
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D Marine Division	2013	200	Camp Butler	Okinawa	Japan	Curtailment of mechanized/motorized training. Uses less fuel and avoids maintenance at the cost of invaluable training.
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D Marine Division	2013	300	MCB Hawaii	Kaneohe	Hawaii	Reduction of scope of Division directed exercises, deployment of fewer vehicular and equipment assets. Saves on costs, but reduces training opportunities.
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D Marine Division	2013	375	Camp Butler	Okinawa	Japan	Entering vehicle assets into administrative storage programs to save on maintenance and reduce upkeep. Defers costs, but maintenance will be required when used again
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D Marine Division	2013	1300	Camp Butler	Okinawa	Japan	Postponing and cancelling planned replacement of depleted, missing, broken and consumed End Item add ons and enhancements
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D Marine Division	2013	1800	MCB Hawaii	Kaneohe	Hawaii	Postponing and cancelling planned replacement of depleted, missing, broken and consumed End Item add ons and enhancements

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MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	1A1A	OMMC	I MEF	2013	7502	Various	Various	CA	Deferred and Canceled Intermediate and Organizational Maintenance will result in the OPFOR units not maintaining 1st, 2nd, and 3rd echelon maintenance operations. The OPFOR commands will see readiness erode by being unable to replenish and replace items, repair and maintain parts, and purchase POLs and others supplies and equipment necessary for conducting maintenance.
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/12/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D MLG, CLR-3	2013	322	Camp Kinser	Okinawa	Japan	Deferment of SL3 deficiency. CLB-3 will continue to operate under a shortfall on all TAMNCS.
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/12/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D MLG, 9TH ESB	2013	350	Camp Kinser	Okinawa	Japan	Deferment of SL3 deficiency. 9TH ESB unable to replace missing equipment. Deficiency will continue to grow and degrade readiness.
MARFORPAC	CONTRACTS	03/12/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D MLG, CLR-35	2013	375	Camp Kinser	Okinawa	Japan	Cancel contract labor ISO MEDLOG. Reduction in ability to maintain current business processes and integrity of Class VIIIA in Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support System (DMLSS)
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/12/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D MLG, CLR-35	2013	411	Camp Kinser	Okinawa	Japan	Inability to purchase Fast Mover AMAL block ISO annual exercises, HA/DR and overseas contingencies.
MARFORPAC	CONTRACT	03/12/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D MLG, G-4	2013	500	Camp Kinser	Okinawa	Japan	Cancel contract labor ISO GCSS-MC integration. Will cause significant degradation to both garrison and deployed MAGTF logistics within the PACOM AO.
MARFORPAC	OPERATIONS	03/12/13	1A1A	OMMC	3D MLG, SMU	2013	2100	Camp Kinser	Okinawa	Japan	Defer replacing/restocking SMU inventory. Readiness and support will be degraded.
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	4th Civil Affairs Group	2013	200	JB Anacostia, DC	Washington	DC	RM project at Anacostia to provide open storage and fencing

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MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	6th Engineer Support Bn	2013	1400	MFR Tenant (NMCRC)	Battle Creek	MI	Road and Pavement Repairs
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	4th Tank Bn	2013	555	MFR Tenant (Gowen Field-ARNG)	Boise	ID	Overhead Crane Installation
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	4th Maintenance Bn	2013	2500	MFR Tenant (USNR)	Sacramento	CA	Repairs to Buildings 1,2,& 3 (RC, VMF, WHSE)
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	6th Engineer Support Bn	2013	50	MFR Tenant (USNR)	Wilmington	DE	Install HVAC for fuel bladder storage warehouse
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Bn	2013	650	MFR Tenant (USAR)	Syracuse	NY	Install 100 kW Wind Turbine
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	6th Communication Bn	2013	650	MFR Tenant (AFRC)	Brooklyn	NY	Install 100 kW Wind Turbine
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	4th Assault Amphibian Bn	2013	700	MFR Host	Galveston	TX	Install 100 kW Wind Turbine
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	6th Communication Bn	2013	500	MFR Tenant (AFRC)	Brooklyn	NY	Install Micro-Grid
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	6th Motor Transport Bn	2013	621	MFR Host	Texarkana	TX	Install 100 kW Wind Turbine
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Bn	2013	634	MFR Tenant (Ft Jackson-ARNG)	Eastover	SC	Install 100 kW PV
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	MCR Training Center	2013	667	MFR Host	Windy Hill	GA	Install 100 kW PV
MARFORRES	FSRM	03/04/13	1107 BSM1	OMMCR	3 Bn / 25 Marines	2013	499	MFR Host	Brook Park	OH	Install 100kw Wind Turbine
MARFORSOUTH	OPERATIONS	03/03/13	1A1A	OMMC	SOUTHCOM	2013	32	MARFORSOUTH HQ	DORAL	FL	DOWNSCALE OF PDSS FOOTPRINT ISO SPS AMPHIB-13 IVO GUATEMALA (CUT FROM ORIGINAL 25, DOWN TO 15 PAX)
MARFORSOUTH	OPERATIONS	03/03/13	1A1A	OMMC	SOUTHCOM	2013	2	MARFORSOUTH HQ	DORAL	FL	SC-TEAM OIC CANX TAD TO HONDURAS (IOT CONDUCT TEAM AND SITE INSPECTION)
MARFORSOUTH	OPERATIONS	03/10/13	1A1A	OMMC	SOUTHCOM	2013	7	MARFORSOUTH HQ	DORAL	FL	COMMARFORSOUTH, SGTMAJ, & AIDE CANX SITE VISIT TO MARDET EMBARKED ON HSV-2, SWIFT IVO BELIZE/GUATEMALA
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	260	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	INSTALL COMMUNICATION POLE AND EMERG GEN SYS AT FUJI-269

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MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	290	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	INSTALL FIRE SPRINKLER SYS , BLDG 4446, CAMP COURTNEY
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	1700	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	REPAIR CONCRETE SPALLS AND CRACKS, BLDG 801, CAMP KINSER
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	450	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	INSTALL FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM IN BLDG. 5206, CAMP MCTUREOUS
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS FUTENMA	13	480	MCAS FUTENMA	Okinawa	JA	REPAIR FIRE PROTN DEFS AT ENGINE TEST CELL BLD 740, FUT
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	3842	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	REPAIR LUNGA DAM
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	642	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	REPAIR BRECKENRIDGE DAM
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	1335	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	REPAIR GRAY'S RESERVOIR
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	1259	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	VAN PAD 1B REPAIRS, B5038
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	1247	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	400 HZ GENERATOR REPAIRS, B390G
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	399	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	REPLACE COMMUNICATION LINES FOR VAN PAD 1A (B5037)
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	338	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	REPLACE COMMUNICATION LINES FOR VAN PAD 1B (B5038)
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD SAN DIEGO	13	416	MCRD SAN DIEGO	San Diego	CA	REPAIR WATER VALVES @ LATERIALS, DEPOT WIDE
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD SAN DIEGO	13	570	MCRD SAN DIEGO	San Diego	CA	REPAIR BLDG 623 RECEIVING BARRACKS
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD SAN DIEGO	13	2919	MCRD SAN DIEGO	San Diego	CA	REPAIR SEWER SYSTEM - AREA 2
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD SAN DIEGO	13	635	MCRD SAN DIEGO	San Diego	CA	REPAIRS BUILDING 11
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	6434	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	REPAIR BUILDING 386 BEQ
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	673	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	MODERNIZE B386 BEQ
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	920	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	REPAIR ROOF, B72 PCA
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCLB ALBANY GA	13	659	MCLB ALBANY GA	Albany	GA	RECONFIGURE BLDG 3700 PARKING FOR ADA
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCLB ALBANY GA	13	2572	MCLB ALBANY GA	Albany	GA	RESURFACE VARIOUS ASPHALT ROADS WAREHOUSE AREA
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCLB ALBANY GA	13	1086	MCLB ALBANY GA	Albany	GA	REPAIR BLDG 7120
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCLB BARSTOW	13	445	MCLB BARSTOW	Barstow	CA	RENOVATE BUILDING 613, INSTALLATION DIVISION MAINTENANCE
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCLB BARSTOW	13	512	MCLB BARSTOW	Barstow	CA	ADDITION TO BLDG 613 INSTALLATION DIVISION
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCLB BARSTOW	13	7023	MCLB BARSTOW	Barstow	CA	REPAIR RAILROAD TRACKAGE PHASE 1, NEBO

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MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCLB BARSTOW	13	649	MCLB BARSTOW	Barstow	CA	FIRE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY VEHICLE OPERATIONS COURSE (EVOC)
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS BEAUFORT	13	3755	MCAS BEAUFORT	Beaufort	SC	REPAIR LAUREL BAY ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PH I
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS BEAUFORT	13	1350	MCAS BEAUFORT	Beaufort	SC	REPAIR BLDG. 555, WAREHOUSE
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS BEAUFORT	13	103	MCAS BEAUFORT	Beaufort	SC	CONSTRUCT RESTROOM AT BLDG 555, WAREHOUSE
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS BEAUFORT	13	604	MCAS BEAUFORT	Beaufort	SC	DEMOLISH BLDG 595, COMBINED FIRE-ARFF FACILITY
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS BEAUFORT	13	3519	MCAS BEAUFORT	Beaufort	SC	RENOVATE SHOP AND ADMIN SPACES IN HANGAR 594
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS BEAUFORT	13	685	MCAS BEAUFORT	Beaufort	SC	REPAIR ADMIN BUILDING 703
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS BEAUFORT	13	610	MCAS BEAUFORT	Beaufort	SC	RESTORATION OF ADMIN BUILDING 703
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS BEAUFORT	13	684	MCAS BEAUFORT	Beaufort	SC	REPAIR SQUADRON HEADQUARTERS BLDG 1252
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCLB BLOUNT ISLAND	13	6060	MCLB BLOUNT ISLAND	Jacksonville	FL	REPAIR B-350 ROOF
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCLB BLOUNT ISLAND	13	1017	MCLB BLOUNT ISLAND	Jacksonville	FL	REPAIR B-450 HIGH BAY ROOF
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCSF BLOUNT ISLAND	13	554	MCSF BLOUNT ISLAND	Jacksonville	FL	REPLACE HAZMAT PACKING FACILITY 551
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCSF BLOUNT ISLAND	13	641	MCSF BLOUNT ISLAND	Jacksonville	FL	HAZMAT PKG TRANSFER BUILDING
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MWTC BRIDGEPORT	13	691	MWTC BRIDGEPORT	Bridgeport	CA	BASE STABLE FACILITY UPGRADE
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCMWTC BRIDGEPORT	13	880	MWTC BRIDGEPORT	Bridgeport	CA	ELECTRIC UTILITY VAULT REPAIR
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MWTC BRIDGEPORT	13	693	MWTC BRIDGEPORT	Bridgeport	CA	CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL ROLLED CURB
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	3000	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	RPR BEQ 4300
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	1000	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	REPAIR BEQ/ADMIN, BLDG 4344, CAMP COURTNEY
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	2800	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	REPAIR BOQ 4138, CAMP FOSTER (ESR 036-05)
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	970	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	REPAIR SINKHOLE NEAR, B-425 KINSER
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	1100	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	REPAIR 25M SWIMMING POOL, B-2431A, CAMP HANSEN
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	1400	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	REPAIR 50M SWIMMING POOL B-3663, CAMP SCHWAB

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MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	660	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	INSTALL POOL HEATING SYSTEM, B-5905, CAMP FOSTER
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP BUTLER	13	1500	MCB CAMP BUTLER	Okinawa	JA	REPAIR SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT, B-2889, CAMP HANSEN
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS CHERRY POINT	13	2788	MCAS CHERRY POINT	Cherry Point	NC	REPAIRS TO BEQ BLDG 4166
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS CHERRY POINT	13	683	MCAS CHERRY POINT	Cherry Point	NC	IMPROVEMENTS TO BEQ BLDG. 4166
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS CHERRY POINT	13	2777	MCAS CHERRY POINT	Cherry Point	NC	REPAIRS TO BEQ BLDG. 4167
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS CHERRY POINT	13	683	MCAS CHERRY POINT	Cherry Point	NC	IMPROVEMENTS TO BEQ BLDG. 4167
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS CHERRY POINT	13	1252	MCAS CHERRY POINT	Cherry Point	NC	REPAIRS TO TRAINING CENTER BLDG. 4335
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS CHERRY POINT	13	690	MCAS CHERRY POINT	Cherry Point	NC	CONSTRUCT FUELS BUILDING AT BOGUE FIELD
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS CHERRY POINT	13	280	MCAS CHERRY POINT	Cherry Point	NC	INSTALL A/C SYSTEM BLDG 9012 AT BT-11
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS FUTENMA	13	400	MCAS FUTENMA	Okinawa	JA	UPGRADE AIRCRAFT WASH FACILITY BLDG 527A FUTENMA
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS FUTENMA	13	750	MCAS FUTENMA	Okinawa	JA	REPAIR ROOF CRACKS AT HANGAR 503, MCAS FUTENMA
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	631	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE OF B146 WAREHOUSE
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	5820	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	MAJOR REPAIRS AND FIRE PROTECTION UPGRADES, BEQ BLDG 1633
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	3034	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	MISC REPAIRS AND FP UPGRADES AT VENDING WHSE, B140
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	182	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	DEMOLISH TENNIS COURTS, B497
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	70	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	DEMOLISH NOSC LUNCHROOM, B1638
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	25	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	DEMOLISH VEHICLE REFUELING SHOP, B3053
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	107	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	DEMOLISH ADMIN FACILITY, B3074
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	1580	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	REPAIR SEWER LINES UPSTREAM OF PS 302
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	376	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	DEMOLISH POWER CHECK PAD, B5020
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	1046	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	VAN PAD 1A REPAIRS, B5037
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	423	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	REPAIRS TO WAREHOUSE, BLDG 4088

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MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB HAWAII	13	677	MCB HAWAII	Kaneohe Bay	HI	CONVERSION TO LAUNDRY AREA AND OFFICE SPACE, BLDG 4088
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	2286	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	MAJOR INTERIOR/EXTERIOR REPAIRS ADMIN BUILDING 422
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	537	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	INT/EXT REPAIRS TO WAREHOUSE M326
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	961	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	MAJOR INTERIOR REPAIRS TO BLDG FC364
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	676	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	CONVERT RR3 TO ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION FACILITY
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	550	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	MAJOR INTERIOR REPAIRS TO BUILDING 1775
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	1388	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR REPAIRS TO FC280
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	208	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	INSTALL FIRE TRAINING SIMULATOR IN TP460 2ND DECK
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	3159	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	REPAIR BLDG FC520 BEQ
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	2567	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	REPAIR BLDG BB265 BEQ
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	235	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	CONSTRUCT MARTIAL ARTS PIT AND ROPE CLIMB
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	481	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	CONSTRUCT OBSERVATION TOWER SOUTHSIDE G10 AREA
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	400	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	DEMOLISH RAILROAD TRACK LOCATED ABOARD MCB CAMP - UN430
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	626	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	REPLACE TOWER LZ STARLING
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	189	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	DEMOLISH THE SMALL ARMS STORAGE FACILITY FC302.
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	839	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	REPAIR THE VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP FACILITY 1829.
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	623	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	REPAIR THE ELEVATED POTABLE WATER STORAGE TANK SM623.
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	340	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	EXPAND MEDIUM GIRDER BRIDGE CHB
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	13	550	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE	Camp Lejeune	NC	HOME STATION TRAINING LANE INSTRUCTORS BUILDING
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS MIRAMAR	13	624	MCAS MIRAMAR	San Diego	CA	FAMILY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CENTER ADDITION
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS MIRAMAR	13	341	MCAS MIRAMAR	San Diego	CA	CONSTRUCT AMMUNITION TRUCK PARKING

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MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS MIRAMAR	13	596	MCAS MIRAMAR	San Diego	CA	CONSTRUCT E-LMR TOWER NEAR B3322
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS MIRAMAR	13	23	MCAS MIRAMAR	San Diego	CA	DEMO BUNKER 9527
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS MIRAMAR	13	23	MCAS MIRAMAR	San Diego	CA	DEMO BUNKER 9528
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS MIRAMAR	13	23	MCAS MIRAMAR	San Diego	CA	DEMO BUNKER 9529
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS MIRAMAR	13	11	MCAS MIRAMAR	San Diego	CA	DEMO BUNKER 9530
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	43	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	DEMO STORAGE BUNKER 9404
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	474	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	AS518 ELECTRICAL UPGRADES
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	212	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	AS4100 ELECTRICAL UPGRADES
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	530	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	AS4108 ELECTRICAL UPGRADES
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	1800	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	REPAIR BLDG AS518
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	740	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	AIR CONDITIONING UPGRADES AS4108 MAINTENANCE BLDG
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	759	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	REPAIR THE ELEVATED POTABLE WATER STORAGE TANK AS2010.
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	663	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	CONVERT AS215 TO FAMILY SERVICE CENTER
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	2266	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	REPAIR THE FAMILY SERVICE CENTER BUILDING AS215
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	1240	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	REPAIR THE AIRFIELD PARKING APRON SURFACES 11320.
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	22	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	DEMOLISH THE UTILITY PLANT BUILDING AS5001A
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	22	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	DEMOLISH THE UTILITY PLANT BUILDING AS190A
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	22	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	DEMOLISH THE UTILITY PLANT BUILDING AS191A
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS NEW RIVER	13	4367	MCAS NEW RIVER	Jacksonville	NC	BLDG. AS4020 BEQ INTERIOR/EXTERIOR REPAIR PROJECT
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS CAMP PENDLETON	13	383	MCAS CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	CONSTRUCT ORDNANCE SHED
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	404	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	IMPROVE TRAINING FACILITY 43302
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	589	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	REALIGN INTERSECTION RATTLESNAKE RD
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	238	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	DEMOLISH BUILDING 41350

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MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	360	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	IMPROVE TRAINING BUILDING 64322
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	1973	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	REPAIR BUILDING 53528
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	1657	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	RESTORE BUILDING 53528
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	3270	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	REPAIR BEQ 210725, DEL MAR
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	582	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	IMPROVE RANGE 214
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	107	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	IMPROVE FIRE STATION BUILDING 22131
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	648	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	CONSTRUCT LOW WATER CROSSING BRIDGE - 64 AREA
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	113	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	DEMOLISH BUILDING 43354
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	177	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	INSTALL RETAINING WALL AT CRISTIANITOS ROAD
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	959	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	REPAIR COUNTRY STORE BLDG 15100
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	267	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	IMPROVE COUNTRY STORE BLDG 15100 (NAF COMPANION)
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	13	340	MCB CAMP PENDLETON	Camp Pendleton	CA	REPAIR ALL SEASONS BLDG 15102
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	13	452	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	Parris Island	SC	CONSTRUCT SUPPORT BN SYNTHETIC RUNNING TRACK
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	13	670	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	Parris Island	SC	CONVERT CDC TO RTR
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	13	446	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	Parris Island	SC	REPAIR CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER B-699
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	13	7354	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	Parris Island	SC	REPAIR 2ND BN BARRACKS BLDG 599
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	13	715	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	Parris Island	SC	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION REPAIRS
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAF QUANTICO	13	422	MCAF QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	COVERED STORAGE SHED
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	678	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	RESTORE OPERATIONAL BUILDING 2043
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	6525	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	REPAIR BUILDING 2043
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	690	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	INSTALL VENTILATION IN CORRIDORS/LOBBIES - LIVERSEDGE, 15
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	6691	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	B-15 (LIVERSEDGE HALL) REPLACE ROOFTOP UNIT & AIR HANDLER, 228 FC
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	404	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	B-2009 REPLACE FREIGHT ELEVATOR WAREHOUSE

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MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	1305	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	REPLACE ROOF B-3500 (MCX)
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCB QUANTICO	13	1143	MCB QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	QU1403M DEMO HORSE STABLES AND INCIDENTAL APPURTANCES
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD SAN DIEGO	13	570	MCRD SAN DIEGO	San Diego	CA	REPAIR BLDG 623 RECEIVING BARRACKS
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD SAN DIEGO	13	732	MCRD SAN DIEGO	San Diego	CA	REPLACE MAINT HOLES (MH-1 & MH-2) ON SANTIAGO AVE AND NOVALETA ST
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD SAN DIEGO	13	4715	MCRD SAN DIEGO	San Diego	CA	REPAIR DETERIORATED GAS MAIN LINE PIPING
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD SAN DIEGO	13	910	MCRD SAN DIEGO	San Diego	CA	REPLACE SWIM TANK WATER FILTRATION SYSTEM @BUILDING 639
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCRD SAN DIEGO	13	545	MCRD SAN DIEGO	San Diego	CA	REPLACE CNG UNIT @ 648
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	217	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	DEMOLISH TRAINING FACILITY, BLDG 1811
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	696	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	CONSTRUCT PERMANENT ECP & GUARD SHACK; CMA
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	207	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	REPLACE TARGET SHED B2172
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	737	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	REPAIR ROOF BUILDING 1830
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	775	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	REPLACE ROOF BUILDING 1738
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	775	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	REPLACE ROOF AT BLDG 1737
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	734	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	REPLACE ROOF AT BLDG 1747
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	775	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	REPLACE ROOF AT BLDG 1758
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	743	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	REPLACE ROOF BUILDING 1848
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	265	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	REPAIR AGATE AND CALCITE ROADS (NAF COMPANION)

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MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	13	112	MCAGCC TWENTYNINE PALMS	Twentynine Palms	CA	DEMOLISH BUILDING 5175 WAREHOUSE
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS YUMA	13	10546	MCAS YUMA	Yuma	AZ	REPAIR AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON (SOUTH)
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS YUMA	13	5760	MCAS YUMA	Yuma	AZ	RENOVATE BEQ 913
MCICOM	FSRM	03/08/13	BSM1	OMMC	MCAS YUMA	13	196	MCAS YUMA	Yuma	AZ	COMM & DATA BEQ 913
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	MCRC HQ	2013	2	9MCD	Kansas City	MO	Comptroller will not be conducting Fiscal Assist Visit (FAV) to the 9MCD.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	MCRC HQ	2013	1	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	Parris Island	SC	National Training Team will not be conducting AOP follow on training.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	MCRC HQ	2013	2	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	Parris Island	SC	National Training Team cancelled a Systematic Recruiting inspection.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	MCRC HQ	2013	2	8MCD	Fort Worth	TX	National Training Team cancelled a Systematic Recruiting inspection.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	MCRC HQ	2013	2	MCRD SD	San Diego	CA	Officer Programs cancelled CGIP.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	MCRC HQ	2013	1	NTC	Leesburg	VA	Officer Programs will not be conducting the OSOC 2-13 Conference.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	MCRC HQ	2013	2	12MCD	San Diego	CA	Officer Programs cancelled a district training visit by HM1.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	1MCD	2013	40	1MCD	Garden City	NY	Cancelled the annual Musician Enlisted Option Program (MEOP) workshop, where Music Educators travel to DC/Quantico to receive a better understanding of the Marine Corps' music programs available, similar to an Educator workshop at Parris Island.
MCRC	CIV LABOR	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	1MCD	2013	32	1MCD	Garden City	NY	Not hiring the GS09 IT Specialist at the District HQ. This billet will remain vacant.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/12/13	3C1F	OMMC	1MCD	2013	10	1MCD	Garden City	NY	Postponed and may cancel the annual Logistics, Supply, Fiscal and Family Readiness training conferences and conduct training via DCO or phone conferences

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MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/12/13	3C1F	OMMC	1MCD	2013	10	1MCD	Garden City	NY	Cancelled all Non-DoD Conferences, the legal 3 day course, and reduction of travel in 1MCD AO.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	1MCD	2013	4	1MCD	Garden City	NY	Cancelled the buses ISO the RS NYK annual poolee function.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/18/13	3C1F	1106	4MCD	2013	4	RS Raleigh	Raleigh	NC	CGIP Inspection for Raleigh. Savings for 8 travelers over 4 days,
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/11/13	3C1F	1106	4MCD	2013	8	4MCD	New Cumberland	PA	Savings for 8 travelers over 5 days. There will be a cost of peer-to-peer discussions.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/05/13	3C1F	OMMC	9MCD	2013	5	9MCD	Kansas City	MO	HQ Supply account reduced for general operating supplies. Cancelled 1st Educator Workshop Yearbook.
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/22/13	3C1F	OMMC	9MCD	2013	9	9MCD	Kansas City	MO	Cancel RSI for RS Indianapolis (all support branches)
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/22/13	3C1F	OMMC	9MCD	2013	4	9MCD	Kansas City	MO	Cancel RS Lansing Relo Site Visits and WRR visit (Log)
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/22/13	3C1F	OMMC	9MCD	2013	4	9MCD	Kansas City	MO	Cancel TAD for cert training (ISMB)
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/22/13	3C1F	OMMC	9MCD	2013	4	9MCD	Kansas City	MO	Deferred MPAR conference (PAB)
MCRC	OPERATIONS	03/22/13	3C1F	OMMC	9MCD	2013	28	9MCD	Kansas City	MO	Cancel Commanders conf, SgtMaj conf. Reduced SRI visits by number of personnel and limited number of days travel
PP&O	OPERATIONS	03/08/13	BSS1	OMMC	USMC-wide	2013	81	USMC-Wide		CA, HI, NC, SC, VA, GA, AZ, LA	Antiterrorism/Force Protection Training and Exercises throughout the Marine Corps Installations: HQMC funded support to Antiterrorism and Disaster Communications and response exercise have been cancelled.
PP&O	OPERATIONS	03/20/13	BSS1	OMMC	MARFORPAC	2013	200	CAMP SMITH, HI	HONOLULU	HI	OPERATIONS Deferred upgrades to Operations Center at MarForPac.
PP&O	OPERATIONS	2013/03/10-15	4A4G	OMMC	MCESEG, DEPARTMENT OF STATE	2013	56	QUANTICO	Quantico	VA	MCESEG Commander Conference was cancelled due to funding restraints.

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (1-22 March)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
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Legislative Engagements Related to Sequestration											
ENGAGEMENT	BRIEFING PERSONNEL	DATE									
	SMMC										
HASC - Posture (T)		04/16/13									
SAC-D Posture		04/24/13									
SASC - Posture (T)		04/25/13									
HAC - D Posture		05/07/13									
CMC	OPERATIONS	03/03/13				2013	UNKNOWN	QUANTICO	QUANTICO	VA	CMC cancelled April 19 scheduled "Marine Day"

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (13-17 May)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
AR- HQMC Safety Division	Contracts	13-17 May	BSS1	OMMC	Marine Corps Installations West	2013	200	Camp Pendleton	Oceanside	CA	The cancellation of Contract # N00244-08-C-032 which provides hands on Level III motorcycle training for 2,000 marines and effect over 6,000 marines and vendors who attend the training event in the Camp Pendleton area. This training is required by MCO 5100.19F.
AR- HQMC Safety Division	Operations	13-17 May	BSS1	OMMC	Marine Corps Installations Pacific	2013	20	Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay	Honolulu	HI	The cancellation of the on site Command Safety Assessments provided by (3) Safety Division Staff Members. These assessments are required for all Marine Forces and Marine Expeditionary Forces and installations by MCO 5100.29B and will effect 15-20 Safety Professionals.
C4	No new inputs this week										
LOGCOM	No new inputs this week										
M&RA	No new inputs this week										
MARCENT	No new inputs this week										
MARFORAFRICA	No new inputs this week										
MARFORCOM	No new inputs this week										
MARFORCYBER	No new inputs this week										
MARFOREUR	No new inputs this week										
MARFORPAC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORRES	No new inputs this week										
MARSOC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORSOUTH	No new inputs this week										
MCCDC	No new inputs this week										
MCICOM	No new inputs this week										
MCRC	No new inputs this week										
MCSYCOM	No new inputs this week										
PP&O	No new inputs this week										

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (13-17 May)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
TECOM	No new inputs this week										
TSO	No new inputs this week										

USMC TOTAL 220

Public Engagements Related to Sequestration

ENGAGEMENT	BRIEFING PERSONNEL	DATE									

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (1-5 April)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
AR	No new inputs this week										
C4	No new inputs this week										
LOGCOM	No new inputs this week										
M&RA	Operations	04/01/13	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MF)	2013	23	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	In accordance with Fiscal Director Guidance for Sequestration/CR Planning, travel has been delayed.
M&RA	Operations	04/01/13	3B4D	OMMC	M&RA (MPC-30)	2013	0	MCAS, New River	New River	NC	Delay piloting employee competency assessments at MCAS, New River using the USMC CWDA. Pilot delayed to the end of April.
MARFORAFRICA	No new inputs this week										
MARFORCOM	Operations	04/01/13	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	50	NSA	Norfolk	VA	Multiple conferences postponed or canceled including: Explosive Ordinance Disposal; Training and Readiness for 05xx MOS; (Space Ops, Planners) Training and Readiness for CH53 MOSs. Impact: Delayed integration of individual and collective training requirements into unit T&Rs.
MARFORCOM	Contracts	04/01/13	1A1A	OMN	MALS-31	2013	221	Beaufort, SC	Beaufort	SC	2d MAW is reviewing task orders that are expiring in order to look for savings to offset sequestration related reductions and to slow spending. Review has thus far revealed that one F/A-18D Field Service Representative at Beaufort, SC is excess to need; as a result, MARFORCOM does not plan to renew the task order for this FSR when the current order expires on 31 March.
MARFOREUR	Operations	04/01/13	Facilities	O&M	MARFOREUR	2013	10	Panzer	Stuttgart	Germany	Defer purchase of 2 approved high capacity shredders with associated 1yr maintenance contract for classified materials.

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (1-5 April)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
MARFOREUR	Operations	04/01/13	Facilities	O&M	MARFOREUR	2013	50	Panzer	Stuttgart	Germany	Deferral of Maintenance Contract for IT equipment that operates the Command Conference/VTC Suite.
MARFOREUR	Operations	04/01/13	Facilities	O&M	MARFOREUR	2013	25	Panzer	Stuttgart	Germany	Defer Re-key of building 2901. Impact: necessary to bring facility into compliance with MCO 5530.14A (Marine Corps Physical Security Program Manual).
MARFOREUR	Operations	04/01/13	Communications	O&M	MARFOREUR	2013	37	Panzer	Stuttgart	Germany	Defer purchase of Deployable Comm Suite (Satellite-Comm Fly-Away Package) intended to support MARFOREUR HQ Continuity of Operations Plan as well as enhance Crisis Response capabilities.
MARFOREUR	Operations	04/01/13	Supply	O&M	MARFOREUR	2013	19	Panzer	Stuttgart	Germany	Defer purchases of individual issue Organizational Equipment to offset shortfalls.
MARFOREUR	Operations	04/01/13	Facilities	O&M	MARFOREUR	2013	90	Panzer	Stuttgart	Germany	Defer Renovation and Equipment refresh to Command Center that provides 24hr watch and command coordination for MARFOREUR.
MARFORRES	Operations	04/01/13	1A1A	OMMCR	4TH MAW	2013	70	MARCORSPTFAC NOLA	New Orleans	LA	4TH MAW Admin Symposium has been postponed til 15 May.
MARFORRES	Operations	04/05/13	1A1A	OMMCR	4TH MARDIV	2013	42	MARCORSPTFAC NOLA	New Orleans	LA	4TH MARDIV Spring Commanders Conference has been postponed til 25 April.
MARFORRES	Contracts	04/01/13	1A1A	OMMCR	ALL MFR MSCs	2013	678	VARIOUS MARFORRES SITES	Multiple	Multiple	Deferral of Corrosion Prevention and Repair for tactical vehicles and equipment.
MARFORSOUTH	Operations	04/01/13	1A1A	OMMC	SOUTHCOM	2013	2	MARFORSOUTH HQ	Doral	FL	Reduction in the number of personnel attending USMC Security Cooperation Planning Working Group. (reduced from 2 to 1 pax. Impacts: will not be able to have MARFOR representations at all break-out sessions as they run concurrently.

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (1-5 April)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
MARFORSOUTH	Operations	04/01/13	1A1A	OMMC	SOUTHCOM	2013	4	MARFORSOUTH HQ	Doral	FL	Cancelation of the Regional Planner's travel to serve as forward coordination element and augment advance coordination element for Southern Partnership Station (SPS)-High Speed Vessel (HSV) swift deployment to Honduras. (Impacts: reduced capability for coordinating arrival of Marine detachment from operational optic from component HQ to shape initial arrival, meetings, and reduce impacts of and changes from PN.)
MARSOC	No new inputs this week										
MCCDC	No new inputs this week										
MCRC	No new inputs this week										
MCRC	Operations	04/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	4MCD	2013	1	RS Raleigh	Raleigh	NC	Cancel trip in support of ISMO for 4 days - 1 traveler.
MCRC	Operations	04/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	4MCD	2013	2	Unknown at FY13 Budget Formulation			Cancel trip in support of logistic operations for 5 days - 2 travelers to National Facility Conference.
MCRC	Operations	04/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	4MCD	2013	1	Unknown at FY13 Budget Formulation			Cancel trip in support of logistic operations for 5 days - 1 traveler.
MCRC	Operations	04/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	4MCD	2013	2	Unknown at FY13 Budget Formulation			Cancel trip in support of logistic operation for 5 days - 2 travelers.
MCRC	Operations	04/01/13	3C1F	OMMC	4MCD	2013	1	Unknown at FY13 Budget Formulation			Cancel trip in support of logistic operation for 5 days - 1 traveler for National Telecom Conference.
MCRC	Operations	04/02/13	3C1F	OMMC	4MCD	2013	1	RS Cleveland	Middleburgh	OH	Cancel trip for 3 days - 1 traveler.
MCRC	Operations	04/02/13	3C1F	OMMC	4MCD	2013	1	RS Baltimore	Baltimore	MD	Cancel trip for 4 days - 1 traveler for MEOP Support.
MCSYCOM	Contracts	4/1/2013	6532	PMC	MCSC (27-CMC)	2013	400	MCSC	Orlando	FL	Cancel \$400k planned for engineering support for Range Modernization Transformation efforts.
PP&O	No new inputs this week										
TECOM	No new inputs this week										
TSO	No new inputs this week										

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (1-5 April)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
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USMC TOTAL 1,730

Public Engagements Related to Sequestration

ENGAGEMENT	BRIEFING PERSONNEL	DATE									
Battle Color Detachment Performance	Operations	3/19/2013			MBW	2013		MCLB Albany	MCLB Albany	GA	Support Cancelled
Battle Color Detachment Performance	Operations	3/20/2013			MBW	2013		MCAS Beaufort	MCAS Beaufort	SC	Support Cancelled
Battle Color Detachment Performance	Operations	3/20/2013			MBW	2013		MCRD Parris Island	MCRD Parris Island	SC	Support Cancelled
Battle Color Detachment Performance	Operations	3/22/2013			MBW	2013		MCAS New River	MCAS New River	NC	Support Cancelled
Battle Color Detachment Performance	Operations	3/22/2013			MBW	2013		MCB Lejeune	MCB Lejeune	NC	Support Cancelled
Western Association of Food Chains Convention	Operations	4/22/2013			Quantico Marine Band	2013		Norfolk	Norfolk	VA	Support Cancelled

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (15-19 April)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
AR	No new inputs this week										
C4	No new inputs this week										
LOGCOM	No new inputs this week										
M&RA	No new inputs this week										
MARCENT	No new inputs this week										
MARFORAFRICA	No new inputs this week										
MARFORCOM	Operations	4/15/2013	1A1A	OMMC	MFC	2013	1.6	NSA, Hampton Roads	Norfolk	VA	Reduced participation in annual HQMC C4 Comm Operational Advisory Group in Quantico from 3 to 1, saving TAD costs of \$1600.00 at risk of coverage to working groups. Also reduced TAD by one day to not attend annual C4 Awards Dinner, which was deemed as not mission essential.
MARFORCYBER	No new inputs this week										
MARFOREUR	No new inputs this week										
MARFORPAC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORRES	No new inputs this week										
MARSOC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORSOUTH	No new inputs this week										
MCCDC	No new inputs this week										
MCICOM	No new inputs this week										
MCRC	OPERATIONS	4/15/2013	3C1F	OMMC	9th Marine Corps District	2013	3.5	9th Marine Corps District	Kansas City	MO	Reduced travel by Command group personnel and cancellation of recruiting station inspection by admin personnel
MCSYCOM	No new inputs this week										
PP&O	No new inputs this week										

TECOM	Contract	4/15/2013	3B4D	OMMC	MAGTFTC	2013	15500	MAGTFTC 29 Palms/ MWTC	29 Palms and Bridgeport	CA	Decreased Role Player immersion for ITX and MTNX exercises to support non-OEF bound battalions and exercise forces. Contract remains but reduced support will likely reduce the number of contractor personnel employed.
TSO	No new inputs this week										

UMSC TOTAL 15,505

Public Engagements Related to Sequestration											
ENGAGEMENT	BRIEFING PERSONNEL	DATE									
	SMMC										
HASC - Posture (T)		04/16/13									
SAC-D Posture		04/24/13									
SASC - Posture (T)		04/25/13									
HAC - D Posture		05/07/13									
Denver Nuggets Half Time Performance		4/14/13			Silent Drill Platoon, MBW				Denver	CO	Support Cancelled
Ft. Lauderdale Air Show		4/21/13			2D MAW				Fort Lauderdale	FL	Support Cancelled

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (22-26 April)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
AR- CMC Support Staff	OPERATIONS	4/19/2013	4A4G	O&M	Office of Legislative Affairs	2013	1.6	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Cancellation of Marine Day - which strengthens the relationship between old and new members of Congress and the Marine Corps.
AR- CMC Support Staff	OPERATIONS	4/5/2013-4/8/2013	4A4G	O&M	Public Affairs	2013	2	The Renaissance Portsmouth Hotel	Portsmouth	VA	Cancellation of Training for Band Instrument Repair Technicians. This training is encouraged annually to all NMOS 5523.
C4	No new inputs this week										
LOGCOM	No new inputs this week										
M&RA	No new inputs this week										
MARCENT	No new inputs this week										
MARFORAFRICA	No new inputs this week										
MARFORCOM	Operations	4/22-26/2013	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	4	New York	NY	NY	Fleet week Mid Planning Conference delay pending OSD waiver; Fleet Week event consists of approximately 200 Marines and static displays.
MARFORCYBER	No new inputs this week										
MARFOREUR	No new inputs this week										
MARFORPAC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORRES	OPERATIONS	4/22/2013	1A1A	OMMCR	Marine Force Reserves - G6	2013	31	Sturbridge Hotel & Conference Ctr (DOD Leased)	Sturbridge	MA	Marine Force Reserves Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) Training Conference is postponed with no future date scheduled. Had been planned at 30 attendees.
MARSOC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORSOUTH	No new inputs this week										
MCCDC	No new inputs this week										
MCICOM	No new inputs this week										
MCRC	No new inputs this week										
MCSYCOM	No new inputs this week										

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (22-26 April)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
TECOM	No new inputs this week										
TSO	No new inputs this week										

USMC TOTAL 39

Public Engagements Related to Sequestration

ENGAGEMENT	BRIEFING PERSONNEL	DATE									

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (25-29 March)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
AR	No new inputs this week										
C4	No new inputs this week										
LOGCOM	No new inputs this week										
M&RA	Operations	3/25/2013	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MR)	2013	2	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Cancellation of Therapeutic Recreation Specialist inclusion site visit/program review scheduled for Pendleton and Miramar
M&RA	Operations	3/25/2013	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MF)	2013	103	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Travel delayed
MARCENT	No new inputs this week										
MARFORAFRICA	No new inputs this week										
MARFORCOM	Operations	2013/03/25-29	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	10	NSA Hampton Road	Norfolk	VA	Per OSD memo dated 10 Jan 13, TAD has been deferred and limited to mission-essential travel only. MARFORCOM expects to recoup any savings associated with TAD and re-apply it to mission essential requirements.
MARFORCOM	Operations	2013/03/25-29	1A1A	OMMC/OMN	MARFORCOM	2013	0	CLNC	Jacksonville	NC	Ships services affected due to USFF modified ship schedule. Overall this is a readiness issue for unit deployment training and qualification. Shipboard qualification currencies will potentially expire, creating a bow wave of training to update these requirements. MFC Ops and IIMEF are in the process working with USFF to produce a solution.
MARFORCYBER	No new inputs this week										
MARFOREUR	No new inputs this week										
MARFORPAC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORRES	No new inputs this week										
USMC	Operations	03/13/13	3C2F	OMMC	M&RA	2013	19000	USMC-Wide	Varied	Varied	On 13 March, the USMC published MARADMIN 125/13 'Suspension of the Marine Corps Tuition Assistance Program,' suspending approval of new TA requests and grandfathering requests submitted before 4 March 13.

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (25-29 March)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
MARFORSOUTH	Operations	3/25/2013	1A1A	OMMC	SOUTHCOM	2013	10	MARFORSOUTH	DORAL	FL	Reduction of personnel to conduct pre-deployment site survey to Iquitos, Peru in support of 8-week mobile training team being conducted at multiple training locations.
MARFORSOUTH	Operations	3/25/2013	1A1A	OMMC	SOUTHCOM	2013	3	MARFORSOUTH	DORAL	FL	Cancel regional planner attendance at USMC security cooperation planner's course.
MARFORSOUTH	Operations	3/25/2013	1A1A	OMMC	SOUTHCOM	2013	2	MARFORSOUTH	DORAL	FL	Cancel action officer working group to discuss Navy support to validated MARFORSOUTH Theater Security Activities within SOUTHCOM AOR.
MARSOC	No new inputs this week										
MCCDC	No new inputs this week										
MCICOM	No new inputs this week										
MCRC	Operations	03/25/13	3C1F	OMMC	4MCD	2013	2	Parris Island	Beaufort	SC	Cancellation of 4th Marine Corps District Career Planner visit for to Parris Island. Annual training for the district career planner and coordination meeting with the region career planner was cancelled.
MCRC	Operations	03/27/13	3C1F	OMMC	4MCD	2013	1	RS Baltimore	Baltimore	MD	Cancellation of 4th Marine Corps District Marketing training and assist visit to Recruiting Station Baltimore. Would have assisted RS Baltimore Marketing and PAO Sections. Cancellation will result in nominal degradation in marketing and PA within the Baltimore RS and lack of corrective action taken on reportable items during a normal visit.
MCSYCOM	Contracts	3/27/2013	4181	PMC	MCSC	2013	1,325	MCSC	Wichita	KS	Cancel order for 24 Ground Radio Maintenance Automatic Test Systems (GRMATS)
MCSYCOM	Contracts	3/27/2013	4181	PMC	MCSC	2013	532	MCSC	Warren*	MI*	Cancel order for 149 Small Arms Tool Kits

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (29 April - 3 May)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BAS E	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
AR	No new inputs this week										
C4	No new inputs this week										
LOGCOM	No new inputs this week										
M&RA	Operations	4/26-5/3/13	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MF)	2013	31.6	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	In accordance with P&R's Guidance for Sequestration/CR Planning, Travel has been cancelled.
MARCENT	No new inputs this week										
MARFORAFRICA	Operations	4/26-5/2/13	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORAF	2013	3.2	MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	HQMC directed minimize of conference attendees along with reduction of conference efforts. This action intended to save money. MARFORAF G2 will now only send one vice two attendees.
MARFORCOM	Operations	5/3/13	1A1A	OMMC	MFC	2013	0.8	NSA, Hampton Roads	Norfolk	VA	Reduced participation in MEU Operational Advisory Group from 2 to 1, saving TAD costs of roughly \$800.00 at risk of coverage to working groups.
MARFORCYBER	No new inputs this week										
MARFOREUR	No new inputs this week										
MARFORPAC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORRES	No new inputs this week										
MARSOC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORSOUTH	No new inputs this week										
MCCDC	No new inputs this week										
MCICOM	No new inputs this week										
MCRC	No new inputs this week										
MCSYCOM	No new inputs this week										
PP&O	OPERATIONS	5/1/13	BSS1	OMMC	Marine Force Command	2013	69	Camp Lejeune	Jacksonville	NC	OPERATIONS deferred upgrades to Continuity of Operations Center (COOP) at MarForCom.
PP&O	OPERATIONS	5/1/2013	BSS1	OMMC	Marine Force Reserves	2013	69	Marine Forces Reserve	New Orleans	LA	OPERATIONS deferred upgrades to Continuity of Operations Center (COOP) at MarForRes.

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (6-10 May)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
AR- HQMC Safety Division	Contract	6-10 May	BSS1	OMMC	Marine Corps Installations Command East	2013	220	Camp Lejeune	Jacksonville	NC	The cancellation of Contract # N00244-08-C-032 which provides hands on Level III motorcycle training for 2,000 marines and effect over 6,000 marines and vendors who attend the training event in the Camp Lejeune area. This training is required by MCO 5100.19F.
AR- HQMC Safety Division	Operations	6-10 May	BSS1	OMMC	III Marine Expeditionary Forces	2013	20	Okinawa	Japan	APO	The cancellation of the on site Command Safety Assessments provided by (3) Safety Division Staff Members. These assessments are required for all Marine Forces and Marine Expeditionary Forces and installations by MCO 5100.29B and will effect 15-20 Safety Professionals.
C4	No new inputs this week										
LOGCOM	No new inputs this week										
M&RA	No new inputs this week										
MARCENT	No new inputs this week										
MARFORAFRICA	No new inputs this week										
MARFORCOM	No new inputs this week										
MARFORCYBER	No new inputs this week										
MARFOREUR	No new inputs this week										
MARFORPAC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORRES	OPERATIONS	5/6/2013	1A1A	OMMCR	4th Marine Logistics Group	2013	65	Camp Rilea	Astoria	OR	4th MLG 6th Engineer Support Battalion Inspector-Instructor Conference is postponed with no future date scheduled. Had been planned at 50 attendees.
MARSOC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORSOUTH	No new inputs this week										

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (6-10 May)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
MCCDC	No new inputs this week										
MCICOM	No new inputs this week										
MCRC	No new inputs this week										
MCSYCOM	No new inputs this week										
PP&O	Operations	5/6/13 - 5/10/2013	BSS1	OMMC	MCIPAC	2013	13	Okinawa	Japan	JA	Regional Site Visit (OCONUS) has been delayed for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Protection Officers/First Responders
PP&O	Operations	5/6/13 - 5/10/2013	BSS1	OMMC	MCIWEST	2013	12	Camp Pendleton	San Diego	CA	Regional Site Visit (OCONUS) has been delayed for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Protection Officers/First Responders
PP&O	Contracts	5/6/2013	BSS1	OMMC	Multiple Marine Corps Installations	2013	462	Camp Lejeune/MCAS Iwakuni/Miramar	Jacksonville, Iwakuni and San Diego	NC, JA, and CA	Loss of three support contract personnel required to maintain regional field engineers supporting Installations Electronic Security Systems
TECOM	Operations	05/01/13	3B3D	OMMC	Numerous Stations/Bases - Civilian Leadership Development	2013	360	Worldwide	Numerous	Numerous	Funding to bases and stations to support Civilian Leadership Development Programs.
TSO	No new inputs this week										

UMSC TOTAL

1,152

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (6-10 May)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
Public Engagements Related to Sequestration											
ENGAGEMENT	BRIEFING PERSONNEL	DATE									

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (8-12 April)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
AR	No new inputs this week										
C4	No new inputs this week										
LOGCOM	No new inputs this week										
M&RA	Operations	4/8/2013	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MR)	2013	3	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Postponement of "Train-the-Trainer" course for Aquatic Cadence and Reconditioning training. (Semper Fit)
M&RA	Operations	4/8/2013	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MR)	2013	3	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Cancellation of Therapeutic Recreation Specialist inclusion site visit/program review (with 2 day training event conducted by Penn State) scheduled for Hawaii.
M&RA	Operations	4/9/2013	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MR)	2013	3	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Cancellation of Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) Conference participation. (Semper Fit)
M&RA	Operations	4/10/2013	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MR)	2013	2	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	Postponement of pre-conference logistics associated to the Single Marine Program (SMP) conference on the West Coast. (Semper Fit)
M&RA	Operations	4/12/2013	BSS1	OMMC	M&RA (MF)	2013	49	HQMC at MCB Quantico	Quantico	VA	In accordance with P&R's Guidance for Sequestration/CR Planning, travel has been delayed.
MARCENT	No new inputs this week										
MARFORAFRICA	No new inputs this week										
MARFORCOM	Operations	4/8/2013	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	0.7	NSA, Hampton Roads	Norfolk	VA	Reduced participation in annual HQMC C4 Comm Chief's conference in Quantico from 2 to 1, saving TAD costs of \$700.00 at risk of coverage to working groups.

USMC Weekly Sequestration Report (8-12 April)

MARFOR/CMD	ACTION TYPE	ACTION DATE	AFFECTED LINE ITEM	APPN	AFFECTED ORGANIZATION	Fiscal Year	ESTIMATED COST DEFERRAL (\$000)	LOCATION/BASE	CITY	STATE AFFECTED	MARFOR/CMD DESCRIPTION
MARFORCOM	Operations	4/8/2013	1A1A	OMMC	MARFORCOM	2013	10.4	NSA Hampton Roads	Norfolk	VA	Delay of purchase of Class IIIIP (packaged POL) for rotation/replenishment of Landing Force Operational Reserve Materiel (LFORM) stocks to FY14. Analysis of
MARFORCOM	Operations	4/6/2013	1A1A	OMMC	II MEF, MCSFR, HQSVC BN - MFC, MARFORRES	2013	TBD	NOB, Norfolk - Pier 14	Norfolk	VA	This is a reduction in the number of aircraft, equipment, and personnel being requested from Camp Lejeune to support the commissioning ceremony for
MARFORCYBER	No new inputs this week										
MARFOREUR	No new inputs this week										
MARFORPAC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORRES	OPERATIONS	4/8/2013	1A1A	OMMCR	Marine Force Reserves - Health Service Support	2013	60	JRB Ft Worth	Ft Worth	TX	Marine Force Reserves Surgeon's Conference is postponed with no future date scheduled. Had been planned at 55 attendees.
MARSOC	No new inputs this week										
MARFORSOUTH	No new inputs this week										
MCCDC	No new inputs this week										
MCICOM	No new inputs this week										
MCRC	OPERATIONS	4/11/2013	3C1F	OMMC	4th Marine Corps District	2013	4	Orlando	Orlando	FL	Deferred three travelers, five days for Comptroller Financial Symposium
MCRC	OPERATIONS	4/8/2013	3C1F	OMMC	4th Marine Corps District	2013	1	RS Louisville	Louisville	KY	Deferred one traveler, four days for Support Recruiting Inspections , Information Systems Management Office

