



# governmentattic.org

*"Rummaging in the government's attic"*

Description of document: List of investigations involving the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) closed 2011-2014, released by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG)

Request date: 29-June-2014

Released date: 23-October-2014

Posted date: 04-may-2015

Source of document: 245 Murray Lane SW  
Mail Stop – 0305  
Washington, D.C. 20528-0305  
Fax: 202-254-4398  
Email: [FOIA.OIG@OIG.DHS.GOV](mailto:FOIA.OIG@OIG.DHS.GOV) (requires

The governmentattic.org web site ("the site") is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.



**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
 Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / [www.oig.dhs.gov](http://www.oig.dhs.gov)

October 23, 2014

Subject: Freedom of Information Act Request No. 2014-142 – Final Response

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG), dated June 29, 2014, and seeking a list of investigations involving the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) closed from January 2011, to present (request enclosed for reference). Your request was received in this office on July 11, 2014.

DHS-OIG conducts independent investigations, audits, inspections, and special reviews of DHS personnel, programs, and operations to detect and deter waste, fraud, and abuse, and to promote integrity, economy, and efficiency within DHS. In response to your request, a search of the DHS-OIG investigative database was conducted. That search resulted in the enclosed records responsive to your request. We reviewed the responsive records under the FOIA to determine whether they may be accessed under the FOIA's provisions. Based on that review, this office is providing the following:

12 page(s) are released in part (RIP);

The exemptions cited for withholding records or portions of records are marked below.

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552			Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
<input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(5)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 552a(j)(2)
<input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(6)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> 552a(k)(2)
<input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(3)	<input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(E)	<input type="checkbox"/> 552a(k)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(F)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other:

**Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)**

Exemption 6 allows withholding of “personnel and medical files and *similar files* the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)(emphasis added). DHS-OIG is invoking Exemption 6 to protect the names of third parties and any information that could reasonably be expected to identify such individuals.

**Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)**

Exemption 7(C) protects from public disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes...[if disclosure] could reasonably be expected to cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). DHS-OIG is invoking Exemption 7(C) to protect the names of third parties, and any information contained in these investigative records that could reasonably be expected to identify those individuals.

**Exemption 7(D), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D)**

Exemption 7(D) protects records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which could reasonably be expected to disclose the identities of confidential sources. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). DHS-OIG is invoking Exemption 7(D) to protect any information that could reasonably be expected to identify such individuals.

**Exemption 7(E), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E)**

Exemption 7(E) protects all law enforcement information that “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigation or prosecution, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecution if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). DHS-OIG is withholding from disclosure specific information which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

**Appeal**

You have the right to appeal this response.<sup>1</sup> Your appeal must be in writing and received within 60 days of the date of this response. Please address any appeal to:

FOIA/PA Appeals Unit  
DHS-OIG Office of Counsel  
Stop 0305  
245 Murray Lane, SW  
Washington, DC 20528-0305

Both the envelope and letter of appeal must be clearly marked, “Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Appeal.” Your appeal letter must also clearly identify the DHS-OIG’s response. Additional information on submitting an appeal is set forth in the DHS

---

<sup>1</sup> For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. *See* 5 U.S.C. 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

regulations at 6 C.F.R. § 5.9. If you have any questions about this response, please contact Kirsten Teal, FOIA/PA Disclosure Specialist, at 202-632-0346.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Stephanie L. Kuehn". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping tail on the letter 'h'.

Stephanie L. Kuehn  
Senior FOIA/PA Disclosure Specialist

Enclosures

Requester's Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
FOIA/PA NO.: 2014-142

### MIXED DOCUMENTS

\_\_\_\_\_ (RIF)

12 (RIP)

\_\_\_\_\_ (WIF)

\_\_\_\_\_ (DUP)

\_\_\_\_\_ (NR)

\_\_\_\_\_ Referred

\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA. Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA.  
Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

Investigation Number	DHS Affected Agency	Received Date	Date Completed / Closed	Narrative of the original allegation	Allegation Category	Allegation	Allegation Detail	Disposition Type
I11-USSS-PHL-00441	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	2/10/2011	4/20/2011	[REDACTED] currently is incarcerated at the [REDACTED]. Last year, prior to [REDACTED] acceptance of a plea agreement, [REDACTED] swindled by [REDACTED] displayed false credentials, claimed to be an FBI agent, claimed that an [REDACTED] a Secret Service agent in the [REDACTED] office, had proof of investigative and prosecutor misconduct in [REDACTED] case, and that a sitting federal judge, [REDACTED], had approved a quiet deal where [REDACTED] could pay a substantial fine and serve a year of house arrest. As a result, [REDACTED] paid [REDACTED]. *This case was Admin. Closed on April 20, 2011 [REDACTED]	Program Fraud / Financial Crimes	False Personating of a DHS Employee	NA	NA
I11-USSS-SID-00405	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	2/2/2011	5/12/2011	*SID CASE* Anonymous complaint addressed to [REDACTED] from a USSS [REDACTED] Employee. The employee alleges an unjustified sole source contract of millions to [REDACTED] as ordered by [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] staff was allegedly warned [REDACTED] after questioning the award.	Program Fraud / Financial Crimes	Procurement Fraud	NA	Administrative Disposition
I11-USSS-HQ-00492	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	02/23/11	07/12/11	Complainant alleged [REDACTED], SA, USSS has committed time and attendance fraud, by failing to show up for work repeatedly for the past [REDACTED].	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	General Fraud	NA
I11-USSS-HQ-00308	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	01/07/11	07/14/11	On [REDACTED], 2010, the Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (PID) notified the Inspection Division that [REDACTED] provided false statements to [REDACTED] supervisors when questioned regarding [REDACTED] actions during a recent [REDACTED] assignment. [REDACTED] Top Secret security clearance was suspended pending investigation. Inspectors subsequently interviewed USSS personnel who had direct interaction [REDACTED] during the [REDACTED] assignment and [REDACTED] initially provided false statements in a signed sworn statement to inspectors, but later admitted [REDACTED] lied to [REDACTED] and inspectors. An administrative review is pending. [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	False Statements	NA
I11-USSS-HQ-00415	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	02/04/11	10/17/11	Complainant alleged that [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED], violated hiring laws with the [REDACTED] office through an agreement between them stating that [REDACTED] would not hire any SAs from USSS [REDACTED] and USSS [REDACTED] would not hire any SAs from [REDACTED].	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Prohibited Personnel Practices	NA
I11-USSS-SID-01134	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	6/7/2011	11/8/2011	*SID CASE* - It is alleged that USSS Inspection Division personnel misconstrued and/or misinterpreted statements attributed to the complainant in a Fact-Finder Inquiry on Special Agent [REDACTED].	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	False Statements	Administrative Disposition
I12-USSS-ATL-00054	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/28/2011	4/9/2012	On [REDACTED] /11 [REDACTED] notified ISP that the [REDACTED] Police Department received a complaint from [REDACTED], alleging that USSS [REDACTED] has been sending harassing communications [REDACTED]. The police advised that they are not taking any further action at this time. ISP will follow-up on the allegations. On [REDACTED] /11, [REDACTED] forwarded ISP an e-mail notification [REDACTED] received from [REDACTED], reporting that [REDACTED] accused [REDACTED], of making inappropriate comments [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] interpreted the comments to be sexual harassment.	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Harassment	Administrative Disposition
I12-USSS-ATL-00054	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/28/2011	4/9/2012	Duplicate narrative of above	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Harassment	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-ATL-00054	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/28/2011	4/9/2012	Duplicate narrative of above	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Harassment	Judicial Disposition
I11-USSS-ATL-00706	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	04/18/11	07/23/12	SA [REDACTED] allegedly had a sexual relationship with [REDACTED] who was the [REDACTED] on a USSS investigation conducted [REDACTED]. Joint investigation with USSS-OI, with DHS OIG as the lead. [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Ethics Violations - Criminal	Administrative Disposition
I11-USSS-ATL-00706	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	04/18/11	07/23/12	Duplicate narrative of above	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Ethics Violations - Criminal	Judicial Disposition
I11-USSS-DVR-01313	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	09/14/11	08/09/12	Complainant, [REDACTED], stated that [REDACTED] were both raped by the subject, [REDACTED]. The complainant also stated that [REDACTED] extorted money [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Abuse / Violence	Judicial Disposition
I11-USSS-WFO-00624	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	3/30/2011	10/4/2012	On [REDACTED] 2011, [REDACTED], ISP was notified that on [REDACTED], 2011, [REDACTED] Field Office (FO), deposited [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] personal bank account at the [REDACTED] ATM in the [REDACTED] Building. Some of the money appeared suspicious to bank employees, and they contacted the USSS Criminal Investigative Division. A review of the money (all genuine [REDACTED]) lead Counterfeit Systems Specialists to believe that the money may have been received by a bank and forwarded to the [REDACTED] FO as suspected counterfeit money. On [REDACTED], 2011, Inspectors surreptitiously searched [REDACTED] workspace and found [REDACTED] containing incriminating evidence that [REDACTED] may be involved with the theft of [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Theft	Administrative Disposition

\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA.  
Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I11-USSS-WFO-00624	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	3/30/2011	10/4/2012	<p style="color: red;">Duplicate narrative of above</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Theft	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-ATL-00815	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	5/30/2012	11/15/2012	<p>I'm uncertain I put this in the correct category, so if I didn't, please be certain I am trying very hard to report correctly. I am a victim of an International Organized Crime Group/Drug Cartel that I have discovered; reported and that I refuse to be a part of. In fact, I am a victim of attempted murder, extensive identity theft, extensive public and political corruption, stalking since my birth, identity fraud, extensive human exploitation, etc. [REDACTED] I thought [REDACTED] for over [REDACTED], I have discovered is a fraud and I have been told [REDACTED] was never a [REDACTED] because everything about [REDACTED] is a fraud. [REDACTED] is an employee of the [REDACTED] and is currently using the alias of [REDACTED]. That being said, [REDACTED] is directly associated with a known former illegal drug cartel and has committed multiple crimes and frauds against me, including, but not limited to, identity theft, identity fraud, human exploitation of me, etc, some with my own birth family, some with former schoolmates of mine, some with Judges, etc. The man who is currently using the alias of [REDACTED] has willfully, knowingly and intentionally committed bank fraud; identity theft; forgery of my signatures [REDACTED]; credit card fraud; bankruptcy fraud; mortgage fraud; insurance fraud; perjury; human exploitation of me; etc. When I started discovering said frauds, I called the US Secret Service to report such frauds. I contacted [REDACTED] of the US Secret Service in [REDACTED] made an appointment to come to my apartment I had at the time and examine some of the evidence. There is so much of the evidence, literally boxes and boxes of evidence. When Special Agent [REDACTED] arrived at my then apartment, [REDACTED] was with [REDACTED]. I did not recognize [REDACTED] as anybody that I have every met in my life. [REDACTED] later contacted me seeking more information and a personal relationship with me. I was led to believe that the [REDACTED] I met as "Special Agent [REDACTED]" of the US Secret Service was pursuing an investigation into the alleged frauds that I had discovered and was trying to report. [REDACTED] said if I could show [REDACTED] fraud, [REDACTED] would go out and make the arrests on my behalf. I finally was able to put together enough evidence to show [REDACTED] undeniable fraud that I am a victim of. [REDACTED] refused to make any arrests and in fact, stated that I am "crazy". I have since discovered photo's of [REDACTED] with some of the perpetrators of the crimes dating all the way before I met [REDACTED], along with others directly associated with the crimes and frauds that have taken place against me, including, but not limited to, a [REDACTED] who, like them, is using multiple alias' to willfully, knowingly and intentionally deceive and commit frauds. [REDACTED] has used alias of [REDACTED] (real name). They are [REDACTED] who have willfully, knowingly and intentionally stalked me and co-conspired to cause me significant, very personal, permanent harm, of which they have absolutely, undeniably done. I have also been in touch with Mr. Eric Holder because I discovered some of them are employed in the US Department of Justice in the FBI, the US DEA, the US FDA, various banking institutions including, but not limited to, the Federal Credit Union where my identity has been stolen and used to commit frauds. I have discovered some of them are employed at [REDACTED]; etc. They are all covering for each other and their various frauds. They have been attempting to murder me before I could make discovery of their true identities and report them.</p>	Employee Corruption	Other Employee Corruption	NA	NA
I12-USSS-ATL-00815	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	5/30/2012	11/15/2012	<p style="color: red;">Duplicate narrative of above</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>	Employee Corruption	Other Employee Corruption	NA	Judicial Disposition



\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA.  
Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

i12-USSS-ATL-00832	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	6/4/2012	11/19/2012	On [redacted]/12, the Office of Professional Responsibility was notified of an apparent road rage incident which occurred in [redacted] NC involving a GOV assigned to the USSS [redacted] Field Office. The actual incident occurred on [redacted], 2012, and was recorded by a private citizen. This link for the recording of this incident is provided below. On [redacted] 2012, there was a Vice Presidential visit to [redacted] NC, thus on [redacted], 2012, the advance team and their field office counterparts were scheduled to work in preparation for the upcoming visit. Preliminary information provided to [redacted] indicates that the agent involved in this incident was assigned as [redacted] and [redacted] on the date of this incident. [redacted] will open an investigation regarding this incident.	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Ethics Violations - Criminal	Judicial Disposition
i13-USSS-ORL-00025	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/8/2012	3/13/2013	Field Originated Complaint stemming from I1200800 [redacted] In June 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received information that in [redacted] 2005 [redacted], U.S. Secret Service (USSS) [redacted] USSS management for additional manpower and magnetometers to adequately accomplish the protection mission of President George Bush in [redacted]. [redacted] USSS, denied this request for additional assets. On [redacted] 2005, an individual named [redacted] attempted to assassinate former President Bush by throwing a hand grenade at him; however, the hand grenade failed to detonate. During the arrest of [redacted] a gun battle ensued and [redacted] and a local police officer were killed. After the incident, it was alleged that [redacted] ordered the destruction of all documents pertaining to the assassination attempt on former President Bush because the incident would be embarrassing to the USSS. Interview of [redacted] acknowledged that in [redacted] that [redacted] made a request through official channels for more protective assets for a Presidential visit to [redacted], and that this request was later denied. [redacted] believes that the report of an assassination attempt made against the POTUS, was sensationalized by media, and stated that the visit was over and the POTUS was back at his [redacted] hotel with USSS when the incident occurred. [redacted] further stated that the [redacted] authorities' version of the events were inconsistent. [redacted] has no knowledge if [redacted], USSS, was directly involved with declining the request for additional protective assets, as the request is routed through several approving authorities, but it's possible that [redacted] had knowledge of the request and influenced it's denial. [redacted] has neither knowledge of orders from [redacted] nor any other USSS staff to destroy records, and [redacted] has never destroyed records or ordered any other employees to destroy records. [redacted] remembers that the denied request for [redacted] additional resources came up during a Protective Efficiency Review conducted by the OPO approximately [redacted] [redacted] knowledge, all the documents related to the request and denials for assets are still a matter of record with the USSS. [redacted], USSS can testify to the request and denial for these assets, as well as these documents still being a matter of official record with the USSS	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Management	Administrative Disposition
i13-USSS-ORL-00025	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/8/2012	3/13/2013	Duplicate narrative of above [redacted]	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Management	Judicial Disposition
i12-USSS-ATL-00985	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	6/19/2012	3/14/2013	[redacted] of the USSS [redacted] Field Office. [redacted] has been involved in various frauds in the USSS? 1. [redacted] had an affair with [redacted] while [redacted] assigned to [redacted] in the [redacted] Office of Professional Responsibility, charged with going after those who violated these such rules [redacted] during the affair. 2. [redacted] was recently "caught" by USSS HQ for [redacted] for profit. It is against the ERA rules and it is unethical to do this. 3. [redacted] admonished for [redacted] poor handling of the [redacted] incident concerning one of [redacted] employees. The USSS is suffering from many recent public incidents of poor behavior. USSS HQ refuses to fire or even remove [redacted] from position of [redacted]. Any employee who did any of the above three incidents would be fired from [redacted] position, not allowed to remain in place. They are allowing [redacted] to make public appearances [redacted] during the Democratic National Convention in [redacted] this summer. This is another example of the good old boy system in place under the current Director. And USSS HQ wonders where the culture of corruption comes from? I doubt these known incidents have even been reported to USSS Office of Professional Responsibility.	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Abuse of Authority	Judicial Disposition
i12-USSS-MIA-01019	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/11/2012	4/1/2013	On [redacted], the USSS [redacted] Office received information regarding possible improper conduct by SA [redacted] related to an open investigation by the [redacted] County Sheriff's Office [redacted] SO deputies had obtained an arrest warrant for [redacted] believed to be involved with an organized criminal group. [redacted] O deputies received information that the suspect was informed of the arrest warrant and fled [redacted] before [redacted] could be apprehended. [redacted] SO intelligence determined [redacted] had called the suspect, and [redacted] currently under investigation, approximately [redacted] before the suspect fled [redacted]. [redacted] SO investigators stated [redacted] is not a target of their current investigation but had previously been identified socializing with suspects believed to be involved with organized criminal groups. In [redacted] investigators had received information that [redacted] had "worked" and frequented [redacted] operated by [redacted] suspects under investigation [redacted] investigators determined [redacted] had developed close relationships with many [redacted] suspects and a [redacted]. Additionally, [redacted] was believed to have identified [redacted] attempted to influence [redacted] officer regarding [redacted]. At that time [redacted] was interviewed and denied all of the allegations which could not be substantiated.	Employee Corruption	Other Employee Corruption	NA	Administrative Disposition



\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA. Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I12-USSS-MIA-01019	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/11/2012	4/1/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Employee Corruption	Other Employee Corruption	NA	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-BOS-00897	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	7/18/2012	4/2/2013	purported to be a DHS employee and may be stalking . allegedly claimed to provide DHS security for presidential events and presented badge and identification card to .	Program Fraud / Financial Crimes	False Personating of a DHS Employee	by Non-DHS Employee	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-SID-00035	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/8/2012	4/5/2013	*SID CASE* - Field Originated Complaint stemming from I1200800 ) , was working a security shift on the Whitehouse grounds. brought onto the Whitehouse grounds while the President was outside of his room. It was reported " the President who was walking the dog. was counseled by , Supervisor, but was never punished.	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Employee Misconduct, General	Administrative Disposition
I13-USSS-MIA-00364	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	4/11/2013	4/12/2013	The purpose of this affidavit is to document the illegal and improper conduct committed by Field Office. These illegal and improper acts are described in this affidavit. These acts are described in detail. Some are known to me personally and others have been reported to me by men and women with great courage and unquestioned character. All of us are subordinates of and have taken great risk to report this conduct upon fear of retaliation by against us. This fear of retaliation is real and present. Although this may be the first time an illegal or improper act of has been reported to Inspection, you will see that has a long history of illegal and improper acts, both in the Field Office and at least one event of falsifying paperwork outlined below in the Field Office. As an introduction to this affidavit, I feel it appropriate and necessary to document the most recent conduct committed by that involves me. Upon conclusion, I will document other conduct which will be broken down by event and those that have knowledge of the event and conduct of .	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Ethics Violations - Non-Criminal	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-DET-00987	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/9/2012	4/23/2013	Field Originated Complaint stemming from I1200800 ) ??? , was "sexting" with . was later promoted.	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Ethics Violations - Non-Criminal	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-ORL-00023	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/9/2012	4/23/2013	Field Originated Complaint stemming from I1200800 ??? was taken to Medical Facility for psychiatric problems. While being treated, the USSS was in possession of badge and firearm. The USSS obtained medical records for psychiatric evaluations and treatment without a warrant. When was confronted by the USSS after being released from medical treatment, explained to the USSS they did not properly obtain medical records. threatened to sue the USSS and returned to full duty at .	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Employee Misconduct, General	Administrative Disposition
I13-USSS-ORL-00023	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/9/2012	4/23/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Employee Misconduct, General	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-ORL-00026	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/8/2012	4/30/2013	Field Originated Complaint stemming from I1200800 , a USSS employee, was , a USSS , John Tooles, a who was in charge of logistical support and administration for the G20 Summit. Because of for Tooles, Tools from the G20 Summit assignment him to the Combined Federal Campaign. Tooles was so distraught over the reassignment that he committed suicide shortly afterwards. was after the suicide. SEE RELATED- C11-USSS-HQ-16331 info below located: On the morning 11, , Office of Professional Responsibility, was notified that Deputy Division Chief John F. Tooles, Administrative Operations Division (AOD), personally owned motor vehicle was found abandoned on the Chesapeake Bay Bridge in Maryland. As a result of this finding, local law enforcement initiated a search of the local waters surrounding the Chesapeake Bay Bridge, which lead to the discovery of Mr. Tooles' body. A preliminary investigation conducted by Maryland law enforcement officials found no signs of foul play and determined that Mr. Tooles' death was a probable suicide. The the Baltimore conducted appropriate liaison with the local authorities and reported back to the Office of investigations and the Office of Administration regarding the local investigation. Mr. Tooles was a GS-15 Deputy Division Chief-Special Projects/Supervisory Support Services, in AOD at the time of his death. He was not on duty at the time of his death. A review of Mr. Tooles' office space, e-mail and voice mail by USSS supervisory personnel did not yield any evidence of his intent to commit suicide. The Inspection Division did not open an investigation.	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Management	Judicial Disposition

\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA.  
Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I13-USSS-ORL-00026	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/8/2012	4/30/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Management	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-PHL-00439	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	2/7/2012	5/15/2013	On [REDACTED] 2012, the Inspection Division was notified [REDACTED], that [REDACTED] received an electronic complaint from [REDACTED] alleging that four USSS agents assigned to the [REDACTED] FO, physically and verbally assaulted a [REDACTED] confidential informant (CI) on [REDACTED], 2012, at the USSS [REDACTED]. The complainant also alleged that the USSS agents held the CI for three hours and coerced [REDACTED] into performing a deal after [REDACTED] did not want to assist the USSS. The complainant reported that the CI required hospitalization for treatment of [REDACTED] injuries. 7D	Civil Rights / Civil Liberties	Use of Force	Non-Weapon Related	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-PHL-00439	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	2/7/2012	5/15/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Civil Rights / Civil Liberties	Use of Force	Non-Weapon Related	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-PHL-00439	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	2/7/2012	5/15/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Civil Rights / Civil Liberties	Use of Force	Non-Weapon Related	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-PHL-00439	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	2/7/2012	5/15/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Civil Rights / Civil Liberties	Use of Force	Non-Weapon Related	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-ORL-00024	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/8/2012	5/15/2013	Field Originated Complaint stemming from I1200800 [REDACTED], met a [REDACTED] and had a continuous relationship [REDACTED] sent the [REDACTED] e-mail messages using [REDACTED] official government e-mail account. The [REDACTED] contacted the USSS and advised that [REDACTED] needed to stop all contact with this [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] may have been involved with the [REDACTED] government or a criminal organization. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was removed from [REDACTED] might have received a week off work, but continues to work for the [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Contact with Foreign Governments / Nationals	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-TUC-00029	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/13/2012	5/28/2013	Field Originated Complaint stemming from I1200800 (referred from [REDACTED]). An incident occurred on a trip to [REDACTED] with Vice President Dick Cheney in which a [REDACTED] member had a [REDACTED] relationship with a [REDACTED] did not believe the [REDACTED] was a prostitute. The [REDACTED] was observed waiting for [REDACTED] outside of briefings. Another incident that occurred while in [REDACTED] involved a [REDACTED] Intelligence Officer that attempted to stick a thumb-drive into a U.S. government computer when a USSS [REDACTED] (name unknown) turned away to speak with someone.	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Contact with Foreign Governments / Nationals	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-NYC-00368	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	4/15/2013	6/26/2013	Today, I [REDACTED] an e-mail and spreadsheet from [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. The documents were passed from the USSS Office of Protective Operations (OPO) to our Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) last [REDACTED]. In [REDACTED] e-mail to OPO and RES supervisors, [REDACTED] details an investigation [REDACTED] conducted into the suspected misuse of a government credit card by [REDACTED] has substantial proof that [REDACTED] used the government credit card to gas up [REDACTED] personally owned vehicle on multiple occasions.	Program Fraud / Financial Crimes	Program Fraud / Theft	Program Benefits Theft	Administrative Disposition
I13-USSS-NYC-00368	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	4/15/2013	6/26/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Program Fraud / Financial Crimes	Program Fraud / Theft	Program Benefits Theft	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-SID-00876	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	6/28/2012	6/27/2013	*SID CASE* - During the course of DHS OIG investigation #I12-USSS-OSI-00800, DHS OIG received source information that [REDACTED], USSS, made false statements [REDACTED] regarding the handling and investigation into the April 11, 2012, Cartagena, Colombia incident. According to the allegations, [REDACTED] also attempted to conceal [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] executives of the USSS to cover up the incident.	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	NA	Judicial Disposition

\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA.  
 Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I11-USSS-LAX-01153	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	08/17/11	07/10/13	<p>On [REDACTED], 2011, a confidential source provided information indicating that [REDACTED] have engaged in financial transactions during 2010 and 2011 which could be the basis for a violation of 31 USC 5324, Structuring. The nature of the activity is as follows: On [REDACTED]/10, [REDACTED] wrote a check in the amount of [REDACTED] made payable to [REDACTED], which was negotiated at [REDACTED] account at [REDACTED] Bank. That same date [REDACTED] wrote a separate check in the amount of [REDACTED] payable to [REDACTED], which was negotiated at [REDACTED] Bank. The two check numbers were sequential. These checks appear to be funded by two cash deposits in the amounts of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], which were deposited in [REDACTED] savings account in [REDACTED] and transferred into [REDACTED] checking account on [REDACTED]. The total of the [REDACTED] 2010 deposits were [REDACTED], just under the CTR requirement. On [REDACTED]/11 [REDACTED] received an electronic funds transfer from [REDACTED] in the amount of [REDACTED]. On [REDACTED]/11 [REDACTED] drafted a check to [REDACTED] in the amount of [REDACTED], which [REDACTED] negotiated at [REDACTED] FCU. On [REDACTED]/11 [REDACTED] drafted a check to [REDACTED] in the amount of [REDACTED] which was negotiated at [REDACTED] Bank. The total of these checks were [REDACTED] just under the CTR requirement. The source further advised that [REDACTED] a restaurant named [REDACTED] made a series of cash deposits in [REDACTED] 2011 totalling [REDACTED] 5 separate locations in Southern California, accompanied by a series of withdrawals totalling [REDACTED]. The deposits and withdrawals were generally even dollar transactions, which are unusual, even for a cash business such as a restaurant. The source further advised that [REDACTED] applied for a mortgage in [REDACTED]. The property was valued at that time at [REDACTED] a mortgage in the amount of [REDACTED] and indicated that [REDACTED] of the cash used as a down payment was a "gift".</p>	Employee Corruption	Deliberate Disclosure of Classified / Law Enforcement / National Security Related information	Law Enforcement Sensitive Material	Administrative Disposition
I11-USSS-LAX-01153	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	08/17/11	07/10/13	<p>Duplicate narrative of above</p>	Employee Corruption	Deliberate Disclosure of Classified / Law Enforcement / National Security Related information	Law Enforcement Sensitive Material	Judicial Disposition
I11-USSS-LAX-01153	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	08/17/11	07/10/13	<p>Duplicate narrative of above</p>	Employee Corruption	Deliberate Disclosure of Classified / Law Enforcement / National Security Related information	Law Enforcement Sensitive Material	Judicial Disposition
I11-USSS-LAX-01153	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/17/2011	7/10/2013	<p>Duplicate narrative of above</p>	Employee Corruption	Deliberate Disclosure of Classified / Law Enforcement / National Security Related information	Law Enforcement Sensitive Material	Administrative Disposition



\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA. Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I11-USSS-LAX-01153	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/17/2011	7/10/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Employee Corruption	Deliberate Disclosure of Classified / Law Enforcement / National Security Related information	Law Enforcement Sensitive Material	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-ATL-01004	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/29/2012	7/11/2013	On [REDACTED], 2012, after discussions with the Office of Investigation [REDACTED] requested that ISP open a case and investigate a report of missing money from a search warrant conducted by our [REDACTED] FO, in [REDACTED] 2011. I am sending you [REDACTED] below for your review to determine if DHS-OIG wants this case. I have no further information at this time, and we have not initiated any action.	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Theft	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-WFO-00986	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/9/2012	7/19/2013	Field Originated Complaint stemming from I1200800 ***Anonymous source requested complaint NOT be returned to USSS*** Command Consulting Group (CCG), [REDACTED] [REDACTED], received a \$14-million dollar sole source contract from the Department of Homeland Security in 2009. [REDACTED] reportedly dealt with the contract which can be confirmed by interviewing [REDACTED], USSS [REDACTED]. In relation to the deal, CCG then hired [REDACTED], [REDACTED] in a direct kickback. See- <a href="http://www.commandcg.com/en/team">http://www.commandcg.com/en/team</a> Source stated that because of this contract, USSS separated the USSS SII (Intelligence Unit), [REDACTED] from the USSS IRM division to accommodate the contract portion at USSS. (DO NOT DISCLOSE: Source reported that [REDACTED] t USSS, [REDACTED] had confronted [REDACTED] about the contract and was told not to pursue it.)	Employee Corruption	Kickbacks	NA	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-WFO-00986	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	8/9/2012	7/19/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Employee Corruption	Kickbacks	NA	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-SID-00800	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	5/30/2012	8/9/2013	*SID CASE* - On May 23, 2012, during a hearing before the U.S. Congress, the DHS Office of Inspector General was requested to initiate an investigation regarding allegations that USSS employees engaged in inappropriate conduct while on assignment to Cartagena, Colombia, and to determine whether the questioned conduct was attributable, in part, to broader cultural issues within the USSS.	Employee Corruption	Other Employee Corruption	NA	Administrative Disposition
I12-USSS-SID-00800	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	5/30/2012	8/9/2013	*SID CASE* - Duplicative of case above.	Employee Corruption	Other Employee Corruption	NA	Judicial Disposition
I11-USSS-CHI-00377	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	01/28/11	08/19/13	[REDACTED], DOJ-OIG, [REDACTED] IL, informed SAC Armando Lopez, DHS-OIG, Chicago, IL, that [REDACTED] office was conducting a civil rights investigation regarding [REDACTED] i violation by [REDACTED], IL. Also [REDACTED], U.S. Secret Service while [REDACTED] has been identified as an agent on site during the possible civil rights	Civil Rights / Civil Liberties	NA	NA	Judicial Disposition
I12-USSS-DAL-00690	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	4/12/2012	12/11/2013	On [REDACTED], 2012, the Office of Investigations notified the Office of Professional Responsibility that on [REDACTED] 2012, U.S. Secret Service (USSS) special agents from the [REDACTED] Field Office (FO) received information from a criminal defendant [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] FO, allegedly warned [REDACTED] about USSS plans to arrest [REDACTED] on two separate occasions in 2010. It should be noted that the criminal defendant is a suspect in a USSS counterfeit investigation involving the manufacture of [REDACTED] in counterfeit U.S. currency, and is currently [REDACTED].	Employee Corruption	Deliberate Disclosure of Classified / Law Enforcement / National Security Related information	Law Enforcement Sensitive Material	Administrative Disposition
I12-USSS-DAL-00690	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	4/12/2012	12/11/2013	Duplicate narrative of above	Employee Corruption	Deliberate Disclosure of Classified / Law Enforcement / National Security Related information	Law Enforcement Sensitive Material	Judicial Disposition

\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA.  
Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I13-USSS-DVR-00146	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	12/6/2012	12/13/2013	On [REDACTED], 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), [REDACTED] Colorado, discovered that [REDACTED], Special Agent (SA), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), [REDACTED] Colorado, attempted to import through the U.S. mail a quantity of [REDACTED], also known as [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] International Airport, [REDACTED]. Additionally, [REDACTED] allegedly utilizes the [REDACTED] to seduce and molest [REDACTED] under 18 years of age. On [REDACTED], 2012, [REDACTED], SA, DHS OIG, Denver, Colorado, conducted a name review of [REDACTED] in TECS, a DHS law enforcement database [REDACTED] discovered that on [REDACTED], 2011, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP), international mailroom at [REDACTED] examined a package containing approximately [REDACTED]. Upon further review by the CBP Officers, they determined that [REDACTED] was identified as [REDACTED] also known as [REDACTED] a List 1 chemical, a controlled substance.	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Abuse / Violence	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00629	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	12/17/2013	During the course of OIG project # 13-131-ISP-USSS, DHS OIG Office of Inspection administered a survey to United States Secret Service employees. This survey obtained employees??? views on misconduct and security clearance concerns, among other topics. We administered the survey from May 13, 2013, to June 11, 2013. Twenty two survey respondents indicated that they observed either (1), the solicitation of prostitute by a USSS employee or (2), other criminal sexual behavior by a USSS employee. We asked these 22 respondents if they reported the behavior; only one did. We asked respondents to only consider events between 2004 and 2013 but did not ask when the behavior occurred. We also did not ask where it occurred or who perpetrated the crime. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Please follow-up with the Office of Inspections for more information. 2 of 22: [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00631	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	12/17/2013	Duplicate narrative of above [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 4 of 22: [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-NYC-00628	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	1/9/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 1 of 22: [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-ATL-00630	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	1/14/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 3 of 22: [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-CHI-00649	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	2/10/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 22 of 22: [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Administrative Disposition
I13-USSS-CHI-00649	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	2/10/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 22 of 22: [REDACTED]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition

\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA.  
Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I13-USSS-ORL-00001	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	6/26/2012	2/10/2014	Field Originated Complaint stemming from I1200800. INFO RECEIVED from ██████████ - LOSS OF UNREPORTED CLASSIFIED INFORMATION In ██████████ 2008, an unnamed USSS ██████████ employee ██████████ a disk containing personal identifying information (PII) for the entire USSS personnel ██████████. The employee ██████████ the data via the ██████████ public metro. During the trip the employee lost the disk containing the data. The incident was only reported to the local police department. The incident was not reported to OIG, nor were the employees whose PII was disclosed notified of the breach. The disk was never recovered ██████████, was ██████████ division at the time. INTERVIEW OF ██████████ also denied losing CDs that contained PII of employees of USSS. ██████████ remembered that there was an incident approximately ██████████ years ago, where a "tape" that had required mandatory backup information was lost. The "tape" was to be transferred from ██████████ to an undisclosed (classified) location in ██████████ and that the tape was lost in the transport process. The tape had ██████████ assigned to the tape, where if lost or stolen, the contents of the tape could not be accessed unless an individual(s) ██████████ to view the information.	Miscellaneous  7E	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Failure to Safeguard / Unauthorized Release of Information	Administrative Disposition
I13-USSS-ORL-00001	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	6/26/2012	2/10/2014	Duplicate narrative of above ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Failure to Safeguard / Unauthorized Release of Information	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-AIG-00633	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	2/27/2014	During the course of OIG project # 13-131-ISP-USSS, DHS OIG Office of Inspection administered a survey to United States Secret Service employees. This survey obtained employees' views on misconduct and security clearance concerns, among other topics. We administered the survey from May 13, 2013, to June 11, 2013. Twenty two survey respondents indicated that they observed either (1), the solicitation of prostitute by a USSS employee or (2), other criminal sexual behavior by a USSS employee. We asked these 22 respondents if they reported the behavior; only one did. We asked respondents to only consider events between 2004 and 2013 but did not ask when the behavior occurred. We also did not ask where it occurred or who perpetrated the crime.  ██████████ ██████████ Please follow-up with the Office of Inspections for more information.	Miscellaneous  7E	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00632	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ 5 of 22: ██████████	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00634	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ 7 of 22: ██████████	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00635	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ 8 of 22: ██████████	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition



\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA. Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I13-USSS-WFO-00636	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 9 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00638	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 11 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00639	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 12 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00640	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 13 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00641	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 14 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00642	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 15 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00643	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 16 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition

\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA.  
Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I13-USSS-WFO-00644	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 17 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00645	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 18 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00647	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 20 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-WFO-00648	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	3/6/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 21 of 22: [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I14-USSS-ORL-00794	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	[Redacted] /2013	3/26/2014	NOTE: <del>DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE DHS-OIG INV.</del> If this matter is not investigated by the DHS OIG, the confidential complainant has asked that the complaint not be returned/referred to the USSS for fear of future retaliation. A confidential complainant alleged that United States Secret Service (USSS [Redacted] have retaliated against USSS [Redacted] because of a formal complaint [Redacted] filed against [Redacted]	Miscellaneous 7D	Criminal Misconduct	Ethics Violations - Criminal	Administrative Disposition
I14-USSS-ORL-00794	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	10/22/2013	3/26/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]	Miscellaneous 7D	Criminal Misconduct	Ethics Violations - Criminal	Administrative Disposition
I13-USSS-AIG-00637	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	5/2/2014	During the course of OIG project # 13-131-ISP-USSS, DHS OIG Office of Inspection administered a survey to United States Secret Service employees. This survey obtained employees??? views on misconduct and security clearance concerns, among other topics. We administered the survey from May 13, 2013, to June 11, 2013. Twenty two survey respondents indicated that they observed either (1), the solicitation of prostitute by a USSS employee or (2), other criminal sexual behavior by a USSS employee. We asked these 22 respondents if they reported the behavior; only one did. We asked respondents to only consider events between 2004 and 2013 but did not ask when the behavior occurred. We also did not ask where it occurred or who perpetrated the crime. [Redacted] [Redacted]	Miscellaneous 7E	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition
I13-USSS-AIG-00646	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	9/25/2013	5/2/2014	Duplicate narrative of above [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]	Miscellaneous	Criminal Misconduct	Other Criminal Activity	Judicial Disposition

\*All redactions in this document are made pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of the FOIA.  
Any additional exemptions used are cited in the margin near the appropriate redaction. \*

I13-USSS-SID-00076	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	11/1/2012	5/8/2014	<p>*SID CASE* - It is my understanding from interviews conducted thus far, and information from RES, FSD - polygraph, SCD and LEG, that a decision was made Friday, to place ASAIC Prieto on administrative leave and make him a DNA. This decision was made following the results of a national security polygraph administered to him by our FSD - polygraph program, following an SCD five year update investigation. According to polygraph examiners, ASAIC Prieto was first inconclusive, then in their judgment - failed the national security polygraph regarding handling of sensitive information. We are still awaiting a report.</p> <p>As a result, ██████████, was contacted ██████████ by ██████████ and told that this case would be referred to ██████████ investigation of possible misconduct by ASAIC Prieto, with a briefing on Monday.</p> <p>██████████ ASAIC Prieto was found dead and appeared to have committed suicide. ██████████ further advised that ██████████ Field Office (██████████) and ██████████ personnel were working with ██████████ and coordinating with others to notify his family. There were very few particulars, and we were standing by to see if we would be referred the investigation. ██████████ via e-mail within 30 minutes of ██████████</p> <p>A ██████████, following a meeting of the ██████████ and advised that ISP will coordinate with ██████████ and the ██████████ and conduct an investigation. To date, inspectors and ██████████ investigators have interviewed ██████████ ██████████ and ██████████ other individuals who spoke to ASAIC Prieto recently. Other USSS personnel and ██████████ are coordinating with his family. ██████████ seized computers and cell phones at ASAIC Prieto's residence and are obtaining search warrants to get in to them. They will coordinate the forensic examinations/searches with us when they obtain the warrants. We have run multiple records checks with a variety of agencies on ██████████ ██████████ ██████████. No derogatory information has been developed to date.</p>	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Death Investigation	Judicial Disposition
I14-USSS-SID-01281	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	10/30/2013	7/1/2014	<p>*SID CASE* - On ██████████/13, the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) directed the Inspection Division (ISP) to conduct a fact-finder investigation into allegations made by the Washington Post involving several Secret Service employees. The Washington Post had earlier contacted the Office of Government and Public Affairs alleging that ██████████ ██████████ ██████████, Washington D.C., ██████████ ██████████ ██████████, were involved in an inappropriate relationship which included sexually explicit e-mail/text messages and photos.</p> <p>Initial investigation has not revealed an inappropriate sexual relationship between these employees involving sexually explicit e-mail messages, text messages, or photos.</p>	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	NA	Administrative Disposition
I14-USSS-DAL-10736	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	6/11/2014	7/2/2014	<p>See above -- Public website submitter indicated that the incident location was: ██████████ Agent is still involved in a relationship with ██████████ who was fired for cause. Agent has paid cash for multiple ██████████. Agent and ██████████ to still be involved in non ethical behavior. Public website submitter indicated that the duty status of subject was: On Duty Public website complainant indicated that the subject ██████████ had miscellaneous identifiers of ██████████</p>	Employee Corruption	Kickbacks	NA	Administrative Disposition
I13-USSS-SID-00036	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	5/31/2012	7/3/2014	<p>*SID CASE* - On ██████████/13, the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) directed the Inspection Division (ISP) to conduct a fact-finder investigation into allegations made by the Washington Post involving several Secret Service employees. The Washington Post had earlier contacted the Office of Government and Public Affairs alleging that ██████████ ██████████ ██████████, Washington D.C., ██████████ ██████████ ██████████, were involved in an inappropriate relationship which included sexually explicit e-mail/text messages and photos.</p> <p>Initial investigation has not revealed an inappropriate sexual relationship between these employees involving sexually explicit e-mail messages, text messages, or photos.</p>	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Contact with Foreign Governments / Nationals	Administrative Disposition
I13-USSS-SID-00036	U.S. Secret Service (DHS)	5/31/2012	7/3/2014	<p>*SID CASE* - Duplicative of case above.</p>	Miscellaneous	Non-Criminal Misconduct	Contact with Foreign Governments / Nationals	Judicial Disposition