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Description of document: Closing documents for Eight Department of the Interior Office of Inspector General (OIG) Investigations, 2011-2013

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Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
MS-4428, MIB
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Washington, DC 20240
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OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

VIA EMAIL

5/12/2015

Re: OIG-2015-00048

This is in response to your FOIA request dated November 28, 2014, which was received by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) on December 8, 2014. You requested the following information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552: copies of the final report, report of investigation, the referral memo and the referral letter as applicable for 8 separate OIG investigations. In an email dated January 28, 2015 you stated that you would like to limit the request to only the cover or title page for those two cases that we needed to consult with other agencies.

A search was conducted and enclosed are copies of seven separate OIG investigations. There are 16 pages responsive to your request and all pages contain some information that is being withheld. A search was conducted for OI-VA-11-0377 and no records were located.

Deletions have been made of information that is exempt from release under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), and (b)(7)(C). These sections exempt from disclosure items that pertain to: (1) information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (2) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (3) personnel and other similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and (4) records of information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

One document you requested has information that is exempt from release under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3). This section exempts from disclosure information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. The OIG seeks to withhold information based on the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which relates to "matter[s] occurring before the grand jury." See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B). Information may also be withheld Rule 6(e) if the disclosure would reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury's investigation, such as the identities or addresses of witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony, the deliberations or questions of the jurors, the strategy or direction of the investigation.

Exemption (b)(5) was used to protect inter- and intra-agency communications protected by the attorney work-product privilege. Exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) were used to protect the personal privacy interests of witnesses, interviewees, middle and low ranking federal employees and investigators, and other individuals named in the investigatory file.

If you disagree with this response, you may appeal this response to the Department's FOIA/Privacy Act Appeals Officer. If you choose to appeal, the FOIA/Privacy Act Appeals Officer must receive your FOIA appeal **no later than 30 workdays** from the date of this letter if Appeals arriving or delivered after 5 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, will be deemed received on the next workday.

Your appeal must be made in writing. You may submit your appeal and accompanying materials to the FOIA/Privacy Act Appeals Officer by mail, courier service, fax, or email. All communications concerning your appeal should be clearly marked with the words: "FREEDOM OF INFORMATION APPEAL." You must include an explanation of why you believe the OIG's response is in error. You must also include with your appeal copies of all correspondence between you and the OIG concerning your FOIA request, including your original FOIA request and the OIG's response. Failure to include with your appeal all correspondence between you and the OIG will result in the Department's rejection of your appeal, unless the FOIA/Privacy Act Appeals Officer determines (in the FOIA/Privacy Act Appeals Officer's sole discretion) that good cause exists to accept the defective appeal.

Please include your name and daytime telephone number (or the name and telephone number of an appropriate contact), email address and fax number (if available) in case the FOIA/Privacy Act Appeals Officer needs additional information or clarification of your appeal. The DOI FOIA/Privacy Act Appeals Office Contact Information is the following:

Department of the Interior
Office of the Solicitor
1849 C Street, N.W.
MS-6556 MIB
Washington, DC 20240
Attn: FOIA/Privacy Act Appeals Office

Telephone: (202) 208-5339
Fax: (202) 208-6677
Email: FOIA.Appeals@sol.doi.gov

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of FOIA. *See* [5 U.S.C. 552\(c\)](#). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

The 2007 FOIA amendments created the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) to offer mediation services to resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal


agencies as a non-exclusive alternative to litigation. Using OGIS services does not affect your right to pursue litigation. You may contact OGIS in any of the following ways:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road - OGIS
College Park, MD 20740-6001
E-mail: ogis@nara.gov
Web: <https://ogis.archives.gov>
Telephone: 202-741-5770
Facsimile: 202-741-5769
Toll-free: 1-877-684-6448

Please note that using OGIS services does not affect the timing of filing an appeal with the Department's FOIA & Privacy Act Appeals Officer.

However, should you need to contact me, my telephone number is 202-208-1644, and the email is foia@doioig.gov.

Sincerely,



For Ofelia C. Perez
Government Information Specialist

Enclosure



**OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Case Title GLOBAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT	Case Number OI-VI-03-0339-I
Reporting Office Atlanta, GA	Report Date January 25, 2011
Report Subject Closing Report of Investigation	

RESTRICTED INFORMATION – FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 6(e) APPLIES

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated at the request of the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) in the District of the Virgin Islands. The USAO alleged that [REDACTED] of Global Resource Management (GRM), coordinated, negotiated, and influenced the awarding of a \$3.6 million sewer construction contract, without full and open competition to GRM, while he was serving as a [REDACTED] to the Governor of the Virgin Islands. The USAO also alleged that GRM had no prior work experience, no financial assets and no equipment.

During the course of the investigation, it was determined that [REDACTED] of GRM; [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; and [REDACTED] of the Virgin Islands Public Works Department, conspired to defraud the Government of the Virgin Islands (GVI). The fraud was committed through omissions and concealment of material facts, false representations, generating fraudulent financial statements, and generating fraudulent expenses.

On February 20, 2004, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were indicted on federal and territorial charges. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were acquitted of all charges on May 23, 2006 and April 9, 2007, respectively. [REDACTED] pled guilty to one count of Felony Information on May 5, 2006. In addition, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were convicted on federal and territorial charges on September 20, 2006.

On March 6, 2008, [REDACTED] was sentenced to 12 months confinement; two years supervised release, and

Reporting Official/Title [REDACTED], Special Agent	Signature
Approving Official/Title [REDACTED], Special Agent in Charge	Signature

Authentication Number: 339A29D024284C869E0B741D628CC734

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OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Case Title [REDACTED]	Case Number OI-VA-04-0585-I
Reporting Office Herndon, Virginia	Report Date April 11, 2011
Report Subject Closing Report of Investigation	

RESTRICTED INFORMATION – FEDERAL GRAND JURY MATERIAL
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 6(e) APPLIES

SYNOPSIS

In October 2004, the Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General (DOI OIG) began investigating allegations of illegal payments made to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], for the purpose of influencing Indian gaming and Catawba Indian Nation (CIN) legislation.

(b)(3), (b)(5) Per CRM

[REDACTED] David T. Collier and Robert H. Price III, who managed New River Management, plead guilty in the District of Columbia to one count of making false statements to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Collier was sentenced to 120 days of home confinement, 5 years probation, \$5,000 in restitution, and \$100 special assessment. Price was sentenced to 5 years probation, \$1,000 in restitution, and \$100 special assessment.

(b)(3), (b)(5) Per CRM

[REDACTED] The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) conducted a complete investigation on [REDACTED] and Grant and presented its findings to the Department of Justice for prosecution. The U.S. Attorney's Office for District of Columbia declined to prosecute [REDACTED] on December 11, 2009.

[REDACTED] Grant plead guilty to an information on March 29, 2011, to

Reporting Official/Title [REDACTED]	Signature
Approving Official/Title [REDACTED]/Special Agent in Charge	Signature

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GRAND JURY MATERIAL - OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OI-002-6E (04/10 rev. 2)



OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Case Title [REDACTED]	Case Number OI-VA-10-0346-I
Reporting Office Herndon, VA	Report Date April 18, 2011
Report Subject Final Report of Investigation	

SYNOPSIS

On March 23, 2010, [REDACTED] Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Office of Law Enforcement and Security (OLES), reported to Program Integrity Division (PID), Office of the Inspector General (OIG) that BLM employee [REDACTED] (GS-8) for [REDACTED] BLM has been misusing her government credit/purchase card. [REDACTED] is accused of withdrawing cash advances for personal use, specifically for possible gambling purposes.

Our investigation revealed that [REDACTED] withdrew numerous cash advances taken at Waysons Bingo, Lothian, MD and cash obtained from several local ATM's including Bank of America, M&T Bank, a mall in District Heights, Maryland and the Department of the Interior.

[REDACTED] accepted a plea agreement from the U.S. Attorney's office, Washington, DC on December 21, 2010. [REDACTED] pled guilty to one count of Theft, 18 USC 641, and agreed to pay restitution in the amount of \$17, 831.68.

Reporting Official/Title [REDACTED] Special Agent	Signature [REDACTED]
Approving Official/Title [REDACTED] Special Agent in Charge	Signature [REDACTED]

Authentication Number: F060E8B16D816BE576180B0186A4421C

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BACKGROUND

██████████ credit card statements reflected numerous cash advances taken at Waysons Bingo, Lothian, MD over the past year. Not only were cash advances taken from a bingo location, there was cash obtained from several local ATM's including Bank of America, M&T Bank, a mall in District Heights, Maryland and the Department of the Interior. It is estimated ██████████ cash advances are in excess of \$25,000.

██████████ was placed on administrative leave by her supervisor, ██████████, as of March 23, 2010. ██████████ government credit card was taken as well as her access to her government computer.

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

██████████ BLM, OLES reported to our office that he was contacted by ██████████ ██████████ regarding some suspicious charges on a credit card assigned to ██████████ ██████████ told ██████████ that ██████████ was detailed to her office from BLM Budget in 2009 and became permanent in March 2010. ██████████ said that on March 22, 2010, ██████████ ██████████ alerted ██████████ that there were suspicious charges on ██████████ government credit card statement to include cash advances at Waysons Bingo, Lothian, MD.

We spoke to ██████████ who corroborated the aforementioned information. She also said that after being informed of the suspicious charges on ██████████ credit card she confronted her and asked her to explain why the suspicious charges were on her credit card statement (**Attachment 1**).

██████████ admitted to ██████████ that she had a gambling problem and she withdrew the cash advances so she could continue to gamble. ██████████ recalled that ██████████ repeatedly apologized to her for misusing her government credit card. After speaking with ██████████ contacted BLM Human Resources (HR) and ██████████. On March 23, 2010, the day after ██████████ confessed to ██████████ placed her on administrative leave and during this interaction ██████████ again apologized for misusing her government credit card claiming that her gambling addiction contributed to her illegal behavior.

██████████ said ██████████ did not obtain a government credit card until she was assigned to BLM Budget, and we learned that while ██████████ was detailed to ██████████ office, her monthly credit card statements were not being reviewed, and it wasn't until ██████████ became a permanent member of ██████████ office that ██████████ started that process. ██████████ also recalled that there had been problems with getting timely statements from JP Morgan Chase during the time ██████████ was abusing her credit card. In February of 2010 ██████████ received a copy of ██████████ credit card statement which reflected suspicious charges such as cash advances from a bingo club in Lothian, MD (**Attachment 2**).

██████████ said that the Merchant Category Code (MCC) ██████████ used to obtain cash advances at the bingo club was 8388 which denotes a charitable organization and is not a prohibited transaction. ██████████ explained that items centrally billed would not produce a monthly balance on ██████████ credit card statement.

██████████ researched ██████████ training records as they pertain to government credit card holders. She informed us that ██████████ completed several training sessions regarding her government issued credit card with the last training session being in February 2008. ██████████ also said that ██████████ attended Financial and Business Management System (FBMS) training which also covers areas of the

appropriate use of a government credit card.

Prior to being detailed to [REDACTED] office, [REDACTED] supervisor, [REDACTED], provided the review of [REDACTED] monthly credit card statements. [REDACTED] confirmed what [REDACTED] told investigators, that she did review and sign [REDACTED] government credit card statements for January, February and March 2009. However, [REDACTED] stopped bringing her credit card statements to her and said she does not remember asking [REDACTED] for them after March 2009. Therefore, none of [REDACTED] credit card statements were reviewed by [REDACTED] between April 2009 and January 2010. When queried as to why she did not ask [REDACTED] for the monthly statements [REDACTED] explained, "I just forgot to ask about them (**Attachment 3**)."

We obtained a copy of [REDACTED] monthly credit card statements from May 18, 2009, when the first suspicious transaction occurred, to March 18, 2010, which is when her suspicious transactions were discovered. The record reflected that [REDACTED] had used her government credit card to make unauthorized cash advances from various ATM machines as well as cash advances from Waysons Bingo. The records also revealed that there were 114 illegal transactions during this time period totaling \$19,488.68. [REDACTED] made payments in the amount of \$1,657.00 with a difference of \$17,831.68 (**Attachment 4 &5**).

We attempted to interview [REDACTED] but after receiving advice from her legal counsel she declined.

[REDACTED] accepted a plea agreement from the U.S. Attorney's office, Washington, DC on December 21, 2010. [REDACTED] pled guilty to one count of Theft, 18 USC 641, and agreed to pay restitution in the amount of \$17, 831.68.

SUBJECT(S)

[REDACTED] GS-8, [REDACTED] Information Resources Management, BLM, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], SSN [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GS-X, [REDACTED] BLM, 1620 L Street, NW, Suite 1025, Washington, DC,
20036, SSN [REDACTED], DOB [REDACTED]

DISPOSITION

[REDACTED] accepted a plea agreement from the U.S. Attorney's office, Washington, DC on December 21, 2010. [REDACTED] pled guilty to one count of Theft, 18 USC 641, and agreed to pay restitution in the amount of \$17, 831.68.

ATTACHMENTS

1. IAR – interview of [REDACTED] on March 24, 2010.
2. IAR – interview of [REDACTED] on March 25, 2010.
3. IAR – interview of [REDACTED] on March 25, 2010.
4. General – credit card statements.
5. General – credit card statements.



OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Case Title [REDACTED]	Case Number OI-VA-11-0215-I
Reporting Office Herndon, Virginia	Report Date April 18, 2011
Report Subject Report of Investigation	

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated based on information provided by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Cameron Prairie National Wildlife Refuge, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), who reported that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Lake Charles, Louisiana, was arrested by the Louisiana State Police for obtaining and distributing child pornography. [REDACTED] said he learned of [REDACTED] arrest from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED], FWS, who had seen [REDACTED] arrest on the news.

This investigation was opened as an addendum to the criminal charges filed against [REDACTED] by the State of Louisiana, and primarily involved a search of [REDACTED] government computer by the Computer Crimes Unit (CCU) of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), Office of Inspector General (OIG). The result of CCU's search of [REDACTED] computer revealed no additional material relevant to this investigation.

During the course of this investigation, it was noted that [REDACTED] government computer did not have an employee "sign-on warning" banner, which would advise the user of his or her rights each time they were to log onto the desktop. While the OIG felt confident in their authority to conduct a search of [REDACTED] computer without this banner, a copy of the FWS policy on computer usage along with certification of his completion of the Federal Information Security System training was obtained and reviewed by the Office of General Council (OGC). OGC granted permission to search the computer but advised that the language in the FWS policy should be changed to reflect a more specific and direct scope of authority.

DETAILS

On January 27, 2011, Louisiana State Police detectives executed a search warrant at the residence of [REDACTED] heavy machine operator, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). Detectives located two computers and one external digital storage device in the home. A forensic examination of the equipment revealed evidence of child sexual abuse images on two of the devices. During an interview with detectives, [REDACTED] admitted to intentionally searching for and downloading images and movies of children in sexual situations. This evidence was seized and [REDACTED] was arrested (**Attachment 1**).

[REDACTED] government computer was seized and transported to the Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) on February 1, 2011, for inspection by the Computer Crimes Unit (CCU). However, it was soon noted that [REDACTED] government computer did not have an employee "sign-on warning" banner, which would advise the user of his or her rights each time they were to log onto the desktop. While the OIG felt confident in their authority to conduct a search of [REDACTED] computer even without this banner, a copy of the FWS policy on computer usage along with [REDACTED] certification of his completion of the Federal Information Security System training was obtained and reviewed by the Office of General Council (OGC), who subsequently granted permission to search the computer (**Attachment 2**).

The search of [REDACTED] government computer revealed no additional material relevant to this investigation (**Attachment 3**). In regard to the seriousness of the charges brought against him, [REDACTED] was put on [REDACTED] from his position on April 3, 2011 (**Attachment 4**).

In regard to a 2009 Department-wide Federal Information Systems Management Awareness (FISMA) evaluation report, where the Department's information security was deemed to be rife with weaknesses, the absence of a banner on [REDACTED] computer provokes further concern of a possible FWS-wide lapse in IT security protocol. Moreover, OGE advised that the language in the FWS policy on computer usage and employee rights should be changed to reflect a more specific and direct scope of authority.

SUBJECT(S)

[REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED], SSN: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of the Interior.

DISPOSITION

This investigation was not presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office due to lack of prosecutorial merit.

ATTACHMENTS

1. Booking report and warrant
2. FWS computer usage policy and [REDACTED] certification
3. CCU report on the search of [REDACTED] computer
4. [REDACTED] notice of suspension



**OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Case Title [REDACTED]	Case Number OI-VA-11-0562-I
Reporting Office Herndon, Virginia	Report Date February 9, 2012
Report Subject Report of Investigation	

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated based on notification from [REDACTED] U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) that an FWS spot audit revealed potential fraudulent use of a government purchase and travel card by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Division of Migratory Bird Management, FWS. During the course of this investigation, [REDACTED] was interviewed by OIG agents and admitted to misusing more than one government credit card on a routine basis for approximately three years, purchasing various items for his office, for coworkers, and for himself and his family.

On October 14, 2011, [REDACTED] was arrested and charged by the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland with one count of 18 U.S.C. § 641, Theft of United States Property. [REDACTED] subsequently pled guilty. On March 16, 2012, [REDACTED] was sentenced to three years' probation and must make restitution in the amount of \$28,239. Following his arrest, [REDACTED] was removed from his position with the FWS. No further investigatory work is needed.

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) launched this investigation pursuant to the receipt of a complaint from [REDACTED], U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). [REDACTED] advised that during an FWS spot audit, potential fraudulent use of a government purchase and travel card by [REDACTED], Program Support Analyst, Division of Migratory Bird Management, FWS, was uncovered by auditors.

An interview was conducted with [REDACTED] to learn more details about what the audit uncovered (**Attachment 1**). Also present during this interview was [REDACTED]

Reporting Official/Title [REDACTED], Special Agent	Signature
Approving Official/Title [REDACTED] Special Agent in Charge	Signature

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[REDACTED], FWS. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] FWS was also involved telephonically.

[REDACTED] advised that he had begun going line by line through [REDACTED] purchases with his government purchase card. [REDACTED] said some of the more egregious purchases he was able to identify were of electronic gaming systems, gift card, video games, and similar items. [REDACTED] said he hadn't completed his review, but had already tallied just the gift card purchases at approximately \$14,000 (**Attachment 2**).

According to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and his wife were going through a divorce, and that [REDACTED] had been acting unusual lately. Specifically, [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] had been showing up late for work or calling out sick with little or no notice, and that his overall demeanor lately had been one of stressfulness and discomfort. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] wife also worked for the FWS as an [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and that she typically worked from home Mondays and Fridays. [REDACTED] said the [REDACTED] had [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised OIG agents that [REDACTED] told him he owned handguns. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] mentioned the handguns to him after [REDACTED] had asked how marriage counseling had been going with [REDACTED] wife. [REDACTED] allegedly told [REDACTED] that his wife didn't like him having guns in the house. Moreover, [REDACTED] advised that, when scrutinizing [REDACTED] credit card purchases, he noted that [REDACTED] had bought some firearms equipment.

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] purchase card was suspended in July 2011 during the spot audit. [REDACTED] added that [REDACTED] had, between the months of June and July, also utilized a General Services Administration (GSA) fleet card for a vehicle that was no longer in operation. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] accrued approximately \$300 of charges each month on the fleet card before that card was similarly suspended. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was not told that he was under investigation, though she supposed he knew since the cards had been suspended.

[REDACTED] was interviewed concerning these allegations (**Attachment 3**). [REDACTED] was told that his credit card statements for the past few years had been reviewed, and that the OIG wanted to hear in [REDACTED] own words why he had been making unauthorized purchases. [REDACTED] admitted to making the purchases with his government credit card, and said he was ashamed of having done it and that it was unjustified. He said he and his wife were going [REDACTED] and that he did not always have money for birthday or Christmas gifts. [REDACTED] admitted to purchasing Xboxes, groceries, gift cards, and the multitude of other items detailed in [REDACTED] credit card statements. [REDACTED] reviewed the items listed on a spreadsheet and agreed that many of them appeared to be items that he had purchased for himself, while some of the other purchases were made for work. [REDACTED] said he still had some of the items at home.

[REDACTED] admitted to taking his annual cardholder training (**Attachment 4**). [REDACTED] said he was aware that what he was doing was wrong and that he had no good excuse why he had done it. When asked if his wife ever used the card, [REDACTED] said he had once given her the credit card account number while on travel so she could FedEx a package to him, though he was not aware she had ever used it other than that time. When asked if his wife was aware of what he was doing, he said that she had asked him on a few occasions where he had gotten the money to purchase certain items. [REDACTED] told her not to ask questions she didn't want to hear the answers to. [REDACTED] also acknowledged utilizing a GSA fleet card to make additional purchases at gas stations for his personal use. Following [REDACTED] interview, he was arrested and removed from his position with the FWS (**Attachment 5**).

Simultaneous with [REDACTED] interview and arrest, OIG agents conducted a search warrant at [REDACTED] residence, located at [REDACTED] (Attachment 6). [REDACTED] wife, [REDACTED] was present in the home at the time the warrant was executed. Approximately 63 items of evidentiary value were seized per the warrant. [REDACTED] was also interviewed by OIG agents, though it was determined she had no knowledge of her husband's activity (Attachment 7).

On March 16, 2012, [REDACTED] was sentenced to three years' probation and must make restitution in the amount of \$28,239 (Attachment 8).

SUBJECT(S)

- [REDACTED]
Program Support Analyst
Division of Migratory Bird Management
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

DISPOSITION

[REDACTED] was interviewed by OIG agents and admitted to misusing more than one government credit card on a routine basis for approximately three years, purchasing various items for his office, for coworkers, and for himself and his family. [REDACTED] was arrested and charged by the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland with one count of 18 U.S.C. § 641, Theft of United States Property. [REDACTED] subsequently pled guilty, was sentenced to three years' probation, and must make restitution in the amount of \$28,239. Following his arrest, [REDACTED] was removed from his position with the FWS. No further investigatory work is needed.

ATTACHMENTS

1. Investigative Activity Report, Interview of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] dated August 23, 2011
2. Documentation supplied by [REDACTED] office, to include credit card statements and spreadsheets of purchases
3. Investigative Activity Report, Interview of [REDACTED], dated October 14, 2011
4. [REDACTED] card holder training certificate
5. [REDACTED] SF-50 for removal from federal service
6. Search Warrant documentation
7. Investigative Activity Report, Interview of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dated October 14, 2011
8. [REDACTED] charging and sentencing documents



**OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Case Title [REDACTED]	Case Number OI-VA-12-0492-I
Reporting Office Herndon, VA	Report Date November 20, 2012
Report Subject Report of Investigation	

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated based on a complaint referred to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) hotline by [REDACTED], Attorney-Adviser and Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official, Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior (DOI), on behalf of [REDACTED] Program Manager and Assistant Associate Director, Park Cultural Resources, National Park Service (NPS), Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] alleged that while employed by the NPS, [REDACTED] former Supervisory Archaeologist and Chief Archaeologist, NPS, Washington, D.C., oversaw the creation of a database called the National Archaeological Database Reports Module (NADB) which contained approximately 350,000 records of published and unpublished archaeological reports. Upon his retirement from federal service, [REDACTED] allegedly directed the University of Arkansas, who maintained the NADB on behalf of the government, to transfer the data to [REDACTED] new employer, Digital Antiquity, who maintained their own database called the Digital Archaeological Record (tDAR) at Arizona State University.

This investigation revealed that the information contained in NADB and subsequently transferred to tDAR was public information, not proprietary government data. This investigation was declined for prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Columbia.

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

The OIG launched this investigation pursuant to the receipt of a hotline complaint made by [REDACTED], Attorney-Adviser and Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Official, Office of the Solicitor, DOI, on behalf of [REDACTED] Program Manager and Assistant Associate Director, Park Cultural Resources, NPS, Washington, D.C. According to the complaint, [REDACTED] alleged that while employed by the NPS, [REDACTED] former Supervisory Archaeologist and Chief Archaeologist,

Reporting Official/Title [REDACTED], Special Agent	Signature
Approving Official/Title [REDACTED], Special Agent in Charge	Signature

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NPS, Washington, D.C., oversaw the creation of a database called the NADB which contained approximately 350,000 records of published and unpublished archaeological reports. Upon his retirement from federal service, [REDACTED] allegedly directed the University of Arkansas, who maintained the NADB on behalf of the government, to transfer the data to [REDACTED] new employer, Digital Antiquity, who maintained their own database called the tDAR at Arizona State University (**Attachment 1**).

[REDACTED] was interviewed concerning his knowledge of the details of this complaint (**Attachment 2**). [REDACTED] explained that the NADB had been developed by [REDACTED] while he was the Chief Archaeologist for NPS in Washington, D.C., under [REDACTED] supervision. The NADB included comprehensive information detailing various archaeological sites throughout the country. This information was compiled and housed on a free website which was maintained and monitored by the University of Arkansas through a cooperative agreement between the university and NPS. In exchange, the University of Arkansas would receive monetary allotments in order to maintain, update, and host the database. [REDACTED] advised that this project had been under the sole purview of [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] had overseen the cooperative agreement between NPS and the University of Arkansas (**Attachment 3**).

The contents of the NADB consisted of both published and unpublished archaeological reports. It was intended to serve as a way for individuals with a “need to know” to get access to information as to what archaeological work has been done and what resources currently existed. This would in turn save individuals a significant amount of time and money.

Upon [REDACTED] departure from NPS sometime in 2010, his replacement, Chief Archaeologist [REDACTED], had come to [REDACTED] and told him that he had noticed that the information in the NADB had been transferred to a non-government organization (NGO) called Digital Antiquity, based on the campus of Arizona State University. [REDACTED] said he found this information disconcerting, because [REDACTED] had gone to work for Digital Antiquity after leaving his position with NPS. In short, [REDACTED] said that both he and [REDACTED] were concerned that [REDACTED] had directed the transfer of the NADB to a company that he ultimately wound up working for.

[REDACTED] said that he maintained a secondary concern, in that since leaving NPS to work for Digital Antiquity, [REDACTED] had returned to make presentations to NPS employees who were in a position to make decisions about whether or not they should do business with Digital Antiquity, including people who had previously worked for him in a peripherally subordinate role. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] had begun approaching NPS employees almost immediately following his departure from the government. As a result of these presentations, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED], Director, Midwest Archaeological Center, NPS, has provided funds to Digital Antiquity to host NPS data. When asked what other NPS employees would have been approached by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] mentioned [REDACTED] and NPS archaeologist [REDACTED].

[REDACTED], Archaeologist, Cultural Resources Partnership and Sciences, NPS, was interviewed (**Attachment 4**). [REDACTED] advised that his knowledge about the NADB, which was being maintained by the University of Arkansas, was limited. [REDACTED] said he was aware that Arizona State University maintained a duplicate database called tDAR. [REDACTED] stated that the NADB had not been significantly updated since approximately 2004; however he said the University of Arkansas was still being paid approximately \$15,000 annually in accordance to a cooperative agreement. In addition, [REDACTED] said that in January 2012, [REDACTED] had sent him an email inquiring about the amount of money that NPS was paying to the University of Arkansas to host and maintain NADB, because [REDACTED]

██████████ believed that he might be able to undercut the cost and bring this business over to his current employer, Digital Antiquity. ██████████ subsequently responded to ██████████ that the rules of ethics did not permit him to disclose such information.

Chief Archaeologist ██████████ was also interviewed (**Attachment 5**). ██████████ said he started working at NPS in September 2011, after ██████████ retired from federal service. Soon after, he received an e-mail from ██████████ who was already working for Digital Antiquity. ██████████ asked if ██████████ would be interested in supplying information to tDAR, Digital Antiquity's database. When ██████████ reviewed tDAR, he noticed that it was a duplicate of the NADB. ██████████ then spoke with a few employees at the University of Arkansas and asked them how the NADB database wound up in tDAR, and they informed him that ██████████ had sent them a letter requesting that the information be transferred. ██████████ surmised that this must have taken place around the time ██████████ retired and became the director of tDAR.

When ██████████ came to the NPS and gave a presentation, he stated that tDAR had over 360,000 references in the tDAR database. ██████████ thought it was curious, as the NADB had approximately 340,000 references, and assumed the majority of tDAR's references came directly from NADB. According to ██████████ tDAR charges individuals to upload their information to the database, as opposed to the NADB database, which was free.

██████████ advised that the NPS continued to fund NADB via a cooperative agreement with the University of Arkansas, though he will be reconsidering renewing this agreement when it expires in 2013.

██████████ was interviewed concerning the allegation (**Attachment 6**). ██████████ said that back when he was still employed by NPS, he was contacted by a group of colleagues out of Arizona who said they had been approached by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation about creating and maintaining an online database where archaeological records could be stored and searched. ██████████ said these conversations took place around 2007 or 2008. ██████████ advised the group to contact ██████████ (**Attachment 7**) at the University of Arkansas, who was in charge of maintaining the NADB for the government, and request a copy of NADB's information which, according to ██████████ "apparently they did." ██████████ did not recall having any discussions with anyone concerning the copying and transferring of this data, since it was all public information.

The Arizona group got the Mellon grant then started a company called Digital Antiquity. ██████████ later learned that Digital Antiquity was looking to hire an executive director, so he applied for the job, interviewed, and received the position. He then retired from federal service and went to work fulltime for Digital Antiquity.

██████████ said he did not believe there was a problem with what he had done, since the information that was copied and provided to the group that later became Digital Antiquity was public information.

SUBJECT(S)

- ██████████ ██████████ former Supervisory Archaeologist and Chief Archaeologist, National Park Service, Washington, D.C.

DISPOSITION

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This investigation revealed that the information contained in NADB and subsequently transferred to tDAR was public information, not proprietary government data. This investigation was declined for prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Columbia. The results of this investigation will be sent to NPS for administrative action, as necessary.

ATTACHMENTS

1. Initial complaint
2. Investigative Activity Report, Interview of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dated July 20, 2012
3. Cooperative Agreement
4. Investigative Activity Report, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 17, 2012
5. Investigative Activity Report, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 29, 2012
6. Investigative Activity Report, Interview of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dated November 20, 2012
7. Investigative Activity Report, Interview of [REDACTED], dated October 12, 2012



**OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Case Title Rockaway Point Yacht Club	Case Number OI-VA-12-0614-I
Reporting Office HERNDON, VA	Report Date May 23, 2013
Report Subject Report of Investigation	

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated in October 2012 by the U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General (DOI-OIG), upon receipt of a letter from the Law Offices of [REDACTED] New York which detailed allegations that the Rockaway Point Yacht Club (Yacht Club) had discriminated against his client by denying his membership application because he was overweight. [REDACTED] further alleged the Yacht Club engaged in clear racial discrimination, intimating that his client was a protected minority. Finally, [REDACTED] alleged the Yacht Club was “monopolizing” the land/property that it was leasing from the National Park Service (NPS) to the exclusion of the general public.

Agent’s Note: The DOI-OIG investigation was focused on whether the Yacht Club’s practices excluded accessibility to the general public. DOI employees were not the subject(s) in the allegation of discrimination.

The DOI-OIG investigation was halted due to the Yacht Club being destroyed by Hurricane Sandy in late October 2012.

BACKGROUND

The Rockaway Point Yacht Club is a non-profit organization that currently leases, occupies and manages approximately one acre from the National Park Service (NPS) in the Gateway National Recreation Area. The current lease began on June 1, 2009 and ends May 31, 2016. The Club includes a small building, a dock and a parking area. After Hurricane Sandy destroyed the Yacht Club the NPS stated it had no immediate plans to rebuild and according to the lease, the Yacht Club may be responsible for rebuilding.

Reporting Official/Title [REDACTED] Special Agent	Signature
Approving Official/Title [REDACTED] SAC	Signature

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The DOI-OIG issued an Audit report (W-IN-MOA-0008-2005) "Private Use of Public Lands" in 2007 which focused on the accessibility of public lands. The audit report found that the Yacht Club's accessibility to the general public was limited.

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

The U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General (DOI-OIG), initiated this investigation after receiving a letter from the Law Offices of [REDACTED] Mineola, New York which detailed allegations that the Rockaway Point Yacht Club (Yacht Club) had discriminated against his client by denying him membership to the Yacht Club (**Attachment 1**). In the complaint letter [REDACTED] also alleged the Yacht Club engaged in clear racial discrimination, suggesting that his un-named client was a protected minority. The Yacht Club leases its property from the National Park Service (NPS) and the DOI-OIG investigation was focused on whether the Yacht Club's practices excluded accessibility to the general public (**Attachment 2**).

In October 2012, a few weeks after this investigation was initiated, Hurricane Sandy, a category 1 hurricane, came ashore near Rockaway New York, devastating the Yacht Club and the surrounding area. In early November 2012, we inspected the Yacht Club and verified that it was a total loss.

When we spoke to [REDACTED] he agreed that the total loss of the Yacht Club changed the perspective of his accessibility allegation; since no one could access the Yacht Club. He also understood that the DOI-OIG was not investigating his allegations of discrimination and we were terminating our investigation.

SUBJECT(S)

None

DISPOSITION

This investigation will be terminated due to the Yacht Club being destroyed by a natural disaster.

ATTACHMENTS

1. Letter from Law Offices of [REDACTED] dated August 21, 2012.
2. Copy of Lease No. GATE022-09 : Lease Between The National Park Service And The Rockaway Point Yacht Club June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2016.