Description of document:	**US Department of State Self Study Guide for Angola, August 2001**
Requested date:	11-March-2007
Released date:	25-Mar-2010
Posted date:	19-April-2010
Source of document:	Freedom of Information Act Office of Information Programs and Services A/GIS/IPS/RL U. S. Department of State Washington, D. C. 20522-8100 Fax: 202-261-8579
Note:	This is one of a series of self-study guides for a country or area, prepared for the use of USAID staff assigned to temporary duty in those countries. The guides are designed to allow individuals to familiarize themselves with the country or area in which they will be posted.

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No.: 200701753

MAR 25 2010

I refer to your letter dated March 11, 2007 regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

We searched for and reviewed the self study guides that you requested and have determined that all except one of them may be released. They are on the enclosed disc. One of the guides is being released with excisions.

An enclosure provides information on Freedom of Information Act exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

We have now completed the processing of your case. If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,

for Margaret P. Grafeld, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

63934 Federal Register/Vol. 69, No. 212
Rules and Regulations

Subpart F – Appeal Procedures

§171.52 Appeal of denial of access to, declassification of, amendment of, accounting of disclosures of, or challenge to classification of records.

(a) *Right of administrative appeal.* Except for records that have been reviewed and withheld within the past two years or are the subject of litigation, any requester whose request for access to records, declassification of records, amendment of records, accounting of disclosure of records, or any authorized holder of classified information whose classification challenge has been denied, has a right to appeal the denial to the Department's Appeals Review Panel. This appeal right includes the right to appeal the determination by the Department that no records responsive to an access request exist in Department files. Privacy Act appeals may be made only by the individual to whom the records pertain.

(b) *Form of appeal.* There is no required form for an appeal. However, it is essential that the appeal contain a clear statement of the decision or determination by the Department being appealed. When possible, the appeal should include argumentation and documentation to support the appeal and to contest the bases for denial cited by the Department. The appeal should be sent to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LC, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, DC 20522-8100.

(c) *Time limits.* The appeal should be received within 60 days of the date of receipt by the requester of the Department's denial. The time limit for response to an appeal begins to run on the day that the appeal is received. The time limit (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) for agency decision on an administrative appeal is 20 days under the FOIA (which may be extended for up to an additional 10 days in unusual circumstances) and 30 days under the Privacy Act (which the Panel may extend an additional 30 days for good cause shown). The Panel shall decide mandatory declassification review appeals as promptly as possible.

(d) *Notification to appellant.* The Chairman of the Appeals Review Panel shall notify the appellant in writing of the Panel's decision on the appeal. When the decision is to uphold the denial, the Chairman shall include in his notification the reasons therefore. The appellant shall be advised that the decision of the Panel represents the final decision of the Department and of the right to seek judicial review of the Panel's decision, when applicable. In mandatory declassification review appeals, the Panel shall advise the requester of the right to appeal the decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel under §3.5(d) of E.O. 12958.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

(b)(1) Withholding specifically authorized under an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and properly classified. E.O. 12958, as amended, includes the following classification categories:

- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
- 1.4(b) Foreign government information
- 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
- 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
- 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
- 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(h) Information on weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

ARMEX	Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2778(e)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
EXPORT	Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. USC 2411(c)(1)
FSA	Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4003 & 4004
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f)
IRAN	Iran Claims Settlement Act, Sec 505, 50 USC 1701, note

(b)(4) Privileged/confidential trade secrets, commercial or financial information from a person

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product

(b)(6) Information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

(b)(7) Information compiled for law enforcement purposes that would:

- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
- (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
- (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (D) disclose confidential sources
- (E) disclose investigation techniques
- (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

(b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions

(b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request, excised with the agreement of the requester

ANGOLA
A Self-Study Guide

GEORGE P. SHULTZ NATIONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TRAINING CENTER
School of Professional and Area Studies
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State

The **Self-Study Guide: Angola** is intended to provide U.S. government personnel in the foreign affairs community with an overview of important issues related to Angolan history, geography, politics, economics, culture, religion, media, and international relations. The guide should serve an introductory self-study resource. The topic is far too complex to be covered in depth using only the text in this guide. The reader is encouraged to explore the questions and issues introduced using the internet and bibliographic sources provided in the text and in the resource sections. Most of the referenced material can be found on the internet or in Foreign Service Institute or Main State Libraries.

The first edition of this guide was prepared by Dr. William Minter, senior research fellow at Africa Action in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this guide are those of the author and attributable sources and do not necessary reflect official policy or positions of the Department of State or the National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC).Staff members of the NFATC made final edits to the draft study submitted by Dr. Minter. All sources used for graphics and extended quotes are public domain, from sites that

First Edition
August 2001
Cover credit: Photograph of statue owned by author.

Table of Contents

Capsule Chronology
Maps
History
Geography
Politics
Economy
Languages and Literature
Religion
International Relations
Selected Bibliography
Angola on the Internet

Capsule Chronology

Early First Millennium - settlement of Angola by Bantu-speaking peoples.
1483 - First Portuguese contact with Kongo kingdom.
1485-1550 - First sugar plantations established in São Tomé and Brazil, using slaves from Angola.
1550-1600 - Kongo kingdom weakened by slave trade and war.
1576 - Foundation of Luanda.
1617 - Foundation of Benguela
1624-1663 - Reign of Queen Nzinga of the Ndongo kingdom, one of the most famous of Angolan leaders who resisted Portuguese control.
1641-1648 - Dutch temporarily occupy Luanda and Benguela.
1650s to 1830s - The slave trade and associated conflicts dominate the history of Angola, their impact extending farther and farther inland from the coast.
1830s to 1880s - Transition from slave trade to trade in other goods, including ivory, rubber and wax. Gradual expansion of Portuguese control inland from the coast.
1880s to 1917 - Portuguese complete their military conquest of Angola.
1884-1885 - Berlin Conference at which European powers decided how to divide up Africa.

1926 - Coup establishes dictatorship in Portugal, which lasts until 1974, under António Salazar from 1932 to 1968.
1956 - Foundation of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
1957 - Foundation of Union of Peoples of Northern Angola (UPNA), that became the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in 1962.
1966 - Foundation of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
April 25, 1974 - Coup overthrows dictatorship in Portugal.
January 15, 1975 - Alvor Accords signed for coalition government and transition to independence.
November 11, 1975 - Angolan independence declared.
May 31, 1991 - Bicesse Accords signed.
September 29-30, 1992 - Multiparty elections mandated under Bicesse Accords held with international observation. MPLA wins parliamentary majority, and President dos Santos wins a plurality barely short of a majority. Runoff is not held as UNITA President Savimbi decides to return to war.
November 20, 1994 - Lusaka Protocol with new peace plan signed.

Maps

The best reference maps can be found in *Atlas Geográfico*, published by the Angolan Ministry of Education with Swedish assistance in 1982. There are also a number of on-line maps available from international agencies, including maps of the current humanitarian situation. A good place to start to search for these is the Relief Web map centre: http://www.reliefweb.int

This map, courtesy of www.theodora.com/maps, used with permission, shows the position and principal topographical features of Angola.

The major river coming in from the coast south of Luanda is the Cuanza. The river flowing into Zambia in the far east is the Zambezi, which flows to the Indian Ocean on the other side of Africa..

The map on the next page shows the provinces into which Angola is divided.

Angola's Provinces

See also the map from the United Nations in the Geography section below.

History

Pre-Colonial

As early as 1,000 years ago, Angola was inhabited by peoples speaking Bantu languages, engaged in agriculture with iron tools and trade over long distances. Before the Portuguese arrived on the coast in the 16th century, African states included the Kongo kingdom and Mbundu kingdoms inland from Luanda. Ovimbundu kingdoms arose later on the central plateau.

Among leaders prominent in early Angolan history were King Afonso I of the Kongo and Queen Nzinga of the Mbundu kingdom of Matamba. In the 16th century King Afonso adopted Christianity, but his efforts at a constructive relationship with Portugal were frustrated by the slave trade. In the 17th century Queen Nzinga resisted Portuguese influence for decades.

King Afonso's exchanges of correspondence with his Portuguese counterparts are among the earliest diplomatic records of the contact of sub-Saharan Africa with Europe. In 1526, in a letter to King Manuel, he deplored the effect of the growing slave trade on his kingdom:

You should know that our kingdom is being destroyed in many ways. These are the fruit of excessive freedom given by your officials and representatives to men and merchants who come here and set up stores with goods and many things which we have forbidden. These they spread throughout our kingdom and domains in such abundance that many of our vassals, whom we had in our obedience, no longer obey.All this does great harm not only to the service of God, but also to the security and peace of our kingdom and state. ...

Many of our subjects so covet the rewards and good of your kingdom ... that in order to satisfy their greed they set upon free men ... and sell these to white men in our kingdom ... And as soon as these are bought by white men, they are ironed and branded with fire and taken to be embarked. If then they are caught by our guards the whites allege that they have bought [these captives], though they cannot say from whom ...

Quoted in Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, pp. 73-74.

The Portuguese soon established control over the port cities of Luanda and Benguela, but they did not conquer most of the country until the late 19th century. The dominant feature of European-Angolan relations until the late 19th century was the slave trade, mostly to Brazil. It is estimated that approximately one-third of the slaves transported across the Atlantic left from the ports of Angola and the adjoining Congo region to the north.

Historian Joseph C. Miller provides a comprehensive survey of the slave trade from Angola in *Way of Death* (1988), tracing the economics and political structure of the trade which linked Angola to the markets in Brazil, the traders from Portugal and the British financiers who provided the financial backing for the complex multi-continental trading system. His work explores the dynamic interaction between violence and trade as rulers were sold guns on credit and then required to repay their debts with human beings whose capture the guns helped secure. The result, in Miller's words, "a moving frontier zone of slaving violence," based on "a political economy in which warlords drew strength from imported slave mercenaries and guns, and in which indebted patrons, elders, and dependent gentry stocked immigrant slaves against future payments on forced loans from powerful merchant princes." Rulers and peoples who resisted were defeated or marginalized, as the system favored those most able to provide the commodity most in demand at the coast: slaves.

Inside Angola the "slaving frontier" moved steadily inland, bringing with it war. In the 16th and 17th centuries the sources of slaves were primarily within a 200 kilometer distance from the coast at Luanda, and a lesser distance inland from Benguela. In the 18th century the primary source of supply moved hundreds of kilometers further northeast of Luanda, and onto the central plateau inland from Benguela. By the 19th century the supply line stretched halfway across the continent.

As seen in the previous section, the common reference to over four centuries of Portuguese colonialism is misleading. Before the end of the 19th century, colonial rule was confined to only a few enclaves. At independence in 1975 Portuguese domination was, for the most part, less than a century old, coinciding with the European occupation of the African interior by Britain, France, Belgium and Germany.

Colonial Portuguese rule in the 20th century was characterized by rigid dictatorship and exploitation of African labor. Despite theories of cultural assimilation, racial hierarchy prevailed. After World War II many new Portuguese settlers arrived, making up 5% of the population by the early 1970s.

According to Portuguese colonial theory, African natives (*indígenas*) could exempt themselves from forced labor by assimilating Portuguese culture and in effect becoming Portuguese. A small number succeeded in meeting the tests of income, education and life style to gain this *assimilado* status. Others, even if not assimilated, were incorporated into the colonial order with some relative advantage over other Angolans: chiefs used in administration, overseers, teachers in mission schools, semi-skilled workers in the ports or administration.

In the 1950s and 1960s the economy grew rapidly, with coffee, diamonds and then oil. But Portugal denied the possibility of independence, claiming that Angola was an integral part of the Portuguese nation. Angolan nationalists were not allowed to organize openly.

Nationalism and the Struggle for Independence

In Luanda, the capital, the tradition of Angolan resistance to colonialism had deep roots. The relatively large number of African assimilados and mestiços provided the context for a 19th-century protest journalism, criticizing Portuguese colonialism and the way in which even educated Africans were shoved aside by new Portuguese settlers. As in other colonial contexts, most Africans with Western education accepted aspects of the colonial system. But Angolan nationalists of the 1950s and 1960s looked back to a literary tradition stressing Angolan identity and protest. It is no accident that the first president of Angola, Agostinho Neto, was also a renowned poet.

The MPLA, led by Neto, grew from this Luanda milieu, coming together as a clandestine organization at the end of 1956. Harassed by police repression, with key leaders in prison or in exile, MPLA supporters launched an armed assault on political prisons in February 1961. In response white vigilantes killed hundreds of Africans in the city's suburbs. The following month an even bloodier conflict erupted in northern Angola. Rebels linked to

the Union of Peoples of Angola (UPA, later to become the National Front for the Liberation of Angola - FNLA) killed hundreds of white settlers in the coffee plantation zone, and targeted mestiços and Africans from other parts of Angola as well. The Portuguese retaliated with vigilantes and troops, inflicting a death toll estimated at up to 50,000.

The Angolan war for independence thus exploded suddenly. It caught both the colonial authorities and the nationalist leaders unprepared. The divisions evident in that initial eruption persisted throughout the thirteen years of struggle against the Portuguese -- and beyond.

UPA had been formed in 1957 in the Belgian Congo as the Union of Peoples of Northern Angola. Led by Holden Roberto, it relied primarily on Kikongo-speaking northern Angola and on exiles in the former Belgian Congo. In the early sixties UPA also recruited student exiles from other areas of Angola, including Jonas Savimbi and his colleagues from the central plateau. The common thread was suspicion of nationalist currents in Luanda, embodied in exile by the MPLA.

Disunity was further fostered by the exile environment. Most found exile in the former Belgian Congo, itself beset by internal strife and the first major Cold War confrontation in Africa. By the end of 1963 the MPLA had been totally excluded from Congo (Kinshasa) and had set up a headquarters across the river in the former French Congo (Brazzaville). Congo (Kinshasa) was controlled by leaders supported by the United States, principally through of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Holden Roberto's movement, now called the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), was also being subsidized by the US. The US goal was clearly to build barriers against Soviet-tied radicalism, by isolating the MPLA in particular.

Disunity and geopolitical maneuvering thus undermined prospects for a sustained guerrilla offensive against Portuguese rule. The FNLA continued actions in parts of the north, as did pockets of MPLA guerrillas northeast of Luanda. The MPLA opened up a front in Cabinda from its Brazzaville base. Zambia's independence permitted the MPLA to launch an eastern front in 1966, which for some years was the most significant military threat to the Portuguese in Angola.

But there were divisions in the east as well. Breaking with the FNLA in 1964, Jonas Savimbi two years later founded the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), appealing primarily to Umbundu-speakers and others from southern and eastern Angola. He installed a small guerrilla operation in eastern Angola, in the same area as the MPLA. UNITA failed to win any open support from African states, but boasted of self-reliance and espoused Maoist rhetoric. By 1971, Savimbi agreed with the Portuguese military to concentrate their military efforts against the MPLA. When the Portuguese coup came in 1974, the MPLA was also suffering internal strife, exacerbated by the difficulties of guerrilla war and of coordination among exile leaders dispersed among different African capitals.

The scenario that followed in 1974-76 played out both the legacy of Angolan divisions and the Cold War dynamics that had previously focused on the Congo. In January 1975 the three movements and Portugal signed an agreement in Alvor, Portugal, calling for a transition government and elections leading to independence in November 1975. But the agreement could only have worked if all the parties, both Angolans and their external allies, agreed on power sharing and a process of confidence-building, or if some external force were neutral enough and powerful enough to hold the ring for peaceful competition. None of these conditions was met.

With Portuguese authority in Angola tattered, none of the three contenders for power held a decisive advantage. The MPLA had perhaps six thousand troops, most recent recruits. The FNLA enjoyed military superiority, with roughly twenty thousand conventional troops and the backing of Zaire. Politically, the positions of the Angolan movements roughly followed the stereotypes attached to them, although the labels oversimplified a complex and changing reality. The FNLA maintained its political base among Kikongo-speaking Angolans, including exiles in Zaire. It offered a program that combined populist rhetoric with promises of security for free enterprise, asking that its leadership be accepted into the emerging bourgeoisie along with white Angolans.

The MPLA offered a socialist vision tempered with pragmatism. Its major assets were popular support among the Kimbundu-speaking population of Luanda and its hinterland, along with a policy of nonracialism and nontribalism that gave good prospects of wider national support. It won loyalty among urban workers, students and middle-level government employees around the country, of all races and linguistic groups. Most whites saw the MPLA as a Marxist nemesis, although the participation of white and mestiço leftists in the movement also exposed it to 'black power' critiques from the other two movements.

UNITA, characteristically, had a less defined program. It sought to rally eastern and southern ethnic groups, while appealing to whites on the basis of opposition to the MPLA's radicalism. More than its rivals, it relied on loyalty to a charismatic leader--Jonas Savimbi. In 1974-1976, in military terms it was by far the weakest of the three movements.

War and The Search for Peace

With virtually no interlude of peace, Angolans moved from the war against colonialism to wars that primarily pitted Angolans against each other. But the ups and down of war were decisively influenced by outside actors as well. The character of war shifted dramatically from period to period: open conventional battles in 1975-76, low-scale guerrilla warfare until 1981, massive South African intervention combined with logistical support for UNITA in the 1980s, an interval of peace in 1991-1992, UNITA assaults on inland cities in the aftermath of the 1992 election, a period of neither war nor peace along with nominal implementation of the Lusaka peace accord from 1994 to 1998, and a return to guerrilla warfare after the collapse of the peace accord from 1999 to the present.

The following sections provide brief summaries of these periods. For more detail on 1975-1992 see among other sources William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras* (1994). On the aftermath of the 1992 election see Human Rights Watch, *Angola: Arms Trade and the Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections* (1994). For the period 1994 to 1998 see Human Rights Watch, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process* (1999). For an overview of the war from 1975 to 1996, see Victoria Brittain, *Death of Dignity* (1998). A somewhat longer and very well informed account through 1996 available on-line is Karl Maier, "Orphan of the Cold War" at: http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wriago.htm

Two eloquent descriptions in English are, for 1975, Ryszard Kapuscinksi, *Another Day of Life* (1987) and, for the late 1980s and early 1990s, Karl Maier, *Angola: Promises and Lies* (1996).

1975-1976

In January, only a few days after the Alvor Agreement, the US decided at the White House level to allocate $300,000 to support the FNLA. On January 31, the transitional government was sworn in. Within days, localized conflicts between the MPLA and FNLA began again. On February 13, the Luanda office of the MPLA splinter group leader Daniel Chipenda was attacked by the MPLA. Chipenda then joined the FNLA, and became its assistant secretary general.

Two months later, the FNLA launched a military assault on MPLA positions in Luanda, casting the die for a military resolution of the conflict. Popular mobilization and the arrival of Eastern bloc arms enabled MPLA forces to expel the FNLA from the Luanda area in July, after a series of major confrontations. By all accounts the major external involvement in this period was that of Zaire. Mobutu's regime, encouraged by the US, served as patron of the FNLA, supplying funds, arms and even troops. The MPLA had a small number of foreign military advisors, mostly left-wing Portuguese but also a few Cubans. Cuba had been assisting the MPLA since the mid-1960s.

As the conflict in northern Angola continued in 1975, a new area of confrontation opened up in the south, bringing in not only UNITA but also South African and Cuban troops. Savimbi joined Holden Roberto in receiving US support, upped to $14 million for the two movements in July.On August 14, the transitional government established by the Alvor Agreement officially collapsed.

The US also encouraged South Africa to join the anti-MPLA military alliance. South Africa sent troops into Angola in August, linking up with forces of former MPLA dissident Daniel Chipenda and with UNITA. In October, South Africans, mercenaries and troops from FNLA and UNITA joined in a well-equipped mechanized column of more than three thousand troops to launch a lightning strike aimed at reaching Luanda before the November 11 independence day. Like the US, the South African government hoped to keep its involvement secret.

The decision to escalate and involve the South Africans was opposed by some US diplomats, who doubted it could be kept secret and predicted it would backfire by discrediting the US-backed Angolan groups and provoking further escalation. Indeed, the operation did unravel with amazing rapidity. By independence day, thousands of Cuban troops were arriving in response to Neto's plea for help. The Soviet Union provided arms sufficient to equip the MPLA and the Cubans – by some estimates over $200 million – and by mid-December the anti-MPLA coalition had lost the military initiative.

As the US scrambled to revive the flagging fortunes of its allies with CIA funded infusions of mercenaries and additional arms, the political cover for intervention was collapsing. Revelations of South African involvement tipped African opinion decisively in favor of the MPLA. In the US congressional opposition to the intervention culminated in a December amendment barring further US covert aid in Angola. New escalation was blocked. Pretoria, feeling betrayed, withdrew its armored columns in March 1976.

1976-1988

During this period the pace and extent of the war was closely tied to the fate of Namibia, where South Africa continued to resist independence despite a 1971 international court ruling that its control was illegal.South Africa justified its military intervention in Angola and support for UNITA by citing Angolan support for the guerrillas of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). US-led diplomatic initiatives during this period relied on "linkage" between South African concessions on Namibia and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. This period ended with December 1988 agreements among South Africa, Angola and Cuba laying out timetables for UN-supervised independence elections in Namibia and withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

From the South African troop withdrawal in March 1976 until 1981, the scale of war in Angola was relatively small. Despite two revolts in Zaire in 1977 and 1978, which involved Congolese exiles in Angola and were put down with the intervention of Western troops, Angola and Zaire moved toward detente. Large numbers of supporters of the FNLA, including FNLA troops, returned to Angola; many were integrated into the Angolan army. UNITA under Savimbi withdrew into the countryside, continued small-scale guerrilla attacks, and began to rebuild its military strength with Western-encouraged support from Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa..

The war escalated significantly in the 1980s, however, after the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 shifted the focus of Africa's push for liberation to Namibia and South Africa itself. By that time as well, South Africa President P. W. Botha, who took office in September 1978, had begun the massive expansion of his "total strategy" of direct and indirect military intervention in the region. And the political climate had changed in Washington as well with the coming to power of the Reagan administration.

The war in Angola during this period was effectively at least two different wars, a conventional war in Angola's southernmost provinces, and guerrilla war that extended throughout the country.

The conventional war involved primarily South African troops on the one hand, who invaded and occupied large portions of southern Angola, and Angolan government troops on the other, who periodically tried to advance into UNITA and South African-controlled areas.UNITA participated in these conventional battles as well, but in a clearly secondary role to their South African patrons. For the Angolan government, Cuban troops provided rear base defensive support for the most part, but also decisively intervened in the largest confrontations in 1987- 1988.

In that set of battles – mostly around the small town of Cuito Cuanavale – South African airpower was countered by effective Angolan and Cuban defenses so that it could no longer provide effective protection to South Africa's long-range artillery and troops. Most analysts think that this was one of the decisive factors convincing the South African government that it was better to concede a timetable for the independence of Namibia. Namibia's independence in 1990 marked the end of conventional South African military intervention in Angola.

The guerrilla war during this period was also different from the classic image of a guerrilla war, given that the supply, communications and training for UNITA were provided on a large scale by South Africa, in addition to assistance from other UNITA allies and CIA support following repeal of the congressional prohibition on such aid in 1985. UNITA's "base area" around Jamba in southeastern Angola had little indigenous population and was adjacent to and integrated into South African military operations in northern Namibia. UNITA guerrilla units further afield could count on a motorized supply line by rugged trucks in much of the country and on airdrops in areas further to the north and east.In the second half of the 1980s supply lines through Zaire as well became much more significant.

As amply documented in reports by human rights organizations, both UNITA and Angolan government forces were guilty of massive abuses of the civilian population, with a strategy that involved clearing out areas in "enemy" territory and transporting the population to areas considered under "friendly" control.UNITA also systematically targeted civilian transport and all sectors of the economy. Use of landmines was widespread by both sides, but particularly developed by UNITA as a means of targeting agricultural production as well as military targets. Another strategy widely used by UNITA was the kidnapping of foreign workers, most of whom were walked for weeks or months through the bush, and later released at press conferences in Jamba.

1989-1992

Reference: Bicesse Peace Accord (in English)

http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/ang1.pdf

The 1988 agreements ended conventional South African military involvement. But South Africa, in violation of the agreement, continued to supply UNITA by air and through Zaire.Disappointing Angolan government hopes, the U.S. continued its military support

for UNITA. In its last stage of disintegration, the Soviet Union nevertheless continued to supply Angola with weapons for defense. The war continued. In May 1991, after two years of talks, the Angolan government and UNITA signed a treaty providing for a cease-fire, troop demobilization and multi-party elections. In the September 1992 elections, judged free and fair by UN observers, the MPLA won 54% and UNITA 34% in the legislative race. President José Eduardo dos Santos, of the MPLA, fell just short of 50% in the presidential contest, while UNITA leader Savimbi had 40%. [See more details below, under Politics.]

After Savimbi refused to accept the election results, Angola returned to war. UNITA, aided by supplies from Zaire and South Africa (then still under the apartheid regime), launched offensives around the country. The government responded, expelling UNITA from Luanda while armed civilians took reprisals against UNITA supporters. In 1993-94, UNITA controlled much of the countryside and some inland cities. Bitter fighting raged in most areas, causing casualties of an estimated 1,000 people a day and physical damage to both towns and countryside far above that of the previous two decades of war. At this stage, UNITA had the clear military advantage, as it had maintained its forces in war-readiness while the government army deteriorated and the new integrated "national army" was only a fiction.

Critics charged that inaction by the U.S. and the United Nations, which failed to protest UNITA's failure to disarm before the election or to react quickly when the war resumed, was in part responsible for the catastrophe. In May 1993, the United States finally recognized the elected Angolan government. In September 1993 the UN imposed an arms and fuel embargo on UNITA. New peace talks began in Lusaka, Zambia, in November 1993. A year later came a new peace treaty, including troop demobilization in exchange for a share of ministries and provincial governorships for UNITA.

1993-2000

Reference: (1) For the period 1995 to the present, the monthly Angola Peace Monitor provides a summary of events and occasional references to other documents. It is available on-line at http://www.anc.org.za/angola and http://www.actsa.org/apm

(2) Lusaka Peace Accord (in English)

http://www.embaixadadeangola.org/frames/ac_paz/ac_paz.htm

Given the recent character of this period and the greater availability of current sources in news accounts and on the web, this study guide provides only the briefest summary here. For more detail consult the references cited above, and, for analyses from different point of view, start with the sources on the next page.

The bottom line is that, despite much discussion on the "lessons" to be learned from the failure of the Bicesse Accords, and international investment in a much more costly UN operation, the second peace process also collapsed.International opinion shifted

decisively against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA army, which was preserved intact despite repeated announcements that demobilization had been completed. Sanctions on UNITA's key diamond exports (see Economics section below) were imposed as the process foundered in 1988 rather than at the beginning to facilitate implementation of the agreement. And Angolan popular disillusionment, already profound with respect to the internal belligerents, was also focused on the outside actors whose strategies for bringing peace were beset with an apparently incurable tendency to mistake words for reality.

Issue for Further Study

The reasons for the successive failures of peace agreements in Angola in the 1990s are, as one would expect, hotly disputed both by the internal and external parties to the war and by those who have played some role in mediating seemingly endless rounds of negotiations (the U.S., paradoxically, at times played both the roles of belligerent and mediator). The issue is far too complex for treatment in this short study guide. Those who are interested should seek out sources in a good research library, as the sources available on-line are very limited.

Several diplomats who have written their own accounts of this period. Margaret Anstee, who headed the UN operation in Angola (UNAVEM II) during implementation of the Bicesse Accords, wrote *Orphan of the Cold War : The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93* (London: St. Martin's Press 1996). Ambassador Paul Hare, who now heads the U.S.-Angola Chamber of Commerce, and was U.S. special representative to the peace process from 1993 to 1998, wrote *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insider's Account of the Peace Process* (US Institute of Peace, 1998).

There is no comprehensive analytical study to date that makes good use of Angolan as well as international sources. The Human Rights Watch report *Angola Unravels* is the most accessible and well-informed factual summary. Shorter analytical studies that are available include C. Knudsen, A. Mundt and I. W. Zartman, "Peace Agreements: The Case of Angola" (http://www.accord.org.za/publications/casestudy/2000-01/contents.htm); William Minter, "Lessons to be Learned from the Angolan Elections: Reliable Guides or Misleading Judgements," in Rukhsana Siddiqui, *Subsaharan Africa in the 1990s* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).A very well informed and carefully reasoned comparative analysis is Thomas Ohlson, *Power Politics and Peace Policies: Intra-State Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa* (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 1998). An analysis and advocacy statement by US and European non-governmental organizations on implementation of the Lusaka process can be found at:

http://www.africapolicy.org/docs96/ang9603.1.htm and

http://www.africapolicy.org/docs96/ang9603.2.htm

The UN Secretary-General's regular reports on peacekeeping missions since 1994 are available on-line at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm

Geography

Located in southwestern Africa, Angola is roughly square in shape, with a maximum width of about 800 miles (1,300 kilometers), Angola covers 481,354 square miles (1,246,700 square kilometers), including the Cabinda enclave, which is located along the Atlantic coast just north of the Angola-Congo (Kinshasa) border. Angola is bordered to the far northwest by Congo (Brazzaville), to the north and northeast by Congo (Kinshasa), to the east by Zambia, to the south by Namibia, and to the west by the Atlantic Ocean. There are 1,025 miles of coastline.

The coastal plain in Angola is narrow, mostly between 30 to 90 miles in width. From the plain the land rises sharply in a series of escarpments, leading to the interior plateau which forms the eastern two-thirds of the country. Even before the recent war-related population movements which have swelled Angola's coastal cities, the density of population in most of the country was sparse and highly uneven, with densities above 40 persons per square kilometer only in the rural areas inland from Luanda and on the central plateau around Huambo and Bié. Vast portions of eastern and southern Angola have densities of less than 5 persons per square kilometer, and the most remote area in the southeast was known in colonial times as "terras do fim do mundo" (lands at the end of the earth).

Urban population growth has been extremely high due to war-related displacement, and some estimates indicate over 50% in urban areas, as compared to only 14% in 1970. Luanda's population is estimated at over 3 million, or approximately one-fourth of the population of the country. Another 3 million are estimated to be living in other major cities of Lobito, Benguela, Huambo, Lubango, Malanje, and Uíge.

The Benguela Railway, which crosses Angola, served in colonial times as the outlet for trade of the Belgian Congo's copperbelt. But international traffic was suspended entirely due to the war in the early 1980s, and in the early 1990s the segment linking the interior to the coast were also cut. An Italian company began rehabilitation of the line in 1997.

With the continuation of war, road traffic is also precarious in Angola. Passenger as well as commercial traffic and relief deliveries depend on costly air transport. The map of the domestic routes of TAAG (the Angolan national airline), shown on the next map, is revealing both of the country's focus on the capital and of the remoteness of areas beyond the provincial capitals served by the airline..

Source: http://www.taag-airlines.com/rota_nac.htm

The most recent color version of this map can be found on-line, in PDF format, at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/angola.pdf

Angola has a tropical climate with a marked dry season. Most of the coast, except in the far north, is very dry. Vegetation over most of the country is savanna grasslands with scattered trees.

Angola's central plateau has significant agricultural potential. Indeed, Angola is potentially one of the richest agricultural countries in Africa. In the mid-1970s it was self-sufficient in foodstuffs and exported a surplus of maize. Yet the war and the failure to reestablish economic connections between city and countryside mean that this potential is not yet exploited. For the 2000/2001 marketing year, for example, the FAO estimated domestic cereal supply at 540,000 tons, leaving import requirements at 753,000 tons.

Subject for Further Study: Cabinda

With less than one percent of Angola's land area and less than two percent of its population, the enclave of Cabinda produces between 60 and 70 percent of the country's total oil production. It is separated from the rest of the country by the Congo River and by a narrow strip of land which is part of Congo (Kinshasa), and is bordered on the north by Congo (Brazzaville).

Cabindan nationalists seeking independence for the territory have had significant support in the territory since the 1960s, but have been divided into numerous factions and had little success in gaining support for their cause internationally or in gaining greater benefits for the people of Cabinda from either the colonial or post-colonial government of Angola.

FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) was founded from a merger of several other groups in 1963, and small groups of guerrillas associated with the group have been sporadically active since then. FLEC successfully called for a boycott of the 1992 elections, and only 12% of potential voters participated. The Catholic bishop of Cabinda was quoted as saying that over 95% of Cabindans would vote for independence if offered the choice.

Without that option – sure to be rejected by any Angolan government – Cabindans currently give little active support either to FLEC or to the government. The provincial government receives 10% of the oil taxes paid by Cabinda Gulf. Cabindans occupy most

top posts in the provincial government, and a few Cabindans are prominent in the national government.

However, negotiations between the Angolan government and some FLEC factions have not led to a stable settlement. Nor have oil revenues been applied to significant economic development in the province. Most observers see continuation of low-scale violence as the most likely prospect.

For a short background article about Cabinda in French, see

http://www.chez.com/cabinda/francais/enclave_or_noir.htm

Politics

The politics of the post-colonial period was, and still is, fundamentally shaped by the unresolved war. Yet the issues that ostensibly defined the conflict – Cold War, the liberation of Southern Africa, and party ideologies – are little help in defining the real differences between the parties. Moreover, while party allegiances hold some relationship to ethnic and regional divisions, as seen in the 1992 election results, that too would be a highly misleading prism for understanding Angolan politics. The tangled history of the war, the extent to which political alliances are linked to private business and personal connections, and the widespread disillusionment of Angolans with all political leaders allow for no simple interpretation of the current political scene.

While no third party has effectively challenged the preeminence of the principal protagonists of the war, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), neither group is a coherent unity. MPLA party loyalists are only a small fraction of those who trace their political roots to that movement. The UNITA heritage is disputed by the army following Jonas Savimbi in the bush, others who participate in parliamentary politics under the UNITA label, and still others who have joined the government while not abandoning their political heritage. The most popular political option in Angola is almost certainly "none of the above."

In formal terms the political system under the MPLA prior to the Bicesse peace agreement of 1991 was a one-party state on a Marxist-Leninist basis. In practice party membership was small and bureaucrats who were not party members also had substantial influence. Factionalism within party and state, together with the inefficiency inherited from the colonial bureaucracy, often paralyzed policy formation and implementation. The first national People's Assembly was elected in 1980, but had relatively little authority. Although the strongest influence within the state was the presidency, in practice even the president had to conciliate many internal factions.

While it is little discussed in almost all accounts of Angola, the abortive coup of May 1977 led by MPLA dissident Nito Alves, in which key party officials were killed by the abortive coup-makers, and unknown numbers were executed in the wake of the coup's failure, was decisive in solidifying a climate of suspicion and fear within party ranks, which still has profound effects in Angolan society.

UNITA's administration in zones under its control was also based on Marxist- Leninist principles, although for public relations purposes the movement exalted a commitment to Western democratic values. Control was far more consistently implemented than in zones controlled by the government, and was highly centralized in the person of Jonas Savimbi. Internal rivals and protest were ruthlessly repressed, although little information about these purges leaked to the outside world until the late 1980s.

Constitutional reforms enacted by the government during 1991 provided for a national assembly and a president, each elected by direct suffrage on a secret ballot. While separate rights and duties were defined for both branches, the constitution retained a strong role for the president. Details of the electoral system were specified in an electoral law passed in April 1992.

The electoral system provided for presidential and legislative votes during the same two-day period, with voters qualified by registration cards distributed earlier in the year. It was administered by a National Electoral Commission chaired by a former FNLA supporter and including representatives of all parties. All parties were entitled to have representatives at every level down to the local polling station; both the MPLA and UNITA were present in almost every station. A second round was required in the presidential contest if no candidate gained more than 50%. Five legislative seats were allocated to each province, for a total of 70; within each province these were allocated proportionately by the D'Hondt method. In addition, 130 were allocated on the basis of the national vote.

During the election campaign, none of the new small parties, or the historical FNLA, managed to gain much support, despite popular disillusionment with the government and fear of UNITA. (The oft-cited slogan in Luanda was "MPLA thieves, UNITA murderers." Most people may have voted against rather than for, but felt they did not really have a third choice.) Election campaigning was relatively free and open in the cities, with all parties having equal access to free television time. Freedom of movement was difficult in the countryside, however, particularly in areas under UNITA control. Peace treaty provisions mandating demobilization of troops and formation of a new national army were delayed on both sides, and systematically evaded by UNITA. During the campaign President dos Santos projected an image of peacemaker, while Savimbi's belligerent style shocked many Angolans.

The election itself was conducted in an orderly fashion, with observers of the rival parties present at polling stations, and a total of almost 800 international observers from the UN, and other private and public delegations. The observers generally rated the process free and fair, and there was a high turn-out of over 90%. The MPLA won 54% in the

legislature, as compared with 34% for UNITA. President dos Santos, of the MPLA, fell just short of 50%, compared with 40% for UNITA leader Savimbi, requiring a run-off. UNITA rejected the results as fraudulent, however, and Angola returned to war.

For Angolans of all political persuasions, the election was a time of hope, and its aftermath a profound disillusionment. Although many saw it as a vote for peace rather than an exercise in choice of leadership, and in rural areas many probably doubted the secrecy of the ballot and voted for those they feared the most, the commitment to make the process work at local levels was impressive. Although the results revealed the expected regional concentration of votes, substantial minorities in almost every province voted against their presumed "natural" allegiance, as shown in the table of provincial votes on the next page.

Presidential Election Results, September 1992

Candidate	Votes	Percent of Total
José Eduardo dos Santos (MPLA)	1,953,335	49.57
Jonas Malheiro Savimbi (UNITA)	1,579,298	40.07
Alberto Neto (PDA)	85,249	2.16
Holden Roberto (FNLA)	83,135	2.11
Honorato Lando (PDLA)	75,789	1.92
Luís dos Passos (PRD)	58,121	1.47
Five other candidates (<1% each)	105,596	2.68

MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
PDA - Angolan Democratic Party
FNLA - National Front for the Liberation of Angola
PDLA - Democratic Liberal Party of Angola
PRD - Democratic Renewal Party

In April 1997, after repeated delays, the elected UNITA deputies took their seats in the national assembly, and a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) was officially established.. However, Savimbi refused to participate, maintained his army, and the war resumed full-scale by the end of 1998. Almost all of UNITA's historical leaders other than Savimbi had by that time opted for the city rather than the bush.

While the dominant political discourse continued to reflect the historical bipolar division between the MPLA and UNITA, and the failure to resolve the war continued to dominate the political agenda, a wider range of political views was gradually reflected in the diverse political origins of government and army personnel, in the official "opposition" within the national assembly, and, most significantly, in the cautious emergence of independent press and civil society organizations, including those linked to the churches.

Legislative Election Results, by Province and Party

Province	% MPLA	% UNITA	% Others	Total Votes
Cunene	87.64	4.58	7.78	102,958
Kwanza Norte	86.26	5.62	8.12	118,493
Malanje	78.04	11.00	10.96	238,247
Cabinda	77.62	16.09	6.29	9,595
Kwanza Sul	71.90	19.96	8.14	306,098
Luanda	70.66	18.75	10.59	751,865
Bengo	69.91	17.61	12.48	78,085
Namibe	66.65	24.14	9.21	63,700
Lunda Norte	65.52	7.46	27.02*	118,578
Huíla	63.73	25.97	10.30	385,925
Moxico	58.49	24.06	17.45	113,437
Lunda Sul	53.81	3.87	42.32*	69,335
Uíge	51.88	30.20	17.92	262,474
Benguela	37.36	53.58	9.06	486,451
Zaire	31.66	25.58	42.76**	63,922
Kuando Kubango	21.75	71.54	6.71	122,735
Huambo	15.52	73.40	11.08	394,107
Bié	13.75	76.97	9.28	266,260
All provinces	53.74	34.10	12.16	3,952,265

* The PRS won 15.66% in Lunda Norte and 41.55% in Lunda Sul.

** The FNLA won 31.37% in Zaire province.

The civil society initiatives that have emerged since 1998 involve a variety of groups and coalitions, and key participants have a conscious strategy of maintaining openness and flexibility rather than creating another "party" seen as seeking power for itself. There are common themes, however, illustrated in the statement excerpted below, one of the earliest of such public statements.

PEACE THROUGH DIALOGUE

Luanda, April 2, 1999

The Angolan Group of Reflection for Peace

(Daniel Ntoni Nzinga - Reverend; Carlinhos Zassala - Professor of Agostinho Neto University; Filomeno Vieira Lopes - Economist; Francisco Tunga Alberto - General Secretary, FONGA; Rafael Marques - Journalist)

[full text available at http://www.africapolicy.org/docs99/ang9906a.htm]

The time has come to address, in the public fora, the promotion of dialogue as the only way to seek adequate solutions to end the Angolan holocaust. Such a dialogue must be inclusive, in regards to all the groups and different aspirations of civil society, and throw away the idea that without foreigners Angolans are incapable of talking to each other, and devise their own way to achieve national reconciliation. War, contrary to what has been announced by the government, will not end with war. It will continue to devastate the Angolan people and their poor material belongings. ...

On the other hand, it seems to be rather difficult to talk about peace and peace initiatives, without first addressing the issue of justice. The act of acting out of the truth of the facts. ...

Concerning the current situation of Angola, a lot has been said and it is enough to generate an internal wave, a wave in favour of the defenceless victims that are slaughtered every day throughout Angola. The least Angolans can do for themselves, at this point, is to abandon fear and challenge the terror so as to call upon the reason of power holders, who do not hold the truth, to answer for the Angolan holocaust.

It is unjustifiable for Angolans, who are still sensible, to continue lamenting the fate of their sisters and brothers from Malange, Kuito, Maquela do Zombo, Andulo and Bailundo, as if it was a foreign holocaust.

The sentiment being forged in Luanda, the capital of Angola, whereby all the decision making and social definition centres are concentrated, must not continue to scorn what is happening elsewhere in the country.

We have been witnessing, with deep concern and sorrow, incitation to hatred, to death penalty of those labelled as enemies, and thus, we see an Angolan sowing hatred in the chest of other Angolan, on behalf of a power that does not serve the people.

In mainly the rural areas, civilians are being killed just for the sake of having been left alive by one of the belligerents, under the accusation of being informers of the enemy. Those who sometimes refuse to join any of the warring parties often also face the same destiny.

Since the resumption of the all out war, last December, more than 700,000 people have been forced to leave their homes and are living as displaced in inhumane conditions, relying exclusively on the mercy of the humanitarian industry. The dead are no longer being counted, neither the civilians nor soldiers while material loss is also being unaccounted for. ...

War has not been serving the Angolan people. They do not want war, regardless of its motivation, because this is a war against themselves and in which they are the only defeated ones.

No one has the right to talk on behalf of the people to carry out this civil war, either with the argument of defending the sovereignty or of resistance. People have not been consulted.

It no longer matters to point the finger to who is doing the war for the power and/or for enrichment or the maintenance of individual privileges. Therefore, it is important to gather together all the civil society sensibilities, eager for peace and social justice in order to converge the utmost public interests and peaceful struggle for a common and just cause. To end with the hatred and political intrigue which foments the division and destruction of the Angolan people.

As a reminder, successive peace processes for Angola have failed one after the other due to the lack of political willingness from both government and UNITA, in tune with the immediate interests of the International community in Angola.

There is still an opportunity for the resolution of the civil war: the recourse to civil society is the only surviving factor to set the fundamentals for overcoming the war. There is an urgent need for the intervention of civil society, with its own and autonomous voice, with the absolute denial of the war idea and as the main factor of harmonising all interests, humanly justifiable, which exist in society.

The absolute promotion of an internal dialogue, and with every local stakeholder, is the only way to seek adequate solutions towards the end of the Angolan holocaust.

Since Alvor, passing by Mombaça, Gbadolite, Bicesse, Addis Ababa, Abidjan up to Lusaka, the peace talks for Angola have always been mediated and pressed by foreigners.

As Angolans, we have to abdicate the alarms of our intolerance which leads as to wars, and then having to wait for outsiders, supposedly neutral, to mediate our crisis.

Angolans must be able and bear the responsibility for developing an internal capacity for mediating the conflict, from the bottom to the top. We must show our political and civic maturity in the resolution of the conflict's causes which generate violence among us.

It is time to join hands, unite mind and hearts, and to work together towards the common goal: PEACE.

Among other related sources, see also the web site for the Catholic-initiated Congresso pela Paz:http://www.ecclesia.pt/destaque/angola.htm

---

Economy

The Post-Colonial Economy

In 1973, the last and best year for Angola's colonial economy, oil and coffee contributed 30% and 27% respectively to export earnings. One-third of the coffee production came from African farmers. Maize production was over 700,000 tons, including over 100,000 tons for export. Diamonds and iron ore also provided significant export earnings. But this system, which showed almost 8% growth rates between 1960 and 1974, still depended on administrative force for most agricultural production, and on Portuguese manpower for key economic functions in every sector except oil. Production on Portuguese-run farms provided 86% of agricultural production. Portuguese bush traders provided the commercial link tying peasants to markets. Settlers provided both markets and manpower for a growing industrial sector.

Once this economic structure collapsed, in the wake of the settler exodus and war of 1975-76, it was never restored or replaced on more than a piecemeal basis. Efforts to do so were impeded by the war and by ineffective policies, but also because there was an easily available alternative that was not affected by the settler departure. Oil production, which began in 1968 and grew rapidly, was under the control of large multinational companies--not the Portuguese. Independent Angola worked closely and cooperatively with the global oil industry, and oil revenues provided the essential resources both for defense and for feeding the burgeoning urban population. By the mid-1980s oil consistently provided over 90% of export earnings and over 50% of state revenues. Much of the rest of the economy, with the exception of diamond production, fed indirectly from oil revenues. The countryside sank into neglect.

It is an oft remarked irony that the economy of an allegedly Marxist state depended almost entirely on Western big business. And there was nothing uniquely socialist about the national oil company Sonangol, which took charge of the country's oil resources in 1976. The petroleum law of 1978 established joint ventures with private companies and production sharing agreements by which foreign companies served as contractors to Sonangol. More than twenty companies, including American, French, Italian, Japanese and Brazilian, were involved by the mid-1980s. The largest was still Cabinda Gulf, which became a subsidiary of Chevron in 1984.

The largest oil fields were off Cabinda, but other sites, mostly offshore, extended south of the Zaire River and down the Angolan coast to the Namibian border. Oil production rose steadily, from under 200,000 barrels a day in 1980 to more than 500,000 barrels a day in the early 1990s. New oil investment averaged over $400 million a year in the 1980s, and even after the return to war in 1992 oil companies were bidding actively for exploration permits. In 1993, the Economist Intelligence Unit noted that Angola had "an excellent track record for exploration drilling successes and amicable industry-government relations." The easy money from expanding oil production was enough to compensate for falling world oil prices. While oil prices dropped from a high of almost $39 a barrel in January 1981 to $26 a barrel in 1985, Angolan oil revenues still grew from $1.3 billion to $1.9 billion in the same period. Even when prices dropped below $20 a barrel after 1985, revenues continued to climb. But with rising payments due on earlier debt, balance of payments deficits mounted, and available funds for imports dropped drastically. The

shock both led to internal plans to move in a free market direction and accelerated efforts to reach agreement on membership in the World Bank and IMF.

The pattern, however, had been set. Under ideal conditions, perhaps, much of the oil revenue would have been invested in rehabilitating the shattered transport infrastructure, and in providing tools and consumer goods for sale to peasant farmers in exchange for food supplies for the cities. Instead, revenues went overwhelmingly for defense and to import food and other consumer goods for the cities. Despite high defense expenditures, secure land transport to rural areas became ever more elusive as conflict mounted in the 1980s. The most productive areas for grain were in the central plateau and further south in Huíla. But urban population was concentrated in Luanda, linked to provincial capitals mainly by expensive air transport.

The difficulties were real: war damage, the lack of commercial networks, and the inefficiency of state structures set up to fill the gap. But the failure was compounded by the fact that money for imports was available. Feeding the cities with imports, arguably a necessary short-term expedient, became a structural feature of the economy. The countryside became no more than an afterthought. The enclave effect of the oil sector, common to any less developed oil-producing country, was multiplied both by the disappearance of the colonial trading networks and by insurgent attacks aimed precisely at breaking the remaining links between city and countryside. Nor was there any strong countervailing force within the government to campaign against the path of least resistance: imports paid for with oil money. Little was left over for productive investment in development of any kind.

As a result, the vast majority of rural dwellers reverted to subsistence production. State farms, along with a handful of private commercial farms, continued to produce export crops but at drastically lower production levels. Abandoned Portuguese farms fell to state control, but in practice much of their land was appropriated by individual peasant families. Commercialized production of domestic staples stagnated at less than 10% of pre-independence levels. For most peasants, there was no opportunity to sell a surplus, and few goods to buy if they did sell. The state had only a fraction of the capacity needed to administer the enterprises, and only about 3% of the government budget was allocated to agriculture.

As long as they were not directly touched by war, peasant families were largely left to their own devices. But they had little access to outside goods, hampering even subsistence production. In the mid-1980s maize seed inputs were less than 10% of the quantity required. The supply of hoes also consistently fell short. Families increasingly turned to more resilient crops such as cassava, millet and sorghum. Tens of thousands fled war and sought opportunities for survival in the cities. The urban population grew from 18% of the total in 1975 to 31% in 1986. By 1990 over half Angola's population was estimated to be living in urban areas.

Although only about half of industrial enterprises came under state control at independence, leaving a substantial private sector, industrial production also plummeted.

Output in 1977 was only 18% of that in 1973. By 1985 output had recovered, but only to 54% of the 1973 total, constrained by lack of management and shortage of raw materials. Urban consumers therefore not only lacked domestic agricultural supplies, but faced shortages of manufactured goods. Even light industries such as textiles and shoes fell significantly short of recovering 1973 production levels.

Oil monies were sufficient to maintain a minimum level of imports for towns, but little more. Urban consumer demand was not satisfied, there was only a trickle left over for rural areas, and essential inputs for both agriculture and industry were in short supply. There was no hope of addressing the fundamental issues unless the link between city and countryside was restored, so that the food deficit would be met by domestic production and peasants would have income and goods to purchase from the market. State policies did not cut the link initially--that was the result of the first stage of war in 1975-76 and the Portuguese exodus. Nor is it clear that alternate free-market policies could have restored the links under war conditions. But there is no doubt that state policies failed to address the crisis. The survival mode of dependence on oil-bought imports, allocated by an inefficient bureaucracy, was one with no ready exit.

Price-controlled goods sold in state shops provided only minimal supplies to the urban population, with access pegged to employment. Salaried employees (*responsáveis*) had access to somewhat better supplies, and a small number of top officials enjoyed comfortable living standards on official rations. But, in the words of the Economist Intelligence Unit, the price control system was "so extensive and rigid, yet also so disorganized and incoherent, that it produced extreme distortions of relative values." The result was a burgeoning parallel economy, illegal and unregulated but tolerated by the state, where free enterprise and corruption ran rampant. Average citizens had to resort to the parallel economy for survival, and entrepreneurs in and out of state employment found opportunities for large profits. The goods came from resale at higher prices of purchases from state shops, from products allocated to workers at their place of work and, increasingly, from theft and fraud. Everyone had to have an *esquema* (scheme) for combining complex barter of goods and favors with transactions in Angolan kwanzas and hard currency.

Behind the facade of a state-run economy, therefore, existed another economy highly responsive to market forces. But it was only partially related to production, as peasants and rural traders found transport possible and urban vendors hawked small-scale crafts. Instead it consisted for the most part of recirculating imported goods, while draining off the energies of the work force from their formal employment. Those who made money in this free-wheeling environment included not only those with political clout but also significant numbers of Kikongo-speaking entrepreneurs returned from Zaire and Umbundu-speaking merchants from the central plateau.

Oil both saved the economy from total collapse and postponed the search for other solutions. With falling world oil prices, Angola introduced a series of economic adjustment plans between 1983 and 1990. The plans envisaged adjustments in exchange rates and prices, curbs on imports, encouragement for rural producers, scaled-back

government payrolls and a reduced role for state planning. But only the 1990 program, a year after Angola joined the World Bank, was implemented in more than a fragmentary way. Angola's balance of payments turned consistently negative beginning in 1986, with a $300 million deficit, and was running an annual deficit of over $900 million by 1989.

Current Economic Situation: Oil and Diamonds

Angola's economy is dominated by oil, which accounted for 88% of the $5.3 billion of export earnings in 1999. Almost all the remaining 12% export value came from diamonds, with all other commodities coming to less than half of one percent.

Angola is sub-Saharan Africa's second largest oil producer behind Nigeria. Almost all production is in Cabinda or offshore, adjacent to Cabinda as well as along the coast north and south of Luanda. Production has quadrupled since 1980, averaging 766,000 barrels a day in 1999.

While the current production comes from shallow-water wells, deep- water wells are expected to provide an increasing fraction of production in coming years, with the oil industry expected to invest as much as $5 billion a year in new exploration and production.

In addition to royalties, foreign companies pay a "signature bonus" for the right to operate a given exploration block. In 1998-1999, for example, BP Amoco, TotalFinaElf and ExxonMobil paid a total of $900 million for rights in deepwater blocks 31-33. Depending on such bonuses and on the international price of oil, revenue from oil may vary widely from year to year.

In 1999, oil revenues paid to the government accounted for 87.2% of government revenue and 42.4% of gross domestic product. However, these figures may even underestimate the importance of oil given that much of oil revenue coming to the Angolan national oil company Sonangol does not appear in the government budget.

Accountability for oil revenue has been a major issue both for international financial institutions and for non-governmental critics of the Angolan government.

Subject for Further Study: Angola’s Oil Economy

Sources to consult:

(1) For current oil statistics see the US Department of Energy country report, on-line at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/angola.html.

(2) For non-governmental critiques on oil revenue, corruption, and war:
Global Witness, *A Crude Awakening.*
http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/angola99/cover.htm

For additional Global Witness documents, see:
http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/#oil
Human Rights Watch, *The International Monetary Fund's Staff Monitoring Program for Angola: The Human Rights Implications*, June 2000
http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/06/ango-0623-back.htm

Unlike oil, Angola's diamonds are not located offshore, but in the interior. Most are in the remote Lunda Norte province adjacent to Congo (Kinshasa). Control over the diamond fields has fluctuated with the fortunes of war between the Angolan government and UNITA. The diamond fields, which include both alluvial diamonds and kimberlite pipes, are infamous for their "Wild West" security environment, in which private enterprise smuggling coexists with areas controlled by the government or UNITA..

Recorded exports have increased significantly in recent years, with greater government control over key fields. In 1995 exports worth $168 million were recorded, rising to $629 million in 1999.

In the war in the 1990s, diamond exports provided the most important source of funds for UNITA's arms purchases. In 1998, Global Witness estimated that UNITA gained $3.7 billion from the diamond trade between 1992 and 1998. The international community was slow to act, however, and sanctions on illegal diamond exports were only imposed in 1998. Since then, despite violations, the sanctions are generally regarded as having weakened UNITA's military capacity. Along with the role of diamonds in fueling the wars in Sierra Leone and in the Congo, the Angolan case has helped spark an international debate on "conflict diamonds."

Subject for Further Study: Angola's Diamonds

Sources to consult:

Global Witness, *A Rough Trade*
http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/Angola/cover.htm

For summary see: http://www.africapolicy.org/docs98/ang9812.htm
United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA* ("Fowler Report," March 2000)
http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/angolareport_eng.htm

Current Economic Situation: Overview

[For the most recent statistical information on the economy, see the staff reports from the International Monetary Fund, available on the IMF web site. The September 2000 report is at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=3686.0]

The latest economic plans for Angola have been formulated in close coordination with the International Monetary Fund, in terms of an agreement for monitoring by Fund staff. Non-governmental critics of government policy agree with the international financial institutions in the call for transparency of government finances, but are also critical of the hardship for ordinary Angolans entailed by macroeconomic adjustment measures.

Despite its current income from oil exports and new capital investment in oil, Angola still consistently runs deficits both on its current account and its overall balance of payments. In 1999, for example, a positive current trade balance of $2.1 billion and capital account balance of $1.6 billion were offset by a negative balance on service and transfer payments of $3.9 billion. Angola's long-term external debt at the end of 1999 was $8.8 billion, 43% of it in arrears.

Inflation has been reduced from its crushing levels of the mid-1990s, but was still high and widely variable - 107% in 1998, 248% in 1999, and 325% in 2000. For all but a small minority of Angolans, economic survival requires extraordinary creativity and reliance on the informal sector.

According to the United Nations Development Program, in 1999 sixty percent of Angola's population were below the poverty line. According to the same source, between 1995 and 1999, the income of the richest 10 percent of families increased by 43 percent compared to a reduction of 59 percent for the poorest families. (Cited in FAO Assessment Mission, 17 May 2000, at

http://www.fao.org/giews/english/alertes/2000/SRANG500.htm)

Despite its oil wealth, Angola was ranked 146 out of 162 countries in the UNDP's Human Development Report for 2001.

The humanitarian situation continued to be one of the worst in the world, with large parts of the country even inaccessible to relief operations, as shown in this UN map from May 2001.

Languages and Literature

As with almost all statistics concerning Angolan population, the numbers given forlanguages spoken in Angola rely on data that is decades out of date, and should be

taken with a great deal of caution. The "ethnic map" often seen derives from one prepared on the basis of the 1960 census, and has been recycled and updated since then without the benefit of a new nation-wide census (the 1970 census did not ask the question about language, and the 1983 census results are available only for Luanda and a few other areas).

The rough proportions are as follows. The largest language groups, all closely related Bantu languages, are Umbundu, spoken by the Ovimbundu people of the central plateau (approximately 36 percent), Kimbundu, spoken by the Mbundu people of Luanda and its hinterlands (approximately 26 percent), and Kikongo, spoken by the Bakongo people of the north (approximately 13 percent). Other Bantu languages include Chokwe, Cuanhama and Nhaneca-Humbe.

Population movement, particularly into urban areas, and the widespread use of Portuguese may have significantly altered these figures. A recent commentary notes the existence of many "pluri-ethnic" families. Particularly in urban areas, bilingualism in Portuguese and one or more African languages is common, as is the predominant use of Portuguese by people of diverse ethnic origins.

Despite the multiple conflicts afflicting the country, there is also a strong sense of national identity, or *angolanidade*.This is reflected in various aspects of culture, including dance, sculpture and literature. Literature, and poetry in particular, is closely associated with Angola's public culture, as illustrated in the extraordinarily high sales of books by Angolan authors published in the first years after independence by the Angolan Writers Union. As many as 20 books a year appeared, with some editions of 20,000 or more selling out in a few weeks.

Those interested should consult the books on Lusophone literature in the bibliography. A search on the web for "poesia angolana" or "literatura angolana" will also turn up a few excerpts, mostly in Portuguese. The novels of Pepetela, some available in English translation, are extremely popular in Angola and also recommended as accessible portraits of Angolan society.

Excerpted below, several poems by the first president of Angola.

Agostinho Neto

Agostinho Neto, a medical doctor and first president of independent Angola, was also one of his country's most distinguished poets. He died in 1979. Many of his poems can be found in Portuguese on the web, or in collections of Lusophone African poetry. The most famous published collection is *Sagrada Esperança*, published in Angola by the Angolan Writers Union, and in English translation (*Sacred Hope*) by Tanzanian Publishing House and later by UNESCO. Below are brief excerpts from several of his best-known poems.

Amanhã
entoaremos hinos à liberdade

quando comemorarmos
a data da abolição desta escravatura

Nós vamos em busca de luz
os teus filhos Mãe
(todas os mães negras
cujos filhos partiram)
Vão em busca da vida - *Adeus à Hora da Largada,* 1957

Tomorrow
we will sing songs of freedom
when we celebrate
the date this slavery ends

We are going in search of light
your children Mother
(All the black mothers
whose children left them)
are going in search of light - *Farewell at the Hour of Parting,* 1957

Latas pregadas em paus
fixadas na terra
fazem a casa
Os farrapos completam
a paisagem íntima
A velhice vem cedo - *Civilização Ocidental*

Tins fixed to stakes
driven in the earth
make the house
Rags complete
the intimate landscape
Old age comes quickly - *Western Civilization*

Aquí no cárcere
a raiva contida no peito
espero pacientemente
o acumular das nuvens
ao sopro da História
Ninguém
impedirá a chuva. - *Aqui no Cárcere,* 1960

Here in prison
rage contained in my breast
I patiently wait
for the clouds to gather

blown by the wind of history
No one can stop the rain. - *Here in Prison*, 1960

Religion

Statistics of religious affiliation in Angola are highly uncertain. The 1960 census counted 51% Catholic, 17% Protestant and 32% other (traditional African religions).A web page dedicated to the Pope's visit to Angola in 1992 claims 59% Catholic, 12% Protestant, and 29% "animist," while a "World Church's Handbook" gives 29% Catholic and 41% "other Christian." Particularly in the peri-urban areas, small churches with no affiliation with major denominations have grown rapidly in recent years.

While the churches are seen as one of the important forces now working for peace and national unity, they also have a complicated relationship to the political conflicts of the late colonial and post-colonial periods. In the modern colonial period the Roman Catholic Church was the state church, and the hierarchy strongly endorsed the colonial dictatorship and the war against the independence movements. Protestant churches were strictly controlled, and suspected as disloyal. From the perspective of the far-right colonial regime, Protestantism was seen as virtually equivalent to Communism.

Among the lower ranks of the Catholic clergy, and particular among missionaries from other European countries, there was dissent to this position and some support for African nationalism. The Vatican as well symbolically took a different position when Pope Paul VI met with leaders of African liberation movements in 1970, including Agostinho Neto of MPLA. In the post-colonial period, with Africanization of the Catholic hierarchy in the country, different leaders within the Catholic Church have taken a range of stands on the country's internal conflicts.

The principal Protestant churches, founded by non-Portuguese foreign missionaries, had links with parts of the country corresponding with the three major nationalist movements, thus adding their own distinct overlapping strand to divisions within the country. The Baptists, with missionaries from Britain, had their closest links to the FNLA; the Methodists, with missionaries from the United States, their closest links to the MPLA; and the United Church of Christ, with missionaries from Canada and the United States, their closest links to UNITA.

Despite this historical background, however, it would be a serious mistake to use the links between ethnic background, religious background, and political positionas fixed stereotypes. The churches are a significant social force of their own at grassroots level, and one of the most important components of popular Angolan opinion in favor of peace.

International Relations

Like other Portuguese colonies, and like the Belgian Congo to its north, Angola as a modern territory was defined geographically by rivalries and compromises between larger powers that allowed small European countries to assume control over vast territories they lacked the capacity to govern. It is no accident that some of the most intractable post-colonial conflicts in Africa afflict these territories, which fell subject not only to their own internal divisions but also to multiple external forces.

Angola, moreover, is positioned in a fracture zone between central and southern Africa, vulnerable to geopolitical tremors from both directions. Added to the global Cold War and to the attraction of oil and diamond riches, these factors have created complex and indeed contradictory patterns of international relations.

The Regional Context

At the regional level, Angola's post-colonial conflict was decisively affected by the first major Cold War battle in its neighborhood, which took place in Congo (Kinshasa) beginning in 1960. The failure of Angolan nationalists to achieve unity in their war against Portugal was at least in part due to the exile context in the Congo, where the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and its client Joseph Mobutu promoted Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola at the expense of the more leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

In the 1975-76 war, this earlier lineup helped to determine the pattern of Cold War intervention at that time (see history section above). In the current period, Angola continues engaged in the complex divisions of its Central African neighbors, with UNITA making use of these countries as supply lines and channels for diamond sales and the Angolan government using its military forces to intervene decisively in the internal conflicts in both Congo (Brazzaville) and Congo (Kinshasa). These relationships involve a complex interaction not only of regional geopolitics but also of commercial rivalries, including foreign companies and state actors with interests in the oil wealth of the region.

Angola is also a part of southern Africa, but among the members of the Southern African Development Community it is the least integrated into the region in both economic and political terms. In contrast to Mozambique, with its economy closely linked to the English-speaking countries that surround it, Angola's significant economic ties are almost entirely outside the continent, to countries engaged in the oil sector or selling goods in exchange for Angola's oil revenues. Linguistic barriers, with French the most common second European language in Angola despite a new emphasis on English, still isolate Angola from the rest of the southern African region.

Thus, while the conflicts over the independence of Namibia and majority rule in South Africa led South Africa to decisive intervention in Angola from the mid- 1970s to the mid-1990s, the spin-off effects of southern African stability in the late 1990s has had more limited effects in Angola. Economic links with South Africa have grown, but the

pattern has resembled that of commercial deals with Angola's other external economic partners rather than effective collaboration for development. The relationship between the Angolan and the South African governments has often been tense, with not infrequent misunderstandings and suspicion from Luanda of the residual influence in Pretoria of UNITA's former military and commercial patrons. Relationships between Angola and Zambia have also been strained by charges over UNITA's use of Zambian territory.

In short, the regional context for Angola has provided little support for stability in Angola, and, in the case of the Congos, made its own large contribution to continued instability.

The Global Context

From the beginning of the 1960s until the mid-1990s, Angola's history was decisively influenced by the Cold War context, as is spelled out in more detail in the history section above. The alliance of the recalcitrant Portuguese dictatorship with NATO in the 1960s and early 1970s, the complex international intervention in the key years of 1974-1976, the collaboration of Washington with Pretoria in sponsoring UNITA's war in the 1980s, and the moves toward a regional settlement in the late 1980s and early 1990s form one thread which has left its legacy long after the motivations of those involved have been decisively altered.

For more background on the period 1975-1992 in particular, see chapter 5, “The Cold War Connection,” in William Minter, *Apartheid’s Contras*. The views of a key U.S. policymaker (Assistant Secretary for African Affairs) can be found in Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa* (New York: Norton, 1992)

Throughout this period, however, another thread was present which now seems to be dominant in Angola's external relations. That thread is, of course, oil, accompanied by the other commercial relationships which are associated with imports based on oil revenues. In this part of the picture, throughout the post- colonial period, even at the height of Cold War antagonism, Angola's key external partners have been the U.S. and France. Oil companies from other countries have also gained smaller stakes. Portugal, Brazil and other European countries have also played important roles in exports to Angola, with South Africa gaining a rising share in recent years.

With Angola predicted to surpass Nigeria as sub-Saharan Africa's primary oil producer, the external relations of the oil sector will likely continue to eclipse other considerations in Angola's external relations.

Key Oil Company Players in Angola

Major Players

Chevron, USA

ExxonMobil, USA
TotalFinaElf, France/Belgium
BPAmoco, UK/USA

Also Involved
Agip, Italy BHP Petroleum, Australia
Daewoo/Pedco, South Korea
Energy Africa, South Africa
Falcon Oil, Panamanian registration
Naptha, Israel
Norsk Hydro, Norway
Occidental Petroleum, USA
Ocean Energy, USA
Petrobras, Brazil
Petrogal, Portugal
Petronas, Malaysia
Prodev International, Swiss registration
Ranger Oil, Canada
Shell, UK/Netherlands
Statoil, Norway
Texaco, USA

Selected Bibliography

Note: This bibliography lists only a small selection of books about Angola, and only includes books in English.

History (Pre-colonial and Colonial, including liberation struggle)

Bender, Gerald J. 1978. *Angola under the Portuguese: Myth and Reality*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

Davidson, Basil. 1973. *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press.

Heywood, Linda. 2000. *Contested Power in Angola, 1840s to the Present*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.

Marcum, John. 1969. *The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950-1962*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Marcum, John.. 1978. *The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Miller, Joseph C. 1988. *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

History (Contemporary)

Brittain, Victoria. 1998. *Death of Dignity: Angola's Civil War*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Hare, Paul. 1998. *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insider's Account of the Peace Process*. Washington: USIP Press.

Human Rights Watch. 1999. *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*. New York: Human Rights Watch. Full text available on-line at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/

Kapuscinski, Ryszard. 1987. *Another Day of Life: A Haunting Eyewitness Account of Civil War in Angola*. New York: Viking Penguin.

Maier, Karl. 1996. *Angola: Promises and Lies*. London: Serif.

Minter, William. 1994. *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique*. London: Zed Books.

Stockwell, John. 1978. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Education and Culture (including fiction)

Chabal, Patrick, editor. 1996. *The Post-Colonial Literature of Lusophone Africa*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Hamilton, Russell G.1975. *Voices from an Empire: A History of Afro-Portuguese Literature.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Pepetela, 1996. *Yaka.* Oxford, Portsmouth: Heinemann.

Other

Henderson, Lawrence W. 1992. *The Church in Angola : A River of Many Currents*. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press.

Hodges, Tony. 1993. *Angola to 2000: Prospects for Recovery*. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Hodges, Tony. 2001. *Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

Robeson, Paul, ed. 2001. *Communities and Reconstruction in Angola*. Guelph, Canada: Development Workshop.

Tvedten, Inge. 1997. *Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction*. Boulder: Westview.

van der Winden, Bob, ed. 1996. *A Family of the Musseque: Survival and Development in Postwar Angola*. Oxford: Worldview; Washington: APIC.

Angola on the Internet

As of 2001, there is less information from and about Angola available on the web than for many other African countries, in striking contrast to the wide variety of sources on the other major Portuguese-speaking country, Mozambique. What is available on Angola is primarily in Portuguese, and addressed to an Angolan rather than an international audience. Sites in Angola are heavily used, and may be very slow in loading. For web visitors in North America, consulting these sites in late afternoon or evening, when Angolan usage is at its low point, is the most recommended strategy.

Angola's leading commercial internet service provider and web portal is Ebonet (http://www.ebonet.net), which has news, background information and a wide variety of other features and links. Angonet (http://www.angonet.org), sponsored by the Canadian non-governmental organization Development Workshop, has information from Angolan and other non-governmental organizations.

General Sites

Angolan Government (Embassy in Washington)
http://www.angola.org/
Contains general background on Angola, and English-language documents and press releases from Angolan government.

Angola Peace Monitor
http://www.anc.org.za/angola/ or http://www.actsa.org/apm/
Published since 1995, this monthly bulletin by Action for Southern Africa (London) provides political and economic updates on Angola. A basic reference source.

Library of Congress
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/aotoc.html
Angola country study. Full book-length study available on-line, in small separate files, published 1989.

UNITA (Jonas Savimbi)
http://www.kwacha.org/

This is the perspective on Angola from the wing of UNITA headed by Jonas Savimbi, in English and Portuguese.

News Sites

allAfrica.com
http://allafrica.com/angola/

Integrated Regional Information Network
http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/archive/angola.phtml

Worldnews.com
http://www.angolanews.com/

Compilation by Angolan Embassy, Washington
http://www.angola.org/news/news.cfm

Specialized Sites

Angola Peace Action Network
http://www.web.net/~iccaf/humanrights/angolainfo/angola.htm
Reports compiled by the Canadian Inter-Church Coalition on Africa.

Committee to Protect Journalists
http://www.cpj.org/regions_01/africa_01/africa_01.html
Updates on press freedom issues.

Food and Agriculture in Angola
http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/faoinfo/economic/giews/english/basedocs/ang/angtoc1e.htm
Updates from the Food and Agriculture Organization.

International Monetary Fund
http://www.imf.org/external/country/AGO/index.htm
Contains latest economic reports and statistics.

Religion in Angola
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/emorier/Angola.htm
A collection of links maintained by Eric Morier-Genoud.

US-Angola Chamber of Commerce
http://www.us-angola.org/
Includes membership list and other economic news.

US Department of Energy
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/angola.html
Contains most recent data on Angolan oil sector

Yet More Links on Angola

While many links are duplicated in the listings on the sites below, many are not.

Governments on the Web
http://www.gksoft.com/govt/en/ao.html

Stanford University African Studies
http://www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/angola.html

University of Pennsylvania African Studies
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Country_Specific/Angola.html

Columbia University African Studies
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/africa/cuvl/Angola.html