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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No.: 200701753

MAR 25 2010

I refer to your letter dated March 11, 2007 regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).


We searched for and reviewed the self study guides that you requested and have determined that all except one of them may be released. They are on the enclosed disc. One of the guides is being released with excisions.

An enclosure provides information on Freedom of Information Act exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

We have now completed the processing of your case. If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,



for Margaret P. Grafeld, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

63934 Federal Register/Vol. 69, No. 212
Rules and Regulations

Subpart F – Appeal Procedures

§171.52 Appeal of denial of access to, declassification of, amendment of, accounting of disclosures of, or challenge to classification of records.

- (a) *Right of administrative appeal.* Except for records that have been reviewed and withheld within the past two years or are the subject of litigation, any requester whose request for access to records, declassification of records, amendment of records, accounting of disclosure of records, or any authorized holder of classified information whose classification challenge has been denied, has a right to appeal the denial to the Department's Appeals Review Panel. This appeal right includes the right to appeal the determination by the Department that no records responsive to an access request exist in Department files. Privacy Act appeals may be made only by the individual to whom the records pertain.
- (b) *Form of appeal.* There is no required form for an appeal. However, it is essential that the appeal contain a clear statement of the decision or determination by the Department being appealed. When possible, the appeal should include argumentation and documentation to support the appeal and to contest the bases for denial cited by the Department. The appeal should be sent to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LC, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, DC 20522-8100.
- (c) *Time limits.* The appeal should be received within 60 days of the date of receipt by the requester of the Department's denial. The time limit for response to an appeal begins to run on the day that the appeal is received. The time limit (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) for agency decision on an administrative appeal is 20 days under the FOIA (which may be extended for up to an additional 10 days in unusual circumstances) and 30 days under the Privacy Act (which the Panel may extend an additional 30 days for good cause shown). The Panel shall decide mandatory declassification review appeals as promptly as possible.
- (d) *Notification to appellant.* The Chairman of the Appeals Review Panel shall notify the appellant in writing of the Panel's decision on the appeal. When the decision is to uphold the denial, the Chairman shall include in his notification the reasons therefore. The appellant shall be advised that the decision of the Panel represents the final decision of the Department and of the right to seek judicial review of the Panel's decision, when applicable. In mandatory declassification review appeals, the Panel shall advise the requester of the right to appeal the decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel under §3.5(d) of E.O. 12958.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Withholding specifically authorized under an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and properly classified. E.O. 12958, as amended, includes the following classification categories:
 - 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Information on weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
 - ARMEX Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2778(e)
 - CIA Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
 - EXPORT Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. USC 2411(c)(1)
 - FSA Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4003 & 4004
 - INA Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f)
 - IRAN Iran Claims Settlement Act, Sec 505, 50 USC 1701, note
- (b)(4) Privileged/confidential trade secrets, commercial or financial information from a person
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Information compiled for law enforcement purposes that would:
 - (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request, excised with the agreement of the requester

East Africa Study Guide: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania



Introduction

This self-study guide is intended to provide users with a working knowledge of the nations and peoples of East Africa - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Separate chapters address topics of historical to contemporary interest. Each chapter of the study guide begins with a general overview followed by issues to ponder. Thereafter the user is directed to a series of readings that elaborate on the theme presented. A listing of web sites is also provided. Obviously, the user who follows through on the readings or who even expands his study beyond the specific recommendations will benefit most from the exercise. Self-study involves a bit of legwork. Readings have been chosen from books and articles that are available in the NFATC and Main State libraries, but books may also be obtained from good university or even public libraries. Finally, on-line bookstores carry the essential texts.

Although this East African guide covers all three countries, there is an obvious breakout of topics that pertain more specifically to each nation. These will be identified as one progresses. However, given the commonality of history and of current problems – AIDS for example - one of the fascinations of East Africa is the comparison that one may make between the varying pathways chosen by the three nations. Thus, readers are encouraged to sample readings pertaining to countries outside their immediate focus so as to reinforce comparative judgments and to understand the wider regional context.

Ambassador Robert E. Gribbin prepared this study guide. He lived and worked in all three East African nations from the 1960s onward. He professes to all the opinions expressed herein and accepts responsibility for the errors and omissions.

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
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Chapter 1: Pre-History

Geography

East Africa is one of the most spectacularly scenic parts of the planet because of its geography. Generally, eastern Africa is high and dry. The land rises from the coast to inland plateaus of two to five thousand feet. Statistically most of the land including Kenya's northeast and northwest, Uganda's north and Tanzania's center are very dry. Some places are deserts and others can only sustain the hardest vegetation. Fertile land abounds, however, in all three countries with Kenya having proportionately the least amount relative to its overall area. Nonetheless, East Africa's 100 million people are predominately farmers and they strive to produce crops under conditions, which range from marvelous to terrifying.

The Great Rift Valley is the region's most notable feature. It is the only place on land where the earth's tectonic plates are still moving. Beginning in Jordan, this rift holds the Red Sea, blasts through Ethiopia and manifests itself in two divisions in East Africa, the eastern and the western rifts. The eastern rift valley carves an impressive trough across Kenya and into Tanzania beginning with Lake Turkana and subsequently holding a series of lakes such as Baringo, Bogoria, Nakuru, Elementita, Navashia, Magadi, Natron and Manyara in its basin. The eastern rift valley is characterized by steep walls which provide spectacular views. The valley floor is littered with volcanoes some of which were recently active and countless hot springs. In fact, geothermal production of electricity is growing in Kenya. The eastern rift is Kenya's most dramatic geographical feature, but it does peter out south of Lake Manyara in northern Tanzania.

If anything, the western rift valley is more impressive. It holds Lakes Albert and Edward and the Semliki Nile on Uganda's western border with Congo, then Lake Kivu between Rwanda and Congo, then Lake Tanyanika, the world's second deepest fresh water lake with depths over 5,000 feet, which constitutes the border between Tanzania and Congo. These rift winds further south to cradle Lake Malawi on Tanzania's southern border. This valley also contains much volcanic activity as evidenced by hot springs and fumeroles. Mount Nyiragongo, a volcano near Goma, Congo remains quite active. Eventually, this rift will separate East Africa from the rest of the continent and let the sea flood in. However, that eventuality lies many millions of years in the future.

East Africa's largest lake, Lake Victoria Nyanza (the name itself is a marvelous redundancy - translated from Swahili it means Lake Victoria Lake) lies in a shallow basin between the two rift valleys. This vast body of fresh water provides the livelihood directly and indirectly for millions of people. Because of its size, Victoria creates its own micro-climate of regular rainfall for surrounding areas. Lake Victoria is also the source of the Nile River, which begins its northward flow at Rippon Falls, Uganda.

The highest points on the geographical tapestry of East Africa are mountains. Mount Kilimanjaro, of clear volcanic origin and certainly the most photographic peak in the world, is Africa's highest topping out at 19,340 feet. In probably what was one of the blatant gestures of colonial arrogance, Queen Victoria gave the Mountain to her cousin Willy (Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany) in 1901 as a birthday present. (Check the map and see how the boundary diverts to allow for this "gift.") Kilimanjaro and neighboring Mt. Meru tower over Tanzania's northern border. Further west other large volcanoes, including Ngorongoro, whose collapsed crater is the world's most unique game park, dot the landscape.

In addition to Kilimanjaro, whose northern slopes remain in Kenya, Kenya's main mountains are Mt. Kenya (17,058 ft.), whose snow covered crag dominates the sky of northern Kenya and Mount Elgon (14,178 ft.) which sits astride the western border with Uganda. In terms of surface area, Elgon wins the prize as the largest volcano in the region. Uganda's southern border with Rwanda/Congo is defined by the Virunga Volcanoes, home to the rare mountain gorillas.

Elsewhere Uganda's most prominent mountains, the mystical Mountains of the Moon, known today as the Ruwenzoris constitute part of the western frontier with the Congo. Mt. Stanley's glacier covered peak

Margarita (16,763 ft.) lies mostly hidden from outside view by ever-present clouds. Truly, the remote reaches of the Ruwenzoris resemble land that time forgot with huge ferns, verdant grasses and giant succulent plants dominating a landscape of rare plants and birds. In Kenya other ranges such as the Abedares on the eastern rift wall and the Matthews range in the semi-desert north, pushed upwards by crustal movements, indicate the range of geological forces at work in the region.

Kenya has only two major rivers that reach the Indian Ocean, the Tsavo/Galana and the Tana. A third the Uaso Nyiro evaporates in the northern desert. Tanzania too has only two major rivers, the Rufiji and the Rovuma, that reach the sea. None of these rivers is easily navigable. Historically they have not provided a means of access to the interior or vice versa. Other watercourses in Kenya and Tanzania empty into the lakes of the rift valleys or into Lake Victoria. All of Uganda's streams drain into the Nile watershed and eventually into the great river itself. The Nile begins its 3,000-mile course to the Mediterranean Sea from the northern bank of Lake Victoria (elevation 3710 feet) near present day Jinja. After the dam at Owens Falls, which produces electricity for Uganda and parts of Kenya, the Nile (in this section known as the Victoria Nile) tumbles down through white water rapids to Lake Kyoga. It turns westward and speeds up until it crashes through the nineteen-foot wide portal at Murchinson Falls and drops 150 feet in a cataclysm of spray and thunder. Then it meanders slowly to Lake Albert amidst thousands of hippos and huge crocodiles. Exiting as the Albert Nile from the northern end of the lake, the river contains some fast sections as it passes out of Uganda into Sudan. The cataracts end in southern Sudan from whence the Nile is navigable to Khartoum and beyond.

Early Man

Anthropologists, evolutionists and paleontologists agree that human kind got its start in East Africa some several million years ago. While they agree on the basic assumption to the effect that man evolved from ape like ancestors, they disagree on when this might have happened and as to what the direct lineage was. The ape/man branch apparently had several dead ends including the much later but better known Neanderthal man. In East Africa, however, the dead ends came earlier in the paleontological record and each skeleton or fragment thereof, especially skulls, opens new areas of discussion and debate. The effort is to fully document the evolution of Homo Sapiens (i.e. us) through discovery of missing links. Also, scientists wish to understand the dead ends - why and when. This may seem like arcane science to the uninvolved, but it is very topical in East Africa. National museums in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam feature relics of early man found at Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania (near the Serengeti) or Koobi Fora, Kenya (on Lake Turkana). The distinguished Leakey family (father Louis, mother Mary, sons Richard and Philip) blazed the way but they have been subsequently joined by numerous scientists from all around the world in trying first to find and then to interpret the fossil record. Museum societies in the three capitals often sponsor talks on current excavations.

Modern Man

Leaping forward over the eons of time during which the region apparently sustained almost no people to the modern era, East Africa's population grew and changed over the past several thousand years due to

successive waves of gradual migrations. The oldest peoples currently in the region are remnants of hunter-gatherer clans, related to the bushmen of southern Africa or the pygmies of the Congo basin. Other Africans are usually identified at the broadest level by language group. In this regard Africa's three-principle language groups all meet and overlap in East Africa, especially in Kenya. Most East Africans speak Bantu languages, they trace their distant ancestry to people who pushed out of the Niger River delta region of current day Nigeria/Cameroon to populate most of the continent. The Bantu expansion in Africa took thousands of years and obviously involved lots of assimilation along the way. Tanzania today counts some 120 groups or tribes of people who speak Bantu tongues. Some Bantu tribes, for example the Embu, Meru and Kikuyu people of Kenya are closely related. However, they have major differences with other nearby Bantu tribes such as the Luhya and little in common with more distant groups, such as the Baganda in Uganda.

The second language group present in East Africa is the Nilotic group. As the name indicates people speaking these languages trace their roots to the upper Nile region. The Luo people around Lake Victoria and the Acholi of northern Uganda are classified as western Nilotic, the Masai of the Kenyan and Tanzanian plains are eastern Nilotic and the Kalenjin (President Moi's group) are southern Nilotic. Perhaps because they are more closely related in time, Nilotics tend to have more cultural practices in common than do Bantus.

The third language group is the Cushitic or Hamitic group represented in Kenya by Somali speakers and other emigrants from the Horn of Africa.

Finally, today there are other groups present in all three nations. Most numerous are "Asians," the term used to describe all people from the sub-continent of India. Many of their ancestors came to build the railroads around the turn of the 20th century. Arabs as well have lived for generations in the towns of the Swahili coast. Finally, Europeans - mostly British but including others - collectively called "wazungu" in Swahili compose a small minority of settlers and businessmen.

Even though the people of the region form a complicated mosaic of interacting languages and traditions, individual identity is often defined by Africans themselves in terms of tribe or ethnicity. Increasingly in the melting pots of cities and in the modern sector, tribal identity is breaking down somewhat as class, education, religious or other affiliations become important. That being said, and despite efforts to broaden cross-tribal appeal to deal with issues as they affect all citizens, politics in the region, especially Kenya and Uganda, continue to be defined in many instances by tribe.

One of the unifying aspects of life in East Africa is the growth of Swahili and English as common languages. Swahili is a Bantu language that has incorporated many words from Arabic, English and other languages. Spoken as an original language by the people of the coast, the Zanzibari dialect of Swahili was adopted by the East African Swahili Board in 1943 to be the basis of a standardized language. This version of Swahili became the national language of Tanzania. Under the tutelage of first President Julius Nyerere it spread widely throughout the country. Swahili is also an "official" language of Kenya and can be used in Parliament and in government, even though all documents are still mostly in English. Swahili is less common in Uganda where Luganda (the language spoken by the Baganda people) serves also as a

lingua franca, but Swahili is spoken by many people and is the language most used by the army.

English is the language of the modern sector - business, education, science, government and diplomacy – in all three nations.

Items to Ponder

Why was East Africa the garden of Eden? What characteristics made it conducive to the evolution of early man? Are those elements still present today?

How has the geography of the region influenced national boundaries? One often speaks of illogical boundaries in Africa, is that true for East Africa?

Tribalism will be a theme throughout this study guide. Begin to think about personal and group identity. Who are you? How do you introduce yourself to others? By family, region of origin, profession? What do you associate with that gives you a group identity?

Hujambo! Sijambo! Habari yako? Mzuri (How are you? I am fine! What is new? Fine). As evidenced by this little greeting dialogue, Swahili is a wonderful language and most spoken forms are fairly simple. Swahili words infiltrate English throughout East Africa, for example, "wanainchi," i.e. person of the country, is almost always used in Kenya to the exclusion of citizen. Learn some Swahili (there are many phrase books and the old FSI course is excellent) and you will enjoy your tour.

Readings:

Reader, John. *Africa: A Biography of the Continent*. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1998.

DT20R43

Pages 9-99.

Reader's excellent pre-history of Africa is fascinating. The first sections deal with the development of human kind and are relevant to this opening chapter on East Africa.

Davidson, Basil. *Africa in History; Themes and Outlines*. McMillian, New York, 1991.

DT 20.D28 1991

Pages 7-24, "Peopling of a Continent."

Davidson has written the best history of Africa. Parts pertinent to East Africa will be flagged as we go along.

Web Sites:

<http://history.evansville.net/prehistory.html>


This site has a lot of anthropology links.

www.members.aol.com/Donnpages/EarlyMan.html#EARLY

Quick and easy references to Lucy and other finds in East Africa.

<http://daphne.palomar.edu/hominid/default.htm>

This site contains a series of essays, which provide a more scholarly, journalistic look at the origins of man.



The Tribes of East Africa.

Chapter 2: Early Civilizations

Even as population movements changed the complexity of the hinterlands, a recognizable, distinct and very sophisticated culture grew up along the coast. By about 800 AD small trading towns dotted the coast

line from Sofala in the south (in present day Mozambique) to the Benadir coast of present day Somalia in the north. Trade between these enclaves and the greater world of the Indian Ocean littoral – Arabia to India - flourished for centuries.

The people of these enclaves were the ancestors of the present day Swahili people; African with a good mixture of Persian and Arab included. Their towns were built of coral, which can be easily quarried and carved when wet, but which hardens to stone as it dries. The workability of this material permitted elaborate designs to be carved as ornate decorations to prominent buildings and homes. Settlements from this era evolved into present day Mombasa, Malindi, Kilwa, Zanzibar and Lamu. Other early towns were abandoned when wells dried up, disease struck or war ravaged them. It is from ruins, Geti near Malindi in Kenya is probably the best preserved, that scholars today learn something about the vanished civilization. Collectively this civilization was known as the Zenji Empire, named from a Persian word for black. Zanzibar for example is derived from the same source and means "black coast." Although the word Zenji was appropriate, these towns constituted no empire but rather a collection of independent city-states. While there were often links between ruling and prominent families, the towns usually owed no allegiance to any single sovereign.

Like Venice and Genoa in Europe, the coastal towns existed on trade. They were not centers of production, but merely collectors and forwarders of goods. They took a percentage and lived well. Gold, ivory and slaves constituted their offerings to the east. In turn the Zenji towns imported consumer goods such as porcelain, cloth, brass and other metals. They are known to have had contact with China, India and, of course, Arabia. Even though slaves were undoubtedly part of their commerce, slaving as it was to become in the 18th and 19th centuries was not a mainstay of the Zenji economies.

The geography of the coast was conducive to an independent seaward oriented culture. The coast is protected from greater reaches of the mainland by swamps, escarpments and near deserts. The coastal strip receives adequate rainfall. The climate is conducive to tropical agricultural. The sea provides bountiful food. And the monsoon winds blow consistently from northeast to southwest during half the year then change 180 degrees to blow in the opposite direction for six months. This means that lanteen rigged dhows can ride the winds to the east and back. Although interactions with people of the hinterlands were regular, the towns do not appear to have exercised political or military power beyond their immediate shore side spheres. To the contrary, the towns were apparently attacked and sacked from time to time by raiders from the interior.

Arrival of the Portuguese

This golden, but fragile civilization endured for hundreds of years. Little is known of it, because the people had no written language, or, in any case left no records. The towns were independent but interrelated. Islam was adopted at some point along the way. It probably arrived with Omani Arabs in the seventh century. Real change, however, came in 1498 with the arrival of Portuguese sea captain Vasco da Gama. Da Gama is the best known of a series of Portuguese explorers who, under the initial impetus of Prince Henry the Navigator beginning in 1415, pushed doggedly along Africa's western coast finally to

round the Cape of Good Hope in 1488 (named by its Portuguese discoverer Bartolomeu Dias). The Portuguese quest was for adventure, wealth, power, and new lands. Prince Henry enlisted the support of the Pope who blessed the explorations and fired Portuguese religious zeal to find and aid the mythical Christian king "Prester John" who was reportedly besieged by Moslem infidels.

In the spring of 1498 having rounded the Cape of Good Hope, Da Gama entered unknown territory as he turned northward along the eastern coast. Da Gama missed the first of the Swahili towns, Sofala, at the outlet of the Zambezi River, but he subsequently landed in Mozambique town. There he found a flourishing civilization that was more advanced in many respects than was Portugal's. However, the inhabitants were infidels. That fact, coupled with the reality of superior Portuguese firepower, justified looting the town. Subsequently Da Gama looted other towns as he moved up the coast toward Mombasa, which he found hostile and prepared to resist. He by-passed Mombasa, but word of his inimical intent spread ahead of him so that the rulers of Malindi upon learning of Da Gama's coming struck a bargain with him. In exchange for peace, they would show him the way to India. Da Gama agreed, but before leaving Malindi erected a large stone cross, which he brought from Portugal, called a "padrado" that still stands today upon Malindi's headland.

Although abandoned by his Malindi-provided Arab navigator in India, Da Gama found his way back to East Africa, looted the few towns he missed on the way out and returned to Lisbon. He came back to the Indian Ocean two years later and blazed the way for other Portuguese vessels captained by even more rapacious individuals. Because black infidels peopled the towns, the Portuguese displayed no qualms about reducing them to vassalage. They enforced their will and established military bastions from which to rule. Admiral D'Almedia's conquest of the region was sealed with the subjugation of Kilwa and Mombasa in 1507. The most enduring relic of this era is the massive stone edifice of Fort Jesus which dominates the old harbor entrance at Mombasa. However, rather than military might, it was Portuguese insistence on monopolizing trade that rang the death knell for the Swahili coast. Because the Portuguese did not have the number of ships necessary to takeover or maintain the trade, it declined precipitously. Additionally, the Portuguese wanted more gold than was available and they used force to take what they wanted. Obviously, there was resistance to Portuguese rule plus much clandestine trade. Even though the Swahili coast survived this first brush with European imperialism, it was never to be the same.

Portuguese dominance of the seas and consequently of the East African coast endured 200 years, but left few marks. Only administrators and military men lived in the region. Virtually no settlers came and the staunchly Islamic communities proved immune to feeble missionary efforts. Over time the Portuguese presence weakened. Intrigue and revolts became more frequent. Mombasa was a particularly troublesome place. Fort Jesus fell to local Sultan Yusuf in 1631. It was recaptured by Portugal, but fell definitively in 1698, following a five year siege during which most of the defenders died. Saif ben Sultan who conquered the fort also drove the Portuguese from Kilwa and Pemba in 1699. Having cleared the Swahili coast of the Portuguese, he then returned to Oman to straighten out dynastic issues

To complement weakening Portuguese power in its coastal enclaves, by the end of the seventeenth century the Dutch and the English displaced Portuguese control of the oceans. Since not much of value had been found along the East African coast, it slipped out of the glare of European attention. As noted

above, sovereignty was regained, in the first instance by Imams and Sheiks from Oman who in turn passed control to prominent Swahili family dynasties such as the Mazuris in Mombassa.

Issues to Ponder

What of the Zenji Empire remains in the culture of the coast? Does the tolerance towards others reflect a centuries old contact with the wider world?

Prince Henry the Navigator died long before Da Gama's voyage; yet he caused the development of ships and navigational devices that permitted such voyages to occur. Portuguese discoveries led directly to the Atlantic slave trade and the subjugation of Africa to European powers. Has anyone else had such an impact on Africa? Should Henry be blamed or absolved?

Why were the Portuguese so inept and unable to leave a better legacy in East Africa?

Readings:

Davidson, Basil. *Africa in History: Themes and Outlines.*

Pages 78-82, "Swahili Coast and Interior"

Pages 190-198, "The Portuguese Era"

Davidson, Basil. *African Civilization Revisited.* Africa World Press, Trenton, NJ

Pages 125-165, "Early East Africa."

Web Sites:


www.pbs.org/wonders/Episodes/Epi2/Swahi_2.htm

www.cocc.edu/cagatucci/classes/hum211/timelines/

www.Africana.com

www.geocities.com/Athens/Styx/6497

All three sites contain readable summaries of this epoch along the coast. The latter site focuses more exclusively on the Portuguese expansion.



The Indian Ocean.

Chapter 3: The Omani Epoch

Omani Sultans Rule the Coast

Omani rulers exercised indirect rule over the coast for the next hundred years, but the Sultan only formally re-claimed the coast as his dominion in 1777. His successor Seyyid Said sought to levy more direct rule in the early 1800s, but to do that had to re-take control from the Swahili families. Mombasa was the prize because of its harbor and fort. The Mazuris, however, wished to retain their independence and in 1823, just as the Sultan's forces closed in, the Mazuri sought British protection. Thinking that the establishment of a protectorate was an excellent way to abolish slavery and exceeding his orders (he had none) British naval Captain Owens who was then in Mombasa accepted the Mazuri offer and thus temporarily thwarted Sultan Seyyid Said's plans. The British government, however, reneged on the deal

in 1826 because it wanted no obligations or responsibilities in East Africa. Seyyid Said subsequently took control of Mombasa in 1837.

During the period of time when he consolidated his rule on the coast, Sultan Seyyid Said lived in Zanzibar. In fact, he formally shifted his capital from dry, sandy Muscat to green, fertile, Zanzibar in 1832. Beyond the obvious inducement of climate, Seyyid Said reckoned that commercial opportunities along the coast were superior to those of southern Arabia. He set out systematically to ensure success. He introduced cloves and found that the soils and climate of Zanzibar and neighboring Pemba Island were perfectly suited for the crop. Cloves then complimented long-standing trade in slaves and ivory from the mainland.

Sultan Seyyid Said was an astute diplomat. He recognized British power so did little to antagonize the British. Instead he always put forward enough real cooperation to compliment the façade of even greater gentility which he portrayed to the world. Other trading nations of the globe recognized the growing importance of Zanzibar and Seyyid Said's court. The United States opened a consulate in Zanzibar in 1837, which remained in operation (with a small hiatus during World War I when it moved temporarily to Mombasa) until 1979, long after Zanzibar's 1964 union with Tanyanika.

In short order, Seyyid Said built the slave trade from a trickle to a torrent. He was never interested in imperial domination of the mainland, but only in drawing out its wealth. As they had done for centuries past Arab slave caravans trudged regularly into the interior of Tanganyika where they acquired slaves either by barter or purchase from local chiefs or by direct capture. Slaves were bound together, collected at points such as Tabora and Ujiji, then marched to the coast. Newly acquired slaves often carried ivory as their first duty to their new masters. In the 1820s and 30s about fifteen thousand Africans were sold each year in the slave market in Zanzibar. For each person sold, three did not live long enough to reach market and another one or two died in transit to Arabia or India. Although these annualized numbers in no way approach the outflow of slaves from West Africa to the Americas, remember that the eastern slave trade had been ongoing for a thousand years. So the total of slaves exported from East Africa over the centuries may well equate to the fifteen to twenty million people who endured the Atlantic passage.

Whatever the numbers, the slave trade had a devastating effect on African society in the interior. Villagers were never safe from marauding slavers. Slave raids fostered acceptance of violence and periodic disruptions of everyday life forced a continued cycle of economic subsistence. There was neither the time nor the historical space for the people of East Africa to create the types of institutions and surplus wealth (which west Africans had experienced a thousand years earlier) that led to economic advancement.

Combating Slavery

Following its 1815 victory in the Napoleonic wars (in which England gained the island of Mauritius from France), English ships ruled the Indian Ocean. Conforming to domestic pressure – much of which was generated by William Pitt and John Wilberforce - Britain gradually began to increase anti-slavery pressures in the region. Britain focused first on the sea-borne trade which could be interrupted, then more

determinedly on the land-based trade and the markets along the coast. By and large these anti-slavery activities coupled with the fact that Britain was the global superpower of the 19th century drew it inevitably further into East Africa. (This study guide does not go into the intellectual history of Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries which gave rise to new ideas regarding the equality of men - manifested in the American and French revolutions – which undermined the idea of slavery. Readers interested in pursuing this topic will find much material available.)

In 1807 Britain banned the slave trade and authorized the Royal Navy to interdict slavers. Even though traffic in English ships halted almost immediately, the ban had little impact in the Indian Ocean. Flush from victory over France, in 1822 the British forced the Moresby Treaty on Sultan Seyyid Said which required that he not sell slaves to Christians, nor transport slaves to the British colonies of India and Mauritius. The treaty did not interfere in the commerce within the Sultan's dominions nor with exports to the Muslim world. Although the loss of peripheral markets irritated the Sultan, pragmatist that he was, he accepted the British conditions. In 1833 the British Parliament voted to abolish slavery in its dominions. This, of course, had no impact on East Africa, but did set the stage for further British efforts to curtail the trade which came in 1845 via the Hamerton Treaty with Seyyid's successor Seyyid Majid. The treaty legally severed the slave trade between East Africa and Arabia. Enforcement of trading restrictions was very difficult due to the inadequate means available. Therefore much of the trade continued as before. During the era of explorations which ensued (discussed below) the evils of slavery were exposed by the mass media of the day – books, newspapers and journals – which generated great public clamor in Europe for outright abolition. Finally in 1873 under threat of a British blockade of Zanzibar, Sultan Bargharsh (Seyyid's third son) agreed to abolish the trade. Even so, it took another thirty or so years to stamp out vestiges of the trade and the institution itself. It was not, in fact, until 1897 that slavery was outlawed in Zanzibar.

Issues to Ponder

Was East African slavery more humane than the slave trade to the plantations of the new world? Does the legacy of slavery still exist on the coast? If so, how might it be manifested?

What was the day of the American consul in Zanzibar like? What did he do? Whom did he report to?

What was Seyyid Said's longest lasting impact on the region?


Readings:

Davidson. *Africa in History: Themes and Outlines*
Pages 255-261

Web Site:

www.Zanzibar.archives.com

A true gem of a web site. This one contains a series of papers about Zanzibar. The items on slavery and the lineage of the Sultans are pertinent to this chapter.



Slave Routes.

Chapter 4: Exploration

Attention shifts to the mainland

By the middle of the nineteenth century, most of the world's map had been filled in to the satisfaction of Europe. Yet several great mysteries remained to be unraveled. Foremost among these was the source of the Nile River. From Ptolemy's time, the Mediterranean world heard rumors of snow and ice in the center of Africa. Ptolemy said that the Nile rose in the Mountains of the Moon. But where were those mountains? Also, what was the course of the mighty Congo River that disgorged itself into the Atlantic Ocean? Intrepid men (and women) set out to solve these mysteries mostly for the glory of it (riches and fame were showered on those who survived), but also for the sheer adventure of testing themselves against the unknown. One of the pathfinders, Dr. David Livingstone, was something of an anomaly because his motivation was also related to stamping out slavery. The mortality rate of European explorers in tropical Africa was appallingly high largely due to disease, but also as a result of conflict with indigenous people who, because of the slave trade, were deeply suspicious and hostile towards outsiders. Nonetheless, even against great odds, men stepped forward willingly to participate in these journeys of exploration.

Among the first bits of tantalizing news from Africa was the 1847 allegation by a German missionary J. Rebman resident at Rabai near Mombasa to the effect that a great snow covered mountain (Kilimanjaro) existed inland just south of the equator. His colleague Krapf confirmed the sighting in 1849 and also reported a second snow clad peak (Kenya) further to the north. Learned societies were skeptical and someone even wrote a book "proving" that snow could not exist on the equator, but the reports sparked the interest of the Royal Geographical Society and resulted in further efforts to unlock the mysteries of East Africa.

Most expeditions into East Africa were mounted from Zanzibar. They followed the slave caravan routes across central Tanganyika to the Lake. Livingstone went this way in 1853, again in 1856 and again in 1866. His reports of the evils of slavery plus the geographical marvels (he saw and named Victoria Falls on the Zambezi River in 1855, but the African name "smoke that thunders" is much more apt.) gave him cult like status with the reading public. However, little was heard of Livingstone after the beginning of his third journey. He seemed to have disappeared into the depths of the dark continent. Henry Morton Stanley, who was to become the 19th century's best known man of adventure, took a commission from the New York Herald newspaper and set off to search for him in 1871. Walking into the Tanganyikan lakeside village of Ujiji on November 10, 1871, Stanley spied an ill white man shuffling forward to greet him. He proffered his hand and uttered the immortal phrase of obvious logic, "Dr. Livingstone, I presume?"

Stanley's account of his expedition was front-page news around the world and re-kindled a public interest in African exploration, and in Stanley himself, that lasted the best part of the next thirty years.

Meanwhile Burton and Speke solved the Nile mystery in 1857 when they verified no northern outflow from Lake Tanganyika. Several weeks later, Speke alone saw the vast expanse of Lake Victoria (which he named for his queen). Although Speke speculated the lake was the source of the Nile, this was not confirmed and became a cause celebre in England pitting Burton and Speke, proponents of conflicting theories, against each other. The issue was resolved in 1860 when Speke returned with James Grant and saw the outlet at Rippon Falls. In the early twentieth century the British administration erected a statue of

Speke at this point with the inscription saying that John Hanning Speke was the "first man" to see the source of the Nile. Later a Ugandan government took down the plaque noting that while Speck may have been the first "European" to see the Nile, many African men before him had often seen it.

In 1860 Samuel Baker and his wife Isabelle filled in blanks on the map regarding the course of the Nile and in the process found Murchinson Falls. Henry Stanley made East and Central Africa his turf with voyages of discovery to the lakes of the western rift valley, the Mountains of the Moon (which Stanley passed by on one occasion, but did not see because of clouds) and finally the course of the Congo River. Stanley went on to greater glory in the expedition to rescue Emin Pasha and then, as an employee of King Leopold, in the establishment of the Congo Free State.

John Thompson explored Kenya in 1882. Previously, the country had been avoided by Europeans on account of fear of the Masai, but Thompson experienced few difficulties and traced a grand circuit from Mombasa to Lake Rudolph (which Hungarian Count Teleki coming from Ethiopia mapped earlier) on to Lake Victoria and back to the coast.

By 1880 the geographical mysteries of the continent were solved, but more importantly the lands and the people that inhabited them were revealed to the outside world. Whether they wanted to or not (and, of course, no one asked) East Africans were about to embark on a new era of encounters with that world.

Issues to Ponder

What today would compare with the mid-19th century fascination with the exploration of Africa? Going to Antarctica, climbing Everest, travel to the Moon or Mars? Maybe just the Discovery Channel?

What does it take in a person's character to venture into the unknown, understanding a real possibility of death?

Readings:

Ward, N.E. & White, L.W. *East Africa: A Century of Change 1870-1970*. Africana Publishing Corp., New York, 1971.

DT 431.W37

Pages 1-12

This excellent history of the region will become our basic text for the next few chapters of this study guide.

Additional Readings:

Moorhead, Alan. *The White Nile*. Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York 1960

This is the definitive book about the search for the source of the Nile. The first half of it is pertinent to the

upper Nile, mostly Uganda, and the latter part deals with the struggle for Sudan.

Harrison, William, *Mountains of the Moon*

The story of Burton and Speke. This book was also made into a film. Check your video store.

Livingstone, David, *The Last Journals of David Livingstone*

Stanley, Henry M. *How I Found Livingstone.*

_____, *Through the Dark Continent.*


_____, *In Darkest Africa.*

Speke, J.H. *Journal of Discovery of the Source of the Nile.*

Burton, Sir Richard, *The Lake Regions of Central Africa.*

Thompson, J.P. *Through Masai Land.*

If you want to get a contemporary flavor of the best sellers the explorers themselves were writing about their adventures, sample some of these original works.



Explorers of East Africa.

Chapter 5: The Partition of Africa

Initially European nations, Britain in particular, were not interested in colonies in Africa. Britain had been spurned by America, and saw that similar divisions were coming with Canada and Australia. If people of British origin declined links to the motherland, why then could one expect that black and brown people would want ties? The colonial experience in India too had been less than satisfactory and expensive besides. Instead Britain was more than content with military dominance of the seas, which enabled flourishing commerce. British prosperity was based on trade wherein raw materials and goods were bought and sold on open markets. As long as these markets functioned there was no need for

governmental control of raw materials. However, in order to assure profitable trade, the British government chartered companies and granted them exclusive rights to specific areas of British influence. To this end in the late 1880s the Imperial British East African Company headed by Sir William Mackinnon was granted trade rights in East Africa. The competing German company was the German East African Company directed by Karl Peters. Both entities actively established trading relationships and signed treaties with local chiefs along the Tanganyikan and Kenyan coasts. While both organizations made profits, neither was spectacularly profitable. Peters sought to expand German influence in Kenya and in Uganda, but both companies made the case in their respective capitals that greater administrative control and the development of infrastructure were essential to stopping slavery (still a good rallying cry) and to commercial success. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Gladstone, who served for much of the last half of the nineteenth century, held off Parliamentary proponents for African colonies.

Yet when the time came Britain was forced by European politics to acquire colonies. The impetus came from King Leopold of Belgium and German Chancellor Bismarck. Leopold was a schemer par excellence who sought to establish Belgium, and himself, as a greater power via the acquisition of colonies. After eyeing Asia and Latin America (already taken) he settled on Africa. He organized a "benevolent" society, employed Henry Stanley and began to establish trading stations along the Congo River. French explorer de Brazza took note and began a competing system of alliances with chiefs on the north bank of the river. As time progressed, Leopold's society metamorphosed into a private company (which he controlled) and finally into a Belgian government colony. But to back up, Leopold's acquisitiveness coupled with Portugal's long-standing territorial claims and complimented by Bismarck's intent to make Germany a real world power all coalesced into the Berlin conference of 1885. Diplomats in Berlin simply carved up Africa into spheres of influence. France and Britain got the lions' shares as they were granted rights to the hinterlands behind their coastal spheres of influence, but Leopold got his Congo, Portugal retained most of its claims and Germany was allocated territories in West Africa (Togo and Cameroon), Southwest Africa (Namibia) and East Africa (Tanganyika). The only conditions that the colonial powers imposed upon themselves at Berlin were the obligation to exercise "effective control" over and to develop their new possessions. This obligation became the driving force for greater metropole efforts in the newly delineated colonies.

The East African coast had been troublesome to carve up, complicated as it was by the recognized sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar over the coastal zone and by his claims to the interior. Britain acquiesced to German control of the coastal strip of Tanganyika including its acquisition of the port of Dar es Salaam, but Britain defended the Sultan's rule over Zanzibar, Pemba and a ten-mile wide strip in Kenya, including Mombasa. Based on a treaty Peters signed with a local sheik Germany also laid claim to an area around Witu (between Malindi and Lamu in Kenya). Bismarck sent a flotilla of battleships to Zanzibar to ensure that the Sultan signed away his rights in accordance with decisions made in Berlin. Even though authorized by its peers at Berlin, Britain was reluctant to become more involved in East Africa, until it decided to strengthen its role in Egypt. In the late 1880s once Britain decided to stay in Egypt, it too became concerned with control of the Nile River, as had the rulers of Egypt for thousands of years.

In previous years explorers and missionaries found thriving kingdoms in Uganda where they planted

seeds of division: English vs. French, and Catholic vs. Protestant vs. Muslim. By the 1880s Leopold had pretensions to parts of the Nile watershed. France's claims to the area were not resolved until the Fashoda (Sudan) confrontation with Great Britain on the Nile in 1889. Germany too sought to exercise dominion in Uganda. Moreover, in 1885 an Anglo/Egyptian army under General Gordon had been soundly defeated at Ormdurman leaving the Sudan in the hands of the Mahdi, an Islamic fanatic. For all these reasons Britain felt compelled to obtain and exercise control of Uganda.

The initial responsibility for the establishment of an official British presence in Uganda was assigned to officials of the Imperial British East African Company. Lord Lugard set out to accomplish this task in 1890. After a series of wranglings with Kabaka Mwanga (king of Buganda), Lugard obtained a treaty which recognized the company's authority in Buganda, but anti-British intrigues continued in the court of the Kabaka and in rival kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole. However, Lugard was not diverted and proceeded to consolidate control of Uganda. In 1894 Sir Gerald Portal, the British consul from Zanzibar, arrived in Kampala and declared a British protectorate.

Meanwhile the provisions of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 cleared up conflicting claims on the coast. Germany agreed to stay out of Uganda, but could extend its claim in Tanganyika westward to the Congo. Germany also gave up its claim to Witu. In return, for the sum of 200,000 English pounds Germany bought outright the ten mile coastal strip of Tanganyika which earlier it only "leased" from the Sultan. Germany also recognized a British protectorate over Zanzibar, which included the island itself, Pemba Island and the ten-mile wide coastal strip in Kenya and part of Somalia. Establishment of this protectorate relieved the Sultan of the realistic fear that Germany would completely take over his dominions. Finally, as the dealmaker, Britain returned to Germany the island of Heligoland in the North Sea, which it had held since the Napoleonic era.

As agreements go, except for Sultan Barghash who lost territory and his independence, this was a fairly good treaty as it eliminated a dangerous British- German rivalry in the region.

Issues to Ponder

Why did the European nations need colonies? What did Germany and Belgium realistically gain? Did Africa matter, or was it just a way to keep score? Could you have drawn the borders of East Africa in a better fashion?

Did the Sultan of Zanzibar deserve to lose his lands or was he a victim of racism?

Readings:

Ward and White. *East Africa ; A Century of Change 1870-1970*
Pages 12-44, "The Partition of East Africa."

Pakenham, Thomas. *The Scramble for Africa: the White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from*

1876 to 1912. Random House, New York, 1991.

Chapter 16, "The Sultan's Flag"

Chapter 17, "Cries from the Heart"

Chapter 18, "Dr. Emin, I presume"

Chapter 19, "Salisbury's Bargain"


Pakenham's opus is a detailed study of the acquisition of spheres of influence, power and colonies throughout the continent. He focuses much attention on politics and pressures on European governments and leaders in their home arenas. An excellent table of contents lets the discerning reader choose chapters of most immediate interest.

Web Sites:

www.Africana.com

www.Zanzibar.archivies.com

Both these sites, which we have visited before, contain items relevant to the age of exploration and the partition of Africa.



Anglo-German Agreements of 1886 and 1890.

Chapter 6: Conquest and Consolidation

Exercising control of the people of East Africa took some doing. Outsiders were not especially welcome; particularly when they dismantled traditional political structures, disrupted social customs and introduced alien philosophies and religions. As was true elsewhere on the continent Africans found Europeans to be a different type of opponent. Rather than raid, win and leave, taking livestock and maybe women, the Europeans stayed and sought to rule. Ultimately throughout all of East Africa the establishment of colonial rule was aided by the spread of disease such as sleeping sickness and measles which decimated populations and weakened their social fabric. Rinderpest too, chiefly the epidemic around 1900, wiped out cattle herds and concomitant economic prosperity. Conquest and consolidation, however, took different forms in each of the three territories.

British Uganda

Ugandan kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Busoga were well-established functional

societies. Other groups in the territory such as the Teso, Acholi, Langi, Bugisu and Bukedi were not organized centrally. Luggard established a policy of indirect rule, which meant that he used the existing tribal structures to establish and enforce British rule. Essentially this meant that aside from some basic law-and-order and economic issues, i.e. tax collection, life for most went on pretty much as before. Even so, British officials were instructed to get out, meet the people and learn the districts. Even though the District Officer held some ultimate power of coercion, which always provided him with a strong hand to play, imperial policy favored persuasion over coercion.

As noted earlier, Luggard signed a company treaty with the Kabaka of Buganda in 1890 which was followed by the declaration of a protectorate in 1894. During those intervening years and afterwards, some military effort and a good bit of politics were required to bring other kingdoms, especially Bunyoro, into the British fold. In fact, as an aftermath to the conquest of Bunyoro, accomplished with Bugandan military help, several Bunyoro regions – now called the lost counties – were transferred to Buganda's control.

By 1902 when the British demarcated border for eastern Uganda was shifted from the rift valley (of Kenya) to its present location bisecting Mt. Elgon, most of Uganda was pacified under British authority. However, the political issues that plagued Uganda later in the 20th century were well established. Those issues included: the prominence of the kingdom of Buganda in the Ugandan protectorate, divisions within the Baganda people according to religion – Catholic, Protestant (Anglican) or Muslim. These divisions often had dynastic implications for the ruling family. Beyond Buganda, traditional rivalries amongst the other kingdoms and tribal groups – the Bunyoro, for example, continued to complain about the lost counties - were compounded by their separate adherence along tribal or regional lines to either Catholicism or Anglicanism. Political parties would later build on these cleavages. Another issue was that of land ownership, particularly the Mailo lands of Buganda. (Mailo is a word derived from "mile" that was applied to land that, for the first time, could be sold or leased.)

A key tenant of British indirect colonial administration was that a protectorate or colony should be self-supporting. It should generate the funds necessary to support its operations and development. Obviously, this philosophy meant that taxes had to be paid, but to do that money needed to be earned. Consequently cash crops of cotton, coffee and tea were introduced. Since the indigenous sector was not able to pay lots of taxes, revenue needs justified the imposition of high import and export taxes – a structural economic problem that still plagues the three states today.

German Tanganyika

In contrast to the British, the Germans insisted on Germanizing their colony. First, however, they had to conquer it. In the 1890s Germany separately fought the Hehe, the Nyamwezi and the Chagga in order to establish control. Subsequently, Germany introduced the "akida" system of appointed local officials who reported in turn to German commissioners. The men chosen to be akida agents had little loyalty to the existing tribal governing system, and usually were not from the area where they were posted, so were responsive to their German masters. This system was fairly repressive; coercion was used to obtain labor,

payment of taxes, etc. However, one positive aspect of German colonial administration, seen in retrospect, was the use of Swahili throughout the territory.

Also in contrast to the British, the German government took a more active interest in promoting economic development. It was willing to spend money from Berlin on agriculture, infrastructure and other projects. The German administration introduced cotton and sisal and helped establish them as crops. It also began a government backed education system. The crowning opus was construction of the Tanga to Moshi rail line in 1893 and construction of the central line from Dar es Salaam to Tanga and Lake Tanganyika in 1905 – 1914 (the British added the extension to Mwanza in the 1920s).

Governor Count von Glotzen who served in the first years of the 20th century introduced some reforms to reduce abusive coercive practices, but simmering resentment burst forth in 1905 in the Maji Maji rebellion. Maji Maji was a carefully planned full-scale revolt by the Ngoni and related people in the southern part of the territory. Designed to oust the Germans completely, the plan was to kill officials, traders and missionaries; to force the Germans back to the coast and even to capture Dar es Salaam. Fortunately for the Germans, the Ngoni fought alone, apparently they never sought support from the larger better-organized Nymawezi or Hehe tribes. Maji maji means water water in Swahili. Warriors were anointed with magic charms that were supposed to turn German bullets to water. (This same idea of magic and faith turning bullets aside surfaced in the Simba Rebellion in the Congo in the sixties and again with Alice Lakwana's Holy Spirit Movement in Uganda in 1986.) The southern revolt caught the administration totally by surprise. Maji Maji warriors enjoyed initial success in killing and running off Germans. However, once contained, it was simply a matter of time before German colonial troops with modern arms reversed the tide of battle. The German response was heinous; its scorched earth policy brought an end to the rebellion but at the cost of reducing the south to ruin and alienating the people of the region for generations. At about this same time German suppression of a revolt in South West Africa (Namibia) took on the dimensions of genocide when the Herero people were almost annihilated as distinct ethnic group following General von Trothu's "Extermination Order."

Although unsuccessful in ousting the Germans, the Maji Maji rebellion did generate a more careful look at colonial policies by the administration and did result in some easing of strictness.

British East Africa

Kenya was different from both of its neighbors. It was lightly populated, had no centralized kingdoms or large tribal societies. While the coastal strip under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Zanzibar produced food and copra, the end of slavery in the Sultan's dominions in 1897 with no other source of labor in sight brought an end to large scale plantation agriculture. The region immediately behind the coast was barren bush for hundreds of miles. Because the combination of geography and the fearsome Masai kept intruders away, Kenya's interior was spared the ravages of slavery.

On Thompson's and other explorers' treks to the interior, groups of agriculturists such as the Kikuyu and nomadic herdsmen like the Masai were encountered as well as Luhya and Luo farmers and fishermen

around Lake Victoria. Of these Chief Mumia, a Luhya, who lived just north of the lake had been hospitable and helpful to Luggard in his efforts to reach Uganda.

Once the Ugandan protectorate was declared in 1894, Britain was faced with the problem of how to get to and from that landlocked territory. The solution was to build a railroad from Mombasa to the lake. This vast construction project began in 1897 and terminated at Kisumu on Lake Victoria in 1901. Along the way it generated the towns of present day Kenya. Nairobi started as the storehouse and construction site at the end of the plains and before the climb to the rift valley escarpment. Nakuru was an entrepot in the center of the rift valley and Kisumu grew up around the terminus of the line at Lake Victoria. Indian coolies were brought in to build the rail line. Many stayed. Joined by families, they grew into the community collectively called Asians that one finds in East Africa today. The rail line was also the cause of the Ugandan border being shifted westward in 1902 when the powers-that-be decided it would be better administratively to have all the line in one territory.

British authorities fought to establish imperial rule in Kenya. A series of separate skirmishes with the Kikuyu, Meru, Kisii and Luo brought peace to their respective regions. The Nandi were the most troublesome especially when they saw the railroad dividing their land, but they too were subdued. The British generally avoided confrontation with the Masai who were reputed to be the most warlike of Kenya's people.

The railroad changed Kenya. Justification for opening Uganda was not enough; backers of the rail scheme needed more. Although the idea of white settlement in the cool, fertile and non-tropical highlands had been advanced earlier by Johnston, Luggard and Mackinnon, it was not until a railroad through nowhere was being built that further justification for the venture was required. European settlement was the answer.

In order to attract settlers, a crown lands ordinance was passed in 1901, which rendered the conveyance of title possible. Settlers were then sought from Britain and South Africa. In the pre-World War years they trickled in slowly and like pioneers everywhere found it a demanding task to bend the new land to their way of life and ideas about agriculture. Though perseverance and individual effort they succeeded and effectively transformed the Kenyan highlands into "white man's country." Settling along the railway, they turned it into a profitable operation within a dozen years.

Although the British administration used mechanisms of indirect rule in Kenya, labor and land issues, especially the alienation of tribal land for European settlement were continually troublesome and were the seed that flowered later as Kikuyu nationalism. Even after independence land questions would remain central features of political argumentation in the quest for tribal and individual economic prominence.

Issues to Ponder

What enabled Britain and Germany to establish their respective rule in East Africa? Moral superiority, political advancement, military might, divine providence? What did the Germans and the British, at the time, think authorized them to take over?

Was African resistance more or less active than you had thought? What mobilizing factors were involved?

What were the differences between "direct" and "indirect" colonial rule. Which was more effective? Which was better?

Readings:

Ward & White, *East Africa: A Century of Change, 1870-1970*
Pages 45-78, "The beginnings of colonial rule"

Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa*
Chapter 23 "The Flag Follows the Cross"
Chapter 34, "Maji Maji"

Additional Readings:

Miller, Charles. *The Lunatic Express*, Random House, New York, 1971

This book recounts the trials and tribulations of building the Kenyan railroad. It is a superb history of the time and the region covering Zanzibar, Uganda and, of course, Kenya.

Huxley, Elspeth, *White Man's Country (Volume One: 1870-1914); Lord Delemare and the Making of Kenya*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1935.

DT434.K4H78

Huxley wrote the definitive biography of Lord Delemare, a truly unique individual whose enthusiasms, exuberance and money made him larger than life as an individual, as well as someone fanatically committed to Kenya; to its economic and political success. He was the unchallenged leader of the settlers for nearly a half century.


Meinertzhagen, Richard, *Kenya Diary (1902-1906)*, Eland Books, London, 1957.

DT434.K4M4

Meinertzhagen was a district officer in Kenya at the turn of the century. His very readable reminisces give an accurate flavor of indirect administration and of the efforts necessary to pacify the Kikuyu and the Nandi. Also, he happily killed an astonishing number of rhino. Although handicapped by his surname, Meinertzhagen went on to become the chief of British intelligence in East Africa during World War I where he pitted wits with General von Lettow-Vorbeck, but that's the next chapter.


Churchill, Winston S. *My African Journey*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908.

As a young assistant cabinet minister for the colonies, Churchill took the railroad from Mombasa to Lake Victoria, sailed to Entebbe, biked, walked and boated down the Nile to the Mediterranean. An excellent writer, his descriptions of Uganda are especially interesting.



The Railway, European Settlement, and Agricultural Products of Kenya.

PEOPLES AND KINGDOMS OF UGANDA



Chapter 7: World War I

As if the changes of the previous twenty years weren't enough, World War I arrived. The war generated long range consequences for Tanganyika and Kenya, but it had an immediate impact as well.

When war loomed, the military commander in German East Africa General P.E. von Lettow-Vorbeck, was astute enough to recognize that European powers would try to keep the war away from the colonies. He knew from the outset that Germany would probably lose the war, but felt rather than keep war from Africa, he should do as much as he could to tie up British assets in Africa. This would consequently provide more breathing space for German forces in Europe. He judged that he probably could not win in

East Africa either because he would be unable to get munitions and supplies. Nonetheless, with those caveats in mind, Lettow-Vorbeck convinced his reluctant governor of his position and began his campaign.

In 1914 Lettow-Vorbeck's army consisted of several hundred German regulars, several hundred Tanganyikan troops and hundreds up to thousands of porters, called carriers. Dar es Salaam's central market is known as Karikor (carrier corps) as it was first an assembly ground for the carriers. General von Lettow-Vorbeck's motley army seized the initiative, attacked and took Taveta on the Kenyan border from whence it raided and cut the Mombasa/Nairobi rail line at Tsavo. This got British attention. British forces, mostly Kenyan irregulars, counterattacked at Taveta, got a fight but then found the Germans gone. In 1915 an expeditionary force of Indian troops landed at Tanga on the Tanganyikan coast and were routed by the German defenders. In 1916 when General Smuts of South Africa took command of the British effort and began pressing German positions, Lettow-Vorbeck marched south. Along the way men and guns from the German cruiser *Konigsberg* which had been blockaded in the Rufiji delta by British warships joined him. The heavy naval guns were strapped onto carts and towed along. (Today, one is in Entebbe, Uganda as a war memorial). The German commander began a long game of cat-and-mouse skirmishing as his forces moved along. He led his enemies south into Mozambique, back again into western Tanganyika and then into Northern Rhodesia. It was there, after the Armistice, on British territory, with his tattered flags flying and drums beating, that he surrendered. In sum, Lettow-Vorbeck achieved his goal. He was never defeated. He tied up tens of thousands of British men and millions of pounds of resources. Although, the East Africa campaign had no impact on the outcome of the war, General von Lettow-Vorbeck became a legend.

Legendhood notwithstanding, the consequences for Tanganyika were devastating. First, there had been no administration for years so what had been established, particularly in the economic arena was lost. War and troop movements from both sides had taken a toll on the rural areas. The modern economy had stopped. The country was wrecked. Recovering from this devastation was not easy. Germany was shorn of its colonies by the victors. In its place Britain accepted (the U.S. refused) to govern under a mandate from the League of Nations. Although in retrospect this probably provided a climate more conducive to future political freedoms, in the short term, Tanganyika became an obligation and a responsibility rather than a possession where the metropole was willing to invest. Deprived of resources, the economy limped along and never registered a respectable rate of growth.

In the aftermath of the war, Britain began a program of granting land to British officer war veterans in Kenya's white highlands. This led to an influx of settlers that raised overall numbers of whites to a critical enough level so that they had to be taken into account by the administration. Soon settler interests and British administrative interests began to diverge with regard to the role and future of Africans in the colony. The settlers wanted land and cheap African labor to farm it, whereas the administration sought to protect and advance the interests of the indigenous Kenyans. This is not to say that the administration became pro-African; it very much saw Kenya's future as an imperial multi-racial dependency, but it did begin to constrain settler aspirations.

Another consequence of the war was the collapse of the world financial system. Kenya's currency was the

Indian rupee, which fell like a rock making settler financial obligations, which were enumerated in pounds sterling, shoot up. While there was a quick rebound in prices just after the war for primary products, by the early twenties the boom was over as the devastated European economies had much reduced spending power. Inflation was rampant in Kenya and farm laborers naturally sought higher wages to pay for more expensive imports. Thus white settlers, who constituted the modern sector of the economy, were squeezed by creditors and laborers alike. The resulting economic stall precipitated further confrontation between settlers and Africans and between settlers and the administration.

A final consequence of WWI was expanding political awareness of the African populations of all the territories. Africans had fought and carried. They had journeyed far, seen other lands, met other people, seen whites fighting whites for no understandable reason. They shared all these views with families and neighbors upon returning home. This greater opening to the wider world, as accelerated by the war, was a factor in newly created African organizations and societies that were the precursors of the coming political movements.

Issues to Ponder

Was von Lettow-Vorbeck a genius or just an egomaniac who personally drove East Africa into a decades long morass? If he had not fought, would Germany have retained Tanganyika?

Of the consequences of the war, which do you think was the most influential in changing the course of history in the region?

Readings:

Ward & White. *East Africa, A Century of Change, 1870-1979*
Pages 78-96, "The First World War"

Additional Readings

Miller, Charles, *The Battle for the Bundu: The First World War in East Africa*

This is the same Miller who wrote The Lunatic Express. Like the other book, this is a detailed chronicle – literally almost step by step – of the war in East Africa. Military history buffs will find it compelling.

Boyd, William, *An Ice Cream War*

This is a novel, but it is set squarely in the context of the war. Boyd respects all the historical facts. Although he focuses exclusively on the European characters – Africans are mostly background - the story is entertaining and provides a realistic feeling for the situation.

Chapter 8: Between the Wars

Kenya

Land, labor and the Legislative Council were the issues between the wars. Since Kenya was still lightly settled by Europeans, an effort was made to entice ex-servicemen to come and farm. Several thousand ultimately came and many stayed, but only several hundred succeeded as farmers. At the same time settlers were determined to preserve the highlands for whites only. Efforts by Asians and appeals for them by a sympathetic colonial government in India came to naught. Policy remained firm. Asians were not to farm in the highlands. (They were permitted to occupy marginal lands near Kisumu where they started a sugar industry.) Segregated residential areas in the towns and cities also became the norm. As an interesting aside, the British government offered the Zionist Movement the opportunity to make the Trans-Nzoia region (between Eldoret and Kitale) a new Jewish homeland in exchange for relinquishing claims to Palestine, but Zionist leaders refused.

Africans were confined to "native reserves" and thus effectively excluded from land that they or their ancestors had used intermittently for years. Africans, especially Kikuyus whose traditional territory bore the brunt of seizure for English farms, chafed at exclusions from unused farmland. Their animosity grew as their numbers and "land hunger" increased. The largest scale dispossession operation, however, was the removal of the northern Masai from the Laikipia plateau, which opened this vast ranch land to European settlers. (Since much of this region was not suited to crops, it was not coveted in the same way as cropland by Kikuyu farmers.) Currently, Kenya's great ranches of hundreds of thousands of acres each, many of which inadvertently act as game reserves, are in the Laikipia region northwest of Mt. Kenya.

The establishment of viable cash crops, coffee for example, was the objective of European farmers, but cash crops - coffee in particular - were denied to African farmers. Reasoning for this was several fold; first Europeans believed that Africans could not properly care for coffee; thus their plots would harbor disease and risk infecting larger European plantations. Secondly, and more to the point, was labor. To farm effectively Europeans needed African labor, which they wanted on their own terms. Africans, however, were content to engage in subsistence farming that met their daily needs. They had no desire to leave families to work away from home. Therefore, settlers additionally feared that if Africans could produce cash crops they would have even fewer incentives to seek work on European farms in order to have money for taxes or purchases. Much argument, legislation and coercion were employed over the decades as practices gradually evolved in the highlands away from migrant labor to a system of residential labor wherein men and their families lived on white-owned farms.

Paralleling racial land policies were racial political policies. Although Britain envisaged a multi-racial colony where, in time, even Africans would come into their own, it was confounded by strident settler aspirations for self-preservation through strict racial separation. Nonetheless, Britain made its intent clear in the 1923 Devonshire White Paper.

"Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races

should conflict, the former should prevail."

Throughout the troublesome years to come, Britain half-heartedly stuck to that principle. As part of its colonial policy Britain gradually increased the powers of the Kenyan Legislative Council and began to shift from appointed to elected members. Finally, the Council came to include elected members from the European, Asian, Arab and ultimately African communities (for decades Africans were represented by Europeans appointed for that purpose). The political history of this era is largely given over to the posturing and political battles over representation on the Legislative Council, not only the numbers of seats per community, but also whether election would be on communal or common roles.

In retrospect the superciliousness of colonial attitudes of moral superiority and paternalism seem unfathomable today, but they were very real and very operative at the time. British society was based on class where everyone had a position in society. In the colonies the British saw themselves as the ruling, wealthy, upper class. The Asians were shopkeepers and traders and the Africans were the laborers and servants. Missionaries viewed Africans as essentially people without culture, blank pages upon which to write Christianity. Administrators saw them as peoples without valid traditions or political institutions who were to be protected and tutored. Additionally administrative jobs and careers were tied to success within the system. Settlers, of course, saw Africans as labor to be exploited. Combined the three European groups – colonial officers, missionaries, and settlers – all had a stake in the perpetuation of the colonial system. Thus, any effort to challenge that system on the basis of land or labor rights or God forbid, indigenous political aspirations, was perceived as dangerous and seditious.

African Political Awakenings

Modern African politics began in the twenties. Harry Thuku was a young government clerk who protested work conditions and land policies. Jailed, he became a lightning rod for African grievances. He formed an organization that became the Kikuyu Central Association in 1921. Other tribal associations such as the Kavirondo Association (Luos and Luhyas) and the Ukambani Association also emerged. Britain had envisaged African political leadership growing from its system of indirect rule, that is, Britain hoped the traditional chiefs and others who had become part of the colonial apparatus would gradually take on political responsibilities. This was not to be, but it took some time throughout all of East Africa before colonial authorities accepted that the new breed of African political leaders would arise among the young educated men in the towns.

The tribal associations made no immediate claims to Legislative Council representation; rather they took up cudgels on issues directly related to their peoples. The Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) agitated for access to unoccupied land in the highlands. A young firebrand, Jomo Kenyatta was sent to London in 1929 and again in 1931 to lobby Kikuyu land concerns with Parliament. (The second time he stayed until 1946.) KCA seized on the issue of female circumcision to take on the Anglican and Catholic churches and as a way to instill Kikuyu nationalism. Fallout from this struggle led to the creation of hundreds of independent Kikuyu schools. Kenyatta's account of these issues and his constant challenges to colonial attitudes are found in his book on the Kikuyu people, Facing Mount Kenya. Meanwhile, the Kavirondo Association objected to land alienation around Kakamega for gold mining while the Ukambani

Association fought against government mandated herd thinning during years of drought.

Uganda

Although the idea of European settlement was briefly considered for Uganda, it became clear that the situation there was not conducive to such an undertaking. Asians, however, were permitted to settle. They soon organized vast sugar and tea estates. Without the motor of European agricultural production that Kenya possessed, colonial authorities searched to find suitable cash crops for Uganda to replace the once prolific but now dwindling ivory exports. Cotton was the answer. Soon Ugandan farmers were producing commercial quantities of cotton. Coffee too became a staple crop - the robusta variety throughout most of the land, but high quality arabica on Mt. Elgon and in the western highlands. East African authorities extended the "Ugandan" railroad to Uganda in 1924 by finishing the line from Nakuru to Kampala.

Constitutionally, Britain established a multi-racial Legislative Council in Uganda. While Europeans served on the Council, they represented no special constituency, but the people of the protectorate as a whole. Asians and Africans were appointed to the Council early on. The key issue during these years was the role of the kingdom of Buganda in relation to the rest of the country and especially in relation to the Legislative Council. Britain tried to rule equitably, but Buganda – recalling the Protectorate Treaty of 1898 - insisted on special status as an independent entity within the territory. Consequently, the Bugandan Parliament, the Lukiko, refused to participate in the Council. Colonial governor Sir Philip Mitchell got so frustrated with the Lukiko's obstinacy that he withdrew colonial officials from Buganda for a period of years during the 1930s.

Tanganyika

The years between the two world wars were a slow time for Tanganyika. Britain, the new colonial authority, took time to re-establish government functions. In a notable reversal of German direct rule, Governor Byatt introduced indirect colonial administration in the 1920s. Indirect rule, however, was not as successful as hoped because many traditional authorities had disappeared or been devalued during the German epoch. One far-reaching decision by the new authorities was the policy of non-encouragement of European settlement. Some German settlers did return and some other Europeans also came, but they received no special inducements or status and the African character of the territory was retained.

Tanganyika's important cash crop was sisal. Additionally, to the dismay of Kenyan settlers, Governor Byatt encouraged Chagga farmers on Mt. Kilimanjaro and in the Para Mountains to grow arabica coffee. In contrast to efforts elsewhere in East Africa to implement policies conducive to the flow of cheap labor to white owned farms, the Tanganyikan authorities sought to protect African workers from abuses. To this end they set forth requirements for improved working conditions and even set up camps to house and feed men journeying to and from seasonal work.

Constitutionally, Britain set up a Legislative Council similar to those of Uganda and Kenya. Only Europeans and Asians sat on it initially; some members were designated to represent Africans. The

colonial government also began to establish local government councils but, as noted above, found few tribes – only the Chagga – organized enough to be able to participate. Nyamwezi and Sukuma leadership had been destroyed and the GoGo, Masai and Ngoni never had centralized structures in the first place.

The worldwide economic depression hit all of East Africa hard. Tanganyika's economy stalled. Commercial despair coupled with British reluctance to rule led for a time to thoughts of returning the territory to Germany. However, the idea was not too serious and Europe tumbled into war before any thing occurred.

Issues to Ponder

Some say colonialism was a product of its era, i.e. Victorian and Edwardian times, and once exported to Africa the values of those times – paternalism, racism, moral superiority - became set in stone and seemingly impervious to changes occurring at home. Others say colonialism was more about realistic economic exploitation than attitudes. Finally a third point of view is that colonialism was an inevitable outgrowth of European competition in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What do you think? Was colonialism justified?

Disputes over access to land have been part of human history since time immemorial, but in Kenya - perhaps as nowhere else on the planet – such issues have driven the formation of the modern state. Keep tracking this problem.

Readings:

Ward & White. *East Africa: a Century of Change, 1870-1970*

Kenya: pages 126-143

Uganda: pages 144-160

Tanganyika: pages 160-168



Chapter 9: Paths to Independence

Effects of World War II

No battles were fought in East Africa, but the territories provided troops and essential supplies for the allied effort. The U.S. opened a Consulate in Mombasa in 1942 for the express purpose of buying hides and skins for boots, pyrethrum (a natural insecticide), tantalite (used in bomb scopes) and other items for the war effort. Italian POWs captured in Ethiopia and Somalia were incarcerated in Kenya and put to work building roads. Those who stayed on after the war formed the core of Kenya's small Italian community.

Africans who went to war went far. The King's African Rifles fought not only in Ethiopia, but also in North Africa and in Burma. Men who returned home truly came back with a different view of the world. They became part of a modern politically aware group, which felt entitled to a greater political role.

Unlike the post-WWI era, the economic boom that followed WWII did not collapse, but rather carried East Africa to greater prosperity.

Another consequence of the war was changed attitudes in Britain about colonies. The war could not have been won without colonies and popular sentiment was shifting in favor of economic support leading to eventual political autonomy. This was evident in the passage of the Colonial Welfare and Development Act of 1945, which provided funds for infrastructure, schools and health clinics. Additionally to Tanganyika's benefit, the United Nations Trusteeship system replaced the League of Nations mandate. Under new rules the trustee was required to prepare its territory for independence and, to ensure progress, its activities were subject to scrutiny by UN members.

In all four territories constitutional progress was marked by an increase in African representation on respective Legislative Councils, a widening of the franchise, and a shift of governing responsibility from the colonial authorities to the Legislative Council. Even so, particularly in Kenya, Britain remained determined to structure a multi-racial constitutional governing system that enshrined firm protections for minority rights.

Kenya

In the forties education zoomed to the forefront of African concerns and in the process established a social priority which remains valid today. In 1945 the Beecher Commission recommended that four years of primary school be immediately instituted country-wide, to be followed by another four years as soon as possible. It also recommended the creation of government secondary schools as well as vocational, agricultural and technical schools and a teacher training institute. Implementation of these recommendations, while not replacing church and independent Kikuyu schools, put the government fully into the educational business for the first time.

Mau Mau

In 1944 Mr. E.W. Mathu became the first African appointed to Kenya's Legislative Council. He founded a new political party named the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). By 1948 there were four African members of the Council and by 1951 there were six. Despite this marginal but real progress on the constitutional front, Kikuyu grievances, especially over land, erupted into violence. The Kikuyu had long complained over being excluded from the white highlands, especially as their number increased and land became scarce in the reserves. Mathu was joined by recently returned budding politician Jomo Kenyatta in arguing the Kikuyu point of view, but to no avail. Popular Kikuyu resentment manifested itself in traditional oath taking which led to intra Kikuyu violence in the late forties aimed at real and perceived supporters of the authorities. Violence became more common and extended to whites in the early fifties. Violence took the form of intimidation, maiming of cattle, hut burning, forced oathing and killing. The rebels took to the bush on the high slopes of Mt. Kenya and in the dense forests of the Aberdare Mountains from whence they raided surrounding areas.

In response to the violence the colonial government declared a "state of emergency" in 1952. As almost the first act, the governor arrested Jomo Kenyatta, accused him of leading the rebellion and banished him to the barren northwest to await trial. KANU was banned and its other leaders also arrested. The government recruited "home guards" of loyal Kikuyus, brought in police and military forces composed of Kenyans from other tribes, enlisted settlers as special anti-guerrilla forces and assigned regular British army units to combat the irregulars. Mau Mau was very disruptive. Not only did it usher in a reign of terror in the central highlands and the Kikuyu reserves, but it led to massive dislocations, forced resettlement into protected villages and squalid detention camps. However, all told only 58 whites and Asians and about 2,000 African civilians were killed. Military casualties on the government side were about a thousand and much higher, perhaps 10,000, among the Mau Mau forces. Most of the fighting concluded by 1956, but the state of emergency remained in effect until the eve of independence in 1962.

Mau Mau had several near term consequences of which the most important was to elevate Kenyatta to mythical status as a martyr and leader. Secondly, Mau Mau was perceived in England very much as the logical consequence of racist settlers seeking to dominate Africans. This resulted in sympathy for the beleaguered Africans and rising approval of African political aspirations. Also, the assignment of regular British forces ensured that decisions about Kenya's future would be made in London and not by settlers in Nairobi. In longer-term perspective and with an obvious element of historical revisionism, Mau Mau – which was purely a Kikuyu phenomenon - became mythologized as a "Kenyan" nationalist struggle, which embodied the independence hopes of all the people of the territory.

Constitutional Progress

Despite Mau Mau – or even because of it – Britain continued to push ahead with Legislative Council revisions. In 1957 Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga (both Luos) and Daniel arap Moi (a Kalenjin) were elected to the Council. In that year 29 of the 59 members were elected on communal rolls so that Europeans, Arabs, Africans, and Asians, further sub-divided into Hindus and Moslems, all had seats. (On a communal voting roll members of each racial community elect members to specific seats reserved for that community. On a common roll, all voters vote together for all seats. Obviously, the purpose of a communal roll is to assure minority representation in elected bodies.) By the mid-fifties it was clear that Kenya would at some point become independent, as Ghana did in 1958. Although there was a small hard core of opposition, Europeans on the Legislative Council began to accept this eventuality and several parties; the United Party of Kenya and the New Kenya Group began to look for ways to cooperate with their African colleagues. Mboya lead the African block. Following the 1957 elections his vision for Kenya included: no franchise requirements, no racial/communal voting rolls, no restrictions on land ownership but a maximum size of land holdings, eight years of primary school, African involvement in local government and an end to the Mau Mau emergency.

In 1960 constitutional negotiations at Lancaster House in the UK led to agreement for a greater number of elected seats to be chosen from a common roll. Those elected would form a responsible autonomous government. In subsequent elections two African political parties contested for power. The Kenyan African National Union (KANU) - largely a coalition of the two largest tribes, the Kikuyu and the Luo - led by James Gichuru, Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya took the majority of seats while the Kenyan

African Democratic Union (KADU) - led by Ronald Ngala (from the coast), Masinde Muliro (a Kamba) and Daniel arap Moi - established a strong minority. Since KANU refused to form a government in the absence of Kenyatta, Ngala formed Kenya's first internal African government. By 1962, however, in time for the second round of Lancaster House constitutional talks, the emergency was over and Kenyatta assumed a leadership role. In the second round of talks, KADU achieved protections from domination by the majority tribes through the creation of regional assemblies with considerable powers over agriculture, education, health and local government. With this constitution in hand, Kenyatta assumed the position of Prime Minister and independence was set for December 12, 1963.

Uganda

Uganda's political history in the post war era was largely that of maneuvering between Buganda, the colonial authorities and other political elements for control of the Legislative Council and ultimately the independent government. In 1945 the Governor appointed African representatives from Bunyoro and Busoga along with the Katikiro (Prime Minister of Buganda) to the Legislative Council. Immediately the Lukiko objected and ordered the Katikiro not to participate on the grounds that Buganda must remain aloof from wider territorial government. In fact, the Kabaka, Sir Edward Mutesa II, insisted that Buganda become fully independent. As evidence of British acceptance of his position, the Kabaka wanted the responsibility for Buganda to be shifted from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office. Machinations of the early fifties that culminated in this proposal were too much for Governor Andrew Cohen who summarily deported the Kabaka trusting that his successor would be more pliant. Cohen's hopes were realized in some respects in 1954 when changes to the Bugandan government enhanced the Lukiko's power and transformed the Kabaka into a constitutional monarch.

The Protectorate Constitution of 1958 provided for direct election of representatives to the Legislative Council from all parts of the territory. However, still insisting on its special prerogatives, the Bugandan government boycotted the elections thus denying itself representation on the new Council. Meanwhile, other political forces and parties were making their case. Dr. Milton Obote created the Ugandan National Congress (subsequently the Ugandan Peoples' Congress – UPC), which drew its strength from the north. Benedicto Kiwanuka, a Catholic Mugandan, started the Democratic Party (DP), which catered to those opposed to the Bugandan Protestant establishment. Apolo Kironde created the United National Party designed to support the Kabaka and the Lukiko. These parties contested for power under new rules laid out by the Wild Commission in 1959. The Commission eliminated minority safeguards inherent in communal rolls, it provided for a Council of Ministers to be drawn from the Legislative Council to run government affairs under the supervision of the governor. Finally, it permitted the continued existence of traditional rulers, i.e. the five kingdoms, but gave them no political role in the territorial government.

In the elections of 1961, Obote's UPC won the popular vote throughout the country, but captured only 35 seats. The Democratic Party ran second and took 43 seats including all seats in Buganda. Sticking to its special status argument, the Lukiko boycotted the election thus forfeiting Baganda representation on the Council to its opponents in the Democratic Party. On March 1, 1962 Kiwanuka became Prime Minister of an internal self-government. Because of Lukiko's non-participation, the new government was inherently unstable. Consequently as part of ensuing independence negotiations federalism was re-proposed and this

time accepted. The new National Assembly would be directly elected by most citizens, but 21 Bugandan MPs would be chosen by the Lukiko, a majority of whose members by this time were themselves elected rather than appointed. Elections under this formula were held in April 1962. The UPC again won the most seats but did not obtain a simple majority. Kironde's party evolved into the Kabaka Yekka Party (the Kabaka "alone") and under this banner, as named by the Lukiko, its members took seats in the Assembly. Exploiting Baganda differences, Obote convinced the Kabaka Yekka members to join the UPC in a coalition to outvote the Democratic Party and dismiss Prime Minister Kiwanuka. Obote took over,

Uganda became independent on October 9, 1962 with Obote as Prime Minister.

Tanganyika.

Tanganyika's path to independence was less troublesome than its neighbors. However, because of its poverty, its prospects as a viable nation were more modest as well. Africans were named to the Legislative Council in 1945 and by 1951 their number had expanded to four (of fourteen). On the recommendation of his Council, innovative governor Sir Edward Twining appointed an African, Chief Kidaha Makwaia, to his executive team. Finally, by the mid-fifties, Britain abandoned the remnants of indirect rule and established a system of elected local governments. Also the Legislative Council continued to evolve in numbers and responsibilities. As was true elsewhere in East Africa, Tanganyika moved steadily away from the idea of communal voting rolls and protected constituencies towards universal representation.

Dr. Julius Nyerere emerged on the political scene in 1953 when he transformed a moribund association into the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU). A pragmatist, Nyerere counseled moderation in terms of working within the system, but was adamant that Tanganyika should move quickly forward to independence. In particular, Nyerere found allies among the members of the UN Trusteeship Council who held oversight responsibility for Tanganyika. In 1958 TANU won a majority in the Legislative Council. In 1960 TANU won all but one seat. Subsequently, Nyerere formed a government and worked closely with Governor Sir Richard Turnbull, who was sympathetic to nationalist aspirations. With some constitutional modifications in 1961 to reflect the reality of the political system already in place and functioning well, Tanganyika achieved self-government. It became fully independent on December 8, 1961 with Nyerere as Prime Minister.

As noted earlier, Tanganyika was poor. Cash crops consisted of coffee, sisal and a smattering of other products. Most of the people were subsistence farmers. Tanganyika had produced small quantities of gold for some time and a wandering prospector found diamonds in Geita in 1946. Dr. J.T. Williamson, a Canadian geologist later gave a magnificent stone, "the Star of Africa" to Queen Elizabeth upon the occasion of her coronation. In an effort to find a viable crop, Britain spent millions on a vast groundnut production scheme in the late forties designed to produce vegetable oil for the world market. After several years of effort, the poorly planned, poorly implemented project collapsed completely. Mention of the Tanganyikan groundnut scheme fiasco today still brings grimaces to the faces of development experts around the world.

Issues to Ponder

As many books have been written about Mau Mau as on any other topic pertaining to Kenya. They include novels, memoirs from each side of the conflict, efforts to chronicle it impartially and lots of political revisionism replete with historical "spin." Sample some. Meanwhile, assess Mau Mau in the context of its times. It changed the course of history in Kenya, led to the emergence of real national consciousness and the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta. Yet within months of independence virtually, all acknowledged Mau Mau leaders themselves disappeared from the political scene.

Although its people were relatively well educated and its economy strong (in comparison to other African states at this time) the seeds for Uganda's future troubles were clearly visible in the weak political institutions it inherited at independence. Whose fault was this? What could have been done differently? Why was Uganda not a viable country-to-be?

Julius Nyerere made his political appearance in this chapter. We will look more at him later, but how much of Tanganyika's peaceful accession to independence was due to him personally or how much credit should be given to the colonial/trustee authority? Why was Tanganyika different?

Readings:

Ward and White. *East African, A Century of Change, 1870-1970*

Kenya: pages 176-198

Uganda: pages 198-218

Tanganyika: pages 218-232

Chapter 10: Zanzibar

Zanzibar dropped from our scope during the recitation of East Africa's history during the Twentieth century. Indeed Zanzibar did recede into the shadows as the focus of politics and development concentrated on the mainland. Following implementation of the anti-slavery ordinances at the turn of the century, Britain became the complete master of Zanzibar. The British representative known progressively as the Regent, the Consul General and the Resident ruled. The Sultan remained only as a figurehead. However, long reigning Sultan Seyyid Khalifa who served from 1911 to 1963 did effectively embody the virtues of a benign constitutional monarch and came to symbolize continuity and stability to his people. Over time Britain introduced its colonial practices to replace the Sultan's inept judicial and police systems, but generally Britain grafted its indirect system of administration onto the Sultan's antiquated administration. Although they solved the slavery problem, British administrators did little to resolve the intense racial antagonisms that grew up in its aftermath. The British record for spending on infrastructure or economic development was poor. Although ostensibly the Sultan's dominions extended to the ten-mile

wide coastal strip of Kenya, in reality the British administered that part of the protectorate from Mombasa with little reference to Zanzibar.

Zanzibar's population was a polyglot composition of Arabs, Africans, Europeans and Asians. Arabs were mostly of Omani descent; many families first came with the early Sultans in the 18th and 19th centuries. Other Arabs were of more recent vintage and some only rode the dhows, stayed for a season and departed. Arabs composed the traditional ruling class associated with the Sultanate. They owned the mid-size to large clove and copra plantations which had been economically devastated by the termination of slavery. The small European community comprised the handful of consuls, representatives of global trading companies or shipping lines and colonial officials. Asians were influential merchants, moneylenders and shopkeepers. In addition to those who had been there for generations, more Indians settled in Zanzibar in the early part of the 20th century as an alternative to the mainland. Africans composed the majority of the population and occupied the bottom rungs of society and the economy. They too were divided into two or even three distinct groups. First, were the indigenous people of the islands whose culture and background were that of the Swahili coast. A second group were those who had been slaves or were the descendants of slaves. Some of the indigenous people could be characterized as belonging to this group as well. Third, were those, even second-generation ex-slaves, who were identified as mainlanders. This group also included a steadily growing number of true mainlanders who, following the abolition of slavery, were recruited to work the plantations.

Land and education became issues between the wars. With slave labor gone, the clove plantations produced less and less. Many reached a state of collapse and were acquired by default by the Asian moneylenders. Worried over Asian acquisition of coconut and clove land at the expense of the islanders (and feeling a bit guilty about removing the Arabs' economic prop of slavery), in 1934 the government formally restricted sale of land outside the African/Arab community. It also developed a program to transfer ownership of some plantation land to African smallholders. Educational efforts were not as successful. In fact, it was not until after WWII that substantial numbers of Zanzibari children had the opportunity to go to school.

While the crux of economic life was manifested in the increasing Asian takeover of the economy, issues in politics pitted all three races against each other. Arabs were the traditional elite and maintained their dominance. The British saw them as the planters and the clerks for the administration. During the fifties, however, this dominance, theretofore assured by reserved seats on the Legislative Council as well as the Sultan's nominal role as chief of state, began to slip away. The British followed their East African process of gradual constitutional development by slowly allowing more elected seats and a progressive widening of the franchise. In 1960 Zanzibar adopted constitutional changes that would have a majority of members elected from a common role. This new Council would become the basis for true self-government.

Political parties organized to compete for power in January 1961. The Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) led by Abied Karume reflected the aspirations of ex-slaves and mainlanders. A breakaway faction, the Zanzibar and Pemba's Peoples' Party (ZPPP) led by Abdul Rahman Babu appealed to Pembans and represented African interests against the Arabs. The Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) led by Shiek Ali Muhsin was deemed to be the Arab party, but garnered substantial support from indigenous islanders. Election results

were split. Although the Afro-Shirazi Party received a clear majority of the overall vote, it deadlocked with the ZNP at 11 seats each in Council after dividing the ZPPP's three seats. Since government was impossible new elections were called. This time campaigning turned violent, racial harangue and intimidation were rampant, shops were looted and people killed in riots, but nearly 95 percent of the voters cast ballots. Again the Afro-Shirazi Party won a majority of the popular vote, but only ten seats. The ZNP also got ten seats with 3 falling to the ZPPP.

The ZNP and the ZPPP joined forces in a coalition. Afro-Shirazi partisans objected to this outcome and its members boycotted the Council. Nonetheless internal self-government went forward on the basis of these election results which were repeated in pre-independence voting of July 1963. Zanzibar thus became independent on December 9, 1963 as a constitutional monarchy with newly enthroned Sultan Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdullah as monarch and a ZNP Prime Minister in charge of government. However, a large African faction headed by the Afro-Shirazi Party felt cheated and remained discontent.

Revolution

Zanzibar's revolution produced a violent change in the social, economic and political order of the islands. Although there was discontent within the Afro-Shirazi Party led by Abied Karume, the ASP leadership was apparently not thinking in terms of a coup, but others were. Only a month after independence an enigmatic Ugandan immigrant named John Okello led an uprising. Okello had a history of working class jobs in Uganda, Kenya and on Pemba Island. He believed he had a mission from God to purify society. He held an abiding hatred of foreigners which he defined as Asians and Arabs. The ultimate irony is, of course, that he himself was also a foreigner in Zanzibar. In any case, Okello's dreams were put into action during the closing months of 1963. He carefully selected, trained and organized a group of several hundred men for revolution. Most of the leaders were, like Okello, recent arrivals from the mainland, especially from Kenya.

Okello's war was made easier by the arrogance of the new government which lightly dismissed rumors that something was afoot, had no army, made a stupid decision to centralize all armaments in two police stations of Zanzibar town which sat smack in the middle of African neighborhoods. Finally, the new government fired about forty policemen, Africans from the mainland, but did not repatriate them. These policemen subsequently lent their expertise and knowledge to the revolution.

Okello's ragtag army struck on the night of January 10. In fighting that lasted several hours, they captured the two police station armories and the radio station thus seizing control of Zanzibar. The Sultan, his family and some ministers fled before dawn. In the ensuing days and weeks self-proclaimed Field Marshall Okello unleashed a terror aimed at Arabs. Lists were used to identify those to attack. Perhaps as many as ten thousand persons were tortured and killed, women and girls raped, shops, homes and plantations burned. Arab and Asian civil servants were dismissed and imprisoned. While visiting this chaos and settling ancient grievances on the islands, Okello was careful to exclude the British from his ire. Thus, there was no intervention by British troops on stand-by in Nairobi or from British warships that soon arrived in Zanzibar's harbor.

Okello stated early on that he was not interested in government. In fact, he named Karume president during one of his early radio broadcasts. Karume, however, was not part of the plot nor were Abdulrahman Babu, leader of Umma, a communist oriented splinter party, and Kassim Hanga. The two latter men had been separately plotting their own violence. However, all three opposition leaders had been caught unaware by Okello's move. In fact, all three were in Dar es Salaam when it happened. They quickly returned to Zanzibar and even as Okello directed the terror, they began organizing the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council (ZRC). Over the course of several weeks in late January and February these leaders of the indigenous people and established mainlanders eased Okello progressively to the margins. When Okello left Zanzibar in late February for a victory tour of neighboring capitals, Karume consolidated power and then refused permission for Okello to return. (Okello bounced around East Africa for a few years. He did some time in a Kenyan jail at some point where he wrote his memoirs. He was last seen shaking hands with Idi Amin in 1971.)

Meanwhile on Zanzibar the new order was being put into place. Land and businesses were nationalized. Rule by decree established. Asians by the thousands and Arabs from the detention camps were dispossessed and sent packing. The ZRC was much influenced by the communist leanings of Babu and Kassim and found ready openings to the east – East Germany, the Soviet Union and China. Arms shipments and experts swiftly solidified these new bonds. The cold war arrived in Zanzibar almost overnight. Originally pro-British, Karume became disenchanted with the slow pace of British recognition of his regime and with other signs which he interpreted as counter-plotting. He also adopted a distaste for the United States. Chargé d'affaires Picard was expelled in January for passing lurid rumors to the press. In April, in a bluster of communist inspired rhetoric, Karume ordered the American satellite tracking station closed and expelled acting U.S. Chargé Petterson along with all American and all British citizens.

Tanzania

As all this was going on, Karume felt buffeted by his colleagues and compelled to adopt their socialist/communist views. While he apparently liked the policies, he sensed strong personal rivalries from his peers and feared cold war machinations. His solution to these rising challenges was unity with Tanganyika. Unity was secretly planned and hastily accomplished in April 1964. Karume got what he wanted which was autonomy for Zanzibar under the broader umbrella held by Julius Nyerere. Karume's rivals were trucked off to be ministers in the new union government in Dar es Salaam. Since Zanzibar was no longer a sovereign entity as such, it became less of a cold war prize. For Nyerere union represented the logical extension of national territory. Furthermore, union reduced the risk of surprises from a volatile neighbor and set some controls on the nearby communist presence.

The Act of Union was passed on April 26, 1964. Even while retaining his Zanzibari presidency, Karume also took title to the newly created position of First Vice President of Tanzania.

Karume in Power

Uneducated but shrewd, Karume consolidated his rule. He rarely left the islands. He became despotic,

arbitrary and capricious. He recruited a small army and established a fairly competent East German trained secret police. Karume brooked no rivals. He maneuvered them out of the way, sent them to the mainland, imprisoned and executed them. Essentially Okello's revolution succeeded in destroying the old order, but Karume's new order was arbitrary and chaotic. Suspicion and fear were the hallmark of the day. Social services decayed and bureaucratic inefficiency prevailed. All land was nationalized, but three-acre parcels were then allocated to individual families. This saved the economy because when clove prices rebounded in the late 1960s Zanzibari clove growers earned hard currency for the islands. All businesses were nationalized in the sixties and private commerce formally outlawed in 1970. Karume's outrages against sensibilities were many. One well-reported transgression was the forced marriage of young Arab and Asian girls to himself and his political cronies.

Zanzibar was a parasite in the union. It contributed little to the arrangement and took much from it. Karume largely ignored Nyerere. Zanzibar maintained relations with eastern bloc nations and came to depend strongly on East Germany and China. Karume was assassinated in 1972 by the son of a man he probably killed in 1964. Aboud Jumbe replaced him as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and began a slow process of re-establishing political norms and reasonable economic and social order.

Issues to Ponder

Zanzibar's revolution was begun by a megalomaniac who put another warped individual into power. Does the quest for power automatically corrupt? Or does the sort of ruthlessness inherent in each man's character simply make him the only type of individual capable of managing such a situation?

Were there any positive outcomes to the Zanzibar revolution? Who were the winners over the long run? Have they yet really won? Did Britain acquit itself well?

Although we will look more at Nyerere later, what compelled this ostensibly honorable man and his mainland government to accept Karume's and Zanzibar's outrageous actions and behavior?

Readings:

Ward & White: *East Africa: A Century of Change, 1870-1979*
Pages 232-245

Additional Readings:

Clayton, Anthony. *The Zanzibar Revolution and Its Aftermath*. Hamden, Conn. Archon Books, 1981
DT 435.75.C58

This is a fascinating, readable and detailed account of Okello, the revolution and Karume.

Web Site:

www.zanzibar.archieves.com

Flagged previously, this site contains several interesting pieces about this epoch.

Chapter 11: Leaders

With the exception of Karume, several unusual men came forward to lead their nations through the last throes of colonialism into independence. Specifically, Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote quickly became larger-than-life figures who cast varied shadows over their respective political landscapes. Indeed the history of the three nations would have been much different had they not played key roles. Kenyatta was the supreme pragmatist, Nyerere an unabashed ideologue, and Obote a first rate opportunist.

Kenyatta

Born in the 1890s, about the time Europeans first arrived in Kikuyuland, Jomo Kenyatta got a smattering of mission primary education before moving to Nairobi. He emerged as a Kikuyu nationalist, took on the reins of the Kikuyu Central Association in the twenties and was sent by that organization to London in the thirties to lobby Parliament for land rights. He circulated in leftist circles, visited the Soviet Union, preached Kikuyu causes including female circumcision, studied anthropology, wrote an anti-colonial treatise in the form of an explanation of Kikuyu culture, married an English woman, and took refuge on a Sussex farm during WWII. He imbibed British culture and learned the British way of thinking. Throughout he stayed in contact with Kenyans, but on account of the distance, remained aloof from Nairobi political squabbles. He returned to Kenya in 1946 and quickly became immersed in agitations for land. His nationalism was deemed seditious by the authorities and the settlers and, although no conclusive proof was ever offered, he was tagged with being an instigator of Mau Mau. Kenyatta was arrested in 1952, convicted and imprisoned. His political reputation grew even as he spent ten years in jail. He was released just in time to become Kenya's first Prime Minister.

Without a doubt an agitator and nationalist, Kenyatta was also a moderate who – had he been given the chance – would probably have worked within the system. History did not happen that way, however, and because of what people thought of him - settlers and the authorities considered him the devil incarnate while Africans believed him to be the savior of the nation – he achieved powerful stature. As president he coupled this stature with the aura of age and the reality of wisdom. He was fondly and respectfully known as "Mzee," a Swahili term for elder. Kenyatta implemented pragmatic and conciliatory policies. He urged the settlers to stay and make Kenya prosperous. Yet he acted quickly to assuage "land hunger." He instituted land reform and opened the highlands to all. He opted to continue a free market economy. He pursued pro-western foreign policies, but rarely ventured into the international arena. Internally, he groomed, trained and balanced both his own generation of political colleagues as well as the coming generation of leaders.

Kenyatta was not perfect. His judgment was not always sound. He could be autocratic. As a politician he played hard and sometimes dirty. As he aged and withdrew from the day-to-day management of government, he relied on persons who often pursued their own agendas - either personal political aggrandizement or private wealth. He allowed too much political and economic power to accrue to his family and to the Kikuyu elite. Yet on balance, the verdict is extremely positive. Kenyatta led Kenya to independence without rancor. Given the emotions of that time, that was a singularly astonishing achievement. He later established the moderate and pragmatic parameters that characterize Kenya today as a quasi-democratic, free-market oriented, largely peaceful society. On the negative side, the roots of Kenya's current problems, i.e. less than full democracy, abuse of human rights and corruption, also lie in the Kenyatta era.

Over eighty years old, Kenyatta died in office in 1978.

Nyerere

Julius Nyerere was born in 1922 at Butiama, near Musoma on Lake Victoria in western Tanganyika. He was educated in mission schools and as clear evidence of his extraordinary intellect was among the first Tanganyikans to earn university degrees. Nyerere taught school prior to becoming a full time politician in the 1950s. He never lost the demeanor and aura of a teacher. Indeed "Mwalimu" (teacher in Swahili) was the most appropriate title ever assigned to this humble and decent man whose ideas and philosophy dramatically changed not just Tanzania, but also the whole way the world looked at third world nations and their problems.

Nyerere entered the political arena in the fifties and shortly became the founder of the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU). He became a member of the Legislative Council and as independence drew near collaborated with Governor Turnbull to assure the smooth transfer of power. Nyerere became Tanganyika's first Prime Minister and its first President. Nyerere's agenda was to combat disease, poverty and ignorance. To do that he sought to mobilize the nation, to assemble and devote its meager resources for the betterment of all. The tranquillity he had hoped to engender as part of this quest was rattled by the violence of the Zanzibar revolution in January 1964. That revolt was mirrored shortly thereafter by a mutiny in the newly minted Tanganyikan army. Although army grievances had more to do with pay and conditions of service than they did with political aspirations, Nyerere was shaken by the event, but in accordance with his personal style – and in contrast with Kenyatta who called in British troops to quell a similar outburst – Nyerere negotiated his mutiny away.

As noted in Chapter 10, Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined in 1964 to form Tanzania (the name is usually accented, as are most Swahili words, on the penultimate syllable - TanzaNia). Although, as also noted, Zanzibar retained autonomy in most spheres, nonetheless, the act of union alone gave further credence to Nyerere as an architect of a new Africa.

Ujamaa

Nyerere's vision for the nation was to shape new approaches to problems. He constructed a whole ideology of how a poverty stricken nation like his could through self-reliance throw off the confines of colonialism and imperialism and take control of its own destiny via a distinctly African brand of socialism. Nyerere began by mobilizing rural people to better use resources for development. He noted that Tanzania lagged behind the rest of the world in economic progress. To catch up, he said, "We must run, while they walk." In accordance with his ideas Tanzania created a system of ujamaa villages which grouped traditionally scattered homesteads of rural residents onto a single site for several purposes. First, to facilitate the flow of government services of education, adult literacy, health services, agricultural extension efforts and the like. Secondly, by pooling efforts via cooperative production and larger-scale marketing, villagers should make greater strides than via traditional inefficient methods. Villagers would stress their self-reliance via such a system. Supporting these ideas was the conviction that collectivism was traditionally African. The word "ujamaa" itself means family.

Another step on the economic front was the belief that the state, as opposed to the private sector, should control the means of production. Consequently, the government nationalized most of Tanzania's industry. Historically, this proved to be an error in terms of maintenance or expansion of output, but part of the initial purpose behind nationalization was to enforce the fact that Africans, not outsiders, were masters in their own house.

Concomitantly, Nyerere believed that political competition wasted human resources. He felt it important that all Tanzanians accept one vision of society and of the future. He believed that common vision could best be expressed via a single political party. He accepted that choice should be part of self-reliance in the political sphere, but was convinced that democracy could be accommodated within the sole party. Furthermore, unlike almost every other leader on the continent, Nyerere put into practice the idea that the one party must be a real channel of communication from the leadership to the people and vice versa. Consequently, a TANU party structure grew up nationwide that paralleled or excised governmental functions. While this doubled the bureaucracy that citizens had to deal with, party officials were less bound by regulations and enjoyed greater flexibility in managing local issues.

Nyerere was aware that in much of Africa the heady promise of independence was being destroyed by the canker of corruption. He was determined to spare Tanzania that fate. In 1967 he enunciated the Arusha Declaration which put forward a leadership code that reflected Nyerere's personal asceticism. Under the code leaders were to eschew personal investments and acquisition of property. They were to subsist solely on their government or party salaries and not use their positions for unethical purposes. This Puritanism and the vigor with which the people enforced it did in fact have the desired result, which was to combat corruption.

Finally, Nyerere made a bold mark in international affairs. An ardent believer in African independence, he was a staunch supporter of southern African freedom movements. Groups opposing white rule in the south found ready support and succor in Dar es Salaam. British policy of acceptance of white Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 cast a pall over Tanzania's ties to the U.K. Additionally, Tanzania's socialist proclivities complicated relations with other western nations including the U.S. However, Scandinavian states rallied to a socialist brother and the Communist bloc did as well, especially

China. In accordance with its philosophy of self-reliance, Tanzania accepted support from any professed friend. Nyerere sought to bind third world nations together so as to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the cold war contestants. He joined the Non-Aligned Movement and was an ardent supporter of the Organization for African Unity.

In what was almost another African first, Julius Nyerere voluntarily retired from Tanzania's presidency in 1985. By that time the world he knew in the 1960s was no more. The cold war was about to wind down and Southern Africa was free from colonial domination. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and their economic philosophies dominated third world development issues. Nyerere's bold experiments in ujamaa, a nationalized economy, a single party state and self-reliance had not borne the fruit he envisaged (under subsequent leadership many economic directions were reversed.) Yet Nyerere's legacy is compelling. Tanzania today exudes a great sense of nationhood and a powerful ethic of self-reliance and self-confidence. The nation that Nyerere created from the disparate tribes of Tanganyika and Zanzibar remains vibrant.

Nyerere died in 1999.

Obote

The least charismatic of the three fathers of their countries, Milton Obote had the most difficult assignment in forging unity and a sense of direction out of the complexities of Ugandan politics. He gave it a try during his first years in office, but ultimately retreated - particularly during his second incarnation as president - to tribal parochialism, which was his downfall.

Obote was born in 1924 in Lira. A Langi tribesman by birth, like all northerners, Obote was viewed as a lesser breed by the haughty rulers of Buganda. The Langi, the Teso and the Acholi people of the north and east had not been historical players in Uganda where attention had focused on Buganda in the first instance and the other kingdoms in the second. Nonetheless, as northerners became educated, they too clamored for political rights. Obote spent several years at Makerere College, but left without obtaining a degree. He worked for a while in Kenya in the 1940s then returned home and found his metier in politics. A mesmerizing orator, he proved to be a ruthless infighter and ambitious schemer. Obote was among the first to seize upon new political opportunities. Initially he formed a Langi based group called the Ugandan Nationalist Movement, which successively joined other groups before finally coalescing into the Ugandan Peoples' Congress in 1960. Although the UPC was the first political party with some elements of broad national appeal, the fundamentals of Ugandan politics remained firmly based on tribe and/or religion. The Baganda themselves were split by religion and most everyone else was anti-Baganda.

Obote convinced the Kabaka Yekka Party to join the UPC in a coalition and under those terms he became Uganda's first Prime Minister in 1962. This doomed coalition was a marriage of convenience. Obote wanted national power and the Kabaka wanted to ensure that his Bagandan rivals in the Democratic Party were denied power. As a condition of the coalition, the Kabaka had demanded a federal system. However, the new federal state, which allowed latitude for the five kingdoms, was not successful. Following much

political maneuvering and infighting, including a debacle over the still contentious lost counties plus an effort to oust Obote from the UPC (thwarted in part on account of support for Obote from General Idi Amin, Deputy Army Commander), confrontation with the Kabaka came to a head. Obote won. In what was to be dubbed "the battle of Mengo," thousands of Baganda died and the Kabaka fled to London. Obote suspended the constitution in 1966, removed the Kabaka from the presidency and ordained a centralized republic with himself as president. Obote took steps to eliminate Buganda as a political entity. The centralization of power permitted the development and increasing use of detention and violence to cow or eliminate rivals.

Recognizing the need to build a popular power base, Obote sought to expand his government's appeal by transforming the nation into a socialist state. (Theories of "African" socialism abounded during the sixties and were quite popular – and equally devastating – across the continent.) During the next few years Obote's "The Common Man's Charter" steered Uganda leftward through a series of nationalizations, extension of government regulation into the economy and use of cooperatives for many rural endeavors. The economic program was popular in some quarters and despised in others. In short, it fostered even more acrimony in an already divided nation. However, it was neither bitter politics vis a vis Buganda, nor disagreement over policy that cost Obote his position, but rather his failure to control General Amin. Although promoted to Army Commander by Obote, Amin correctly felt Obote's moves to increase the number of senior Langi officers as well as to investigate Amin for killing a military rival, threatened his tenure as army chief. Consequently, in January 1971 when Obote was in Singapore for a Commonwealth summit, Amin launched a coup d'état.

Obote went into exile in Tanzania where he plotted his return. To jump ahead a half dozen years, Obote supported Nyerere's military response to Amin's seizure of Tanzanian territory in 1979. Amin was ousted in 1979 and following short-lived governments of Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa (currently a public defender in New Jersey), Obote returned to the presidency. This time he made little pretense of trying to forge a national consensus, instead he relied on his northern brethren to combat insurgent armies at every turn. He faced Amin loyalists in the far northwest, disgruntled Bagandan irregulars in the center and a well organized guerrilla campaign of Yoweri Museveni in the southwest and in the Luwero triangle outside Kampala. Obote relied on his army, traditionally staffed by northern Acholi and Langi tribesmen, to fight these foes. They did a very poor job and as the house was crumbling about them, Obote turned more exclusively to his Langi tribesmen. The Acholi counter-reaction was to oust Obote, which they did in July 1985.

Obote went into exile again (rumor has it that he looted the national bank on his way out of town). He currently resides in Zambia.

Issues to Ponder

If you haven't soured on British colonialism yet, carefully study the kangaroo trial accorded to Jomo Kenyatta. Keep in mind, however, that this judicial proceeding and others like it were where the Kenyans learned how to handle political dissent. Kenyatta and especially Moi learned the lesson well.

What is the impact of a single person in a nation's destiny? How much different would Kenya have been without Kenyatta? While that might be imaginable, it is inconceivable that Tanzania as it evolved could have done so without the influence of Mwalimu. Lacking him, Tanzania would probably have remained an unremarkable third world basket case. With him, however, it was a very remarkable third world basket case.

When making your assessments of Nyerere's programs, avoid simple characterizations of what worked or didn't work. Instead, try to get inside his head, try to understand his dreams, his vision and his ideas. Obviously, many of Nyerere's programs did not work, but is that because his philosophy was fatally flawed, or was it because the Tanzanian people (or humankind in general) weren't up to the task?

Obote falls short on our list of heroes, yet Uganda had the most numerous, best educated people in all of East Africa. Where were its leaders? How badly flawed was the system at independence? Whose fault was that? Obote did not have the strength of character or political skills to lead Uganda out of morass. Could anyone have saved Uganda from tribal and sectarian violence?

Readings:

There are many readings pertinent to this chapter. Indulge yourselves. Nyerere-phobes will want to look hard at Mwalimu's ideas.

Arnold, Guy, *Kenyatta and the Politics of Kenya*, London, J.M. Dent & Sons, 1974.
DT434.K4A7

Pages 98-110, 167-180, and 192-210 provide the basic information. Those who want more would enjoy the chapters on Facing Mount Kenya, Mau Mau and the Kapenguria trial.

Legum, Colin and Mnari, Geoffrey, editors, *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere*, Trenton, Africa World Press, 1995
DT448.2.M89

This is a fascinating collection of essays by scholars extremely knowledgeable about Tanzania who assess the various elements of Nyerere's contributions to political and economic thought and practice. Skim through it all, but read Chapter 4, Ujamaa; Chapter 6, One-Party Democracy; Chapter 7, Human-Centered Development and the closing short chapters assessing his impact.

Ofcansky, Thomas P. *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa*. Boulder, Westview Press, 1996.
DT433.222.O35

Pages 39-68 cover politics and government from Obote 1 to Museveni.

Mutibwa, Phares. *Uganda Since Independence, a Story of Unfilled Hopes*. Trenton, Africa World

Press, 1992

DT433.26.M88

Pages 22-71 provide a more detailed look at the Obote era.

Additional Reading:

Murray-Brown, Jeremy, *Kenyatta*, New York, E.P. Dutton and Company, 1973

DT433.576.K46M8

Milton and Ingrham. *Obote: a Political Biography*. London, Routledge, 1994

(Not in Department of State Libraries)

Web Sites:

www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/171099/Comment/News_Analysis8.html

www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/171099/Comment/News_Analysis9.html

Published shortly after his death, these two commentaries on Julius Nyerere by prominent scholars Ali Mazuri and James Nyong'o recount Mwalimu's contributions.

www.uganda.co.ug/millium/obote.html

This is a decent encyclopedia entry on Obote with links to other figures of his era.

Chapter 12: Conqueror of the British Empire

Idi Amin came from obscurity to leave a mark of terror and buffoonery on Uganda. In the process he traumatized the people, destroyed the economy and wrecked the political system. Although Amin was certainly possible in the first instance because of the tribalism, which permeated politics, his legacy was to further tribalize society to the extent that the dysfunctionality he engendered still plagues Uganda today.

A Kakwa tribesman from the West Nile District, Amin received only a smattering of primary schooling. A northern warrior, he joined the King's African Rifles in 1946. An amiable giant of a man, British officers thought Amin to be an ideal soldier – simple, enthusiastic, strong and of regal bearing, i.e. he looked good in a parade. He fought Mau Mau insurgents in Kenya and rose steadily in the ranks. As independence loomed, Amin was one of two senior sergeants to be commissioned as officers. He received training in Britain and Israel, but was not literate enough to successfully complete the courses. Nonetheless, because of seniority he became one of the top men in the independent Ugandan Army. He rose quickly from lieutenant to general. When Deputy Army Commander in 1966, Amin sustained Obote against a poorly plotted takeover. Afterwards Obote promoted him to Army Commander. Although his personal quirks, aberrations and predilection for violence were evident, Amin did command the loyalty of some troops, particularly Kakwa brethren whom he brought into the army. Although Amin had helped Obote out of several jams, the Army Commander was a liability, an embarrassment, but above all an

unpredictable unknown, for the president.

Amin correctly interpreted Obote's attempts to move him aside in late 1970, and so he struck back. When Obote was attending a Commonwealth meeting in Singapore in January 1971, Amin took over. Amin's coup d'état did not enjoy the total support of the army, which was dominated by Acholi and Langi northerners, but it was embraced by the people of Buganda who were delirious with joy at the ouster of their nemesis Milton Obote. Always cunning and with a solid sense of theater, Amin consolidated Bagandan support by authorizing the re-burial in Buganda (at Kasubi) of recently deceased Kabaka Mutesa II who died in exile in London.

Even in the euphoria of takeover, Amin began to purge the army of his real and perceived enemies. This was the beginning of the years of slaughter that cost several hundred thousand Ugandans their lives. The rationale behind most of the killings was "enemy of the state," but decisions were arbitrary and capricious. Many prominent Ugandans including first Prime Minister Kiwanuka and Anglican Archbishop Lwum were murdered. The State Research Bureau staffed by Amin's thugs who flaunted fancy clothes and dark glasses, systematized torture and death.

With the expulsion of the Asians, citizen and non-citizen alike, in 1972 Amin dealt a crippling blow to the economy. Shopkeepers and proprietors of small businesses for the most part, Asians also served as doctors and lawyers and owned factories, sugar and tea plantations. Despite a storm of protest from abroad, Amin was adamant; all 50,000 Asian would leave...and so they did – humiliated, stripped of their wealth and possessions. Many Africans who long envied the perceived prosperity of the Asians and resented their business practices applauded this action. The "economic war" as the expulsion and the subsequent acquisition of property came to be known was a resounding defeat for the economy. New owners sold off stocks and had no way to re-supply. Credit systems evaporated. Because a large part of the moneyed sector disappeared, the economy spiraled downward.

Amin also reversed Uganda's foreign policies and threw his lot in with the Muslim world. The leftward jaunt under Obote already raised qualms in Britain and the west about Uganda's orientation. Amin multiplied these fears as he appeared unreliable and increasingly incompetent. The expulsion of the Asians, mostly to Britain, confirmed the judgment that Uganda was not a worthy partner. A whole series of other incidents involving detained Peace Corps Volunteers, the murder of Edward Stroh, the hijacking of Air France (and the subsequent Israeli raid on Entebbe), the murder of Dora Bloch, the arrest of Cecil Hills, not to mention growing knowledge of the grisly murder machine of the State Research Bureau all combined to sour and interrupt ties with western nations. In their stead, playing on his Islamic faith, Amin turned to the Muslim world, to Egypt, to Saudi Arabia and especially to Libya. Less critical, but also with fewer resources to share, these nations rallied around Uganda. To the dismay of critics both inside and outside of Africa, Amin ascended to the presidency of the OAU in 1975, further tarnishing the reputation of that body.

In his final act of arrogance, Amin decided to reclaim the Kagera salient, the small bit of Tanzanian territory just south of the Ugandan border. Amin claimed that the Akagera River was the natural boundary, so he was just rectifying a colonial border mistake. Ugandan occupation of region in 1979

brought an immediate military response from Tanzania. Nyerere mustered his army, which counter-attacked. Accompanied by a motley grouping of Ugandan dissidents including pro-Obote forces, Bagandan dissidents, and newly minted rebel leader Yoweri Museveni, the Tanzanian army recaptured the salient and slowly moved toward Kampala. Amin's army put up feeble resistance. Ultimately their chief fled, first to Jinja, then home to Aura and finally into exile in Libya.

Today Amin lives in exile in Saudi Arabia, under conditions resembling house arrest.

Issues to Ponder

1. Was Idi Amin an anomaly or merely the most egregious example of colonial authorities' failure to select and train suitable men for military positions?
2. How do you account for Amin's appeal to the Ugandan public? Was he a legitimate hero or was he just good theater?

Readings:

Mutibwa, Phares. *Uganda Since Independence, A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes* Trenton, Africa World Press, 1992

DT433.26.M88

Pages 78-122

Additional Readings:

Decalo, Samuel. *Psychoses of Power, African Personal Dictatorships*. Boulder, Westview Press, 1989

DT352.8.D44

Pages 79-119

Decalo writes an excellent description of Amin's personality – what drove him and how he drove others.

Grahame, Iain. *Amin and Uganda, A Personal Memoir*. London, Granada, 1980

DT433.282.A55G7

Grahame remembers the soldier Amin he commanded. He also recounts the several occasions when he was sent by the British government to intervene and plead with his former subordinate.

Martin, David. *General Amin*. London, Faber and Faber, 1974

DT433.282.A5M3

Written just as he attained the presidency, this book recounts Amin's military service more than his political career.

Web Sites:

www.uganda.co.ug/millennium/amin.htm

A serviceable biography of the man.

Chapter 13: Uganda: Liberators and Revolution

Uganda's agony did not end with Amin's departure. In the chaotic period that followed two short-lived governments, both propped up by Tanzanian occupiers, attempted to rule. First was Yusuf Lule, a Mugandan who was not part of the Baganda hierarchy. He proved unable and was quickly replaced by Godfrey Binaisa. Binaisa too was weak and proved unable to contain corruption in the army. Many officers leftover from the pre-Amin era were actively working for Obote's return. Binaisa was also sandbagged by fellow Baganda from the Democratic Party who refused to work with him. Finally, Binaisa's ouster was accepted by Museveni, the Minister of Defense at the time, who represented a growing third force not aligned with any of the older parties. With Binaisa's departure, the pro-Obote Military Commission stepped in and organized elections in 1980. Museveni formed a new party, the Ugandan Patriotic Movement, to contest the elections against Obote's UPC and Ssemogerere's DP. The elections were flawed, essentially rigged by Paulo Muwanga, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. The UPC won a commanding majority and Obote took office in December.

The 1980 elections had major consequences. First, Uganda missed an opportunity to redress matters in the wake of Amin's departure and to establish a viable political system. Secondly, the debacle provided the rationale for Museveni to opt out of working within the system and to begin efforts to overthrow it. Thirdly, Obote realized that many Ugandans hated him and his new government. Rather than try to mend fences, Obote retreated into staunch tribalism. Finally and most tragically, the situation overall was conducive to the continuation of criminal and state-orchestrated violence that had become part of every day life.

In the wake of the stolen election of 1980, Obote made no reconciliatory moves. The DP, however, pursuing misguided hopes that it could reform the system from within took up its 51 seats in Parliament. On the other hand, Museveni concluded that the system – a too powerful presidency dominated by a vile, corrupt northern army – had to be changed, if Uganda's cycle of violence were to cease. He and his followers formed the National Resistance Army (NRA) and took to the bush.

Obote unleashed his loosely reined army against the belligerents. The army committed many atrocities against civilians – predominately Bagandan farmers - in the Luwero Triangle region just northwest of Kampala. The struggle quickly took on dimensions of a tribal war: southern Bantus versus northern Nilotics. The fighting Nilotics increasingly came from the Acholi half of the army. Acholi military leaders saw that Obote sent their tribesmen to war while keeping the Langi half (Obote's tribesmen) in garrisons elsewhere. This division inside the army, reinforced by the Acholi view that the war was lost in the field and could only be resolved by negotiations, led to Brigadier Basilio Okello's coup d'état of July 1985. The coup makers installed their senior man, General Tito Okello, as president. Obote fled to Zambia.

Despite overtures to the Baganda, the Acholi regime quickly showed it merely changed the guard. Troops

ran amuck in Kampala and an alliance was forged with the remnants of Amin's army from the West Nile. The NRA initially did not respond to Okello's peace overtures, but finally under enormous pressure from outside, its political wing, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), did join peace talks organized in Nairobi in November under the aegis of President Moi. By December those talks hammered out a power sharing agreement which was signed by both sides.

Museveni apparently recognized that the Okellos could never honor their obligations under the agreement. Therefore, he concluded that the NRA too, which already controlled about half of Uganda, would not be held to the provisions of the agreement. Consequently, in January 1986 the NRA finally moved on and took Kampala. Museveni was sworn in as president.

The significance of the NRA takeover was several fold. First, for Uganda it represented revolutionary change – the old colonial based political system that exploited tribal differences was thrown out and the predatory northern army was dissolved. Secondly, Museveni's continuation of the struggle after signing the Nairobi agreement was taken as a personal affront by President Moi. This translated into strained relations between the two men and their nations for the next decade. Thirdly, the NRA takeover was a home grown revolution (with minimal outside support) that successfully replaced a recognized sitting government. This sent shudders through neighboring autocrats like Moi and Mobutu.

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni

Born into a Bahima family in southern Ankole (near the Rwandan border), Museveni was named by his father in honor of the seventh battalion of the King's African Rifles. He attended university in Dar es Salaam where he threw his considerable energy into student politics and where he also imbibed nationalist revolutionary vibes of Tanzania and of FRELIMO. Museveni did not burst unknown upon the political scene with the NRA, but was already an acknowledged leader. He held the post of Minister of Defense during the Lule and Bianisa regimes when he was deemed to be the second most dangerous challenger (DP chief Ssemogerere being the lead) to Obote's return. Museveni was defeated (by a DP candidate) in the stolen election of 1980.

In the bush Museveni's leadership and revolutionary vision flourished. He was of a new generation of pragmatic leaders who owed nothing to the system. A man of far reaching vision, Museveni held determined convictions of the rightness, and righteousness, of his point of view. Nonetheless, although not easily swayed, he was astute enough to listen to contrary opinions and to weigh them on their merits. In office as president, he has mastered the practice of co-opting opponents to accept his point of view or ridiculing and cowering them into silence. President Museveni has an appealing public persona. He uses humor and homespun wisdom in public pronouncements. He rejects labels of "politician" or "general," instead he describes himself as a "revolutionary." Under his direction Uganda's economy strengthened. Also, President Museveni himself emerged onto a wider regional and global stage as a leader whose influence and opinions count.

The National Resistance Movement

The NRM took power in 1986 with a self-imposed mandate to rebuild Uganda. Its ten-point program included restoration of democracy, the establishment of security and re-launching the economy.

Decrying Uganda's "backwardness," the NRM completely rejected party politics. Instead it opted for a pyramid of elected bodies called Resistance Councils (RCs). Citizens directly elect village level RCs. RC members, in turn, choose the next level and so forth up to the national level, which is Parliament. Persons stand for election on their own merits rather than under a party banner (everyone generally knows, however, which party a candidate would support were parties permitted.) Nonetheless, the exclusion of party affiliations reduced the vicious tribalism that characterized previous politics. Secondly, the RC system reserved seats in Parliament for special constituencies, i.e. women, youth, labor and the army. Laudably, this insured that women were well represented. Uganda's commendable constitutional consultations (1989-92) found widespread support for the new representational system.

Despite support for the RC system, the continued ban on political party activities remains contentious in Uganda. Parties are permitted to exist, but may not contest elections, hold rallies or otherwise "politic." Furthermore the ban became a point of dissension between the U.S. (and to a lesser extent other donors) in the late 1990s. Debate on the timing to resume full political freedoms remains topical at the turn of the century. Meanwhile, a relatively unfettered press emerged and, except in conflict zones, human rights were respected.

The Museveni government confronted security problems at every turn. First, in 1986, it had to chase down the retreating Acholi and West Nile forces. Some of the Acholi troops joined civilians and metamorphosed into priestess Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement, which upon her departure, was further transformed into the Lord's Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony. These atavistic Acholi movements initially appealed to an anti-Bantu sentiment, accentuated by the NRA's abuses directed at non-combatants in the north,. In the years since the late 1980s, when the NRA imposed better internal discipline, the victims of the LRA have been overwhelmingly their fellow Acholis. Despite vast military superiority and intense political efforts, the NRA has not brought the LRA to heel. Today the LRA enjoys very little support in Acholiland, but has been sustained by a hard core of believers operating from bases in southern Sudan with support from Khartoum.

Uganda was plagued with other insurgents as well. Ex-Amin forces were largely neutralized in 1989 when Brigadier Ali joined the government, but a small secessionist movement of the Bakonjo people has operated in the Ruwenzori Mountains for decades. More recently, in the late ninties and into 2000, the African Democratic Party, a loose coalition of dissidents including some Islamic fundamentalists, operating out of the Congo sowed havoc with raids along the eastern border and even into Kassese and Kibale towns.

In 1990 about 4,000 NRA troops of Rwandan refugee origin, led by General Fred Rwigema, one of Museveni's original NRA bush compatriots, deserted and invaded Rwanda under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Army. Although he denied prior knowledge and provided minimal active support for the deserters, Museveni certainly acquiesced to their leaving and did little to thwart their invasion of

Rwanda. In fact, the Rwandan departure ended the political liability of having so many foreigners in the NRA.

On the economic front, the NRM government has dramatically changed the landscape. We will look at that in the next chapter.

Issues to Ponder

1. No-party politics characterize present day Uganda. What arguments justify banning political parties? What are the arguments for lifting the ban? Would you join the cynics who say the ban is only in place until Museveni and the NRM can build themselves up enough so that they would not lose a fair election?
2. Internal violence remains a factor in Uganda's political life. Can this apparently ingrained practice be halted? or will it remain a problem for years to come?
3. President Museveni often chastises his countrymen for blaming troubles of backwardness, under-development, political violence, etc. on outsiders instead of accepting responsibility for their own predicament. Is he correct?

Readings:

Mutibwa, Phares. *Uganda Since Independence, A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes*, Trenton, Africa World Press, 1992
DT433.26.M88
Pages 125-198

Additional Readings:

Zartman, William, editor, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995
JQ1879.A15C647
Pages 33-49, Khadiagala, Gilbert M. "State Collapse and Reconstruction in Uganda"

Web Sites:

www.uganda.co.ug

This web site has lots of links to Ugandan newspapers. *New Vision* (pro-government) and *The Monitor* (critical of government) have the largest circulations.

Chapter 14: Uganda's Economy

One of the remarkable success stories of Africa in the last 15 years is the rehabilitation of Uganda's economy. The base for success was always there. At independence in 1962 Uganda's per capita income was among the highest in Africa and its income distribution was the best. But nationalizations during Obote's first presidency skewed efficient resource allocation. Amin's plundering of the government and expulsion of Asians ruined daily commerce and destroyed the tax base. Continued violence and instability under Obote the second time around kept donors and investors at bay. During the twenty or so years from the mid-1960s, Uganda's GDP dropped precipitously.

The NRM, however, was committed to the restoration of economic growth through the building of a mixed economy. Although Museveni was initially suspect on account of his University of Dar es Salaam "socialist" education (plus some of his early statements), he proved to be an apt pupil of economic reality and a pragmatic executor of tough policies. President Museveni and his team instituted sweeping economic reforms. They freed the exchange rate, disposed of state owned enterprises, permitted Asians to regain property, eliminated marketing boards, sliced away petty regulations and reformed taxation. Above all they encouraged diversification in the agricultural sector and insisted on more transformation of primary products into finished goods. These measures paid off, not only on their own merits, but also because their implementation opened veritable flood gates of foreign aid from the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, Britain and others.

Lest we sound too laudatory, we flag that free market economics bring problems of unequal income distribution. This is compounded in Uganda (as in Kenya) by the elite having priority access to opportunities and by corruption. Although steps have been taken to curb "eating" as it is locally known, punishments have not yet been harsh enough to seriously inhibit corrupt practices. Additionally, Uganda has not delivered up to the expectations of rural residents in terms of modernization particularly the improvement of roads, schools and health clinics. It is precisely these sorts of issues – hopes for improvements in their own lives and disgust with those perceived to be perverting the delivery of improvements – that are fodder for political dissent.

Issues to Ponder

1. Uganda offers the perfect case study of how macro-economic discipline adversely affects social spending. In other words, adherence to IMF/IBRD economic reform targets usually translates into less money available for government spending. Cuts or reduced increases are usually taken in education and health sectors. Is that fair? See the readings for several perspectives.
2. Persons excluded from the modern sector must make ends meet. Their economic activities are often referred to as the informal economy. In all of East Africa informal economies claim a large portion of the population. A priority for nations is to discover ways to integrate the formal and informal sectors.

Readings:

Ofcansky, Thomas, op cit.

Additional Readings:

Hansen, Holger Bernt and Twaddle, Michael, editors, *Changing Uganda – The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change*, London, James Curry, 1991

DT433.285.C47

See: Mugenyi, Joshua, "IMF Conditionality and Structural Adjustment"

Oblo, Christine, "Women, Children and a Living Wage"

Web Sites:

www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/afr/ug2.htm

This is an excellent and concise recounting of economic policy developments under NRM rule.

www.perds.go.ug

Sponsored by the Ministry of Finance, this site provides good current information on the economy and business climate with many links to similar sites.

Chapter 15: From Kenyatta to Moi

The Kenyatta era tapered off. Problems of ossification of government mirrored the aging leader. Since his family and the Kiambu Kikuyu coterie around him were desperate to hang on to power, and Kenyatta himself was unwilling to name an heir, his entourage concocted a plan to keep an unwanted successor from arising. They made it illegal to speculate on the death of the president and on a possible successor. This did indeed contain the overt positioning, but only heightened the internal maneuvering. Ultimately the idea was to permit self-effacing Vice President Daniel arap Moi, who served Kenyatta loyally, to become president in accordance with the Constitution. According to the Kiambu plan, he then would be replaced by some carefully chosen Kikuyu. When Kenyatta did die in 1978, Moi inherited the presidency as foreseen. The plan then went awry as the Kikuyu inner circle could not agree on a candidate. Charles Njonjo (a Kikuyu), Kenyatta's Attorney General, stood by Moi and helped battle back aspirants. Njonjo's savvy coupled with Moi's theretofore hidden cunning as exemplified in the appointment of Mwai Kibaki (also Kikuyu) as Vice President and the rather considerable powers of the office combined to solidify his hold on the presidency.

Moi inherited a nation marked with the indelible stamp of Mzee. Kenya was characterized by Kenyatta's system of patronage and the concentration of power in the administrative authorities (just like the British). Yet, despite its faults, Kenya was a fairly prosperous place. Its private sector-oriented economy flourished. Coffee prices were good in the late seventies. In the growing economy there was a place for everyone to pursue his ambitions. Additionally, Kenya had taken none of the ideological bents of its neighbors. It continued with a British style Parliamentary system and maintained pro-western foreign

policies. The military stayed in the barracks. Most human rights were decently respected and national issues were debated in Parliament.

Daniel arap ("son of") Moi was born in 1924 near Karbarnet in Baringo District. He is Tugen, a subset of the Kalenjin tribe. Educated in American mission schools, Moi remains a churchgoer and is prone to use Biblical quotations in speeches. Initially a teacher, he turned to politics in the nineteen fifties and was one of the first Africans elected to the Legislative Council in 1957. As independence approached Moi joined Ngala and others to form the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) which was a coalition of the smaller tribes designed to offset KANU, the coalition of Kikuyus and Luos. KADU was absorbed into KANU in 1964 and Moi shifted his allegiance to Kenyatta. Moi was selected to be Kenya's third vice president in 1967. As vice president he stayed in the background, but obviously learned many lessons of political control from the master manipulator Kenyatta himself.

Tall, gravelly-voiced, stern-faced, Moi cuts an avuncular figure. Kenyatta's trademark was a flywhisk and Moi's is a baton. As president, over the years, Moi has become more autocratic and more out of touch with the people. His challenge has been to preside over a nation acutely divided by tribal animosities (particularly in the political arena), an elite, which considers continued wealth and power its birthright and an economy, which has been up and down. All of this plays out against the backdrop of a burgeoning population, especially of urban poor, and growing demands led by the educated portion of the population for greater political freedoms.

The coalition led by Njonjo, which helped consolidate Moi's early presidency, began to unravel in 1980. In a carefully orchestrated campaign, word went out from the presidency of a "traitor." This assertion got lots of press play and it soon became evident that Njonjo was the target. Although no compelling evidence of real treason was ever produced, Njonjo was hounded out of public life. The message was clear. Loyalty and subservience to Moi were essential for a political career. Soon after the Njonjo episode, another conspiracy named "Mwakenya" was alleged. The final outrage was an attempted coup d'état mounted by men from Kenya's Air Force. Although the Air Force was composed largely of Kikuyus, Luo non-commissioned officers instigated the uprising. On a Sunday in August 1982 coup makers took Nairobi's radio station and set up roadblocks in town. Army Commander Mohamed, a Somali, immediately rallied his forces and occupied Nairobi with little opposition from the rebels. In the interim, however, lawlessness in Nairobi set off a spate of looting which proved difficult to contain. Indeed, the combined events of a coup attempt and unfettered looting showed how fragile the veneer of public order really was.

The result of these challenges was to confirm in the Moi camp the idea that it was under siege from the larger tribes – the Kikuyu and the Luo. This mind set then engendered a siege mentality during which all challenges to the regime were met with harshness. The government harassed, intimidated, arrested, imprisoned and mistreated its critics. Such actions raised public consciousness about the regime and, in turn, rebounded in greater alienation. Western countries were outraged. The U.S. in particular called for a halt to human rights abuses. Subsequently, human rights concerns coupled with unresolved issues regarding tolerance of corruption led donors, including the World Bank, to cut back assistance programs in Kenya.

The 1988 election was a low point in Kenya's democratic history. KANU used all the power available to it to ensure victory in what observers' said was not a free and fair election. The next low point was the political murder of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko. The minister was taken from his farm in Koru in the middle of the night. His mutilated body was found partially burned nearby the next day. The circumstances of the crime itself were sensational enough, but the government's clumsy attempts to cover-up fueled convictions that the presidency was involved. A yearlong inquiry led by a Scotland Yard detective came to the same conclusion. Moi cronies and confidants Nicholas Biwott and Hezekiah Oyugi lost their jobs.

As Kenya moved into the nineties, it was clear that economic and political changes were vital. Reforms in one arena complimented reforms in the other. Economic regulations were eased. Monopolies – cereal boards, milk and meat commissions, etc. were abolished. Parastatals like Kenya Airways were privatized. The doors to competition were opened internally and to a lesser extent externally. Implementation of these set of reforms led to resumption of World Bank and some other donor assistance.

In the political sphere, multiple parties were permitted. Although a number were created, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) led by old warhorse Oginga Odinga, a Luo, and Kikuyu lawyers Paul Muite and Gideon Imanyora, younger activists, led the challengers. Soon they were joined by Kenneth Matiba, a Kenyatta kinsman, and Martin Shikuku, a maverick Luhya MP. Former Vice President Mwai Kibaki formed the Democratic Party. FORD was soon rent asunder by internal differences and essentially broke into two factions Odinga/Muite vs Matiba/Shikuku.

Even though the Moi coterie continued to sow division wherever it could and used the still considerable powers of the presidency to intimidate and harass opponents, the elections of 1993 confirmed that power was shifting away from the president. He gained only 36 percent of the vote, but led the presidential voting so was returned for another eight year term. Due to gerrymandering KANU retained a majority in Parliament. More importantly, Moi's support came from the relatively poorer sections of Kenya - Rift Valley, Coast and Northeastern Provinces. The larger tribes voted along tribal lines for their brethren.

In the later nineties, Moi continued to institute reforms only under dire pressure. He demonstrated a knack to do just the bare minimum at the last minute. But reforms of the civil service, anti-corruption measures, greater independence for the judiciary and more economic measures have just barely kept the lid on. Students, the Law Society of Kenya, professional associations, non-governmental organizations, the media and even the churches clamor for more liberalization and greater freedoms.

The boost to the economy that reform measures engendered have helped buy time, but the structural problem of badly skewed distribution of wealth remains troublesome. Kenya's fast growing population means that land hunger can never be satiated. At the same time, it also means that quantities of poor youths crowd both the urban and rural areas. There is no relief in sight for them.

President Moi says that he will step down when his current term ends in 2002. Kenya then will be a much different place and the new leadership will have to create new, probably more pluralistic mechanisms,

through which to govern.

Issues to Ponder

1. Certainly the concept of loyalty in Kenya, to tribe and to leaders, takes on a dimension unknown and perhaps even unfathomable to Americans, but the idea of responsible dissent has still to find root in Africa. One is either a supporter or an enemy. There is little ground in between for constructive criticism...and politicians do take things personally.
2. Like the United States, Kenya has an unfortunate history of political assassinations. Mboya, Pinto, Kariuki and Ouku all died because of their politics. What are the similarities and the differences between events here and there?

Readings:

Miller, Norman and Yeager, Rodger. *Kenya, the Quest for Prosperity*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994.
DT433.58.M55 1994
Pages 97-125

Additional Readings:

Morton, Andrew. *Moi: The Making of an African Statesman*. London, Michael O'Mara, 1998
DT433.582M64M6

This is a partially authorized biography, which sheds some light on President Moi's family, early years and attitudes.

Smith, Hempstone, *Rogue Ambassador*, Sewanee, Tenn., The Sewanee Press, 1997
E840.8H45A3

This personal memoir by a controversial ambassador chronicles the policy struggle between the U.S. and Kenya over democracy as well as the ambassador's confrontational dealings with the Department of State on the same issue. A shorter version can be found in Ambassador Smith's article, "Kenya: A Tarnished Jewel" published in *The National Interest* magazine, Winter 1995/96.

Web Sites:

www.theatlantic.com/issues/96feb/africa/africa.htm

This is an excellent article by Bill Berkeley that gives a good account of the frustrations and challenges faced by Kenyans under Moi in the 1990s.

Chapter 16: Kenya's Economy

Kenya's economy is a continuation of its colonial economy which was based on agricultural exports complimented by a protected manufacturing sector producing import substitutes. This economy grew up behind a rather stiff set of government imposed controls that only began to be loosened in the 1980s.

Coffee, tea and pyrethrum were the colonial era exports, which were grown mostly on white owned farms. The export base expanded when post-independence land reforms placed an African yeomanry on mid-size farms on millions of acres formally held by Europeans. Extension services encouraged African production of cash crops and augmented the quantity of agricultural exports. In the years since independence there was great diversification into other cash crops such as fresh vegetables, houseplants and even cut flowers for airfreight to Europe.

Behind Kenya's barriers which protected local enterprises from global competition, a manufacturing sector grew up making items like batteries, soap, beer, cement, textiles, vehicle assembly, agricultural chemicals, tires and the like. These concerns provided employment and were the basis for the formal economy, i.e. the portion of the economy that is measured, regulated and taxed. Meanwhile, because most Kenyans were excluded from the formal sector, they continued to work and produce in the "informal" sector comprised of subsistence farmers, pastoralists, many thousands of street traders and "jua kali" (hot sun) workshops.

Although ostensibly a capitalist economy during the colonial, Kenyatta and early Moi eras, the government became increasingly involved in managing the economy through marketing boards, regulations and government owned corporations. Parastatal companies offered myriad opportunities for patronage, nepotism, cronyism and corruption. Kenyan managers who often sported big bellies would slap them satisfactorily and note, "participation in democracy." Even though few efforts were made to fix the system that was rotting at the top, the government responded readily to everyday concerns of the Wanainchi by imposing price controls on key commodities such as sugar, tea, matches, vegetable oil, maize meal and beer. To satisfy anti-Asian sentiment, the government also reserved trading in essential commodities to African merchants.

Kenya has no major mineral deposits and much of its land surface is arid with little agricultural value. Great tracks of this marginal land, however, are home to one of the greatest profusions of wildlife in Africa. Tourists have come for a hundred years to hunt (former President Roosevelt killed thousands of animals during his 1904 safari) and to view. The game parks are a major attraction, as are Kenya's sparkling beaches. By the 1980s despite ups and downs with poachers and devastating drought, over 350,000 visitors a year made tourism Kenya's second largest foreign exchange earner, a position which it retains today. The sector generates tens of thousands of jobs as well, many of which are held by persons from marginal land game areas.

Kenya experienced a solid economic growth rate in the sixties and seventies, the latter largely due to the coffee boom (frosts in Brazil dramatically reduced the world supply). But by the eighties, the growth rate had dropped to about 4% per year, which equaled Kenya's population growth rate. It was clear that major structural reforms and cleansing of corruption were necessary if momentum was to be regained. Progress was slow, hampered in part, by a devastating drought in the early eighties, imported inflation due to the

global energy crisis, and investor loss of confidence attributed to the 1982 coup attempt. The increase in authoritarian rule that followed also led to disengagement by the donor community.

In 1983 President Moi commissioned Central Bank Governor Philip Ndegwa to produce reform recommendations. Ndegwa recommended that government budgetary and fiscal policies be changed. An IMF structural adjustment program was also begun. Over time reforms have included freeing the currency, elimination of import barriers, modification of the tax system, reduction of internal regulation, elimination of price controls, opening monopolies to competition and privatization of parastatals. The deeply imbedded corruption issue has proven more difficult to contend with, but privatization reduced opportunities for corruption and progress has been registered. Public airings of a sugar import scandal and a banking swindle coupled with punishment of the perpetrators helped drive home the message that such activity was no longer permissible.

At the turn of the 21st century, Kenya's economy looks better than it has in years from a structural point of view, but severe problems remain. National infrastructures, especially roads, are in a woeful state. Energy supplies are insufficient. Environmental controls are practically non-existent. Arable land is over subscribed. Historically self-sufficient in food, Kenya is now hard pressed to maintain that sufficiency. When drought hits as it did in 1999 and 2000, Kenya must import food. The economy cannot create jobs – either urban or rural - fast enough to absorb new workers. There is a vast gap between the wealthy ruling class and the poor. In sum, the rapidly expanding population quickly negates almost any progress that is achieved.

Issues to Ponder

1. A Kenyan economist argues that Kenya's prosperity relative to other African states occurred because it spent less on social welfare. Like the United States and Britain in the 19th century resources were concentrated in the wealthier class who invested. The diversified and growing economy that resulted benefits all. While this theory justifies Kenya's economic history, it also has a ring of truth to it. Time will tell whether the price is worth it. What do you see as the trade-offs?
2. Globalization, defined as the growing linkage between national economies via information age technologies, is seen as blight and a benefit for the third world. A blight because it will further widen the gap between rich and poor, i.e. computer users vs non-users. Globalization is deemed a benefit because the second and third generation of Kenya's elite will be the innovators and entrepreneurs who can use information technology to Kenya's advantage. Only time will tell which trend predominates.
3. Globalization also renders national economic controls and policies less powerful. For example, multinational banks make lending decisions irrespective of monetary policy. Prices are set in the world market place and barriers to trade are abolished. Economic information is completely uncontrollable. Loss of government levers means that governments become less able to control their national destinies and to provide for the

common welfare. How is this going to impact on East Africa?

Readings:

Miller and Yeager, op cit
Pages 125-161

Web Sites:

www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/afr/ke2.htm

This is the World Bank address for information on Kenya.

Chapter 17: Tanzania: Post Nyerere Politics and Economy

Nyerere's multi-pronged experiment included: nationalizations (ultimately there were over 400 parastatals – everything from banks to diamond mines to meerschaum pipe companies), ujamaa (socialism at the village level), and the Arusha code of conduct (which kept government and party elite out of business). Combined with ineffective management and misallocation of resources, these factors provoked a backward slide of the economy into the doldrums. Additionally, Tanzania's socialist orientation did not generate external resource flows. The communists, except for China's major one-time shot of the TAZARA railroad to Zambia's copper belt, did not have much to give. Although European socialist governments, i.e. the Scandinavians, made Tanzania a priority, major western donors and the Bretton Woods institutions backed away.

Internally, the TANU political machine made itself predominate. Party faithful ran bureaucracies across the country. Even though his public persona was magnanimous, Nyerere tolerated little internal dissent. Tanzanian jails overflowed with political prisoners. Also, despite the fact that the 1967 Arusha set of principles was designed specifically to limit corruption and to eliminate conflict of interest, in effect, it drove such activities underground and made them more difficult to root out. In short, by the mid-seventies, the verdict was becoming clear; Tanzania's noble economic experiment was failing.

To his credit, Mwalimu recognized the problems and accepted partial responsibility for them. He apparently also saw that he could not preside over any real reversal of direction, so decided not to stand for the presidency in 1985. However, he retained the chairmanship of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM); the political party successor to TANU formed when it merged with Zanzibar's sole political party ASP in 1977. As chairman Nyerere continued to exert influence on Tanzania's political course.

In 1986 Nyerere's vice president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, was chosen to represent CCM. As the candidate of the sole political party in the one-party state, he was elected president. Mwinyi's first order of business was to begin economic reforms. He established an Economic Recovery Program and entered into talks

with the IMF and World Bank. Reforms included dismantling government controls, liberalization of regulation, and floating of the currency. Although some initial progress was achieved, the system proved entrenched. Reforms also ran into popular discontent generated by sharp increases in prices of imported goods as the Tanzanian shilling found international equilibrium. During Mwinyi's second term reform zeal waned and economic malaise re-asserted itself. On the political front, however, the winds of change were blowing. Tanzania permitted the establishment of multiple political parties in 1992. Parties organized as expected along tribal and personality lines, but were unable to displace the monolith of CCM, which was truly a national machine.

In free and fair elections in 1995, CCM candidate Benjamin Mkapa won over sixty percent of the vote and was sworn in as president. Omar Ali Juma from Zanzibar was elected Vice President. Tanzanian Labor Party candidate Mrema polled twenty-six percent of the popular vote. The TLP and four other parties won seats in a CCM controlled Parliament.

Born in 1938, Mkapa's initial political training was as Nyerere's press spokesman. Very much a Nyerere and TANU/CCM insider, Mkapa was fully aware of the issues at stake. As president, he renewed economic reforms, insisted on more rapid privatization, and tackled reduction of the civil service. Promising a more effective fight against corruption, in 1993 he entered into a structural adjustment program with the IMF/IBRD. Under Mkapa's leadership Tanzania swallowed some tough medicine as it realigned its economy. But by and large, the remedy, although damaging to the patient, took hold. By 2000 Tanzania turned a corner and was achieving real progress and steady growth.

The economy itself

Tanzania's economy remains primarily agricultural. Agricultural exports of coffee, sisal, cotton, cashews, cloves (from Zanzibar), tea and wheat make up 85% of total exports. Considering that only five percent of Tanzania's total area is catalogued as "arable," it is easy to understand that Tanzania is one of the poorest countries on the planet. Per capita income is only about \$150 per year. Obviously most Tanzanians make their livelihood via subsistence agriculture.

Unlike its East African neighbors, Tanzania does have exploitable minerals. The famous Wilkinson Diamond Mines have been re-privatized and gold is beginning to be mined on an industrial basis. Natural gas deposits at Songo Songo in the Rufiji delta have been under development for years. When on line, the gas should alleviate Tanzania's severe energy crunch.

Via privatization Tanzania's meager industrial sector has been dramatically re-structured, although not without controversy. Controversy because of complaints that assets were incorrectly priced and sold off either via old boy networks to the political class or sold at bargain rates to external investors – bogeyman multinationals – who will only exploit the nation. Of course, there is some truth in both perspectives, but overall the transformation is beginning to prove positive. Locally produced commodities like beer, soap, batteries, plastics, etc., are of good quality. Credit is becoming available as private banks expand and agricultural export performance has improved due to more efficient marketing mechanisms.

Problems abound. Internal economic infrastructure remains woeful. Road and rail systems are inadequate and in a poor state of repair. Hydraulic power production fails to meet demand. Most tellingly, the delivery of social services to rural citizens lags far behind expectations.

Like Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania hosts spectacular areas brimming with wildlife. Yet unlike its neighbors development of this resource has been slow. Part of the issue has to do with a longstanding dispute with Kenya over who should benefit from the tourist dollar (for example, northern border crossings to Kenya from the Serengeti have been closed for decades so as to keep Nairobi based operators at bay), but the issue is also philosophical. Tanzania did not want the demonstration effect of opulent decadent westerners polluting its simple pastoral people or the conservative Muslim communities of the coast. More recently, Tanzania slowly opened the door to greater tourism albeit charging top dollar for park fees in an effort to capture the top end of the tourist spectrum. This change is already producing greater revenues from the parks and beaches. Growth should continue.

In summary, at the turn of the century, Tanzania is getting most of its macro-economic policies in alignment with global requirements. Despite perturbations, the economy is re-shaping to free market dimensions. This should ensure the continuation of assistance flows from donor nations as well as new investment, which will compliment internally mobilized resources and thus enable the modest growth so far obtained to expand further.

Issues to Ponder

1. Where might Tanzania have been if it had not taken a thirty-year economic detour?

Readings:

Smith, John, "Top Down Democracy in Tanzania," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 10, October 1999.

Web Sites:

www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/afr/tz2.htm

This is an excellent site packed with good economic information.

www.ft.com/ftsurveys/country/sc2246a.htm

This web address gets you into a series of sectorial articles on Tanzania produced by the *Financial Times*.

www.nyenzi.com/tanzania/socialist.htm

This is an excellent site that has a number of articles on various aspects of Tanzania's political history.

Chapter 18: International Relations

Kenya

All three of the East African states came out of the British colonial tradition and inherited a natural affinity and orientation towards the west. Kenya has never deviated much from this orientation. Britain remains its major partner politically as well as economically. Additionally, Kenya established solid links to other developed Commonwealth nations such as Canada and Australia. And even though there were some ups and downs, the United States too maintained solid relations with Kenya over the years. On the other side of the ledger Kenya eschewed close ties with the eastern bloc and with Libya. Instead, Kenya maintained ties to nations on the western side of the cold war, i.e. Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam. Even though it paid lip service to the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, in reality, Kenya stood aloof from the more contentious subjects on the radical agenda. Rather, its foreign policy was shaped by Kenya's own needs, especially in the economic development sphere, and its reluctance to play a larger role, even on the African stage.

Kenya's reluctance to engage internationally emerged early as decided by President Kenyatta. In the first instance he was already old when he came to power and did not like to travel. He especially disliked flying. Secondly, when Kenyatta did attempt to exert influence, partially at the behest of the United States, during the Stanleyville crisis of 1964, he was badly bruised diplomatically and felt betrayed by the U.S./Belgian military intervention just when he was pressing a negotiated solution. Kenyatta concluded that such activity would not rebound to his credit so thereafter kept away. This policy of separateness remains largely in effect today.

Kenya did, however, have troubles of its own. First, it faced an irredentist Somali movement in the vast northeast just after independence and had to expend considerable effort in dealing with the "shifta" bandits. Secondly, Nyerere led Tanzania onto a socialist path, as did Obote in Uganda shortly thereafter. Kenyatta believed his colleagues were wrong. He also thought they mounted a challenge to Kenya, which maintained a capitalist path. Economic, political and philosophical differences with his neighbors led to closed borders, the collapse of East African Common Services and un-neighborly accusations. Matters, of course, intensified when Amin took power in Uganda. In 1973 Kenya readily lent its airspace and landing fields for the Israeli raid on Entebbe. Already cool, Kenyan relations with Uganda took another nosedive following Museveni's take-over in 1986. President Moi who was trying to facilitate a negotiated outcome felt betrayed by upstart Museveni. Museveni, in turn, saw Moi as a relic of an older time.

Kenya's relations with Ethiopia and Sudan were more correct, essentially on account of distance. An ally of the Emperor, Kenya steered clear of Mengistu and has kept its distance from Meles as well. Sudan posed more of a problem because Sudanese People liberation Army (SPLA) leader John Garang makes Nairobi his home, as do hundreds of politically aware southerners. Thousands of Sudanese refugees live in Kenya's far northwest from whence humanitarian operations are conducted into southern Sudan. Through the mechanism of IGAD (the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), Kenya has been active with its Horn of Africa neighbors in seeking a solution to the Sudanese conflict. Elsewhere Kenya is a reluctant host to tens of thousands of Somali refugees and leaders, but has largely refrained from mixing in any of the volatile politics of that trouble spot.

As noted above Kenya's relations with the United States have been generally good. The U.S. approves of Kenya's moderate pro-west orientation, of its competition-oriented economy and of its democratic institutions. The two nations share the same perspective on many global issues. Kenya readily agreed to sign a military access agreement in 1980 when the U.S. felt threatened by events in Iran and the Persian Gulf. (The U.S. opened a consulate in Mombasa in 1981 (closed in 1991) to oversee political relations with the Islamic coast and to supervise dozens of U.S. Navy ship visits.) Over the years the United States provided over a billion dollars in development aid to Kenya. Many American companies are headquartered in Nairobi, tens of thousands of Americans take safaris in beautiful game parks, a large American missionary community works in rural areas and the Peace Corps thrives.

The terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassy in August 1998 traumatized both the United States and Kenya. The people of Nairobi rallied actively to rescue victims, to remove the dead and to care for the injured. In the aftermath of the event Kenyan citizens were horrified to learn that hatred could take such a toll of their fellow citizens. The sense of shared victimization reinforced positive sentiments towards Americans. The Kenyan and American governments subsequently coordinated very closely in seeking out perpetrators of the crime.

The positive side of the relationship notwithstanding, the U.S. criticizes Kenya's human rights shortcomings, its entrenched corruption and the leadership's reluctance to open more fully to democratic norms. Kenya, in turn, complains that it is being held to a standard higher than that applied to other African states. The U.S. agrees that is the case, because more is expected of Kenya. The dialogue continues.

Uganda

Uganda too came to independence with a strong British orientation. Although he still maintained ties to Israel, Obote's move to the left and third world activism put him squarely in the Non-Aligned camp and strained relations with the United Kingdom. Obote was critical of Britain's obstinacy regarding apartheid in South Africa and the U.K.'s acquiescence of settler unilateral independence in Rhodesia. Obote thought these issues to be so important that he went to the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore in 1972 to pursue them knowing full well that Idi Amin was discontent at home.

As noted in an earlier chapter, Amin let ties with the west fall aside to be replaced by links with the Muslim world – Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. The U.S. closed its embassy in 1973. Amin's bizarre behavior, however, sooner or later alienated most everyone but Qadhaffi. Amin was elected chairman of the OAU in 1975 in accordance with standing practice of selecting the chairman from the host country (the Kampala venue for the OAU was chosen long in advance).

Kenyatta carefully regulated contact with Amin and Kenya kept guard on the common border. However, malefactors profited. Much Ugandan coffee was smuggled out and many ostensibly Ugandan-bound goods – upon which no Kenya duties were collected – never reached Uganda. Fleeing Amin, Obote found refuge in Tanzania from whence with Nyerere's full support he sought to regain power. The 1979 war

epitomized Nyerere's hatred and disgust with Amin and cast some aspersions on Nyerere's otherwise progressive image.

The United States re-opened its embassy in Kampala in 1979, but it was not until after Obote left the scene for the second time (in 1986) that western nations began to re-engage in Uganda in a substantive fashion. Re-engagement took the form of complete dialogue on political, human rights and economic issues. Although as with Kenya there have been differences in degrees of compliance, with western benchmarks, overall the donor community led by the United States, the U.K. and the World Bank have been quite satisfied with results in Uganda. One internal sticking point with the U.S. revolves around Uganda's time frame for the return to normal party politics.

President Museveni is often dubbed a model of a new breed of African leaders who owe nothing to the former political order. Whatever the designation, Museveni plunged Uganda into a complicated set of problems within the region. The issues with Kenya were noted previously and while relations improved by the year 2000, hiccups still occur. Sudan is a grievous problem where the juxtaposition of Ugandan support for SPLA rebels is offset by Sudanese support for the Lord's Resistance Army as well as its support for African Democratic Party rebels operating out of Congo.

Partially because of anti-Ugandan rebels in Zaire/Congo, in 1996 Uganda threw its weight behind the rebel alliance that ousted Mobutu. Subsequently, when the Kabila alliance collapsed, Uganda and Rwanda joined forces with new bands of rebels to oppose Kabila in the war that subsequently tore Congo apart. Uganda is a party to the 1999 Lusaka Accords, which put forward a framework for peace in Congo, including the withdrawal of foreign troops, but so far (in September 2000) progress towards peace is stymied.

As noted previously, President Museveni accepted the RPA mutiny and invasion of Rwanda in 1990. The post-genocide alliance between Kampala and Kigali that began in 1994 was strong as evidenced by joint involvement in protection of their eastern borders, operations against perpetrators of genocide who took refuge in Zaire and the ouster of Mobutu. This same alliance is instrumental in the ongoing war in Congo aimed at replacing Kabila. However, the alliance frayed a bit in the summer of 2000 when fighting erupted between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani over the spoils of war. Leaders subsequently mended relations and by September 2000 the anti-Kabila alliance again presented a united front.

Tanzania

Less British in orientation than its neighbors, Tanzania was also less beholden to the "motherland" at independence. Nyerere's vision was to be self-reliant. To this end he sought to balance Tanzania's external orientation between the West and the East as well as internally within the South. However, his "socialist" rhetoric alienated western powers that were chary to deal with such radicalism and who had the conviction that Nyerere's state controlled economy was doomed to fail. Estrangement from Great Britain was compounded over disagreements regarding British acceptance of the apartheid state of South Africa and its failure to prohibit Rhodesian unilateral independence. The United States shared British unease

with Nyerere's radicalism, which, for the U.S., was compounded by Tanzania's support of Mozambique (anti-Portuguese) freedom movements. As if that weren't enough, Tanzania accepted China's offer to build a railroad from Dar es Salaam to Zambia's copper belt (a project that western experts said was not profitable). This turn to the communist world, even though Nyerere never had much use for the Soviets, confirmed negative judgments about Tanzania.

Nyerere joined the Non-Aligned Movement, a grouping of third world states determined to forge their own destiny outside the confines of the cold war. However, led by nations like Cuba, Yugoslavia and India, the NAM was little more than a vociferous anti-west grouping. Nyerere was also instrumental in creating a South/South dialogue designed, partially because of the failure of the NAM, to generate and share third world expertise and resources among nations of the third world.

The passage of time eased Tanzania's strained relations with the west. The cold war ended. Mozambique became independent. The Chinese did not prove to be much of a threat to western economic prowess in Africa. From the western perspective, the NAM remains a thorn in the smoother functioning of the world, but beyond rhetoric it poses no real threat. Internally, when Tanzania's bold economic experiments failed to bear fruit, the west was prepared to re-engage and to work with the Tanzanian government for economic development.

Regionally, just before and at independence Tanzania rejected closer ties with Kenya within the context of East African unity. In pre-independence days Tanzania was leery that Kenya's white settler community might exert too much influence in any union arrangements. In the post-independence era it feared Kenya's relatively stronger, capitalistic economy. Tanzania's weak manufacturing sector just could not compete. Initial common market arrangements collapsed precisely because of this concern. Additionally, as leaders with diametrically opposed political philosophies, Kenyatta and Nyerere kept their distance from each other. Nyerere was much more compatible with Obote whom he saw as a fellow traveler in the quest for social justice and African independence. As noted above, Nyerere's support for Obote extended to invading Uganda and helping put Obote back in power.

Support for Obote aside, Tanzanian leaders also enjoyed good relations with Museveni. When he took power in 1986 (after Nyerere's departure from the presidency), Tanzanian and Ugandan relations continued at even keel. Tanzania has productive peaceful ties with its other neighbors – Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia and to a lesser extent with Congo. Ties with Rwanda and Burundi, however, have been troubled periodically by refugees and insurgents from those nations seeking refuge in Tanzania. Yet in both the cases of Rwanda and Burundi, power-sharing talks designed to sort out internal conflict have been held in Arusha, touted recently by President Clinton as the "Geneva of Africa."

As was the case with Kenya, the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam in August 1998, in which only Tanzanians died, generated a shared sense of vulnerability between Tanzanians and Americans. Tanzania has a resident community of American missionaries scattered widely around the country, a small Peace Corps program, but only a few businessmen. Tanzania has, however, over the years attracted dedicated American academics who studied, wrote about and supported Nyerere's various programs.

Issues to Ponder

1. Constant themes in American policy in Africa for the last forty years have included: the cold war face-off, shared international and regional objectives, establishment of a stable system based on the rule of law which promotes democracy and human rights, and the achievement of a free market economy. When countries did well in reflecting American values and priorities, U.S. relations prospered, when countries came up short, relations turned sour. U.S. ties with all three East African nations have reflected the ups and downs of assessments of where they stood on the scale at any given time. In the last few years there seems to be a convergence of opinion on what is desirable, so current relations are often based on how effective a nation is in achieving goals.

Readings:

Uganda: Ofcansky, Thomas, op. cit
Pages 125-153

Kenya: Miller and Yeager, op. cit
Pages 161-181

Tanzania: Legum and Mnari, Mwalimu The Influence of Nyerere
DT448.2.M89
See chapters on Tanzania's economy.

Additional Readings:

Hansen and Twaddle, op. cit.

Pages 187-208, Throup, David "Kenya's Relations with Museveni's Uganda"

Chapter 19: Society, Population and AIDS

Africans still value family and tribe above national identity. Within the tribe one has shared language, common culture, myths, values, and most importantly a built in support group vis a vis outsiders. Historically tribes were complete societies unto themselves. They occupied specific territories, which they defended against interlopers. Land use was central to both agrarian and pastoral peoples. Tribal law and practice governed access and use. Along with domestic disputes, land issues were much litigated in whatever judicial forum the group employed. Tribes developed governing institutions ranging from a council of elders (the norm in most of Kenya and northern Uganda) to elected or hereditary chiefs (in much of Tanzania) to elaborate kingdoms (central and western Uganda). Persons had specific

responsibilities within the society. Most tribal societies had some sort of adulthood ceremony or rite of passage for boys and girls. Although historically tribes interacted with one another it was often via the market place, political alliance or warfare.

Given that the social fabric of Africa was tribal, it is little wonder that tribal affiliation became a building block of modern politics where tribal identity and personal allegiance outweigh other concerns. This sort of tribalism (the word itself has taken on slightly negative connotations of backwardness) has been particularly vicious in Kenya and Uganda where tribal groups constitute fairly sizable blocks – up to 25 percent – of the population. The fear is that one group will seize control at the expense of others. In Tanzania, in contrast, no group dominates to that extent so government must be by coalition. Plus, Nyerere did a commendable job of building a national consciousness. These factors render tribalism a less explosive political force in Tanzania.

Whatever their tribe East Africans are now caught in a period of transition from traditional ways of life to the modern world. Groups as a whole and individuals within groups are in various stages of this transition. The least modern peoples, pastoralists such as the Masai, Turkana, Samburu, and Karamojong, El Molo fishermen on Lake Turkana or the pygmy bands of the Semliki forest live very much as they have for thousands of years. They wear colorful dress, carry spears, herd animals, fish or hunt and gather. Even so tribal elders may have a son or nephew who works as a security guard in Nairobi or as a game scout in a nearby park. They are likely to have a transistor radio in their hut, a plastic jerry can for water and other vestiges of the modern world. Increasingly, some children of these nomadic groups go to school. Even though young men from the pastoral tribes try to maintain warrior traditions, the kind of raiding practiced in years past is no longer tolerated.

The greatest number of East Africans are subsistence farmers. They eat what they grow, barter or sell surpluses in local markets and buy what necessities they can afford. As was true with their ancestors, access to land is the key determinate of economic success. Evolving concepts of land use ranging from ujamaa villages to outright ownership complicate relations in rural Africa. Nonetheless, farm families scrape up school fees to send their children to school. They attend church, belong to cooperatives, participate in community development activities, exercise their right to vote, and have relatives in town. Despite their difficult circumstances rural Africans face their lives with an admirable sense of determination and optimism.

A growing number of East Africans are urbanized. They come to the towns and cities in search of jobs which most don't find. Better educated persons, including young women, scramble for clerical, shop keeping, government or other positions. Those who don't find work in the modern sector often resort to informal sector activity – shining shoes, selling papers, running kiosks, or day labor. Others resort to crime. Africa's cities are indeed dangerous places. New arrivals rely on the social net of extended family and tribal brethren as they strive to find a place in the urban pot. One fully employed person often supports a household of over a dozen relations. A new phenomenon that bears watching is that bonds of poverty are creating a class-consciousness that overrides tribal affinities in urban areas.

Sitting on top of the economic pyramid are the elite, usually self-made men and women who by virtue of

acumen, education and ambition arrived at the top. These people too accept extended family obligations to house, feed and educate relatives. They also send money home to parents. (The ultimate ambition of every Nairobi elite is to buy a big farm and retire to the country.) In short, current African society is a very dense network of relationships that start with the family and extend outward along tribal lines. Increasingly modern sector Africans are also connected via school ties, political party alliances, sports or business interests. Inter-tribal marriage, although still far from common, also occurs.

Population Growth

The single most powerful negative factor impeding economic growth is rapid population growth. Kenya, with one of the highest population growth rates in the world, has gone from 12 million people at independence to 27 million today. Uganda and Tanzania are also similarly impacted. Dar es Salaam, for example, a town of just over one hundred thousand in 1960, sports almost three million inhabitants today. Population growth nefariously saps economic growth. East African nations battle hard just to stay even. Populations mushroomed in the latter half of the 20th century because modern medicine, especially childhood immunizations, meant more children lived into adulthood. Economic planners quickly saw the problem looming, but families who prized children did not heed exhortations to reduce births. Additionally, limited availability of birth control devices and flat out opposition to birth control by pro-natal governments and the Catholic Church hampered early programs. It was only after the reality of the economic cost of large families sunk in, as exemplified by more school fees, clothes, etc., that East Africans began to space births. When birth control devices became more available and governments changed their stance, birth rates began to decline, but the problem remains acute. Meanwhile, the sheer numbers of people overwhelm social and economic infrastructure. Suitable agricultural land is not available so marginal land is utilized and even that is not enough. A new underclass of rural landless poor has been created.

AIDS

The newest scourge visited on the people of East Africa is HIV/AIDS. Deemed by researchers to have attained epidemic proportions first in Raikai District of Uganda, AIDS subsequently spread throughout the region. Transmitted heterosexually initially by truck drivers, soldiers, prostitutes and others who engaged in sex with multiple partners, HIV infections multiplied easily among urban populations.

In the year 2000 the rate of HIV inflection among sexually active people in Kampala, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam hovers around 30%. AIDS devastates a nation's human resources as it strikes people in peak earning years. The loss of their human potential is compounded when deaths tear families asunder and condemn tens of thousands of orphans and other survivors to lives of poverty.

Can the tide be stemmed? Probably not, but it can and is being slowed, especially in Uganda via an intense education program aimed at changing peoples' sexual practices. "Zero grazing," i.e. faithfulness to one partner, is a common slogan. Condom use is taught and encouraged. Counseling support systems are available to infected persons and their families. Neither the governments of Kenya or Tanzania have been

as pro-active as Uganda in facing the crisis. Unfortunately, without great activism, the prospects for reversing the infection rate are not good.

Cures? Even though Africans are fatalistic about "slim" disease, they have flocked to spurious miracle cures. A woman near Masaka, Uganda, for example, sold clay out of her backyard as fast as she could dig it as a natural cure. A medical researcher in Kenya claimed to have discovered a cure, which he named Kenron, and raked in thousands before his pseudo-scientific product was shown to have only marginal impact. However sad these instances are, they indicate growing knowledge about AIDS and its invariably fatal consequences. Equally sadly, even the most favorable projections indicate that millions of people will die. The pandemic may be contained over time, but no cure is in sight.

Issues to Ponder

1. Tribalism is a minefield – past, present and future – for the peoples of East Africa. Rapidly increasing populations result in inherently greater competition for the more slowly expanding economic pie. This translates into stiffened tribal solidarity with regard to land, education, job opportunities, governmental largess, military promotions and political power. How nations manage this competition and the caldron of emotions it generates will largely determine how harmonious their futures will be.
2. The population and AIDS data comprise a terrifying Malthusian double whammy. East Africa is being swamped by a rising tide of children and youth at the same time it grapples with succor for the large number of HIV/AIDS victims. These parallel calamities will test the resiliency and social cohesiveness of East African societies. Facing these problems forthrightly is a real exercise of leadership for national authorities. Are they up to the challenge?

Readings:

Kenya: Miller and Yeager, op cit
Pages 61-97

Uganda: Ofcansky, op. cit
pages 69-93

Tanzania: www.nyenzi.com/tanzania/people.htm

Latham, Michael C. "AIDS in Africa: A Perspective on the Epidemic," *Africa Today*, 3rd Quarter 1993
(available via pro-quest)

This is an excellent discussion of the problem and the policy choices Africans face. Even though the discussion covers all of Africa, most of the examples are from Uganda and Kenya.

Web Sites:

www.fhi.org/en/gen/nbooksrep.html

This site leads to the latest statistics and summaries of the AIDS epidemic in Kenya and Tanzania.

www.usaid.gov

On this site chose "health and population" which leads to AIDS data and information about programs in East Africa.

Congratulations!

You have finished the study guide. We hoped you achieved your goals. You should now know something about East Africa, but there will not be a test. Remember there are dozens of books, hundreds of articles and a growing number of informative web sites out there waiting for you to continue your study.