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ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
3171-I-01	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	FEMA is more oriented to "responding to recover" than to "responding to operate."
3171-I-02	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Response operations were hampered by the absence of a single well-defined and understood incident management system, such as the Incident Command System (ICS).
3171-I-03	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	There is no single framework that guides response operations for the federal family. This issue includes the lack of a single, overarching plan with associated implementing procedures and protocols, and a common operating and command system that is employed by all federal departments and agencies.
3171-I-04	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	The Stafford Act, as amended, and as currently interpreted does not address federal support from an all-hazards position.
3171-I-08	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	The FEMA firewalls used in network operations prevent other federal agencies from accessing necessary sites.
3171-I-10	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	8/12/2003	Region 6 does not have sufficient dedicated, full-time information and planning personnel to support both ROC operations and to be able to deploy to conduct immediate operations.
3171-I-12	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	Information collection and dissemination rules need to be developed early and aggressively managed throughout the operation.
3171-I-14	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	10/27/2003	There needs to be a capability to handle offers of assistance during response operations.
3171-S-01	Shuttle Columbia	Smart Practice		Close coordination between the Operations Sections in the Emergency Support Team (EST) and the Emergency Response Team (ERT) resulted in smoother mission assignment operations and minimized the potential for duplication of mission assignments.
3171-S-04	Shuttle Columbia	Smart Practice		The Office of General Counsel (OCG) liaison to the FCO greatly facilitated decision-making, especially in areas for which there was little or no precedence; an excellent example of matching abilities and skills to tasks.
3171-S-03	Shuttle Columbia	Smart Practice		FEMA Region 6 had recently conducted internal training for Information and Planning (I&P) for a variety of individuals which gave them a significant flexibility in this response.
3171-S-02	Shuttle Columbia	Smart Practice		The logistics section placed a full-time liaison in the operations section, improving the capability to coordinate logistics support for operational requirements.
3171-L-01	Shuttle Columbia	Lesson Learned		The Logistics Section was able to bring logistics representatives from all participating organizations together on or about Day 5 of the operation, to discuss and coordinate logistical support for current and possible future operations.
3171-I-13	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	Existing GIS capability and processes are inadequate to support response operations.
3171-I-11	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	Representatives of some agencies receiving a mission assignment did not fully understand what was required of the tasked agency, especially in the area of logistical support.
3171-I-09	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	Field logistics personnel need authority to redirect equipment to ensure appropriate support in accordance with changing priorities.

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3171-I-07	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	The current FEMA logistics system is not sufficiently flexible to provide timely and effective support during response operations. This issue also applies to rules and regulations concerning local purchasing, use of credit cards, and methods of paying for local purchases.
3171-I-06	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	There is no centrally managed, easily accessible information system that identifies the resources and capabilities of all federal agencies.
3171-I-05	Shuttle Columbia	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	A lack of a single point of oversight of flight operations resulted in unsafe conditions.
1465-I-01	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	3/11/2004	Existing procedures for deployment of disaster assistance employees are not being followed, particularly in regard to the Automated Disaster Deployment (ADD) system. FEMA Headquarters should review the whole deployment process, and the ADD system, in particular, to make sure the regions can call up sufficient staff to support emergency operations. We need standard agency-wide deployment rules and procedures to govern the whole deployment process.
1465-I-02	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Information]	7/24/2003	The regional operations center's lack of adequate GIS support caused delays in reports to headquarters and in exchanging information with the State emergency operations center.
1465-I-03	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	The NEMIS database became overloaded several times and the system had to be re-booted.
1465-I-06	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	Report schedules and teleconference should be aligned or synchronized with actual headquarters needs, rather than being arbitrarily chosen or based on minor considerations.
1465-I-07	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	10/27/2003	There is no clear policy about employment of various components of AmeriCorps in disaster operations. There are no standard procedures or points of contact for issuing mission assignments to the various components of AmeriCorps.
1465-I-05	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	The situation report format is too long and doesn't capture information actually needed by Headquarters.
1465-I-04	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	During the video tele-conferences too many weather agencies were tasked to brief their area of expertise. This resulted in lengthy tele-conferences, and duplication of information.
1465-I-08	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	The usual delay between the time a declaration is signed and the time the RST leader learns about the declaration causes delays in DFO planning, deployment of various teams, and other activities that depend on a signed declaration.
1465-I-11	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	Region VI and the National Weather Service (NWS) Regional Office have arranged for representatives from the National Weather Service to staff the Regional Operations Center (ROC) whenever weather is a factor in an emergency situation. The National Weather Service representative needs a workstation in the ROC to maximize NWS access to its sources and for the production of up-to-date weather information.
1465-I-20	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	The wireless router provided by Mt. Weather broke down and could have caused two or three days delay in opening the disaster field office (DFO).

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1465-I-19	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	The "mail kits" that came from the Disaster Information Systems Clearinghouse (DISC) lacked parts and supplies and could not be used.
1465-I-18	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	Applicant eligibility letters and other routine correspondence to applicants are often poorly worded, difficult to understand, vague, or otherwise unclear. The "Applicant Guide" sent out to each applicant has incorrect information in it.
1465-I-17	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	Some ineligible applicants become eligible for assistance because the wrong date of the event is recorded during the tele-registration process.
1465-I-16	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	Regular office-style paper shredders cannot handle the volume of material that must be destroyed at the disaster field office (DFO).
1465-I-15	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	After their initial training, Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs) who serve as Congressional Liaison Officers have no follow-on training or any regular source of information about developments in FEMA.
1465-I-14	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	FEMA is paying too much for car rentals for DFO staff.
1465-I-13	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	FEMA does not have an integrated budgeting and accounting system. This results in time-consuming and inefficient entry of the same data into multiple databases at the disaster field office. The comptroller estimates that the duplication of effort costs 3 - 4 man-days for each small disaster.
1465-I-12	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	Current methods of debris-clearance monitoring are inefficient and expensive. Effective debris-monitoring has potential to cut federal expenses and save money for local governments who employ debris-removal contractors. The problem is that the public assistance program usually hires technical assistance contractors (TACs) at several times the cost of Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs) or local hires.
1465-S-01	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		A trained and well-informed liaison officer stationed at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) improves information flow between the State EOC and the FEMA regional support team (RST).
1465-L-01	Oklahoma Floods	Lesson Learned		Satellite-dish supported communications systems helped alleviate normal delays in establishing communications.
1465-I-27	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	Some Federal agencies did not follow established protocol for dealing with State officials and could have cause caused embarrassment to the state emergency management agency.
1465-I-26	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	The G-3 telephone switch furnished by the disaster information systems clearinghouse (DISC) had a problem that took three weeks to diagnose, even with diagnostic help from the telephone company. Meanwhile, telephone service in the disaster field office was unreliable for nearly three weeks.
1465-I-25	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	Some external affairs disaster assistance employees (DAEs) --- deployed to the disaster area prior to arrival of the emergency response team (advanced) (ERT-A) --- did not have cell phones or computers needed for their work.
1465-I-24	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Information]	4/5/2006	Although there are enough trained and experienced comptrollers available, the comptroller's office was short of trained support staff. A shortage of comptroller's staff could hinder start-up of financial activities that support disaster field office operations

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1465-I-23	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	The current process for determining eligibility for housing replacement assistance and for getting the assistance approved through various levels at the disaster field office (DFO) and at FEMA Headquarters is resource-intensive and delays timely assistance to eligible applicants. For large-scale disasters --- with thousands of houses destroyed --- the current process would not allow FEMA to provide adequate assistance to those who have been most heavily affected.
1465-I-22	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/24/2003	Disaster field office (DFO) staff often arrive at the DFO without up-to-date knowledge of FEMA's standard computer practices and software and without standard computer skills.
1465-I-21	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	A disaster field office (DFO) and its outlying field operating sites need to have 100% availability of Automated External Defibrillators (AEDs) and personnel trained in their use.
1465-S-13	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		When a disaster field office (DFO) has set up outlying disaster recovery centers (DRCs), the Individual Assistance (IA) Branch at the DFO normally conducts a daily teleconference to keep DRC staffs informed about the latest developments and to answer questions about disaster-relief programs.
1465-S-12	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		The Individual Assistance (IA) Branch at the disaster field office often needs to get the crisis-counseling immediate-services program (ISP) under way as soon as possible.
1465-S-11	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		When a disaster field office (DFO) opens, Individual Assistance (IA) Branch --- usually one of the largest organization elements in the DFO --- often needs help from Logistics Section to set up its work space in the DFO and to find and set up sites for disaster recovery centers (DRCs).
1465-S-10	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		When a disaster field office (DFO) opens, some response efforts need to be funded right away to support rental contracts and allow operations to get underway or continue. For example, funds are needed up front for mission assignments to Federal agencies and for implementing individual assistance programs.
1465-S-09	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		External Affairs staff needs to be able to monitor all local television channels, plus national news and weather.
1465-S-08	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		After a disaster, local governments are often under pressure to start debris removal. Sometimes cities and counties engage contractors who over-charge for debris-removal work or who set up faulty piggy-back contracts.
1465-S-07	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		When weather is a factor in an emergency situation, the Regional Support Team (RST) needs current weather information and analysis of the effects the weather could have on response and recovery operations. Commercial news media are available, but most of the commercial media get their original information from the National Weather Service.
1465-S-06	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		Information and Plans (I&P) staff needs to keep the rest of the Regional Support Team (RST) members informed and up-to-date on all aspects of the emergency situation, including plans for the next operational period.

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1465-S-05	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		The Regional Support Team (RST) leader needs ready-access to the latest information about many aspects of the developing situation.
1465-S-04	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		Regional staff who have not been deployed to the current emergency or disaster still need to be kept informed about on-going response and recovery activities. The situation report and fact sheet contain the type of information needed by regional staff.
1465-S-03	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		When the Regional Support Team (RST) operates in two shifts, outgoing team members ordinarily brief their counterparts on the in-coming team.
1465-S-02	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs), especially those in the Individual Assistance program cadre, often need refresher training before beginning work in the field.
1465-I-09	Oklahoma Floods	Issue [Action]	7/25/2003	Standard documents used in all emergency operations were not readily available. This is a continuing problem from disaster to disaster, and causes delays in processing what should be routine administrative activities.
1465-S-14	Oklahoma Floods	Smart Practice		A disaster field office (DFO) is usually a hastily set-up, temporary work-site making use of improvised office space in whatever building is available in or near the disaster area. The location of the DFO is not planned in advance, and its location is generally not announced to the public. Security procedures should be adapted to actual circumstances so they do not interfere with DFO operations.
1480-I-01	Nebraska Storms	Issue [Information]		Computer equipment issued by the DISC does not have required software for Public Affairs.
1480-I-02	Nebraska Storms	Issue [Information]		Admin kits are not adequate for DFO needs.
1480-I-03	Nebraska Storms	Issue [Information]		Currently, cell phone contracts do not provide adequate cellular service for rural coverage areas.
1480-L-01	Nebraska Storms	Lesson Learned		Individual Congressional office briefings to inform members/staff of the disaster recovery progress and process provide a more relaxed environment for linteraction between FEMA and state emergency management officials and Congressional staff. The informal meetings offer the opportunity for the Congressional staff members to ask questions directly related to their constituent needs and the impact on the area that the particular member represents (state or congressional district). The briefings may be targeted to their particular districts, assisting the members/staff in working with FEMA/the State to help their constituents/communities recover from the disaster. The individual office briefings also allow for offices with staff not familiar with FEMA programs and processes to be provided with an overview of federal disaster response and recovery authorities, participants and programs.
0901-I-01	Determined Promise 03	Issue [Information]	3/12/2004	A standard FEMA-wide exercise design and management doctrine with implementing procedures should be adopted, in coordination with DHS exercise policy, to ensure consistent application.

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0901-I-02	Determined Promise 03	Issue [Information]	3/12/2004	The increasing role of Graphical Information Systems (GIS) in support of response and recovery operations suggests a comprehensive policy and supporting protocols for interagency electronic data access and sharing should be developed in an expeditious manner.
0901-I-04	Determined Promise 03	Issue [Information]		Recent Federal reorganizations (creation of DHS and activation of USNORTHCOM in particular) have changed/increased the cast of players with response missions, interests, capabilities, and procedures resulting in confusion and unusual delays in providing support and completing missions. A number of events in DP 03 suggest the mechanisms for pre-, and trans-event interagency coordination must evolve to accommodate these changes and needs.
0901-I-03	Determined Promise 03	Issue [Information]	3/12/2004	The emerging role of the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and its support requirements must be developed and articulated as rapidly as possible. (Note: this issue is in some ways a subset of the issue of recognizing and dealing with recent changes in Federal government organization, the creation of DHS and the activation of USNORTHCOM serving as prime examples.) It is raised as a separate issue because of its direct impact on FEMA preparedness and operations.)
1479-I-01	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		FEMA headquarters has standing contracts with companies who manage housing-inspection sub-contracts in the field. The contracts governing inspections for individual assistance programs are not clear, not being followed, and not being enforced.
1479-I-05	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		FEMA regulations allow FEMA to provide assistance for damage to vehicles. Some applications for assistance for damaged vehicles are inadvertently eliminated from consideration for eligibility because of a particular tele-registration procedure. Tele-registration procedures are being followed, but there is a flaw in the procedure.
1479-I-11	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		FEMA does not have a clear policy, rule, or guidance as to the responsibility for rental or use of Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs). Misunderstanding and disagreements about responsibilities for leasing or use of DRC sites could delay opening DRCs.
1479-I-10	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		Mt. Weather provided little advance notice and apparently took no account of the effect on Disaster Field Office (DFO) operations when it shut down the FEMA network to install National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) updates and patches. Two DFOs and six Disaster Recovery Centers were open during the shut down.
1479-I-09	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		A FEMA contracting officer must be deployed with the Logistics Section Chief at the beginning of disaster field operations. FEMA currently wants Disaster Field Offices (DFOs) to use FEMA contracting officers instead of General Service Administration (GSA) contracting officers. In this disaster --- and several recent disasters in this region, the FEMA contracting-officer cadre has not been responsive to the urgent needs in the first week of disaster operations.

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1479-I-08	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		FEMA's new policy is for the Logistics Section to request all telecommunications services through Mt. Weather. The Disaster Field Office (DFO) logistics staff did that in this disaster and in the last two disaster operations, but Mt. Weather did not provide the necessary services during the first week of field operations.
1479-I-07	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		NEMIS procedures generated several payments for other needs assistance/miscellaneous items despite an inspector's clear comments that the items were not needed. This problem could cause significant recoupment efforts.
1479-I-06	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		FEMA regulations allow us to provide assistance for repair of houses to bring them to safe and sanitary living conditions. Awkward and illogical procedures concerning safety result in inequitable disbursement of home-repair assistance. For example, some homeowners receive no assistance for damaged houses. There is a similar problem with the home unsafe question for renters.
1479-I-04	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		Home-replacement applications are subjected to cumbersome, labor intensive, and time-consuming manual review at FEMA headquarters. Meanwhile, by the time replacement cases have been processed, applicants could have already received awards for personal property losses under the Other Needs Assistance Program.
1479-I-02	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		Because of FEMA's caps on home-repair and home-replacement grants, applicants have difficulty getting assistance for unmet needs. There is no mechanism to refer applicant with unmet needs to the American Red Cross or to the Unmet Needs Committee for additional repairs.
1479-I-03	Hurricane Claudette	Issue [Information]		Personal property grants often exceed actual costs necessary to pay for serious needs as intended by the law.
1478-I-01	Ohio Storms	Issue [Action]		Public Affairs needs cable or satellite TV connectivity in DFO.
1478-I-04	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		Dual disasters operating in the same DFO can cause problems with registration. This can cause confusion with the
1478-I-08	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		The plotters shipped to the DFO arrived broken.
1476-I-06	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		A perceived inequity in application of travel pay policy for DAEs attending training raises question of two classes of disaster employees.
1476-I-26	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Program information available on the FEMA website (fema.gov) is not kept up-to-date, resulting in a potential for confusion on the part of the public.
1476-S-02	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		There should be an MOU between public assistance and mitigation to encourage the best possible practice in the field.
1476-S-01	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		All Regions should use Region 10's mitigation CD
1476-I-31	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Spectrafax system is incapable of confirming to field personnel when and if faxes have been sent.
1476-I-30	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 has limited the cap on emergency repair money.
1476-I-27	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		A perception that the unsuccessful use of WIFI technology in some DFOs results in increased workload for network personnel.

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1476-I-19	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Timeframes associated with environmental regulation create perceived unreasonable delays in in-kind infrastructure replacement.
1476-I-13	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Perception of a lack of multi-language-capable specialists at NPSC and DRC creates difficulty when speaking with individuals who request assistance.
1476-I-15	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		A perception of generic and confusing language in the letter people receive following Teleregistration creates difficulties in understanding.
1476-I-16	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		A perceived lack of standardization in Disaster Unemployment Assistance Programs at the state level, combined with standard language used in FEMA handouts, creates unintended confusion among members of the public.
1476-I-17	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Teleregistration personnel and filed inspectors may tell an applicant how much money they can expect to receive, establishing expectations which may not be met.
1488-I-01	Vermont Storms	Issue [Information]		Lodging availability adversely affecting operations
1488-I-02	Vermont Storms	Issue [Information]		Some Disaster Assistance Employees are unaware of Federal Travel Regulations requirements.
1491-I-92	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		ROC needs a pre-emption policy to provide incident/disaster response personnel priority usage of ROC facilities such as the ROC Operations Room.
1491-I-94	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		The ROC activation was a confusing process.
1491-I-96	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Region needs a procedure to notify all tribal governments in New England about pending disaster/incident situations. Such notification and coordination process needs to be on par with current methodologies used with state governments.
1491-I-97	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs) were placed on hold for potential regional activities without the knowledge of the cadre managers.
1491-I-95	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Implementation of ROC activation proved to be a confusing situation.
1491-I-93	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		ROC e-mail communications were disrupted for four hours due to an ongoing network software upgrade.
1491-I-91	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Regional video teleconferencing capabilities are inadequate.
1488-I-03	Vermont Storms	Issue [Information]		DAE employees, who live between 25 to 50 miles of a DFO, are receiving conflicting guidance about renting cars.
1489-I-01	New Hampshire Storms	Issue [Information]		Need to decentralize cost of lodging waivers authority to Federal Coordinating Officers.
1490-I-01	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	ERT-A operations suffered due to the lack of a rostered logistics liaison and mission assignment coordinator.
1490-I-04	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]	11/17/2003	A shortfall of material handling equipment (MHE) and transportation assets resulted in pre-positioned commodity distribution being delayed for two (2) days.
1490-S-04	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		When the Disaster Field Office opened the Operations Section directed an assigned staff member to act as a dedicated liaison to the Information and Planning Section, resulting in more effective coordination.

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1490-S-03	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		Because FEMA was able to monitor the approach of the hurricane, and based on historical data from previous responses, a decision was made to forward-deploy and stage significant resources before Isabel actually made landfall. This included staging emergency supplies of commodities and personnel. This put FEMA in an excellent position to provide immediate support to the State of North Carolina as soon as requests were received. Even though the state, prior to landfall, believed it was well prepared for the hurricane, they quickly identified post-landfall requirements that FEMA was able to quickly support due to the pre-positioning of response assets.
1490-S-02	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		By employing two teams on 12-hour shifts, and maintaining team integrity, the logistics support team was able to get this relatively large Disaster Field Office (DFO) set up in a little over 24 hours.
1490-S-01	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		The ERT-A was able to develop an internal capability to track deployed resources in the absence of a standard team capability.
1490-I-21	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Video teleconferences (VTC), as currently practiced, are inefficient.
1490-I-03	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) communications support to the Emergency Response Team -- Advance (ERT-A) was inadequate.
1490-I-02	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	The failure to coordinate mission assignments at multiple levels of the response operation resulted in duplication and confusion.
1491-I-01	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		FEMA should attempt to save time and effort required to request county by county direct federal assistance at 100%
1491-I-12	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/20/2003	The lack of effective Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) coordination prevented information from getting to groups needing it and contributed to multiple, overlapping assessments.
1491-I-11	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Need to ensure response operations hours coincide with those of an affected state and staff fatigue needs to be given more attention, particularly in light of several studies conducted after 9/11.
1491-I-10	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Need to ensure that information on response personnel can be retrieved from ADD in a timely manner when/if needed for security and protocol purposes.
1491-I-09	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Mission assignment process needs to be changed to allow direct mission assignments to all other federal agencies.
1491-I-08	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Need to effectively use existing information management technology to develop an information management system for response activities.
1491-I-07	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	12/17/2003	The ability to deal with local government officials was not delegated to field management personnel.
1491-I-06	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	The absence of a state liaison at the Mobilization Center negatively impacted ability to complete the mission to deliver commodities in a timely manner.
1491-I-05	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Headquarters needs to temper State and Local expectations regarding the acquisition and distribution of ice.
1491-I-04	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	The flow of assistance requests from local governments to the State to FEMA and the return flow of corresponding mission assignment(s) were often so slow that they failed to keep abreast of rapidly changing on-the-ground conditions.

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1491-I-23	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	1/28/2005	Approved operational procedural guidance is needed.
1491-I-22	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Lack of an organized and commonly understood information management system adversely impacted mission execution.
1491-I-21	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	1/27/2005	The lack of standardized position requirements combined with inadequate training for EST positions resulted in an inefficient use of personnel resources, duplication of effort and a lack of section cohesion.
1491-I-18	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Regions did not adequately staff state EOC liaisons for 24/7.
1491-I-17	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Little or no FEMA policies or safety and health programs exist identifying safety equipment requirements, medical clearance/fit-for-duty requirements, or content-specific safety training for FEMA employees. Coupled with the lack of a pre-landfall, deployment safety program can result in inadequate sheltering (especially for response operations), lack of personal protective equipment, inadequate clothing and fatigue-caused accidents.
1491-I-16	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		The mission goals and objectives of RNA Teams were not clarified regarding management of contact with local jurisdictions and didn't fully reinforce FEMA/state partnership procedures.
1491-I-15	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		?As of? reporting times were not consistent so date capture and reporting often appeared to provide conflicting information.
1491-I-14	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Receptionist function was placed in logistics and should be in ADMIN Section.
1491-I-13	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Response elements need to capture/ensure total personnel accountability for non-FEMA employees.
1491-L-02	Hurricane Isabel	Lesson Learned		One of the successes of the transition of 1491-DR-VA operations from the National Team to the Region was that regional staff were assigned to each of the functional areas of the ERT and deployed along with the National team members.
1491-L-01	Hurricane Isabel	Lesson Learned		The Action Request Form (ARF) should be considered as the "Go Document" for initiating a mission request.
1491-I-31	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Unfamiliarity with or lack of established operational procedures created confusion between operations centers/teams at every level of the federal response.
1491-I-30	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	12/29/2003	The OPERATION SOP does not currently include standard position descriptions, responsibilities, transition of mission assignments to a DFO, and duty assignments for individual positions in the ROC.
1491-I-29	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	12/29/2003	Need to reconsider the role of the FEMA State Liaison Office.
1491-I-28	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	12/29/2003	ERTs did not coordinate deployment of out of region assets with the ROC and Regional ESFs. In some instances, teams and personnel were being requested from agencies outside of Region 3 when local assets were available.
1491-I-27	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	12/29/2003	Regional GIS is inadequate to support ROC Operations during a full activation. It is time to embrace 21st Century technology.
1491-I-26	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	12/29/2003	ESFs were asked to respond and report information that was not standardized and time lines for reporting information were constantly changing. This need to manage the flow of new information and adapt to frequently changing report periods, shifted essential resources away from mission accomplishment to meet urgent information reporting requirements.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1491-I-25	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]	10/19/2005	There was some confusion and uncertainty with regard to shifting mission assignment responsibility from the ROC to DFOs.
1491-I-24	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Expediting the declaration process raised expectations that requests, regardless of overall impact, would be handled expeditiously.
1491-I-02	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Unduly onerous inventory requirements at mobilization center sites adversely affect the expeditious delivery of commodities.
1491-I-03	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Response elements need to better organize and schedule conference calls and meetings.
1487-I-02	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/11/2004	When several equally qualified people come together at a DFO, there is no financial incentive to take on the extra responsibilities of supervisor. There should be temporary "in charge" pay for the designated supervisors. Individuals alternate between being the supervisor and subordinate at subsequent disasters. This leads to a situation where negative "payback" could occur when an individual has the opportunity to evaluate a former supervisor.
1487-I-03	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		A master editor is needed to quality control Memos before they are released to all hands or the public. Some memos are poorly written, not relevant, inappropriate, unprofessional or inaccurate. This situation is exasperated because of the amount of cut-and-pasting done.
1487-I-05	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		MERS IT needs to spend more time hard wiring all computer connections. Wireless internet is a good idea for getting DFOs set up quickly, but the time saved by using wireless internet is lost later when DAEs waste haour after hour due to slow wireless system speed, compared to faster hardwired networks.
1487-I-08	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Whenever a Disaster Assistance Employee (DAE) is deployed, one of the first activities required is to set up a computer and log-on using a password to gain access to NEMIS. After 90 dyas, a NEMIS password automaticall lapses and a new one must be obtained from the IT (Network) staff.
1487-I-10	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Medical Privacy Rule Changes -- Implication for deployed employees There were recent changes in the federal medical privacy rules that affect the disclosure of an individual's medical information. The rules could potentiall have an impact on any employee in the Agency. (See 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164; and December 28, 2000 as amended May 31, 2002) In short, many hospitals and doctors will no longer release medical information even to immediate family members, unless the individual has signed a release indication approval to do so. This has the potential to be a problem for an employee who becomes sick or injured while deployed or a deployed employee that has a family member at home who becomes sick or injured.
1487-I-12	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Review how often ERO training is given and how this can be tracked. The mandatory ERO courses can consuer 3-5 hours and some DAEs have had the courses 7-8 times.

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1487-L-01	Indiana Storms	Lesson Learned		The Territorial Logistics Center (TLC) delivered broken or unusable equipment/furnishings/merchandise to the DFO and charged the DFO \$5,000, apparently the standard fee. This forced the logistics section to fix or replace the items so they could be used.
1487-I-31	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Telemarketers gaining access to switchboard telephone number and calling so often that the incoming calls could not be received by the switchboard.
1487-I-30	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		This would be a great avenue to help push hazard mitigation. Make arrangement with Television shows, such WGBH's This Old Hous, or Dean Johnson's Hometown to do show on building wind resistant homes (hurricane/windproof), building home that's flood resistant (elevation or wet/dry proofing), or a show on how to clean up after a disaster, such as flooding.
1487-I-29	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		The IT system should be reviewed from set-up requirements to maintenance of equipment before it arrives at the DFO.
1487-I-28	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		There needs to be a higher consistency between DAEs from Region to Region.
1487-I-25	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		DAEs are working without benefits. Many DAEs work virtually fulltime. (disaster to disaster)
1487-I-22	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		FEMA field personnel should have more than one set of apparel (i.e., shirt and jacket)
1487-I-14	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		There should be a mandatory course for supervisors with suggested topics including: evaluations, planning, leadership, decision making, supervising, time-management, ERO, directing people, discipline, record keeping and goal setting.
1487-I-13	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Training Module for Supervisors on Equal Rights Issues The effectiveness with which Supervisors establish a work environment of non-discrimination in the workplace and the efficiency and effectiveness with which they handle equal rights issues in a disaster operation will almost always be the most important factor in avoiding costly and time consuming equal rights complaints.
1487-S-03	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		The ERO has two informational flyers targeted to address the needs of seniors and people with disabilities. These flyers are generally distributed to appropriate locations and organizations in the disaster area by the Community Relations field staff and they are also available on the "handout" table in Disaster Recovery Centers. When preparing the flyers, the ERO obtains a telephone number from a state official that can be used to direct non-disaster related calls. The number is usually an 800 number for a state hotline or state agency identified to deal with such issues.
1487-S-02	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		Region V prepared checklists to assist Regionally-managed DAEs and their families in keeping important papers up-to-date to make the deployment process smoother. The checklist addresses wills, medical releases, prescriptions and shot records, child care arrangements, and powers of attorney.
1487-S-01	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		During the initial DFO setup, the MERS team set up a computer bank in a single common access area. This provided individuals with email and data connectivity immediately upon their arrival and enhanced operations during the setup period.

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1487-I-11	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Obtaining and Maintaining a Diverse Workforce Despite strong support from the FCO and DFCO in DR1487, there is a moderately low level of racial or ethnic diversity among members of the FEMA staff. Among members of the management staff, both minorities and women are present but still statistically under-represented. While there's a fairly wide range of ages, from younger staff to older adults, there are very few persons with identifiable disabilities at any level.
1487-I-09	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		There is a need to review the policy on how training history is maintained in ADD for the FCO, DFCO, et al, with regard to Equal Rights-related classes.
1487-I-07	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	12/15/2003	There is a need to review existing DISC maintenance policies with regard to DFO operations. Computers should be updated with new software and virus protection between disasters, so time is not wasted at the disaster sites performing these upgrades. The DISC does not seem to be completing these installations in accordance with the procedures.
1487-I-04	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	11/14/2003	There is a need to develop a method to ensure everyone has received and acknowledges vital information at the DFO and prior to deployment.
1479-L-01	Hurricane Claudette	Lesson Learned		The lead Public Information Officer (PIO) was assigned to the Regional Operations Center (ROC) and a PIO liaison officer was stationed at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) prior to the disaster being declared. From the ROC, the lead PIO was able to stay informed and prepare several news releases in advance, especially with information from the PIO liaison officer in the State EOC. After initial activity at the ROC, the lead PIO then checked out and delivered cell phones to the State EOC --- where lead elements of the Emergency Response Team had deployed --- for distribution to field PIOs. The State Coordinating Officer agreed that having a PIO liaison officer in the State EOC is useful to the State and FEMA.
1492-I-01	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		It seems as if there is a duplication of effort in maintaining staff contact information updated.
1492-I-02	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	10/18/2005	The Mitigation function is not adequately represented on early deploying federal teams or in operational program discussions, contributing to a delay in the development of a thorough and effective mitigation strategy and missed mitigation opportunities.
1492-I-03	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		ERT team members were not issued a cell phone and laptop computer on the day they checked in, adversely impacting their performance.
1492-I-05	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Mission Assignment to GSA for Site Search assistance. During the height of the search, there was no GSA Real Estate Specialist ever assigned to assist or develop leads.
1492-I-07	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/20/2003	The Disaster Registration Intake Form does not address whether a member of the applicant household has special needs.
1492-I-09	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		When the FEMA project officer or Public Assistance Coordinator goes out to write up a project worksheet. They are in need of the proper software loaded on the laptop computer to do his or her job. The software that I am speaking are Mapping programs like Map Point, Streets and Roads.

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1492-I-12	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/20/2003	Equipment was not available to support hearing-impaired customers when Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) were opened. The expectation that Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) can be established and fully operational within five days of a disaster declaration is problematic.
1492-I-16	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	1/6/2004	DHS is requiring us to use certain specific, yet uncommon, fonts when preparing certain documents.
1492-S-04	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		State's Information and Planning Group co-located with ESF-5 in the Disaster Field Office.
1492-S-03	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		Having a representative at the DFO from the Administration on Aging (AOA) proved to be an effective practice for building recovery networks and creating referral processes between FEMA and Aging.
1492-S-02	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		The Disaster Recovery Center (DRC) IT HELPLINE provided excellent customer service and should be implemented on all future disasters.
1492-S-01	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		Deployment of a contractor representative to provide technical assistance, clarify complex eligibility issues with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), and provide interpretation of NFIP guidance and it's regulations proved to be a smart practice.
1492-I-20	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		As good as "Recovery Times" is, it could be a lot better and timelier. It provides too little information to the disaster victim and invariably arrives too late.
1492-I-19	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	1/6/2004	FEMA DFO staff members are provided computers and computer software to enable them to do priut jobs in the DFO. For Public Affairs personnel, this includes reviewing digital photographs and using Microsoft Word to create documents that contain graphics. If the software provided does not facilitate those fictions, significant portions of our responsibilities go undone or done poorly.
1492-I-18	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Homeland Security requires that the first reference to "FEMA" in all DFO press releases appear as: "The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)."To clarify the reference to DHS, Headquarters requires the following paragraph to be included as the last paragraph in all DFO written press releases:"On March 1, 2003, FEMA became part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. FEMA's continuing mission within the new department is to lead the effort to prepare the nation for all hazards and effectively manage federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident. FEMA also initiates proactive mitigation activities, trains first responders, and manages the National Flood Insurance Program and the U.S. Fire Administration."
1492-I-17	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Geographic Information Systems units (GIS) at disaster field offices (DFO) rely on data delivered from the National Processing Services Center (NPSC) through the Mapping Analysis Center (MAC) to produce maps and other data products for the use of DFO management. The data supplied by NPSC should be delivered in a data format and at a level of accuracy that allows the recipients to use the data for its intended purposes. This has not been the case.

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1492-I-15	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Employment disincentive for SAE's between 62 and 65 years of age. If you are under full retirement age (65+) when you begin receiving your Social Security benefits, \$1 in benefits will be deducted for each \$2 you earn above the annual limit. For 2003, that limit is \$11, 520. This acts as a deterrent to staffing availability after a month or two of work. Pay is essentially cut in half.
1492-I-10	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	A procedure needs to be established and enforced to ensure that all disaster-related press releases issued by federal or state agencies responding to a disaster are coordinated with the Joint Information Center (JIC) prior to release or dissemination.
1492-I-08	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Local government entities often cannot recoup otherwise eligible costs under the Public Assistance program because of ineligible contracting measures and improper or incomplete documentation.
1492-I-06	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Coordination is a must between Individual Housing Program (IHP) and Mitigation. At the time Individual Assistance (IA) meets with the Inspection Services Coordinator, Mitigation personnel should be included to discuss applicable mitigation measures, specific to the disaster, that would be included in the habitability inspection and a part of the Housing grant.
1492-I-04	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/19/2003	Identification of potential mitigation activities and projects during the PDA process. Currently, mitigation staff members participate in the PDA process by serving on the IA and PA sponsored teams. This methodology of conducting PDAs does not support the need for the identification of potential mitigation activities and projects
1493-I-01	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		The current payroll system used in field operations results in duplication of effort and increased workloads.
1493-S-01	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		A thorough food distribution plan jointly developed by federal, District and non-government personnel proved easy to augment when feeding requirements sharply increased.
1493-S-02	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		Smart planning of available time and opportunity allowed Community Relations (CR) personnel to conduct training for headquarters CR personnel who had not been previously able to attend training classes.
1493-L-02	Hurricane Isabel	Lesson Learned		Out-of-Region Disaster Field Office staff need to be aware of the unique jurisdictional considerations when dealing with the District of Columbia, it essentially functions as both a state and a local community, but shares the same staff.
1493-I-02	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Capital Region GSA staff did not respond to DFO needs/requirements in a timely manner.
1493-I-03	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	DoD asserted they were not authorized to deploy resources in support of requests for assistance from an FCO prior to a Presidential declaration, resulting in a failure to provide timely and requested emergency medical transport for the District of Columbia.
1493-L-01	Hurricane Isabel	Lesson Learned		Failure to incorporate back-up or contingency plans for mobile Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) resulted in problems when transportation was pulled.

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1494-I-01	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		A failure to maintain current information on the FEMA Internet website and Intranet results in inaccurate expectations for external and internal customers.
1494-I-05	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	There are several problems with the current system used to identify personnel for deployment.
1494-I-07	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	The procedures for the notification and deployment of Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs) through the Automated Deployment Database (ADD) are unevenly or inflexibly applied.
1494-I-09	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	10/18/2005	Overly restrictive usage-blocks on local purchase credit cards hinder expedient field logistics support.
1494-S-02	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		The DFO staff purchased memory sticks to provide a compact and efficient means of transporting files between disasters allowing them to retain files, such as examples of reports, etc.
1494-S-01	Hurricane Isabel	Smart Practice		The ERT was able to quickly set up a DFO and easily meet the 3-day goal because the local GSA support team worked a lease for a building that already had furniture, a hard-wired telephone and computer network and sufficient square footage.
1494-L-02	Hurricane Isabel	Lesson Learned		Turn-key ERTs require a current in-brief that provides up-to-date information concerning the state being supported.
1494-L-01	Hurricane Isabel	Lesson Learned		The ERT was able to determine how to activate voice mail and caller ID on their DISC-provided cell phones to ensure they were able to provide the maximum customer service.
1494-I-08	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/19/2003	The lengthy time required to process properties eligible for Hazard Mitigation repetitive-loss funds precludes timely assistance to the applicants.
1494-I-06	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		The inability of a few NPSC service representatives to handle incoming calls in accordance with procedures and specific instructions from the DFO resulted in incorrect information being given to applicants.
1494-I-04	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/19/2003	FEMA rules and requirements applicable to the Coastal Barrier Resource Act (CBRA) were not uniformly practiced or appeared to be well-understood.
1494-I-02	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		An inability to tailor the response effort to specific circumstances of an event results in unnecessary challenges to efficiently manage the initial response effort.
1494-I-03	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	Pre-declaration policy unnecessarily discourages the use of highly qualified and experienced retired annuitants.
0801-I-01	Salt Lake Shake	Issue [Information]		FEMA, ESFs and State cell kept no situation maps and no logs of issues, situations, incidents, ARFs, MAs, status, etc. RFIs, situational awareness, and other information issues that could have been answered or actioned quickly (had such resources existed), instead resulted in excess legwork, priority pushdowns, and excessive processing time.
0801-S-01	Salt Lake Shake	Smart Practice		In a catastrophic disaster covering a large area dividing the stricken area into zones is very helpful in managing the response.
0001-I-01	Live Wire	Issue [Action]	12/30/2003	A lack of established processes and protocols for cyber-related response activities resulted in misunderstanding of operational response actions at all levels.

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1499-S-01	Washington Floods	Smart Practice		Projecting daily SITSTAT display from ROC overhead "Infocus" projectors was well-received and easy to update.
1499-I-03	Washington Floods	Issue [Information]		There were problems with Email connectivity between the ROC and EMD's EOC NOTE: Combine with Email issue input from Montgomery.
1499-I-02	Washington Floods	Issue [Action]	11/26/2003	There were problems with Email connectivity between the ROC and WA EMD's EOC.
1499-I-01	Washington Floods	Issue [Action]	11/26/2003	There were problems with timely delivery of remote sensing products requested by WA EMD's EOC.
0001-I-02	Live Wire	Issue [Information]		A lack of established internal protocols and knowledge of what USDHS component-agencies do (how they operate) resulted in the Interagency Incident Management Group's (IIMG) State and Local desk took unilateral action in advising the Commonwealth of Massachusetts directly, preventing FEMA from implementing a coordinated federal response.
0001-I-03	Live Wire	Issue [Information]		NORTHCOM's/DoD's failure to respond to EST requests for information regarding the status/capability of military assets resulted in the inability of FEMA to provide timely assistance to a supported state.
0001-I-05	Live Wire	Issue [Action]	12/30/2003	A lack of information handling procedures, e.g., information collection plan, incident-specific EEs, analysis capability, and information management procedures tailored to cyber-related incidents, impacted decision-makers' ability to coordinate a timely and appropriate response to requests for assistance.
0001-I-06	Live Wire	Issue [Information]		There are insufficient communications assets available to or identified by EP&R to handle the amount of mission-essential message traffic to meet nationwide response operations requests during a cyber attack.
1497-I-01	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	12/31/2003	The inspectors determination of "Home Unsafe" yes or no, and RELOCATE yes or no caused a problem with people who needed a sanitary clean up. The home may be determined to be structurally safe but for sanitary reasons, may not be safe to inhabit.
1497-I-02	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	11/17/2003	In some cases inspectors recorded damage to access but failed to inspect the home and a second inspection had to be requested.
1497-I-04	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Not having an I&P "Go Kit" at Region restrains the I&P Section in being fully productive upon reporting the DFO.
1497-I-05	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		Planning formats are not user friendly and emphasize format over content, creating inefficiency and more work for the I&P staff.
1497-I-03	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Information]		IID (Ineligible Insufficient Damages) letters are generated by NEMIS when an inspector records NO to Misc. losses even if the applicant has stated at time of application they have a loss or expense. There will not be a referral to ONA for this applicant. The observations and the questioning of the inspector are the determining factors - not the teleregistration.
1491-I-36	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	12/2/2003	The California request for funding to remediate dry fuels resulting from the bark beetle infestation took too long to review and render an approval decision.
1491-I-37	Hurricane Isabel	Issue [Action]	12/2/2003	Improved processes and protocols are required for handling high-profile distinguished visitors.

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1486-I-01	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		DFO staff not trained on how to use assigned equipment such as GPS and cell phones.
1486-I-05	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		The VPN interfered with Travel Manager and IFMIS. The software is incompatible with the VPN.
1486-I-07	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		NYS PAO does not have a presense in the DFO.
1486-I-09	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		Project work sheets are left inlimbo after the PA inspectors leave until Mitigation approves them.
1486-I-18	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		DFO needs to be notified when grants are processed and paid.
1486-I-17	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		Phone operators at the NPSC did not ask half of the callers to see if they have special needs. This is due to the fact that these questions are at the end of the interview.
1486-I-16	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		The Regional GIS suite is outdated and does not support operations due to it's age.
1486-I-15	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		There is not an adequate available staff of GIS within the I&P Cadre.
1486-I-14	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		NEMIS does not have the capability to scan the PDA's into the System, nor is there another way to view these PDA's.
1486-I-13	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		Requests for equipment were done on a unorganized manner, there was no prioritization of who needed the equipment first.
1486-I-12	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		APO did not have adequte help to process requests and check in and out equipment.
1486-I-11	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		Corrections to T/A for SAE's are not done in a timely manner.
1486-I-10	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		NJ does not have any project officers.
1486-S-03	New York Storms	Smart Practice		VOLAG did a great job with unmet needs, those claims that exceeded a \$5000 claim.
1486-S-02	New York Storms	Smart Practice		Support from the FCO and PA to include Enviro in meetings was very well coordinated.
1486-S-01	New York Storms	Smart Practice		Training and Cross Training was very effective.
1486-I-20	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		NYS was not represented in the DRC's.
1486-I-19	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		There is no policy of guidelines/standards for States that state what we need from DRCs. That would be dependant on the type of DRC, if it a temporary location, or if it is one that will be around for several weeks and HS needs to be involved in selecting DRC sites.
1486-I-08	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		Allowing extension and late arrivals hinder the operation.
1486-I-06	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		The State of NY has not handled the Private Non-Profits. Eligibility has still not been met. New York lacks the training to handle the P-N-P's and waited to the end of the disaster to address the P-N-P's.
1486-I-04	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		The NEMIS rites and ADD job titles do not always match up. Staff needs to be updated on changes in codes to assign jobs
1486-I-02	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		Due to the rapid change in technology DFO staff were not familiar with computer services, such as how to access the network off-site.
1486-I-03	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		Equipment coming from DISC was not up to date on all software.

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1498-I-01	Wildfires	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The use of Government purchase cards for field procurement in support of disaster response operations continues to be ineffective, labor intensive, and frustrating.
1498-I-03	Wildfires	Issue [Action]	7/27/2004	Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued new intra- and inter-agency financial management, control, and reimbursement documents during the response operation that conflicted with established mission assignment procedures and policies.
1498-I-05	Wildfires	Issue [Information]		Fire Service Incident Commanders (ICs) see a need for staff resources to address coordination and public information issues arising during urban-wildland interface fire fighting, particularly when it is combined with a Stafford Act disaster declaration.
1498-I-06	Wildfires	Issue [Information]		Debris removal from private property can be an eligible Public Assistance cost if the debris constitutes a "Public Health Threat". There appears to be no mutually agreed (FEMA, EPA, HHS) Federal definition of "Public Health Threat".
1498-I-04	Wildfires	Issue [Information]		During early response operations, significant management and staff resources, particularly in the Operations Branch, were committed to un-anticipated coordination and support of a variety of VIP visitor (including the Departmental Secretary) activities.
1498-I-02	Wildfires	Issue [Action]	7/15/2004	Damage inspectors could not safely conduct damage assessment in a timely manner due to delays completing ash safety-sampling in burned areas.
1467-I-01	New York Storms	Issue [Information]		The Disaster Field Office (DFO) officially opened on Monday, May 19, 2003, with T1 data connectivity only. Although formally requested on May 15, T1 voice connectivity was not established until Friday, May 23, resulting in the dependence on limited number of POTS lines for the first five working days.
1467-S-01	New York Storms	Smart Practice		To better monitor television media coverage over a multi-county disaster area, External Affairs hired a national television news monitoring service, NEWS TRAX, which monitors all of the television news around the country and provides edited video news clips upon request. Contact at (800) 442-2547, sales@newstrax.com.
1467-S-03	New York Storms	Smart Practice		Information and Planning Section deployed to the Disaster Field Office (DFO) without a GIS mapping production capability, yet was challenged to meet map requirements. In conjunction with the Deputy FCO for Mitigation and the Comptroller's contracting officer, a relatively inexpensive agreement was reached with the Geographic Information System Laboratory at Syracuse University for the provision of real-time mapping support.
1467-S-02	New York Storms	Smart Practice		FEMA and State developed a concise, one-page checklist for use in future operations to assist staff in the selection of sites for Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs). A copy of the checklist may be obtained from the POC listed at the bottom of the form.

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1500-I-01	West Virginia Floods	Issue [Information]		In some instances, the NFIRA database used to cross check NEMIS does not appear to be completely reliable. Several times, a home was identified as being in a special flood hazard area, when it was not physically located in the SFHA. In states with a significant number of rural route addresses, the number of false hits increases.
1500-I-02	West Virginia Floods	Issue [Information]		County of residence is completed automatically during disaster registration. However, the registration intake representative is supposed to ask for verification. If the intake rep does not ask for verification, there is the potential for the registering individual to be placed in a non-declared county - which means that no inspection will take place. Or, the resident could be incorrectly placed in a declared county, requiring a recoupment of monies incorrectly received.
1500-I-03	West Virginia Floods	Issue		Telephones T-1 Data/Voice: On the past several disasters the local telephone company has been unable to deliver the required services quickly for immediate operations.
1503-I-03	Tropical Storm	Issue [Information]		On the past several disasters the local telephone company has been unable to deliver the required services quickly for immediate operations. What was most unsettling about 1500-DR-WV was the T-1 line was already installed in the building from the previous disaster and it still took 5 days to activate and establish connectivity. This poses a problem when expectations are that field operations must be established within 48 hours.
1500-I-04	West Virginia Floods	Issue [Information]		In order to facilitate the need for Public Assistance Operations training at the DFO, the DFTO training manager makes a request of the PA training Point of Contact in DC. The POC locates and selects available PA trainers from PA cadre, then instructs the DFTO to contact other individuals to get printed materials masters, and still other individuals to get copies of PA Digest and Guide for use in the training program(s). The DFTO must make repeated attempts to contact appropriate individuals, track shipments, and keep Lead PA instructors informed.
1507-I-01	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		All branches should make a comprehensive equipment order to Logistics at the pre-disaster deployment meeting.
1507-I-06	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		TLC trailer contents are sometimes haphazard and have varied quality.
1507-I-08	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		The I&P Go Kit, containing a color printer and poster maker, should be shipped to every disaster. Also, a color laser printer in the DFO would be useful and cost effective.
1507-S-04	Severe Storms	Smart Practice		Safety and Security Cadres were used to assist in site selection.
1507-S-03	Severe Storms	Smart Practice		Every DFO should have a DFO website. It can be an excellent resource.
1507-S-02	Severe Storms	Smart Practice		GIS Specialist should be located at the DFO to ensure excellent service to DFO.
1507-S-01	Severe Storms	Smart Practice		MERS and local hire personnel were present upon arrival at the DFO to assist in office area setup. They were of great assistance in getting the office up and ready to start work the next day.
1507-L-02	Severe Storms	Lesson Learned		Some personnel were never entered on the ?All Hands? DFO mailing list.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1507-L-01	Severe Storms	Lesson Learned		Hotwashes should be scheduled earlier to ensure that most staff can participate.
1507-I-16	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		The DFO COOP Plan should be shared with MOC and the Region.
1507-I-15	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		Deployment Process provides incomplete and inaccurate information. For example, deployment instructions given with the deployment request form were not relayed to the people being deployed.
1507-I-14	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		New DAEs need adequate orientation and formal training.
1507-I-13	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		DAEs are left in the dark between deployments.
1507-I-12	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		Routine use of employee SSN should be discouraged.
1507-I-11	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		Community Relations would benefit from PDA information.
1507-I-10	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		Community Relations needs mobile phone and email access in the field.
1507-I-09	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		Current Social Security regulations discourage some DAEs and DTEs from working. This affects ?Availability? status.
1507-I-07	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		Pre-Disaster Planning should address actions, products, resources and requirements in order to effectively transition from incident, to DFO Activation. The quality of current efforts is variable. Sometimes it is excellent. Additionally, other sections can assist in activities before the DFO opens.
1507-I-05	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		Inadequate rollout of new IPASS technology caused frustration and significant productivity losses.
1507-I-02	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		Untimely and completely inadequate copying capacity at the DFO impacted mission during the first two weeks.
1507-I-03	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		The lack of Purchase Cardholders resulted in certain supplies, such as copier paper and computer diskettes, were in short supply during the initial days of the DFO.
1507-I-04	Severe Storms	Issue [Information]		Spectralink Phone system has limitations.
9001-I-01	Bam, Iran Earthquake	Issue [Action]	5/12/2004	The IMSuRT and MST that deployed to Bam, Iran were unprepared to execute a humanitarian mission to a country without full diplomatic relations or support infrastructure; humanitarian missions have not previously been considered a mission the IMSuRT would have to execute.
9001-L-03	Bam, Iran Earthquake	Lesson Learned		Deployed team leadership did not completely understand the chain of command, creating confusion and duplication of effort.
9001-L-02	Bam, Iran Earthquake	Lesson Learned		When coordinating airlift support through DoD, ensure provisions are in place to prevent crew rest considerations from delaying arrival at the destination.
9001-I-02	Bam, Iran Earthquake	Issue [Action]	5/12/2004	NDMS lacks contingency plans, entry and exit strategies, medical threat assessments, procedures to perform emergency team member egress in the event of serious injury, and specialized requirements for international deployments.
9001-I-03	Bam, Iran Earthquake	Issue [Action]	5/12/2004	Members of the deploying IMSuRTs and the Management Support Team were not adequately prepared for OCONUS travel.
9001-L-01	Bam, Iran Earthquake	Lesson Learned		Pre-deployment mission analysis and mission execution was not possible without input from and support of other federal agencies.

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0501-L-01	Heartland Response	Lesson Learned		Participating in this 1st US Army exercise imposed artificial constraints on the Information and Planning Section (ESF-5) which resulted in a lack of realistic play for that section.
0501-S-01	Heartland Response	Smart Practice		This exercise included ESFs (e.g., ESF-12 Energy) that don't normally play in exercise activation.
0501-S-02	Heartland Response	Smart Practice		Regional Operations Center used HAZUS for the first time in an exercise.
1510-I-01	Storms	Issue [Information]		We are currently operating in our Disaster Field Offices and Disaster Recovery Centers without providing safe drinking water for the duration of our operations. The requirement to provide safe, potable drinking water to all employees is codified in Title 29, U.S.C. Although we attempt to have all building leases provide for chilled drinking water, it normally takes a few days to get this service established. Providing safe drinking water is most crucial during the initial set up phase of an office when employees are unloading trucks, moving freight on docks and setting up offices with furniture and equipment.
1510-S-01	Storms	Smart Practice		Provided a comprehensive Emergency Plan for use by the DFO for DR-1510-OR. It included Crisis Management Procedures, Continuity of Operations Procedures and General Emergency Actions.
1510-S-03	Storms	Smart Practice		The senior staff delayed the deployment of Public Assistance Project Officers knowing they would not be gainfully employed during the DFO start-up process.
1510-S-02	Storms	Smart Practice		Due to the presence of a Native American tribe within the impacted area, senior staff ensured an Equal Rights Officer (ERO) was deployed to the DFO.
1505-I-01	California Fires	Issue [Information]		Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
1505-I-02	California Fires	Issue [Action]	11/24/2004	The increasing reliance on automated systems, in this case IPASS, makes timely program delivery vulnerable to technical support shortfalls.
1505-I-04	California Fires	Issue [Action]	11/26/2004	Program policy decisions made in response to specific situations are not consistently codified and disseminated.
1505-S-01	California Fires	Smart Practice		A free method to transmit to telephone-based facsimile machines from a personal computer saves time and improves communication.
1505-I-05	California Fires	Issue [Information]		The phrase "Public Assistance" used in the context of damage and repair to public structures and emergency actions continues to cause confusion among public officials, the public media, and the general population.
1505-I-03	California Fires	Issue [Information]		Public Assistance Project Worksheet development frequently requires reference to current cost estimating data.

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1511-I-01	Typhoon Sudal	Issue [Action]	3/18/2005	The absence of immediately available, fully adequate, post-disaster voice and data telecommunication capability continues to seriously degrade FEMA's emergency response and recovery mission accomplishment. This issue has been raised in every Pacific Island disaster (4) since RAMP was initiated in June of 2003, there has been repeated demonstration of the available technology's capability to resolve the issue (see discussion below). FEMA's disaster response and recovery operations continue to increase their dependence on adequate telecommunication (particularly digital data) capability, yet FEMA response and recovery resources continue to deploy to communication-sparse environments without FEMA controlled, immediately responsive communication capability.
1511-I-02	Typhoon Sudal	Issue [Information]		Current administrative control policies and procedures for emergency procurement in the field appear to lack sufficient flexibility to support emergency operations requirements in a timely manner. This issue has been repeatedly raised by this Region and is applicable for both mainland disasters in resource-rich environments, and is particularly evident in Pacific Island disasters, which usually occur in a remote and austere-resource environment. Present policies and procedures should be reviewed and revised to provide sufficient flexibility and delegated authority (within reasonable and appropriate accountability controls) to support the widest range of emergency procurement requirements in support of mission critical operations.
1511-I-04	Typhoon Sudal	Issue [Information]		Island disaster response and recovery operations are (as would mainland catastrophic disaster operations) greatly affected by the availability of surviving usable infrastructure. Even slight degradation of existing marginal capabilities (lodging, feeding, medical treatment, and working spaces) has historically restricted FEMA's physical ability to provide timely and appropriate response to disaster events.
1511-I-07	Typhoon Sudal	Issue [Information]		Establishment of a limited forward (Guam?) day to day operating capability (a so called "warm base") and increased pre-positioned Immediate Response Resource inventories in Guam could reduce response times for Western Pacific disaster declarations.
1511-I-06	Typhoon Sudal	Issue [Information]		Although arising in the context of medical supplies, several relatively minor incidents suggest that current procurement and distribution processes need review and amendment. In the process of resolving these incidents, difficulties were experienced in cargo shipment, apparently arising from recent Transportation Security Administration regulations. There was a consensus the FEMA logistics needs revised and enhanced policy and enhanced technical expertise in the areas of medical procurement, hazardous/dangerous cargo movement and cargo movement administration, to preclude future difficulties.

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1511-I-05	Typhoon Sudal	Issue [Information]		It appears that FEMA has yet to promulgate or perhaps effectively disseminate) policy instructions addressing the incorporation of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). In the absence of such policy, substantial operations and logistic staff effort was devoted to defining and supporting medical operations in Yap, including deployment requirements and techniques, equipment and medical supply requirement, scope of service limitations (what types of services should be offered on-site, versus by evacuation to a treatment facility), etc,
1511-I-03	Typhoon Sudal	Issue [Information]		Many of the issues raised during the current hot wash process are similar, or in some cases, identical (emergency procurement procedures, communications capabilities, deployment criteria for response personnel), to issues identified by previous hot washes. There was consensus that the absence of a positive feedback or status reporting process for previously identified, similar issues, caused many staff members to question the validity and value of the RAMP process. It is not obvious in the field, that the RAMP process per se is the appropriate management mechanism for development, communication, and implementation of agency policy (as opposed to the identification of policy and procedural change requirements). However, this issue strongly implies an improvement to those existing processes is in order.
1511-L-01	Typhoon Sudal	Lesson Learned		Transportation mission assignments using Department of Defense military aircraft should always include a request for Air Force Aero Support Teams.
1511-L-03	Typhoon Sudal	Lesson Learned		Informally developed, software document templates used for critical tasks suffered apparent data loss, when imported into different generation application software.
1511-L-02	Typhoon Sudal	Lesson Learned		The dial-up PALMPAD devices used for Individual Assistance inspection data collection would not work as intended on commercial telephone circuits in the Western Pacific islands. A field expedient solution was developed to utilize digital conversion to permit transmitting data via the FEMA network/satellite telecommunication support, producing transfer times reportedly faster than state-side commercial telephone service.
1513-I-01	Illinois Storms	Issue [Action]	11/24/2004	Changes in systems and procedures are not relayed to the DAE Cadre. The DFO was opened and two of the comptroller personnel were not familiar with the new Credit Card System and Procurement Tracking System (ProTrac) which is entered and maintained through the use of the National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS).
1513-I-05	Illinois Storms	Issue [Action]	11/24/2004	The ability to purchase equipment early in the set up of a DFO is significant for early success. A person with the authority to purchase on a credit card, a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) for \$2000 in place, or a mission assignment needs to be in place before establishing a DFO. One of the above mentioned capabilities should be mandatory, at the time of declaration of a disaster, before any staff are deployed to open a DFO to ensure proper operational capabilities to be established.

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1513-I-04	Illinois Storms	Issue [Action]	11/26/2004	The DFO did not have appropriately prepared and working equipment at the opening of the facility. The Region should maintain a cache of go-kits for immediate deployment.
1513-I-03	Illinois Storms	Issue [Action]	11/26/2004	Region V needs a complete Outlook e-mail list for all DAEs to transmit appropriate information during periods when they are not deployed.
1513-I-02	Illinois Storms	Issue [Action]	1/20/2005	Admin is not adequately prepared to accept Safety & Security duties after departure of Safety & Security staff from the DFO. Since Security is included in the Administrative functions, it would be helpful if the Administrative Section Chief had some kind of overview training on the kinds of records to be kept for the DFO and actions to be taken when the Security Officer is no longer deployed to the DFO.
1513-I-06	Illinois Storms	Issue [Information]		The ability to purchase equipment early in the set up of a DFO is significant for early success. A person with the authority to purchase on a credit card, a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) for \$2000 in place, or a mission assignment needs to be in place before establishing a DFO. One of the above mentioned capabilities should be mandatory, at the time of declaration of a disaster, before any staff are deployed to open a DFO to ensure proper operational capabilities to be established.
1513-L-02	Illinois Storms	Lesson Learned		Every DFO should have an evacuation plan with considerations for safe rooms.
1513-L-01	Illinois Storms	Lesson Learned		The DFO should not be co-located with the building owner, in an operating business facility.
1514-I-01	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Information]		Ineffective and inefficient inter-office communications caused a degradation in field support operations and mission accomplishment.
1514-S-02	New Mexico Storms	Smart Practice		When the four standard PA briefings were scheduled and held on the same day: the Federal-State meeting, an elected officials meeting, an inspector briefing, and an applicants' briefing, the participating state and local officials were able to more effectively use their time.
1514-S-01	New Mexico Storms	Smart Practice		The Federal Coordinating Officer arranged for deployment of a community relations officer from Region VI to coordinate community organizations to form an "unmet needs" committee to find some way to needy individual citizens. The "unmet needs" committee found local resources to provide some significant long-term assistance to affected families.
1516-I-01	Arkansas Storms	Issue [Information]		After a disaster, especially a disaster involving flooding, community officials need information about the flood insurance program, since a community's participation may affect the community's current and future eligibility for flood insurance and for disaster-relief.

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1516-I-02	Arkansas Storms	Issue [Information]		Deployment of disaster field office (DFO) staff in stages allowed the logistics and administration sections more time for more efficient personnel in-processing, allocation of DFO space, and installation and issue of network and telephone equipment and services. In this disaster, section chiefs made careful plans to phase-in their staffs, but there were some "miscommunications" in deployment instructions between Region VI through the automated deployment database (ADD) to people being deployed. Written instructions or guidance would make phased deployments more useful, more efficient, and more cost-effective.
1516-I-03	Arkansas Storms	Issue [Information]		The Automated Deployment Database (ADD) does not allow the best match between reservist skills and needs of the disaster field office (DFO).
1517-I-01	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		Headquarters FEMA Public Affairs website outdated.
1517-I-02	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		Equipment received from the DISC was inoperable, missing parts, and not delivered in a timely manner, creating difficulty in effecting field support and mission completion by the Information and Planning Section.
1517-S-01	Storms and Floods	Smart Practice		Region VII and DR-1517-NE staff use of internally created web groups within the "Disasterhelp.gov" website contributed significantly to the success of the disaster operation.
1521-I-01	Louisiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The External Affairs Officer - Public Information Officer (PIO) needs to monitor local television coverage closely as soon as FEMA becomes directly or indirectly involved in a disaster situation so the PIO can respond quickly to correct inaccurate information. A quick response is especially urgent when errors involve declaration information or FEMA operations. External Affairs currently does not have adequate access to disaster-area broadcast media from the FEMA regional office or from a Disaster Field Office (DFO).
1521-I-02	Louisiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	Current policies about the early deployment of ?disaster recovery centers? (DRCs) raise questions about the purpose, organization, and functions of a DRC.
1521-I-04	Louisiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Information Technology (IT) staff often needs to install latest NEMIS patches, Windows and MS-Office, and other software updates on laptops that have been stored for some time. They need access to the most current software changes.
1521-I-05	Louisiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Personnel who are on temporary duty away from the disaster field office or FEMA regional center are becoming increasingly dependent on the electronic transfer of reports and for routine communications. If IPASS is going to be the agency-wide standard for off-net data communications, FEMA staff needs training in use of IPASS.
1521-I-03	Louisiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Current business rules call for the Other Needs Assessment (ONA) Coordinator to conduct a forms-review on the 30th day of relief operations to determine if any problems have developed in automated processing. The problem is that the 30-day review takes place too late to fix most problems.
1518-I-01	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		Multiple problems with iPASS created problems in every aspect of DFO/DRC operations.

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1518-I-02	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		Premium pay waivers are not being approved in a timely manner resulting in many personnel apparently not receiving pay for overtime worked.
1518-I-04	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		Rules and procedures for iPass registration accounts and passwords are too restrictive; this results in mission degradation.
1518-I-03	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		There is not a single-point contact at HQ for iPASS issues; this resulted in degraded operational capability for every program area, lost production time and end-user frustration.
1518-I-05	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		Users had not been trained to use the new iPass remote access system. As a result, users had to be trained at the DFO, by DFO IT people, at the worst possible time -- during DFO and DRC setup.
1518-S-01	Storms and Floods	Smart Practice		A document control clerk was deployed to assist Resource Management personnel maintain their credit card logs.
1518-I-08	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		EMI Training Course for FCO Secretary.
1518-I-07	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		Premium pay waivers are not being approved in a timely manner.
1518-I-06	Storms and Floods	Issue [Information]		Laptops sent to the field lack key programs/configuration required for field use. Instead laptops have to be configured in the field at the worst possible time -- during DFO and DRC setup.
1524-I-01	Missouri Storms	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	There were no high-volume shredders or contract shredding services available during the disaster, causing multiple staff hours wasted as documents were shredded individually in single document shredders.
1524-I-04	Missouri Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Lack of Voluntary Agency Liaisons (VAL) throughout FEMA for disaster operations.
1524-I-06	Missouri Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	IPASS guidance and training is lacking for disaster staff.
1524-I-08	Missouri Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	DHS requirement to open DRCs early in the disasters causes a rush to get federal, state, and local staff out to staff the DRCs at times when there aren't yet customers needing their services.
1524-L-01	Missouri Storms	Lesson Learned		Use of Audio GPS system allowed disaster staff member to navigate more quickly and effectively to multiple destinations during the early stages of the disaster operation.
1524-I-07	Missouri Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Regional support equipment in ERT-A kits is antiquated and new equipment cannot be purchased with Fund "6" money to replenish regional stocks.
1524-I-05	Missouri Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	IPASS not being pre-loaded on DFO laptops resulted in mission degradation early in the DFO operation.
1524-I-03	Missouri Storms	Issue [Action]	7/10/2006	Disaster staff had great difficulty in completing training through online training courses.
1524-I-02	Missouri Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Evolving de facto requirement to establish DRCs and PA PAC sites concurrent with the setup of DFO is not realistic without additional equipment, personnel, and procedures.
1520-I-01	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Authority of FEMA employees to carry concealed weapons while on duty and in the course of their official activities.
1520-I-04	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Coordination problems with HQ/TLC in regard to travel trailers.
1520-I-06	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Documentation for the GIS suite was both missing and incorrect.

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1520-I-08	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	The GIS suite was incapacitated for over two days due to GIS network server problems.
1520-S-02	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		For Indiana Storms we combined the DFO Safety Procedures, Crisis Management Plan, and COOP Plan into one integrated emergency plan.
1520-S-01	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		Have the Public Information Office prepare a Friday recap each week of disaster recovery information on a flyer, using colored photos of the disaster, with the latest statistics such as number of teleregistrations, approved housing and ONA dollars, approved SBA dollars an DRC attendance, etc. for distribution to CR field personnel. This was tried on this disaster and well-received in the communities through field distribution via CR and PIO.
1520-L-02	Indiana Storms	Lesson Learned		IA staff at this disaster were able to reduce the amount of processing involved for Individual Assistance applicants by providing rental assistance grantees with an initial award of two months? rent. To avoid a possible duplication of benefits, we provided each applicant later leased into a FEMA-provided manufactured housing unit with a letter specifying that rental assistance funds which were not spent on disaster-related housing needs must be remitted to FEMA. The possible duplication was also assessed at the PPI, and the applicant informed if there appeared to be a potential. IA staff determined that two months rental assistance for all applicants was appropriate, given the very small number of direct housing units expected. Staff felt that administratively it made more sense to provide two months upfront for everyone who qualified for this assistance. Now, almost 6 weeks after the declaration there are still only 8 travel trailers leased in. Staff anticipates leasing in a total of 20-30 applicants for this disaster. Staff also feels that it is an unnecessary interruption in the program to require any duplicated funds to be returned prior to lease-in. Monitoring the applicants who are leased in, discussing the issue at the
1520-L-01	Indiana Storms	Lesson Learned		The use of a stand alone outdoor emergency shelter should be considered for inclusion in updating FEMA 320.
1520-I-16	Indiana Storms	Issue [Information]		Most personnel need to carry manuals, forms and information resources from computer to computer and from disaster to disaster.
1520-I-15	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Rental Assistance tied to the "Willing to Relocate" question when the home is determined "unsafe" by inspector.
1520-I-14	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	The "PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL FOR THE DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM" form is entirely inadequate.
1520-I-13	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Regarding the DISC laptops: Consider loading the "FEMA VPN with iPass" as the standard load, verses simply "FEMA VPN" which only works while in the DFO.
1520-I-12	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Recommend that all DISC cell phones have a consistent standard / procedure of how they are sent out to disasters: 1) have Voice mail already activated, 2) have the Voice mail password reset to a standard default.
1520-I-11	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Coordination problems with HQ/TLC in regard to travel trailers.

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1520-I-10	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	The Super letter generated to an applicant receiving a GFIP does not inform them of the policy being purchased on their behalf. It states that the applicant is responsible for purchasing and maintaining flood insurance, and to call NFIP ?to learn where to obtain flood insurance
1520-I-09	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Software for the GIS suite was not included, incorrectly installed, out of date, incompatible with other software packages that it needed to operate with and generally created a number of terminal issues that halted Technical Services operations.
1525-I-01	Virginia Flooding	Issue [Action]	7/30/2004	Commitment Documents (40-1s) are not pre-loaded when a Declaration is issued causing a delay in receiving start up funding for DFO operations. It is necessary to initiate purchases and incur financial obligations prior to receiving fund allocations to get the DFO operational. These are questionable system work-arounds dictated by the current process. During the DFO start-up phase, there are delays in purchase of required items. When credit cards are used, it is done without any authorized funding. Obligating funds without an authorizing document is not consistent with Comptroller Policy and has adverse legal implications.
1520-I-07	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Multiple, major hardware issues delayed the setup and utilization of the GIS Suite (identified as the "Green Suite").
1520-I-05	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Insufficient and expired data was supplied with the GIS suite.
1520-I-03	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	There is a need to get an immediate wavier on blocked Purchase Credit Card purchases.
1520-I-02	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	It is the current FEMA requirement that the FEMA/State Agreement be signed prior to the disbursement of the Other Needs Assistance. In this disaster, waiting for a signed FSA delayed the disbursement of ONA assistance, and all Housing Assistance attached to ONA cases, by a full week following the declaration. This procedure needs review for eliminating such unnecessary delay.
1519-I-01	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		There needs to be a procedure established to quickly change IFMIS Authorization, Rights and Permissions for the Contracting Officer/Comptroller. The Protrac Interface system is not disaster friendly. The process slows down acquisitions ability to process documents and obligations in a timely manner.
1519-I-03	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		Some of the contracted Home Inspectors conduct is not acceptable.

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1519-I-02	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		There needs to be a National Policy/Procedure for Disaster Relocation Center (DRC) Operations. There are several documents on the IA Toolbox found on the Intranet (http://166.112.101.14/content/iatoolbox/index.htm) that will assist with the DRC Coordination. The DRC Operational Procedures are not defined in any known policy document. Issue There has been a trend over the last several years of opening Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) for shorter periods of time. The cost effectiveness of shorter operating periods is clearly beneficial. It allows DRCs to move to more locations better serving our customers. Problem However, DRCs still tend to begin their operations as quickly as possible following a disaster declaration. This practice coupled with the trend of shorter operating periods results in DRCs closing before many applicants have applied for assistance and well before they encounter problems with documentation, SBA loan packages and other issues likely to warrant a visit to a DRC.
1519-I-04	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		Servers need to come to the DFO with Software installed for back-up. Remote backup of the server failed at least twice weekly using the default Microsoft backup software installed on the server. Server backup was delayed until 8mm tapes could be ordered and shipped from OEM.
1522-I-04	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Information]		Current State: FEMA does not have enough Flood Insurance Specialists in the DAE cadre Impact: Not able to adequately support NFIP outreach mission Desired State: Build up the Flood Insurance Specialists cadre with flood related specialists
1522-I-03	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Information]		Current State: Individual Assistance Group Temporary Housing Mission - Inefficient coordination and decision making methodology between field staff and office staff in assessing potential housing sites. Impact: Complicated program development and team agreement, which led to inefficient mission performance. Desired State: Develop standard operating procedures and incorporate decision matrix tools to manage and facilitate, the housing site selection process. This initiative should begin with a Region 3 Temporary Housing Summit.
1522-I-02	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Information]		Current State: Delivery of documents from the FEMA Publication Catalog is slow and doesn't support rapid needs of field teams, and affected communities. Impact: It is very difficult to get ?just in time? delivery of FEMA publications to disaster victims. Desired State: DFO needs the flexibility to coordinate with local printers in producing disaster related publications
1522-I-01	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Information]		Current State: The Equal Rights Officer (ERO) was not deployed in a timely manner to meet the needs of the DFO staff. Impact: The ERO did not arrive until the second week of activation and was not involved in pre-activation DFO site selection. Desired State: Have the ERO involved in the site selection process and deploy in time for day one of operations.
1519-I-09	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		Properties acquired, relocated, or elevated by HMGP funds remain on the NFIP repetitive loss lists.

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1519-I-08	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		There is no definitive answer to the questions: How many days should a Public Notice be posted? In how many jurisdictions? How do we determine a paper of record referenced in the Public Affairs Field Guide? We are requesting a standardization of a policy on Public Notice requirement from Headquarters.
1519-I-07	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		Community Relations and External Affairs need to be able to access information from the ROC throughout the PDA process. Community Relations (CR) should be deployed as early as possible to be able to inform the public of operation, registration and response efforts.
1519-I-06	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		The RAMP Manual could use additional information regarding participants expectations, responsibilities and non-retaliatory statutes for use by the RAC in the field.
1519-I-05	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		A plan or a better plan is needed for Turn-key and Multiple Regional Operations.
1522-L-02	West Virginia Storms	Lesson Learned		New digital media monitoring equipment purchased during FEMA 1522-DR-WV makes media monitoring efficient by allowing quick scanning of newscast and computer based distribution of FEMA clips.
1522-L-01	West Virginia Storms	Lesson Learned		In order to get FEMA information into the hands of disaster victims as soon as possible, a new approach can be taken. The current practice generally results in people getting to DRCs weeks after declaration. In our mitigation outreach program, supported by IA and CR, in building center (e.g. Lowe's Home Depot, 84 Lumber) we have reached many people impacted by floods who could benefit from FEMA's support. A large number of these do not know how or where such support is available, and thus have been directed to DRCs or NFIP contacts.
1522-I-08	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Information]		Current State: The Privacy Act does not permit sharing of information with respect to applicant name and address among DFO staff elements. Impact: The Privacy Act impedes applicant service Desired State: In particular, Hazard Mitigation staff and IA staff should be able to share information when it will facilitate assistance to citizens affected by a disaster
1522-I-07	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Information]		Current State: Mitigation DAE job titles in ADD are not specific enough to provide a definite skills/mission match Impact: DAE Mitigation Specialists are deployed to assignments where their skills and abilities are not matched well with mission requirements Desired State: Expand mitigation job titles in ADD to include specific mission specialist
1522-I-06	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Information]		Current State: Cell phones are not a reliable mode of communication in the southern counties of West Virginia Impact: Unable to maintain daily communication with field staff for routine reporting and lack of communications is a safety issue. Desired State: Implement standardized back-up communication procedures
1522-I-05	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Information]		Current State: No printers available initially at the IOF Impact: As a result, the state received a copy of the draft FSA so it could be printed as a finished document. This created a lot of confusion. Desired State: The IOF needs printer capability on day one

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1474-I-01	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Action]	1/9/2004	CR Field Officers are not adequately equipped to immediately get out and start performing their assignments. Upon deployment CR Field Officers need to be equipped with cell phones, TACAS, laptop computers, portable printers and GPS units. This should be the "issue standard" for Region 3 Field Officers.
1474-I-02	West Virginia Storms	Issue [Information]		The efficiency of VISA impact cards has been reduced over time by Headquarters requirements, negating the original intent of what was a responsive and streamlined purchasing process.
1474-S-01	West Virginia	Smart Practice		Mitigation counselors assisted with the establishment of roving DRCs.
1474-S-02	West Virginia Storms	Smart Practice		Good practice--PIOs accompanying field personnel to experience what happens first-hand.
1474-S-03	West Virginia Storms	Smart Practice		Individual Assistance Counselors and Mitigation Counselors participated in a joint initial briefing.
1474-S-04	West Virginia Storms	Smart Practice		The External Affairs Section at the DFO was comprised of Congressional Relations, Public Affairs and Community Relations. Because of their similar missions, having these work groups collocated worked very well. They were easily able to coordinate and ensure all were working with the same information.
1539-I-51	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	There are no readily-available accurate nationwide lists for State Emergency Management Agency Directors and Citizen Corps Directors.
1539-I-53	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	The lack of a dedicated database solution hampered the recruitment process, increased the data entry burden, and decreased data quality. A dedicated database solution could be tremendously powerful.
1539-L-02	Hurricane Charley	Lesson Learned		Different pieces of the Recruitment process operated at different speeds and had different capabilities. This led to volunteer frustration and delays in mission readiness.
1539-S-02	Hurricane Charley	Smart Practice		The challenge was to provide Citizen Corps support for FEMA's Community Relations Effort in the field. However, due to other deployments, there were not enough FEMA staff to staff this effort.
1542-I-06	Storms	Issue [Action]	11/26/2004	The I&P Section needs better skills in visual display of information (graphs, charts and tables).
1542-I-05	Storms	Issue [Action]	11/26/2004	Better coordination is needed among FEMA Region V I&P Section, the State, the Preliminary Damage Assessment team, and Disaster Field Office I&P Staffs.
1542-I-04	Storms	Issue [Action]	1/20/2005	PA forms, work aids, and spreadsheets should be standardized throughout FEMA.
1542-I-03	Storms	Issue [Action]	1/20/2005	Problems with NEMIS and internet connectivity cause Public Assistance Coordinators (PACs) and Project Officers (POs) to spend too much time processing their Case Management Files.
1542-I-02	Storms	Issue [Information]		DHS and FEMA travel regulations impact our ability to deploy quickly.
1542-I-01	Storms	Issue [Action]	11/26/2004	The definition of subgrantee includes a minimum damage amount of \$1,000.
1539-S-04	Hurricane Charley	Smart Practice		There is no substitute for actual ICS experience and certification.
1539-S-03	Hurricane Charley	Smart Practice		The Federal Executive Board in Chicago was instrumental in obtaining specialized assistance from other federal agencies.

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1539-I-52	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Plans, policies, and procedures for the surge employee recruitment cell should be reviewed and approved prior to the next time it is needed.
1548-I-06	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	There is no adequate tracking system for commodities furnished to the disaster area.
1548-I-07	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	12/3/2005	Employee proficiency levels recorded in the Automated Deployment Database (ADD) are not being kept updated. This causes irregularities in deployment assignments so that some employees are not put into the proper jobs.
1548-I-01	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Field office purchasing personnel in the logistics section can't use the government purchase credit card for common purchases because many of the purchase codes remain "locked."
1548-I-02	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	12/13/2004	The hasty hiring and training of community relations and disaster recovery center temporary disaster assistance employee (DAEs) created a number of problems, mentioned below.
1548-I-05	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	12/3/2005	Public assistance staff expressed concern about lack of guidance from FEMA headquarters concerning sheltering costs in parishes ineligible for public assistance. The current policy leads to differing interpretations.
1548-I-04	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]		Communications at several DRCs were inadequate to support access to NEMIS.
1548-I-03	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	12/13/2004	Numerous problems were encountered by individuals trying to use the "super credit card" to pay expenses for 90-day temporary DAEs.
1548-S-02	Hurricane Ivan	Smart Practice		Instead of conducting separate initial applicant briefings in each parish, the public assistance branch conducted one video teleconference for all of the eligible jurisdictions. This technique saved money, used fewer personnel, and got applicants earlier than the usual methods.
1548-S-04	Hurricane Ivan	Smart Practice		Individual assistance branch staff effectively shared administrative resources with other disaster field officer (DFOs). For example, the reports officer at the Mississippi DFO agreed to generate reports for both field offices until local employees could be hired and adequately trained.
1548-S-03	Hurricane Ivan	Smart Practice		FEMA representatives at the State emergency operations center (EOC) were able to participate in the State's twice-daily pre-landfall teleconferences with all of the involved parishes. Participation in the teleconferences between the State and its local governments served to brief and train emergency managers about proper financial documentation of disaster costs (shelters, debris removal etc.) and how to obtain the proper forms from FEMA's websites. In addition, the conference calls helped identify debris-removal staging and processing sites.
1548-S-01	Hurricane Ivan	Smart Practice		Weekly conference calls kept public assistance staff informed about public assistance policies throughout the multi-state disaster area.
1546-I-01	TS Frances	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Careful screening of Citizen Corps people should be accomplished to assure suitability and preparedness for a given assignment.
1546-I-02	TS Frances	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	There is a critical need for a large quantity of CR flyers to be readily available at the time of Declaration. A continued printing need also exists at the JFO level.
1546-I-04	TS Frances	Issue [Action]	1/20/2005	Inconsistencies in iPass configuration created difficulties and delays for both the training staff and field personnel.

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1546-L-01	TS Frances	Lesson Learned		Deployment of comptroller staff with super card along with new recruits, such as Citizen Corps reservists, allowed JFO staff the ability to keep doing their assigned job.
1546-I-06	TS Frances	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	The lack of appropriate and manageable fiscal support capability resulted in a significant decrease in administrative staff operations.
1546-I-05	TS Frances	Issue [Information]		For Public Affairs photographers, there are no provisions to protect their personal photographic equipment during disaster operations.
1546-I-03	TS Frances	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Better coordination and communication between Atlanta (or whatever originating point of deployment) and ultimate place of deployment for Citizen Corps staff would have resulted in increased efficiencies.
1548-L-02	Hurricane Ivan	Lesson Learned		DRCs need to have adequate access to internet-based NEMIS to provide services to customers.
1548-L-01	Hurricane Ivan	Lesson Learned		FEMA set up a link to a Florida website that provided information for individuals and businesses seeking to provide services to the disaster areas.
1539-I-91	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]		The lack of policies, plans and procedures addressing recruiting people in a surge situation negatively impacted operations.
1539-L-91	Hurricane Charley	Lesson Learned		Citizens Corps was able to quickly learn from the mistakes and difficulties during the first recruiting period (Charley) and make in-course corrections as they stood up to support the needs of Hurricane Frances.
1539-S-91	Hurricane Charley	Smart Practice		DHS/FEMA's use of Citizens Corps to recruit temporary disaster assistance employees proved very beneficial.
1539-I-92	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]		The lack of a MOU between Citizen Corps and FEMA identifying roles, requirements, policies and procedures prior to execution resulted in systemic inefficiencies that negatively impacted the operation.
1544-I-01	TD Gaston	Issue [Information]		FEMA uses two incompatible GIS software programs. The software programs FEMA uses are sometimes incompatible with the GIS software the state uses. This is particularly challenging for the Planning Section, which often has difficulty producing maps and graphic display products essential for decision-making and information sharing. Planning is frequently behind the curve in producing these documents during the critical initial response phase.
1544-I-04	TD Gaston	Issue [Information]		NEMIS letter is difficult to understand.
1544-I-06	TD Gaston	Issue [Information]		The length of time for a local hire to be converted to a DAE is too lengthy and needs to be expedited.
1544-L-01	TD Gaston	Lesson Learned		PA projects that come in late do not get sufficient FEMA support and often result in worsening relations between FEMA and applicants.
1544-S-03	TD Gaston	Smart Practice		Automatic Electronic Defibrillators (AEDs) were placed in DRCs. They should be quickly available at all DRCs along with trained staff.
1544-S-02	TD Gaston	Smart Practice		Set up of ONA telephone hotline worked exceptionally well.
1544-S-01	TD Gaston	Smart Practice		For this disaster, FEMA was able to quickly and efficiently get an 800 number established for affected people to call and request services from voluntary agencies.
1544-L-02	TD Gaston	Lesson Learned		Headquarters directed implementation of streamlining for ONA processing.

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1544-I-07	TD Gaston	Issue [Information]		While the JFO meets the minimum criteria for a safe and secure operation, it was only after additional monies and effort were expended to make it meet applicable standards.
1544-I-05	TD Gaston	Issue [Information]		There was a major interference to the FEMA Wireless Network from neighboring business-networking system. A message in a email from a JFO IT employee further defines the problem: "As you may recall, basically what's happening here is that we have several business neighbors who use wireless internet. Their systems are set to open broadcast and subsequently bleed over into our configuration profile. This causes the WOLF, TIGER, ELEPHANT, MONKEY etc. to be replaced with linksys? and of course prevents our users from connecting to the FEMA wireless VPN.?"
1544-I-03	TD Gaston	Issue [Information]		Local hires are brought in at a pay scale that is not matched for DAE conversion. This becomes a negative and a major impediment when attempting to recruit promising local hires into the DAE cadre.
1544-I-02	TD Gaston	Issue [Information]		Poor cadre planning The critical IA staffing in the 2004 hurricane season reflects poor long range planning, and failure to cross train staff.
1550-S-02	Hurricane Ivan	Smart Practice		The comptroller's staff at this disaster field office conducted informal training for disaster field office and disaster recovery center staff to inform them about new travel-related policies and procedures.
1550-S-01	Hurricane Ivan	Smart Practice		Early deployment (by mission assignment to the Corps of Engineers) of a Debris Planning and Response Team (Debris PRT) was crucial for the early stages of public assistance operations.
1550-I-08	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]		In the period immediately following a disaster, debris-removal contractors may persuade local governments to enter into disadvantageous clean-up contracts.
1550-I-07	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Some of the field office staff need to install special-purpose software for use on their FEMA-issued individual computers, for example: Streets and Trips, Street Atlas USA, and other inexpensive off-the-shelf proprietary software.
1550-I-06	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Two of the 30 new mobile disaster recovery center vehicles were assigned to disaster operations in Mississippi. The vehicles were not fully outfitted with communications equipment --- and not well-designed to support DRC operations.
1550-I-05	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]		The current centralized deployment system --- the Automated Deployment Database (ADD) --- occasionally did not work properly under the load generated by multiple disasters.
1550-I-04	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Two weeks into the recovery operation, FEMA Headquarters enlarged the "window" for 100% cost-share for public assistance (PA) categories A & B. Meanwhile, many applicants had already prepared project worksheets based on the original guidance.
1550-I-03	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	The temporary-DAE hiring project quickly recruited a large number of good potential disaster assistance employees, but hasty processing and deployment caused a number of new problems that took staff time away from their usual duties.

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1550-I-02	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The public assistance staff in both field offices need guidance from FEMA headquarters concerning costs incurred by counties/parishes ineligible for public assistance. The current published policy is not clear.
1550-I-01	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	FEMA's current system for ice and water procurement, transportation, and distribution is cumbersome, inefficient, and does not meet the needs of the victims.
1549-I-01	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	The fast hiring, processing, and deployment of large numbers of temporary-DAEs revealed a number of problems with the DAE program.
1549-I-03	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	In this event, the early set-up of disaster recovery centers (DRCs) may not have been of much value to victims. In the earliest days after a disaster, victims are temporarily focused more on immediate problems of food, water, electric power, phone service, and emergency repairs than they are in registering or asking questions about FEMA's assistance programs.
1549-I-02	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	12/13/2004	FEMA Headquarters often updates the many policies that apply to response and recovery operations, but there is no organized distribution or central point of access for policies and other internal management documents.
1549-I-04	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	12/13/2004	In a large-scale disaster, many joint field office functions rely on support from geographical information systems (GIS). A number of problems hinder FEMA's GIS systems.
1549-I-06	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	Pre-positioned disaster support (PPDS) containers placed with the states are too difficult to move, and require specialized equipment that is difficult to find during a large-scale disaster.
1549-I-08	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]		In regard to internal transportation support for the disaster field office, the roles, responsibilities, and delineations between the Logistics Section and ESF-1 (Transportation) are not clear.
1549-I-10	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	The External Affairs - Public Information Office needs modern equipment to support its operations.
1549-S-01	Hurricane Ivan	Smart Practice		Implementation of NIMS/ICS and associated planning processes were a priority in this disaster. To accomplish that objective, the field office staff made use of personnel with knowledge of both ICS and FEMA programs.
1549-I-09	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]		The current organizational placement of logistics as a component of the Response Directorate at FEMA Headquarters ultimately hinders effectiveness of the Logistics Section in the field.
1549-I-07	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Action]	11/30/2004	The Information Technology (IT) Branch in the disaster field office needs an efficient method to determine if FEMA network users are on the IPASS permission list. The current system is too time-consuming, and delays users' access and sometimes delays their deployment to the field.
1549-I-05	Hurricane Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	FEMA did not have adequate control of resources flowing through mobilization and staging areas.
1545-I-01	Hurricane Frances	Issue [Information]		Logistical support infrastructure was inadequate to support the large CR team.
1545-I-03	Hurricane Frances	Issue [Information]		Team were badly organized and poorly managed.
1545-I-02	Hurricane Frances	Issue [Information]		Poor training was provided for temporary CR staff in Frances.

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1545-I-04	Hurricane Frances	Issue [Information]		The public was given misinformation about FEMA reimbursement for generators.
1545-I-06	Hurricane Frances	Issue [Information]		Residents were provided travel trailers without addresses.
1545-S-01	Hurricane Frances	Smart Practice		A Sarasota County school superintendent was very proactive to provide school supplies to temporary students.
1545-L-01	Hurricane Frances	Lesson Learned		Using the "Go Where the People Are" approach, teams made more contacts at places of congregation, i.e. Wal-Mart & Home Depot, than by going door to door in areas where many residents were out of their homes.
1545-I-05	Hurricane Frances	Issue [Information]		CR staff experienced problems with teleregistration operators.
1536-I-01	Storms	Issue [Information]		The laptop computers that are used in the JFO are very slow and lock up. This slows work and reduces efficiency, having a cumulative effect over time.
1536-I-05	Storms	Issue [Information]		FEMA Headquarters required that Other Needs Assistance be determined with the "Auto Determination" feature on. This resulted in a significant number of determinations being returned to FEMA and the state for corrections. It produced additional work for the state and FEMA, and frustration for applicants.
1536-S-01	Storms	Smart Practice		When personnel leave the DRC to go home, they have to come through the JFO to check out. The DRC coordinator types up their last time sheet. This was becoming time consuming.
1536-S-03	Storms	Smart Practice		Having a recreational vehicle modified to operate as a MDRC is an excellent idea.
1536-S-02	Storms	Smart Practice		The IT team has been making Customer Service calls daily to the DRC's and Mobile units.
1536-I-06	Storms	Issue [Information]		A communication failure between the Regional Environmental Officer, or delegate, and the Disaster Field Office management resulted in identified environmental/historic preservation issues being acted upon prematurely and raised to an unnecessary level of concern.
1536-I-04	Storms	Issue [Information]		A teller registration question is obtuse. The operator asks, "Will you relocate?" Victims respond they will not relocate because they think they are being asked to move to a different location. The operator actually wants to know if they are willing to accept a travel trailer or a mobile home.
1536-I-02	Storms	Issue [Information]		DRC staffs are spending time counseling applicants on administrative requirements for having or not having flood insurance. This takes extra time on the part of the DRC staff and is often a frustrating way for applicants to learn how the process works.
1536-I-03	Storms	Issue [Information]		Housing ? Recommend changes in specifications of units being purchased to reduce on site maintenance and repair, which is a drain on the JFO staff, and frustrating for those affected by a disaster and in need of housing.
1539-I-01	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]	11/8/2005	Integration of ICS into FEMA operations was inconsistent and ineffective.
1539-I-06	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	The hasty hiring and processing of large numbers of temporary disaster assistance employees (DAEs) helped carry out certain community relations outreach objectives, but the project caused many administrative and logistical problems that offset much of its utility.

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1539-I-08	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	1/20/2005	Lack of pre-established mass evacuation and shelter-in-place plans for the DFO staff and other field facilities created confusion and detracted from operations.
1539-S-01	Hurricane Charley	Smart Practice		Local hires can be trained quickly to perform certain administrative tasks that DAEs usually perform, but PFT and DAE staff should be cross-trained to supervise and train local hires.
1539-L-04	Hurricane Charley	Lesson Learned		Local hires and DAEs should learn to use QuickTime.
1539-L-03	Hurricane Charley	Lesson Learned		Local hires can be trained quickly to perform certain administrative tasks that DAEs usually perform, but PFT and DAE staff should be cross-trained to supervise and train local hires.
1539-L-01	Hurricane Charley	Lesson Learned		Numerous video-teleconferences divert staff from their priority functions and detract from response operations.
1539-I-16	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	Transportation tasking was disorganized, confusing, and generally inefficient.
1539-I-15	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	USACE planning and response teams (PRT) -- ice, water, generators -- did not support regional operations.
1539-I-14	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]		The DoD approval process for Stafford Act response activities was cumbersome and inefficient.
1539-I-13	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/13/2004	Official requests for assistance require extensive training for those allowed to generate and approve.
1539-I-12	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]		The use of manual and "automated" time sheets for local hires and DAEs created overwhelming problems for administrative staff.
1539-I-11	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	Hastily opened Disaster Recovery Centers --- sometimes without electricity, communications, or sanitation facilities --- were reduced in effectiveness and presented an unfavorable image of FEMA to the public and the news media.
1539-I-10	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	There is still confusion about the roles of the Department of Health and Human Services and FEMA NDMS staff during disaster operations. Misunderstandings and disagreements about their roles delayed some disaster operations.
1539-I-09	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	Lack of a funding account for purchase of goods and services and complications in getting approval for such purchases slowed down operations at remote sites such as the Pasadena, California call-in center.
1539-I-07	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	Lack of coordination between ESF-2 and the DFO logistics section created confusion in the set-up of DFO communications and computer networks.
1539-I-05	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	The failure to deploy a "push-package" of materials needed to support operational staging areas delayed set-up of staging areas.
1539-I-02	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	The logistics and administrative staff were unable to keep track of the large amounts of commodities, supplies, teams, personnel, and other assets dispersed throughout the widespread disaster area.
1539-I-03	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	The operations and logistics sections are unable to effectively and efficiently track and manage assets while in transit and at staging areas.
1539-I-04	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/3/2004	A lack of communications and coordination between the Emergency Support Team (EST) in Washington, the Regional Operations Center (ROC) in Atlanta, and the Disaster Field Office (DFO) in Orlando sometimes resulted in duplication of mission assignments.

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1569-I-01	Thunderstorms	Issue [Action]	11/24/2004	Headquarters needs to provide additional guidance and examples concerning the ICS Forms 201, 202 and 203. These forms are now required for the submission of SITREPs.
1569-L-01	Thunderstorms	Lesson Learned		Computers in the DRCs were used for applicant registration. Training on the process was given to the DRC staff before they were deployed to the site, significantly improving registration time to the applicants.
1569-S-01	Thunderstorms	Smart Practice		Community Relations (CR) had fliers printed and ready to go prior to arrival of Staff.
1569-I-06	Thunderstorms	Issue [Information]		Project Officers should have the ability to produce or procure business cards for the disaster locally, in order to show a professional image.
1569-I-02	Thunderstorms	Issue [Information]		Public Assistance Programs needs a set of digital Flood Maps for field use.
1569-I-03	Thunderstorms	Issue [Action]	11/26/2004	Staffing requirement sheets were not submitted to Region V support staff.
1569-I-05	Thunderstorms	Issue [Information]		Why are we using wireless, when it is not really a time saving option, and wireless connections to the server are less reliable?
1569-I-04	Thunderstorms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Computers should come to the DFO with IPASS software already installed. IPASS accounts should stay with an individual, no matter where that person is assigned.
1554-I-01	TS Ivan	Issue [Information]	4/5/2006	The upgrade of FEMA laptops systems to Microsoft Windows XP and Microsoft Office 2003 caused compatibility problems with existing templates and forms, especially those used by Planning Sections. This was especially true of newly purchased laptops.
1554-I-06	TS Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	DHS policy regarding the issue of purchase credit cards severely stresses the operation of the DFO.
1554-I-07	TS Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Inequities exist involving IA declarations/designations of contiguous counties separated by a State line.
1554-I-05	TS Ivan	Issue [Information]		DHS-approved list of authorized application software is inadequate to support mission requirements.
1554-I-02	TS Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	The Incident Command System (ICS), as directed in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) manual, is not being fully implemented on natural disaster response and recovery operations.
1554-I-03	TS Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Lack of a Catastrophic Staffing Plan and the rapid, quick-fix, surge approach to the Community Relations (CR) staffing requirement for multiple hurricane disasters in the Southeastern United States caused a myriad of systemic problems throughout the FEMA community.
1554-I-04	TS Ivan	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) opened and closed too soon, causing problems with the provision of assistance to individuals and households.
1539-I-71	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]		The continuing rigid interpretation of "commuting area" as a strict linear distance limitation, rather than a proscriptive time/distance/access standard, inhibits management's ability to effectively employ some key, unique-skill staff during periods of intensive, mission-critical activity, and may put such employees at risk to their personal health and safety.

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1539-I-72	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	Existing procedures and policies for staff augmentation (either newly-hired or detailed from other existing sources) do not appear responsive to requirements of an accelerated, large scale work force expansion.
1539-I-74	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]	11/30/2004	There was consistent pattern of assigning responsibility to the Pasadena Call Center for accomplishing designated missions, without providing the concomitant authority to do so.
1539-S-71	Hurricane Charley	Smart Practice		The Call Center staff included some 116+ employees of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), mostly assigned to a regular IRS worksite in Fresno, California. The presence of these IRS employees required rapid development of several new, heretofore never required, support services, primarily lodging to worksite transportation.
1539-L-71	Hurricane Charley	Lesson Learned		The presence of key members of the Regional Senior Staff during initial establishment and operation of the Pasadena Call Center proved invaluable in establishing the fundamental course of future activities, and in rapidly resolving or mitigating difficult issues and problems.
1539-I-75	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Information]	12/3/2004	Termination procedures for some newly hired employees were apparently initiated by FEMA Headquarters Security staff, without sufficient coordination to preclude some of the affected employees learning of their impending termination before site-supervisory personnel were informed of the actions, and undertake their required local procedural actions.
1539-I-73	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/13/2004	The Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement (MOU/MOA) between FEMA and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assumes IRS support to FEMA will be provided from existing IRS sites, and proved unnecessarily restrictive, or silent on many issues arising from employment of IRS personnel at a FEMA site.
1552-I-01	TS Jeanne	Issue [Information]		During this disaster we encountered many incidents of fraud involving our Individual Assistance Inspectors. The fraud included some of the following: accepting bribes, doing the inspections from their homes or other locations, signing the forms 90-69 re US Citizenship, using DHS/FEMA seal for personal reasons, helping others to impersonate FEMA inspectors, etc.
1552-I-02	TS Jeanne	Issue [Information]		FEMA staff were insufficiently supplied with FEMA clothing. This resulted in confusion with the victims and created a poor corporate image.
1552-I-03	TS Jeanne	Issue [Information]		Streamlining Line Items and auto-determination process combined resulted in overpayments to applicants under ONA.
1539-I-61	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/6/2004	Current financial procedures and accounting systems preclude charging disaster related costs for personnel, equipment, etc to the specific disaster for which they are utilized. [NOTE: This issue resulted from the Under Secretary's Hotwash on December 2.]
1539-I-62	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/6/2004	Procedures for hiring, training, releasing and terminating 90-day Disaster Assistance Employees were either inadequate or not followed. Disaster personnel were terminated prior to coordination with all required FEMA organizations. [NOTE: This issue resulted from the Under Secretary's Hotwash on December 2. I is a compilation of issues originally identified during other field hotwashes.]

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1539-I-63	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/6/2004	There is neither written policy nor procedures to properly handle and disseminate predictive loss information produced by HAZUS during a national level emergency, such as from a hurricane approaching landfall. This includes respective roles and responsibilities for involved FEMA HQ and Regional staff as well as support contractors. [NOTE: This issue resulted from the Under Secretary's Hotwash on December 2.]
1539-I-64	Hurricane Charley	Issue [Action]	12/6/2004	NDMS hospital costs for disaster-related definitive patient care are not federally reimbursable [NOTE: This issue resulted from the Under Secretary's Hotwash on December 2.]
1556-I-01	TD Frances/Ivan	Issue [Action]	4/25/2005	Region V knows of no standard FEMA procedure to address a worker fatality.
1556-I-04	TD Frances/Ivan	Issue [Action]	4/25/2005	The Travel Trailer Program process needs to be updated to reflect lessons learned from the current disasters.
1556-L-01	TD Frances/Ivan	Lesson Learned		The DFO for 1556 was located in and transitioned from an existing DFO for a much smaller disaster (1519). This created several issues related to the difference in resources necessary to complete the mission.
1556-I-05	TD Frances/Ivan	Issue [Information]		The Travel Trailer Program process needs to be updated to reflect lessons learned from the current disasters.
1556-I-03	TD Frances/Ivan	Issue [Action]	4/20/2005	The RAMP program fails to effectively publicize remediated issues.
1556-I-02	TD Frances/Ivan	Issue [Information]		Headquarters use of ?Program Head? access rights in NEMIS significantly impacted the FCO's ability to manage the disaster.
1573-I-01	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/25/2005	Cell phones deployed to the JFO had not had PIN numbers cleared from users at previous disasters and needed to be reprogrammed for immediate use.
1573-I-03	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/25/2005	Housing inspectors do not provide, or are unable to provide, adequate information to define the jurisdictional locations of all inspected units.
1573-I-02	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/25/2005	Increasing use by headquarters? and regions? cadre managers of the ?pending? designation in ADD is causing problems securing staff to complete response missions.
1573-I-04	Indiana Storms	Issue [Action]	4/25/2005	The on-line Employee Suggestion Program is not functional for disaster staff.
1573-L-02	Indiana Storms	Lesson Learned		The use of ?Speedy Estimations? procedures by housing inspectors has resulted in the inability of some programs to deliver their program services.
1573-S-01	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		The Finance Section/Travel Unit developed a traveler data worksheet that quickly speeds up the ability of the Travel Manger to prepare vouchers.
1573-S-03	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		The emergency evacuation procedure for FEMA facilities for this disaster was revised to incorporate special language for evacuation procedures for persons with disabilities.
1573-S-02	Indiana Storms	Smart Practice		The Human Services section prepared a ?large print? copy of the Mold and Mildew: Cleaning Up Your Flood-Damaged Home brochure for distribution to older citizens.
1573-L-03	Indiana Storms	Lesson Learned		Careful timeline planning and early identification of DRC locations can avoid many operational conflicts.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1573-L-01	Indiana Storms	Lesson Learned		It is essential to properly plan and coordinate DRC set-up to the maximum extent possible, especially the installation of telephone lines, well in advance of the desired opening date.
1582-I-01	Tropical Cyclone Olaf	Issue [Action]	4/25/2005	Logistics management policies, especially covering transportation of material, should be reviewed and amended to insure resources intended for use as sets or kits are packaged, marked, stored, transported, issued, and recovered to maintain their functional integrity.
1582-I-02	Tropical Cyclone Olaf	Issue [Action]	4/25/2005	There was strong consensus the Emergency Response Team Advance elements (ERT-A) were frequently deployed to Pacific island disasters without adequate initial computing support. This was particularly noticeable in staff sections (I&P mentioned prominently) which are traditionally reliant on Stafford Act employees who do not have permanently assigned laptop computers (as opposed to PFT staff who usually bring their own dedicated computers). Even after receiving IT equipment from the DISC, considerable time is required to configure equipment and locate proper software and template information before staff can become productive. This initial deficit in capability and support resources is usually overcome as the disaster evolves, but the initial shortfalls tend to foster an atmosphere of perpetual "catch-up" adversely affecting the quality and effectiveness of initial operations.
1582-S-01	Tropical Cyclone Olaf	Smart Practice		The American Samoa Power Authority (ASPA) was able to rapidly provide federal disaster responders an accurate assessment of post-disaster emergency power requirements. This assessment greatly improved the ordering, transport, and employment of early, critical response power restoration assets, thereby, reducing the time required to re-establish the power grid. In addition, this process maximized cost effectiveness while ensuring appropriate power generating capability to address the needs of the island population.
1582-I-03	Tropical Cyclone Olaf	Issue [Action]	4/25/2005	Current logistics management policy prohibits direct coordination of Initial Response Resources (IRR) between the Pacific Area Office (PAO) and Logistic Center Hawaii (LCH). This prohibition appears to degrade overall mission responsiveness during early response operations when resource requirements and transportation capabilities fluctuate dramatically.
1575-I-01	Hawaii Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Staff continues to experience time consuming frustrations including loss of data when trying to use locally developed and distributed software applications. These difficulties appear to arise from the absence of awareness, and lack of knowledge and enforcement of appropriate, agency-wide, software management policies, procedures, and standards.
1575-L-01	Hawaii Storms	Lesson Learned		The Texas Medical Center Task Force Final Report, May 2002 (Final Report) published after Tropical Storm Allison (DR 1379, June 2001) proved an invaluable information and eligibility guidance resource for recovery efforts on the University of Hawaii campus in DR 1575.

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1583-I-01	Nevada Heavy Rains and Flooding	Issue [Action]	5/23/2005	Excessive delays between receipt of the Nevada Governor's request for a Presidential disaster declaration and its announcement (in this case 33 days) directly resulted in a number of adverse consequences affecting applicant eligibility for assistance, generated widespread media criticism, and called into public question the Federal government's disaster response competence.
1583-I-02	Nevada Heavy Rains and Flooding	Issue [Information]		Joint Field Office (JFO) staff reported a high incidence of respiratory illness, resulting in loss of staff productivity during the early phases of disaster operations. These illnesses were largely attributed to JFO environmental factors, such as insufficient fresh air circulation from the building Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system.
1583-I-03	Nevada Heavy Rains and Flooding	Issue [Information]		DR 1583 was declared for Public Assistance (PA) only. Therefore, traditional Individual Assistance (IA) staff elements, such as Community Outreach (CO) and Voluntary Agency Liaisons (VAL), were not initially assigned to the Joint Field Office (JFO). The FCO had requested staff with CO and VAL experience, but available staff with this type of experience were very limited at the time due to disaster activity elsewhere. Hot-wash participants felt that CO and VAL personnel could have provided technical assistance to local volunteer organizations. Volunteer organizations could have readily helped in confronting certain issues they were facing. The FCO's request was denied based on the fact that IA was not declared.
0002-I-01	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]		The change of location of the exercise site from Fort Monmouth to Jersey City less than ten days prior to the exercise caused real-world administrative problems for participants and their agencies.
0002-I-05	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	New Jersey emergency management staff had minimal role in this exercise.
0002-I-07	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]		ESF-8 / NDMS was understaffed during this exercise, partly due to differences between the level of play projected in the planning meetings and the level of play in the actual exercise.
0002-I-09	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Authorities and operations of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and FEMA's National Disaster Medical System are not clear.
0002-I-26	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]		It was impossible for ESF-8/NDMS to track requests for action that had been ordered from upper layers of the organization, especially when those actions changed often.
0002-I-25	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The procedures for closing ports and airports did not follow the Incident Command System (ICS).
0002-I-24	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The role of the regional resource coordination center (RRCC) was unclear.
0002-I-23	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The national resource coordination center (NRCC) tasked ESF-7 at the regional resource coordination center (RRCC) directly, without going through the RRCC operations section.
0002-I-22	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Tracking requests for assistance and mission assignments is slow and inefficient.

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0002-I-21	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	ESFs received many "action requests" and "taskings" that came through improper channels. Requests were often handled from the top down instead of from the bottom up.
0002-I-20	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The organization of the field office and the flow of documents did not follow the Incident Command System (ICS).
0002-I-19	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	In a disaster of the magnitude portrayed in this exercise, mental health subject matter experts should be present for early intervention and to promote education and self-care.
0002-I-18	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The role and capabilities of Veterinary Medical Assistance Team (VMAT) is not well-understand.
0002-I-17	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	There were no provisions for immunization or drug treatment for the families of federal emergency responders.
0002-I-16	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	There was no policy or determination of "essential" personnel who should receive priority prophylaxis to prevent impairment of federal response capability.
0002-I-15	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	While pesticides may have to be used to eradicate the rodents and fleas that spread plague, FEMA needs to be ready to inform the public about their use --- and their hazards.
0002-I-14	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The disease eradication plan failed, and in a real event, the disease probably would have soon got out of control.
0002-I-13	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Confusion and delays in verifying a mobilization site could have delayed deployment and operations of National Disaster Medical System teams (NDMS).
0002-I-12	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	At the beginning of the exercise, State officials at the New Jersey emergency management center (State EOC) were not familiar with the assets and capabilities of the National Disaster Medical System.
0002-I-11	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	It was not clear who "alerted" and "activated" National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) teams. That information did not reach ESF-8 staff after ESF-8 was activated.
0002-I-10	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The Department of Health and Human Service's Secretary's Emergency Response Team (SERT) began providing medical support to the State of New Jersey without coordinating with the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) or with the Emergency Response Team (ERT) deployed by the Department of Homeland Security.
0002-I-35	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	There were inconsistent and confusing instructions about how to use the FEMA network and how to get email.
0002-I-34	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	There was no immediately accessible information about the status of critical infrastructure, transportation, or the status of mission assignments at the joint field office (JFO).
0002-I-33	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	There was a general lack of communications between the joint field office (JFO), the regional resource coordination center (RRCC), and between participants at all levels.
0002-I-32	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Materials positioned at work stations for emergency support functions were out-of-date.

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0002-I-31	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	There was no situation room or other location for posting maps and other situational-awareness information.
0002-I-30	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Staff could not hear briefings conducted in the briefing room of the joint field office.
0002-I-29	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The role of the U.S. Forest Service in support of FEMA logistics and distribution of medical supplies is not clear --- and was not tested adequately in this exercise.
0002-I-28	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	A request for Citizen Corps volunteers to assist New Jersey at medical distribution "pods" was delayed because of slow processing of action request form (ARF).
0002-I-27	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Requests for services or support got lost. There was no organized system for processing requests for internal services or support.
0002-I-52	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]	4/5/2006	Citizen Corps needs a national deployment system as an option for deployment of Citizen Corps personnel.
0002-I-51	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]	6/9/2006	Single-person staffing at the regional resource coordination center (RRCC) and the joint field office (JFO) is insufficient in an event of this intensity.
0002-I-50	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Single-person staffing at the regional resource coordination center (RRCC) and the joint field office (JFO) is insufficient in an event of this intensity.
0002-I-49	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]		The State of New Jersey knew it was facing food shortages and the need for food and water at the medical distribution points (?pods?), but the State never requested any support services.
0002-I-48	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Regulatory restrictions do not allow activation of Small Business Administration programs under an declaration of emergency.
0002-I-47	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	There was confusion as to whether FEMA's Individual Housing Programs (IHP) and the Small Business Administrations loan programs can be implemented under a presidential declaration of emergency (as opposed to a declaration of major disaster).
0002-I-46	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Many families of deceased breadwinners and other disaster victims who have lost their jobs will face homelessness, foreclosure, and eviction as a result of income loss.
0002-I-45	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Federal medical experts were deployed, but there was no formal provision for keeping track of them so that they could be deployed when and where needed.
0002-I-44	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Federal subject-matter experts serving as medical advisors at the State emergency operations center (State EOC) did not have any official means with which to communicate with their counterparts in the joint field office.
0002-L-01	TOPOFF 3	Lesson Learned		Subject Matter Experts (SME) were dispatched to the State emergency operations center to provide experience and knowledge regarding public health. Public health SMEs need to be recognized as a valuable asset in the response to a biological emergency, and should be included in the planning for future events.
0002-I-59	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The Human Services Branch Chief had no coordination with Office of Victims Compensation at headquarters level or Office of Victims Assistance in Connecticut to activate IA programs such as crisis counseling and Disaster Unemployment Assistance.

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0002-I-58	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Briefings, reports, and documentation used acronyms and abbreviations not widely understood.
0002-I-57	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The reporting chain under the National Response Plan is not well-understood, and FEMA's training courses are not teaching the correct procedures.
0002-I-56	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	It was unclear which situation report form to use at the JFO.
0002-I-55	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	It was difficult to develop a public affairs strategy due to lack of guidance from the joint field office and no information about strategic goals and priorities.
0002-I-54	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Account Activity Codes must be registered with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to make sure medical materials managed by DLS are accessible when needed for emergencies.
0002-I-53	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]	4/5/2006	Citizen Corps representatives at the regional resource coordination center and in the joint field office (JFO) asked for, but never received, goals and directions from Citizen Corps Headquarters.
0002-I-43	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Joint Information Center did not operate so as to support the whole response organization. .
0002-I-42	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The exercise scenario involved plague, but the Worker Safety and Health Annex was not activated and OSHA staff received no mission assignments.
0002-I-41	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]		American Red Cross plans and staff were not well-prepared for the scenario presented in this exercise.
0002-I-40	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The national law enforcement network does not have a national mutual aid mobilization plan.
0002-I-39	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Current action request forms (ARFs) and mission-assignment processing procedures are not designed to process or track direct taskings and reimbursements for direct taskings.
0002-I-38	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Department of Justice did not have anyone present to work with ESF-13 in the regional resource coordination center (RRCC) or in the joint field office (JFO). Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security need to assign and train lead agencies to deal with law enforcement issues.
0002-I-37	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]		The joint field office had no provisions for security of law-enforcement-sensitive information.
0002-I-36	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]		Small Business Administration (and other players) were unable to access the email system at the joint field office (JFO).
0002-I-08	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	FEMA and DHS should review the role and functions of the Principal Federal Official (PFO).
0002-I-06	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]		Testing of the National Response Plan should be considered unsuccessful.
0002-I-04	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Information]		The exercise scenario did not adequately test the role of voluntary agencies.
0002-I-02	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	The exercise did not have enough injects or mission assignments some ESFs. In general, there was not enough activities to occupy the night shift.
0002-I-03	TOPOFF 3	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	The exercise did not provide an adequate test of American Red Cross capabilities.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1581-I-01	Arizona Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Current FEMA policies and procedures (and possibly some general Federal regulatory and statutory requirements) regarding disaster preparedness and assistance for Native American Tribes appeared to be inapplicable, inappropriate, unrealistic, or simply silent, regarding some situations arising during Arizona disaster response/recovery operations (and encountered anecdotally elsewhere by several experienced staff members). Therefore, FEMA should undertake a comprehensive review of existing Tribal policies, with revision as appropriate, to insure the consistent, and equitable delivery of preparedness, response, and recovery services to Tribal applicants.
1581-I-06	Arizona Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	The May 1, 2005 deadline for compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Assistance Act of 2000 (DMA2K) eligibility requirements has highlighted a continuing ambiguity (or anomaly) which appears related to the Stafford Act definition affecting Tribal disaster eligibility. FEMA's Tribal policy review efforts should seek resolution of this issue. Resolution may require legislative action, and in specific regard to DMA2K, may require development of policies to enhance Tribal ability to comply with the planning requirement.
1581-S-01	Arizona Severe Storm	Smart Practice		The early deployment of Joseph Hesbrook, Senior Tribal Liaison from Inter-Governmental Affairs, proved invaluable for Native American Tribal operations.
1581-I-07	Arizona Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Disaster assistance program delivery for Tribal applicants could be improved by enhanced technical and cultural understanding on the part of Federal, State, and local disaster staff, as well as Tribal manager and emergency recovery applicants. FEMA should review existing policies with the objective of developing and delivering improved training for both groups, and enhance the current personnel management system (ADD) to assure assignment of appropriately qualified staff to Tribal disaster operations.
1581-I-05	Arizona Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The Navajo Nation has contiguous Tribal lands in the States of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah (FEMA Regions IX, VI, and VIII) with the tribal leadership and organizational Headquarters in Arizona. During an initial planning conference call of the involved Regions, the FCO for this disaster (1581) recommended without objection that for consistency, the FEMA lead for all Tribal assistance policy reside in Arizona because of the location of the Tribal leadership and Headquarters.
1581-I-02	Arizona Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Develop studies or training of the major Native American Tribal populations to increase the understanding response personnel will have for their culture, etc.
1581-I-03	Arizona Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	On her own initiative, the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) attempted to organize the Joint Field Office (JFO) on the Incident Command System (ICS) model of the newly promulgated National Response Plan (NRP). The effort was undertaken primarily for its learning value, and had no adverse impact on JFO operations. The attempt demonstrated that the current ADD database (job titles, performance elements, and performance measures) has little, if any, direct correlation to the requirements of an ICS staff structure.

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1581-I-04	Arizona Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Staff members attempting to locate needed FEMA reference material (known to be available) from the FEMA web site library were routinely frustrated by absence of an intuitively obvious, user friendly, rapidly responsive, search and retrieval mechanism. As a result, staff response to client inquiries was occasionally slow and incomplete. This issue was raised initially by Mitigation staff, but during discussion, virtually all participants expressed varying degrees of dissatisfaction or frustration with the reference library search mechanism. There was near-unanimous agreement that the current library search and retrieval mechanism is inadequate. The library indexing, search, and retrieval system should be reevaluated and improved to provide rapid and user-friendly access.
1587-I-01	Pennsylvania Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Canned letters for Disaster Unemployment and Disaster Legal Services are outdated.
1587-S-01	Pennsylvania Severe Storm	Smart Practice		Phone banks in the JFO were staffed by NFIP insurance specialist.
1587-S-02	Pennsylvania Severe Storm	Smart Practice		Use of the Blast FAX Distribution System for in-house distribution of releases to the print and broadcast media is very efficient.
1577-I-01	California Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	A continuous, comprehensive, feedback-driven, policy review and remediation process for managing agency Information Technology (IT) operations could help minimize IT support shortfalls experienced during DR-1577.
1577-I-06	California Storms	Issue [Information]	3/30/2006	Information Technology (IT) security and data protection (backup) policies and procedures should be reviewed and revised as appropriate to prevent major data loss and subsequent downtime which ultimately negatively impacts productivity and mission accomplishment. During this event such an incident occurred as a result of an apparent inadvertent deletion of a major Public Assistance database.
1577-I-08	California Storms	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA disaster field workers, Disaster Assistance Employees (DAE), local hires, and Technical Assistance Contractors (TAC) make frequent contact with the public and need to provide contact information for follow up communication with members of the public. Department of Homeland Security policies evidently preclude procuring standard business cards for many of these employees. An unofficial, disaster-specific, write-in-your-name, "Information Card" was produced locally as an expedient solution.
1577-I-10	California Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The FEMA policy of issuing separate, individual disaster declarations for similar events occurring in the same jurisdiction within close time proximity, rather than administratively extending an existing declaration to cover new damage, can cause a significant burden to local public entities and individual homeowners. This policy should be reviewed with the goal of minimizing these negative impacts.
9999-I-01	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	12/29/2005	Test Issue
9999-S-01	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		Test Smart Practice

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
9999-L-01	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		Test Lessons Learned
9999-I-02	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/19/2006	Training in Texas
9999-I-03	RAMP Application Training	Issue		
1577-I-11	California Storms	Issue		
9999-I-04	RAMP Application Training	Issue		
9999-I-05	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	The Corps of Engineers insists on shredding debris, even when there is plenty of dump space.
9999-I-06	RAMP Application Training	Issue		Blah
9999-I-07	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
9999-L-02	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		The ERT was able to determine how to activate voice mail and caller ID on their DISC-provided cell phones to ensure they were able to provide the maximum customer service.
9999-I-08	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Program policy decisions made in response to specific situations are not consistently codified and disseminated.
9999-S-02	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		The DFO staff purchased memory sticks to provide a compact and efficient means of transporting files between disasters allowing them to retain files, such as examples of reports, etc.
9999-L-03	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		The ERT was able to determine how to activate voice mail and caller ID on their DISC-provided cell phones to ensure they were able to provide the maximum customer service.
9999-I-09	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Program policy decisions made in response to specific situations are not consistently codified and disseminated.
9999-I-10	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.

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9999-I-11	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) for this disaster has the authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, since housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), which is a State matched program, payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed. This has resulted in applicants not being paid on a timely basis.
9999-I-12	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Program policy decisions made in response to specific situations are not consistently codified and disseminated.
9999-I-13	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Program policy decisions made in response to specific situations are not consistently codified and disseminated.
9999-S-03	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		The ERT was able to quickly set up a DFO and easily meet the 3-day goal because the local GSA support team worked a lease for a building that already had furniture, a hard-wired telephone and computer network and sufficient square footage.
9999-I-14	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
9999-S-04	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		The ERT was able to quickly set up a DFO and easily meet the 3-day goal because the local GSA support team worked a lease for a building that already had furniture, a hard-wired telephone and computer network and sufficient square footage.
9999-I-15	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	The ERT was able to quickly set up a DFO and easily meet the 3-day goal because the local GSA support team worked a lease for a building that already had furniture, a hard-wired telephone and computer network and sufficient square footage.
9999-L-04	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		Turn-key ERTs require a current in-brief that provides up-to-date information concerning the state being supported.
9999-L-05	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
9999-I-16	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/19/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
9999-I-17	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
9999-S-05	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		The ERT was able to quickly set up a DFO and easily meet the 3-day goal because the local GSA support team worked a lease for a building that already had furniture, a hard-wired telephone and computer network and sufficient square footage
9999-S-06	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		The ERT was able to determine how to activate voice mail and caller ID on their DISC-provided cell phones to team members in order to ensure they were able to provide the maximum customer service.
9999-L-06	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		Turn-key ERTs require a current in-brief that provides up-to-date information concerning the state being supported.
9999-S-07	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		The DFO staff purchased memory sticks to provide a compact and efficient means of transporting files between disasters allowing them to retain files, such as examples of reports, etc.
9999-L-07	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		Turn-key ERTs require a current in-brief that provides up-to-date information concerning the state being supported.
9999-L-08	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		The ERT was able to determine how to activate voice mail and caller ID on their DISC-provided cell phones to ensure they were able to provide the maximum customer service.
9999-L-09	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		Turn-key ERTs require a current in-brief that provides up-to-date information concerning the state being supported.
9999-I-18	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Program policy decisions made in response to specific situations are not consistently codified and disseminated.
9999-I-19	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/19/2006	Is this supposed to be the space for entering a short title for the issue, or is this space intended for an introductory description of the issue --- longer than a short title.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
9999-I-20	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
9999-I-21	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	1/27/2006	Program policy decisions made in response to specific situations are not consistently codified and disseminated.
9999-L-10	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		Turn-key ERTs require a current in-brief that provides up-to-date information concerning the state being supported.
9999-S-08	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		The ERT was able to quickly set up a DFO and easily meet the 3-day goal because the local GSA support team worked a lease for a building that already had furniture, a hard-wired telephone and computer network and sufficient square footage.
9999-I-22	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
9999-I-23	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	2/8/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
9999-I-24	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
9999-S-09	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		The ERT was able to quickly set up a DFO and easily meet the 3-day goal because the local GSA support team worked a lease for a building that already had furniture, a hard-wired telephone and computer network and sufficient square footage.
9999-S-10	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		Turn-key ERTs require a current in-brief that provides up-to-date information concerning the state being supported.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
9999-L-11	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		The ERT was able to determine how to activate voice mail and caller ID on their DISC-provided cell phones to ensure they were able to provide the maximum customer service.
9999-S-11	RAMP Application Training	Smart Practice		The ERT was able to quickly set up a DFO and easily meet the 3-day goal because the local GSA support team worked a lease for a building that already had furniture, a hard-wired telephone and computer network and sufficient square footage.
9999-L-12	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		Turn-key ERTs require a current in-brief that provides up-to-date information concerning the state being supported.
9999-L-13	RAMP Application Training	Lesson Learned		Turn-key ERTs require a current in-brief that provides up-to-date information concerning the state being supported.
3215-I-01	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Shortage of staff seriously affected administration of emergency shelter operations in Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.
3215-I-02	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Federal annuitants could relieve some personnel shortages, but they cannot be paid under an emergency declaration.
3215-I-03	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Agencies do not share information that would be helpful to fellow agencies engaged in providing individual assistance to applicants.
3215-I-04	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Some states providing support to Louisiana under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact may have over-extended the use of their own resources.
3215-I-05	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Community relations and firefighter teams were often improperly or inefficiently used in the field.
3215-I-06	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Applicants receive poorly written letters of explanation after they have received (and perhaps spent) money from FEMA individual assistance program.
3215-I-07	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	FEMA's expedited assistance program generated unwarranted expectations on the part of some recipients.
3215-I-08	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA's web-based registration program caused many duplications and delays in processing of individual assistance applications.
3215-I-09	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Policies, guidelines, and deadlines changed so fast that field staff had difficulty keeping up with them.
3215-I-10	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Use of public assistance funding for support of emergency sheltering is unfamiliar and unclear to public assistance personnel.
3215-I-11	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Slow processing of claims for Workman's Compensation caused some employees extra costs and loss of work-time.
3215-I-12	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The Automated Deployment Database (ADD) does not work as intended and creates inefficiencies in personnel processing.
3215-I-13	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Liaison officers need training.
3215-I-14	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	ERT-A arrived without adequate supply of cell-phones, computers, and other communications equipment.
3215-I-15	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	The evacuation, movement, and reception of evacuees was chaotic.

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3215-I-16	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The shift of the Regional Resource Coordination Center functions to the Austin Joint Field Office left states without their familiar and customary contacts at Denton.
3215-I-17	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Small field teams working at the Oklahoma City and Santa Fe "branch" field offices did not have communications equipment or credit cards needed for their work.
3215-I-18	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	FEMA email system is inadequate --- too difficult to set up, too slow, and too restrictive --- for use in the field.
3215-I-19	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	States had no plans for reception of evacuees and no accurate assessment of shelter space.
3215-I-20	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	FEMA lacks equipment to support Geographic Information Systems.
3215-I-21	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue		Please ignore and delete this item, and go to the next .
3215-I-22	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	DHS routinely called for twice-daily reports --- which duplicated efforts of the RRCC.
3215-I-23	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Information]		DHS and FEMA apparently have focused on the potential effects of terrorism --- when catastrophes could have similar or worse effects.
3215-I-24	Hurricane Katrina Evacuation	Issue [Action]	7/10/2006	FEMA ICS training is currently inadequate
1623-I-01	Severe Winter Storm	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	The Request for Public Assistance (RPA) Form 90-49 does not include a space for the grantee's federal tax ID number.
1623-I-02	Severe Winter Storm	Issue [Information]	4/14/2006	The declaration document for FEMA-1623-DR-OK and its amendments caused confusion, created additional manpower requirements, and contradicted what the state was trying to accomplish.
1623-I-03	Severe Winter Storm	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	The hiring process for firing locally based employees (?local-hires?) takes too long.
1623-I-04	Severe Winter Storm	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	Network connectivity for field staff created numerous burdens on Information Technology staff
1620-I-01	Severe Winter Storm	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The Territorial Logistics Center did not have sufficient stock of winter parkas to support the number of JFOs presently operating in the northern United States. DR 1620 SD Senior Staff submitted a request for winter jackets or parkas for personnel operating in a winter environment but the Logistics Center did not have a sufficient number.
1620-I-02	Severe Winter Storm	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA does not have a consistent policy covering several Cellular Telephone management issues, and this results in confusion, frustration, and delays in service for field workers.
1620-S-01	Severe Winter Storm	Smart Practice		The ability to maintain coordination/continuity with other Joint Field Offices (JFOs).
3223-I-01	Hurricane Katrina Housing	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Most Federal grants do not provide provisions for state personnel being paid by the grant to work on emergency or major disaster declarations.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
3224-I-01	Hurricane Katrina Housing	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	Some Federal Departments and Agencies did not fulfill their responsibilities, as outlined in the National Response Plan (NRP). The Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) under Section 5 (pg 10) Federal Execution Strategy, states: "All Federal Departments and Agencies (and other NRP signatories) identified to initiate specific actions in the Execution Schedule will implement those assigned actions within the directed timeframes." Once the initial response phase was completed, some agencies returned to their regular non-disaster functions without considering the continuing needs and impacts on the evacuees and the Host States.
3224-I-02	Hurricane Katrina Housing	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	States need access to the same NEMIS information on Public Assistance support for evacuees that they have for Individual Assistance/Other Needs Assistance.
3224-I-03	Hurricane Katrina Housing	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	FEMA did not provide the host states with clear, consistent policy guidance.
1621-S-01	Sever Winter Storm	Smart Practice		State management of the Public Assistance Program on small disasters in North Dakota has resulted in the provision of timely and reasonable financial assistance for victims.
3223-I-02	Hurricane Katrina Housing	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	During catastrophic disaster situations when victims are evacuated to other states, the Public Assistance program under the emergency declaration does not reimburse host states for basic labor costs (regular time salaries) for employees who are taken away from their normal duties to provide services for evacuees from the impacted states.
3223-I-03	Hurricane Katrina Housing	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	States have incurred un-reimbursable costs for special needs sheltering such as medical care and social services programs after the Federal congregate sheltering period ended.
3224-I-04	Hurricane Katrina Housing	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	FEMA HQ implemented the housing transition from 403 (Public Assistance Program) to Individual Assistance before a strategy was developed to deal with the complex and significant issues this program change would create for the states, landlords and evacuees.
3223-I-04	Hurricane Katrina Housing	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	Many individuals were involuntarily evacuated to the host state and will require assistance to return to their home state or another suitable location to start their lives over. There is currently no FEMA transportation program to fund or reimburse the states or evacuees for travel costs.
3223-L-01	Hurricane Katrina Housing	Lesson Learned		All FEMA disaster programs need to incorporate incentives for victims to recover from disasters and quickly become independent from Federal assistance.
1603-I-01	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Information]	4/14/2006	The Federal Coordinating Officer has coordinating authority but little command capability. COMMAND STAFF
1603-I-02	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	Decision-making was not pushed down to the lowest level in keeping with the principles of the incident command system.
1603-I-03	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	FEMA needs reliable communications hardware, communications protocols, and backup communications.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1603-I-04	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	FEMA's plans for pre-positioning supplies, personnel, and equipment --- especially expensive transportation assets --- is not clear.
1603-I-05	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	FEMA Headquarters is not responsive to the RAMP program.
1603-I-06	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	There was no clear chain of command during response operations.
1603-I-07	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	FEMA needs to set firm personnel rotation policies --- for FEMA and all other federal staff.
1603-I-08	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	Volunteer organizations requiring logistical and financial support put administrative and financial burdens on FEMA.
1603-I-09	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	FEMA lacks means of communicating and putting out facts directly with the public.
1603-I-10	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	The DAE cadre system and the ADD system failed, leaving the operations section with critical staff shortfalls.
1603-I-11	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	FEMA's lack of a tracking system for mission assignments hinders oversight of federal agency activity
1603-I-12	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/14/2006	Public assistance branch reviews sometimes delayed procurements paid for with public assistance funds.
1603-I-13	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Too many elements of the emergency organization issued confusing or overlapping mission assignments.
1603-I-39	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA's program to provide emergency financial assistance created some new problems and needs study.
1603-I-40	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Public affairs responded to media stimulation, but did not get FEMA's message out.
1603-I-41	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Information]	6/9/2006	FEMA should be able to evaluate state plans as to whether they address emergency operations.
1603-I-42	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	All deployed teams should be self-sufficient for two weeks.
1603-I-43	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The urgency of the situation caused FEMA Logistics to negotiate and award large contracts that were hastily drawn-up and not well thought-out.
1603-I-44	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Improperly coordinated and documented acquisitions created unnecessary and time-consuming problems for logistics staff and contract officers at the JFO.
1603-I-45	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The current requisition system does not work for large-scale disasters.
1603-I-46	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The Total Asset Visibility system still does not provide accurate information about the type and location of commodities.
1603-I-47	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA has no system for tracking requisitions for commodities.
1603-I-48	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Fear of breaking the rules may inhibit field staff from making life-saving decisions.
1603-I-49	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA needs mass-feeding plans and alternate sources for ready-to-eat meals so that disaster or terrorist events do not deplete the military's MRE supply.
1603-I-50	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	A shortage of trained logistics staff severely degraded logistics support for Hurricane Katrina response operations.
1603-I-51	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	A shortage of COTRs left FEMA without means to oversee the operations of some contractors.
1603-I-52	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The current geospatial intelligence unit should serve as the nucleus of a Joint Geospatial Information Unit in future JFOs.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1603-I-53	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The supply of trained FEMA GIS staff has not keep up with the ever-growing demand for GIS products and services.
1603-I-54	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	A complicated procurement system for GIS equipment and supplies caused delays and loss of responsiveness for the geospatial intelligence unit (GIU).
1603-I-55	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA's computer systems have not kept up with the increased demand for GIS support.
1603-I-56	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA's remote sensing guidance is out-of-date to the point that we are operating with no guidance.
9998-I-01	Katrina Hurricane	Issue [Action]		Enrolling for disaster assistance is too complicated and requires too many separate actions for disaster victims.
9998-I-02	Katrina Hurricane	Issue [Action]		Federal, State and local plans for sheltering and housing victims of Hurricane Katrina were inadequate.
9998-I-03	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		In terms of the management of the Federal response to Katrina, our architecture of command and control mechanisms as well as our existing structure of plans did not serve us well.
9998-I-04	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Senior Federal government officials could not get an accurate flow of timely information that would support effective decision making during Hurricane Katrina.
9998-I-05	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Reports from Hurricane Katrina were disjointed, used different frames of reference, and sometimes contained contradictory information.
9998-I-06	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		The existing planning and operational structure for delivering critical resources and humanitarian aid was inadequate to the challenges presented by Hurricane Katrina.
9998-I-07	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		There were not enough trained personnel readily available at the Federal, State, and local level to meet the disaster relief needs of Hurricane Katrina.
9998-I-08	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Contracts for major disaster relief support activities and commodities should be in place before the disaster rather than developed after the disaster.
9998-I-09	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Federal assistance for States is too slow in arriving to help them prepare for impending disasters, even if they have advance warning.
9998-I-10	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		The PFO lacked adequate authority to coordinate Federal efforts to respond to a catastrophic incident like Hurricane Katrina that impacted a multi-state area and encompassed numerous disaster declarations with multiple JFO's.
9998-I-11	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		The NRP and NIMS did not function as smoothly as desired during the response to Hurricane Katrina.
9998-I-12	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		The NRP does not adequately anticipate that the Federal government may need to temporarily assume some inherently State and local responsibilities and augment State and local incident command staff during a catastrophic incident.
9998-I-13	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		The Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and Support Annexes to the NRP did not have sufficiently developed standard operating procedures and notification protocols to support effective response and recovery operations.
9998-I-14	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Federal agencies involved in responding to Hurricane Katrina did not have adequate resources or familiarity with their responsibilities under the NRP to be fully effective.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
9998-I-15	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Federal departments and agencies that are not normally involved in disaster response activities were not adequately prepared to support Hurricane Katrina response activities.
9998-I-16	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		The pre-positioning of supplies for Hurricane Katrina was not adequately planned and executed so needed assets were not in place in a timely manner.
9998-I-17	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR C10 The disaster assistance registration system was not capable of handling the large numbers of registrations needed under Hurricane Katrina in a timely manner, thereby resulting in disaster victims having to make contact on numerous occasions and spend considerable time in order to register. There also were insufficient safeguards against fraud, resulting in numerous people receiving assistance who were not entitled to it.
9998-I-18	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR C7 The Emergency Alert System does not currently take advantage of all available technological advances to improve its functionality for issuing alerts and warnings.
9998-I-19	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR C3 Communications with the Hurricane Katrina impact area were disrupted for an extended period and it took too long to establish an effective communications structure to provide timely and accurate situational awareness information for senior government officials.
9998-I-20	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR C2 It took too long to establish and implement JFOs in response to Hurricane Katrina, thereby hampering early response and recovery efforts.
9998-I-21	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR C1 During Hurricane Katrina, senior Federal, State and local disaster response leadership were not co-located resulting in less than optimal use of available resources
9998-I-22	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR 77 The nation's alert and warning systems are not adequately robust and don't take advantage of available technological advances to improve the breadth and depth of alert and warning dissemination.
9998-I-23	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR 39 The mission assignment process during Hurricane Katrina was too cumbersome and inefficient, both for the tasking and execution of assignments.
9998-I-24	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR 38 The Hurricane Katrina response effort was hampered by procurement and logistics systems that were not sufficient to ensure the timely delivery of the appropriate resources where needed.
9998-I-25	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR 37 The Federal government lacks adequate deployable communications capability to quickly gain and retain situational awareness when responding to catastrophic incidents.
9998-I-26	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR 33 Communications between all levels of government were not effectively integrated for response to Hurricane Katrina.
9998-I-27	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR 22 The NRP does not adequately address how the DOD might temporarily assume the lead for Federal response to a catastrophic incident of an extraordinary nature.

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9998-I-28	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR 7 Establishment of JFOs in the Katrina response took too long.
9998-I-29	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR 4 The Department of Homeland Security lacks regional office structures to support its preparedness efforts with State and local governments.
9998-I-30	Katrina Hurricane	Issue		Issue: HSC KAAR C11 State evacuation plans are not reviewed as robustly as is needed and do not adequately incorporate Continuity of Government planning.
9999-I-25	RAMP Application Training	Issue		This is an apostrophe' This is Jeff's this is a text version ' ok
1624-I-01	Extreme Wildfire Threat	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA policy was not clear about eligible costs under Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAGs) versus eligible costs under FEMA's public assistance program.
1624-I-02	Extreme Wildfire Threat	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Several abrupt changes in FEMA policy guidance regarding public assistance for fires created confusion and frustration for applicants, and damages FEMA's credibility.
1624-I-03	Extreme Wildfire Threat	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The application of an 8-hour "deduction" for labor and equipment costs under mutual aid agreements created an unreasonable administrative burden.
1624-I-04	Extreme Wildfire Threat	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Because of the lack of a process of inputting information for the tracking system for joint field office staff, the administrative section was unable to give the FCO an accurate count of all staff stationed in the JFO and outlying operations centers.
1624-S-01	Extreme Wildfire Threat	Smart Practice		Texas public assistance staff simplified processing of fire management assistance by allowing county governments to apply for assistance on behalf of all responding agencies in the county.
1628-I-01	Severe Storms, Flooding, Mudslides, and Landslides	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel security screening process hinders the timely and responsive recruitment and employment of disaster response staff for what is generally short term, temporary positions.
1606-I-01	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	The many requests for up-to-the-minute information about commodities interfered with operations.
1606-I-02	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	Tracking and accounting for commodities is still not adequate and continues to cause numerous problems and inefficiencies that interfere with operations.
1606-I-03	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	FEMA furnished leased load-handling equipment for use by other organizations and agencies, but those agencies often failed to account for them properly.
1606-I-04	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	FEMA furnished satellite telephones to various non-FEMA field teams, but the recipients failed to return the telephones to FEMA.
1606-I-05	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	Some mobile disaster recovery center (MDRC) vehicles were sent out with insufficient supplies and equipment.
1606-I-06	Hurricane Rita	Issue		Delete me, please.
1606-I-07	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	FEMA tasked several agencies to set up FEMA operations sites. FEMA later had to reconstruct records to account for and track purchases made by those agencies.
1606-I-08	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	FEMA still does not have an adequate agency-wide system for tracking people, commodities, equipment, and services.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1606-I-09	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	Some forward elements of the response organization committed FEMA to purchase goods or services without going through proper channels.
1606-I-10	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	Because state and local governments had not identified or planned for potential points of distribution of commodities (PODs), FEMA had difficulty determining the best place to locate federal operations staging areas (FOSAs) that supply the PODs.
1606-I-11	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	7/10/2006	Most points of distribution (PODs --- for distribution of commodities) did not have refrigeration. To keep ice from melting, FEMA had to provide expensive power and fuel to maintain refrigeration for several days per truck.
1606-I-12	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	FEMA officials in Washington retain signature authority for many emergency functions, but they are often not in their offices and not otherwise available during emergency operations.
1606-I-13	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	After the first thirty days of emergency operations, FEMA requires the logistics section to make all purchases through the Defense Department's E-Mall catalog. DoD's E-Mall is inefficient and slow, and increases costs.
1606-I-14	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	DHS-FEMA rules require FEMA to use the Government Printing Office for all print jobs. This practice delays print jobs and increases costs.
1636-I-01	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	The Automated Deployment Database System (ADDS) does not work as intended.
1636-I-02	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	Supervisors are responsible for assigning NEMIS rights to their staff, yet most supervisors depend of the Information Technology Branch to assign rights.
1636-I-03	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	When some employees transferred from other JFOs to the Little Rock JFO, they brought with them equipment they had checked out at the first JFO.
1636-I-04	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	Some JFO staff used expensive broadband wireless internet access in the JFO --- where a FEMA network was available.
1636-I-05	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	A shortage of public assistance staff could delay processing of applicant projects.
1636-I-06	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	7/6/2006	A three-week delay in deploying an environmental officer slowed recovery efforts which relied on analysis of disaster effects on the environment, historic sites, and tribal interests.
1636-I-07	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	The manufactured housing staging area at Hope, Arkansas operated independently of the Manufactured Housing Office in the Joint Field Office.
1636-I-08	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	The State of Arkansas did not have enough trained staff to carry out its role in processing "Other Needs Assistance" (ONA) programs.
1636-I-09	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	The auto-fill feature of the NPSC registration process sometimes entered the wrong date of occurrence.
1636-I-10	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	The NPSC sometimes misidentified documents placed into applicant files --- which caused delays in processing applications for mobile homes.
1636-I-11	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	6/29/2006	The two mobile disaster recovery centers used in this disaster lacked certain supplies and equipment necessary to support and improve MDRC operations in the field.

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1636-S-01	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		The GIS branch linked its standard map products to up-to-date geo-coded information in a FEMA data-warehouse updated regularly by the National Processing and Service Center.
1636-S-02	Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		The JFO Logistics Section furnished to each incoming office worker at the JFO a standard kit of office supplies that saved employees time and enabled them to start working without delay.
1635-I-01	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	The JFO staff continues to experience significant delays in processing changes to the applicant's situation to the end of applying the proper P-code.
1635-I-02	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	Lack of IA temporary housing expertise on site resulted in many questions on this program from applicants and others going unanswered.
1635-I-03	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	The lack of people with direct housing operations experience and training significantly hampered the ability to deliver housing to disaster victims in a timely manner.
1635-I-04	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	The lack of clearly defined reporting and coordination requirements between the JFO and the FEMA HQ Emergency Housing Unit (EHU) negatively impacted unity of command.
1635-I-05	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	An early and clear understanding of the role/responsibilities of each entity (JFO, EHU, USACE, contractors, etc.) in the direct housing process and their position in the chain-of-command was lacking.
1631-I-01	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	Disaster Recovery Centers are not fully accessible to the disabled population.
1631-I-02	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Information]		There are insufficient CR printed materials at the beginning of the disaster fro CR to effectively conduct its mission.
1631-I-03	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	The change in policy that authorizes only one months housing assistance for homeowners significantly impacts the ability to implement the temporary housing program.
1631-L-01	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Lesson Learned		Many of the disaster recovery centers (DRCs) were not equipped with TTYs or TDDs when they opened.
1635-L-01	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Lesson Learned		The protracted direct housing lease approval process causes an excessive time delay in setting up group sites.
1635-L-02	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Lesson Learned		A NPSC liaison assigned to the JFO was invaluable to working through Individual Assistance issues.
1631-I-04	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	DAEs who are routinely assigned to conduct preliminary damage assessments (PDAs) do not have the necessary equipment on hand to accomplish the mission effectively.

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1635-L-03	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Lesson Learned		A Congressional inquiry was generated based on inaccurate information regarding an applicants insurance coverage in NEMIS.
1635-S-01	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		Local officials were given the opportunity to explain their issues, perspective, and concerns regarding the direct housing operations.
1635-L-04	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Lesson Learned		There was no opportunity to coordinate important aspects of the operation with key players at the beginning of the direct housing operations process.
1635-L-05	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Lesson Learned		The local electric company was slow to respond to requests for power to travel trailers and mobile homes which resulted in delays in getting disaster victims in their units.
1635-I-06	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	The process for delivering direct housing creates excessive delays in getting disaster victims into a unit significantly impacting the accomplishment of this mission.
1635-L-06	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Lesson Learned		There were no clear guidelines or requirements provided to the Corp of Engineers for development of the direct housing staging site.
1635-I-07	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	6/22/2006	FEMA's policy not allowing deployed disaster workers to maintain dual lodging when travel requirements dictate
1631-I-05	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Information]	6/29/2006	The significantly lower limits on government credit card cash advances negatively impacts the ability of deployed staff and DAEs to accomplish their mission.
1631-I-06	Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Information]		The constant and time consuming maintenance required to keep many FEMA information management systems up and running negatively impacted the ability to provide timely services to disaster victims.
1604-I-14	Hurricane Katrina	Issue		HQ CR should promulgate a Community Relations Resource Center Plan for surge training and deployment operations.
1524-S-01	Missouri Storms	Smart Practice		Use of Audio GPS system allowed disaster staff member to navigate more quickly and effectively to multiple destinations during the early stages of the disaster operation.
1606-L-01	Hurricane Rita	Lesson Learned		Most points of distribution (PODs -- for distribution of commodities) did not have refrigeration. To keep ice from melting, FEA had to provide expensive power and fuel to maintain refrigeration for several days per truck
1606-I-15	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	7/6/2006	HQ and regional websites are not user-friendly for the media.
1606-I-16	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	7/6/2006	The current housing-assistance system is ineffective and resulted in costly failures to accommodate hundreds of thousands of hurricane victims in housing that meets the standards FEMA has already set in previous disasters.
1606-I-17	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	7/6/2006	Deploying other federal agencies (OFAs) and firefighters was a good idea but lack of expectation management caused problems and created challenges for disaster recovery centers (DRCs).

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1606-I-18	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	7/6/2006	Mobile DRCs serving as long-term fixed DRCs lacked reliable communications, were short of trained and knowledgeable staff and supervisors, exposed applicants to weather, and were otherwise not effective to respond to a large number of applicants.
1606-I-19	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	7/6/2006	FEMA field operations are hindered by unresolved and continuing conflicts between the concepts of a "stovepiped" centralized approach to command-and-control or a more dispersed, on-site "incident commander" concept of command-and-control.
1606-S-01	Hurricane Rita	Smart Practice		Note: This should be re-styled as an ISSUE, since the staff agrees that Region VI --- and other regions --- should "remind" state agencies that they are responsible for refueling generators providing refrigeration. Most points of distribution did not have refrigeration for perishable commodities. FEMA had to provide expensive power and fuel to maintain refrigeration for several days for each truckload of perishables
1606-I-20	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	7/6/2006	A shortage of multi-lingual public affairs staff and interpreters sometimes hindered the flow of information to disaster victims.
1606-I-21	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	9/7/2006	Newly hired employees and other-federal-agency public information officers were sent to the field with little or no training in FEMA programs, policies, and procedures.
1606-I-22	Hurricane Rita	Issue [Action]	7/6/2006	Most points of distribution did not have refrigeration for perishable commodities. FEMA had to provide expensive power and fuel to maintain refrigeration for several days for each truckload of perishables. Region Iv and other Regions should "remind" state agencies that they are responsible for refueling generators providing refrigeration.
9999-I-26	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Because the Emergency Housing Program is a 100% Federally funded program, the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) has authority to provide housing assistance without the completion of the FEMA-State agreement. However, housing assistance is mechanically processed in conjunction with Other Needs Assistance (ONA), a State matched program, therefore payment for either program cannot be commenced until the FEMA/State agreement is completed.
9999-I-27	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Senior Federal government officials could not get an accurate flow of timely information that would support effective decision making during Hurricane Katrina.
9999-I-28	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Senior Federal government officials could not get an accurate flow of timely information that would support effective decision making during Hurricane Katrina.
9999-I-29	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	The PFO lacked adequate authority to coordinate Federal efforts to respond to a catastrophic incident like Hurricane Katrina that impacted a multi-state area and encompassed numerous disaster declarations with multiple JFO's.

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9999-I-30	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Joint Field Office (JFO) staff reported a high incidence of respiratory illness, resulting in loss of staff productivity during the early phases of disaster operations. These illnesses were largely attributed to JFO environmental factors, such as insufficient fresh air circulation from the building Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system.
9999-I-31	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Current financial procedures and accounting systems preclude charging disaster related costs for personnel, equipment, etc to the specific disaster for which they are utilized.
9999-I-32	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	FEMA Headquarters is not responsive to the RAMP program.
9999-I-33	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	The current requisition system does not work for large-scale disasters.
9999-I-34	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Disaster staff had great difficulty in completing training through online training courses.
9999-I-35	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Public assistance surge training failed to train employees adequately.
9999-I-36	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	FEMA ICS training is currently inadequate
9999-I-37	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	The Federal Coordinating Officer has coordinating authority but little command capability.
9999-I-38	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	There were no provisions for immunization or drug treatment for the families of federal emergency responders.
9999-I-39	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	The Navajo Nation has contiguous Tribal lands in the States of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah (FEMA Regions IX, VI, and VIII) with the tribal leadership and organizational Headquarters in Arizona. During an initial planning conference call of the involved Regions, the FCO for this disaster (1581) recommended without objection that for consistency, the FEMA lead for all Tribal assistance policy reside in Arizona because of the location of the Tribal leadership and Headquarters.
9999-I-40	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	Network connectivity for field staff created numerous burdens on Information Technology staff
9999-I-41	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	A continuous, comprehensive, feedback-driven, policy review and remediation process for managing agency Information Technology (IT) operations could help minimize IT support shortfalls experienced during DR-1577.
9999-I-42	RAMP Application Training	Issue [Action]	8/3/2006	NIMS is out of date
1603-I-57	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	8/31/2006	Surge staffing procedures as operated during the 2005 hurricanes did not meet response needs.
9999-I-43	RAMP Application Training	Issue		

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9999-I-44	RAMP Application Training	Issue		test statement
1645-I-01	Severe Storms and Flooding, and Ground Saturation	Issue [Action]	10/23/2006	The DHS/FEMA employee identification badge/re-badge process is cumbersome and is in desperate need of immediate streamlining.
1645-I-02	Severe Storms and Flooding, and Ground Saturation	Issue [Information]	10/23/2006	Per diem limitation of \$100/week creates a hardship for deployed FEMA personnel.
1645-S-01	Severe Storms and Flooding, and Ground Saturation	Smart Practice		Disaster Field Training Office (DFTO) conducted the mandatory Equal Rights Training using video teleconference (VTC) technology from HQ to the JFO.
1645-S-02	Severe Storms and Flooding, and Ground Saturation	Smart Practice		Conducting the RAMP via Video Tele-Conference (VTC) for small disasters between the JFO and the Regional Office.
1654-I-01	Delaware Severe Storms and Flooding	Issue [Action]	12/6/2006	JFO's need the ability to operate independently and not rely on the availability of shared resources at other JFO's.
1654-I-02	Delaware Severe Storms and Flooding	Issue [Action]	12/6/2006	FEMA needs to establish a manual pay system to expeditiously correct pay issues.
1655-I-01	Virginia Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	12/6/2006	There are no threshold/guidelines for IA declaration, which creates vagueness and possible misrepresentation to states/locals.
1649-I-01	Pennsylvania Storms	Issue [Action]	12/6/2006	Currently, software required to complete essential functions in Planning, Public Assistance and other sections in the JFO need to be purchased for each individual user locally for each disaster. A better solution would be to buy and Enterprise license for each of the software listed below and keep on a centralized server to be utilized by HQ, Regions and JFO around the country.
1658-I-01	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/14/2006	The situation unit in the planning section in this JFO (and other JFOs) does not have the technology and data to present timely decision-making information to the FCO and operations staff. The situation unit's most recent information was from one or two days earlier. In a fast-changing situation, the information would be stale before anyone could use it.
1658-I-02	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/15/2006	The GIS office in the JFO asked for GIS equipment from Region VI, but Region VI initially furnished only a plotter. The GIS office eventually acquired computers and data, but only after delays and time-consuming installation of software and data.
1658-I-03	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/15/2006	When the FCO wanted to set a closing date for the incident period, the proposed closing date (August 25, 2006) had to be approved by FEMA headquarters and published in the Federal Register in order to take effect. FEMA Headquarters took until early September to approve and publish the closing date --- after the proposed closing date had passed.

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1658-I-04	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue		ERROR. Please delete this duplicate entry.
1658-I-05	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/15/2006	The on-board satellite telephone service on the mobile disaster recovery center (MDRC) vehicle had a switching problem between the satellite and Mt. Weather. This problem caused wait times of up to 40 minutes for tele-registration applicants, and interfered with access to Spanish-speaking registrars.
1658-I-06	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/15/2006	Safety and security officers were not deployed and were unable to inspect the JFO for suitability until after the JFO had been acquired by Logistics Section.
1658-I-07	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/15/2006	The standard JFO kit includes an overhead projector, but does not include an LCD projector. The training officer always needs an LCD projector to support training in the JFO. The training officer had to acquire an LCD projector from Region VI.
1658-I-08	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	FEMA rules require us to transmit or fax all print jobs to the Government Printing Office. The GPO normally approves the print task quickly and sends the materials to a local vender who then prints and delivers the materials to the JFO --- usually within 24 hours. The problem is that the GPO is open only during normal work hours on weekdays, and is closed on Saturday and Sunday
1658-I-09	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Many of the laptop computers furnished by the DISC were more than five years old -- with worn out hard disk drives and bad software.
1658-I-10	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	The mobile disaster recovery center deployed to this disaster did not have an adequate DRC sign kit. It also lacked standard individual-assistance and human-services forms and documents.
1658-I-11	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Satellite communications on-board a mobile disaster recovery vehicle (MDRC) occasionally went down because of lightning or other weather or atmospheric disturbances. The temporary loss of satellite service halted registrations and otherwise interfered with field operations.
1658-I-12	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Some applicants received disaster-relief checks and later received poorly-written form-letters intended to explain the purpose of the funds. Meanwhile, the applicant may have spent the money for some unintended purpose. The letters are difficult to understand and often fail to deliver information the applicant needs.
1658-I-13	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	A severe shortage of trained and retainable public assistance reservists created difficulty in staffing the public assistance branch of the JFO and created backlogs in processing applications for public assistance.
1658-S-01	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Smart Practice		Writing project worksheets for mitigation-related demolition projects may save time in determining eligibility for public assistance if the projects never qualifies for mitigation funding.
1658-S-02	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Smart Practice		Hazard mitigation, environmental, flood insurance and flood plain management specialists should be involved in public assistance project development and formulation stages and not just the review stage.
1658-I-14	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue		External affairs office needed standard Spanish-language materials, and ordered seven publications from the FEMA publications catalog. The FEMA publications office delivered only one publication --- and fewer than 10 copies of that.

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1658-I-15	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	A shortage of experienced bi-lingual public-affairs reservists slowed production of Spanish-language newspaper releases targeted at the large population of Spanish-speakers in the El Paso area.
1658-S-03	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Smart Practice		FEMA external affairs disseminated a lot of information about individual assistance programs early-on to help manage the public's expectations, avoid unnecessary application-processing costs, and prevent disappointment.
1658-S-04	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Smart Practice		The federal coordinating officer (FCO) asked the National Processing Service Center to furnish a liaison officer to the joint field office (JFO) to help resolve processing-related problems.
1658-I-16	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Where a mobile disaster recovery center (MDRC) was supporting a fixed DRC, the temporary loss of satellite service on the MDRC held up registrations and otherwise interfered with field operations.
1658-I-17	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Some staff arrived at the joint field office unaware that they were still mapped to some other FEMA server and were temporarily blocked from access to the JFO server.
1658-I-18	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Information]	11/20/2006	Because specialized software was not installed on their computers for several days, the comptroller and administrative section of the joint field office (JFO) had to delay some comptroller and travel-processing operations.
1659-I-01	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/15/2006	FEMA failed to furnish cell phones and laptops necessary to coordinate community relations operations until seven working days after their deployment to the field. FEMA also failed to furnish cell phones and laptop computers for external affairs and congressional liaison officers until one week after operations began.
1659-I-02	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/15/2006	Some employees had to go home soon after deployment because of altitude-related health problems.
1659-I-03	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Slow processing of technical assistance contracts (TACs) delayed the installation of direct housing and prolonged the hardship for housing applicants.
1659-I-04	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	The technical assistance contract for direct housing (mobile home installation) omitted provision for paying hook-up fees often levied by local governments or utilities.
1659-I-05	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	The DISC furnished printer and plotter equipment for the JFO planning section, but the equipment arrived without print cartridges, cleaning cartridges, and other necessary supplies.
1659-I-06	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Some employees had problems getting mapped to the Santa Fe JFO server for more than one month until the IT branch could arrange for removing an earlier mapping that was still in effect for another FEMA site.
1659-I-07	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Staff of the JFO planning section were not able to obtain laptop computers until five days into field operations. Even after computers arrived from the DISC, the computers needed time-consuming installation of software and data specific to the needs of the planning section.

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1659-I-08	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	A lack of geographic information delayed production of map-products and intefered with the geographic analysis and visual protrayal of management information.
1659-I-09	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Some contractor personnel arrived at the JFO without FEMA badges or record of FBI clearance to perform work for FEMA. The services of those employees were delayed for 5 to 21 days while they waited for personal identification verification and "suitability determination" before they could begin work.
1659-I-10	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	Safety and security officers were not deployed and were unable to inspect the JFO for suitability until after the JFO had been acquired by Logistics Section.
1659-I-11	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	FEMA does not have publish consistent guidance about its interpretation of laws and regulations and stating the agency's policies concerning disaster relief for tribal governments under the Stafford Act.
1659-I-12	New Mexico Storms	Issue [Information]	11/20/2006	FEMA's current policy establishes a \$100 per-week and \$400 per-month limit for cash withdrawals from employees' government credit cards. The limitation creates a hardship for some field office staff, especially in high-cost areas.
1659-S-01	New Mexico Storms	Smart Practice		At the beginning of this disaster, only seven of New Mexico's 50 jurisdictions had adopted approved hazard mitigation plans --- and were thereby candidates for hazard mitigation grant program (HMGP) financial assistance. The few eligible jurisdictions presented a narrow field for mitigation projects that could reach a total federal share of more than \$2 million.
1659-S-02	New Mexico Storms	Smart Practice		The federal coordinating officers of the New Mexico and Arizona disaster-relief operations tested a joint strategy to provide a single federal point-of-contact for administration of federal disaster relief in the Navajo Nation --- whose territory extends into both states.
1658-I-19	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	The National Processing Service Center will not register a registrant unless the applicant can furnish a verifiable name and social security number. Undocumented workers can apply on behalf of a US-citizen dependent child, but if the dependent child is new-born or does not have a social security number, registration can be delayed by up to 13 weeks while the Social Security Administration issues a social security number.
1658-I-20	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	11/20/2006	FEMA requires every registrant to furnish a name and social security number. When the NPSC's identify-proofing mechanism can't match the name and social security number, registration is delayed until after the applicant furnishes additional proof of identification. The preferred form of proof is the social security administration's "NUMIDENT" document. The document costs \$16 and is available only in person from an SSA office.

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1658-I-21	Texas Flooding 8/15/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	Each state has the option to process "other needs assistance" (ONA) itself or to let FEMA do the processing --- or they can share processing. The JFO's individual assistance branch defines the arrangement by setting several electronic "toggle switches" to tell the NPSC which options to use. In this case, the JFO IA staff set the toggles correctly for the State to do the processing, but somehow the toggle concerning ONA was set wrong. As a result, FEMA improperly processed the first 40 ONA applications, causing delays in payments to the applicants.
1662-I-01	Indiana Severe Storms 10/06/06	Issue [Action]	11/27/2006	The Presidential disaster declaration was made late on Friday, and Headquarters (HQ) does not maintain personnel on staff to support Individual Assistance (IA) Operations over the weekend.
1662-I-02	Indiana Severe Storms 10/06/06	Issue [Action]	11/27/2006	Improvements are needed in NPSC mailroom processing.
1662-I-03	Indiana Severe Storms 10/06/06	Issue [Action]	11/27/2006	The Award Letter for Electronic Fund Transfers (EFT) comes a week later than the funds are transferred into the applicants banking account.
1662-I-04	Indiana Severe Storms 10/06/06	Issue [Action]	11/27/2006	Teleregistration information is being entered inaccurately.
1662-I-05	Indiana Severe Storms 10/06/06	Issue [Action]	11/27/2006	The super letter is not user friendly.
1662-I-06	Indiana Severe Storms 10/06/06	Issue [Action]	11/27/2006	The timing of DRC opening and closings are not conducive to applicants support.
1662-I-07	Indiana Severe Storms 10/06/06	Issue [Action]	11/27/2006	The early arriving PIO/CR and Congressional staff do not have communications.
1662-S-01	Indiana Severe Storms 10/06/06	Smart Practice		The Community Relation staff was directly deployed to the County for briefings and not to the JFO for the initial briefing. This saved valuable time for the CR staff.
1654-S-01	Delaware Severe Storms and Flooding	Smart Practice		Deploying FEMA PA and IA personnel early to affected states prior to PDA provided states with expert guidance on assessment standards and declaration process.
1654-S-02	Delaware Severe Storms and Flooding	Smart Practice		Close coordination between states on the DELMARVA Peninsula on routine emergency planning facilitated communications between states during a disaster.
1654-L-01	Delaware Severe Storms and Flooding	Lesson Learned		FEMA and State firewall issues precluded access for state personnel to utilize web based email system for several days.
1654-L-02	Delaware Severe Storms and Flooding	Lesson Learned		In dealing with congressional representatives and staff, FCO needs to carefully weigh pros and cons of visit locations and formats.
1654-L-03	Delaware Severe Storms and Flooding	Lesson Learned		The FCO has the ability to order water for extreme heat conditions, provided water is not for personnel located in the JFO. However, a codified, widely distributed message to FEMA responders should be sent to clarify these guidelines.

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1652-S-01	Maryland Storms	Smart Practice		DR-1652 was used as an opportunity to mount a media campaign on hurricane awareness and flood insurance. Mitigation provided a subject matter expert and graphical products for the campaign and PIO provided the skills required to establish contacts with television and print media outlets.
1649-L-01	Pennsylvania Storms	Lesson Learned		Excessive work time lost due to time required for APO to issue equipment and then for IT to set up equipment. APO and IT lack SOP which establishes the priority for the issuing and set up of equipment. Additionally, IT needs to establish a priority for issuing access to NEMIS and NACS.
1649-L-02	Pennsylvania Storms	Lesson Learned		A Training Officer needs to be deployed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Mandatory training should begin as soon as possible for JFO staff.
1649-S-01	Pennsylvania Storms	Smart Practice		During this disaster, we set up a Floodplain Management Hotline staffed by a Regional Floodplain Management expert. State and local officials were provided the Hotline number through various correspondences. Also, DRC Personnel were provided the Hotline number. The juxtaposition of the Floodplain Management expert and Hotline, and the Insurance expert and Hotline, provided an outstanding resource for problem solutions that had both Floodplain Management and Insurance implications.
1649-S-02	Pennsylvania Storms	Smart Practice		During this event, we set up a DRC Insurance Hotline staffed by the Region III CSC Regional Insurance Manager. His expertise and knowledge of the way insurance is handled in PA, the Agents and Lenders in PA, the Insurance Commissioners Office officials and the local and State officials, as well as the Regional way of doing things and the Regional personnel, provided an outstanding and error-free operation of the insurance task.
1649-S-03	Pennsylvania Storms	Smart Practice		During some disasters, there are some people affected that feel they have not been treated fairly and equitably. Public community meetings are sometimes held to address these issues and concerns. Some of the attendees are angry and frustrated over what has happened to them and their families. In addition to other issues, there are questions that relate to National Flood Insurance Program, such as how claims are settled, the length of time in the settlement process and coverage issues. The Smart Practice described below has worked very well to reduce and possibly eliminate confrontations in public community meetings and provide much needed, timely and correct information.
1649-S-04	Pennsylvania Storms	Smart Practice		There are many times in a Joint Field Office or a Disaster Recovery Center setting where there are questions asked to Individual Assistance or Volunteer Assistance Liaison people relating to the National Flood Insurance Program. Early on, during 1649-DR-PA a very strong working relationship was established with IA, VAL and the NFIP representatives. This relationship benefits every one involved including the IA and VAL recipients.
1655-L-01	Virginia Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Lesson Learned		There was a lack of availability of JFO "go-kits" when VA JFO stood up. JFO sought state support or other federal agencies support to obtain necessary equipment and supplies for initial operations.

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1655-S-01	Virginia Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		Mitigation Branch's use of an existing template for their mitigation goals and objectives led to quicker delivery of support to customers.
1655-S-02	Virginia Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		Imbedding of state reps with federal counterparts at all levels of JFO Organization added greatly to the efficiency of operations at the JFO.
1661-S-01	Virginia Severe Storms 9/22/06	Smart Practice		Direct TV Plus System allows programs to be recorded at a moments notice without the hassle of tapes or several remote controls.
0902-I-01	Golden Guardian (GG06)	Issue [Action]	1/11/2007	Travel funds from FEMA Headquarters to support the Golden Guardian 2006 (GG06) exercise were commingled under the same accounting code (Strategic Resource Management, SRM 62-6120-RB9097) that is used for day-to-day Divisional travel funds. This commingling of funds created significant confusion, diverted staff attention from substantive exercise issues, and risked misapplication of funds and curtailment of other legitimate activities.
0902-I-02	Golden Guardian (GG06)	Issue [Action]	1/11/2007	There is insufficient preliminary intra-departmental coordination for approving the degree of Agency involvement in state level exercises. This lack of coordination results in poor or inadequate exercise planning, resulting in compromise to potential exercise benefits and a lack of efficient resource utilization.
0902-I-03	Golden Guardian (GG06)	Issue [Action]	1/11/2007	FEMA should develop and publish a formal Agency policy addressing Regional participation in state and federal inter-agency exercises.
0902-I-04	Golden Guardian (GG06)	Issue [Action]	1/11/2007	During GG06 it appeared that the State's understanding of how certain specialized Federal response assets would be utilized, in this case out-of-state Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams, was at variance with published Federal policy.
0902-I-05	Golden Guardian (GG06)	Issue [Information]	1/11/2007	Many States have developed their own proprietary response management information systems which are not interoperable with the Department of Homeland Security Information System (HSIN).
0902-I-06	Golden Guardian (GG06)	Issue [Action]	1/11/2007	The State has not functionally integrated concepts of the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) into State and local emergency plans for dealing with events beyond the capabilities of the State and its political subdivisions.
0902-L-01	Golden Guardian (GG06)	Lesson Learned		Technical expertise and support provided by Headquarters' staff who augmented the Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG) was essential to the successful execution of Golden Guardian
1668-I-01	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	Some JFO supervisors did not understand FEMA travel policies.

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1668-I-02	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	FEMA travel reimbursement policy for "rotational" travel is not clear, resulting in unexpected expenses for some employees.
1668-I-03	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	Contracting officers deployed from the national cadre were not equipped with credit cards necessary to acquire urgently-needed supplies and services in the first days of disaster-relief operations.
1668-I-04	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	Slow processing at FEMA Headquarters delayed the effective date of the FCO's proposal to include new parishes in the area of eligibility for disaster relief, delayed delivery of disaster relief, and resulted in higher costs.
1668-I-05	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	Late deployment of a security officer delayed arrangement for JFO security guards.
1668-I-06	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	Mitigation staff received a pallet-load of mitigation-related publications, but some publications were missing.
1668-I-07	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	Mitigation staff had several project officers, but only one section 406 reviewer.
1668-I-08	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	FEMA does not have a clear policy, rule, or guidance as to the responsibility for rental or use of Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) or mobile disaster recovery centers (MDRCs).
1668-I-09	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	When individuals fail to check out with the JFO Information Technology Branch when they are re-assigned or return home, they remain assigned to the JFO network group, and their log-in scripts continue to attach them to that former JFO's user groups, common drives, and printers --- even after redeployment to another JFO.
1668-I-10	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	IT Branch staff have duties that they cannot perform adequately without increased rights on the FEMA network. Minor adjustments to their administrator rights would prevent much time now spent on the telephone or in emailing discussion of minor, fixable network problems.
1668-I-11	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	Inconsistencies in the way field inspectors' recorded determination of eligibility for grants to replace flooring may result in increased administrative costs.
1668-I-12	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Issue [Action]	2/12/2007	Payments to applicants for other needs assistance (ONA) grants of over \$20,000 were delayed because of indecision about how to word the letters of explanation.
1668-S-01	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Smart Practice		Local-government officials and floodplain managers often need fresh information about post-disaster flood insurance and floodplain-management programs and policies. FEMA and State NFIP coordinators prefer to conduct joint on-site visits to help inform local officials about the programs.

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1668-S-02	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Smart Practice		In sparsely populated North Central Louisiana, the public information office could not always rely on the usual major press or broadcast media to get disaster-relief information out to the public.
1668-S-03	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Smart Practice		Public information officer relied largely on small-scale local news media to help distribute FEMA's disaster-relief messages.
1668-S-04	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Smart Practice		While viewing and assessing damage in a disaster area, preliminary damage assessment (PDA) teams sometimes attract attention from news media and from people in the neighborhood.
1668-S-05	Louisiana Severe Storms and Flooding 11/2/06	Smart Practice		Local government officials sometimes lack current information about FEMA's activities in their areas --- and don't know who to contact to get information.
1671-I-01	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	JFO staff need better access to IT technical support at the beginning of JFO operations to ensure efficient and effective operations, especially for staff deployed to the field.
1671-L-01	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Lesson Learned		Flyers and other printed materials needed by Community Relations were not available at the beginning of Community Relations (CR) field operations.
1671-I-02	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Not allowing State personnel to drive FEMA rental cars contribute to safety and other problems.
1671-L-02	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Lesson Learned		FEMA Logistics needs to provide copies of condensed telephone (cellular and desk set) instructions to all users when telephones are issued to allow for efficient and effective use of resources.
1671-I-03	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) posters and information was not provided to JFO staff prior to the arrival of the Equal Rights Officer (ERO).
1671-I-04	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	COOP and Emergency Planning for the JFO needs to be accomplished within 72 hours of opening a JFO. Updates would be anticipated over the life of the JFO to ensure the safety and well-being of the staff as well as the operational effectiveness of the recovery operations.

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1671-I-05	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Purchase authority for bottled water for the JFO is restrictive and impedes field purchasing by JFO management.
1671-I-06	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Email access at JFO's needs to be improved in three aspects: - State employees and other non-FEMA employees are not reflected in the FEMA email system global address list which limits interoperability - The amount of time necessary to add email accounts for DAE's needs to be shortened - Email accounts for DAE's should remain open after demobilization
1671-I-07	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Lack of a Programmatic Agreement with the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) results in unnecessary costs and wasted time in implementing Recovery programs.
1671-I-08	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Access to ADD functions was problematic due to limited overlap between West Coast and East Coast working hours.
1671-I-09	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Better definition is necessary as to "what constitutes" the Incident Period and "how it is determined".
1671-I-10	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Since paying for travel home from a disaster is now allowed for DAE's, there is not a uniform policy understood by all that is applied across the board resulting in differences between regions and disasters.
1671-I-11	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Safety and Security personnel are not mobilized in conjunction with the JFO establishment process but in conjunction with the rest of the staffing of the JFO.
1663-I-01	Alaska Severe Storms 10/16/06	Issue [Information]	5/21/2007	Due to Agency Cyber Security requirements, those employees that are operating in remote locations away from the JFO using the FEMA issued laptop computers have only a limited number of logins before the computer locks up and will not allow them access. This necessitates a return to the JFO for the computer to be reset before the individual can resume their work.

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1663-I-02	Alaska Severe Storms 10/16/06	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	FEMA policy limits holiday travel cost comparisons for non-rotational travel to 4 days instead of actuals. This policy penalizes those travelers in situations where they are working outside their region or OCONUS during the holiday season.
1663-I-03	Alaska Severe Storms 10/16/06	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	The "ADD request and call from ADD Support to reservists" process does not happen during weekends and may affect operational success.
1663-I-04	Alaska Severe Storms 10/16/06	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	There is a Continuity of Operations (COOP) concern regarding not having off-site/backup for the database/server information of the JFO.
1663-I-05	Alaska Severe Storms 10/16/06	Issue [Information]	5/21/2007	In order to hold an ICS 300 class at the JFO, staff needed to coordinate with the course manager at EMI regarding course materials, dates, and scheduling of qualified instructor(s).
1663-I-06	Alaska Severe Storms 10/16/06	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	The GIS CPU and plotter shipped from Mt Weather to the Anchorage JFO was missing parts needed for assembly and the ink cartridges were almost empty. This was the only unit in the JFO capable of GIS functions. Also, while IT was setting up the GIS computer they discovered it had an illegal version of Windows which prevented it from being connected to the network.
1663-I-07	Alaska Severe Storms 10/16/06	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Citibank government credit cards do not work for some common carriers (airlines) in remote locations because they are not on the list of approved vendors.
1663-S-01	Alaska Severe Storms 10/16/06	Smart Practice		Planning look-ahead and preparation activities for the pending Alaska Declarations conducted by Region X and Planning Cadre staff facilitated the ability for the Planning Section to get up to speed very quickly after the declaration.
1671-S-01	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Smart Practice		Global Positioning Devices are a very valuable tool for Community Relations field staff and should be provided on every disaster.
1671-S-02	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Smart Practice		According to a DR1671 Customer Opinion Survey Result, Public Information was the most frequently mentioned aspect of service recommended to be improved.
1671-S-03	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Smart Practice		Regional Ops Section Go kits contribute to operational effectiveness.

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1671-S-04	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Smart Practice		During application of the 406 mitigation program at this disaster, significant issues have arisen which may impede the timely delivery of services to Public Assistance Program applicants. Mitigation Technical Specialists are imbedded in the FEMA/State PA field teams and work directly with the team and the applicant to identify, write, and determine the cost of Hazard Mitigation Proposals (HMPS). These HMPs frequently change the footprint or scope of repair work required to provide the additional mitigating protection for a facility. These HMP changes often trigger a more detailed environmental review, which can take significant additional time to complete. The environmental review can also lead to scope of work changes due to legal requirements imposed during the review process. These legally required changes in scope of work can also add substantial costs to the price of completing a mitigation measure.
1671-S-05	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Smart Practice		Security had to badge over 175 DAE's as their badges were expiring. About 30 people had to redo their 85P release forms and complete an e-Quip profile which entailed a lot of time. Many of the DAES did not have their information with them, seeing as many had filled this out many times and didn't think it was necessary to do it again.
1671-S-06	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Smart Practice		Complete lease for the JFO premises should be on the premises in Logistics, even though the negotiations have to be between the Lessor (Owner) and the Lessee (GSA).
1671-S-07	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Smart Practice		Without having documentation for use agreements at non-JFO facilities, things are not 'in black and white' concerning liability and other considerations.
1671-L-03	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Lesson Learned		It is important that Mitigation be capable of quantitatively demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of mitigation projects that are funded by FEMA. Region X now has the staff resources to conduct analyses on the savings realized due to past mitigation projects. With the extreme flood events that occurred in DR-1671, and the many past acquisitions and elevations that Washington has funded, it was planned to study several areas to quantify the cost savings in mitigating areas that were flooded in November, 2006.
1671-S-08	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Smart Practice		Information sharing suffers when there is a lack of consistency and/or ease of access to the information.

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1671-S-09	Washington State Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	Smart Practice		Active state participation and having good staff at the JFO provided strong and positive coordination and service.
3269-I-01	Illinois Snow 12/29/06	Issue [Action]	3/14/2007	ISSUE # 1 Statement: Joint Field Offices should be inspected for Health, Safety Issues and cleanliness issues before staffing.
3269-I-02	Illinois Snow 12/29/06	Issue [Action]	3/14/2007	ISSUE # 2 Statement: Personnel status in ADD is not being maintained current and in some cases has incorrect information entered in the system.
3269-I-03	Illinois Snow 12/29/06	Issue [Action]	3/14/2007	ISSUE # 3 Statement: Personnel deployment through ADD is not available on National Holidays.
1675-I-01	Kansas Severe Winter Storms	Issue [Action]	5/25/2007	USDA staffing in the RRCC and the JFO was inadequate and represented the wrong skill set.
1675-I-02	Kansas Severe Winter Storms	Issue		The Contracting Officer initially deployed by the Headquarters Contracting Officer Cadre was unqualified and was unable to provide the required contracting support services. The Contracting Officer did not have a warrant and did not have an active purchase card.
1675-S-01	Kansas Severe Winter Storms	Smart Practice		The use of plan development computer aided tools and technology to assist in the rapid development of local hazard mitigation plans that are consistent and approvable prior to and immediately after a Stafford Act Declaration. Prior to DR 1675 KS, the State of Kansas purchased user rights for all counties to access an Internet-based mitigation planning software, to assist in the developing local mitigation plans. This program will allow the State to enter their newly-created or revised plans into this internet-based database. During operations for DR 1675 KS, this approach proved successful, other states might consider this "fast track" approach to Hazard Mitigation planning conducted at the local level. The advantages to utilizing a software program as this, include: 1) providing a template, or framework, for data entry or plan development; 2) simplifying the writing of the plan for communities that do not have significant staff resources to give to the project; 3) allows the county, State and FEMA to access the plan during draft stages so timely courtesy reviews can provide feedback to plan developer; 4) counties know exactly what information is required of them to "fill in the blanks" of the plan; 5)
3269-I-04	Illinois Snow 12/29/06	Issue		ISSUE # 4 Statement: The process for receiving medical assistance within the JFO needs to be standardized.
3269-I-05	Illinois Snow 12/29/06	Issue [Action]	3/14/2007	ISSUE # 5 Statement: Numerous packages sent through DHL were lost in the mailing process when sent to the State of Illinois. This caused delays in Project Worksheet processing between FEMA and the State of Illinois.
3269-I-06	Illinois Snow 12/29/06	Issue [Action]	3/14/2007	ISSUE # 6 Statement: FEMA cell phones issued in the field are not technologically up to date, and were received in an inoperable condition.
1672-I-01	Oregon	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Special purpose computer systems need to arrive at the JFO ready for use and not needing extensive prep work or lacking usable versions of special purpose programs.

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1672-I-02	Oregon	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Lack of email access by DAE's hampers information exchange during non-deployed periods.
3269-S-01	Illinois Snow 12/29/06	Smart Practice		Statement: The Joint Field Office (JFO) used a news release to publicize the approaching RPA deadline. The utilization of News Release to inform more applicants of the Public Assistance (RPA) Deadline improved communication with the public through the state agency.
1672-I-03	Oregon	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Inadequate provisions exist for foul weather gear to support FEMA's deployments in the field.
3269-S-02	Illinois Snow 12/29/06	Smart Practice		SMART PRACTICE # 2 Statement: Training of the personnel greatly improved the staff performance.
1672-I-04	Oregon	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	There is no standardized record retention system in place dictating how purchasing staff must maintain records and differences exist between regionally imposed requirements.
1672-I-05	Oregon	Issue [Action]	5/21/2007	Select FEMA DAE's need to have FEMA cell phones issued to them on a permanent basis due to their early activation and/or need to provide consistent contact information to critical support customers.
3269-S-03	Illinois Snow 12/29/06	Smart Practice		SMART PRACTICE # 2 Statement: Training of the personnel greatly improved the staff performance.
1678-I-01	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	GENERATORS NOT "MISSION READY": Some generator sets delivered to the field staging area were not ready for use, and had to be set aside and later returned to the logistics center for maintenance.
1678-I-02	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	INACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT GENERATORS: Description of items listed in FEMA's logistics management information system (LIMS) database sometimes does not match the characteristics of the actual equipment.
1678-I-03	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	GENERATOR LABELS: People working in the logistics chain need accurate tracking information about each generator, and people working with the installation and use of generators need precise information about a generator's electrical output characteristics. Many generators arrived in the field without labels or barcodes --- creating unnecessary confusion about the identity and capability of the generators.
1678-I-04	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	SYNCHRONIZATION OF EQUIPMENT DATABASES: Because FEMA and Corps of Engineer databases are not synchronized, the JFO logistics section was unable to obtain an accurate and timely picture of the identification, location, and disposition of generators supporting emergency operations. It took several days for the JFO geographic intelligence unit to link disconnected information manually and produce a map that should have been available within hours.
1678-I-05	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	GPS DEVICES NOT READY FOR USE: Some total asset visibility (TAV) tracking devices (GPS transponders) were not ready for use and did not report the location of the equipment.
1678-I-06	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	INCONSISTENT TRAVEL POLICY: FEMA's travel rules often change, are inconsistent, and are haphazardly administered.

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1678-I-07	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	SECURITY CLEARANCES AND BADGING: FEMA's procedures for personnel clearance and badging effectively prevent hiring of citizens in the disaster area, delay disaster-relief work, and generally impose cumbersome and inconsistent requirements on in-coming disaster assistance employees and contract staff.
1678-S-01	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Smart Practice		APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY: FEMA has no money for research and development at the regional or field office level, but FEMA needs to experiment with new technology and procedures to improve its field operations.
1678-I-08	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	SHORTAGE OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PUBLICATIONS: A shortage of applicant handbooks and related publications results in distracting public assistance staff from their duties to field questions from applicants, and increases the frustration of uninformed applicants.
1678-I-09	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	TRAINING IN INDIAN AFFAIRS: Oklahoma has 37 tribal organizations and a large population of Native Americans, but the circumstances are much different from other states. FEMA's training in Indian affairs does not adequately address the situation in Oklahoma.
1678-I-10	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	COMPLICATED ESF-15 ORGANIZATION: The former external affairs office adhered to an official new ESF-15 organization chart in this disaster. Though this was a relatively small operation, the new organization for external affairs was unwieldy and cumbersome.
1678-I-11	Oklahoma Severe Winter Storms 2/1/07	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	DEBRIS-REMOVAL CONTRACTS: Many public officials knew little about FEMA's public assistance programs, and were vulnerable to unscrupulous debris-removal contractors who tried to persuade them to sign contracts that could leave the jurisdiction ineligible for FEMA debris removal assistance.
3270-L-01	Colorado Snow	Lesson Learned		This was the Contracting Officers first FEMA deployment. The Contracting Officer did not have a Warrant and a Purchase Card.
3270-L-02	Colorado Snow	Lesson Learned		RTM, DFTO instructional staff and regional cadre managers should work together to make effective use of DRF training funds in DFTO environment when possible.
3270-L-03	Colorado Snow	Lesson Learned		We need a national standard for Project Worksheet back-up documents that is efficient, will save the Project Officers time and save the Agency money.
3271-S-01	Colorado Snow	Smart Practice		RTM, DFTO instructional staff and regional cadre managers should work together to make effective use of DRF training funds in DFTO environment when possible.

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3271-S-02	Colorado Snow	Smart Practice		The Public Assistance Management Team made the decision early on to use Community Relations Staff (CR) to identify potential Private non-profit (PNP) applicants for these two snow events. It was finally decided after conferring with the State PAO to have a CR representative assigned to the office of each declared county's Emergency Manager. This allowed the local emergency management staff to have a stake in the "recovery" process, which is not often the case. It also gave the CR person a single, knowledgeable, point of contact for each county. Prior to deployment to the county offices, the CR staff was briefed by a representative of the Public Assistance management staff regarding the PA program and their mission focus. A single page information sheet had been carefully composed to help define the PA Snow Declaration program for the lay person. This information sheet was faxed to potential PNP applicants so they could make a reasonable determination regarding their eligibility, the eligibility of their facilities, or the work they may have performed. Our intent was to reduce the number of ineligible applications that might apply and would ultimately need to be reviewed.
3271-I-01	Colorado Snow	Issue [Action]	3/29/2007	The Automated Electronic Defibrillators (AEDS) are sent to field operations in the go kits assigned to the Safety Officer or Security Official. Once these two elements are demobilized there are no AEDS available at field operations facilities. There are significant periods of time during the full life span of a field operation that there is no AED available. This condition will be true in this JFO once the Safety Officer and Security Official have departed.
3271-I-02	Colorado Snow	Issue [Action]	3/29/2007	Public Assistance Contract Project Officers arrived at this disaster with no FEMA badges or expired FEMA badges. The badging process requires the Security Official to query the Personal Identification Section of the Physical Security Branch for the status of the contractor's employee. The query identifies whether the individual has undergone fingerprinting and found to be suitable (no disqualifying information in the FBI records). Secondly, the query determines whether the contractor's employee has submitted all required paperwork to FEMA if they have worked in their lifetime more than 180 days as a FEMA contractor. This paperwork is known as the 85P Packet. It is being revised to be called the Equip Package but it is the same. Until a contractor's employee is determined to be suitable and receipt of the 85P package is confirmed the contractor's employee can not be issued a FEMA contractor badge. All of the contractor's employees assigned to this disaster (20) had identified when and where they had submitted their 85P packets. That information alone does not allow them to be issued a badge. One half of these submissions were not recorded by the Personal Identification Section or not submitted from the source to which the
3270-I-01	Colorado Snow	Issue		Program managers at the regional office and JFO have the ability to submit and approve NACS team assignments and roles. However, the program managers do not have the rights to submit and delete team assignments and roles. This is not consistent program management and needs to be corrected.

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3270-I-02	Colorado Snow	Issue		An increasing number of FEMA Region 8 employees are not received credit for Emergency Management Institute (EMI) courses which they have previously completed at FEMA Headquarters, in another FEMA region, in a Joint Field Office (JFO), in a Long Term Recovery Operation (LTRO) or in some other non-EMI location. It is extremely time consuming for the RTM/DFTO to research each individual case in order to obtain, if possible, official FEMA credit for each student. We have noticed a number of consistent problems and/or omissions of critical procedures that have caused more than 95% of these lapses in assigning course credit.
3270-I-03	Colorado Snow	Issue		Other Federal Agencies (OFA) assign personnel to the JFO without sufficient authority or knowledge to speak for their agency, which results in confusion and misunderstanding.
1685-I-01	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	OFF-NETWORK COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS: Field staff often disrupt their workday to locate an internet entry source and set up access to the FEMA intranet so they can send urgently needed information and reports to the joint field office. Field staff usually have laptop computers that help them collect information and prepare reports, but they lack the technical means to communicate efficiently.
1685-I-02	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	CAR RENTAL POLICY: FEMA travel policy --- with very few exceptions --- forbids rental of anything other than compact cars.
1685-I-03	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	GPS UNITS: Community relations and intergovernmental affairs staff often have difficulty finding buildings or addresses in a disaster area where there are few recognizable reference points.
1685-I-04	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	SHORTAGE OF PUBLICATIONS (EXTERNAL AFFAIRS): Two of FEMA's most useful publications for fostering positive community relations are out-of-print and unobtainable.
1685-I-05	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Information]	4/24/2007	MEDIA-MONITORING SERVICE: FEMA does not have standby accounts for satellite television service. Although a work order was submitted early in disaster relief operations, access to local media was not established until at least a week after the JFO opened
1685-I-06	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	WEBSITE INFORMATION FOR DAES: FEMA has no practical way to keep disaster assistance employees (DAEs) informed about changes and developments in FEMA policies, salary issues, and program information that they need to know. .
1685-I-07	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	DRC SIGNBOARD KITS: Mobile disaster recovery vehicles (MDRCs) are not furnished with DRC sign kits when they are deployed from the logistics center. Lack of the sign kits renders the MDRCs unready for DRC duty.
1685-I-08	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	APPROVAL PROCESS FOR DUA: The obligation approval process often takes two to three weeks after the JFO submits a request. The delay often means delay in delivery of unemployment benefits to disaster victims.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1685-I-09	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	NPSC PROCESSING ERRORS: Errors in case processing at the Texas NPSC sometime results in denial or delay in benefits to disaster victims.
1685-I-10	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	PUBLICATIONS SHORTAGES (MITIGATION): The supply of mitigation-related information publications is not consistent, and sometimes FEMA runs out of the publications in greatest demand for distribution at disaster recovery centers and by public affairs and individual assistance field workers.
1685-I-11	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	DELAY IN PROVIDING SITE-SECURITY: The system for setting up security for joint field offices and disaster recovery centers is not working.
1685-I-12	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/24/2007	PROOF-OF-INSURANCE (RENTAL CARS): Rental-car drivers may not be in compliance with proof-of-insurance required by state laws.
1685-S-01	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING VIA TELECONFERENCE: Representatives from distant congressional offices were sometimes unable to attend FEMA's congressional briefings, and were therefore unable to ask questions and clarify their understanding of FEMA's operations in the disaster area.
1685-S-02	Louisiana Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		SBA PARTICIPATION IN JIC: Small Business Administration (SBA) usually does not participate directly in the joint information center (JIC). In the past, SBA public information staff tended to operate out of some distant location where there was not good communications with the JIC.
3274-I-01	Indiana Snow	Issue [Action]	5/23/2007	FEMA HAS NO MEANS TO COMMUNICATE WITH OFF-DUTY DAES: When disaster reservist employees (DAEs) are not on active duty, they generally do not get any information from FEMA about developments, policy changes, organizational changes, and other information that affect them or that they need to do their jobs when they return to duty.
3274-I-02	Indiana Snow	Issue [Action]	5/23/2007	EQUIPMENT NOT READY FOR USE: Much of the equipment that arrived from FEMA's logistic centers (LCs) and disaster information systems clearinghouse (DISC) was broken, worn out, or otherwise not ready for use, and had to be returned.
3274-I-03	Indiana Snow	Issue [Action]	5/23/2007	JFO SUPPLY-KIT HAS OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT. Expendable supplies that come with the standard shipment of a 50-person JFO supply kit contain obsolete or unnecessary materials or supplies that are beyond their shelf-life.
3274-I-04	Indiana Snow	Issue [Action]	5/23/2007	ADD DOES NOT RECORD DAES' SECONDARY SKILLS. FEMA does not make use of its DAEs with secondary skills --- or encourage people to acquire secondary emergency operations skills. When the JFO staff needed public assistance specialists, they found that ADD system could not search for people by their secondary specialty or secondary skill.
3274-I-05	Indiana Snow	Issue [Action]	5/23/2007	LOSS OF INTERNET E-MAIL ACCESS DAEs no longer have access to external email or to external services. DHS/FEMA recently blocked disaster assistance employees from long-standing access to the personal email systems that many rely on.

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3274-S-01	Indiana Snow	Smart Practice		IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS: Many state and local government officials --- and members Congressional staffs --- have little experience with FEMA and do not fully understand FEMA's programs and their services. FEMA needs to find ways to improve communications with public officials and with the general public to improve the public's perception of FEMA and its capabilities --- and limitations.
3274-S-02	Indiana Snow	Smart Practice		USE OF DAE "GENERALISTS": The public assistance staff arranged for deployment of about 22 DAE "generalists" who were quickly trained and deployed to help prepare project worksheets for snow-removal projects.
1690-I-01	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	LACK OF COMPUTER CONNECTIVITY AT IOF. For several days before the JFO was set up, the IOF at Clovis did not have adequate computer connectivity with other FEMA Headquarters or other FEMA sites. This delayed delivery of some disaster-relief services.
1690-I-02	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	SBA NEIGHBORHOOD LOAN-APPLICATION INTAKE. The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) well-intended new practice of going door-to-door to take SBA loan applications creates confusion about the need for registering with FEMA, and could result in some citizens failing to register for FEMA assistance within the time limits.
1690-I-03	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	ABSENCE OF DEFIBRILLATOR. The safety officer brings a defibrillator to the joint field office (JFO), and takes it when he or she leaves the JFO, sometimes leaving the JFO staff without a defibrillator on site.
1690-I-04	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	LACK OF COST INFORMATION: The federal coordinating officer and the joint field office staff do not have readily at hand cost information for various FEMA services, supplies, and activities that could be useful for comparing and selecting options.
1690-I-05	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	CELL-PHONE VOICE-MAIL & PASSWORDS: Staff who were issued cell phones at Region VI or at the JFO often found they could not retrieve voice- mail messages because the user could not set (or re-set) the required message-retrieval password.
1690-I-06	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	PDA TEAMS DID NOT HAVE CELL PHONES. Preliminary damage assessment teams (PDA teams) need cell phones to do their work, but team members often go directly to the field and do not have an opportunity to pick up FEMA cell phones.
1690-I-07	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Information]	8/20/2007	LAPTOP COMPUTERS NOT READY FOR USE. Some of the laptop computers issued to field staff at the JFO did not have IPASS installed, or IPASS malfunctioned so the user lost access to the FEMA network and to FEMA email.
1690-I-08	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	SITUATION REPORTS NOT POSTED ON FEMA WEB SITE. The Plans Officer sent in situation reports and fact sheets via email to the routine distribution list, which included the regional response coordination center and the national response coordination center (NRCC).

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1690-S-01	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		SITUATE JFO IN THE DISASTER AREA, APPOINT LOCAL COORDINATING OFFICER. The local governments involved in this disaster took strong action to help themselves before and after FEMA became involved. We needed to continue with the strong sense of coordination and teamwork that characterized intergovernmental relations from the beginning.
1690-S-02	New Mexico Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		FEMA-STATE AGREEMENT SIGNATURE. The FEMA-State Agreement (FSA) was ready for signature on a Friday, but because of the distance involved, there was no way to deliver the agreement to Region VI on a Friday, and no way the regional administrator at FEMA Region VI could sign the agreement until after the weekend.
1679-I-01	Florida Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/4/2008	The Statement Of Work (SOW) and other areas involved in the acquisition of a Manufactured Housing Operations (MHOPs) Maintenance and Deactivation Contractor (MDC) require a lengthy amount of time to complete, thus delaying the preparation of documents required to notify potential bidders of the Maintenance and Deactivation Contract.
1679-I-02	Florida Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/4/2008	Housing of disaster victims was delayed for over a week due to not having a contractor on the ground when we were ready to house individuals in trailers. HQ decision to use the IA TAC instead of allowing us to have a local contractor caused a week of delays in housing disaster victims.
1679-I-03	Florida Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/4/2008	The removal of the Individuals and Households program (IHP) cap for Housing Assistance has resulted in a change to the processing procedures, and now the IA Sequence of Delivery is no longer been followed. The end result is that the full payment of the Max Grant is now delayed on some cases
1679-S-01	Florida Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		Continue to improve upon the transparent transition from the RRCC to JFO. Examine procedures, if applicable, that could be performed regardless of physical location.
1679-S-02	Florida Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		A Congressional Liaison was deployed with the ERT-A to the State Emergency Operations Center. Thanks to MERS support, connectivity to FEMA e-mail was achieved early on in the event and was sustained until redeployment to the JFO.
1679-I-04	Florida Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	4/4/2008	Definitive guidance is needed from HQ on the production of Joint FEMA/State Situation Reports under Unified Command restrictions on publishing SITREPS on the Internet. The State of Florida publishes State SITREPS on the web. FEMA Planning SOP guidance is that FEMA SITREPS are NOT to be published on the Internet. The State pushed hard to rescind FEMA Planning SOP guidance. As a last resort, the State agreed not to publish on the web and insisted on one joint report. This necessitated FEMA Planning Section to insert a disclaimer on the SITREP that "This document is not to be published on the Internet or distributed to any other media outlet." Because of that disclaimer, when we posted SITREPS on HSIN, the HSIN staff had to mark the SITREPS FOUO which is unusual for FEMA SITREPS.

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1686-L-01	Georgia Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Lesson Learned		Some individuals require extensive help in the Individual Assistance application process due to personal limitations or stress from their recent experience of a highly traumatic event. Millions of citizens have physical, medical, sensory or cognitive disabilities and/or present challenges such as the elderly and other special needs populations. To ensure equal access to the full range of FEMA programs in a timely manner, a well defined "Special Needs" process is vital to assist these applicants.
1686-S-01	Georgia Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		The Geospatial Intelligent Unit changed their practice from requesting a server from D.C., or taking the time to copy (a limited set of) data to an external drive, to using a direct connect to the Regional Server in Region IV. IT hard wired the GIS laptop to reduce the load on the wireless network at the JFO.
1680-I-01	Florida Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue		The Community Education and Outreach mission was implemented rapidly in this disaster. Ten building supply retailers were solicited as partners in an outreach mission that included staging of three teams at these facilities to provide mitigation advice to their customers. The success of this recruiting effort was due partially to the existence of an agreement that FEMA Headquarters had made with Home Depot. Two of the retailers donated supplies, and a high school agreed to have students build two mitigation models for a total of four to display as these teams rotated through the ten stores. The success of this operation was due in part to the access to Community Relations human resources and the leadership of the Mitigation Branch. Unfortunately JFO schedules do not allow the continuation of this vital operation.
1697-I-01	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	~ FEMA's E-TASKER SYSTEM IS TOO CUMBERSOME FEMA's new Logistics e-Tasker computer program requires the (electronic) approval of from seven to ten people in FEMA headquarters, depending on the nature of the request.
1697-S-01	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Smart Practice		CO-LOCATION OF CONTRACTING OFFICER WITH LOGISTICS SECTION Contracting officers (COs) are part of the Administrative Section of the JFO staff, and normally sit in the Admin area of the JFO office layout --- sometimes far away from the Logistics Section (Log Section). This distance and inconvenience often causes difficulty in communications between Logistics staff and Contracting Officers (CO), and subsequently delays in logistics support.
1697-I-02	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` CONTRACTING DELAYS General Service Administration contracting officers sometimes are unfamiliar with common FEMA contracting requirements.
1697-I-03	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Information]	8/20/2007	` BACK-UP SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS FEMA still does not have dependable satellite communications equipment in the field.
1697-I-04	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and Tornadoes	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` VIDEO TELE-CONFERENCE EQUIPMENT Some VTC equipment components are incompatible with each other, which renders the system unusable.

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1697-I-05	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` MISSING PASSWORD PREVENTS USE OF vtc EQUIPMENT Some VTC equipment is password-protected. If the user does not have the password, the user cannot operate the VTC system.
1697-I-06	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` AIR-CARD PROBLEMS Staff working in the field continue to have problems with computer connectivity. New Air-cards delivered to the field could not be used in some areas because of activation and access problems.
1697-I-07	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	INEXPERIENCED COTRS SLOWED DELIVERY OF DIRECT HOUSING Contracting officer's technical representatives (COTR) for direct-housing contracts are not familiar with the set-up, installation, maintenance, and deactivation of mobile homes and travel trailers.
1697-I-08	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` DRC SIGN KITS Although the majority of citizens in the Eagle Pass area speak Spanish, FEMA did not have a complete Spanish-language sign kit for the disaster recovery center (DRC).
1697-S-02	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Smart Practice		` IMPROVISED DRC SIGN KITS The majority of citizens in the Eagle Pass area speak Spanish, but we did not have Spanish-language sign kits for the disaster recovery center.
1697-L-01	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Lesson Learned		` CO-LOCATION OF DRC AND OTHER-AGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITY A county-operated distribution center adjacent to the Eagle Pass DRC created security and image problems for FEMA.
1697-L-02	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Lesson Learned		` LOCATION OF DHOPS STAGING AREA One of the direct housing operations (DHOPS) staging areas was located in a highly visible place that may have skewed the public's view of FEMA's disaster-relief operations.
1697-I-09	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` PHASING OF MOBILE HOUSING UNITS The DHOPS staging area in the disaster area had on-hand more mobile housing units than it actually needed to support housing operations
1697-I-10	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ESTIMATES Inaccurate preliminary damage estimates (PDAs) can distort the projection of the type and amount of disaster relief needed, especially when mobile housing units are involved.
1697-I-11	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` MOBILE DRC COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS Some mobile disaster recovery center (MDRC) vehicles dispatched to this disaster area did not have fully functioning communications equipment.
1697-I-12	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` NO DEFIBRILLATOR IN JFO The safety officer and the security officer each bring a defibrillator to the joint field office (JFO), but when they leave, they take the AEDs with them. Sometimes, the JFO has no defibrillator on-site for several days or weeks.
1697-I-13	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	DELAY IN PROCESSING DISASTER UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE Approval of funding of a bout \$50,000 for the disaster unemployment assistance (DUA) took nearly four weeks from the day the request went to FEMA Headquarters. The significant delay in approval translated to a delay in delivery of unemployment benefits to disaster victims by about one month.

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1697-I-14	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` TRAINING INFORMATION NOT ENTERED IN ADDS Some employee training completed at the JFO is not being recorded in ADD. Employees do not get credit for training unless its recorded, and have to re-take training.
1697-S-03	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Smart Practice		` AREA FIELD OFFICE AS EXTENSION OF JFO In some disasters where geographic circumstances call for a JFO in one area and a subordinate AFO hundreds of miles away, the AFO staff tend to consider themselves less an extension of the JFO and more as a separate entity that needs the full array of staff functions and personnel. This can lead to increased costs, inconsistent practices and procedures, confusion in reporting channels, and degradation of unity of command.
1697-S-04	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Smart Practice		` UNITY OF EFFORT, EMPHASIS ON FEDERAL ROLE AS SUPPORT FOR STATE FEMA field operations can begin in a disaster area with little regard for the whole operational picture. Sometimes local officials are overwhelmed and ignored by FEMA, and are left with the perception that FEMA has come in to take charge of all disaster operations.
1697-I-15	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` LACK OF CULTURAL AWARENESS Texas border towns have their own culture, history, ethnic and geographic awareness, and language. There were many short delays and minor inefficiencies in operations attributable to differing points of view and misunderstandings.
1697-I-16	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` SHORTAGE OF SPANISH-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS About 80-85% of the residents in Maverick County, Texas speak Spanish at home, and some do not speak any English. The FEMA publication system does not have an adequate selection of Spanish-language publications of the sort routinely supplied in English language.
1697-I-17	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` ADD CALLING CENTER CLOSED ON WEEKENDS AND AFTER HOURS FEMA's ADD calling center is closed on weekends and holidays, and is only open from 8:00 to 5:00 Eastern Time on weekdays.
1697-L-03	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Lesson Learned		` CO-LOCATION OF ALL EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ELEMENTS IN JFO The component offices under ESF-15 are sometimes separated in the JFO. The separation of offices creates problems in communications between branches that need to maintain constant interchange of information.
1697-I-18	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` INCORRECTLY SET GPS DEVICES Many FEMA field staff have GPS devices, but do not know how to set them up properly. In some cases, incorrectly set GPS systems can result in collection of useless data.
1697-I-19	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` COTRs for EMERGENCY HOUSING PROGRAM FEMA is privatizing the EHU program. Contractors now perform tasks previously done by FEMA personnel. Privatization requires new contractor officer technical representative (COTR) positions, many of which are filled by personnel not familiar with the EHU program.

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1697-I-20	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` INCONSISTENT PROCEDURES FOR DIRECT HOUSING OPERATIONS Procedures, organization, roles, and functions of the various components of emergency housing operations were unclear and confusing, and caused delays and inefficiencies that would be intolerable in a larger operation.
1697-I-21	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT FOR DIRECT HOUSING OPERATIONS Lack of well-defined environmental criteria to apply to direct housing operations caused delays in installation of some group sites.
1697-I-22	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` UPDATE TO NPSC TRACKING PROGRAM (DARIC) INTERFERED WITH ON-GOING OPERATIONS Virginia NPSC implemented a radical update to the DARIC system for tracking direct housing operations. The system had operational flaws that at times made it unusable. Personnel using the system had not been trained in advance, and had to be trained on-site, and therefore their ability to do their job was severely degraded. At times the JFO's ability to issue work orders for mobile units, or to certify potential occupants came to a complete halt because DARIC was not functioning.
1697-I-23	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL ADVICE JFO staff discovered that the agency providing legal advice at the disaster recovery center was not covered by the current memorandum of understanding with the Disaster Legal Services – Young Lawyers Division.
1697-I-24	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Issue [Action]	8/20/2007	` MANY RAMP ISSUES NOT CORRECTED AND NOT ADDRESSED The remedial action management program (RAMP) delivers information and recommendations about problems that interfere with FEMA operations, but little is done to correct those problems.
1697-S-05	5/1/07 Texas Severe Storms and TORNADOS	Smart Practice		DELETE ME. DELETE ME. DELETE ME. DELETE ME.
1702-I-01	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	For employee safety, it is essential that the Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) be written and distributed as soon as possible upon establishment of a new FEMA facility, such as a JFO, SFO, etc. However, the mechanics of modifying the existing FEMA OEP form to incorporate disaster specific information and attachments made it extremely difficult to work with. As a result, publication of the OEP was delayed, thereby endangering employees and visitors to FEMA offices.
1702-I-02	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	Stafford Act Employees, even those who are senior and experienced, are often unaware of recent policy and procedure changes because they are usually excluded from FEMA internal communications and the intranet when they are not on duty. This leads to confusion and inefficiency in the early stages of a response.
1702-I-03	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	A DAE deployed to 1702-DR was scheduled to assist in teaching a one-week course in Emergency Operations for Tribal Governments (E-581) at EMI during the course of the 1702 disaster. The DAE is highly skilled and respected in this field, and his contribution to this course would have been of great value.

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1702-I-04	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	FEMA Employees are not provided full and accurate information regarding their personal liabilities when driving rental cars on deployments.
1702-I-05	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	FEMA does not have a standardized policy on how much travel time to allow employees when they drive their private vehicles to a disaster assignment. We were unable to get a clear answer from HQ HR as to the answer to the following question: When a FEMA employee elects to drive to a disaster site and the drive time exceeds the time that would be allowable had the FEMA employee flown to the disaster site, for which hours should the employee be compensated – the actual drive time or the time that it would have taken to fly (including time to get from home to the departure airport and to get from the arrival airport to the employee's accommodations)?
1702-I-06	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	FEMA often operates at facilities that are provided by states and local agencies. We often do so without a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that lays out the terms of our occupancy and use.
1702-I-07	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	Software packages such as Adobe Acrobat 8.0 that are purchased (repeatedly) to improve productivity, reduce bandwidth usage or reduce storage space should not be returned to Regional Logistics instead of Mount Weather at the end of the disaster. This will ensure immediate availability of the software for future disaster deployments.
1702-I-08	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	: At the beginning of this disaster, both FEMA employees and contractors were deployed with expired badges or no badges. New badges could not be issued until suitability was determined by Headquarters. As a result, we had FEMA employees and contractors sitting in the office and hotel rooms not being able to be issued equipment or go to the field. There were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in place for Admin or Security in regards to badging. The Admin section was not adequately staffed to handle the unforeseen new bow wave of increased workload associated with badging at the start of a disaster which was in addition to the normal high level of administrative activity at the front end of a deployment.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1702-I-09	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	The Individual Assistance (IA) Technical Assistance Contractors (TACs) do not check-in at the JFO. Instead, they go directly to assignments in the field and report to the JFO through an Inspections Coordinator. When the Inspections Coordinator leaves the JFO, that position's responsibilities are transitioned to a person at HQ. Though untested, it is believed that the 24/7 connectivity to the IA TACs is lost to the FCO when this transition takes place. Also, JFO Admin and Help Desk staff are often called upon to relay messages to IA TACs while they are deployed to work with FEMA. This is often during times of family crisis. These messages generally come from family members who only know that their family member is "working for FEMA". Only after searching staffing lists to no avail does the FEMA staff (out of desperation) think to make enquire of the Inspections Coordinator. This slows notification to the TAC and frustrates FEMA staff who are involved in the search.
1702-I-10	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	For the Public Assistance (PA) Program, all Project Worksheets (PWs), which document the basis for reimbursement, are scanned into the National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS). Viewstar is the software program installed in the scanners that are used to scan the PWs and backup documentation into NEMIS. This process is critical to timely processing and distribution of PA grant monies. The scanners are shipped to the JFO from the Disaster Information Systems Clearinghouse (DISC). They arrive at the JFO in poor working condition and are typically inoperable – so there's downtime while IT works on the scanner to get it operational. In 1702-DR-SD, we are on our third scanner – and all 3 arrived in inoperable condition. Every few hours, the scanner goes down and as a result, 1702-DR-SD is currently unable to process 200+ PWs. Data Entry can enter the PWs but because scanning cannot be done, the PWs cannot be forwarded for review. Public Assistance Coordinators (PACs) are unable to conduct their reviews and move PW's forward to the other review queues (environmental, historical, insurance, etc). Basically, we are unable to process the PW's from start to completion in a timely
1702-S-01	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		All deployed staff need to be briefed on disaster specific emergency information, and measures to protect themselves in such an emergency on each disaster to which they are deployed. Reasonably expected emergencies differ from state to state and from season to season.
1702-S-02	5/22/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		FCO utilized a certified on-site CPR/AED/First Aid Instructor to train deployed personnel. This improved flexibility and efficiency while reducing costs.
1713-I-01	7/17/07 Severe Storms, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	Travel card limits are set too low and, as a result, are impacting on FEMA's ability to support its mission. The \$10,000 credit card limit and the \$100 a week cash advance limits are not high enough to realistically support staff being deployed to disaster events and should be raised.

ITEM NUMBER	EVENT NAME	ITEM TYPE	SUBMITTED DATE	STATEMENT
1713-I-02	7/17/07 Severe Storms, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	There is no regular training for managers and their administrative assistants who request and approve NACS rights available. There are some sites that can be utilized for guidance but they are scattered and cumbersome. There should be regular physical training available to teach, guide and refresh personnel in this position.
1713-I-03	7/17/07 Severe Storms, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	The FEMA Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP) is at risk of losing credibility due to the perception that many difficult issues are not being resolved. Since many of these same issues have affected different disaster operations, it is apparent that the factors are systemic and that someone is making a conscious decision not to change policy. Some topics are heartburn issues with employees, who watch carefully to see how they are handled by FEMA and who take note when policies do not change even though the issues are repeatedly identified in successive disasters. At the field level, the perception is that some offices at FEMA HQ appear to have directed closeout of several RAMP Action Plans without a careful policy review. Closing action on a RAMP issue by saying that change isn't possible because of an established policy supports neither the purposes of program improvement through RAMP, nor the "New FEMA" initiatives being directed by the FEMA Administrator to have this organization work better and smarter. As a result of seeing problematic policies remain unchanged, many employees are now questioning whether it is worth their time and effort to identify policy-related RAMP
1713-I-04	7/17/07 Severe Storms, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	9/21/2007	The current \$100.00 a week limit of ATM withdrawal is an embarrassment. The \$100.00 a week amounts to \$14.285 per day and it is impossible for a person to exist on this amount
1713-S-01	7/17/07 Severe Storms, and Flooding	Smart Practice		Taping the feet or bases of partition walls for safety purposes.
0502-I-01	Region V August 7, 2007 COOP Event	Issue		Better Coordination with DOD was needed.
0502-I-02	Region V August 7, 2007 COOP Event	Issue		Cost of the move was more than expected.
0502-I-03	Region V August 7, 2007 COOP Event	Issue		There are not enough phone lines for all desks to have phones.
0502-I-04	Region V August 7, 2007 COOP Event	Issue		There are not enough phone lines for all desks to have phones.
9999-I-45	RAMP Application Training	Issue		Incident is misspelled under the FIRST Organizational Element

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1699-S-01	5/6/07 Kansas Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		Use ground rods on all generators.
1709-I-01	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	SUPERVISION OF CONTRACT EMPLOYEES: Federal supervisors and employees often do not understand the "ground rules" or correct relationships between federal and contract employees.
1709-I-02	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	SHORTAGE OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE STAFF: The public assistance effort had difficulty acquiring enough staff to deal with this disaster.
1709-I-03	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	TRAVEL RULES AND REGULATIONS: FEMA's travel rules are not clear and create time-consuming disagreements, appeals, and unnecessary paperwork.
1709-I-04	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	HIGH-SPEED PRINTER MALFUNCTIONS: Breakdowns in high-speed printers delayed production of maps, reports, and charts needed to support field operations.
1709-I-05	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	NETWORK ACCESS FOR PLANNING SECTION: The JFO planning section has to send transmit maps and other heavy data traffic over the internal network. The wireless network at the JFO is too slow to support printing of maps and other planning products such as reports and charts.
1709-I-06	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	GRAPHICS-PRODUCTION SOFTWARE FOR PLANNING SECTION: The JFO planning section does not have the software needed to design and produce graphic materials demanded by other staff sections of the joint field office (JFO).
1709-S-01	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		GO-KIT WITH GIS SOFTWARE AND GEO-DATA: The geographic information systems (GIS) unit in the planning section of a joint field office (JFO) needs immediate access to maps and other geographic data about the affected disaster area.
1709-I-07	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	REGISTRATION INTAKE: The National Processing Service Center (NPSC) stopped taking registrations even before a decision was made about the governor's request for presidential disaster declaration.
1709-I-08	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	NPSC LIAISON OFFICER: A new policy of the National Processing Service Center (NPSC) allows a liaison officer to serve with the JFO field staff for a maximum total of 15 days, not long enough for a liaison officer to learn about the situation and problems that usually develop several weeks into disaster-relief operations.

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1709-S-02	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		DEPLOYMENT OF NPSC LIAISON OFFICER In the past, numerous problems develop regarding processing of individual applicants for individual assistance. Many of the problems are derived from the way the National Processing and Service Center (NPSC) conducts business, and from the NPSC's requirements for process information that feeds into the NPSC's automated processing system. A NPSC liaison officer can help prevent problems from developing.
1709-I-09	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	PROCESSING APPLICANTS' SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: The current method of transmitting an applicant's supporting documents from the intake point at a disaster recovery center (DRC) to the national processing service center (NPSC) uses old techniques that are labor-intensive, time-consuming, and that delay services to applicants.
1709-I-10	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	LETTERS FOR INELIGIBLE APPLICANTS: Normally, when the NPSC determines that an applicant is ineligible for disaster relief, the NPSC automatically sends a letter to the applicant, explaining that the applicant is ineligible and how to appeal that decision. In this case, though, applicants who registered months ago have still not been notified of their ineligibility.
1709-I-11	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	DISASTER LEGAL SERVICES POLICY: FEMA's policy concerning legal assistance by telephone and at disaster recovery centers is not clear.
1709-I-12	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	MOBILE DISASTER RECOVERY CENTER EQUIPMENT: Office equipment carried aboard the standard mobile disaster recovery center (MDRC) vehicles breaks down often or otherwise fails to support the function of the DRC.
1709-I-13	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	COAST GUARD PROCUREMENT RULES DELAYED OPERATIONS: US Coast Guard procurement rules now applying to FEMA interfere with disaster relief field operations.
1709-I-14	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	DELAY IN FUNDING FEMA CREDIT CARD DELAYED OPERATIONS: A delay in funding for credit card obligations rendered the FEMA credit card useless to help set up the joint field office (JFO) --- when streamlining such emergency operations was the purpose for issuing the credit card.
1709-I-15	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	INFLEXIBLE CONTRACTS: FEMA headquarters acquisition staff sometimes produces contracts whose narrow language does not allow vendors the flexibility to accomplish the work or provide the services intended by the contract.
1709-I-16	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	NETWORK UPDATES INTERFERED WITH JFO OPERATIONS: Mt Weather's practice of force-feeding downloads of updated software, patches, and security determinations during field office working hours wastes staff time and delays services for disaster victims.

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1709-I-17	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	LIMITS ON GOVERNMENT CREDIT CARD CASH-ADVANCE WITHDRAWALS: FEMA's \$100 per-week limit on cash withdrawals on government travel cards creates a hardship for some field office staff.
1709-I-18	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	DOCUMENTATION OF FLOOD EVENT, HIGH-WATER MARKS: To help prevent or mitigate future floods, hydrologists and flood-plain managers needs information about the height of flood water. The problem is that we don't have anyone to go out and record that perishable information immediately after the event.
1709-I-19	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	SHORTAGE OF SECTION-406 MITIGATION SPECIALISTS: Because of a shortage of Section-406 mitigation specialists, we missed opportunities to inform local officials about mitigation possibilities at public assistance "kick-off" meetings.
1709-L-01	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Lesson Learned		MODERNIZED DAMAGE-ASSESSMENT METHODS: FEMA's current damage assessment methods rely on out-moded, labor-intensive, and inefficient manual recording of the location, nature, and magnitude of damage effects --- and for estimating the amount of debris that may have to be removed.
1709-S-03	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		AIR CARDS FOR FIELD WORKERS: Community relations workers who stay on the road for long periods in isolated areas need to be in regular communications with the JFO without having to travel long distances to find an internet access point.
1709-S-04	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		NEWS RELEASES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Local governments asked the JFO for the latest FEMA press releases. The public-affairs information distribution system is not designed to communicate with local governments, so the public affairs officer tried to find other ways to get information to them.
1709-S-05	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		MAIL ROOM TRACKED OUTGOING DHL DELIVERIES: The problem was that joint field office staff previously had no method for tracking-down outgoing mail shipped via DHL or US mail.
1709-S-06	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		The RESIDENTIAL SUBSTANTIAL FLOOD ESTIMATOR (RSDE) program allows flood plain administrators who inspect buildings after a flood to determine if a building suffered substantial damage as defined by the National Flood Insurance Program guidelines. We find that local-government flood-plain administrators make better use of the RSDE program if we provide training.
1709-S-07	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		INTERIM FLOODPLAINS MAPS: The problem is that in some flood-damaged areas outdated or missing floodplain maps can detract from the effectiveness of floodplain management

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1709-I-20	6/29/07 Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue [Action]	11/14/2007	FEMA NETWORK BANDWIDTH: The FEMA network did not make best use of the available bandwidth for data communications, which delayed some data-dependent disaster-relief activities.
1718-I-01	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue		FIELD-LEVEL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION : FEMA's management information systems provide useful information from a headquarters perspective, but do not support the management of emergency operations at the field level.
1718-I-02	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue		UNMET NEEDS REFERRALS: FEMA policy and guidance concerning referral of applicants to voluntary agencies is confusing and inconsistent.
1718-I-03	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue		LETTERS TO INELIGIBLE APPLICANTS: FEMA has suspended sending out the customary letters to notify applicants that they are not eligible for federal disaster relief under the Stafford Act.
1718-I-04	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue		ERRORS IN REGISTRATION DATA ENTRY AT NPSC: Errors in entry of registration data at the National Processing Service Center delayed benefits for applicants, and increased FEMA processing costs.
1718-S-01	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		HUD AND USDA LIAISON HELPED FIND HOUSING FOR DISASTER VICTIMS: Housing resources are scarce in some areas of Region VI. This is a recurring problem in rural areas and small towns.
1718-S-02	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		SMART PRACTICE: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE PREPARED BRIEFING BOOKS FOR CONGRESSIONAL STAFF: The field office external affairs office surveyed the district offices of Oklahoma's five congressional office staffs to find out what information they wanted.
1718-I-05	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue		CONTRACTOR OVERSIGHT DURING FIELD OPERATIONS: Some contract staff working directly with or directly supporting FEMA field activities refused to take any directions or accept any oversight by FEMA officials responsible for those activities.
1718-I-06	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue		TRIBAL LIAISON OFFICER: The role of the tribal liaison officer is not clear.
1718-S-03	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		USE OF REGIONAL STAFF FOR PDAs The joint field office at Midwest City served as the staff for five disasters that affected Oklahoma within very short intervals. The JFO staff had difficulty keeping sorting out and maintaining a separate accounting for each disaster.

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1718-S-04	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Smart Practice		CONSOLIDATION OF 406 MITIGATION STAFF WITH PUBLIC ASSISTANCE STAFF: Section 406 mitigation staff worked directly with public assistance instead of operating as part of the mitigation branch of the joint field office.
1718-I-07	8/24/07 Oklahoma Severe Storms, Tornadoes, and Flooding	Issue		INCONSISTENT OPERATING METHODS: Methods and operating techniques for public assistance and mitigation assistance are inconsistent from disaster to disaster and region to region.
0003-I-01	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/2/2008	Dedicated funding needs to be earmarked prior to creating expectations that FEMA Regions will participate in exercises.
0003-I-02	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/2/2008	With the integration of the Preparedness Directorate into the Federal Emergency Management Agency, it is vital that all FEMA employees are identified as such and speak from a doctrinally grounded, fully coordinated, and unified posture. FEMA's newly formed National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), National Exercise Division (NED), must dialogue with the FEMA Regions early in the venue selection process and prior to engaging State and Territory leadership.
0003-I-03	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/2/2008	The use of HSIN and multiple information management systems is complicated, duplicative, and leads to unnecessarily repetitive information submissions.
0003-I-04	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/2/2008	The NRCC should not report on field activities or change reports generated by the RRCC, JFO or initial operations field elements.
1577-I-09	California Storms	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	In response to specific early priorities of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), a work order for Hazard Mitigation technical assistance (geotechnical/structural and civil engineering) support for the Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) was submitted in February. However these positions were not filled for two months (just prior to closure of the DRC). Hazard Mitigation (HM) should review and revise its current staffing policies and procedures to preclude a reoccurrence.
1577-I-07	California Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Department of Homeland Security policy requires field procurement of support supplies and services after the initial 30 days of field operations to be conducted through GOV EMALL, a pre-arranged, pre-qualified vendor system. GOV EMALL did not provide timely support to Disaster Recovery Center operations in the post-30 day period, particularly with regard to delivery schedules. FEMA should develop a business case to support exceptions to the restrictive DHS policy
1577-I-05	California Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	The State of California expressed concern that FEMA continues to develop its own Joint Field Office (JFO) Information Technology (IT) systems without considering interagency, interoperability requirements. Strengthening Interoperable Communications Capabilities is one of the seven national priorities under the National Preparedness Goal. Also, as outlined in the National Incident Management System, effective communications, information management, and information and intelligence sharing is critical to domestic incident management and essential for the JFO to operate efficiently.

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1577-I-02	California Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Public Assistance (PA) Inspectors found that the large file size of automated Project Worksheets required field workers to use laptop computers capable of reading and writing CD-ROM media. Sufficient numbers of such computers were not available, adversely affecting inspection work schedules.
1577-I-03	California Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Graphical Information System (GIS) support for the Joint Field Office was not provided in a timely manner, evidently resulting from insufficient initial inventory and subsequent procurement delays.
1577-I-04	California Storms	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	As presently configured, NEMIS Project Worksheets will permit only one form of Hazard Mitigation to be applied per Project Worksheet, even though a single Project Worksheet may cover a project with multiple sites, each with different Hazard Mitigation applications.
1589-I-01	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	After the JFO has been active for 30 days, office supplies are required to be purchased through DOD E-mail in accordance with DHS Directive 731, Strategically Sourced Commodities Policy and Procedures. Using this mandated source has resulted in many compelling issues such as deficient delivery time, excess shipping cost, excess minimum orders, and shortfalls in ability to check order status, as described in ?Discussion?. The contracting cadre manager has requested a blanket waiver for use of DOD E-mail during entire disaster declaration. This request is still pending DHS consideration.
1589-S-02	New York Severe Storm	Smart Practice		The Housing Task Force that was established during this disaster was very successful and provided valuable housing resources and information for applicants housing needs
1589-S-01	New York Severe Storm	Smart Practice		
1589-I-10	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Information]		Inaccurate determinations have caused problems for the victim.
1589-I-09	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Infrastructure Cadre is inadequate to support Field Operations. Multiple, catastrophic and frequently occurring disaster operations have stretched the Infrastructure Cadre (DAE) to the breaking point. Formerly, the DAE rolls were large enough to meet program needs. Recently, however, actions driven from the top down have reduced the cadre size to the point where JFO Program leads have had to turn to the TAC for staff to serve as Project Officers and Public Assistance Coordinators.
1589-I-08	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Streamline is a major hindrance for the processing of applicants correctly and for appeal rights. Auto determination needs to be turned off
1589-I-07	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Households with member(s) who are physically disabled, mentally disabled, or have other special needs may require assistance to navigate through all the steps necessary to receive the disaster assistance for which they may be eligible. The first step is to identify the target population, and then follow up.
1589-I-06	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Inspectors are not following NFIP instructions.

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1589-I-03	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Returned checks causes confusion for victim and State.
1589-I-04	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Time delay in employing local hires.
1589-I-02	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	After the JFO has been active for 30 days, office supplies are required to be purchased through DOD E-mail in accordance with DHS Directive 731, Strategically Sourced Commodities Policy and Procedures. Using this mandated source has resulted in many compelling issues such as deficient delivery time, excess shipping cost, excess minimum orders, and shortfalls in ability to check order status, as described in ?Discussion?. The contracting cadre manager has requested a blanket waiver for use of DOD E-mail during entire disaster declaration. This request is still pending DHS consideration.
1589-I-05	New York Severe Storm	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	NEMIS Report not valid and timely.
1594-I-01	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Federal staging areas were simultaneously established for national NDMS and US&R resources at the Meridian NAS by the NRCC that duplicated an Operational Staging Area (OSA) established by the ERT-A at the Meridian NAS.
1594-I-02	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Independent actions by the NRCC and Federal Resource Teams -- such as the NDMS & US&R teams -- without consultation or coordination with the ERT-A caused problems with resource accountability, personnel safety, and support capabilities of Federal assets.
1594-I-04	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	All transportation resource requests were required to be forwarded from the RRCC to NRCC causing a severe "bottle neck" in the system that lead to delays and confusion.
1594-I-06	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Time delay for connectivity of OSA personnel to the FEMA network during the critical response operation period had an adverse impact on operational activities during this event.
1594-I-08	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Action Request Form (ARF) numbering convention used by the RRCC does not specify State, which leads to unnecessary time delays and confusion when reconciling request.
1594-I-14	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	10/27/2003	The DHS-FEMA shirt wear is not designed for women sizes.
1594-I-13	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) staff did not follow ADD procedures when released from this disaster operation.
1594-I-12	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	3/30/2006	Requirement to split travel for surge and declared disaster accounts caused unnecessary work for employees during the critical response phase and also caused increased lodging and rental car cost.
1594-I-11	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	The requirement to develop the OMT for this event combines support and planning elements at the RRCC and NRCC with Operational elements at the ERT level. This caused unnecessary complexity, added development costs, and degraded critical-outputs resolution due to conflicting mission of the Coordination Centers and the ERT.

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1594-I-10	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	Requirement for the ERT to update/complete the CONOPS Operation Matrix Tool (OMT) when the required information is already available in the Incident Action Plan places an unnecessary burden on the ERT.
1594-I-09	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The JFO setup Kit container was not properly stocked.
1594-I-07	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	On-call ERT-N was not activated for a predicted major hurricane landfall along a highly populated coastal area on the Gulf Coast, which indicates either a reluctance to use an ERT-N or there is no solidified need for ERT-N's.
1594-I-05	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	The NRCC, RRCC, and the ERT-A were issuing Action Request Forms (ARF) for the State of Mississippi disaster operations that were not coordinated that lead to duplication, conflicts, and confusion.
1594-I-03	Hurricane Dennis	Issue [Action]	4/3/2006	There were no "Operations Coordination Calls" established for Hurricane Dennis, the result which lead to a lack of visibility by Operational leaders on important resource issues and other concerns that could impact their operations.
1604-I-01	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	There is no standard national surge training curriculum for CR. As a result, there is no mission statement for surge CR training, no defined core training requirements, no training plan, no consistency between training sites, and no articulated concept of what specific skill sets are required for students deploying to the field. In addition, the 8 hour training was not sufficient to minimally train volunteer CR staff to be the "face of FEMA" for disaster victims
1604-I-04	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	A variety of letters and e-mails went out to agencies announcing the need for augmentees with varying information. Often this correspondence was inconsistent and not signed..
1604-I-03	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	ADD and other Headquarters offices were doing deployment call outs and there was a lack of consistent information being provided.
1604-I-02	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	The number of personnel issued accountably property items was extremely large for a operation of this magnitude. The tracking and accountability for issued phones was especially difficult. FEMA also Issued significant amounts of organizational clothing. These items need to be pre-staged at Logistics Centers to avoid costly local purchases when inventories are depleted---and our inventory was depleted.
1604-I-05	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	It was difficult to activate an operation of this magnitude without having an adequate facility to receive the initial deployment of over 4,500 personnel to the Atlanta Community Relations Resource Center (CRRC). The facility selected was simply not adequate for the mission.
1604-I-07	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	From an HR Standpoint, the biggest problem we encountered was lack of communication and poor planning between those of us in the field doing the actual hiring and the folks back at HQ making the call to deploy.
1604-I-09	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Establishing an operation of this size without anyone ensuring that sufficient support staff are in place to handle the over 4,000 personnel being deployed to Atlanta to be sent out to the field as community relations. The CRC was not fully operational when students began to arrive and the payroll unit was not properly staffed.

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1604-S-03	Hurricane Katrina	Smart Practice		We established positions at JFO to perform CR liaison activity between the JFO and CRRC. Verification of ADD Deployments with CR Points of Contact in the field has proven beneficial to reports and tracking.
1604-S-02	Hurricane Katrina	Smart Practice		By creating a family environment we have produced a high level of cooperation, the ability to take on a variety of assignments from other areas, and cross train staff with little consequence.
1604-S-01	Hurricane Katrina	Smart Practice		The personnel recruited to perform Community Relations were predominantly from the Fire Service. While the Fire Service provides a ready source of manpower experienced in incident response, the Community Relations performs in not by any means incident response. While attempts were made to recruit from other sources, notably the Peace Corps, CERT Teams, and Coast Guard Reserve, Fire Service personnel made up the largest number of new recruits for CR.
1604-L-03	Hurricane Katrina	Lesson Learned		The key to proper processing of payroll and timely payment to employees is open communication, written guidance and constituency between all entities
1604-L-02	Hurricane Katrina	Lesson Learned		Clear communication between Community Relations and ADD regarding any movement of employees from one location to another is imperative.
1604-L-01	Hurricane Katrina	Lesson Learned		Planning was tasked with the responsibility of managing the operation to deploy incoming staff for Community Relations requirements for other locations that were impacted by Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. Multiple agencies were requested by FEMA to assist with the staffing needs. This task was given to Planning by the Community Relations Resource Center Manager to effectively and efficiently deploy incoming staff as requested by the impacted areas. At the height of the deployment requests, Planning was unable to efficiently process Community Relations incoming staff through the Community Relations Resource Center in Atlanta, GA due to no single point of entry and no Standard Operating Procedures.
1604-I-13	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	There is no formal process to determine when personnel can be released for just cause.
1604-I-12	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Information]	4/5/2006	In support of recent hurricanes, CR?s primary function is to hand out flyers to victims. If I were a disaster victim without phone, electricity or some means to get to a disaster center, etc. and received a flyer informing me of this information, I would be infuriated.
1604-I-11	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	EMI, NFA, DAE, and RTM trainers, training managers, administrative and tech support surge staff would benefit from a Surge train the trainer course. Job descriptions for each position should be developed and presented. A review of course and alternative delivery styles beyond lecture format would be beneficial.
1604-I-10	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	Lack of process to determine deplorability of individuals. Currently, individuals are being deployed to DFOs, JFOs, etc. without verifying travel cards worthiness. Transportation for these individuals is at the expense of the Federal Government, and a waste of taxpayers? dollars.

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1604-I-08	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	No consistent method of informing Travel Card Processing of de-mobilization. Timely decrease of credit card limits significantly reduces, if not eliminates, the opportunity for credit card misuse once deployment ends.
1604-I-06	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	4/5/2006	TOO MUCH PAPER; increased chances for errors due to manual processing.
1478-I-12	Ohio Storms	Issue [Information]		DFO computers imprinted with a "ghost" image from a master image.
1467-S-04	New York Storms	Smart Practice		Administration Section had an email address created and published to allow candidates for local hire positions to submit resumes electronically.
1603-I-14	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	A lack of planning and a shortage of trained public assistance staff undermined public assistance efforts and contributed partly to FEMA's poor public image.
1603-I-15	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA failed to get information out to applicants and to the public about the purposes of public assistance grants.
1603-I-16	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	7/10/2006	Public assistance surge training failed to train employees adequately.
1603-I-17	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	NDMS teams did not have complete supply-and-equipment caches, and arrived in the disaster area without enough supplies.
1603-I-18	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Medical strike teams drew their supplies and equipment from the parent DMAT team --- a practice that diminished the capability of both teams.
1603-I-19	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	NDMS teams cannot provide their own logistical support, and FEMA had trouble re-supplying NDMS teams in the field.
1603-I-20	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The JFO staff had trouble tracking the procurement of ambulances and then had difficulty tracking the number and location of ambulances after they arrived in the disaster area.
1603-I-21	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA Headquarters' insistence on detailed justification for DMAT teams delayed delivery of urgently-needed medical assets to the disaster area by at least 24 hours.
1603-I-22	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	There is no staging site for NDMS teams arriving for further deployment to the Gulf Coast.
1603-I-23	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Some people with medical problems were evacuated from group sites without their medical records or medications.
1603-I-24	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA rules prohibit the use of federal financial assistance to repair private medical facilities. In some cases, those rules resulted in increased costs to the federal government, when there were other less expensive options.
1603-I-25	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	The DMORT team working at the St. Gabriel morgue designed a victim identification program intended to help identify deceased storm victims. Other agencies would not share information that would help with identification.
1603-I-26	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	DMORT teams do not have the personnel and equipment needed to collect human remains efficiently in a large-scale recovery mission.
1603-I-27	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	A DMORT Task Force formed by the Joint Field Office was successful in allowing subject matter experts to concentrate on their mission. Note: This item was also entered as a "SMART PRACTICE."
1603-S-01	Hurricane Katrina	Smart Practice		DMORT Task Force formed by the Joint Field Office was successful in allowing subject matter experts to concentrate on their mission.

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1603-I-28	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Procedures for recruiting and processing local-hires are cumbersome and expensive.
1603-I-29	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Lack of coordinated support from GSA Procedures for recruiting and processing local-hires are cumbersome and expensive.
1603-I-30	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA's shortage of sufficient trained surge staff for individual assistance and community relations add extra training time and costs --- and results in partially-trained field staff.
1603-I-31	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Decentralized command and control and poor communication with Area Field Offices resulted in disjointed and inconsistent operations in the field.
1603-I-32	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	There is currently no systematic means to determine how many people are in shelters.
1603-I-33	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	ESF-6 is short of trained staff.
1603-I-34	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Mobile-home- and travel-trailer-operations --- normally a function of Individual Assistance --- were handled by an independent housing command that did not work well with the JFO staff.
1603-I-35	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA's contractors are not trained in FEMA's programs.
1603-I-36	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	Trailers for the disabled and elderly were not available for months.
1603-I-37	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA's program to install mobile-home and travel-trailer at group sites raised questions about jurisdiction over selection of sites and who can stay in them.
1603-I-38	Hurricane Katrina	Issue [Action]	6/9/2006	FEMA needs the option of restoring or installing permanent housing in some circumstances.
0003-I-05	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/2/2008	Need to establish safety and security requirements for deploying personnel into potentially unsafe environments, including more reliable process for interpreting impact of technical data.
0003-I-06	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/2/2008	Numerous systems (NEMIS, e-tasker, TDL-e-caps, IMCAD) are needed to order and track resources, contrary to the concepts of ICS. This leads to duplication of requests and does not allow an effective single point to monitor all resource requests. Regions need the ability roster and train Resource Unit staff, aligned FEMA with ICS protocols, using processes that are not duplicative or overly complicated.
0003-I-07	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/2/2008	HQ Logistics should not disagree with resource requirements from the RRCC and the field.
0003-L-01	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Lesson Learned		The active participation of trusted agents from FEMA's Response and Recovery Division as well as trusted agents from other federal agencies aided the exercise planning process and enhanced the realism of the exercise.
0003-I-08	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/2/2008	There should be a pre-determined process to waive "Buy American Act" (BAA) requirements when dealing with disaster responses in the Pacific Territories and other OCONUS areas.
0003-I-09	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/16/2008	The mechanics for providing reporting orders to requested staff after the initial activation of the RRCC staff and ESF is not clear.
0003-I-10	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/16/2008	No established position for safety in the RRCC structure.

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0003-I-11	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue		There was confusion and a lack of relevant safety and health information provided to the FCO/SCO and ESFs at the JFO in Portland due to barriers created by the current command structure.
0003-I-12	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/16/2008	Circulating the Situation Report (and other files) in a tables format results in the inability or imitated ability to access the information contained in the report by end-users who only have access to Blackberry devices.
0003-I-13	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/16/2008	HSIN as a tool to use in the RRCC and the JFO was not efficient or effective and did not meet the operational needs of the RRCC/JFO Staff and the HSIN national situation report may actually give a false impression of what is known in the field
0003-I-14	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/16/2008	RDDs proved to be very unfamiliar to most Operations and RRCC and JFO staff, especially the intricacies of contamination, stay times, response procedures, etc.
0003-I-15	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/16/2008	Significant issues exist related to the operations of the PFO cell and the JFO as to integration, information sharing and relevance of operations.
0003-I-16	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/16/2008	No policies or procedures exist for integration of Consular Assistance and Action teams into the operations of the JFO for a disaster or terrorist event.
0003-I-17	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/16/2008	There needs to be a standardized approach and procedures for intial standup of RRCC and NRCC operations and information flow
0003-L-02	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Lesson Learned		Needed a Subject Matter Expert (SME) to interpret data and provide analysis of RDD related impacts
0003-L-03	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Lesson Learned		There was confusion and a lack of relevant safety and health information provided to the FCO/SCO and ESFs at the JFO in Portland due to barriers created by the current command structure.
0003-L-04	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Lesson Learned		A regional finance specialist was tasked with approving mission assignments in TDL as comptroller for funding. They had not received any information as to what the budget was as aresult of that since itwas an exercise, nothing would be found in IFMIS.
0003-L-05	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Lesson Learned		Capabilities to provide geospatial situation summary briefing material of ESF-6 and IMAAC activity to DHS Secretary Chertoff and summary Critical Infrastructure Assessment map-books to executive top officials was enabled by integrating NGA, FEMA RX GIS, FEMA RVI GIS and Planning functions. The unit was able to work around limiting factors including malfunctioning hardware (8-years old) and lack of coherent data structure due to limited storage resources (no server).
0003-L-06	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Lesson Learned		Proper coordination needs to happen with check-in staff, to ensure accountability of employees and to ensure staffing pattern counts are correct.
0003-S-01	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Smart Practice		The RRCC/JFO should routinely share the ARF log (and MA log) with the State EOC
0003-I-18	TOPOFF 4 FSE	Issue [Action]	1/16/2008	The FIRST Team was inadequately utilized for the TOPOFF e exercise resulting in a large exoenditure of resource for a little operational gain.
1731-I-01	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Issue [Action]	3/3/2008	The role and responsibilities of the Tribal Liaison vis-a-vis ESF-15 (External Affairs) and operational program delivery needs to be clearly defined.

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1731-I-02	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Issue [Action]	3/3/2008	Combining program planning requirements when applying for assistance will ease the burden on state, local and tribal entities.
1731-I-03	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Issue [Action]	3/3/2008	The inability of unified command partners to share information on IT systems at an incident, to include GIS data, negatively affects operations.
1731-I-04	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Issue		Logistics, Planning, Admin/Finance, and Operations urgently require a user-friendly integrated IT system to support the mandate that FEMA maintain resource status during an incident. The status and location of all personnel, equipment, teams, and commodities ordered and deployed to a disaster must be maintained on a real time basis and reported in an accurate and timely manner. FEMA's current organizational structure, procedures, and IT systems do not meet this requirement.
1731-I-05	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Issue [Action]	3/3/2008	The current expectation is that the Planning Section at a JFO will assume total responsibility for (1) check-in and check-out of personnel and resources; and (2) maintaining the status and location of all resources, to include personnel, equipment and IRR. To accomplish this, Planning Sections would need to deploy large numbers of personnel to be present at various Staging Areas and AFOs. Requiring Planning Sections to assume these responsibilities is highly labor intensive and will require a great deal of training.
1731-I-06	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Issue [Action]	3/3/2008	The manual process used to compile information and process products for the Incident Action Plan (IAP) was labor intensive and error prone.
1731-I-07	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Issue		SBA be included in the early stages of planning on the opening and closing of LAC/AAS/DRC's along FEMA, the State and the county authorities.
1731-S-01	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Smart Practice		Having the Region IX Administrator (Nancy Ward) serve as the Senior Federal Official for the California wildfires (FEMA-1731-DR-CA) was extremely successful due to her pre-existing relationships with State and local officials and her knowledge of the Stafford Act.
1731-S-02	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Smart Practice		The development of the Concept of Operations Plan that articulated the integration of direct federal assistance and operational activities between FEMA and the State of California prior to the California wildfires (FEMA-1731-DR-CA) was extremely beneficial.
1731-S-03	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Smart Practice		The FEMA draft Incident Management Handbook (IMH) was used as the basis for establishing incident management operations and organization during the California wildfires (FEMA-1731-DR-CA) and proved extremely valuable in standardizing operational procedures.
1731-S-04	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Smart Practice		The deployment and utilization of the ERT-N Red was extremely successful during the California wildfires (FEMA-1731-DR-CA).
1731-S-05	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Smart Practice		During response to the California wildfires (FEMA-1731-DR-CA), the development and deployment of specific Task Forces—Tribal, Housing, Debris, and Erosion Control— with representation from multiple Federal and State agencies to establish and implement specific courses of actions was very successful.

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1731-S-06	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Smart Practice		In contrast to the movement of Bothell MERS to San Diego, which can require up to two days, the deployment of FIRST Atlanta via airlift to provide communications at shelter operations at the Qualcomm Stadium during the early stages of the California wildfires (FEMA-1731-DR-CA) proved invaluable for real-time situational awareness with forward-deployed resources.
1731-L-01	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		Advance Planning Function needs to be a part of the Planning Section.
1731-L-02	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		Placement of mitigation teams in the vicinity of tribes that have been affected by a disaster event has proven to be an excellent way to bring along those tribes who elect, or are required to come directly to FEMA as grantees. It is often the case that tribes have to update previously approved multi-hazard mitigation plans, must begin the planning process, or are having problems understanding how to manage previously awarded mitigation grants, etc. By placing teams in the field who have a broad range of expertise on the overall mitigation programs, these tribes are able to obtain one-on-one assistance. In addition, the small group advantages of having a "Division H" Tribal unit, allows for much closer coordination and information exchange between functions, such as Mitigation, Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, VOLAGS, and the designated Tribal Liaisons. In particular, joint field visits elicited good discussion and clarification of cross-program issues with the tribes.
1731-L-03	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		The Air Coordination Branch was properly staffed and functioned very well.
1731-L-04	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		Public Outreach to deliver mitigation messages is an integral component of the Mitigation Community Education and Outreach (CEO) Group. The Building Improvement Store Program as implemented for 1731-DR-CA was very successful and proved the effectiveness and value of the program. This program was in place for five weeks and program staff interacted with over 116,000 residents of five counties.
1731-L-05	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		A possible outreach venue that has been successfully tried in the past is to implement mitigation outreach initiatives in conjunction with VOLAG and the Long Range Recovery Task Force meetings. This outreach is similar to the Speakers Bureau assignments but instead of waiting for requests to arrive, we actively pursue speaking engagements with church organizations, corporations, various neighborhood groups such as condo associations, realtors and manufacturing firms. Although we assign individuals when the opportunity arises to speak at large community meetings, experience shows that most people do not ask the questions that are pertinent to their individual situations or issues in front of large groups of strangers. In smaller groups like a church congregation, or neighborhood group, they are amongst friends and fellow group members and are more likely to be able to absorb technical information, discuss their issues and see the value of the available publications.

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1731-L-06	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		The use of remote sensing data, in conjunction with existing GIS data, allowed flood staff to focus their resources on those areas with the highest likelihood of damage
1731-L-07	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		FEMA's ESF 6 allowed NVOAD access to information and provided a platform for disseminating NVOAD Member information to other operating partners, Federal Agencies, State level and NGOs.
1731-L-08	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		The use of the National Incident Management System to include the Incident Command System enabled the quick integration of a diverse workforce into the Joint Field Office.
1731-L-09	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		The use of Division Supervisors assigned to each Operational Area (County) as well as one assigned to the Tribal Communities greatly enhanced the integration of federal, state, regional, county, and tribal response and recovery efforts.
1731-L-10	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		Best Practice: Deploying members of the FCO cadre to serve as an executive group to attend external meetings on behalf of the Disaster FCO was highly successful.
1731-L-11	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		On almost all Disaster operations, the Human Resources Unit hires, at the request of the various Sections in the JFO, Local Hire employees to perform a variety of duties within the JFO. This process is coordinated with the State Employment Service and requires that files of applications be maintained for each job opening. For DR-1731-CA, an Access database has been used which greatly reduced the time and effort required to perform this function.
1731-L-12	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		During a disaster the payroll process is completed by the HR Unit and is for the most part a manual process. Team members must type up regional timekeeper fax headers, cross-check all timesheets with ADD generated staffing patterns and project/calculate overtime hours. The entire payroll process is manually maintained using various word documents and excel spreadsheets to track timesheets/QT statements and overtime authorizations. This process is labor intensive and as with any manual process errors can be made. An Access Administration database has streamlined each and every aspect of payroll, tracking rotations and the phone list for the JFO.
1731-L-13	10/24/07 California Wilfires	Lesson Learned		EA was given permission to develop a newsletter to educate CA Tribes about emergency preparedness, mitigation and FEMA help when disasters are federally declared.