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Note:	This is one of a series of self-study guides for a country or area, prepared for the use of USAID staff assigned to temporary duty in those countries. The guides are designed to allow individuals to familiarize themselves with the country or area in which they will be posted.

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No.: 200701753

MAR 25 2010

I refer to your letter dated March 11, 2007 regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

We searched for and reviewed the self study guides that you requested and have determined that all except one of them may be released. They are on the enclosed disc. One of the guides is being released with excisions.

An enclosure provides information on Freedom of Information Act exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

We have now completed the processing of your case. If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,

for Margaret P. Grafeld, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

63934 Federal Register/Vol. 69, No. 212
Rules and Regulations

Subpart F – Appeal Procedures

§171.52 Appeal of denial of access to, declassification of, amendment of, accounting of disclosures of, or challenge to classification of records.

(a) *Right of administrative appeal.* Except for records that have been reviewed and withheld within the past two years or are the subject of litigation, any requester whose request for access to records, declassification of records, amendment of records, accounting of disclosure of records, or any authorized holder of classified information whose classification challenge has been denied, has a right to appeal the denial to the Department's Appeals Review Panel. This appeal right includes the right to appeal the determination by the Department that no records responsive to an access request exist in Department files. Privacy Act appeals may be made only by the individual to whom the records pertain.

(b) *Form of appeal.* There is no required form for an appeal. However, it is essential that the appeal contain a clear statement of the decision or determination by the Department being appealed. When possible, the appeal should include argumentation and documentation to support the appeal and to contest the bases for denial cited by the Department. The appeal should be sent to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LC, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, DC 20522-8100.

(c) *Time limits.* The appeal should be received within 60 days of the date of receipt by the requester of the Department's denial. The time limit for response to an appeal begins to run on the day that the appeal is received. The time limit (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) for agency decision on an administrative appeal is 20 days under the FOIA (which may be extended for up to an additional 10 days in unusual circumstances) and 30 days under the Privacy Act (which the Panel may extend an additional 30 days for good cause shown). The Panel shall decide mandatory declassification review appeals as promptly as possible.

(d) *Notification to appellant.* The Chairman of the Appeals Review Panel shall notify the appellant in writing of the Panel's decision on the appeal. When the decision is to uphold the denial, the Chairman shall include in his notification the reasons therefore. The appellant shall be advised that the decision of the Panel represents the final decision of the Department and of the right to seek judicial review of the Panel's decision, when applicable. In mandatory declassification review appeals, the Panel shall advise the requester of the right to appeal the decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel under §3.5(d) of E.O. 12958.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

(b)(1) Withholding specifically authorized under an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and properly classified. E.O. 12958, as amended, includes the following classification categories:

- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
- 1.4(b) Foreign government information
- 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
- 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
- 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
- 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(h) Information on weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

ARMEX	Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2778(e)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
EXPORT	Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. USC 2411(c)(1)
FSA	Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4003 & 4004
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f)
IRAN	Iran Claims Settlement Act, Sec 505, 50 USC 1701, note

(b)(4) Privileged/confidential trade secrets, commercial or financial information from a person

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product

(b)(6) Information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

(b)(7) Information compiled for law enforcement purposes that would:

- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
- (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
- (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (D) disclose confidential sources
- (E) disclose investigation techniques
- (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

(b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions

(b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request, excised with the agreement of the requester

HAITI

A Self-Study Guide

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This Self-Study Guide on Haiti is intended to provide US government personnel in the foreign affairs community with an overview of important issues related to the history, geography, politics, religion, culture, economics, and international relations of Haiti. The guide merely serves as an introduction and should be used as a self-study resource for further exploration of information and issues. With this in mind, each reader is strongly encouraged to undertake independent reflection using the self-study questions for further research identified at the end of each section. Included in the guide as research tools are a bibliography of publications on Haiti and an index to useful sites on the Internet. For more detailed bibliographic information, readers can consult *"A Reader's Guide to Haiti,"* prepared for the Foreign Service Institute in September 1999.

Dr. Robert Maguire, Director of Programs in International Affairs at Trinity College in Washington DC and the Trinity College Haiti Program, prepared this first edition guide on Haiti. The views expressed in this guide are those of the author and attributable sources and do not necessarily reflect official policy or the position of the Department of State or the National

HAITI SELF STUDY GUIDE

INDEX

Introduction

Haiti's size on the world stage has been compared with an accordion: sometimes, when the instrument's bellows are open, it is large; sometimes, when they are closed, it is small. Over the past three hundred years the nation located on the western third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola has on numerous occasions occupied a position at the center of the world stage, highly disproportionate to its small size and population. At other times, it has stood at the edge of that stage, marginalized or isolated through external imposition and/or internal choice.

By the mid-eighteenth century, the French colonial possession was renowned as one of the world's most productive slave-based plantation economies. By the early twenty first century, the independent state had become notorious for its grinding poverty, political strife, and extreme internal social and economic polarization. In between, Haiti emerged in 1804 as the Western Hemisphere's second independent nation, forged from a successful revolt of slaves. Cast subsequently as a pariah state by the world's slave-holding powers and as a beacon of liberty and hope for oppressed peoples worldwide, the new country was plagued by a severely damaged post-revolution economy, harsh international sanctions, and successive internal power struggles leading largely to decades of misrule. The proud and promising, but troubled nation entered the twentieth century under the watchful eye of an expansionist United States, which invaded its southern neighbor in 1915, occupied it until 1934, and has cast a long shadow over Haiti ever since. During the Cold War era, the harsh Duvalier family dictatorship (1957-1986) received tacit support from the US. In the post-Cold War/Duvalier era, US support for Haiti's quest to develop more democratic governance ultimately resulted in its leading a 1994 multinational military intervention that removed a defacto military government and restored an elected president.

Haiti has emerged from its past as a country of contradictions. Its two-century quest to forge an independent nation from the ruins of a successful revolution has evolved into a country alarmingly dependent on external resources to make ends meet and fraught with severe internal dichotomies along lines of geography, ethnicity and race, culture, and access to power and resources. From its early promise as a beacon of liberty and hope for the world's oppressed, Haiti has become a place from which oppressed and impoverished citizens flee, seeking a better life elsewhere.

How are we to understand Haiti? Is it a nation victimized by others because of its glorious past? Is it a country being destroyed by its own internal dichotomies? Is it a place that can still achieve its early promise if only the halters of inept governance and severe strife can finally be removed? Or, is it, perhaps more realistically, a combination of all of this? This study guide is not intended to answer these questions. Rather, it is designed to provide background information that can open paths toward further research. Those who follow those paths will reflect on issues and questions that can help them better understand Haiti's multidimensional past, present, and, certainly, future.

MAP OF HAITI
(Base 801108 12-97)

Geography and Population

Location and Physical Geography

Haiti is not an island. Rather, it is located on the western third of the island of Hispaniola, bordered on the north by the Atlantic Ocean, to the west and south by the Caribbean Sea, and to the east by the Dominican Republic. Its closest, non-contiguous neighbors are Cuba, Jamaica, the Turks & Caicos Islands, the Bahamas, and the United States. Haiti's southern coast is the first landfall traveling due north from Columbia. Occupying a land mass of 10,714 square miles, Haiti is roughly the same size - though not the same configuration - as the state of Maryland. The country's shape is likened to that of a crab's claw, with northern and southern peninsulas reaching from its main body toward the west. Settlements at the ends of the northern and southern claws are closer to Cuba and Jamaica, respectively, than to Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince. In addition to its mainland, the country is composed of several offshore islands, principal among them being La Gonave and La Tortue.

Haiti is mostly mountainous and rugged. Approximately 63 percent of Haiti's territory is composed of lands having slopes greater than 20 percent. Conversely, less than 20 percent of the territory has land with slopes less than 10 degrees. Two mountain ranges, the Massif de la Hotte and the Massif de la Selle, which includes Pic la Selle the country's highest peak (c.2,900 feet), run in a west to east direction along the southern part of the country. Another range, the Massif Central, gives rise to the Central Plateau. Smaller mountains extend towards the north and west. Plains and river valleys, although limited in size, are the most productive agricultural land and the most densely populated areas. The Northern Plain, the Artibonite River Valley, and the Cul-de-Sac Plain, just north of Port-au-Prince, are the country's most extensive areas of low-lying land. Haiti's rivers are numerous but short, mostly not navigable, and often flow with significant irregularity.

As a rule, Haiti's tropical climate is humid and characterized by daily variations of temperature that are greater than annual variations. Temperatures vary with altitude, however. The mountain village of Kenscoff located to the interior of Port-au-Prince, for example, has an average temperature of 60 degrees, whereby the coastal capital averages 79 degrees. The country's location on the leeward side of Hispaniola and its mountainous terrain also combine to create weather conditions that vary considerably. Rainfall patterns range from less than 12 inches a year in the northwest to more than 120 inches in the southwest mountains. Tropical storms, hurricanes, droughts and floods are not infrequent. The country has no active volcanoes. While Haiti has not experienced a major earthquake in more than 50 years, mild tremors are felt on occasion.

Much of the country's natural vegetation has been removed during the past three centuries through clearing for agriculture, grazing, and the exploitation of timber. This process has accelerated in recent decades with increased population pressure. Haiti's virgin forests have been reduced to less than 6 percent of the land area, as forest resources are sought for

firewood and charcoal production. Subsequently, an estimated 6,000 hectares of top soil are washed away annually as food crop cultivation and grazing have moved into higher and steeper elevations. Irregular river flow, flash floods, salinization of fresh water supplies and landslides have resulted from the extensive removal of surface vegetation in Haiti's mountainous watersheds. As Haiti's natural vegetation has disappeared so have the habitat and shelter of its wildlife. Wild boars are no longer present. The number of avian species present in Haiti has dwindled significantly. Many remaining species are endangered, including the country's flamingos, which are hunted without restriction.

Human Geography

Haiti is densely populated. Exact population data, however, is unavailable, even though the government attempted to undertake a census in 2001-2002. The estimated population in 2000 was 8 million, with an annual growth rate of about two percent. Haiti's population is a young one with approximately 40 percent under 15 years of age. The average life expectancy is 51 years. Emigration and the ailments of poverty function in tandem to limit Haiti's population growth. Haiti's growing prevalence of HIV/AIDS infections, estimated at 5 percent of the population, may have begun to have a negative impact on population growth.

About 60 percent of Haitians live in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture. Migration to cities, especially Port-au-Prince whose metropolitan area population now exceeds 1.5 million, has increased considerably in recent decades. Thirty years ago, the percentage of the rural population was closer to 75 percent. As Port-au-Prince expands, its settlements climb up already deforested mountainsides, spread onto marshy seaside lands, and occupy former agricultural lands, particularly in the Cul-de-Sac Plain north of the city. Despite significant off-the-land migration, rural populations continue to grow. Throughout the country, the plains and valleys are densely populated. While most hillsides and steep mountains are dotted with homesteads and cultivated plots, some areas of extreme erosion and drought have been abandoned.

Although only 30 percent of Haiti's surface is considered suitable for agriculture, more than 40 percent is under cultivation. Most farms, very small and severely undercapitalized, are worked by their owners. With few areas irrigated, most farmers depend on rainfall, a risky business in the best of times and a terribly risky business today with numerous micro-climate areas becoming drier as a result of deforestation. Rural settlements, generally dispersed, are sometimes organized along roads. Peasant homesteads, usually small wooden framed houses with a roof of corrugated iron, are often grouped in extended family clusters, called *habitacion*. Household furnishings are sparse. Individual means of transportation are virtually nonexistent. Peasant women usually market food crops that are produced by men, following by foot, donkey or truck (*tap-tap*) the periodic markets usually organized twice a week in local towns and villages.

Municipalities, also referred to as *bourg*, are scattered throughout the country. As administrative, political and commercial centers, most have a police station, a court of justice, a town hall, small shops or depots lining the principal thoroughfare or surrounding a central square, and a Roman Catholic church. Real urban life, however, is limited to Port-au-Prince and to five or six large towns, all of which are a small fraction of the size of the country's capital. Although settlements characterized by large villas, often hidden behind high walls, have grown up in the hillsides surrounding the capital, those areas are also occupied by expanding slums, or *bidonvilles*. Shantytowns have also expanded onto the coastal areas west and north of the city, and toward the Cul-de-Sac Plain, where many of the country's small middle or professional class also have been building homes. The vast majority of Port-au-Prince residents live on meager incomes and the signs of poverty are ever present in this highly congested city and its equally congested suburbs.

Political Geography

Haiti is divided into a three geopolitical units: *departements*, of which there are nine; *communes* (or municipalities) of which there are 133, and *sections communales*, of which there are 565. Haitians living overseas - or the Diaspora - are often referred to as being part of the country's Tenth Department. Departments correspond roughly with American states; municipalities with counties; and communal sections with towns or districts.

Department names relate either to their location or one of their major geographic features. The dominant settlement in each department is its capital city, as follows:

Department	Capital City
West *(Ouest)*	Port-au-Prince
South East *(Sud-Est)*	Jacmel
South *(Sud)*	Les Cayes
Grand Anse	Jeremie
Center *(Centre)*	Hinche
Artibonite	Gonaives
North East *(Nord-Est)*	Fort Liberte
Nord *(North)*	Cap Haitien
North West *(Nord-Ouest)*	Port-de-Paix

Haiti's two largest off shore islands, Isle de la Gonave and Isle de la Tortue, are part of the West and North West departments, respectively.

Geography and Population *Self-study questions:*

1. What are current political and economic implications of Haiti's geographic location, particularly given its proximity to Cuba, Jamaica, the Bahamas and the United States? What are the implications of Haiti's location due north of northern South America?

2. Only a few islands in the world are occupied by two independent nations, with Hispaniola, occupied by Haiti and the Dominican Republic, being one of them. It is fair to say that in most cases of shared-island occupation, relations between the two neighbors have not always been smooth. Identify current issues linked to the shared occupation of Hispaniola. Think in terms of both challenges and opportunities.

3. A small country with a rugged topography, Haiti has been - and to a great extent still is - a nation of small farmers. What is the impact of the three factors of size, topography, and dominant land use on the country's prospects for development?

4. Current estimates place Haiti's population in 2025 at 12 million. What impact will the country's continued population growth most likely have on internal migration patterns and the environment? What prospects are there to modify this impact, particularly in view of continued population growth?

History

European Contact and The Colonial Period

Within little more than 100 years of the 1492 landfall by Christopher Columbus, the original Arawak Indian population of the entire island, estimated by some to have been as high as one million, had virtually disappeared as a result of warfare, brutal treatment and rampant disease. Throughout this post-Columbus period, the Spanish settlement on La Isla Espanola was sparse and concentrated mostly in its eastern end, particularly around the port town of Santo Domingo. By the early seventeenth century, French pirates, or *bucaniers*, occupied the western side of the island, particularly La Tortue Island off its northwest coast, using their location as a base for attacking Spanish shipping. By mid-century, the French had begun to establish plantations in mainland coastal areas for the cultivation of sugarcane, coffee, cocoa, indigo, tobacco and cotton, and for the extraction of precious tropical hardwood. In 1664, when French settlers founded the town of Port-de-Paix in the northwest, the French West India Company took possession of the French settlements.

In 1697, by the Treaty of Rijswik, the western third of the island was formally ceded to France by Spain and was renamed Saint-Domingue. The colony's population increased greatly during the 18th century, particularly as a result of the massive importation of black Africans to work as slaves on the expanding plantations. By 1789, 500,000 of a total population of 556,000 were slaves. The remainder of the population was composed of 32,000 whites and 24,000 free blacks or people of color *(gens de couleur)*. Fueled by slave labor and state-of-the-art infrastructure development paid for by massive amounts of French overseas investment, Saint-Domingue became the most prosperous colony in the New World, sending such volumes of sugar, molasses, rum, coffee, cocoa, indigo, cotton and hardwood to France as to require more than 700 ocean-going vessels annually to haul off the colony's products.

Revolt, Revolution, Independence

The highly disproportionate number of slaves among the colony's population, combined with their harsh treatment, was a recipe for revolt. On August 24, 1791, in place called Bois Caiman on the northern plain, slaves rose in rebellion, led by a now legendary vodou priest named Boukman. Over the next several years marauding slaves set fire to fields and attacked plantations, spreading fear throughout the colony. In order to maintain its beleaguered colony, France abolished slavery there in 1794. Inspired at least in part by the ideals set forth by the leaders of the French Revolution, however, the winds of dissatisfaction in what had become the world's wealthiest plantation colony, did not settle, particularly among the colony's people of color who had allied themselves with the leaders of the French Revolution.

In May 1801, Toussaint Louverture, a former slave, became Saint Domingue's governor general and remained loyal to the French. Shortly thereafter, however, Napoleon sent a 30,000

strong expeditionary force from France to restore the old regime, including slavery. Led by his brother-in-law, General Charles Leclerc, the force also included several exiled mulatto officers. Other mulatto officers, however, including Alexandre Petion, did not join the French. In May 1802, after several months of struggle against the expeditionary force, Louverture came to terms with Leclerc. The French, however, abrogated the agreement, captured Louverture through deceit, and imprisoned him in France, where he died on April 7, 1803.

Subsequently, two other of Haiti's "founding fathers," Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe, led the black army against the French in what became a razed earth campaign to expel them and avoid the reinstitution of slavery. Demoralized by their opponent and decimated by disease, particularly malaria, the French were defeated, surrendering on November 9, 1803 and withdrawing from Saint Domingue on November 18. On January 1, 1804, the revolutionary leaders proclaimed independence from France and restored the Arawak name, Haiti, to the hemisphere's second independent nation. The Haitian blue and red flag was by removing the white stripe from the French tricolor. From the beginning of the revolt, French colonists and some people of color had begun fleeing the colony, with many going either to Cuba or to Louisiana. At independence, the few whites that remained in Haiti were expelled, leaving the country in the hands of a population composed largely of former slaves. Indeed, at independence, it is said that over half of Haiti's population was African-born.

The Post Independence Period

The war of independence had largely destroyed Haiti's state-of-the art plantation infrastructure and, with it, its economy. Christophe managed to improve the shattered economy temporarily by enacting a policy of 'military agriculture' that forced former slaves to work on the plantations along the northern plain. The stigma of plantation labor, however, inspired most laborers to resist the recuperation of large-scale, commodity-based agriculture. They opted, rather, either to retreat from the plantations and establish small subsistence farms in isolated locales, or to occupy the remnants of plantation land, mixing food crop and cash crop cultivation with animal husbandry. As such, Haiti's peasantry was constituted.

While foot soldiers and their families retreated from slavery and plantation agriculture, the country's leaders set upon each other. On October 17, 1806, Dessalines who had previously assumed the title Emperor Jacques I, was killed while trying to put down a mulatto revolt. Christophe then took control of the country, but civil war soon broke out between Christophe in the north and Petion, based in Port-au-Prince, in the south. In his northern kingdom, Christophe built a spectacular palace, Sans Souci, as well as an imposing fortress, the Citadelle Laferriere, also by way of forced labor. In the south, Petion took a different approach toward economic recuperation. He granted land to former slaves and encouraging them to engage in mixed crop agriculture. Peasant coffee cultivation was a particularly important source of revenue to the state and for a new class of largely French-speaking, educated mulatto businessmen, or *commercants,* who resided in the coastal cities and controlled the country's commerce.

Upon his death in 1818, Petion was succeeded in the south by another mulatto, Jean-Pierre Boyer. In 1820, Christophe suffered a stroke. With mutinous soldiers and a population angry over his attempt to re-institute plantation labor moving toward his palace, the revolutionary leader committed suicide, allowing Boyer to unify the country. In 1822, Boyer invaded and conquered Santo Domingo, which, having declared itself independent from Spain the previous year, was engulfed in struggle with the Spanish crown. He immediately abolished slavery in the former Spanish possession. With Haitians entering Santo Domingo and Spanish whites and Creoles leaving the Haitian-occupied country in large numbers, the racial configuration of the eastern two-thirds of Hispaniola was fundamentally changed. The occupation continued until 1844, when it was expelled by a popular uprising.

An International Pariah State

Issued shortly after independence, the Haitian constitution declared that any person of African origin or descent would gain freedom and citizenship there. As such, the hemisphere's second independent nation quickly became an international pariah when European colonial powers, joined by the United States, officially shunned the black republic, hoping to isolate from their own slave-based economies its 'virus' of freedom-from-slavery. Haiti's southern neighbors replicated this pattern. Simon Bolivar, fighting for independence in South America, visited Haiti in 1815 and 1816, finding respite from his Spanish adversaries and receiving material support from Petion. Under US pressure, however, Bolivar betrayed the friendship of Haiti in 1826, when he led the new republics of Latin America in joining with the United States to exclude Haiti from the hemisphere's first region-wide meeting of independent states held in Panama.

In 1825, France grudgingly recognized Haitian independence return for an indemnity of nearly 100 million francs, to be paid at an annual rate until 1887. By 1838, the young republic, having transferred to its former colonial owner more than 30 million francs that could have been used for national recovery, suspended payments. The United States finally recognized Haitian independence in 1862, as it was about to grant its own slaves freedom. Other republics in the Western Hemisphere slowly followed suit, commencing with Brazil's recognition of Haiti in 1865 and ending with Peru's in 1938.

Political Turbulence and the US Occupation

Between 1843, when Boyer was overthrown by a military coup, and 1915, when the United States invaded the country, Haiti was plagued by political unrest. Of 20 leaders during this period, 16 were either overthrown or assassinated. Political rivalries tended to be framed by geography and skin color. Attempts to establish enduring political parties and develop stable government were weakened not just by rivalries, but also by the exclusion of women, rural dwellers and the poor from the political process at the behest of deeply engrained, Port-au-Prince-based *classe politique*.

A leadership pattern characterized as *politique de doublure*, or politics by understudy, emerged during this period. Under this framework, a black political leader, usually with a military background and often a regional strongman, after forcing himself upon Port-au-Prince and gaining the presidency of the country, would develop a mutually beneficial relationship with the capital's political and commercial classes, who then became his advisors, or 'understudies.' Such arrangements were often quite tenuous, however, as some presidents turned against their advisors, while others were abandoned by them once their grip on the palace weakened. Under this system of governance, the Haitian treasury was successively depleted by rulers with a tenuous grip on power who were eager to gain the material trappings of that power, and whose desires were eagerly accommodated by their understudies within the country's commercial class.

As US political and economic interests expanded into the Caribbean at the end of the 19th Century, Haiti's political instability offered a rationale for increased US involvement in its domestic affairs. In 1905, when the United States took Haiti's customs into receivership, US business interests gained a secure financial foothold in the sovereign republic and valuable concessions from its government. In 1915, with political unrest in Port-au-Prince and the specter on the horizon of intervention by Germany to protect its own economic interests in Haiti, United States marines were dispatched to Port-au-Prince. While US authorities justified their action on the grounds of the Monroe Doctrine and humanitarian concerns, many Haitians believed the US rational for invading their country was to protect and expand its business interests, and to establish a military base at Mole St. Nicolas in Haiti's far northwest. After the invasion, Haiti signed a treaty with the United States - originally for 10 years, but ultimately extended through 1934 - establishing US political and financial domination. In 1918, Haiti received a new constitution that permitted foreigners to own land in the black republic for the first time since independence.

One effect of the US occupation was the nominal re-establishment of the mulatto elite in control of the government. Another was the dissolution of the old revolutionary Haitian army and its replacement by a Marine-trained *Garde d'Haiti.* Many black Haitians resented the occupation, which they believed excluded them from public office and subjected them to daily racist indignities at the hands of the marines. Causing further resentment was the revival of a practice from Christophe's time by which the US Marines organized *corvee*, or forced labor, groups for public infrastructure projects such as road-building. Resentment grew quickly to resistance, with several thousand guerrilla fighters called *cacos* engaging in armed skirmishes with the US Marines. With their protégés in the newly formed Haitian national security force at their side, US Marines eventually dealt the cacos a fatal blow when their leader, Charlemagne Perault, was captured and killed in 1919.

Having tamed the resistance, US forces turned more fully to the exercise of 'nation building,' putting energy and resources into public works programs that oversaw the construction of health clinics, bridges, roads, electrical systems and urban sewage systems. In the Haitian countryside,

evidence of this infrastructure remains today, particularly in the form of the military outposts constructed throughout the country and occupied jointly by US Marines and the *Garde d'Haiti*.

After the Occupation

In August 1934, facing increased pressure at home and in Haiti, President Franklin D. Roosevelt withdrew the marines, ending the longest foreign occupation in US history. The national infrastructure of military occupation was handed over to the Haitian Guard. Governance of the country was handed to President Stenio Vincent who had been elected to that position by a national assembly reconstituted in 1930. A plebiscite extended Vincent's term to 1941 and amended the constitution so that future presidents would be elected by popular vote.

In 1937 troops and police in the Dominican Republic, with popular support, massacred thousands of Haitian laborers there, while thousands more fled across the border into Haiti. Haitians had been recruited and drawn to work as cane cutters in the DR's plantation sector that had expanded significantly under the 1915 - 1924 US occupation of that country. The massacre drew upon a deeply rooted enmity between the two countries that had its roots in the 1824-1844 Haitian Occupation. Dominicans, with their Spanish culture and greater admixture of European blood looked disdainfully upon black Haitians. Haitian labor, however, had become necessary to the Dominican economy.

In 1946, Haitian workers and students protested in opposition to Vincent's successor, Elie Lescot, who had altered the constitution to extend his term in office. Three ranking officers in the reconstituted Haitian army *(Force Armee d'Haiti - FAd'H)*, which had emerged from the occupation-era Haitian guard, led a *coup d'etat*, seizing power and overseeing the election of Dumarsais Estime to the presidency. When Estime sought to extend his own term in 1950, the same three officers again took control. Soon after, one of them, Colonel Paul E. Magloire, was elected president in a plebiscite overseen by the army. Magloire in turn sought to remain in power, but in December 1956 the army forced him to resign from office.

The Duvalier Dictatorship

In 1957, against a backdrop of political and social unrest, Francois Duvalier, or "Papa Doc" - a former employee of a US medical aid project - was elected president with the tacit support of the army. Duvalier espoused black nationalist rhetoric, promising to end domination by the mulatto elite and to put political and economic power into the hands of the black masses. In July 1958, following an unsuccessful attempt by the army to remove him from office, Duvalier organized a private paramilitary force - the *Tontons Macoutes* - sanctioned to terrorize the population and provide a counterweight to the FAd'H. His control firmly established, Duvalier had himself elected president-for-life in 1964.

Under the dictatorship of Francois Duvalier, Haiti became, in effect, a police state and a pariah state, increasingly isolated from the world community. By the late 1950's, Duvalier's political opponents and the country's professional class - often one and the same - had begun to flee the country in growing numbers, heading for self-imposed exile in the United States, Canada, France, and French-speaking Africa.

By the eve of his death in 1971, Papa Doc had led Haiti along a path of destruction. The country faced a diminished economy, the withdrawal of most international aid, the collapse of what had been a vibrant tourist industry, a considerable 'brain drain,' and a largely traumatized population. Nevertheless, having successfully established control over the army by bestowing power and privilege in the hands of loyal supporters, Duvalier was able to orchestrate a transition of power to his 19 year-old son, Jean-Claude.

The regime of president-for-life Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier immediately sought to distance itself from the repressive reputation of Francois and gain international respectability. Promising an 'economic revolution,' the new president and his handlers, most of whom had been integral players in his father's regime, managed to present an improved face of Haiti, to which there was a positive response. International aid - particularly from the United States - revived. Some Haitian professionals returned. Even the tourism sector experienced a modest revival. While superficially repression appeared to decline, the population, as a whole, experienced few expanded civil liberties and political opposition to the government remained taboo. Matching the more quiet, but continued, political repression was growing poverty among the citizenry. As a result, by the late 1970's the new facade of economic development was matched by the images of increasingly desperate poor people setting to sea in precariously overloaded sailboats to seek refuge in South Florida.

In 1980, Jean-Claude Duvalier married a mulatto, Michele Bennett, and transferred to his wife and her family and associates many of the privileges and prerogatives that had belonged to his father's inner circle. Subsequently, a rivalry grew between the 'dinosaurs' of Papa Doc and the 'technocrats' brought into government by Jean-Claude. Many of the latter were mulattos. While trying to maintain international economic support, the regime followed an uncertain path, appearing to lift political controls only to restore them brusquely as soon as dissent was expressed. As internal repression continued, Haitians in communities throughout the country began to organize grassroots groups seeking to improve their member's social and economic status. These groups, usually aligned with churches or non-governmental organizations, began to emerge as a new challenge to the regime.

Duvalierism without Duvalier

In late 1985 and early 1986, the government attempted, without great success, to repress countrywide demonstrations against high unemployment, poor living conditions, growing economic disparities, and the lack of political freedom. With his power base eroded as a result of internal rivalries, and popular unrest blanketing the country, Duvalier and his wife fled Haiti

for France on February 7, 1986 aboard a US military aircraft. A five-member civilian-military council, the National Council of Government (CNG), led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy assumed control of the government while the country became engulfed by popular explosions of what Haitians called their second independence. Concurrently, the *dechoukaj*, or uprooting, of the physical trappings of the dictatorship took place. The Tontons Macoutes disappeared. As the Duvalier paramilitary force dissolved, the army quickly regained its dominant position. Against this backdrop of hope, unrest and transition, the CNG authorized a national commission to draft a new constitution that was then ratified in a popular referendum in early 1987. The elections mandated by that document were scheduled for late the same year.

Violence led by pro-Duvalier elements and the Namphy-led army, plagued the country during the lead up to the November 1987 elections. On election day, voter massacres in Port-au-Prince carried out by gangs allied with the FAd'H forced their cancellation. In early 1988, Leslie Manigat, an exiled intellectual with political ambitions, was chosen President in an election run by the army. Most voters had stayed home. Only months later, Namphy overthrew Manigat and then, in return, was sent into exile in September 1988 in a coup led by junior officers of the FAd'H but orchestrated by another General, Prosper Avril, who was installed as president.

Facing mounting opposition at home and pressure from abroad, Avril left the country in early 1990 when he failed to move the country toward elections. Avril was succeeded by a prominent judge, Ertha Trouillot, according to constitutional guidelines. Careful oversight from within Haiti and by the international community resulted in the political acquiescence of the army, enabling Trouillot's provisional government to hold successful national elections in December 1990.

The runaway victor of the 1990 presidential race was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest and charismatic personality who had gained a massive following among the country's urban and rural poor as an outspoken critic of the Duvalier and military regimes. Throughout the post-Duvalier period, Haiti had been plagued by a struggle between those vying to impose "Duvalierism-without-Duvalier" and those seeking political, social and economic reform, with various international actors, including the United States, perceived as playing influential roles in Haiti's struggle to cast off its authoritarian past. It was in this context that Aristide's victory, sanctioned by international observers, was seen as a glowing victory of the reformers.

Aristide was inaugurated on February 7, 1991, exactly five years after the demise of the Duvalier dictatorship. As an outspoken opponent of Duvalierists, the army, and the socio-economic status quo, he was despised by most of the country's elite's and the military. His efforts to initiate political, economic and social reform were interrupted in late September when a violent military *coup d'etat* forced him and his government into exile, turning Haiti once again into a police state and an international pariah. Over the next three years, turmoil engulfed the country as an estimated 3,000 - 5,000 supporters of Aristide and his government were murdered, and countless others cowered in fear of the *defacto* regime. Tens of thousands took

to boats going north, fleeing violence and repression not seen since the darkest days of Duvalier rule.

Although the coup reversed the gains of those seeking reform, those gains were not erased. The coup leader, General Raoul Cedras, and his co-conspirators succeeded in grasping power, but they failed either to consolidate their hold on it or to gain the national and international legitimacy they desperately sought. The strength and depth of Haitian support for the Aristide government, the legitimacy granted to it as a result of the 1990 elections, and the refusal of international actors to abandon Aristide and embrace the defacto rulers ultimately enabled Haiti's nascent process of change to get back on track.

Following three years of international attempts to unseat the defacto government through combinations of negotiations and economic sanctions, in September 1994, a United Nations-sanctioned and United States-led multinational military force entered Haiti, much to the delight of the vast majority of Haiti's population, and forcefully escorted the leaders of the defacto military government from power. Shortly thereafter, President Aristide and his elected government was restored to power. The government was restored to a country deeply traumatized by the attempted return to past. It was also restored to a country whose overall human, institutional, economic and physical infrastructure had disintegrated considerably from the indignities of the recent period of military mis-rule.

In the presence of international peacekeepers, trainers, program-planners, economists, and election monitors, Aristide completed his five-year term of office. Some of the trauma of the past was treated when the Haitian army was dissolved, a new national police force was created, national elections were held, and attempts to rebuild the shattered country got underway. Yet, when Rene Preval was inaugurated as Aristide's successor in February 1996, Haiti remained a country whose future was very much burdened by its past.

History *Self-study questions:*

1. At the time of Haiti's independence, more than 50 percent of its population had been born in Africa. What impact might this have had on the evolution of Haiti's post-independence social, economic and political path, and how might this have contributed toward contemporary differences between Haiti and other Caribbean nations whose independence came much later?

2. In addition to becoming an isolated, international pariah state following independence, Haiti was also forced to deplete its treasury to pay the indemnity demanded by France and required for Haiti's ultimate diplomatic recognition by other nations. What impact did these factors have on Haiti's ability to pursue a path toward economic development in the aftermath of independence? What was their long-term impact on the country?

3. Today, Haiti is the home of an elite *classe politique* known more for its ability to resist change than for embracing it. How might Haiti's historical path have contributed to this phenomenon?

4. In 2004, Haiti - and Haitians - will celebrate the country's 200th anniversary of independence. In the context of celebrating the bicentennial, what historical issues ought Haitians stress, particularly given that this will be a golden opportunity to communicate them to the rest of the world?

5. The Haitian army has a long legacy of active involvement in Haitian politics, often serving as the arbiter of who gets to - and stays - in power. Today, Haiti does not have an army; rather, it has a recently created national police force (HNP) under civilian jurisdiction. A new national police force created under the US Occupation rapidly transformed itself into the Haitian Armed Forces (FA'dH) and re-instituted the army's role as political arbiter. Are conditions different or similar today regarding a potential parallel evolution of the HNP? Identify key indicators to help determine whether or not the HNP is evolving in the same way as the FAd'H.

Government and Politics

Political Dynamics

Since the inception of the Haitian state, the country's political system has displayed certain enduring dynamics. Traditionally, Haitian politics have been the domain of the army and urban elites. Other potential political actors, with the occasional exception of the Catholic Church, have been excluded from political life. As the country's twin power-brokers, the national security forces and the urban elites usually developed mutually beneficial alliances to achieve their political and economic objectives. Political analysts have referred to this alliance as the aforementioned *politique de doublure,* with elites in the background, pulling the strings of power.

Typically, Haiti's leaders have been anointed or self-anointed, as opposed to rising to leadership based on ideas, work, or merit. As a rule, political movements led by charismatic leaders have dominated the country's political life. Political parties have tended to be either absent or bereft of longevity or large constituencies of supporters. Without exception, Haitian politics have focused on one office - the presidency. For generations, individuals have aspired to this single jewel in the country's political crown. Elective offices other than the presidency have little or no importance in and of themselves. Rather, they exist for little more than rewards, patronage, and prestige.

The quest for political power seems to have given rise to two enduring political axioms. The first is win - and win big, with the means justifying the end. The second is should one lose, the task becomes to undermine the winner, with the means once again justifying the end. In a political system based upon these twin axioms, layered over with the politics personality, not platforms, and with a pattern of little tolerance for dissent, there is no tradition of political negotiation, grace in victory, or being part of a 'loyal opposition.'

Patterns of political leadership in the *Republique d'Haiti* have resembled those seen in a dynastic monarchy. Leaders have a long history of attempting to extend their terms in office at will. Many have succeeded. Some, including most recently both Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier, have given themselves lifetime mandates as *President-a-vie*. Limits on power, particularly as prescribed by the country's constitution or laws, have been ignored by the will of force, symptomatic of the well-known Haitian proverb, "Laws are made of paper, and bayonets are made of steel." Free and fair elections have been a rare commodity, and, until recently, the peaceful transfer of power from one officeholder to another was virtually unknown.

Since the 1986 ouster of the Duvalier dictatorship, the 1987 ratification of a new constitution, and the 1994 dissolution of the army, however, these patterns have begun to change, albeit slowly. Although the jury remains out in terms of how far changes in Haiti's political dynamics

will go, whether they will be sustainable, and if they will result in enduring democratic governance, some changes are worth noting. For example, significant changes have occurred in political participation. Since 1986, those traditionally excluded from meaningful participation in Haiti's political life - the urban and rural poor - have begun to exert an independent political voice. That participation was especially seen in the 1990 election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Since then, improvements in political participation have included the election to local and national offices of Haitians from modest backgrounds. As a result, some erosion of the traditional power of the urban elites who compose the country's *classe politique* is in evidence.

The successful transition of elected presidents experienced in 1996 from Aristide to Preval, and in 2001 from Preval to Aristide, represents another change in Haiti's political dynamics. The deeply enrooted "presidentialitis" of Haitian politics and the corresponding limited balance of powers within the Haitian political system remains evident, however, in spite of the 1987 constitutional make-over of how government in Haiti would be created and function. Political parties, though evident in large profusion on the political landscape, remain either weak institutions dominated by self-anointed leaders, or structures more akin to the manifestation of the successful political movement of a charismatic figure than a durable political institution. The former is characteristic of the so-called parties grouped at present under an opposition organization called the *Convergence Democratique (CD),* whereas the latter appears to apply to the ruling party, *Fanmi Lavalas (FL),* created by Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

The Constitutional Framework

The 1987 Constitution, overwhelmingly approved by popular referendum, declares the intent to establish and maintain democracy in Haiti through the lens of ideological pluralism, electoral competition, and the separation of powers. Mindful of the political dynamics outlined above and the perfidious abuse by leaders of past constitutions, the framers of the 1987 version incorporated articles stipulating that it can be amended only with a two-thirds majority approval by two consecutive sessions of the National Assembly. They also ban a sitting president from initiating and enacting amendments during his term of office, along with the practice of amendment by popular referendum. The constitution was applied - or suspended - selectively by military governments between 1987 and 1994. With the reinstatement of democratically elected government in 1994, the constitution has also been fully reinstated. Since 1994, governmental actions as a rule have been bound by the constitution and justified, at times not without controversy, by what is written in that ambitious and complex set of laws. Significantly, debate around the legitimacy of a government's actions now tends to revolve around considerations of their constitutionality.

Key constitutional provisions seek to reshape Haiti's governmental system and counteract certain political traditions. Specifically, the constitution reduces presidential power through various checks and balances and decentralizes government authority, creating elected councils for local government. It specifics provisions for an independent judiciary, abolishes the death penalty, and focuses on the protection of civil rights through restrictions on the arrest and

detention of citizens. The 1987 document calls for a career civil service based on merit, separates the police from the army and placing the former under civil jurisdiction, and recognizes both French and Creole as official languages.

Among constitutionally mandated institutions to operate or oversee certain key governmental functions, the creation and functioning of the one mandated to organize and run national elections has proven particularly problematic. Specifically, the constitution calls for a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to conduct elections, paving the way for the creation of a permanent CEP from members nominated by elected officials in departmental-level institutions following the inauguration of the first democratically elected president. Although the latter event occurred in 1991, successive attempts at organizing a CEP according to constitutional guidelines have failed. As a result, Haiti remains without a permanent electoral council, and attempts on numerous occasions to reconstitute even a provisional council have been so fraught with political power struggles that elections have repeatedly been thrown off their constitutionally-mandated schedules due to the inexistence of a functioning CEP.

Governmental System

Haiti's complicated system of decentralized governance is premised on the composition and functioning of a series of executive and legislative bodies that correspond to the country's three principal geopolitical units: departments, municipalities, and communal sections. At each geopolitical level, the executive and legislative units are in juxtaposition to provide a system of checks and balances.

Starting at the smallest of the units, voters in each of the 565 communal sections elect to four-year terms a three-member **Communal Section Administrative Council (KASEK)** and a seven-to twenty-five member **Communal Section Assembly (ASEK)**. ASEKs serve a parliamentary function, charged with advising and assisting the KASEKs. The KASEKs are responsible for administering the affairs of the communal section and, as such, serve as the executive branch of local government. ASEKs also nominate justices of the peace and appoint a representative to the Municipal Assembly, the next highest legislative level of government. At this writing, both ASEKs and KASEKs are constituted nationwide.

Each of Haiti's 133 municipalities has both a **Municipal Assembly** and a **Municipal Council**. The assemblies are composed of one member per communal section, plus a town delegation whose members are elected to four-year terms. Municipal assemblies serve an essentially parliamentary function, overseeing the three-member Municipal Council whose members are elected to a four-year term and function in an executive role. The president of the Municipal Council serves as mayor. At this writing, Municipal Councils are constituted nationwide, with Municipal Assemblies not yet fully constituted all over the country.

The legislative and executive bodies for each of Haiti's nine departments are the **Departmental Assembly** and the **Departmental Council**, respectively. The assembly is constituted first,

comprised of one member from each Municipal Assembly within the department. The Departmental Assembly in turn elects three people to serve four-year terms on a Departmental Council. Members of the council do not have to be chosen from among assembly members. In addition to its role in electing members to the council, the Departmental Assembly nominates candidates for the CEP and judges for the courts of appeal and the courts of first instance. It also selects a representative to serve on the **Interdepartmental Council**. The nine members of the Interdepartmental Council become members of the **Council of Ministers**, which also includes the prime minister and his cabinet of ministers. Representatives of the departmental assemblies who become members of the Council of Ministers carry ministerial rank and voting rights on issues of governmental decentralization and development. At this writing, neither Departmental Assemblies nor Departmental Councils are fully constituted nationwide. As a result, there is not yet a fully functioning Interdepartmental Council.

The **executive branch** is headed by a **president** elected by popular vote to a five-year, non-renewable term. Presidents can be elected to two, non-consecutive terms, however. The president names a **prime minister** who, once confirmed by the National Assembly, heads the government. He or she selects a council of ministers or cabinet and appoints secretaries of state. The president presides over the Council of Ministers, which must be composed of no fewer than 10 members. At this writing, there are 16 ministries in the government of Haiti, including the portfolio held by the Prime Minister. They are: Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development; Commerce and Industry; Culture; Economy and Finance; Environment; Foreign Affairs; Haitians Living Overseas; Interior and Territorial Collectivities; Justice and Public Safety; National Education, Youth and Sports; Planning and External Cooperation; Public Health and Population; Public Works, Transportation and Communication; Social Affairs; and Women's Affairs. The president also appoints representatives to coordinate and control public service functions in each department, excluding public safety. At this writing, the President of Haiti is Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The Prime Minister is Yvon Neptune.

The **legislative branch** is headed by the **National Assembly** composed of a **Senate** and a **Chamber of Deputies**. Three senators from each department are elected to staggered six-year terms, with one-third of the 27-member Senate coming up for election every two years. The eighty-three deputies are elected from smaller electoral districts determined by population distribution. Large urban areas can be represented by no more than three deputies. Deputies are elected to four-year terms.

The **judicial branch**, also decentralized, is based on an ascending order of courts, beginning at the municipal level. The lowest level court in the system is the **Court of the Justice of the Peace.** Justice of the peace courts are located in each of Haiti's municipalities. Each court has at least one judge. Justices of the peace hear civil law cases, including those that involve limited sums of money, and landlord and tenant disputes. They also hear criminal cases where the penalty does not exceed six months in jail. **Courts of First Instance** are either civil or criminal tribunals located in major cities. Cases heard by these courts include those sent by the inspector general of the Haitian National Police. **Courts of Appeal** are one step above the

Courts of First Instance. Located in Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes, Gonaives, and Cap Haitien, the appeals courts have a president and four or five judges. They hear both civil and criminal cases, including appeals from the courts of the justice of the peace. Haiti's highest court, the **Court of Cassation**, or Supreme Court, consists of a president, vice-president and ten judges. It generally functions in two chambers with five judges each. When hearing appeals or pleas concerning the unconstitutionality of laws or decrees, however, the highest court convenes in a single chamber.

The several specialized courts that complete the judicial system are a Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes and special courts to oversee matters concerning property rights, juveniles, and labor conflicts. The Senate may constitute itself into a High Court of Justice to preside over crimes of state treason, embezzlement or abuse of power involving high state officials. In 1996, a School of the Magistrature opened in Port-au-Prince to provide judicial training for current and new judges. Haiti has derived the formal aspects of its legal system from Roman law, the Napoleonic Code, and the French system of civil law.

Current Political Issues

Enactment of the twin axioms of Haitian politics mentioned above have thrust the country into a prolonged political crisis characterized by legislative gridlock, bitter feuding among political actors, electoral controversy, and thus far ineffective attempts at crisis resolution. The ability of the Government of Haiti to enact constitutional election mandates, build public institutions, reform the state, govern effectively, and respond to citizen's needs has been severely hampered as a result.

The roots of the current crisis go back to January 1997, when the leader of the governing Lavalas political movement and then-former President Aristide announced the formation of a new political party, the Lavalas Family (FL). Immediately, the movement splintered into two camps: those who gravitated to the FL and President Preval; those who stayed loyal to the previous vehicle of Lavalas mobilization, the OPL (renamed Organization of People in Struggle from Lavalas Political Organization), and Prime Minister Rosny Smarth, whose block still held the majority of seats in the National Assembly. The rivalry between the two camps quickly became bitter.

Successively, 1997 and 1998 saw tarnished off-year legislative elections, the resignation of Smarth, the inability of the divided Senate to confirm Preval's several nominations, and the failure of the National Assembly to legislate. Although the Senate eventually confirmed Jacques Edouard Alexis in December 1998, the action came too late for steps needed to organize the legislative elections required in late 1998. When the terms of most legislators elected in 1995 expired in early 1999, Preval cited constitutional provisions and issued a decree dismissing the entire Chamber of Deputies and most of the Senate. The detractors of Preval, Aristide, and the FL labeled this move as a "political coup d'etat."

Political negotiations during 1999 eventually led to enough compromise between the feuding groups for the creation of a CEP to organize the now-delayed elections. Following two postponements, elections for 19 Senate seats, 72 Chamber of Deputy seats, all of the country's 133 Municipal Councils, and all of its 564 KASAKs and ASEKs were held on May 21, 2000. In all, 30,000 candidates from 37 political parties or groups ran for the 7,500 offices up for grabs. Turnout at the polls was high among voters, political parties, and domestic and international election observers, including an observation mission from the OAS. Approximately two-thirds of all registered voters cast ballots.

A pall was cast on the apparent successful electoral exercise almost immediately, from two different camps. First, even before the announcement of preliminary results, representatives of four of the five political parties that nominated candidates for offices across all nine departments (*the OPL, Espace de Concertation (EC), the Assembly of Progressive National Democrats (RNDP)* and *the National Christian Movement of Haiti (MOCHRENA)* began to cry foul. The fifth party, *FL*, did not join the chorus, particularly as it already appeared that it had fared well in the vast majority of the races. Perhaps FL had done too well, suggested the OAS, the second camp to sound an electoral alarm. Challenging the methodology used by the CEP to tabulate votes in the Senate races that gave all 19 Senate seats to the FL, the OAS stated that as many as 10 seats should move to second round run-offs, according to the electoral law.

The controversy over the disputed Senate seats heightened as the opposition parties joined the chorus, several members of the CEP resigned citing governmental intimidation, and the government refused to abide by the OAS requests for run-offs, in spite of the efforts of that organization - joined by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) - to find a way out of the emerging electoral morass. Escalating the crisis further was the automatic suspension off assistance by the European Union following this type of electoral dispute, along with the suspension of bilateral aid by the US government. Not long afterward, these were followed by similar steps taken by such international financial institutions as the World Bank. Nevertheless, toward August 2000, the government ratified the results of the disputed May 2000 elections, giving the FL virtually unfettered power at all levels of government in Haiti.

The next political marker on the horizon was the presidential election scheduled for late 2000. With the FL nominating Jean-Bertrand Aristide as its candidate, the four protesting parties came together to join a united front - called the Democratic Convergence (CD) - and attracted a handful of minor parties to their side. The coalition opted to boycott the presidential elections. In late November, without the presence of OAS monitors, Jean-Bertrand Aristide easily won his second term as President of Haiti. The FL also won all nine Senate seats contested in the same election.

As the February 7, 2001 Presidential Inauguration approached, the crisis deepened. The boycotting CD, ignoring Aristide's entreaties for participation in the event, chose to stay away and name from within its own ranks a "provisional president," who almost immediately surprised

many Haitians by calling for the recreation of Haiti's army. On inauguration day, with few international leaders in attendance, Aristide gave an address that set forth a detailed plan for national development and called for Haitians to work together for the achievement of the plan, supported by the international community. The CD responded by issuing its call for a clean slate, or "zero option," with the resignation of the government and the entire electoral process beginning again from square one.

With the political temperature in Port-au-Prince rising, various international actors extended their involvement toward a hopeful resolution of the crisis. In late 2000, the Clinton Administration dispatched former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who met with Aristide and came up with an eight-point plan for addressing the crisis. Upon its ascension to office in January 2001, the Bush Administration endorsed the eight-point plan. Concurrently, the Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, often in the company of CARICOM officials, shuttled back and forth to Port-au-Prince, also seeking a way to resolve the political gridlock. By mid-June, with the government responding to several of Lake's eight points and committing itself to a resolution of the electoral dispute through the resignation of the senators in disputed seats followed by new elections, the OAS cautiously spoke of the impending resolution of the crisis.

Now cast as *the* opposition group, the CD, however, maintained its hardened position, refusing to accept government offers for ending the crisis. In August 2001, political violence in the form of an attack by suspected former members of the Haitian army on several police stations put a damper on the resolution of the crisis. Following an armed assault on the Presidential Palace in mid-December and a subsequent anti-CD explosion by FL-partisans that resulted in burning and looting of CD-affiliated properties, any immediate hope for crisis resolution came to an end.

As Haiti moved into 2002, it confronted the specter of growing political violence and chaos around the country, putting it on the brink of social, economic and political disaster. The government lacked resources to govern and increasingly perceiving itself on the defensive as the dispute over a handful of senate seats seemed to snowball so that no steps it took or actions it proposed seemed sufficient to break the log jam. Remaining a thorn in the government's side were a twin - and some claimed entwined - set of opponents: the politicians affiliated with the CD, which held fast to its zero option strategy, and the apparent partisans of the old guard seeking change through violence.

With feelings of desperation and insecurity spreading among the populace, and people expressing greater and greater frustration with the overall political process and all the country's political actors, the OAS, again with crucial support from CARICOM, took action. In early 2002, it passed Permanent Council Resolution 806 that provided the organization a mandate to work more actively toward the resolution of the political crisis by independently inquiring into the events of December, seeking reparations to damages done to organizations and individuals who suffered damage as a result of those events, and establishing a special OAS Mission in Haiti for strengthening democracy there.

In September, the OAS followed CP. Res. 806 with CP. Res. 822. This resolution took an even more active role, setting forth a road map for crisis resolution with a specific mandate and deadline for setting up a CEP to lead toward elections. CP. Res. 822 also tackled security-related issues related to climate for elections, including the increasing spread of weapons among Haiti's people. The new resolution also de-linked the suspension of international aid to the government of Haiti from the mired political process.

By the middle of 2003, however, resolution to the crisis had not been achieved. CP. Res. 822 remains the operational framework for crisis resolution, in spite of the fact that the immediate deadline for the formation of the CEP was missed when hard core opposition groups, expressing security concerns, refused to match government actions of nominating representatives to the body. Increased episodes of sporadic political violence, particularly in the area of the Haiti - Dominican Republic border, once again threatened to untrack diplomatic efforts toward crisis resolution. On a more positive note, in mid-May the Government of Haiti achieved an agreement with the IMF that holds the promise of enabling multilateral funders to recommence operations in the country and provide the government with much needed support. Some analysts believe that a renewed flow of development assistance to the government will play a positive role not only in helping to fend off an approaching humanitarian crisis in Haiti, but also in resolving the long-festering political crisis.

Government and Politics *Self-study Questions*

1. Haiti's penchant toward "Presidentialitis" in politics will be difficult to overcome. How might this enduring characteristic of Haitian politics be weakened or overcome, particularly in view of the fact that this is a key goal of the 1987 Constitution?

2. Immediately following the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier, a huge cry arose across the country Haiti - largely excluding Port-au-Prince - for the effective decentralization of the state. How did the 1987 Constitution respond to this national desire? What has been the track record for achieving it thus far? Is decentralization a good idea? What are - and remain - the principal constraints to decentralization of the Haitian state?

3. In view of the strong legacy in Haiti of political movements as opposed to political parties; of self-nominated and charismatic leadership; and of the twin political axioms elaborated in the text, is working to form US-type political parties the best insertion point for international actors seeking to help Haiti strengthen its democratic institutions? Why or why not? What other insertion points might be considered?

4. Another legacy of Haitian politics has been the system of *politique de doublure*. Do the relationships of Haiti's current political leadership with the country's elites follow a similar or different pattern to the phenomenon of 'politics by understudies?' What is the pattern?

5. What are the factors of Haitian politics that have been contributing to the country's long-standing, current political impasse? In view of those factors, what might be the most effective strategies for international actors seeking to help Haiti out of its political morass?

Economy

Agriculture

Haiti's largest single economic sector is agriculture. Today's agricultural economy grew out of a slave plantation system during the colonial period that was based on the export of agricultural products and precious hardwoods. Little processing of these products or manufacturing took place in the colony. Haiti's economy was transformed into a mixed agricultural economy following the revolution, when slaves abandoned the mostly destroyed plantations. In that mixed economy, small farmers, or peasants, often working multiple farm plots of an acre or so in isolated hilly areas, produced cash crops, particularly coffee, along with food crops using slash and burn methods of farming. Agricultural commerce, particularly the export of coffee, was controlled by a small group of merchants based in coastal cities and towns. Working through intermediaries, they purchased peasant-produced coffee and other crops like cacao and cotton, exporting them to Europe and North America.

Though few large plantations survived the revolution, sugarcane remained an important crop, grown both by small holders and by some large holders, particularly following the US Intervention in 1915 and the removal of the Haitian constitutional ban on foreigners owning land. In addition to a post-intervention investment in sugarcane, US companies also established large holdings for bananas, rubber and sisal. Following World War II, however, Haiti's banana and rubber ventures collapsed. Sisal production declined in the 1980s. While sugarcane is still cultivated, mostly on smallholdings, two or three large operations continue, struggling to remain solvent. Most of Haiti's peasant-grown sugarcane is processed in small, primitive grinding operations and transformed into cane syrup, coarse brown sugar, or country rum (*clairin*). A commercially produced rum under the label *Barbancourt* is exported worldwide.

Haiti's leading agricultural export today is mangoes, a seasonal crop. Like coffee, mangoes are a peasant-produced crop, bought and exported by coastal-based merchants and their intermediaries. The more significant basis of Haiti's agricultural economy today is the production of food for domestic consumption, produced on smaller and smaller plots by peasants who plant mostly corn, beans, sorghum, rice, and tubers. Rice is also planted in large, irrigated holdings in the Artibonite Valley. Livestock, particularly chicken and pigs, are also produced, usually on small farms and in limited quantities. Haiti's pig population is still rebounding from its extermination in the 1980s as a result of an African swine fever outbreak.

Although agriculture still engages some 45 percent of the working population, the country does not produce enough food to feed itself. Haitian agriculture, particularly that of the small farmer, has suffered severely from lack of investment and assistance. Some 90 percent of Haiti's government agronomists are based in Port-au-Prince. What little assistance Haiti's small farmers receive is more likely to be provided by foreign non-governmental organizations than by the Haitian state. The vast majority of Haitian farmers work their land using only a machete and

a hoe, depending on rainfall in an environment increasingly devastated by deforestation, erosion, and resultant changing microclimate patterns. Farmers, with little or no access to agricultural credit, except at usury interest rates often reaching 20 percent per month, have begun to move off the land in large numbers. A surprising amount of Haiti's limited quantity of low-lying land appears fallow, sometimes a result of emigration by the middle class owners. Much precious farmland in the area of Port-au-Prince has been lost to urban expansion.

Industry and manufacturing

Like agriculture, Haitian industry and manufacturing grew out of the raw product-exporting plantation system, where investment for product transformation occurred principally in the colonizing country. Following the revolution and the creation of Haiti's decentralized peasant society, Haitian manufacturing developed in small towns and villages where craftsmen produced practical articles from local materials. The legacy of this decentralized, homegrown manufacturing is seen in a portion of today's Haitian craft sector, which remains located in villages and towns nationwide.

Another portion of today's economically important craft sector, however, is situated in factories in Port-au-Prince, where it comprises a segment of the country's industry and manufacturing sector. That sector, composed principally of light assembly operations, grew mostly in the 1980s as a result of international aid, Haiti's proximity to US markets, its cheap and ample labor, and preferential investment and trade arrangements. The size of the light assembly sector has ebbed and flowed according to economic and political developments. Under the dictatorship of Jean-Claude Duvalier, the sector was stable, employing an estimated 60,000 - 80,000 workers. Following the ouster of Duvalier, and particularly during defacto military rule from 1991 - 1994 when an international embargo was placed on Haiti, the sector declined precipitously, employing as few as 7,000 workers in 1994. Today, while the sector still largely based in Port-au-Prince is on the rebound, it has not reached levels of previous development largely on account of the country's deteriorated infrastructure and lack of investor confidence. Recent industrial park investment by Dominican Republic business interests in the Haiti-DR border areas, however, raise the prospect of both the decentralization and expansion of the light assembly sector.

One element of Haitian manufacturing that seems to boom constantly is the construction sector. Fueled in large part by remittance money sent by family overseas and by revenue from such nefarious activities as drug trafficking, Haiti appears to be a country with a permanent housing boom - from cinder block pillboxes to hillside mansions. This labor intensive sector offers Haitians a great deal of formal and informal employment, and fuels thriving cement and building materials import and manufacturing operations.

Other Sectors

Haiti's mining sector, somewhat robust for two decades when based on bauxite, collapsed in the 1980s when deposits were exhausted. Today it is small and undeveloped. Mining ventures are limited principally to some extraction of gold and copper deposits in the north of the country, and small growth in the domestic sea salt sector in response to growing international demand for natural products. Haiti's large deposits of high quality limestone have begun to attract the attention of investors as demand for that product expands in international markets. Haiti has no oil or natural gas deposits.

The country meets its energy needs through high-cost importation of oil and gas, and through some hydroelectricity production, notably at Peligre along the Artibonite River. Much of the population's basic energy needs are met through the consumption of low- grade kerosene, also imported, and of charcoal, produced from Haiti's dwindling national fuel wood supply. Although charcoal production has become a major cause of Haiti's environmental deterioration, alternate sources of energy have not been successfully introduced.

Given the country's rugged and natural beauty, cultural uniqueness, and geographic location, Haiti should have a vibrant tourism sector. For brief periods in the mid-20th century, the sector showed signs of flourishing. In more recent times, however, political unrest and repression, poverty, the fear of AIDS, and the general un-development of facilities and the transportation infrastructure of the country have combined to limit this sector. Tourism in Haiti today has become mostly the domain of Haitians overseas returning home for periodic visits. As that population grows, becomes economically established and ages it offers great promise for the revitalization and growth of tourism in Haiti.

While surrounded on three sides by water, Haiti has only a limited and primitively developed fishing sector. Small fishermen fish coastal waters from sail and rowboats, using hand cast nets and woven fish traps. The quadruple detriments of limited investment, over fishing waters nearest the coast, use of sailboats - and the country's most skilled watermen - to achieve migration goals, and environmental degradation of fishing grounds because of land-based erosion have worked together against the development of Haiti's fishing industry

Commerce and Trade

A tremendous contrast in Haiti's commercial sector exists between its formal and informal sectors. The former, represented by licensed business and banking services found mostly in Port-au-Prince and the country's secondary cities, is quite limited when compared with the informal sector of higglers (*madan sara*), small producers, hustlers and various service providers that dominate Haiti's economy. The under-capitalized informal sector that provides at least some form of employment and revenue to vast numbers of Haiti's citizens has been estimated recently as having at least 6 or 7 times the capital assets of the country's formal sector. Unfortunately, however, because these assets are not recognized as a source of

collateral for investment capital, they are not effectively used as a motor for Haiti's economic development. Recently, however, a number of the country's commercial banks have 'discovered' the informal sector and its reliability as a customer for credit, making loans as small as $100 to informal sector business people.

The split of Haiti's economy between formal and informal sectors is symptomatic of the division in Haiti between its economic 'haves' and 'have nots.' Various estimates usually state that some 67 percent of the country's economy is controlled by four percent of its population, with a corresponding 20 percent of the economy allocated to 70 percent of the population.

Haiti's principal formal trading partner for both exports and imports is the United States. Haiti also has strong trading ties with the Dominican Republic, although as much as 2/3rds of the commerce that flows across the shared border is not recorded. Haiti maintains trade relations with Europe, particular France, and has recently become a full member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which holds the promise of heightened trade between Haiti and the mostly English-speaking CARICOM members. Haiti's membership in CARICOM is also already resulting in heightened advocacy for, involvement in, and support of Haiti by CARICOM members in various international fora. Haiti benefits from preferential US trade agreements through its inclusion in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBI). In early 2003, legislation for the Haitian Economic Recovery Opportunity Act (HERO) was introduced in the US Congress to provide Haiti with a broader range of trade preferences, similar to those recently accorded Africa's most underdeveloped countries.

Development Assistance and External Aid

Given Haiti's status as the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, it has been the recipient of considerable amounts of development assistance and external aid, particularly during the period of Jean-Claude Duvalier's rule and for several years following the 1994 restoration Aristide's elected government. Aid has come in the form of loans and grants from bilateral and multilateral donors, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The United States and the European Unions are Haiti's major bilateral partners, although both have suspended direct assistance to the government since 2000, as have the multilateral donors. The suspension of aid has devastated the government's ability to provide services to citizens since an estimated two-thirds to three-quarters of the government's investment budget is supported by foreign aid.

Canada and Taiwan are also important donors, as are the governments of France and Germany. Much assistance has also entered Haiti through non-governmental organizations and religious groups. This assistance tends to support smaller scale projects in diverse locations in the country, many of which, however, do not sustain them selves when the assistance ends.

Perhaps the most significant - and sustainable - form of development assistance and external aid received by Haiti comes from Haitians themselves, in the form of the country's vast number of

Haitians living overseas, or Diaspora. Conservative estimates of the annual value of money sent home by family members reaches $600 million. The estimate increases annually. Remittances are used to cover such basic individual and family needs as health care, education, food, and lodging. In addition to sending money, Haitian's overseas also send goods, or arrive laden with them on their visits home.

Economy *Self-study questions*

1. When Haitian peasants migrate to the Dominican Republic and become involved in agriculture there, they have a reputation as successful farmers. Yet, in Haiti, peasants usually fail to support themselves and their families successfully from their farming efforts. What might be some of the key reasons for these differences? What ought to happen in Haiti to help make farming - and farmers - improve their chances of success? Or, is Haiti just too far gone to be worth major investment in small-farmer agriculture?

2. In view of Haiti's dilemma of depending on charcoal as a cheap and ready energy source vis-à-vis its environmental deterioration and the disappearance of fuel wood supplies, what should - and can - be done?

3. Throughout rural Haiti, cocaine is called 'manna' as in something wonderful that has come down from heaven. The quality of life of many Haitian villagers has improved dramatically because they have intentionally - or unintentionally - gotten their hands on some manna and sold it for a relatively handsome sum. Has drug trafficking become such an important element of the economic survival of Haiti - and individual Haitians - that a successful attempt to stem the flow would result in considerable unrest and suffering among Haitians? Might Haitian officials be reluctant to join forces with the US in cracking down on drug trafficking because of the detrimental impact its success might have on Haiti's economy and society? If so, what steps might the US take to mitigate against this?

4. In The Mystery of Capital, Hernando De Soto's book on worldwide informal economies and the need to 'formalize' their assets so they can be used as collateral for loans and investment, examples from Haiti abound. What might be the economic impact in Haiti of the loosening up of the hundreds of millions of dollars currently tied up in poor people's hands because they have been excluded from the formal economy? Is formalization a realistic option for the Haitian poor?

5. Although the US Congress has yet to pass HERO - and its passage is far from assured - what impact might additional trade preferences for Haiti, particularly in the apparel industry, have on the country's economic well-being? While Haiti may be helped by this kind of individually-received preference, will it be hurt if it is simply lumped in with other countries in regional - or hemispheric - trade pacts, or has to compete with them (such as NAFTA), particularly in terms of its ability to penetrate the US market? If so, why is it in the long-term interests for the US to enter into trade agreements that otherwise might hurt Haiti?

Culture

In distinct contrast with the cloud cast over Haiti by its problems of political instability and economic underdevelopment, the country is brightened by a dynamic, authentic, and well-developed cultural life. The cultural expression at the root of today's Haitian society has emerged to a great extent from the interplay over time of two distinct cultural hearths: French and African. Initially, they stood apart, separated by language, skin color and power. The drums and chants of the slave had little in common with the violin and waltz of the colonists. To a certain extent, the two expressions - African and French - still stand apart, especially as a function of social status and class. To a certain extent, things French still have a higher status than things non-French, or Haitian. Yet, to perhaps an even greater extent, the parallel French and African cultural heritage of Haiti has merged into a vibrant Creole culture that is uniquely Haitian.

Fundamental to that merger and uniqueness is Haiti's national language - Creole *(Kreyol)*. Born as a language of command between French-speaking overseers and African slaves with diverse linguistic backgrounds, it has evolved into a Haitian language, sharing its roots with both French and the language of African ancestors. Perhaps ten percent of Haitians speak French today. All Haitians speak Creole. It is not at all untypical for conversations that begin in French to transition to Creole once the ice is broken or the topic is truly engaged.

Haitian culture today is far from static. It continues to evolve, not just as a function of its French and African roots, but also as a function of the country's larger presence on the world stage and, most importantly, as a function of the influences of its sons and daughters living overseas, particularly in the English-speaking United States.

Literature

Haitian literature is still almost exclusively written in French, though efforts are being made to translate works into Creole and to establish Creole as a literary language with its own novels, poems and plays. Haiti has had some writers of international status, including Jean Price-Mars, who evaluated African heritage in Haitian culture; Jacques Roumain, a poet, essayist and novelist; Jacques-Stephen Alexis, who wrote novels about Haitian society; and Rene Depestre, noted for elegant French poetic creations. As an indication of the cultural interplay today between Haitians at home and Haitians overseas, however, the best known contemporary Haitian writer, Edwige Danticat, was transplanted to New York from Haiti as a child. Her works often examine the impact of her Haitian roots on her experience of emigration and being an immigrant.

For a society with a high degree of illiteracy, Haiti supports a number of publishing houses in Port-au-Prince. Self-published works are common. It is said that Haiti publishes a higher number of books per capita than its more literate Caribbean neighbors.

Art

Haitian paintings have received worldwide attention since the 1940s when a school of naive or primitive artists developed in Cap Haitien and Port-au-Prince. Multitudes of artists - mostly self-taught - have followed in the footsteps of Haiti's primitive masters, whose paintings grace the walls of top rate museums and galleries around the world. The primitive influence is also seen in wood carvings, metal sculpture and tapestries, particularly the sequin studded vodou flags that have become very popular in recent years. Although formal galleries abound in and around Port-au-Prince, individual artists often display their wares on street corners and by hotels. It is not uncommon to see an artist walking through a crowded street carrying a painting. Haiti's streets are routinely decorated with ambulant art, as one of the most vivid expressions of the country's artistic tendencies is seen on the multitude of brightly painted passenger vehicles - the crowded *cammionettes* and *tap-tap* - each bearing a different motif and message according to the interests and expressions of the owner and the artist.

Music

Haiti's cammionettes and tap-taps are also known for blasting pulsating rhythms of Haitian music as they move slowly in congested city traffic. Prospective passengers often listen before they decide to climb onboard, preferring to chose a vehicle vibrating with their favorite rhythm - be it *kompa* or *rasin* - or their favorite musician or band - be it Sweet Mickey, King Posse, Koudjay, Boukman Eksperyans, or one of a multitude of others. Or, showing an eclectic taste, prospective passengers may wait for a vehicle blasting out ragga dance hall music or reggae from neighboring Jamaica, or the sounds of Haitian and Haitian-American rappers, particularly the Haitian refugee - or *'Fugee'* - from New York City, Wyclef Jean, giving their verses in varying mixtures of Creole and English.

The interplay of music between Haiti and Haitian-Americans, though a relatively recent development, has its roots in the travels of Haitian orchestras to New York beginning in the 1960s, shortly after large numbers of Haitians began arriving in the United States. The concert path expanded to other venues, such as Boston and South Florida, and today goes up and down the US east coast. Over the course of time, individual musicians - and complete bands - made the US their home. Now they are joined by a new generation of Haitian-American musicians - sometimes from their own families - who have begun reversing the migratory path by traveling to Haiti to perform.

Haiti's music - and musical culture - has been, and remains, diverse. Without a doubt, the single greatest influence on Haitian music has been the drum - and drumming - brought over from Africa. In the aftermath of the Haitian revolution, the drum that had been silenced by the French slave owners could be silenced no more. In addition to the pulsating urban rhythms already mentioned, Haitian music includes the quieter, acoustic sounds from the countryside, where accordions, guitars, drums and bamboo flutes take over from electric instruments that cannot

find electricity. It also includes the slow Haitian meringue sounds popular along the border, in the north of Haiti, and with an older generation.

Recreation

Although the intense poverty of Haiti can rob its citizens of opportunities for relaxation and recreation, numerous recreational occasions and activities do exist, and elicit the participation of millions of Haitians. Foremost among them is the Lenten carnival - widely celebrated annually regardless of whatever else may be going on in the country. Intensely held over the three or four days preceding Ash Wednesday, carnival itself is preceded by weeks of small street parades led by *ra-ra* bands in cities, towns and villages throughout the country. Especially during the summer months, Haitians travel around the country to villages celebrating their patron saint day. Manifesting the syncretism that has occurred between Catholicism and Vodou, village festivals usually also have a vodou undercurrent. In sports, most Haitians are true fanatics of the national sport - soccer. Time stops in homes with a radio or a t.v. when a soccer match is broadcast. Villages around the country with only a small stony field to offer are worn clean of grass by dedicated players. Finally, a different kind of sport - cockfighting - is popular throughout the countryside, particularly to gambling enthusiasts.

Culture *Self-study questions*

1. Haitian cultural expression, particularly at musical and sporting events and during carnival, tends to be highly participatory, with even the most distant spectators displaying animated expressions of involvement. How do you see this as different from participation at US cultural events? How will you feel in this highly participatory cultural environment?

2. Often, Haitian bands are quite large, with a number of 'hangers on' who seem to do little than play a hand-held percussion instrument. In view of the steady and large migratory flow of musicians to and from Haiti, coupled with the fact that over time many Haitian musicians have found ways of remaining in the US, what will be your approach to trying to determine whether or not a visa applicant is an essential member of the band or more of a member of the band's entourage?

3. A Haitian craftsman once told me that it seems that the more difficult things get in Haiti, the more beautiful, creative, and fanciful are the expressions of its craftsmen and artists. Why do you think this may be the case?

4. How do you think Haiti's African heritage has influenced various aspects of the country's cultural expression? Why do you think Haiti's cultural expression is much more deeply African than that of other Caribbean countries?

Social Issues

The first thing often told to foreigners by Haitians is that Haiti is really two countries: the Republic of Haiti and the Republic of Port-au-Prince. This is a short hand way of explaining that their homeland has been a country of great social and economic division and dichotomy. By the 1980s, these divisions had become so systematized and marked, that leading scholars referred to the country as one practicing a form of "Caribbean apartheid." As these dichotomies evolved, distinctions of social status had become so pervasive that they touched on such factors as location or geography, language, religious practice, health care, skin and facial features, and marital status. The social dichotomies of Haiti even reached into how one's status was identified on a birth certificate.

As a result of this dichotomization of society, an individual fell into the category of being someone who was either "official" or "tolerated." Some of the specific dichotomies of Haiti's Caribbean apartheid, with the 'official' feature first have been:

- Location/Geography: *moun lavil* (city dweller) - *moun andeyo* (hick)
- Language: French - Creole
- Religious Practice: Catholic - Vodou
- Health Care: Hospital/Western Medicine - Healer/Traditional "Leaf' Medicine
- Skin/Facial Features: Light/European - Black/African
- Marital Status: Marriage in Church - Informal Union (*plasaj*)
- Birth Certificate: Citizen (*citoyen*) - Peasant (*peyizan*)

That Haiti became a place of such rigid contrasts is not surprising when one considers the social divisions during the colonial period, based heavily on race. In Haiti, by French practice, individuals, if not 'pure' black or 'pure' white, were neatly fit into one of 64 categories according their racial mix going back at least four or five generations. Strict rules of behavior, exclusions, inclusions and privileges that even included prescribed articles and colors of clothing were applied according to one's racial admixture. With independence, only one element of this racial hierarchy disappeared - that at the very top, as the whites were expelled. All else, with its systems of inclusions and exclusions, remained in place.

Leaders for social change in Haiti in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on the necessity of changing the poor's own deeply engrained, negative and inferior perceptions of themselves - a kind of blame the victim complex. Church leaders at this time spoke of the need to restore the poor's sense of personal dignity and self-worth. By the late 1980s, the change sought by social leaders had begun. The ouster of the Duvalier dictatorship followed by a new constitution that validated the legitimacy of Creole and empowered all Haitians with an equal right of inclusion at the ballot box put important change in motion, threatening the status quo. That change was starkly represented in 1991 by new popularly elected leadership that used Creole in official functions

and that ultimately did away with the dual birth certificate system. For those on top of the system, this kind of change was perceived as more than a menace. In 1992, a respected Haitian sociologist attributed the violent military coup d'etat that ousted President Aristide to the fact that those accustomed to managing the country toward their own well-being could not accept the fact that the vote of their servants counted the same as theirs.

Social change may be the slowest of all change. As a rule, throughout Haitian history, the poorer, blacker, and less urbane an individual, the lower his or her status. The richer, lighter, and more urbane an individual, the higher his or her status. In Haiti, today, the engrained social and economic dichotomies, while not changing much over 20 years, have nevertheless begun to change. Those whose lives have improved due to the changes are not content to go backward. As such, conflicts over issues of social change have been at the root of much of Haiti's stormy political and economic history in the recent past.

Women

In Haitian households, women are sometimes referred to as the *poto mitan*, or weight bearing center post, of society. Particularly in poor and middle class families, it is the woman who takes responsibility for raising the children, tending to health and education issues, engaging in commerce, and managing the household and family finances. In upper class families, it is usually the woman of the house who manages the servants. In rural areas, women and men play complementary roles, with men assuming primary responsibility for farming and women assuming primary responsibility for marketing.

Women of all walks of life have played critical roles in recent years in the country's public life. A woman who served as Provisional President, Supreme Court Judge Ertha Pascal Trouillot, led the country to its first free and fair elections in 1990. For years, women have held top management positions in the country's private banks. Women's associations and organizations have been active in urban and rural Haiti for decades. Women of all classes played key roles in fomenting social change initiatives since the 1980s. In recognition of the important role played by women in Haitian society, the government created a Ministry for Women's Affairs for the first time in 1995.

Civil Society

During the post-Duvalier era, this expression has come into widespread use, but its use varies widely according to the diverse points of reference of those who employ it. As a rule, organized civil society refers to the array of organizations that are not of the government. Civil society organizations can be rural or urban; local, national or international; narrow or broad in their constituency, aims, and activities. As a rule, they are durable, democratically structured, and formally organized, and, as a result, often seek and receive some form of formal legal recognition. This distinguishes organized civil society from more informally organized groups and associations that tend to emerge in response to specific contexts and then melt away later.

Hence, this also distinguishes most civil society organizations from Haiti's so-called popular organizations, which tend to be less formally organized and lack democratic structure. Such popular organizations as the gang-type *zenglendo*, *san maman*, and *chimeres* have a tendency to engage in non-democratic or criminal activities, and either ascribe themselves - or are ascribed to - political and other leaders or groups. In Haiti, organized civil society is commonly composed of professional associations, trade unions, business and trade associations, poor people's organizations, women's associations and groups, small farmer's associations and grassroots groups, neighborhood and community associations, and church-sponsored associations or groups.

Organized civil society at Haiti's grassroots became extensively developed starting in the 1970s, when associations and organizations comprised of poor people throughout rural and urban Haiti began to be formed, in large part as a result of organizing efforts undertaken by the Catholic Church. With the fall of Duvalier, these associations grew and multiplied, in some cases to regional or national organizations, including several peasant movements. As this happened, they became outspoken leading forces for social, economic, and political change, developing alliances and liaisons with others seeking this goal, including some rising populist political leaders.

Haiti's grassroots civil society organizations played an instrumental role in the election of Aristide in 1990. With Aristide's election, numbers of civil society leaders either left their organizations to join government efforts, or became clearly allied with them. As a result, grassroots civil society organizations were at the brunt end of reprisals meted out by the Haitian army and its allies following the late 1991 coup d'etat. Between 1991 and 1994, the grassroots component of Haiti's organized civil society suffered and was weakened considerably. It has still not fully recovered from this traumatic period.

In more recent years, Haiti's organized civil society, like the society writ more large, has tended to become politically polarized. In the past several years, certain elements of the country's civil society have attempted to play the role of broker of political disputes, but without great success, at least in part because of this polarization. As Haiti's political landscape became more complex after 1986 and again after 1994, and civil society became a more high profile actor in the country's political life, major elements of that element of Haitian society became politicized.

Education

Education is officially compulsory for children between the ages of seven and 13. Because of lack of school facilities and staff, the difficulties confronted by many families to cover school costs for all children in the family, and the occasional need for children to stay away from school and work at home, only an estimated 50 percent or lower of the children in this age group actually attend school. Estimates of adult illiteracy range from around 80 to 40 percent. One reason for this range is due to the fact that increasing numbers of Haitians are becoming at least partially literate in Creole, for which there has been a standard orthography for only 20 or so

years. Measuring literacy rates in Creole is a very inexact science. Most schools around the country are either church-run or private schools, of extremely varying quality. Public schools tend to be under-equipped and ill staffed. Haiti's curriculum traditionally has been based on a French model. The leading private schools, in Port-au-Prince, have produced an educational elite, while most of the society remains un- or under educated. Haiti's State University is small and underdeveloped. A number of private universities, including a Catholic university, have been established in recent years. Haitians who can afford to send their children to the United States, Canada, or France to attend university.

Health and Welfare

Haiti has the highest rate of infant mortality in the Americas, and the lowest average annual adult life span. Malnutrition is rampant and diets are notoriously insufficient. Infectious diseases abound because of improper shelter, unsafe water, unsanitary living conditions and limited health care services. Malaria is quite common. The incidence rate of AIDS, now estimated at 5% of the population, is among the highest outside of sub-Sahara Africa. In recognition of the growing problem of AIDS in Haiti, the country has become one of only two Caribbean countries slated for inclusion in the special $15 billion international AIDS assistance program recently authorized into US law. The country suffers from a chronic shortage of health care personnel - in both cities and in rural areas. Many rural areas are served only by international medical missions of volunteer doctors that visit infrequently. Typically, government's track record for providing for the health and welfare of its citizens has been miserable.

Labor Force

Statistics on Haiti's labor force, like many statistics about Haiti, are difficult to gather. An estimated 60 percent of Haitian workers remain engaged in farming despite a marked shift away from that sector by migrating farm families in recent years. Services and government employ the bulk of the remaining labor force, with manufacturing following. Unemployment is estimated at between 60 and 70 percent. Some two thirds of Haitian workers participate in the country's informal economy. Given the limited opportunities for employment in Haiti, significant numbers of laborers have sought work in the Dominican Republic or elsewhere, including the Bahamas. As many as 500,000 Haiti and 'Dominico-Haitians' now reside in the Dominican Republic.

Haiti's minimum wage, fixed in Haitian gourdes, is now worth the equivalent of little more than $2.00 a day. Since 1986, the exchange rate of the gourde to the US dollar has risen from 5:1 to as high as 40:1 in recent times. The minimum employment age in all formal sectors is fifteen years. In rural areas, children enter the agricultural economy at a young age, working on the family farm. In urban areas, children enter the informal economy at a young age, engaging in activities that can augment family income. Some children, particularly those sent to the cities from rural families ostensibly for their education, are used as low paid or unremunerated servants, especially in middle and lower class households. Called *restavek* (stay with), these

children can be subject to the kind of abusive treatment often experienced by human beings who are trafficked.

Religion

The official religion of Haiti is Roman Catholicism, but the constitution allows the free choice of religion. Some 75 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, and about 15 percent is Protestant. The Catholic clergy is now strongly "Haitianized" through the appointment of priests, nuns and bishops. During the 1980s, the groups of clergy pushed the Catholic Church toward playing a high profile and progressive social and political role, through its radio station, leadership training programs and national adult literacy program. When he was elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was a member of Haiti's Catholic clergy. He has since left the church. In recent years, the social and political role of the Catholic Church has diminished. However, the Conference of Catholic Bishops, as the presiding body of Haiti's Catholic church, occasionally issues statements related to national social, economic and political issues. The Vatican is represented in Haiti by a Papal Nuncio, who also serves as the ceremonial head of the Haitian church.

A majority of Haitians are believers of vodou, a religion whose gods (*loas*) are derived from West African religions. For many years, clergy in Catholic and Protestant churches spoke out against vodou. Most practitioners, however, do not find any contradiction between vodou and Roman Catholicism. Catholic antipathy toward vodou has cooled considerably in recent years. A great deal of religious syncretism has occurred between the two religions. Francois Duvalier used certain vodou symbols extensively during his repressive rule in order to surround himself with a cloak of power. In early 2003, the Haitian state, for the first time ever, granted formal recognition to vodou as an organized religion.

A number of Protestant sects are found in Haiti. Methodists, Episcopalians and Presbyterians established churches in Haiti in the early 19th century. New sects, including Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Mormons came to Haiti during and after the US Occupation. In 1999, leaders of several more conservative Protestant churches created a Christian political party (MOCHRENA). A few Haitians have embraced Islam, evidenced by the presence of a mosque in Port-au-Prince.

Social Issues *Self-study questions*

1. As a country once labeled by many as having a form of "Caribbean apartheid," Haiti begs comparison with South Africa. What is it about Haiti's social structure led it to be susceptible to being compared with South Africa. What developments in Haiti over the past 15 years indicate that it is either making a transition away from its own version of apartheid or failing to do that?

2. Since independence, the Haitian state has not developed or enacted a social contract with the Haitian people. Investments by the state in such key contract areas as education, health, and welfare have been minimal. Still today, Haiti has a government that describes itself in populist terms and presents itself as seeking to develop and enact a social contract with the nation. What do you see as the principal obstacles to the Haitian state developing and enacting out a social contract with the Haitian people?

3. What might be the social - and political - implications of the formal recognition as a religion recently granted to vodou?

4. A recent development in Haiti responding to Haiti's political impasse has been the emergence of an organization portrayed as an umbrella group of some 164 civil society organizations that will help work toward a solution of the impasse. While many have responded favorably to this development, others have responded negatively or skeptically, expressing doubts about its sincerity and objectivity. What criteria would you use to determine whether-or-not such an umbrella group claiming to be representative of civil society is indeed representative? What criteria would you use to try to determine the umbrella group's sincerity, objectivity, and potential for making a positive and lasting contribution to crisis resolution?

5. *Restavek* has received a great deal of attention lately as a social issue, with some claiming that the practice is an insidious form of human trafficking and slavery, while others claim that in Haiti's desperate reality it is simply a strategy used by the poor to try to gain access to education for their children and, hence, offer them a future. While there are cases of abuse, the latter group argues, one should not throw the baby out with the bath water of this traditional practice. What social reforms might occur in Haiti towards dealing with the problem of *restavek*? Which actors should play the lead roles and what should those roles be?

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Foreign Affairs

In recent years, Haiti has occupied the world stage quite disproportionate to its small size. This was particularly the case between 1991 and 1996 when the Haitian army's coup d'etat resulted in international sanctions, intense multilateral diplomacy, a refugee crisis, and ultimately, a military intervention and peacekeeping operation sanctioned by the United Nations and led by the United States. The intense attention given to Haiti at this time also included active participation in crisis resolution by the Organization of American States, member states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and a grouping within the UN referred to as the Friends of Haiti, composed principally of Argentina, Canada, France, the United States, and Venezuela. During UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti between 1994 and 1999, the governments of 34 countries contributed personnel to the relatively small Caribbean country.

Previously, Haiti had received some prominence on the world stage, mostly as a result of its successful revolution in 1804 and especially by other oppressed populations in the Western Hemisphere and Europe. Governments of slave holding countries, however, either ignored or decried Haiti in the first half of the 19th century. The advent of the US Civil War allowed President Lincoln to grant US recognition of the nation of free slaves, more than 50 years after its independence. The US and Europe's great powers became intensely focused on Haiti in the early 20th century mainly because of the country's strategic location. In 1915, the US invaded Haiti, in part to pre-empt a similar German action, and occupied the country for 19 years. Subsequently, and until the 1980s, Haiti was fairly isolated from the world community, stemming from its cultural and linguistic uniqueness, its economic underdevelopment, and international condemnation of the Duvalier dictatorship.

Relations with the United States

Haiti has maintained a long-standing relationship with the United States, its northern neighbor and primary trading partner for both imports and exports. The US is also Haiti's most important single source of bilateral foreign assistance and the primary target for Haitian emigration. Many US non-governmental organizations and religious groups are active in Haiti. The Haitian private sector is closely tied to the US economy.

Diplomatic interest by the United States in Haiti has been uneven. Washington's late 19th and early 20th century interest in its neighbor arose chiefly because of the country's proximity to the Panama Canal and Central America. Haiti borders the Windward Passage, a narrow waterway on which maritime traffic could be easily disrupted. During and after World War I, the US occupied Haiti and a number of Caribbean and Central American countries. During the Cold War, Washington viewed Haiti as an anti-Communist bulwark, partly because of the country's proximity to Cuba. Francois Duvalier exploited US hostility toward Cuba and its fears of communist expansion in the Caribbean basin in order to deter the US from exerting excessive pressure on his own dictatorship.

Since the 1980s, US interest has been particularly focused on curbing illegal Haitian immigration. Washington has also viewed Haiti as a transshipment point for narcotics destined for US markets. Given the country's poverty, legacy of public sector corruption, and underdeveloped public security capacities, Haitian coasts today are particularly vulnerable to international traffickers seeking to land their product there for transfer to proximate US ports of entry, notably Puerto Rico and Florida.

From the 1970s until 1987, US assistance to Haiti grew. Between 1987 and 1994, however, the flow of aid to Haiti was disrupted on several occasions, notably during the 1991-1994 period of defacto military rule. Following the intervention and restoration of legitimate government in 1994, the US added a pledge of $458 million to the $2.342 billion pledged by other bilateral and multilateral donors as part of a five year plan for the rehabilitation and development of the country. Unfortunately, little more than half of those funds were disbursed over that period, largely on account of the inability of the Haitian government to meet disbursement conditionalities. Since the political turmoil of 1999 and thereafter, US bilateral assistance has diminished, channeled principally through non-governmental organizations. Aid to the government of Haiti has been minimal, ceasing altogether following the May 2000 election controversy.

Relations with the Dominican Republic

The second-most important country to Haiti is the neighboring, the Dominican Republic (DR). An enormous amount of trade, much of it informal, crosses the border, mostly going toward Haiti. The Haitian economy has proven to be a desirable market for Dominican products. During the 1991-1994 period of international economic sanctions against Haiti's military government, the flow of goods into Haiti from the DR provided a lifeline for the defacto rulers. In terms of long-term impact that flow facilitated sustained market penetration of Dominican products as never before.

Until recently, political relations between Haiti and the DR have been strained. Since the 1920s, large numbers of Haitians crossed into the DR both informally and under contract in search of work. The resultant, perceived "blackening" of the Dominican population motivated dictator Rafael Trujillo to carry out a notorious massacre of Haitians in 1937.

From the early 1950s until 1986, Haiti provided the DR with cheap, mostly agricultural, labor through formal intergovernmental exchange. With the issue of the status and treatment of those laborers a prickly one between the two countries, that arrangement ceased with the ouster of the Duvalier regime. The troublesome issue of the recruitment and treatment of laborers has not gone away, however. In 1991, for example, US Congressional hearings focused on the abusive treatment of Haitian children in Dominican cane fields. Periodically, particularly under former Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer, Haitians were periodically rounded up and transported back to Haiti.

Although the issue of Haitians in the DR remains a difficult one, since the mid 1990s, official governmental relations have improved. The two governments now explore cooperation on such cross-border issues as the environment, drug trafficking, and economic development. Haitians continue to flow into the DR, pushed by conditions at home and pulled by opportunities in the DR, particularly, in recent years, in its construction sector. Today, an estimated 500,000 Haitians or people of Haitian parentage live in the Dominican Republic.

Relations with Other Countries

Ties with other Caribbean nations, limited until 1995, became more robust thereafter when Haiti restored relations with Cuba and then became a full member of CARICOM. Historically, Britain and France stove to limit contacts between their Caribbean dependencies and Haiti. Haiti's cultural and linguistic distinctiveness also prevented close relations with Caribbean neighbors. Haitians migrated to Cuba to cut cane for decades prior to the advent of the Castro government. When Castro came to power, many Haitians remained in Cuba. Today, Creole is Cuba's second language with many Cubans of Haitian descent living in the eastern half of the island.

Considerable Haitian labor migration to the Bahamas occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the late 1990s, relations between Haiti and the Bahamas have become strained over the continued migration of Haitians to the Bahamas. Subsequently, the Bahamas enacted programs for the return to Haiti of undocumented and new immigrants. Other Caribbean relations have not been strained.

In 1994, CARICOM troops were the first international contingent to land in Haiti. In more recent years, CARICOM governments have been particularly active in pushing the OAS to work aggressively toward a resolution of Haiti's political and economic difficulties. Haiti's relations with Spanish-speaking countries in Central and South America, limited historically, have expanded in recent years, as Haiti became part of a broader movement away from military rule in the hemisphere. Relations intensified in the 1990s as Venezuela, Argentina and Chile played leading roles in the international effort to restore democratic governance to Haiti following the 1991 coup.

Other countries important to Haiti include the primary donor countries of Canada, France, Germany and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Relations with France also remain important on account of historical and cultural ties. Increasingly, European assistance to Haiti has been coordinated under the auspices of the European Union, which by 1998 was the largest single donor of aid to Haiti. Haiti has enjoyed a supportive relationship with Canada, particularly the French-speaking province Quebec, home of a significant number of Haitian émigrés.

Haiti's membership in international and multilateral organizations includes the UN and its associated organizations (Haiti was a founding member), the OAS, the Inter-American

Development, the World Bank, the Lome Convention, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.

Foreign Affairs *Self-study Questions*

1. In the aftermath of the successful military intervention of Haiti in 1994, the consensus among US actors was that the US would not engage in an exercise of 'nation-building' in Haiti - in spite of the welcoming atmosphere given by most Haitians, but rather it would execute an exit strategy based largely upon an electoral calendar. In retrospect, what could - and should - have been done differently?

2. Some have come to think that 'with friends like these, who needs enemies,' with regards to the role international actors have played in Haiti at various times since the ouster of Duvalier in 1986. In retrospect, what have been the strengths - and the weaknesses - of international involvement in Haiti over the past 17 years? How would you address the weaknesses?

3. One salubrious effect of the 1991 coup d'etat is that it resulted in bringing the country out of its isolation, particularly among its Caribbean neighbors. How have developments over the past 10 years or so validated this statement? What do you see as the direction of Haiti's relations with its various Caribbean neighbors?

4. One of Haiti's special Caribbean neighbors is the country with which it shares a border - the Dominican Republic. In spite of the upswing in relations between the two countries over the past 10 years, there remain many obstacles to the relationship, with immediate and longer-term challenges to be confronted - individually and together. Outline the improvements in Haiti-DR relations over the past 10 years and indicate the obstacles. What are some actions that can be taken now to begin confronting both the immediate and long-term obstacles in those relations? What positive role can the US play in this regard?

5. Some characterized the 1994 UN intervention in Haiti as a US move wearing a UN fig leaf. How do you view the relationship today between the US and the OAS with regards to Haiti, particularly regarding the latter's involvement in seeking a solution to Haiti's enduring political crisis?

6. One long-stated foreign policy objective of the Aristide government is for Haiti to be treated as a partner among equals in its international relationships. Why has the Government of Haiti had to make this a stated objective of its foreign policy, and what are the chances that it will succeed?

Haitians Overseas

Large scale, non-agricultural emigration from Haiti began in the 1950s, with France, Quebec in Canada, the United States and, to a lesser extent, French-speaking Africa as the principal destinations. At first, those leaving were members of Haiti's educated upper and middle classes, seeking a better standard of living abroad. Skilled professionals migrating to Africa helped to establish some of the first United Nations technical missions there. Migration to the US of doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, and others was principally to New York and, to a lesser extent, Boston and such other cities as Chicago and Philadelphia. Not long following the rise to power of Francois Duvalier in 1957, Haiti's "brain drain" grew in size. Opportunities for professional advancement in Haiti, already limited, decreased as political repression increased.

During the 1960s, semi-skilled Haitians from the middle and lower urban classes joined the exodus, leaving in increasing numbers. The flow continued during the 1970s and 1980s, in the US principally to the New York City area, and in Canada and France principally to Montreal and Paris, respectively. In the US, as increasing numbers of Haitians established themselves in New York, family members and friends from back home visited them. Between 1956 and 1985, the US government issued over one million entry visas to Haitians. It is estimated that some 50 percent of these visa holders overstayed their time with the hope of establishing permanent residence in the US

A new phrase of migration from Haiti to the US began in 1972 when several sailboats carrying Haitians arrived in South Florida. Participants in this new migration phase - called "boat people" - were more likely to be poorer Haitians who could not afford the exit visas or the airplane tickets of the "Boeing people," or better off Haitians who continued to migrate further north. Many boat people were from rural areas. They sold valuable possessions, including farm animals and land, to raise the amount charged for the 700-mile trip to Florida. When they arrived in South Florida they did not, as a rule, travel very far from their point of entry. As a result, from the 1970s, Haitian enclaves in Miami and nearby South Florida cities began to grow in number and size.

During the 1970s and 1980s, as political repression continued and the country sank deeper into poverty, some 50,000 to 80,000 migrants arrived in Florida. In 1981, up to 1,000 Haitian boat people arrived in South Florida every month. Some arrived directly from Haiti while others reached indirectly, usually through the Bahamas. An unknown number perished at sea. Incidents of Haitian bodies washing up on South Florida beaches were not uncommon.

Haitians seeking entry into the US were viewed by the government as 'economic migrants,' and, as such, usually returned to Haiti when intercepted at sea by the US Coast Guard under the terms of an interdiction agreement between the US and Haitian governments. Many Haitians who arrived in the US managed to slip past authorities. Those who did not were often detained in the Krome prison facility in South Florida. Being black, mostly poor, and speakers of Creole

- a largely unknown language, placed Haitian immigrants in a difficult position in the United States. During the 1980s when the US Center for Disease Control named Haitians as one of several source populations for the new and frightening AIDS disease, the US Haitian population experienced particularly difficult times.

In 1990, the flow of boat people temporarily ceased following Aristide's election and the widespread expectations that it would lead to decreased repression and increased economic opportunity. By late 1991, however, Haitians were once again taking to the high seas and heading north, in larger numbers than before on account of the renewed violence and repression in Haiti that came with the military coup that ousted the Aristide government. During late 1991 and early 1992, some 37,000 Haitian boat people were interdicted on the high seas by US authorities. Thousands more fled in between 1992 and September 1994, as the violence and repression continued. With the removal of the military regime that September, however, the outpouring came to an almost complete halt. When economic and political conditions once again began to deteriorate in Haiti after 2000 and hope for improved conditions diminished, a small, but steady stream of boats were once again being interdicted in the high seas or discharging their poor, desperate passengers on one of South Florida's beaches.

The Haitian Diaspora in the United States continues to grow by more than the occasional boatload of refugees who manage to elude government authorities. Family and friends of Haitians already established in the US continue to arrive by air, many seeking permanent residence. Most importantly, the US Haitian Diaspora is growing through its own internal growth, as a second or third generation is born and raised within Haitian-American families throughout the United States.

In the past two decades, Haitians have moved beyond the traditional destinations of metropolitan New York City and South Florida, branching out to other cities up and down the East Coast and beyond. Presently, for example, Atlanta is experiencing a significant boom in its Haitian population. As they have become established in the US, Haitian-Americans have joined the ranks of other US immigrant populations that sought opportunity where it was found. Current census data indicate varying numbers of Haitian-American populations in all 50 states.

Haitian-Americans have begun to make a discernible mark as a US immigrant group, both in terms of their numbers and their talents. Several currently hold elected state office in Florida and Massachusetts, and others serve as mayors and city council members in South Florida communities. As increasing numbers of Haitian-Americans join the US political process, their voice to influence US policy toward and programs in Haiti grows louder. Haitian-American physicians, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, entertainers, sports figures, diplomats, and community activists are all joining elected officials as leaders in their fields.

With the growth of Haiti's US Diaspora has emerged a two-way flow, with first, second, and even third generation Haitians returning 'home' to visit family and friends, and to get to know their roots. Many Haitian-Americans seek ways to reconnect to Haiti in a way that can

contribute to the country's development. The US Haitian Diaspora sends cash transfers to Haiti of at least $600 million annually, an enormous sum and enormously important source of support for those who have remained in Haiti.

Parallel to the growth of the Haitian Diaspora in the US has been the emergence of interest by the Haitian government in "Haitians Living Overseas." As part of that interest in the so-called 'Tenth Department,' the government has begun to take steps aimed at attracting members of the Haitian Diaspora to Haiti in celebration cultural events, particularly the two hundredth anniversary of Haitian Independence throughout 2004, and as investors in the Haitian economy.

Haitians Overseas *Self-study Questions*

1. Historically, the large-scale immigration of populations from any single country to the United States have had positive - and negative - impacts both in the sending country and the US destination. What are the positive and negative impacts - in Haiti and the US - of the considerable migration to the US of Haitians?

2. Many Haitian-Americans have expressed an interest in gaining voting rights in Haitian elections. To date, however, the Haitian government has not moved toward the exercise of that option. Why do you think this has been so, and what impact might Haitians Living Overseas have on the electoral - and political - process in Haiti?

3. The track record of Haitian-American investment in Haiti has been mixed. While many Haitians have tried to invest in the country, few have been able to sustain their investment. Why do you think this has been the case? What might be done to improve it?

4. In recent times, particularly when Jean-Claude Duvalier fled Haiti in 1986 and when Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected in 1990 and then restored to office in 1994, some Haitians of the Diaspora endeavored to return home. Few ended up staying. What do you think this was the case? Can you foresee a time when significant numbers of Haitians in the Diaspora will try to return home again? If so, when and why; if not why, not? What conditions would have to exist in Haiti to attract large numbers of Haitians to return and to be able to remain in Haiti?

5. For the most part, over the past 25 years or so, Haitians have been characterized as 'economic migrants,' not 'political refugees.' Why do you agree or disagree with that assessment? How should people taking boats for South Florida be classified today?

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Website Resources

Each of the web sites listed below will serve as a source of valuable information on Haiti, and as a gateway to the exploration of other sites:

www.haiti.org/embassy	The site of the embassy of the Government of Haiti.
www.windowsonhaiti.com	A site with recent developments in Haiti and on Haitian culture, music and more.
www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/haiti.html	Gateway to a comprehensive Haiti site that includes historical information, book reviews, and a lively Haiti list serve.
www.Haiti-USA.org	An examination of Haiti's historical contributions to the US and contributions made today by Haitians in America.

About the Author

Dr. Robert Maguire became the Director of Programs in International Affairs at Trinity College in Washington, DC in September 2000 following a career with the US Government as a specialist in Latin America and the Caribbean, grassroots development, democratization, and political economy. He is best known for his work on Haiti, which has spanned more than two decades, mostly as Caribbean Foundation Representative for the Inter-American Foundation (IAF). In 2000, Maguire accepted a temporary position at the Department of State as Haiti specialist in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.

Dr. Maguire has also worked on Haiti issues as a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins University and as the Director, since 1994, of the Georgetown University (now Trinity College) Haiti Program. Since the early 1990's, he has served as the Haiti Seminar Chair at the Foreign Service Institute. Among his publications are *Bottom-Up Development in Haiti* and *Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood, 1986 to 1996.* He has traveled to Haiti more than 100 times and extensively within Haiti, and is fluent in Creole.

Maguire, a former Peace Corps Volunteer in Dominica, West Indies, has earned a Ph.D. in geography from McGill University, an M.A. in Latin American & Caribbean Studies from the University of Florida, and a B.A. in Social Studies Secondary Education from Trenton State College. At Trinity College he is responsible for the overall creation, development and administration of academic programs and curricula in international affairs, and teaches occasional courses in world geography, the Caribbean, geopolitics, and international migration.