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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No.: 200701753

MAR 25 2010

I refer to your letter dated March 11, 2007 regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

We searched for and reviewed the self study guides that you requested and have determined that all except one of them may be released. They are on the enclosed disc. One of the guides is being released with excisions.

An enclosure provides information on Freedom of Information Act exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

We have now completed the processing of your case. If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,

for Margaret P. Grafeld, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

63934 Federal Register/Vol. 69, No. 212
Rules and Regulations

Subpart F – Appeal Procedures

§171.52 Appeal of denial of access to, declassification of, amendment of, accounting of disclosures of, or challenge to classification of records.

(a) *Right of administrative appeal.* Except for records that have been reviewed and withheld within the past two years or are the subject of litigation, any requester whose request for access to records, declassification of records, amendment of records, accounting of disclosure of records, or any authorized holder of classified information whose classification challenge has been denied, has a right to appeal the denial to the Department's Appeals Review Panel. This appeal right includes the right to appeal the determination by the Department that no records responsive to an access request exist in Department files. Privacy Act appeals may be made only by the individual to whom the records pertain.

(b) *Form of appeal.* There is no required form for an appeal. However, it is essential that the appeal contain a clear statement of the decision or determination by the Department being appealed. When possible, the appeal should include argumentation and documentation to support the appeal and to contest the bases for denial cited by the Department. The appeal should be sent to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LC, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, DC 20522-8100.

(c) *Time limits.* The appeal should be received within 60 days of the date of receipt by the requester of the Department's denial. The time limit for response to an appeal begins to run on the day that the appeal is received. The time limit (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) for agency decision on an administrative appeal is 20 days under the FOIA (which may be extended for up to an additional 10 days in unusual circumstances) and 30 days under the Privacy Act (which the Panel may extend an additional 30 days for good cause shown). The Panel shall decide mandatory declassification review appeals as promptly as possible.

(d) *Notification to appellant.* The Chairman of the Appeals Review Panel shall notify the appellant in writing of the Panel's decision on the appeal. When the decision is to uphold the denial, the Chairman shall include in his notification the reasons therefore. The appellant shall be advised that the decision of the Panel represents the final decision of the Department and of the right to seek judicial review of the Panel's decision, when applicable. In mandatory declassification review appeals, the Panel shall advise the requester of the right to appeal the decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel under §3.5(d) of E.O. 12958.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

(b)(1) Withholding specifically authorized under an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and properly classified. E.O. 12958, as amended, includes the following classification categories:

- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
- 1.4(b) Foreign government information
- 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
- 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
- 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
- 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(h) Information on weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

ARMEX	Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2778(e)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
EXPORT	Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. USC 2411(c)(1)
FSA	Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4003 & 4004
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f)
IRAN	Iran Claims Settlement Act, Sec 505, 50 USC 1701, note

(b)(4) Privileged/confidential trade secrets, commercial or financial information from a person

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product

(b)(6) Information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

(b)(7) Information compiled for law enforcement purposes that would:

- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
- (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
- (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (D) disclose confidential sources
- (E) disclose investigation techniques
- (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

(b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions

(b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request, excised with the agreement of the requester

Indonesia

A Self-Study Guide

George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center

School of Professional and Area Studies
Foreign Service Institute

U.S. Department of State

The *Self-Study Guide: Indonesia* is intended to provide U.S. Government personnel in the foreign affairs community with an overview of important Indonesian issues related to history, geography, culture, economics, government and politics, international relations and defense. This guide should serve as an introduction and a self-study resource. Indonesia is far too complex and diverse a society to be covered in any depth using only the text in this guide. The reader is encouraged to explore the questions and issues raised in the guide by referring to the books, articles, periodicals and web sites listed in the bibliography. Most the bibliographic material can be found on the Internet or in the National Foreign Affairs Training Center Library, the Main State Library, or the major public libraries.

The first edition of the *Self-Study Guide: Indonesia* was prepared by Dr Greg Fealy, a research fellow and lecturer in Indonesian politics at The Australian National University, Canberra, and a former C.V. Starr Visiting Professor in Indonesian Politics at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D. C. He has also worked as an Indonesia analyst at the Australian Office of National Assessments. The views expressed in this guide are those of the author or of attributed sources and do not necessarily reflect official policy or the position of the Department of State or the National Foreign Affairs Training Center.

November 2003

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THE LAND

Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic nation. It stretches some 5,000 kilometers across the equator and comprises, according to a 2003 government survey, 18,000 islands and islets, about 6,000 of which are inhabited. These range in size from Kalimantan (Borneo), which is almost as large as Alaska, to tiny islands little bigger than a football field. The five main islands are Kalimantan, Sumatra, Papua (Irian Jaya), Sulawesi and Java. It also has 30 minor archipelagos. Indonesia's total area is 5,193,250 square kilometers, of which 2,027,087 square kilometers is land and 3,166,163 square kilometers is sea. It is the sixteenth largest nation in the world in land area.

Indonesia lies in a region of great geological instability. It sits astride three major continental plates – the Australian, Indian and Pacific – and has at least another 17 significant plate fragments within its borders. Tectonic forces result in frequent tremors and earthquakes. It also has high levels of volcanic activity. Most of Indonesia's active volcanoes can be found in an arc running from West Sumatra, down through Java and Bali, and terminating in the Maluku archipelago (Moluccas). Java, alone, has 112 volcanic centers, of which 15 are active.

Indonesia's chief weather pattern is that of the equatorial double monsoon (rainy season). The western monsoon brings heavy rain falls; the eastern monsoon brings a relatively dry season. The climate changes roughly on a six-month cycle. The wet season is from about November to March and dry season is from June to September. The intervening periods experience mixed weather conditions. Average temperatures in Indonesia are generally classified by geographical position: 28ºC for coastal plans; inland and mountain areas 26ºC; and higher mountain areas 23ºC, depending on the altitude. Average humidity ranges from 70% to 90%.

The archipelago has abundant mineral wealth. It has tin, gold, copper and nickel in large quantities as well as extensive coal reserves. There are vast deposits of oil and gas, found in subterranean basins. The soils and agriculture of Indonesia vary enormously. In small areas of the archipelago, such as Bali, Java and north Sumatra, volcanic activity has produced rich soils capable of supporting intensive agriculture, particularly that of wet-rice production. Other parts of west and central Indonesia have less favorable agricultural conditions; the least fertile land is found in the east of the archipelago. The poorer regions usually have dry-field and swidden agriculture. Forests are another major resource. Indonesia has the second largest rainforest reserves in the world, after Brazil, but widespread logging in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua in recent decades has greatly depleted this resource.

The name 'Indonesia' is a combination of two Greek words: "Indos" (India) and "Nesos" (islands). Curiously, the term was first coined by an English anthropologist in the late nineteenth century and was picked up by "native Indonesians" studying in The Netherlands in the 1920s. It was then adopted by the nascent nationalist movement in the

late 1920s in preference to the other common non-Dutch term for the archipelago, "Nusantara" (Malay for "archipelago").

THE PEOPLE

Recent statistics put Indonesia's population at somewhere between 203 and 230 million. In truth, no one knows the exact number of Indonesians, and most figures represent an informed estimate based on incomplete census data and statistical surveys carried out by government agencies. The most widely quoted and probably the most accurate figures are those from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The Bureau's 2000 national census put Indonesia's population at 206,264,595. In early 2002, BPS revised this figure upwards to 216.9 million. The World Bank estimated Indonesia's population in 2002 to be 211.7 million. Regardless of the precise figure, Indonesia has the world's fourth-largest population after China (1.274 billion), India (1.029 billion) and the United States (286 million).

Indonesia is ethnographically highly diverse. Scholars estimate that it has between 150 and 300 ethnic groups (depending on how they are classified). By far the largest ethnic group is the Javanese, who are thought to make up about 40% (85 million) of the total population. Javanese are concentrated in Central and Eastern Java. They are the most politically dominant of ethnic groups, with four of Indonesia's five presidents being Javanese. The next largest grouping is the Sundanese of West Java who constitute about 15% of the population (30 million). Other major ethnic groups are the Madurese of East Java (6% or 13 million), the Minangkabau of West Sumatra (5% or 11 million), the Balinese (2.6% or 5.8 million) and the Bugis of South Sulawesi (2.3% or 4.8 million). Indonesia also has significant "foreign" minority communities (often referred to as *nonpribumi*, meaning "non-native"). The largest of these are the Chinese, who are said to number about three million, and the Arab community, most of whom are of Yemeni extraction.

Archaeological evidence suggests two major sources for Indonesia's ethnic groups: Melanesian and Austronesian. The Melanesian (Papuan) migration began about 5000-7000 years ago and spread across much of the archipelago. Melanesians were later displaced in the western and central parts of Indonesia by Austronesians, a seafaring Mongoloid people from Taiwan or South China, who appear to have begun settling in the region from about 4000 BC. Little is known of the interaction between the Melanesians and Austronesians but it is thought that genetic mixing in many areas resulted in the modern-day ethnic diversity of Indonesia. The dark skin, curly hair and broad facial features of the Melanesians is more evident in eastern Indonesia, most notably in Papua, whereas the "Han"-like appearance of the Austronesians, including paler skin, Mongoloid eyes and straight hair, is apparent in western and central ethnic groups.

This racial legacy has also influenced the linguistic development of Indonesia. About 350 languages are present in contemporary Indonesia: 200 Austronesian and 150 Melanesian. The main local language groups are Javanese, Sundanese, Acehnese, Balinese, Sasak (Lombok) and Buginese (South Sulawesi). Since independence in 1945, Indonesia's

national language has been Bahasa Indonesia, which is based on Malay but also has significant borrowings from Arabic, Dutch, English and Portuguese. Although there is no official policy to eradicate local languages and dialects, the use of these among the younger generations is in slow decline.

Indonesia's current population growth rate is 1.6%, one of the lowest in Asia. For much of the archipelago's modern history, however, the population grew at an extraordinarily fast rate. For example, in 1939, Dutch officials put the population at 70 million. This figure had blown out to 97 million in 1961 and by 1981, it was 155 million. Thus the population had more than tripled in 42 years. The figures for Java, which is about the size of Alabama, are even more striking. It was estimated to have about three million residents in 1800, 28 million in 1900, 41 million in 1961, 83 million in 1971 and 108 million in 1990. Today, Java has one of the highest population densities in the world: 945 people per square kilometer (the US has 30 people per square kilometer, Japan 317 and South Korea 409). Although Java forms just 7% of Indonesia's land area, it is currently home to about 60% of the nation's population. See Table 1 for information on the population distribution across Indonesia.

Life expectancy in Indonesia is 67 years, compared to 77 years in the US. Infant mortality is 42 per one thousand and maternal mortality during childbirth 395 per 100,000 births; these are among the highest in Asia. The official statistics for the number of HIV/AIDS sufferers is put at 52,000 (1999), though widespread under-reporting suggests that the real figure is far higher.

In terms of religious identification, Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country. In the 2000 census, 88% of Indonesians (about 191 million) declared their faith to be Islam. Indeed, there are more Muslims in Indonesia than in the entire Arab world. Some care is needed in interpreting this figure as all citizens are required to nominate one of five state-recognized faiths. Many Muslims may have only a nominal adherence to the faith. Other religious affiliations are: 6% Catholic (13 million adherents); 3% Protestant (6 million); 2% Hindu (4 million) and 1% Buddhist (2 million).

Table 1: Population by Province (2000 BPS Census)

	Province	**Population**
1	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Islamic Region of Aceh)	3,930,905
2	Sumatra Utara (North Sumatra)	11,649,655
3	Sumatra Barat (West Sumatra)	4,248,931
4	Riau	4,957,627
5	Bengkulu	1,567,432
6	Jambi	2,413,846
7	Sumatra Selatan (South Sumatra)	6,899,675
8	Bangka-Belitung	900,197
9	Lampung	6,741,439
10	Banten	8,098,780
11	Jawa Barat (West Java)	35,729,537

12	DKI Jakarta (Special Capital Territory of Jakarta)	8,389,443
13	Jawa Tengah (Central Java)	31,228,940
14	DI Yogyakarta (Special Territory of Yogyakarta)	3.052,100
15	Jawa Timur (East Java)	34,783,640
16	Bali	3,151,162
17	Nusa Tenggara Barat (West Nusa Tenggara)	4,009,261
18	Nusa Tenggara Timur (East Nusa Tenggara)	3,952,279
19	Kalimantan Barat (West Kalimantan)	4,034,198
20	Kalimantan Tengah (Central Kalimantan)	1,857,000
21	Kalimantan Selatan (South Kalimantan)	2,985,240
22	Kalimantan Timur (East Kalimantan)	2,455,120
23	Sulawesi Utara (North Sulawesi)	2,012,098
24	Gorontalo	835,044
25	Sulawesi Tengah (Central Sulawesi)	2,218,435
26	Sulawesi Selatan (South Sulawesi)	8,059,627
27	Sulawesi Tenggara (Southeast Sulawesi)	1,821,284
28	Maluku (Moluccas)	1,205,539
29	Maluku Utara (North Moluccas)	785,059
30	Irian Jaya (Papua)1	2,220,934

Questions and Issues

1. Indonesia's ethnic diversity and dispersed archipelagic geography are often cited as reasons why the nation is vulnerable to fissiparous tendencies. Is this necessarily the case? Are there examples of other nations with similar ethnic and geographical features which have proven internally stable and socially cohesive?

2. A recent UN-sponsored report painted a bleak picture of Indonesia's environmental problems. It pointed to serious air pollution and contamination of ground water, accelerating depletion of forests and worsening shortages of potable water in many parts of the archipelago. Added to these problems were poor government monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws. Given Indonesia's population pressures and economic problems, is there any prospect of an improvement in the country's environmental outlook?

HISTORY

1 The central government has embarked on a program of partitioning Papua into three provinces: Irian Jaya (in the north); Central Irian Jaya and West Irian Jaya. Central Irian Jaya was proclaimed in Manokwari in early 2003 with little fanfare. West Irian Jaya was proclaimed in September 2003 and immediately sparked violent clashes between supporters and opponents of partition. Jakarta responded by suspending any further implementation of partition. Thus at the time of writing, the number of Papuan provinces remains uncertain, but it seems likely that by late 2004, Indonesia will formally have 32 provinces.

Pre-colonial History

The Indonesian archipelago has had well developed and organized societies since the 7th century BC. Many of these early Indonesians lived in permanent settlements with irrigated rice fields, domesticated animals, and copper and bronze implements. They were animists who believed that all animate and inanimate objects had a distinctive life force or soul and that the spirit world had control over natural events. In the more fertile areas such as Java and Bali, towns and kingdoms began to develop based around wet-field rice cultivation (*sawah*). More elaborate social and religious structures emerged as society became more organized around intensive, systematized production of rice and other crops. In dry-field (*ladang*) agricultural regions, communities were more mobile and less socially organized.

The opening of shipping routes between South Asia and China around the 1st century AD and rising Indonesian participation in trade led to a spread of Indian cultural and religious ideas within the archipelago. Earlier historians believed that Indian conquerors, traders and missionaries had been primarily responsible for this Indianization of Indonesia, but more recent research points to local communities, and especially elites, initiating and encouraging this process. Undoubtedly as societies in the archipelago became more complex and wealthy, leaders were in need of more sophisticated concepts of kingship and state structure. Hindu, and later Buddhist, philosophy provided new forms of legitimacy and hierarchical organization. Rulers began to promote themselves as incarnations of Hindu deities and adopted rituals glorifying their position as intermediaries between the divine and profane worlds. Submission to the authority of the ruler came to be seen as essential to ensuring the material and spiritual wellbeing of society. By the 3rd century AD, Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms could be found across the western part of the archipelago. Despite the growing sophistication of state structures, political instability remained the rule rather than the exception, and the rapid rise and fall of states was a feature of the early centuries AD.

Larger, more stable kingdoms began to emerge from the 8th century. The most important of these was the maritime empire of Srivijaya, which was centered on the Palembang region in modern-day South Sumatra. The Buddhist Sailendra kingdom emerged in Central Java in the same century, a lasting monument of which is the massive Borobodur temple. The largest Javanese empire was that of Majapahit, which reached its high point in the 14th century under the rule of Hayam Wuruk. The last of the powerful Java-based pre-colonial states were the sultanates of Banten, in West Java, and Mataram, centered in Central Java. Islam came to the archipelago in the thirteenth century and was spread by traders, mystics (Sufis) and religious scholars. As with Hinduism and Buddhism, Islam brought new means of political legitimation as well as a strong legal code in matters of commerce – an important advantage in the trading communities in littoral regions.

The Colonial Period

The first European power to have colonial ambitions in the archipelago was the Portuguese. They came to Southeast Asia in the early 16th century primarily seeking to

control the lucrative spice trade emanating from Maluku. After capturing the vital port city of Melaka, on the Sumatran side of the Malay peninsula, the Portuguese soon established fortified bases in various Moluccan islands and succeeded in gaining a large share of the spice trade. Portugal's successes in the region were short-lived; local forces proved militarily superior and the Portuguese were also under growing pressure from Dutch, British and Spanish forces.

The Dutch soon became the dominant colonial power in the archipelago. They defeated the Portuguese in Maluku in 1605, thus gaining substantial control of the spice trade, and established a fortified settlement at what is now Jakarta in 1617. This latter site, named Batavia by the Dutch, became the chief trading port for The Netherlands in the archipelago. Their paramount interest in the region was economic rather than political. The Dutch East India Company (VOC), which controlled Dutch operations in the archipelago, initially sought to avoid territorial conquests, regarding them as expensive and an unnecessary distraction from the core activity of making money. Over time, however, the Dutch became gradually involved in conflicts within "native" states, and increasingly sided with local rulers or aspirants who could best safeguard or promote their colonial interests.

During the late-18th and 19th centuries, the Dutch built a genuine colonial state, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). As much as possible, they sought to leave in place the local aristocracy and traditional structures, thereby minimizing the cost and disruption to "native society and culture". Local rulers were, however, closely supervised by Dutch officials and colonial control over social, political and religious affairs was extensive. Compared to their British and French counterparts, the Dutch were half-hearted in their proclaimed commitment to a "civilizing mission". Education, health and welfare for the masses were neglected until the early 20th century and there was little political participation allowed for non-Europeans. For most of the colonial period, the Dutch were more interested in wealth extraction than they were "enlightenment". It is perhaps for this reason that Indonesians today have little warmth or sense of allegiance to the Dutch.

Japanese Occupation, Independence and Revolution

The three years of Japanese occupation of Indonesia were a watershed in the archipelago's history. The Japanese began attacking areas in eastern Indonesia in early January 1942 and by March 8, had forced the surrender of all Dutch forces in the colony. Many Dutch fled the colony but those remaining were interned in camps. The speed of the Dutch military collapse destroyed earlier assumptions about European superiority and Indonesians looked on in distaste as many of their former colonial masters hastily departed the country.

The Japanese propaganda and mobilization campaigns were to have a profound effect on Indonesian consciousness. The Japanese popularized a strident anti-European ideology and promoted the ideal of "Asia for the Asians". Moreover, they provided military training and intensive political indoctrination to many hundreds of thousands of Indonesians and used nationalist Indonesian leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta to

promote anti-colonial and pro-Japanese views. They also allowed Indonesians to fill senior bureaucratic and military positions as well as offering the prospect of independence. After three centuries of Dutch restrictions and perceived paternalism and condescension, these policies had an exhilarating effect on many Indonesians. Japanese rule also proved oppressive and harsh, particularly for those who were suspected of not supporting the war effort. Especially during the latter stages of the war, there was widespread deprivation and growing social unrest. Despite this, Indonesians tend to regard the Japanese occupation less critically than they do Dutch rule.

In early 1945, the Japanese allowed prominent Indonesians to begin formal preparations for independence, including the drafting of a constitution. As the war entered its final stages, Japanese officials were determined that Indonesia would not be "returned" to The Netherlands as a colony. Accordingly, news of Japan's surrender on August 15, 1945 was suppressed within the colony to enable Sukarno and Hatta to proclaim the establishment of an independent Republic of Indonesia on August 17. The new state was based on Pancasila (literally, "five principles"), that is: a belief in God; nationalism; humanitarianism; democracy; and social justice. This religiously neutral state philosophy was a defeat for Muslim groups which had wanted Indonesia to be an Islamic state.

The declaration of Indonesian independence was dismissed by the Dutch as invalid according to international law, and they immediately set about resuming control of their former colony. Initially the task of securing the archipelago fell largely to British and Australian forces, but by late 1945, large numbers of Dutch officials and troops began to arrive in Indonesia. It was widely expected that newly established Republican forces would quickly succumb to superior allied armies and that the Dutch would soon regain full control. But the Republicans fought with tenacity, often reverting to guerilla campaigns in areas where Dutch authority was re-established. These caused extensive disruption and made it almost impossible for the Dutch to ensure the security of rural areas and transport links. Also unexpected was the success of Indonesia's diplomatic campaign to gain international recognition of its claim to independence. Key members of the educated elite, such as Sutan Syahrir, emerged as astute and articulate advocates of the Republic's case in international fora. By 1948, international opinion was beginning to turn strongly against the Dutch, with the United States, Britain and Australia increasingly sympathetic towards Indonesia's claim and critical of The Netherlands tactics in reasserting their authority. For their part, the Dutch were also realizing the difficulty and cost of taming the archipelago. Eventually they relented and sovereignty was formally transferred to the Republic on December 27, 1949. Despite this, Indonesians still regard August 17, 1945 as their date of independence.

Parliamentary and Guided Democracy

From 1950 to 1957, Indonesia had a European-style parliamentary system. Governments required a majority in parliament and were answerable to it; the president's role was largely ceremonial. The system proved unstable, with six cabinets in just seven years. The main political fault line was between what Herbert Feith called "administrators" and "solidarity makers". The administrators had a technocratic and economically rationalist

approach to policy; the solidarity makers were more populist and favored greater government intervention in social and economic matters. This cleavage cut across secular nationalist and Muslim politics.

Growing public disillusionment with parliamentary politics and worsening regional unrest provided an opportunity for Sukarno and the army, both of which were seeking a greater political role, to press for a more centralized and authoritarian system. Sukarno called this "Guided Democracy" and he claimed that it was more culturally appropriate to Indonesia than Western-style "50% plus one" democracy. From 1957 to 1960, he and the army, with support from the rapidly expanding Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), gradually dismantled constitutional democracy and replaced it with a presidential, executive heavy system. Sukarno claimed that Guided Democracy brought together the three main streams within Indonesian politics and society: nationalism, Islam and Communism (encapsulated in the acronym "Nasakom"). In reality, communal tensions rose to dangerous levels throughout the early 1960s. This was especially true of the PKI on one hand, and the army and Islamic groups on the other.

An abortive coup launched by leftist middle-ranking army officers and small sections of the PKI on September 30, 1965, provided the spark which ignited massive intra-communal violence. The coup was quickly put down by the army, led by then Major-General Soeharto, one of the few senior commanders in Jakarta not kidnapped and murdered by the coup plotters. The army and Muslim groups blamed the coup attempt on the PKI and moved systematically and ruthlessly to eliminate communism as a force. Killing squads slaughtered up to 500,000 PKI members and suspected communists and several hundred thousand others were detained for long periods without trial. Communism was also banned.

Soeharto's New Order

When Soeharto first achieved national prominence following his crushing of the coup attempt, few expected that he would soon become president, let alone one of the longest-serving heads of state of the twentieth century. Prior to the coup, Soeharto had avoided involvement in politics and lacked many of the attributes found in successful political leaders. Unlike the charismatic and extroverted Sukarno, Soeharto was a dull public speaker, had not displayed any skills in political organization and was cautious and understated in manner. But it soon became apparent that he was a masterly tactician and manipulator of those around him. He gradually out-flanked Sukarno and eventually replaced him as president in 1967. He also moved methodically against his opponents and potential sources of dissent, either coopting them into his New Order regime through the use of rewards or punishing those who defied him. His leadership style within government was often likened to that of a Javanese sultan: ministers would have to compete among themselves for his attention and favor, and his method of running government was highly personalized. Ministers' portfolios would often overlap, enabling him to play cabinet members off against each other. Displaying loyalty and subservience to the president was just as important as performing competently in one's portfolio.

The hallmarks of the New Order regime were stability and development. Restoring Indonesia's ravaged economy became a key priority for Soeharto. He abandoned the leftist orientation of Sukarno's Guided Democracy and welcomed Western investment and expertise. He gave extensive powers to a group of technocrats, commonly referred to as the "Berkeley Mafia", to formulate and implement policies for economic rehabilitation and growth. The regime argued that political order was an essential pre-condition for economic recovery and set out depoliticizing society while entrenching the position of the New Order's electoral vehicle, Golkar. The number of "non-government" political parties was limited to eight in the late 1960s and these parties were forced into uneasy amalgamations to form just two parties: the Muslim United Development Party (PPP) and the secular-nationalist and Christian Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). PPP and PDI were subject to tight electoral restrictions and constant regime intervention. Elections were highly orchestrated affairs designed to ensure the legitimacy of the regime. All public servants were obliged to vote for Golkar and the bureaucracy and the military often pressured communities to support the government party. In the six general elections of the New Order, Golkar gained sweeping majorities, its lowest vote being 61% and its highest 74%.

In the 1980s, the regime underwent a number of significant changes. Soeharto's personal domination reached its peak and there were few effective brakes on his exercise of executive power. Moreover, he began to indulge the increasingly avaricious tendencies of his family and close circle of cronies. This created tensions with the Armed Forces, as it found itself marginalized by the growing economic and political activities of the Soeharto family. The military's disaffection prompted Soeharto to shore up his support by cultivating Islamic community support. His regime had previously regarded Islam as a possible threat to its dominance and had firmly repressed it. From the late 1980s, Soeharto began making concessions to Islamic sentiment and appointing devout Muslims to senior positions, something he had been reluctant to do previously.

The Soeharto regime began to falter in the late 1990s. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 provided the trigger for a series of events which would eventually bring the president down. The value of the rupiah plummeted, many Indonesian companies were unable to repay their foreign debts, there was a run on banks, resulting in the closure of 16, and unemployment rose sharply. Amid all this, Soeharto, now 76, fell ill, causing widespread speculation as to his capacity to steer Indonesia through the crisis. Mounting student demonstrations from April 1998 and demands for the president to resign put the government under growing pressure. On May 21, after most of his senior ministers and the military withdrew their support, Soeharto announced that he would stand down. He was replaced the next day by Vice-President B. J. Habibie.

Despite the crisis which precipitated the New Order's demise, the regime's economic record was impressive. Indonesia averaged 7% growth from 1965 to 1980 and 5.5% growth from 1980 to 1990. Only Thailand had better growth in Southeast Asia during this period. There was also a consistent reduction in the levels of malnutrition and poverty from 1965 to 1997. Agricultural output also grew at 3-4% throughout this period, one of the highest levels anywhere in the Third World. By the late 1980s,

Indonesia had achieved self-sufficiency in rice production, something deemed impossible in the mid-1960s. Population growth was another remarkable achievement, with Indonesia shifting from one of the highest birth rates in Asia in 1965 (2.6%), to one of the lowest (1.5%) in the early 1990s. There was also a marked improvement in the quality of health and educational services. Against these positives, the regime presided over massive environmental destruction, widespread human rights abuses, endemic corruption and political stagnation.

The Post-Soeharto Era

The catch-cry of the student protests which helped to unseat Soeharto in 1998 was "reformasi" ("reform"). The post-New Order has thus acquired the label "Era Reformasi", a reference to the supposed implementation of sweeping political and economic reforms. There is much debate among Indonesians and foreign scholars regarding the extent of these reforms. In terms of legislative, electoral and constitutional reform, the changes have been significant. Most of the restrictions on the media and political parties were lifted within months of Soeharto's fall. Indonesia's first free and fair general elections in 44 years were held in mid-1999, with surprisingly little violence and intimidation. There have been a series of revisions to the original 1945 Constitution which have vastly improved the protection of human rights, provided a better balance of powers between the key institutions of state, introduced direct presidential elections for the first time in Indonesia's history and eliminated unelected military and police representation from national and regional legislatures. A number of anti-corruption bodies have also been established, including the Wealth Audit Commission (KPKPN) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK). The nation has also embarked on one of the most radical decentralization processes ever attempted in the world. Underway since January 2001, this policy will see extensive devolution of authority over political and economic affairs to the district level (i.e., largely bypassing the first tier of regional government, the provinces). The military has also been brought under a measure of civilian control.

Many aspects of the political and bureaucratic culture, however, have changed little. Corruption and cronyism are still pervasive and may even have worsened since the end of the New Order. Many political parties remain elite-driven and lack genuine grassroots participation. Few of the major human rights abusers and corrupt officials of the New Order have been successfully prosecuted (Soeharto's son, Tommy, and key crony, Mohammad "Bob" Hasan, are two of the rare exceptions to this – both are serving long prison sentences). The justice system continues to be shot through with corruption; a majority of verdicts are decided by money rather than their legal merits. Added to these problems has been the emergence of new social blights such as bloody intra-communal conflict, particularly between Christians and Muslims, and rising vigilantism.

Of the three presidents of the post-Soeharto era – Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as "Gus Dur") and Megawati Sukarnoputri – only Habibie is likely to be remembered by historians as a significant reformer. An eccentric but intellectually gifted aeronautical engineer, Habibie strived to shake his reputation as Soeharto's

"golden boy" by embarking on a whirlwind of legislative reforms. Many of the above-mentioned reforms were initiated by the Habibie administration. Often poorly thought out and badly drafted, they nonetheless provided a basis for change. His successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, was a controversial and erratic president. Despite a well-deserved reputation as a social and political reformer in the 1980s and early 1990s, by the time he became president health problems had diminished his leadership capacities and he quickly squandered the political goodwill which accompanied his initial election. He was dismissed as president in July 2001 and replaced by his vice-president, Megawati.

Megawati restored much-needed stability to Indonesian politics after the tumult of the Wahid presidency, but she is widely criticized for excessive caution and hesitancy. She remains an unlikely political leader. She lacks oratorical flair and dislikes the Machiavellian maneuvers that characterize much of Indonesian politics. She frequently complains of the unpleasant burdens of high office and shies away from confrontation. The Indonesianist, Harold Crouch, once observed that she prefers to "reign rather than rule". Critics often claim that Megawati's chief source of legitimacy is the fact that she is Sukarno's eldest daughter, but this ignores her role as an opposition leader during the later Soeharto period. Megawati's quiet but determined resistance to the regime's dictates endeared her to many Indonesians. Her perceived decency and political simplicity were also attractive after three decades of New Order rule. Despite a sharp fall in her public standing throughout 2003, she is still the leading candidate in the 2004 presidential election.

Questions and Issues

1. Both Sukarno and Soeharto asserted that the failure of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s was due to the incompatibility of Western-style democracy with Indonesia's culture. Do you agree? Are contemporary Indonesian society and values more suitable to democratic consolidation?

2. Jeffrey Winters has written that the overthrow of Soeharto's New Order was "probably one of the shallowest regime transformations in a major country in the 20th century" and that the reform movement "peaked and collapsed on the same day, May 21, 1998". Is this an accurate summation of the reform process?

3. Does the experience of the Soeharto regime prove that rapid economic development and modernization is only possible in an authoritarian system?

CULTURE

Indonesia has a rich and highly diverse cultural life. Some of its art forms, such as the *gamelan* orchestra and plays using shadow puppets (*wayang*), are internationally famous and have become distinctive cultural markers. But many aspects of the nation's complex cultural life are poorly understood by the outside world. Globalization and the spread of national electronic media have eroded some local cultures, but overall, the breadth of

cultural expression in Indonesia remains one of the sources of fascination for close observers of the country.

Indonesia has a strong literary tradition and many of the nation's more famous authors have had their works translated and published in English. The best known of Indonesia's living authors is Pramoedya Ananta Toer. A controversial figure, he was a leading member of the Communist Party's cultural arm, Lekra, in the early 1960s, and was jailed without trial for 14 years by the New Order, spending much of this time on the bleak prison island of Buru. It was there that he composed his masterful historical quartet of novels, generally referred to as the *This Earth of Mankind* series (the other three novels being *Child of All Nations, House of Glass* and *Footsteps*). The regime banned all of Pramoedya's *oeuvre*. This was not lifted until 1998 and his works have now become best sellers within Indonesia. Other notable works of his include: *The Fugitive*, *Story from Blora*, and *The Sparks of the Revolution*. Literary scholars have on several occasions nominated him for the Nobel Prize in Literature.

Other leading Indonesian writers include: the poet and novelist Sutan Takdir Alisjabana; Marah Rusli, who wrote one of Indonesia's most popular stories, *Sitti Nurbaja;* Mochtar Lubis, whose novel *Twilight in Jakarta* paints a vivid picture of life in the capital during the Sukarno years; and the poet Chairil Anwar.

Indonesia's musical culture contains a number of distinctive forms. The *Gamelan* is undoubtedly the best known of these. The generic term *gamelan* refers to a great variety of ensembles in Java and Bali, differing in style, size and function. This is a highly developed musical form with subtle rhythmical and melodic structures. At a more popular level, there are musical types such as the gentle Portuguese-influenced *Keroncong*, which features singers, guitars and syrupy melodies, and the Indian-derived "Islamic" rock known as *dangdut*. This latter form enjoys high popularity at the grassroots and is often earthy and suggestive in style. Leading *dangdut* performers include: Rhoma Irama, Camelia Malik, Elvie Sukaesih and the raunchy Inul, whose gyrating "borer" dance attracted controversy and eager young male fans in approximately equal measure. Also ubiquitous in Indonesia is karaoke and many an unwary guest to an Indonesian function has found themselves having to sing unfamiliar tunes to the good-natured amusement of their hosts and fellow guests.

Indonesia's film industry is relatively small, given the size of the country. One problem is that films and television programs from India, China (especially Hong Kong) and the United States flood the market, often available at much cheaper cost than a locally produced program. Nonetheless, certain types of visual entertainment are flourishing. On television, the Indonesian version of the soap opera, usually known as *sinetron*, dominates prime-time programming on local free-to-air networks. The quality of *sinetron* varies markedly: some have thoughtful scripting and good acting and production standards; others are clichéd and formulaic, often peddling maudlin or sexually titillating content to attract viewers. A small number of good quality films are produced each year, but much of Indonesia's cinematic output is cheaply produced and largely devoid of aesthetic value.

Sport is another popular Indonesian pastime. Indonesia is one of the world's leading nations in badminton and it also has a number of moderately successful tennis players and boxers (boxing is one of the higher-rating sports programs on the television). Probably the most widely followed sport is soccer, though the poor standard of the domestic competition and Indonesia's lack of success at the international level are constant sources of vexation among the soccer-following public. (A common joke asks how it is that Indonesia can't find 11 decent footballers out of 200 million people!) English and European soccer broadcasts draw large audiences in Indonesia.

Questions and Issues

1. Given the high penetration of Indian, Chinese and American films and television programs, can Indonesia still be said to have a vibrant and distinctive cultural life?

2. Does the popularity of sexually suggestive cultural forms indicate that Islam, the religion of 88% of Indonesians, is not a powerful force on the nation's cultural life?

3. Will globalization and modernization lead to greater homogenization of Indonesia's popular culture?

SOCIAL ISSUES

Indonesia has faced a number of pressing and controversial social issues in the five years since the end of the New Order. These include high levels of inter-religious violence (mostly between Muslims and Christians), a divisive debate over the role of Islam in society and politics, the threat of terrorism, hostility towards minorities, particularly the Chinese, and the rising incidence of crime and vigilantism.

Islamic Law

The role of Islam in the state has long been a contentious issue. When Indonesia was founded in 1945, Islamic leaders wanted a clause inserted in the constitution requiring Muslims to carry out the Shari'ah (Islamic law). The clause was part of the Jakarta Charter, a compromise agreement worked out between Muslim and secular nationalist leaders, which was initially included in the draft constitution but later omitted after non-Muslim communities threatened to secede. The issue re-emerged in the late 1950s and late 1960s, when Islamic parties again sought unsuccessfully to gain constitutional recognition of the Shari'ah. Soeharto's New Order emphatically opposed any attempt at comprehensive implementation of Islamic law, branding such moves to be not only divisive but also subversive. For 30 years, the issue virtually disappeared from public debate.

The end of the New Order brought with it a revival of the campaign for wider enactment of Islamic law. Several Islamic parties, including PPP and PBB, proposed the re-insertion of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution, though this was soundly defeated in

the MPR sessions dealing with constitutional amendments. In various regions of Indonesia, Shari'ah law began to be implemented in a more zealous manner. The most obvious case was Aceh, where wide-ranging Islamic law came into force in early 2003 as part of a Jakarta-sanctioned special autonomy package. In a number of districts of West Java, Sumatra and South Sulawesi, Shari'ah has been implemented in a de facto manner by local Islamic groups. This often includes the formation of vigilante squads to enforce the wearing of Islamic dress (usually targeting women) and attack "places of iniquity" such as nightclubs and red-light districts. There are also recently established, high-profile organizations such as MMI (Indonesian Mujahidin Council) and KPSI (Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Shari'ah) which are campaigning for full enactment of Islamic law.

Attempts to further Islamize Indonesian law have had a polarizing effect within society. Non-Muslims are strongly resistant but are also fearful of speaking out. Some of the most trenchant opposition to Shari'ah law activism comes from the liberal Islam movement. Figures such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla and Syafii Maarif use Islamic teachings to rebut arguments that Muslims and the state are obliged to carry out the Shari'ah. They uphold the notion of a religiously neutral, "deconfessionalized" state and espouse Islamic devotions as a matter for the private sphere, not the public sphere.

Terrorism

Indonesia has long been said by regional and foreign intelligence agencies to have terrorist groups based within its territory. But for most Indonesians, the magnitude of the threat was not apparent until bombs tore through two crowded Bali nightclubs on October 12, 2002. In the worst terrorist attack since 9/11/01, 202 people died, including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 32 Britons, 9 Swedes and 7 Americans. Another 350 were seriously injured.

The Megawati government, which had previously been reluctant to act against suspected terrorist groups, took a number of dramatic steps. For the first time in Indonesian history, it allowed dozens of foreign police and intelligence officers into the country to assist local officials with their investigations. It also introduced anti-terrorism laws which gave wide powers to the police and legal system to pursue and prosecute suspected terrorists.

Investigators very quickly uncovered evidence that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a clandestine group founded by two Indonesian Islamic scholars of Yemeni extraction in Malaysia in the mid-1990s, had carried out the attacks. A string of arrests and revelations soon followed indicating the extent of JI operations and the intensity of its anti-Western animus. At the time of writing, over 100 arrests have been made and almost 30 men have been tried and found guilty – three of them sentenced to death by firing squad. The head of JI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was also jailed for four years, though charges that he was directly involved in decision-making regarding terrorist attacks were unproven.

The terrorism issue has several controversial elements to it. The first is that, although most Indonesians would appear to accept the severity of the local terrorist threat, they also are skeptical about the motives behind the U.S.-led "war on terror". Public opinion polls repeatedly show that a majority of Indonesians believe that the West is using the terrorism issue to further its strategic and economic interests. Many surveys also suggest that the public believes the U.S. has had some role in orchestrating the "JI issue". While Indonesian officials continue to pursue terrorists with rare vigor and dispatch, the government is wary of the political costs in being seen as too compliant to Western demands for further action, such as tighter supervision of the Islamic education sector. Second, many Indonesian Muslims are worried that local security agencies will use the "war on terror" to justify a return to the repressive "Islamo-phobic" policies of the Soeharto era. Third, there is much rivalry between the police, intelligence agencies and the military over who should lead the anti-terrorism campaign. The police have primary responsibility for domestic security and anti-terrorism operations and their success in investigating the Bali bombing has won wide praise. But TNI and BIN, the main civilian intelligence agency, are resentful of the resources and plaudits going to the police and have been pressing for a greater role.

Minorities

The role and status of minorities has been a contentious social and political issue since the founding of the Indonesian state. This is particularly so for the largest minority community, the Chinese. Resentment and hostility towards the Chinese remains dangerously high in many sections of "indigenous" society and physical attacks on the Chinese and their property have occurred regularly since at least the eighteenth century and continue today. During the Soeharto era, the Chinese were accorded a privileged economic position which helped to further concentrate wealth disproportionately in Sino-Indonesian hands. However, the regime kept the Chinese politically and culturally isolated: Confucianism was banned, as also were public celebrations of Chinese festivals; the use of Chinese characters in public places was prohibited; and there were few prominent Chinese politicians. The position of the Chinese has improved over the last five years. Confucianism is no longer proscribed and Chinese New Year festivities are now publicly celebrated. Chinese have a higher political profile. Despite this, discrimination and insecurity remain a fact of life for most Sino-Indonesians.

Rule of Law and Vigilantism

Faith in Indonesia's law enforcement and justice systems is low. Both the police and judiciary have low professional standards and are notoriously corrupt. Police often demand payment to investigate a case and prosecute an offender; judges more often than not decide a case based on who pays the greater bribe rather than who has the stronger case in law. Not surprisingly, communities have, in recent years, been given increasingly towards vigilantism. Almost daily, suspected miscreants are set upon by local communities, often viciously so. Victims are frequently killed in the attacks and police rarely appear interested in apprehending their assailants. Undoubtedly, such attacks indicate a belief within grassroots communities that the only certain form of "justice" is

that which they can dispense summarily by themselves. But the cycle of violence and lynch-mob mentality engendered by vigilantism is a serious obstacle to developing a respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights within Indonesia.

Questions and Issues

1. Does the frequency of attacks on Chinese and their property indicate socio-economic resentment on the part of "native" (*pribumi*) Indonesians or outright racism? Why have other "distinctive" minorities such as Arabs and Indians not suffered similar violence?

2. Former president, Abdurrahman Wahid, once said that "Islamic politics has failed and most Indonesians are happy about that". He argued that Muslims want Islam to be a private matter rather than a matter of state enforcement. Does history support his view?

3. What constraints does the Indonesian government face in prosecuting its campaign against terrorism?

ECONOMICS

Until the 1997 financial crisis, Indonesia had recorded almost three decades of impressive growth. When Soeharto came to power in 1966, Indonesia had some of the worst economic indicators in the world. After eight years of ruinous mismanagement under Sukarno's Guided Democracy, per capita Gross National Product (GNP) had fallen to about $30 per annum. Daily food consumption was less than 1800 calories per head and malnutrition was widespread. Inflation was running at about 500%, foreign reserves were exhausted and the value of the rupiah had plummeted. Many economic commentators regarded Indonesia as a basket case.

Soeharto quickly set about rehabilitating and modernizing Indonesia's economy. He appointed a group of US-trained "technocrats" led by the economist Widjojo Nitisastro to draw up new policies and oversee their implementation. The IMF was also invited to advise on economic policy. Vigorous anti-inflation measures were introduced, targets for balanced budgets were set, new foreign exchange regulations stimulated imports and concessions were offered to foreign investors in order to attract new capital. This was a major reorientation of economic policy based on direct foreign investment and the integration of Indonesia's economy into the global capitalist system. Western donors and Japan rescheduled Indonesia's heavy debt repayments and injected large quantities of aid. Foreign investment also flowed into the country with the oil industry being a particular focus. The oil boom of the early 1970s proved a windfall for the regime, with well over half of the government's revenue coming from the petroleum sector. Strong export markets for nickel, timber and copper also swelled the state's coffers.

The success of the New Order's policies was apparent in Indonesia's GNP growth rates: from 1965 to 1980 these averaged 7% per annum; during 1980-90, they were 5.5%.

Between 1965 and 1996, per capita GNP rose from $30 to $950, the highest income growth of any Southeast Asian country. There was also a consistent reduction in both the absolute number and percentage of Indonesians living in poverty.

The 1997 financial crisis brought a dramatic, and for many Indonesians, traumatic end to the boom. As large sums of foreign capital began flowing out of the country from September 1997, the value of the rupiah fell sharply, leaving many corporations with large US dollar loans highly exposed. Confidence in the financial sector was shaken by a run on the banks and an IMF-induced government closure of 16 banks. By January 1998, the rupiah had dropped to Rp17,000 per one US dollar. Economists have calculated that during this period, Indonesia suffered the most severe economic reversal of any country since the Great Depression. Certainly poverty levels rose from 11.3% in 1996 to 24.3% in 1998 (based on the World Bank criterion of a daily income less than US$2).

Since that time, the Indonesian economy has gradually stabilized and regained some of its momentum of the pre-1997 period, though this recovery has been slowest of all the major East Asian economies affected by the financial crisis. Only in early 2003 did per capita GNP income return to the 1996 level, and the incidence of poverty and unemployment has also fallen consistently. Although Indonesia has been tardy in overcoming the effects of the crisis, its economy is now performing better than most of its regional counterparts. GNP grew by 3.8% over the year to June 2003; only Thailand had a better growth figure within ASEAN. Inflation had been brought down to 6% (from 14% in early 2002), and the exchange rate remained steady at about Rp8400/US$1. Domestic consumption continues to drive economic growth. Investment, however, remains at about two-thirds the level preceding the 1997 financial crisis and international investors are reluctant to commit capital to Indonesia. The political uncertainty surrounding the 2004 general and presidential elections is likely to deter investment at least until 2005.

Questions and Issues

1. Was the strong economic growth of the Soeharto era due to good policy making or was the New Order the beneficiary of booming resource exports such as oil, gas and precious metals?

2. When the 1997 financial crisis hit Indonesia many politicians and community leaders blamed “predatory” international capital markets and bad IMF policies for the nation’s plight. Is there any justification for such a view?

3. Economists predict that Indonesia needs annual GNP growth of over 5% to generate work for its burgeoning labor force. Is there any prospect of such growth rates being achieved in the short to medium-term? If not, will Indonesia suffer increasing social unrest?

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

<u>Structure of Government</u>

According to the Indonesian Constitution, there are five principal organs of state: the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR); the Presidency; the Parliament (DPR); the State Audit Board (BPK); and the Supreme Court (MA).

Indonesia's existing political system is a predominantly a presidential system but it also has elements of a parliamentary system. Major changes will come into force in 2004, but under the existing system, the president is elected by and answerable only to the supreme decision-making body, the MPR. The president selects and leads the cabinet and has wide executive powers. Parliament can censure a president and call for the MPR to initiate dismissal proceedings but it has no direct power to remove a president. In practice, parliament's powers of legislative obstruction and censure mean that a president's authority can be greatly undermined if he or she loses majority support in the legislature. The MPR's other tasks include: setting the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN), monitoring the performance of other organs of the state such as parliament, the BPK and MA, and amending the constitution.

The present parliament has 500 members, 462 of whom are popularly elected and 38 are appointed representatives of the Armed Forces (TNI) and the Police. The MPR has 695 members, comprising the 500 parliamentarians, 130 regional representatives (each of the 26 provincial parliaments in 1999 elected 5 delegates) and 65 community and professional group representatives. From 2004, parliament will have 550 members, all of whom are elected (i.e., guaranteed military and police representation will be eliminated). The MPR will also undergo extensive changes. A new Regional Representative Council (DPD) will be established comprising four members for each province (i.e., with the current 31 provinces, it will have 124 members). The DPD will have powers of legislative review in matters pertaining to regional affairs. Once the DPD is formed, the MPR will comprise the 550 members of parliament as well as the DPD.

During the Guided Democracy and New Order periods, Indonesia's power structures were highly centralised and rigidly top-down. All important decisions were made in Jakarta and regions were expected to implement without demur the central government's policies. Since the enactment of decentralisation laws in January 2001, Jakarta has surrendered extensive authority to district level government and legislatures. The central government, however, retains control of five main areas of policy: defence and security; monetary controls; foreign affairs, religious affairs; and justice. All other fields, including health, education, the environment and infrastructure, are now the responsibility of the approximately 420 district administrations.

Indonesia has a five-year electoral cycle and has used three different election systems in its history. The seven elections from 1955 to 1997 used a proportional system with provincial boundaries as electorates. For the 1999 election, a convoluted mix of proportional and district representation was used. Each province formed an electoral region but the allocation of seats was tied to a party's performance in districts (*kabupaten/kota madya*) within the province. For example, if a party won 25% of the vote in a province it was (theoretically) entitled to one quarter of the seats. It would then

gain seats in those districts where it recorded its highest vote. (In practice, the system had many anomalies and outcomes did not always reflect the intention of the legislation.)

The 2004 elections will be by far the most complex in Indonesia's history. There will be five electoral processes using three different systems, including a new electoral mechanism for parliamentary elections. The five processes are: national, provincial and district legislative elections; the DPD election; and the presidential election. The legislature and DPD elections will all take place on the same day: April 5. Parliamentarians will be chosen by an open-list proportional representation system using newly drawn electorates. Voters can pierce either a party symbol or the box of an individual candidate. Members of the DPD will be elected by a single non-transferable vote system and each province forms one electorate. DPD candidates stand as individuals rather than party representatives. The first round of the presidential election will take place on July 5 when electors vote for a pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. To be elected, a "package" of candidates must win over 50% of the vote nationally as well as gain at least 20% of the vote in 50% of provinces. If no pairing of candidates meets these requirements in the first round, the top two pairs go through to a second round to be held on September 5. The constitution requires the new president to be installed by October 22, 2004.

Political Parties

Indonesian politics has often been characterized in terms of *aliran* (literally, "streams"). The three major historical streams were secular nationalism, Islam and communism/socialism, with a range of parties representing each stream. The major nationalist party in the early decades of independence was the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). Although Sukarno was not formally a member, he was widely regarded as the guiding light of the party. PNI emerged from the 1955 election as the top-ranked party with 24% of the national vote. Always an ideologically diverse party, PNI suffered splits between its leftist and more conservative-technocratic wings during Guided Democracy. The New Order regime forced it to join other nationalist and Christian parties in PDI in 1973. Megawati became the chair of PDI in early 1994 but was later removed by the regime in 1996. Following Soeharto's downfall, Megawati loyalists led by her husband, Taufik Kiemas, formed the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) as a new vehicle for political secular nationalism and PNI-inspired ideals. PDI-P won 34% of the vote at the 1999 general election, making it by far the largest party. PDI-P is the most heterogeneous of Indonesia's current major parties. It includes members of the "greater PNI family" (i.e., older generation PNI people as well as younger "family" members who remain active in PNI-affiliated community and professional groups), technocrats and businessmen, retired military officers and former student and NGO activists. The party has few ideological preoccupations apart from an unelaborated commitment to maintaining Indonesia's secular nationalist orientation.

The Islamic stream is the most complex of the three. It has two major sub-streams: traditionalism and modernism (sometimes referred to as "reformism"). Traditionalist Muslims are those who adhere closely to one of the four main Sunni law schools, usually

the Syafi'i school, which predominates in Southeast Asia. They also tend to have more heterodox religious practices. The largest traditionalist organization is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which has its base in East and Central Java. NU claims to have about 35 million members, making it one of the largest Islamic organizations in the world. Modernists place greater emphasis on the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah) than on the classical law schools as a basis of doctrine and ritual. They are less tolerant of non-Islamic elements in their religious life. The largest modernist organization is Muhammadiyah, which claims a membership of about 30 million.

Shortly after independence, traditionalist and modernist Muslims agreed on a united front for political Islam. They established the Masyumi party for this purpose. Tensions between traditionalists and modernists led NU to split from Masyumi in 1952 and form its own political party. This left Masyumi a largely modernist party. At the 1955 election, Masyumi was the second-largest party, with 22% of the vote, and NU the third largest with 18%. For much of the 1950s, NU and Masyumi regarded each other as rivals and formed coalitions with non-Islamic parties. Masyumi trenchantly opposed Sukarno's Guided Democracy and was eventually banned by the president in 1960. NU served as the only significant Islamic party in Guided Democracy.

The Soeharto regime was determined to minimize the threat of Islamic parties to its dominance. Accordingly, it imposed onerous restrictions on political Islam. It prevented the rehabilitation of Masyumi and would only allow a new modernist-based party with a new name, Parmusi. NU was also subject to growing pressure from the regime to comply with its wishes. At the 1971 elections, NU gained 18% of the vote, virtually the same as in 1955, but Parmusi's vote was only 5%. In 1973, as part of the regime's "party simplification" policy, NU and Parmusi were forced into an amalgamation with two smaller parties to form the United Development Party (PPP). For much of the New Order, the PPP functioned as the main opposition party.

After the demise of the New Order, there was a proliferation of Islamic parties. Twenty-one of the 48 parties contesting the 1999 election were in some significant way Islamic. The traditionalist and modernist streams both experienced unprecedented fragmentation. NU launched a separate but endorsed party, the National Awakening Party (PKB), under the effective leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid, a former NU chairman. There were also three other, much smaller NU-based parties. A sizeable number of NU members remained loyal to PPP, particularly after NU's Hamzah Haz became the party's first non-modernist chairman in late 1998. The modernists were spread even more widely. Some continued within the Parmusi component of PPP; others remained in Golkar (discussed below). Still others joined the former Muhammadiyah chairman Amien Rais in forming a new "pluralist" party, the National Mandate Party (PAN). A final group sought to revive Masyumi and founded the Crescent Moon and Star Party (PBB). Overall, most Islamic parties were disappointed with their support at the general election. NU's PKB got 13%, PPP was down to 12%, Amien Rais's PAN 7% (far less than expected), and PBB a meager 2%. In total, the 21 Islamic parties got 39% of the national vote, 4% below the combined Islamic vote at the 1955 election.

The communist stream during the late 1950s and early 1960s was probably the largest single component of the electorate. Although the PKI's vote at the 1955 election was 15%, at regional elections across Java and some outer islands in 1957-8 it averaged 27% of the vote. This made other parties and the military fearful that the Communist Party would soon be in a position to dominate Indonesian politics. But the post-1965 coup arrest and slaughter of PKI members, combined with the rigorously enforced ban on communism, virtually eliminated the PKI as a force. In the 1999 election, only one party, the People's Democratic Party (PRD) had a genuinely leftist agenda; its vote was a fraction of one percent.

Golkar (literally "Function Groups") represents a major anomaly in the *aliran* analysis of Indonesian politics. Formed in the early 1960s by the military as a vehicle for anti-communist groups, Golkar was transformed into the government party in the late 1960s. It became the chief instrument in the New Order regime's corporatizing agenda, in which they sought to incorporate as many social and political groupings as possible within Golkar. Not surprisingly, the party was dominated by the military and bureaucrats, but many technocratically-inclined young professionals, including modernist Muslims, also flocked to the party. Following 1998, Golkar partially reformed itself, driving out some of the more prominent Soeharto-era figures and installing the Soeharto-era minister Akbar Tanjung as chairman. Although the party's vote dropped from 78% in 1997 to 22% in 1999, Golkar's performance was stronger than many analysts had expected. Golkar remains the most disciplined and professional of Indonesian parties and is likely to improve its position in the 2004 general election.

Table 2. 1955 Election Results

Ranking	Party	National Vote (%)	Seats in Parliament
1	PNI	24	57
2	Masyumi	22	57
3	Nahdlatul Ulama	18	45
4	PKI	15	39

Table 3. Election Results, 1977-97

Ranking	Party	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997
1	Golkar	62	64	73	68	74
2	PPP	29	27	16	17	22
3	PDI	9	8	11	15	3

Table 4. 1999 Election Results

Ranking	Party	National Vote (%)	Seats in Parliament
1	PDI-P	34	153
2	Golkar	22	120
3	PKB	13	51
4	PPP	12	58

5	PAN	7	34
6	PBB	2	11

Questions and Issues

1. Should a country as diverse as Indonesia have a strong presidential system allowing firm central control of the state or a decentralized parliamentary system which permits representation of the widest range of community and interest groupings?

2. Is it likely that democratic elections will ever deliver a majority party or even a strong majority coalition?

3. Is the *aliran* concept still useful in analyzing political trends in Indonesia?

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE

Foreign Policy

The underlying principles of Indonesia's foreign policy have remained remarkably constant through most of the post-independence period. Two related concepts – non-alignment and a "free and active" (*bebas dan aktif*) stance – provide the central underpinnings of Indonesia's approach to international relations. The origins of this foreign policy philosophy can be traced back to the tumult of the Revolution (1945-49) and Indonesia's struggle for international recognition of its independence struggle. Leftists within the Republican government wanted Indonesia to be aligned to the Soviet Union, which at that time strongly supported the Indonesian cause in the UN. The more pragmatic and conservative Republican leaders were wary of provoking the Dutch and antagonizing the United States, which was then ambivalent on the question of Indonesian independence. In this environment, two of the seminal figures in Indonesia's foreign policy formulation made key speeches setting out what soon became the guiding principles: former Prime Minister Syahrir proposed to parliament in February 1948 that the country pursue a non-aligned stance; and Vice President Hatta, in August of the same year, argued forcefully for a "free and active" approach in dealing with other nations. Hatta's speech, in particular, was seen as laying the cornerstone of Indonesian policy. He stated:

> Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the arena of international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to determine its own standpoint with the right to fight for its own goal – the goal of a fully independent Indonesia.

While Indonesia's foreign policy has swung in varying degrees towards the Communist Bloc and back to the West, in response to both domestic and international conditions, governments have still upheld their commitment to a non-aligned and active approach.

An early manifestation of Indonesia's foreign policy preoccupations was the 1955 Asian-African Conference held in Bandung. Twenty-nine states, many represented by their heads of states (including Chou En-lai, Nasser and Nehru), attended the conference. Although there were important differences of opinion between some of the states on international issues, the conference nonetheless captured a growing spirit of common struggle and assertiveness among former colonies. The conference was also seen by Indonesians as a triumph of diplomacy and confirmation that the nation could play a significant role in world affairs. The Asian-African conference has also been credited with paving the way for the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Indonesia was to be an important player in NAM.

During the early 1960s, Indonesia's foreign policy veered leftwards. Sukarno, in particular, became increasingly critical of the West, accusing it of having neo-colonial designs upon recently independent nations. He famously told the United States in 1964 to "go to hell with your aid" and he withdrew Indonesia from the United Nations. He also pursued a low-level military confrontation with Britain opposing the formation of Malaysia. Indonesia became more closely aligned with the Communist Bloc nations and Sukarno trumpeted a prospective alliance between Beijing, Pyongyang, Hanoi, Phnom Penh and Jakarta.

Soeharto dramatically changed Indonesia's foreign policy. A staunch anti-communist, he abandoned Sukarno's leftist orientation and drew Indonesia closer to the West and Japan. Indeed, gaining Western aid and investment were critical parts of the regime's blueprint for economic recovery. Soeharto was determined to integrate his nation more closely into international markets. Despite Soeharto's pro-Western and anti-communist disposition, the New Order was careful to maintain a broadly independent stance. Soeharto played a pivotal role in founding and guiding the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, partly because he wanted a regional counterbalance to superpower involvement in Southeast Asia. He also remained active in the NAM and allowed Indonesia to be one of the founding nations of the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC). There were also strains in the regime's relations with Western nations, especially over human rights issues and Indonesia's policies in East Timor.

In the post-Soeharto era, Indonesia's attitudes towards the West have cooled somewhat. Many Indonesians were shocked by the severity of the 1997 financial crisis, believing that the IMF had left the country vulnerable to the predatory tactics of international money traders. The separation of East Timor in 1999, after an internationally supervised plebiscite and military intervention, hardened opinion that the West was seeking to divide and weaken Indonesia. The war on terror is also seen by many as having a concealed agenda to undermine Islam and Indonesian independence from US foreign policy imperatives.

Defense and the Military

For most of Indonesia's history, governments have seen the main threat to security as being internal rather than external. As a result, the primary preoccupation of Indonesia's Armed Forces is in maintaining national order and unity; outside threats occupy a secondary importance.

Indonesia's Armed Forces (TNI; ABRI during the Soeharto era) see themselves as holding a unique position in the history of the nation: unlike most armed forces, which are a creation of the state, TNI believes that it was vital to the birth of the Indonesian state. Subsequent events tended to confirm TNI's self-perception as the central pillar of the state. These include: its role in militarily opposing the Dutch during the 1945-49 Revolution, the crushing of a series of regional rebellions during the 1950s and early 1960s, its putting down of the 1965 coup attempt and more recently, its campaigns against separatist movements in Papua and Aceh.

There are several key concepts within TNI doctrine. The first is Sishankamrata (The System of Overall People's Defense and Security), which sets outs that the military and the people are inextricably linked and will work together to ensure the nation's security. Its origins can be found in the Revolution when, according to TNI histories, the close cooperation of ordinary civilians with TNI brought about the defeat of the Dutch. Thus, there was no boundary between civilian and military life and TNI has also seen itself as being a community-based rather than barracks-based force.

The second key concept is that of *dwi-fungsi* (dual function). Effectively, this doctrine asserts that TNI is both a socio-political and a military force. TNI argued that *dwi-fungsi* grew out of the military's traditional "alliance" with society and also its guardian role of national unity. During the New Order, *dwi-fungsi* was used to justify extensive military involvement in virtually all the key institutions of state. Indeed, the military had a parallel structure to that of the civilian state apparatus which extended down to the virtually every village in the archipelago. The military counterparts of civilian officials could intervene and control a wide range of decision-making processes. The system was known as the "territorial system" and it is a crucial element in TNI functioning. Since 1999, TNI has formally abandoned *dwi-fungsi* but the replacement doctrine retains many of the same features. Some elements of the territorial system have also been dismantled but the essential structure persists and TNI is determined to preserve the system given that decentralization has shifted many political and economic resources to the regions.

TNI's total number of personnel is 298,000, some 230,000 (72%) of which is army. Indeed, the Army is by far the dominant service in TNI, both historically and contemporaneously. Since the 1960s, all but one of the TNI commanders-in-chief has been from the army. The operational capacity of the Armed Forces is limited. It is poorly equipped and levels of training and morale are low. (Recent reports suggest that less than 30% of the Navy's ships are seaworthy and only 93 of the Air Force's 222 aircraft are operational). Standards among the territorial units (those recruited from and based in a specific area) tend to be particularly poor. Only the Special Forces, which

comprise Kostrad (green berets) and Kopassus (red berets), are reasonably well trained and resourced. Human rights abuses are commonplace and few perpetrators are ever prosecuted. TNI gains only about 30% of its income from the budget; the remainder is generated from "private" sources. These sources can range from large TNI-controlled enterprises, to gun-running, drug distribution and protection rackets.

Questions and Issues

1. Indonesia's historical dependence on external economic assistance has meant that rarely has it been able to pursue its avowed "free and active" foreign policy. Discuss.

2. Despite its claim to be the guardian of national unity, TNI's frequent human rights abuses and economic predations have created deep hostility in some regions and fueled separatist sentiment. Discuss.

TIMELINE

1945 – August 17: Sukarno and Hatta proclaim Indonesia's independence.

1949 – The Netherlands formally hands over sovereignty to Indonesia.

1955 – Indonesia's first general election is held; four major parties are PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI

1957 – President Sukarno begins the transition to "Guided Democracy" by appointing himself as "citizen Sukarno" to form an extra-parliamentary "business cabinet".

1959 – Constituent Assembly deadlocked on drafting the new constitution; Sukarno decrees the dissolution of the Assembly and proclaims the return of the executive-centered 1945 Constitution; Guided Democracy now in place.

1960 – Sukarno purges parliament of opponents and installs unelected military and "community group" representatives; bans the Masyumi party.

1963-4 – bloody clashes between Communists and Muslims in Java over the Communist Party's attempts at land reform through seizures of larger farm holdings.

1965 – September 30-October 1: coup attempt launched by middle-ranking leftist army officers and sections of the PKI; quickly put down by Major-General Soeharto.

1965-66 – massacre of PKI members and suspected communists by military, Muslim and nationalist groups; at least several hundred thousand are killed and an equal number detained without trial.

1967 – Soeharto installed by the MPRS as acting president, though he effectively holds full authority; Sukarno formally stripped of the presidency in 1968.

1971 – first election of the New Order regime; "opposition parties" subject to intense intimidation and intervention; the regime's Golkar party wins a large majority.

1974 – "Malari" riots break out in Jakarta following student protests against the New Order's policies; 8 killed and 800 arrested.

1975 – Indonesian "volunteers" invade the former Portuguese province of East Timor.

1984-5 – regime forces all social and religious organizations to accept Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation or face dissolution.

1990 – Soeharto endorses the formation of a government-sponsored Muslim Intellectuals' Association (ICMI), signaling a rapprochement with Islamic groups; ICMI becomes a major vehicle for Muslim career advancement and regime cooptation of Islamic groups.

1991 – Soeharto takes the pilgrimage to Mecca.

1997 – financial crisis hits East Asia; the rupiah plummets in value and Indonesia forced to accept IMF rescue package; Soeharto suffers a minor stroke in December.

1998 – May 21: Soeharto announces he will stand down and hand over power to Vice-President B. J. Habibie.

1999 – June 7: Indonesia's first free and fair elections in 44 years are held; contested by 48 parties, 19 of which win seats in the national parliament.

1999 – October 21: Abdurrahman ("Gus Dur") Wahid elected as president by the MPR; Megawati elected as vice-president the follow day.

2001 – July 23: Abdurrahman Wahid declares a state of emergency and attempts to shut down parliament and the MPR; his order is ignored by the police and military and he is dismissed as president by the MPR; Megawati is installed as president and Hamzah Haz as vice-president.

2002 – October 12: terrorist bombing of 2 nightclubs in Bali; 202 people die and 350 injured, making it the deadliest terrorist attack since September 11, 2001.

2003 – August 5: terrorist car-bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta; 12 people die.

INTERNET SITE GUIDE

Official Sites

- Indonesian government official website (only in Indonesian, at present): www.indonesia.go.id (another English-language site, www.ri.go.id, is currently under construction).

- Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs (Deplu): www.dfa-deplu.go.id (English and Indonesian)

- Central Bureau of Statistics website contains a wealth of information on Indonesia's society and economy (English and Indonesian): www.bps.go.id

- Indonesian parliamentary website offers quite good coverage of legislative processes in the DPR (mainly in Indonesian): www.dpr.go.id..

- Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM): www.komnas.go.id. (Indonesian).

- Indonesian Election Commission (KPU) offers detailed information on Indonesia's election system and preparations (mainly in Indonesian): www.kpu.go.id..

- Useful private website listing important Indonesian government and political sites: www.gksoft.com.govt/en/id.html.

Newspapers, magazines and online sources

The Jakarta Post - the leading English-language newspaper in Indonesia - http://www.thejakartapost.com

Inside Indonesia – topical and informative magazine on Indonesian current affairs and society - http://www.insideindonesia.org/

Far Eastern Economic Review - the best of the English-language magazines devoted to Asia – quite good coverage of Indonesia but now subscription only – http://www.feer.com

BBC's Asia Pacific and East Asia Today services are consistently good – http://www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific; and http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/eastasiatoday/

Gatra – Indonesian-language current affairs magazine at http://www.gatra.com

Tempo - authoritative and probing current affairs magazine – http://www.tempo.co.id (available in both English and Indonesian)

Kompas Online - rather staid but usually the most reliable and accurate newspaper - http://www.kompas.com (has selected articles available in English).

Media Indonesia – http://www.mediaindo.co.id

Republika Online - the most influential 'Islamic' daily - http://www.republika.co.id

Suara Merdeka - Semarang daily with excellent website and archive access – http://www.suaramerdeka.com

Jawa Pos - East Java-based daily, usually with good quality journalism and links to its many local *Radar* offshoots – http://www.jawapos.co.id

John Macdougall, Indonesia Publications, apakabar@clark.net

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