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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No.: 200701753

MAR 25 2010

I refer to your letter dated March 11, 2007 regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

We searched for and reviewed the self study guides that you requested and have determined that all except one of them may be released. They are on the enclosed disc. One of the guides is being released with excisions.

An enclosure provides information on Freedom of Information Act exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

We have now completed the processing of your case. If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,



for Margaret P. Grafeld, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

63934 Federal Register/Vol. 69, No. 212
Rules and Regulations

Subpart F – Appeal Procedures

§171.52 Appeal of denial of access to, declassification of, amendment of, accounting of disclosures of, or challenge to classification of records.

- (a) *Right of administrative appeal.* Except for records that have been reviewed and withheld within the past two years or are the subject of litigation, any requester whose request for access to records, declassification of records, amendment of records, accounting of disclosure of records, or any authorized holder of classified information whose classification challenge has been denied, has a right to appeal the denial to the Department's Appeals Review Panel. This appeal right includes the right to appeal the determination by the Department that no records responsive to an access request exist in Department files. Privacy Act appeals may be made only by the individual to whom the records pertain.
- (b) *Form of appeal.* There is no required form for an appeal. However, it is essential that the appeal contain a clear statement of the decision or determination by the Department being appealed. When possible, the appeal should include argumentation and documentation to support the appeal and to contest the bases for denial cited by the Department. The appeal should be sent to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LC, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, DC 20522-8100.
- (c) *Time limits.* The appeal should be received within 60 days of the date of receipt by the requester of the Department's denial. The time limit for response to an appeal begins to run on the day that the appeal is received. The time limit (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) for agency decision on an administrative appeal is 20 days under the FOIA (which may be extended for up to an additional 10 days in unusual circumstances) and 30 days under the Privacy Act (which the Panel may extend an additional 30 days for good cause shown). The Panel shall decide mandatory declassification review appeals as promptly as possible.
- (d) *Notification to appellant.* The Chairman of the Appeals Review Panel shall notify the appellant in writing of the Panel's decision on the appeal. When the decision is to uphold the denial, the Chairman shall include in his notification the reasons therefore. The appellant shall be advised that the decision of the Panel represents the final decision of the Department and of the right to seek judicial review of the Panel's decision, when applicable. In mandatory declassification review appeals, the Panel shall advise the requester of the right to appeal the decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel under §3.5(d) of E.O. 12958.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Withholding specifically authorized under an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and properly classified. E.O. 12958, as amended, includes the following classification categories:
 - 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Information on weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
 - ARMEX Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2778(e)
 - CIA Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
 - EXPORT Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. USC 2411(c)(1)
 - FSA Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4003 & 4004
 - INA Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f)
 - IRAN Iran Claims Settlement Act, Sec 505, 50 USC 1701, note
- (b)(4) Privileged/confidential trade secrets, commercial or financial information from a person
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Information compiled for law enforcement purposes that would:
 - (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request, excised with the agreement of the requester

JORDAN

SELF STUDY GUIDE



GEORGE P. SHULTZ NATIONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS TRAINING CENTER

School of Professional and Area Studies
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State

Self-Study Guide to Jordan

The **Self-Study Guide: Jordan** is intended to provide U.S. Government personnel in the foreign affairs community with an overview of important issues related to Jordanian history, geography, politics, economics, culture, religion, media, and international relations. The Guide should serve an introductory self-study resource.

The topic is far too complex to be covered in depth using only the text in this Guide. The reader is encouraged to explore the questions and issues introduced, using the Internet and bibliographic sources provided in the text and in the resource sections. Most of the referenced material can be found on the Internet or in the Foreign Service Institute or Main State Libraries.

The first edition of this Guide was prepared by Dr. Jenab Tutunji, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, George Washington University. The views expressed in this Guide are those of the author and attributable sources and do not necessarily reflect official policy or positions of the Department of State or the National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC). Staff members of the NFATC made final but minor edits to the draft study submitted by Dr. Tutunji.

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First Edition

September 2002

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Historical Timeline

Up to 8500 BC Paleolithic Age, gradual settling and cultivating of hunting and gathering nomads.

8500–4500 BC Neolithic Age, widespread agriculture, first large settlements and first pottery c. 5500 BC.

4500–3200 BC Calcolithic Age, appearance of metal working.

3200–1950 BC Early Bronze Age, emergence of “city states” surrounded by huge defenses and change to village and pastoral life.

- 1950–1550 BC Middle Bronze Age, re-emergence of urban life in strongly defended cities.
- 1550–1200 BC Late Bronze Age, continuance of city states and dominance by the Egyptian Empire.
- 1200–539 BC Iron Age, establishment of kingdoms of Edom, Moab and Ammon.
- c. 950 BC Israelites conquer region. United Israelite Monarchy under Saul, David and Solomon.
- 854 BC Assyrians invade region.
- 850 BC King Mesha of Moab gains control of the region.
- c. 580 BC Babylonians invade region. Jews deported to Babylon.
- c. 500 Nabataean Arab tribes establish presence in region.
- 539–332 BC Region falls under Persian Empire, rule by Persian governors until region is conquered by Alexander the Great in 330 BC.
- 332–63 BC Hellenistic period., rule by Ptolemies and Seleucids.
- 63 BC–AD 324 Roman and Nabataean period.
- 63 BC Conquest by Roman General Pompey.
- 106 BC Nabataean kingdom, with capital at Petra, conquered by Rome. With the Roman conquest, Jordan becomes part of the Roman Province of Arabia.

- c. AD 200 Ghassanid Arab tribe establishes presence in region.
- AD 324–640 Byzantine period, official conversion to Christianity under Roman Emperor Constantine. Region experiences population explosion.
- AD 629–636 Arab Islamic conquest of the region.
- AD 661–750 Ummayyad Dynasty established, area ruled from Damascus which becomes seat of caliphate.
- AD 750–1258 Abbasid Dynasty rules vast Islamic empire from Baghdad.
- AD 945 Buyids, a dynasty of military leaders from the fringes of the Caspian Sea, seize power and rule from behind the throne in Baghdad
- AD c. 1071 Seljuk Turks rule in Baghdad while Abbasids remain titular caliphs. Centralized rule begins to disintegrate.
- AD 1099–1100 Crusader conquest, establishment of Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem which lasts from AD 1099 to 1291.
- AD 1187 Ayyubid Dynasty founded by Salah al-Din, who re-establishes Arab Muslim rule in Jordan after defeating the Crusaders at Karak. Ayyubids rule Syria until 1260.
- AD 1258 Baghdad sacked by Mongols. Abbasid dynasty ends.
- AD 1260 *Mamluk* army from Egypt prevents expansion of Mongols into Syria (and Jordan). *Mamluks* rule Syria until defeated by Ottomans.
- AD 1518 Ottomans conquer greater Syria.

AD 1831–1841 Egyptian Khediv Muhammad Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha, conquers Syria, introduces administrative changes, but the Ottomans regain control in 1841.

AD 1867–1880 Wave of village settlement in Jordan involving local peasants.

AD 1880–1893 Ottomans extend direct rule to Jordan 1880-1890 and take direct control of northern Jordan, extending rule to Karak and southern Jordan in 1893.

AD 1887–1910 Second wave of village settlement in Jordan (until 1906) by Circassians, Chechens and Turkmen fleeing Russian persecution and massacres. Alarmed by this, Bedouin leaders encourage settlement on tribal lands by sharecroppers, constituting a third wave, ending in 1910.

1900–1908 Hijaz Railroad is built and runs through Jordan, connecting the western Arabian peninsula to Constantinople.

1910 Rebellion in Karak against encroachments of centralized Ottoman state in December 1910 is suppressed, but Karak remains frontier town in contrast to northern provinces which were incorporated into Ottoman domain.

1917–1918 Great Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. Forces of Sharif Hussein, accompanied by T.E. Lawrence, conquer Aqaba, but progress of the revolt in Jordan is stretched out from July 1917 to September 1918.

1918–1920 Transjordan ruled by Sharif Hussein's son Faisal from Damascus.

1920 San Remo Conference in April grants Britain mandate over

Iraq and Palestine and France mandate over Syria. Britain announces to tribal leaders in August that Transjordan is included in Palestine mandate, but *Um Qais* treaty is signed giving assurances Transjordan would not be colonized by Zionists. Faisal is declared King of Syria but is ousted by British.

1921 British offer throne of Iraq to Faisal. Churchill meets with Faisal's brother, Abdullah, convinces him to give up claim to Iraq in exchange for Syria. On April 1, Abdullah declared amir of Transjordan.

1922 Arab Legion, British officered Transjordan army, is founded.

1922 Saudi invasion of Transjordan fails.

1924 Second invasion by Saudi Arabia fails.

1927 Saudi Arabia acknowledges in Treaty of Jidda that Ma'an and Aqaba are in fact part of Transjordan.

1928 Anglo-Transjordanian agreement signed giving Britain special prerogatives. Organic Law promulgated. Legislative Council elected.

1930 John Bagot Glubb appointed commander of Arab Legion.

1941 Britain uses Arab Legion to help quell pro-Axis Gilani rebellion in Iraq.

1946 Treaty of alliance with Britain recognizes Transjordan's nominal independence. Britain undertakes to defend Transjordan. Abdullah changes his title from amir to king.

1947 P.M. Abul Huda and Glubb secure agreement of British

Foreign Secretary Bevin for Arab Legion to seize area allocated to Arabs under U.N. Partition Plan.

1948 New Anglo-Transjordanian treaty signed reducing Britain's prerogatives but London keeps the use of two airbases and boosts its subsidy to the Arab Legion.

1948-49 First Arab-Israeli war. Arab Legion secures control of West Bank, including Jerusalem. Jordan and Israel sign armistice agreement.

1950 Parliamentary elections held in Transjordan and West Bank. Parliament then votes to unite the East and West Banks under the name of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan under King Abdullah. Palestinians granted rights of citizenship.

1951 King Abdullah assassinated. His eldest son, Talal, crowned king despite illness.

1952 Parliament removes Talal from office due to incapacitation. His son, Hussein, becomes king but a regency council rules in his place for a few months because he is underage. 1952 constitution states Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy.

1953 King Hussein sworn into office and assumes duties.

1954 Parliamentary elections.

1955 Riots break out to prevent Jordan joining Baghdad Pact.

1956 King Hussein relieves General Glubb of his duties. Army is "Arabized."

- 1956 Parliamentary elections.
- 1956–1957 Constitutional experiment. Nabulsi becomes Prime Minister because of support in Parliament and charts Arab nationalist policies in collision course with King. Coup attempt against King. Hussein dismisses Nabulsi and declares martial law. Jordan reverts to conservative policies.
- 1957 U.S. replaces Britain as source of military and financial support for Jordan.
- 1958 Jordan forms federation with Iraq. British troops sent to Jordan following revolution in Iraq and civil war in Lebanon. Federation breaks up.
- 1961 Parliamentary elections.
- 1962 Parliamentary elections.
- 1964 Palestine Liberation Organization created.
- 1967 Parliamentary elections.
- 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Israel occupies West Bank, including Jerusalem.
- 1970–1971 Jordanian army clashes with PLO. Syrian tanks enter Jordan but are repulsed. Army drives PLO guerrillas out of Jordan, never to return.
- 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
- 1974 Rabat Arab summit declares PLO sole legitimate

representative of the Palestinian people.

1974 King Hussein dissolves lower House of Parliament and suspends Parliament indefinitely.

1975 Beginning of decade of rapid, planned economic growth.

1978 National Consultative Council created.

1978 Camp David accords signed. Jordan joins other Arabs in severing diplomatic ties but maintains economic exchange with Egypt. Baghdad Arab summit pledges significant sums in aid to Jordan and other “confrontation states.”

1980 Iran-Iraq war begins. Jordan supports Iraq and enters into economic cooperation deals with Baghdad.

1980 Arab summit held in Amman.

1984 King dissolves National Consultative Council and recalls Parliament. By-elections in East Bank.

1984 Jordan resumes full diplomatic relations with Egypt.

1985 King Hussein and Yasser Arafat agree on framework for peace, sign agreement in February for joint diplomatic initiative, and acceptance of confederation with Jordan.

1986 King Hussein calls off dialogue with PLO in February.

1986 By-elections in East Bank.

1987 King Hussein and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres reach

agreement in London on international conference, but Prime Minister Shamir torpedoed Hussein-Peres accord.

1987 Arab summit in Amman brings about Arab reconciliation but emphasis on Iran-Iraq, not Palestinians.

1988 Jordan gives up responsibility for West Bank and cuts administrative links.

1988 Jordan joins Iraq, Egypt and North Yemen in forming Arab Cooperative Council.

1988 Jordan requests standby credit arrangement with the IMF and acquiesces to structural adjustment program.

1989 Riots break out in southern towns in protest against cuts in government subsidies. Demands for reform.

1989 Parliamentary elections. Return of the constitutional experiment in the form of “defensive democratization.”

1990 Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 900,000 third country nationals flee Kuwait to Jordan which assists in massive repatriation. 240,000 Jordanian citizens return from Kuwait.

1990 U.N. economic sanctions on Iraq cause severe hardship in Jordan. Arab Cooperation Council incapacitated.

1991 Jordan refuses to join military coalition against Iraq, causing severe strain in relations with U.S.

1991 2000 civic leaders endorse National Charter on Jordanian

Political Life prepared by royal commission and it is signed by the King.

1993 Parliamentary elections.

1994 On June 7 Jordanian and Israeli delegates sign three “common-sub-agendas” in Washington; “Washington Declaration” signed by King Hussein and Israeli PM Rabin at White House on July 25; peace treaty signed on October 26.

1996 President Clinton designates Jordan a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. in November.

1997 Parliamentary elections

1999 King Hussein dies in early February.

2000 King Abdullah II crowned on June 9.

2001 Economic Consultative Council recommends major privatization drive.

2001 Congress ratifies free trade agreement signed with Jordan in 2000.

Section I

Geography

Was it destiny that made Jordan Israel’s eastern neighbor, giving it the longest border with Israel in comparison with any other country? The word destiny naturally comes to mind in view of the profound impact this accident of geography has had on Jordan’s history and politics. Many unavoidable

consequences have followed.

To the north lies Syria, to the east Iraq, and to the south Saudi Arabia. Along with Israel, these are Jordan's immediate neighbors. A visitor to Amman will find himself within easy reach of Damascus, which still retains some aspects of the ancient city that it is—particularly its medieval Islamic heritage—tucked away here and there, such as old covered souks or markets; the same can be said of Cairo, although the latter is really only accessible by air. The holy cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem are close by to the west. Lebanon, with which Jordan does not share a common border, but which is only 6 or 7 hours away by car, has a deserved reputation as a tourist attraction.

Most of the East Bank of the Jordan River consists of arid desert. Northern Jordan consists of a plateau, most of which is between 700 and 1,000 meters above sea level, which has a temperate climate and where the nights are cool, even in summer. Rainfall is light (although snow storms have become much more common than in the past), and most agriculture is rain-fed, except in the Jordan Valley. On the plateau, almost on the same parallel as Jerusalem, lies the capital Amman, a site once occupied by Rabbat Ammon in Biblical times, and later by the city of Philadelphia, relics of which can be seen in the amphitheater (now restored) in the middle of the downtown area.

This plateau slopes westwards down to the Dead Sea, the lowest point on earth, at 400 meters below sea level, which is fed by the Jordan River. The Jordan River runs for about 160 kilometers from Lake Tiberias to the Dead Sea. The plateau slopes south as well, providing a spectacular panorama of colorful hills and valleys stretching mile after mile to distant horizons, leading to Petra, the ancient Nabatean city carved out of rose-colored rock, and further south to Aqaba, a port on the Red Sea where Jordan has a short stretch of coastline. A 380-kilometer-long rift valley runs from the Yarmuk River in the north to Aqaba in the extreme south. The highest point in Jordan is Jabal Ramm, which is 1,754 meters above sea level.

Jordan has an area of 89,326 square kilometers (34,489 square miles). The main cities are Amman (population 1.6 million); Irbid in the north (about 750,000); Zarqa, which lies east of Amman (about 625,000); and as-Salt, lying to the West of Amman on the road to the Dead Sea (about 275,000).

Section II

History

Archaeology and Antiquities of Jordan

In archaeological terms, Jordan sits at the crossroads of the Near East. In ancient times, it served as a major communications and trade route, in contact with great empires whose capitals were far away. Its geographic location—east of the Jordan River, with major settlements dating from ancient times dotted along major trading routes between Arabia to the south and Syria in the north—made control of Jordan a strategic necessity. Each of the great empires has occupied this area in succession, each leaving their cultural, social, and political influences on the local populations, and more often than not, acquiring uniquely local interpretations in turn as expressed in local crafts and industries.

Jordan's archaeological history extends back in time to the Paleolithic and Neolithic periods—c. 1200000–8500 BC and c. 8500–4500 BC, respectively. Although there are only flint and basalt tools left behind from the Paleolithic period to indicate human settlement, the Neolithic period is more clearly marked by evidence of building, skeletal remains, clay statues and busts, along with evidence of small-scale trade in pottery, jewelry, and ancestor worship.

It was during this period that pottery originated and was systematically fashioned into clay vessels. The largest, most important Neolithic sites in Jordan today are at Ain Ghazal in Amman and Beidha in southern Jordan. In the 1990's, excavations at Ain Ghazal uncovered a number of figures constructed of clay surrounding bundled straw, depicting human forms with some facial detail. These early statues may have been part of a burial custom intended to represent deceased persons.

The Chalcolithic (copper-stone) period that followed from c. 4500–3200 BC saw the use of copper in the manufacture of tools. Agricultural communities developed in this period as well, with sheep and goat breeding and cultivation of wheat and barley. These more sociologically systematic activities led to the development of a more urban character by the end of that period.

Jawa, a town built by an agricultural community in the eastern desert, is an example of this new urban character of the Chalcolithic period. This town's remains show evidence of water collection and diversion to basins for animal and human use. By the Early Bronze Age (c. 3200–1950 BC), urban development also included defenses and fortifications, and the first "city-states" had come into being. Most famous of these are Bab edh-Dhra' (southern Dead Sea area) and Jericho in the Jordan Valley. These cities had massive walls, towers, and fortifications, intended as much to withstand earthquakes and other natural disasters as well as attacks by enemies.

Most of the Early Bronze Age towns were destroyed or abandoned by 2300 BC, giving way to the Middle Bronze Age, when people moved away from large sites on hills and settled in smaller villages. By the Late Bronze Age (c. 1950–1200 BC), there was a sharp decline in settled occupation. In about the 13th century BC, the area was invaded from the north by the Hyksos—said to be a military aristocracy from north Mesopotamia, though this is currently in dispute—who also went on to invade and conquer Egypt. The Hyksos influence was clearly seen in the new, distinctive type of fortifications they brought, exemplified at sites such as Amman (the Citadel), Irbid, Pella (Fahil, in the Jordan Valley), and Jericho.

During the Middle Bronze Age, crafts and local industries had advanced considerably. Copper, used originally during the Chalcolithic Age to make tools, was now mixed with tin to produce bronze to make

weapons and ornamentation. Pottery had also evolved with the invention of the potter's wheel to fashion sophisticated shapes.

Also during the Middle Bronze Age, contact with Egypt grew significantly. The Egyptian presence in Jordan can be seen in the numerous mentions in inscriptions found in various towns, as well as in artifacts of Egyptian or Egyptian-inspired origin.

The real change in Jordan during the Late Bronze Age occurred when the Egyptian pharaoh Tuthmosis III set up an empire in Canaan—straddling modern-day Palestine, Jordan, and Syria. This occurred in about the middle of the 13th century BC. Several hundred years later, during the reign of pharaoh Ramesses II, the Egyptians found themselves at war with the Hittites for control of Syria. The battles, lasting some 16 years, culminated in a peace treaty between the Egyptians and the Hittites in 1259 BC.

Considerable evidence of dealings, trade, and communication among the peoples of the Asiatic component of the Egyptian Empire and their African “home” are evident in many sites in the Canaanite city-states of that period. Important sites are Pella and Tell es-Sa'idiyeh in the Jordan Valley. Objects found at these two sites, as well as in Deir 'Alla, show clear Egyptian influence. During this period of relative peace, there was also significant trade between Jordan and several Mediterranean and Aegean city-states.

Recent excavations at Tell es-Sa'idiyeh unearthed some remarkable burial customs. There is evidence of some type of mummification and interesting use of pottery and bronze, used to cover or contain the bodies.

The end of the Late Bronze Age is marked by the collapse of many Near Eastern and Mediterranean kingdoms at the hands of the Sea Peoples—marauders probably from the Aegean and Anatolia—around 1200 BC. These included the Philistines, who settled on the coast of southern Palestine and later battled the Israelites. The Israelites had destroyed many towns in their conquest of the land of the Canaanites, including Jericho, Ai, and Hazor, and eventually overcame the Philistines to found a united Kingdom of Israel around 1000 BC.

Following this period, three new kingdoms arose in Jordan: Edom in the south, Moab in central Jordan, and Ammon in the north. These were the first kingdoms to develop in this area that went beyond city-states. The development from city-state to kingdom was probably made possible by the increased wealth in the region, attributed to growing trade in gold, spices, and precious metals. The wealth eventually attracted peripheral attacks from desert tribesmen and later conquest by Israelites, Aramaeans, and Assyrians. Eventually, the overall victors were the Assyrians, whose conquest of the area, including Israel, was accomplished by 721 BC. Ammon, Edom, and Moab retained their independence by buying off the Assyrians with tribute and enjoyed a period of relative prosperity.

The most important existing site of this period is at Buseirah in southern Jordan. Buseirah is the modern name of Bozrah, the capital of Edom. Bozrah was a substantial administrative center fortified by a town

wall. The city was divided into Upper and Lower Towns by an enclosure wall, with an “acropolis” in the Upper Town containing public buildings on an artificially built-up platform. An early 7th century building on this acropolis had an imposing entrance flanked by the plinths of two columns, the whole suggestive of a temple. The Lower Town is made up of “ordinary” residences. The capitals of Ammon and Moab—Rabbath Ammon and Dhiban, respectively—had similar layouts and features.

The Assyrian Empire fell in 612 BC to an alliance of Medes from Persia and the Chaldean kings of Babylonia. The Babylonian Empire lasted till 539 BC, when it fell to the Persians under Cyrus. This empire grew to become the largest ever known in the Near East, extending into Egypt in the west, Asia Minor in the north, and India in the east. Their clashes with the Greek states of Sparta and Athens are well known from the classic histories of Theucydides and Herodotus.

During the Persian Empire, the Ammonites, Edomites, and Moabites persisted under tutelage, with the Persians appointing an Ammonite governor for the area west of the Euphrates River. Locally, the Ammonites and Moabites frequently fought. The site of Tell Mazar in the Ammon territory, first constructed in the 8th century, was often destroyed and rebuilt as a result of these battles until the 4th century. Remains in this city suggest rooms surrounding central courtyards in houses that may have also been used for private industry. These include many domestic and industrial artifacts—utensils and such. During the late Persian occupation, many silos and other grain storage pits were built, either to support armies or for storage against the threat of famine.

In 330 BC, the Persian Empire gave way with Alexander the Great’s sack of Persepolis in Persia, ushering in the Hellenistic Period in the Near East. The Greeks founded new Hellenistic cities in Jordan, such as Um Qais, and renamed others, such as Amman (Philadelphia) and Jerash (Antioch). While Greek became the official language, the spoken language continued to be Aramaic.

The finest Hellenistic site in Jordan is “Iraq al-Amir,” in a valley just west of Amman. This site was the estate of the Tobiad family, the Ammonite governor’s family that reigned during the Persian Empire. One of the structures on this site is believed to be a temple because of the architecture and the finely sculpted lions and eagles.

During the Hellenistic period, a new Arabic-speaking people known as the Nabataeans were settling near Petra in southern Jordan. Thought to originate from Arabia, the Nabataeans were originally nomadic herdsmen and merchants who came to control the major trade routes between Arabia and Damascus. As traders, they handled trade in animals, spices, incense, iron, copper, fabrics, sugar, medicines, perfumes, and gold with far-flung markets in China, India, the Far East, Egypt, Syria, Greece and Rome.

Famous for their imposing city Petra, the Nabataeans displayed great water engineering ability, irrigating their land with ingenious systems of dams and canals. Nabataea reached its peak in 9 BC–40 AD under King Aretas IV. In addition to the fine architecture found at Petra, other Nabataean sites are Khirbet et-Tannur, Wadi Rum, and Lehun in Jordan.

Petra pre-existed the Nabataeans—there is evidence of Bronze Age settlement there—as well as of the Edomites. After the Romans conquered the Near East during the first century AD, Petra maintained its independence, coming under Roman control almost 50 years later in 106 AD. The city continued to flourish under the Romans and well into the Christian period. Nevertheless, it remains most famous for the Nabataean remains and artifacts.

The Roman province of Arabia, which encompassed Jordan, came into being with Pompey's conquests of 64–63 AD. The Greek cities in Jordan—Philadelphia (Amman), Pella (Fahil), Gadara (Um Qais), and Gerasa (Jerash) formed 5 of the 10-city federation known as the Decapolis. These cities were laid out with colonnaded streets and were provided with theaters. Latin became the official language, while Greek remained the main spoken language of the educated elites. Aramaic continued to be the language spoken in the street.

Jerash is probably the best-preserved Roman provincial city in the Near East. The most current archaeological evidence suggests it dates from the 2nd century BC, with its golden age in the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD. It was designed by Roman architects and underwent expansions over several centuries. Among its monuments are theaters, a bath, a gymnasium, beautifully preserved, colonnaded streets, and temples to Zeus and Artemis. Jerash is located in a hilly, forested area northwest of Amman, an easy car ride away.

The major cities of the Roman period continued to flourish into the Byzantine period, which dates from 324 AD, when the emperor Constantine I founded Constantinople on the site of modern Istanbul as the eastern counterpart to Rome. A Christian community had already been in existence in Jordan since 66 AD, when the city of Pella had received fugitives from Jerusalem during the Jewish revolt against Rome. Under Byzantine control, the area and its Christian communities experienced a rise in prosperity and a population explosion. Many temples were destroyed or converted to churches. New churches were built everywhere; most were of the basilica type, with semi-circular apses to the east end of a church. Many of the churches had ornate mosaic floors with pictures of people, animals, and towns. Perhaps the most famous of these is the map of the Holy Land, an impressive Byzantine mosaic in a small church in Madaba, just a short drive south of Amman. Another famous site of floor mosaics is in the Church of the Deacon Thomas on Mt. Nebo, on a ridge overlooking the descent into the Jordan Valley just west of Madaba.

Jordan was conquered by the Bedouin armies of Islam that swept northwards from the Arabian Peninsula to defeat the Byzantines at a great battle on the Yarmuk River in 636 AD during the rule of Omar, the second *khalifah* (successor to the Prophet). In 661, after a brief period of rule from Mecca, Jordan came under the rule of the dynastic Umayyad caliphate, which moved the seat of government to Damascus. Jordan experienced a period of prosperity under the Umayyads, as it was close to the capital and was on the pilgrimage route to Mecca. It was during this period that Jordan acquired its Arabic name of al-Urdun.

The Umayyads did not destroy earlier cultural sites, and the major Byzantine cities continued to be occupied. Culturally, the major change was the replacement of Greek with Arabic as the main language, and the replacement of Christianity with Islam as the major religion. Christian communities continued to

exist after the major conversions, and churches continued to be built well into the 8th century.

The Ummayyad caliphs built a number of castles in the desert (all of which can be visited) at Mashatta, Kharana, Qastal, Tuba, Amra, and elsewhere. Although originally thought to have been built primarily as hunting lodges, these castles are now believed to be an important part of the frontier defensive line and were likely used as administrative outposts as well as residences of the Ummayyad rulers. These castles not only exemplify Ummayyad architecture, but also include many beautiful ceiling and wall frescos, representing scenes from nature as well as hunting and social scenes.

The Islamic dynasties that succeeded the Ummayyads had no direct impact on the architecture or artifacts of Jordan. The next major influence was the invasion of the European Crusaders, who wrested the area from Fatimid Egyptian control in 1099 and established the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Between 1099 and 1187, the Crusaders and Arab defenders built several castles running along strategic lookout points on a north-south axis from Anatolia to southern Jordan. The Crusader castles in Jordan are all in the southern region, at Kerak, Shobak, and Petra. In the north, the Arabs built castles at Ajlun, overlooking the Jordan Valley, and Salt, on the road to Jerusalem.

Salahuddin (Saladin), the Kurdish founder of the Ayyubid dynasty, finally defeated the Crusaders in 1187. From that time on, Jordan was again in Arab hands. Under the Ayyubids, and later the Mamluks, Jordan prospered because of its key geographic location between Egypt and Syria and its location on the pilgrimage route to Mecca. During this period, the castles were rebuilt, and a fort was added at Aqaba to aid pilgrims in their travels as well as to encourage trade and communications. Much later, the Ottomans continued constructing forts along the pilgrimage routes to protect pilgrims from raiding desert tribes of the Peninsula and to provide sources of food and water.

Modern Jordan has been the scene of both local and foreign archaeological activity since the early 20th century. By mid-century, Jordan had a fully active Department of Archaeology and Antiquities that worked to uncover and preserve archaeological sites. Foreign archaeological institutions play an important role, with centers in Jordan that attract archeologists from all over the world and help provide a lively exchange of information about discoveries and artifacts with academics, naturalists, and archeologists everywhere. Most notable among the foreign institutions active currently in Jordan are the American School of Oriental Research, the British Institute at Amman for Archaeology and History, and the Swedish-Jordan Expeditions. The University of Florence and the University of Sydney also have teams currently at work in Jordan. All in all, there are between 50 and 75 excavations going on at various sites at one time—both in existing sites as well as in newly discovered sites.

Suggested Bibliography for Further Reading

Information about excavations currently proceeding in Jordan can be found on the Internet at <http://archaeology.about.com/library/atlas/bljordan.htm>. There is an extensive bibliography on the archaeology and antiquities of Jordan, in addition to articles in various archaeological journals, such as *Biblical Archaeologist*, *Levant*, and the *Journal of Field Archaeology*. The short bibliography that follows

lists only books that have historical interest or that may be considered “classics” on the subject.

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Questions for Further Study

- Archaeological evidence shows a rich history of pottery use and development in Jordan. How did the local artisans use local clays to make household utensils? What methods were used in Neolithic times to make statues and other items depicting human figures? (See Homes-Fredericq and Franken, *Pottery and Potters, Past and Present: 7000 Years of Ceramic Art in Jordan*, 1986.)
- What artifacts—pottery, jewelry, textiles—characterize the Islamic era in Jordan? (See Bienkowski, Piotr, *The Art of Jordan*. Wolfeboro Falls, U.S.A.: Alan Sutton Publishing Inc., 1991)

Modern History of Jordan Ottoman Period to 1910

Jordan came under Ottoman control along with much of the Arab Middle East in 1518, their attention having been turned from their conquests in the Balkans. Until the 19th century, the Ottomans exercised little control of Transjordan, confining direct activity to sending occasional military patrols through the area to safeguard the pilgrimage route. Starting in the 1840s, the Ottoman plan to extend their authority encompassed the northern provinces of Jordan, centered around Irbid, Ajlun, and Salt. In 1868, this plan was expanded to include areas further south, originally centered around Ma'an, but later relocated to Karak.

The Ottomans realized that, in order to establish their authority in frontier zones like Jordan, certain administrative and demographic realities had to be changed on the ground. Among these was replacing local leadership with professional bureaucrats and establishing village settlements in agricultural areas. This in turn promoted higher productivity, generating tax revenues for the state. The new settlements thus established would be linked together and to regional markets by a road network. The Ottoman state thus came to integrate frontier districts through the extension of its bureaucratic network and linkage with regional markets.

The settlement policy that the Ottomans undertook was intended, in the first instance, to populate the lands between administrative centers with cultivators. In the 19th century, these administrative centers were largely in northern Jordan, abutting the southern Syrian districts, which were administered by Damascus, and the Levant districts administered by Jerusalem and Nablus. The settlement policy effectively developed a close link between community identity and the villages they established as well as affording them title to the land they cultivated.

Three distinct waves of village settlement in Jordan occurred between 1867 and 1910. The first, between 1867 and 1880, involved local peasants who radiated out from older settlements to establish new villages for reasons of economic gain or to resolve local disputes. The second wave spanned the years 1878 and 1906, and involved mostly refugee communities, including Circassians, Shishan (Chechens), and Turkmen. These were Muslim communities that had fled Tsarist Russian persecution and had sought protection from the Ottomans.

The third wave was partially a reaction to the second. Bedouin tribes had become alarmed at what they saw as expropriation of their traditional domain through resettlement of refugees. To counteract this, they encouraged settlement by sharecroppers on their lands in plantation villages. These "rented" villages also served as a framework for the bureaucratization of the land through registration and settlement title.

Subsequent developments resulting from the initial village settlements included the development of better and more extensive communications—roads and telegraph, as well as the Hijaz railway completed in 1908—and rapid urban development in towns located along major trade routes, such as Salt and Karak. Urban-based merchants from Damascus, Nablus, and Jerusalem gained significantly from the trade in Jordan's major surplus commodities—wheat and barley—which in turn had been made possible by the Ottoman village settlement policy. The effect was an unprecedented prosperity for both village and urban areas in northern Jordan.

The experience in Karak and points south took a different turn. The Ottomans took direct control of Karak in 1893, along with the southern portions of Jordan. In this area, the village settlement policy was not pursued diligently. Consequently, the demographic balance was not altered sufficiently to help develop stronger ties of loyalty to the sultan or the state, and local tribes were not motivated to register their land and obtain title. Strong loyalty to the state, as had resulted in the north, never took place. Instead, most Ottoman attempts to bureaucratize or otherwise extend direct administrative control in the region were met with various degrees of resistance.

In December 1910, the people of Karak led a violent but ill-fated revolt against the Ottomans. Earlier, the Young Turk Revolution had instigated a new centralizing initiative to impose a common rule of law across all the territories of the Ottoman Empire. In the frontier zones, this was manifested in a new intolerance for local particularism, and was expressed in swift and violent suppression of any dissent. Among the actions taken against local communities included demands for registering all citizens, confiscation of weapons, and forced conscription of young men.

The regional government representative in southern Syria requested that residents of Karak demonstrate their loyalty to the state by registering and turning in their weapons. The residents of Karak took this to be a precursor of a conscription campaign—as had happened in areas further north. The leading shaykh in Karak, Qadr al-Majali, meanwhile agitated to resist this request by the Committee for Union and Progress through rebellion. The actual revolt took place on December 4, when Ottoman census takers were attacked and killed, followed by an attack on Karak itself the following day. The revolt spread to Tafila and led to Bedouin raids on stations of the Hijaz Railway. The ensuing battle resulted in substantial loss of life and property in Karak, including the obliteration and burning of local government and municipal documents and attacking civilians in their homes. Although victorious in the short term, the insurgency was squelched with a vengeance just 10 days later by the Ottoman army sent to rescue besieged officials and their families.

In the wake of this revolt, the Ottomans reasserted their presence in Karak but allowed it to remain a frontier town. This was in contrast to the districts in northern Jordan. Ajlun and Salt had been incorporated into the Ottoman domain. Eight years later, at the conclusion of the first World War, the experience of Ottoman rule in northern Jordan made that region amenable to centralized government. However, this rebellion was an attempt by an outdated tribal system to defend itself against the encroachments of a centralized state, it was not an expression of Arab nationalism and should not be seen as the precursor for the Great Arab Revolt led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca.

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Rogan, Eugene L. and Tariq Tell (eds.), *Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan* (British Academic Press. London, 1994).

Questions for Further Study

- Do you believe that the complex network of social and economic relations that characterized the inhabitants of Transjordan during the Islamic centuries can be reduced to a simple contraposition of desert and sown land, pastoralist and farmer, nomad and settler? (See Jeremy Johns listed above.)
- Historians of the Near East describe the Ottoman period between the early 16th century and the early 19th century as a time when few, if any, dramatic events took place in Transjordan and its environs. What does that tell us, and how did that relate to events and conditions in other Ottoman domains in the region? (See Eugene Rogan listed above.)
- What role did the ethnic and religious minorities play in Jordan's modern history? What lingering impact did they have on contemporary Jordan? (See Gubser, Peter Jordan, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*, 1983.)

Arab Revolt and the Founding of the Amirate of Transjordan

Sharif Abdullah, the second of four sons of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, began his political career as a delegate to the Ottoman Parliament from Mecca. He came to act as his father's representative in negotiations with the Ottoman authorities and later with Great Britain. In February 1914 he met with Britain's plenipotentiary minister to Egypt, Lord Kitchener, and later with Ronald Storrs, the Oriental Secretary of the British consulate in Cairo. These meetings eventually led to the famous Hussein-McMahon correspondence, under which Sharif Hussein reached an understanding with Britain's representatives that he could count on Britain's support against the Turks, and he came to expect British help in creating an Arab kingdom in the Fertile Crescent, with some vague qualifications, over which he and his descendants would rule. These promises, of course, conflicted with the then still secret Sykes-Picot agreement and with the Balfour Declaration.

The forces of Sharif Hussein, accompanied by T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), recruited the support of the Huwaytat tribe in the south, and, with this help, succeeded in occupying the Port of Aqaba on the Red Sea. However, the course of the Arab Revolt in Transjordan was neither spectacular nor swift, lasting from July 1917 to September 1918. Tribes in the south tended to support Sharif Hussein's son Faisal in exchange for gold, driven primarily by food shortages and hunger, whereas tribes whose territory lay north of Karak in Transjordan and south of Damascus, where grain was more abundant, were less desperate and were inhibited from participation by the presence of the Turkish Fourth Army. These tribes preferred to straddle the fence until Faisal seemed assured of victory.^[1] Ultimately, it was Allenby's victory that broke Turkey's military hold and swept Faisal into Damascus.

From November 1918 to July 1920, Transjordan formed part of the Arab Kingdom of Syria. As part of the post-war settlement at the San Remo Peace Conference in April 1920, France was given the mandate over Syria and Britain secured a mandate over Iraq and Palestine (the latter was only formalized by the League of Nations on September 23, 1922 and incorporated the Balfour Declaration). Britain's plan, a consequence of its promises to the Hashemites, was to make Abdullah, the second son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, King of Iraq, and Amir Faisal, the third son of Sharif Hussein, King of Syria. Prince Faisal had been acting as a military governor based in Damascus. He gained favor with the nationalists, and, in response to their insistence, refused to toe the line laid down by the French and the Zionists at the Peace Conference. The Syrian National Congress, which claimed to represent Palestine and Transjordan as well, proclaimed Faisal king in March 1920. The nationalists suffered a rapid military defeat in their confrontation with the French, and Faisal was ousted.

With the retreat of the Turkish armies, tribal violence broke out in Transjordan. Faisal's government in Damascus could not bring the situation under control. Herbert Samuel, the high commissioner in Jerusalem, proposed that British forces occupy the portion of Transjordan lying west of the Hijaz Railway. This may have been due to his sympathy with Zionist appeals to bring that area within the sphere of the Balfour Declaration. Fearing Syrian control of Transjordan after Faisal's departure, Whitehall decided on a move to keep the area, which it perceived as a link between Iraq and Egypt, under British authority. Samuel met with tribal leaders and notables from Karak, al-Balqa, and Salt in August 1920 and told them that Transjordan would be included in the British mandate over Palestine, allowing for a measure of autonomy in the 'Ajlun, Salt and Karak areas. The sheikhs of 'Ajlun, encouraged by members of the *Istiqlal Party* that supported Faisal, put forward a list of demands in September, including assurances that Transjordan would not be colonized by the Zionists. Major Somerset, acting for Samuel, signed the so-called Um Qais treaty, agreeing to these provisions.

Amidst the chaos, Samuel recruited members of the local Circassian population to form a troop of cavalry and machine gunners to send to Amman to control Bedouin raids on settled areas and to collect taxes. Later, Frederick Peake (to become Peake Pasha) expanded this force and turned it into the nucleus of the Arab Legion. In February 1921 Abdullah arrived in Ma'an in Transjordan, leading a force of Hijazi troops with the intention of restoring Faisal to the throne of Syria.

In December 1920, Britain created a Middle East Department within the Colonial Office under the direction of Winston Churchill, who was colonial secretary. Churchill organized a gathering of Britain's high commissioners for Iraq and Palestine and prominent Arabists in Cairo in March 1921, which, under Churchill's leadership, decided to offer the throne of Iraq to Faisal. From July 1920 to March 1921, Transjordan had been left without an indigenous government and fell under the authority of the British Mandate government in Palestine. Following the Cairo conference, Churchill met with Abdullah in Jerusalem and convinced him to give up his claim to the Iraqi throne in favor of his brother. Churchill also promised to use his good offices with France to attempt to convince Paris to accept Abdullah as King of Syria. In the interim, Abdullah was encouraged to remain in the southern part of Greater Syria east of the Jordan river (Transjordan) and to establish his own amirate with British help. On April 1, 1921 Abdullah was declared amir of Transjordan and was granted a monthly subsidy of 5,000 pounds Sterling.

Britain was represented by a permanent resident in Amman in lieu of a high commissioner who exercised a great deal of power and acted as a plenipotentiary ambassador and supervisor of governmental affairs and head of a team of advisors to the various government departments.

On February 20, 1928 an Anglo-Transjordanian agreement was signed confirming Britain's supreme authority and assigning special prerogatives to the British resident in the areas of legislation, foreign affairs, and fiscal policy. A subsequent amendment allowed the amir to appoint consular representatives in foreign countries. British subsidies increased from an average of 100,000 pounds Sterling in the 1920s to about 2 million pounds Sterling in the forties.

A small army was created in 1921 under Captain F.G. Peake and dubbed the Arab Legion. Peake was replaced by Major John Baggot Glubb (who later became a major general but was generally referred to as Glubb Pasha, a title bestowed on him by the amir). A Transjordanian Frontier Force was also set up under the 1928 treaty but fell under the command of the high commissioner for Palestine. In 1940 a Desert Mechanized Regiment was added to the Arab Legion, making the Legion one of the most effective fighting forces in the Arab world. The Arab Legion had about 40 British officers and was funded by subsidies from London. Because of this Amir, Abdullah was able to play a significant role in Palestine and Iraq and Syria which was out of proportion to Transjordan's size and resources.

The Legion proved its worth in defending the fledgling emirate against incursions by King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in 1922 and a subsequent and more significant attack in 1924 (which was also directed against the Hijaz, where it was more successful). In 1925 Ibn Saud defeated Abdullah's elder brother Amir Ali, who had assumed the title of King of the Hijaz, and Ibn Saud claimed that the southern part of Transjordan, including Ma'an and the Port of Aqaba, was still part of the Hijaz; but Abdullah's forces established their presence in the Ma'an and Aqaba areas, claiming they had long been part of Transjordan. These areas were only formally incorporated into Transjordan under the 1927 Treaty of Jidda with Ibn Sa'ud.

The Arab Legion was used by the British during the Second World War against the Rashid Ali Gilani rebellion in Iraq and against the pro-Vichy regime in Syria. By 1948 the Arab Legion had grown into a force of about 10,000 and was to play a crucial role in saving a large part of Palestine and its Arab population from being incorporated in the emerging Jewish state.

The agreement with Britain was amended in 1941 but little changed in the pattern of British administrative and political control. In 1942 the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri as-Sa'id, floated the idea of a federation between Iraq and Greater Syria consisting of Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan. This was vehemently opposed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon, which valued their republican status. In May 1941 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden issued a statement favorable to the idea of Arab unity. Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha proposed the idea of a league of Arab states. Transjordan was one of the seven founding members of the Arab League in March 1945. On March 22, 1946, Amir Abdullah signed a treaty of alliance with Britain under which London recognized Transjordan's independence, diplomats were exchanged; Britain undertook to defend Transjordan against foreign aggression; to continue subsidies; and to and train the Arab Legion; and to maintain troops in the country. Both sides

agreed to consult on matters of foreign policy affecting their common interests. On April 25 of the same year, Abdullah assumed the title of king. In August 1947, the U.S.S.R. vetoed Jordan's admission to the United Nations on the grounds that it neither possessed true independence nor the requisite resources to be independent. On March 15, 1948, a new Anglo-Transjordanian treaty was signed that reduced the prerogatives assigned to Britain, but the latter continued its subsidies to the Arab Legion and retained two airbases in Amman and Mafraq. An Anglo-Transjordanian Joint Defense Board was established. In 1949 Britain increased its subsidy to 3.5 million pounds Sterling

Perhaps the most notable aspect of King Abdullah's reign is that he was a pragmatist with a vision. The vision was that of a united Fertile Crescent and Arabian Peninsula (or, at least the Hijaz) under Hashemite rule, and failing that, a greater Syria united under his rule, through which he was willing to include a homeland for the Jews enjoying autonomy but not full independence. Bowing to reality, Abdullah abandoned the idea of regaining the Hijaz, but he remained intent on enlisting the help of Syrian political refugees, former members of the Independence or Istiqlal Party, who had supported Faisal and the Hashemites, who flocked to Amman in droves, and whom he employed in his administration, to wrest Syria from the French. Even after Syrian independence, he continued to intrigue for the formation of a Greater Syria.

But Abdullah's vision dated back to the early part of the century; it preceded and was incompatible with more radical and populist notions of pan-Arabism, such as Ba'thism. It also exacerbated Arab rivalries, challenged the bids for hegemony of larger and more established Arab states, notably Egypt, and invited intrigues against him. Iraq, although ruled by Hashemites, often competed rather than cooperated with him under the regency of Abdul-Ilah. British residents, particularly St. John Philby and Henry Cox, drove a wedge between Abdullah and followers of the Istiqlal Party. After the death of his brother Faisal, Abdullah advocated a Fertile Crescent union under his personal leadership. However, the assassination of Abdel Rahman Shahbandar, a Syrian nationalist and loyal Abdullah supporter, in 1940 effectively signaled the demise of his base of support in Syria. Still, Abdullah brought up the subject of Greater Syria in July 1941, after the ouster of the Vichy government from Syria, when he declared the aim of his policy to be the union of Arab lands, and again in 1942 and 1944 and in speeches from the throne in 1946 and 1947, and introduced it as an Arab League agenda item in 1947. In 1943 and 1947, when Syrians were going to the polls, Abdullah appealed to them directly to accept unity under his leadership. Hopes were revived with the Husni al-Za'im coup in Syria in March 1949, seeing as Za'im initially favored a closer union with Jordan and Iraq; but he did an about face and started courting Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A few months later, Za'im was overthrown by Col. Hinnawi, who embraced the idea of a Fertile Crescent Union with the support of Nazim al-Qudsi's People's Party. The issue had become a high priority for the Syrian Constituent Assembly by the end of 1949, but a coup by Col. Adib Shishakli brought these plans to naught.

Abdullah has been described with a great deal of justification as a falcon trapped in a canary's cage. He sought to bend British influence to the task of achieving his brand of Arab unity, but Britain thought Abdullah was poorly placed to exercise pan-Arab leadership, and it was more concerned with not antagonizing Cairo and avoiding a break-up of the Arab League. However, Britain found itself cooperating with Abdullah as the mandate over Palestine drew to an end.

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Questions for Further Study

1. What was the significance of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence for the Arab Revolt under Sharif Hussein and the formation of Transjordan? (See Albert Hourani listed above, as well as *A Peace to End All Peace* listed above, for that question and for a general history of the creation of the modern Middle East. Also see Mary Wilson listed above.)
2. What were the motives that determined the attitudes of the Bedouin tribes in Transjordan towards the Arab Revolt? (See Tariq Tell listed above.)
3. How did Amir Abdullah establish himself in Transjordan? (See Mary Wilson listed above.)

Section III

Culture and Social Issues

The most recent published statistics of the population in Jordan date from 1999, which set the total

population of the East Bank at 4,839,000. This figure includes residents of Jordan, including Palestinians who have Jordanian passports and Palestinian refugees, but excludes Jordanians resident or working abroad, as well as Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship, who are residents of the West Bank or Gaza Strip.

In addition, Jordan hosts a substantial Palestinian refugee population that entered the East Bank in two major waves: in 1948 as a consequence of the creation of the State of Israel, and again in 1967 when Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza fled the Israeli occupation. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees in the Near East, about 224,000 people were admitted to the East Bank immediately after the 1967 war, joining the original 400,000 who had been refugees since 1948. By 1986, UNRWA cited 826,128 registered refugees living on the East Bank, 205,000 of them living in refugee camps. A recent estimate of the total Palestinian refugee population—including UNRWA-registered and non-registered—is 1.25 million.

United Nations statistics projected an annual growth of 3.6 percent in the early 1980's, rising to 4.11 percent from 1990 to 1995, with a steady decline to about 2.88 percent by 2020. These growth rates reflect both overall improved health care—leading to higher life expectancy—as well as a high birth rate of 6.0 births for each woman over the span of her reproductive years. This birth rate is expected to decline in 2000 to 4.2 births due to several factors. Women, particularly in urban areas, are deferring motherhood or practicing “spacing” of children. In addition, educated women have tended to marry slightly later than uneducated women and have tended to practice modern methods of contraception.

Jordan's population is largely concentrated in the northwest of the country, mostly in urban areas. The bulk of the population is centered in the governorate of Amman and the smaller urban areas of Irbid, Salt, and Zarqa. According to World Bank figures, some 70 percent of the population lives in urban areas. The rest are scattered in small towns and villages in the Jordan Valley, as well as in towns and villages strung along a north-south axis in ever-diminishing numbers, starting south of Amman and ending at Aqaba on the Red Sea.

Palestinian refugees live mostly in camps in or near major cities, including the capital. Although camps originally consisted of emergency shelters, they developed rapidly into units of concrete and galvanized steel structures, initially consisting of two rooms per family. Until the 1980's, refugees were allowed to own the structures—thus making it possible for them to expand their living quarters whenever they could afford to—but could not own the land where these structures were located. Once this became possible, improvements in these urban areas expanded as rapidly as the new and additional structures.

In addition to Palestinians and Palestinian refugees, Jordan is home to a number of ethnic and religious minorities. These include religious minorities—several Christian sects and denominations—as well as ethnic communities of Armenians, Circassians, and Shishans. While Jordan's official religion is Islam, the constitution, adopted in 1952, promulgates the basic rights of freedom and equality before the law for all citizens, regardless of race or religion. In practice, both religious and ethnic minorities enjoy free religious and cultural expression. The largest and oldest community is that of Jordan's Christians, who trace their origin to the earliest days of Christianity in the Near East. As is the case with all Christian sects

in Jordan, Christian communities apply their own church and religious laws to social affairs, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other “personal status” laws.

Residents of towns and villages in agricultural areas, notably in the Jordan Valley and in the irrigated northwest, are mainly occupied in agriculture and animal husbandry. Jordan has experienced a steady decline in the population in these areas, as young people continuously seek better opportunities in the cities. In an attempt to reverse this migration, the government has encouraged development in the Jordan Valley. These plans have been somewhat successful, attracting substantial numbers back into the Valley.

About 2 to 3 percent of the population are nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouins living mainly in the *badiya*, an area on the periphery of the cultivated lands edging the eastern desert, with a portion living in or around the Jordan Valley in the area near the northern city of Irbid.

The Bedouin as a social group are a constituent of the tribal system in Jordan that predominated before World War II and continues to play an important role in modern-day Jordan. The basic form of social organization in Transjordan was tribal, and social relations among various nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes and between them and villagers—many of whom were themselves tribally organized—were based on trade and the exchange of tribute for protection.

In 1983, Peter Gubser classified Jordanian tribes along a continuum of nomadic, semi-nomadic, semi-sedentary, and sedentary. Bedouins were a fully nomadic group whose livelihood was based on camel herding. Although Bedouins upheld a highly independent existence, they interacted with settled communities by trading animals and their products for goods they did not produce. Government policy has encouraged settlement by providing schooling, medical services, and the development of water resources. This has resulted in moving Bedouin communities more rapidly towards the sedentary end of the continuum. Despite the diminishing numbers of nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouins, their tribal social structure, in its idealized form, continues to be adhered to.

Tribal social structure was based on the ramification of patrilineal ties among men. Within this structure, a preference for endogamy—marriage among paternal cousins in the first instance and then in descending levels of relatedness—is prevalent. Endogamy gives rise to a network of kin relations that are both maternal and paternal at the same time.

Tribes in Jordan were composed of groups of related families claiming descent from a supposed founding ancestor. Within this overall loyalty, descent from intermediate ancestors defined several levels of smaller groups within each tribe. The structure resembled a pyramid composed of ascending levels, each of which was both a political and social group. At some point, each unit automatically contained within it all units of the lower level. Despite the near-disappearance of the nomadic way of life, tribal social structure and organization have not been transformed drastically. Tribal organization actually played an important role in the settlement process, helping with land allocation, among other things. Leadership patterns have changed significantly, however, as government-appointed officials have assumed many of the tasks formerly associated with the position of shaykh. In the end, tribal social structure was weakened; individual titles to land, which can be rented or sold to outsiders, and individual employment dilutes

lineage solidarity and cohesiveness.

Observers in the 1980s noted that a process of detribalization was taking place in Jordan, whereby the impact of tribal affiliation on the individual's sense of identity was declining. Sedentarization and education were prime forces in this process. Smaller groups, such as the extended family and clan (*hamula*), were gradually replacing tribes as primary reference groups.

The *hamula* is the principle social structure for people who live in the villages and small towns of Jordan. In common with tribal structure, the *hamula* traces its origins to a common, relatively distant ancestor. The *hamula* ordinarily had a corporate identity; its members usually resided in a distinguishable quarter or neighborhood, and it acted in concert in village, and often regional, political affairs. The *hamula* was the repository of family honor and tended to be endogamous.

Immediate kin groups existed below the level of the *hamula* and above that of the household. In many cases, a group of closely related households, descendants of a relative closer than the founder of a *hamula*, formed entities called lineages or branches. A still smaller unit was the *luzum*, a close consultation group, usually composed of several brothers and their families.

Social control and politics in the village traditionally grew out of the interactions of kin groups at various levels. Social control over individual behavior was achieved through the process of socialization and a system that imposed sanctions for unacceptable behavior. Respected elder males from various *hamail* (plural of *hamula*) provided leadership in villages. They often made decisions by consensus. With the formation and consolidation of the state, traditional leaders lost some power, but they continued to mediate conflicts, and state officials often turned to them when dealing with village affairs. Nevertheless, other social changes have conspired to erode the structure, and consequently the power, of the traditional *hamail*. The decline in significance of agriculture as a way of life, and the migration of increasingly better-educated young people to the cities, has decreased the traditional elders' authority. Despite this trend, family relations and obligations remain strong. The young defer less frequently to their elders in decisions about life choices than has been the custom, but respect for parents and elders remains evident.

In the cities, *hamula* structure and dynamics is hardly in evidence and is overshadowed by the extended kin relationship dynamic. Until recently, extended families lived within the same household or within close proximity. Modern economic realities have made this less common, and more families are beginning to live in nuclear households.

Jordanians continue to rely on extended kin relations for a variety of purposes, including financial support; job information; social connections; access to strategic resources; marital partners; arrangements, protection, and support in the event of conflict; child care and domestic services; and emotional sustenance.

Formally, kinship was reckoned patrilineally. Because the family was central to social life, all children were expected to marry at the appropriate age. Marriage conferred status on both men and women, and

the birth of children further enhanced this status. This was particularly true for women, who then felt more secure in their marital households.

Traditionally, the individual subordinated his or her personal interests to those of the family. Typically, children lived with their parents, even as young adults, until they were married. Children were expected to defer to the wishes of their parents. Marriage was a family affair rather than a personal choice. In more traditional households (tribal or hamulas), arranged marriages were preferred. In the more modern urban areas, more and more young, educated adults are meeting in the workplace and initiating marriage proceedings themselves.

In Islam, marriage is a civil contract rather than a sacrament. Representatives of the bride's interests negotiate a marriage agreement with the groom's representatives. The future husband and wife must give their consent. Young men often suggest to their parents whom they want to marry. Although women do not initiate a marriage, they usually have the right to refuse a marriage partner of their parents' choice.

The social milieu in which a Jordanian lived significantly affected the position of the wife and her degree of autonomy. In rural agricultural areas and among the urban poor, women fulfilled important economic functions. Such women enjoyed a modicum of freedom in their comings and goings within the village or neighborhood. Although casual social contact between the sexes of the kind common in the West was infrequent, segregation of the sexes was less pronounced than in traditional towns.

Among the traditional urban bourgeoisie, women fulfilled fewer and less-important economic functions. Women's responsibilities were more confined to the home. Among the new urban middle class, women occupy a variety of positions, some of them contradictory. Some women of this class were educated and employed, and enjoyed a fair measure of mobility within society. Others, also educated and skilled, lived a more sheltered life with minimal mobility.

Status within the household varied considerably depending on sex, age, and type of household. In principle, men had greater autonomy than women. Their movements in public were freer and their personal decisions were more their own. Within the household, however, younger males were subject to the authority of older and more senior males, particularly in decisions about education, marriage and work. Older women exerted substantial authority and control over children and adolescents, the most powerless sector within a household.

Segregation by gender was tied closely to the concept of honor (*'ird*). In most Arab communities, honor inhered in the descent group—the family, and to some extent, the lineage or clan. Honor could be lost through the failure of sisters, wives, and daughters to behave properly (i.e., modestly) and through the failure of men to exert self-restraint over their emotions towards women. On the one hand, the segregation of women worked to minimize the chance that a family's honor would be lost or diminished. On the other hand, the education of women and their participation in a modern work force tended to erode the traditional concept of honor by promoting the mingling of sexes in public life.

Some of the most marked social changes have affected women's roles. In urban areas, young women have begun to demand greater freedom and equality than in the past, though traditional practices still broadly govern their lives. This may be largely attributed to women's educational achievements in the last 50 years and women's increased participation in the work force, giving them a greater degree of autonomy than ever experienced.

Jordan's experience with public education evolved from providing free and compulsory education for children between the ages of 6 and 15 to building three universities and encouraging the development of community and technical colleges. The latter were a recent development in response to the perceived need of specialized skills and technologies in the workplace—traditionally not available in the academic mainstream university curricula. In addition to the public education system, Jordan boasts numerous private schools, several private community/technical colleges, and at least one private university. While a few of the private schools were founded by missionaries, a number of newer schools are not associated with missionary or other philanthropic organizations.

In the 1980s, Jordan faced high rates of unemployment among educated young people, particularly in the professions of medicine, engineering, and teaching, as well as in skilled technical labor. Expansion of vocational and technical training helped counteract this trend, along with the development of 2-year community colleges that allowed students to earn transferable credits in short-term skill training for later university study.

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Questions for Further Study

- What is the social impact of traditional tribal social behavior on urban and village (i.e., non-Bedouin) family relationships and behavior?
- What role does the informal sector play in the modern Jordanian economy? (See Miles Doan, "Class Differentiation and the Informal Sector in Amman, Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 24, 1 (February 1992), 27-38.)
- How has the economy changed the traditional role of Jordanian women in agriculturally productive areas and in urban areas? What differences, if any, exist between these evolving roles among women of different classes and educational levels in urban areas? (See Layne, Linda, *Home and Homeland: The Dialogics of Tribal and National Identities in Jordan*, 1994.)
- What health policies have been most instrumental in improving life expectancy for Jordanians, and what is the impact on Jordan's demographic profile?

Section IV

Economics

Jordan is a small and poor country with limited natural resources, a high birth rate, a small market that hampers investment, both domestic and foreign, and an underdeveloped economy. It has promising human resources, and Jordanian citizens working abroad, notably in the Gulf region, have helped compensate for chronic balance of trade deficits. Budgetary support and foreign aid (both U.S. and Arab) have also helped narrow down the deficits. Jordan has pursued a long-standing policy of soliciting economic benefits from political exchange; i.e., it has sought economic advantage from its political alliances, so that it can be said that the country depends on "strategic rents." However, Jordan suffers from regional economic downturns and from conflicts in the region; both inter-Arab and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts.

Whereas the Jordanian government is a staunch advocate of free enterprise, the government has assumed a large role in the ownership of very large enterprises, notably mineral extraction companies, whose financing needs (in the hundreds of millions of dollars) exceed the capabilities of the local private sector. The government has also long felt the need to involve itself due to the lack of adequate local entrepreneurial skills. The reasoning behind this is not fallacious,^[2] however, and a series of 5-year economic development plans have produced remarkable results. By the late 1980s, Jordan had a mixed economy of about 40 semipublic corporations, of whose combined paid-up capital the government held a 40 percent share,^[3] GDP growth averaged nearly 16.5 percent between 1972 and 1975, fell to a

respectable 8.5 percent between 1976 and 1979, and reached 18 percent in 1980, according to UN figures. Manufacturing has grown steadily, from 4 percent of GDP in 1970 to 15 percent by 1987. The share of agriculture has declined steadily. There is not enough water to satisfy the demands of household use, industry and agriculture simultaneously.

There have been several distortions in the Jordanian economy. In 1986, for example, the government consumed over 26 percent of GDP, which was the fourth highest figure in the non-communist world. Private consumption, at 87 percent of GDP, was among the highest in the world. Public and private consumption combined amounted to 113 percent more than GDP. The excess of imports over exports as a proportion of GDP was the highest in the world, at -44 percent. The government employed about 40 percent of the workforce (67 percent of all services sector employees) in the late 1980s but contributed only 18 percent of GDP. Public and private services have traditionally accounted for between 60 and 65 percent of GDP. [4] In 1996 the structure of gross domestic production was as follows: public administration and defense accounted for 18.6 percent of GDP; finance 18 percent; manufacturing 16.2 percent; transport and communications 13.9 percent; trade 11.3 percent; construction 8 percent; agriculture accounted for 5.5 percent of GDP; mining 3.6 percent; and other services 4.7 percent. [5] Mineral extractive industries, which formerly the public sector owned, account for the major share of valued added in manufacturing. Phosphates were long regarded as the kingdom's primary natural resource. Total phosphates production by the semi-publicly owned Jordan Phosphate Mines Company was 6.7 million tons in 1986; 5.7 million tons were exported as raw rock and the rest turned into fertilizer at the \$450-million facilities built by the government near the Port of Aqaba port, which turned out mono- and diammonium phosphates, phosphoric acid, and other chemicals. "Jordan was the third ranked phosphate exporter in the world, after Morocco and the United States, and it had the capacity to produce over 8 million tons annually. In 1986 phosphate sales generated US\$185 million in income, which made up 25 percent of export earnings and gave Jordan a 10 percent share in the world market." [6] The other principal mining industry was potash, produced at the semi-publicly owned Arab Potash Company's \$480-million facility on the Dead Sea.

Between 1972 and 1983 Jordan's GNP grew at an average of approximately 10 percent annually. This was made possible through Arab aid in the form of intergovernmental transfers which jumped from \$72 million in 1973 to \$1.2 billion (in 1981 dollars) at the 1978 Baghdad Arab summit. It has been argued that Arab aid, the remittances from over a third of a million Jordanians (mostly of Palestinian origin) working in the oil-producing Gulf region, and commodity exports were the principal components of Jordan's economic prosperity during the seventies and the early eighties. Remittances increased from \$15 million to \$900 million between 1970 and 1981, while commodity exports, mainly to the Gulf region, rose from \$58 million to \$735 million in the same period. These three components accounted for 84 percent of Jordan's GDP in 1981. [7]

However, during the mid-1980s, a producers' oil crisis led to a severe decline in oil revenues and intergovernmental transfers. Markets for Jordan's goods in the Gulf also dried up. A huge cement plant built near Aqaba, intended to supply the Saudi market, turned from an asset into a huge liability. Jordanian Cabinets, which had grown dependent on Arab aid, had become accustomed to turning a blind eye to the economy's structural weaknesses and borrowed money to make ends meet. At the end of 1987, GNP

shrank by 2.4 percent, and the ratio of debt to GNP rose to 70 percent. In 1988, servicing the national debt cost Jordan nearly \$900 million, and by 1989, the kingdom's debt burden had reached \$8.3 billion. Meanwhile, Jordan's special relationship with Iraq had also changed from an asset to a liability: Iraq owed Jordan \$600 million by the end of 1988. There were runs on the Jordanian dinar, which lost a third of its value during 6 months in 1988 (the dinar, which had an exchange rate of about 3 dollars in the seventies and early 1980s, was trading at about JD1.4 to the dollar in 2001). In April 1988, Jordan requested a standby credit arrangement with the IMF and had to acquiesce to a structural adjustment program. This required Jordan to reduce governmental spending and imports and to boost governmental revenues and exports. The medium-term macroeconomic goals were to register a 4 percent rate of economic growth by 1991; reduce inflation from 15 percent to 7 percent by 1993; and to wipe out the current account deficit by that year (including foreign budgetary support in the calculations).^[8] Government subsidies for food items and exports had to be cut or eliminated.

Budgetary support from Gulf states which had run between \$550 million and \$1.3 billion a year during 1980–1989, fell to \$393 million in 1990 and \$164 million in 1991 following the Gulf War. Jordan, a rentier country (deriving a fixed income from returns on investments), had entered the post-rentier stage, which was to last from 1990 to 1994.

GNP for 1994–1998 in current prices were JD 4.246 billion, JD 4.56 billion, JD 4.711 billion, JD 4.946 billion, and JD 5.18 billion.

The following section examines the most recent economic developments in Jordan.

GDP Growth

Economic growth, which was negative in real terms in 1998, scored a healthy rate of 3.1 percent in 1999 and 3.9 percent in 2000, according to government figures, despite the *intifada* ^[9] in the West Bank and Gaza, which has had severe repercussions for Jordan's tourism industry and has depressed foreign direct investment (FDI). The government hopes that GDP growth will continue at a real annual growth rate of 3.5 percent. Current per capita income is about \$1,700. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that GDP growth will be a more modest 2.8 percent in 2001, followed by 3.8 percent growth in 2002 and 4.4 percent in 2003.^[10]

Trade and Current Account Deficits

Despite the traditional chronic trade deficit, exacerbated by rising oil prices, the external current account balance recorded a surplus in 2000 due to U.N. payments to compensate countries negatively affected by the Gulf war, and in view of an increase in workers' remittances. The trade deficit for the first 4 months of 2001 was JD609.6 million (\$859.8 million).

The Economist Intelligence Unit expected exports to increase to \$2.1 billion and imports to increase as

well to \$4.4 billion, so that the trade deficit would rise by 7 percent in 2001 compared to 2000, increasing to \$ 2.3 billion; and then to \$ 2.5 billion in 2002 and \$2.7 billion in 2003. The EIU estimates the expected current account deficits to be 2 percent of GDP in 2001, amounting to a modest \$175 million; and to rise to 4.3 percent of GDP, equal to \$399 million in 2002; and the trend should continue with an increase to 4.4 percent of GDP, or \$438 million, in 2003.

Budgetary Deficit^[11]

The government's budget deficit still amounted to about 7 percent of GDP in 2000, but would be zero if income from privatization of government equities are included. The Central Bank's official foreign exchange reserves rose by \$800 million to \$2.8 billion by the end of 2000, which is sufficient to cover 8 months of imports, according to the Jordan Letter of Intent to the IMF. The plan is for the budget deficit to shrink to 3 percent of GDP before grants and to decline to zero by 2005 after grants, which would bring it down to figures similar to those accepted internally by the EU. The government is introducing a value added tax (VAT).

Debt Burden, Inflation, and the Exchange Rate

External government debt amounted to 190 percent of GDP after the Gulf War but was whittled down to 81 percent of GDP by 2000, and the government hopes to bring it down to 50 percent of GDP by the end of 2006. Gross government debt was 101 percent of GDP at the end of 2000 and should be reduced to 65 percent of GDP by end of 2006, according to its letter of intent to the IMF; but this may be overly optimistic. The debt burden is still formidable and is a drag on the economy. The government currently has an external debt of \$7.2 billion.

The unemployment rate is 20 percent. Inflation is low and was running at an annual rate of 2.3 percent in September 2001 but should rise in 2002, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, in view of the anticipated expansion of public and private spending, a rise in world non-oil commodity prices, and a strong euro. The EIU estimated average consumer price inflation to be 2.8 percent in 2002, and 3.5 percent in 2003.^[12]

The Jordan Dinar is nominally pegged at JD0.709 to the U.S. dollar.

Standard & Poors has revised upwards Jordan's long-term foreign currency issuer credit rating from stable to positive in view of the government's reduction of fiscal imbalances and the country's structural reform program. S&P "predicts that Jordan's accelerating reform programme should boost long-term growth prospects, improve the efficiency of the economy and enlarge the role of the private sector."^[13] The U.S. credit rating agency noted that Jordan's total debt burden was still too high, amounting to 126 percent of GDP and interest payments were put at 4.8 percent of GDP.^[14]

Economic Growth and the Government's Liberalization Plans

Three slogans emerged from King Abdullah II's First Economic Forum in Aqaba where the King met with businessmen and government officials to formulate the broad lines of an economic development strategy: globalization, information technology and privatization. A Cabinet headed by Ali Abu Ragheb since June 2000 has been charged with overseeing economic reform, and the Cabinet was reshuffled in October 2001 to streamline it and introduce new blood. A 20-member Economic Consultancy Council, which is a policymaking body, was established by King Abdullah II in December 1999 to promote the development of information technology, tourism, fertilizers, and the service industry. But bureaucracy and vested interests still pose a hurdle to liberalization.

Jordan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in April 2000; this step, combined with the IMF structural adjustment plan, are serving to modernize the economy and the trend is to look to the private sector for innovation and growth. Among other things, WTO membership is expected to benefit the mining industry (potash, phosphates and fertilizers), which is responsible for 20 percent of export revenues. However, tariffs, which at one time reached as high as 120 percent, have come down to 30 percent and are expected to be reduced to 20 percent by 2011. WTO rules include trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), and Jordan now permits foreigners to own 100 percent of businesses in Jordan. However, the combined effect of the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza and the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 have led to a decline in direct foreign investment (FDI) in Jordan from about \$600 million in 2000 to an estimated \$200 million in 2001.^[15]

In 1997 Jordan signed a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement that aims to create a free-trade zone between the EU and Jordan by 2010 and to establish a framework for political, economic, trade, and financial cooperation. A groundbreaking U.S.- Jordanian Free Trade Agreement came into Force in December 2001. Under a previous arrangement made with the U.S. in 1996, Jordan has set up 5 qualifying industrial zones (QIZs) in various areas of the kingdom, and 25 more are in the pipeline. Goods can be exported to U.S. markets from QIZs free of customs duties and excise tax on condition that 35 percent of the value of the products is manufactured within the zone and 8 percent of the value of the product is Israeli made. These are meant to be a reward for Jordan's cooperation with the peace process. Incidentally, these zones employ a sizeable number of women, which has led to the economic empowerment of Jordanian women. Apparel exports, mainly from such zones, amounted to \$276 million in 1999. The QIZs have provided a boost for Jordan's exports, which were expected to rise by 11 percent in 2001, compared to the year 2000, but imports were expected to rise by 13 percent in the same period.

The current focus of the development effort is a 380-square-kilometer special economic zone (SEZ) in the Red Sea port of Aqaba, which was inaugurated by King Abdullah II on May 17, 2001. The zone will include a QIZ, which will benefit from customs exemptions, low taxes, and streamlined labor procedures. The government expects that it will attract foreign investors seeking to take advantage of duty-free access to the U.S. market and that it will lead to \$6 billion in investments and may even double per capita income by 2020.^[16] This project has been criticized because it allows foreigners to purchase land, and it is feared that it might be a venue for Israeli infiltration of the economy. Government statements have stressed that this is baseless, and trade unions are said to be pleased with the prospect of 70,000 jobs being created. In June 2001, the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) shortlisted six

companies to set up the master developer for the zone (which has been dubbed Aqaba Inc.), and bids were submitted near the end of August. Activities in the zone are to center on industry and tourism. ASEZA has been headed by former Tourism Minister Aqel Biltaji since the Cabinet reshuffle. The Authority will put up land and build infrastructural facilities and regulate activities in the zone. So far, the main investors are Jordan Projects for Tourism Development (JPTD, a joint venture by Zara Investment Company and Abu Jaber Investment Company), along with Egypt's Orascom Projects and Tourism Development.^[17] JPTD began work on the marina area of the Tala Bay Resort in Aqaba in June 2001. The company has a 2.7 million-square-meter site on Aqaba's south beach.^[18]

Jordan is trying to develop computer related skills among the young and teach English to students from a very early age. A Reach Initiative is meant to provide 30,000 information technology-related jobs within the next 5 years, and to advance to \$550 million in annual exports to Europe and the U.S. and to create \$150 million in foreign direct investment by 2004.

Global One Communications (Jordan), the leading local internet service provider, was bought by Jordan Telecom for \$12.8 million in January 2001. Meanwhile Jordan Mobile Telephone Services (Fastlink) is hoping to challenge Jordan Telecom's monopoly of fixed-line and international services and plans to invest \$130 million in telecommunications projects to help develop ASEZA.^[19]

Privatization

In January 2001, an ad hoc committee, which had been set up by the Economic Consultative Council (ECC) 4 months earlier, endorsed a plan for the privatization of the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC); 69.3 percent of the equity is held by the Social Security Corporation.^[20] JPMC lost JD80 million in 2000 and now has a cumulative debt of JD350 million, but did expect a profit of about JD1 million in 2001. The ECC also recommended the privatization of the other major mining company in Jordan, the Arab Potash Company (APC), which, unlike JPMC, is profitable. The government owns 52.9 percent of APC.

The ECC further recommended the privatization of Aqaba port under a plan by which port facilities and services would be sold off, but the government would retain ownership of the port and exercise a regulatory function. The public sector has invested JD400 million in the port, which is underutilized.

In addition, the ECC wants the postal service and power generation and distribution companies restructured and privatization to begin within a year. The latter include the Central Electric Power Generating Company, the Electric Distribution Company, and the Irbid District Electricity Company.^[21]

The government is already engaged in privatizing a number of publicly held corporations. In 1998 the government sold a 33-percent stake in the Jordan Cement Factories Company; the following year France Telecom bought a 40-percent stake in Jordan Telecoms for \$508 million, and Jordan is now trying to sell off 49 percent of the shares of the Royal Jordanian Airlines, but this is encountering difficulties in view of the company's JD840 million debt. The National Assembly passed a privatization law in May 2000,

under which 15 percent of privatization revenues should be spent on infrastructural development or setting up a social safety net. The government announced plans for \$423 million in additional spending in 2001, partly in view of the 20-percent unemployment rate, but it is not clear where the money will come from.

Pharmaceuticals

Jordan has a thriving pharmaceuticals industry, which produces about \$260 million a year in medicines and related products, of which \$180 million go to exports. The industry employs 8,000 people. Some Jordanian firms in this sector will experience difficulties as a result of intellectual property right protection under the WTO, but others are already operating under license.

Tourism

Tourism, which now contributes 11 percent of GDP, enjoyed a big boost from the peace agreement with Israel, with the number of visitors growing by almost 50 percent during 1994-96. Over 100,000 Israelis visited Jordan in 1997. Forty four percent of investments in Jordan are in the tourism industry. The tourism sector has attracted JD424 million in investments over the 3-year period ending in 2000, 38 percent of which is foreign investment.^[22] Jordan has 293 hotels with 16,600 rooms, most of them in Amman. However, the outbreak of the intifada and the deterioration of relations with Israel, alongside events in the U.S., has severely hurt package tours that take in Jordan, the holy places in the West Bank, and Israel. Tourism from Israel has also dried up. In November the Jordan issued \$250 million in long-term bonds, guaranteed by the central bank, to help the hotel industry, which was suffering from a severe liquidity crunch, to reschedule its debts. This was reportedly a first in the Arab world.^[23]

Amman Stock Exchange

The Amman Financial Market opened on January 1, 1978. All Jordanian public shareholding companies capitalized at over JD100,000 (about \$290,000, according to the exchange rate at the time) had to be listed, although smaller companies could also qualify. In addition to the shares of such companies, government and private corporate bonds, other securities, and debt instruments were traded on the market. Corporate bonds were quite rare, however.

In 1997, the Temporary Securities Law was enacted to restructure the market. The privately operated Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) was created; transactions were to be settled by the new Securities Depository Center; and an oversight and regulatory role was assigned to the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC).

A total of 134 companies were listed on the ASE in November 2000, with a total market capitalization of JD 3.4 billion. At the end of August 2000, foreign investment accounted for 42 percent of market capitalization, but only 6 percent was non-Arab portfolio investment. A few American and European emerging market funds tried to enter the market in the mid-nineties, but found the Amman Financial

Market ill prepared to handle their requirements. Only 20 percent of Jordanians own equity in the market. This is due to low incomes as well as the fact that mutual funds were only introduced recently in Jordan. The government does not issue treasury bills, but the monetary authorities have been issuing certificates of deposit that suck up liquidity at the expense of capital markets, indicating a lack of coordination among various agencies.^[24]

Executive Chairman of the JSE Bassam Saket sees his organizations' task to be to prepare a new culture of investment and to ensure greater transparency and that disclosure requirements be observed. Many firms are still not complying. New rules governing trading and listing were introduced in 2000, and a brokers' guarantee fund was established. Electronic and remote trading were also introduced. There were hopes that the government would conduct privatization transactions through the ASE, but important deals, such as the Jordan Cement Factories Company and a 40-percent share in the Jordan Telecommunications Company, were sold off directly by the government.

The ASE general weighted price index, which stood at 167.4 in 1999, declined 15 percent during the first three quarters of 2000 and was not initially particularly affected by the outbreak of the intifada in October; nevertheless, it resumed its decline and closed the year at 133.1. The total value of trading for the year 2000 was JD334.5 million (\$472.3 million), down from \$549.4 million in 1999 and from \$655 million in 1998. Foreign investment declined in 2000, with a net outflow of \$16.6 million compared to a net inflow of \$21.8 million in 1999, but foreign investment still accounted for 41 percent of market capitalization.^[25] By August 15, 2001, the index was up 13 percent since the beginning of the year, closing at 150.69 points following a rally in anticipation of favorable earnings reports by blue chip companies. The index did dip sharply after the tragic events of September 11 in the U.S., but by October 24 it had climbed back above pre-9/11 levels to reach a 20-month high as foreign funds grabbed up blue chip Arab Bank shares in anticipation of a share split early in 2002.

Arab Bank shares account for 40 percent of total market capitalization on ASE. The bank was founded in 1930 in Jerusalem. Management of the highly conservative Arab Bank changed hands this year, as Abdul Majid Shoman retired as CEO and his son, Abdul Hamid Shoman, who is also part of the conservative camp, took over as CEO and deputy chairman of the board. His uncle Khalid Shoman, who is known as something of a modernizer, resigned as deputy chairman. But observers noted that the Arab Bank was facing stiff competition and had to find new sources of noninterest income.

Recent Economic Cooperation With Egypt and Syria

15-Year Gas Supply Deal With Egypt

Jordan's Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry signed an agreement in June 2001 with al-Sharq Gas Company, which is based in Egypt, to supply Jordan with 1,000 million cubic meters of natural gas a year for 15 years, starting in 2003. There are plans to construct a 370 kilometer gas pipeline in Jordan from Aqaba to Khirbet al-Samra near Amman, where an independent power project (IPP) is to be located, and to other power plants as well. Arthur D. Little is the consultant for the project, and Tractebel of Belgium is negotiating a contract to build the IPP. The ministry was accepting tender bids in December 19, 2001

for the build-own-operate gas pipeline contract. The capacity of the pipeline will be 10,000 million cubic meters a year, with a view to extending the delivery of gas to Syria, Lebanon and perhaps Turkey as well. In December 2000, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon signed a memorandum of understanding for a regional gas pipeline.^[26]

Wahdeh Dam Project

Jordan has invited international contractors to prequalify for a contract to build a \$200 million, 100-meter dam in association with Jordanian and Syrian firms that will provide 50 million cubic meters of water from Syria to Jordan annually. The project, which has been delayed, is being financed by the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in Kuwait, and the Jordanian government.^[27]

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The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement

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Questions for further study

1. What economic changes do you think Jordan's membership in the WTO will bring in the long run?
2. In what ways do you think Jordan's economic progress is threatened by the new *intifada*?
3. What do you think are the prospects for the development of an information technology in Jordan?
4. Do you predict success for the privatization effort?
5. What do you think Jordan needs to do to attract foreign portfolio and direct investment?

Section V

Politics

By 1927, British officials had prepared a draft constitution for Transjordan based on the Iraqi constitution (also the handiwork of British civil servants), which unfortunately excluded some of the protections built into the Iraqi model, and was designed to be subservient to the prerogatives of the mandatory power built into the agreement with Amir Abdullah, placing ultimate control in the hands of the British representatives. Earlier, in 1923, a committee of Transjordanian officials had begun work on a constitution which, when work on it ended, resembled the British version but was not based on the supremacy of the agreement with Britain. The constitution created an elected unicameral legislature, an "executive council" or Cabinet that was not accountable to the legislative council and had no provisions for judicial review. Abdullah had to request a modification that allowed the legislative council to approve the budget. The British draft was promulgated in 1928. In response, an unofficial group of Transjordanians authored a National Pact that acknowledged the authority of the amir but would have made the Cabinet responsible to the national assembly. The National Pact was not adopted, but the issues it raised came to constitute a leitmotif in Jordanian political life.^[28]

To placate Palestinian fears of autocratic Hashemite rule following the annexation of the West Bank, King Abdullah promised constitutional reform but did not follow through; he dissolved the first Parliament after the union because it proved to be obstructionist once its members found that these reforms were not forthcoming. King Abdullah was assassinated before new elections could be held.

Parliament and the Struggle With the Crown

The 1952 Constitution

The new Parliament or National Assembly (*Majlis al-Umma*) was in favor of radical constitutional revisions, and there was a constitutionalist bent to the Jordanian statesmen who were wielding power in the interregnum between Abdullah and Hussein. This made possible the adoption of a more liberal constitution. In 1951, the Cabinet submitted to Parliament a list of revisions to the constitution. Parliament and the government compromised on the principle that a simple majority was sufficient for a vote of no-confidence in the government. A High Court was established, as well as provisions for limited judicial review.

The issue of succession from Abdullah to Hussein is a very interesting chapter in Jordan's history. It provides a very rare example in the Middle East of commoners arranging the rules and procedures of succession to the monarchy so that a smooth transition was effected from King Abdullah to his eldest son, Talal, as an interim measure, until Talal's eldest son, Hussein, was old enough to ascend the throne. Talal, who was suffering from schizophrenia, was unfit to serve, but he was made king for a brief period to ensure the legitimacy of the succession. When the time came for him to abdicate, this was effected through proper parliamentary procedures, peacefully and according to the book.^[29]

The 1952 constitution states that Jordan is a constitutional hereditary monarchy, based on primogeniture. Jordan has a bicameral Parliament (*Majlis al-Ummah*, loosely translated as National Assembly), consisting of an elected lower house (*Majlis al-Nuwwab* or House of Deputies) and a Senate or upper house (literally *Majlis al-A'yan* or House of Notables) appointed by the King. The King promulgates laws through royal decrees that must be cosigned by the Prime Minister or the Cabinet Member concerned. The King may veto legislation, and royal vetoes require two-thirds of each House of Parliament to override them. The King appoints the Prime Minister and the judges. He is supreme commander of the armed forces. Cabinets must submit their programs to the lower house for approval, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the members. Elections for the lower house are supposed to be held every 4 years by secret ballot. Women were enfranchised in 1973.

Jordanian laws are based on the principles of both Islamic law (the *shari'a*) and European laws, showing influences of Ottoman, French, and British law. Under the constitution, the judiciary is independent, and formerly this was largely true, but the independence of the courts have been gradually undermined. There are civil, religious, and special courts in Jordan. Civil courts exist at four levels: magistrate's courts, courts of first instance, courts of appeal, and a supreme court called the Court of Cassation. The King appoints the president of the seven-member Court of Cassation, who fills the function of chief justice.

Religious courts consist of *shari'a* courts for Muslims and ecclesiastical courts for Christians.

The constitution bars discrimination on the basis of race or religion; bans compulsory labor; and requires due process to be followed in the case of arrest, imprisonment, or confiscation of property. However, an order from the Prime Minister (rather than a court) may satisfy due process in the case of arrest. Freedom of opinion, the press, and worship are guaranteed within limits. Censorship, or rather self-censorship, of the press is often practiced, however. During the period of martial law (from 1967 to 1989), newspapers were often closed down by order of the government for a few days at a time as a financial penalty for violating censorship restrictions. The Ministry of Information (which no longer exists) often laid down general guidelines for the press. Television and radio are government owned and operated.

King Hussein and the Constitutional Experiment

General elections were held on October 21, 1956 under the 1952 constitution and the Political Parties Law of 1955, according to which the Cabinet had the authority to license all political parties. These were the freest elections in the history of Jordan, before or since, under the explicit orders of the King. Given the change in the electorate due to the incorporation of the West Bank, it led to the victory of Arab nationalist parties, notably the National Socialist Party led by Sulaiman al-Nabulsi, which won 11 out of 40 seats in the lower house. There were 3 communists, 2 Ba'thists, 4 Muslim Brethren, 4 Arab Constitutionalists, 2 other parties that won one seat apiece, and 14 independents. The pro-Nasserist Arab Nationalists (*qawmiyeen*) did not contest the elections and remained outside Parliament.

On 27 October 1956, Sulaiman Nabulsi was charged with forming a Cabinet, and he named a Ba'thist from the West Bank, Abdullah Rimawi, as minister of state for foreign affairs. The 11-man Cabinet included 7 National Socialists, 1 Ba'thist, and 1 communist. As one distinguished commentator put it: "Thus, of all the countries in the Arab East, Jordan became the first to have what it is customary to call a "popular front" government, i.e., a liberal-socialist-communist coalition which, in the Middle East context, was dedicated to the struggle against domestic conservatism and Western influences, while favoring closer links with the Arab countries and the Soviet bloc."^[30] Amman became a center for pan-Arab conferences and Jordan played an important role in founding the Federation of Arab Labor Unions.

There was an irreconcilable conflict between the goals of Nabulsi and those of the King. Nabulsi, being a pan-Arabist, wanted to end what he perceived as the artificial existence of Jordan and unite with other Arab countries, most immediately, Syria. The new Prime Minister favored the replacement of Britain's subsidy with Arab aid, notably from Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Nabulsi also wanted to establish the principle of the independence of the Cabinet to formulate foreign policy.

The significance of what the government was attempting can be gleaned from a cabinet resolution read by Rimawi on February 26, 1957 defining Jordan's position at an upcoming conference. The resolution rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine (military and economic support for Middle East states whose independence was threatened by international communism) and upheld the principle of positive neutrality. The prelude to the government's audacious position on foreign policy issues was even more

striking: “We hereby announce . . . the Government’s policy . . . On this basis the government won the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies.”^[31] The significance of this statement cannot be overestimated: “The inference that Jordan was a parliamentary state does not contradict the text of the 1952 constitution (amended in 1954), even though the constitution did not state that policymaking devolved on the ministers rather than on the King. But as everyone knew, this assumption negated all that Jordan had stood for as a body politic since its birth, and just as important, no officeholder had ever before dared to make it in public.”^[32]

Jockeying between the King and the Cabinet continued. When the Cabinet retired the director of security and replaced him with their own man, Hussein acted. On April 10 he ordered Nabulsi to resign. By maintaining personal contacts with Cairo and Damascus, Hussein had managed to silence their hostility at a crucial time.

That was not the end of the constitutional experiment; the King was still willing to play along. But the next 3 weeks were a period of severe crisis. Army officers in Zarqa, east of Amman, had mounted a plot against the King with the connivance of the chief of staff, Ali Abu Nuwwar. Hussein managed to foil the plot bloodlessly through a demonstration of personal courage. Then, for the first time, he invited a Palestinian, Hussein Fakhry al-Khalidi, to form a Cabinet, which included Nabulsi as foreign minister. This Cabinet lasted 9 days but significantly allowed a Patriotic Congress to convene in Nablus in the West Bank on April 22. This was attended by the Qawmiyeen or Nasserists, the National Socialists, Ba’thists, and communists—in other words, all the opposition. The Muslim Brothers by this time were supporting the King. The congress issued a proclamation signed by 23 members of the lower house that espoused federation with Egypt and Syria, a purge of the administration, and respect for the constitution and called for a general strike and demonstrations on April 24. Some demonstrations took place accompanied by violent clashes between the leftists and the Muslim Brotherhood. Khalidi resigned, so none of the congress’ resolutions were carried out.

After soliciting and receiving assurances of American support, on the evening of April 24 the young King assembled a group of senior politicians among his grandfather’s supporters and sought and received their approval for a declaration of martial law. Shortly after midnight on April 25 martial law was declared. The King had exerted his authority and finally put an end to the constitutional experiment. Jordan would rely on U.S. aid. In effect, the United States had stepped into Britain’s shoes as Jordan’s sponsor.

This assertion of independence by Parliament and the Cabinet had been spectacular but short-lived, and it ended with a victory for King Hussein and the prerogatives of the crown (see detailed discussion of the international dimension of the challenge of Arab radicalism in the next section).

Civil War of 1970–71

In 1964, Egyptian President Abdel Nasser was instrumental in creating the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was not entirely independent from the Arab regimes that had set it up and

financed it, and the Palestine Liberation Army, which consisted of regular brigades subject to regular military discipline, stationed in Syria and Egypt. Independent Palestinian organizations, such as the Palestine Liberation Movement (Fateh),^[33] which was established in several stages ranging from the late fifties to the early sixties, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and its offshoot, the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP, later the DFLP), as well as many other small organizations, had already taken shape or were in the process of being formed. Following the defeat of Arab armies in the June 1967 war, their mission became to liberate their homeland, Palestine (now Israel), through guerrilla action.

Whereas conventional warfare worked to the Israeli army's advantage, guerrilla warfare, it was thought, was far better suited to Arab limitations and Israeli vulnerabilities. These organizations went through a soul-searching period in which theoretical debates took place concerning the nature of guerrilla warfare, wars of national liberation, people's wars, etc.^[34] They hit upon the practice of guerrilla action (*al-'amal al-fida'i*), since guerrilla warfare was actually beyond their capabilities; but that did not prevent them from employing grandiose names such as "mass armed struggle" or "revolutionary war." A sanctuary or base for guerrilla operations against Israel was needed. The countries surrounding Israel—Jordan, Syria and Lebanon—were the natural choices, Jordan being preferred because it offered the longest border with Israel and because Palestinians constituted over half the population. Whereas Fateh espoused the doctrine of noninterference in the affairs of the regimes in the host countries, the Marxist organizations, the PFLP and the breakaway PDFLP were inspired by Vietnam and, in the case of the latter, the thoughts of Mao Zedong, to the extent that its founder, Nayef Hawatmeh, was satirized as Nayef Zedong by members of other organizations. To the PDFLP and the PFLP, Amman had to undergo an apotheosis as the Arab Hanoi or little Hanoi. Unfortunately these concepts were divorced from social, economic and political reality.

Palestinian nationalism (or more accurately protonationalism) and the emergence of Palestinian institutions were driven by "armed struggle." The principle of "armed struggle" shaped the form and function of Palestinian institutions. The proliferation of guerrilla organizations, and the ongoing formation of militias and administrative and decisionmaking institutions, however, created a dualism of power. "The guerrilla movement now had its own military police, security apparatus, revolutionary courts, information offices, media, trade union movement, and, of course, full-time armed forces and 'liberated zones' in the refugee camps."^[35] The military and paramilitary bodies that emerged, designed as they were to further the goal of armed struggle, were incompatible with Jordanian sovereignty. Many of the men who staffed these organizations were recruited from refugee camps in Jordan; the Palestinian refugees could escape the dismal world of the camps and strive for a better future for themselves and their families by joining the guerrillas, those who sacrificed themselves for their people.

In April 1969, the guerrilla groups united to form the Palestine Armed Struggle Command, which, due to internal differences, excluded the PFLP. "In the years which followed 1969, Fateh strengthened its hold on all parts of the PLO apparatus, while Fateh's own native-born vigour and resilience expanded the PLO's hold over all aspects of Palestinian public life, knitting together the dispersed and demoralized Palestinian communities into a reformed and distinctive national group under the leadership of the PLO."^[36]

The concentration of the presence of the *fida`iyeen* (guerrilla organizations dedicated to the liberation of Palestine) on Jordan soil, and the high percentage of Palestinians in the population, presented a challenge to the regime and to many indigenous Jordanians. The prospect of turning Amman into an Arab Hanoi was anathema to the regime. Nevertheless, it was difficult for King Hussein to resist support for efforts by the Palestinians to regain their homeland; and personally, the young King may well have been swept away initially by the tide of popular sentiment: at one point he said in a much publicized speech: “We are all *fida`iyeen*.” Those words would come back to haunt him.

The guerrillas became contemptuous of the authority of the government, which was “reactionary” after all, and, according to the radicals, had to be superseded by something better, more progressive. Armed *fida`iyeen* started to throw their weight around under the presumption that they had the mantle of legitimacy. They flaunted their independence (and rebelliousness) and thought that the regime could not take them on for fear of the Arab reaction. The guerrillas had also infiltrated the armed forces, which had recruited many Palestinians alongside the traditional Bedouin troops, and thought they army would split in the event of a confrontation with the King.

As a final resort, the guerrillas thought they could count on Iraqi troops that had been stationed in Jordan following the war and had received assurances from Iraq’s defense minister. The radical guerrilla groups, particularly the PDFLP and the PFLP, sought a confrontation with the authorities, and there was a debate among the radicals whether to maintain the duality of authority or to overthrow the regime. Fateh was against attempting to replace the government because it thought this would invite Israeli intervention, but this fear apparently did not daunt the less cautious and much weaker radicals (Fateh had a militia of around 10,000, whereas the PFLP and PDFLP commanded only a few hundred), and even Fateh commanders in Jordan were militants. The Marxist groups counted on Fateh to come to their aid in a showdown and acted recklessly. The Jordanian Communist Party split, with the majority supporting the radical Palestinians.

But the *fida`iyeen* lacked unity and discipline and their forces were not integrated. By contrast, the government was well organized and better capable of planning, its troops were more disciplined and better armed. Malcolm Kerr offers the following insight into the mentality of the elements within the army and the general population who were alienated by the methods and attitudes of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations: between 1968 and 1970 “they had built up a reservoir of special resentment against the arrogant attitudes of the Palestinians. The political tension was mixed closely with social differences between the proud men of tribal background, trained under the paternal eye of the British, whose whole life and livelihood had been based on loyal service to the Hashemite crown, and the slick urbanites, the socially mobile, ideologically facile, irreverent young men who led the resistance movement. Transposed on to the Jordanian stage, it was the police of Chicago or Paris face to face with student demonstrators.”^[37]

But fearing a split in the army, the government brought back Ma’n Abu Nuwwar (in keeping with the King’s tradition of forgiving and coopting former adversaries) to reactivate the army’s Mobilization and Moral Guidance Branch; a Special Branch (*shu`bah khassah*) consisting of loyal Bedouin recruits under

the command of the King's uncle, Sharif Nasir bin Jamil, and his cousin, Sharif Zeid bin Shaker, who commanded the armored brigades. The so-called Popular Resistance (*al-muqawamah al-sha'biyah*) was formed, which came under the direct command of the King. A third armored brigade was formed in 1969, and army strength increased from 60,000 to about 75,000. The King received the support of the southern tribes, indigenous East Bankers, and even Palestinian businessmen who perceived the need for law and order. The King met several times with tribal and clan leaders and rallied support in the army.

Clashes broke out in February 1970 and again in May and June. The PFLP tried to capture the radio station, and Fateh even fired rockets at one of the King's palaces. Still, Hussein tried to compromise on several occasions. On June 11, he offered Arafat the post of Prime Minister at the head of a Cabinet of the Fateh leader's choice. Arafat declined, but still a Cabinet was formed under 'Abdel Mun'im al-Rifa'I, and Mashhur Haditha replaced Sharif Nasir at the head of the army. Both new appointees enjoyed the trust of the Palestinian guerrillas.

On July 22, Abdel Nasser agreed to the Rogers Plan, involving a cease-fire in the war of attrition that had been going on in the Suez. Jordan concluded a cessation of hostilities agreement with Israel 4 days later. This sent alarm bells ringing at PLO headquarters, and the radicals started plotting a coup against Hussein. The PFLP came to believe that an offensive against the government would induce large segments of the population and the army to rally behind the rebels, on the model of the Bolshevik revolution,^[38] and now advocated a direct assault on the monarchy in an overall offensive.^[39] The King reinstated bin Shakir as army commander.

George Habash's PFLP had a penchant for "external operations," which generally meant hijackings, although Fateh frowned on this. On September 6, the PFLP hijacked a Pan Am flight, flew it to Cairo, and blew up the plane on the tarmac after evacuating the passengers. A Swissair aircraft and a TWA plane were also seized and flown to a desert air strip in Jordan, where a BOAC flight was also diverted 3 days later, and the passengers were held as hostages. The army surrounded the air strip. The PFLP's organ, *al-Hadaf*, announced the group's actions to be a blow at the peace process.^[40] Arafat suspended the PFLP's membership in the PLO Central Committee. But the Palestinian leadership vacillated: "Fateh had long raised the slogan of noninterference in domestic Arab politics, but its problem (Salah) Khalaf summarized, was that it had in fact 'interfered, but not intervened', and 'defied [King] Husayn's authority without seriously trying to seize power.'" ^[41] On the other hand, some hawks, such as PLO "foreign minister" Faruq Qaddumi, thought the King was a "paper tiger" and could be toppled "in half an hour."^[42]

Iraq warned Jordan against taking on the guerrillas and said it would intervene to defend the *fida'iyeen* and the refugee camps.^[43] Again the King compromised. Mashhur Haditha was reinstated as army chief of staff, and the King had to intervene personally to prevent an attack on the guerrillas by mutinous troops. The King now faced a challenge from the right by East Jordanian hardliners who were ready to invite the King to step aside if he could not lead them against the guerrillas.^[44] Finally, Fateh called for a "revolutionary nationalist government" on September 11.

Faced with these challenges, and by increasing hostility to the guerrillas from the indigenous East Bank population, which verged on the threat of rebellion against the King if he failed to act, Hussein acted. The Jordanian army began its offensive on September 17, massing between 30,000 and 35,000 troops in the Amman governorate. The government had a master plan to use the special Bedouin forces it had created to attack centers of guerrilla strength in Amman and to sever their ties with other cities, cutting off supplies and reinforcements. Iraq failed to intervene but Syria did, sending in a force of 200 tanks, which the King was able to defeat by deploying his air force while Syria failed to do so (see section under Foreign Affairs, below.)

Arab mediation led to several cease-fires, none of which endured. The government had set a course of action for itself, from which it was not ready to deviate unless the PLO was prepared to change its ways. Still, the King exhibited a willingness to compromise on several occasions, to appease both domestic and Arab criticism. There were many pauses in the offensive. A subsequent protocol on October 13 restored many of the former prerogatives and freedoms the guerrillas had enjoyed. The United States, which was clearly sympathetic to the King, resupplied Jordan with the equipment it had lost. The army resumed what has come to be termed a “creeping offensive.” By March 1971 the army regained Irbid; by April the guerrillas agreed to evacuate Amman and assembled their forces in ‘Ajlun. Government forces attacked and overran Palestinian positions in ‘Ajlun between July 13 and 16. The PLO left Jordan, never to return as an armed force.

The Palestine Red Crescent estimated a death toll of 3,650 and over 11,000 wounded even before the final assault, and the Palestinian guerrillas had lost their principal Arab sanctuary. Jordan was censured and ostracized for a while. Kerr offers a perceptive retrospective analysis: “Who had really won the civil war, and what did it signify? The violence was deeply disturbing to the Arab public, the more so because the victims were already the objects of general sympathy. King Hussein’s army had killed more Palestinians in 1970 than Moshe Dayan’s had done in 1967. The poignancy of this was not lost on Palestinians living in the West Bank under Israeli occupation. What did it foretell of prospects for them and their aspirations if they were ever returned to Hashemite sovereignty?”^[45]

Return to Constitutional Government in 1989

Defensive Democratization

At the 1974 Rabat conference, the PLO was accepted by Arab governments as the sole legitimate representative of the PLO. This created a constitutional problem for Jordan: Was the West Bank still part of Jordan? In practice, the area was under Israeli occupation, and now the question of the legitimacy of representation had been raised. Who did West Bankers in the Jordanian Parliament represent? Could new elections be held? Should West Bank deputies vote on laws affecting the East Bank only?

Martial law had been declared in 1967 and remained in force until a new Parliament was formed after the 1989 elections. The official explanation for this situation is that war justified martial law, and the occupation of the West Bank prevented the holding of new elections there, and it would have been

unconstitutional to hold elections only in the East Bank, so that normal constitutional practices had to be suspended.

There have been five amendments to the 1952 constitution: in 1974, 1976, and 1984. The first two amendments allow the King to dismiss the Senate and to postpone lower house elections for a year. In 1974 the King dissolved the lower house and suspended Parliament indefinitely. In 1978, feeling the need for participation by the public in government, the King created an appointed body, the National Consultative Council, which debated laws and made recommendations to the government. This body had no legal powers or authority, but the government made a point of almost never going against the wishes of the NCC. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet regularly attended the weekly NCC sessions.

Writing in 1981, one scholar noted: “Although most of the laws that have been promulgated since the establishment of the Council have been initiated by the government, nevertheless, all of them have been deliberated in the appropriate Council committee, and then voted on and passed with or without amendment by the Council as a whole. Neither the government nor the King have so far vetoed any amendment recommended by the Council.” In response to a proposed amendment by a prominent NCC member, the following text was adopted: “Members can debate and offer advice on matters of public policy, each member having the right to question the Prime Minister or the concerned Cabinet minister on any such topic.”^[46] Although strictly an advisory body, the NCC gathered authority as it went along.

In 1984, King Hussein dissolved the NCC and recalled the suspended Parliament. The 1976 amendment empowered the King to postpone parliamentary elections indefinitely, while the two 1984 amendments allowed elections to be held in the East Bank alone and empowered serving deputies to choose replacements for deputies who died in office, in order to fill vacant seats from the West Bank. Thus the government’s justification for the hiatus in parliamentary life was that circumstances beyond the government’s control had forced a situation upon it. In 1988, Jordan gave up responsibility for the West Bank, and it became sensible as well as constitutional to resume parliamentary life in the East Bank.

Other explanations stress economic factors, specifically the nature of Jordan as a rentier state and the need to respond to economic crises. One noted characteristic of rentier states is the depolitization of society: Since the state does not depend primarily on taxes to sustain the government’s budget, the operative maxim could be phrased as “no representation without taxation.” The state may be benevolent, but it is decidedly paternalistic. It tends to discourage the emergence of independent political parties and pluralist interest groups with the power to contest government policies.

By the end of the 1980s, strategic rents were drying up, and the government’s need to borrow from abroad had led to a budget deficit of \$8.3 billion. Per capita GNP had fallen by a quarter since 1985 to under \$1,500 in 1989; consumer spending had been declining since 1986; and remittances by Jordanians working abroad, which exceeded a billion dollars annually for about a decade up to 1987, had dropped to \$623 million by 1989 as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. The kingdom sought to reschedule its debts, and this led to a structural readjustment agreement with the IMF in 1988, which was initially kept secret, and included an austerity package involving reductions in government subsidies.

Subsequent government's had been ignoring the structural imbalances in the economy, and the public did not even know the full extent of the problem. The structural adjustment program called for price increases on petroleum products, alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, soft drinks and detergents. Automobile registrations and licensing fees were increased. Subsidies on barley, bran, olive oil and powdered milk were reduced. The immediate objective was to reduce the budget deficit from 23.7 percent of GDP in 1988 to 19.6 percent in 1989.^[47]

The program was met with public protests directed against both the austerity measures and governmental corruption. Riots broke out in the south in April 1989, beginning in Ma'an and spreading to surrounding areas. The unusual aspect of these riots was that they occurred in areas of traditional bedrock government support; the protesters were not radicals or leftists or Palestinian refugees but were East Bankers of Bedouin descent. Palestinian refugee camps remained quiet, and the largely Palestinian middle class and left-leaning professional associations were content to petition the crown to replace the government. The Muslim Brotherhood simplified the complex economic causes by placing the blame on governmental corruption. Zeid Rifa'i's government was forced to resign and was replaced by a Cabinet headed by Sharif Zeid Ibn Shaker, who was known for his integrity. Rifa'i had been known for his antiliberal policies and close control of the press, and the new Cabinet chose a path of liberalization to placate citizens who had to bear the burden of economic austerity.

The government responded to the clarion call of unrest among part of its core constituency with political liberalization.^[48] The first parliamentary elections since the 1967 war were announced to be held before the end of 1989, and the King appointed a 60-member commission to draft a National Charter. Glenn Robinson has argued that these measures amounted to "defensive democratization," by the state, preemptive liberalization in view of anticipated demands for political reform, and not as a result of agitation by groups in civil society. "Defensive democratization, even in the absence of democratizing social pressure, is a state strategy to maintain the dominant political order in the face of severe state fiscal crisis. Such fiscal crises, particularly in rentier states, are only loosely related to general economic problems in a country."^[49] Rents, derived from outside the country, dried up, leading to protests, and the King opted for a program of defensive democratization in order to forestall and preempt even more serious challenges to the crown further down the line without making fundamental changes in the structure of power and the elite.

While the liberalization is real in comparative terms, and may allow for the emergence of political parties and greater freedom of the press, the King maintains an ultimate veto power over policy issues. The function of Parliament, which was freely elected, was to sanction or legitimize government policies and give its blessings to the IMF's structural reforms.^[50] Parliament was also needed to legitimize the peace agreement with Israel, which the King would have anticipated in view of his April 1987 agreement with Shimon Peres in a secret meeting in London to convene such a conference.^[51] King Hussein had been saying since the late seventies that he wished there were a way for the public to participate in the decisionmaking process so that it would better understand the government's calculations and motives and so that citizens might share in the responsibility for the decisions rather than criticizing everything the government did while they maintained their distance. Ahmad al-Lawzi, who was Prime Minister during

the early seventies and had extensive experience as a Senator, believes that liberalization should in fact be dated back to 1984.^[52] Although the elections were free, the rules of the electoral game were such as to minimize the influence of opponents of the regime, particularly during the 1993 elections.

The notion of defensive democratization is supported by Ryan. In a study of the Arab Cooperation Council, formed by Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and North Yemen on February 16, 1989 (see section on the ACC under Foreign Policy, below), Ryan argues that the Council primarily represented a format for economic cooperation and that Jordan had worked to create it in order to deal with the looming fiscal crisis. Although it antedated the unrest in the south, the Jordanian government could see the threat of unrest, although it may not have predicted where it was going to break out. At any rate, the intention was to shore up support for the regime by catering to the interests of the business elites, an important source of support for the regime, in the belief that economic stability would promote social peace.

Political liberalization and the ACC went hand in hand. "The liberalization effort, in fact, opened the way for interest groups to form together as informal policy coalitions in efforts to affect the policy process to a greater extent than before. These developments enhanced the role of the commercial bourgeoisie in particular, which found that some of its interests matched those of the Jordanian regime. One aspect of this policy convergence was the push for greater market access not only for Jordanian labor but also for Jordanian exports."^[53] The export industry, in which Palestinian interests were well represented, stood to benefit, as did the construction industry, which provided a lucrative employment opportunity for retired army officers, and which sought foreign markets for the export of its services. Economic alliances and political liberalization offered an opportunity to coopt key groups in society.

According to Robinson, this move towards democratization is not in any imminent danger of getting out of hand, because the Palestinian economic elite are reticent about further liberalization that might work to the advantage of East Bankers and are content with the IMF-backed structural adjustment (which promotes privatization); the IMF plan preserves the position of the private sector dominated by Palestinian businessmen and firms, who may be threatened by attempts to redistribute resources towards the state sector, which is dominated by East Bankers.^[54]

The lower house of Parliament was expanded to 80 seats, of which 68 seats were assigned to representatives of Muslims of Arab origin: nine for Christians, two for Circassians, and one seat was to be filled either by a Circassian or a Chechen.

Political parties had not been legalized before the 1989 elections, so the largest single bloc of seats went to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood was the only organized group to contest the elections, but they could not run officially under the party name. Nevertheless, 20 Brethren and 12 other independent candidates affiliated with the Brotherhood were elected, adding up to 32 seats. Representatives of tribal groups and centrists won 35 seats. Thirteen leftists were elected, a remarkable change from the 1950s. The government now faced a problem: the combined strength of the Islamist and leftist candidates amounted to a parliamentary majority. The King called on Mudar Badran, who had good relations with the Brotherhood, to form a cabinet. Badran declared an amnesty for political prisoners; lifted harsh

controls on the press; and froze martial law. He chose to coopt the Islamists and formed a cabinet that included three independent Islamic deputies but no members of the Brotherhood. Parliament convened in November 1990. Badran reshuffled his Cabinet to include three Muslim Brethren, with the ministry of education going to one of them. The new minister of education announced that schools and school events would be strictly segregated according to sex. This meant that fathers could not attend the graduation of their daughters or mothers attend ceremonies for their sons. This went against Jordanian family values and offended the sensibilities of nonfundamentalist Jordanians and such a large section of the middle class that the minister was forced to resign.

Despite their parliamentary strength, the Islamic deputies were unable to impose their political agenda on the three subsequent Prime Ministers: Taher al-Masri, Zayd ibn Shaker, and Abdul Salam al-Majali. Parliament did endorse structural adjustment programs that had been agreed with the IMF, however. According to Robinson: "Parliament could only act within the political parameters set by the King and enforced by his chosen Prime Minister . . . Parliament had little real power to substantially change policies or course. In the end, Parliament's primary task was to legitimate King Hussein's political agenda."^[55]

The National Charter, a truly progressive document, was approved by Parliament and signed by the King in June 1991. In line with the charter, political parties were legalized in September 1992. The Press and Publications law, which was enacted in April 1993, removed some restrictions on the press, but shackled press freedoms in other ways, such as prohibiting material that was offensive not only to the crown and the armed forces but to other Arab states, diplomats, etc. The conservative Parliament was more concerned with defamation than with press freedom. Apparently, the Muslim Brotherhood and tribal deputies did not favor an overly emancipated or outspoken press. The tame Jordanian press, however, failed to mount opposition to Jordan's 1994 peace agreement with Israel, opposition which the Brotherhood led. Of course, an important source of control of the press lay in the fact that the government indirectly owned 60 percent of the shares of *al-Ra'i* newspaper, 35 percent of *al-Dustur*, and 75 percent of *Sawt al-Sha'b*.

The government also retained the ability to circumvent parliamentary channels in certain areas. For example, the Cabinet enjoys the right, subject to the King's approval, to promulgate laws by decree when Parliament is out of session in "matters which admit of no delay." Such laws must be submitted to Parliament at the next session. However, there is an interesting nicety here: Instead of requiring Parliament to endorse the laws passed by decree, the constitution states that the law will remain valid unless it is repealed by Parliament.^[56]

Relations With the Islamists

The Muslim Brotherhood, while critical of corruption in government, had been an important source of domestic support for the government in its confrontations with leftists and radicals, as noted, during the Nabulsi episode. It has served as a counterweight not only to leftist groups, but also to more extremist Islamist organizations, such as *Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami*. East Bankers were the grass roots mainstay of

the Brotherhood, which included in its leadership scions of established political families. However, the Islamists were opposed to a peace agreement with Israel that involved full normalization and did not satisfy Palestinian national aspirations, as conservative Palestinians were rather well represented in the Brotherhood.

Following the 1989 liberalization, the Muslim Brotherhood found itself in a strong position to compete, because it was about the only group in Jordanian civil society that was organized and in a position to mobilize mass support, a strong advantage it enjoyed over other groups and newly formed parties. The Brotherhood and Islamic groups affiliated with it formed the Islamic Action Front (IAF). The government, wary of Islamist opposition to peace with Israel, sought to strengthen its hand against the IAF. In preparation for the 1993 elections, the Cabinet changed a rule that allowed voters to cast ballots for all the seats in a multiseat district, so that the new principle became “one-person, one vote.” This forced voters in such districts to choose between voting on a clan basis or an ideological one, thereby undermining support for IAF candidates. In addition, the existing electoral districts over-represented the southern regions of the country, which consisted predominantly of indigenous Jordanians, and tended to vote on a clan basis. The IAF threatened to boycott the elections but later relented. Voting on November 8, 1993 was fair and free; the government did not interfere in the elections, although it did manipulate voting rules to its advantage. The number of Islamic deputies in the new Parliament declined from 32 to 22, 16 of them members of the IAF.

Only 41 percent of all eligible voters and 54 percent of those registered to vote participated in the 1989 election, and 45 percent of eligible and 56 percent of registered voters participated in the 1993 elections. Nevertheless, Robinson remarks that “Jordan’s political-liberalization program, initiated in 1989, represents the longest sustained such opening in the Arab world today.”^[57]

A very interesting point that Robinson makes is that the success of the IAF is linked to Palestinian politics. The IAF performed best in districts with a heavily Palestinian population. Islamic deputies also opposed the Madrid-Oslo peace process, which gave voice to Palestinian opposition to the process. But because of East Bank sensitivities about the disproportionate number of Palestinians among the business elite, East Bankers felt this should continue to be counterbalanced by overrepresentation of Palestinians in the bureaucracy and governmental institutions. Indigenous Jordanians also felt misgivings concerning the possibility that Palestinians may want to retain political rights in Jordan as well as enjoy rights in a Palestinian state that may emerge from the Oslo process, in which case Palestinians would be doubly enfranchised, so to speak.

Palestinians running as independents or as members of a leftist party aroused controversy, except in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. “the Muslim Brotherhood is the only party in Jordan that effectively integrates Palestinian interests without the political baggage of Palestinian ethnicity. No other organization that overtly espouses a Palestinian nationalist agenda and that is seen to be a legitimate political player in Jordanian affairs by East Bankers exists (or has existed) in Jordan.”^[58]

Satloff argues that there was a struggle between the traditionalists and “Young Turks” within the Brotherhood. The radicals have “urged the leadership to consolidate the ‘Palestinization of the

Brotherhood and have goaded the leadership into heightening the role that jihad against Israel has in the pantheon of Brotherhood political priorities.”^[59] The radicals seem to have gained the upper hand, and have been bent on challenging the regime. The government has responded by encouraging the formation of a coalition of secular and leftist groups. “Most significantly, this has included the return of the Fatah wing of the PLO to domestic politics—with the regime’s blessing, no less. In mid-July [1990] the Jordanian Communist Party, Nayif Hawatmeh’s Jordanian People’s Democratic Party, George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Fatah joined together to form the “Jordanian Arab National Democratic Coalition,” a political movement aimed at winning back the Palestinian support that had been ceded to the Islamists over the previous year.”^[60]

The Jordanian government has also resorted to some underhanded tactics in its attempt to control the Islamists, in response to some of their legitimate complaints against corruption in government and the acceptance of kickbacks by senior politicians. A prominent Islamist, Laith Shubailat, was arrested on trumped up charges on more than one occasion for causing trouble on this issue. He was tried and convicted but pardoned by the King, who was seeking reconciliation.

Relations with the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) were another sensitive issue. Hamas had been allowed to maintain spokesmen and representatives in Jordan. King Hussein even intervened with Israel when Mossad agents tried to assassinate the main Hamas representative in Jordan, Khalid Mishal, by injecting him with lethal poison on a street in Amman in September 1997. Infuriated, the King forced the Israeli government to provide the antidote and to release the invalid founder of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who had been languishing in an Israeli prison for 8 years. However, in 1999 the government cracked down on Hamas, declared it illegal, and closed its offices in Jordan. Twenty-one members of the organization were arrested, and its chief representatives in Jordan, who were abroad, were prevented from returning. Later, most of them were pardoned and deported, along with four high-ranking members of the organization.

Most recently, the government said it had uncovered a plot by a group with connections to the al-Qa’ida organization, who were attempting subversion, and put them on trial.

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Questions for Further Reading

1. What was the impact of the British mandate on Jordanian society and politics? (See Amadouny, Bocco and Tell, Kirkbride, Kingston, and Wilson, listed above.)
2. How was the transition from Abdullah to Hussein and the forced abdication of Talal brought about peacefully and constitutionally? (See Satloff for a thorough account and Kirkbride, above.)
3. To what extent did Jordan function as a constitutional monarchy? (See Brown, Khoury, Wiktorowicz, Robinson, and the two Satloff references above.)
4. How did the Palestinian presence in Jordan influence politics in the Nabulsi episode, the civil war of 1970, democratization since 1989, and in the question of peace with Israel? (See Dann, Sayigh, Robinson, Satloff and al-Khazendar, above. Al-Khazendar is the least scholarly, but covers some useful territory).
5. How do you perceive the Islamist challenge to the Jordanian regime? (See Robinson and the Satloff's "Jordan's Great Gamble.")
6. What do you think are the major challenges facing Jordanian politics in the near future?

Section VI

Foreign Affairs

Jordan's foreign policy is determined to a large extent by its size and economic resources, its geographic location and the politics and rivalries in the region, its population mix, and the pragmatic orientation of its

monarchs.

Jordan is a small country with limited economic resources. It stands in need of a powerful patron or ally and either economic aid or a relationship that allows it to collect economic rents, often in the form of budgetary support or open markets.

Jordan is surrounded by neighbors more powerful than itself: It is the Arab country with the longest border with Israel, its neighbor to the west; to the north lies Syria; to the east Iraq, to the south Saudi Arabia, and to the southwest Egypt, although there is no direct link with the last country. Jordan is therefore embroiled in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in inter-Arab rivalries; its stability has repeatedly been threatened by the forces of Arab and Palestinian nationalism. Slightly over half the population is of Palestinian origin, which leads to volatility, but this is offset by the pragmatic politics of the Hashemite dynasty that has ruled Jordan since its creation.

This pragmatism should be understood in the sense of a rational choice approach to policymaking: namely, the choice of the best policy alternative or the policy that maximizes benefits for the country and perhaps the regime. National security is the top priority, but when that is not threatened then economic security and budgetary support tend to rise to the top of the list. In other words, Jordan is a country of a type that generally conforms to traditional realist doctrine. Exceptions are few and are explainable in terms of domestic constraints. It is important to understand, nevertheless, that national security is not restricted to coping with external threats, but often involves considerations of domestic stability. Furthermore, one must also allow room for one other determinant of foreign policy: namely, the will of the sovereign, which almost invariably follows the rational course of action, but on rare and often crucial occasions, asserts itself in defiance of what a cautious policy choice would indicate, such as the decision by King Abdullah I to cooperate in the partition of Palestine, perhaps the decision by King Hussein to participate in the 1967 war, and his decision not to get involved in the Gulf War. Sometimes these decisions are ultimately imponderable because the long-term consequences of actions are unknown. It is significant, however, that when King Hussein was dying and had to make an irrevocable decision about who his successor was to be, he chose his son Abdullah, not least due to the fact that Abdullah had exhibited courage and determination, in place of his brother Hassan, who enjoyed considerable experience but tended to err on the side of caution. Personal courage and a willingness to challenge public opinion are qualities that Hussein felt were indispensable for a successful king

Relations With the Palestinians and Israel

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War

When King Abdullah's ambition to become King of Syria was thwarted (see section on History, above) his imagination was captured by Palestine. In May 1938, Abdullah had sent the Woodhead Commission of Inquiry (which was looking into the idea of partition,) a 12-point plan under which Transjordan and Palestine would become parts of a United Arab kingdom in which the Jews would enjoy autonomy and have proportional rights of representation; Jewish immigration would continue but be restricted; and the

British mandate would remain in force for another 10 years. Although this proposal was not accepted, it affords a good idea of King Abdullah's thinking. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to recommend the partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs.

It has been pointed out that there were not one but two partition plans: one being the UN plan, the other the result of an understanding between the Zionists and Abdullah, under which a Jewish state would be created and the rest of Palestine annexed by Transjordan. The Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, under Hajj Amin al-Husseini, rejected the UN partition plan, and the Arab League offered its military help.

Abdullah knew that the *Haganah* (Israeli underground military organization) was quite capable of taking over the entire territory of Palestine unless the Arab Legion intervened—he did not place much trust in the other Arab states. But the Arab Legion was too small to dominate the entire country, and it had British officers and was financed by Britain. Logically, he concluded that he could not blatantly violate Britain's wishes. The best hope for the Arabs was for the Arab Legion to occupy that part of Palestine allotted to the Arabs and to avoid attacking the area set aside for the Jews because neither Britain nor the United Nations would countenance it. On the other hand, he did not wish to hand over the Arab area to Hajj Amin al-Husseini because he believed that an Arab state under the Mufti (Islamic state officials) would mean economic strangulation for Jordan and its annexation by Syria or Iraq or Saudi Arabia.^[61] By contrast, Egypt wanted to prevent a union between Transjordan and the Arab portion of Palestine at all costs, and backed a government by the Mufti for that reason.

Abdullah had met or conferred with representatives of the Jewish Agency either directly and through intermediaries, including Golda Meir, the acting head of the political department in Moshe Sharett's absence, after the UN vote in 1947, whom he met again on May 10, 1948. He proposed an autonomous Jewish state as part of a kingdom over which he would rule. There was no written agreement and he never committed himself to an independent Jewish state, but his interlocutors felt that his acceptance of such a state, though unspoken, was unambiguous,^[62] although doubts were to arise subsequently. There was no understanding concerning Jerusalem, which was to have been internationalized according to the UN plan.

Tewfiq Pasha Abul Huda, who had served as Abdullah's Prime Minister for much of the interwar period, was dispatched, along with Glubb Pasha, the head of the Arab Legion, to meet with British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin in London. The meeting took place on February 7, 1947 in secret without the knowledge of other members of the Jordanian delegation or the Cabinet. Abul Huda secured Bevin's approval for the entry of the Arab Legion into the area allocated for the Arabs under the Partition Plan. According to the record of the meeting, Bevin asked for clarification from Tewfiq Pasha that the Arab Legion would not enter the Jewish area. Glubb reported in his memoirs that Bevin commented concerning the entry of the Arab Legion under the stated circumstances: "It seems the obvious thing to do." Bevin cautioned Glubb that if the Jewish area were attacked, Britain would come under pressure to reconsider its subsidy to the Arab Legion and to reconsider the position of British officers seconded to the Legion.^[63] The meeting represented a major turning point in British policy towards Palestine; from then on, Britain, which had declined to enforce the UN partition plan, cooperated closely with King Abdullah to engineer the expansion of his kingdom to most of the Arab area.

For David Ben Gurion (Prime Minister from 1948–53), King Abdullah's offer was not satisfactory, but it had the advantage of averting a war between the Haganah and the Arab Legion. Abdullah came under a lot of pressure from the Arab League to engage in and even lead an all out-war against the Jewish forces. He resisted demands to allow Arab forces to enter Palestine through Transjordan.

But the Arab Legion entered the zone allocated to the Arabs. Glubb followed an essentially defensive strategy in view of the small size of the forces under his command, but he was more aggressive in the case of Jerusalem, where he competed with Jewish forces for control of the old city and won. Other Arab armies, except for the Iraqis, suffered humiliating defeats. Abdullah was singled out by Arab League members, notably Egypt, as well as many Palestinians, for criticism for the loss of certain areas such as Lydda (Lod) and Ramlah, and he was accused of collaboration. Egypt tried to expel Transjordan from the Arab League and managed to pressure Abdullah into not signing a peace accord with Israel, although all combatants signed an armistice. Abdullah complained that he had only joined the Arab League to please Sir Alec Kirkbride, the British representative, and found himself having to cope with a series of ridiculous decisions by irresponsible politicians.^[64]

The outcome of the intervention by the Arab Legion was that it was left in control of what came to be known as the West Bank of the Jordan. Abdullah wanted to annex the West Bank, but he sought an arrangement that would earn the consent of the Palestinian population and enjoy a significant measure of legitimacy. In September an all-Palestine government under the leadership of Hajj Amin and Ahmad Hilmi Pasha had been established in Gaza with Egyptian backing. It claimed to be the sole legitimate Arab government for Palestine. In October 5,000 delegates of Palestinian refugees met in Amman and asked for Abdullah's protection. In December Palestinian notables and political leaders from the West Bank convened the Congress of Jericho, which called for immediate union with Transjordan.

The Parliament in Amman approved this plan, and the West Bank was annexed. In March 1949 the military administration of the West Bank was terminated, and the area came under direct civil administrative control from Amman. On April 26, 1949 the country's official name became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the following May the King formed a Cabinet that included Palestinians. The Transjordanian Parliament was dissolved, and elections were set for April 1950 to elect a new Lower House of Parliament that would include 20 East Bank members and 20 members from the West Bank.

The elections were held on schedule, and King Abdullah appointed a new 20-seat upper house that included seven Palestinians. On April 24, both houses voted to unite the East and West Banks "without prejudicing the final settlement of Palestine's just cause." All residents of the West Bank and all Palestinian refugees in Jordan were given Jordanian citizenship.

King Abdullah was assassinated as he entered the Omari Mosque in the Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem for Friday prayers on July 20, 1951 with his grandson Hussein by his side. He had been branded a traitor and collaborator. The assassin belonged to the Hajj Amin al-Husseini organization, Sanctified

Struggle, but the Jordanian Cabinet was convinced that Egypt was involved in planning the assassination. Abdullah was succeeded briefly by his son, Talal, and then by his grandson Hussein. The conflict and competition between the Hashemites and Palestinian nationalists became a constant theme in Arab politics until the end of the century.

The June 1967 War and Its Aftermath

The legacy of the quarrel between the Hashemites on the one side and Palestinian nationalists and Arab radicals on the other was to lead to the unmitigated catastrophe for the Arabs in the form of the June 5, 1967 war. The rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964 (which was essentially controlled by Egyptian President Abdel Nasser), under the leadership of Ahmad Shuqairi, opened up a vituperative verbal war over the airwaves, pitting Cairo and Damascus against Amman. The Arab Cold War was in full swing. Meanwhile, Fateh had begun commando raids against Israel, largely from Syrian territory but also from Jordan. Abdel Nasser concluded a mutual defense pact with Syria in 1966 in the hope of restraining the Ba'thist regime in Damascus.

Israel carried out a particularly cruel raid against the village of Samu' in Jordan in retaliation for Fateh's actions. The Palestinians and Arab radicals lambasted Hussein for not defending his Palestinian citizens against Israel, casting doubts on his nationalism. Jordan capitalized on the opportunity to taunt Egypt for not coming to its aid; in particular, Amman implied that Abdel Nasser was hiding behind the skirts of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai and Gaza. On April 7 Israel shot down six Syrian MIGs over Mount Hermon. The Arabs became convinced that Israel meant to attack Syria. Hussein came under very harsh verbal attacks, and Egypt and Syria charged that the Hashemites were going to be responsible for another disaster by not forming a common front with the other Arab countries neighboring Israel.

The Voice of the Arabs in Cairo started taunting Jordanian soldiers, casting aspersions and questioning their honor. Shuqairi was in full cry. Hussein became convinced that if Jordan did not join its Arab brethren in their hour of need, the army might mutiny and go to war anyway; if not, he would be left holding the blame for another Arab defeat because Jordan remained on the sidelines. The Hashemite regime would not survive that. On May 30 he flew to Cairo and signed a bilateral defense pact with Egypt. An Egyptian general, Abdel Mun'im Riyad, was made commander of the Jordanian front. On June 5 war broke out, and the West Bank was lost.

Was King Hussein short sighted? He himself later said he was convinced the Arabs could not win. He no doubt hoped war would not break out; Abdel Nasser had decided not to instigate hostilities. Hussein may have thought that once hostilities broke out, Israel would find a pretext to occupy the West Bank regardless of what he did. Had Israel not fired the first shot, after all? Was he not bound to Egypt by a defense pact? On top of that, his honor was at stake. Ultimately, one has to agree that domestic political vulnerabilities were the driving force behind the King's decision.^[65] As it was, he lost half his kingdom, but kept the other half.

Following the very humiliating Arab defeat, the PLO, Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other *fida`iyeen* lamented the failure of regular Arab armies and decided that they had to pick up the torch. An entirely new approach, guerrilla warfare, was required, given the apparent invincibility of the Israeli army. Palestinian organizations began a series of raids into the West Bank with the intention of eventually establishing a presence in the Israeli-occupied territories. This was overly optimistic and they found themselves hard put defending themselves in their sanctuaries as Israel adopted a policy of punitive retaliation that was very costly to the host countries. On March 21, 1968 Israel decided to adopt a radical solution and wipe out a major base for Palestinian guerrilla activity in the town of Karameh in Jordan.

In what Israel dubbed “Operation Inferno,” 15,000 troops, supported by artillery, armor, and aircraft, crossed the Jordan River with the objective of eliminating the Karameh guerrilla base and its occupants. Since Israeli troops movements could not be kept secret, the guerrillas had advance warning. There were an estimated 300 to 400 *fida`iyeen* in the base, and to their credit, they chose to stand and fight, except for the PFLP, which withdrew its men in the face of the hopeless odds. Apart from the small force made up primarily of Fateh guerrillas, Israel faced the entire Jordanian First Infantry Division reinforced with armor, notably tanks, from the 60th armored brigade. The battle was joined, and the intervention of the Jordanian armed forces prevented Israel from achieving its objective. Israel actually appealed for a cease-fire in order to withdraw its forces, and Jordan refused, so they had to be withdrawn under fire.

The *fida`iyeen*, under the personal leadership of Yasser Arafat, fought bravely, but it was the intervention of the Jordanian army that prevented a total rout. Nevertheless, Fateh seized credit, and as relations with the Jordanian regime deteriorated, the Palestinian organizations assumed sole credit for the victory, which entered the annals of Palestinian political mythology.^[66] The small force of guerrillas became heroes who set the standard of sacrifice (*fida*) for Palestinian nationalism. Their glory shed its glow on other guerrillas. Even the name of the base, Karameh (dignity), lent itself to the formation of myth.

There was a conscious attempt to mobilize the Palestinian masses and to give a new identity to the Palestinians in exile, notably those living in wretched refugee camps: Henceforth they could think of themselves not as hapless refugees but as freedom fighters. They would grasp their destiny in their own hands and move out from under the tutelage of Arab regimes. However, for the PFLP and particularly the PDFLP, the task could not be achieved without a transformation of the “reactionary” Arab regimes into “revolutionary” governments that would dedicate their resources to the battle for liberation. The guerrillas vastly exaggerated their achievements, engaging in actual fabrication at times to sustain their public image in the Arab world, particularly among Palestinians. The reality was that Israeli retaliation was exacting a huge toll; 100,000 farmers and villagers were driven out of the Jordan valley, and Israeli strikes had reached the outskirts of the important Jordanian towns of Irbid and Salt.

Showdown With the PLO in 1970

The next major challenge to the authority of the crown came in the wake of the 1967 war and built up to a major confrontation between the government and the PLO in 1970. Jordan and Egypt had declared their

acceptance of Security Council resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 (which established provisions and principles that would lead to a solution of the conflict); Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and the PLO rejected it. An alliance of convenience was formed between Abdel Nasser and Hussein, both of whom were eager to regain territory lost in the war. A split arose within the Arab world as to the path to be pursued to undo the damage inflicted in 1967.

Traditional warfare had failed to resolve the deeply rooted conflict with Israel; the choice now was between diplomacy and a people's war of liberation (inspired by the successful Algerian struggle with France; those who supported this approach thought that the model would be exported to Palestine). Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya (until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969) were concerned with the possibility that Egypt might drift closer into the arms of the Soviet Union and Jordan and farther away from the West.

At the Khartoum Arab summit in August 1967 (6 months before the Karamah battle), King Hussein and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia were reconciled with President Abdel Nasser, and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya agreed to pay an annual subsidy of \$392 million to Jordan and Egypt, two-thirds of which was to go to the latter. In the December 1969 Rabat Arab summit, Abdel Nasser let it be known that Egypt would chart its own path toward the restoration of lost territory, given the unreadiness of other Arabs to fight Israel.

Palestinian guerrilla organizations established their own institutions and commanded their own militias in Jordan. They created a dual structure of authority in the country. The leftist organizations within the movement, the PFLP and the PDFLP sought out ways to challenge the authority of the Jordanian government. Hawatmeh, the leader of the PDFLP, advocated that Amman should come to play a role comparable to that of Hanoi in the Vietnam war. An incident between the commandos and the army in November 1968 was resolved on the basis of an agreement granting the *fida'iyeen* a measure of autonomy. Clashes between the *fida'iyeen* and the army became frequent and threatened to get out of hand in June 1970, but Hussein and Arafat concluded a cease-fire, which the PFLP sought to undermine. Fateh did not want to intervene in the affairs of host Arab countries, but was dragged into the quarrel.

An inter-Arab conciliation committee, headed by President Ja'far al-Numairi of Sudan, was established. On July 23, 1970, Egypt accepted the Rogers Plan, which was based on Security Council Resolution 242. Jordan and Israel followed suit. These events sounded alarm bells for the Palestinian guerrillas, and Arafat complained of a sell-out. Abdel Nasser closed down the outspoken Voice of Palestine Radio, which had been operating out of Cairo. On September 6, the PFLP carried out several hijackings, making use of a desert airfield in Jordan. Arab states voted for a Security Council resolution condemning the actions, and the PFLP was expelled from the Unified Command of the Palestinian Revolution. The group's leader, George Habash, went on an extended trip to North Korea.

Rightist groups in Jordan called for a showdown with the guerrillas. Abdel Nasser had advised Hussein against a confrontation with the Palestinian groups until after an understanding was reached with Israel on the implementation of resolution 242. The King tried to bring former Prime Minister Sulaiman Nabulsi out of retirement, but the latter refused on the grounds that he too opposed the Rogers initiative. By

September 11, 1970, even Fateh was ready for a confrontation, and called for a revolutionary nationalist government in Jordan (as explained in the section above under Politics); nevertheless, the Unified Command of the Palestinian Revolution signed a new agreement with the government on September 15 regulating the activities of the guerrillas. This was merely a bid by each to win public opinion over to its side; the Palestinians were preparing for a general strike that would be an invitation for King Hussein to step aside, a naïve expectation by the guerrillas, as they had clearly severely underestimated how far they had alienated indigenous Jordanians. A military government was formed on the 16th, and the Jordanian army began its offensive on September 17.

Iraqi had stationed forces in Jordan and had pledged to come to the aid of the PLO in the event of a showdown. However, when the Jordanian army moved against the *fida'iyeen*, Iraq simply moved its troops out of the way. Baghdad had received a message from the United States to keep out of the civil war in Jordan, according to President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr in a subsequent conversation with Fateh's Salah Khalaf.^[67] In fact, President Nixon was quoted by the *Sun-Times* of Chicago on the evening of September 17 to the effect that the United States "was prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian war should Syria and Iraq enter the conflict and tip the military balance against Government forces loyal to Hussein."^[68] Syria, on the other hand, did intervene, sending two armored brigades and a mechanized infantry brigade under the command of its Ninth Infantry Division into northern Jordan on September 19 and 20 and engaged in fierce combat with the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade. Syria also sent in battalions belonging to the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA, normally stationed in Syria), which reached Irbid by the 21st, but Syria claimed that only PLA units were involved.

King Hussein appealed to the United States for help. On the 20th, Secretary of State Rogers called on Syria to halt its "invasion" of Jordan." Still, it would be difficult to get U.S. troops into Jordan on time. Kissinger conferred with Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel's ambassador to Washington, and plans were laid for Israel to come to the King's aid. Israel threatened to use the Israeli air force against Syria. King Hussein was loath to be rescued by Israel and strongly preferred U.S. help. Eventually, the King decided to rely on his own resources and used his tiny air force against the Syrian armor. On September 20 and 21, 120 Syrian tanks were destroyed and Syria suffered 600 casualties. Hafez al-Assad, who was commander of the Syrian air force, decided not to commit his aircraft to the battle (and soon afterwards seized power in Damascus.) The Syrian threat had been dealt with successfully.

Abdel Nasser had cautioned the King against miscalculating, but the silence from Abdel Nasser had become deafening. Now he acted by sending PLA battalions stationed in Egypt to Syria in a largely symbolic gesture. Jordan accepted a cease-fire on September 25, but this was not immediately implemented. Abdel Nasser pressured Jordan to accept an Arab peacekeeping mission headed by President Numeiri of the Sudan. Kuwait and Libya suspended payment of aid to Jordan pledged at the Khartoum conference. Libya severed diplomatic relations with the kingdom. Numeiri flew to Amman but was not particularly successful in his mission, and, on returning to Cairo, accused the Jordanian government of waging "a war of extermination against the Palestinian people."^[69] On September 25, President Abdel Nasser publicly complained of "the existence of a deliberate desire on the part of the Jordanian authorities not to respect the cease-fire . . . the total non-respect of all the promises made to us; the putting into effect of a plan aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance, despite all the

declarations to the contrary; the frightful carnage now under way in Jordan, in disrespect of all Arab and human principles.”^[70] The King signed an agreement with Arafat in Cairo on September 27 at a mini-Arab summit arranged by Abdel Nasser. The Egyptian leader died the next day of a heart attack. .

Biding its time, the Jordanian army engaged in what has been termed a creeping offensive, and by July 1971 the last strongholds of the guerrillas had fallen. Meanwhile, the political landscape had changed. Abdel Nasser had been replaced by Anwar Sadat, and the adventuresome Salah Jadid and Nuriddin al-Atassi were replaced by the stable and cautious Assad in Syria. Relations between Jordan and Israel improved. “Jordan came to be treated as a regional partner of the United States . . . Aid and arms to these U.S. partners would serve as a substitute for a costly American military presence in the region or unpopular military intervention.”^[71]

Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Libya severed relations and Syria and Iraq instituted a land and air blockade on Jordan. On March 15, King Hussein announced a plan to create a United Arab kingdom to include both the East and West Banks of the Jordan. In an interview with the Egyptian magazine *Rose al-Yusif* on August 16, 1971, Arafat expressed the opinion that King Hussein had launched the crackdown on the PLO in order to have a clear field for himself to negotiate peace terms with Israel.^[72] Early in the following year, rumors of talks between King Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir gave rise to fears that Israel and Jordan may settle on the 1968 Allon Plan. The DFLP, renamed the PDPFLP (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and other groups launched a sabotage campaign against Jordan from Syrian territory. In March, the Fateh Revolutionary Council established a Jordan Affairs Bureau under Salah Khalaf to organize an armed insurrection against the King; however, Jordanian intelligence was largely successful in mounting counteroperations, and by June this phase of conflict was over.

Wasfi al-Tal, the chief Jordanian hardliner who was serving as Prime Minister and apparently conspiring against the King,^[73] was assassinated during a trip to Cairo in November 1971 by Black September, a secret organization that actually belonged to Fateh. In December, Black September tried to assassinate Jordan’s ambassador to London, Zaid Rifa’i. In January 1973 the Palestine National Congress abandoned its call for the overthrow of King Hussein. However, the following month Jordanian authorities captured a 17-man Black September team that had infiltrated into the country with orders to take the U.S. ambassador and Jordanian Prime Minister hostage or to attack the royal palace and the Parliament building. In March Black September tried to secure their release through an operation in Khartoum, involving an attack on the Saudi Embassy, which culminated in the deaths of two U.S. ambassadors and a Belgian diplomat.^[74]

The PLO, which moved its base of operations to Lebanon, engaged in some heavy self-criticism for its failure in Jordan, notably its lack of effort at building solidarity with the East Bankers. Paradoxically, the PFLP and DFLP refused to shoulder any responsibility. In 1974, an Arab summit in Morocco recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Pursuit of Peace: Enlisting the Partnership of the PLO

The 1978 Camp David accord between Sadat and Begin alienated the rest of the Arab world, even the soft-liners blamed Egypt for acting without consulting its Arab friends, and there was a universal protest in the Arab world that without Egypt's weight on the Arab side of the scales, the imbalance of power with Israel had become insuperable. Jordan did not condemn the accord, but tried to distance itself from it while adopting a conciliatory position towards Cairo, maintaining trade relations with it (although it had followed the Arab consensus in formally breaking ties), and working slowly to form a basis for reintegrating Egypt into the Arab fold. Jordan had been promised \$1.25 billion in aid annually to help it stand fast against the temptation to follow in Egypt's footsteps. The PLO, in particular, regarded the accords as a disaster.

Israel's massive invasion of Lebanon in 1982 created problems for U.S. diplomacy. The resulting September 1982 Reagan Initiative opposed indefinite control of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel, but it also opposed the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Secretary of State George Shultz, who had replaced Alexander Haig, put together a plan involving Israeli territorial concessions (land for peace) and some form of self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan. Washington started courting Hussein to play the role of Israel's principal interlocutor. In December the King met with President Reagan and Shultz in Washington. Washington promised arms and the use of its leverage with Israel to freeze settlement activity. Hussein declared the initiative "the most courageous stand taken by an American administration ever since 1956."^[75] He tried to drum up Arab support for the plan. However, the Arab reaction was the so-called Fez Plan, which, while indicating flexibility, followed the more traditional Arab line, based on a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Only Egypt and Jordan supported the Reagan Initiative, and Syria was vehemently opposed to Jordanian-PLO participation in peace talks, and openly challenged Arafat's leadership and sharply criticized Hussein.

King Hussein felt he was still constrained by the 1974 Rabat summit recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; he knew he would be exposed if he acted without the PLO. It was encouraging that Arafat was more willing now to cooperate with the U.S., since the organization had lost its base in Lebanon. Israel would not deal with the PLO, nor would the U.S. in view of promises made to Israel by Kissinger.

The PLO was invited to reopen a number of offices in Jordan, but no armed PLO presence was tolerated. The King made it clear he was not trying to displace the PLO leaders, and he proposed the formation of a joint delegation to any future peace talks and recommended a federation of the West Bank with Jordan as a feasible final settlement. Arafat understood that Hussein was an indispensable go-between with Washington, but the organization was split, with hardliners feeling definitely hostile to the King's diplomatic initiative. After all, the Black September organization (operating within the PLO) had only recently been assassinating Jordanian officials in revenge for 1970. Furthermore, there was rivalry between the PLO and Jordan in the West Bank, and each had been carefully cultivating its own base of support. Jordan cultivated its own clients and sympathizers among West Bank mayors. The Baghdad summit had set up a joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee to dispense \$150 million in aid to the West Bank and Gaza, which strengthened Jordan's position. In general, however, neither the King nor the leaders of the other organizations within the PLO commanded the loyalty of Palestinians in the occupied

territories as Arafat did. The leader of Fateh was ahead by a very wide margin when it came to public support.. On the other hand, some of the East Bank political elite did not cherish the prospect of the reintegration of the West Bank, and the King was advocating a federal union. Talks with the PLO dragged on for months, but the King broke them off in April 1983 as he despaired of forming a joint negotiating position.

Jordan restored full diplomatic relations with Egypt in September 1984. Amman found Egypt to be necessary to counterbalance Syria. As the Iran-Iraq war was bleeding Iraq dry, Jordan needed a strong ally against the anti-peace talks camp. Jordan hoped to form an alliance of “moderate” states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Iraq. Meanwhile, the King worked to resume the dialogue with the PLO. In November 1984 Amman hosted a meeting of the Palestine National Congress, and the King urged acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242. In February 1985, the King and Arafat signed an agreement for a joint diplomatic initiative, which envisaged the formation of a joint delegation to peace talks to be based on the exchange of territory for peace. The agreement also included acceptance for confederation with Jordan. An Arab summit in Morocco in August failed to endorse the agreement, partly due to vehement opposition from Syria. In August 1985 the Reagan administration refused to meet with Palestinian members of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Furthermore, Jordan was aiming for an international peace conference, and the U.S. was opposed because it did not want to admit the Soviet Union into the game. Israel’s Labor and Likud parties both opposed the Hussein-Arafat accord. Nothing came of the agreement, and in February 1986 the King called off his dialogue with the PLO. The organization abrogated the agreement in April 1987. By that time, Washington had come to appreciate the King’s need for an international conference.

By the end of 1985, Shimon Peres, who had become Israel’s Prime Minister, began to make positive remarks about an international peace conference. This was encouraging to Hussein. The King’s calculations were that he needed either PLO or Syrian backing for a peace conference. In the mid-eighties, King Hussein had tried to improve relations with Syria because of a felt need for Arab support to initiate peace talks with Israel. In April 1985 he appointed Zeid Rifa’i, who had become identified as the architect of good relations with Syria, Prime Minister. In a letter to Rifa’i, which was published by the press on November 10, the King admitted Jordanian support for the violence perpetrated by the Muslim Brotherhood against the Syrian regime.^[76] Jordan tried to mediate between Damascus and Baghdad.

The King also held secret contacts with Israeli leaders, which intensified in 1986. In April 1986 he met with Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Austria. In April 1987, the King held secret talks in London with Peres, who was Foreign Minister in the coalition Cabinet under Prime Minister Shamir. On April 11 agreement was reached concerning the rules governing an international conference, including provisions for three committees: a Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli committee; a Syrian-Israeli committee; and a Lebanese-Israeli committee.^[77] The conference would be opened by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and attended by all regional actors who had accepted resolution 242. This was to facilitate the beginning of the negotiations and to lend legitimacy to them. The plenary sessions, however, could not veto the results of bilateral negotiations.

The King also sent an emissary to Secretary of State Shultz to inform him that Syria was prepared to

attend an international peace conference. However, Shamir rejected the agreement Peres had concluded. Later Shamir met with Hussein, and he informed Shultz that the meeting had allegedly gone well. Shultz consulted extensively with the Israelis and presented the outcome to the King, who rejected them, partly because he was about to host an Arab summit. The November 1987 Arab summit in Amman provided an opportunity to achieve reconciliation at the level of heads of state. However, the focus of the summit was the Iran-Iraq war land, not the Palestinian issue. Progress towards peace had to await the convening of the Geneva conference following the Gulf War. Shamir had torpedoed the Hussein-Peres accord, although it contained the germ of ideas that flowered later in the Madrid conference.

Much later, with the Oslo agreement in tatters following a year of Palestinian *intifada*, Shimon Peres was to appear before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on December 17, 2001. In the midst of recriminations, MK Moshe Arens, a Likud stalwart, took Peres to task because the latter had “brought Arafat and his cronies from Tunisia and imposed them on the local population. You [Peres] have to admit your mistake. All of Oslo was one big mistake.” To which Peres replied: “You and Shamir did the worst thing, canceling the London agreement with Hussein in 1987. We could have had an agreement with Hussein, but you in your zealotry and blindness did not allow it.”^[78]

Jordan-Israel Peace Agreement

Jordan had pursued peace talks with Israel for many years. Peace with Israel was thought to serve the strategic interests of the country, and King Hussein, who had long lamented the loss of the West Bank in 1967, had entertained ideas of undoing that catastrophe through negotiations. Although that ended when Jordan relinquished responsibility for the West Bank in 1988, King Hussein continued to feel compelled to do what he could to secure the return of the holy city of Jerusalem and the territory of the West Bank to Arab hands. When the Madrid Conference convened on October 30, 1991, a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation was in attendance alongside the Syrian, Lebanese, and Israeli delegations. In Israel, the Labor Party led by Yitzhak Rabin won a stunning victory at the polls on June 23, 1992. Shamir, who opposed territorial concessions, was gone.

Progress was rather swift and not too difficult on the Jordanian-Israeli bilateral track at the negotiations, although there was stalemate with the Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese. Meanwhile, the PLO was conducting separate negotiations between January and August 1993 at Oslo, which led to the exchange of letters between Rabin and Arafat, the Declaration of Principles, and the Cairo agreement and Oslo II.

These developments presented both an opportunity and a challenge to Jordan. It was a challenge because Jordan had been left out in the cold; it was no longer needed as an intermediary, since the Palestinians and Israelis were dealing directly with each other. An important advantage had been lost, and possibly, along with it, Israel’s “Jordan Option.”^[79] The opportunity was that Jordan was now free to proceed with a peace deal of its own, which it could not have done before. The PLO’s actions, unlike Sadat’s, legitimized Jordan’s conclusion of a separate peace agreement, even if the Oslo process did not yet fully work its course—recognition of Israel by the PLO was sufficient.

Jordan's actions can be seen as the rational pursuit of national interests, or the attempt to maximize advantage. The opportunity had presented itself, dramatically lowering the cost of an agreement. Economically, Jordan was strapped. The outcome of the Gulf war was disastrous for Jordan, and on top of that, the deficit in the government budget in 1991 was JD95 million, and the national debt had climbed to over \$8 billion. Riots broke out in the south in April 1989 in response to the IMF-inspired austerity measures. The liberalization measures and the return to constitutional government through the process of "defensive democratization" (as explained above in the section on Politics), kept the political coalition that backed the government in place and allowed the King to legitimate the peace treaty, sweetened by the promise of economic benefits to follow peace and the normalization of relations. Palestinian and Islamic opposition was contained.

Hussein and Rabin had met in London on May 19, 1994. On June 7, Jordanian and Israeli delegates signed three detailed "common-sub-agendas" in Washington. On July 6, King Hussein flew to Cairo to solicit President Mubarak's support. On July 18-19, Jordanian and Israeli negotiators met on the border between them and agreed on a number of economic projects. President Clinton was happy to sponsor the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel. The "Washington Declaration" was signed at the White House by the King and Rabin on July 25, 1994. King Hussein characterized this event as "the crowning achievement of all my years." Prime Minister Abdel Salam al-Majali initialed the first draft of the treaty on October 17 and he signed the peace treaty on October 26. The treaty was debated by both chambers of the National Assembly during November 5-8. Despite the displeasure of the Islamic Action Front, the leftists, and Arab nationalists, it was passed and was ratified by King Hussein on November 10, 1994.

Relations With Arab States

Reign of King Hussein

The incorporation of the West Bank and its Palestinian population into Jordan altered the nature and dynamics of domestic politics for the long run and of foreign policy for the next 14 years. Dissent from the new Parliament had caused Abdullah to dissolve the lower house in May 1951. But the new Parliament was assertive and eager for constitutional change. Some of the leading Jordanian politicians who had overseen the transition from Abdullah to Hussein, surviving Talal's brief but unstable reign, also appreciated the value of constitutional government. The constitution of 1952 marked the end of the patrimonial monarchy in the style of Abdullah and ushered in an era of (limited) parliamentary democracy and institutional government unparalleled in the history of the kingdom. It only lasted 5 years (although formal parliamentary life did not end in 1957), but it laid down the principles of popular participation in and contestation of governmental policies, principles which were then substantially shelved for 31 years between 1957 and 1989. Young King Hussein who was declared King in August 11, 1952 but ascended to the throne in May 1953 on reaching the age of 18 (by the Islamic calendar), learned a valuable lesson concerning the need to placate popular sentiment and the cost of opposing it.

The other important development lay outside the borders of Jordan: The July 1952 Free Officers coup in Egypt, which led to the rise of the Nasserist brand of Arab nationalism, and the growing assertiveness of

the Ba' thist brand of pan-Arabism in Syria. These were forces favoring Arab unity (which implied the merger of Jordan with Syria) and independence from former colonial ties (which threatened Jordan's relationship with Britain). After the Free Officers came to power in Egypt, conflictual relations with Jordan continued as balance-of-power politics continued, but dynastic rivalries gave way to ideological conflict. Abdel Nasser assumed the mantle of leadership of the Arab world. His ultimate goals were Arab unity and independence. He also dedicated himself to championing the Palestinian cause.

Beginning of the Arab Cold War 1952–58

Baghdad Pact and Parting With Glubb

The interplay of the above-mentioned forces set the stage for three important challenges to Hussein's rule and the stability of his regime during 1956-58. The first revolved around the issue of Arab independence from the former colonial powers. This concerned a move initiated in 1954 by Turkey and Pakistan, who entered into a treaty to form the nucleus of a defensive Northern Tier alliance against the Soviet Union that would form a bridge between NATO and SEATO. A Turkish-Iraqi alliance followed on February 24, 1955, which Britain joined on April 4. Scarcely 11 days later, President Abdel Nasser of Egypt attended a conference in Bandung with India's Nehru, China's Zhou Enlai, and Yugoslavia's Tito, which witnessed the birth of the nonalignment movement. Egypt sought liberation from its entanglement with Britain, and the door to friendship with the Socialist bloc was opened with Abdel Nasser's "Czech" arms deal in September 1955. Thus, two opposed trends vied for the allegiance of Arab states of the Middle East. Egypt signed mutual defense pacts with Syria (October 20, 1955) and Saudi Arabia (October 27, 1955), forming pincers around Jordan. Saudi Arabia's actions appear to be an anomaly, but are to be understood not in terms of global politics but through the lens of local rivalry between the house of Saud and the Hashemite dynasties in Iraq and Jordan. In fact, regional politics were at least as significant as the issue of Arab independence, seeing as Middle Eastern politics often revolved around the traditional rivalry between Egypt and Iraq. Personal competition between Abdel Nasser and Iraq's Nuri as-Sa'id also complicated the equation.

On January 12, 1955, Iraq and Turkey announced that they were about to conclude a military alliance and were inviting other countries to join what was to become known as the Baghdad Pact. Britain dispatched Sir Gerald Templer, chief of the imperial general staff, to Amman; Abdel Nasser countered by sending Egypt's chief of staff Abdel Hakim 'Amer and Colonel Anwar Sadat in December. The Egyptians were more persuasive and popular with the press. Nevertheless, the King formed a new Cabinet under Hazza' al-Majali, whose policy was to negotiate Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact. On December 16 rioting broke out against the new government's policy and escalated the following day, even extending to traditional bastions of support for the King. Majali resigned and the King dissolved Parliament, but that decision was reversed on January 5. Further riots followed, spurred on by the "Voice of the Arabs" radio broadcasts from Cairo (and it was charged, financed by Saudi Arabia), and martial law was declared and the army brought in to quell the riots, which grew quite violent, and were unprecedented in Jordanian history. On January 8, 1956 Samir al-Rifa'i, who had replaced Abul Huda as Jordan's perennial Prime Minister, formed a new cabinet and declared Jordan would not be joining the Baghdad Pact. On March 1, King Hussein dismissed Glubb Pasha, which put at risk the 12 million pound Sterling British subsidy, but

was greeted with unprecedented popular enthusiasm and received the blessings of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.

This last move ended Jordan's status as a British dependency, marking its "emancipation from British tutelage."^[80] This was also the beginning of Jordan's transition, shortly thereafter, to the status of an ally of the United States. Among other things, it led to the "Arabization" of the Arab Legion, which was renamed the Jordanian army, through the replacement of its British officers.

Arab Radicals and the Turmoil of 1956–58

On 27 October 1956 Sulaiman Nabulsi was charged with forming a Cabinet. There was an irreconcilable conflict between the goals of Nabulsi and those of the King. The new Prime Minister was quoted by the *New York Times* as saying: "Jordan cannot live forever as Jordan."^[81] Nabulsi wanted to dissolve the kingdom, which he, along with the Arab nationalists, regarded as an artificial entity, within a greater Arab union, most immediately with Syria. Hussein was attached to the independence and continued separate existence of Jordan.

A major task awaiting the new government was the renegotiation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. The problem that presented itself was the need for a foreign subsidy. One view on this, advocated by Samir al-Rifa'i, was to maintain some form of link with Britain that would allow for the continuation of the 12 million pounds sterling subsidy, perhaps for the lease of military bases. Nabulsi favored replacing the sum with an Arab subsidy, as this would encourage independence from the former colonial powers, which, not incidentally, were supporting Israel, and it would foster inter-Arab cooperation.^[82] On January 19, 1957, an Arab Solidarity Agreement was signed under which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria pledged to pay Jordan an annual subsidy of 12.5 million Egyptian pounds, roughly equal to the support Jordan had been receiving from Britain. The two Houses of Parliament approved the accord.

The previous day, a State Department release stated that Jordan had made informal contacts to inquire if Washington would increase its subsidy to the kingdom from \$8 million to an annual \$30 million, which would have been equal to the promised Arab subsidy. On January 5 the Eisenhower administration, which was worried about Soviet penetration of the Middle East, had announced a plan of military and economic support for Middle Eastern states whose independence was threatened by international communism and who had appealed to Washington for help. Congress passed the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine on March 7.

The significance of what the government was attempting can be gleaned from a cabinet resolution read by Rimawi on February 26, 1957 defining Jordan's position at an upcoming conference. The resolution rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine and upheld the principle of positive neutrality. The prelude to the government's audacious statement made the claim that the government, under the authority given it by Parliament, was empowered to formulate foreign policy, implying that the Cabinet could disregard the Crown's wishes.

On March 24 Nabulsi announced that Jordan wanted to extend diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, and on April 3 he said he wanted full diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. A tug of war between the King and the Prime Minister characterized those fateful days. When the Cabinet retired the director of security and replaced him with their own man, Hussein acted, forcing Nabulsi to resign on April 10. By maintaining contacts with Cairo and Damascus, Hussein succeeded in keeping Abdel Nasser and Quwatly on the sidelines, and he even made a convert of King Saud, who was impressed by the King's anticommunist attitude.

The constitutional experiment was not yet over, and the next 3 weeks were a period of severe crisis. The King had to quash an army coup in the offing in order to save his throne (see section on politics for details.)

The King had been publicly blaming his troubles on the communists for the benefit of Washington and Saudi Arabia. According to Richard B. Parker, who served in the U.S. Embassy in Amman in the mid-fifties " . . . Hussein turned to the Americans. In a message passed through the second ranking CIA man in Amman, he said that he was prepared to impose martial law, suspend the constitution, and speak out forcefully against the Syrians and the Egyptians; he wanted to know if he could count on the United States if either Israel or the Soviet Union intervened. Dulles proposed to respond affirmatively . . ." [83] The United States also responded forcefully. Within 3 hours, the White House press secretary declared that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles regarded "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital." [84] The Sixth Fleet was already on its way to the eastern Mediterranean as a signal to the Soviets regarding both Lebanon and Jordan, and Dulles had informed Israeli ambassador Abba Eban of Washington's concerns. The next day, April 25, martial law was declared. The King had exerted his authority and finally put an end to the constitutional experiment. The U.S. had stepped into Britain's shoes, and Jordan had gained an ally in Saudi Arabia. Shortly thereafter, the dependable and astute Samir al-Rifa'i resumed the post of Prime Minister. Hussein emerged as the sole master of Jordan and stayed in that position until his death 32 years later.

Union With Iraq and Its Breakup

On February 1, 1958, the merger of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic was declared. Jordan joined with Iraq in a federal union on February 14, largely as a defensive measure. On July 14, a revolution led by General Abdel Karim Qassem overthrew the monarchy in Baghdad and wiped out the Iraqi branch of the Hashemites. The federation ceased to exist overnight. This was perceived in Washington and London as a major crisis, as the small states of Jordan and Lebanon appeared to be on the verge of being overwhelmed by pro-Moscow radical Arab nationalists and leftists. President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon, who had a local rebellion on his hands by the country's most senior Muslim leaders (whose electoral defeat he had cleverly engineered), appealed to the United States for help under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The United States responded by landing 14,000 troops in Lebanon, with the Sixth Fleet and its 70 ships standing by. British paratroopers landed in Jordan on July 17. Diplomacy was successful in defusing the crisis, and the U.S. discovered that Abdel Nasser was willing to cooperate. Washington ceased to perceive Egypt as an appendage to the U.S.S.R., and relations with Cairo actually

improved for several years.^[85]

In September 1960, Jordanian Prime Minister Hazza' al-Majali was assassinated by plotters, who then sought refuge in Syria. The Arab Cold War was back on.

Pursuit of Economic Development and Strategic Rents, 1975–90 Alliances with Syria and Iraq

From the mid-seventies to the early eighties, King Hussein concerned himself with alliance formation, improving relations with Jordan's neighbors and with economic development. As Crown Prince Hassan was fond of putting it, Jordan's policy could be summed up as "doing good things in bad times." Alliance formation was designed to secure economic cooperation; find markets for Jordan's products; or solicit economic grants from oil-producing countries. This was a period of low security threats, both internally and externally; under those circumstances the main aim of foreign policy became to secure budgetary support.

Brand argues that "foreign policy, in general, and alliance formation, in particular, may well constitute an integral part of the state-building or regime-consolidation process. In this way, national security at its most basic may, in fact, be budgetary security . . . Thus alignments and alliance decisions may be made, not to balance power or external threats as the realists and neorealists have long argued, but rather to help balance the budget . . . Thus, state or regime behavior may be described most accurately as budget stabilizing, stability promoting, or regime ensuring."^[86]

This is a valuable insight, one with which most Jordanian analysts and even government officials would have readily agreed, with the proviso that it is not generalizable; in other words, in Jordan's case, national security and economic security go hand in hand; however, in the long run it may not be possible to satisfy both, in which case national security trumps economic security, or a way is found to satisfy both at the same time. Better put, national security issues determine where to look for economic and budgetary security, as we have seen in the several crises the country has gone through. If the same source (such as the U.S.) can satisfy both needs, all the better.

It is misleading to isolate a period in which national security concerns are not dominant and argue, for the sake of originality, that budgetary security is all important, as Brand does: "The Arab-Israeli conflict and the kingdom's large Palestinian community have certainly played a major role in shaping Jordan's history. But . . . other, more basic, factors have played a driving or *determining* role in the King's foreign policy decisions: without access to sufficient budgetary resources, *all else becomes a secondary consideration.*"^[87] This line of argument, while original, is misleading and in fact fallacious in the long run. Imagine King Hussein adopting this approach during the clash with the PLO in 1970 or the conflict with radical nationalists in the late 1950s. In both cases King Hussein chose courses of action dictated by national security (of the domestic variety, emphasizing regime survival) irrespective of whether they alienated (Arab) budgetary supporters.

It so happens that in both cases the King managed to locate a more satisfactory source of budgetary support (the United States) that was consistent with national security. There are no examples of Jordan preferring budgetary security to national security. On the other hand, during the Gulf War, Jordan prioritized national security (domestic stability) over budgetary security (aid from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United States). Whereas one cannot pay the army or purchase the loyalty of Bedouin tribes with empty coffers, the state can borrow money to get through hard times, which could last for a few years (as in 1989-94), but the Jordanian state could disappear overnight if the regime neglects security considerations. The art of statecraft in Jordan is how to balance the dictates of security and economics, while prioritizing the first.

This is not to belittle the relevance of Brand's thesis for the time period in question, which suggests that one should not try to interpret Jordan's alliances in terms of local balance of power politics, but rather in terms of the need for lucrative economic exchange and budgetary support. Regional balancing in the interest of national security, although attempted on occasion (as in the 1958 federation with Iraq), was not particularly fruitful during the Cold War, as the superpowers could trump any combination of regional partners, and besides, tended to intervene to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between their clients. Furthermore, Israel's military power is such that inter-Arab alliances are not particularly effective if Israel enters the game, since that becomes the decisive factor from the military perspective. The optimal solution for Jordan was to maintain good relations with the United States, as that tended to diminish the Israeli threat, as we saw in 1970, for example. It also tended to encourage the cultivation of peaceful relations with Israel.

That is not to say Jordan was not free to seek regional alliances for economic or budgetary reasons; it certainly did that. Good examples are to be found in the rapprochement with Syria (1974-77) and with Iraq (1979-). But apart from budgetary considerations and national security, regional alliances were very useful to muster support for Jordan's political initiatives and provided important sources of legitimacy and political support, specially when Jordan faced formidable opposition from other Arab states or the PLO. This was part of the art of statecraft that Hussein had learnt from his mentor, King Abdullah. Whether Syria opposed, supported, or remained neutral to peace initiatives that Jordan considered vital sometimes made the difference between the failure and success of the King's enterprises, as did Abdel Nasser's public criticism or his silence during crucial periods during the Nabulsi episode and the showdown with the PLO in 1970, as mentioned previously. But this is political rather than military balancing.

But to return to the topic of economic advantage, diplomatic relations with Syria, broken over the showdown with the PLO in 1970, were resumed on October 4, 1973. Jordanian Prime Minister Zeid Rifa'i initiated contacts with President Assad in March 1975. Some joint cooperation committees were established, and a follow-up visit by King Hussein in April led to a more substantive accord on trade. Assad flew to Amman in August and a Higher Joint Committee headed by the Prime Ministers of the two countries was created. This helped convince Saudi Arabia to convene a meeting of donors in the Gulf to resolve the issue of unpaid aid pledges to Jordan at the 1974 Rabat summit. Jordanian and Syrian officials were meeting regularly, and by the beginning of 1977 there were press reports that a federation between the two countries was contemplated. This never came to pass, possibly due to Saudi opposition.

Nevertheless, the benefits of improved relations with Syria consisted of more sustained Gulf aid and economic exchange with Syria.

An example of Jordanian-Syrian joint ventures was an industrial holding company to fund joint manufacturing projects, which was to have a capital of \$60 million, to be augmented by loans worth \$120-\$180 from abroad.^[88] A free-zone company was established, and cooperation was advancing in many fields, including the coordination of academic curricula.

However, relations between Syria and Jordan cooled while those between Jordan and Iraq improved. Iraq was capable of offering Jordan significantly greater economic advantage, grants, cheap oil, and markets for Jordanian goods. The Syrian regime began experiencing problems with Muslim fundamentalists, and relations between Damascus and Baghdad deteriorated sharply. Damascus first accused Amman of not doing enough to prevent saboteurs from entering Syria from Jordan, and by May 1980 Damascus was accusing Amman of supporting groups responsible for anti-regime violence in Syria. When Jordan found it could not maintain good relations with both, it chose Iraq because that relationship was more lucrative.^[89]

Iraq was instrumental in securing other Arab aid for Jordan. The November 1978 Baghdad summit set up \$9 billion in aid for Egypt (\$5 billion), Syria (\$1.8 billion), Jordan (\$1.2 billion), the PLO (\$150 million), and the West Bank economy (\$150 million). Saudi Arabia pledged to pay \$1 billion a year. Saddam Hussein promised to make up for any shortfall in payments to Jordan, and itself pledged \$520 million for 10 years.

As war with Iran became more likely, Iraq wanted to establish a secure source of supplies through Aqaba on the Red Sea. In 1979, Iraq paid JD15 million for a road linking Aqaba with Azraq, a link on the road to Baghdad; ID3 million for the development of Aqaba Port; and another ID4 million for expanding the free zone there. Baghdad put up \$25 million to establish a joint land transport company. As the war progressed, Iraqi dependence on Aqaba increased. Jordanian firms were granted multimillion construction contracts in Iraq, and Baghdad informed the Jordanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry that it would buy virtually anything Jordan could export to it.^[90]

At the beginning, Jordan received a substantial aid from Baghdad. But, as the war depleted Iraq's resources, the benefits declined. After the Gulf war, the Jordanian government found itself subsidizing Jordanian exports and services to Iraq. The main advantage that Baghdad continued to offer was to supply most of Jordan's petroleum needs at well below market prices. Despite the economic boycott of Iraq, the Security Council made special provisions allowing this trade to continue.

Eclipse of Jordan's Pan-Arab Role in 1988

During the mid- to late eighties, Jordan's foreign policy had several goals: to enlist Palestinian support for a peace agreement, to shore up Arab support for Iraq in its war against Iran; and to restore good relations with Syria. At the 1987 Arab summit in Amman, King Hussein was able to push through a resolution of

support for Iraq against Iran, gaining the readmission of Egypt to the Arab fold while neutralizing opposition from Syria. The fact that the summit was held in the Jordanian capital and the success of Jordanian diplomacy was a triumph for King Hussein, which highlighted the central role Jordan was playing in Arab politics. It also altered traditional priorities by downgrading the importance of the Palestinian problem and promoting the conflict between Iraq and Iran to the top rank. This suited Jordan very well in view of the need to compensate for the decline in the strategic rents in the form of Arab aid it derived from supporting Iraq (which had declined with the drop in oil prices and needed to be reinvigorated) and trade with Iraq (which Iraq was having trouble paying for—a condition which may have been ameliorated through increased Arab aid to Iraq.) However, the winding down of the Iran-Iraq war upset these calculations.

Almost simultaneously, the first Palestinian *intifada* in the West Bank and Gaza Strip against Israeli occupation broke out at the end of 1987 and came to occupy center stage by 1988. In 1986 the King had broken off efforts to enlist PLO support for a peace conference leading to a federation of the regained Palestinian territory with Jordan. In 1987 Shamir had torpedoed the King's deal with Peres that could have led to a peace agreement. U.S. Secretary of State Shultz's initiative on March 1988, which allowed a central role for Jordan, had failed. An Arab League summit in Algiers in June 1988 restored the Palestinian issue to its former status as the foremost Arab cause, and the PLO circulated a document that affirmed its position as the legitimate interlocutor for the Palestinians in peace talks with Israel, a position that was endorsed by the summit. In a speech on July 31, King Hussein severed virtually all legal and administrative ties with the West Bank. Referring to the 1974 Rabat summit that had recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, the 1982 Fez summit that had endorsed the creation of an independent Palestinian state, and the 1950 text of the resolution that had united the West Bank with Jordan "without prejudice to the final settlement of the just cause of the Palestinian people," he declared that "Within this context we respect the wish of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to secede from us in an independent Palestinian state." The King added: "Since there is a general conviction that the struggle to liberate the occupied Palestinian land could be enhanced by dismantling the legal and administrative lines between the two banks, we have to fulfill our duty and do what is required of us."^[91] This did not, however, affect Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin who remained an integral part of the state, the King added.

A good assessment of the significance of this act is provided by Satloff: "Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank brought to a close an era of fast-paced, high-profile political and diplomatic activity in the international arena. The end of the Iran-Iraq War and the onset of the *intifada* together deprived the kingdom of the environmental conditions that had allowed it to assume such an extroverted identity in the mid-1980s. Instead, the kingdom turned inwards, and a series of domestic problems that had been percolating beneath the surface inside the East Bank came to brew with the divorce from the West Bank. The economy topped the list."^[92] (See section on Politics, above)

Arab Cooperation Council: An Experiment in Integration

In addition to Iraq's military difficulties, the producer oil crisis in 1985-86 led to a shortfall in Arab aid to

Jordan. At the Baghdad summit, seven countries: Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates had pledged \$1.25 billion in annual aid to Jordan over a 10-year period. Algeria and Libya never paid, and by 1984 the contributions of Qatar and the UAE had become ad hoc. A year later Kuwait suspended its payments. Iraq had its own problems. Only Saudi Arabia met its obligations at the rate of about \$360 million a year. Total aid to Jordan in 1980 was \$1.3 billion, of which \$750 million was Arab money. Arab aid declined to \$670 million in 1983; \$320 million in 1984. By 1988, Jordan was receiving \$474 million in financial aid and another \$260 million in soft loans and development aid, for a total of \$734 million from all sources.

As aid to Jordan dried up with the decline in oil revenues in the mid- to late eighties, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and North Yemen convened in February 1989 to form the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), the main objective of which was to capitalize on gains from economic integration. Although this assemblage later constituted of joint defense pact, and issues such as “strategic depth” were considerations behind the formation of the alliance, these were secondary to economic considerations, particularly from Jordan’s perspective. Its purpose was to open up markets for Jordanian exports of goods and services and labor (notably to Iraq), such as pharmaceuticals, agricultural products, cement, and fertilizers, and to create opportunities abroad for Jordan’s construction firms in order to alleviate the country’s economic difficulties and consolidate the base of support for the regime. Although technically the ACC preceded the riots in southern Jordan that served as a stimulus for political liberalization (see section on Politics), it served the same policy objectives and can be seen as an attempt at preempting unrest. Economic cooperation involved establishing joint projects in manufacturing and agricultural production. Integration meant not only “cooperation in industry, agriculture, transportation, communications, and labor flow,” but also “greater coordination in social affairs, including education, health and cultural exchange.”^[93] One dividend Jordan derived from the formation of the ACC was the resumption of aid from the Gulf countries as they grew concerned over the possible significance of the new alliance. The ACC was also envisaged as a nucleus for greater pan-Arab cooperation. Jordan did not seek to use the alliance against other Arab countries, in fact, it went to pains to reassure Syria that the alliance was not directed against it. That was not necessarily true of Iraq’s attitude. Egypt found that the ACC was instrumental in readmitting Iraq into the Arab fold at the 1989 summit in Amman. Unfortunately, Egypt and Iraq were somewhat distracted by the rivalry between them, which broke into open conflict with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the outbreak of the Gulf war. The ACC collapsed under the weight of that war.

The lessons to be drawn from the ACC venture tend to reinforce Brand’s emphasis on the role of economics as a determinant of foreign policy. Ryan, however, offers a more balanced view of the interplay of the various state motives: the “examination of the rise and fall of the ACC suggests the need to move beyond standard military-security explanations of inter-state alliance dynamics, in order to incorporate a more complex model that takes into account domestic politics and political economy as key elements influencing policy makers. Jordan’s experience with the ACC underscores the importance of focusing on the changing dynamics of its domestic politics, as well as on the economic underpinnings of its regime stability.”^[94] Incidentally, Ryan’s view, and to a certain extent Brand’s perspective too, are a reflection of the Jordanian insiders’ view; they are based to a large extent on the views of Jordanian functionaries derived from interviews with foreign ministry officials and former Cabinet Ministers and Prime Ministers.

Ryan goes on to remark that the demise of the ACC represents “the triumph of the Westphalian state system,”^[95] meaning that the motive of individual state sovereignty tends to trump integrationist schemes and pan-Arab unity.

Relations With the United States

Response to Arab Radicalism: The Beginning of the Relationship

Relations between Jordan and the United States have proven to be enduring. They are based on the fact that Jordan has always been a pro-Western state, and, from Washington’s perspective, a force for moderation that is strategically located in relation to Israel. The West Bank, which is integral to any solution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, was part of Jordan from 1949 to 1988. Up until 1993, particularly as neither Israel nor the United States were willing to talk to the PLO, Jordan was the principal available interlocutor. Any resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute had to involve Jordan. In addition, Jordan exercised control over the activities of the PLO on its soil, which led to the bloody showdown in 1970. Even after signing its own peace treaty with Israel, Jordan has remained involved in the dispute as one of the only two Arab states able to mediate with Israel.

During the Cold War, Jordan was clearly in the Western camp. It bolstered the security of the oil-producing states and even lent its armed forces and the expertise of retired army officers to the maintenance of security in the Gulf and the suppression of a rebellion in Oman. That particular advantage that Jordan offered more or less ended with the Gulf War, although military cooperation with the United States has resumed since, and cooperation in intelligence matters between Washington and Amman appears to be strong. Despite occasional attempts by the United States to adopt a more positive relationship with Arab nationalism, at which times an alliance with Jordan may have seemed a liability to the development of better relations with Abdel Nasser’s Egypt, such reconciliation efforts with Cairo never got very far, and in the final analysis Egypt, Syria, and Iraq (after 1958) appeared to be far closer to Moscow than to Washington. Radical Arab nationalism was perceived as a threat to the conservative regimes in the Arabian Peninsula, and Jordan was instrumental in blunting the menace of that radicalism to Washington’s interests.

For Jordan’s part, the United States was a powerful patron, and an alliance with Washington was vital for Jordan’s national security needs on many occasions. Washington also provided much needed budgetary and military aid to Jordan, although financial aid from the U.S. paled in comparison with the support provided by Arab states in the Gulf during the seventies and eighties. Still, Jordan’s working relationship with Washington and its overall policy orientation was instrumental in securing aid from oil-producing states during that period. In general, the United States could offer a combination of military and financial support to Jordan that was unmatched.

The relationship between the United States and Jordan was first formed when King Hussein was casting about for a substitute for Britain. The Nabulsi government, in accordance with its ideological convictions,

sought to forge an agreement with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to compensate for the British subsidy (see section on the constitutional experiment under Politics and the section on Arab radicalism under Foreign Policy above.) Jordan was already receiving modest sums from the United States

On January 19, 1957 the agreement was signed. The day before Parliament endorsed the agreement, a State Department release said that Jordan had made informal contacts to inquire if Washington would increase its subsidy to the kingdom from \$8 million to an annual \$30 million, which would have been equal to the promised Arab subsidy. On January 5 the Eisenhower administration, which was worried about Soviet penetration of the Middle East, had announced a plan of military and economic support for Middle Eastern states whose independence was threatened by International Communism and who appealed to Washington for help. Congress passed the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine on March 7.

As the struggle with the Nabulsi cabinet progressed, the King had been publicly blaming his troubles on the communists for the benefit of Washington and Saudi Arabia. According to Richard B. Parker, who served in the U.S. embassy in Amman in the mid-fifties “ . . . Hussein turned to the Americans. In a message passed through the second-ranking CIA man in Amman, he said that he was prepared to impose martial law, suspend the constitution, and speak out forcefully against the Syrians and the Egyptians; he wanted to know if he could count on the United States if either Israel or the Soviet Union intervened. Dulles proposed to respond affirmatively . . .”^[96] The United States also responded forcefully. Within 3 hours, the White House press secretary declared that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles regarded “the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital.”^[97] The Sixth Fleet was already on its way to the eastern Mediterranean as a signal to the Soviets regarding both Lebanon and Jordan, and Dulles had informed Israeli ambassador Abba Eban of Washington’s concerns. The next day, April 25, martial law was declared. The King had exerted his authority and finally put an end to the constitutional experiment.

On April 29 the U.S. made a much publicized \$10 million payment to Jordan (from funds under the control of the International Cooperation Administration, in other words, not from funds connected to the Eisenhower Doctrine). In June, the United States granted another \$10 million for the army and a further \$10 million in budgetary support^[98] Saudi Arabia also paid its first installment of promised aid. Ironically, it was learned many years later that the CIA secretly began payment of millions of dollars to the King in early 1957.

Cooperation with the United States continued for the better part of those years. U.S. budgetary support increased to \$40 million in 1958; remained constant through 1963; and was gradually phased out by 1967. It resumed in 1971 and continued through 1990; was terminated during the Gulf War; and resumed a second time in 1994 after Jordan’s peace agreement with Israel. Jordan became one of only five countries to receive direct U.S. military assistance.

Courage and decisiveness were traits that Hussein demonstrated time and again alongside the pragmatism he had learned from his grandfather. This pragmatism dictated a close relationship with the United States, because Jordan needed protection (from Israel and other Arab states), and it needed aid. King Hussein’s style and personality were a factor in his relationship with the United States: “However we evaluate it,

there is one aspect of the policy process that stands out clearly: the importance of the personality factor on both sides. Eisenhower's avuncular response to Hussein's courage assured favorable replies to the King's request for help . . . There is a quality about Hussein that strikes a responsive chord in Washington . . . and that is about all he has had in the way of assets in the power game."^[99]

One question that arises in relation to Jordan and the United States is: How can this square the fact that Washington had decided at the time that U.S. interests would best be served by cultivating the friendship and cooperation of Abdel Nasser and Arab nationalist forces and that Jordan was expendable? Specifically, National Security Council (NSC) directive 5280/1 of November 4, 1958 states:

"A. Recognizing that the indefinite continuance of Jordan's present political status has been rendered unrealistic by recent developments and that attempts on our part to support its continuance may also represent an obstacle to our establishing a working relationship with Arab nationalism . . .

D. Encourage such peaceful political adjustments by Jordan, including partition, absorption or internal political realignment , as appears desirable to the people of Jordan and as will permit improved relations with Jordan's Arab neighbors . . ."^[100]

Parker offers a satisfactory answer to the Jekyll-and-Hyde aspect of this relationship: "I and former diplomats I contacted, who were intimately connected with U.S.-Jordanian relations at the time, recall that there was never any question of the unswerving support of the United States to King Hussein and the viability of Jordan. They commented that there were people who talked about the policy advocated in NSC 5820/1, but it was never seriously promoted as policy, even though Eisenhower signed off on it. This may say something about the relevance of NSC discussion to the policy followed on the ground."^[101]

The 1970 Crisis

As the showdown with the Palestinian guerrilla organizations operating in Jordan loomed, King Hussein again turned to the United States for help. (See section on the Civil War of 1970-71 under Politics and the section on the Showdown with the PLO in 1970 under Relations with the Palestinians and Israel under Foreign Affairs.)

First, Jordan needed help to neutralize Iraq. Later, when 200 Syrian tanks invaded the kingdom, Hussein issued a call for help to Washington. Iraq had stationed forces in Jordan and had pledged to come to the aid of the PLO in the event of a showdown. However, when the Jordanian army moved against the *fida'iyeen*, Iraq simply moved its troops out of the way. Baghdad had received a message from the United States to keep out of the civil war in Jordan, according to Iraqi President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr in a conversation with Fateh's Salah Khalaf.^[102] In fact, President Nixon was quoted by the *Sun-Times* of Chicago on the evening of September 17 to the effect that the United States "was prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian war should Syria and Iraq enter the conflict and tip the military balance against Government forces loyal to Hussein."^[103] Syria, on the other hand, did intervene, sending two armored

brigades and a mechanized infantry brigade under the command of its Ninth Infantry Division into northern Jordan on September 19 and 20 and engaged in fierce combat with the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade. Syria also sent in battalions belonging to the Palestine Liberation Army (normally stationed in Syria), which reached the town of Irbid by the 21st, but Syria claimed that only PLA units were involved.

King Hussein appealed to the United States for help. From the perspective of Washington, “the Jordan crisis at its peak had much more to do with U.S.-Soviet relations than with the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestinians.”^[104] The U.S. was disturbed by Israeli complaints that Abdel Nasser was violating the terms of the cease-fire on the Suez Canal, presumably with Soviet connivance. Relations between Washington and Tel Aviv were at a nadir in the spring of 1970, and the State Department viewed Israel as an obstacle to good relations with the Arab states. On the other hand, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger convinced Nixon that the U.S.S.R. was boosting its presence in Egypt and that this had to be stopped. Kissinger argued that Moscow must not be allowed to help Abdel Nasser regain the Sinai; that arming Israel would frustrate Moscow’s designs; and that Israel would be a valuable strategic ally of the United States in the region. Nixon had met with Israeli Premier Golda Meir on the 17th and promised her \$500 million in additional military aid and more F-4s. Now, he maintained, this attack on Jordan by another Soviet client required a response. Rather than rely on U.S. capabilities, which would have involved a costly delay, Kissinger turned to Israel. Perhaps his preferred option was to demonstrate the value of Israel to the United States.

The U.S. had already placed the 82nd Airborne Division on semi-alert status on September 10 in view of the hostage situation and had sent C-130s to Turkey. Ships of the Sixth Fleet had left port; the aircraft carrier Saratoga was ordered to the eastern Mediterranean; and the carrier JFK, stationed in the Atlantic, was ordered to the Mediterranean, as was the helicopter carrier the Guam, which was stationed in Norfolk. Now the alert status of the 82nd and the units in Germany was raised and the Sixth Fleet was ordered to proceed further east.

On September 20, Secretary of State Rogers called on Syria to halt its “invasion” of Jordan, and Under Secretary Sisco told the Soviet ambassador that the attack on Jordan “could lead to the broadening of the present conflict.”^[105] Messages exchanged with the Soviet Union implied that Moscow was trying to restrain Syria. Still, it would be difficult to get U.S. forces into Jordan on time. Kissinger conferred with Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel’s ambassador to Washington, and plans were laid for Israel to come to the King’s aid. Israel and the U.S. arrived at a joint plan of action that was approved by Nixon on the 21st. Moshe Dayan threatened to unleash the Israeli air force against Syria. King Hussein, on the other hand, preferred to be rescued by the U.S. Eventually, the King decided to use his own tiny air force against the Syrian armor. On September 20 and 21, 120 Syrian tanks were destroyed and Syria suffered 600 casualties. The Syrian threat had been dealt with successfully.

“Jordan came to be treated as a regional partner of the United States. Jordan’s special task on behalf of American interests, in King Hussein’s view, would be to promote stability in the small oil-producing Arab states of the Gulf after the British departure at the end of 1971. Nixon and Kissinger gave the King some encouragement and boosted aid to Jordan accordingly. In true Nixon-doctrine style. Israel, Jordan, and Iran were emerging in official Washington’s view as regional peacekeepers. Aid and arms to these

U.S. partners would serve as a substitute for a costly American military presence in the region or unpopular military intervention.”[\[106\]](#)

The Gulf War

When Iraq occupied Kuwait in the summer of 1990, the threat of war loomed. President Bush pushed Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, into a corner: He offered him a choice between military defeat or a humiliating retreat from Kuwait. King Hussein tried his best to find a diplomatic solution; he wanted to prevent a recourse to force at all costs, because he realized that a confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq would lead to the destruction of Iraq. He was looking for a solution that would allow Iraq to withdraw without losing face. His goal was to maintain Arab unity and keep lines of negotiation open. This failed, and the Arab world split, with Egypt and Syria joining the military alliance against Iraq and others supporting Iraq politically.

Of course, Jordan had a vested interest in trying to salvage the Arab Cooperation Council, an essentially economic alliance that included both Iraq and Egypt alongside Jordan and North Yemen, if possible. However, once the initial mediation efforts failed, it must have been obvious that Jordan stood to lose all the budgetary support it had been getting from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia if it did not line up on their side. Jordan tried to remain neutral and condemned the occupation of Kuwait, but it was accused of backing Iraq, since the Bush administration’s position seemed to allow no room for neutrality.

Jordan refused to allow Israel to use its air space to attack Iraq or to allow Iraq to move Scud missiles into Jordan to attack Israel or other states. There was tremendous pressure from public opinion in Jordan not to join the war against Iraq, partly because of the large percentage of Palestinians among the population who saw Saddam Hussein as their champion against Israel, and partly because of Jordanian business interests tied to Iraq. Iraq was the biggest customer for Jordan’s exports (23.2 percent) and its primary source of oil imports. On top of that, the force of Arab nationalism worked more to Iraq’s advantage than against it. But by not committing to the U.S.-led alliance, Jordan alienated not only the United States but also Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, whose largesse had kept government coffers filled for many years in the late seventies and the eighties.

Thus King Hussein believed that the destruction of Iraq went against Jordan’s long-term strategic interests, and he had wide domestic support for adopting a neutral position; in addition, domestic pressures also militated against his joining the anti-Iraq coalition.[\[107\]](#) In the final analysis, King Hussein’s gut instincts were not to join in the war against Iraq. Arguably, this was one of those situations where the personal preferences of the sovereign may have had a significant role to play, which would further restrict the generalizability of a monocausal economic explanation. Jordan had to suffer the consequences; the King was ostracized for years by the Kuwaitis and the Saudis, although relations with the U.S. improved dramatically after the 1994 peace treaty with Israel.

Jordan also had to absorb the huge flood of (mainly expatriate) refugees from Kuwait and later from Iraq. In addition, tens of thousands of Jordanian citizens who had been working in the Gulf, notably in Kuwait

(most of them Palestinians), were expelled. This exacerbated the economic crisis, seeing as Jordan had been receiving almost \$1 billion a year in remittances from those workers. There was a time lag before the effect was felt, however, as many returning Jordanians also repatriated their life's savings with them. This fueled the construction industry in Jordan, as most of the money went into housing. But when it was exhausted, Jordan found itself heavily indebted and suffering from a high level of unemployment.

Reconciliation

Thus the period from late 1990 to late 1993 was the nadir of relations between the United States and Jordan. President Bush was somewhat flexible, but members of Congress sought to punish Jordan. Congress suspended aid to Jordan in fiscal year 1991, and FY 1992 aid was also held (except for military training and food aid) up until 1993, and beginning in 1993, the U.S. President had to certify that Jordan was in compliance with the embargo against Iraq; that it supported the peace process with Israel; and that aid to Jordan was in the U.S. national interest, in order to satisfy the conditions attached to aid appropriation acts and for the aid to be released. The beginning of the Geneva peace talks after the war provided an avenue for cooperation between Washington and Amman, but it was really following the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Rabin and Arafat in Washington that Jordan started pushing hard for the conclusion of a peace agreement with Israel and for full rehabilitation with the U.S. President Clinton was pleased to do what he could to help produce the peace treaty that was signed in 1994. Since then, Washington has offered Jordan rewards and incentives to normalize relations with Israel. The stipulation that the President had to vouch for Jordan's good conduct were removed. Israel was instrumental in convincing Congress to write off most of Jordan's debts. Relations with the United States improved considerably after 1994.

U.S. aid to Jordan since 1951 through 1997 amounted to about \$3.9 billion, divided into \$2.1 billion in economic aid and \$1.8 billion in military aid.^[108] In fiscal 1991, total U.S. aid to Jordan was a mere \$56.3 million; in 1992 it rose to \$70.6 million; it dropped to \$44.5 million in 1993; and to \$37.2 million in 1995. In 1996 total U.S. economic and military assistance rose to \$137.3 million; it increased further to \$152.1 million in 1997; to \$202.8 million in 1998; and amounted to \$198.1 million in 1999. Between 1994 and 1996, at the request of President Clinton, Congress appropriated \$401 million to go toward forgiving Jordan's debt of \$702 million to the United States. In 1996, the U.S. offered Jordan 16 F-16 fighters and 50 M60A3 tanks in military aid. These were paid for by an annual \$220 million allocation in the form of foreign assistance, and other hardware is being paid for through a special \$100 drawdown authority as part of the 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. President Clinton designated Jordan a major non-NATO ally of the United States as of November 1996, partly in recognition of King Hussein's services to the peace process.^[109]

In 1997, the U.S. administration created a Middle East Peace and Stability Fund through which Jordan was granted an additional \$100 million in 1997. In 1998, Jordan received \$150 million in economic aid and \$75 million in military assistance. Washington has arranged for the creation of qualified industrial zones in Jordan from which goods that contain an Israeli-produced component can be shipped to the United States duty free. In September 2001 President Bush finally signed the trade agreement with Jordan

after it cleared Congress. The agreement, negotiated under the Clinton administration and signed in October 2000, did not have an easy passage through Congress because conservatives objected to provisions that set a precedent in establishing a connection between trade and environmental protection and trade and labor rights. Another novel feature of the agreement is that it covers electronic commerce. It also provides for the protection of intellectual property rights and contains procedures for dispute resolution. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on December 17, 2001. Washington has also increased both financial and military aid to the kingdom.

Section VII

Reign of Abdullah II

King Hussein died at the age of 63 after a struggle with cancer on February 7, 1999. In January, he had named his oldest son Abdullah heir apparent to the throne instead of his brother Prince Hassan, who had been the crown prince since 1965 (Prince Hassan had been assigned that position because none of the King's sons was old enough to assume the duties of monarch). King Abdullah II was crowned on June 9. He faces a daunting task in steering the country through a minefield of regional and international conflicts.

The new King has embarked on a course of modernization and economic liberalization. He is more concerned with economic issues than his father and more savvy about them. Jordan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in April 2000 and entered into a free trade agreement with the U.S., and another such agreement with the European Union (the second with the EU) is being finalized.

Maintaining good relations with the United States is one of the top priorities of Abdullah II, as is controlling the damage caused by the unraveling of the Oslo peace process and the crisis occasioned by the second *intifada* which broke out shortly after his first year as head of state and was still going strong a year later. The precipitous deterioration of relations between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government of Ariel Sharon is a major concern for the young monarch. Since over half the population of Jordan consists of Palestinians, Israel's recourse to combat tactics to quell the *intifada* from the very beginning, when it was still a form of civilian protest, has generated a great deal of resentment and popular indignation in the kingdom. Since the United States is perceived as being less than evenhanded in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, angry demonstrations have targeted the U.S. as well as the Israeli embassy in Amman, and riot police have had to be called out to protect the embassies and restore order.

Jordan has had to play a balancing act between the United States and Iraq, as well. Jordan has been at the forefront of countries calling for the easing of economic sanctions on Iraq in order to alleviate the suffering of the people of that country, which is keenly felt by the man in the street in Jordan. Before the economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq, Jordan was exporting about a billion dollars' worth of goods to Iraq; and since the end of the Gulf War Jordan has been granted special permission by the United

Nations to trade with Iraq. Half the oil that Jordan imports from its eastern neighbor comes at reduced prices, which amount to budgetary support for the kingdom. Trade with Iraq is very important to Jordan, and Amman has a vested interest in the economic revival of Iraq.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has proposed “smart sanctions” against Iraq, which are designed to reduce the burden of suffering born by the Iraqi people, by lifting the economic sanctions, but this would involve the creation of a special fund under UN supervision into which all oil revenues would be deposited. Iraq opposes this as a perpetual infringement on its sovereignty and has threatened to cut off the supply of oil to Jordan (and Turkey and Syria) if its neighbors cooperate with the smart sanctions regime. That would amount to the elimination of Iraqi subsidized oil sales that are vital to Amman, which is coping with economic restructuring due to the burden of foreign debt. At the end of 2001, Iraq was supplying Jordan with \$650 million in crude oil (although at that point Jordan wanted to renegotiate the deal in view of the drop in international oil prices.)

On the other hand, the U.S. has pledged \$450 million in economic assistance and \$250 million in military aid to Jordan through 2001. There are also plans to reduce the size of the Jordanian army and turn it into an efficient rapid intervention force with the help of the U.S. Jordan stands to benefit a great deal from the access to the U.S. market afforded by the qualified industrial zones. This creates an additional dilemma, as goods produced in these zones qualify for special treatment only if they have an Israeli-produced component. The deterioration of relations with Israel will affect the QIZs.

Jordan may be too closely identified with the United States. The Hashemite kingdom has condemned the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. more vehemently than any other Arab country, and it is prosecuting members of the al-Qa’ida organization for terrorist acts planned in Jordan. It has volunteered to send peacekeeping forces to Afghanistan. Jordan is a non-NATO ally of the United States, and in September 2001 Congress admitted it to a list of only four countries to sign a free-trade agreement with the U.S. To balance the perception that the King is toeing Washington’s line and to justify this relationship to the Jordanian public, the government needs the United States to intervene more forcefully and even handedly in the Palestinian-Israeli dispute and to ease the burden of suffering imposed on the Iraqi people by the Security Council’s economic embargo. Jordanians have been waiting for a long time for a “peace dividend” to materialize since signing the 1994 treaty with Israel. Their expectations are largely unmet.

Domestically, Abdullah II has increased the freedom of action of the country’s intelligence services in view of the domestic disturbances. Their interference is strongly resented by the public. However, as part of the King’s modernization drive, the Ministry of Information is being scrapped and replaced by a higher media council, which should have a positive effect on the freedom of expression. But will this lead to more vociferous opposition from the Islamist opposition, which includes many Palestinians in its ranks, and which is opposed to the normalization of relations with Israel?

Abdullah II has worked to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf. In this regard he has the advantage of not carrying the baggage of his father from the Gulf war.

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Questions for Further Study

1. Do you think Jordan has indeed followed a rational course in foreign policy? What exceptions can you think of?

2. How important are budgetary support and economic advantage in determining the kingdom's foreign policies? (See Brand, Baram and Curtis (MEJ) above.)
3. What do you believe King Abdullah I's overall effect has been on the Palestinian problem? Did he lay the foundations of Jordan's relations with Israel? (See Shlaim and Glubb, above).
4. What would have happened if King Hussein had followed a more conciliatory policy towards Arab radicals inspired by Abdel Nasser and the Ba'th? (See Kerr and Dann, above).
5. Do you think King Hussein followed the best course in dealing with the PLO in 1970? (See Sayigh, Kerr and Quandt (1978) above).
6. Do you think King Hussein was truly adept at striking alliances and shifting alliance partners so as to derive strategic rents (economic or financial advantages from the exploitation of one's strategic position)? (See Brand, Ryan, Klieman, Sahlieh, A. Lesch and Quandt above.)
7. How would you characterize Jordan's relations with the United States? (See Parker, Satloff, Klieman, Quandt and Prados, above).
8. What causal effect would you assign to the personal preferences of King Abdullah I in the position Jordan adopted in relation to partition in 1948, and what role did King Hussein's own values play in determining Jordan's position in the Gulf War? (See A. Lesch.)
9. What do you think are the major problems which King Abdullah II will face? (See the Financial Times special supplement on Jordan).

[1] Tariq Tell, "Guns, Gold and Grain: War and Food Supply in the Making of Transjordan" in Steven Heydemann (ed.), *War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of Californian Press, 2000), p. 44-48.

[2] See the general argument, particularly the first three chapters of Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), although one would not venture to say that Jordan is the ideal variant of a developmentalist state. Evans does a good job of refuting the argument that states should simply not "meddle" in the economic sphere.

[3] *The Role of the Government, Jordan, A Country Study*, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Helen Chapin Metz (ed.)

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[4] See GDP by Sector, section 1 of 1, in *Jordan, A Country Study*, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Helen Chapin Metz (ed.)

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[5] Allowing for an error term of -2.1 percent.

[6] Natural Resources, section 1 of 1, in *Jordan, A Country Study*, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Helen Chapin Metz (ed.)

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[7] Robert Satloff, "Jordan's Great Gamble: Economic Crisis and Political Reform," in Henri Barkey (ed.), *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) p. 130.

[8] Ibid, p. 137.

[9] *Intifada*-a popular uprising among Palestinian youths in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza directed against Israeli occupation forces.

[10] EIU Country Monitor (Jordan), 17 December 2001 (Internet).

[11] See IMF, Country's Policy Intentions Documents: Jordan-Letter of Intent, Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, August 7, 2001.
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2001/jor/01/index.htm>

[12] EIU Country Monitor (Jordan), 17 Dec. 2001. (Internet).

[13] *Middle East Economic Digest*, May 4, 2001, p. 19.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Jordan, November 2001 Updater.

[16] FT Survey: Jordan, Stephanie Grey, "Strategy to boost investment potential," November 17, 2000,

- [17] “Bidders line up for Aqaba Inc.,” *MEED*, August 3, 2001, p. 16.
- [18] “Tala Bay work gets under way,” *MEED*, June 1, 2001, p. 16.
- [19] See *MEED* January 26, 2001, p. 18 and *MEED* June 29, 2001, p. 20.
- [20] See “Phosphate firm sell-off by end-2002,” *MEED*, June 22, 2001, p. 16.
- [21] “Consultative council boosts privatisation programme,” *MEED*, January 26, 2001, p. 18.
- [22] Stephanie Gray, F.T. Survey–Jordan: Feeling the pinch from unrest: TOURISM (Internet).
- [23] *Al-Hayat* (Arabic), November 16, 2001, p. 11.
- [24] Avi Machlis, “Pressing ahead with reform: Capital Markets,” *Financial Times Survey: Jordan*, Nov. 7, 2000 (Internet) <http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=001107001515>
- [25] “Amman still struggling,” *Middle East Economic Digest (MEED)*, January 19, 2001, p. 30.
- [26] “Bidders line up for gas pipeline,” *MEED*, November 2, 2001, p. 18.
- [27] See *MEED*, June 1, 2001, p. 17 and *MEED*, May 5, 2000 under Tenders.
- [28] See Nathan J. Brown, *Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001).
- [29] (For details of this episode, see Robert Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
- [30] George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 4th edition, p. 484.
- [31] Dann, Uriel, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 21.
- [32] Dann, p. 51.

[33] *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniya*—whose acronym in Arabic, spelled backwards, forms FTH, which is read Fat-h in Arabic (meaning conquest), and is often rendered Fateh in the vernacular, and Fatah by non-Arabic speakers.

[34] Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993* (Washington, DC: The Institute of Palestine Studies and Oxford University Press) pp. 195-216.

[35] Sayigh, p. 244.

[36] Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) pp. 10-11.

[37] Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd a-Nasir and His Rivals* (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), third edition, p. 145.

[38] Sayigh, p. 255.

[39] Sayigh, p. 256.

[40] Sayigh, p. 257.

[41] Sayigh, p. 258.

[42] Sayigh, p. 259.

[43] Sayigh, p. 259.

[44] Sayigh, p. 260.

[45] Kerr, p. 151.

[46] See Nabeel A. Khoury, “The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in Legislative Development,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13 (1981), p. 434.

[47] Robert Satloff, “Jordan’s Great Gamble: Economic Crisis and Political Reform,” in Henri Barkey (ed.), *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 138.

[48] Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan in the Middle East Peace Process," in *The Middle East Peace Process*, Ilan Peleg (ed.), (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 166. The author bases his observation on an interview with the former speaker of parliament and leader of the Islamic Action Front, Abdul Latif 'Arabiyat.

[49] Glenn E. Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30 (1998), (387-410), p. 389.

[50] Robinson, p. 393.

[51] See Emilr Sahilyeh, "Jordan and the Palestinians," in William Quandt (ed.), *The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988), p.303.

[52] Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan and the Rise and Fall of the Arab Cooperation Council," *The Middle East Journal* 52, 3 (Summer 1998), p. 393 (ft).

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[54] Robinson, p. 390.

[55] Robinson, p. 393.

[56] See the section on Jordan in the chapter on Arab monarchies in Nathan J. Brown, *Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001).

[57] Robinson, p. 387.

[58] Robinson, p. 400.

[59] Robert Satloff, "Jordan's Great Gamble: Economic Crisis and Political Reform," in Henri Barkey (ed.), *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 145.

[60] Ibid, p. 146.

[61] Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) p. 123.

[62] Shlaim, p. 142.

[63] Shlaim, pp. 132-140.

[64] Letter by Pirie-Gordon, quoted in Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan*.

[65] Janice Gross Stein, "The Security Dilemma in the Middle East: A Prognosis for the Decade Ahead," in B. Korani, P. Noble and R. Brynen (eds), *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*, (St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 56-75.

[66] W. Andrew Terrill, "The Political Mythology of the Battle of Karameh," *The Middle East Journal*, 55, 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 91-111.

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[68] Quoted in William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington and Berkeley: The Brookings Institution and the University of California Press, 1993).

[69] Quoted in Kerr, p. 150.

[70] Kerr, p. 150.

[71] Quandt, p. 111.

[72] Quoted in Sayigh, p. 308.

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[74] Sayigh, pp. 310-11.

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[76] Sahliyeh, Emile, "Jordan and the Palestinians," in Quandt, William B., (ed.) *The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 303.

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[78] “Powell, Chirac seek leeway for Arafat,” *Ha’aretz*, December 18, 2001 (Internet edition) <http://www.haaretzdaily.com>

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[80] Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.34.

[81] Quoted in Dann, p. 45.

[82] Satloff comments that on November 9, in an exchange with the U.S. military attaché in Amman, Chief of Staff Ali Abu Nuwwar solicited American aid in exchange for which he would be prepared to “guarantee” a declaration of martial law, the dissolution of Parliament, and a crackdown on communists. See Robert B. Satloff, “The Jekyll-and-Hyde Origins of the U.S.-Jordanian Strategic Relationship,” in *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*, David W. Lesch, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), second edition, p. 117. This is very striking, given Abu Nuwwar’s Arab nationalistic reputation.

[83] Richard B. Parker, “The United States and King Hussein,” in *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*, David W. Lesch, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), second edition, p. 108.

[84] Quoted in Satloff, p. 121.

[85] See William B. Quandt, “Lebanon, 1958 and Jordan, 1970,” in Blechman, Barry and Stephen Kaplan, *Force without War* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978).

[86] Laurie A. Brand, “Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan’s Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-81,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26 (1994), p. 394.

[87] Brand, p. 395 (emphasis added).

[88] Brand (IJMES), p. 400.

[89] Brand (IJMES), p. 402.

[90] See also Amatzia Baram, "Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment," *The Middle East Journal*, 45, 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 512-70.

[91] William B. Quandt (ed.), *The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988) p. 496 (Appendix M).

[92] Robert Satloff, "Jordan's Great Gamble: Economic Crisis and Political Reform," in Henri Barkey (ed.), *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 134.

[93] Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan and the Rise and Fall of the Arab Cooperation Council," *The Middle East Journal* 52, 3 (Summer 1998), p. 396.

[94] Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan and the Rise and Fall of the Arab Cooperation Council," p.400.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Richard B. Parker, "The United States and King Hussein," in *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment* David W.Lesch, ed.(Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), second edition, p. 108.

[97] Quoted in Satloff, p. 121.

[98] Parker, p.109.

[99] Parker, p. 111.

[100] Quoted in Satloff, pp. 123-24.

[101] Parker, note 28, p. 113.

[102] Quoted in Sayigh, p. 265.

[103] Quoted in William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington and Berkeley: The Brookings Institution and the University of California Press, 1993).

[104] Quandt, p. 94.

[105] Quandt, p.103.

[106] Quandt, p. 111.

[107] For a more detailed discussion, see Ann Mosely Lesch, “Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians,” *The Middle East Journal*, 45, 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 30-50.

[108] Alfred Prados, “Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues,” Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, CRS Issue Brief, updated May 1, 1998, (IB93085), p. 9.

[109] See Prados for greater detail, particularly the table on p. 16..