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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No.: 200701753

MAR 25 2010

I refer to your letter dated March 11, 2007 regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

We searched for and reviewed the self study guides that you requested and have determined that all except one of them may be released. They are on the enclosed disc. One of the guides is being released with excisions.

An enclosure provides information on Freedom of Information Act exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

We have now completed the processing of your case. If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

We hope that the Department has been of service to you in this matter.

Sincerely,

for Margaret P. Grafeld, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

63934 Federal Register/Vol. 69, No. 212
Rules and Regulations

Subpart F – Appeal Procedures

§171.52 Appeal of denial of access to, declassification of, amendment of, accounting of disclosures of, or challenge to classification of records.

(a) *Right of administrative appeal.* Except for records that have been reviewed and withheld within the past two years or are the subject of litigation, any requester whose request for access to records, declassification of records, amendment of records, accounting of disclosure of records, or any authorized holder of classified information whose classification challenge has been denied, has a right to appeal the denial to the Department's Appeals Review Panel. This appeal right includes the right to appeal the determination by the Department that no records responsive to an access request exist in Department files. Privacy Act appeals may be made only by the individual to whom the records pertain.

(b) *Form of appeal.* There is no required form for an appeal. However, it is essential that the appeal contain a clear statement of the decision or determination by the Department being appealed. When possible, the appeal should include argumentation and documentation to support the appeal and to contest the bases for denial cited by the Department. The appeal should be sent to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LC, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, DC 20522-8100.

(c) *Time limits.* The appeal should be received within 60 days of the date of receipt by the requester of the Department's denial. The time limit for response to an appeal begins to run on the day that the appeal is received. The time limit (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) for agency decision on an administrative appeal is 20 days under the FOIA (which may be extended for up to an additional 10 days in unusual circumstances) and 30 days under the Privacy Act (which the Panel may extend an additional 30 days for good cause shown). The Panel shall decide mandatory declassification review appeals as promptly as possible.

(d) *Notification to appellant.* The Chairman of the Appeals Review Panel shall notify the appellant in writing of the Panel's decision on the appeal. When the decision is to uphold the denial, the Chairman shall include in his notification the reasons therefore. The appellant shall be advised that the decision of the Panel represents the final decision of the Department and of the right to seek judicial review of the Panel's decision, when applicable. In mandatory declassification review appeals, the Panel shall advise the requester of the right to appeal the decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel under §3.5(d) of E.O. 12958.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

(b)(1) Withholding specifically authorized under an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and properly classified. E.O. 12958, as amended, includes the following classification categories:

- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
- 1.4(b) Foreign government information
- 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
- 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
- 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
- 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(h) Information on weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

ARMEX	Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2778(e)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
EXPORT	Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. USC 2411(c)(1)
FSA	Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4003 & 4004
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f)
IRAN	Iran Claims Settlement Act, Sec 505, 50 USC 1701, note

(b)(4) Privileged/confidential trade secrets, commercial or financial information from a person

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product

(b)(6) Information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

(b)(7) Information compiled for law enforcement purposes that would:

- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
- (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
- (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (D) disclose confidential sources
- (E) disclose investigation techniques
- (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

(b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions

(b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request, excised with the agreement of the requester

MOZAMBIQUE
A Self-Study Guide

NATIONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS TRAINING CENTER
School of Professional and Area Studies
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State

The **Self-Study Guide: Mozambique** is intended to provide U.S. government personnel in the foreign affairs community with an overview of important issues related to Mozambican history, geography, politics, economics, culture, religion, media, and international relations. The guide should serve an introductory self- study resource. The topic is far too complex to be covered in depth using only the text in this guide. The reader is encouraged to explore the questions and issues introduced using the Internet and bibliographic sources provided in the text and in the resource sections. Most of the referenced material can be found on the Internet or in Foreign Service Institute or Main State Libraries.

The first edition of this guide was prepared by Dr. William Minter, senior research fellow at Africa Action in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this guide are those of the author and attributable sources and do not necessary reflect official policy or positions of the Department of State or the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. All sources used for graphics and extended quotes are public domain, from Internet sites that explicitly say "can be used for non-profit or educational use, or are from the

First Edition

July 2001

Cover credit: Eduardo Mondlane University, http://www.uem.mz/malangatana/230999/resum2.jpg

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Contents

Capsule Chronology

Early First Millennium - settlement of Mozambique by Bantu-speaking peoples.

Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries - height of Zimbabwe civilization located in region of present-day Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

Fourteenth to Sixteenth Centuries - height of Swahili city-states on East African coast.

1498 - Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama lands in Mozambique.

Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries - Portuguese, Arabs and Africans contend for and collaborate in control of trade from the coast.

Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries - Portuguese occupy parts of Zambezi valley as well as key coastal posts, but many settlers are assimilated into African kingdoms. Most of interior remains under African control.

Eighteenth to Nineteenth Centuries - The slave trade is at its height in Mozambique, with slaves shipped both across the Atlantic and to Indian Ocean islands.

1880s to 1917 - Portuguese complete their military conquest of Mozambique.

1884-1885 - Berlin Conference at which European powers decided how to divide up Africa.

1895 - Gungunhana, chief of the Gaza state, is defeated by the Portuguese and deported to the Azores, leading to Portuguese occupation of southern Mozambique.

1890s to 1910s - Southern Mozambique becomes a major source of workers for the mines of South Africa, and Lourenço Marques the key port for South Africa's mining region.

1926 - Coup establishes dictatorship in Portugal, which lasts until 1974, under António Salazar from 1932 to 1968.

June 16, 1960 - Mueda massacre in northern Mozambique, in which Portuguese kill an estimated 600 protesters.

June 25, 1962 - Founding of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)

September 25, 1964 - Beginning of the war for independence

February 4, 1969 - Assassination of FRELIMO's first president, Eduardo Mondlane.

April 25, 1974 - Coup overthrows dictatorship in Portugal.

June 25, 1975 - Independence of Mozambique.

April 18, 1980 - Independence of Zimbabwe

March 16, 1984 - Mozambique signs Nkomati nonagression pact with South Africa.

October 19, 1986 - Mozambican President Samora Machel and 33 others die in suspicious air crash

inside South African border with Mozambique.

October 4, 1992 - General Peace Agreement for Peace in Mozambique signed in Rome.

October 27-28, 1994 - In Mozambique's first national multiparty elections, voters choose Joaquim Chissano as president and give legislative majority to Frelimo.

December 3-4, 1999 - Second national multiparty elections reelect Joaquim Chissano as president and maintain Frelimo majority in parliament.

Maps



There are many maps of Mozambique available on-line.

These two, from the UN's Africa Recovery magazine (www.africarecovery.org) and the CIA's World Factbook 2000 (www.cia.gov/cia/

publications/factbook) show the position of the country and selected cities and towns.

The map on the next page, from the government of Mozambique, shows the

provinces into which the country is divided.

Other maps show more detail and provide current information on a wide variety of subjects.

A good place to start is the Relief Web map centre:

http://www.reliefweb.int

http://www.mozambique.mz/dadosbas/provinc.htm Mozambique's ten provinces (plus Maputo city) are the basic geographical divisions within the country. The provincial divisions are significant in economic and cultural as well as political terms. They are commonly divided into "South": Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane; "Center": Manica, Sofala, Tete and Zambézia; and "North": Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa. The names of the provincial capitals are shown in the list to the right of the map.

The URL on the Mozambican government website (above) has descriptions and a detailed map of each province (can be slow to download).

As in the U.S. the usage of the terms "South" and "North" is not consistent. Sometimes Tete or Zambézia is included in the "North" for example, or people may even refer to everything north of Gaza and Inhambane as "North." People may also speak of being in or going to "the capital," "the provinces" (generally the provincial capitals) or "the districts" (the next level of administrative subdivision).

History

Particularly recommended for additional background on Mozambican history: Jeanne Marie Penvenne, "History of Mozambique" on www.brittannica.com; Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995).Also see additional sources in the bibliography.

Pre-Colonial

The history of the geographical area which is now Mozambique is deeply intertwined with that of its African neighbors and of the Indian Ocean region which borders it to the east. Its rivers and ports served as gateways for trade between the interior and the sea for at least a thousand years before arrival of Portuguese ships coming around the Cape of Good Hope from the Atlantic.

Like most of Africa south of the Sahara, Mozambique is populated by speakers of Bantu languages whose ancestors brought iron technology, agriculture and cattle along with their languages from west-central Africa between 1,500 and 2,000 years ago. Archaeologists think Bantu speakers arrived in Mozambique from the North along the coast as well as from the west, intermarrying with earlier peoples who lived by hunting and gathering.

By the end of the first millenium, kingdoms featuring stone enclosures or *zimbabwes* were emerging on the interior plateau to the west of Mozambique. The peak of the Zimbabwe civilization, which overlapped the border with present-day Mozambique, was in the 13th to 15th centuries. Along with the area of central Africa in what is now the Katanga province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, this region supplied gold, copper, ivory and other goods for trade within the region and through Indian Ocean ports in Mozambique and to the north.

While trade and migration across the Indian Ocean, including routes from Indonesia through Madagascar to Mozambique, date back thousands of years, the 14th to 16th centuries saw the height of the Swahili (the word means coast) Afro- Arab city states that extended as far south as Sofala, near present-day Beira in central Mozambique.

The voyage of Vasco da Gama around the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean in 1498 was the beginning of Portuguese influence on Mozambique and the Indian Ocean region. They established control over Mozambique Island in northern Mozambique and Sofala in the center, as well as setting up trading posts as far as Tete on the Zambezi River. *Prazos* (land grants) became independent centers of Afro-Portuguese military power, contending for power and trade with other African chiefdoms and Arab and Portuguese traders.

By the 18th century, the slave trade became the most dominant part of the coastal trade. Slaves from Mozambique and its interior were sold for trade across the Atlantic, and within the Indian Ocean to both Arab destinations and French- controlled islands. Declining after the middle of the 19th century, the slave trade nevertheless continued clandestinely into the early 20th century.

Colonialism

As seen in the previous section, the common reference to over four centuries of Portuguese colonialism is misleading. Before the end of the 19th century, colonial rule was confined to only a few enclaves. At independence in 1975 Portuguese domination was, for the most part, less than a century old, coinciding with the European occupation of the African interior by Britain, France, Belgium and Germany.

On the east coast Portugal claimed a long strip of land stretching more than 1500 miles from the German (later British) colony of Tanganyika in the north to British-controlled South Africa and Swaziland in the south. To the interior Mozambique bordered on the British-held territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. By the turn of the century most of this territory had been conquered. The Gaza chiefs in the south were finally defeated in 1897. But conquest was only completed with the close of World War I. A widespread revolt in Zambézia was suppressed only towards the end of 1918.

Portuguese-ruled Mozambique had a population of approximately 10,000 whites, 12,000 mestiços (persons of mixed race) and almost 3 million Africans, according to estimates published in 1920. The least developed colonial power, Portugal lacked the capacity to administer, much less develop, the territory. From the 1890s huge portions of the country were handed over to concessionary companies

financed by British and other foreign capital.

Mozambique's dependence on other white powers was also reflected in the transport links and labor flows to its neighbors. Before the colonial powers arrived, shared languages had joined the peoples of southern Mozambique to South Africa, central Mozambique to Rhodesia, and northern Mozambique to central and east Africa. The economic bonds forged under colonialism reinforced these east-west axes, leaving north-south links within Mozambique to neglect.

The South African connection made southern Mozambique an economic dependency of the mining economy of the Transvaal and the most developed area within Mozambique. Portugal supplied the mines with migrant workers, while South Africa channeled trade through Lourenço Marques and eventually agreed to remit part of the miners' wages to Mozambique in hard currency.

In central Mozambique, Beira served as the port for Southern Rhodesia. Mozambican migrants went to work on the mines and white farms across the border, although in smaller numbers than the southern flow to South Africa. Even further north, on a less organized basis, Mozambicans emigrated to find work in Nyasaland, Tanganyika and as far afield as Zanzibar and Kenya. There was a glaring contrast between the economic opportunities available under Portuguese colonialism and in these neighboring countries.

In most areas, nevertheless, the majority continued to depend on small-scale subsistence agriculture. Their participation in the colonial economy was limited to occasional forced labor on roads or on Portuguese plantations or, later in the century, forced cultivation of cotton and other crops to serve industry in Portugal. Portuguese colonialism was not unique in coercing a labor force to serve the European economy. Its relative underdevelopment, however, meant that market incentives were less significant and force more prominent than in neighboring British territories.

According to Portuguese colonial theory, African natives (*indígenas*) could exempt themselves from forced labor by assimilating Portuguese culture and in effect becoming Portuguese. A small number succeeded in meeting the tests of income, education and life style to gain this *assimilado* status. Others, even if not assimilated, were incorporated into the colonial order with some relative advantage over other Mozambicans: chiefs used in administration, overseers, teachers in mission schools, semi-skilled workers in the ports or administration.

At mid-century, this colonial order appeared to be a stable although backward system. The Salazar regime had constructed a more integrated Portuguese empire, expanding forced cultivation and encouraging Portuguese settlement. The white population of Mozambique increased from about 18,000 in 1930 to some 85,000 in 1960. Salazar's corporatist ideology excluded dangerously liberal democratic ideas both at home and in Africa. Independence was not an issue, the theory held, because the colonies were an integral part of Portugal. Neither African protest, as in South Africa, nor nationalist stirrings, as in other African colonies, were particularly visible in Mozambique before the 1960s.

Even the assimilado elite, however, who to a certain extent bought into the Portuguese model of culture and politics, rejected its implications of white racial superiority. They also reacted against competition

from an increased flow of white immigrants, who were legally assumed to be 'civilized' even if illiterate. Discrimination favored whites from Portugal not only over Africans, but also over mestiços and even locally born whites.

Nationalism and the Struggle for Independence

Mozambican nationalism emerged first of all among those who had some education, whether or not they were officially assimilados. The numbers were not large--in the late 1950s there were probably not more than a few thousand Africans and a somewhat larger number of mestiços who had completed more than four years of school. The largest cluster of educated Mozambicans was close to the capital, in the south, where Portugal had permitted Protestant missions from the US and Switzerland. Beira and the Zambezi area were other zones of concentration.

The individuals and groups who came together in June 1962 to form Frelimo reflected these diverse origins. The founding congress met in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika--later to become Tanzania--which had just won independence from Britain. The leaders of Frelimo had the example of the successful independence struggles by Britain's African colonies. The movement's first president, Eduardo Mondlane, had served in the UN Secretariat overseeing independence referenda in West Africa. The contrast with Portugal's refusal even to consider independence was striking. It was clear that the route to independence for Mozambique would pass through war.

In September 1964 Frelimo guerrillas launched attacks in northern Mozambique, beginning the 'armed struggle.' It was, above all, Frelimo's virtually undisputed leadership of this war of national liberation that positioned it as the natural successor when the Portuguese colonial state collapsed a decade later. Tanzania and later Zambia gave Frelimo bases for diplomacy and for the guerrilla war inside Mozambique. Portuguese secret police intrigue, exploiting internal divisions, culminated in the assassination of President Mondlane in early 1969. But the leadership which regrouped around top guerrilla commander Samora Machel proved remarkably cohesive. Although rival organizations announced their existence from time to time in various African capitals, none gained significant credibility. Individual rivals to the Frelimo leadership either deserted to the Portuguese or faded into obscurity in exile.

Frelimo sought to create a broad base of international support. It declined to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute and won military aid both from China and the Soviet Union. In the West, religious organizations and the Nordic countries provided support for Frelimo's health and education programs. But efforts to build links with other Western governments or mainstream organizations foundered on vested interests tying the Western bloc to Lisbon.

This pattern of international support, together with the radicalizing effect of guerrilla war, reinforced Marxist ideas within the Frelimo leadership. The emerging Frelimo perspective stressed collective commitment and mobilization of the people for social justice as well as national independence. Those who opposed Mondlane and Machel were seen as opponents of the revolutionary process, as witnessed by

their pursuit of individual privilege, their resort to divisive ethnic and racial appeals, and their willingness to be wooed by the colonial authorities.

Portuguese repression ruled out open political action, so Frelimo's activities were played out in exile, in areas of guerrilla operations and in scattered clandestine cells. The war opened up 'liberated areas' in the north in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete. Here the movement set up administration, health services and schools. By 1973 Frelimo forces in these areas, as well as in several other provinces, were stretching the Portuguese military. The Portuguese coup in April 1974 allowed clandestine Frelimo supporters greater freedom to operate. The movement was met with a wave of enthusiasm and applauded for defeating colonialism.

Nevertheless, most areas of Mozambique, including the cities, experienced little impact from the war of liberation. When the independence agreement was signed in September, the movement's organizational structures around the country were at best rudimentary. In this period Frelimo entrusted local organization to ad hoc *grupos dinamizadores* (dynamizing groups). These were self-constituted residential or workplace committees of Frelimo members or sympathizers. While they took their general direction from the national leadership, their membership ranged from long-time supporters to others newly engaged by the excitement of the hour or by the sense that this was the bandwagon to ride. Their activities ranged from political organization to literacy campaigns and cultural programs. As Portuguese authority receded and settlers left, abandoning or sabotaging their farms and shops, the local *grupo dinamizador* was often called on to pick up the pieces.

One month before independence, Frelimo President Samora Machel left Tanzania for a triumphal tour of Mozambique from north to south. On independence day, June 25, dance troupes from all ten provinces performed before festive crowds in Lourenço Marques (Maputo) and in each provincial capital, symbolizing national unity. The constitution promised people's power under Frelimo's leadership, solidarity with national liberation movements, and a drive to eliminate underdevelopment and exploitation. Few expected such ambitious goals to be easy, but most were optimistic. Hope was the dominant note, not just of the day, but of the years immediately to follow.

Topic to explore:

Eduardo Mondlane: First president of FRELIMO, regarded as father of the nation,graduated from Oberlin College and gained his doctorate at Northwestern University. Mozambique’s national university is named after him. Among the resources you will find on the web:

http://www.cphrc.org.uk/sources/so-col/so-col-160561.htm

Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, May 16, 1961, Subject: Conditions in Mozambique, Participants: Mr. Eduardo Mondlane, Mr. William J.

Wright, Jr., Deputy Director AF/E.

http://www.oberlin.edu/~alummag/oampast/oam_spring98/Alum_n_n/eduardo.html

Oberlin Alumni News and Notes

See what other sources you can find in libraries and on the web. In Mozambique you should be able to get his book *The Struggle for Mozambique* and a memoir by his widow, Janet Mondlane.

War and Peace

On June 25, 2000, Mozambique celebrated 25 years of independence. During that period, Mozambique was at war for more than 16 years, from the first Rhodesian attacks in March 1976 to the Rome peace treaty of October 1992. And implementation of the treaty took more than two years. The period since 1994 is in effect covered by later sections of this guide, particularly those on politics and economics. This section focuses on the period from 1975 through 1994, and particularly on issues of war and peace. It is also particularly brief, since there are abundant published sources covering this period.

While divisions within Mozambique would in any case have provided reasons for

tension along regional and political lines in the years after independence, the intractable war and pervasive destruction that resulted was above all the result of Mozambique's engagement in the regional conflict accompanying the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Without this context, its political history would probably have resembled more closely that of Tanzania, its close ally to the north.

The scale of war over the years and the timing of peace efforts were also related to external as well as internal factors – a relatively contained conflict in the period 1976-1980, affecting primarily central Mozambique and tied to the last stages of the war for the independence of Zimbabwe; an overwhelmingly devastating reality throughout the country from 1981 through1989, the years of P.W. Botha's "total strategy" to defend apartheid; and a gradual transition from war to peace from 1990 to 1994, paralleling almost exactly the complicated mix of talks and covert violence in South Africa during the years preceding South Africa's first democratic election.

The Mozambican National Resistance (first MNR and then Renamo, the equivalent Portuguese acronym) was initiated by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization as an adjunct to Rhodesia's attacks on Mozambique, which provided rear bases for Zimbabwean guerrillas fighting the white minority regime in that country. Throughout the war, it retained the legacy of its military origin, with most of its soldiers being recruited by force in the countryside. Increasingly, however, it also gained strength from the neutrality or sympathy of Mozambicans alienated by the government's failures, abuses of power, and repressive counter-insurgency strategies. By the end of the war, after transition to the status of a political

party, it also provided a political home for many Mozambicans opposed to the government who had not participated in the war.

[The relationship between the external and internal causes of war in Mozambique was much debated during the war and in the immediate post-peace agreement years. For an extensive discussion, see William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras* (London: Zed, 1994). For alternate views see the sources cited there, and more current works such as T. Young and M. Hall, *Confronting Leviathan* (London: Hurst, 1997). For a summary of the chronology of the war, see particularly Chapter 2 of *Apartheid's Contras*.]

The war escalated rapidly in the 1980s. At Zimbabwe's independence, Renamo forces were transferred from Rhodesia to South Africa, and participated in the expansion of covert and surrogate armies directed by South Africa's special forces against its neighbors. While Mozambique did not provide military bases for the African National Congress as it had for Zimbabwean guerrillas, it did provide political support and passage through Mozambique to the ANC. By the end of 1982, Mozambique was seeking a detente with South Africa, and in 1984, hoping for an end to South African backing for Renamo, President Machel signed the Nkomati Accord pledging that neither country would provide any support for armed groups in the other's territory.

While Mozambique kept the terms of the Accord, and won increasing diplomatic and financial support from Western countries, including the conservative administrations in London and Washington, South Africa did not. While South African material support for Renamo did eventually decrease, it was more than sufficient to ensure the continuation of the war against Mozambique's weakened defenses. Since the primary targets of attack were civilians, social services and transport in the rural areas, it was in any case impossible for an army which often lacked fuel for its vehicles to defend a territory almost twice the size of California with fewer paved roads than the state of Delaware.

In 1989, the UN estimated the economic loss to Mozambique from war over the period 1980-1988 at $15 billion, more than five times the gross domestic product in 1988 (United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force, *South African Destabilization: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*. New York / Addis Ababa, 1989). The same study also estimated the loss of lives directly and indirectly due to the war as 900,000 people, more than half young children.

[Among recent books in English dealing with the human reality of the war, one can particularly recommend Nordstrom, 1997. Older books include Magaia, 1988 and Human Rights Watch, 1992 (see bibliography for full references). On-line, see Alcinda Honwana, "Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Rural Mozambique" at http://www.c-r.org/acc_moz/honwana.htm].

The details of the tortuous peace process which led to the Rome agreement in October 1992 and elections in October 1994 are described in many sources available in print and on-line (see particularly http://www.c-r.org/acc_moz/contents_moz.htm). The reasons for success are complicated, as indicated below in William Minter’s review of several books on the topic (the review was originally published in *Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research*, April, 2000).

The Mozambican Peace Process: An (Over)abundance of Lessons

by William Minter

Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94.* Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.

Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson and Alex Vines, eds., *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*. London: Conciliation Resources and Maputo: Arquivo Historico, 1998.

Carolyn Nordstrom, *A Different Kind of War Story.*Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997.

Thomas Ohlson, *Power Politics and Peace Politics: Intra-State Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa*.Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1998.

Success, the saying goes, has many parents. The successful peace process in Mozambique, taking added prominence by comparison to the war still raging in Angola and other conflicts on the African continent, is no exception. The books discussed or cited in this review -- recent English-language books which have come to the attention of this reviewer -- well illustrate the point. A more comprehensive bibliography might turn up even more aspects to be considered. But the factors singled out for attention in these books are wide-ranging enough to confound any attempt to draw simple lessons to be emulated elsewhere: international mediators ranging from diplomats to tycoons to church leaders, multilateral and bilateral donors, global and regional geopolitics, as well as Mozambican political and military forces, religious groups and cultural traditions, both national and local.

Synge provides both a chronological and analytical overview, with particular attention to the role of ONUMOZ, the $700 million UN peacekeeping operation in Mozambique between December 1992 and December 1994. The success of the peace operation, Synge sums up, was due mainly to "the commitment to peace of all Mozambicans; the importance placed on the political functions of the leading peace commission; the skill, patience and flexibility of the SRSG [special representative of the UN Secretary-General, Aldo Ajello]; strong financial and logistic support from the international community; and the political support of neighboring states" (p. 146).In the next paragraph Synge quotes a 'senior UN official in Maputo' as saying "Success was achieved despite ONUMOZ and not because of ONUMOZ" (Ibid.).

Synge's lucid account documents both successes and weaknesses. He shows how the process of implementing the Rome peace accord of October 4, 1992 was pushed along, despite a seemingly unending series of delays, to culminate in demobilization of government and Renamo troops, formation of a new national army, and multi-party elections won by incumbent President Joaquim Chissano and the ruling Frelimo Party.One of the principal goals of the process, Synge notes, was to convert the rebel Renamo group from a force of destruction to a credible political organization, an objective at least minimally achieved by international engagement and direct funding of Renamo to replace its previous external support from South Africa. In this way, and in other steps such as two- year subsidy packages for

demobilized soldiers on both sides, the international community literally paid for peace (total demobilization costs came to about $85 million, according to Synge; other sources put the total as high as $95 million, or more than $1,000 per soldier demobilized).

Yet the weight of the UN presence during this period increased rather than diminished the country's already massive donor dependency. Short-term priorities diverted attention from longer-term requirements for reconstruction (for example, weapons collection was a notable failure). More generally, Synge argues, the international community "effectively displaced the normal functions of government ... [and] derailed the government's own efforts to reform" (p. 149).

Synge does draw up his list of "lessons" for successful peacekeeping [1. a credible formula, 2. manageable components, 3. a closely monitored cease-fire, 4. outside support, 5. clear rules, and 6. capacity building]. He rates Mozambique as successful in 1, 3, and 4, and less successful on 2, 5 and 6.

Synge's first point pushes the search for factors responsible for success back into the pre-implementation phase, namely the existence of a viable peace settlement. The best resource on the process leading to the settlement is probably the edited collection by Conciliation Resources, which is also available in full on their web site (www.c-r.org/acc_moz/contents_moz.htm). In addition to a comprehensive chronology and the text of the Rome peace agreement and other key documents, *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective* sets the agreement in historical context, with general background essays by Zimbabwean scholar (and former army officer) Martin Rupiya and Mozambican journalist Fernando Gonçalves.It also features an article on the role of the churches by two of the key participants (Anglican Bishop Sengulane and Catholic Bishop Gonçalves), a detailed account of the central role of entrepreneur 'Tiny' Rowland in the diplomacy, and Mozambican scholar Alcinda Honwana on the role of traditional ritual in healing war trauma.

Despite its modest length (100 pages in the printed edition), this collection is rich in insights which go beyond conventional wisdom on Mozambique's peace process.Thus, for example, Zimbabwe is portrayed as an important mediating force as well as in its better-known role as a military ally of the Mozambican government. And while the Italian congregation of Sant' Egidio is given credit for its well-known role in hosting the peace talks in Rome, so are the longer-term peace efforts of local Mozambican church leaders and the more material incentives provided by 'Tiny' Rowland and the Italian government in particular.

Honwana's essay stresses not only the resilience of local Mozambican communities in confronting the trauma of war but also the fact that these measures still fall short of ensuring reconciliation and a stable peace at local levels. Five years after the peace agreement, she notes, writing in 1997, in the rural areas "profound social unrest and intermittent violence pose a persistent threat ... tensions reflect both the deep social divisions spilling over from the long war and the desperate survival tactics of many Mozambicans attempting to rebuild their lives in the face of overwhelming poverty" (p. 75). The horrors experienced by many Mozambicans, particularly but not exclusively at the hands of Renamo, "cannot simply be erased from the collective memory" (p. 80).

The same issue is explored in depth in Carolyn Nordstrom's reflective and moving *A Different Kind of*

War Story. During extensive travel in rural Mozambique between 1988 and 1996, anthropologist Nordstrom talked with local people about their experience of war. She found not only horror stories, but also extraordinary creativity in not only surviving war but also in constructing a pervasive nationwide culture of peacemaking. Most surprisingly, she found that this culture extended throughout the country, across ethnic and political boundaries. From traditional healers through teachers and students who found ways to restart classes in the aftermath of horrendous violence, or traders who carried news as well as goods across war zones, she found a commitment to "unmaking" violence. Both soldiers and civilian victims of violence were perceived as in need of healing, both physical and mental. Common threads in the culture of healing stretched across the diversity of traditional cultures in different parts of the country. She concludes that Mozambique illustrates the opposite of the Hobbesian premise that elite-brokered agreements bring peace.Average Mozambicans, she notes, "crafted sophisticated institutions to stop violence ... and set the stage for peace. .. it was on this work that the peace accords were built" (p. 220).

In a brief but intriguing epilogue, she contrasts Mozambique with Angola. Angolans, she notes, have also crafted a wealth of cultural resources to withstand war. But, unlike Mozambique, they had not coalesced into a "nation-wide set of linked practices" (p. 230).The arenas of conflict management in Mozambique had spread from area to area, via displaced people, traditional healers, traders and teachers to form a space independent from the armed conflict. In Angola, such space was -- and is -- still embedded in a bipolar militarized political space.

The comparison Nordstrom makes rings true. Her appeal to learn from the Mozambican example to build cultures of peace from the bottom-up will hopefully find echoes in other conflicts. And yet one must also wonder whether the Mozambican culture of peace would have prevailed without the other favorable conditions -- in the Southern African region, in the international community, and in the character of the armed forces on both sides -- that were conducive to a national political settlement in Mozambique.

The final book in this review, Thomas Ohlson's *Power Politics and Peace Politics*, is a systematic attempt to explore this question by a comparison of eight peace accords in southern Africa between 1974 and 1994 -- the Lusaka (1974) and Rome (1992) accords for Mozambique, the Alvor (1975), Bicesse (1991) and Lusaka (1994) accords for Angola, the 1979 Lancaster House accord for Zimbabwe, the 1988 agreement for Namibia and the 1993 agreement for South Africa. His question in each case: what factors determined whether the peace agreement was implemented or whether there was a return to war? At the time the study was written, the Lusaka agreement in Angola had not yet definitively collapsed, and the return to war there actually confirms Ohlson's theoretical propositions even more clearly than the tables in the published book.

Ohlson lays out six key variables -- systemic conflict (Cold War), regional conflict, the role of third parties, leadership (of the parties in conflict), learning (experiences leading to negotiation being valued over conflict), and the extent to which the peace agreement satisfied the parties' goals of political participation and security. A review of Ohlson's work more generally lies outside the scope of this essay, but it is noteworthy that his review of the implementation of the Rome agreement for Mozambique finds almost all the indicators of the six variables predicting success. Writing in mid-1998, Ohlson notes that "the fact that large- scale warfare has not resumed in Angola ... has more to do with sober assessments of

military, diplomatic and economic realities than with a genuine willingness to compromise" (p. 155). As this review is written, in mid-1999, Angola is not only still missing a powerful national culture of peace. It has also not yet had the Mozambique post-Rome advantage of having a set of stable neighbors and a relatively unified international community also interested in investing heavily in peace.

The numerous ways in which the Mozambique experience is unique do not invalidate the efforts to draw "lessons" that might apply to resolving other conflicts.Each of the studies above provide insights that may be helpful in other contexts. As Armon, Hendrickson and Vines note, however, Mozambique "does not offer a blueprint for other war-torn countries engaged in the search for peace" (p. 7). Successful application of any of the lessons, if it happens, will likely less resemble transmission of "best practices" than the kind of creativity Nordstrom documents in the transmission of a culture of peace within Mozambique.

Geography



Mozambique stretches along the Indian Ocean from Tanzania in the north to South Africa in the south, bordering to the west on Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland.

With a coastline of 2,470 km--more than 1500 miles–Mozambique is a little less than twice the size of California in area, or slightly more than all the east coast states from New York through Florida.

The defining physical features of the country are the great distance along the north-south axis and the contrast between the low areas adjoining the sea and the interior plateau, which is most prominent in the north and center.

Note: The topographical map above is taken from the Population- Development-Environment Project study of Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia, by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria, in partnership with institutions in the three countries. The project's report, with rich data and illustrations, is available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pde.

The most important rivers are the Zambezi, which bisects the country, the Rovuma along the northern border, the Limpopo in the south, and the Save along the northern borders of Gaza and Inhambane

provinces.

The climate varies from semi-arid and subtropical in the south to tropical in the north. Seasons are divided into one rainy and one dry season a year. Vegetation is predominantly light forests and grasslands.



http://www.fao.org/giews/english/basedocs/moz/mozmet1e.stm

Topic to explore:

Read the following article. Follow up with research on line on international and Mozambican responses to the floods in 2000 and 2001, and on issues such as the role of dam management in increasing flood risk and the possible influence of global warming. You can start with http://www.africapolicy.org/search.htm andhttp://www.mol.co.mz.

Friday, 2 March, 2001

Mozambique: Prepared but overwhelmed

Rescue efforts combine local and international expertise

By Joseph Hanlon, co-author with Frances Christie of *Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000* (London: James Currey, 2001).

As floodwaters rise on the Zambezi, Mozambique's navy has picked up more than 8,000 stranded people using rubber boats donated by the international community for last year's floods.

This is the second year of major flooding, and a similar pattern is emerging.

Both this year and last year, predictions of heavy rain led to flood warnings and extensive preparation by the Mozambican government, local non-government organizations such as the Red Cross, and United Nations agencies such as the World Food Programme.

But Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and record-breaking floods soon exhaust the capacity of the government - and of neighboring countries.

International help is needed to provide fuel for the boats and helicopters, and to provide tents, food and clean water for the tens of thousands who are forced to flee to high ground.

Media images

Dramatic television pictures and appeals for help by international agencies tend to present a picture of helplessness. But they miss the extensive preparation and organization which had already been done at local level.

Research for my book on last year's floods pointed to three months of preparation, which provided an essential foundation and infrastructure for the massive international support.

Local input

The result was remarkably successful international cooperation, with human, material and financial international aid providing vital help to the Ministry of Health, Red Cross and local government who were already in action dealing with huge numbers of displaced people. One improvement on last year is an increased participation by the Mozambican military.

Last year the Mozambican military rescued 17,000 people, but with very few boats and no helicopters. This year, the boats donated by the international community for last year's flood were put to use quickly.

Mozambique's air force has only two helicopters, but this year, because of the advance warnings, both were serviced and ready to fly, and are now in use for rescue and reconnaissance.

The provinces of Mozambique differ significantly in size, population and other characteristics.



POPULAÇÃO, SUPERFÍCIE E DENSIDADE, SEGUNDO PROVÍNCIA, MOÇAMBIQUE, 2000

PROVÍNCIAS	POPULAÇÃO	SUPERFÍCIE	HAB/Km2
	N	Em Km2	
Total	17.242.240	799,380	21.6
Niassa	870,544	129,056	6.7
Cabo Delgado	1,465,537	82,625	17.7
Nampula	3,265,854	81,606	40.0
Zambezia	3,316,703	106,008	31.6
Tete	1,319,904	100,724	13.1
Manica	1,137,448	61,661	18.4
Sofala	1,453,928	68,018	21.4
Inhambane	1,256,139	68,615	18.3
Gaza	1,203,294	75,709	15.9
Maputo Província	933,951	26,058	35.8
Maputo Cidade	1,018,938	300	3396.5

http://www.ine.gov.mz/indicadores2/densidade_populacional_por__prov.htm

Additional tables from the 1997 census, at both national and provincial levels, are available at the web sites of the National Institute of Statistics (http://www.ine.gov.mz) and, in more detail, the Ministry of Education

(http://www.mined.gov.mz/docs/censo97).

Topic to explore:

Find a map that shows Mozambique's railways, such as that on page 29 of *Atlas Geográfico* published by the Mozambican Ministry of Education or one in a good world atlas (one can find maps on the web that show railways, but not clearly). What does the pattern suggest about problems of national unity in the country?

Politics

Under the 1990 constitution, Mozambique's president and unicameral national assembly are both elected in multiparty national elections every five years. The president appoints professional members of the supreme court, from candidates proposed by the judiciary, and the assembly elects other members of the supreme court. The president also appoints the prime minister, who is the head of government.

Joaquim Alberto Chissano has been president of Mozambique since November 1986. He was first chosen by the central committee of Frelimo after the death of the country's first president Samora Machel, and returned to office in national elections in 1994 and 1999.

Pascoal Mocumbi, previously minister of health, has been prime minister since December 1994.

For parliamentary elections Mozambique uses the d'Hondt method of proportional representation, similar to that used in Australia and for the European parliamentary elections. To be included in the assembly, a party must gain at least 5% of the votes at a national level. Seats within a province are then divided among parties depending on their vote within that province

(See http://www.mozambique.mz/governo/eleicoes/hondt.htm).

The two major parties are Frelimo and Renamo (see history section above). As indicated by the elections results by province shown below, Frelimo has its strongest electoral bases in the south and in the northern province of Cabo Delgado; Renamo has its strongest base in the central provinces of Manica, Sofala, and Zambézia; Niassa, Nampula, and Tete are more evenly divided.

Both history and geography are important influences on political divisions, but it would be a mistake to exaggerate stereotypes based on either influence. Thus, for example, most elected representatives of Renamo joined the party after the war was over, when donors were providing subsidies to turn it from an armed group to a political party. Their common element was opposition to the ruling party, not identification with Renamo's history. And many of the strongest critics of the government today in Mozambique were active supporters of Frelimo's liberation struggle and post-independence policies, who have no sympathies for Renamo's brand of opposition politics. Within both government and opposition, moreover, there is a wide diversity of views on political issues.

1999 Elections

[Source: Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 24 - 28 December 1999

http://www.mozambique.mz/awepa/eawep24/eawepa24.htm]

The results announced by the CNE (National Elections Commission) for the 1999 elections were:

Joaquim Chissano	2,338,333	52.3%
Afonso Dhlakama	2,133,655	47.7%

(Percentages are of valid votes; blank votes were 6.5% and invalid votes 2.9% of a total of 4,934,352 votes.)

This compares with the 1994 results :

Joaquim Chissano 2,633,740 53.3%
Afonso Dhlakama 1,666,965 33.7%
Others 640,774 13.0%
(Percentages are of valid votes; blank votes were 5.8% and invalid votes 2.8%.)

This year there were only 2 presidential candidates, compared to 12 in 1994.

Although Renamo's leader made major gains in the presidential race, Renamo itself made only small gains in the parliamentary race; both Frelimo and Renamo increased their number of seats, but Frelimo strengthened its position as majority party.This year there were 12 parties and coalitions in the parliamentary race, compared to 14 in 1994.

The votes this year were:
Frelimo 2,005,713 48.5%
Renamo 1,603,811 38.8%
Others 522,799 12.7%
(Percentages are of valid votes; blank votes were 9.6% and invalid votes 4.9%.)

The 1994 votes were:
Frelimo 2,115,793 44.3%
Renamo 1,803,506 37.8%
UD 245,793 5.2%
Others 608,133 12.7%
(Percentages are of valid votes; blank votes were 8.4% and invalid votes 3.2%.)

Distribution of 250 Seats in Parliament, by Province

Province	**Renamo-UE**	**Frelimo**
Niassa	7	6
Cabo Delgado	6	16
Nampula	26	24
Zambézia	34	15
Tete	10	8

Manica	10	5
Sofala	17	4
Inhambane	4	13
Gaza	0	16
Maputo Province	1	12
Maputo City	2	14
TOTAL	117	133

For additional background in English on politics in Mozambique in recent years, an invaluable source is the Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, which has been published irregularly, in English and Portuguese, by AWEPA (European Parliamentarians for Africa). Recent issues are available at: http://www.mozambique.mz/awepa.

Although no political parties other than Frelimo and Renamo have gained any significant momentum, there is widespread and growing disillusionment with both parties and with "politics" in general among Mozambicans. In April 2001, the journalist Ricardo Timane, a leading figure in the Movement for Peace and Citizenship, wrote a commentary eloquently expressing this view (Timane died of a heart attack several weeks after the article was published).

An Alternative of Hope, by Ricardo Timane

Metical, April 18, 2001 [translated excerpt;

for Portuguese original see http://www.mol.co.mz/noticias/mt010418.html]

The hour of difficult choices has arrived. Our country is passing through a very troubled period in its history.Those in power try to hide the many problems under the rug and to paint reality with the marvelous colors of the macroeconomic situation, cooking up a beautiful dish called two-digit growth, which the majority of Mozambican citizens from Cabo Delgado to Maputo and from Manica to Zambézia neither eat nor even catch a smell of. The opposition directed by Dhlakhama grumbles, shouts, and pounds on the table, but finds it too much work to come up with even a single idea or project to improve the lives of Mozambicans. At one moment it is throwing rocks at Frelimo and at the government it says it doesn't recognize; at the next moment it is kissing the check from the Planning and Finance Ministry and running to the bank to pick up the salaries for its representatives in parliament. And then it either begs or

threatens violence, depending on its whim, to make its political opponents, which it calls corrupt, divide up the cake, because after all they are brothers, as Dhlakama says. ...

... Mozambicans regardless of party need to join hands in a broad patriotic front and construct an alternative of hope for Mozambique. An alternative against exclusion, for social justice, for dignity and effective institutions, for ethics in government and for participatory democracy by and for the citizens.

Topics to explore: (1) Look up the Mozambique Land Act of 1997 (try "Mozambique land reform" in a search engine) to explore the role of peasant associations in lobbying for changes in the act. (2) In late 2000, the assassination of journalist Carlos Cardoso and the death of prisoners by suffocation in the northern town of Montepuez were each the subject of intense controversy in Mozambique and internationally among those concerned with the country. You will find much information on-line.

Economics

Colonial Legacy of Underdevelopment

Prior to independence in 1975, the economy of Mozambique depended largely on services provided to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The service income came from transit traffic through the ports of Maputo, Beira and Nacala, and from remittances from migrant workers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.A large part came from wages of over 100,000 Mozambican miners working in South Africa.

Exports were concentrated in the agricultural sectors, characterized by forced labor on approximately 4,500 foreign-owned plantations and farms and by forced sale by peasants of cash crops at artificially low prices. Roughly 80 percent of agricultural production by Mozambicans was dedicated to subsistence agriculture. The commercial retail and wholesale network linking the rural areas to national and world markets was dominated by Portuguese settlers and, to a less extent, by Mozambicans of Asian or mixed-race origin.

The major products exported at independence were cashews (15 percent in value), sugar (11 percent), cotton (9 percent), wood (7 percent), prawns (5 percent) and copra (5 percent).Although industry employed only 2 percent of the active labor forces and was concentrated around Maputo and Beira, there was significant increase in manufacturing in the last decade of colonial rule.This was oriented to the consumer market provided by some 200,000 Portuguese settlers, most of whom had arrived in the country since World War II.

Semi-skilled as well as skilled posts in both the colonial administration and the private sector were concentrated in the hands of Portuguese and, secondarily, Mozambicans of Asian and mixed-race origin. Only 20 percent of the non- agricultural work force was of African origin in 1970.Only one tenth of one percent of black Mozambicans (some 5,000 individuals) were estimated to have more than four years of schooling in 1970, out of a total population of 6.6 million over the age of six.

Post-colonial Economy: Exodus, War, Overextended State

Between 1973 and 1975, Mozambique's gross domestic product declined abruptly from $3.5 billion to $2.2 billion (at 1980 prices), a drop of 37 percent. This was the result of the exodus of probably more than 80 percent of the Portuguese settler population in anticipation of or immediately following independence. In aggregate terms, Mozambique has never fully recovered to pre-independence levels, although the trend was modestly positive in the first years of independence (and significantly positive in the last part of the 1990s).

From 1981, the war had an even more negative impact than that of the settler exodus, with GDP declining to $1.6 billion in the low year of 1985. During the period 1980-1988, the UN calculated that Mozambique suffered economic losses due to the war of approximately $16 billion (1988 prices).

While the primary reason for economic decline was the war, the economy also suffered from over-centralized management by a state that was seriously lacking in skilled personnel and management capacity. While health care, education and banking were nationalized by decree, much of the rest of the economy also fell into government hands, as the state took responsibility for farms, factories and other businesses abandoned by settlers.

The Mozambican service sector--including rail and port services for all the interiorcountries as well as migrant labor to South Africa and Rhodesia--was highly vulnerable. When Mozambique implemented UN sanctions against Rhodesia in 1978, it was a crippling blow to the economy of central Mozambique. South African cutbacks on migrant Mozambican mine workers were devastating to southern Mozambique, as well as cutting foreign exchange. And the transport sector was at the mercy of sabotage during the war.

The colonial agricultural economy had been based on the coercion of the Portuguese state and a network of rural trading dominated by Portuguese settlers. Makeshift replacements failed to install a working agricultural system. Efforts to build a new system suffered both from the government's concentration on state farms (formerly Portuguese-owned) to the neglect of peasant farmers, and from the African and Renamo military strategy of targeting rural communities and the links between city and countryside. Both agricultural export earnings and food production dropped dramatically in the 1980s.

For an overview of the interaction of war and other factors in Mozambique's economic decline in the 1980s, see chapter 10 of William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras* (London: Zed, 1994). For a detailed analysis of economic policies in the agrarian sector, see Merle Bowen, *The State against the Peasantry* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000).

Growth with Poverty

Since the end of the war in 1992 and elections in 1994, Mozambique has seen renewed economic growth, combined with continuing poverty for the vast majority of the population. The current context is

summarized in the October 2000 issue of the UN publication *Africa Recovery*, in an article reproduced below in condensed form.

Condensed from "Mozambique: growth with poverty," by Paul Fauvet, *Africa Recovery*, October 2000. *Africa Recovery* is available on-line at http://www.africarecovery.org.

Since peace came in 1992, the image of Mozambique has been transformed from that of an economic basket case to an African "success story." Despite severe flood damage this year [2000], the economy has grown dramatically, achieving some of the highest growth rates in thecontinent. But poverty remains widespread and the country is still heavily dependent on donor aid -- and subject to the onerous conditionsattached to such assistance.

By the late 1990s, the economy had made remarkable progress, with double-digit growth rates.Nevertheless, economic growth is not a panacea. Large increases in gross domestic product (GDP) coexist with grinding poverty for the bulk of the population.

By the time President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama signed a peace agreement in 1992, much of the country's physical infrastructure -- roads, bridges, railways, sugar mills, rural shops and much else -- lay in ruins. Annual per capita GDP had fallen from $133 in 1981 to $90 in 1993.

Since the mid-1990s, the targets of high growth rates, low inflation and currency stability have all been met, and the government has won praise from its international partners for its tight control over public finance. The GDP growth rate peaked at 11.3 percent in 1997 and averaged nearly 10 per cent in 1996-99. This is one of the highest rates in the world, although from an admittedly low starting point.

By 1997, the inflation rate had declined to 5.5 per cent, from 54 per cent in 1995. In 1998, for the first time, average prices actually fell and the inflation rate for the year was minus 1.3 per cent, before rising again to a modest 4.8 per cent in 1999. Significantly, these price falls were concentrated in foodstuffs, on which poor Mozambicans spend the bulk of their income.

Low inflation went hand-in-hand with currency stability. In 1992 the Bank of Mozambique stopped fixing the exchange rate of the country's currency -- the metical -- and let it float according to supply and demand. The metical's depreciation against the US dollar became no more than a gentle slide, making it one of the most stable currencies in Southern Africa. This was achieved thanks in part to tight credit ceilings and control over the money supply, although this has posed difficulties for Mozambican businesses. The government has vowed that it will not resort to printing more money to pay its bills.

Despite this macro-economic "success story," 69 per cent of Mozambicans still live below the poverty line (see table). As Prime Minister Mocumbi told donors in 1998, poverty "is an atrocious reality, particularly in the countryside where 80 per cent of the population lives." This rural poverty is intimately linked with rudimentary agricultural techniques. Only 7 per cent of farmers use traction (animal or mechanical) and only 2 per cent use fertilizers or pesticides. The dominant image of Mozambican

agriculture remains that of a farmer (usually a woman, and often with a baby on her back) turning the soil over with nothing but a hoe.

Peace and adequate -- if sometimes excessive -- rains have contributed to an agricultural recovery, despite some flood losses. The 1980s spectre of famine has vanished. There is no longer a chronic food deficit.

Increased grain harvests are not due to higher productivity, however, but simply to an increase in the area under cultivation. Most peasant families have been unable to build up a reserve of food or money that would see them through a bad harvest. A disaster such as this year's floods plunges the affected areas into an immediate crisis and sends the government appealing once again for international food aid. Fragile marketing networks and the poor state of access roads add to the precariousness of small-scale farming.

In the towns, most of the social and economic safety nets that existed under the previous centrally planned economy have been withdrawn. There is no longer a basic ration of subsidized food for all and health services are no longer essentially free. The statutory minimum wage for industrial and office workers is now the equivalent of $30 a month. The trade unions complain that workers alone are bearing the costs of the structural adjustment programmes under way since 1987. The Mozambican Workers' Organization (OTM), the main union federation, argues that more than 100,000 jobs have been lost over the past decade because of structural adjustment policies. The unions calculate that in order to meet the basic needs of an average family of five, a worker needs a monthly wage of 900,000 meticais ($76).

One of the government's main goals is to attract foreign investment, particularly in large enterprises that could generate thousands of jobs. The largest project is the $1.3 billion MOZAL aluminium smelter on the outskirts of Maputo, which began production in June 2000. The main shareholders are the London-based metals company Billiton, Mitsubishi of Japan, and the South African Industrial Development Corporation. The construction phase created around 7,000 temporary jobs, but there will only be 800 full-time staff when the smelter is fully operational, probably by March 2001, when its annual output is expected to reach 250,000 tonnes. All of this will be for export, and at an anticipated value of $400 million, the aluminum will earn Mozambique more than all exports combined in 1999.

An even larger project on the drawing board is a factory to produce steel slabs in Maputo, using South African iron ore and Mozambican natural gas. This would entail a $1.6 billion investment and another $600 million to build a gas pipeline. However, negotiations between the Mozambican government and the US corporation Enron stalled for more than a year over terms for exploiting the Pande gas field in Inhambane province. Agreement was finally reached in April 1999, giving Enron rights over a larger area than the government had initially wanted.

Focus on transport

Despite the war, major upgrading of transport infrastructure took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including rehabilitation of Beira port and the rail lines from Beira and Maputo to Zimbabwe and most of the line from Nacala into Malawi.

Currently, Mozambique and South Africa are improving transport links to encourage traffic from South Africa's Gauteng and Mpumalanga provinces to use Maputo port, which is much closer to Johannesburg than any South African port. The key component of a major project called the Maputo Development Corridor, launched by Mozambique and South Africa in 1996, is a toll road from Maputo to the South African town of Witbank. Now under construction by a consortium headed by the French firm Bouygues, the road is ahead of schedule and should be ready later this year. Plans for the corridor also include dredging the Maputo port entrance channel to take larger vessels.

Dependence on donors

Despite the macro-economic improvements, Mozambique remains dependent on huge annual injections of foreign grants and soft loans. The government collects enough domestic revenue to cover its running costs, but the capital budget is almost entirely funded by foreign aid.



Every year the government attends the World Bank's Consultative Group for Mozambique, which brings together the country's major creditors. The most recent meeting, in June 2000, brought donor pledges of $530 million for this year and $570 million for 2001.

Besides the bilateral creditors, both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) exercise significant policy leverage through their lending. If they are not satisfied with Mozambique's implementation of IMF/World Bank programmes, they can suspend lending, which in turn endangers funds from bilateral sources. Prime Minister Mocumbi, responding in a parliamentary debate to opposition complaints that the government is taking orders from foreigners, acknowledged, "We are a



country that begs, and beggars have their sovereignty curtailed." Agreements reached with the Bank, Fund and other creditor institutions have included a wide variety of policy targets and conditions. Most recently, Mozambique's policy framework for 1999-2002, agreed to with the IMF and World Bank, stipulates that the government will continue to improve the environment for private sector development and further liberalize trade and investment.

The Case of the Disappearing Cashew Industry

Cashews, one of Mozambique's leading exports, grow on trees, which are owned by peasant families in almost all areas of the country. But the nuts must be extracted from a hard shell containing a toxic liquid. In the years immediately following independence, Mozambique's processing industry employed some 10,000 workers, mostly women. In 1976 Mozambique exported 21,100 tonnes of processed cashew kernels, worth $33 million, 23% of export earnings

By the end of the war in 1992, marketed production of raw nuts had dropped dramatically, from 200,000 tons a year in the 1970s (when Mozambique was the world's leading producer) to about 32,000 tons a year. This was due mainly to the collapse of the rural marketing network and war-related damage to the cashew tree stock (estimated at 25 million trees). Still, in 1996-1997 a survey reported that26% of rural families had cashew trees.

Early in 2001 the Mozambique News Agency reported that most cashew workers were unemployed.The decline of the industry has been the subject of a bitter policy dispute pitting the World Bank against Mozambican public opinion and international critics. Read the news agency report below, and excerpts from the clashing views of columnist Paul Krugman and critic Robert Naiman.

You can find more on-line, including the classic article of Mozambique specialist Joe Hanlon (http://www.jubileeplus.org/analysis/reports/roape100400.htm) , and a recent article by Washington Post correspondent Jon Jeter (http://www.globalexchange.org/wbimf/washpost101800.html). For other sources use the search at http://www.africapolicy.org/search.htm.

MOST CASHEW WORKERS NOW UNEMPLOYED

Maputo, 20 Jan, 2001 (AIM / Mozambique News Agency) - About 6,000 workers in Mozambique's cashew processing industry lost their jobs in 2000, according to the general secretary of the Cashew Workers Union (SINTIC), Boaventura

Mondlane, cited in Saturday's issue of the Maputo daily "Noticias".

This brings to 8,500 the number of workers who have definitively lost their jobs since the crisis in the cashew sector began to bite in 1997. In other words, the great majority of workers in this industry are now unemployed.

"We have just ended a dark year for the cashew sector", said Mondlane. Prospects for the future looked no better - he said there was no money available to reopen factories that have closed because of the liberalization of the trade in cashews imposed on Mozambique by the World Bank.

Since 1995, the World Bank had insisted that protection be removed from the local processing industry: in effect, this meant that raw cashew nuts were exported to India, for processing by child laborers who shell the nuts by hand, rather than sold to the Mozambican factories. Liberalization, the World Bank insisted, protected the interests of the peasants who harvest the nuts, who would receive a greater percentage of the cashew price.

But as the industrialists predicted, the opposite has happened. With next to no competition from the local factories, the exporters of raw nuts have been able to push prices down.

"The result of liberalization, which we are now witnessing, is a fall in the marketing price", said Mondlane. "The producers are earning less and less, contrary to the arguments of the World Bank and the government. Now that the industry has been put out of action, prices are tumbling".

This year's cashew marketing campaign in northern Mozambique looks good, but the bankrupt industries are unable to purchase nuts and reopen their plants.

With the fading of all hope for the industry, workers who had been kept on the books even though they were producing nothing, have now been made definitively redundant.The sacked workers are receiving their wage arrears and their redundancy pay. "We are not satisfied at the payment of redundancy money", said Mondlane. "Our objective is employment, and not the laying off of workers". (AIM)

Krugman v. Naiman (excerpts only: full text of Krugman’s article and Naiman’s reply can be found at http://www.fair.org/articles/naiman-krugman.html)

From “Reckonings: A Real Nut Case,” Paul Krugman, *The New York Times*, April 19, 2000

When Seattle Man went to Washington, his activities were coordinated in large part by a Web site, www.a16.org. Browsing the site, I was struck by the critique of the World Bank, written by Robert Naiman ... [Naiman’s] example of how bank-imposed policies inflict economic damage is the way the bank "destroyed Mozambique's cashew nut processing industry, by forcing Mozambique to remove export tariffs on raw cashew nuts."

Mozambique's cashews are grown overwhelmingly by small farmers. ... a stiff export tax levied on raw, but not processed, nuts [...] in effect prevented the farmers from selling their product on the world market, and forced them to continue selling cheaply to domestic processors.

The World Bank demanded, as a condition for new loans, that this export tax be reduced. ... Governments

frequently tax the rural poor to subsidize urban industries -- industries whose workers are very badly paid by Western standards, but nonetheless receive much higher wages than most of their compatriots. This case -- in which peasants were forced to sell their crops cheaply in order to protect the jobs of 10,000 processing workers -- fits right into the pattern. ...

The World Bank is evil, then, because it tried to end a policy that not only made Mozambique as a whole poorer, but directly hurt millions of impoverished small farmers. Its high-minded critics want to keep the prices those farmers receive low, on behalf of 10,000 politically influential workers and a handful of foreign factory owners.

From Robert Naiman letter to the New York Times, “Krugman’s Sloppy Economics,” April 20, 2000

Paul Krugman ("A Real Nut Case") is right about one thing: the destruction of Mozambique's cashew nut processing industry by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is my favorite example showing why the destructive power of these institutions must be dramatically reduced. It illustrates that the IMF and the Bank exercise colonial power over developing countries; that, like Krugman, they are sloppy economists ...

On the paramount question of democracy, Krugman doesn't contest that the IMF and the World Bank imposed their policies on Mozambique-- contrary to their claims about "negotiation" and "dialogue."

As to whether the World Bank's diktat was good economic policy for Mozambique, it is Krugman who needs to do his homework. Krugman ignores the 1997 Deloitte & Touche study commissioned by the World Bank, which found that Mozambique's peasants did not gain anything from liberalized exports of raw cashews. This single fact demolishes Krugman's entire defense of the Bank's policy. The study also found that Indian subsidies to its cashew nut processing industry made competition unfair, and that Mozambique earns an extra $130 per ton processing its own cashews, "sufficient reason to support the processing industry against competition from India."

Health and Education

“According to estimates in Mozambique's national Human Development Report, released last Tuesday, the country can expect to lose 17% of its educational personnel by the year 2010 due to HIV/AIDS. Predicted deaths from AIDS include 9,200 teachers and 123 senior professional staff in the Ministry of Education.”

The news item above, from a Maputo newspaper (*Noticias)* of June 14, 2001, starkly poses the enormous challenge for both health and education in Mozambique. After initial successes in the first years of independence in addressing the legacy of backwardness left by Portuguese colonialism, and significant progress in the 1990s in recovering from the damages to health and education from the years of war, the country now faces another formidable challenge.

Visitors arriving in the country today, without a sense of earlier successes against long odds, may easily see only the obstacles to progress. Yet there is a hidden resource in Mozambique's well-documented determination to succeed in health and education when resources are available.

Some Early Successes

Beforeindependence the country hadapproximately 500 doctors, overwhelmingly of Portuguese origin, less than one doctor for 22,000 people. They served primarily the white population and a fraction of urban blacks; most rural communities had little or no accessto modern health care. Less than 100of these doctorsstayed on afterindependence. But after nationalizinghealth care in July 1975, the new government managed to expand services,stressing preventive medicine andprimary health care.

By recruiting foreign health workers from a wide variety ofcountries, and by traininglarge numbers of nurses andparamedics, the new health system quickly extended rudimentary coveragearound the country.A national vaccination campaign in 1976, achieving coverage of 96%, was rated a remarkable success by the World Health Organization (WHO). In 1982, the last year before war becamegeneralized in mostof the countryside, a WHO study of randomly selectedrural areas found "extensive contact by mothers andtheir young children with rural health services." Thehealth budget, 3.3% of state expenditures in 1974, increased to an average of over 10% overthe 1976-82 period. Mozambique's poverty meant that this added up to only US$5 per capita in1982, the peakyear. Making the most of limited resources, the HealthMinistry established aformulary of several hundred basic drugs, requiring competitive biddingfrom foreign suppliers. The new system reduced costs of imported medicines by 40%, making it possible to provide rural health posts with relatively regular supplies.

Even in 1982, regular preventive measures were reaching less than half the population, and even fewer had access to curative medicine.The majority of doctors werestill in the cities, and less than a third were Mozambican. Management, particularly in the hospitals, left much to be desired. Butgiven the startingpoint and the resourcesavailable, Mozambicansrightly took pridein the achievements of their health policies.

Developments in education were also impressive. Justbefore independence theilliteracy rate, including whites, was over 90%. Only one percent--about80,000 people--had completed more thanfour years of school, and most of these were Portuguese settlers. In 1973, only40 of the 3,000 university students were African.By 1980, illiteracy was down to 75%.Primary school enrollment expandedfrom 666,000 in1973 to 1.4 million in 1980. Secondary school enrollmentwent from 33,000 to91,000 over thesame period, an extraordinarypace considering thatin 1973 a high proportion werewhite. New teacher training courses in each province increased thenumber of primary teachersfrom 11,000 to 19,000. Double shifts and classes held outdoors orunder hastily constructed shelters partially made up for a lack of school buildings.

This pace of advance would likely not have been sustainable even with peace. But

with rural clinics and schools among the primary targets of attack by Renamo, the 1980s saw much of this progress reversed. During the war half the rural primary schools were burned down or forced to close, and the health network shrank by more than a third.

*Recovery and Obstacles**

* condensed from Paul Fauvet, *Africa Recovery*, October 2000.

Until 1994, defense spending was easily the largest single item of recurrent expenditure in the annual budget. But after the 1994 elections, resources were shifted, and each year saw a real increase in allocations to the social sectors.

By the end of 1998, the primary school network had recovered from the damage inflicted during the war. The number of first-level primary schools (first to fifth years) equaled and then surpassed the number that had been operating in 1983. There were 6,600 such schools by April 1999, attended by 2.1 million children.

However, according to the education ministry's planning directorate, 32 per cent of primary schoolchildren attend schools that are so crowded that classes have to be given in three shifts a day. Even so, many children still cannot get a place in school. Currently, only 81 per cent of all 6-year-olds enter the first year of primary school, though this is much better than the 59 per cent figure in 1992.

The education pyramid narrows dramatically after the fifth year. There are only 440 second-level primary schools (sixth and seventh years), and just 81 secondary schools in the entire country. Most children cannot go to secondary school, since there are simply not enough places. There were fewer than 64,000 children receiving basic secondary education (levels eight to ten) in early 1999, and only 8,500 in pre-university schools. There are about 7,000 students enrolled in Mozambique's six university-level institutions (three public and three private), and 15,000 in various vocational colleges.

The school system also is characterized by high dropout and failure rates, particularly among girls. The quality of education is poor, in part because teachers remain poorly paid, despite the budget increases.

Illiteracy Rate by Sex and Residence in 1980 and 1997

Sex	Residence	1980	1997
Both sexes	Total	72.2	60.5
	Urban	40.3	33.0

	Rural	77.1	72.2
Female	Total	84.5	74.1
	Urban	56.5	46.2
	Rural	88.4	85.1
Male	Total	na	44.6
	Urban	na	19.4
	Rural	na	56.4

Modern health services reach only about 40 per cent of the population. For key public vaccination campaigns, mobile brigades are sent into remote areas, with great success. Indeed, the second dose of the 1998 vaccination against polio reached 111 per cent of the national target, partly, explained Health Minister Aurelio Zilhao, because many mothers from neighbouring countries brought their children into Mozambique to be vaccinated. Mozambique is now likely to qualify for World Health Organization certification as a polio-free country . But the shortage of clean drinking water, poor or non-existent sanitation in peri-urban areas, and inadequate refuse collection facilitate the spread of disease, including cholera and malaria.

And now AIDS. At the end of 1999, UNAIDS estimates 13% of Mozambican adults as infected with HIV. This is lower than the 25% rates in Swaziland and Zimbabwe, or the 20% rates in South Africa and Zambia. (For country fact sheets see http://www.aids.org). But it is more than enough to overwhelm the resources of the country, even one with double-digit economic growth rates. Mozambique's leaders were among the earliest in Africa to speak frankly about AIDS.

Mozambique's Prime Minister, himself a doctor and former minister of health, had this to say in an opinion piece in *The New York Times* (June 20, 2001)

A Time for Frankness on AIDS and Africa, By PASCOAL MOCUMBI

[excerpts: For the full article, go to:

http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/20/opinion/20MOCU.html

"In Mozambique, the overall rate of H.I.V. infection among girls and young women–15 percent--is twice

that of boys their age, not because the girls are promiscuous, but because nearly three out of five are married by age 18, 40 percent of them to much older, sexually experienced men who may expose their wives to H.I.V. and sexually transmitted diseases. Similar patterns are common in other nations where H.I.V. is rapidly spreading. Abstinence is not an option for these child brides. Those who try to negotiate condom use commonly face violence or rejection. And in heterosexual sex, girls and women are biologically more vulnerable to infection than are boys or men."

As a father, I fear for the lives of my own children and their teenage friends. Though they have secure families, education, and the information and support they need to avoid risky sex, too few of their peers do.

As prime minister, I am horrified that we stand to lose most of a generation, maybe two. The United Nations estimates that 37 percent of the 16-year-olds in my country will die of AIDS before they are 30.

As a man, I know men's behavior must change, that we must raise boys differently, to have any hope of eradicating H.I.V. and preventing the emergence of another such scourge."

"Today, in Africa and elsewhere, we are far from achieving these goals. Most political leaders still view adolescent sex as a politically volatile subject to be avoided. Community and religious leaders wrongly believe that sexuality education promotes promiscuity. Health providers and teachers are ill trained about sexuality and ill at ease with it. Parents know little about sexuality, contraception or sexually transmitted diseases, and many believe that early marriage will "protect" their daughters. They may themselves condone or perpetrate sexual violence as a legitimate expression of masculinity.

For the long term, we need to develop H.I.V. vaccines and provide treatment to everyone with H.I.V. We need to develop protection methods like microbicides that women can use with or without a partner's knowledge or cooperation. Above all, we must summon the courage to talk frankly and constructively about sexuality. We must recognize the pressures on our children to have sex that is neither safe nor loving. We must provide them with information, communications skills and, yes, condoms.

To change fundamentally how girls and boys learn to relate to each other and how men treat girls and women is slow, painstaking work. But surely our children's lives are worth the effort."

– Pascoal Mocumbi, prime minister of Mozambique and its former minister of health, is a physician and a board member of the International Women's Health Coalition.

Culture

Languages

Mozambique encompasses a wide variety of cultural traditions which have intertwined in complex

patterns of interrelationship over history–those coming from Bantu-speaking cultures in Mozambique and neighboring countries, from Islamic and other Asian influences, and from the colonial powers and settlers in neighboring countries as well as the Portuguese.

African languages spoken in Mozambique belong to the group of Bantu languages. Their similarities are roughly the same as those within the Romance group of European languages, and it is relatively easy for someone who knows one of them to acquire at least a working knowledge of another. The largest group of closely related languages is Makua-Lomwe, in Nampula and Zambézia provinces, which is spoken by approximately a third of Mozambicans. Tsonga, with variants called Ronga and Tswa , is referred to as Shangaan in neighboring South Africa, and dominates southern Mozambique, being spoken by a with a bit more than a tenth of Mozambicans. In central Mozambique Shona languages are spoken, including Ndau and Manyika.

Mozambicans share many languages with their neighbors, including Swahili, Yao, and Makonde with Tanzanians; Nyanja and Chewa with Malawians; Shona with Zimbabweans; and Shangaan with people of the northeastern Transvaal in South Africa.

Note: the names of languages are spelled in many different ways. They may often be preceded by Xi (in Portuguese) or Chi (in English), the Bantu prefix that indicates a language name.

The national language of Mozambique, and the language of instruction in schools,is Portuguese. As such, Portuguese is being assimilated into Mozambican culture, and adapted to Mozambique, as significant numbers of Mozambicans use it as a first language. Although less than one percent of Mozambicans are of Portuguese ancestry, 1997 census results say 6.5% of those over 5 years old regard Portuguese as their “mother tongue.” In urban areas 17% say they regard Portuguese as their mother tongue; 26.1% say it is the language they speak most frequently at home.

Almost 40% of Mozambicans say they know how to speak Portuguese, with the rate rising to 81% among urban males and falling to 16% among rural females.

Contemporary Arts

No attempt to present Mozambican music, dance, painting, sculpture, theatre and literature could possibly substitute for hearing and seeing in person. Fortunately there are at least small samples now available on the web that can give at least a glimpse of what is available in Mozambique.

The black-and-white painting to the left and the color painting on the cover of this study guide are among the prodigious artistic output of Malangatana Valente Ngwenya, generally considered Mozambique's leading contemporary artist.

You will find a page dedicated to him on the Mozambique home page

(http://www.mozambique.mz /malangatana) and an extended collection of photographs of making of his mural at the Center for African Studies of Eduardo Mondlane University (http://www.uem.mz/

malangatana). A web search will turn up numerous additional sites, many with images of his paintings.

Despite his prominence, Malangatana is not alone, but part of a wide panorama of artistic creativity in the country.

The culture page of Mozambique On-Line (http://www.mol.co.mz/cultura) is the best entry point for those visiting by web. Among links of particular interest are the following:

Arms into Art

http://www.africaserver.nl/nucleo/

On-line exhibit of sculptures from recycled weapons, the result of a joint project by the Christian Council of Mozambique and Maputo's Nucleo de Arte.

Centro Cultural de Matalana

http://www.matalana.cjb.net/

Innovative web site, including children's art, from a cultural center outside Maputo.

Caixinha de Música (Music Box)

http://www.macua.com/caixinha1.html

Collection of Mozambican music on the web, in Real Audio and MP3 formats.

Child's Eye

http://www.piac.org/childseye/silva.htm

Exhibit of photographs of children in central Mozambique, Sérgio Silva

Art of Mozambique

http://www.cama.org.za/mozambiq/art.htm

Exhibit in South Africa of several Mozambican artists.

Mozambican musical instruments

http://www.geocities.com/TheTropics/2962/instrumentos_index.html

Drawings and descriptions (in Portuguese) of traditional Mozambican musical instruments.

Religion

As shown by this graph reporting on the 1997 census, from the National Institute of Statistics in Mozambique, Catholics and those claiming no religion–many of whom may hold local traditional beliefs--each make up almost one quarter of the population of Mozambique. Muslims and adherents of what in Southern Africa are called "Zionist" or "African Independent" churches come next, with a bit over 17% each, followed by Protestants with almost 8%



http://www.ine.gov.mz/

In colonial Mozambique, the Roman Catholic church was the state church, with close links to the colonial state. Pressure from other European powers ensured access by Protestant missionaries to some parts of Mozambique, but it was restricted to certain areas of the country. Missions were restricted in their use of African languages in education, and the Portuguese hierarchy suspected not only Protestants but also non-Portuguese Catholic missionaries of disloyalty to Portugal. In the colonial period, the Portuguese Catholic Church was among the most conservative in the world.

Nevertheless, Catholic as well as Protestant Mozambicans were active in the liberation struggle. One of the martyrs of the struggle, a Presbyterian minister named Zedequias Mangahela, has a street named after him in Maputo. And it was Catholic missionaries who exposed the massacre of villagers by Portuguese troops in Wiriyamu in Tete province in 1972.

In the years following independence, relations between the Mozambican government and the Catholic church in particular were very tense, as Frelimo nationalized church schools and medical services and integrated them into expanded national educational and health systems. The hostility intensified in 1978 after Frelimo declared itself a "Marxist-Leninist" party and many party officials displayed a dogmatic opposition not only to organized religious groups but also to traditional religious beliefs. Suspicion that some in the Catholic hierarchy supported Renamo widened the gap with the Catholic church in particular.

By the early 1980s, however, the ruling party was seeking rapprochement even with the most hostile church leaders, including cooperation in responding to the damages from war and natural disasters. At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, Mozambican church leaders as well as the Italian Catholic order of St. Egídio played key roles in facilitating contacts between the government and Renamo, one of the factors leading to the peace agreement in 1992. [See an account of the role of the churches in the peace process in Mozambique, by two of the church leaders who were involved: "A Calling for Peace: Christian Leaders and the Quest for Reconciliation in Mozambique," By Dínis S. Sengulane and Jaime Pedro Gonçalves (http://www.c-r.org/acc_moz/sengulane.htm)]

For additional sources on religion in Mozambique, including links to the web sites for specific churches and missions, see http://www.mol.co.mz/religiao.

International Relations

Mozambique's international relations have been decisively shaped by its geographical position, its history and its poverty. Through skillful diplomacy, both as a liberation movement before independence and then as the country's ruling party, Frelimo succeeded in building good will and relationships for the country that go well beyond those that might be expected on the basis of its resources or strategic interest to outside powers.

In terms of transport, labor migration, and culture, the three zones of Mozambique have been linked to different sectors of southern and eastern Africa. Southern Mozambique has an intimate connection to South Africa. Central Mozambique's ties to Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi are also profound. And northern Mozambique is tied to Tanzania and, to a lesser extent, to other countries of the western Indian Ocean. All its land borders are with English-speaking nations, and English is taught in Mozambican schools.

For those familiar with this context, it was not a surprise that Mozambique formally joined the Commonwealth in 1997 (http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97nov1/14nov-mozambique.html). Portuguese continues to be the official language, however, and Mozambique is also an active participant in organizations of Portuguese-speaking states, including the group called PALOP (African Countries with Portuguese as an Official Language -

http://portal.com.pt/palop/pnn1) Despite a series of disputes with the former colonial power in the first decade after independence, Mozambique also enjoys generally good relations with Portugal.

The history of Mozambique's war for independence and the subsequent years of engagement in the struggle against minority rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa was also decisive in shaping Mozambican foreign relations. Mozambique had particularly close ties with Tanzania and Zambia, which provided the rear base for the war for independence. Similarly, it had close ties with Zimbabwean and South African liberation movements which relied on Mozambican support. Mozambique not only played a leading role in founding the group of Front Line States and then the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), but also continues to be one of the key actors in facilitating communication among other members and in behind-the-scenes diplomacy on regional issues. Mozambique diplomats, for example, played an important role in facilitating the Lancaster House agreement for independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.

On a global scale, Mozambique's position was also shaped by the stance taken by different actors towards the liberation of southern Africa. Before independence, with the United States and other Western countries allied to Portugal, Mozambique relied on the Soviet bloc and China as well as African support. It also continued to reach out for support in the West. The Nordic countries were an important source of support, as were churches and other non-governmental groups in other Western countries.

These international relationships, especially that between the US and South Africa as Washington pursued

the Reagan Administration's "constructive engagement" policies, shaped Mozambique's international relations in the first decade after independence. By 1983, however, Mozambique's leaders had concluded that the danger from South Africa was so great and Mozambique so vulnerable that they had no choice but to try to woo the Western countries and build new ties with even the most conservative Western leaders. The rapprochement with President Reagan, despite some in the U.S. who proposed adding Renamo to the list of Reagan Doctrine military clients, was facilitated by the good ties Mozambique already enjoyed with Margaret Thatcher's government in the United Kingdom.

By the late 1980s the U.S. had joined the Soviet Union, Sweden and Italy among the top bilateral donors to Mozambique. Mozambique had joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and shifted its economic policies accordingly. It had engaged the U.S. as well as other intermediaries in the search for peace with

South Africa and with Renamo. And it had built solid relationships with a host of donor agencies and non-governmental organizations, to the extent that some quipped that the "people's republic" had given way to the "donor's republic."

For more background on the period 1975-1992 in particular, see chapter 5, "The Cold War Connection," in William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*.The views of a key U.S. policy maker (Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) can be found in Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa* (New York: Norton, 1992)

With the heavy engagement of the UN and bilateral donors in management as well as funding of the peace process in 1992-1994, and the parallel escalation of the World Bank and IMF role in economic planning during the 1990s, one of the key issues in Mozambican foreign relations was how much autonomy it was possible to maintain in such a context of dependence. Nevertheless, Mozambique continued to offer a distinctive voice in the international arena, on regional and global as well as on national issues.

Topic to explore: use an internet search engine and look up "Mozambique debt" or "Mozambique landmines" to find out Mozambique's role on these issues.

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Mozambique on the Internet

Despite all its apparent disadvantages--poverty, the damages left by war, and the use of a national language other than English--Mozambique has been one of the pioneers in Africa in use of the Internet. Under the leadership of Venâncio Massingue at the computer center of Eduardo Mondlane University, store-and-forward e-mail connections were first set up in 1992, and direct Internet access in 1994. The university provided Internet services both inside and outside the university, finding an enthusiastic response in both government and non-government sectors.

In the second half of the 1990s, with increased donor support and strong government encouragement, including the state-owned telephone company, internet access expanded rapidly with founding of new private ISPs, the development of web sites by government agencies, and extension of services to areas outside Maputo. Mozambique was one of the first African countries to have its national telephone book available on-line (in 1999)! (See http://rovuma.tdm.mz).

By the year 2000, Mozambique was estimated to have over 6,000 Internet subscribers, with 5 major ISPs

and access points in 4 cities.

There is a wealth of information on-line provided by Mozambican sources: government agencies, commercial media, non-governmental organizations and private individuals, as well as information about Mozambique from international agencies. Most of the Mozambican sites are in Portuguese, but many also contain sections in English. While some sites are slow to load due to limited bandwidth, this situation is improving rapidly.

As everywhere in the world, Internet sites in Mozambique change rapidly. For current information, always use a search engine as well as the sites suggested in this section.Be sure to enter “Moçambique” or “Mocambique” as well as “Mozambique” to get sites in Portuguese as well as English. Two highly recommended search engines are Google http://www.google.com and FAST http://www.alltheweb.com.

The most comprehensive guide to Mozambican sites (as well as to information on Mozambique from many international sites) is Mozambique On-Line (http://www.mol.co.mz). Mozambique On-Line provides current news (in Portuguese and in English), and links organized by topic, often with informative annotations. The following is a small selection of recommended sites in several sectors. Additional links can be found in the topical sections above.

General Information

http://www.mozambique.mz/eindex.htm

Official Mozambique home page, produced by Computer Center at Eduardo Mondlane University.URL is for English version.

http://www.ine.gov.mz

National Statistical Institute; includes results of last census (1997)

http://www.unsystemmoz.org

UN System in Mozambique – includes World Bank as well as other agencies; current information on 2001 floods

http://www.africapolicy.org/featdocs/southern.htm and

http://www.africapolicy.org/featdocs/southnws.htm

Links to other sources of country-specific data and news.

Economy

http://www.mol.co.mz/economia/

Comprehensive collection of links

http://www.mozambique.mz/economia/contacto.htm

Useful contacts for economic issues

Politics

http://www.mozambique.mz/awepa/

Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 1997-2001, in English and Portuguese

Published by European Parliamentarians for Africa

News

http://allafrica.com/mozambique

News updated daily from international sources, in English and French.

http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/archive/mozambique.phtml

From the UN's Integrated Regional Information Service

http://www.mol.co.mz/notmoc/

Weekly news summary, in Portuguese. Also available free by e-mail subscription.

http://www.sortmoz.com/aimnews/English/Menu.htm

Mozambique News Agency daily news summary, in English.

and links to many more sources at:

http://www.mol.co.mz/noticias

Yet More Links on Mozambique

While many links are duplicated in the extensive listings on the sites below, many are not.

http://www.gksoft.com/govt/en/mz.html

Governments on the Web

http://www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/moz.html

Stanford University African Studies

http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Country_Specific/Mozambique.html

University of Pennsylvania African Studies

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/africa/cuvl/Mozambique.html

Columbia University African Studies

http://www.kanimambo.com/kan4i0.htm

A site in Portugal dedicated to Mozambique