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<td>9800 Savage Road, Suite 6248</td>
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<td>Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248</td>
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<td>Fax: 443-479-3612</td>
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A REFERENCE GUIDE TO SELECTED HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 1931 - 1985 (U)

SOURCE DOCUMENTS IN CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY VOL. 2

Compiled by:
Gerald K. Haines
Henry F. Schorreck
Donald C. Wigglesworth

This document contains CODEWORD material

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TOP SECRET
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CLASSIFICATION NOTICE

The Reference Guide was compiled from documents which were produced over a period of fifty-some years, spanning repeated and significant changes in Department of Defense, NSA, and national classification policy and guidelines. Under these circumstances it has proven impractical to portion-mark this work with any confidence in the validity of such an effort.

Therefore, the Guide is classified TOP SECRET UMBRA in its entirety. No portion of its text or prefatory material may be extracted or released without the explicit permission of the National Security Agency.

The contents of this publication should not be reproduced, or further disseminated outside the National Security Agency/Central Security Service without permission of the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the History and Publications Division (T542), National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, MD, 20755.
This is a reference guide to selected historical documents which reflect the evolution and development of a national organization charged with the responsibility for United States Signal Intelligence (Sigint) and Communications Security (Comint). It is not a complete listing of all documentation on the cryptologic effort of the United States government. Beginning in the early 1930s with the closure of the Black Chamber and the establishment of the U.S. Army's Signal Intelligence Service, it focuses on the origins and functions of the Armed Forces Security Agency and the creation of the National Security Agency. It traces the development of the National Security Agency, its organization, functions, and missions from 1952 to 1985. It is not a complete listing of all documentation but a carefully selected representation of major issues and events in the history of modern U.S. cryptology. Additional supplements will be published periodically to update the Guide. In addition, a supplement is planned which will outline the development of the U.S. cryptologic effort from the time of the American Revolution to the 1930s. The authors encourage Agency personnel to forward important documents to the History and Publications Division for inclusion in subsequent additions. The Guide represents the beginning of a long range project to provide a useful source guide to the major documentation reflecting the history of U.S. cryptology. It is meant to provide a ready reference source for researchers interested in the development of the U.S. cryptologic effort since 1930.

The Guide, compiled by Gerald K. Haines, Henry F. Schorreck, and Donald C. Wigglesworth, of the History and Publications Staff, draws on source materials from the NSA History Collection, the NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, other Agency organizations, and outside repositories such as the National Archives, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Each entry provides the reader with information on the type of document, its title, the date of the document, the originator, a synopsis of the significance of the document, the classification, where the document may be found, related documentation, and its location.

Documents are listed in chronological order. An index (last section of the Guide) contains a subject list to aid in locating a document if the date is unknown.

The authors would like to thank Thomas L. Burns for his encouragement, helpful suggestions, and timely comments in aiding the organization and compilation of this Guide. They would also like to express special appreciation for the editorial work and encouragement offered by Any errors are, of course, the responsibility of the authors.
DATA/ELEMENTS

a. TYPE AND TITLE OR SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT:

b. DATE OF DOCUMENT:

c. ORIGINATOR AND ADDRESSEE:

d. LOCATION:

e. SUMMARY:

f. CLASSIFICATION:

g. RELATED DOCUMENTS:

h. LOCATION OF RELATED DOCUMENTS:
TERMS AND ACRONYMS

ADDR&E  Assistant Director, Defense Research and Engineering (Special Intelligence)
ADP     Automated Data Processing
ADPR    Assistant Director, NSA for Plans and Resources
AFSA    Armed Forces Security Agency
AFSAC   Armed Forces Security Agency Council (formerly AFCIAC)
AFSI    Air Force Signal Intelligence
ANCIB   Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board
ANCICC  Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee
ANRICC  Army-Navy Radio Intelligence Coordinating Committee
ASA     Army Security Agency (also USASA & INSCOM)
ASD(I)DDI Assistant Secretary of Defense (for Intelligence) under the Deputy Secretary for Operations
Bob     Bureau of Budget
CFI     Committee on Foreign Intelligence
CINCPOA Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Area
CJO     Coordinator of Joint Operations
COMINT  Communication(s) Intelligence
COMPSEC Computer Security
COMSEC  Communication(s) Security
CRITICOM Critical Intelligence Communications
CSEC    Computer Security Evaluation Center
CSG     Cryptologic Support Group
CSS     Central Security Service
DCI     Director of Central Intelligence
DDO     Deputy Director for Operations
DEA     Drug Enforcement Agency
DEF/SMAC Defense Special Missile and Aeronautics Center
DF      Direction Finding
DIA     Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD     Department of Defense
DOE     Department of Energy
DSECC   Defense Security Command (Proposed by Blue Ribbon Defense Panel)
EW      Electronic Warfare
ELINT   Electronic(s) Intelligence
FCC     Federal Communications Commission
GC&CS   Government Code and Cipher School (British)
GCHQ    Government Communications Headquarters (British)
HSCI    House Select Committee on Intelligence
ICC     International Commercial Communications
ICG     Intelligence Coordinating Group
IRAC    Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCB</td>
<td>Joint Communications Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICG</td>
<td>Joint Intercept Control Group (of the CJO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARS</td>
<td>Military Affiliate Radio System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBS</td>
<td>National Bureau of Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCSC</td>
<td>National Communications Security Committee</td>
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<td>NEGAT</td>
<td>Washington address of OP-20-G</td>
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<td>NIRB</td>
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<td>National Intelligence Tasking Center</td>
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<td>National Reconnaissance Office</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>National Security Council Intelligence Directive</td>
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<td>NSC/SCC</td>
<td>National Security Council/Special Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>NSG</td>
<td>Naval Security Group (also USNSG, USNSGC)</td>
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<td>Naval Security Group Command (also NSG, USNSG, USNSGC)</td>
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<td>President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Service Cryptologic Agency</td>
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<td>Service Cryptologic Element</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signal(s) Intelligence</td>
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<td>SMP</td>
<td>Subcommittee (of ANCICC) or Merger Planning</td>
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<td>SUSLO</td>
<td>Senior United States Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>TCP</td>
<td>Tactic Cryptologic Program</td>
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<td>United States Signals Service</td>
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OFFICIALS OF THE ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

DIRECTORS OF THE ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY

15 July 1949 – 15 July 1951  Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, USN
15 July 1951 – 4 November 1952  Major General Ralph J. Canine, USA

DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

4 November 1952 – 23 November 1956  Lieutenant General Ralph J. Canine, USA
1 July 1962 – 31 May 1965  Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake, USAF
1 June 1965 – 31 July 1969  Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA
1 August 1969 – 31 July 1972*  Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, USN
1 August 1972 – 24 August 1973  Lieutenant General Samuel C. Phillips, USAF
1 April 1981 – 1 April 1985  Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
8 May 1985 –   Lieutenant General William E. Odom, USA

DEPUTY DIRECTORS OF THE ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY**

For Army (OAA)  Colonel S.P. Collins, USA
For Navy (OOB)  Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN
For Air Force (OOC)  Colonel Roy H. Lynn, USAF
Colonel T. M. Hetherington, USAF

VICE DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

2 December 1952 – 28 July 1953  Rear Admiral Joseph N. Wenger, USN
28 October 1953 – 4 June 1956  Brigadier General John B. Ackerman, USA
4 June 1956 – 24 November 1956  Major General John A. Samford, USAF

DEPUTY DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

2 February 1957 – 18 September 1957  Joseph H. Ream
18 October 1957 – 1 August 1958  Howard T. Engstrom
1 August 1958 – 21 April 1974  Louis W. Tordella
22 April 1974 – 30 April 1978  Benson K. Buffham
1 May 1978 – 31 March 1980  Robert E. Drake
1 April 1980 – 31 July 1982  Ann Z. Caracristi

*Effective 23 December 1971 the Director, NSA also served as Chief, Central Security Service.
**Deputy Directors of the Armed Forces Security Agency served concurrently and had specific areas of responsibility as well as representing their respective Service.
A REFERENCE GUIDE TO SELECTED HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE Documents

a. Memorandum: "Allocation of Radio Intelligence Activities between the Army and Navy"
   b. 29 October 1931
   c. From the Director of Naval Communications (Captain Stanford C. Hooper) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral William V. Pratt) via the Director of Naval Intelligence (Captain Hayne Ellis)
   e. This memorandum advanced the concept that the radio intelligence activities of the military services have reached a point where a definite agreement should be concluded between the Army and the Navy in order to avoid duplication of effort, waste of funds, and delay in production.

Draft Agreement: "Policies Covering Mutual Cooperation between Army and Navy Code and Cipher Sections"

a. Draft Agreement: "Policies Covering Mutual Cooperation between Army and Navy Code and Cipher Sections"
   b. 18 January 1932
   c. Created jointly by the Office in Charge of War Plans and Training Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer and the Officer in Charge of Navy Code and Cipher Section (Commander John W. McClaran)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. I, 1b.
   e. This early draft agreement proposed cooperation between the Army and Navy decryption activities. The agreement was meant to be a flexible, working arrangement between the two sections. Although each reserved the right to investigate any system, it was thought that a general understanding was necessary to prevent duplication and to exchange technical information. It also outlined proper dissemination procedures.

Memorandum: "Disclosure of Secret Military Plans to Outside Activities"

a. Memorandum: "Disclosure of Secret Military Plans to Outside Activities"
   b. 10 April 1933
   c. From Op-20-G (Commander John W. McClaran) to the Director of Naval Communications (Captain Stanford C. Hooper)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. I, 1c.
   e. After acknowledging the series of unofficial meetings between the Army and Navy focusing on cooperation, McClaran reported that in the 10 April meeting, the Army had referred the matter of radio intelligence to the State Department and that State had objected to the Army participating in intercepting foreign diplomatic traffic. McClaran suggested that if the Army could not be trusted to restrict dissemination about radio intelligence to its own organization, cooperation between the two services would be impossible.
a. Memorandum: (Untitled) The Division of Comint Effort between the Army and the Navy
b. 12 April 1933
c. From OP-20-G (John W. McClaran) to the Director of Naval Communications (Captain Stanford C. Hooper)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, Box 4, 19, Vol. I, 1d.
e. This document summarized the agreements concluded between the Army and Navy on Comint as of 12 April 1933. It covered such areas as intercept and decryption; the development of joint radio intelligence and Comsec activities in Districts and Corps Areas; training; uniform procedures for handling classified dispatches; censorship in time of war; authentication systems; and common recognition signals for aircraft and local defense forces and districts.
f. (S)
g. (U)
h.

a. Public Law 98-599: Communications Act of 1934
b. 19 June 1934
c. Enacted by the U.S. Congress
d. 64 Statutes at Large 184.
e. Of particular interest to the cryptologic profession was Section 605 of the act which forbade any person, not authorized by the sender of a foreign or interstate message by wire or radio, from intercepting the communication or from divulging or publishing any information contained in the message.
f. (U)
g. This act was amended 19 June 1968 in P.L. 90–351 to eliminate this prohibition.
h. See 82 Statutes at Large 197.

a. Agreement: “Agreement Regarding Special Material”
b. 8 December 1939
c. Signed by the Chief, Military Intelligence Division (Colonel E.R. Werner McCabe) and the Director of Naval Intelligence (Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, U.1.
e. The agreement confirmed and defined the existing arrangements between the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence under the Chief of Naval Operations for the handling and dissemination of special material.
f. (U)
g. (U)
h.

a. Memorandum: (Untitled) Response to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Concern Over the Apparent Lack of Coordination Among the Intelligence Services
b. 5 July 1940
c. From the Assistant Director, FBI (Edward A. Tamm) to the Director, FBI (J. Edgar Hoover)
e. This memorandum summarized the discussions at a conference attended by Tamm of the FBI, General Sherman Miles, Chief of Military Intelligence; Vice Admiral Walter A. Anderson, the Director of Naval Intelligence; Admiral Leigh Noyes, the Director of Naval Communications, and
Major General Joseph O. Mauborgne, the Army's Chief Signal Officer. The purpose of the meeting was to resolve any problems which existed among the intelligence organizations in terms of coordination and cooperation. Tamm reported that the FBI was, in fact, not covering German Embassy telephone conversations nor was the FBI receiving any German diplomatic intelligence from the War or Navy Departments. Both the Army and the Navy promised cooperation. The conferees also discussed President Roosevelt's probable appointment of Henry Stimson as Secretary of War and the effect this might have on Army Comint activities especially in light of Stimson's closing Herbert O. Yardley's Black Chamber in 1929. The President was reported as having instructed the War Department to keep Stimson ignorant of current activities. The meeting concluded with nothing decided on what to report back to the White House.

a. Memorandum: "Coordination of Intercept and Decrypting Activities of the Army and Navy"
   b. 25 July 1940
   c. From Op-2O-G (Commander Laurance F. Safford) to Op-2O (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. I, 1e.
   e. Colonel Spencer B. Akin (for the Army) and Safford (for the Navy) were unable to reach an agreement with regard to a division of responsibilities for intercept and decrypting activities. Safford recommended that the rationale for a division of diplomatic traffic be based on the nationality of the intercepted communications with the Navy doing Japanese and Russian and the Army analyzing German, Italian, Mexican, and Latin American. He recommended that Admiral Noyes meet with Major General Joseph O. Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer of the Army, to make the division and "issue appropriate orders."

f. (U)

g. h.

a. Memorandum: (Untitled) The Division of Comint Effort between the Army and the Navy
   b. 27 July 1940
   c. From Op-2O-G (Commander Laurance F. Safford) to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol I, 1f.
   e. This naval memorandum proposed that interception and decryption of foreign traffic be divided between the Army and Navy as follows:
      ARMY: Army traffic of Japan, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Russia, South America, International Commercial
      NAVY: Naval traffic of Japan, Germany, Italy, Russia, International Commercial.
      The diplomatic traffic was divided as follows:
      ARMY: German, Italian, Mexican, South American
      NAVY: Japanese and Russian.
      Safford suggested that if General Joseph O. Mauborgne would not agree to the Navy decrypting and translating all Japanese diplomatic messages, then the most efficient method would be to turn them all over to the Army. He also suggested that if the Japanese diplomatic had to be divided then the Army should do the A and B machines and the Navy the rest.

f. (U)

g. h.
a. Directive: "Directive to Joint Army-Navy Committee"
   b. 31 July 1940
   c. Signed by Commander Laurence F. Safford and Colonel Spencer B. Akin, Signal Corps
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. I, 1g.
   e. This joint agreement established a committee consisting of Lieutenants Earle F. Cook and Robert E. Schukraft, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant Commander Earl R. Gardner and Lieutenant James A. Greenwald, Jr., U.S. Navy, for the purpose of establishing an equitable and practical division of Comint responsibilities between the Army and Navy.
   f. (S)

a. Letter with Enclosure: (Untitled) Proposed Exchange Basis with the British
   b. 5 September 1940
   c. From Colonel Clyde L. Eastman, Signal Corps to Major General Joseph O. Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 3a.
   e. Eastman's letter included a "marked-up" proposed agreement with the British. General George V. Strong (in London) had sent a message to General Sherman Miles asking whether or not the Army Chief of Staff was willing to agree to a program with the British to exchange Japanese, German, and Italian traffic and technical information on cryptosystems. It noted that the Navy would probably oppose the suggested agreement.
   f. (TS)
   g. See memorandum to the Secretary of War (Henry Stimson) on this subject, 4 October 1940.
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, 3a.

a. Study: "A Study of the Radio Intercept Activities of the Army and the Navy with Respect to Coverage of Foreign Diplomatic Traffic"
   b. 27 September 1940
   c. Signed by the members of the Joint Army/Navy Study Committee on Intercept Activities
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, Box 4, 19, Vol. I, 1h.
   e. This study investigated the division of the interception of radio transmissions between the Army and Navy according to transmitting station, geographical location, nationality, and of any other method of increasing the volume of traffic intercepted. The report listed the Army and Navy intercept stations as of 1 August 1940 and discussed interception capabilities, transmitting traffic, and made numerous recommendations pertaining to these subjects.
   f. (S)
   g. See also "Directive to Joint Army Navy Committee," 31 July 1940.
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. 1, 1g.

a. Memorandum: "Traffic Division"
   b. 3 October 1940
   c. From Colonel Spencer B. Akin, Signal Corps and Commander Laurence F. Safford, Op-20-G, to Chief Signal Officer Joseph O. Mauborgne, and the Director of Naval Communications, Leigh Noyes
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. I, 1h.
   e. This memorandum provided four comments to the study subcommittee's report of 23 August 1940. Both Akin and Safford agreed to the comments which related to: (1) the use of radio or air-mail for the transmission of traffic; (2) the assignment of circuits; (3) further study of traffic assignments to avoid duplication of efforts, and (4) the exchange of Russian and Mexican traffic.
diplomatic and foreign military and naval traffic. The memorandum was endorsed as "approved" by Mauborgne and Noyes. Appended was a list of directives for Army and Navy stations.

Draft Memorandum: (Untitled) Exchange of German, Japanese, and Italian Cryptologic Intercepts, Technical Data, and Product with the British

This memorandum recommended to the Secretary of War that he agree to the exchange of intercepts and cryptologic technical data with the British.

Memorandum: "Limitation of Cryptanalytical Activities"

An informal standing committee composed of the heads of naval and military intelligence and the FBI conducted a study of current and prospective cryptanalytical activities to assure maximum security and efficiency. The committee concluded that such activities be restricted to the Army, Navy, and FBI. It noted that in view of the fact that the Federal Communications Commission, Director of Censorship, and the Coordinator of Information also had cryptanalytic units and that other units possibly existed in the government, a Presidential edict would probably be required to reduce the number of organizations participating in communications intelligence.

Memorandum: "Cryptanalytical and Decryption Operations on Diplomatic Traffic"

Redman stated that the odd-even arrangement worked out by the Study Committee on Intercept Activities was not conducive to efficiency. He recommended that the Army perform all of the diplomatic work. He also explained why the Army had agreed to continue to provide the Navy with decryption results for delivery to the President and the Navy Department. (This memorandum provides insight into the competitiveness between the two services.)
c. Signatories to this report were for the Army: Carter W. Clarke, Frank Bullock, William F. Friedman; for the Navy: John R. Redman, Joseph N. Wenger, Alwin D. Kramer; for the Coast Guard: Leonard T. Jones; and for the FBI: Edmund P. Coffey and D. Milton Ladd.
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VU, 19, Box 4, Vol. lA, 2c3.
e. Representatives of the Army, Navy, and the FBI met to discuss and resolve the question of the division of cryptanalytic effort between the three organizations. The Coast Guard was to be phased out of the Comint business.
f. (S)

Memorandum: (Untitled) Limiting U. S. Cryptanalytic Activities
b. 6 July 1942
c. From the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed by General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff and Frederick J. Horne, Vice Admiral, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, for Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet/Chief of Naval Operations, to the President (Franklin D. Roosevelt)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. lA, 2c4.
e. The Joint Chiefs recommended to the President that in the interest of security and efficiency, cryptanalytical activities be limited to the Army, Navy, and FBI. They pointed out that agreement on this subject had already been reached by the three organizations and they requested Presidential approval.

Memorandum: (Untitled) Curtailment of Funds for Cryptanalytic Activities
b. 8 July 1942
c. From the President (Franklin D. Roosevelt) to the Director of the Budget (Harold D. Smith)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. lA, 2c6.
e. This note from Roosevelt ordered the Director of the Budget to issue instructions directing the discontinuation of cryptanalytical activities by the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Office of Strategic Services, and to issue similar instructions to any other federal agency performing cryptanalytical functions.

Memorandum: (Untitled) Interchange of Cryptanalytic Information with the British
b. 9 July 1942
c. From the President (Franklin D. Roosevelt) to General George C. Marshall
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, Box 4, 19, Vol. III, 3c.
e. In this brief memorandum, Roosevelt reported to Marshall that Winston S. Churchill had informed him that the British and American Naval "cipher experts" were in close touch, but that there was not a similar exchange between the Army cryptologic organizations. Roosevelt asked Marshall to take up this issue with Field Marshall Sir John Dill, British Military Liaison Officer in Washington.
f. No classification noted on this copy.
g. See General George V. Strong's response of 9 July 1942.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 3c.
a. Memorandum: (Untitled) Cooperation between the U.S. Army and the British Army Comint Organizations
b. 9 July 1942
c. From the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Major General George V. Strong) to the Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 3c.
e. In a response to a query from Marshall (responding to the note from Roosevelt on 9 July 1942), Strong stated that there had been an intimate interchange of technical cryptanalytic information between the British and American Army cryptologic agencies for over a year, and it was satisfactory to both sides. Strong further stated that if it appeared that the Navy exchange of similar cryptologic information seemed more advanced it was simply because coordination between the two had been necessary for a much longer period.

f. (S)

See also the letter of 5 September 1940 from Eastman to Mauborgne, and the memorandum from Roosevelt to Marshall, 9 July 1942.

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series 19, VII, Box 4, Vol. III.

a. Memorandum: "Report of Meeting of Standing Committee for Coordination of Cryptanalytical Work"
b. 9 September 1942
c. From the Standing Committee for Coordination of Cryptanalytical Work
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IA, 2c5.
e. This report provided details concerning the allocation of Comint tasks, discussed the relationship of the FBI and diplomatic communications, clandestine traffic, allocation on trade codes, the handling of decrypted traffic, and the dissemination of raw traffic to the FBI. Committee members included: Colonel Alfred McCormack (in lieu of Colonel Carter W. Clarke), Army; Commander Joseph N. Wenger, Navy, and Edmund P. Coffey, FBI. Also present were Colonel Frank W. Bullock and William F. Friedman of the Signal Security Division, Lieutenant Colonel Alwin O. Kramer, Office of Naval Intelligence and Lieutenant Commander Leonard T. Jones, United States Coast Guard.

f. (S)

Report: "A Survey Looking to the Merging of Army and Navy Communications Services, Initially to Involve Removal of Duplications and Overlaps and the Performance by One Service of Certain Functions for the Other, as well as Any Other Way and Means of Working Toward the End in View"
b. 19 February 1943
c. From the Joint Communications Board (JCB) Ad Hoc Committee
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IA, 2c7.
e. This report was probably the first detailed and documented proposal for the merger of the cryptanalytic operations of the United States. However, it recommended that such consolidation be delayed until the cessation of hostilities because of the inevitable disruptions which occur as a result of major reorganizations. The committee's recommendations were disapproved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 March 1943.

f. (S)
a. Memorandum: "Collaboration between Melbourne RI Unit and 'Central Bureau,' Brisbane"

b. 20 March 1943
c. From Captain Joseph N. Wenger to Op-20-G (Captain Earl E. Stone)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 3g.
e. This document provided an account of a meeting in the Pentagon held to discuss problems relating to the operation of the U.S. Navy's cryptologic unit in Melbourne and the "Central Bureau," a combined U.S. Army-Australian Army/Air Force radio intelligence organization at Brisbane. This memorandum provided excellent details of the Comint relationships in Australia and the background of the American Navy's reluctance to cooperate with the Central Bureau. The U.S. Naval Comint officials in Melbourne did not feel that Central Bureau was well organized and felt that there were serious security problems associated with the organization. The British were asked to investigate and some changes were made. Wenger suggested that a certain amount of cooperation could be possible and that a suitable plan might be worked out.

f. (C)

g. h.

a. Agreement: Agreement between the British Government Code and Cipher School and the U.S. War Department Concerning Comint Cooperation

b. 17 May 1943
c. Unsigned
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 3e.
e. This agreement concerned U.S.-British cooperation in Special Intelligence, Traffic Intelligence (TA), and Y Intelligence. The agreement extended only to enemy service traffic and did not, therefore, include diplomatic traffic or traffic from neutrals. The agreement included definitions, details of exchange, the division of effort, and the handling and safeguarding of the intelligence. Included were two appendices: Appendix A entitled, "Special Provisions Regarding Work on German Machine Ciphers and Appendix B, dated 1 March 1943, entitled, "British Security Regulations for Special Intelligence, Coordination of Routing Security, and Use of Special Intelligence."

f. (TS)

g. See also an outline for the collaboration on Japanese cryptanalysis between the U.S. Navy and the British, 1 July 1944.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 3f.

a. Memorandum: "Proposed Agreement for Dissemination of Special Material"

b. 2 June 1943
c. From the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman) to the Director of Naval Intelligence (Captain Harold C. Train)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c8.
e. This detailed memorandum responded to an endorsement to Major General Strong's memorandum of 26 May 1943 to the Director of Naval Intelligence. It highlighted the Navy's position with regard to Comint dissemination. Redman feared that if the proposed agreement were adopted, it would establish, in affect, a "Unified Radio Intelligence Organization" and would place dissemination of radio intelligence under control of a group separate from the producing activity. Redman said it had been demonstrated under wartime conditions that to ensure effectiveness, the Comint organizations must be under the control of the operational commanders. He included that there should be no important changes to the present policies of dissemination.

f. (S)

g. h.
a. Agreement: "Joint Army–Navy Agreement for the Exchange of Communication Intelligence"
   b. 4 February 1944
   c. Executed by Army Chief of Staff (General George C. Marshall) and Chief of Naval Operations (Ernest J. King)
   e. This joint agreement applied to the coordination of the Army and the Navy on communications intelligence on Japan. It applied only to the Washington, D. C. area however.
   f. (S)

Memorandum for the Record: "Agreements Reached During the First Meeting of Army–Navy Radio Intelligence Coordinating Committee"
   b. 18 April 1944
   c. No signatures and no addresses
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4a.
   e. This brief memorandum for the record included agreements which stipulated that intelligence from two currently read Western Hemisphere clandestine systems would not be divulged to the FBI without disguising its source and that the Office of Strategic Services would not be encouraged to participate in the clandestine field of radio intelligence without the concurrence of the Army, the Navy, and the British.
   f. (S)
   g. Cited and summarized in "Outline of the Collaboration in Cryptanalysis between the Army and Navy."
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c12.

Memorandum for the Record: "Agreements Reached During the Second Meeting of the Army–Navy Radio Intelligence Coordinating Committee"
   b. 10 May 1944
   c. No signatures and no addressees
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4a.
   e. This memorandum for the record described the points on which the Army and the Navy representatives achieved agreement; most concerned dissemination of Comint product. But, two agenda items were particularly significant. Both the Army and the Navy agreed on the need for new legislation to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning Comint activities and they appointed a working committee to prepare tentative plans for the merger of Army–Navy Comint activities in case such a move was directed from above.
   f. (TS)
   g. Cited and summarized in "Outline of the Collaboration in Cryptanalysis between the Army and Navy."
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c12.

Memorandum: "Army Air Force Communication Intelligence Activities"
   b. 1 June 1944
   c. From the Chief Special Branch, MID (Colonel Carter W. Clarke) to Commander Wesley A. Wright
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IV, 5e.
TOP SECRET UMBRA

e. In this memorandum Clarke was evidently responding to a previous memorandum from Wright and was presenting Wright with Army Special Branch interpretations of Army Air Force Comint activities. Clarke informed Wright that the Air Corps and Signal Corps had agreed to "technical coordination" of Comint activities but he added that this did not guarantee the "control which we all feel is essential." He also posited that the Air Force radio intelligence units existed only for the Air Force; that no personnel could be attached or detached from them; and that theater commanders do not give them operational directives "in the sense that we think of it."

f. (S)

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h.

a. Memorandum: "Army Air Force Communication Intelligence Activities"
b. 5 June 1944
c. From the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Ernest J. King)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IV, 5b.
e. In this memorandum Horne informed King that the Army Air Force was proceeding independently with radio intelligence operations in the Pacific. It was contemplating establishing a large radio intelligence company in a forward area, probably Kwajalein, to function as part of the organization of the local Air Force Commander. At a meeting of the Army-Navy Radio Intelligence Coordinating Committee on 10 May, the Navy raised the question of the status of the Air Force Unit in the Pacific. The Army replied that except for some training and technical coordination, the Signal Security Agency (SSA) did not control them. It was agreed that some control, preferably through SSA, be established in order to ensure proper handling of information and to avoid duplication of effort. Horne further noted that SSA and G-2 had been unsuccessful in exerting any control and would welcome naval assistance. Horne concluded by asking King to express his views to General Marshall on the subject.

f. (S)

g.
h.

a. Memorandum: "Radio Intelligence Unit"
b. 8 June 1944
c. From the Commanding General, Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Central Pacific Area (signed by Colonel Orten N. Thompson, Adjutant General) to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz).
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IV, 5c.
e. A Mobile Radio Squadron, consisting of 44 officers and 300 enlisted men, was scheduled for departure to the Central Pacific Area in September 1944. This memorandum recommended that it be employed under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA), and that intelligence derived by the unit be distributed as directed by CINCPOA or by subordinate commanders.

f. (TS)

g. See also the memorandum to Admiral King dated 5 June 1944.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IV, 5b.

b. 9 June 1944
c. Prepared by Lieutenants John V. Connorton, and Floyd W. Tompkins, Jr., for the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC)
The report was divided into a number of parts including: a history of the publicity associated with communications intelligence; the effects of publicity leaks; deficiencies in the then current legislation; proposals for new legislation; and a proposal for a military intelligence review commission which would pass on all books, newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, and radio scripts before permission for publication would be granted.

Memorandum: "Radio Intelligence Unit"

29 June 1944

From the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz) to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area (Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr.)

In this memorandum Nimitz approved assigning operational control of the Army Air Force Radio Intelligence Unit to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA). He noted that he would place an experienced naval officer in charge of all such Comint activities in the forward area, and that this officer would be "the representative of CINCPOA." While his memorandum noted that dissemination of final intelligence was to remain the responsibility of CINCPOA, he authorized the delegation of the dissemination of some product of "immediate nature" to the Commander, Forward Area. Nimitz also invited the Army to appoint experienced officers to work out the details of operation with the appointed naval officer.

Agreement: "Outline of the Collaboration in Japanese Cryptanalysis between the U.S. Navy and the British"

1 July 1944

Unsigned

This agreement reviewed several actions of collaboration involving the British, Americans, Canadians and Australians during World War II up to 1 July 1944. It provided information on personnel, conflicts between the various organizations, their successes and failures, and descriptions of the U.S. Army and Navy cooperative activities with their British counterparts.

Compilation: "Outline of the Collaboration in Cryptanalysis between the Army and the Navy"
agreement of 1943; the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee and other committees; issues which had created major problems; documents on merger possibilities; and post-war plans.

f. (TS)

g. h.

a. Agreement: "An Agreement between GC&CS and NEGAT on Japanese Cryptanalytic Tasks"

b. 23 October 1944
c. Executed by the Director, GC&CS (Edward W. Travis) and the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 3h.
e. In this agreement, the British and Op-20-G (NEGAT) Comint organizations set forth the details of collaboration between the agencies on Japanese cryptanalytic tasks. Appended to this agreement was a memorandum for the Director of Naval Communications signed by Captain Alan H. Hillgarth, Royal Navy, Intelligence Officer for Admiral Bruce Fraser, Royal Navy. It summarized a discussion held between the two men concerning the Guam-Colombo relationship and the Fleet Radio Unit Pacific/Fleet Radio Unit Eastern Fleet relationship.

f. (TS)

g. h.

a. Mission Statement: "Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC) – General Information – No. 1"

b. 10 November 1944
c. From ANCICC Secretariat (Lieutenant John V. Connorton, and Captain Rhea M. Smith) to the ANCICC members
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4b.
e. This document contained five enclosures which together, provided the details of the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee's (ANCICC) organization, missions, functions, rosters, and schedules. Enclosure A was "Organization and Functions"; Enclosure B: Subcommittee Functions; Enclosure C: "Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee Roster"; Enclosure D: "ANCICC Subcommittee roster"; and Enclosure E contained schedules of meetings and procedures for submission of reports.

f. (TS)

g. h.


b. Undated (cover memorandum dated 13 December 1944).
c. Signed by Lieutenant Benson K. Buffham
e. This report concerned a discussion on the allocation of commercial traffic between Op-20-G and the Signal Security Agency. Those present at the meeting were - Army: Harold G. Hayes, Frank B. Rowlett, Benson K. Buffham (recorder) - Navy: Charles A. Ford, George L. Todd.

f. (S)

g. h.
a. Memorandum: "Establishment of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board"

b. 22 December 1944

c. From Admiral Ernest J. King to General George C. Marshall

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4c.

e. Admiral King noted that the informal Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee had been meeting for the past year and that the results of this informal collaboration were so beneficial that he believed it should be established on a permanent formal basis. King then noted that war experience demonstrated the logic of centralizing control and coordination of Comint. King further expressed his belief that such a controlling body should be outside the framework of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and report directly to the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations/Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet.

f. (TS)

g. h.

a. Memorandum: "Correlation of Radio Intelligence Activities, Forward Area, Central Pacific"

b. 9 January 1945

c. From the Commander in Chief, Pacific and Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (Chester W. Nimitz) signed by Admiral Forrest P. Sherman Deputy Chief of Staff to Commander, Forward Area, Central Pacific; Coast Guard U.S. Army Forces Pacific Areas; Island Commander, Guam; Officer in Charge, Joint Communication Activities, Guam

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c14.

e. This document reflected an attempt to correlate the Comint activities of the four Army (including the Army Air Force's 8 Radio Squadron Mobile) and one Navy unit in the forward area. To effect this correlation, components of the five units were amalgamated into a joint communication analysis group known as "RAGFOR." This memorandum outlined the missions and functions of "RAGFOR" and designated Commander Linwood S. Howeth as Nimitz's representative supervising the correlation.

f. (TS)

g. h.

a. Minutes: "Minutes of an 'Informal' Meeting with Air Commodore Hewitt"

b. 13 January 1945

c. Prepared by Captain Joseph N. Wenger

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 3i.

e. Joseph E. Hewitt, Director of Intelligence; Australian Air Commodore, GHQSWPA, met with representatives of OP-20-G to discuss Australian relations with the Central Bureau Brisbane (CBB). Hewitt criticized CBB as having unsatisfactory security practices. He wanted greater control from Washington. In fact, he favored a much closer arrangement for collaboration. Wenger suggested Hewitt discuss the problem with General Clayton Bissell or General Carter W. Clarke. In an appended note, Wenger stated that it was difficult to reconcile Hewitt's views on security with his former practice of releasing Ultra to Australian newspaper editors.

f. (TSC)

g. h.
c. From the Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall) for Admiral Ernest J. King
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4e.
e. In this memorandum Marshall concurred with King's proposal for an Army–Navy Communication Intelligence Board. Marshall enclosed a draft of a joint memorandum outlining the functions of the board and requested King's approval. The chain of command proposed in the enclosure was identical to that suggested by King on 22 December in that the board would function outside the framework of the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet/Chief of Naval Operations.

f. (TS)
g. See King's memorandum of 22 December 1944.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4c.

b. 3 July 1945
c. From President Harry S. Truman
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.22, Tab H, Enclosure E, Tab D.
e. This Executive Order established a "Cryptographic Security Board." It consisted of three members, one each from the State, War, and Navy Departments. It also exempted the FBI from the provisions of the order. The functions of the board were to: (a) study governmental cryptographic systems; (b) establish standards and policies to achieve maximum security of governmental communications; and (c) promulgate directives to implement the standards and policies.

f. (C)
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23, Tabs I and J.

a. Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
b. 18 August 1945
c. From the Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall) for Admiral Ernest J. King
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III; Series V, A.22.
e. Marshall noted that with the termination of hostilities, all Comint agreements would have to be reexamined and readjusted. He stated that the War Department was in a position to continue to meet fully the requirements of the President, State, Navy, and War Department in the diplomatic message field as provided under present agreements. Marshall felt they should ask the Army–Navy Communications Intelligence Board to study the situation and make whatever recommendations were required. He also believed, if the Navy concurred, that it was time to consider combining Army–Navy intercept and cryptanalytic activities under joint direction or recommend procedures to ensure complete integration.

f. (TSC)
g. h.

a. Memorandum: "The Continuation and Development of Communication Intelligence"
b. 21 August 1945
c. From Op–20–G (Captain Joseph N. Wenger) for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Frederick J. Horne)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IA, 2b4.
This memorandum provided powerful arguments for the continuation of a strong communications intelligence organization after the war and stressed the desperate need for technical continuity in the Comint field. (It provides excellent insights into the transition period of U.S. cryptography and cryptanalysis.) Proposed post-war strength charts were also attached.

(TS)

Memorandum: "The Continuation and Development of Communication Intelligence"
24 August 1945
From the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Ernest J. King) to the Secretary of the Navy (James V. Forrestal)
In this memorandum, King informed Forrestal that he and George C. Marshall had directed that a study be made that would consider merging the Army and Navy cryptanalytic activities. The merger would result in a Comint organization that would serve the intelligence needs of not only the War and Navy Departments, but also the State Department. King urged Forrestal to give the program his personal approval and support.

(TSC)

Memorandum: (Untitled) Preventing Release of Information about Cryptanalysis to the Public
28 August 1945

(TOP SECRET UMBRA)
c. From the President (Harry S Truman) for the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, the Attorney General, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Budget, and the Director of the Office of War Information.

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series IV, 00.1.

e. Truman directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate departments of the government to take whatever steps were deemed necessary to prevent the release of cryptanalytic information to the public. This included the status of cryptanalytic activities, techniques, degree of success, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit in the government.

f. (U)

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a. Minutes: Extracts from the 10th ANCICC Meeting, "Merging Army–Navy Comint Activities"

b. 28 August 1945

c. Army–Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee Secretariat
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c21.
e. These minutes reflected an agreement on the basic propositions as outlined by Captain Joseph N. Wenger and General Preston W. Corderman that: (1) there would be as complete a merger as possible of all Army and Navy elements in the operation of central technical activities; and (2) that administrative control would necessarily be maintained separately by each service although such control would be on a joint basis. It was further agreed that: (1) Army and Navy cryptanalytic activities would be completely merged; (2) the merged activities would be located on one reservation; (3) intercept units would retain their service integrity but receive direction from the merged authority, and (4) specific Army–Navy cryptanalytic problems should be handled by the respective service personnel. Also discussed were the location of a site for the central unit, the creation of a subcommittee on merger planning, and the issue of gradual or immediate consolidation. Captain William R. Smedberg III, USN, later appended (dated 21 September 1945) an enclosure which noted his reservations about consolidation.

f. (TS)

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a. Memorandum: (Untitled) Merger Planning

b. 30 August 1945

c. From the Secretariat, Army–Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC) (signed by John V. Connorton and Robert F. Packard) for the Subcommittee on Merger Planning (SMP)
e. This memorandum noted that at a special meeting on 28 August 1945 the ANCICC established a Subcommittee on Merger Planning (SMP). The mission of the SMP was to develop recommendations for Admiral Ernest J. King and General George C. Marshall on a "prompt and complete" merger of the Army–Navy intercept, cryptographic, and cryptanalytic units and to have the recommendations completed by 8 September 1945.

f. (TS)

g. See Marshall/King correspondence on the subject of "Signal Intelligence."
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4 Series V.A.22, Tab H.

a. Letter: "Establishment of the Army Security Agency"

b. 6 September 1945
c. From the Secretary of War (Issued by Major General Edward F. Witsell, Adjutant General for Secretary Robert P. Patterson) to all Army Commands

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IA, 2a4.

e. This letter established the Army Security Agency (ASA) effective 15 September 1945. The ASA was made directly responsible to the Secretary of War. ASA was to comprise all signal intelligence and communications security establishments, units and personnel of the Army.

f. (S)

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a. Memorandum: (Untitled) Consolidation
b. 6 September 1945
c. From the Subcommittee on Merger Planning (SMP) for the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c19.
e. This memorandum informed the members of ANCICC of SMP proposals for consolidating certain product reports, i.e., the MAGIC Summaries and the F-20 Daily Summaries. The SMP also suggested some physical relocation of personnel to achieve a savings in manpower.

f. (TS)

g. 

h. 

a. Memorandum: "Interim Report from Subcommittee on Merger Planning (SMP)"

b. 7 September 1945

c. From the Secretariat, Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC) for members of ANCICC
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c19.
e. This memorandum tasked the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Security to establish a joint center for evaluating non-military intelligence.

f. (TS)

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a. Memorandum: (Untitled) US/UK Collaboration on Comint
b. 12 September 1945
c. From President Harry S Truman to the Secretary of State (Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.), Secretary of War (Robert P. Patterson), and Secretary of Navy (James V. Forrestal)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.22, Tab C.
e. In this memorandum Truman authorized the Army and Navy to continue collaboration with the British and to extend, modify, or discontinue that collaboration as determined by the best interests of the United States.

f. (TS)

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a. Minutes: Extracts from 20th ANCICC Meeting, "Navy Position"

b. 12 September 1945

c. Unsigned. Probably prepared by the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC) Secretariat

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c21.
In this meeting Captain Joseph N. Wenger stated that he had been directed by higher authorities within the Navy Department to present a policy statement to ANCICC. The thrust of the Navy's policy was that a full physical merger of Army and Navy communications intelligence activities was not desirable. The basic reason was the Navy's desire to retain "complete control" over all elements of naval command.

Memorandum: "Merger of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Activities"
14 September 1945
From the Secretariat, Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC) (John V. Connorton and Robert F. Packard) to the Subcommittee on Merger Planning (SMP) and to all regular ANCICC subcommittees.
This memorandum suspended the activities of the SMP and other subcommittees of ANCICC that were developing plans to merge the Army-Navy Comint organizations. This action was the result of the Wenger statement during the ANCICC deliberations of 12 September 1945.

Draft Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
18 September 1945
From Admiral Ernest J. King to General George C. Marshall
Apparently in order to clarify a misunderstanding caused by Captain Wenger's statement, Naval policy concerning the proposed merger of Comint activities, King sent this memorandum to Marshall. He simply repeated the concepts announced by Wenger, to the effect that it had always been the Navy's interest and understanding that although there might be a complete and free interchange of technical information and joint control of dissemination of strategic, non-operational intelligence, the Navy itself must retain complete control over all aspects of operational intelligence and that the Navy would not merge their physical facilities.

Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
25 September 1945
From General George C. Marshall to Admiral Ernest J. King
Marshall responded to King's memorandum of 18 September by stating that he agreed with King, in general, that each service needed to retain dissemination authority over operational intelligence relative to each service. He also pointed out that the other Navy conclusions removed the practical basis for an agreement which both considered essential. Marshall then stated that he felt that ANCICCs' recommendations met essential requirements and he suggested that if the services could not come to an agreement, they might lose control of Comint or be unable to appropriate funds for its continuance.
Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence (Communication Intelligence)"
2 October 1945
From Admiral Ernest J. King for General George C. Marshall
In this memorandum, King responded to Marshall's memorandum of 25 September 1945. King stressed that he wanted complete integration of Army-Navy Comint activities as opposed to physical combination of the activities. He noted that they had agreed on a number of issues including separate, although coordinated, Army-Navy intercept, direction finding units; that Army and Navy traffic would be processed by respective services; that non-military/naval traffic would be jointly processed; that non-operational Comint would be evaluated and disseminated as joint product; that there would be full exchange of technical information, collateral, and Comint; that security standards would be jointly maintained; and that coordination with other intelligence would be conducted jointly. King felt that there was enough "common ground" here to insure complete integration short of an actual merger. He then reiterated his stand on independent control for Navy Comint operations.

Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
10 October 1945
From the Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall) for Admiral Ernest J. King
In this memorandum, Marshall succinctly restated the Army position that the best solution for improving the effectiveness of Ultra and for resolving the entire question of an Army and Navy intelligence organization was for the Army and Navy to combine in one location, under joint control all the service Comint efforts. He then recommended the armed forces join with the Department of State in a united effort.

Memorandum: "The Navy's Interest in the Processing of Intercepted Foreign, Non-Military Communications"
14 October 1945
From the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Ernest J. King) to the Secretary of the Navy (James V. Forrestal)
NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, Box 4, 19, Vol. II, 2c27.
King forwarded a memorandum to Forrestal on the Navy's interest in foreign, non-military communications. King commented that the Army and Navy had not yet reached an agreement satisfactory to both services. With respect to non-military and non-naval traffic King stated that although they agreed with the Army about the necessity for this, they disagreed as to how it should be accomplished. He then restated both service positions.

Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
8 November 1945
c. From Admiral Ernest J. King for General George C. Marshall


e. This was King's response to Marshall's memorandum of 10 October 1945. King agreed with Marshall's proposal, as long as the Navy retained control of functions which related to naval operational intelligence, including cryptography. This memorandum was a restatement of the Navy position, that the Navy needed control of its cryptologic resources to support Navy operational commands. King did agree that the Armed Forces should cooperate with the State Department in the formation and operation of a central intelligence agency, "... should one be established."

f. (TSC)

g. See Marshall's memorandum of 10 October 1945.

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c26.

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a. Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
b. 8 December 1945
c. From the Chief of Staff (General Dwight D. Eisenhower) for Admiral Ernest J. King
e. Following his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army, replacing General George C. Marshall, Eisenhower reviewed the "merger correspondence" between the Army and Navy, specifically that between Marshall and King. He particularly noted the 8 November 1945 memorandum from King and the stated differences of views. Eisenhower thereupon wrote King noting that the Secretaries of State, War and Navy had appointed a committee to study the proposal for the formation of a "central intelligence agency." In view of that action, Eisenhower thought it would seem appropriate to defer action on the merger proposals until the new committee's recommendations were announced.

f. (TSC)

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a. Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
b. 28 December 1945
c. From the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz) for General Dwight D. Eisenhower
e. Nimitz, the new Chief of Naval Operations, continued Admiral Ernest J. King's policy with regard to the merger proposal. He also insisted on total Navy control over its Comint resources relating to operational requirements and in the exercise of naval command regardless of any Army/Navy joint efforts and regardless of any "interdepartmental joint intelligence agency" which might be created.

f. (TS)

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a. Memorandum: "Joint Intelligence Activities"
b. 29 December 1945
c. From the Chief of Staff (General Dwight D. Eisenhower) for Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c31.
e. Referring to Nimitz's memorandum of 28 December 1945, Eisenhower agreed with Nimitz that commanders in all levels of the Services must be permitted to exploit intelligence to the fullest. Eisenhower also discussed foreign secret intelligence being placed with a National Intelligence
Authority. He thought an intelligence exchange office might be of value. He also believed the ultimate organization of intelligence must await the decision of the Congress and the President.

f. (TS)
g. See Nimitz memorandum of 28 December 1945.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c30.

a. Memorandum: "Future Status of U.S. Naval C.I. Activities"
b. 2 January 1946
c. From Op-20-G (Joseph N. Wenger) to Op-20 (Admiral Joseph R. Redman)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IA, 2b7 and 2b8 and Vol. II, 2c32.
e. Attached to this memorandum was a lengthy argument prepared supposedly by Wenger. Wenger tried to show that, although the Army finally realized the need for strong centralized control, there were basic philosophical differences which prevented adoption of a complete merger. Wenger pointed out that the placement and orientation of Comint within the services was different (communications - Navy and intelligence - Army); that Navy's greater successes in World War II resulted from superior organizational status and operating plans; so that while the Army might believe in strong centralized control, the naval authority on the spot was in a better position to evaluate and use the intelligence. He concluded that the British system in World War II was not effective either and therefore not a good example for a U.S. post-World War II organization. (Enclosure was signed by Joseph R. Redman, the Director of Naval Communications, 3 January 1946.)

f. (TS)
g. h.

a. Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
b. 2 January 1946
c. From General Dwight D. Eisenhower for Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
e. In this memorandum Eisenhower suggested to Nimitz that they make a "fresh start" by tasking the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board with developing recommendations for a merger. However, if its members could not agree to a set of recommendations, then the members were to formulate positive proposals so that the two commanders (Eisenhower and Nimitz) might consider the merits of each.

f. (TSC)
g. See all previous correspondence between Marshall and King.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4.

a. Memorandum: "Coordination of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Activities"
b. 4 January 1946
c. From the Chief of Naval Operations (Chester W. Nimitz) to the Navy members of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c35.
e. Nimitz referenced President Eisenhower's memorandum of 2 January 1946, and noted that Eisenhower had suggested that the ANCIB make a "fresh start" in developing the Army/Navy Comint organizations merger. Nimitz stated his agreement. He related that he had ordered Navy units to disregard previous naval restrictions and work out a plan for coordination and integration of the Comint organizations, because declining resources made it necessary that they be conducted under some form of joint direction.

f. (TSC)
g. See Eisenhower's memorandum of 2 January 1946, subject: "Signal Intelligence."
a. Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
   b. 4 January 1946
   c. From the Chief of Naval Operations (Chester W. Nimitz) to General Dwight D. Eisenhower
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c34.
   e. Nimitz agreed with Eisenhower's memorandum of 2 January 1946 to task the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB) to make a "fresh start" in formulating a merger proposal, and if the ANCIB members could not draft a mutually acceptable consolidated position, then to develop alternatives. Nimitz also proposed that they agree on an acceptable designator; "signal intelligence" or "communication intelligence."
   f. (TSC)
   g. See Eisenhower memorandum, 2 January 1946.
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c33.

a. Memorandum: "Reallocation of Cryptanalytical Work"
   b. 4 January 1946
   c. From the Chief of Naval Communications (Joseph R. Redman) to the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c36.
   e. In this memorandum Redman announced that Op-20-G would resume coverage of non-military traffic because of the Navy's "... certain inescapable responsibilities in maintaining technical and substantive continuity..." In so doing, he asked for the Army's full cooperation and requested that the Army supply the Navy with traffic and technical information.
   f. (TS)
   g.
   h.

a. Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
   b. 16 January 1946
   c. From General Dwight D. Eisenhower for Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
   e. In this memorandum Eisenhower thanked Nimitz for his cooperation in approving a "fresh start" and asked the Army/Navy members of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board to develop plans for the most complete integration of signal intelligence efforts. He also asked Nimitz to agree to a free exchange with the Army of everything having to do with any aspect of Ultra intelligence, including: cryptographic or cryptanalytic activities, systems, solutions, product, or equipment.
   f. (TSC)
   g. See Nimitz, memorandum, 4 January 1946, same subject, and Eisenhower, memorandum, same subject, 2 January 1946.
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c34.

a. Memorandum: "Signal Intelligence"
   b. 18 January 1946
   c. From Admiral Chester W. Nimitz for General Dwight D. Eisenhower
   e. In this memorandum Nimitz agreed generally with Eisenhower's proposed policy (16 January 1946) on a free exchange of cryptologic information, but did not want to comment further lest he impose restrictions on members of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board.
Memorandum: "Coordination of the Army and Navy Communication Intelligence Activities"
15 February 1946
From the Secretariat, State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (STANCICC) to State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIB).
The State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board and the State-Army Coordinating Committee (STANCIB-STANCICC) were created on 20 December 1945 when the State Department accepted the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Boards' invitation to membership. No original documentation for this event has yet been found, only secondary references. In order to ensure thorough integration of Army-Navy Comint activities which had been determined to be a joint responsibility, it was proposed that the newly created STANCIB-STANCICC be modified to provide for a Coordinator of Joint Operations (CJO). The plan provided only for collection, production, and exchange of information; not evaluation or dissemination. The memorandum outlined the functions of the CJO and specified chain of command as illustrated in enclosed charts. The memorandum was careful to specify responsibilities for military, naval, and attaché systems. In addition, it identified the Joint Intercept Control Group, Joint Processing Allocation Group, and a Joint Liaison Group to assist the CJO. An appended note indicated STANCIB approval on 22 April 1946.

Monograph: "The Achievements of the Signal Security Agency in World War II"
20 February 1946
Army Security Agency
NSA Historical Collection: Series IV, Box 4.
This monograph provided a brief history of the origins of the Army's cryptologic organization. It focused on the development of the organization in World War II, the production of intelligence, and the preservation of security. An appendix exhibited various examples of the activities of the ASA during the war.

Minutes: Meeting of STANCIB, "FBI Membership"
20 February 1946
From the Secretariat, State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIB) (Robert F. Packard and John F. Callahan)
NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H, Minutes of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee Meeting 1945-47, Pre-AFSA Era, Tab 15.
This meeting and subsequent ones raised the issue of the proper relationship between the FBI and Government Code and Cipher School relative to STANCIB's position as representing all U.S. Comint activities (FBI at this point was not a member). The minutes of this meeting reflected the idea that the FBI be invited to join STANCIB and thus resolve this potential problem. The board
agreed that General Hoyt S. Vandenburg and Admiral Thomas B. Ingles meet with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and arrange for FBI membership.

f. (TSC)

g. This topic was discussed again on 27 February 1946 (NSA Historical Collection: Series XII.H, Joint STANCIB-STANCICC Minutes and Agenda, Tab 27) and on 12 June 1946 the discussion centered on steps required to change the name of STANCIB to the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) pending the FBI reply to the invitation to membership. Hoover accepted on 11 June and STANCIB-STANCICC was changed to USCIB and the United States Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee on 13 June.

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H, Tab 30; USCIB Organizational Bulletin, Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4g1.

a. Agreement: "British-US Communication Intelligence Agreement"

b. 5 March 1946

c. Executed by the London Signal Intelligence Board (Colonel Patrick Marr-Johnson) and State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board for the United States (Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 3j.

e. This agreement was the first in which the United States entered into a consolidated agreement with the British rather than separate service agreements. It provided an exchange of traffic, communications documents and equipment, traffic analysis and cryptanalysis information, decryption and translation data, and information relating to all aspects of communications organization, practices, procedures, and equipment.

f. (TS)

g.

h.

a. Memorandum: "Allocation Plan for Processing Tasks"

b. 23 April 1946

c. From the Joint Processing Allocation Group (signed by Captain Charles A. Ford, "Deputy Coordinator for Allocation") to NEGAT Captain John S. Harper, Officer in Charge and the Army Security Agency, Colonel Harold G. Hayes

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c39.

e. This detailed memorandum allocated specific processing tasks, by country, to ASA and Op-20-G. Essentially, the plan allocated the communications of certain nations totally to the Army or Navy. For certain countries, such as the Soviet Union, there continued to be a joint effort.

f. (TS)

g.

h.

a. Memorandum: "General Principles Governing the Duties and Responsibilities of the Joint Liaison Group of the Coordinator of Joint Operations"

b. 25 April 1946 (date of approval by the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board)

c. From the Deputy Coordinator for Liaison (Commander Rufus L. Taylor)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c39.

e. This memorandum specified organizational control procedures for Army or Navy liaison with other U.S. or foreign intelligence agencies.

f. (S)

g.

h.
Memorandum with Enclosure: "Establishment of a United States Communication Intelligence Liaison Center in Great Britain"

12 June 1946
From the Deputy Coordinator for Liaison (Commander Rufus L. Taylor)

This memorandum announced the establishment of a Senior Liaison Officer for the London Sigint Centre and defined the duties and responsibilities of that position.

Bulletin: USCIB Organizational Bulletin No. II
31 July 1946
Issued by the Secretariat, United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB)

This bulletin identified the members of USCIB and quoted the authority for each of its member's participation. It also described the functions of the board and the committee; operating procedures, the mission and function of the Coordinator of Joint Operations; and outlined the subcommittees and their responsibilities.

Mission Statement: "United States Communication Intelligence Board, Organization and Functions"
31 July 1946
Issued by USCIB.

This statement outlined the mission and functions of the USCIB, the organization and functions of the Coordinating Committee, and the Coordinator of Joint Operations, and listed the subcommittees and their responsibilities.
MEMORANDUM: "USCIB Coordinator of Joint Operations Report 1 April 1946 - 28 February 1947"

Memorandum: "Status and Authority of USCIB-USCICC, Its Members, and the Coordinator of Joint Operations: Comments on"

MEMORANDUM: "Status and Authority of USCIB-USCICC, Its Members, and the Coordinator of Joint Operations: Comments on"

Public Law 253: "The National Security Act of 1947"
a. Memorandum: "Duplication of Effort Between Army Security Agency (ASA) and Communications Supplementary Activity (CSA)"
b. 1 October 1947
c. From Captain Joseph N. Wenger, Coordinator of Joint Operations, for the Chairman, United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) (Lieutenant General Hoyt C. Vandenberg)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c41.
e. In this memorandum, Wenger reported to the USCIB the results of a study he had initiated in May to determine the extent of unnecessary/undesirable duplication of effort between the Army Security Agency and the Communications Supplementary Activity in the processing field. He concluded in general that there was surprisingly little duplication and that which did exist was capable of elimination.

f. (TSC)
g. h.

a. Minutes: The 21st Meeting of USCIB, "Discussion of the FBI's Withdrawal from USCIB"
b. 4 November 1947
c. Issued by Charles T. R. Adams and Joseph E. Fitzpatrick, Secretariat, United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB)
e. Reference was made in this 4 November meeting to a letter from the Director of the FBI which apparently announced FBI's withdrawal from USCIB. The board discussed the ramifications of the FBI's withdrawal and speculated that the FBI had been withdrawing from the cryptanalytic field anyway and this current decision was actually the result of a lack of funds to continue. The board decided to inform the FBI that it viewed the FBI withdrawal with regret; to notify the Bureau that it would continue to receive the bulletin, and that USCIB understood the Bureau would continue to observe pertinent commitments made during its membership. The board also decided to object to J. Edgar Hoover's comment that board discussions "have been primarily concerned with methods of policy formation within the Armed Services."

f. (TS)
g. h.

a. Report: "Report USCIB Coordinator of Joint Operations for Period 1 April 1947 to 31 March 1948"
b. 29 March 1948
c. From the Coordinator of Joint Operations (Captain Joseph N. Wenger) to members of the United States Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (USCICC)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c41.
e. This report of the Coordinator of Joint Operations noted that operations were being carried on with increasing smoothness and efficiency and that the two operating agencies (Army and Navy) were now working together on a more closely integrated basis than at any time in their history.

f. (TSC)
g. h.

a. Memorandum: "Russian Plain Language Problem"
b. 14 April 1948
c. From Coordinator of Joint Operations (Colonel Harold G. Hayes) to members of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c43.

e. This memorandum informed USCIB that the Army Security Agency (ASA) and Op-20-G would continue to increase the processing of Russian plain language intercept to the extent possible at both agencies. This was pursuant to the ASA and Op-20-G agreement of 17 March 1948. The agreement was signed by Hayes and Wenger and was appended to this memorandum.

f. (TSC)

g. See 17 March 1948 memorandum.

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c43.

a. Directive: NSCID No. 9 “Communications Intelligence”

b. 1 July 1948

c. Issued by the National Security Council


e. This directive, based on the National Security Act (Sections 101 and 102), constituted the charter for the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB). As of 1 July 1948, the "Board" was the National Security Council’s (NSC) agent for coordinating the Comint activities of the United States and it was to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in the area of Comint. The board was to be comprised of representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force, State Department, CIA, and the FBI. Decisions were to be based on unanimity with the Secretary of Defense arbitrating military issues and the NSC as the final arbiter. USCIB first met under this charter on 27 August 1948.

f. (C)

g. h.


b. 24 July 1948

c. Secretary of the Army (Kenneth C. Royall) to the Secretary of Defense (James V. Forrestal)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.27

e. In this memorandum Royall informed Forrestall that prior to approving the various agreements transferring Army Comint activities and functions to the Air Force, the Secretary might consider one alternative arrangement which would avoid the increased costs inherent in such proposals. The alternative was the establishment of some form of joint or unified security agency capable of serving the Armed Forces as a whole at the national level. He recommended that Forrestal initiate a study of the subject.

f. (U), Enclosure (S)

g. Forrestal responded in an undated memorandum that he agreed and proposed to place the issue before the War Council.

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.27.


b. 7 August 1948

c. From the Office of the Secretary of Defense (signed by John H. Ohly) to the Secretary of the Army (Kenneth C. Royall), Secretary of the Navy (John L. Sullivan), Secretary of the Air Force (W. Stuart Symington), Chief of Staff U.S. Army (General Omar N. Bradley), Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Louis E. Denfield), and the Chief of Staff, USAF (General Hoyt C. Vandenberg)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.27.
This memorandum listed the actions of the War Council at its meeting of 3 August 1948. Item 3 concerned the establishment of a "Unified Armed Forces Security Agency." The council directed that an interdepartmental committee consisting of representatives of the three services should study the durability of creating a joint or unified "Security Agency." Specific terms of reference would be prepared and the Secretary of Defense would appoint a representative to work with the committee.

Memorandum: "Terms of Reference for the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency"

Forrestal named the members of the committee created as a result of the 3 August War Council meeting and directed the committee to study whether there should be a joint or unified Armed Forces Security Agency for Comint and Comsec and if so, what form it should take. The members of the committee were Major General A. R. Bolling and Colonel Harold G. Hayes from the Army; Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone and Captain William S. Veeder from the Navy; and Major General Charles P. Cabell and Brigadier General Francis L. Ankenbrandt of the Air Force, and Robert Blum of the secretary's office.

Agreement: "Responsibilities of U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force in Signal Intelligence and Communications Security Matters"

This agreement defined those cryptologic functions the Air Force would perform as opposed to those to be retained by the Army. It defined responsibilities in various areas including: secret inks, interception of radio and wire traffic, direction finding, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, research and development, Comsec, and the handling and storage of equipment and systems.

Directive: United States Communications Intelligence Board Directive 1 - "Organizational Bulletin"

This directive identified USCIB membership as the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It also outlined the duties and responsibilities of USCIB as well as internal procedures and workings of the board. Appended to the directive was a chart depicting USCIB and its functions. This directive implemented National Security Council Directive No. 9 of 1 July 1948.
f. (S)
g. See also the revised Directive 1, 13 October 1950.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4j.

b. 16 November 1948
c. Issued by United States Communications Board (USCIB)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4d and Series V, A.22, Tab H.
e. This directive described the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Joint Operations (CJO), the executor for policies and directives formulated by USCIB.
f. (TS)
g. 
h.

b. 16 November 1948
c. Issued by the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.22, Tab H.
e. This directive provided instructions for the operation of the USCIB standing committees. It emphasized the need for "coordination on all matters" and "consultation by all members" on all minutes, reports, and documents as well as issues needing resolution.
f. (S)
g. 
h.

a. Study: "Army View and Recommendations on the Creation of an Armed Forces Security Agency"
b. 20 December 1948
c. Prepared by the Army members of the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.22, Appendix D.
e. In response to Secretary James V. Forrestal's request for a study on a joint or unified Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) for the production of Comint, the Army members of the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency produced this report. It served as the basis of the Army's position on the issue throughout subsequent dealings with the other services and until the creation of AFSA. The Army concluded that such a unified organization was needed and this report cited the background of the issue; stated general principles involved; discussed the division of responsibilities, both within AFSA and within the services; and provided details of the proposed organization. Included as appendices were copies of pertinent correspondence between the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy's Chief of Naval Operations; Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee memoranda and minutes; a study done on the "Lack of Coordination in German Signal Intelligence Activities" in World War II to support their contention for a unified organization; and organizational details of both the AFSA and the Army Comint activities. The report did not address the question of cryptographic security.
f. (TS)
g. See the Stone Board Report, 27 December 1948.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.22, Tab G (less Part B, Comsec) and Series V, F.1.4.
Memorandum: "Report of the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency" (Stone Board Report)

From the Chairman (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone) to the Secretary of Defense (James V. Forrestal)

NSA Historical Collection: Series V.F.1.4 and Series V, A.22, Tab G for Part A only.

This report was in two parts: Part A which dealt with communications intelligence (Comint) and Part B, which treated communications security (Comsec). The services did not reach complete agreement on either Part A or Part B. The Navy and Air Force recommended that the status quo concerning Comint be maintained while the Army favored total consolidation. In Comsec matters, the Army and Navy favored centralized direction with decentralized but coordinated implementation. The Air Force's position was to wait until the Comint issue had been settled before deciding on Comsec.

(TS)

Memorandum: "Recommendations Concerning a Merger of the Armed Forces Cryptanalytic Agencies"

From Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (W. Park Armstrong, Jr.) to the Secretary of Defense (James V. Forrestal)

In this memorandum Armstrong denounced the majority (Navy-Air Force) plan of the "Stone Board." He claimed it was not consistent with the principle of equality in the conduct of communications intelligence policy laid down in the deliberations leading to the promulgation of NSCID No. 9. Further, he stated that the Navy and Air Force were less concerned with merger than with the erection of an elaborate military control structure parallel to the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) organization and independent of it. While he favored giving more authority to the Director in place of the Coordinator of Joint Operations, he did not support the apparent supersession of USCIB.

(TS)
a. Agenda: "Agenda for Meeting of the War Council – A Unified Armed Forces Security Agency"
b. 13 May 1949
c. From the Secretary of the War Council (John Sherman) to members of the War Council
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IV, 6f.
e. The prime agenda item listed for discussion at the War Council meeting of 17 May was the Unified Armed Forces Security Agency. Attachment A of this agenda was a proposed memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the three service secretaries in which James V. Forrestal commented on the Stone Board Report. Forrestal concluded that with certain exceptions, Comint and Comsec activities should be consolidated.
f. (TS)
g.
h.

b. 20 May 1949
c. Issued by the Secretary of Defense (Louis A. Johnson)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IV, 6g, Series V, A.22, Tab I, and Series V, A.27.
e. This directive, which was also issued as an enclosure to JCS 2010, established the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) as a component of the National Military Establishment. It placed Comint and Comsec efforts under the authority of a Director, but the Director's powers were limited to coordination. Further, he was under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Differences of opinion between the three military components within AFSA and the Director of AFSA had to be forwarded by the Director, AFSA to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution.) Initiation date of the organization was to be 1 July 1949, and the organizational completion date was to be not later than 1 January 1950.
f. (TS)
g.
h.

a. Letter: (Untitled) The Establishment of AFSA
b. 20 May 1949
c. From the Secretary of Defense (Louis A. Johnson) to the Secretary of State (Dean G. Acheson)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.27.
e. Johnson informed Acheson of the establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). He explained why it had been created and the role to be played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. He outlined the functions of the Director of AFSA and assured Acheson that he did "not expect and will not permit" AFSA to interfere in any substantial way with the continuity of operations. He wanted to assure Acheson that Comint consumers would not have any interruption in the flow of intelligence nor would the new agency interfere with the functions of the United States Communications Intelligence Board.
f. (TS)
g. See also the AFSA implementing documents, issued 20 May 1949.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.22, Tabs J, K, and L.

a. Letter: "The CANUSA Agreement"
b. 27 May 1949
c. From the Chairman, Communications Research Committee (Gordon G. Crean) to the Chairman, United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) (Major General Charles P. Cabell)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.22 (Tab E), Series V.J.3.3, and Series VII, 19, Box 4, 9k.
e. This unlikely format for an agreement was in actuality a letter from the chairman of the Communication Research Committee to the chairman of USCIB in which he proposed to clarify the existing Comint relations by offering a new set of proposals which, if the U.S. agreed, could serve as the basis for a new agreement. The proposals included provisions for the exchange of data, and a variety of other information. The agreement would apply to all Canadian and U.S. Comint authorities which existed at that time or in the future. This was not the first exchange between the U.S. and Canada. Collaboration with Canada on Comint matters dated to before the U.S. entry into World War II.

f. (TSC)

g. 

h. 

a. Minutes: "Item not on the Agenda discussed at the Forty-First Meeting of USCIB: Establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA)"
b. 17 June 1949
c. Prepared by the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USClB) Secretariat
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IV, 6h.
e. W. Park Armstrong, from the State Department, noted that upon the establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson had assured State and CIA that the creation and implementation of AFSA would not interfere with the functions of USCIB. He stated that upon closer examination of the AFSA directive, there appeared to be inconsistencies between it and NSCID No. 9. He requested that these inconsistencies be clarified before USCIB continued its business.

f. (TS)

g. 

h. 

a. Memorandum: "Establishment of Armed Forces Security Agency"
b. 15 July 1949
c. From the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
d. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 5123.
e. On 29 June 1942 Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, appointed Stone as the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). In this directive, Stone announced that he had assumed command as Director, AFSA and as Coordinator of Joint Operations. He also requested detailed information on the cryptologic activities of the National Military Establishment.

f. (TS)

g. 

h. 

a. Report: “Change in Title of Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council”
b. 11 October 1949
c. From the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
d. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 5562N, Tabs 11, 12 and 13.
e. In this report, Stone declared that for security reasons and because the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) dealt with Comsec, the name Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council should be changed to reflect these considerations. On 9 November the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum approving the change to the Armed Forces Security Agency Council, and on 11 November JCS 2010/12 implemented the change.

f. (TS)
TOP SECRET UMBRA

a. Memorandum: "Revised USCIB Charter"
b. 31 October 1949
c. From AFSA–OOB (Captain Joseph N. Wenger) to the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.31.
e. In this memorandum Wenger discussed recurring problems involving the policymaking powers of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB), especially those involving coordinating Comsec activities under NSCID 9. Wenger favored one body within the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) to resolve these problems. Such a body would strengthen USCIB and AFSA's relationship with USCIB.

f. (C)
g. The question of the governing authority for Comsec remained unresolved until President Truman created the United States Communications Security Board (See his memorandum of 24 October 1952). This was followed by NSC Directive 168 (20 October 1953) which appointed the Director of the National Security Agency as the Executive Agent of the Secretary of Defense for Comsec. The Director, NSA’s Comsec responsibilities subsequently were detailed in DoD Directive C-5200.5 (24 April 1954).
h. For rejected proposals see documents in NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.31 for dates of 2 November 1949; 9 August 1950; 11 August 1950; 15 September 1950; 3 November 1950 and 10 November 1950. For Truman’s directive, see NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.27. For NSC Directive 168, see NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23 Tab J. For DoD Directive C–5200.5, see NSA Historical Collection: Series A, 23, Tab K.

a. Memorandum for the Record: "AFSA Conference with ASA Concerning Policy Questions"
b. 1 March 1950
c. From the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone) and Chief, Army Security Agency (ASA) (Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke) to meeting attendees
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23.
e. This memorandum reflected a meeting attended by AFSA authorities (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Captain Joseph N. Wenger, Colonel Samuel P. Collins, Captain Redfield Mason, Colonel Arthur Peterson, and Philip J. Patton) and ASA authorities (Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Colonel John C. Arrowsmith, Colonel John P. Moss, Colonel John Connor, Colonel Julian H. Baumann, Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Bernier, Major A.V. Whitehead, and Colonel Jesse N. Hill). In this meeting Clarke stated the Army's consistent position, that AFSA should control and direct the use of all cryptologic assets and that ASA was prepared to assist AFSA in every way to accomplish this goal. There followed a discussion of certain Comint activities not covered by the JCS 2010 series. Working agreements were reached on almost all subjects.

f. (TS)
g. h.

a. Directive: NSCID No. 9 (Revised) "Communications Intelligence"
b. 10 March 1950
c. Issued by the National Security Council
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.31; and Series V, A.28.
e. Pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947 the National Security Council established the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB). USCIB's mission was to coordinate
Comint activities and advise the Director of Central Intelligence on Comint matters. This revision also added the FBI to the USCIB.

f. (C)

g. h.

a. **Memorandum: "Division of Responsibility Between AFSA and the Services" (AFSAC 25/83)**
b. 1 June 1950
c. From the Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee (Captain Joseph N. Wenger) to members of the Armed Forces Security Agency Council
d. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 4285.
e. In this memorandum Wenger listed the several differences of opinion regarding the basic principles for operation of the Armed Forces Security Agency. The four views (AFSA, Army, Navy, Air Force) of each area of conflict were detailed in chart form.
f. (TS)
g. h.

a. **Report: "Report by the Director, AFSA to AFSAC on Division of Responsibility between AFSA and the Services (AFSAC 25/88)"
   b. 27 April 1950 (corrected 2 May 1950)
   c. Issued by the Secretariat, the Armed Forces Security Council
   d. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 5864.
   e. This report took the position that the Armed Forces Security Agency and the Service Cryptologic Agencies had overlapping responsibilities.
f. (TS)
g. h.

   b. 9 June 1950
   c. From the Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Atomic Energy Intelligence (Ralph L. Clark) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 2c49.
   e. This report provided strong criticism of the Intelligence Community in general. The Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was credited with making important contributions but the report noted that large volumes of raw material were unexploited due to a lack of personnel. It was also noted that the complexity of organizational control had created a lack of guidance and support for AFSA.
f. (TSC)
g. h.

   b. 1 July 1950
   c. From the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Armed Forces Security Agency Council
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.22, Tab L. Also NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 5219.
This annual report highlighted the problems caused by the limited authority and power of the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agencies (AFSA). It also pointed out the fact that resolution of problems within AFSA was slow because the Director of AFSA was required to obtain agreement from all three services before acting.

Memorandum: "Division of Responsibilities between AFSA and the Services"
6 July 1950
From AFSA-OOB (Captain Joseph N. Wenger) for the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone)
NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.4.
In this memorandum Wenger noted that under the guidance in effect the Services controlled mobile intercept activities which might leave the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) without its most vital coverage should hostilities occur. (Note: Because "mobile facilities," according to the then current rules, were the responsibility of their parent Service, each Service bent the definition greatly to its advantage. The result was that there were relatively few intercept facilities which were non-mobile, and hence, managed directly by AFSA.) This memorandum was provided to the "Brownell Committee" by Wenger on 15 March 1952.

Memorandum: "Proposed Changes in JCS 2010 Series Relative to the Division of Responsibility between AFSA and the Services"
21 August 1950
From the Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee (Captain Joseph N. Wenger) for the members of the Armed Forces Security Agency Council
NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 5864, Folder 4.
This memorandum contained a series of staff studies concerning the division of responsibilities between the Armed Forces Security Agency and the Services.

Agreement: "AFSA-Air Force Agreement on Task Assignments to AFSS Mobile Intercept Facilities"
22 September 1950
Agreement between the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone) and the Air Force Director of Intelligence (Major General Charles P. Cabell)
This agreement was the result of a conference held on 18 September 1950, at which it was agreed that AFSA would make final decisions on radio-printer, and automatic morse, while the Air Force Security Service (AFSS) would determine voice assignments. It was also agreed that AFSA and AFSS would jointly decide on manual morse assignments, and that differences of opinion that could not be resolved on the working level would be forwarded to the directors who would jointly make the decision.
a. Public Law 831: "Internal Security Act of 1950"
   b. 23 September 1950
   c. Enacted by the U.S. Congress
   d. 64 Statutes at Large 987.
   e. This was the first law which mentioned specifically cryptologic activities of the government. It recognized the legality of such cryptologic activities by the Federal government and made it a crime to disclose classified cryptologic information.
   f. (U)

a. Memorandum: "Method for Handling AFSAC 60/26"
   b. 30 September 1950
   c. From the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone) for the members of Armed Forces Security Agency Council
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. II, 5q.
   e. Stone commented in this memorandum that if events continued on their present course, with overlapping directions and responsibilities, there would inevitably be four security agencies (the United States Army Security Agency, the United States Navy Security Group Command, the United States Air Force Security Service, and the Armed Forces Security Agency). None would be effective, according to Stone, under such an agreement.
   f. (TS)

a. Report: "Division of Responsibilities between AFSA and the Services" AFSAC 60/26
   b. Undated and attached to 30 September 1950 Stone memorandum to the Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC)
   c. From Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) via the Armed Forces Security Agency Council.
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. IV, 5q.
   e. Stone reported that although the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) had been functioning both in the Comint and Comsec fields in accordance with directives from the JCS and the Secretary of Defense, certain basic differences of opinion on Comint continued, particularly with respect to the implementation of the JCS 2010 series. More specifically, these differences focused on the interception and processing of messages in the production of Comint. The problems had been referred to the AFSAC which was unable to resolve them. Therefore, the issue was sent to the JCS for arbitration. Stone recommended that the conclusion offered in his report be adopted. It would strengthen AFSA considerably.
   f. (TS)

   b. 13 October 1950
   c. Issued by USCIB
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4j.
e. This revised USCIB Directive 1 added the FBI to the membership and appointed the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency as the coordinator.

f. (S)

g. See original USCIB Directive No. 1 of 16 November 1948

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4, Vol. III, 4i.

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a. Minutes: The 22nd Meeting of AFSAC (AFSAC 60/40), "Division of Responsibility between AFSA and the Services"

b. 6 November 1950

c. Issued by the Secretariat (J. W. Pearson/Hamill Jones), the Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC)

d. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 4285.

e. These detailed minutes recorded the discussion relating to the problem of the division of responsibilities between the Armed Forces Security Agency and the Services. Admiral Earl E. Stone's frustrations at the inability of AFSAC to arrive at decisions were highlighted in his statement that "... the Committee had not even been able to arrive at a definition of duplication."

f. (TS)

g. h.

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a. Report: "Division of Responsibility between Armed Forces Security Agency and the Military Services" (AFSAC 60/42)

b. 24 November 1950

c. From the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone) for the members of the Armed Forces Security Agency Council

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23.

e. In this report, Stone noted that the Air Force Security Service Comint processing system at Brooks Air Force Base essentially duplicated the operations of AFSA. This issue once again raised the question of the division of responsibilities between AFSA and the Services. Stone concluded that processing within the United States by the Air Force was an undesirable and unnecessary duplication of operations assigned to AFSA.

f. (TS)

g. h.

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a. Agreement: "AFSA-Navy Agreement Regarding Direction and Support of Communications Intelligence Operating Activities of the Navy" (AFSAC 60/48)

b. 23 March 1951

c. Executed by the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman) and the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23, Tab B.

e. The purpose of this agreement was to effect closer liaison and coordination between AFSA and the Naval Security Branch (Op-202), Naval Communications Division, in regard to the direction of Comint activities within the Navy.

f. (TS)

g. h.

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a. Report: "Annual Report by the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency to the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Armed Forces Security Agency Council"
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b. 1 July 1951

c. From the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone) for the Joint
Chiefsof Staff

d. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 4285, folder 3.

e. Stone's report discussed Comint and Comsec accomplishments during the preceding year; the
impact of the Korean War on the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) and the Services; the
expansion of Comint facilities and activities; foreign collaboration; and current problems. Included
in the latter were the volume of voice intercept in the Korean War and the security
problem resulting from increased dissemination of product. Stone recommended the membership
of the Armed Forces Security Agency Council be reduced. He also complained that the Director,
AFSA was circumscribed in the exercise of his authority and that the problem of a clear
delineation of duties and responsibilities between AFSA and the Services still needed to be
resolved.

f. (TS)

g.

h.

a. Memorandum: "Organization of AFSA"
b. 2 August 1951
c. From Deputy Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) (Captain Joseph N. Wenger)
to the Director, AFSA (Major General Ralph J. Canine)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, F.2.1.
e. In this memorandum Wenger focused on the organizational difficulties within AFSA. They
included problems in decision-making, a lack of clear-cut division of responsibilities and
authorities, and lack of unified authority over the three military divisions.

f. (C)

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h.

a. Agreement: "Intercept Task Assignment Between Commanding General, USAF Security
Service and Director, Armed Forces Security Agency"
b. 16 November 1951
c. Executed by the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (Major General Ralph J. Canine) and
the Commander, United States Air Force Security Service (Brigadier General Roy L. Lynn)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23, Tab C.2.
e. This agreement specified the arrangement concerning AFSA/USAFSS controls over the AFSS
intercept positions.

f. (C)

g.

h.

a. Memorandum: "Proposed Survey of Communications Intelligence"
b. 10 December 1951
c. From the Director of Central Intelligence (General Walter Bedell Smith) to the National Security
Council
d. CIA Historical Records, Central Intelligence Agency.
e. This memorandum outlined the civilian/military struggle over management of Sigint and specific
problems surfaced by the Korean War. It recommended that a complete survey be conducted of all
United States Comint activity.

f. (TS)

g.
   b. 14 December 1951
   c. From the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) (Major General Ralph J. Canine, USA)
   d. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 3772.
   e. This manual outlined the organization of AFSA and defined its responsibilities and functions.
      The document included organizational diagrams and revisions through 15 February 1952.
   f. (S)
   g. This manual superseded earlier ones issued in March 1950, February 1951, and December 1951.
   h. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 3772.

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Memorandum: (Untitled) Establishment of the "Brownell Committee"
   a. Memorandum: (Untitled) Establishment of the "Brownell Committee"
   b. 28 December 1951
   c. From the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett) and the Secretary of State (Dean G. Acheson) for
      George Brownell, Charles Bohlen, Brigadier General John Magruder, USA Ret., and William H.
      Jackson
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, F.7.13 Exhibit A.
   e. Because of growing dissatisfaction with the way Comint activities were organized and performed
      during the Korean conflict, on 13 December 1951, President Truman directed Secretary of State
      Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett and the Director of Central Intelligence
      Walter Bedell Smith to conduct a survey of the organization of the Comint activities of the
      government and make recommendations for its improvement. This memorandum appointed a
      committee (subsequently known as the "Brownell Committee") to make this survey and
      established the parameters from which the committee would make its study and
      recommendations.
   f. (TS)
   g. See the "Brownell Committee Report."
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, F.7.13.

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Memorandum: "AFSAC, Expanding DIRAFSA's Authority"
   a. Memorandum: "AFSAC, Expanding DIRAFSA's Authority"
   b. 24 January 1952
   c. From the Deputy Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) (Captain Joseph N. Wenger) for
      the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (Major General Ralph J. Canine)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.4.
   e. In this memorandum Wenger discussed efforts to expand the authority of the Director, AFSA
      within the complicated framework of the Armed Forces Security Agency Council organization.
   f. (TS)
   g. 
   h. 

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Report: "Communications Intelligence Rationale"
   a. Report: "Communications Intelligence Rationale"
   b. 5 March 1952
   c. Prepared by the Department of State (W. Park Armstrong, Jr.) for the "Brownell Committee"
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.4.
   e. This report investigated how U.S. intelligence organizations handled Comint in relationship with
      intelligence from other sources in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence. It
      concluded that Comint should be processed and disseminated independently of other intelligence
      operations and that the integration of Comint with other sources should be a Comint process, not
      a general intelligence one.

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a. Memorandum: "Responsibility and Command Relationships in the Production of
Communication Intelligence (Comint)"
13 March 1952
From the Deputy Director of the National Security Agency (Captain Joseph N. Wenger) for
George Brownell
NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, D.2.11, D.3.2.
Wenger's memorandum to the "Brownell Committee" provided an organizational analysis of the
pros and cons of total consolidation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force cryptologic units. Wenger
also highly stressed the need for a total unification, which would mean that the Services had to
surrender certain command prerogatives and at the same time lend total support to the proposed
organization.

b. Report: "Problem Areas in the Procurement of Cryptologic Equipments"
24 March 1952
Prepared by the Logistics Division, Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA)
NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.4.
This report illustrated the difficulties of implementing a centralized procurement program for
cryptologic equipments. It noted that the Navy insisted on procuring cryptologic equipment
without coordination with AFSA. It also noted that the Army's Signal Corps did allow AFSA
engineers to exercise technical control over AFSA contracts administered by that Service but
little else.

f. (TS)
g. See related papers provided the "Brownell Committee" by AFSA.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.4.

a. Report: "Report on Similarities and Differences between GCHQ and AFSA in REGARD to
Organization, Methods, and Arrangements for the
Production of Comint and a Few Comments Thereon"
31 March 1952
Prepared by William F. Friedman
NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.5.
In this report, Friedman compared the United Kingdom's Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) centralized organizational arrangement with the U.S. Armed Forces
Security Agency's (AFSA) decentralized plan. He concluded that GCHQ was more efficient, but
Memorandum: "Plan for Reorganization of U.S. Comint Effort"
28 May 1952
From the Deputy Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) (Rear Admiral Joseph N. Wenger) for the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency (Major General Ralph J. Canine)
NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, D.3.2.
This plan for a world-wide Comint effort was requested by Canine. William F. Friedman, Captain Ernest S. L. Goodwin, and Captain John S. Harper assisted Wenger in the study. It included charts that displayed the proposed world system. The introductory statement (drafted 18 April 1952) assumed that the Director, AFSA would have operational and technical control of the resources necessary to implement the plan.

Report: Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense ("Brownell Committee Report")
13 June 1952
Issued by the "Brownell Committee" (George Brownell, Charles Bohlen, John Magruder, and William Jackson)
NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.
On 13 December 1951, President Truman directed the Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) and the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett); assisted by the Director of Central Intelligence (Roscoe Hillenkoetter), to review the Comint activities of the U.S. Government. Truman's directive led to the formation of a committee headed by George A. Brownell. The committee was tasked to study and make recommendations on: (1) The Comint needs of the government and (2) the most effective allocation of responsibilities and authorities for Comint activities, including the extent to which these activities should be performed by a single agency. This report concluded that Comint was a national responsibility and recommended the strengthening of a centralized agency (Armed Forces Security Agency) to obtain the optimum results. The committee found that the pattern of Comint activities was that of four associated agencies performing limited and often duplicative functions. This report led to the designation of the Department of Defense as the executive agent of the government for the production of Comint and the creation of the National Security Agency.

Memorandum for the Record: "Draft of Proposed Presidential Directive for Organizing the Comint Activities of the U.S."
14 October 1952
Prepared by the Deputy Director, Armed Forces Security Agency (Rear Admiral Joseph N. Wenger) for use by those who were drafting a Presidential Directive (NSCID No.9) concerning the reorganization of the Comint functions in the U.S. Government.
NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.27; VI, C.1.4 and VI, B.1.4.
This memorandum recounted the events of a meeting of Thursday, 9 October 1952, attended by General Ralph Canine and Wenger in the office of General John Magruder. There were subsequent negotiations with CIA (Loftus Becker) and the State Department (W. Park Armstrong and T. Achilles Polyzoides) representatives concerning the interpretation of various

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statements of the draft directive. Finally, on Monday, 13 October 1952 Wenger obtained concessions from the State and CIA members. In further discussions with Magruder, it was decided that the importance of arriving at an early decision with regard to the "Brownell Committee" recommendations was such that the drafting of this directive must be brought to a close without further delay.

f. (TS)
g. See NSCID No. 9, 24 October 1952, and implementing directives.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23.

a. Directive: NSCID No. 9 "Communications Intelligence"
b. 24 October 1952
c. Issued by the National Security Council
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, B.1.8.
e. This directive established the United States Communications Intelligence Board. It also established the National Security Agency and assigned it the Comint mission for the U.S. government. The Department of Defense was made executive agent of the government for Comint and the directive noted that FBI responsibilities concerning internal security were not encroached upon by this directive.

f. (TS)
g. See "Interim Implementation of NSCID No. 9 (Revised)," 4 November 1952 and NSCID No. 6, 15 September 1958, which superseded NSCID No. 9, by the addition of the Elint functions to NSA's charter.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23.

a. Memorandum: "Communications Intelligence Activities"
b. 24 October 1952
c. From President Harry S Truman to the Secretary of State (Dean G. Acheson) and the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.27.
e. Truman's memorandum designated the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the National Security Council for Comint. The tasks of the committee were to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in establishing Comint policies and to keep the President advised of such policies. The memorandum also designated the Secretary of Defense as executive agent of the government for Comint and outlined the duties of the United States Communications Intelligence Board and the mission of the National Security Agency.

f. (TS)
g. 
h.

a. Memorandum: "Communications Security (Comsec) Matters"
b. 24 October 1952
c. From President Harry S Truman to the Secretary of State (Dean G. Acheson) and the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23, Tab I.
e. Truman's memorandum established the United States Communications Security Board and tasked the State and Defense Departments with establishing uniform standards for Comsec. It also stated that the security of federal communications was a national responsibility.

f. (TS)
g. h.
a. Disposition Form: "Initial Plans Effecting National Security Agency (NSA)"
b. 31 October 1952
c. From the Chief, Plans and Policy Division (Colonel Jesse O. Gregory) to Chiefs, Staff, Divisions and Offices
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, A.1.1.
e. This disposition form outlined General Ralph J. Canine's organizational concepts for NSA. His guidance was that: (a) no joint units should support single-service field units; (b) operations should be decentralized; (c) control should be centralized and have clear command lines; (d) sub-organizations should have clearly defined channels of communication; (e) field units should have operational control when engaged in close support; and (f) operational control of other units should be delegated to NSA area commanders.
f. (TS)
g. h.

a. Memorandum: "Interim Implementation of NSCID No. 9 (Revised)"
b. 4 November 1952
c. From the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett) for the Secretary of the Army (Frank Pace, Jr.), the Secretary of the Navy (Dan A. Kimball), the Secretary of the Air Force (Thomas K. Finletter), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director, National Security Agency (Ralph J. Canine)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23 Tab F-1 and Series VI, A.1.1.
e. In this memorandum Lovett directed each military department to designate a representative to the reconstituted United States Communications Intelligence Board, pursuant to NSCID No. 9 (Revised). This memorandum also changed the name of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) to the National Security Agency (NSA) and assigned all responsibilities for Comsec activities and all other Director, AFSA responsibilities to the Director, NSA. Addressees were requested to appoint a representative to a working group to develop directives necessary for the implementation of NSCID No. 9 (Revised).
f. (TS)
g. h.

a. Memorandum: "Redesignation of Armed Forces Security Agency as National Security Agency" (NSA Memorandum 0–16)
b. 7 November 1952
c. From the Director, National Security Agency (Major General Ralph J. Canine) to Distribution III
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, A.1.
e. This memorandum from Canine, NSA's first Director, informed the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) employees that effective 4 November 1952, AFSA would become NSA, and that fundamentally the mission remained unchanged, although the Director, NSA would have added responsibilities.
f. (R)
g. h.

a. Memorandum: "Department of Defense Documents Inconsistent with the Provisions of NSCID No. 9 (Revised)"
b. 2 December 1952
c. From the NSA Working Group (Major General Ralph J. Canine, Chairman) to the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett)
Memorandum: "Implementation of NSCID No. 9 (Revised)"
5 December 1952
From the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett) to the Secretary of the Army (Frank Pace, Jr.), the Secretary of the Navy (Dan A. Kimball), the Secretary of Air Force (Thomas K. Finletter), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director, National Security Agency (Ralph J. Canine)

This memorandum placed NSA within the framework of the Department of Defense and defined its operations. It also reaffirmed that all Communications Intelligence (Comint) resources were under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA.

See NSCID No. 9, 24 October 1952 and the Secretary of Defense memorandum: "Interim Implementation of NSCID No. 9 (Revised)" 4 November 1952.

Memorandum: "Interim Responsibility for Communication Security"
5 December 1952
From the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett) to the Secretary of the Army (Frank Pace, Jr.), the Secretary of the Navy (Dan A. Kimball), the Secretary of Air Force (Thomas K. Finletter), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director, National Security Agency (Ralph J. Canine)

In this memorandum Lovett stated that the responsibilities for Comsec assigned to the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency are now assigned to the Director, NSA.

See the series of memoranda relating to a national Comsec policy.

Memorandum: "Further Implementation of NSCID No. 9 (Revised)"
9 December 1952
From the Director, NSA (Ralph J. Canine) to the Secretary of Defense (Robert A. Lovett)

In response to an Office of the Secretary of Defense request, NSA prepared a list of memoranda and directives which would be affected by the issuance of NSCID No. 9 (Revised). Canine's memorandum also proposed that although Comsec issues were not directly addressed in the revised directive, these issues be addressed as well.

See 2 December 1952 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on this related subject.

Memorandum: "FBI's Internal Security Responsibility"
24 December 1952

From the Assistant Director, Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Huntington D. Sheldon) to Rear Admiral Joseph N. Wenger

NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, A.1.

In this memorandum Sheldon confirmed to Wenger that NSCID No. 9 (Revised) would be amended to ensure that the FBI responsibilities in the field of internal security would not be infringed upon by the new directive.

(TS)

See NSCID No. 9, 24 October 1952.

NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.22.


1 January 1953

Issued by the Director, NSA (Ralph J. Canine)

NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23 Tab G.

This NSA directive implemented NSCID No. 9 by setting forth the agency's mission and responsibilities for Comint operations, research and development, administration, training, and logistics.

(TSC)

**General Order: "Reorganization of Headquarters, National Security Agency"**

23 January 1953

From the Director, NSA (Ralph J. Canine)

NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, E.1.1.

This order listed the organizational components of the new NSA and the names of individuals appointed to key positions. Also attached to the order is an organizational chart of the new agency.

(S)

**Directive: NSA Directive No. 2 "Priorities"**

2 March 1953

Issued by the Director, NSA (Ralph J. Canine)

NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23, Tab H.

This NSA directive established machinery within NSA for developing intercept and processing priorities. It also provided for participation in this process by representatives of the departments and agencies which were eligible to receive Comint product.

(TSC)

**Public Law 108: "Establishment of a Commission on Government Operations" (Hoover Commission II)**

10 July 1953

Enacted by the U.S. Congress

64 Statutes at Large 184
This law required a complete review of the management and operations of the U.S. Government. A subsection concerned the management of intelligence operations, and another subsection required the preparation of a report on intelligence activities of the U.S. cryptologic agencies.

**Directive: NSC Directive on Communications Security** 188

- **Issued by the Executive Secretary (James S. Lay, Jr.) of the National Security Council to the Secretaries of Treasury, Army, Navy, Air Force, Attorney General, Director FBI, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Director, NSA, and the Director, Atomic Energy Commission.**

- **NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23, Tab J.**

- This directive implemented a Presidential Directive of 24 October 1952 on Comsec and established a United States Communications Security Board (USCSB) responsible for integrating policies and procedures affecting the security of federal telecommunications. The USCSB was composed of one representative from State, Defense, Treasury, FBI, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, NSA, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The directive also made the Director, NSA responsible for all Comsec matters and for other matters relating to cryptosecurity.

- **See the Presidential memorandum of 24 October 1952 “Communication Security (Comsec) Matters.”**

- **NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23.**


- **Issued by President Dwight D. Eisenhower**

- **NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.2 (National Directives).**

- This Executive Order set out the guidelines for the protection of official information in the interest of national defense. It limited such classification to three categories: (1) Top Secret, (2) Secret, and (3) Confidential. NSA officials sought a legal opinion from the Department of Defense Legal Counsel as to whether or not the new Executive Order applied to the handling of classified Comint material. The legal counsel, Wilber M. Brucker, replied that in his opinion the provisions of Executive Order 10501 did not control the handling of classified Comint material and that the Presidential Directive of 24 October 1952 “Communications Security” still applied.

- **See the various memoranda on the interpretation of Executive Order 10501.**

- **NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.2 (National Directives).**

**USCIB Directive 12: “Conduct of Overt Comint Liaison With Foreign Governmental Activities”**

- **Issued by the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB)**

- **NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.4 (Miscellaneous – Non-Current).**

- This directive set forth USCIB policy for overt Comint liaison with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. It also established a Senior U. S. Liaison Officer (SUSLO) for each country. The SUSLO was appointed by the Director, NSA with the approval of USCIB and was accountable to the Director, NSA.

- **(S)**
a. Minutes: Minutes of USCIB Meeting 102: "Increase in Scope of USCIB Authority (Elint)"
b. 9 April 1954
c. Issued by the Secretariat of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) to its members
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, F, USCIB Minutes 1954-56.
e. After discussing Comint relations with Third Parties and the disclosure of the
SCC, the board took up the issue of Elin control. After much discussion, the USCIB agreed to recommend to the National Security Council that USCIB authority be extended to the Elin field in the same manner as the Comint field.
f. (TSC)
g. 

b. 24 April 1954
c. Issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Roger M. Kyes)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23, Tab K.
f. (C)
g. See NSC Directive 168, 20 October 1953; Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 5 December 1952; NSCID No. 9, 24 October 1952; Secretary of Defense Directive, 5 December 1952.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.23.

a. Memorandum: "Arrangements to Provide Administrative Services for the National Security Agency"
b. 19 May 1954
c. From the Secretary of Defense (Robert B. Anderson,)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, E.1.2.
e. This memorandum with its two enclosures provided the administrative arrangements for the support of the new NSA. It also delegated to the Director, NSA the direction and control of the agency. In addition, it specified that the Department of the Army would continue to act as the fiscal agent for the agency.
f. (C)
g. 

a. Memorandum: "USCIB Policy on Jamming of Foreign Radio Communications" (CIB #000158)
b. 20 May 1954
c. Issued by the Chairman, United States Intelligence Communications Board (USCIB) (Allen W. Dulles) to the Secretary of Defense (Charles E. Wilson)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.9B.
e. In this memorandum Dulles set forth the position that direct jamming of foreign communications should be performed only on circuits approved in advance by USCIB. The Director, NSA was also directed to keep Comint field units informed as to what foreign circuits had been approved for
The text is a collection of reports and directives related to electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT). It includes information on the role of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) in approving jamming, the role of the NSA Office of Plans and Policy in preparing reports, and the responsibilities of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency in ELINT collection activities. The text also discusses the vulnerability of the United States to surprise attack and the potential of COMINT for strategic warning.
The Hoover Commission appointed a Task Force headed by General Mark W. Clark, to investigate the intelligence activities of the Federal Government and to make appropriate recommendations. On 25 May 1955 the Task Force submitted two reports to the Hoover Commission. One was an unclassified report which recommended that the President appoint a committee of private citizens to report to him periodically on foreign intelligence activities. This later became The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Killian Board). The classified study reported a need for the further expansion of the Comint effort “during an era when not only our national security but our national survival so well may depend on adequate intelligence.” Noting the inherent relationship between Comint and Elint, the Task Force observed that “National interests will be better served, and a more economical and efficient operation will result if Elint is placed under NSA.” It also called for a “Manhattan Project” on high-level Comint.

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** Directive: DoD Directive S-3115.2 "Elint"**

**a.** Secretary of Defense (Charles E. Wilson) to the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) members

**b.** NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.30.

**c.** In this directive Wilson assigned implementation responsibility in the Elint field to the Secretary of the Air Force, pending the issuance of further recommendations by the USCIB and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**d.** (S)

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**Memorandum: "USCIB Policy on Jamming of Foreign Radio Communications"**

**a.** From the Chairman, United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) (Allen W. Dulles) to the Secretary of Defense (Charles E. Wilson)

**b.** NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.9(B), USCIB document CIB-0003.

**c.** In this memorandum Dulles set forth the position that jamming be employed only as approved in advance by USCIB. He further stated that USCIB had no objection to the transmission or retransmission of plain-language messages, if in the discretion of the military commanders it was deemed essential.

**d.** (TS)

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See also "USCIB Policy on Jamming of Foreign Radio Communications," 20 May 1954.
a. Report: "The Report from The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities" (Killian Board Report)
b. 24 October 1957
c. From the "Killian Board" for the President and the National Security Council
d. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 7507N.
e. President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities by Executive Order on 6 February 1956. Chaired by Dr. James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the board was to review the foreign intelligence activities of the government and make semi-annual reports to the President. In this report, the board recommended that the functions of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) be combined into a single board, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and that the new board be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence.
f. (TSC)
g. 
h.

a. Report: "Scientific Judgements on Foreign Communications Intelligence" (Baker Panel Report)
b. 23 January 1958
c. From the Special Intelligence Panel of the Science Advisory Committee to President Dwight D. Eisenhower
d. NSA Cryptologic Archival Holding Area: Accession No. 16667.
e. President Eisenhower convened the "Baker Panel" (Dr. William O. Baker, Director, Bell Laboratories, Chairman) for the purpose of conducting a study of Soviet high-grade ciphers. In this report the panel concluded that no national strategy should be based on the expectation of a vigorous research program, and the strengthening of NSA.
f. (TSC)
g. 
h.

a. Minutes: Minutes of the 147th Meeting of USCIB, "Baker Panel Report"
b. 31 January 1958
c. The United States Communications Intelligence Board Secretariat
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, USCIB Minutes.
e. At this meeting the board considered the recommendations of the "Baker Panel." It recommended that the President accept the Baker Report and direct its implementation. President Eisenhower approved the recommendations on 13 February 1958.
f. (TSC)
g. 
h.

a. Tasking Paper: Establishment of the "Strong Committee"
b. 9 February 1958
c. Issued by the United States Communications Intelligence Board Secretariat
USCIB, responding to a Presidential memorandum of 13 February 1958, established a special Elint Task Force (the "Strong Committee", Philip G. Strong of the CIA was its chairman). It was to study the U.S. Elint structure. This committee submitted its report on 11 June 1958.

See the "Strong Committee Report" 11 June 1958.

The Secretary of Defense (Charles E. Wilson) established the Robertson Ad Hoc Committee in January 1957 to study the operations of NSA and the related cryptologic services. Wilson tasked the committee with making recommendations to maximize the economy and efficiency of the U.S. Comint/Comsec effort. In its report the committee included an assessment of the intelligence value of current Comint efforts against twenty-nine major intelligence targets.

The "Strong Committee" concluded there should be a single national operational and technical authority to direct and control all U.S. Elint activities of the committee and noted that it was "logical, desirable, and feasible" that a single national authority direct and control both the Comint and Elint activities of the U.S. Government.

This NSCID declared the intelligence effort of the United States a national responsibility and assigned the Director of Central Intelligence as the coordinator of all foreign intelligence activities. It also defined the Intelligence Community as including the Central Intelligence Agency; the intelligence components of the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the NSA.

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a. Directive: NSCID No. 5, "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad"
b. 15 September 1958
c. Issued by the National Security Council (NSC)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.28.
e. Approved by the NSC on 27 August 1958 and by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 29 August 1958, this directive established guidelines for U.S. espionage and counterintelligence activities, assigned the responsibility for their execution to the Director, CIA, and tasked the intelligence agencies with assisting CIA in this mission.
f. (TS)

a. Directive: NSCID No. 6, "Communications Intelligence and Electronic Intelligence"
b. 15 September 1958
c. Issued by the National Security Council (NSC)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.28.
e. NSCID No. 6 assigned Elint responsibilities to NSA. Elint was now viewed as a national responsibility along with Comint. It also established the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for Comint/Elint activities, thus abolishing the Special Committee of the NSC for Comint.
f. (TS)

a. Directive: NSCID No. 7, "Critical Intelligence Communications"
b. 15 September 1958
c. Issued by the National Security Council (NSC)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.28.
e. This directive designated the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent of the Government to provide for the establishment, operation, and perfection of communications means necessary to provide the most timely transmission of critical intelligence to higher authorities.
f. (TS)

a. Directive: DoD Directives S-3115.2 (Revised) "Electronic Intelligence (Elint)" and S-3115.4 "Communications Intelligence (Comint)"
b. 19 March 1959
c. From the Secretary of Defense (Neil McElroy)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.30.
e. These directives implemented NSCID No. 6 by outlining the Comint and Elint missions and responsibilities of NSA and the military services. They place most U.S. Elint activities under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA.
f. (S)

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e. These directives implemented NSCID No. 6 by outlining the Comint and Elint missions and responsibilities of NSA and the military services. They place most U.S. Elint activities under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA.
f. (S)

See also the Director, NSA report "Concept of U.S. Elint Operations Within the Cryptologic Community"

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.38.
b. 19 March 1959
c. From the Secretary of Defense (Neil McElroy)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.1.e.
   This directive established a Critical Intelligence Communications System (Criticomm). NSA was
directed to establish, after coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the operational procedures
for handling Comint and critical intelligence traffic within the new system. The Director, NSA
was to have control of the traffic and cryptographic operations of the Criticomm system.
f. (S)

b. 19 March 1959
c. From the Secretary of Defense (Neil McElroy)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.38.e.
   This directive formally established NSA as a separately organized agency within the Department
   of Defense. It also required the Director, NSA to submit to the Secretary of Defense an annual
   Consolidated Cryptologic Program.
f. (S)
g. See also DoD Directives S-3115.2 revised and S-3115.4, both dated 19 March 1959. In addition,
   see DoD Directive 5100.23, 25 August 1959, which provided for the administrative arrangements
   for NSA.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.30.

b. 28 March 1959
c. From the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (John S. Foster) to the Deputy Secretary
   of Defense (David Packard)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.27.e.
   In this memorandum Foster notified Packard that the Director, NSA would report to the
   Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Director for Electronics and Information Systems. All
   previous Principal Deputies had the technical depth of knowledge to fully comprehend the NSA
   programs, but the new appointee was to be a generalist rather than an engineering professional.
   Hence, there would be a need for someone more technically oriented to review NSA programs.
   Packard concurred. Gardiner L. Tucker, Deputy Director for Electronics and Information
   Systems was appointed to the new position.
f. (U)

b. 29 May 1959
c. Enacted by the U.S. Congress
d. 73 Statutes at Large 63.e.
   Public Law 86-36 provided the administrative authorities for civilian personnel administration
   and an effective career system for NSA. It also established the policy that information concerning
   the activities of the NSA would not be made available to the public, thereby providing protection
to the agency so that it could function without disclosure of such information as might impair its
mission. It also made NSA exempt from public disclosure of its organization, functions, and any of its activities.

f. (U)


h. Public Law 96–450 (94 Statutes at Large 1975) and Public Law 97–89 (95 Statutes at Large 1150).


b. 25 August 1959
c. Signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Thomas Slater)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.2.
e. This DoD directive outlined the administrative arrangements for NSA and the arrangements for its support by the military services.
f. (U)
g. See Public Law 86–36, 29 May 1959 and DoD memorandum "Arrangements to Provide Administrative Services for the National Security Agency" 19 May 1954.
h. 73 Statutes at Large 63 and NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, E.1.2.


b. 15 December 1960
c. Issued by the Joint Study Group
d. NSA History Collection Series VI, C.1.32.

e. This Joint Study Group, chaired by Lynn B. Kirkpatrick, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, was to promote the most effective and efficient use of intelligence resources. In studying the NSA, the group recommended that the Department of Defense (DoD) unify Elint resources under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA and that DoD strengthen the control of NSA over the service cryptologic agencies.
f. (TS)
g. 
h.

a. Briefing Paper: "The Operations of the National Security Agency"

b. January 1961
c. The Deputy Director, NSA (Dr. Louis W. Tordella) briefing of the Secretary of Defense (Robert S. McNamara)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.1.
e. Tordella's purpose in delivering this briefing to the new Secretary of Defense was to sensitize McNamara to the importance of Sigint and Comsec and the vital part they played in the strategic and tactical decisions of U.S. policymakers. In this briefing, Tordella also detailed many U.S. successes in the Sigint field.
f. (TSC)
g. h.

a. NSCID Directive No. 6, "Communications Intelligence and Electronic Intelligence"

b. 18 January 1961
c. Issued by the National Security Council (NSC)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.28.
e. The NSC recommended approval of a revision of NSCID No. 6 proposed by the Secretary of Defense in regard to the collection and processing of Comint or Elint. This NSCID revision specified that only the Secretary of Defense may exercise or delegate authority to perform these functions within the Department of Defense.

f. (TS)

g. See NSCID No. 6, 15 September 1958.

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series V, A.28.

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a. Memorandum: "Development of Advanced Intelligence Collection Programs"

b. 17 February 1961

c. From the Director, NSA (Vice Admiral Laurence H. Frost) to the Secretary of Defense (Robert S. McNamara)

d. NSA Cryptologic Holding Area: Accession No. 2852.

e. This memorandum cited NSA's responsibilities and authorities to task Comint/Elint resources, especially satellites. It also outlined NSA approval authority over Service research and engineering plans and programs involving Comint/Elint research and development efforts. It pointed out the unique authority of the Director, NSA in the area of operational planning and tasking in the Comint/Elint collection field. It was intended to clarify the authority of NSA in the field of satellite Comint/Elint tasking.

f. (TS)

g. h.

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a. Report: "Recommendations of the Management Board"

b. July 1961

c. From the Chairman, Management Board (Frank B. Rowlett) to the Director, NSA (Laurence H. Frost)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, B.3.11.

e. Because of the defections to the Soviet Union of NSA employees William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell and their revelation of the internal structure of NSA, (Frost) established a Management Board to review the organizational structure of NSA. The report recommended that the current offices of production be abolished and a new organization put in place. In the new organization, all PROD analytic activities were combined into "groups," A Group (Soviet), B Group (non-Soviet), C Group (support activities). Several of the old PROD and R/D staff activities were elevated to agency staff levels and were designated the National Cryptologic Staff and Research and Engineer Staff. This general structure, though much modified in subsequent years, is still in effect.

f. (TSC)

g. h.

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a. Study: "National Signals Intelligence Program"

b. 26 June 1962

c. From the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) Chairman (James R. Killian, Jr.) to President John F. Kennedy

d. NSA Cryptologic Holding Area: Accession No. 9792N.

e. The PFIAB recommendations included strengthening the U.S. capability to collect and process Sigint. The recommendations were to: (1) strengthen NSA control over Sigint resources, (2) provide NSA supervision of all Sigint collection and processing, (3) increase Department of Defense leadership of NSA activities, (4) complete a National Electronics Intelligence Plan, and (5) redefine the intelligence priorities of the United States Intelligence Board.
Memorandum: "Reporting Channel for the Director, NSA"

1. 10 July 1963
2. From Deputy Secretary of Defense (Cyrus Vance) to the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake)
3. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.27.
4. In this memorandum, Vance informed Blake that, effective 15 June 1963 the Director, NSA's reporting channel was through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering, (Dr. Eugene G. Fubini)).

Report: "The National Signals Intelligence Program" (Fubini Report)

1. 10 March 1964
2. The Deputy, Secretary of Defense (Cyrus R. Vance) to the President's National Security Advisor (McGeorge Bundy)
3. NSA Cryptologic Holding Area: Accession No. 288ZN.
4. This report (prepared by Dr. Eugene G. Fubini for Vance) recommended that NSA be given increased self-sufficiency with regard to the deployment and expansion of its resources. The study strongly reaffirmed the long-term principle that NSA should have supervision over all types of Sigint collection and processing and urged that it be given strong authoritative management over the Sigint system. It was in response to a (request by President John F. Kennedy that the U.S. intelligence) community seek to improve and refine the procedures for providing adequate early warning of crisis situations and timely appraisals of current intelligence concerns.

Public Law 88-290: "National Security Agency - Personnel Security Procedures"

1. 26 March 1964
2. Enacted by U.S. Congress
3. 78 Statutes at Large 168.
4. This act set forth the procedures for employment at NSA including full field investigations for security purposes. It also stated that the Secretary of Defense may terminate the employment of any officer or employee of NSA whenever he determined that such action would be in the interest of the United States. In addition, it also stated that no section of the act shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency, of any information with respect to its activities, or the names, titles, salaries, or number of persons employed.

DoD Directive S-5100.43 "Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEF/SMAC)"

1. 27 April 1964
2. Issued by the Secretary of Defense (Robert S. McNamara)

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This directive established a management arrangement for the control of missile and space intelligence collection and processing activities directed against foreign missile and space activities. It ordered the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director, National Security Agency to jointly establish at NSA, Ft. Meade, Maryland, the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC). The new center was responsible for 24-hour surveillance of foreign missile and space activities.

Report: "Review of Selected NSA Cryptanalytic Efforts" (Bissell Study)

Issued by Brigadier General Clayton Bissell to the Deputy Director for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation, CIA (John A. Bross)

This report concerned high-grade Soviet systems and the level of effort and appropriate expenditure of resources which should be applied to such systems.

Memorandum: "National Security Agency"

From the Chief of Policy (D32, John J. Connelly, Jr.) to NSA Distribution II

Effective 15 July 1965 the Deputy Secretary of Defense ordered the Director, NSA to report to the Secretary of Defense through the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). The Assistant Director (Special Intelligence), ADDR&E was ordered to report directly to the DDR&E or the Deputy Director, DR&E.

Memorandum for the Record: "White House Direct Receipt of Comint Product"

On 16 November 1965 a meeting was held in the White House Situation Room for the purpose of discussing and identifying the White House requirement for Comint. Arthur McCafferty, who chaired the meeting, expressed the White House desire for direct receipt of Comint. The White House position was that it must have things first. Following this meeting, NSA began disseminating selected Sigint end-product to the White House Situation Room. Generally, the end-product fell into four categories: (1) that serving to alert the President to rapidly developing situations which may require executive action; (2) that which was necessary as background for policy considerations; (3) that quoting or allegedly quoting the President or his senior advisors, and (4) that which may be helpful to the Secret Service in fulfilling its mission to protect the President.
a. **Directive**: DoD Directive S-3115.2 "Electronic Intelligence (Elint)"
b. 7 February 1967
c. Issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Cyrus R. Vance)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.30.
e. This directive replaced DoD Directive S-3115.2 of 19 March 1959 and implemented NSCID No. 6 of 15 September 1958, as amended 18 January 1961, and NSCID No. 5 of 18 January 1961. This directive assigned twenty-one Elint tasks to the Director, NSA. It also assigned Elint tasks to the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the military departments.
f. (S)
g. h.

a. **Report**: "Special Study Group on Sigint" (Eaton Report)
b. 11 September 1967
c. Prepared by the Special Study Group on the U.S. Signals Intelligence Effort
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.24.
e. In response to a Presidential Directive, the Director of Central Intelligence established a Special Study Group to review the U.S. Sigint effort. This was the first Presidentially-directed study of the total Sigint effort since the Brownell Committee study in 1952. It looked at all aspects of the Sigint production cycle and the entire range of organizational relationships. This report recommended that the authority of the Director, NSA be reaffirmed and clarified with regard to Service Cryptologic Agency relations; that NSA programming and planning staffs be strengthened; that authority over the tasking, collection, and processing of satellite Comint and telemetry be placed with NSA; and that the control of Elint resources be clarified. It also recommended the establishment of a long-range National Intelligence Plan and the creation of a National Intelligence Resources Board.
f. (TSC)
g. h.

a. **Report**: "PFIAB Recommendations Relative to NSA's Authority and Responsibility"
b. 27 September 1967
c. From the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to the Secretary of Defense (Robert S. McNamara)
d. NSA Q4 Office.
e. The PFIAB recommendations included a proposal for new legislation exempting NSA from Civil Service requirements; that all defense Elint collection and processing be centered in and supervised by NSA; that the United States Intelligence Board levy realistic collection requirements on NSA; that NSA establish a stronger management control over its vast Sigint resources; and that the exercise of strong leadership within NSA in meeting national intelligence requirements should go beyond particular military needs and responsibilities.
f. (TSC)
g. h.
a. Memorandum: "Cryptologic Support"
b. 14 October 1967
c. From the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (Rear Admiral James O. Cobb, Deputy Director, Joint Staff) to the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.2.
e. With this memorandum the Joint Chiefs set forth their concept of Sigint support to military commanders. This interpretation put no restrictions on field requests and once the JCS approved such a request, NSA was committed to provide it. The problem for NSA officials was how to modify the JCS position given a realistic appraisal of NSA resources.
f. (TS)
g. See the related correspondence and comments in this file by Rear Admiral Lester R. Schulz, Dr. Louis W. Tordella, Marshall S. Carter, Frank Austin, IG, and various senior NSA staff officers.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.2.

a. Memorandum: "Continuity in the Directorship of the National Security Agency (NSA)"
b. 26 January 1968
c. From William O. Baker to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clark M. Clifford)
d. NSA Cryptologic Holding Area: Accession No. 294ZN.
e. In this memorandum Baker urged that the tenure of the current Director, NSA, (Marshall S. Carter) should not be interrupted. Baker also outlined the advantages and disadvantages in having a military person versus a civilian as Director, NSA.
f. (S)

a. Memorandum: "Revision of JCS Memorandums of Policy 95 and 96" (JCS Policy on Electronic Warfare)
b. 2 April 1968
c. From the Director, NSA (signed by Rear Admiral Lester R. Schulz) to the Director, J-3, Joint Staff (Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Smith)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, 2.
e. This NSA memorandum was in response to a Joint Chief of Staff working paper concerning the management of electronic warfare assets. NSA objected to the use of the term electronic reconnaissance/surveillance and the confusion which resulted in the definition of Sigint and NSA's responsibilities with this term. (This was another attempt by the JCS to erode NSA's control over Sigint intercept and processing activities.)
f. (S)

a. Memorandum: "Letter of Dr. Fubini on Sigint Trawlers"
b. 5 April 1968
c. From D15 (Harry J. Donahue) to D11 (Lieutenant Commander Edward H. Koczak)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.3.
e. This memorandum reasoned that because of the United States international trade imbalance (then called the "flow-of-gold" problem) and growing ultra-nationalism, particularly the type fostered by President de Gaulle of France, that the U.S. Sigint System could expect to be forced to relinquish several of its key fixed intercept sites in overseas areas. The solution, according to Donahue, was to recommend to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Paul Nitze) that a fleet of Sigint ships (not trawlers) be outfitted for Sigint use. Ultimately, this NSA proposal was approved and
NSA became directly involved in seaborne collection with as many as three ships at sea simultaneously.

20 June 1968
Enacted by the U.S. Congress
82 Statutes at Large 197
This law prohibited, with certain specified exceptions, all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officials. The language of the act precluded any interpretation that this prohibition against wiretapping or electronic surveillance techniques applied to Sigint and Comsec activities of the Federal Government. Wiretapping and electronic surveillance techniques were, therefore, legally recognized as means for the Federal Government to acquire foreign intelligence information and to monitor U.S. classified communications to assess their protection against exploitation by foreign intelligence.

26 August 1968
Issued by the National Security Council (NSC)
NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H37.
This NSC directive designated a special committee of the NSC for Comsec, established the U.S. Comsec Board (USCSB), designated the Secretary of Defense as the executive agent for Comsec for the U.S. Government and the Director, NSA to act for the executive agent, and defined the Comsec responsibilities of all heads of departments and agencies of the government.

9 November 1968
Issued by a Department of Defense (DoD) Study Group chaired by Joseph J. Eachus
NSA Cryptologic Holding Area: Accession No. 366ZN.
In September 1968 the Secretary of Defense established a DoD Study Group to review the NSA effort against Soviet high-level machine ciphers. This group, known as the Eachus Committee, was asked to determine the impact of an increase or decrease in the NSA effort against each of the Soviet machine ciphers. The Eachus Committee concluded that the currently approved level of NSA effort on all Soviet cipher machines should be continued. The report included detailed

Memorandum: “Policy on Processing and Reporting”
b. 19 November 1968

c. From the Director, NSA (Marshall S. Carter) to the Assistant Director for Policy (Major General John E. Morrison, Jr.)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.30.
e. In this memorandum Carter asked Morrison to clarify NSA's relationship with the military regarding the centralization of processing and reporting. Carter related that the military commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to take the position that centralization of processing at NSA was unresponsive to the needs of commanders in the field and that the Sigint system had been seriously degraded by this policy.

f. (C)

g. h.

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a. Memorandum: "Sigint Processing and Centralization"
b. 24 December 1968
c. From Deputy Director (Louis W. Tordella) to the Director, NSA (Marshall S. Carter)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.27.
e. This "pile of paper" as Dr. Tordella called it all, started with Rear Admiral Schulz's memorandum to General Carter of 10 December 1968 in which Schulz resurrected the Op-20-G arguments opposing consolidation of the Comint effort at NSA. Major General Morrison gave his objections to Schulz's view in great detail. (These papers illustrate how the positions so strongly put forth in the 1945-1952 period in the exchanges between Marshall and King, Eisenhower and Nimitz, and later the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, were still being argued.)

f. (S)

g. h.

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a. Memorandum: "Comsec Support for State and Local Police"
b. 13 February 1969
c. From Harry J. Donahue (Director's Staff) to the Director, NSA (Marshall S. Carter)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.3.
e. In this memorandum Donahue advised Carter that the issue of NSA support to state and local authorities should be presented to the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB) to obtain its concurrence lest NSA be viewed as "end-running" the USCSB. He recommended first discussing the proposal with the FBI. The General Counsel of NSA also supported the "contact FBI first" approach.

f. (U)

g. h.

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a. Memorandum: "Comsec Support for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies"
b. 14 February 1969
c. From the Deputy Director, NSA (Louis W. Tordella) to the Director, NSA (Marshall S. Carter)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.4.
e. In this memorandum Tordella vehemently opposed NSA providing Comsec to state and local police, first, because such a function was not within the purview of NSA's Comsec charter, and second, because he believed the function was properly that of the FBI. He further noted that NSA's relationship with the Bureau during the past 15-20 years had been very good, and he would not like to take an action which might disrupt it. He believed that the FBI could, with NSA support, provide Comsec support adequate for the needs of the state and local authorities, especially noting that Comsec equipment in the NSA inventory would be a gross overkill for local
authorities. Tordella also recommended not taking this issue before the U.S. Communications Security Board but dealing directly with the FBI.

f. (C)
g. See attached draft memorandum: "Comsec Support for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies."
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.4.

a. Memorandum of Policy: "Electronic Warfare" (MOP 95)
b. 7 March 1969
c. Issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Policy Statement
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.31.
e. The JCS approved this new policy on 7 March 1969. It was to establish a standard policy for the effective use of Electronic Warfare (EW) and its integration into military operations. NSA voiced a number of concerns relating to the new policy including the failure of the JCS to distinguish EW support from Sigint activities, the duplicative information gathering systems implicit in the new policy, and the threat to Comint security posed by enlarged EW operations. NSA officials felt these concerns were largely disregarded by the JCS.

f. (S)
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.31.

a. Memorandum: "Centralization of Processing and Reporting"
b. 13 May 1969
c. From Deputy Director, Joint Staff (Major General David I. Liebman) to the Secretary of Defense (Melvin R. Laird)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.2.
e. In this memorandum Liebman resurfaced the military arguments against centralization of the Comint effort. He argued that the military field sites no longer were able to provide effective Sigint support to military commanders. Because of NSA's centralization efforts, field site personnel no longer performed analysis but rather merely did data reduction Liebman explained. Liebman recommended that military field site units be permitted to perform analysis and reporting functions and that any further centralization efforts in these areas by NSA be prohibited.

f. (S)
g. See related memoranda on this question.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.2.

a. Letter: (Untitled) The Establishment of a National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB)
b. 17 May 1969
c. From the Director of Central Intelligence (Richard Helms) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (David Packard)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.2.
e. In this letter Helms stated his intent to establish a National Intelligence Resources Board. The board, consisting of representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State, was to assist the DCI in evaluating the need for resources to support the national intelligence effort. NSA's concern revolved around the fact that it was excluded from membership on the board and that decisions involving NSA resources would be made without NSA input.

f. (S)
Also see the memoranda from Director, NSA (Marshall S. Carter) to Deputy Secretary of Defense (David Packard), 12 May 1969 in which Carter objected to being excluded from representation on the proposed NIRB and DCI (Helms) to Deputy Secretary of Defense (Paul Nitze), 17 May 1968 on the same subject.

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.2.

a. Report: "Joint Chiefs of Staff Revision of NSCID 6" (Port Watch Committee Report)
b. 25 July 1969
c. From the Port Watch Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
d. NSA Cryptologic Holding Area: Accession 293ZN.
e. The Port Watch Committee was established in March 1969 in response to a request from the Secretary of Defense (Robert S. McNamara) to the JCS for a series of reports on defense intelligence matters. In a follow up action the JCS produced a proposed revision of NSCID No. 6 (JCS 2031/531). The JCS draft revision enhanced electronic warfare concepts and tactical operations at the expense of Sigint and basically eroded the authority of the Director, NSA.
f. (TS)
g. See NSA comments relating to this draft revision.
h. NSA Cryptologic Holding Area: Accession 2932N.

a. Memorandum: "Data Elements and Data Codes Standardization Program"
b. 27 August 1969
c. From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (Robert C. Moot) to Directors, Defense Agencies
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17.
e. When NSA initially started using data processing for Sigint product in the 1950s it developed its own "country codes." Subsequently, national standards for country codes were established by DoD DIR 5000.11 (27 April 1965), Bureau of the Budget Regulation A-86, and National Bureau of Standards (NBS) country code standards. NSA officials fought vigorously for an exception to the new standards, in order to continue use of their own country code systems. They argued that if NSA accepted the NBS system, its many computer-generated files would have had to be revised—a very time-consuming, tedious, and costly effort. NSA ultimately lost this battle for a "cryptologic exception."
f. (U)
g. See the series of memoranda on this subject.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17.

a. Memorandum: "NSA Authorities and Relationships"
b. 3 September 1969
c. From the Director, Joint Staff (Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson) to the members of the Joint Staff
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.27.
e. This memorandum exhibited irritation by the military services over the operation of NSA. The Services proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that the National Security Council be convinced of the need to revise NSCID No. 6. In a discussion with the JCS the Director, NSA said that the basic directives governing Sigint operations were sound and appropriate, but that any difficulties were probably occasioned by the attitudes of personnel. The Director asked the military departments for a specific "bill of particulars" which would show those areas where the NSA relationships with the military were wanting. The areas in which the services had complaints were: (1) not enough coordination of studies and plans, (2) not enough military personnel in key NSA management positions, (3) a desire for closer cooperation in Vietnam operations, and (4) a desire for more delegation of operational control over certain Sigint units to military commanders.
a. Memorandum: "Comint Support from Third Party Activities"
   b. 15 December 1969
   c. From Assistant Director, NSA for National Cryptologic Staff (Paul E. Neff) to the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Earle W. Wheeler)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.4.
   e. In response to a JCS request for an evaluation of the capability of Third Party Comint activities and the degree to which these activities were responsive to time-sensitive requirement, Neff provided an appraisal of the six Third Party Country Comint activities in
   
   f. (TS–CCO–NF Limited Distribution)
   g. 
   h. 

a. Report: "Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense"
   b. 1 July 1970
   c. Issued by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, C.1.29.
   e. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was appointed by President Richard M. Nixon in July 1969. Chaired by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the panel was to study and make recommendations regarding the organization and management of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The panel found the National Military Command System vulnerable to nuclear attack and a dangerously weak element in the U.S. strategic deterrence posture. Regarding the Intelligence Community, the panel found little coordination of intelligence activities within the Department of Defense, duplication of effort, an imbalance in the allocation of resources, and too little attention given to consumers outside of the Intelligence Community. It recommended restructuring the Defense Intelligence Community to create a clear chain of command from the President down to the Secretary of Defense. This involved the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence under the Deputy Secretary for Operations (ASD(I)/DDI). Under the ASD(I)/DDI, a Defense Security Command (DSECC) would be established composed of all the Service Cryptologic Agencies and all other Defense intelligence collection activities except those associated with combat units. The Commander, DSECC would also serve as Director, NSA. The Defense Intelligence Agency, under the Panel's recommendations, would be replaced by a Defense Intelligence Production Agency and NSA's responsibilities would be expanded to include processing, data base maintenance, and reporting of all intelligence information as directed by the DDI.
   
   f. (TS)
   g. 
   h. 

a. Presidential Memorandum: "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community"
   b. 5 November 1971
   c. Issued by President Richard M. Nixon
   d. NSA, Q4.
   e. Nixon issued this memorandum to strengthen the Director of Central Intelligence's management role in the Intelligence Community. He also directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a
unified national cryptologic command under the Director, NSA for the conduct of all U.S. Comint and Elint activities.

b. 23 December 1971
c. Issued by the Secretary of Defense (Melvin R. Laird)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.1.
e. This directive established the Central Security Service (CSS) and made the Director, NSA the Chief of the CSS. It also directed that the commanders of the service cryptologic organizations be subordinate to the Chief, CSS, for all matters involving Sigint activities.

f. (S)
g. See also "The National Security Agency/Central Security Service Organization Plan."
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, E.1.1 – E.3.

a. Directive: NSCID No. 1, "Basic Duties and Responsibilities"
b. 17 February 1972
c. Issued by the National Security Council (NSC)
d. NSA Historical Office: Series XII, H.1.
e. This directive declared the intelligence effort of the United States a national responsibility and designated the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the coordinator of the foreign intelligence activities of the U.S. It also established under the chairmanship of the DCI the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) to advise and assist the Director. The membership of the board consisted of the DCI, chairman; the Deputy DCI, Vice Chairman; the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, NSA; a representative of the Secretary of the Treasury; a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission; and a representative of the Director, FBI.

f. (S)
g. See NSCID No. 1 dated 4 March 1964.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.1.

a. Directive: NSCID No. 6, "Signals Intelligence"
b. 17 February 1972
c. Issued by the National Security Council
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.23.
e. In this revision the term "electromagnetically transmitted communications" was used in the definition of Comint. The Navy seized upon this terminology in an attempt to exclude

f. (TS-CCO)
g. See Louis Tordella, Deputy Director, NSA, memorandum dated 24 December 1973. (TSC)
h. NSA Historical Collection Series: XII, H.23.

a. Directive: NSCID No. 1 (Revised), "Intelligence Community"
4 March 1972

b. Issued by the National Security Council (NSC)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.23.
e. Because of the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), it was necessary to revise the membership of the United States Intelligence Board, hence the need for a revision of NSCID No. 1. The Intelligence Community now included representatives from: CIA, State, Defense (DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force), NSA, FBI, and the Atomic Energy Commission (now Department of Energy), and made DIA the voting representative for the Department of Defense on the United States Intelligence Board.

f. (TS)


b. 14 April 1972
c. Issued by the Director, National Security Agency (Vice Admiral Noel Gayler)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series VI, E.1.6.
e. This document described the complex organization plan of the integrated National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS). Included was an organizational chart.

f. (S)

g. (H)


b. 13 July 1972
c. Enacted by U.S. Congress
d. 86 Statutes at Large 489.
e. Section 601 of this act established a Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. A Joint Executive Congressional Commission, its purpose was to improve governmental processes and programs in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. As a part of this mission, it was to study the U.S. intelligence community.

f. (U)

g. See the Murphy Commission Report.

h. NSA Historical Collection, Series VI, C.1.20.


b. 18 December 1972
c. Signed by the Secretary of Defense (Melvin R. Laird)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.38.
e. This directive established a uniform policy for the safeguarding of classified information and unclassified but sensitive information contained in Automated Data Processing Systems.

f. (U)

g. See NSA/CSS Directive No. 10-27.

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.38.

(a. DoD Directive S-3115.7 "Signals Intelligence (Sigint)"

b. 25 January 1973
c. Issued by the Secretary of Defense (Melvin R. Laird)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.1.
e. This directive consolidated S-3115.2 "Electronic Intelligence" and S-3115.8 "Communications Intelligence." It restated the duties and responsibilities of the Director, NSA in these areas; added telemetry intelligence to the definition of Sigint; provided a definition of Teлинт – technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry; and added a new exception to the definition of Comint – oral and wire interceptions.
f. (S)
g. This directive implemented NSCID No. 6: "Signals Intelligence," 17 February 1972.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.23.

a. Letter: (Untitled) DCI’s Draft Memorandum for the President on "Objectives for the Intelligence Community"
b. 3 July 1973
c. From the Deputy Director, NSA (Louis W. Tordella) to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (William E. Colby)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.4.
e. Colby provided the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Samuel C. Phillips) a copy of his draft memorandum for President Richard M. Nixon which outlined new objectives for the Intelligence Community. By this letter NSA endorsed Colby’s objectives suggesting only that the Director, NSA be appointed a member of Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) and have representation on its Research and Director Advisory Council.
f. (S)
g. See Colby’s memorandum “Objectives for the Intelligence Community.”
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.4.

a. Memorandum: “Intelligence Manpower Planning”
b. 13 July 1973
c. From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (William P. Clements) to the Director, NSA (Samuel C. Phillips)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.19.
e. Clements directed NSA to reduce the manpower of the cryptologic community to a level of [number] billets, or an overall reduction of [percentage]. Phillips was to do this by increasing management efficiency through reorganization, consolidation, program restructure, and elimination of non-essential support personnel. All of these actions were to be taken without degrading the overall intelligence operations. Phillips replied that such a cut would reduce Sigint production and contingency resources no matter how he attempted to implement it.
f. (S)
g. See Phillip’s reply, 31 July 1973.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.19.

a. Memorandum of Understanding: "M/U Between Director, NSA/Chief, CSS and Chief of Naval Operations on Coordination of Navy-Controlled, Sigint-Related Resources”
b. 11 October 1973
c. Executed by the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.21.
e. This memorandum of understanding spelled out how Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons One and Two (VQ-1, VQ-2) and transportable shipboard vans (QUIC and CICS) were to be managed and controlled by the Navy and the NSA. It sought to ensure that these resources were used effectively and efficiently.
Study: Cryptologic Support Group Study
12 October 1973
From the Deputy Director for Field Management (John L. Marocchi) to the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen)
NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.26.
The study was to ascertain where the management responsibility for the Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) should be vested. It was part of a large study of NSA reorganization efforts. After reviewing the background of the CSG program back to 1964, the study focused on the scope of CSG operations, CSG subordination to the military commander being supported, and internal NSA staff management of CSG matters. It recommended that the roles and functions of CSG's be clearly delineated; that the CSG's continue as identifiable elements and not placed under the commands being supported; and that additional billets be provided to the Deputy Director for Operations in order to carry out CSG functions.

Memorandum: “Concept of Sigint Support to Military Commanders”
24 October 1973
From the Joint Chiefs of Staff
NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.27.
This memorandum established procedures for providing signals intelligence support to military commanders. It also defined Cryptologic Support Groups (CSGs) and their responsibilities. Acting NSA Director, Louis Tordella placed the Deputy Chief, CSS/Deputy Director, Field Management and Evaluation in the position of coordinator for the CSG’s to ensure NSA oversight.

Memorandum for the Record: “Centralization”
19 March 1974
Prepared by Thomas L. Burns for the NSA Management Council
NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.33.
This memorandum noted the discussions of the NSA Management Council meeting of 19 March 1974 concerning “centralization.” The discussions centered around the issue of adequate Sigint support to field commanders.

Memorandum: “Role of Deputy Chief, CSS”
18 April 1974
From the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen) to Distribution II
NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.16.
In this memorandum Allen restated NSA intentions to use the Deputy Chief, Central Security Service as the principal focal point for dealing with the military.

Memorandum: "Revision of MOP-95" (Revised Policy on Electronic Warfare Support Measures—ESM)

- 23 July 1974
- From the Deputy Chief, CSS Deputy Director NSA for Field Management (John L. Marocchi) to the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen)
- NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.18.
- NSA officials objected to the use of the term Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM). They were concerned that the definition of ESM could ultimately include the majority of Sigint resources. At issue was whether NSA or the services exercised control over the functions and assets described as ESM.

Draft Agreement: "Agreement for the National Reconnaissance Program"

- 26 September 1974
- From the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) (John W. Plummer) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (Dr. Albert C. Hall)
- NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.23 (Omnibus NSCID).
- This draft agreement placed the conduct of all satellite reconnaissance under the National Reconnaissance Program within the Department of Defense. It established an NRO responsible to the Secretary of Defense. The NRO was composed of the three military departments, the Central Intelligence Agency, and NSA.

Letter: (Untitled) NSA Objections to the Draft Omnibus NSCID

- 18 November 1974
- From the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (D/DCI) for the Intelligence Community (Lieutenant General Samuel C. Wilson)
- NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.23.
- Allen reminded Wilson in this memorandum that the current NSCID No. 6 (17 February 1972) was little more than two years old, and that the draft revision deleted the important phrase in NSCID No. 6 that forbade any other U.S. Government agency from engaging in Sigint activities.

Memorandum: "House Appropriations Committee Investigation of NSA"

- 7 May 1975
- From the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (Dr. Albert Hall)
In this memorandum Allen discussed the House Appropriations Committee's report on the Intelligence Community, especially the major issue addressed in the report on the management of U.S. cryptologic activities. The issue as defined in the report centered around, "whether the cryptologic community should become a unified agency or whether the responsibility for the management of the collection and processing of signals intelligence should remain dispensed among NSA, the Services, CIA, and the National Reconnaissance Office." Allen argued that the community had to avoid over centralization.

Statement: "Statement by W. E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence before House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence (HSCI)"
4 August 1975
Presented to the committee on 4 August 1975
This statement provided an outline of the organization and structure of the Intelligence Community, its role, members, budget process, management functions and, authorities.
See also the correspondence between Otis G. Pike, Chairman and William E. Colby.

Staff Paper: "Proposed Committee Staff Statement Re: Categories of People and Entities on the WATCH LIST"
7 October 1975
Informal correspondence between John Harney and David Lowman of the NSA Congressional Liaison Office and Barry Carter of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities
This correspondence included several pages of questions and answers for General Lew Allen relating to NSA participation in a project which included the maintenance of a "Watch List" of Americans whose radical activities were of interest to the government during the Vietnam era. A number of these questions and answers related to the maintenance of such lists as far back as the 1940s, and the legality of such an effort. The questions also focused on Project Minaret, the Huston Plan, and Operation Shamrock.

Statement: "Statement of Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, National Security Agency"
29 October 1975
Delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
This long statement covered the mission of NSA, successes in American cryptologic history, the history of the NSA organization, and the legal authorities for its existence. Allen also discussed the "Watch List."

71
a. **Letter:** (Untitled) Management of CIA Sigint Activities  
   b. 14 November 1975  
   c. From the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen) to the Director of Central Intelligence (William E. Colby)  
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.16.  
   e. In this letter Allen set forth a number of proposals for centralizing Sigint activities under the supervision of the Director, NSA especially with regard to operations. After some delay, Colby gave NSA a voice in CIA’s Sigint efforts.  
   f. (TS-CCO)  
   g. See also Colby’s letter to Allen, 24 November 1975.  
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.16.

a. **Memorandum for the Record:** "Organization and Management of the Foreign Intelligence Community"  
   b. 24 November 1975  
   c. From the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (Rear Admiral Robert P. Hilton, Deputy Director for Force Development and Strategic Plans) to Distribution of Working Group members of the Intelligence Coordinating Group  
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.19.  
   e. The Intelligence Coordinating Group was established in 1975 to review and make recommendations relating to the structure and management of the Intelligence Community. This memorandum set forth the issues and topics to be examined. Included were covert actions, intelligence support in crisis situations, control of intelligence resources in peacetime and wartime, producer/consumer relationships, and the protection of sources and methods. All of these issues were of major concern to NSA policymakers. NSA was not represented on the working group however.  
   f. (C)  
   g. See the various issue papers prepared by the group.  
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.19.

a. **Memorandum:** "Options for Reorganization of Defense Intelligence"  
   b. 2 February 1976  
   c. From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Robert F. Ellsworth) to several Defense components including the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen)  
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17.  
   e. In an effort to tighten management control over Department of Defense intelligence activities, Ellsworth set forth four reorganization proposals. In his response, Allen objected to all the proposals because they placed an additional management layer between the Director, NSA and the Secretary of Defense. Allen argued that NSA would be placed in a subordinate position within the Department of Defense structure rather than serving the Secretary of Defense as his executive agent for Comint and Comsec. Despite Allen’s comments, however, the Secretary of Defense approved a reorganization which designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) as Director of Defense Intelligence and directed that NSA report to the Secretary through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)/Director of Defense Intelligence.  
   f. (S-NF)  
   g. See also Allen, memorandum to Ellsworth, 14 April 1976, and Ellsworth’s memorandum on Reorganization of 11 May 1976.  
   h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17.
Executive Order 11905: "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities"

18 February 1976

Issued by President Gerald R. Ford


The purpose of this Executive Order was to improve the quality of intelligence, clarify authorities and responsibilities within the executive department on intelligence, and establish an effective oversight system to ensure compliance with U.S. laws. It also sought to establish more effective oversight of the Intelligence Community through the establishment of an Intelligence Oversight Board. The new board was composed of individuals appointed by the President from outside the government and who had no personal contractual relationship with the Intelligence Community. It also established a Committee on Foreign Intelligence consisting of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The committee's responsibility was to manage and control the budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

Memorandum: "The Functions of the Intelligence Board"

8 March 1976

From the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen) to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) (George W. Bush)

NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.16.

In this memorandum, Allen responded to a DCI request for recommendations regarding the restructuring of the United States Communications Intelligence Board. Allen recommended that the reality of NSA as a producer of "finished intelligence" be officially recognized, especially in view of the fact that for a large body of intelligence, NSA was the only or the major producer of such information. Allen further recommended that regardless of how the board was restructured, the Director, NSA be a full member.

Memorandum of Understanding: "Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Air Force Security Service and the National Security Agency Concerning the Operation and Support of a at RAF Chicksands, United Kingdom"

23 April 1976

Signed by the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen) and the Commander, United States Air Force Security Service (Kenneth D. Burns)

NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.21.

This memorandum set forth the organization, management, and support of a

The center was a major test for joint operations.

Memorandum for the Record: "Signals Intelligence Support to the U.S. Coast Guard"
b. 26 April 1976  
c. Issued by NSA Assistant General Counsel (James G. Hudec) for information of the NSA Directorate  
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.21.  
e. The issuance of Executive Order 11905 raised the question of the legality of the Naval Security Group providing Direction Finding (DF) support to the Coast Guard in its efforts to ensure compliance with international tuna agreements. Preliminary findings of the Justice Department were that there was only one provision of the Order which might be viewed as a violation. That provision might be satisfied, according to Justice, by the Coast Guard reimbursing the National Security Group (NSG) for each DF "fix." The Coast Guard agreed provided that the NSG direction finding activity was defined as a Sigint programmed activity.  
f. (C)  
g.  
h.  

b. 26 May 1976  
c. Issued by the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen)  
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.38.  
e. This directive prescribed the general NSA policy and Sigint operating policy regarding reporting. It provided procedures and assigned responsibilities to ensure that the signals intelligence mission of the National Security Agency was conducted so as to guarantee proper safeguards to the rights and privacy of U.S. persons. In general, this directive required that all references to U.S. persons or corporations be deleted from product reporting.  
f. (S)  
g. See revisions to this directive and internal memoranda relating to it.  
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.38.  

a. Memorandum of Understanding: "M/U Between the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce and the Central Intelligence Agency with Respect to Special Warnings to Mariners"  
b. 20 July 1976  
c. Issued by the Department of State for action by State, Defense (which included NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency specifically named), Commerce, and CIA.  
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.21.  
e. The capture of the S.S. Mayaguez by Cambodian Communists caused U.S. authorities to establish warning procedures for American ships at sea similar to procedures used during World War II. This memorandum of understanding provided for the State Department to collect and consolidate the warning information and to release it to all ships at sea. NSA and the CIA were assigned responsibilities to collect and forward "Mariner Warning Information" to State for dissemination. The paramount criterion used throughout the decision process was whether or not a threat existed to the safety of U.S. mariners.  
f. (U)  
g.  
h.  

a. Memorandum of Understanding: "Provision of Certain Information to CIA and State Department"  
b. 29 September 1976  

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Top Secret Umbra
This Memorandum of Understanding set up guidance for the distribution of selected NSA compartmented product reports to CIA and the Department of State representatives. It was designed to provide the U.S. Intelligence Community with all possible insight. 

EO 1.4. (c)
P.L. 86-36

a. Letter: (Untitled) Lawfulness of NSA Providing the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) with Certain Strategic Intelligence Collected by NSA
b. 13 December 1976
c. From the Attorney General of the U.S. (Edward H. Levi) to the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.22.
e. Asked to render an opinion as to the lawfulness of NSA’s providing DEA with certain strategic intelligence acquired by NSA, Levi advised that NSA could provide DEA with certain narcotics intelligence provided it was not derived from “Protected Communications” or identified “United States persons.” It had to be incidentally acquired in the course of a lawful intercept and could not include the specific targeting of “United States persons.”
f. (TS–CCO)
g. See NSSID No. 18, 26 March 1976.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.38.

a. Memorandum: "US Strategic Missile Telemetry Encryption"
b. 17 February 1977
c. From the Secretary of Defense (Harold Brown) to the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.9(B).
e. Following a successful demonstration of telemetry encryption on Minuteman test firings, Allen recommended that all U.S. strategic missile tests be encrypted. Brown replied that this would be inconsistent with current policy regarding Salt II. He supported, however, continued development activities to encrypt telemetry on U.S. strategic system flight tests.
f. (TS)
g.
h.

b. 1 March 1977
c. Introduced into the House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st Session, by Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D-Cal.)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17.
e. The question of establishing NSA as a statutory agency was considered by various Executive Branch and Congressional Committees since the agency’s establishment in 1952. Part E of this bill provided for the establishment of NSA as an independent agency subordinate only to the President. NSA officials believed there was adequate statutory base for NSA’s existence and
functions and that specific legislation was not essential. The bill was never reported out of committee.

f. (U)
g. See also NSA memoranda relating to H.R. Bill 4173 and H.R. Bill 11542.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.23 and Series XII, H.9.

b. 24 March 1977
c. From the National Security Council (NSC) (Signed by President Jimmy Carter)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.25.
e. In this memorandum, Carter voiced his concern over intercept activities of U.S. telecommunications systems and the lack of a well-defined protection policy to deal with these activities. He directed the NSC Special Coordination Committee to undertake a thorough review of U.S. counteractions and to examine all the legal, diplomatic, and technology issues involved. He also ordered the development of an integrated National Telecommunications Protection Policy.
f. (TS–CCO)
g. See also NSA memoranda concerning this issue.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.23.

b. 28 March 1977
c. From the National Security Council (Signed by President Jimmy Carter)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.25.
e. Concerned that the United States did not have a coherent national space policy for its civil, military, and national intelligence space programs, President Carter asked for a complete review of U.S. programs and a Statement of National Policy. Harold Brown (Secretary of Defense) headed the effort.
f. (TS)
g. 
h.

a. Message: "NSA–GCHQ Collaboration"
b. 28 March 1977
c. From SUSLO (L/Cheltenham) (Milton Zaslow) for the Director, NSA (Lieutenant General Lew Allen) and the Deputy Director, NSA (Benson K. Buffham)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.28.
e. In this message Zaslow reported on a meeting between British Prime Minister James Callaghan and President Jimmy Carter on 11 March 1977. Among other things, Carter discussed the UK/USA agreement of 1945 which provided for the exchange of

Carter noted the benefits accruing to both countries and indicated his desire that it continue in force. Prime Minister Callaghan agreed.

f. TS–Limited Distribution

g. 
h.

a. Memorandum: "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act"
b. 4 April 1977
c. From the Assistant Director for Legislative Affairs (Gerald P. Burke) to Distribution (Deputy and Assistant Directors)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.9.

e. In this memorandum Burke noted that on 1 April 1977 the Department of Justice reconsidered its interpretation of the act and adopted the NSA position. This included permitting the President to authorize electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information without a court order whenever surveillance was directed at a foreign power or non-U.S. person, who was either an agent of a foreign power or not in the United States. Any such surveillance had to be conducted in accord with minimization procedures approved by the Attorney General and reported to the Senate Intelligence Committee and such committees of the House as the Speaker might choose. Burke believed it was a step in the right direction but there were still problems with the Justice Department's over-all position.

f. (U)

g. 

h. 

a. Memorandum: "People's Republic of China"

b. 5 April 1977

c. From the National Security Council (NCS) (Signed by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs: Zbigniew Brzezinski)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.25.

e. Brzezinski noted in this memorandum that President Jimmy Carter had directed the Policy Review Committee of the NSC to review the American policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC). A concomitant issue in this review was the impact on intelligence operations on normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC.

f. (S-CCO)

g. 

h. 

a. Memorandum: "Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM–11) Task 3 Review of Intelligence Community"

b. 14 April 1977

c. From the Assistant Director, NSA for Policy and Liaison (John R. Harney) to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (George P. Dinneen)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.24.

e. On 22 February 1977 President Jimmy Carter directed the National Security Council (NSC) Special Coordination Committee (SCC) to conduct a review of major foreign intelligence activities and the organizational structure and function of the Intelligence Community. After a rough start in which no consensus was reached, Task Force 3 was set up in April in an attempt to arrive at some concrete recommendations. Of major concern to the NSA was the recommendation to retain NSA within the Department of Defense structure with the Director, NSA reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary. The over-all report which primarily concerned the roles of the Director of Central Intelligence was submitted to the President on 1 June 1977.

f. (S)

g. See the report.

h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.25.

9 June 1977
Prepared by the National Security Council's Special Coordination Committee pursuant to the direction in PRM/NSC-II issued by President Jimmy Carter
This report recommended the strengthening of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) line authority over all intelligence activities. NSA's primary objection to the report was with the proposal to transfer all tasking functions of collectors to the DCI. NSA officials believed this would have the effect of "splintering the Sigint system." They argued it would adversely effect NSA's ability to provide support to its customers.

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b. 4 August 1977
c. National Security Council (NSC)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.25.
e. This directive gave the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) full authority to review and approve the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget before its presentation to the Congress. No longer was the Secretary of Defense the prime approving authority for the NSA financial program. The directive also established a National Intelligence Tasking Center under the direction of the DCI.

a. Memorandum: "Intelligence Charter Legislation"
b. 20 August 1977
c. From the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Zbigniew Brzezinski)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.25.
e. President Jimmy Carter agreed with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that there should be charter legislation for the intelligence agencies. This memorandum asked the Central Intelligence Agency, NSA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and the FBI to give the committee their proposals. Proposals were made, but after extensive Congressional hearings, only one paragraph of one proposal was enacted, which said that Congress must be kept informed of the activities of the intelligence agencies.

a. Memorandum: "Joint Report on CIA Sigint Activities"
b. 26 August 1977
c. From the Director, NSA (Vice Admiral Bobby R. Inman) and the Acting Director, CIA (John F. Blake) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Admiral Stansfield Turner)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.9(B) and 15.
e. In its report of April 1976 the House Appropriations Committee took note of the draft study on CIA Sigint activities prepared by the Committee's Surveys and Investigations Staff. The draft study argued that the CIA Sigint program might be effectively consolidated with that of NSA, and pointed to areas of potential savings which might result. The Committee directed NSA and CIA to review the findings of the study and to comment back to the Committee in September of 1976. In response to the HAC charge, CIA and NSA prepared separate reports which were
consolidated by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) of the National Security Council and provided to the Committee in October of 1976. A more detailed report, written jointly by CIA and NSA, was subsequently provided to the Committee by the CFI in January of 1977. The thrust of the CFI findings was that CIA should continue a Sigint program, concentrating on those areas where CIA possessed unique capabilities but that the CIA program should be operated as part of the U.S. Sigint System under the Director, NSA, and responsive to him. The CFI did not identify specific areas where CIA Sigint activities should be transferred to NSA but directed CIA and NSA to continue to study the possibilities and desirabilities of such transfers. The CFI specifically directed DIA and NSA to work out jointly a plan by September 1977 for the further integration of CIA Sigint activities within the U.S. Sigint System and to identify jointly which CIA Sigint activities would be transferred. The attached report outlined the findings of CIA and NSA in response to this charge.

f. (TS - Special Clearances Required)
g. 
h.

a. Minutes: Special Coordination Committee Meeting, 26 August 1977, "An Integrated Telecommunications Protection Policy"
b. 26 August 1977
c. Issued by the Presidential Advisor (Zbigniew Brzezinski) to Meeting attendees from the White House Staff, State, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Justice, National Security Council, CIA, NSA, Commerce, and the Office of Management and Budget
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.25.
e. At this high level meeting, chaired by Brzezinski, the participants which included Vice President Walter Mondale, Admiral Stansfield Turner and Vice Admiral Bobby Inman discussed whether to pursue a policy of developing only defensive measures to reduce U.S. vulnerability to Soviet intercept activities within the U.S. or to also employ political and, if necessary, technical active countermeasures. The committee was also concerned with public disclosures of sensitive intelligence operations.

f. (S)
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.25.

a. Memorandum: "Comments on Intelligence Activities and Individual Rights Act of 1977"
b. 13 September 1977
c. From the Deputy Chief, Intelligence Community Affairs (David W. Gaddy) to the Assistant Director for Policy and Liaison (John R. Harney)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.9(C).
e. In this memorandum Gaddy suggested that the law was so heavily oriented to the protection of the individual rights of the American citizen and the curtailment of domestic intelligence activities that it inadvertently also curtailed legitimate foreign intelligence operations by the U.S. intelligence agencies.

f. (U)
g. 
h.

a. Memorandum: "Government-to-Government and International Liaisons Which May Result in Export Proposals" (Serial #NI070)
b. 19 September 1977
c. From the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman) to the Director of Policy Review, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Admiral Murphy)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XI, H.9.
e. Inman, concerned that certain elements of the U.S. government were committing the United States to policies which required the export of technology to nations that would have a deleterious impact on U.S. Sigint efforts, proposed a draft Presidential Directive to deal with the problem. Attached to the memorandum is the draft directive.
f. (U)

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b. 16 November 1977; (Reissued on 9 February 1979 to adjust classifications by paragraph)
c. Signed by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Zbigniew Brzezinski)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.10.
e. This directive provided national policy guidelines for the security of U.S. telecommunications. Its objective was to provide a framework for protecting private communications of Americans against exploitation by the Soviets. It restated the tasking of the Secretary of Defense to act as executive agent for the U.S. Government for Comsec.
f. (S)

---

a. Executive Order: Executive Order 12036 "United States Intelligence Activities"
b. 24 January 1978
c. Issued by President Jimmy Carter
d. NSA General Counsel, 3 Code of Federal Regulations 112 (1979).
e. Carter's Executive Order established the National Security Council Special Coordination Committee (SCC) to consider and submit to the President policy recommendations on special intelligence activities. It also set up the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) to advise the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on foreign intelligence programs. In addition, it established a National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC) under the direction, control, and management of the DCI for coordinating and tasking national foreign intelligence collection activities. Under the section relating to NSA it stated that no other department or agency may engage in signals intelligence activities except as delegated by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense delegated that authority to the Director of NSA by a memorandum of 23 March 1978.
f. (U)
g. See also Secretary of Defense memorandum, 23 March 1978 delegating authority to the Director, NSA; D5 memorandum to the Director, NSA, 2 February 1978 on changes in the role and status of NFIB resulting from Executive Order 12036.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.22 and 18.

---

a. Minutes: Special Coordinating Subcommittee Meeting: "PD/NSC 24: Telecommunications Protection Policy"
b. 27 January 1978
c. From the White House Science and Technology Advisor and SSC Subcommittee Chairman (Frank Press)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.23.
e. Of particular concern to NSA officials was the discussion which focused on the Soviets proposed purchase of real estate in New York City which would enable them to intercept U.S.
communications. Also of interest were discussions relating to the protection of contractors' communications and public cryptography.

f. (C)
g. h.

a. Bill: Senate Bill 2525 "National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978"
b. 9 February 1978
c. Introduced by Senator Walter D. Huddleston, (D-KY) and Senator Charles McC. Mathias (R-MD)
d. Huddleston, with the support of Mathias introduced this lengthy bill following three years of work primarily by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. The NSA portion of this bill (Title VI, "National Security Agency Act of 1978") was a consolidation of its authorities granted in several authoritative documents. It left NSA within the Department of Defense but made it responsive to the intelligence requirements levied by a "Director of National Intelligence." The bill was not acted upon by the Senate.

f. (U)
g. h.

a. Memorandum: "Delegation of Authority Under E.O. 12036"
b. 23 March 1978
c. From the Secretary of Defense (Harold Brown) to the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.22, (NSA/CSS Directive 10-30.)
e. This memorandum referenced Section 1-1202 of Executive Order 12036, which forbid any department or agency other than NSA from engaging in Sigint activities. Brown restated that charge to the Director, NSA. Further, he noted that the responsibility may not be redelegated, and that a periodic reporting of the Director, NSA was required through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

f. (U)
g. See Executive Order 12036, 26 January 1978.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series VII, 19, Box 4.

a. Memorandum: "Revised NSDM-3 - ACTION MEMORANDUM"
b. 27 March 1978
c. From the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman) to the Secretary of Defense (Harold Brown)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.16, D4.
e. In this memorandum, Inman responded to a 15 March 1978 State Department letter which proposed a revision of the National Security Decision Memorandum NSDM-3. He stated that Executive Order 12036 and NSCID No. 6 both expressly delegated authority to the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent of the U.S. government for signals intelligence. Inman suggested that State's proposed revision (which would have broadened State's control over Sigint activities overseas) was contrary to the Executive Order and the law defining the activities of responsibilities of U.S. ambassadors.

f. (C)
g. h.

a. Memorandum: "Sigint Support in Wartime"
b. 1 April 1978
c. From Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) (Gerald P. Dinneen, Principal Deputy) to the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.6, (ADPL Chrono, July - September 1978).
e. In this memorandum Dinneen noted that the Department of Defense had promised Congress that it would develop a long-range plan to provide intelligence support to all military tactical units. The Director, NSA was directed to participate in the development of this plan and was specifically tasked to provide Sigint support to all echelons of military command. This memorandum reflected continuing concern by the military with regard to adequate Sigint support from NSA.
f. (No classification shown)
g. See also an NSA memorandum on the general subject of Sigint support to the military.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.5.

a. Executive Order 12065: "National Security Information"
b. 28 June 1978
c. Issued by President Jimmy Carter
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.18.
e. The new Executive Order was designed to protect national security information but at the same time it attempted to reduce unnecessary classification and overclassification of documents. It defined classified authorities and delegations of that authority; specified systematic review procedures; provided declassification policy; created mandatory review procedures; clarified access to records; and created an Information Security Oversight Office to ensure implementation of the order. The new Oversight Office would also act as an appeals authority on declassification decisions.
f. (U)
g. h.

a. Letter: "NSA Comsec Responsibilities"
b. 20 July 1978
c. From the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman) to Secretaries of Army (Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.), Navy (W. Graham Claytor, Jr.), and Air Force (John C. Stetson)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17.
e. In this letter Inman notified the military services of a new national policy on the protection of telecommunications. One notable change was the separation of responsibilities between two executive agents. The Secretary of Defense retained responsibility for protecting classified information and for unclassified national security information. The Secretary of Commerce was designated to protect unclassified information unrelated to national security. Further, Inman stated that NSA's responsibilities had not changed as executive agent for the Secretary of Defense especially in prescribing or approving all cryptographic systems used in any manner. This memorandum reinforced NSA's position as the final authority on all cryptographic systems.
f. (C)
g. h.

a. Memorandum: "Public Cryptology"
b. 23 August 1978
c. From NSA General Counsel (Daniel B. Silver) to NSA Internal Distribution (Deputy Directors)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17, (DDC).
e. This memorandum outlined Admiral Bobby Inman's decision that NSA would seek new legislation for control and dissemination of non-governmental cryptologic information. Inman
approved the continuation of talks with private industry and the National Science Foundation in support of non-governmental Comsec efforts.

f. (U)
g. In this same file are numerous position papers and other background information on public cryptology.
h. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17 (DDC).

a. Memorandum: “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act”
b. 3 November 1978
c. From the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman) to NSA Distribution I
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.18, (General Counsel).
e. In this memorandum Inman notified NSA officials that the recently enacted Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act regulated the use of electronic surveillance devices in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. Therefore, Inman required all operational elements planning such operations to obtain guidance and approval before initiating any such operations. Further, Inman emphasized that he was going to ensure that the agency fully complied with the law.
f. (C)
g. (U)
h. 

a. Memorandum: “Congressional Requirements”
b. 24 November 1978
c. From the Assistant Director, NSA for Plans and Resources (ADPR) (Rear Admiral Henry J. Davis, Jr.) to NSA Internal Distribution

e. This memorandum also included summaries of agreements with other Federal agencies relating to certain intelligence activities and projects.
f. (TS – Special Handling Required – TK)
g. 
h. 

a. Aide-Memoire: “Aide-Memoire on NSA/CIA Consolidation Plan”
b. 28 November 1978
c. From the Assistant Director for Policy and Liaison (John R. Harney) to the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman)
e. This aide-memoire was for Inman’s use in discussions with the staff of the House Appropriations Committee. It concerned the methods by which CIA’s Sigint activities might be consolidated with those of NSA to achieve savings in resources and improve their management.
f. (TS – CCO)
g. 
h. 

a. Memorandum: “Request for Amendment to NACSI 4000”
b. 11 December 1978
c. From the Deputy Commander, Naval Security Group Command (William A. Cahill) to the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman)
d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17.
e. In this memorandum the Naval Security Group Command (NSGC) notified NSA that it had sought a legal opinion from the Naval Judge Advocate General with regard to the legality of
TOP SECRET UMBRA

NSGC monitoring transmissions from the Military Affilate Radio System (MARS) and amateur radio transmissions. JAG ruled that, except under certain specified conditions, it was illegal. The importance of fleet and ship commanders at sea being permitted to monitor MARS communications prompted this request for an amendment to NACSI 4000.

(U)

a. Memorandum of Understanding: "Procedures to Ensure NSA/CSS Opportunity for Evaluation of Elint to be Provided to Foreign Governments in Support of Ad Hoc Electronic Warfare (EW) Requirements"

b. 22 January 1979

c. Signed by the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (General Lew Allen, Jr.) and the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.21.

e. This memorandum of understanding established procedures that permitted NSA to evaluate USAF proposals to release U.S.-produced Elint to foreign governments in support of the United States Air Force ad hoc requirements.

(U)

f. Memorandum: "Proposal for a

b. 13 March 1979

c. From the Assistant Director, NSA for Policy and Liaison (John R. Harney) to NSA distribution

d. NSA Historical Collections: Series XII, H.7, (ADPL Chrono, March 1979).

e. This memorandum and its enclosure outlined the concept for the organization of the

EO 1.4. (c)

f. (S–CCO)

g. EO 1.4. (d)

h. P.L. 86-36

a. Letter: (Untitled) Collection of Information on U.S. Persons

b. 24 May 1979

c. From the Director, NSA (Bobby R. Inman) to the Director, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)

d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.22.

e. In this letter Inman information relating to issues of collection, dissemination, and storage of information concerning U.S. citizens as set forth in Executive Order 11905. He noted that GCHQ

EO 1.4. (d)

f. (S–CCO)

g. P.L. 86-36

h. EO 1.4. (c)


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TOP SECRET UMBRA
b. 20 June 1979
   c. From the Secretary of Defense (Harold Brown) to Defense Components
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.17; (S Policy Staff).
   e. This directive was an implementation of Executive Order 12036, “U.S. Intelligence Activities,” and assigned Comsec responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense, the National Communications Security Committee, the Director, NSA, and other heads of departments and agencies of the government. Generally, NSA was charged with executing the Comsec responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and for conducting research and development on Comsec for the government.
   f. (C)

   Memorandum: “Charter Legislation”
   b. 31 October 1979
   c. From the Intelligence Community Affairs (John B. Callahan) to ADPL (John R. Harney)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.10.
   e. Callahan commented that the proposed CIA charter appeared to contradict the interest of Executive Order 12036 on which the charter was to be released, especially in assigning new duties/responsibilities to the Director of CIA. An appended NSA internal memorandum expressed similar concern with the proposed charter particularly as it appeared to extend CIA’s authority in the Sigint area.
   f. (U)

   Memorandum: “Export of LANDSAT-D Ground Station to the PRC”
   b. 15 November 1979
   c. From the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International Programs and Technology) (Dr. Vitalij Garber) to the Secretary of Defense (Cyrus R. Vance)
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.20.
   e. This memorandum discussed a proposal for the U.S. to provide certain technical support to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the possible adverse impact of such an action on the missions.
   f. (S)
   g. P.L. 86-36
   h. EO 1.4. (c)

   Memorandum: “Policy on Usage of Term: Service Cryptologic Element(s)”
   b. 2 January 1980
   c. From Assistant Director, NSA for Policy and Liaison (John R. Harney) to NSA Distribution II
   d. NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.10.
   e. This memorandum announced the replacement of the collective term “Service Cryptologic Agency” (SCA) with the term “Service Cryptologic Element” (SCE).
   f. (U)
   g. The rational for the change was contained in an attached M/R.

   85
Memorandum: "Tactical Cryptologic Program (TCP)"
22 January 1980
From the Acting Secretary of Defense (ASD) (Gerald P. Dinneen) to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commandant, United States Marine Corp, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director, NSA

In March 1979, the Secretary of Defense appointed the Director, NSA as the Program Manager for the Tactical Cryptologic Program. This memorandum provided the guidance for the overall management of the program.

Memorandum: "Jamming Against Foreign Communications"
6 September 1980
From the Secretary of Defense (Harold Brown) to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) (Stanfield Turner)

Concerned that the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) limitations on the employment of jamming placed undue restrictions on the operational activities of military commander, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed major revisions to the policy to allow military commanders more authority to employ jamming against hostile communications. NSA officials were concerned that peacetime jamming would reveal the extent of U.S. knowledge.

Memorandum: "National Policy on Public Cryptography"
7 October 1980
From the Director, NSA (Vice Admiral Bobby R. Inman) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Policy Review) (Robert W. Komer)

Inman did not support the position advocated by the Department of Defense in either specific context or general philosophy. He felt that the proposed policy did not adequately protect national security concerns nor accurately reflect NSA's work with the American Council on Education's Study Group on Public Cryptology. Inman offered a number of alternatives to the proposed policy. He also noted that NSA's discussions with the Department of Commerce had surfaced broad policy disagreements on the proposed government position.

Executive Order: Executive Order 12333 "U.S. Intelligence Activities"
4 December 1981
Issued by President Ronald Reagan

NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.10.
This Executive Order created a national effort to provide intelligence for the President and National Security Council in an effort to enhance decision-making. It reviewed intelligence functions of the National Security Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, heads of executive branch departments, and agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and NSA. The intent of this Executive Order was to provide centralized control and guidance to the national intelligence effort.

**Directive: DCI Directive 3/1 (Previously 1/8) "National Foreign Intelligence Board"
**
- 28 January 1982
- Issued by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) (William Casey)
- NSA Historical Collection: Series XII, H.1.
- This directive replaced the United States Intelligence Board with the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB). The NFIB was an advisory body to the DCI for the production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence products.
- (U)
- DCI Directive 3/2, 28 January 1982 created a companion body, the National Foreign Intelligence Council.
- NSA Historical Collection: Series XV, H.1.

**
- 25 October 1982
- Issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Frank C. Carlucci) to all Department of Defense Components
- NSA Policy Office, Telecommunications and Computer Services Policy Staff
- This directive assigned to the Director, NSA the responsibility for establishing and operating a Computer Security Evaluation Center (CSEC). The CSEC mission was to develop a uniform set of basic standards and criteria for assessing the effectiveness of security controls built into trusted computer systems. Also, the CSEC was to conduct R&D of such systems for evaluation and verification. The knowledge gained was to be used to assist government agencies, industry, foreign governments, and NATO in computer security matters.
- (U)

**Public Law: Public Law 97–89 "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982"
**
- 4 December 1982
- U.S. Congress
- 95 Statutes at Large 1150.
- This law provided for a cryptologic linguist reserve at NSA and created the Senior Cryptologic Executive Service.
- (U)
- See also Public Law 86–36 "National Security Act of 1959."
- 73 Statutes at Large 63.

**
- 29 March 1984
- Signed by the Director, NSA/Chief CSS (Lincoln D. Faurer)

87
This directive declared that all NSA/CSS ADP systems will be specified, designed and evaluated to ensure that they include the applicable features of trusted systems and that they conform to communication security standards.

(U)

This directive stated that Comsec and Compusec are national responsibilities and directed the Director, NSA to assume responsibility for and to manage telecommunications and automated information systems security programs. It established the National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NTISSC), which was the successor to the National Communications Security Committee (NCSC).

(U)

This memorandum forwarded new procedures approved by the Department of Justice which specified the legal basis for NSA’s support to federal and state agencies on narcotics trafficking. The result of at least two years of negotiation and interpretation, the new procedures reflected the expanded executive philosophy of proper intelligence collection and law enforcement activities inherent in the wording of Executive Order 12333, and led to a dramatic increase in the participation of the U.S. Sigint System in these matters.

(TS-CCO)

This Department of Defense directive transferred staff supervision of the NSA/CSS from the Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.

(U)
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P.L. 86-36
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)