Reference: DF-2011-00107

This responds to your 23 June 2011 letter to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, wherein you requested, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), “...a copy of the NIE on Global Terrorism.”

Your request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C § 552, as amended. Upon review, it is determined that the responsive document, NIE 2006-02R, may be released in segregable form with deletions made pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1, 2, 3, and 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1), (2), (3), and (6).

Exemption 1 protects information which is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. Exemption 2 protects records that relate only to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency. Exemption 3 protects information that is specifically covered by statute. In this case, the applicable statute is the National Security Act, which protects information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods. Exemption 6 protects information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.

The document, as approved for release, is enclosed. Should you wish to appeal this determination, please do so in writing to:

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Information Management Office
Washington, DC 20511

Appeals must be received within 45 days of the date of this letter. If you have any questions, please call the Requester Service Center at (703) 275-3642.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
John F. Hackett
Director, Information Management Office

Enclosure (NIE 2006-02R)
National Intelligence Estimate

Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States (U//FOUO)

NIE 2006-02R
April 2006
Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States (U//FOUO)

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Intelligence Board under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence. (U)

April 2006
This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) analyzes the nature of the threat that terrorist groups across the world will pose to US lives or property worldwide (herein referred to as US interests), including in the Homeland, during the next five years. This Estimate does not analyze the many ways in which terrorist groups might directly or indirectly affect broader US interests, including regional stability, access to energy resources, or the longevity of friendly regimes. Based upon all-source reporting over the last several years, it provides a broad, strategic framework for understanding the trends that will define the primary international terrorist threats to the United States. It focuses primarily on radical Islamic groups because the Intelligence Community judges that the preponderance of the terrorist threat comes from radical Islamic groups. A separate National Intelligence Estimate is under development that will assess more specifically the terrorist threat to the US Homeland over the next three years. The information cut-off date for this NIE is 28 February 2006. (U//FOUO)

The definition of “terrorist group” is any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism; the definition of “international terrorism” used herein is the one provided in US law for reporting purposes.1

The Intelligence Community defines “al-Qa’ida” (the Base) as the organization founded and led by Usama Bin Ladin and his lieutenants. Al-Qa’ida is considered a part of the global Salafi jihadist movement in which many groups and individuals participate; not all are connected to or cooperating directly with al-Qa’ida. For the definition of other related terms, see Who Wages Terror and Jihad: Pros and Cons of Frequently Used Terms (U//FOUO), NIC 3853-05, of June 2005. (U)

Conflicts that have occurred in the following countries and regions have been designated as jihads by many participants of the global jihadist movement: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Burma, Chechnya, Dagestan, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iraq, Kashmir, Kosovo, Palestine, Philippines, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Thailand. (G)

1 “Terrorism” is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. “Noncombatant” includes, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty. “International terrorism” means terrorism involving the citizens or territory of more than one country. 22USC 2656f(d) (U)
What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language (U)

When we use words such as “we judge” or “we assess”—terms that we use synonymously—as well as “we estimate,” “likely,” or “indicate,” we are trying to convey an analytical assessment or judgment. These assessments, which are based on incomplete or at times fragmentary information, are not a fact, proof or knowledge. Some analytical judgments are based directly on collected information; others rest on previous judgments, which serve as building blocks. In either type of judgment, we do not have “evidence” that shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues. (U)

Intelligence judgments pertaining to likelihood are intended to reflect the Community’s sense of the probability of a development or event. Assigning precise numerical ratings to such judgments would imply more rigor than we intend. The chart below provides a rough idea of the relationship of terms to each other. (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remote</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Even chance</th>
<th>Probably, Likely</th>
<th>Almost certainly</th>
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</thead>
</table>

We do not intend the term “unlikely” to imply that an event will not happen. We use “probably” and “likely” to indicate that there is a greater than even chance. We use words such as “we cannot dismiss,” “we cannot rule out,” and “we cannot discount” to reflect an unlikely—or even remote—event whose consequences are such that it warrants mentioning. Words such as “may be” and “suggest” are used to reflect situations in which we are unable to assess the likelihood generally because relevant information is nonexistent, sketchy, or fragmented. (U)

In addition to using words within a judgment to convey degrees of likelihood, we also ascribe “high,” “moderate,” or “low” confidence levels based on the scope and quality of information supporting our judgments.

- “High confidence” generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality information and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment.

- “Moderate confidence” generally means that the information is interpreted in various ways, that we have alternative views, or that the information is credible and plausible but not corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

- “Low confidence” generally means that the information is scant, questionable, or very fragmented and it is difficult to make solid analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources. (U)
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As these examples illustrate, jihadist networks are emerging with little affiliation to known terrorist groups and, in some cases, involve individuals located in countries not known to have a significant Islamic extremist presence. The combination of multilateral counterterrorism efforts and diffusion of the jihadist movement could result in a greater percentage of terrorist incidents being of lower lethality.
Key Judgments

United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qa’ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa’ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes al-Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

- Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting, indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.

- If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.

- Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa’ida, could erode support for the jihadists. (S//NF)

We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.

- We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.

- The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings. (NSF)

We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.

- The Iraq conflict has become the “cause celebre” for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight. (C//NF)
We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.

- Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq jihad; (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims—all of which jihadists exploit.

Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement. They include dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the jihadists' radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.

- The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution—an ultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based governance spanning the Muslim world—is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.

- Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few notable clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.

- Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders.

If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit.

Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.

- The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa'ida.
• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global threat.

• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa’ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations. *(S//NF)*

Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al-Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.

• We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al-Qa’ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and regional or global ones. *(S//NF)*

We judge that most jihadist groups—both well-known and newly formed—will use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.

• CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups. *(C//NF)*

We judge that Lebanese Hizballah, which is operationally capable of attacking the United States at home and US interests abroad, probably would do so only if it perceived a direct threat from Washington or were persuaded to act on behalf of Iran, its primary sponsor.

• While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from being exploited by terrorists. *(S//NF)*

Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.

• *(S//NF)*

We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial support.
Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments (U)

High Confidence (U)

• We have high confidence that the global jihadist movement, which includes al-Qa‘ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells, is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

• We have high confidence that al-Qa‘ida, now merged with Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s network, will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization.

• We have high confidence that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist groups with anti-American agendas are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups. We have high confidence that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.

• We have high confidence that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.

• We have high confidence that CBRN capabilities will be sought by jihadist groups. (S//NF)

Medium Confidence (U)

• We have medium confidence that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement currently outweigh the vulnerabilities in the movement and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate. Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement.

• We have medium confidence that jihadists’ greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution—an ultra-conservative interpretation of shari‘a-based governance spanning the Muslim world—is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims.

• We have medium confidence that loss of key leaders, particularly Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause al-Qa‘ida to fracture into smaller groups. The resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa‘ida.

• We have medium confidence that other Sunni extremist organizations affiliated with al-Qa‘ida, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al-Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of operation. We have medium confidence that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al-Qa‘ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests abroad.

• We have medium confidence that anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical ideologies. The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint. (S//NF)
Intelligence Reporting on the Global Jihadist Movement (U)

Much analysis and research on the strategic perspective of the jihadist movement is readily available in open sources.
Discussion

Primary Terrorist Threats to US Interests (U//FOUO)

The terrorist threat is evolving. This Estimate first outlines the status of the terrorist movement today as a baseline. It then examines the trends driving the evolution of terrorism and future threats, and assesses the implications for the United States. (U//FOUO)

Global Jihadist Movement Spreading (U//FOUO)

The jihadist movement emerged out of the Afghan-Soviet “jihad” in the 1980s but has been fueled by larger social, political, and ideological trends affecting Muslim populations around the globe for decades. Adherents of the movement, from organized groups to loosely connected networks and individuals, subscribe to or are influenced by a shared set of radical Salafi Islamic beliefs (see box). A succession of jihads following the Afghan-Soviet conflict produced expanded networks of veteran fighters and facilitators willing to use violence and terrorism to further the movement and defend their beliefs against perceived enemies. (U//FOUO)

Religious Interpretations Behind the Movement (U//FOUO)

Jihadists believe that violent jihad, including terrorism, is necessary to defend Islam from perceived aggression and attempts to subjugate Muslims. Most jihadist groups have adopted this belief system and rely on radical Salafi Islamic interpretations to justify their actions.

- A largely non-violent current in Islam, Salafism is followed by a small percentage of Sunni Muslims. Salafis view the Koran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (7th Century) and his companions as the only legitimate source of religious conduct. They believe that the subjugation of the ummah (Islamic community) has been the result of errant religious practices compromising the purity of Islam.

- Radicals or Salafi Jihadists, a small subset of Salafis, believe their interpretation of Islamic doctrine must be implemented in society and the state through an absolutist interpretation of shari’a (Islamic law). They contend that violence is necessary to create and defend pure Islamic states and societies. (U//FOUO)
Today the global jihadist movement consists of three categories of actors:

- The first is al-Qa’ida.

- A second category of groups describing themselves as jihadists is composed of affiliates of al-Qa’ida (not under its command and control).

- A third category of jihadists has emerged in the form of unaffiliated groups, cells, and individuals that have been inspired by the jihadist Al-Qa’ida has promulgated the unifying vision that the United States is the “head of the snake,” focusing on jihad against the United States as the primary enemy.

Macro trends that facilitate the growth of the jihadist movement include:

- The communications revolution, allowing for instant connectivity.

- Dispersal of information on weapons and weapons technology on the Internet.

- Massive legal and illegal migration across international borders.

- Demographic trends and the youth bulge in the Middle East, with underemployment among educated youth.

- Media sensationalism and exploitation of violence.

- Decades of well-funded proselytizing efforts, that have been exploited by radicals. (U//FOUO)
Europe: A Key Battleground (U)

Western Europe has become a key battleground in the internal struggle over Islam's future. For some time Western Europe has been the setting for efforts aimed at Muslim assimilation and multiculturalism. Meanwhile, attitudes of second- and third-generation Muslims show a strengthening of Islamic identity as the relevance of their country of origin wanes and is not replaced by allegiance to their new home, and they experience real or perceived racism. This identity is being shaped in an environment of past economic, political, and social patterns of exclusion that clash with increased opportunities for education, upward mobility, and exposure to popular culture. (U//FOUO)

The discovery in 2004 of multiple cells in the UK, the Madrid bombing, the van Gogh murder, and the July 2005 London bombings—all of which involved citizens born and educated domestically—suggest a more threatening characterization.

- In the July 9, 2005 letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, the former articulates a strategy for al-Qa'ida that focuses on the formation of a Muslim state. [redacted]
This confluence of shared purpose with dispersed actors presents a new and different challenge to efforts to find and undermine jihadist groups and prevent their attacks.

We assess that “homegrown” jihadist cells of a few isolated individuals, and possibly

- Prior to the merger with Zarqawi’s organization in October 2004, the
In his July 2005 letter, Zawahiri advised Zarqawi on important points of strategy, stressing the need to win popular support to gain, and hold, power.

The potential opportunities borne from the Iraq jihad, have prompted al-Qa'ida leaders to advance plans to leverage the Iraq
theater as a main platform from which to launch external operations. The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa’ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.
The cumulative impact of the loss of several key leaders in quick succession—particularly Bin Ladin, Zawahiri, and Zarqawi—probably would lead to the group's fracturing.

- The North African-based LIFG, GICM, GSPC, and Iraq-based Ansar al-Sunnah are examples of locally focused Salafi jihadist groups that have grown more internationally active, including in Europe, and have shown interest in attacking US interests abroad, though their capability to do so has remained limited.

- JI is growing more regionally active, has attacked US interests in Southeast Asia, and has assisted al-Qa'ida with Homeland plots.

- The Islamic Jihad is growing incrementally more active
regionally:

Jihadist Support Networks Evolving
(U//FOUO)
An academic study into the jihadists' use of the Internet concludes that the power of anonymity and instant intimacy of the Internet is allowing jihadists to forge strong bonds among people on the Internet. One of the dangers of the Internet is that it provides “sound bite” versions of Islam that are particularly attractive to individuals with little religious education.

- This study also argues that jihad will gradually become more “randomly distributed,” include younger participants, and involve more women due to the gender neutrality of the Internet.
al-Qa’ida, al-Qa’ida in Iraq, and other jihadists seek to acquire chemical and biological agents for use in terrorist attacks.
Hizballah To Focus on Core Strategy
(U//FOUO)
We judge that Lebanese Hizballah, which is operationally capable of attacking the United States at home and US interests abroad, probably would do so only if it perceived a direct threat from Washington or were persuaded to act on behalf of Iran, its primary sponsor.
Iran Continues Sponsorship Activities

Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, and, we assess that Tehran probably will continue to carry out its calibrated, deliberate policy—approved by Supreme Leader Hoseini Khamanei and carried out by the Qods Force—to provide explosives support and training to a number of Iraqi Shi'a militant groups to conduct attacks against Coalition Forces. Given Iraq's prominence in Iran's sphere of influence, we judge Tehran probably seeks to build surrogate relationships that it can tap in the future as well.
Factors Shaping the Direction of Terrorism (U//FOUO)

We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement currently outweigh the vulnerabilities that can be discerned in the movement.

We assess that four underlying factors will shape the terrorists' landscape over the next five years. These trends will have a bearing on jihadist violence as well as the potential for other ideologies to threaten US interests. (U//FOUO)

Entrenched Grievances Will Continue To Fuel Jihadism (U//FOUO)

Jihadist groups place ongoing political, economic, social, and territorial struggles into the context of the "West versus Islam." They deftly exploit long-standing grievances that—unless addressed holistically—will continue to resonate, enabling the jihadist movement to continue to grow. (U//FOUO)

Powerlessness. Jihadists are re-branding terrorism as justified resistance by exploiting in their propaganda emotions of revenge, anger, fear, and humiliation with images of Muslims under attack, particularly in the Palestinian territories and Iraq. By offering a course of action for enraged or frustrated Muslims.

Radicalization Process (U)

Numerous studies, both from within the Intelligence Community and from academia, illuminate the process by which individuals and groups become radicalized. While there are differing interpretations and theories about how and why individuals join terrorist groups or become radicalized—from religious, sociological, and psychological perspectives—most studies suggest that the process happens over time. (U//FOUO)

Similarly, most of the studies conclude that deterring individuals from adopting violent and extremist ideas, and from acting upon them, requires the sustained involvement of a host of actors, including religious and educational leaders, a spectrum of information outlets, role models, friends, and family. (U//FOUO)
the jihadists provide an alternative
to feelings of powerlessness. (U//FOUO)

The Iraq conflict has become the “cause
celebre” for the jihadist movement,
breeding a deep resentment of US
involvement in the Muslim world and
cultivating supporters for the global
jihadist movement
Should jihadists leave Iraq quietly admitting they failed to “defeat” the United States, and should they be perceived to have failed to do so as Iraqis move toward establishing a stable political and security environment, we judge that fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight. (C//NF)

In Short Run, Political Reforms Problematic—(U//FOUO)—

A recent academic study suggests that when presented with greater opportunity to engage in a political process predicated on rejection of violence, groups tend to splinter.

- Under governmental and popular pressure, the Pakistan-backed Kashmiri-based group Hizb ul-Mujahedin became more moderate over time. But some of its extremist members joined other radical groups.
In the early 1990s in Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front—a legal political party— included both militant and moderate members until it divided over how to respond to the military rejection of its victory in the 1992 elections. (U//FOUO)
Other Events To Shape The Context (U)

A number of geopolitical developments during the next five years could impact radical Salafi and radical Shi'a trends. (U//FOUO)

Anti-US Sentiment Will Animate Jihadists and Proponents of Other Ideologies (U//FOUO)
Vulnerabilities of the Jihadist Movement *(U//FOUO)*

Concomitant with the trends that suggest the jihadist movement will expand over the next five years, vulnerabilities emanating from the jihadists' ideology and tactics present openings to limit the growth and spread of the movement.

We assess that four key areas of vulnerability limit the appeal and effectiveness of the movement. *(C//NF)*

**Dependence on Ongoing Conflicts** *(C//NF)*

**Vulnerabilities of the Jihadist Movement** *(U//FOUO)*

Concomitant with the trends that suggest the jihadist movement will expand over the next five years, vulnerabilities emanating from the jihadists' ideology and tactics present openings to limit the growth and spread of the movement.
Unpopularity of Jihadist Ideology (C/NF)
The jihadists lack a critical element in gaining widespread acceptance among the majority of Muslim populations that they seek: their political solution—an ultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based governing authority that spans the Muslim world—is unpopular.

Reliance on Lack of Competition (C/NF)

- Hundreds of influential clerics in the UK condemned the July 2005 London bombings, calling them "disgraceful and shameful" and transgressing important criteria of "acceptable jihad."

...
Violent Tactics Backfiring (C//NF) The jihadists replay images of Muslim civilians under attack by the West to justify their actions to Muslim audiences. Some of their more violent and indiscriminate attacks, as well as grisly beheadings, have come increasingly under fire, however.

- Media coverage of Muslim victims of jihadist terror, particularly innocent bystanders, women and children, has generated significant criticism of the jihadist groups, even those operating in Iraq.

- Attacks involving large numbers of Muslim victims, such as the 9 November attacks in Amman, Jordan, have produced public outcry and even criticism from some jihad supporters.

- Public confidence in the ability of governments to restore order and services after an attack, such as in London following the attacks in July, reduces the long-term disruption, economic loss, and panic that jihadists seek to create with their terrorist attacks. (U//FOUO)

Implications (U//FOUO)
Understanding "Lessons Learned" (U)
The spread of the jihadist movement over the past decade and the challenges it has posed offer important lessons to help strengthen future counterterrorism efforts. (U//FOUO)
Outside Views (U//FOUO)

b3 assessed the Estimate to be well argued and thorough. He suggests that no one can confidently determine whether the jihadist movement has a strong future or not: aggressive US counterterrorism measures of the last four years are having an impact, yet the movement is morphing into a decentralized phenomenon that could still carry out spectacular attacks. For this reason, he recommends that the countervailing trends that are identified in the Estimate deserve special emphasis.

b6 agrees with the assessment that the movement is spreading, adapting, and will present a threat over the next five years, but he notes that amassing data to support this conclusion is challenging. The global pattern of localized attacks, the way jihadist websites exploit them worldwide, and the fact that the movement today is less dependent on a geographic base than on the Internet and ideology are trends that seem to suggest the movement is growing. Equally challenging is generating metrics for determining when/if the movement is at a “tipping point” either toward rebirth or decline. (U//FOUO)

He also wonders whether Zarqawi could be in a pre-9/11 phase now, preparing for different types but large-scale attacks on the Homeland. (U//FOUO)

He indicates that the potential confluence of former leftists, anti-globalists, and anarchists should not be overlooked. (U//FOUO)

b6 commented that the NIE was an excellent and sophisticated paper. In his assessment, the militant Salafi movement may well be growing: consistent anti-American opinions of Muslims around the world, the proliferation of jihadist websites, and the large number of arrests of jihadist sympathizers or supporters around the world seem to indicate that the movement is robust. Like b6 notes that generating metrics to determine the movement’s growth accurately is difficult. He concludes that the existence of an effective democratic government in Iraq would diminish the appeal of the Salafi utopia and that developments in Iraq will determine whether the movement grows or contracts. (U//FOUO)

b6 observed that the efficacy of terrorist networks depends on both internal and external factors.

- Internally, networks that have been newly self-organized lack coordination and are amateurs who must train and finance themselves. Given the continued disagreements among many diverse actors, there does not appear to be a unitary jihadist entity emerging. Without a central coordinating body like al-Qa’ida, these networks will be active at local levels, primarily threatening allies rather than the US Homeland. A second internal factor is the appeal of the terrorist strategy to effect change, which he concludes is in decline due to excesses in violence by the jihadists.

(Continued on next page...)
The most important external factor limiting the jihadist movement is the success of US-led counterterrorism measures, and concludes that US counterterrorism activities have been dramatically successful. He assesses that the success in hardening US targets has kept the threat to the Homeland at fairly constant low levels while the threat against our allies has grown correspondingly. However, if US vigilance were to relax, al-Qa'ida could resurrect itself and resume its activities, potentially resulting in another sophisticated attack on the Homeland.
The National Intelligence Council

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Information available as of April 2006 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:

- The Central Intelligence Agency
- The Defense Intelligence Agency
- The National Security Agency
- The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- National Counterterrorism Center
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation
- The Department of Homeland Security
- The Department of Energy
- The Department of the Treasury

also participating:

- The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
- The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
- The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

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