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Information Management Services Center
Information Access and Release Team
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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

26 October 2011

This is in response to your letter, dated 20 November 2008, received in the Information Management Services Center of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) on 26 November 2008. Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), you are requesting "an electronic/digital copy on a CD-ROM or by email of each transcript or summary linked directly (for 2006-2008) or indirectly (for years 2002-2005) to the NRO Town Hall page on your internal website at: <http://frontoffice.gwan.npa.ic.gov/townhall.htm>."

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, as amended, Title 5 U.S.C. § 552. The NRO has provided two interim releases to you in response to your request, dated 23 July 2010 and 19 August 2011. Details of these releases were included in the letters that accompanied the released documents

At this time, as a third interim response to your request, we are releasing to you one additional document, consisting of nine pages. This document includes no NRO equities that require protection from release. The NRO had provided this document to another agency for their further review, treatment, and direct response to you. Rather than responding directly to you, that agency returned a treated document to the NRO. It is hereby being released to you in part.

Information withheld from release is denied pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) as properly classified information under Executive Order 13526, Sections 1.4; and (b)(3), which pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute, specifically the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403, as amended, e.g., Section 6, which exempts from the disclosure requirement information pertaining to the organizations, functions..., including those related to the protection of intelligence sources and methods, names, official titles, salaries, and numbers of employed by the Agency.

Please note that the small portions of "double-printed" text within the document exist in the source record used for treatment. The document provided represents the best quality available.

In addition to the items that have been released, there are three documents, consisting of twenty-six pages that have been treated for NRO equities and forwarded to other agencies for their reviews, treatments, and direct responses to you. Finally, eleven documents consisting of 165 pages have been forwarded to other agencies for reviews for their equities and return to the NRO for our final release determinations.


Since we have been unable to provide a final response within the 20 working days stipulated by the Act, you have the right to consider this as a denial and may appeal to the NRO Appeal Review Panel. It would seem more reasonable, however, to have us continue processing your request and respond as soon as we can. You may appeal any denial of records at that time. Unless we hear from you otherwise, we will assume that you agree, and will proceed on this basis.

The FOIA authorizes federal agencies to assess fees for record services. Based upon the information provided, you have been placed in the "other" category of requesters, which means you are responsible for the cost of search time exceeding two hours (\$44.00/hour) and reproduction fees (.15 per page) exceeding 100 pages. To date, assessable fees have not met our minimum billing threshold of \$25.00. We will notify you if it appears that assessable fees approach this amount.

You have the right to appeal this determination by addressing your appeal to the NRO Appeal Authority, 14675 Lee Road, Chantilly, VA 20151-1715, within 60 days of the above date. Should you decide to do this, please explain the basis of your appeal.

If you have any questions, please call the Requester Service Center at (703) 227-9326 and reference case number F09-0009.

Sincerely,



Stephen R. Glenn
Chief, Information Access
and Release Team

Enclosure: Transcript - CIA All-Hands, DCI General Michael V. Hayden,
Nov.14, 2006 (Case Doc ID #31)

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CIA ALL HANDS
DCI GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Nov. 14, 2006

DNRO Dr. Donald Kerr: Many of you have only seen our visitor today on T.V. He's much better live. As a historian from Pittsburgh and Duquesne University, he entered into a military intelligence career starting years ago. I won't remind him when, but he's the longest serving director of NSA, an important mission partner for the NRO in that job. Even more importantly, he went on to be the first principal deputy director of national intelligence, and left quite a mark there, and that's where he gained his fourth star that makes him the most senior military intelligence officer on active duty in the United States. So, it's a particular (audience applauds)... of course, then he went to CIA. No one had expected that, but it's been going very well, because we hear rumors out here, of what's going on in Langley. It's a real pleasure to introduce General Mike Hayden, the director of CIA.

DCIA Gen. Michael V. Hayden: Good morning, and thanks for the chance to come and talk with you a little bit. You know we've been trying to emphasize a certain sense of communication back on main campus. We've had some town meetings there, but it's not as easy for you to be there as it is for the folks back at Langley, so, I wanted to come out and talk to you personally. I hope you're seeing the e-mails that go out periodically, as I try to keep you updated with some things. Particularly the one this morning about the strategy, the draft strategic plan being posted, and your comments being invited. Please take advantage of that. I'll chew up maybe twenty five minutes at the most, and then leave some room for questions before we break ~~fast~~ ~~to~~ ~~talk~~ a little bit about how it's going at the Agency, what it is we think we're doing, and how it is we think it's going. Don mentioned my getting the job there, and I think he had the word, Hayden, CIA, and surprise all in the same sentence. No one was more surprised than me. I was walking to work, my house is at Bolling Air Force Base, and the DNI's office is about three quarters of a mile from my quarters, and we had just moved in on Holy Saturday, the day before Easter. My wife and I had opened up all the boxes, all the 'I love me stuff' that had been in storage since NSA. We had it all up on the wall, and two weeks later, Larry and I are walking around downtown Washington doing something useful for national defense when I had this phone call that the ambassador is being called back from New York. The next morning, I'm in an unusually shaped office in downtown Washington getting a speech about duty, honor, and country. I was not told to go out to the Agency and blow anything up. I mean that, I really do. This was not to be a burning platform, to go out there and do x, y, or z. If anything, it was quite the reverse. To the degree I got guidance about the agency, it was, just ask folks to go back to work. Not that anyone was sloughing off their duty, but, if you recall we were, for those technically inclined in the audience, of which I'm told there are many. We were in high PRF, as an Agency, and we were in the paper too much, people were talking about us too much. We were probably talking about us too much, and it just wasn't conducive to focus. So, to the degree I got any direction, I could translate it to -- liberate those folks. Get the real and perceived bunkies off

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their back, and let them go on and do what it is they do for America. You may have noticed that Steve, and Michael, and I have worked really hard to do that. You haven't seen us blow anything up; you haven't seen us say, o.k., student body left. We decided to do this completely differently. In essence, we've tried to get the Agency to have a low profile. To get the Agency out of the news, as I said in my confirmation hearings, as source, or subject, and just get back to work. Because frankly, we're pretty good at this. To the degree we can work and not be distracted, to the degree we can work and not have people, invasively, I'll use the word interfere; get inside our processes, to that degree we'll be successful. So the first job we had with the new leadership team was to essentially give out this message; let's just go back to work.

I was blessed that I was able to get Steve Kappes to come out of retirement, and Michael Morrell from NCTC to come on. I don't have a career pedigree with the Central Intelligence Agency, and there's always the danger that my being selected from the DNI staff as a career military officer would have sent the wrong message. I was heartened that I got Steve to agree to come be the deputy director, should I be confirmed, on the day I was told I was going to go be the director. That was the Thursday before the Friday you saw Porter in the Oval Office. I actually caught Steve on a train platform in London, and, his response was ...who is this again? A few weeks later, Michael joined folks who have an unarguably long and rich history with the agency. Again, task one was just to have folks go back and do our work. I think we've been successful. We've stayed out of the press essentially from confirmation time until September sixth, and then we had that bottom spike about detainees and interrogation. Now you've seen us go back out of the press again. You've heard me say these things in my testimony about social contract with the American people. There has to be a dialogue, between our agency and the public, a dialogue between our agency and the congress, but we are way off the chart on how to talk about our work, and what it is we think we're doing. Let me talk about first the crosscutting issues. We're more tribal than any other organization I've been a part of, and it would be useful if we were one tribe looking out the fence line at 1, 2, and 3. That actually might even be an advantage. But that's not the way we are. We're a bunch of tribes inside the fence line. I understand that. I'm from the Air Force, you probably noticed. We've got our tribes there, too. We've got one real tribe called fighter pilots. The Air Force spends most of every waking day trying to convince fighter pilots that they're actually a part of a larger institution. But they never want them to forget they're fighter pilots. That's kind of our challenge at CIA. I don't want DO or NCS officers to be identical to DI officers, to be identical to DS officers, to be identical to DS&T officers. There are reasons those organizations are different. There are reasons we have four boxes on the org chart. You need some differences. I think, as an agency, we have probably pushed those differences to an extreme. We need to swing back, a little bit, toward more commonality in some fundamental things. It really hurts our ability to work as a team.

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What are we going to do? Three or four large areas -- HR...you've already seen this in some of the correspondence coming out of my office. I want an HR chief who is truly empowered to be HR across the enterprise. I need a chief information officer who is going to be truly empowered to organize our IT across the whole enterprise, rather than down into the individual parts. A chief financial officer, so that the budget is viewed as an agency budget rather than the metaphor I used to use at NSA. At NSA the financial officer went to the key components on the first of October every year with a wheelbarrow full of money, saying, here's yours, and then forgetting about it for the rest of the fiscal year. No, there's going to be a CIA budget, and it's going to be a lot more fundable, between and among the pieces, than it has been in the past.

Another thing we're making more common, and this is almost sacramental; in the theological sense of the word, sacramental is both sign, and reality, sign and substance, it's the ops center. I'm accustomed to a pretty robust ops center. Not just because I'm a GI, I had one of those at NSA, remember in the NSOC, it's really big. I was a little surprised at how thin the ops center was at the CIA, and believe me, that's not a commentary on any people, it's just structurally, it's a pretty small organization. Then I said, so, what's over there, and they said, that's the other ops center, that's the DO ops center. Now, you can view that as just bringing my culture into CIA from my historical experience and not being sensitive to the needs of the agency. But when Michael Morrel and Steve Cappas have the same attitude, I think I pretty much got this one right. We are going to have one ops center. And, again, sacramental's the right word here. sign and substance. It's a symbol that we're unified, but it also substantively unifies us, that we have one operations center. We're looking for a variety of things that better get us in a communal spirit, a more agency wide identity. I just want to change the flavor a little bit. We should feel a bit more like CIA officers as a community, without destroying that uniqueness that makes us functional inside DO, DI, SD, DS&T, so we're working on that. That's probably the big muscle movement, back on main campus, and you'll see that play out. Things are going to be different...nothing's going to be catastrophic, nobody's going to drive a new car over the cliff, but, there's going to be fundamental differences that develop over time because of our building a more common heritage through each of the directorates. Let's start with NCS, and the DO. We are taking very, very seriously a couple of injunctions, a couple of directives we've gotten. Number one, I am the national HUMINT manager. We're gonna do that. We will actually take that function on.

A lot of this has to be methodical, with a lot of stubbornness behind it. We're crafting a body of precedent that makes the national HUMINT effort far more integrated. By law, I get to coordinate, deconflict, and evaluate all American HUMINT. That's all gathering of foreign intelligence from human sources by any organization of the federal government under whatever authorities they think they're doing it. Title ten, title fifty. I am indifferent. If you are gathering foreign intelligence from a human being, I think we've got the authority to coordinate it, deconflict it, and evaluate it. That's not op con, that's not directive authority, and so on, but it does

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have an awful lot to do about standards, and tradecraft.

Inside the DI. The DI has been flogged a bit on quality of analysis. For a couple of years, you recall, Jamie Messick was having everyone in the bubble for a while, kind of doing one of those self criticism sessions. If I can divide the task of the DI up into two parts, I think you'll have a sense of where we are. First there is tradecraft -- how do you discover hidden assumptions, how do you hold assumptions up to the light, how do you prevent group think, and all those tools that you can use to make sure you're doing analysis in a professional way. Check, we got that. Now that doesn't mean we can forget about it, it does mean I can probably forget about it, though. It's not something that we, on the seventh floor, are going to have to fret about. We think the processes, the education, the training, are in place, and are under way. The periodic checks are fine on that. The other part, though, is just raw knowledge of the target. This is different from having techniques that help you discover prejudices in your own analytic judgments. This gets to the heart of what you know about the target. What we have are a bunch of really young people. Seven percent of our agency has been hired in the last twelve months. That's not right. Fourteen, fourteen percent, that's right, one seventh of the people. Fourteen percent of our agency has twelve months or fewer in terms of experience. Now that's across the board. And that may be o.k. for your communicators, in fact, in many ways, getting these kids coming out of the commercial world and coming out of college as communicators or computer specialists is good news. That's not quite the same thing when you're looking at a long view on the Iranian theocracy. We need to build up time on target, just raw target expertise, inside of our analytical workforce. And, frankly, that takes time...to build up time on target. You can accelerate it a bit, with creative assignments:

We have not invested; in some ways have disinvested in our infrastructure, under any meaning of that word. Consider: heating, air conditioning, facilities, plants, IT. Having been the head of an agency whose IT infrastructure has gone belly-up for three and a half days, I can

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tell you I do not want to repeat the experience. NSA was dark for three and a half days in January of two thousand. Borrowing from the NSA experience, we knew it was always inevitable, and it was a surprise the day it happened. We could be in that same circumstance here at CIA. We don't want to be there, so we have really got to pay attention to our infrastructure. One of our infrastructure elements is just raw space. At our hiring rates, and I think I put the numbers out here the last couple of weeks in terms of the number of folks we've hired this past year, we're out of space.

I don't see the particular fiscal or infrastructure upside of renting floor space in one of the highest priced urban localities in North America. Eventually we need a bit of a footprint not in the national capital area. If I could have done it, a building we will occupy in 2008 would have been built outside the capital area. But we can't, the timing is just too close. We have another big chunk of floor space we plan to occupy in two thousand eleven. If we have our way, that will not be within the sound of my voice. That will be somewhere else in the United States. That makes a lot of sense. Number one, it's cheaper. Number two, it's not on the Eastern power grid, or any other catastrophic factor that might make us go dark. In addition to that continuity of government, in addition to that continuity of operations, in addition to it might be cheaper to do it somewhere else.

There's another opportunity written in here. That's to actually play with a blank sheet of paper once. What would you do in your organization if you didn't have to legacy anything? I can recall back to a time at NSA, talking to audiences about the African target, and how the African target was so technologically challenging. They would wonder what I meant by the African target being so technologically challenging? I said, because it's so modern. What? So modern. Yes, there are no disinvestments decisions to make in the African telecommunications system. There are no legacy investments to protect. They're literally working with a blank sheet. So, they're actually, they were actually high end. Higher end, frankly, than almost all of our European targets, who did have that massive investment in legacy. I'm not sure how many people or exactly where, yet. But I believe we need to move some people to other locations.

excellence we have had in S&T? If you take the long view, and you should do this, because a new secretary of defense will take the long view. He remembers this way back when. He can remember NRO being a bit of a different character in terms of that stew we have between DOD and CIA. He's going to remember a time when there was a stronger agency flavor to the activities here. If you take the long view as to how the American Intelligence community has done S&T, to go all the way back to NRO origins, to NPIC, and a variety of these other things. There has been a shifting, and we've maintained excellence throughout this. How do we maintain this excellence as we go forward, and that is the question we have in terms of our S&T. We do it better, and faster, than anyone else. How do we continue to do that in, frankly, an even newer environment than the one I just referenced? By the way, I had this conversation with Bob Gates, when I was a candidate to be the principle

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deputy, DNI. Actually, called him at Texas A&M and got his long view on the intel community. But how we do it now with the DNI? How do we continue our autonomy which gives us our independence and our flexibility and to play teeball, with the DNI staff? How do we continue to make the investments we make to support our mission, and the investments we make because we're more agile than anyone else, to support everyone else's mission, and still fit in this new structure. That's a fundamental question we have, and we've got to work that out.

That's how we're looking inside each of the four big directorates. Those are the big muscle movements we're kind of doing left and right. We're doing fine. We're getting pretty good reviews from the congress, because you haven't seen anything comments from them about us in the press lately. Those are the best reviews we ever get. We're gonna, we're probably gonna go visible again on detainees and interrogation. As I go back to the hill, starting Thursday, to talk about that. Let me spend two or three minutes to talk about that subject, and then I'll stop and we'll take a couple of questions. I mentioned social contract. I mentioned it here because I mentioned it in my hearings for confirmation. We're at an odd place. We're a powerful and secretive intelligence organization inside of a political culture that distrusts only two things... power and secrecy. But we can't defend the republic, we can't defend American liberties without being powerful and without being secretive. And we can't defend the nation, unless we use all the authorities we have. So a line I've used with another program with another agency, equally controversial, we've got to play pretty close to the line. We have to use all of our authorities. Otherwise, we're not defending America, we're just defending us. In the dialogue we have with the administration about detainees and interrogation, we laid out some things that we needed to have, in order to continue this very valuable program, but that if we had them we would continue the program. You probably saw the debate reflected in the press after the September sixth announcement; the things we needed in the legislation to go forward. We got everything we needed in the legislation in order to continue a CIA detention and interrogation program. To continue a detention and interrogation program that is consistent with the constitution, the laws, and the international treaty obligations of the United States. Now it's not one that we want to talk about, the phrase I would use is...we have secrets, but we don't have anything to hide. If you understand that all of this is among native English speakers, you'll see the distinction between the two. We have to have secrets, but we don't have anything to hide, in the sense we use with our kids -- nothing to be ashamed of; nothing to be embarrassed about. We will have our secrets. We won't publish interrogations techniques. We won't announce when we have a detainee. But our oversight committees will know. And we will get information valuable to the defense of the public out of these folks. We ended up in a pretty happy place. We've got the legislation. The legislation requires an executive order that is already drafted, and is now with the president for his consideration that rounds out our Geneva Convention responsibilities. You can put your mind at ease about this. This has been held up to the light, and we're gonna ~~What light, or the going might, on the edge of secrets~~ probably going to be chalk dust on our cleats, but we're going to stay in fair territory.

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Question: We're in a world with weapons of mass destruction. What are we going to do if we catch someone smuggling a bomb, a real A-bomb, into the U.S., and we think they know that there's a second one coming in. The stakes are bigger. Do we have any understanding about the times when you have to go over the line?

DCIA Hayden: Actually, that's the aspect of U.S. law that the military detainee act codified for us. It's also the aspect of U.S. law that is a bit different than some other nation's interpretations of our international treaty obligations. This is the crux of the argument. America's understanding of it's responsibilities under the Geneva Convention were tied, explicitly, for most of the articles of Geneva, not common article three, and that was the issue. It wasn't that we decided not to, it's just that we thought common article three would never apply to us. Common article three applies to conflicts not of an international character. Sitting here in Virginia, you may recognize that we've already had our conflict not of an international character. We had it about a hundred and fifty years ago. Therefore, we thought common article three wouldn't apply. That was a surprise in Hamden verses Rumsfeld; that five justices said that it did apply. American understanding of it's responsibilities of common article three were always caveated with our understanding in our constitutional law and body of precedent, within our responsibilities against cruel and inhuman punishment. Therefore, when we say we signed up to common article three, it's consistent with our body of law in the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the constitution. The fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the constitution embody in law a concept called shock the conscience. So, my shaking an Al Qaida detainee, or my shaking an eight year old child, is viewed to be fundamentally different, even though they are objectively the same act. The one shocks the conscience, the other one does not. That is the crux of the legal distinction between America's understanding of it's responsibilities, and some other nations around the world. They have absolute standards. Our standard is shock the conscience. And, therefore, it is much more circumstance dependent. What shocks the conscience in one circumstance, might not shock the conscience in another. That's why we fought for what we fought for in September, in the legislation. Other **Questions?** When you spoke of being able to establish a longer term knowledge base for the people. Over the past few years, we've been basically telling people not to specialize in a target, to gain wide expertise. How do you reconcile that?

DCIA Hayden: You don't. They're contradictory. For a body of people inside the agency...time on target now gets more coinage, more value than another phrase I use. Get out of your comfort zone, and be challenged by different experiences. Michael Morrell manages this for us. We have got to reward, for a certain body of people, long term expertise in an area, and not punish them, not make it harder for them to put their kids through college because they stayed on the Iranian target for twenty years. There has got to be an award structure for those kinds of people. There are a whole bunch of other people that are actually benefited by moving around and experiencing different things at different levels. We simply have to set up a reward system that time on target matters, time on target's rewarded. One last one. Yes.

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World. It really is. The challenge is to be good enough. The challenges are so great for us, given the kind of threat the nation faces. We need to defend the republic, protect it from attack, and not change our DNA as a free people.

I'm glad you gave me some of your time. I'm glad to come out...this won't be the only visit the director makes. I look forward to coming out and learning a lot more about what you do. Thanks so much.

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