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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

September 13, 2012

FOIPA Request No.: 1108627- 001
Subject: MONOGRAPH: SOVIET USE OF
THE POLYGRAPH (JUNE 1981)
Appeal No. 09-0472

This is in further reference to your administrative appeal to the Office of Information Policy, Department of Justice, concerning information referred to the Department Review Committee (DRC) for a classification review.

Prior to the presentation to the DRC, the FBI declassified certain information which had previously been classified and withheld pursuant to Title 5, U.S. Code, Section 552, subsection (b)(1). Nevertheless, the same information still remains exempt pursuant to subsections (b)(7)(D) and (b)(7)(E) and, hence, were excised from the enclosed pages. An explanation of exemptions is also enclosed.

This completes the processing of your administrative appeal by the FBI.

If you desire, you may appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Hardy", is positioned below the closing.

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

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I. SOVIET POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS
CONCERNING THE POLYGRAPH

An examination of Soviet policies and perceptions concerning the polygraph is presented in this section. Refer to Sections II-V for specific source reporting concerning Soviet interest in the polygraph and its use. ~~(S)~~ (U)

The KGB conducts polygraph examinations on prospective employees, at least on a selective basis. Polygraph examinations of selected KGB candidates are reportedly administered as part of the medical examination portion of the KGB entrance processing procedure. KGB polygraph examinations are apparently designed to assess the candidate's personality and psychological stability, rather than as a counterintelligence tool to determine the veracity of the candidate's answers or whether the candidate is cooperating with hostile forces. There is no information to suggest that the KGB has progressed to the stage where all prospective employees are polygraphed as a matter of policy. However, such a policy could conceivably evolve with further Soviet research on the validity and utility of the polygraph, or as the [redacted]

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[redacted] KGB employees are not repolygraphed for the remainder of their careers, except in certain circumstances--e.g., polygraph research experiments, counterpolygraph training, or the emergence of a serious question concerning the loyalty of a KGB officer. ~~(S)~~

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
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There is limited information concerning [redacted] of the polygraph as a counterintelligence tool for determining the bona fides of their agents or uncovering Western agents

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working against the USSR. Such examinations are probably only conducted in rare circumstances, such as suspicious activity on the part of the agent or serious accusations leveled against the agent.



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The Soviets initiated research programs in the mid to late 1960s to study the polygraph and to develop their own polygraph capabilities. The KGB is particularly interested in developing methods and training to circumvent Western polygraph techniques. The KGB reportedly conducts an active program to train agents and illegals either to pass Western polygraph examinations or to obfuscate the results of such examinations so that a fair determination of deception on the part of the subject can not be made.

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The Soviets have long held a skeptical view of the polygraph, claiming that it was not scientific, but rather a Western (primarily American) deception. Recent reports, however, suggest that this perception has been significantly modified. According to these reports, the Soviets have become increasingly interested in the polygraph and believe that Western intelligence services use the polygraph as an effective counterintelligence tool. At the same time, however, the Soviets do not consider the polygraph machine to be foolproof and firmly believe that with proper training, a subject can beat the polygraph.

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
II. SOVIET USE OF THE POLYGRAPH

EMPLOYEES


According to most reports, the KGB began conducting polygraph examinations on prospective KGB candidates, at least on a selective basis, as early as 1968 or 1969, a policy which has continued to the present time. Polygraph examinations of selected KGB candidates are reportedly administered as part of the medical testing portion of the KGB entrance processing procedure and are designed to assess the candidate's personality, stress level, and psychological stability rather than to test the truthfulness or loyalty of the candidate. ~~(S)~~

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
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
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
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With certain exceptions, KGB employees are not repolygraphed for the remainder of their careers. According


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Circumstances which might warrant a polygraph examination of a KGB employee include the employee's selection for polygraph research purposes, or if a serious question arises concerning the employee's loyalty to the KGB and the Soviet Union. With the exception of KGB "illegals" (see below), KGB officers or employees do not normally receive any extensive instruction in methods to counter Western polygraph examinations. However, KGB trainees are lectured on Western polygraph concepts, techniques, and capabilities and some KGB officers or employees are selected to participate in Soviet counterpolygraph research experiments. ~~(S)~~ (U)

ILLEGALS

The KGB affords polygraph examinations, at least on



reportedly designed to determine their psychological

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[redacted] Selected
illegals are also instructed in methods to circumvent Western
polygraph examinations. [redacted]

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AGENTS

There is little information concerning Soviet use of the polygraph to determine the bona fides of its agents or to uncover Western agents working against the USSR. Such examinations are probably only conducted in extreme cases, such as suspicious activity on the part of the agent or serious accusations leveled against the agent. The logistics of polygraphing probably prohibit a major Soviet effort to polygraph its agents. In most cases, the KGB would first have to obtain the consent of the agent to be polygraphed. Furthermore, many Soviet agents targeted against the West seldom travel to the USSR or other East European nations which have the facilities and expertise to conduct adequate polygraph examinations. ~~(S)~~ (U)


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The KGB has also instructed some of its agents on methods of circumventing Western polygraph examinations (see Section III). ~~(S)~~ (U)


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III. SOVIET PROGRAM TO COUNTER THE POLYGRAPH

The early theme of Soviet counterpolygraph training was centered on denigration of the Western polygraph procedure as a counterintelligence tool. KGB instructors and agent handlers simply tried to convince their agents or illegals that they could "beat" the examiner by trivial exercises of feigning illness, expressing anger or outrage, drug usage, intoxication, breathing exercises, or concentration on peripheral subjects during the testing. In fact, KGB instructors and agent handlers still propagate this theme in some cases (see below). Such techniques, however, could not afford protection against sophisticated Western polygraph procedures and skilled polygraph examiners. As Western intelligence services continued to register successes with the polygraph as a counterintelligence tool, Soviet propaganda on polygraph machines changed from "bourgeois hoaxes" to (untested) research devices. ~~(S)~~ (U)

(U) The most recent reporting suggests that the Soviets believe the polygraph is an effective Western counterintelligence tool, particularly against untrained or poorly trained agents or illegals.



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Another area of Soviet counterpolygraph research is operant conditioning (or instrumental learning). In this form of conditioning,

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There is concern that such techniques could affect the validity of a polygraph examination or render polygraph examinations inconclusive.

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There have been some reports on Soviet counterpolygraph training programs. One of the most detailed

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
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


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
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


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
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KGB POLYGRAPH MACHINES

There have been reports which document KGB efforts to acquire polygraph machines, and which describe the polygraph machines employed by the KGB. Official Soviet interest in purchasing a U.S. manufactured polygraph was evident at least as early as 1965, when Medeksport, the Soviet trading organization, ordered a Keeler polygraph model 6303 from Associated Research Incorporated of Chicago. Again, in 1966, a Washington-based correspondent for Selskaya Zhizn, a

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
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
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
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