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21-April-2000

30-March-2012

19-August-2013

21-June-2013

Description of document:

Records relating to the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) contract with Analytical Services Inc. to study restructuring of the DPMO mission and an overall change in the DoD handling of missing in action/prisoner of war (MIA/POW) issues, 1998-2000

Requested date:

Released date: 2<sup>nd</sup> release date:

Posted date:

Source of document:

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command Attn: Deputy to the Commander for External Relations and Legislative Affairs 310 Worchester Avenue, Bldg. 45 JBPHH, Hawaii 96853-5530 Fax: (808) 448-1978 Online FOIA submission form (PDF)

Note:

Some records are undated Second release records start on (PDF) page 40

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MAR 3 0 2012

Ref: 00-F-1568

This is an interim response to your letter dated April 21, 2000, copy enclosed, to the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO), which requested various records that you identified as falling within 12 specified categories. Based on searches conducted by the DPMO, a large number of records were located of which nine, totaling 29 pages, are attached as partially responsive to your request. A final response to your request will be provided when reviews of the additional responsive documents have been completed.

Sincerely,

MIC Bul

: Paul J. Jacobsmeyer

Enclosures: As stated

# 14n

## Gilk, Clair, Maj, O\$D/DPMO

From: Sent: To:	Simpson, Lynn, Ms., OSD/DPMO Saturday, April 15, 2000 9:38 AM 'brian.walters@gsa.gov'
Cc:	Beltran, Angel, Mr., OSD/DPMO; Marchi, David E., Mr., OSD/DPMO; Brian Walters; Caswell, James; Daley, David; George Thompson; Gilk, Clair; Gravelle, James; Harvey, Joe; John Arnold; MacDougall, James; Marchi, David; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Biohmond, Makvin
Subject:	Sydow, C.; Talaber, Angela Mission Area Analysis Future Planning

As you know, the contract for the MAA ends 30 September. There are currently no plans to continue with a "phase III"; however, if the DASD decides he would like a follow up to the work completed, we need to start planning now.

I would like to specifically discuss this issue with you, Angel Beltran, and anyone from the MAA panel who is interested. Since you are scheduled to be here on Tuesday, the 18th at 1:30 to discuss the SOW for the IS contract I suggest we schedule this meeting at 2:30 for the same day. I am unable to meet after our regularly scheduled MAA meeting scheduled for 24 April since I have another meeting at 9:00.

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Please let me know if you are able to attend. Thanks!

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# Gilk, Clair, Maj, OSD/DPMO

From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:	Nasarenko, Jennifer, Ms., OSD/DPMO Tuesday, April 25, 2000 2:59 PM John Arnold; Daley, David OSD/DPMO; George Thompson Brown, John, Mr., OSD/DPMO; Whitley, Kaye H., Ms., OSD/DPMO; Simpson, Lynn, Ms., OSD/DPMO; Sydow, C. Gary, Mr., OSD/DPMO; Gilk, Clair, Maj, OSD/DPMO; Richmond Jr., Melvin, Col, OSD/DPMO; Caswell, James, Mr., OSD/DPMO; Henley, Charles, Mr., OSD/DPMO; Greer, James, Mr., OSD/DPMO; Harvey, Joe, Mr., OSD/DPMO CoS Guidance
Importance:	High

The CoS followed up with the DASD on the subject of MAA interviews with Family and Veteran representatives. There is no requirement for DPMO to review proposed questions or screen a list of perspective interviewees.

Also, DPMO will host a meeting on (or about) 3 May with the leadership of key family and veteran organizations. We would like Anser (George Thompson) to give a broad brush general overview of the MAA. The details of the meeting are being coordinated by Larry Greer (PA). More to follow.

1

Thanks, Jennifer

# 22a

#### Gilk, Clair M. Maj

From:	Simpson, Lynn
Sent:	Friday, October 01, 1999 6:16 PM
To:	DIRECTORS
Cc:	Gilk, Clair M. Maj; Talaber, Angela M.; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Beltran, Angel L.; Mangente,
	Brenda, Maj
Subject:	MAA Kick Off Meeting

As you may know, Mr. Jones is now TDY on Monday; however, we are going forward with the official kick off meeting on Monday at the Director's staff meeting. Anser will be here to brief the MAA and their strategy, etc. They will come back another day to brief Mr. Jones and answer any questions he may have.

Advisory members of the MAA panel are also invited to attend the kick off on Monday. Directors may also invite other - members from their staffs who will have some involvement with the MAA.

Colonel Mel Richmond, Major Clair Gilk, and Ms. Jennifer Nasarenko are the primary subject matter points of contact. You may contact them if you have any questions.

Thank you.

Original Me	essage
From:	Simpson, Lynn
Sent:	Wednesday, September 29, 1999 9:46 AM
To:	Richmond Jr., Melvin E. Col
Cc:	Harvey, Joe B.; Liotta, J. Alan
Subject:	RE: Update on MAA

As we discused this morning, I agree and will plan accordingly. Will be good to bring this up at this morning's staff meeting.

Thanks.

Original	Message
From:	Richmond Jr., Melvin E. Col
Sent:	Wednesday, September 29, 1999 6:27 AM
To:	Simpson, Lynn
Cc:	Harvey, Joe B.; Liotta, J. Alan
Subject:	RE: Update on MAA

Lynn

I talked to Joe yesterday suggesting that we schedule a meeting (probably this one you're talking about) in conjunction with a staff meeting. Naturally, we would invite Bob Jones to attend unless he wants something separate. The object would be for the ANSER team to brief ALL the directors on their plan and introduce themselves -- maybe one hour. I think we need to get all the directors on board and the sooner the better. Before we get buy-in from our constituency/customers, we should probably ensure we have buy-in throughout DPMO for the study as all will have input. Might want to suggest to Bob that the Program Manager spend a few minutes with him in his office either before or after the briefing so that Bob can have some one-on-one time with the head of the ANSER team. What do you think?

#### Mel Richmond

-----Original Message-----

From: Simpson, Lynn

Sent: Tuesday, September 28, 1999 6:13 PM

To: Beltran, Angel; Caswell, James; Collura, Angelo; Gilk, Clair; Gravelle, James; Harvey, Joe; Liotta, Jay; Man,, Gregory; Marchi, David; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Richmond Jr, Melvin; Talaber, Angela

Subject: Update on MAA

Ms. Holly Carr prepared her documentation for the contract award. She expects the information back from her Contracting Officer by 9:30 tomorrow morning (Wednesday, September 29, 1999) and hopes to make the award shortly after that.

Next major step for the panel is to attend a "kick off" meeting which will reiterate the major players and get the

process into action. Holly says that is the point where the clock starts ticking so we do not expect the meeting to last more than one hour.

At the conclusion of the kick off meeting, Major Gilk and Jennifer Nasarenko will serve as the primary Subject Matter Experts for the MAA; however, the company may discuss other issues with others from the panel and others in DPMO. Holly will be back in touch with us to schedule the kick off meeting. I suspect it will be next week.

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Thanks to all for their participation in this process. Will keep all posted.

# 22b

### Gilk, Clair M. Maj

From:	Simpson, Lynn
Sent:	Tuesday, October 05, 1999 1:53 PM
To:	Greer, James L.
Cc:	Gilk, Clair M. Maj; Nasarenko, Jennifer
Subject:	RE: MAA Kick Off Meeting Follow up

1) Major Gilk and/or Jennifer will coordinatate all the meetings; therefore, you are on stand by for an actual meeting.

2) You are not required to be present on the 18th. That is specifically for the contract requirements and process items.

Let me know if you have any other questions.

Thanks.

Original M	essage
From:	Greer, James L.
Sent:	Monday, October 04, 1999 6:27 PM
To:	Simpson, Lynn
Subject:	RE: MAA Kick Off Meeting Follow up
Importance:	High

Lynn,

There's some confusing language here. Am I to stand by until an ANSER person contacts me to have a discussion? And, should I plan to attend the meeting on the 18th, or not?

Larry

-----Original Message-----

From: Simpson, Lynn

Sent: Monday, October 04, 1999 6:24 PM

To: DIRECTORS

Cc: Foti, Anthony LtCol; Beltran, Angel; Caswell, James; Collura, Angelo; Gilk, Clair; Gravelle, James; Harvey, Joe; Liotta, Jay; Man,, Gregory; Marchi, David; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Richmond Jr, Melvin; Talaber, Angela

Subject: MAA Kick Off Meeting Follow up

I appreciate your participation in this morning's kick off meeting for the MAA.

As you know, the Anser team will need to talk with a variety of people involved in the recovery and accounting areas. In order to maintain some sense of order to the contacts, I would ask that subject matter meetings be arranged through the subject matter points of contact -- Major Gilk and Jennifer Nasarenko. This is a tremendous undertaking and it is imperative that we continue to coordinate properly on all these issues. At the same time, we need to provide the Anser team with enough information so that they can produce a quality and accurate product.

Holly Carr and I are the primary points of contact related to the contract, costs associated with the contract, and any changes required in the contract. Therefore, any meetings, TDY or other aspects of the contract should be discussed with the subject matter experts and me so that we can ensure the contract stays on the right course and is executed within the established prices and deadlines.

Individual staff members should not contact the Anser team directly, but should raise the issue to the appropriate person so that the potential for miscommunication is minimized. The meeting scheduled for the 18th should include Colonel Richmond, Major Gilk, Jennifer, me and the Anser Team so we can ensure the processes are working. Any specific issues of concern should be raised to my attention so that they may be addressed in that meeting.

Again, thank you for your participation and please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or require additional information.

Thanks. -----Original Message-----From: Simpson Lynn Sent: Friday, October 01, 1999 6:28 PM To: DIRECTORS

Cc: Gilk, Clair M. Maj; Talaber, Angela M.; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Beltran, Angel L.; Mangente, Brenda, Maj Subject: MAA Kick Off Meeting

As you may know, Mr. Jones is now TDY on Monday; however, we are going forward with the official kick off meeting on Monday at the Director's staff meeting. Anser will be here to brief the MAA and their strategy, etc. They will come back another day to brief Mr. Jones and answer any questions he may have.

Advisory members of the MAA panel are also invited to attend the kick off on Monday. Directors may also invite other members from their staffs who will have some involvement with the MAA.

Colonel Mel Richmond, Major Clair Gilk, and Ms. Jennifer Nasarenko are the primary subject matter points of contact. You may contact them if you have any questions.

Thank you.

----Original Message----From: Simpson, Lynn Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 1999 9:46 AM To: Richmond Jr., Melvin E. Col Cc: Harvey, Joe B.; Liotta, J. Alan Subject: RE: Update on MAA

As we discused this morning, I agree and will plan accordingly. Will be good to bring this up at this morning's staff meeting.

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#### Thanks.

 -----Original Message---- 

 From:
 Richmond Jr., Melvin E. Col

 Sent:
 Wednesday, September 29, 1999 6:27 AM

 To:
 Simpsoh, Lynn

 Cc:
 Harvey, Joe B.; Liotta, J. Alan

 Subject:
 RE: Update on MAA

#### Lynn

I talked to Joe yesterday suggesting that we schedule a meeting (probably this one you're talking about) in conjunction with a staff meeting. Naturally, we would invite Bob Jones to attend unless he wants something separate. The object would be for the ANSER team to brief ALL the directors on their plan and introduce themselves -- maybe one hour. I think we need to get all the directors on board and the sooner the better. Before we get buy-in from our constituency/customers, we should probably ensure we have buy-in throughout DPMO for the study as all will have input. Might want to suggest to Bob that the Program Manager spend a few minutes with him in his office either before or after the briefing so that Bob can have some one-on-one time with the head of the ANSER team. What do you think?

Mel Richmond

Origin	al Message
From:	Simpson, Lynn
Sent:	Tuesday, September 28, 1999 6:13 PM
To:	Beltran, Angel; Caswell, James; Collura, Angelo; Gilk, Clair; Gravelle, James; Harvey, Joe; Liotta, Jay; Man,,
	Gregory; Marchi, David; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Richmond Jr, Melvin; Talaber, Angela
Subject:	Update on MAA
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Ms. Holly Carr prepared her documentation for the contract award. She expects the information back from her Contracting Officer by 9:30 tomorrow morning (Wednesday, September 29, 1999) and hopes to make the award shortly after that.

Next major step for the panel is to attend a "kick off" meeting which will reiterate the major players and get the process into action. Holly says that is the point where the clock starts ticking so we do not expect the meeting to last more than one hour.

At the conclusion of the kick off meeting, Major Gilk and Jennifer Nasarenko will serve as the primary Subject Matter Experts for the MAA; however, the company may discuss other issues with others from the panel and others in DPMO. Holly will be back in touch with us to schedule the kick off meeting. I suspect it will be next week.

# 25d

# PERSONNEL RECOVERY & ACCOUNTING MISSION AREA ANALYSIS

## **Goals**:

- Develop a methodology to implement the most effective use of budget, resources, and technology to pursue the worldwide live recovery of isolated personnel and post-hostility accounting while maintaining consistent policy, control, and oversight by FY 2001.
- Implement a unified system for the live recovery of isolated personnel, post-hostility accounting and identification system by the end of FY 2002.
- Develop and apply scientific, technological and business process breakthroughs on the issues of
  - ✓ Collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of information on covered personnel by the end of CY 2000.
  - ✓ Identification, location and authentication of missing personnel worldwide by the end of CY 2001.
- Without degrading the current accounting opportunities, transition all historical accounting processes from prior conflicts to efforts triggers by new information by FY 2004.

### Process

**Personnel Recovery:** The MAA must examine the entire range of personnel recovery, to include diplomatic, military (both conventional and unconventional), and other means of recovering isolated personnel. It shall span recovery operations throughout the spectrum of conflict from small-scale contingencies to major theater war and peacetime operations; and from tactical to strategic levels. The analysis shall provide

- Construct for strategic and operational planning; analyze capabilities and force structure (forces and materiel);
- identify deficiencies and excesses; identify requirements to change existing doctrine, policy, organization, training, technology, etc.;
- assess risk and effectiveness; form a basis for Mission Needs Statements and Operational Requirements Documents;

- and support simulations and modeling. It must also analyze the structure and procedures for interagency coordination and cooperation so as to maximize the USG's ability to recover its personnel who become isolated.
- examine how the process transitions from the personnel recovery process (isolated live personnel) to the post-hostilities process of personnel accounting.

**Personnel Accounting/Remains Recovery:** The MAA must analyze all facets of the personnel accounting and remains recovery functions from operational activities to diplomatic efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of historical and future unaccounted-for. It shall

- Provide a detailed analysis of mission, organizational structure and associated budgets of:
  - ✓ DPMO
  - ✓ U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii
  - ✓ U.S. Army Casualty & Memorial Affairs Operations Center
  - ✓ Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory
  - ✓ USAF Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory
  - ✓ Joint Task Force-Full Accounting;
- Include a description and assessment of the current DoD remains recovery effort for which the U.S. Army is the executive agent.
- Examine the capability and efficiency of the current DoD remains recovery program and its ability to handle requirements of the 21st Century.
- > Include functional and manpower studies for each organization.
- Recommend organizational structures or mergers to best accomplish the mission requirements.
- Consider the impact of interagency and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on accounting policy and operations.

# 25e

Gilk, Clair M. Maj	
From: Sent: To: Subject:	Nasarenko, Jennifer Monday, February 28, 2000 7:29 AM Caswell, James R.; Harvey, Joe B.; Richmond Jr., Melvin E. Col; Simpson, Lynn; MacDougall, James; Sydow, C. Gary; Gilk, Clair M. Maj; Daley, David RE: ANSER Discussion
Importance:	High
CLASSIFICATION: UNCL CAVEATS: NONE TERMS: NONE	ASSIFIED
FEBRUARY 29 <sup>TH</sup> who corrected me.	don't know what my fingers were thinking when I typed March. Thanks to all
Jennífer	
To: Nasarenk Sydov Subject: R	James R. bruary 25, 2000 2:05 PM o, Jennifer; Harvey, Joe B.; Richmond Jr., Melvin E. Col; Simpson, Lynn; MacDougall, James; v, C. Gary; Gilk, Clair M. Maj; Daley, David E: ANSER Discussion igh : UNCLASSIFIED
TERMS: NONE Sounds good to m	
Original Mess From: Sent:	

Anser is prepared to present information regarding mission & functions evaluation and begin a dialog with DPMO to shape the product into something usable to us and to them for the end state. They have created a chart (very preliminary draft) -- assigning events to tasks -- that they would like to share and discuss.

I have reserved the conference room from 1300 to 1500 on Tuesday, March 29<sup>th</sup>. Anser has requested that the audience be limited to the addressees initially as it is not ready for prime time.

Please let me know if anyone has any questions.

Thanks, Jennífer CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED CAVEATS: NONE TERMS: NONE

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Event	Host	Location	
Evasion & Recovery Conference	JPRA		Dates
1999 DoD Personnel Recovery Conference		Fort Belvoir, VA	19-21 Oct 1999
ISPACOM Personnel Personnel Press	DPMO	Fort Belvoir, VA	26-28 Oct 1999
JSPACOM Personnel Recovery Council Meeting	USPACOM	Hickam AFB, HI	
USEUCOM Personnel Recovery Council Meeting	USEUCON	Patch Barracks, Stuttgart,	
	USEUCOM	Germany	
JSSOUTHCOM Personnel Recovery Council Meeting	USSOUTHCOM		
JSSOCOM Personnel Recovery Council Meeting	USSOCOM	MacDill AFB, FL	
JSCENTCOM Personnel Recovery Council Meeting	USCENTCOM		
Vorld-wide Casualty Conference		MacDill AFB, FL	16-18 Nov 99
In the Family Update	DPMO	Honolulu, HI	Jan-00
	DPMO	Houston, TX	Nov-99
10U Conference	DPMO	Crystal City, VA	
JSFK Personnel Recovery Council Meeting	7th Air Force		16-17 Nov 1999
	AIT AIT Force	Osan, South Korea	

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# 25k

Gilk, Clair M. Maj	j.
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From:	Simpson, Lynn
Sent:	Thursday, April 27, 2000 8:50 AM
To:	Brown, John A.; Caswell, James R.; Collura, Angelo J.; Gilk, Clair M. Maj; Gravelle, James F. Col; Harvey, Joe B.; Liotta, J. Alan; MacDougall, James; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Richmond Jr., Melvin E. Col; Sydow, C. Gary
Cc:	Rush, Tawaunna M.; Wulff, Timothy R.; Foti, Anthony LtCol; Walker, Andrea; Beltran, Angel L.; Marchi, David E.; Talaber, Angela M.
Subject:	RE: Mission Area Analysis Future Planning – 27 April 00

#### CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED CAVEATS: NONE TERMS: NONE

Subject meeting has been cancelled. No news on rescheduling.

 ----Original Message---- From: Simpson, Lynn
 Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 7:28 PM
 To: Brown, John A.; Caswell, James R.; Collura, Angelo J.; Gilk, Clair M. Maj; Gravelle, James F. Col; Harvey, Joe B.; Llotta, J. Alan; MacDougall, James; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Richmond Jr., Melvin E. Col; Sydow, C. Gary
 Cc: Rush, Tawaunna M.; Wulff, Timothy R.; Foti, Anthony LtCol; Walker, Andrea; Beltran, Angel L.; Marchi, David E.; Talaber, Angela M.
 Subject: FW: Mission Area Analysis Future Planning -- 27 April 00

#### CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED CAVEATS: NONE TERMS: NONE

Reminder about the subject meeting tomorrow 27 April at 11:30 in the Main Conference Room.

-----Original Message-----

 From:
 Simpson, Lynn

 Sent:
 Friday, April 21, 2000 3:55 PM

 To:
 Brown, John A.; Caswell, James R.; Collura, Angelo J.; Gilk, Clair M. Maj; Gravelle, James F. Col; Harvey, Joe B.; Liotta, J. Alan; MacDougall, James; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Richmond Jr., Melvin E. Col; Sydow, C. Gary

 Cc:
 Talaber, Angela M.; Marchi, David E.; Beltran, Angel L.; Walker, Andrea; Foti, Anthony LtCol; Wulff, Timothy R.; Rush, Tawaunna M.

 Subject:
 RE: Mission Area Analysis Future Planning - 27 April 00

#### CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED CAVEATS: NONE

TERMS: NONE

Unfortunately, I was not able to find a day early next week to fit this meeting and am proposing the 27th at 11:30 in the main conference room. Mel has a draft of a decision paper that we should be prepared to discuss. (Attached)

<< File: Decision memo on next steps.doc >> The purpose of the meeting will be to:

1) Discuss the decision memo and agree upon a desired approach

2) Determine who has the lead in drafting a Phase III requirements document

3) Estimate budget projections

4) Discuss issue of competition for contract if decision is approved to proceed

Please read the attached draft decision memo and come to the meeting with your ideas and suggestions. Also come to the meeting prepared to discuss the items 1 - 4 listed above.

Let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks.

----Original Message----From: Simpson, Lynn Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2000 8:42 PM

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To: Caswell, James; Collura, Angelo; Gilk, Clair; Gravelle, James; Harvey, Joe; Liotta, Jay; MacDougall, James; Nasarenko, Jennifer; Richmond Jr, Melvin; Sydow, Gary

Cc: Jones, Robert L.; Talaber, Angela M.; Marchi, David E.; Beltran, Angel L.; Walker, Andrea; Brown, John A.; Foti, Anthony LtCol; Wulff, Timothy R.

Subject: Mission Area Analysis Future Planning

#### CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED CAVEATS: NONE TERMS: NONE

As I mentioned to you via the unclassified network, I have been thinking about the future planning required for any phase III implementation for the MAA. The contract ends 30 September and the DASD will be taking a hard look at the findings and recommendations at that time.

If he decides to move into a phase III, we need to be prepared for all the actions required to plan for and budget for any additional work. The preparation for these actions needs to occur between now and mid-June even though Mr. Jones will not make a final determination on any phase III until the current contract expires and he has a chance to review the work.

I met today with Mr. Brian Walters from FEDSIM, Colonel Richmond, Mr. Caswell, and Mr. Beltran to discuss the necessary steps to prepare for future planning with the MAA. We focused on the requirements document (Statement of Work), the competition/solicitation and the timing of actions. We left the meeting with the following plan:

1) Mel is writing a draft decision paper for the DASD which will outline the issues regarding the MAA and any future planning.

2) This draft paper will be sent to the MAA panel for review.

3) The MAA panel members will meet to discuss the draft decision memo and address any additional issues that we may have overlooked. This meeting is tentatively scheduled for early to mid-week next week since we want Mr. Harvey to be aware of the planning before his surgery.

I want to ensure that the plan is properly coordinated and that we are prepared to implement the DASD's direction if he decides to move forward. Please let me know if you have any questions or require additional information.

Reminder: The regularly scheduled bi-monthly meeting to discuss the MAA is scheduled for Monday, 24 April 00 in the Family Room.

Thanks for your assistance and participation.

Lynn

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#### MISSION AREA AND BUSINESS PROCESSING ANALYSIS FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY AND ACCOUNTING FOR THE DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE (DPMO)

#### 1. STATEMENT OF WORK

#### 1.1 Background

The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) was created in 1993 after the U.S. Government consolidated the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action offices. DPMO is charged with assembling and analyzing information on U.S. military and civilian personnel who are, or were, prisoners of war or missing persons. To accomplish their mission, DPMO requires appropriate automated and integrated information systems and networks.

Personnel recovery is the umbrella term for operations focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from danger. It is the sum of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. This includes U.S., allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary and others designated by the National Command Authorities. Personnel recovery includes, but is not limited to, search and rescue; Combat Search and Rescue; Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE); Evasion and Recovery; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through any of those options (DOD Directive 2310.3).

DPMO requires assistance to:

- A. Develop a methodology to implement the most effective use of budget, resources, and technology to pursue the worldwide live recovery of isolated personnel and post-hostility accounting while maintaining consistent policy, control, and oversight by FY 2001.
- B. Implement a unified system for the live recovery of isolated personnel, post-hostility accounting and identification system by the end of FY 2002.

#### 1.2 Mission

DPMO's mission includes:

- A. Exercise policy, control, and oversight within the Department of Defense (DoD) for the entire process for investigation and recovery related to missing persons (including matters related to search, rescue, escape and evasion).
- B. Coordinate for DoD with other departments and agencies of the USG on all matters concerning missing persons, and establish procedures for the determination of status of 05/12/00 1 95132DEA-07

missing persons including those to be followed by DoD boards of inquiry and officials reviewing the reports of such boards, and;

C. Coordinate for the systematic, comprehensive, and timely collection, analysis, review, dissemination, and periodic update of information related to such persons.

#### 1.3 Goals

DPMO goals include:

- A. Develop a methodology to implement the most effective use of budget, resources, and technology to pursue the worldwide live recovery of isolated personnel and post-hostility accounting while maintaining consistent policy, control, and oversight by FY 2001.
- B. Implement a unified system for the live recovery of isolated personnel, post-hostility accounting and identification system by the end of FY 2002.
  - 1. <u>Recovery</u>. By 2003, DoD will have a fully integrated personnel recovery architecture that ensures its ability to recover through military means, designated personnel who are isolated in harm's way. The DoD architecture supports and complements the recovery of personnel through diplomatic and other means. It will develop an interagency mechanism that maximizes the unique capabilities of each department, agency, or office in resolving personnel recovery issues and incidents.
  - 2. <u>Accounting</u>. In those instances where DoD is unable to recover its personnel immediately, a system that ensures all critical information for making identifications is in place that ensures rapid correlation to the specific loss incident.
- C. Develop and apply scientific, technological and business process breakthroughs on the issues of:
  - 1. Collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of information on covered personnel by the end of CY 2000.
  - 2. Identification, location and authentication of missing personnel worldwide by the end of CY 2001.
- D. Without degrading the current accounting opportunities, transition all historical accounting processes from prior conflicts to efforts triggers by new information by FY 2004.
- E. On the basis of the above analysis, recommend appropriate use of Information Technology to streamline, consolidate, and organize business functions. To identify the right opportunities for business reengineering and technology infusion, the first step is to survey the current environment.

#### 1.4 Objective

The objective of this statement of work is to assist DPMO in meeting the goals described above. The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall conduct a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) / Business Process Reengineering (BPR) (MAA/BPR) effort that defines the components of an effective DoD personnel recovery, accounting and remains recovery architecture by examining the full spectrum of personnel recovery and accounting functions at the DoD, DPMO, and interagency levels. This analysis will correlate and validate the mission requirements based upon the impacts associated with implementing the Missing Persons Act and current capabilities.

To the maximum extent possible, Business Process Engineering tools and methods will be employed to provide:

- Process models that depict work processes in the "AS IS" and "TO BE" environments.
- Information Models that describe data required to perform and make decisions.
- Organization Models that define the new or existing organization structure, job positions, and job configurations
- Technology Models: that describe the potential of today's technologies for meeting mission requirements.
- Management Strategy: The analysis of the organization and process models will provide critical input for defining a management strategy to best meet mission objectives.

#### 1.5 Requirements

DPMO requires a team of individuals with demonstrated experience (i.e., work performed within the past 5 years) that have knowledge and expertise in the areas of:

- 1. Successfully managing high-level, politically sensitive and classified projects.
- 2. Personnel recovery.
- 3. Policy, doctrine, and plans development in DoD.
- 4. Mission analysis, and operations research.
- 5. Strategic planning, organizational analysis and development experience.
- 6. Manpower and budget analysis for improving organizational efficiency including Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards and requirements for A-76 and Most Efficient Organization (MEO) Studies.
- 7. Ability to apply knowledge of A-76 and MEO studies and to make necessary recommendations on manpower and organizational efficiency.
- 8. Missing Persons Act.
- 9. Business Process Reengineering, Simulation and Modeling.

In addition, the industry partner should provide knowledge in

10. Historical Accounting of missing persons

05/12/00

#### 95132DEA-07

11. Research and scientific methods in anthropological analyses

#### 1.6 Scope

The scope of this effort includes all analytic and information engineering tools and services required to accomplish the goals described above.

#### 1.7 Description

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall accomplish the objectives described above in two phases:

<u>Phase I</u> :	MANDATORY: Identify the problem and develop an analytical plan. (Duration: approximately 3 months).
<u>Phase II</u>	OPTIONAL: Conduct the MAA / BPR – Phase II will cover the "AS IS" and "TO BE" Environment. (Duration: 8 to 9 months) The key component of Phase II will be the actual functional analysis and preparation of the final report.

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall identify opportunities for business process redesign and information technology infusion. Following the principles of business redesign, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall consider:

- (1) Organizing work around outcomes, rather than tasks;
- (2) Providing direct access to customers; --that is, provide timely and accurate responses to information inquiries;
- (3) Harnessing technology—provide right information at the right time.
- (4) Enabling interdependent and simultaneous work. When people have access to information and can communicate cross-functionally and cross-organizationally, work can be performed simultaneously instead of linearly.

The following paragraphs describe the tasks that will be performed:

## **1.7.1** Task 1 - Project Management (Mandatory)

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall maintain a project diary and provide support for reviewing and providing comments on completed studies, analyses, documentation and activities.

### **1.7.1.1** Subtask 1.1 - Monthly Status Reports (Monthly) (Mandatory)

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall prepare Monthly Status Reports. The monthly status reports will provide a description of activities (both completed (past month) and planned for the next month), issues/problems, recommended solutions, and client actions. (Upon award of the Delivery Order, the Contractor's status reports will correspond with contractor invoices and provide DPMO with the project fund status as well as the level of effort expended).

05/12/00

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## 1.7.1.2 Subtask 1.2 – Periodic In Process Reviews (Mandatory)

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall brief the DPMO on findings and activities as required (estimated weekly basis). The in-process reviews will describe project progress, accomplishments, issues, and required client actions. The reviews will provide information on:

- a) Personnel Recovery Analysis progress
- b) Accounting and Remains Recovery Analysis progress
- c) Model development
- d) Conference coordination
- e) PRAG meeting arrangements
- f) Budget and manpower issues

During the in-process reviews, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall document any issues, comments, recommendations, and/or findings in minutes, and distribute the minutes the next working day.

### 1.7.2 Task 2 – Phase I: Project Plan to Conduct the Personnel Recovery Analysis and Personnel Accounting (Mandatory)

To establish a mutually-agreed upon plan of action and milestones for the project, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall prepare a Project Plan. The Plan will be a living document to be used by both DPMO and INDUSTRY PARTNER to monitor Phase II tasks, milestones, and deliverables for this project element plan.

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall propose the scope of the Phase II MAA/BPR describing the technical approach, organizational resources, and management controls to be employed to meet the performance, cost, and schedule requirements throughout execution of the analysis. The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall describe in detail the research methodology they will employ to identify governing directives, legal authorities, and joint and service policy. *To the maximum extent possible, the research methodology will incorporate business process analysis tools and principles.* The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall identify and take into account current studies (including, but not limited to service studies) and analysis for capabilities, tasks, doctrine, and policies so as to avoid duplication of effort between studies. Phase I shall include development of an approach for determining required Joint Mission Essential Tasks for personnel recovery. The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall ensure that the plan connects required capabilities, tasks, doctrine, and policies to Defense planning documentation.

As part of this plan, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall prepare a Baseline Schedule, containing all resources, activities, and milestones necessary to accomplish work specified in the SOW. The Plan will include the following information:

• All technical activities (including the development of BPR models and other documents) will be identified and organized in a work breakdown structure (WBS) at a level of detail

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sufficient for FEDSIM to manage the task, with approximately two additional WBS levels below the technical activities specified in the SOW.

- A GANTT chart which contains activities and milestones pertinent to completion of the technical activities specified in the SOW.
- Description and expected result of each step or milestone in the work plan.
- An estimate of the duration and level of effort (by labor category) for each element of the WBS, with approximately two additional WBS levels below the technical activities specified in the SOW.
- A matrix of all deliverables, and their planned delivery dates.
- A matrix of all personnel assigned to the task order and their total aggregate level of effort for all tasks.

#### 1.7.3 Task 3 – Phase II: (OPTIONAL)

### 1.7.3.1 Subtask 3.1 - Conduct Personnel Recovery Process Analysis

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall examine the entire range of personnel recovery, to include military (conventional, non-conventional, and unconventional), diplomatic, and other means of recovering isolated personnel. During the examination, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall document and describe the relationships of personnel recovery legislation, policy, doctrine, organizations, technology, and tasks. Recommend who best should resolve each action to achieve the end-state. The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall identify and take into account current studies (including, but not limited to service studies) and analysis for capabilities, tasks, doctrine, and policies so as to avoid duplication of effort between studies.

- A. <u>Method</u> The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall:
- Analyze the full range of DoD personnel recovery requirements. Address requirements of the interagency community, including, but not limited to the Department of State, CIA, and U.S. Coast Guard.
- Analyze the structure and procedures for interagency coordination and cooperation so as to maximize the USG's ability to recover its isolated personnel and account for its missing.
- Analyze the organizations responsible for Personnel Recovery policy, doctrine, intelligence, technology, and tasks (including the Joint Mission Essential Task List)
- Identify and analyze capabilities and force structure (forces and materiel).
- Assess risk and effectiveness of DoD personnel recovery policy and procedures in military, diplomatic, or other Government agency scenarios.
- Use recent studies and analyses performed by other DoD components.
- Identify technologies (including information technologies) that can improve personnel recovery and use Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations as a source for

05/12/00

information. Cooperate with the DoD Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group to obtain information and recommend additional technological enhancements.

- Identify deficiencies and excesses.
- Identify requirements to change existing doctrine, policy, training, technology, assessing risk and effectiveness in each key area.
- Identify requirements to modify organizations of the recovery community to include the potential need to conduct future manpower, budgetary, and other resource studies.
- Recommendations <u>must consider and incorporate current DoD budget and personnel</u> realities.

#### B. Interim Deliverables:

As attachments to the monthly status reports, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall prepare interim deliverables (i.e, point papers, and graphics) that summarize the results of the activities above. The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall:

- Identify technological enhancements that will improve personnel recovery.
- Develop the supporting documentation for Mission Needs Statements and Operational Requirements Documents.
- Provide information to support the development of a personnel recovery-planning model for operational, process improvements, and strategic planning. Recommended process improvements will include a description of impacts and results for both the "AS IS" and recommended "TO BE" solution.
- Identify alternative methods for organizations to resolve each action to achieve the end-state.

As required, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall provide executive briefings on each of the items above.

#### C: <u>Final Deliverable</u>:

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall provide draft and final versions of a Report and Executive Briefing that fully describes the results of this analysis, including: (1) the methodology, (2) analytic tools, (3) DOD organization/ infrastructure (i.e, description of each of the components, their mission, and operations), (4) analysis and findings, and (5) recommendations.

#### 1.7.3.2 Subtask 3.2 - Conduct Personnel Accounting and Recovery

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall Examine the process of accounting and recovery. The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall analyze the policy, directives, organizations, resources, and tasks involved in accounting and recovery. The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall provide recommendations to DPMO for the efficient organization of DoD resources currently available and recommendations for the best means available to meet the requirements of accounting and recovery in the future. The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall identify and take into account current

05/12/00

studies (including, but not limited to service studies) and analysis for capabilities, tasks, doctrine, and policies so as to avoid duplication of effort between studies.

- A. <u>Method</u>: The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall:
- Describe and assess the current DoD recovery effort for which the U.S. Army is the executive agent.
- Conduct a detailed analysis of mission, organizational structure, and associated budgets of the DPMO, U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, HI; the U.S. Army Central Memorial Affairs Operations Center; the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory; the USAF Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory, and the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting.
- Conduct analyses leading to findings and recommendations on the capability of the current DoD remains-recovery program and its ability to handle requirements of the 21st Century.
- Identify requirements to modify organizations of the recovery community to include the potential need to conduct future manpower, budgetary, and other resource studies.
- Coordinate working groups with key stakeholders in the worldwide recovery program to develop draft and final reports of findings.
- Consider the impact of interagency and NGOs on accounting policy and operations.
- Make recommendations that consider and incorporate current DoD budget and personnel realities.

#### B. Interim Deliverables:

As attachments to the monthly status reports, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall prepare interim deliverables (i.e, point papers, and graphics) that summarize the results of the activities above.

#### C: <u>Final Deliverable</u>:

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall provide draft and final versions of a Final Recovery Reports and Executive Briefing, The Report will fully describes the results of this analysis, including: (1) the methodology, (2) analytic tools, (3) DOD organization/ infrastructure (i.e, description of each of the components, their mission, and operations), (4) analysis and findings, and (5) recommendations.

### 1.7.3.3 Subtask 3.3 - Develop Personnel Recovery Analytical Model

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall develop a credible model or methodology to calculate recovery-force requirements for the full range of military operations. The model will serve as a planning tool for operational and strategic-level personnel-recovery planners, and as a precursor to a Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment.

A. <u>Method</u>: The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall Collect data and use available analytical methods to forecast loss rates across the spectrum of conflict derived from Defense planning 05/12/00 8 95132DEA-07

documentation or develop a new method that is mathematically rigorous and credible. Determine force mixes that are capable of various recovery operations and provide options for planners.

#### B. <u>Deliverables:</u>

- 1) The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall develop draft and final versions of a non-proprietary model or method that predicts losses and provides options for recovery force selection. The model will be fully documented in draft and final version of a report that describes each component of the model, the research, analytic tools, and processes that were utilized to create the model
- 2) Upon acceptance of the final model and report, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall provide a model demonstration that forecasts Personnel Recovery resources required over the next five years.

### 1.7.3.4 Subtask 3.4 - Develop Accounting And Recovery Analytical Model

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall develop a credible computer model that calculates requirements (i.e., force structure, budget, time, etc.) to achieve the fullest possible accounting for Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia, the Korean Conflict, the Cold War and World War II (WWII).

A. <u>Method</u>: The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall use available methods and historical data from efforts to account for Americans still missing as a result of the wars in Southeast Asia, the Korean Conflict, the Cold War and WWII to develop a mathematically rigorous and credible model. The model must incorporate variables such as investigative and recovery team mix, site access, field operations frequency, and budget constraints.

#### B. <u>Deliverables:</u>

- The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall develop draft and final versions of a non-proprietary model or method that forecasts requirements to achieve the fullest possible accounting for Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia, the Korean Conflict, the Cold War and WWII. The model will be fully documented in draft and final version of a report that describes each component of the model, the research, analytic tools, and processes that were utilized to create the model
- 2) Upon acceptance of the final model and report, The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall provide a model demonstration that forecasts Accounting and Recovery resources required over the next five years.

## 1.7.3.5 Subtask 3.5 - Conduct Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) Meetings

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall work closely with DPMO's is to keep senior leaders of the personnel recovery community apprised of issues resulting from the MAA. These meetings will serve as a forum to review the results and progress of the MAA. These meetings shall be held in December, March, and June annually; however, variations may occur.

 A. <u>Method</u>: The Industry Partner shall provide facilitator(s) for meetings of the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG). The meetings will consist of contractor and member-05/12/00
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 95132DEA-07 sponsored briefings, and interactive dialogue among USG officials responsible for various aspects of personnel recovery.

The meetings will be 2-3 hours in duration. Classification will be no higher than collateral Secret.

B. Deliverables:

- 1) Facilitator(s) to assist in conducting the meeting
- 2) Reproduction of required PRAG meeting material
- 3) Visual aids to support the meeting (e.g., PowerPoint)
- 4) Audio-visual support personnel to operate the equipment for briefings
- 5) Labels, VIP seating signs, and name tags
- 6) Minutes of each meeting delivered to DPMO

### **1.8** Significant Milestones and Deliverables

Milestones	Responsibility	Duration
PROJECT START (PS)		Upon Government receipt and approval of approved required TS/SI/TK clearances for project personnel + 5 days
Task 1 - Project Management	INDUSTRY PARTNER	
Monthly Status Reports	INDUSTRY PARTNER	PS + Monthly for the Duration of this Project Element Plan
In Process Reviews	INDUSTRY PARTNER/ DPMO	Weekly (or as required) for the Duration of this Statement of Work.
Task 2 – Phase I: Project Plan to Conduct the Personnel Recovery Analysis and Personnel Accounting (Mandatory)		Task will begin upon DPMO receipt of approved TS/SI/TK clearances of contractor personnel
Draft Plan	INDUSTRY PARTNER	PS + 8 weeks
Comments Final	DPMO INDUSTRY PARTNER	Draft + 1 month PS + 3 months
05/12/00	10	95132DEA-07

Task 3: Phase II	INDUSTRY PARTNER	Acceptance of final Plan plus 9 months
3.1 Personnel Recovery Process		
Analysis Interim Deliverables		A . 1
Interim Deriverables	INDUSTRY PARTNER	As required
Draft Report	INDUSTRY	In accordance with Plan
	PARTNER	in accordance with I fair
Comments	DPMO	Draft + 2 weeks
Final	INDUSTRY PARTNER	Comments + 2 weeks
3.2 Accounting and Recovery		~
Analysis Interim Deliverables	DIDIGEDI	
Interim Deliverables	INDUSTRY PARTNER	As required
Draft Report	INDUSTRY	In accordance with Plan
	PARTNER	In accordance with I fair
Comments	DPMO	Draft + 2 weeks
Final	INDUSTRY	Comments + 2 weeks
	PARTNER	
3.3 Personnel Recovery		
Analytical Model		
Draft Model and Documentation	INDUSTRY PARTNER	In accordance with Plan
Comments	DPMO	Draft + 2 weeks
Final	INDUSTRY	Comments + 2 weeks
	PARTNER	
Demonstration	INDUSTRY	At a time mutually convenient to
	PARTNER	DPMO and the INDUSTRY
		PARTNER
3.4 Accounting And Recovery		
Analytical Model		
Draft Model and Documentation	INDUSTRY PARTNER	In accordance with Plan
Comments	DPMO	Draft + 2 weeks
Final	INDUSTRY	Comments + 2 weeks
_	PARTNER	
Demonstration	INDUSTRY	At a time mutually convenient to THE
	PARTNER	INDUSTRY PARTNER AND DPMO
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95132DEA-07

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# **3.5 PRAG Meetings**

Facilitated Sessions with	INDUSTRY	As required
reproduced materials, briefings,	<b>PARTNER</b> /	-
audio-visual aids, identification	DPMO	
tags		
Minutes of meetings	INDUSTRY	Within 5 work days of meeting
	PARTNER	

# **1.9 Period of Performance**

The period of performance on this Delivery Order for the MANDATORY TASKS is Date of Award (DOA) plus 3 months. The period of Performance on the OPTIONAL Tasks is nine months after acceptance of the Plan.

# 1.10 Security

The project manager assigned to work on this project shall have TS/SI/TK clearance. There will be no exceptions. The Government anticipates there will be a close-working relationship with the Industry Partner and that there will be occasions when work is to be performed on-site. The entire DPMO organization is housed within a SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility).

The INDUSTRY PARTNER SHALL comply with all appropriate security regulations in handling classified material and in publishing reports and other products. DPMO will not accept nor pay any billings for uncleared contractor personnel without prior approval of the DPMO POC.

Required clearances for the analysis of requirements Top Secret/SCI, (estimated for a very limited number of contractors (<5)).

For all other personnel, secret security clearances are required for to access DPMO office space, attend or facilitate the Conferences, or to view plans, procedures, and historical data. Contractor candidates must have at least a security clearance IAW DD 254 established for the task.

The contractor must be able to store secret documents and material.

# 1.11 Key Personnel

1.11.1 The Industry partner shall identify key personnel. The Corporate Officer shall be an employee of the Prime Contractor whose role is that of overall manager of the contract and single point-of-contact for FEDSIM for resolution of contract-related (as opposed to specific DO-related) issues. The Corporate Officer shall also be a recourse when DO-related issues are not resolved to the Government's satisfaction at the DO level.

05/12/00

1.11.2 Key personnel assigned to the contract must be assigned for the entire contract period barring circumstances outside the control of the Contractor, e.g., resignation, death, disability, etc.

1.11.3 In order to ensure a smooth and orderly start up of a DO, it is essential that the key personnel specified in the Contractor's proposal for that DO be available on the effective date of the DO. If these personnel are not made available at that time, the Contractor shall show cause. If the Contractor does not show cause, the Contractor may be subject to default action as prescribed by FAR 52.249-8, Default (Fixed-Price Supply and Service).

# **1.12 Government-Furnished Equipment**

- Desks or workstations equipped with suitable computers and access to appropriate local area networks (including e-mail and Internet access) for cleared contractor personnel. DPMO will determine the number of persons based on tasks and the contractor's analytical plan.
- The Government will furnish or make available to the contractor any necessary Government documentation to accomplish the task.

# **1.13** Place of Performance

Work is to be performed at the contractor's facility and in the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office at 1745 Jefferson Davis highway, Arlington, VA, 22202.

# 1.14 Travel

Travel may be required to gather information and to meet with subject matter experts, and organization representatives involved in the process of Personnel Recovery, and Accounting and Remains Recovery. Specific locations include: Combatant Commands; Joint Services SERE Agency at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii; Central Identification Laboratory-Hawaii; Combat Search and Rescue Agency at Langley AFB, Virginia; and the Joint Warfighting Center at Ft. Monroe, Virginia. As a travel requirement is identified, the INDUSTRY PARTNER SHALL coordinate requirements with the Task Monitor.

Travel will be on a cost reimbursable basis in accordance with Federal Joint Travel Regulations and Section H.4 of the base contract. All travel shall be authorized in advance by the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR). Travel costs shall be itemized in accordance with Paragraphs 1.15 and 1.16 below.

The Government estimates the following trips:

		<b># Persons</b>	# Days	
Trip 1	Tampa, FL	2	5	
Trip 2	Stuttgart, GE	2 .	7	
Trip 3	Hampton, VA	2	3	
Trip 4	Honolulu, HI	2	7	
Trip 5	Miami, FL	2	2	
Trip 6	Spokane, WA	2	2	
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05/12/00

Trip 7	San Diego, CA	2	4	
Trip 8	Fayetteville, NC	2	2	
Trip 9	Montgomery, AL	2	2	
Trip 10	Little Creek, VA	2	2	
Trip 11	Seoul, Korea	2	7	

# 1.15 Invoice Submission

Invoices shall be submitted to FEDSIM electronically in TOS. TOS Help Support Phone number is 703 605 9716. Prior to submission in TOS to FEDSIM, the contractor shall obtain a signature from the Client POC on the Form 1034.

(1) <u>Send the 1034 with client's signature to:</u> Ms. Holly T. Carr 5203 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1100 Falls Church, VA 22041

# 1.16 Invoice Detail

The INDUSTRY PARTNER shall provide for each WBS element in the Task Order Management Plan, the labor category, the number of hours worked, the labor rate, current price, cumulative cost to date. When applicable, the contractor shall provide copies of invoices and/or receipts for Other Direct Costs. When applicable, the contractor shall provide copies of invoices and receipts for software tools. Each invoice that includes travel shall provide itemized detail and supporting information to enable the reviewer to assess compliance.

1.17 FEDSIM Points-of-Conta	ct
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<b>Project Manage</b>	r:
Senior Project N	Aanager:
Mailing Address	5:

Ms. Holly T. Carr Ms. Sue Latham 5203 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1100 Falls Church, VA 22041

**Telephone No:** 

Fax No: Email: (703) 605 9829(Carr) (703) 605 9822 (Latham) (703) 605 9870 holly.carr@gsa.gov

05/12/00



# JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND 310 WORCHESTER AVENUE JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, HI 96853-5530

DCO (ER) 2012-1026 June 21, 2013

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information Act request, which was referred to the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command by the Department of Defense Office of Freedom of Information, Reference Number 00-F-1568. Your request was for records pertaining to contracts and related documents with Analytic Services, Inc (ANSER). Thank you for your patience while we processed your request.

Please find enclosed copies of documents labeled 7, 8a, and 29 and redacted copies of documents labeled 6, 6a, 8b, 17, and 22cl. These documents, totaling 132 pages, are appropriate for their full release and those with partial release with excisions. These excisions are made pursuant to Exemptions of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (6), which pertains to the release of information which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a third party. And excisions pursuant to Exemption (b) (3) Statute, 50 U.S.C. § 435 Note Sec 1082, P.L. 102-190, which protects the disclosure of information concerning U.S. personnel classified as POW/MIA during the Vietnam and Korean Conflicts, otherwise known as the "McCain Bill". All processing fees have been waived.

If there is anything else that I or any member of my staff can do for you, please do not hesitate to contact Ms. Rachel Phillips, my FOIA Officer at the above address or at Rachel.Phillips@jpac.pacom.mil.

Sincerely,

JOHNIE E. WEBB, JR. Deputy to the Commander for External Relations and Legislative Affairs

**Encl: Responsive Documents** 

Copy to: DFOIPO

16 June 1998

# MEMORANDUM THRU Director, Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22331-0480

FOR Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs), Joint Support Directorate, 2400 Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-2400

SUBJECT: Korean War Remains Recovery Plan

1. The DPMO plan is a good basis for discussion on the expansion of operations in the DPRK. However, CILHI proposes the following Facts, Assumptions, and Recommendations for consideration prior to any decision or further discussion of the issue.

2. After review of the proposed plan CILHI would like to provide the following comments for consideration.

FACTS.

- The weather window in DPRK will support five deployments of 30 days each into the DPRK. Based on experience, the recovery time frame in the DPRK runs from April through late October. This allows for a seven-month window, which can realistically support five 30-day recovery windows per year given transit time into and out of country.
- Updated information is not available on potential recovery sites. Information which CILHI bases its search areas on is derived from historical documents dating from the 1950s. This information does not pinpoint areas of possible remains, does not address the current status of the site and does not necessarily meet the criteria for launching a recovery team.
- CILHI completed five recovery operations resulting in nine remains. To date CILHI has completed five recovery operations in the DPRK. Nine remains were recovered from these efforts. Historically, an operation consists of CILHI and DPMO proposing areas to be searched for remains with negative results. As a recovery operation comes to a close the DPRK search the surrounding countryside for a credible witness from the 1950s era. After locating a witness the DPRK conducts a pin point search and if positive, leads the recovery team to an area, which historically has yielded the remains of one or two people.
- CILHI manpower is currently resourced to support two recovery teams. CILHI currently possesses two staffed recovery teams dedicated to DPRK recoveries.

SUBJECT: Korean War Remains Recovery Plan

- Movement within DPRK is tightly controlled. Movement within the DPRK is completely supervised and directed. Recovery teams are not free to explore the country side nor canvass the areas of operations for witnesses.
- DPRK recoveries do not comply with CILHI SOP. For CILHI to deploy a recovery team anywhere else in the world certain criteria must first be meet. This criteria includes the site is that of a US loss, is accessible, is pinpointed, and has a probability of recovering remains is high.
- DPRK will not allow female team members to work out of a base camp. As it stands the leadership of the DPRK recovery effort strongly advises against allowing US females to work out of a base camp. This concern is based on the lack of privacy and the close proximity of DPRK soldiers. DPRK feels it better not to chance inadvertent contact and the possibility of an incident.
- It is currently more cost effective to deploy survey teams vs recovery teams. Due to the lack of current information on proposed recovery sites and the fact that recovery teams are now spending in excess of fifty percent of their time in country searching for viable sites, it would ease site location and comply with CILHI SOP to survey and verify prospective sites prior to deploying recovery teams.

#### ASSUMPTIONS.

- DPRK will allow increased access in the future. Contrary to current actions, the DPRK will openly cooperate and allow additional teams into their country.
- Team structure will remain the same. Future recovery teams or survey teams will remain staffed by at least one Field Grade Officer and will not include female team members unless operations can be conducted from a hotel.
- OPTEMPO will continue to be linked with external factors. Political forces surrounding the DPRK opening of relations will continue to push for increased participation in this humanitarian issue.
- Weather patterns will remain constant. Weather patterns will be as they were during 1997 and early 1998.
- Manpower requirements will be filled. CILHI will continue to operate with its current strength.
- Current system will continue to produce limited results. If we continue to deploy
  recovery teams to non specific sites we will continue to spend the majority of time
  surveying sites to pin point burial locations.

SUBJECT: Korean War Remains Recovery Plan

- With three teams in country operating on verified isolated burial sites, at a proposed OPTEMPO of five JROs per year, it would take at least 20 years to recover the remains of 4,000 individuals. This information is based on a single team being able to recover one isolated burial (which has a known location) in a period of two working days.
- DPRK is limited in their ability to support additional teams. The Panmunjom
  mission is limited by their available manpower to adequately supervise increased levels
  of US personnel moving in and around their country. This statement is based on
  conversations with DPRK Officials speaking of their inability to handle over 90 US
  personnel in their country at one time. This capability is tied to the lack of English
  speakers and officials dedicated to international affairs.
- SEA OPTEMPO will remain in a constant state through the year 2001. Operations in support of JTF-FA will not increase nor decrease from the FY 98/99 projections through the year 2,001. CILHI will continue to provide 47 recovery teams to JTF during this time period.
- CIL HI will continue to provide five recovery teams in support of the WWII/Cold War resolution effort. Current projections call for five recovery operations per year in support of WWII/Cold War losses. This schedule will remain constant though 2,001.
- Any additions in military manpower can be gained either through the 54<sup>th</sup> Quartermaster Company (QM) or active reservist. The 54<sup>th</sup> QM is located on Ft. Lee and maintains a pool of Mortuary Affairs specialist which can be either assigned to CILHI by redistributing personnel authorizations, assigned on a TDY and return or attached for training purposes. Activating reserve officers for active duty mission requirements may fill the increase in Field Grade Officer requirements. Since this is a non-crisis operation the position may require a reservist volunteer for the duty.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

That until recovery sites are properly surveyed and their locations verified by US team members a US presence be maintained in the DPRK by the FY 98-recovery plan remaining in effect. That, until there is a significant increase in verified sites concerning US losses with a high probability of recovery, OPTEMPO does not increase. That if operations are to increase that they do so over a three year ramp up culminating in three teams in country for five JROs per year.

That operational control of recovery teams remains a CILHI responsibility and no umbrella organization such as JTF is created to increase the bureaucratic demands on the recovery effort. Policy level organizations remain involved with policy decisions and the operations involved in the humanitarian recovery of remains not be directly tied to political motives.

#### Proposal would be implemented as follows:

 Note: Cost estimates are based solely on the recovery teams requirements and do not include compensation paid the DPRK for their participation in the effort, security charges, increased witness fees nor off season storage fees. These costs are estimated at 705K for FY 98 and can be assumed to increase at a yet undetermined rate for higher OPTEMPO.

#### FY 99

Conduct Five JROs consisting of one Recovery Team (RE) of eight personnel and one Investigation Team (IE) of four personnel. This breaks down into a team mix of the following.

#### **Recovery Element:**

1-Field Grade	0-4	Mision Commander
1-DA Civilian	GS-13	Anthropologist
1-Company Grade	0-3	Team Leader
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Sergeant
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6	MA Specialist
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Medic
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6	EOD Tech
1-Junior NCO	E5-E7	Linguist

#### Investigative Element

1-Fireld Grade	0-4	Team Leader
1-DA Civilian	GS-13	Anthopologist
1-DA Civilian	GS-9	Analyst
1- Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Medic

a. This results in the following impacts:

# Increases:

#### **Civilian changes**

- Requires two additional anthropologists be added to the CILHI staff 145K.
- · Two each Casualty data analysts for an increases of 105K per year

#### Military personnel'increases

- Requires the addition of two medics to the TDA or augmentation for five JROs
- Requires the addition of two field grade officers to the TDA unless locally available
- · Eight additional Mortuary Affairs Specialists added to the TDA
- Two Linguists added to the TDA
- Requires a budget increase of 130 K of operational funding

#### Travel & Per diem

Increases for 4 personnel est. at 134K.

No Change to:

- Commo Cell in Pyongyang
- Logistical NCO in Beijing

Losses: Nonc

#### Civilian Pay increase of 250K

Total operational cost estimate (open allotment) of 1,382K. This estimate includes the projected cost of FY 99 (1,118K) operations and the additional cost 130K for transportation/administrative costs for the Investigative Element in the DPRK and their increased travel of 134K. \*This figure will look low due to the purchase of all equipment used in the DPRK during FY 98.

\* Note Compensation for DPRK (fuel, rice, witness interviews, official pay ect.) is not reflected in this plan. Compensation package agreed to during FY 98 equals to 672K for the initial agreed upon price. This does not include base camp security, bus rental, nor additional vehicular rental which can be expected to total 10K per operation. In addition to this CILHI pays 26.4K per year for off season storage. Realistically FY 98s compensation package to the DPRK can be expected to be 750K. Based on these figures total cost estimate for FY 99 is 2,382K (open allotment 2,132K) increase in civilian pay of 250K

FY 00 Based on the successful identification of positive recovery sites during FY 99, operations could be increased to include conducting five JROs consisting of two REs totaling 16 personnel and one IE of four personnel. This breaks down into a team mix of the following.

# Recovery Element #1:

1-Field Grade	0-4	Mision Commander
1-DA Civilian	GS-13	Anthropologist
1-Company Grade	O-3	Team Leader
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Sergeant
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6	MA Specialist
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Medic
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6	EOD Tech
1-Junior NCO	E5-E7	Linguist

# Recovery Element #2:

1-Field Grade	0-4		Mision Commander
1-DA Civilian	GS-13	••	Anthropologist
1-Company Grade	O-3		Team Leader
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7		Team Sergeant
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6		MA Specialist
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7		Team Medic
1-Junior NCQ	E5/E6		EOD Tech
1-Junior NCO	E5-E7		Linguist

# Investigative Element

1-Field Grade	0-4	
1-DA Civilian	GS-13	
1-DA Civilian	GS-9	
1- Senior NCO	E6/E7	

Team Leader Anthropologist Analyst Team Medic

a. This results in the following impacts:

#### Increases:

Civilian changes

SUBJECT: Korean War Remains Recovery Plan

- Requires three additional anthropologists be added to the CILHI staff 210K
- · Two each Casualty data analysts for an increases of 105K per year

#### Military personnel increases

- · Requires the addition of two EOD specialists to the TDA
- · Requires the addition of two Linguists to the TDA

Equipment

• increases 999K

#### Travel & Per diem

Increases for 8 personnel est. at 268K

No Change to:

- Logistics NCO in Beijing
- Commo cell in Pyongyang

Losses:

None

Total cost estimate includes an increase over the previous year of 1,582K and can be expected to total at least 3,399K of open allotment expenditure. This estimate includes the purchase of 1 additional complete set of base camp equipment, the purchase of 8 ea. Nissan Patrols for the teams mobility around the DPRK the additional shipping charges to and from DPRK and travel costs of the teams. Based on these figures total cost estimate for FY 00 is 3,964K (open allotment 3,399K) increase in civilian pay of 565K

\* Note this cost estimate uses the FY 98 compensation package for the DPRK and does not reflect additional requirements of the DPRK for witness payment, additional fuel, or any other administrative charges that may be negotiated by the DPRK resulting from increased operational tempo.

FY 01 and beyond: Conduct five JROs consisting of three REs and one IE. This breaks down into a team mix of the following

7

# ТАРС-РЕД-Н

SUBJECT: Korean War Remains Recovery Plan

# Recovery Element #1:

1-Field Grade	0-4
1-DA Civilian	GS-13
1-Company Grade	O-3
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6
1-Junior NCO	E5-E7

Mission Commander Anthropologist Team Leader Team Sergeant MA Specialist Team Medic EOD Tech Linguist

Mission Commander Anthropologist Team Leader Team Sergeant MA Specialist Team Medic EOD Tech Linguist

# Recovery Element #2:

1-Field Grade	0-4	Mission Commander
1-DA Civilian	GS-13	Anthropologist
1-Company Grade	O-3	Team Leader
I-Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Sergeant
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6	MA Specialist
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Medic
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6	EOD Tech
1-Junior NCO	E5-E7	Linguist
i		•

# **Recovery Element #3**

1-Field Grade	0-4
1-DA Civilian	GS-13
1-Company Grade	O-3
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7
1-Junior NCO	E5/E6
1-Junior NCO	E5-E7

# Investigative Element

1-Fireld Grade	0-4	Team Leader
1-DA Civilian	GS-13	Anthropologist
1-DA Civilian	GS-9	Analyst
1- Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Medic

# ТАРС-РЕД-Н

SUBJECT: Korean War Remains Recovery Plan

#### Increases:

#### Civilian changes

Two additional Anthropologists 145K

#### Military personnel increases

• One additional Logistics NCO or Officer in Beijing 46K

Equipment

increases 999K

Travel & Per diem

Increases for 8 personnel est. at 268K.

No Change to:

Commo Cell in Pyongyang

Losses:

None

Total cost estimate includes an increase over the previous year of 1,458K and can be expected to total at least 4,722K of open allotment expenditure. This estimate includes the purchase of 1 additional complete set of base camp equipment, the purchase of 8 ea. Nissan Patrols for the teams mobility around the DPRK the additional shipping charges to and from DPRK and travel costs of the teams. Based on these figures total cost estimate for FY 00 is 5,422K (open allotment 4,722K) increase in civilian pay of 700K

3. Once relations reach an acceptable state of normalization a forward-deployed detachment should be established in Pyongyang. The detachment's mission would be to provide communication and logistical support to deployed recovery teams and constant archival research/analysis and lead development for future recovery possibilities. The detachment should be permanently assigned to CILHI and staffed as follows:

Cdr	0-4	lea	
NCOIC	E-7/8	lea	

Commo E-6 3 ea Specialist

Analyst/ E-6 2ca Linguist

Though information does not currently exist to prepare a costs estimate it may be similar to Detachment Three in Vientiane and be expected to run in the 700K per year range.

4. Implementation of this plan relies on the capability to utilize both the reserves and the 54<sup>th</sup> Quartermaster Company for additional personnel as needed.

5. POC for the above information is  $^{(b)}$   $^{(6)}$  number (808) 448-8903.

Executive Officer, at telephone

(b) (6)

Colonel, Quartermaster Commanding

DOC, GA

#### 24 August1998

#### MEMORANDUM THRU Director, Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center, 2461 Bisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22331-0480

FOR Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs), ATTN: (b) (6) Joint Support Directorate 2400 Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-2400

SUBJECT: Operational template for future recovery operations

1. The following information is provided to be used as a basic guideline for remains recovery operations outside of the United States. It gives a basic outline of team requirements and some cost factors, which are based on historical expenditures.

2. These recovery packages are designed to service other than Southeast Asian recovery areas and do not include air crash analysts as part of their organic structure. They are suitable for ground loss and slow moving air crash recovery. In the event that a fast moving aircraft loss is to be serviced air crash analysts should be added to the team.

Currently CILHI operates in three distinct theatres, each with a specific set of requirements.

(4) SEA—Multiple teams supported by both a forward deployed detachment in the country of operations and a support detachment, one country away from the area of operations, with a higher level of infrastructure to support deploying teams.

(b) DPRK—Single team supported by a communication liaison in the country of operations and a logistics NCO stationed at a USEMB, one country away from the area of operations, with a higher level of infrastructure to support deploying teams.

(d) WWII/Cold War—Single team, when deployed becomes totally self reliant for in theatre support. These operations are pre-forecasted and extensively planned on a case by case basis. The establishment of forward-deployed logistical personnel becomes a very real requirement when you plan to conduct either multi-team (more than one) or multiple successive operations in a single country, or region.

(1) The following details in general terms USACILHI's 5 year focus for world wide recovery operations. USACILHI will assign priority for recovery for any world wide site using the following criteria:

(a) Sites that arc open.

(b) Sites with associated remains.

(c) Sites positively correlated to a US loss incident.

(d) Sites with special Congressional or Next of Kin interest.

SUBJECT: Operational template for future recovery operations

(2) USACILHI will focus recovery efforts in the next five years in the following regions/countries:

(a) Papua New Guinea. 15 sites are ready for excavation in Papua New Guinea. 73 additional recorded sites require some form of investigation before USACILHI recovers them. USACILHI receives on average one reported new site from the Bmbassy in Port Moresby each month. If the threat level in Papua New Guinea does not increase, USACILHI will focus most of its efforts for world wide recoveries here for the next five years and beyond.

(b) Europe. In 1997, USACILHI and the United States Army Memorial Affairs Activity, Europe (USAMAAE) drafted an MOU for recovery operations in Europe which has proved very effective. Since the MOU took effect, USACILHI and USAMAAE have recovered 10 sites in Europe. Various sources have reported many sites warranting recovery and identification in eastern Europe. Using USAMAAE to investigate these sites, as well as providing logistic coordination, has facilitated recovery operations. The mission planning and coordination window for Europe as a result has been cut from six months to under three. USAMAAE also increases our flexibility in dealing with unilateral remains disinterment and turnover.

(3) Other world wide sites. Overall, USACILHI has identified the following site for recovery and investigation by region:

<b>(a)</b>	Pacific AOR*:	23 Rocoveries.	105 Investigations
(b)	Europe:	12 Recoveries.	25 Investigations

\* includes Papua New Ouinea

4. The following is a generic template, which could be matched to anyone of CILHI's three theatres of operation.

- a. Single toam recovery.
  - (1) Tcam composition:

# Recovery Element #1:

1-DA Civil	ian	GS-13	Anthropologist
1-Company	Grade	O-3	Tcam Leader
1-Senior N	CO '	E6/E7	Tcam Sergeant
3-4 Junior	NCO	E5/E6	MA Specialist
1-Senior N	CO	E6/E7	Team Medic
1-Junior N	CO	E5/E6	EOD Tech
1-Junior N	CO	E5-E7	Linguist
1-Junior NC	0	115-E6	Photographer

Total 9-11 Personnel

SUBJECT: Operational template for future recovery operations

(2) General costs associated with deployment during a normal deployment window of 30 days including transportation to and around the area, per-diem and Class A funds. These costs do not include any additional equipment costs, which can normally be estimated at \_\_\_\_\_

Country		Average cost		
Papua New Guinea		\$170K		
Russia		\$140K		
*Germany		\$88K		
China		\$175K		
Vanuatu		\$155K		

\*Operations conducted in Germany, and some other locations in Europe, are done in conjunction with the United Sates Army Mortuary Affairs, Europe (USAMAE) acting as a supporting agency. Costs such as Labor, transportation around the area and additional equipment charges are not represented in CILHI costs.

b. Multiple team recovery such as SEA or successive recoveries in any one country during a single FY:

(1) Multiple team or successive multiple recoveries performed in any one region during any single year will require supporting personnel be deployed into that area. These personnel are required to facilitate logistical requirements, provide site identification and command and control. Recommend that the forward deployed support personnel take the form of a Detachment Headquarters and one Investigative Element (IE). Recommend that theInvestigative Element remain attached to the forward-deployed Detachment Headquarters for continuos exposure and rapport building with the Host Nation (HN).

(2) Regional Recovery Package:

Recovery Element #1-TBD:

1-DA Civilian	GS-13	Anthropologist
1-Company Grade	0-3	Team Leader
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7	Tcam Scrgcant
3-4 Junior NCO	E5/E6	MA Specialist
1-Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Medic

SUBJECT: Operational template for future recovery operations

1-Junior NCO	E5/E6	EOD Tech
1-Junior NCO	ES-E7	Linguist
1-Junior NCO	E5-B6	Photographer

# Total 9-11 Personnel or higher

# **Investigative Element 1**

1-Company Grade	· O-3	Team Leader
I-DA Civilian	GS-13	Anthropologist
1-DA Civilian	GS-9	Linguist/Analyst
1- Senior NCO	E6/E7	Team Medic

#### **Total 4 Personnel**

#### Detachment Headquarters.

Cdr	04/05	lea	
NCOIC	E-7/8	lea	
Commo Specialist	E-6	3 ea	
Analyst / Linguist	E-G	2ea	
Contracting Specialis	rt GS 9/10	)	1 ca
Air Movement NCO	E-7		lea

# Total 9 personnel

Minimum personnel total for continuous operations in a single country would be;

Recovery Elements X 2 = 18 personnel

Invetigative Element X I= 4 personnel

Detachment X 1=9 personnel

Total=31 personnel

Monetary costs associated with establishment of a detachment are not currently documented by CILIII. As recovery teams increase over CILIIIs currently authorized number of 13, additional support personnel must also be included. The expanded operations in the DPRK document may be used to indicate that.

5. Multiple options exist as current plans research the feasibility of JTF-FA and CILHI merging into one organization. This new recovery organization becoming the sole proponent for the

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
# **ТАРС-РЕД-Н**

SUBJECT: Operational template for future recovery operations

worldwide remains recovery effort. The Bacl, outlines a proposed organizational diagram for such an organization.

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
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# **Proposed Organizational Chart**




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
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





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
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P. 12

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
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P. 13

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
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


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
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P. 16

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# USACILHI OPERATIONS UPDATE

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15 OCTOBER 1998

# OUTLINE

- Deployment Highlights
- Current/Recent Operations
- Future Operations
- FY Master Schedule

# HIGHLIGHTS

- Currently 6 of 13 teams deployed
- Recently Completed: 98-1GE (Germany)
- Ongoing missions:
  - 98-3PP (Papua New Guinea)
  - 98-2CH (China)
  - 98-5KN (DPRK)
  - 98-1L ( Laos)

# GERMANY

- Team returned 30 September 1998
- Results
  - 3 sites closed remains recovered at two sites
  - Received one set of remains in Luxembourg
- Recovery team augmented by USAMAAE, 54th QM Co (MA)

# PAPUA NEW GUINEA

- Team deployed 21 September 1998
- Results to date:
  - 1 site closed remains recovered (DeSilets P-47)
  - 1 site on-going (Gaffney P-47)
    - a/c correlated through machine gun serial numbers
    - Remains recovered
- Team Returns 31 October 1998

# CHINA

- Team deployed 09 September 1998 (B-24 10BNR)
- Second recovery mission to site
- Results to date;
  - Remains recovered primarily from second of five levels
- weather has impeded excavation will not close site
- Team returns 24 October 1998

## NORTH KOREA

- 12 Sets remains CY 98
- Team Deployed 12 October 1998
- Results to date:
  - N/A team moves to Pyongyang on 17 October
- team returns 8 November 1998

# LAOS

- 3 teams deployed 27 September 1998
- Results to date:
  - 3 sites in Svannakhet Province ongoing
  - -1 site has yielded remains
- 3 teams return 1 November 1998

# FUTURE OPERATIONS

- 53rd JFA Vietnam (30 Oct 10 Dec 98)
  - 6 Teams
  - Northern Vietnam
- Log Survey Irian Jaya (Nov 98)
  - Prep for January recovery (B-25 8 BNR)
  - Verify logistics viability and support assets
- 99-2L Laos (8 Jan 15 Feb 99)
  - -4 teams
  - Boulikhamxi and Savannakhet Provinces

# FUTURE OPERATIONS

- 99-11J Indonesia (5 -23 Jan 99)
  - -1 team
  - PACAF Support
- 54th JFA Vietnam (19nFeb 30 Mar 99)
  - -6 teams
  - North and Central Vietnam

## FY 99 SCHEDULE

## Vietnam

- 53rd 30 Oct 9 Dec 98
- 54th 19 Feb 31 Mar 99
- 55th 30 Apr 9 Jun 99
- 56th 9 Jul 18 Aug 99
- 57th 17 Sep 27 Oct 99

### Laos

- 99-1L 27 Sep 4 Nov 98
- 99-2L 8 Jan 15 Feb 98
- 99-3L 5 Mar 11 Apr 99
- 99-4L 4 Jun 14 Jul 99
- 99-5L 13 Aug -22 Sep 99

### Cambodia

- 99-1C 8 Jan - 15 Feb 99

# FY 99 Worldwide Schedule

- Indonesia
- Papua New guinea
- China
- Makin Island

5 -23 Jan 99

22 Jan - 12 Mar 99

22 Apr - 7 Jun 99

- 8 May 14 Jun 99
- Europe/PPNG 1 31 Aug 99
- Mission to DPRK dates TBD during December 99 talks in New york



# Zero Based Work Plan

	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05
SRV JFAs IEs/REs	5 10/30	5 10/30	4 8/24	3 6/18	0 0/0	0 0/0	0 0/0
LAOS JFAs	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
IES/RES SRV IND(END OF FY, IE/RE)	3/17	3/17	3/17	3/17	3/17	3/17	3/17
PROJECTED LAO IND(END OF FY.IE/RE)	129/94	65/41	11/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
PROJECTED	48/189	40/158	31/134	22/108	13/84	4/57	0/33

JTF-FA PRODUCT

### SUBJ: JTF-FA ZERO BASED WORK PLAN

**SUMMARY:** JTF-FA conducts joint field activities (JFAs) in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to achieve the fullest possible accounting for the 2,063 Americans still unaccounted for. Current projections using the zero-based plan indicate investigative and excavation requirements for Vietnam complete in FY02 and in Laos investigative and excavation requirements complete in FY07.

### **KEY POINTS**

- Zero Based Work plan geared toward mission completion of current/projected requirements.
- Work plan includes five JFAs in Vietnam through FY00 reducing to three in FY02, five per year in Lags through the FYDP and one JFA in Cambodia for FY99/00.
- JTF-FA budget has been approved (POM) through FY05.
- JTF-FA billets have dropped from 181 (FY92) to current level of 161. Billets will continue to decrease to match the work requirement beginning in FY02 until FY04, then stabilize at 85 until mission completion.

### DISCUSSION

### Vietnam:

- Five JFAs scheduled for FY99 and FY00, four JFAs for FY01, and three JFAs for FY02.
- Team usually composed of two investigation elements and six recovery elements of over 100 personnel. Personnel also required to investigate priority discrepancy cases.
- Vietnamese linguists' key to maintaining projected OPTEMPO.

### Laos:

- Five JFAs scheduled each year from FY99 through FY05.
- Team usually composed of one investigative and three recovery elements totaling 40 personnel. Personnel also required for archival research and oral history interviews.
- 40 personnel cap per JFA has limited progress of excavations resulting in extension of mission completion beyond the FYDP.

### Cambodia:

- One JFA scheduled per year for FY99 and FY00.
- U.S. team usually tailored to mission requirements.
- Cambodian operations will be conducted as required FY01 and beyond.

### Budget:

- JTF-FA budget is approved through POM for FY99 FY05.
- Includes O&M, N plus Army funds, and drops from \$20.7M in FY99 to \$14.6M in FY05.

### Manpower:

- JTF-FA billet extensions approved by USA, USAF, and USMC. USN approval is pending.
- Billet extensions reflect current projections of work requirements.
- PERSTEMPO increasing due to decreased manning with no change in OPTEMPO through FY00.
- JTF+FA will continue to require augmentation from service components for each JFA.
- Augmentees include medics, EOD, comm, mechanics, linguists, and life support techs.

Future: DPMO is developing options for follow-on capability after JTF-FA.

**BOTTOM LINE:** JTF-FA will continue to conduct JFAs in Southeast Asia at the current level for the next two years, then reduce deployments until projected completion.

(b) (6)

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OTTUZDKW RUHEMAD0001 1661603-UUUU--RUHPSUU. **ZNR UUUUU** O P 151700Z JUN 98 ZDK FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J3// **TO AIG 960** INFO USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3-ODJ// HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//SAAM// HQ AMC TACC COMMAND CENTER SCOTT AFB IL//XOOZ/TRKX// NAVCSRF HONOLULU HI//PW-MIA// CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/N6/N45/NOIM/N1/N13// COMMARFORPAC//G1/G3/G6// CG I MEF//G1/G6// CG III MEF//G1/G6// **USARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI** HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI/DO/SGX/SGO/SGN PACAF AOS HICKAM AFB HI//AOM/AOP// 15ABW HICKAM AFB HI//CC/LG// 15LGS HICKAM AFB HI//CC/LGSM// FISC PEARL HARBOR HI//OO// 374OG YOKOTA AB JA//CC// 374OSS YOKOTA AB JA//OSO/OSOO// 374AW YOKOTA AB JA//OCO// 374AES YOKOTA AB JA//SG/AO/AOE// **BUMED WASHINGTON DC//27//** AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO// INFO USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC 13AF ANDERSEN AFB GU//CC/LG// CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP-OP/APLG-MV/APLG-MU-EODCT// CDR703MIBDE OPS KUNIA HI RSOC KUNIA HI//J342/JOC/J3M3/J3W// CDR205THMIBN FT SHAFTER HI//IAGPD// 15OSS HICKAM AFB HI//DOX// 635 AMSS HICKAM AFB HI//DO/DOCO/DOX// JFMO PAC HONOLULU HI 354MDG EIELSON AK//SGOAR// COMNAVSURFRESFOR OPS FLTSUPP NEW ORLEANS LA/N3// COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N10// BT UNCLAS //N03460// PART ONE OF THREE-PART TWO IDENT IS 151701Z JUN 98-PART THREE IDENT IS 151702Z JUN 98 MSGID/GENADMIN/JTF-FA/1-99/MAY// SUBJ/JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING OPLAN 1-99// REF/A/RMG/CJCS/082354ZJAN92// REF/B/RMG/CJCS/222300ZJAN92// REF/C/RMG/CJCS/020046ZNOV91// REF/D/DOC/USCINCPAC// REF/E/RMG/SECDEF/061158ZAUG93// REF/F/RMG/USCINCPAC/5080-93// NARR/REF A IS CJCS ALERT ORDER. REF B IS CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. REF C IS CJCS PLANNING ORDER. REF D IS USCINCPAC/DIA MOU DEFINING RELATIONSHIP FOR POW-MIA OPS. REF E IS REORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL POW-MIA OPERATIONS. REF F IS USCINCPAC OPORD FOR EXPANDED POW-MIA **OPERATIONS IN SE ASIA, OPERATION FULL ACCOUNTING.//** POC/(b) (6) 'DJ3(PLANS)/JTF-FA/CAMP SMITH, HI/TEL:DSN 477-3001/ TEL:FAX DSN 477-5501// POC/(b) (6) /DJ3(AIR)/JTF-FA/CAMP SMITH, HI/TEL:DSN 477-3001// RMKS/1. SITUATION. SINCE ITS INCEPTION IN 1992, JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA) HAS CONDUCTED IN EXCESS OF 26,350 INVESTIGATIONS AND 422 EXCAVATIONS WHICH HAVE LED TO THE RECOVERY OF 495 SETS OF REMAINS OF US SERVICEMEN MISSING AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT IN SE ASIA. TO DATE, THE REMAINS OF 177 SERVICEMEN HAVE

BEEN IDENTIFIED AND RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES. AS RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV), THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR), AND THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA (KOC) CONTINUE TO IMPROVE, JTF-FA CONTINUES ITS RESOLVE TO ACHIEVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF THOSE MISSING AMERICANS.

A. THREAT. SEE ANNEXES B AND L.

B. TOPOGRAPHY AND WEATHER. SEE ANNEX B.

C. FRIENDLY FORCES. THE GOVERNMENTS OF SRV, LPDR, AND KOC WILL PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND LIMITED LOGISTICS TO ASSIST IN RECOVERY AND INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS IN THE ACCOUNTING OF AMERICANS MISSING AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT IN SE ASIA.

D. ASSUMPTIONS

(1) PERTINENT SE ASIAN GOVERNMENTS WILL PERMIT JTF-FA

CONTINUED ACCESS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES TO RESOLVE POW/MIA ISSUES.

(2) JOINT STAFF WILL AUTHORIZE REQUESTED MANNING LEVELS TO SUPPORT PROJECTED OPERATIONS THROUGH FY99.

(3) HOST NATION, CONTRACTED OR US MILITARY HELICOPTER SUPPORT WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR JTF-FA OPERATIONS IN REMOTE AREAS OF SE ASIA.

(4) PROJECTED BUDGET LEVELS WILL ACCOMMODATE THE PLANNED OPERATIONAL SCHEDULE.

2. MISSION. DURING FY99, JTF-FA CONDUCTS INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN SRV, LPDR AND KOC IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF AMERICANS MISSING AS A RESULT OF THE WAR IN SE ASIA.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. JTF-FA WILL DEPLOY TASK ORGANIZED, INVESTIGATION RECOVERY TEAMS (IRT) TO CONDUCT A MINIMUM OF TEN JOINT FIELD ACTIVITIES (JFAS). THESE ACTIVITIES ARE DEPLOYMENTS, LASTING APPROXIMATELY 30 DAYS IN-COUNTRY, AND ARE PLANNED FOR SRV AND LPDR. EACH OPERATION CONSISTS OF SEVEN PHASES:

(1) PHASE I: PREPARATION PHASE. COMMENCES WITH THE FIRST INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY BRIEFING AND TERMINATES WITH EMBARKATION ABOARD AIRCRAFT FOR DEPARTURE TO THAILAND. CONSISTS OF PROMULGATION OF WARNING AND FRAG ORDERS, ARRIVAL OF AUGMENTEES, PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING, MISSION BRIEFS, EQUIPMENT PREPARATION AND EMBARKATION.

(2) PHASE II: DEPLOYMENT TO THAILAND. COMMENCES WITH THE DEPARTURE OF AIRCRAFT FROM HAWAII AND TERMINATES WITH EMBARKATION ABOARD AIRCRAFT FOR DEPARTURE TO COUNTRY OF OPERATION. IRT DEPARTS HICKAM, QUICK TURNS ANDERSEN AFB, GUAM AND ARRIVES U TAPAO, THAILAND, USUALLY TWO CALENDAR DAYS LATER. IRT THEN PREPARES FOR ONE OR TWO DAYS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT TO COUNTRY OF OPERATION.

(3) PHASE III: DEPLOYMENT TO COUNTRY AND SITE OF OPERATION. COMMENCES WITH THE DEPARTURE OF AIRCRAFT FROM THAILAND AND TERMINATES WITH ARRIVAL OF TEAMS IN COUNTRY AT INITAL SITES OF OPERATION. IRT DEPLOYS TO COUNTRY AS REQUIRED PER FRAG ORDER.

(4) PHASE IV: FIELD OPERATIONS. COMMENCES WITH THE DESIGNATED FIELD ACTIVITY IN THE HOST NATION (HN) AS DEFINED IN THE FRAG ORDER, AND TERMINATES WITH THE EMBARKATION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ABOARD THE LAST AIRCRAFT FOR DEPARTURE BACK TO THAILAND.

(5) PHASE V: RE-DEPLOYMENT TO THAILAND. COMMENCES WITH THE DEPARTURE OF AIRCRAFT FROM HN AND TERMINATES WITH THE EMBARKATION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ABOARD AIRCRAFT FOR DEPARTURE BACK TO HAWAII. IRT RE-DEPLOYS TO U TAPAO FOR REPORT WRITING, BLOOD DRAW, EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE, PALLET RECONFIGURATION, AND RE-EMBARKATION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ABOARD AIRCRAFT FOR FLIGHT TO HAWAII.

(6) PHASE VI: RE-DEPLOYMENT TO HAWAII. COMMENCES WITH THE DEPARTURE OF AIRCRAFT FROM THAILAND AND TERMINATES WITH THE ARRIVAL OF PERSONNEL IN HAWAII. IRT RE-DEPLOYS FROM U TAPAO, QUICK TURNS ANDERSEN AFB, GUAM, AND ARRIVES HICKAM AFB, HAWAII, USUALLY THE SAME DAY DEPARTURE. (7) PHASE VII: POST DEPLOYMENT. COMMENCES UPON ARRIVAL IN HAWAII AND TERMINATES WITH THE DISSEMINATION OF ALL DETAILED REPORTS OF INVESTIGATIONS AND RECOVERIES AND JFA SUMMARY REPORTS. IRT BREAKS DOWN PALLET, CONDUCTS EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE, AND TURNS IN UNIT AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT. AUGMENTEES RETURN TO HOME STATION, AFTER ACTION REPORTS ARE REVIEWED, AND OPERATIONAL REPORTS ARE COMPILED, REVIEWED AND RELEASED BY JTF-FA/J3.

**B. MANEUVER** 

(1) SRV. FIVE JFAS ARE PLANNED FOR SRV. SRV JFAS USUALLY CONSIST OF TWO INVESTIGATIVE ELEMENTS, A RESEARCH INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) AND SIX RECOVERY ELEMENTS.

(2) LPDR. FIVE JFAS ARE PLANNED FOR LPDR. THREE JFAS WILL CONSIST OF ONE INVESTIGATIVE ELEMENT AND THREE RECOVERY ELEMENTS, AND TWO JFAS WILL CONSIST OF FOUR RECOVERY ELEMENTS. ADDITIONALLY, AN ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM (ART) WILL DEPLOY AS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ARCHIVAL PROJECTS.

(3) KOC. JTF-FA WILL CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS AND SCHEDULE RECOVERY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

C. TASKS

(1) J1

(A) ISSUE ORDERS AND TRAVEL ADVANCES FOR JTF-FA PERSONNEL.

(B) ARRANGE FOR COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION AS REQUIRED. (C) PROCESS EMERGENCY LEAVE REQUESTS FOR DEPLOYED JTF-FA

PERSONNEL.

(D) CONDUCT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING FOR AUGMENTEES. COORDINATE ORDERS, ADVANCES, AND TRAVEL WITH UNITS PROVIDING AUGMENTEE SUPPORT.

(E) COORDINATE WITH USCINCPAC J1 FOR:

((1)) ONE 3510 AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN FOR DESIGNATED 179 DAY TAD/TDY.

((2)) ONE SGT (E-5) 63W AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE MECHANIC FOR DESIGNATED 30 DAY TAD/TDY.

(2) J2

(A) ANALYZE AND RESEARCH CASE FILES, REPORTS, DOCUMENTS, ARCHIVAL INFORMATION, WITNESS INTERVIEWS, AND RECOVERED MEDIA IN ORDER TO GENERATE LEADS AND DETERMINE FATE OF MISSING AMERICANS.

(B) CORRESPOND WITH SERVICE CASUALTY OFFICERS REGARDING NEW INFORMATION PERTAINING TO SPECIFIC CASES.

(C) IDENTIFY, IN COORDINATION WITH JICPAC/OTC/OSE AND LEVY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS TO ENSURE SATISFACTION OF COMMAND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION PERTAINING POTENTIAL THREATS. (D) COORDINATE WITH DPMO TO ENSURE A CLEAR DISTRIBUTION

OF INFORMATION RESPONSIBILITY TO REDUCE AMBIGUITY AND REDUNDANCY. (E) ENSURE SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION, MATERIAL AND

DOCUMENTATION COLLECTION IN SUPPORT OF MISSION REQUIREMENTS. (F) SUBMIT STANDING SIGINT REQUIREMENTS OR TACTICAL EVENT

REPORTING SYSTEM REQUESTS TO USCINCPAC/J23.

(G) SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR TIME-SENSITIVE AD HOC AND STANDING IMAGERY COLLECTION/EXPLOITATION REQUESTS VIA DD1684 FORMATTED MESSAGES.

(H) FORWARD ALL NON-STONY BEACH TIME SENSITIVE HUMINT COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR VALIDATION TO USCINCPAC J23/J233.

(I) PROCURE HOST NATION ARCHIVE DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

(J) COORDINATE PROCESSING, ANALYSIS AND REPORTING OF POW/MIA INTELLIGENCE WITH DPMO AND USCINCPAC/J23.

(K) PRODUCE THREE TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS:

((1)) EVALUATIONS OF SOURCE REPORTING.

((2)) EVALUATIONS OF ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS AND

ARCHIVAL RESEARCH.

((3)) ANALYSIS OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

(L) FORWARD ALL JTF-FA PRODUCED ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS TO THE FOLLOWING DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: SECSTATE, SECDEF, NSC, DIA, JOINT STAFF, USCINCPAC, AMERICAN EMBASSIES HANOI, VIENTIANE AND PHNOM PENH, CASUALTY OFFICES, JTF-FA DETACHMENTS AND CILHI.

(M) EXERCISE STAFF COGNIZANCE OVER THE ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM (ART).

(N) COORDINATE LIFE SUPPORT TECHNICIAN AUGMENTATION. (3) J3

(A) PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS BY DEPLOYING TASK ORGANIZED FIELD TEAMS TO SE ASIA FOR PERIODS OF APPROXIMATELY 30 DAYS AND COORDINATE WITH PERMANENTLY BASED DETACHMENTS IN SE ASIA.

(B) ISSUE WARNING ORDERS NO LATER THAN 60 DAYS PRIOR TO OPERATION AND FRAG ORDERS NO LATER THAN 30 DAYS PRIOR TO OPERATION.

(C) DEVELOP AND PUBLISH SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH

JFA.

(D) AT THE CONCLUSION OF EACH JFA, SUBMIT DETAILED REPORTS OF INVESTIGATIONS, EXCAVATIONS, SUMMARY REPORTS AND REVIEW ALL AFTER ACTION REPORTS WITHIN 30 DAYS.

(E) SUPERVISE ALL COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES PER ANNEX K.

(F) SUPERVISE ALL MEDICAL OPERATIONS PER ANNEX Q.

(G) COORDINATE ALL AMC AIRLIFT AND CHANNEL FLIGHTS

THROUGH PACIFIC AIRLIFT MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PAMO) AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH JFA.

(H) COORDINATE ALL LOAD PLANS AND PALLETIZING FOR ALL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

(I) PLAN AND COORDINATE ALL JOINT FORENSIC REVIEWS AND REPATRIATION CEREMONIES IN SRV AND KOC.

(J) PLAN AND COORDINATE PERSONNEL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH JFA.

(4) J4

(A) PROVIDE FOR ALL LOGISTICAL AND FISCAL SUPPORT OF JTF OPERATIONS NOT COVERED BY REF F.

(B) PROVIDE FUNDING SUPPORT FOR CIVILIAN PAYROLL, TRAVEL, JTF-FA PERSONNEL PER DIEM AND HN SUPPORT COSTS TO INCLUDE SITE PREPARATION, COMMUNICATION SUPPORT, HELICOPTER CONTRACT COSTS, LABOR/DRIVERS, SECURITY AND SUPPORT VEHICLES.

(C) ARRANGE FOR INTER SERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENTS AS REQUIRED.

(D) COORDINATE AUGMENTEE BILLETING IN HAWAII.

(5) J5

(A) PREPARE, COORDINATE AND EXECUTE TECHNICAL AND CONSULTATIVE TALKS WITH EACH HN IN PREPARATION FOR JFAS.

(B) SUBMIT WEEKLY SITREPS TO USCINCPAC J5.

(6) PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(A) PREPARE ALL PA GUIDANCE FOR DETACHMENTS AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

(B) PREPARE MEDIA PREPARATION PACKETS FOR HIGH LEVEL VISITORS TO JTF-FA OPERATIONS.

(C) COORDINATE ALL MEDIA SUPPORT WITH DETACHMENT COMMANDERS.

(7) HQ PACAF

(A) COORDINATE AND SCHEDULE ALL USAF SAAM AIRCRAFT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

(B) PROVIDE CONTINUOUS CAPABILITY FOR AERIAL MEDICAL EVACUATION CAPABLE OF RECOVERING INJURED PERSONNEL IN THE AO WITHIN FIVE HOURS.

(C) COORDINATE WITH USCINCPAC AND PROVIDE PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE INDEPENDENT DUTY TECHNICIANS AS MEDICS AND MEDICAL OFFICERS FOR DESIGNATED JFAS PER ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(D) PROVIDE TWO PASSENGER SERVICE PERSONNEL (AIR TRANSPORTATION SPECIALISTS) TO SUPPORT DAILY OPERATIONS AT U'TAPAO. TASKED PERSONNEL WILL COORDINATE DAILY WITH UTAPAO ROYAL THAI NAVY REPRESENTATIVE AND JTF-FA DETACHMENT ONE TO ENSURE ALL TRANSITING AIRCRAFT, PAX AND CARGO ARE PROPERLY SERVICED, RECEIVED AND PREPARED FOR DEPARTURE.

(E) PROVIDE TWO FORKLIFTS, ONE STANDARD AND ONE ALL TERRAIN, TO SUPPORT WAREHOUSE, AND AIRCRAFT LOADING/UNLOADING OPERATIONS.

(F) PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS QUALIFIED ON LST-5, THE URC-101 SATCOM SYSTEMS AND THE PRC-132 HF RADIO FOR DESIGNATED JFAS IAW ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(G) PROVIDE LIFE SUPPORT TECHNICIANS FOR DESIGNATED JFAS IAW ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(8) CINCPACFLT

(A) SUPPORT JTF-FA, UIC R33011, HIGH PRIORITY (0-1) REQUISITIONS IN MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS THROUGH FLEET AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER, PEARL HARBOR. URGENT OR WALK THROUGH REQUISITIONS WILL BE GIVEN HIGHEST PRIORITY PROCESSING MEANS AVAILABLE.

(B) COORDINATE WITH USCINCPAC J07 AND PROVIDE PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMEN AND MEDICAL OFFICERS FOR DESIGNATED JFAS IAW ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(C) PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS QUALIFIED ON LST-5, THE URC-101 SATCOM SYSTEMS AND THE PRC-132 HF RADIO FOR DESIGNATED JFAS IAW ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(D) PROVIDE LIFE SUPPORT TECHNICIANS FOR DESIGNATED JFAS IAW ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(9) CDRUSARPAC

(A) DIRECT USARPAC EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CONTROL TEAM (EODCT) TO COORDINATE WITH SERVICE COMPONENTS TO PROVIDE EOD PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE TECHNICIANS FOR DESIGNATED JFAS IAW ANNEX C , APPENDIX 8.

(B) PROVIDE REQUIRED NUMBER OF AN/PSS-12 OR EQUIVALENT TO USARPAC EODCT FOR USE BY EOD AUGMENTEES.

(C) PROVIDE PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS QUALIFIED ON LST-5, THE URC-101 SATCOM SYSTEMS, AND THE PRC-132 HF RADIO FOR DESIGNATED JFAS IAW ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(D) COORDINATE WITH USCINCPAC J07 TO PROVIDE MEDICAL OFFICERS FOR DESIGNATED JFAS IAW ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(E) SUPPORT JTF-FA PERSONNEL UIC R33011 WITH

ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT (OCIE) THROUGH CENTRAL ISSUE FACILITY (CIF), SCHOFIELD BARRACKS AS REQUIRED. CIF WILL ALLOW JTF AUGMENTEES MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO RECEIVE AND TURN IN OCIE. AS REQUIRED, CIF WILL TRANSFER OCIE TO JTF-FA/J4 FOR HN TEAM MEMBERS IN SUPPORT OF THIS OPERATION.

(10) MARFORPAC. PROVIDE PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS QUALIFIED ON LST-5, THE URC-101 SATCOM SYSTEMS, AND THE PRC-132 HF RADIO FOR DESIGNATED JFAS IAW ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(11) COMSOCPAC. COORDINATE WITH USCINCPAC J07 TO PROVIDE 18D MEDICS TO SUPPORT JFAS IAW ANNEX C, APPENDIX 8.

(12) CDRUSACILHI

(A) PROVIDE RECOVERY TEAMS IAW APPENDIX 8, ANNEX C.

(B) CONDUCT JOINT FORENSIC REVIEWS OF REMAINS RECOVERED IN SRV.

(C) PROVIDE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO CONDUCT RECOVERY OPERATIONS.

(D) COORDINATE SPECIAL LOGISTICS/EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED FOR PALLETIZING AT UTAPO WITH JTF-FA DETS (INFO JTF-FA/J4) 14 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF DEPLOYMENT FROM HAWAII.

(E) PROVIDE PALLET LOAD PLANS TO JTF-FA/J3AIR NLT D-13. (13) NCPAC. COORDINATE WITH FT MEADE, SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER AND USCINCPAC J28 FOR FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES. (14) JTF-FA DETACHMENTS (DETS)

(A) COORDINATE DIPLOMATIC OVER FLIGHT, LANDING, AND PERSONNEL CLEARANCES FOR THAILAND, SRV, KOC AND LPDR AIRSPACE FOR ALL AIRCRAFT SUPPORTING JFAS AND REPATRIATION CEREMONIES.

(B) COORDINATE HN HOTEL RESERVATIONS AND GROUND TRANSPORTATION FOR IRT.

(C) COORDINATE WITH EMBASSIES FOR VISAS, AND WITH DET ONE FOR THAI IMMIGRATION PASSPORT ENTRY AND EXIT STAMPS.

(D) COORDINATE OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS WITH HN GOVERNMENTS AND PROPOSE ADJUSTMENTS TO WORK PLAN BASED ON HN APPROVAL.

(E) SUBMIT DAILY AND WEEKLY SITREPS TO CJTF-FA, EOC AND DETACHMENTS.

(F) PLAN FOR THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF JTF-FA PERSONNEL IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILE, TERRORISTIC, OR EXCESSIVE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

(G) ESTABLISH A 24 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER AND MONITOR RADIO NETS FOR THE DURATION OF OPERATIONS.

(H) AS REQUIRED, COORDINATE WITH OTHER DETS REGARDING THE PREPARATION AND MOVEMENT OF WITNESSES, OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES FOR BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS.

(I) SUBMIT JFA SUMMARY REPORTS NLT ENDOP+12.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) COMPONENT COMMANDS PROVIDING PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION SUPPORT ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE WIDEST DISSEMINATION OF APPENDIXES 8 AND 9 OF ANNEX C IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SUPPORTING UNITS WITH SUFFICIENT WARNING TO MEET ALL DEADLINES FOR PERSONNEL REPORTING, BUDGET PLANNING, PASSPORT AND MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS.

(2) EOD OPERATIONS WILL BE IAW JTF-FA INST 8000.

(3) DATES OF OPERATIONS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT MADE BY HQ USCINCPAC.

(4) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED.

(5) ALL TEAM LEADERS AND SPECIALIZED AUGMENTEES WILL COMPLETE AFTER ACTION REPORTS AND SUBMIT TO JTF-FA J3 NLT ENDOP+5.

(6) MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT THE PACOM THEATER WILL BE

ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE USE OF AMC WHENEVER POSSIBLE. (7) JFAS ARE PLANNED ON SEVERAL VARIABLES TO INCLUDE

WEATHER, LOGISTICS, SITE ACCESSIBILITY, KNOWN RECOVERY AND PROJECTED INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS, AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS. JFA DATES AND TASK ORGANIZATION MAY BE ADJUSTED BASED ON PREVIOUS FIELD ACTIVITIES OR NEW INFORMATION. CHANGES TO OPLAN FY99 WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN SUBSEQUENT WARNING AND FRAG ORDERS.

(8) D-DAY IS DAY OF FIRST SORTIE ARRIVAL INTO COUNTRY OF OPERATION. DATES WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND PUBLISHED FOR EACH OPERATION IN SUBSEQUENT WARNING AND FRAG ORDERS.

(9) ENDOP IS DAY OF LAST SORTIE DEPARTURE FROM COUNTRY OF OPERATION.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. SEE ANNEX D.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. SEE ANNEXES J AND K.

6. ANNEXES:

A. TASK ORGANIZATION - OMITTED

**B. INTELLIGENCE** 

(1) SITUATION

(A) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA

((1)) SRV. SRV IS GOVERNED BY THE VIETNAMESE

COMMUNIST PARTY'S (VCP) RULING BODY, THE POLITBURO, WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENTAL ELEMENT AND SETS ALL NATIONAL POLICY. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS THE HIGHEST REPRESENTATIVE BODY IN THE COUNTRY, WITH 170 ELECTED MEMBERS. THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION WAS RATIFIED IN 1992. SRV'S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) IS US \$108 BILLION, WITH A PER CAPITA INCOME OF US \$1470. THE REAL GROWTH RATE IN SRV IS 9.5 PERCENT AND THE MAY 98 RATE WAS 12,960 DONG (D) TO ONE US DOLLAR. THE COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL EXPORTS ARE RICE, TEA, TEXTILES AND CRUDE PETROLEUM, CASHEW NUTS, SILK YARN, IRON ORE, LEAD, TIN, COPPER AND SEAFOOD. SRV'S PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS ARE TAIWAN, JAPAN, SINGAPORE, FRANCE, HONG KONG, AND SOUTH KOREA. SRV'S POPULATION IS ESTIMATED AT APPROXIMATELY 75.1 MILLION WITH AN AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF 1.5 PERCENT. SRV IS APPROXIMATELY 325,360 SQ KM. THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL WATERS EXTEND 12 NAUTICAL MILES AND VIETNAM CLAIMS AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF 200 NAUTICAL MILES. VIETNAM IS 70 PERCENT BUDDHIST, 10 PERCENT ROMAN CATHOLIC, WITH THE REMAINING 20 PERCENT OF THE NATION BEING MADE UP OF CONFUCIANISM, TAOISM, AND OTHERS RELIGIONS. ETHNICALLY THE NATION IS COMPOSED OF 85-90 PERCENT VIETNAMESE, 03 PERCENT CHINESE, AND 07 PERCENT ETHNIC MINORITIES THAT INCLUDE MUONG, THAI, MEO, KHMER, MAN, AND CHAM.

((2)) LPDR. LPDR IS A ONE PARTY STATE RULED BY THE LAO PEOPLE S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (LPRP). THERE IS AN OVERLAP OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT HIERARCHIES, WITH THE FORMER HAVING PRECEDENCE OVER THE LATTER; E.G., THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY IS ALSO THE PRIME MINISTER. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO ACT AS MINISTERS TO THE THIRTEEN MINISTRIES. AGAIN, POWER IS CONCENTRATED IN THE PARTY S CENTRAL COMMITTEE. LPDR'S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OR PURCHASING POWER WAS ESTIMATED IN 1997 AT US \$8 BILLION. THE REAL GROWTH RATE IN LPDR IS 6.9 PERCENT AND THE CURRENT EXCHANGE RATE IS ABOUT 2400 KIP (K) TO ONE US DOLLAR. LPDR IS AN EXTREMELY POOR COUNTRY. SINCE 1986, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ABANDONED IN PART, ITS SOCIALIST ECONOMIC AGENDA. EGONOMIC REFORMS HAVE MOVED THE COUNTRY FROM A CENTRALLY PLANNED SYSTEM TO A GROWING, MARKET ECONOMY BEGINNING TO PERMIT FOREIGN INVESTMENT. THE POPULATION IS ESTIMATED AT APPROXIMATELY FIVE MILLION WITH AN ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF 2.9 PERCENT. LPDR IS APPROXIMATELY 236,804 SQ KM. THE COUNTRY IS LANDLOCKED AND HAS NO CLAIM TO ANY TERRITORIAL WATERS. LPDR IS 60 PERCENT BUDDHIST AND 40 PERCENT ANIMIST AND OTHER RELIGIONS. ETHNICALLY THE NATION IS COMPOSED OF 68 PERCENT LAO LOUM (LAO AND LOW), 22 PERCENT LAO THEUNG (HILL TRIBES) IN THE SOUTH, AND 10 PERCENT HMONG AND YAO IN THE NORTH.

((3)) KOC. THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT (RCG) IS A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY WITH A CONSTITUTIONALLY APPOINTED KING. THE GOVERNMENT IS COMPOSED OF 18 MINISTRIES, HEADED BY TWO PRIME MINISTERS, ONE, FROM THE UNITED FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL, PEACEFUL AND COOPERATIVE CAMBODIA (FUNCINPEC) PARTY AND THE SECOND, FROM THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CPP). THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (CNA) HAS 120 SEATS FILLED BY POPULAR ELECTION. IN JULY 1998, THE KOC IS SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT COMMUNAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS. POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAS OCCURRED THROUGHOUT 1996 AND 1997 AND WILL LIKELY CONTINUE PRIOR TO AND DURING THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS. KOC'S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) IS US \$6.4 BILLION, WITH A PER CAPITA INCOME OF US \$200. THE COUNTRY EXPERIENCES A 4.7 PERCENT INFLATION RATE, THE REAL GROWTH RATE IN KOC IS SIX PERCENT AND THE EXCHANGE RATE IS 3500 RIEL TO ONE US DOLLAR. THE COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL EXPORTS ARE NATURAL RUBBER, RICE, PEPPER, AND TIMBER. KOC'S PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS ARE THAILAND, JAPAN, SINGAPORE, HONK KONG. AND INDONESIA. THE POPULATION IS ESTIMATED AT APPROXIMATELY 10.3 MILLION WITH AN AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF 2.8 PERCENT. KOC COVERS APPROXIMATELY 176,520 SQ KM, SLIGHTLY SMALLER THAN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA. THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL WATERS EXTEND OUT 12 NAUTICAL MILES AND KOC CLAIMS AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF 200 NAUTICAL MILES. KOC IS 95 PERCENT THERAVADA BUDDHIST AND 5 PERCENT OTHER RELIGIONS. ETHNICALLY, THE NATION IS COMPOSED OF 90 PERCENT KHMER, 5 PERCENT VIETNAMESE, 1 PERCENT CHINESE, AND 4 PERCENT OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES.

(B) TOPOGRAPHY AND WEATHER. AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST (AUR)

(C) ESTIMATE OF THREAT

((1)) SRV. THE OVERALL TERRORIST THREAT TO US PERSONNEL OPERATING IN SRV IS NEGLIGIBLE. CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IS

LISTED AS HIGH IN HO CHI MINH CITY AND MEDIUM IN HANOI, UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE REMAINS THE MOST ACUTE DANGER TO ALL DEPLOYED PERSONNEL. RECOVERY TEAMS REMAIN AT THE HEAVIEST RISK DUE TO THE NATURE OF THEIR MISSION; (E.G. EXCAVATING IN THE HEAVILY BOMBED PROVINCE OF QUANG BINH). SECONDARY POTENTIAL THREAT PRECIPITATES FROM ANIMOSITY FROM LOCAL POPULATIONS TOWARD AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PRESENCE. TEAMS ARE CAUTIONED TO STRICTLY ADHERE TO ALL HOST COUNTRY LAWS AND CULTURAL CUSTOMS. DEPLOYED PERSONNEL SHOULD EXERCISE DISCRETION AND TRAVEL IN GROUPS OF TWO OR MORE AT ALL TIMES. CURRENTLY THERE ARE NO KNOWN DOMESTIC OR TRANS-NATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN SRV. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT US PERSONNEL ARE SPECIFICALLY TARGETED BY CRIMINAL ELEMENTS, HOWEVER, COMMON FORMS OF CRIME AFFECTING US PERSONNEL IN SRV ARE PICK POCKETING AND THE THEFT OF EASILY ACCESSIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY. PETTY CRIME IS A PROBLEM IN HO CHI MINH CITY. PETTY THEFT, BRIEFCASE AND PURSE SNATCHING SHOULD BE EXPECTED, PARTICULARLY ON THE CITY'S MAIN STREETS AND AROUND MAJOR HOTELS. ASSAULTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN OUTLYING AREAS. SOME PEDICAB DRIVERS HAVE REPORTEDLY KIDNAPPED PASSENGERS AND EXTORTED MONEY.

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#0001 NNNN

OTTUZDKW RUHEMAD0002 1661701-UUUU--RUHPSUU. ZNR UUUUU O P 151701Z JUN 98 ZDK FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J3// **TO AIG 960** INFO USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB ILI/TCJ3-ODJ// HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//SAAM// HQ AMC TACC COMMAND CENTER SCOTT AFB IL//XOOZ/TRKX// NAVCSRF HONOLULU HI//PW-MIA// CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/N6/N45/NOIM/N1/N13// COMMARFORPAC//G1/G3/G6// CG | MEF//G1/G6// CG III MEF//G1/G6// **USARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI** HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI/DO/SGX/SGO/SGN PACAF AOS HICKAM AFB HI//AOM/AOP// 15ABW HICKAM AFB HI//CC/LG// 15LGS HICKAM AFB HI//CC/LGSM// FISC PEARL HARBOR HI//OO// 374OG YOKOTA AB JA//CC// 374OSS YOKOTA AB JA//OSO/OSOO// 374AW YOKOTA AB JA//OCO// 374AES YOKOTA AB JA//SG/AO/AOE// **BUMED WASHINGTON DC//27//** AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO// INFO USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC 13AF ANDERSEN AFB GU//CC/LG// CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP-OP/APLG-MV/APLG-MU-EODCT// CDR703MIBDE OPS KUNIA HI RSOC KUNIA HI//J342/JOC/J3M3/J3W// CDR205THMIBN FT SHAFTER HI//IAGPD// 150SS HICKAM AFB HI//DOX// 635 AMSS HICKAM AFB HI//DO/DOCO/DOX// JFMO PAC HONOLULU HI 354MDG EIELSON AK//SGOAR// COMNAVSURFRESFOR OPS FLTSUPP NEW ORLEANS LA//N3// COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N10// BT UNCLAS //N03460// PART ONE OF THREE-PART TWO IDENT IS 151701Z JUN 98-PART THREE IDENT IS 151702Z JUN 98 MSGID/GENADMIN/JTF-FA/1-99/MAY// SUBJ/JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING OPLAN 1-99// REF/A/RMG/CJCS/082354ZJAN92// REF/B/RMG/CJCS/222300ZJAN92// REF/C/RMG/CJCS/020046ZNOV91// REF/D/DOC/USCINCPAC// REF/E/RMG/SECDEF/061158ZAUG93// REF/F/RMG/USCINCPAC/5080-93// NARR/REF A IS CJCS ALERT ORDER. REF B IS CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. REF C IS CJCS PLANNING ORDER. REF D IS USCINCPAC/DIA MOU DEFINING RELATIONSHIP FOR POW-MIA OPS. REF E IS REORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL POW-MIA OPERATIONS. REF F IS USCINCPAC OPORD FOR EXPANDED POW-MIA **OPERATIONS IN SE ASIA, OPERATION FULL ACCOUNTING.//** POC/<sup>(b) (6)</sup> /DJ3(PLANS)/JTF-FA/CAMP SMITH, HI/TEL:DSN 477-3001/ TEL:FAX DSN 477-5501// POC/(b) (6) 'DJ3(AIR)/JTF-FA/CAMP SMITH, HI/TEL:DSN 477-3001// RMKS/ ((3)) KOC. THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT (RCG) IS A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY WITH A CONSTITUTIONALLY APPOINTED KING. THE GOVERNMENT IS COMPOSED OF 18 MINISTRIES, HEADED BY TWO PRIME

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((3)) KOC. OVERALL THREAT TO US PERSONNEL OPERATING IN CAMBODIA VARIES BY AREA. THE PRIMARY THREATS ARE MINES, UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE, AND INADVERTENT INVOLVEMENT IN FACTIONAL VIOLENCE. DETERIORATING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS HAVE RESULTED IN INCREASED CRIME THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. CRIMINAL DANGER EXISTS, BOTH IN URBAN AREAS SUCH AS PHNOM PENH AND SIHANOUKVILLE AND WHILE TRAVELING BETWEEN URBAN AREAS. US PERSONNEL SHOULD EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE CAUTION WHILE TRAVELING WITHIN CAMBODIA. WHILE THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT US PERSONNEL ARE DIRECTLY TARGETED, TERRORIST ACTIONS COULD INADVERTENTLY INVOLVE AMERICANS WHO ARE IN THE WRONG PLACE AT THE WRONG TIME. TEAMS ARE CAUTIONED TO STRICTLY ADHERE TO ALL HOST COUNTRY LAWS, CULTURAL CUSTOMS AND JTF-FA STANDARDS OF CONDUCT.

((4)) THAILAND. THE OVERALL TERRORIST THREAT TO US INTEREST IN THAILAND IS ASSESSED AS LOW. THE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DIRECT THREAT TO US/DOD INTERESTS IN THAILAND. THE CRIMINAL THREAT IS ASSESSED AS MEDIUM. ROBBERY, PETTY THEFT, PICK POCKETING, DRIVE-BY PURSE SNATCHINGS COMMITTED BY CRIMINALS ON MOTORCYCLES AND THEFTS BY PROSTITUTES ARE COMMON CRIMES AFFECTING WESTERNERS IN THAILAND. REPORTS HAVE CITED SEVERAL DRUGGINGS OF US PERSONNEL BY STREET PERSONS AND SUBSEQUENT THEFTS OF CASH AND VALUABLES. TEAMS ARE CAUTIONED TO STRONGLY ADHERE TO HOST COUNTRY LAWS, CULTURAL CUSTOMS AND JTF-FA STANDARDS OF CONDUCT.

C. OPERATIONS

(1) GENERAL. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ANNEX AND ITS APPENDICES IS TO FURTHER AMPLIFY AND TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE MISSION AS PRESCRIBED IN THE BASIC PLAN. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS ENCOMPASSED BY THIS PLAN INCLUDES THE LAND, SEA, AND AIRSPACE OF THOSE HNS AS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED.

(2) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. SEE BASIC PLAN.

(3) MANEUVER. SEE BASIC PLAN.

(4) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS FOR THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN ARE HIGHLIGHTED BELOW.

(A) HOST NATION. JTF-FA IS LIMITED BY HN TO THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IT CAN INTRODUCE INTO A COUNTRY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING A JFA. ADDITIONALLY, HN MAY LIMIT THE NUMBERS OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A GIVEN PROVINCE OR MAY REQUIRE A SPECIFIC SEQUENCE IN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS. COMMUNICATIONS ARE RESTRICTED IN SOME COUNTRIES AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS NOT ALWAYS IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THE TEAMS OPERATING IN SE ASIA. WHILE HN POLICIES ARE OFTEN CUMBERSOME, THEY DO ALLOW FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION.

(B) ENVIRONMENTAL. ANOTHER CONSTRAINT IS THE ENVIRONMENT IN FORMS OF WEATHER, TERRAIN, AND WILDLIFE. DUE TO THE INHERENT WEATHER PATTERNS OF SE ASIA, ROUGHLY ONE THIRD OF THE YEAR IS NOT FAVORABLE TO OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, DUE TO MISSION AND HN POLICY REQUIREMENTS, JTF-FA MUST MAXIMIZE ALL AVAILABLE TIME. LOCATIONS OF MANY SITES ARE IN INACCESSIBLE TERRAIN, DEEP GORGES, RAVINES OR ARE UNDERWATER, THEREBY HAMPERING RECOVERY OPERATIONS. WILDLIFE SUCH AS POISONOUS SNAKES, MOSQUITOES, AND VERMIN ARE NUMEROUS AND CARRY POTENTIALLY LIFE THREATENING DISEASES.

(C) TIME. TIME IS PERHAPS THE MOST SERIOUS CONSTRAINT ON THE OPERATIONAL SUCCESS AND MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE JTF. AS TIME PASSES, WITNESSES DIE OR THEIR MEMORIES FADE, CRASH SITES ARE SCAVENGED AND REMAINS DECAY. IT IS THEREFORE MOST IMPERATIVE THAT THE JTF WORK QUICKLY YET DILIGENTLY IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF THOSE MISSING PERSONNEL.

(5) APPENDICES:

1 - OPERATIONS SCHEDULE FOR JFAS

(A) PLANNED JFA OPERATIONS FOR FY99

03 NOV-05 DEC 98
23 FEB-27 MAR 99
04 MAY-05 JUN 99
13 JUL-14 AUG 99
21 SEP-23 OCT 99
E S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
01 OCT-31 OCT 98
12 JAN-11 FEB 99

- 99-3L 09 MAR-07 APR 99
- 99-4L O8 JUN-10 JUL 99
- 99-5L 17 AUG-18 SEP 99
- ((3)) KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA NONE SCHEDULED. INVESTIGATIONS AND EXCAVATIONS CONDUCTED AS REQUIRED.

(B) PLANNED UNILATERAL PERIODS

- ((1)) VIETNAM
  - 05-23 OCT 98
  - 10-30 DEC 98
  - 09-30 JAN 99
- ((2)) LAO PEOPLE S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
  - 15-25 NOV 98
  - 10-20 DEC 98
- 2 TECHNICAL AND CONSULTATIVE TALKS SCHEDULE (AUR)
- 3 JOINT FORENSIC REVIEW AND REPATRIATION SCHEDULE (AUR)
- 4 MISSION PLANNING MILESTONES (AUR)
- 5 PROPOSED C-141/C-17, KC-130, AND C-130 DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE (AUR)
- 6 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE OPERATIONS (AUR)
- 7 STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (AUR)
- 8 COMPONENT COMMAND PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS (A) PURPOSE
  - ((1)) THIS APPENDIX IDENTIFIES THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION BY THE USCINCPAC COMPONENT COMMANDS IN SUPPORT OF JTF-FA OPERATIONS FOR FY99. ITS PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE SUPPORTING COMMANDS WITH A LIST OF KNOWN REQUIREMENTS FOR BUDGET AND MANPOWER PLANNING.

((2)) APPENDIX 9 TO THIS ANNEX IS A CHECKLIST FOR THE SUPPORTING COMMAND TO ENSURE AUGMENTEES TO JTF-FA ARE ADMINISTRATIVELY PREPARED, PROPERLY EQUIPPED, FISCALLY READY AND PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF DEPLOYING TO SE ASIA.

((3)) IF REQUIRED, CHANGES IN PERSONNEL

AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PUBLISHED IN SUBSEQUENT WARNING AND FRAG ORDERS.

(B) RANK AND PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS

((1)) AUGMENTEES SHOULD RANK FROM E5 TO E8.

THERE IS NO RANK REQUIREMENT FOR MEDICAL OFFICERS ASSIGNED IN SUPPORT OF LPDR MEDCAP MISSIONS.

((2)) THERE ARE NO GENDER SPECIFIC AUGMENTEE

BILLETS.

((3)) AUGMENTEES MUST BE IN TOP PHYSICAL CONDITION. THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO OPERATE UNDER AUSTERE AND RIGOROUS FIELD CONDITIONS AND CAPABLE OF CARRYING A HEAVY RUCKSACK FOR EXTENDED DISTANCES IN RUGGED MOUNTAINOUS AND JUNGLE TERRAIN.

((4)) PERSONNEL WITH A HISTORY OF HEAT STROKE/ EXHAUSTION SHOULD NOT BE SELECTED AS AN AUGMENTEE.

(C) MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS

((1)) IMMUNIZATIONS. DEPLOYING PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMMUNIZATIONS: PLAGUE, JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS, RABIES, IMMUNE SERUM GLOBULIN, OR HEPATITIS A VACCINE (HARVRIX), AND TYPHOID. ADDITIONALLY, A G6PD SCREEN IS ALSO REQUIRED. TB PPD REQUIRED BEFORE DEPLOYMENT AND 8-12 WEEKS AFTER DEPLOYMENT. VERIFICATION OF IMMUNIZATIONS WILL OCCUR NO LATER THAN D-15.

((2))MALARIA PROPHYLAXIS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED BY JTF-FA MEDICAL PERSONNEL PRIOR TO AND UPON RETURN FROM SE ASIA.

(D) PERSONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS. SEE APPENDIX 9, ANNEX C. ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOT AVAILABLE AT HOME STATION SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED TO JOINT TASK FORCE J-4 14 DAYS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IN HAWAII.

(E) ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

### ((1)) REPORTING PROCEDURES

((A)) AUGMENTEES WILL REPORT TO HONOLULU VIA COMMERCIAL AIR OR AVAILABLE AMC AIRCRAFT. JTF-FA PERSONNEL WILL TRANSPORT AUGMENTEES TO DESIGNATED BILLETING. MEDICAL AUGMENTEES WILL REPORT NLT D-13 IN ORDER TO ATTEND TRAUMA TRAINING. ALL OTHER AUGMENTEES WILL REPORT NLT D-9.

((B)) UNIFORM WHILE AT JTF-FA HQ AND IS BDU/CAMMIES OR SERVICE EQUIVALENT. CIVILIAN ATTIRE IS REQUIRED FOR DUTY IN SE ASIA.

((C)) SUPPORTING COMMANDS ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE ALL TRANSPORTATION COSTS TO AND FROM HOME BASE AND HONOLULU AND PER DIEM THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT. RENTAL CARS ARE RECOMMENDED FOR AUGMENTEES DURING PRE DEPLOYMENT INPROCESSING WHILE IN HAWAII.

((D)) AUGMENTEES ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE FULL ADVANCE PER DIEM, IN CASH, PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IN HONOLULU. COUNTRIES OF OPERATIONS RARELY ACCEPT TRAVELERS CHECKS, CASHIER'S CHECKS OR CREDIT CARDS. DAILY PER DIEM RATES ARE:

CAMP SMITH, HAWAII \$180.00 PATTAYA, THAILAND \$40.00 LPDR \$ 51.00 KOC \$115.00 SRV \$130.00 \$275.00 GUAM

KOC AUGMENTEES REQUIRE ROUGHLY \$4200 PLUS HAWAII COSTS LPDR AUGMENTEES REQUIRE ROUGHLY \$4800 PLUS HAWAII COSTS SRV AUGMENTEES REQUIRE ROUGHLY \$6000 PLUS HAWAII COSTS

((2)) PASSPORTS

((A)) ALL PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO POSSESS EITHER A TOURIST OR OFFICIAL PASSPORT. IF SELECTED PERSONNEL DO NOT HAVE PASSPORTS, THE INDIVIDUAL MUST OBTAIN ONE AND HAVE IN HIS POSSESSION AT LEAST 30 DAYS PRIOR TO REPORTING TO JTF-FA.

((B)) PASSPORTS MUST CONTAIN FIVE BLANK PAGES AND HAVE AT LEAST SIX MONTHS REMAINING UNTIL DATE OF EXPIRATION.

((C)) AUGMENTEES MUST POSSESS 6 PASSPORT PHOTOGRAPHS FOR VISA PROCESSING.

((3)) BELOW ARE PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS BY **COMPONENT FOR FY99:** 

	MEDIC	AL PEF	RSON	INEL			
MISSION	CINCP	ACFLT	US	ARPAC	SOCPA	C PACAF	7
99-1L	2		1	1/1A			
53RD JFA	3		3	3			
99-2L	1/1A		2	1			
54TH JFA	3		3	3			
99-3L	1	1A	1	2			
55TH JFA	2/1A		3	3 3			
99-4L	2		1	1/1A			
56TH JFA	3		3	3			
99-5L	1/1A		2	1			
57TH JFA	3		3	3			
CAMBODIA							Constant and and and and and
@ - REQUI	RESAM	IEDICA	L DO	CTOR FO	OR MEDI	CAL CAPA	BILITIES
PROGRA	M						
COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL							
MISSION	MA	RFORP	AC	CINCPA	CFLT L	JSARPAC	PACAF
99-1L	2/1A						

MISSION	MARFORPAC	CINCPACFLT	USARPAC	PACAF
99-1L	2/1A			
53RD JFA	6/2A			
99-2L		2/1A		
54TH JFA		6/2A		

99-3L 2/1A 55TH JFA 6/2A 99-4L 2/1A 56TH JFA 6/2A 98-5L 2/1A 57TH JFA 2/1A CAMBODIA\* 3/1 LIFE SUPPORT TECHNICIANS MISSION CINCPACFLT PACAF 99-1L 3 53RD JFA 4 99-2L 3 54TH JFA 4 99-3L 3 55TH JFA 4 99-4L 3 56TH JFA 4 99-5L 3 57TH JFA 4 2 CAMBODIA\* EOD PERSONNEL

MARFORPAC CINCPACFLT USARPAC PACAF CILHI 99-1L 1/1A 1 1/1A 1 53RD JFA 2/1A 3/1A 99-2L 1 2 /1A 1/1A 54TH JFA 1 2 1/2A 2 99-3L 2 1/1A 1 /1A 55TH JFA 3/1A 1/1A 2 99-4L 1 2/1A /1A 1 56TH JFA 2/1A 1 /1A 3 1 99-5L 1 1/1A 1/1A 57TH JFA 1/1A 2/1A 2 1 CAMBODIA 1 1 /1A

A - DENOTES ALTERNATES IN THE EVENT A PRIMARY CANDIDATE IS UNABLE TO DEPLOY WITH THE MISSION. ALTERNATES MUST BE FULLY PREPARED TO GO AND ALL PASSPORT DATA FORWARDED TO JTF AS IF DEPLOYING WITH THE MAIN BODY FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE PURPOSES.

CAMBODIA\* - ANY MISSION IN CAMBODIA WILL BE IDENTIFIED AT A LATER DATE, HOWEVER AUGMENTEE PROJECTIONS ARE INDICATED FOR FISCAL AND PERSONNEL PLANNING. MOST LIKELY DATES WILL BE BETWEEN JANUARY AND MAY 1999.

9 - AUGMENTEE REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST

((A)) PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS APPENDIX IS TO PROVIDE THE INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE WITH A CHECKLIST IN PREPARATION FOR DEPLOYMENT TO SE ASIA.

((B)) TRAINING

TOP PHYSICAL CONDITION CAN CARRY A 30 LB PACK 10 KM WITHIN 1 HR 45 MIN CAN OPERATE IN AUSTERE ENVIRONMENT FOR 30 DAYS HAS RECEIVED TERRORISM AWARENESS TRAINING CAN PERFORM DROWN PROOF TRAINING

((C)) MEDICAL

NO MEDICAL PROFILE BLOOD TYPE VERIFICATION CURRENTLY NOT ON MEDICATION WHICH REQUIRES AVOIDING DIRECT SUNLIGHT NO PRIOR HISTORY OF HEAT STROKE/EXHAUSTION HAS REQUIRED MEDICAL ALERT TAGS

Page 14 of 29

G6PD ENZYME SCREENING **RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING IMMUNIZATIONS** PLAGUE JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS RABIES IMMUNE SERUM GLOBULIN OR HEPATITIS A VACCINE **ORAL POLIO BOOSTER** TB PPD PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT **TB PPD 8-12 WEEKS AFTER RE DEPLOYMENT BEGIN MALARIA PROPHYLAXIS (AT JTF-FA)** COMPLETE MALARIA PROPHYLAXIS AT HOME STATION ((D)) ADMINISTRATION TWO IDENTIFICATION TAGS UPON NOTIFICATION OF ASSIGNMENT TO AUGMENT JTF-FA MISSION, INDIVIDUAL IMMEDIATELY CONTACTS JTF-FA AND PROVIDES THE FOLLOWING PASSPORT DATA TO JTF-FA/J3 ADMIN 808 477-7121 DSN 477-7121 FULL NAME DATE OF BIRTH SSN PLACE OF BIRTH **BRANCH OF SERVICE** PASSPORT PLACE OF ISSUE PASSPORT ISSUE DATE PASSPORT EXPIRATION DATE LEVEL OF SECURITY CLEARANCE POSSESSES 6 PASSPORT PHOTOS **PASSPORT CONTAINS A MINIMUM 5 BLANK PAGES** UNIT ORDERS TELL INDIVIDUAL TO REPORT TO JTF-FA ORDERS INDICATE THAT GOVERNMENT MESSING AND **BILLETING ARE NOT AVAILABLE** JTF-FA NOTIFIED OF FLIGHT ITINERARY TO HONOLULU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT OR HICKAM AFB FLIGHT AIRLINE ARRIVAL TIME INDIVIDUAL HAS RECEIVED FULL TRAVEL ADVANCE AND HAS THE CASH IN HAND ((E)) MEDICAL AUGMENTEES ARRIVE TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM HICKAM IN ORDER TO COMPLETE REQUIRED TRAINING ((F)) ALL OTHER AUGMENTEES ARRIVE SUNDAY PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT ((G)) PERSONAL EQUIPMENT FLASHLIGHT LEATHER WORK GLOVES 2 X PADLOCKS DUFFEL BAG(S) RUCK SACK (MIL ISSUE) OR BACK PACK (CIV TYPE) CIV WET WEATHER PARKA/TROUSERS (NO CAMOUFLAGE) PONCHO LINER SLEEPING BAG (CHECK WITH JTF-FA FOR AREA OF **OPERATION AND SEASONAL REQUIREMENT)** WATERPROOF BAG(S) COMPASS INSECT REPELLENT/BAR/BARRIER NET KNIFE/MULTI-PLIER TOOL OTHER FIELD EQUIPMENT TO SUSTAIN BASE CAMP OR FIELD OPERATIONS **CIVILIAN ATTIRE FOR FIELD OPERATIONS CIVILIAN ATTIRE FOR LIBERTY** 

BDU S/CAMMIES FOR DUTY WHILE AT JTF-FA HEADQUARTERS

((H)) BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE. AUGMENTEES ARE AUTHORIZED 325 LBS OF TOTAL BAGGAGE WEIGHT ALLOWANCE. THIS INCLUDES FOOTLOCKERS, CHECKED BAGGAGE, FOOD, AND CARRY ON ITEMS.

10 - RISK AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT (AUR)

11 - OPERATIONS SECURITY (AUR)

D. LOGISTICS

(1) REFERENCES (UAR).

(2) SITUATION. PER BASIC OPLAN.

(3) MISSION. PER BASIC OPLAN.

(4) EXECUTION. PER BASE OPLAN.

(A) CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

((1)) PHASE I: PREPARATION PHASE. ALL OFF-ISLAND AUGMENTEES WILL RESIDE IN DESIGNATED GOVERMENT APPROVED LODGING UNTIL DEPLOYMENT TO SE ASIA. EQUIPMENT NOT AVAILABLE AT HOME STATION IS DRAWN ON A BY EXCEPTION BASIS IN HAWAII WITH NOTIFICATION TO JFA-FA/J4 NLT D-21. ALL PERSONAL FOOTLOCKERS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLIES NOT PREPOSITIONED AT THE U TAPAO WAREHOUSE, ARE PALLETIZED AT HICKHAM AFB PER REF A.

((2)) PHASE II: DEPLOYMENT TO THAILAND. SAAM UPON APPROVAL IN UTAPAO AIRCRAFT IS UNLOADED FOR RECONFIGURATION FOR FOLLOW ON SAAM FLIGHT AIRCRAFT (A/C) PER REF A. TEAMS DRAW REQUIRED PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT FROM U TAPAO WAREHOUSE. CILHI NCOIC PREPARES EQUIPMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT INTO COUNTRY. ALL DEPLOYMENT A/C ARE SAAM. RESUPPLY FLIGHTS ARE CHANNEL (CHNL) MISSIONS.

((3)) PHASE III: DEPLOYMENT TO COUNTRY OF OPERATION. TEAMS UNLOAD SAAM A/C AND INVENTORY/PREPARE EQUIPMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT TO FIELD SITES. DETS PREPOSITION EQUIPMENT STORED IN HN AT FIELD SITE OR PREPARE EQUIPMENT FOR TRANSPORTATION TO FIELD SITE.

((4)) PHASE IV: FIELD OPERATIONS. DETS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATION OF ALL SUPPORT REQUIRED BY TEAMS AT COUNTRY SITES. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED PRIMARILY THROUGH HN SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS VIA LOCAL CONTRACTS AND BLANKET PURCHASE AGREEMENTS.

((5)) PHASE V: REDEPLOYMENT TO THAILAND. TEAMS CLEAN, INVENTORY, AND TURN IN EQUIPMENT DRAWN IN COUNTRY AND PREPARE ALL OTHER EQUIPMENT FOR RETURN ON SAAM A/C PER REF A. AN INVENTORY LIST OF CONSUMED SUPPLIES AND MAINTENANCE REPORTS IDENTIFYING NON MISSION CAPABLE EQUIPMENT ARE SUBMITTED TO DET ADMIN PERSONNEL FOR RESUPPLY AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS NLT ENDOP-1.

((6)) PHASE VI: REDEPLOYMENT TO HAWAII. TEAMS OFFLOAD SAAM A/C AND PREPARE FOR TURN IN OF PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT TO WAREHOUSE NCOIC. INVENTORY AND MAINTENANCE FORMS ARE COMPLETED ON ALL PERSONAL FOOTLOCKERS AND EQUIPMENT FOR TURN IN TO UTAPAO WAREHOUSE. ALL OTHER EQUIPMENT IS PALLETIZED PER REF A FOR FOLLOW ON SAAM A/C. LIFE SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS ARE COORDINATED BY DET 1.

((7)) PHASE VII: POST DEPLOYMENT. TEAMS OFFLOAD CARGO, BREAK DOWN PALLETS, CONDUCT EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE AND INVENTORY OF ALL PERSONAL AND MISSION EQUIPMENT. ISSUED EQUIPMENT IS RETURNED TO ISSUE POINT. LOSSES ARE REPORTED PER REF A OF ANNEX D.

(B) TASKS. JTF-FA DETACHMENT COMMANDERS

((1)) COORDINATE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICS CONCEPTS WITH HNS AND PROPOSE ADJUSTMENTS TO WORK PLAN BASED ON HN APPROVAL. ((2)) COORDINATE BILLETING FOR TEAMS WHILE IN HN.

((2)) COORDINATE BILLETING FOR TEAMS WHILE IN HN. ((3)) DEVELOP WATER PLAN AND PURCHASE BOTTLED WATER

TO SUPPORT TEAMS DURING OPERATIONS.

((4)) COORDINATE GROUND/AIR TRANSPORTATION, TO INCLUDE CARGO TRUCKS, BOATS, HELICOPTERS AND VEHICLES TO TRANSPORT RECOVERY EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO AND FROM SITES AS REQUIRED.

((5)) PREPARE AND PREPOSITION RECOVERY TEAM EQUIPMENT.

((6)) COORDINATE WITH HN FOR LABORERS DURING OPERATIONS.

((7)) ASSIST TEAM LEADERS AND HQ JTF-FA IN THE COORDINATION AND PAYMENT OF HN REIMBURSABLE COSTS.

((8)) SUBMIT HELICOPTER TRACKING MATRIX DAILY DURING JFAS AS PART OF THE DAILY SITREP. SEE APPENDIX 1.

((9)) MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF FIVE CASES OF MRE'S FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES. DET 1 WILL MAINTAIN SE ASIA EMERGENCY STOCKS AT U'TAPAO WAREHOUSE.

((10)) REVIEW AND CERTIFY INVOICES AS APPLICABLE.

((11)) MAINTAIN APPLICABLE BUDGET LOGS.

((12)) ADHERE TO BUDGET GUIDANCE INSTRUCTION PER REF

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(C) CLASSES OF SUPPLY

((1)) CLASS I. (SUBSISTENCE)

((A)) PHASES I THROUGH III. COMMERCIAL DINING

FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE ON ISLAND FOR AUGMENTEES. PERSONNEL MAY PURCHASE SUBSISTENCE ITEMS IN HAWAII FOR CONSUMPTION WHILE DEPLOYED TO SE ASIA. SUBSISTENCE MAY BE PACKAGED IN ONE OR MORE FOOTLOCKERS. FOOTLOCKERS SHALL NOT EXCEED 125 LBS FOR SAFETY REASONS. FOOTLOCKERS ARE MARKED IAW REF A AND PALLETIZED FOR MILAIR MOVEMENT WITH DEPLOYING PERSONNEL INTO HNS. ADDITIONAL FOOD STUFFS MAY BE PURCHASED IN THAILAND FOR TRANSPORT INTO COUNTRY OF OPERATION.

((B)) PHASES III THROUGH V. VERY LITTLE SUBSISTENCE IS AVAILABLE WITHIN HNS THROUGH COMMERCIAL FACILITIES. JTF-FA MEMBERS AND AUGMENTEES WILL DEPLOY WITH 30 DOS FOOD SUPPLIES. PRECAUTIONS FOR SUBSISTENCE AND WATER ARE LISTED IN JTF-FA APPN 8 OF ANNEX C. BOTTLED WATER IS PROVIDED BY DET 1 AT U'TAPAO WAREHOUSE DURING OFFLOAD OF SAAM A/C AND ONLOAD OF SAAM A/C INTO HNS. TEAM LEADERS WILL DRAW REQUIRED EMERGENCY MRE'S FROM U'TAPAO WAREHOUSE NCOIC FOR DEPLOYMENT INTO HNS. DURING DEPLOYMENTS, INDIVIDUALS WILL SUBSIST ON FOOD STORES FROM PACKED FOOTLOCKERS WHILE OPERATING IN REMOTE LOCATIONS AND/OR FROM COMMERCIAL FACILITIES WHEN AVAILABLE. BOTTLED WATER IS PROVIDED AND COORDINATED BY DETACHMENTS. ALL MRE'S ISSUED BY TEAM LEADERS TO INDIVIDUALS ARE ACCOUNTED FOR AND APPROPRIATE DEDUCTIONS ARE MADE FROM PERSONNEL ON PER DIEM.

((C)) PHASES VI AND VII. UNCONSUMED MRE'S ARE RETURNED TO U TAPAO WAREHOUSE NCOIC. RESUPPLY ACTIONS ARE FORWARDED BY DET 1 LOG OIC.

((2)) CLASS II (INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT)

((A)) PHASES I THROUGH III. DEPLOYING

PERSONNEL WILL PACKAGE INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT PER APPENDIX 2 WITH NO MORE THAN A TOTAL WEIGHT LIMIT OF 225 LBS OF MISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT/PERSONAL GEAR. AUGMENTEES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYING ON A FIRST MISSION OR REDEPLOYING FROM FINAL MISSIONS ARE AUTHORIZED AN ADDITIONAL 100 LBS. SEE APPENDIX 9, ANNEX C. AUGMENTEES WILL DEPLOY FROM HOME STATION WITH MISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT. EQUIPMENT UNAVAILABLE AT HOME STATIONS IS DRAWN FROM CENTRAL ISSUE FACILITY (CIF) HAWAII OR FROM JTF-FA/J4 ON A BY EXCEPTION BASIS WITH 14 DAYS PRIOR NOTICE TO JTF-FA/J4. ALL EQUIPMENT IS PALLETIZED FOR MILAIR TRANSPORT WITH DEPLOYING PERSONNEL.

((B)) PHASES IV AND V. LIMITED INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE WITHIN HNS. PERSONNEL WITH GEAR STORED AT UTAPAO WAREHOUSE WILL PALLETIZE ADDITONAL EQUIPMENT PER REF A FOR MOVEMENT INTO HNS.

((C)) PHASES VI AND VII. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT IS CLEANED AND PACKAGED INSIDE FOOTLOCKERS. CHECKED BAGGAGE AND CARRY ON ITEMS ARE PACKED FOR REDEPLOYMENT ON MILAIR. APPLICABLE FOOTLOCKERS ARE STORED AT U'TAPAO WAREHOUSE. AUGMENTEE EQUIPMENT DRAWN FROM CIF HAWAII OR JTF-FA/J4 IS RETURNED. SEVENTY-TWO HOUR BAGS ARE DEPLOYED AND RE DEPLOYED TO AND FROM IN THE POSSESSION OF THE INDIVIDUAL. ((3)) CLASS III. (PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS)

((A)) PHASES I THORUGH III. DETS COORDINATE WITH HN FOR ESTIMATED FUEL REQUIRED FOR JFA. OIL AND LUBRICANT REQUIREMENTS NOT AVAILABLE IN HN ARE IDENTIFIED TO J4. THESE ITEMS ARE PALLETIZED PER REF A FOR TRANSPORT WITH DEPLOYING PERSONNEL.

((B)) PHASES IV AND V. PURCHASE OF VEHICLE AND AVIATION FUEL IS COORDINATED BY DETS. LIMITED PACKAGED POL IS AVAILABLE WITHIN HNS.

((C)) PHASES VI AND VII. NONE.

((4)) CLASS IV. CONSTRUTION MATERIALS

((A)) PHASES I THROUGH III. REQUIRIED

CONSTRUCTION ITEMS UNAVAILABLE OR TOO EXPENSIVE WITHIN HNS ARE IDENTIFIED TO J4. ITEMS ARE PURCHASED LOCALLY AND PALLETIZED FOR TRANSPORTION WITH DEPLOYING PERSONNEL. PREPOSITIONED ITEMS ARE STORED IN U'TAPAO WAREHOUSE, HANOI, AND SAVANNAHKET, LPDR. THERE ARE NO CLASS IV MATERIALS IN KOC.

((B)) PHASES IV AND V. REQUIRED MATERIALS ARE DRAWN BY TEAM LEADERS FROM UTAPAO WAREHOUSE TO AUGMENT PREPOSITIONED

MATERIALS WITHIN LAOS AND VIETNAM. MATERIALS ARE PALLETIZED FOR AIR TRANSPORT WITH PERSONNEL INTO HN. UNFORCASTED REQUIREMENTS ARE COORDINATED WITH DET AND PURCHASED WITHIN HN.

((C)) PHASES VI AND VII. ALL PREPOSITIONED MATERIALS IN SERVICEABLE CONDITION ARE RETURNED TO RESPECTIVE ISSUE POINTS WITHIN HN. PREPOSITIONED MATERIALS ARE PALLETIZED FOR AIR TRANSPORT WITH PERSONNEL TO U'TAPAO WAREHOUSE. SHORTAGES ARE IDENTIFIED TO THE DET LOGISTIC PERSONNEL FOR RESUPPLY.

((5)) CLASS V. (AMMUNITION)

((A)) PHASES I THROUGH III. DEMOLITIONS REQUIRED IN EXCESS OF QUANTITIES PREPOSITIONED AT UTAPAO AMMUNITION STORAGE POINT (ASP) AND VIENTIANE ARE FORWARDED TO J4 AND J3/EOD NCOIC. DEMO REQUIREMENTS ARE FORWARDED TO USARPAC AMMUNITION OFFICER. DEMO IS DRAWN FROM THEATER STOCKS IN JAPAN AND FORWARDED TO U TAPAO ASP VIA MILAIR.

((B)) PHASES IV AND V. EOD OPERATIONS WILL BE

IAW REF C.

((C)) PHASES VI AND VII. ALL UNCONSUMED CLASS V ARE RETURNED TO RESPECTIVE DETS FOR STORAGE. POC FOR ALL EOD OPERATIONS IS JTF-FA/J3 EOD REP.

((6)) CLASS VI. (PERSONAL DEMAND ITEMS)

((A)) PHASES I THROUGH III. ALL PERSONAL ITEMS ARE PACKAGED INTO INDIVIDUAL FOOTLOCKERS AND AUTHORIZED BAGGAGE IAW APPENDIX 2. ITEMS ARE PALLETIZED FOR MILAIR TRANSPORT WITH DEPLOYING PERSONNEL INTO HN.

((B)) PHASES IV THROUGH V. CLASS VI IS AVAILABLE WITHIN HNS BUT NOT IN REMOTE LOCATIONS.

((C)) PHASES VI AND VII. N/A

((7)) CLASS VII. (MAJOR END ITEMS).

((A)) PHASES I THROUGH III. ALL REQUIRED

TENTAGE, PUMPS, CHAINSAWS, GENERATORS, AND OTHER ITEMS IN EXCESS OF PREPOSITIONED ITEMS AT U TAPAO, HANOI, AND SAVANAHKET ARE IDENTIFIED BY TEAM LEADERS TO J4 OFFICE NLT D-30. IF ITEMS ARE REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF RE S, THEN SUBMIT REQUITSITIONS TO CILHI S-4. ITEMS ARE PALLETIZED FOR AIR TRANSPORT WITH DEPLOYING PERSONNEL.

((B)) PHASES IV AND V. TEAM LEADERS DRAW REQUIRED PREPOSITIONED ITEMS FROM U TAPAO WAREHOUSE THAT ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES OR AVAILABLE IN PREPOSITIONED STOCKS AT HANOI OR SAVANAKHET. PREPOSITIONED ITEMS ARE NOT MAINTAINED IN KOC. ITEMS DRAWN FROM UTAPAO WAREHOUSE ARE PALLETIZED FOR TRANSPORT ON MILAIR TO HNS. PREPOSITIONED ITEMS INSIDE HNS ARE DRAWN BY TEAM LEADERS AND TRANSPORTION IS COORDINATED BY DET. EMERGENCY ITEMS ARE PURCHASED IN HN IF AVAILABLE. ((C)) PHASES VI AND VII. ITEMS DRAWN FROM PREPOSITIONED STOCKS ARE RETURNED CLEAN AND IN SERVICEABLE CONDITION TO ISSUE POINTS. UNSERVICEABLE ITEMS ARE RETURNED CLEANED WITH MALFUNCTIONS IDENTIFIED TO DET ADMIN PERSONNEL FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION.

((8)) CLASS VIII. (MEDICAL). SEE ANNEX Q.

((9)) CLASS IX. (REPAIR PARTS)

((A)) PHASES I THOUGH III. PAJERO, CUCV, AND JEEP REPAIR PARTS ARE PROVIDED BY JTF-FA HQ AND LOCAL VENDORS AS REQUIRED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DET 1. EMERGENCY REPAIR PARTS FOR VEHICLES PARTICIPATING IN JFA S ARE IDENTIFIED BY DET S TO J4 FOR ACTION. PARTS ARE PALLETIZED FOR TRANSPORT WITH JFA PERSONNEL. DET 2 MAINTAINS PREPOSITIONED STOCKS OF VEHICLE PARTS IN THE RANCH COMPOUND. DET 3 MAINTAINS PREPOSITIONED STOCKS OF VEHICLE PARTS AT INTER AUTO REPAIR CO LTD.

((B)) PHASES IV AND V. TEAM LEADERS ARE BRIEFED BY DET PERSONNEL ON PROPER MAINTENANCE ACTIONS PRIOR TO VEHICLE USE. EMERGENCY REPAIR ACTIONS ARE CONDUCTED IAW REF D.

((C)) PHASES VI AND VII. TEAM LEADERS REPORT ANY MAINTENANCE ACTIONS PERFORMED ON VEHICLES PER REF D TO DET ADMIN PERSONNEL. MECHANICAL REPAIRS REQUIRED IN HNS ARE PERFORMED AT THE FOLLOWING PRIMARY LOCAL VENDORS: IN SRV AT V-75, IN LPDR AT INTER AUTO CO LTD, IN KOC AT K-SERVICES.

((10)) CLASS X. (NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS). ALL NON STANDARD EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ARE COORDINATED WITH J4 FOR PURCHASE AND MOVEMENT INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA.

(5) APPENDICES:

1 - HELICOPTER MATRIX (AUR)

2 - BAGGAGE AND EQUIPMENT PROCEDURES AND ALLOWANCES (AUR) E. PERSONNEL

(1) REFERENCES

(A) JTF-FA INST 1650.1A, AWARDS PROGRAM, DTD 02 OCT 96 (2) GENERAL

(A) PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ANNEX IS TO PRESCRIBE POLICY AND PROCEDURES IN PROVIDING PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT TO ALL PERSONNEL DURING JTF-FA OPERATIONS.

(B) CONCEPT. PROVIDE PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT AS FEASIBLE DURING ALL PHASES OF JFA OPERATIONS. THIS INCLUDES PROVIDING TAD/TDY ORDERS FOR JTF-FA PERSONNEL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORTING UNITS, ORDERS ENDORSEMENTS FOR AUGMENTEES AND VERIFICATION OF RECORD OF EMERGENCY DATA PRIOR TO DEPLOYING TO SE ASIA.

(3) PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

(A) GENERAL GUIDANCE. UPON CHECKING INTO HEADQUARTERS JTF-FA, AUGMENTEE PERSONNEL WILL HAVE THEIR ORDERS ENDORSED AND FILL OUT EMERGENCY DATA FORMS DURING THEIR IN BRIEFING.

(B) MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION. THERE ARE NO MWR FACILITIES IN SE ASIA FOR JTF-FA OPERATIONS.

(C) CASUALTY REPORTING. CASUALTY REPORTING WILL BE

COORDINATED BY THE DETACHMENT COMMANDERS THROUGH HQ, JTF-FA. (D) DECORATIONS AND AWARDS. SEE REF A.

(E) IMMINENT DANGER PAY. SEE APPENDIX 1

(F) MILITARY LAW, DISCIPLINE, AND ORDER. ALL PERSONNEL

WILL ADHERE TO THE JTF-FA STANDARDS OF CONDUCT POLICY (APPENDIX 7,

ANNEX C) AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.

(G) MEDICAL RETURNEES TO DUTY. SEE ANNEX Q.

(H) PROMOTIONS. PARENT UNITS HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF NOTIFYING AUGMENTEE PERSONNEL DIRECTLY OR THROUGH HQ, JTF-FA OF THEIR PROMOTION STATUS.

(I) SINGLE OR DUAL MILITARY SERVICE PARENTS. PERSONNEL

WITHOUT A FAMILY CARE PLAN IN EFFECT AT THEIR PARENT ORGANIZATION ARE NON DEPLOYABLE AND WILL NOT AUGMENT JFAS.

(J) LEAVE

#### (1) EMERGENCY LEAVE

((A)) JTF-FA/J1 AND DETACHMENT COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE ALL EMERGENCY LEAVE. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN FUNDED EMERGENCY LEAVE, RED CROSS NOTIFICATION IS REQUIRED. DETACHMENT COMMANDERS HAVE FINAL DECISION ON GRANTING LEAVE. ONCE APPROVED, AUGMENTEES AND JTF-FA PERSONNEL WILL HAVE GOVERNMENT PROCURED TRANSPORTATION ISSUED FROM THEIR LOCATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TO THE CLOSEST CONUS PORT OF ENTRY.

((B)) J1 WILL COORDINATE WITH THE APPROPRIATE PACOM SERVICE ELEMENT FOR THE FUND CITE FOR TRAVEL FROM SE ASIA OR HAWAII TO THE WEST COAST. J1 WILL MODIFY ORDERS FOR JTF-FA PERSONNEL AND RECOUP THE REQUIRED PORTION OF PER DIEM. SUPPORTING UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECOUPMENT OF FUNDS FROM THEIR INDIVIDUAL SERVICE MEMBERS.

(2) LEAVE TRAVEL TO SOUTHEAST ASIA. REQUESTS FOR LEAVE AND ALL TRAVEL TO SOUTHEAST ASIA MUST BE APPROVED BY THE COMMANDER, JTF-FA. PERSONNEL INTENDING TO TRAVEL TO SOUTHEAST ASIA ON LEAVE SHALL CLEARLY STATE THAT INTENTION IN WRITING ON THE LEAVE REQUEST FORM AND SUBMIT TO COMMANDER, JTF-FA FOR FINAL APPROVAL VIA DETACHMENT COMMANDER, DIRECTORATE HEAD, OR CILHI COMMANDER. ADDITIONALLY, ONCE TRAVEL IS APPROVED, PERSONNEL WILL FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS IN THE FOREIGN CLEARANCE GUIDE FOR REQUESTING TRAVEL CLEARANCE. JTF-FA J1 WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF LEAVE PAPERS TO DETACHMENT 1. DETACHMENT COMMANDERS HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE PERMANENT PARTY PERSONNEL LEAVE REQUESTS. LEAVE REQUESTS FOR SRV, LPDR AND KOC WILL NOT NORMALLY BE APPROVED. A LEAVE REQUEST MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE J3 FOURTEEN DAYS PRIOR TO JFA DEPARTURE FROM HAWAII AND A REQUEST FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE MUST BE INITIATED BY THE PARENT COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREIGN CLEARANCE GUIDE.

(K) TAD/TDY PAY. SEE APPENDIX 1

(L) ID TAGS: TWO ID TAGS ARE REQUIRED. MEDICAL WARNING TAGS, IF REQUIRED, WILL BE IN THE INDIVIDUAL S POSSESSION AT ALL TIMES.

(M) PASSPORTS. SEE APPENDIX 8, ANNEX C.

(N) PASSPORT/VISA PHOTOS. PERSONNEL WILL HAVE SIX

PASSPORT SIZE PHOTOS FOR VISA REQUIREMENTS AND UNFORESEEN TRAVEL WITHIN SE ASIA.

(3) FINANCE AND DISBURSING: SEE APPENDIX 1

(4) LEGAL

(A) STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA). THE US HAS NO SOFA WITH SRV, LPDR, KOC OR THAILAND. JTF-FA PERSONNEL AND AUGMENTEES ARE AFFORDED THE SAME PROTECTION AS A CITIZEN TOURIST AND ARE SUBJECT TO LOCAL LAWS.

(B) LEGAL ASSISTANCE. LEGAL ASSISTANCE IS NOT PROVIDED DURING DEPLOYMENTS TO SE ASIA. PERSONAL LEGAL MATTERS SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM THE PARENT UNIT.

(5) MILITARY POSTAL SERVICES. REGULAR MAIL DELIVERY IS NOT AVAILABLE TO JFA MEMBERS DUE TO THE SHORT DURATION OF THE OPERATIONS. THOSE DEPLOYING SHOULD PUT THEIR MAIL ON HOLD AS IT CAN NOT BE LEGALLY HAND CARRIED INTO SE ASIA. FOR THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO WISH TO SEND MAIL WHILE DEPLOYED, MAIL MUST BE FERRIED OUT OF THE FIELD BACK TO THE EMBASSY FOR ITS EVENTUAL RELEASE ON A CHANNEL FLIGHT.

(6) APPENDIX:

1 - FINANCE AND DISBURSING (AUR)

F. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(1) SITUATION

(A) GENERAL. THIS ANNEX ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR PA ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH JTF-FA OPERATIONS.

(B) ENEMY. N/A

(C) FRIENDLY. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ASD)(PA), DPMO(PA), USCINCPAC, JO1PA, USACILI(EXTERNAL LIAISON OFFICE), US INFORMATION AGENCY(AMEMB-BANGKOK, HANOI, VIENTIANE, PHNOM PENH). (D) POLICY. DPMO(PA) ESTABLISHES POLICY REGARDING POW/MIA OPERATIONS. USCINCPAC, JO1PA ESTABLISHES PA POLICY REGARDING OPERATIONS IN THEATER. (E) ASSUMPTIONS ((1)) JTF-FA OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO ATTRACT

ATTENTION FROM US AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA. ((2)) HNS WILL SUPPORT REPORTING ON JTF-FA OPERATIONS AS LONG AS THE REPORTING SUPPORTS A POSITIVE VIEW OF THE HN AIDING IN A HUMANITARIAN MISSION.

((3)) JTF-FA OPERATIONS WILL NOT BE CANDIDATES FOR COVERAGE BY DOD MEDIA POOLS.

(2) MISSION. SEE BASIC PLAN.//

BT #0002

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OTTUZDKW RUHEMAD0003 1661702-UUUU--RUHPSUU. **ZNR UUUUU** O P 151702Z JUN 98 ZDK FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J3// **TO AIG 960** INFO USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3-ODJ// HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//SAAM// HQ AMC TACC COMMAND CENTER SCOTT AFB IL//XOOZ/TRKX// NAVCSRF HONOLULU HI//PW-MIA// CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N3/N6/N45/NOIM/N1/N13// COMMARFORPAC//G1/G3/G6// CG I MEF//G1/G6// CG III MEF//G1/G6// **USARPAC INTEL FT SHAFTER HI** HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI/DO/SGX/SGO/SGN PACAF AOS HICKAM AFB HI//AOM/AOP// 15ABW HICKAM AFB HI//CC/LG// 15LGS HICKAM AFB HI//CC/LGSM// FISC PEARL HARBOR HI//OO// 3740G YOKOTA AB JA//CC// 374OSS YOKOTA AB JA//OSO/OSOO// 374AW YOKOTA AB JA//OCO// 374AES YOKOTA AB JAI/SG/AO/AOE// **BUMED WASHINGTON DC//27//** AMEMBASSY HANOI//CJTFFA DET TWO// INFO USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC 13AF ANDERSEN AFB GU//CC/LG// CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOP-OP/APLG-MV/APLG-MU-EODCT// CDR703MIBDE OPS KUNIA HI RSOC KUNIA HI//J342/JOC/J3M3/J3W// CDR205THMIBN FT SHAFTER HI//IAGPD// 15OSS HICKAM AFB HI//DOX// 635 AMSS HICKAM AFB HI//DO/DOCO/DOX// JFMO PAC HONOLULU HI 354MDG EIELSON AK//SGOAR// COMNAVSURFRESFOR OPS FLTSUPP NEW ORLEANS LA//N3// COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORONADO CA//N10// BT UNCLAS //N03460// PART ONE OF THREE-PART TWO IDENT IS 151701Z JUN 98-PART THREE IDENT IS 151702Z JUN 98 MSGID/GENADMIN/JTF-FA/1-99/MAY// SUBJ/JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING OPLAN 1-99// REF/A/RMG/CJCS/082354ZJAN92// REF/B/RMG/CJCS/222300ZJAN92// REF/C/RMG/CJCS/020046ZNOV91// REF/D/DOC/USCINCPAC// REF/E/RMG/SECDEF/061158ZAUG93// REF/F/RMG/USCINCPAC/5080-93// NARR/REF A IS CJCS ALERT ORDER. REF B IS CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. REF C IS CJCS PLANNING ORDER. REF D IS USCINCPAC/DIA MOU DEFINING RELATIONSHIP FOR POW-MIA OPS. REF E IS REORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL POW-MIA OPERATIONS. REF F IS USCINCPAC OPORD FOR EXPANDED POW-MIA **OPERATIONS IN SE ASIA, OPERATION FULL ACCOUNTING.//** POC/<sup>(b) (6)</sup> 'DJ3(PLANS)/JTF-FA/CAMP SMITH, HI/TEL:DSN 477-3001/ TEL:FAX DSN 477-5501// POC/(<sup>(b) (6)</sup> /DJ3(AIR)/JTF-FA/CAMP SMITH, HI/TEL:DSN 477-3001// RMKS/ (3) EXECUTION. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. JTF-FA WILL PURSUE AN ACTIVE PA APPROACH. OPPORTUNITIES TO TELL THE FULLEST POSSIBLE

ACCOUNTING STORY WILL BE EXPLOITED TO THE FULLEST OPPORTUNITY. (A) PLANNING. PA PLANNING INCLUDES PUBLICATION OF PA GUIDANCE FOR ALL JTF-FA OPERATIONS. PA GUIDANCE IS INTERNALLY STAFFED 30 DAYS PRIOR TO EACH JFA AND FORWARDED TO USCINCPAC JO1PA FOR STAFFING AND RELEASE 20 DAYS PRIOR TO EACH JFA.

(B) DEPLOYMENT. PA ASSETS DEPLOY IN SUPPORT OF JFA OPERATIONS AND DETACHMENT EVENTS AS NEEDED. PA ASSETS WILL DEPLOY TO SUPPORT ALL REPATRIATION CEREMONIES.

(C) OPERATIONS. JTF-FA/PA WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN THEATER IN COORDINATION WITH USCINCPAC, JO1PA AND AMEMBASSY PA ASSETS. JTF-FA/PA HAS RELEASE AUTHORITY DURING OPERATIONS.

(4) TASKS

(A) DPMO(PA) WILL COORDINATE RELEASES RELATIVE TO IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS WITH ASD(PA).

(B) JTF-FA/PA WILL:

((1)) SEE BASIC PLAN.

((2)) PREPARE AND EXECUTE BRIEFINGS.

(C) DETACHMENT COMMANDERS AND TEAM LEADERS WILL FOLLOW PA GUIDANCE AND THE JTF-FA HANDBOOK IN PROVIDING INFORMATION TO THE MEDIA.

(5) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. DETACHMENT COMMANDERS AND TEAM LEADERS WILL REPORT ALL MEDIA CONTACT. ACCIDENTS OR OTHER OCCURRENCES WHICH MAY GENERATE MEDIA ATTENTION WILL BE REPORTED TO JTF-FA/PA VIA THE OUTSIDE OF NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(6) ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEDIA. MEDIA, WHEN AUTHORIZED, WILL NORMALLY ACCOMPANY JTF-FA OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS AT A NO ADDITIONAL COST TO THE GOVERNMENT AND ON A NONINTERFERENCE BASIS. JTF-FA/PA WILL COORDINATE WITH MEDIA DEPLOYING INTO THEATER TO ENSURE PROPER PREPARATION (I.E. MONEY, INTERPRETERS, INOCULATIONS). TRANSPORTATION MAY BE PROVIDED SPECIFICALLY FOR MEDIA IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS VIP MEDIA EVENTS. WHEN MEDIA ARE PROVIDED TRANSPORTATION, MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA MUST FILL OUT A WAIVER. SEE APPENDIX 1.

(7) VISUAL INFORMATION. INVESTIGATIVE TEAM LEADERS WILL ENSURE ALL INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY SITES ARE DOCUMENTED THROUGH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEOTAPE. NEWS MEDIA WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO PHOTOGRAPH OR VIDEOTAPE REMAINS.

(8) APPENDIX:

1 - MEDIA WAIVER (AUR)

G. CIVIL AFFAIRS - OMITTED

H. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES - OMITTED

J. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

(1) GENERAL

(A) PURPOSE. ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JTF-FA AND

((1)) USCINCPAC

((2)) SERVICE COMPONENTS

((3)) JTF-FA DETACHMENTS

(B) SCOPE. THIS ANNEX DEFINES COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS APPLICABLE FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS TO ACHIEVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED IN SE ASIA WITH FORCES ASSIGNED TO, ATTACHED TO, AUGMENTING, OR IN SUPPORT OF JTF-FA.

(C) CONCEPT. USCINCPAC USES EXISTING COMMAND

RELATIONSHIPS DEFINED IN USCINCPACINST C3020.2 AND REF F. ((1)) CJTF-FA IS TASKED TO ACHIEVE THE FULLEST

POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR AMERICANS MISSING IN SE ASIA WITH SUPPORT FROM USCINCPAC SERVICE COMPONENTS, SUPPORTING COMMANDS AND AGENCIES. ((2)) EXISTING MEMORANDUM(S) OF AGREEMENT OR

UNDERSTANDING (MOA OR MOU) PROVIDED BY USCINCPAC IN THE FACILITATION OF POW-MIA OPERATIONS REMAIN IN EFFECT.

((A)) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

((1)) NCA. SECDEF RETAINS OVERALL

RESPONSIBILITY FOR CENTRALIZED PLANNING, NATIONAL LEVEL COORDINATION, AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION, EXERCISING OVERSIGHT THROUGH CJCS AND THE JOINT STAFF. ((2)) USCINCPAC PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL EFFORT THROUGH CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND EXECUTION. USCINCPAC EXERCISES COCOM OF ASSIGNED FORCES THROUGH COMMANDERS OF SERVICE COMPONENTS AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS WHICH SUPPORT CJTF-FA.

((3)) USCINCPAC EXERCISES COCOM OVER JTF-FA, HQPACAF, CINCPACFLT, COMMARFORPAC, CDRUSARPAC, COMSOCPAC, COMUSKOREA, COMMACCOM, COMUSJAPAN, AND JUSMAGTHAI. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF JTF-FA, ALL ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDS IN THE JTF-FA EFFORT. USACOM, USCINCTRANS, USCINCSOC, DIRNSA, CIA, DIA, USIA, OCEANCOMCEN, USACILHI, LSEL, HQ DMA, USDAO BANGKOK, AM EMBASSIES HANOI, VIENTIANE, AND PHNOM PENH PROVIDE SERVICES TO CJTF-FA.

((4)) CJTF-FA HAS OPCON OVER ELEMENTS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF JTF-FA MISSION EXCEPT DIA WHICH IS ADCON WHEN DEPLOYED WITH JTF-FA ELEMENTS PER REF B OF THE BASIC ORDER. DIA PERSONNEL ARE SUBJECT TO THE JTF-FA STANDARDS OF CONDUCT WHEN DEPLOYED WITH JTF-FA PERSONNEL.

((5)) CJTF-FA INFORMS CHFJUSMAGTHAI ON ALL POW-MIA OPERATIONS ORIGINATING FROM OR TRANSITING THAILAND.

((6)) AUGMENTATION FORCES REMAIN OPCON TO USCINCPAC THROUGH SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS UNTIL FORCES ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE OPCON OF CJTF-FA.

((7)) INVESTIGATIVE RECOVERY TEAMS WHILE DEPLOYED ARE OPCON OF THE DETACHMENT COMMANDER.

((B)) SUPPORT AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS ((1)) CJTF-FA EXERCISES GENERAL DIRECTIVE

AUTHORITY OVER THE SUPPORTING EFFORT PER JCS PUB 0-2, PARA 3-17C. THE TIME, PLACE, AND DURATION OF THE SUPPORTING EFFORT WILL BE AS DIRECTED BY CJTF-FA, THIS OPLAN AND SUBSEQUENT WARNING AND FRAG ORDERS.

((2)) STRENGTH OF FORCES ALLOCATED TO JTF-FA WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE CJTF-FA.

((3)) THE SUPPORTING MISSION IS SECOND IN PRIORITY IN RELATION TO THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE SUPPORTING COMMANDER. THEREFORE, THE SUPPORTING FORCE MAY DEPART FROM THE JTF-FA MISSION IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY OR EXCEPTIONAL OPPORTUNITY. CJTF-FA MUST BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY OF SUCH INTENT TO WITHDRAW SUPPORTING PERSONNEL.

((4)) MOAS EXISTING BETWEEN USCINCPAC AND SUPPORTING UNIFIED COMMANDS APPLY TO CJTF-FA.

((5)) USCINCPAC SERVICE COMPONENT

COMMANDERS NORMALLY OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF CJTF-FA PROVIDING DIRECT SUPPORT PER JCS PUB 0-2.

((6)) POW/MIA ACTIVITIES ORIGINATING FROM OR TRANSITING JAPAN, KOREA, OR ALASKA WILL BE COORDINATED WITH RESPECTIVE UNIFIED COMMANDERS.

(2) ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED IN REF (F).

K. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (1) GENERAL

(A) PURPOSE. PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE INSTALLATION, OPERATION, AND MAINTAINENCE OF C3 SYSTEMS IN SUPPORT OF THE JTF-FA FY99 OPLAN.

(B) SITUATION

((1)) GENERAL. JTF-FA C3 SYSTEMS WILL PROVIDE CONTINUOUS 24 HOUR COMMUNICATIONS LINKS BETWEEN THE TEAMS IN THE FIELD, CORRESPONDING DETACHMENT HEADQUARTERS, AND JTF-FA HEADQUARTERS.

((2)) FRIENDLY. CINCPAC/J6 SUPPORTS JTF-FA C3 SYSTEMS WITH MAINTENANCE, EQUIPMENT, C3 TECHNICAL SUPPORT, AND ADVICE. EACH OF THE MAJOR SERVICE COMPONENTS WILL BE TASKED AT LEAST DURING THE FY TO PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT JTF-FA C3 FIELD OPERATIONS. ((3)) ASSUMPTIONS. JTF-FA WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ONE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL ON SATELLITE 172E UHFFLTSAT TO FACILITATE JTF-FA COMMAND NET. CINCPAC/J6 WILL CONTINUE THE CURRENT LONG TERM TEMPORARY LOAN OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT TO JTF-FA. ALL JTF-FA SATELLITE AND HF COMMUNICATIONS ARE MONITORED BY HNS.

(2) MISSION. TO INSTALL, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN A COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS ARCHITECTURE TO SUPPORT THE CJTF-FA WITH CONTINUOUS UNSECURE COMMAND AND CONTROL THROUGHOUT THE YEAR AND DURING ALL JFAS.

(3) EXECUTION

(A) GUIDING PRINCIPLES

((1)) SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS (SATCOM) IS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS DURING ALL JFAS IN LPDR AND KOC. HF COMMUNICATIONS IS THE ALTERNATE. THE PRIMARY MEANS COMMUNICATING WITH LAO WESTCOAST HELICOPTER IS VIA HF. IN SRV, THE PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION IS HF, INMARSAT IS THE ALTERNATE. WHEN AVAILABLE, LANDLINE AND CELLULAR TELEPHONE MAY BE USED AS ALTERNATE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION.

((2)) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS WILL BE SIMPLE WHILE MAINTAINING RELIABILITY, SPEED, AND FLEXIBILITY.

(B) OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

((1)) DURING EACH JFA, THE RESPECTIVE DETACHMENT WILL ACT AS NET CONTROL FOR THE MISSION. CJTF-FA RESERVES THE RIGHT TO TAKE NET CONTROL AS NECESSARY.

((2)) CALLSIGNS AND PROPER RADIO PROCEDURES WILL BE USED ON JTF RADIO NETS AT ALL TIMES.

((3)) ALL JTF COMMUNICATIONS NETS ARE UNSECURE. CRYPTOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE USED IN SE ASIA UNLESS APPROVED BY THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER.

((4)) THE USE OF INMARSAT RADIOS IN SRV IS LIMITED TO EMERGENCY SITUATIONS AND PERIODS WITHOUT HF CONNECTIVITY.

((5)) IN KOC AND LPDR, DATA TRANSMISSIONS VIA A LST-5C AND THE DSRTTY DATA PROGRAM WILL BE USED TO THE WIDEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

((6)) U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY WILL NOT BE DISTRIBUTED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS UNTIL APPROVED BY THE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. THIS INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, PSN-10 (SLUGGER) GPS, MOTOROLA SABER RADIOS, URC-101S, AND LST-5CS.

((7)) ONE TECHNICALLY MODIFIED URC-101 WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE LAO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN LAOS.

((8)) COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS SHOULD BE DONE AT LEAST ONCE EVERY TWO HOURS WITH THE PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION WHEN TEAMS ARE AT FIELD SITES. DETACHMENT COMMANDERS MAY ADJUST COMM CHECK TIMES AS REQUIRED.

(C) TASKS

((1)) JTF-FA COMMUNICATIONS SECTION:

((A)) PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT JTF MISSIONS.

((B)) PROVIDE TRAINING TO ALL TEAM MEMBERS PRIOR TO EACH JFA.

((C)) IDENTIFY AND COORDINATE FOR

COMMUNICATIONS AUGMENTEES AS REQUIRED.

((D)) ENSURE A COPY OF OPERATING LICENSES ARE

INCLUDED WITH EACH RADIO PREPARED FOR SHIPMENT TO SE ASIA. ((2)) TEAM LEADERS:

((A)) DRAW AND OP-CHECK REQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

((B)) COORDINATE COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER.

((C)) ENSURE THAT ALL TEAM PERSONNEL KNOW PROPER EMERGENCY RADIO PROCEDURES. ((3)) DETACHMENT COMMANDERS:

((A)) PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT TO FIELD TEAMS DURING JFAS AS NECESSARY.

((B)) IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF ANY COMMUNICATIONS RELATED PROBLEMS.

(D) SPECIAL MEASURES. IF ANY TEAM RECEIVES WHAT IT SUSPECTS AS "JAMMING" ON THE SATCOM NET, IT WILL IMMEDIATELY INFORM JTF HEADQUARTERS VIA ANOTHER MEANS OF COMMUNICATION (TELEPHONE, ETC). NOTIFY THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER/CHIEF WHO WILL INFORM THE COGNIZANT AGENCIES.

(4) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

(A) LOGISTICS

((1)) RADIO

((A)) ALL EQUIPMENT REQUESTS WILL BE FORWARD TO

THE JTF-FA HEADQUARTERS BY THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER/CHIEF. ((B)) THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER/CHIEF IS

RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING ALL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT REPAIR WITH CINCPAC AND OUTSIDE AGENCIES.

((2)) BATTERIES

((A)) ALL BATTERIES WILL BE DISTRIBUTED AT DET

1 FORWARD IN ÚTAPHAO. LITHIUM BATTERIES MUST BE TRANSPORTED IN DASH-2 APPROVED PACKAGING ABOARD AIRCRAFT.

((B)) DET 1 FORWARD IS RESPONSIBLE TO KEEP

STRICT ACCOUNTABILITY OF BATTERIES STORED AT THE WAREHOUSE IN UTAPHAO. WHEN ON HAND BATTERIES FALLS BELOW 20, DET 1 FORWARD WILL INFORM THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER/CHIEF FOR RESUPPLY.

(B) ADMINISTRATION

((1)) RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WILL BE SIGNED FOR BY EACH TEAM LEADER PRIOR TO THEIR JFA NLT D-7.

((2)) COMMUNICATIONS AUGMENTEES ARE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT AN AFTER-ACTION REPORT UPON RETURN TO HAWAII ENDOP+5.

((3)) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. TEAM LEADERS SHOULD

ENSURE THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN CLEANED AND A DA-2404 MAINTENANCE FORM COMPLETED OUT PRIOR TO RETURNING EQUIPMENT. (5) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. SEE ANNEX J

(5) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. SE

(6) APPENDIX

1 - CEOI FOR JTF-FA OPERATIONS IN SE ASIA

L. OPERATIONS SECURITY - APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C

M. MAPPING, CHARTING AND GEODESY - OMITTED

N. SPACE OPERATIONS - OMITTED

Q. MEDICAL SERVICES

(1) SITUATION. PER BASE OPLAN.

(A) PURPOSE. TO PROVIDE A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, ASSIGN TASKS, AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE MEDICAL SYSTEM TO SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS ENVISIONED IN THE BASIC PLAN.

(2) MISSION. TO PROVIDE TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MEDICAL COVERAGE IN SUPPORT OF THE JFA. MEDICAL PERSONNEL ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IMMEDIATE CARE AND STABLIZATION OF US PERSONNEL AND THOSE HN PERSONNEL SUPPORTING THE JTF-FA MISSION. LOCAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MAY ONLY BE TREATED IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. FOR THOSE MEDICAL PERSONNEL PROVIDING MEDCAP SUPPORT, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WILL BE TREATED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES PROVIDIED.

(3) EXECUTION

(A) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. PER BASE OPLAN.

(B) CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

((1)) PRE-DEPLOYMENT

((A)) IMMUNIZATIONS. SEE APPENDIX 9, ANNEX C.

((B)) TRAINING

((1)) MEDICAL AUGMENTEES MUST HAVE A

BACKGROUND IN TRAUMA AND EMERGENCY MEDICINE. ALL SERVICE SPECIFIC CREDENTIAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS MUST BE CURRENT PER SERVICE REGULATION. ((2)) MEDICAL AUGMENTEES WILL BE 18D

MEDICS, INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMEN, INDEPENDENT DUTY TECNICIANS, OR HAVE COMPLETED MORE ADVANCED PROFESSIONAL TRAINING.

((3)) MEDICAL AUGMENTEES ARE REQUIRED TO ATTEND REFRESHER TRAINING, CONDUCTED BY JTF-FA/J3MED IN ORDER TO ENSURE PROFICIENCY PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

((C)) RESPONSIBILITIES

((1)) TASK FORCE SURGEON AND THE CILHI MEDICAL SECTION WILL ISSUE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TO EACH TEAM LEADER PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FROM HAWAII.

((2)) JTF-FA/J3MED WILL PROVIDE DETAILED

BRIEF TO MEDICAL AUGMENTEES PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. ((3)) TEAM LEADERS WILL ENSURE ALL TEAM

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT (PER PACKING LIST) IS INVENTORIED AND ACCOUNTED FOR PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

((4)) TEAM LEADERS AND MEDICAL AUGMENTEES

WILL BE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH MEDEVAC PLAN.

((2)) DEPLOYMENT

((A)) HOSPITALIZATION. PATIENTS WILL BE TREATED AT ONLY AT APPROVED HOSPITALS IN THAILAND. HN HOSPITALS ARE INADEQUATELY EQUIPPED, MAINTAINED AND ARE ALL SUBSTANDARD. HN HOSPITALS WILL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A LAST RESORT IN THE EVENT ON AN EXTREME EMERGENCY TO SAVE A LIFE ONCE OTHER OPTIONS HAVE BEEN RULED OUT.

((B)) MEDEVAC

((1)) DET 2 WILL SERVE AS MEDEVAC CONTROL DURING OPERATIONS IN SRV.

((2)) MEDEVAC FROM SITE TO HANOI/DA NANG/HO CHI MINH CITY BY MOST EXPEDIENT MEANS AFTER EVALUATION BY ON-SITE MEDICAL PERSONNEL.

((3)) MEDEVAC FROM HANOI/DA NANG/HO CHI MINH CITY TO BANGKOK, THAILAND BY UTAPAO BASED USAF C-130 OR COMMERCIAL MEDICAL EVACUATION AIRCRAFT.

((4)) DET 3 WILL SERVE AS MEDEVAC CONTROL

DURING OPERATIONS IN LAOS.

((5)) MEDEVAC FROM SITE TO SAVANNAKHET/ PAKSE/VIENTIANE BY LAO MI-8/17, COMMERCIAL HELICOPTER, OR COMMERCIAL AIR AFTER EVALUATION BY ON-SITE MEDICAL PERSONNEL. ((6)) MEDEVAC FROM SAVANNAKHET OR

VIENTIANE TO BANGKOK BY U'TAPAO BASED USAF C-130 OR COMMERCIAL MEDICAL EVACUATION AIRCRAFT.

((7)) NON-EMERGENT MEDICAL EVACUATIONS WILL BE BY THE MOST EXPEDIENT CONVEYANCE TO INCLUDE COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT IF PATIENT AMBULATORY.

((8)) DET 1 WILL SERVE AS MEDEVAC CONTROL

FOR ALL MEDICAL EMERGENCIES ORIGINATING OUT OF KOC. ((9)) MEDEVAC FROM SITE TO SIHANOUKVILLE/

BUNG LUNG/SIEM REAP/PHNOM PENH BY VEHICLE OR CONTRACTED HELICOPTER OR COMMERCIAL AIR AFTER EVALUATION BY ON-SITE MEDICAL PERSONNEL.

((10)) MEDEVAC FROM SIANOUKVILLE/BUNG LUNG /SIEM REAP/PHNOM PENH WILL BE BY C-130 OR CONTRACT AEROMEDICAL SERVICE BASED ON THE SEVERITY OF THE INJURY AND CONDITION OF THE PATIENT.

((C)) PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

((1)) MALARIA PROPHYLAXIS WILL BE

DISTRIBUTED BY JTF-FA MEDICAL PERSONNEL. MALARIA PROPHYLAXIS MEDICATION IS REQUIRIED TWO DAYS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE TO SE ASIA AND UP TO FOUR WEEKS UPON DEPARTURE DEPENDING ON THE PRESCRIBED MEDICATION. ((2)) TB STATUS DOCUMENTED/PPD BEFORE

DEPLOYMENT AND 8-12 WEEKS AFTER DEPLOYMENT.

((3)) POST-DEPLOYMENT

((A)) UPON COMPLETION OF JFA ALL MEDICAL KITS

WILL BE INVENTORIED AND RETURNED TO HAWAII FOR RE-STOCKING. ((B)) ALL TEAM MEDICS AND ASSIGNED MEDICAL

OFFICERS WILL COMPLETE AND PROVIDE A MEDICAL AFTER ACTION REPORT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE JFA TO JTF-FA/J3MED NLT ENDOP+5.

((C)) ALL PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO CONTINUE MALARIA PROPHYLAXIS AS PRESCRIBED.

(C) TASKS. MEDICAL AUGMENTEES WILL REPORT PER APPENDIX 9, ANNEX C IN ORDER TO OBTAIN REQUIRED TRAINING PRIOR TO DEPLOYING TO SE ASIA.

(D) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. MEDICAL CONDITIONS RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MAN DAYS MUST BE REPORTED TO JTF-FA/J3MED ASAP.

(4) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. PURCHASE OF MEDICATIONS, DRUGS OR PHARMACEUTICALS OUTSIDE OF US BOUNDARIES BY NON-MEDICAL PERSONNEL OPCON TO JTF-FA IS PROHIBITED. THIS INCLUDES PURCHASES FROM DRUG STORES, PHARMACIES, CLINICS OR OTHER PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY STORES.

(A) MEDICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRE THE DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S OR JTF-FA MEDICAL OFFICER S AUTHORIZATION PRIOR TO PURCHASING ANY MEDICATION.

(B) PURCHASE OF RE-FILL MEDICATIONS USED FOR CHRONIC MEDICAL CONDITIONS WHICH ARE NOT LIFE-THREATENING IS NOT AUTHORIZED. PROCURE SUPPLIES THROUGH ESTABLISHED CHANNELS.

(C) DETACHMENT ONE'S COMMANDER OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE IS AUTHORIZED TO PURCHASE MEDICATIONS EITHER PRESCRIBED LOCALLY OR DEEMED NECESSARY TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS EITHER IN THAILAND OR ELSEWHERE.

(D) THE MEDICAL DOCTOR AUGMENTED TO THE LAOS JFA IS AUTHORIZED TO PURCHASE MEDICATIONS NEEDED TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.

(E) TRAVEL ORDERS WILL BE ANNOTATED AUTHORIZING TEAM MEDICS TO CARRY CONTROLED MEDICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MISSION IAW MEDIC S CERTIFICATION.

(5) COMMAND AND CONTROL. SEE ANNEX K.

R. CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES - OMITTED

X. EXECUTION CHECKLIST

(1) PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ANNEX IS TO PROVIDE AN ALL INCLUSIVE CHECKLIST FOR THE PLANNING AND TRACKING OF JFAS TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND REDUCE ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHTS. D DAY IS DATE OF ARRIVAL INTO COUNTRY OF OPERATION. DATES ARE FLEXIBLE DUE TO UNFORESEEN REQUIREMENTS AND HOLIDAYS.

PLANNING/EXECUTION CHECKLIST REQUIREMENT TIMELINE J3 ANALYSYTS AUGMENT J2 FOR LEAD DEVELOPMENT D-75 COORDINATE AO W/J2 AND CILHI D-70 RECEIVE DRAFT LEADSHEETS AND RECOVERY ASSESSMENT D-65 OUTLINES FROM J2 STAFF WARNORD D-65 **1ST INVESTIGATION RECOVERY BRIEF** D-60 PUBLISH WARNORD D-57 2ND INVESTIGATION RECOVERY BRIEF D-45 AUGMENTEES IDENTIFIED D-43 PROVIDE DET DRAFT PRODUCTS D-40 RECEIVE FINAL LEADSHEETS AND RECOVERY ASSESSMENT OUTLINES FROM J2 D-40 STAFF FRAGO D-35 RECOVERY DECISION BRIEF D-35 PRE-BRIEF BOOKS TO J3 D-33 PRE-BRIEF BOOKS TO CJTF, DCO AND CDR CILHI D-32 PASSPORT DATA RECEIVED FROM AUGMENTEES D-30 TEAM LEADERS IDENTIFY MAJOR END ITEMS TO J4/S4 D-30 RELEASE COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUEST D-30

**RELEASE AIR REQUEST** D-30 PROVIDE FINAL PRODUCTS TO DETACHMENT D-30 PUBLISH LOAD PLAN D-30 **PUBLISH FRAGO** D-30 AUGMENTEES CONTACTED BY J3 ACTION OFFICER D-22 AUGMENTEE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT LIST TO J4 D-21 MEDICAL AUGMENTEES REPORT TO JTF-FA D-18 TEAM LEADERS IDENTIFY SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TO DETS D-14 **CILHI PROVIDES PALLET LOAD PLANS** D-13 NON MEDICAL AUGMENTEES REPORT TO JTF-FA D-9 TEAM LEADER BRIEF D-7 D-7 **PRE-DEPLOYMENT BRIEF** PALLETIZE EQUIPMENT D-5 ENDOP+3 ANNOTATE PHOTOGRAPHS STAFF DRI'S, AIR'S, AAR'S AND DRE'S ENDOP+5 ALL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO J3 FOR STAFFING ENDOP+5 ENDOP+6 **TURN IN EVIDENCE/PHOTOGRAPHS TO J2 TEAM LEADER S DEBRIEF** ENDOP+7 **IDENTIFY ITEMS FOR RESUPPLY TO J4** ENDOP+7 ENDOP+12 **TURN IN TRAVEL CLAIMS TO J1** PUBLISH SUMMARY JFA REPORT ENDOP+14 PUBLISH DRI'S, AIR'S AND DRE'S ENDOP+30 Z. DISTRIBUTION CHECKLIST (AUR)// BT #0003 NNNN

DUC 17

#### ACCELERATED REMAINS RECOVERY PLAN FOR NORTH KOREA

#### **Discussion of the Problem**

We have made significant progress since 1996 in gaining cooperation from the North Koreans in our Korean War accounting efforts. This progress, after 40 years of North Korean refusals to cooperate on this issue, provides a foundation for expanding our accounting efforts. These activities include jointly searching for and recovering remains, resolving live sighting reports, searching through archives here and abroad to locate, retrieve and review Korean War-era documents related to the POW/MIA issue, and exploiting new forensic identification techniques. Moreover, in February 1997, an interagency decision delinked the Korean War remains recovery issue from other issues associated with the developing US-DPRK relationship.

In December 1997, the North Koreans indicated their desire to expand our remains recovery operations. At that time, we told them we would wait and see if operations this year resulted in a significant increase in remains recovered. What we have learned to date, however, is that the first stage of any accelerated program must be a significantly increased joint investigation and survey effort aimed at locating sites for expanded recovery operations. In light of this, we have identified six major issues critical to a successful, comprehensive, recovery and identification plan:

**Number of Recoverable Remains:** We believe we can recover as many as half of the more than 8,100 US servicemen whose remains were never accounted for from the Korean War. The other 50% involve those remains we believe are unrecoverable due to loss over water, the passage of time, exposure to the elements, and other factors. In addition, for planning purposes, we excluded losses in South Korea, as well as the over one thousand unidentified remains in US possession (844 unknowns in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific and over 200 currently at CILHI undergoing forensic identification).

Initial Survey/Investigative Effort: The area involved and the number of potentially recoverable remains presents an unprecedented challenge to our current capabilities. Moreover, our lack of access to potential recovery sites for over 40 years limits our ability to predict exactly what we will find. The North Koreans provided documentation for many of the remains returned both immediately after the War and more recently, but we have serious doubts about the accuracy of their reporting. Joint recovery operations to date have only confirmed that more preparation work must be done if we are to realize a significant increase in recoveries.

The first stage of an accelerated recovery effort must therefore involve a stepped up site survey and investigative effort that will dictate the pace and direction of subsequent recovery operations. This effort must start with a joint comparison and analysis of information on known or possible gravesites, with emphasis on the part of the North Korea on original wartime records. This would set the stage for joint teams to systematically survey these sites, supplemented by an ongoing joint investigative interview process, which would lead to follow-on site surveys. The results of this research will guide the nature and degree of expanded joint recovery efforts.

Types of Recovery Sites: Although aircraft crashes account for a small number of sites, they are often the easiest and most successful types of recovery, if the plane can be found. CILHI has less experience in mass graves (though some CILHI anthropologists have assisted in Bosnia mass grave excavations on their own time) and concentrated grave sites (where large numbers of individual graves may be located close together).

Geographically, potential recovery sites can be grouped as follows:

- POW camp burial grounds (mostly along the Yalu) (over 1,200 individuals)
- Suspected battlefield burial sites and known temporary cemeteries on the western side from Unsan south through the Kaechon-Sunchon corridor and on to Pyongyang plus one cemetery in Kaesong (over 1,200 individuals)
- Suspected battlefield burial sites and known temporary cemeteries on the eastern side, from the Chosen Reservoir down to Hungnam (over 1,000 individuals)
- Sites along the DMZ (over 80 individuals)
- Known or suspected crashsites throughout the countryside (over 600 individuals)

Legal Requirements: As a result of litigation involving the recovery and identification of remains from Vietnam, CILHI has established numerous procedural and operational safeguards. Since their adoption, there has never been a successful legal challenge to these procedures. Although the North Koreans contend there are faster ways to do the work, it is imperative that CILHI procedures withstand American judicial scrutiny. (In 1995 we asked the DPRK to cease their massive unilateral recovery efforts--aimed at recovering large numbers of remains as quickly as possible--because we could not identify most, and would have difficulty validating the identifications of those we could make.) Any effort to expand operations must ensure sufficient participation of US forensic anthropologists and other specialists to account for all required operational and legal standards.

DoD Manpower Issues: Both CILHI and DPMO will require some manpower support to mount a significant expansion of field investigations and excavations. In the current downsizing climate, the numbers of military/civilian personnel required to establish a Joint Task Force for Korea would be difficult to carve out of existing command structures. The Services are acutely focused on force power issues, particularly the limitations in some critical areas. Although the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting has performed magnificently in the Southeast Asia accounting effort, current projections show that the JTF will remain occupied in Vietnam and Laos for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we believe we will need to staff the effort from someplace other than existing JTF resources. CILHI envisions increasing the number of recovery teams in the initial years through additional military allocations as well as support from Ft. Lee Quartermaster detachments and reserve Quartermaster units. However, if the initial survey and investigation effort identifies large numbers of recoverable remains, or if sufficient military personnel are not made available, CILHI will have to consider outside sources to handle the surge. Also, without personnel augmentations, CILHI will have to defer WWII and Cold War investigation and recovery operations.

**DPRK Sensitivities:** The types and number of personnel we deploy to North Korea to conduct the joint investigative and recovery work will remain a sensitive issue for the immediate future. Since we began direct negotiations with the DPRK in 1996, we have worked to foster a modicum of trust and respect. We know from several sources that the KPA found it easier to work with DPMO and CILHI because neither was associated directly to a command structure inimical to their interests. Rather, both DPMO and CILHI have reputations as organizations purely interested in the humanitarian pursuit of accounting for our missing. Available information suggests that North Koreans will continue to object to an outside military command structure, such as one imposed by a formal Joint Task Force, or any direct connection of the recovery teams to USFK, UNC, or PACOM. We have also received indications that the North Koreans prefer keeping the total number of Americans, including relief and spent fuel rod workers, in the DPRK at one time to under a hundred. This constrains us from Southeast Asia-scale joint field activities.

#### Assumptions

 The DPRK, particularly the KPA, will cooperate in a significantly expanded joint effort and accept compensation consistent with already established formulas.

--The DPRK will grant us access to all areas identified as potential recovery sites. --The DPRK will allow 5 recovery rotations of 30 days each per year, and allow us to eventually deploy 3 recovery teams and multiple investigation elements (IEs) each rotation. Each recovery team will cost roughly \$150,000 per operation and each IE team will cost \$130,000

--Communications will improve with the likely implementation of SATCOM.

- JTF-FA's SEA mission will remain steady for the foreseeable future, thus ruling out these
  resources for consideration. A similar entity out of UNC or USFK would not be
  acceptable to the North Koreans.
- There will be sufficient increases in funding priorities to both DPMO and CILHI.
- DPMO, CILHI, and the Service Casualty Offices will require limited, but critical, military and civilian personnel augmentation to support the significant increase in oversight, analytical, operational, remains processing and family outreach requirements.
- It will take three years for CILHI to ramp up to a three-team-per-operation capability. CILHI can accomplish this ramp up in conjunction with the initial investigative effort.
- The US and DPRK governments will not have reached agreement on exchanging liaison offices or a more formal diplomatic recognition during the next three years.
- If investigative effort generates large numbers of expected recoveries, we can contract for civilian recovery teams that can perform to CILHI standards to augment CILHI's current teams dedicated to Korea.
- There are qualified non-DoD anthropologists that CILHI can use as needed.

#### Concept/Plan for Expanded Surveys/Recoveries

#### A. Develop/initiate survey/investigation plan:

- DPMO/CILHI and DPRK counterparts hold joint meetings in the fall of 98 and winter of 1999 to share information and develop survey plans for 1999 and 2000. The goal of these planning meetings is to incorporate a comprehensive exchange of information on all potential recovery sites, and plan surveys of these locations to produce a prioritized list of recovery sites with estimated recoverable remains for each.
- Beginning in spring 1999, two research/investigation elements (IEs) deploy during each JRO.
- The initial effort will be conducted by augmenting existing DPRK teams with two CILHI personnel. As relations continue to improve the teams composition and structure may change to increase American involvement and accelerate the development of a database.

#### B. Sustain current optempo of JROs and archival reviews:

- DPMO/CILHI and DPRK counterparts hold joint meeting in Winter 1999 to plan sustained rate of five JROs with one recovery team each, but adding two IEs each JRO (5x1/2) for 1999 and to discuss parameters for increased optempo in 2000 and out.
- JROs begin in spring 1999 following current recovery team-LNO team organization.
- CILHI evaluates current success and modifies the IE composition as required. Initial proposal will be to either ramp up to two-recovery team and four IEs or one IE (4-man tm) per operation (5x2/4 or 1+) capability for 2000. CILHI operational plans will culminate with a three-recovery team and six IEs or 1 expanded IE (5x3/6 or 1+) capability for 2001. If military allocations are not available, consider contracting civilian personnel to round out additional teams (6 per team).

#### C. Evaluate results of initial site surveys:

 DPMO/CILHI and DPRK counterparts meet in fall of 1999 to evaluate results of survey effort and impact on JRO optempo for 2000 and out.

#### D. Conduct annual year-end reviews:

Both sides meet in late fall each year to evaluate that year's progress in joint accounting
efforts. Areas where progress is made should be sustained; areas lacking progress will
be reviewed for possible changes.

#### E. LNO/Logistics:

- Maintain two-person LNO team to coordinate communications and logistics in Pyongyang. When we reach maximum optempo, or if LNO Offices are opened, expand as required.
- Continue to run logistics through Beijing. CILHI expands logistics LNO team as required.
- If a surge in recoveries occurs, consider switching logistics base to ROK. Run contractor and military logistics out of ROK and move personnel and supplies either through Panmunjom or via direct contractor flights from Seoul to Pyongyang.

**F. Repatriation of Remains:** Currently, remains are repatriated through the UNC at Panmunjom. The maximum number of remains repatriated at one time via UNC has been approximately 30 (Dec 93). Even if UNC can handle significantly more remains at one time,

we still must deal with the KPA's expressed intent to remove nay participation of the UNC. Our goal now and in the near term is to preserve the remains recovery channel without compromising the role of UNC. This issue will be the focus of talks with UNC in the fall of 1998.

#### Responsibilities

- DPMO: Policy oversight, analytical support, investigation support
- CILHI: Site operations, recovery standards (anthropologists to supervise recovery teams), process remains for ID, contracting, field IE
- CMAOC: CILHI oversight, coordinate active duty/reserve augmentation
- Services: Family outreach program
- AFDIL: Reference sample data base, process remains samples
- **PACOM:** Air medical evacuation contingency, personnel support (medics, commo, linguists), support repatriation missions
- UNC: Repatriation ceremony and mortuary support, medical evacuation alternate contingency, funds transfer

#### **Policy Implications**

If the situation arises where CILHI cannot acquire sufficient military personnel to increase the number of recovery teams, or we have a larger number of known recovery sites than we can currently handle, even with the envisioned CILHI military ramp-ups, we will have to consider operational adjustments that will have policy implications.

- Contracted civilians playing a large part in remains recoveries. Traditionally, military graves registration specialist teams have conducted recovery missions. Responsible supervision and recovery expertise were incorporated in each team. However, there are not enough active duty and reserve specialists to support the number of additional recovery teams that we believe will be necessary to handle a potential surge in the number of recoveries. To deal with this shortfall, CILHI may consider contracting for qualified civilian support. However, CILHI will also require even more allocations of its own to insure each team has CILHI team leadership and qualified anthropological expertise.
- Using the ROK as a personnel and logistics staging base: In the past, UNC and the ROKG have been sensitive to US-DPRK bilateral activities at or though Panmunjom. Also, there was no direct air access from Seoul to Pyongyang. Recent political developments on the peninsula, even with the most recent submarine incidents, cast each of these considerations in a new realm of possibility, but UNC and ROK sensitivities must be resolved. CILHI can continue to use China as a logistics base for a sustained or gradually increasing recovery optempo, but a surge in recoveries will force CILHI to consider a more direct logistics pipeline, through the ROK.

#### **Personnel Implications**

The expanded Korean War recovery effort will place an enormous load on personnel staffing in all agencies connected to the accounting process, particularly in the initial 3-5 years of concentrated effort.

- DPMO will realign or add policy/planning officers and analysts to support the increased policy and analytical requirements.
- CILHI will need additional anthropologists, team leaders, analysts and remains
  processing specialists. CILHI will not be able to draw from its ten teams dedicated to
  support JTFFA operations. CILHI does envision a gradual ramping up over a three-year
  period. In the event of a significant surge of remains, we have to consider using
  contracted civilians to fill the gaps.
- The Service Casualty Offices, particularly the Army, must continue to be resourced to complete the family outreach program for the almost 7,000 families with whom we have lost contact over the years (most staffs have already been ramped up).

DPMO will realign or add 6 personnel as follows beginning in 1999:

- 2 policy/plans officers (mil/civ)
- 4 additional analysts (civilian) to support the increase in operations and investigations.

1999	2000	2001	Normalization/200
2 anthropologists (civ)	3 anthropologists	2 anthropologists	
3 Mission Cdrs/(Ino)	2 Mission Cdrs	2 Mission Cdrs	1-E7 Mort.Affairs
6 Mortuary affairs	4 Mortuary affairs	2Mortuary affairs	3 Commo. Spclsts
2 Photographers	2 Photographers	2 Photographers	2 Analysts/Linguists
2 Medics	2 Medics	2 Medics	
	2 EOD Specialists	2 EOD Specialists	
4 Linguists	2 Linguists	2 Linguists	
2 case analysts (civ)	2 case analysts (civ)		
	1 Admin. Spclst	1 Admin. Spclst	
	1 Admin Tech (civ)		
	2-E7 Mort. Affairs	2-E7 Mort. Affairs	al a se
		2 Logistics NCO	
	1 Transpo. Clrk		
	1 Orders Clerk		······································
	1 Opns. NCO		
	1 Contract. Spclst.		

CILHI will need additional personnel as follows:

TOTAL=21	TOTAL=27	TOTAL=19	TOTAL=6 * Det will contain 7 (Lno becomes Det Cdr)

#### **Funding Implications**

DPMO funding will increase in the first year as follows (not a factor if realignment is possible):

2 Policy A/Os = \$130K (Civilian policy A/O salary = \$65K)

4 analysts = \$210K (Civilian case analyst salary = \$52.5K)

CILHI annual increases to current level of spending will be as follows:

	1999 (5x1/2)	2000 (5x2/14)	2001 (5x3/16)	*Out
Civilian Personnel	250K (+4)	815K (+9)	700K (+2)	
Equipment	Equipment O/H	1million	1million	
Compensation	260K	1.28million	2.29million	
IE Sppt	100K	200K	300K	
TDY	201K (+6)	670K (+20)	1.1million (+34)	
TOTAL	811K	3.97 milion	5.4million	

#### Figures are based on following rates:

- Salary for civilian anthropologist = \$72.5K ea / for case analyst = \$52.5K ea
- Equipment to support one team for five JROs = \$1million
- Compensation for one JRO = \$150K (five JROs = \$750K)
- Compensation for one IE tm= \$26K (five IEs = \$130K)
- Admin/sppt for one IE tm = 10K (2 IEs x 5 JROs x 10K = 100K)
- TDY for CILHI personnel = \$6.7K ea (6 personnel x 5 missions = \$260K) 1999: 2-man Lno tm + one 8-man RE tm + two 2 person IE tms = 4 additions per JRO 2000: 2-man Lno tm + two 8-man RE tms + one 4-man or four 2-man IE = 12-14 additions

2001: 7-man Det + three 8-man RE tms + one 4 man IE tm or six 2-man tms =25 additions

• All additions in excess of pre fourth JRO FY 98 manning levels

#### Potential contracted civilian team costs:

A contracted civilian team would cost approximately \$80K per operation. This estimate is based on based on \$25K salary for one individual for five JROs (or \$5,000 per JRO) and \$8,400 travel and per diem for each individual for each JRO. Assuming each team would have a CILHI team leader and anthropologist, 6 individuals would be required to

round out a team. Therefore, each team would cost \$30K in salary and \$50K in travel/per diem for a total of \$80K.

#### Potential CILHI forward detachment (Det) costs:

- In the event formal liaison offices are exchanged between the US and DPRK governments, CILHI will establish a forward Det in Pyongyang. The cost of this, based on Det costs in Southeast Asia, would be approximately \$700K annually.
- In the event that the FY 2001 plan goes into effect it will become imperative that CILHI establish a forward deployed Det in Pyongyang. The Det will facilitate the ongoing research and logistical concerns of three deployed recovery teams and one Investigative Element.

#### **Other Factors**

China: We believe Chinese archives and Korean War veterans, possess considerable information to assist our Korean War accounting efforts. However, to date they have been reticent about cooperating on the Korean War issue. Assuming we can convince the Chinese to cooperate on the Korean War accounting issue, DPMO will have to devote a significant amount of research and analytical effort here, in addition to its efforts in North Korea. This need is incorporated into the request for 4 additional analysts for the Research and Analysis Directorate.

Archival Research: DPMO archivists are engaged in an ongoing effort to locate, retrieve and review Korea War-era documents to aid in the accounting effort. So far we have only scratched the surface of the information in US archives. We have also just begun a joint archival review program in North Korea. The DPMO Special Projects Directorate, which handles archival research, has advised that an additional nine full—time (or contracted) personnel (3 junior archivists and 6 intelligence technicians/librarians) would be needed per year to assist in archival searches and to review, index and manage documents. The estimated cost for this is \$600,000 per year (slightly more if contracted). Additionally, Special Projects envisions bringing in short-term reservists at an estimated cost of \$250,000 per year.

MtDNA Processing: Normally, mtDNA testing is used as a last resort. Experts try to match the remains DNA sequence to a particular case. However, in Korea, mtDNA can be used up front to help resolve commingling problems and to separate out by exclusion or inclusion possible groups or individual identities when compared to each other and to family reference samples. Then, anthropological and circumstantial evidence can be brought to bear to further define the possibilities. This ability may also have to be considered in cases of previously unidentified remains already under US control, such as the over 850 Korean War remains buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific in Hawaii (the Punchbowl).

However, this means AFDIL will face an enormous increase in the number of remains and reference samples that will require processing and storage. AFDIL has already received an initial increase in funding from the Army to begin hiring additional personnel and acquire additional space, and there is a plan to expand as more remains are recovered. To create a family reference sample data base, AFDIL will need \$810,000 annually. To process the expected influx of remains, AFDIL will need \$5 million annually. We are assuming these costs would be about the same if AFDIL was used in combination with non-DoD sources as well as CILHI's own testing facilities (currently under development).

**Family Outreach:** Recent trends indicate a growing awareness and concern for the Korean War accounting issue from members of Congress, veterans, and particularly, families of Korean War missing. However, over the years, the services have lost contact with most families of the US servicemen missing from the Korean War. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have made significant headway in redressing this problem, but their numbers are not great. The Army, with more than 6,100 Army families involved with the Korean War issue, faces a much more daunting challenge. In light of the shift in our use of mtDNA testing for Korean War remains, it is even more critical that the outreach program be as complete as possible. The Army's Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center has begun hiring personnel for an outreach action cell, but this process will have to be accelerated. This will not result in any significant additional cost.

	1999	2000	2001
DPMO archivists	\$427.5K	\$855K	\$855K
DPMO policy A/Os	\$130K		
DPMO case analysts	\$52.5K	\$52.5	\$52.5
CILHI personnel	\$250K	815K	\$700K
JRO Equipment		\$1million	\$1million
JRO Compensation		\$750K	\$1.5million
IE Compensation	\$260K	\$520K	\$780K
IE Sppt/Admin	\$100K	\$200K	\$300K
CILHI TDY	\$201K	\$670K	\$1.1million
AFDIL DNA processing	\$5million	\$5million	\$5million
AFDIL Family DNA d-base	\$850K	\$850K	\$850K
TOTALS	\$7.28million	\$9.95million	\$9.87million

#### Projected Cost Recapitulation (increased funding above current levels)

#### **APPENDIXES:**


- A. Potential Recovery Sites
  B. Remains Recovery Timeline
  C. Organizational Chart
  D. JRO Compensation Breakdown
  E. Contingency Matrix

#### **APPENDIX A**


#### POTENTIAL RECOVERY SITES DPRK

Tab 1: Ground Losses

Tab 2: Air Losses







#### APPENDIX B

#### **REMAINS RECOVERY TIMELINE**

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
RMNS	1	6	*10	200	421	445	700	700	109		
AREA	Unsan	Unsan	Kujang	Chong -chon	Chong- chon	Chosin Reservoir	Yalu POW Camps	Yalu POW Camps	DMZ	TBD	TBD
JRO Scheme	**1x1	3x1	5x1	5x1/2	5x2/4 or 1+	5x3/6 or 1+	5x3/6 or 1+	5x3/6 or 1+	5x3/6 or 1+	TBD	TBD

\* Projected based on recoveries in JROs 1,2-98


\*\* Number of JROs x recovery teams each JRO/RI teams each JRO

Assumptions:

- Not all known mass gravesites were excavated earlier by DPRK teams.
- The investigation and survey site will provide solid recovery leads.

Estimated Recovery Rates:

POW camp burial ground = 90% Temporary cemetery = 90% Battlefield sites = 30% Aircraft loss sites = 10%



#### APPENDIX D

#### AVERAGE COMPENATION TO DPRK JOINT RECOVERY OPERATION 1998

•	Witnesses	\$9,000
•	Labor (KPA provides): 20 DPRK Officials (20 x \$40/day x 24 days) 60 workers/security (60 x \$30/day x 24 days	\$19,200 \$43,200
•	Mission Support (KPA provides): Water (13,200 liters x \$1) Fuel Land Compensation Transportation Standby Helicopter Lumber Rice (800 gms/day/ind x 80 inds x 24 days) Meat	\$13,200 \$8,400 \$14,400 \$12,000 \$10,800 \$600 \$1,250 \$2,348

#### TOTAL: \$134,398

Contingency Costs:

Helicopter operations (\$1,000 per hour) Camp downtime security (\$500 per day)

#### CONTINGENCY MATRIX

#### DPRK site cooperation stalls

-DASD telephones initial frustrations to Li Gun

-DASD meets with Li Gun; expresses intention to send Deputy to DPRK

-Deputy Director raises the issue to KPA during his visit with possibility of scaling back or curtailing remaining JROs, or withholding compensation

#### DPRK refuse to repatriate remains to UNC

-Advise DPRK via Li Gun and DPMO LNO that failure to abide by agreement will curtail remaining JROs

-DPMO coordinates with UNC to go ahead with the ceremony if possible and have recovery team arrange to turn over remains to UNC honor guard

-DASD informs Li Gun that remaining JROs have been cancelled

#### DPRK refuses to allow remains to be repatriated at Panmunjom

-Transfer custody of remains to Swedish Embassy for shipment via commercial airline to CILHI

#### Swedish Embassy unable to accept remains

-Arrange for US milair via air medevac corridor to pick up remains at Panmunjom

#### DPRK detains one or more recovery personnel

-Senior recovery team individual contacts DPMO, CILHI, Swedish Embassy

- -DASD contacts State Department Consular Affairs POC (see below)
- -DASD contacts Li Gun to demand explanation

-DASD, with State Department Consular Affairs representative, meets with Li Gun

-DASD dispatches Deputy Director, with State Department Consular Affairs representative, to DPRK

#### DPRK continues to detain individual(s)

-DASD calls interagency meeting to form crisis cell to determine subsequent COAs -DASD recalls recovery team

-DASD advises Li Gun that remaining JROs will be cancelled

State Department Consular Affairs POC: (b) (6)

### ACCELERATED RECOVERY PLAN

### NORTH KOREA








## SITUATION

- Over 8,100 unaccounted for from Korean War
- Over 1,000 unidentified remains in US control
- Several hundred to several thousand remains recoverable in North Korea
- Joint Recovery Operations began in July 1996
- 1 JRO in 1996, 3 in 1997, 5 in 1998
- 20 remains recovered to date
- Both sides looking to expand JROs
- CILHI worldwide recovery mission capability of 13 recovery teams
  - 10 teams dedicated to JTFFA Southeast Asia conflict mission
  - 2 teams dedicated to North Korea
  - 1 team dedicated to other missions (WWII, Cold War, miscellaneous)

### PROBLEM

- Growing concern over pace of recoveries
  - Not realistic at current pace
  - Will window of opportunity remain open
  - Equivalency of effort
- DoD manpower issues
  - Current trend is less, not more
  - Steady-state Southeast Asia mission for JTFFA
- DPRK sensitivities
  - Accept humanitarian essence of DPMO/CILHI
  - Total number of Americans in DPRK at one time
- Lack of joint investigative and survey effort



# MISSION

 DoD accelerates effort over the next five years to recover remains of US Korean War dead in North Korea.

# ASSUMPTIONS

- DPRK cooperation continues
- Five JROs per year
- Available funding
- Some personnel augmentation
- Three-year ramp-up to max optempo
- Civilian roundout support available

### **OPERATIONAL ENHANCEMENTS**

•More Investigation Elements

- 1999: 2 IEs
- 2000: 4 IEs
- Minimize guess work

•Priority to Known Mass Grave Sites

- Concentrated graves
- Known sites

•More Recovery Teams

- 2000: 2 teams per JRO
- 2001 and out: 3 teams per JRO
- increase in flexibility, coverage

### **TECHNOLOGY ENHANCEMENTS**

•Ground Penetrating Radars

- Used successfully in SEA recovery missions
- Best used in known or concentrated sites

Increased use of Imagery

Comparison with past imagery

Guide to investigative elements

Aerial Searches

Using KPA helicopters

## LOGISTICAL ENHANCEMENTS

•Permanent (semi-permanent) detachment

- Improved communications
- Improves operational control & transition
- Improved maintenance and equipment support
- More consistent investigative element support
- Greater archival contacts

# SITE PRIORITY/REMAINS RECOVERY TIMELINE (Notional)

Sites (Potential Remains)	Current	Ramped- Up	Estimated Remains
Apex (270)	1999	1999	*135
Camp 5 (322)	2000	2000	*161/296
Koto-ri Cemetery (30)	2001	2000	*15/311
Hungnam Cemetery (49)	2001	2001	*25/326
Death Valley Camp (233)	2002	2001	*117/443
Suan Camps (75)	2003	2002	*38/481
Pyongyang Cemetery (185)	2004	2002	*93/574
Other POW Camps (600)	2006	2003	**300/874
Unsan/Chongchon B/F (1559)	2009	2005	**480/1354
Chosin B/F (1000)	2012	2007	**300/1654
DMZ (89)	2015	2009	**30/1684
Crash Sites (600)	TBD	TBD	TBD

\* 50% recovery rate

\*\* 30% recovery rate

### **COMMAND** and **CONTROL**

- DPMO: Policy oversight for accounting issue
- CILHI: Operations
- CMAOC: Executive Agency, CILHI oversight
- PACOM: Theater responsibility
- UNC: Korean peninsula responsibilities

### SUPPORT

- DPMO: Analysis, negotiations, PMKOR data base
- CILHI: Operations, handling of remains, contracting
- CMAOC: Coordinate personnel/funding support
- Services: Casualty Office outreach to families
- AFDIL: Reference sample data base, mtDNA testing of remains
- PACOM: Air medical evacuation contingency support, commo/medical personnel support, repatriation mission support
- UNC: Repatriation ceremony and mortuary support, funds transfer, land medivac contingency

# **PRIMARY ISSUES**

- Logistics base
  - Currently China via air
  - ROK via Panmunjom if recoveries accelerate
- Personnel
  - DPMO needs 12 personnel through augmentation or realignment (None under DPMO "2000")
  - CILHI needs 33, 35 and 25 personnel augmentations in 1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively.
  - Civilian roundout alternative to military shortfall
- Funding
  - Increase of \$27 million over the next three years (Less \$3 million under DPMO "2000")

# **RELATED ISSUES**

- Growing Worldwide Mission
  - SEA expansion
  - WWII backlog
  - External requests (State, CIA)
- China initiatives
- Service Issues
  - Joint billets
  - Burden sharing
  - Next-of-kin and DNA reference samples

### **Funding Summary**

Projected Cost Recapitulation (increased funding above current levels)

	1999	2000	2001
DPMO archivists	\$427.5K	\$855K	\$855K
DPMO policy A/Os	\$130K		
DPMO case analysts	\$52.5K	\$52.5	\$52.5
CILHI personnel	\$250K	815K	\$700K
JRO Equipment		\$1million	\$1million
JRO Compensation		\$750K	\$1.5million
IE Compensation	\$260K	\$520K	\$780K
IE Sppt/Admin	\$100K	\$200K	\$300K
CILHI TDY	\$201K	\$670K	\$1.1million
AFDIL DNA	\$5million	\$5million	\$5million
processing			
AFDIL Family DNA d-base	\$850K	\$850K	\$850K
TOTALS	\$7.28million	\$9.95million	\$9.87million

DPMO notional "2000" plan would reduce cost by \$3 million over 3 years.

### FUNDING SOURCES

DPMO OSD (14M)

CILHI Army DCSPER (15M)

JTFFA

Army DCSPER (5M) Navy (15M)

AFDIL

Army DCSPER (5M) DoD Health Affairs (Current DNA work)

## **PERSONNEL SUMMARY**

#### **Personnel Increase Estimates**

	1999	2000	2001
DPMO Policy/Plans Officer	2		
DPMO case analysts	4		
DPMO archivists	3		
DPMO archival analysts/technicians	3	6	
CILHI anthropologists	2	3	2
CILHI mission commanders (O4)	3	2	2
CILHI Mortuary affairs specialists	6	4	2
Photographers	2	2	2
CILHI Medics	2	2	2
CILHI EOD Specialists		2	2
CILHI Linguists	4	4	4
CILHI analysts	2	2	
CILHI Administrative specialist		1	1
CILHI Admin. Tech		1	
CILHI Senior Mortuary affairs spec.		2	3
CILHI Logistics NCO			2
<b>CILHI Communications specialists</b>			3
CILHI Transportation clerk		1	
CILHI Orders clerk		1	
CILHI Operations NCO		1	
CILHI Contracting specialist		1	
TOTALS	33	35	25

## **DPMO** Personnel Assets **Korean War Accounting**

### PRESENT

### **DPMO 2000**

P&P AOs	2	P&P AOs	2
Analysts	9	Analysts	18
Archivists	4	Archivists	1
Technicians	0	Technicians	Contracted


# NEXT STEPS

- Initiate Korea-driven manpower survey
- Draft/implement DoD Directive to Army
- Brief OSD intent to Army leadership
- Brief OSD intent to Joint Staff (PACOM, UNC)
- Survey sources of civilian roundout support
- Negotiate agreement with North Koreans

## **HERE and NOW**

- •Veterans Family Visit to DPRK (Oct 24-27)
- •Tentative Vets/family Meeting with DPRK representatives in Chicago (Nov 16-18)
- •Tentative 1999 Planning Meeting with KPA in New York (Dec 9-12)

•Tentative DASD trip to DPRK (1999)



# REMAINS RECOVERY TIMELINE (Notional)

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
RMNS	1	6	*10	200	421	445	700	700	109		
AREA	Unsan	Unsan	Kujang	Chong- chon	Chong- chon	Chosin Reserv oir	Yalu POW Camps	Yalu POW Camps	DMZ	TBD	TBD
JRO Scheme	**1x1	3x1	5x1	5x1/2	5x2/4 or 1+	5x3/6 or 1+	5x3/6 or 1+	5x3/6 or 1+	5x3/6 or 1+	TBD	TBD

\* Projected based on recoveries in JROs 1,2-98

\*\* Number of JROs x recovery teams each JRO/RI teams each JRO


Assumptions:

- Not all known mass gravesites were excavated earlier by DPRK teams.
- The investigation and survey site will provide solid recovery leads.
- Estimated Recovery Rates:

POW camp burial ground = 90% Temporary cemetery = 90% Battlefield sites = 30% Aircraft loss sites = 10%

# EXECUTION

- Three-year ramp-up of CILHI effort
- five JROs per year
- 1999: 1 Rec Tm / 2 IEs per JRO
- 2000: 2 Rec Tms / 4 IEs per JRO
- 2001-2003: 3 Rec Tms / 6 IEs per JRO



Mission Area Analysis Study Team Visits PACOM November 29-30. <sup>(b) (6)</sup> escorted <sup>(b) (6)</sup> ANSER analysts, on a visit to the Pacific Rescue Coordination Center (PACRCC) and PACOM. <sup>(b) (6)</sup> were well received by the PACRCC. <sup>(b) (6)</sup> the assistant director of the PACRCC, provided a briefing on their peacetime operations and their organization to support wartime contingencies. <sup>(b) (6)</sup> provided a briefing on the overall intent of the MAA and that the study is in Phase One, problem definition and study plan development. <sup>(b) (6)</sup> also asked for inputs from <sup>(b) (6)</sup> and his staff.

(b) (6)

the PACOM personnel recovery point of contact, arranged a meeting with the component offices responsible for personnel recovery and a meeting with legal and intelligence representatives. All components were present except Marine Forces. During the meeting with the components, <sup>(b) (6)</sup> provided the basic plan for personnel recovery within PACOM. He said he was pleased with the MAA briefing he received at the 1999 Personnel Recovery Conference. He was particularly impressed with the goals and the fact that the study is going to provide recommendations, instead of just studying the problem. <sup>(b) (6)</sup> gave the same briefing on the MAA he gave to the PACRCC earlier and asked for inputs from the component representatives.

The meeting with the legal and intelligence representatives provided<sup>(b) (6)</sup>

with part of the support picture. The legal representative said there is a process in PACOM to ascertain legal status of combatants early enough to ensure they are aware of their status prior to possibility of capture. The intelligence representative said they are in the process of identifying ways to reachback to the CONUS to support the warfighter. He also said they have two personnel recovery intelligence support positions identified in the JICPAC.

(b) (6)

also attended the initial meetings between JTF-FA and the ANSER representatives. <sup>(b) (6)</sup> attended these more out of a personal desire to learn more about DPMO's accounting mission, than to represent DPMO in "accounting" discussions. <sup>(b) (6)</sup> the JTF-FA public affairs officer, gave a briefing to explain the JTF-FA mission. This briefing provided the command structure of JTF-FA and how they accomplish their mission. It also included information on successful remains recoveries and how difficult it is to locate and identify remains lost over 30 years. <sup>(b) (6)</sup> briefed the goals of the MAA and that it is in Phase One.

After the mission briefing<sup>(b) (6)</sup> discussed public affairs issues with<sup>(b) (6)</sup> explained the support he provides to JTF-FA and how his office is structured. The next meeting was with the JTF-FA J5 office.<sup>(b) (6)</sup> defined the office structure and negotiation support J5 provides to the accounting mission.

(b) (6)

impression of the first meetings with JTF-FA is that some appear apprehensive of the MAA. Although they did not voice specific concerns about the study, their body language, questions, and answers left the impression that they are uneasy about what they believe could be an unstated purpose of the MAA and its outcome.



#### **REMAINS RECOVERY PLAN FOR WORLD WAR II LOSSES**

#### I. Introduction

This annex briefly reviews past efforts to recover persons unaccounted-for from World War II, outlines current efforts, and details steps that must be taken to transition the WWII effort into a dynamic, proactive search and recovery program in accordance with new World War II legislation.

#### II. Past Efforts

A. The German surrender on May 8, 1945, and the Japanese surrender on August 15,1945, together marked the end of World War II. Of the estimated 16 million Americans who served during the war, 406,000 had died and almost 79,000 were missing. Today, the number of persons still unaccounted-for remains in excess of 78,000.<sup>1</sup> By service, these losses total 38,439 Army/Army Air Corps, 35,713<sup>2</sup> Navy, 4,141 Marine Corps, and 661 Coast Guard.<sup>3</sup>

B. Following WWII, the US Government had full access to most former battle areas, which facilitated the recovery of America's war dead. Indeed, Army identification laboratories were established in Japan and Germany, at the core of former enemy territory, to serve as headquarters for remains recovery operations on both sides of the globe. From 1945 to 1951, extensive recovery efforts were made. By 1951, leads had dwindled and the Army identification laboratories in Japan and Germany were closed. From 1951 until 1976, WWII excavations were accomplished only when crash sites with numerous remains were located, which occurred once or twice each year.

C. In 1976, the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) was established. Whereas previous identification laboratories were war-specific, CILHI's assigned mission was to recover and identify all unrecovered US service members from past wars, and from non-hostile situations such as the 1985 air crash in Gander, Newfoundland, in which members of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne were killed. CILHI's WWII program initially focused on Papua New Guinea due to the large number of sites already identified in Papua New Guinea and the fact that the sites were accessible. The effort was assisted by a number of expatriate Australians permanently living in Papua New Guinea, who came forward and identified crash sites they had seen. To further support the effort, the US began an aggrassive campaign in Papua New Guinea to encourage local nationals to report any knowledge of possible American remains locations. The effort was,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The term unaccounted-for as used in this paper defines individuals whose remains have not been recovered, identified, and buried. As such it includes individuals whose remains have been purposely left at their incident sites, such as approximately 1100 persons entombed in the U.S.S. Arizona Memorial in Peart Harbor.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Navy losses include burials at sea.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Current loss numbers are from the American Battle Monuments Commission.

and continues to be, highly successful. As a result, there are now roughly 85 sites in Papua New Guinea where American losses have been confirmed, or where information submitted to US authorities warrants further investigation. Today, the WWII recovery effort is worldwide and not limited to a specific geographic region, but is conducted worldwide.




Figure 1: Timeline of World War II Activity and Recoveries

#### III. 78,000-Plus Unrecovered Remains

A. The war with Germany resulted in roughly 24,000 unaccounted-for, the number unaccounted for as a result of the war with Japan totals over 54,000. Of these, almost 16,000 individuals were lost in Europe; this number includes those

lost in the Battle of the Atlantic. An additional 4,000 were lost in the western waters of the Atlantic. Also lost in the war with Germany were almost 4,000 servicemen serving south and west of the Mediterranean in North Africa and the Persian Gulf. In the east, over 54,000 were lost in the Pacific and in Asia. This includes




Figure 2: Regional Losses

American casualties lost during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Over 400 additional servicemen were lost in US mainland Pacific coastal waters<sup>4</sup>.

#### IV. Current Site Notification Procedures

A. WWII investigations and excavations are now conducted by CILHI teams worldwide. In 1999 alone, CILHI conducted WWII field activities in England, Bulgaria, Germany, Panama, China, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea. Currently there are over 150 sites in almost 30 countries worldwide that are awaiting further investigation or excavation. This list is growing despite the fact that the US Government does not pro-actively seek the disposition of each individual still unaccounted-for from WWII, such as is the procedure for resolving the cases of individuals still missing from the Indochina and Korean Wars. Instead, it actively pursues leads passed to it by private citizens and other governments. In addition, CILHI investigators ask about, and are frequently informed of, additional sites during each WWII field activity they conduct.

B. Standardized procedures for handling reports of WWII remains sites have been developed over the years. In most instances, information is reported to the US Defense Attache (DATT) in a given country. The DATT performs an initial verification of the information before forwarding the package to CILHI. Occasionally a private citizen notifies CILHI or DPMO directly. CILHI conducts historical research on each report to determine if there are any unaccounted-for losses in the reported area, in which the circumstances of the incident fit the description of the information forwarded. If warranted, the Casualty Data Section of CILHI forwards a questionnaire to the reporting party for additional information and clarification. If initial analysis indicates a potential for further action, the case is placed on the CILHI Worldwide Case List. <sup>5</sup>

C. The US Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, established in 1992 to investigate cases of Americans and Russians still unaccounted-for as a result of previous conflicts, also collects leads. Offices in Moscow are permanently manned by US personnel, who work jointly with their Russian counterparts to collect information and follow leads. Any WWII site information they obtain that requires investigation or excavation is forwarded to DPMO and subsequently passed to CILHI.

#### V. Operational Considerations

A. Land-Based Obstacles. CILHI draws on a wide variety of recovery resources to overcome hazards such as loss sites precariously perched on cliffs, sites with an abundance of unexploded ordnance, and sites in extremely remote, difficult-to-access areas. In 1994, for example, a CILHI team crossed a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The numbers in this paragraph are approximations of numbers listed in literature produced by the American Battle Monuments Commission.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> CILHI's Worldwide Case List is explained in detail in Section VI.

Himalayan glacier on horseback and on foot to recover the frozen remains of five US airmen killed during WWII. Thus far, no WWII, land-based site has been rejected for excavation due to safety concerns. However, access to some sites is temporarily delayed due to security concerns such as civil unrest, or due to State Department restrictions related to foreign policy.



Figure 3: This photo shows a WWI, 0-47 (observation variant of a C-47) loss site on the side of a mountain in Panama. A CILHI recovery team has investigated the site, and the site is on the excavation list.

B. Underwater Safety Concerns. Not all underwater sites can be safely excavated, such as most deep water ship and aircraft loss sites. There are likely in excess of 30,000 individuals whose remains are, if they still exist, located at such sites. Navy divers are used to conduct underwater recoveries since these are specialized skills that CILHI does not maintain. The Department of the Navy recognizes that the sea has always been considered a fit and final resting place for Navy and Marine Corps personnel. Nevertheless, reasonable efforts are made by the Navy's Salvage and Recovery Program to accomplish specific underwater recoveries as a humanitarian undertaking. Navy underwater recoveries must be scheduled so as not to conflict with other, time-critical salvage and recovery operations. Further, and more importantly, remains recoveries will not be undertaken if they put the lives of recovery team members at risk. Requirements for conducting underwater remains recoveries are shown in Figure 4.

- The site must be confirmed as an unaccounted-for loss site. Confirmation of an underwater loss site is complicated due to vague or conflicting reports concerning losses, which took place over a vast ocean area. Further, strong ocean currents may have moved material evidence that would have helped identify the site and the individual.
- There must be sufficient probability of finding remains. Most water losses occurred following fire and explosion aboard a ship, or during high-speed aircraft crashes at sea.
   Remains not destroyed during the incident that have remained intact, now lie on the ocean floor, often in scattered locations. This makes finding them extremely difficult.
- The recovery must be able to be conducted safely. All underwater salvage operations carry an element of danger with them and there is little margin for error. For this reason, underwater recoveries are only conducted if there is a high probability of success, and if studies indicate the recovery can be safely conducted.

#### Figure 4: Criteria for Underwater Recoveries

#### VI. Prioritization of Recovery Efforts

A. The CILHI Worldwide Case List depicts all WWII loss sites that are awaiting further action, be that research, investigation, or excavation. The list is divided into three categories (A-B-C Lists). Cases on the C-List have little or no corroborated information. Cases on the B-List have some corroborated information, but are still lacking key pieces of information. Cases are put on the A-List when no additional information can be obtained, the site is verified as relating to an unaccounted-for American, remains have been reported at the site, the site location has been positively identified and, if the site is a crash site, the aircraft type has been identified. There are 27 sites currently on the A-List, 104 sites on the B-List, and 31 sites on the C- List.<sup>6</sup> The preponderance of B-List cases are in the South Pacific, primarily Papua New Guinea. A-List sites, those awaiting excavation, are spread almost equally between Europe, the North Pacific, and the South Pacific as shown on the following page in Figure 5.

B. Cases on the A-List face additional screening and evaluation prior to an excavation taking place. First, the political stability in the excavation area must be assessed by the regional military Commander in Chief (CINC). The site cannot be excavated without CINC approval. Second, a climatology review is conducted to determine in what time frame the weather would best accommodate an excavation. Additional factors weighed during the evaluation process are: risks involved in the actual excavation process; availability of medical evacuation should a team member be injured or become ill; likelihood of success; accessibility of the site; weather and terrain conditions; requirements for special equipment and special training; whether or not remains have actually

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The numbers for the A-B-C Lists are valid as of November 1999, These numbers are highly fluid due to periodic new site notifications, and ongoing investigations and excavations.

been observed at the site; whether or not an excavation was previously begun at the site and is awaiting completion; witness reliability; the estimated time it will take to close the site, and political and family interest in the site.




Figure 5: Sites by Region on the CILHI Worldwide A-B-C List

#### VII. Current OPTEMPO

A. Field Activities Scheduled for Calendar Year 2000. WWII investigations and excavations are conducted by the CILHI global team. The global team is also responsible for all losses from the Cold War, Gulf War, and any other past, current, or future loss not associated with the Indochina or Korean Wars. It further back-fills temporary manpower shortages on other teams. Thus the global team is periodically diverted from WWII field activities. Conversely, Korea War recovery teams have periodically been used to support WWII missions when adverse weather on the Korean Peninsula or political developments have resulted in the cancellation of a North Korean recovery effort. Currently, the global team, augmented by the North Korean team, is scheduled to conduct eight WWII excavations and seven WWII investigations during calendar year 2000.

B. The Backlog. Teams conducting excavations in support of WWII deploy for periods ranging from 28 to 35-days. During each deployment, a team can normally excavate no more than one or two sites. Investigation teams normally deploy for 21 days, during which they are able to pursue 10 to 20 cases. CILHI personnel have an overwhelming operations tempo, commonly spending over 200 days each year deployed, and rarely spending more than 45 days in succession at their home base. Their time at headquarters is spent writing detailed reports on the last deployment and doing extensive research and preparation for the next deployment. With information on new sites being gathered on a regular basis, and with no additional WWII assets, it will be extremely difficult for CILHI to reduce the number of backlogged cases awaiting excavation and investigation. The following three pages depict cases currently awaiting CILHI action.

### <u>A-List: Sites Awaiting</u> <u>Excavation</u>




Figure 6: CILHI's A-List Sites as of November 1999

### **B-List: Sites Undergoing Research and Investigation**




Figure 7: CILHI's B-List Sites as of November 1999

### **C-List: Newly Reported Sites**




Figure 8: CILHI's C-List Sites as of November 1999

#### VIII. Current Issues Impacting WWII Recoveries

A. New WWII Legislation. A recent amendment of Section 1506, Title 10, United States Code has levied additional pressure on the DoD and CILHI. The amendment, found in Section 576, states that the Secretary of Defense shall make every reasonable effort to search for, recover, and identify the remains of US service men lost in the Pacific theater during WWII while engaged in flight operations. The amendment further states the Secretary of Defense shall consider increasing the number of personnel assigned to CILHI. Although the legislation highlights air operations in the Pacific, it also draws attention to the entire WWII recovery effort -- an effort working at maximum capacity with current manpower authorizations.

B. An Increase in Site Reports. The number of sites annually reported has increased dramatically in recent years. Persons engaged in enterprises such as timbering, mining, and hunting are moving deeper into remote areas and finding sites previously beyond the reach of human activity. Expanded agricultural activity and new construction efforts in settled areas have unearthed evidence of remains or loss-related artifacts that were previously not visible. The expansion of mass communications has led to an increasing worldwide awareness of the ongoing US effort to recover remains. Finally, during each deployment recovery teams learn of additional sites.

C. German and Japanese Recovery Programs. Germany and Japan also have programs to recover their WWII unaccounted-for. Japanese efforts began immediately following WWII and continue today throughout the Asia-Pacific and in the former Soviet Union. Rather than return recovered remains to Japan, the Japanese cremate the remains at the recovery location. German recovery efforts began only recently and focus primarily on mass graves in the former Soviet Union. The Germans inter recovered remains near the recovery locations in individual plots in military cemeteries. DPMO is endeavoring to ensure that American remains are not mistakenly recovered and cremated, or reburied, by Japanese or German recovery teams so that they are forever lost to US recovery efforts. Nonetheless, the best method to prevent this from occurring is to locate and excavate the sites of America's unaccounted-for as expediently as possible.

#### IX. The Number of Recoverable Remains

A. The vast area involved, and the potentially large number of recoverable remains, presents an enormous challenge to the US Government. It is not known how many of the more than 78,000 still unaccounted-for individuals are potentially recoverable; however, certain limiting factors exist. Most personnel lost at sea are unrecoverable. This number is likely in excess of 30,000 and includes not only seamen, but also Army personnel lost during transport on naval ships, as well as Navy and Army Air Corps aircrew, whose aircraft crashed at sea. Additional remains were unknowingly destroyed or permanently lost to the

recovery effort during wartime artillery bombardments and bombing strikes, as well as during building efforts during the postwar reconstruction period. Finally, a large number of remains have been destroyed through the passage of time, exposure to elements, and circumstances of loss, such as fire and explosion.

#### X. Plan of Attack

A. Develop an Operational Plan. CILHI, working with DPMO and the services, must develop a deliberate, proactive plan to search for, recover, and identify the remains of servicemen unaccounted-for as a result of WWII. The Department of Defense must analyze the circumstances and regions of loss for the more than 78,000 individuals still unaccounted-for. Determinations must be made as to how many individuals are permanently lost due to the nature and/or location of their loss incidents. Research, analysis, and recovery efforts can then prioritize recovery assets to focus on individuals and geographic areas where recoveries are deemed most probable. The Department of Defense must develop a carefully balanced plan that will not only comply with new legislation that highlights aviators lost over the Pacific, but will also ensure continued efforts on behalf of all Americans lost during WWII, whether in the Asia-Pacific or European Theaters, and whether engaged in flight, naval, or ground activity.

B. Consider Forward Deployment. Given the high volume of cases already known to exist in Papua New Guinea, the Department of Defense must consider the advisability of establishing a small detachment in Papua New Guinea to actively collect new leads in the Pacific. A similar evaluation should be directed to consider the advisability forward deploying a CILHI representative to work out of the Office of Mortuary Affairs in Landstuhl, Germany. As in Southeast Asia, forward-deployed offices are expected to attract individuals with new information, determine the value of newly reported information, and conduct preliminary site visits. They can also facilitate the throughput of deploying and redeploying teams.

C. Procure Personnel. CILHI must grow sufficient recovery teams, solely dedicated to the WWII mission, to aggressively pursue both current and future cases on their Worldwide A-B-C Lists. CILHI also requires sufficient anthropological support for field activities as well as for ongoing forensic analysis at CILHI. In addition, both DPMO and CILHI require sufficient analytic support to enable a proactive analytic approach to the WWII recovery effort. Finally, DPMO must ensure adequate policy support for all related issues. Manpower requirements and funding are detailed in sections XI and XII.

11

Figure 9: Necessary Steps for the New WWII Mission

#### XI. Required Manpower

A. CILHI Manpower Requirements. CILHI will require two WWII-specific investigation/recovery teams and an increase in support staff to fully support the increased mission. The global team will focus on real time recoveries; back-fill other teams when necessary; conduct special, ad hoc recoveries; and support WWII efforts as it has done in the past. Initial estimates indicate CILHI needs a manpower increase of at least 21 persons, which provides for the manning of the two WWII-dedicated teams, and support personnel. Each nine-person team will consist of one team leader, one anthropologist, one non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), one medic, three mortuary affairs specialists, one explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialist, and one photographer. CILHI also requires two additional analysts to increase research efforts, and a third anthropologist, in addition to the two anthropologists hired for the two teams, to ensure ongoing forensic analysis at CILHI during the deployment of field teams. New personnel will be phased in over a two year period, beginning with fiscal year 2001. Under this timeline, by the end of fiscal year 2002, all personnel will be trained, and the new teams will be operating at full strength. This manpower estimate presupposes that all manpower requirements already validated for CILHI are filled.

Position	2001	2002	Totals
Team Leaders	1	+1	. 2
Anthropologists	2	+1	3
NCOICs	1	+1	2
Medics	1	+1	2
Mortuary Affairs Specialists	3	+3	6
EOD Specialists	1	+1	2
Photographers	1	+1	2
Analysts	2	+0	2
Totals	12	+9	21

Figure 10: CILHI's Additional Manpower Requirements for the New WWII Mission

B. DPMO Manpower Requirements. As it does for the Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia recovery efforts, DPMO will fully support CILHI's WWII efforts with analytic and policy support. At present, DPMO has no authorizations for WWII, and is able to support the effort on an ad hoc basis only. To establish a full-time support program for the expanded WWII mission, DPMO will require three additional analysts – one each for Pacific air losses, worldwide naval losses, and European Theater losses – and one policy officer. The additional manpower will be phased in during fiscal years 2001 and 2002.

Position	2001	2002	TOTALS
Analysts	2	1	3
Policy Officer	1	0	1
TOTALS	3	1	4

Figure 11: DPMO's Additiona	I Manpower Requirements	s for the New WWII Mission
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#### XII. Required OPTEMPO

A. Each WWII-dedicated team will conduct a minimum of five excavations each year. The global team will conduct up to five WWII excavations each year as permitted by other requirements. In addition to excavations, each WWIIdedicated team will each conduct a minimum of four investigation activities annually. During each investigation, 10 to 20 sites will be visited; thus four annual investigative activities will result in the investigation of 40 to 80 sites in one year. The current global team will conduct additional investigation activity in support of WWII when possible. Northeast and Southeast Asia teams, when diverted from their primary mission for any reason, will augment the WWII effort. The two WWII-dedicated teams will have as their priority, investigations and excavations in the Pacific as mandated by new legislation. However, excavations will only be done on sites that have met all the excavation criteria. The expanded activity will ensure that by the start of fiscal year 2003, 18 excavations and 15 investigative activities will be conducted annually in pursuit of the resolution of WWII cases. The following chart depicts the number of anticipated WWII field activities from the year 2000 through 2005.

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Totals
Excavations	8	10	13	18	18	18	90
Investigations	7	9	11	15	15	15	76

Figure 12: Number of Estimated Investigations and Excavations with Two WWII teams, Regular Global Team Assistance, and Periodic Participation by other Regional Teams

#### XIII. Budgetary Requirements

A. The fully expanded WWII mission will increase CILHI's current annual spending levels by an estimated \$2,923,593 by the close of fiscal year 2002. For

fiscal year 2001, the increase includes one WWII team, plus an additional anthropologist and two analysts. A second WWII team will be added in fiscal 2002. The costs also include the expansion of the current WWII mission by five excavations and four investigation periods in fiscal year 2001, and doubling the number of deployments beginning with fiscal year 2002.

Category	2001	2002-2005
Anthropologists <sup>7</sup>	\$163,422	\$245,133
Analysts <sup>8</sup>	\$136,352	\$136,652
Excavations <sup>9</sup>	\$802,616	\$1,605,232
Investigations <sup>10</sup>	\$468,288	\$936,576
Totals	\$1,570,678	\$2,923,593

#### Figure 13: Estimated Annual Cost Increases at CILHI for Increased WWII Activities

B. DPMO annual increases to current spending levels will rise to \$329,108 by the close of fiscal year 2002. This increase reflects the addition of one policy officer and three policy-support analysts.

Category	2001	2002-2005
Analysts <sup>11</sup>	\$164,554	\$246,831
Policy Officer <sup>11</sup>	\$82,277	\$82,277
Totals	\$246,831	\$329,108

Figure 14: Estimated Annual Cost Increases at DPMO for Increased WWII Activities

#### XIV. Assumptions

A. The following assumptions have been made in preparing this annex.

• WWII sites will continue to be reported in the same, or increasing, numbers over the next five years, and increased research efforts on the part of CILHI and DPMO will unearth new leads.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Anthropologists were calculated as follows: GS12/4 (\$52,681), plus FY 2000 pay raise (4.8%), plus benefits (25%), plus Hawaii COLA (25%) = \$81,711.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Analysts were calculated as follows: GS11/4 (\$43,955), plus FY 2000 pay raise (4.8%), plus benefits (25%), plus Hawaii COLA (25%) = \$68,176.

<sup>\*</sup> Annual excavations were calculated at five activities per team: 3 x \$208,000 (South Pacific), 1 x \$70,266 (North Pacific), and 1 x \$108,350 (Europe).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Annual investigations were calculated at four activities per team at \$117,072 each.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> DPMO analysts and policy officers were calculated as follows: GS13/4 (\$63,829) plus FY 2000 pay raise (4.8%) plus benefits (23%) = \$82,277.

• Manpower requirements will be validated and authorized, and the billets will be manned.

• Funding to support the expanded mission will be approved.

• Nations in which Americans were lost as a result of WWII will continue to cooperate with the US in its effort to locate and retrieve remains.

• The global team will continue to focus the bulk of its effort on WWII recoveries, and WWII will remain a priority task for regional teams when diverted from their primary mission.

#### XV. Conclusion

The list of WWII loss sites awaiting investigation and excavation continues to grow. The current paucity of assets available to research the sites, conduct field activity, and conduct forensic analysis of recovered remains, has contributed to the backlog of cases awaiting action. Steps outlined in this paper, when implemented, will ensure an aggressive, proactive Department of Defense effort to search for, recover and identify the remains of persons still unaccounted-for from WWII. The expanded WWII recovery effort will place an enormous load on staffing in all agencies connected to the accounting process. However, the Department of Defense has a responsibility to the men and women of the armed forces, as well as to the families of the unaccounted-for, to fulfill our obligation of the fullest possible accounting, and it takes that responsibility very seriously.