

PRESENT. AFTER GOING OVER THE ALLEN COLUMN, FECHHEIMER CONCLUDED HE
COULD SEE NO INACCURACIES IN IT.

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL, USAF, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
ADVISED HE ATTENDED THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE MONDAY, DECEMBER TEN; THAT
THIS WAS THE FIRST SUCH CONFERENCE HE EVER ATTENDED AND DID SO ONLY AS AN
OBSERVER AND TOOK NO PART IN THE DISCUSSIONS. GENERAL CABELL WAS UNABLE
TO RECALL SPECIFICALLY WHAT WAS SAID, BY WHOM AND IN WHAT ORDER THE
SPEAKERS OFFERED THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS. CABELL WAS UNAWARE THAT INSTANT
INVESTIGATION HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN, ALSO UNAWARE THAT ANY ALLEGED LEAK
HAD OCCURRED CONCERNING THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. CABELL ADVISED HE
DID NOT KNOW DREW PEARSON EXCEPT BELIEVES HE MET PEARSON CASUALLY ON
ONE OCCASION A LONG TIME AGO AND PROBABLY WOULD KNOW BY SIGHT; DOES
NOT KNOW JACK ANDERSON OR ANY OTHER PEARSON EMPLOYEE. IN CONNECTION WITH
THE DISCUSSION AT THE CONFERENCE, CABELL ADVISED HE COULD NOT RECALL
ANY MENTION MADE ABOUT EXTENDING THE CEASE FIRE NEGOTIATIONS DEADLINE,
AND SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE PRESIDENT OR ANYONE ELSE PRESENT MENTIONED
THIS. HE SAID THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A QUESTION POSED BY SOMEONE IN ATTENDANCE
CONCERNING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN THE THIRTY DAY DEADLINE WAS PASSED,
AND NO AGREEMENTS REACHED, BUT CABELL POINTED OUT THAT QUESTION HAD
ARISEN MANY TIMES PREVIOUSLY, IN VARIOUS JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETINGS
ATTENDED BY CABELL, AND HE COULD NOT RECALL THAT THAT POINT WAS MENTIONED
AT THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. THE TEXT OF THE COLUMN OF ROBERT S. ALLEN
IN THE NEW YORK POST DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF

GENERAL CABELL, AND HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF IT WAS NOT AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. FOR INSTANCE, CABELL POINTED OUT THAT HE BELIEVES THE COMMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL COLLINS IN THE ALLEN COLUMN WERE MORE IN LINE WITH THINGS GENERAL COLLINS HAD SAID PREVIOUSLY, INCLUDING COMMENTS MADE BY HIM AT FORMER CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETINGS. CABELL BELIEVED THE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED BY ALLEN TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN WAS ACCURATE IN SUBSTANCE, BUT WAS NOT A VERBATIM ACCOUNT. IN APPRAISAL OF THE ALLEN COLUMN, CABELL STATED IT CONTAINED A CONTINUOUS THREAD TO INDICATE ALLEN HAD AN INFORMANT WHO ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE. CABELL POINTED OUT SOME OF THOSE IN ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE WERE NOT KNOWN TO HIM; ALSO OTHERS WERE NOT INTIMATELY KNOWN TO HIM, BUT HE COULD NOT SUGGEST ANY PERSON OR PERSONS ATTENDING THAT CONFERENCE AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY LEAK.

HOOD

cc: Mr. Belmont

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Laughlin	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

12-15-51

15

8:00 P.M.

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH. PRESIDENTIAL AIDE GENERAL HARRY VAUGHAN INTERVIEWED THIS DATE. UNABLE SUGGEST IDENTITY PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK. STATES, HOWEVER, FROM STANDPOINT OF SECURITY, STATE DEPT. WEAKEST OF ALL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS THIS AREA, BUT HAS NOTHING SPECIFIC TO INDICATE STATE DEPT. INVOLVED IN LEAK OF INFORMATION UNDER INVESTIGATION. VAUGHAN WAS FURNISHED MATERIAL CONTAINED IN ALLEN ARTICLE, APPEARING IN NEW YORK POST DECEMBER THIRTEEN, AND INFOEMS MATERIAL, WHILE NOT CONSISTING QUOTES OF STATEMENTS AND VIEWS EXPRESSED AT CONFERENCE, IS EXTREMELY ACCURATE, AND STATES IT WOULD BE QUOTE MIRACULOUS UNQUOTE IF THE INDIVIDUAL WRITING IT DID SO WITHOUT ACTUALLY HAVING ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE OR WITHOUT HAVING ACCESS TO A PERSON WHO DID ATTEND. DENIES ANY TYPE OF PERTINENT CONTACT WITH PEARSON OR ASSOCIATES AND STATES PEARSON HAS SOME ENMITY TOWARD HIM FOR NUMER OF YEARS.

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FRANK PACE INTERVIEWED THIS DATE AND ADVISED THAT HE COULD NOT FURNISH ANY INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE ALLEGED LEAK. THE ARTICLE PREPARED BY ROBERT S. ALLEN WAS READ TO PACE, AND HE ADVISED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE, WHO WAS NOT IN ATTENDANCE, COULD HAVE PREPARED IT, BUT THAT THIS WAS IMPROBABLE. HE STATED THAT THE

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MATERIAL APPEARING IN THE ARTICLE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY THAT WHICH WAS DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL COLLINS WITH RESPECT TO QUOTE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE DEFINITELY WAS NOT STATED BY GENERAL COLLINS. PAGE ADVISED THAT HE HAS MET PEARSON ON TWO OCCASIONS AND HAS NOT SEEN HIM FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS, AND HAS NOT SEEN OR TALKED TO ANY OF PEARSON-S EMPLOYEES OR ASSOCIATES FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS. DENIES THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE WITH ANYONE OTHER THAN POSSIBLY SECRETARY LOVETT OR SECRETARY FINLETTER.

HOOD

W. M. Belmont

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

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ATTENTION INSPECTOR CARL HENNRICH
COLUMN OF ROBERT S. ALLEN, N. Y. POST DEC., THIRTEEN FIFTYONE. REF
TEL CALL INSPECTOR HENNRICH DEC FOURTEEN LAST, NY POST "BLUE FINAL"
EDITION DEC THIRTEEN LAST CONTAINS COLUMN OF ALLEN WHICH IS QUOTED
AS FOLLOWS "REDS- CEASE-FIRE TERMS N. G. BY ROBERT S. ALLEN -
WASHINGTON, DEC, THIRTEEN- THE UN CAN HAVE A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA,
BUT AT THE COST OF IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO THE REDS.

THAT-S WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS TOLD THE PRESIDENT IN THEIR BIG
CONFERENCE WITH HIM AFTER HIS RETURN. GEN. BRADLEY DECLARED THE POR-
TRACTED TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED THE POINT "WHERE A FEW CON-
CESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BRING AN AGREEMENT IF THE COMMUNISTS
REALLY WANT ONE."

"WHAT DO THEY WANT QUESTIONMARK" ASKED THE PRESIDENT.

"THE DEADLOCK GETS DOWN TO THIS," EXPLAINED BRADLEY. "WE ARE DE-
MANDING THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO ROTATE OUR TROOPS AS WE HAVE BEEN
DOING FOR MONTHS. THE REDS ARE FLATLY REFUSING TO ALLOW THAT. THEY
ARE INSISTING ON A COMPLETE FREEZE ON REPLACEMENTS AND WEAPONS. BUT
THEY HAVE INDICATED THEY WOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS ON THAT IF WE WILL
ALLOW THEM TO BUILD SOME AIRFIELDS IN NORTH KOREA. WE HAVE REFUSED
TO DO THAT. OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE USING THE ROTATION ISSUE TO TRY TO
WREST CONCESSIONS FROM US ON THE AIRFIELD DEMAND."

END OF PAGE ONE

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PAGE TWO

GEN. HOYT VANDENBERG VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING ANY GROUND ON THAT.

"I WANT A CEASE FIRE, IF ONE CAN BE WORKED OUT THAT IS FAIR AND PROPER," DECLARED THE AIR CHIEF OF STAFF. "BUT I DON-T SEE HOW WE CAN SAFELY DO ANYTHING THAT WILL ENABLE THE REDS TO BUILD UP THEIR AIR STRENGTH. THAT IS WHAT PERMITTING THEM TO BUILD AIRFIELDS WILL AMOUNT TO. SUCH BASES IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE OF GREAT COMBAT VALUE TO THEM, IF THEY DECIDE TO BREAK THE TRUCE NEXT SPRING, WHICH I WOULDN-T PUT PAST THEM."

GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS WAS INCLINED TO FAVOR SOME TERMS ON THE AIR-FIELD DISPUTE. HE THOUGHT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THAT. BUT THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WAS ADAMANT IN INSISTING THE COMMUNISTS BE REQUIRED TO AGREE TO ROTATION OF UN GROOPS.

"THAT WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE MORALE OF OUR MEN," COLINS ARGUED. "I AM STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY CONCESSION ON THAT. IT IS AN UNFAIR DEMAND, AND THE ONLY REASON THE REDS ON MAKING IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE US TO GIVE IN ON AIRFIELDS.

"OUR ARMY CAN HOLD THE PRESENT LINE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER, AND I AM FLATLY OPPOSED TO GIVING THE SLIGHTEST GROUND ON THE REPLACE-MENT ISSUE. THE REDS WOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHT AS US ON THAT, AND I DON-T SEE WHY THEY SHOULD OBJECT TO IT, EXCEPT FOR TRADING PURPOSES."

END OF PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

BRADLEY AGREED WITH COLLINS, BUT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS TO BUILD UP A POWERFUL AIRFORCE.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN LISTENED INTENTLY TO THE MILITARY LEADERS AND SAID NOTHING UNTIL THEY FINISHED. THEN HE TOLD THEM-

"AS YOU KNOW I AM VERY ANXIOUS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. BUT I WILL NOT AGREE TO CONCESSIONS TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT WE MAY REGRET LATER ON. WE WANT TO BE VERY CAREFUL THAT WE DO NOT SELL OURSELVES SHORT IN OUR EAGERNESS TO SECURE A TRUCE FOR OUR MEN."

ALSO DISCUSSED WAS THE QUESTION OF BUILDING UP THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY, AS THIS COLUMN HAS REPORTED WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL RIDGWAY.

COPY OF COLUMN MAILED BUREAU DECEMBER FIFTEEN

SCHEIDT

END

NY-R 1 WA LEA

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~~ORIGINAL~~ DIRECTOR

12-15-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15

9:45 A.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DEC TEN FIFTY

ONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH. COL.

[REDACTED] AID TO GEN OMAR BRADLEY, ADVISED THAT UPON THE RETURN

OF GEN BRADLEY FROM WHITE HOUSE ABOUT SIX THIRTY PM WEDNESDAY DEC

TWELVE, BRADLEY ADVISED [REDACTED] AND COL [REDACTED] PRESS

RELATIONS OFFICER FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT PRES TRUMAN WAS GREATLY

CONCERNED OVER FACT THAT DREW PEARSON POSSESSED KNOWLEDGE OF WHITE HOUSE

CONFERENCE ON MONDAY DECEMBER TEN AND THAT A COLUMN HAD BEEN PREPARED

CONTAINING DETAILS OF THAT CONFERENCE. BEFORE ANDERSON ARRIVED GEN.

BRADLEY TELEPHONED SEC ROBERT LOVETT AND FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR AND DISCUSSED

LEAK AND PRESIDENTS CONCERN. COL [REDACTED] STATED MATTER OF CONCERN TO

COL [REDACTED] PRESS OFFICER, AND HE WAS IN AND OUT CONFERENCE ROOM

DURING ANDERSONS VISIT, HOWEVER, HE RECALLED THAT GEN BRADLEY HAD

READ ALOUD THE COLUMN TEXT RELATING TO INSTANT CONFERENCE AND HE

REMEMBERED THAT REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE PRESIDENTS ENTERING THE WHITE

HOUSE CONFERENCE ROOM, SHAKING HANDS WITH EVERYBODY AND A REFERENCE TO HIS

SUNTAN WAS MADE. HE ADVISED THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT

WAS QUOTED RATHER FREELY AND IT WAS INDICATED THE INFORMATION EMANATED

FROM A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE OR AN INFORMED SOURCE. HE RECALLED THERE

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WAS REFERENCE TO CEASE FIRE AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS OPOSED TO THE
COMMUNISTS REBUILDING AIR FIELDS, ROADS, ETC. HE DID NOT RECALL ANY
MENTION WAS MADE OF EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS. COL [] STATED THERE
WERE TWO ITEMS WHICH WERE PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE TO GEN BRADLEY AND
ANDERSON AGREED HE WOULD DELETE ANYTHING CONSTITUTING SECURITY VIOLATIONS.

HE STATED HE REMEMBERED ONE OBJECTIONABLE ITEM IN WHICH IT WAS STATED THAT
WE ARE ANXIOUS FOR AN ARMISTICE AND WOULD GO TO ALMOST ANY LENGTH. FURTHER,
THE PRESIDENT HAD URGED THAT WE NOT GO AND MAKE ANY FOOLISH MISTAKE THERE-
AFTER. [] COULD NOT RECALL THE SECOND ITEM. HE INDICATED GEN BRADLEY

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DID NOT COMMENT ON THE TRUTH OR ACCURACY OF COLUMN AND STATED THAT HE, COL
[] URGED GEN BRADLEY TO CIRCLE WITH A PENCIL THE OBJECTIONABLE ITEMS
WHICH GENERAL BRADLEY DID. HE STATED THE MEETING WITH ANDERSON ENDED
AMICABLY AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COLUMN WAS NOT HARMFUL AS CORRECTED.

COL [] WHO IS INTIMATELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESS, AND ANDERSON
PARTICULARLY FURNISHED MORE COMPLETE INFORMATION. HE CONFIRMED THE ABOVE
REGARDING ARRIVAL OF GEN BRADLEY FROM WHITE HOUSE AT SIX THIRTY PM DEC

TWELVE AND STATED GEN BRADLEY HAD RELATED THAT ANDERSON HAD VISITED FRANCIS
WHITEHAIR THE PREVIOUS DAY ON PRETEXT OF WANTING TO MEET HIM AND THEN
PRODUCED A PAPER AND READ A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE PRESIDENTIAL
CONFERENCE. IN THIS, ANDERSON DIRECTLY QUOTED ADM WILLIAM FECHTELER
AND GEN HOYT VANDENBERG WHICH ALARMED WHITEHAIR WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO

WFO 6060

THE PRESIDENT. COL [] STATED IN THE LATE AFTERNOON DEC TWELVE GEN BRADLEY VISITED WHITE HOUSE TO CLEAR A CABLE TO GEN RIDGWAY AND WAS INFORMED OF THE LEAK BY THE PRESIDENT WHO WAS GREATLY DISTURBED. GEN BRADLEY VOLUNTEERED TO HANDLE THE MATTER AS THE PRESIDENT FELT THE STORY MIGHT UPSET THE ENTIRE TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS. GEN BRADLEY RELATED WHITEHAIR HAD CALLED PEARSON CONCERNING THE COLUMN AND PEARSON DECLARED NOTHING IN THE COLUMN ENDANGERED SECURITY AND ADDING THE COLUMN HAD ALREADY BEEN DESPACHED. COL [] STATED HE DEEMED IT ADVISABLE TO VERIFY THIS AND CONTACTED RUSS WIGGINS, WASHINGTON POST, WHO INFORMED HIM THE STORY DID NOT APPEAR IN COLUMNS PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION DEC THIRTEEN AND FOURTEEN. [] THEREAFTER CONTACTED ANDERSON AND TOLD ANDERSON THERE WAS GREAT ALARM OVER THE COLUMN WHICH ENDANGERED THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. IN REPLY ANDERSON TOLD [] IF THERE WAS ANYTHING IN THE COLUMN THAT WAS A VIOLATION OF SECURITY HE DID NOT WANT TO PUBLISH IT.

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ANDERSON AGREED TO BRING THE COLUMN OVER TO GEN BRADLEYS OFFICE AND GO OVER IT AND SAID HE WOULD DO SO IF IN EXCHANGE COL [] WOULD TELL HIM HOW [] HAD FOUND OUT ABOUT THE COLUMN. TO THIS [] SAID HE AGREED.

SHORTLY THEREAFTER ANDERSON CAME OVER TO THE PENTAGON TO GEN BRADLEYS OFFICE AND THERE IN THE PRESENCE OF GEN BRADLEY, ANDERSON, [] AND COL [] THE COLUMN WAS READ ALOUD BY GEN BRADLEY. GEN BRADLEY POINTED TO TWO ITEMS IN THE COLUMN WHICH GEN BRADLEY CONSIDERED DANGEROUS AS REFLECTING THINKING AT HIGH LEVEL WHICH WOULD LEAD COMMUNISTS TO BELIEVE WE WERE TOO

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ANXIOUS FOR AN ARMISTICE. [] STATED THE COLUMN INDICATED THAT THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO OBTAIN A CEASE FIRE BUT SHOULD MAKE NO CONCESSIONS THAT WE WILL REGRET LATER. HE STATED GEN BRADLEY FELT THIS SHOULD BE CHANGED AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FIRST PORTION SHOULD BE DELETED AND MADE TO READ THAT THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED WE SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS WHICH WE WOULD REGRET LATER. THE SECOND OBJECTIONABLE ITEM INDICATED THAT WE WOULD GRANT AN EXTENSION OF A FEW DAYS IF DETAILS WERE NOT WORKED OUT BY DEC TWENTY SEVEN FIFTY ONE. GEN BRADLEY INSISTED THIS SHOULD BE CHANGED AND MADE TO READ: UNDOUBTEDLY THERE WILL BE SOME DETAILS THAT WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT AFTER THE DEC TWENTY SEVEN DEADLINE.

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FOLLOWING THE TWO CORRECTIONS AT THE PLACES MARKED ON THE TEXT BY GEN BRADLEY AS COL [] HAS STATED IT WAS AGREED ALL AROUND THAT THE COLUMN WOULD NOT BE HARMFUL AND IN FACT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. ALTHOUGH GEN BRADLEY DID NOT APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE THE PUBLICATION AND DID NOT AFFIRM OR DENY THE TRUTH OR ACCURACY OF THE STATEMENTS, THE CORRECTIONS IMPOSED ON HIM BY ANDERSONS PRESENTATION IN EFFECT CONSTITUTED AN APPROVAL. COL [] INDICATED THIS IS NECESSARY ROUTINE HANDLING OF STORIES WHICH CONSTITUTE ACCOMPLISHED SCOOPS OF NEWS AND ALTHOUGH THEY ARE UNABLE TO PREVENT PUBLICATION THEY ENDEAVOR TO PROTECT NATIONAL INTEREST BY PERSUADING REPORTERS NOT TO PUBLISH ANY ITEMS WHICH WOULD ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY. COL [] ALSO RECALLED THE COLUMN MENTIONED

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WFO 6060

THE PRESIDENTS ENTRANCE INTO THE CONFERENCE ROOM WHERE HE GREETED EVERYONE IN GOOD SPIRITS AND ASKED QUOTE HOW DO YOU ALL LIKE MY SUNTAN UNQUOTE. HE ALSO RECALLED AN ITEM SUBHEADED QUOTE SILENT ADMIRAL UNQUOTE WHICH QUOTED A STATEMENT BY ADM FECHTELER THAT THE NAVY STANDS READY TO CARRY ON ITS PART IN THE KOREAN WAR IF CALLED ON ANY TIME, ANY PLACE AND UNDER ANY GONDITIONS. COL

[] ADVISED IN DEALING WITH ANDERSON THE LATTER STATED HE HAD MORE DETAILS THAN SET FORTH IN THE COLUMN AND MENTIONED TWO ITEMS, ONE QUOTING GEN COLLINS CONCERNING ROTATION OF TROOPS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. ANOTHER QUOTED GEN VANDENBERG CONCERNING HOW THE AIR WAR WOULD AFFECT US. ANDERSON CLAIMED THAT HE HAD OMITTED THESE ITEMS AS AFFECTING SECURITY. COL

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[] STATED THE COLUMN OF ROBERT S. ALLEN IN THE NY DAILY MIRROR LAST NIGHT DEC THIRTEEN FIFTY ONE CONTAINED A FULL RESUME OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE AND IN FACT WENT INTO GREATER DETAIL THAN DID THE PEARSON COLUMN. [] EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT ALLEN HAD SCOOPED PEARSON BY TWO DAYS AND IN ADDITION TO THE MATERIAL USED BY ANDERSON IN THE ORIGINAL COLUMN BEFORE DELETION OF TWO ITEMS BY GEN BRADLEY. THE COLUMN IN THE NY MIRROR BY ALLEN ALSO CONTAINED THE TWO QUOTATIONS FROM GEN COLLINS AND FROM GEN VANDENBERG, WHICH QUOTATIONS JACK ANDERSON HAD DECLINED TO USE ON THE GROUNDS OF SECURITY. COL [] STATED HE HAD DISPLAYED THIS COLUMN TO CLAYTON FRITCHEY, CHIEF OF PUBLIC

WFO 6060

INFORMATION, DEPT OF DEFENSE, WHO INFORMED [] HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE MATTER, THAT HE WAS AT THE HOME OF DREW PEARSON PLAYING BRIDGE ON THE EVENING OF DEC TWELVE WHEN ANDERSON CALLED PEARSON TO INFORM HIM OF THE CALL RECEIVED FROM GEN BRADLEYS OFFICE.

FRITCHEY RELATED TO [] THAT PEARSON HAD DISPLAYED A COPY OF THE COLUMN TO FRITCHEY WHO EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT IT WAS NOT HARMFUL. LATER AFTER THE CHANGES WERE MADE UPON OBJECTION BY GEN BRADLEY AS RELATED BY [] TO FRITCHEY, [] STATED

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FRITCHEY EXPRESSED THE OPINION HE DID NOT SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH PUBLISHING THE COLUMN IN EITHER FORM. IN CONCLUSION COL [] REMARKED THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH PEARSONS STYLE OF WRITING AND INFORMATION TECHNIQUES AND BELIEVED THE SOURCE OF INSTANT LEAK WAS SOME INDIVIDUAL WHO ATTENDED THE PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE.

COL [] EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT AFTER READING THE STORY BY ROBERT ALLEN IN THE NY MIRROR, [] CONCLUDED IN ALL PROBABILITY THE SAME SOURCE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR GIVING THE STORY TO BOTH COLUMNS.

HOOD

12-16-51

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Laughlin	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

16

9:45

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER

FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE

THOMAS K. FINLETTER, SECRETARY, AIR FORCE, ON INTERVIEW, ADVISED HE

WAS NOT INVITED TO WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR TEN THIRTY AM,

DECEMBER TEN LAST, UNTIL ABOUT ONE HALF HOUR BEFORE THAT TIME. HE HAD

NO PRIOR BRIEFING FOR THE CONFERENCE. HIS DESCRIPTION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED

AT CONFERENCE WAS LESS DETAILED, BUT AGREES SUBSTANTIALLY WITH WHAT

OTHER PERSONS INTERVIEWED HAVE SAID. HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT, PRIOR

TO THE CONFERENCE, HAD THE IDEA THE COMMUNISTS WERE OUT-TRADING THE

UNITED STATES, BUT LATER AGREED WITH OTHERS AT THE CONFERENCE THIS WAS

NOT THE CASE. FINLETTER PREPARED NO NOTES DURING CONFERENCE. AFTER THE

CONFERENCE, GENERAL VANDENBERG DICTATED A MEMORANDUM TO FINLETTER-S

SECRETARY CONCERNING HIS VIEWS ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM KOREA IN

EVENT OF CEASE FIRE ORDER. FINLETTER TOOK UP THIS MEMO AND PREPARED

A SECOND ONE OF HIS OWN ON THE SAME SUBJECT AND PERSONALLY DELIVERED THE

ORIGINAL OF THIS TO SECRETARY LOVETT. ON DECEMBER ELEVEN LAST FINLETTER

PREPARED A THIRD MEMO FOR LOVETT. EIGHTEEN OF THE TWENTY PREPARED COPIES

WERE AVAILABLE WITH ONE HAVING PREVIOUSLY GONE TO VANDENBERG AS WELL AS

LOVETT. ONE COPY OF THIS MEMO FURNISHED BUREAU BY MY MEMO OF DECEMBER

FIFTEEN LAST. THE VANDENBERG MEMO AND FINLETTER-S FIRST MEMO WERE TORN

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DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-8/BJD

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TO PIECES AND ARE STILL MAINTAINED IN FILE LETTERS OFFICE. HE STATES
HE DOES NOT KNOW JAKE ANDERSON AND HAS NOT SEEN PEARSON FOR SOME MONTHS,
AND HAS DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE WITH NO UNAUTHORIZED PERSON. HE HAS
NO SUSPICIONS AS TO WHOM MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK OF INFORMATION.

HOOD

cc: [unclear]

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Laughlin	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

12-16-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD 16 8:00 PM
 DIRECTOR *RBH* U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, DECEMBER
 TEN, FIFTYONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON.

ESPIONAGE - X. FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE NAVY INTERVIEWED TODAY. ADVISED HE ATTENDED WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN IN PLACE OF SECRETARY DAN KIMBALL. ARRIVED AND LEFT ALONE, RETURNING IMMEDIATELY TO PENTAGON WHERE HE FURNISHED RESUME TO SECRETARY KIMBALL SAME AFTERNOON. MADE NO NOTES OR MEMOS AND DISCUSSED CONFERENCE WITH NO ONE ELSE. FOLLOWING DAY BETWEEN FIVE AND SIX PM, JACK ANDERSON, WHOM HE HAD NEVER MET, VISITED HIS OFFICE WITHOUT APPOINTMENT, INTRODUCED HIMSELF, AND STATED DREW PEARSON DESIRED THAT HE MAKE ACQUAINTANCE OF WHITEHAIR, AS ANDERSON COVERS PENTAGON FOR PEARSON. THEY EXCHANGED PLEASANTRIES, THEN ANDERSON STATED HE UNDERSTOOD WHITEHAIR ATTENDED THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE AND INQUIRED WHO WAS PRESENT, FOLLOWING THIS WITH A QUERY AS TO WHETHER THERE WERE ANY JOKES TOLD IN THE CONFERENCE. WHITEHAIR STATED HE ANSWERED NEITHER OF THESE QUESTIONS, INDICATING IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE COUNTRY NOT TO DISCUSS THE CONFERENCE. HE STATED ANDERSON THEN PULLED FROM HIS POCKET A GLOSSY PAPER, FOLDED LIKE A NEWSPAPER, AND ASKED IF IT WERE NOT TRUE THAT GENERAL VANDENBERG STATED THAT WE SHOULD REACH AN ARMISTICE WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND WITHDRAW, AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND THE YALU RIVER. WHITEHAIR DECLINED TO CONFIRM THIS QUERY, AND

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ANDERSON THEN ASKED DIDN'T JIMMY WEBB SAY THAT WE SHOULD REACH AN ARMISTICE AND THEN IMPOSE A THREAT IN THE EVENT THE ARMISTICE TERMS WERE VIOLATED. ANDERSON ALSO ASKED IF ADMIRAL FECHTELER HAD NOT OPPOSED THIS PROPOSITION OF INCLUDING A WARNING TO THE COMMUNISTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHITEHAIR STATED HE DID NOT ANSWER EITHER QUESTION, BUT DID STATE ADMIRAL FECHTELER TALKS VERY LITTLE ABOUT ANYTHING. ANDERSON WAS PERSISTENT AND INQUIRED WHETHER WHITEHAIR SAW THE PRESIDENT AND MAY HAVE INQUIRED REGARDING THE PRESIDENT BEING TANNED. WHITEHAIR STATED HE MAY HAVE, INDICATING IN THE AFFIRMATIVE THAT HE SAW THE PRESIDENT, WHICH WAS OBVIOUS, AND HE COULD NOT RECALL ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT. HE STATED ANDERSON THEN PUT THE PAPER AWAY AND HE GAVE ANDERSON A LECTURE TO THE EFFECT THAT SUCH MATERIAL MAY BE DANGEROUS TO THE US AND GIVE COMFORT TO THE ENEMY, BUT THAT ANDERSON SHOULD DRAW NO INFERENCES FROM ANYTHING STATED BY HIM. WHITEHAIR EXPRESSED THE BELIEF ANDERSON'S ORIGINAL INTENTION WAS TO MERELY OBTAIN ANECDOTES OR PLEASANTRIES AS WINDOW DRESSING FOR THE COLUMN, AND HAD NOT INTENDED TO REVEAL TO WHITEHAIR HIS MATERIAL, BUT THAT THIS WAS A DEVELOPMENT FROM WHITEHAIR'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE AT THE OUTSET. WHITEHAIR ADVISED THAT ON WEDNESDAY MORNING, AROUND EIGHT O'CLOCK, HE DISCUSSED THIS INCIDENT WITH SECRETARY KIMBALL AND TOLD HIM THE ENTIRE STORY. HE ADVISED, APPARENTLY KIMBALL RELATED THE INCIDENT TO ADMIRAL FECHTELER AND LATER IN THE MORNING, ADMIRAL FECHTELER BROUGHT THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF ADMIRAL DENNISON, WHO HAD COME OVER TO THE PENTAGON ABOUT ELEVEN THIRTY AM ON ANOTHER MATTER. WHITEHAIR SURMISED DENNISON RETURNED AND BROUGHT THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE

PAGE THREE. . .

PRESIDENT, AND LATER DENNISON THEN CONTACTED WHITEHAIR, AND ADVISED HIM THE PRESIDENT DESIRED THAT WHITEHAIR BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF SECRETARY LOVETT, AND AT THE SAME TIME, ADVISED MR. LOVETT THAT THE FBI SHOULD BE ADVISED. WHITEHAIR STATED HE FELT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO STOP THE STORY AND AT HIS SUGGESTION, ADMIRAL DENNISON CALLED BACK AND OBTAINED THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION TO CONTACT PEARSON. HE THEREAFTER PHONED DREW PEARSON, WHOM HE HAD MET ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SINCE HIS APPOINTMENT AS NAVY UNDER-SECRETARY IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR. HE STATED HE APPEALED TO PEARSON ON TWO GROUNDS, FIRST: THAT HE WAS GREATLY EMBARRASSED BY PEARSON'S ACTION IN SENDING HIS YOUNG MAN TO VISIT WHITEHAIR ON A FRIENDLY BASIS AND, SECONDLY: AND MOST IMPORTANT, THAT DISCLOSURES OF THE CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS MIGHT INJURE THE COUNTRY. PEARSON REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT WHITEHAIR HAD CALLED HIM YESTERDAY. WHITEHAIR DECLARED THAT PEARSON STATED THAT QUOTE YOU NEEDN'T WORRY, YOU DIDN'T TELL ANDERSON ANYTHING UNQUOTE AND ALSO INSISTED THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD NOT HURT THE PRESIDENT OR THE COUNTRY, AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, PEARSON THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE IT. AS INDICATED, WHITEHAIR ADVISED HE KNEW PEARSON AND EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD FIRST RECEIVED AN INVITATION TO VISIT PEARSON WHEN HE WAS GENERAL COUNSEL ESA, AND WAS INVITED BY PEARSON ALONG WITH [REDACTED] HOWEVER, HE DID NOT ACCEPT THIS INVITATION. ON A SATURDAY AFTERNOON, SHORTLY AFTER HIS APPOINTMENT, HE WAS AGAIN INVITED TO THE HOME OF PEARSON FOR AN INFORMAL BUFFET SUPPER AND ACCEPTED, DRIVING JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND HIS WIFE TO PEARSONS IN WHITEHAIR'S CAR. HE RECALLED

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THAT ON THIS OCCASION, PERSONS PRESENT INCLUDED: MR. AND MRS.

ABE FORTAS: [REDACTED] OF PEARSON, AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PEARSON'S [REDACTED] HE RECALLED THAT SOMETIME

LATER, PEARSON HAD DROPPED INTO HIS OFFICE FOR A BRIEF VISIT,

INQUIRING HOW HE LIKED HIS JOB, AND EXCHANGING SMALL TALK. ON ONE

OTHER DAY, PEARSON DROPPED IN VERY BRIEFLY WHILE IN THE BUILDING TO

SEE THE SECRETARY OF NAVY, KIMBALL. WHITEHAIR STATED HE KNEW NO

OTHER REPORTER ASSOCIATED WITH PEARSON, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF

[REDACTED] WHOM HE HAD ALSO SEEN IN HIS OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH

A MATTER RELATING TO THE HARVEY MACHINE COMPANY AND ITS EFFORTS TO

OBTAIN A LOAN, WHICH PEARSON APPARENTLY OPPOSED. WHITEHAIR LIKEWISE

DID NOT KNOW ROBERT S. ALLEN OR [REDACTED] WITH WHOM PEARSON WAS

ASSOCIATED UNTIL RECENTLY. THE NEW YORK POST COLUMN OF ROBERT ALLEN

DATED DECEMBER THIRTEEN, WAS DISPLAYED TO WHITEHAIR, WHO READ IT

AND STATED IT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY BASED ON KNOWLEDGE OF SOMEONE WHO

ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE. HE STATED THAT THE QUOTATIONS OF THE

PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COLLINS APPEARED REASONABLY ACCURATE, MEN-

TIONING THAT COLLINS HAD STATED THAT QUOTE FOR MY MONEY THE

COMMUNISTS CANNOT DRIVE US OUT OF THIS COUNTRY; RATHER THAN UNTIL

HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE. WITH REFERENCE TO BRADLEY'S ALLEGED

QUOTATIONS, HE STATED HE DID NOT RECALL THAT BRADLEY HAD PLACED

ROTATION OF TROOPS CONTRA UN CONCESSIONS ON AIRFIELDS AS INDICATED

IN THE COLUMN, BUT THAT BOTH MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED IN GENERAL

BRADLEY'S PRESENTATION OF THE POINTS AT ISSUE IN THE TRUCE NEGOTIA-

TIONS. WHITEHAIR COULD OFFER NO SUSPECT AND HAD NO SUGGESTIONS FOR

b6
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PAGE FIVE.....

SOLUTION OF THE LEAK TO ANDERSON, PEARSON, OR ALLEN. HE AFFIRMATIVELY
DECLARED HE DID PLACE COMPLETE RELIANCE IN ADMIRAL FECHIELER
AND SECRETARY PAGE, AND OF COURSE PROCLAIMED HIS OWN INTEGRITY.
HE EXPLAINED THIS WAS NO REFLECTION ON ANYONE ELSE PRESENT, BUT
THAT HE HAD MORE INTIMATE ASSOCIATION WITH THESE TWO MEN.

H O O D

cc: Mr. Belmont

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, WFO (65-6060)

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON

DATE: 12-17-51

Alleged Leak from White House Conference, December 10, 1951 to JACK ANDERSON, Leg-man for DREW PEARSON ESPIONAGE - X

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The following persons have been interviewed by Agents of the WFO in connection with this investigation:

- General OMAR BRADLEY
- Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER
- General CHARLES CABELL
- Secretary FRANK C. PACE
- Secretary THOMAS K. FINLETTER
- Acting Secretary FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR
- Acting Secretary JAMES E. WEBB
- H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
- JAMES LAY
- General HARRY VAUGHN
- General ROBERT LANDRY

The following interviews will be held on Monday, December 17, 1951:

- General JOE COLLINS
- CLAYTON FRITCHEY (Department of Defense)
- S. EVERETT GLEASON (National Security Council)

Short reinterviews will be had with Messrs. WEBB and MATTHEWS in order to obtain their comments relative to the news column of ROBERT S. ALLEN that appeared in the New York Post December 13 last.

General HOYT S. VANDENBERG is out of the city and the date of his exact return is unknown; however, this will be available to us on December 17.

Admiral DENNISON of the White House has been ill and it is not known if he will be available on December 17.

Admiral SOUERS of the White House is absent from the city until December 19th.

The above interviews will in all probability conclude the inquiries of this office, unless unforeseen developments occur. The investigation will continue to be expedited.

RBH/agg

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65-6060-13

COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY EMPLOYED BY (EMP. CARD)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: December 13, 1951

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT *sl*

SUBJECT: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE,
DECEMBER 10, 1951,
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR DREW PEARSON;
Espionage - X.

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

In accordance with instructions, Mr. Hennrich and I interviewed Secretary of Defense Lovett at his office in the Pentagon, starting at 6:30 p.m. and ending at 7:45 p.m. today (December 13). Mr. Lovett was alone. The interview concerned information in the possession of Jack Anderson, leg man for Drew Pearson, which information Mr. Lovett believed came from one of the Government representatives attending a White House conference on the afternoon of December 10, 1951, presided over by President Truman. The information concerned was of a "top secret" nature.

DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE

In laying the groundwork for the conference itself, Mr. Lovett advised that the Defense Department had been considering four points in connection with the present cease-fire discussions in Korea, as follows, which points were presently matters of conflict between the United Nations Forces and the Communist peace representatives:

1. The UN representatives desire to rotate the soldiers in Korea in order to allow the men who have been in the field to come home after a certain period of service. This rotation by UN is man for man and, as a matter of fact, there are some 5,000 less UN soldiers in Koreanow than at the beginning of the peace talks. On the contrary, the Communists have rotated by replacing divisions or armies, with the result that they now have over 200,000 more men in Korea than when the peace talks started.
2. The exchange of prisoners of war. The UN wants to exchange man for man to insure the return of all UN prisoners and also because the UN has a far greater number of Communist prisoners (approximately 175,000 to 10,000) than there are UN prisoners under the control of the Communists. Mr. Lovett advised that there is a humanitarian principle involved also, as it is felt that the Communist prisoners will be liquidated if they are returned in toto.

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AHB:LL

3. A special Air Force problem involving the question of whether the Communists should be allowed to build air fields in North Korea after the cease fire preceding the armistice.
4. The question of whether the Communists should be allowed to repair roads, bridges, railroads, etc., after the cease fire has been put into effect.

Mr. Lovett stated that there had been a full agreement on the first three points and, as a result, instructions on these three points had already been sent to General Ridgeway. However, on point No. 4 regarding rehabilitation and repairs, the President called from Key West on Saturday, December 8, as he wanted further explanation of this point because he could not see why we should allow the Communists to build up by such rehabilitation and repairs during the cease-fire period. As a result, a conference was called by the President for 10:30 a.m., Monday, December 10, 1951, and the White House issued invitations to the Secretaries of the three Services, the three Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley and Mr. Lovett from Defense, the Acting Secretary of State, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Political Affairs. On Sunday, December 9, Mr. Lovett requested that the Director of the Joint Staff, General Cabell, be present also. The purpose of the conference was to consider this question of rehabilitation and repairs. The position of the Defense Department was that such rehabilitation and repairs were as necessary in South Korea as they were in North Korea and that we would probably lose more than we would gain if both sides were prohibited from rehabilitating and repairing the areas under their jurisdiction.

WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 10, 1951

Mr. Lovett advised that he had made inquiry, since talking with the Director, of Secretary Frank Pace and General Joe Collins, and, as best the three of them could remember, the following were present at the conference:

President Truman

Secretary of Defense Lovett

General Omar Bradley - Chief of Staff

General Joe Collins - Army

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg - Air

Admiral William Fechtler - Navy

General Cabell - Joint Staff

Secretary Frank C. Pace - Army

Secretary Thomas K. Finletter - Air

Acting Secretary Francis P. Whitehair - Navy

Acting Secretary James E. Webb - State

Mr. H. Freeman Matthews - State

Admiral Sidney Souers - White House

James Lay - National Security Council

General Vaughan - White House

Admiral Dennison - White House

General Robert Landry - White House

In addition to the above, Mr. Lovett said that

Joe Short and Matt Connelly, press representatives of the White

House, were at the conference, but he does not know how long or whether they merely came in and out delivering messages. Mr. Lovett had previously indicated to the Director that Mr. Edward Foley of the Treasury Department may have been present, but he now believes that Foley was not there.

The President came in and shook hands with everyone at the conference and it was remarked that he looked tan and fit. The conference then discussed the question of repairs and rehabilitation and, after it was explained to the President that we would lose as much as we would gain through such prohibition and there was unanimous agreement on this point, the President agreed and approved the instructions authorizing a dispatch to General Ridgeway on that point.

Mr. Lovett advised that the President then asked about the NATO agreement in Rome. Mr. Lovett and General Bradley discussed this at the conference.

A discussion then ensued as to "how tough do you get if there is a violation of the armistice." Mr. Lovett advised it was pointed out that every condition that is put into an armistice points up necessary action if the Communists should violate that particular condition and such a violation would immediately raise a question of what action would the UN Forces take if the Communists violated a condition of the armistice. It was decided it would be better to take a general stand and make general conditions in the armistice, rather than get too specific, and at the same time make it plain to the Communists that if the armistice were not kept "there would be a hell of a war" and that any breaking of faith in the armistice would result in a war extending to other fields, such as China, and that it would not result in a resumption of just the Korean war.

Mr. Lovett advised that the White House conference, which was held in the Cabinet Room, lasted from 10:30 a.m. until approximately 11:45 a.m. on December 10.

Mr. Lovett advised that at the close of the conference the President called aside Mr. Webb and spoke to him briefly near the door. Mr. Short went outside and advised the press, who were present in the White House in great number and who had been clamoring for information, that they had discussed world affairs, including Korea. Mr. Lovett said that Mr. Short made no further statement.

In answer to our questions, Mr. Lovett advised that all of the above-listed individuals were present throughout the conference, with the exception of Short and Connelly. There was no secretary taking notes and no minutes were kept of the meeting. There was no written agenda prepared for the items to be taken up. He noted no one taking notes, although Admiral Dennison, General Vaughan, and General Landry were behind him and he did not know as to them. Mr. Lovett stated that he made no notes and dictated no memorandum following the conference. Mr. Lovett did not know and had not made inquiry as to whether any other persons dictated memoranda following the conference. Relative to the inquiries that Mr. Lovett had indicated he would cause Colonel Randall to make, these were merely inquiries as to who was present at the conference.

ACTIVITIES OF JACK ANDERSON

Mr. Lovett advised that yesterday afternoon (December 12), exact time not known to him, Jack Anderson, leg man for Drew Pearson, contacted Acting Secretary Whitehair (probably not in his office) and showed to Whitehair or read to him a story which purported to be almost a verbatim account of the important things set forth above which occurred at the conference at the White House on December 10. Mr. Lovett said that Whitehair was shocked and told Anderson it would be a bad idea to publish this material. Whitehair spoke to his executive officer about Anderson's visit and they agreed that Admiral Dennison should be advised. Admiral Dennison reported this to the President, who was very much upset. The President got word to General Bradley, who called Pearson or Anderson, and Anderson was asked to come over and bring his story. Anderson came to see General Bradley about 7:00 p.m. and brought the story, which was read by General Bradley and his aides, Colonel Clifton and Colonel Matthews. Bradley attempted to get Anderson to "kill" the story entirely, but Anderson said he had checked with Pearson and that the story was already on the Bell Syndicate wires and would come out this Saturday, December 15. Anderson said it was impossible to "kill" the story. General Bradley and his aides marked in red pencil two parts which they stated would be especially injurious to the security of this country, and Anderson said he would recommend that these two parts be "killed." The first part was a statement attributed to

the President that if we did not get a cease fire by December 27, we should arrange to extend the time. The second part related to concessions we might be prepared to make to the Communists.

In answer to our queries, Mr. Lovett advised that he did not know the full content of Anderson's paper. He stated that neither Whitehair nor General Bradley had secured a copy of Anderson's paper and that the only source from which the contents could be obtained in the Government would be recollections of Whitehair, General Bradley, and Bradley's two aides. He said that when the article comes out on Saturday, it will be possible for these gentlemen to compare it with what they read on Anderson's paper. He advised that he did not know the exact excerpts of Anderson's paper which shocked Whitehair, but rather thought it was the fact that Anderson had what appeared to be an accurate picture of the conference. He pointed out that Anderson's story had background which would indicate that it must have come from someone actually at the conference; for example, it started out by saying that the President, tanned and fit, walked briskly into the conference room and shook hands with everyone, including his own White House aides. Other background information made it appear that the story must have been given to Anderson by someone actually at the conference.

Mr. Lovett was asked whether all of the items in Anderson's story pertained to the conference and, specifically, whether the two items which General Bradley red-penciled occurred at the conference. Mr. Lovett stated that he did not recall any discussion at the conference of extending the time if we did not get a cease fire by December 27, although he conjectured that this might have happened while the President was talking to Mr. Webb at the door. He said that the second point (on concessions we might make) was probably covered in some measure at the conference. We asked whether there were any items mentioned at the conference that were not in Anderson's story. He did not know. We asked whether, in view of the fact that three of the four points covered in the cease-fire agenda had already been acted on and dispatched to General Ridgeway prior to the conference, it would be possible that the story was secured from these

dispatches or from sources other than those within the actual conference. He stated he had not thought of this and that it might be possible. We pointed out that if Anderson's story carried an item concerning the cease fire date of December 27, and this was not discussed at the conference, it was very pertinent and therefore it was very necessary that the exact story by Anderson be furnished us, in so far as possible, for comparison purposes as to exactly what went on at the conference. Mr. Lovett said that when the story comes out, such a comparison can be made. He said that General Bradley would not be back until Saturday, December 15, but that his two aides, Colonels Clifton and Matthews, were available for interview.

Mr. Lovett related that when Anderson came over to see General Bradley, at Bradley's request, he came over on a basis of trade; that is, "if he would bring the article over and give Bradley a chance to screen it, Bradley would tell him where the Defense Department learned that he had this information." After Bradley and his aides had gone over the story and red-penciled it, Anderson asked where they had learned he had the story. General Bradley told him from the President, whereupon Anderson "damn near fell off the chair." After leaving Bradley's office and while walking down the corridor, Anderson commented, "I guess Whitehair must have told."

Mr. Lovett related that when Whitehair told of Anderson's visit to him, he said that he told Anderson, "For god's sake tell Pearson that if he publishes this story it will throw suspicion on me," pointing out that he was the newest member of the conference and that it was known he had a longstanding acquaintance with Pearson. Whitehair definitely told Lovett he did not give out any information on the conference, and Lovett stated this was borne out by the fact that Whitehair reported Anderson's visit to him and that had Anderson got it from Whitehair, he would not have come back to Whitehair to verify it.

ATTITUDE OF MR. LOVETT

Mr. Lovett advised he believed that this story was leaked by a member of the conference and that it was done deliberately. He said he based this feeling on the fact the story had color and background that it would be difficult to secure from anyone who was not at the conference, and that the story set forth what various persons said at the conference.

Mr. Lovett went on to relate that he was extremely concerned about leaks in the Defense Department and he earnestly wanted to find out one person who was responsible for leaks, in order that he could make an example of him. He advised that he believes these leaks occur in four ways:

1. By flannel mouths who talk too much at cocktail parties;
2. Through officials who wanted to show that they "knew it all";
3. Through officials who assumed that everyone in the Pentagon was cleared for all types of security information, with the result that they talked to anyone in the Pentagon;
4. Through leaks by members of Congress.

Mr. Lovett was asked to explain this last point. He said that frequently members of Congress, such as members of the Senate Armed Services Committee or members of other Congressional committees who had to consider such things as appropriations for the armed services, would call the Defense Department for information on the current situation in Korea or in some phase of the Defense Department activities. Rather than write a reply, the Defense Department sends up an officer, who talks to the Congressman and furnishes him the information. This is done with the understanding that it is very confidential and "in 99 out of 100 cases" the Congressman observes the confidence. Mr. Lovett was asked whether it was necessary to furnish such information to the Congressmen. He stated that unless the information is furnished, the Defense Department does not

get its appropriations or satisfactory action from the Congress. Mr. Lovett advised that he could recall four instances where Congressmen betrayed confidences to the papers and, as he recalls these individuals, they were Senator Kane, another Senator, and two Representatives - "Gavin and Zand or someone like that." He was not at all sure of this.

Mr. Lovett advised he was certain that Generals Bradley and Collins and Secretary Pace had not given out any information from this conference and had not fallen into any pitfalls, such as dictating memoranda after the conference. He said he was sure of them.

Mr. Lovett advised that in the matter of dealings with Congress, some difficulty had been experienced with the Air Force, in that Secretary Finletter and General Vandenberg had gone direct to Congress, after rules adverse to the Air Department had been made in the Department of Defense. He said he could not say how this could pertain to this particular matter, however.

Mr. Lovett further advised it was well known that the Armed Services used Pearson "to send up trial balloons" on their problems, in order to find out what the reaction would be.

It was our impression that Mr. Lovett was rather frank with us and he appeared to be sincere in his desire to get to the bottom of leaks in the Defense Department.

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION

Mr. Lovett advised that General Bradley called him yesterday (December 12) and said that the President would call Lovett this morning (December 13). Bradley said that the President had asked that Lovett call Director Hoover and see if this leak could be traced. This morning (December 13) Admiral Dennison did call Mr. Lovett and requested him to call the Director and ask that this leak be traced. Lovett asked Dennison why he was being requested to call the FBI and asked whether there was any feeling on the part of the President that the

Defense Department was responsible for this leak. Admiral Dennison said "no," but it was felt that Lovett would follow through more vigorously than their own Executive Staff. Mr. Lovett advised that it occurred to him the President might want the request to come from outside the White House so that it would not exclude the members of the White House staff. Mr. Lovett said that he, Secretary Pace, General Collins, and General Bradley were the only ones in the Defense Department who know of the request for investigation.

It was pointed out to Mr. Lovett that if a full investigation is launched into this matter, it may be necessary to talk with everyone who was at the conference and, on that basis, we would like to know if this request for investigation emanated direct from the President and if we could so state in conducting the investigation. He said it did and we should.

Mr. Lovett said it had occurred to him that possibly there was a microphone in the Cabinet Room.

It was pointed out to Mr. Lovett that we had previously conducted investigations for leaks along this same line and that it was apparent a condition existed in the Defense Department where information supposedly restricted to a very small tight group of officials received wide dissemination as a result of memoranda dictated following the conference, which, in turn, went through many hands.

It was further pointed out to Mr. Lovett that on the basis of our discussion with him, there was doubt whether all of the information contained in Anderson's story covered topics discussed at the conference in question; therefore, it was highly desirable that we know exactly what was in Anderson's story and exactly what topics were discussed at the conference, for comparison purposes. He reiterated that such an analysis can be made when Pearson's article comes out on Saturday, December 15.

RECOMMENDATION:

From the above information, it appears that we will be required to make an investigation. It likewise appears that under the set of circumstances, the chances of success are small. The only accurate sources of information would be Anderson and Pearson, who will not talk if past experience with them is indicative. The individual who gave the information to Anderson would be a fool to talk.

Nevertheless, it is believed we should follow the logical steps, even though they will probably only prove that this information has had rather wide dissemination.

The suggested steps, in order of preference, are:

1. Interview Colonels Clifton and Matthews of General Bradley's office at once for full details as to what was in Anderson's story.
2. Interview Whitehair for the same information and at the same time interview him as a possible source of information to Pearson. Secure from him his recollection of what went on at the conference.
3. Interview General Bradley upon his return Saturday, December 15, for his recollection of what went on at the conference and the details of Anderson's story.
4. Secure a copy of Pearson's column for Saturday, December 15, in order to compare it with the information supplied us as to what went on at the White House conference.
5. Interview every individual who attended the White House conference, with the possible exception of President Truman, to secure their detailed recollections of what went on at the conference and the topics discussed. The purpose of this is to get a composite picture against which we can compare the picture obtained of Anderson's story and the resultant Pearson column. Ascertain from all persons who attended the conference whether they made notes; whether they dictated memoranda; whether they discussed the conference with other persons; and

what distribution was made of any memoranda dictated and through whose hands they passed. Secure copies of these memoranda for comparison with Pearson's column.

6. Follow up any logical leads by interviews with other persons having access to this information.
7. In addition to the above, inasmuch as Mr. Lovett brought up the question as to whether there might not be a microphone in the Cabinet Room, it is recommended that Admiral Dennison be contacted and advised that this question was raised by Mr. Lovett and, if Admiral Dennison so desires, we have Laboratory representatives make a thorough check of the Cabinet Room for a possible microphone.

As this will be a lengthy investigation, it is recommended that the experienced Agents of the WFO who conducted the prior investigation of the alleged Pearson leak be called in for briefing and instructed to conduct this investigation at once.

In keeping with the above recommendation, I contacted SAC Hood of WFO tonight (December 13) and he will bring Agents to my office at 9:00 a.m. on December 14 for proper briefing, in order that this investigation may be immediately instituted.

*I approved all
recommendations
last night.*

12/14/51

D-

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd *DL*

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AB*

SUBJECT: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
 DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN
 FOR DREW PEARSON
 ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 15, 1951

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Mohr _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Harbo _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Nessee _____
- Gandy _____

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At 12:25 P.M. today, Secretary Lovett called to furnish two bits of information which he had picked up subsequent to our interview with him on the night of December 13.

Mr. Lovett advised that it is his understanding now that James Lay did take notes during the conference of December 10.

Mr. Lovett further advised that Clayton Fritchie, Public Relations Department of Defense, came to see him and showed him a column by Robert Allen, former partner of Drew Pearson, which has information similar to that which appeared in the story of Jack Anderson. Mr. Lovett advised that he has not seen the Pearson column as anticipated in today's papers. He advised that Clayton Fritchie informed him that he was at Pearson's house on the evening when Anderson was called down to General Bradley's office and that Fritchie saw the articles at Pearson's home.*

I informed Secretary Lovett that we had obtained a copy of the column by Robert Allen, which Secretary Lovett referred to above, and that we are using this as one basis for questions in the interviews that are presently going on. I advised Secretary Lovett that as he was undoubtedly aware, we had launched an investigation into this matter immediately following our interview with him on December 13 and a number of interviews had been conducted and additional interviews are being conducted over the week end with persons who attended the conference.

Secretary Lovett advised that he would call me in the event any additional information came to his attention. I thanked him for his thoughtfulness.

AHB:hmb *hmb* * We had received this same information during an interview with Colonel Clifton of General Bradley's office on December 14.

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EDITORIAL SECTION

Letters • Cartoons • Columns • Press
Digests • Labor and Business News

WASHINGTON FOREIGN

Reds' Cease-Fire Terms N. G.

By Robert S. Allen

Washington, Dec. 13—The UN can have a cease fire in Korea, but at the cost of important concessions to the Reds.

That's what the Joint Chiefs told the President in their big conference with him after his return. Gen. Bradley declared the protracted truce negotiations have reached the point "where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one."

"What do they want?" asked the President.

"The deadlock gets down to this," explained Bradley. "We are demanding the right to continue

to rotate our troops as we have been doing for months. The Reds are flatly refusing to allow that. They are insisting on a complete freeze on replacements and weapons, but they have indicated they would make concessions on that if we will allow them to build some airfields in North Korea. We have refused to do that. Obviously, they are using the rotation issue to try to wrest concessions from us on the airfield demand."

Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg vigorously opposed giving any ground on that.

"I want a cease fire, if one can be worked out that is fair and proper," declared the Air Chief of

Staff. "But I don't see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build airfields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them, if they decide to break the truce next spring, which I wouldn't put past them."

Gen. J. Lawton Collins was inclined to favor some terms on the airfield dispute. He thought something could be worked out on that. But the Army Chief of Staff was adamant in insisting the Communists be required to agree to rotation of UN troops.

"That would be a serious blow

to the morale of our men," Collins argued. "I am strongly opposed to any concession on that. It is an unfair demand, and the only reason the Reds on making it is to try to force us to give in on airfields."

"Our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over, and I am flatly opposed to giving the slightest ground on the replacement issue. The Reds would have the same right as us on that, and I don't see why they should object to it, except for trading purposes."

Bradley agreed with Collins, but emphasized the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful airforce.



President Truman listened intently to the military leaders and said nothing until they finished.

Then he told them:

"As you know I am very anxious to bring the fighting to an end if that is possible. But I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on. We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men."

Also discussed was the question of building up the South Korean army, as this column has reported was proposed by General Ridgway.

NEW YORK POST
"Blue Final" Edition
DECEMBER 13, 1951

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT *ah*

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH *ch*

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON, Alleged Leak from
White House Conference,
December 10, 1951, to JACK ANDERSON,
Leg-Man for DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 17, 1951

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I went over the investigations of this case with Special Agent in Charge Hood in some detail on December 17. Interviews have been completed with all but two of the persons who attended the December 10 conference, plus those who had knowledge of what was discussed. Those remaining to be interviewed are Secretary Dan Kimball, who will be interviewed on December 18, and Admiral Sidney Souers, who will be interviewed on December 19.

Analysis of the information developed up to this time indicates that there was limited dissemination of information as to what actually went on at the President's conference of December 10, 1951. The Washington Field Office is carefully analyzing this particular problem in order to come up with as definite a picture as possible as to exactly who did have access to the specifics of the conference prior to the time they were known to be in Anderson's possession.

Regarding the problem as to whether Anderson's information and, in addition, Allen's column could have been prepared from information available from sources other than someone who attended or had detailed information regarding the conference of December 10, there is divergent opinion. The consensus is that the information must have come from someone who knew what went on at the December 10 conference. This is modified by statements that certain of the information is not accurate and some not true. It is further modified by the fact that many of the persons interviewed are unable to recall exactly what was discussed at the conference and, of the items discussed, exactly what was said by certain individuals. It has been pointed out that most of the matters discussed had been previously discussed in great detail on many occasions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those officially interested in the particular problems. The conviction of those who feel that the information in question had to have come from someone who had knowledge of what went on at the December 10 conference

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is generally based on the fact that most of the items in Anderson's paper and Allen's column were actually discussed in some form at the conference. As pointed out above, some of the information was inaccurate.

At this point, it appears necessary that we actually determine when the Pearson column of December 15, appearing in the New York "Daily Mirror," was filed with Bell Syndicate. Since Allen actually printed a similar column in the "New York Post" on December 13, it is important that we know when he filed that column since Allen's information may have been made available by Pearson. We cannot overlook the possibility that Allen may have originally obtained the information and made it available to Pearson. The timing, therefore, of the filing of any columns would have significance in analyzing these questions. It is, I think, a fair assumption that Pearson is aware of our investigation. If the leak originated with someone who attended the December 10 conference they would, in all probability, have notified Pearson that the investigation is going on. Since this is true, I feel that we should now go directly to Bell Syndicate to obtain information as to when Pearson's column was filed. We should obtain a copy of the complete column. I think we should also make similar inquiries regarding the Allen column as to the time of filing.

In the event results of pending interviews do not indicate otherwise, we should, after obtaining the information regarding the Pearson columns, interview Joseph Short, Press Secretary at the White House. Short was not present at the December 10 conference to our knowledge. He did make a brief statement to the press regarding the conference. He should be interviewed to determine if Anderson, or a representative of Pearson or of Allen, was at the White House on that date and, if so, complete details should be obtained as to Short's observations of who they talked to, what questions were asked, etc. Short should also be discreetly questioned regarding his knowledge of Pearson's and Allen's sources in the Government which would have a bearing on this investigation. Thereafter, interviews should be had with Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson and Robert Allen. In order that the record may be clear and, on the off chance that we may develop information, it is felt that these interviews will have to be conducted.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

If you approve, the New York Office will be telephonically instructed to initiate inquiries at Bell Syndicate in New York. It is not definite whether Bell Syndicate handles Allen's column. In the event it does not, inquiries should be initiated at the "New York Post" for information regarding Allen's column.

oh.
j.



New York
instructed to
handle
S.P.

Washington MERRY- GO-ROUND By Drew Pearson

WASHINGTON, Dec. 14. —The world sat up over Pres. Truman's publicized meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he returned from Key West, but it was routine. The highlight was an assurance from Gen. Omar Bradley that a cease-fire could be worked out in Korea.

The diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting when HST strode in, grinning. He shook hands all around, said it was "good to be back," asked how they liked his tan.

He let the joint chiefs do most of the talking, and here is a brief account of what happened:

Truman sat back, called for views, and made such comments as: "That's a tough one."

Bradley led with a summary of the Korean situation, reported the Reds seemed ready to come to terms, that a cease-fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions. Gen. Vandenberg, Air chief, opposed major concessions, was adamant against allowing the Communists to build airfields during the cease-fire.

Gen. Collins, Army chief, opposed giving in on troop rotation. The Chinese propose a freeze on all troops entering Korea, blocking replacements for combat veterans. This would be a blow to morale Collins warned.

Silent Admiral

Collins agreed "minor concessions" should be made to win some in return. Truman commented that no concessions should be granted that we "would later regret."

Admiral Fechteler made only a half-minute speech, pledged that the Navy is prepared to carry out "any mission any time any place."

For the Army, Collins pledged the Army couldn't be blasted out of Korea, could hold on "until hell freezes over."

One concession discussed was yielding to the Reds on inspection behind the lines. We have been holding out for it by U.N.-Communist teams, but the Reds want it by "neutral" nations—and that meant Poland and Czechoslovakia. Later they agreed to consider Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. These would be acceptable to us. Bradley proposed giving ground here and it has been done.

The principal theme was that a cease-fire may be close, with

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- Belmont
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- Gandy

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- Wash. News _____
- Wash. Star _____
- N.Y. Mirror 7
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WASH FROM WASH FIELD 17 7:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

DREW PEARSON: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE
 DECEMBER TENTH, FIFTYONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR
 DREW PEARSON; ESP DASH X. CHIEF OF AIR FORCE GENERAL HOYT S.
VANDENBERG WAS INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISED THAT HE HAD
ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE AT THE WHITEHOUSE ON DECEMBER TENTH,
LAST. GENERAL VANDENBERG STATED THAT HE HAD NOT MADE ANY
NOTES AT THE CONFERENCE AND HAD NOT PREPARED ANY MEMORANDA
OR SEEN ANY MEMORANDA WHICH ANYONE ELSE HAD PREPARED CONCERNING
THE CONFERENCE. HE STATED THAT THE MEMO WHICH HE HAD PREPARED
WITH MR. FINLETTER ON DECEMBER TENTH, LAST, REFERRING TO THE
WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE WAS MATERIAL WHICH WAS NOT DISCUSSED
AT THE WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE AND WHICH HE, MR. FINLETTER AND
MR. LOVETT THOUGHT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE
PRESIDENT, AND THAT IT PERTAINED TO AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL IN
CONNECTION WITH THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE STATED THAT THE ONLY
PERSONS HE HAS DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE WITH ARE MR. LOVETT
AND MR. FINLETTER. HE STATED THAT THE ORIGINAL OF THE MEMO
PREPARED IN MR. FINLETTER'S OFFICE ON DECEMBER TENTH, FIFTYONE,
A COPY OF WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED THE BUREAU, WAS DELIVERED
PERSONALLY TO MR. LOVETT BY MR. FINLETTER AND HIM. GENERAL
VANDENBERG STATED THAT A COPY OF THE MEMO WAS GIVEN TO
HIM AND HE GAVE IT TO HIS AIDE, COLONEL

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DEC 19 1951

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PAGE TWO

CHARLES V. MURPHY, BUT HE REITERATED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MEMO WERE NOT DISCUSSED AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE CONFERENCE HELD AT THE MEETING ON DECEMBER TENTH, LAST. THE ARTICLE BY ROBERT S. ALLAN^E WAS SHOWN TO GENERAL VANDENBERG AND HE ADVISED THAT IN HIS OPINION THIS ARTICLE COULD ~~NOT~~ HAVE BEEN WRITTEN WITHOUT THE WRITER'S HAVING ACCESS TO WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE CONFERENCE. HE POINTED OUT THAT EVERYTHING APPEARING IN THE ARTICLE HAD BEEN SOMETIME OR OTHER IN THE PAST PUBLICLY STATED BY THE INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM THE MATERIAL WAS ATTRIBUTED, AND THAT CERTAINLY ANYONE WHO HAD FOLLOWED THE KOREAN SITUATION AND ANALYZED VARIOUS ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE PRESS ON THE SITUATION COULD HAVE PREPARED THE ALLAN^E ARTICLE. HE FURTHER COMMENTED THAT THE ALLAN ARTICLE WAS, IN FACT, ERRONEOUS IN ITS REPORTING OF WHAT ACTUALLY TRANSPIRED. HE STATED THAT THE WHOLE REASON FOR THE CONFERENCE IN HIS OPINION WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE REASONS WHY CERTAIN NEGOTIATION INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN SENT TO GENERAL RIDGEWAY IN JAPAN. GENERAL VANDENBERG STATED THAT THE PART OF THE ARTICLE ATTRIBUTED TO HIM WAS ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT AND STATED THAT HE HAD ONLY MADE A SHORT STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE WHICH WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE ALLAN^E ARTICLE. HE STATED WITH RESPECT TO GENERAL COLLINS' REMARK QUOTE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE THAT HE COULD NOT RECALL THIS REMARK AND DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT GENERAL COLLINS WOULD MAKE SUCH A REMARK IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESIDENT AND THAT HE FEELS CONFIDENT THAT IF GENERAL COLLINS HAD MADE SUCH REMARK,

PAGE THREE

HE WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY REMEMBERED IT. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE ^EALLAN ARTICLE WAS A POOR REPORT ON WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CONFERENCE, AND STATED THAT WHOEVER PREPARED THE ARTICLE MUST HAVE HAD VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON WHAT ACTUALLY TRANSPIRED, UNLESS THE WRITER DELIBERATELY SLANTED THE ARTICLE IN THAT FASHION. HE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT ACQUAINTED WITH JACK ANDERSON AND BELIEVES THAT HE HAS MET DREW PEARSON ONCE ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO IN THE DEFENSE BLDG., AND THAT THE LAST TIME HE SAW ROBERT S. ^EALLAN WAS IN EUROPE WHEN ^EALLAN WAS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR GENERAL PATTON. HE DENIED SEEING OR TALKING TO ANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS SINCE THE CONFERENCE IN QUESTION.

HOOD

12-17-51

8:30 P.M.

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

17

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE, DECEMBER

TEN, FIFTYONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESP

DASH X. MR. S. EVERETT GLEASON, DEPUTY SECURITY OFFICER,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ADVISES THIS DATE THAT HIS SUPERIOR,

MR. JAMES E. LAY, JR., BRIEFED HIM GENERALLY ON LAY'S RETURN

FROM CONFERENCE. FURNISHED GLEASON WITH DETAILED BRIEFING ON

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER TWELFTH. GLEASON NOTIFIED

PLANNING OFFICER, STATE DEPT., OF GENERAL CONTENTS OF DECISIONS

REACHED AT PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON DECEMBER TENTH; HOWEVER,

STATES APPEARED [] ALREADY FAMILIAR WITH RESULTS OF CONFERENCE

THROUGH INFO FURNISHED [] BY STATE DEPT. OFFICIALS. []

INTEREST IN CONFERENCE BASED ON FACT THAT HE WORKED ON STAFF

PREPARING NSC DRAFT RE KOREAN SITUATION. JAMES E. WEBB, UNDERSECRETARY

OF STATE, REINTERVIEWED TODAY AND PRESENTED WITH COPY OF EXCERPTS

FROM COLUMN OF ROBERT ALLEN APPEARING IN QUOTE NEW YORK POST UNQUOTE

DECEMBER THIRTEENTH. CONTENTS OF COLUMN INDICATE ALLEN RECEIVED INFO

FROM SOMEONE AT CONFERENCE. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

OF STATE, FURNISHED SAME COLUMN AS THAT GIVEN WEBB. STATED IN HIS

OPINION COLUMN COULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED BY NEWSPAPERMAN WELL VERSED

IN BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO CONFERENCE WITHOUT OBTAINING ANY INFO

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PAGE TWO

FROM THOSE IN ATTENDANCE AT CONFERENCE. ADMIRAL DENNISON OF
WHITEHOUSE STAFF ALSO INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISES DID NOT SEE
THE PEARSON RELEASE IN THE POSSESSION OF ANDERSON. CLAIMS DOES
NOT KNOW PEARSON OR ANDERSON AND DENIES ANY DISCLOSURE ON HIS PART
OF INFO INVOLVED. ADVISES ONLY NOTES OF CONFERENCE TO HIS KNOWLEDGE
WERE THOSE MADE BY LAY, WHO TOOK MINUTES OF MEETING. STATES FIRST
KNEW FACT MEETING TO BE HELD ON DECEMBER EIGHTTH, WHEN ADVISED BY
PRESIDENT. DOES NOT RECALL DISCUSSION AT MEETING OF DECEMBER
TWENTYSEVENTH CEASE FIRE EXTENSION. STATES UNABLE SUGGEST ANY
SUSPECT AS RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK. SUGGESTS STATE DEPT. AS POSSIBLE
SOURCE OF LEAK, BUT HAS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT THIS OTHER THAN PAST
EXPERIENCE IN LEAKS OF INFO. THAT DEPT. HIS ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSIONS
AT CONFERENCE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE DEVELOPED THROUGH OTHER
INTERVIEWS. DENNISON READ AND ANALYZED BOTH THE ALLEN AND PEARSON
COLUMNS AND STATES HIS OPINION NEITHER COULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY
OUTSIDE INDIVIDUAL WITHOUT ASSISTANCE. ADVISES HIS RECOLLECTION
THAT OVER ONE HALF OF CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN
SITUATION AND INDICATED HE CONSIDERED IT UNUSUAL THAT NEITHER COLUMN
CONTAINED ANY DETAILS CONCERNING EUROPEAN DISCUSSIONS.

HOOD

CC: Mr. Belmont

2-17-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

17 9:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DEC. TEN, NINETEEN FIFTY ONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG DASH MAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE DASH X. GENERAL JOSEPH COLLINS, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISED HE HAD ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE AT THE WHITEHOUSE DEC. TEN LAST. COLLINS ADVISED MEETING OPENED BY BRIEFING BY GENERAL BRADLEY, THEN PRESIDENT CALLED ON LOVETT, FOLLOWED BY VANDENBERG AND THEN ADMIRAL FECHTELER. THEREUPON THE PRESIDENT TURNED TO THE SECRETARIES, PACE, FINLETTER AND ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WHITEHAIR, FOR REMARKS. COLLINS ADVISED HE FOLLOWED WHITEHAIR AS SPEAKER AND MADE BRIEF POINTS, SPEAKING AT DIFFERENT TIMES. HIS FIRST REMARKS WERE BASED ON A POINT WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED BY ADMIRAL FECHTELER, AND COLLINS ADVISED HE POINTED OUT SOME DISAGREEMENT WITH ADMIRAL FECHTELER'S REMARKS AND THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE ARMISTICE AND CONCESSIONS THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED. LATER THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE AIR BUILDUP OF THE COMMUNISTS AND THE POSSIBILITIES THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN OUR FORCES IN KOREA. COLLINS THEREUPON INTERJECTED WITH

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THE COMMENT THAT HE WOULD GUARANTEE THAT WE WOULD NOT BE THROWN OUT OF KOREA. FOLLOWING GENERAL COLLINS' LAST REMARKS, HE ADVISED MR. WEBB WAS CALLED UPON AND HE REFERRED TO MR. MATTHEWS, WHO OUTLINED THE POSITION OF THE STATE DEPT. HE ADDED MR. WEBB ALSO SPOKE A FEW WORDS, DETAILS NOT RECALLED. COLLINS ADVISED HE WENT TO CONFERENCE IN SAME CAR WITH ADMIRAL FECHTELER AND RETURNED TO PENTAGON FOLLOWING CONFERENCE WITH FECHTELER, THEREAFTER, DISCUSSING THE PROCEEDINGS WITH NO ONE ELSE AND MADE NO RECORD OF SAME. THE NEW YORK POST COLUMN, PREPARED BY ROBERT S. ALLEN, RELATIVE TO WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE, WAS DISPLAYED TO GENERAL COLLINS AND HE ADVISED THAT PORTION ATTRIBUTED TO HIM AS REFLECTED IN THE ALLEN COLUMN WAS A FAIR SUMMATION OF HIS PORTION, ALTHOUGH NOT IN THE EXACT WORDS AS RECALLED BY GENERAL COLLINS. HE WAS POSITIVE IN STATING HE DID NOT USE THE PHRASE QUOTE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT CERTAIN ABOUT HIS HAVING MADE ANY REMARKS CONCERNING TROOP ROTATION. CONCERNING THE PRESIDENTIAL QUOTATION AS REFLECTED BY ALLEN, GENERAL COLLINS SAID IT WAS ESSENTIALLY WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD STATED, BUT NOT AN EXACT QUOTATION, ALTHOUGH IN SUBSTANCE WAS ACCURATE. HE ADVISED THE ALLEN QUOTATION ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL VANDENBERG WAS ESSENTIALLY CORRECT AND THAT THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED

TO GENERAL BRADLEY WERE GENERALLY ACCURATE, ALTHOUGH IN THE CONFERENCES GENERAL BRADLEY HAD NOT STRESSED THAT THE MATTER OF TROOP ROTATION HAD BEEN HELD AS A BARGAINING POINT AGAINST THE CONSTRUCTION OF AIR FIELDS ON THE PART OF THE COMMUNISTS. GENERAL COLLINS HAD NO SUGGESTION AS TO HOW A LEAK MAY HAVE OCCURRED, IF A LEAK DID OCCUR, AND EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE THAT THE COLUMN BY ROBERT ALLEN COULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED BY SOMEONE WHO HAD PICKED UP A FEW BITS OF DATA HERE AND THERE FROM PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE OBTAINED IT EVEN SECOND OR THIRD HAND, WHICH PERSONS MAY HAVE ALSO POSSESSED KNOWLEDGE OF PREVIOUS CONFERENCES RELATIVE TO SIMILAR SUBJECT MATTER. CONCERNING THE PERSONNEL PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE, GENERAL COLLINS SAID HE HAD NO PERSONAL SUSPICIONS AND POINTED OUT HE HAD NOT SEEN OR HAD ANY CONTACT WITH DREW PEARSON IN MORE THAN A YEAR. GENERAL COLLINS ADVISED HE KNEW WHO JACK ANDERSON WAS, BUT NEVER HAD MET HIM AND KNEW OF NO OTHER PERSONS IN PEARSON'S EMPLOY. CONCERNING ROBERT S. ALLEN, GENERAL COLLINS ADVISED HE KNEW ALLEN, BUT HAD NOT SEEN OR TALKED TO HIM IN MORE THAN A YEAR. CLAYTON FRITCHEY DIRECTOR PUBLIC INFORMATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ADVISED HE POSSESSED NO INFO CONCERNING PROCEEDINGS, WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE, DEC. TEN AND DID NOT KNOW WHO ATTENDED OTHER THAN FROM CONJECTURE. HE ADVISED ON AFTERNOON TUESDAY DEC. ELEVEN, JACK ANDERSON VISITED

HIS OFFICE BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE P.M. ANDERSON INQUIRED REGARDING THE WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE AND FRITCHEY INDICATED HE POSSESSED NO INFORMATION. ANDERSON INFORMED FRITCHEY HE HAD PRETTY GOOD FILL IN AND FRITCHEY GATHERED FROM ANDERSON'S MANNER ANDERSON CONSIDERED THE MATERIAL AUTHENTIC. ON WEDNESDAY, DEC. TWELVE FRICHEY VISITED DREW PEARSON'S HOME FOR DINNER AND BRIDGE, ALTHOUGH PEARSON DOES NOT PLAY BRIDGE PERSONALLY. ENROUTE FRITCHEY WENT BY HOME OF FRITCHEY'S ASSISTANT, COLONEL [REDACTED] WHO LATER JOINED FRITCHEY AT THE PEARSON RESIDENCE FOR BRIDGE. DINNER GUESTS AT THE PEARSON HOME INCLUDED PEARSON AND WIFE, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] OF KENTUCKY, MR. FRITCHEY AND ATTORNEY, [REDACTED] AND WIFE. WHILE AT DINNER OR POSSIBLY JUST BEFORE DINNER, JACK ANDERSON CAME IN AND FRITCHEY WAS INVITED ASIDE AND SHOWN AN ARTICLE WHICH HE GATHERED WAS PART OF A COLUMN TYPEWRITTEN ON SEVERAL YELLOW PAGES. FRITCHEY LEARNED FROM PEARSON THAT THE MATERIAL CONTAINED SEVERAL ITEMS TO WHICH GENERAL BRADLEY OR COLONEL CLIFTON OBJECTED AND THAT ANDERSON WAS GOING TO PRESENT THEM TO THESE OFFICERS. PEARSON INVITED FRITCHEY TO READ THE COLUMN MATERIAL WHICH HE DID AND ADVISED HE FOUND IT RATHER INNOCUOUS AND PRETTY TAME. HE STATED DESPITE THIS, IT STRUCK HIM THAT THE FACT THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A LEAK FROM AN IMPORTANT CONFERENCE WAS IMPORTANT.

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HE STATED HE DID NOT SUGGEST THIS TO PEARSON NOR DID HE SUGGEST THAT PEARSON NOT PUBLISH THE COLUMN, STATING THAT HE DID NOT FEEL IT WOULD CAUSE ANY FUROR AS IT IS KNOWN PEARSON HAS EXCELLENT SOURCES AND THIS SORT OF THING OCCURS REGULARLY. FRITCHEY ADVISED THAT ANDERSON THEN DEPARTED AND AN HOUR OR SO LATER ANDERSON RETURNED WHILE FRITCHEY WAS PLAYING BRIDGE. HE DID NOT SEE THE COLUMN ON THIS OCCASION; HOWEVER, PEARSON SAID THE COLUMN HAD BEEN CHANGED IN ONE OR TWO PLACES IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL BRADLEY'S SUGGESTION AND PEARSON INCLUDED THAT THE COLUMN WOULD BE CHANGED IF SUGGESTED. FRITCHEY GATHERED FROM THIS THAT THE COLUMN WOULD BE DISPATCHED AND ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE COLUMN HAD APPEARED, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AS EDITORS OFTEN EXERCISE THE PREROGATIVE TO DELETE COLUMNS OR PORTIONS. FRITCHEY EXAMINED THE ROBERT ALLEN COLUMN OF THE NEW YORK POST, DEC. THIRTEEN, AND SAID THAT TO HIS RECOLLECTION, THEY ARE PRETTY WELL PARALLEL TO THE PEARSON MATERIAL HE HAD READ. FRITCHEY RELATED THAT ON SATURDAY DECEMBER FIFTEEN, BEFORE NOON, ANDERSON HAD VISITED HIM ON ANOTHER MATTER AND HE TWITTED ANDERSON ABOUT BEING SCOOPED BY ALLEN. HE DECLARED ANDERSON APPEARED GENERALLY SURPRISED AND LEFT IN A HURRY, APPARENTLY IN SEARCH OF A NEW YORK POST CONTAINING THE ALLEN COLUMN. FRITCHEY COULD OFFER NO SUGGESTION AS TO THE SOURCE OF THE LEAK NOR FURNISH

WFO 65-6060

Page Six

ANY INVESTIGATIVE LEADS IN THIS DIRECTION. HE ALSO SAID HE
COULD DRAW NO CONCLUSIONS AS TO WHETHER A COMMON SOURCE MAY
HAVE BEEN USED TO FURNISH INFO FOR THE PEARSON AND THE ALLEN
COLUMNS OR IF A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE HAD BEEN USED.

HOOD

W. J. [unclear]

SAC, WFO (65-6060)

December 18, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

DREW PEARSON,
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON,
ESPIONAGE - X.

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Reurlet December 15, 1951.

There is attached the original of Copy No. 10 of 20 copies of a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, bearing the stamped signature of Thomas K. Finletter, dated December 10, 1951, together with one photostatic copy thereof. This is being returned in accordance with your request.

Enclosure

CEH:LL

Two photostatic copies of the above-described memorandum being retained in the files of the Bureau.)

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DEC 19 1951

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- Belmont _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Harbo _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
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- Gandy _____

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. C. E. ~~Henrich~~ *Henrich*

DATE: December 18, 1951

FROM : W. A. Branigan *WAB*

SUBJECT: ~~ROBERT S. ALLEN~~ COLUMN APPEARING
IN "NEW YORK POST," 12-13-51

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 3-28-88 BY *[Signature]*

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Ladd	_____
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Glavin	_____
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The New York Office furnished the following information:

The "New York Post" regularly publishes four weekday editions as follows:

- (1) "Night Extra." This is published as of 9:30 A.M. each day.
- (2) "7 Blue Final**" printed at 1:30 P.M.
- (3) "7 Blue Final*" printed at 3:15 P.M.
- (4) "7 Blue Final" printed at 7:20 P.M.

In the editions published by the "New York Post" for December 13, 1951, Robert S. Allen had two different columns. The first column entitled "Must Truman Toss Out McGrath" appeared in the "Night Extra" edition. The second column which contained the story on Korea was printed in all three of the "7 Blue Final" editions.

This is for your information.

WAB: *jmr*

Drew Pearson

RECORDED - 5

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 13, 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Belmont _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Laughlin _____
- Mr. Mohr _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. TOLSON ✓
LADD ✓
NICHOLS ✓
BELMONT ✓

UNCLASSIFIED
BY SP8 JTG/ab

Drew Pearson

Secretary of Defense Lovett called me this afternoon and stated the President wanted him to discuss with me what appears to be a rather serious leak on what occurred at a meeting last Monday at the White House. He said that the President was desirous of trying to trace out the source of this leak. Secretary Lovett stated that the meeting related to plans in Korea and general European matters. He said that the press reports have been very speculative in this regard.

Secretary Lovett stated that to his recollection the following were in attendance at the meeting: The three Chiefs of Service, General Collins, Admiral Fechteler, and General Vandenburg; the three Secretaries or Acting Secretaries, Frank Pace, Francis Whitehair replacing Kimball, and Tom Finletter; Jim Webb and Matthews from the State Department; possibly Ed Foley representing Secretary Snyder; General Bradley, and Secretary Lovett. He stated that from the White House were General Vaughan, Admiral Dennison, and possibly Connelly or Short. He added that he could not remember whether he saw both Connelly and Short, but just before going into the room he recalls seeing them both.

The Secretary related that the following has happened. Yesterday afternoon an individual by the name of Anderson, who appears to be a leg-man for Drew Pearson, went up to Whitehair and said, "I've got a story of the Monday meeting; thought you would like to take a look at it," and Whitehair reportedly said he didn't want to take a look at it. Apparently Anderson either read him or showed him certain excerpts which startled Whitehair so in their apparent accuracy that he came back and spoke to his Navy colleagues about it and they advised Admiral Dennison and Dennison advised the President. The President then called General Bradley and suggested to Bradley that he get hold of Pearson or Anderson and ask to see this report; that Anderson subsequently last night around seven o'clock came over to General Bradley with the report, which was

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*2-5 memo Ladd
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already on the Bell Syndicate wires and Bradley persuaded Anderson to delete two major statements by red-penciling them, stating that they were either a breach of security or definitely not within the national interest. Anderson, according to Secretary Lovett, appeared to have agreed to this.

Secretary Lovett stated that General Bradley called him after the meeting and said that in his opinion the statement is presumably coming out this Saturday and that it is not too harmful but the story was not killed. He stated that the President appears to be relieved but he is very apprehensive as to the leak of information concerning the meeting. Secretary Lovett stated that he thought it was a terrible thing when the President could not talk to his supposedly intimate advisors without having someone go out and talk about it. He stated that it was the President's desire that he talk with me and find out what could be done.

I told the Secretary that the important thing was first to find out who was at the meeting and then find out if any of them, upon returning, had made any memoranda on the meeting or advised someone in their own office. I told him I would be very glad to assign the matter to Assistant Director Belmont. Secretary Lovett stated that General Bradley is out of town but he would have his Executive Officer, Colonel Randall, try to collect some information on the matter this afternoon.

The Secretary is attending budget hearings this afternoon but will return to his office at 6:30 PM. I told him that Mr. Belmont will be in his office (Secretary Lovett's) promptly at 6:30 to discuss the matter.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.
John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc--Mr. Nease

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 18, 1951

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD *DL*

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON,
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON,
ESPIONAGE - X.

Tolson	
Ladd	
Clegg	
Glavin	
Nichols	
Rosen	
Tracy	
Harbo	
Belmont	
Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Nease	
Gandy	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-80 BY SP-6/STJ/STJ

PURPOSE:

To advise you that a memorandum prepared by Secretary Finletter, dated December 10, 1951, following the President's conference, was seen by [redacted] and [redacted] to Finletter; Colonel [redacted] Aide to Finletter; General Vandenberg; Colonel [redacted] Aide to General Vandenberg; and Secretary Lovett. The memorandum was prepared with twenty copies. Eighteen copies are in the possession of Finletter; one was furnished to Secretary Lovett; and one was furnished to Vandenberg.

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b7C

DETAILS:

Concerning a memorandum dated December 10, 1951, prepared by Secretary Finletter, following his attendance at the President's conference at the White House on December 10, 1951, the Director noted: "This is interesting. We should find out who saw this, how many copies, etc."

Inquiries by the WFO have developed that this memorandum was prepared by Secretary Finletter for the specific purpose of pointing out "what was not said at the conference," and in this connection the only reference to the conference is contained in Paragraph 2, which states: "At the meeting it was decided that, since we now have what we went into Korea to get, namely the defeat of the aggression, we should adopt the attitude of conceding all points within reason to get the cease-fire." This statement is set forth in the memorandum as a predication for the comments.

This is the last of three memoranda which were prepared at that time for the purpose of recording and calling to the attention of Secretary Lovett the views of the Air Force which were not expressed at the conference. The first two memoranda were not considered adequate when prepared and were torn up. The torn-up copies are in the possession of Finletter. At this stage in the investigation, it does not appear that the

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contents of the Finletter memorandum are particularly germane to our investigation of the Pearson and Robert Allen columns. The Finletter memorandum is directed at what the UN position will be after a cease-fire, whereas the material discussed in the columns in question had to do with negotiations looking toward the cease-fire.

The Finletter memorandum has been seen by General Vandenberg; Colonel [redacted] Aide to General Vandenberg; Secretary Lovett; and by Colonel [redacted] and [redacted] of Finletter's office. The memorandum was prepared with twenty copies. Eighteen copies are in the possession of Finletter; one was furnished to Secretary Lovett; and one was furnished to Vandenberg.

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b7C

ACTION:

Consideration of the Finletter memorandum will continue in our investigation of this matter.

We certain we point this out in our report as this is a point the President was particularly interested in but all of course indicate the fact by it dealing with another matter though indirectly with the President's Conf.

12/20/57
Joe Storing
advised
JK

d.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 18, 1951

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON,
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON,
ESPIONAGE - X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 3-25-88 BY SP4/ab

Tolson	
Ladd	
Clegg	
Glavin	
Rosen	
Tracy	
Harbo	
Belmont	
Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Nease	
Gandy	

While talking with Admiral Robert Dennison, Naval Aide to the President, on December 17, 1951, he advised me that the President, when he told Dennison to call Secretary Lovett and request the FBI to conduct investigation in this matter, indicated the reason he designated Lovett was because the question as to whether there was a leak was of principal interest to the Department of Defense, since the conference involved Department of Defense matters. In this connection, Admiral Dennison stated the President gave him the impression he expected the FBI to talk to Jack Anderson and obtain from Anderson information as to who may have leaked the information. Dennison specifically indicated that the President was interested in finding out whether any of the individuals who attended this conference went back and dictated a memorandum as to what went on.

Admiral Dennison further stated that the President did not indicate to him any particular person who the President had in mind as possibly being responsible for the leak.

While discussing the propriety of commenting on what went on at the conference by any of those in attendance, Admiral Dennison stated that there are no written instructions which restrict the comments of either Cabinet members at Cabinet meetings or persons attending conferences such as the one of December 10; that, nevertheless, in the past the President has expressed concern over the possibility of leaks occurring from conferences at the White House. In this regard, he stated that in connection with the Forrestal and Morgenthau papers, there was considerable concern, as a result of which he, Admiral Dennison, had conferred with Mr. Peyton Ford of the Justice Department. Ford had expressed the opinion that legally Cabinet meetings and other important meetings could be per se classified and that considerable thought at the time was given to applying a classification to everything that went on in such meetings. It was ultimately decided, however, to not classify such conferences, since many things are discussed which are really not in a classified status, and the question then of clearing such matters for comment would become involved.

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DEC 28 1951

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ACTION:

The above is submitted for your information. It will not be included in the investigative reports in this matter.

12-18-51

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

18

8:00 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN
LAST, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE DASH X.

[REDACTED] FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,

STATES WAS ADVISED BY H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF
STATE, ON DECEMBER TEN, FIFTYONE, AFTER MATTHEWS RETURNED FROM
CONFERENCE THAT THE PROPOSED DRAFT TO RIDGEWAY HAD BEEN APPROVED
AT THE CONFERENCE. NO DETAILS GIVEN TO [REDACTED] BY MATTHEWS AS TO
CONVERSATIONS OF MEMBERS PRESENT AT PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE. [REDACTED]

IN TURN ADVISED [REDACTED] NORTHEAST,

ASIA AFFAIRS, WHOSE DUTIES COVER ACTIVITIES IN KOREA AND JAPAN, AND

WHO WAS [REDACTED] IN WORKING ON THE DRAFT TO

RIDGEWAY, THAT THE DRAFT HAD BEEN APPROVED. NO FURTHER DETAILS

FURNISHED [REDACTED] AS [REDACTED] HIMSELF NOT IN POSSESSION OF SAME.

SIMILAR INFO FURNISHED BY [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] PLANNING ADVISORY

BUREAU, FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. [REDACTED] STATES ADVISED BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AS SET FORTH ABOVE, AND ALSO BY S. EVERETT GLEASON,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH WHOM HE HAD COLLABORATED ON A NATIONAL

SECURITY DRAFT CONCERNING KOREAN MATTERS, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE

JAC:PJT: eas

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ad

Mr. Tolson
[Handwritten signatures and initials]

PAGE TWO

CONFERENCE WOULD CAUSE NO CHANGES IN THAT NSC DRAFT. [REDACTED]
ADVISED THAT MR. GLEASON FURNISHED HIM NO FURTHER INFO CONCERNING THE
PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE. [REDACTED] OFFICE SECRETARY DEFENSE, OFFICE
OF FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS, AN INDIVIDUAL WHOM S. EVERETT GLEASON
MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE PERSON WHOM HE TELEPHONED TO ADVISE THAT THE
RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE WERE SUCH THAT NO CHANGES WOULD
BE NECESSARY IN THE NSC DRAFT ON KOREA, IN WHICH [REDACTED] HAD COLLABORATED,
WAS CONTACTED, AND [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN NOTIFIED BY
GLEASON CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT
GLEASON WAS DOUBTFUL THAT HE HAD CONTACTED [REDACTED] BUT MENTIONED HIS NAME AS A
POSSIBILITY.

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HOOD

Mr. [unclear]

12-18-51

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

18

8:00 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, LAST, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE DASH X.

RE INTERVIEW WITH MR. JAMES E. WEBB, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, THE

FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DETAILS BEING SET FORTH OF INTEREST TO THE

BUREAU: WEBB STATES THAT SUBSEQUENT TO DECEMBER TEN CONFERENCE

HAS SEEN [REDACTED] FOR THE RALEIGH NEWS

AND OBSERVER AT RALEIGH, NC, IN CONNECTION WITH AN ITEM APPEARING

IN THE NY TIMES DECEMBER TEN, FIFTYONE, TO THE EFFECT THAT WEBB

CONTEMPLATED LEAVING THE STATE DEPT. [REDACTED] REPRESENTS THE NEWSPAPER

IN WEBB'S HOMETOWN AND WAS NATURALLY INTERESTED IN THIS STORY. WEBB

ALSO TALKED WITH JOHN HIGHTOWER, WHO COVERS THE STATE DEPT FOR

ASSOCIATED PRESS, AND ALSO TALKED WITH JAMES RESTON WHO REPRESENTS

THE NY TIMES. WEBB STATES HIGHTOWER RAISED TWO POINTS IN DISCUSSING

THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE, ONE QUOTE WAS THERE A WORLD CRISIS? UNQUOTE

AND TWO QUOTE WAS EUROPE DISCUSSED UNQUOTE. WEBB GAVE HIGHTOWER THIS

BACKGROUND: THE PRESIDENT IS FURNISHED WITH A GREAT NUMBER OF WRITTEN

REPORTS CONCERNING THE WORLD SITUATION. HE TAKES HIS POSITION SERIOUSLY

AND TAKES THE WHOLE SITUATION SERIOUSLY. THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO GET THE

FULL QUOTE FLAVOR UNQUOTE OF THE THINKING OF THE TOP PEOPLE AS IT IS

THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH WHAT GOES ON AROUND

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DEC 20 1951

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PAGE TWO

THE WORLD. WEBB STATES HE GAVE THIS INFO TO HIGHTOWER FOR BACKGROUND.
JAMES RESTON CONTACTED WEBB ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER ELEVEN, AND WAS GIVEN
GENERALLY SAME BACKGROUND INFO CONCERNING THE DECEMBER TEN CONFERENCE
AS WAS GIVEN TO HIGHTOWER. RESTON INQUIRED CONCERNING CHURCHILL'S
VISIT AND WANTED TO KNOW THE POLICY OF THE US AS TO CHURCHILL. WEBB
ADVISED HIM THAT THE GOVT WAS MAKING A VERY CAREFUL STUDY OF THE
BACKGROUND AND PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH OUR RELATIONS WITH GREAT
BRITAIN AND EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST, AND INDICATED THAT THIS COUNTRY
WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS WHETHER CHURCHILL TALKED
ABOUT THEM OR NOT. RESTON ALSO INQUIRED AS TO RECENT CHANGES IN THE
STATE DEPT AND WEBB DISCUSSED THE SIGNIFICANCE AND HISTORY OF THESE
CHANGES. A REPORTED RESIGNATION OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON
WAS ALSO DISCUSSED.

HOOD

7 ...

12-18-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

18

9:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH X. SECRETARY OF

NAVY DAN KIMBALL INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISED HE WAS ABSENT FROM TOWN AT

TIME OF WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN LAST AND IN HIS STEAD CONFERENCE

WAS ATTENDED BY UNDERSECRETARY FRANCIS WHITEHAIR. KIMBALL RELATED FOLLOWING

CONFERENCE WHITEHAIR DISCUSSED SAME WITH HIM ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS AND DID NOT

FURNISH TO HIM A SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS MADE BY THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WITH THE

EXCEPTION OF FURNISHING BRIEF RESUME OF REMARKS BY MR. WHITEHAIR AND ADMIRAL

FECHTELER. KIMBALL RELATED HE HAD DISCUSSED CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS WITH

MOORE, MADE NO MEMORANDUM OR NOTES PERTAINING TO CONFERENCE AS RECEIVED FROM

MR. WHITEHAIR. HE ADVISED HE LEARNED LATE THE FOLLOWING EVENING OR MORNING

DECEMBER TWELVE FROM UNDERSECRETARY WHITEHAIR OF ANDERSON-S CONVERSATIONS

WITH WHITEHAIR AND OF THE OBVIOUS LEAK OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CONFERENCE

DISCUSSIONS. HE STATED HE REPORTED THIS MATTER THE SAME MORNING TO ADMIRAL

FECHTELER AND ADMIRAL FECHTELER, IN TURN, GAVE THE INFORMATION TO ADMIRAL

DENNISON, WHO INFORMED THE PRESIDENT. SECRETARY KIMBALL ADVISED HE HAD NO

SUGGESTION AS TO THE IDENTITY OF ANY POSSIBLE SOURCE TO PEARSON, ANDERSON

OR ROBERT S. ALLEN.

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HOOD

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MAT/CAG:DDJ.

RBH
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DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-5/BJG/STK

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