

Mr. FRITCHEY stated he had known DREW PEARSON for about ten years and visits him periodically averaging, perhaps, once a month. He did not believe he had seen PEARSON since the visit on December 12, 1951.

On December 18, 1951, Mr. FRITCHEY was reinterviewed by Agents [redacted] and [redacted] at which time he was shown the DREW PEARSON column dated December 14th, which appeared in the "New York Daily Mirror" of December 15, 1951, and the DREW PEARSON column, which appeared in the "Philadelphia Bulletin" of December 15th. Mr. FRITCHEY examined both columns, and stated they are reasonably accurate accounts of the material, which ANDERSON had displayed to him on the night of December 12 at the home of PEARSON. He stated that tabloid papers have a tendency to condense and rewrite, and he thought, perhaps, the article in the "Bulletin," which is slightly different from the "Mirror" column, would be more likely to be an exact or nearly exact copy as furnished by PEARSON.

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As a matter of interest, Mr. FRITCHEY advised that on the evening of December 17th, [redacted] of DREW PEARSON, phoned him and invited him to play bridge the night of December 18, 1951, at the PEARSON residence. Mr. FRITCHEY expressed the thought that, perhaps, Mr. PEARSON contemplated making some discreet inquiries of him concerning developments growing out of the instant leak.

DREW PEARSON AND ROBERT S. ALLEN COLUMNS

The column under the by-line of DREW PEARSON appearing in the New York Daily Mirror for December 15, 1951, reads as follows:

"Washington, Dec. 14. -- The world sat up over Pres. Truman's publicized meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he returned from Key West, but it was routine. The highlight was an assurance from Gen. Omar Bradley that a cease-fire could be worked out in Korea.

"The diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting when HST strode in, grinning. He shook hands all around, said it was 'good to be back', asked how they liked his tan.

"He let the joint chiefs do most of the talking, and here is a brief account of what happened:

"Truman sat back, called for views, and made such comments as: 'That's a tough one'.

"Bradley led with a summary of the Korean situation, reported the Reds seemed ready to come to terms, that a cease-fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions.

"Gen. Vandenberg, Air Chief, opposed major concessions, was adamant against allowing the Communists to build airfields during the cease-fire.

"Gen. Collins, Army chief, opposed giving in on troop rotation. The Chinese propose a freeze on all troops entering Korea, blocking replacements for combat veterans. This would be a blow to morale. Collins warned.

"Silent Admiral

"Collins agreed 'minor concessions' should be made to win some in return. Truman commented that no concessions should be granted that we 'would later regret'.

"Admiral Fechteler made only a half-minute speech, pledged that the Navy is prepared to carry out 'any mission any time any place'.

"For the Army, Collins pledged the Army couldn't be blasted out of Korea, could hold on 'until hell freezes over'.

"One concession discussed was yielding to the Reds on inspection behind the lines. We have been holding out for it by U.N.-Communist teams, but the Reds want it by 'neutral' nations -- and that meant Poland and Czechoslovakia. Later they agreed to consider Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. These would be acceptable to us. Bradley proposed giving ground here and it has been done.

"The principal theme was that a cease-fire may be close, with a settlement within 20 days. Some details will be left to iron out later.

"Another matter discussed was the question of withdrawing U.N. troops altogether -- after the armistice. The facts regarding this must not be published now."

Through inquiry at the Bell Syndicate, Inc., 229 West 43rd Street, New York City, it was ascertained that in the original column as dispatched by PEARSON to Bell Syndicate there appeared under the caption "Silent Admiral" the following:

"President TRUMAN's only comment was that every effort should be made to reach a cease-fire, but no concessions should be granted that we 'would later regret'".

On the basis of the same inquiry it was ascertained that following the dispatch of the original article to Bell Syndicate, PEARSON requested that the above paragraph be changed to read:

"President TRUMAN commented that no concessions should be granted that we would later regret."

It was further determined from the Bell Syndicate that in the original dispatch signed by DREW PEARSON the following was contained:

"The chief theme of the meeting was that a cease-fire agreement may be close at hand. All signs point to a settlement within the next 20 days. Though some details will be left to iron out after the December 27 deadline, we are sure to grant a short extension to clean them up."

Subsequent to the filing of the original dispatch and before publication, PEARSON requested that the last sentence of the above paragraph be changed to read: "Some details will be left to iron out after the December 27 deadline." In making the request for this change PEARSON stated in addition, "In other words, omit the word 'though' and the words 'we are sure to grant a short extension to clean them up'."

The New York Post for December 13, 1951, in its "Blue Final" edition attributed the following column to ROBERT S. ALLEN:

"Washington, Dec. 13. - The U.N. can have a cease-fire in Korea, but at the cost of important concessions to the Reds.

"That's what the Joint Chiefs told the President in their big conference with him after his return. Gen. Bradley declared the protracted truce negotiations have reached the point 'where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one'.

"'What do they want?' asked the President. 'The deadlock gets down to this,' explained Bradley. 'We are demanding the right to continue to rotate our troops as we have been doing for months. The Reds are flatly refusing to allow that. They are insisting on a complete freeze on replacements and weapons. But they have indicated they would make concessions on that if we will allow them to build some airfields in North Korea. We have refused to do that. Obviously, they are using the rotation issue to try to wrest concessions from us on the airfield demand.'

"Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg vigorously opposed giving any ground on that.

"'I want a cease-fire, if one can be worked out that is fair and proper,' declared the Air Chief of Staff. 'But I don't see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build airfields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them, if they decide to break the truce next spring, which I wouldn't put past them.'

"Gen. J. Lawton Collins was inclined to favor some terms on the airfield dispute. He thought something could be worked out on that. But the Army Chief of Staff was adamant in insisting the Communists be required to agree to rotation of U.N. troops.

"'That would be a serious blow to the morale of our men,' Collins argued. 'I am strongly opposed to any concession on that. It is an unfair demand, and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on airfields.'

"Our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over, and I am flatly opposed to giving the slightest ground on the replacement issue. The Reds would have the same right as us on that, and I don't see why they should object to it, except for trading purposes."

"Bradley agreed with Collins, but emphasized the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful Air Force."

"President Truman listened intently to the military leaders and said nothing until they finished. Then he told them -

"As you know I am very anxious to bring the fighting to an end if that is possible. But I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on. We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men."

"Also discussed was the question of building up the South Korean Army, as this column has reported was proposed by General Ridgway."

Through the Post Hall Syndicate, Inc., 295 Madison Avenue, New York City, it was ascertained that the mimeographed copy of the quoted ALLEN article reflected that the article, as filed by ALLEN, also included the following:

"He wants to increase the ROK divisions from 11 to 20. No decision was reached on the matter, but President Truman strongly approved the plan. 'I am for prompt action on that,' he said. 'It seems to me a very sound thing to do.' Similarly, the President approved moving to Korea one of the two National Guard divisions now in Japan. This has been suggested by Ridgway in order to permit the transfer of one of the battle-experienced divisions in Korea to Europe. General Eisenhower has requested that."

The original dispatch filed by PEARSON with Bell Syndicate Incorporated was received by wire at approximately 4 P.M. on December 11, 1951. The change in the PEARSON column was received at Bell Syndicate from PEARSON by wire on December 12, 1951. The dispatch from ROBERT S. ALLEN to the Post Hall Syndicate Incorporated was received by them by mail on December 11, 1951.

NEWS DISPATCHES

In order to show what details of the President's conference of December 10, 1951, were reported in general news dispatches, the items appearing in several publications were examined, and the following quotations therefrom are set forth as being of possible interest to this investigation.

WASHINGTON STAR, December 10, 1951,  
by JOSEPH A. FOX

"Korea was among the subjects discussed but the meeting was not confined to that subject." (Mr. JOSEPH SHORT).

".....officials here indicated that he (the President) wanted a detailed first-hand account of recent developments in Korea with full reports on possible new moves in the armistice talks."

"The deadline for the Korean truce negotiations is December 27."

"Mr. Short said that the meeting took up European affairs....."

"President Truman also said yesterday that one of the reasons for his return was to talk with people recently in Europe."

NEWSWEEK, December 17, 1951.  
National Affairs

"The actual situation: General Matthew B. Ridgway wanted instructions about what kind of truce conditions he could make, particularly concerning exchange of prisoners and inspection."

WASHINGTON TIMES HERALD, December 10, 1951.  
Evening Edition

"One of the matters presumably discussed was what course the United States should follow if the present Korean truce failed to produce a complete armistice by December 27, the deadline set by truce negotiators....." (Associated Press)

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NEW YORK TIMES, December 11, 1951,  
by W. H. LAWRENCE

"There was said to be a strong belief that the Chinese and North Korean Communists had concluded that it was militarily impossible to expel United Nation forces from Korea and now really wanted a cessation of the fighting there....."

"In quarters that have followed closely the long drawn-out negotiations..... there was speculation that a compromise might be near on the controversial inspection-enforcement issue, which has deadlocked the truce talks since November 27....."

"Few believed that all the odds and ends of an armistice could be bargained out and agreed to by December 27, the present deadline for the negotiators to reach complete agreement on an armistice....."

"There seemed general agreement that the United Nations policy-makers would not oppose a further extension of this time limit, now only seventeen days off, if the present battlefront lull continued."

"In the cautiously optimistic reports of a possible Korean cease-fire in the not distant future, which followed in the wake of this session, the talk of compromise on the controverted inspection-enforcement issue centered on elaboration of a Communist proposal..... At that time the Communists suggested Poland and Czechoslovakia, both members of the Soviet bloc, as two 'neutral' nations qualified to supervise enforcement of an armistice..... At the same session, however, the Communist negotiators conceded, in response to Allied questioning, that they would also consider Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark as 'neutral' nations qualified to supervise the behind-the-lines inspection....."

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INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL ROBERT L. DENNISON

Admiral DENNISON was interviewed at his residence on December 17, 1951, by Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and SA [redacted]. He advised that in pursuance of the decision of the President to have the December 10, 1951, meeting, he telephonically advised Admiral LATOR of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the fact the meeting was to be held and furnished similar advice to Mr. WEBB of the Department of State, and informed he made both of these telephonic contacts on December 8, 1951, from Key West.

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With reference to the question as to whether an agenda had been prepared and distributed to those who attended the meeting, Admiral DENNISON advised that none had been prepared. He said that in a general way those who attended the conference would know of problems which had arisen regarding world affairs and would certainly be prepared to present the views of the particular department involved in a conference of this type. He said that the persons he had called would be aware of the fact that certain questions regarding cease fire negotiations would come up at the conference by reason of a previous exchange of radio messages referring to unresolved questions.

Admiral DENNISON stated that at the time the conference broke up no particular group was observed by him to be gathered in any sort of a discussion to the extent that such a fact was brought to his attention. He advised he recalled that the President desired to see Mr. WEBB following the conference and it is his recollection that at the end of the conference, Mr. WEBB went to the office of the President. When WEBB left the Cabinet Room, he left by a door which would take him out to the corridor where the press would be aware of the fact that he had gone to the President's office. The remainder of the persons attending the conference left through another door and the press would not necessarily be aware of their specific presence at the time. Admiral DENNISON advised that he does not recall that anyone arrived at the conference following the arrival of the President. He likewise is unable to recall that anyone left before the end of the conference and did not recall any secretaries or other persons having occasion to enter the conference room during its progress. He stated that he took no material to the conference, took no notes whatever and informed that he recalled seeing no one take notes with the exception of Mr. JAMES LAY, who took notes for the President.



Admiral DENNISON advised that upon the conclusion of the conference, in view of the interest of the press in the meeting, he instructed Mr. JOSEPH SHORT of the White House staff to advise the press that at the meeting the President had discussed world affairs and no policy decisions had been reached. DENNISON stated he might not have used these exact words, but the words do reflect the sense of what he told SHORT. He stated he did not furnish Mr. SHORT any further information as to what had transpired at the conference. This statement was made after conferring with Admiral SOUERS. He was advised it has been indicated that SHORT had stated to the press that Korea had been discussed at the meeting. He said SHORT may have made such a statement, but he does not recall authorizing him to so state.

Admiral DENNISON was requested to furnish the identity of all individuals with whom he had discussed the conference. He replied he had discussed the conference with no individual who had not attended it. He further advised he has made no written record of any type pertaining to any matter under discussion at this conference. He stated he does not know DREW PEARSON, does not know JACK ANDERSON and does not know ROBERT ALLEN. He advised he has not had contact with any of these individuals or any employees or representatives or associates of these persons in any way concerning the subject matter of this investigation. He does not know whether anyone who would have any connection with these persons was present at the White House on December 10.

Admiral DENNISON read the column under the by-line of DREW PEARSON appearing in the New York Daily Mirror for December 15, 1951, and furnished his comments concerning the relative points of accuracy and inaccuracy as appearing in the article. He advised that the statement concerning the fact that the diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting when the President walked into the conference room, is obviously correct. He advised that the statement that the President shook hands all around is true and that in fact the President to the best of his recollection, shook hands with all individuals in the Cabinet Room. Concerning the mention appearing in the PEARSON article of the President's tan, he stated he doubts that this is true and informed he is unable to recall any comment concerning whether the President had a suntan. With regard to the statement that the President permitted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do most of the talking, he stated he believes this is accurate. In the same regard, he advised with respect to the comment attributed to the President "that's a tough one," that while the President probably did not use these exact words, he might from time to time have made comments identical in sense.

Admiral DENNISON advised the statement that General BRADLEY led with a summary of the Korean situation is accurate and informed that in fact General BRADLEY did so at the direction of the President and spent perhaps as much as eight minutes in covering the Korean military situation, including in his briefing, the use of maps prepared for this purpose. He stated he is reasonably certain General BRADLEY did not, as reported in the PEARSON column, say the Reds seem ready to come to terms, but believed that from the summary furnished by General BRADLEY it could be accurately concluded he did state a cease fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions. In explaining this, he advised he does not recall General BRADLEY actually making such a statement, but informed that a conclusion based on what he did state to this effect would not be erroneous.

With regard to the comments attributed to General VANDENBERG in the PEARSON article, Admiral DENNISON advised he could not recall General VANDENBERG commented particularly on the subject matter of major concessions.

In connection with the statement attributed to General COLLINS concerning the opposition to making concessions in connection with the rotation of troops, Admiral DENNISON advised he saw no particular reason to attribute this comment specifically to COLLINS, adding that COLLINS did not take any stronger position in this regard than anyone else at the conference. He stated the statement does accurately reflect the view held by many individuals. He did state General COLLINS did comment on the matter of troop rotation. He commented particularly that the wording of this portion of the PEARSON article in his opinion implies that some individuals at the conference favored the making of concessions with respect to this point and he stated such was not the case. Still in connection with the statement attributed to General COLLINS, Admiral DENNISON informed he could not recall COLLINS making the comment that we should make minor concessions in order to receive the same. In the same regard in connection with the comment attributed to the President, to the effect no concessions should be granted that we would later regret, Admiral DENNISON advised the President did make a statement to this effect but not necessarily in the same words.

Relating to the comment concerning Admiral FECHTELER, he stated FECHTELER did speak very briefly, but he cannot recall that he made the "any mission any time any place" statement and informed that according to his recollection, such a statement does not appear at all to fit in with what the Admiral was actually talking about.

With respect to the "until hell freezes over" statement attributed to General COLLINS, Admiral DENNISON stated he does not feel that General

COLLINS would have used this language at this conference, but informed that at the conference COLLINS expressed an optimistic attitude as to the ability of the UN forces to stay in Korea and to the best of DENNISON's recollection, put some sort of a time limit on the ability of these forces to stay in Korea.

Admiral DENNISON, commenting in connection with the section of the PEARSON article dealing with inspection behind the lines, advised he cannot recall that General BRADLEY offered the proposal attributed to him in the article, nor can he recall specific mention in the conference of the countries mentioned in the article.

Admiral DENNISON stated the conclusion in the PEARSON article that the principal theme was that a cease fire may be close, with the settlement within twenty days, is an inaccurate statement and commented similarly concerning the statement there was discussed the question of withdrawing U.N. troops altogether after the signing of an armistice.

Admiral DENNISON advised that to the best of his recollection, there was no discussion concerning the December 27th cease fire extension. (This relates to an item which JACK ANDERSON agreed to delete from the column after he discussed it with General BRADLEY and attributes the particular statement to the President.)

Admiral DENNISON likewise read the article attributed to ROBERT S. ALLEN, as appearing in the New York Post for December 13, 1951. He stated the statement that the Joint Chiefs told the President the U.N. could have a cease fire in Korea at the cost of important concessions, is inaccurate and no such statement to his knowledge has been made by the Joint Chiefs. He advised General BRADLEY did not use the words attributed to the effect that a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one, but did advise that during his comments, BRADLEY undoubtedly made statements from which such a conclusion could be inferred. With further regard to the statement attributed to General BRADLEY, Admiral DENNISON advised he would describe this portion of the article as generally accurate as to the sense of what was actually said by General BRADLEY. He added that he cannot, of course, say that these were the exact words used by General BRADLEY.

Admiral DENNISON commented on the statements attributed to General VANDENBERG by advising he could not recall General VANDENBERG stating to the effect he desired a cease fire. He believed the General had made a statement with respect to the potentialities involved in the build up of Red air strength. He stated he did not recall the General using the words "which I wouldn't put past them."

Concerning the comments attributed to General COLLINS, Admiral DENNISON felt that a reading of the ALLEN article would suggest that the matter of rotation of troops was in dispute and informed that such was not the case. He stated he does not believe that General COLLINS said "it is an unfair demand, and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on air fields." He stated that the comment attributed to COLLINS concerning the ability of the U.N. armies to hold in Korea is essentially correct. He informed that the ALLEN article is accurate in indicating the opposition of the President to the agreement on a complete freeze with respect to replacements and weapons.

Admiral DENNISON commented with respect to the statements attributed to and comments made concerning the President, and advised that the President did not, as commented in the article, listen intently to the Joint Chiefs and then make a final statement, but during the conference did, in at least a general way, express the views attributed to him.

In summarizing his views concerning both the PEARSON and ALLEN articles, Admiral DENNISON informed he felt it is likely both columns were prepared from the same basic material. He commented that it appears somewhat strange that practically no mention was made of the European situation, whereas in fact more than one half of the time of the conference was expended in a discussion of the European situation. He advised that in his opinion, it appears quite unlikely that either article could have been written by an individual who did not have at least limited access to the agenda of the conference. He described the two articles as relatively accurate as to the subject matters under discussion, to the extent to which they were reported in the columns, but as inaccurate in attributing the views indicated to the persons mentioned in the articles. He commented without attaching any significance to this fact, that both articles purported to mention only the views of armed forces personnel, including the President, and failed to mention the views of civilian persons in attendance, some of whom had very definite views and expressed them.

Admiral DENNISON observed that he was unable to see from a perusal of the PEARSON and ALLEN columns why anyone from the conference would disclose information for the press. He particularly stated he saw no interest to be served on behalf of any agencies represented. He commented that there was a remarkable degree of agreement on the part of all present concerning the items described and advised that such disagreement that did exist was primarily with respect to details or timing rather than substance. Admiral DENNISON was requested to furnish any information in his possession which would reflect upon the question at issue namely, who of those attending

the conference may have furnished information to the press or who may have been responsible for information getting to the press. DENNISON stated that he had absolutely no facts upon which to base any opinion as to who might have been responsible for any information being furnished to the press. He did state that because of his intimate knowledge of certain individuals, he would state that it would be, in his opinion, psychologically impossible for them to be responsible. In this group, he placed the following:

The President, General BRADLEY, JAMES LAY, Admiral SOUERS, Secretary LOVETT, Admiral FECHTELER, General LANDRY, General VAUGHAN, and H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS.

DENNISON specifically pointed out that there should be no inference that others might be suspected by him, informing that his degree of association with the remaining individuals has been less extensive.

Admiral DENNISON, after receiving the approval of the President, reviewed for the benefit of the interviewing agents, on December 20, 1951, the notes which had been made at the December 10 conference by Mr. JAMES LAY. In conducting this review and analysis, Admiral DENNISON discussed the various points of accuracy and inaccuracy of the material appearing in the PEARSON and ALLEN columns, a substantial portion of which he had already commented on in the interview conducted on December 18. He informed upon the completion of the review of the notes, that this review had served more definitely to confirm his previously expressed opinion that both the PEARSON and ALLEN articles were written by an individual who had had access in some form to at least a limited account of the conference. Admiral DENNISON in commenting on the relation of the columns to the conference notes, pointed out that certain matters actually covered at the conference of particular security significance, were not covered in either of the columns.

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INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL HARRY H. VAUGHAN

General VAUGHAN was interviewed December 15, 1951, at his residence by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]

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General VAUGHAN advised that he had attended the conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Cabinet Room of the White House on December 10, 1951. General VAUGHAN stated he had made no preparations for the conference and had taken no notes while at the conference. He stated he observed that JAMES LAY had taken notes at the conference, but he was unable to say whether Mr. LAY's notes were voluminous or not. He stated that he had not prepared any memoranda on the conference and that he had not discussed it with anyone with the exception of General LANDRY, at which time he remarked to General LANDRY the wide difference of opinion of General VANDENBERG and General COLLINS with respect to the withdrawal of our troops in Korea in the event of a cease fire order.

He stated after the President left the room he, VAUGHAN, immediately started for his own office and outside of the Cabinet Room he stopped for a moment and kidded Mr. WEBB about a red tie he was wearing, and that, thereafter, he went directly to his own office.

The article appearing in the "New York Post 'Blue Final'" edition for December 13, 1951, under the by-line of ROBERT S. ALLEN, was read to General VAUGHAN. He was asked to comment as to whether this column accurately reflected the statements or views expressed at the conference by the individuals mentioned.

General VAUGHAN stated the material appearing in the article was substantially that which transpired at the conference. He stated he could not, of course, recall the exact verbiage of the various speakers at the conference, but the theme set forth in the article was substantially the same, and the statements attributed to the various individuals attending the conference were substantially the statements made by these individuals at the conference.

General VAUGHAN stated it was remotely possible, in his opinion, that a person not in attendance at the conference could have prepared the article, but he thought it was miraculous if this was done in the absence of actual attendance or access to an oral or written account of the proceedings. General VAUGHAN pointed out the person preparing the ALLEN article could have discussed the conference with someone, who had talked to a person attending the conference and who had possibly divulged what transpired at the conference with no intention of divulging these matters. In explaining this, General VAUGHAN stated it was possible some person attending the conference may have discussed what transpired at the conference with one of his subordinates and the subordinate was responsible for the leak.

General VAUGHAN stated the portion of the article attributed to the President was "pretty near on the nose", and that this could not have been gotten out of thin air. He pointed out General BRADLEY, at the conference, had mentioned the building up of the forces of the South Koreans, and stated it would be some months before those forces would be self-sufficient.

General VAUGHAN stated that during his years of experience at the White House, he had found the security of the State Department was not good, mainly because of their peculiar administrative set-up and described it as not as effective as the security maintained in other Government agencies. He explained this by saying that perhaps due to their administrative set-up, matters of highly confidential nature are filtered down within the State Department from high level to lower level subordinates. He stated he felt it was, undoubtedly, due to this filtering process in the State Department that the Department had been responsible on many occasions in the past for the untimely or premature release of confidential matters. General VAUGHAN specifically pointed out he was in no way stating the State Department or any member of that Department was responsible for the leak involved in this inquiry. He did state that if he had to give a quick answer as to the source of this leak, he would say the State Department. He stated he could not conceive of the leak emanating from the White House. He stated he had the highest regard for the White House staff, and he knew of no one on the staff whose activities gave him any cause for suspicion.

General VAUGHAN stated he is of the opinion that, if the leak occurred through an individual in the military establishment, it would not be an accidental divulgence but rather a deliberate divulgence, and he contrasted this type of divulgence to that which he had offered in connection with the State Department.

General VAUGHAN stated in his opinion, this would be true of a military establishment because it is his belief that DREW PEARSON has on his payroll at least one individual highly placed in each of the three establishments who serves as an informant for him. He stated he bases this on the

many articles which have been written by PEARSON on confidential military and political matters in the past which certainly, in his opinion, could only have come from the military establishments involved. In this connection, General VAUGHAN pointed out that when LOUIS JOHNSON was Secretary of Defense he knew Mr. JOHNSON was a close friend of DREW PEARSON, and PEARSON visited Mr. JOHNSON in his office about twice a week, and that [redacted] a leg-man for PEARSON, was in Mr. JOHNSON's office almost every day. He stated it was his opinion that JOHNSON was PEARSON's pipeline to the Department of Defense.

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With respect to DREW PEARSON, General VAUGHAN pointed out he was naturally prejudiced to PEARSON because of the continued, unjustified criticism he had received from PEARSON in his newspaper articles. General VAUGHAN was asked when he had last seen PEARSON or any of his employees. General VAUGHAN stated that he had first met PEARSON about two months ago at a dinner in the Carlton Hotel when he was introduced to him in the lobby by Commissioner F. JOSEPH DONAHUE of the District of Columbia, at which time he merely acknowledged the introduction. He said he had not seen or talked to PEARSON or any of his employees since the conference occurred on December 10, 1951.

During the interview with General VAUGHAN, with relation to DREW PEARSON, he advised in the past he had become acquainted with other leg-men working for PEARSON but had had no contact with any of these individuals with relation to the conference on December 10, 1951.

General VAUGHAN was asked if he knew JACK ANDERSON. He stated that he did know him and that he believed the last time he saw ANDERSON or spoke to him was at the Argentina Embassy, he believed in about 1948, when he (VAUGHAN) received a decoration from the Argentina Government, pointing out that ANDERSON was present at the ceremony as PEARSON's "inside man".

General VAUGHAN was asked to furnish, on the basis of his long experience in the White House and association and contact with the personnel attending various Presidential conferences of the type involved, any suspicions or suggestions which, in his opinion, might be of any possible aid to the FBI in carrying out the instructions of the President that the source of the leak in this matter be identified. He replied that the information attributed to him hereinbefore constitutes all that he is able to offer.



INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL ROBERT LANDRY

General ROBERT LANDRY, Air Force Aide to the President, was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] in his office at the White House on December 14, 1951. General LANDRY advised that he had attended a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President on December 10, 1951, in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

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General LANDRY stated he made no notes at the conference, nor did he recall seeing anyone else making any notes. He stated he had not been briefed on the agenda for the conference and that no printed agenda was prepared. He stated as soon as the conference was over, he himself did not stop to talk to anyone but started towards his own office and while enroute, he stopped in the office of Mr. MATT CONNELLY and that Mr. JOE SHORT and Admiral DENNISON were there and Mr. SHORT asked General LANDRY if the President had designated someone to see SHORT about giving out a press release. General LANDRY stated that he told SHORT, "No", and suggested that he see Mr. LOVETT or the President.

General LANDRY stated at no time has he prepared a memorandum concerning what transpired at the conference nor has he seen any memoranda prepared by anyone else. He further stated he has not heard of any memoranda being prepared on this conference. General LANDRY stated he had not discussed this conference with anyone other than the President.

General LANDRY stated he did not know JACK ANDERSON and that he had never met DREW PEARSON and that to his knowledge, he knows no one in the employment of DREW PEARSON. He stated, of course, he knows of DREW PEARSON and knows him when he sees him. He stated he has not talked to him on the telephone and that he did not see him in the White House at the time of the conference. He stated the last time he saw PEARSON was about a year ago.

General LANDRY was asked if he had any suspicions about anyone who would have had any connection with the alleged leak of information of what transpired at the conference and he replied in the negative, and stated he was unable to furnish any information, whatsoever, in this regard.

INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS

Admiral SIDNEY W. SOUERS was interviewed on December 19, 1951, by Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent [redacted]. At the beginning of the interview, Admiral SOUERS indicated that he was already aware of the fact that the President had requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to endeavor to identify the reported leak involved in this matter.

Admiral SOUERS advised during the conference he made no notes and subsequent to the conference did not dictate or record in any form any of the matters discussed at the conference. He likewise advised he has not discussed the matters considered at the conference with anyone. He advised that he did not know positively that the meeting was to be held until the morning of the meeting.

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He advised, to the best of his recollection, that he received a telephone call during the evening of December 8, 1951, from a [redacted] of the New York News, who called him in relation to the rumored return of the President to Washington. He advised that he furnished [redacted] no information and recalled that following the conclusion of the conference on December 10, 1951, [redacted] again called him and wanted to know what had happened, to which Admiral SOUERS responded, he could not furnish him any information whatsoever.

Admiral SOUERS advised that he did not know of the meeting in advance, nor the specific matters which would be discussed. He advised, however, that due to his knowledge of current conditions and his position that he could surmise as to the matters which would be on the agenda. In this regard, he commented that newspaper reporters and journalists possessing an awareness of political conditions and particularly with regard to the existing situation in Korea, and having knowledge of the fact a meeting was to be held, could likewise engage in speculation as to the matters which would be discussed at such a meeting and do so with a relatively fair degree of accuracy.

Admiral SOUERS advised that upon the termination of the conference and acting on instructions received by him, he and Admiral DENNISON instructed Mr. SHORT, with respect to the making of a press release, that the reporters should be told the President discussed world affairs and no decisions on policy were reached.

Admiral SOUERS read the article by DREW PEARSON which appeared in the "New York Mirror" on December 15, 1951, and the article prepared by ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in the "New York Post" on December 13, 1951. In commenting on these columns, Admiral SOUERS advised that in his opinion both represented poor reporting. In explanation of this, he pointed out that according to his understanding of the matters actually discussed at the conference, four key points were involved. He stated that none of the key points is covered in either of the newspaper articles in question. He advised that both articles rather accurately reflect the atmosphere which prevailed at the conference. He did comment that it is his belief that a considerable portion of the views expressed in the two articles had already appeared in some form or other in the press prior to the conference. In support of his statement that the two columns are considerably inaccurate, he stated that to the best of his recollection General VANDENBERG did not express opposition to major concessions. Along the same line, he advised that the comment appearing in the PEARSON column with respect to Admiral FECHTELER is not only inaccurate but fails to make reference to an extremely important position expressed by FECHTELER at the conference. He stated that he is reasonably certain that General COLLINS did not make the statement, "until Hell freezes over", and with further regard to the columns, advised that the articles did not set forth an extremely important comment made by COLLINS at the meeting, the publication of which would have been of widespread interest. He stated it was particularly significant to note that whereas considerable discussion was held at the conference with relation to the European situation, neither column commented in this regard. He stated that the portion of the PEARSON article relating to yielding to the Reds on inspection behind the lines is untrue since this discussion was not engaged in at this conference, to the best of his recollection.

Admiral SOUERS commented that there is nothing unusual about the fact that the President shook hands with those gathered at the conference, since it is frequently his habit to do so at meetings of this nature.

With further relation to the PEARSON article, Admiral SOUERS commented that in his opinion the statement that the "principal theme was that a cease-fire may be close . . . ." was inaccurate. On the other hand, in commenting as to the last paragraph of the PEARSON article pertaining to the discussion of the withdrawal of U.N. troops, he advised in his opinion the inclusion of this statement in the PEARSON article definitely lends some credence to the viewpoint that at least some of the information reflected in the article was obtained from a person having knowledge of the conference.

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In analysing the quality of the information contained in the columns, Admiral SOUERS advised that it appeared to him the major portion of the two articles could have been written by an individual sufficiently knowledgeable as to international affairs, who had at least some degree of access to what was actually covered at the conference. In the same regard, he advised it appeared to him from a study of the two columns that the information perhaps was made available through a subordinate of an individual who attended the conference.

Admiral SOUERS was asked as to whether he recalled any mention at the conference by the President as to possible extension of the December 27 cease-fire deadline. He stated he did not recall this.

Admiral SOUERS advised that he was unable to furnish any specific suggestion that he felt would assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation in carrying out the request of the President.

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INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, FRANK C. PACE

Secretary PACE was interviewed on December 15, 1951, in his office by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]

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Mr. PACE advised that he had attended the conference at the Cabinet Room of the White House on December 10, 1951.

Mr. PACE stated he had not been briefed on what was to be discussed at the conference, but he had taken no notes at the conference and had not noticed anyone else at the conference taking notes. Mr. PACE stated since the conference he had prepared no memoranda, nor had he seen any memoranda prepared by anyone else pertaining to the conference, and, likewise, advised that he has discussed the conference with no one, with the exception of Mr. LOVETT, Secretary of Defense, and Mr. FINLETTER. He pointed out that he does not specifically recall discussing the conference with Mr. LOVETT or Mr. FINLETTER, but since the three of them returned to the Pentagon from the White House in Mr. LOVETT's car, immediately after the conference, it is quite possible that the three of them did discuss or at least mention certain items which had been brought up at the conference.

The article attributed to ROBERT S. ALLEN, as published by the "New York Post 'Blue Final'" edition of December 13, 1951, was read to Secretary PACE. Secretary PACE was asked if the material appearing in the article was discussed at the meeting, and he replied in the affirmative. He pointed out that he could not recall the exact verbiage used by the various individuals at the conference, but that the material appearing in the article reported substantially the views of the individuals mentioned as expressed at this conference.

Secretary PACE was asked if, in his opinion, the ALLEN article could have been prepared by anyone who had not been in actual attendance at the conference or had had access to a substantially complete and accurate written or oral report of the conference. He replied that it was within the realm of possibility, but during his discussion of this point, indicated his view that the article could not have been written without aid of some type.

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He pointed out, however, with respect to the views of General COLLINS as reported in the article, that these were substantially General COLLINS' views, but that he was positive that the verbiage used in the article was not accurate, particularly where General COLLINS is quoted as having said "until hell freezes over". He stated that he knows that General COLLINS did not say that. Secretary PACE stated that he is not certain that General COLLINS, at the conference, made as complete a statement of his views as is reported in the ALLEN article, and doubts that COLLINS did do so.

Secretary PACE, with respect to the statements attributed in the ALLEN article to General BRADLEY, advised it is his recollection that, during the conference, General BRADLEY did comment on airfields in North Korea and rotation of troops. Secretary PACE stated that he can't recall that General BRADLEY tied these two items together in making his comments at the conference. He stated that he cannot recall whether, at the conference, General BRADLEY agreed with General COLLINS or not. With respect to the remarks made by the President, as quoted in the Allen article, he stated that this was substantially what the President said at the conference, although he could not recall the President's exact words. He stated that, with respect to the build-up of the South Korean Army, this matter was discussed by himself at the conference.

Secretary PACE advised that he did not know JACK ANDERSON, and that he had met PEARSON only on about two occasions, both at social functions, and that on both of those occasions, the only conversation he had had with PEARSON was of a social nature. He stated that the last time that he saw or spoke to DREW PEARSON was six or seven months ago. He stated that the only employee he knows of DREW PEARSON is [redacted] whom he has met on about two occasions, and has never discussed with [redacted] any matters concerning the Department of Defense. He stated that he would say that he had not seen or talked to [redacted] for at least three months. He stated that he does not know and has never talked to ROBERT S. ALLEN.

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Secretary PACE was asked whether he could furnish any information or make any suggestions which would assist the FBI in carrying out the desires of the President in this matter that the source of the alleged leak of information be identified. Secretary PACE replied that it was inconceivable to him that anyone who attended the conference had passed on or divulged anything that

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was discussed at the meeting. However, he stated that it was his opinion that the material appearing in the ALLEN article came from someone who attended the conference or someone who knew why the President had called the meeting. Secretary PACE stated that, otherwise, he was unable to be of any assistance. Secretary PACE was asked if he knew of or was suspicious of any security weakness in the Departments represented at the conference which might suggest a source for this leak, and he responded negatively.

INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS K. FINLETTER

THOMAS K. FINLETTER, Secretary of the Air Force, was interviewed on December 14, 1951, in his office in the Pentagon by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]. Mr. FINLETTER advised he attended a conference held in the Cabinet Room at the White House on December 10, 1951.

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Secretary FINLETTER advised that prior to the commencement of the conference, he was not briefed concerning the agenda in any way. He recalled that General VANDENBERG came to his office sometime before the meeting on the morning of December 10, and said something about the meeting at the White House, but he did not recall exactly what was said by General VANDENBERG or discussed in this connection.

Secretary FINLETTER advised he had gone from his office to the conference with Secretary PACE. He stated that upon conclusion of the meeting, he went downstairs from the conference room with Secretary LOVETT. He stated that Secretary PACE was detained a minute or two and joined Secretary LOVETT and him downstairs and they all three rode together back to the Pentagon in LOVETT's car.

He stated he is positive he took no notes of any sort at the conference, and advised that during the conference, he could possibly have made a single note. He stated that if he did make such a note, he left it behind him at the conference or took it with him and destroyed it later. He advised that any note he did make was extremely brief and in no way could be considered to be approximate full notes. He stated he can almost positively state he did not put pencil to paper. He advised he cannot recall seeing anyone else at the conference taking notes.

He advised that following the Presidential meeting, he met General VANDENBERG at 12:00 Noon, and then at 1:00 P.M., had luncheon with the Secretary of Defense and a group of labor representatives. He advised that he dictated no memorandum or writing of any sort with direct and immediate relation to the meeting. He advised he has seen no memoranda or material of any sort written by anyone relating to the conference concerned with this investigation.



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He advised he is positive he has discussed the meeting only with VANDENBERG and LOVETT. In qualifying this, he advised that even these discussions were not as to the actual conference but pertinent more to matters which were logical follow-throughs and outgrowths of the items discussed at the conference and the views expressed of those in attendance.

Mr. FINLETTER stated that on the day of the conference, General VANDENBERG came to his office about 12:00 Noon and dictated a rough draft memorandum to Mr. FINLETTER's [redacted] [redacted] concerning the views on the withdrawal of troops from Korea in the event of a cease-fire order. He stated that after this memorandum was typed up, he destroyed it and dictated to the same secretary another rough draft memorandum of his own (FINLETTER) along the same lines, the original of which was furnished to Mr. LOVETT during the latter part of the afternoon of December 10, 1951. He stated that the following day he prepared a new memorandum for Mr. LOVETT pertaining to the same matter. Mr. FINLETTER made a copy of this memorandum available and is set forth as follows:

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"December 10, 1951

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

"1. The conference with the President today on the Korean situation failed to bring out certain important points.

"2. At the meeting it was decided that, since we now have what we went into Korea to get, namely the defeat of the aggression, we should adopt the attitude of conceding all points within reason to get the cease-fire.

"3. What wasn't said, however, is that once we get a cease-fire, from that moment on our military position deteriorates. The Chinese, free from our interdiction campaign, can bring in men and materiel - and no inspection teams of ours are going to stop them. Our morale will go down. Our fighting ability will go down. And our domestic support for the operation will go down further than it already has.

"4. Moreover, the attaining of the cease-fire may fail to defeat the Russo-Chinese plan of pinning down large quantities of our military power in Korea. This results from the fact that an agreement to permit the gradual withdrawal of UN and Communist troops, without a firm decision in advance by the UN to punish a violation of the cease-fire by aggressive means, is not to our interest, and cannot be carried out without risking all we have fought for in Korea. Once we withdraw our troops they are going to be very hard to put back. On the contrary it would be easy for the Communists to withdraw beyond the Yalu and come back whenever they want to.

"In short, a cease-fire without a firm position and statement as to what the UN intends to do if the terms of the cease-fire are broken and without provision for the rapid withdrawal of UN troops, is a disadvantageous operation from our point of view.

"5. The question arises what then should we do? The following is suggested:

"a. Make a provision in the cease-fire arrangements which will result in the United Nations ground troops being pulled out as rapidly as they can be after the signing of the cease-fire.

"b. Leave a thin line of South Korean troops, and maybe even a token United Nations force, in South Korea.

"c. Make arrangements with our major allies to issue a joint statement, approved by the UN, serving notice on China that we no longer intend to hold the Korean front by great ground forces as at present, but that if the Chinese run over our modest forces that will bring down vast retaliatory action by the UN on the mainland of China. We should also consider whether this statement might not contain a request to Russia to use her best efforts to prevent the Chinese from violating the cease-fire agreement.

"d. We must agree with our friends in the UN what this vast retaliatory action means. It

presumably would mean a naval blockade, harassment of the lines of communication by bombing, continuing the use of guerrilla troops, and maybe releasing Chiang for action on the mainland. The question of certain other special air action would have to be considered; also the use of the A-bomb. These are, however, in a way, questions of detail. The important thing is to get agreement with our friends in UN to be ready to go through with a good tough campaign, but without the use of ground troops other than Chiang's.

(Signed) Thomas K. Finletter"

With respect to the final memorandum prepared by Mr. FINLETTER, he had in his office, at the time of the interview, eighteen copies of this memorandum. He advised that the original had gone to Mr. LOVETT and he believed that another copy went to General VANDENBERG. He stated an original and nineteen copies of this memorandum were prepared.

In connection with the VANDENBERG rough draft memorandum and the rough draft memorandum of FINLETTER, these were located at the time of the interview in Mr. FINLETTER's office torn in pieces, and it was not possible, at the time of the interview, for his secretaries to piece together all of the copies of the memoranda, but they were able to piece together from the confidential waste in his office the originals of these two rough draft memoranda.

Secretary FINLETTER advised all of the memoranda in question were dictated to his [redacted] He advised the security regulations in his office are very exacting and are of the type to prevent the entrance of any outside individual during the daytime. He advised that during the evening hours all confidential material is securely locked up. He advised the material handled in his office, and particularly the memoranda under discussion, would have been seen only by himself, [redacted] another [redacted] and his aide, Colonel [redacted] He informed top secret material handled in his office would not be examined even by official military and civilian personnel outside his immediate staff, as identified above. He stated he is completely certain of the security of his office and stated it to be his opinion that it would be most irregular for any individual, other than himself

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and the three members of the staff, to see these memoranda. With further relation to the security of the memoranda involved, he stated that he recalls he personally delivered the original to Secretary LOVETT.

In connection with this memorandum Colonel [redacted] aide to Mr. FINLETTER, subsequently furnished a case history concerning these memoranda prepared by General VANDENBERG and Secretary FINLETTER relative to the meeting at the White House on December 10, 1951. General VANDENBERG's memorandum was typed once with original and three copies. All copies accounted for ordered destroyed by Secretary FINLETTER. Mr. FINLETTER had prepared one draft original and three copies, all accounted for and ordered destroyed. Mr. FINLETTER prepared a second draft with original and six copies, the original of which was given to Mr. LOVETT with no signature, the remaining six copies accounted for. The third draft original and seven copies all accounted for. The final memorandum, a copy of which is set forth above, was prepared as an original and nineteen copies. The original was given by Mr. FINLETTER to Mr. LOVETT and copy number nine was given to General VANDENBERG. The copy furnished General VANDENBERG was returned and all other copies have been accounted for in Mr. FINLETTER's office. Secretary LOVETT advised Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent [redacted] that he had in his possession the original memorandum prepared by Mr. FINLETTER. In connection with the original of the rough draft which was delivered to Mr. LOVETT by Mr. FINLETTER, Mr. FINLETTER advised and had at the time of the interview this original rough draft memorandum which he stated he obtained from Mr. LOVETT's office so that he could prepare the final memorandum for Mr. LOVETT on this matter.

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He was asked as to whether he knows JACK ANDERSON, an employee of DREW PEARSON, and he informed he knows no individual by this name. In response to questions, he likewise advised he does not know any employee or associate of DREW PEARSON. He stated that some years ago he did know an individual, whose name he could not recall, who was employed as a "leg-man" for PEARSON, but has had no contact with this individual. He advised he is acquainted with DREW PEARSON, but advised he has not seen him for months and stated positively he has not discussed the matter under investigation with PEARSON in any way. He stated he discussed this meeting only with General VANDENBERG and Secretary LOVETT and on the basis indicated herein before. He recalled that on December 11, 1951, he had luncheon at 1:00 P.M. at the

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Metropolitan Club with Admiral SOUERS and in this regard informed that it is possible he may have mentioned the meeting during his luncheon with SOUERS, but does not think this occurred and advised that if it did occur, it was merely a mention and not a discussion. He was specifically questioned as to whether he had in mind any suspects who might have been responsible for the leak of information involved, or whether he possessed any other information of possible aid or pertinence to this investigation, and in response thereto advised he possesses no information whatsoever.

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INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBERG,  
CHIEF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General HOYT S. VANDENBERG was interviewed on December 17, 1951, at his office by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]

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He stated on December 8, 1951, General BRADLEY told him that the President was making inquiry about a message the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to General RIDGWAY concerning the peace negotiations, and they drew the conclusion that the President possibly would come back to Washington to discuss the reasons behind the message and the conditions being discussed in the peace negotiations.

General VANDENBERG stated he had been officially informed of the meeting by his Aide, Brigadier General R. A. GRUSSENDORF, who had been informed by General ROBERT LEE that Admiral LALOR, Assistant Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had received word that the meeting was to be held on December 10, 1951. He stated that on December 9, 1951, in preparation for this conference, he requested his office to have on his desk on the morning of December 10, 1951, the available air strength and composition of the Air Force in Korea and other Far Eastern units, and also a paper which had been prepared a week before on the location of all F-86 planes other than those in Korea. He stated that he desired this information so that he would have it available at the meeting at the White House in the event the President made any inquiry concerning these matters. He stated that on the morning of the conference and just prior to the conference he had discussed with Mr. FINLETTER the information on the F-86 planes, advising him that this information should be available at the meeting in the event the President made any inquiry concerning it.

In connection with the question as to whether he had prepared any memorandum or other record with relation to the matters covered at the conference, General VANDENBERG explained that he had an alternate proposal on the peace negotiation insuring protection of the 8th Army. He stated at the time of the conference at the White House he had this alternative proposal in mind and mentioned it at the conference without giving any details. In this connection General VANDENBERG stated that what he said at the conference was substantially as follows: "There

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is a possible additional approach to this question. If the UN could come out with a very strong statement to the effect that if there was a violation to the present line of contact, there would be a new war with no holds barred, and we might be able to afford to pull out practically all troops immediately after a cease-fire and let the Reds put in as many airfields and troops as they desired." He pointed out at the conference this statement by himself, which was the only statement he made at the conference, was discussed for about a minute and a half by those present.

He stated shortly following the conference on the same day he conferred with Mr. FINLETTER about this alternate proposal, and together they prepared a memorandum for Mr. LOVETT, Secretary of Defense. He stated after the memorandum was prepared he and Mr. FINLETTER personally delivered the original to Mr. LOVETT. He stated there was nothing in the memorandum that had been discussed at the President's conference, and, in fact, specifically described its contents as relating to matters which had not been discussed at the White House conference. General VANDENBERG stated that he had a copy of this memorandum, and he had given it to his aide, Colonel [redacted] for possible use of the State Department in the event the proposal appeared to have any merit. He stated Colonel [redacted] was an officer on a special assignment in his (VANDENBERG's) office to assist him for speech writing.

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General VANDENBERG stated since the conference he had discussed it only with Secretaries LOVETT and FINLETTER.

General VANDENBERG read the article attributed to ROBERT S. ALLEN as appearing in the "New York Post" for December 13, 1951.

He stated in connection with remarks in the article attributed to himself, they were definitely not stated by him at the conference although he has made similar remarks at the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferences and has stated them in public.

General VANDENBERG stated he believed that the article was largely in error on what actually transpired at the conference. He stated he was of the opinion that any person who had access to what transpired at the conference could have written a far better article unless the writer had deliberately slanted it, pointing out that the ALLEN article did not reflect the real purpose of the meeting. General VANDENBERG

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further stated he believes the ALLEN article could have been prepared by someone who had closely followed the Korean situation and the public statements and positions proclaimed by the various Joint Chiefs of Staff without access to an actual account of the meeting.

With respect to the material in the article attributed to General BRADLEY, General VANDENBERG stated he could not recall General BRADLEY saying that the UN could have a cease-fire in Korea. He pointed out that no one is sure of a cease-fire and that everyone is wondering if a cease-fire can be obtained. He further stated with respect to the statement attributed to General BRADLEY concerning rotation of troops and the building of airfields in North Korea, General BRADLEY may have said this but it certainly was not the main subject matter of the conference. He pointed out the main reason for the conference was not the concessions that would be made but how far the United States would go before ceasing the negotiations. General VANDENBERG further pointed out that he did not think General BRADLEY would say the Communists refused to agree with the UN view relating to the rotation of troops because the negotiations are still being carried on and that the matter concerning the rotation of troops has not come to the breaking point. General VANDENBERG stated that as far as he knows the Reds have not tried to trade on the issue of new airfields as against the issue of rotation of troops. He pointed out the U.S. has insisted as one of the points in the negotiation that there were to be no new airfields constructed in North Korea. He stated he does not recall General BRADLEY stating that the Reds have indicated they would make a concession on troop rotation if allowed to build some airfields in North Korea. He feels positive that if General BRADLEY had made such statement that he certainly would have remembered it, pointing out that the United States' position has always been positive on not allowing the construction of new airfields in North Korea, and therefore, this point was not discussed at the conference because it was an accepted fact.

With respect to the material attributed to General COLLINS, General VANDENBERG stated he could not recall this matter being brought up at the conference but it had been discussed at previous Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings. He is positive that General COLLINS did not relate the points concerning rotation of troops to the points concerning the construction of new airfields in North Korea. He stated he is of the opinion that General COLLINS has always maintained that the UN forces



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are strong in Korea and that we can hold the peninsula; however, he did not recall General COLLINS saying this at the conference, and he is positive that General COLLINS made no remarks concerning the airfield point. General VANDENBERG stated that he would have been extremely surprised if General COLLINS had made the remark at the conference "Until hell freezes over". He stated that this meeting was much more dignified, and he believes that General COLLINS would not have spoken to the President in such language, and if General COLLINS had so spoken, he (VANDENBERG) would have certainly remembered it.

Concerning that part of the article which states General BRADLEY agreed with General COLLINS, he stated he does not recall this at the conference or does he recall any mention of the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful Air Force.

With respect to that part of the article which refers to the President listening intently to the military leaders and saying nothing until they had finished, General VANDENBERG stated that was not what happened at the conference. He stated the President first had General BRADLEY brief those present on the Korean situation and then the President told the conference what was troubling him concerning the instructions sent to General RIDGWAY. He stated General BRADLEY and Secretary LOVETT together with Acting Secretary WEBB did most of the talking. He stated General COLLINS and himself had very little to say.

With respect to that part of the article attributed to the President concerning the President's anxiety to bring the fighting to an end, General VANDENBERG stated that he couldn't recall the President saying this, but that the President could have stated it, and he would expect the President at such a conference to say substantially what is attributed to him in the article. He pointed out he is definite that the President did not say "but I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on". He stated the President had not made this point in that way. He stated that the article makes it appear that the President thought the members attending the conference wanted peace at any price. He stated, however, actually such was not the case. He stated at the conclusion of the conference the President agreed with those present on their reasons for sending the negotiation instructions to General RIDGWAY.

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General VANDENBERG advised with respect to the statement in the article that the buildup of South Korea was discussed, that this was true. He pointed out, however, this is not unusual and this question is normally discussed at all meetings of this type because of the importance of this question.

He was asked to state whether he recalled any comment by the President during the conference as to a possible extension of time in the event a cease-fire order was not achieved by December 27, 1951. It is to be noted that a reference to such an alleged statement on the part of the President was contained in the PEARSON article in the possession of JACK ANDERSON. General VANDENBERG advised to the best of his knowledge the President made no such reference.

General VANDENBERG stated he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any other employee or associate of DREW PEARSON. He stated he has only met DREW PEARSON on one occasion which was about two years ago when he was introduced to him in the Pentagon Building. He stated the last time he had any contact of any sort with ROBERT S. ALLEN was when the latter was the Intelligence Officer for General GEORGE PATTON in Europe during World War II.

He was asked if he could furnish any information or had any suggestions which might assist the FBI in carrying out the desire of the President in this matter. He replied in the negative.

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INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS

General J. LAWTON COLLINS, Army Chief of Staff, was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] in his office, Room 3E668, Pentagon, on December 17, 1951.

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General COLLINS advised he attended the White House conference Monday, December 10, 1951. General COLLINS stated that he followed Mr. WHITEHAIR as speaker and related he made three points, speaking at two different times. General COLLINS advised he first directed remarks to the question as to whether a U.N. statement containing a threat would have any deterring effect on the Communist enemy. It had been suggested that it would have an effect on the Russians and possibly on the amount of aid afforded the Chinese by the Russians. Admiral FECHTELER doubted the wisdom of including any threat to be contingent on breach of an armistice agreement as no one knows what action we may find desirable several years from now when the agreement may be violated. General COLLINS said his own views in the matter were that he did not agree with Admiral FECHTELER's position, but rather concurred with the position that while the Chinese Communists might disregard a warning, it still might have a good effect on the Russians. General COLLINS stated while he was speaking, he covered another matter, namely, that the armistice might be all we will get, that we may not get a peace treaty for several years, and that we may want to stay there a long time; and that whatever the conditions of the armistice, we will want to rebuild and make repairs in the rear areas. General COLLINS continued that he also stated he would favor everything in connection with repairs and rehabilitation except in connection with permitting military airfields to be built and pointed out we may have to give in on one or two commercial airfields.

General COLLINS remarked that at a later time during the proceedings of the conference, the President expressed great concern over the air build-up of the Communist forces and the possibility that we might not be able to maintain our forces in Korea. General COLLINS stated this was the reason that he again spoke. General COLLINS stated he assured the President that if this was what was causing the President's concern, he would guarantee that we will not be thrown out of Korea.

The article prepared by columnist ROBERT S. ALLEN which appeared in the "New York Post" December 13, 1951, was displayed to General COLLINS. That column in substance indicated General COLLINS favored some terms on

the airfield dispute but insisted the Communists be required to agree on troop rotation, pointing out the lack of troop rotation would effect the morale of our men. In addition General COLLINS was reported by ALLEN to have stated our army could hold the present line "until hell freezes over." General COLLINS related the ALLEN article substantially set forth his position in this matter and that part of the remarks attributed to him by ALLEN actually may have been made by him. He related he may have made some mention of troop rotation at the conference but he was not sure that he did mention it.

General COLLINS was not absolutely certain as to the language he employed in the above statement and advised he may have used the phrase I will "put my money" or "for my money," we will not be thrown out, but is certain that he did not say that our forces can hold on in Korea "until hell freezes over." He commented that this is not an expression which he uses and added that he would not have used it before the President at a formal conference.

The ALLEN news column quoted the President as having remarked in substance that he was anxious to bring the fighting to an end if possible but would not agree to concessions that we may regret later on. Also the President warned the necessity of being careful lest in our eagerness to secure truce we sell ourselves short. Concerning this statement attributed to the President, General COLLINS stated it was essentially what the President had said but not a word for word quotation. The ALLEN column was noted to attribute to General VANDENBERG in substance he was vigorously opposed to giving any ground on the matter of permitting the Communists to build airfields, pointing out bases in North Korea would be of great combat value in the event the Communists decide to break the truce next spring. General COLLINS stated ALLEN's remarks attributed to General VANDENBERG were essentially correct although not as complete as General VANDENBERG had outlined his position. The ALLEN column in substance set forth General BRADLEY as having pointed out the issues of the deadlock on the matter of rotation of our troops along with the Communists' insisting on a freeze on replacements and weapons. Also General BRADLEY was reported as having indicated the Communists would make concessions on rotation if they were permitted to build some airfields. General COLLINS related that the ALLEN column was essentially accurate but he did not believe that General BRADLEY had indicated the Communists were trading a rotation of troops against airfields as stressed by ALLEN.

General COLLINS could offer no suggestion as to how a leak had occurred and expressed the belief it would be possible for someone to have prepared the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN from bits of information picked up here and there from individuals receiving the information second or third

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hand from an official who attended the conferences, such second or third hand sources being persons possessed of intimate knowledge of the subject matter and previous conferences. As for the personnel present at the White House conference, General COLLINS advised he had no personal suspicions concerning any member present.

General COLLINS advised that he did not make any notes during or after the conference, and thereafter did not make any record of memorandum of the proceedings of the conference. Furthermore, he stated he had not discussed the proceedings of the conference with anyone.

General COLLINS recalled his acquaintanceship with DREW PEARSON dated back several years when he was Chief of Public Information shortly after the war. He advised his first meeting with PEARSON came about following a PEARSON article which had criticized General EISENHOWER unjustly so he invited PEARSON to his home to talk the matter over. At that time, General COLLINS advised he and PEARSON reached a "gentlemen's agreement" that whenever PEARSON received any complaints or allegations of inefficiency, dishonesty, or other malfeasance in connection with the Army, he would first make them known to General COLLINS, who would in turn ascertain and furnish the true facts to PEARSON. If the facts were as alleged, PEARSON could publish them; but if he could show they were false or inaccurate, PEARSON would refrain from publication. General COLLINS related that this working arrangement with PEARSON had been satisfactory for a considerable time. General COLLINS recalled that sometime during the period of the [redacted] brothers fraud investigations, PEARSON had called him one Sunday to inquire whether the Army had a contract for the manufacture of caskets and in which contract the [redacted] had an interest. General COLLINS advised he ascertained that the information presented by PEARSON was not true and so advised PEARSON, who refrained from making any mention of it. Sometime later General COLLINS recalled PEARSON had published a critical article containing erroneous information, so he had PEARSON to lunch in the Pentagon and called his attention to PEARSON's having violated their "gentlemen's agreement". General COLLINS advised he recalled no further incidents thereafter.

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General COLLINS stated that he had never engaged in any social dealings with PEARSON and had never visited in his home or received him except on the one occasion. As a matter of fact, he has not seen PEARSON in more than a year. General COLLINS added that he knows who JACK ANDERSON is, but never had met him; likewise, he did not know the identity of any other of PEARSON's employees. Concerning ROBERT S. ALLEN, General COLLINS stated he knew ALLEN, but had not seen nor talked with him in more than a year.

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