

WFO 65-6060
MAT/CAG, eak

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL

Major General CHARLES P. CABELL, United States Air Forces, Director, Joint Staff, was interviewed at his office, Room 2E928, Pentagon, on December 15, 1951, by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]

b6
b7c

General CABELL advised that he had attended the White House conference held at 10:30 AM, December 10, 1951, as an observer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He advised he had taken no part in the actual proceedings. He stated he did not discuss anything which occurred at the conference with anyone with the exception of a conversation with Admiral THOMAS ROBBINS of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reference will be made to this conversation with General ROBBINS hereinafter. General CABELL made no notes or memoranda during or following the conference. He returned to the Pentagon immediately following the conference.

General CABELL stated he was unaware that any leak had occurred or that an investigation was in progress at the time he was interviewed. He declared he was not acquainted with ROBERT S. ALLEN or JACK ANDERSON or any other of DREW PEARSON'S employees. He stated he thought he may have met DREW PEARSON on one occasion at a cocktail party but was not certain of this.

General CABELL also stated that Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER had spoken briefly concerning the question of introducing into the truce negotiations a threat that in the event of breach the Communists could expect the war to be widened, which threat we later might not be able or desire to carry out. In connection with this, General CABELL advised he had a subsequent discussion with Admiral THOMAS ROBBINS, although it is recalled with reference to the alleged newspaper column prepared by JACK ANDERSON some reference was made about extending the cease-fire negotiations deadline beyond December 27, 1951. General CABELL advised that he did not recall that President TRUMAN or the others made specific reference to the cease-fire date or indicated that an extension beyond this date would be sought or granted. He stated he was not certain whether the deadline had been mentioned at all, but that if so it was not belabored in the discussion. General CABELL recalled that that question and all other questions pertinent at the Presidential conference previously had been discussed at great length in various Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings attended by General CABELL.

WFO 65-6060

The column of ROBERT S. ALLEN dated December 13, 1951, which appeared in the "New York Post," was displayed to General CABELL for his examination. He expressed the belief it was not an accurate account of the proceedings at the White House conference, but that it contained a continuous thread to indicate the author, ALLEN, had an informant who attended the conference. For example, General CABELL stated that the ALLEN column indicates that the Communists were bargaining the rotation of troops issue against concessions from us on their airfield demands. He stated he did not believe General BRADLEY placed emphasis on the airfields versus rotation items and that these were merely two items mentioned in connection with the negotiations. He stated that there is some feeling that the Communists are using the rotation question to wrangle concessions generally, but he did not believe this was specifically brought out in the White House conference.

With reference to the statement attributed to General COLLINS in the ALLEN column to the effect that General COLLINS was inclined to favor some terms on the airfield dispute, General CABELL stated this was an oversimplification and not strictly accurate. He stated that it appeared that this reflected some views which COLLINS may have expressed in the past at previous meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General CABELL referred further to the ALLEN column and to the statement in it attributed to the President. General CABELL advised he considered it an accurate summation, although not a verbatim quotation.

WFO 65-6060
PJT:JAC/agg

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JAMES E. LAY, JR.

Mr. JAMES E. LAY, JR., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] on December 15, 1951.

b6
b7C

Mr. LAY advised that he attended the President's conference at the White House on December 10, 1951, as a representative of the National Security Council. At this time, he explained, the National Security Council was preparing a draft concerned with present truce negotiations in Korea.

Mr. LAY commented in detail as to the opinions expressed by the various individuals attending the aforementioned conference.

Mr. LAY advised that there was no written or oral agenda or program for the conference. He added that no minutes were kept, and there was no record of any actions to be taken. He did not recall anyone taking notes, with the exception of Secretary FINLETTER, who may merely have been "doodling."

Mr. LAY advised that he made notes at the conference for the President's benefit. He brought the notes directly from the conference to his office and placed them in a safe. He described the notes as the personal property of the President. He advised that, to his knowledge, no one but himself has seen the notes. He added that his secretaries have access to the safe where his notes are maintained, but did not think anyone who did not have a thorough understanding of what went on could decipher the notes. He explained that the notes consisted of personal abbreviations, etcetera. The [redacted] in Mr. LAY'S office are [redacted] and [redacted]

b6
b7C

Mr. LAY advised that, following the conference, he informed his Deputy, Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, as to the opinions expressed by the various individuals who attended the conference. He explained that he and GLEASON worked together on the NSC aspects of the Korean problems, and in this connection, he advises GLEASON of all important matters in connection therewith. He stated he attempts to keep GLEASON as well informed as himself concerning all details of current developments in connection with the NSC.

Mr. LAY advised that, subsequent to the conference, the "Time" magazine representative at the White House, whose name he could not recall, telephoned him, asking two questions: (1) He, facetiously, asked Mr. LAY if the latter were the cause of the President's sudden return to Washington from Key West, to which question Mr. LAY answered, "No." (2) Mr. LAY was then asked if a reported request of General EISENHOWER to be replaced was discussed at the

WFO 65-6060

conference. Mr. LAY informed that he advised the newspaperman that he was unable to say anything about the conference.

In answer to a specific question, Mr. LAY advised that he could not recall any discussions at the conference concerning a recommendation of the President that there be an extension of time in the event an armistice were not obtained by December 27, 1951. Mr. LAY advised that the conference did relate to concessions which might be made to the Communists.

Mr. LAY advised that he does not know, nor has he spoken to DREW PEARSON or PEARSON'S leg-man, JACK ANDERSON. He was unable to furnish any information as to a possible source of the leak of information from the White House conference.

Mr. LAY furnished the following information concerning indicated portions of the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN in the "New York Post" of December 13, 1951:

Quotes from ALLEN Column

"The UN can have a cease fire in Korea, but at the cost of important concessions to the Reds. That's what the Joint Chiefs told the President in their big conference with him after his return. General BRADLEY declared the protracted truce negotiations have reached the point 'where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one'".

"General HOYT VANDENBERG vigorously opposed giving any ground on that. (Referring to concessions on the Communists' airfield demand). He wanted a cease-fire if one can be worked out that is fair and proper declared the Air Chief of Staff, but I don't see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build airfields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them if they decide to break the truce next Spring which I wouldn't put past them".

Remarks of Mr. LAY

Mr. LAY described this as a good summation of General BRADLEY'S remarks at the conference. He also advised that General BRADLEY'S ideas in this respect conceivably could have come from another source, inasmuch as he believed that they had been previously discussed.

Mr. LAY advised that this statement, as to VANDENBERG'S expressions at the conference, is false. VANDENBERG generally agreed with the statement of General BRADLEY at the conference. He explained that General BRADLEY clearly indicated that later in the negotiations, the UN might be willing to make concessions as to airfields if the number of airfields were, appropriately, limited.

enter pg. 64

64

11-3-97 PWS OF A 876-90 "remains (W SP7C/66 #265 255

Quotes from ALLEN column

A statement attributed to General COLLINS relating to concessions on rotation of UN troops that "it is an unfair demand and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on airfields".

Statement attributed to General COLLINS that "our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over".

The statement attributed to the President that "as you know I am very anxious to bring the fighting to an end if that is possible. But I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on. We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men".

"Also discussed was the question of building up the South Korean Army".

Remarks of Mr. LAY

Mr. LAY could not recall General COLLINS making a statement to this effect.

Mr. LAY described this as correct in thought, but considered the words "until hell freezes over" as wrong. To his recollection, General COLLINS assured the President the Army troops could hold the line for the next year.

Mr. LAY described this as a good summation of the views expressed by the President at the conference. Mr. LAY advised that, in his opinion, this information, in particular, could have come from no source except through an individual who was in attendance at the conference on December 10, 1951. He explained that he did not feel that anyone who attended the conference had a clear idea of the President's views on matters discussed at the conference. Mr. LAY based this conclusion on the fact that the President had been at Key West for sometime prior to the conference.

Mr. LAY advised that the matter of building up the South Korean Army was discussed at the conference, as indicated above.

entire pg. 65

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JAMES E. WEBB

Mr. JAMES E. WEBB, Under Secretary of State, was interviewed at his home, [redacted] on the evening of Friday, December 14, 1951, by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section of the Bureau was also present during the interview.

b6
b7C

Mr. WEBB advised that he was in attendance at the President's conference held at the White House on the morning of December 10, 1951. He furnished general background information of events leading up to the conference and also details as to the comments of various individuals in attendance at the conference.

Mr. WEBB advised that there was no formally prepared agenda for the conference. He further advised that he took no notes during the conference, and that he does not know whether anyone else present took notes.

In answer to a specific question, Mr. WEBB advised that he did not recall any discussion at this conference concerning a suggestion by the President that in the event an armistice was not reached by December 27, 1951, arrangements should be made for an extension of the time.

The conference terminated between 11:30 and 11:35 A.M., at which time, pursuant to the President's specific request, Mr. WEBB stayed with the President and went into his office for a further conference with respect to the impending visit of British Prime Minister CHURCHILL to the United States. WEBB then returned to his office and dictated a brief memo to include (1) that no notes or instructions had been taken at the President's conference in connection with the discussion of the proposed draft to be issued to General RIDGWAY, inasmuch as Mr. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS was present during the discussion and was in a position to see that the necessary action required by the State Department would be taken. (2) The second part of WEBB'S memo dealt with the necessary data that would have to be prepared to brief the President on matters that would be discussed with Prime Minister CHURCHILL.

WEBB stated he had not discussed the details of the conversations in the President's general conference on December 10, 1951, with anyone. He stated he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, who is associated with Columnist DREW PEARSON; that he does know DREW PEARSON, but has not been in contact with him for at least six months. Nevertheless, he has seen other newspapermen subsequent to December 10, one of whom was [redacted] Washington correspondent for the Raleigh News and Observer at Raleigh, North Carolina. Another was JOHN HIGHTOWER, who covers the State Department with Associated Press, and the third and last was JAMES RESTON, associated with the New York Times. HIGHTOWER raised two points in questioning WEBB: (1) Was there a world crisis? (2) Was Europe discussed? WEBB gave HIGHTOWER this background:

b6
b7C

The President is furnished with a great number of written reports concerning the world situation. He takes his position seriously, and takes the whole situation seriously. The President wants to get the full "flavor" of the thinking of the top people, as it is the President's policy to keep in close touch with what goes on around the world. WEBB gave this information to HIGHTOWER for background.

JAMES RESTON contacted WEBB on Tuesday, December 11, 1951, and he was given generally the same background information concerning the December 10th conference as was given to HIGHTOWER. RESTON'S inquiries of WEBB also touched on the reported resignation of Secretary of State DEAN ACHESON. WEBB Briefed RESTON on the very close relationship between ACHESON and the President, and stated such a report of ACHESON'S resignation was not true. RESTON inquired concerning CHURCHILL'S visit, and wanted to know the policy of the United States as to CHURCHILL. WEBB advised him that the Government was making a very careful study of the background and problems in connection with our relations with Great Britain in Europe and the Far East, and indicated that this country would be prepared to discuss these problems whether CHURCHILL talked about them or not. WEBB advised that RESTON in recent articles has been throwing rather sharp barbs at the State Department with respect to some of its actions, and he felt that RESTON should be briefed as to the Department's activities as set forth above. RESTON also inquired as to recent changes in the State Department, and WEBB discussed the significance and history of these changes.

Mr. WEBB was also contacted by [redacted] concerning the statement in the December 10, 1951, issue of the "New York Times" to the effect that he, WEBB, contemplated resigning. He stated [redacted] is a representative of his hometown newspaper and was interested in this article.

b6
b7c

Mr. WEBB was re-interviewed in his office at the State Department by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] on December 17, 1951, to make available to him the contents of the news column of ROBERT S. ALLEN, as it appeared in the December 13, 1951, issue of the New York Post "Blue Final" edition. His comments on this column follow:

The column quotes General BRADLEY to the effect that the truce negotiations have reached the point "where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one." The column also attributes to the President the question "What do they want?", and BRADLEY'S response was "The deadlock gets down to this." Mr. WEBB stated the President did not say "What do they want?" The President's inquiry was more along these lines, "Why are we willing to go this far with them?" Mr. WEBB made it clear that it was not the position of anyone, including

WFO 65-6060

BRADLEY, that the talks had reached the stage of a deadlock. While this could possibly be the opinion of General MATTHEW RIDGWAY who is conducting the negotiations, responsible officials in Washington have never regarded the status of these talks as reaching a deadlock. They have always felt that we will get an armistice for two reasons, (1) the Communists in North Korea have been very badly hurt, (2) the United Nations forces in Korea are in a position of strength and can hold their present lines. It is felt that while we want an armistice from the position of global strategy, the Communists are anxious to obtain an armistice because of their present weakness in their position. Therefore, Mr. WEBB reiterated that these negotiations have never gotten to a deadlock stage and to quote that they have is not correct.

With respect to the statement attributed to General BRADLEY by ROBERT ALLEN to the effect that the Communists would make concessions on our stand on rotation of troops if we made concessions that allowed them to build some airfields in North Korea, Mr. WEBB stated that this topic was discussed at the conference, and he felt that perhaps this information could have come from someone in attendance at the conference. However, in WEBB'S opinion, this information was also available to others not in attendance at the conference who had previously sat in on discussions in the Defense and interested Departments and who, prior to the conference, knew General BRADLEY'S position concerning these points at issue. Therefore, in Mr. WEBB'S mind such a well informed person could have anticipated what remarks General BRADLEY would make when these topics were discussed.

The December 13, 1951, column of ROBERT ALLEN attributes the following statement to General VANDENBERG:

"I want a cease-fire if one can be worked out that is fair and proper, but I do not see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build air fields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them, if they decide to break the truce next spring, which I wouldn't put past them."

Mr. WEBB stated that this was an erroneous statement of General VANDENBERG'S position, that at the present time the Communists have a powerful air force in North Korea which is well known. WEBB stated that VANDENBERG'S position in this connection was that if a cease-fire is obtained with the threat of a "greater sanction," that air power would be the sanction, and that he would withdraw all air power from Korea for re-deployment in Japan and other strategic areas. VANDENBERG went so far as to recommend that if a cease-fire is obtained that ground troops could be removed from South Korea so that in the event the cease-fire is later violated they would not be destroyed by the Communists. He suggested that they, too, be reassigned to other strategic locations.

With respect to the position of General J. LAWTON COLLINS, wherein he insisted that Communists be required to agree to the rotation of UN troops and is quoted in the column as follows:

10-28-97 PA 06A 11-20-91 intro pg. 68 remains (u) SP7ci/sb #265, 955

WFO 65-6060

"That would be a serious blow to the morale of our men. I am strongly opposed to any concession on that. It is an unfair demand and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on air fields. Our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over and I am flatly opposed to giving the slightest ground on the replacement issue. The Reds would have the same right as us on that, and I don't see why they should object to it, except for trading purposes."

Mr. WEBB'S opinion was that this quotation of COLLINS had a strong "flavor" of someone who was in attendance at the conference. He stated that it was COLLINS' position that it would be impossible to maintain ground forces without rotation.

WEBB described the ALLEN column as a whole not as "upsetting as it might be" from the security point of view. He added that from reading the column, one might gain the impression that United States top officials had decided to get tough with the Communists, whereas actually the discussions at the President's conference were concerned with granting concessions to the Communists. Mr. WEBB considered references in the column to discussions of building up the South Korean Army as harmful from the security standpoint, inasmuch as he felt that they did not want this fact released for general information. Mr. WEBB advised that references were made to building up the South Korean Army at the conference.

Mr. WEBB advised that after considering the column as a whole, he was of the opinion that possibly someone attending the conference gave a newspaperman too much detailed background concerning the conference, thus enabling a column such as the ALLEN column to have been written. Mr. WEBB was questioned as to who might be the source of the information contained in the ALLEN column. He advised that he had no suspects as to the source of the leak.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

Mr. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Room 5121, New State Department, was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] on December 14, 1951. Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section of the FBI was also present at the interview:

b6
b7c

Mr. MATTHEWS advised that he attended the President's conference held at the White House on the morning of December 10, 1951. He furnished in detail information relating to comments of various individuals in attendance at the President's conference.

With respect to the item in the material shown by JACK ANDERSON to General BRADLEY on the evening of December 12, 1951, wherein it was stated that the President had indicated we would grant an extension of time if cease-fire were not obtained by December 27, 1951, Mr. MATTHEWS advised that to his recollection this matter was not discussed at the conference.

Mr. MATTHEWS returned directly to his office from the December 10, 1951 conference, and told [redacted] of the President's approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff draft of instructions to General RIDGWAY, and that the opinion of those attending the conference was unanimous to the effect that an armistice was extremely desirable at this time. MATTHEWS said that other than talking to [redacted] he spoke to no one else concerning the events taking place at this conference.

Mr. MATTHEWS stated that he did not take any notes during the conference and prepared no memorandum or record concerning it thereafter; also, to the best of his recollection, no one came in or went out of the conference room during the conference. He stated there was no agenda available prior to the conference as to the topics to be discussed.

b6
b7c

Mr. MATTHEWS does not know JACK ANDERSON. He has previously met DREW PEARSON, but has not been in contact with him for the past few years. Mr. MATTHEWS had no suggestions or suspicions as to where, or in what manner, the alleged leak occurred.

Mr. MATTHEWS was reinterviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] on December 17, 1951.

The contents of the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in the "Blue Final Edition" of the New York Post, December 13, 1951, concerning the White House conference of December 10, 1951, were exhibited to Mr. MATTHEWS for his perusal and comments.

With respect to the initial comments attributed to General BRADLEY by ALLEN to the effect that truce negotiations have reached the point where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement, Mr. MATTHEWS stated that the General did indicate that a stage had been reached where things might break quickly, and suggested that we make concessions on minor issues. Mr. MATTHEWS stated that a careful review of the communiques and news bulletins for the ten days immediately prior to the President's conference on December 10 would contain this information. He commented that if the New York Times was obtained to cover this period, it would be apparent that this statement attributed to General BRADLEY by ALLEN was common knowledge. However, this was BRADLEY'S position at the conference. To Mr. MATTHEWS' recollection, General BRADLEY did not make the statement that "They are using the rotation issue to try to wrest concessions from us on the air field demand."

Mr. MATTHEWS described the statements attributed to General HOYT VANDENBERG as being inaccurate. He explained that VANDENBERG favored the "greater sanction" theory and suggested a withdrawal of the air force and ground troops from Korea and their re-deployment in strategic areas such as Japan.

In connection with the statements attributed to General J. LAWTON COLLINS concerning rotation of UN troops, Mr. MATTHEWS stated that COLLINS may have discussed rotation, but that the matter of rotation was not a point in issue at the conference since there was complete agreement as to the position of the United Nations on rotation. Mr. MATTHEWS advised that from the article it would appear that there was much argument at the conference on the rotation issue which is not true. Mr. MATTHEWS could not recall General COLLINS' making a statement to the effect that the Reds were demanding concessions as to rotation in order to force us to give in on airfields.

Mr. MATTHEWS described the statement attributed to General BRADLEY as to "the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful air force" as being incorrect since it is common knowledge that the Communists already have a powerful air force.

In connection with the statements attributed to President TRUMAN by ALLEN, Mr. MATTHEWS advised that the President may have said that we were trying to bring the war to an end and may have remarked that we might be making too many concessions, but to his recollection these statements were made at the beginning of the conference. He did not recall that the President made this statement: "We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men."

In Mr. MATTHEWS' opinion the ALLEN column was an inaccurate report of what had occurred at the White House conference on December 10. He felt

WFO 65-6060

that if ALLEN had obtained his information from someone attending the conference, he would have received much more accurate information. He also described that ALLEN column as a "poor job" of reporting the conference. In conclusion, Mr. MATTHEWS stated that any good newspaperman who had been closely following truce negotiations as released to the press prior to the White House conference and who maintained close contact with the lower echelon of individuals at the Pentagon working on topics of discussion would have been in a position to write ALLEN'S column without ever having had contact with anyone in attendance at the White House conference.

72

10-28-97 PAV OGA 11-20-91 entire pg. 72 removed (u) SP7ci/bd #265,955

WFO 65-6060
MAT:bar:ddj

INTERVIEW WITH REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR.

Rear Admiral THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR., member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was interviewed at his office, Room 2E1010, on the afternoon of December 19, 1951, by Special Agent [redacted]

b6
b7C

Admiral ROBBINS advised that he possessed no information concerning the proceedings at the White House Conference on December 10, 1951, with the exception of a single item which was brought to his attention, probably at noon on the day of the conference, at the regular briefing of Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER, attended by Admiral ROBBINS and about eight other senior officers. He mentioned these briefings are held on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday.

Admiral ROBBINS advised Admiral FECHTELER had informed the group at the briefing that he had attended the White House Conference and desired to apprise them of his remarks opposing a certain course of action in Korea.

Admiral ROBBINS stated that subsequently it became necessary for his committee to consider this point in order to prepare certain recommendations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He stated this item was only one of a number in the preparation of their report. At 4:30 P.M. on Friday, December 14, he conferred with Major General CHARLES CABELL, [redacted] and Colonel [redacted] [redacted] who constitute the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and discussed the above point raised by Admiral FECHTELER. On Monday, December 17, Admiral ROBBINS contacted General OMAR BRADLEY in the presence of Major Generals CHARLES CABELL and EIMER J. ROGERS, and advised General BRADLEY that in connection with the positions taken by his Committee on the point in question, they were aware of the remarks of Admiral FECHTELER at the White House. Admiral ROBBINS advised that this constituted all knowledge in his possession concerning the White House Conference and all discussions in which he had participated on this subject.

b6
b7C

INTERVIEW WITH MR. S. EVERETT GLEASON

Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council, was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] on December 17, 1951.

b6
b7C

Mr. GLEASON advised that Mr. JAMES E. LAY, JR., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, immediately after returning from the White House conference on December 10, 1951, advised Mr. GLEASON that the conference would not necessitate any changes in a draft with which Mr. GLEASON was concerned. Mr. GLEASON explained that he and a small group of individuals had been working on a National Security Council draft which contained recommendations relating to the present truce negotiations in Korea and which possibly would be affected by the conference. At this time, the information furnished Mr. GLEASON by Mr. LAY concerning the conference was only enough to assure Mr. GLEASON that the draft would not have to be changed.

GLEASON stated that at approximately 4:00 P.M. on December 10, he contacted [redacted] Far Eastern Bureau, Department of State, who was also working on the NSC draft and advised [redacted] that no changes in the draft would be necessary as a result of the White House conference on that date. According to GLEASON, he furnished [redacted] no further information. [redacted] advised GLEASON that he understood from his superiors in the State Department that no changes would be necessary.

b6
b7C

GLEASON stated that he may have telephonically contacted [redacted] [redacted] who is the Department of National Defense representative assisting in the preparation of the draft, and advised him that no changes in the draft would be necessary as a result of the White House conference. GLEASON could not definitely recall if he had contacted [redacted] in this connection.

According to GLEASON, [redacted] is on the staff of Mr. FRANK WASH, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense LOVETT.

GLEASON advised that on midmorning, December 12, 1951, Mr. LAY orally advised him in more detail as to the position taken by various individuals at the White House conference on December 10. This briefing of GLEASON took place in Mr. LAY'S office. No one else was present, GLEASON took no notes, and GLEASON has not discussed with any other individual the detailed briefing furnished him by Mr. LAY.

GLEASON advised that to the best of his recollection LAY indicated that General VANDENBERG suggested pulling out our air force in the event a cease-fire was obtained in Korea, and that the President expressed some concern lest the North Koreans drive all the way down to Pusan. As he further recalled, General COLLINS assured the President that the Army could hold the line.

WFO 65-6060

In connection with LAY's briefing, Mr. GLEASON recalled that the President indicated a willingness to follow along the lines suggested by General BRADLEY and that previously he had been worried that the United States might be making too many concessions.

The column of ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in the New York Post December 13, 1951, was exhibited to Mr. GLEASON. He stated that from his understanding the statements attributed to General BRADLEY and to the President by ALLEN expressed the thoughts of these individuals as relayed to him by LAY.

GLEASON advised that prior to attending the conference on the morning of December 10, LAY may have mentioned to him the fact that the President was concerned over the matter of concessions. He added that he definitely did not mention this fact to anyone nor had he had any knowledge as to whether other individuals in Washington were aware of the President's attitude prior to the conference.

GLEASON advised that his social life was limited to his family and very close friends of long standing whose intelligence precluded them from ever making inquiry as to the nature of his assignments. He has no newspaper friends and does not know columnist DREW PEARSON, JACK ANDERSON, or any of their representatives. Mr. GLEASON stated that he had been concerned about this matter and had been considering the whole thing in his own mind. From past experience, he knew that in some instances stories are "planted" with columnists in order to accomplish some objective that would benefit the individual giving the story. In analyzing this possibility as applied to the facts in instant case, he could see no objective to be obtained by so doing. He stated there has been no "knock down fight" on any matters of policy and that contrariwise there had been a high degree of unanimity of thinking by all individuals at the conference concerning the issues involved, and therefore it was his conclusion that the story appearing in the newspaper had not been "planted."

WFO 65-6060
JAC/PJT:fk

[REDACTED]
INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Advisory Bureau, Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, was interviewed by Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in his office, Room [REDACTED] New State Department Building, on December 18, 1951.

[REDACTED] advised that he was one of several individuals who with Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, National Security Council, were preparing a National Security Council draft concerned with present truce negotiations in Korea.

b6
b7c

According to [REDACTED] on December 10, 1951, subsequent to the White House conference, [REDACTED] indicated to him that as a result of the conference no changes in the draft on which [REDACTED] was working would be necessary. Mr. JOHNSON furnished him no further information concerning the White House conference.

[REDACTED] advised that subsequently Mr. GLEASON telephoned him also indicating that no draft changes were necessitated as a result of the conference. Mr. GLEASON furnished him no further information concerning the White House conference.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. KEAY YOUNG

[REDACTED] Office, Secretary Defense, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Far East Specialist, Room [REDACTED] Pentagon, was interviewed on December 18, 1951, by Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON previously indicated that he may have called [REDACTED] when he, GLEASON, learned that as a result of the White House Conference on December 10, that it would be unnecessary to make any changes in the draft of a NSC paper that [REDACTED] had assisted in preparing. Mr. GLEASON was doubtful at the time of the original interview with him that he had called [REDACTED] nevertheless, [REDACTED] was personally contacted and questioned whether he had received a call from Mr. GLEASON concerning this matter. He stated that he had not, and further that he was advised by no one of any details relating to the President's conference of December 10, 1951.

b6
b7c

INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, was interviewed by Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on December 18, 1951.

WFO 65-6060
JAC/PJT:fk

[redacted] advised that he had worked on the draft of instructions prepared for General MATTHEW RIDGWAY with H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, Deputy Under Secretary, State Department, [redacted] State Department, and others. [redacted] was interested in the decisions reached at the White House conference on December 10 only in so far as it affected the draft which he helped prepare for General RIDGWAY. When Mr. MATTHEWS returned from the President's conference he called [redacted] and told him that the draft had been approved as drafted. He did not go into any detail at this time. Later in the afternoon he spoke with [redacted] in a general fashion and told him that the general philosophy of the men who had worked on the draft had been adopted at the White House conference and that there was no objection to the message being transmitted to General RIDGWAY. He did not furnish [redacted] with a detailed summarization of the views of those present at the conference.

b6
b7c

[redacted] in turn advised [redacted] is [redacted] in the Office of North East Asia Affairs which handles Korea and Japan, and told [redacted] that their draft had been approved. He stated that this was all he told [redacted] as actually it was all he knew. [redacted] also indicated that he possibly told the same to [redacted] Planning Advisory Bureau, Far Eastern Affairs.

The DREW PEARSON column appearing in the New York Daily Mirror of December 5, 1951, was exhibited to [redacted] advised that he had no previous knowledge of the existence of this column. He stated that he was in no position to comment as to whether the column accurately portrayed the White House conference of December 10 because he had never been advised to the details thereof.

77

10-28-97 Pw OGA 11-20-91 intro pg. 77 (revised) (u) SP7C/BA #265, 915

65-6060
CEH:i am
KTD

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JOSEPH SHORT

Mr. JOSEPH SHORT, Press Secretary of the White House, was interviewed by Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent [REDACTED]. He advised that he possessed no prior knowledge as to the matters which were to be discussed at the White House conference on December 10, 1951. Mr. SHORT informed that upon the termination of the conference, he was authorized by the President, following consultation with Admiral DENNISON and Admiral SOUERS, to release to the press, the statement that the President had discussed world affairs and no decisions on policy were reached. Mr. SHORT stated that because of his lack of knowledge as to the actual discussions of the conference, he was, of course, necessarily limited to the authorized statement in his contact with the press. He produced from his files, in substantiation of his statement, and furnished a typewritten copy which he informed fully covers all comments and questions made at this press release.

b6
b7c

Mr. SHORT said that [REDACTED] of DREW PEARSON'S office, at times covers the White House. He was unable to state whether [REDACTED] had been present on December 10, but indicated he was relatively certain he did not see him on this date. He was unable to furnish any statement which would indicate who may have been responsible for the leak of information from the President's conference of December 10, 1951. In discussing this matter, Mr. SHORT furnished certain background and activities which had come to his attention concerning DREW PEARSON, which he indicated had served as confirmation for his opinion as to the unscrupulous nature of PEARSON, but in relating this background, was unable to tie any of these activities into the instant investigation.

P E N D I N G

WFO 65-6060

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

LEAD

THE WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE:

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.:

Will await Bureau instructions as to what, if any, further investigation is desired.

Previous correspondence in this case has carried the title as follows:

DREW PEARSON;
Alleged Leak from White House Conference;
December 10, 1951,
to JACK ANDERSON, Leg-man for DREW PEARSON
Espionage - X

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd *de*

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*


SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: December 26, 1951

3-28-88
 Classified by *SP8UTJ/ab*
 Declassify on: OADR

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE



General Smith stated he felt the Director might desire to know the above facts in view of the alleged leak from the White House conference. *[S-1)(u)]*

CWB:slw

12/2/91
 Classified by *9803 RDD/ACM*
 Declassify on: OADR
 Comp. # *293983*

ADDENDUM - CEH:LL - December 26, 1951

We have developed no information indicating that Clayton Fritchey was in possession of any information regarding the conference prior to the preparation of the Pearson column.

FOI/PA # *265, 255 ; 293983*
 APPEAL # _____
 CIVIL ACT. # _____
 E.O. # *12356*
 DATE *3-28-88* INITIALS *SP8UTJ/ab*

20
 RECORDED - 76
 INDEXED - 76
 EX - 28

JAN 8 1952

b2
b6
b7c

5-1 to app. from Agency
 MARKED FOR LETTER
 65 JAN 25 1952 of 116/91

~~SECRET~~



March 6, 1952

10:00

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-8 JJK

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. LADD
MR. NICHOLS

W 1-1
W 2-1

Admiral Souers, Special Consultant to the President, called and stated he was very much interested in my memorandum to the Attorney General dated February 20, 1952 regarding Drew Pearson. He stated he had tried to prevent the request for such investigations since we would not be able to prosecute and would only antagonize good newspapermen who would rush to Pearson's defense following the mistaken belief that the freedom of the press was involved. Admiral Souers stated that he had briefed the President about my memorandum. I indicated to him that I was concerned about the waste of thousands of dollars and manpower. Admiral Souers stated he had straightened out Joseph Short, Secretary to the President, and he told me that Short had told him to stop all the investigations but the Admiral stated of course we could not do this as some of these investigations may be based on the possibility of espionage but it might be possible to stop those that the President had specifically requested. The Admiral stated he was not doing this officially now but was just talking to me on a personal basis and I told him I understood perfectly. He stated he told the President he was going to show this memorandum to Mr. Short and to Admiral Dennison, Naval Aide to the President, and he had told the President of the procedure followed by the NSC in tracking down leaks whereby each agency was responsible for locating its own leak. I stated I had tried to point out in my memorandum that there are literally hundreds of people in some of those cases who have access to classified and top secret material and there should be a tightening up of the distribution of a lot of this information. Admiral Souers stated that the President had told him hereafter to track down the leaks according to the procedure he had indicated NSC had followed. Admiral Souers then inquired if we had many more current investigations of Pearson and I told him we had practically finished; that I thought there were no more pending.

Very truly yours,

181 J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

65-6013-52

RECORDED-137

MAR 11 1952

25

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 6-45-PM
DATE 3-6-52
BY W. J. D. J.

Callahan ✓
74

J. E. H.

MAR 18 1952

February 15, 1952

MR. TOLSON

L. B. NICHOLS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-11/1/88

1-1
8-1

The Attorney General called on February 13, 1952, and stated that he had a recollection that the Director recently informed him that in connection with one of our investigations of Drew Pearson we had learned of a group of individuals who are meeting at Drew Pearson's house, one of whom was Clayton Fritchey of the Defense Agency. The Attorney General stated that McKinney of the National Democratic Committee was thinking of bringing Fritchey into the National Democratic Committee and the Attorney General had told McKinney to hold up until he could check. Likewise, he stated he had heard that Fritchey was being considered for a White House appointment and the Attorney General felt that under the circumstances, Fritchey would not be a good security risk.

The Attorney General also asked if our investigation of Drew Pearson, growing out of the use of the [redacted] messages in 1950 was conclusive.

After talking to the Director, I advised the Attorney General that the Director had talked to him about the investigation of Drew Pearson and had pointed out that Fritchey was an old friend of Pearson and played bridge at Pearson's house on the average of once a month and was at Pearson's house on the evening that General Bradley had talked to Jack Anderson and had succeeded in killing a portion of Pearson's column. I told the Attorney General that what the Director had in mind was that an official of the Government could not play bridge at periodical intervals with a close friend without being pumped. The Attorney General stated this was sufficient.

b6
b7c

With reference to the [redacted] investigation, I told the Attorney General he might prefer to have the Criminal Division go over our reports which had been sent to the Department and give him an opinion since it would be inappropriate for us to draw any conclusions. In response to his inquiry, I told him that our investigation had been brought to a close after it had been determined that the [redacted] messages had been given very widespread dissemination.

cc - Mr. Ladd
Mr. Belmont
LBN:mb

165-60573
NOT RECORDED
71 FEB 29 1952

F 314

ORIGINAL FILE IN

3/26/52

MR. TOLSON:

Ed Nellor told me last night that [redacted] was conferring with some people on the McCarran Committee as one section of the McCarran Committee is now investigating Drew Pearson and the incident involving leaks from the Pentagon.

b6
b7C

We, of course, had not heard of this before.

LBN
L. B. Nichols

LBN:hmc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-28-88 BY SP-8 BTJ/ST

RECORDED - 20 65-60573-53

APR 3 1952
16

INDEXED 29

EX - 80

780 *B*

76 APR 11 1952

b6
b7C

FORMATION -

Assistant Attorney General
James M. McInerney

April 10, 1952

EX-164

Director, FBI
RECORDED - 139
DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

13 54

Reference is made to your memorandum dated April 1, 1952, your reference, JMM:CEN:bjn, in which you requested to be apprised of statements made by White House Press Secretary, Joseph Short, during the course of our investigation, as reflected in the report of Special Agent in Charge R. B. Hood, dated December 22, 1951.

In compliance with your request, please be advised that Mr. Short also stated that it was his belief that Drew Pearson extensively uses newspaper reporters who are associated with reputable news media and who feed to Pearson, for a price, off-the-record comments, which are made in the course of legitimate interviews and which the news media represented by the particular reporter, would not use because it is "off-the-record." In this connection, Mr. Short stated he understood that [redacted] formerly of Trans - Radio Press, and [redacted] while employed by CBS, were among those "peddling" information to Pearson. He further stated that it was his understanding that the above two individuals had been caught, but that he had no doubt there were others.

b6
b7c

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-8 JAY/let

65-60573

DECLASSIFIED BY 6080 Led/TAP
ON 10/6/77

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED - FBI
F. B. I. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
APR 11 1952
DIRECTOR

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Nichols _____
- Belmont _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Harbo _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Mohr _____
- Tele. Rm. _____
- Nease _____
- Gandy _____

AJM:dar

APR 25 1952

APR 11 1952

Handwritten initials and signatures, including a large 'A' and 'R'.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY *SPY/alt*

65-60573-55
CHANGED TO
65-59762-297

JUL 18 1952
92

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN *WAB*

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

DATE: July 29, 1952

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-22-88 BY SP8/STP

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

In connection with Mr. Nichols' memorandum to Mr. Belmont dated June 16, 1952, entitled "Confidential Files Maintained in Room 6527," it was requested that pertinent files maintained in the above room be reviewed for the purpose of determining whether or not there was still a need for the maintaining of the same.

6/30
ROTTER

File 65-60573 has been reviewed and it is requested that due to the nature of the content of this file it still be maintained in Room 6527.

7-1
8-1

The above file reflects the investigation requested by Mr. Robert Lovett, Secretary of Defense, which request was based on instructions received from the President. The investigation concerned classified information revealed by Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen relative to a White House Conference on December 10, 1951. The Conference was called by President Truman and attended by a number of key civilian and military personnel. At this Conference, the Korean War situation was the main topic of discussion and far-reaching decisions were made, which decisions were classified as "~~Top Secret~~." In view of these far-reaching decisions, it is felt that only limited access should be had to the file until the Korean War is over. At the conclusion of the Korean War, this file can be maintained in the General Records Files Section.

The above file should be made available for review; however, the information contained therein should not be disseminated without prior approval of the Espionage Section.

65-60573

AJM: je s
je s

RECORDED-113

65-60573-56
JUL 30 1952

EX-28

20

619
AUG 5 1952

1001

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-10/10/88

65-60573 - 57, 58
CHANGED TO
62-98194 - 29, 30

JUN 8 1953
Shaw

C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: March 27, 1953

FROM : D. M. Ladd *DL*

SUBJECT: ~~LEAKAGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION~~
TO DREW PEARSON, CONCERNING A WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
ESPIONAGE

Tolson	✓
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	✓
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-28-88 BY SP8/BJ

In accordance with your request, there is attached a memorandum concerning the results of the Bureau's investigation in the case entitled "Drew Pearson" (Column of December 15, 1951); Jack Northman Anderson, aka Jack Anderson; Robert S. Allen (Column of December 13, 1951); Espionage - X." Both Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen published information discussed at a White House Conference held December 10, 1951, which was classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" information. The investigation reflected a close association between Mr. Clayton Fritchey, Director, Office of Public Information, and Drew Pearson, although no information was developed that Mr. Fritchey had prior knowledge of the material published in Pearson's column. This investigation did not determine the source from which Pearson obtained his information.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the attached memorandum may be forwarded to the Attorney General.

DL

EX - 107

RECORDED - 68
INDEXED 68

65-69573-59

Attachment *out*

55 APR 28 1953
DEG:amb

Handwritten signatures and initials

The Attorney General

March 27, 1953

Director, FBI

DREW PEARSON (COLUMN OF DECEMBER 15, 1951);
JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON, aka Jack Anderson;
ROBERT S. ALLEN (COLUMN OF DECEMBER 13, 1951)
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-11/1/88

65-6172-60

Drew Pearson, in the column in the "New York Daily Mirror" on December 15, 1951, and also Robert S. Allen, in an article in the "New York Post," on December 13, 1951, purported to report matters discussed at a White House Conference held December 10, 1951, in regard to the cease-fire discussions concerning Korea. The information was classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" This Bureau conducted an investigation at the request of the then Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett. The inquiry revealed the White House Conference was presided over by President Truman and attended by sixteen key civilian and military personnel. Those in attendance were:

- President Truman
- Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett
- General Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff
- General J. Lawton Collins, Army
- General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air
- Admiral William Fichteler, Navy
- General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Secretary Frank C. Pace, Army
- Secretary Thomas K. Finletter, Air
- Acting Secretary Francis P. Whitehair, Navy
- Acting Secretary James E. Webb, State
- Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, State
- Admiral Sidney Souers, White House
- James Lay, National Security Council
- General Harry Vaughan, White House
- Admiral Harry L. Dennison, White House
- General Robert Landry, White House

The civilian and military personnel attending the conference were interviewed, and all denied any unauthorized disclosure of the matters discussed at the conference. Mr. Joseph Short, White House Press Secretary, and others who had been furnished the information on a "need-to-know basis," were also interviewed with similar results. The

RECORDED - 57

65-6172-60

DET:amb

SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED BY 6080 [signature]
ON 10/1/77

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Nichols _____
- Belmont _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Harbo _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Laughlin _____
- Mohr _____
- Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Rm. _____
- Holloman _____
- Gandy _____

75 APR 1 1953

MAR 27 12 19 1953
DIRECTOR

AGENCIES
P (C)
DATE 12/2/77

MAR 30 1953

The Attorney General

March 27, 1953

Interviews reflected that no one took notes during the conference except James Lay, who turned the notes over to President Truman, and no one dictated a memorandum concerning the conference except Secretary Pinletter. All copies of that memorandum were accounted for. Both the columns written by Drew Pearson and Lebert S. Allen indicated the writers had a firsthand knowledge of what occurred at the conference, such as the manner in which the President strode into the room, grinning and shaking hands all around. The columns purported to highlight the discussions, and both were limited to the discussions on the cease-fire negotiations.

It was the consensus of those persons interviewed who had read the columns that the reporting was relatively accurate as to the points discussed in connection with the cease-fire negotiations, but inaccurate as to the quotations attributed to the individuals present. Individuals interviewed believed the columns had been prepared with at least some information as to the points discussed and particularly with regard to the cease-fire negotiations.

The investigation developed that there had existed a social relationship of long standing between Drew Pearson and Mr. Clayton Fritchey, Director, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense. Mr. Fritchey admitted he had known Drew Pearson for ten years and visited with him periodically about once a month. He had been at Drew Pearson's home playing bridge on the evening of December 18, 1951, at which time Pearson exhibited to him an article pertaining to the White House Conference, which Mr. Fritchey read. Mr. Fritchey stated that the article impressed him as being rather innocuous, but, despite the fact that it was not sensational, it indicated a leak had occurred in a very important conference, which of itself was significant. He stated he did not suggest this to Pearson, nor did he suggest that Pearson withhold publication of the column. Mr. Fritchey stated he did not know the source of Pearson's information but that it was a well-known fact that Drew Pearson had excellent sources of information and that this sort of thing occurred regularly.

The Attorney General

March 27, 1953

The investigation did not develop information that Mr. Fritchey was in possession of the facts regarding the White House Conference prior to the date that Pearson showed him this article. Secretary of Defense Lovett advised that so far as he knew Fritchey was not in possession of such information.

Information was also developed that the Acting Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Whitehair had been visited previously by Drew Pearson on two occasions and also by [redacted] a Pearson employee. Mr. Whitehair had called Pearson on December 12, 1951, with the President's approval, for the purpose of attempting to prevent the publication of Pearson's column. At this time, Mr. Whitehair indicated concern to Pearson that he might be blamed for the leak, but Pearson told Whitehair he should not be apprehensive since he had not told Pearson anything, and Pearson commented that he was an old friend of General Bradley and many other friends of his were at the conference and he named the then Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter, General Hoyt Vandenberg, and the then Acting Secretary of State James H. Webb. (U) REMAINS UNCLASS PER NAVY RFR 6/15/92
SP7 CW H24/98

b6
b7c

The results of the investigation conducted by this Bureau were made available to the then Attorney General Edward J. McGrath, the then Deputy Attorney General A. Devitt Yonck, the then Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, and the then Administrative Assistant to the President Admiral Sidney E. Souers.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP4 JFB

65-60573-61

CHANGED TO

94-1-5698

MAY 3 1955

C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: 1/13/54

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

11-3-97 PND/VA 6-3-97 remainder
SP76/ob # 43,828

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8ay/ab

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Laughlin
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Rm.
- Holloman
- Gandy

Mr. Walt Yeagley of the Department on January 13, 1954, mentioned that the Department is still actively considering our investigative reports concerning instances wherein Drew Pearson published allegedly classified information. He said the Department wants to be sure that Pearson could not put up a defense that the information he published came from official sources, and particularly high sources in the Department of Defense who would have the authority to declassify the information. Pursuant to this, the Department has contacted Roger Keyes, Under Secretary of Defense, who has given assurance that the information in question was not declassified and could not have been legitimately obtained by Pearson. The Department is pursuing this further by checking to see what witnesses could be produced by the Department of Defense to show that this material was classified and could not have been obtained legitimately.

Mr. Yeagley did not know whether the Department will call Pearson before a Grand Jury or whether any action will be taken as a result of the present study being afforded the case.

For your information.

52 JAN 25 1954

AHB:t1c

RECORDED 13
EX-124

65-61-62
ES-100

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 9, 1955

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON BROADCAST
SEPTEMBER 3, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY SP8BJJ/ok

Reference is made to my memorandum dated September 6, 1955, pointing out that Jack Anderson substituted for Pearson on the September 3, 1955, broadcast and the memorandum also set forth items of possible interest to the Bureau. One of the items stated "Our atomic scientists have simplified the complex H-Bomb and designed an H weapon so self-compact that it can be carried on a fighter bomber. This baby H-Bomb has a one megaton punch that is equal to one million tons of TNT." The memorandum stated that this matter was being checked with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

On September 8, 1955, Liaison Agent Bates contacted [redacted] of the AEC; Colonel [redacted] of the Division of Military Applications, AEC; and [redacted] of the Security Division, AEC. [redacted] and Colonel [redacted] both indicated concern over the above statement in that it appears to report latest up-to-date development in this particular field. They both felt that this amounted to a disclosure of sensitive and classified information.

b6
b7C

[redacted] commented that he would obtain a copy of the Pearson broadcast from the AEC Public Information Office and would have it officially reviewed by the AEC's Classification Division for an official opinion as to whether or not the statement contained classified information. [redacted] stated if so, the AEC would then direct a letter to the Bureau pointing out its concern and possibly asking for investigation.

ACTION:

This matter will be followed with AEC and you will be kept advised.

CWB:fjb
(8)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bates

RECORDED - 70

60-60523-63

21 SEP 13 1955

LIASON

SEP 22 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED - 70

65-10023-64

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date : September 14, 1955
 (original and one)
 To : Director of Special Investigations
 The Inspector General
 Department of the Air Force
 Building Tempo E
 Fourth and Adams Drive, S. W.
 Washington, D. C.

From : John Edgar Hoover, Director
 Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: JACK ANDERSON
 "THE WASHINGTON POST AND
 TIMES HERALD" ARTICLE ENTITLED
 "TALK OF IMPEACHING FPC HEAD HEARD"
 IN SEPTEMBER 8, 1955, ISSUE
 ESPIONAGE - X


*Declassified
 by 2040
 5/7/77
 EFG/EGM*

*approp. offices and
 agencies advised
 5-11-77*

TJS/map

Attached is a copy of an article appearing in "The Washington Post and Times Herald" newspaper on September 8, 1955, entitled "Talk of Impeaching FPC head heard" by Jack Anderson. In that portion of the article captioned "A-bomb Warning," Mr. Anderson states, "A confidential blue booklet, meant for Air Force eyes only, warns bluntly that Atomic weapons may be used to stop future 'small wars'." Mr. Anderson then purports to quote directly from this document.

Referral/Direct



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-28-88 BY SP-5/STP/STP

- Tolson _____
- Boardman _____
- Nichols _____
- Belmont _____
- Harbo _____
- Mohr _____
- Parsons _____
- Rosen _____
- Tamm _____
- Sizoo _____
- Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holloman _____
- Gandy _____

Enclosure (1)

cc - 1 - Records Administration Branch (by 0-6 routing slip same date)

BY COURIER SVC.
 1 SEP 14
 COMM - FBI

ARJ/eh
 SEP 23 1955


63

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Director
Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force

Referral/Direct



Mr. Tompkins advises that upon receipt of this information the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice will advise whether any further action is warranted in this case. Your earliest attention to this matter will be appreciated.

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Assistant Attorney General (orig. & 1)
William F. Tompkins

October 10, 1955

Director, FBI

RECORDED-32

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-88 BY []

EX-121

JACK ANDERSON,
"The Washington Post and Times Herald,"
Article Entitled "Talk of Impeaching RFC
Head Heard," in September 8, 1955, Issue
ESPIONAGE - X

Reference is made to your communication dated
September 14, 1955, in which you requested that appropriate
officials of the United States Air Force be asked certain
questions with respect to the captioned article.

By memorandum dated October 1, 1955, the
Department of the Air Force advised that the pamphlet
in question, prepared at the Air War College of the Air
University, is entitled "The Air Force and National
Security Policy," and is not classified. The Department
of the Air Force advised that portions of the captioned
article may be found in the following excerpts from the
aforementioned pamphlet:

(1) "Under the former concept atomic munitions
were to be employed only against an atomic aggressor who
had directly attacked the United States or one of our
allies. This was a pattern of general war. It has been
pointed out that now the policy of 'massive retaliatory
capability' loosens the restrictions on offensive air
power, brings into consideration the question of a choice
in the use of munitions, and thus gives the opportunity
for a degree of flexibility and versatility which previously
was not present. It could now be possible for the tremendous
force in question to be used in other than general war as
a powerful deterrent to lesser aggressions. Accordingly,
an aggressor could no longer assume that the United States
would be willing to permit him to select the geography and
munitions of another contest." (Section VI, pages 2 and 3)

(2) "In terms of hot war, the United States is
readying for a decisive air war to be fought principally
with nuclear weapons. This type of hot war has been
accepted as the likeliest by both the military and the
higher governmental authorities." (Section VI, page 5)

- Tolson _____
- Boardman _____
- Nichols _____
- Belmont _____
- Harbo _____
- Mohr _____
- Parsons _____
- Rosen _____
- Tamm _____
- Sizoo _____
- Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holloman _____
- Gandy _____

JFW:hpf
(5)
50 OCT 17 1955

MAILED 11
COMM-FBI

OCT 10 11 33 AM '55

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

RECEIVED BOARDMAN

Memorandum to Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

(3) "The current U. S. military strategy does not tie us down to an all-out war. We do not have to empty a whole basket of eggs for each emergency. Neither do we have to trot out a heavy-weight boxer if the walter-weight type can do the job and get out without getting killed himself." (Section VI, page 15)

The Department of the Air Force also advised as follows: "The pamphlet was circulated in May, 1954, to Air Force Commanders as unclassified material which should be handled and retained in Air Force channels only. It is not known how Mr. Anderson obtained the quoted excerpts.

"Specific answers to the questions you raised are not being made since the document in question is not classified. In the event additional information is desired, it will be furnished upon request."

It is requested that you advise whether you desire any further investigation by this Bureau in this matter.