

are not likely to accept such an approach (S NF)

e in Afghanistan

Daoud is reported to have disbanded the so-called central committee, a shadowy body set up after the coup and dominated by leftist army officers. The committee had a large role in the government during the months immediately after the 1973 coup, but Daoud has been gradually reducing its influence.

Leftists have never been numerous in Afghanistan, but Daoud has been concerned about their ties to the USSR and their cobwebiness in a country where no formal political parties are permitted. He may also have concluded, following an outbreak of anti-government violence in August, that Afghanistan's many conservative Islamic tribesmen were unhappy about government policies.


In turning away from the left and toward the Mohammadzai, Daoud may also be trying to improve his government's performance. Many of the leftists are young and inexperienced, while the Mohammadzai have a good deal of influence in running the country. Daoud will not, however, go so far as to damage relations with his Soviet neighbor, on which Afghanistan has long depended for military and economic aid. (S NF/OC)

US Break with ILO

US withdrawal would do more damage to non-Communist labor influence internationally than US disaffiliation from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1970.

French, Canadian, and Italian government officials have also expressed apprehensions over the consequences of a US withdrawal.

An Italian official in Geneva has expressed concern that such a US move might portend an intention to withdraw from other UN agencies. (C NF)



SS-12 Propellant Tank

The Soviets now have a unit of the SS-12 Scaleboard tactical missile in 12 of the 16 military districts.

Satellite photography taken in June shows a Scaleboard unit at Luga in the Leningrad military district, the fifth new unit identified in the last two years.

The Scaleboard, the longest range tactical missile in the Soviet inventory, can fire a nuclear warhead a maximum of about 500 nautical miles. They are normally found in brigade-sized units having 12 launchers each.

Recent analysis indicates that the Scaleboard is a two-stage missile with a solid propellant rather than a liquid propellant as previously believed. As a

result, the re-entry vehicle probably would weigh significantly more than the 1,500 pounds previously estimated, and the system would have a faster reaction time. (S NF)

Soviets Preparing

The Soviets are preparing for an underground nuclear test in a previously created salt cavity. The test could yield useful information on the feasibility of recovering heat from such explosions, and on damping the seismic waves produced.

Recent satellite photography shows preparations at the Arzgir site for an un-

Photoreconnaissance Satellite Has Several Unusual Features

A Soviet high-resolution photoreconnaissance satellite that returned to Earth last week had several unusual features.

- It had a launch inclination of 81 degrees which is unprecedented for this late in the year. Normally these satellites are launched from March through May.

- It provided coverage of the Antarctic, an area never covered by previous satellites.

- Camera activity over the eastern Europe, USSR, and Mongolia areas was about five times that of the usual photoreconnaissance satellite. The combined coverage of these areas represented 65 percent of the mission instead of the

normal 10 percent.

- Camera activity over the US dropped from about 20 percent for previous satellites to only 2 percent.

The coverage of Antarctica is probably related to Soviet preparations to send a research group there later this month. For the last 20 years, the Soviets normally have sent resupply and research ships to the Antarctic. They now have six permanent stations in the area and are building a seventh.

We do not know why the Soviets deviated so drastically from past patterns, but the satellite obviously had a mission quite different from that normally associated with photoreconnaissance spacecraft. (TS ZARF UMBRA)

TOP SECRET

NED. 451018

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AWT
6

- MR. CALLAHAN _____
- MR. BAKER _____
- MR. CAMPBELL _____
- MR. CLEVELAND _____
- MR. GEBHARDT _____
- MR. JACOBSON _____
- MR. JENKINS _____
- MR. MARSHALL _____
- MR. MILLER _____
- MR. THOMPSON _____
- MR. WALSH _____
- MR. WHITE _____
- TELE. ROOM _____
- MRS. METCALF _____

Mr. Mulford *[Signature]*

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Handwritten signature

January 25, 1985

OUTSIDE SOURCE

Mr. Jack N. Anderson
1401 16th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Dear Jack,

This is to confirm our telephone conversation and to convey to you information concerning the FBI's investigation into allegations relayed by [redacted]

As you noted in our meeting with FBI Director William H. Webster on December 10th, [redacted] had passed on his concerns that the FBI had been slow to investigate his allegations which he had also conveyed to you.

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In May, 1984, [redacted] appeared at the FBI's Los Angeles Office and provided us with information concerning an alleged bribe made by [redacted] to judges in Ohio relative to a 1980 trial and subsequent appeal of a defamation action brought by [redacted] against [redacted]. Investigation conducted by the FBI consisted of a review of 35 tapes made by [redacted] and provided to us by [redacted] and interviews of witnesses who could corroborate [redacted] allegations. Two key witnesses refused to be interviewed by the FBI. The U. S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California, reviewed the results of the investigation by the FBI's Los Angeles Office and subsequently declined prosecution expressing an interest to transfer Federal jurisdiction to the Southern District of Ohio where the prosecutor decided jurisdiction more clearly rests.

194-4713

RECORDED COPY FILED

94-50053-246

In view of the declination by the U. S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California, the FBI's Los Angeles Office has forwarded to our Cincinnati Office the results of its investigation and we will coordinate our investigation with the U. S. Attorney's Office there. I'm sure you understand that I cannot expand on the scope or extent of our investigation inasmuch as this is an ongoing investigative matter.

- Exec AD Adm. _____
- Exec AD Inv. _____
- Exec AD LES _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. _____
- Crim. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Insp. _____
- Intell. _____
- Lab. _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
- Rec. Mgnt. _____
- Tech. Servs. _____
- Training _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

- _____ - SAC, Los Angeles (PERSONAL ATTENTION)
- _____ - SAC, Cincinnati (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

WMB:nls

Mr. Baker
Mr. Revell

MAIL ROOM

APR 10 1985

MAR 28 1985

Mr. Jack N. Anderson

As I explained to you on the telephone, certain perceived delays in our investigation were in part attributable to the assignment of the FBI case Agent in Los Angeles the extensive duties during the Los Angeles Summer Olympics. Also it is a time-consuming process to review and transcribe the contents of 35 tapes furnished in this case. Thank you for your consideration and your thoughts.

On another matter, I want you to know that [redacted] who handles the FBI's Crime Resistance Program has been in touch with [redacted] concerning our participation in the Young Astronauts Program that you are so avidly promoting.

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b7c

Sincerely,

William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

SUMMARY FROM TURKISH

SIDE SOURCE

This letter is postmarked 2/18/82 in Kizilcahamam, Turkey, and is addressed to "William Webster F. B. I. Washington Amerika." The writer's return address is:

S.M.A.

[Redacted return address]

MISCELLANEOUS

April 29
b6
b7C

Jack Anderson

This is a carbon copy of a letter directed to Jack Anderson. The letter, dated 2/15/82 in Kizilcahamam, Turkey, is written by a woman who claims to have been a writer for the last twenty years in addition to being a university graduate and a retired teacher.

[Redacted] is writing to inform that the assassinations of Turkish diplomats who are stationed overseas, in her opinion, are being done by Turks themselves. The collaboration is between high-ranking former Turkish government officials and Armenian "thieves." The perpetrators, including two former presidents and the Minister of Culture, have arranged these murders while, at the same time, praising their victims. All this has been done solely for money, and the former President of Turkey, Korutürk, has made billions this way. Large sums of money have been paid to quiet certain people.

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b7C

[Redacted] states these officials have attempted to kill her and goes on to expose nepotism in the Turkish Government.

The second page of the letter is titled, "What I Know About the Release of General James Dozier." After having seen General Dozier's picture in the newspaper, the writer is convinced that he is not an American, but rather a "mixed blood" with Chinese origins. She further states that she heard on the Soviet radio that Dozier's real name is Nikolay and the Russians were involved in his kidnapping.

The writer has written previously to President Reagan to ask that he bestow on her the Distinguished Service Medal. A copy of that letter was sent to the American NATO Commander in Turkey.

94-50053-2

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DATE 08-22-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Summarized by:
[Redacted]

April 20, 1982

NOT RECORDED
MAY 10 1982

*Copy to Mr. Dozier
Bureau
...
...*

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b7C

5-1-82
57 MAY 12 1982

1982-338-238-208
64-175-238

The letter concludes with the writer stating that she writes this letter to satisfy her conscience and that she desires all thieves and assassins be punished.

The writer appears to be an educated person. This letter contains nothing of administrative importance and no threats are made.

Attached are copies of a certificate of retirement and issuance of monthly annuities from the Public Library in Çorum, Ministry of Culture, and two picture post cards depicting scenes of Zizilcahamam.

- Mr. Monroe - Enc. (2)
- Mr. Young - Enc. (2)
- 1 - [redacted] - Enc. (2)
- 1 - [redacted] - Enc. (2)_{b6}
- 1 - [redacted] - Enc. (2)_{b7C}
- 1 - [redacted] - Enc. (2)
- 2 - [redacted] - Enc. (2)
- 2 - [redacted] - Enc. (2)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 5, 1982

Jlc

Honorable Orrin G. Hatch
 United States Senate
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Orrin:

I have received your letter of February 25, 1982, which enclosed a column by Jack Anderson, and in which you relayed the concerns of a constituent who was upset by references to members of a Lebanese Shiite Moslem sect in the column.

As a result of the initial report of a Libyan assassination plot directed against President Reagan, an investigation was conducted to determine facts that would show what, if any, threat to the President's security existed, and to take whatever steps might be judged necessary to assure his safety. It was to serve these ends that we acted, and, as with any investigation, the fact that interviews were conducted was not intended to put anyone under a cloud of suspicion or to reflect negatively on any group with which a person may be connected.

As I am sure you will understand, the sensitive nature of this investigation precludes me from publicly commenting on detailed aspects of the case.

Sincerely,
Bill 94-50053-

William H. Webster
 Director

NOT RECORDED
 JUN 2 1982
 APR 15 1982

APR 13 1982

1 - Salt Lake City - Enclosures (2)

- Exec AD Inv. _____
- Exec AD Adm. _____
- Exec AD LES _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. _____
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- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

WPH/JKO:lmb (14)

68 JUN 11 1982

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Intell. _____	

* SIGNED "Bill" - *efm*

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

Original Filed In 199-1-300-642X

Honorable Orrin G. Hatch

Note:

This letter responds to Senator Hatch's inquiry of 2/25/82 in which he wanted to know the background of a Jack Anderson column, which he enclosed with his letter. Hatch was concerned that one of his constituents had been offended by references to the Shiite Moslem sect from Lebanon and that the FBI investigation into the Libyan assassination team had put certain individuals under suspicion. This letter assures Senator Hatch that the FBI's investigation into this matter was not intended to put anyone under a cloud of suspicion and that because the investigation is ongoing, no public comment is possible.

SM
MM
SX

March 17, 1982

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DATE 08-20-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

[Redacted]

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b7C

Dear [Redacted]

John Anderson

The letter you directed to the President has been referred to FBI Headquarters for reply.

The FBI conducted an investigation into the allegations that a foreign intelligence service had penetrated the General Accounting Office, and we found no information which would substantiate such claims. Please be assured that the FBI will thoroughly investigate all allegations of this nature that are brought to our attention, and we will continue to make every effort to protect our country within our mandate.

Sincerely yours,

ES

Edward J. O'Malley
Assistant Director
Intelligence Division

- 1 - Mr. O'Malley - Enclosures (2)
- 1 - [Redacted] - Enclosures (2)

94-50853

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NOTE: Bufiles contain no record of [Redacted] Bufiles indicate similar responses to such inquiries have been given.
MN:rfw (5)

NOT RECORDED

6 APR 7 1982

~~MAR 25 1982~~

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MAR 22 1982
FBI

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- Crim. Inv. _____
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- Tech. Servs. _____
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MAY 9 1982
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DATE 08-20-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

SAC, Baltimore
Director, FBI



Jack Anderson

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Attached are two copies of a communication addressed to President Reagan from [redacted] that was referred to the FBI. Her communication has not been acknowledged at FBI Headquarters and is being furnished to your office for any action you deem appropriate. It is noted that her [redacted] may have been investigated by your office when charges of false pretense were made by the Lincoln National Bank, Gaithersburg, Maryland, when he did not make restitution for a \$3,879.38 deficiency. Advise FBI Headquarters, Attention: Correspondence Unit-Office of Congressional and Public Affairs of any action taken by your office.

Enclosures (4)

1 - Mr. Jamar - Enclosures (2)

94-5053
NOT RECORDED
6 MAR 22 1982

NOTE: [redacted] wrote to President Reagan stating that her family has been a victim of a "scam" by the FBI similar in nature to the one described in an article entitled "Abscam Trap Also Snared Honest Men" by Jack Anderson which she enclosed. She states her [redacted] was approached by the FBI in February, 1980, and told to work for the Organized Crime Task Force or spend the next 15 years in jail. She indicates that her husband was brought to the Washington, D. C., area where they met and married. [redacted] further states that for the past two years they have literally put their lives on the line, lost thousands of dollars and "front money" for the FBI's illegal activities and ventures. She says that she unsuccessfully attempted to commit suicide because of all of their problems and indicates her husband has felt obligated to resort to minor misdemeanors in order to survive financially because of all the broken promises of the FBI. She states that recently the FBI had threatened their lives. The contents of her letter were discussed with the Office of Professional Responsibility which advised it had no interest. Reply suggested by SA Jamar, Organized Crime Section, CID.

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- Exec AD Inv. _____
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- Adm. Servs. _____
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- Training _____
- Public Affs. Off. _____
- Telephone Rm _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM [initials]

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 29-0-17039

ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH, CHAIRMAN
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 DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., MICH.
 HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND
 HUMAN RESOURCES
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 25, 1982

- Exec. AD Inv. _____
- Exec. AD LES _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. _____
- Crim. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
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- Legal Coun. _____
- Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
- Rec. Mgnt. _____
- Tech. Servs. _____
- Training _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Honorable William Webster
 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Washington, D.C.

W

Dear Bill:

I would appreciate knowing the background to the enclosed column by Jack Anderson. A constituent of mine in Utah has written me to ask if an apology can be given by the FBI to the family mentioned in the column. My constituent is a friend of a Shia Moslem from Lebanon and he has been upset by the reference to the Lebanese Shia leader in the Jack Anderson column. Would you look into this for me? I would like to have a letter from you that would describe what has happened and to confirm that the FBI interview of the family in Detroit was not intended to put them under any cloud of suspicion or reflect negatively on the Shia Moslems of Lebanon.

Thank you for your assistance. My staff adviser for this is the Administrative Assistant Frank Madsen or the Labor Committee staff director Renn Patch at telephone 224-7171 if your staff has any further questions.

Sincerely,

Orrin G. Hatch
 (u+h)

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 DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

94-50053-

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 JUN 2 1982

ENCLOSURE

68 JUN 11 1982

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Original Filed In 199-1-300-5842

4 22 1982

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CRS MAIN FILE COPY
WASHINGTON POST

JAN 7 1982

P. DC 11

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DATE 08-20-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Washington Post

D.C. 11

JACK ANDERSON

Why So Few Believed in The 'Hit Squad'

Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker announced weeks ago that the threat to President Reagan and other high officials from Libyan assassination squads was "diminishing." What was diminishing was the credibility of the reported threat.

The charges that led to the international uproar—and the tightened security measures at U.S. border crossings — were contained in a 40-page secret report by the Central Intelligence Agency to the National Security Council. My associate Ron McRae has seen parts of this report.

From the outset, foreign policy experts outside the spy agency assessed the CIA's assassination alarm as "possible, but not much better than 10 percent." But obviously, however farfetched the possibility, it had to be treated seriously by security agencies.

"The Secret Service tracks down dozens of crank calls every year, including threats to shoot Reagan with psychic bullets," one official pointed out, adding: "But we don't broadcast them all over the world."

What made non-CIA people in the administration suspicious of the

Libyan hit squad story is clear from the CIA report itself:

- The chief source of the hit squad allegation, who claimed to have been present when Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi gave orders for the assassins' mission, demanded \$500,000 for his information (whether he received it is unknown). The fact that the informer passed a lie-detector test is not compelling; a practical liar can beat the gadget, particularly someone with the coolness to demand a half-million for his story.

- The informer also provided the names of some buddies in Beirut who would be willing to sell information on the drug traffic. The CIA recognized some of them as hustlers who had been peddling phony documents for years. Oddly enough, though the CIA itself was dubious about this part of the informer's material, the Drug Enforcement Administration began stuffing suitcases full of cash in anticipation of a big score in Beirut.

- Two of the 14 names on the hit squad were members of the Lebanese Shiite Moslem sect, Amal, which has been engaged in a blood feud with Qaddafi since their leader, Mousa Sadr, disappeared in Libya in 1978. The FBI claimed that the names were included because of a "computer error" and were quickly removed. Yet the names were still on the list in documents issued at least 12 days later.

- Several of the informers are known to have connections with Israeli intelligence, which would have its own reasons to encourage a U.S.-Libyan rift.

- The report calls the evidence of the hit squad's existence "overwhelming," and predicts that "more detailed information is forthcoming" from reliable sources. None materialized.

- The CIA report predicted confidently that its evidence "guarantees the support of allied governments in any action deemed reasonably necessary to protect the lives of American officials." In fact, our allies, when briefed on the CIA findings, found them unconvincing—in a class with the white paper on El Salvador earlier last year, which was later shown to have relied on highly questionable and probably forged documents.

Footnote: There is a possibility that the CIA was played for a sucker by its own "disinformation" campaign directed at Qaddafi. The campaign, ordered by CIA Director William J. Casey last May, used foreign nationals for the dirty work.

Knowing what the CIA wanted, and without proper supervision by American agents, it's possible the CIA's foreign hirelings cooked up the "hit squad" on their own. It fit neatly into the Reagan administration's political scheme of things, and—*voilà!* a full-blown international incident was born.

94-50053-

ENCLOSURE

Security at GAO Tightened After Soviet's Queries

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

On Jan. 19, 1979, Vladimir Kvasov, a naval attache at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, walked into the General Accounting Office headquarters here and asked for a list of numbered reports on U.S. military affairs.

Foreign attaches are sort of legal spies and it is not unusual for them to travel around to government agencies collecting public documents. In fact, later that year Kvasov traveled to Nevada, tailed all the way by FBI agents in western garb, and collected unclassified documents about possible MX missile basing sites.

But on this trip to the GAO, Kvasov asked for several highly classified reports, in addition to the publicly available ones. Some of them hadn't even been printed at the time; much less issued.

The Soviet attache apparently wasn't given the classified documents he requested. But faint alarm bells sounded. A week later a secretary in the office sent her boss a note saying, "It seems unusual that this

GAO, From A1

person should have accurate numbers, prior to publication, for so many reports that have restricted access." No superior acted on the information, however.

Three months later, Kvasov was back again. This time he signed in to visit the public documents room. But he apparently strolled unaccompanied through the building first, because he didn't show up at the document room for nearly half an hour.

When he did, he requested several more classified reports, including one dated only two days earlier, on the electronic jamming system of the EF111A fighter-bomber.

The plane is capable of carrying nuclear bombs over the Soviet Union from bases in Britain and West Germany. The Soviets obviously would covet any information that could be used to counter American radar jamming systems. The report hadn't even been sent to other agencies for comment at the time, a security review found.

Again, there's no sign the Soviet officer was given the secret reports. But the series of visits raised troubling questions. How could Kvasov know the numbers of reports that hadn't even been issued? Did he have inside help? Was there a Soviet "mole"—an inside source—in the investigative arm of Congress?

The FBI finally was called in to investigate. A months-long counter-intelligence inquiry couldn't find any "mole," law enforcement sources said. But a companion check of security measures at the GAO uncovered several weaknesses.

Although less than 5 percent of the GAO's reports are classified, its weapons system analysts have access to much highly classified material. The security check found classified work papers in unlocked filing cabinets and microfiche (sheets of microfilm) of classified reports mixed in with unclassified material. The check led in August to a tightening of procedures by then-Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats.

In a memo to all his division directors on Aug. 3, 1979, Staats announced several changes to restrict access to classified material and added:

"Finally, I frequently get the feeling that some of our reports are cluttered with a lot of precise classified data that is not essential to an understanding of our report message. Accordingly, during the preparation of reports the staff should 'write around' such data whenever feasible. While such efforts might not permit declassifying the entire report, the amount of data subject to being compromised will be reduced."

Nearly 2½ years later, the new security system is still not completely in place, and GAO officials concede that a Vladimir Kvasov could still walk into the building unchallenged.

In a recent telephone interview Staats said he recalled the concern generated by the Soviet attache's visits and requests. "I asked [FBI Director William H.] Webster to come in and check it out," he said. He acknowledged that the GAO was concerned about the possibility of a "mole."

"I never saw the FBI's written report. What we did as a result was decide to put in a whole lot of additional security." This included procedures such as an electronic pass system like the one in use at the FBI, and closing off stairwells,

Staats recalled.

The story of the Soviets' interest in the GAO and the security overhaul there was raised recently by Ralph C. Sharer Jr., a former GAO auditor who is now facing dismissal on unrelated matters from his job at the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration's inspector general office.

Sharer said, when contacted by a reporter, that he worked with the FBI on what he calls the "Vladimir affair." He left the GAO last year after he criticized the agency security leadership and was reassigned, he said.

"GAO security was virtually nonexistent," he said. "There was a high probability that the Soviet intelligence services were successful in obtaining internal GAO information." He also contends that the GAO botched any chance to find the possible inside source by warning the weapons analysis division that it might be the target of Soviet spies.

Sharer also has told his story to Congress. A member of the investigative staff of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) said the FBI authenticated the documents in a 200-page report Sharer filed in the NASA case. He also is being referred to GAO oversight committees, which GAO had not told about the security lapses, the aide said.

After joining the GAO in 1976, Sharer said he rose from GS9 to GS13 in four years and received two merit commendations for his work. In 1978 he was selected to go to the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence School.

When he graduated in June, 1979, he worked for a few months on the Kvasov incidents and briefed Staats on what he saw as the agency's security weaknesses. But former colleagues interviewed during the NASA case said he began to have a "fixation" over intelligence matters.

He was taken off the case after refusing to give classified documents to Clario Pin, a top administrator at the GAO, who had been in charge of security.

"I thought he [Sharer] was seeing things under the bed," Staats recalled. "He would add two and two

and get a lot more out of it" than four. Sharer's current troubles at NASA began early this year when he filed allegations of financial misconduct against colleagues in the IG's office there. His firing was recommended early this month after another IG office studied his charges and found them groundless. The report included derogatory remarks from GAO employes about Sharer's credibility.

Sharer countered with a 200-page rebuttal, including the outlines of the GAO/Soviet story. He raised the issue, he said, to show that his former colleagues tried to discredit him because he had uncovered GAO security problems they didn't want exposed.

Staats said he felt the Soviet attache could have obtained the numbers of the reports elsewhere.

David Ryan, security officer at the FBI at the time the bureau was first informed of Kvasov's visits, said in a recent phone interview that he worked on the GAO's security review task force until early 1980, as an agent, and then after he retired, as a consultant for GAO.

Ryan said his group reviewed the hiring and security checks policies, the physical security of offices, locks and safes, and the protection of classified documents. After the review was completed, the agency began a series of improvements in its headquarters and sensitive regional and foreign offices.

He said he's convinced the security system there is now comparable to any U.S. agency outside the Pentagon and intelligence agencies.

Charles Bowsher, the new comptroller general, said in a recent phone interview that he was briefed on the Soviet attache's actions and is satisfied with the new security steps. He noted, however, that the new electronic security pass system will not be in place until next spring.

NOTE: PLEASE UNDERLINE NAMES IN ARTICLE REQUIRING COPIES FOR PERSONAL FILES.

80
DOS/FBI

FBI
Dec 28, 1981

Office of the President


Hon President Ronald Reagan
attaching article from
Commentator Jack Anderson
which has shocked and
has me flabbergasted.

We hope our F.B.I.
is aware of these facts
and someone is closing
these defense gaps.

Sincerely JOHN
D Anderson

SMM
St

Hon.
g



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b7c

ORIGINAL FILED IN 67-56866-

ACK 10 11
3/15/82
M. J. J.

~~MAR 23 1982~~

94-50053

NOT RECORDED
APR 7 1982

ENCLOSURE

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 MAY 27 1982

Jack Anderson

General Accounting Office

The Post, Sunday, December 27, 1981—D3

'Mole' Helped Soviets

WASHINGTON — There is startling evidence that the General Accounting Office (GAO) — the investigative arm of Congress, with access to top-secret military information — has been penetrated by Russian spies.

Investigators for Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) have confirmed that the FBI conducted a four-month probe of GAO recently, and concluded that an unidentified Soviet agent is still working in the sensitive agency. My intelligence sources tell me, however, that there may be as many as three Soviet moles in the GAO.

GAO is generally regarded as a rather humdrum agency composed of auditors looking for waste and fraud in government contracts. But to do their job, the GAO fiscal sleuths must have access to files of congressional intelligence committees as well as all defense-related agencies. In short, the GAO is a veritable treasure trove of sensitive national security information.

According to the 1979 internal GAO report — which has been corroborated by congressional investigators — the Russian agents



were able to obtain at least 42 sensitive GAO reports, 15 of them classified TOP SECRET.

These are some of the reports that wound up in the KGB's hands: "The Effectiveness of F14A1-Phoenix Weapons System," "Operational Problems Facing the Army's Advanced Attack Helicopter," "The Diplomatic Community and Terrorism," "Marine Amphibious Forces Readiness" and "U.S. Air Defense Capabilities in Europe."

The eyes-only intelligence report to GAO

Comptroller General Elmer Staats illustrated the potential impact of what it called "the KGB collection operation" by noting that the Soviet Naval Journal described in exact detail the location of U.S. anti-submarine sound-surveillance arrays at the very time the GAO was auditing the program.

Intelligence officials determined that there were KGB moles inside the GAO when known Soviet agents repeatedly requested — by exact internal report control number — GAO studies that had not even been printed; and were in fact classified secret or top-secret.

For example, a Soviet intelligence official visited the GAO reports center on Jan. 19, 1979, and requested 10 different reports. Four of them had not yet been printed, so he returned 11 days later and picked them up. Obviously, he was privy to advance information on the reports from some inside source.

On April 27, 1979, the same Soviet intelligence official signed in at the GAO at 2:40 p.m. At 3:07 p.m., he logged in at the records center and requested 11 reports, most of

The Soviets became so bold in their "collection" that on March 27, 1979, the KGB station chief phoned the GAO in advance and requested a certain classified report. The Russians then sent a limousine to pick it up. What particularly disturbed investigators about this "curb service" incident was that the report in question was one that had been prepared totally within the GAO; it had never been sent out in draft form to other agencies for comment.

On March 30, 1979, the Soviet official showed up at the GAO at 12 noon and visited an undetermined office. Two hours later, while he was still in the building, two Bulgarian intelligence officials, described as working for the KGB, visited the GAO's seventh

floor "collection" pattern. Incredibly, the GAO personnel neglected to report the telephone call to the FBI.

GAO counter-intelligence agents working on the case were told by their superiors not to furnish copies of their findings to the FBI. They ignored the orders. One of the GAO investigators was then banished to a study of marine mammals.

The Soviet spy was still in place at least as late as June 1980, when the Russian intelligence official appeared at the records center and requested a GAO report — 16 days before it had been printed.

Jack Anderson is a Washington-based investigative reporter and columnist.

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

94-50053

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DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Memorandum



Exec AD Inv. ___
 Exec AD Adm. ___
 Exec AD LES ___
 Asst. Dir.:
 Adm. Servs. ___
 Crim. Inv. JK
 Ident. ___
 Intell. ___
 Laboratory ___
 Legal Coun. ___
 Plan. & Insp. ___
 Rec. Mgnt. ___
 Tech. Servs. ___
 Training ___
 Public Affs. Off. ___
 Telephone Rm. ___
 Director's Sec'y ___

To : Assistant Director
 Criminal Investigative Division

Date 12/18/81

From : Legal Counsel *JAM*

Subject : DATA GENERAL CORPORATION;
 [Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 08-20-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

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At 2:56 p.m. on December 18, a caller identifying himself as [Redacted] Safety and Security, Data General Corporation, Westboro, Massachusetts, telephone 800-343-7630, extension [Redacted] called and said that he is a former Bureau employee. He requested a meeting at FBI Headquarters during the week of December 28 through 31, 1981, to be attended by [Redacted] and the General Counsel for the Data General Corporation. They would like to discuss allegations that were published during November and early December 1981 that the FBI is investigating Data General Corporation based on allegations of arson and theft of computer secrets.

[Redacted] said that there have been references to these allegations in columns by Jack Anderson and Data General believes that the source of the allegations is one [Redacted].

An indices check of December 18, 1981, did not produce any relevant references.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Criminal Investigative Division review this matter and prepare an appropriate response to [Redacted] who requested that he be called at the above telephone number and advised whether the FBI is conducting such an investigation and whether a meeting may be arranged with appropriate officials at FBI Headquarters during the week of December 28.

JAN 19 1982

1 - Mr. Young
 1 - Mr. Mintz
 JAM:bpr
 (3)

SA [Redacted] 12-29-81
SA [Redacted] telephoned [Redacted] contacted [Redacted] advised that [Redacted] criminal investigation [Redacted] was satisfied [Redacted] full cooperation [Redacted] of any future [Redacted] investigation [Redacted] instituted.

Adm. Servs. [Redacted]
 Ident. [Redacted]
 Intell. [Redacted]
 Lab. [Redacted]
 Legal Coun. [Redacted]
 Plan. & Insp. [Redacted]
 Rec. Mgnt. [Redacted]
 Tech. Servs. [Redacted]
 Training [Redacted]

b6
 b7c

NOT RECORDED
 202 FEB 9 1982

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
Memo Legal Counsel to Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division
Re: Data General Corporation...

RECOMMENDATIONS: (Continued)

2. That Criminal Investigative Division call

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b7C

APPROVED:	DATE:	<i>CM</i>	<i>Jaw</i>
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	_____	_____	_____
EXECUTIVE ADJUTANT	_____	_____	_____
EXC. ADJUTANT	_____	_____	_____



b6
b7C

Smm

December 10, 1981

The President of
The United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Jack Anderson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Dear Mr. President:

94-50053-
Unfortunately, you most probably will
never read, let alone be advised of this
writing. I say unfortunate, as you were elected
by the people to serve the people, but due
to bureaucracy as it is, this statement is
necessitated

NOT RECORDED
6 MAR 22 1982

~~15 MAR 1982~~

ENCLOSURE

BA
I am taking this opportunity to write
as a last resort. Enclosed is an article
from the Washington Post, Jack Anderson's
column of 12-10-81. My family are victims
of a ~~59~~ MAR 30 1982 the FBI, similar in nature

ORIGINAL FILED IN 200-17038

REC'D
MAR 22 1982
FBI

We have been alerted and
 alerted by the same being placed
 by the FBI. On February 1956, my
 husband was visiting Fred on a
 hot date through Fresno, Ca. He
 was approached by the FBI and told
 to work with them. Disregard name

I have thought and placed with
 FBI Headquarters, Wash., D.C. The
 Attorney General of the United States,
 the Justice Department and as of
 late probably Attorney General
 the White House. I was given the
 these steps, arranged to be interviewed
 and was told I would receive a return
 call at my home. Let me say that
 we remain calm.

Walter and Associates in the Pasadena
 area

will have a normal way of life. In fact that the FBI will completely satisfied with the results. I confess, my husband has felt obligated to resort to some means of persuasion, in order to help us survive financially, but sadly because of broken promises of payment from the FBI, and most recently, within the last eight months, threats from them upon our lives.

My husband is currently in the D. C. Jail, awaiting extradition to Oreg. & Chicago. For the second year, he is Christmas for our children.

We have been torn apart, emotionally, socially and economically ruined by our own government, and, we are both at the point where neither one of us have the desire

attention in security. Will have to see (acc)

Healthly concerns, (illness)
in a. chance to look over like a...
fighting to save my family. We are not
The letter to you I am in flight. I am
I suppose you are wondering why
to stay out of it. help.

The news makes you feel
easier and we still economy.
The news affect the events in
and of the recent - economy and
I wish you have to promote the family
we really available from the FBI,
included, but I am the news
to tell you all that is actually

I would like to take the time
of information and information

The information

Abscam Trap Also Snared Honest Men

During the Abscam operation, members of Congress were conned by the FBI into taking bribes and engaging in corrupt business deals. That much has been made clear.

What has escaped public attention, however, is the fact that legitimate businessmen were also conned by the FBI's operatives. What's worse, these honest businessmen were victimized for personal profit by the con artists who were enlisted by the FBI to entrap congressmen.

Here's the story of just one company, Intersea Fisheries, which was put out of business by Abscam. The FBI recklessly ruined this perfectly legitimate business enterprise to protect its phony Abscam cover.

The California-based firm numbered among its directors the respected shipbuilder Don Vaughn and Jean Michel Cousteau, son of the prestigious undersea explorer Jacques Cousteau.

Intersea Fisheries was suckered into the Abscam trap by the FBI's con men—and was given no help at all when it asked the FBI for information that might have extricated it from the trap.

The FBI preferred to let Intersea Fisheries go down the drain, rather than stop its hirelings from working their private scam on the company.

From interviews and a sworn deposition, my associate Indy Badhwar has pieced together the con game devised by an FBI lackey named Joseph Meltzer. In February, 1979, Denver accountant Richard Stanczyk was retained by a client to check out Intersea as an investment opportunity. Stanczyk, a former Internal Revenue Service investigator, was to be ruined by the FBI's game.

He gave Intersea high marks, largely on the basis that an outfit called Abdul Enterprises was going to finance the company's venture to build three tuna boats. Unknown to Stanczyk, Abdul Enterprises was the FBI's phony Abscam corporation. It wasn't about to provide financing.

Stanczyk signed on as a consultant to Intersea; his job was to bring investors into the project until the Arab money from Abdul Enterprises materialized. There was, of course, no such money. But Meltzer, the FBI's pet con man, received thousands of dollars in commissions.

As part of its scheme to lend legitimacy to Abdul Enterprises, the FBI had arranged for a vice president of Chase Manhattan to lie about the spurious Arab company's assets. When Intersea called Chase Manhattan, the inquiring official was assured that the money was there.

Another legitimate broker, Ken Gulve, was roped in on the project. Reassured by meetings with the FBI's Arab "sheiks," Gulve spent \$50,000 of his own money traveling in this country and in Europe promoting the Intersea deal. Stanczyk and Gulve grew suspicious about Meltzer and his "Arabs" after months of runaround. They relayed their doubts to the FBI's San Diego office. But the FBI did nothing to warn Intersea to back off from any dealings with Abdul Enterprises. Instead, complaints were referred to Meltzer, the FBI con man.

On Halloween, 1979, FBI agents swooped down on Intersea's headquarters and carted off 27 cartons of files. Apparently, this was another protective measure to keep the businessmen's suspicions about Abdul Enterprises from leaking out.

But an agent answered the company's telephone, telling callers that the firm's employees were under arrest. Foreign business interests, including Matsui Corp. of Japan, were scared away by statements that Intersea was under FBI investigation.

No Intersea official was arrested nor charged with a crime, for the simple reason that they had done nothing except rely on FBI lies.

Accountant Stanczyk lost more than \$200,000, his business, his clients and his marriage. He contemplated suicide. The other consultant, Gulve, also lost his business, and some \$900,000 in commissions.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-08-2006 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

*The President of the United States
of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.*

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
94-50053-

Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. _____
 Exec AD Inv. _____
 Exec AD LES _____
 Asst. Dir.:

- Adm. Servs. _____
- Crim. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Plan. & Insp. _____
- Rec. Mgnt. _____
- Tech. Servs. _____
- Training _____
- Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

~~SECRET~~

*OWD
GAC*

To : Mr. Lee Colwell

Date 9/4/81

From : C. P. Monroe *CM*

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
 DECLASSIFICATION
 AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
 DATE 08-20-2008

Subject : DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
 FBI CONFERENCE, 9/2/81,
 Regarding Unauthorized Disclosure
 of Classified Information;
 ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[Handwritten signature]


PURPOSE: To provide a summary of a conference held with the FBI on 9/2/81 by Mr. Mark Richards, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (DOJ). (U)

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only (U)

APPROVED: *[Handwritten signature]*

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
		Tech. Servs. _____

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
(S)

~~SECRET~~

NOT RECORDED
 15 SEP 21 1981

Classified and Extended by 4035
 Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 & 3)
 Date of Review for Declassification 9/4/2001

- 1 - Mr. L. Colwell
- 1 - Mr. F. M. Mullen
- 1 - Mr. J. E. Otto
- 1 - Mr. C. P. Monroe
- 1 - Mr. R. T. Castonguay
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. J. F. Price
- 1 - [Redacted]



b6
b7C

RDD:skp (9)

[Handwritten mark]

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-9794-201

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from C. P. Monroe to Mr. Colwell
Re: Department of Justice and
FBI Conference, 9/2/81

The captioned meeting was attended by James F. Price,
Assistant Section Chief, Terrorism Section, and [redacted]
Supervisor for the Espionage-X Program at FBIHQ; Mark Richards and
Thomas Marum, Internal Security Section, DOJ. The purpose of this
meeting was to respond to the above request from [redacted] (U)

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from C. P. Monroe to Mr. Colwell
Re: Department of Justice and
FBI Conference, 9/2/81

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b6
b7C

attached. (U)

A copy of a previous memorandum dated 8/21/81 is

*detached and
hand led separately*

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum



- Exec AD Adm.
- Exec AD Inv.
- Exec AD LES
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs.
- Crim. Inv.
- Ident.
- Insp.
- Intell.
- Lab.
- Legal Coun.
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs.
- Rec. Mgnt.
- Tech. Servs.
- Training
- Telephone Rm.
- Director's Sec'y

B. Bayse
6423

To : THE DIRECTOR

Date 7/29/81

Lee Colwell

From : LEE COLWELL

Subject : INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT ON THE
MOTOR VEHICLE PROGRAM IN THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Lutz
(6)

On 7/29/81 in the Washington Post, page D7, Jack Anderson reports on "Audit Faults FBI's Handling of Auto Fleet." I requested a point-by-point analysis of this article, both of which are attached for your information.

We have previously responded to this audit and the criticisms contained therein, many of which were unfounded, to the Department of Justice. I previously advised you that Jack Anderson had made inquiries regarding this audit about two or three months ago. The audit, which covers 1979 and earlier years, was issued in 1980.

For information.

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DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Enc. - 2 ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Otto
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Revell
- 1 - Mr. Young

LC:ams
(6)

94-50053

NOT RECORDED
26 SEP 9 1981

~~AUG 25 1981~~

11/2

64 SEP 2 1981

66-1980-7-4543

8/1/81

JACK ANDERSON

Audit Faults FBI's Handling Of Auto Fleet

Those automobile chase scenes that are featured nightly on television might be hard for the FBI to duplicate in real life. If an agent should get involved in a high-speed chase, he might wind up calling for a tow truck.

An internal Justice Department audit report shows that the FBI, like most other American car owners, has been tripped off by auto mechanics. In its pursuit of the bad guys, the FBI operates the third-largest motor fleet in the government. But apparently the G-men seldom check under the hood.

"Inadequate maintenance and repair practices have left a number of bureau vehicles in poor emergency response readiness," the auditors warn. They add that other vehicles may have been operated in an unsafe condition.

Every beginning driver learns that he should get an oil change every few thousand miles. The auditors checked 160 FBI cars at random. 18 had been driven between 15,000 and 30,000 miles without an oil change; another 66 had gone 9,000 miles without fresh oil.

Likewise, engine tuneups were widely ignored by the G-men. The auditors found 77 cars that had not received their checkups on time. In the Chicago field office, four vehicles had averaged 28 months of hard driving without a tuneup.

The investigation also uncovered a high rate of duplicate or repetitive repairs. Yet in only a few instances had the FBI received the corrective repairs at no additional charges.

An examination of the books turned up a \$500,000 discrepancy in expenses for the auto fleet in 1979. Again, the Chicago office was singled out for failing to police "improper or questionable credit card purchases" of gasoline and repair work.

The FBI is supposed to investigate others who cheat the government. But the auditors found at least one agent — in Chicago, of course — who allegedly had used an FBI credit card to make personal purchases. This malfeasance has gone unnoticed and unchallenged by the FBI, the auditors charged.

They were also skeptical of the improved gas efficiency claimed by field offices in New York City, Mobile, Ala., Knoxville, Tenn., and New Orleans. The New York office, for example, claimed its agents drove 1.8 million more miles, yet used 118,000 fewer gallons of gas in 1979 than the previous year. That would have been a 61 percent improvement in fuel efficiency.

Footnote: FBI officials told my associate Tony Capaccio that the audit doesn't reflect the current situation. They said that the conclusions were based on outdated information, that a series of steps have been taken to improve auto care and that computers are now used to keep track of vehicles in need of maintenance.

Culinary Watch: President Reagan's cutbacks in government spending have not stopped some of his Cabinet members from lunching in luxury. Here are some examples:

Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis is spending about \$100,000 a year to pay five Coast Guardsmen to work in his dining room. Attorney General William French Smith has \$80,000 in his budget for two cooks and an assistant. Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige maintains a private dining room at an annual cost of \$24,000.

Transportation officials argue that the secretary's dining room is in reality a mess for about 80 upper-echelon employes who pick up their own tabs. At Commerce, spokesmen contend that the cost of the secretary's private dining room averages out at \$3 to \$5 per lunch, cheaper than entertaining at Washington's high-priced restaurants.

Justice Department officials concede they have a five persons on Smith's culinary payroll at salaries totaling \$85,000. However, they claim the kitchen help also do other duties such as mail sorting.

94 - 50053 -

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE


UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

WASHINGTON D.C. 20523

April 7, 1981

- Exec. AD-Adm.
- Exec. AD-Inv.
- Exec. AD-LES
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs.
- Crim. Inv.
- Ident.
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Legal Coun.
- Plan & Insp.
- Rec. b6
- Tech. b7C
- Training
- Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director's Sec'y

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535



10413112

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Dear Mr. Webster:


In connection with a criminal investigation being conducted by my office, I have enclosed the original of an anonymous typewritten letter dated March 20, 1981, to the General Counsel, Agency for International Development and designating a copy for Mr. Jack Anderson, national columnist.

It is requested that the document be examined to determine the identifying data of the typewriter used to enable us to attempt to locate it. Should there be any questions on this matter, please contact me or Foreign Assistance Inspector on

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

b6
b7C

Sincerely,



50653-

Assistant Inspector General
Investigations and Inspections

NOT RECORDED
38 APR 24 1981

APR 22 1981
ORIGINAL FILED IN 95-21097-1

Encl: a/s

*Re: Unknown Subject;
anonymous letter sent to
General Counsel,
Agency for International
Development, Dated 3/20/81*

SEVEN

APR - 6 1981
59

53 JUN 3 1981

"COPY AND SUPPORTERS RETAINED IN EXP. PROC. APR 10 1981"

INDEXED

[Redacted]

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b7c

October 27, 1980

OUTSIDE SOURCE

~~Miscellaneous~~

Mr. William Webster
Director, of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

27
18

Anderson, Jack

Dear Mr. Webster:

No doubt that by now you are in receipt of my last correspondence, (w/Exhibit) which explained my disbelief and sorrow for the ludicrous way in which J. Edgar Hoover, tried too undermine the Mickey Mouse Club, Mouseketeers, Et. Al. (Ex. A, enclosed).

However, my office feels that even the Company, under new direction should have a chance to make right a wrong.

Therefore, enclosed is Exhibit B., in regard to one Bugs Bunny, a dedicated Guard Rabbit, who died in the line of duty.

Wherefore, my Office would highly suggest that on behalf of the American People that the Bugs Bunny Florida Grave be vacated and corpus delicti be replanted next to the Hoover Grave.

Thanking you in advance.

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DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted]

b6
b7c

94-50053-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PS: Please disregard Exhibit C., of the enclosed as this matter is still pending on Appeal by the step-Father in this cause.

NOT RECORDED
10 DEC 18 1980

DEC 2 1980

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

59 DEC 9 1980

W. A. C. Warrant
NY 23 files.
11/23/80

[Handwritten signature]

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-89789

ack Anderson

FBI shows its 'Mickey Mouse' side

WASHINGTON — Exactly 25 years ago, millions of American children watched the premiere of Walt Disney's newest creation — the Mickey Mouse Club. The youngsters didn't know it, but someone was watching over their shoulder. The FBI was monitoring the program, too.

While it would, of course, be ridiculous to imagine J. Edgar Hoover sitting in front of his television set sporting a big-eared Mouseketeer hat, internal FBI files reveal that the late director was a close — and critical — viewer of the Mickey Mouse Club.

Hoover did not always approve of what he saw. Why? Well, in Mouseketeer parlance, "M-I-C-K-E-Y? Because we don't like you. M-O-U-S-E!"

The Disney-Hoover connection began the year before the Mickey Mouse Club was formed. A 1954 memo from the Los Angeles FBI office informed Hoover: "Mr. Disney has volunteered representatives of this office complete access to the facilities of Disneyland for uses in connection with official matters and for recreational purposes."

Two months later, Disney was approved as a regular FBI contact. So far, so good.

But in 1957, a committee within the FBI approached Disney on the possibility that he might film a segment on the FBI laboratory for use on the Mickey Mouse Club show.

Hoover was outraged. The committee "should not have done this without prior approval," Hoover penciled on the memo, adding: "This is a most embarrassing and unfortunate situation. No one should initiate such a move without clearance here."

In a subsequent memo, a Hoover aide explained the director's objection. "It is not felt that the Mickey Mouse Club is the proper place to publicize this... It comes on at 5:30 p.m. each weekday and is aimed at the 'small fry.' If we are going to do this, we should do it right, and try and get Disney to do a one-hour Disneyland show, which at present is at 7:30 p.m. on Wednesday night. This show has an adult and juvenile appeal."

The obliging Disney agreed, and earned the following commendation in his FBI dossier: "Appears to be a very reliable individual and has been quite friendly with the FBI."

Alas, Disney's reliability soon suffered setback in Hoover's eyes, when he failed to let the FBI check four Mickey Mouse newsreel segments on the bureau before they were shown to the nation's moppets.

"Obviously," said an internal memo reviewed by Hoover, "the mishandling on the part of the Disney Studio and failure to live up to their agreement will be taken into consideration when future approaches are made to the Bureau by this outfit."

Hoover penciled a grim notation on the memo. "No further cooperation is to be extended to the Disney Studios."

From that point on, the once happy relationship between Disney and Hoover fell apart like a Donald Duck picnic. In 1961, the Bureau's studio-watchers were alarmed by a Disney movie called "Moon Pilot." "Discreet inquiries" showed that the film made the FBI look like — well, like a Mickey Mouse operation.

Most references to the FBI are handled inaccurately and some are ludicrous, states a memo to Hoover aide Cartha (Deke) DeLoach. "The Air Force officer for example, is continually outwitting surveilling agents... and the agents are generally pictured as bumbling heavy-footed incompetents."

Hoover ordered the Los Angeles FBI office to protest, and the FBI's name was changed to "Federal Security" in the finished movie.

Kiddies acquit Hansel, Gretel

DENVER (UPI) — A jury has confirmed the feelings of generations of fairy-tale readers, ruling that Hansel and Gretel acted in self-defense when they shoved their wicked stepmother into an oven and baked her.

The jury, composed of fifth- and sixth-graders from Littleton, Friday found Hansel and Gretel guilty of theft and vandalism, but innocent of trespassing and second-degree murder.

The trial was held in Denver District Judge Karen Metzger's courtroom to give students an understanding of the judicial system. Witnesses were sworn in on a copy of Grimm's Fairy Tales.

Public Defender Dan Cook noted Hansel was kept in a 30-by-30-inch cage and fed all he could eat, in an apparent effort to fatten him. A student-portrayed pediatrician said Gretel was fed only crab shells and water, which could have irritated her digestive tract and been partially responsible for her actions.

Nicole White, portraying the district attorney, presented a strong case against Hansel and Gretel on the theft and vandalism charges. She produced jewels allegedly stolen from the victim, Mrs. Salem, and also stressed Hansel's admission that he had eaten part of Mrs. Salem's house.

Judge Metzger obviously was impressed with the students.

"You could tell they'd done a lot of preparation. Did you notice their questions were all typed out?" she asked. "They are all so bright. It was worth coming down on my day off."

Ex. B ↓

Briefly:

LEESBURG, Fla. (AP) — Bugs Bunny, a guard rabbit who gained notoriety for patrolling his fenced yard, hopping madly toward dogs and people who dared to intrude, is dead.

He died Wednesday, his owner, Margaret Aspinwall, disclosed Thursday. The reason he died was not known, she said.

Bugs' nipping attacks were reported by The Associated Press and the Aspinwalls received calls from across the country.

"Mrs. Aspinwall said she was consoled by one possibility: Flopsy, the female rabbit that enjoyed Bugs' protection, may be pregnant."

*Note: All Exhibits were taken from the Daily Hampshire Gazette during the period in time of, 10/1/80 - 10/24/80.

94-50053-
ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STU

15701/MSURK

Memorandum

TO: Mr. Mullen

DATE: 2-13-80

Exec AD Adm.	_____
Exec AD Inv.	_____
Exec AD LES	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

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SUBJECT: CECIL DALE ANDRUS
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
SPECIAL INQUIRY CONDUCTED IN 1976-1977

PURPOSE:

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

To advise of information published in Jack Anderson's column today, and results of review of Bureau files in the matter.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None, for information.

APPROVED: *[Signature]* Adm. Serv. _____
 Director _____
 Exec. AD Inv. _____
 Exec. AD LES _____

DETAILS:

Enclosed is a copy of Jack Anderson's column appearing in "The Washington Post" today. Therein, Anderson alleges that Mr. Andrus may have accepted a large campaign contribution from a "Mafia-connected sports cartel in his 1970 gubernatorial race;" that this allegation was included in the FBI's report to The White House subsequent to our background investigation concerning him in early 1977; and that this information was deleted from our report before the report was shown to the staff of the Senate committee which was charged with considering the President's nomination of Mr. Andrus for the position of Secretary of the Interior.

Enclosure

LJN:rap (VI)

- 1 - Mr. Mullen
- 1 - Mr. Monroe
- 1 -
- 1 -
- 1 -

94-50053-

NOT RECORDED
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~~FEB 21 1980~~

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08 MAR 11 1980

ORIGINAL FILED IN 161-12205-25

[Handwritten initials]

Memorandum to Mullen
Re: Cecil Dale Andrus

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A review of our special inquiry file discloses that on December 20, 1976, we received from authorized representatives of President-Elect Carter, a request to conduct the usual background investigation of Mr. Andrus, then Governor of Idaho, who was under consideration for appointment to his present post.

The bulk of the results of our investigation was furnished to the Carter Transition Group on January 3, 1977. Short follow-up communications were furnished to the transition group on January 6 and January 12, 1977, which reported the results of routine name checks of the records of three Federal agencies. Our communication of January 12, 1977, reported the completion of our investigative effort.

In none of the three communications furnished to representatives of President-Elect Carter was there any information relating to the content of Mr. Anderson's column. No unfavorable information of any sort was contained in our communications. The only information which could be construed as adverse to Mr. Andrus' qualifications for the Interior post was that furnished by an American Indian, who was opposed to Mr. Andrus' positions in certain matters relating to American Indian interests.

JACK ANDERSON**Allegation on Andrus Was Kept Quiet**

In his three years as interior secretary, Cecil Andrus has managed to keep a pretty low profile. Except for a ludicrous flap over an endangered species of rattlesnake served at his favorite Washington restaurant, the former Idaho governor has escaped the kind of controversy that has embroiled some of President Carter's other appointees.

What hasn't been reported, however, is that a serious allegation against Andrus—that he may have accepted a healthy campaign contribution from a Mafia-connected sports cartel in his 1970 gubernatorial race—was covered up by the White House at the time of his Senate confirmation hearing.

The allegation, known to more than two dozen Idaho officials, state and county police and the FBI, was included in the bureau's confidential report to Carter in early 1977. Yet it was mysteriously deleted before the report was shown to the Senate committee staff that was considering Andrus' nomination for the Cabinet post.

As a result, Andrus' confirmation hearing turned into what one senator described as a "love-in." Andrus was confirmed in a breeze, with no embarrassing questions raised by the senators.

One source who read the report as it was made available to the Senate committee stated categorically that it contained no mention of possibly tainted campaign contribution. "There was no smoke of any kind," he said.

Yet another source, who was familiar with the FBI's background check on Andrus, told my associate Dale Van Atta that the allegation definitely was

included in the original report to the White House.

There was, he said, mention of a questionable campaign contribution from out of state. He added, "Because of the nature of the campaign contribution, the FBI report was red-flagged and landed on Carter's desk, and he personally ruled on it."

The allegation that was apparently scissored out of the FBI report after it "landed on Carter's desk" involved \$20,000 to \$40,000 purportedly kicked into Andrus' 1970 campaign chest by Emprise Corp., a Buffalo-based sports concession and gaming firm. Emprise was widely regarded with suspicion by organized-crime investigators, and in 1972 was convicted of a felony in Nevada for illegally disguising its partnership with known mobsters in a Las Vegas casino.

In 1970, Emprise wanted to open a lavish racetrack in northern Idaho, within easy reach of Spokane, Wash., which was then getting ready for its 1974 Expo. According to law-enforcement sources, Emprise's standard operating procedure at that time was to spread money around where it would do the most good, whether in payoffs or legal campaign contributions to politicians it regarded as favorable to it.

In light of the corporation's subsequent conviction for illegal ties to the Mob, acceptance of a sizable campaign contribution from Emprise—while perfectly legal—might have proved embarrassing to Andrus at his Senate nomination hearing. Someone in the White House evidently thought so, at any rate.

So Andrus was spared the necessity of even discussing the allegation, and was confirmed as interior secretary his Mr. Clean image gleaming.

Footnote: Andrus has denied emphatically that he took any money from Emprise. But though he has long been a vocal proponent of campaign contribution disclosure, he steadfastly refuses to make public the list of contributors to his successful 1970 race for the Idaho governorship.

Watch on Waste—The Pentagon spends more than \$350 million a year to operate out-rate food commissaries across the country. Service families buy food and other items at a 25 percent discount, thanks to this taxpayer subsidy. Congress intended that commissaries serve military posts that were remote from civilian shopping centers, but the Pentagon wordsmiths have gotten around this by coming up with a unique definition of the word "remote." In the brasshats' view, a post is remote if it is more than 10 minutes' drive from a supermarket.

• A loosely administered Agriculture Department program has the General Accounting Office buzzing angrily. The Beekeepers Indemnity Program compensates apiarists as much as \$25 for each beehive population that's destroyed by pesticides, at a cost the taxpayers almost \$3 million this year. GAO investigators suspect that some unscrupulous beekeepers are either submitting phony claims or are deliberately letting their bee colonies die from exposure to toxic chemicals. It's easier than taking precautions, and after all, it's only public money.

"The Washington Post"

Washington, D. C.

February 13, 1980

94-50053-

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 2/16/70

FROM : T. E. Bishop *EB*

SUBJECT: ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF
RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
6/30/68, BOMBING MATTERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/79 BY *alw*

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On memorandum from Bishop to DeLoach, 2/13/70, concerning the above-captioned matter, the Director has indicated that he wishes an absolute ban on any discussions by our Field or Seat of Government representatives with people from "The Los Angeles Times," "The New York Times," "The Washington Post" or with Jack Anderson, the author of "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column or his "runners."

We completely agree with the Director's feelings on this matter as we are well aware of the antagonism of the above-mentioned papers and of Anderson toward the Bureau. Certainly, extended discussions of cases or situations in which the Bureau is involved between representatives of the Bureau and representatives of these 3 papers or Anderson can only result in stories unfavorable to the Bureau.

In order to prevent our instructions from being disclosed in any manner, and to prevent any charges that Bureau policy in this regard is a violation of the Freedom of Information Act, it is felt that such instructions to the field with regard to these newspapers, and to Anderson, should not be put in writing, but should be given orally to the SACs of the cities where these newspapers are located. In addition, Bishop has orally passed on the Director's instructions to each employee in his office, and will orally pass on these instructions to SACs from offices other than Los Angeles, New York and Washington Field Office when talking with them on other matters, either telephonically or in the course of their visits to the Bureau.

ACTION:

If you agree, this will be handled orally in the manner indicated above.

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach *EB*
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Bishop

5-MAR-3 1970
JONES

FEB:j0 (6) 30 AUG 29 1978

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SAC [unclear] [unclear]
ADIC [unclear] [unclear]
SAC [unclear] [unclear]
cc advised 2/17/70

NOT RECORDED
47 104 26 370

3 FEB 26 1970

801-122-108
FILED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	1
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Fin. & Pers.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
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Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgt.	_____
S. & T. Serv.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

FBI/DOJ

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 6/22/77

TO : Assistant Director
Intelligence Division

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)
DATE 08-22-2008

FROM : Legal Counsel *Jam*

SUBJECT: REQUEST OF CHAIRMAN CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
FOR BRIEFING CONCERNING ARTICLE
OF COLUMNIST JACK ANDERSON, 6/14/77

PURPOSE:

To advise of captioned request for briefing concerning infiltration by Yugoslav Secret Police of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the U. S. as related in columnist Anderson's article.

DETAILS:

On 6/21/77 at 5:40 p.m., Ivo J. Spalatin, Staff Director of the House Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, telephoned SA [redacted] advising Chairman Zablocki had expressed concern regarding a news article by columnist Jack Anderson of 6/14/77 (attached), which related to the infiltration by Yugoslav Secret Police into the activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the U. S. Mr. Spalatin said Chairman Zablocki is considering whether to request a briefing by the FBI concerning the basis for Anderson's article and that he, Spalatin, would recontact SA [redacted] on 6/22/77 to advise of the Chairman's decision with regard to the briefing.

~~ALL INFO CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/9/79 BY [redacted]~~

Redacted
9209-410
ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-9209-410

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2323
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 6/22/77

[redacted]

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Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Leavitt - Enclosure
- 1 - [redacted] - Enclosure
- 1 - Mr. Cregar - Enclosure
- 1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
- 2 - [redacted] - Enclosure
- 1 - [redacted] - Enclosure

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191 SEE SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION ADDENDUM
PAGE 3

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]



(9)


Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

57 SEP 14 1977
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Memorandum to Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Re: Request of Chairman Clement J. Zablocki

~~SECRET~~



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On 6/22/77 at 11:30 a.m., Mr. Spalatin telephoned SA [redacted] advising that Chairman Zablocki has received numerous telephone calls from various clergymen of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the vicinity of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and that a delegation of the Church will visit the Chairman in Washington, D. C., on Monday, 6/27/77, for the purpose of demanding that the FBI investigate the matter contained in the Anderson column. Mr. Spalatin said Chairman Zablocki asks that he be briefed concerning Anderson's column prior to 6/27/77.

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RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division consider prompt briefing of Chairman Zablocki as requested, it being noted that if the briefing entails disclosure of substantive information from FBI files it must be with the approval of the Department.

JCF

APPROVED: [initials]

Director _____
Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____

pm

[signature]

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Fin. & Pers. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

m/b [signature] 6/27/77



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ADDENDUM TO LEGAL COUNSEL MEMO 6/22/77 TO ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, RE REQUEST OF CHAIRMAN CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FOR BRIEFING CONCERNING ARTICLE OF COLUMNIST JACK ANDERSON, 6/14/77

Memorandum
Re: Request

- 1 - Mr. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - [Redacted]

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Intelligence Division
seriously

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WOC:mjt 6/22/77

SR [Redacted] If approved the Intelligence Division will obtain moral approval for the briefing from Mr. Mike Kelly, Counsel to the Attorney General.

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Jma

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WOC:mjt 6/27/77

On the morning of 6/27/77, Mr. Mike Kelly, Counsel to the Attorney General, telephonically advised that it was the consensus of Departmental officials, including the Attorney General, that Congressman Zablocki should be recontacted and advised that after discussions with the Office of the Attorney General it was felt he should submit his request for a briefing to the FBI in writing to the Attorney General. This request should be predicated on Congressman Zablocki's role as Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee of International Relations. In addition the letter from Congressman Zablocki should set forth the reasons why he believes he needs such a briefing from the FBI in his role as Chairman of this Committee.

Mr. Kelly also mentioned that the Department felt future requests from members of Congress should be reduced in writing; should be addressed to the Attorney General and should set forth the justification for briefings by the FBI.

The Legal Counsel Division should so advise Congressman Zablocki of the above.

7/7/77 Z not available per door
7/12/77 Z " " " " " "
7/19/77 " " " " " "
7/21/77 Chmn Zablocki advised of procedure for briefing requests per in accord with our Div addendum of 6/27/77

APPROVED: [Signature]	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Assoc. Dir. _____	Fin. & Pers. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Spec. Inv. _____
Dep. AD Inv. [Signature]	Intell. [Signature]	Tech. Servs. _____
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Affs. On _____

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____
 Asst. Dir.:
 Adm. Serv. _____
 Ext. Affairs _____
 Fin. & Pers. _____
 Gen. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Inspection _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____ b6
 Legal Coun. _____ b7C
 Plan. & Eval. _____
 Rec. Mgnt. _____
 Spec. Inv. _____
 Training _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director Sec'y _____

DATE: 11/30/76

TO : [Redacted]

FROM : [Redacted]

SUBJECT: RECEIPT OF "CRANK" LETTER BY
 [Redacted]
 MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION
 CONCERNING

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Ingram
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Moore
- 1 - New Haven Field Office File

PURPOSE: To set forth facts regarding a breakdown in liaison between the FBI and U. S. Secret Service as alleged in 11/29/76. "The Washington Post," column by Jack Anderson and [Redacted] relating to the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, "Legionnaires Disease" matter.

SYNOPSIS: Jack Anderson - [Redacted] column of 11/29/76, states U. S. Secret Service (USSS) is upset with FBI for failing to advise them of a suspect in the "Legion Fever" case. Column states [Redacted] received a vague, but ominous letter which he made available to the FBI on 8/2/76. Column states President Ford cleared for visit to Philadelphia 9/23/76, and had the USSS known a suspect was loose, it is doubtful the President would have been permitted to visit Philadelphia. Column further states USSS did not know of the letter until Anderson/[Redacted] wrote about it on 10/28/76, and that USSS identified the writer and determined he was not in Philadelphia at the right time and was not of protective interest. Hartford, Connecticut, Resident Agency did on 8/2/76, receive letter from [Redacted] in which he enclosed what he described as a "crank" letter received by him. The letter contained ramblings and drawings which indicated writer had complaint concerning New York Insurance Compensation Fund. Mention was made in letter of various chemicals causing cancer. No violation was noted on letter nor was there indication of information which should be disseminated to USSS under established guidelines. New Haven Division filed letter in 9-0 file and did not send copy to FBIHQ. 10/28/76, Anderson [Redacted] column set forth information regarding testimony of [Redacted] before Congressional committee investigating "Legionnaires Disease" in which he theorized a nickel compound might

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 ORIGINAL FILED IN

Enclosures

WEN:amd
(10)



5010-108

ENCLOSURE

94-50053-6-WW
NOT RECORDED

14 DEC 3 1976
CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

54 DEC 21 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

[redacted] to [redacted] Memo
Re: RECEIPT OF "CRANK" LETTER BY
[redacted]

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have been used in Philadelphia. Mention was made of the anonymous, ominous-sounding letter. [redacted] quoted same date in Associated Press release that his remarks had been overstated and taken out of context. USSS contacted FBIHQ 10/28/76, advising they had learned FBI had copy of letter. Telephonic contact with New Haven Division resulted in copy being sent to FBIHQ which was turned over to USSS. USSS identified writer as [redacted] in New York City and determined he had no information regarding "Legionnaires Disease" and was not a threat to any of their protectees. USSS has advised FBIHQ they are not concerned about this matter and relations between the USSS and FBI are excellent. They so advised Anderson's Office prior to the 11/29/76, column.

RECOMMENDATION: For information APPROVED:

VKH
NW

BHe
[signature]

Director [signature]
Assoc. Dir. [signature]
Dep. AD Adm. [signature]
Dep. AD Inv. [signature]

Adm. Serv.
Ext. Affairs.
Fin. & Pers. [signature]
Gen. Inv. [signature]
Ident.
Intell.
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgt.
S. & T. Serv.
Spec. Inv.
Training.

DETAILS: The 11/29/76, column by Jack Anderson and [redacted] in "The Washington Post" newspaper, alleged that the U. S. Secret Service (USSS) is upset with the FBI for failing to tell them about a suspect in the "Legion Fever" case. The column states the FBI, on 8/2/76, received a vague, but ominous letter, which had been sent to [redacted] the nation's leading expert on nickel poisoning. This was after the "Legionnaires Disease," incident in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, but before experts began to suspect nickel carbonyl as the lethal agent used.

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The column states that President Ford was cleared for a visit on 9/23/76, to Philadelphia and some of the spots frequented by the Legionnaires. Had the USSS known a suspect was loose, with a knowledge of nickel poisoning, it is doubtful the President would have been permitted to visit the Bellevue Stratford Hotel in Philadelphia, which was the center of the "Legionnaires Disease," according to the column.

Further, the column states the USSS did not learn of the letter until Anderson and [redacted] wrote about it on 10/28/76. According to Anderson [redacted] the USSS, by use of sophisticated ink comparisons and other tools, located the letter writer and determined he had not been in Philadelphia at the right time and was not now of protective interest.

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[redacted] to [redacted] Memo
Re: RECEIPT OF "CRANK" LETTER BY
[redacted]

b6
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The facts of this matter are as follows:

The Hartford, Connecticut, Resident Agency, on 8/2/76, was in receipt of a letter from [redacted] who is with the University of Connecticut School of Medicine, in which he enclosed what he described as a "crank" letter received by him on 7/28 or 29/76, from an unknown writer. The letter contained Xerox copies of ramblings and a drawing of what appeared to be the devil and the Statue of Liberty. The gist of the ramblings indicated the writer had some type of complaint concerning the New York Insurance Compensation Fund. Mention was made of various chemicals causing cancer. [redacted] made no mention of the "Legionnaires Disease." No violation under FBI jurisdiction was noted nor was there any indication of information which should be disseminated to USSS under established guidelines (generally, these guidelines require any information regarding a threat against any public official to be disseminated to USSS). The New Haven Division filed the letter in their 9-0 file and did not send a copy to FBIHQ.

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On 10/28/76, the Anderson - [redacted] column in "The Washington Post" set forth information regarding testimony of [redacted] before a Congressional committee chaired by Representative John Murphy of New York.

[redacted] theorized before the committee that a nickel compound combined with dry ice may have been introduced into the hotel where delegates were meeting. The column stated his theory was bolstered by "an anonymous, ominous-sounding letter" which was mailed days before the "Legionnaires Disease" attracted national attention. [redacted] according to the article, turned the letter over to Murphy who brought it to the attention of the Chief of Forensic Psychiatry at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. This psychiatrist advised Murphy that the writing was characteristic of "an envious paranoid, full of hatred," who could be murderous.

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In an Associated Press release later on that day [redacted] was quoted as saying that his remarks regarding the possible role of nickel as causative factor in the "Legionnaires Disease" were overstated and his comments were taken entirely out of context.

[redacted] to [redacted] Memo
Re: RECEIPT OF "CRANK" LETTER BY
[redacted]

b6
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On 10/28/76, SA [redacted] USSS Liaison, contacted General Investigative Division Supervisor [redacted] [redacted] advising USSS had learned that the FBI had a copy of the letter and requested a copy of it.

Supervisor [redacted] telephonically contacted New Haven ASAC F. X. O'Neill, who advised New Haven did have a copy of the letter. A copy was sent to FBIHQ by facsimile and was turned over to SA [redacted]

Subsequently, SA [redacted] advised Supervisor [redacted] that the USSS had gone to the New York Insurance Compensation Fund in New York City where a secretary remembered an individual who in the past had mentioned such things as were contained in the letter. USSS Agents contacted this individual, [redacted] at his residence, room [redacted] the Olcott Hotel, 27 West 72nd Street, New York City. [redacted] admitted sending this letter to [redacted] and a similar letter he sent to the White House in September, 1976, (which had not been brought to the attention of the FBI by the USSS). The USSS Agents determined [redacted] possessed no information whatsoever regarding the "Legionnaires Disease" and was not a threat to any of their protectees. [redacted] claimed to have no history of mental illness, but does suffer from a rapid heart condition.

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USSS furnished copy of their report to Representative Murphy's committee, but did not furnish [redacted] name out of consideration of his privacy.

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[redacted] was in contact with Deputy Assistant Director Frank J. Illig, Jr., External Affairs Division, on 11/22/76, regarding his proposed article. Additionally, USSS Assistant Director James Burke, Office of Protective Research, on 11/23/76, contacted Assistant Director Thomas W. Leavitt, to advise that USSS Public Affairs Office had been in touch with Jack Anderson's Office regarding the proposed article in an effort to set the record straight. Burke advised USSS was not concerned about this matter and that relations between the USSS and the FBI are excellent. They so advised Anderson's Office.

Copies of [redacted] letter and the 10/28/76, and 11/29/76, Anderson - [redacted] columns are attached.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Gallagher *of JGD's*

DATE: 10/1/75

FROM : L. E. Rhyne *LE Rhyne*

- 1 - Mr. Gallagher
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Rhyne
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Wannall

SUBJECT: [Redacted] AND OTHERS

BURGLARY OF THE DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JUNE 17, 1972

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

INCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____
 Asst. Dir. _____
 Admin. _____
 Comp. Syst. _____
 Ext. Affairs _____
 Files & Com. _____
 Gen. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Inspection _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Legal (b6) _____
 Plan. & Eval. _____
 Spec. Inv. _____
 Training _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director Sec'y _____

ST
C

PURPOSE: To set forth request from Special Prosecutor, Henry S. Ruth, Jr., regarding any information we may have in our files regarding the assassination plot against Jack Anderson. A review of our files discloses no such information.

DETAILS: Henry S. Ruth, Jr., Special Prosecutor, telephonically contacted Section Chief, Louis E. Rhyne, 9/30/75, in reference to recent newspaper articles reporting that E. Howard Hunt had contemplated the murder of Jack Anderson, a Washington Syndicated Columnist. Ruth requested that we review our files regarding the Watergate investigation to determine if we had ever received any such information from informants or during the course of our investigation. He indicated that they had conducted some interviews and reference had been made that such a plot may have existed, however, no concrete facts have been developed, that such was the case. Ruth also indicated that possibly there was a plot to assassinate [Redacted]

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In an interview in the current issue of Time Magazine, convicted Watergate Burglar E. Howard Hunt, OCT 10 1975 said former White House Aide, Charles Colson, once suggested that Anderson might be discredited if he appeared on his live radio program under the influence of a drug. Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, another convicted Watergate Burglar, discussed the means for doing this, but never contemplated murder as was previously reported. Hunt said it was just another wild idea that never got beyond the proposal stage, in the interview with Time. Hunt denied that any action as serious as murder was ever contemplated, but revealed the drugging plot. 94-50053-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ORIGINAL FILED IN 139-4089-8057

GDR:els (6)
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NOT RECORDED
167 OCT 15 1975 CONTINUED - OVER

84 OCT 16 1975

5010-104

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Gallagher

Re: [REDACTED] AND OTHERS

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A review has been conducted of files maintained relative to the Watergate investigation and no information was found to indicate that we had any knowledge of such a plot nor was any reference to such a plot found relative to Jack Anderson or [REDACTED]

On 10/1/75, Mr. Ruth was advised of the above and no investigation will be conducted unless specifically requested by the Special Prosecution Force.

ACTION: For information.

RR

Joe

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~~Handwritten signature~~

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Jim

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Hoover, Aides Ignored Strict Rules

By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten

The FBI has always required its agents to toe the line. The standards are strict, the rules rigid. Agents have been disciplined for accepting a football ticket or a free meal.

Yet top FBI officials haven't always obeyed the regulations they have imposed on the rank-and-file.

The late J. Edgar Hoover accepted race-track vacations from Texas tycoon Clint Murchison and used FBI agents to write books for him. His successor, L. Patrick Gray III, took to flying about the country in Air Force planes and staying at fancy hotels.

Now we have learned that the present FBI director, Clarence M. Kelley, was invited, dined and hosted for a weekend at New York City's posh Waldorf Astoria by the insurance company that underwrites health insurance for FBI employees.

Not only Kelley but two of his deputies, Thomas Jenkins and Thomas Feeney, got the full treatment from the Prudential Insurance Co. Their wives also were guests of the company.

Aside from the Waldorf incident, Kelley has kept himself clean. An associate said this was the only time a

question of a conflict of interest had ever been raised about Kelley.

Although FBI employees aren't supposed to accept such expensive favors from firms with which they do business, the FBI insurance program theoretically is independent of the FBI. The agents run it, however, with Feeney as president and Jenkins a board member.

In explaining the Kelley junket, the FBI said: "The primary purpose of the trip was for Prudential executives...to meet with Mr. Kelley and key members of the (health insurance program). During this meeting, items of mutual interest...were discussed."

The FBI said Prudential didn't pay travel expenses for the FBI party, only hotel and related bills. Kelley's transportation costs were picked up by the FBI because he consulted with his New York office head during the visit.

Far more flagrant were the abuses of that stern old disciplinarian, Hoover and his sidekick, Clyde Tolson. Here are a few examples we have obtained from sworn statements and old-time FBI sources:

—Hoover and Tolson used an FBI inspector, Albert Gunsser, to fill out their tax forms and so metimes to advise them on their oil investments in Texas, Louisiana and Kansas. Gunsser must have been an investment genius, for Tolson left an estate approaching \$750,000, much of it bequeathed to him by Hoover.

—At one time, Tolson was drawing \$4,000 a month from oil investments. After he retired in 1972, recalls former FBI bigwig John Mohr, "people in the oil business would call (Tolson) on the phone and tell him, 'We've got a good one going here, do you want to get in on it, Clyde?' And I guess he would get in on it."

—Despite his wealth, the aged Tolson demanded \$4,500 from the J. Edgar Hoover Foundation for some books Hoover had willed him. When the foundation's director complained bitterly, Tolson retorted: "Pay the \$4,500 or forget it."

—When Tolson's mother was sick, he didn't hire nurses with his own money but assigned a special agent "who spent a great deal of time taking care of Clyde's mother." The agent's wife also helped with the nursing.

—Tolson excluded from his will a nephew he had installed as an FBI agent. The nephew upset Tolson by running off with a woman from a local police department, Mohr alleged. Yet Tolson used an artifice, himself, to stay at the FBI long after his health had failed.

—A bachelor, Tolson dated a model in New York City "a long time ago" and frequented race tracks where he had a "special arrangement," Mohr said.

—Tolson had his erstwhile aide, Mohr, draw up a series of wills and codicils. Mohr wrote himself in for a \$26,000

legacy plus perhaps an equal amount in executor's fees. For a lawyer to write himself into a client's will is a breach of legal ethics. Mohr explained that he was acting for Tolson as a friend, not as his lawyer, and that Tolson specifically ordered him to write himself into the will.

Mohr denied emphatically, meanwhile, that he took the mysterious "Hoover papers" out of the late FBI chief's old house where they reportedly had been stored. All he removed, said Mohr, were "several boxes of spoiled wine," a half-dozen boxes of trash and "15 or 20 jars of honey" which he said were "thrown out."

He also took some other innocent items, he said, including some "loose papers" which Mohr said he turned over to his attorney for safekeeping.

PURINA POSTSCRIPT—In an earlier column, we reported that the Humane Society of the United States found cats used by Purina for its commercials were from a facility where mistreatment of animals occurred.

We can now report that Purina is no longer using the facility and has taken measures to make sure its cats are as well-cared-for as they look on TV. The firm avows that it has "initiated periodical unannounced inspections of all facilities" used for its TV and other ads, a practice that other firms might well follow to insure humane care of TV animals.

(1975, United Feature Syndicate, Inc.)

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DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

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ENCLOSURE

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Admin. _____
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Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
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Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

2

BJ

Transmit attached by Facsimile - PLAINTEXT

NOV 07 1975

Priority Urgent

To: SAC, KANSAS City, Mo. **TELETYPE** Date:

From: DIRECTOR Time: Transmitted - 10:15 AM

Subject: WASHINGTON POST
JACK ANDERSON'S COLUMN
11/7/75
Initials - KAB
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 08-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

- Fingerprint Photo
- Fingerprint Record
- Map
- Newspaper clipping
- Photograph
- Artists Conception
- Other _____

LET THE
PERSON

Special handling instructions:

ATT: SAC BILL WILLIAMS

94-50053-

PERS. REC. UNIT

5 NOV 7 1975

94-50053

ENCLOSURE

Approved: TJH/JAP

J *nd*

To : Mr. J. C. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

Date 10/18/89

From : N. J. Gallagher

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Legal Coun.
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

Subject :
FCI-X
OO: WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

Reference Mr. J. C. Johnson's memorandums to Mr. N. J. Gallagher, dated September 1, 1989, and September 12, 1989.

PURPOSE: To respond to Mr. J. C. Johnson's memo dated September 1, 1989.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the below listed first time disclosures of classified information be reviewed and considered for referral to the Department of Justice.

DATE: 06-18-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 auc/baw/rs/ljm
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 06-18-2032

~~2/18/98
CLASSIFIED BY: SP4 bja/Hcg
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1
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DETAILS: In referenced memorandums, it was recommended that the Counterterrorism Section (CTS) review The Washington Post articles by Jack Anderson and entitled "FBI Learned of Arms Shipment to Iran," August 28, 1989, and "Senate Panel knew of Iran Arms Sale," September 6, 1989. An examination of these two articles, and a third The Washington Post article by Anderson and entitled "Arms for Iran: How Much Did CIA Know?" September 12, 1989, was conducted by CTS. Items that appear to be first time unauthorized disclosures of classified information are as follows:

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~~SECRET~~
Classified by G-3
Declassify on OADR

- 1 - Mr. Gallagher
- 1 - Mr. Johnson

1 -

TP:mmw (9)

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

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Memorandum from N. J. Gallagher to Mr. J.C. Johnson

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RE: [redacted]


FCI-X

OO: Washington Metropolitan Field Office

I. "FBI Learned of Arms Shipment to Iran"

Paragraph one refers to "an intelligence coup" scored by the FBI in 1985, and reports that the FBI received information that American missiles had been shipped to Iran in violation of U.S. law and policy. Further detail is developed in paragraph seven where it is reported that TOW missiles had been delivered to Tabriz, Iran on board a U.S. aircraft in September, 1985.

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✓ II. "Senate Panel Knew of Iran's Arms Sale"



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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from N. J. Gallagher to Mr. J.C. Johnson

RE: [redacted]

FCI-X

OO: Washington Metropolitan Field Office

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(S) [redacted]

✓ III. Arms for Iran: "How Much Did CIA Know?"

This article contains additional references to the FBI's knowledge of the shipment to Tabriz, Iran, and to the memo written in 1987, [redacted] but appears to disclose no additional first time leaks of classified information.

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The three Anderson, [redacted] articles all contain references to the content of testimony on Capitol Hill by various individuals. Inasmuch as the Counterterrorism Section is unaware of whether or not this testimony before various committees was classified, no comment is offered here concerning the possible leak of classified information from Congressional testimony.

On September 8, 1989, WMFO learned from [redacted] Senior Staffer for Senator Cohen of the SSCI, that [redacted] had recently been interviewed by a Vermont newspaper reporter. According to the reporter during the five-hour interview, [redacted] admitted that he had provided information to Jack Anderson's staff for the three articles regarding the shipment of weapons to Iran. [redacted] received this information regarding [redacted] admissions directly from the reporter.

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Additional details regarding this interview of [redacted] by the Vermont newspaper reporter will be forthcoming from WMFO.

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9/6/89

STON POST

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

Senate Panel Knew of Iran Arms Sale

The investigation of the Iran-contra affair was bounced through enough congressional committees to set a record. It is on the rebound again on Capitol Hill with startling evidence that a Senate committee knew crucial information and failed to do anything with it.

The fumble happened in April 1987 when the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was quizzing William H. Webster about his qualifications to become director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Behind closed doors, the committee asked Webster, then director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, what his agency had known about a delivery of American missiles to Iran.

Webster said the FBI had monitored a shipment of American arms to Iran in 1985. Elsewhere on Capitol Hill that day, the Iran-contra committees were furiously assembling evidence to begin hearings on the scandal. But apparently the intelligence committee never bothered to tell the Iran-contra committees about Webster's bombshell. "We blew it," a staff aide for the intelligence panel confided.

The FBI was told by the CIA to mind its own business because the shipment was a "White House operation."

The information has heated up the congressional Iran-contra investigation again. It is important because it indicates that the FBI may have known more about the arms sales to Iran than was acknowledged, and failed to do anything even though the shipment violated arms export laws.

It also raises the possibility that the CIA was trying to cover up for Oliver L. North and the National Security Council as early as 1985. The

arms-for-hostages deal was not exposed and stopped until 1986.

Our associate Stewart Harris asked the two ranking senators on the Senate intelligence committee why they did not tell the Iran-contra committees about Webster. Both David L. Boren (D-Okla.) and William S. Cohen (R-Maine) also sat on the Senate Iran-contra committee.

Boren declined to talk to us about it. Cohen's office said the information was passed on to the Iran-contra committees. But none of the former Iran-contra committee staff aides we talked to knew about it.

Cohen's office also contends that the issue came up in open sessions of Webster's confirmation hearing and was public knowledge. But it is nowhere to be found in the transcript. Congressional sources who have reviewed the record of the open and closed hearings on Webster confirm that it came up only behind closed doors.

The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee learned in July that the FBI had been warned away from investigating the arms shipment in 1985. But the intelligence committee found out and took charge of the investigation.

Senators should find out why the CIA never gave the Iran-contra committees its only record of the FBI information: a memo written by a CIA desk officer in 1987, at the time of Webster's confirmation hearings. The classified memo tells of a call to the CIA from FBI agent Randall Boone, who wanted to know what to do about the arms shipment. The memo says Boone was told to leave it alone.

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NGTON POST

9/12/89 The Washington Post

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

Arms for Iran: How Much Did CIA Know?

A secret Senate investigation has uncovered the possibility that the Central Intelligence Agency knew far more than it admits about the 1985 shipment of American missiles to Iran.

A former CIA desk officer told two Senate committees this summer that the CIA knew about a September 1985 shipment shortly after the missiles arrived in Tabriz, Iran. Testimony before the Iran-contra investigating committees in 1987 implied that the CIA was a latecomer to the operation, not learning about it until November 1985.

The information raises the possibility that the Iran-contra committees in Congress were duped when they tried to piece together the details of the operation to swap arms for American hostages. It also raises the specter of perjury by anyone who knowingly misled the committees to believe that the CIA was not involved until November, after two missile shipments had already been made.

Our sources say those questions are now being probed by the Senate intelligence committee.

As we reported earlier, the Iran-contra wound was secretly reopened this summer when two Senate committees, working with the General Accounting Office, began probing the question of what federal agencies knew about the illegal arms shipments. Sources told our associate Stewart Harris that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had developed information about the September shipment and took it to the CIA, only to be told to back off because it was a "White House operation."

All of that occurred shortly after the September shipment—early October at the latest—the former CIA desk officer has told the Senate committees.

In contrast, the Iran-contra report from the congressional investigating committees says then-CIA Director William J. Casey didn't find out about the arms-for-hostages deal until Nov. 14, 1985, in a meeting with former national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane.

National Security Council consultant Michael Ledeen told the Iran-contra committees that before Nov. 14, the NSC had left the CIA in the dark because the White House was afraid the CIA might leak the information. It has been generally assumed that the CIA joined the arms deal in November 1985 with a shipment of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Iran on a CIA airline.

The only record of the earlier contact between the CIA and the FBI was never turned over to the Iran-contra committees. That record is a memo written in 1987 by the same CIA desk officer. At the time, the CIA was scrambling to prepare for confirmation hearings for then-FBI Director William H. Webster; who had been nominated to head the CIA. Webster was quizzed on what he knew about Iran-contra.

The Senate committees were told the memo was written in April 1987, the same month that Webster's nomination was before the Senate intelligence committee. That committee discussed the information behind closed doors, but never gave it to the Iran-contra committees. Congress asked for all CIA documents about the affair, but aides for both Iran-contra panels told us they never saw the memo.

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DATE 8-12-98 BY spd/BJA-MLB

TON POST

10/3/89

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

Ex-Agent Joins Call for CIA Watchdog

Congressional efforts to install an independent watchdog inside the Central Intelligence Agency won't help Bruce Hemmings.

The 17-year agency veteran claims he was driven out of government service last year after refusing to help cover up CIA knowledge of arms sales to Iran. Hemmings has since cooperated with a Senate probe, which this summer confirmed that the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation knew more than they admit about the secret White House operation to supply missiles to Iran.

Hemmings has shed his spy cloak and is now a self-styled whistle-blower, vowing to bring rogue spooks to justice.

"In the area of intelligence, there is no mechanism available to an employee or ex-employee to address . . . allegations of impropriety," Hemmings told our associate Stewart Harris.

Hemmings has added his voice to those advocating a bill proposed by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) that would establish a presidentially appointed inspector general with statutory independence to expose fraud, waste and abuse at the CIA.

The CIA has had a relatively toothless inspector general—appointed by the CIA director and operating under his direction—since 1952. Hemmings presented his concerns about the covert operation to CIA Inspector General William Donnelly before going to Capitol Hill.

Hemmings has heard little since being interviewed by one of Donnelly's agents. The CIA insists the probe is still open. But Donnelly implied the case was closed in a June 9 letter to Hemmings.

The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee took Hemmings's information so seriously that it commissioned a probe by the Office of Special Investigations at the General Accounting Office, which confirmed that FBI and CIA officials traded information about a U.S. arms shipment to Iran in late September 1985, at least one month before the CIA officially claims to have become involved.

The probe also produced evidence of a cover-up. Hemmings was assigned to the Iran desk in late 1985. He was working with the FBI, which had developed an intelligence network deep within Iran. The FBI handed the item about the arms shipment to Hemmings at the CIA for analysis.

Hemmings was instructed to inform the FBI not to disseminate the information further because it involved a sensitive "White House operation." The FBI complied, even though the shipment violated arms export law and stated public policy.

In 1987, Hemmings says he was again asked to cover up the incident.

FBI then-Director William H. Webster was seeking Senate confirmation to be director of the CIA. Senators grilled Webster on the FBI's knowledge of the arms sale.

Hemmings was ordered by the CIA to prepare a memo about the incident. When his memo noted that he was advised to tell the FBI not to spread the word, his superiors exploded. A censored version was sent to Congress, Hemmings says.

Hemmings, caught in a cross-fire, had seen too much and was hounded by the CIA until eventually he was warehoused in a job without responsibilities. He resigned in 1987.

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

1064442

~~SECRET~~

Date 1/29/90

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: INTD, [CI-2])

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (65X-HQ-80777) (RUC) [(S-2)]

"CHANGED"

UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (UDCI) IN ARTICLES BY JACK ANDERSON AND [REDACTED] IN THE AUGUST 29, 1989; SEPTEMBER 5, 1989; SEPTEMBER 12, 1989; AND OCTOBER 3, 1989, EDITIONS OF THE WASHINGTON POST CONCERNING ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAN; ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK);
OO:FBIHQ

This entire communication is classified "~~SECRET~~".

[REDACTED] on case titled, [REDACTED] FCI-X;
OO:WMFO".

Reference Boston airtel to the Bureau and WMFO, dated 1/9/90 and captioned, [REDACTED] FCI-X; OO:WMFO [REDACTED] and WMFO airtel to Director, Et Al, dated 1/22/90 and captioned as above.

Boston Division was requested to conduct indices searches, directory checks, as well as contact established business or community sources regarding [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and INVESTIGATIONS GROUP INCORPORATED (IGI) in Boston.

Investigation in the Boston Division has revealed the following information:

~~DE-36~~ 65-80777-4

- 3-Bureau
- (1-INTD [CI-2])
- 2-WMFO
- 1-Boston
- RMS:IRP

~~SECRET~~
SENT

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFIED BY 6-3
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

MAR 8 1990
[Handwritten signatures and initials]

Approved:

JAH/wt

Transmitted

(Number) (Time)

Per

2-28-98 7/10/2001
CLASSIFIED BY SP4-BJA/MB
REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1
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CAS-6738TPJ

06 Airtel is unclassified per letter dated 6/15/98

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65X-HQ-80777

The Boston general indices was queried regarding [redacted] and INVESTIGATIONS GROUP INCORPORATED with negative results and revealed Boston file number [redacted] and [redacted] for a [redacted]

The Boston FOIMS indices was queried regarding [redacted] and revealed Boston file number 206A-Z-1-61 for an IGI CONSULTING INC.

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Review of Boston file 206A-AL-61 and 61A (206A-Z-1-61) reveals serial 61A to be a cover airtel to Boston, dated 9/17/85 under the caption of. "IGI CONSULTING, INC., BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS; [redacted] POSSIBLE FAG-DOD." Serial 61 is a copy of a Naval Investigative Service (NIS) report, dated 3/20/85, concerning above subjects. The NIS report involves an IGI CONSULTING, INC. of attempting to gain information concerning military application of fiber optic projects for dissemination to U.S. contractors and foreign corporations.

Boston file 116-14113 was destroyed 8/71 as per manual rules and regulations.

Boston file 77-1996 was destroyed per manual rules and regulations.

Review of Boston file number 100-16162 Serial 3 revealed this to be a six page letter, dated March 6, 1945 entitled, "Americans United for World Organization, Inc., 5 West 54th Street, New York City". Above said organization was formed for the purpose of unifying all groups advocating the United States participation in the WORLD PEACE ORGANIZATION. A [redacted] (not further described) was listed as being [redacted] of above said organization. Furthermore, a [redacted] (not further described) was listed as a member of the Board of Directors.

The NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE NYNEX INFORMATION RESOURCES computerized records was queried concerning the below listed individuals/entities with the following results:

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
INVESTIGATIONS GROUP No matching records found
INCORPORATED

[redacted] No matching records found

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203X-WF-1642430



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Attempts by the Boston Division to obtain information
regarding [redacted] and an INVESTIGATIONS
GROUP INCORPORATED (IGI) through established business or
community sources met with negative results.

Boston considers this case RUC'd.

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~~SECRET~~

10/19/21/089

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~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO FBI WMFO (65X-HQ-80777) (C)/ROUTINE/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //0524//

SUBJECT: UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN
ARTICLES BY JACK ANDERSON AND [REDACTED] IN THE AUGUST 29,
1989; SEPTEMBER 12, 1989; AND OCTOBER 3, 1989, EDITIONS OF "THE
WASHINGTON POST" CONCERNING ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAN;
ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK); OO: FBIHQ.

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b7C

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

REFERENCE WMFO TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR DATED JULY 10, 1990.

ON JULY 24, 1990, THOMAS E. MARUM, INTERNAL SECURITY
SECTION, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WAS PRESENTED WITH AN
OVERVIEW OF CAPTIONED MATTER AND THE WMFO INVESTIGATION
ENTITLED [REDACTED] ESPIONAGE-X; OO: WMFO (WMFO

NSW/Edsm *CR*
AMP: [REDACTED] (4)
1 - MEDIA LEAK - CLOSING

65-80777-8
7/30/90 4147/5 [REDACTED] b2
b6
b7C

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

2 - [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP4 BTA-MLB*
ON *8-24-98*

06Ainfo is undeclass per 16th N.J. / 2001
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10/15/2001

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

OK 352 RPT
JUL 31 1990

PAGE 2

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

FILE NUMBER 65X-WF-164243.

AS RELATED BY WMFO IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, BOTH CASES ARE INTERRELATED IN THAT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE SOURCE OF CAPTIONED DISCLOSURES. THE CONSOLIDATION OF THESE TWO CASES WAS DISCUSSED WITH MR. MARUM WHO ADVISED THAT HIS OFFICE HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF BOTH CASES AS THEY ARE BOTH TREATED BY HIS OFFICE AS ESPIONAGE VIOLATIONS WITH NO DISTINCTION AS TO THE TYPE OF VIOLATION (MEDIA LEAK OR OTHERWISE).

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AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, IT HAS BEEN DECIDED BY FBIHQ TO CLOSE CAPTIONED MATTER IN LIEU OF THE PENDING WMFO ESPIONAGE-X INVESTIGATION. WMFO IS ADVISED TO CLOSE CAPTIONED MATTER AND CONSOLIDATE IT INTO THEIR FILE 65X-WF-164243.

~~C 25824 B OADR.~~


BT

|

~~SECRET~~

NOTE:

THE ABOVE COMMUNICATION WAS PREDICATED BY A DISCUSSION WITH SSA [REDACTED] WMFO, REGARDING THE CONSOLIDATION OF THESE TWO CASES. ISS HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO THIS ACTION AS THEY VIEW BOTH ACTIONS, THE MEDIA LEAK AND THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY, AS THE SAME CATEGORY OF VIOLATION. THIS COMMUNICATION ADVISES WMFO TO CLOSE CAPTIONED MATTER AND TO CONSOLIDATE IT INTO THEIR ESPIONAGE-X INVESTIGATION OF [REDACTED]

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b7cHandwritten signatures in cursive script, including one that appears to be 'R. John' and another that is more stylized, possibly 'Gulf'.

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 04-22-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC/EAM/RS/LJM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
04-22-2033

Dep. Dir.	
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TO DIRECTOR FBI/PRIORITY/

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CITE: //3010:5060//

PASS: INTO, CI-20.

SUBJECT: UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
(UDCI) IN ARTICLES BY JACK ANDERSON AND [REDACTED] IN THE
AUGUST 29, 1989; SEPTEMBER 5, 1989; SEPTEMBER 12, 1989, AND
OCTOBER 3, 1989 EDITIONS OF THE WASHINGTON POST CONCERNING
ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAN; ESP-X (MEDIA LEAK); OO: FBIHQ.

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THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

RE WMFO AIRTEL TO THE BUREAU AND ALBANY DATED JANUARY 9,
1990.

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