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## US ARMY PRISONER OF WAR DOCTRINE REPORT

Doctrine For Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel, Short Title: USPOW  
ACN 15596, March 1972

United States Army Combat Developments Command, Special Operations Agency

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MARCH 1972

AD

ACN 15596

**DOCTRINE FOR CAPTURED/DETAINED UNITED STATES  
MILITARY PERSONNEL (U)**

( Short Title : USPOW (U) )

**FINAL STUDY**

**VOLUME I**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**UNITED STATES ARMY  
COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY**



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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The conclusions and recommendations of this study are those of the Commanding Officer, USACDC Special Operations Agency. This study is based upon information gathered and analysis performed primarily by the US Prisoner of War Study Team at USACDCSOA. Some of the individuals having a major area of responsibility in the preparation of supporting study material are listed below:

Major John C. Carlin	Team Chief
Mr. Herschel G. Nance	Co-Team Chief
Major Florencio Berumen	Project Officer
Captain John M. McDaniel	Project Officer
Captain Joseph S. Kraemer	Project Officer
Lieutenant Robert T. Bockman	Project Officer
Lieutenant Michael M. Doodan	Project Officer
Lieutenant Clarence L. Fisher	Project Officer

The members of the USPOW Study Team wish to extend their thanks for the cooperation received from personnel contacted during the course of the study and, in particular, those who contributed so freely of time and expertise at the in-process reviews. Personnel who contributed to the study are too numerous to mention herein but are listed on page ix, Volume II, Part I.

Special notes of thanks are reserved for:

Dr. William Miller - Central Intelligence Agency  
LTC Winfield S. Singletary - Office of the Surgeon General  
LTC Bruce E. Stevenson - USACDC Judge Advocate Agency  
MAJ James R. Coker - The Judge Advocate General's School  
MAJ James N. Rowe - Prisoner of War, SVN (Oct 63 - Dec 68)  
MAJ Michael P. Umhofer - Project Officer (PW, WWII)  
WO2 Malcomb V. Loepke - Detainee, North Korea (Aug 69 - Dec 69)  
MSG Daniel L. Pitzer - Prisoner of War, SVN (Oct 63 - Nov 67)  
Mr. David A. Ellis - Office of the Provost Marshal General

Each of the above manifested a strong active interest in the study from inception to completion and provided knowledge and data in his area of interest that contributed immeasurably to the overall effort.

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(U) ABSTRACT

The study develops new/revised US Army doctrine and procedures for captured/detained US military personnel. It analyzes key Communist prisoner of war management principles and applicable national/DOD policy in light of their impact upon Army doctrine in three phases: preinternment (training), internment (family assistance), and postinternment (evacuation and processing). An analysis of current Army doctrine/procedures identifies voids/deficiencies in its adequacy to meet requirements generated by Communist treatment of prisoners of war and guidance from national/DOD level. Specific doctrinal recommendations are offered to correct the deficiencies and fill the voids.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### USPOW STUDY

#### (U) INTRODUCTION

1. (U) General: Upon publication, the Doctrine for Captured/Detained US Military Personnel (USPOW) Study becomes the most comprehensive and meaningful analysis of prisoner of war related matters existing within the Department of Defense. This Executive Summary provides a synopsis of study content, but because of its brevity does not contain in-depth discussions of important details. Users are therefore encouraged to read both the Executive Summary and the main report. By so doing, they will better understand the total scope and timely impact of the doctrine presented within its covers.

2. (U) Study Origin: On 8 June 1968, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSOD) issued a policy memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provided guidance relative to the processing of returned US prisoners of war and other detained military personnel.<sup>1</sup> This initial memorandum was followed by a supplemental policy memorandum issued by the DSOD on 18 January 1969 which provides guidance for repatriation planning by the Services for the return of a relatively large group of USPW/detainees who are interned in the SEA land mass.<sup>2</sup> A subsequent HQ CDC review of Army doctrine on the subject of US prisoners of war revealed that doctrine in the area of captured US personnel was deficient.<sup>3</sup> Further, HQ, CDC review revealed that no agency within CDC had been assigned overall responsibility for captured US personnel. Accordingly, on 22 October 1969, HQ CDC tasked Special Operations Agency, Fort Bragg, NC with reviewing and developing doctrine for captured US Army personnel.<sup>4</sup>

3. (U) Need for the Study: Exploitation of captured US military personnel by unfriendly foreign states in recent years, during both peace and war, has dictated the need for an in-depth review of the adequacy of US Army doctrine to meet this situation. This exploitation of captured US Army personnel, served the cause of unfriendly powers by providing a means by which political and other bargaining pressures were brought to bear on the US. A study was needed to assess the adequacy of current doctrine to meet this threat and where necessary, develop required doctrine for US military personnel which will best support national interests and concurrently insure to the maximum extent possible the rights and dignity of the individual during and following capture.

<sup>1</sup> Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 8 June 1968, Policy for Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel.

<sup>2</sup> Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 18 January 1969, Policy for Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel.

<sup>3</sup> HQ CDC Fact Sheet, 26 March 1969, Doctrine for Captured US Personnel.

<sup>4</sup> HQ CDC Study Directive, 22 October 1969, Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel.

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4. (U) Problem: Many of the policies and procedures pertaining to captured US military personnel are outgrowths of the experiences of World War II and the Korean War. They are oriented mainly toward insuring that US treaty obligations of the Geneva Conventions are observed and that national security interests are protected through emphasis on the Code of Conduct. Although consideration for the survival and well being of the individual soldier during captivity is reflected throughout national policy, this consideration is accommodated mainly on the assumption that humane treatment by the US toward enemy prisoners of war will be reciprocated by unfriendly powers toward captured US military personnel. Recent experiences of US prisoners of war in North and South Vietnam and in Korea (USS Pueblo Crew), however, have evidenced this assumption to be incorrect. The US policy of humane treatment toward prisoners of war has not been reciprocated by the enemy who constantly circumvents the provisions of the Geneva Conventions by denying their applicability. Further, experience has evidenced that under the mental and physical duress imposed by Communist captors, US prisoners of war cannot rigidly adhere to the common conception of conduct, i.e., strict adherence to name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. In fact, their survival often depended upon their knowingly violating this concept. The main problem addressed by this study is how best to reconcile doctrinally US national interests (as expressed by DOD policy guidance) with those of the individual in light of prevailing Communist prisoner of war management principles and techniques. A second but equally important problem is to identify those areas requiring improvement in Army policy and doctrine (and make appropriate recommendations) where Communist management principles are not a consideration.

5. (U) Purpose:<sup>5</sup> The purpose of the study is to develop Army doctrine for captured US military personnel applicable to both peace and wartime situations including all levels and intensities of conflict.

6. (U) Objectives:<sup>6</sup> The objective of the study is to develop recommended new/revised US Army doctrine and procedures relating to captured US military personnel:

- a. During the training phase and prior to internment.
- b. During internment and activities associated with release or recovery.
- c. Following release or recovery.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. See also 1st Indorsement (HQ CDC, 16 Feb 70) to basic letter, ISSO, undated, Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel, which deletes requirement to develop "joint service doctrine and procedures" from the study plan.

<sup>6</sup> HQ CDC Study Plan, approved 16 Feb 70, Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel.

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7. (U) Assumption:<sup>7</sup> US military personnel will continue to face the threat of capture/detention and possible exploitation during peacetime as well as during armed conflict.

8. (U) Limitations:<sup>8</sup>

a. Study is conducted based on current US national policies relating to captured US military personnel.

b. Study does not infringe upon US Air Force escape and evasion responsibility.

9. (U) Definition: The term "doctrine" is used in this study in the broader context and includes information contained in Army regulations, pamphlets, field manuals, subject schedules, and operational plans.

10. (U) Methodology: See figure 1, page 5.

a. Data were collected and analyzed to determine (1) current policies, doctrine, and procedures pertaining to captured US military personnel, (2) the PW management principles of selected Communist states, and (3) current US Army procedures governing captured US military personnel during preinternment, internment, and post internment.

b. Through synthesis and further analysis of the above data, US Army requirements were established and doctrinal voids and inadequacies identified. These deficiencies were examined both in the light of national policy requirements and those requirements derived from Communist management principles. This examination resulted in the development of recommendations.

11. (U) On-Going Department of the Army Activities: During the progress of this study, there has been continuous interaction among members of the study team and representatives of various DA staff sections. As a result, some of the early identified problem areas have become subject of immediate consideration by the DA staff and, in some cases, DA action has been initiated to resolve the problems. Due to the continuous update of programs and policies now occurring at DA, a number of the recommendations proposed in this study may be completed prior to final publication of this study.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

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12. (U) Summary Organization: The Summary is divided into six (6) sections. The first section, "Communist Prisoner of War Management Principles," describes the principal techniques used by the Communists in managing PW's and the specific purposes. The second section identifies elements of national and DOD policy which impact upon Army doctrine. The third, fourth, and fifth sections evaluate existing Army doctrine/policy in the three phases (preinternment, internment, and post internment) for adequacy in terms of the requirements posed by the Communist PW management principles and national/DOD policy. The final section identifies the findings, conclusions, and broad recommendations derived in the main study.

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~~(C)~~ COMMUNIST PRISONER OF WAR MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

1. (U) GENERAL. Communist PW management principles (Chapter 2, Main Report) constitute the threat portion of the study. In order to identify those principles and techniques employed by Communists in their handling of prisoners of war, five conflict situations were analyzed: (a) USSR during World War II, (b) North Korea/Chicom during the Korean War, (c) North Vietnam during the present crisis, (d) the de facto Viet Cong government operating in South Vietnam during the present crisis, and (e) the treatment of the USS Pueblo crew members in North Korea during 1968-1969. For quick reference, a graphic representation of similar and dissimilar practices and procedures employed in those conflicts analyzed is provided in Figure 2, page 11.

2. (U) PRINCIPAL COMMUNIST TECHNIQUES USED IN HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR:

a. The Communist prisoner of war management system is designed to obtain maximum exploitation of the prisoner of war, and, wherever possible, reorient ideologically the individual captive. These goals are sought through the efficient and effective use of resources, both physical facilities and skilled personnel, and application of specific techniques.

b. The most commonly used techniques are those of intimidation, interrogation, isolation, segregation, psychological and physical stress, and indoctrination. By the calculated application of these techniques, the Communist create an environment which supports the mental (attitude) conditioning process to eliminate resistance tendencies on the part of the prisoner and to facilitate exploitation.

3. (U) SPECIFIC PURPOSE(S) FOR EACH TECHNIQUE.

a. Intimidation. Intimidation is used to degrade psychologically the individual PW to the point where he no longer resists the demands of his captor. Immediately upon capture and for the duration of his internment, the threat of death intimidates the PW. The vocalization of this threat by his Communist captors serves to heighten his fears and makes him dependent upon the captor for his very existence. Along with promoting the fear of death, it is not uncommon that the Communists threaten the PW with detention beyond the cessation of the current hostilities. Normally, the development of a "progressive" attitude is held out as the key for repatriation.

b. Interrogation. The Communists use interrogation to assess the exploitation value of the PW and to obtain initial dialogue between captor and captured. When assessing the prisoner or exploitation value, interrogation also serves as a screening process. The relative

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resistance displayed by the prisoner is weighed against those measures deemed necessary to gain his compliance. Prisoners are rapidly segregated into "reactionaries" (hard-line resistors) and "progressives" (individuals who are or who appear to be receptive to indoctrination efforts). This permits the Communists to identify those PW's with whom they have the best chance to succeed. Establishing an early dialogue is a first step toward the responsive pattern desired in the exploitation process. The "give and take" discussion, albeit one-sided, provides the skilled interrogator the opportunity to undermine the ideals of the prisoner, and at the same time, accustoms the prisoner to responding to ideas provided him.

c. Isolation. Communists use isolation primarily for disciplinary purposes and for the promotion of a particular response or action from the PW. By removing the prisoner from the outside stimuli from which he would normally derive support (e.g., his fellow prisoners, familiar objects, communication, established routine), the PW becomes totally dependent upon his Communist captors. Isolation also provides an environment in which the PW can only look inward; and his doubts, fears, and guilt continue to grow. Playing on these emotions, the Communists seek to destroy confidence and instill dependency.

d. Application of Psychological and Physical Stress. The Communist application of rewards or punishments is often done for no explicable reason. The principle behind this seemingly haphazard technique is that it keeps the PW off-balance. He never knows when he will receive extra rations, his standard rations, or no rations at all. He is severely punished for slight offenses and leniently treated for more serious acts. In the strictly controlled atmosphere of internment, such treatment frustrates and disorients the PW. He becomes wary of every act, not only of his own making but also those of his fellow PW's. Resentment is not unusual when a PW feels he is being punished for another PW's act(s). Often mass reward and punishment is used as an instrument for disrupting prisoner loyalties and reducing collective resistance. (See Segregation below).

e. Segregation. It is normal for Communists to separate officers, NCO's, and enlisted personnel if sufficient facilities exist. Two specific purposes are served: the first is to destroy the USPW command structure, thus reducing collective resistance; and the other is to form homogenous blocks of "students" at whom a special brand of indoctrinal material can be aimed. Along the latter line, hard-line resistors are often segregated from other PW's so that their example of resistance does not adversely affect the indoctrination of the "progressives."

f. Indoctrination. Indoctrination is a technique which has been developed and refined by the Communists. It is a program of instruction


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directed toward altering the pre-capture values of the prisoner. The indoctrination effort seeks to instill within the PW an understanding of the Communist cause and, if possible, gain his sympathy for, or convert him to, the Communist ideology.

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FIGURE 1. STUDY METHODOLOGY

Figure 1 Comparison of Principles of the Objectives and Management Principles and Techniques in Five Communist Conflicts

COMMUNIST MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES	OBJECTIVES				PROCESSING AND CONFINEMENT							INTERROGATION / DOCTRINATION															
	NO PWs INVOLVED	NO DEPORTATION	NO ESCAPES	NO REDEMPTION	ESTIMATION	INFORMATION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	PROSECUTION	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	
U.S.S.R. (PWs 51)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
ML KOREA (COMSEC MORGAN PARS)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
NO VIETNAM (PRESENT CRIES)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
VIET CONE (NO VIETNAM)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
NO KOREA (PUSLO INCIDENT 1962-67)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

FIGURE 2. Comparison of Prisoner of War Objectives and Management Principles and Techniques in Five Communist Conflicts

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(U) NATIONAL AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY

1. National Policy. In addition to addressing those considerations derived from Communist prisoner of war principles, US Army programs must also adhere to higher US authority policy requirements. These requirements are examined in Chapter 3, Main Report. Those goals which form the basis for and constitute current US national policy in regard to captured US personnel are set forth in Department of State Bulletin, "Treatment of American Prisoners of War in Viet Nam," 22 December 1969. These goals address three principal areas: (a) general policy, (b) policy concerning captured US personnel, and (c) policy concerning captured enemy personnel.

a. General Policy. Relates to the attainment of five national and international goals: (1) establishing clear lines of authority on the national level and within the defense establishment for a program that includes both captured US and enemy personnel, (2) gaining positive public support for the PW programs of the US, (3) gaining world support for the US in its interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, (4) persuading nonsignatories of the Geneva Conventions to become signatories, and (5) providing a means by which captured personnel are permitted an option with respect to repatriation.

b. Policy Concerning Captured US Personnel. Relates to support and assistance of US personnel during internment by a foreign power and addresses four basic objectives: (1) providing for the protection and humane treatment of captured US personnel, (2) improving the ability of the US serviceman to fight the enemy, resist capture, and if captured to resist the enemy while in captivity, (3) providing a unified and purposeful standard of conduct for USPWs, and (4) promoting morale, esprit de corps, and discipline; also, strengthening character, citizenship, and faith in the United States.

c. Policy Concerning Captured Enemy Personnel. This third area is addressed in the hope that the US, by providing humane treatment to enemy PW's, may encourage the reciprocal application of GPW provisions by enemy states. Five objectives are covered: (1) providing for the protection and humane treatment of enemy personnel, (2) encouraging defection and weakening the will of the enemy to resist capture, (3) providing for timely and maximum intelligence exploitation of captured enemy personnel, (4) establishing an educational, vocational training, and information program for captured enemy personnel, and (5) establishing a coordinated PW program for captured enemy personnel in combined operations.

2. The Geneva Conventions of 1949. The foregoing policy goals reflect the desires of the US government to provide support and assistance to

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US personnel during internment by a foreign power. The US believes it can best achieve these goals by basing its national policy on the 1949 Geneva Conventions in general, and the Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War (GPW-1949) in particular which stresses the humanitarian treatment of PW's by a detaining power. In substance, adopting the Geneva Convention as the basis for national policy has reduced this policy to two key propositions. First, the US through the principle of reciprocity seeks to obtain humane treatment and protection of its nationals in enemy custody as provided for in recognized international law. Second, by observing these legal standards, the US seeks to exemplify and maintain the elementary concepts of humane and civilized treatment it desires in relations between states and individuals.

### 3. Enforcement of National Policy.

a. For all practical purposes, the only leverage that can be brought to bear by the United States upon Communist governments is moral pressure, since Communist states have refused to recognize the legal procedures and constraints of international law pertaining to captured military personnel. In times past, the United States has sought to apply such pressure by seeking to obtain world recognition of the humanitarian principles of the GPW-1949 and by demonstrating to the international community proper standards of treatment of enemy prisoners of war held by the US and its allies.

b. During the time frame 1972 to 1975, there is no indication that any innovative measures will be developed which will provide the United States with additional means of leverage to bring significant pressure to bear upon a Communist detaining power. It is anticipated that the US will continue to press for worldwide recognition of and adherence to the principles of the Geneva Conventions and that there will be additional emphasis placed upon the Department of Defense to insure proper treatment of enemy prisoners of war. Until such time as Communist states voluntarily recognize the principle of human rights and dignity, it will be difficult for the US to obtain humane treatment for US prisoners of war.

### 4. DOD Policy.

a. Promulgation. DOD policy, in support of the national policy goals set forth above, is contained in the following Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSOD) Memorandums and Department of Defense (DOD) Directives and Instructions:

DOD Dir 1300.7, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct (8 Jul 64).

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DOD Instr 1300.9, Casualty Procedures for Military Personnel (6 Apr 67).

DOD Pam GEN-28, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code (5 Jun 67).

DSOD Memo, Policy for Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel (8 Jun 68).

DSOD Memo, Policy and Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel (30 Nov 68).

DSOD Memo, Policy and Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel (18 Jan 69).

These documents embrace the total scope of policy requirements relating to captured US military personnel. To facilitate analysis, the study categorizes DOD policy into three phases: (1) preinternment, (2) internment, and (3) postinternment. During the preinternment or training phase, policy is directed toward indoctrination of the individual member in his responsibilities if captured and in survival, escape, and evasion. For the internment phase, policy prescribes for notification of PW/MIA status and support and assistance of next of kin. Policy covering the postinternment phase is divided into four general areas related to the immediate and long term handling of released/recovered/escaped prisoners of war: (a) evacuation and routine processing, (b) debriefing, (c) medical treatment, and (d) rehabilitation.

b. Code of Conduct. Nonpunitive standards for the behavior of prisoners of war are set forth in the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States. This Code, promulgated in Executive Order No. 10631, dated 17 August 1955, is an expression of those national and DOD policy goals relating to the conduct of US military personnel in captivity; as an Executive Order, it also constitutes national policy. The Code was an outgrowth of the Korean War which reflected the need for the delineation of principles for resistance to enemy prisoner of war management. Stated in simple and direct terms, the Code establishes what is expected of the US serviceman should he become a prisoner of war. It is not a legal document, but rather a set of principles to guide the US soldier. Prisoners of War remain subject to the provisions of the UCMJ for acts committed in detained or captured status.

c. Key DOD Principle. The primary document dealing with US captured military personnel is DOD Directive 1300.7. This document stresses the Code of Conduct as basic DOD policy; however, recognition is taken of the fact that certain training and education measures are required to

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support realistically the Code. DOD Directive 1300.7 specifies that instruction will be given each serviceman in subject areas designed to enhance his ability to avoid capture and, if captured, to resist enemy interrogation and indoctrination. It also provides that instruction will be given relating to the conduct expected of the serviceman while in captivity. However, the directive does not prescribe the degree of emphasis which will be afforded these subject areas nor does it take cognizance of the extreme pressures which will be faced by the soldier if captured. These considerations and how they are addressed are left to the discretion of the separate services.

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~~(C-NF)~~ PREINTERMENT

1. (U) GENERAL: The preinternment phase examines that doctrine and training presented to the soldier prior to his commitment into combat which, if he is captured, would assist his survival.

2. (U) DOCTRINE CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR INTERNMENT SURVIVAL: The primary doctrine required is that which will establish and maintain the ability of the soldier to cope with the physically demanding and mentally debilitating effects of the captive environment. It must provide guidance on conduct, escape, evasion, and survival both while evading and, equally importantly, while interned. Doctrinal literature must insure the US soldier is completely familiar with the principles and techniques which will be directed at him by a captor. Guidance must be provided on the best means to counter or endure these techniques.

3. (U) CURRENT ARMY DOCTRINE:

a. Existing doctrine as expressed in current Department of the Army Field Manuals addresses the following broad areas:

- (1) Survival (FM 21-76)
- (2) Escape (FM 21-76)
- (3) Evasion (FM 21-76)
- (4) Code of Conduct (FM 21-76, FM 21-13, FM 21-75)
- (5) Geneva and Hague Conventions (DA Pam 27-1)
- (6) Field Sanitation (FM 21-10)
- (7) Personal Hygiene (FM 21-10)
- (8) Physical Conditioning (FM 21-20)
- (9) First Aid (FM 21-11)

b. Much of the doctrine presented in the above areas is directed toward existing in the combat situation while under friendly control. However, many of the points covered are equally applicable to the internment environment.

c. Current Army interpretation of the Code of Conduct on permissible dialogue with the captor is strict adherence to name, rank, serial

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number, date of birth, and matters of health and welfare. Such interpretation obscures the flexibility of response inherent in the concept prescribed in Article V of the Code, i.e. "evading to the utmost of one's ability, the answering of further questions."

4. (U) INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT DOCTRINE:

a. The principal drawback of current doctrine is its excessively general nature. Also, most of the doctrine presented concerns itself with the large World War II prisoner of war compound situations to the exclusion of the low PW population situations characteristic of the war in Southeast Asia.

b. Current Army doctrine on the internment environment does not address Communist management principles. It is limited primarily to Code of Conduct instruction. Topical areas such as First Aid, Physical Training, Field Sanitation, and Personnel Hygiene are not considered in their relation to that environment nor is there any guidance on interrogation/indoctrination resistance.

5. ~~(C)~~ OTHER SERVICE PROGRAMS:

a. ~~(FOUO)~~ The Air Force and the Navy maintain established resistance training programs for their personnel. These programs address the entire spectrum of the prisoner of war environment and existence. In both Services, the depth of resistance training varies according to duty assignment and the "risk of capture" potential of the individuals (e.g., Air Crews and SEALs). Both Services conduct "resistance training laboratories" which are mock internment compounds complete with isolation cells, interrogation rooms, and aggressor cadre.

b. (U) The Marine Corps training closely resembles that of the Army. Like the latter, the Marines have no specific course in resistance, but lightly brush the subject as a part of their Code of Conduct training.

c. ~~(C-XP)~~ For comparison, although not a sister Service per se, the resistance program conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) consists of a six hour film series in which an acknowledged expert describes the incidents and effects of captivity and demonstrates methods of resistance. It is a highly effective approach permitting a wide range of related information to be realistically presented in a minimum of time. Such a program has definite application for any SERE course of instruction.

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(U) INTERNMENT

1. GENERAL: The internment phase examines doctrine/policies which relate to Next of Kin (NOK) Assistance Programs while the sponsor is in a missing or prisoner of war (MIA/PW) status.

2. PROGRAMS REQUIRED TO ASSIST THE NOK OF MIA/PW PERSONNEL: There are three major programs required to assist the next of kin (NOK) once a sponsor falls into a Missing or Prisoner of War status. The first (1) is that of notifying the NOK of the sponsor's status in a manner that will lessen the psychological shock such news will cause to the NOK. The second program (2) involves the preparation and assignment of a mature officer to the NOK who can act as a sensitive liaison between the Army and that NOK. The final program (3) is actually a series of family assistance programs designed to alleviate the personal problems which commonly occur and with which the NOK of a PW must cope. These programs must assist the NOK in such matters as finance, medicine, transportation, housing, education, and legal assistance.

3. CURRENT NOK ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS:

a. Notification. Notification is accomplished as soon as possible through a personal visit by an active duty service member of a rank higher than or equal to that of the MIA/PW sponsor.

b. Assistance Officer: A Family Services and Assistance Officer (FSAO) is appointed to personally advise and assist the NOK of the MIA/PW service member. The FSAO is to be equal to or higher in rank than the service member and must have a retention period to serve in the FSAO capacity of at least 12 months.

c. Family Assistance. A brief synopsis of the services and assistance available to the NOK is provided in Figure 3, page 18.

4. ELEMENTS OF REQUIRED PROGRAMS NOT CURRENTLY SATISFIED:

a. The current programs within Department of the Army to assist the next of kin of MIA/PW personnel satisfy all requirements. The failures noted are more in execution of the programs as opposed to lack of programs themselves.

b. The specific requirements for the selection of both notification and FSAO personnel are at the discretion of the installation Commander. Accordingly the quality and performance of these individuals varies from post to post.

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ASSISTANCE TO  
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PRINCIPAL US ARMY PROGRAMS

ADVISORY	Notify NOK of status by active military personnel of equal or higher rank than sponsor.  Appointment of an assistance officer to advise and assist NOK during period sponsor is carried in a MIA/PW status.
MONETARY	Provide military personnel with option to specify a percentage of his monthly pay entitlement that he wishes to be paid to his designated NOK should he become MIA/PW.  Permit deposit of excess pay and allowances into soldier's deposit; amount may exceed authorized limit of \$10,000.
MEDICAL	Provide dependent NOK hospitalization, outpatient treatment and services under the Uniformed Services Health Benefits program.  NOK authorized medical care in civilian community under provisions of civilian Health and Medical Programs of Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).
HOUSING	Entitle dependent NOK to government owned or leased facilities while sponsor is MIA/PW.  Provide on-post guest facilities for shopping convenience for NOK living beyond commuting distance to installation.
EDUCATION	Provide various loans, grants and scholarships for dependent NOK of MIA/PW's.
TRANSPORTATION	Entitle dependent NOK to military air transportation in CONUS on a space available basis for humanitarian reasons.  Entitle movements of NOK and household goods to a site selected by NOK.
PERSONAL INFORMATION	Provide personal monthly letters containing pertinent reports and comments on MIA/PW status.
LEGAL	Entitle NOK to assistance by Judge Advocate activities.

FIGURE 3. SERVICES PROVIDED THE NOK OF MIA/PW'S

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c. The delivery of PW/MIA personal effects to the next of kin causes a significant emotional shock to that NOK. Current procedures of direct mail delivery is highly impersonal and offers no emotional support at a time when such support is needed.

d. There is an apparent absence of emphasis on informing the soldier of the nature of the services available to his next of kin should he become missing or captured.

5. OTHER SERVICE PROGRAMS: The programs for assisting the NOK of MIA/PW personnel in the other Services are, in the main, identical to those of the Army. The most significant difference is within the Air Force which maintains a Specialty Code (MOS) directly related to family assistance. As a consequence, the USAF casualty officer is a specialist with only one job--assisting dependents and next of kin.

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(U). POST INTERNMENT

1. GENERAL: The post internment phase examines doctrine/policies which relate to the receipt, evacuation, processing, debriefing, and rehabilitation of returned former USPW's.

2. DOCTRINE REQUIRED TO ADEQUATELY RECEIVE, DEBRIEF, AND PROCESS RETURNED USPW'S:

a. The processing and screening of returned PW's must strive toward their full rehabilitation and adjustment as functioning, constructive citizens.

b. There must be sufficient safeguards in the processing policy which will permit the weeding out of possible enemy agents or, more importantly, permit the identification of those individuals requiring physical or psychiatric assistance.

c. During debriefing, every effort must be made to safeguard the returnee's legal rights. Policy established in this area must take into account the hardships and duress, both physical and psychological that the individual endured.

d. Personal rights must also be considered in established policy. The reunion with next of kin, the treatment as a soldier of the US Army, appropriate scheduling such that the returnee has time to reflect, etc., are areas which should be addressed. Guidance on relations with the press must be provided to the returnee.

e. In summary, there must be adequate policy which insures that the reception process of returnees is not a "dehumanizing" experience and which assures that the individual's health and welfare is the paramount concern.

3. CURRENT ARMY DOCTRINE/POLICY:

a. There is no current doctrine per se on receipt, debriefing, and processing of returned USPW's. All policy guidance in these areas is found in Army regulations and operation plans.

b. AR 190-25, "Captured, Missing, or Detained US Army Personnel: Administration, Return, and Processing," is the primary source for policy and contains guidance for both in-theatre and CONUS processing. It is currently under review by The Adjutant General's Office.

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c. COMUSMACV OPLAN J-190 (EGRESS RECAP) is the in-theatre procedures for reception, processing and evacuation. It covers the same aspects as AR 190-25 but in more detail.

d. US Army Intelligence Command Prisoners of War Debriefing Plan (U) OPLAN 107-71 (EGRESS RECAP-Army) is a supplement to AR 190-25 for the CONUS debriefings and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for simultaneous debriefing of large scale return (11 or more) of US Army personnel from SEA to CONUS. (10 or less are governed by AR 190-25 and USA Intel Cmd Reg 381-100.)

#### 4. ELEMENTS OF REQUIRED DOCTRINE/POLICY NOT CURRENTLY SATISFIED:

a. Army policy as prescribed in AR 190-25 suffers from a lack of explicit guidance in regard to the welfare and morale of returnees. It fails to impart to implementing commanders the critical priority DOD clearly intends to be given in these areas.

b. Neither AR 190-25 or MACV OPLAN J-190 provide adequate guidance on the returnee/news media relationship and the release of information.

c. Debriefing guidance as currently provided by AR 190-25 and USAINTC OPLAN 107-71 fails to provide specific procedures for protecting the rights of the returnees to be presumed innocent where there exists no prior evidence/accusations of misconduct. Debriefing references cited in these documents are clearly weighted in the direction of conduct investigations as opposed to the acquisition of intelligence.

#### 5. OTHER SERVICE PROGRAMS:

a. The other Services have developed detailed OPLANS to cover the CONUS portion of processing and debriefing. Such OPLANS insure a greater degree of coordination and uniformity than do the general provisions of AR 190-25.

b. A few of the more significant features of other Service programs not currently incorporated in Army doctrine are presented here:

(1) Detailed "Concept of Operations" which sets the appropriate sympathetic tenor for receipt/processing of returnees (Navy).

(2) Detailed public affairs guidance to include verbatim brief to be given to all returnees (Navy, Marine).

(3) Comprehensive information briefings which bring the individual up-to-date on significant current events (Air Force).

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(4) Specific guidance on the use of Service chaplains to provide spiritual assistance to the returnee and to his family (Navy).

(5) Personalized brochures provided to the returnee for his information and convenience (Air Force).

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(U) FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. FINDINGS:

a. The Communists consider the PW as an instrument to further their political/military goals and to influence world opinion.

b. The key is the distinct similarity to the manner in which Communist countries handle PW's. The principles are specific and identifiable and are relied upon by the Communists to accomplish their exploitation goals. (See page 7). Differences in treatment are due more to prisoner population and availability of internment facilities than to ethnic/cultural backgrounds of captor states.

c. Environmental control is the key to Communist PW management. Intense interrogation, unrelenting indoctrination, isolation, selective segregation, and manipulation of food, medicine and mail, all create a depressing and debilitating atmosphere in which the will to resist is eroded. Psychological pressures are used to a far greater extent than physical abuse.

d. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW-1949) and the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States are the cornerstones for US national policy on PW's. The GPW-1949 is the framework for US policy when dealing with other states on PW issues while the Code represents the conduct expected by the US government of its armed forces personnel should they be captured.

e. Current DOD policy primarily addresses the evacuation and processing procedures for returnees from the conflict in SEA. DOD Directive 1300.7 is the key document for DOD guidance on promulgating the Code of Conduct throughout the Services.

f. Current Army instruction on the Code of Conduct stresses adherence to name, rank, date of birth, and serial number while excluding the flexibility of response inherent in the concept of "evading to the utmost of one's ability, the answering of further questions." Within this concept, a captive when enduring undue stress may exceed the stringent bounds of the "Big Four" without an accompanying sense of guilt or failure.

g. Existing doctrine includes brief descriptions of methods and techniques of Communist interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation, but fails entirely to provide positive means of resisting them. There is no adequate doctrine on the maintenance of physical or mental health in the prison camp, nor is there realistic guidance for the PW's conduct.

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h. Other Services conduct composite programs containing instruction on key subjects such as primitive medicine, internment sanitation, Communist PW management principles, and interrogation/indoctrination resistance. Code of Conduct training forms a subtopic to their overall resistance training courses. Other Service training is structured to provide intensive training to high risk of capture personnel.

i. The Army programs for assisting the Next of Kin of MIA/PW's are generally adequate. Minor improvement can be made in selection criteria for notification personnel, and in selection criteria and duties of the FSAO. Command emphasis on these programs fluctuates from post to post. Direct mail delivery of personal effects to the NOK fails to account for the psychological shock such delivery causes.

j. Current Army plans for the processing and evacuation of returned prisoners of war are generally adequate. Medical resources and plans are in accordance with DOD directives and the needs of the returnee. PW/news media relationship is not thoroughly defined, and the current directives lack the requisite emphasis on the welfare of the PW.

k. DA debriefing plans are in accordance with DOD guidance but contain references which imply conduct investigations rather than intelligence acquisition. These references and the current guidance on reading Article 31, UCMJ, during initial debriefing establish a precedent which may be detrimental to both intelligence acquisition and returnee rehabilitation.

2. CONCLUSIONS: Based on the analysis of Communist PW Management Principles, current direction provided to DA at the national and DOD level, and doctrine/policy as it is presented in current Army publications, it is concluded that:

a. US military personnel captured by Communist countries will be subjected to PW management principles and techniques designed to further the captor's political and military goals. Individual survival of the USPW will depend in large measure upon his ability to cope with these principles and lessen their psychological and physical impact.

b. US Army SERE training must be as current and realistic as possible, incorporating the best features of the other services as applicable. A cornerstone principle must be that the US soldier receive such training as is commensurate with his risk of capture potential.

c. Strict adherence to name, rank, serial number, and date of birth as the sole resistance to enemy interrogation/indoctrination is unrealistic. DA must establish positive guidelines which will assist the soldier to resist enemy manipulation to the utmost of his ability.

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d. Captured US military personnel will be faced with situations and circumstances not adequately addressed in current doctrine and training. The soldier should be given guidance as to what he may expect from his captors, what he can do for himself to aid his survival, and what the US government will be doing for him and his family.

e. Current assistance programs adequately provide for known and anticipated needs of next of kin. To improve consistency in implementation by local commanders, additional DA guidance should be provided concerning selection of personnel for notification and assistance of next of kin. To reduce unnecessary emotional strain on the NOK, a new procedure for the delivery of personal effects should be established.

f. Procedures relating to the evacuation and processing of returnees are adequately defined to permit implementation at the action level. Stronger emphasis in the regulations on the welfare and morale of returnees is needed, however, to insure that this remains a paramount consideration during each step of the repatriation process.

g. Returnees will experience emotional stress after their return to freedom and families. Reunion of returnees with their families under ideal conditions (half-way house concept), devoid of official pressure and public exposure, might lessen the shock of repatriation and facilitate their return to society.

h. Returnees require additional guidance on what they may and may not reveal to the press in order to protect the interests of the returnee, other USPW's, and the US government.

i. During debriefing, the use of DA prescribed material intended for conduct type investigations and the reading of Article 31, UCMJ, may cause many returnees to believe that the primary purpose of the debriefing is to investigate their conduct during captivity rather than to acquire intelligence information.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended:

a. That DA task CONARC, in coordination with USACDC, to develop a resistance training program, structured to account for varying "risk of capture potential" which incorporates practical instruction on:<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> This training program should include a film series similar to the CIA "Risk of Capture" program to insure uniform presentation of material and proper correlation between topical subjects (1-8).

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- (1) Communist PW management principles.
- (2) Psychological stresses of captivity.
- (3) Evasion and escape.
- (4) Code of conduct.
- (5) Resistance to interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation.
- (6) Internment survival.
- (7) Personal affairs and Army NOK assistance programs.
- (8) Geneva and Hague Conventions.

b. That DA task CONARC, in coordination with USACDC, to revise its doctrinal/technique literature using the results of this study to present those subjects, tactics, and techniques, which have been identified as practical aids to the soldier in his efforts to survive the rigors of internment and to resist the manipulative efforts of his captors.

c. That as an interim measure to a and b above, DA task CONARC, in coordination with USACDC, to publish a pamphlet enumerating and explaining the Communist PW management principles and further, that CONARC and overseas commanders be tasked to use the CONARC pamphlet as source material to insure that every US Soldier is appropriately instructed in Communist PW management principles.

d. That DA revise those regulations (AR 350-30 and AR 350-225) most directly related to Code of Conduct policy so that required doctrine and training insure the individual soldier is provided positive guidance, to include practical techniques, on how to resist Communist interrogation and indoctrination to the utmost of his ability.

e. That DA recommend to DOD that a comprehensive interservice/interdepartmental review be conducted of the Code of Conduct and DOD implementing instructions to determine their current adequacy in light of Communist PW management principles and USPW experiences since the Korean War. The review should take cognizance of the fact that DOD implementing instructions do not allow the flexible response to Communist treatment that is necessary if the USPW is to preserve US national security interests and, concurrently, his own health and well being.

f. That DA publish explicit selection criteria for personnel to be used in the NOK notification and family assistance programs. Further, that DA request the Inspector General to make subject programs a matter of increased emphasis during Annual Inspections.

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g. That DA direct the Office of the Chief of Support Services to review the feasibility of shipping MIA/PW personnel's personal effects to the installation nearest the primary next of kin for delivery by the FSAO.

h. That DA revise AR 190-25 to include:<sup>10</sup>

(1) A comprehensive and detailed "concept of operations" which places proper emphasis on the returnee's welfare and morale during each step of the processing procedure.

(2) Comprehensive public information instructions which clearly delineate the desired returnee/news media relationship.

i. That DA examine the advisability of incorporating a "half-way house" concept as part of the rehabilitation program for returnees and, if considered feasible, make appropriate recommendations to DOD for Army implementation.

j. That DA publish guidance which eliminates, except for cases specifically designated by DA, the necessity for any reading of Article 31, UCMJ, during the initial debriefings of returned US Army Prisoners of War when such debriefings are for intelligence purposes only and not associated with conduct investigation.

NOTE: A synopsis of the key recommendations made in the main study are provided for each phase on the following pages:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>Figure No.</u>
32	Preinternment	4
33	Internment	5
34	Post Internment	6

<sup>10</sup> TAGO is currently (Feb 72) revising AR 190-25 based on concepts identified in this study. Other areas, identified during the early development of the study, have likewise been reviewed by the DA Staff and are under consideration or actually are being implemented. (See para 8, chapter 1, volume II, part I.)

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PREINTERMENT

THAT DA TASK CONARC IN COORDINATION WITH USACDC TO:

Develop a Resistance Training Program for all US Soldiers which:	Revise FM 21-76 or develop a new FM to incorporate the following:	Other Actions by Other Activities:
a. Stresses psychological depression upon capture.	a. Identification of permitted verbal & written communication.	a. TAGO publish a DA Pam on Notification and NOK Assistance Programs.
b. Presents Communist PW Mgt Principles.	b. Accountability of USPW under the UCMJ.	b. DA revise AR 350-30 to read: "All training programs will impress upon every soldier that the PW compound is in many ways an extension of the battlefield.
c. Identifies positive resistance measures to principles.	c. The consequences of committing violence against the captor while escaping.	c. DA initiate action to establish Service Committee at DOD to review SERE & SERE related training with a view of attaining service uniformity.
d. Provides for degrees of training based on risk of capture.	d. The consequences of war crime admissions and accusations.	
e. Provides E&E data for low intensity conflicts and for various theatres.	e. Detailed description of Communist PW Mgt Techniques.	
f. Identifies techniques of personal hygiene and area sanitation using indigenous materials.	f. Positive actions to limit exploitation effectiveness.	
g. Identifies beneficial physical exercises for PW.	g. Techniques for resisting segregation and isolation.	
h. Identifies self help medical techniques for internment diseases and injuries.	h. Guidance on physical fitness, area and personal hygiene, and diet variability.	
i. Informs US Army personnel of NOK assistance programs.	i. Comprehensive guidance on primitive medicine.	
j. Stresses the need for having personal affairs in order prior to overseas movement.	j. Effect of psychological depression upon capture.	
k. Identifies impact of Communist reservation to Art. 85, GPW-1949.	k. Guidance of escape and evasion opportunities and techniques for all conflicts and theatres.	
l. Is presented through the media of a training film series to insure presentation uniformity.	l. Identification of NOK assistance programs.	
	m. Identification of PW organization techniques w/ emphasis on in-camp and out-of-camp communication.	

FIGURE 4. PREINTERMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

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INTERMENT

THAT THE DA TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION:	ACTIONS BY OTHER ACTIVITIES:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Revise AR 600-10 to expand NOK notification criteria.</li><li>b. Revise DA Form 41 to account for NOK medical infirmities and post notification assistance.</li><li>c. Task the IG to make the notification and NOK assistance programs a matter of increased emphasis during annual IG inspections.</li><li>d. Expand AR 600-10 to include a chapter on assistance to NOK. Chapter should include selection criteria and duties of FSAO.</li><li>e. Publish a DA Pam on duties of FSAO and programs/services available to NOK of PW/MIA members.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. CONARC publish a regulation on the selection, training, and supervision of FSAO's.</li><li>b. DA direct CofSS to review feasibility of delivery of MIA/PW personal effects to NOK by the FSAO. If feasible, CofSS to develop implementing plan.</li></ul>

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FIGURE 5. INTERMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

POST INTERNMENT

THAT DA:	ACTIONS OF OTHER ACTIVITIES:
<p>a. Develop and promulgate detailed guidance for all phases of large and small repatriation.</p> <p>b. Revise AR 190-25 to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(1) make it commensurate with guidance provided by EGRESS RE-CAP plans of other Services.</li><li>(2) include a detailed "Concept of Operations."</li><li>(3) relieve medical authorities from the retention beyond ETS responsibility when such retention is for intelligence purposes.</li></ul> <p>c. develop detailed public information briefing guidance for inclusion in AR 190-25.</p>	<p>a. That USA Intelligence Command revise USAINTC Reg 381-100 to delete all reference to FM 30-15</p> <p>b. That USA Intelligence Command revise USAINTC OPLAN 107-71 to delete all reference to development of procedures based on AR 381-130.</p> <p>c. That USA Intelligence School revise FM 30-15 to delete statements of applicability to "US escapees and evaders."</p>
<hr/> <p>a. That DA task CONARC to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(1) determine feasibility of presenting doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel through the media of a training film series.</li><li>(2) review and evaluate other Service "high risk of capture" programs for possible application to Army training.</li></ul> <p>b. That DA review the "half-way" house concept for processing returned US Army PW's.</p> <p>c. That DA publish guidance which eliminates any reading of Article 31 during debriefings when such briefings are solely for intelligence purposes and not for conduct investigation.</p> <p>d. That DA review current other Service special PW staff activities for possible application and incorporation within DA staff.</p>	

17-Apr-2009 FIGURE 6. POST INTERNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

This document has  
been declassified IAW  
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