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US ARMY PRISONER OF WAR DOCTRINE REPORT

Doctrine For Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel, Short Title: USPOW

ACN 15596, March 1972

United States Army Combat Developments Command, Special Operations Agency

This file is: AD-521596, Final Study, Volume II: Main Report Part III – 5.5 MB

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[AD-521595, Final Study, Volume II: Main Report Part II](#) – 14.1 MB

[AD-521597, Final Study, Volume III](#) – 5.3 MB

[AD-521598, Final Study, Volume IV](#) – 6.6 MB

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MARCH 1972

AD

ACN 15596

**DOCTRINE FOR CAPTURED/DETAINED UNITED STATES
MILITARY PERSONNEL (U)**

(Short Title : USPOW (U))

• FINAL STUDY .

VOLUME II

MAIN REPORT

PART III

- APPENDIX A, STUDY DIRECTIVE
- APPENDIX B, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS
- APPENDIX C, FOLLOW-ON ACTION
- APPENDIX D, REFERENCES
- APPENDIX E, DISTRIBUTION
- APPENDIX F, METHODOLOGY
- APPENDIX G, DATA

**UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY**



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MARCH 1972

AD

ACN 15596

**DOCTRINE FOR CAPTURED/DETAINED UNITED STATES
MILITARY PERSONNEL (U)**

(Short Title : USPOW (U))

FINAL STUDY

**VOLUME II
MAIN REPORT
PART III**

- APPENDIX A, STUDY DIRECTIVE
- APPENDIX B, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS
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COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
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Chapter 3 - National/DOD Policy

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Chapter 5 - Internment
Chapter 6 - Postinternment
Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations

Part 3

Appendix A - Study Directive
Appendix B - Essential Elements of Analysis
Appendix C - Follow-On Action
Appendix D - Reference
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Appendix K - Policies and Procedures of Other US Armed Services
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29. Methodology

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APPENDIX A

~~(S)~~ STUDY DIRECTIVE APPENDIX

Attached as Annexes to this Appendix are the following documents:

1. ANNEX I - (U) Study Directive
2. ANNEX II - (U) Change to Study Plan
3. ANNEX III - ~~(S)~~ Study Plan

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ANNEX I

(U) STUDY DIRECTIVE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060

CDCCD-S

SUBJECT: Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. General.

The Institute for Strategic and Stability Operations will undertake a study which will develop joint doctrine for captured/detained United States military personnel.

2. Purpose.

The purpose of the study is to develop proposed joint and Army doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel applicable to both peace and war time situations including all levels and intensities of conflict.

3. Objective and Scope.

The study will synthesize all current policies and procedures pertaining to captured/detained US military personnel at national, Department of Defense and other services levels; determine and establish requirements for new joint service doctrinal literature and/or modification of existing doctrinal literature; and develop necessary joint doctrine. Doctrine for military personnel classified as missing or defectors will be addressed only to the extent that these individuals are involved in a captive role and/or the repatriation process. The study will address three specific areas:

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SUBJECT: Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel

- a. During the training phase and prior to internment.
- b. Conduct during internment, and doctrine and policy applicable to treatment, release, recovery or return.
- c. Doctrine and policy for captured/detained US military personnel following their recovery or return. (Post-Internment Phase).

4. Responsibilities.

- a. ISSO is proponent for the study.
- b. Assistance will be provided by other USACDC institutes and groups upon request by ISSO. Conflicts in priorities will be forwarded to this Headquarters for adjustment.

5. References.

A partial listing is at Inclosure 1. Additional references may be added at the discretion of CO, USACDCISSO.

6. Assumptions.

- a. US military personnel will continue to face the threat of capture or detention during peace time as well as war.
- b. Other assumptions deemed necessary will be approved by this Headquarters.

7. Guidance.

- a. Field visits may be required to selected areas for the collection of data. Requirements for travel will be determined by availability of data, importance to the study, and availability of time and funds. CDC Liaison Officers may be used to collect data to reduce travel requirements.
- b. Interviews will be conducted with selected US military personnel, where possible, in order to obtain the benefit of their personal experiences which have relevance for the study.
- c. Analysis will be made of senior officer debriefings, lessons learned, after-action reports, and staff studies relevant to captured or detained US military personnel.

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CDCCD-S

SUBJECT: Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel

d. Although national policy applicable to captured US personnel is beyond the mission of USACDC, recommendations or comments, if any, resulting from the study which bear on national policy will be reported.

e. Study will not infringe upon US Air Force escape and evasion doctrine responsibility. However, the study report may include proposed Army input to change or modify this joint doctrine.

f. Input from other services and governmental agencies may be obtained through existing liaison channels.

8. Administration.

a. Coordination and other communication will be accomplished as provided in USACDC Regulation 71-1.

b. Schedule of milestones:

(1) Complete Study Plan: One month following distribution of this directive.

(2) Commence Study: Upon approval of study plan.

(3) In-Process Reviews: As scheduled by the study plan at critical points of the study.

(4) Coordination Draft: Nine months after commencement of study.

(5) Complete Coordination and Submit Final Draft: Two months after completion of study.

c. Distribution will be in accordance with USACDC Regulation 310-2.

9. Correlation.

This action is designated as USACDC Action Control Number 15596 and supports the following:

a. Army Combat Developments Program: Army-75.

b. Study "Army-75" USACDC ACN 3189.

c. Army Tasks: High-Intensity Conflict
Mid-Intensity Conflict

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CDCCD-S

SUBJECT: Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel

Low-Intensity Conflict, Type I

Low-Intensity Conflict, Type II

Complementing Allied Land Power

d. Phase: Doctrine

e. Functions: All.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

I Incl
as

/S/ A. J. DOMBROWSKI
A. J. DOMBROWSKI
LTC, GS
Adjutant General

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REFERENCES

1. Proposed Department of Defense Directive: DOD Program for Captured and Detained Personnel (DOD PW Program).
2. Draft AR 600-75, (U) Personnel - General, Captured or Detained United States Army Personnel Administration, Return, and Processing.
3. Letter, USACDC, May 1969, subject: USACDC Proponency for Doctrine Pertaining to Captured US Military Personnel.
4. Code of Conduct (Information and Guidance).
5. Geneva Conventions 1929 and 1949 pertaining to Prisoners of War.
6. United States Department of Defense Report on Implementation and Dissemination of the Geneva Convention of 1949.
7. Army Training Program (ATP) 21-114.
8. AR 350-225, 24 April 1969, Survival, Evasion, and Escape Training.
9. USMACV Intelligence Bulletin, 1 May 1969.
10. Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) Newsletters.
11. DOD Directive 1000.1, 31 December 1964, Issuance of Identity Cards Required by the Geneva Convention.
12. DOD Directive 5105.18, 25 August 1959, Department of Defense Committee Management Program.
13. DOD Directive 5105.21, 1 August 1961, Defense Intelligence Agency.
14. DOD Directive 5230.7, 25 June 1965, Censorship Planning.
15. DOD Instruction 1300.9, 6 April 1967, Casualty Procedures for Military Personnel.
16. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 8 June 1968, Policy for Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel.

Incl 1

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17. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 30 November 1968, Policy and Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel.

18. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 18 January 1969, Space Available Travel for Wives and Dependent Children of Missing-in-Action and Captured Personnel.

19. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 18 January 1969, Policy for Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel.

20. Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Memorandum, 31 October 1967, Medical/Psychological Analysis of Films, Photographs, and Tape Recordings of Captured American Servicemen.

21. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Memorandum, 3 August 1966, Dossiers for Personnel Missing-in-Action and Captured.

22. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Memorandum, 14 March 1967, Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia.

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ANNEX II

(U) CHANGE TO STUDY PLAN

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060

CDCCD-S

SUBJECT: Captured/Detained US Military Personnel

Commanding Officer
US Army Combat Developments Command
Institute of Strategic and Stability Operations
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

1. Reference: Letter, HQ USACDC, dated 16 Feb 70, subject as above (Incl 1).
2. Paragraph 2b of letter referenced above is changed to read:
"Addition of the Viet Cong as a consideration for specific attention regarding treatment of captured/detained US military personnel."

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

/S/ J. T. SCRUGGS
J. T. SCRUGGS
Major, AGC
Asst AG

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~~(S)~~ STUDY PLAN (U)

STUDY PLAN

~~(S)~~ DOCTRINE FOR CAPTURED/DETAINED UNITED STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL

1. ~~(S)~~ PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES

a. Definition of Problem. Exploitation of captured/detained US military personnel by unfriendly foreign states in recent years, during both peace and war, has dictated the need for a review of present US military doctrine to meet this situation. This exploitation of captured/detained personnel, often in violation of the Geneva Conventions, has served the cause of unfriendly foreign powers by providing a means by which political and other bargaining pressure can be brought to bear on the US. The problem as it is recognized, involves the lack of adequate interpretation of policy relative to training and guidance of the individual concerning his actions during the pre-internment, internment, and post-internment phases, and with respect to other actions relative to the individual taken by the Army during those phases. In short, the problem entails the interpretation of policy, and the formulation of doctrine and procedures which will best support national interests while concurrently insuring to the maximum extent the rights and dignity of the individual during the following capture/detention.

b. Objective and Scope.

(1) Objective. Develop recommended new/revised US Army doctrine and procedures relating to captured/detained US military personnel.

(2) Scope.

(a) Collate, synthesize, and analyze present US national policies and the military services doctrine and procedures relevant to captured/detained US military personnel.

(b) Collate, synthesize, and analyze pertinent data concerning the policies, processing, treatment, and methods of exploitation of captured/detained US military personnel by unfriendly foreign powers. North Korea, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong will be specifically addressed in this regard.

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(c) Determine the adequacy of current doctrine and procedures.

(d) Develop new/revised recommended doctrine and procedures, where required, in the following specific areas:

1. During training and prior to internment.
2. During internment.
3. During post-internment.

2. ~~(S)~~ IDENTIFICATION AND EXPLANATION OF STUDY ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

a. Assumption. US military personnel will continue to face the threat of capture/detention and possible exploitation during peacetime as well as during armed conflict.

b. Limitations.

(1) This study will be conducted based on current US national policies, relating to captured/detained US military personnel, as provided by the Senior Army Staff Representative to the Department of Defense Prisoner of War Policy Committee (TPMG), only. Point of contact is MAJ Lazzaro, phone 11-35152.

(2) The study will not infringe upon US Air Force escape and evasion doctrine responsibility. However, the study report may include proposed Army input to change or modify this joint doctrine.

3. ~~(S)~~ METHODOLOGY

a. Phase I. Data Collection. During this phase, data will be collected to determine (1) current US policies, doctrine, and procedures pertaining to captured/detained US military personnel and (2) the policies, and practices of selected foreign powers relating to captured/detained US military personnel. Data collection, for other than US policy, will be accomplished through:

(1) Literature search.

(2) Debriefing reports and interviews with repatriated US military captives/detainees.

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(3) Interviews and consultations with other selected US military and civilian personnel.

(4) Input by US Army staff agencies and organizations.

(5) Input by other military services.

b. Phase II. Synthesis and Analysis. Data collected during Phase I will be synthesized during Phase II prior to analysis into three components (1) training and pre-internment; (2) internment; and (3) post-internment. Analysis will be accomplished on a systems basis, i.e., examining each component as part of a total system.

(1) Each component will be analyzed in the light of current US policies, doctrine, and procedures, and the threat.

(2) A systems analysis will then be conducted to determine the relationships which exist between components and the degree of impact between components.

(3) The validity of present doctrine and procedures will be assessed and requirements for adjustments will be determined on a component and systems basis.

(4) Recommendations for new/revised doctrine and procedures will be developed in coordination with other military services.

c. Phase III. Production of Reports.

(1) A coordination draft of the study will be prepared and ready for coordination 9 months after commencement of the study. The coordination draft will include a synopsis of the findings, conclusions, and specific recommendations.

(2) Final draft of the study will be distributed 2 months after distribution of the coordination draft.

(3) Initial manpower and materiel requirements (IMMR) will be submitted to include those relevant basis elements of information set forth in Section IV, page 39, paragraph f(1) of study, "Methodology for the Combat Developments Doctrinal Study Program," USACDCICAS, June 1969. The final draft of the study will accompany the IMMR as a supporting document.

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4. (U) CONTRACT SUPPORT REQUIRED

No contractual support is requested. The urgency of initiating this study precludes utilization of contractor support because of the lead time required for approval.

5. (U) STUDY TIME SCHEDULE

The programmed timetable for conducting this study is depicted in Inclosure 1. The development is phased to permit input from all agencies and organization concerned with the subject.

6. (U) DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF MAN-HOURS AND DOLLAR ALLOCATION

a. Man-Hours: 24-man-months' effort expended in a period of 12 calendar months.

(1) ISSO Effort:	14.4 m/m
(a) Pre-internment:	5.0 m/m
(b) Internment:	3.0 m/m
(c) Post-internment:	6.4 m/m
(2) Other Effort:	9.6 m/m
(a) CDC agencies:	3.3 m/m
(b) Other services:	4.0 m/m
(c) Other organizations:	2.3 m/m

NOTE: ISSO effort is programmed for three project officers averaging 75 man-days per quarter (25 man-days per quarter per individual or approximately 8 1/3 man-days per month per individual).

b. Dollar Allocation

(1) Contractual Support:	None
(2) TDY:	\$4,600.00
(3) In-house admin costs and add-ons:	\$50.00

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- (4) Other:
 - (a) Consultant visit and fees: \$750.00
 - (b) Other services visitors for conferences: \$725.00

TOTAL	1,475.00
	<u>\$6,125.00</u>

7. (U) DATA REQUIREMENTS

As indicated in the Methodology, an extensive literature search is on-going to determine existing documentation relative to the study. Data requirements include such items as:

- a. Current US policies, doctrine, and procedures pertaining to captured/detained US military personnel.
- b. Policies and practices of selected foreign powers relating to captured/detained US military personnel.

8. (U) RESOURCE PLAN FOR PERFORMANCE OF ENTIRE STUDY

- a. ISSO Effort: Three people employed to expend approximately 14.4 man-months and one social scientist and an operations research analyst to aid and work with study project officers.
- b. Other CDC Effort: At the request of ISSO, other CDC organizations will provide information required for the development of the study.
- c. Other Services Effort: Other services will be requested to provide pertinent information in regard to present activities and programmed plans regarding captured/detained military personnel.
- d. Other Support: Other organizations, not listed above, will be requested to provide information required for full development of the study. Previous research or studies in this area plus the experience of other social scientists may provide valuable data.

9. ~~(S)~~ COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR THE STUDY EFFORT FROM USACDC AND NON-USACDC ELEMENTS

- a. Support will be requested as follows:
 - (1) With other CDC elements - Normal requests for input, documentation and/or coordination through established channels.

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(2) With non-CDC organizations - Requests for replies to specific EEA and information through CDC Headquarters. In the case of other services represented at the US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, initial contact will be made through their liaison personnel.

b. Appropriate CDC organizations, including HQ CDC, and the Office of the Provost Marshal General, DA, will be requested to furnish representatives to participate in in-process reviews to be held at times keyed to the progress of the study.

c. Discussion or requests concerning the obtaining of policy, as opposed to doctrine or procedures, will be directed through HQ USACDC to the Office of the Provost Marshal General, DA, only.

d. Contact with other than DOD agencies and organizations will be approved, on an individual basis, by HQ USACDC in coordination with HQ DA (TPMG).

10. (U) STUDY OUTLINE

Study outline is attached as Inclosure 2.

11. (U) CORRELATION

This action is designated as USACDC Action Control Number 15596 and supports the following:

a. Army Combat Developments Program: Army-75.

b. Study, "Army-75", USACDC Action Control Number 3189.

c. Army Tasks: 1 High-Intensity Conflict.

2 Mid-Intensity Conflict.

3 Low-Intensity Conflict, Type I.

4 Low-Intensity Conflict, Type II.

7 Complementing Allied Land Power.

d. Phase: Doctrine.

e. Functions:

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- (1) Intelligence.
- (2) Mobility.
- (3) Firepower.
- (4) Command, Control and Communications.
- (5) Service Support.

2 Incls

- a. Study Time Schedule and Flow Chart
- b. Study Outline

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
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INCLOSURE A.
CAPTURED / DETAINED US MILITARY PERSONNEL
STUDY TIME SCHEDULE



Inclosure b
STUDY OUTLINE* (U)

Purpose.

Scope.

Objectives.

Assumptions.

Limitations, Constraints.

Background.

Current Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures.

National.

Executive.

Governmental Agencies.

DOD Level.

Services (Army, Navy, AF).

Unfriendly States.

North Korea.

North Vietnam.

Viet Cong.

Current Doctrine.

Army.

* This outline is not intended to indicate final form of the report, but only to indicate major areas of consideration and general sequence of the study.

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Gaps, Conflicts, Inconsistencies.
Requirements.

Joint.

Gaps, Conflicts, Inconsistencies.
Requirements.

Navy.

Air Force.

Development of Army Doctrine by Phase.

Prior to Internment.

Personal Aspects.

Pretraining (Reception).

Physiological and Psychological.

Individual, Advanced Individual and Unit Training.

Information and Education.

Code of Conduct.

Geneva Convention.

Character Guidance.

Survival, Evasion, and Escape.

Esprit de Corps.

Conditioning.

Schools.

Family Considerations.

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During Internment.

Conflict.

Personal Behavior.

Intelligence.

Escape.

Tactical Recovery.

Non-Conflict.

Family Considerations.

Post Internment.

Evacuation and Handling.

Debriefing and Investigation.

Medical Treatment.

Intelligence and Security.

Information.

Legal.

Special Considerations.

Identification of Defectors.

Nature of Return.

Escapee (or Evadee).

Recoveree.

Releasee.

Rehabilitation.

Reassignment or Discharge.

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Family Considerations.

Development of Joint Doctrine.

Roles and Responsibilities.

Intelligence.

Information.

Training.

Coordination with Other Agencies.

Recovery.

Evacuation and Handling.

Legal.

Rehabilitation.

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APPENDIX B

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS

1. GENERAL. Listed below are the essential elements of analysis (EEA) which are the primary questions posed prior to the initiation of the study effort. The answers to the EEA are as brief and succinct as possible and reference is made to the main part of the study where a more thorough explanation or derivation may be found.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS:

a. Communist Prisoner of War Management Principles:

(1) WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL COMMUNIST TECHNIQUES USED IN HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR? (See Section II, Chapter 2)

(a) The Communist prisoner of war management system is designed to obtain maximum exploitation of the prisoner of war, and, whenever possible, reorient ideologically the individual captive. These goals are sought through the efficient and effective use of resources, both physical facilities and skilled personnel, and by application of specific techniques.

(b) The most commonly used techniques are those of intimidation, interrogation, isolation, segregation, psychological and physical stress, and indoctrination. By the calculated application of these techniques, the Communists create an environment which supports the mental-conditioning process (attitude), to eliminate resistance tendencies on the part of the prisoner and to facilitate exploitation.

(2) WHAT SPECIFIC PURPOSE(S) DOES EACH TECHNIQUE FULFILL?
(See Section II, Chapter 2)

(a) Intimidation. Intimidation is used to degrade psychologically the individual PW to the point where he no longer resists the demands of his captor. Immediately upon capture and for the duration of his internment, the threat of death intimidates the PW. The vocalization of this threat by his Communist captors serves to heighten his fears and makes him dependent upon the captor for his very existence. In addition, the PW recognizes that any act considered to be arrogant or uncooperative could result in reduced rations or denial of medical help. Along with promoting the fear of death and the withholding of privileges or necessities, it is not uncommon that the Communists threaten the PW

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with detention beyond the cessation of the current hostilities. Normally, the development of a "progressive" attitude is held out as the key for repatriation. In all cases and whatever the threat, the aim of intimidation is PW compliance with the captor's desires.

(b) Interrogation. The Communists use interrogation to assess the exploitation value of the PW and to obtain initial dialogue between captor and captured. When assessing the prisoner for exploitation value, interrogation also serves as a screening process. The relative resistance displayed by the prisoner is weighed against those measures deemed necessary to gain his compliance. Prisoners are rapidly segregated into "reactionaries" (hard-line resisters) and "progressives" (individuals who are or who appear to be receptive to indoctrination efforts). This permits the Communist to identify those PW's with whom they have the best chance to succeed. Establishing an initial dialogue is a first step toward the responsive pattern desired in the exploitation process. The "give and take" discussion, albeit one-sided, provides the skilled interrogator the opportunity to undermine the ideals of the prisoner, and at the same time, accustoms the prisoner to responding to ideas provided him.

(c) Isolation. Communists use isolation primarily for disciplinary purposes and for the promotion of a particular response or action from the PW. By removing the prisoner from the outside stimuli from which he would normally derive support (e.g., his fellow prisoners, familiar objects, communication, established routine), the PW becomes totally dependent upon his Communist captors. The PW who refuses to converse with his interrogator/indoctrinator is quite likely to experience a long period of isolation. Upon release from weeks or months of isolation, the PW is normally eager to talk to someone--even if that someone is the enemy interrogator. Isolation also provides an environment in which the PW can only look inward; and his doubts, fears, and guilt continue to grow. Playing on these emotions, the Communists seek to destroy confidence and instill dependency.

(d) Application of Psychological and Physical Stress. The Communist application of rewards or punishments is often done for no explicable reason. The principle behind this seemingly haphazard technique is that it keeps the PW off-balance. He never knows whether he will receive extra rations, his standard rations, or no rations at all. He is severely punished for slight offenses and leniently treated for more serious acts. In the strictly controlled atmosphere of internment, such treatment frustrates and disorients the PW. He becomes

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wary of every act, not only of his own making but also those of his fellow PW's. Resentment is not unusual when a PW feels he is being punished for another PW's act(s). Often mass reward and punishment is used as an instrument for disrupting prisoner loyalties and reducing collective resistance. (See Segregation below)

(e) Segregation. It is normal for Communists to separate officers, NCO's, and enlisted personnel if sufficient facilities exist. Two specific purposes are served: the first is to destroy the USPW command structure, thus reducing collective resistance; and the second is to form homogeneous blocks of "students" at whom a special brand of indoctrinal material can be aimed. It is worth noting, as stated in Interrogation above, that hard-line resisters are normally separated from the other prisoners so that their example of resistance will not adversely affect the indoctrination of the others. This too, is part of the segregation policy.

(f) Indoctrination. Indoctrination is a technique which has been developed and refined by the Communists. It is a program of instruction directed toward altering the pre-capture values of the prisoner. The indoctrination effort seeks to instill within the PW an understanding of the Communist cause and, if possible, gain his sympathy for, or convert him to, the Communist ideology. From the moment of capture to the time for release, the PW is subjected to both overt and covert efforts to realign his personal and nationalistic ideals. The only information (current events, political, military, etc.) he receives is that which his captors feel will enhance his "progress." The eroding effect upon his values works toward inducing the PW to participate in compromising propaganda exercises. The indoctrination effort has succeeded when the PW is ready for exploitation.

(3) IN THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, WHAT DIFFERENCE EXISTS, IF ANY, BETWEEN COMMUNIST METHODS AND/OR OBJECTIVES AND THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES? (See Section I, Chapter 2)

A significant difference in treatment of prisoners of war exists because of the difference in the relative value placed upon the PW himself by the respective detaining powers. In the case of a non-Communist nation who is a belligerent to an armed conflict, the value of the prisoner of war, outside of any immediate tactical information he might divulge, lies solely in the fact that he represents one less soldier the opposition has under arms. He has, in effect, been removed from the conflict. The Communists, on the other hand, consider the PW to be a valuable prize to be exploited and used to support their

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military/political/economic goals. They expend considerably more effort than other detaining powers in attempting to condition the PW to accept their doctrinal material. Even partial acceptance alters the PW's values and beliefs, thus making him more amenable to exploitation. Although most techniques used by the Communists in their treatment of prisoners are commonly used in penal institutions, there is always a unique twist which supports the indoctrination/exploitation effort. A PW of a non-Communist state is primarily concerned with boredom and survival; the PW of a Communist state must be concerned with resisting a relentless re-education campaign from which there is no relief.

(4) WHAT RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES, IF ANY, WILL LESSEN THE EFFECTS OF INTERNMENT UNDER COMMUNIST MANAGEMENT? (See Appendix H)

(a) Adherence to the concepts set forth in the Code of Conduct represents the best resistance to Communist management principles. Further techniques for resistance are provided in the paragraphs below:

(b) Specific techniques for foiling interrogation/indoctrination are:

1. Remain silent to the utmost of one's ability, except for providing name, rank, service number, and date of birth.
2. Claim ignorance.
3. Portray stupidity.
4. Provide long, drawn out answers which buy time.
5. Answer questions with questions.

(c) Specific techniques for foiling segregation are:

1. Establish and respect the chain of command regardless of the rank of the "senior."
2. Establish communication whenever possible with other groups through signals or message drops.
3. Discuss passive resistance techniques with fellow PW's.

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4. Respect and maintain loyalty to fellow PW's and country.

(d) Specific techniques for enduring isolation:

1. Establish and maintain a daily schedule of mental gymnastics of at least one-hour duration.

2. Establish and maintain a daily schedule of proper exercise.

3. Prepare to experience hallucinations and not fear them inasmuch as they are not harmful and the effect is totally reversible upon release.

4. Remain loyal to fellow PW's and country.

5. Establish, if possible, communication through hand signals, knocking codes, or message drop.

(e) Specific techniques for enduring physical debasement:

1. Establish and respect the chain of command.

2. Establish and maintain a daily regimen of proper exercise.

3. Eat everything the captor provides and supplement whenever possible.

4. Maintain good personal hygiene.

5. Maintain the proper sanitation in the internment area.

6. Establish communication with fellow PW's.

7. Keep the mind active by planning escapes and other mental gymnastics.

(f) As implied in the Code, the best resistance techniques for all the above is an intangible which must be ingrained in the soldier even before he is inducted into the Army; i.e., faith--faith in himself, faith in his fellow PW, and faith in his country.

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b. National Policy:

(1) WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF US NATIONAL POLICY AS IT PERTAINS TO CAPTURED/DETAINED US MILITARY PERSONNEL? (See Section II, Chapter 3) There are three principal elements of US national policy:

(a) To persuade hostile nations detaining US personnel to provide treatment and protection in accordance with the provisions of international law and custom, particularly the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. This is accomplished primarily by the principle of reciprocity; that is, providing prisoners of war of hostile nations with the kind of treatment and protection the United States desires for USPW's in enemy hands.

(b) To permit prisoners of war, during or after the cessation of hostilities, to elect whether or not they desire to be returned to their own country. Although the principle of voluntary or nonforcible repatriation is not a matter of written international, or even national, agreement, the United States established the precedent following the Korean War and has abided by the concept in the current hostilities in Southeast Asia.

(c) To improve the ability of the US serviceman to fight the enemy, avoid capture, and, if captured, to resist the enemy while awaiting an opportunity to escape.

(2) WHAT PROMINENT PRINCIPLE(S) OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTS US NATIONAL POLICY IN THE AREA OF CAPTURED/DETAINED US MILITARY PERSONNEL? (See Section III, Chapter 3)

(a) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) is the fundamental legal document which guides US national policy. This convention, one of four which as a composite make up the Geneva Conventions of 1949, sets forth international law in the following areas:

1. Definition of a prisoner of war.
2. Categories of captured civilian personnel entitled to the protection of the GPW.
3. Rights of the POW.
4. Obligations of the detaining power.

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5. Functions of the protecting power.

6. Functions of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

(b) A second series of conventions to which the United States is a signatory and which thus have an influence on US national policy toward PW's are the Hague Conventions of 1907. The Hague Convention No. IV addresses the treatment of PW and establishes guidelines in the following areas:

1. Responsibilities of the detaining power.

2. Utilization of PW's as a labor force.

3. Establishment of PW information center.

4. Parole/escape/neutral internment.

5. Treatment of sick and wounded.

6. Prohibitions on killing or wounding prisoners of war.

7. Repatriation of prisoners of war.

c. Pre-internment Phase:

(1) WHAT DOCTRINE IS REQUIRED TO ASSIST THE US SOLDIER TO SURVIVE INTERNMENT AS A PRISONER OF WAR? (See Section IV and V, Chapter 2)

The primary doctrine required is that which will establish and maintain the ability of the soldier to cope with the physically demanding and mentally debilitating effects of the captive environment. It must provide guidance on conduct, escape, evasion, and survival both while evading and, equally importantly, while interned. Doctrinal literature must acquaint the US soldier with the principles and techniques which might be directed at him by a captor. In line with this, there must be doctrinal guidance on the best means to counter or endure these techniques. If accomplished, the soldier would have a better indication of what to anticipate and how to survive when thrust into the prisoner of war role. In essence, a collection of doctrinal guidelines is required which will promote the ability to survive the mentally and physically hostile environment of a prison camp. Such guidelines must be expressed in terms of what the captive can expect.

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(2) WHAT IS THE EXISTING DOCTRINE FOR ASSISTING THE US SOLDIER TO SURVIVE INTERNMENT AS A PRISONER OF WAR? (See Chapter 4)

(a) Existing doctrine as expressed in current Department of the Army Field Manuals addresses the following broad areas:

1. Survival (FM 21-76).
2. Escape (FM 21-76).
3. Evasion (FM 21-76).
4. Code of Conduct (FM 21-76, FM 21-13, FM 21-75).
5. Geneva and Hague Conventions (DA Pam 27-1).
6. Field Sanitation (FM 21-10).
7. Personal Hygiene (FM 21-10).
8. Physical Conditioning (FM 21-20).
9. First Aid (FM 21-11).

(b) Much of the doctrine presented in the above areas is directed toward existing in the combat situation while under friendly control. However, many of the points covered are equally applicable to the internment environment.

(3) WHAT ELEMENTS OF REQUIRED DOCTRINE ARE NOT CURRENTLY SATISFIED? (See para 4, Section I, and para 5, Section II, Chapter 4)

(a) The principal drawback of current doctrine is its excessively general nature. Further, insofar as the internment environment is concerned, most of the doctrine presented concerns itself with the large World War II prisoner of war compound situation and fails to address the low prisoner population situations such as occurred with the Pueblo crew and the current conflict in Southeast Asia.

(b) Existing doctrine includes only brief descriptions of methods and techniques of interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation, but fails entirely to provide positive means of resisting them. There is no adequate doctrine on the maintenance of physical or mental health in the prison camp, nor is there realistic guidance for the POW's conduct.

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(c) In summary, current Army doctrine does not provide sufficient guidance to the US soldier on what he can expect from his captors, what he can do to assist his own survival, and what is expected of him insofar as his own conduct while a prisoner of war is concerned.

(4) WHAT PROGRAMS EXIST IN THE OTHER SERVICES TO ASSIST THEIR MEMBERS IN SURVIVING INTERNMENT AS A PRISONER OF WAR? (See Annex I, Appendix K)

(a) The Air Force and the Navy maintain established resistance training programs for their personnel. These programs address the entire spectrum of the prisoner of war environment and existence. In both Services, the depth of resistance training varies according to duty assignment and the "risk of capture" potential of the students.

(b) For personnel with a high "risk of capture" potential, especially air crewmen, both the Air Force and the Navy conduct intensive resistance training programs at Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) schools. SERE training programs at these facilities provide training in the Code of Conduct, primitive medicine, evasion and escape, and the techniques and countermeasures of interrogation and indoctrination. The principles taught in the classroom are tested in "resistance training laboratories" which are mock internment compounds complete with isolation cells, interrogation rooms, and aggressor cadre. The duration of the Navy program is 5 1/2 days, while the Air Force program lasts 2 weeks.

(c) The Marine Corps training closely resembles that of the US Army. The Marines have no specific course in resistance, but cover the subject as a part of their Code of Conduct training.

(d) For comparison, although not a sister Service per se, the resistance program conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lasts but 6 hours. As a medium, the CIA program utilizes exclusively a film series in which an acknowledged expert describes the incidents and effects of captivity and demonstrates methods of resistance.

d. Internment Phase:

(1) WHAT PROGRAMS ARE REQUIRED TO ASSIST THE NEXT OF KIN DURING A SPONSOR'S PERIOD OF INTERNMENT AS A PRISONER OF WAR? (See Section I, Chapter 5)

(a) There are three major programs required to assist the next of kin (NOK) once a sponsor falls into a prisoner of war status.

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The first and most obvious is that of notifying the NOK of the sponsor's status. Such a program must be geared to account for the psychological shock such news will cause to the NOK. The second program involves the preparation and assignment of a Family Services and Assistance Officer (FSAO) and the delineation of his duties. A selected member of the Army must be made available to act as an efficient and sensitive liaison between the Army and the missing or captured sponsor's family. The final program is actually a series of programs designed to alleviate the personal problems which commonly occur and with which the NOK of a PW must cope. These programs must assist the NOK in such matters as finance, medicine, transportation, housing, education, and legal assistance.

(b) The latter programs are required inasmuch as the sponsor is no longer capable of providing the guidance and assistance he normally gives. The FSAO must be knowledgeable in these programs and stand ready to assist the NOK to take full advantage of them.

(2) WHAT PROGRAMS CURRENTLY EXIST TO ASSIST THE NEXT OF KIN DURING A SPONSOR'S PERIOD OF INTERNMENT AS A PRISONER OF WAR? (See Section I, Chapter 5)

(a) Army policy broadly, and, for the most part, adequately, addresses the area of concern indicated in subparagraph (1) above. A very brief synopsis of the programs currently operative is provided in subsequent paragraphs.

(b) Notification. Notification is accomplished as soon as possible through a personal visit by an active duty service member of a rank higher than or equal to that of the MIA/PW sponsor.

(c) Family Assistance. A Family Services and Assistance Officer (FSAO) is appointed to personally advise and assist the NOK of the MIA/PW service member. The FSAO must be of a rank higher than or equal to that of the service member and must have a retention period to serve in the FSAO capacity of at least 12 months.

(d) Monetary Assistance. Excess pay and allowances not already designated in allotment to NOK may be placed in the Uniformed Services Savings Deposit to draw 10 percent per annum; amount deposited may exceed authorized limit of \$10,000.

(e) Medical Assistance. Dependent is authorized hospitalization, outpatient treatment and services under the Uniformed Services

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Health Benefits program. If NOK lives beyond commuting distance to a military medical facility, civilian facilities may be used under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).

(f) Housing Assistance. The NOK of a MIA/PW sponsor is entitled to live in government owned or leased facilities during the period the sponsor remains in that status.

(g) Education Assistance. There are several programs designed to assist the adult and children NOK to obtain both high school and college level educations.

(h) Transportation Assistance. Within 1 year of notification, the NOK of a MIA/PW sponsor may, at government expense, move to an area of her(his) choice. There are also provisions to permit such NOK to travel aboard military air transportation on a space available basis within CONUS for humanitarian reasons.

(i) Legal Assistance. The NOK may request and receive legal assistance from the closest JAG activity.

(j) Personal Information Assistance. The Adjutant General provides personal monthly newsletters to the NOK of MIA/PW personnel which contain pertinent reports and comments on MIA/PW status and related activities.

(3) WHAT ELEMENTS OF REQUIRED PROGRAMS ARE NOT CURRENTLY SATISFIED BY EXISTING PROGRAMS? (See Appendix I)

(a) The current programs within Department of the Army to assist the next of kin of MIA/PW personnel satisfy all requirements. The failures noted are more in execution of the programs as opposed to lack of programs themselves.

(b) Specific requirements for the selection and composition of the notification personnel are at the discretion of the installation commander and guidance to those personnel varies from post to post. Further, the general guidance provided by Army Regulation 600-10 fails to adequately address the psychological and physiological effects of notification upon the NOK.

(c) Specific requirements for the selection of the Family Services and Assistance Officer (FSAO) are also left to the discretion of the installation commander, as are his instructions for carrying out

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his duties. From the standpoint of the NOK, there is no single source document or collection of documents which list the specific services available to the NOK.

(d) Finally, there is an apparent absence of emphasis on informing the soldier of the nature of the services available to the next of kin should he become missing or captured.

(4) WHAT PROGRAMS EXIST IN THE OTHER SERVICES TO ASSIST THE NEXT OF KIN DURING A SPONSOR'S PERIOD OF INTERNMENT? (See Annex II, Appendix K)

(a) The fundamental objectives of the casualty programs of the other Services are common: to provide prompt and appropriate notification and to offer complete assistance to the next of kin. There are, however, structural differences in the various programs delineated by the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force.

(b) The notification procedures of the Navy program closely parallel those of the Army casualty program. The Navy Casualty Assistance Calls Program (CACP) requires that an officer be designated to assist the primary next of kin. The Navy counterpart to the Army Family Services and Assistance Officer (FSAO) is the Casualty Assistance Calls Officer (CACO). Services and benefits available to next of kin are similar to those available to the next of kin of Army personnel (financial matters, travel, housing, etc.). In addition, the Navy publishes a manual for the next of kin, "MIA/PW Family Information," which lists and describes all available benefits and services.

(c) The Marine Corps casualty program resembles that of the Navy. Marine Corps policies and methods vary somewhat from those of the other Services because of limitations in personnel and facilities. Thus, for example, casualty assistance calls are conducted on a periodic basis (quarterly), rather than with the frequency manifested by the other Services. The benefits and services provided, however, are practically identical to those offered to next of kin by the Navy.

(d) The Air Force provides the most sophisticated casualty program among the Services. While notification procedures and services offered the next of kin do not differ from those of the other Services, the techniques of application and administration are substantially more efficient. There is an Air Force pamphlet, "Benefits for Dependents and Survivors of Air Force Casualties," which delineates and describes the services offered next of kin. The Air Force provides a specific

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Specialty Code (corresponding to an Army MOS) directly related to family assistance. As a consequence, the casualty officer is a specialist with only one job--assisting a dependent or a next of kin. In addition, the Air Force has created an organization to handle all family problems and provide advice to next of kin. This organization is known as the Family Service Center. The Air Force Casualty Division is the principal organization responsible for prisoner of war matters. As a service to next of kin, the Casualty Division evaluates and distributes to the next of kin reports, messages, letters, and eyewitness accounts as they are received.

e. Postinternment Phase.

(1) WHAT DOCTRINE/POLICY EXISTS FOR RECEIVING, DEBRIEFING, AND PROCESSING RETURNED USPW'S? (See Sections I and II, Chapter 6)

(a) There is no current doctrine on receipt, debriefing, and processing of returned USPW's. All policy guidance in these areas is found in Army Regulations (AR's) and Operation Plans (OPLANS).

(b) AR 190-25, "Captured, Missing, or Detained US Army Personnel: Administration, Return, and Processing," is the primary source for policy and contains guidance for both in-theatre and CONUS processing. It covers the following:

1. DA staff responsibilities.
2. In-theatre staff responsibilities.
3. Evacuation and medical processing instructions.
4. In-theatre and CONUS intelligence/counter-intelligence debriefing guidance.
5. Investigation for misconduct guidance.
6. Public information guidance.
7. Personnel actions instructions.

(c) COMUSMACV OPLAN J-190 (EGRESS-RECAP) is an in-theatre Operation Plan which prescribes procedures for in-theatre reception, processing, and evacuation of US prisoners of war and civilian detainees who are returned to US control in South Vietnam.

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(d) US Army Intelligence Command Prisoners of War Debriefing Plan (U) OPLAN 107-71 (EGRESS RECAP - Army) is a supplement to AR 190-25 for the CONUS debriefings and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for simultaneous debriefing of large scale return of US Army personnel from Southeast Asia to CONUS. It is applicable only in the event of a requirement to simultaneously debrief 11 or more released/recovered USPW's. (10 or less are governed by AR 190-25 and USA Intelligence Command Regulation 381-100.) It contains guidance in the following areas:

1. Task organization.
2. Conduct of debriefing.
3. Preparation for debriefing.
4. Narrative debriefing guide and list of desired information.
5. Administration and logistics.

(2) WHAT DOCTRINE/POLICY IS REQUIRED TO ADEQUATELY RECEIVE, DEBRIEF, AND PROCESS RETURNED USPW'S? (See Appendix J)

(a) The processing and screening of returned PW's must strive toward their full rehabilitation and adjustment as functioning, constructive citizens.

(b) Appropriate policy must exist which will assure the expeditious integration of repatriates back into society. There must, however, be sufficient safeguards in the processing policy which will permit the weeding out of possible enemy agents or, more importantly, permit the identification of those individuals requiring physical or psychiatric rehabilitation. The delicate balance between the needs of the government and the needs of the individual must be identified and maintained.

(c) There must be appropriate policy in the matter of debriefing the returnee. Every effort must be made to safeguard the returnee's legal rights. The policy established in this area must take into account the hardships and duress, both physical and psychological that the individual endured.

(d) Personal rights must also be considered in established policy. The reunion with next of kin, the treatment as a soldier of

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the US Army, appropriate scheduling such that the returnee has time to reflect, etc., are areas which should be addressed. Guidance on relations with the public press must be provided to the returnee.

(e) In summary, there must be adequate policy which insures that the reception process of returnees is not a "dehumanizing" experience and which assures that the individual's health and welfare is the paramount concern.

(3) WHAT ELEMENTS OF REQUIRED DOCTRINE/POLICY ARE NOT CURRENTLY SATISFIED BY EXISTING DOCTRINE/POLICY? (See Appendix J)

(a) Army policy as prescribed in AR 190-25 suffers from a lack of explicit guidance in regard to the welfare and morale of returnees. The AR devotes only a single paragraph to this subject, and it fails to impart to subordinate commanders the critical priority which DOD clearly intends to be given to the welfare of returnees.

(b) Army policy on public release of information is inadequate. Both AR 190-25 and MACV OPLAN J-190 specify that returnees are to be counseled by an information officer and an intelligence officer on this aspect, but no specific guidance on what the counseling should address is provided. The only explicit public information guidance in AR 190-25 consists of a single paragraph contained in Appendix A of that regulation.

(c) Debriefing guidance as currently provided by AR 190-25 and USAINTC OPLAN 107-71 fails to provide specific procedures for protecting the rights of the returnees to be presumed innocent where there exists no prior evidence/accusations of misconduct. AR 381-130, cited by OPLAN 107-71 as the basis for developing debriefing formats and techniques, is clearly weighted in the direction of an investigation of conduct rather than a search for intelligence information. Further, the guidance in both OPLAN 107-71 and AR 190-25 on the special need to assure that the individual's rights are protected is very sterile and lacks the requisite emphasis.

(4) WHAT PROGRAMS EXIST IN THE OTHER SERVICES FOR RECEIVING, DEBRIEFING, AND PROCESSING RETURNED USPW'S? (See Annex III, Appendix K)

(a) The other Services have developed detailed OPLANS to cover the CONUS portion of processing. Such OPLANS insure a greater degree of coordination and uniformity than do the more general provisions of an Army Regulation.

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(b) Several of the key features of the other Service programs not currently incorporated in Army doctrine are presented here:

1. Detailed "Concept of Operation" which sets the appropriately sympathetic tenor for receipt/processing of returnees (EGRESS/RECAP-Navy).
2. Detailed public affairs guidance to include verbatim brief to be given to all returnees (EGRESS/RECAP-Navy, Marine).
3. Specific guidance on the use of Service chaplains to provide spiritual assistance to the returnee and to his family (EGRESS/RECAP-Navy).
4. Comprehensive information briefings which bring the individual up-to-date on significant current events (EGRESS/RECAP-Air Force).
5. Personalized brochures provided to the returnee for his information and convenience (EGRESS/RECAP-Air Force).

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APPENDIX C

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~~(S)~~ FOLLOW-ON ACTION APPENDIX (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. The purpose of this appendix is to identify related areas that cannot be solved within the scope of the current study. In every case, these topics were discussed in the course of in-process reviews at which the proponent activity was represented. What is presented here is the consensus of those in-process reviews.

2. ~~(S)~~ CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRESENTATION OF DOCTRINE:

a. ~~(S)~~ Discussion:

(1) (U) The study was developed under the premise that USACDC formulates doctrine and CONARC provides the techniques for implementing doctrine. Often, however, the two areas appeared to overlap and one had to be considered in order to evaluate the other in its proper perspective.

(2) (U) As has been shown in the main body of the study, what doctrine exists in the area of captured/detained US military personnel is proliferated throughout a great number and variety of documents. Much of the "doctrine" is that which is prescribed for environments other than that of captivity but which has direct applicability to the latter state. Army training can be no more effective than the doctrine it imparts. As doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel is widely diffused and not consciously interrelated, training is degraded to the same extent. Although the soldier receives a considerable amount of information which would be of assistance to him should he find himself a prisoner of war, there is only one subject that he receives that by design is directly related to the internment situation. That subject is the Code of Conduct.

(3) (U) The implementing Army Regulation, AR 350-30, "Code of Conduct," dated 8 July 1968, is quite explicit as to what should be taught. Unfortunately, much of what should be taught is not currently in a field manual. The doctrine upon which Code of Conduct instruction is based is nonexistent. Having recognized this, the study makes numerous recommendations for additions and revisions to the primary manual in the concerned doctrinal area, FM 21-76, Survival, Evasion, and Escape. The recommendations explicitly nominate FM 21-76 rather than an associated manual which might be more topical to the specific recommended area, because of the desire to combine all doctrine pertaining to captured/detained personnel under one cover. In fact, despite the

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current program to reduce the number of field manuals in existence, the import of this doctrinal area is considered to be of such a magnitude as to offer as an alternative a major rewrite of FM 21-76, the creation of a new field manual entitled, "Doctrine for Prisoners of War."

(4) (U) If the premise that doctrine for captured/detained US personnel should be incorporated into a single source document is correct, then it follows that such doctrine should be taught as a single integrated subject. This is the concept under which the US Navy and the US Air Force function. Both of these Services provide blocks of instruction in which survival, evasion, escape, and resistance are correlated and structured to meet the particular need of the target audience; i.e., increasing the intensity of the training in proportion to the "risk of capture" potential of the student. (For details of Other Service Programs, see Appendix K.) Even their basic personnel receive a minimum of instruction on what to expect should they become prisoners of war. It appears an inescapable conclusion that the US Army is not living up to its obligations to the US soldier.

(5) (U) The Army, by its organization and mission, has a requirement to train far more "high risk" personnel than does any other Service. There is no higher risk than meeting the enemy face-to-face on the battlefield. Every combat soldier (and combat support soldier) upon entering the combat area becomes a high risk. In a low-intensity conflict, the numbers lost may be minimal. In a mid-intensity conflict (conventional war) where major elements face each other and breakthroughs and envelopments occur, the dangers of capture are significantly high. The soldier, once captured, will have to rely on his moral fiber, self-confidence, and his training in order to survive. The Army can only reinforce the first two--it can organize and maintain the last. In this respect, the problem the Army faces is twofold: it must identify high risk Army elements, and it must provide training for large numbers of personnel who require a basic knowledge of internment survival and resistance.

(6) ~~(S)~~ In order to assure that the most soldiers receive the most training in the most efficient manner and at a reasonable cost, it is worth considering the manner in which the Central Intelligence Agency approaches the training of its personnel. (See Other Service Programs, Appendix K.) The major topical areas within doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel readily lend themselves to an integrated, progressive film series. A segment on "Resistance" could describe the Communist management principles and the positive steps (techniques) the PW can take to lessen their impact and effectiveness. Another segment could deal with "Internment Survival." Here the soldier

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could learn proper exercises to perform which would be most beneficial to survival. It would also include the principles on how to treat common internment diseases and injuries without the aid of commercially prepared medicines. Personal hygiene and area sanitation, using material indigenous to the prisoner of war camp, could be covered at this time with particular emphasis on why such activity is crucial to survival. "Evasion and Escape Techniques and Survival" could constitute a third separate but related topic which easily lends itself to the medium of film. And finally, in a shorter but no less important segment, the Army's Assistance to the PW and His Family" could be presented. This topic, nearly completely overlooked by current training, becomes a matter of paramount concern to the prisoner of war, but at a time when it is too late for the Army to provide him the "anxiety calming" information that "the Army takes care of its own". All these subareas under doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel are key to survival-- survival with honor. If the US soldier knows basically what to expect if captured, and what he can do to enhance his chances to survive, chances are he will survive. At least, his psychological fears at the moment of capture and those that he will live with for the duration of his captivity will be lessened. There are few programs in the Army today that for such a minimum of effort such a potential reward can be reaped-- a returned prisoner of war grateful to his Service for teaching him how to survive a degrading, debilitating and, not uncommonly, fatal environment.

(7) (U) If accepted as a means for presenting doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel, the film series would offer significant advantages over subject lectures, command information lectures, or student seminars. Perhaps the two key advantages are uniformity of presentation and mass dissemination.

(8) (U) The "how" of presenting the material in the film offers wide alternatives. Dramatizations of PW life are perhaps the most animate, but, unless done with tact and art, can easily be over- or under-played. The use of a lecturer talking with authority about the key subjects as a tested solution as it is the one used by the Central Intelligence Agency in their film sequences. This method would be particularly effective if the speaker were a former prisoner of war speaking authoritatively and animatedly about the physical and psychological stresses of capture and internment. The "how" of presenting the material is crucial to assuring comprehension and retention of the information being offered. It must be remembered that the primary target is the combat infantryman. The information must be provided in a manner and at a level which will best assure his acceptance of it.

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(9) (U) The Army has soldiers whose duties place them in a higher risk category than that of the combat infantryman (see Section 5, Chapter 4). The Special Forces soldier and the aircraft crewmember may deserve a more intensive course of instruction than that provided anyone else. In reply to a query sent by CONARC to all the Service schools, 75 percent replied that a need existed for a special school for high risk personnel. It is conceivable that the needs of these individuals could be met by the film series, as it may not be feasible to establish a special school. The establishment of a special school would require staffing and physical plant. The goal would be to expose the high-risk category personnel to a mock internment situation complete with interrogations, indoctrinations, isolation cells, and, as in the case of the Navy, controlled physical abuse. Such a venture if undertaken would be expensive and, for the cadre and students, time-consuming.

(10) (U) Inasmuch as two sister Services have considered the merits of such a program to be worth the effort and expense, it appears prudent that the appropriate activity within the Army (i.e., CONARC) evaluate the "high risk of capture" training programs of the other Services for possible application to Army training.

b. (U) Recommendations:

(1) That DA task CONARC to determine the feasibility of presenting "Doctrine for Captured/Detained US Military Personnel" through the medium of a training film series.

(a) Presented doctrine should reflect the contents of this study.

(b) If favorably considered, scenario and production should be coordinated with USACDC.

(2) That DA task CONARC to review and evaluate the "high risk of capture" programs of the US Navy and US Air Force for possible application to training CONARC-identified "high-risk" personnel.

3. (U) ARTICLE 31 WARNING DURING DEBRIEFING:

a. (U) Discussion:

(1) (U) Article 31, UCMJ, "Compulsory Self-Incrimination Prohibited," reads as follows:¹

¹ Uniform Code of Military Justice - 1951, p. A2-12.

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(a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him.

(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him.

(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

(2) (U) Past Procedures:

(a) Korea. The official instructions to the interrogators of the Big Switch returnees gave guidance with respect to the reading of Article 31 (UCMJ). The instructions provided that when suspicion of a returnee was developed during the course of an interrogation, a warning of his rights (Article 31) was to be read. This warning was to be accompanied by a statement that previous testimony given by him cannot be used against him.

(b) Southeast Asia:

1. Prior to the promulgation of AR 190-25, "Captured, Missing, or Returned US Army Personnel: Administration, Return and Processing," in November 1969, and Intelligence Command OPLAN 107-71, 26 April 1971, all debriefing was conducted in accordance with AR 381-130,

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"Counterintelligence Investigations: Supervision and Control." Debriefers were trained in counterintelligence and were taken from their routine duties to debrief returnees.

2. AR 381-130 specifically states that "US Army Counterintelligence Special Agents are specially trained to detect treason, sedition, subversive activity and disaffection, and for the detection, prevention, and neutralization of espionage and sabotage."² The tenor of this AR and the use of counterintelligence personnel resulted in the interrogation of returnees rather than their debriefing.

3. These interrogations were preceded by a reading of Article 31 (UCMJ) as explicitly directed by paragraph 5, Section I, Appendix V (Debriefing Guides for Returned US Personnel) of AR 381-130. The result of a reading of Article 31, coupled with the interrogation procedures being utilized, tended to detrimentally affect the free flow of information which is a prerequisite to a successful debriefing.³

(3) (U) Current Plans:

(a) (U) On 26 April 1971, HQ, US Army Intelligence Command, promulgated the "US Army Intelligence Command Prisoners of War Debriefing Plan," whose short title is OPLAN 107-71, EGRESS RECAP-Army (U). This OPLAN is applicable only in large scale debriefing when 11 or more USPW's are released/recovered. If 10 or less are recovered/released (small scale debriefing), the debriefing procedures are governed by AR 190-25 and US Army Intelligence Command Regulation 381-100. OPLAN 107-71 is concerned exclusively with the CONUS portion of the debriefing while MACV OPLAN J-190 contains the guidance for the in-theatre debrief during the current hostilities in Southeast Asia.

(b) (U) The suspicion of PW misconduct following Little Switch which was prevalent at the time of Big Switch resulted in the interrogation rather than the debriefing of returnees. Appendix V to AR 380-130 which was used as a guide to debriefing in the earlier stages of hostilities in Southeast Asia, shows a similar tendency to interrogate misconduct rather than to debrief for information. Current DOD policy, which is reflected in AR 190-25, is a deliberate attempt to correct the faults of the earlier debriefing procedures.

(c) (U) In regard to this, AR 190-25 provides identical guidance for both the in-theatre and the CONUS debriefings:

² AR 381-130, "Counterintelligence Investigations: Supervision and Control (U)," (10 June 1966), p. 1-2.

³ Interviews conducted in March-April 1971 with returnees from enemy control in SEA.

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Debriefers will advise a returnee of his rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and his right to counsel only when previously acquired information, an accusation by a fellow returnee, or a returnee's own statement give reasonable cause for a debriefer to suspect the returnee of conduct constituting a violation of the law. The returnee's former status as a prisoner of war or detainee must not give rise to inferences of misconduct.⁴

(d) (U) Such a correction was necessary because the delicate relationship between a returnee and the personnel with whom he comes into contact during initial processing was finally recognized. Debriefing is a critical element in the readjustment process, and consequently, the debriefer has a great deal of responsibility which includes, not only gathering information, but also functioning so as to relieve the anxieties of the returnee.

(e) (U) Indication of surprise or criticism by a debriefer "is going to raise barriers to communication which may never be surmounted. The returnee expects the debriefer to lack understanding, to be suspicious and even hostile."⁵ The consequences of an unsympathetic approach on the part of the debriefer is likely "to be a quiet belligerency and anger on the part of the returnee which is hardly calculated to result in the fullest possible body of information."⁶ There will be a great deal of anxiety on the part of the returnee who is likely to realize that "promotions, security clearances, and career all hinge on the degree to which his debriefers interpret his experience with total understanding of all of his environmental pressures, physical and psychological, which were affecting him at the time."⁷

(f) ~~(FOUO)~~ The current practice of requiring the reading of Article 31 (UCMJ) only upon prior evidence or allegations by other PW's

⁴ AR 190-25, "Captured, Missing, or Detained US Army Personnel: Administration, Return and Processing ~~(FOUO)~~" (November 1969), p. 17.

⁵ LTCDR William Buck, USN, Psychological Problems Associated with Debriefing of Returnees from Foreign Prisons (U), (unpublished paper used by SERE Department, FAETUPAC, North Island Naval Station, San Diego, California), p. 1.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

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must be considered a significant improvement over the mandatory reading required by Appendix V of AR 380-130. The guidance for the reading of Article 31 (UCMJ) is the same for the CONUS debriefing as it is for the in-theatre debrief.

(g) ~~(FOUO)~~ Certain other problem areas remain. There is no specific guidance as to when the debriefing of a repatriate should be interrupted for a reading of Article 31 (UCMJ). This is left up to the individual debriefer's ability to discern when an individual is engaged in self-incrimination. Furthermore, personnel assigned to the debriefing mission will not necessarily have extensive prior experience, although all will generally have had counterintelligence interrogation training.

(h) ~~(FOUO)~~ There exists the possibility that intelligence requirements will be in conflict with legal requirements (Article 31 reading). This arises when an individual possesses needed information, but his debriefing is effectively closed down by the reading of the rights.

(i) (U) Past history has shown that it is probably impossible to convict a returnee for his actions while in captivity unless he was unmistakably traitorous or took actions against fellow PW's. The Combat Developments Command Judge Advocate Agency offers three possible alternatives to the reading of Article 31 (these are principle alternatives and not necessarily all inclusive):⁸

1. One position is that as a matter of policy all returning POW's should be warned of their rights under Article 31 regardless of whether an individual is suspected of committing any criminal offense. Justification of this position is that the POW's interests are protected if he is first put on notice that anything he says can be used against him. Secondly, if the POW does incriminate himself, litigation at trial of the Article 31 warning requirement before admission of the statement is minimized.

2. Another position is that only prisoners suspected of an offense should be given an Article 31 warning. This warning could be given initially if the POW is suspected of criminal wrongdoing or at any time during the interview when the interrogator first suspects the POW of committing an offense. This is the normal investigative procedure used by CID agents.

⁸ Letter from USACDCJAA to USACDCSOA (U) (14 January 1972)

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3. A third alternative is not to give Article 31 warnings to any POW. This position emphasizes that the main purpose of the interview is the acquisition of intelligence and the early rehabilitation of the individual.

(j) (U) The first two alternatives, by emphasizing the Article 31 warning, appear to ignore the basic purposes of the interview which are the acquisition of intelligence and to provide a vehicle for the rehabilitation of the POW after his prolonged period of confinement and harassment. Allowing the interrogator to determine during the interview when the POW becomes a suspect necessitating an Article 31 warning presupposes an unrealistic degree of sophistication on the part of the interrogator. Exaggerated and/or incorrect allegations of misconduct against fellow POW's caused by personality, bias, deprivation, hearsay, distorted mental aberrations, etc., resulting from enemy management techniques could make many innocent POW's appear to be guilty of criminal wrongdoing, thus necessitating an Article 31 warning. Any mistakes as to when warning must be given would undoubtedly embitter the POW against the military and his country, and could cause serious psychological problems. Congressional and public criticism of anything that reflects treatment of our POW's as criminals can be expected to be extremely severe.

(k) (U) The third alternative should be given careful consideration. If an Article 31 warning is not given, the most conducive atmosphere for intelligence gathering purposes is established; the purpose of the interview is facilitated; congressional and public criticism is minimized; and the rehabilitation of the POW is enhanced. However, if this approach is used, it must be emphasized that the statement made by the POW to the interviewer cannot be utilized for any adverse purpose whatsoever, either administrative or criminal.

(l) (U) This third alternative does not preclude criminal prosecution. If the POW is suspected of criminal conduct, a later interrogation can be conducted and an Article 31 warning given at this time. If the POW then incriminates himself, this statement can be admitted into evidence "if it clearly appears that all improper influences of the preceding interrogation had ceased to operate on the mind of the accused or suspect at the time he made the statement" (para 14a(2), MCM, 1969, Ref. Ed.). Critics of this approach emphasize the desirability of using the POW's statement at trial. However, an accused can never be convicted upon his own uncorroborated confession; and, further, if the POW is actually a suspect before the initial interview, evidence of an independent nature must have come to the attention of military

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authorities. Consequently, this independent evidence might be sufficient to convict an accused without resort to his confession. Also the probability of a POW admitting to the commission of an offense without considerable extenuation and mitigation to exonerate his conduct will probably be extremely rare. If a POW accuses another returnee of criminal conduct, this could be reported to the CID for a separate investigation. At this time all criminal evidence could be evaluated independently to determine its authenticity vis-a-vis exaggeration, hearsay, mental and physical stress, aberrations, etc.

(m) (U) Another argument against the third alternative is that Article 31, UCMJ, requires all suspects to be given a warning regardless of the circumstances or purpose of the interrogation; and that only a grant of immunity will allow the omission of an Article 31 warning. This view is not supported by the Judge Advocate Agency nor apparently by the other military services. The legislative history of Article 31 reflects only concern with criminal prosecutions and the inadmissibility of statements in criminal proceedings. To say that no one subject to military law cannot, at any time, take any statement, for any purpose whatsoever, regardless of any and all circumstances, e.g., national security, safety or accident investigations, IG investigations, reporting of social diseases, psychiatric evaluations, from any individual without Article 31 warning once that person is suspected of criminal conduct (without prior grant of immunity) appears to be a misapplication of legal principles. It should also be noted that the only penalty for not warning a suspect under Article 31 is the non-admissibility of the statement. The legislative history of Article 98 fails to support an Article 98 violation for not following the provisions of Article 31, UCMJ.

(n) (U) In any event, outside evidence would be necessary to convict, and under normal circumstances, hard-to-get intelligence information is likely to be of more importance than the conduct of a very sensitive prosecution which, to begin with, has only a slight chance of resulting in conviction. In strict legal terms this is not to say, however that the information which emerges is classifiable as "privileged communication."

Privileged Communications: is a term or art, with a very specific meaning in US law and should not be used in relation to debriefing. It is a communication made as an incident of a confidential relation which it is the public policy to protect. Generally, this involves communications: (1) of classified information; (2) between husband and wife,

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client and attorney, penitent and clergymen; and (3) to a limited extent, of an informant and Inspector General (para. 151, MCM, 1969 (Ref.)). A debriefing would not readily fall into any of these categories. It may involve classified information, but normally would not be classified per se.

This privilege may be waived only by the person or agency entitled to the privilege. Thus, categories 1 and 3 can be waived only by the government, and category 2 only by the individual repatriate. As such the debriefer could not enter into a privileged communication category, since he is totally subject to his superiors in categories 1 and 3 and factually cannot be within category 2.

There is a "compromise" position. The debriefer can advise the repatriate substantially as follows: "This is solely an intelligence debriefing for the purpose of finding out exactly what happened in the internment facilities. This information will not be released and will be used only for official government purposes and will not and cannot be used against you for any adverse proceeding. Therefore, you should feel free to speak the entire truth." Such advice would not be a grant of immunity, would not establish any "privileged communication," would not be in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but would make any information gained by the debriefing inadmissible in a trial of that repatriate by court-martial (Art. 31d, UCMJ: para. 140, MCM, 1969 (Rev.)).⁹

(o) (U) This is substantially the same procedure utilized by the US Navy in the debriefing of the Pueblo crewmen upon their return. The objectives of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was a free flow of information which required that there be no reading of Article 31

⁹ Letter from USACDCJAA to USACDCISSO (U). (16 March 1971)

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(UCMJ). None of the information which emerged at these initial debriefings would have been admissible as evidence in a judicial proceeding.

(p) (U) Essentially, the issue is whether emphasis is to be placed upon possible prosecution or upon the readjustment of the individual coupled with a free flow of intelligence information. An emphasis upon prosecution will have an adverse impact upon readjustment and intelligence. To give priority to readjustment and intelligence by eliminating any reading of Article 31 (UCMJ) will preclude any prosecution based upon a returnee's own statements. This is the either/or choice which must be made.

b. (U) Recommendation. Recommend that DA (TJAG) publish guidance which eliminates, except for cases specifically designated by DA (ACSI/CSSPER), the necessity for any reading of Article 31, UCMJ during the initial debriefings of returned US Army Prisoners of War when such debriefings are for intelligence purposes only and not associated with conduct investigation.

4. (U) EVACUATION PROCEDURES:

a. (U) Discussion:

(1) (U) Past Procedures:

(a) (U) Korea:

1. (U) The returnees from Operation Little Switch were returned by air to CONUS. Most of the repatriates from Operation Big Switch returned by troopship or hospital ship from Inchon to San Francisco. It should be noted that a proposal to retain the releasees for 30 days in Korea, Japan, or Hawaii was rejected.¹⁰ The rationale behind this proposal was to enable medical and psychiatric treatment to be carried out. The plan which was actually implemented called for the return of releasees via ship within about 15 days of release.

2. (U) The delay involved in returning by sea, rather than by air, resulted in the releasees forming group ties with one another and "offered the men a necessary working-through period, both for reality testing and a protective form of initial social exposure

¹⁰ Psychiatric Report of Little Switch and Big Switch prepared for OTPMG (S) (1953), p. 2.

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to 'outsiders'."¹¹ However, it should be noted that some returnees found the shipboard routine tedious and resented being cooped up with the same personnel with whom they had been imprisoned.¹²

(b) (U) Southeast Asia. Since June 1968, Department of Defense policy has stipulated that "all returned personnel will be placed under medical auspices as soon as possible and evacuated to an appropriate facility, normally in CONUS, when medically and operationally feasible."¹³ It was further directed that medical evacuation channels will be used to move returnees to CONUS medical facilities. "A later memorandum specified that "aeromedical evacuation to CONUS" was to be utilized."¹⁴

(2) (U) AR 190-25 directs that aeromedical evacuation to CONUS will take place as soon as it has been determined that "the returnee has reached a physical and emotional state where evacuation to CONUS is appropriate."¹⁵ This AR further stipulates that "medical and personal considerations will be paramount in determining evacuation time and availability of the returnee for debriefing and/or contacts with the press."¹⁶

(b) (U) The Armed Services Medical Regulating Office (ASMRO) channels are used for reporting when the returnee is ready for evacuation. The mission of this office is to "regulate or monitor the transfer of patients to medical treatment facilities having the capability to provide the necessary medical care."¹⁷ Overseas commanders are notified of the hospital assignment of returnees through ASMRO subsequent to the Office of the Surgeon General's (OTSG) determination of that assignment.

¹¹ Robert T. Lefton. "Home by Ship: Reaction Patterns of American Prisoners of War Repatriated from North Korea," American Journal of Psychiatry (April 1954), p. 739.

¹² Interviews conducted in January 1971 with Big Switch repatriates currently on active duty at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

¹³ SecDef Memorandum (8 June 1968).

¹⁴ SecDef Memorandum (18 January 1969).

¹⁵ AR 190-25, op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ AR 40-350, "Medical Regulating to and Within the Continental United States (U)" (3 November 1969), p. 1-1.

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(3) (U) Discussion:

(a) (U) As previously indicated former Big Switch repatriates have indicated that the 15-day voyage took too long.¹⁸ There is some evidence of resentment by the repatriates at being confined with the same men with whom they were imprisoned.¹⁹

(b) (U) Recently, a recommendation was made that a "halfway house" be established. "At this halfway house, the PW and his immediate family should receive a short course on nutrition, malnutrition, accident prevention, marriage counseling, personal affairs (finance, records), and public relations."²⁰ Sites suggested were Garmisch, Germany, Hawaii, or some CONUS facility. This procedure would seem to be a compromise between the need for a therapeutic delay and the desire of the returnee to be reunited with his family and be reintegrated into society.

(c) (U) The Navy followed a procedure similar to the halfway house concept when it brought together the crew of the USS Pueblo and their families at Balboa Naval Hospital in San Diego.²¹ However, one deficiency in the procedures followed in San Diego was the lack of facilities for allowing the returnees to meet with their families in privacy rather than in a large communal area.

(d) (U) One of the key problem areas for returning PW's will be readjustment. A primary factor which must be taken into account in terms of readjustment is "cultural shock." This is the "transfer from a solitary, sedate existence to a modern, fast society where the PW will be the focus of attention."²² The impact of cultural shock has been known to have a deleterious effect upon the physical and mental health of returnees. "This cultural shock has been known in the past to cause somatic symptoms such as peptic ulcers, cardiovascular disease, and a tendency to accident morbidity. Symptoms of anxiety, depression, headache, insomnia, and gastrointestinal complaints are to be expected."²³

¹⁸ Interviews, op. cit.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ OTSG, paper presented to the DOD Policy Committee (4 February 1971).

²¹ Lloyd Bucher, Bucher: My Story, (New York, 1970).

²² OTSG paper, op. cit.

²³ Ibid.

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The halfway house could mitigate the impact of "cultural shock" and facilitate readjustment. It could act as a buffer between the controlled life of captivity and the life of a free man.

b. (U) Recommendation. That the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) review the "halfway house" concept and if favorably considered, forward an appropriate recommendation to the Army Chief of Staff for consideration.

5. (U) PEACETIME DETENTION:

a. Discussion:

(1) Peacetime detention has not been addressed. Each peacetime occurrence is distinct from the next in several particulars: cause of detention, goals of the detaining power, treatment of detainees, and ultimate resolution of the situation by the involved nations. Any concerted effort to address this area in the main text would have detracted from the major topic of doctrine for the captured US soldier.

(2) Illustrative of the occasions of detention involving US military personnel are the incidents which have occurred since 1968. In the 3-year period, five significant and varied incidents took place. In each case, the problem was created by different situations and resolved uniquely. Briefly, the incidents were:

(a) January 1968: North Korea seized the USS Pueblo and towed it into Wonsan Harbor. The crew was detained in North Korea for 1 year before being released. The vehicle for their release was an acknowledgement by the United States that the USS Pueblo had intruded into North Korean territorial waters for the purpose of electronic espionage. (Note: Acknowledgement was refuted by the US representative at the time it was issued.)

(b) July 1968: Eleven US Army personnel were detained by Cambodia when their boat accidentally violated the neutral border of that country. The personnel were well-treated by the Cambodians, but they were detained for a period of several weeks. An assertion by the United States that it would make every effort to avoid repetition of the incident sufficed to gain release of the 11 personnel.

(c) August 1969: North Korea shot down a US Army Helicopter which had accidentally strayed over the 38th Parallel. The

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three crewmembers were detained for 3 1/2 months. Their release was contingent on an apology by the United States for border violation.

(d) November 1970: Two US Army generals were detained by the Soviet Union for a period in excess of 2 weeks after their light aircraft strayed over the Turkey/Soviet Union border and accidentally landed at an airport on the Soviet side of the border. As in the case of the Cambodian incident, the detainees were well-treated by the detaining power.

(e) March 1971: Four US Army soldiers serving with US Forces in Turkey were kidnapped by the Turkish Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), a terrorist group working toward the overthrow of the established government. The four were held for ransom by the PLA but were ultimately released without payment.

(3) By no means do the above examples of peacetime detention constitute all occasions of detention during the period, especially if detention of US citizens, regardless of status, civilian or military, was included. It is sufficient to state that such occasions are numerous and their increasing frequency adds a note of urgency to the need for a comprehensive evaluation of the cause, effect, and solution of the problems of peacetime detention.

(4) It would be logical to assume that much of the doctrine developed and recommended for captured US personnel would be applicable for detainees. This would especially hold true in the areas of what they can say and what their conduct should be while interned or detained. The peculiar nature of recent motives for detention in contrast to those of capture indicate that it may be easier, through security measures, to avoid detention than to avoid capture, especially in the case of high ranking officers/civilians. Conditions under which the detainee is kept will most likely be less rigorous than that of the internee unless the detaining power is a very hostile state such as North Korea. There is, therefore, a logical argument for not expending additional effort to develop or revise doctrine to handle the situation of peacetime detention. The same concepts and expected code of behavior which have been developed in this study for the normally more rugged detention as a prisoner of war are equally applicable to the peacetime detainee. This conclusion in no way undermines the increasing need for awareness of the increasing frequency of peacetime detention incidents and the corollary requirement to develop countermeasures to prevent such incidents.

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b. Recommendation: That no additional time and effort be expended to examine the adequacy of existing/proposed US Army doctrine on individual conduct during incidents of peacetime detention.

6. (U) SPECIAL STAFF ACTIVITY:

a. Discussion:

(1) An area of concern recognized in Chapter 2 of this study is the emerging practice of Communist governments to use prisoners of war as pawns for attaining their political objectives. Generally, until the Korean War, the repatriation of prisoners of war, both friendly and enemy, was accomplished without fanfare or political ransom. The cessation of the Korean War introduced a new strategy whereby prisoners of war were used for political advantage and bargaining for world opinion and support. Capitalizing on US public opinion for the quick return of USPW's, the Chinese and North Korean Communists forced the US government to consider the PW question as part of the armistice agreement.

(2) This practice has again emerged to a significant degree in the conflict in Southeast Asia. The North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) forced the US government to consider repatriation of USPW's in Vietnam as part of the national policy for eventual withdrawal. It can be seen that the political value of PW's is not in direct proportion to the number of PW's held. Most likely in any future conflict with Communist or Communist-influenced nations, the PW will continue to be an instrument of negotiation as opposed to just a "casualty of the war," removed from the action and awaiting the cessation of hostilities.

(3) The political importance of the PW has not been overlooked by either the American government or private organizations. "Remember our PW's" or other supportive slogans have been used to further aims and to elicit support. A furor was created, both over condemnation of the North Vietnamese/VC on the one hand, and the war on the other, using the PW issue as the catalyst. The prisoner of war issue has become a matter of critical importance to the nation and is relevant not only to this study, but to the individual Services to whom those PW's belong.

(4) Obviously, any factor that can influence national policy is worthy of careful consideration by the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. It is critical that the Services be able to react to developments within that factor. The prisoner of war issue qualifies for such consideration not only from the political/emotional standpoint,

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but from the humanitarian aspect as well. The manner in which the other Services, vis-a-vis the Army, address their PW problems is the subject of this discussion.

b. Other Service Special Staff Activity:

(1) US Navy. The importance and sensitivity attached to the PW question is attested to by the establishment of a special advisory position with a direct line to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and a direct line to the CNO's subordinate staff sections in all matters relating to and resulting from the PW question. The official title of the advisory position is the "Special Assistant for PW Matters." This office provides centralization of effort and a focal point for all PW related matters. It receives directives from and disseminates information to the CNO directly.

(2) The US Air Force:

(a) The Chief of Staff of the Air Force has tasked the Director of Plans, Headquarters, USAF (AFXPD), with the responsibility for planning, coordinating and directing all activity pertaining to prisoners of war.

(b) In order to carry out this task, the Director of Plans, has further delegated one of his subordinate staff sections, the Global Plans and Policy Division (AFXPPG), as primary point of contact for the Air Staff on PW matters. This activity handles all queries and reviews plans and policies directly or indirectly related to USAF prisoners of war.

(c) The US Air Force has also established the Escape and Evasion/Prisoner of War (E&E/PW) Committee to coordinate and exchange views. This committee, which meets once a month, is composed of the various Air Staffs within HQ, USAF, which have immediate responsibility for PW matters, and is chaired by the representative of the Global Plans/Policy Division.

(d) In AFXPPG, the Air Force has a focal point for formulating policy matters pertaining to PW's. The AFXPPG does not have, however, the direct lines of communication between action officer and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, as the Navy Special Assistant does with the Chief of Naval Operations.

(3) US Marine Corps. The Marine program for coordinating intra-Service PW matters is one of diffused responsibilities throughout their

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general staff. The primary staff responsibility for PW matters rests with their Chief of Personnel Operations. There is no special PW staff activity or committee which can coordinate the various General Staffs. The desks responsible for handling PW matters do not have direct access to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

c. US Army Coordination of PW Matters:

(1) Prisoner of war matters at DA level are handled by numerous and diverse branches and activities. The Adjutant General handles casualty and personnel matters; the Provost Marshal General considers the legal (Geneva Conventions) and military police aspects; the Surgeon General has proponency for medical considerations; the Chief of Support Services handles personal effects and burial (if required); and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence coordinates all intelligence activities. All these activities are decentralized and function as separate entities. Like the Marine Corps, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is charged with the General Staff responsibility for the Army Casualty and Personnel Operations Program.

(2) The US Army has no centralized office nor is there an established DA committee that convenes on a regular basis to discuss and air problems in the PW area. Problems are resolved at the individual activity level and, where such problems overlap areas of proponency, the two or more DA activities involved are expected to coordinate and propose a joint solution to DCSPER.

d. Joint Cooperation:

(1) In the course of an armed conflict it is normal for all Services to have personnel in PW status; therefore, many areas (conduct, family assistance, repatriation plans) should be as uniform between the Services as possible.

(2) A current solution to joint planning and cooperation was the creation of a Prisoner of War Task Force under the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International and Security Affairs (OSD/ISA). This Task Force is staffed with members of all Services and is charged with developing joint policy on captured/detained US personnel.

(3) To resolve day-to-day joint problems, an ad hoc committee was formed at the working level and entitled the "Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee (IPWIC)." IPWIC, established by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency on 23 August 1967, addresses

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intelligence matters pertaining to USPW and MIA personnel at the intelligence working level. The principal task of IPWIC is to augment and facilitate the flow of appropriate PW/MIA intelligence to US Government offices with related operational, administrative, or policy responsibilities. It provides a clearing house for the exchange of PW intelligence and a forum for the discussion and resolution of related problems and requirements. It meets weekly or as often as the need dictates.

e. Conclusions:

(1) Prisoners of war will continue, if not increase, in importance as an instrument of national policy and as such will have considerable impact upon the Department of Defense in its efforts to meet and resolve PW issues.

(2) There will be a continuing need for review of current Army programs in the PW area and new or revised programs will require joint Service coordination.

(3) The US Navy and Air Force Special PW Staff Activities have significant advantages over the programs currently in effect in the Marine Corps and Army. These advantages are:

(a) A single point of contact to deal with the entire spectrum of PW matters is provided.

(b) Intra-Service uniformity is insured.

(c) Quick response is possible.

(d) "Action-level" intra-Service and inter-Service coordination and cooperation is facilitated.

f. Recommendation. That the Department of the Army review current US Navy and US Air Force Special PW Staff Activities for possible application and incorporation within the Department of the Army Staff.

7. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS. The following represent a summation of the recommendations made in the preceding discussions:

a. That DA task CONARC to determine the feasibility of presenting doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel through the medium of a training film series.

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(1) Presented doctrine should reflect the contents of this study.

(2) If favorably considered, scenario and production should be coordinated with USACDC.

b. That DA task CONARC to review and evaluate the "high risk of capture" programs of the US Navy and US Air Force for possible application of training CONARC-identified "high risk" Army personnel.

c. Recommend that DA (TJAG) publish guidance which eliminates, except for cases specifically designated by DA (ACSI/DCSPER), the necessity for any reading of Article 31, UCMJ during the initial debriefings of returned US Army Prisoners of War when such debriefings are for intelligence purposes only and not associated with conduct investigation.

d. That the Surgeon General review the "halfway house" concept for processing returned US Army prisoners of war and, if favorably assessed, forward an appropriate recommendation to the Army Chief of Staff for consideration.

e. That no additional time and effort be expended to examine the adequacy of existing/proposed doctrine on individual conduct during incidents of peacetime detention.

f. That Department of the Army review current US Navy and US Air Force Special PW Staff Activities for possible application and incorporation within the Department of the Army Staff.

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APPENDIX E

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	<u>Complete Report</u>	<u>Basic Package</u>	<u>Executive Summary</u>
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USA Europe	1		
USA Pacific	1		
USA Alaska	1		
USA Vietnam	1		
LO Eighth US Army Korea	1		
CONARC	1		
USA Elec Comd			1
USA Missile Comd			1
USA Tank Automotive Comd			1
USA Munitions Comd			1
USA Test & Evaluation Comd			1
USA Aviation Systems Comd			1
USA Weapons Comd			1
USA Tactical Air Warfare Comd			1
DA Pentagon			1
USAF Aeronautical Systems Division			1
USACDC Coord Office MASSTER			1
USA STRATCOM			1
USAF Armament Lab			1
Army Commands			
CG US CONARC	25		
CINC ARSTRIKE	1		
CG USAMC	1		
CG USARADCOM	1		
CG USARAL	1		
CG USASA	1		
CG USATECOM	1		
CG USAECOM (AMSEL-RD-T)	1		
CINC USAREUR	3		
CINC USARPAC	3		
COMUSARSO	3		
CG USARV	3		
CG USACSC	1		

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DCS/MILITARY OPERATIONS	1		
DCS/LOGISTICS	1		
ASST CoFS/INTELLIGENCE	1		
ASST CoFS/FORCE DEV	2		
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL	1		
THE SURGEON GENERAL	1		
THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL	1		
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL	1		
CHIEF, OFFICE OF PERS OPNS	1		
CHIEF, RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENTS	1		
CHIEF OF INFORMATION	1		
Other Activities			
HQ, USA INTELLIGENCE COMMAND	1		
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	1		
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	1		
CG MARINE CORPS DEV&ED COMD	1		
COMDT AFSC	1		
COMDT C&GSC	1		

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APPENDIX F

(U) METHODOLOGY

1. INTRODUCTION:

a. The purpose of the study as prescribed by the study directive is to develop proposed joint and Army doctrine for captured/detained U.S. military personnel applicable to both peace and wartime situations including all levels and intensities of conflict.

b. In fulfilling its role for formulating doctrine, the Army is responsive to the direction and guidance of Department of Defense. Terms of reference for the Army in the area of captured/detained U.S. military personnel are also constraints, for Army doctrine is constrained and guided by national and DOD policies, the Geneva Convention relative to Prisoners of War (GPW), the Code of Conduct for Uniformed Members of the Armed Forces, and applicable Joint Service regulations, memoranda, and field manuals.

2. MAJOR TASKS:

a. Synthesize all current policies and procedures pertaining to captured/detained U.S. military personnel at national, Department of Defense, and military service levels.

b. Collate, synthesize, and analyze pertinent data concerning the policies, processing, treatment, and methods of exploitation of captured/detained U.S. military personnel by unfriendly foreign powers, specifically addressing North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong.

c. Determine the adequacy of current doctrine and procedures.

d. Develop new/revised recommended doctrine and procedures, where required, in the following specific areas:

- (1) During training and prior to internment.
- (2) During internment.
- (3) During postinternment.

3. DATA COLLECTION. The data collection effort centered on synthesizing current U.S. policies and procedures and identifying Communist PW management principles.

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a. Synthesizing Current U.S. Policies and Procedures. Data were collected for the three phases of the study as follows:

(1) Pre-Internment. During pre-internment the soldier is taught what to expect if he is captured and how he is to respond to the treatment he receives. Data collection for this phase focused on individual and unit training, the Code of Conduct, and other Services training. More specifically, information was acquired in regard to types of training being presented, the substance, levels at which it was conducted, intensity, number of hours, scope, and frequency of presentation. The training methods, techniques, and procedures employed by other Services were reviewed for possible incorporation into Army doctrine and training programs. With regard to the Code of Conduct, information was acquired on its developmental history; its purpose; its meaning to the different services and to different individuals of the same service; the methods used by the Army and other Services for training in the Code; the interpretation of various Articles of the Code at DOD, DA, CONARC, and by recent repatriates and basic training graduates; and the identification of facets of the Code that are not clearly understood or are frequently misinterpreted. Data on the Code were not assembled for the purpose of determining Code adequacy--that is a function of DOD. The primary requirement in this study was to assemble data that would contribute to the development of Army doctrine for implementing the Code.

(2) Internment. This phase of the study deals not with what is required of the soldier during internment but with what the Army is to do for him and his family. Conduct of the USPW is governed largely by the training he receives during the pre-internment phase. Data collection for the internment phase revolved around acquisition of information in regard to current National, DOD, and DA policies and procedures for providing assistance to families of captured/detained U.S. military personnel. Also assembled was information on the means by which the Army acquires intelligence in regard to the USPW. There is an evident connection between data requirements of the internment and pre-internment phases. Even though family assistance will not be required except under internment conditions, the pre-internment phase represents the Army's sole opportunity to inform the soldier of the procedures that exist for assisting his family if he is captured.

(3) Postinternment. This phase deals with action that is required by all elements of the Army in the return of USPW's to U.S. control: their evacuation and processing, debriefing, medical treatment, and rehabilitation. Data requirements existed for: historical

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documentation of what has been done in this area in the current and all previous armed conflicts of the United States; current National, DOD, and DA policies; legal, medical, and personal problems encountered by repatriates; short- and long-range needs of repatriates; intelligence needs of the Army; and the role of each Army element in the repatriation and rehabilitation process. Especially germane to the postinternment phase was the acquisition of data which revealed the conflicts among Army requirements for intelligence, the maintenance of high priority attention to the personal welfare of the repatriate, and the Army role in fulfilling the requirements of military justice. Data were acquired concerning conditions under which Article 31 of the UCMJ must be read and explained to the repatriate; the degree of medical attention he is to receive at each step in the process; how long a repatriate may be retained at each intermediate point in the processing; whether medical, intelligence, or legal personnel have priority needs; the nature and type of escorts selected to accompany the repatriate to CONUS; the nature and geographical location of hospitals selected for repatriates; the policies for repatriates to be interviewed by the press; and existing policies and procedures for establishing contact and reuniting repatriates with their families.

b. Identifying Communist Management Principles. The principles employed by the Communists against captured/detained U.S. military personnel are the heart of the study. It is against these principles that both Army doctrine and national policy must be applied. In a true sense, they might be termed the threat, for they are a threat to the life of every U.S. soldier subjected to them. To identify the Communist management principles, it was necessary to acquire the following data:

(1) The lessons of history as evidenced by Soviet practices during World War II, USPW treatment during the Korean War, the experiences of USPW's in North Vietnam and with the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, and USPW (Pueblo detainees) treatment by North Koreans after the Korean War.

(2) The methods of the Communists include: facilities and location, organization and personnel, control measures and regulations, medical and sanitation provisions and procedures, prison routine, and prison welfare.

(3) The role of interrogation as employed by the Communists includes: the objectives of interrogation; the personnel performing the interrogation functions, their status and training; the facilities

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and equipment used in the process; the techniques and procedures employed in interrogation; and the duration and frequency of interrogation sessions.

(4) The role of indoctrination as it is employed by the Communists, including: its objectives, themes, duration, and frequency; the types of personnel charged with administering indoctrination, their status and their training; the facilities and special equipment used in the indoctrination process; and the techniques and procedures of the process.

(5) Exploitation as it is employed, including: the purpose, scope, and objectives; the passive and active measures used by the Communist; the rationale which the Communists offer for its use; the effect it has upon the USPW; the legal aspects under the Geneva Convention; how it is addressed by the Code of Conduct; and the roles of propaganda, physical persuasion, mental anguish, isolation, and deprivation.

4. DATA SOURCES. The following sources were used to acquire input and/or to develop information for input to the study:

a. Literature. These sources included the Defense Documentation Center (DDC); the Army Study Documentation and Information Retrieval System (ASDIRS); Battelle Memorial Institute; ACSI Intelligence Document Branch; the Army Study Program; Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG); Office of Provost Marshal General (OTPMG); Office of the Chief of Military History; Chief of Information (CINFO); DA; and Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUS MACV).

b. Input from Other Military Services. The acquisition of input from the other Services was facilitated by requesting assistance through the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Liaison Officers at the US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (USAJFKCMA). Particularly vital input came in the nature of the Air Force and Navy contributions in regard to Survival, Evasion, Recovery and Escape (SERE) training and postinternment Operations Plans. The Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the PW/MIA Action Task Group under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) were contacted for documentation concerning policy matters on PW's and for general information on prisoner of war affairs.

c. Input from Army Staff and Activities. All elements of the Army believed to have knowledge, interest, or expertise in the subject

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area were brought into the planning and decision making process. Considerable interest was promoted by contacting applicable sources through correspondence and by liaison visits, by inviting and encouraging attendance at In-Process Reviews, and by actively soliciting data gathering assistance from all parties. Army staff and activities providing input were Headquarters CDC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; USACDC Intelligence Agency, Fort Holabird, Maryland; USACDC Judge Advocate Agency, Charlottesville, Virginia; USACDC Medical Service Agency, Fort Sam Houston, Texas; USACDC Personnel and Administrative Services Agency, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; Office of the Provost Marshal General, Forrestal Building, Washington, DC; Office of the Adjutant General, Casualty Branch, Forrestal Building, Washington, DC; Office of the Chief of Information, Communist Relations Branch, Pentagon, Washington, DC; Office of the Chief of Support Services, Pentagon, Washington, DC; and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Pentagon, Washington, DC.

d. Debriefings. First hand knowledge was acquired from debriefing reports of recent repatriates. ACSI provided these reports.

e. Interviews. In those cases where debriefing reports failed to provide elements of information needed by the study, arrangements were made to interview the repatriates, either by bringing the returnee to the study team or by a study team member traveling to the resident location of the returnee. The interviews were designed to determine the nature, scope, and intensity of training received by Army personnel. A mass interview technique was employed at an Army training center, with an active Army division, and with a US Army Special Forces Group, a specially trained unit.

f. Questionnaire. In some cases, time and expense precluded personal interviews. Questionnaires were devised to obtain necessary data in such cases. These questionnaires were forwarded to former PW's for review and response. Each question was worded in such a manner as to elicit an affirmative or negative answer, thereby facilitating the process of evaluating results.

5. DEVELOPMENTAL STEPS. Stated in its simplest form, the purpose of this study is to identify inadequacies of current doctrine in the area of captured/detained US military personnel and to formulate recommended doctrine to resolve those inadequacies. Development of the study involved the following steps:

a. Identification of the Communist principles and techniques that will be employed against captured/detained military personnel in the 1972-75 time frame.

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b. Identification of doctrinal requirements for countering Communist principles and techniques.

c. Identification of current policies and procedures of Department of Defense and higher levels of government, hereinafter identified as National and DOD policy.

d. Identification of doctrinal requirements evolving from National and DOD policies.

e. Synthesis of existing US Army doctrine for the USPW in the pre-internment phase. Topics addressed were US Army doctrine as it applies to Individual, Advanced Individual, and Unit training and the degree to which the individual soldier is prepared for the psychological stresses of an internment environment. Specific areas reviewed in the pre-internment phase were: Code of Conduct, Geneva and Hague Conventions, First Aid, Physical Conditioning, and Survival, Evasion, and Escape training.

f. Synthesis of US Army doctrine as it relates to the internment phase. Topics addressed were procedures for notifying the immediate family that a soldier is in MIA or PW status, policy for releasing information concerning PW's, personnel actions in regard to a soldier while he is a PW, Army provisions for family assistance, and procedures for collection and dissemination of intelligence in regard to captured/detained soldiers.

g. Synthesis of US Army doctrine as it relates to the postinternment phase. Topics addressed were evacuation and personnel processing procedures, debriefing procedures, rehabilitation of the returnee, intelligence collection, legal aspects with regard to behavior while interned, and information release.

h. Determining the adequacy of current doctrine in the areas of pre-internment, internment, and postinternment (6d, e, and f, above) by comparing it against the requirements generated by Communist management principles (6a and b, above), and requirements imposed by National and DOD policy (6c, above).

i. Identifying specific doctrinal voids and/or inconsistencies that evolved during the comparative analysis.

j. Analytically deriving feasible solutions to each requirement.

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k. Recommending doctrine for filling each void or correcting identified deficiencies.

6. ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES (SEE FIGURE 29 on page F-9):

a. The methodology consisted mainly of a synthesis of existing doctrine and comparatively analyzing it against requirements generated by national policy and Communist prisoner of war management principles. The output of the comparative analysis provided two important criteria: (1) requirements that are satisfied by existing doctrine and (2) those requirements which can be resolved only by the formulation of new doctrine, or by revising the old.

b. The Communist management principles constitute what in most studies is identified as the "Threat." Together with U.S. National policy, they represent requirements against which Army doctrine is compared for determination of adequacy. Once the national policies and the Communist management principles had been identified, the next step of the study focused on the synthesis of existing doctrine and its categorization into the three phases which the doctrinal analysis had addressed: Pre-internment, Internment, and Postinternment.

(1) Pre-internment:

- (a) Unit training.
- (b) Code of Conduct training.
- (c) SERE-related training.

(2) Internment: Family assistance measures.

(3) Postinternment:

- (a) Evacuation and processing of the returnees.
- (b) Debriefing procedures.
- (c) Medical treatment of repatriates.
- (d) Rehabilitation.

c. After completion of b, above, existing doctrine and current implementation procedures were compared against the requirements

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generated by Communist management principles and national policy. Subjective evaluations of each requirement in terms of existing doctrine and identified doctrinal voids and deficiencies. These voids and deficiencies became the subject of further research and analysis.


d. Each void/deficiency was analyzed for the purpose of identifying additional data elements that might assist in resolution. These data elements were acquired through further literature search, interviews with knowledgeable people, consultation with members of appropriate DOD and DA staffs or, when necessary, further study on historical development and trends. The additional research and analysis was approached with a view toward identification of several realistic alternatives for responding to the doctrinal void/deficiency. Alternatives selected were required to be militarily practical, suitable for employment in the 1972-75 time frame, responsive to national policy and Communist management principles, and economically feasible. DA staff sections, organizations, and activities with areas of proponency or vital interest in the study participated in the selection of alternatives.

e. Each alternative (possible solution) was analyzed against known constraints. Those alternatives not invalidated by the constraints were comparatively analyzed against requirements. The best solution was selected on the basis of qualitative evaluation supported by sound rationale. All DA staff sections and activities with areas of proponency or special interest participated in the evaluation of the solution.

f. The best solution evolving from the analysis of each void/deficiency was structured in the form of a recommendation for doctrine or for follow-on action.

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APPENDIX G

(U) DATA APPENDIX

1. This appendix contains direct response data obtained through the device of questionnaires for the purpose of establishing current levels of training and adequacy therein.

2. The following data is included:

- a. Annex I - CONARC Branch School Responses
- b. Annex II - BCT/AIT/Active Unit Questionnaire
- c. Annex III - Former Prisoner of War Questionnaire
- d. Annex IV - Basic and Advanced Officer Courses POI.

3. The CONARC branch schools' responses consist of replies to a series of questions forwarded to the Army's branch schools by Commanding General, Continental Army Command. Formulated under the auspices of this study, the questionnaire was concerned with SERE training and SERE-related training in the Army. Annex I presents three distinct elements of information: the CONARC questionnaire, a CONARC consolidated position, and a study-oriented statistical analysis.

4. Annex II consists of a statistical display of the responses to a series of questions presented to several groups of subjects currently serving in the Army. These sample groups included members of BCT and AIT students at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and officer and enlisted personnel of the 82d Airborne Division and of the 5th Special Forces Group, both units located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The object of the questionnaire was to reveal the latitude and depth of current Army training in the area of doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel. The responses served to indicate the degree of assimilation of the pertinent doctrine.

5. Annex III contributes a statistical display of the responses to a questionnaire by repatriated Army prisoners of war of the Vietnam conflict. The intent of this analytical instrument was to discern the applicability and efficiency of Army training for the prisoner of war environment. Responses to this questionnaire revealed evaluations tempered by the actual experience of prison camp existence.

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6. Annex IV presents a graphic analysis of the number of hours devoted to SERE subjects and SERE-related subjects during the various Officer Basic Courses and Officer Advanced Courses. The purpose of this display was to provide an indication of the relative depth of instruction presented in the several categories of topics, expressed as a function of time.

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ANNEX I

CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND

BRANCH SCHOOL RESPONSES

1. On 29 January 1971, a questionnaire was forwarded to Commanding General, Continental Army Command for distribution to the various branch schools. The questionnaire concerned various aspects of current and future training in the area of doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel.
2. Each branch school responded separately and CONARC, after analysis, consolidated the schools' replies and formulated its position on the questions furnished.
3. Attached at Inclosure a is a copy of the questionnaire. Inclosure b represents the consolidated CONARC Response, and Inclosure c represents the study consolidation of the individual branch schools' responses.

Inclosures:

- a. CONARC Questionnaire
- b. CONARC Position
- c. Consolidated Branch School Responses

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Inclosure a

SERE AND SERE-RELATED INSTRUCTION

The following represents a list of questions pertaining to Survival; Escape, Resistance, and Evasion (SERE) training as it is presently being conducted in the United States Army. SERE subjects are considered to be Code of Conduct, Geneva and Hague Conventions, Escape and Evasion and Land Navigation. SERE-related subjects are considered to be Military Justice, First Aid, Field Sanitation, Personal Sanitation and Physical Training.

1. Does a requirement exist for insuring uniformity of instruction on SERE subjects between:

- a. Branches of the Army?
- b. CONUS Military Posts?
- c. Other Services (USAF, USN, USMC)?

2. What is school's position on Code of Conduct instruction?

- a. How does school interpret the precepts of the Code?
- b. How does school evaluate the effectiveness of Code Instruction?
- c. Does school consider present requirements for Code training adequate? If not, why?

3. Is a separate course or school needed for "high risk of capture" personnel?

- a. Who should have proppency?
- b. Who should administer it?

4. Does school consider the quantity and quality of current SERE training adequate to properly orient the US soldier on the internment environment and to prepare him for the best chance for survival?

5. Does a requirement exist in US Army training to differentiate between internment under armed conflict conditions and peacetime detention during periods of latent hostility?

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6. Does a requirement exist to conduct instruction on conflicting ideologies? If so, what should be the content of instruction and at what stage of training should it be conducted?

NOTE: Question #2a was not included in this study's analysis of the CONARC branch schools' responses since it demanded descriptive answers which were not competently displayed. In addition, the numbers of the questions in Inclosure c do not precisely correspond to those delineated here.

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Inclosure b
CONARC POSITION

The following represents CONARC reply dated 29 April 1971 to questionnaire forwarded to that command on 29 January 1971.

1. How is SERE and SERE-related training currently being conducted in CONUS TO&E units?

ANSWER: SERE and SERE-related training is taught in units as both unit and individual subjects and is accomplished through both pure and integrated instruction as required by appropriate directives. Units and individuals are required to maintain proficiency in all of these subjects. The subjects of Survival, Evasion, and Escape, Code of Conduct, and physical fitness testing are of special significance in that they are used as training indicators for ascertaining training readiness of units under the provisions of AR 220-1, "Unit Readiness."

The training requirements for SERE and SERE-related subjects are explained as follows:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Training Requirements</u>	<u>Authority and Supporting Publications</u>
Code of Conduct	POR qualification, and as required to maintain proficiency. To be integrated as appropriate in all phases of training.	AR 350-30 AR 220-1 AR 612-2 Anx B, CON Reg 350-1 ASubjScd 21-15
Geneva & Hague Conventions	POR qualification. All individuals receive 2 hours formal instruction within 6 weeks of entry on active duty and 2 hours formal instruction annually. Practical training to be integrated as appropriate in all tactical training and will be related to the <u>Code of Conduct, Uniform Code of Military Justice and Survival, Evasion & Escape.</u>	AR 350-216 AR 612-2 Anx B, CON Reg 350-1 ASubScd 27-1

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Survival, Evasion, and Escape	POR qualification, and as required to maintain proficiency. To be integrated into all appropriate phases of training.	AR 350-225 AR 612-2 AR 220-1 Anx B, CON Reg 350-1 Para 4d(1), Basic CON Reg 350-1 ASubjScd 21-12
Land Navigation*	Special Emphasis subject in CONARC Training Directive. Commander will determine time required to maintain proficiency. Integrated with Survival, Evasion, & Escape.	Anx B, CON Reg 350-1 ASubjScd 5-3 ASubjScd 7-10 ASubjScd 21-40
Military Justice	Course A to be given to EM during BCT; Course B to be given each EM upon completion 6 months active duty and upon each reenlistment. Courses C and D to be given officer personnel at the discretion of Bn or equivalent commanders.	AR 350-212 Anx B, CON Reg 350-1 ASubjScd 21-10 ASubjScd 27-2
First Aid & Emergency Medical Treatment	Annual refresher training.	DA Pam 40-5 Anx B, CON Reg 350-1
Field Sanitation & Hygiene*	Special Emphasis subject in CONARC Training Directive. Commander will determine time required to maintain proficiency. Training will emphasize operations in primitive areas.	Anx B, CON Reg 350-1 DA Pam 40-2 ASubjScd 21-3 ASubjScd 21-11
Physical Fitness	Tests to be administered semi-annually; physical fitness will be emphasized throughout training programs.	AR 600-9 AR 220-1 Anx B, CON Reg 350-1 ASubjScd 21-37

* - Indicates special interest subject rather than mandatory training requirements.

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2. What model is used as the target recipient for overall Army training?
For SERE training?

ANSWER: CONARC does not recognize a model soldier for overall Army training. The educational minimum requirements and the aptitudinal qualifications differ for some 472 enlisted MOS as described in AR 611-201. Additionally, DA Pamphlet 350-10 specifies the prerequisites for all Army courses of instruction which differ according to the difficulty of the courses. SERE training is given to all levels of both officer and enlisted courses of instruction.

3. Does a requirement exist for insuring uniformity of instruction on SERE subjects between:

- a. Branches of the Army
- b. CONUS Military Posts
- c. Other Services (USAF, USN, USMC)

ANSWER: Yes. A requirement exists for standardizing SERE instruction throughout the US Armed Forces. The applications of SERE principles and techniques should be consistent by the members of all Services to insure optimum performance and a united front against any enemy. Uniform application of SERE by all personnel will inhibit the enemy's efforts to play one person against another.

4. What is CONARC's position on Code of Conduct instruction?

- a. How does CONARC interpret the precepts of the Code?
- b. How does CONARC evaluate the effectiveness of Code instruction?
- c. Does CONARC consider present requirements for Code training adequate? If not, why?

ANSWER: The basis of CONARC Code of Conduct instruction is AR 350-30. DA establishes policy on PW conduct. The articles of the Code are considered to prescribe optimum behavior. The policy of this headquarters is not to promote or instill in the student of CONARC schools a doubt or negative attitude concerning a deviation from expected behavioral patterns regardless of the enemies' treatment of PW's. A determination of the effectiveness of Code instruction can only be made by an analysis of the behavior of US prisoners in Southeast Asia--a determination which cannot be made accurately until a substantial number of prisoners are

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returned to US control. Present requirements for Code instruction are considered adequate until US PW debriefings conclude otherwise. Additional instruction in all military subjects would be beneficial; however, because of resource limitations the amounts of Code instruction currently being taught are considered adequate when balanced against other equally important subjects.

5. Has a program similar to that conducted by Fleet Air Electronics Training Unit, Pacific (FAETUPAC), North Island Naval Air Station, San Diego, California, been reviewed as having possible application to US Army "high risk of capture" personnel? If so:

- a. Who will have proponenty?
- b. Who will administer it?

ANSWER: Certain categories of Army personnel would benefit from additional instruction in SERE and SERE-related subjects. However, this headquarters has no plans for a separate course for "high risk of capture" personnel until such time as a definite need is justified.

6. What is CONARC's position on SERE instruction?

- a. How does CONARC interpret the requirements for SERE training?
- b. How does CONARC evaluate the effectiveness of Army-wide SERE training?
- c. Does CONARC consider the quantity and quality of current SERE training adequate to properly orient the US soldier on the internment environment and to prepare him for the best chance for survival?

ANSWER: AR 350-225 established the requirements for Survival, Escape, and Evasion training. The CONARC interpretation and guidance to CONARC schools is found in Annex Q, CONARC Regulation 350-1. CONARC Regulation 350-1 lists SEE as a Common Subject, prescribes the scope for this instruction and designates USAIS as the CONARC proponent. The answer to the question concerning the effectiveness, quality, and quantity of SEE training is basically the same as for questions 4 and 5 above.

7. Does a requirement exist in US Army training to differentiate between internment under armed conflict conditions and peacetime detention during periods of latent hostility?

ANSWER: The possibility exists and should be examined by the study group of the Institute for Strategic and Stability Operations. In other

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words, there are certainly differences in the level of conflict, international relations, and operational environment experienced by a helicopter pilot in RVN, an Air Force pilot on a strategic reconnaissance mission in the Caribbean, or the crew of a Navy ship seized by the North Koreans. On the other hand, conditions of peace have not truly existed since World War II; US Forces have operated or trained to operate in environments ranging from cold to limited war. Moreover, the argument can be made that the enemy's treatment of US prisoners has been substantially the same throughout the range of conflict even at the lower levels, and that therefore US personnel should be trained to behave in a uniform manner if captured. This headquarters will entertain any recommendation for change depending on the outcome of the US PW study.

8. Does a requirement exist to conduct instruction on conflicting ideologies? If so, what should be the content of instruction and at what stage of training should conduct instruction be conducted?

ANSWER: There is no requirement in existing regulations to conduct instruction on conflicting ideologies. The trend in the past 2 years has been away from the concept of attempting to strengthen patriotism by defamation of Communism. The current Command Information Program presented to the soldier in Advanced Individual Training utilizes such subjects as United States Government and Freedom Under Law, The Army In Service To The Nation, US Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations, and Standards for Honorable Service. Instruction on conflicting ideologies is presented to Officer Advanced Course students and at US Army Command and General Staff College.

9. What improvements or additional courses could be incorporated into US Army training to make it a more effective instrument for instilling patriotic ideals, faith in country, and respect for authority?

ANSWER: Individual and unit training at CONARC schools, units, and training centers is under continuous revision. Adding additional courses during this time of declining resources is not advisable. All school courses are currently under consideration for possible elimination or consolidation. At this time, all Army leadership instruction is under study by the DA Leadership Task Group headed by BG Emerson at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

10. What recommendations does CONARC have for SERE and SERE-related training?

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ANSWER: The answer to this question is answered in the answers to questions 4, 5, and 6 above. There are no current plans for a change to present methods of amounts of Survival, Escape, and Evasion training. Current programs are considered adequate. However, if the results of the US PW study reveal inadequacies, this headquarters will entertain recommendations for change.

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Inclosure c

CONSOLIDATED BRANCH SCHOOL RESPONSES

The following represents a consolidation of responses received from the branch schools to eight (8) questions pertaining to SERE training.

1. "Does a requirement exist for insuring uniformity of instruction on SERE subjects between branches of the Army?"

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
SIGNAL-DIX		X	
FINANCE	X		
USAIMA	X		
USAMMC	X		
USACGS	X		
ARMOR	X		
CHAPLAIN	X		
ARTILLERY	X		
ORDNANCE	X		
AVIATION	X		
ENGINEER	X		
INFANTRY			X
QUARTERMASTER	X		
INTELLIGENCE	X		
AIR DEFENSE	X		
SIGNAL-GORDON	X		
CIVIL AFFAIRS		X	
M. P.	X		
HELICOPTER	X		
SURVEILLANCE - ELECTRONICS	X		
TRANSPORTATION	X		
ADJUTANT GENERAL	X		

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2. "Does a requirement exist for insuring uniformity of instruction on SERE subjects between CONUS military posts?"

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
SIGNAL-DIX		X	
FINANCE	X		
USAIMA	X		
USAMMC	X		
USACGS	X		
ARMOR	X		
CHAPLAIN	X		
ARTILLERY			X
ORDNANCE			X
AVIATION	X		
ENGINEER	X		
INFANTRY	X		
QUARTERMASTER	X		
INTELLIGENCE	X		
AIR DEFENSE	X		
SIGNAL-GORDON	X		
CIVIL AFFAIRS		X	
M. P.	X		
HELICOPTER	X		
SURVEILLANCE - ELECTRONICS	X		
TRANSPORTATION	X		
ADJUTANT GENERAL	X		

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3. "Does a requirement exist for insuring uniformity of instruction on SERE subjects between Other Services?"

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
SIGNAL-DIX		X	
FINANCE	X		
USAIMA	X		
USAMMC			X
USACGS	X		
ARMOR	X		
CHAPLAIN			X
ARTILLERY			X
ORDNANCE			X
AVIATION		X	
ENGINEER		X	
INFANTRY			X
QUARTERMASTER		X	
INTELLIGENCE		X	
AIR DEFENSE		X	
SIGNAL-GORDON		X	
CIVIL AFFAIRS			X
M. P.		X	
HELICOPTER			X
SURVEILLANCE		X	
TRANSPORTATION		X	
ADJUTANT GENERAL		X	

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4. "Does school consider SERE training to be adequate?"

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>QUALIFIED YES</u>	<u>QUALIFIED NO</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
TRANSPORTATION	X				
SURVEILLANCE- ELECTRONICS		X			
HELICOPTER	X				
M. P.	X				
CIVIL AFFAIRS	X				
SIGNAL-GORDON		X			
AIR DEFENSE	X				
INTELLIGENCE		X			
QUARTERMASTER			X		
INFANTRY	X				
ENGINEER	X				
AVIATION	X				
ORDNANCE			X		
ARTILLERY			X		
CHAPLAIN		X			
ARMOR		X			
USACGS					X
USAIMA			X		
MISSILE - MUNITIONS		X			
FINANCE	X				
SIGNAL - MONMOUTH	X				

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5. "Does a requirement exist in US Army training to differentiate between internment under armed conflict conditions and peacetime detention during periods of latent hostility?"

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>QUALIFIED YES</u>	<u>QUALIFIED NO</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
TRANSPORTATION		X			
SURVEILLANCE- ELECTRONICS	X				
HELICOPTER	X				
M. P.	X				
CIVIL AFFAIRS				X	
SIGNAL-GORDON		X			
AIR DEFENSE		X			
INTELLIGENCE		X			
QUARTERMASTER	X				
INFANTRY			X		
ENGINEER	X				
AVIATION		X			
ORDNANCE		X			
ARTILLERY	X				
CHAPLAIN	X				
ARMOR		X			
USACGS	X				
USAIMA	X				
MISSILE - MUNITIONS	X				
FINANCE		X			
SIGNAL - MONMOUTH		X			

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6. "Does a requirement exist to conduct instruction on conflicting ideologies?"

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>QUALIFIED YES</u>	<u>QUALIFIED NO</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
TRANSPORTATION	X				
SURVEILLANCE-ELECTRONICS	X				
HELICOPTER	X				
M. P.		X			
CIVIL AFFAIRS		X			
SIGNAL-GORDON	X				
AIR DEFENSE		X			
INTELLIGENCE		X			
QUARTERMASTER	X				
INFANTRY	X				
ENGINEER	X				
AVIATION		X			
ORDNANCE		X			
ARTILLERY				X	
CHAPLAIN	X				
ARMOR		X			
USACGS	X				
USAIMA	X				
MISSILE - MUNITIONS				X	
FINANCE		X			
SIGNAL - MONMOUTH	X				

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7. "How does your school evaluate the effectiveness of the Code instruction?"

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>GOOD</u>	<u>ADEQUATE</u>	<u>LESS THAN ADEQUATE</u>	<u>POOR</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
ADJUTANT GENERAL					X
TRANSPORTATION		X			
SURVEILLANCE- ELECTRONICS			X		
HELICOPTER					X
MILITARY POLICE					X
CIVIL AFFAIRS					X
SIGNAL-GORDON					X
AIR DEFENSE					X
INTELLIGENCE					X
QUARTERMASTER	X				
INFANTRY		X			
ENGINEER			X		
AVIATION					X
ORDNANCE					X
ARTILLERY					X
CHAPLAIN					X
ARMOR	X				
USACGS					X
USAIMA			X		
MISSILE-MUNITION			X		
FINANCE		X			
SIGNAL-MONMOUTH					X

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8. "Does the school consider present requirements for Code training adequate?"

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>ADEQUATE</u>	<u>NOT ADEQUATE</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>ADEQUATE WITH RESERVATIONS</u>
ADJUTANT GENERAL	X			
TRANSPORTATION	X			
SURVEILLANCE- ELECTRONICS		X		
HELICOPTER	X			
M. P.	X			
CIVIL AFFAIRS	X			
SIGNAL-GORDON				X
AIR DEFENSE		X		
INTELLIGENCE				X
QUARTERMASTER				X
INFANTRY	X			
ENGINEER				X
AVIATION				X
ORDNANCE				X
ARTILLERY		X		
CHAPLAIN			X	
ARMOR	X			
USACGS				X
USAIMA			X	
MISSILE		X		
FINANCE	X			
SIGNAL - MONMOUTH	X			

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ANNEX II

BCT/AIT/ACTIVE UNIT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The data provided in the following section were collected from three sources:

- a. Trainees at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.
- b. Enlisted men and officers from the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
- c. Enlisted men and officers from the 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

2. The attached questionnaire provides examples of the questions that were addressed to these three sources. The responses are provided, in percentages, for five groups within the three source elements. These five groups were delineated as follows:

- a. Trainees from Fort Jackson, South Carolina.
- b. Enlisted men within the 82d Airborne Division.
- c. Officers within the 82d Airborne Division.
- d. Enlisted men within the 5th Special Forces Group.
- e. Officers within the 5th Special Forces Group.

3. A comment is demanded concerning the size of the samples for the groups defined above. All samples are small. This small sample size was a function of the limited time available and the problems inherent in locating and obtaining soldiers for participation. The data are viewed as providing indications of the degree to which the respective groups assimilated the information relevant to the questions employed; however, it must be stressed that the data are not provided in the context of a sophisticated program implemented to provide statistically significant results. The composition of the samples is provided below:

- a. Fort Jackson BCT, AIT trainees: n = 104
- b. Fort Bragg, 82d Airborne Division:
 - (1) Enlisted: n = 29
 - (2) Officer: n = 17

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c. Fort Bragg, 5th Special Forces Group:

(1) Enlisted: n = 33

(2) Officer: n = 11

4. Interviews of the Fort Jackson AIT and BCT trainees were held on 6 and 7 April 1971. The 82d Airborne Division interviews were conducted on 30 June 1971 and the interviews of the Special Forces personnel on 7 July 1971.

5. All officers interviewed were of the rank of Captain or below. All enlisted men were E7 or below. No selection was made on the basis of military or civilian occupational specialization and none of the prospective interviewees were rejected for any reason.

6. The duration of the interviews averaged twenty-five minutes in duration. When possible, interviews were conducted individually; however, at times several were interviewed at the same time as necessitated by the time available.

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Composite Statistics

	<u>Fort Jackson</u>	<u>82d Abn Div</u>		<u>Special Forces</u>	
	<u>AIT/BCT</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>
1. How many articles are in the Code of Conduct?					
Correct	20%	03%	76%	36%	09%
Incorrect	80%	97%	23%	64%	91%
2. In your own words could you state what one of these articles is?					
Correct	15%	03%	53%	45%	36%
Incorrect	85%	97%	47%	55%	64%
3. Were you instructed to give to the enemy <u>only</u> the "Big 4" (name, rank, serial number and DOB)?					
Yes	98%	100%	100%	90%	91%
No	02%	00%	00%	10%	09%
4. Were you instructed to go beyond the "Big 4" in order to "evade" answering questions?					
Yes	18%	17%	06%	12%	36%
No	82%	83%	94%	88%	63%
5. What do you understand by the sentence: "I will <u>evade</u> answering further questions to the utmost of my ability."?					
Adequate	12%	00%	00%	00%	03%
Inadequate	88%	100%	100%	100%	97%

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Fort Jackson

82d Abn Div

Special Forces

AIT/BCT

EM Officers

EM Officers

6. Article V of the Code of Conduct states that a prisoner will "evade" answering questions (other than to give his name, rank, service number and date of birth) to "the utmost of his ability." Answer "yes" or "no" according to your own understanding of Article V:

a. A PW may not under any circumstances divulge more than his name, rank, service number, and date of birth.

Yes	87%	55%	59%	67%	77%
No	13%	45%	41%	33%	23%

b. A prisoner should resist giving additional information up to the point of physical mistreatment at the hands of his captors.

Yes	46%	44%	59%	72%	45%
No	54%	56%	41%	28%	55%

c. A prisoner should resist briefly and then lie in order to confuse and harass the enemy.

Yes	35%	45%	18%	10%	06%
No	65%	55%	82%	90%	94%

d. A prisoner should resist up until the point when resistance is no longer possible. He should then

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	<u>Fort Jackson</u>	<u>82d Abn Div</u>		<u>Special Forces</u>	
	<u>AIT/BCT</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>
give truthful answers to whatever questions he can no longer avoid answering.					
Yes	20%	14%	18%	24%	09%
No	80%	86%	82%	76%	91%

7. Are US military personnel permitted to fill out the Red Cross "Capture Card," although the information required goes beyond name, rank, service number and date of birth:

Yes	29%	28%	18%	21%	09%
No	71%	72%	82%	79%	91%

8. Were you instructed in methods to resist interrogation and indoctrination other than dependence upon name, rank, service number and date of birth?

Yes	15%	18%	24%	51%	55%
No	85%	82%	76%	49%	45%

9. Are the following actions violations of the Code?

a. Statements made by PW's that the enemy treats PW's well.

Yes	64%	52%	47%	69%	45%
No	36%	48%	53%	31%	55%

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	<u>Fort Jackson</u>	<u>82d Abn Div</u>		<u>Special Forces</u>	
	<u>AIT/BCT</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>
b. Statements by USPW's that the war is unjust and should be ended.					
Yes	65%	59%	88%	81%	82%
No	35%	41%	12%	19%	18%
c. Television or film appearances in which USPW's which express a desire for an immediate end to the fighting.					
Yes	67%	48%	94%	88%	73%
No	33%	52%	06%	12%	27%
d. Discussion with an interrogator/indoctrinator about the merits of capitalism versus Communism.					
Yes	60%	65%	55%	70%	65%
No	67%	66%	100%	67%	91%
e. Discussing internment conditions and camp administration with the enemy.					
Yes	33%	34%	00%	33%	09%
No	67%	66%	100%	67%	91%
10. Can you be punished for not living up to the Code of Conduct?					
Yes	94%	83%	88%	63%	100%
No	06%	17%	12%	37%	00%
11. Why should a PW live up to the Code?					
Because he can be punished.	36%	06%	02%	15%	02%
Because it is a good standard for conduct.	36%	36%	40%	20%	30%
Because it is expected of a US serviceman.	66%	42%	60%	35%	40%

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	<u>Fort Jackson</u>	<u>82d Abn Div</u>		<u>Special Forces</u>	
	<u>AIT/BCT</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>
12. What techniques would be used against you by an enemy interrogator/indoctrinator?					
Adequate	10%	17%	41%	03%	27%
Inadequate	90%	83%	59%	97%	73%
13. Based on your training, what are you permitted to say to your captors?					
"Big 4"	88%	79%	85%	75%	82%
"Big 4" plus	12%	21%	15%	24%	18%
14. In the area of First Aid were you provided with information concerning primitive medicine?					
Yes	62%	31%	41%	43%	36%
No	38%	62%	59%	57%	64%
15. Can you tell me how personal hygiene and sanitation could benefit you if you were a prisoner?					
Adequate	75%	30%	55%	35%	40%
Inadequate	25%	70%	45%	65%	60%
16. What will be done for your family if you are taken prisoner?					
Don't Know	80%	85%	82%	82%	48%
Nothing	04%	05%	03%	03%	36%
Adequate	02%	05%	05%	06%	15%

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	<u>Fort Jackson</u>	<u>82d Abn Div</u>		<u>Special Forces</u>	
	<u>AIT/BCT</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>
17. How would you resist enemy interrogation?					
a. Maintain silence.	48%	62%	47%	33%	06%
b. Maintain silence until subjected to pain then relate anything.	12%	07%	07%	03%	17%
c. Resist then lie to deceive.	26%	14%	35%	15%	27%
d. Relate a preconceived cover story.	12%	14%	12%	39%	43%
18. How many types of food would be available (under survival conditions) in the jungles of Southeast Asia?					
Adequate	30%	10%	35%	35%	45%
Inadequate	70%	90%	65%	65%	55%
19. If captured in Southeast Asia what type of confinement would you anticipate?					
a. Compound in North Vietnam.	25%	14%	18%	12%	64%
b. Permanent camp in South Vietnam.	04%	14%	09%	03%	00%
c. Compound in China	05%	03%	06%	06%	00%
d. Mobile camp in Southeast Asia.	70%	55%	88%	78%	91%

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	<u>Fort Jackson</u>	<u>82d Abn Div</u>	<u>Special Forces</u>		
	<u>AIT/BCT</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>

20. What disease(s) would represent the greatest threat to your health while interned?

Only diseases mentioned by a significant portion of any of the groups were malaria and dysentery.

21. Designate which of the following subjects areas will be of greatest importance to you if interned. (List in order of importance.)

a. First Aid and primitive medicine.	2	2	3	2	2
b. Physical Training.	5	5	4	5	5
c. Survival, escape, and evasion.	1	1	1	1	1
d. Personal hygiene and sanitation.	3	3	2	3	3
e. Code of Conduct.	4	4	5	4	4
f. Geneva and Hague Conventions.	6	6	6	6	6

22. How would you anticipate the treatment you would receive at the hands of the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese?

a. Torture	72%	55%	47%	65%	09%
b. Execution	26%	14%	18%	33%	09%
c. Intensive Interrogation	88%	05%	71%	78%	55%

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	<u>Fort Jackson</u>	<u>82d Abn Div</u>		<u>Special Forces</u>	
	<u>AIT/BCT</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>
d. Good Care	06%	07%	00%	00%	09%
e. Starvation, No Care	59%	35%	34%	45%	18%
f. Other	00%	00%	00%	00%	00%
23. Would you anticipate different types of care at the hands of the NVN as opposed to the Viet Cong?					
Yes	38%	45%	76%	34%	82%
No	62%	47%	18%	39%	06%
24. Which of the following foods would be best to eat for your health?					
a. Rice	23%	24%	28%	30%	18%
b. Fish	20%	35%	17%	12%	18%
c. Meat	47%	47%	48%	72%	55%
d. Green Vegetables	51%	59%	48%	72%	73%
e. "Potato" tubers	08%	06%	07%	03%	18%
f. Anything offered	09%	12%	31%	03%	18%
25. Are the following safe to eat? (Response indicates percentage answering in affirmative.)					
a. Monkey	80%	20%	40%	60%	70%
b. Raw Fish	70%	15%	40%	45%	65%
c. Raw Eggs	50%	40%	75%	80%	95%
d. Maggots	15%	02%	05%	15%	15%
e. Poisonous Snakes	50%	10%	20%	40%	50%

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	<u>Fört Jackson</u> <u>AIT/BCT</u>	<u>82d Abn Div</u> <u>EM Officers</u>		<u>Special Forces</u> <u>EM Officers</u>	
26. What would you do if you saw blood in your stool:					
Adequate	05%	00%	00%	03%	28%
Inadequate	95%	100%	100%	97%	72%
27. Would you take "pills" if offered them by your captors?					
Yes	10%	24%	71%	48%	91%
No	90%	59%	29%	51%	09%
28. If you saw worms in your stool would that indicate:					
a. You were very sick.	50%	48%	18%	48%	36%
b. You were near death.	01%	00%	00%	00%	00%
c. You were not seriously ill.	26%	34%	35%	33%	33%
d. You will recover.	30%	17%	47%	18%	18%
29. If interned in a PW camp without pharmaceutical medicines, how would you treat:					
a. Dysentary:		All inadequate - all groups.			
b. Burns:		All inadequate - all groups.			
c. Pneumonia:		All inadequate - all groups.			
30. When is the best time to escape:					
Adequate	58%	24%			
Inadequate	36%	59%			

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	<u>Fort Jackson</u>	<u>82d Abn Div</u>		<u>Special Forces</u>	
	<u>AIT/BCT</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Officers</u>
31. Based on your answers to these questions, do you feel you could survive an extended (1 year or more) internment in the jungles of South Vietnam?					
Yes	48%	45%	82%	81%	73%
No	52%	48%	18%	06%	18%
of North Vietnam?					
Yes	66%	28%	94%	88%	73%
No	37%	66%	06%	06%	18%

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ANNEX III

FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Responses to a questionnaire dispatched to US Army repatriates of the Vietnam conflict provided additional data. Although the size of the sample group was limited, the results of the questionnaire are not intended to present a categorical analysis of the impressions conveyed by all former prisoners. Rather, the responses and their inclusion merely purport to present several indications prevalent among these former prisoners of war.
2. Although thirty-three questionnaires were sent to individuals, only twelve completed forms were returned. Thus, the sample provides anything but conclusive fact. However, the responses are indicative of several important attitudes in regard to the Code of Conduct and the Army training program designed to prepare soldiers to survive and resist during internment.
3. Compilation of the responses occurred between 18 March 1971, the date the questionnaires were sent, and 27 April 1971, the date on which the last completed questionnaire was received.

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Composite Statistics

1. By whom were you held prisoner?
 - a. North Vietnam (NVA) 17%
 - b. South Vietnam (VC) 59%
 - c. Both NVA and VC 8%
 - d. National Liberation Front 17%
2. How long were you held captive?
 - a. Less than 12 months 59%
 - b. More than 12, but less than 36 months 25%
 - c. More than 36 months 17%
3. When did you receive Code of Conduct training:
 - a. BCT 42%
 - b. AIT 0%
 - c. Officer Basic Course 8%
 - d. In your unit 50%
 - e. In all the above 17%
4. What type of instruction did you receive on the Code of Conduct prior to your captivity?
 - a. Classroom lecture 67%
 - b. Practical exercise (in conjunction with survival, escape, evasion, and resistance) 8%
 - c. Both lecture and practical exercise 25%
 - d. Don't remember
5. Did you receive any specialized training on the Code of Conduct as a part of a specialized school (e.g., Special Forces)?

Yes	17%
No	83%

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6. The following statement should be answered yes or no according to your own understanding of the Code.

US servicemen who are captured are legally responsible under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for their actions while prisoners.

Yes	67%
No	33%

7. Article V of the Code of Conduct states that a prisoner will "evade" answering questions (other than to give his "name, rank, service number, and date of birth) to the "utmost of his ability." Answer "yes" or "no" according to your own understanding of Article V:

a. A PW may not under any circumstances divulge more than his name, rank, service number, and DOB.

Yes	33%
No	67%

b. A prisoner should resist giving additional information up to the point of physical mistreatment at the hands of his captors.

Yes	75%
No	25%

c. A prisoner should resist briefly and then lie in order to confuse and harass the enemy.

Yes	33%
No	67%

d. A prisoner should resist up until the point when resistance is no longer possible. He should then give truthful answers to whatever questions he can no longer avoid answering.

Yes	8%
No	92%

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8. List in order of value (1 thru 6), the kinds of training which would have proven of the greatest value to you during your status as a PW. (The item you consider the most valuable should be marked with a "1"; the second most valuable with a "2" and so on, down to "6".)

- | | |
|---|---|
| a. Instruction on the nature of Communism | 3 |
| b. Evasion and escape techniques | 1 |
| c. Techniques of PW organization while in captivity | 5 |
| d. Techniques of interrogation resistance | 2 |
| e. Sanitation and health | 4 |
| f. Code of Conduct training | 6 |

9. In your understanding, are captured US military personnel permitted to give the information required on the Red Cross "Capture Card," although this information goes beyond name, rank, service number, and DOB?

Yes 25%

No 42%

Not familiar with capture card 33%

10. Did your captors mention the US Code of Conduct while you were in captivity? If so, in which of the following situations did it occur?

- | | |
|--|-----|
| a. To tell you it violates the Geneva Convention. | 8% |
| b. To make you feel that you had been disloyal to your country. | 0% |
| c. To see if you know what your country expected of you. | 17% |
| d. To convince you that the Code meant something different from what you thought it did. | 25% |
| e. Did not mention Code. | 50% |

11. In your training, were you taught what techniques the Communists employ against prisoners of war?

Yes 25%

No 75%

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12. Did you consider yourself properly trained in what your government expected of you (Code of Conduct) at the time of your capture?

Yes	50%
No	50%

13. Which one or more of the following actions do you consider violations of the Code of Conduct?

a. Statements by USPW's that the enemy treats PW's well.

Yes	17%
No	83%

b. Statements by USPW's that the war is unjust and should be ended.

Yes	58%
No	42%

c. Television or film appearances in which a USPW expresses a desire for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

Yes	58%
No	42%

d. Discussion with an interrogator/indoctrinator about the merits of capitalism versus Communism.

Yes	33%
No	67%

e. Discussing internment conditions with the enemy.

Yes	8%
No	92%

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14. In your training, were you instructed in methods to resist in-terrogation and indoctrination beyond dependence upon name, rank, serial number, and DOB?

Yes 17%

No 83%

15. Considering your PW experience, which of the following methods of instruction should be used in teaching the Code of Conduct?

a. Lecture 33%

b. Seminar (Open discussion among trainees) 67%

c. Practical application (placing student in a "mock" internment situation) 83%

16. Considering all your Army training, indicate how well it prepared you, in the event of capture, to counter the treatment you would receive as a PW and to survive the ordeal.

a. Excellent 0%

b. Good 25%

c. Adequate 0%

d. Less than adequate 17%

e. Poor 42%

f. Useless 17%

17. In your training, which of the following would have benefitted you most in preparation for internment?

a. More emphasis on prison camp routine. 67%

b. More subjects presented. 50%

c. More time allotted to specific subjects. 58%

d. More practical field exercises. 50%

e. More physical training. 8%

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f. More emphasis on the protection afforded by the Geneva Convention. 8%

g. None. 17%

18. In order of value (1 thru 6) which of the following do you feel would best assist the soldier in survival, escape, and evasion.

a. Provide greater emphasis on the geographical area in which the survival experience will most likely take place. 2

b. Increase the emphasis placed on practical field exercises involving survival techniques. 3

c. Provide greater exposure to classroom instruction in techniques of survival. 6

d. Increase the training in the area of primitive first aid and preventive medicine. 4

e. Increase the emphasis placed on the variations in diet that may be experienced in a survival situation and nutritional value of certain foods. 1

f. Increase the emphasis on land navigational techniques. 5

19. What form of training did you receive in the area of survival, escape, resistance, and evasion?

a. Lecture 75%

b. Seminar (open discussion among trainees) 8%

c. Practical application (placing student in a simulated situation) 17%

d. Don't remember 0%

e. Film 8%

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20. When considered in comparison with other training you have received, how would you rate the survival, escape, resistance, and evasion training you received?

- | | |
|--|-----|
| a. Better than any of the other areas of Army training received. | 8% |
| b. As good as any other Army training received | 8% |
| c. About average for Army training. | 17% |
| d. Less effective, or complete, than the other areas of training received. | 17% |
| e. Far inferior to most of the other training received. | 33% |
| f. The least effective of any Army training | 8% |

21. In order of value (1 thru 5) which of the following do you feel would benefit the individual soldier in the area of resisting enemy interrogation and indoctrination techniques:

- | | |
|--|---|
| a. Provide simulated compound training designed to expose the serviceman to the nature of the threat he will face. | 1 |
| b. Increase classroom presentation that provides information on the Communist methods of interrogation and indoctrination. | 3 |
| c. Training that is directed to providing the serviceman with techniques which may be effectively used in organizing resistance in a PW compound. | 2 |
| d. Nutritional guidance oriented to provide the serviceman with information concerning the relative value of foods that may be encountered while interned. | 4 |
| e. Increased emphasis on physical training. | 5 |

22. In order of value (1 thru 3) which of the following do you feel would benefit the individual soldier in the area of escape and evasion:

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a. Spend more time training in the field in simulated escape and evasion circumstances. 2

b. Place more emphasis on the classroom instruction of escape and evasion training. 3

c. Direct evasion and escape training to the area of the world in which the individual will most likely be involved. 1

23. List subject areas that were not considered in the training that you feel could be of value:

a. Resistance of interrogation/indoctrination 33%

b. Study of comparative political systems 25%

c. Psychological aspects of imprisonment 25%

d. Nutritional aspects of imprisonment 8%

e. Preventative medicine 8%

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ANNEX IV

BASIC AND ADVANCED OFFICER COURSES POI

1. The following charts represent a schematic display of the number of hours devoted to SERE and SERE-related subjects under the auspices of the various Basic Officer Courses and Advanced Officer Courses. The figures offer some indication of the importance deemed each subject by each course.

2. Attached as Inclosure a is a display of the hours devoted to the pertinent subjects as Basic Officer Courses. Inclosure b represents the analysis of the Advanced Officer Course program.

Inclosures:

- a. Basic Officer Course Analysis
- b. Advanced Officer Course Analysis

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Inclosure b

ADVANCED OFFICER COURSE ANALYSIS

NUMBER OF HOURS OFFERED IN SERE-RELATED SUBJECTS

Branch School	Code of Conduct	Land Navigation	Geneva & Hague Conventions	Survival Evasion & Escape	First Aid & Field Sanitation	Military Justice
Infantry	1	30	2	1	10	9 ^a
Artillery	0	4	2	1	1	7
Air Defense	1	0	1	2	0	15
Armor	0	19 ^b	0	3*	0	12
Engineer	0	0 ^c	0	1*	3	6
Chemical	1*	10	1*	8	22 ^d	7
Ordinance	*	5	0	2*	2	8
Med Svc	1	6	2	0	12	5
Trans	*	10 ^b	2	1*	3	4
Signal	0	0 ^c	0	1	0	6
Q.M.	1	4	0	1	0	4
Mil Police	0	0	4	1	3	6
Mil Intel	2	0	3	1*	0	11
Chaplain	1/2	0	-	5	0	2 1/2*
Adj General	1	6	2	1*	0	6
C & GS	-	-	3	-	-	6

NOTES: * Integrated with Code and Geneva Conventions
 ** Projected

a - Includes International Law
 b - Includes Text Assignments
 c - Pass by Exam
 d - Integrated w/other subjects

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