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US ARMY PRISONER OF WAR DOCTRINE REPORT

Doctrine For Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel, Short Title: USPOW

ACN 15596, March 1972

United States Army Combat Developments Command, Special Operations Agency

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MARCH 1972

AD

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DOCTRINE FOR CAPTURED/DETAINED UNITED STATES
MILITARY PERSONNEL (U)

(Short Title : USPOW (U))
FINAL STUDY .

VOLUME III

APPENDIX H, PREINTERNMENT DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS APPENDIX
APPENDIX I, INTERNMENT DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS APPENDIX
APPENDIX J, POST INTERNMENT DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS APPENDIX

UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY



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**DOCTRINE FOR CAPTURED/DETAINED UNITED STATES
MILITARY PERSONNEL (U)**

**(Short Title : USPOW (U))
FINAL STUDY .**

VOLUME III

APPENDIX H, PREINTERNMENT DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS APPENDIX
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APPENDIX H

(U) DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS APPENDIX
PRE-INTERMENT PHASE (U)

1. GENERAL:

a. In Chapter 4, Army doctrine as it relates to the Code of Conduct, SERE subjects, and SERE-related subjects is reviewed in light of the requirements generated by Communist treatment of prisoners of war (See Chapter 2) as well as requirements generated by precedents or directives established at the national or Department of Defense level (See Chapter 3). The fallout from this review is the identification of twenty-eight (28) requirements not currently being met by Army doctrine.

b. The purpose of this Appendix is to analyze and discuss the specific weaknesses of current doctrine and to make recommendations on improvements such that all the requirements are satisfied.

c. To facilitate the analysis, the 28 requirements were reviewed and consolidated by topic area into ten broad problem areas. These ten (10) areas are addressed independently in the ten ANNEXES to this APPENDIX. For review purposes, the requirements which created the particular broad area are presented at the beginning of each ANNEX.

d. The analysis of the ten problem areas resulted in the formulation of specific recommendations for actions that need to be taken by various Army activities in order to bring pre-internment doctrine (and training) up to the desired level. Listed below (see par 2.) are the recommendations offered in ANNEXES I-X. A synopsis of these recommendations is presented in FIGURE 30 on the following page.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS: The following is a list of recommendations offered in ANNEXES I-X. For ease of staffing, the recommendations have been consolidated by tasked activity.

a. That DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to use results of this study to:

(1) Develop and maintain current doctrine on evasion techniques which are theater oriented (subject doctrine to be in sufficient detail to identify key differences in techniques).

(2) Develop a resistance training program for presentation to all US soldiers which:

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THAT DA TASK CONARC IN COORDINATION WITH USACDC TO:

Develop a Resistance Training Program for all US soldiers which:

- a. Stresses psychological depression upon capture.
- b. Presents Communist PW management principles.
- c. Identifies positive resistance measures to principles.
- d. Provides for degrees of training based on risk of capture.
- e. Provides E&E data for low intensity conflicts.
- f. Identifies techniques of personal hygiene and area sanitation.
- g. Identifies beneficial physical exercises for PW.
- h. Identifies self-help medical techniques for internment diseases and injuries.
- i. Informs US Army personnel of NOK assistance programs.
- j. Stresses the need for having personal affairs in order prior to overseas movement.
- k. Identifies impact of Communist reservation to Art. 85, GPW-1949.
- l. Is presented through the media of a training film series to insure presentation uniformity.

Revise FM 21-76 or develop a new FM to incorporate the following:

- a. Identification of permitted verbal and written communication (p. H-4).
- b. Accountability of USPW under the UCMJ.
- c. The consequences of committing violence against the captor while escaping.
- d. The consequences of war crime admissions and accusations.
- e. Detailed descriptions of Communist PW management techniques (Chap 2).
- f. Positive actions to limit exploitation effectiveness.
- g. Techniques for resisting segregation and isolation (p. H-9).
- h. Guidance for physical fitness, area and personal hygiene, and diet variability.
- i. Comprehensive guidance on primitive medicine.
- j. Effect of psychological depression upon capture.
- k. Guidance of escape and evasion opportunities and techniques for all conflicts and theatres.
- l. Identification of NOK assistance programs (p. H-7).
- m. Identification of PW organization techniques w/emphasis on in-camp and out-of-camp communication.

ACTIONS BY OTHER ACTIVITIES:

- a. TAGO publish a DA Pam on Notification and NOK Assistance Programs.
- b. DA revise AR 350-30 to read: All training programs will impress upon every soldier that the PW compound is in many ways an extension of the battlefield.
- c. DA initiate action to establish Service Committee at DOD to review SERE and SERE-related training with a view of obtaining Service uniformity.

FIGURE 30. PRE-INTERMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

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(a) Presents the Communist prisoner of war management principles identified in this study.

(b) Identifies positive action to resist or limit the effectiveness of those principles.

(c) Provides for variable degrees of exposure depending on the risk of capture potential of the target training group.

(d) Stresses the psychological depression to be expected immediately following the moment of capture and how to lessen its effect.

(e) Expands instruction on escape opportunities and techniques in unconventional warfare and low intensity conflict environments such as Southeast Asia (instruction to be based on experiences related by escapees from that theater).

(f) Identifies significant differences in escape and evasion techniques required due to theater environment.

(g) Identifies realistic techniques for personal hygiene and area sanitation using material indigenous to the internment camp (to be developed by US Army Medical Field Service School in coordination with the Surgeon General).

(h) Identifies specific physical exercises that are beneficial and practical in the restrained environment of internment (to be developed by US Army Medical Field Service School in coordination with The Surgeon General).

(i) Identifies self-help medical techniques for treating common internment injuries and diseases without commercially prepared medicines (to be developed by US Army Medical Field Service School in coordination with The Surgeon General).

b. That DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to use results of this study to:

(1) Revise FM 21-76 to incorporate the following:

(a) Positive guidance that a USPW can realistically follow with emphasis on what he is permitted to say and write and what he is to evade as indicated below:

I. Permitted Actions.

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a. Petitioning his captor for medical and sanitation needs, food, and shelter.

b. Engaging in conversation with captor in regard to normal day to day prison life and other activities such as weather, athletics, hobbies, and work in which engaged.

c. Divulging his unit designation if wearing a patch at time of capture.

d. Completing the Red Cross Capture Card.

e. Discussing literary matters without commitment to a cause.

f. Providing limited autobiographical data which does not reveal special training or qualifications that would enhance his exploitation.

2. Subjects which the USPW should evade discussing to the utmost of his ability:

a. Fellow prisoners of war

b. Identity of units other than own

c. Tactical disposition of own or any other unit

d. Weapons, weapon systems, or unit organizations

e. Cryptographic matter or procedures

f. Knowledge of technical equipment

g. Radio/telephone procedures

(b). Emphasis on the fact the US soldier is held accountable under the UCMJ for his conduct while a PW.

(c) Cautionary guidance on the commission of violence against the captor while attempting escape or subsequent evasion.

(d). Guidance to the effect that admission of a "war crime" may cause the USPW to lose protection of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

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(e) Detailed description of Communist techniques of interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation (based on Chapter 2, this study).

(f) Positive actions to resist or limit the effectiveness of Communist interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation efforts (based on material in Chapter 2, this study), and experiences of repatriated USPW's from Korea and Viet Nam. (Necessary resistance techniques to be incorporated in the FM 21-76 chapter or section dealing with the specific subject.)

(g) Description of Communist techniques of segregation and isolation and the following key elements for resisting them:

1. Faith in fellow PW's and adherence to the chain of command reduce the effectiveness of segregation.

2. Onset of hallucinations during prolonged isolation is not to be feared. The phenomenon is nonharmful and immediately reversible upon release from the isolated state.

3. Communication with fellow PW's is possible even in the isolated state through the media of simplified codes, message drops, prearranged signals, etc. (A display of an example code and brief explanation should be included.)

4. Exercises in mental gymnastics daily will assist in maintaining mental and emotional stability.

(h) Addition of the following in Section III, Chapter 14:

1. The need for maintaining physical fitness while interned.

2. Specific exercises for maintaining fitness during internment (to be derived by US Army Medical Field Service School in coordination with OTSG).

3. The need for keeping self and area as hygienically clean as possible.

4. Techniques for maintaining self and area cleanliness while interned (concepts to be provided by US Army Medical Field Service School).

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5. Description of the variances in diet and delicacies between Occidental and Oriental cultures and the need to overcome resistance to eating because of unpalatability.

(i) A graphics-supported narrative on primitive medicine written in language understandable to the basic combat soldier. Subject to deal with self treatment of injuries and diseases common to the internment environment in the absence of qualified medical personnel or commercially prepared medicines. (Technical concepts to be developed by US Army Medical Field Service School in coordination with OTSG.)

(j) A description in Section II, Chapter 13, of the psychological depression to be expected at and immediately following the moment of capture and how to lessen its effect.

(k) Updating Chapter 17 to expand guidance on escape opportunities and techniques in unconventional warfare and low intensity conflict environments such as Southeast Asia.

(l) Identifying in Section II, Chapter V, the significant differences in evasion techniques that may be required due to theater/environment orientation.

(m) Identification in paragraph 13-1, Section I, Chapter 13, of the following key elements of Next of Kin Assistance programs:

1. Personal notification of NOK by an officer/senior NCO.

2. Assignment of an officer to assist USPW families throughout the period of internment.

3. Movement of immediate NOK to his (her) requested location.

4. Continued on-post privileges for immediate family, including housing if it were authorized prior to capture of the USPW.

5. Educational grants and assistance for immediate NOK.

6. Continuous update of USPW status as information becomes available. (NOTE: Additional information should be included to the effect: "You do your part! Should you become a prisoner of war, a major psychological concern can be alleviated if you have your personal affairs in proper order prior to leaving your family for your overseas assignment.")

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(2) In the event incorporation of the above recommendations into FM 21-76 makes the subject manual too unwieldy, develop a new manual, FM 21-77, entitled "Doctrine for Prisoners of War" which incorporates the results of this study.

c: That DA task CONARC to:

(1) Determine the feasibility of presenting doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel to include Communist PW management principles, their use and USPW resistance measures by means of a training film series.

(2) Review the current Geneva Convention training program to insure the US soldier is receiving instruction on the concepts identified in sub par b(1)(c) and (d) above.

(3) Develop a training program which emphasizes doctrine identified in sub paragraphs b(1)(e)(f) and (g) above.

(4) Develop a training program designed to inform US Army personnel of Army programs which assist the NOK in the event the sponsor becomes missing or is captured. (Chapter V, this study may be used as a guide.)

(5) Identify suggested methods and techniques for PW organization under conditions of intense segregation and/or isolation, placing special emphasis on in-camp and out-of-camp communication systems. (Subject methods and techniques to be incorporated into FM 21-76 and FM 21-77A or new manual recommended in par b(2) above.)

(6) Develop a training program to familiarize every US soldier with the following:

(a) An immediate and long term priority concern of the PW is for the health and welfare of his family.

(b) The US Army takes care of its own. Information as to the specific key family assistance programs available to Next of Kin of PW's to be covered here. The need for the US soldier to have his personal affairs in order prior to departure for an overseas assignment.

d. That the Adjutant General initiate action to publish a DA pamphlet on the notification program and the next of kin family assistance programs which are currently in effect for next of kin of service members being carried in an MIA/PW status. Subject pamphlet should

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be so written as to be easily read and understood by the basic combat soldier and his next of kin. (See Internment Phase Recommendation 6b, ANNEX II, APPENDIX I.)

e. That DA initiate action to revise Section III, Paragraph 8, AR 350-30, "Code of Conduct," dated 8 July 1968, to read, "All training programs will impress upon every soldier that prisoner of war compounds are in many ways an extension of the battlefield."

f. That DA initiate action to establish a joint service committee at DOD to continually review SERE and SERE-related training of the four Services and to make appropriate recommendations for achieving training uniformity among the Services.

ANNEXES:

- I- Instruction on Communist Management Principles
- II- Permissible Discourse and the Geneva Convention
- III- Resistance to Communist Management Principles
- IV- Internment Environment Survival
- V- Escape and Evasion
- VI- Conflicting Ideology Instruction
- VII- Faith and the Chain of Command
- VIII- Government Assistance to PW and NOK
- IX- Interservice Code Training Uniformity
- X- Overlapping Requirements

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ANNEX I

INSTRUCTION ON COMMUNIST MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

REQUIREMENT: THE US SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED ON THE COMMUNIST MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND HOW THESE ARE USED TO HIS DETRIMENT AND THAT OF HIS COUNTRY.

1. PROBLEM. To identify the most practical approach for insuring that US soldiers are instructed on the Communist PW management principles and how they are used to his detriment and that of his country.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. That Communist PW management principles will not change significantly during the 1972-75 time frame.

b. That National/DOD policy will continue to espouse the need for the US soldier to be instructed on what he should expect from his captors, should he have the misfortune to be captured.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. Chapter 2 of this study identifies the Communist PW management principles that will be employed during the 1972-75 time frame.

b. CONARC will be responsible for training the US soldier to meet the Communist threat during 1972-75.

c. To instruct the US soldier in techniques, CONARC must possess doctrine. This study is for the purpose of formulating doctrine.

4. DISCUSSION. Chapter 2 has identified the Communist threat to US military personnel who will become prisoners of war during the 1972-75 time frame. The fundamentals of the threat will have a definite impact upon US military prisoners of war. By knowing what to anticipate if captured by the enemy and by having received training in techniques for countering the impact, the US soldier will have enhanced his chances for surviving Communist internment. This ANNEX deals only with instructing the US soldier in regard to Communist PW management principles. The principles in themselves have been broken down into individual requirements which are addressed in appropriate sections of the study. Those requirements are not repeated here. FM 21-76 and FM 21-77A are the prime sources of doctrine for what a US soldier is to be taught in regard to the Communist threat. The succeeding ANNEXES of this Appendix.

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and the other APPENDIXES of the study establish the fact that existing doctrine for instructing the US soldier is inadequate. Primarily, it is inadequate because, heretofore, Communist PW management principles have not been synthesized into a document available throughout the Army and updated as required to account for the most recent trends or developments. Chapter 2 provides that synthesis and update. The problem then is concerned with the most practical approach for conveying the Communist PW management principles to the US soldier. There are three alternatives for consideration.

a. Integration of threat information into blocks of training addressing a related portion of the threat. This alternative would minimize time requirements by permitting the information to be imparted as parts of previously scheduled classes. On the other hand, it would present only a portion of the total picture at any one time. As a result, it would be far less meaningful and of doubtful effectiveness. There would be no means of insuring uniformity of instruction without revising the related Army Subject Schedules, associated POI's and individual lesson plans.

b. Incorporate as part of the Troop Information Program. This alternative would provide for genuine round table discussion and greater participation, thus stimulating interest and enhancing memory retention. It would not require amendments of existing Army Subject Schedules, POI's and lesson plans. It would not require a trade-off with other prescheduled subject matter. On the other hand, it would preclude any possibility of uniform instruction and there is a likelihood that the subject matter would not be accorded the seriousness to which it is entitled. The fact that TI classes are not uniformly scheduled nor attendance rigidly enforced would deny many soldiers the benefit of the programs.

c. A specific block of training in BCT and basic officer courses to insure that every US soldier receives instruction. This alternative would provide for uniformity and comprehensiveness of training, would permit orderly scheduling, and could be organized through a specifically designated program of instruction (POI). The importance of the subject matter would not be overshadowed by other material and, although there would probably have to be a trade-off with some other subject in the training cycle, it would minimize interference with the Army Subject Schedules, other POI's and instructor lesson plans. This alternative would permit the structuring of a SERE POI for a specific block of training which integrates the Communist threat with other subjects such as the Code of Conduct, Geneva Conventions, and survival, evasion and escape. It would provide the needed flexibility for adopting the most appropriate facets of the training programs of the Navy and Air Force.

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(See Appendix K.) By the same token, it would permit discarding those Navy and Air Force procedures not applicable to Army needs or not compatible with time demands of other subjects. As in the other Services, this alternative would permit the trainee to relate the sub-subjects such as Geneva Conventions, Code of Conduct, field sanitation, Communist PW management principles, as pieces of a whole, i.e., Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Training. Acknowledgement of the interrelationship of SERE subjects by the Army and ultimately by the student (trainee) assures proper instruction and reception of doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel.

d. The manner in which Communist PW management principles is presented is the prerogative of CONARC. In APPENDIX C (Follow On Action Appendix) there is a discussion on the manner in which the doctrine contained within this study could best be presented. It ultimately derives that the doctrine for captured/detained personnel is of such import as to require presentation to every US soldier but only to such a degree as to insure understanding of solely the principal concepts. The vehicle recommended for CONARC's consideration is a film series, a major portion of which delves into the Communist prisoner of war management principles and how to resist and/or limit their effectiveness. Whether the film proposal is approved or not, the requirement for presentation of the doctrine remains. Without dissent, all former prisoners of war queried acknowledged that they were poorly prepared for internment and that additional training in SERE doctrine would have been of significant benefit.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. It is impractical to integrate instruction on Communist PW management principles with other subjects in the Army Subject Schedule.

b. A specific block of instruction which incorporates survival, evasion, and escape subjects with resistance subjects provides the best vehicle for insuring proper correlation and understanding of the doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel.

c. Instruction on Communist PW management principles could best be presented as part of the specific block of instruction stipulated in 5b. above.

d. That Communist PW management principles, their use and USPW countermeasures could be structured meaningfully into a film series of SERE training.

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to develop a training program for Basic Combat Training and Basic Officer Training on Communist PW management principles, their use and USPW countermeasures.

b. That DA task CONARC to review the feasibility of presentation of Communist PW management principles, their use and USPW countermeasures by means of a training film. (See Follow On Recommendation 6a., APPENDIX C.)

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ANNEX II

PERMISSABLE DISCOURSE AND THE GENEVA CONVENTION

REQUIREMENTS:

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE GIVEN EXPLICIT GUIDANCE WHICH HE CAN REALISTICALLY FOLLOW WHEN PLACED IN PHYSICALLY AND/OR MENTALLY STRESSFUL SITUATION SUCH AS CAPTIVITY. THE DEGREE OF TRAINING RECEIVED MUST BE COMMENSURATE WITH THE "RISK OF CAPTURE" POTENTIAL OF HIS DUTY POSITION.

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE FULLY AWARE OF WHAT HE IS PERMITTED TO SAY AND WRITE WHILE IN CAPTIVITY AND WHAT VARIANCES ARE ACCEPTED UNDER DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DURESS.

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE FULLY INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GPW.

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES THAT MAY OCCUR FROM WHAT HE SAYS AND WRITES BECAUSE OF THE COMMUNISTS' REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE ARTICLE 85, GPW.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

To develop doctrine for the US soldier which:

a. Provides explicit guidance which he can realistically follow when placed in a physically and/or mentally stressful situation such as captivity.

b. Insures full awareness of what he is permitted to say and write in captivity and what variances are accepted under different levels of duress.

c. Insures that he is fully informed of his rights and obligations under the GPW-1949.

d. Identifies the impact of Communist refusal to recognize Article 85 of the GPW.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

The Code of Conduct will not be modified prior to repatriation of USPW's from the Vietnam conflict.

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3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

- a. The Code of Conduct is the basis of current doctrine.
- b. The Army interpretation of the Code of Conduct is exemplified in AR 350-30, FM 21-76, FM 21-77A and ASubjScd 21-15.
- c. DOD Directive 1300.7 is the primary document for implementing training aspects of the Code of Conduct.
- d. Article V of the Code of Conduct, with explanatory notes, provides the basis for the rules of permissive discourse.
- e. FM 21-77A is the prime doctrinal source for prisoner-captor communication.
- f. The Army Subject Schedule for training on Geneva Conventions is Army Subject Schedule 27-1, "The Hague and Geneva Conventions."
- g. AR 350-216, "Training: The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907" (28 May 70) is the basic document for Army training in the GPW.
- h. ASubjScd 21-7 does not provide for training in respect to reservations to Article 85 of the GPW.
- i. AR 350-216 provides no training guidance relative to Communist reservations to Article 85 of the GPW.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. General. The general guidelines provided by the original Defense Advisory Committee report, the Defense Department Directive, and the Code's explanatory notes were intended to offer sufficiently explicit and realistic guidance for the behavior of a PW. These sources were of such latitude that the Army doctrine designed to implement the Code reflected the generality rather than the substance of the intended guidance. The superficiality of the Army doctrine exemplified the absence of any explicit guidance. The standard doctrinal contribution of Army literature either reiterates the Code and Explanatory Notes (see FM 21-13, pp. 120-125) or reduces the tenets to over-simplification (see FM 21-75, paragraph 88). The notable exception is FM 21-77A, Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual, which, although not sufficiently detailed, does provide limited guidance. The principal

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drawback to the use of this particular manual is its "Secret" classification, which precludes wide dissemination.

b. Current guidance. The inability of the current doctrinal sources to adequately address the problem of providing explicit and realistic guidance is demonstrable evidence that the limited and disparate doctrine must be collected and magnified in a single source document. Such an exposition could be made in a distinct field manual providing doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel or in a major re-write of FM's 21-76 and 21-77A. Manifestly, this consolidated publication would serve as a fundamental text for a more detailed training program. This augmented display of doctrinal material should make specific reference to contemporary information on the physical and psychological environments of captivity in an effort to obviate the effects of over-publicized classical situations and characters of popular usage in the literature concerning prisoners of war and prison compounds. Thus, doctrinal literature would provide for a discussion of the effects of the application of the 1949 GPW to something other than the conventional prison compound environment. Expression of doctrine would certainly take advantage of the manifestation of Communist prisoner management principles in the Vietnam conflict, to a far greater extent than does FM 21-77A. Positive guidance with examples should be provided on the permissible communications a prisoner may have with his captor rather than sole emphasis on the formula of name, rank, service number and date of birth. This type of positive assistance, recognized in the other services, is currently glossed over in the Army in favor of the "Big Four".

c. Rule or Role. In general, the determination of detailed doctrine in demonstrating explicit and realistic guidance for the PW should provide for a reevaluation of the traditional rules-approach:

Anything a person might try to do by way of resisting or coping with the stresses of imprisonment has to be something which will work consistently - day after day - for a period of as long as three to five years. Consequently, what we should be thinking of is not giving the prisoner rules, but rather giving the prisoner what we might call a role. By a role, I mean a consistent, overall strategy in terms of which the prisoner can organize his daily existence.

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And, it should be a strategy which will permit him to maintain himself for a long period of time.

This notion has special significance in regard to prisoner-captor communications. The captor maintains such control in the prison compound environment that he can structure situations in which the prisoner must talk.

If we give the prisoner a rule that he can communicate with the enemy only by giving "his name, rank, and serial number," we may be creating for him a situation in which he cannot succeed. If he cannot succeed, and in fact, does communicate with the enemy, he has immediately committed a breach of discipline. In his own eyes, he has done what his officers told him he should not do. As a result he is wide-open to more guilt feelings.²

Thus, the delineation of mere rules for the PW may prove detrimental in the experience of captivity.

Rules are important but they should be rules which lay out the goals and standards to be achieved by the prisoner. They should avoid being prescriptions telling him how he should meet those standards and goals.³

Unrealistic as it is, the current inclination of Army doctrine is to limit prisoner communication to the four items of name, rank, service number, and date of birth, with some unspecified medical or administrative information included. Doctrine must allow for a more realistic appraisal of the role the PW must play. Guidance must be made explicit in regard to what a PW can do while interned, an aversion from the present tenor of emphasizing what he cannot do.

¹ Edgar K. Schein, Roles - Not Rules - For the POW, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. for the USAF Office of Scientific Research (September 1963), p. 1.

² Ibid., p. 2.

³ Ibid.

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d. Positive Guidance:

(1) The current guidance provided the soldier by Army doctrine in regard to prisoner-captor communication is limited and unnecessarily vague. In addition, there is the apparent negative orientation of what is forbidden to be communicated. The bulk of published material is restrictive in tenor, emphasizing what not to say. Guidance of a positive nature is limited, since the most common reference to prisoner-captor communication is the restriction to name, rank, service number, and date of birth. The intended principle of "evading" answering detrimental queries is entirely overlooked. The principal positive guidance offered by doctrinal sources in regard to communication with a captor concerns the Red Cross "capture card" and letter writing, guidance of such nebulous and contradictory nature that it fails to provide adequate standards for the soldier.

(2) Prohibitions on the nature of communication contained in doctrinal materials may be assailed on two counts. On the one hand, such prohibitions are vague to the point of exclusion of their application. On the other hand, they presuppose the ability on the part of the prisoner to predict the effect his communication will have upon the United States, its allies, the Armed Forces, or other prisoners. To hold a man capable of such judgement, in the context of the stresses of captivity, appears, in light of past experiences, to be unrealistic.

(3) Concomitantly, doctrinal statements on the effect of duress and coercion upon prisoner-captor communication is even more superficial. Doctrine does not describe the nature of duress and coercion nor does it demonstrate that duress and coercion are legal defenses under certain provisions. In effect, doctrine practically ignores the subject.

e. More than name, rank, serial number and date of birth:

(1) Doctrine must positively address the thorny problem of day to day prisoner-captor communication in order to present the soldier with guidance which he can utilize in the prison compound environment. Recognition must be made that strict adherence to name, rank, service number and date of birth is an unworkable formula. Allowance must be made for more communication than the four basic items, and limited medical and administrative matters. Should the prisoner be permitted mail privileges, he will surely convey more than those items to his family. Since the enemy most assuredly will monitor correspondence they will have the benefit of that communication. It may be necessary to reevaluate the prohibitions on communication to the extent that it no

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longer be necessary to withhold information which the enemy already knows. The refusal to communicate such information could have little beneficial effect upon the prisoner.

(2) The soldier must be made to realize that his captor may be able to establish situations in which the prisoner may want to communicate. The effects of isolation and segregation may cause the prisoner to seize the opportunity of an interrogative or indoctrinatory session just to satisfy his desire to converse.

(3) Survival and resistance within the prison compound environment are often matters of individual judgement. Each man must be provided sufficient latitude within which to structure his responses to daily situations. To place the prisoner within a rigid framework of academically derived responses to potential situations is to subvert his chances of resistance with minimum psychological and physical damage. Doctrinal materials emphasize a concept of "Big Four and nothing more." This concept should be tempered to emphasize the fact that the USPW, if forced beyond this stand, is not to provide information detrimental to the U.S. or fellow PWs.

f. Perishability of Information: Seldom will a USPW especially in the lower ranks, possess information that is of critical import to national security. Any critical information which he might possess will deteriorate rapidly in regard to criticality. Thus, what is vital security information on the day of capture may be of no value to the enemy two weeks later. If a USPW steadfastly refuses to divulge any information other than name, rank, serial number and date of birth, he may needlessly limit his chances for survival. To avoid needless jeopardy, a USPW needs realistic guidance. To avoid the psychological trauma that is associated with a USPW not knowing what course of action to take and yet, being compelled to make decisions, the following factors should be considered:

(1) The Geneva Convention permits a PW to petition the captor for medical and sanitation needs.

(2) The USPW cannot reasonably be expected to remain mute forever. He needs conversation to maintain mental health. He should be able to engage in conversation with his captor to discuss normal day to day occurrences affecting his life in prison and other activities such as the weather, athletics, hobbies, and work.

(3) If wearing a unit patch at time of capture, the USPW should be permitted to divulge designation of that patch. Most likely

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the enemy will know the patch designation and to refrain from providing such information is impractical and senseless. The USPW should not divulge the identity of any US unit other than his own.

(4) The USPW is permitted to provide data required by the Red Cross capture cards (GPW 1949).

(5) The USPW should be permitted to discuss literary material with his captor, but he should be warned that such topics may be presented by his captor from a slanted or propagandistic view. Reading material is often a welcomed diversion to the PW whether it is slanted or not.

(6) The USPW should not discuss fellow USPW's.

(7) The USPW should not divulge the tactical disposition of his own or any other unit.

(8) The USPW should not discuss weapons, weapons systems, or unit organizations.

(9) The first few days of captivity are crucial as far as sensitivity of information is concerned. During the first few days, the USPW should make every effort to evade all discussion except name, rank, serial number, date of birth and unit designation (if requested and obviously known by the enemy).

(10) The USPW should disclaim all knowledge of cryptographic procedures.

(11) The USPW should disclaim all knowledge of familiarity with US technical equipment.

(12) The USPW should avoid to a practical extent providing the captor with comprehensive background autobiographical data. Any such data given to the captor should be as general as possible and sufficiently factual to permit recall at a later date if required.

g. GPW Training. The present orientation of Army training in regard to the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War (GPW) demonstrates the need for US soldiers, as captors, to apply the tenets of the Convention to enemy prisoners of war. The primary concern is one of recognition of the obligations of the detaining power. Doctrinal material either reflects this orientation with captor obligations or

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it presents a rather sterile list of the articles of the Convention, devoid of commentary in respect to the manner in which they pertain to the US prisoner of war (FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, for example). The tenor and content of current literature and instruction does not provide sufficient guidance to point out to the US soldier the effect of the Geneva Convention upon him as a PW.

h. Rights and Obligations:

(1) To adequately demonstrate to the US soldier the extent of the effect of the provisions of the GPW upon him as a prisoner of war, it is necessary to emphasize the USPW in a captive environment. As a companion to current literature, which is principally concerned with treatment of enemy prisoners, doctrinal material must reflect the rights and obligations proffered to the US prisoner in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Thus, the required doctrinal difference is one of emphasis rather than substance.

(2) There is a distinct difference in the preceptions of obligations and rights of captors and those of prisoners of war. The US soldier must be made aware of this distinction. Familiarity with the influence of the Convention upon a prisoner would provide some indication of what to expect from the captor. He should know what personal equipment he is allowed to retain upon capture; he should be familiar with his rights to medical attention; he should be aware of his right to adequate quarters, food and clothing. In all respects, doctrine must stipulate clearly that the rights and obligations pertain specifically to the prisoner of war in the captive environment.

(3) In making the US soldier familiar with the provisions of the GPW, it is important that he be informed that some provisions of the Code of Conduct are not completely compatible with the Geneva Conventions. The Code of Conduct specifies, "If captured, I shall continue to resist." Guidance (AR 350-30) published to implement the Code also advises that internment is an extension of the battlefield. The Code urges every soldier to escape at the first opportunity. These portions of the Code are in keeping with traditional concepts of resistance and escape; however, they are facets that are not protected by the GPW. Under the GPW, internment is not considered an extension of the battlefield and a PW, although expected to make the attempt, is not given the right to escape. In fact, if apprehended in an attempted escape, the PW can receive punitive punishment for the act. Further, the soldier must be informed that if he commits an act of violence against his captors in the course of his escape attempt and is subsequently recaptured, he is

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subject to punishment under the laws of the detaining power. It is important that the distinction between the implementing DOD Directive and the AR be resolved. DOD Directive stipulates that internment is in many ways an extension of the battlefield. AR 350-30 by deleting those three key words significantly alters the guidance provided to the US soldier and is in direct conflict with the GPW.

i. Article 85 Reservations:

(1) Current Army doctrine makes cursory cognizance of the Communist reservations to Article 85 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War. The most authoritative statement made in this regard is found in the explanatory notes accompanying the Code of Conduct, specifically Article V of the Code. This expression is but a short paragraph, which embodies little more than general guidance.

Under Communist Bloc reservations to the Geneva Convention, the signing of a confession or the making of a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used to convict him as a war criminal under the laws of his captors. The conviction has the effect of removing him from the prisoner of war status and according to this Communist Bloc device denying him any protection under terms of the Geneva Convention and repatriation until a prison sentence is served.

This guidance is too vague to offer more than limited and general guidance to the US soldier.

(2) The Army training program in support of the GPW-1949 must reflect more than this superficial description of the effect of the Communist reservations to Article 85 upon the prisoner. The soldier must be informed of the ramifications of the placement of a prisoner into a "war criminal" status, particularly in regard to his rights under the Geneva Convention.

(3) In addition, the soldier must understand that he may be considered a war criminal, irrespective of the signing of any statement or the making of any confession. He may be accorded the status of war criminal and deprived of the protection of the Geneva Convention by the

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detaining power without benefit of the judicial conviction implicit in Army literature. Thus, he may be considered a war criminal from the moment of capture. Army training must accommodate this notion.

(4) Recognizing the importance that the US soldier be aware of how he is expected to treat enemy PW's, it would prove difficult to absorb any of the time currently scheduled for Geneva and Hague Convention training to discuss the soldier's rights and obligations as a USPW. It would perhaps be more appropriate that the provisions of the GPW-1949 as they apply to the USPW be presented as a subtopic to an overall SERE course of instruction thereby leaving the scheduled (ASubjScd 27-1) training to cover the critical subject of treatment of enemy PW's.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Current doctrine is inadequate for providing a US soldier explicit guidance that can be realistically followed in captivity.

b. Current doctrine does not provide the US soldier with awareness of what he is permitted to say and write during captivity. The guidance to refrain from giving information beyond name, rank, serial number and date of birth is unrealistic and impractical.

c. The US soldier does not generally possess information of national importance. All information is perishable; i.e., its importance tends to deteriorate with the passage of time. The passage of only a few days will frequently render classified information useless to the enemy.

d. In the 1972-75 time frame, there will be various topics that the US soldier can discuss with the enemy without damaging the interests of the United States.

e. The US soldier needs positive, not negative, guidance on what he is permitted to say and write. The Code of Conduct specifies "I will evade answering questions." It does not say avoid. Thus, positive guidance can be provided within the Code framework.

f. Social exchange of ideas (conversation) is a necessary prerequisite to mental health.

g. Current doctrine does not insure that every US soldier is familiar with his rights and obligations under the GPW.

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h. AR 350-30, "Code of Conduct," is in violation of DOD Directive 1300.7 and the GPW-1949 in stipulating that internment is an extension of the battlefield.

i. Current doctrine does not provide the US soldier with information regarding the impact of Communist refusal to recognize Article 85 of the GPW. This refusal means that Communists may classify American fighting men as war criminals, not as prisoners of war.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to revise FM 21-76 to include positive guidance that a USPW can realistically follow, especially the limits of what he is permitted to say and write.

(1) That the following examples of permitted actions be included in the revised FM:

(a) Petitioning his captor for medical and sanitation needs, food, and shelter.

(b) Engaging in conversation with captor in regard to normal day to day prison life and other activities such as weather, athletics, hobbies, and work in which engaged.

(c) Divulging his patch unit designation if wearing a patch at time of capture.

(d) Completing the Red Cross capture card.

(e) Discussion of literary matters without commitment to a cause.

(f) Limited autobiographical data which does not reveal special training or qualifications which would enhance his exploitation.

(2) That the revised FM 21-76 stress that the USPW must evade to the best of his ability discussion of the following:

(a) Fellow prisoners of war.

(b) Identify of units other than own.

(c) Tactical disposition of own or any other unit.

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- (d) Weapons, weapons systems or unit organizations.
- (e) Cryptographic matter or procedures.
- (f) Knowledge of technical equipment.
- (g) Radio/telephone procedures.

(3) That the revised FM 21-76 caution the US soldier that he is held accountable under the UCMJ for his conduct while a PW.

b. That DA task CONARC to revise Section I, Chapter 17, FM 21-76 to include cautionary guidance on the commission of violence against the captor while attempting escape or subsequent evasion.

c. That DA task CONARC to revise Chapter 15, FM 21-76 to incorporate guidance to the effect that admission of a "war crime" may cause the USPW to lose his protection of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

d. That DA task CONARC to review its current Geneva Convention training program to insure the US soldier is receiving instruction on concepts stated in recommendations 6b. and c. above.

e. That DA initiate action to revise Section III, Paragraph 8, AR 350-30, "Code of Conduct," dated 8 July 1968 to read "All training programs will impress upon every soldier that prisoner of war compounds are in many ways an extension of the battlefield, ..."

f. That DA task CONARC to develop a training program for presentation to all US soldiers which provides guidance on approved discourse with the captor as outlined in recommendation 6a. above. (See Follow On Action Recommendation 6a., APPENDIX C.)

g. That in the event the incorporation of the above recommendations into FM 21-76 makes that manual too unwieldy, DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to develop a new manual, FM 21-77, "Doctrine for Prisoners of War."

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ANNEX III

RESISTANCE TO COMMUNIST MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

REQUIREMENTS:

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE AWARE OF THE VARIOUS INTERROGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND HOW BEST TO EVADE GIVING SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION.

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED ON THE USE OF SEGREGATION AND THE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES IN EMPLOYING IT.

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE AWARE OF THE TECHNIQUES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION PROGRAM AND WHAT INDIVIDUAL COUNTERMEASURES CAN BE TAKEN.

THE US SOLDIER SHOULD BE FAMILIAR WITH THE EFFECTS OF ISOLATION AND THE MEANS TO COMBAT IT.

THE US SOLDIER SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ON THE EXPLOITATIVE AIMS OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

To provide doctrinal guidance to assist the US soldier to resist Communist techniques of interrogation, segregation, indoctrination, isolation, and exploitation.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. Prisoner of war management techniques currently employed by the Communists will continue into the 1972-75 time frame.

b. US military personnel becoming prisoners of war during the 1972-75 time frame will more than likely be prisoners of a Communist power.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. FM 21-76 is the prime source of Army doctrine for Survival, Evasion, and Escape.

b. FM 21-77A is a classified joint Services manual dealing with techniques for Survival, Evasion, and Escape.

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c. DOD Directive 1300.7 provides general guidelines for the Services to follow in achieving uniformity of training.

d. Interrogation, segregation, indoctrination, isolation, and exploitation are principal techniques employed by Communists in their PW compounds.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. General:

(1) Current Army doctrine is oriented toward reliance on the Code of Conduct for resistance training. The superficiality of Army doctrine in this area is best exemplified by the fact that FM 21-76 devotes only 4-1/2 pages to this crucial subject.

(2) Resistance training per se and as an identifiable block of instruction is non-existent in the Army. What little resistance training is offered to the US soldier is integrated with other blocks of training, with little uniformity of subject matter or correlation. Although current DOD guidance infers a primary objective of Army training is survival of the US soldier, FM 21-76 is low key and devoid of practical techniques to assist the soldier to survive. Its guidance is a monument to brevity and provides the following:

- (a) Exercise leadership responsibilities
- (b) Maintain military and self-discipline.
- (c) Keep up individual and group morale.
- (d) Participate fully in group survival activities.
- (e) Recognize and control fear.
- (f) Eat anything edible.
- (g) Maintain the sense of humor.
- (h) Practice survival, first aid, and preventive medicine.
- (i) Maintain the will to survive.

These general statements without further specific guidance offer little to the soldier turned prisoner of war.

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(3) The survival doctrine presented in the manual deals only with physical aspects of confinement -- and what it says in that area is inadequate. As written, it fails completely to address the psychological aspects associated with interrogation, segregation, indoctrination, isolation and exploitation. The "book" solution provided is a list of "do's" and "don'ts" for a USPW to follow in an interrogation or indoctrination situation. Much of the guidance is applicable to a World War II or Korean War situation, but is inadequate in a low population, intensive PW treatment situation such as in South or North Vietnam. The requirements generated by current Communist PW management principles dictate a new and more sophisticated approach. The Navy and the Air Force have recognized the necessity for changes and intensification of training, but the Army has made little progress. Both the Navy and Air Force conduct extensive practical exercises wherein their personnel assume the roles of prisoners and enter into a simulated prison camp environment for a meaningful period of time. The Air Force exercise is called the "Resistance Training Seminar." In the Navy, it is the "Resistance Training Laboratory." These "resistance programs" of the other Services are based on interviews with recent returnees, analysis of returnee debriefing reports, and reliable intelligence. Such programs are predicated on the concept that there are counters to Communist techniques, and knowledge of them enhances the chances of the USPW to survive Communist internment.

b. Interrogation:

DA Pamphlet 30-101, May 1956, is the sole official source document which provides information in any detail about Communist interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation techniques. It describes the treatment of USPW's during the Korean conflict, but is outdated in terms of dealing with the conflict in Southeast Asia. Experience proves that it is no longer realistic to expect a PW to adhere to the concept of giving only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. Such action only invites more frequent and more intense interrogation. As the captor becomes more frustrated, physical and mental abuse become realities. Formulators of Army doctrine must recognize the fact that the overwhelming majority of human beings will probably submit; and that point will be reached subject only to the frequency and intensity of interrogation and the accompanying physical and/or mental abuse. What a US soldier is permitted to say or write under conditions of duress is addressed in ANNEX II, this APPENDIX. The rationale contained therein is applicable here. Paragraph 15-2, FM 21-76, identifies the following points as aids in resisting interrogation:

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a. Give only name, rank, service number and date of birth.

b. Be respectful during interrogation but do not give the impression of willingness to cooperate through politeness.

.....
k. Do not be tricked into filling out innocent looking questionnaires or writing statements which require more than name, rank, service number, and date of birth.

l. Do not attempt to deceive the enemy.

.....

Recent experiences in Southeast Asia have degraded the validity of some of the above concepts. Following is a brief description of some of the lessons learned in Southeast Asia:

(1) Silence is no longer an acceptable resistance technique. The USPW will be required to provide the captor with more information than just name, rank, service number and date of birth.

(2) The idea that a USPW should not be polite during interrogation for fear of prolonging the interrogation is not always true. In fact, an attitude of politeness toward an Asiatic captor might lessen the frequency or at least the intensity of interrogation.

(3) Admonitions against completing innocent looking questionnaires are not necessarily valid. Prisoners are required by the GPW (1949) to complete the Red Cross Capture Card, which, in itself, exceeds the bounds of name, rank, serial number and date of birth. Refusal to complete questionnaires will likely invite physical and/or mental abuse. What is really needed is a more realistic appraisal of what a USPW is permitted to say and write under conditions of duress. (See ANNEX II, this APPENDIX.)

(4) The warning that a USPW should not attempt to deceive the enemy remains generally true, but recent returnees have indicated that a well planned and well executed cover story can be quite successful. Major James N. Rowe successfully duped the Communists with a cover story which he employed for four years.¹ Every US soldier

¹ Major James N. Rowe, Five Years to Freedom, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1971, Loc. Cit.

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will not be capable of devising and employing a successful cover story, but US Army doctrine will be remiss if mention is not made of the potential success of well planned partial or total cover stories.

c. Segregation. A principal technique common to all Communist detention facilities is segregation of prisoners, always by rank (i.e., officers from enlisted personnel), often by race or socio-economic background. The compartmentalization of homogeneous groups significantly aids Communist indoctrination and/or exploitation efforts. Characteristically, segregation is employed by the Communists immediately after prisoners fall into their hands, and is employed more extensively with each succeeding step in the internment process. Segregation is employed primarily to: (1) break down the chain of command, (2) facilitate PW control, (3) disrupt PW organization, and (4) facilitate indoctrination. Research has shown that these critical points are not identified in current field manuals. Although DA Pamphlet 30-101 makes reference to Communist employment of segregation during the Korean War and describes its use in indoctrination efforts against USPW's, it fails to demonstrate the critical nature of these efforts for psychological resistance and survival.

(1) Although by DOD directive, US Army training should include coverage of segregation, there is no proof that, outside of a mention of segregation as a technique, the subject is adequately covered. The number of training hours prescribed for the Code of Conduct simply does not permit significant discussion of any area outside the enumeration of the six articles found within the Code. In contrast, the other Services incorporate segregation within a block of training which addresses all facets of the internment environment. As mentioned before, this readily identifiable block of instruction is entitled SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) training. (A thorough discussion of their respective programs is found in Appendix K.)

(2) It is important that the US soldier be made aware of the following facts in regard to segregation:

(a) Upon capture, the USPW can expect to be initially segregated by rank.

(b) The initial and subsequent interrogation will be used as screening aids to further segregate prisoners by mental attitude and susceptibility to exploitation.

(c) USPW's may expect to be segregated by race, nationality, and socio-economic status.

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(d) Where only a few prisoners are in a compound, the enemy may use total isolation in lieu of group segregation.

(3) USPW returnees from Southeast Asia have reported that "communication" is the most effective means for countering enemy segregation efforts. Even under conditions of isolation, prisoners have contrived means of communication with one another. Methods successfully employed have been:

(a) Tapping on walls, tables or other objects using simplified Codes.

(b) Devising a tap code of their own.

(c) Hiding messages underneath the lip of refuse pails that are in common usage.

(d) Bird calls and whistles.

(e) Hand and finger signals (where the prisoner inmate is visible).

(f) Singing or humming.

According to recent returnees, the results of such communication lifted morale and contributed immeasurably to the will and determination to survive.

d. Indoctrination:

(1) Doctrine for defense against indoctrination, like that for interrogation, is oriented toward the Code of Conduct. Paragraph 16-9, FM 21-76, states:

"Rules for defense against enemy interrogation apply equally as well to defense against indoctrination. If the interrogator cannot induce you to give information other than name, rank, service number, and date of birth, then indoctrination obviously is impossible. If uncooperative, you are considered poor material for indoctrination. Confidence in yourself, your family, your unit, your country, and your religion serves as a

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very effective defense against indoctrination. Above all, the will to survive must be retained."

Total reliance on the Code of Conduct is not realistic doctrine. The prevailing Code guidance of name, rank, serial number, and date of birth denies the USPW of the opportunity to communicate with his captors, even though such communication might be to the prisoner's benefit. Man as a social animal must interact with others if he is to maintain mental stability. The Code as currently presented deprives the soldier of this psychological prerogative and instills guilt feelings within him when he violates it. He will violate it because, over a period of years, constant adherence to such a precept is impossible. The misconception that such is possible is highlighted by the interviews with BCT and AIT trainees at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The great majority (60%) of them believed that they should maintain silence at any cost if interned by the Communists. In addition the great majority felt that they would be sadistically tortured by the Communists during their internment experience. These misconceptions are of critical importance and represent the product of important voids in the Army's approach to resistance training.

(2) In combatting indoctrination, the USPW will be dependent upon many of the attitudes and values developed before his entry into the service. These attitudes and values are discussed in ANNEX VII, this APPENDIX, which deals with convincing the US soldier that his survival is dependent upon his keeping faith with himself, his fellow prisoners of war, and his country. It is also discussed in ANNEX II, this APPENDIX, which deals with a US soldier's awareness of what he is permitted to say and write while in captivity.

e. Isolation:

It is important that the US soldier understand the effects of complete isolation and how it affects an individual's psychological behavior. This past decade has witnessed a rapid development and expansion of interest in the results of isolating a human being from the familiar elements of his sensory world. It was not until the 1950's and the Korean conflict that the use of isolation as an indoctrination method by the Chinese gained widespread attention. This particular form of isolation is referred to as "social isolation," in that the individual was not completely divorced from outside stimulation. There are numerous accounts of individual experiences encountered while in complete isolation, voluntary or involuntarily. In each account, mention is made of hallucinations and all sorts of bizarre experiences. Accounts of those who were confined in cells

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and no one with whom to communicate, tell of forcing themselves to participate in some sort of mental or physical exercise every day to overcome the monotony of doing nothing. Physically, there is very little an individual can do to prepare himself for complete isolation. According to returnees from Viet Cong internment, it was the most effective technique they encountered. It is the opinion of repatriates that if they had received instruction on the "how's" and "why's" of isolation, they could have withstood its application better. Basically, it was fear of the unknown that caused the greatest concern. It is important that the US soldier be made aware of the following factors:

- (1) That as a PW he most likely will experience periods of total isolation while in Communist captivity.
- (2) That total isolation is a common mind-conditioning technique of the Communists, and may last from a day to several months.
- (3) That he may experience hallucinations if subjected to long periods of total isolation.
- (4) That the deprivation of sensory stimuli to the brain causes the hallucinations; however, they are not harmful and the effect is immediately reversible once released from isolation.

f. Exploitation:

(1) The principal objective of interrogation, segregation, indoctrination, and isolation is to condition the individual so that he can be profitably exploited. The most common forms of exploitation are political, military, or propaganda.

(2) Of all the techniques used by the Communists, exploitation is probably the best covered insofar as explanation of what it is. Nevertheless, doctrine on the best means to avoid or at least reduce the effects of exploitation is vague, and, as in the case of the other resistance techniques, negatively oriented. Both FM 21-76 and FM 21-77A touch upon the subject of exploitation, but neither delves into it in sufficient quantity or quality as to make themselves adequate reference material for the enlightenment of the basic soldier. DA Pamphlet 30-101, Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation, provides data on the three subject areas but addresses them from the historical standpoint of World War II and the Korean War. Although not updated to include the conflict in Southeast Asia, the explanation of the three remains essentially valid. But again, it

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resorts to stereotyped solutions based on the rigid interpretation of the Code of Conduct when discussing means in which to combat enemy exploitation of the prisoner of war.

(a) Resisting Exploitation. The theme for resisting exploitation is simply to make ones self as undesirable a target as possible. There are many types of exploitation which do not require the consent or even knowledge of the PW. A PW photographed while relaxing in the sun or a PW being held for political ransom cannot possibly prevent his being exploited. It is in the areas where his physical presence or faculties are required wherein the PW has an opportunity to foil his captors' efforts. Foiling the ultimate exploitation begins immediately upon capture and entails all the resistance techniques for interrogation and indoctrination. In other words, through the use of cover story, claims of ignorance or memory failure, or displaying outright stupidity, the PW can convince his captor of his unsuitability for exploitation. If still pressured for an act of writing or speaking, the use of stilted or improper language conveys the message of unwilling compliance. Current doctrine provides little if any guidance in this area of foiling or at least reducing the validity of exploitation. Yet doctrine abounds with positive statements that the Communists will make every effort to exploit the PW. Knowing that the Communists will exploit the American prisoner of war is important. Knowing how to reduce ones vulnerability is vital.

(b) Other Service Programs. Both the Navy and the Air Force recognize the vulnerability of their personnel to exploitation. For this reason, they have developed intensive training which exposes their personnel to the rigors of interrogation, indoctrination, and isolation. In their practical exercise approach they attempt to permit the student to develop his own reaction to these pressures and decide just how exploitable they might be at the end of the training session. Of course, it must be clarified that only their high risk personnel are subjected to such an expensive and comprehensive course of instruction but even their low risk personnel receive far more instruction on the Communist management principles and exploitation goals than that received by the majority of US Army combat personnel. (For a detailed description of the other Services programs, see Appendix K.)

g. The US Army Role. The US Army, like any of the other services, has individuals whose duty assignment subjects them to a greater risk of capture than that of others. Pilots, Special Forces personnel, and the combat infantryman are likely candidates for capture by the enemy. It would appear that these individuals, if not every soldier in the Army, should be as well prepared to survive the internment

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experience as his contemporary in the other Services. To do so he must be knowledgeable about the use and aims of interrogation, indoctrination, isolation, and segregation. He must know that every technique used by the Communists has as its ultimate objective his exploitation in one form or another. He should be able to combat outright, or at least lessen the effects of these techniques which in turn will reduce his potential as an exploitable commodity. There is no reason that the US soldier, if unfortunate enough to be captured, should enter into the internment environment completely ignorant of what will happen to him and what is expected of him. The US Army must have realistic and comprehensive doctrine on how to resist the Communist prisoner of war management techniques and once having developed that doctrine, present it to the US soldier in the most efficient and authoritative manner possible.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. FM 21-76, Survival, Evasion, and Escape, and FM 21-77A (S), Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual, are too vague and general in their presentation of doctrine for resisting interrogation, segregation, indoctrination, isolation, and exploitation.

b. Current Army training fails to address adequately doctrine for resisting interrogation, segregation, indoctrination, isolation, and exploitation.

c. Current Army training programs which incorporate resistance doctrine are far inferior to those presented by other services.

d. The psychological effects of isolation and segregation and their countermeasures are requisite subjects for Army doctrine and training.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to revise FM 21-76 by incorporating the following subject material:

(1) Detailed description of Communist techniques of interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation based on material in Chapter 2, this study.

(2) Positive actions to resist or limit the effectiveness of Communist interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation efforts. Doctrine to be developed based on material in Chapter 2, this study and from the experiences of former PW's from the Korean and Vietnam War.

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b. That ACSFOR task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to revise FM 21-76 to incorporate material on the Communist use of segregation and isolation. Key elements to be included are:

(1) Faith in fellow PW's and adherence to the chain of command are key elements to reducing the effectiveness of segregation.

(2) Onset of hallucinations during prolonged isolation are not to be feared. Phenomenon is nonharmful and immediately reversible upon release from the isolated state.

(3) Communication with fellow PW's is possible even in the isolated state through the media of simplified codes, message drops, prearranged signals, etc.

(4) Daily exercise in mental gymnastics will assist in maintaining mental and emotional stability.

c. That DA task CONARC to develop a training program for all US soldiers which incorporates the doctrine required by recommendations 6a and b above. (See Follow-on Recommendation 6a, APPENDIX C.)

d. That in the event the incorporation of the above recommendations into FM 21-76 makes that manual too unwieldy, DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to develop a new manual, FM 21-77, "Doctrine for Prisoners of War".

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ANNEX IV
INTERNMENT ENVIRONMENT SURVIVAL

REQUIREMENTS:

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE IN PEAK PHYSICAL CONDITION.

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE TAUGHT THAT HIS SURVIVAL IS DEPENDENT ON HIS EATING REGARDLESS OF HOW UNPALATABLE THE FOOD MAY BE.

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE KNOWLEDGEABLE IN THE COMMON DISEASES AND INJURIES EXPERIENCED DURING CAPTIVITY AND HOW TO TREAT THEM WITHOUT THE AID OF COMMERCIALY PREPARED MEDICINES.

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE KNOWLEDGEABLE IN THE AREAS OF SANITATION AND PERSONAL HYGIENE IN ORDER TO BE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING HIMSELF AND HIS ENVIRONMENT IN A MANNER CONDUCIVE TO GOOD HEALTH.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

To provide doctrine which will assist the US soldier to survive the rigors of internment.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. The prison camp environment imposes serious challenges to the prisoner's ability to maintain fitness.

b. The US soldier is ignorant of the palatability and nutritional value of most foreign edibles that would be served in captivity.

c. Diet provided in a prison camp will be limited and has a direct bearing on the maintenance of health and physical condition.

d. The prison environment will be virtually devoid of medical facilities, and medical assistance offered by the detaining power will be limited.

e. The prison camp environment exposes the individual to critical health problems that are seriously complicated by deficiencies in sanitation and hygiene.

f. The detaining power will make only limited efforts to maintain satisfactory hygienic and sanitary conditions within the prison camp.

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g. The detaining power cadre are often ignorant of the serious implications that poor hygiene and sanitation may have for problems of health.

h. Only the most primitive tools will be available with which to improve the conditions that prevail.

i. The hygienic conditions of internment will be far below that to which the US soldier is accustomed, and his resistance to disease brought about by unsanitary conditions will be far less than that of his captors.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. FM 21-20, Physical Readiness Training, dated January 1969, is the prime source document for doctrine on maintenance of physical condition. It does not, however, address this topic in respect to the internment environment.

b. FM 21-76, Survival, Evasion, and Escape, dated March 1968, and FM 21-77A (S), Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual, dated 1 August 1967, are the primary source documents for dietary conditions and responses during internment.

c. FM 21-11, First Aid for Soldiers, dated May 1970, is the primary source document for doctrine on treatment of injuries. It does not however, address this topic or the subject of illnesses in respect to the internment environment.

d. FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, dated July 1970, is the prime source document for doctrine on sanitation and personal hygiene. It does not, however, address these topics in respect to the internment environment.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. General:

(1) Every experience the US soldier has had as a prisoner of war under prolonged Communist detention has been one of constant struggle to survive the physically debilitating conditions under which he was interned. Often due to the extensive use of isolation, the USPW had to be self-supporting and sustaining. His survival was dependent solely on his own ingenuity to feed himself, care for his own illnesses, treat his own injuries, and maintain himself in such a state of physical health as to be able to withstand the mental and physical abuses to which he was

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subjected. Even when not isolated, the maintenance of proper physical health and the ability to assist his fellow PW during his times of ill health often meant the difference between death and survival. Experience has shown that Communist prisoner of war camps are operated under conditions of sanitation which fall well below those normally experienced by the American soldier. These conditions create an environment wherein disease is the rule rather than the exception.

(2) Current Army doctrine, as given in the field manuals listed in paragraph 3 above, provides guidance suitable to the maintenance of health and welfare while the US soldier is functioning in a friendly environment. By design or omission there is no discussion of the health, sanitation, and welfare areas as they relate to the internment conditions under an unfriendly captor. The sole exception to this is in FM 21-76, where the topical areas are only mentioned without elaboration. Their significance is lost due to the extremely superficial treatment given to them. Further, the manual concerns itself with stressing the need to avoid disease and not what to do if the disease(s) is contracted.

(3) As stated above, the contraction of vector-borne or communicable diseases in the internment camp is not surprising, and the American soldier should not consider it so. He must anticipate being ill and doing all that he can beforehand to ward it off and to treat it once he falls victim. According to the analysis of existing doctrine conducted in Chapter 4, this study, and based on opinions offered by former prisoners of war from both Korea and Southeast Asia, current doctrine and training fail to provide the soldier with the requisite knowledge to meet the challenge.

b. Preventative Actions:

(1) The maintenance of physical health and the keeping of self and immediate confinement area as hygienically-clean as possible are topics which fall into the category of preventative actions. The unique conditions under which the PW must operate (i.e., the fact that his every action is subject to the approval of his captor) dictate the degree of influence the PW can have in these areas. Regardless of adverse conditions he must try. For his efforts to be effective, he must have the necessary basic knowledge.

(2) FM 21-20, Physical Readiness Training, is an outstanding manual which narratively and graphically portrays a total spectrum of both individual and team exercises. Many of the exercises described, particularly those with cardio-vascular benefits, would be ideal for use in an internment camp. At a conference at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,

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on 16 June 1971, a representative of the Surgeon General's Office, Department of the Army, stated unequivocally that the most important muscle in the body, and that which most often is neglected in exercise programs, is the heart.¹ He further stipulated that a substantial number of returned prisoners of war exhibit cardio-vascular disorders directly attributable to the internment environment. He concluded by saying that there were, in fact, actual exercises which under internment conditions could be harmful to the PW by overstressing his heart. Reduced rations, poor health, and confined area are parameters which must be considered in establishing a physical exercise routine. It appears then, that although physical exercise is important to maintaining health, there are constraints to the type and amount of exercise to be performed. The medical aspects of such a program seem worthy of further examination.

(3) FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, is nearly exclusively devoted to the normal field situation. In addition there are only superficial comments on the manner in which poor hygiene and sanitation is related to the proliferation of disease germs. What comments are made are not relative to an internment environment characterized by limited material and facilities. In this regard, many of the sanitation techniques described within the manual call for considerable tools, equipment, and material not readily available to the prisoner of war. The need for cleanliness of the body and the immediate internment area cannot be overemphasized. The US soldier must be taught three paramount concepts: that he keep himself and his area clean, why he must keep himself and his area clean, and finally, and perhaps most important, how to keep his area and himself clean when cleaning tools and materials (including soap) are not available to him. The procedures described in FM 21-10 are in many ways applicable to the internment situation. With minor changes in doctrine which places more emphasis on techniques which can be used with materials indigenous to the prison camp, adequate guidance could be provided in the area of prison camp personal and area hygiene.

(4) Knowledge of sanitation principles and a well executed physical exercise program are worthless unless the prisoner provides his body with the necessary sustenance to support the physical effort required to perform the tasks involved. As of the date of this writing, all the major experiences the US soldier has had with Communist internment have occurred in Asia. Asiatic diets and delicacies are far different from those with which the US soldier is familiar. WO Malcom V. Loepke, detained by the North Koreans in 1969 when his helicopter was shot down over North Korean territory was provided a gelatinous mass

¹ Statement by LTC Joseph R. Cataldo, MC, OTSG PW Representative at an In-Process Review of USPOW Study held at USACDCISSO, Fort Bragg, N.C on 16-17 June 1971.

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which he had difficulty stomaching.² It turned out to be octopus, a North Korean delicacy. This is not a unique experience. Most returned USPW's from the conflict in Southeast Asia have described their difficulties in eating the local food provided by their captors. Many stated that only the realization that not to eat was to die gave them the strength to force their stomachs to accept what was provided. Both Major James N. Rowe and MSG Dan Pitzer stated they saw USPW's die because they lost that strength and refused to eat that which was given to them. With this background, it appears essential that the US soldier be aware that should he be captured, he will be provided with sufficient food to sustain life, if only barely so, but that the food he is provided may be totally unfamiliar to his palate. It must be emphasized that there is no case on record where poisonous food was knowingly provided to a USPW by a Communist captor, and that regardless of unfamiliarity or distaste, the prisoner of war must eat it. This concept is totally lacking in current Army doctrine and, as such, is a major void in doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel.

c. Primitive Medicine:

(1) Here, perhaps, is the most serious void in doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel. As described in Chapter 2, of this study, a prisoner of war, interned by a Communist power, can expect only the absolute minimum in professional medical assistance. Captor medical personnel are few and those that have treated USPW's in the past have exhibited little of the quality the US soldier would expect of a doctor. The medicines provided have been of the most primitive types and in only marginal quantities. Often the amount provided has been sufficient to arrest the disease or infection, but not to cure it. Treatment of minor injuries and diseases has rested with the ingenuity of the prisoner. Often minor injuries or diseases have become infected, and proved fatal due to lack of knowledge on the part of the soldier and/or lack of medical supplies to treat the ailment. In a conference at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 16-17 June 1971, the Surgeon General's representative identified Primitive Medicine as a major void in current medical doctrine.³ All returnees have indicated either through personal interview or by questionnaire their concern for this doctrinal deficiency. All gave a very high priority to the subject of preventive medicine, feeling that they would have been better off during their internment had they had more knowledge of it. The overwhelming response in this area is indicative of the lack of doctrine currently in existence.

² Personal interview with CWO-2 Malcom V. Loepke, at USACDCISSO, Fort Bragg, N.C. on 23 April 1971.

³ Statement by LTC J. R. Cataldo, Op. Cit.

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(2) FM 21-11, First Aid for Soldiers, is the manual which approaches the subject, but it fails to provide adequate guidance. It deals primarily with traumatic injuries and offers nothing on disease. Much of that provided within FM 21-11 could be incorporated into doctrine on primitive medicine, however, the use of substitute medical materials for those normally available to the combat soldier would have to be stressed. The value of bark and herbs to treat skin and intestinal disorders should be explained. And above all, the doctrine on primitive medicine if written would have to be presented in such a manner as to be easily understood by the layman, i.e., the basic combat soldier.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Doctrinal material for assisting the US soldier to survive the rigors of internment is scant, marginal, and diffused throughout several field manuals.

b. A need exists to identify those physical exercises that are most beneficial to the cardio-vascular system and which can be performed in a confined space without external props.

c. The need for, and manner in which to accomplish, personal and area sanitation in the pathogenic environment of a prison camp are not adequately addressed in current doctrine or training.

d. The concept that, regardless of its unfamiliarity and seeming unpalatability, the eating of captor staples is essential to survival is not adequately addressed in either doctrine or training.

e. Doctrine and instruction on primitive medicine for use while interned as a prisoner of war are totally lacking in current US Army literature and training.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That DA task CONARC to revise Section III, Chapter 14, FM 21-76, Survival, Evasion and Escape, to incorporate the following doctrinal concepts:

(1) Physical Exercises Suitable for Internment:

(a) Doctrine to stress the need for maintaining physical fitness while interned.

(b) Specific exercises included to be derived by US Army Medical Field Service School in coordination with Office of the Surgeon General.

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(2) Personal Hygiene and Area Sanitation:

(a) Concepts to be provided by US Army Medical Field Service School.

(b) Concepts to stress need for keeping self and area as hygienic as possible, the reasons for doing so, and realistic techniques to maintain hygiene while a prisoner of war.

(3) Captor Staples for Subsistence:

(a) Concepts to be provided by Institute for Military Assistance in conjunction with USACDC (SOA).

(b) Concepts to stress recognition of the variances in diets and delicacies between the US and foreign cultures and the need to overcome resistance to eating because of unpalatability.

b. That ACSFOR task CONARC to develop and incorporate into FM 21-76, Survival, Evasion, and Escape, a graphics-supported narrative on primitive medicine.

(1) Technical concepts to be developed by US Medical Field Service School in coordination with the Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army.

(2) Concepts on primitive medicine to deal with self-treatment of injuries and diseases common to the internment environment without the aid of qualified medical personnel and commercially prepared medicines.

(3) Concepts to be written in layman's language so as to be easily understood by the basic combat soldier. Maximum use to be made of graphic depiction.

c. That ACSFOR task CONARC to develop a training program for presentation to all US soldiers which incorporates the concepts included in recommendations 6a and b above. (See Follow On Requirement 6a, APPENDIX C.)

d. That in the event the incorporation of the above recommendations into FM 21-76 makes that manual too unwieldy, DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to develop a new manual, FM 21-77, "Doctrine for Prisoners of War."

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ANNEX V

ESCAPE AND EVASION

REQUIREMENTS:

THE US SOLDIER SHOULD BE WELL VERSED IN ESCAPE TECHNIQUES AND HOW TO RECOGNIZE ESCAPE OPPORTUNITIES.

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE TAUGHT EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR EVADING CAPTURE. (NOTE: E&E TRAINING SHOULD BE THEATRE-ORIENTED.)

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED ON HOW TO AVOID CAPTURE, EVADE DETECTION AND SURVIVE WHEN OPERATING IN AN ENEMY TERRITORY AND IF CAPTURED, HOW TO CONCENTRATE ALL HIS RESOURCES TOWARD ESCAPE BY HIMSELF AND OTHERS.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

To provide doctrine on escape and evasion techniques which will assist the US soldier if captured, to return to friendly control.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. Scope of the study limits discussion to evasion after escaping from enemy control although similar precepts are involved in evasion after separation from friendly unit.

b. FM 21-76, Survival, Evasion and Escape, and FM 21-77A (S), Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual, are the primary source documents for escape and evasion.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. The Army Subject Schedule provides the lesson objective for Basic Combat Training as follows: "To familiarize the individual with the procedures and techniques of survival, evasion and escape." As noted in Chapter 3, the basic trainee receives only one (1) hour of training in SE&E while the advanced trainee receives two (2) hours in the classroom and six (6) hours in practical field exercises. The field exercise is oriented to evasion as opposed to both evasion and escape.

¹ ASbjScd 21-12, "Survival, Evasion, and Escape," dated 4 December 1967, p. 1.

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b. The amount of SE&E training at officer basic courses fluctuates widely, ranging from 24 hours at the Chemical School to none at the Field Artillery School. Most other schools average one to two hours. This limited approach in junior officer training appears to be a significant deficiency in captured/detained US personnel doctrine.

c. The two primary documentary sources, FM's 21-76 and 21-77A (S), devote only a limited amount of material to evasion, and even less to escape. While the doctrine provided for evasion appears satisfactory, the doctrine for escape is outdated due to its overwhelming emphasis and reliance on the World War II internment experience.

d. There are psychological effects of capture which are not taken into account when discussing the best time for escape. Although current doctrine stresses the principle that the best time to escape is usually immediately after capture, experience has shown that there is a crushing psychological depression at the moment of capture which both mentally and physically exhausts the captive. In this state the newly captured soldier is hardly likely to be able to think out a proper and realistic escape. However, if pre-informed of the psychological shock his morale and confidence will experience upon capture, the US soldier will be better able to cope with his situation. The knowledge that one is no weaker than any fellow soldier because he experiences this psychological depression could be the first step toward halting the downward trend and stabilizing the morale and confidence at a more receptive level. Once stabilized, the new captive can begin to consider escape opportunities and techniques.

e. An outstanding example of the lack of realistic escape training on the part of the Army can be provided by Major James N. Rowe. In the published account of his five years of captivity under the Viet Cong, Major Rowe commented on the period immediately after capture:²

I had no idea where we were or how far it was to anything friendly. I recalled the chapter in the pamphlet on "Escape and Evasion" that had said, 'One should attempt to escape as soon after capture as possible before the enemy can move you to a secure area.' I wish the author had include at least one paragraph on how to do it!

² Major James N. Rowe, Five Years to Freedom, (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1971), pp. 86-87.

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Major Rowe was not an ordinary officer. At the time of capture, he was a recent graduate from West Point and Special Forces School. His training helped him to survive the ordeal of internment and ultimately to escape, but it did not give him the escape techniques when he needed them most. How much less can we expect of the average combat soldier?

f. It is a tenet of the Code of Conduct that every US fighting man should attempt to escape so as to return to friendly control. Unless, and until, Department of the Army provides the US soldier with the necessary knowledge to be able to recognize and take advantage of escape opportunities, the Army cannot hold the soldier to that tenet. Techniques for escape can be evolved and documented by reviewing successful escapes recently executed. There have been several escapes from Southeast Asia by members of the various Services. It would appear prudent to review the manner in which each escape was made in order to identify techniques which proved to be a success in the past and could be a success in the future. This is not new or unique. It is apparent that such a review was made of escapes executed during World War II, inasmuch as the majority of the doctrine presented in current Army literature reflects such experience. Techniques developed from that era are valuable - providing the US soldier is interned in a mass prisoner compound in an occidental country. If he is not, such doctrine rapidly loses validity. The keynote, then, is that doctrine, like training, must reflect the theatre of operations and the anticipated internment conditions. Many of the same precepts apply, and therefore the task is not as formidable as it may first appear.

g. If theatre-orientation is desirable for escape doctrine, it is equally critical for evasion. FM 21-76 devotes a significant amount of material to identifying survival techniques in various areas, cold weather, tropical, desert, and at sea. Evasion techniques are closely associated with these survival techniques. The basic tenets for evasion remain the same:³

- a. Have a definite plan.
- b. Observe the elementary rules of movement, camouflage, and concealment.
- c. Be patient, especially while traveling. Patience, preparation, and determination are key words in evasion. Be confident, but careful.
- d. Conserve food.

³ FM 21-77A, Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual, dated 1 August 1967 (S), p. 13.

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- e. Conserve strength as much as possible for critical periods.
- f. Know survival techniques well.

It appears that knowledge of the above tenets is of value to all US soldiers, but it is insufficient guidance once the soldier finds himself in combat in a foreign land. A need for expanded guidance which is oriented to the theatre in which the combat is taking place is then required. Specific evasion techniques differ significantly for desert, tropic, or arctic conditions. The Army should stand ready to provide guidance on those techniques prior to the time that they may be needed.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Junior officers are not being uniformly instructed in the precepts of SE&E, with many receiving a totally inadequate amount to properly conduct themselves should they, and those for whom they might be responsible, be captured.

b. Evasion doctrine is, in the main, satisfactory, but requires theatre-orientation to account for the various areas in the world where evasion techniques will differ.

c. Escape doctrine, as written, applies primarily to the World War II prison camp environment, and, although applicable in that situation, fails to address the low intensity environment experienced in Southeast Asia.

d. Doctrine on the psychological effects of capture in relation to recognition and taking advantage of escape opportunities is a void in current Army literature and training.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That ACSFOR task CONARC to establish a minimum essential program in survival, evasion and escape to be taught uniformly throughout branch basic officer courses.

b. That DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to revise Section II, Chapter 13, FM 21-76, to include a brief description of the psychological depression to be expected at, and immediately following, the moment of capture and how to lessen its effect.

c. That DA task CONARC to update Chapter 17, FM 21-76 to provide doctrine on escape opportunities and techniques in unconventional

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warfare and low intensity conflict environments such as Southeast Asia. Subject doctrine should be based on experience related by escapees from that theater.

d. That ACSFOR task CONARC to develop and maintain current doctrine on evasion techniques which is theater-oriented. (Subject doctrine to be in sufficient detail to identify the key differences in techniques.)

e. That DA task CONARC to revise Section II, Chapter 5, FM 21-76 to identify the significant differences in techniques required due to theater/environment orientation.

f. That ACSFOR task CONARC to develop a training program for presentation to all US soldiers which incorporated the doctrine included in recommendations 5b, c, and d above. (See Follow On Requirement 5a, APPENDIX C.)

g. That in the event the incorporation of the above recommendations into FM 21-76 makes that manual too unwieldy, DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to develop a new manual, FM 21-77, "Doctrine for Prisoners of War."

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ANNEX VI

CONFLICTING IDEOLOGY INSTRUCTION

REQUIREMENT:

THE US SOLDIER MUST HAVE A BASIC GRASP OF THE CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

To define the scope of knowledge that each US soldier is to acquire in regard to the conflicting ideologies.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

AR 350-30 provides limited training guidance in this regard.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. Current training in support of the Code of Conduct is required to provide "education in our nation's goals and in the advantages of our democratic institutions to develop resistance to enemy political and economic indoctrination." Doctrinal literature provides the individual soldier with little more than a basic primer on the American way of life. There is little conscious attempt made to portray the realities of the American society or those of a Communist society. As a consequence, the soldier is ill-prepared to relate to the expositions of a qualified interrogator or indoctrinator.

b. There is a need for the US soldier to realize that Communist indoctrinators will argumentatively exploit the less virtuous aspects of the American way of life - racism, economic inequities, bureaucratic ineptitude, and social injustice. It would be desirable for the US soldier to have the ingrained faith to respond to these indictments. This response would not need to be verbally communicated to the captor, but it would have to be of sufficient depth to convince the prisoner that maintenance of the American society is advantageous. Otherwise, the prisoner would be more susceptible to the indoctrinatory arguments of a captor. To be effective, training would have to present a sufficiently realistic view of American society, acknowledging the problems and shortcomings, but demonstrating the potential for eradication of many of the current injustices in the American way of life. Concomitantly, a basic knowledge of the Communist system would have to be offered. It would not do the US soldier justice to evaluate the American and Communist systems in the overly-simplistic terms of

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good and evil exclusively. A realistic portrayal of the conflicting ideologies manifested by American democracy and Communism might equip the individual soldier to respond to the indoctrinational arguments proffered by a Communist captor. Realistically, however, such a training program would require extensive research and a standardization of dissemination that would be expensive in time and difficult to achieve. In fact, attempting to educate every fighting man in the details of conflicting ideologies would rapidly reach the point of diminishing returns. This is true because a technical knowledge of the conflicting ideologies cannot be developed in a few easy lessons; and every soldier is not intellectually qualified to grasp the differences between the two systems. There is also the eminent hazard that an attempt to school all US soldiers in the conflicting ideologies may be worse than no instruction at all. It would be unforgivable to permit a US soldier to develop an exaggerated idea of his knowledge, and make the mistake of attempting debate on the subject with Communist captors who, in an internment situation, will have all the advantages. Ostensibly, such a debate could do more to convince the soldier that the Communist ideology is a superior one. Rather than prepare US soldiers for a pre-destined debating defeat, it is better to equip them with a knowledge of Communist management principles so they will recognize the cleverness of the Communist indoctrination attempts. The USPW's job is not to convert the captor. It is the job of the USPW to resist indoctrination. Education on the conflicting ideologies more properly belongs in the Troop Information Program.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. Current training in the philosophies of conflicting ideologies is almost nonexistent.
- b. The US soldier needs enough knowledge for confidence in the American way of life to motivate him to resist Communist indoctrination.
- c. It is neither practical nor necessary to instill in each US soldier an in-depth knowledge of Communism.
- d. It is necessary for each US soldier to be familiar with Communist management principles.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That no additional effort be made within the SERE training program to instruct the US soldier in the conflicting ideologies.

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b. That DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to develop a training program to instruct the US soldier in Communist management principles. (See Follow On Requirement 6a, APPENDIX C.)

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ANNEX VII

FAITH AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

REQUIREMENTS:

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE THOROUGHLY CONVINCED THAT HIS SURVIVAL IS DEPENDENT ON HIS KEEPING FAITH WITH HIMSELF, HIS FELLOW PW'S AND HIS COUNTRY.

THE US SOLDIER MUST FULLY UNDERSTAND HOW HIS SURVIVAL AND THAT OF OTHERS IS DEPENDENT ON DISCIPLINE AND ADHERENCE TO A CHAIN OF COMMAND REGARDLESS OF THE RANKS INVOLVED AND COMMUNIST SEGREGATION EFFORTS.

EVERY US SOLDIER MUST HAVE AN INGRAINED POSITIVE ATTITUDE THAT HE CAN AND MUST SUCCESSFULLY RESIST ANY ENEMY OF HIS COUNTRY.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

To develop doctrine incorporating the following characteristics:

- a. Convinces the US soldier that his survival is dependent on his keeping faith with himself, his fellow prisoners of war, and his country.
- b. Stresses the need for the USPW to adhere to the chain of command in order to promote resistance and survival.
- c. Insures that every US soldier has an ingrained positive attitude that he can and must successfully resist any enemy of his country.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

- a. US Army training programs can complement the assembly of socioeconomic, political, moral, and other attitudinal values instilled in the individual prior to service.
- b. A "positive attitude" is an attitude dedicated to the propositions of survival and resistance in captivity.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

- a. Articles IV and VI of the Code of Conduct pertain to the notion of "keeping faith."

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b. AR 350-30 provides the basic US Army policy for training in support of the Code of Conduct and, ultimately, the notion of "keeping faith."

c. FM 21-76 and FM 21-77A are the principal sources of doctrine in regard to prisoner of war organization and discipline.

d. DOD Directive 1300.7 provides the basis for the demand that a US soldier maintain a "positive attitude."

e. The Code of Conduct will not be formally reviewed until after the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. General. The general tenor of the current doctrine relative to "keeping faith" is at best superficial and innocuous. Explicit guidance is non-existent and what guidance does exist provides little more than cursory attention to the notion of keeping faith: "Regardless of location, poor living conditions, and brutalities which the enemy might impose, if the individual makes up his mind to survive, he will succeed."¹ There is little additional reference to "keeping faith," ostensibly because this notion is sufficiently imbued with tradition as to preclude the necessity for its overt expression. The relationship between adequate doctrinal literature and "keeping faith" with ones fellow prisoners is similarly tenuous. The basic guidance provided in current doctrine consists of admonitions that "informing or any other action to the detriment of a fellow prisoner is despicable and is expressly forbidden" or that "it is expressly forbidden to inform on, or take any other action that might be harmful to your fellow prisoners."² Positive guidance is offered only in regard to the establishment and maintenance of a PW organization within the prison compound. Army doctrine on the Code of Conduct is far from explicit in regard to "keeping faith with... his [the PW's] country." Training in support of the Code is to provide education in national goals and "in advantages of its democratic institutions," which could be construed as contributing to the ability to "keep faith." More pointedly, assurances in regard to the Army's program of benefits and services for the PW and his family are supposed to enhance the "keeping faith" ability. Neither a brief explanation of broad national goals nor

¹ FM 21-77A, Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (1 August 1967), Chapter 8, p. 46.

² ASubjScd 21-15, Appendix II, paragraph 3d, p. 6.

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a superficial propagation of Army services is sufficient to foster the necessary "keeping faith" attitude. In retrospect, the indications remain that that the direction of the substance of the current doctrinal literature does little in addition to merely demonstrating that a PW must "keep faith." The guidance provided is neither specific nor particularly lucid, especially in regard to the necessary reasons for "keeping faith."

b. A program of doctrine designed to thoroughly convince the US soldier that he must "keep faith" with himself, his fellow prisoners and his country must be of sufficient depth that the soldier realizes why he must "keep faith." The soldier must be made aware of the psychological effects of isolation, indoctrination, sensory deprivation, and the accompanying techniques of PW management. Emphasis must be placed upon the maintenance of interpersonal relationships among prisoners of war as stabilizing influences in the alien environment of the prison camp or compound. A specific and standard approach must be adopted for familiarizing military personnel with the principal Army programs designed to provide services and benefits for the captured serviceman and his family. The knowledge that such benefits are being rendered and received might alleviate serious concern manifested by prisoners of war during their incarceration. If a soldier is aware of the enemy techniques and has been given guidance in regard to their effects upon him, he should be better able to cope with the problems of captivity with a diminished psychological concern. If a soldier knows that his relationships with fellow prisoners contribute to his own mental stability, he will be more inclined to maintain such relationships. If a soldier recognizes the concern the Army takes in regard to himself and his family, he will be more able to concentrate his concern upon his immediate plight. Presently, there is no doctrinal source which incorporates the rather explicit notions that a soldier be made aware of the reasons for his "keeping faith."

c. The term "faith" means different things to different people, but it is safe to say that it is derived from one of the following: religious attitudes and beliefs, moral fibre, perception of social acceptance of his actions, loyalty to comrades, education, family influence, group solidarity and motivation to serve. Most of these factors are developed in a soldier prior to his entry into the service. The best that the Army can reasonably accomplish is to supplement or refine those attributes already developed. The values and standards which the soldier has set for himself will influence his attitudes and his physical and mental stamina while in captivity. Among many things that can be done to supplement and sharpen previously acquired values are the instilling of pride in ones unit, convincing him of

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the righteousness of his cause, appropriate awards and recognition, instilling and encouraging loyalty among peer groups and cultivation of personal pride in every soldier. None of these things can be accomplished through a specific lesson in BCT or AIT. It is something that must be brought about through conscious and continuous policy and demonstrated leadership, all of which must permeate the Army, the unit, classroom exercises, training experiences, and every facet of official endeavor. Even then, there will be those on whom there will not be a positive response. Faith can be either a positive or negative force. Basically, if a soldier believes in what he is doing, the act of keeping faith will be made infinitely easier.

d. The notions that prisoners of war are impelled to organize and that such organizations are subject to established principles of command and discipline are commonplace in doctrinal literature. Yet, the majority of doctrinal sources supply little guidance beyond cursory observations in regard to discipline and respect for the senior USPW and to prisoner organization. The principal exception is FM 21-77A which contributes relatively detailed guidance on the nature of PW camp organization. The very evident direction of the doctrine contained in both FM 21-77A and FM 21-76 emphasizes large-scale, extensive organization, feasible in sizeable prisoner of war compounds. There is a decided lack of regard for less conventional situations. Thus, diagrams in field manuals include "sports, entertainment, education, and welfare subcommittees," as well as more realistic, but hardly ubiquitous, elements in prison compound organization. The practical result is a distorted and unworkable description of current PW phenomena. In addition, the tenor of the doctrinal material apparently underscores the notion that the survival of the USPW is "dependent on discipline and respect for the senior USPW" and not "how" this is the case. While nearly every doctrinal source publicizes the necessity for the maintenance of discipline and respect for seniors in the prison compound environment, there is a definite lack of realistic enlightenment in respect to how these attributes will contribute to survival and the ability to resist.

e. It is not enough to tell the soldier that his survival in a prison compound is dependent upon discipline and the maintenance of the chain of command. It is more essential that doctrinal literature contains specific guidance in regard to how discipline and the establishment and maintenance of an organization relate to the abilities of the prisoner to successfully survive and resist within the prison compound environment. The soldier must know how to maintain discipline and organization in an environment, the dominant feature of which may be nearly continuous isolation from fellow prisoners. The soldier must also

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be aware of the potentially beneficial effects of discipline upon the prisoner, particularly in regard to the salutary psychological effect of offering something with which to identify in stressful situations. The content of doctrinal literature must reflect those notions in order to induce comprehension on the nature of discipline and respect for the chain of command within the prison compound.

f. Doctrinal materials pointedly demonstrate that a USPW has the obligation to resist enemy interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation. Doctrinal rhetoric indicates that servicemen will be impressed with the notion that they will resist. The cultivation of a "positive attitude" is not so readily recognized. The mere acknowledgment of an obligation to resist, however, does not require the premise of a positive attitude. There is no assurance that the current program is designed to foster, rather than demand, a "positive attitude." The relatively negative orientation of many of the notions contained within the Code of Conduct conceivably account for a possible aversion to a "positive attitude." Much of the diction and accompanying themes of the Code are expressed in negative fashion. The most facile approach to dissemination of the Code is to emphasize these negative admonitions.

g. The establishment and maintenance of a "positive attitude" in regard to resistance is partly a function of the training materials presented in support of the "positive attitude." While the diction of the Code is to remain static, its message can be presented in a more positive fashion to deemphasize the tendency to underscore the prohibitions revealed in it. Essentially, the US soldier must be made aware of what he can say and how he can behave while in captivity, rather than merely what he is forbidden to say and do. This orientation will serve to encompass the training program with a more positive aura. To achieve the maximum benefit from a positively oriented Code of Conduct training program, it should be in conjunction with a thorough resistance program. By competently presenting enemy prisoner of war management techniques to the US soldier, along with the positive measures he can take to counter them, the formation and maintenance of a positive attitude would be more likely within such a program. Training in support of the Code would be integral, but not dominant.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. "Keeping faith" is a nebulous term, but "faith," regardless of its origin, is ingrained into the American fighting man prior to his entry into the service. The best the Army can do to promote the concept

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is to refine and reinforce those values already in existence. This can be done through familiarizing the soldier with causes, methods and techniques of both the enemy and the US; insuring a dynamic around the clock leadership program; providing the soldier with a continuous flow of information; and making him cognizant at all times that the US Army is concerned with his welfare and that of his family.

b. FM's 21-76 and 21-77A identify the necessity of prison camp organization and following the chain of command, but contain nothing prescribing how to organize under adverse conditions or how to follow a chain of command when each PW is being held in isolation.

c. The principal guidance for instilling a "positive attitude" is the Code of Conduct. Many of the notions contained in the Code are negatively oriented. They tell what cannot be done rather than what can be done. The message of the Code can be presented in a more positive fashion, and Code training can be presented in conjunction with a well-planned and realistic resistance program. The resistance training would identify the threat and measures to counter it. Together, the Code instruction and the resistance program would tend to promote a positive attitude.

6. - RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to revise Part Three, FM 21-76, by accomplishing the following:

(1) Addition of the nature and purposes of the Communist prisoner of war management principles embodied in Chapter 2, this study.

(2) Addition of resistance techniques to the prisoner of war management principles required by (1) above.

b. That DA task CONARC to develop a training program designed to inform the US Army personnel of existing Army programs (see chapter 5, this study) which assist the Next of Kin in the event of the sponsor becomes missing or captured. (See Recommendation 5b, Annex VIII, this APPENDIX.)

c. That DA task CONARC to identify suggested methods and techniques for PW organization under conditions of intense segregation and/or isolation.

(1) Special emphasis to be placed on in-camp and out-of-camp communication systems.

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(2) Subject methods and techniques to be incorporated into FM 21-76 and FM 21-77A.

d. That ACSFOR task CONARC to develop a training program for presentation to all US soldiers which incorporates the doctrine included in recommendations 6a and c above. (See Follow On Recommendation 6a, APPENDIX C.)

e. That in the event the incorporation of the above recommendations into FM 21-76 makes that manual too unwieldy, DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to develop a new manual, FM 21-77, "Doctrine for Prisoners of War."

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ANNEX VIII

GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO PW'S AND NOK

REQUIREMENT:

THE US SOLDIER MUST BE FULLY AWARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF, HIS FELLOW PW'S, AND HIS FAMILY DURING AND AFTER HIS INTERNMENT.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

To develop doctrine to insure that the US soldier is fully aware that the government will make every possible effort on behalf of himself, his fellow PW's, and his family during and after his internment.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. AR 600-10 provides some limited guidance in the establishment of the Army assistance program for families of prisoners of war.

b. AR 350-30 provides the basis for making the soldier aware of the established programs of support and assistance offered by the Army.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. The current policy provided in several sources, notably AR 350-30, is theoretically adequate to address this problem. Training in support of the Code of Conduct is designed to demonstrate a three-fold concern on the part of the Army:

As a prisoner of war, every fighting man continues to be of special concern to the United States; that the rights to which he is entitled, his promotional status, pay and allowances, and dependent care, continue during his time of incarceration.

Every available means will be employed to establish contact with, and to gain release of prisoners of war.

During his incarceration every available means will be employed to insure that while in captivity, prisoners of war are afforded protection and rights under the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention (GPW).

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Doctrinal material reiterates the themes that "you will not be forgotten" and that "every available means will be employed to establish contact with you, to support you, and to gain your release." There is a further provision which adds, "The laws of the United States provide for the support and care of dependents during periods in which you serve in PW status or are detained in a foreign country against your will."

b. Although published doctrine apparently establishes a competent foundation for a comprehensive discussion of this problem, there are indications that the US soldier has not received the delineated information. To say that there are programs to assist the families falls far short of delineating what those programs are. It has been proved that a major cause for psychological stress while a captive is worry over the health and welfare of ones next of kin. This fact is not an indictment of the substance of existing doctrine, but rather a result of the machinery for its dissemination.

c. There is no single source document which pertains to the benefits and services provided to the PW and his family. There is a need for such a document, which would collect the key programs and services in an accessible publication. It is conceivable that this collection of material could be provided in the manual most concerned with doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel (i.e., FM 21-76) but the subject matter appears more suited to inclusion in a pamphlet. The need to stress the fact that the Army "will take care of its own" remains, and certainly the field manual can do more in this vein. However, the publication of a pamphlet describing in layman terms the many and varied benefits and programs available to next of kin of MIA/PW personnel would provide both reference for instruction during training and for the next of kin in the event of actual capture. It should be noted that as of the date of publication of this study, the Adjutant General's Office is compiling such a pamphlet.

d. As indicated above, a major cause of worry and despair on the part of a PW could be alleviated if that PW were properly informed of the programs the US government provides to the next of kin. According to DOD Directive 1300.7, there is an obligation that the US soldier be so informed. The US Army is not living up to that obligation.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Current guidance is adequate to address this problem but doctrine is not adequately documented.

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b. A need exists for Army services and programs for the PW and his family to be compiled into one document available to the Army in the field.

c. A need exists for the US soldier to be aware of the programs the US government provides to the NOK should the soldier fall into an MIA/PW status.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the Adjutant General initiate action to publish a DA pamphlet on the notification program and the next of kin family assistance programs which are currently in effect for next of kin of service members being carried in an MIA/PW status. Subject pamphlet should be so written as to be easily read and understood by the basic combat soldier and his next of kin. (See Internment Phase Recommendation 6b, ANNEX II, APPENDIX I.)

b. That DA task CONARC to develop a training program which will provide the US soldier with the following concepts:

(1) An immediate and long term priority concern of the PW is for the health and welfare of his family.

(2) The US Army takes care of its own. Information as to the specific key family assistance programs available to next of kin of PW's to be covered here.

(3) The need for the US soldier to have his personal affairs in order prior to departure for an overseas assignment. (See Follow On Action Recommendation 6a, APPENDIX C.)

c. That DA task CONARC to revise paragraph 13-1, Section 1, Chapter 13, FM 21-76, to include the following doctrine:

(1) Programs currently in effect to assist your next of kin in the event of your capture include:

(a) Personal notification of your next of kin by an officer/senior NCO.

(b) Assignment of an officer to assist your family throughout the period of your internment.

(c) Movement of your immediate next of kin to any place in the world.

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(d) Continued on-post privileges, including housing if authorized prior to capture.

(e) Educational grants and assistance.

(f) Continuous update of your status as information becomes available.

(2) You can do your part! Should you become a PW, a major psychological concern can be alleviated if you have your personal affairs in proper order prior to leaving your family for your overseas assignment.

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ANNEX IX

INTERSERVICE CODE TRAINING UNIFORMITY

REQUIREMENT:

CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING PROGRAMS AND TRAINING MATERIALS WILL BE CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

To identify Code of Conduct related topics and materials included in other Service training programs that are not implemented by the Army as required by DOD Directive 1300.7.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. AR 350-30 provides the basis for US Army training in respect to resistance.

b. There is no separate resistance training program developed for Army utilization, except that provided under the guise of training in support of the Code of Conduct.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. The notion that all Services have coordinated and complementary training programs and materials in respect to the Code of Conduct was recognized by the Defense Advisory Committee which drafted the Code and provided its rationale. The idea of service-coordinated programs was incorporated into the implementing guidance of DOD Directive 1300.7. In spite of this concern for coordinated and complementary training programs, there has been relatively little exchange of ideas and methods. Although a DOD review of the effectiveness of the Code is conducted on regular basis, the results of this formal review are not publicized. There are only a handful of joint doctrinal materials on the Code of Conduct. As a consequence, interpretations and training programs vary among the several services (for a complete discussion of the other Services' interpretations of the Code and their training programs, see APPENDIX K).

b. A fundamental hindrance to an all-Services accommodation on training topics and techniques lies in the Army's lack of effort in developing a resistance program. The Navy and Air Force provide emphasis upon resistance in their training program with the Code of Conduct as an

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integral, but not dominant, consideration. Conversely, the current Army program establishes resistance subjects within the generic Code of Conduct training. There has been little conscious effort on the part of the Army to implement extensive resistance training in accordance with the tenets of AR 350-30, certainly nothing on the order of the Navy and Air Force programs. A competent resistance program demands the establishment of Army resistance-oriented training; at least for "high risk" personnel. For Army-wide dissemination, methods and principles of resistance must be propagated to a far greater degree than is being accomplished currently. If, in fact, accomplished, this would have the effect of providing training programs similar to those of the other Services. In addition, there are indications that interpretations of the Code of Conduct among the several Services varies significantly. The principal confusion lies in the placement of emphasis with regard to prohibition of prisoner-captor communication. The Navy and Air Force emphasize the notion of "I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability." Army literature manifests a slightly modified adherence to the "name, rank, service number, date of birth only" attitude. A liberalized appreciation of the "I will evade" notion on the part of the Army would facilitate an inter-service accommodation of training topics and programs in support of the Code of Conduct.

c. The documented justification for the establishment and maintenance of a resistance training program is found in the DOD directive as well as in the original Defense Advisory Committee report. The implementation of coordinated programs is a function of inter-service communication. Interservice communication in this respect cannot be completely realized if dependent upon unscheduled and infrequent coordination among the Services. Broad general guidelines issued by DOD to the several Services does more to insure differences in implementation than uniformity of policies and procedures.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The Navy and the Air Force are more thorough in their approach to resistance training than is the Army.

b. The Navy and the Air Force have a constructive program for training high-risk of capture personnel. The Army has no comparable program.

c. Current coordination procedures among the various Services are not insuring uniformity of training as stipulated by DOD Directive 1300.7.

d. The Army must recognize the tenets of resistance training and incorporate this subject as part of the Army Training Program. Code of

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Conduct training, as in other Service programs, would be a sub-course of resistance training as opposed to vice-versa.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That DA task CONARC in coordination with USACDC to develop a resistance training program which incorporates the following broad areas:

- (1) Code of Conduct
- (2) Communist prisoner of war management principles
- (3) Evasion and Escape
- (4) Evasion Survival
- (5) Internment Survival
- (6) Resistance to interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation.

Doctrine to be included in the above program should be in consonance with conclusions and recommendations contained in this study.

b. That the resistance training program to be developed by CONARC be so structured as to provide variable degrees of exposure depending on the risk of capture potential of the target training group. (See Follow On Action Recommendation 6a, APPENDIX C.)

c. That DA initiate action to establish a joint Service committee at DOD level to continually review SERE and SERE-related training of the four Services and to make appropriate recommendations for achieving training uniformity among them.

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ANNEX X

OVERLAPPING REQUIREMENTS

The following requirements of the Pre-internment phase have been addressed in other portions of the study. Their analysis is not repeated here. Sections of the study where analysis is made are depicted after each requirements:

1. National/DOD Requirement #2: "THE US SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED THAT SHOULD HE BE SUBJECTED TO COERCION, HE WILL AVOID ANY ACT OR STATEMENT HARMFUL TO THE US OR DETRIMENTAL TO HIS FELLOW PW'S OR WHICH WILL PROVIDE AID OR COMFORT TO THE ENEMY." (See Annex II, this APPENDIX.)
2. National/DOD Requirement #3: "THE US SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED THAT PW COMPOUNDS ARE IN MANY WAYS EXTENSIONS OF THE BATTLEFIELD AND, AS SUCH, THE INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF RANK AND LEADERSHIP, MILITARY BEARING, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE, TEAMWORK, AND DEVOTION TO FELLOW SERVICEMEN, AND THE DUTY TO DEFEAT ANY ENEMY OF THE UNITED STATES REMAIN." (See Annexes II and V, this APPENDIX.)
3. National/DOD Requirement #4: "THE US SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED ON HOW TO RESIST INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION, AND EXPLOITATION." (See Annexes I and III, this APPENDIX.)
4. National/DOD Requirement #6: "THE US SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED IN PW CAMP ORGANIZATION, TO INCLUDE A NEED FOR OVERT AND COVERT SYSTEMS OF ORGANIZATION." (See Annexes III and VII, this APPENDIX.)
5. National/DOD Requirement #7: "THE US SOLDIER MUST BE FULLY INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION FOR PRISONERS OF WAR (GPW)." (See Annexes II and V, this APPENDIX.)

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APPENDIX I

(U) DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS APPENDIX
INTERMENT PHASE (U)

1. GENERAL:

a. In Chapter 5, Army doctrine as it relates to assistance rendered to the Next of Kin of US soldiers in a PW/MIA status is reviewed in light of the requirements generated by Communist treatment of prisoners of war (see Chapter 2), as well as requirements generated by precedents or directives established at the national or Department of Defense level (see Chapter 3). The fallout from this review is the identification of two (2) requirements not currently being met by Army doctrine.

b. The purpose of this Appendix is to analyze and discuss the specific weaknesses of current doctrine and to make recommendations on how doctrine can be improved to a point where both requirements are satisfied.

c. For purposes of analysis and presentation, each requirement is addressed independently in ANNEXES to this APPENDIX. For review purposes, the requirement under discussion is presented at the beginning of each ANNEX.

d. The analysis of the two problem areas resulted in the formulation of specific recommendations for actions that need to be taken by various Army activities in order to bring interment phase doctrine up to the desired level. Listed below (See para 2,) are the recommendations offered in ANNEXES I & 2. A synopsis of these recommendations is presented in FIGURE 31 on the following page.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That paragraph 3-16, Section IV, AR 600-10, be revised by the Adjutant General to include the following guidance:

(1) That responsible commanders establish criteria and pre-select officers (preferably field grade) and NCO's to perform notification duty.

(2) That notification be made by an individual or where feasible by a notification team consisting of a notification officer, a chaplain, and a medical attendant.

b. That the Adjutant General revise paragraph 3-17, Section IV, AR 600-10, to include the following guidance: That commanders of

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THAT THE ADJUTANT GENERAL TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION:

- a. Revise AR 600-10 to expand NOK notification criteria.
- b. Revise DA Form 41 to account for NOK medical infirmities and post-notification assistance.
- c. Task the IG to make the notification and NOK assistance programs a matter of increased emphasis during annual IG inspections.
- d. Expand AR 600-10 to include a chapter on Assistance to NOK. Chapter should include selection criteria and duties of FSAO.
- e. Publish a DA Pam on duties of FSAO and programs/services available to NOK of PW/MIA members.

ACTIONS BY OTHER ACTIVITIES:

- a. CONARC publish a regulation on the selection, training, and supervision of FSAO's.
- b. DCSLOG direct CofSS to review feasibility of delivery of MIA/PW personal effects to NOK by the FSAO. If feasible, CofSS to develop implementing plan.

FIGURE 31. INTERMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

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installations responsible for notification of next of kin will insure that such notification is accomplished in a dignified, humane, and understanding manner.

c. That the Adjutant General initiate action to revise DA Form 41 to include the following data and explanatory remarks:

(1) Notification Medical Problems. (Explanatory Notes: If notification is desired, but special medical considerations exist, enter name of NOK (relationship), and pertinent medical consideration.)

(2) Post-Notification Assistance. (Explanatory Notes: Enter here name(s) and address(es) of relative/neighbor living in the immediate vicinity of primary next of kin whose presence following casualty notification might be beneficial to next of kin.)

d. That the Inspector General make inspections of installation Casualty Notification Programs a matter of emphasis during Annual Inspector General inspections.

e. That the Adjutant General expand AR 600-10 to include a chapter on Assistance to Next of Kin of Missing/Captured Personnel, subject chapter to be structured similar to that on Survivor Assistance (Chapter 4, AR 600-10) and contain, as a minimum, the following:

(1) Responsibilities for appointment of Family Services and Assistance Officers.

(2) Criteria for selection of Family Services and Assistance Officer.

(3) Duties of the Family Services and Assistance Officer.

(4) A synopsis of the key DOD/DA programs which impact directly or indirectly upon the next of kin.

f. That the Adjutant General initiate action to publish a Department of the Army Pamphlet on the appointment and duties of the Family Services and Assistance Officer. Subject pamphlet should include a comprehensive list of programs and benefits available to the next of kin of missing/captured US Army personnel, and be so written as to be easily read and understood by nonmilitary next of kin. (Pamphlet number and title should be referenced in new chapter in AR 600-10 noted in previous recommendation.)

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g. That CONARC promulgate and implementing CONARC regulation on the selection, training, and supervision of Family Services and Assistance Officers based on current TAG guidance; subject regulation should emphasize the requisite need for command attention to this critical area.

h. That the Inspector General make inspections of installation FSAO programs a matter of emphasis during Annual Inspector General inspections.

i. That DCSLOG review the feasibility of shipping personal effects of MIA/PW personnel to the installation nearest to the next of kin for delivery to that next of kin by the FSAO.

ANNEXES:

- I - Notification of Next of Kin
- II - Continuing Assistance to Next of Kin.

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ANNEX I

(U) NOTIFICATION OF NEXT OF KIN

REQUIREMENT #10. IN THE EVENT A US SOLDIER BECOMES MISSING IN ACTION OR CAPTURED WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY, HIS NEXT OF KIN MUST BE NOTIFIED AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE IN A DIGNIFIED, HUMANE, AND UNDERSTANDING MANNER.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. To notify the next of kin of missing or captured US Army personnel in a dignified, humane, and understanding manner.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. That the initial impact of notification upon the next of kin is significantly affected by the manner in which the notification is made.

b. That the long term relationship between the next of kin and the US Army is significantly affected by the manner in which the notification is conducted.

c. That most company grade officers during the time frame 1972-76 will lack the requisite maturity to properly handle casualty notification.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. AR 600-10, "The Army Casualty System," dated June 1968, is the primary document for US Army in next of kin notification.

b. Explicit instruction for next of kin notification is the responsibility of the Post, Camp, or Station Commander in whose area of operations the next of kin resides.

c. DA Form 41, "Record of Emergency Data," is the primary source for next of kin notification data.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. The notification procedure is well established and analysis has shown it to be effective in providing the next of kin with the report of casualty in a minimum of time. Procedures, however, are sterile and have little bearing on alleviating the psychological impact that the

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notification of a loss brings. Although the shock cannot be eliminated totally, it can be lessened significantly by the composition of the notification team and the manner in which that team conducts itself.

b. Current procedures as stipulated in AR 600-10 do not require "team" notification. The sole requirement is for an individual, preferably an officer on active duty who is equal to or higher in rank than that of the person missing or captured. Most posts maintain a roster of available officers/NCO's, and these are assigned to notification duties when the casualty report is received.

c. The duties of the notification officer/NCO are clearly stipulated in the AR. Acting as the personal representative of the Secretary of the Army, he is expected to be courteous, helpful, and sympathetic toward the next of kin. His performance of duty reflects directly on the Department of the Army and the notification system. It is apparent that the notification officer has two related obligations--one to the next of kin and one to the Department of the Army.

d. There are several significant steps which could conceivably enhance the notification process in meeting the goal of being dignified and humane. The first of these would be the expansion of the notification team from one individual to two or more. Where personnel strengths and installation commitments permit, the program warrants the addition of a chaplain whose training and vocation equip him for alleviating grief and providing spiritual strength. It would also be advisable to have a medical attendant present in the event the next of kin is aged or in ill health. But most important, should commitments be such that the chaplain and medic cannot be made available, it is crucial that the appointed notification officer/NCO be a mature, intelligent and soldierly individual capable of carrying out a duty that requires the utmost sensitivity and compassion. Discrimination in the preselection of officers/NCO's for the duties of notification would insure that the US Army is best represented at a time when substandard representation could do irreparable damage. The services of a chaplain and/or a medic for notification will sometimes be difficult to acquire. In view of this contingency, there is a step which the sponsor can take to assist in notifying his own NOK should he become missing or captured. The vehicle for this would be a revised DA Form 41, Emergency Data Card. Two vital bits of information if added to the card and provided by the sponsor would assist the notification process:

(1) Primary Next of Kin State of Health. Addition of this data would permit the responsible command to assess the need for providing medical assistance at the time of notification. The attendance of medical personnel would be advisable when notifying ill next of kin.

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(2) Post-Notification Relative/Neighbor Assistance. Presence of a known friend or relative following notification could provide a figure of emotional support to whom the next of kin could relate. That person could remain with the next of kin for the immediate adjustment period following the departure of the notification team. The notification team should stand ready to provide transportation of the relative/neighbor to the residence of the next of kin should distance warrant such assistance. The presence of the relative/neighbor following the notification would be contingent upon the stated request of the next of kin, the immediate availability of the individual(s) and his(her) willingness to assist. The data should contain name, address, and family relationship, if any.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. That AR 600-10 provides adequate guidance on the duties of the notification officer to permit subordinate commands to develop comprehensive implementing instructions.

b. That AR 600-10 provides inadequate guidance on criteria for selection of notification personnel.

c. That revision of DA Form 41 to include identification of next of kin medical problems and of a relative(s)/neighbor(s) to assist the next of kin following notification would be of significant benefit to the notification team and the next of kin.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the Adjutant General revise paragraph 3-16, Section IV, AR 600-10, to include the following guidance:

(1) That responsible commanders establish criteria and preselect officers (preferably field grade) and NCO's to perform notification duty.

(2) That notification be made by an individual or, where feasible, by a notification team consisting of a notification officer, a chaplain, and a medical attendant.

b. That the Adjutant General revise paragraph 3-17, Section IV, AR 600-10, to include the following guidance: That commanders of installations responsible for notification of next of kin will insure that such notification is accomplished in a dignified, humane, and understanding manner.

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c. That the Adjutant General initiate action to revise DA Form 41 to include the following data and explanatory remarks:

(1) Notification Medical Problems. (Explanatory Notes: If notification desired but special medical considerations exist, enter name of NOK (relationship), and pertinent medical consideration.)

(2) Post Notification Assistance. (Explanatory Notes: Enter here name(s) and address(es) of relative/neighbor living in the immediate vicinity of primary next of kin whose presence following casualty notification might be beneficial to next of kin.)

d. That the Inspector General make inspections of installation Casualty Notification Programs a matter of emphasis during Annual Inspector General inspections.

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ANNEX II

(U) CONTINUING ASSISTANCE TO NEXT OF KIN

REQUIREMENT #12. AN ASSISTANCE OFFICER MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE NEXT OF KIN OF A CAPTURED/DETAINED US SOLDIER WITH THE TASK OF PROVIDING GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE NOK IN MATTERS RELATED TO THE SERVICEMAN'S STATUS. CONTACT BETWEEN THE NOK AND ASSISTANCE OFFICER WILL BE MAINTAINED UNTIL THE CASE IS RESOLVED.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. To insure an effective Family Services and Assistance Officer (FSAO) program for the next of kin of missing or captured US Army personnel (Requirement #12).

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

- a. That the US Army will make every effort to "take care of its own."
- b. That the FSAO/next of kin relationship is critical to the public image of the Department of the Army.
- c. That command interest is the key to proper selection and execution of the FSAO program.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

- a. No Department of the Army publication officially addresses the selection criteria for FSAO's.
- b. DA Pamphlet 608-33, "Survivor Assistance Officer And Family Services And Assistance Officer Handbook" dated August 1971 describes in general terms the duties of the FSAO.
- c. No official Department of the Army publication consolidates the multiple services and benefits provided to and for next of kin of missing or captured US Army personnel. TAGO is currently staffing a draft pamphlet which will allegedly present this material.
- d. AR 600-10, "The Army Casualty System," dated June 1968, offers one paragraph (4-8) of guidance on missing personnel.
- e. AR 643-50, "Disposition of Personal Effects Outside Combat Areas," dated October 1965, and AR 638-5, "Disposition of Personal Effects - Military Operations," dated September 1968, are the primary documents for deliverance of personal effects to the next of kin.

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f. Selection of and guidance for FSAO's is a local requirement placed upon the installation commander whose installation is closest to the residence of the next of kin.

g. Department of the Army staff responsibility for next of kin affairs rests with the Adjutant General.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. As indicated in paragraph 3 above, "Facts Bearing on the Problem," there is a decided lack of official written guidance on the selection of FSAO's as well as the programs about which the FSAO is to inform the next of kin. As a stopgap measure, most instructions pertaining to these areas have been forwarded by message to the field installations from Casualty Branch, The Adjutant General. As described in Chapter 5, this study, major programs for assisting the next of kin were devised and incorporated during the period December 1970 and April 1971. In a DCSPER Memorandum dated 28 November 1970 concerning a visit by the Consultant to the Army Chief of Staff on Next of Kin Affairs, Mrs. Iris Powers, to the Office of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, 19 recommendations were listed covering such areas as financial assistance, education assistance, transportation of self and household goods assistance and several others. All recommendations were favorably considered and action was taken to implement them. It is understandably due to these major and recent innovations that Department of the Army (TAGO) is only now considering the publication of a consolidated list of benefits and programs in an official document. However, the fact that it is yet to be published prohibits judgment as to its adequacy to fill the gap. Up to now, the promulgation of such programs through the medium of telegrams in lieu of a regulation has resulted in nonstandard execution of those policies.

b. The policies and programs as devised are thorough and address the majority of the problem areas which directly impact upon the next of kin. It is, as indicated above, in the area of execution that these policies fail. The key to proper execution of the policies and insurance that the next of kin is aware of and takes maximum advantage of them is command emphasis on the Family Services and Assistance Officer program.

c. When the Adjutant General provided responsible installations and activities with criteria for selection of an FSAO it was electronically transmitted. Again, the instructions were not documented in any official publication. If this guidance is scrupulously followed, the FSAO would be a mature, active duty field grade officer (or experienced

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captain) with a retention expectancy on the job of not less than 12 months. In a conference at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 6 May 1971, Mrs. Powers indicated that serious deficiencies exist in the current FSAO program. She stated that the variation in the training and emphasis placed in the FSAO program Army-wide had caused major problems among the next of kin.

d. The needs of the next of kin of MIA/PW personnel differ a great deal from those pertinent to the survivors of deceased personnel. There are fewer administrative-type actions to be taken in the case of the missing or captured personnel, but the tenure and depth of the NOK/FSAO association will be far greater than in the case of assistance to survivors of deceased personnel. It follows, therefore, that the selection of FSAO's must not be a perfunctory procedure but rather one of selectivity and prior training. Inasmuch as the responsibility for selection and training of FSAO's currently rests with the installation commanders, it becomes readily apparent that the success or failure of the FSAO program rests solely with the amount of command emphasis and concern provided by that installation commander.

e. Although not directly related to the appointment and training of an FSAO, there is an area of concern which can best be discussed in this annex. During the 6 May 1971 conference, Mrs. Iris Powers stated that the delivery of MIA/PW personal effects via the mail has a significant and often deleterious effect upon the morale and hope of the next of kin. She indicated that the dispatch of personal effects from in-theater to the military post/activity closest to the next of kin prior to delivery by the assigned FSAO would be a more sensitive and humane approach. In a 28 May 1971 reply to a query concerning the feasibility of this approach, the Office of the Chief of Support Services, Department of the Army, concurred on both the feasibility of such a program and in its humane and personal approach. It is immediately recognized that such a program would, if enacted, require stringent administrative controls to insure proper delivery of all personal effects to the appropriate next of kin. It also would place one more requirement upon the shoulders of FSAO's who will be burdened with normal duty assignment and family assistance duties. Nevertheless, in keeping with the tradition of the Army's "taking care of its own," and insuring that everything possible that can be done is being done, the delivery of missing/captured personnel's personal effects to the next of kin by the FSAO appears to be worth considering.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Department of the Army guidance is required on criteria for selection of Family Service and Assistance Officers.

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b. Insufficient command attention is currently being given to the selection and training of Family Service and Assistance Officers.

c. A need exists for a consolidated list of policies and benefits which directly affect the next of kin and which can be used by the Family Service and Assistance Officer to advise the next of kin.

d. The delivery by mail of personal effects to the next of kin of missing/captured Army personnel has a deleterious effect upon the morale of that next of kin.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the Adjutant General expand AR 600-10 to include a chapter on assistance to next of kin of missing/captured personnel. Subject chapter is to be structured similar to that on Survivor Assistance (Chapter 4, AR 600-10) and contain as a minimum the following:

(1) Responsibilities for appointment of Family Services and Assistance Officers.

(2) Criteria for selection of Family Services and Assistance Officer stressing the need for command selectivity and prior training on FSAO duties.

(3) Duties of the Family Services and Assistance Officer.

(4) A synopsis of the more key DOD/DA programs which impact directly or indirectly upon the next of kin.

b. That the Adjutant General initiate action to publish a Department of the Army pamphlet on the appointment and duties of the Family Services and Assistance Officer. Subject pamphlet should include a comprehensive list of programs and benefits available to the next of kin of missing/captured US Army personnel and be so written as to be easily read and understood by nonmilitary next of kin. (Pamphlet number and title should be referenced in new chapter in AR 600-10 recommended in previous recommendation.)

c. That CONARC promulgate an implementing CONARC regulation on the selection, training, and supervision of Family Services and Assistance Officers based on current TAG guidance. Subject regulation is to emphasize the requisite need for command attention to this critical area.

d. That the Inspector General make inspections of installation FSAO programs a matter of emphasis during Annual Inspector General inspections.

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e. That DCSLOG review the feasibility of shipping personal effects of MIA/PW personnel to the installation nearest to the next of kin for delivery to that next of kin by the FSAO.

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APPENDIX J

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS APPENDIX

~~(S)~~ POSTINTERNMENT PHASE (U)

1. (U) GENERAL:

a. In Chapter 6, Army doctrine as it relates to evacuation and processing, debriefing, and medical treatment of returned prisoners of war is reviewed in light of the requirements generated by Communist treatment of prisoners of war (see Chapter 2), as well as requirements generated by precedents or directives established at the national or Department of Defense level (see Chapter 3). The fallout from this review is the identification of five (5) requirements not currently being met by Army doctrine.

b. The purpose of this APPENDIX is to analyze and discuss the specific weaknesses of current doctrine and to make recommendations on how doctrine can be improved to a point where all the requirements are satisfied.

c. For the purpose of presentation, the five requirements have been consolidated into one major problem area, i.e., processing of returned PW's, which is discussed in the ANNEX to this APPENDIX.

d. The analysis of the problem area resulted in the formulation of specific recommendations for actions that need to be taken by various Army activities in order to bring postinternment phase doctrine up to the desired level. Listed below (see para 2.) are the recommendations offered in ANNEX I. A synopsis of these recommendations is presented in FIGURE 32 on the following page.

2. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS: The following are the recommendations offered in ANNEX J:

a. That DCSPER task TAGO to develop and promulgate comprehensive guidance to include all phases of large and small scale repatriation.

b. That subject guidance be included in a revised AR 190-25 and be commensurate in scope and tenor with that provided by the EGRESS RECAP plans of the other Services.

c. That the revised AR 190-25 include a comprehensive and detailed "Concept of Operations" which puts adequate emphasis on the requirement that repatriation processing be so organized as to insure maximum consideration for the needs of returnees.

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THAT DCSPER TASK TAGO TO:

a. Develop and promulgate detailed guidance for all phases of large and small scale repatriation.

b. Revise AR 190-25 to:

(1) Make it commensurate with guidance provided by EGRESS RECAP plans of other Services.

(2) Include a detailed "Concept of Operations" (see p. 7-20, Chap 7).

(3) Relieve medical authorities from the retention beyond ETS responsibility when such retention is for intelligence purposes.

c. Task CINFO to develop detailed public information briefing guidance for inclusion in AR 190-25.

ACTIONS OF OTHER ACTIVITIES:

a. That USA Intelligence Command revise USAINTC Reg 381-100 to delete all reference to FM 30-15.

b. That USA Intelligence Command revise USAINTC OPLAN 107-71 to delete all reference to development of procedures based on AR 381-130.

c. That USA Intelligence School revise FM 30-15 to delete statements of applicability to "US escapees and evaders."

FIGURE 32. POSTINTERNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

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d. That the detailed "Concept of Operations" emphasizes the following points:

(1) All phases of processing must proceed with full consideration of hardships.

(2) Processing must not belittle the returnee's dignity but rather bolster it and restore his pride and confidence in himself and his service.

(3) The personal welfare of the individual is of primary importance during all phases of processing.

(4) Returnees must be fully briefed on the importance of the debrief for intelligence purposes.

(5) It is not the goal of the debriefer to seek documentation to determine the returnee's culpability.

(6) Debriefings must be conducted so as to afford full protection to the right of the individual.

(7) In full consideration of the returnee's physical condition, processing must not be too demanding but must follow an orderly schedule.

(8) Returnees must be received with genuine fraternalism.

(9) Fanfare and a carnival-like atmosphere surrounding the returnee processing must be avoided.

(10) Processing must be sufficiently considerate of personal desires, and established administrative procedures flexible enough, to permit the returnees to attain these goals.

(11) Depending on length of captivity, returnees may require personal and current event orientation.

(12) Exposure of the returnee to the press and public must not offend the NOK or reflect unfavorably on the US or individual returnees.

(13) The returnee must be treated as a brother-in-arms and be accorded all rights and dignity such a title confers.

(14) Processing must avoid implication of culpability, or that a returnee is being restrained, or is under custody.

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e. That TAGO task CINEO to develop comprehensive Public Information briefing guidance for inclusion in APPENDIX A of AR 190-25.

f. That the PI briefing guidance contain the following precepts:

(1) That the US Army provide the returnee and/or his family with required PI guidance.

(2) That guidance to the returnee is for the protection of national interests and individual rights of the returnee.

(3) That the returnee is not required to talk to newsmen or pose for pictures.

(4) That, if a returnee has questions as to the propriety of answering a question, he should ask the assigned Army information officer.

g. That the expanded Briefing Guidance be structured so as to permit it to be used as a Public Affairs briefing suitable for presentation to returned US Army prisoners of war/detainees.

h. That USAINTC Regulation 381-100 be revised to delete all reference to FM 30-15, which is conduct oriented.

i. That FM 30-15 be revised to delete statements of applicability to "US escapees and evaders."

j. That USAINTC OPLAN 107-71 be revised to delete all reference to the development of procedures based on AR 381-130.

k. That TAGO initiate action to modify AR 190-25 so as to stipulate that, upon completion of medical processing, any further retention of a returnee beyond ETS is the responsibility of other than medical personnel.

ANNEXES:

I - Processing of Returned PW's

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ANNEX I

~~(S)~~ PROCESSING OF RETURNED PW's (U)

REQUIREMENTS:

~~(S)~~ PROCESSING OF ARMY RETURNEES MUST BE COMPARABLE TO THAT CONDUCTED BY THE OTHER SERVICES.

~~(S)~~ DURING PROCESSING, THE WELFARE AND MORALE OF THE RETURNED USPW WILL BE OF PRIME IMPORTANCE AND ALL REASONABLE EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO PROVIDE FOR HIS PERSONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SPIRITUAL NEEDS.

~~(S)~~ APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS MUST BE IN EFFECT TO INSURE THAT PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING RETURNED USPW'S IS FACTUAL AND GIVES PROPER CONSIDERATION TO (1) THE WELFARE OF THE RETURNED PERSONNEL AND THEIR FAMILIES (2) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND (3) THE SAFETY AND INTERESTS OF OTHER PERSONNEL WHO MAY BE DETAINED.

~~(S)~~ US ARMY RETURNEES WILL BE ACCORDED ALL OF THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED AS MILITARY PERSONNEL. PARTICULAR EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO INSURE THOSE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AND IN NO WAY COMPROMISED OR DILUTED.

~~(S)~~ MEDICAL PERSONNEL WILL PROVIDE OPTIMUM DEBRIEFING CONDITIONS CONSISTENT WITH TREATMENT.

1. (U) STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. To structure a US Army repatriation program incorporating the following characteristics.

- a. Commensuration with other service programs.
- b. Maximum emphasis on the welfare and morale of the returnees.
- c. Detailed and uniform public information policy guidance.
- d. Elimination of any reference to procedures which infringe upon the right of returnees to be presumed innocent where no prior evidence/accusations of misconduct exists.
- e. Provision that retention of a repatriate beyond ETS is considered a legal not a medical problem.

2. (U) FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

- a. US Army doctrine for processing returnees is defined in AR 190-25, dated November 1969.

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b. The US Army Intelligence Command operations plan for the CONUS debriefing of 11 or more returnees is entitled USAINTC OPLAN 107-71.

c. MACV OPLAN J190 governs the in-theater processing of returnees.

d. EGRESS RECAP-NAVY is the guide for the CONUS processing of US Navy returnees.

e. EGRESS RECAP-MARINE is the guide for the CONUS processing of US Marine returnees.

f. EGRESS RECAP-AIR FORCE is the guide for the CONUS processing of US Air Force returnees.

3. (U) DISCUSSION:

a. General. The current US Army repatriation program, primarily based upon AR 190-25, provides general guidance for major commands and some detailed guidance for individuals charged with specific responsibilities. It is not detailed enough or sufficiently broad in scope to provide "need-to-know" type information for all personnel who plan and execute the program. AR 190-25 is supplemented by USAINTC OPLAN 107-71 and by MACV OPLAN J190, but in its entirety is not as definitive or broad in scope as EGRESS RECAP-NAVY, EGRESS RECAP-MARINE, or EGRESS RECAP-AIR FORCE which, respectively, are the prime guidance documents of the other services. The processing of returnees has been determined by DOD to be a sensitive area. The requirement for processing procedures to be uniform among the armed services cannot be achieved if some of the services provide detailed guidance for each echelon of command while others provide only general guidance that depends upon intermediate commands and activities to provide supplementing plans. Traditionally, the Army has maintained the policy of providing guidance to the field through the medium of regulations as opposed to OPLANS and other dissemination means. Members of the DA staff participating in the USPOW study have argued that an AR is permanent in nature, available to all who need the information it provides, and is applicable generally to the Army in the field, i.e., it is not restricted to a given locale or to only the immediate time frame. OPLANS are generally published by major commands within the Army for enunciating command policies and prescribing detailed administrative procedures. During the course of the study, participants from the DA staff indicated a strong DA consensus for adhering to the use of an Army Regulation for dissemination of guidance to the field. The problem, then, is reduced to determining appropriate input to a revised AR 190-25 in such a manner as to identify, amplify, and expand areas of the repatriation program where adequate guidance is not currently provided.

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b. Programs of Other Services. The inadequacy of AR 190-25 is revealed by comparing it with the EGRESS RECAP OPLANS of the other services. (See APPENDIX K.) Inadequacy is further exemplified by comparing it with MACV OPLAN J190 which provides detailed in-theater guidance. The only comprehensive Army OPLAN in existence for any phase of repatriation is USAINTC OPLAN 107-71 which is applicable only in the event of large scale repatriation and pertains only to the debriefing phase of repatriation. A need exists for Army-wide guidance similar to that contained in EGRESS RECAP-NAVY which addresses all aspects of the program and yet which allows subordinate commanders to prepare their own implementing plans. A "Concept of Operations" should be included in the AR which provides guidance to subordinate commanders so that such commanders are aware of the critical role the repatriation process plays in the sensitive task of reintegrating the returnee into society.

c. Welfare and Morale of Returnees. AR 190-25 suffers from a lack of explicit guidance in regard to the welfare and morale of returnees. OPLAN J190 details the in-theater repatriation program for MACV, but once out of theater, AR 190-25 is the primary guide to processing. It fails to meet the spirit of DOD requirements due to the lack of an unmistakable and firm position on the need for insuring the welfare and morale of returnees. EGRESS RECAP-NAVY contains a thorough "Concept of Operations" which gives explicit and comprehensive guidance for all phases of the repatriation process. This "concept" sets a sensitive and sympathetic tenor for the handling of returned PW's which, if acknowledged and practiced by processing personnel, will be highly beneficial to the readjustment of the returnee. The equivalent section of AR 190-25, entitled "Concept," consists of a single, inadequate paragraph. It fails to impart to subordinate commanders the critical priority which DOD and DA clearly intend to be given to the welfare of returnees. The entire repatriation process requires centralized guidance in order to insure uniform decentralized execution. The centralized guidance must include an emphasis on the sensitive nature of the entire repatriation process. If AR 190-25 is to contain the proper emphasis, revision is required.

d. Public Information Policy Guidance. Both AR 190-25 and MACV OPLAN J190 specify that returnees are to be counseled by an information officer and an intelligence officer. However, the only explicit Public Information (PI) guidance in AR 190-25 consists of a single, two-sentence paragraph contained in APPENDIX A of that Regulation. This paragraph is too broad to be of assistance. It fails to impart to processing personnel an understanding of the issues involved. The lack of detail may result in the returnee not having a clear picture of the

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boundaries within which he may speak freely without harming himself, his country, or his fellow PW's still interned. Further, APPENDIX A, AR 190-25, does not insure that the PI guidance for returnees will be uniform from individual/group to individual/group. Expanded PI guidance is needed to provide awareness on the part of processing personnel to the issues involved; to insure uniformity of guidance; and present a clear picture to the returnee of what he can/cannot say. The PAO Briefing Guide contained in EGRESS RECAP-NAVY is designed to be read to returnees and insures a uniform policy throughout the Navy. It is written in simple but explicit terms which convey to processing personnel and returnees the sensitive nature of the issues involved. The Navy PAO Briefing Guide provides an excellent example toward which Army guidance efforts should be directed. The only disadvantage of increased detail in APPENDIX A of AR 190-25 lies in the fact that the detail will require periodic evaluation to insure relevancy and currency in accordance with prevailing DOD policy. This is not a major disadvantage as all programs of this import require periodic evaluation and updating.

e. Debriefing Guidance. AR 381-130 governs counterintelligence investigation and was the sole debriefing guide during the early years of the conflict in Southeast Asia. USAINTC Regulation 381-100, governing CONUS debriefing of 10 or less returnees, and USAINTC OPLAN 107-71, governing CONUS debriefing of 11 or more returnees, now supplement AR 381-30. For intelligence interrogations FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation, contains the existing doctrinal guidance. The promulgation of OPLAN 107-71 has provided a greater degree of coordination/control for the debriefing of returnees than did the use of AR 190-25 and/or USAINTC Regulation 381-100. Collectively, however, all the guidance documents fail to provide specific debriefing procedures for protecting the right of returnees to be presumed innocent where there exists no prior evidence/accusations of misconduct. USAINTC Regulation 381-100 states that DA doctrine as set forth in FM 30-15 will apply. The techniques outlined in FM 30-15 are oriented toward interrogating enemy personnel who are reluctant to impart information rather than debriefing of returnees who are anxious to describe their experiences. The interrogation techniques listed in the FM are the following:

- (1) Direct Approach
- (2) File and dossier
- (3) We know all
- (4) Futility

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- (5) Rapid fire
- (6) Harrassment
- (7) Repetition
- (8) Mutt and Jeff
- (9) Pride and ego
- (10) Silence
- (11) Change of scene
- (12) Establish your identity
- (13) Emotional

These techniques cannot but help generate an antagonistic debriefer-returnee relationship which is dysfunctional to the desired flow of information. Furthermore, the generation of such antagonism will aggravate the already difficult problem of reintegrating the returnee into society. USAINTC OPLAN 107-71 specifies that AR 381-130 will serve as one of the bases for developing the debriefing format and techniques. This AR has an appendix entitled "Debriefing Guides for Returned US Personnel." This appendix is clearly weighted in the direction of an investigation of conduct rather than a search for intelligence information. Out of 11 areas into which the interrogation is directed to inquire, five are conduct oriented. These include the following:

- (1) Possible requests for political asylum by the returnees.
- (2) Possible acceptance of parole by the individual while in captivity.
- (3) Possible recruitment of returnee as an agent of enemy intelligence.
- (4) Possible signing of statements while under foreign control.
- (5) Possible disclosure of information to the enemy.

The appendix to AR 381-130 is clearly unsuitable to serve as a basis for developing a debriefing format. The AR of which it is a part is oriented

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toward the counterintelligence mission of preventing subversion. This is an inadequate approach to the establishment of rapport with anxiety-ridden returnees who will be sensitive to the least implication of misconduct. The guidance of Appendix V also requires a mandatory reading of Article 31 (UCMJ) which is a contradiction of DOD and DA policy as set forth in Sec Def Memorandums, AR 190-25, MACV OPLAN J190, USAINTC Regulation 381-100, and USAINTC OPLAN 107-71.

f. Retention of Returnees Beyond ETS. The conduct of an individual while outside of U.S. control is a sensitive matter. Public interest results in large scale mass media coverage of the return and subsequent processing of returnees. Consequently, this retention beyond his ETS is likely to be brought to the attention of the public. If such retention can be justified as a medical matter rather than a legal matter, it will be less likely to arouse public controversy. The medical and counterintelligence/investigatory aspects are blurred by having the hospital commander appear to be responsible for retention on active duty of an individual beyond his ETS when, in actuality, it is counterintelligence or other reasons rather than medical requiring such retention. This puts the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) in a compromising situation, which can adversely affect the relationship between medical personnel and the returnee. Once medical processing is completed, retention decisions should be clearly designated as the responsibility of other than medical personnel. If such retention is for the convenience of counterintelligence/investigatory personnel, the responsibility should be fixed accordingly. This would not compromise the relationship of medical personnel with the returnee, and would avoid the adverse impact on returnee readjustment which could result from using medical excuses for a non-medical decision. This is the policy of EGRESS RECAP-NAVY and EGRESS RECAP-MARINE. Both of these Services fix the responsibility with other than medical personnel. For the Navy, the responsibility is that of the Chief of Naval Personnel, while the Commandant of the Marine Corps has this responsibility for the Corps.

4. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

a. AR 190-25 is not in sufficient detail to provide guidance to all personnel with a "need to know." A need exists for guidance similar to that contained in EGRESS RECAP-NAVY.

b. AR 190-25 needs a "Concept of Operations" included as an appendix, so that subordinate commanders may be aware of the role which the repatriation process plays in the sensitive task of reintegrating the

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returnee into society. The detailed "Concept of Operations" APPENDIX should provide detailed information to insure that the welfare and morale of returnees is given the priority intended by DOD.

c. The PI guidance contained in APPENDIX A, AR 190-25 is inadequate. The PAO briefing guide contained in EGRESS RECAP-NAVY is an excellent document in this respect and one with which Army guidance should be commensurate.

d. Interrogation techniques identified in FM 30-15 are not compatible with MACV OPLAN J-190, AR 190-25, and USAINTC OPLAN 107-71, all of which state that no presumption of culpability is to be attached to the fact of captivity.

e. Current debriefing procedures do not make adequate distinction between debriefing for information and debriefing for conduct.

f. APPENDIX V, AR 381-30, is conduct oriented and, therefore, inapplicable as a basis for establishing standardized debriefing procedures.

g. There is no reasonable basis for medical command authority being utilized to retain a returnee beyond his ETS when such retention is for reasons other than medical.

5. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That DCSPER task TAGO to develop and promulgate comprehensive guidance to include all phases of large and small scale repatriation.

(1) That subject guidance be included in a revised AR 190-25, and be commensurate in scope and tenor with that provided by the EGRESS RECAP plans of the other Services.

(2) That the revised AR 190-25 include a comprehensive and detailed "Concept of Operations" which puts adequate emphasis on the requirement that repatriation processing be so organized as to insure maximum consideration for the needs of returnees.

(3) That the detailed "Concept of Operations" emphasize the following points:

(a) All phases of processing must proceed with full consideration of hardships.

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(b) Processing must not belittle the returnee's dignity, but rather bolster it and restore his pride and confidence in himself and his service.

(c) The personal welfare of the individual is of primary importance during all phases of processing.

(d) Returnees must be fully briefed on the importance of the debrief for intelligence purposes.

(e) It is not the goal of the debriefer to seek documentation to determine the returnee's culpability.

(f) Debriefings must be conducted so as to afford full protection to the rights of the individual.

(g) In full consideration of the returnee's physical condition, processing must not be too demanding and must follow an orderly schedule.

(h) Fanfare and a carnival-like atmosphere surrounding the returnee processing must be avoided.

(i) Processing must be sufficiently considerate of personal desires, and established administrative procedures flexible enough, to permit the returnees to attain these goals.

(j) Depending on length of captivity, returnees may require personal and current event orientation.

(k) Exposure of the returnee to the press and public must not offend the NOK or reflect unfavorably on the United States or individual returnee.

(l) The returnee must be treated as a brother-in-arms and be accorded all rights and dignity such a title confers.

(m) Processing must avoid implication of culpability, or that a returnee is being restrained, or is under custody.

b. That TAGO task CINFO to develop comprehensive Public Information briefing guidance for inclusion in APPENDIX A of AR 190-25.

(1) That the PI briefing guidance contain the following precepts:

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(a) That the US Army provide the returnee and/or his family with required PI guidance.

(b) That guidance to the returnee is for the protection of national interests and individual rights of the returnee.

(c) That the returnee is not required to talk to newsmen or pose for pictures.

(d) That, if a returnee has questions as to the propriety of answering a question, he should ask the assigned Army information officer.

(e) That guidance is to be provided returnees in the nature of a list of subject matters they are not authorized to discuss.

(2) That the expanded Briefing Guidance be structured so as to permit it to be used as a Public Affairs briefing suitable for presentation to returned US Army prisoners of war/detainees.

c. That ASCI task USAINTC to revise USAINTC Regulation 381-100 so as to delete all reference to FM 30-15, which is conduct oriented.¹

d. That DA task CONARC (US Army Intelligence School) to revise FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation, so as to delete statements of applicability to "US escapees and evaders."

e. That ACSI task USAINTC to revise USAINTC OPLAN 107-71 by deleting all reference to the development of procedures based on AR 381-130.

f. That TAGO initiate action to modify AR 190-25, so as to stipulate that, upon completion of medical processing, any further retention of a returnee beyond ETS is the responsibility of the Chief of Personnel Operations.

¹ Revision of USAINTC Reg 381-100 is currently being revised to eliminate reference to FM 30-15. Projected publication date is February 1972.

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