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July 31, 2008

Subject: THE FEDAYEEN TERRORIST/MONOGRAPH

FOIPA No. 1108394- 000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552		Section 552a
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- Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:
 - referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
 - referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Hardy", with a stylized flourish at the end.

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request concerning the above subject.


EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
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- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



ARAB TERRORISTS ATTACKS--WESTERN EUROPE

THE FEDAYEEN TERRORIST-- A PROFILE



Not for Dissemination Outside the Bureau

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
John Edgar Hoover, Director

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**THE FEDAYEEN TERRORIST--
A PROFILE**

(Not for Dissemination Outside the Bureau)

June, 1970

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
John Edgar Hoover, Director**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	i
<u>CONCLUSIONS</u>	ii
<u>PROFILE OF THE FEDAYEEN TERRORIST</u>	1
Background.	1
Language Ability.	1
Documentation	1
Transportation.	2
Weapons	3
Training.	3
Modus Operandi.	3
General.	3
Contacts in Target Country	4
Attacks on Aircraft.	5
Assistance by Arab Diplomatic Missions	5
Involvement by Fedayeen Groups.	5
Use of Non-Arab Mercenaries	6
[Redacted]	6
[Redacted] and [Redacted]	6
Two Unidentified West Germans.	7

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this monograph is to furnish Field Agents a profile of the fedayeen terrorist. The profile is based on an analysis of the ten fedayeen terrorist attacks in Europe, which are portrayed on the cover of this document, as well as other information available to the Bureau. As a profile, it sets forth the probabilities regarding the prospective fedayeen terrorist based on available evidence and should not be interpreted as excluding other possibilities.

This monograph is a follow-up to a previous monograph which presented an overall view of the leading fedayeen groups, including politics, leadership, operations, and propaganda. Also included in the previous monograph were a summary of the leading Middle East communist parties and details of Arab activities in the United States, including fedayeen support which exists among Arab individuals and groups, black extremists, and domestic subversive groups.

The second monograph has been prepared in view of persistent reports that terrorist attacks in Europe will be extended to the United States. The two monographs should enable field offices to develop more effective informant coverage of Arab activities in the United States, including information relating to any plans to conduct terrorist activities here, and to better evaluate data received in the context of the potential Arab terrorist.

This monograph contains information classified up to "~~Secret~~-Background Use Only." It has been prepared for Bureau use and must not be disseminated outside the Bureau.

CONCLUSIONS

Fedayeen terrorist activities against Israeli targets and supporters outside the Middle East will continue.

As Arabs, or those with an Arab visage, appearing in the vicinity of air terminals and Israeli establishments have become increasingly suspect, terrorists will probably rely more on non-Arab mercenaries in the planning and execution of future terrorist operations.

Whether such operations will be extended to the United States will depend on the extent of this country's continued support for Israel, the severity of Arab military losses inflicted with American equipment, and the need of any of the fedayeen groups of lesser stature to improve their image or finances through an attack against United States-based Israelis or their supporters in this country.

If the fedayeen do carry out terrorist acts in the United States, they will probably rely on the large segment of sympathetic Arab students residing here for at least the planning stages of the operation. They relied on students in Europe and it is logical that they would not want to change a successful format.

A student's support of Al Fatah would not prevent his participation in a terrorist operation carried out by one of the other fedayeen groups.

While no information has been developed that terrorist attacks have been committed in the United States by fedayeen groups, the volatile nature of Middle East politics militate against this threat's remaining dormant.

PROFILE OF THE FEDAYEEN TERRORIST

Background

The terrorist will almost invariably be an Arab national, having been born and raised in Palestine or one of the Arab countries most involved with Israel, with the exception of Syria.

The terrorist can be a member of either sex and most probably in his/her 20's or 30's. Without exception, all who committed terrorist acts in Europe were under 40 years of age at the time of the act. However, he/she could also be a teenager or a subteen since fedayeen feel that a terrorist act committed by a child is politically very effective and, if apprehended, a child will be treated leniently by the courts. If the terrorist is a child, he/she will be accompanied to the target country by an adult who will depart just before the commission of the act. The child can also expect the assistance of an Arab already present in a target country.

He/she will be a student or a teacher who has accepted the mission willingly without regard to his/her personal safety. The perpetrator will be quite willing to face a jail sentence, regardless of duration, which may result from the terrorist act.

Language Ability

There will not be a requirement that the terrorist speak the language of the target country, as there will usually be an Arab located there who will assist the terrorist in this regard. For instance, the 15-year-old youth who bombed the Israeli Embassy in Bonn on September 8, 1969, was able to arrive in Germany, commit the act, and successfully escape while having no speaking ability whatsoever in the German language.

Documentation

The terrorist will have documentation of some sort and will not have been smuggled clandestinely into the target country. This documentation can be either a passport or a laissez-passer issued by Lebanese authorities to Palestinian

refugees. The passport can be legitimate or counterfeit and, if the latter is the case, will purport to have been issued not in the country represented, but in a diplomatic establishment of that country in another Arab state. The passport will not be or purport to be Syrian.

The issuing of a visa to the terrorist will most likely have occurred at a diplomatic establishment of the target country which is located in the Middle East. If this is the case, the visa will probably have been issued in Amman, Jordan, or Beirut, Lebanon, both fedayeen strongholds.

Transportation

He/she will travel to the target country by plane. No particular air line is favored, as United States, Middle East, and European air lines were used by the perpetrators of the terrorist acts in Europe.

The odds are against the terrorist flying directly from the Middle East to the target country; he/she will fly to a third country, stay there for a short period, and then go on to the target country. In this regard, Arab governments have reportedly demanded that terrorist attacks abroad not be launched directly from the Middle East.

Although in some cases a number of precautions were taken, including the purchasing of plane tickets on different days by members of the same group who then traveled to the target country aboard different air lines, the perpetrators on other occasions bought the tickets at the same time and traveled on the same air line.

After arriving in the target country, the perpetrators used routine methods of transportation, including taxi cabs, rented cars, and automobiles belonging to friends residing in the target country. On one occasion, it was reported that terrorists used an automobile belonging to a Jordanian military attache to surveil an Israeli diplomatic establishment.

When leaving or attempting to leave the target country after the commission of the terrorist attack, the perpetrator will probably use air transportation, tickets most likely having been purchased before his arrival in the target country. On one occasion, however, the perpetrator rented a car and drove from Europe to Amman.

Weapons

Weapons used by terrorists in Europe included rifles, pistols, Russian-made fragmentation hand grenades, thermite grenades, homemade bombs and other explosives, including plastique. The latter is reportedly favored since its existence cannot be ascertained through the use of metal detection devices.

It has been reported that as weapon searches are becoming institutionalized, particularly at airports, the fedayeen groups are seeking ways of purchasing their weapons or sabotage materials in the country where the operation is to be mounted. In this regard, German authorities are concerned over the increasing number of small arms held by members of Arab groups in Germany and feel that such weapons may be used in terrorist operations in the future.

Training

The terrorist will have been trained for his mission abroad in the Middle East, probably by a fedayeen group in Jordan. There is no information that anything other than final planning and coordinating of activities will take place in the target country.

The training of the terrorist will consist of the study and practice of guerrilla techniques, politics, defensive tactics, explosives, and the use of small arms, including pistols and knives.

Modus Operandi

General

All attacks were carried out by Arabs who traveled from the Middle East to the target country specifically for the attack. There is no information that any terrorist made a dry run to the target country before he arrived there to carry out the attack. However, in one instance, there was information that the terrorist had resided previously in the target country.

After arriving in the target country, the terrorist will reside in a third-rate hotel or at the residence of a local Arab. In most cases, the terrorist will have an Arab contact in the target country who will assist in the planning but not in the execution of the operation.

Contacts in Target Country

In regard to these local Arab contacts, the following information is pertinent. One [redacted] a Palestinian residing in Frankfort, was arrested by German authorities as an accessory in the February 21, 1970, bombing of the Austrian Airways plane. The plane was bombed by means of an explosive wired to an altimeter which triggered a positive electrical contact and explosion when the plane reached 3,000 meters in altitude. The altimeter was purchased in Germany.

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After he was contacted by the perpetrators who had flown to Germany to carry out the attack, [redacted] obtained a hotel room for them in Frankfort. He was also one of the individuals who went along on an automobile trip to test the altimeter. The explosion device itself was tested at [redacted] residence and one of the perpetrators, who had also stayed briefly at [redacted] residence, was accompanied by [redacted] to the airport on February 20, 1970, when he boarded a flight for Cairo.

When he was arrested, [redacted] had in his possession a letter which indicated that he was in contact, for organizational purposes, with [redacted] a Jordanian living in a student home in West Berlin. A search of [redacted] residence revealed documents which indicated [redacted] connection with Al Fatah and the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) in Germany.

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Temporarily residing in [redacted] residence at the time was a Palestinian, [redacted] who is known to German security authorities as a collector of donations for Al Fatah and a participant in GUPS conferences. Among [redacted] effects were leaflets, an Al Fatah pennant, and books of blank donation receipts.

According to German authorities, GUPS was one of the key Arab groups to serve as a "base of underground work" for the Palestinian liberation movement in Germany. It cooperates closely with the fedayeen organizations, particularly Al Fatah which dominates the German scene in terms of its influence over local Arab groups. GUPS, on behalf of Al Fatah and other fedayeen groups, holds meetings billed as cultural events during which Arab views on the Middle East crisis are presented and collections are taken. All funds are raised "under the pretense of being contributions to a cultural fund or donations to families of fallen comrades," but they are actually intended for the "support of fedayeen organizations." GUPS also participates in the recruitment of Arabs and Europeans for guerrilla training in the Middle East.

Attacks on Aircraft

The attacks against aircraft on the ground and/or in-transit passengers were carried out with very precise timing, the perpetrators obviously having been briefed by someone with detailed knowledge of the airport and flight schedules. Relative to this point, one source has advised that the Arabs are interested in recruiting well-placed employees at international airports.

With one exception, attacks on aircraft were carried out by terrorists who had a legitimate reason to be at the airport, either because they had purchased an air-line ticket or, having departed one aircraft, they were waiting in the international in-transit passenger lounge to make connections with another flight. The one exception concerns the February 18, 1969, attack on an El Al aircraft at Zurich by terrorists who drove directly to the runway in a rented car to carry out the attack.

Operations against aircraft which were aloft were carried out by hijacking, with the exception of the February 21, 1970, bombings of Swissair and Austrian Airways planes which, as indicated above, were bombed by means of an explosive rigged to an altimeter and set up to explode at 3,000 meters in altitude.

Assistance by Arab Diplomatic Missions

There has been no confirmed information furnished by European authorities which links official Arab establishments in Europe with any of the bombings or hijackings. However, there is reliable information which indicates that the terrorists were counting on the assistance of these diplomatic establishments in making their escape from the target country.

Involvement by Fedayeen Groups

The terrorist acts in Europe which have been surveyed have been carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine. Al Fatah and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine are not known to have participated; however, European sources are concerned that Al Fatah may engage in such acts in the future.

Use of Non-Arab Mercenaries

A whole new dimension has been added to the problem of defining the fedayeen terrorist by reports that non-Arab European mercenaries have been recruited to carry out or assist in terrorist activities. Such individuals include:

1. [redacted] a Dutch national and self-described adventurer, claimed he was trained in Jordan by Al Fatah during the Summer of 1969. His training included uses of explosive materials, "bombings in particular," hand grenades, firearms, and self-defense. He was given a Beirut accommodation address and was issued a 9mm pistol and a knife before his return to Amsterdam. His future target was supposed to be an aircraft, and he was told that he would be recontacted after he returned to Europe. However, there have been no follow-up contacts by representatives of Al Fatah or any other fedayeen groups.

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2. [redacted] a United States citizen and suspected intelligence provocateur, claimed in May, 1969, that he had been recruited and trained by Al Fatah and given intelligence and sabotage assignments in Israel. There are definite indications [redacted] actually was in contact with the United Arab Republic intelligence and Al Fatah and had been in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan shortly before May, 1969. When confronted by authorities, he had two pistols in his possession and highly sophisticated sabotage material. The latter consisted of explosive devices expertly concealed in cakes of soap and shaving cream of Dutch and British manufacture.

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3. [redacted] and [redacted] both British subjects, were arrested by British authorities on a charge of attempting to destroy an El Al plane at London Airport. They had visited the Middle East during November and December, 1969, and met fedayeen members ("presumably PFLP") who gave them an assignment to blow up the El Al plane. Their weapons consisted of more than eleven pounds of gelignite, two detonators, and a wrist watch timing device. Their meeting with the fedayeen took place in Amman, Jordan, and the go-between was [redacted] a British national employed either by the [redacted] or the [redacted]. The motive of [redacted] and [redacted] was money.

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4. Two Unidentified West Germans

Two individuals who have been identified only as West Germans are reported to have assisted members of the PFLP-GC in the bombing of the Swissair and Austrian Airways planes on February 21, 1970. In September or October, 1969, two young men who identified themselves as West Germans visited PFLP-GC headquarters in Amman, Jordan, and expressed their sympathy for the Palestine problem and the fedayeen. One of them was an electrical engineer and PFLP-GC sought his advice on electrical problems connected with explosives, which he readily provided. They then returned to West Germany, and PFLP-GC maintained contact.

On February 10, 1970, the two West Germans were contacted in Frankfort by [redacted] and [redacted] two PFLP-GC members who had flown to West Germany on a terrorist mission. A discussion was held as to what device should be used to blow up a plane. One of the West Germans suggested an altimeter rigged to an explosive and set to give an electrical charge at 3,000 meters. All agreed that this was a satisfactory technique. The altimeters were then purchased in Frankfort and the West Germans helped the terrorists wire them to the explosives which were then placed in a hollowed-out used radio set and packaged for mailing to Israel.

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There is some discrepancy as to who actually mailed the packages. One reliable source advised that the two Germans took the responsibility for mailing the packages, one from Frankfort and one from Zurich. Another source, also reliable, furnished information concerning one of the packages which the source claimed was mailed by [redacted] in Frankfort to a businessman in Jerusalem.

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[redacted] following his successful escape and return to Amman, expressed his opinion that the two West Germans were actually Israeli agents who saw to it that the bombs were not placed on El Al planes. He felt that the PFLP-GC had been entrapped into carrying out the bombings by the Israelis in an effort to embarrass the fedayeen. Subsequent PFLP-GC efforts to locate the two West Germans were negative.