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Subject: Copy of final report provided by SAIC in its contract from DEA (DJDDEAHQ040118D) and ICF Incorporated in its contract from DEA (HQTRS200009DDEA01C0003) to do a top down study of the Intel Division

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) request dated August 15, 2013, addressed to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit (SARF), seeking access to information regarding the above subject.

The processing of your request identified certain materials that will be released to you. The documents are being forwarded to you with this letter.

The rules and regulations of the Drug Enforcement Administration applicable to Freedom of Information Act requests are contained in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Part 16, as amended. They are published in the Federal Register and are available for inspection by members of the public.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

If you are not satisfied with the response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP’s eFOIA portal at http://www.justice.gov/oip/efoia-portal.html. Your appeal must be received within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked “Freedom of Information Act Appeal.”
If you have any questions regarding this letter, you may contact FOI Specialist Jane Edmonds on (202) 307-7603.

Sincerely,

Katherine L. Myrick
Chief
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit
FOI/Records Management Section

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DEA Intelligence Program
Top-Down Review

A partnership to build a premier intelligence program
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In March 2004, the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) commissioned a top-down review of DEA's Intelligence Program. The objective was to provide a high-level review of DEA Intelligence capabilities to support traditional drug law enforcement objectives, as well as the new operational imperatives contained in the Administrator's Vision statement to address the challenges generated by the new National Security environment. The DEA Review Team looked at the Intelligence Program and its capabilities in the following areas:

- Role in the post September 11, 2001, National Security environment.
- Program and resources necessary to meet new mission requirements.
- Relationships with other Federal organizations, including law enforcement and national Intelligence agencies.
- Interactions with DEA Headquarters (HQ), Field Divisions, Country Offices, the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force–Fusion Center (OFC), and the Special Operations Division.
- Capability to sustain a highly motivated, professional workforce through a well-structured career development program.
- Incorporation of best business practices, including instituting a formal collection and requirements management system.

The DEA Review Team interviewed more than 100 DEA personnel assigned to Field Divisions and Country Offices, members of the national law enforcement community and Intelligence Community (IC), and senior officials in the Executive Office of the President. These interviews were complemented by information gathered through an electronic survey, and the findings were compiled in a series of recommendations to strengthen DEA Intelligence. During the review, two distinct themes surfaced, both of which are woven throughout the report and recommendations. The first is in direct response to the events of September 11, 2001, and the Administrator's new Vision—the changing role of the DEA as it embraces the National Security responsibilities associated with protecting America and its people. The second is a result of the ascendance of the information age, which dictates that operational successes will be based on the ability of the organization to efficiently, effectively, and securely share information across all domains (internally and externally) without jeopardizing mission performance.

Some of the DEA Review Team recommendations are obvious, evolutionary improvements and easily implemented; others are more complex and will take time and study to assess their full impact on the DEA; and a few are radical departures from the current state. The major recommendations, which are summarized in the following paragraphs, and the supporting rationale are contained in this report. In some cases, these recommendations are summarized consolidations of more than one individual recommendation contained in the body of the report.

- **Conduct a Baseline Review of National Drug Intelligence Capabilities.** For some agencies, post-September 11, 2001, events resulted in significant mission changes. The Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination Group (CDICG) should direct the DEA to lead the Drug IC in a baseline assessment of Drug Intelligence capabilities. The assessment should cover all Executive Branch organizations, including intelligence and enforcement agencies. In addition, it should address connectivity to, and support of, state, local, and foreign counterpart organizations.
Empower the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence with Direct Control over all DEA Intelligence Resources. This includes moving all Intelligence billets under direct control of the Intelligence Division and making it responsible for all hiring, firing, training, and assignments. To strengthen the position, the Administrator should create a DEA Intelligence Program that grants the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence line item budget authority for Intelligence dollars in the DEA Program.

Create an Analyst Career Development Program run by the Intelligence Division. The Intelligence Training Unit at Quantico should report directly to the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, while continuing to be housed in the DEA Training Academy. Under the direction of the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, the Training Unit will lead in the development of a tiered (Entry, Intermediate, and Senior) Analyst Career Development Program that will detail the training and education necessary for each career level, as well as prescribe a program for Senior Executive Service personnel.

Invest in New Information Technologies and Information Sharing to Enhance Operations. Inherent in the theme of sharing information is the imperative for the DEA to begin to assess the IT infrastructure necessary to meet this expanding role in the law enforcement community and IC. The Operations and Intelligence Divisions, in conjunction with the Operational Support Division, should begin to define requirements and establish future IT architectures. A Systems Engineer and Systems Integration Office should be established immediately to oversee this IT development.

Enhance Intelligence Operations at Field Divisions and Country Offices. The Intelligence Division should establish Field Intelligence Managers and Strategic Analysts at each Field Division and at major Country Offices. Additional analysts and new GS-0134 Intelligence Aide positions should be requested to provide increased intelligence support to the enforcement and diversion elements. GS-0134 Series—Intelligence Aide and Clerk Series.

Restructure HQ Intelligence. The intelligence elements at HQ should be realigned to create clear avenues of authority and to flatten the organization. The Financial Investigative Intelligence Unit (NIWF) functions should be moved to the Office of Financial Operations. The Office of Investigative Intelligence (NI) should be disbanded and personnel reallocated. The Office of Strategic Intelligence (NT) should be reinforced and reorganized to provide senior staff support to the DEA Administrator and the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, and create a current Intelligence function that provides daily updates on domestic and foreign activities of importance to the DEA. The Intelligence Division (NC) organization should be “flattened” by eliminating “Units” and replacing them with unstructured “analytic teams.”

NDIC. NDIC should logically be subordinate to the DEA as the principal drug law enforcement agency and efforts should be initiated to effect that organizational change. Pending that, the DEA must create a partnership for intelligence production and share analytic resources. The best combination of skills and talent to produce outstanding drug-related Intelligence production resides in a combined DEA and NDIC program. As part of its role as the lead for drug law enforcement, the DEA should create a Drug Intelligence Production Program to coordinate and synchronize Drug Intelligence production throughout the drug law enforcement community. For the DEA and NDIC, this would include direct sharing of information between the two organizations and cross assignment of personnel to DEA and NDIC sites.

OFC. Test the OFC concept through requirements assessments and operational exercises. The DEA should sponsor a series of proof-of-concept exercises and simulations to test current concept
of operations and IT capabilities. Intelligence should work with the Operational Support Division to create an enterprise-level IT solution, using OFC as the Washington test bed.

- EPIC. Enhance analytic capabilities and reorganize to strengthen the bond with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense. Restructure EPIC to improve trend and pattern analysis, and include the NDIC Document Exploitation capability at EPIC. Work closely with DHS and the United States Northern Command to create a center of excellence at EPIC.

- Establish a Collection and Requirements Management System. The increase in National Security responsibilities and the positive recommendation for joining the National Foreign Intelligence Program will require the DEA to have a more structured requirements management system to track and satisfy requests for information and collection that it generates.

- Create Advisory Panel of Senior-Level Intelligence Subject Matter Experts. Implementation of the report's recommendations and the new National Security environment will require DEA Intelligence to move in a number of new directions in the IC and Government. The advice and counsel of experienced former senior Intelligence officials could be very helpful in this regard by ensuring that proven processes, procedures, and policies are considered.
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 OBJECTIVE

The principal objective of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Intelligence Program Top-Down Review (DIPTDR) is the development of an optimal law enforcement Intelligence Program. Such a program will support DEA drug-related law enforcement goals and objectives, as stated in the DEA Mission and as highlighted in the DEA Administrator’s Vision. In addition, this new program is intended to support, as appropriate, overall United States (U.S.) homeland security requirements. This DEA Review Team report summarizes the results of the DIPTDR review, which was conducted by a group of veteran Intelligence professionals taking a fresh look at the organizational, programmatic, procedural, and personnel management processes required to maintain the high standards set by the DEA over the past 30 years. To better understand how the high-level review developed by the DEA Review Team will support DEA’s Intelligence Program, it is necessary to first understand the background and challenges that led to this undertaking.

1.2 INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN ENFORCEMENT IN A POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, ENVIRONMENT

The world has been transformed by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As conventional nation-state conflicts subside and non-state terrorist attacks against U.S. interests worldwide take center stage, intelligence professionals must balance the right-to-know with the need-to-share. Today’s Intelligence Analysts (IAs) must be able to accurately and efficiently process and share information and Intelligence across all sectors of the law enforcement community and Intelligence Community (IC). Intelligence requirements to support field operations against narcotrafficking and other National Security threats demand multi-agency collaborative intelligence sharing and coordination. The same is true for the development of long-range intelligence strategies against these threats. Particular emphasis also must be placed on associated infrastructure and systems integration improvements.

For the DEA Intelligence Program, these changes require an enhanced collaborative analytical environment and a comprehensive review of the processes and procedures supporting the collection, management, analysis, production, and dissemination of Intelligence in the DEA, as well as to external customers at the Federal, state, and local levels. A collection and requirements management (CRM) structure must be developed that can efficiently track incoming and outgoing tasking to provide the data and Intelligence required by the customer. Most important, DEA’s efforts to develop a highly skilled, well-motivated IA corps that is supported by state-of-the-art information technologies must continue unabated.

1.3 DIPTDR METHODOLOGY

The DEA Review Team conducted the DIPTDR in response to a DEA Statement of Work (SOW) provided to the contractor on 25 February 2004 under Contract GS-23F-8006H. The SOW directed the contractor to conduct a top-down review of DEA’s Intelligence Program and to identify areas for improvement. When conducting the review, the contractor was directed to consider and include the following:
Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Program Top-Down Review

The National Security aspects and implications in the conduct of DEA’s daily work, as well as DEA’s need to build responsive collection and reporting mechanisms to ensure an effective and immediate response to National Security requirements.

The use of best practices, lessons learned, and customer service.

The suitability of intelligence-related training that is being provided to both the Special Agent (SA) and IA in a post-September 11, 2001, environment.

The functionality of the Intelligence Program structure, staffing, programs, initiatives, and policies as they support the Administrator’s Vision.

All aspects of the relationship that the DEA has with the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC).

The issue of possible overlaps in roles/missions and redundancies of reporting by the various entities in the DEA.

A review of the Priority Target Activity Resource and Reporting System (PTARRS) to determine if it can be modified to function as the “backbone” of Intelligence analysis for linked networks of foreign/national/regional/local organizations, and whether various types of Intelligence can be hosted on the system.

The Intelligence Program’s relationships with other law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and with the IC.

The methodology used to accomplish the top-down review of DEA’s Intelligence Program allowed the DEA Review Team to develop a high-level overview that provided a visual picture of the current players in the DEA Intelligence Program, from the IAs at DEA Field Divisions to the customers on the National Security Council. Subsequently, the DEA Review Team conducted a review of the DEA Intelligence Program’s internal and external interfaces, from suppliers of data to production partners and customers at the Federal, state, and local levels. The DEA Review Team assessed current organizational alignments, both internal and external, to locate synergies and overlaps. The DEA Review Team reviewed procedures, processes, and policies in light of best business practices, new transformational ideas in the IC such as Horizontal Integration, and proven customer service processes and standards. Finally, the DEA Review Team reviewed the Analyst Career Development Program—from recruitment to retirement—to ensure that the DEA has the best-trained, best-equipped, and most highly skilled analysts.

To assist the DEA Review Team in collecting necessary data, an electronic survey was conducted using a specially created Web site. This approach allowed the DEA Review Team to obtain perspectives across all of the DEA, and beyond what could be achieved from selected personal interviews and document research. Survey questions were prepared for and addressed to DEA Intelligence Program personnel and to both external and internal customers. Although participation was lacking from customers, particularly those external to the DEA, the Intelligence Program response was excellent, especially from the IAs. Fully two-thirds of the IA corps responded. In addition, although SA participation was minimal, sufficient numbers responded to allow comparisons of data. Altogether, the Web site survey succeeded in gathering valuable insight, comments, and statistics.
Throughout the entire top-down review of DEA's Intelligence Program, the DEA Review Team used an action plan and work breakdown structure (WBS) to guide the collection, evaluation, recommendation, and reporting phases of the effort. Figure 1.1 depicts the WBS.

**FIGURE 1.1.**

The Data Collection Plan (DCP) required in SOW Task 1 was based on meeting the requirements delineated in SOW Sections 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 to provide a written report and recommendations on performance measures. (Per subsequent direction from the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative, the performance measures requirement was modified to provide only a general approach to performance measurement.) The DCP was broken down into several phases and allowed the DEA Review Team to simultaneously collect and evaluate the data presented to DEA Headquarters (HQ) in Washington, D.C., and at various DEA Field Divisions and centers.

1.4 COMPLIANCE AND ORGANIZATION

This report documents the findings of the DEA Review Team and addresses the issues enumerated in Sections 7.4.3.1 through 7.4.3.8 of the SOW. In addition, this report recommends performance measurements (SOW Section 7.4.4). It is organized to present these findings and recommendations as follows:

- Vision, Mission, and Functions (Section 2)
- Organizational Structure and Alignment (Section 3)
- Policies, Processes and Procedures (Section 4)
- Products and Services (Section 5)
IT Systems and Applications (Section 6)
Analyst Development and Allocation (Section 7)
Program/Budget Development and Allocations (Section 8)
Performance Measurements (Section 9)
Recommendations (Section 10)
2 VISION, MISSION, AND FUNCTIONS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This section describes the extent to which the DEA Intelligence Program vision, mission, and functions align with the DEA Administrator’s overall Vision. It also provides specific recommendations that, if implemented, will enable achievement of the Administrator’s Vision-related Intelligence goals. In addition, this section addresses the importance of information sharing in realigning the Intelligence Program goals and objectives to support execution of the Administrator’s Vision.

2.2 NEW VISION

Based on a review of Government-furnished documentation, the vision, mission, and functions of the DEA Intelligence Program were most recently articulated in Planning for the Future: Strategic Goals and Objectives for the DEA Intelligence Program (DEA-02007), dated January 2002. The stated goals and objectives were predicated on and aligned with the Administrator’s overall DEA Strategic Plan for fiscal year (FY) 2001-2006. Since then, however, a new Administrator was appointed and dramatic world events occurred. These changes clearly dictate that new Intelligence priorities must be considered by the DEA as a Federal LEA in support of U.S. National Security.

In a recent National Narcotics Officer’s Association’s Coalition speech entitled “My Vision at DEA: Back to the Future,” the current Administrator clearly articulated her Vision for the DEA and spelled out “... seven key principles which will lift our agency from good to very great” (Figure 2.1). Five of the Administrator’s principles (1, 3, 4, 6, and 7) directly affect the mission of the DEA Intelligence Program.

Although the Intelligence Program’s current vision, mission, and functions generally support the Administrator’s new Vision and implementing principles (strategic goals), they are not yet fully synchronized. In addition, they do not address the need to support critical nondrug priorities. This task must be undertaken to ensure Intelligence Program support for the Administrator’s stated principles, to provide meaningful staff direction, to gain support for necessary Program resource initiatives, and to meet strategic goals in executing the overall DEA mission.

According to the Web survey conducted by the DEA Review Team, most respondents believe that the DEA Intelligence Program is supportive of, and organized to support, the Administrator’s Vision. It was not clear, however, if all respondents were referring to the most recent version. More significantly, only 26 percent (Figure 2.2) believed that IA staffing was adequate to support the Administrator’s Vision.
Is DEA intelligence staffing adequate to support the Administrator's Vision?

2%  
8%  
14%  
22%  
38%  

No Opinion  
Not at All  
To a Small Extent  
To a Moderate Extent  
To a Large Extent  
Essential

FIGURE 2.2.
*For survey purposes, "Essential" means that it is essential for mission accomplishment.

2.2.1 RECOMMENDATION ON ALIGNING THE ADMINISTRATOR'S VISION

Revise and update DEA Publication 02007 to align the Intelligence Program vision, mission, strategic goals, and objectives with the Administrator's "Back to the Future" Vision and seven implementing principles. Publish the Administrator's new Vision in hard copy and place it on the DEA Web site.

2.3 NEW DIRECTIONS

The Administrator's Vision is a far-reaching, transformational paradigm that acknowledges that the threats to the U.S. homeland in the post-September 11, 2001, environment have significantly changed the operational environment. It highlights the key role of Intelligence in drug law enforcement operations and emphasizes DEA's obligation to support new National Security priorities. To meet the new challenges without endangering its single mission—drug law enforcement—the DEA must shift its resources in a way that does not jeopardize the gains made over the past several years. The results will create a flexible, mobile, and highly trained Intelligence corps of professionals to meet the challenges facing our nation.

Underpinning this era of Intelligence is a new philosophy that states that Intelligence drives enforcement, a concept that is often misunderstood and received with mixed feelings in DEA operations and Field Divisions. Reflecting significant new directions for the DEA, the Vision is in line with the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) top management challenges (Figure 2.3).

2.3.1 SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Changes to incorporate new National Security responsibilities have already begun. Recent policy direction from DOJ and DEA operations has emphasized the critical need for the DEA to be vigilant in collecting and reporting terrorist/extremist information. This included direction to ensure that all

DOJ—2003 Top Management Challenges
1. Counterterrorism
2. Sharing of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Information
3. Information Systems Planning and Implementation
4. Computer Systems Security
5. Protecting the Security of Department Information and Infrastructure
6. Financial Management
7. Grant Management
8. Performance-Based Management
9. Human Capital
10. Reducing the Supply of and Demand for Illegal Drugs

FIGURE 2.3.
Confidential Sources (CSs) are questioned about their knowledge of any terrorism activities and to include IAs in initial and routine debriefings of all CSs. Moreover, it provided clear direction concerning documenting and reporting any extremist terrorist information.

The results of the survey and interviews (see Appendices A and E) conducted by the DEA Review Team confirm that most of the Intelligence Program workforce understands the need to refocus a portion of its efforts in support of other National Security Intelligence efforts. Of those surveyed, 61 percent (Figure 2.4) reported that they are sensitive to, searching for, and prepared to report on nondrug Intelligence information (a survey category that includes counterterrorism and other National Security priorities).

To what extent are you personally sensitive to, searching for, and prepared to report non-drug-related Intelligence Information?

![Pie chart showing survey results]

- No Opinion
- Not at All
- To a Small Extent
- To a Moderate Extent
- To a Large Extent
- Essential

**FIGURE 2.4.**

*Nondrug-related intelligence information includes all other intelligence topics that the DEA may encounter and report on, including alien smuggling, weapons violations, money laundering, financial crimes, and counterterrorism.*

More significantly, 67 percent (Figure 2.5) of survey respondents (mainly analysts) believe that the National Security Intelligence that the DEA can provide is useful. Some 43 percent believe reporting nondrug-related Intelligence is essential, or at last very valuable. These findings confirm the DEA Review Team’s opinion that the DEA has an often unique and significant intelligence resource capability that can be used to support multiple U.S. National Security requirements worldwide.
Support for this new paradigm, however, may not be universal in the DEA. During the interviews, a few individuals dismissed it as unimportant or redundant of other agency efforts. This thinking is reflected in the survey by the 4 percent who reported that DEA National Security information was of small value.

Although the new policy direction and buy-in by a majority of the workforce suggest that the DEA will do its part in the Global War on Terrorism, more may be done. Currently, the core of the effort focuses on the Special Operations Division (SOD) Special Coordination Unit (OSCU) and mandatory terrorist knowledgeability questioning of CSs. Clearly, these efforts are critical—especially given the immense value that SOD brings to the Operations Division (OC). The same level of institutionalized focus, however, does not appear to be present in the Field Divisions. In addition, the use of analysts, other than to assist in debriefings, to provide necessary coordination, information fusion, and reporting does not appear to have been fully considered. Working directly with case agents and other agencies in the field, they could perhaps identify and bring to bear additional diverse, unique, detailed, and timely information.

In addition, although DEA's policy and commitment to work together against terrorism is clear, some impetus may be needed to ensure successful execution. This situation is occasioned by the fact that there are no institutional incentives for SAs or IAs to work on nondrug issues. In fact, because the DEA can lose control of domestic investigations if terrorism links are found, there are probably few, given their many other priorities, who would spend considerable time investigating and reporting terrorist connections. There is still a danger, therefore, that terrorist-related information could "fall through the cracks."

### 2.3.1.1 Recommendation on National Security Operations Support Policy

Work with DEA OC to supplement national-level terrorist activities policy to ensure that IAs are effectively utilized to support this critical function and that SAs are institutionally encouraged to identify and report information relating to critical National Security requirements. Coincidently, develop a mechanism that assures SAs that their drug cases will not be jeopardized if they encounter terrorist links.

### 2.3.2 Percentage of Resources Dedicated to National Security

Given the high level of this review and limited timeframe, it was not possible to fully quantify the level of effort actually being expended by the DEA Intelligence Program on National Security issues, specifically terrorist issues. Almost to a person, analysts, group supervisors, and Field Intelligence Managers (FIMs) said that they look for terrorism data when they conduct case support or strategic analysis. At DEA HQ
and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), statements were made that 30 or 40 percent of their efforts were dedicated to terrorism and asymmetric threat issues, with 55 percent (Figure 2.6) of survey respondents reporting that they were already reporting to some extent on National Security-related Intelligence other than counterdrugs.

![Figure 2.6](image)

**FIGURE 2.6.**

Although these figures may be accurate for EPIC, where the mission extends beyond counterdrugs and where the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) maritime watch has been devoting significant time to support COASTWATCH operations, the 30%-40% total work time spent on nondrug National Security issues appears to be inaccurately high. The DEA Review Team was unable to document a significant number of specific resultant products or cases other than at EPIC, and believes that the responses may be more a reflection of capability, as indicated above, rather than of actual time expended. Of survey respondents, only 28 percent (Figure 2.6) of those who indicated that they were reporting on National Security-related information indicated that this reporting was at a moderate or higher level.

Only 34 percent (Figure 2.7) reported that they believe there are adequate resources in DEA to support nondrug National Security requirements.

![Figure 2.7](image)
Only 26 percent of the overall nondrug-related information reporting by DEA was believed to be significantly related to counterterrorism (Figure 2.8).

How much of this non-drug intelligence information reporting is related to counter terrorism?

17%
11%
5%
10%
32%

- No Opinion
- Not at All
- To a Small Extent
- To a Moderate Extent
- To a Large Extent
- Essential

FIGURE 2.8.

2.3.2.1 Recommendation on National Security Resource Support

Both the interviews and survey confirm DEA's support of National Security issues. It is doubtful, however, that a full 30%-40% of all DEA analysis is devoted to nondrug National Security research and reporting. The DEA should acknowledge support to overall National Security priorities as a key DEA mission support area, but not quote percentages of resources allocated. Statements of high rates of resource commitment to threats such as terrorism cannot be substantiated by the DIPTDR analysis.

2.3.3 INFORMATION PROCESS—DEA NONDRUG INTELLIGENCE

In concert with the recently released DEA-wide policy guidance for handling terrorist information, there seemed to be a common understanding of how to pass on terrorism information uncovered by analysts. Although they were not specifically addressed in the policy guidance, the analysts, especially at the Field Divisions and Country Offices, are aware of their responsibility to identify and extract terrorism information from the material they process. They pass any terrorist-related information they discover to their Group Supervisor, the FIM (when available), and the proper authorities. Interviews indicated that analysts were comfortable passing the information to the next higher level. They did not, however, receive any feedback on its value or if, indeed, the information had been shared with other agencies. The DEA Review Team, which could not ascertain from interviews how often these discoveries occurred, at what level, and to whom, was assured that the process works.

2.3.3.1 Recommendation on Passing Nondrug National Security Information

Reassess this important process and assign the analysts more direct responsibility for ensuring that the data are passed in a timely manner to local counterterrorism authorities. Under the recommendation for restructuring Field Division strategic analysis, a tangential recommendation is to engage case support analysts in a more active role with local counterterrorism and LEAs. The establishment of an analyst-driven e-mail “address group” for disseminating terrorism information in the DEA, as well as to
local LEAs, would (1) place responsibility on the analyst closest to the issue; (2) strengthen the bond between DEA analysts and other LEAs; and (3) provide a documented trail of DEA support to overall National Security.

2.3.4 INTELLIGENCE AS THE DRIVER

From an organizational culture perspective, this aspect of the Administrator’s Vision (Intelligence as the driver) may be more difficult to enact than the sharing of Intelligence. The DEA Review Team observed an emotional reaction by several SAs on this issue. Among them, they generally reacted along the lines that, “Intelligence was not going to run their operations.” When actively engaged on the subject, however, virtually all agents agreed that Intelligence was vital to their cases and that IAs provide much of the context and direction for the case. More than once, the DEA Review Team heard “My best cases are the ones where I have analytic support.” In the DEA Review Team’s interview with the Administrator, she made it clear that she strongly supports the principle that “Intelligence drives enforcement.” She felt that it was a necessary rallying cry to change the DEA culture and support the necessary improvements in Intelligence.

2.3.4.1 Recommendation on Intelligence as a Driver of Operations

Provide the necessary training for SAs and IAs to fully understand how Intelligence “drives” not “runs” operations. Continue to include the concept in all of the Administrator’s internal and external meetings and briefings. Ensure that SAC conferences discuss the concept and participants are invited to comment. Hold SACs and FIMs accountable and ensure compliance through management reviews, inspections, and the monitoring of selected operations.

2.4 ALIGNMENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATOR’S IMPLEMENTING PRINCIPLES

In the Administrator’s Vision, the five implementing principles that relate to Intelligence (see Figure 2.1, principles 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7) must be addressed by the DEA Intelligence Program in the context of this assessment. Although these principles are currently supported to varying degrees, a number of initiatives could be undertaken that would contribute significantly to achieving the Administrator’s Vision. Sections 2.4.1 through 2.4.5 summarize these initiatives, which are discussed in greater detail throughout this report.

2.4.1 PRINCIPLE 1: FOCUS ON THE MONEY MOVEMENT, NOT THE ASSETS

The Administrator’s establishment of an Office of Financial Operations (FO) under the Operations Division (OC) begins to address the needs of the first principle—Focus on the Money Movement, Not the Assets—which the field refers to as Follow the Money. It also rebuilds the previous financial expertise resident at the DEA until the early 1990s. The workforce understands the need to rebuild its capabilities to assess the financial operations associated with drug organizations. Establishment of Financial Investigative Teams (FITs) at the Field Divisions will create a bottom-up understanding of the financial capabilities of narcotrafficking organizations.

2.4.1.1 Intelligence Support to Financial Operations

Since the FO is new and its operations and procedures have not been vetted fully, it is premature to discuss the impact on the DEA Intelligence Division. There is, however, an impact on the Financial Investigative Unit (NIWF), under the Office of Investigative Intelligence (NI) and on IAs at the Field Divisions and Country Offices. According to the recently appointed FO, Chief, although the NIWF unit
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will remain in the Intelligence Division, it will serve the needs of and be tasked by the new FO. At the Field Divisions, FITs are being established and, once operational, will have to work out a modus vivendi with the resident senior IA.

2.4.1.2 Recommendation on Support to the FO

With the majority of financial analysts actually being in the new FO Division, it may be necessary to move the Financial Investigative Unit to the FO to ensure clear “avenues of analysis.” The financial analysis functions closely parallel Intelligence analysis. To avoid duplications all financial analysis should be under the direct control of the Chief, FO. (For more information, see Section 3, Organizational Structure and Alignment.)

2.4.2 Principle 3: Expand Intelligence Tools

This principle, Expand Intelligence Tools, is addressed in Section 6, IT Systems and Applications. In general, the DEA Review Team found that the IT infrastructure does not meet the standard for DEA mission requirements. The Firebird front end masks a set of system and application stovepipes that must work in a more efficient manner. Analytic support tools, such as Pen Link and i2Analyst Notebook, are good for case support; however, there is a dearth of tools to support deep data mining, geospatial display, information visualization, and analyst case support.

2.4.2.1 Recommendation on Intelligence Tools

For specific recommendations, see Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.

2.4.3 Principle 4: Build Partnerships and Resolve Baggage

The key elements for Intelligence in this principle, Build Partnerships and Resolve Baggage, are the directions that “Intelligence must be shared, and it must strategically drive enforcement with full coordination among all involved.” This is the essence of the Intelligence challenge—not only for the DEA but also for the rest of the law enforcement community and IC.

2.4.3.1 Build Partnerships (Internal)

For the DEA Intelligence Division, the critical partnership must be between IAs and their supported SA partners. Although 61 percent (Figure 2.9) of survey respondents believe that the DEA Intelligence Program is consistent with, and supportive, of the operational guidance included in the Agent Manual, Intelligence responsibilities do not seem to be universally understood. To be successful throughout the DEA, however, the partnership must entail close cooperation between the parties, with the responsibilities, relationship, and duties of each element clearly specified in writing.
To what extent is the DEA intelligence program consistent with and supportive of the operational and administrative guidance included in the Agents Manual?

![Pie chart showing responses to the question.]

FIGURE 2.9.

2.4.3.2 Recommendation on Internal Relationships

Update the Agent Manual and Policy Order 00-200 to reflect current IA responsibilities, as well as an accurate description of their working relationship with SAs. These guidelines should include primary analytic functions, as well as production responsibilities. The written guidelines should include operational limitations and proscriptions.

2.4.3.3 Recommendation on Internal Partnerships

Ensure a strong partnership between Operations and Intelligence. Instill the concept that one of the primary missions for the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence is to ensure optimum intelligence support to enforcement operations. To forge a closer relationship with Operations, consider disbanding the Office of Investigative Intelligence and moving the analysts to SOD, the new Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force/Fusion Center (OFC), and the Field Divisions. To better support Operations in the field, structure the FIMs as Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASACs), reporting operationally to Associate SACs or directly to the SAC (as the FITs do) at larger Field Divisions and Country Offices. At smaller Field Divisions and Country Offices, establish FIMs as Intelligence Group Supervisors who report operationally to an ASAC or SAC directly. Continue to serve as the national-level analytic element in support of SOD.

2.4.3.4 Build Partnerships (External)

A number of external partnerships are maintained in varying degrees by DEA units at HQ and in the field. These partnerships tend to fall into five major categories:

- National Intelligence
- National Drug Intelligence
- Federal Law Enforcement
- State and Local Law Enforcement.
Later in this report, each potential partnership is addressed in greater detail. Some recommendations relevant to implementing the Administrator’s Vision, however, are presented for initial consideration in Sections 2.4.3.5 through 2.4.3.9.

2.4.3.5 Recommendation on National Intelligence

Reestablish/create relationships with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and strengthen the relationship with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC). Reestablish/create DEA Intelligence Liaison Officer and analyst exchange programs (see Section 5, Products and Services) at key nodes of each major Intelligence and law enforcement organization. Establish joint Intelligence publications and analyst exchanges whenever and wherever possible.

2.4.3.6 Recommendation on National Drug Intelligence

Ensure the continuation and effectiveness of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination Group (CDICG) by continuing to support and lead this unique Government policy body. The CDICG, which was instituted by the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP), is the only formal venue for Drug Intelligence policy, coordination, and oversight. It can be used to resolve interagency issues, build partnerships, drive enforcement decisions, and improve information sharing.

2.4.3.7 Recommendation on NDIC

The special relationship that NDIC has with the DEA is important to producing high-quality domestic strategic Drug Intelligence. After ensuring that quality control processes are in place, the DEA should fully implement NDIC’s “The memorandum for the Attorney General, DEA-NDIC Joint Initiatives,” signed 17 December 2003. Full implementation is especially important for paragraphs 1-4 on Intelligence Production. Establish a reporting system between DEA regional strategic Intelligence elements and NDIC.

2.4.3.8 Recommendation on Federal Law Enforcement

The concept of operations (CONOPS) for OFC may mitigate many issues on the sharing of law enforcement case-sensitive information of Intelligence value. The work accomplished in creating OFC should continue to build on the trust developed during its inception and initial operating capability (IOC). Individual bilateral or multilateral agreements can be made to extend information sharing from the OFC environment to other participants. (For more information, see Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.)

2.4.3.9 Recommendation on State and Local Law Enforcement

Information-sharing relationships vary radically from one Field Division to another. Much of the variance is driven primarily by personalities. It also is clear that where a strong relationship with High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Intelligence Support Centers (ISCs) exists, there is universally better cooperation and resultant information sharing, at least on an informal basis. This cooperation should be institutionalized and standardized across all DEA Field Divisions by establishing a policy that stresses the requirement for SACs and FIMs to become closely involved with the HIDTA/ISCs Task/Strike Forces and Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), as well as with state and local police. Continue to push EPIC as the central reporting place or clearinghouse for the ISCs located with each HIDTA. Establish a strategic Intelligence coordination process, joint Intelligence publications, and analyst exchanges whenever and wherever possible.
2.4.3.10 Sharing Intelligence

Sharing information and Intelligence is a critical element to ensuring the success of the Administrator's Vision. The concept of sharing data is not in the culture of most large organizations. According to *The 9/11 Commission Report* of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, "Secrecy stiles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all current organizational incentives encourage over-classification. This balance should change...." (p. 24). Data ownership and the propensity of organizations to restrict access to the information (need-to-know) are serious fault lines in the Drug IC. This issue and striking the right balance in sharing are addressed in more detail in Section 2.5, Section 4, Policies, Processes, and Procedures, and Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.

2.4.3.11 Recommendation on Sharing Intelligence

Assess DEA products and data systems to identify what specific data and information must be protected, as well as what data and information can be shared fully among participating partners. Consider writing all products at a level that can be shared, with a special section (tearline) to protect highly sensitive data. The Drug Movement Alert (DMA) format used by the DEA with JIATF South (JIATFS) is a right first step toward an effective information-sharing process. Include timing mechanisms for release of post-trial (or post-plea agreement) case information and analysis into the shared knowledge base. Delegate authority to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Operations and to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Intelligence as final adjudication authorities for release of information and Intelligence, respectively. (Additional recommendations on sharing are contained in subsequent sections of this report.)

2.4.4 Principle 6: Institute Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) to Ensure Accountability

Current DEA MOEs are tied to the operational success of "taking down" drug organizations, capturing or negating high-profile targets, and confiscating drugs and money. At the case support level, these are adequate metrics but they do not evaluate analytic products or the effectiveness of specific IA support to the case agent. These metrics do not account for the longer term operations or the real value of the Intelligence provided. MOEs must be developed to address these deficiencies and to determine the value of DEA Intelligence: the return on investment on the labor and funding expended. To some degree, these metrics can only be subjective.

Concurrently, the Intelligence Program must address and systematize a threat assessment process that can be used to assist the Administrator in determining DEA's overall impact on the drug problem and related National Security issues. (For more information, see Section 9, Performance Measurements.)

2.4.4.1 Recommendation on MOEs

Conduct a study, using Intelligence performance measurement experts, to develop specific Intelligence Program metrics and MOEs. Along with OC, develop a further methodology to utilize Intelligence processes and information to assess the overall impact of DEA mission accomplishment. Build a Web site to obtain subjective evaluation. (For more information, see Section 9, Performance Measurements.)

2.4.5 Principle 7: Build Leaders for Tomorrow by Focusing on Career Development

The focus of this principle is to cultivate excellence in leadership and to develop the next generation of DEA leaders. In doing so, there must be continued emphasis on building a diverse workforce that reflects
the richness of the American population and culture. Implementing a performance-based career development plan in which all DEA personnel will know what is uniformly required to excel is an integral part of career and leadership development.

A number of personnel, promotion, and rotational policies are in place in the Intelligence Program to ensure a steady supply of well-rounded and qualified Intelligence personnel for future leadership positions. Current requirements include specific training and assignments for personnel selecting the supervisory/manager career paths. For the most part, these policies are adequate and in consonance with similar requirements elsewhere in Government. They fall short, however, in execution and, in some cases, have become a serious source of dissatisfaction for too many DEA IAs. For the most part, this seems to be due to inadequate and inconsistent funding. For example, without a consistent dedicated source of funding for Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves, it is unfair to require varied experience at different posts as promotion criteria. Consistency with regard to promotions also appears to be weak. Although standards are in place, there is a perception by many interviewees that these standards are not always adhered to by selecting officials. There was also a general perception among interviewed analysts that promotion boards are generally “rubber stamps” for arbitrary field management decisions, which are often at variance with required standards and based on personal relationships. (For more information, see Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation.)

2.4.5.1 Recommendation on Career Development

Transfer administrative control of all Intelligence billets throughout the DEA to the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence to ensure consistent and standardized hiring, training, rotation, and promotion practices. Operational control and direction would remain with the field SACs via the FIM, who in some cases would be an ASAC equivalent. (For more information, see Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation.)

2.4.5.2 Recommendation on Rotational Policy

Designate specific billets in each Field Division as rotational to prevent homesteading. Consistently enforce mobility to ensure a fair and systematic rotation of personnel to and from overseas billets and in the supervisory/manager career path. (For more information, see Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation.)

2.4.5.3 Recommendation on Rotational Funding

Obtain separate NC line item budget authority for all Intelligence Program PCS moves, including sufficient resources to rotate IAs in accordance with current Intelligence Program policy. (For more information, see Section 8, Program/Budget Development and Allocations).

2.4.5.4 Recommendation on Entry-Level Program

Establish an entry-level career program for IAs similar to that for SAs, including strict hiring standards controlled by NC, basic training in the first quarter of being hired, and two required initial tours—with the first one at HQ and a second one in the field. (For more information, see Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation, and Section 8, Program/Budget Development and Allocations.)
2.5  KEY TO SUCCESS—INFORMATION SHARING

2.5.1 INFORMATION SHARING—INTEGRAL TO THE ADMINISTRATOR’S VISION

One of the most trenchant interviews conducted for the DIPTDR review was with an Assistant U.S. District Attorney who said simply that over the last 30 years, “Drug cases have become far more complex.” To prosecute them successfully, he said, requires superb IAs, a multidisciplinary approach to investigation, and excellent cross-cutting analysis of information. The Administrator of the DEA has fully embraced the critical importance of information to the DEA mission, and the interplay of Intelligence and analysis, in the seven implementing principles included in her Vision. Each principle—presented in the list that follows—includes an inherent concentration on information and recognition of the value of information, and most important, of Intelligence in every phase of DEA’s operations:

Focus on the money movement, not the assets—Relating information and Intelligence on money flows to understand and target trafficking.

Think through the enforcement priorities and dismantle organizations across division lines—Using information and developing Intelligence that fully characterizes drug structures and vulnerabilities for targeting.

Expand Intelligence tools—Exploiting more information and developing better, actionable Intelligence more effectively.

Build partnerships and resolve baggage—Getting and sharing information and generating Intelligence cooperatively.

Reduce the demand for drugs by focusing on user-based sanctions—Gathering information and developing Intelligence on impacts of counterdrug operations and awareness initiatives.

Institute MOEs to ensure accountability—Using the right tools and processes to gather key information for management decisions and directing operations effectively.

Build leaders for tomorrow by focusing on career development—Understanding that training and incentives must encourage agents to collect information, and analysts to develop Intelligence as the paramount means for DEA to achieve its mission.

The DEA faces the same challenge of every forward-looking and well-led organization in the 21st century. Its mission is growing in scope, complexity, and cross-connectivity with other organizations and missions; its resources are unlikely to grow proportionately over time; and its performance effectiveness will be subject to increasing and demanding public scrutiny. The best way for the DEA to respond is to focus on collection of the right information by every available means, and the development of exceptional Intelligence from analysis of all relevant information to help direct scarce DEA assets optimally to fulfill its mission. To ride the descending cost curve for improved IT performance to the best effect, the DEA must organize, train, and equip around the best information, advanced information technologies, and optimized information flows and information-based work processes. To do so means that the DEA must first understand its goals for Intelligence and also the mission implications and requirements related to those goals.

2.5.2 NEW INFORMATION PARADIGMS

At the highest level, DEA Intelligence, because of the effects of September 11, 2001, has been recast in two broad task areas, which are reflected in the Administrator’s Vision and are as follows:
Intelligence-Driven Enforcement, Operations, and Programs. From now on, the drug mission will be directed, based on information sharing and all-source Intelligence analyses that characterize drug trafficking in every respect—organizational, operational, financial—and also uncover vulnerabilities for targeting and total organizational dismantlement. Insights from Intelligence will be used to inform and focus investigations, plan and support case development, and target and direct enforcement. The old paradigm of taking investigations and cases wherever CSs provide an opening will give way to broad-based Intelligence attacks by analysts as well as agents, identifying priority targets and information gaps for which data sources, including CSs, must be developed for high-value exploitation and targeted operations.

National Security Support. All Federal agencies have a special responsibility to recognize and quickly share information that may have a bearing on National Security, especially the terrorist threat and weapons of mass destruction. Because of the potential nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism, where drug activity could provide both the financial means and transit mechanisms for terrorists and their weapons, DEA faces a burdensome demand to be alert. The DEA Administrator and her senior managers have all expressed abiding fears that their agency could have in its sources—and fail to recognize—the information that IAs need to “find the dots” and “connect the dots” on threats that National Security decisionmakers require to prevent a future September 11, 2001-like event.

The sources of information available to the DEA, which are contained in the Drug IC, are extensive, diverse, and distributed overall. The challenge for timely data access, retrieval, and recognition by IAs is extreme when measured against these two broad tasks. The ways in which information is shared in the DEA, and with its partners, for Intelligence analysis is of singular importance to ensuring DEA’s success in responding to its extended mission since September 11, 2001.

2.5.3 INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, SHARING, AND REQUIREMENTS

DEA Intelligence analysis focuses a great deal on providing (1) support to investigations and case development requirements coming from the field; (2) tactical support to drug operations, including interdictions and takedowns; and (3) strategic analyses that provide national and international context and alerting and planning information based on emergent trends and shifts in drug threat, players, working methods, markets, and operating environments. DEA Intelligence analysis serves law enforcement first responders in the field (through tactical operations at EPIC). The DEA, through its Field Divisions, supports Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials in agencies and strike forces aimed at dismantlement and disruption of drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) at the local, state, regional, and national levels. DEA planning, programming, budgeting, and resource allocation managers are supported at the Field Division and HQ levels through Strategic Analysis conducted by NC, NDIC, and DCU/CNC.

It is useful to look closer at the characteristics and information requirements for each of the following analytic Intelligence activities—Investigative, Tactical, Organizational, and Strategic—that must be aligned to implement Intelligence-driven targeting in support of DEA operations.

INVESTIGATIVE INTELLIGENCE is aimed at active or potential targets under investigation and/or subject to prosecution. It is intended to win convictions and dismantle organizations. Its characteristics and information requirements are as follows:

Primary Data Sources. Human Intelligence (HUMINT), communications, financials, document exploitation, commercial, and civil information.
Analytic Complexity. Low to Moderate as currently practiced. Sources and methods of exploitation are generally well-structured and repeatable; however, linkage across cases is demanding. Full integration of financials will increase complexity.

Collaboration. Cases are normally developed by agents working in enforcement teams or supported by a single analyst. Growing complexity of cases requires multidisciplinary analytic approaches and peer team—agent and analyst—review of all the analytic elements of the case, not individual analyses in isolated stovepipes.

Data Access. Currently closely held under distributed control of case agents with limited direct access by analysts. Owing to increasing case complexity, “need-to-share” data must trump “need-to-know” data to develop robust cases on reduced time lines.

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE is a subset of Investigative Intelligence that evaluates information upon which immediate enforcement actions may be taken. Its characteristics and information requirements are as follows:

Primary Data Sources. Often perishable elements in HUMINT, communications, document exploitation, and some civil information.

Analytic Complexity. Low as currently practiced. Data research is provided in response to prioritized queries. No real analysis is done except by help desk initiative.

Collaboration. Law enforcement field officers generally phone in or FAX (e-mail sometimes) queries for information research to a help desk at EPIC or Field Division Offices. A response from the respondent is provided in direct support by the same means that the query was submitted. There is a need for secondary analysis that is equally responsive in supporting and expanding on such queries.

Data Access. No current direct access to EPIC databases (DBs) from field case agents. With personal digital assistants (PDAs) and wireless devices, secure direct access to select data must be considered for simple data queries in the near future.

ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE is systematic all-source analysis and production of Intelligence concerning DTOs. It is a subset of Investigative Intelligence. Its characteristics and information requirements are as follows:

Primary Data Sources. HUMINT, financials, communications, document exploitation, and public news sources.

Analytic Complexity. Moderate. Sources and methods of exploitation are generally well structured and repeatable and make use of new visualization tools to current relationships.

Collaboration. Organizational analysis is usually done by individual analysts with draft product review, not via interactive peer collaboration. This approach, evidently, has worked well enough; however, product confidence would be enhanced with collaborative participation in draft, not just revision.

Data Access. Limited direct data access. Reliance on communications data for developing linkages. Analysts negotiate access to case data to do secondary data text searches for context and detail to communications linkages. Increasing direct access will be needed to deal effectively with growing case complexity and volume.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE is becoming more and more important as Federal, state, and local Governments begin a closer collaboration to ensure the security of the homeland. In Strategic
Intelligence, DEA analysts and information technologist must consider, for planning purposes, the following five primary areas:

1. **Trend Analysis.** Study emergent patterns and tendencies in drug supply and demand; drug technology, production, transportation, distribution, and use; money flows, money laundering, and exfiltration; and geographic points of entry and routing.

2. **Predictive Analysis.** Study what trends mean to enforcement actions and timing, estimating what the next threat steps and impacts will likely be based on the trends.

3. **Courses of Action Analysis.** Study what the timing, impacts, and outcomes will likely be for various enforcement actions that may be undertaken by drug law enforcement and what the counteractions may be by DTOs.

4. **Support for Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Actions at HQ/Field Divisions.** Study inputs to help characterize changes in the threats and workings of DTOs, as well as the redirection/enhancements of Intelligence resources needed to respond effectively to those changes.

5. **Narcoterrorism Nexus Analysis.** To respond effectively to National Security concerns, the DEA will have to make a distinct effort in strategic analysis to identify trends and activities that could indicate a convergence of drug and terrorist threats to the U.S.

**Strategic Intelligence characteristics and information requirements are as follows:**

- **Primary Data Sources.** All-source, including HUMINT, communications, financials, document exploitation, and civil, commercial, and public news information sources.

- **Analytic Complexity.** Medium to high. Many problems are not well structured or entirely original. They require expert all-source analysis and new approaches, using all available data sources and adaptations of tools and analytic processes.

- **Collaboration.** A high degree of judgment is associated with strategic intelligence, as well as the need to tap diverse but related experience. Collaboration in analysis, not just in review, is required.

- **Data Access.** This is work for experienced senior analysts who have achieved strong reputations and trust in their agency and among their peers. They cannot provide confident and well-informed strategic analytic products without direct access to all-source data.

**2.5.4 CURRENT LEA MODEL FOR INFORMATION SHARING**

During her DEA Review Team interview, the Administrator said that information sharing is critical to the success of DEA and its law enforcement, and other partners. Despite the obvious advantages and mission-based need for drug IAs to have the most direct data access possible, the DEA Review Team found, at every level, that the LEA model for information sharing is not one of direct data access but mediated data access, a model that may be called “Query and Response.” For Query and Response, someone who has a question calls one or more sources/friends in the agency or another agency to request that a “name or number be run” against DBs to which the source(s) have access to find more leads, linkages, or background information. There is a process of personal contact, negotiation, and vetting that must occur before engagement. The source(s) respond as quickly as validation, search, other priorities, and communications permit.

There are three predictable concerns about this approach.
It is personality based and not systematic or institutionalized.

There is no guarantee that an ad hoc process like this provides a complete search for relevant data.

The questioner does not know the extent or potential of data held by the source, and the source who is contacted does not understand the full range of possible inquiries that could or should be made as follow-up.

For highly structured and familiar Intelligence analysis problems, the Query and Response model is time tested and probably suffices, although it involves several persons in data retrieval functions and only one in analysis. For less structured and more demanding Intelligence analysis problems, this approach is inefficient and likely to increase the risk of mistakes and missed opportunities.

The larger drawback to this model for data sharing is that it consigns too many analysts to data research functions and allows too few to perform high-end functions of analysis responsive to the information needs contained in the Administrator’s Vision. Instead, it takes eyes and minds off the target to perform mechanical functions of negotiating and watching and checking the work of others.

### 2.5.5 IMPEDIMENTS TO INFORMATION SHARING

Many interviewees stated that trust is a primary concern. The DEA Review Team identified six trust-related issues that seem to justify the restrictions and inefficiencies inherent in the Query and Response model for information sharing. These issues, enumerated in the following six paragraphs, reflect the collision of equities associated with the “need to know” and the “need to share” critical information.

1. **SECURITY AND SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) RESTRICTIONS.** The originating agency or division imposes special handling requirements due to sensitivity or privacy restrictions for the information. These restrictions sharply limit the ability to share information directly.

   - **Sharing Counterpoint.** For classified data, there are well-known means for the IC to sanitize reporting to provide the relevant essentials, while protecting sources and methods. These means should be borrowed from the IC and implemented in the LEA community wherever possible to increase the use of critical classified information. For SBU information, the business rules on usage need to be formally developed and understood between data owners and users whenever possible, and not left to arbitrary and inconsistent interpretation on a case-by-case basis. SBU, like classified information, can be formatted to separate the sensitive information—typically personal identification details—from the shareable information, which typically is concerned with events or other details.

2. **SPECIAL ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES AND ECONOMIES OF ANALYTIC SCALE.** This type of data requires special processing and manipulation with nonstandard tools and techniques, and extensive expertise in its use. Only a small number of specially trained analysts supported by a costly technical infrastructure handle data and tools effectively. Consequently, there are economies of analytic scale in using a centralized approach to processing Intelligence problems against this data, rather than letting individual analysts access and exploit the data.

   - **Sharing Counterpoint.** There are indeed specialized tools and techniques that may best be applied by experts supported by a powerful, centralized IT capital plant. Broadly, communications exploitation may well be such an example of interest to the Drug IC. Most drug analysis, however, is against text sources and financials related to cases and target organizations. Data mining tools that require such expert handling that they cannot be used by the wide analyst
community are probably not very well tailored for analysis to begin with. DEA should select tools and analytic methods that support maximum numbers of eyes and minds on the target.

(3) **OPEN CASE LIMITATIONS.** Information is law enforcement sensitive and cannot be shared without risks of exposing CSs or undercover operations, compromising sensitive methods, or revealing information with privacy restrictions.

- **Sharing Counterpoint.** This is the most powerful argument used to limit information sharing of case data. This argument is based on a variety of interpretations of U.S. Code Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) and Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedures) legal requirements. These requirements are most telling and command the greatest attention when related to deconfliction among investigations and cases, where information and sources are subject to discovery in court. For support of strategic Intelligence analysis and applications, on the other hand, it is not necessary to focus on specific names, events, and assets. It should be possible to develop business rules on information use from open investigations to support trend, predictive, and what-if analyses. In the future, tactical use of investigative information may be a closer call because of (1) the need to justify, and thereby expose, information sources supporting grounds for probable cause and (2) the possibility that tactical usage may compromise larger opportunities for takedowns of entire DTOs. Case data should be formatted and organized to separate personal information from event and asset data to make the latter easier for analysts to access directly.

(4) **NEED FOR DECONFLICTION AND COORDINATION.** The use of data cannot be permitted without first alerting either the data originator or informing other agencies, agents, and/or analysts who have related interest in the same data. This is to ensure that cases are properly linked operationally and to encourage cooperation among analysts who may be pursuing related analysis issues for investigations.

- **Sharing Counterpoint.** There are classes of information that clearly do not require third-party intervention or special permissions for use by analysts for any reason. There are other classes of data in which automated alerts can be provided by IAs or SAs with common interests. There are still other classes of data where usage does require active third-party inquiry and mediation to ensure case deconfliction and coordination. If these latter classes of data are being tapped for strategic analytic purposes, further third-party intervention is not needed. With a DIPTDR recommendation for coordinated production in place, it will not be necessary to use deconfliction and coordination by third parties to avoid duplication of analytic efforts. The sole purpose for third-party mediation at that point will be for case deconfliction and coordination in servicing investigative Intelligence analysis.

(5) **TECHNICAL INTERFACE PROBLEMS.** IAs in the field—from the DEA or other agencies in the Drug IC—may not have the secure bandwidth available to support large data downloads to remote or mobile locations or the toolsets and time to exploit downloaded data fully. Alternatively, those analysts may have neither the knowledge nor the experience to do needed analysis effectively, and data mediators are needed to provide support through a Query and Response model.

- **Sharing Counterpoint.** There will always be a need for the Query and Response model to support certain Federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel who are operating on tactical problems and who do not have the technical (e.g., wireless PDA) or security access, or the time, to work analysis themselves. As a matter of policy, however, training and technical support for IAs should be aimed at enabling and empowering them to access the data they need when they need it.
(6) **NEED FOR QUERY PRIORITIZATION.** Without active management by a human mediator, it is likely that direct access queries for data will saturate available processing and communications resources and place unacceptable delays on obtaining support for priority investigations and other purposes.

- **Sharing Counterpoint.** An alternative and efficient approach to provide direct data access and query prioritization is a rule set implemented in software to evaluate the urgency of the query, and an adequate IT Web-based computation infrastructure and intranet to support responsive processing. Resources would be assigned based on automated criteria, optimizing overall support to analysts, and balancing the processing load accordingly.

### 2.5.6 REQUIREMENTS TO SHARE INFORMATION FOR DRUG INTELLIGENCE

The Administrator and senior leadership are driving DEA Intelligence analysis to address cross-cutting problems and deliver answers to high-end strategic questions for decision support in budgeting and programming; for planning and coordinating operations; and for anticipating trends, predicting outcomes, and comparing impacts for courses of action. These are inherently unstructured problems that require imagination and sophisticated analysis drawing upon all-source data. Experience in the IC shows that analysis of this kind is best done by analysts who have direct access to that data, and who can move quickly wherever inferences from the data takes them, rather than operating with limited, negotiated, and sequential data access through intermediaries.

### 2.5.7 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) INTELLIGENCE APPROACH TO INFORMATION SHARING

DoD has long been grappling with similar issues of data access and controlled usage in support of a myriad of Intelligence analysis problems. DoD Intelligence data are held at a range of security levels, from open source to compartmented TOP SECRET. Intelligence analysis based on this data may be time critical to support forces in harm’s way. DoD has responded to challenges in complexity, timelines, and security for analysis of many classes of operational Intelligence data with a cycle of functions that task, post, process, and use (TPPU) data for Intelligence analysis. Data are “tasked” for collection through centralized procedures (similar to DIPTDR review recommendations), “posted” after collection in a common access and retrieval space for consumers, “processed” by consumers according to their needs, and “used” by consumers for direct support of their operations. TPPU is a deliberate strategy, not yet fully implemented, to separate DoD organizations from notions of exclusive data ownership and to promote in their place the concept of “Horizontal Fusion” by empowered users of that data. Horizontal Fusion is intended to permit users to select, compare, and correlate different classes of relevant data in parallel, before fully processing each data class in its respective stovepipe. Instead, users can fuse all available data from all data classes, at the lowest possible level, to compose an enriched all-source solution required by that user. These value-added applications of the original raw data, in turn, would be “posted” to support other users with possible related requirements.

DoD is taking additional steps under the TPPU concept that could be instructive to the Drug IC. The armed services are beginning to regard all members as Intelligence collectors and sources of Intelligence, whose information must be “tasked” and “posted” with other Intelligence sources. In addition, DoD is using the TPPU concept to increase the numbers of eyes and minds on target Intelligence and to promote analytic collaboration among analysts who are now able to access, use, and share the same data.

The TPPU model has practical limitations even in DoD, based on security and technical exploitation issues. TPPU may not be fully applicable to DEA and the Drug IC because there are fewer data classes, and handling rules are different. Nevertheless, TPPU is a DoD response and an acknowledgement of the primacy of information in support of its operations, and an attempt to enable and empower more analysts.
by increasing direct access to the right information at the right time earlier rather than later in the processing cycle.

2.5.8 INFORMATION-SHARING LIMITATIONS—THE RISK

To the extent that DEA must acquiesce to continued limitations on direct analyst access to information without rigorous scrutiny of and challenge to the legal or organizational basis for those limitations, it is placing at mounting risk its ability to (1) recognize and link critical information in a sea of data and to (2) generate vital Intelligence on an actionable time line for drug threats, as well as other National Security threats.
3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ALIGNMENT

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This section describes the functionality of the Intelligence Program structure, staffing programs, initiatives, and policies as they support the Administrator's Vision. In addition, this section assesses EPIC in its role as a tactical-level activity; provides workforce and customer insights into the newly conceptualized OFC; highlights the need to strengthen links between NDIC and DEA HQ in the strategic Intelligence arena; reviews HQ and field strategic and investigative Intelligence activities; and provides interview comments concerning SOD. Moreover, this section addresses the potential overlaps in roles/missions and redundancies of reporting by the various entities. Finally, it addresses DEA participation in NFIP.

3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE—AN INTELLIGENCE BASELINE

3.2.1 OVERVIEW

The DEA is operationally focused with virtually all of its resources dedicated to the primary mission of drug law enforcement. The HQ is compact and well organized to provide staff support to the drug law enforcement mission. Although OC was not part of the review requirement, it is interesting to note that all 21 Field Divisions and 57 Country Offices are directly subordinate to the Deputy Administrator, rather than to the Chief of Operations. From a business perspective, this creates a broad span of control for the Administrator. This business model also places all personnel in the Field Divisions under the direct authority of the SAC or a Country Attaché in the Country Offices. To bind these separate "entities" together, the DEA relies on the "Agent Manual," which provides detailed instructions for operations, processes, and procedures.

3.2.2 NC

NC is an operational and administrative unit that provides Intelligence support to HQ and analytic personnel in the field. It has 846 billets/authorizations assigned to Washington, the Field Divisions, and Country Offices. Nearly 400 billets are assigned to the HQ in Arlington, Virginia. This figure includes the 77 Intelligence authorizations assigned to the Office of Special Intelligence (NS) at SOD. Another 416 IAs are assigned to the Field Divisions. With the exception of those at EPIC (47), however, they are not under the control of the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence. Of the 400 billets assigned to the Intelligence HQ staff element, 176 (44 percent) are GS-0132 series authorizations. The remaining billets are a mix of SAs and Program and Systems Administrators, as well as Administrative Support positions. The Assistant Administrator for Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant Administrator are supported by the:

- Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Intelligence Policy and Management (NP).
- Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Strategic Intelligence (NT).
- Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Investigative Intelligence (NI).
- Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Special Intelligence (NS).
- Director of EPIC.
The first three offices average between 30 and 40 people, with NS having more than 200 (214) authorizations. EPIC, with 132 DEA personnel, including the 47 analysts noted above, is the tactical arm of NC. The NP Intelligence element at DEA HQ is responsible for developing Intelligence planning, programming, and budgeting. NT and NI provide analytic support to the DEA and its national-level and field customers. NS provides analysts and information to SOD and has been designated to develop and operate the new OFC. The Intelligence production elements reside in the HQ Intelligence staff structure.

3.2.3 EPIC

Although EPIC is administratively controlled by NC, it is in fact an interagency Intelligence center. Of the 132 DEA billets assigned, the majority are SAs and other nonanalysts who staff the Watch, support systems operations, and provide administrative and management support. Of the 47 IAs, 29 are assigned to Research and Analysis (NER) and 12 are assigned to Tactical Operations (NET), Information Management (NEI), and Watch Operations (NEW). EPIC’s mission is to support (1) law enforcement through the timely analysis and dissemination of Intelligence on drug and alien movements and (2) other programs of interest to its 13 Federal and state (Texas) member agencies. The focus of these efforts is on drug smuggling to the U.S. across the U.S./Mexican border and from the Caribbean and other points of origin in the Western Hemisphere. In addition, EPIC collects and analyzes raw data and Intelligence to identify drug-smuggling activities and organizations; to identify and fill Intelligence gaps; and to provide tactical Intelligence to law enforcement field operations. EPIC functions include:

- A clearinghouse-coordination mechanism for timely dissemination of all-source DB information in support of ongoing worldwide tactical enforcement operations, 24x7.
- Analysis and dissemination of human, technical, or other Intelligence information related to a drug seizure/activity or movement.
- Analysis and fusion of reported data relative to drug movement and organizations for dissemination to affected law enforcement entities.

The DEA Review Team found that most EPIC functions remain unique and valid. No other Intelligence organization provides the same level of 24x7 drug interdiction and investigations support as does the EPIC Watch, special units, and programs. In addition, EPIC provides a significant in-depth research capability in support of active investigations—which generally provides a depth that is beyond what a Field Division analyst can provide and is unequaled as a repository of interagency drug-related Intelligence.

Due to its extensive information-sharing agreements, EPIC has a unique capability to interface with state, Federal, and international partners. No other multi-agency law enforcement intelligence activity has anything close to these agreements, which have been negotiated and expanded over the last 25 years. They are key to allowing state and local access to Federal information and enabling the acquisition of information only available at those levels. Although the international agreements have been less productive due in part to their more restrictive nature, they hold great promise as well.

There is a fair amount of support, particularly by state and local law enforcement, for EPIC’s special tactical programs like Pipeline, Convoy, and Jetway. The same cannot be said, however, of EPIC’s research and analysis products beyond the case support research referred to above. Generally, the analytic products, some of which have already been discontinued, are not valued by their intended customers. In fact, most of those interviewed by the DEA Review Team could not recollect a recent analytic product of value. Most interviewed stated that these products were generally rehashes of known information and were not predictive in nature. Having said this, there was some evidence that at least a few state and local LE officials valued some Research and Analysis (R&A) products as summaries of ongoing enforcement
efforts. These officials believed that these products provided them with a broader picture of what was happening outside their respective office/locality. The DEA Review Team believes that this type of work could be more effectively produced by NDIC.

3.2.4 SOD

In partnership with the Operations Division, the Intelligence Division is highly involved in SOD. While 77 analysts are collocated and working at SOD, the other 137 positions at NS provide direct support to SOD, which is a multi-agency program comprising 70 DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. Operating in a classified environment, SOD provides criminal investigators with the capability to fully exploit Federal law enforcement’s investigative authority under Title III of the U.S. Code. SOD has developed sophisticated methods to compile investigative information and ensure that all leads are properly followed and coordinated. This mechanism allows all DEA Field Divisions and Country Offices to capitalize on investigative information from various sources as cases are being developed. SOD is a central player in cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin investigations.

3.2.5 FIELD DIVISIONS AND COUNTRY OFFICES

DEA has 21 domestic Field Divisions, with 237 domestic offices throughout the U.S. and 80 Country Offices in 57 countries. Each Field Division is run by a SAC. The Intelligence Program allocates IAs to these field sites. Domestically, 416 analysts are assigned to Field Divisions and 68 analysts are assigned to Country Offices. Depending on the size of the Office, the SAC can be supported by Associate SACs, who are supported, in turn, by ASACs, who manage day-to-day operations. IAs who are directly assigned to Field Divisions usually work for, or are housed under, an ASAC. In the larger offices, a GS-15 FIM position has been established to provide management and oversight to the Intelligence Program. In New York, the FIM was viewed as an ASAC, reporting to an Associate SAC. Each SAC, however, has the authority to place the FIM and the Intelligence staff at any level of the organization. The common supervisory level at Field Divisions is the Group Supervisor, who oversees the IAs assigned to the Division. Analyst assignments are based on priorities established by the SAC or Country Attaché. Analysts can be assigned to support a particular Enforcement Group or to individual teams as required. Analysts assigned to case support normally perform a variety of tasks at the direction of, or in partnership with, their 1811 SA counterparts. They are often relied on to provide the big cross-case picture. They produce this picture through toll and link analysis; looking at other cases for information (DEA and non-DEA); doing research on Firebird, Merlin, and the Internet; using selected Federal and state DBs; and interfacing with Title III operations. The analysts often are assigned to produce the Quarterly Trends in Traffic Reports (QITRs), DEA Form-6 reports, cables, and specially focused Intelligence products on local DTOs, drug trends, and operations.

3.2.6 OFC

Currently in the concept phase, the OFC (Drug/Financial) will be based at DEA HQ and provide OCDETF member agencies with a complete Intelligence picture of targeted DTOs and their financial infrastructure, through enhanced technical capability and HUMINT analysis. NS has been charged with overseeing development and implementation of the OFC as a cornerstone of the Administrator’s Vision of sharing Intelligence and building collaborative partnerships. The OFC will develop investigative leads in support of OCDETF investigations aimed at disrupting or dismantling the most significant DTOs and their financial infrastructure. Resultant operations will significantly expand DEA’s SOD by providing the ability to cross-analyze and exploit all investigative information (e.g., names, addresses, criminal associates) to their current, effective exploitation of communications. Investigative leads developed by the
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OFC—based on links between DTOs, money-laundering organizations, and terrorists or terrorist organizations—will be disseminated through SOD to appropriate elements of the FBI, DHS, Department of the Treasury, and IC.

3.2.7 DEA Training Academy

The Office of Training (TR), under the Human Resources Division, operates the DEA Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The Academy is managed by a SAC assigned to TR. The Intelligence Training Unit (TRDI) is subordinate to the ASAC for Domestic Training. The Intelligence Unit has approximately eight IAs assigned to develop, build, and present all Intelligence-related training, including the Basic Intelligence Research Specialist (BIRS) training program. The 9-week BIRS course provides entry-level training for recently hired IAs and is primarily focused on training and skill development for IAs. The course curriculum emphasizes the development of analytic skills, the use of computerized tools, and a range of academic subjects critical to providing investigative and tactical Intelligence. The course uses a variety of teaching techniques—including group practical exercises designed to train analysts in presenting critical analytic judgments to investigators, prosecutors, and policymakers. In addition, TRDI teaches a series of week-long courses, available after completion of the BIRS course, as follows:

- **Advanced Intelligence Training**—Updates IAs on agency changes in priorities, programs, policies and protocols, changes to the law, and new analytic tools and methodologies.
- **Intelligence Managers Seminar**—Brings managers up to date on policies, procedures, employee-related issues, and Intelligence analytic tools.
- **Merlin File Management Training**—Provides an overview of the Merlin system.
- **Strategic Intelligence Seminar**—Designed for senior IAs and Intelligence Managers. The course includes developing targeting tools, strategic writing skills, and improving critical thinking skills.
- **Federal Law Enforcement Analyst Training**—This is a 2- to 4-week training program for other Federal agencies, as well as state and local law enforcement personnel. It is designed to share DEA’s Drug Intelligence expertise, along with the best analytic tools and practices.

3.2.8 NDIC

NDIC is located in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Since its inception, its mission has been to produce domestic strategic Intelligence products in support of policymakers and LEAs across the board. This mission was validated by the GCIP in 2000. At the same time, a new function, Document Exploitation (DOCEX), was approved (although clearly not strategic in nature, DOCEX was assigned to the NDIC because of the ready availability of funding). Although the NDIC is not a part of the DEA, it has been closely associated with it due to similar missions and common subordination to DOJ and the GCIP. This relationship was strengthened recently by a joint memorandum to the Attorney General, dated 17 December 2003, in which the DEA Administrator and the Director of NDIC agreed to a revitalized DEA/NDIC partnership. Key aspects of this new relationship include a focus on streamlined jointly produced strategic Intelligence reports; better identification of customer requirements; more predictive Intelligence, consolidated threat assessments; increased DOCEX support for SOD and the new OFC; NDIC access to the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADDIS), Telephone Analysis Subsystem (TOLLS), and other DEA investigative data systems; and coordinated missions and strategic plans. In addition to eight DEA SAs, NC recently identified six IA positions for assignment to NDIC.

Based on the Web survey and personal interviews conducted by the DEA Review Team, NDIC strengths appear to lie in its DOCEX program and the Real-time Analytical DB (RAID). Although these assets are
less than optimum given today's technology, they allow assigned NDIC personnel to exploit large volumes of data quickly and accurately in the law enforcement milieu. (For more information, see Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.) Both are enhanced by knowledgeable labor, equipment, and other resources required to get the job done. Comments also were made about the workforce's strong work ethic and the quality of the library, equipment, training and technical support.

Although NDIC clearly has considerable resources and its DOCEX capabilities are generally valued in the field, it is not highly regarded as an analytic center. Results from the Web survey indicate that only 39 percent of respondents believe that NDIC is effective in accomplishing its mission (Figure 3.1).

Only 27 percent said that NDIC met its specific mission requirements (Figure 3.2).

![Figure 3.1](image1)

Do you believe NDIC is effective in its support mission?

![Figure 3.2](image2)

Does NDIC production and support meet requirements in your current mission?
This was borne out by survey comments and interviews at both HQ and in the field. Survey comments included the following: "[NDIC] analysts write products with limited personal knowledge of their subjects (e.g., geography—never visiting the area; drugs—never seeing the drug);" "... distant location leaves them outside of the loop;" "... strategic reporting is poor and inadequate.;" "... inaccuracies and incompleteness of reporting;" "... no checks or balances on the information;" and "... limited field experience."

In addition, although most DEA personnel—particularly Case Agents—value DOCEX, some believe that the process could be enhanced by additional research and analysis and by a better understanding of individual cases and regional issues. There also is a great deal of concern with the development of the RAID system. (For more information, see Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.)

Some NDIC production issues may stem from its relatively remote location. Unlike the Washington, D.C., area, Johnstown does not have a large recruitment pool of experienced Intelligence professionals. The distance from Washington also inhibits face-to-face contact with counterpart analysts in cognizant agencies, an almost essential function to ensure a coordinated, complete product. From all accounts, it has also been affected by the lack of full access to NADDIS, DEA Form-6s, and other Drug Intelligence DBs. Although access to NADDIS and other DBs was called for in the GCIP and the need is appreciated by DEA Intelligence management, it has not been fully implemented. This access will be critical to improving NDIC's products and will do much to overcome any liabilities associated with its location.

3.2.9 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout the DEA, analysts are highly valued for their support to investigations. Numerous comments by case agents and managers at all levels, however, revealed that there are not enough analysts for case support and Strategic Intelligence requirements. Both case agents and managers, as well as analysts themselves, commented that if more analysts were available, more high-quality enforcement work could be performed.

**Case Support.** Based on the numerous interviews conducted, the case loads described, and the sheer size of the drug threat, the DEA Review Team found that there is a major shortfall in IA end strength to support investigations. Priority target investigations have become more complex and involve a worldwide array of people, organizations, and operations—with the number of investigative work hours involved in supporting priority target investigations having increased by 45 percent over the past 2 years. Yet, no commensurate increase in analyst support has occurred. In addition, the increased demands placed on IAs to support counterterrorism have grown dramatically over the past 3 years. Since September 11, 2001, SOD has coordinated more than 9,406 Intelligence products in support of U.S. counterterrorism activities and the number of counterterrorism Intelligence products has increased by 72 percent. Last year alone, EPIC—a multi-agency Intelligence center—responded to more than 300,000 inquiries and performed more than two million DB searches, of which 38 percent were related to counterterrorism. Yet, again, the number of analysts to support this new workload has not increased. Additional analysts and/or aides are required at Field Divisions and Country Offices, NS, and the new OFC (1) to enhance support for increasingly complex investigations and new initiatives related to diversions, financial research, and Intelligence gathering and (2) to ensure optimum coordination with the HIDTA ISCs and other state and local intelligence activities.

**Strategic Analysis.** At almost every domestic Field Division and many Country Offices, there appears to be a lack of dedicated analysts to provide all-source assessments of major DTOs and regional trends and patterns, as well as predictive estimates of future threats that are critical to national-level threat assessments, priority targeting, resource planning, and operations management.
In addition, there does not appear to be enough dedicated analysts to assure that the unique capabilities of the DEA are used to fulfill its national obligation to support counterterrorism and other National Security priorities. This involves identifying and managing National Security requirements and ensuring that related DEA information is coordinated, validated, and quickly disseminated to the appropriate state, local, and Federal activities and organizations.

The shortage of analysts to support DEA requirements appears to be occasioned, in part, by the current practice of determining the number of analytic resources employed by the DEA by utilizing an arbitrarily imposed ratio of 11:1 SAs to Intelligence Research Specialists agencywide. Although this approach is reasonable, if there is an equal distribution of agents throughout every DEA office and staff elements were all homogenous in nature, this is not the case, causing disparities in the allocation of analysts.

In fact, actual distribution using this ratio is almost nonexistent except at the overall agency level. For example, there is almost a 1:1 ratio of analysts to agents at SOD while many Field Divisions and/or Country Offices have considerable less. Moreover, it appears that little or no consideration has been given to the number of non-DEA agents supported in various Task Forces, HIDTAs, etc., by DEA analysts. A much better approach would be to allocate analytical labor by geographic and functional requirements. This approach would consider the unique aspects of each office, including the number of actual enforcement groups supported and any unique local or regional threat situations, and provide the basis for 1-3 IAs/aides per enforcement group/HIDTA/DO/RO based on the number of assigned agents. (These case support analysts/aides could be either assigned directly to the enforcement group or subassigned by the FIM.) In Country Offices where the principal activity is intelligence vice enforcement operations, the number of analysts to agents could be increased to as much as 1:1.

To support regional strategic analysis, the number of analysts could be determined by the size of the Field Division or Country Office region, external agency relationships, and estimated scope of the drug problem it is working. (See Appendix G for a notional list of the recommended analyst distribution.) HQ and other activities where DEA IAs function could likewise be determined individually by mission function alone. Where there is little need for sworn DEA agents, either for investigative or coordinative functions, the number of analysts could be increased, freeing agent resources for their operational roles. For example, SOD functions well with the current 1:1 analyst-to-agent ratio, while more analysts/aides could be utilized at EPIC, NDIC, HIDTA ISCs, and possibly the new OFC. (For more information, see Section 4.3.4.1.)

Clearly, more analysts are needed to expand current case work and provide the focused strategic and predictive analysis that will identify emergent trends and future threats upon which to base operational and resource decisions. More analysts will also be critical to ensuring that DEA meets its national obligations by identifying and expeditiously reporting any terrorist-related or other National Security threat-related information it may discover while executing its primary antidrug mission. Without additional analytic strength, the DEA will be unable to significantly enhance its performance at the case level and will have great difficulty in achieving the Administrator’s Vision.

3.2.9.1 Recommendation on Increasing IA End Strength

Fund an additional 100 positions with a mix of analysts (80) and administrative support staff (20) to support new National Security requirements, priority target investigations, and regional strategic analysis at Field Divisions and Country Offices. To avoid delays in hiring, consider a mix of new FTFs and contract analysts. (See Appendix G for recommended distribution of analysts.)
3.3 HQ INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING

3.3.1 THE PREMISE

The recommendations presented in Sections 3.3.3.1 through 3.3.3.6, which are intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DEA Intelligence resources, are based on interviews and documentation provided to the DEA Review Team. Given the time available and limited interview pool, the recommendations do not have the detail and clarity that a lengthier review would have produced. In most cases, the recommendations are designed to enhance the leadership role of the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence in the DEA, improve business processes, and highlight areas of interest for further discussion. Many recommendations are made without regard to policies, politics, funding constraints, or DEA culture.

3.3.2 SUPPORTING THE NEW INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM

The HQ organizational recommendations of the DEA Review Team support the Administrator’s Vision of Intelligence-driven enforcement by suggesting changes that will better enable NC to support national decisionmakers, as well as other Federal, state, and local law enforcement entities. They support a new era for Intelligence through the creation of a well-structured career development and training program that is more tightly controlled by NC to achieve the Administrator’s goals. Institutionalizing these program changes will strengthen the role of the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence and help create a more collaborative, structured Intelligence production process for the drug law enforcement community. (For more information, see Section 4, Policies, Processes and Procedures, and Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation.)

3.3.3 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.3.3.1 Recommendation on Organizational Bureaucracy

Flatten the organization by eliminating the Units, and group the analysts into teams under each Section. The Intelligence elements at DEA HQ appear to be overly structured, with Offices, Sections, and Units. With the exception of NS, units often are as small as five people and are “supervised” by a GS-14. This small unit size seems to be abetted by an organizational “rule of three,” where the justification for establishing a section appears to necessitate establishing three subordinate units. In today’s flatter organizations, it is more common to find a supervisor to worker ratio of 1:15 rather than the 1:5 ratio found in DEA units. The Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) has commented that “... while there is no hard-and-fast rule about appropriate team size, some experts suggest that communication and coordination can become difficult for groups larger than 15 to 20 people.” Since the recommended team structure is not registered/presented on the “line and block” as part of the official organization, the number, composition, and disposition of the teams can, therefore, change as management sees fit. It allows management to surge analysts to meet new issues more quickly and can provide a more broadened work environment of team members. The “loss” of supervisory positions is offset by the capability to appoint GS-14 analysts as team leaders and add another person to provide administrative support of the team (e.g., a Program Analyst). The ability to create a nonsupervisory GS-14/15 is an extant power and authorized under 2250 Personnel Management, Section 2250.52, Paragraph F.
3.3.3.2 Recommendation on NI

Disband NI and distribute personnel to Strategic Intelligence, OFC, NS/SOD, NDIC, and the Field Divisions. Case work is best performed at Field Division Offices. A small number of senior IAs should be moved to the Office of Strategic Intelligence. In addition, they could serve as an initial cadre for OFC. Remaining analysts should be moved to meet DEA commitments to analyst exchanges with NDIC and to support key Field Divisions whose analyst-to-agent ratio is greater than 1:13.

3.3.3.3 Recommendation on NIWF

Move NIWF directly to FO. This separation of the financial analysis unit from the Intelligence organization parallels the Intelligence support to the Field Divisions, and ensures clear “avenues of analysis” between OC and NC.

Alternative 1 would be to negotiate with OC not to have GS-0132s in the money-laundering operation and move current NIWA analysts elsewhere in the NC organization.

Alternative 2 would be to move NIWF personnel (preferably coded as GS-0110 Economists) to billets in the new FO, thus creating vacancies at NC.

Alternative 3 would be to give the personnel and billets to OC, re scope the work to the GS-0110 series, and have OC “pay back” the billets in FY2005-2006.

3.3.3.4 Recommendation on the Office of Strategic Intelligence

Reorganize NT to serve the Intelligence needs of the Administrator and provide support to the National Security Community. This unit will be the multisource strategic analytic unit at HQ. It should be organized along two distinct lines. First, it would be organized as a Strategic Intelligence Office organized to assess the overall current and future drug threats, primarily by integrating the foreign and domestic drug threats as produced and provided by CNC and NDIC, respectively, and by reviewing DEA internal strategic reporting from Field Divisions and Country Offices. In this respect, it also would serve as the knowledge/production center for dangerous drugs by merging NTSG and NIWG. Close contact with DEA labs will be essential. Second, it would be organized as a current Intelligence unit comprising primarily senior analysts and external and internal liaisons organized to provide subject matter expertise to the Administrator and other HQ elements in support of evolving operational, interagency, resource, and Congressional requirements, as well as other taskings. In this arrangement, responsibility for regional strategic assessments currently performed in the Regional Strategic Intelligence Section (NTR) would transition to regional Strategic Analysts at Field Divisions and Country Offices. Domestic strategic Intelligence duties performed by the Domestic Strategic Intelligence Unit (NTSD) would pass to NDIC.

3.3.3.5 Recommendation on the Intelligence Production Unit (NPMP)

Reorganize NPMP to administer the new Drug Intelligence Production Program (DIPP). The office would coordinate all joint Intelligence production among DEA, NDIC, CNC, EPIC, and the HIDTA ISCs, as well as other Intelligence activities producing counterdrug Intelligence. Technologies would be upgraded with the introduction of digital authoring and production tools and improved high-quality printing (reproduction) capabilities. In addition, the office will coordinate hard-copy reproduction with NDIC as part of DIPP. (For more information, see Section 5, Products and Services.)

3.3.3.6 Recommendation on TRDI

Give NC direct control over course requirements, presentation, and personnel. The best approach would be to take TRDI out from under the command of HR and the Academy SAC. Assign a senior GS-15 or
new Senior Executive Service (SES) employee, who reports to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, to head the program and coordinate with HR and OC to have the program as a tenant organization at the Academy facility. Have the Academy provide space for offices, the Merlin Room, and one or two classrooms to be designated as NC “space” at Quantico to house the revised Intelligence Program. The independence and flexibility to provide a dynamic course environment will be essential to building an Analyst Career Development Program for DEA Intelligence. Turn the revitalized Intelligence Training Center into the repository for all Intelligence training records and all training associated with the new Analyst Career Development Program.

3.4 EPIC

EPIC should continue to function as a tactical Intelligence support center; however, it should be restructured to capitalize on its strengths, better support the Administrator’s Vision, fulfill the recommendations of the 1996 EPIC Top-Down Review, and realize the synergy of working with developing the DoD Joint Task Force North (JTFN) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Border Interdiction Support Center activities in El Paso. In addition, it should perform the DOCEX functions now performed by NDIC as these are clearly of an investigative support vice strategic nature.

3.4.1 RECOMMENDATION ON EPIC STRUCTURE

Revise the EPIC Management Structure below the Director/SAC level and create two divisions in EPIC, each to be headed by an SES employee: one to be filled by an FBI 1811, and one to be filled by a DHS 1811, 0132, or USCG junior flag officer. The additional SES positions appear to be justified by the size and scope of EPIC operations. An FBI SES employee is considered appropriate if a counterterrorism/National Security mission is incorporated.

3.4.2 RECOMMENDATION ON OTHER EPIC SECTIONS

Reorganize the remainder of current EPIC Watch, Special Operations, and R&A functions into seven new sections, including:

- A Current Intelligence/Intelligence Analysis Section that would perform analysis of the routes and techniques used by international smuggling organizations with the objective to produce timely estimative (predictive) Intelligence in support of interagency operations. It also would be charged with ensuring that any information that may be of strategic value is identified and made available expediently to NDIC, CNC, and DEA HQ (NT). It also would cooperate and coordinate routinely with all HIDT A ISCs to ensure the Drug Intelligence information analysis efforts are coordinated and complete.

- An Information Management Section that would have duties similar to existing EPIC data management functions but would assume additional duties for data standardization, integration, and acquisition, as well as ensuring that EPIC data are being shared with all validated customers.

- An Investigative Support Section, including DOCEX from NDIC, asset forfeiture analysts, and case support analysts, to provide in-depth research for field customers beyond what is available in the field.

- A Tactical Support Section, including the existing Special Operations unit, an expanded fraudulent documents unit, the Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC), and an in-depth query research function that would proactively conduct in-depth research of EPIC queries to determine additional leads or other information of value to the field and strategic elements.
• A Special Programs Section headed by a senior state or local law enforcement official to manage existing programs such as Pipeline and Jetway, as well as training and day-to-day coordination with the HDTAs.

• A Counterterrorist Operations Support Section, including a JTTF, USCG COASTWATCH Support, and terrorist alert and information coordination function to ensure that EPIC is fully aware of all alerts and provides any terrorist-related information it receives or formulates to the appropriate agency.

The General Watch would not require change except that analysis support functions would move to the Tactical Support and Counterterrorist Operations Sections.

3.5 STAFFING

3.5.1 OVERVIEW

The recommendations for staffing changes—which are in concert with efforts to improve the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence’s control of Intelligence resources in the Field Divisions—institute a well-structured Analyst Career Development Program.

3.5.2 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.5.2.1 Recommendation on GS-0134 Conversion

Convert selected GS-0132 positions at the Field Divisions to GS-0134 Series—Intelligence Aide and Clerk Series. The DEA Review Team noted that many tasks performed by IAs (TOLLS and pen registers) are similar to data entry or extraction tasks that could be more economically performed by Intelligence Aides (GS-0134). NC should assess which positions should be converted to GS-0134s (a suggested number is included in Section 8, Program/Budget Development and Allocations). Identify the positions and, when vacated, advertise the new billet as a GS-0134/12. Individuals hired into these billets would be outside the career path for analysts and could stay in the particular Field Division for their careers. This allows the SAC and FIM to recommend local personnel who are proven assets but who do not want to be subject to analyst reassignment.

These individuals, however, may not be promoted above GS-12, but would be eligible to enter the Analyst Career Development Program if they meet the requirements and are willing to deploy from their current location. Their first job would be in Washington, D.C., to ensure an understanding of the overall DEA Intelligence process. Recommendation on DEA Senior Analyst Positions

3.5.2.2 Recommendation on Senior Analyst Positions

As part of flattening the organization suggested above, begin regular appointment of GS-14/15 to nonsupervisory positions. The flattening of the organization will displace GS-14/15s from their supervisory/management positions. The current NC policy allows for promoting nonsupervisors/managers to GS-14/15 positions to ensure that the depth of analysis is maintained. This was not included in the Program Management/Budget section recommendations because NC must decide the exact number and location if implemented.

3.5.2.3 Recommendation on SES Expansion

Expand the DEA SES positions and appointments to match or parallel the SES percentage in the 1811/Agent Corps. This recommendation is based on the minimal number of Intelligence SES observed
in NC and the much larger number of SES agents that were interviewed. It is also a recommendation to broaden the base for creating the new leadership (for Intelligence) in the Administrator's Vision statement. (Specific numbers are included in Section 8, Program Budget Development and Allocations.)

3.5.2.4 Recommendation on Creating Additional FIMs

Create a FIM position at all Field Divisions. The concept of FIMs appears to be well received. In each site, the FIM provided oversight and guidance, and conducted meetings with the analysts to provide cross-case fertilization. The Group Supervisors provided mid-level supervision over analysts assigned to each of the groups. Incrementally expand this concept to all Field Divisions, starting with the larger divisions and working down to the smaller units. Collaborate with OC to have all FIMs treated as an ASAC for Intelligence (or GS in smaller divisions), reporting to an Associate SAC or the SAC. In the largest four Field Divisions and the South America Country Office, make the FIM position an SES, to provide leverage and build a career base for future DEA leaders. (For more information, see Section 4, Policies, Processes, and Functions.)

3.6 ALIGNMENT

3.6.1 OVERVIEW

The DEA Review Team examined the issue of possible overlaps and redundancies in the roles, missions and reporting by EPIC, the newly conceptualized OFC, NDIC, and HQ Intelligence Division's strategic and investigative activities and support for SOD. The focus of this examination was placed on the relationship between the DEA and NDIC on strategic Intelligence production, the roles and mission of EPIC, and the potential impact of the evolving OFC.

3.6.2 PERCEPTION

The examination revealed that although there is some duplication of effort among these activities, the major issue is one of perception. About 87 percent of Web survey respondents believe that the roles and missions of EPIC, the OFC, NDIC, DEA HQ strategic and investigative Intelligence activities, and support to SOD either overlap or are redundant to some degree. Only 3 percent felt that there was no redundancy or overlaps (Figure 3.3).
To what extent do you believe the roles and missions of EPIC, OCDETF Fusion Center, NDIC, DEA HQ strategic and investigative intelligence activities, and support to SOD overlap or are redundant?

[Diagram showing percentage responses to the question about overlaps and redundancies among the mentioned entities, with 32% indicating a moderate extent, 21% indicating a large extent, and 29% indicating no overlap.

**Figure 3.3.**

About 58 percent believe there are actual major overlaps and redundancies (Figure 3.4). These statistics were borne out during the personal interviews in the field and at HQ. A primary cause of this perception is undoubtedly a less than full understanding of each activity’s mission and operations and a sense of competitiveness engendered by personal and institutional pride and in some cases a scarcity of resources. There is also a basis for it in the fact that “investigative support Intelligence” is performed to some degree at all of these activities.

[Diagram showing percentage responses to the question about overlaps and redundancies among DEA/NDIC/OCDETF/Fusion Center, with 25% indicating a moderate extent, 4% indicating a large extent, and 29% indicating no overlap.

**Figure 3.4.**

### 3.6.3 EPIC/HIDTA/OFC

EPIC has little or no overlap with NDIC or with the HQ Intelligence Division due to its unique tactical focus. There are, however, significant overlaps with the HIDTAs, the six Regional Information Sharing
System Centers, the nine OCDETF regional centers, and, in some cases, the Field Divisions. There is a significant probability for duplication and functional overlaps between EPIC and current and proposed DoD, JTFN, and DHS Intelligence components in the El Paso area.

### 3.6.4 NDIC AND DEA HQ

The greatest actual overlap of responsibilities is between the DEA HQ Intelligence Division and NDIC in the area of domestic Intelligence. There is duplication of reporting (e.g., NDIC, State Reports, Field Division State Reports, and Dangerous Drug Reports), and there is a clear need for the two organizations to work more closely together. One survey respondent stated that “NDIC’s mission directly competes with DEA’s Intelligence Program . . .” and that “NDIC duplicates what the DEA already has . . . turning it around and publishing it under a different name.” Other respondents stated that NDIC “duplicates DEA reports.” Although the specifics could not be substantiated, responses support the DEA Review Team’s assessment.

### 3.6.5 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The DEA Review Team supports the proposition made in the 17 December 2003 memorandum to the Attorney General on DEA-NDIC Joint Initiatives. In fact, the DEA Review Team believes that the DEA and NDIC combined is the best solution for producing timely, cogent Intelligence about current events and trends and providing predictive analysis for the Administrator to present to the Attorney General, the President, and the Congress.

To successfully implement this concept, however, steps must be taken to significantly upgrade NDIC analytic processes, increase DEA (NC) control, and refocus the mission solely on strategic Intelligence production by transferring the OCCEX function to EPIC. The recommendations presented in Sections 3.6.5.1 through 3.6.5.8 will help to achieve the optimum end state.

### 3.6.5.1 Recommendation on NDIC Subordination and Mission Focus

To eliminate duplication in both mission and process, NDIC like EPIC should be subordinate to the DEA. The review could find no viable reason for this not to be done. Such a move would only enhance the production of Strategic Drug Intelligence. Coincident with this move should be the transfer of the nonstrategic DOCEX function to EPIC, allowing NDIC to focus solely on its Strategic Intelligence mission.

### 3.6.5.2 Recommendation on NDIC Data Access

Provide NDIC with full access to DEA/EPIC/HIDTA data, including DEA Form-6s and other participating agency DBs and reporting. Direct NDIC to be listed as an addressee on all DEA cables/DEA Form-6s, including those from Country Offices.

### 3.6.5.3 Recommendation on National Drug Intelligence Collection Management and Production System

Initiate and institute a joint DEA/NDIC/Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) (HIDTA ISCs), EPIC, OCDETF effort to define objectives for a national Drug Intelligence collection management and production system that is based on analyst-developed collection priorities to ensure comprehensive, nonduplicative reporting and production. (See recommendations for collection and production management in the DEA in subsequent sections.)
3.6.5.4 Recommendation on NDIC Analyst Professional Development and Support

Call for and support an NDIC Analyst professionalization program that includes additional training at national Intelligence agencies, quality reviews by the CDICG/Counterdrug Secretariat (CDX) staff and establishing and using standards for fair and equitable hiring and promotion that are based solely on qualifications.

3.6.5.5 Recommendation on Analyst Exchanges with NDIC

Call for, negotiate, and institute the placement of NDIC analysts in major DEA Field Division regional Strategic Intelligence units/elements to ensure coordinated collection and production. In addition, exchange and collocate analysts wherever it is deemed feasible.

3.6.5.6 Recommendation on NDIC Systems Architecture

Conduct an in-depth review of NDIC systems architecture to ensure it is focused on its primary mission of strategic domestic Drug Intelligence. Closely examine the RAID development process.

3.6.5.7 Recommendation on Integrated Operations at EPIC

Integrate operations on a coequal basis with JTFN or other local, DoD, or DHS components sharing a common current Intelligence function and the development, operation, and maintenance of Intelligence systems.

3.6.5.8 Recommendation on OFC

Although it is too soon to tell, there is potential overlap or customer confusion on the difference between NS and OFC. If an open IT architecture is approved, the information difference between NS and OFC may become indistinguishable and a merge of operations may be considered. (For more information, see Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.) The use of SOD as a single point of entry to retrieve information may eliminate potential confusion.

3.7 DEA PARTICIPATION IN NFIP

3.7.1 OVERVIEW

Any discussion of the DEA Intelligence Program organization and functions must address whether the DEA should become a member of NFIP. This is not a new issue. In fact, the DEA was a member of the national IC for a brief period—although membership was retracted in 1981. Because of legal and resource concerns, subsequent world events, changes in law and Government, and the extensive DEA overseas presence, the Administrator's new Vision requires a reexamination of membership.

Increasingly, the DEA has coordinated its overseas and Intelligence operations with elements of the national foreign IC. The relationship is a direct reflection of the fact that illicit drugs are a National Security issue. The relationship was formalized by the GCIP, which specifies that the CDICG will be led by co-chairs from the IC and Federal law enforcement communities. To date, these co-chairs have been the Director of the CNC and the DEA Assistant Administrator for Intelligence. The GCIP also specifies that "CNC will remain the principal center for foreign strategic counterdrug Intelligence analysis and for coordinating IC support to U.S. foreign counterdrug activities." The exchange of liaisons, joint staffing of the CDX, and the success of numerous cooperative operations, such as Linear and Linkage, have been positive steps in furthering this cooperation.
Resource disparities and the differing approaches to Intelligence operations, especially in the area of collection management and reporting in the field, continue to impede the growth and success of this relationship. There are still some operational conflicts between the DEA and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at some overseas offices. Although the CIA is the principal foreign Intelligence agency, the DEA is the principal counterdrug agency worldwide and, as such, conducts foreign Drug Intelligence operations.

3.7.2 Survey Responses from the Field

The majority of survey respondents, most of whom were IAs, strongly believe that the DEA should join the IC. In fact, there is almost universal agreement about the advantages that would be gained from being closer to the policymakers and the IC. Their rationale for DEA joining the IC focused largely on the advantages that would accrue from membership. In the words of one SA, "Our [DEA's] interaction with the IC could be an awesome force."

In general, DEA personnel believe that membership in the IC would increase the amount of current, reliable Intelligence they would have available to produce all-source, actionable Intelligence in support of counternarcotics and other important National Security issues. This increased Intelligence would be factored into DEA's ground operations, thus allowing a more focused development of informants. Some respondents either stated or implied that membership also would provide markedly improved collection management, especially in support of their interrogation process.

According to one analyst, "... they [DEA] are not a part of the IC and they do not ask the right questions [of sources] to extract the strategic information." On the other hand, there were a few responses indicating that establishing a collection management system would create more bureaucracy and stifle creativity.

Other respondents believe that simply being a member would help in establishing a more defined procedure to pass information from source interrogations to the IC. In addition, these respondents seemed to share a common belief that they have the potential to make greater contributions, not only on counternarcotics matters but also on overall National Security issues, including counterterrorism.

Moreover, several respondents believe that a more formalized association with the IC would help alleviate information-sharing problems and enhance the degree of confidence that the DEA can have in the Intelligence it receives from the IC. HQ and field analysts cited several routine problems, including the credibility of the Intelligence because the IC's source is often unknown; the lack of appropriate security clearances, especially in the field; and a general mistrust and fear of sharing data with the IC. Although these problems will not disappear if the DEA joins the IC, the DEA Review Team agrees that any step that promotes a closer association with the IC is likely to increase trust and sharing among all entities.

Finally, there is a general sense among IAs that they, as a group, have improved significantly since DEA's entry into the Intelligence business some 30 years ago. As one IA explained, "DEA has improved tremendously... it still needs a lot of work, but it's getting better."

3.7.3 IC and Law Enforcement Community Perspective

Senior IC and law enforcement officers that the DEA Review Team spoke with in the Washington, D.C., area have a more balanced view toward the DEA and NFIP. While they recognized the advantages that DEA personnel mentioned, they believe that membership in the IC largely depends on whether the DEA would be able to obtain additional resources that would be "fenced for Intelligence purposes" through the IC's budgetary process. The IC cautions that the DEA would have to devote existing personnel assets to
ensure a thorough compilation of data for this budgetary process to justify receiving additional resources under the Intelligence budget. If the DEA can keep these personnel expenditures under reasonable, albeit somewhat strict, control, it is generally believed that the DEA could consider joining the IC. That this can be accomplished is evidenced by the recent experience that the USCG had in joining NFIP.

One interviewee commented that by joining the IC, the DEA would be publicly proclaiming to all other organizations that it had a “professional Intelligence force that was an integral part of the IC.” As previously mentioned, this struck a resonant and favorable chord with many IAs.

3.7.4 DEA CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Surprisingly, there was little mention by any survey respondents or interviewees, both external and internal to the DEA, with respect to the value that the DEA could bring to the IC. Most seemed to focus only on the benefits that the DEA may derive. None seemed to recognize that any participation in NFIP must necessarily be predicated on what the value added would be for the national Intelligence effort. Clearly, as discussed in Section 2, Vision, Mission, and Functions, the DEA has much it can contribute to National Security beyond counternarcotics. If properly refocused, DEA’s worldwide network of often unique sources would be of significant value for several other information requirements. Also indicated earlier, the drug threat continues to be a validated National Security concern. This by itself argues for participation in NFIP and consequent support through the NFIP budgetary process.

3.7.5 OBSERVATIONS

Joining the IC would enable DEA IAs to gain insight into IC perceptions and analytic approaches through contacts and training. This would provide analysts with new tools and methodologies to apply to the new problem set of National Security issues. The analysts would most likely benefit from improved information sharing, better interagency relationships, and a shared interest in developing quality Intelligence, not only on counternarcotics but also on other important National Security issues.

Membership in the IC, however, likely would involve some tradeoffs. It could be considered favorable if the overall outcome resulted in a net gain of Intelligence resources. These resources would have the additional advantage of being “dedicated to Intelligence purposes.” The latter was a key driver for the USCG in seeking membership in NFIP. Like DEA Intelligence, USCG Intelligence had to compete internally with operational priorities and frequently lost resource initiatives that, if funded, would have enhanced operational success. A separate NFIP budget (although still in the USCG/DHS authorization/appropriation process) now is fenced essentially from such offsets due to the Intelligence review and authorization process.

3.7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS

3.7.6.1 Recommendation on Joining the IC

Reactions are mixed as to DEA’s joining the DCI’s national foreign IC. Nevertheless, the DEA Review Team recommends that the DEA should join. Clearly, doing so would be in keeping with the Administrator’s Vision of expanding DEA’s contribution to National Security. To accomplish this, a special team comprising senior-level staff from Intelligence, Operations, and DOJ should be commissioned to identify the advantages and disadvantages of NFIP membership and to determine exactly what DEA’s responsibilities/cost/liabilities would be, as well as what benefits may accrue to both the DEA and the nation. To achieve its objectives, this team should (1) seek the advice of an organization that has succeeded in a similar undertaking and (2) seek the support of DOJ/DEA Congressional affairs staff to determine what the level of Congressional interest may be in such an initiative.
There are, however, some alternatives to full immersion or commitment to the IC:

**Alternative 1:** Request NFIP observer status and dedicate 6 months to 1 year on direct interaction with NFIP. Whatever the decision, continue to keep open channels with the IC and sanitize DEA information for use by NFIP.

**Alternative 2:** Request permanent observer/nonvoting status.

**Alternative 3:** Negotiate full voting membership within the resource and policy restrictions established by DOJ and the DEA Administrator.
4 POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND PROCEDURES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This section describes the DEA Intelligence Program's use of best practices, lessons learned, and customer requirements service procedures and provides recommendations on a number of internal policies, processes, and procedures to enhance DEA Intelligence operations. In addition, this section examines the Intelligence Program's relationships with other LEAs and the IC, in particular, their views on DEA information sharing. This section highlights the IC and LEA quid pro quo capabilities to support the DEA, especially in the area of National Security.

Of significant importance are the interview-derived recommendations on developing processes for identifying requirements and managing the collection process against these requirements. Recommendations also are provided on how to best analyze, produce, and disseminate Intelligence in response to identified requirements.

4.2 BEST BUSINESS PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

For this report, best business practices are defined as procedures or policies that could be applied throughout the organizational enterprise to significantly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DEA processes or services and the Intelligence resources committed to support these tasks. Lessons learned or After-Action Reports (AARs) are defined as the knowledge and understanding (positive and negative) gained from a structured review of a process or operation by those involved or responsible for the activity. To be categorized as a valid lesson learned, the findings must have been incorporated into current or proposed policies and procedures to improve the process, correct deficiencies, or reinforce positive aspects of the process or operation.

There was an interesting dichotomy of survey responses on the use of best business practices. During the interview process, the DEA Review Team asked if the organization had incorporated best business into its operations. A majority of the answers indicated that there was not an enterprise (NC) effort to capture and document best business practices. Yet, 66 percent of those surveyed indicated that DEA Intelligence made use of best business practices, and 58 percent said these practices are captured by the DEA (Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, and Appendix B). The DEA Review Team believes that this disparity of results centers on the perceived need to officially "document" best business practices in a formal process that helps to build or refine NC policies and procedures and the current practice of conducting local "hot wash" to improve methods and operations.
To what extent does DEA intelligence make use of best practices?

![Figure 4.1](image)

**Figure 4.1.**

How effectively are they captured, disseminated, utilized?

![Figure 4.2](image)

**Figure 4.2.**

Nevertheless, the DEA Review Team found a variety of best business practices at all levels of the organization. These activities include:

- Establishment of FIMs at selected Field Divisions.
- Family-friendly policies associated with attempts at collocating DEA spouse teams when possible.
- Course critiques conducted by TRDI at Quantico.
4.3  INTERNAL POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND PROCEDURES

The DEA Review Team recommends a number of new policies and procedures, as well as some changes to existing policies and procedures to improve DEA Intelligence operations. The DEA Review Team recommendations are based on interviews and survey findings. Some recommendations are presented as a byproduct of the interviews (e.g., diversity), although they are not required in the original Statement of Work.

4.3.1  OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In general, the policies, processes, and procedures promulgated by the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence (NC) appear sound and reflective of general agency direction, at least through the last Administrator. Some, however, appear to require updating and revision, particularly concerning the current Administrator's Vision and guidance. In addition, new policy and procedural directives will be needed to direct and implement the recommendations, if adopted, that are presented in Section 10 of this report.

4.3.2  POLICIES

4.3.2.1 Recommendation on FIMs

Collaborate with OC to have all FIMs treated as ASACs for Intelligence, reporting to an Associate SAC or the SAC. In select Field Divisions and Country Offices, the FIM position should be an SES, to provide leverage and build a career base for future DEA leaders. At each site, the FIM should provide oversight and guidance to Intelligence operations, serve as the SAC advisor on Intelligence, and institute a process in the Intelligence unit that ensures all analysts are informed of ongoing cases through their division, as well as those in other divisions that could have an impact on their cases. Incrementally expand FIM positions to Field Divisions, starting with the larger divisions and working down to the smaller units. (For more information, see Section 3, Organizational Structure and Alignment.)

4.3.2.2 Recommendation on Strategic Analysts in Field Divisions

Each Field Division and Country Office should have at least one Strategic Analyst, unencumbered by case support or other nonstrategic responsibilities. These analysts would be from NDIC and NC and be responsible for writing the strategic reports for the Field Division. These reports would be combined at NDIC and NC into domestic strategic Intelligence reports and special national-level (international and domestic) strategic reports for the DEA Administrator. (For more information, see Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation.)

4.3.2.3 Recommendation on Marketing DEA

With the concurrence of DOJ and the DEA Administrator, begin to develop a program that "markets" the value of DEA Intelligence as a National Security resource. Three initial target sets to consider are the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congress and the American people.
4.3.2.4 **Recommendation on the Diversion Program**

DEA Intelligence should consider providing Intelligence support to diversion operations. This would be predicated on requesting and receiving new Intelligence personnel for this expanded mission.

4.3.2.5 **Recommendation on AARs**

The NC and OC Divisions should institute an AAR to capture the lessons learned from completed cases. TRDI at Quantico has a rigorous process of postcourse evaluation by the students. The findings are weighted and, when feasible, incorporated into the next course. The summarized evaluations are presented to the training SAC. If used throughout DEA, AARs would highlight the best practices as well as the operational deficiencies. AARs would be sent to all operational units and stored in a central, Web-based repository for future use. TRDI should continue with its postcourse review process.

4.3.2.6 **Recommendation on CS debriefings**

The policy should be changed to require IAs at all CS debriefings associated with cases that they are assigned. Analysts should develop a set of case-specific questions, garner information that would be pertinent as cross-case support, and formulate a set of questions that would elicit information on issues of National Security. IAs would include these findings in a joint agent/analist-generated DEA Form-6 or cable. Analysts should represent the FITs in standard debriefings.

4.3.2.7 **Recommendation on Establishing a Diversified Workforce**

The creation of a new Intelligence Program model will demand a diverse IA population. The DEA Review Team believes that a diverse workforce is an essential pillar in building a new Intelligence Program model.

4.3.3 **PROCESSES**

4.3.3.1 **Recommendation on IA Presence at the Field Divisions**

Expand the FIM concept to all Field Divisions and capture the team-building processes and procedures developed in the New York and Los Angeles Field Divisions. The DEA Review Team noted two distinct models for the FIM to allocate analytic resources: (1) assigning IAs directly to support an enforcement group and (2) allocating individual IAs based on specific SA requests, availability of resources, and case priority. (For more information, see Section 4.3.2.1 and Section 3, Organizational Structure and Alignment.)

4.3.3.2 **Recommendation on the Field Division Annual Field Management Plan**

The Field Division’s Annual Field Management Plan should serve as a basis for evaluating Intelligence support to the enforcement groups. FIMs should be integral partners in developing the Annual Field Management Plan and in adjusting Position Descriptions (PDs), as well as in preparing IA evaluations to reflect the objectives of the Annual Field Management Plan.

4.3.3.3 **Recommendation on the SFIP**

Reinvigorate the SFIP. Although reviews on the effectiveness of the SFIP are mixed, this program allows good ideas to surface from the bottom of the organization. Use it as a special funding mechanism for identifying and filling intelligence gaps, purchasing new intelligence equipment for testing, fostering IT innovation, and sponsoring special intelligence-centric “operations.” In addition, the SFIP can be a useful
tool to encourage information sharing and to develop multi-agency relationships as DEA IAs exchange and cross-reference their analysis with that of other agencies’ Intelligence professionals.

4.3.4 PROCEDURES

4.3.4.1 Recommendation on IA-to-SA Ratio

Although the 1:1 SOD ratio is not practical throughout the DEA, the success of SOD suggests that a better analyst-to-agent ratio based on a number of conditions other than simple head counts would improve operations. (For more information, see Section 3.2.9.) The DEA Review Team recommends that the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence (NC) and the Chief of Operations jointly sponsor a study to ascertain the best balance, especially at the Field Divisions. With the support of DOJ and ONDCP, the findings should be included in the DEA Congressional strategy and submissions to OMB. The additional analysts that may be realized by utilizing this approach are needed to support growing priority investigations, new financial investigations, counterterrorist obligation, and the new regional strategic analysis effort that will develop threat priorities, identify drug-trafficking trends and patterns, and provide predictive Intelligence based on all-source analysis. (For more information, see Section 3, Organizational Structure and Alignment, and Section 8, Program/Budget Development and Allocations.)

4.3.4.2 Recommendation on “Analyst Handbook”

Continue rapid development of an “Analyst Handbook.” This handbook should complement the Agent Manual (not repeat sections) and should provide the Intelligence perspective on issues central to Intelligence policies, processes, and procedures. It is critical to obtain OC concurrence and to reinforce the operational boundaries established in the handbook.

4.3.4.3 Recommendation on Sanitizing DEA Intelligence

Continue with the Reports Officer effort to establish a set of procedures for sanitizing DEA information. This process should be the first action taken by DEA HQ on all incoming DEA Form-6s and cables and should turn nonwarning information around within 24 hours of receipt. There should be a continuous review of incoming information, with the intent of further disseminating such information to other LEAs and Intelligence agencies.

4.3.4.4 Recommendation on National Security Process

DEA should continue supporting National Security issues other than narcotrafficking. Narcoterrorism is an option for any drug-smuggling organization. The same organizations that smuggle drugs and people easily can use their concealment operations, money-laundering processes and logistics capabilities to support international terrorist organizations, and to smuggle weapons or terrorists into the U.S. The DEA must solidify and institute procedures to ensure that terrorism information it obtains is shared with other LEAs and Intelligence agencies efficiently and expeditiously.

4.4 COLLECTION AND REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT (CRM)

CRM is an essential step in the intelligence process, especially in the identification of intelligence gaps in the general knowledge base. The CRM process has three subcomponents: (1) requirements determination, (2) tracking, and (3) tasking. The objective “to-be” model should be a highly automated process that analyzes, receives, records, and tracks requirements for information and collection and merges them through a single front-end Web-based portal. Requirements would include those associated with ongoing cases, information needed to support cross-case development, and requests to fill gaps in the general

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knowledge base on drug law enforcement operations. Planning and managing this proactive aspect of the requirements determination process is best done collaboratively with the IAs and SAs working together to define the issues.

CRM, however, is not part of current DEA Intelligence procedures. Within the IC, Collections Management and Requirements Management are distinct functional attributes of the Intelligence cycle. Collection management is a rigorous all-source process. The primary collectors and processors are the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for mapping- and imagery-derived information, the National Security Agency (NSA) for Signals Intelligence, and the CIA and DIA for HUMINT. Each agency has a collection management organization that centralizes requirements and then feeds them into a central requirements process. DIA represents the Defense IC in the requirements process at the national level.

Requests for Information (RFIs) are requirements for analyzed or finished Intelligence, usually in the form of a paper, report assessment or DB compilation. These RFIs are normally processed by the analyst community (DIA, the Military Service Intelligence Centers, and the Unified Commands). Within DoD, these requests usually go through equally rigorous processes of validation and assignment, based on previously established collection objectives for each collecting activity. As with collection objectives, they are either considered satisfied and closed, or they are modified and updated, and a new set of RFIs are developed. The Defense IC uses the Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers (COLISEUM) system to process RFIs.

4.4.1 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Virtually all information requests within DEA are made on a person-to-person basis and the closest that the DEA gets to manage a collection requirements system is the Title III requests and operations TRACKER system used at SOD. The DEA Review Team did not find support for the IC’s more rigorous management systems; however, there was an understanding of the value for a management system that could help direct case-specific collection of information. The DEA may not require an extensive CRM system; however, it does need a process and methodology to assess the information available, identify information gaps, and task the appropriate authorities to fill these gaps. This process is an essential part of the new DEA Intelligence model that divides Intelligence production among the HQ, Field Divisions, EPIC, and NDIC. Each production unit will depend on other units for pieces of their production process. For example, Strategic Analysts at the Field Divisions will produce assessments of the drug activities in their divisional area. These assessments, in turn, will be used by NDIC to build state, regional, and national domestic assessments. Subsequently, these NDIC assessments will be merged with CNC international information at DEA HQ to provide national policy and decisionmakers with the total drug picture—from the U.S. streets to the overseas production areas.

4.4.1.1 Recommendation on a CRM System

The DEA should institute a CRM process and intelligence gap identification methodology within NC and in collaboration with OC. A Web-based system could be hosted on Firebird and Merlin and serve as the main requirements and production coordination mechanism for the proposed DIPP. The DEA Review Team recommends that DEA evaluate DIA’s COLISEUM system to determine if this system can be modified for DEA purposes. NC should institute procedures for developing an analytical methodology that assesses information available and what additional information is needed to provide a full picture of the target. The U.S. Army uses the term “Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space” for this discovery process. It should become a part of the BIRS training and be used as an Intelligence gap analysis tool for case development. When establishing a collection management process, DEA must synchronize it with the IC.
4.5 DEA RELATIONSHIP WITH LEAS AND THE IC

The DEA is one piece of a complex web (Figure 4.3) of Intelligence and LEAs that support U.S. policy. The relationship it has varies significantly with each agency. Officials in all organizations contacted by the DEA Review Team believe that the DEA has an in-depth knowledge of the drug-smuggling business, especially in the U.S. These officials appreciate whatever information DEA can bring "to the table" at various meetings. Particularly valued is DEA's drug-related input supported by data obtained from its extensive field network.
DEA’s operational work is assessed as a distinct contribution, citing the Signature Program and the Breakthrough studies on source crops as two representative examples.

4.5.1 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The LEAs and the IC place high value on the counternarcotics support provided to them by DEA. Many of these organizations, since September 11, 2001, have experienced a marked shift in resources away from counternarcotics, as well as from other areas, to activities concerned with counterterrorism. With a smaller staff covering counternarcotics, many law enforcement groups responsible for that mission find themselves relying more on DEA. One official even commented that the border inspectors are now looking to DEA because of a lack of information from other sources. Several LEAs appeared to be counting on DEA and others in the IC to compensate for their deficiencies in staff and drug-related Intelligence. Some suggested regular briefings on “new developments” in the fight against drugs. In essence, they wanted more support and greater interaction with DEA.

In general, the LEA community and IC believe that they receive requested information from the DEA in a timely manner. Overall, law enforcement officials think that DEA’s responses to their information requests are accurate and thorough. The IC, on the other hand, believes that the responses provided, although generally good, sometimes suffer by not incorporating Intelligence from other data sources. In addition, many in the LEA community and IC realize that they are receiving answers only to their specific RFIs. Some opine that a DEA Web-based system with controlled access would likely provide valuable information not only on drug trafficking but also on other National Security issues. Some officials indicate that various IC members already have gone to such a system (Inteliink) to make a substantial part of their published information available to customers.

4.5.2 INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

Both the LEAs and the IC agree that the DEA Administrator and Assistant Administrator for Intelligence are strong proponents of sharing information among the LEAs and Intelligence agencies. IC, and in particular other LEA, officials also realize, however, that the LEA culture does not easily facilitate multi-agency information sharing. Numerous interviewees believe that if upper management is not able to obtain cooperation from large segments of the DEA, fully implementing this change will be very difficult.

Moreover, to some LEA and IC officials, it appears that the DEA does not have a standard way of disseminating large volumes of information expeditiously to the LEAs and IC. Officials from both groups indicated that meetings and other periodic personal contacts with DEA officials are currently the most effective, albeit time consuming, means to augment the information that the formal production system provides to them.

IC officials also voiced concern that the DEA appears to be sharing some data occasionally with select law enforcement organizations but not with them. One example cited was “Panama Express,” an operation in which the DEA and FBI appear to be sharing information only between each other. In this instance, the IC is able to obtain access to some data by making specific RFIs to DEA. Although the timeliness, thoroughness, and accuracy of the responses are highly regarded, they do not meet the standards for what some in the IC consider an acceptable information-sharing environment.

4.5.3 DEA’S VIEW OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IC AND LEAS

In general, survey results “mirrored” the responses obtained from interviews conducted by the DEA Review Team. Survey results, for example, indicate that the relationship with the IC was usually good but
needed improvement. For example, less than 40 percent of respondents rated the “effectiveness of their relationship” with the IC as moderately good or better (Figure 4.4).

These results may be skewed somewhat by an extremely high percentage (33 percent) of “no opinion” responses, suggesting that many IAs and SAs really had not worked with the IC.

On the other hand, DEA respondents believed that their relationship with their law enforcement counterparts was far better. Some 80 percent of respondents indicated that “cooperation” with them was moderately good or better (Figure 4.5).
The DEA Review Team's personal interviews with IAs and SAs, however, revealed that, while informal relationships are indeed excellent, information sharing still remains a problem.

### 4.5.4 Relationships with SOD

Virtually everyone in the Washington, D.C., area, especially in the IC, mentions SOD as one of the best components in the DEA. SOD also is viewed as one of the components that is the most forward looking in terms of sharing and coordinating intelligence data with others. One member organization of the IC that is most concerned with Strategic Intelligence is most appreciative for the assistance being provided to them by SOD. This IC member indicates that most association with the DEA is via SOD, which occasionally provides it with DEA Form-6 cable information and e-mail streams. It cites the following benefits due to its association with SOD:

- SOD information provides "leads" that are vital to its operations.
- SOD personnel are highly effective in the Linear Committee.
- SOD personnel provide superb insights into targets during their meetings, allowing this IC member to provide superior, relevant reports and general support for takedowns.
- Based on the results obtained from this association with SOD, this IC member is considering the use of videoteleconferences to interact with SOD personnel more often.

### 4.5.5 DEA Interagency Agreements

Although various interagency documents address information sharing, some LEA and IC officials believe that most of these documents simply define roles and respective responsibilities for the involved parties rather than promote real intelligence sharing. One IC member also believed that some Country Offices may not be willing to follow these information-sharing guidelines.

### 4.5.6 Nondrug Intelligence Operations

LEA and IC officials are about evenly divided as to whether DEA values and supports nondrug-related missions, such as counterterrorism. There are those who believe that DEA is aware of National Security issues and either has already factored them into its daily work patterns or is in the process of doing that. These officials point out that information from DEA's regular counternarcotics operations spills over to other venues, such as counterterrorism and the smuggling of people—either illegal aliens or terrorists—into the U.S. On the smuggling issue, they further point out that the DEA already has provided information on illegal aliens, especially in the Southwest area of the U.S. The extent to which the DEA is providing information on counterterrorism to the IC or other LEAs, however, is less clear.

Conversely, there are others who perceive that DEA is not making a concerted effort to introduce National Security issues into its training curriculum. These officials also believe that DEA participation in other National Security venues, especially those dealing with counterterrorism, is woefully lacking. One LEA official mentioned that DEA appears reluctant to become involved with counterterrorism, perhaps considering it of little relevance or value to its principal mission.

### 4.5.7 Observations and Recommendations

The DEA Intelligence Program has made major steps forward in improving its relationship with the IC and LEAs. This has resulted in highly successful joint operations and a number of other significant cooperative achievements. These include operations conducted by the JATFS, Panama Express,
KINGPIN and SNOWCAP. Nevertheless there is much that can still be done to further improve these relationships and achieve even greater success.

4.5.7.1 Recommendation on DEA Intelligence Briefings

DEA liaison and other off-site personnel need to recommend DEA briefers to their host organizations. These briefings could be scheduled on a periodic basis.

4.5.7.2 Recommendation on Use of Web-Based DB System

The DEA should strongly consider implementing a Web-based DB system (similar to Intelink) to promulgate at least some of its National Security and/or counternarcotics-related information, as well as its Intelligence reports.

4.5.7.3 Recommendation on Reporting Integrity

The DEA should carefully monitor field units to ensure that all collected Intelligence data on counternarcotics and National Security issues is reported to HQ, with a view toward rewarding those individuals and units performing the best.

4.5.7.4 Recommendation on “Information-Sharing” Evaluation

The DEA should explore making “information sharing” a part of the evaluation of all SACs.

4.5.7.5 Recommendation on Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs)

The DEA should ensure that its work in formulating MOAs and MOUs will promote information sharing among the agencies.

4.5.7.6 Recommendation on “Reports Officer Program”

The DEA should guide and carefully monitor the progress that the “Reports Officer Program” is making in discerning how much information is releasable to the IC and other LEAs. In addition, DEA should determine how much of this information pertains to counternarcotics and how much relates to other National Security issues. It is anticipated that a direct and immediate means of distributing any data found to be of critical importance will be implemented.

4.5.7.7 Recommendation on National Security Training

The DEA must ensure that courses on National Security issues, other than drugs, are incorporated into the DEA training curriculum. The DEA should take full advantage of the National Security knowledge and education gained by DEA SAs graduating from the Armed Forces war colleges and the IAs graduating from the Joint Military Intelligence College, Post Graduate Intelligence Program. A select group of these graduates should be tasked with designing courses tailored for DEA SAs and IAs. A comprehensive understanding of what National Security means is paramount to fully understanding how DEA’s Intelligence capabilities can support overall U.S. National Security.

4.5.7.8 Recommendation on Counterterrorism Liaison Officers

The DEA should send IA Liaison Officers to all principal counterterrorism groups, such as the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC). By doing so, the DEA will be kept abreast of available counterterrorism-related Intelligence data—especially in its countries of interest—and the key issues that
are confronting the Washington-area policymakers. This also will help the DEA make sure that it is providing all pertinent, important counterterrorism-related data.

4.5.7.9 Recommendation on Combining Data Systems

The DEA, in addition, should explore the possibility of combining data systems that are largely duplicative and share the Intelligence placed in those systems among the participating agencies. The current CONCORD effort appears to be headed in this direction for DEA systems. This could become a baseline model for consolidation of duplicative DBs among all of the Drug IC.

4.6 DEA AND GCIP

4.6.1 Drug Intelligence Coordination

The DEA does not stand alone in the Drug Intelligence world. Although it is the lead agency for drug law enforcement, other agencies also are involved. Because of this, the DEA cannot afford to operate unilaterally. To be effective in its mission, it must interface, coordinate, and share information with its drug law enforcement and Intelligence agency partners. This interface requires a set of policies, procedures, and processes that are interagency in scope. For the most part, these provisions are covered by the GCIP, which was approved in 2000 by eight cabinet officials and the President. In addition to a cabinet-level Policy Guidance and Oversight body composed of the eight Cabinet officials, the GCIP provides for a subcabinet-level CDICG to implement its provisions and provide a forum for resolving Drug Intelligence issues among the member agencies. In addition, the CDICG is the only interagency body that provides guidance and direction of NDIC and EPIC. This is a vital function, given the criticality of these two centers in ensuring that Drug Intelligence information is being coordinated and shared among various governmental agencies.

4.6.2 CDICG

Although not permanent, one co-chair of the CDICG has always been the DEA Assistant Administrator for Intelligence. This co-chair provides an excellent vehicle for the DEA to play a leading role in the national Drug IC. The importance of this role cannot be overestimated. It provides the DEA with the opportunity to drive Drug Intelligence issues across Government and to ensure that there is a minimum of duplication. More important, it can resolve interagency issues, particularly regarding information sharing, and direct scarce national counterdrug resources to the most effective purposes as commonly agreed to by the members.

4.6.2.1 Recommendation on DEA's Drug Intelligence Leadership Role

The DEA must continue to lead the CDICG to ensure that interagency Drug Intelligence issues are surfaced and addressed; that DEA HQ, NDIC, and EPIC produce quality products; that ONDCP resources are distributed fairly and equitably across multiple agencies to ensure maximum national benefit; and that duplication of Drug Intelligence reporting and production is reduced to a minimum.

4.6.2.2 Recommendation on Drug Intelligence Coordination

In its role as the lead drug LEA and co-chair of the CDICG, the DEA must, at all times, consider the wider Drug IC and coordinate its Drug Intelligence policies, processes, and procedures to ensure that there is a synchronized national Drug Intelligence collection, production, and dissemination process.
4.6.2.3 Recommendation on the CDICG

The CDICG should be retained to provide guidance and direction to the National Drug IC and for interagency guidance and direction of NDIC and EPIC. The DEA should market CDICG's usefulness to other agencies and strengthen it by scheduling regular and ad hoc meetings. It should use the CDICG forum to discuss and resolve all Drug Intelligence policy issues. It should continue to ensure resource allocations provided through ONDCP are used only on projects that benefit multiple agencies.
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5 PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This section discusses the products and services provided by DEA Intelligence, and assesses the alignment of these products to an expanded National Security mission. Briefly, this section discusses DEA's current Intelligence production and makes recommendations on the future production processes involving a collaborative agreement among DEA HQ, EPIC, and NDIC. For the purpose of this assessment, the recommended production program is entitled DIPP. In addition, this section addresses the role of DEA Intelligence Liaison Officers and makes recommendations on how to best implement this initiative.

5.2 PRODUCTION

DEA's main Intelligence products received mixed reviews in the law enforcement community and IC. Production is managed at HQ by NPMP, which has a good production management program that reviews the required products and develops an annual production plan. This process tends to produce set-piece recurring products that generally fall into the following three categories, which align with the functional areas of DEA Intelligence:

- **Strategic**—Primarily listed in the NPMP annual plan, these products include ad hoc items that support the DEA Administrator’s reports to Congress, speeches, and meetings. At the Field Divisions, strategic analysis is sought after, with SACs (e.g., New York) stating that they needed dedicated Strategic Analysts to provide the “big picture” for their area of responsibility (AOR) and to produce the QTTR. Typical strategic recurring products include:
  - Country Drug Briefs and Profiles
  - Drug-Specific (e.g., PCP) Reports

- **Investigative**—With the exception of the NI organization, investigative reports, in the form of DEA Form-6s, cables, and other products, are produced overwhelmingly at the Field Divisions and result from case development and informant debriefings.

- **Tactical**—Normally produced by EPIC, these reports are predominately compilations of information received from state and local LEAs and include issues received by the Watch.

5.2.1 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In general, officials in LEAs and the IC want products on important issues that are predictive, reliable, and well presented. LEAs and the IC, however, have differing assessments of the current value of DEA Intelligence products.

LEA officials interviewed by the DEA Review Team assess DEA Intelligence products as very good. Officials responsible for covering narcotics issues for their respective LEAs expressed particular interest in DEA reports that cover trends in regional areas like Colombia and Afghanistan; contribute information on smuggling drugs or illegal aliens/suspected terrorists across borders; and products that discuss the possible whereabouts of suspected criminals and fugitives. When asked to be more specific, however, these officials were unable to recall the names of any publications. One official admitted that he had little time for reading; instead, he relied on his DEA Liaison Officer or analysts to bring important narcotics issues to his attention.
IC officials interviewed by the DEA Review Team believe that DEA Intelligence products are largely mediocre, offering little information of new interest for consumption. These officials believe that some products seem to suffer from a lack of quality analysis. One official considers these products to be "strong on color but too rote." The IC, in general, prefers DEA's strategic products. Most officials, however, admit that they have seen few, if any, tactical or operational Intelligence documents. In the assessment of many IC officials, DEA Intelligence products that incorporate data acquired by its extensive cadre of SAs in the field—such as reports on the "Signature Program"—and by those in foreign countries where DEA's presence is high are distinct areas of strength. These officials also endorse those products that report on narcotics-related usage in the U.S.

Officials in the IC, and to a lesser extent the LEAs, believe that the DEA must do a better job marketing its products. Some officials suggest that the DEA should pay more attention to Washington-area policymakers and the law enforcement community and IC rather than just its agents. Another official indicated that the DEA simply lacks a systematic, or dynamic, way of distributing its information to policymakers and Washington-area counterparts. All LEA and IC officials interviewed by the DEA Review Team essentially agree that there is room for improvement.

DEA Intelligence consumers interviewed by the DEA Review Team indicate that they also receive narcotics-related products from organizations within the IC. Except for areas in which the DEA has a particular strength—for example, reports on domestically produced specialty drugs—consumers prefer the IC product.

About 45 percent of survey respondents believed that DEA Intelligence reports are very useful, while another 30 percent believe that they are at least moderately useful (Figure 5.1).

![Figure 5.1. How useful are DEA Intelligence reports?](image)

This represents 75 percent of respondents and indicates a high value in contrast to the above. It must, however, be kept in mind that the survey question was very general, conveying all types of reporting from DEA Form-6s to strategic assessments. Moreover, the vast majority of respondents were the producers, not the consumers, of these reports.

The value, quality, and production methodology of DEA strategic production requires further study. In general, the interviews indicate a need to improve the timeliness and quality of the content.
5.2.1.1 Recommendations on Production Improvement

The DEA Review Team recommends that the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence begin an outreach effort to Washington-based law enforcement and Intelligence organizations. In addition, the DEA should:

- Increase its ongoing dialogue with Washington-area policymakers about their "requirements" on narcotics and other National Security issues. Then, a program should be implemented that will ensure that the DEA provides them with reports that satisfy their requirements in terms of relevancy and timeliness.

- Implement a defined production coordination process to help focus limited resources on the key issues facing policymakers in the areas of narcotics and other National Security concerns where the DEA can contribute.

- Institute training that provides IAs with methodologies for doing different types of analysis—especially predictive techniques and methodologies—and that familiarizes SAs and IAs with various issues of National Security, in addition to the current issues involving illicit drugs.

- Expand coauthoring papers with others in the IC. In the DEA Review Team's view, the DEA should expand coauthoring domestic strategic reports on narcotics with NDIC. NDIC's current reports could benefit substantially from the timely, extensive data that is obtained by DEA's extensive network of SAs and IAs in the U.S.

5.2.1.2 Recommendation on Strategic Reports

Continue producing these reports; however, direct them toward customer needs. Customers should be surveyed annually to ascertain their requirements for DEA products. The DEA should work closely with NDIC to create a collaborative production environment that creates strategic reports that are informative as well as predictive in content. See Section 5.3.1 for a discussion on the proposed DIPP. Restructure strategic reports to meet customer requirements, to compel the analyst to take a chance on illuminating real trends and patterns in the material, and to produce predictive Intelligence.

5.2.1.3 Recommendation on the QTTR

Keep the QTTR and continually review format to ensure it is providing the right metrics for use by DEA HQ. Limit reporting to 10 pages. Rely on tables and charts to highlight metrics/evaluation criteria and the verbiage to let the SACs tell their story. Consider making it a semiannual report that is compiled by the Strategic IA at each Field Division.

5.2.1.4 Recommendations on DEA Form-6

Review incoming DEA Form-6s and cables for content value and clear writing style and capture the time it takes to make these reports available to the general reader at HQ. Consider using the "cable" as a vehicle for analysts to express new ideas, make observations across cases, and share their analysis with other analysts. The "6s" are the law enforcement life blood for DEA. DEA Form-6s, combined with the more free-form cables, allow SAs and IAs to create the case knowledge to aid in the apprehension and eventual incarceration of drug traffickers. They also serve as the basis for strategic production at the Field Divisions and HQ. Recurring themes on DEA Form-6s include improvement of the content and writing styles and speeding the processing of DEA Form-6s at HQ.

Apparently the indexing of items, such as names and numbers, contained in DEA Form-6 creates a 3- to 4-month backlog of DEA Form-6 posting to M-204.
5.2.1.5 Recommendation on Creating Virtual Products

All DEA reporting should be built and designed for electronic posting. The DEA should institute a digital production process that places extensible markup language (XML) tags on products and paragraphs and allows for near-real-time posting on Webster and the Internet. Printing should occur only for requests that cannot be satisfied by an electronic version.

5.3 DEA PRODUCTION PROGRAM

Under the commitments made in the DEA-NDIC Joint Initiatives memorandum, there is a real opportunity to parcel out drug law enforcement Intelligence production, using all DOJ resources. Of those agencies and organizations charged with a counternarcotics mission, the DEA and NDIC have the majority of the resources: money, labor, and talent. These elements produce Intelligence reports that often are indistinguishable by consumers in the field. In addition, there is overlap in the production that is generated by both organizational elements on such topics as specific drugs, transportation capabilities, and drug prices.

5.3.1 RECOMMENDATION ON INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

The DEA and NDIC should enter into an enterprise-level Intelligence production program (Figure 5.2). This DIPP would treat both the products and the personnel assigned as enterprise resources. The key elements of the program include:

- DEA and NDIC Intelligence personnel would be assigned to Washington, Field Divisions, and Johnstown.
- Strategic Analyst positions at Field Divisions would be created and staffed by NDIC/DEA personnel. As Figure 5.2 indicates, they would be responsible for developing area strategic assessments and guiding collection by the Field Program Specialist. These analysts would produce the Field Division Strategic Report (perhaps a reconfigured QTR) that would address all cases managed by the Field Division.
- Strategic Field Division reports would be sent simultaneously to DEA HQ and NDIC to serve as the basis for other collaborative products.
- Production would be a collaborative effort until all parties are confident in one another’s ability to produce accurate, timely cogent Intelligence. With few exceptions, all finished Intelligence would use the DEA and NDIC seals to illustrate the joint nature of the production. The following division of labor is offered as a starting point:
  - NDIC would produce national-level domestic strategic Intelligence reports (by state, region, and nation), primarily based on the strategic reporting from the Field Divisions and through direct access to DEA information on Firebird and Merlin.
  - DEA HQ would merge these reports with IC and DEA Country Office reporting to produce a comprehensive picture of the drug threat, including trend predictive assessments and foreign involvement. In addition, DEA HQ would provide direct support to the DEA Administrator but could task NDIC for information.
  - EPIC would produce its compilations and specific analytical assessments on drug transportation methods, biographies of drug personnel, and similar tactical assessments.
  - ONDCP would direct a joint NDIC/DEA lead in developing the annual National Drug Threat Assessment.
A Joint DEA-NDIC production committee, based on the NPMP model, would meet quarterly to decide on production of other drug-related Intelligence.

Production of domestic drug reports would be divided between the DEA and NDIC. The DEA NPMP would lead the DIPP effort and be responsible for the production schedule and printing options. NDIC would be the primary producer of hard-copy products, and NPMP would move to host virtual production.

- Field Program Specialists are NDIC employees located throughout the U.S. who provide information on local and regional drug issues. They provide followup contacts to the annual NDIC drug surveys and also produce Field Contact Reports that cover a multitude of functional areas—from drug use through health systems assessments and correctional information.
5.3.2 RECOMMENDATION ON PRODUCT IDENTITY

The need for consumers to rapidly identify the new drug law enforcement products is important. The DEA and NDIC should consult with a graphics/visualization company to design a cover/content format for rapid identification of DIPP products.
5.4 SERVICES

As stated in the preceding section, other LEAs and the IC generally believe that they receive specific information requested from DEA in a timely manner. Overall, the LEAs believe that DEA responses to specific information requests are accurate and thorough. The IC, on the other hand, believes that while the responses provided generally are good, they sometimes suffer from not incorporating other Intelligence data sources. In addition, many in both communities realize that they are receiving answers only to their RFIs—strictly on a “pull” basis.

5.4.1 ACCESSIBILITY TO DEA INFORMATION AND DBS

The consensus is that DEA DBs and information are not accessible—at least not directly, according to the LEA and IC officials interviewed by the DEA Review Team. Many indicated that they need an interlocutor—an IA Liaison Officer on site, or some other DEA employee—to access the information on their behalf. As possible exceptions, one LEA official indicated that his office had access to DEA DBs through SOD and EPIC. It is not clear, however, if this access is gained through their own onsite personnel. The extent of this access is not clear either. Several LEA and IC officials believe that there is a great deal of information that is useful in the DEA Form-6 cables that is not being used by anyone. Recently, the DEA initiated a Reports Officer Program to determine the utility of using the DEA Form-6 cables to discern the extent to which information on counternarcotics and other National Security issues can be shared with others in the IC for analysis purposes. The expectation is that this effort will provide a great deal of data that prove to be very useful either immediately or to postevent analysis.

The OFC is another DEA undertaking that possibly will provide an increased volume of Intelligence to LEAs and the IC. Unfortunately, details of how this Center actually will provide data have not yet progressed to the implementation stage.

5.4.1.1 Recommendation on Access to DEA Data

See Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.

5.4.2 OVERLAPS IN SERVICES WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Almost all LEA and IC officials interviewed by the DEA Review Team indicated that DEA services overlap, to various degrees, with the services of other organizations involved in counternarcotics issues. Among the organizations mentioned were the following:

- NDIC—The organization most often mentioned was NDIC, whose primary mission is to produce strategic domestic Drug Intelligence assessments. According to other LEA and IC officials, the two organizations seem to overlap on domestic Intelligence issues. Although the DEA is responsible for the mission, some officials commented that the DEA has the existing network of domestic field assets, access to the Washington policymakers, and a great deal of experience on the subject matter.

- FBI—Both the FBI and DEA conduct drug investigations and have similar drug law enforcement jurisdiction. DRUG-X, a joint DB managed by the DEA, provides each agency with the ability to determine if the other has information that may be relevant to their investigation. DEA’s contribution to this is a subset of NADDIS information called NADDISX. The FBI input is referred to as FBlX. This, however, does not appear to allow a full exchange of investigative data that would be useful for both DEA and FBI IAs.
ICE—Under broad statutory authority, ICE conducts investigations of persons and organizations suspected of smuggling illicit items into the U.S. Since this includes drugs, there are operational overlaps. There is little duplication, however, within the respective intelligence components due to the refocusing of ICE intelligence almost entirely to the homeland security mission. In addition, any overlaps or duplication of effort are ameliorated by the continuing DHS/ICE participation in EPIC operations and management and through such joint activities as the HDTAs, OCDETF, and JTFs.

OFC—Although there may be overlaps with OFC, this fact is still unclear. LEA and IC officials interviewed stated that they are still waiting to learn more about the FC's envisioned capabilities and their access to OCDETF member agency DBs. No National Security information other than counternarcotics will be in OFC DBs.

Using the survey functional matrix (Figure 5.3), survey respondents identified the Intelligence functions that they believe are being performed at DEA HQ, EPIC, SOD, the OFC, and NDIC. From this data, it appears that EPIC and the OFC are providing or are expected to provide tactical 24x7 Watch support. In addition, both provide, along with SOD, tactical interagency access. NDIC and NT were identified as the primary strategic Intelligence producers; and NDIC, SOD/NS, and NI were seen as principal providers of investigative Intelligence (including DOCEX) support. This supports the interviews with regard to NDIC-DEA overlaps and the possibility of overlaps between EPIC and the OFC. It also supports the finding that investigative Intelligence may be unnecessary at HQ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence Function / Organization</th>
<th>NDIC</th>
<th>DEA NT</th>
<th>DEA NI</th>
<th>DEA NS</th>
<th>SOD</th>
<th>EPIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical 24x7 Watch</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Interagency access</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative (including DOCEX)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 5.3 FUNCTIONAL OVERLAP MATRIX (STATED IN PERCENTAGES ADDRESSED BY EACH ORGANIZATION FOR EACH INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION) (NOTE: BRIGHT GREEN INDICATES HIGH VALUES)**

Most Washington-area officials are unsure if the overlaps are useful. Some opine that a certain degree of overlap may be unavoidable and venture that this overlap may even be helpful. It is generally accepted that if the responsibilities of all parties are clearly delineated and understood by all, the amount of needless redundancy can be minimized.

5.4.2.1 **Recommendation on Overlaps in DEA Services**

See Section 2, Vision, Mission, and Functions, and Section 3, Organizational Structure and Alignment.
5.5 DEA INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICERS

The SOW asked the DEA Review Team to assess "the nature, effectiveness and organizations of assignment of Intelligence Program liaison personnel." To some extent, this became irrelevant since there was only one official liaison position at CNC. A similar position is maintained at JIATFS; however, that job is not listed as a liaison position. The issue is confused further by the fact that SAs who may not be part of the Intelligence Program sometimes are assigned as liaisons. In addition, the DEA Review Team examined existing relationships to assess not only the level and degree of interagency cooperation but also the utility of these arrangements for enhancing the professionalization of DEA analysts.

5.5.1 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Universally, LEA and IC officials are positive about the services of DEA liaison and onsite DEA SAs and IAs. Comments run from very good to excellent, with all officials being very pleased about the fact that onsite DEA personnel are knowledgeable about the counternarcotics mission and its goals and objectives and have a good working knowledge of the host organization's role and responsibilities. They are able, therefore, to contribute almost immediately after they report for duty. Some LEA officials who were interviewed indicated that they rely heavily on the counternarcotics information that onsite DEA personnel bring to their efforts. In particular, community officials cited the following advantages:

- DEA onsite personnel have access to DEA DBs and are able to occasionally provide new and essential counternarcotics information.

- DEA liaisons, and occasionally the onsite SA and IA, help high-level managers and others in the host organizations stay abreast of all relevant and important counternarcotics data.

- DEA liaisons provide the host organization with access to the DEA for filling Intelligence gaps.

- DEA personnel often play a key role in counterdrug community activities, especially in the Linear and Linkage Committees.

DEA personnel, including IAs, are assigned to various HIDTA task forces throughout the country. Some are referred to as DEA liaisons and some are not. Regardless, their contribution was highly valued at those HIDTAs visited by the DEA Review Team. They are not only critical to coordinated operations but also can ensure the flow of local information essential to identify regional trends and patterns and assess the drug threat.

In those instances where a DEA SA is providing onsite support, DEA operational support is judged to be superb, especially in instances where the host organization must obtain field-specific information or "access to field assets" for joint operational activities.

In summary, DEA liaisons and other onsite personnel are judged to be doing an excellent job. Those organizations that did not have a DEA liaison or an onsite SA or IA expressed a strong desire to have one. In fact, the LEAs, including HIDTAs, and the IC agencies seem to want more support across the board, not only in the Washington area but also in the field – including at the Embassies and Consulates.

To develop analysts to their full potential, they can benefit greatly from rotation into other law enforcement and Intelligence assignments. Liaison with, and similar or related positions in, other agencies provide this opportunity. To be effective, however, the assignments must be career enhancing, and promotion of those assigned to these positions should be closely monitored by the senior DEA leadership.
5.5.1.1 Recommendation on DEA Intelligence Liaisons

DEA liaisons and onsite SA and IA programs provide Washington-area consumers with a number of advantages and should be continued and expanded. In addition to the current Intelligence liaison and support positions at CNC, consider assigning additional DEA Intelligence personnel to the HIDTAs and to the DIA, NSA, DHS/Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), USCG, ICE, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), JATFs, and DoD activities with drug interdiction support missions. NC personnel should be assigned as the embedded or exchange IA.

5.5.1.2 Recommendation on IA Exchanges

In addition to the liaison functions, DEA/NC should expand the IA presence in the law enforcement community and IC. These IAs should be coded as “Embedded or Exchange IAs.” They would work in other organizations in analytical positions that complement their DEA career path. Although they would serve as the touchstone for access to DEA Intelligence, they would not be considered solely as Liaison Officers. Many law enforcement and IC organizations would welcome the inclusion of a DEA IA in their Latin America and/or counternarcotics offices. The best model would be an exchange of analysts, with law enforcement and IC IAs moving between the two communities and among the agencies. Both Firebird and Merlin capabilities would have to be installed at the various participating agencies to support the embedded DEA IAs and provide access to key DEA Intelligence.
6 IT SYSTEMS AND APPLICATIONS

6.1 IT ISSUES AND APPROACHES FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS SUPPORT

6.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The DEA has excellent HQ IT personnel who now are very well managed according to enterprise planning methods, including Capability Maturity Model-based standards and practice. A stable of vendors provides products, product support, maintenance, and other services to HQ, and to Field Divisions. EPIC and NDIC use vendors, in the same way, for support and integration of their own Intelligence analysis systems. DEA HQ IT personnel take responsibility for managing the design and integration of its Intelligence support systems. This responsibility is divided between the DEA CIO, who has charge of SBU systems, and the Deputy Assistant Administrator, NS, who has management charge of classified systems. Classified systems are better funded than are unclassified systems, and the technology level of classified systems leads unclassified systems by a substantial margin. The classified program, in particular its communications exploitation component, is on track and appears to be effective. It is using state-of-the-art Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) capabilities. Technology sharing for Intelligence analysis from the classified systems side seems to work well based on good personal and professional relations and crisscrossed career path job experience by IT personnel in the two areas. Time permitting; technology sharing is extended, when requested, from HQ IT to analyst support in the field. Although interoperability is achieved system by system, it must evolve in the future to be a consistent part of Intelligence enterprise IT planning.

6.1.2 GENERAL IT ISSUES

DEA Review Team Field Division visits indicate that there are both near- and long-term challenges in IT capabilities and processes limiting the full empowerment of IAs in the Drug IC. In the near-term, issues and shortfalls that may be considered include the following:

Data Validation. New data are entered into DBs at the Field Divisions, EPIC, and NDIC/RAID without strong and consistently enforced validation processes for format, content, reliability, and accuracy. In addition, once data are entered, it is not clear how data integrity is maintained.

6.1.2.1 Recommendation on Data Validation

Analysts should have a larger, defined responsibility to review and comment on data. They should be provided with a standard toolkit to do data correction and consistency checking, as well as to easily cross-check information among cases for data verification. In addition, the “pedigree” of data should be clearly indicated and visible, with flags and dates that automatically indicate who has seen and altered data and when.

Common Case Management Tools. The content of cases seems fairly well defined: details about persons, places, events, timelines, assets, and agent/agency participation. The LEA community, however, has not been able to standardize a case management format for (1) developing consistency in making initial entries; (2) providing updates; and (3) tracking cases through the entire submission cycle of investigation, prosecution, and disposition. In addition, data in cases are not separated by what is sensitive and restricted (typically personal information) and what is shareable (usually event and asset information).
6.1.2.2 Recommendation on Common Case Management Tools

The DEA needs a standardized case management tool that supports agent and expanded analyst roles in accessing, updating, annotating, and exploiting case data throughout the case life cycle. Ideally, case formatting should be organized to contain sensitive law enforcement information like names and CS references in a restricted space so that the broader content of cases can be scanned by analysts, especially those working on strategic problems. Standard cross-case comparison tools are especially needed, and a collaborative workspace for case analysis should be attached to the case management tool.

Standardized Data Entry. DEA Review Team Field Division visits revealed that a significant portion of analyst work time is committed to nonanalytic functions of manual data capture, review, preparation, and entry. Data comes to them piecemeal, in a variety of formats at physically diverse locations for pickup (e.g., multiple electronic templates and media, FAX, document, cable, and phone calls).

6.1.2.3 Recommendation on Standardized Data

Developing and disseminating standard electronic data formats for use by DEA sources, and reducing as much as possible nonstandard formats and media input, would reduce mechanical work and increase the time available to field analysts for analysis tasks. Establishing and tasking a Tiger Team to find ways to improve data input efficiency throughout DEA HQ, Field Divisions, NDIC, and EPIC would pay large dividends in improved analyst productivity.

Classified versus Unclassified Data Usage. DEA Review Team Field Division visits revealed that many analysts were afraid to use classified information at all—so concerned were they about inconvenient access, inadvertent security violations, and the real value for analysis tasks. The best form of analysis, however, would use classified and unclassified IT systems, as well as special-purpose systems, for communications analysis. All three systems are physically separate with functional and security constraints on the transfer of data. Analysts need a more efficient, integrated IT operating environment.

6.1.2.4 Recommendation on Data Classification

In the future, guard technology for high-to-low data transfers and browse-down capabilities to unclassified intranet and Internet, in addition to low-to-high capabilities, should be considered for Intelligence dissemination and unclassified data access. This generalized COTS-based guard technology—already successfully demonstrated in DoD operational Intelligence applications—has been certified and accredited for use by analysts across two security levels (e.g., for a DEA analyst, this may be for SBU and SECRET or SECRET and TOP SECRET). These analysts should be migrated to security-high work environments and to workstations that are linked to lower security DBs by one-way COTS-based guard technology that only permits data flows from low-to-high security. In this environment, analysts can be supported with an integrated analyst Graphical User Interface (GUI) that would provide access to all necessary data. This approach would have to be implemented with additional cyber security technical protections to ensure that computer viruses are not introduced via the low-to-high software guard connection.

Analyst Tool Mix. DEA Review Team Field Division visits revealed a mixture of organization display, case linkage and mapping, time line visualization, case management, and data retrieval tools that sometimes were not well integrated for easy use. Hosted on various classified and unclassified systems (but not both at any location visited), these tools were not always readily accessible to analysts who needed them.
6.1.2.5 Recommendation on Analyst Tool Mix

It would be useful to standardize tools and toolset configurations for recognized applications and the system on which they are hosted. Standardization should be based on a further survey of analyst functions and work patterns. There should be a bias to place analyst tools first in the classified environment. In the longer term, there are IT architectural issues and tradeoffs that must be considered in light of mission priorities and policy implications, both for the DEA and its partners. (For more information, see Section 2, Vision, Mission, and Functions.)

6.1.3 IT Systems Issues

The DEA Review Team detected several problems with unclassified legacy systems, as well as with classified systems, important to Intelligence analysis. In addition, there are questions about how these systems can interface and exchange information to enable an analytic all-source environment for Intelligence analysis. Sections 6.1.3.1 and 6.1.3.2 present the observations and recommendations for maximizing the potential for these systems, both separately and together.

6.1.3.1 NADDIS

NADDIS is the preeminent indexing legacy system for Federal, state, and local task force drug investigations. Through its support of data analysis and lead generation—by sharing current and historical Intelligence data generated by DEA investigations—NADDIS is the primary mechanism for searching DEA investigative information on people, businesses, or addresses. Moreover, it is the first system to be checked by DEA SAs and IAs researching new investigations. In addition, the FBI, ICE, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and state/local law enforcement officers assigned to DEA task forces have access to NADDIS. Now containing more than 5.7 million records, NADDIS makes more than 3,000 DB changes on a daily basis. Last year, more than two million inquiries were made into the NADDIS DB.

The need for near-real-time parsing and injection of data from voluminous DEA-produced reporting requires a NADDIS contract. As the DEA modernizes its information-sharing systems and supporting architecture, NADDIS and its 28-year investigative DB must be upgraded to improve administrative and operational efficiencies. In addition to the essential system hardware and software upgrades, the DB itself must be converted and rehosted to improve productivity in the areas of records updating, storing, retrieving, comparing, and sharing.

6.1.3.2 Recommendation on NADDIS Modernization

Provide additional personnel to support NADDIS upgrades and DB conversion and rehosting to support increased productivity. This modernization is an essential element in the operation of OFC to provide real-time information checks and case notifications.

6.1.4 MERLIN

Merlin is the legacy backbone classified Intelligence system for the DEA, providing secure, enterprise-level connectivity that facilitates the rapid transmission of sensitive information from other Federal organizations to the DEA. At SOD, Merlin access is provided to collocated LEA partners, including the FBI, ICE, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), NDIC, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), and National Guard Bureau. Currently, Merlin is deployed to domestic Field Divisions and throughout the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Asia.
In addition to classified messaging and e-mail capabilities, Merlin provides DEA users with direct access to enterprise systems and tools to support DEA investigations and Intelligence analysis. By the end of FY2004, the DEA will have deployed 1,045 workstations to 158 sites (117 domestic and 41 foreign).

6.1.4.1 Recommendation on Merlin

Establish a 4-year replacement cycle and maintenance program to ensure that Merlin continues to provide timely, accurate Intelligence to the DEA and other Federal and state organizations working with the DEA.

6.1.5 Speedway

Speedway is a multi-agency program that provides Field Offices, through SOD, with target information on major DTOs and the methods by which these organizations conduct their illegal activities. Speedway uses unique, highly specialized software applications on a network of supercomputers, microcomputers, and high-end workstations to process, parse, and display large volumes of data. The data are assessed for their relationship to key drug operations, and the resulting analysis is sanitized and presented to IAs and enforcement agents for further exploitation.

6.1.5.1 Recommendation on Speedway Program Enhancements

Provide Speedway with additional IT and analytic personnel to support increased requirements for counterterrorism support. In addition, acquire additional source data and upgrade existing equipment.

6.1.6 Internet Investigative Support

As DTOs continue to use the Internet, it is anticipated that DEA's Internet-related case load will continue to increase. It is operationally imperative for DEA's Internet investigative approach to empower and provide the field with the necessary tools to investigate an Internet target from beginning to end without compromise. A pilot program in the Atlanta Field Division to support Internet-related investigations has been successful. NS and SOD continue to invest resources in Internet training for field personnel who, however, lack the necessary analytic and operational tools to utilize what is learned in training.

6.1.6.1 Recommendation on Internet Investigative Support

Provide personnel, including analysts, to establish a virtual private network (VPN) that will enable field personnel to develop, identify, and investigate Internet targets safely, effectively, and efficiently.

6.2 Concord

CONCORD is the future IT enterprise architecture for DEA, hosted on and networked via Firebird or Merlin (still to be determined). It is intended to consolidate data and data stores throughout DEA, Field Divisions, EPIC, and NDIC and to evolve into single entry of data to populate all relevant DEA DBs. In addition, it will develop single query capabilities for all attached DBs. CONCORD will standardize data access and tools for data exploitation and will operate in a work environment governed by policy-based business rules and disciplined, tracked, and audited processes. CONCORD will move DEA IT from a legacy mainframe backbone (M204) and batch transaction processing to an internal Web and portal system supported by enabling Web services. These services will be provided by means of a user-customized "dashboard" providing direct data access through the portal to users, subject to authorization via an automated privilege management function. PTARRS, currently a case prioritization and resource management tool that could be expanded to support PTO analysis, will be a key DB that will be included in and supported by the CONCORD enterprise architecture. The DEA will standardize and consolidate all
internal business and management data and work processes in CONCORD. Several questions of interest about CONCORD's potential for Intelligence analysis support are as follows:

- To what extent will CONCORD's Web access and portal features be extended to support IAs and provide them with direct data access? This architecture is efficient and enabling for the Intelligence Analysis Section (IAS).

- Will CONCORD be linked to classified systems using low-to-high guard technology to support IAs? Or, as in other cases at the DEA, will there be a shadow CONCORD system operating on Merlin, with bulk data transfers from a baseline unclassified CONCORD system? An IT architecture with a fully deployed guard technology may make it possible to consolidate Firebird and Merlin SECRET-level requirements in one network.

- Will CONCORD be funded and supported sufficiently to keep pace with the emergent needs of Intelligence analysis? The promise of CONCORD architecture to enable all DEA business and mission processes is very high; however, the planning and resources assigned to its realization appear to be lagging.

6.3 CENTRALIZED VERSUS DISTRIBUTED ARCHITECTURES FOR ANALYSIS SUPPORT

The DEA collects most of its data through agents operating in 237 domestic offices throughout the U.S. and 80 foreign offices in 58 countries. Ideally, the DEA, its partners at the foreign, Federal, state, and local levels, and the Drug IC broadly should have access to all relevant data for analyst access and use. One extreme model for responsive IT support is to bring all data to a central physical location; cleanse, standardize, format, tag, and store it; and provide an integrated toolset for exploitation on site or remotely by all authorized Drug IC members. This would be done in a CONCORD architecture, using portal access and Web services on the internal DEA network. Results of individual queries and value-added analysis would be archived centrally for all to use. This approach, although seemingly ideal for analysts, has the following real-world drawbacks:

- It would be tremendously expensive for capital investment, upgrade, and support.

- Data duplication would require constant synchronization between collector DBs and those in the new center.

- It would be difficult to realize because of classification and data ownership concerns.

- One super center could pose survivability and continuity of operations risks.

6.3.1 DECENTRALIZED ALTERNATIVE

A preferred alternative may be a variant of a more decentralized approach. Collectors of data are best able to validate, groom, and maintain integrity for their data. Wherever possible, data should reside with its owners who will maintain it for authorized use by all Drug IC analysts. Under this model, there may be a centrally accessed toolkit that authorized analysts would use to develop single query forms for data mining the distributed DBs. The only DBs that might be held centrally would be those that archive value-added analysis done by national centers against all distributed data. This approach, although more practical, must address a number of issues as follows:

- Distributed DBs must be unified and data must be prepared by owners according to a common format that supports single query data mining by a centralized toolkit. What standard formats,
tools, and query forms will be used, and how will this development effort be managed, implemented, and paid for among Drug IC organizations?

- Alternatively, distributed data could be left in its owners' original data formats; however, queries would have to be translated and tailored, using data-specific tools for each DB to be searched. Then, retrieved data would have to be formatted and standardized either centrally or by analysts at their locations. With so many possible formats and variations in data quality, there may be data correlation problems.

6.4 MIDDLEWARE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL FOR DATA

The LEA model for information sharing, as discussed earlier, is based on ownership and close control of data and negotiated access through a Query and Response model. Currently, negotiations occur site by site and perhaps DB by DB. Another model uses COTS middleware that provides graduated data access automatically and according to consistent policy and business rules. It uses far fewer person-in-the-loop "watchers and checkers," while preserving options for directly managing and monitoring data access and use on a case-by-case basis. This automated approach would be especially well suited for providing centralized or distributed access control for all DEA analysts operating worldwide in a distributed data stores environment. It could be introduced as a management layer and interface in existing and planned production nodes in the Drug IC. It would, where permitted, automatically provide the negotiation services that the Query and Response model does only with human intervention. Where not permitted, it would engage a human actor in the standard Query and Response role. Figure 6.1. depicts one hypothetical construct for this Access Control Level Middleware (ACLM).

![Diagram](Figure 6.1)
For purposes of illustration, Figure 6.1 covers the following functional capabilities:

**ACLM Manager (ACLM2).** This module exercises overall control, prioritization, sequencing, and coordination of all operations and transactions conducted by other modules in the ACL Middleware application. It has a control interface to the Communications Manager (not shown) that receives user queries and provides them with data, reporting, and coordination services from the Intelligence assets and production center(s) that ACLM2 supports.

**User Identification and Authentication Manager (U&AM).** The analyst would use/submit appropriate identification—based on anything from password, PIN, common access card, and soft token, to public key infrastructure certificates and multifactor biometrics tokens, or any required combination of these. The U&AM would compare submitted identification data to a User Directory to authenticate identity and confirm that the query is from a legitimate user. The User Directory would contain all information about a user, including complete identification, job series/rank, role(s), organization, location, task force or working group memberships, and clearances. There also may be required identification data supplied for the terminal device and location used by the analyst for other levels of verification, authentication, and authorization. Under direction of the ACLM2, authentication information would be passed via U&AM module to the following:

- **Query Interpreter & Manager (QI&M).** Based on successful authentication, the query would be parsed by the query parser and mapped by the DB Search List Generator to relevant DBs requested in the query or contained in a Drug IC DB Directory. The DB Directory would contain meta-tagged descriptors of data in all Drug IC DBs, as well as their structures and protocols for access and search. This information would enable the DBSGL to estimate not only DBs but also domains in the DB likely to pertain to the query. Then, the Multiple DB Query (MDBQ) generator would use that information to formulate appropriate queries specific to each DB. It would build a package for each query, starting with tailored MDBQ for all relevant DBs. Modules that follow in the ACLM would sequentially add information about access, usage, and coordination restrictions as the query package advances in the management workflow toward execution. Then, QI&M passes control to the ACLM2, which would task the DB Access Manager (DBAM).

- **DBAM.** Based on successful authentication and selection of DBs for search, the DBAM, linked to the User Directory and the DB Directory, would task the Data Owner Rules Director to check for and tag associated analyst permissions, based on role, rank, agency, security access, and any other organizational factors from the User Directory, and compare these against restrictions and conditions in the DB for Data Owner Rules, for each Intelligence DB that must be queried. These would be added to the query package and control would then be passed to the Production Center Rules Director to compare the query data access requirements against general restrictions and qualifications associated with the production center and information community servicing the query. These conditions too would be added to the query package. Both Directors could collaborate to add rules about how data are to be used, not just accessed, using Digital Right Management features. These rules, enforced in a software wrapper (attached to the query package) in which data would be placed and sent to the query source, could, for example, impose upon the query source data usage rules like Read Only, View Only XX Times, Share Only With, Retain Only XX Hours, etc. This additional set of restrictions would be flagged and tagged for monitoring, measurement, and review. Then, the DBAM would pass control of the expanded query package and its rule set from the Directors' modules to the ACLM2, which would task the Access Mediation and Tracking Manager (AM&TM).
AM&TM—The AM&TM receives a query package with data access and handling restrictions attached, as well as the identification of DBs that should be accessed to service the query. The AM&TM tasks the Coordination and Deconfliction Rules Director to review the query package against its operations rules to determine from the list of required DBs that can be (1) accessed directly, (2) accessed directly with automated passive notification to data owner and/or operations elements, and (3) accessed following active coordination between query source and data owner and/or operations elements. The AM&TM will see that contact information is exchanged for data accesses requiring active coordination, flag any shared data that requires use and user tracking by the DB owner, alert any others who have queried for and downloaded the same data, archive the transaction history for each query, and provide alerts concerning new queries or data updates to all. Next, the AM&TM will transfer control to the ACLM2, which will task the Query Execution and Coordination Manager (QE&CM).

QE&CM—The QE&CM passes tasking to the Data Flag and Usage Tracker, which consolidates all handling instructions and restrictions for the query package and its software wrapper. The Data Retrieval Director uses the query package to establish links to listed DBs, coordinates data searches and retrievals, and leaves flags with query source identity, contact, and data usage with each data owner. The Query Correlator and Data Archiver (QC&DA) consolidates all the data and prepares reporting. In addition, it either stores copies of the retrieved data or flags or links to its sources in the production center that the ACLM2 supports. Under direction of the QE&CM, data and coordination information then is packaged and relayed to the Data Dissemination Manager, which forwards it to the query source. The QC&DA archives all aspects of the query service transaction for later auditing at the production center.

ACLM functionality, conceptually described above in a hypothetical application, is available now in COTS products that can be configured and integrated to support information sharing with and within an individual Intelligence production node. It also can be installed among all nodes in the Drug IC IT enterprise to promote streamlined information sharing among all analysts. There are significant, even compelling, advantages to increasing automation using ACLMs in the process of managing analyst access to data throughout the Drug IC as follows:

- It provides access under disciplined, consistent business rules directed by the owners of data and general Drug IC data usage standards. Business rules for data access can be changed or updated easily, universally, and reliably on very short notice as requirements and relationships among participating agencies change. By comparison, the Query and Response model is arbitrary, personality based, and not fully predictable in how it will be implemented or updated.
- It frees analysts and agents from query help desk and low-end data research functions so that they can take on higher end analysis work.
- It will provide analysts with quick access to the considerable body of data that does not require deconfliction and coordination before use, permitting them to pursue and test data-driven hypotheses directly.
- It provides a baseline and tools for establishing and operating a trust-based infrastructure for the Drug IC. Initially, data owners will be stringent and highly controlled in granting access. Over time, as personal, professional, and interagency relationships grow closer, the drive for direct data sharing will grow. ACLM will easily accommodate changed and relaxed business rules on sharing while providing accurate and timely data user and use tracking. A trust-based infrastructure will help DEA Intelligence effectiveness grow with the inevitable evolution in information sharing, for analysis of complex drug targets and National Security threats.
It will provide an audit structure that will enable development, implementation, and aggregation of MOEs to estimate the value of information and the effectiveness of those who provide it. This could provide meaningful input to personnel annual performance evaluation.

**Collaboration for Analysis**—The sheer volume and variety of its available data, the growing complexity of the drug threat, and the critical need to respond to National Security threats will force the DEA to embrace more direct and efficient access to its data and to increase the numbers of eyes and minds it deploys to high-end analysis functions, especially for strategic and National Security problems. Better use of IT, especially automated ACL Middleware as discussed earlier, will make it possible to redirect more analysts to high-end analysis tasks. Like the IC, the DEA will discover advantages in analytic collaboration on high-end problems—"more of us are smarter than one of us." There are a variety of COTS products that can improve collaboration and support collaborative working approaches. These can include IT COTS products that can be included in the CONCORD architecture and hosted on the Firebird and/or Merlin intranet and can provide virtual collaboration by means of:

- Chat/bulletin boards
- Instant messaging
- Whiteboard workspace
- Web seminars/conferences
- Collaborative production tools.

COTS collaboration tools are easier to implement than the corresponding analytic workflows and work processes that make best use of them. To make best use of collaboration tools and direct data access, DEA Intelligence managers must reinvent analyst business processes.

6.5 **OCDETF/FC—IT CONSIDERATIONS**

6.5.1 **INTRODUCTION**

The most significant new initiative now underway for the Drug IC is establishment of the OCDETF/FC. OCFC is intended to build on the recognized success of SOD and the technical effectiveness of communications exploitation by the Office of Special Intelligence (NS), which support SOD. The OCFC will (1) extend this technical and operational approach in parallel to exploit all-source, all classification case information, financial data, and other data types, and (2) fuse independent databases from the participating agencies and use it with communications exploitation information to deliver the best integrated Intelligence support for investigations and strategic analysis.

The need for a new drug community Intelligence center is predicated on beliefs that (1) most of the voluminous noncommunications drug case data (excluding Title III-related case information) and almost all of the related financial data are either poorly or scarcely coordinated, and other open data sources have not been adequately integrated for analysis, (2) applying powerful IT capabilities for data concentration and data mining to this data will provide critically valuable new linkages, organizational understanding, and target leads for investigations, similar to the success of this technical approach with communications data, and (3) placing this capability under the operational management of SOD will ensure support of the OCDETF agencies and deconfliction of their product information. All OCDETF members except ICE have signed on fully to this approach and have committed to share needed data to support it. In addition, the IC will provide Intelligence data under a range of classifications, and there will be a number of commercial data sources accessed as well.
6.5.2 OFC CONOPS

Data will be aggregated at the Center, in *ad hoc* ways at first, and later—ideally—from DOJ Law Enforcement Information System (LEIS) architecture standard "data marts," operated by each OCDETF agency. Data will be "cleansed," standardized, formatted, loaded, and stored in the OFC data repository that will consolidate OCDETF DBs. Data loads will be done incrementally and based on change conditions whenever possible to limit burdens on processing and communications. Cyber protections and low-to-high guards will be used to move OFC data to a classified system to support all-source processing by authorized OFC analysts. The overall OFC technical architecture envisions a data interface, a user interface, a data warehouse/repository, and an applications logical space. These will each be cyber-secured, compartmented as needed for security, and redundant.

In response to tasking, OFC will produce target profiles, leads, and various Intelligence products concerning drugs and other criminal activities to include counterterrorism issues of interest to OFC participants and subscribers. Analysis in the OFC will involve three functions: (1) proactive queries on identified CPOT, RPOT and priority targets of investigation, (2) work on case and investigation-related queries, submitted by authorized analysts or agents of the OCDETF member agencies to SOD, and (3) work on strategic Intelligence issues. Some OFC analysts and agents will be provided under OCDETF funding. Others will be detailed from OCDETF agencies. SOD will be the operational control point for query access, OFC tasking, and Field Query Responses (FQRs) in support of OCDETF agency analysts external to OFC. SOD will communicate with OFC on DEA's classified Merlin network and will disseminate FQR data at appropriate classification, and by means of suitable communications to query sources.

SOD will assume responsibility for coordination and deconfliction of cases linked by textual data sources, as it does for cases linked by communications data. SOD will also be the operational control point for strategic Intelligence activities, and will coordinate appropriately with strategic entities including NDIC. There will be no direct access by external analysts to OFC data and data mining tools. The precise relationship and permissions between NDIC Strategic Analysts at OFC and Strategic Analysts at NDIC and other external locations at DEA HQ and in the field are not clear.

6.5.3 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the probable advantages to Intelligence analysis against drug, other criminal, and National Security threats, the OFC mission—full fusion and exploitation of all-source data—appears to be worthwhile and well justified. There are, however, concerns and tradeoffs in how the OFC mission may best be met and implemented. All concerns relate to the ways and means by which information is shared. How data are shared in the OFC will decisively influence information-sharing standards throughout the Drug IC.

**Query and Response versus Direct Data Access.** According to its CONOPS, OFC is evidently not going to provide external analysts with any direct data access whatsoever. In fact, external analysts will have no direct contact with OFC analysts at all, without any opportunity to collaborate on investigative problems and organizational targeting. All contacts will be through SOD staff in the standard Query and Response model. SOD will not be engaged in mediation for strategic Intelligence analysis, but will continue in a coordination role.

The consequence of this operational approach for the OFC is that the analysts with the very best all-source data and data mining tools in the Drug IC will not be free to collaborate directly with Field Division analysts and agents who have the greatest need for assistance in cross-case analysis and investigations. Instead, the OFC will serve mainly as a large data research center, and its analysts will do
their best to deliver responsive data products to the Field Divisions while working at arms length through SOD intermediaries. It is likely that the strategic analytic problem at OFC will drift into the same operational mode, substituting NDIC interees in OFC for SOD staff intermediaries. Strategic Analysts outside the OFC may not benefit significantly under this arrangement.

Despite recognized inhibitors in data sharing among agencies shared data access and IA collaboration are absolutely required if the DEA is to gain the agility and knowledge to support its complex, expanded mission.

The arguments likely to be raised against analysts having direct data access and collaboration with OFC have been previously discussed, and counterpoints specific to the OFC case are presented below.

- Much of the data in the OFC will require special handling due to classification, sensitivity, or privacy; however, a great deal of the data will not. At least these data classes should be directly accessed by analysts throughout the Drug IC. Other classes can be made directly available by prior agreement on sharing terms and conditions reflected in automated business rules for access and segmented formats for use.

- Analysis of communications data may require special techniques and expert analysts. The same is not true, however, of text data, the major new source of data in OFC. Standard OFC data mining toolkits should be accessible and operable remotely by any analysts in the Drug IC. If they are not, the OFC data stores architecture, data mining tools, or analysts were selected poorly.

- Production coordination, but not deconfliction and operations coordination functions, are needed for strategic analysis. In many circumstances for investigations and case access, sharing rules and responsibilities can be prenegotiated and implemented under automated business rules.

- All DEA Field Divisions will have access to Merlin, the network standard for OFC. There should be no technical interface issue for analysts throughout the Drug IC in accessing OFC.

- OFC required response times for navigational and simple queries must be seconds, and complex queries must return results in minutes. In a Web and portal operating environment such as CONCORD, OFC should be able to take advantage of required scalability to avoid query saturation and support external data access effectively. A machine, and not a human intermediary, should take responsibility for prioritizing and scheduling query processing.

There are important reasons—legal, security based, and operational—to control and monitor access to data in OFC. The above counterpoints, however, illustrate that the LEA Query and Response model, relying on direct SOD mediation in all cases, is not the only way for this to be done.

What appears to be missing in the OFC architecture is a Trust Management Layer (TML)—using the ACLM model discussed earlier. ACLM is what external analysts from anywhere in the Drug IC should see when seeking direct access to OFC data and direct collaboration with OFC analysts via a Web and portal architecture connected to Merlin. ACLM would be operated by SOD, which would arrange data sharing rules with OCDETF stakeholders and data owners and implement these rules for automatic execution in ACLM.

ACLM would manage at least three broad classes of access to OFC data and would facilitate analyst collaboration as follows:

- **Direct Data Access.** In this class, data are general purpose and reference or users have "gold card" access. SOD does not have to monitor access and use based on any data owner interest or
need for coordination/deconfliction. ACLM is programmed to provide the query source with
direct data access.

- **Direct Data Access with Passive Monitor.** Data are made available for direct access based on
prior arrangements with the data owner or on identity and permissions of the query source. SOD,
however, must observe data access and use for possible coordination and deconfliction
requirements that may be pursued later. ACLM, which is programmed to provide the query
source with direct data access, also attaches flags identifying query source information and tags
data with usage details.

- **Data Access with Active Monitor.** Data are made available conditionally for access per data
owner instructions, but only with SOD direct mediation with query source. ACLM is
programmed to facilitate contact and to attach flags identifying query source information and tags
data for usage details when SOD is authorized to facilitate data access to the query source.

- **Analysts Collaboration Management.** ACLM, with various levels of SOD oversight and
intervention, can coordinate, schedule, and facilitate analyst collaboration virtual resources and
ensure that the right analysts are notified and engaged to work on the Intelligence analytic issue.

ACLM would need automated identification and authorization capabilities to be implemented; however,
the drug law enforcement community—indeed the entire Federal law enforcement community like the
rest of Government—is headed in that direction anyway. ACLM buildout could start with an
identification/authentication core, with the other functions previously discussed being added
incrementally.

The main advantages of adding a TML to the OFC Intelligence IT architecture are that it could:

- Give all Drug IC analysts better, timelier access to the best data and data mining tools.
- Facilitate and support effective analyst collaboration throughout the Drug IC, using virtual
resources.
- Provide consistent implementation of data-sharing business rules—first at OFC and ultimately
throughout the Drug IC.
- Reduce the number of human monitors ("watchers and checkers") and data researchers, and
increase the number of IAs throughout the Drug IC who can concentrate on high-end IA
problems.
- Extract maximum operational advantage from the large OFC investment.

If implemented, the TML at first probably would be programmed by SOD to require its active
participation in most data access and collaboration transactions. Over time, as trust is established among
OCDETF stakeholders in OFC, the business rules for data sharing and analytic collaboration will grow
more permissive, and these changes can be automated in ACLM for execution. As all of the Drug IC turns
to Web and portal IT architectures, the TML, implemented in ACM at OFC, can be added at all the
Drug IC production nodes. When Intelligence analysis is fully mature, the TML using ACLM is the key
element that can make possible a Drug IC IT enterprise that networks all analysts for data access and
collaboration.

**Data Warehousing and Data Mining Approach.** In the OFC IOC, data will be down-selected and
transported from its owners to the OFC for preparation, loading, archiving, and exploitation. In the full
operational capability of the future, per DOJ LEIS architecture plans, data owners may post their data,
properly formatted according to DOJ XML or other standards, to data marts for retrieval and use by the
OFC. In all likelihood, however, the OFC will have to deal with a mix of data formats among data owners. An alternative approach to centralized data retrieval and storage at the OFC is for the OFC to export queries tailored to data format and organization at each of the data owner’s locations, and retrieve a much reduced set of relevant data for preparation, loading, and exploitation at the OFC. This approach will leave data in the hands of its owners to groom as they do best, reduce the volumes of data that must be transmitted to and mined by OFC, and reduce data synchronization problems between OFC and data owners. In one implementation of this concept, the OFC would permanently store only the value added analysis generated from this data, but maintain flags and links back to the data owner and to the original data and data sources used for the OFC analysis.

6.5.3.1 Recommendation on Data Warehousing

OFC planning should consider carefully whether centralized data storage and universal data reformatting is needed or whether a hybrid centralized and decentralized data storage concept would be more cost effective, especially in handling data of different classifications and sensitivities.

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) Role and Leveraging. Initial plans for OFC assumed collocation with and technology transfer from the FBI FTTTF Center. In operation, this also would ensure that any Intelligence analytic nexus developing between the drug and terrorist threats would be quickly recognized, shared, and exploited. Plans have changed, however. First, space concerns forced OFC planning to separate physically from the FTTTF.

6.5.3.2 Recommendation on FTTTF

DEA Review Team information is incomplete about FTTTF and its potential for support by OFC. Compatible IT architectures and a close operational and technical interface for data sharing with FTTTF, however, appear indispensable if the DEA is going to respond effectively to its expanded Intelligence role in National Security. The OFC relationship with FTTTF must be reexamined and revitalized.

Classified/Unclassified Data Handling and Fusion Analysis. Beyond NS/SOD and IC supporters, the DEA Review Team found few examples of effective fusion of unclassified and classified information by drug community IAs, especially for Strategic Intelligence problems. In OFC, there are plans for a classified DB (with all available unclassified and classified OFC data), a dedicated processing system, and specially cleared analysts for all-source data exploitation. With this approach, there will be continuing doubts about whether analysts without complete classified data access are generating fully accurate analytic products. DEA Review Team interviews indicated, moreover, that the SCIF supporting communications exploitation currently has chronic staffing problems and difficulties in connecting and reporting all sources of information—classified and unclassified—required for analysis. In short, there is likely to be a fault line between the two classes of data and the procedures for gathering and exploiting them within OFC and its external subscribers.

6.5.3.3 Recommendation on Data Handling

To avoid security boundary discontinuities, it would be preferable for the OFC to have only one all-source classified network and all personnel cleared to operate in a classified data environment. Then, SOD would be charged with sanitization and dissemination functions, although OFC analysts would have report templates with security tear-lines and automated classification aids to assist SOD.

OFC Development and Acquisition Process. Several ODETF working groups are defining OFC technical requirements, CONOPS, MOUs, data sources, and program goals. The DOJ CIO is developing the program plan and managing the actual procurement. DEA Acquisition will ensure that the stakeholder
requirements and technical experience of SOD/SID are properly factored into OFC development. Since pertinent SID technical expertise is concentrated in only a few senior people and OFC technical requirements documentation is sparse, there is a real risk that DEA Acquisition will deliver a system that was asked for but not the one that was wanted.

6.5.3.4 Recommendation on OFC Development

The OFC requires a systems architect, requirements analyst, and systems engineer to work with OFC stakeholders, technical staff, DOJ COTR, DEA Acquisition, and vendors to provide program planning, technical continuity, and tracking assurance that the IOC and Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the OFC will effectively support the OFC mission.

Alternative Approaches to OFC Configuration. Based on this recommendation, it is clear that the main architectural degrees of freedom in the final configuration of OFC include the following alternative approaches to OFC configuration:

- **Access Control**—How Drug IC analysts access OFC data, tools, and analysts, directly or through intermediaries, or via automated means, or some combination of all these.
- **Query Formulation**—What roles analysts and OFC will take separately or cooperatively in framing the query and translating for vagaries of individual DBs.
- **Tools Distribution**—Where tools will be held, centrally by OFC or remotely by data owners, whether standard tools or tools tailored to various data sets will be employed, and whether tools will be deployed permanently or exported for each transaction.
- **Data Storage Distribution**—What the balance will be between data that reside with and are groomed by owners and what is provided in whole or part to OFC; and how OFC handles value-added analysis and overhead data generated in its tasking.
- **Data Cleansing and Standardization**—What the balance or responsibility will be for data cleansing, standardization, and formatting by data owners and the OFC.
- **Analyst Distribution**—What the distribution of analysts will be between the OFC and existing production centers in the Drug IC.

Table 6.1 presents four alternative approaches to OFC. Left to right, these are as follows:

- **Current OFC**—No outside analyst directs data access and limited analytic collaboration. All analysts with access are OFC integees. This use is Query and Response, to maximize data control via SOD.
- **Federated OFC**—Graduated levels of analyst access, regulated via the TML with SOD mediation according to automated policy and business rules for data, users, and use. Analysts are networked in and out of OFC for collaboration. Data are held and shared throughout the federation.
- **Service Center OFC**—The OFC is virtual. There are no OFC analysts; all analysts work in existing production centers. SOD uses TML to observe and mediate access among OFC subscribers to their respective data and DBs. All are networked for graduated levels of analyst access.
- **Strategic/Service Center OFC**—For investigative support, this is exactly the same as the pure Service Center OFC. This alternative, however, concentrates the entire strategic problem in the
OFC and networks data from other production centers to support consolidated strategic analysis in this OFC model.

**TABLE 6.1: FOUR ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO OFC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFC Alternative Architectural Approaches</th>
<th>Current OFC (limited collaboration)</th>
<th>Federated OFC (broad collaboration)</th>
<th>Service Center OFC (no collaboration)</th>
<th>Strategic Service Center OFC (strategic collaboration)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access Control</strong></td>
<td>Query and Response only via SOD; no direct data access from outside OFC.</td>
<td>TML services for direct data access and reportback, observed and mediated by SOD for internal, external query sources.</td>
<td>TML services for direct data access and reportback, observed and mediated by SOD for external query sources.</td>
<td>TML services for direct data access and reportback, observed and mediated by SOD for internal, external query sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Query Formulation</strong></td>
<td>Query evaluated and prioritized by SOD; formulated by OFC for processing.</td>
<td>Query received in various formats from source, put into tailored format for each DB, and queued for processing in OFC, or for export to other DB owners.</td>
<td>Query received in standard format from source, put in MDBQ format, queued for internal processing, or for export and processing.</td>
<td>Query received in standard format from source, put in MDBQ format, queued for internal processing, or for export and processing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tools Distribution</strong></td>
<td>All tools concentrated in OFC.</td>
<td>Various toolsets held by owners of each DB. OFC query is tailored for each DB and each toolset available for DB.</td>
<td>Standard toolsets exported from OFC to respective data owners to process MDBQ for each DB.</td>
<td>Standard toolsets exported from OFC to respective data owners to process MDBQ for each DB. Same standard tools used for internal OFC processing and analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Storage Distribution</strong></td>
<td>Raw data in OFC replicated from data owners. OFC original data are archived analysis of raw data for investigations and strategic problems.</td>
<td>Raw data in OFC replicated from data owners. OFC original data are archived analysis of raw data for investigations and strategic problems.</td>
<td>Data owners hold all original/raw data to be searched. OFC archives MDBQ and retrieved data only.</td>
<td>Data owners hold all original data to be searched. OFC archives MDBQ and retrieved data for investigations. OFC original data are archived for strategic analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Cleansing and Standardization</strong></td>
<td>All replicated data cleansed in OFC.</td>
<td>Data may be cleansed either at OFC or by certain data owners according to common standards.</td>
<td>OFC cleanses all retrieved data before forwarding and archiving.</td>
<td>OFC cleanses all retrieved data before forwarding and archiving.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.1: Four Alternative Approaches to OFC

<table>
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<th>Strategic Service Center OFC (strategic collaboration)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyst Distribution</td>
<td>OFC analyst teams supporting external queries for investigation, also doing strategic analysis.</td>
<td>Federation analysts external to OFC, and OFC analyst teams collaborating on investigations, strategic tasks.</td>
<td>No OFC analysts, no analysts. All analysts at existing production centers and locations. OFC is SOD with TLM and archiving for queries and data retrievals.</td>
<td>OFC analysts work only on complete strategic problems—strategic domestic and international and strategic regional. All IAs are external. For them, OFC is service center.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With these six dimensions of OFC architecture, it is possible to envision still other alternatives for OFC. It is important to consider the full range of choices for OFC design and the way that design will affect information sharing within the Drug IC before fixing on a particular approach. Even within the current OFC concept, it would be possible to insert the TML to provide the technical infrastructure for OFC, over time, to implement fuller information sharing with OFC and within the Drug IC.

6.6 EPIC AND NDIC—IT CONSIDERATIONS

The other major production nodes in the Drug IC are EPIC and NDIC. Any Intelligence IT enterprise architecture must address their as-is and current to-be architectures, as well as their potential for information sharing. Below is a thumbnail description and assessment for each.

6.6.1 EPIC

EPIC Mission—EPIC provides tactical Intelligence to a range of regional, state, and local law enforcement elements, using its internal EPIC Information Data (EID) and drawing on data and DBs available through agency partners and their representatives assigned to support EPIC. Through its multi-agency 24x7 Watch, EPIC provides rapid response to law enforcement queries for information to support operations (e.g., seizures and interdictions), and some secondary analysis developed by its R&A Watch sections.

IT Description—The EPIC Information System (EIS) supports EID in an Oracle DB environment, the standard for all EPIC managed DBs. EID has extensive unclassified DBs containing extensive archival information on events and entities dating from 1973. EID information is tagged and archived from data collected through seizure and interdiction operations like Pipeline, Jetway, and Convoy; from data shared from its partner agencies; from fraudulent document exploitation; and from EPIC-10 reports that record queries, responses, and other followup serviced by the EPIC Watch for its clients. Other data available to EPIC include that from Zones of Drug Intelligence Activity (DB for drug threat indicators along the Southwest border) and the National Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System. The EPIC Automated Message Handling System (AMHS) processes DEA classified and unclassified cables from GESCAN for Intelligence support.

Partners provide vital information support. The DEA provides EPIC with access to the Case Status Subsystem (CAST), Central Reference System (multiple commercial and Government data sources),
TOLLS, NADDIS, and Shared DB and Query System. In addition, the DEA provides EPIC with access to the Firebird (SBU) and Merlin (SECRET) networks. The Department of the Treasury provides EPIC with access to the Treasury Enforcement Communications System II (TECS) (automated enforcement and inspection computer system concerning subjects of enforcement interest). The FBI provides access to the National Crime Information Center and to its Automated Case Support system. ICE, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Bureau of Prisons (BOP), USCG Office of Naval Intelligence, IRS, USMS, ATF, and U.S. Secret Service all offer access to select data and DBs through their EPIC onsite representatives.

EPIC has two internal network configurations for analysts and Watch standers: (1) A single terminal accessing Firebird and EID (unclassified) systems, using a keyboard-video-mouse (KVM) switch to toggle between them, and (2) a single terminal accessing Merlin and EID (classified) systems using a KVM to toggle between them. EID (classified) includes EID (unclassified) daily uploads combined with GESCAN cables via AMHS, and other classified information. The single terminal in each workstation supports a multiple DB query (MDBQ) capability in an X-Windows environment. MDBQ can simultaneously query EID, and external DBs, including NADDIS (DEA), TECS (Treasury), Central Index System (ICE), Aircraft Registration System (FAA), and Sentry (BOP). There are no data mining tools to support EPIC other than those that are available standard with MS Office, and Oracle DB products.

Future IT Plan—EPIC IT is committed to convert the EIS into a Web-based architecture with portal access to consolidated DBs and an expanded MDBQ capability. In doing so, it will incorporate and demonstrate CONCORD-based Web access and portal architectures, and probably use the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System for secure access with its state and local clients if the latter are converted to TCP/IP standards. Development of the Web-based architecture will be conducted incrementally with a small audience, and when successful, will be expanded in phases to all its subscribers.

EPIC has a number of plans for specific upgrades to its EID system. These include addition of comprehensive query results built on an expanded MDBQ capability; automated analytic toolkit; Geographic Information System (GIS) capability; improved cyber security features, especially for Intrusion Detection; automated business rule implementation; single entry for data across all DBs; data push based on data tags and alerts when data fields are altered or refreshed; and wireless for law enforcement field subscribers.

Data Sharing/Compatibility—There will be continued human mediation at EPIC for most of its tactical subscribers because of their demanding time lines and their assumed limited ability to retrieve data in the multiple DB EPIC data environment. Other external subscribers may be provided direct data access, as will all internal users.

Assessment—Currently, EPIC does Intelligence research (data retrieval for query response) but almost no Intelligence analysis. It has no analysis tools or toolkit. It does, however, have access to a range of valuable data, either its own or that of its agency partners. Moreover, it is on a path—although under funded—to transform its inadequate IT to a Web and portal architecture based on DEA’s CONCORD. Its IT planners still assume that access to the data will be mediated.

6.6.1.1 Recommendation on EPIC IT

With a CONCORD-like backbone, EPIC would be an excellent candidate to prototype a general purpose ACTLM approach to automate mediation and data access electronically for its subscribers.
6.6.2 NDIC

Mission—NDIC provides strategic drug analysis and products concerning the domestic drug threat. Products are tailored to Congressional; national drug community agencies; and regional, state, and local audiences for planning and decision about allocation of drug resources. NDIC also provides DOCEX services, and captures exploited data—now more than 400 document seizures—in RAID DBs.

IT Description—Analysts are supported by two networks: (1) Justice Network System operating at the SBU level, and (2) Main Network System operating at the SECRET level. At each analyst seat, there is one terminal and a KVM that permits the analyst to toggle between the systems without danger of mixing classified and unclassified data inadvertently. CPUs are implemented with blade technology, similar to that in FBI's FTTF, and at DEA. NDIC is being fitted by DEA for access to their Firebird (SBU) and Merlin (S) systems, and many of the DBs of Intelligence value, to which these are linked. Analysts have access to such tools as Convera RetrievalWare, i2Analyst Notebook, and several link visualization and time line capabilities. The key NDIC DBs archive data from the DOCEX program. RAID DBs (some 70) and retrieval tools were executed in MS Access. DOCEX is widely respected within the Drug IC for its timely exploitation of paper and digital media from laptops, PCs, PDAs. DOCEX data preparation and entry into RAID, however, are completely manual processes—scanners and other automated aids are characterized as too unreliable and inaccurate compared to a large complement of analysts.

Future IT Plans—These focus singularly on upgrades to RAID that will improve its technical efficiency, render it compatible with the OFC and inclusion among its data stores, and broaden its use domestically and internationally by means of a strong training program. RAID will migrate to Oracle and MS.Net for front-end Input/Output with users and back-end DBs—supporting standalone, small group, and enterprise work environments. RAID DBs will be consolidated into a repository and formats standardized. RAID is adding a centralized search screen for individual cases, an import/export wizard, a rich multimedia capability, and customizable fields, links, defaults, and reports. Data will be exploitable in four languages and have add options for multimedia data inclusion, including GIS features. RAID Release 3.0, delayed for more than a year, is now expected to be available in the first quarter of 2005.

Data Sharing/Compatibility—RAID is able to import and export data in XML schema or in a related RAID format. RAID has an export interface tailored to FINCEN, and other interfaces compatible with i2Analyst Notebook for time line, link, and case analysis. NDIC management is very open to data sharing. It will offer RAID and, in the future, its analysts are anxious to gain access to DEA Form-6s and FBI 302s. Only the former is likely to happen. DOCEX field team deployments to EPIC will help develop access to HIDTAs, state, and local sources that will be vital to maturing its strategic domestic analysis mission performance.

Assessment—NDIC is producing more than 700 domestic strategic Intelligence products annually, some 600 of which are based on self-initiated requirements. NDIC is conducting a review of its product offerings to eliminate those of low value and will free up considerable capacity as a result. Its IT internal Intelligence capabilities include two networks, classified and unclassified, like EPIC. Each, however, has a reasonable analytic toolkit and a focus on its RAID DBs. Classified data were not exploited significantly. Beyond RAID, NDIC data sources are all external. For strategic Intelligence analysis, NDIC requires more data from EPIC, state, and local sources. Consequently, there is a strong propensity at NDIC to trade RAID for other data access, as with the OFC. There are no evident plans to convert to a Web and portal architecture based on CONCORD; however, NDIC appears ready to adapt to any IT Intelligence architecture compatible with information sharing, especially with OFC.
6.6.2.1 Recommendation on NDIC

To realize its full analytic potential in sharing and using data, NDIC should acquire and install ACLM.

6.7 PTARRS

This section will examine issues concerning the utility of PTARRS as an Intelligence tool. Specifically:

- Can PTARRS function as the "backbone" for Intelligence analysis of linked networks of foreign, national, regional, and local drug organizations?
- Can various kinds of information important for DEA Intelligence analysis support be hosted on the PTARRS application?

6.7.1 ORIGIN AND PURPOSES OF PTARRS

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 sought to shift Government performance and accountability away from a focus on counting activities to concentrate, instead, on the results or outcomes of those activities. For the DEA, the GPRA task is to track progress against its principal strategic goal to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle the international, national, state, and local DTOs that are having the most significant impact on America. Starting in April 2003, the DEA implemented a computer application known as PTARRS to automate tracking of its progress for improved target prioritization and resource management, as well as for GPRA reporting. It was conceived as a management tool, intended for DEA field agents to enter case-based data for priority target nominations; for DEA field agent managers to review, edit, and approve nominated targets; and for DEA managers at all levels to view priority targets and monitor resources allocated to engage them.

6.7.2 CURRENT PTARRS CAPABILITIES

PTARRS is essentially an Oracle DB, with standard search tools, now hosted on the Impact system, a subsystem of DEA's CONCORD IT enterprise architecture that will support almost all DEA law enforcement sensitive mission and business applications. The PTARRS DB structure includes fields that characterize the following drug target elements:

- Organizational hierarchy
- Linked organizations
- Tactical Operations Plan
- All known assets, not simply those seized
- All known members, not simply those with assigned DEA case numbers

PTARRS has tools and reporting features that permit DEA's PTOs to be sorted by drug and by a link to OCDETF; terrorism; mobile exploitation teams; state and local task forces; SOD; and HIDTA. PTARRS fields entries for each PTO that indicates staff hours and expenditures committed. PTARRS, therefore, provides management capabilities not only to reflect activities, knowledge, and progress made against PTOs, but also to indicate resources expended in this work.

Other capabilities have been added to PTARRS for management support. These include features to assist DEA Field Divisions to process PTOs and provide additional linkage reports as follows:
Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Program Top-Down Review

- Workflow so that each Field Division can customize PTO processing for local use.
- Automation of PTOs linked to Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) and Regional Priority Organization Target (RPOT) reporting. CPOTs and RPOTs, designated by the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), are the critical aim points for executing the current national drug strategy. The DEA can prioritize engagement of PTOs based on the criticality of their relationship to CPOTs and RPOTs.
- Keyword/key element search.
- Linked investigations to include organizational element (such as source of supply, transportation, financial, facilitation, distribution, etc.).
- Means to link non-DEA cases (from the FBI, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ATF, IRS, OCDETF, etc.) and general file numbers to PTOs.

PTARRS also has improved its reporting capability for management support by using the PTO classification coding structure reflecting multiple indices and status conditions on PTO cases, and has added data elements and aggregated reports for all elements using queries. Specific features include the following:

- New data elements, such as organizational components, threat zone, and base of operations.
- PTO classification coding structure based on organizational component, threat zone, base of operations, identified nexus linkage, and CPOT linkage with aggregated reporting.
- Exception Report that provides differences between Geographical Drug Enforcement Programs in PTARRS, and CAST, updated daily.
- Enhanced management reports that display PTO staff hours by job series (e.g., 0132, 1811) and operational expenditures by type (e.g., CS, Title III, travel).

More recently, PTARRS is adding a data collection protocol to support the new DEA FO and modules for SOD Operational Linkage and CPOT Linkage reporting. These additions, to be completed in August/September 2004, have the following specific features to:

- Capture specific data on PTO financial investigation elements and the gross revenue of each PTO and aggregated reporting for FO.
- Deploy a checklist for DEA Operations (DO) to validate PTO Handbook elements using a new editing tool.
- Provide PTOs targeting a named CPOT; associated costs and staff hours; CPOT linked PTOs sorted by region; and validation and reporting tool for PTOs linked to terrorism.
- Upgrade Operational Linkage to connect all SOD operations to PTOs through a new reporting tool.

6.7.3 DIPTDR INTERVIEW AND SURVEY RESULTS ON PTARRS

Based on interviews and survey results, PTARRS has succeeded reasonably well in its original purpose of (1) providing management support to DEA HQ for arraying PTOs; (2) depicting their linkages to CPOTs and RPOTs; (3) displaying the resource allocations against PTOs; and (4) providing the basis for GPRA and other performance reporting to DOJ, OMB, and appropriations committees in Congress. Personal
interviews, however, indicate a more guarded overall view about PTARRS, especially from respondents in the field.

Field agents in interviews tend to dislike PTARRS because its entries parallel reporting requirements for DEA Form-6s, but do so in a different format that enforces a requirement for separate and essentially parallel data entry. A number of agents reported that PTARRS is not “user friendly” with respect to input, search, and cut and paste functions for data from other sources. There also is agent concern about the cumbersome workflow from agent entry through review and revision at multiple field management levels before final review and approval by the SAC. The result is a marked increase in agent workload, the purpose of which is not widely understood. Agent survey results, presented in Table 6.2, reflected interview opinion concerning the value of the current version of PTARRS for management applications.

**Table 6.2: Perceived Effectiveness of PTARRS for Management Applications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Series Responding</th>
<th>Total in Survey</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Not at All</th>
<th>To a Small Extent</th>
<th>To a Moderate Extent</th>
<th>To a Large Extent</th>
<th>Essential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1811 SES/GS-15/GS-14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-13 and Below</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0132 SES/GS-15/GS-14</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-13 and Below</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysts have three tiers of access and are aware of PTARRS but do not normally have other than read-only access to its content. The SACs control access and some are given broad access to PTARRS content within a Field Division’s AOR. Agents, on the other hand, have read-and-write access, which often is limited only to those PTOs that their Field Office originates. In some cases, field analysts are used as PTARRS data entry clerks, which all believe to be inappropriate for their job descriptions. Overall, access to and use of PTARRS by IAs is determined by the SAC.

With some exceptions, analysts do not use PTARRS much because (1) they obtain similar case data from NADDIS and CAST, and (2) they are often assigned cases for analytic support and do not need to concern themselves with questions of case priorities or relationships among CPOTS, RPOTs, or PTOs—agents using PTARRS are making those decisions and analysts are merely in support. For these analysts, it is easier to import NADDIS data as needed to Firebird or Merlin (for all-source, including classified, analysis).
In Table 6.3, the perceived utility of the currently fielded PTARRS is indicated by agents and analysts in response to the survey question. Clearly, members of both job series believe that PTARRS falls short of the functionality they need, both for management and analytic purposes.

### Table 6.3: Perceived Utility of Currently Fielded PTARRS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Series Responding</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-13 and Below</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>91</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-13 and Below</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>158</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 6.7.4 PTARRS Phase III Capabilities

New features in PTARRS may make it more attractive for analysts, as well as agents. The latest phase of PTARRS development is intended to improve graphical capabilities and to take the first steps toward increasing PTARRS potential to support analysis as well as management applications. Specifically, this phase expected to complete in FY2005-06, will:

- Develop or adapt a mapping graphics application and software programming methodology to pre-populate the application by leveraging the PTO Classification Coding Structure.
- Provide PTO linkage charts for DEA-wide viewing and enhanced ability to spot information gaps and support requirements generation.
- Include capability for users to reposition and edit organizational linkage charts and import organizational analyses and studies.

#### 6.7.5 DEA IA Requirements

As a useful simplification concerning their tasking, drug law enforcement IAs either are involved in support to investigations and case building or, broadly, in strategic analysis. To serve as a "backbone" for Intelligence analysis of linked networks, PTARRS must serve the needs of analysts in accessing, sorting, evaluating, displaying, sharing, and retaining a variety of critical information for these tasks as follows:

- For investigation and case building, analysts need an integrated user interface to gather data from a group of known sources, and a standard personal workspace, case format, and visualization tool to establish linkages among people, places, events, and assets.
• For strategic analysis, analysts must be able to search large quantities of data from many sources to discern patterns and trends and use a standard collaboration workspace and toolset to anticipate the outcomes and impacts of emergent activities. Of note is the fact that Strategic Analysts may not be using existing capabilities in PTARRS to the best effect, indicating the need for further training.

Both kinds of analysis require access to case data, as well as the ability to understand case relationships with OCDETF CPOTs and RPOTs and with DEA's PTOs.

6.7.6 POTENTIAL FOR PTARRS TO SUPPORT DEA INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

For the IA, PTARRS currently provides the following advantages:

• It is the only DEA DB where the CPOT/RPOT/PTO relationships are documented and displayed.
• Entries are mostly based on unique and invaluable DEA agent first-person reporting via DEA Form-6s. In some cases, it has data not held by SOD.
• Technically, PTARRS is already hosted on CONCORD, which will make its data more accessible in a Web services/portal environment. It also will benefit from a single data entry standard with related DBs and applications and improved access to other data sources that will become available as the CONCORD IT architecture becomes standard throughout the DEA.

PTARRS has added features that archive and support analysis of financial information and relate it to PTOs. Weighed against these are the following disadvantages:

• The design, look, feel, and much of the limited content of PTARRS is to support managers, not analysts.
• To this point, PTARRS includes only validated data. To be useful to analysts, PTARRS must include or have access to large and diverse data sources, the contents of which may not be fully validated.
• Only agents make entries, and no Intelligence data (i.e., information from sources other than agents) is currently included in or easily accessed from PTARRS.
• There are data latency and data validation issues for PTARRS information that make Intelligence support problematic.
• It is difficult to import separate data items from other sources into the current PTARRS work environment.
• PTARRS operates in the law enforcement SBU security environment, isolating it from all-source data, including classified sources needed by analysts.
• PTARRS does not contain any data for the many cases not designated as or related to PTOs.

On this last point, just the case data that analysts may need to access for investigative and especially strategic tasks, compared to that available in PTARRS, is illustrated above. This does not address other needed data from a variety of sensitive or classified sources held by drug community agencies, civilian organizations, and commercial enterprises.
6.7.7 WHAT PTARRS NEEDS TO SUPPORT DEA IAS

PTARRS could be a tractable choice to assume a more central role in supporting DEA IAs. To be worthwhile, however, this would require changes in DEA IA roles and workflow, as well as technical enhancements to PTARRS.

6.7.8 PROPOSED ANALYST ROLE AND WORKFLOW USING PTARRS

For investigative analytic support, analysts need direct access to the full range of case information. As discussed in Section 6.4, Middleware-Based Control for Data, this access could be authorized, tracked, and audited using ACLM in a TML controlling access to PTARRS data on Firebird.

The same TML could automate access and sharing for strategic intelligence applications of PTARRS data by analysts. The workflow that would permit IAs to make best use of PTARRS for strategic analysis is presented in Figure 6.2.

**FIGURE 6.2.**

IAs have no real input on PTO definition, submission, review, or selection via PTARRS. To move toward Intelligence-driven targeting and, ultimately, Intelligence-driven enforcement, the first step is to put IAs into a position to look at and across all drug cases and all drug organizations to analyze and compare them and to recommend priorities for engagement.

The best way to do this would be to start at DEA Field Divisions, where agents would enter their PTO candidates and related case information in PTARRS. Strategic IAs, as recommended in this report, would review these PTO submissions in PTARRS across the entire regional AOR for that division. They would use all-source information—case, drug and drug technologies, financial money laundering, CS, and classified, as well as their own observations on drug-trafficking patterns and trends—to make recommendations to the FIM on the merit and priority of PTO submissions, and enrich current entries with additional information. Based on their broad access to information, including that contained in PTARRS, they also would be authorized to submit and justify alternative selections for PTOs through PTARRS.
The FIM would advocate the Intelligence-based analysis of PTOs to the SAC, who would continue to make the field recommendation forwarded to DEA HQ. At DEA HQ, IAs would use PTARRS as well as access to the sensitive sources and methods available to the OFC to provide global review, assessment, and validation of the PTO submissions from the field. In doing this they would be supported by collaboration capabilities to network the best thinking among DEA Strategic Analysts at every level in making their recommendations. These would be provided through NC to HQ/Operations for decision.

This approach would make PTARRS the common venue in the DEA for information sharing, analytic exchange, and decision support for DEA agents and analysts alike in targeting drug organizations. It would enable analysts to review, compare, and validate case information heretofore not subject to this level of independent scrutiny.

It also would support analysts in thinking strategically about the drug problem and, starting with a full view of PTO cases and linked CPOTs and RPOTs, enable them to provide a balanced view of target priorities and opportunities to SACs and DEA HQ decisionmakers. From a baseline using PTARRS, enriched with access to other data sources and tools, analysts would finally have the perspective needed to move toward high-end analysis functions for predictive analysis and the evaluation of impacts and outcomes for different policies and courses of actions by DEA leadership.

**6.7.9 NECESSARY TECHNICAL ENHANCEMENTS TO PTARRS**

With workflow changes, the following technical upgrades could be considered for PTARRS to expand its potential for analytic support. These are reflected in Figure 6.3, which shows the features for (1) partition of the management, data storage, and analytic functions; (2) collaboration between agents and analysts in examining cases and submitting them for review and inclusion as PTOs; and (3) a classified version of select PTARRS data, based on analyst selection and enhancement from all-source Intelligence, and the addition of the complete analyst toolkit. The classified PTARRS version would rely on a Merlin network backbone, while the other two PTARRS components would be hosted on Firebird.
Partition of PTARRS Management and Analytic Support Functions. Significant developmental upgrades will be needed to support analytic functions. Analysts must participate in characterizing needed attributes and capabilities in PTARRS. These can be at odds for funding, functional analytic requirements definition, and project management attention relative to PTARRS legacy management functions. In addition and when implemented, there will be an application and data synchronization issue, with analysts as well as agents and managers using PTARRS for quite different purposes.

The developmental and operational demands for PTARRS would probably be best addressed by providing some virtual and real separation of functions in its implementation and use, and also in establishing functional linkages programmatically, technically, and operationally in future phases of its life cycle.

Addition of a Standard Investigation and Case Management Tool. There is no common approach to investigative case management evident in DEA. The composition of cases—concerning persons, places, events, time lines, and assets—would seem to admit of a common format and information workflow design as cases are detailed over time with further information from many sources and sequential analysis. For support of analysis in PTARRS, an investigative case management tool, used at different stages in case development by agents and analysts, is required. This tool would start first with DEA Form-68 and progress over time as cases mature and are advanced for linkage to CPOTs/RPOTs and nominated as PTOs.
Linkage to Other Data Sources. Analysts supporting either investigations or strategic analysis problems using PTARRS, at a minimum, would need access to DBs, including NADDIS, CAST, RAID (NDIC), EID (EPIC), NDPIX, and DRUG-X. Also needed would be a standard toolkit that would provide data mining, link analysis, and time line capabilities.

Integration of an Analytic Collaboration Workspace. Analysts working within a PTARRS baseline, especially those working strategic problems that are inherently less structured and require high-end thinking, must collaborate with their peers at Field Divisions, DEA HQ, NDIC, sometimes EPIC, and other Federal, state, and local agencies to be fully effective. PTARRS will have to add a capability, perhaps using relatively straightforward commercial tools and either Firebird or Merlin network connectivity, to support information sharing, chat, whiteboard sessions, and other means of analytic collaboration.

Configuration of a TML for Privilege Management Capability. In a shared work and information environment such as that proposed for PTARRS analytic functions, it will be necessary to assign, manage, and track access to data; provide authorization to revise or update data or enter new information or products; and audit dissemination and use of data. All this would be done with business rules negotiated among DEA stakeholders and implemented with commercially available (discussed earlier in Section 6.4) ACLM tuned to PTARRS usage.

Data Export Capability to Classified Networks. PTARRS is accessed on DEA’s SBU Firebird network. Analysts, however, will increasingly have to work tasks with crossover to the Merlin Network to access classified sources. PTARRS will require an ability through commercially available “guard” software to export data one way from Firebird to Merlin, which would host the analyst version of PTARRS. Management functions of PTARRS would remain on Firebird. This approach will require enhanced cyber security to protect the exchange, and certification and accreditation of the necessary cyber security architecture at the boundary of these networks.

Development of a GUI. Current analyst accesses, interfaces, and tools are scattered and not uniform. As part of the CONCORD to-be IT architecture for DEA, PTARRS ideally would standardize a “dashboard” for analysts to select, obtain, and manipulate data from many heterogeneous sources using a consistent set of commands and tools. This dashboard must be available to analysts to support PTARRS hosting on both Firebird and Merlin.

Possible Integration within OFC Data Stores. The Intelligence partition for PTARRS should be one of the DBs included in the data stores contained in the planned OFC. It can serve as a baseline repository for linkages among CPOTS, RPOTs, and PTOs and grow to include similar linkages among all drug-related cases for OCDETF agencies. Plans under way to do this should be given highest priority.

6.7.9.1 Recommendation on PTARRS

PTARRS is going to migrate to the CONCORD IT architectural platform. Based on DEA Review Team findings, it is believed that PTARRS could feasibly function as the “backbone” for Intelligence analysis of linked networks of foreign, national, regional, and local drug organizations if DEA IA work assignments and workflows are modified to take advantage of its capabilities and if those capabilities are augmented to support analytic, not management, functions. Necessary information and applications important to DEA analysis can certainly be linked to, and accessed from, PTARRS. DEA Review Team findings do not clearly show whether PTARRS should be used for that purpose. This question has budgetary and operational dimensions, as well as some technical ramifications, that are beyond the scope of this report. There may be other alternatives to consider as well.
It is recommended that this part of the DEA Review Team report be used as a starting point for discussions among DEA Intelligence, operational, and IT support personnel to determine the effectiveness and suitability of PTARRS for analysis support, and compare this with alternative solutions.

6.8 THE WAY FORWARD TO AN ENTERPRISE IT INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INTELLIGENCE

There are two broad conclusions from the DIPTDR report: (1) DEA must organize, train, and equip at every level for information and (2) the way in which information is shared will determine whether the Administrator's Vision will “lift our agency from very good to great.” Critical recommendations about the uses of, and IT support for, information sharing and enablement for Intelligence analysis have been discussed previously and are summarized in Sections 6.8.1 through 6.8.7.

6.8.1 RECOMMENDATION ON INFORMATION FOCUS

All federated Intelligence production nodes of the Drug IC depend on all-source information—that is relevant, accurate, and timely—for mission success. Analysts and agents must work together to share and use all-source information to develop Intelligence as their primary business process. The DEA must become a learning organization based on information. It should be optimized at every level for the collection and agile use of information to drive its mission. In the new operational environment based on Intelligence-driven investigation and enforcement, every agent and analyst must recognize the importance of collecting and analyzing information.

6.8.2 RECOMMENDATION ON TARGET-BASED INFRASTRUCTURE

As a matter of high urgency, the emergent Intelligence enterprise architecture of the Drug IC should include a TML, using ACLM to automate and manage identification and business rules providing tiered levels of access to, with auditing and tracking of use for, Drug Intelligence data. Initially, it can be expected that business rules for access will be very limiting. Over time, however, as the Administrator’s Vision is implemented, collaborative analysis and federated production take hold, and resources are pinched in calendar year (CY)2006 budgets and beyond, it is anticipated that trust will grow among agencies and the impetus for direct data access will increase.

By building an enterprise Intelligence infrastructure—a TML—with embedded trust management features in the middleware, the DEA will be prepared to evolve into a more mature information-sharing model that implements business rules in software, and not with an expanding army of human watchers and checkers. TML will allow DEA to apply more of its human capital to Intelligence analysis and to collaborate more widely on investigative and strategic analytic problems. The urgent and best choice to build and demonstrate a trust-based system to share information is in the OFC. A trust-based Intelligence IT enterprise can follow at all Drug IC production nodes.

6.8.3 RECOMMENDATION ON INFORMATION MOE

Information value should be an MOE for DEA personnel and a tool to direct an Intelligence-driven mission. Agent and analyst performance needs to be measured substantially in terms of the value of information they collect or retrieve, and the added value analysis they both contribute collaboratively to arrests, dismantlement, disruptions, and outcomes. The necessary data flagging and data tracking capabilities largely exist in COTS products that can be incorporated with ACLM in the TML. Other products can be adapted to correlate data use and value for investigations and cases that are tracked. These can be used to develop and aggregate a new generation of effectiveness measures to recognize those who best gather and exploit information in support of the Administrator’s Vision. The value of...
information also can be used as a metric in a feedback loop linking the value of information to the importance and benefit of operational outcomes, and the utility of all processes in between. Using information value as a metric, Field Division SACs and HQ managers can direct truly effective Intelligence-driven operations and enforcement.

6.8.4 **RECOMMENDATION ON MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO INFORMATION SHARING**

Senior DEA managers must focus on information-sharing details. Management attention must be directed to the crucial but mind-numbing details of how information sharing is implemented now and will evolve in the future, and what specific impediments to direct access remain and on what basis. This is a vital concern because DEA Review Team interviews showed clearly that a number of DEA senior managers operated on a more expansive assumption about analyst information access than was confirmed in person and on site with interviewees. Middle managers consistently implement far more cautious rules for data sharing than senior managers realize. To improve management insight, it would be useful to assign a Tiger Team to develop (1) a mapping of information sources that contribute to each analyst function; (2) the level and extent of current access to each of these sources by functional analysts at every production node in the Drug IC; (3) the plans and schedule for each functional analyst’s expanded access; (4) a list of sources and reasons for which access is not planned for each functional analyst throughout the Drug IC; and (5) an impact statement on the costs and risks of limited data access for each Drug Intelligence analytic function.

6.8.5 **RECOMMENDATION ON INFORMATION SHARING WORKING GROUP (ISWG)**

Establish the ISWG. The DEA should form a management group to assess Tiger Team inputs and convene Drug IC representatives in an ISWG to negotiate an information-sharing strategy favoring direct data access. The ISWG would address the information-sharing issues and equities that limit direct data access to remaining sources, and develop workarounds and understandings to promote maximum access to, and use of, these sensitive information sources for analyst support.

6.8.6 **RECOMMENDATION ON COUNTER DRUG TECHNOLOGY EXPLOITATION CENTER (CTEC)**

Revitalize the CTEC. It should be chartered and redirected to include software tool evaluation and to study how to meet specific technical analytic support requirements for Drug IC functional analysts in their various federated production nodes. This approach will leverage the experience and technology leadership potential of the SID IT Group. In addition, it will ensure less scatter in smaller technology evaluation efforts at the Intelligence production nodes, improve commonality in analytic tools, and possibly provide quantity price breaks in software licenses at the enterprise level.

6.8.7 **RECOMMENDATION ON ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR**

Select an enterprise IT systems integrator that will help realize an integrated enterprise IT system architecture and infrastructure for Intelligence analysis. DEA Review Team interviews confirm that there are competent, dedicated Government IT organizations and personnel supporting each Intelligence production node. They manage a stable of contractors for specific technical support specialties. The respective Government IT organizations assume the systems integrator role at each node. The technical coordination role among nodal IT organizations is irregular and on a time-available basis. An integrated enterprise IT system architecture provides for interoperability and integration support for specific networks, DBs, and communications paths between nodes.
To build an integrated enterprise IT system architecture for Intelligence, a dedicated enterprise systems integrator is required to assist Drug IC stakeholders in defining enterprise IT Intelligence support requirements: develop a system, technical, and operational as-is enterprise architecture; develop a to-be architecture; develop migration/implementation strategy and plans; and either conduct or monitor enterprise architecture migration and implementation activities. The enterprise systems integrator would work closely with all stakeholders on evolving analytic requirements and with technical and acquisition authorities for execution. The place to start is with OFC and TML. OFC—and the way in which information sharing is implemented technically and functionally—will profoundly affect the Drug IC's effectiveness and the performance of DEA's mission.
7 ANALYST DEVELOPMENT AND ALLOCATION

This section describes the training required to transform the DEA Intelligence Program into a more professional, highly diverse workforce that stands ready to meet new U.S. National Security challenges as stated in the Administrator’s Vision. The section discusses the current state of DEA’s Intelligence Program training and addresses the future training required to enhance strategic and predictive Intelligence analysis in terms of trends, emergent threats, and the intersection of drugs to other National Security issues. A high-level overview of the requirements is provided, and recommendations are made on the Analyst Career Development Program, including recruitment, employment, and training.

7.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW—THE FRAMEWORK OF DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ANALYSIS

The purpose of analysis is to fuse all-source information from myriad and sometimes disparate sources into accurate, predictive, and actionable Intelligence. This Intelligence must then be quickly disseminated to decisionmakers in a clear and concise format that is easily understood and usable. Despite the many forms and types of analysis, Intelligence provides three basic functions for decisionmakers. It can describe a situation or object; it can explain or provide context to occurrences or activities; and it can predict or make judgments about future courses of actions or events. Figure 7.1 depicts a high-level model of the analytic process. It is displayed as a linear, single-issue process for ease of explanation. In reality, there are hundreds, perhaps thousands of these “processes” going on each day as SAs and IAs work together to build cases and strengthen court presentations.

In the Intelligence Program, 1,100 positions are authorized. Of these, 727 are GS-0132 IAs allocated to HQ, the Field Divisions, and the Country Offices. These analysts perform three distinct types of analytic Intelligence functions to support the DEA mission. The largest number of analysts is assigned to investigative Intelligence in the Field Divisions, NS/SOD, and NI. Nearly 550 of the 727 DEA IAs are assigned to provide case support to SAs.
In addition to their day-to-day interactions with the SAs, these analysts rely on Firebird, Merlin (to some degree), open source material, and CS debriefings to assist the agents in building their cases. At the Field Divisions, IA-to-SA ratios vary from a high of 1:5 in San Diego to a low of 1:21 in Chicago. Each IA nominally can handle two to three active cases. The DEA Review Team interviews indicate that SAs are usually paired on cases and that each SA pair has between two and five active cases at any given time. In places like San Diego, the IA can probably provide fairly good support to the SAs. In Divisions like Chicago, New York, and Boston, however, many cases are developed with little or no IA participation.

The second largest numbers of analysts are assigned to tactical Intelligence at EPIC. More than 40 DEA IAs are involved in the day-to-day support provided to Federal, state, and local authorities in the Southwest border area. Equal in number to the EPIC analysts are the strategic IAs, assigned predominately to DEA HQ. Some strategic IAs are assigned to select Field Divisions. For the most part, however, IAs are used in a part-time strategic role to produce the QITR.

These three types of analysts are not necessarily transferable across the enterprise. The skills associated with tactical and investigative analysis do not lend themselves to the cognitive, reflective skills required for strategic analysis. It is difficult for an IA to work a case file in the morning and become a strategic writer in the afternoon. Conversely, the long-term analysis, so important to the strategic IA, has little importance to the analyst-agent working to bring a case to court. The DEA Review Team also noted that many tasks performed by IAs, such as TOLLS and pen registers and similar data entry or extraction tasks, could better be performed by Intelligence Aides (GS-0134).

### 7.2 WHO OWNS THE ANALYTIC WORKFORCE?

A key question that the DEA Review Team asked often was “Who owns this product, process, or resource?” When it comes to the analytic workforce, this question appears to elicit a complex answer with Field Division SACs and Country Attachés “owning” most of the analytic workforce. This equates to more than 26 separate owners, each with similar but distinct operational models for Intelligence analysis. In general, the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence is viewed as managing the program, establishing intelligence standards, and providing policy guidance to the workforce. Most important, however, the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence is viewed as the provider of investigative IAs to the field enforcement units. This creates an untenable model where the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence is tasked by the Administrator to provide Intelligence support to the organization, yet has direct control of only 13 percent of the Intelligence workforce.

### 7.3 A NEW INTELLIGENCE MODEL

To meet the new National Security challenges as envisioned by the Administrator, the DEA must transition Intelligence operations into a new Intelligence model (Figure 7.2).
This shift in operations must be accomplished with the support of the Chief, OC; the Assistant Administrator for Operational Support; the Office of the Chief Counsel; the Financial Management Division; and the Assistant Administrator for Human Resources. It is important, however, for NC to lead this effort. The recommended model increases the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence’s control of Intelligence resources in the Field Divisions and institutes a well-structured Analyst Career Development Program. The new program is based on central hiring of all IAs, a significant expansion of the current training program and a concomitant broadening of analyst experience through temporary deployments and recurring changes of duty station. In addition, the new program establishes a GS-0134 series of Intelligence Aides (Technicians) who are exempt from the requirements of the general Intelligence Program but restricted to grades GS-5 through GS-12. Significantly, it leaves operative control in the respective SAC or Country Offices.

7.3.1 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.3.1.1 Recommendation on Implementation of New Model

Begin now. Work with Operations, Human Resources, Operational Support Financial Management Division, and the Office of the Chief Counsel to develop the new DEA Intelligence model and transfer control of billets. In conjunction with the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, begin to craft a Congressional strategy based on the policy and programmatic requirements generated by moving to the new model.

7.3.1.2 Recommendation on Recruitment and Hiring

All labor authorizations (the current 727 IA positions/billets) belong to the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence. Process vacancy and recruitment announcements centrally, using the DEA public Web site and Firebird. Request Field Divisions to encourage locally known candidates to apply or send forward their recommendations for these candidates. The process from there will be:

- Using the current HQ board structure, applications will be reviewed by a panel and a slate of potential candidates will be recommended.
- The selected candidate application packages will be sent to the nearest Field Divisions, where the senior IA and a SAC-appointed reviewer will interview the candidate. Scoring will be returned, the candidates compared, and after a final score is assigned, offer letters will be sent by HR to those with the highest scores.
• All GS-0132 candidates will sign a mobility agreement as part of their sign-on process.
• GS-0134 applications will be processed in the same manner, however, no mobility agreement would be required.
• All final selections will be approved by HQ to ensure the level of diversity of personnel required by the Intelligence Program is met.

7.3.1.3 **Recommendation on Allocation of IAs**

NC reviews all Intelligence positions throughout DEA annually. Analytic positions within the Field Divisions and other OC-led organizations will be based on the availability of resources and allocated on requirements received for support through the Chief of Operations. Approved requirements for Intelligence personnel may be filled by reassignment or temporary duty (TDY).

7.3.1.4 **Recommendation on Assignments and Deployments**

All new IAs will be required to serve in a field organization and in the Washington, D.C., area as their first two assignments. The Washington assignment may be within NC or NS/SOD. Analysts will be moved at the discretion of the career board; however, NC will continue support with the family-friendly policy of attempting to locate husband and wife employees in the same area when possible. The average rotational period should be between 3 and 5 years, with multiple assignments in the same Field Division counting as one assignment. Overseas assignments should remain at a maximum of 6 years. An annual career board should look at possible career movements over the next 2 fiscal years and plan for potential reassignments. No analyst or technician should be sent to an operational unit or major Country Office below the Field Division level until the third or fourth assignment.

7.3.1.5 **Recommendations on PDs**

Restructure every PD to reflect work performed and include specific measurements for evaluating the level of success. The PD should serve as the basis for developing individual annual evaluation reports. In many cases, current PDs appear to be general in nature, listing general functions to be performed, rather than actually reflecting the work required by the particular position or grade. This recommendation also will serve as the basis for a thorough review of the analytic and support positions, their actual duties and the current work locations.

7.3.1.6 **Recommendation on Evaluations**

The evaluations for IAs and technicians should be restructured to two levels, form and substance. The FIM will be in the rating chain for all Intelligence personnel assigned to the field. The evaluation form should be changed to include a block for the Field Division FIM as reviewer. The evaluations also must be restructured (see above) to include success criteria that support the new Intelligence policy, including, but not limited to, rotational assignments, attendance at the DEA Academy, and other continuing education. The metrics should include the value of the Intelligence products generated, as well as support to enforcement operations. Evaluations will be used as the basis for promotions and awards.

7.4 **ANALYST CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM**

An Analyst Career Development Program should be created that establishes entry, journeyman, and senior career fields, with concomitant training and educational requirements developed for each level. The program should cover all GS occupational series: IA, Administration, and Program Support.
The Analyst Career Development Program will transform the DEA workforce by training new IAs to be change agents and information-sharers, which can drive innovation from the bottom up. The desired end state of this training is to forge a partnership of people, technologies, and processes that can provide enforcement operations and national decision makers with assured access to actionable Intelligence.

Survey statistics on the current state of DEA Intelligence training reveal that more than two-thirds of respondents (primarily analysts) believed that it was at least moderately effective (Figure 7.3). About half (51 percent), believed that BIRS training was moderately effective or better (Figure 7.4).

**Overall how effective is DEA intelligence training?**

![Figure 7.3](image)

**Do you believe Basic Intelligence Research Specialist Training (BIRS) is effective?**

![Figure 7.4](image)
Less than half, however, believed that DEA Intelligence training addressed, at least to a moderate extent, how to identify drug trends or promote a collaborative analytic environment, and a mindset and culture of information sharing (Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6).

**FIGURE 7.5.**

Does training adequately address how to identify emerging drug trends?

**FIGURE 7.6.**

Does training adequately address new requirements related to existing and emerging National Security threats?
Even fewer believed that it adequately (moderately or better) addressed how to perform predictive intelligence or new requirements related to existing and emergent National Security threats (Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8).

FIGURE 7.7

Does training adequately address how to perform predictive intelligence?

FIGURE 7.8

Does training adequately address new requirements related to existing and emerging National Security threats?

7.4.1 CAREER PROGRESSION FOR ANALYSTS IN THE NEW WORKING ENVIRONMENT

The new intelligence model for drug law enforcement as a contributor to the National Security of the nation requires readjustment to the type of analysts employed, changes in the work environment, and a new concept of partnerships with both the law enforcement community and the IC. The new environment will demand that each analyst have a variety of tools and information, including:
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- A comprehensive understanding of the entire drug "battlespace," from local case support to international support structures and operations.
- The ability to leverage drug law enforcement Intelligence as a collaborative enterprise with a variety of supporting and supported communities.
- In-depth customer knowledge at all levels of support.
- Tools and methodologies to improve productivity.
- Desktop access to state-of-the-art computers and IT.
- Access to comprehensive and timely DBs to rapidly create, sort, store, and retrieve data and information, both sensitive and unclassified.
- The ability to acquire nontraditional information as it is discovered.
- Use of a collection and requirements framework to assess the gaps and deficiencies of Intelligence at their particular level of operation.

The training organization should support the development of an Analyst Career Development Program by establishing courses to support the growth of analysts through entry, intermediate, and senior skill levels. The associated curricula should reflect the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to succeed at each professional level. In addition, the program should require at least 40 hours annually of additional training agreed to by analysts and their supervisor.

7.4.1 Recommendation on Program Emphasis

The primary program should focus on analytic development and be designed to allow IAs to understand where they are in their career, what they need to do to advance to the next level, and the training and education essential for their promotion. Key elements are as follows:

- The program should comprise mandatory (statute- and/or policy-based) training, required analytic training for all three levels, and a special supervisory/managerial track, with entry-level sections of this track open to all Intelligence employees.
- An individual with extensive pre-DEA experience can receive credit for some of this experience but will not be exempted from the BIRS course.
- Courses will be developed in house, using other Federal services and the commercial market.
- Programs for support and administrative staffs will be developed as an adjunct or in conjunction with the DOJ and/or the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).

Ancillary programs such as the recently instituted mentoring program will be restructured to support the new model. Most training will be conducted at Quantico at the DEA Academy Intelligence Unit. Computer-based training, distance learning, and course sharing with the other law enforcement and Intelligence training centers, however, will be an integral part of the new program. Existing boards and panels will be assessed for their value to the program and adjusted as necessary. Figure 7.9 depicts the General Training Program.
7.4.1.2 Recommendation on a Tiered, Three-Level Program

The core competencies should be divided into three performance levels. As noted in Figure 7.9, each level will develop the needed skills, and as the analyst progresses, the training will become more individually focused:

- **Entry Level**—Includes all new analysts regardless of past experience. The grade structure for this level is nominally GS-7 through GS-11/12. At this level, analysts are developing basic knowledge skills, abilities, and behaviors required by their PDs. They will require mentoring and assistance from more senior analysts. This entry-level program is focused primarily on developing investigative analytic skills; it is based on the current BIRS course.

- **Intermediate (journeyman) Level**—Nominally at the GS-12 and GS-13 levels. These analysts will receive additional training and education in the advanced areas of strategic/predictive analysis and law enforcement community/IC roles and missions. The program will round out the analysts and prepare them for senior-level service and include rotational assignments to other agencies.

- **Senior Level**—Nominally at the GS-14 and GS-15 levels. This program would be highly flexible, identifying school and training to fit the particular needs of the senior-level analyst. It also will assist in identifying and preparing the top analysts for transition to the SFS.

7.4.1.3 Recommendations on Analytic and Management Tracks

At the intermediate level, analysts will decide whether they want to continue on an analytic track or move into supervisory and management positions. The management track will entail extra courses at the intermediate and senior levels to qualify individuals for management and leadership positions. No analyst will be qualified to apply for a supervisory or management position without the basic (initial) set of management and leadership training courses. A second, but smaller track will be established for those
analysts that desire to stay in the analytic field and are promoted to the GS-13 level. This option will be dependent on the establishment of a DEA Intelligence Senior-level Program that will give IAs an opportunity to achieve GS-14, GS-15, and senior, nonsupervisory DEA SES positions.
8 PROGRAM/BUDGET DEVELOPMENT AND ALLOCATIONS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This section describes the DEA budget process for resource management as it applies to the Intelligence Program and provides recommendations for a process that will optimize Intelligence resource acquisition and management. In addition, this section describes and lists the resource requirements for implementing and supporting DEA Review Team recommendations to achieve an optimal law enforcement Intelligence Program. These requirements—derived from the model developed in the preceding sections—are based on a projected DEA Intelligence Program budget over a 5-year cycle, using FY2004 as a baseline.

8.2 BUDGET PROCESS

The current process for resource management within the DEA underscores the fact that there is no true Intelligence resource management process in effect. The Assistant Administrator for Intelligence (NC) controls funding only for non-Government personnel services and contracts for operations of the HQ Intelligence Division and EPIC. In FY2003, the total appropriated funding for these two activities was approximately $34 million out of a total $1.56-billion DEA budget—about 2 percent of the total budget. Of the $34 million, $6.5 million or 19 percent was for EPIC and $24.8 million or 73 percent was for the Office of Special Intelligence, leaving only $2.8 million for all other operations within NC. Further complicating the management task is the fact that NC receives funding authorizations in some 13 separate categories. Reallocation among categories must be requested through the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to DOJ, OMB, and beyond.

8.3 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.3.1 RECOMMENDATION (1) ON A SEPARATE INTELLIGENCE BUDGET

A separate Intelligence budget should be established under the control of NC. Funding for nonpersonnel costs—such as training and TDY for all personnel currently assigned to Field Divisions whose personnel authorizations will be transferred to NC as a result of recommendations in this report—should be transferred from the Field Divisions to NC. Where actual data are not available, all offices involved should agree on a general per capita amount to use in making the transfer. This will provide NC with the capability to manage the Intelligence workforce and provide the flexibility needed to meet changing DEA-wide Intelligence priorities as they emerge during budget execution.

The current budget allocation process must be changed to align with the new role of NC as the manager of a separate Intelligence budget. The current microdivision of funding into 13 separate allocations prevents optimum use of resources, and inhibits flexibility to meet changing priorities. The new structure should be used throughout the budget development, presentation, and execution process to ensure comprehensive management and accountability for resources.

8.3.2 RECOMMENDATION (2) ON NEW BUDGET STRUCTURE

The new budget structure should comprise the following four aggregations:
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- **HQ and Centralized Programs**, which would include current funding for the NC operating account, the NS operating account, and the Operation CRISCROSS and Operation Breakthrough accounts. In addition, funding for the new entry-level analyst program, professionalization training for all Intelligence personnel, and professional rotations would be included.

- **Field Operations**, which would include funding for personnel transferred into NC in the field, the operating costs for the FIM structure, and the current Domestic Monitor Program.

- **EPIC**, which should be funded in a single funding account to allow the maximum flexibility for EPIC leadership to manage EPIC as a single entity.

- **Data Processing, Data Acquisition, and Infrastructure**, which would include current funding for Merlin, NEDRS, and commercial DB access. Moreover, it would include the development, acquisition, and operating costs of the recommendations in Section 6 regarding information sharing and IT architecture improvements.

To implement this revised budget structure, NC along with the CFO, should initiate discussions with DOJ officials and key Congressional staff personnel to explain the necessity for these changes and to solicit their input.

To meet the requirements of an optimal law enforcement Intelligence Program and to strengthen DEA's contribution to National Security as described elsewhere in this report, additional resources will be required. The recommendations that follow (Sections 8.3.3 through 8.3.13) are based on a projected DEA Intelligence Program budget over a 5-year cycle, using 2004 as a baseline.

8.3.3 **Recommendation (3A) on Entry-Level Pool**

Create 20 new entry-level positions for a pool of entry-level analysts. Assumptions are GS-7 Step 1 pay for Washington, D.C., and a PCS, using the standard cost provided by DEA for nonsupervisory personnel of $65,000. This figure is reduced to one-third of what it costs to fund this level of analyst for a 3-year tour, given that these new hires would be in Washington for only 1 year and will not have real estate or other significant PCS costs. Given the significant personnel increases recommended elsewhere, this program should be started in year 3 of the new budget to ease the burden on the personnel and training system. Cost for salaries is $848,000 per year as adjusted by OMB pay raise factors.

8.3.4 **Recommendation (3B) on FIM Upgrades**

Upgrade existing positions to create a new FIM structure. Assumptions are as follows: one GS-13 to GS-14; four GS-14 to GS-15; one GS-14 to SES; and four GS-15 to SES. Upgrades are effective for one-half year the first year and the only cost is incremental pay cost. Costs for the first year are $105,000 and for all future years $210,000, subject to adjustments for pay raises.

8.3.5 **Recommendation (3C) on Professional Rotation**

Implement full professional rotation schedule. Assumptions are 25 nonsupervisory rotations at DEA rate of $65,000 and five supervisory rotations at $95,000, with 20 domestic and 10 foreign moves. Note that the domestic moves in most agencies are considerably more expensive when real estate costs are included. Recommend that NC consult with the CFO to determine whether the standard rates represent real actual experience. Costs per year are $2.1 million, which must be adjusted by OMB nonpersonnel inflation rates for the out years.
8.3.6 RECOMMENDATION (3D) ON PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

Implement professional training program for all 0132s. Assumptions are that given overseas assignments, attrition, and other factors, approximately 675 personnel will require training yearly. The cost will include tuition and/or TDY to training sites at $2,000 per person. Costs would be $1.35 million per year subject to inflation adjustment.

8.3.7 RECOMMENDATION (3E) ON INFORMATION SHARING AND IT ARCHITECTURE

As noted in Figure 8.1, define and implement a broadened concept for information sharing for the DEA and Drug IC, including:

- TML for the OFC
8.3.8 **Recommendation (3F) on Use of GS-134 Series**

Cost savings will derive from a change in structure of 84 positions from GS-0132 to GS-0134 series. Assumptions are that the average grade of the 0132s is GS-13 and the average grade of the 0134s would be GS-11. Since these positions are occupied, it is assumed that the change would occur over five years with an equal amount of conversions each year. Cost savings by year, including benefits subject to OMB pay raise factors, would be as described in Figure 8.2.

8.3.9 **Recommendation (3G) on NADDIS**

Provide funds for contractors to support modernization and conversion to a system that supports information sharing. The contractors also will be required to support the conversion of data to the new system and data maintenance. Based on the mix of senior- and middle-level personnel required, contract costs are estimated at $2.9 million per year. In addition, three Government positions are required at an estimated cost of cost of $175,000 the first year and $350,000 a year afterward, including benefits based on current GS-14 Step 5 salary rates.

8.3.10 **Recommendation (3H) on Merlin**

Maintain a 4-year replacement cycle for Merlin workstations. This recommendation includes technology refreshing and adequate funding of operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. The technology refreshing is based on every office being upgrad ed every 4 years. Cost estimates based on preliminary review are $8,200,000 per year for technology refreshing and $800,000 for operating costs.
8.3.11 Recommendation (3I) on Speedway

Support increased requirements for counterterrorism efforts. The requirement includes 20 new positions (i.e., 14 IAs and 12 support personnel), as well as data purchase, contractor support, and specialized equipment to expand intelligence sources and additional personnel needed to analyze the new intelligence. Figure 8.3 presents the cost estimates (total cost is $10.4 million the first year and $8.8 million per year through the program).

8.3.12 Recommendation (3J) on Internet Investigations

Enhance Internet investigations. Includes eight positions (four IAs and four support personnel) to enhance Internet investigations and provide connectivity among DEA Field Divisions, resident offices, district offices, and HQ. Cost estimates are as depicted in Figure 8.4. (Total cost first year is $8,314,000 and $3,190,000 per year afterward).

8.3.13 Recommendation (3K) on Increased Intelligence Support: Additional Analytic and Administrative Staffing

Includes 100 new positions (80 IAs) to improve the ratio of Intelligence personnel to agents to provide more adequate case support and to provide for the strategic analysis thrust addressed elsewhere in the review. Cost estimates are described in Figure 8.5 (total cost first year $5,500,000 and $7,850,000 per year afterward).

8.4 SUMMARY

Resource recommendations presented are estimates in FY2004 dollars. The appropriate OMB civilian pay raise and nonpersonnel inflation adjustments must be applied when preparing the budget for each fiscal year. Where appropriate, recommendations were phased, based on proper implementation schedules; however, many large investment programs could also be phased to meet fiscal guidance requirements.

The DEA Review team found that the issue of the proper ratio of case support personnel to agents was a key issue in the resource arena. Many personnel recommendations are based on clearly defining the roles of case support personnel and Strategic Analysts and between IAs and intelligence technicians. Should the personnel recommendations be implemented, a review of their impact must be undertaken after implementation. The timeframe for this review should be approximately 2 years following implementation. Any such review must consider the full range of law enforcement personnel being
supported through task forces and other cross assignments and not be limited to DEA agent strengths only.

Figure 8.6 summarizes the estimated resource impacts of the recommendations ($ in thousands).
9 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS

9.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this section is to discuss performance management briefly and generally and to recommend a framework for DEA Intelligence (and, in general, for the DEA) to consider for gauging mission success. Incorporating findings and insights learned from interviews, survey results, and document review, the section addresses the extent to which performance measures are currently employed and where there may be areas for improvement. Finally, this section discusses a suggested approach for developing MOEs that properly assess the impact that the DEA is having in its counternarcotics efforts and that build on these performance measurements.

9.2 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Performance measurement can be defined as a process of assessing progress toward achieving predetermined goals, including information on the efficiency with which resources are transformed into goods and services (outputs), the quality of those outputs (how well they are delivered to clients and the extent to which clients are satisfied), and outcomes (the results of a program activity compared to its intended purpose). In general, the term measure of performance (MOP)—used interchangeably with performance measurement—measures "how well" a person/group is doing what it is doing. In general, a MOP measures the "efficiency" of a person/group, under its current conditions and constraints. It is usually an important element in arriving at optimal MOEs, as will be discussed later in this section. Figure 9.1 encapsulates the concept of performance management.

9.3 DEA INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

The DEA Review Team's research into DEA's Intelligence performance management system revealed that, although a comprehensive program that is planned, understood, and contributed to by all units does not currently exist, the issue is being addressed within the DEA. This is largely in response to the September 2003 DOJ Office of the Inspector General's Audit Report. It asserted that the DEA had not included performance indicators for 7 of its 11 decision units—Intelligence being one of them—in its FY2003 Performance Plan, and even fewer performance results. In response, in its FY2004 budget request, DEA reduced its decision units to four and included performance indicators for all units (Figure 9.2).

(Note: DEA concurred with all seven of the Inspector General's recommendations and has implemented an action plan to accomplish them. These include developing an impact assessment methodology and a methodology to estimate projected performance based on actual data for each performance indicator, listed below, by December 2004.)

In this plan, the role of the Intelligence Program is to provide direct analytic support to investigations and to develop the strategic, investigative, and tactical Intelligence necessary for effective targeting and resource allocation—“Intelligence Driven Targeting and Enforcement.” It must provide actionable Intelligence that identifies and links command and control functions and results in successful dismantlement and disruption of the key DTOs that are having the most significant impact on U.S. drug availability and the economy. DEA’s strategy states that this will be accomplished “through the increased collection and analysis of HUMINT and technical Intelligence that identify the major drug threats.” In the international arena, the strategy calls for “an Intelligence system that drives international enforcement operations and identifies future trends and information for strategic analysis.” In the domestic arena, the Intelligence system is to maintain in-depth information concerning the leadership and operations of all significant domestic DTOs and drug facilitators—all of which must be placed in a near-real-time virtual environment. This, then, should set the guidance and parameters for measuring performance, with enforcement as the primary customer.

A review of survey and interview results and relevant documentation during this top-down review of DEA’s Intelligence Program suggests, however, that although a significant amount of raw data are tracked via various programs—with mixed reviews as to their effectiveness—a measurement process is not consistently defined, applied, or communicated. An example from the survey indicates that the extent to which measures are compiled, computed, reviewed, and adjusted often are not standardized; do not use a coherent methodology; and appear to be poorly conveyed to personnel. For instance, analysts and agents in nonmanagement positions repeatedly reported that these activities “never” happened, while compiler’s answers ranged from “daily,” “monthly,” “quarterly,” and “annually” to “when Congress or HQ asks.”

This is supported by survey statistics that indicate that only 12 percent of respondents believe, to a large extent or more, that their respective organization employs a systematic process for measuring progress toward effective mission accomplishment for Intelligence support (Figure 9.3).
To what extent does your organization employ a systematic process for measuring progress toward effective mission accomplishment for Intelligence support?

![Figure 9.3](image)

**FIGURE 9.3.**

Moreover, only 27 percent of respondents believe, to a moderate or greater extent, that the goals and objectives annotated in the FY2002-2007 Planning for the Future (Intelligence) are communicated to their respective organizations relative to Intelligence support (Figure 9.4). Further supporting this point was an interview comment indicating that compiling that document was merely a "paper drill" and that nothing is "congealed" within the Intelligence Program.

To what extent are the goals and objectives annotated in the FY2002-2007 Planning for the Future communicated to your organization relative to Intelligence support?

![Figure 9.4](image)

**FIGURE 9.4.**

The result is that—given this lack of communication and standardized process that is compounded by the lack of a common system for information sharing—no inherent system is in place to know whether progress is being made. It is up to individuals and/or individual organizations to determine what to adopt and what to "map" to. This is further reflected by the following statistics:
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- 50 percent of respondents believe that the DEA conducts internal process reviews and practices continuous work improvements “not at all/to a little extent” versus 34 percent responding “to a moderate/large extent.”

- 61 percent of respondents believe that DEA Intelligence makes use of best practices “to a moderate/large extent” versus 24 percent responding “not at all/to a little extent” (Figure 4.1) (and, when asked how effectively best practices are captured and disseminated, 54 percent responded “to a moderate/large extent” versus 31 percent responding “not at all/to a little extent” (Figure 4.2).

Although no systematic process is in place, raw data are collected and monitored through a variety of programs (Figure 9.5 summarizes a sampling of them).

Based on survey comments, it appears that what analysts and agents view as the best application of MOEs—using this term interchangeably, and incorrectly, with measures of performance (MOPs)—is primarily limited to operational outcomes, including, but not limited to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Significant Investigations Impact Measurement System</td>
<td>Used to determine impact of implementation or disruption of DTOs on drug trafficking and selected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Signature Program</td>
<td>Used to identify threat (primary and secondary) and compile sources of threat intelligence or other critical information to identify threat (both domestic and international)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Multi-Drug Threat Program</td>
<td>Used to identify threat (primary and secondary) and compile sources of threat intelligence or other critical information to identify threat (both domestic and international)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Tables are not visible in the text provided.)
• Drug purity and weight
• Interdictions and seizures of drugs, money, and real assets (property)
• Arrests and prosecutions
• Routes and new methods of transportation
• New members identified in drug-related organizations
• Financial wherewithal
• Targets linked to RPOTS and CPOTS
• Wiretap intercepts
• Quantity of leads provided
• Percent of requests for support answered
• Feedback from the community
• Dismantlements and disruptions.

Although this information is essential to collect and analyze, the benefits or value-added of Intelligence results are, as yet, largely undetermined; some respondents even stated that Intelligence has been ineffective in “marketing” its worth. In essence, the performance health of the organization, regarding its contributions toward achieving those outcomes, has not been measured—including, but not limited to, such items as the effectiveness of its training to meet mission requirements, internal processes that impact its services, and appropriate use of financial and labor resources. Based on interview comments, this is driven, in one sense, by the DEA, as an agency, needing to define where it is for Intelligence to follow suit.

9.4 MOEs

MOEs are used to assess the effectiveness of operations in terms of their specific contributions to program objectives. MOEs can be addressed in qualitative terms but are more often preferred as metrics, that is, quantitative parameters that are used to measure the performance, over time, of a particular entity—such as an operation, activity, system, or program—based on its objectives and criteria. Linked together to a strategic plan, associated goals, strategies, and critical success factors, this becomes the basis for performance-based management, which was discussed earlier.

An MOE, therefore, is an important management tool, not only for those who initiate the process but also for the agents and analysts who must help define the overall counternarcotics problem, propose solutions (i.e., courses of action), and assess the effectiveness of these solutions. By reviewing the MOEs generated in the field, DEA management can assess “how well” a proposed solution is working to enhance the organization’s effectiveness and use the findings either to refine the current course of action or propose an alternative one.

9.4.1 Criteria for Judging MOEs

Although MOEs are a recognized part of determining whether a proposed solution is satisfying an organization’s goals and objectives, there is no universally accepted definition of the term. It seems clear, though, that any solution selected should (1) represent the customer’s viewpoint—that is, “how well”
does the customer believe that the organization is meeting its needs; (2) assist management in making appropriate choices that will better meet the customer's needs; and (3) be quantifiable in some manner.

Moreover, if the DEA is to formulate logical solutions (as part of the MOE process), it needs criteria, or at least well-defined requirements, that measure the "value" or relative importance of the courses of action that are being taken by agents and analysts in the field. It is imperative for the MOE to describe in detail the customer's expectations or needs. When the DEA is formulating MOEs, therefore, it can better delineate the components of a proposed solution that would assist in addressing the customer's needs. Then, the DEA can devise methodologies for ensuring that these components, such as information sharing, are being addressed in the field and at HQ.

As reflected in OMB Circular A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget and GPRA, OMB mentions a requirement for MOEs to be quantifiable, directly measurable, and assessment (or impact) based. Other criteria and characteristics of good measures include:

- Simplicity—Each MOE should prove simple in application and interpretation. Data collection should be easy and economical.
- Sensitivity and Usability—Each MOE should be able to distinguish between relatively small changes.
- Timeliness—Each MOE should reflect timely data, illustrate trends, and respond to the intended "customer."
- Distinctiveness—Each MOE should be unique in what it measures to avoid redundancy and should be formulated to the appropriate detail for the proper level of analysis.
- Agreeability—MOEs should be agreeable to the broadest leadership spectrum.
- Manageability—MOEs should be kept to a number that provides leadership and management with the critical information they need to know without "burying" them in data.
- Linkage—MOEs should link to each other in a cause and effect-type relationship in support of identified strategies.
- Accountability—Each MOE should have a "champion" who is responsible for monitoring, analyzing, and communicating progress as well as determining if, when, and how an MOE should be modified to achieve results.

In addition to the types of measures identified above (outputs and outcomes), two others must be balanced in a sound performance-based management plan: lagging and leading. Figure 9.6 synthesizes some of the key differences between the two.
In essence, effective MOEs should reflect an integrated, value-based “story” underscoring an organization’s mission, vision, and associated activities performed by its personnel; they should address the “so what” or impact factor of an organization’s mission.

9.4.2 Survey Feedback on MOEs

In interviews and surveys, the customer was defined in multiple ways. Two categories, however, that seem most appropriate for formulating pertinent MOEs would be the public (for example, the neighborhoods that are being affected adversely by an influx of drugs) and their elected officials, including those in Congress. In our view, officials in Congress play an important role not only because they are highly visible representatives for their constituency but also because they are able to directly affect DEA functions through the budgetary process.

Many respondents expressed the opinion that DEA had no formal, meaningful set of MOEs to determine if the actions conducted by agents and analysts in the field were meeting the needs of the public, that is, the neighborhoods in their area of operation. Some were very frank on this issue, going so far as to state or infer that little effort was being made to collect examples of DEA contributions to national or organizational priorities.

Many respondents, unfortunately, did not fully understand the meaning of MOE, frequently confusing it with MOP. For example, some of the more popular responses were that the number of arrests/prosecutions and the amount of drugs seized were important MOEs. Analysts who did not participate in the arrests or seizures believed that their MOEs should be scored according to their participation in these operations. Some cited the number of reports on a particular case, or the number of staff-hours expended on a case, as their MOE. Others believed that the number of priority targets they were following was a key measure.

Although many of the mentioned factors/perceived measures may be important—especially as MOPs—they only indicate how well an analyst or agent is doing under a particular set of circumstances. They may be important as a building block in establishing an MOE. Often, however, they have little or nothing to do with the overall MOE, which should be viewed from the perspective of the customer. Customer-oriented MOEs should, if they are formulated properly, provide insight into how well the DEA is accomplishing its objectives.
On the encouraging side, some analysts seemed to have a good sense of what factors and issues should be addressed in an adequate MOE. They indicated that DEA needed to do a better job of communicating with the customer. As one respondent succinctly stated, “Need feedback, your success [satisfaction] is our metric.” As evidenced from personal interviews in the field, there are counternarcotics success stories about several urban neighborhoods.

(Note: in November 2003, a working group was formed to review DEA’s performance measures. Coined “Drugstar,” its intent was to explore a checks-and-balances system that could be implemented throughout the DEA. As part of its review, it benchmarked other LEAs, most notably the New York City Police Department’s Computer Statistics Model. This model collects crime statistics from every precinct to monitor performance and to hold precinct commanders personally accountable. The working group has since stood down to concentrate on the Field Management Plans, which will incorporate Intelligence goals.)

9.4.3 DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE MOEs

MOEs should be measured from the viewpoint of the end-user/customer, and in virtually all situations involving DEA, the salient information/Intelligence they are likely to receive will be obtained either directly from the customer or from the marketplace:

- In a localized domestic environment, the customer is likely to be a resident of a neighborhood whose well-being is directly impacted by an influx of drugs there. If a DEA operation to rid the neighborhood of drugs has occurred, a primary determinant as to how well DEA has performed this operation will come from the feedback generated by the residents. Periodic checking of the neighborhood will assess if the solution (that is, the operation) has stood the test of time.

- On a broader scale, the marketplace itself vis-à-vis the neighborhood is likely to provide the best MOE. For example, dismantlement of a narcotics network or seizure of drugs from a particular country is likely to have an impact that is broader than a single neighborhood. To assess this impact, measurements of such items as price, quantities of the “signature” drug (as to such items as country and type) remaining in the marketplace, and overall drug quality and quantity must be conducted. The variable “time” also will need to be factored into these calculations to arrive at the most appropriate MOE.

9.5 RECOMMENDED FRAMEWORK FOR TOTAL SYSTEM MEASUREMENT

There are any number of viable approaches toward measuring the overall performance of a system. The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is one measurement system that has seen significant success in both the private and public sectors, and it is the one the DEA Review Team recommends for DEA consideration. The DEA Review Team believes that this approach is ideal for DEA Intelligence (and for the agency as a whole) to manage its complex mission in a fashion that can translate and communicate the Administrator’s initiatives throughout the organization, establish accountability, develop new behaviors, and monitor real progress, or lack thereof.

Created by Robert Kaplan and David Norton, the BSC method has, at its heart, the belief that an organization’s mission and vision can best be achieved when viewed objectively from a small number of “perspectives.” Perspectives are simply focus areas that provide the context for the organization’s overall activities. Linkage between the perspectives provides a balanced and more holistic view of the operations of the organization. It is this well-rounded assessment that can provide management with a “balanced” view of all areas of operations.
This measurement method not only includes lead indicators but also measures the organizational skills and competencies—by using a variety of MOPS—that are key to organizational success or mission accomplishment, which is best measured by using MOEs. This total system approach acknowledges the challenges in achieving a balance between the information needed to run an organization and the external customers' requirements. The key is to translate the organization's mission, vision, goals, and strategic objectives into a coherent set of performance measures that offer a balance between short-term and long-term objectives and associated measures. In essence, the BSC encapsulates the following:

- **Management Method**—Not a reporting system but a system that helps manage the organization.
- **Organizational Measures**—Broad based and comprehensive.
- **Links to Strategy**—Not only links to, but aids in, deploying strategy.
- **Future Performance**—As opposed to traditional measurement systems that review past performance, it incorporates both lag and lead MOEs.

Central to the BSC philosophy is identifying the critical information that leadership must have to steer the organization toward the alignment of its vision and strategies, including:

- **Mission Accomplishment Information**—Focusing on customers and outcomes and answers the question “How do you know you are meeting mission requirements?”
- **Productivity Information**—Focusing on key resources used in development and process execution and answers the question “How do you know you're being productive?”
- **Competence Information**—Focusing on current and future knowledge, skills, and abilities that are required and answers the question “How do you know your people are competent today and will be in the future?”
- **Resource Allocation Information**—Focusing on creating investment opportunities through budget savings and performing people and answers the question “How do you know you’re allocating resources effectively?”

One benefit of using the BSC is that it utilizes fewer measures, enabling better communication. Typically, the BSC generates 2-3 strategic objectives for each of 3-5 perspectives and 1-2 measures for each objective (note that these are necessarily customized to meet the needs of each organization). The BSC:

- Reduces the sheer volume of measures to the necessary few.
- Reduces redundancy.
- Develops and collects measures at key operating levels.
- Operationalizes and communicates the mission, vision, perspectives, and relationships among objectives.
- Influences behavior and decisions throughout the organization.

### 9.5.1 BSC Development Process

Figure 9.7 illustrates the typical method for implementing the BSC development process.

(Note: The BSC usually incorporates four different perspectives: Customer, Resources, Internal Processes, and Learning and Growth. The DEA Review Team modified this to include IT—based on DEA's identification of IT enhancements as a key focus area.)
DEA's overarching mission and Vision—as outlined in the Administrator's seven implementing principles—are documented. Against this backdrop, DEA Intelligence would begin by validating its mission and clarifying its vision against the Administrator's new initiatives. By conducting analyses of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in the organization, the DEA should be able to identify gaps between where the organization is compared to where it wants to be. The strengths and weaknesses take an internal look at the organization and help formulate the objectives for the internal perspectives, such as internal processes and organizational learning. The opportunities and threats take an external view of the organization and help to provide context for the external perspectives, such as customer service. This analysis sets the stage for defining the perspectives as identified in Figure 9.7.

Objectives must then be developed for each perspective. Four perspectives that have been used in public sector organizations are identified below, along with some of the key questions that are required to develop a robust set of objectives. As stated above, the DEA Review Team added IT to reflect DEA's emphasis on IT enhancements.

- **Customer Satisfaction and Partnerships**—"**How must we look to our customers and partners?**"
  
  Who are our customers?  
  Who are our partners?  
  What does it take to satisfy them?  
  What data do we have to support the above?  
  How do we solicit feedback on customer and partner satisfaction?

- **Delivery of Programs and Services (Resource Allocation)**—"**How must we deliver our programs and services?**"
  
  What are the anticipated new or major improved programs/projects?  
  What parameters do we currently use to gauge success?
Do we consistently deliver on time and within budget?
How amenable are our budgets for improvements and innovations?
What key programs are we currently delivering?
Do we have the requisite labor to support these programs?

- **Best Business Practices (Internal Processes: Productivity)—"At which processes must we excel?"**
  - How do we currently assess the effectiveness and efficiency of our internal processes?
  - How do we share knowledge within the organization?
  - How do we eliminate outmoded/obsolete practices from our operations?
  - How do we identify our future needs?

- **Learning and Growth (Competency)—"How our organization must learn and improve?"**
  - How do we ensure employee satisfaction, competency, and workforce quality of work life?
  - What tools and training are needed for employee work optimization?
  - What facilities need to be upgraded to improve employee productivity?
  - How do we manage professional development and advancement?

- **IT—"What IT requirements must be satisfied to effectively accomplish our desired objectives?"**
  - Are current systems employed to provide maximum efficiencies, including all necessary personnel training?
  - What level of interconnectivity is required internally and externally to best serve our customers, both within Intelligence and law enforcement?
  - Are there current systems being used by other organizations within the IC that DEA Intelligence could potentially adopt?
  - What new capabilities should we explore and invest in to become more effective?

Once objectives are identified and documented, appropriate measures and associated targets can be created (e.g., specific number of leads provided through tactical and organizational Intelligence analysis over a designated time period that results in a disruption, dismantlement, or identity of significant key players). As mentioned above, measures should remain limited to no more than 20 to 25 at a time and should be based on consensus as to which measures to use and how they will be collected. Finally, specific initiatives, or action plans, are identified to achieve stated objectives.

## 9.6 SPECIFIC MEASUREMENT APPLICATIONS

Beyond the programwide aspects, the DEA Review Team believes that some key subareas could be more effectively managed using a performance measurement process. After discussing them, the DEA Review Team will mention a means of using an existing IT tool to assist management in conducting performance measurement.
9.6.1 TRAINING

The DEA Review Team believes that the quality of training, or lack thereof, can be better gauged through surveys and personal interviews conducted after a period of time has elapsed since BIRS training. Based on the results of the DEA Review Team’s survey and personal interviews, the issues surrounding training for Intelligence can be largely binned into the need for better career development and more finely honed expertise. One message gleaned from survey and interview results indicated that a far more robust, specialized training program needs to be incorporated into an individual’s career development plan. When asked about the overall effectiveness of Intelligence training, 61 percent reported “small-to-moderate” effectiveness, with 19 percent reporting “large,” and 7 percent reporting “not at all” (Figure 7.3). Specific to BIRS training, responses were 55 percent “small-to-moderate,” 15 percent “large,” and 11 percent “not at all” (Figure 7.4). General strengths included “dedicated training staff, computer training, and broad overviews.” Weaknesses included, but are not limited to, needing “more interaction and balance between analysts and agents and better predictive Intelligence (ability to identify emergent drug trends), financial investigations, report writing, and telecommunication exploitation skills training.

Other areas of training that respondents by and large identified as needing improvement—particularly in light of DEA’s evolving mission—are training that (1) promotes a collaborative analytic environment and a mindset and culture of information sharing; (2) addresses new requirements related to existing and emergent National Security threats; (3) prepares trainees to collect, analyze, and report on nondrug National Security threats; and (4) makes use of IC training courses and programs.

These responses are in line with the Administrator’s “Back to the Future” Vision and seven implementing principles in which enhancement of Intelligence expertise and training are emphasized. Establishing a formal performance measurement system would enable the leadership to continue to obtain this data and, therefore, know whether the program is meeting stated objectives.

9.6.2 ASSIGNING VALUES TO TARGETS

After generating a list of high-priority targets, DEA HQ will have to systematically measure the progress in the field, which can occur in two ways: (1) a list of questions that has to be answered periodically or (2) asking questions and soliciting information on work that is occurring on high-priority targets during inspections.

9.6.3 INFORMATION SHARING

Given the current culture of controlling the release of information in the DEA, management will need to monitor (measure) the situation very closely. To ensure that every effort is being made to implement information sharing, answers must be routinely sought on the number of cases involving multiple agencies or sources of data. Moreover, management must have statistics indicating the number of times that DEA information was passed to other agencies for use in the Global War on Terrorism, paying particular attention to those instances where DEA information helped foil a counterrorism or weapons/illegal alien smuggling plot.

9.7 A METHOD FOR MEASURING TOTAL SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS

The DEA Review Team used extensive interviews and detailed online surveys to gather most of the information that provided the basis for its recommendations. The insights from both these methods were indispensable to understanding DEA Intelligence from field, HQ, management, analyst, and customer
perspectives, and in formulating an integrated list of change recommendations that are both feasible and potentially effective.

As the DEA restructures Intelligence analysis, processes, and personnel practices to support the Administrator's Vision of a more agile and effective agency whose entire mission is driven by Intelligence, it plans to implement some DEA Review Team recommendations. The DEA Review Team believes that continued use of the online survey methodology would help DEA senior managers implement change recommendations, as well as influence the DEA workforce in building understanding and support for information-based transformation for Intelligence and operations.

The Web site would be used for the survey of, and exchange with, the DEA workforce on issues relating to planning, transition, transformation, implementation, and operation according to DIPTDR and other change recommendations to every aspect of Intelligence and Intelligence support. This could be accomplished in two ways through continued operation of the DIPTDR Web site.

9.7.1 ONLINE SURVEYS

For the following, online surveys could be conducted periodically to:

- Monitor the effectiveness of implementation of DEA Review Team change recommendations and provide opportunities to specify problem areas.
- Pose technical analytic workplace/workflow/work process issues and solution alternatives, and to canvas the analyst and/or agent community for their preferences.
- Include workforce opinion on selected policy issues as senior managers consider choices—especially pertaining to promotion, rotation, training, and career development.
- Monitor the successes and problems of information sharing for drug law enforcement and National Security purposes at every level of the DEA, and with/between DEA partners.

9.7.2 COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE/COMMUNITY OF INTEREST DISCUSSION AND INFORMATION-SHARING SPACE

Using e-mail, chat, and/or bulletin boards, the Web site could be enhanced to provide more direct contact among DEA workforce and managers on the above issues. In addition, this feature of the Web site could help DEA to:

- Identify, select, define, develop, and implement an integrated set of MOEs, especially for the use of information, that are consistent with measuring the performance of the DEA against the Administrator's Vision.
- Provide continuing evaluation and feedback on the quality, relevance, and effectiveness of entry-level and follow-on training initiatives throughout analysts' careers.
- Share lessons learned selecting and implementing best practices from experience throughout DEA and with its partners.

9.7.3 DIPTDR SURVEY WEB SITE OVERVIEW

The DEA Review Team survey and admin query applications supporting the top-down review were built and operate in a Microsoft (MS) Windows 2000 environment that comprises the following:
Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Program Top-Down Review

- Web Server (currently MS IIS 5.0)—used to serve the front-end Web forms.
- Application Server—used to host the back-end DB.

Both of these are protected behind a firewall server.

9.7.4 DIPTDR Survey—Relocation

The Survey and Admin Query application can be packaged onto a CD and relocated to operate on a system outside the contractor’s facilities. O&M for the applications should be minimal (estimated at a few hours a week) once the system is operational.

9.7.5 DIPTDR Survey—Contractor Facilities

Continuing to have the contractor host the current DIPTDR survey applications can be done; however, it will require some minimal O&M support, consisting primarily of system administration duties (software patches, version upgrades, virus definition updates, tape backups, etc.). Other costs that cannot be fully anticipated are for the contractor and include the following:

- Collaboration in development, analysis, and reporting for new surveys.
- Changes to the front-end form or specialized query support needed, and not provided by the current Admin Query application.
- Design, implementation, and support for the Community of Practice/Community of Interest workspace.

9.7.6 Recommendations

9.7.6.1 Recommendation on Framework for Total System Measurement

There are any number of viable approaches toward measuring the overall performance of a system. The BSC is one measurement system that has seen significant success in both the private and public sectors, and it is the one that the DEA Review Team recommends for DEA’s consideration. The DEA Review Team believes that this approach is ideal for DEA Intelligence (and for the agency as a whole) to manage its complex mission in a way that can translate and communicate the Administrator’s initiatives throughout the organization, establish accountability, develop new behaviors, and monitor real progress.

9.7.6.2 Recommendation on MOE

By concentrating on the customers and the public marketplace, the DEA Review Team believes that the DEA can formulate MOEs that show the impact of their efforts and shed considerable insight into both the strengths and weaknesses of their program. In the interim, the DEA Review Team would recommend:

- HQ should use surveys, such as the one generated for this report, and their own corporate inspections to continually assess the progress on counternarcotics that is being made in the field. Specific questions should be asked to determine that all HQ-directed measures, such as information sharing, are being implemented in their efforts.
- Periodic feedback from neighborhoods, as well as testimonials from their elected officials, on the favorable impact that the DEA is having should be collected and publicized.
- Selected analysts should be made a part of the target selection and ranking process.
• HQ should consider if they are using all available media to advertise successful operations to Congress and other Washington-area customers. Opportunities should be sought for further information sharing among these entities.

9.7.6.3 Recommendation on Intelligence Program Performance Measurement Management

Consideration should be given to contracting performance measurement specialists with expertise in Intelligence measurement to develop a performance measure management system to evaluate the effectiveness of the DEA Intelligence Program on a continuing basis.

9.7.6.4 Recommendation on Web Tool

The Web could be used to survey, and exchange information with, the DEA workforce on issues concerning planning, transition, transformation, implementation, and operation according to DIPTDR and other change recommendations to every aspect of Intelligence and Intelligence support. This could be accomplished through continued operation of the DIPTDR Web site.
10 RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 VISION IMPLEMENTATION

10.1.1 RECOMMENDATION ON ALIGNING THE ADMINISTRATOR’S VISION (2.2.1)

Revise and update DEA publication 02007 to align the Intelligence Program vision, mission, strategic goals, and objectives with the Administrators “Back to the Future” Vision and seven implementing principles. Publish the Administrator’s new Vision in hard copy and also place it on DEA’s Web site.

10.1.2 RECOMMENDATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS SUPPORT POLICY (2.3.1.1)

Work with DEA OC to supplement national-level terrorist activities policy to ensure that IAs are effectively utilized to support this critical function and that SAs are institutionally encouraged to identify and report information relating to critical National Security requirements. Coincidently, develop a mechanism that assures SAs that their drug cases will not be jeopardized if they encounter terrorist links.

10.1.3 RECOMMENDATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCE SUPPORT (2.3.2.1)

Both the interviews and survey confirm DEA’s support of National Security issues. It is doubtful, however, that a full 30%-40% of all DEA analysis is devoted to nondrug National Security research and reporting. The DEA should acknowledge support to overall National Security priorities as a key DEA mission support area, but not quote percentages of resources allocated. Statements of high rates of resource commitment to threats such as terrorism cannot be substantiated by the DIPTDR analysis.

10.1.4 RECOMMENDATION ON PASSING NONDRUG NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (2.3.3.1)

Reassess this important process and assign the analysts more direct responsibility for ensuring that the data are passed in a timely manner to local counterterrorism authorities. Under the recommendation for restructuring Field Division strategic analysis, a tangential recommendation is to engage case support analysts in a more active role with local counterterrorism and LEAs. The establishment of an analyst-driven e-mail “address group” for disseminating terrorism information in the DEA, as well as to local LEAs, would (1) place responsibility on the analyst closest to the issue; (2) strengthen the bond between DEA analysts and other LEAs; and (3) provide a documented trail of DEA support to overall National Security.

10.1.5 RECOMMENDATION ON INTELLIGENCE AS A DRIVER OF OPERATIONS (2.3.4.1)

Provide the necessary training for SAs and IAs to fully understand how Intelligence “drives” not “runs” operations. Continue to include the concept in all of the Administrator’s internal and external meetings and briefings. Ensure that SAC Conferences discuss the concept and participants are invited to comment. Hold SACs and FIMs accountable and ensure compliance through management reviews, inspections, and monitoring of selected operations.
10.1.6 **RECOMMENDATION ON SUPPORT TO THE FO (2.4.1.2)**

With the majority of financial analysts actually being in the new FO Division, it may be necessary to move the Financial Investigative Unit to the FO to ensure clear "avenues of analysis." The financial analysis functions closely parallel the IA. To avoid duplications of all financial analysis, it should be under the direct control of the Chief, FO. (For more information, see Section 3, Organizational Structure and Alignment.)

10.1.7 **RECOMMENDATION ON INTELLIGENCE TOOLS (2.4.2.1)**

For specific recommendations, see Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.

10.1.8 **RECOMMENDATION ON INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS (2.4.3.2)**

Update the Agent Manual and Policy Order 00-200 to reflect current IA current responsibilities, as well as an accurate description of their working relationship with SAs. These guidelines should include primary analytic functions, as well as production responsibilities. The written guidelines should include operational limitations and proscriptions.

10.1.9 **RECOMMENDATION ON INTERNAL PARTNERSHIPS (2.4.3.3)**

Ensure a strong partnership between Operations and Intelligence. Instill the concept that one of the primary missions for the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence is to ensure optimum intelligence support to enforcement operations. To forge a closer relationship with Operations, consider disbanding the Office of Investigative Intelligence and moving the analysts to SOD, the new OFC, and the Field Divisions. To better support Operations in the field, structure the FIMs as ASACs, equivalent reporting operationally to Associate SACs or directly to the SAC (as the FITs do) at larger Field Divisions and Country Offices. At smaller Field Divisions and Country Offices, establish FIMs as Intelligence Group Supervisors who report operationally to an ASAC or SAC directly. Continue to serve as the national-level analytic element in support of SOD.

10.1.10 **RECOMMENDATION ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (2.4.3.5)**

Reestablish/create relationships with the DIA and strengthen the relationship with the DCI CNC. Reestablish/create DEA Intelligence Liaison Offices and analyst exchange programs (see Section 5, Products and Services) at key nodes of each major Intelligence and law enforcement organization. Establish joint Intelligence publications and analyst exchanges whenever and wherever possible.

10.1.11 **RECOMMENDATION ON NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE (2.4.3.6)**

Ensure the continuation and effectiveness of the CDICG by continuing to support and lead this unique Government policy body. The CDICG, which was instituted by the GCIP, is the only formal venue for Drug Intelligence policy, coordination, and oversight. It can be used to resolve interagency issues, build partnerships, drive enforcement decisions, and improve information sharing.

10.1.12 **RECOMMENDATION ON NDIC (2.4.3.7)**

The special relationship that NDIC has with the DEA is important to producing high-quality domestic strategic Drug Intelligence. After ensuring that quality control processes are in place, the DEA should fully implement NDIC's "The memorandum for the Attorney General, DEA-NDIC Joint Initiatives," signed 17 December 2003. Full implementation is especially important for paragraphs 1-4 on Intelligence...
Production. Establish a reporting system between DEA regional strategic intelligence elements and NDIC.

10.1.13 RECOMMENDATION ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2.4.3.8)

The CONOPS for OFC may mitigate many of the issues on the sharing of law enforcement case-sensitive information of Intelligence value. The work accomplished in creating OFC should continue to build on the trust developed during its inception and IOC. Individual bilateral or multilateral agreements can be made to extend information sharing from the OFC environment to other participants. (For more information, see Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.)

10.1.14 RECOMMENDATION ON STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2.4.3.9)

Information-sharing relationships vary radically from one Field Division to another. Much of the variance is driven primarily by personalities. It also is clear that where a strong relationship with HIDTA/ISCs exists, there is universally better cooperation and resultant information sharing, at least on an informal basis. This cooperation should be institutionalized and standardized across all DEA Field Divisions by establishing a policy that stresses the requirement for SACs and FIMs to become closely involved with HIDTA/ISCs/Task/Strike Forces and JIA TFs, as well as with state and local police. Continue to push EPIC as the central reporting place or clearinghouse for the ISC located with each HIDTA. Establish a strategic Intelligence coordination process, joint Intelligence publications, and analyst exchanges whenever and wherever possible.

10.1.15 RECOMMENDATION ON SHARING INTELLIGENCE (2.4.3.11)

Assess DEA products and data systems to identify what specific data and information must be protected, as well as what data and information can be shared fully among participating partners. Consider writing all products at a level that can be shared, with a special section (tearline) to protect highly sensitive data. The DMA format used by the DEA with JIATFS is a right first step toward an effective information-sharing process. Include timing mechanisms for release of post-trial (or post-plea agreement) case information and analysis into the shared knowledge base. Delegate authority to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Operations and to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Intelligence as final adjudication authorities for release of information and Intelligence, respectively. (Additional recommendations on sharing are contained in subsequent sections of this report.)

10.1.16 RECOMMENDATION ON MOEs (2.4.4.1)

Conduct a study, using Intelligence performance measurement experts, to develop specific Intelligence Program metrics and MOEs. Along with OC, develop a further methodology to utilize Intelligence processes and information to assess the overall impact of DEA mission accomplishment. Build a Web site to obtain subjective evaluation. (For more information, see Section 9, Performance Measurements.)

10.1.17 RECOMMENDATION ON CAREER DEVELOPMENT (2.4.5.1)

Transfer administrative control of all Intelligence billets throughout the DEA to the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence to ensure consistent and standardized hiring, training, rotation, and promotion practices. Operational control and direction would remain with the field SACs via the FIM, who in some cases would be an ASAC. (For more information, see Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation.)
10.1.18  **Recommendation on Rotational Policy (2.4.5.2)**

Designate specific billets in each Field Division as rotational to prevent homesteading. Consistently enforce mobility to ensure a fair and systematic rotation of personnel to and from overseas billets and in the supervisory/manager career path. (For more information, see Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation.)

10.1.19  **Recommendation on Rotational Funding (2.4.5.3)**

Obtain separate NC line item budget authority for all Intelligence Program PCS moves, including sufficient resources to rotate IAs in accordance with current Intelligence Program policy. (For more information, see Section 8, Program/Budget Development and Allocations).

10.1.20  **Recommendation on Entry-Level Program (2.4.5.4)**

Establish an entry-level career program for IAs similar to that for SAs, including strict hiring standards controlled by NC, basic training within the first quarter of being hired, and two required initial tours—with the first one at HQ and a second one in the field. (For more information, see Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation, and Section 8, Program/Budget Development and Allocations.)

10.2  **Organizational Structure and Alignment**

10.2.1  **Recommendation on Increasing IA End Strength (3.2.9.1)**

Fund an additional 100 positions with a mix of analysts (80) and administrative support staff (20) to support new National Security requirements, priority target investigations, and regional strategic analysis at Field Divisions and Country Offices. To avoid delays in hiring, consider a mix of new FTEs and contract analysts. (See Appendix G for recommended distribution of analysts.)

10.2.2  **Recommendation on Organizational Bureaucracy (3.3.3.1)**

Flatten the organization by eliminating the Units, and group the analysts into teams under each Section. The Intelligence elements at DEA HQ appear to be overly structured, with Offices, Sections, and Units. With the exception of NS, units often are as small as five people and are “supervised” by a GS-14. This small unit size seems to be abetted by an organizational “rule of three,” where the justification for establishing a section appears to necessitate establishing three subordinate units. In today’s flatter organizations, it is more common to find a supervisor to worker ratio of 1:15 rather than the 1:5 ratio found in DEA units. SHRM has commented that “... while there is no hard-and-fast rule about appropriate team size, some experts suggest that communication and coordination can become difficult for groups larger than 15 to 20 people.” Since the recommended team structure is not registered/presented on the “line and block” as part of the official organization, the number, composition, and disposition of the teams can, therefore, change as management sees fit. It allows management to surge analysts to meet new issues more quickly and can provide a more broadened work environment of team members. The “loss” of supervisory positions is offset by the capability to appoint GS-14 analysts as team leaders and add another person to provide administrative support of the team (e.g., a Program Analyst). The ability to create a nonsupervisory GS-14 is an extant power and authorized under 2250 Personnel Management, Section 2250.52, Paragraph F.

10.2.3  **Recommendation on NI (3.3.3.2)**

Disband NI and distribute personnel to Strategic Intelligence, OFC, SOD, NDIC, and the Field Divisions. Case work is best performed at Field Division Offices. A small number of senior IAs should be moved to
the Office of Strategic Intelligence. In addition, they could serve as an initial cadre for OFC. Remaining analysts should be moved to meet DEA commitments to analyst exchanges with NDIC and to support key Field Divisions whose analyst-to-agent ratio is greater than 1:13.

10.2.4 RECOMMENDATION ON NIWF (3.3.3.3)

Move NIWF directly to FO. This separation of the financial analysis unit from the Intelligence organization parallels the Intelligence support to the Field Divisions, and ensures clear “avenues of analysis” between OC and NC.

Alternative 1 would be to negotiate with OC not to have GS-0132s in the money-laundering operation and move current NIWA analysts elsewhere in the NC organization.

Alternative 2 would be to move NIWF personnel (preferably coded as GS-0110 Economists) to billets in the new FO, thus creating vacancies at NC.

Alternative 3 would be to give the personnel and billets to OC, rescope the work to the GS-0110 series, and have OC “pay back” the billets in FY2005-2006.

10.2.5 RECOMMENDATION ON THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE (3.3.3.4)

Reorganize NT to serve the Intelligence needs of the Administrator and provide support to the National Security Community. This unit will be the multisource strategic analytic unit at HQ. It should be organized along two distinct lines. First, it would be organized as a Strategic Intelligence Office organized to assess the overall current and future drug threats, primarily by integrating the foreign and domestic drug threats as produced and provided by CNC and NDIC, respectively, and by reviewing DEA internal strategic reporting from Field Divisions and Country Offices. In this respect, it also would serve as the knowledge/production center for dangerous drugs by merging NTSG and NIWG. Close contact with DEA labs will be essential. Second, it would be organized as a current Intelligence unit comprising primarily senior analysts and external and internal liaisons organized to provide subject matter expertise to the Administrator and other HQ elements in support of evolving operational, interagency, resource, and Congressional requirements, as well as other taskings. In this arrangement, responsibility for regional strategic assessments currently performed in NTR would transition to regional Strategic Analysts at the Field Divisions and Country Offices. Domestic strategic Intelligence duties performed by NTSD would pass to NDIC.

10.2.6 RECOMMENDATION ON NPMP (3.3.3.5)

Reorganize NPMP to administer the new DIPP. The office would coordinate all joint Intelligence production among DEA, NDIC, CNC, EPIC, and the HIDTA ISCs, as well as other Intelligence activities producing counterdrug Intelligence. Technologies would be upgraded with the introduction of digital authoring and production tools and improved high-quality printing (reproduction) capabilities. In addition, the office will coordinate hard-copy reproduction with NDIC as part of DIPP. (For more information on DIPP, see Section 5, Products and Services.)

10.2.7 RECOMMENDATION ON TRDI (3.3.3.6)

Give NC direct control over course requirements, presentation, and personnel. The best approach would be to take TRDI out from under the command of HR and the Academy SAC. Assign a senior GS-15 or new SES employee, who reports to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, to head the program and coordinate with HR and OC to have the program as a tenant organization at the Academy facility. Have the Academy provide spaces for offices, the Merlin Room, and one or two classrooms to be
designated as NC “space” at Quantico to house the revised Intelligence Program. The independence and flexibility to provide a dynamic course environment will be essential to building an Analyst Career Development Program for DEA Intelligence. Turn the revitalized Intelligence Training Center into the repository for all Intelligence training records and all training associated with the new Analyst Career Development Program.

10.3 EPIC

10.3.1 RECOMMENDATION ON EPIC STRUCTURE (3.4.1)

Revise the EPIC Management Structure below the Director-SAC level and create two divisions in EPIC, each to be headed by an SES employee: one to be filled by an FBI 1811, and one to be filled by a DIFS 1811, 0132, or USCG junior flag officer. The additional SES positions appear to be justified by the size and scope of EPIC operations. An FBI SES employee is considered appropriate if a counterterrorism/ National Security mission is incorporated.

10.3.2 RECOMMENDATION ON OTHER EPIC SECTIONS (3.4.2)

Reorganize the remainder of current EPIC Watch, Special Operations, and R&A functions into seven new sections, including:

- **A Current Intelligence/Intelligence Analysis Section** that would perform analysis of the routes and techniques used by international smuggling organizations with the objective to produce timely estimative (predictive) Intelligence in support of interagency operations. It also would be charged with ensuring that any information that may be of strategic value is identified and made available expeditiously to NDIC, CNC, and DEA HQ (NT). It also would cooperate and coordinate regularly with all HIDTA ISCs to ensure the Drug Intelligence information analysis efforts are coordinated and complete.

- **An Information Management Section** that would have duties similar to existing EPIC data management functions but would additional duties for data standardization, integration, and acquisition, as well as ensuring that EPIC data are being shared with all validated customers.

- **An Investigative Support Section**, including DOCEX from NDIC, asset forfeiture analysts, and case support analysts to provide in-depth research for field customers beyond what is available in the field.

- **A Tactical Support Section**, including the existing Special Operations unit, an expanded fraudulent documents unit, the Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC), and an in-depth query research function that would proactively conduct in-depth research of EPIC queries to determine additional leads or other information of value to the field and strategic elements.

- **A Special Programs Section** headed by a senior state or local law enforcement official to manage existing programs such as Pipeline and Jetway, as well as training and day-to-day coordination with the HIDTAs.

- **A Counterterrorist Operations Support Section**, including a JITF, USCG COASTWATCH Support, and terrorist alert and information coordination function to ensure that EPIC is fully aware of all alerts and provides any terrorist-related information it receives or formulates to the appropriate agency.

General Watch would not require change except that analysis support functions would move to the Tactical Support and Counterterrorist Operations Sections.
10.4 STAFFING

10.4.1 RECOMMENDATION ON GS-0134 CONVERSION (3.5.2.1)

Convert selected GS-0132 positions at the Field Divisions to GS-0134 Series—Intelligence Aide and Clerk Series. The DEA Review Team noted that many tasks performed by Investigative Analysts (TOLLS and pen registers) are similar to data entry or extraction tasks that could be more economically performed by Intelligence Aides (GS-0134). NC should assess which positions should be converted to GS-0134s (a suggested number is included in Section 6, Program/Budget and Resources). Identify the positions and, when vacated, advertise the new billet as a GS-0134/12. Individuals hired into these billets would be outside the career path for analysts and could stay in the particular Field Division for their careers. This allows the SAC and FIM to recommend local personnel who are proven assets but who do not want to be subject to analyst reassignment.

These individuals, however, may not be promoted above GS-12 but would be eligible to enter the Analyst Career Development Program if they meet the requirements and are willing to deploy from their current location. Their first job would be in Washington, D.C., to ensure an understanding of the overall DEA Intelligence process. Recommendation on DEA Senior Analyst Positions (3.5.2.2)

10.4.2 RECOMMENDATION ON DEA SENIOR ANALYST POSITIONS (3.5.2.2)

As part of flattening the organization suggested above, begin regular appointment of GS-14/15 to nonsupervisory positions. The flattening of the organization will displace GS-14/15s from their supervisory/management positions. The current NC policy allows for the promotion of nonsupervisors/managers to GS-14/15 positions to ensure that depth of analysis is maintained. This was not included in the Program Management/Budget section recommendations as NC must decide the exact number and location if implemented.

10.4.3 RECOMMENDATION ON SES EXPANSION (3.5.2.3)

Expand the DEA SES positions and appointments to match or parallel the SES percentage in the 1811/Agent Corps. This recommendation is based on the minimal number of Intelligence SES observed in NC and the much larger number of SES agents that were interviewed. It is also a recommendation to broaden the base for creating the new leadership (for Intelligence) in the Administrator's Vision statement. (Specific numbers are included in Section 8, Program/Budget Development and Allocations.)

10.4.4 RECOMMENDATION ON CREATING ADDITIONAL FIMs (3.5.2.4)

Create a FIM position at all Field Divisions. The concept of FIMs appears to be well received. In each site, the FIM provided oversight and guidance, and conducted meetings with the analysts to provide cross-case fertilization. The Group Supervisors provided mid-level supervision over analysts assigned to each of the groups. Incrementally expand this concept to all Field Divisions, starting with the larger divisions and working down to the smaller units. Collaborate with OC to have all FIMs treated as an ASAC for Intelligence (or GS in smaller divisions), reporting to an Associate SAC or the SAC. In the largest four Field Divisions and the South America Country Office, make the FIM position an SES, to provide leverage and build a career base for future DEA leaders. (For more information, see Section 4, Policies, Processes, and Functions.)
10.5  ALIGNMENT

10.5.1  RECOMMENDATION ON NDIC SUBORDINATION AND MISSION FOCUS (3.6.5.1)

To eliminate duplication in both mission and process, NDIC like EPIC should be subordinate to the DEA. The study could find no viable reason for this not to be done. In fact, such a move would only enhance the production of Strategic Drug Intelligence. Coincident with this move should be the transfer of the nonstrategic DOCEX function to EPIC to allow NDIC to focus solely on its Strategic Intelligence mission.

10.5.2  RECOMMENDATION ON NDIC DATA ACCESS (3.6.5.2)

Provide NDIC with full access to DEA/EPIC HIDTA data, including DEA Form-6s and other participating agency DBs and reporting. Direct NDIC to be listed as an addressee on all DEA cables/DEA Form-6s, including those from Country Offices.

10.5.3  RECOMMENDATION ON NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTION SYSTEM (3.6.5.3)

Initiate and institute a joint DEA/NDIC/ONDCP (HIDTA ISC's), EPIC, OCDETF effort to define objectives for a national Drug Intelligence collection management and production system that is based on analyst-developed collection priorities to ensure comprehensive, nonduplicative reporting and production. (See recommendations for collection and production management within the DEA in subsequent sections.)

10.5.4  RECOMMENDATION ON NDIC ANALYST PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT (3.6.5.4)

Call for and support an NDIC Analyst professionalization program that includes additional training at national Intelligence agencies, quality reviews by the CDICG/CDX staff and establishing and using standards for fair and equitable hiring and promotion that are based solely on qualifications.

10.5.5  RECOMMENDATION ON ANALYST EXCHANGES WITH NDIC (3.6.5.5)

Call for, negotiate, and institute the placement of NDIC analysts in major DEA Field Division regional Strategic Intelligence units/elements to ensure coordinated collection and production. In addition, exchange and collocate analysts when deemed feasible.

10.5.6  RECOMMENDATION ON NDIC SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE (3.6.5.6)

Conduct an in-depth review of NDIC systems architecture to ensure it is focused on its primary mission of strategic domestic Drug Intelligence. Closely examine the RAID development process.

10.5.7  RECOMMENDATION ON INTEGRATED OPERATIONS AT EPIC (3.6.5.7)

Integrate operations on a coequal basis with JTFN or other local, DoD, or DHS components sharing a common current Intelligence function and the development, operation, and maintenance of Intelligence systems.
10.5.8 **RECOMMENDATION ON OFC (3.6.5.8)**

Although it is too soon to tell, there is potential overlap or customer confusion on the difference between NS and OFC. If an open IT architecture is approved, the information difference between NS and OFC may become indistinguishable and a merge of operations may be considered. (For more information, see Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.) The use of SOD as a single point of entry to retrieve information may eliminate potential confusion.

10.6 **NFIP MEMBERSHIP**

10.6.1 **RECOMMENDATION ON JOINING THE IC (3.7.6.1)**

Reactions are mixed as to DEA’s joining the DCI’s national foreign IC. Nevertheless, the DEA Review Team recommends that the DEA should join. Clearly, doing so would be in keeping with the Administrator’s Vision of expanding DEA’s contribution to National Security. To accomplish this, a special team comprising senior-level staff from Intelligence, Operations, and DOJ should be commissioned to identify the advantages and disadvantages of NFIP membership and to determine exactly what DEA’s responsibilities/cost/liabilities would be, as well as what benefits may accrue to both the DEA and the nation. To achieve its objectives, this team should (1) seek the advice of one or more individuals who have succeeded in a similar undertaking and (2) seek the support of DOJ/DEA Congressional affairs staff to determine what the level of Congressional interest may be in such an initiative.

There are, however, some alternatives to full immersion or commitment to the IC:

**Alternative 1:** Request NFIP observer status and dedicate 6 months to 1 year on direct interaction with NFIP. Whatever the decision, continue to keep open channels with the IC and sanitize DEA information for use by NFIP.

**Alternative 2:** Request permanent observer/nonvoting status.

**Alternative 3:** Negotiate full voting membership within the resource and policy restrictions established by DOJ and the DEA Administrator.

10.7 **POLICIES**

10.7.1 **RECOMMENDATION ON FIMs (4.3.2.1)**

Collaborate with OC to have all FIMs treated as ASACs for Intelligence, reporting to an Associate SAC or the SAC. In select Field Divisions and Country Offices, the FIM position should be an SES, to provide leverage and build a career base for future DEA leaders. At each site, the FIM should provide oversight and guidance to Intelligence operations, serve as the SAC advisor on Intelligence, and institute a process within the Intelligence unit that ensures that all analysts are informed of ongoing cases through their division, as well as those in other divisions that could have an impact on their cases. Incrementally expand FIM positions to Field Divisions, starting with the larger divisions and working down to the smaller units. (For more information, see Section 3, Organizational Structure and Alignment.)

10.7.2 **RECOMMENDATION ON STRATEGIC ANALYSTS IN FIELD DIVISIONS (4.3.2.2)**

Each Field Division and Foreign Office should have at least one Strategic Analyst, unencumbered by case support or other nonstrategic responsibilities. These analysts would be from NDIC and NC and responsible for writing the strategic reports for the Field Division. These reports would be combined at
NDIC and NC into domestic strategic Intelligence reports and special national-level (international and domestic) strategic reports for the DEA Administrator. (For more information, see Section 7, Analyst Development and Allocation.)

10.7.3 RECOMMENDATION ON MARKETING DEA (4.3.2.3)

With concurrence of DOJ and the DEA Administrator, begin to develop a program that “markets” the value of DEA Intelligence as a National Security resource. Three initial target sets to consider are OMB, the Congress, and the American people.

10.7.4 RECOMMENDATION ON THE DIVERSION PROGRAM (4.3.2.4)

DEA Intelligence should consider providing Intelligence support to diversion operations. This would be predicated on requesting and receiving new Intelligence personnel for this expanded mission.

10.7.5 RECOMMENDATION ON AARs (4.3.2.5)

The NC and OC Divisions should institute an AAR to capture the lessons learned from completed cases. TRDI at Quantico has a rigorous process of postcourse evaluation by the students. The findings are weighed and, when feasible, incorporated into the next course. The summarized evaluations are presented to the training SAC. If used throughout DEA, AARs would highlight the best practices as well as the operational deficiencies. AARs would be sent to all operational units and stored in a central, Web-based repository for future use. TRDI should continue with its postcourse review process.

10.7.6 RECOMMENDATION ON CS DEBRIEFINGS (4.3.2.6)

The policy should be changed to require IAs at all CS debriefings associated with cases that they are assigned. Analysts should develop a set of case-specific questions, garner information that would be pertinent as cross-case support, and formulate a set of questions that would elicit information on issues of National Security. IAs would include these findings in a joint agent/analyst-generated DEA Form-6 or cable. Analysts should represent the FIT in standard debriefings.

10.7.7 RECOMMENDATION ON ESTABLISHING A DIVERSIFIED WORKFORCE (4.3.2.7)

The creation of a new Intelligence Program model will demand a diverse IA population. The DEA Review Team believes that a diverse workforce is an essential pillar in building a new Intelligence Program model.

10.8 PROCESSES

10.8.1 RECOMMENDATION ON IA PRESENCE AT THE FIELD DIVISIONS (4.3.3.1)

Expand the FIM concept to all Field Divisions and capture the team-building processes and procedures developed in the New York and Los Angeles Field Divisions. The DEA Review Team noted two distinct models for the FIM to allocate analytic resources: (1) assigning IAs directly to support an enforcement group and (2) allocating individual IAs based on specific SA requests, availability of resources, and case priority. (For more information, see Section 4.3.2.1 and Section 3, Organizational Structure and Alignment.)
10.8.2 **RECOMMENDATION ON THE FIELD DIVISION ANNUAL FIELD MANAGEMENT PLAN (4.3.3.2)**

The Field Division's Annual Field Management Plan should serve as a basis for evaluating Intelligence support to enforcement groups. FIMs should be integral partners in developing the Annual Field Management Plan and in adjusting PIDs, as well as in preparing IA evaluations to reflect the objectives of the Annual Field Management Plan.

10.8.3 **RECOMMENDATION ON THE SFIP (4.3.3.3)**

Reinvigorate the SFIP. Although reviews on the effectiveness of the SFIP are mixed, this program allows good ideas to surface from the bottom of the organization. Use it as a special funding mechanism for identifying and filling Intelligence gaps, purchasing new Intelligence equipment for testing, fostering IT innovation, and sponsoring special Intelligence-centric "operations." In addition, the SFIP can be a useful tool to encourage information sharing and to develop multi-agency relationships as DEA IAs exchange and cross-reference their analysis with that of other agencies’ Intelligence professionals.

10.9 **PROCEDURES**

10.9.1 **RECOMMENDATION ON IA-TO-SA RATIO (4.3.4.1)**

Although the 1:1 SOD ratio is not practical throughout the DEA, the success of SOD suggests that a better analyst-to-agent ratio based on a number of conditions other than simple head counts would improve operations. (For more information, see Section 3.2.9.) The DEA Review Team recommends that the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence (NC) and the Chief of Operations jointly sponsor a study to ascertain the best balance, especially at the Field Divisions. With the support of DOJ and ONDCP, the findings should be included in the DEA Congressional strategy and submissions to OMB. The additional analysts that may be realized by utilizing this approach are needed to support growing priority investigations, new financial investigations, the counterterrorist obligation, and the new regional strategic analysis effort that will develop threat priorities, identify drug-trafficking trends and patterns, and provide predictive Intelligence based on all-source analysis. (For more information, see Section 3, Organizational Structure and Alignment, and Section 8, Program/Budget Development and Allocations.)

10.9.2 **RECOMMENDATION ON “ANALYST HANDBOOK” (4.3.4.2)**

Continue rapid development of an “Analyst Handbook.” This handbook should complement the Agent Manual (not repeat sections) and should provide the Intelligence perspective on issues central to Intelligence policies, processes, and procedures. It is critical to obtain OC concurrence and to reinforce the operational boundaries established in the handbook.

10.9.3 **RECOMMENDATION ON SANITIZING DEA INTELLIGENCE (4.3.4.3)**

Continue with the Reports Officer effort to establish a set of procedures for sanitizing DEA information. This process should be the first action taken by DEA HQ on all incoming DEA Form-6s and cables and should turn nonwarning information around within 24 hours of receipt. There should be a continuous review of incoming information, with the intent of further disseminating such information to other LEAs and Intelligence agencies.

10.9.4 **RECOMMENDATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESS (4.3.4.4)**

The DEA should continue supporting National Security issues other than narcotrafficking. Narco-terrorism is an option for any drug-smuggling organization. The same organizations that smuggle drugs and people
easily can use their concealment operations, money-laundering processes, and logistics capabilities to support international terrorist organizations and to smuggle weapons or terrorists into the U.S. The DEA must solidify and institute procedures to ensure that the terrorism information it obtains is shared with other LEAs and Intelligence agencies efficiently and expeditiously.

10.10 CRM

10.10.1 Recommendation on a CRM System (4.4.1.1)

The DEA should institute a CRM process and Intelligence gap identification methodology within NC and in collaboration with OC. A Web-based system could be hosted on Firebird and Merlin and serve as the main requirements and production coordination mechanism for the proposed DEA Intelligence Production Program. The DEA Review Team recommends that the DEA evaluate DIA’s COLISEUM system to determine if this system can be modified for DEA purposes. Institute procedures for developing an analytical methodology that assesses information available and what additional information is need to provide a full picture of the target. The U.S. Army uses the term “Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space” for this discovery process. It should become a part of the BIRS training and be used as an Intelligence gap analysis tool for case development. When establishing a collection management process, the DEA must synchronize it with the IC.

10.11 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

10.11.1 Recommendation on DEA Intelligence Briefings (4.5.7.1)

DEA liaison and other off-site personnel need to recommend DEA briefings to their host organizations. These briefings could be scheduled on a periodic basis.

10.11.2 Recommendation on Use of Web Based DB System (4.5.7.2)

The DEA should strongly consider implementing a Web-based DB system (similar to Intelink) to promulgate at least some of its National Security and/or counternarcotics-related information, as well as its Intelligence reports.

10.11.3 Recommendation on Reporting Integrity (4.5.7.3)

The DEA should carefully monitor field units to ensure that all collected Intelligence data on counternarcotics and National Security issues is reported to HQ, with a view toward rewarding those individuals and units performing the best.

10.12 INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING

10.12.1 Recommendation on “Information Sharing” Evaluation (4.5.7.4)

The DEA should explore making “information sharing” a part of the evaluation of all SACs.

10.12.2 Recommendation on MOAs and MOUs (4.5.7.5)

The DEA should ensure that its work in formulating MOAs and MOUs will promote information sharing among the agencies.
10.12.3 **RECOMMENDATION ON “REPORTS OFFICER” PROGRAM (4.5.7.6)**

The DEA should guide and carefully monitor the progress that the “Reports Officer Program” is making in discerning how much information is releasable to the IC and other LEAs. In addition, DEA should determine how much of this information pertains to counternarcotics and how much relates to other National Security issues. It is anticipated that a direct and immediate means of distributing any data found to be of critical importance will be implemented.

10.13 **INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

10.13.1 **RECOMMENDATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING (4.5.7.7)**

The DEA must ensure that courses on National Security issues, other than drugs, are incorporated into the DEA training curriculum. The DEA should take full advantage of the National Security knowledge and education gained by DEA SAs graduating from the Armed Forces war colleges and the IAs graduating from the Joint Military Intelligence College, Post Graduate Intelligence Program. A select group of these graduates should be tasked with designing courses tailored for DEA SAs and IAs. A comprehensive understanding of what National Security means is paramount to fully understanding how DEA’s Intelligence capabilities can support overall U.S. National Security.

10.13.2 **RECOMMENDATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM LIAISON OFFICERS (4.5.7.8)**

The DEA should send IA Liaison Officers to all principal counterterrorism groups, such as the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC). By doing so, the DEA will be kept abreast of available counterterrorism-related Intelligence data—especially in its countries of interest—and the key issues that are confronting the Washington-area policymakers. This also will help the DEA make sure that it is providing all pertinent, important counterterrorism-related data.

10.13.3 **RECOMMENDATION ON COMBINING DATA SYSTEMS (4.5.7.9)**

The DEA, in addition, should explore the possibility of combining data systems that are largely duplicative and share the Intelligence placed in those systems among the participating agencies. The current CONCORD effort appears to be headed in this direction for DEA systems. This could become a baseline model for consolidation of duplicative DBs among all of the Drug IC.

10.14 **DEA AND GCIP**

10.14.1 **RECOMMENDATION ON DEA’S DRUG INTELLIGENCE LEADERSHIP ROLE (4.6.2.1)**

The DEA must continue to lead the CDICG to ensure that interagency Drug Intelligence issues are surfaced and addressed; that DEA HQ, NDIC, and EPIC produce quality products; that ONDCP resources are distributed fairly and equitably across multiple agencies to ensure maximum national benefit; and that duplication of Drug Intelligence reporting and production is reduced to a minimum.

10.14.2 **RECOMMENDATION ON DRUG INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION (4.6.2.2)**

In its role as the lead drug LEA and co-chair of the CDICG, the DEA must, at all times, consider the wider Drug IC and coordinate and synchronize its Drug Intelligence policies, processes, and procedures to ensure that there is a synchronized national Drug Intelligence collection, production, and dissemination process.
10.14.3 **RECOMMENDATION ON THE CDICG (4.6.2.3)**

The CDICG should be retained to provide guidance and direction to the national Drug IC and for interagency guidance and direction of NDIC and EPIC. The DEA should market CDICG's usefulness to other agencies and strengthen it by scheduling regular and ad hoc meetings. It should use the CDICG forum to discuss and resolve all Drug Intelligence policy issues. It should continue to ensure resource allocations provided through ONDCP are used only on projects benefiting multiple agencies.

10.15 **PRODUCTS AND SERVICES**

10.15.1 **RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRODUCTION IMPROVEMENT (5.2.1.1)**

The DEA Review Team recommends that the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence begin an outreach effort to Washington-based law enforcement and Intelligence organizations. In addition, the DEA should:

- Increase its ongoing dialogue with Washington-area policymakers about their "requirements" on narcotics and other National Security issues. Then, a program should be implemented to ensure that the DEA provides them with reports that satisfy their requirements in terms of relevancy and timeliness.
- Implement a defined production coordination process to help focus its limited resources on the key issues facing the policymakers in the areas of narcotics and other National Security concerns where the DEA can contribute.
- Institute training that provides IAs with methodologies for doing different types of analysis—especially predictive techniques and methodologies—and that familiarizes SAs and IAs with various issues of National Security, in addition to the current issues involving illicit drugs.
- Expand coauthoring papers with others in the IC. In the DEA Review Team's view, the DEA should expand coauthoring domestic strategic reports on narcotics with NDIC. NDIC's current reports could benefit substantially from the timely, extensive data that is obtained by DEA's wide network of SAs and IAs in the U.S.

10.15.2 **RECOMMENDATION ON STRATEGIC REPORTS (5.2.1.2)**

Continue producing these reports; however, direct them toward customer needs. Customers should be surveyed annually to ascertain their requirements for DEA products. The DEA should work closely with NDIC to create a collaborative production environment that creates strategic reports that are informative as well as predictive in content. See Section 5.3.1 for a discussion of the proposed DIPP. Restructure strategic reports to meet customer requirements, to compel the analyst to take a chance on illuminating real trends and patterns in the material, and to produce predictive Intelligence.

10.15.3 **RECOMMENDATION ON THE QTTR (5.2.1.3)**

Keep the QTTR and continually review format to ensure it is providing the right metrics for use by DEA HQ. Limit reporting to 10 pages. Rely on tables and charts to highlight metrics/evaluation criteria and the verbiage to let the SACs tell their story. Consider making it a semiannual report that is compiled by the Strategic IA at each Field Division.

10.15.4 **RECOMMENDATION ON DEA FORM-6 (5.2.1.4)**

Review incoming DEA Form-6s and cables for content value and clear writing style, and capture the time that it takes to make these reports available to the general reader at HQ. Consider using the "cable" as a
vehicle for analysts to express new ideas, make observations across cases and share their analysis with other analysts. The "6s" are the law enforcement life blood for the DEA. DEA Form-6s, combined with the more free form cables, allow SAs and IAs to create the case knowledge to aid in the apprehension and eventual incarceration of drug traffickers. They also serve as the basis for strategic production at the Field Divisions and HQ. Recurring themes on the DEA Form-6s include improvement of the content and writing styles and speeding the processing of DEA Form-6s at HQ.

Apparently, the indexing of items, such as names and numbers, contained in DEA Form-6 creates a 3- to 4-month backlog of DEA Form-6 posting to M-204.

10.15.5 RECOMMENDATION ON CREATING VIRTUAL PRODUCTS (5.2.1.5)

All DEA reporting should be built and designed for electronic posting. The DEA should institute a digital production process that places XML tags on products and paragraphs and allows for near-real-time posting on Webster and the Internet. Printing should occur only for requests that cannot be satisfied by an electronic version.

10.15.6 RECOMMENDATION ON INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION (5.3.1)

The DEA and NDIC should enter into an enterprise-level Drug Intelligence Production Program (DIPP) (Figure 5.2). This DIPP would treat both the products and the personnel assigned as enterprise resources. The key elements of the program include:

- DEA and NDIC Intelligence personnel would be assigned to Washington, Field Divisions, and Johnstown.

- Strategic Analyst positions at Field Divisions would be created and staffed by NDIC/DEA personnel. As indicated in Figure 5.2, they would be responsible for developing area strategic assessments and guiding collection by the Field Program Specialist. These analysts would produce the Field Division Strategic Report (perhaps a reconfigured QTTR) that would address all cases managed by the Field Division.

- Strategic Field Division reports would be sent simultaneously to DEA HQ and NDIC to serve as the basis for other collaborative products.

- Production would be a collaborative effort until all parties are confident in each other’s ability to produce accurate, timely, cogent Intelligence. With few exceptions, all finished Intelligence would use DEA and NDIC seals to illustrate the joint nature of the production. The following division of labor is offered as a starting point:

  - NDIC would produce national-level domestic strategic Intelligence reports (by state, region, and nation), primarily based on strategic reporting from the Field Divisions and through direct access to DEA information on Firebird and Merlin.
  
  - DEA HQ would merge these reports with IC and DEA Country Office reporting to produce a comprehensive picture of the drug threat, including trends, predictive assessments, and foreign involvement. In addition, DEA HQ would provide direct support to the DEA Administrator and could task NDIC for information.
  
  - EPIC would produce its compilations and specific analytical assessments on drug transportation methods, biographies of drug personnel, and similar tactical assessments.
  
  - ONDCP would direct a joint NDIC/DEA lead in developing the annual National Drug Threat Assessment.
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10.15.7 RECOMMENDATION ON PRODUCT IDENTITY (5.3.2)

The need for consumers to rapidly identify the new drug law enforcement products is important. The DEA and NDIC should consult with a graphics/visualization company to design a cover/content format for rapid identification of DIPP products.

10.15.8 RECOMMENDATION ON ACCESS TO DEA DATA (5.4.1.1)

See Section 6, IT Systems and Applications.

10.15.9 RECOMMENDATION ON OVERLAPS IN DEA SERVICES (5.4.2.1)


10.15.10 RECOMMENDATION ON DEA INTELLIGENCE LIAISONS (5.5.1.1)

DEA liaisons and onsite SA and IA programs provide Washington-area consumers with a number of advantages and should be continued and expanded. In addition to the current Intelligence liaison and support positions at CNC, consider assigning additional DEA Intelligence personnel to the HDTAs and to the DIA, NSA, DHS/Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAPD), USCG, ICE, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), JIATFs, and DoD activities with drug interdiction support missions. NC personnel should be assigned as the embedded or exchange IA.

10.15.11 RECOMMENDATION ON IA EXCHANGES (5.5.1.2)

In addition to the liaison functions, DEA/NC should expand the IA presence in the law enforcement community and IC. These IAs should be coded as “Embedded or Exchange IAs.” They would work in other organizations in analytical positions that complement their DEA career path. Although they would serve as the touchstone for access to DEA Intelligence, they would not be considered solely as Liaison Officers. Many law enforcement and IC organizations would welcome the inclusion of a DEA IA in their Latin America and/or counternarcotics offices. The best model would be an exchange of analysts, with law enforcement and IC IAs moving between the two communities and among the agencies. Both Firebird and Merlin capabilities would have to be installed at the various participating agencies to support the embedded DEA IAs and provide access to key DEA Intelligence.

10.16 IT

10.16.1 RECOMMENDATION ON DATA VALIDATION (6.1.2.1)

Analysts should have a larger, defined responsibility to review and comment on data. They should be provided with a standard toolkit to do data correction and consistency checking, as well as to easily cross-check information among cases for data verification. In addition, the “pedigree” of data should be clearly indicated and visible, with flags and dates that automatically indicate who has seen and altered data and when.
**10.16.2 Recommendation on Common Case Management Tools (6.1.2.2)**

The DEA needs a standardized case management tool that supports agent and expanded analyst roles in accessing, updating, annotating, and exploiting case data throughout the case life cycle. Ideally, case formatting should be organized to contain sensitive law enforcement information like names and CS references in a restricted space so that the broader content of cases can be scanned by analysts, especially those working on strategic problems. Standard cross-case comparison tools are especially needed, and a collaborative workspace for case analysis should be attached to the case management tool.

**10.16.3 Recommendation on Standardized Data (6.1.2.3)**

Developing and disseminating standard electronic data formats for use by DEA sources, and reducing as much as possible nonstandard formats and media input, would reduce mechanical work and increase the time available to field analysts for analysis tasks. Establishing and tasking a Tiger Team to find ways to improve data input efficiency throughout DEA HQ, Field Divisions, NDIC, and EPIC would pay large dividends in improved analyst productivity.

**10.16.4 Recommendation on Data Classification (6.1.2.4)**

In the future, guard technology for high-to-low data transfers and browse-down capabilities to unclassified intranet and Internet, in addition to low-to-high capabilities, should be considered for Intelligence dissemination and unclassified data access. This generalized COTS-based guard technology—already successfully demonstrated in DoD operational Intelligence applications—has been certified and accredited for use by analysts across two security levels (e.g., for a DEA analyst, this may be for SBU and SECRET or SECRET and TOP SECRET). These analysts should be migrated to security-high work environments and to workstations that are linked to lower security DBs by one-way COTS-based guard technology that only permits data flows from low-to-high security. In this environment, analysts can be supported with an integrated analyst Graphical User Interface (GUI) that would provide access to all necessary data. This approach would have to be implemented with additional cyber security technical protections to ensure that computer viruses are not introduced via the low-to-high software guard connection.

**10.16.5 Recommendation on Analyst Tool Mix (6.1.2.5)**

It would be useful to standardize tools and toolset configurations for recognized applications and the system on which they are hosted. Standardization should be based on a further survey of analyst functions and work patterns. There should be a bias to place analyst tools first in the classified environment. In the longer term, there are IT architectural issues and tradeoffs that must be considered in light of mission priorities and policy implications, both for the DEA and its partners. (For more information, see Section 2, Vision, Mission, and Functions.)

**10.16.6 Recommendation on NADDIS Modernization (6.1.3.2)**

Provide additional personnel to support NADDIS upgrades and DB conversion and rehosting to support increased productivity. This modernization is an essential element in the operation of the OFC to provide real-time information checks and case notifications.

**10.16.7 Recommendation on Merlin (6.1.4.1)**

Establish a 4-year replacement cycle and maintenance program to ensure that Merlin continues to provide timely, accurate Intelligence to the DEA and other Federal and state organizations working with the DEA.
10.16.8 RECOMMENDATION ON SPEEDWAY PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS (6.1.5.1)
Provide Speedway with additional IT and analytic personnel to support increased requirements for counterterrorism support. In addition, acquire additional source data and upgrade existing equipment.

10.16.9 RECOMMENDATION ON INTERNET INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT (6.1.6.1)
Provide personnel, including analysts, to establish a VPN that will enable field personnel to develop, identify, and investigate Internet targets safely, effectively, and efficiently.

10.16.10 RECOMMENDATION ON DATA WAREHOUSING (6.5.3.1)
OFC planning should consider carefully whether centralized data storage and universal data reformatting is needed or whether a hybrid centralized and decentralized data storage concept would be more cost effective, especially in handling data of different classifications and sensitivities.

10.16.11 RECOMMENDATION ON FTTTF (6.5.3.2)
DEA Review Team information is incomplete about FTTTF and its potential for support to OFC. Compatible IT architectures and a close operational and technical interface for data sharing with FTTTF, however, appear indispensable if the DEA is going to respond effectively to its expanded Intelligence role in National Security. The OFC relationship with FTTTF must be reexamined and revitalized.

10.16.12 RECOMMENDATION ON DATA HANDLING (6.5.3.3)
To avoid security boundary discontinuities, it would be preferable for the OFC to have only one all-source classified network and all personnel cleared to operate in a classified data environment. Then, SOD would be charged with sanitization and dissemination functions, although OFC analysts would have report templates with security tear-lines and automated classification aids to assist SOD.

10.16.13 RECOMMENDATION ON OFC DEVELOPMENT (6.5.3.4)
The DEA requires a systems architect, requirements analyst, and systems engineer to work with OFC stakeholders, technical staff, DOJ Acquisition, and vendors to provide program planning, technical continuity, and tracking assurance that the IOC and Full Operational Capability (FOC) OFCs will effectively support the OFC mission.

10.16.14 RECOMMENDATION ON EPIC IT (6.6.1.1)
With a CONCORD-like backbone, EPIC would be an excellent candidate to prototype a general purpose ACLM approach to automate mediation and data access electronically for its subscribers.

10.17 RECOMMENDATION ON NDIC
To realize its full analytic potential in sharing and using data, NDIC should acquire and install ACLM.

10.17.1 RECOMMENDATION ON PTARRS (6.7.9.1)
PTARRS is going to migrate to the CONCORD IT architectural platform. Based on DEA Review Team findings, it is believed that PTARRS could feasibly function as the "backbone" for Intelligence analysis of linked networks of foreign, national, regional, and local drug organizations if DEA IA work assignments and workflows are modified to take advantage of its capabilities and if those capabilities are augmented to support analytic, not management, functions. Necessary information and applications
important to DEA analysis can certainly be linked to, and accessed from, PTARRS. DEA Review Team findings do not clearly show whether PTARRS should be used for that purpose. This question has budgetary and operational dimensions, as well as some technical ramifications, that are beyond the scope of this report. There may be other alternatives to consider as well. It is recommended that this part of the DEA Review Team findings be used as a starting point for discussion among DEA Intelligence, operational, and IT support personnel to determine the effectiveness and suitability of PTARRS for analysis support, and compare this with alternative solutions.

10.18 ENTERPRISE IT INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INTELLIGENCE

10.18.1 Recommendation on Information Focus (6.8.1)

The DEA must become a learning organization based on information. It should be optimized at every level for the collection and agile use of information to drive its mission. All federated Intelligence production nodes of the Drug IC depend on all-source information—that is relevant, accurate, and timely—for mission success. In the new operational environment based on Intelligence-driven investigation and enforcement, every agent must recognize and collect information with the same urgency devoted to enforcement. Analysts and agents must work together to share and use all-source information to develop Intelligence as their primary business process.

10.18.2 Recommendation on Target-Based Infrastructure (6.8.2)

As a matter of high urgency, the emergent Intelligence enterprise architecture of the Drug IC should include a TML, using ACLM to automate and manage identification and business rules providing tiered levels of access to, with auditing and tracking of use for, Drug Intelligence data. Initially, it can be expected that business rules for access will be limiting. Over time, however, as the Administrator's Vision is implemented, collaborative analysis and federated production take hold, and resources are pinched in CY2006 budgets and beyond, it is anticipated that trust will grow among agencies and the impetus for direct data access will increase. By building an enterprise Intelligence infrastructure—a TML—with embedded trust management features in the middleware, the DEA will be prepared to evolve into a more mature information-sharing model that implements business rules in software, and not with an expanding army of human watchers and checkers. TML will allow the DEA to apply more of its human capital to Intelligence analysis and to collaborate more widely on investigative and strategic analytic problems. The urgent and best choice to build and demonstrate a trust-based system to share information is in the OFC. A trust-based Intelligence IT enterprise can follow at all Drug IC production nodes.

10.18.3 Recommendation on Information MOE (6.8.3)

Information value should be an MOE for DEA personnel and a tool to direct an Intelligence-driven mission. Agent and analyst performance needs to be measured substantially in terms of the value of information they collect or retrieve, and the added value analysis they both contribute collaboratively to arrests, dismantlement, disruptions, and outcomes. The necessary data flagging and data tracking capabilities largely exist in COTS products that can be incorporated with ACLM in the TML. Other products can be adapted to correlate data use and value for investigations and cases that are tracked. These can be used to develop and aggregate a new generation of effectiveness measures to recognize those who best gather and exploit information in support of the Administrator's Vision. The value of information also can be used as a metric in a feedback loop linking the value of information to the importance and benefit of operational outcomes, and the utility of all processes in between. Using information value as a metric, Field Division SACs and HQ managers can direct truly effective Intelligence-driven operations and enforcement.
10.18.4  **RECOMMENDATION ON MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO INFORMATION SHARING**

(6.8.4)

Senior DEA managers must focus on information-sharing details. Management attention must be directed to the crucial but mind-numbing details of how information sharing is implemented now and will evolve in the future, as well as what specific impediments to direct access remain and on what basis. This is a vital concern because DEA Review Team interviews showed clearly that a number of DEA senior managers operated on a more expansive assumption about analyst information access than was confirmed in person and on site with interviewees. Middle managers consistently implement far more cautious rules for data sharing than senior managers realize. To improve management insight, it would be useful to assign a Tiger Team to develop a mapping of (1) information sources that contribute to each analyst function; (2) the level and extent of current access to each of these sources by functional analysis at every production node in the Drug IC; (3) the plans and schedule for each functional analyst’s expanded access; (4) a list of sources and reasons for which access is not planned for each functional analyst throughout the Drug IC; and (5) an impact statement concerning the costs and risks of limited data access for each Drug Intelligence analytic function.

10.18.5  **RECOMMENDATION ON THE ISWG**

(6.8.5)

Establish the ISWG. DEA should form a management group to assess Tiger Team inputs and convene Drug IC representatives in an ISWG to negotiate an information-sharing strategy favoring direct data access. The ISWG would address the information-sharing issues and equities that limit direct data access to remaining sources, and develop workarounds and understandings to promote maximum access to, and use of, these sensitive information sources for analyst support.

10.18.6  **RECOMMENDATION ON THE CTEC**

(6.8.6)

Revitalize the CTEC. It should be chartered and redirected to include software tool evaluation and study how to meet specific technical analytic support requirements for Drug IC functional analysts in their various federated production nodes. This approach will leverage the experience and technology leadership potential of the SID IT Group. It also will ensure less scatter in smaller technology evaluation efforts at the Intelligence production nodes, improve commonality in analytic tools, and possibly provide some quantity price breaks in software licenses at the enterprise level.

10.18.7  **RECOMMENDATION ON ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR**

(6.8.7)

Select an enterprise IT systems integrator to help realize an integrated enterprise IT architecture and infrastructure for Intelligence analysis. DEA Review Team interviews confirm that there are competent, dedicated Government IT organizations and personnel supporting each production node. They manage a stable of contractors for specific technical support specialties. The respective Government IT organizations assume the systems integrator role at each node. The technical coordination role among nodal IT organizations is irregular and on a time-available basis. An integrated enterprise IT system architecture provides for interoperability and integration support for specific networks, DBs, and communications paths between nodes. To build an enterprise IT architecture for Intelligence, a dedicated enterprise systems integrator is needed to assist Drug IC stakeholders to define enterprise IT intelligence support requirements; develop a system, technical, and operational as-is enterprise architecture; develop a to-be architecture; work up migration, implementation strategy and plans; and conduct or monitor enterprise architecture migration and implementation activities. The enterprise systems integrator would work closely with all stakeholders on evolving analytic requirements and with technical and acquisition authorities for execution.

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**10-20 Recommendations**
The place to start is with the OFC and TML. The OFC and the way in which information sharing is implemented technically and functionally will profoundly affect Drug Community Intelligence effectiveness and performance of DEA's mission.

10.19 ANALYST DEVELOPMENT AND ALLOCATION

10.19.1 RECOMMENDATION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW MODEL (7.3.1.1)

Begin now. Work with Operations, Human Resources, Operational Support, Financial Management Division, and the Office of the Chief Counsel to develop the new DEA Intelligence model and transfer control of billets. In conjunction with the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, begin to craft a Congressional strategy based on the policy and programmatic requirements generated by moving to the new model.

10.19.2 RECOMMENDATION ON RECRUITMENT AND HIRING (7.3.1.2)

All labor authorizations (the current 727 IA positions/billets) belong to the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence. Process vacancy and recruitment announcements centrally using the DEA Web site (Firebird). Request Field Divisions to encourage locally known candidates to apply or send forward their recommendations for these candidates. The process from there will be:

- Using the current HQ board structure, applications will be reviewed by a panel and a slate of potential candidates will be recommended.
- The selected candidate application packages will be sent to the nearest Field Division, where the senior IA and a SAC-appointed reviewer will interview the candidate. Scoring will be returned, the candidates compared, and after a final score is assigned, offer letters will be sent by HR to those with the highest scores.
- All GS-0132 candidates will sign a mobility agreement as part of their sign-on process.
- GS-0134 applications will be processed in the same manner; however no mobility agreement would be required.
- All final selections will be approved by HQ to ensure the level of diversity of personnel required by the Intelligence Program is met.

10.19.3 RECOMMENDATION ON ALLOCATION OF IAS (7.3.1.3)

NC reviews all Intelligence positions throughout the DEA annually. Analytic positions within the Field Divisions and other OC-led organizations will be based on the availability of resources and allocated on requirements received for support through the Chief of Operations. Approved requirements for Intelligence personnel may be filled by reassignment or TDY.

10.19.4 RECOMMENDATION ON ASSIGNMENTS AND DEPLOYMENTS (7.3.1.4)

All new IAs will be required to serve in a field organization and in the Washington D.C., area as their first two assignments. The Washington assignment may be within NC or SOD. Analysts will be moved at the discretion of the career board; however, NC will continue support with the family-friendly policy of attempting to locate husband and wife employees in the same area when possible. The average rotational period should be between 3 and 5 years, with multiple assignments in the same Field Division counting as one assignment. Overseas assignments should remain at a maximum of 6 years. An annual career board should look at possible career movements over the next 2 fiscal years and plan for potential
reassignments. No analyst or technician should be sent to an operational unit or major Country Office below the Field Division level until the third or fourth assignment.

10.19.5 **Recommendations on PDs (7.3.1.5)**

Restructure every PD to reflect the work performed and include specific measurements for evaluating the level of success. The PD should serve as the basis for developing individual annual evaluation reports. In many cases, the current PDs appear to be general in nature, listing general functions to be performed, rather than actually reflecting the work required by the particular position or grade. This recommendation also will serve as the basis for a thorough review of the analytic and support positions, their actual duties and the current work locations.

10.19.6 **Recommendation on Evaluations (7.3.1.6)**

The evaluations for IAs and technicians should be restructured to two levels, form and substance. The FIM will be in the rating chain for all Intelligence personnel assigned to the field. The evaluation form should be changed to include a block for the Field Division FIM as reviewer. The evaluations also must be restructured (see above) to include success criteria that support the new Intelligence policy, including, but not limited, to rotational assignments, attendance at the DEA Academy, and other continuing education. The metrics should include the value of the Intelligence products generated, as well as support to enforcement operations. Evaluations will be used as the basis for promotions and awards.

10.19.7 **Recommendation on Training—General (7.4.1)**

The new Intelligence model for drug law enforcement as a contributor to the National Security of the nation requires realignment to the type of analysts employed, changes in the work environment, and a new concept of partnerships with both the law enforcement community and the IC. The new environment will demand that each analyst have a variety of tools and information, including:

- A comprehensive understanding of the entire drug “battlespace,” from local case support to international support structures and operations.
- The ability to leverage drug law enforcement Intelligence as a collaborative enterprise with a variety of supporting and supported communities.
- In-depth customer knowledge at all levels of support.
- Tools and methodologies to improve productivity.
- Desktop access to state-of-the-art computers and IT.
- Access to comprehensive and timely DBs to rapidly create, sort, store, and retrieve data and information, both sensitive and unclassified.
- The ability to acquire nontraditional information as it is discovered.
- Use of a collection and requirements framework to assess the gaps and deficiencies of Intelligence at their particular level of operation.

The training organization should support the development of an Analyst Career Development Program by establishing courses to support the growth of analysts through entry, intermediate, and senior skill levels. The associated curricula should reflect the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to succeed at each professional level. In addition, the program should require at least 40 hours annually of additional training agreed to by analysts and their supervisor.
10.19.8 **RECOMMENDATION ON PROGRAM EMPHASIS (7.4.1.1)**

The primary program should focus on analytic development and be designed to allow IAs to understand where they are in their career, what they need to do to advance to the next level, and the training and education essential for their promotion. Key elements are as follows:

- The program should comprise mandatory (statute-and-or policy-based) training, required analytic training for all three levels, and a special supervisory/managerial track, with entry-level sections of this track open to all Intelligence employees.
- An individual with extensive pre-DEA experience can receive credit for some of this experience but will not be exempted from the BIRS course.
- Courses will be developed in house, using other Federal services and the commercial market.
- Programs for support and administrative staffs will be developed as an adjunct or in conjunction with the DOJ and/or OPM.

Ancillary programs such as the recently instituted mentoring program will be restructured to support the new model. Most training will be conducted at Quantico at the DEA Academy Intelligence Unit. Computer-based training, distance learning, and course sharing with the other law enforcement and Intelligence training centers, however, will be an integral part of the new program. Existing boards and panels will be assessed for their value to the program and adjusted as necessary. Figure 7.9 depicts the General Training Program.

10.19.9 **RECOMMENDATION ON A TIERED, THREE-LEVEL PROGRAM (7.4.1.2)**

The core competencies should be divided into three performance levels. As noted in Figure 7.9, each level will develop the needed skills, and as the analyst progresses, the training will become more individually focused:

- Entry Level—Includes all new analysts regardless of past experience. The grade structure for this level is nominally GS-7 through GS-11/12. At this level, analysts are developing basic knowledge skills, abilities, and behaviors required by their PDS. They will require mentoring and assistance from more senior analysts. This entry-level program is focused primarily on developing investigative analytic skills; it is based on the current BIRS course.
- Intermediate (journeyman) Level—Nominally at the GS-12 and GS-13 levels. These analysts will receive additional training and education in the advanced areas of strategic/predictive analysis and law enforcement community/IC roles and missions. The program will round out the analysts and prepare them for senior-level service and include rotational assignments to other agencies.
- Senior Level—Nominally at the GS-14 and GS-15 levels. This program would be highly flexible, identifying school and training to fit the particular needs of the senior-level analyst. It also will assist in identifying and preparing the top analysts for transition to the SES.

10.19.10 **RECOMMENDATIONS ON ANALYTIC AND MANAGEMENT TRACKS (7.4.1.3)**

At the intermediate level, analysts will decide whether they want to continue on an analytic track or move into supervisory and management positions. The management track will entail extra courses at the intermediate and senior levels to qualify individuals for management and leadership positions. No analyst will be qualified to apply for a supervisory or management position without the basic (initial) set of
management and leadership training courses. A second, but smaller track will be established for those analysts that desire to stay in the analytic field and are promoted to the GS-13 level. This option will be dependent on the establishment of a DEA Intelligence Senior-level Program that will give IAs an opportunity to achieve GS-14, GS-15, and senior, nonsupervisory DEA SES positions.

10.20 PROGRAM/BUDGET DEVELOPMENT AND ALLOCATIONS

10.20.1 RECOMMENDATION (1) ON A SEPARATE INTELLIGENCE BUDGET (8.3.1)

A separate Intelligence budget should be established under the control of NC. Funding for nonpersonnel costs—such as training and TDY for all personnel currently assigned to those Field Divisions whose personnel authorizations will be transferred to NC as a result of the recommendations in this report—should be transferred from the Field Divisions to NC. Where actual data are not available, all offices involved should agree on a general per capita amount for use in making the transfer. This will provide NC with the capability to manage the Intelligence workforce and provide the flexibility needed to meet changing DEA-wide Intelligence priorities as they emerge during budget execution.

The current budget allocation process must be changed to align with the new role of NC as the manager of a separate Intelligence budget. The current microdivision of funding into 13 separate allocations prevents optimum use of resources, and inhibits flexibility to meet changing priorities. The new structure should be used throughout the budget development, presentation, and execution process to ensure comprehensive management and accountability for resources.

10.20.2 RECOMMENDATION (2) ON NEW BUDGET STRUCTURE (8.3.2)

The new budget structure should comprise the following four aggregations:

- **HQ and Centralized Programs**, which would include the current funding for the 12th floor operating account, the 5th floor operating account, and the Operation CRISCROSS and Operation Breakthrough accounts. Included would be funding for the new entry-level analyst program, professionalization training for all Intelligence personnel, and professional rotations.

- **Field Operations**, which would include funding for personnel transferred into NC in the field, the operating costs for the FIM structure, and the current Domestic Monitor Program.

- **EPIC**, which should be funded in a single funding account to allow the maximum flexibility for EPIC leadership to manage EPIC as a single entity.

- **Data Processing, Data Acquisition, and Infrastructure**, which would include current funding for Merlin, NEDRS, and commercial DB access. In addition, it would include the development, acquisition, and operating costs of the recommendations in Section 6 on information sharing and IT architecture improvements.

To implement this revised budget structure, NC along with the CFO, should initiate discussions with DOJ officials and key Congressional staff personnel to explain the necessity for these changes and to solicit their input.

10.20.3 RECOMMENDATION (3A) ON ENTRY-LEVEL POOL (8.3.3)

Create 20 new entry-level positions for a pool of entry-level analysts. Assumptions are GS-7 Step 1 pay for Washington, D.C., and a PCS, using the standard cost provided by DEA for nonsupervisory personnel of $65,000. This figure is reduced to one-third of what it costs to fund this level of analyst for a 3-year tour, given that these new hires would be in Washington for only one year and will not have real estate or
other significant PCS costs. Given the significant personnel increases recommended elsewhere, this program should be started in year 3 of the new budget to ease the burden on the personnel and training system. Cost for salaries is $848,000 per year as adjusted by OMB pay raise factors.

10.20.4 **Recommendation (3B) on FIMS Upgrades (8.3.4)**

Upgrade existing positions to create a new FIM structure. Assumptions are as follows: one GS-13 to GS-14; four GS-14 to GS-15; one GS-14 to SES; and four GS-15 to SES. Upgrades are effective for one-half year the first year and the only cost is incremental pay cost. Costs for the first ear are $105,000 and for all future years $210,000, subject to adjustments for pay raises.

10.20.5 **Recommendation (3C) on Professional Rotation (8.3.5)**

Implement full professional rotation schedule. Assumptions are 25 nonsupervisory rotations at DEA rate of $65,000 and five supervisory rotations at $95,000, with 20 domestic and 10 foreign moves. Note that the domestic moves in most agencies are considerably more expensive when real estate costs are included. Recommend that NC consult with the CFO to determine whether the standard rates represent real actual experience. Costs per year are $2.1 million, which must be adjusted by OMB nonpersonnel inflation rates for the out years. Figure 8.3 depicts the broadened concept for information sharing.

10.20.6 **Recommendation (3D) on Professional Training (8.3.6)**

Implement professional training program for all 0132s. Assumptions are that given overseas assignments, attrition and other factors, approximately 675 personnel will require training yearly. The cost will include tuition and/or TDY to training sites at $2,000 per person. Costs would be $1.35 million per year subject to inflation adjustment.

10.20.7 **Recommendation (3E) on Information Sharing and IT Architecture (8.3.7)**

Define and implement a broadened concept for information sharing for the DEA and Drug IC, including:

- TML for the OFC
- TML expansion to EPIC and NDIC
- PTARRS adaptation for Intelligence analysis support
- Information value and use for the DEA—Study and IT implementation

10.20.8 **Recommendation (3F) on the Use of GS-134 Series (8.3.8)**

Cost savings will derive from a change in structure of 84 positions from GS-0132 to GS-0134 series. Assumptions are that the average grade of the 0132s is GS-13 and the average grade of the 0134s would be GS-11. Since these positions are occupied, it is assumed that the change would occur over five years with an equal amount of conversions each year. Cost savings by year, including benefits subject to OMB pay raise factors would be as described in Figure 8.2.

10.20.9 **Recommendation (3G) on NADDIS (8.3.9)**

Provide funds for contractors to support modernization and conversion to a system that supports information sharing. In addition, contractors will be required to support the conversion of data to the new system and data maintenance. Based on the mix of senior- and middle-level personnel required, contract
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costs are estimated at $2.9 million per year. In addition, three Government positions are required at an estimated cost of $175,000 the first year and $350,000 a year afterward, including benefits based on GS-14 Step 5 current salary rates.

10.20.10 RECOMMENDATION (3H) ON MERLIN (8.3.10)

Maintain a 4-year replacement cycle for Merlin workstations. This recommendation includes technology refreshment and adequate funding of O&M costs. The technology refreshment is based on every office being upgraded every 4 years. Cost estimates based on preliminary review are $5,200,000 per year for technology refreshing and $800,000 for operating costs.

10.20.11 RECOMMENDATION (3I) ON SPEEDWAY (8.3.11)

Support increased requirements for counterterrorism support. The requirement includes 26 new positions (i.e., 14 LAs and 12 support personnel), as well as data purchase, contractor support, and specialized equipment to expand Intelligence sources and additional personnel needed to analyze the new Intelligence. Figure 8.3 presents the cost estimates (total cost is $10.4 million the first year and $9.8 million per year through the program).

10.20.12 RECOMMENDATION (3J) ON INTERNET INVESTIGATIONS (8.3.12)

Establish Internet investigations. Includes eight positions (four LAs and four support personnel) to enhance Internet investigations and provide connectivity among DEA Field Divisions, resident offices, district offices, and HQ. Cost estimates are as depicted in Figure 8.4. These positions are in addition to the above (total cost the first year is $5,314,000 and $3,190,000 per year afterward).

10.20.13 RECOMMENDATION (3K) ON INCREASED INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT: ADDITIONAL ANALYTIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFING (8.3.13)

Includes 100 new positions (80 LAs) to improve the ratio of Intelligence personnel to agents to provide more adequate case support and to provide for the strategic analysis thrust addressed elsewhere in the review. Cost estimates are described in Figure 8.5 (total cost first year is $5,500,000 and $7,850,000 per year afterward).

10.21 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

10.21.1 RECOMMENDATION ON FRAMEWORK FOR TOTAL SYSTEM MEASUREMENT (9.7.6.1)

There are any number of viable approaches toward measuring the overall performance of a system. The BSC is one measurement system that has seen significant success in both the private and public sectors, and it is the one that the DEA Review Team recommends for DEA consideration. The DEA Review Team believes that this approach is ideal for DEA Intelligence (and for the agency as a whole) to manage its complex mission in a way that can translate and communicate the Administrator’s initiatives throughout the organization, establish accountability, develop new behaviors, and monitor real progress, or lack thereof.

10.21.2 RECOMMENDATION ON MOES (9.7.6.2)

By concentrating on customers and the public marketplace, the DEA Review Team believes that the DEA can formulate MOEs that show the impact of their efforts and shed considerable insight into both the strengths and weaknesses of their program. In the interim, the DEA Review Team recommends that:
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- HQ should use surveys, such as the one generated for this review, and their own corporate inspections to continually assess the progress on counternarcotics that is being made in the field. Specific questions should be asked to determine whether all HQ-directed measures, such as information sharing, are being implemented in their efforts.
- Periodic feedback from neighborhoods, as well as testimonials from their elected officials, on the favorable impact that DEA is having should be collected and publicized.
- Selected analysts should be made a part of the target selection and ranking process.
- HQ should consider if they are using all available media to advertise successful operations to Congress and other Washington-area customers. Opportunities should be sought for further information sharing among these entities.

10.21.3 Recommendation on Intelligence Program Performance Measurement Management (9.7.6.3)

Consideration should be given to contracting performance measurement specialists with expertise in Intelligence measurement to develop a performance measure management system to evaluate the effectiveness of the DEA Intelligence Program on a continuing basis.

10.21.4 Recommendation on Web Tool (9.7.6.4)

The Web could be used to survey, exchange information with, the DEA workforce on issues concerning planning, transition, transformation, implementation, and operation according to DIPTDR and other change recommendations to every aspect of Intelligence and Intelligence support. This could be accomplished through continued operation of the DIPTDR Web site.
## ACRONYM LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLM</td>
<td>Access Control Level Middleware</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After-Action Report</td>
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<td>AMHS</td>
<td>Automated Message Handling System</td>
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<td>AM&amp;TM</td>
<td>Access Mediation and Tracking Manager</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>ASAC</td>
<td>Assistant Special Agent in Charge</td>
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<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives</td>
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<td>Basic Intelligence Research Specialist</td>
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<td>Society for Human Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
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