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Description of document: Written responses or letters from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to a Congressional Committee (not a congressional office) (or Committee Chair), 2012-2013

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Source of document: National Transportation Safety Board
Attention: FOIA Requester Service Center, CIO-40
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20594-2000
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National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

May 3, 2013

Re: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) No. FOIA-2013-00242

This letter responds to your FOIA request for copies of each written response or letter from the NTSB to a Congressional Committee (not a congressional office) (or Committee Chair) in calendar years 2012 - 2013 to date, including subcommittees. By this, you mean one-time type responses to Committee inquiries, may exclude from the scope of this request regular periodic reports and may exclude from the scope of this request constituent responses to a congressional office.

There is one responsive record for your request, correspondence between NTSB and the Honorable Frank LoBiondo, Chairmain of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, totaling eight pages. These are the best available copies of this letter.

The NTSB has concluded processing your FOIA request. The fees associated with this request have not exceeded \$14.00; therefore the NTSB will not charge a fee for the processing of your request.

To the extent I have denied your FOIA request, you may appeal my decision by writing to: Mr. David L. Mayer, Managing Director, NTSB, Washington, DC 20594.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Melba D. Moyer". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

Melba D. Moyer
FOIA Officer

Enclosures



Office of the Chairman

National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

MAR 08 2012

The Honorable Frank LoBiondo
Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
United States House of Representatives
2165 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman LoBiondo,

Thank you for your February 16, 2012, letter seeking information about the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) implementation of its December 2008 memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Coast Guard and about whether the NTSB has adequate resources to conduct marine casualty investigations. I appreciate and share your commitment to maritime safety and appreciate the opportunity to provide this information.

As you know, the NTSB has the unique responsibility of establishing the facts, circumstances, and probable cause of each accident it investigates and, in many cases, we issue safety recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future. We take this responsibility—improving transportation safety throughout the United States and the world—very seriously.

The important work performed by the NTSB's Office of Marine Safety (OMS) is critical to ensuring the safety of the maritime transportation system. The professional staff of this office includes Coast Guard-licensed master mariners and marine engineers, marine inspectors, naval architects, and human factors and survival specialists. Recently, NTSB staff worked closely with the Coast Guard to develop and implement procedures whereby the NTSB determines the probable cause of all major marine casualties except casualties involving only public vessels, as called for in statute.

Below are the responses to your specific questions regarding our OMS investigative procedures and staff. Three tables are enclosed to provide additional detail.

1. Marine casualty investigations the NTSB has conducted since December 2008, with additional specified data. (See Enclosure 1.)
2. Annual meeting dates between the Chairman of the NTSB and the Commandant of the Coast Guard and who held the respective positions at the time of the meetings:

July 7, 2009

NTSB Acting Chairman Mark Rosenker and Coast Guard
Commandant Admiral Thad Allen

December 13, 2010 NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman and Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp

February 21, 2012 NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman and Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp (The December 2011 meeting was rescheduled at the Coast Guard's request.)

3. International Maritime Organization meetings NTSB officials have attended since December 2008:

April 19, 2009	Subcommittee on Flag State Implementation
May 24, 2009	Maritime Safety Committee
July 25, 2009	Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation
September 5, 2009	Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping
May 12, 2010	Maritime Safety Committee
July 3, 2010	Subcommittee on Flag State Implementation
July 24, 2010	Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation
November 22, 2010	Maritime Safety Committee
February 21, 2011	Subcommittee on Flag State Implementation
May 9, 2011	Maritime Safety Committee
June 4, 2011	Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation

4. NTSB/Coast Guard training opportunities provided since December 2008. (See Enclosure 2.)

5. Although none of the NTSB's Board members has a specific professional background in the maritime sector, service as a credentialed merchant mariner, or service in the Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Corps, each Board Member has extensive technical professional qualifications.

Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman: Chairman Hersman has served as an NTSB Board member since 2004. Prior to her appointment, she was a senior Congressional staff member for 12 years, working extensively on surface transportation issues in both the House and Senate. She holds a commercial driver's license with passenger, school bus and air brake endorsements, and a motorcycle endorsement.

Vice Chairman Christopher A. Hart: Vice Chairman Hart has spent many years in transportation safety, including previous service as an NTSB Board Member, Deputy Director for Air Traffic Safety Oversight at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Assistant Administrator for the FAA's Office System Safety, and Deputy Administrator for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Vice Chairman Hart is a licensed pilot with commercial, multi-engine, and instrument ratings.

Member Robert L. Sumwalt: Member Sumwalt was a pilot for 32 years—24 of those years as a commercial pilot—and has over 14,000 flight hours and type ratings in 5 aircraft. Member Sumwalt served as a member of the Air Line Pilots' Association

Accident Investigation Board, and chaired its Human Factors and Training Group. He has taught human factors courses at the university level.


Member Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D.: Dr. Rosekind is an internationally recognized fatigue expert who has conducted research and implemented programs in many settings, including maritime and other modes of transportation. Dr. Rosekind has been working in human factors for many years, including directing the Fatigue Countermeasures Program and serving as Chief of the Aviation Operations Branch in the Flight Management and Human Factors Division at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Ames Research Center.

Member Earl F. Weener, Ph.D.: Dr. Weener enjoyed an accomplished career as an engineering executive and safety advocate. He worked in various supervisory positions at the Boeing Company and the Flight Safety Foundation. He is an active general aviation pilot and is a licensed general aviation flight instructor. He also has his U.S. Coast Guard Master's License.

6. OMS personnel and background information. (See Enclosure 3.)

Please let me know if I may provide additional information to you on the MOU or any other matter. Again, I appreciate your commitment to maritime safety.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'DAH', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Deborah A.P. Hersman
Chairman

Enclosures

1. NTSB Marine casualty investigations December 2008-March 2012
2. NTSB/Coast Guard training opportunities
3. NTSB OMS staffing

Enclosure 1: NTSB Marine Casualty Investigations December 2008-March 2012

Accident Date	Vessel Name	Lead Agency	Significant Marine Casualty	Launched	Accident Type	NTSB Board Member	Location	Fatalities	Injuries	Estimated Damage	Hazmat	Shore Structure Damage	Probable Cause	NTSB Support to USCG	USCG Support to NTSB
10/22/08	F/V <i>Kanool</i>	USCG	Accident prior to MOU but investigation followed signing	Yes	Sinking		Bering Sea 120° West of Adak, Alaska	7	0	\$1,500,000	Unknown	None	The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the sinking of the <i>Kanool</i> was the loss of the vessel's watertight integrity because watertight doors from the main deck in the processing space and the lazarette were left open by the crew at a time when the vessel was overloaded and navigating in severe weather, which allowed water to enter the vessel resulting in flooding and sinking. Contributing to the accident was the master's decision to continue fishing operations during the approach of severe weather rather than seeking shelter and to load twice the amount of cargo addressed in the vessel's stability report. Also contributing to the accident was the owner's failure to ensure that the stability information provided to the master was current and that the master understood it and operated the vessel accordingly.	Support to Marine Board of Investigation, materials testing	None
3/24/09	F/V <i>Lady Mary</i>	USCG	No	Yes	Sinking		65 NM SE Cape May, New Jersey	6	0	<\$500,000	sheen	None	The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the sinking of the <i>Lady Mary</i> was flooding originating in the lazarette through an access hatch that had been left open during rough weather, contrary to safe shipboard practice. Contributing to the delay in the dispatch of rescue assets was the inability of the EPIRB to transmit position data following activation.	Support to Marine Board of Investigation, materials testing, and Transportation at scene	None
4/12/09	22' R/V & 25' Work Boat	NTSB	No	Yes	Collision	Herman	Porte Vedra, Florida	5	9	Unknown	None	None	The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the allision of the recreational boat with the push boat <i>Little Man II</i> was the inattention of the boat operators, most likely the result of alcohol impairment on the part of the regular operator and in-experience on the part of the designated operator.	N/A	None
5/9/09	Unnamed 33' SeaRay	State of Florida	No	No	Fire with explosion		Tampa, Florida	0	7	>\$500,000	sheen	None	N/A	Materials testing	None
8/28/09	SPV <i>Tied High</i>	USCG	No	No	Equipment failure		Ocean Isle, North Carolina	2	0	Unknown	None	None	N/A	Materials testing	None
9/20/09	M/V <i>Fire Island Belle</i>	USCG	No	Yes	Fire		Bay Shore, New York	0	0	<\$500,000	None	None	The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the engine room fire on the <i>Fire Island Belle</i> was the ignition of fuel that had leaked from a fatigue-fractured fitting on the center engine's secondary fuel filter, sprayed onto the lagging around the port engine exhaust duct, and seeped through a gap in the lagging onto the hot duct, where it caught fire.	Fire analysis	None
10/30/09	T/V <i>Wakai Star</i>	USCG	No	No	Equipment failure		San Francisco, California	0	0	<\$500,000	800 gallons fuel oil	None	N/A	Equipment testing	None
12/5/09	<i>Thriller 09/CG25689</i>	NTSB	No	Yes	Collision between public/non-public		Charleston, South Carolina	0	6	< \$75,000	None	None	The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the collision was the inadequate lookout by the crewmembers of both vessels, given the speed at which they were being operated and the nighttime conditions.	N/A	Transportation at scene
12/20/09	CG3311K P/C (CF2607P2)	NTSB	No	Yes	Collision between public/non-public		San Diego, California	1	4	Unknown	None	None	The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the collision between the CG 3311B and the <i>Sea Ray</i> was the failure of the CG 3311B crew to see and avoid the <i>Sea Ray</i> because of the excessive speed at which the coxswain operated the CG 3311B, given the prevailing darkness, background lighting, and high vessel density, and the U.S. Coast Guard's lack of effective oversight of its small boat operations both nationally and at Coast Guard Station San Diego.	N/A	Transportation at scene
1/12/10	SPV <i>Huronkaiser</i>	USCG	No	No	Equipment failure		St. Croix, US Virgin Islands	0	0	<\$500,000	None	None	N/A	Materials testing	None

Enclosure 1: NTSB Marine Casualty Investigations December 2008-March 2012

Accident Date	Vessel Name	Lead Agency	Significant Marine Casualty	Launch	Accident Type	NTSB Board Member	Location	Fatalities	Injuries	Estimated Damage	Harmful	Shore Structure Damage	Probable Cause	NTSB Support to USCG	USCG Support to NTSB
1/23/10	YV Eagle One	USCG	No	Yes	Collision		Port Arthur, Texas	0	0	>\$500,000	11,000 barrels of crude oil	None	The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the collision of tankship Eagle One with cargo vessel Gulf Arrow and the subsequent collision with the Dixie Venetian was the failure of the first pilot, who had navigational control of the Eagle One, to correct the steering motions that began as a result of the late initiation of a turn at a tight bend in the waterway. Contributing to the accident was the first pilot's fatigue, caused by his unrelieved obstructive sleep apnea and his work schedule, which did not permit adequate sleep; his deviation from conducting a radio call, which the second pilot should have conducted in accordance with guidelines; and the lack of effective bridge resource management by both pilots. Also contributing was the lack of oversight by the Jefferson and Orange County Board of Pilot Commissioners.	Support to formal investigation and VDR transcription	Transportation at scene
3/16/10	SPV Sky King	USCG	No	No	Equipment failure		Daytona Beach, Florida	0	2	<\$500,000	None	None	N/A	Materials testing	None
5/8/10	MV Andrew J. Barberi	NTSU	Yes	Yes	Allision	Stewart	St. George, Staten Island, New York	0	48	<\$500,000	None	13615 TBD - Investigation ongoing		N/A	None
7/7/10	SPV DUKV 34 & UTV Caribbean Sun	NTSB	No	Yes	Collision	Stewart	Delaware River at Penns Landing, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	2	0	\$130,000	Shore	None	The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the mate of the Caribbean Sea to maintain a proper lookout due to (1) his decision to operate the vessel from the lower watchhouse, which was contrary to expectations and to prudent seamanship, and (2) distraction and inattentiveness as a result of his repeated personal use of his cell phone and company laptop computer while he was solely responsible for navigating the vessel. Contributing to the accident was the failure of Ride The Ducks International maintenance personnel to ensure that DUKV 34's surge tank pressure cap was securely in place before allowing the vehicle to return to passenger service on the morning of the accident, and the failure of the DUKV 34 mate to take actions appropriate to the risk of anchoring his vessel in an active navigation channel.	N/A	None
8/18/10	TV Pando	USCG	No	No	Equipment failure		East Providence, Rhode Island	0	Unknown	>\$500,000	None	None	N/A	Equipment testing	None
9/5/10	SPV Sky Screamer	USCG	No	No	Other		St. Petersburg, Florida	1	1	N/A	None	None	N/A	Materials testing	None
11/3/10	CS Carnival Splendor	USCG	No	Yes	Fire		Pacific Ocean, 150 NM South of San Diego, 50 NM off Mexico	0	0	>\$500,000	None	None	N/A	Initial fire investigation support to USCG on-scene; VDR transcription	None
1/16/10	MV Inhofe	USCG	No	No	Collision		Brownsville, Texas	0	0	N/A	None	None	N/A	Materials testing	None
7/3/11	MV Est (Mexican flag)	USCG	No	No	Capsize		Sea of Cortez, Mexico	8	0	Total loss of vessel	Unknown	None	N/A	Interviews and interview transcription	None
8/17/11	UTV Alliance & TV Nautica	USCG	No	Yes	Collision		Houston Ship Channel and ICW near Galveston, Texas	0	0	<\$500,000	None	None	TBD - Investigation ongoing	VDR transcription	Transportation at scene
9/8/11	OSV Trans II	USCG	No	Yes	Liftboat leg collapse and capsize		Gulf of Mexico, about 12 NM off Mexican coast	4	0	Total loss of vessel	Unknown	None	TRD - Investigation ongoing	Support formal investigation, weather report	None

Enclosure 1: NTSB Marine Casualty Investigations December 2008-March 2012

Accident Date	Vessel Name	Lead Agency	Significant Marine Casualty	Launch	Accident Type	NTSB Board Member	Location	Fatalities	Injuries	Estimated Damage	Hazmat	Shore Structure Damage	Probable Cause	NTSB Support to USCG	USCG Support to NTSB
10/10/11	UTV <i>Jury Cover</i>	USCG	No	No	Fire		General ship repair pier, Baltimore, Maryland	0	0	\$1,000,000	None	None	TBD - Investigation ongoing	None	None
10/28/11	KSV <i>MS' Aokhous</i> (Panama) & T/V <i>Eho Apollon</i> (Greece)	USCG	No	Yes	Collision		Houston Ship Channel near junction with Bayport Channel, Houston, Texas	0	0	>\$500,000	None	None	TBD - Investigation ongoing	VDR transcription	None
12/5/11	MV <i>Almerik Wisconsin</i> & UTV <i>Bah M. Bennett</i>	USCG	No	No	Collision		Kill Van Kull, near Bergen Point, New Jersey	0	0	>\$500,000	None	None	TBD - Investigation ongoing	None	None
12/23/11	MV <i>Rickovera Tokso</i> (Marshall Islands)	USCG	No	No	Allision		Pier 11, Toga Marine Terminal, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	0	0	>\$500,000	None	Undetermined - superficial damage to pier no longer in use	TBD - Investigation ongoing	None	None
1/16/12	OSV <i>Adako</i> (U.S. flag)	USCG	No	No	Fire and sinking		7 NM SW of Niger Delta, Nigeria	0	0	Total loss of vessel	Unknown	None	TBD - Investigation ongoing	TBD	None
1/25/12	TV <i>Heritage</i>	USCG	No	No	Sinking		Alatak Bay, south side of Kodiak Island, Alaska	0	0	Total loss of vessel	Unknown	None	TBD - Investigation ongoing	None	None
1/26/12	MV <i>Ischa Luriner</i>	USCG	No	Yes	Allision with bridge span		Tennessee River, Eggner Ferry Bridge in the vicinity of Aurora, Kentucky	0	0	>\$500,000	None	Bridge span collapse	TBD - Investigation ongoing	VDR transcription, weather report	Transportation at scene
2/1/12	Natures Way Commodore Barge <i>N'RI 3111</i> IACOE crane barge	USCG	No	No	Collision public/non-public		Port Allen, Louisiana	0	0	~\$75,000	Unknown	None	TBD - Investigation ongoing	None	None
2/5/12	MV <i>Alotupua</i>	USCG	No	No	Fire		Alaska S&EDD, Netchikan, Alaska	0	0	>\$500,000	None	None	TBD - Investigation ongoing	None	None
2/21/12	EV <i>Plan-B</i>	USCG	No	No	Sinking		Atlantic Ocean approximately 11 NM south of Kennebunkport, Maine	0	0	Total loss of vessel	Unknown	None	TBD - Investigation ongoing	None	None

Enclosure 2: NTSB/Coast Guard Training Opportunities

NTSB Training Provided to USCG	
1-2 week Internships at NTSB for USCG Investigating Officers	
August 2009	1
June 2010	1
September 2011	1
MS 101 - Marine Accident Investigations	
January 2009	23
December 2009	27
December 2011	9
Cognitive Interviewing	
February 2010	10
February and November 2011	9
Photo Documentation	
April 2010	7
May 2011	5
Human Fatigue	
September 2010	8
January 2012	4
Shipyard Competent Person	
March 2011	1
NTSB Roles Presented to Investigating Officer Course	
February 2010	1
May 2010	1
June 2010	1
September 2010	1
March 2011	1
April 2011	1
May 2011	1
October 2011	1
February 2012	1
Coast Guard Training Provided to NTSB	
ISO 9001	
August 2009	1
October 2009	1
Commercial Fishing Vessel Examiner	
November 2009	1
July 2010	1
Investigating Officer	
June 2009	1
Control Verification	
December 2009	1

Enclosure 3: NTSB Office of Marine Safety Staffing

Title	Professional Background
Director	Vacant
Deputy Director	U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Capt, USCG (ret), MSE Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering, MSE Mechanical Engineering, MSE Business, CG Marine Inspector, National Licensing program manager, regulatory project manager
Supervisory Accident Investigator	U.S. Coast Guard Academy, CDR, USCG (ret), MSE Ocean Engineering, MSE Mechanical Engineering, MBA, CG Marine Inspector, previously NTSB marine accident investigator
Supervisory Accident Investigator	PhD, aircraft and marine accident investigator
Supervisory Accident Investigator	State University of New York Maritime Academy, Master Unlimited, First Class Pilot Delaware Bay, Capt USNR (ret), previously NTSB marine accident investigator
Senior Marine Accident Investigator	Maine Maritime Academy, Master Unlimited
Senior Marine Accident Investigator	U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Capt USNR, Professional Engineer, Chief Engineer, motor and steam any horsepower
Senior Marine Accident Investigator	Maine Maritime Academy, Chief Engineer, motor, steam, or gas turbine any horsepower
Senior Marine Accident Investigator	U.S. Coast Guard Academy, LCDR USCGR, CG Marine Inspector
Senior Marine Accident Investigator	U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Capt USCG (ret), CG Marine Inspector, CG Investigating Officer, Inspections and Investigations national program manager, regulatory development
Senior Marine Accident Investigator	CDR USCG (ret), CG Marine Inspector, CG Investigating Officer, Master 100 GRT near coastal
Senior Marine Accident Investigator	State University of New York Maritime Academy, First Assistant Engineer, motor, and Second Assistant Engineer, steam any horsepower
Marine Accident Investigator	California Maritime Academy, Master Unlimited, Capt USNR, staff National Maritime Center (licensing)
Senior Marine Accident Investigator	U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Master Unlimited, investigator Princess Cruise Lines
Technical writer editor	
Technical writer editor	
Administration officer	
Summary	
Office of Marine Safety (OMS) staff	16
OMS separated since 12/08	3
OMS staff hired since 12/08	3
OMS investigators	12 (including 3 managers)