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From: "Delmar, Richard K."

Date: Mar 13, 2014 10:03:40 AM

Subject: FOIA - Treasury OIG - BEP investigations - 2014-02-116

This is the first of four emails to you containing PDFs of redacted Treasury OIG reports of investigation involving the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Per our prior discussions, this collection is a subset of the total amount of BEP-related complaints received by OIG, and consists of those matters that were investigated, as opposed to recorded or referred back to BEP. In addition, there is a list of all the matters received, per your request. Names of subjects, witnesses and other persons have been redacted per FOIA Exemption 7C.

If you disagree with this resolution of your FOIA request, you can appeal the matter pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 552(a)(6)(A)(i). Pursuant to the Department's FOIA appeal process set forth in 31 C.F.R. section 1.5(i), an appeal must be submitted within 35 days from the date of this response to your request, signed by you and addressed to: Freedom of Information Act Appeal, DO, Disclosure Services, Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C. 20220. The appeal should reasonably describe your basis for believing that Treasury OIG possesses records to which access has been wrongly denied, that the redactions are not appropriate, or that we have otherwise violated applicable FOIA law or policy.

Rich Delmar  
Counsel to the Inspector General  
Department of the Treasury  
[delmarr@oig.treas.gov](mailto:delmarr@oig.treas.gov)

BEP-14-0102-G	BEP SECURITY CLEARANCE	11/06/13	11/06/13
BEP-14-0462-G	[REDACTED]	01/17/14	01/17/14
BEP-14-0546-G	MUTILATED MONEY	02/04/14	02/04/14
BEP-09-0120-I	[REDACTED]	07/08/09	07/19/10
BEP-09-0138-I	[REDACTED]	08/05/09	12/29/09
BEP-09-0142-I	[REDACTED]	08/13/09	12/17/09
BEP-09-0154-I	(COUNTERFEIT DVDS)	08/28/09	12/17/09
BEP-09-0201-I	[REDACTED] (ADMIN)	10/05/09	01/28/11
BEP-09-0202-I	[REDACTED]	10/05/09	05/26/10
BEP-10-0149-I	OFF-DUTY ARREST [REDACTED] (ADMIN)	10/19/09	01/28/11
BEP-10-0188-I	[REDACTED]	10/22/09	06/04/10
BEP-10-0193-I	[REDACTED]	10/22/09	06/04/10
BEP-10-0195-I	[REDACTED]	10/22/09	06/04/10
BEP-10-0197-I	[REDACTED]	10/22/09	06/04/10
BEP-10-0199-I	[REDACTED] CORP	10/22/09	06/04/10
BEP-10-0517-I	[REDACTED] (THREAT)	11/30/09	05/09/11
BEP-10-0612-I	[REDACTED]	12/10/09	05/26/10
BEP-10-0932-I	DAMAGED CURRENCY DUE TO DYE PACK	01/27/10	06/04/10
BEP-10-1027-I	SUSPICIOUS MUTILATED CURRENCY REDEMPTION DCF- SIU-2010-010	02/04/10	06/04/10
BEP-10-1028-I	SUSPICIOUS MUTILATED CURRENCY REDEMPTION DCF- SIU-2010-007	02/04/10	06/04/10
BEP-10-1355-I	[REDACTED]	03/16/10	02/02/11
BEP-10-2096-I	[REDACTED]	06/03/10	09/17/10
BEP-10-2506-I	[REDACTED] ET AL. (ADMIN)	07/14/10	01/28/11
BEP-10-2629-I	[REDACTED] - THEFT OF CFC FUNDS / EGREGIOUS TIME & ATTENDANCE ABUSE	08/02/10	12/13/10
BEP-11-0102-I	[REDACTED] WORKERS (COMPENSATION)	10/19/10	05/09/11
BEP-11-1394-I	[REDACTED]	08/04/11	12/19/11
BEP-11-1410-I	[REDACTED] MISUSE OF GOVERNMENT CREDIT CARD	08/05/11	02/07/12
BEP-12-0128-I	[REDACTED] CPU/PORN	10/31/11	07/23/12
BEP-12-0485-I	BEP MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTION PROBLEMS (ADMIN)	02/02/12	06/19/12

BEP-12-1033-I	ETHICS VIOLATION (RETALIATION)	03/16/12	07/26/12
BEP-12-1688-I	FINANCIAL ABUSE	05/08/12	11/20/12
BEP-12-2448-I		08/24/12	10/18/13
BEP-12-2450-I		08/28/12	10/12/12
BEP-13-0208-I		11/06/12	03/02/13
BEP-13-0269-I	DISABILITY FRAUD	11/26/12	02/20/13
BEP-13-0791-I	TIME FRAUD	02/25/13	01/24/14
BEP-13-0990-I		03/22/13	03/19/13
BEP-13-1243-I		04/23/13	10/18/13
BEP-13-1699-I		06/20/13	11/08/13
BEP-11-0993-P	(BEP BODY ARMOR)	05/16/11	07/26/11
BEP-11-1509-P	CONTRACT	08/31/11	10/14/11
BEP-13-0083-P	POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	11/03/12	12/03/12
BEP-13-0181-P		11/06/12	01/04/13
BEP-13-0237-P		12/03/12	02/25/13
BEP-13-1017-P	USPS OIG HOTLINE	04/08/13	05/13/13
BEP-09-0023-R	OIG REFERRAL DUI/ARREST	12/11/08	09/17/10
BEP-09-0032-R		01/26/09	12/14/09
BEP-09-0045-R	MISMANAGEMENT, WASTE BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	03/23/09	02/22/10
BEP-09-0062-R	USM POLICE	04/21/09	09/17/10
BEP-09-0075-R	BEP MANAGEMENT	06/04/09	05/18/10
BEP-09-0084-R		06/01/09	02/04/10
BEP-09-0085-R		06/01/09	09/17/10
BEP-09-0086-R		06/01/09	02/04/10
BEP-09-0089-R		06/04/09	09/17/10
BEP-09-0126-R		07/15/09	09/17/10
BEP-09-0130-R	ALLEGED INAPPROPRIATE TOUCHING AND/OR SEXUAL ACTS	07/22/09	09/17/10
BEP-09-0135-R		07/31/09	01/20/10
BEP-09-0140-R		08/05/09	09/17/10
BEP-09-0147-R	INAPPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES	08/12/09	09/17/10
BEP-09-0149-R		08/14/09	09/17/10
BEP-09-0173-R	ALLEGED SEXUAL HARRASSMENT	09/22/09	09/17/10
BEP-09-0187-R	ALLEGATIONS OF DEFAACING U.S. CURRENCY	09/24/09	05/04/10

BEP-10-0403-R	OFF DUTY/ARREST FOR DUI	10/30/09	12/01/10
BEP-10-0416-R	ALLEGATION OF ASSAULT	11/19/09	12/10/10
BEP-10-0516-R	REFUSED US CURRENCY	11/30/09	01/19/10
BEP-10-0619-R	BEP MATTER	12/09/09	12/11/09
BEP-10-0792-R		01/08/10	12/10/10
BEP-10-0793-R		01/11/10	06/25/10
BEP-10-0794-R	COUNTERFEIT MONEY	01/08/10	01/11/10
BEP-10-0826-R		01/15/10	12/16/10
BEP-10-0855-R		01/20/10	12/10/10
BEP-10-0928-R	DEFACED CURRENCY	01/25/10	01/26/10
BEP-10-0937-R		01/27/10	12/10/10
BEP-10-0945-R	MUTILATED CURRENCY	01/26/10	06/24/10
BEP-10-1023-R	US CURRENCY	02/02/10	02/04/10
BEP-10-1086-R	TEN DOLLAR BILLS	02/12/10	02/24/10
BEP-10-1193-R	TEST NOTE	02/25/10	06/24/10
BEP-10-1259-R		03/03/10	01/21/11
BEP-10-1338-R	LEGAL TENDER	03/11/10	03/12/10
BEP-10-1340-R		03/12/10	12/10/10
BEP-10-1353-R		03/12/10	01/21/11
BEP-10-1398-R	CONFLICT OF INTEREST VIOLATION	03/18/10	06/15/10
BEP-10-1429-R	PRODUCTION OF LOW/ DENOMINATION	03/18/10	06/24/10
BEP-10-1636-R	ARREST OF BEP EMPLOYEE FOR ASSAULT	04/13/10	12/10/10
BEP-10-1664-R	COUNTERFEIT MONEY	04/12/10	04/13/10
BEP-10-1771-R	BEP OFFICER	04/22/10	12/14/10
BEP-10-1789-R		04/22/10	12/14/10
BEP-10-1807-R		04/26/10	12/14/10
BEP-10-1861-R		05/03/10	05/03/10
BEP-10-1864-R		05/03/10	05/03/10
BEP-10-1900-R	EMPLOYEE FAVORITISM AND IMPROPER OVERTIME APPROVAL	05/06/10	12/14/10
BEP-10-1915-R		05/10/10	12/14/10
BEP-10-1922-R	LEGAL TENDER	05/07/10	05/12/10
BEP-10-1977-R		05/18/10	12/14/10
BEP-10-2182-R	COUNTERFEIT IMITATION PRINT SOLD ON EBAY	06/16/10	12/14/10

<u>BEP-10-2183-R</u>	ET AL - FRAUDULENT CREDIT CARD TRANSACTIONS	06/21/10	01/21/11
<u>BEP-10-2242-R</u>	OFF-DUTY ARREST OF BEP EMPLOYEE FOR DUI CHARGE	06/16/10	05/04/11
<u>BEP-10-2366-R</u>		06/30/10	12/14/10
<u>BEP-10-2386-R</u>	UNIDENTIFIED BEP POLICE OFFICER - IMPROPER CONDUCT AND TRAFFIC CITATION/STOP	07/01/10	12/14/10
<u>BEP-10-2551-R</u>	BEP EMPLOYEE SUICIDE ATTEMPT	07/16/10	01/03/11
<u>BEP-10-2573-R</u>	DEFACING CURRENCY	07/19/10	11/02/10
<u>BEP-10-2620-R</u>	MISUSE OF GOVERNMENT CREDIT CARD	07/22/10	06/03/11
<u>BEP-10-2693-R</u>	OFF DUTY ARREST OF BEP EMPLOYEE	07/29/10	01/21/11
<u>BEP-10-2699-R</u>	OFF DUTY ARREST OF BEP EMPLOYEE	07/29/10	02/04/11
<u>BEP-10-2826-R</u>	OFF DUTY ARREST	08/11/10	02/02/11
<u>BEP-10-2953-R</u>	QUESTION REGARDING MUTILATED CURRENCY	08/27/10	08/31/10
<u>BEP-10-3020-R</u>	POTENTIAL HATCH ACT VIOLATION	09/30/10	11/03/10
<u>BEP-10-3039-R</u>	OFF DUTY ARREST FOR DWI	09/10/10	01/02/11
<u>BEP-10-3129-R</u>		09/23/10	12/14/10
<u>BEP-10-3130-R</u>	MUTILATED CURRENCY- AMERICAN CHARTERED BANK	09/23/10	12/14/10
<u>BEP-10-3131-R</u>		09/23/10	12/14/10
<u>BEP-10-3161-R</u>		10/05/10	12/14/10
<u>BEP-11-0022-R</u>	CURRENCY SHEETS	10/06/10	12/14/10
<u>BEP-11-0110-R</u>	ALLEGATIONS AGAINST BEP MANAGEMENT	10/22/10	12/16/10
<u>BEP-11-0258-R</u>	GAO COMPLAINT BEP \$100 NOTES	11/16/10	01/21/11
<u>BEP-11-0418-R</u>	OFF DUTY ARREST	12/17/10	03/25/11
<u>BEP-11-0424-R</u>		12/21/10	05/24/11
<u>BEP-11-0427-R</u>	BEP ISSUE	12/29/10	03/25/11
<u>BEP-11-0521-R</u>		01/14/11	01/02/11



<u>BEP-11-0608-R</u>	MUTILATED CURRENCY REDEMPTION CLAIM	02/09/11	02/15/11
<u>BEP-11-0656-R</u>	BEP SMOKING ROOM	02/24/11	07/29/11
<u>BEP-11-0682-R</u>	OFF-DUTY/ARREST	02/25/11	01/02/13
<u>BEP-11-0683-R</u>	EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT	02/25/11	08/05/11
<u>BEP-11-0690-R</u>	FAILURE TO SELF-REPORT ARREST	02/25/11	01/02/13
<u>BEP-11-0750-R</u>	WORLD MONETARY EXCHANGE	03/11/11	03/30/11
<u>BEP-11-0751-R</u>	OFF-DUTY/ARREST	03/11/11	06/14/11
<u>BEP-11-0752-R</u>	UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	03/11/11	03/18/11
<u>BEP-11-0796-R</u>	ALLEGATIONS AGAINST BEP	03/30/11	05/02/11
<u>BEP-11-0807-R</u>	AND	03/30/11	03/31/11
<u>BEP-11-0868-R</u>		04/13/11	07/07/11
<u>BEP-11-0907-R</u>	AND	04/19/11	07/05/11
<u>BEP-11-1076-R</u>	OFF-DUTY ARREST	05/25/11	10/28/11
<u>BEP-11-1099-R</u>	UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	07/19/11	09/06/11
<u>BEP-11-1309-R</u>	OFF DUTY ARREST	07/19/11	02/10/12
<u>BEP-11-1352-R</u>	BEP EMPLOYEE	07/27/11	08/05/11
<u>BEP-11-1430-R</u>	AND	08/16/11	09/21/11
<u>BEP-11-1431-R</u>	SCAM	08/16/11	08/24/11
<u>BEP-11-1467-R</u>	HATCH ACT VIOLATION	08/24/11	08/31/11
<u>BEP-11-1483-R</u>	BEP HIRING PRACTICES	08/24/11	11/01/11
<u>BEP-11-1533-R</u>	UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY FOR SALE ON EBAY	09/07/11	09/09/11
<u>BEP-11-1539-R</u>	UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY FOR SALE ON EBAY	09/07/11	09/09/11
<u>BEP-12-0126-R</u>	ABUSE OF FMLA	10/31/11	05/09/12
<u>BEP-12-0184-R</u>		11/08/11	03/12/12
<u>BEP-12-0278-R</u>		11/15/11	04/17/12

BEP-12-0362-R	██████████ AND ██████████	11/29/11	02/02/12
BEP-12-0400-R	MUTILATED BILLS	12/05/11	12/08/11
BEP-12-0431-R	██████████ OFF-DUTY ARREST (DRUNK IN PUBLIC)	12/13/11	03/28/12
BEP-12-0432-R	██████████ OFF-DUTY ARREST (FAILURE TO APPEAR)	12/13/11	06/05/12
BEP-12-0492-R	CSA MISPLACED OR LOST CD WITH NEXT GEN \$100 BILL	01/10/12	11/13/12
BEP-12-0535-R	MUTILATED BILLS	01/10/12	03/01/12
BEP-12-1011-R	DEFACING MONEY	03/05/12	03/09/12
BEP-12-1015-R	DEFACED CURRENCY	03/05/12	03/09/12
BEP-12-1062-R	██████████	03/08/12	06/13/12
BEP-12-1144-R	██████████	03/14/12	06/29/12
BEP-12-1251-R	ALLEGED THEFT OF PERSONAL FUNDS	04/04/12	04/09/13
BEP-12-1358-R	██████████	04/04/12	09/20/12
BEP-12-1369-R	██████████	04/09/12	01/11/13
BEP-12-1538-R	REPRISAL FOR WHISTLE BLOWING ██████████	04/27/12	05/01/12
BEP-12-1560-R	SCAM	04/23/12	04/25/12
BEP-12-1641-R	POTENTIALLY FRAUDULANT BILLS	04/30/12	05/07/12
BEP-12-1691-R	FOREIGN CURRENCY	05/07/12	05/09/12
BEP-12-1761-R	OFF-DUTY ARREST FOR DWI AND DWI	05/15/12	08/08/12
BEP-12-2060-R	██████████	06/26/12	02/07/13
BEP-12-2061-R	██████████	06/22/12	11/19/12
BEP-12-2081-R	UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION	07/10/12	01/11/13
BEP-12-2094-R	██████████	07/10/12	11/06/12
BEP-12-2095-R	THEFT OF PERSONAL FUNDS	07/09/12	01/11/13
BEP-12-2143-R	US CURRENCY	07/09/12	07/10/12
BEP-12-2167-R	US CURRENCY	07/10/12	07/11/12
BEP-12-2205-R	SCAM	07/16/12	07/18/12
BEP-12-2222-R	██████████	07/19/12	03/11/13
BEP-12-2259-R	FRAUDULENT OVERTIME	07/26/12	07/26/12
BEP-12-2328-R	██████████	08/03/12	11/19/12
BEP-12-2422-R	██████████	08/16/12	04/18/13
BEP-12-2670-R	DEFACED CURRENCY	09/26/12	09/26/12
BEP-13-0019-R	US DOLLAR BILL	10/02/12	10/04/12



<u>BEP-13-0038-R</u>	DEFACED CURRENCY	10/04/12	10/11/12
<u>BEP-13-0082-R</u>	[REDACTED] L/OFF- DUTY ARREST	10/15/12	03/11/13
<u>BEP-13-0114-R</u>	[REDACTED]	10/19/12	02/20/13
<u>BEP-13-0125-R</u>	SCAM	10/22/12	10/24/12
<u>BEP-13-0169-R</u>	[REDACTED]	10/28/12	03/19/13
<u>BEP-13-0172-R</u>	[REDACTED]	10/31/12	03/19/13
<u>BEP-13-0227-R</u>	DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT	11/07/12	02/12/13
<u>BEP-13-0718-R</u>	[REDACTED]: OFF- DUTY ARREST (ALCOHOL AND SPEEDING)	02/08/13	10/18/13
<u>BEP-13-0783-R</u>	[REDACTED] OFF-DUTY ASSAULT CHARGE	02/21/13	12/13/13
<u>BEP-13-0799-R</u>	[REDACTED] OFF-DUTY ARREST FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR	02/21/13	03/23/13
<u>BEP-13-0839-R</u>	[REDACTED] NON- REPAYMENT OF PERSONAL LOAN	02/27/13	03/12/13
<u>BEP-13-1276-R</u>	[REDACTED]	04/25/13	12/16/13
<u>BEP-13-1283-R</u>	CREDIT CARD FRAUD	04/25/13	08/27/13
<u>BEP-13-1927-R</u>	SCAM	07/19/13	07/19/13
<u>BEP-13-2038-R</u>	[REDACTED]	07/30/13	01/24/14
<u>BEP-13-2080-R</u>	BEP POLICE INSPECTOR & [REDACTED]	08/07/13	10/28/13
<u>BEP-13-2200-R</u>	BEP MISCONDUCT	08/26/13	11/25/13
<u>BEP-13-2300-R</u>	[REDACTED] SEXUAL HARRASSMENT	09/13/13	12/03/13
<u>BEP-13-2343-R</u>	[REDACTED] IMPERSONATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL	09/19/13	01/17/14
<u>BEP-14-0067-R</u>	[REDACTED]	10/28/13	01/24/14
<u>BEP-14-0178-R</u>	DAMAGED/MUTILATED BILLS	11/13/13	11/15/13
<u>BEP-14-0193-R</u>	[REDACTED]	01/06/14	01/10/14
<u>BEP-14-0314-R</u>	SCAM	12/11/13	12/13/13
<u>BEP-14-0387-R</u>	WAY2MANYPENNIES AND MNILA86	12/30/13	02/03/14
<u>BEP-14-0506-R</u>	SCAM	01/28/14	01/31/14
<u>BEP-14-0530-R</u>	[REDACTED]	02/18/14	02/21/14
<u>BEP-14-0593-R</u>	BEP CURRENCY READER	02/18/14	02/21/14
<u>BEP-09-0018-R</u>	BEP REPORT OF WORKERS COMPENSATION FRAUD - [REDACTED]	12/02/08	05/07/10



New Search

BEP-09-0024-G		12/15/08	03/16/09
BEP-09-0175-G		09/22/09	07/27/10
BEP-10-0116-G	WASTED FUNDS	10/26/09	10/26/09
BEP-10-0122-G	COMPLAINT AGAINST BEP POLICE OFFICER	10/21/09	10/21/09
BEP-10-0200-G	POTENTIAL THREAT TO TREASURY EMPLOYEE (THREAT)	10/22/09	10/22/09
BEP-10-0604-G	MISSING/STOLEN HARD DRIVE FROM BEP DESKTOP COMPUTER	12/10/09	03/09/10
BEP-10-0841-G	INTAGLIO TEST PLATE	01/15/10	05/11/10
BEP-10-1115-G	TECHNICAL GRAPHICS	02/17/10	03/25/10
BEP-10-1397-G		03/17/10	03/17/10
BEP-10-1471-G	ITSIRC INCIDENT # 72146		09/30/10
BEP-10-1824-G	GOLD CERTIFICATE	04/27/10	04/27/10
BEP-10-1828-G	WCF COMPLAINT NOTIFICATION	04/28/10	06/07/10
BEP-10-1919-G	BEP WEBSITE	05/10/10	05/10/10
BEP-10-2218-G	UNNAMED SUBJECT REGISTERED SEX OFFENDER EMPLOYED BY TREASURY	07/16/10	07/16/10
BEP-10-2703-G	DEFACED CURRENCY MARKINGS RENDERING BILL UNFIT FOR CIRCULATION	07/30/10	07/30/10
BEP-10-2721-G	SUSPICIOUS MUTILATED CURRENCY REDEMPTION	08/06/10	09/13/10
BEP-10-2800-G	& MISUSE OF BEP AMMUNITION	08/13/10	08/23/10
BEP-10-2876-G	- USE OF BEP MUTILATED CURRENCY PROGRAM TO LAUNDER MONEY	08/23/10	08/23/10
BEP-10-2921-G	ABUSE OF AUTHORITY	08/30/10	09/14/10
BEP-10-3107-G		09/20/10	09/20/10
BEP-11-0002-G		10/12/10	11/05/10
BEP-11-0048-G	AUTHENTIC MONEY	10/12/10	10/12/10
BEP-11-0223-G	SUSPICIOUS MUTILATED CURRENCY REDEMPTION CLAIM	11/03/10	11/03/10
BEP-11-0473-G	ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NEW ENGLAND MINT	11/29/13	11/29/13
BEP-11-0511-G		01/14/11	01/14/11

BEP-11-0640-G	BEP T&A AUDITS	02/18/11	02/18/11
BEP-11-0715-G	ANONYMOUS LETTER	05/12/11	05/12/11
BEP-11-0811-G	ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MANAGEMENT AT BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING	03/30/11	03/30/11
BEP-11-0869-G	ALLEGATIONS AGAINST BEP	04/12/11	04/12/11
BEP-11-0898-G	TECHSTAT REVIEW	04/26/11	04/26/11
BEP-11-0938-G	TREASURY POLICE SAR INITIATIVE (BEP)	05/10/11	05/10/11
BEP-11-1029-G	US BILLS	05/20/11	05/20/11
BEP-11-1228-G	SBA PARITY RULING/FAR LAW	08/01/11	08/01/11
BEP-11-1478-G		08/19/11	08/19/11
BEP-12-0139-G	CURRENCY DEFACEMENT	11/02/11	11/02/11
BEP-12-0185-G		11/22/11	11/22/11
BEP-12-0424-G		12/14/11	12/14/11
BEP-12-0498-G	MONEY DEFACEMENT	12/23/11	12/23/11
BEP-12-0756-G	DEFACED US TREASURY BILLS	02/09/12	02/09/12
BEP-12-0948-G	BEP CONTRACT AUDITED	02/27/12	02/27/12
BEP-12-1524-G	DEFACED CURRENCY	04/18/12	04/18/12
BEP-12-1675-G	LEGAL TENDER	05/04/12	05/04/12
BEP-12-1898-G	DEFACING US CURRENCY	06/05/12	06/05/12
BEP-12-2092-G	LEGAL TENDER	07/03/12	07/03/12
BEP-12-2109-G	DEFACED CURRENCY	07/03/12	07/03/12
BEP-12-2591-G	US CURRENCY	09/25/12	09/25/12
BEP-13-0201-G		11/01/12	11/01/12
BEP-13-0292-G	DEFACED US TREASURY NOTES	11/28/12	11/28/12
BEP-13-0398-G	DEFACED CURRENCY	12/17/12	12/17/12
BEP-13-0591-G	LEGAL TENDER	01/28/13	01/28/13
BEP-13-0617-G	OFF-DUTY SPEEDING ARREST	01/29/13	01/29/13
BEP-13-0708-G	ABUSE OF AUTHORITY	02/14/13	02/14/13
BEP-13-0719-G		02/07/13	02/07/13
BEP-13-0887-G	DEFACING US CURRENCY	03/07/13	03/07/13
BEP-13-1075-G		04/15/13	04/15/13
BEP-13-1256-G		04/23/13	04/23/13
BEP-13-1580-G		06/03/13	06/03/13
BEP-13-2042-G	HUMAN RESOURCES	08/02/13	08/02/13
BEP-13-2144-G	DEFACING CURRENCY	08/15/13	08/15/13
BEP-13-2405-G		10/01/13	10/01/13
BEP-14-0025-G		10/21/13	10/21/13
BEP-14-0030-G	BEP MANAGEMENT HIRING PRACTICES	10/28/13	10/28/13



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

MEMORANDUM TO DEBRA ETKINS, ASSISTANT CHIEF  
BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING

FROM:

John L. Phillips *[Signature]* 7/25/11  
Special Agent in Charge

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED]  
Corporal Officer  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing  
Washington, DC

OIG Case Number: BEP-11-0993-P

A preliminary investigation was initiated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), after receiving information from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) that a PACA body armor vest with serial # [REDACTED] belonging to BEP, was recovered by the Charles County, MD Sheriff's Office (CCSO) during a narcotics operation. Moreover, it was determined that the vest was issued to Corporal Officer [REDACTED] BEP.

The preliminary investigation determined that the allegation is unsubstantiated. A TOIG physical inspection of [REDACTED]'s BEP-issued vest, identified a standard [REDACTED]'s XL vest, model # [REDACTED] manufactured by PACA, with serial # [REDACTED]. It appears that the vest recovered by CCSO was a duplicate of the vest issued to [REDACTED] by BEP.

If you have questions concerning this matter or, if you develop information that may indicate a need for additional or new investigative activity to assist you in resolving this matter, please contact me at (202) 927-[REDACTED]. Staff requests for assistance should be directed to [REDACTED], Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Mission Support Branch at (202) 927-[REDACTED].

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury



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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

October 14, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR DEBRA ETKINS, ASSISTANT CHIEF  
BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING

FROM: John L. Phillips *[Signature]* 10-14-11  
Special Agent in Charge

SUBJECT: Notification of Preliminary Inquiry Closure

OIG Preliminary Inquiry Number: BEP-11-1509-P

A preliminary inquiry was initiated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), after receiving information from an anonymous complainant. Specifically, the anonymous complainant reported that a [REDACTED] contractor threatened a Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) employee with law suits and legal action. The complainant stated the threats were between a BEP Contractor's Oversight Technical Representative (COTR) and a [REDACTED] Project Manager. The complainant did not identify any specific BEP employee or the contractor; however, mentioned that the BEP's Chief Information Officer (CIO) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] may be aware of the incident.

As a result, TOIG conducted an investigative assessment and determined this matter lacks investigative merit. TOIG identified and interviewed the employee who was allegedly threatened. The employee did not feel threatened nor feared for their safety. The matter will be closed accordingly.

If you have questions or if you develop information that may indicate a need for additional or new investigative activity to assist you in resolving this matter, please contact me at (202) 927-[REDACTED]

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

November 29, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR TIMOTHY GERALD, MANAGER  
PRODUCT AND PHYSICAL SAFETY DIVISION  
OFFICE OF SECURITY  
BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING

FROM:

John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

11/29/12

SUBJECT:

Notification of Preliminary Inquiry Closure

OIG Preliminary Inquiry Number: BEP-13-0083-P

A preliminary inquiry was initiated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), after receiving information from your office that four sets of Bureau of Engraving and printing (BEP) engraver progressive proofs were found at auctions in New York and New Jersey in October 2012.

The investigation determined that these items were to be auctioned, but these items were not purchased and are still in the possession of Archives International Auctions. These items were produced by [REDACTED] an engraver at the BEP from approximately 1890 -1920. In February 2000, his family sold approximately 500 pieces of his artwork at the Alderfer Auction in Philadelphia, PA. According to sources interviewed, many of those auctioned items were proofs and progressive proofs from the BEP.

Also according to sources, including [REDACTED] Curator, BEP, it appears that engravers at the BEP during [REDACTED]'s tenure were allowed to keep proofs for their own portfolio. The logs maintained by [REDACTED] also reflect that proofs were taken by [REDACTED] and never returned to the BEP. The US Postal Service also gave numerous stamp proofs from the BEP to politicians and dignitaries.

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Office of Inspector General - Investigations  
Department of the Treasury



As a result, TOIG conducted an investigative assessment and determined this matter lacks further investigative merit. As a result we are closing this matter accordingly.

If you have questions or if you develop information that may indicate a need for additional or new investigative activity to assist you in resolving this matter, please contact me at (202) 927- [REDACTED]

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

January 3, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

FROM: John L. Phillips *1/4/13*  
Special Agent in Charge

SUBJECT: Notification of Preliminary Inquiry Closure

OIG Preliminary Inquiry Number: BEP-13-0181-P

A preliminary inquiry was initiated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), after receiving information from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) regarding an alleged threat against the President of the United States.

██████████ BEP reported to TOIG that on October 25, 2012, ██████████ Star Stock Controller Exchanger BEP, overheard ██████████ Cope Pressman BEP, make racially insensitive comments and a potential threat against the President of the United States.

TOIG interviewed ██████████ who clarified that only racist comments were made by ██████████ on October 25, 2012, not any threats against the President. ██████████ explained that as an example of ██████████'s racist behavior in the past, he mentioned an alleged threat to Barack Obama from 2008 when Obama was a candidate for President which was allegedly made by ██████████

TOIG contacted SA ██████████ United States Secret Service (USSS), and advised him of the case. SA ██████████ advised that due to the length of time since the threat was allegedly made the USSS would not be opening a case on ██████████. SA ██████████ advised the matter was closed with the USSS.

As a result of TOIG's investigative assessment, it has been determined this matter lacks further investigative merit and we are closing this matter accordingly.

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OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

February 25, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

FROM: John L. Phillips *[Signature]* 2-25-13  
Special Agent in Charge

SUBJECT: Notification of Preliminary Inquiry Closure

OIG Preliminary Inquiry Number: BEP-13-0287-P

A preliminary inquiry was initiated by Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), after receiving a telephone call from former Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) Police Officer, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that current BEP Police Officer, [REDACTED], had sexual contact with a 13 year old female five years ago. The alleged victim is currently 18 years of age. [REDACTED] advised that she recently learned of the incident and it had not been reported to the police.

TOIG contacted Prince George's Police Department (PGPD) to determine what action, if any could be taken by PGPD. Detective [REDACTED] advised that due to the current legal age of the victim, only the victim can file a report and stated that PGPD would only investigate the case if the victim filed the report.

TOIG attempted numerous times to contact the alleged victim to interview with negative results.

As a result of TOIG's investigative assessment, it was determined this matter lacks further investigative merit and is being closed accordingly.

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

April 25, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

FROM: John L. Phillips *5/10/13*  
Special Agent in Charge

SUBJECT: Notification of Preliminary Inquiry Closure

OIG Preliminary Inquiry Number: BEP-13-1017-P

A preliminary inquiry was initiated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), after receiving information from [REDACTED], Secretary, Rolling Thunder Maryland Chapter, that [REDACTED] Captain, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), abused BEP resources in his position as Assistant State Director, Rolling Thunder Maryland.

On April 17, 2013, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED]. She stated that she has known [REDACTED] through Rolling Thunder for approximately six years, and on four occasions he offered to make copies using work equipment. [REDACTED] further stated that on one occasion approximately a year and a half ago, [REDACTED] produced 100-200 copies at a meeting that followed one of [REDACTED]'s offers. [REDACTED] also accused [REDACTED] of using a BEP Labor Relations Specialist to assist in writing an email.

On April 24, 2013, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was advised of his rights under Kalkines. He admitted to making less than 100 copies a year for Rolling Thunder business, denied abusing BEP resources for personal business, and denied discussing the matter with anyone at BEP. Furthermore, [REDACTED] stated that he never used, or attempted to use, his position at BEP to influence the actions or decisions of others outside the scope of his professional obligations and responsibilities.

As a result of lack of evidence, TOIG determined that the allegations do not merit additional investigative resources and the matter is being closed accordingly.

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Office of Inspector General - Investigations  
Department of the Treasury



## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



DATE OF REPORT	JUL 13 2010
REPORT STATUS	Final
CASE NUMBER	BEP-09-0120-1
CASE TITLE	[REDACTED] Information Officer, ES-0340, Bureau of Engraving Printing
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)	Procurement Integrity Act, Title 41 USC § 423 – Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Restrictions on disclosing and obtaining contractor bid or proposal information or source selection information. (UNSUBSTANTIATED)

### SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated on July 8, 2009, based on information received from [REDACTED] Information Technology Specialist (IT), Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) alleging that [REDACTED] Information Officer, BEP, engaged in improper procurement practices. Specifically, [REDACTED] alleged that [REDACTED] used separate invoices to purchase related hardware and software for the BEP Enterprise Initiative (BEN) to deliberately avoid reporting IT purchases that exceeded \$5 million, to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Procurement Executives. [REDACTED] also alleged that [REDACTED] purchased 40-servers for the BEN contract prior to the contract being awarded, and that [REDACTED] steered the BEN contract to [REDACTED] by only reviewing [REDACTED]'s response to BEP Solicitation RFQ-09-0056. (Exhibit 1)

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

(Signature)

Supervisory Approval:

John L. Phillips *For*  
Special Agent In Charge

(Signature) 7/13/10

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The investigation determined the allegation that [REDACTED] engaged in improper procurement practices is unsubstantiated. The OIG did not uncover any evidence: that [REDACTED] deliberately split invoices to purchase hardware and software to avoid reporting requirements to Treasury Procurement Executives; that computer equipment such as 40-servers were purchased prior to the contract being awarded; nor did [REDACTED] steer the BEN contract to [REDACTED] by only reviewing [REDACTED]'s response to BEP Solicitation RFQ-09-0056.

## DETAILS

### **I. Allegation – Improper Procurement Practices**

### **II. Context/Background:**

BEP Solicitation RFQ-09-0056 was awarded as BPA C09-07000 on April 23, 2009, to provide IT services and system support for the BEP, Data Base Management Module. BPA C09-07000 is also known as BEN. All work performed under BEN has been negotiated as firm fixed price task orders. To date, there have been approximately 21 task orders awarded under BEN totaling approximately \$30,525,131.

General Services Administration (GSA) has established Special Item Numbers (SIN) within their GSA Schedules Program for special ordering procedures for services that require a Statement of Work. These special ordering procedures take precedence over the procedures in FAR 8.404 (b)(2) through GSA which determined that the prices for services contained in the contractor's price list are applicable to this Schedule and are fair and reasonable. However, the ordering office using this contract is responsible for considering the level of effort and mix of labor proposed to perform a specific task being ordered and for making a determination that the total firm-fixed price or ceiling price is fair and reasonable.

The Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget (OMB 300) has established Circular NO. A-11, Part 7 (section 300), Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, and Management of Capital Assets to report major IT investments. An OMB 300 is a complex reporting document which provides procedural and analytic guidelines for reporting IT projects.

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

In an interview with the OIG, [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] used separate invoices to purchase related hardware and software to avoid reporting requirements to Treasury. [REDACTED] also believed [REDACTED] purchased 40 servers and computer software with funds allocated to the BEN contract. [REDACTED] further alleged that the servers and software were purchased prior to the BEN contract being awarded to [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] also said that [REDACTED] awarded the BEN contract to [REDACTED] without reviewing all responses submitted to the solicitation by competing companies. [REDACTED] said that she did not have any direct evidence to prove her allegations. (Exhibit 2)

In an interview with the OIG, [REDACTED] Contracting Officer, BEP reported that she served as the Contracting Officer for the BEN award to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] reported that there has not been any splitting of funds to purchase related hardware or software for the BEN initiative. [REDACTED] explained that when awarding a BPA with a diversity of required SINs, all GSA purchases fall under the SINs, and a Contractor Team Arrangement (CTA) is allowed. Under a CTA, two or more GSA Schedule contractors work together, by complementing each other's capabilities, to offer a total solution to meet an ordering activity's requirement.

[REDACTED] further explained that only the teaming partner who holds the SINs for the item needed can issue the purchase order. Funds are allocated separately for that purpose. [REDACTED] explained that the CTA concept may be perceived as splitting purchase orders; however, it is a good acquisition methodology in keeping funding tied to the appropriated awarded SIN.

[REDACTED] reported that the BEP has kept Treasury fully informed of all BEN expenditures through "face to face" meetings between the BEP Associate Director and Treasury Procurement Executives. [REDACTED] said eight GSA Contract Holders were issued a copy of the Solicitation for BEN on January 7, 2009. [REDACTED] reported that only four companies responded to the solicitation. Two of the companies were eliminated because their responses to the solicitation were classified as non-compliant by her and the BEP Legal Department. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] chaired two technical evaluation panels for the BEN contract on March 23, 2009, which [REDACTED] emerged as the contract award winner. [REDACTED] reported that there have been no purchases of hardware or software related to the BEN initiative prior to the award of BEN. (Exhibit 4)

In an interview with the OIG, [REDACTED] reported that at the inception of the BEN contract he initially kept task values low simply to reduce risk, and to assess [REDACTED]'s performance. [REDACTED] said after a few months he and the procurement staff were able to establish cost estimates, which he reported to BEP's Director, Deputy Director and Associate Directors. He reported that there was sufficient data to generate an OMB 300, and they concurred. [REDACTED] said in December 2009, he directed appropriate staff to initiate an OMB 300.

[REDACTED] stated that some hardware and software purchases were acquired under the CTA concept. [REDACTED] explained under the CTA, a teaming partner provides hardware and the other teaming partner provides the software. [REDACTED] said his office purchases equipment all of the time; however, he did not purchase 40 servers for the BEN initiative prior to the award. [REDACTED] said that the BEP

servers to be purchased for the BEN initiative prior to the award. [REDACTED] said that as part of the BEN initiative, the contract winner was required to have hardware teaming partners on their team prior to the award. [REDACTED] said that the BEP expenditures are reported in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and reported in BEP's annual report. These expenditures are subject to annual audit.

[REDACTED] reported that he did not steer the BEN contract to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that he worked with [REDACTED] to award the BEN contract. [REDACTED] said that he and Procurement Specialists, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] conducted technical evaluation panels for the BEN contract on March 23, 2009. [REDACTED] said that the evaluations were reviewed by Legal and an award was made to [REDACTED] (Exhibit 5)

## FINDINGS

The investigation determined the allegations that [REDACTED] engaged in improper procurement practices is unsubstantiated. The investigation did not find any evidence that [REDACTED] deliberately split invoices to purchase hardware and software to avoid reporting requirements to Treasury Procurement Executives. The investigation determined that [REDACTED] initially kept the BEN expenditures low to determine cost estimates and avoid wasteful spending, not to avoid reporting requirements to Treasury Procurement Executives. Also, the investigation did not discover any evidence that computer equipment such as servers were purchased prior to the contract being awarded.

In addition, the investigation did not find any evidence that [REDACTED] steered the BEN contract to [REDACTED] by only reviewing [REDACTED]'s response to BEP Solicitation RFQ-09-0056. The investigation discovered that [REDACTED] chaired two Contract Technical Review Panels which reviewed submitted responses from companies for the BEN contract.

### **I. Criminal**

For a prosecutorial opinion, the facts of this case were presented to [REDACTED] Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office (USAO), Washington D.C., to determine if there may have been a violation of Title 41 USC § 423 – Federal Procurement Policy Act, Restrictions on disclosing and obtaining contractor bid or proposal information or source selection information. On July 2, 2010, AUSA [REDACTED] determined there was no criminal violation in this matter. (Exhibit 6)

### **II. Civil**

N/A

### III. Administrative

The allegation of [REDACTED] engaging in improper procurement practices is unsubstantiated. It is recommended that this information be provided to the BEP management for any action they deem appropriate.

#### DISTRIBUTION

[REDACTED] Assistant to the Chief, BEP

#### EXHIBITS

- | <u>Number</u> | <u>Description</u>  |
|---------------|---|
| 1.            | Initial complaint document from [REDACTED] dated June 30, 2009.         |
| 2.            | Memorandum of Activity, interview of [REDACTED] dated April 26, 2010.   |
| 3.            | Memorandum of Interview, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 18, 2009. |
| 4.            | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 14, 2010.     |
| 5.            | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 24, 2010.     |
| 6.            | Memorandum of Activity, Declination of case, dated July 2, 2010.        |



## SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



<b>DATE OF REPORT</b>	
<b>REPORT STATUS</b>	Final
<b>CASE NUMBER</b>	BEP-09-0138-I
<b>CASE TITLE</b>	[REDACTED] - Currency Controller - KG 5
<b>PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)</b>	5 C.F.R. 2635.101 - Basic obligation of public service

### SYNOPSIS

On July 28, 2009, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received an anonymous written complaint regarding [REDACTED], Currency Controller, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) stating that she cannot perform certain duties at the BEP, but can travel distances and play at casinos. The author of the complaint believed [REDACTED] filed a false claim regarding workers' compensation, and should not be able to drive and sit for hours at casinos if she can only sit for 15 minute increments at the BEP. (Exhibit 1)

The OI contacted the casinos in question and found that she only visited the casinos once a month for approximately two hours at a time. [REDACTED] may be exaggerating her symptoms to reduce her work at the BEP, but it cannot be

*Case Agent:*

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

(Signature)

*Supervisory Approval:*

Anthony Scott  
Special Agent in Charge (Acting)

(Signature)

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determined if [REDACTED] submitted false paperwork to receive workers' compensation. It also cannot be determined if attending a casino once a month is beyond her physical abilities and should be viewed as fraud of the workers' compensation program.

### INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

On August 12, 2009, the OIG/OI telephonically contacted [REDACTED], Workers' Compensation Manager, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Western Currency Facility (WCF), Fort Worth, TX.

[REDACTED] stated that she is well aware of [REDACTED]'s claim. [REDACTED] filed a workers' compensation claim in 2002 for an injured back, shoulder, and arm after lifting a cassette to place on a press. Since that date, [REDACTED] has been on light duty. She works eight hours per day, but can only sit or stand 15 minutes per hour, and cannot lift anything over her head.

[REDACTED] has been told by [REDACTED] supervisor, [REDACTED], that [REDACTED] travels one hour away to the Winstar Casino in Oklahoma. She then sits for hours playing the slot machines. [REDACTED] thought of having private investigators, BEP has hired, videotape [REDACTED] at the casino, but [REDACTED] does not know when [REDACTED] will be at the casino. (Exhibit 2)

On August 26, 2009, the OIG/OI telephonically contacted [REDACTED] Currency Control Supervisor, BEP, WCF. [REDACTED] stated she has been employed at the BEP since 1991 and has been the supervisor of [REDACTED] since 2003. [REDACTED] is a Currency Controller on the second shift and is at the BEP from 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. [REDACTED] was allegedly injured in 2002, and now claims that she has back and shoulder problems. Her light duties only allow her to work 15 minutes per hour because she can only sit and use her hands for 15 minutes. Her work consists of data entry on the computer. She is also required to write information on pallets of currency, but [REDACTED] complains that the pallets are stacked too high and she cannot raise her arm over her head, so she does not perform this task. [REDACTED] works for 15 minutes on the computer and then makes personal telephone calls on the telephone and walks around the BEP.

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury

## SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

BEP-09-0138-I

[REDACTED] has been told by several colleagues and subordinates that [REDACTED] speaks of going to the casinos in Oklahoma and Louisiana on the weekends. [REDACTED] stated that she does not know how [REDACTED] can drive long distances to these casinos and spend hours sitting at the casinos, if she cannot sit at work.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] recently filed an Equal Employment Opportunity case against her and [REDACTED], Mechanical Examination Manager, BEP, because she was refused overtime. [REDACTED] stated that she and [REDACTED] agreed she should not be paid for four hours of overtime, plus night differential and only work 60 minutes of the time. (Exhibit 3)

On October 22, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] Operations Manager, BEP, WCF. [REDACTED] stated that he has been an indirect supervisor of [REDACTED] since 2005. [REDACTED] was allegedly injured several years ago and now claims that she has back and neck problems. Her light duties only allow her to work 15 minutes per hour because she can only sit and use her hands for 15 minutes. Her work consists of data entry on the computer.

[REDACTED] is aware that [REDACTED] visits casinos on the weekends because she tells her supervisors and colleagues. He believes she goes to casinos once or twice per month. (Exhibit 4)

On October 21, 2009, the OIG/OI met with [REDACTED] Assistant Security Manager, Winstar Casino, regarding the attendance of [REDACTED] at the casino. [REDACTED] reviewed [REDACTED]'s "player card" and found that [REDACTED] visited the casino on the following dates: March 22, 2009, April 5, 2009, May 27, 2009, June 22, 2009, and July 5, 2009. She played for a total of 12 hours. (Exhibit 5)

On October 21, 2009, the OIG/OI met with [REDACTED], Assistant Security Manager, Thackerville Gaming Center, regarding the attendance of [REDACTED] at the casino. [REDACTED] stated that the Thackerville Gaming Center does not have "player cards" and he did not recognize [REDACTED] when shown her photograph by the OI. (Exhibit 6)

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Department of the Treasury



EXHIBITSNumber      Description

1. Memorandum of Activity, Predicating Document, dated July 28, 2009.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], Workers' Compensation Manager, BEP, WCF, dated August 12, 2009.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Currency Control Supervisor, BEP, WCF, dated August 26, 2009.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Operations Manager, BEP, WCF, dated October 22, 2009.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Assistant Security Manager, Winstar Casino, dated October 21, 2009.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Assistant Security Manager, Thackerville Gaming Center, on October 21, 2009.

DISTRIBUTION

Not applicable

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Department of the Treasury



## SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION





<b>DATE OF REPORT</b>	DEC 14 2009
<b>REPORT STATUS</b>	Final
<b>CASE NUMBER</b>	BEP-09-0142-I
<b>CASE TITLE</b>	New Orleans Training
<b>PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)</b>	Title 18 USC § 641 – Public money, property or records  Section 735.203 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government.

### SYNOPSIS

The OIG/OI received an anonymous complaint in August 2009, alleging that the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Office of Chief Counsel had sent employees to New Orleans, LA to attend Excel spreadsheet training. The complainant had sent a written statement alleging fraud, waste and abuse of Federal funds of expenses related to travel, per diem, and lodging costs for sending BEP employees to New Orleans when the training could have been conducted locally in Washington, DC. (Exhibit 1)

The Chief Counsel of the BEP was interviewed, who advised the OI that the Office of Chief Counsel did send three of its staff attorneys to an "EXCEL" conference in New Orleans, in July 2009. He further described the EXCEL training as an acronym for an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) accredited training course entitled "Examining Conflicts in Employment Law."

<b>Case Agent:</b>  Special Agent (Signature)	<b>Supervisory Approval:</b> John L. Phillips Special Agent in Charge (Acting) FOR  (Signature)
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Investigation is closed without any referrals for any prosecutorial decisions, judicial findings, and/or administrative actions.

### **INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS**

The OI interviewed Kevin J. Rice, Chief Counsel, BEP, on September 30, 2009. Rice advised the OI that the Office of Chief Counsel did send three of its staff attorneys to an "EXCEL" conference in New Orleans, July 27-30, 2009. He further described the EXCEL training as an acronym for an EEOC accredited training course entitled "Examining Conflicts in Employment Law." The Chief Counsel described the training as relevant and significant, and that the training was widely recognized throughout the country and Federal government as the foremost informative and relevant equal employment opportunity training available. (Exhibit 2)

Sonya White, Rice's Deputy Counsel, had recommended that the attorneys attend the training. The BEP legal staff had been unable to send its staff attorneys to attend EEO training in several years due to budget restrictions. In FY 2009, Rice reported that his office's training budget was \$24,000 for 17 personnel. In previous years, the Chief Counsel's training budget was approximately \$10,000 per year. The BEP Office of Chief Counsel has 28 EEO cases open at present and White believed obtaining this training for the staff was a high priority.

Rice provided the OI agents with the conference brochure and agenda, as well as the SF-182's, "Authorization, Agreement and Certification of Training" cost breakdowns for the travels and training. He also provided copies of GovTrip expense detail reports, travels and expenses for each employee. (Exhibit 3)

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Department of the Treasury

**EXHIBITS**

<b>Number</b>	<b>Description</b>
1.	Predicating documents, dated July 29, 2009.
2.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of Kevin J. Rice, dated October 1, 2009.
3.	GovTrip Travel Expense Reports

**DISTRIBUTION**

Not applicable.

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Department of the Treasury



## SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



DATE OF REPORT	NOV 20 2009
REPORT STATUS	FINAL
CASE NUMBER	2009-0154
CASE TITLE	[REDACTED] Currency Worker, 6941-KG-03, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Washington, DC
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)	5 CFR 735.203 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government.  17 USC 506 - Copyright Infringement  18 USC 2319 - Criminal Infringement of a Copyright

### SYNOPSIS

On August 17, 2009, the Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigations (OIG/OI) received a memorandum from [REDACTED] Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Office of Security, Assistant Chief, stating that an anonymous telephone complaint was received alleging [REDACTED] Treasury, BEP, Currency Worker was selling counterfeit Digital Video Disks (DVDs) while working the midnight shift at BEP. (Exhibit 1)

[REDACTED] was interviewed by the OIG/OI in reference to this allegation. She did admit to making copies of counterfeit DVDs on occasion. She denied selling any of

Case Agent:

[REDACTED] Special Agent

(Signature)

Supervisory Approval:

John Phillips, (Acting) Special Agent In  
Charge

(Signature)

11/20/09

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these DVDs for profit; she was however reimbursed for her purchase of blank DVDs as well as DVD covers.

The OIG/OI contacted Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [REDACTED] District of Maryland in reference to the facts of this case. AUSA [REDACTED] stated that if [REDACTED] was not selling counterfeit DVDs for profit she did not meet the elements of 17 USC 506 or 18 USC 2319, Criminal Infringement of a Copyright.

Based on the evidence and information gathered during this investigation it was determined that the allegation could not be substantiated that [REDACTED] was selling DVDs while at work or during work hours.

### INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

On September 30, 2009, the OIG/OI received over two months (July 1, 2009, through September 10, 2009) of email traffic from [REDACTED]'s Government issued email address. Analysis showed no emails in reference to the buying or selling of counterfeit DVDs. (Exhibit 2)

On October 16, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] in reference to this allegation. [REDACTED] did admit to making copies of counterfeit DVDs on occasion. She denied selling any of these DVDs for profit; she was however reimbursed by some of her co-workers for her purchase of blank DVDs as well as DVD covers. [REDACTED] provided written consent to search her BEP locker, personally owned vehicle and her residence. The OIG/OI searched these places with negative results. [REDACTED] provided three names of co-workers for whom she has copied movies, soccer games, documentaries, etc. to DVDs. (Exhibit 3)

On October 16, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] Treasury, BEP, Currency Worker. [REDACTED] stated that he has received approximately five DVDs from [REDACTED] however he has never paid for any of these DVDs. (Exhibit 4)

On October 16, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] Treasury, BEP, Note Examiner. [REDACTED] advised that she received approximately four to five DVDs from [REDACTED] all in the past year. [REDACTED] stated that all of the DVDs she has received were from television shows or documentaries. She informed the OIG/OI that she has paid \$5.00-\$8.00 to [REDACTED] for these items, but never on work property. (Exhibit 5)

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On October 16, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] Treasury, BEP, Security Printing. [REDACTED] advised she has exchanged over 100 movies with [REDACTED] over the years; however she has never purchased anything from [REDACTED] nor has she ever seen [REDACTED] sell any DVDs. (Exhibit 6)

On November 13, 2009, the OIG/OI re-interviewed [REDACTED] in order to clarify the inconsistency between her statement of not selling DVDs and [REDACTED] statement that she paid [REDACTED] between \$5.00 and \$8.00 per DVD. [REDACTED] stated that she only took money from [REDACTED] for reimbursement. [REDACTED] said she purchased materials to make DVD covers for [REDACTED]. In addition, [REDACTED] stated that she did not sell any DVDs on BEP property or during work hours. (Exhibit 7)

### EXHIBITS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description</u>
1.	Memorandum of Activity, Predicating document, dated August 17, 2009.
2.	Memorandum of Activity, Receipt of email traffic, dated September 30, 2009.
3.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated October 16, 2009.
4.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated October 16, 2009.
5.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated October 16, 2009.
6.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated October 16, 2009.
7.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 13, 2009.

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



DATE OF REPORT	JAN 13 2010
REPORT STATUS	Final
CASE NUMBER	BEP-09-0201-I
CASE TITLE	[REDACTED], Plate Maker, Bureau of Engraving and Printing Washington, D.C.
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)	Virginia State Statue 18.2 § 137 – Intentional Destruction of Property.  Section 735.203 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government.

### SYNOPSIS

On September 29, 2009, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received correspondence from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Office of Security, alleging that [REDACTED], Plate Marker, BEP, was arrested in Arlington County, VA, on September 27, 2009, for Intentional Destruction of Property. Specifically, [REDACTED] was arrested for damaging three of [REDACTED]'s, Assistant Chief Engraving, BEP, personal vehicles. (Exhibit 1)

This investigation determined that on December 1, 2009, [REDACTED] plead guilty to violating Virginia State Statue 18.2 § 137 – Intentional Destruction of Property, before Judge Dorothy Clarke of the General District Court of Arlington County VA. [REDACTED] was sentenced to 90 days imprisonment; which was suspended contingent on [REDACTED] meeting the terms and conditions set forth by Judge Clarke. Therefore,

Case Agent:

Supervisory Approval:

[REDACTED], Special Agent

Anthony J. Scott  
Special Agent In Charge (Acting)

(Signature)

(Signature)

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based on the fact that [REDACTED] plead guilty, the Treasury administrative charge of Conduct Prejudicial to the Government is substantiated against [REDACTED]

## DETAILS

### **I. Allegation – Virginia State Statue 18.2 § 137 – Intentional Destruction of Property.**

### **II. Context/Background**

On September 27, 2009, at approximately 12:51 A.M., [REDACTED] was captured vandalizing all three of [REDACTED]'s vehicles at his residence. [REDACTED] stated that he was able to identify [REDACTED] after he reviewed his home video surveillance system. [REDACTED] reported the incident to the Arlington County Police Department, at approximately 1:30 A.M. After the incident was reported, the magistrate for Arlington County issued an arrest warrant for [REDACTED] and he was arrested at his residence on September 27, 2009.

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

### **[REDACTED] Interview**

During an interview on October 21, 2009, [REDACTED] stated on September 27, 2009, at approximately 12:51AM, his home surveillance system was activated. After the system was activated, [REDACTED] said he exited his residence to confront the individual, at which time the unknown individual fled in a vehicle. After he reviewed the video surveillance system [REDACTED] was able to indentify the unknown individual as [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that his video surveillance system captured [REDACTED] vandalizing all three of his vehicles. (Exhibit 2)

### **Detective [REDACTED] Interview**

Detective [REDACTED] of the Arlington County Police Department stated that he reviewed the video footage, which captured [REDACTED] vandalizing [REDACTED]'s vehicles. Detective [REDACTED] stated that the Arlington County Police Department executed a Search Warrant on October 6, 2009, at [REDACTED]'s residence, which is located at [REDACTED]. Detective [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

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admitted to vandalizing [REDACTED]'s vehicles during the execution of the Search Warrant. (Exhibit 3)

### FINDINGS

This investigation determined that on December 1, 2009, [REDACTED] plead guilty to violating Virginia State Statute 18.2 § 137 – Intentional Destruction of Property, before Judge Dorothy Clarke of the General District Court of Arlington County VA. [REDACTED] was sentenced to 90 days imprisonment; which was suspended contingent on [REDACTED] meeting the terms and conditions set forth by Judge Clarke. Therefore, based on the fact that [REDACTED] plead guilty, the Treasury administrative charge of Conduct Prejudicial to the Government is substantiated against [REDACTED]

### REFERRALS

#### **I. Criminal**

See Findings

#### **II. Civil**

Not applicable

#### **III. Administrative**

See Findings

### DISTRIBUTION

[REDACTED] Acting Assistant Chief, Bureau of Engraving and Printing

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EXHIBITS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description</u>
1.	Original allegation, Correspondence, dated September 29, 2009.
2.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated October 21, 2009.
3.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Detective, Arlington County Police Department, dated October 29, 2009.
4.	Memorandum of Activity, [REDACTED] court appearance, General District Court of Arlington County VA, dated December 1, 2009.

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



DATE OF REPORT	
REPORT STATUS	Final
CASE NUMBER	2009-0202 - NOV 13 2009
CASE TITLE	[REDACTED] Small Business Specialist, GS-13, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Washington, DC
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)	5 CFR 735.203 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government.  5 CFR 2635.704 - Misuse of Government Property

### SYNOPSIS

On September 25, 2009, the Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigations (OIG/OI) received a memorandum from [REDACTED] Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Office of Security, Assistant Chief, stating that [REDACTED], Treasury, BEP, Small Business Specialist misused her Government issued credit card while on official travel.

[REDACTED] was interviewed by the OIG/OI and she provided a written, sworn statement admitting to the allegation. She also stated that she was in the process of repaying the money.

Case Agent: [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED] 11/12/09 (Signature)	Supervisory Approval: John Phillips Special Agent in Charge (Acting) [Signature] 11/15/09 (Signature)
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On November 3, 2009, [REDACTED] contacted the OIG/OI and confirmed that as of that date [REDACTED] had paid \$5,000.00 toward her outstanding debt. [REDACTED] also advised that as of October 30, 2009, [REDACTED] had resigned from the BEP.

## DETAILS

### **I. Allegation**

On September 25, 2009, the OIG/OI received a memorandum from [REDACTED] Treasury, BEP, Office of Security, Assistant Chief, stating that [REDACTED] Treasury, BEP, Small Business Specialist misused her Government issued credit card while on official travel.

### **II. Context/Background**

[REDACTED] was on official travel in Las Vegas, NV from July 19 until July 23, 2009. While on this assignment [REDACTED] charged in excess of \$7,500.00 most of which was for cash advances. She was authorized to charge \$200.00 during this travel. Upon her return she charged an additional \$3,714.00 at the Charles Town Racetrack, Charles Town, WV.

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On October 7, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] Treasury, BEP, Manager of Financial Management. [REDACTED] provided copies of [REDACTED]'s Government issued credit card statement as well as her Gov Trip travel orders. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was entitled to \$200.00 while on official travel to Las Vegas, NV. However, [REDACTED] used her credit card to withdrawal over \$7,500.00 in Las Vegas, NV and Charles Town, WV. [REDACTED] provided copies of [REDACTED]'s credit card statement which validated the allegation.

[REDACTED] advised the total of [REDACTED]'s charges were approximately \$7,500.00 in Las Vegas, NV and in Charles Town, WV. He stated that the original allegation that [REDACTED] charged \$7,500.00 in Las Vegas, NV and an additional \$3,714.00 in Charles Town, WV was incorrect. (EXHIBIT 2)

On October 15, 2009, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] admitted to improperly using her Government issued credit card to obtain money in Las Vegas,

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Department of the Treasury

NV while on official travel as well as in Charles Town, WV while not on official travel. [REDACTED] acknowledged her actions were improper and said that it was a lapse of judgment on her part. She is in the process of reimbursing Citibank (credit card financial institution) and at this time has paid back \$5,000.00 which leaves an approximate outstanding balance of \$1,271.51. On October 19, 2009, [REDACTED] provided a signed, sworn statement to these facts. (EXHIBIT 3)

On November 3, 2009, [REDACTED] contacted the OIG/OI and confirmed that as of that date [REDACTED] had paid \$5,000.00 toward her outstanding debt. [REDACTED] also advised that as of October 30, 2009, [REDACTED] had resigned from the BEP. (EXHIBIT 4)

### FINDINGS

[REDACTED] admitted to misusing her U.S. Government issued credit card both while on official travel and while on her personal time to charge in excess of \$7,500.00, most of which was for cash advances.

In addition it has been determined [REDACTED]'s actions violated The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government, 5 C.F.R., Section 735.203 as well as Misuse of Government Property, 5 C.F.R., Section 2635.704.

### REFERRALS

#### **I. Criminal**

None

#### **II. Civil**

None

#### **III. Administrative**

Section 735.203 - The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Treasury Employees, Conduct Prejudicial to the Government.

Section 2635.704 - Misuse of Government Property.

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Department of the Treasury



DISTRIBUTION

[REDACTED], Associate Director (Mgmt), Bureau of Engraving and Printing.

EXHIBITS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description</u>
1.	Initial allegation, Memorandum from [REDACTED] to David Smith, dated September 25, 2009
2.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated October 7, 2009
3.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated October 15, 2009
4.	Memorandum of Activity, email correspondence from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dated November 3, 2009

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury



## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DATE OF REPORT	DEC 2 2009
REPORT STATUS	Final
CASE NUMBER	BEP-10-0149-I
CASE TITLE	[REDACTED] Police Officer, TR-0083-8
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)	5 C.F.R. 2635.101 - Basic obligation of public service  BEP Handbook regulations regarding notifying supervisors of off duty arrest or incident

### SYNOPSIS

On October 16, 2009, the Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received a memorandum from [REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), stating that [REDACTED] a BEP Police Officer, Western Currency Facility (WCF), was arrested for public intoxication, on October 13, 2009, in Roanoke, TX. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation found that [REDACTED] was cited for public intoxication by the Roanoke, TX Police Department. The charges were later dismissed. It was determined that [REDACTED] made false statements to police and the OI. He also did not notify his supervisors of his arrest as required by BEP rules and regulations.

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

(Signature)

11-30-09

Supervisory Approval:

John L. Phillips

Special Agent In Charge (Acting)

(Signature)

12-2-09

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DETAILS

**A. Allegation:** It is alleged that [REDACTED] was arrested for public intoxication by the Roanoke Police Department on October 13, 2009. The OI also developed allegations where [REDACTED] failed to report the arrest to his supervisors per BEP rules and regulations, and provided false statements to the police and the OI.

**B. Context / Background:** [REDACTED] is a police officer with the BEP WCF and has held this position since December 2004.

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On October 16, 2009, the OI received a memorandum from [REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security, BEP stating that [REDACTED] was arrested for public intoxication, in Roanoke, TX, on October 13, 2009.

On October 21, 2009, the OI interviewed [REDACTED] Sergeant, Roanoke Police Department, in Roanoke, TX. [REDACTED] stated that the Roanoke Police Department was contacted by Chili's Restaurant in Roanoke, TX at approximately 10:00 P.M. on October 13, 2009. The Chili's manager (name not recalled) informed [REDACTED] and Officer [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had entered the restaurant and sat at the bar at approximately 6:00 P.M. He had several alcoholic beverages before the manager refused to serve him anymore alcohol at 10:00 P.M. He became irate and left the restaurant, got into his vehicle, and drove away.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] then located a Ford truck matching the description of [REDACTED] vehicle given by the Chili's manager. The truck was parked in the fuel line at a Murphy's gas station. [REDACTED] was observed exiting his truck and running across the parking lot to Wendy's fast food restaurant where [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] spoke with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] where he was parked and he pointed to his truck at Murphy's Gas Station. [REDACTED] was asked how he got there and he replied that a friend had driven him there.

**Agent's Note:** [REDACTED] provided a false statement to police since no friend drove him to the gas station.

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury

██████████ stated that they believe ██████████ saw the police vehicle, panicked, threw his keys in the glove compartment (they were found later when the police towed the vehicle from the gas station) and ran to Wendy's. ██████████ was visibly intoxicated. His eyes were glassy, his words were slurred, and his breath smelled of alcohol.

██████████ patted ██████████ down for weapons and found his Treasury police badge in his pocket. Upon finding the badge, he informed ██████████ and ██████████ that he was a Treasury police officer. ██████████ was handcuffed and taken to the police station. He was given a breathalyzer test which showed the results of .223 which is over the legal limit of .08 in TX. While in custody, ██████████ informed ██████████ and ██████████ on several occasions that he was a Treasury police officer and that the arrest would ruin his career. ██████████ asked ██████████ several times for the name and contact information of his supervisor. ██████████ reluctantly provided the contact information. ██████████ stated that ██████████ was released the following day to his wife. ██████████ stated that ██████████ was charged with a Class C misdemeanor of public intoxication. ██████████ did not contact ██████████ supervisor, but believes one of ██████████'s supervisors contacted the BEP. (Exhibit 2)

On October 22, 2009, the OI interviewed ██████████ Police Officer, BEP, WCF. ██████████ stated that on October 13, 2009, he went to Chili's Restaurant in Roanoke, TX to see a few friends at approximately 6:00 P.M. He had three to four beers and four Yaeger shots. At approximately 9:00 P.M., the Chili's bar manager told him that he could not have anymore alcohol. ██████████ recalled that he and the manager had an argument, but could not recall what was said. He then went to his truck and drove approximately 100 yards to a Wal-Mart parking lot. He then walked over to Wendy's because he was hungry. He stated he did not see the police until they met him in front of the Wendy's restaurant. The police officer patted ██████████ down for weapons and found his Treasury police badge in his pocket. Upon finding the badge, he informed the officers that he was a Treasury police officer. ██████████ was handcuffed and taken to the police station. He was given a breathalyzer test, but could not recall the results. While in custody, ██████████ was asked his supervisor's name and contact information which he provided. ██████████ was released the following day to his wife ██████████ and charged with a Class C misdemeanor of public intoxication. ██████████ contacted the Roanoke City Clerk of Courts regarding a court date because he was leaving October 26, 2009, for military training and then to Afghanistan. He was informed that the charges had been dismissed.

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Department of the Treasury

[REDACTED] stated that he did not inform his supervisor at the BEP because he was unaware he was required to, and believed they would be informed by the Roanoke Police Department. (Exhibit 3)

On October 26, 2009, the OI telephonically interviewed [REDACTED] Assistant Manager, Murphy Oil Company, Roanoke, TX. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] is a "regular" at Murphy Oil Company in Roanoke, TX. He comes in three times per week for gasoline and cigarettes, and she knows him by name.

On October 13, 2009, [REDACTED] came to the station alone at approximately 10:00 P.M. [REDACTED] came into the station, [REDACTED] bought [REDACTED] of gasoline. He then pumped his gas. After pumping his gas, he sat on the passenger's side of his truck smoking a cigarette for several minutes. [REDACTED] left the store to have a cigarette in the parking lot. She saw a Roanoke Police Department vehicle enter the parking lot in the distance. [REDACTED] asked her if she called the police. She stated that she did not.

**Agent's Note:** [REDACTED] informed the OI that he did not see police until he was at the Wendy's Restaurant, however, it is clear from this testimony that he saw the police while sitting in his truck at the gas station.

[REDACTED] then asked [REDACTED] if he could keep his truck at the station while he went to Wendy's Restaurant. She stated that it would not be a problem and she returned to the store. She did not see him walk or run to Wendy's. Within minutes, she looked out of the store window and saw two police vehicles in front of Wendy's. Within half an hour, the Roanoke Police Department had his truck towed from the station. The police also questioned her as to whether he appeared intoxicated. She informed them that he did not appear intoxicated or smell of alcohol. (Exhibit 4)

On October 29, 2009, the OI telephonically interviewed [REDACTED] Assistant Manager, Chili's Restaurant, Roanoke, TX. [REDACTED] stated that on October 13, 2009, [REDACTED] bought two large beers and had several other alcoholic drinks bought by others. At approximately 10:15 P.M., [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] that she would serve him no additional alcoholic drinks because he appeared to be intoxicated. She was aware that he had had several drinks, his words began to slur. He became "upset" and said "Fuck you bitch and fuck this place!" [REDACTED] then told another patron named [REDACTED] that he would wait for

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Department of the Treasury

his wife in his truck. However, he entered his truck and drove out of the parking lot. [REDACTED] then called the Roanoke Police Department. (Exhibit 5)

On October 27, 2009, the OI contacted the Roanoke City Clerk of Court. [REDACTED] Clerk, reviewed her database and stated that the Class C misdemeanor of public intoxication for [REDACTED] was dismissed on October 20, 2009. No reason was listed. (Exhibit 6)

### FINDINGS

Based on the evidence and information gathered during this investigation, it was determined that [REDACTED] was cited for public intoxication on October 13, 2009. It was further determined that [REDACTED] provided false statements to the OI and the police. It was also determined that [REDACTED] did not notify his BEP supervisors as necessary per BEP rules and regulations.

### REFERRALS

#### **Criminal**

Not applicable

#### **Civil**

Not applicable

#### **Administrative**

The allegation of public intoxication by [REDACTED] was substantiated. It is recommended that this information be provided to BEP WCF management for any action they deem appropriate.

### RECOMMENDATIONS / DISTRIBUTION

Scott E. Wilson, Associate Director, BEP

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury

EXHIBITSNumber      Description

1. Memorandum from BEP to the OI, dated October 16, 2009.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], Police Office, Roanoke Police Department, dated October 21, 2009.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Police Officer, BEP, WOE, dated October 22, 2009.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview [REDACTED] Assistant Manager, Murphy Oil Company, dated October 26, 2009.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Assistant Manager, Chili's Restaurant, dated October 29, 2009.
6. Memorandum of Activity, contact with Roanoke Clerk of Courts, dated October 27, 2009.

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED]

OIG File Number BEP-10-0188-I

In the late 1800's, the U.S. government enacted legislation requiring the Department of the Treasury to exchange damaged or mutilated U.S. currency on a one-for-one basis. This allowed the public to exchange currency that, due to its condition, might not otherwise be accepted as legal tender. In addition to providing a public service, this program helped to bolster domestic and international confidence in the value of U.S. currency.

This program is known as the Mutilated Currency Exchange Program (MCEP) and is administered by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). BEP maintains a professional staff of forensic experts who examine each note that is submitted for exchange to determine its authenticity before redemption.

On October 22, 2009, this office received correspondence from the BEP, Office of Security, regarding the potential abuse of the MCEP. Specifically, the Mutilated Currency Division (MCD) identified a mutilated currency redemption claim by [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] that was suspicious in nature. The suspicious claim was for an estimated \$60,523.

However, after further examination by the MCD examiners, it was determined that the mutilated currency redemption claim was legitimate. As such, the claim was validated and redeemed. Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be concluded with the approval of this memorandum.

Approved:

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
Office of Investigations

5/28/10





OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED] Coins & Currency  
[REDACTED]

OIG File Number BEP-10-0193-I

In the late 1800's, the U.S. government enacted legislation requiring the Department of the Treasury to exchange damaged or mutilated U.S. currency on a one-for-one basis. This allowed the public to exchange currency that, due to its condition, might not otherwise be accepted as legal tender. In addition to providing a public service, this program helped to bolster domestic and international confidence in the value of U.S. currency.

This program is known as the Mutilated Currency Exchange Program (MCEP) and is administered by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). BEP maintains a professional staff of forensic experts who examine each note that is submitted for exchange to determine its authenticity before redemption.

On October 22, 2009, this office received correspondence from the BEP, Office of Security, regarding the potential abuse of the MCEP. Specifically, the Mutilated Currency Division (MCD) identified a mutilated currency redemption claim by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Coins & Currency, located in [REDACTED] that was suspicious in nature. The suspicious claim was for an estimated \$75,518.

However, after further examination by the MCD examiners, it was determined that the mutilated currency redemption claim was legitimate. As such, the claim was validated and redeemed. Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be concluded with the approval of this memorandum.

Approved:

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
Office of Investigations

5/28/10



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM: James Howell  
Special Agent

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

OIG File Number BEP-10-0195-I

In the late 1800's, the U.S. government enacted legislation requiring the Department of the Treasury to exchange damaged or mutilated U.S. currency on a one-for-one basis. This allowed the public to exchange currency that, due to its condition, might not otherwise be accepted as legal tender. In addition to providing a public service, this program helped to bolster domestic and international confidence in the value of U.S. currency.

This program is known as the Mutilated Currency Exchange Program (MCEP) and is administered by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). BEP maintains a professional staff of forensic experts who examine each note that is submitted for exchange to determine its authenticity before redemption.

On October 22, 2009, this office received correspondence from the BEP, Office of Security, regarding the potential abuse of the MCEP. Specifically, the Mutilated Currency Division (MCD) identified a mutilated currency redemption claim by [REDACTED], of [REDACTED] that was suspicious in nature. The suspicious claim was for an estimated \$9,500.

However, after further examination by the MCD examiners, it was determined that the mutilated currency redemption claim was legitimate. As such, the claim was validated and redeemed. Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be administratively closed with the approval of this memorandum.

Approved: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
Office of Investigations

5/26/10



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED]

OIG File Number BEP-10-0197-1

In the late 1800's, the U.S. government enacted legislation requiring the Department of the Treasury to exchange damaged or mutilated U.S. currency on a one-for-one basis. This allowed the public to exchange currency that, due to its condition, might not otherwise be accepted as legal tender. In addition to providing a public service, this program helped to bolster domestic and international confidence in the value of U.S. currency.

This program is known as the Mutilated Currency Exchange Program (MCEP) and is administered by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). BEP maintains a professional staff of forensic experts who examine each note that is submitted for exchange to determine its authenticity before redemption.

On October 22, 2009, this office received correspondence from the BEP, Office of Security, regarding the potential abuse of the MCEP. Specifically, the Mutilated Currency Division (MCD) identified a mutilated currency redemption claim by [REDACTED] of [REDACTED], that was suspicious in nature. The suspicious claim was for an estimated \$37,302.

However, after further examination by the MCD examiners, it was determined that the mutilated currency redemption claim was legitimate. As such, the claim was validated and redeemed. Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be concluded with the approval of this memorandum.

Approved:

[REDACTED] 5/24/10  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
Office of Investigations



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM: James Howell  
Special Agent

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Corporation

OIG File Number BEP-10-0199-I

In the late 1800's, the U.S. government enacted legislation requiring the Department of the Treasury to exchange damaged or mutilated U.S. currency on a one-for-one basis. This allowed the public to exchange currency that, due to its condition, might not otherwise be accepted as legal tender. In addition to providing a public service, this program helped to bolster domestic and international confidence in the value of U.S. currency.

This program is known as the Mutilated Currency Exchange Program (MCEP) and is administered by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). BEP maintains a professional staff of forensic experts who examine each note that is submitted for exchange to determine its authenticity before redemption.

On October 22, 2009, this office received correspondence from the BEP, Office of Security, regarding the potential abuse of the MCEP. Specifically, the Mutilated Currency Division (MCD) identified a mutilated currency redemption claim by [REDACTED] Corporation located in [REDACTED] that was suspicious in nature. The suspicious claim was for an estimated \$6,148.

However, after further examination by the MCD examiners, it was determined that the mutilated currency redemption claim was legitimate. As such, the claim was validated and redeemed. Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be concluded with the approval of this memorandum.

Approved: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
Office of Investigations



## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



<b>DATE OF REPORT</b>	
<b>REPORT STATUS</b>	Final
<b>CASE NUMBER</b>	BEP-10-0517-I
<b>CASE TITLE</b>	[REDACTED] Currency Shipment Checker, Office of Production, Bureau of Printing & Engraving
<b>PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)</b>	31 CFR § 605.1(f); BEP Employee Handbook, Rules and Regulations, October 2005, Conduct (pg. 9) and Workplace Violence, Threats and Harassment (pg. 62)

### SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated on November 30, 2009, based on information received from the United States Secret Service (USSS), concerning a security incident involving [REDACTED] Currency Shipment Checker, Office of Production, Bureau of Printing & Engraving (BEP). During a trip to Afghanistan, [REDACTED] visited the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, and expressed an unusual interest in the President of the United States (POTUS). Embassy officials notified the USSS who then placed a lookout in TECS for [REDACTED]. The USSS interviewed [REDACTED] when he returned to the US and determined that he was not a threat to POTUS.

On December 1, 2009, the BEP reported a security incident involving [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was reported to be acting irrational. [REDACTED] allegedly barged into an executive staff meeting being held at BEP's Headquarters. It was also alleged that

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Agent  
(Signature)

Supervisory Approval:

John L. Phillips  
Special Agent In Charge

(Signature)

6/16/10

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when [REDACTED] interrupted the meeting, he exclaimed that he had ingested a germ warfare device that will explode and kill millions of people, if he did not speak with POTUS and the Secretary of Treasury. [REDACTED] was taken into custody by BEP Police and transported to a local psychiatric treatment facility where he was involuntarily admitted for evaluation. It was further alleged that on at least two occasions, [REDACTED] was seen visiting the BEP Director's neighborhood.

The investigation revealed that [REDACTED] barged into the senior management meeting, made statements about ingesting a biological device, requested to speak with the POTUS and with the Secretary of the Treasury, and had visited the BEP Director's neighborhood on at least two occasions. The investigation also revealed that [REDACTED] was involuntarily committed for several days at the Psychiatric Institute of Washington DC (PIW), following the BEP security incident. During his commitment at PIW, [REDACTED] was medically diagnosed with a Bipolar disorder. PIW treated [REDACTED]'s Bipolar disorder with medication, provided him with a 1-year home treatment plan, and then released him. BEP reported that [REDACTED] was on administrative leave from the BEP. Investigative efforts substantiated that [REDACTED] expressed an unusual interest in POTUS, acted irrationally, and was observed in the BEP Director's neighborhood on at least two occasions.

## DETAILS

### **I. Allegations – Displayed Irrational Behavior. Expressed an Unusual Interest in the President of the United States.**

### **II. INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

#### **Interview of SA [REDACTED] USSS**

[REDACTED] reported that on or about November 20, 2009, [REDACTED] visited the United States Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan, and requested to see the American Ambassador and POTUS. [REDACTED] gained entry to the Embassy by displaying his U.S. Passport, Treasury Identification Card, and BEP Identification Card.

[REDACTED] explained that agents from the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), United States Department of State, Kabul Embassy, Afghanistan, interviewed [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised the interviewing agents that he had information concerning the enemy in Afghanistan. DSS agents questioned [REDACTED] about his desire to see the Ambassador and POTUS, but [REDACTED] refused to fully answer their questions.

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██████ told the interviewing agents that the classified information he possessed was above their security clearance. After ██████ left the embassy, DSS agents notified the USSS of ██████'s visit to the embassy and his interest in POTUS.

██████ explained that the USSS placed a lookout in TECS for ██████ and interviewed him, at his residence, once he returned to the US. During the interview with the USSS, ██████ spoke of his family ties to Afghanistan and other family issues. ██████ also explained to the interviewing agents that he had information regarding the enemy in Afghanistan. ██████ refused to supply the information to ██████. ██████ did not feel that ██████ possessed the appropriate security clearance. At the conclusion of the interview, ██████ thanked the interviewing agents for their visit and stated that he no longer wanted or needed to see POTUS. SA ██████ concluded that ██████ did not appear to be a threat to POTUS or any other USSS protectee. (Exhibit 1)

**Interview of ██████ BEP, Deputy Chief, Office of Security**

██████ reported that on December 1, 2009, ██████ interrupted a senior management meeting at BEP. ██████ barged into the meeting and exclaimed that he had swallowed a biological substance; he knew where Osama Bin Laden was located, and that there was going to be an attack. ██████ was escorted out of the meeting by BEP's Director Larry Felix and was questioned by BEP Police and Will Levy III, Chief, Office of Security, BEP. ██████ also reported that ██████ had been seen in the neighborhood of BEP's Director Larry Felix. Given the recent activity, ██████ stated that Director Felix was concerned about his family's safety and wanted guidance on reporting future incidents.

██████ provided an email from ██████ to Director Felix. In ██████'s email to Director Felix, ██████ drew parallels between himself and Seung-Hui Cho, the shooter in the Virginia Technological Institute massacre. ██████ also sympathized with Cho.

██████ also provided a National Park Service Incident Record dated May 22, 2005; that incident report documented an encounter between a United States Park Service Officer and ██████. ██████ approached the officer and requested to speak with a USSS Agent. ██████ explained to the Park Service officer that he had secret information on Osama Bin Laden and that he had worked for the Central Intelligence Agency for 14 years.

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Department of the Treasury

█████ advised that █████ did not have a national security clearance. █████ was a naturalized US citizen, born in Kabul, Afghanistan, and claimed dual citizenship. He worked in the Federal Reserve Vault as a currency shipment checker and was responsible for loading new currency on to Federal Reserve vehicles. (Exhibit 2)

**Interview of Will Levy III, BEP, Chief, Office of Security**

Levy said that █████ had interrupted a BEP executive meeting at BEP Headquarters. According to Levy, Larry Felix, Director, BEP, was present at the meeting. █████ interrupted the BEP executive meeting by exclaiming that he had swallowed a germ-warfare device, he knew where Osama Bin Laden was located, and that he would activate the germ-warfare device if he did not speak to POTUS and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. Levy explained that Director Felix personally escorted Asghar downstairs where they were met by BEP police officers. BEP police officers and Levy interviewed █████ regarding what he had said when he entered the executive meeting. Levy advised that █████ made conflicting statements about what he had said.

Levy commented on █████'s demeanor during the incident. Levy advised that █████ was compliant and that he offered no resistance. Levy further advised that █████ had no history of violence at the BEP.

Levy then explained about █████ reportedly visiting the BEP Director's neighborhood. Levy said that Director Felix observed █████ on two occasions visiting his neighborhood. The first time Director Felix observed █████ was at a yard sale and another time he was seen sitting in a parked car; █████'s car was parked in front of the Director's house.

Levy expressed concern about █████'s escalating behavior and requested that BEP be notified of █████'s release from the Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (CPEP), DC General Hospital Compound, Washington, DC. (Exhibit 3)

**Statement Provided by Larry Felix, BEP, Director, Regarding Neighborhood Encounter with Asghar**

In a written statement, Felix reported that he had observed █████ in his (Felix's) neighborhood on two occasions. According to Felix, each of these sightings were associated with a yard sale. Felix explained that they acknowledged each other by

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nodding and waving to one another. Felix reported that he did not feel threatened by [REDACTED] during either encounter. (Exhibit 4)

**BEP Police Reports & Statement of BEP Director Larry Felix**

[REDACTED] provided a copy of BEP police reports and Director Felix's statement that document the security incident with [REDACTED]. The essential elements of information contained in these reports and statement report corroborate information provided by those interviewed by the investigating agent. (Exhibit 5)

**Information Reported by SA [REDACTED] Regarding [REDACTED] Diagnosis and Treatment**

SA [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] was diagnosed by PIW. PIW determined that [REDACTED] was Bipolar and placed him on medication. According to testimony at a competency hearing, the attending physician reported that [REDACTED] was responding well to his treatment and that an out-patient treatment program was deemed appropriate. [REDACTED] was provided with a one-year home commitment treatment plan and released from PIW. [REDACTED] was advised that if he failed to follow his mental health program, he would be committed for a longer period. (Exhibits 6, 7, 8)

**Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF) & NCIC Records Check**

A records check conducted with ATF met with negative results, meaning that ATF had no record of [REDACTED] in its database. The USSS was advised of the results of the records check. OIG/OI recommended that the USSS verify that PIW sent out an alert that identified [REDACTED] as a person who was prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm. The USSS acknowledged, via email, the OIG/OI's request. (Exhibits 9,10)

A records check with NCIC regarding [REDACTED] met with negative results, meaning that [REDACTED] had no reported criminal history. (Exhibit 11)

**FINDINGS**

The investigation determined that [REDACTED] has expressed an unusual interest in POTUS, by acting and requesting numerous times to speak with POTUS. Further, [REDACTED]'s interruption of the BEP executive meeting followed by his statements,

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were acts of irrational behavior. Additionally, [REDACTED] has also visited the BEP Director's neighborhood on at least two occasions and was observed parked in front of the Director's residence, an act that, at a minimum, is suspicious. Therefore, the allegations that [REDACTED] expressed an unusual interest in POTUS and displayed irrational behavior are substantiated.

### **ASGHAR'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS**

BEP reported that [REDACTED], as of April 6, 2010, was on administrative leave. (Exhibit 12)

### **REFERRALS**

#### **I. Criminal**

This matter was referred to [REDACTED], Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, on June 1, 2010, for criminal prosecution (Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 47, Section 1038, False Information and Hoaxes). The USAO declined prosecution of this matter due to [REDACTED]'s mental condition. (Exhibit 13)

#### **II. Civil**

N/A

#### **III. Administrative**

See Findings

### **DISTRIBUTION**

Will Levy III, BEP, Chief, Office of Security

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EXHIBITS

- | <u>Number</u> | <u>Description</u>   |
|---------------|--|
| 1.            | Initial complaint, Memorandum of Activity regarding interview of SA [REDACTED] dated December 1, 2009.               |
| 2.            | Follow-up complaint, Memorandum of Activity regarding interview of [REDACTED] dated December 1, 2009.                |
| 3.            | Memorandum of Activity regarding interview of Will Levy III, dated December 1, 2009.                                 |
| 4.            | Statement of Larry Felix, dated December 4, 2009.  |
| 5.            | Memorandum of Activity regarding receipt of information from [REDACTED] dated December 3, 2009.                      |
| 6.            | Memorandum of Activity regarding report of information provided by SA [REDACTED] dated December 9, 2009.             |
| 7.            | Email from SA [REDACTED] to SA [REDACTED] regarding [REDACTED]'s Release from PIW, dated December 23, 2009, 4:32 PM. |
| 8.            | Email from SA [REDACTED] to SA [REDACTED] regarding [REDACTED]'s Medical Progress, dated December 22, 2009, 3:07 PM. |
| 9.            | Memorandum of Activity regarding ATF Records Check, dated December 7, 2009.  |
| 10.           | Email from SA [REDACTED] to SA [REDACTED] regarding ATF Records Check, dated December 4, 2009.                       |
| 11.           | Criminal History Check regarding [REDACTED] dated December 3, 2009.  |
| 12.           | Memorandum of Activity regarding [REDACTED]'s Employment Status with BEP, dated April 6, 2010.                       |
| 13.           | Memorandum of Activity regarding referral to USAO, dated June 1, 2010.   |

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



DATE OF REPORT	
REPORT STATUS	Final
CASE NUMBER	BEP-10-0612
CASE TITLE	[REDACTED] Final Verifier, KG-6 Bureau of Engraving and Printing
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)	Bureau of Engraving and Printing – Off Duty Arrest Policy.

### SYNOPSIS

On December 8, 2009, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received correspondence from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Office of Security alleging that a BEP employee failed to report an off-duty arrest. Specifically, it was alleged that [REDACTED] Final Verifier, Office of Management Control, BEP, was arrested on February 25, 2008, by the Charles County, MD Sherriff's Department for Malicious Destruction of Property and failed to make proper notification to the Personnel Security Division, Office of Security. (Exhibit 1)

This investigation determined that [REDACTED] was not arrested on February 25, 2008. However, this investigation revealed that [REDACTED] received a summons on March 14,

Case Agent:

Supervisory Approval:

[REDACTED], Special Agent

Thadious Motley III,  
Special Agent In Charge (Acting)

(Signature)

(Signature)

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2008, from the Charles County, MD Sheriff's Office, to appear in the Charles County District Court for violation of Malicious Destruction of Property, under \$500. On June 30, 2009, the charge against [REDACTED] was subsequently dismissed due to the lack of evidence. This investigation determined that [REDACTED] failed to notify BEP, Personnel Security Division, Office of Security of her court appearance, immediately upon her return to work. Therefore, the allegation that [REDACTED] violated the BEP, Employee Handbook, Rules and Regulations, Conduct Section, for reporting an off-duty arrest is substantiated.

## DETAILS

### **I. Allegation**

It is alleged that [REDACTED] violated BEP, Employee Handbook, Rules and Regulations, Conduct Section, by engaging in off-duty activities that resulted in her arrest for Malicious Destruction of Property. Specially, it is alleged that [REDACTED] failed to properly notify BEP Personnel Security Division, Office of Security, of an off-duty arrest.

### **II. Context/Background**

On February 25, 2008, [REDACTED] was shopping at the Home Depot in Waldorf, MD, when she got into a verbal altercation with [REDACTED] inside the hardware store.

On March 14, 2008, [REDACTED] was summoned to appear in the District Court of Maryland, Charles County as the defendant in the *State v. [REDACTED]* on a charge of Malicious Destruction of Property. On September 9, 2008, the case against [REDACTED] was placed on the stet docket by the State of Maryland with the condition that both complete eight hours of community service. On May 15, 2009, [REDACTED] notified the BEP Office of Security of the incident, via Optional Form 306, during her 2009 background investigation. On June 30, 2009, the District Court of Maryland, Charles County dismissed the charges against [REDACTED] due to the lack of evidence.

The BEP, Employee Handbook, Rules and Regulations, Conduct Section, states that "an employee whose off-duty, off-premises conduct results in the receipt of a criminal citation (any subpoena, or other judicial order to appear before any tribunal, court, or other local, state or federal body to answer for or give

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explanation for any alleged criminal behavior or actions), arrest and/or conviction, is required to make a report of such matters immediately upon the his/her return to work [Monday through Friday], in Washington, DC to the Personnel Security Division, Office of Security." Failure to report such matters may result in disciplinary and/or corrective or adverse action, up to and including removal.

### INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On January 6, 2010, [REDACTED] was interviewed by the OIG/OI regarding the listed allegations. [REDACTED] essentially stated that she did not notify BEP of the incident in a timely manner because she was not formally arrested. [REDACTED] stated that she was summoned to court and the charges against her were subsequently dismissed due to the lack of evidence. [REDACTED] said that it was her interpretation of BEP's policy on reporting an off-duty arrest, that an individual who was formally arrested is obligated to report that off-duty arrest to the Office of Security.

[REDACTED] stated that she informed her background investigator of the incident after she was advised by a representative from the Office of Security. [REDACTED] said she was not attempting to conceal the incident from BEP, because she was not formally arrested. (Exhibit 2)

On January 13, 2010, the OIG/OI retrieved a copy of the court disposition, pertaining to the listed allegation, from the District Court of Maryland, Charles County. The criminal system inquiry charge/disposition indicated that the charges against [REDACTED] were dismissed on June 30, 2009, due to the lack of evidence. (Exhibit 3)

### FINDINGS

This investigation determined that [REDACTED] was summoned on March 14, 2008, to appear in the Charles County, MD District Court for violation of Malicious Destruction of Property, under \$500. On June 30, 2009, the charges against [REDACTED] were dismissed due to lack of evidence. This investigation determined that [REDACTED] failed to notify the Personnel Security Division, Office of Security, immediately upon her return to work [Monday through Friday], in Washington, DC of her summons and court appearance. Therefore, the allegation that [REDACTED] violated BEP rules and regulation for reporting an off-duty arrest is substantiated.

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Office of Inspector General – Investigations  
Department of the Treasury

## REFERRALS

### I. Criminal

On March 14, 2008, [REDACTED] was summoned to appear in the District Court of Maryland, Charles County as the defendant in the *State v. [REDACTED]*. [REDACTED] charged with Malicious Destruction of Property. On September 9, 2008, the case against [REDACTED] was placed on stet docket by the State of Maryland with the condition that each complete eight hours of community service. On June 30, 2009, the District Court of Maryland, Charles County dismissed the charges against [REDACTED] due to the lack of evidence.

### II. Civil

Not applicable

### III. Administrative

This investigation determined that [REDACTED] failed to notify the Personnel Security Division, Office of Security, immediately upon her return to work [Monday through Friday], in Washington, DC of her summons and court appearance. Therefore, the allegation that [REDACTED] violated BEP rules and regulation for reporting an off-duty arrest is substantiated.

## DISTRIBUTION

[REDACTED], Associate Director (Management), Bureau of Engraving and Printing

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EXHIBITS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description</u>
1.	Original allegation, Correspondence, dated December 8, 2009.
2.	Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated January 6, 2010.
3.	Memorandum of Activity, Document Receipt & Review, dated January 13, 2010.

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OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

OIG File Number BEP-10-0932-I

In the late 1800's, the U.S. government enacted legislation requiring the Department of the Treasury to exchange damaged or mutilated U.S. currency on a one-for-one basis. This allowed the public to exchange currency that, due to its condition, might not otherwise be accepted as legal tender. In addition to providing a public service, this program helped to bolster domestic and international confidence in the value of U.S. currency.

This program is known as the Mutilated Currency Exchange Program (MCEP) and is administered by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). BEP maintains a professional staff of forensic experts who examine each note that is submitted for exchange to determine its authenticity before redemption.

On January 27, 2010, this office received correspondence from the BEP, Office of Security, regarding the potential abuse of the MCEP. Specifically, the Mutilated Currency Division (MCD) identified a mutilated currency redemption claim by [REDACTED] located in [REDACTED] that was suspicious in nature. The suspicious claim was for an estimated \$16,058.

However, after further examination by the MCD examiners, it was determined that the mutilated currency redemption claim was legitimate. As such, the claim was validated and redeemed. Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be concluded with the approval of this memorandum.

Approved:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

5/28/10

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
Office of Investigations



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

**MEMORANDUM TO FILE**

**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY**

**FROM:**

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

**SUBJECT:**

Unknown  
U.S. Postal Service, Mail Recovery, Atlanta, GA

OIG File Number BEP-10-1027-I

In the late 1800's, the U.S. government enacted legislation requiring the Department of the Treasury to exchange damaged or mutilated U.S. currency on a one-for-one basis. This allowed the public to exchange currency that, due to its condition, might not otherwise be accepted as legal tender. In addition to providing a public service, this program helped to bolster domestic and international confidence in the value of U.S. currency.

This program is known as the Mutilated Currency Exchange Program (MCEP) and is administered by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). BEP maintains a professional staff of forensic experts who examine each note that is submitted for exchange to determine its authenticity before redemption.

On February 4, 2010, this office received correspondence from the BEP, Office of Security, regarding the potential abuse of the MCEP. Specifically, the Mutilated Currency Division (MCD) identified a mutilated currency redemption claim by an unknown subject, which was recovered by U.S. Postal Service, located in Atlanta, GA, that was suspicious in nature. The suspicious claim was for an estimated \$5,010.

However, after further examination by the MCD examiners, it was determined that the mutilated currency redemption claim was legitimate. As such, the claim was validated and redeemed. Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be concluded with the approval of this memorandum.

Approved: [REDACTED]

5/28/10

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
Office of Investigations



OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED]

OIG File Number BEP-10-1028-I

In the late 1800's, the U.S. government enacted legislation requiring the Department of the Treasury to exchange damaged or mutilated U.S. currency on a one-for-one basis. This allowed the public to exchange currency that, due to its condition, might not otherwise be accepted as legal tender. In addition to providing a public service, this program helped to bolster domestic and international confidence in the value of U.S. currency.

This program is known as the Mutilated Currency Exchange Program (MCEP) and is administered by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). BEP maintains a professional staff of forensic experts who examine each note that is submitted for exchange to determine its authenticity before redemption.

On February 4, 2010, this office received correspondence from the BEP, Office of Security, regarding the potential abuse of the MCEP. Specifically, the Mutilated Currency Division (MCD) identified a mutilated currency redemption claim by [REDACTED] located in [REDACTED] that was suspicious in nature. The suspicious claim was for an estimated \$88,400.

However, after further examination by the MCD examiners, it was determined that the mutilated currency redemption claim was legitimate. As such, the claim was validated and redeemed. Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be concluded with the approval of this memorandum.

Approved: [REDACTED]

5/28/10

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
Office of Investigations



## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



DATE OF REPORT	
REPORT STATUS	Final
CASE NUMBER	BEP 10-1355-I
CASE TITLE	[REDACTED] former HR Specialist Bureau of Engraving and Printing
PERTINENT STATUTE(S), REGULATION(S), AND/OR POLICY(IES)	31 C.F.R. 0.213 - General conduct prejudicial to the government. (SUBSTANTIATED)  31 C.F.R. 0.210 - Conduct while on official duty or on Government property. (SUBSTANTIATED)

### SYNOPSIS

On April 23, 2010, the Department of Treasury (Treasury), Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigations (OIG/OI), initiated an investigation based on information received from a Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) referral memo. It was alleged that [REDACTED], a former (retired) Human Resources Specialist, BEP, accepted and started employment with a BEP contracted company prior to her official retirement from the federal government. It was also alleged that she gained employment with a BEP contracted company based on her employment with BEP. (Exhibit 1, 2)

<i>Case Agent:</i> [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED] 14 SEP 10 (Signature)	<i>Supervisory Approval:</i> John L. Phillips Special Agent In Charge [Signature] 10/22/10 (Signature)
--	--

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The investigation determined that [REDACTED] accepted and began employment with [REDACTED], a company that did not have a contract with BEP, prior to her official retirement from BEP and while she was on approved sick leave.

[REDACTED] admitted during her interview that she started employment with [REDACTED] prior to her retirement from BEP. [REDACTED] advised that BEP was aware of her employment status because she advised her supervisor of the situation.

## DETAILS

**A. Allegation:** General conduct prejudicial to the government and conduct while on official duty or on Government property.

**B. Context/Background:**

[REDACTED] advised she is currently employed as an HR Specialist by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] has a contract with the U.S. Mint (USM) and advised she works under the contract for the USM. A review of [REDACTED]'s Official Personnel File (OPF) revealed that she had no disciplinary actions taken against her during her tenure with the government.

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On April 20, 2010, the Department of Treasury (Treasury), Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigations (OIG/OI), interviewed [REDACTED], Manager, Personnel Security Division, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP).

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] a former BEP employee retired from federal service on November 3, 2008. [REDACTED] was granted extended sick leave to care for her husband prior to her retirement. The sick leave began on September 19, 2008. [REDACTED] signed an employee agreement with [REDACTED] on September 12, 2008. [REDACTED] advised he thought [REDACTED] accepted employment with and began working for [REDACTED] on September 29, 2008.

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[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] completed Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) training with the BEP in September 2002. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] served as a COTR for the BEP until September of 2005. [REDACTED] advised that in her duties as COTR, [REDACTED] represented [REDACTED], which was replaced by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] explained that a request to have [REDACTED] work as a contract employee had been submitted by [REDACTED] in December of 2008, approximately 1 month after her retirement from BEP. [REDACTED] advised that the request was not approved. (Exhibit 3)

On June 2, 2010, OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] Vice President, Human Resources Division, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED] in McLean, Virginia, as an IT Specialist. [REDACTED] was hired by [REDACTED] and started on September 29, 2008. [REDACTED] worked full-time for [REDACTED] from September 29, 2008 thru February 23, 2009. [REDACTED] worked part-time for [REDACTED] from February 23, 2009 thru May 8, 2009. [REDACTED] was on "No work status" from May 8, 2009 thru May 19, 2009. [REDACTED] voluntarily resigned from her position on May 19, 2009. (Exhibit 4)

On July 16, 2010, OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] McIlwain-Nesbitt was advised of her rights and signed OI-Form 25 waiving her rights and agreeing to be interviewed. (Exhibit 5)

[REDACTED] advised her official retirement date from BEP was November 8, 2008. [REDACTED] stated she went on sick leave sometime around the 2<sup>nd</sup> week in September of 2008. [REDACTED] advised she went on sick leave to take care of her husband who had been hurt at work.

[REDACTED] advised once she decided to retire from BEP she put her resume on Monster.com and when she received the job offer from [REDACTED], she took the offer to her supervisor, [REDACTED] to ask if she could accept the job. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] told her she could take the job as long as there were no conflicts of interest with [REDACTED] during her employment with BEP.

[REDACTED] advised that she researched the situation in her ethics manual and did not find a conflict of interest issue with BEP and thought that it would be ok if

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she worked for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised she never had any contact or dealings with [REDACTED] while employed by BEP prior to her retirement.

[REDACTED] advised that during the time she was on sick leave she heard through the "grapevine" that the division chief was upset because [REDACTED] was working while on sick leave. [REDACTED] advised that she tried to call the division chief and spoke with her secretary, [REDACTED], requesting that the division chief call her. [REDACTED] advised that the division chief never called her.

[REDACTED] was asked if she had been employed by [REDACTED] at any point. [REDACTED] advised she worked for [REDACTED] from approximately May 2009 thru December 2009. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] had at any point a contract with BEP and she advised that they did have a policy contract in the early to mid 2000's. [REDACTED] advised she was the COTR on the contract. [REDACTED] advised she worked in the policy division at BEP at the time she was COTR on the contract. [REDACTED] advised she left the BEP policy division in December 2005. [REDACTED] advised when she took the job with [REDACTED] it had been "about 5 years" since she had dealt with [REDACTED] as a COTR and therefore she did not think it was a problem to work with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised she was contacted by [REDACTED] regarding employment and stated the job offer had nothing at all to do with her role as a COTR on the contract between BEP and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised she worked in the area of HR staffing with [REDACTED] on a contract that [REDACTED] had with the Bureau of the Census. [REDACTED] stated that she did not contact [REDACTED] for employment advising they contacted her. (Exhibit 6)

[REDACTED] provided a sworn written statement. (Exhibit 7)

On August 30, 2010, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] Program Assistant, H Human Resources Division, BEP. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] did call attempting to talk to Human Resources Division Chief, [REDACTED], leaving contact information so that [REDACTED] could call [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised that she did not think that [REDACTED] returned [REDACTED]'s call. (Exhibit 8)

On September 1, 2010, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] Division Chief, Human Resources Division, BEP. [REDACTED] advised that it was after [REDACTED] went on sick leave that [REDACTED] informed BEP that she was going to retire from the federal government. [REDACTED] explained that once [REDACTED] submitted her retirement paperwork, her supervisor (Agents Note: [REDACTED] advised

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Department of the Treasury

[REDACTED]'s supervisor was either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] at that time) went to clean up [REDACTED]'s cubicle and found a document which indicated that [REDACTED] had accepted and began employment with another company while she was still employed by and on sick leave with BEP.

[REDACTED] advised she did remember [REDACTED] calling her office and speaking with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised her understanding of [REDACTED]'s intent when calling [REDACTED] was to talk to her about an issue that [REDACTED] had with her T&A and hours. [REDACTED] stated that she told [REDACTED] to tell [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had nothing to do with hours or T&A discrepancies and advised her to contact [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] (Exhibit 9)

On September 2, 2010, the OIG/OI interviewed [REDACTED] Manager, Human Resources Division, BEP. [REDACTED] advised once it became known that [REDACTED] was retiring she went through [REDACTED]'s cubicle to clear it out for future use and it was at this time that she found an employment agreement between [REDACTED] and a company called [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised she thought [REDACTED] had a contract with BEP at that time. [REDACTED] advised that the document showed that [REDACTED] accepted employment and signed the agreement on September 12, 2008. [REDACTED] indicated that she thought there was a problem with [REDACTED] working for another company while still on the payroll with BEP so she took the document and gave it to her division chief, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised she thought that [REDACTED] brought it to the attention of the BEP Personnel Security Department. (Exhibit 10)

## FINDINGS

The investigation determined that [REDACTED] started employment with [REDACTED] on September 29, 2008. [REDACTED] retired from BEP on November 3, 2008. Therefore the allegations of conduct prejudicial to the government and adverse conduct while on official duty are substantiated against [REDACTED]

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## REFERRALS

### **Criminal**

The facts of this case were presented to [REDACTED] Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office (USAO), District of Columbia, for violation of Title 18 USC § 31 – Embezzlement and Theft. The case was declined for prosecution on June 22, 2010, and returned to Treasury OIG for appropriate administrative action. (Exhibit 11)

### **Civil**

Not applicable

### **Administrative**

See Findings.

## RECOMMENDATIONS / DISTRIBUTION

[REDACTED] Assistant to the Chief, Bureau of Engraving and Printing

## EXHIBITS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description</u>
---------------	--------------------

- |    |  |
|----|--|
| 1. | Memorandum from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] Predicating Documents, dated December 18, 2008 and follow up email dated August 25, 2010.               |
| 2. | Predicating Documents detailing BEP's investigatory evidence and steps taken. Email to SAIC [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] dated September 11, 2008. |
| 3. | Memorandum of Activity, Interview [REDACTED] Manager, Personnel Security Division, dated April 20, 2010.   |
| 4. | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Vice President, Human Resources, [REDACTED], dated June 2, 2010.                                 |

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5. OI Form 25, Advice of Rights (Miranda), signed by [REDACTED] dated July 16, 2010.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated July 16, 2010.
7. OI Form 28A, Statement, written by and sworn to by [REDACTED] dated July 16, 2010.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 30, 2010.
9. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated September 1, 2010.
10. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated September 2, 2010.
11. Memorandum of Activity, Criminal Referral, dated September 9, 2010.
12. Email confirming declination, AUSA [REDACTED] dated September 14, 2010.

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



DATE OF REPORT

REPORT STATUS

Final

CASE NUMBER

BEP-10-2096-I

CASE TITLE

[REDACTED]  
Lieutenant, Bureau of Engraving and Printing Police

PERTINENT  
STATUTE(S),  
REGULATION(S),  
AND/OR  
POLICY(IES)

18 U.S.C. § 113 – Assault [UNSUBSTANTIATED]

### SYNOPSIS

On May 28, 2010, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received a complaint alleging that Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) Police Corporal (Cpl.) [REDACTED] was assaulted by two BEP police officers. During her interview by the OIG/OI, Cpl. [REDACTED] revised her allegation and identified BEP Police Lieutenant (Lt.) [REDACTED] as the sole assailant.

The investigation determined that there was no conclusive evidence supporting the allegation that Lt. [REDACTED] assaulted Cpl. [REDACTED]

### DETAILS

Case Agent:

[REDACTED] Special Agent

(Signature)

Supervisory Approval:

John Phillips, Special Agent In Charge

(Signature)

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**A. Allegation:** Lt. [REDACTED] grabbed Cpl. [REDACTED]'s right arm which left a dime/nickel sized bruise.

**B. Context / Background:** On May 27, 2010 at approximately 3:00 PM, Cpl. [REDACTED] attended roll call prior to beginning her shift. At the completion of roll call, BEP Police Sergeant (Sgt.) [REDACTED] conducted an unannounced inspection of the driver's licenses, criminal ticket books and administrative (90/90) ticket books of the police officers present as they departed the roll call room. Upon assuming the B-M-12-West post (a BEP police car located in the alley between the BEP and the Financial Management Service near 15<sup>th</sup> Street, NW), Cpl. [REDACTED] called Lt. [REDACTED] to complain about the inspection.

Lt. [REDACTED] informed her he would speak with Sgt. [REDACTED] regarding her complaints. When asked about the inspection Sgt. [REDACTED] stated that he inspected all the officers present at roll call and confirmed his recollection by referring to his notes. Lt. [REDACTED] and Sgt. [REDACTED] decided to discuss the matter further with Cpl. [REDACTED]

### INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On May 28, 2010, the OIG/OI received a Hotline complaint from Cpl. [REDACTED] who alleged that two BEP police officers grabbed her arm which left bruises. (Exhibit 1)

On May 28, 2010, the OIG/OI interviewed Cpl. [REDACTED] who stated that on May 27, around 5:00 pm Lt. [REDACTED] and Sgt. [REDACTED] walked up to the BEP police car she was using to man post 12 West. As Lt. [REDACTED] and Sgt. [REDACTED] approached, Cpl. [REDACTED] exited the driver's side of the police car and faced towards the rear of the car where Sgt. [REDACTED] was standing. Lt. [REDACTED] stood to Cpl. [REDACTED]'s right side. Cpl. [REDACTED] stated that she felt trapped/cornered by their proximity.

Lt. [REDACTED] opened the conversation by stating that he brought Sgt. [REDACTED] out to her so that they could work out their issues and asked Cpl. [REDACTED] what she felt the problem was. Cpl. [REDACTED] characterized the discussion between her and Sgt. [REDACTED] as heated and animated with raised voices.

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Cpl. [REDACTED] replied that in her opinion, the inspection at roll call was not conducted the way it normally was and that it looked wrong in addition to making her late in assuming her post. Sgt. [REDACTED] responded that we (BEP supervisors and management) can do inspections whenever we want and since BEP pays overtime, there's no problem with arriving late at duty posts. Sgt. [REDACTED] finished his response by stating that when Cpl. [REDACTED] was promoted to sergeant, she could do inspections her way, until then, they would do them his way. Cpl. [REDACTED] asserted that she had a right to her opinion and that the inspection was inappropriate and unprofessional and should not have been conducted in the manner it was. It was during this statement that Cpl. [REDACTED] stated that she leaned/swayed forward towards Sgt. [REDACTED] while making her point. As Cpl. [REDACTED] moved, Lt. [REDACTED] grabbed and held her right arm while saying "whoa, calm down." Cpl. [REDACTED] extricated her arm from Lt. [REDACTED]'s grasp while asking what he was doing. Lt. [REDACTED] replied that wanted to have a calm conversation. Cpl. [REDACTED] replied that she was trying to do that, but that it appeared that a person could not have an opinion without being harassed. Lt. [REDACTED] responded by saying that he was sorry she felt that way.

{AGENT'S NOTE: Cpl. [REDACTED] displayed a dime/nickel-sized, brownish bruise on her upper right bicep consistent with the pictures provided by BEP.}

Following this encounter, a former BEP police officer (Cpl. [REDACTED]) drove up in his personal vehicle. Both Cpl. [REDACTED] and Lt. [REDACTED] approached the vehicle to greet [REDACTED]. When [REDACTED] drove off, Cpl. [REDACTED] approached Sgt. [REDACTED] and reinitiated their previous conversation by stating that she had a right to her opinion. Sgt. [REDACTED] replied that he could do what he wanted because he was a Sergeant. Cpl. [REDACTED] then stated to Sgt. [REDACTED] and Lt. [REDACTED] that they were just there to harass her and that they needed to leave her post. As they departed, Cpl. [REDACTED] said she heard Lt. [REDACTED] tell Sgt. [REDACTED] that he might want to note the time and that they both started laughing. Cpl. [REDACTED] then conducted a radio check and called out the time as 5:53 pm. (Exhibit 2)

On June 4, 2010, the OIG/OI interviewed Sgt. [REDACTED] who stated that approximately an hour after roll call, Lt. [REDACTED] approached him and informed him that he [REDACTED] had received a telephone call from Cpl. [REDACTED] who was upset with Sgt. [REDACTED]'s inspection which she claimed, was not conducted

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correctly and was unfair. Sgt. [REDACTED] suggested that he and Lt. [REDACTED] go to Cpl. [REDACTED]'s post to talk to her about her concerns.

Sgt. [REDACTED] described Cpl. [REDACTED]'s post as a BEP police car that sat between the BEP and the Financial Management Service buildings near 15<sup>th</sup> Street. As he and Lt. [REDACTED] approached the rear of the BEP police car, Cpl. [REDACTED] observed their approach, exited the vehicle and turned to face the rear of vehicle to address Sgt. [REDACTED] (Lt. [REDACTED] stood to Cpl. [REDACTED]'s right side).

Sgt. [REDACTED] opened the conversation by saying that he heard Cpl. [REDACTED] had a problem with how he conducted his inspection. Cpl. [REDACTED] responded with an elevated voice in a rapid fire manner that the inspection was unannounced, unfair and that not everyone was checked. Sgt. [REDACTED] replied that because unannounced inspections were a new supervisor goal set by BEP management, he was required to conduct them in this fashion and that he could only check the officers present at roll call. Cpl. [REDACTED] then asserted the inspection was unprofessional which Sgt. [REDACTED] answered by saying that when she was a supervisor she could conduct inspections her way.

The conversation was interrupted when [REDACTED] a former BEP police officer, now with the Federal Protective Service (FPS) drove up. Cpl. [REDACTED] and Lt. [REDACTED] moved to opposite sides of vehicle to speak to [REDACTED]. After [REDACTED] drove away, Cpl. [REDACTED] reinitiated her conversation regarding the inspection with Sgt. [REDACTED]. After a few exchanges which Sgt. [REDACTED] characterized as similar to the ones described above, Cpl. [REDACTED] ended the conversation by stating loudly that Sgt. [REDACTED] and Lt. [REDACTED] had only come to her post to harass her. Sgt. [REDACTED] and Lt. [REDACTED] then began to walk away from Cpl. [REDACTED]. While doing so, they checked their watches to note the time so that they could document the encounter. Cpl. [REDACTED] noticed this and used her radio to call for a time check and loudly relayed the time to them.

Sgt. [REDACTED] stated that he did not recall Lt. [REDACTED] saying anything during his discussion with Cpl. [REDACTED].

Sgt. [REDACTED] was emphatic that Lt. [REDACTED] did not touch Cpl. [REDACTED] during their encounter on May 27, 2010. Sgt. [REDACTED] elaborated that based on Cpl. [REDACTED]'s reputation for filing complaints, no one would touch her for any reason. (Exhibit 3)

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On June 14, 2010, the OIG/OI interviewed Lt. [REDACTED] who stated that approximately one hour after roll call, he received a telephone call from Cpl. [REDACTED] who complained that Sgt. [REDACTED]'s inspection was unprofessional, unfair and that not everyone was inspected. Lt. [REDACTED] informed Cpl. [REDACTED] that he would speak to Sgt. [REDACTED] regarding her complaints. Lt. [REDACTED] then proceeded to Sgt. [REDACTED]'s office and asked him if he had inspected everyone. Sgt. [REDACTED] replied that he had inspected everyone who was present at roll call and produced his notebook to confirm that. In addition, Sgt. [REDACTED] informed Lt. [REDACTED] that only three officers had been deficient (Cpl. [REDACTED] was one). Lt. [REDACTED] and Sgt. [REDACTED] made a joint decision to discuss the matter further with Cpl. [REDACTED] and walked to her post of duty (B-M-12 West).

As Sgt. [REDACTED] and Lt. [REDACTED] walked up to B-M-12-West (approaching from the rear of the police car), Cpl. [REDACTED] exited the police car and faced towards the trunk of the car to address Sgt. [REDACTED]. Lt. [REDACTED] stood to Cpl. [REDACTED]'s right side facing the police car. Lt. [REDACTED] described their alignment as a triangle with the distance between the participants as conversational and not infringing on anyone's personal space.

After Cpl. [REDACTED] greeted Sgt. [REDACTED] and Lt. [REDACTED], Sgt. [REDACTED] stated that he and Lt. [REDACTED] came to talk to Cpl. [REDACTED] about her complaints regarding the inspection. During the ensuing conversation, Cpl. [REDACTED] became animated and spoke louder and louder which caused Lt. [REDACTED] to state something to the effect of "we're not gonna yell here." As Sgt. [REDACTED] and Cpl. [REDACTED] continued their discussion regarding the inspection, a former BEP police officer ([REDACTED]), drove up in his FPS vehicle and Lt. [REDACTED] and Cpl. [REDACTED] engaged him in conversation. Cpl. [REDACTED] then began to re-engage Sgt. [REDACTED] in their previous conversation and Lt. [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] that he had "a little situation here" and [REDACTED] departed. At this stage of the conversation, Cpl. [REDACTED] became extremely agitated, grew red in the face and began waving her arms stating that Sgt. [REDACTED] and Lt. [REDACTED] were harassing and trying to intimidate her. Upon witnessing this, Lt. [REDACTED] told Cpl. [REDACTED] "that's a crock of crap" and told Sgt. [REDACTED] that "we're done." As Lt. [REDACTED] and Sgt. [REDACTED] started to depart post B-M-12-West, Lt. [REDACTED] checked his watch so that he could be sure of the time, because he knew that he would have to document this incident. Cpl. [REDACTED] observed this and yelled out

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"get the right time" and called on her radio for a time check. Lt. [REDACTED] and Sgt. [REDACTED] departed without further incident.

The OIG/OI asked Lt. [REDACTED] the following direct questions pertaining to the events on May 27, 2010:

Q. Did you assault Cpl. [REDACTED]  
A. No.

Q. Did have any physical contact with Cpl. [REDACTED]  
A. No.

Q. Do know of any reason why Cpl. [REDACTED] would have a bruise on her upper right arm?  
A. No.

Q. Did you feel any need to physically restrain or touch Cpl. [REDACTED] in a cautionary manner based on her behavior?  
A. No.  
(Exhibit 4)

On June 17, 2010, the OIG/OI completed a review of the video imagery from 5:15 PM through 6:00 PM from the surveillance camera that covered Post B-M-12-West on May 27, 2010. The video footage did not provide any indication that an assault had occurred. (Exhibit 5)

### FINDINGS

The investigation determined that there is no conclusive evidence supporting the allegation that Lt. [REDACTED] assaulted Cpl. [REDACTED] on May 27, 2010.

### REFERRALS

#### Criminal

Not Applicable

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Civil

Not Applicable

Administrative

[REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing

EXHIBITSNumber   Description

1. Hotline Complaint dated May 28, 2010
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated June 1, 2010
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated June 4, 2010
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated June 14, 2010
5. Memorandum of Activity, Surveillance Camera Imagery Review, dated June 17, 2010

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Department of the Treasury



## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



DATE OF REPORT

REPORT STATUS

Final

CASE NUMBER

BEP-10-2506-I

CASE TITLE

[REDACTED] Letter and Script Engraver  
[REDACTED] Tour Operations Supervisor  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

PERTINENT  
STATUTE(S),  
REGULATION(S),  
AND/OR  
POLICY(IES)

Hatch Act [UNSUBSTANTIATED]

BEP Circular No. 10-08.37 – Limited Personal Use for BEP Office  
Equipment and IT Resources [SUBSTANTIATED]

### SYNOPSIS

On July 13, 2010, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received an anonymous complaint alleging Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) Letter and Script Engraver [REDACTED] violated the Hatch Act when she sent an email containing satirical images of President Obama to 70 people in the BEP Office of Engraving. (Exhibit 1)

Investigation by the OIG/OI revealed that BEP Tour Operations Supervisor [REDACTED] first sent the email containing the satirical images of President Obama to [REDACTED] who then forwarded it to 70 people in the Office of Engraving. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] explained that they occasionally exchanged humorous and satirical emails. [REDACTED] stated she only intended to send the email to one co-worker (Lead Letter and Script Engraver [REDACTED])

Case Agent:

[REDACTED], Special Agent

(Signature)

Supervisory Approval:

John L. Phillips, Special Agent In Charge

(Signature)

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██████████ and made a mistake when entering his email address which led to the email going out to the 70-person @ENGRAVING group.

The facts and circumstances of the investigation were reviewed by the OIG Office of Counsel, which determined that the email did not violate the Hatch Act. (Exhibit 2) However, the email did violate BEP Circular No. 10-08.37's prohibition against using BEP office equipment for activities that are "inappropriate or offensive to fellow employees or the public."

### DETAILS

**A. Allegation:** It was alleged that ██████████ and ██████████ violated the Hatch Act when ██████████ sent an email containing satirical images of President Obama to March who then forwarded it to 70 BEP employees.

**B. Context / Background:** ██████████ is a Tour Operations Supervisor in the BEP's Office of External Relations and ██████████ is a journeyman Letter and Script Engraver in the BEP's Office of Engraving.

### INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On July 29, 2010, the OIG/OI interviewed ██████████ who acknowledged receiving the email from ██████████ and then forwarding it to the @ENGRAVING group. When ██████████ opened the email, she decided to forward it to ██████████ and never intended to forward it to anyone else. ██████████ explained that her computer and operating system had recently been upgraded and that she was unfamiliar with the new version of her email program and when she was typing ██████████'s name in the "TO:" box, she mistakenly selected the @ENGRAVERS group and sent the message. (Exhibit 3)

On July 29, 2010, the OIG/OI interviewed ██████████, who acknowledged sending the email to ██████████. ██████████ stated she originally received the email on her personal email account. She then forwarded it to her BEP email account in order to send it to her friend ██████████. ██████████ stated she did not send the email to anyone other than ██████████ (Exhibit 4)

On August 4, 2010, the OIG/OI interviewed ██████████ who acknowledged viewing the email as a member of the @ENGRAVING group, but was not offended by the

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images and did not think much of it. [REDACTED] did not perceive that the email was advocating a specific political candidate or political party. (Exhibit 5)

### FINDINGS

The investigation determined that while the email sent by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not violate the Hatch Act, it did violate BEP Circular 10-08.37's prohibition against using BEP office equipment for activities that are "inappropriate or offensive to fellow employees or the public."

### REFERRALS

#### Criminal

Not Applicable

#### Civil

Not Applicable

#### Administrative

[REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing

### EXHIBITS

#### Number Description

1. Hotline Complaint dated July 13, 2010
2. Memorandum of Activity, Coordination with OIG Office of Counsel, dated August 10, 2010
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated July 29, 2010
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated July 29, 2010
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 4, 2010

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OFFICE OF  
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

December 9, 2010

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

FROM:

[REDACTED] Special Agent

12/9/10

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED] Theft of CFC Funds

OIG File Number: BEP-10-2629-I

On July 22, 2010, the Treasury, Office of Inspector General (TOIG) received an anonymous complaint which alleged Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) employee [REDACTED] may have committed theft or mismanagement of Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) funds. The complainant said he/she had observed [REDACTED]'s financial difficulties had recently disappeared although her spouse is not working. Further, it was alleged [REDACTED] mysteriously had enough cash for the down payment of a recent home purchase. Additionally, it was alleged [REDACTED] also commits egregious time & attendance abuse, which has been sanctioned by BEP management.

On August 30, 2010, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] regarding the allegations about [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was the BEP's CFC Coordinator for the 2009-2010 campaign. [REDACTED] said he had not heard nor noticed any irregularities or concerns expressed about [REDACTED]'s handling of CFC funds. He said, however, that such an allegation was odd because most of the CFC monies received are in the form of checks or allotments. He said very little cash is turned in or handled. [REDACTED] said he interacted with [REDACTED] at CFC meetings and gatherings, she accounted for and turned in CFC money, and never noticed anything unusual or amiss in his dealings with her.

On August 31, 2010, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] Manager of the Customer Support Division, BEP Information Technology (IT) Operations. [REDACTED] reported no disciplinary problems or conduct issues with [REDACTED] in over eight years that he has supervised her. He said that he interacts with her daily and

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characterized his supervision of her as being fairly close. He did not know of any financial problems that [REDACTED] may have and was not aware of any issues arising from her involvement in the CFC.

[REDACTED] was also asked about [REDACTED]'s work schedule and he stated that she is authorized and works from home and it is documented on her timesheet. He said [REDACTED] has a lower leave balance than others under his supervision because she has been using her leave to attend to health issues in recent months. He said he does not interfere with his employees' leave requests as he believes that if they have sufficient leave, they can use it as they desire.

On August 31, 2010, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] who told investigators the BEP collected approximately \$200,000 to \$225,000 last year (2009-2010). [REDACTED] said her duties as CFC Coordinator involved collecting pledge cards, payroll deduction forms, and cash donations. She explained that 99% of the funds collected were in the form of payroll deductions and checks. [REDACTED] said on occasion she would handle \$500 to \$600 in cash. Someone always counted the cash with her. She said other BEP employees assisted her in counting pledge forms, checks and cash.

[REDACTED] was also questioned about her personal finances. She said had recently withdrawn \$41,000 from her Thrift Savings Plan account to pay off credit cards and debts from her husband's failed business. [REDACTED] was also asked about her work schedule. She said that she has had health issues over the past two months and has been working weekends to get make up the time. She said her supervisor, [REDACTED] was aware of her work schedule on the weekends.

[REDACTED] provided accounts sheets and pledge summary cards from the 2009-2010 CFC fund drive. A TOIG review of these deposit forms and key worker summaries showed that a very small amount of the total pledge funds were comprised of cash or checks.

On September 1, 2010, TOIG telephonically interviewed [REDACTED], Budget Analyst, Office of Financial Management, BEP. [REDACTED] audited the receipts for the 2009-2010 CFC at the BEP. On Fridays, she met with [REDACTED] and verified the pledge forms were filled out correctly. She went with [REDACTED] to make deposits at the Department of Agriculture Federal Credit Union, where the BEP had an account to deposit CFC funds. When asked whether she ever had any suspicions about [REDACTED]'s handling of the CFC funds, [REDACTED] responded, "absolutely not" and she doubled

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OIG Form-06 (10/01)

Office of Inspector General - Investigations  
Department of the Treasury

checked their work so that there was never any question or doubt about the proper accounting and recording of funds.

In the event additional information is developed in this matter, this case may be re-examined to determine if further investigative activity by the OIG/OI is warranted. Therefore, it is recommended that no further investigation be conducted by the OIG/OI and with the approval of this memorandum, this investigation is closed.

Approved:

  
John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

12/9/10

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OIG Form-08 (10/01)

Office of Inspector General - Investigations  
Department of the Treasury



# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

Case Title: [REDACTED] - Alleged  
Workers' Compensation Fraud

Case Type: Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil

Investigation Initiated: 10/18/10

Conducted by: [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

Investigation Completed: 11/12/10

Approved by: John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

Origin: BEP

Case #: BEP-11-0102-I

### Summary

On October 18, 2010, [REDACTED] Workers' Compensation Manager, Western Currency Facility (WCF), Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) informed the Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General (TOIG) that the BEP had evidence of [REDACTED] Currency Controller, working outside the BEP while on workers' compensation. [REDACTED] filed a CA 2 Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation on May 22, 2009, for Carpal Tunnel Syndrome in both wrists. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that [REDACTED] worked at the [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) 11 times while on workers' compensation, and these dates were just prior to her returning to the BEP from being on workers' compensation. [REDACTED] stated that she had been informed by her physicians that she could return to work at the BEP and accepted approximately five shifts at the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was employed at the [REDACTED] prior to being on workers' compensation. [REDACTED] stated that she was not attempting to defraud the BEP.

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### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED] Workers' Compensation Manager, BEP
- [REDACTED] Currency Control Supervisor
- [REDACTED] Currency Controller

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- US Department of Labor workers' compensation documents
- [REDACTED] labor hours for [REDACTED]

### Investigative Activity

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] Workers' Compensation Manager, Western Currency Facility (WCF), BEP stated that [REDACTED], filed a CA 2 Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation on May 22, 2009, for Carpal Tunnel Syndrome in both wrists. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] went on workers' compensation in October 2009. She had surgery on her left wrist on October 29, 2009, and on her right wrist on April 15, 2010. She returned to work on light duty on September 22, 2010, and to full duty on October 4, 2010. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] filed a request to work outside the BEP in the Summer of 2009, at the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] had also heard rumors that [REDACTED] had worked at [REDACTED] Stores in the Summer of 2009, but [REDACTED] had informed her supervisors that she no longer worked there in the Summer of 2009. [REDACTED] subsequently hired a private investigations company who discovered [REDACTED] working at the [REDACTED] on September 8, 2010, and September 18, 2010. The company also observed [REDACTED] driving to and from her home and the [REDACTED] (Exhibit 1)

[Agent Note: After the interview, the OI reviewed videotape taken by the private investigations company. The videotape clearly shows [REDACTED] leaving her residence, driving to the [REDACTED], walking around inside the shop wearing an employee badge, and driving home. The videotape reflects she worked five hours on September 8, 2010, and ten hours on September 18, 2010.]

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED], Currency Control Supervisor, WCF, BEP stated that she supervised [REDACTED] since 2000. [REDACTED] is a good employee, but has had some leave issues. She has no leave on record, and is currently on leave restriction. In the Fall of 2009, [REDACTED] filed a CA 2 Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation for Carpal Tunnel Syndrome in both wrists, and went on workers' compensation. She had surgery on both wrists, and returned to work on light duty in late September 2010, and to full duty in October 2010.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] filed a request to work outside the BEP in the Summer of 2009 at the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also told [REDACTED] one time that she had worked at a [REDACTED] Store in the Summer of 2009. [REDACTED] was not aware of her working at either location while on workers' compensation. (Exhibit 2)

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Case Name: [REDACTED]

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In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated in 2008 she began having pain in her wrists. In February or March 2009, she went to see her doctor and was diagnosed with Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. In April 2009, she filed a CA 2 Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation for Carpal Tunnel Syndrome in both wrists. She went on workers' compensation in the Fall of 2009. She had surgery on her left hand on November 7, 2009, and on her right hand on April 15, 2010. She returned to work on light duty on September 27, 2010, and to full duty on October 12, 2010.

[REDACTED] stated that she completed forms to request to work outside the BEP in the Spring of 2009 for part time work at the [REDACTED]. At the same time she applied to work part time at [REDACTED]. She decided she was going to take the [REDACTED] position so she resigned from [REDACTED] after two days of training. [REDACTED] worked at the [REDACTED] part time on the weekends until October 2009, when she left BEP for workers' compensation. She began working at the [REDACTED] again in early September 2010 after being advised by her physicians that she could return to work at the BEP in September 2010. She believes she has worked five days at the [REDACTED] in September 2010. She also stated that she drove while on workers' compensation. She stated it was painful, but necessary to get to doctors appointments and grocery stores. [REDACTED] stated that she did not work anywhere while on workers' compensation because she knew that she was not allowed to work, and she often had wrist pain. (Exhibit 3)

TOIG requested the dates of employment and work hours for [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] Human Resources Director, [REDACTED]. A TOIG record review reflected that [REDACTED] is a general [REDACTED] employee and has been employed since July 18, 2009. The record reflected that she worked 29 times from July 2009 through October 2009. She stopped working on October 18, 2009. She began working again on August 30, 2010, and worked 11 times in from August through September 2010. Her last shift was September 19, 2010. (Exhibit 4)

### Referrals

On November 30, 2010, TOIG presented the investigative facts to [REDACTED] Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), Northern District of Texas, for potential criminal prosecution of [REDACTED] for violation of Title 18 United States Code § 1920 – FECA Fraud. AUSA [REDACTED] declined criminal prosecution due to the minimal loss to the US government, and that the BEP could handle administratively. (Exhibit 5)

### Judicial Action

NA

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Findings

Based on the findings of our investigation, it appears that the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policies were violated or could be applied to the case:

- 18 USC 1920 – FECA Fraud
- 5 C.F.R. 2635.101 - Basic obligation of public service

Distribution

[REDACTED] Assistant to the Chief, Bureau of Engraving and Printing

Signatures

Case Agent:

Signature

11/29/10  
Date

Supervisor:

Signature

11/29/10  
Date

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Report of Investigation


Case Name: [REDACTED]

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Exhibits

1. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Workers' Compensation Manager, WCF, BEP, dated October 18, 2010, and US Department of Labor form CA 2 "Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation," completed by [REDACTED] dated May 22, 2009.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Currency Control Supervisor, WCF, BEP, dated October 19, 2010.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Currency Controller, WCF, BEP, dated October 19, 2010, with Garrity Advisement, and written statement.
4. Memorandum of Activity, [REDACTED] employment records of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dated October 29, 2010.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Declination by United States Attorney's Office, Northern District of Texas, dated November 30, 2010.



# Office of Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

Case Title:

Police Officer  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

Case #: BEP-11-1394-I

Case Type:

Criminal

Administrative ☒

Civil

Investigation Initiated: August 4, 2011

Conducted by:

Special Agent

Investigation Completed:

OCT 19 2011

Origin: Assistant Chief, Office  
of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing

Approved by: John L. Phillips,  
Special Agent in Charge

### Summary

This investigation was initiated based on information received from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) after receiving notification from the Prince George's County, MD Police (PGCPD) that on July 23, 2011, BEP Police Officer [REDACTED] was detained and questioned as part of a prostitution ring investigation. [REDACTED] was inside of an alleged sex club when PGCPD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted a search warrant. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that the allegations are substantiated. [REDACTED] was present at the alleged sex club when PGCPD executed a search warrant on July 23, 2011 at approximately 1:40 AM. [REDACTED] was detained and questioned by FBI Special Agents and subsequently released. Earlier in the evening, [REDACTED] called in sick for his assigned tour of duty from July 22, 2011 at 11PM. until July 23, 2011 at 7:30AM. [REDACTED] has not notified BEP about this incident.

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### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

This investigation was initiated on August 4, 2011, based upon information that [REDACTED] a BEP Police Officer since 2004, was detained and questioned in an alleged sex club located in Landover, Maryland as part of a PGCPD prostitution ring investigation.

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED] Commander, BEP Police Department
- [REDACTED] Sergeant, PGCPD
- [REDACTED] Captain, BEP Police Department
- [REDACTED] Special Agent, FBI
- [REDACTED] Building Owner, [REDACTED] Landover, MD
- [REDACTED] Corporal, BEP Police Department
- [REDACTED] Special Agent, FBI

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- Review of PGCPD Report of Investigation (ROI) and Debriefing Sheet
- BEP Form 2032, Call-In Absentee Record
- Photos taken at [REDACTED] Landover, MD

### Investigative Activity

A TOIG document review of the PGCPD ROI noted on July 23, 2011, a search warrant was executed for the second level of [REDACTED], Landover, MD. Members of the PGCPD reported observing individuals engaged in sexual intercourse upon making entry. PGCPD/FBI Cross Border Task Force secured the subjects that were located inside. FBI personnel conducted interviews of the subjects and documented the information on raid debriefing sheets. PGCPD seized 35.4 grams of suspected marijuana and \$2,870 in currency from a subject inside of the location. All occupants located inside were debriefed.

When debriefed by the FBI, [REDACTED] identified himself as a Police Officer with BEP and explained he received a text message about free food, drinks and that 30 girls would be at the location. [REDACTED] knew one of the females who was suppose to be at the location and identified her as "Stormy". She was not there so [REDACTED] was getting ready to leave when the raid started. [REDACTED] paid a fee to enter the premises. He stated that he did not have any drinks or use any drugs nor did he observe anyone using drugs. He informed the officers that he had his personal weapon and BEP credentials in his vehicle. [REDACTED] granted the officers permission to search his vehicle. [REDACTED] told the officers about a prior incident with another female officer that was related to domestic abuse. [REDACTED] also explained he was going over to his girlfriend's house and that was the reason he had condoms in his possession. (Exhibit 2)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated he first learned about the incident on August 1, 2011 when he was contacted by [REDACTED]. The task force [REDACTED] was working with encountered [REDACTED] when

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they were executing a Search Warrant on a location in Landover, MD. During [REDACTED]'s debriefing he was told to notify his command about the incident because they would. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] has not informed anyone about the incident. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] had called in sick for his shift on the evening he was detained. (Exhibit 3)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] knew "Stormy" and claimed he let her previously use his motorcycle to take pictures at a club called Ebony. It was reportedly [REDACTED]'s first time at the Landover establishment and he was there for only 30 minutes. [REDACTED] added that Stormy is one of the subject's in their investigation and is a well known prostitute in Prince Georges County, MD. [REDACTED] believed that anyone who frequents the Landover location knows the location is used for prostitution. [REDACTED] provided photographs that were taken after the location was secured during the execution of the search warrant. (Exhibits 4 and 5)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated all occupants of the building were pulled out and they were ordered to sit on the ground. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] debriefed [REDACTED] because someone pointed out that [REDACTED] may be a United States Government employee. During the debrief [REDACTED] identified himself as a Police Officer and asked the officers if they had to report this to BEP. Specifically [REDACTED] said something to the effect that "Did this have to go where it's going?" [REDACTED] was informed that he was required to report the incident to his agency and emphasized that he should report the incident because they had to report the incident to BEP. [REDACTED] opined that it was hard to believe that [REDACTED] did not know he was in a prostitution house. All the females who were interviewed admitted that's why they were there. [REDACTED] stated this was the first time he visited this location and he was there to see his friend Stormy. He was at the location for about 30 minutes and was about to go to his girlfriend's residence when the warrant was executed. [REDACTED] did not have the text message he received that had invited him to the location. [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] told her he did not have any alcohol at the location. (Exhibit 6)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] had not reported the incident and believed he should have reported this to his command. [REDACTED] provided the Call-In record generated by [REDACTED]'s telephone call requesting sick leave. [REDACTED] called in sick on July 22, 2011 at 9PM. [REDACTED] indicated he was not feeling well, had an upset stomach and requested eight hours of sick leave. (Exhibits 7 and 8)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated that he rents out the location for special events and functions. On the evening of the search warrant the space was rented out to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] understood that [REDACTED] was going to have a bachelor party. [REDACTED] did not personally know [REDACTED] but added that [REDACTED] had rented space from him approximately five to six occasions. [REDACTED] was shown a photo of [REDACTED] and stated he did not know the individual depicted in the photo. (Exhibit 9)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated he was scheduled to work his normal tour of duty on July 23, 2011 from July 22, 2011 at 11PM to July 23, 2011 at 7:30AM. On the afternoon of July 22, 2011, [REDACTED] became ill with a stomach issue. At approximately 8PM [REDACTED] called BEP to request a sick day and went to sleep. [REDACTED] woke up a little after midnight feeling better. [REDACTED] decided to go to his girlfriend's house. Upon departing his apartment complex in Laurel, MD, he ran into a friend from

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Case Name: [REDACTED]

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the neighborhood who told him he was going to a birthday party located at [REDACTED] in Landover, MD. [REDACTED] decided he would stop at the location. [REDACTED] did not recall the name of his friend and explained he was someone from his neighborhood that he knew by face only.

[REDACTED] added after additional inquiry that he had also received a text message about the party a couple of days before from a female he knew as "Stormy" or "Storm". [REDACTED] knew Stormy from a club he frequented. [REDACTED] arrived at the location, paid a twenty dollar entrance fee and stayed for approximately 40-45 minutes. Stormy was not at the location when [REDACTED] arrived. [REDACTED] admitted he had condoms in his pocket; however, he did not engage in any sexual activity. The condoms were for his girlfriend. He did not know anyone at the location, did not observe any sexual acts, did not observe any drugs/drug use and did not consume any alcohol.

[REDACTED] was leaving the premises, but went back in to use the bathroom because his stomach was starting to bother him again. [REDACTED] was beginning to exit again when the search warrant was executed. [REDACTED] was ordered to lie on the floor, eventually brought outside and debriefed. While he was outside he identified himself as a Police Officer. [REDACTED] was debriefed by a male and female agent from FBI. During the debrief [REDACTED] asked the FBI agents if he had to report this incident. [REDACTED] stated that the male FBI agent told him he did not have to report this incident because he was not under arrest and the interview was for informational purposes only. However, this incident would come out in his next background investigation so he should at some point mention the incident. [REDACTED] stated he has not reported the incident to his command. [REDACTED] allowed the agents to search his vehicle because his credentials and personal weapon were in the vehicle. When he was released he went to his girlfriend's house. (Exhibit 10)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] identified himself as a Federal Police Officer. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not ask him if he had to report the incident. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] strongly recommended that [REDACTED] report this incident to his chain of command because they knew that team leader [REDACTED] would make notification. [REDACTED] also recalled [REDACTED] was concerned about this incident because he was on sick leave and there was a previous conduct issue on his record. (Exhibit 11)

Referrals

None

Judicial Action

None

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### Findings

The investigation determined that the allegations are substantiated. [REDACTED] was present at the alleged sex club when PGCPD executed a search warrant on July 23, 2011 at approximately 1:40AM. [REDACTED] was detained and questioned by FBI Special Agents and subsequently released. Earlier in the evening, [REDACTED] called in sick for his assigned tour of duty from July 22, 2011 at 11PM. until July 23, 2011 at 7:30AM. [REDACTED] has not notified BEP about this incident.

Based on the findings of our investigation, it appears that the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policies were violated or could be applied to the case:

- 31 C.F.R., Part 31 Part 0, Employee Rules of Conduct, Subpart B – Rules of Conduct, Section 0.213, General conduct prejudicial to the Government, Employees shall not engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or any other conduct prejudicial to the government.
- Bureau of Engraving and Printing Employee Handbook, Rules and Regulations, Page 12, paragraph 2, An employee's off-duty, off premises, misconduct may also be the subject of a disciplinary and/or corrective or adverse action if there is a nexus between that misconduct and the efficiency of the Bureau's operations. An employee's off-duty, off premises conduct is expected to be such that it will not interfere with either his/her performance or the bureau's trust in the employee's ability to perform those duties; interfere with the Bureau's mission or the employee's official duties; or discredit or bring criticism upon the Bureau. Such misconduct may result in disciplinary and/or corrective or adverse action up to and including removal.

### Distribution

[REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing

### Signatures

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

10/17/2011  
Date

Supervisor:

John L. Phillips

10-19-11  
Date

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Exhibits

1. Initial Complaint document from [REDACTED] dated August 1, 2011.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Document Review PGCPD, dated August 8, 2011.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 12, 2011.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 15, 2011.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 26, 2011.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 16, 2011.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 16, 2011.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 19, 2011.
9. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 31, 2011.
10. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated September 27, 2011.
11. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated September 28, 2011.

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# Office of Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:** [REDACTED]  
Currency Sheet Examiner  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP)  
Washington, DC

**Case #:** BEP-11-1410-I

**Case Type:** Criminal \_\_\_\_\_  
Administrative X  
Civil \_\_\_\_\_

**Investigation Initiated:** August 5, 2011

**Conducted by:** [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

**Investigation Completed:** OCT 17 2011

**Origin:** [REDACTED] Assistant Chief  
Office of Security, BEP

**Approved by:** John L. Phillips,  
Special Agent in Charge

### Summary

On August 5, 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), initiated an investigation based on allegations that [REDACTED] Currency Sheet Examiner, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), misused his government travel charge card. Specifically, it was alleged that [REDACTED] was delinquent on payments for his travel card and from May 2011 to June 2011, he made unauthorized purchases totaling \$408.84 while he was not on official travel status. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that the allegations are substantiated. [REDACTED] made unauthorized purchases totaling \$408.84 on his government travel charge card, and failed to pay the balance on it. [REDACTED] admitted that he misused the government travel charge card, and was delinquent in making payments to the card. Furthermore, this case was declined for criminal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office.

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Report of Investigation

Case Name: [REDACTED]

Case # BEP-11-1410-I

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**Basis and Scope of the Investigation**

This investigation was initiated on August 5, 2011, based on allegations resulting from information provided by [REDACTED], Budget Officer, Office of Financial Management, BEP, concerning account delinquency and questionable charges on [REDACTED]'s travel charge card while he was not on travel status.

[REDACTED] was on official government travel from May 1, 2011 to May 6, 2011. However, between May 15, 2011 and June 6, 2011, [REDACTED] used his government travel charge card to make 12 purchases totaling \$408.84, which were not authorized. Furthermore, [REDACTED] failed to make payments to his travel charge card, resulting in payment delinquency. The charges included purchases at Sunoco, Forbes BP, N'Style Hair Grooming, CKT Cricket Communications, and Royal Farms.

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED], Budget Officer, BEP
- [REDACTED], Finance Officer, BEP
- [REDACTED], Assistant Supervisor, Currency Inspection, BEP
- [REDACTED], Currency Sheet Examiner, BEP

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- BEP Travel Handbook/Policy
- [REDACTED]'s travel charge card statement for May 2011 and June 2011
- BEP Receipt of Travel Card document signed by Hall
- General Services Administration (GSA) "Do's and Don'ts" Government travel charge card hand out

**Investigative Activity**

When interviewed by TOIG, [REDACTED] explained that when an employee is notified of official travel, she coordinates with the Bureau of Public Debt (BPD) through GovTrip to have an official travel charge card issued to the employee. Further arrangements are made with Citicard, who issues the travel charge card in the employee's name. Once the employee has the travel charge card, BEP requires that the employee complete a course and take a quiz on the proper use of the travel charge card. [REDACTED] revealed that the course is operated by the General Services Administration (GSA), and includes a detailed review of the "do's and don'ts" of using the travel charge card. Employees then have to submit the certificate to the BEP Budget Office, as proof that they have reviewed and understand how to use the travel charge card.

Before [REDACTED] issues the card to the employee, she provides additional guidance including a supplemental handout outlining the "do's and don'ts" of using the travel charge card. At this time, employees are also notified of the availability of the BEP Travel Handbook, which she has in hardcopy and is electronically located on BEP's employee website. [REDACTED] also explained that employees have to sign a form indicating they received the handout and the travel charge card.

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In regards to [REDACTED] recalled that he was on official travel at the BEP facility in Fort Worth, Texas, from May 1, 2011 to May 6, 2011. She revealed that Hall contacted the Budget Office concerning his Citi billing statement. It was at this time that [REDACTED] reviewed [REDACTED]'s records, which revealed that [REDACTED] had filed his travel voucher a month late, and that was delinquent in charges totaling \$450.55, which he had not paid. Additionally, Citi has notified BEP that they cancelled [REDACTED]'s travel card due to non-payment. [REDACTED] confirmed that nobody approved [REDACTED]'s delinquent and unauthorized expenses. (Exhibit 2)

When interviewed by TOIG, [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] contacted her concerning his billing statement from Citi, and inquired why BEP had not fully reimbursed him for his travel to Texas. At this time, [REDACTED] explained to [REDACTED] that he was reimbursed for all of his official travel expenses. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] if his travel card had been stolen, which [REDACTED] stated it was not. She then asked [REDACTED] why he had charges outside his travel period. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] became very defensive and verbally combative. [REDACTED] articulated that he used his travel charge card to make up for the difference in per diem that BEP owed him for his travel to Texas. [REDACTED] further stated that he thought he was allowed to use the travel card to spend what he accrued as per diem.

[REDACTED] explained the rules of split disbursement with [REDACTED] and discussed the "do's and don'ts" of using the travel charge card with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] expressed that he did not have prior understanding of the rules. (Exhibit 2)

TOIG reviewed the BEP Travel Handbook/Policy, which provides guidance to employees concerning BEP's travel policy and use of the official travel charge card. The following guidelines were extracted from the handbook:

- "Don't charge personal/unauthorized expenses to your Government travel card," (p. 6).

- "The Government travel charge card must not be used for any personal expense, and there are no exceptions. Use of the travel charge card in this manner will be considered either misuse or abuse and may result in cancellation of the card and possible disciplinary action," (p. 12).

- "The travel charge card may not be used for travel expenses within the local travel area proximate to the employee's official duty station," (p. 12).

- "The traveler is responsible for ensuring the travel charge card statement is paid in full by the due date," (p. 13).

- "If the statement becomes more than 45 days past due, the card is suspended. Past 60 days, the card is permanently cancelled and ineligible for reissue. The cardholder will be referred for possible disciplinary action," (p. 13). (Exhibit 3)

A TOIG review of a "Receipt of Travel Card" dated April 20, 2011, revealed that it was signed and dated by [REDACTED] on April 20, 2011. In that document, [REDACTED] acknowledged he received the travel charge card (account ending in 6837) on August 31, 2011, and that he reviewed and understood the terms outlined in the Citibank's Cardholder Agreement, GSA Smart Pay Information Sheet, CFO Memo (Government Travel Charge Card), Office of Financial Management Fact Sheet, and the GSA online training. These documents all provide guidance concerning proper use and misuse of the travel

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charge card. Specifically, the GSA Smart Pay Information Sheet states, "Don't use your Government Travel Card for personal use," and "Don't allow your monthly bill to become overdue." (Exhibits 4 & 5)

When interviewed by TOIG, [REDACTED] indicated that she has been [REDACTED]'s first-line supervisor for six years. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as a very good, and hard working employee. She further stated that [REDACTED] is her best employee, who is always willing to assist on special tasks and challenging jobs. [REDACTED] expressed that [REDACTED] is very even-tempered and well mannered, and stated that she has never had any disciplinary issues with him. [REDACTED] revealed that [REDACTED] does not travel frequently, but recently had a trip to the BEP facility in Fort Worth, Texas, to assist with equipment/machinery issues. [REDACTED] was not aware of any problems [REDACTED] had related to his travel or travel charge card. She further stated that it would be out of character for [REDACTED] to have purposefully done something wrong. (Exhibit 7)

When interviewed by TOIG, [REDACTED] indicated that he has traveled on official business twice in the 17 years he has been with BEP. He was first issued a BEP travel charge card in 2005, but was most recently issued a new BEP travel charge card in approximately June or July 2011. [REDACTED] reported that he had to go to the BEP facility in Fort Worth, Texas for official business in approximately June of July 2011, and was issued the new card before the trip.

[REDACTED] acknowledged that there was a problem relating to his BEP travel charge card. He stated that while he was in Texas, he did not really use the travel card except to pay for the hotel, and he showed it at the airport. He paid for most of his purchases while on travel out of pocket, because he knew he was supposed to be reimbursed when he returned from travel.

[REDACTED] further expressed that there were several problems with his travel authorization and voucher. [REDACTED] indicated that even before he went on travel, there was confusion about his authorization, which was later sorted out. [REDACTED] also reported that when he arrived back from Texas, he submitted his voucher. However, the way his voucher was set up, it was sent to the wrong approving official. He revealed that once this issue was fixed, they notified him to submit the voucher. [REDACTED] resubmitted the voucher, but claims he did not receive his per diem reimbursement.

At that point, [REDACTED] used his travel charge card to make up for the per diem money that he believed BEP owed him. Furthermore, he spent approximately \$300 on personal purchases, which totaled the estimated amount of what he was to be reimbursed for travel per diem. [REDACTED] explained that he eventually learned that his travel reimbursement was submitted to an old bank account, which he no longer had. [REDACTED] also spoke to a BEP representative in the travel office, who notified him that he was not allowed to make personal purchases using the travel charge card. [REDACTED] then understood that he had misused his travel charge card.

[REDACTED] revealed he made approximately six to seven unauthorized purchases at gas stations and at the barbershop. He could not remember the exact dollar amount of his purchases, but said it was around \$300. [REDACTED] reported that nobody else used his travel charge card.

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[REDACTED] was asked if he knew the general "do's and don'ts" of using the travel charge card. [REDACTED] could not recall, and was given the GSA handout that he received with his charge card. [REDACTED] reviewed it and acknowledged that the information was familiar. TOIG highlighted the line, which stated, "don't use your Government Travel Card for personal use." [REDACTED] expressed that he understood that he should not have used the card for personal purchases.

[REDACTED] revealed that he recently received the reimbursement from his trip to Texas, and he instructed his wife to pay off the travel card with the reimbursement money. [REDACTED] indicated that his wife takes care of the finances, and she told him that she paid the travel card bill. [REDACTED] expressed that he did not have a clear understanding of how to properly use the card. He knows that he took a quiz, but he clicked "yes" for everything and did not really take time to review the information. However, it was not his intention to misuse the card. (Exhibit 7)

A TOIG review of documents provided by [REDACTED] revealed that on September 16, 2011, [REDACTED] submitted personal check # 2088 ([REDACTED] Wachovia Bank), for payment totaling \$300 in the Pay to the Order of "CITI." Additionally, on September 23, 2011, a second payment was made by [REDACTED]'s wife to "CITI COMM CARD." This payment appeared to be an electronic check payment for \$150.55. (Exhibit 8)

In a TOIG follow up inquiry with [REDACTED], she confirmed that a review of [REDACTED] electronic Citi card statement as of October 3, 2011, revealed that there was no outstanding debt on Hall's account. (Exhibit 9)

### Referrals

On September 26, 2011, TOIG presented this matter to [REDACTED], Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), USAO, District of Columbia. [REDACTED] declined criminal prosecution of [REDACTED] concerning violation of 18 U.S.C. 641 (theft of Government funds). (Exhibit 10)

### Judicial Action

N/A

### Findings

The investigation determined that the allegations are substantiated. [REDACTED] admitted that he misused the travel charge card and made unauthorized purchases while he was not on official travel status. [REDACTED] also had a past due balance owed on his travel charge card, and as a result his travel charge card was suspended.

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Based on the findings of our investigation, it appears that the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policy(ies) were violated or could be applied to the case:

- 5 C.F.R. 735.203, Conduct prejudicial to the Government

Distribution

[REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security, BEP

Signatures

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

10/12/11

Date

Supervisor:

[Signature]  
John L. Phillips

10/12/11

Date

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**Exhibits**

1. Lead Initiation Document from BEP, dated August 4, 2011.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] and Miranda Melton, dated August 12, 2011.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Review of BEP Travel Handbook/Policy, dated August 9, 2011.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Review of [REDACTED] "Receipt of Travel Card," dated September 12, 2011.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Review of GSA Smart Pay Information Sheet, dated September 19, 2011.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 24, 2011.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated September 23, 2011.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Review of [REDACTED]'s Supporting Documents, dated September 30, 2011.
9. Memorandum of Activity, Review of [REDACTED]'s Citi Records, dated October 5, 2011.
10. Memorandum of Activity, Criminal Referral/ Declination, dated September 26, 2011.

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# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

Case Title: [REDACTED]  
Stock Control Recorder

Case #: BEP-12-0128-I

Case Type: Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil ☐

Investigation Initiated: October 31, 2011

Investigation Completed: MAY 21 2012

Conducted by: [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

Origin: [REDACTED] Manager  
Product and Physical Safety Division  
Office of Security  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

Approved by: John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

### Summary

On October 27, 2011 the Department of Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG) received an allegation regarding the misuse of five Government computers at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP).

On October 26, 2011 the Global Security Operation Center (GSOC) notified the BEP Office of Security that internet traffic potentially linked to child pornography was monitored and linked to five BEP computers.

On October 27, 2011 the matter was referred from [REDACTED], BEP, Assistant Chief, Office of Security to TOIG. TOIG responded to the BEP, seized the suspect computers and proceeded to conduct forensic examinations on each computer to determine which BEP employee may be linked to the computer misuse.

On March 20, 2011, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) for the District of Columbia, [REDACTED] declined criminal prosecution based upon lack of prosecutorial merit.

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### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED] Stock Control Recorder, BEP
- [REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security, BEP
- [REDACTED], Office Chief, Office of IT Operations, BEP
- [REDACTED] Manager, IT Security Division, Office of Critical Infrastructure and IT Security, BEP.

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- Dell Optiplex GX280, Service Tag: [REDACTED]
- Dell Optiplex 960, Service Tag: [REDACTED]
- Dell Optiplex GX620, Service Tag: [REDACTED]
- Dell Optiplex 960 Dell Service Tag Number: [REDACTED]
- Gateway 507GR computer, serial number [REDACTED]

### Investigative Activity

On October 26, 2011, the GSOC notified the BEP Office of Security that internet traffic potentially linked to child pornography was monitored and linked to five BEP computers.

On October 27, 2011, TOIG responded to the BEP at 14<sup>th</sup> and "C" Streets SW, Washington DC in regards to a referral alleging the misuse of the Government computers. TOIG met with [REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security; [REDACTED], Office Chief, Office of IT Operations; and [REDACTED] Manager, IT Security Division, Office of Critical Infrastructure and IT Security. (Exhibit 1)

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] explained that all of the suspect computers may have been accessed with a unique log on password belonging to BEP employee [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is employed by the BEP as a Stock Control Recorder.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] further explained one of the suspect computers was named "[REDACTED]" because the primary user is BEP employee [REDACTED], Stock Control Recorder. However, this particular computer was located in an engineering office and was shared by several employees. The four additional suspect computers were located in general purpose areas where numerous employees have potential access.

Continuing on the same date, TOIG seized three of the suspect general purpose computers for forensic examination. [REDACTED] told TOIG the fourth general purpose computer hard drive was reimaged and upgraded to Windows 7 prior to the notification of the incident by GSOC. [REDACTED] said the hard drive was reimaged with numerous other hard drives and placed back into

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service. [REDACTED] further stated the hard drive was not recorded or tracked after the reimaging process and could not be identified.

Continuing on the same date, [REDACTED] BEP, Information Technology Specialist (ITS) retrieved and delivered the three general purpose computers into the custody of TOIG. TOIG transported, inventoried and secured the computers in the TOIG evidence vault. (Exhibit 2)

The three seized computers are identified as follows:

1. Dell Optiplex GX280, Service Tag: [REDACTED]
2. Dell Optiplex 960, Service Tag: [REDACTED]
3. Dell Optiplex GX620, Service Tag: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] informed TOIG the seizure of the fifth suspect computer primarily used by [REDACTED] may disrupt the continuity of BEP operations. In an effort to accommodate the BEP and maximize the preservation of electronic evidence, TOIG Cyber Investigations was notified and tasked to seize the fifth computer hard drive on October 31, 2011.

On October 31, 2011, [REDACTED] provided TOIG Cyber Investigations with 80GB Seagate [REDACTED] Barracuda hard drive (Serial Number: [REDACTED]) that was installed in a BEP Dell Optiplex 960 (Dell Service Tag Number: [REDACTED]). TOIG Cyber Investigations imaged and secured the digital evidence related to hard drive (Serial Number: [REDACTED]).

On December 16, 2011, TOIG Cyber Investigations reported, numerous images depicting nudity and/or sexual acts located in the data recovered from the hard drive that was installed in the BEP Dell Optiplex 960 (Dell Service Tag Number: [REDACTED]). TOIG Cyber Investigations also reported the pornographic images were associated with the [REDACTED] user profile. No evidence was found regarding images of minors or child pornography. (Exhibit 3 – also see the file [REDACTED] Forensic\_Analysis.zip)

On December 19, 2011, TOIG interviewed subject [REDACTED] regarding the misuse of government computers.

[REDACTED] told TOIG that he works in the "A-200" area of the BEP and has access to BEP computers. [REDACTED] stated he knows a colleague named "[REDACTED]" and uses [REDACTED]'s computer.

TOIG asked [REDACTED] if any other BEP employees may have used his logon to access [REDACTED]'s computer, [REDACTED] stated, "I don't let anyone use my site". TOIG asked [REDACTED] to clarify if "site" meant "logon", [REDACTED] stated "right".

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TOIG asked [REDACTED] if he ever accessed pornography via a BEP computer. [REDACTED] became evasive and initially stated no. Agents presented digital evidence contradicting his statement and [REDACTED] admitted he searched for and viewed pornography by accessing the internet through BEP computers. [REDACTED] told TOIG that he accessed pornography primarily during breaks or downtime for approximately one hour per incident.

TOIG questioned [REDACTED] regarding search terms he used which potentially indicated he was searching for child pornography. [REDACTED] admitted he used the search terms but further stated, "I'm not into that". TOIG asked [REDACTED] what he expected to find using child pornography search terms. [REDACTED] told TOIG he did not know what he might find.

[REDACTED] agreed to provide TOIG with a written statement upon request. [REDACTED]'s written statement reiterates that he searched for and viewed pornography during his work breaks and that he used some search terms that suggest a search for child pornography. In regards to the child pornography search terms, [REDACTED]'s written statement further states, "I can't explain my reason for doing so, but I regret it".

TOIG requested consent to search [REDACTED]'s home computer. [REDACTED] agreed to let TOIG retrieve and conduct a forensic exam of his home computer. TOIG traveled to [REDACTED]'s residence, [REDACTED] and seized one Gateway 507GR computer, serial number [REDACTED]. (Exhibit 4)

On January 06, 2012, TOIG Cyber Investigations reported the results of [REDACTED]'s home computer examination. The analysis located 192 pornographic images, a pornographic web page and evidence that someone used that computer to view pornography in March 2007 and January 2008. No images depicting child pornography were located. (Exhibit 5 - also see the file [REDACTED]\_Home\_PC\_ForensicReport.zip)

Between January 06, 2012 and February 16, 2012, TOIG Cyber Investigations completed the forensic examinations of BEP computers Dell Optiplex GX280, Service Tag: [REDACTED]; Dell Optiplex GX620, Service Tag: [REDACTED]; and a Dell Optiplex 960, Service Tag: [REDACTED]. TOIG Cyber Investigations analysis located evidence of pornography associated with the [REDACTED] user profile. No images depicting child pornography were located. (Exhibit 6 - also see the file OptiplexGX280\_ForensicReport.zip)  
(Exhibit 7 - also see the file OptiplexGX620\_ForensicReport.zip)  
(Exhibit 8 - also see the file Optiplex960-Internet\_History.html)

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Referrals

On March 20, 2012, TOIG presented the case to AUSA [REDACTED] for the District of Columbia for possible criminal prosecution. AUSA [REDACTED] declined criminal prosecution due to lack of prosecutorial merit. (Exhibit 9)

Judicial Action

N/A

Findings

Based on the findings of our investigation, it appears that the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policy(ies) were violated or could be applied to the case:

- 5 CFR 2635.101 – Basic obligation of Public Service.
- 5 CFR 2635.704 – Use of Government property
- 31 CFR 0.210 – Conduct while on Official Duty or on Government Property

Distribution

[REDACTED] Manager  
Product and Safety Division  
Office of Security  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

Signatures

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Special Agent

05/18/2012  
Date

Supervisor:

[REDACTED]  
John L. Phillips, Special Agent in Charge

5-18-12  
Date

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Exhibits

1. Referral Memorandum, from [REDACTED], BEP to TOIG, dated October 27, 2011.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Evidence Obtained, draft dated November 04, 2011.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Cyber, draft date December 16, 2011.
4. Memorandum of Activity, [REDACTED] Interview, draft date December 20, 2011.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Cyber, draft date January 06, 2012.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Cyber, draft date January 06, 2012.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Cyber, draft date January 10, 2012.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Cyber, draft date February 16, 2012.
9. Memorandum of Activity, Case Presentation, draft date March 20, 2012.

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# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:** [REDACTED], Jr., GS-15  
Deputy Associate Director  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing  
Washington, DC

**Case #:** BEP-12-0485-1

**Case Type:** Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil ☐

**Investigation Initiated:** December 20, 2011

**Investigation Completed:** JUN 19 2012

**Conducted by:** [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

**Origin:** Anonymous Complaint

**Approved by:** John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

### Summary

On December 20, 2011, an anonymous complaint was received by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), alleging improper handling of plates by Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) personnel, creating creasing issues regarding the newly issued \$100 Federal Reserve Note (FRN), and the reason for series changes in FRNs. Specifically, it was alleged that [REDACTED], Deputy Associate Director, Eastern Currency Facility (ECF), BEP, concealed plate cracking. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that the allegations are unsubstantiated. It does not appear that [REDACTED] concealed the fact that plates were cracking. Additionally, TOIG determined that there are several reasons why there would be a series change necessitating new plates, for example, design change, a change in the U.S. Treasurer or U.S. Treasury Secretary. The plates were changed in 2009 from 2009 to 2009A due to the personnel change of U.S. Treasurer Rosie Rios.

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**Basis and Scope of the Investigation**

BEP began producing the NexGen \$100 notes in January 2010, with an anticipated Federal Reserve Board (FRB) issuance in February 2011. During production, BEP noticed sporadic creasing of the notes in April 2010, and a more concentrated occurrence of creasing in June 2010. Shortly thereafter, in July 2010, BEP began working with the currency paper supplier to determine the cause of the creasing problem. BEP suspended production at Western Currency Facility (WCF) in September 2010 and conducted manual/visual inspections of individual notes to obtain data about the extent of the creasing problem. BEP and FRB officials stated that issuing flawed notes could cause the public to question note authenticity, particularly abroad where U.S. currency is scrutinized more closely. In October 2010, FRB announced a delay in the issuance of the NexGen \$100 notes and has not accepted delivery of any of the finished notes. The research and tests performed show evidence of certain paper properties that have a strong correlation to creasing, but the tests have not identified the root cause of the problem.

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED] Investigator, Product and Investigations Branch, BEP
- [REDACTED], Senior Investigator, Office of Security, BEP
- [REDACTED], Deputy Associate Director, ECF, BEP

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- [REDACTED] Technical Report, dated June 14, 2010.
- Fracture in Chromed Intaglio Plate: Microscopic Analysis, dated April 26, 2011.
- [REDACTED] Intaglio Plate Cracking Timeline, dated November 2011.
- Summary of Premature Intaglio Plate Failures, no date.
- E-mail discussing [REDACTED] Report, dated May 13, 2011.
- Cracked Plates spreadsheet, no date.

**Investigative Activity**

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] advised that the issue of the \$100 FRN creasing has been resolved but the reason for the creasing is still unknown. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] advised that there are several reasons why there would be a series change necessitating new plates including: Design change; a change in the U.S. Treasurer; or change in the U.S. Treasury Secretary. The plates were changed in 2009 from 2009 to 2009A, due to the personnel change of U.S. Treasurer Rosie Rios. (Exhibit 2)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated he never concealed the fact that plates were cracking and that the cracking problem has since been corrected as of November 2011 and is unaware of any cracking occurring since. Premature cracking was noticed in plates in March 2011. He explained that premature cracking occurs when the plate is attached to the cylinder and the press begins to run.

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After the commencement of the process, the plates eventually crack. In 2010, a new plating line was created by [REDACTED] the BEP contractor that manufactures the currency production machines. At that time, BEP switched from the old line of plates to the new. The plate cracking was noticed in March 2011 and continued through November 2011.

[REDACTED] continued that in April 2011, an independent laboratory, Laboratory Testing Incorporated (LTI), tested the hardness of the plates with specifications set by the check list for all [REDACTED] machines. [REDACTED] also looked at the hardness of the plates and plate handling procedures on the cylinders and recommended to make the plates harder. BEP followed [REDACTED]'s recommendation to harden plates and the result was additional plate cracking. In May 2011, an official BEP investigation was opened and a group of BEP employees from multiple offices led by [REDACTED] from the BEP plate printing department formed to review the plate cracking. Corrective Action Report (CAR). [REDACTED] was generated by Corrective and Preventive Action Management System (CPAMS) that provides a synopsis from start to finish. The report includes a listing of cracked plates, the action taken, and what office took the action from March 2011 through November 2011.

In October 2011, BEP adjusted the system specifications to match those used with the older system prior to 2010, and the plates ceased cracking as of November 2011. [REDACTED] stated the premature cracking problem is resolved and now BEP is trying to determine why the cracking occurred in the first place. The plates that were cracking would have been destroyed with the exception of those stored in the vault for further review and testing. The cracked plates kept for testing were used by BEP employee, [REDACTED] to prepare an analysis report which concluded that he could not provide a definitive cause of plate cracking.

In October 2011, the ECF exchanged four plates with the BEP WCF to test the presses. The WCF has not yet tested the plates from ECF due to the Nexgen (2009A) testing. Plates are identified with a "W" for WCF or "E" for ECF. Approximately 82 plates had cracking issues. Of the approximate 82 problematic plates, the denominations were \$1, \$20, and \$100 plates. [REDACTED] stated that of the 82 plates discussed, all but four of the plates have been destroyed. Plate numbers [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] are in the BEP plate vault. Plate [REDACTED] was listed incorrectly on the CPAMS report; the number should be [REDACTED]. Plate [REDACTED] has been destroyed. (Exhibits 3-5)

A TOIG review of documentation regarding the plate cracking at the BEP revealed:

- Technical Report

This report provides guidance on the mounting of plates, adjusting the registration of the intaglio plates, and the mounting of cardboard sheets and blanket. [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] visited BEP from May 10, 2011, through May 13, 2011, to diagnose the problem of the premature cracking and observe the production procedures used by BEP. [REDACTED] concluded that in his opinion, the cracking was due to the plates not being hard enough.

- Fracture in Chromed Intaglio Plate: Microscopic Analysis

This report was prepared by [REDACTED] who was tasked to determine possible causes of plate

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Report of Investigation

Case Name: [REDACTED]

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cracking. [REDACTED] used stereoscope light microscopy, reflected light microscopy (RLM), scanning electron microscopy (SEM) with energy dispersive spectrometry (EDS) to perform his analysis. [REDACTED] concluded that a definitive cause of plate cracking was unidentifiable.

- [REDACTED] Intaglio Plate Cracking Timeline

[REDACTED] was generated by CPAMS that provides a synopsis from start to finish. The report includes details of the first two plates noticed to be cracked ([REDACTED] and [REDACTED]) as well as when plate cracking was noticed in other plates from March 2011 through November 2011 and what actions were taken by which offices within BEP. In October 2011, the ECF exchanged four plates with the BEP WCF to test the presses. The timeline provides that the WCF has not yet tested the ECF plating on the WCF system due to the Nexgen (2009A) testing. (Exhibit 6)

Referrals

N/A

Judicial Action

N/A

Findings

The investigation determined that the allegations are unsubstantiated. It does not appear that [REDACTED] concealed the fact that plates were cracking. Additionally, TOIG determined that there are several reasons why there would be a series change necessitating new plates, for example, design change, a change in the U.S. Treasurer or U.S. Treasury Secretary. The plates were changed in 2009 from 2009 to 2009A due to the personnel change of U.S. Treasurer Rosie Rios.

Distribution

[REDACTED] Manager, Product and Physical Safety Division, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing

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Report of Investigation  
Case Name: [REDACTED]  
Case # BEP-12-0485-1  
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Signatures

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

6/6/12  
Date

Supervisor:

[REDACTED]  
John L. Phillips

6-7-12  
Date


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**Exhibits**

1. Anonymous Complaint received by TOIG, dated December 20, 2011.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] dated March 7, 2012.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated April 13, 2012.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated April 23, 2012.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 2, 2012.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Document review of information provided by Brent, dated April 13, 2012.



# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:** Ethics Violation (Retaliation)

**Case #:** BEP-12-1033-I

**Investigation Initiated:** March 16, 2012

**Case Type:** Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil ☐

**Investigation Completed:**

**Conducted by:** [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

**Origin:** Bureau of Engraving and Printing

**Approved by:** John L. Phillips  
Special Agent In Charge

### Summary

On March 6, 2012, the Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), was contacted by [REDACTED] Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) Police via the Treasury Inspector General Hotline email, advising that he is being retaliated against by BEP Police Management because of his prior union affiliation.

The allegation stems from [REDACTED] being charged with Absent without Leave (AWOL) in September 2011. [REDACTED] believes that using AWOL is an abuse by management.

Our investigation determined that BEP Police management used the AWOL category in accordance with BEP policy and there is no indication that BEP Police management is retaliating against [REDACTED].

Our investigation determined the allegations to be unsubstantiated.

### **Basis and Scope of the Investigation**

On March 6, 2012, TOIG received a hotline complaint from [REDACTED], Police Officer, BEP. [REDACTED] alleged that BEP Police management improperly used the leave category AWOL in regards to his September 2011 absence from work. [REDACTED] alleged that BEP Police management did this to retaliate against him for his prior Chairmanship of the BEP Police union.

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED], Corporal, BEP Police
- [REDACTED], Manager, Financial Services Division (FSD), BEP
- [REDACTED] Sergeant, BEP Police
- [REDACTED], Sergeant, BEP Police
- [REDACTED], Captain, BEP Police
- [REDACTED], Lieutenant, BEP Police
- [REDACTED], Human Resource Specialist, BEP

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- Collective Bargaining Agreement between BEP and Fraternal Order of Police
- BEP Police Manual, dated March 2, 1998.
- webTA Certified T&A summary for [REDACTED] pay period 18 and pay period 18 correction.

### **Investigative Activity**

On April 4, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED], Corporal, BEP, Washington, DC, in reference to his complaint regarding retaliation and ethics violations against him by his supervisors for his involvement as Union Chairman for the BEP Police. [REDACTED] was union Chairman from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] said that he believes he is being treated unfairly regarding a leave issue. [REDACTED] said that his son, who is ill, requires being taken to the doctor on many occasions per year and sometimes without notice. [REDACTED] said that he has taken sick leave on 13 occasions in the last year due to his son needing to be taken to the doctor. In all occasions, [REDACTED] has provided a doctor's note for the absence. [REDACTED] said that in September 2011, he was called in by his sergeant who told him they have been tracking his call-ins. [REDACTED] said that in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), management is not allowed to track call-ins.

[REDACTED] said that on September 7, 2011, he got sick with the flu and called in early before his shift and spoke to a Sergeant. [REDACTED] told the Sergeant that he would most likely be out sick the rest of the week and advised he was at home. [REDACTED] was on sick leave from September 7, 2011 through September 9, 2011. [REDACTED] said that he provided a doctor's note and leave slip

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for the sick leave that he had available (21 of the 24 hours) and for the remainder of the time he was going to take Leave Without Pay (LWOP).

On September 12, 2011, [REDACTED] said that Lt. [REDACTED] gave him an AWOL slip even after finding out that a leave slip had been submitted. [REDACTED] said they took three days of pay even though he had submitted leave for 21 of the 24 hours. [REDACTED] said that Lt. [REDACTED] told him he had to charge 3 days of AWOL and that the AWOL stays in the file as a "placeholder" because the sick leave had not been approved yet. [REDACTED] said that he has "a history" with Lt. [REDACTED] after correcting him on misstatements during roll call. (Attachment 1)

On April 25, 2012, TOIG received an email copy of the "Conduct Unbecoming a Supervisor" charge filed by [REDACTED] on Lieutenant [REDACTED] to Chief Levy on November 30, 2011. [REDACTED] filed the charges because he felt that Lt. [REDACTED] "intentionally lied to support a disciplinary action". (Attachment 2)

On May 1, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED], Manager, Financial Services Division (FSD), BEP. [REDACTED] is the contact person for BEP familiar with BEP Police leave policies and familiar with the AWOL case involving complainant [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] said that he is familiar with the [REDACTED] case because all payments go through his division and any changes/corrections of time and attendance are processed by FSD. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED]'s AWOL was reversed in December 2011 and [REDACTED] was paid in Pay Period 24 on December 13, 2011 for the time previously listed as AWOL. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED]'s AWOL was changed to annual leave.

[REDACTED] said that BEP Police normally use AWOL if an officer doesn't call in or have proper documentation for the absence. [REDACTED] said he does not think BEP Police management is singling [REDACTED] out because it has been common practice to submit AWOL documentation and then change it. [REDACTED] said that most of the time the employees have to file grievances before it gets changed. [REDACTED] said that he has never heard of anybody saying either directly or indirectly that they were out to get [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that he doesn't think [REDACTED] supplied the proper paperwork and that is why the AWOL was submitted.

[REDACTED] said the BEP Police is the only entity that he knows that uses AWOL in that way, but says they "are within the "scope" of the policy. [REDACTED] said they do it because they feel that they have to use it that way because they "want to maintain order" within the ranks. (Attachment 3)

On May 14, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] Sergeant, BEP Police. [REDACTED] said that he has been Cpl. [REDACTED]'s supervisor from November 2011 to present. [REDACTED] said that he wrote a Letter of Requirement in approximately January 2012 for [REDACTED]'s repeated "call-ins" for being tardy or needing leave. He said the Letter of Requirement stated that [REDACTED] must talk



to somebody in BEP Police chain of command above the level of Sergeant in order to take leave or be tardy. [REDACTED] said that since the Letter of Requirement in January 2012, [REDACTED]'s attitude has changed for the better and has not had an unexcused tardy or leave.

[REDACTED] said that he doesn't think that any of the disciplinary actions against [REDACTED] have anything to do with [REDACTED]'s former Chairmanship of the Labor union. [REDACTED] said that the use of AWOL is used infrequently, but has been used across the board in the situation where the employee does not have the required leave for the entire time taken off. (Attachment 4)

On May 14, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED], Sergeant, BEP Police. [REDACTED] said that he has been [REDACTED]'s supervisor for the last few years until November 2011. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] has almost always had a low leave balance and said that [REDACTED] has been approved at least a few times for LWOP. [REDACTED] said that during the period of September 7, 2011 through September 9, 2011, in which [REDACTED] was out for being sick, [REDACTED] was given AWOL because he did not have the amount of sick leave to cover the entire period of time that he was out. [REDACTED] said that this is common practice within the BEP Police, that if an Officer has an unscheduled absence without the required amount of leave, they automatically go to AWOL status. The responsibility to put the Officer on AWOL had just been switched to the Sergeant level instead of the Lieutenant level or higher when this incident occurred.

Sergeant [REDACTED] said that in October 2011 he consulted with [REDACTED], Labor Management Relations, about [REDACTED]'s low leave balance. [REDACTED] suggested to [REDACTED] that he conduct a "counseling interview", which [REDACTED] did. [REDACTED] said that the "counseling interview" is a face to face meeting with the employee to discuss the issue and talk about what is expected.

[REDACTED] advised he was no longer [REDACTED]'s supervisor when the Letter of Reprimand was given to [REDACTED], so he did not write it. He believes [REDACTED] wrote the Letter of Reprimand.

[REDACTED] said that all procedures would have been followed the same way for any employee and they were not different because of [REDACTED]'s former Chairmanship of the union. (Attachment 5)

On May 14, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED], Captain, BEP Police. [REDACTED] said that he has been [REDACTED]'s Shift Commander since June 2005 and has been in [REDACTED]'s management chain from the late 1990's to present, except for the period between approximately 2000 and 2005. [REDACTED] said that when he was [REDACTED]'s Lieutenant on day shift in the 1990s, he displayed signs of not coming to work. When he became his Captain in 2005, he was still having problems coming to work. In approximately 2007, [REDACTED] was issued a Letter of Requirement which outlined what [REDACTED] was required to do in order to take leave (who to

contact etc.). When the issue continued, it led to a letter of reprimand, which was later rescinded by Chief Levy.

In approximately May 2010, [REDACTED] felt that the entire police force was given too much leniency on not showing up to work. He worked together with Labor Relations to find out how to get the Officers back to work. Guidance was drafted and Sergeants follow that guidance across the board with everybody.

[REDACTED] said that the AWOL charge and Letters of Requirement and Reprimand have nothing to do with [REDACTED]'s former position in the Union.

[REDACTED] said that after LWOP is requested, it has to be sent up the chain to the Commander for approval. Per the BEP personnel manual, a Division Manager is the decision maker for LWOP requests, which in BEP's case is the Commander. [REDACTED] said that is why it takes a while to change AWOL to LWOP or other leave, which occurred in this case when AWOL paperwork was submitted regarding [REDACTED] in September 2011 and later changed to sick leave and annual leave in December 2011. (Attachment 6)

On May 22, 2012, TOIG met with [REDACTED], Sergeant, BEP Police, to obtain a written statement in reference to the complaint of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]'s statement explains that the use of AWOL was used within the rules of the collective bargaining agreement. [REDACTED] also advised that he has never retaliated against [REDACTED] for any reason. (Attachment 7)

On May 22, 2012, TOIG met with [REDACTED], Captain, BEP Police, to obtain a written statement in reference to the complaint of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]'s statement explains that the use of AWOL and the fact that it was used, in this case, within the rules of the collective bargaining agreement. [REDACTED] also advised that he has never retaliated against [REDACTED] for any reason. (Attachment 8)

On May 23, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED], Lieutenant, BEP Police. [REDACTED] said that he has been [REDACTED]'s Platoon Lieutenant since approximately 2008 or 2009 to present. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] has always had issues of showing up for work and [REDACTED] started to see a pattern of calling in for leave on certain days. [REDACTED] said that they do not track call-ins, but time sheets are audited periodically and if over a period of time they see a pattern, BEP management will go back and look.

[REDACTED] said that in the incident in question, September 7, 2011 through September 9, 2011, [REDACTED] called in and said that he had flu symptoms and was going to be out the rest of the week. [REDACTED] said that it is his requirement to acknowledge the call and advised he cannot force a person to come in if they are sick. [REDACTED] said the sick leave is not approved until the leave request form is submitted for approval. When [REDACTED] came back from being sick, he did not have the leave to cover the absence, so sick leave could not be approved. [REDACTED] said.

that he told [REDACTED] that he was going to be given AWOL because he had to document his time as something because he did not have any leave. [REDACTED] said that any LWOP requests must be submitted to the Division Manager, who in BEP Police's case is the Commander, who approves the requests on a case-by-case basis.

[REDACTED] said that if an employee doesn't have leave on the books, they have to charge something, so they charge AWOL. After that, the employee has three options: request LWOP, request administrative leave, or request advanced leave. This is done as a formal request in writing to the Commander.

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was told on numerous occasions about signing up for the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) benefits because of his son's illness, in which case, he would not have these problems. [REDACTED] recalled that the last time it was mentioned to him was in December 2011, in a meeting with Commander [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (Labor and Management relations), Legal staff, and [REDACTED]'s Fraternal Order of Police representative). [REDACTED] heard that [REDACTED] got very upset and said that he wasn't going to tell anybody his family's personal history.

[REDACTED] said that he followed proper BEP Police policy in implementing the AWOL to [REDACTED]. He said that he has used AWOL in this manner on at least three or four occasions with others since his becoming a Lieutenant. He said that he has never retaliated against [REDACTED] for any reason and is only doing what policy states. [REDACTED] supplied a sworn, written statement. (Attachment 9).

On May 29, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED], Human Resource Specialist, BEP. [REDACTED] has been a Human Resource Specialist for over four years and is [REDACTED]'s BEP Police Company's human resources representative.

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] called in on leave a lot. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] would say that his child was ill but didn't want to disclose any family information. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was told on numerous occasions about FMLA, but [REDACTED] refused to participate in it. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] continued to call in requesting leave. [REDACTED] said that management can't always track "call ins" for disciplinary reasons, for example on an employee's fifth call in they get a letter of reprimand, but if a pattern is found they can address it.

[REDACTED] said that in approximately early 2011, the Sergeants were given the responsibility of handling leave and management issues, as the employee's first line supervisor. This was delegated down from the Lieutenants. [REDACTED] said that every Sergeant brought leave balance and history for every BEP Police employee to their respective Human Resource Specialist in order to get advice on how to handle issues. [REDACTED] said that everybody who had leave abuse issues as defined by the Collective Bargaining Agreement section 28.04 were talked to by the Sergeants. [REDACTED] said that in May 2011, Sergeant [REDACTED] approached him, asking

him his advice about how to handle [REDACTED]'s continued call ins. [REDACTED] said that he told [REDACTED] to follow the contract and have a "counseling" conversation with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that these "counselings" are not disciplinary, but conversations with the employee about what the issues are and how to best work around them. [REDACTED] said that in the BEP Police Collective Bargaining Agreement, Section 28.04 addresses leave abuse. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] falls into a number of categories constituting leave abuse. [REDACTED] said that management gave him a lot of chances.

In reference to Smith's AWOL issued in September 2011, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] did not have the full amount of sick leave to cover his entire leave time, so they had to give him AWOL. [REDACTED] said that AWOL is not disciplinary, but could lead to discipline if it continued or not addressed within the time period on the form (2 days). [REDACTED] said that AWOL is a temporary hold status until the employee comes back and addresses what leave he wanted to be used. [REDACTED] said that management or HR cannot assume the type of leave an employee wants to take. An AWOL charge letter is given to the employee and the employee must fill it out, addressing what leave they want to take. It must be submitted within two days. [REDACTED] said that this is done for everybody who does not have the leave to cover an absence. [REDACTED] said that the employee can ask for a number of things to cover AWOL: LWOP, advance leave or administrative leave. These types of leave must be approved by the division manager, which in BEP's case is the Commander. [REDACTED] provided the section of the BEP manual that addresses LWOP and AWOL.

[REDACTED] said that he never heard anybody say, directly or indirectly, that anybody was out to get [REDACTED] for any reason. [REDACTED] said, "They moved mountains to try to accommodate him." [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was offered the opportunity to apply for FMLA again in December 2011 in a meeting that included [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Union representative, legal, and Commander [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] slammed his fist on the table and said, "I'll be damned if I give anybody my personal info." (Attachment 10)

#### Referrals

None

#### Judicial Action

None

#### Findings

Investigation of possible ethics violations by BEP Police management was unsubstantiated.

Distribution

 Manager, Product and Physical Safety Division, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing


Signatures

Case Agent



7/23/12  
Date

Supervisor:

  
John L. Phillips

7/23/12  
Date

Exhibits

1. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated April 4, 2012.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Conduct Unbecoming charge on Lt. [REDACTED] dated April 25, 2012.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 1, 2012.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated May 14, 2012.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated May 14, 2012.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 14, 2012.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated May 22, 2012.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 22, 2012.
9. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 23, 2012.
10. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 29, 2012.



# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:** [REDACTED] NCIC misuse  
(Treasury Employee)

**Case Type:** Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil ☐

**Investigation Initiated:** May 8, 2012

**Conducted by:** [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

**Investigation Completed:**

**Origin:** Anonymous Complaint, TOIG Hotline

**Approved by:** John L. Phillips  
Special Agent In Charge

**Case #:** BEP-12-1688-I

### Summary

On May 3, 2012, the Department of the Treasury, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG) received an anonymous complaint via the TOIG email hotline alleging Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) Police Officers, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have been misusing the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC), querying criminal history information for their personal use. (Exhibit 1)

The allegations were unsubstantiated based on the review of NCIC/Washington Area Law Enforcement System (WALES) activity logs which revealed that no criminal history queries were conducted on the shift worked by Officer [REDACTED] nor did this investigation find that Officer [REDACTED] misused NCIC databases. Interview of other WALES operators supported the determination that the allegations are unsubstantiated.

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### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

On May 3, 2012, TOIG received an anonymous complaint via the TOIG email hotline alleging BEP Police Officers, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have been misusing NCIC, querying criminal history information for their personal use.

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED], Investigator, BEP
- [REDACTED] Corporal, BEP
- [REDACTED] Corporal, BEP
- [REDACTED] Police Officer, BEP
- [REDACTED] Police Officer, BEP

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- NCIC Activity Logs from Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS), Parkersburg, WV.
- WALES Activity Logs from Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), Washington, DC.

### Investigative Activity

On June 25, 2012, TOIG received the NCIC logs for BEP's Originating Agency Identifier (ORI) (DCBEP + +) dated March 1, 2012 through May 31, 2012 from [REDACTED] Technical Information Specialist, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CJIS, Clarksburg, WV. A review of the documents revealed that there were no queries for criminal history (III) for the entire period by any terminal operator on the midnight shift. The only queries made were for lost/stolen access badges, lost computer equipment or test runs on fictional people. (Exhibit 2,3)

On July 12, 2012, TOIG received the written NCIC logs for BEP Central Police Operations Center (CPOC) for the dates August 6, 2010 through May 24, 2012, from Inspector [REDACTED] BEP, Washington, DC.

On July 18, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] Inspector, BEP Police. [REDACTED] is the NCIC coordinator for BEP. [REDACTED] said that all the terminals are in a secured area and that on the midnight shift, 11 Police Officers have access to the terminals. [REDACTED] said that when an NCIC III is queried, the terminal operator must enter the reason code, criminal or employment, and enter the name of the requestor, but for running a wants or warrants check (QW), the requestor is not required. [REDACTED] said that the only reason to run a III query would be for an arrest. He said that BEP Police have an MOU with the MPD regarding enforcement for several blocks surrounding BEP. This allows BEP Police federal and local jurisdiction within that several block radius. Officers requesting a NCIC query either call or radio in to the CPOC and request the



query. [REDACTED] said that all radio and phone communications with the CPOC are recorded. (Exhibit 4)

On August 10, 2012, TOIG received the WALES logs from Inspector [REDACTED], BEP. The logs are for all queries made by the midnight shift Officers in the CPOC for the last six months. [REDACTED] requested the information from [REDACTED] MPD. A review of the WALES logs for each midnight shift Terminal Operator revealed that there were no criminal history queries made during the entire period. The queries are all license plate checks or registration information, which would include wants/warrants. There are no criminal history queries. (Exhibit 5,6)

On September 26, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] Corporal, BEP. [REDACTED] is a NCIC and WALES Terminal Operator in BEP's CPOC on the midnight shift. [REDACTED] said that he has been with BEP for 24 years and has been assigned to the CPOC since approximately 1998. Since that time, he has been a NCIC/WALES Terminal Operator. [REDACTED] said that on the midnight shift there are about ten people with NCIC/WALES terminal access; six terminal operators and four Sergeants.

[REDACTED] said that everything that he runs is related to traffic stops. He said that nearly everything is run through WALES and not NCIC because it is much easier and user friendly. The Officer on patrol will call in with a tag and he will run the tag for registration information. He said that when that is run, any wants/warrants will also come up on the screen. [REDACTED] said that he cannot recall ever running a criminal history check, either on NCIC or WALES. He said there is never a reason to run criminal history.

[REDACTED] said that all queries are automatically archived electronically; therefore, they do not need to keep a log. [REDACTED] says that there is a log in the CPOC where you can write down the requester and tag information, but it is not required because of the automatic log kept electronically by the computer. [REDACTED] said that some people keep the written log up to date, but it is not mandatory.

[REDACTED] said that he has never been asked to run anything that he thought was suspicious and nobody has ever come into the CPOC to ask him directly to run a query. He said that everything is traffic stops or individuals blocking money trucks.

[REDACTED] said that recently BEP has been assigned to be the Treasury Operations Center for all Treasury agencies requesting NCIC/WALES queries. He said they have been asked by the Internal Revenue Service to run registration information and tag information, but have never been asked to run criminal history. (Exhibit 7)

On September 26, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] Corporal, BEP. [REDACTED] is a NCIC/WALES Terminal Operator in BEP's CPOC on the midnight shift. [REDACTED] said that he has

been with BEP for 8 years and assigned to the CPOC for approximately the last three. Since that time, he has been a NCIC/WALES Terminal Operator.

█████ said that he runs tags through WALES related to traffic stops. He said that he does not recall ever running a criminal history query for any reason since he has been a Terminal Operator.

█████ said that he keeps his own notes daily on the back of the daily roster sheet. The roster sheet has the daily assignments for the posts around BEP. He said that if a request is made to run a tag, he will jot down the tag that is run and the start and ending time of the traffic stop on the back of his roster sheet. █████ said that the query is automatically logged electronically on the terminal that is being used for the query. █████ said that there are typically between 1 to 3 officers out on patrol at a time, 2 cars and 1 bike, and he knows who is calling in. He said that on occasion he will be asked to run wants/warrant information if patrol officers come across somebody on foot that needs to be run, but that is through WALES as a name check.

█████ said that he can't recall anybody ever having to run a criminal history. He said that he has never seen an officer come into the CPOC to run somebody or ask to have somebody run. (Exhibit 8)

On October 10, 2012, TOIG interviewed █████, Corporal, BEP. █████ said that he has been with BEP for 15 years and assigned to the midnight shift since approximately 2000. █████ said that he has never requested a criminal history check. He said that there is no reason to do it. █████ said that he knows that people get in a lot of trouble using NCIC/Wales for unofficial reasons and he said that everything an officer does is recorded, both radio traffic and terminal usage. █████ said that he used to have NCIC/WALES terminal access when he was assigned to the CPOC, but that was over five years ago and all of his access has expired.

█████ said that when on patrol, he requests over the radio to have vehicle tags run and possibly the driver of the vehicle, but only for license information. He said that he will receive wants/warrants information through this type of query, but doesn't need anything else. █████ advised he has never asked for a criminal history. █████ said that everything he asks for is for traffic stops. He said that the terminal operators run the requested query. The terminal operator depends on who is available and answers his radio call. He said that he goes into the CPOC during his shift, but has not requested that criminal history information be queried.

The allegation suggested that █████ was running the boyfriends of his ex-wife to see who was coming in contact with his kids. █████ said that he has been divorced for over five years and does not have contact with his ex-wife. He said she is remarried and lives in Germany. He has two children, ages 21 and 18, who don't live in the area. (Exhibit 9)

On October 19, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED], Corporal, BEP. [REDACTED] said that he has been with BEP since 2003 with a break in service from November 2007 to February 2010. From 2003 to 2007, [REDACTED] said he was assigned to evenings, from early 2007 to November 2007 he was assigned to midnights, then had his break in service, from February 2010 until June 2010 he was assigned evenings, and from June 2010 to present assigned to the day shift and assigned to the CPOC since April 2012.

[REDACTED] said that he doesn't use NCIC that often, and when he does it is only to enter lost control badge information. He said he has never run a tag or a criminal history through NCIC and has never been asked to run a criminal history. If he needs to run a tag, he said he used WALES because it is easier.

[REDACTED] said that he doesn't have knowledge of, or ever seen anybody run a criminal history for any reason. He said that he runs tag information through WALES when a patrol officer requests it via radio. [REDACTED] said that all WALES information is kept in an automated log through WALES and there is no written log.

[REDACTED] said that there are always at least two people in the CPOC and usually at least three. He said one officer monitors the alarms, one officer maintains the call log, and one officer monitors the fire management system. He said the officers on the alarms and call log usually handle the NCIC/WALES requests.

[REDACTED] said that he has been married three times, most recently one month ago and has known her since February of 2010. [REDACTED] said that he has three children, one from first wife (15 year old) who he has full custody, and two from second wife (9 and 6 years old) with whom he has split custody. [REDACTED] said that he has no issues with his ex-wives or their fiancées, and has no concerns about the safety of his kids with ex-wife's boyfriends or fiancée. (AGENT'S NOTE: questions were only asked because complaint specifically says names were run of ex-wife's boyfriends.) [REDACTED] said that he has never run, or asked anybody else to run the names of boyfriends of his ex-wives. (Exhibit 10)

#### Referrals

None

#### Judicial Action

None

**Findings**

TOIG's investigation of the misuse of NCIC/WALES by BEP officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] yielded no evidence that any Officer misused NCIC/WALES; therefore, the allegations are unsubstantiated.

**Distribution**


[REDACTED] Manager, Product and Physical Safety Division, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing.

Signatures

Case Agent: 

11/7/12  
Date


Supervisor:

  
John L. Phillips

11/19/12  
Date

**Exhibits**

1. Complaint document, Letter from Anonymous Complainant, dated May 4, 2012.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Receipt of NCIC user logs, dated June 26, 2012.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Review of NCIC user logs, dated October 23, 2012.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated July 19, 2012.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Receipt of WALES logs, dated August 23, 2012.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Review of WALES logs, dated October 23, 2012.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated October 1, 2012.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated October 1, 2012.
9. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated October 16, 2012.
10. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated October 22, 2012.



# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:**

[REDACTED]  
Plate Plant Worker, KG-3  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

**Case #:** BEP-12-2448-I**Case Type:**

Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil

**Investigation Initiated:** September 17, 2012**Investigation Completed:****Origin:**

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Chief  
Office of Security  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

**Conducted by:**

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent

**Approved by:** John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

### Summary

On September 17, 2012, the Department of Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG) initiated an investigation after receiving information from [REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), that [REDACTED] was allegedly tampering with government equipment. [REDACTED] was observed on video surveillance cameras on two occasions reaching into the path of currency sheets and manipulating the currency. [REDACTED] actions reportedly led to miscuts resulting in work stoppages and spoiled currency. BEP placed [REDACTED] in a non-pay status. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation substantiated the allegations. From the period May 3, 2012 through July 29, 2012, [REDACTED] was observed on video manipulating currency which result in miscuts and spoiled currency on eight separate occasions. When interviewed [REDACTED] admitted to manipulating the currency but did not intent to cause any harm. BEP reported each one of the eight tampering incidents was estimated to cost BEP \$170.97. The total cost was estimated to be \$1,367.76. The investigation was declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia for criminal prosecution.

### **Basis and Scope of the Investigation**

On September 17, 2012, TOIG initiated an investigation after receiving information from [REDACTED] Assistant Chief, Office of Security, BEP, that [REDACTED] was allegedly tampering with government equipment. [REDACTED] whose duties include removing completed bricks of currency from the Currency Over Printing and Packing Exchange (COPE) machine, examining bricks for defective wrapping, verifying and loading bricks of currency on the appropriate skid in numerical sequence, was observed on video surveillance cameras on two occasions reaching into the path of currency sheets and manipulating the currency. [REDACTED] actions reportedly led to miscuts resulting in work stoppages and spoiled currency. BEP placed [REDACTED] on a non-pay status.

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED] Investigator, BEP
- [REDACTED] Division Manager Currency Printing, BEP
- [REDACTED] Assistant Supervisory Foreman, BEP
- [REDACTED] Supervisory Pressman, BEP
- [REDACTED] Currency Worker, BEP

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- BEP Video depicting tampering of currency sheets

### **Investigative Activity**

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was seen on video tampering with COPE Press number 14 located in Room B-200. [REDACTED] action created a Code 195 (miscut) error with the printer and as a result a stack of finished currency was miscut. [REDACTED] explained the currency ruined by [REDACTED] consisted of 100 sheets of \$20 notes with 16 notes to a sheet of finished currency. If the miscut money was to leave BEP, it could be negotiated. [REDACTED] explained the only element lacking was it is not officially categorized as money until it is certified by the Federal Reserve. BEP personnel identified approximately six more code 195 errors in the same area where [REDACTED] worked. On August 9, 2012, [REDACTED] was escorted from the building and placed on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of the investigation. [REDACTED] building badge was "redlined" and he is not permitted entry into BEP unless accompanied by a BEP employee. [REDACTED] work is categorized as "Non-Craft" and his job duties do not require him to touch any of the printing presses. (Exhibits 2-4)



In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] is classified as a Non-Craft worker because he does not operate any of the presses or have an expertise. [REDACTED] had no idea why [REDACTED] tampered with the printing equipment. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as an excellent employee and had a good work ethic. [REDACTED] could only speculate to the reasons [REDACTED] would tamper with the production process and thought it was the end of his shift or time to go to lunch. [REDACTED] explained [REDACTED] was observed tampering with the press and moments later the press stopped. The video confirmed [REDACTED] actions. (Exhibit 5)

[Agent's Note: [REDACTED] was also present during the interview with [REDACTED]. Also in a subsequent email, [REDACTED] reported that each suspected incident cost BEP \$170.97 per occasion.]

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] recalled in late July 2012 he was approached by BEP Examiner/Stock Exchanger [REDACTED] who suspected [REDACTED] may have been tampering with the press which resulted in a "miscut". [REDACTED] was suspicious because he saw [REDACTED] by the printing press and moments later the press malfunctioned. [REDACTED] stated a couple of days passed and he had a brief conversation with [REDACTED] and cautioned [REDACTED] if he was doing something to the press that was improper he should stop. [REDACTED] responded he did not know what he was talking about. [REDACTED] added a short time later [REDACTED] was placed on administrative leave. (Exhibit 6)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated he was not intentionally causing miscuts. [REDACTED] constantly touches the machine because he is only trying to help. [REDACTED] stated he only "jogs" (adjusts) the currency to "fix it". [REDACTED] acknowledged that he knows that he is not supposed to touch the press but does so only to assist the pressman and not to harm anything. Since [REDACTED]' position is defined as "Non-Craft" he is supposed to notify the pressman of problems on the press; however, [REDACTED] stated that is not his style. [REDACTED] stated that he probably should have notified the pressman when the press was about to miscut. [REDACTED] believes that he should be a press technician because of his working knowledge of the press. [REDACTED] acknowledged that he knows only pressman are allowed to touch the press. [REDACTED] explained he has been working alongside all of the pressman for eight years. Because of his length of time working on the machine he feels he knows the press as well as the pressman. [REDACTED] stated that if he did not jog the paper when he noticed an issue there would have been a higher amount of miscuts. [REDACTED] added that when miscuts occur he will assist the pressman.

[Agent's Note: [REDACTED] was shown videos of him manipulating the COPE 14 press on the following dates and times: May 3, 2012 @ 10:27:15, May 23, 2012 @ 13:46:08, June 1, 2012 @ 13:51:05, June 5, 2012 @ 13:56:52, June 6, 2012 @ 10:23:25 and June 8, 2012 @ 10:20:01.]

After viewing the videos, [REDACTED] stated he did not do anything malicious. He simply jogged the paper. [REDACTED] knows it does not look good but he did not do anything on purpose. [REDACTED] knows there are cameras throughout the area and he would be stupid to do something intentionally wrong. [REDACTED] did not see a problem with his actions. If his actions caused a problem it was not intentional. [REDACTED] added that part of the miscut problem could be that there are occasional problems with the press after lunch that affects its operation. The press is shut down for lunch from 12 -12:40 P.M. and problems occur when it is restarted. (Exhibit 7)

### Referrals

On September 17, 2012, TOIG presented the facts of this investigation to [REDACTED] Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, District of Columbia. After hearing the facts in the investigation, [REDACTED] stated her office would decline the investigation. (Exhibit 8)

### Judicial Action

N/A

### Findings

The investigation substantiated the allegations. From the period May 3, 2012 through July 29, 2012, [REDACTED] was observed on video manipulating currency which result in miscuts and spoiled currency on eight separate occasions. When interviewed [REDACTED] admitted to manipulating the currency but did not intent to cause any harm. BEP reported each one of the eight tampering incidents was estimated to cost BEP \$170.97. The total cost was estimated to be \$1,367.76. The investigation was declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia for criminal prosecution.

Based on the findings of our investigation, it appears that the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policy(ies) were violated or could be applied to the case:

- 31 C.F.R., Part 31 Part O, Employee Rules of Conduct, Subpart B – Rules of Conduct, Section 0.213, General conduct prejudicial to the Government, Employees shall not engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or any other conduct prejudicial to the government.
- 5 C.F.R., Part 2635.101 (b) (14), Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating an appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical standards set forth in this part. Whether particular circumstances created an appearance that the law or these standards have been violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts.

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Report of Investigation

Case Name [REDACTED]

Case # BEP-12-2448-I

Page 5 of 6

Distribution

[REDACTED] Product and Physical Safety Division, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing.

Signatures

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]

12/14/2012  
Date

Supervisor:

[Signature]  
John L. Phillips

12-14-12  
Date

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**Exhibits**

1. Initial Complaint document, dated August 21, 2012.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated September 11, 2012.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated September 24, 2012.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated September 26, 2012.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] dated, September 26, 2012.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated October 3, 2012.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated October 10, 2012.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Case Presentation, dated September 17, 2012.



# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:**

Security Specialist  
Bureau of Engraving and  
Printing

**Case Type:**

Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil

Investigation Initiated: August 28, 2012

Conducted by: [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

Investigation Completed: OCT 12 2012

Approved by: John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

Origin: [REDACTED] BEP

Case #: BEP-12-2450-I

### Summary

On August 28, 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), received information from [REDACTED] Physical Security Manager, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), alleging [REDACTED] Security Specialist, BEP, continued to work at [REDACTED] Inc. while on worker's compensation with BEP. (Attachment 1)

The investigation determined the allegations to be unsubstantiated. [REDACTED] was injured while working at BEP on April 17, 2012, and received worker's compensation benefits from BEP until he returned on May 29, 2012. [REDACTED] Inc. payroll records indicate [REDACTED] worked on April 16, 2012 and did not return to [REDACTED] Inc. until May 30, 2012.

### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

This case was initiated on August 28, 2012, based upon a referral from [REDACTED] Physical Security Manager, BEP, informing TOIG of possible worker's compensation fraud by [REDACTED]

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED] Security Branch Manager, BEP
- [REDACTED], Payroll, [REDACTED] Inc.

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- Agency Query System Records (AQS) for [REDACTED] dated August 28, 2012.
- [REDACTED] Inc. Payroll Records for [REDACTED] dated April 16 through May 30, 2012

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### Investigative Activity

On August 28, 2012, TOIG received records from Department of Labor's (DOL) Agency Query System (AQS). The AQS records list [REDACTED]'s date of injury as April 17, 2012. AQS classified the alleged injury as a "crushing injury of foot." [REDACTED] filed a Form CA-1 (Federal Employees Notice of Traumatic Injury and Claim for Continuation of Pay/Compensation) on April 27, 2012, for Continuation of Pay (COP) with BEP. The COP was accepted by BEP on May 4, 2012. In addition, AQS showed [REDACTED] received \$1,500.00 in medical benefits for the injured foot. [REDACTED] was never placed in a worker's compensation status with DOL. (Attachment 2)

On August 30, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] Security Branch Manager, BEP. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED], Security Specialist, BEP, was the supervisor at the time of the incident on April, 17, 2012. [REDACTED] supplied TOIG with a copy of BEP Form 2599 - Offense/Incident Report for [REDACTED]. The report stated that [REDACTED] Platemaker, BEP, was pushing a cart with a steel plate on top of it when one of the legs on the cart broke. This caused the steel plate to fall and strike [REDACTED]'s left foot. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was authorized for outside employment at [REDACTED] Inc. and believed [REDACTED] worked as a night manager. (Attachment 3)

On September 10, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] Payroll, [REDACTED] Inc. [REDACTED] conducted a database query for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said the database showed [REDACTED] worked at [REDACTED] Inc. on April 16, 2012 and May 30, 2012. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not work anytime in between those dates. TOIG requested documentation from [REDACTED] confirming [REDACTED] did not work at [REDACTED] Inc. during the specified time. TOIG sent a request on TOIG letterhead to [REDACTED] Relations/Legal Counsel, [REDACTED] Inc. for supporting documentation. (Attachment 4)

On September 10, 2012, TOIG obtained [REDACTED] Inc. payroll records for [REDACTED] from [REDACTED]. The payroll records confirmed that [REDACTED] did not work at [REDACTED] Inc. from April 17, 2012 through May 29, 2012. (Attachment 5)

### Referrals

N/A

### Judicial Action

N/A

### Findings

The investigation determined that the allegations were unsubstantiated. [REDACTED] sustained an injury to his left foot while working at BEP on April 17, 2012, and did not return to BEP until May 29, 2012. According to payroll records for [REDACTED], Inc., [REDACTED] did not work during that period. [REDACTED] was authorized by BEP for outside employment with [REDACTED] Inc.

### Distribution

[REDACTED] Assistant Chief, BEP

### Signatures

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
Signature [REDACTED]

10/9/2012  
Date

Supervisor:

[REDACTED]  
Signature John L. Phillips


10/11/12  
Date

Exhibits

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description</u>
---------------	--------------------

- |    |  |
|----|--|
| 1. | Original Allegation, Correspondence, dated April 21, 2012.   |
| 2. | Memorandum of Activity, Agency Query System (AQS) Records for [REDACTED]<br>dated August 28, 2012.             |
| 3. | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 30, 2012.   |
| 4. | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated September 10, 2012.                                     |
| 5. | Memorandum of Activity, Review of [REDACTED] Inc. Payroll Records for<br>[REDACTED], dated September 10, 2012. |
-





# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:** [REDACTED]  
Sheet Metal Mechanic  
(Treasury Employee)

**Case #:** BEP-13-0208-I

**Case Type:** Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil ☐

**Investigation Initiated:** November 06, 2012

**Investigation Completed:**

**Conducted by:** [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

**Origin:** [REDACTED], Manager  
Security Investigations Division  
Office of Security  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

**Approved by:** John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

### Summary

On October 26, 2011, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Office of Security was notified that the Global Security Operation Center (GSOC) had picked up computer traffic potentially related to child pornography. BEP indicated the computer misuse was related to four computers; one computer which is assigned to an employee and three general purpose computers.

Treasury Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG) seized and secured three BEP computers and imaged the hard drive of the fourth computer.

Forensic examinations of the computers were completed. The forensic examinations did not reveal images depicting child pornography but did reveal numerous pornographic images. Furthermore, the forensic examinations revealed pornography associated with the user profile [REDACTED] on three of the four examined hard drives. [REDACTED] was interviewed and admitted accessing and viewing pornography on government computers.

This case is cross referenced with case BEP-12-0128-I. The computers referenced in this Report of Investigation were seized and examined under case BEP-12-0128-I. The Memorandum of Activity and Evidence Voucher pertaining to the evidence obtained can be found under case BEP-12-0128-I. (Exhibit 1)

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### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED] Sheet Metal Mechanic, BEP

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- Dell Optiplex GX280, Service Tag: [REDACTED]
- Dell Optiplex 960, Service Tag: [REDACTED]
- Dell Optiplex GX620, Service Tag: [REDACTED]
- Dell Optiplex 960, Service Tag Number: [REDACTED] (Hard Drive)

### Investigative Activity

On October 26, 2011, the GSOC notified the BEP Office of Security that internet traffic potentially linked to child pornography was monitored and linked to five BEP computers.

On October 27, 2011, TOIG responded to the BEP at 14<sup>th</sup> and "C" Streets SW, Washington DC in regards to a complaint alleging the misuse of the Government computers. TOIG seized and secured the three BEP general purpose computers for forensic examination. (Exhibit 2)

On October 31, 2011, TOIG Cyber Investigations imaged and secured the digital evidence of a fourth BEP computer suspected of being used to access and view pornography.

The fifth computer was not recovered or examined due to a prior Windows 7 update conducted at the BEP. This particular computer hard drive was reimaged and upgraded to Windows 7 prior to the notification of the incident by GSOC. The hard drive was reimaged with numerous other hard drives and placed back into service. The hard drive was not recorded or tracked after the reimaging process and could not be identified.

On October 22, 2012 TOIG reviewed electronic forensic data linked to three BEP computers. Between January and February 2012 TOIG, Cyber Investigations conducted forensic examinations on the following BEP computers potentially linked to improper use:

1. Dell Optiplex GX280 (Dell Service Tag: [REDACTED])
2. Dell Optiplex GX620 (Dell Service Tag: [REDACTED])
3. Dell Optiplex GX960 (Dell Service Tag: [REDACTED])

The forensic examinations revealed evidence of pornography and/or unauthorized web surfing associated with the [REDACTED] account. No images depicting child pornography were located. (Exhibit 3)

Report of Investigation

Case Name: [REDACTED]

Case # BEP-13-0208-I

Page 3 of 5

On October 23, 2012, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] regarding the misuse of government computers. [REDACTED] admitted he accessed and viewed pornography on government computers during work hours on several occasions. [REDACTED] told TOIG he only viewed adult pornography and did not access or attempt to access child pornography.

[REDACTED] also told TOIG he did not share his BEP computer password with anyone and did not believe his password had ever been compromised. (Exhibit 4)

Referrals

N/A

Judicial Action

N/A

Findings

Based on the findings of our investigation, it appears that the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policy(ies) were violated or could be applied to the case:

- 5 CFR 2635.101 – Basic obligation of Public Service
- 5 CFR 2635.704 – Use of Government property
- 31 CFR 0.210 – Conduct while on Official Duty or on Government Property

Distribution

[REDACTED] Manager  
Security Investigations Division  
Office of Security  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

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Report of Investigation

Case Name: [REDACTED]

Case # BEP-13-0208-I

Page 4 of 5

Signatures


Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Special Agent

02/11/2013

Date

Supervisor:

  
John L. Phillips, Special Agent in Charge

2-12-13

Date

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Report of Investigation

Case Name: [REDACTED]

Case # BEP-13-0208-I

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Exhibits

1. Memorandum of Activity, Evidence Obtained, dated October 27, 2011.
2. Referral Memorandum, from [REDACTED] BEP to TOIG, dated October 27, 2011.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Record/Information Review, dated October 22, 2012.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Subject Interview, dated October 23, 2012.

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# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:** [REDACTED]  
Former Police Officer  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

**Case #:** BEP-13-0269-I

**Case Type:** Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil ☐

**Investigation Initiated:** November 26, 2012

**Conducted by:** [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

**Investigation Completed:**

**Approved by:** John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

**Origin:** Bureau of Engraving and Printing

### Summary

On November 26, 2012, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations, (TOIG) received an allegation from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) that [REDACTED] former BEP Police Officer, was seen on a national television program performing color guard drills while receiving benefits under the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) disability retirement. [REDACTED] had discontinued employment at BEP in December 2009, after he filed a Department of Labor (DOL) CA-2 "Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation." [REDACTED] stated that he hurt his knee in March 2008. [REDACTED] was on workers' compensation until June 2010, when a DOL physician determined that his injury was not caused or aggravated by his employment at the BEP. Since that date, he has received benefits from OPM under disability retirement. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that the allegations are substantiated. [REDACTED] admitted that he was on the television program performing drills. Our investigation also found that [REDACTED] is employed part time, and has been in cosmetology school on a full time basis sporadically since resigning from the BEP, and receiving benefits from DOL's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, and later OPM.

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### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

TOIG received an allegation from BEP that [REDACTED] former BEP Police Officer, was seen on a national television program performing color guard drills while receiving benefits under the OPM disability retirement. [REDACTED] was employed with the BEP as a Police Officer since July 2003, but discontinued employment in December 2009, after he filed a Department of Labor (DOL) CA-2 "Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation." [REDACTED] stated that he hurt his knee in March 2008. [REDACTED] was on workers' compensation until June 2010, when a DOL physician determined that his injury was not caused or aggravated by his employment at the BEP. Since that date, he has received benefits from OPM under disability retirement.

[REDACTED] was seen during the airing of a television program, the "[REDACTED] Show" performing color guard drills involving spinning a flag and wooden rifle in the area in a standing and prone positions.

He received 60% of his police salary the first 12 months he was on OPM disability retirement. After 12 months, he has been receiving 40% of his police officer salary since July 2010 while on OPM disability retirement. His last salary was \$63,000.

OPM allows an individual to perform some work and receive some benefits. According to the OPM, a claimant may earn up to 80% of their former federal salary. The website reflects: "If you are under age 60, your benefit will stop if:

- You are found to be medically recovered from your disabling condition;
- In any calendar year your income from wages and self-employment is at least 80 percent of the current rate of basic pay from the position you retired from (also known as restoration to earning capacity); or
- You are reemployed in the Federal service in a position equivalent to what you held at retirement (also called "administratively recovered")."

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED] former Police Officer, BEP
- [REDACTED] Investigator, BEP

During the course of the investigation, TOIG reviewed the following pertinent documents:

- BEP's workers' compensation record on [REDACTED]
- OPM's retirement regulations
- Dining In salary record on [REDACTED]

### Investigative Activity

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] allegedly injured his right knee at the BEP and was on workers' compensation for several months. He then went out on disability retirement through OPM. He received 60% of his police salary his first year on disability, and 40% thereafter. (Exhibit 2)

(Agent's Note: A workers' compensation claimant with dependents like [REDACTED] would have received 75% of his salary in benefits from DOL. [REDACTED]'s final salary at BEP was \$63,000. [REDACTED] received a total of \$16,265.26 from DOL. OPM would not provide any information regarding [REDACTED]'s disability case including compensation because of strict regulations on the dissemination of information outside OPM.)

A TOIG review of the [REDACTED] Show aired in [REDACTED] showed [REDACTED] demonstrating his color guard skills. The first video is 1.57 minutes in length; one minute is of [REDACTED] swirling a flag and then what appears to be a wooden replica rifle. He spins the items in front of him and above his head while stepping sideways and rotating. He then lies on the floor as he continues to spin the flag. At one point he drops the rifle and bends to pick it up before resuming his performance.

The second video clip is 1.23 minutes in length and is the show panel asking [REDACTED] questions. One of the panel members asks him how much he enjoys color guarding. [REDACTED] states "I love it to the point where I am a Federal Police Officer. I would give it up to do it." (Exhibit 3)

ATOIG review of the BEP workers' compensation record on [REDACTED] revealed that [REDACTED] completed a DOL CA-2 "Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation" on December 15, 2009. The CA-2 reflected that he realized he has a "disease or illness ...caused or aggravated" by his employment on March 1, 2008. The document was not signed by his supervisor. A medical report dated November 13, 2008, by [REDACTED] MD, Greater Metropolitan Orthopedics, reflected that [REDACTED] has "achy pain, discomfort, and limp." The record showed he was involved in an automobile accident in approximately August 2008 where he injured his knee. [REDACTED]'s claim was for a tear of the medial meniscus of his knee which was accepted by DOL, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs on March 11, 2010.

On July 15, 2010, [REDACTED]'s workers' compensation benefits were terminated by DOL after a second opinion by Dr. [REDACTED], DOL contracted physician, dated June 4, 2010. [REDACTED]'s letter to DOL reflects that [REDACTED]'s knee condition is not related to his employment at the BEP. Specifically, he states: "It appears that Mr. [REDACTED]'s knee arthritis, including his chondromalacia of the patella is related to a preexisting condition causing anatomical deformity of his lower extremities. It should also be noted that he told Dr. [REDACTED] that the auto accident happened in the summer of 2008 caused him to injure his knee, and it was on that basis that Dr. [REDACTED] performed the arthroscopic surgery on November 19, 2008, in which he found torn meniscal



tissues, as well as chondromalacia. It seems therefore, that Mr. [REDACTED]'s knee condition, including the meniscal tears and chondromalacia are not related to his federal employment by direct cause, aggravation, precipitation, or acceleration."

[REDACTED] was last paid by DOL OWCP on June 7, 2010, after DOL informed [REDACTED] that his benefits would be terminated based on Dr. [REDACTED] determination. [REDACTED] then submitted documentation for OPM disability retirement. He has received disability retirement since June 2010. (Exhibit 4)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated that he was a Police Officer for BEP in Washington, DC from 2002-2009. He stated that he was an officer until after December 2009, when he completed a CA-2 form for an occupational illness. [REDACTED] explained that he was walking around the BEP Annex building on March 1, 2008, when he tripped on an uneven sidewalk and fell. During that fall, he hurt his right knee. He did not tell any supervisors and continued to perform his work. In January 2009, he stood for hours in the cold weather at the Presidential inauguration. He believes that day added to the problems he was having with his knee.

Immediately after the inauguration, he had to take two weeks of leave because his knee hurt. He returned to work and continued to perform his duties. In December 2009, he decided to complete a CA-2 because his knee had worsened and he believed he needed some type of treatment. He stated that he would have filed earlier, but he liked his position as a Police Officer and Union Leader at BEP, and officers that file for workers' compensation are treated differently and placed on light duty. Shortly following his filing of the CA-2, he was accepted on the workers' compensation rolls of DOL and discontinued his work at the BEP. [REDACTED] had orthopedic surgery on his right knee. The doctor informed him that he should have a total knee replacement, but he has not had that surgery because he [REDACTED] believes he is too young and may have to get the surgery again later in his life.

In 2010, DOL sent him for another evaluation by a DOL physician. It was determined that his injury to his right knee was not related to his work at BEP. He had informed the physician that he had been involved in an automobile accident and the doctor wrote in his report that the knee injury could have been from that accident. [REDACTED] claims that the doctor's evaluation was incomplete, and that his injury was not from the accident because the accident was after his fall at BEP. Following this evaluation, DOL terminated [REDACTED]'s workers' compensation benefits. [REDACTED] then applied for disability retirement through OPM. [REDACTED] has been on OPM disability retirement since approximately the Fall of 2010.

[REDACTED] has attended several cosmetology academies in an attempt to become a hairdresser. [REDACTED] stated that he has performed color guard routines all of his life. He learned from a non-profit group - "The [REDACTED]". He has also taught drills for the [REDACTED] and drill teams for free or nominal amounts. [REDACTED] subscribes to a reality website and receives e-mails regarding reality show tryouts. He received an e-mail regarding the [REDACTED] Show in the

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Case Name: [REDACTED]

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Fall of 2012. He created a video of him performing color guard drills with flags and a wooden rifle and sent it to the show. He was selected and went to the show in October 2012. He performed several times for producers and then performed it before the cameras and show judges. [REDACTED] stated that he broke his right hand while practicing for the producers. He stated that he does not have to practice his drills because he has performed them so long. He added that he also knows martial arts and taught martial arts to children for an organization called "[REDACTED]" several years ago, but no longer is active in martial arts.

[REDACTED] stated that he began working in November 2012, as a deliverer for the company [REDACTED]. He earns approximately \$4 per delivery, and tips. He could not state how much he has made but believes his largest check was \$200. (Exhibit 5)

A TOIG review of [REDACTED]'s employment record from [REDACTED] Corporation reflected that [REDACTED] was a driver / deliverer from November 12, 2012 - January 3, 2013. He has earned \$2,998.40 in commission and credit card tips. (Exhibit 6)

Referrals

On December 3, 2012, TOIG contacted the Retirement Inspections Branch, OPM. [REDACTED] Acting Program Manager, stated that his office is responsible for investigating and adjudicating fraud in the OPM disability program. [REDACTED] recommended that TOIG provide his office with a report of investigation. His office would determine if additional investigation was necessary, and if [REDACTED]'s activities would be considered fraud in the program. (Exhibit 7)

Judicial Action

N/A

Findings

The investigation determined that the allegations are substantiated. [REDACTED] admitted that he was on the television program performing drills. Our investigation also found that [REDACTED] is employed part time, and has been in cosmetology school on a full time basis sporadically since resigning from the BEP, and receiving benefits from DOL's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, and later OPM.

Based on the findings of our investigation, it appears that the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policies were violated or could be applied to the case:

OPM disability retirement regulations

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Distribution

[REDACTED] Manager, Security Investigations Division, Bureau of Engraving and Printing

[REDACTED] Acting Program Manager, Retirement Inspections Branch, Office of Personnel Management


Signatures

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]

2-11-13  
Date

Supervisor:

  
John L. Phillips

2-11-13  
Date

Exhibits

1. Letter from [REDACTED] Workers' Compensation Specialist, BEP, and e-mail from [REDACTED] Human Resources, BEP, dated July 15, 2010.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Investigator, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, dated November 19, 2012.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Review of [REDACTED] Show video, dated December 6, 2012.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Review of Bureau of Engraving and Printing workers' compensation record on Levine.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated January 3, 2013.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Review of [REDACTED] personnel record at Dining In, dated January 4, 2013.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] Acting Program Manager, Office of Personnel Management, dated December 3, 2012.



# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:** [REDACTED]  
Information Technology  
Specialist  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing  
GS-13, Step 7

**Case Number:** BEP-13-0791-I

**Case Type:** Criminal  
Administrative ☒  
Civil ☐

**Conducted by:** [REDACTED]  
Investigator

**Investigation Initiated:** March 19, 2013

**Approved by:** Jason J. Metrick  
Special Agent in Charge  
(Acting)

**Investigation Completed:** OCT 21 2013

**Origin:** [REDACTED]  
Chief, Office of Security  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

### Summary

The Department of Treasury, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), received a complaint from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) that between September 2012 and February 2013, [REDACTED] BEP Information Technology Specialist, was working secondary employment without proper authorization or notification to BEP. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that the allegation is unsubstantiated; however, during the course of the investigation, TOIG substantiated that [REDACTED] had falsified his time and attendance (T&A) record, misused his Government laptop computer and cellular telephone, and made false statements to his supervisors. [REDACTED] admitted to using his Government cellular telephone and his laptop computer for personal use while on Government time; however, [REDACTED] denied submitting a false T&A record or making false statements to his supervisors.

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### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

On October 16, 2012, TOIG received information from the BEP alleging that [REDACTED] was engaged in unauthorized secondary employment without the consent of BEP management in violation of BEP ethics regulations.

During the course of the investigation, interviews were conducted with:

- [REDACTED] Manager of the Enterprise Strategic Planning and Management Division, Office of Enterprise Solutions (OES), BEP
- [REDACTED] Office of Enterprise Solutions (OES), BEP
- [REDACTED], Assistant Account Manager, [REDACTED] Security Services
- [REDACTED], Information Technology Specialist, BEP

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- BEP Office of Security investigative files
- T&A records of [REDACTED]
- Computer exam results of [REDACTED]'s BEP laptop computer
- Metropolitan Square video footage, badge reader records and sign in sheets
- [REDACTED]'s LinkedIn page

### Investigative Activity

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated that in July 2012, he received an electronic mail (email) invite from a LinkedIn account associated with [REDACTED]. The invite contained [REDACTED]'s BEP Blackberry number listed in the biography, but it also contained a different job title and company above his BEP information. [REDACTED]'s Supervisor, [REDACTED], also received the same email invite from [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] directed [REDACTED] to make sure [REDACTED] was not working a secondary employment without the proper authorization from BEP. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] about the biography on LinkedIn that listed his employment as a System Applications and Products (SAP) Administrator at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] denied any secondary employment and told [REDACTED] that he also received two email invites from LinkedIn. (Exhibit 2)

In August 2012, [REDACTED] requested reasonable accommodations be made for him due to a medical condition that prevented him from working in BEP office space. [REDACTED] teleworked from his home in Cary, NC, for approximately 60 days until arrangements could be made for [REDACTED] to work out of another office site in Washington, DC. Office space was located for [REDACTED] at Market Square, 655 15<sup>th</sup> Street NW, Washington, DC within Departmental Offices (DO) leased space. [REDACTED] started working in the DO space in October 2012.

On February 14, 2013, [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] to let him know he stopped at [REDACTED]'s DO office to have a meeting with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was waiting at [REDACTED]'s desk and called [REDACTED] and told him that [REDACTED] was not at his desk. [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] and his desk

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Case Name: [REDACTED]

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telephone rolled over to his Government issued Blackberry. [REDACTED] answered and told [REDACTED] he was in the restroom. [REDACTED] waited at [REDACTED]'s desk and [REDACTED] never showed up. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] what had happened and [REDACTED] instructed [REDACTED] to call [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] while still standing at [REDACTED]'s desk and [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] he was at the hotel checking out. [REDACTED] instructed [REDACTED] to meet him at his desk at 1:00 PM. Later the same day, [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] an email and told him that his daughter's school in NC had called, his daughter was ill, and that he was going home to NC. [REDACTED] never observed [REDACTED] in the DO space that day.

TOIG obtained a copy of a non-validated T&A report for February 14, 2013, that shows [REDACTED] worked from 6:00 AM to 9:15 AM on that day. A TOIG review of the badge in and out records for Metropolitan Square for February 14, 2013, disclosed that [REDACTED] had not used his Treasury identification card or key fob to enter the building. TOIG attempted to review the video footage from Metropolitan Square; however it was not available. TOIG reviewed the entry logs for Metropolitan Square and discovered [REDACTED] had not signed in on February 14, 2013.

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated Metropolitan Square security policy requires all unbadged visitors or employees sign in and be escorted to Treasury leased space. (Exhibit 6)

[Agents Note: In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated essentially the same as [REDACTED] (Exhibit 4)

A TOIG review of BEP investigative files which included a computer forensic examination of [REDACTED]'s computer revealed hundreds of pages of documents relating to [REDACTED]'s private company, [REDACTED] which does Information Technology and Tax Services. TOIG also reviewed numerous resumes of individuals who did not work for the BEP and numerous emails from [REDACTED] to outside businesses requesting information on products not related to his BEP employment. [REDACTED] also listed his BEP Government cellular telephone as his contact number along with his personal company information on the LinkedIn page. (Exhibit 3)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated that prior to his BEP employment, he worked for [REDACTED] until January 2009. [REDACTED] stated that he did not come to work for BEP until May 2009. [REDACTED] claimed that the email his supervisors received from LinkedIn showing he was a SAP manager with [REDACTED] was auto generated to all of his listed contacts and he was not working for [REDACTED] while employed with BEP. (Exhibit 5)

[REDACTED] admitted to using his Government issued cellular telephone and Government issued laptop computer to conduct personal business and to store and transfer documents relating to his private company named [REDACTED] however, he claimed the usage was for the benefit of the BEP. [REDACTED] also admitted to being aware of Government policy regarding personal use of Government equipment.

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[REDACTED] was questioned regarding his absence from work on February 14, 2013. [REDACTED] stated that he came to work that day from 6:00 AM to approximately 9:30 AM, but left to pick up his daughter who was sick in NC. [REDACTED] was questioned why there were no badge records or key fob records for him entering the Metropolitan Square building for that day and he stated that he forgot his key fob and BEP identification card and the building Security Officer let him in.

[Agents Note: Sign in sheets and badge reader records do not show [REDACTED] in the building that day, and video recordings were not available for the day in question. TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] who stated Metropolitan Square security policy is to have individuals without their Treasury identification cards sign in and obtain an escort to access the offices in the building. The building is locked until 7:00 AM and manned by security officers 24 hours a day. [REDACTED] stated that the Security Officer waved him in the building]. (Exhibit 6)

[REDACTED] was questioned as to his whereabouts when he was contacted by [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was looking for him. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he was in the restroom. When [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] he told [REDACTED] he was at the Hotel packing to leave for NC. [REDACTED] could not recall what hotel he stayed at on this date. [REDACTED] emailed [REDACTED] that he was leaving for NC. [REDACTED] stated that he resigned with BEP shortly after this to take a position with Treasury's DO as a Human Resource Specialist. [REDACTED] stated he was told by [REDACTED] to change his timecard for February 14, 2013, to reflect his leave.

#### Referrals

N/A

#### Judicial Action

N/A

#### Findings

The investigation determined that the allegation of unauthorized secondary employment is unsubstantiated. The investigation substantiated that [REDACTED] misused Government property and made false statements to two different supervisors regarding his whereabouts and work status on February 14, 2013.

Based on the findings of our investigation, it appears that the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policy (ies) were violated or could be applied to the case:

- 5 CFR 2635.704(a)-Use of Government Property- An employee has a duty to protect and conserve Government property and shall not use such property, or allow its uses, for other than authorized purposes

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- CFR 31 § 0.213-General Conduct Prejudicial to the Government
- CFR 31 § 0.205-Care of Documents and Data

Distribution

[REDACTED], Chief, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing  
[REDACTED], Senior Advisor, Departmental Offices

Signatures


Case Agent:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

10/18/13

Date

Supervisor:

  
Jason J. Metrick


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Date

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**Exhibits**

1. Complaint letter from [REDACTED] BEP dated October 16, 2012.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated March 20, 2013.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Documentation Review, dated March 19, 2013.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated March 20, 2013.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated July 17, 2013.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated July 24, 2013.



# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

Case Title: Corporal [REDACTED]  
Police Officer  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing  
TR-8

Case #: BEP-13-0990-I

Case Type: Criminal \_\_\_\_\_  
Administrative X  
Civil \_\_\_\_\_

Investigation Initiated: March 19, 2013

Investigation Completed: JUN 19 2013

Conducted by: [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

Origin: [REDACTED] Manager,  
Office of Security, Bureau of  
Engraving and Printing

Approved by: John L. Phillips  
Special Agent in Charge

### Summary

On March 19, 2013, the Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), received information from [REDACTED] Manager, Office of Security, Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) regarding complaints received at BEP from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] alleging BEP Police Officer, Corporal [REDACTED] abused his authority and position as a Federal police officer to harass and influence various officials of the Charles and St. Mary's Counties, MD government. Additionally, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] alleged that [REDACTED] was criminally charged in Maryland for theft. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that the allegations are unsubstantiated. Witnesses denied [REDACTED] made statements regarding his employment as a Federal police officer in order to hinder, influence, intimidate or persuade officials. Furthermore, on May 23, 2013, the St. Mary's County, MD District Attorney's Office decided to nolle prosequere and dropped the criminal theft charges against [REDACTED]

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### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

On March 19, 2013, TOIG received information from [REDACTED] Manager, BEP regarding complaints received at BEP from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] alleging BEP Police Officer, Corporal [REDACTED] abused his authority and position as a Federal police officer to harass and influence various officials of the Charles and St. Mary's Counties, MD government.

[REDACTED] was initially employed with BEP from September 2005 - November 2007 when he resigned to start his own roofing company, [REDACTED] Home Improvement. [REDACTED] returned to BEP in February 2010, after he closed his roofing company. [REDACTED] is a police officer responsible for physical security, manning entry control points, and conducting external facility patrols. (Exhibit 2)

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED], Complainant
- [REDACTED], Complainant
- [REDACTED], Deputy with SMSD
- [REDACTED], Deputy with SMSD
- [REDACTED], Deputy with SMSD
- [REDACTED], Executive Director of the Charles County, MD Chamber of Commerce
- [REDACTED], Lead Investigator for the MHIC
- [REDACTED], Deputy Chief, BEP

During the course of the investigation, TOIG reviewed the following pertinent documents:

- The Maryland Judicial Case Search for criminal number [REDACTED]

### Investigative Activity

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] reconfirmed that she previously stated in her complaint to BEP, that she had "...no affiliation to or with Mr. [REDACTED].." [REDACTED] admitted that she actually was affiliated with [REDACTED] because she previously worked for [REDACTED] at his roofing company and was familiar with the history between [REDACTED] and her fiancé, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated when [REDACTED] abruptly closed his roofing company, he [REDACTED] refused to provide them with 1099's for tax purposes. [REDACTED] also stated she was upset that [REDACTED] traveled to her residence and removed the vehicle registrations from her vehicle, which were registered in [REDACTED]'s business name, but owned by her. [REDACTED]'s statements regarding her employment, 1099's and vehicle registration were not in her original complaint letter.

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] telephoned [REDACTED], Director of the Charles County, MD Chamber of Commerce, to complain about [REDACTED]'s [REDACTED] company operating unlicensed. [REDACTED] further alleged that [REDACTED] said to [REDACTED] "He is a Federal police officer

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and she needs to take him seriously." [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] telephoned [REDACTED], Lead Inspector for the Maryland Home Improvement Commission (MHIC), and made claims and allegations against [REDACTED]'s business which resulted in a \$1,000 fine.

[REDACTED] denied [REDACTED] ever threatened her or her business personally, whether verbally or in writing. (Exhibit 3)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] stole two All-Terrain Vehicles (ATV's) from him. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] blamed him for losing custody of his two daughters during the divorce trial, because [REDACTED] was supposed to testify on behalf of [REDACTED] and did not. [REDACTED] stated the ATV's were left at [REDACTED]'s property for convenience so that [REDACTED] did not have to repeatedly transport them to and from [REDACTED]'s property each time his granddaughters ([REDACTED]'s daughters) wanted to ride the ATV's.

Once [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]'s business relationship fell apart and [REDACTED] divorced [REDACTED]'s step-daughter, [REDACTED] kept the ATV's and never returned them. [REDACTED] stated when [REDACTED] abruptly closed his roofing business that he did not warn his employees nor did he provide final 1099's.

[REDACTED] stated the St. Mary's County, MD Sheriff's Department (SMSD) accompanied him to [REDACTED]'s residence in an attempt to retrieve the ATV's. [REDACTED] stated the SMSD asked [REDACTED] whether or not he possessed the ATV's and if he would return them to [REDACTED] at which time [REDACTED] told the deputy that [REDACTED] was lying and closed the door. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] played the "Cop Card" when the SMSD deputies were at his door.

[REDACTED] stated on February 19, 2013, he swore out an Application Statement of Charges for theft \$0- \$10,000 against [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] wrote in his Application Statement of Charges that SMSD attempted to retrieve the ATV's from [REDACTED] on three separate occasions in October 2012, but [REDACTED] said they were not at his home and he did not have them. (Exhibit 4)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] was familiar with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] because of the ongoing disputes between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], previously owned by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated there was bad blood between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], [REDACTED]'s previous business partner at [REDACTED] who is [REDACTED]'s new roofing competition.

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] telephoned the Chamber and complained to her that [REDACTED] was improperly advertising and unlicensed to do roofing. [REDACTED] denied [REDACTED] ever acknowledged he was a federal police officer, police officer or government employee. (Exhibit 5)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] stated he remembered [REDACTED] but did not recall [REDACTED] ever mentioning anything about being a Federal police officer. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] may have

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mentioned he worked for the Federal government during the course of a conversation, but never appeared to be using his position or title to influence, intimidate or persuade [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was just one of many complainants who telephoned his office about [REDACTED]'s business. [REDACTED] further stated [REDACTED] was not the only police officer that telephoned a complaint into MHIC. [REDACTED] stated most of the drama involving [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stems from a previous business relationship and possibly something to do with a divorce.

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was probably seeking retaliation against [REDACTED] because she received a fine in lieu of the telephone complaints. [REDACTED] further stated [REDACTED] wrote the citation to [REDACTED] for contracting without a license. [REDACTED] further stated [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] created their own problems with MHIC by not operating in accordance with Maryland law. (Exhibit 6)

During interviews with TOIG, SMSD Deputies [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] all denied [REDACTED] made statements regarding his employment as a Federal police officer. Deputy [REDACTED] also denied that [REDACTED] was uncooperative and stated he ([REDACTED] consented to a search of his property, to include his garage and shed. Deputy [REDACTED] informed TOIG [REDACTED]'s actions seemed retaliatory and more personal. (Exhibits 7-9)

A TOIG document review of the Criminal Summons issued by the St. Mary's County, MD District Court on February 25, 2013 for [REDACTED], confirmed he was charged with one count of theft \$1,000 to under \$10,000, pursuant to Maryland Annotated Code, CR 7 § 104. The summons was served on [REDACTED] at his home address in [REDACTED] MD on March 11, 2013. (Exhibit 10)

### Referrals

N/A

### Judicial Action

On May 23, 2013, the St. Mary's County, MD District Attorney's Office decided to nolle prosequere and dropped the criminal theft charges against [REDACTED] because the plaintiff, [REDACTED] (complainant) initiated a civil law suit against [REDACTED] for the ATV's. (Exhibit 11)

### Findings

The investigation determined that the allegations are unsubstantiated. Witnesses denied [REDACTED] made statements regarding his employment as a Federal police officer in order to hinder, influence, intimidate or persuade officials. Furthermore, on May 23, 2013, the St. Mary's

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County, MD District Attorney's Office decided to nolle prosequere and dropped the criminal theft charges against [REDACTED]

Distribution

[REDACTED], Manager, Security and Investigations Division, Office of Security, BEP

Signatures

Case Agent: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

9/19/13  
Date

Supervisor:

John L. Phillips

Date

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Exhibits

1. Lead Initiation, Memorandum to TOIG dated, March 18, 2013
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated May 31, 2013.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated April 9, 2013.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated April 9, 2013.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated April 9, 2013.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated April 22, 2013.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated April 24, 2013.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated April 24, 2013.
9. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated April 25, 2013.
10. Maryland Judicial status for criminal case # [REDACTED] dated March 18, 2013.
11. Maryland Judicial result for criminal case # [REDACTED] dated May 28, 2013.





# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

**Case Title:** [REDACTED] Assault  
(Treasury Employee)

**Case Type:** Criminal \_\_\_\_\_  
Administrative   X    
Civil \_\_\_\_\_

**Investigation Initiated:** April 23, 2013

**Conducted by:** [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

**Investigation Completed:** JUN 24 2013

**Approved by:** John L. Phillips  
Special Agent In Charge

**Origin:** Bureau of Engraving and Printing

**Case #:** BEP-13-1243-I

### Summary

On April 23, 2013, the Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), was contacted regarding the complaint of [REDACTED] Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), who reported to BEP Police that [REDACTED] was waving a knife at her and that he pinched her cheek while exiting an elevator in BEP Headquarters. (Exhibit 1)

On April 18, 2013, [REDACTED] was on elevator #18 at BEP with a pocket knife opened cleaning his fingernails when the elevator doors opened on the second floor and [REDACTED] entered the elevator. [REDACTED] engaged [REDACTED] in conversation with the pocket knife open. After [REDACTED] commented about her being fearful of the knife, [REDACTED] closed the knife and continued engaging in conversation. On the third floor, upon exiting the elevator, [REDACTED] pinched [REDACTED]'s left cheek. Numerous interviews of BEP employees and viewing the security video did not substantiate the assault allegations.

On April 24, 2013, TOIG received a copy of the video surveillance from BEP Police of the incident.

Investigation determined the allegations of assault could not be substantiated, although, improper behavior, relating to the pinching of [REDACTED]'s cheek, was substantiated.

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### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

On April 23, 2013, TOIG was notified by BEP Police of an incident reported to them by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] was waving a knife at her in a BEP elevator and pinched her cheek as he exited the elevator.

During the course of the investigation, TOIG conducted relevant interviews with:

- [REDACTED] Complainant, Information Systems Specialist, BEP
- [REDACTED] Office of Enterprise Solutions, BEP
- [REDACTED] Deputy Director, BEP
- [REDACTED] Production Manager, BEP
- [REDACTED] IT Specialist, BEP
- [REDACTED] Inspector, BEP
- [REDACTED] Executive Assistant, BEP

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- BEP Police incident report, dated April 18, 2013.

### Investigative Activity

On April 30, 2013, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED] Information Systems Specialist, BEP in reference to her complaint of harassment by [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] provided the following information in substance and in part:

[REDACTED] said that she has been employed at BEP since September 2005 in the Chief Information Officer's Office as an Information Systems Specialist (GS-14). She said that she works on the BEP Enterprise contract with [REDACTED]. She said that [REDACTED] is a GS-15 and a 40 year employee of BEP.

As background, [REDACTED] said that since they started working together, [REDACTED]'s business manner was a "culture shock" compared to the private sector, from where she came. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] uses profanity, sticks his middle finger out at her and others, hugs her and puts his arm around her. Not the business conduct that she was used to. [REDACTED] said that she is fearful of [REDACTED] because he changes moods very quickly and said he seemed to be "bipolar".

Approximately a year ago, [REDACTED] said that she reported to her supervisor, [REDACTED] about an email she received from [REDACTED] that said "Kiss my foot" in response to an email [REDACTED] sent to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said her email response answered a question about program data and about an incident where [REDACTED] stuck his middle finger out at her while she, [REDACTED] and another employee were working over a computer. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] leaned back and gave her the middle

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finger without the third employee seeing it. [REDACTED] said she has tried to avoid [REDACTED] since this time.

[REDACTED] said that on March 18, 2013 she went to the cafeteria for breakfast. As she was returning from the cafeteria, [REDACTED] was waiting for the elevator on the 2nd floor and the elevator door opened. She said [REDACTED] was already on the elevator by himself when she entered the elevator. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had an open pocket knife and she debated whether to get on the elevator but decided to do it because it would have been too obvious not to get on the elevator. [REDACTED] said that she told [REDACTED] that she was "a little scared of the knife". She said that [REDACTED] folded the pocket knife up, but did not put it away. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] "who is going to be your buddy?" referring to a co-worker being transferred. [REDACTED] said she felt intimidated because he changes moods so fast. [REDACTED] said the door opened on the 3rd floor and [REDACTED] was leaving the elevator when he pinched [REDACTED]'s cheek. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] did not say anything as he pinched her cheek and left the elevator.

[REDACTED] said that she reported the incident to her supervisor, [REDACTED] later in the day after she went back to the elevator to see if there were security cameras. She asked [REDACTED] if she could get a copy of the elevator security tape. [REDACTED] said that she was told that [REDACTED] (a [REDACTED]'s manager), the Labor Relations Manager ([REDACTED]) and the Human Resources Manager were going to meet and discuss what to do. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] told her that [REDACTED] has no violent history and "pretty sure he won't do harm to her." [REDACTED] was told that they were going to put the 10-foot rule in effect (saying that neither party could come within 10 feet of the other).

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] spoke to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] said he will ask [REDACTED] to come apologize to her. She didn't want to be alone with him. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] came to her cube and said, "I'm sorry if today's event upset you, wasn't my intent. I apologize." [REDACTED] said she felt no sincerity or remorse.

[REDACTED] said that she felt like nothing was going to be done so she went to the BEP Police and asked for the security tape. She filed a report with Officer [REDACTED] who told her that [REDACTED] wasn't supposed to have the knife on BEP property. The next morning (Friday), [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that she had filed a police report. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] already knew because [REDACTED] had his BEP pass red-lined (suspended). [REDACTED] told her that management was meeting that day to figure out how to handle the situation. [REDACTED] sent an email to [REDACTED] about being fearful and he said a memo would be provided to her and she was told to telework for the next week. [REDACTED] said that she was shocked to hear [REDACTED] on a conference call on Tuesday when she called in. She said part of the 10-foot rule said that [REDACTED] had to teleconference in to every meeting where they both were to attend. (Exhibit 2)

On May 8, 2013, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has been [REDACTED]'s supervisor for the last three years in the Office of Enterprise Solutions.

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█████ said that he found out about the incident in question on Thursday, April 18, 2013. █████ said that █████ came into his office at 10:15 am to tell him about the incident and asked him if she was overreacting. █████ told him that "█████ had a knife out, waving it." She felt like he was waving it at her face. She told him that she thought about not getting into the elevator, but got in anyway. █████ said that █████ told him that █████ said, "Hey █████ how's it going?" █████ responded by saying, "frankly pretty scared right now". █████ explained to █████ that █████ pinched her cheek and said, "everything will be alright" as he was walking out the elevator door. █████ said that █████ also brought up an incident about █████ giving her the middle finger about a year ago, that █████ had never heard before.

█████ said that in approximately March 2012, █████ brought to his attention that █████ used inappropriate language, but had never heard the middle finger story. █████ said that he spoke to █████ about the inappropriate language and told him that it was not appropriate.

█████ said that █████ had never mentioned anything to him or █████ about her being uncomfortable around or working with █████. █████ said that █████ is a good performer and has no disciplinary issues. █████ said that █████ seems to have a "total distrust" of management/government and feels like this will be swept under the rug. That is why she asked to get a copy of the security video tape.

█████ said that because of the incident, both █████ and █████ have been issued a stay away order. █████ must call in to meetings that both are scheduled to attend, and █████ has been teleworking more frequently. █████ said that if there were a violation of the stay away order, it is to be reported to Human Resources. The stay away order (10 foot rule) says that █████ and █████ are not to have interaction. █████ said that there was a miscommunication by █████ (█████'s supervisor) on one occasion, where █████ attended a meeting in person when █████ was thought to be teleworking. When she teleconferenced in to the meeting, █████ was present. █████ was upset because █████ was supposed to call in to all meetings where █████ "could" be present. █████ explained that █████ would not have known whether or not she would be present at the meeting. █████ said that it's been corrected so that █████ must call in to all meetings where █████ and █████ are to participate.

Immediately after █████ was told of the elevator incident, Human Resources was called and the Violence Initiation Team met. █████ was told that it was determined that there was "no indication of risk of violence" by █████.

█████ said that █████ has asked for authorization to bring mace with her into the building. █████ said that he has talked to BEP Police and they told him that it can be authorized, but they would prefer that it not be authorized. █████ said █████ has not brought the issue of mace up again. █████ said that he believes that the employees are authorized to bring a knife into BEP as long as it is under 3 inches long. █████ said that █████ always uses a knife to clean his finger nails. (Exhibit 3)

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On May 8, 2013, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED]'s immediate supervisor. [REDACTED] has been [REDACTED]'s supervisor for the last four months, but has known him for 10 years.

[REDACTED] said that he found out about the incident in question on Thursday, April 18, 2013, via a phone call from [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] came to [REDACTED]'s office and told him the story about [REDACTED] waving a pen knife and pinching [REDACTED]'s cheek. [REDACTED] said that after hearing the story from [REDACTED] he called [REDACTED] to his office and asked him what happened. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] told him that he had gotten on the elevator and was cleaning his nails when [REDACTED] got on the elevator. [REDACTED] said they were talking and when he got off the elevator he pinched her cheek. [REDACTED] said they were talking about a colleague that was transferring. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that pinching her cheek was inappropriate and not to do it again. When asked about the knife, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has brought it in numerous times and that BEP Police say it falls within guidelines. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] not to bring the knife back in and was told to apologize to [REDACTED] which he did.

[REDACTED] said the next morning, [REDACTED] called him and told him that he was red-lined (not allowed in building). [REDACTED] said that he met with Legal, Labor Management Relations (LMR), Security and [REDACTED]. It was decided that [REDACTED] stay home that day (Friday) and be allowed to come back on Monday. [REDACTED] said that over the weekend [REDACTED] became more concerned about incident and being in the building with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that on Monday morning he met again with LMR and Legal and discussed options on what they could do. It was decided to implement the "10 foot rule" which means they are not to have any contact with each other. [REDACTED] said that so far, [REDACTED] worked from home for a week and now [REDACTED] has been sent to Texas for a week which is part of his responsibility. [REDACTED] said that there was some miscommunication about a meeting last week where both were to participate. [REDACTED] was upset that [REDACTED] was present at a meeting that she called into. It has been decided that [REDACTED] will call in to all meetings that [REDACTED] will be a part of, whether in person or telephonically.

[REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as never being violent in the 10 years that he has known him including daily contact he has had with [REDACTED] the last 3 years. [REDACTED] has never been disciplined as far as he is aware. He said [REDACTED] is quirky and strong in his opinions and when he feels passionate about something he is outspoken. [REDACTED] never uses vulgar language that [REDACTED] has heard and does not consider him a threat. [REDACTED] does consider [REDACTED] to be stubborn. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] has never said anything about [REDACTED] and that they work well together. [REDACTED] hasn't seen evidence of [REDACTED] being "touchy/feely" with any employees. (Exhibit 4)

On May 8, 2013, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED], a peer of [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] said that he has been employed at BEP since 1990 and has known [REDACTED] since that time. He sees him almost daily for coffee in the morning and sees him outside of work two times a year for holiday parties and fishing.

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█████ said that █████ has never been violent. █████ is very knowledgeable of BEP. He is well received, has never threatened anybody and is willing to do anything to make it better. █████ said that █████ is a great guy, he umpires little league games and has taken mediation classes to be a mediator for the U.S. Government. He said █████ is opinionated and strong minded and will call "BS" depending on the audience, but never uses profanity. He gets along with 99% of the people at BEP. He said █████ is "touchy/feely" but never in an inappropriate way. People still respect him even though he is opinionated. █████ said that back in the 1970s or 1980s, BEP was doing an audit of time cards and they found that they actually owed █████ money. █████ said he is one of the most honest guys that he knows.

█████ said that █████ has never spoken about █████ and is "disillusioned by the whole thing" (incident).

█████ feels that everything was fine until █████'s partner was transferred and all the responsibility fell on her and she can't do the job and is trying to make excuses. █████ said that it is his opinion that █████ is asking too much with respect to the restrictions being put on █████.

When asked about the knife, █████ said that █████ has a habit of cleaning his nails with anything he can. He said it's a habit of printers. He has his knife to clean his nails and that is the only reason he has a knife. (Exhibit 5)

On May 8, 2013, TOIG interviewed █████ a peer of █████s.

█████ said that she has been employed at BEP since 1998 and has known █████ since approximately 2006. She works on the same project as █████.

█████ said that the morning of the elevator incident, █████ came to her appearing very shaken up. When █████ asked her what was going on, █████ told her what happened on the elevator and asked █████ if she would come with her to try to get the security video tape from the BEP Police.

█████ said that she has had only one meeting with █████ since she has worked at BEP and didn't know him until they worked on the same project. She said █████ is very arrogant and bossy. She said that she has never talked to █████ and █████ never talks to her. █████ said that █████ told her about the "middle finger" incident and how █████ always uses profanity, but she has never seen or heard it directly.

█████ said that she was asked on Friday morning, April 19, 2013, to go take █████'s computer and then in the afternoon she gave it back. She was concerned that █████ would retaliate against her, but she said her manager told her if █████ retaliates, to notify him. █████ said that she is concerned that █████ will retaliate against her for going to the police with █████.

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said that the only people that know she went with [REDACTED] to the Police are [REDACTED] (supervisor) and Officer [REDACTED] (Exhibit 6)

On May 17, 2013, TOIG requested information from BEP, Employee and Labor-Management Relations Division, on any/all disciplinary action related to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Employee and Labor Relations Specialist, BEP, responded via email stating that there is no disciplinary information related to [REDACTED] (Exhibit 7)

On May 22, 2013, TOIG interviewed [REDACTED]. He has been employed at BEP for approximately 39 years and has known [REDACTED] for approximately 2 or 3 years, from working on the same project. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] is the Information Technology Lead and he is the Business Lead for the Data Management Module (DMM) project. [REDACTED] said that they would see each other every day when they worked on the same project for approximately 1 ½ years and then approximately 2 or 3 times a week after they finished the project.

[REDACTED] said that on the morning of the incident referenced in the complaint, he was riding the elevator up to his office when the elevator door opened and [REDACTED] got on the elevator. [REDACTED] said he already had his pocket knife out cleaning his nails because he had been gardening the night before and was trying to get the dirt out of them. [REDACTED] said that when [REDACTED] got on the elevator he was commenting to her about the other Business Lead on the DMM project, [REDACTED], being transferred to Texas. [REDACTED] said he was expressing his concern to [REDACTED] by explaining that he knew that there was more of a need to help her out on the project because of [REDACTED]'s departure. [REDACTED] explained that, as a whole, the line workers do not trust IT because they feel that IT does not know what they need and doesn't understand the business workings of the Bureau. [REDACTED] explained that he believes IT needs an ally on the business side of the house, and that is what he was trying to relay to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] admitted that he is very animated when he talks and tends to "talk with his hands". [REDACTED] said that he does not remember what [REDACTED] said to him on the elevator, but knows that he put the knife blade down at some point. [REDACTED] said that he doesn't remember all the details of the incident because the incident on the elevator was a non-event in his mind and didn't think twice about what he did, because he was trying to comfort [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] said that he "tweaked" [REDACTED]'s cheek as he left the elevator, but it was like a "Paternal cheek tweak" or like a she was a little sister type thing. [REDACTED] said he was trying to comfort [REDACTED] "kind of like, it will be OK". He said he had no intention of causing her fear or to feel uncomfortable. He said the way she took it was 180 degrees different than what he was trying to relay to her.

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] Deputy Director, asked him about the incident later in the day and it was recommended that [REDACTED] go apologize to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that he went up to [REDACTED]'s Office and peeked around the corner to apologize, but realized she was on the phone. [REDACTED]

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said that when hung up the phone, he went back and apologized and said something to the effect that in no way, shape, or form was he trying to make her feel uncomfortable.

said that he, and used to work together very regularly. He said that they have all travelled together and felt that they had a trusting working relationship.

said that has never mentioned not wanting to work together or that she was afraid of . said that he never had the feeling that she was afraid of him.

said that his personality is that he talks with his hands and will sometimes put his arm around someone's shoulder to convey friendship or understanding. He will sometimes shake hands with somebody and then grab their arm as well. He said he tends to do this more with males than with females. said that there was nothing specifically said during the cheek tweak, and stated that he was trying to relay his concern, not about the project, but his concern for her ability to carry out the project.

said he has carried a knife since he was a kid and the habit was passed down by his father. knew about the BEP guidelines referencing pocket knives and was told that the pocket knife he carried met the guidelines. He said the pocket knife he was cleaning his fingernails with during the incident was a leatherman brand knife that he removes to open boxes and perform his daily functions. said he was never questioned about the knife whenever he came in to the building because it was within guidelines. said that he will never carry a knife to work anymore.

said that he is opinionated and "doesn't suffer fools easily". He does not consider himself violent. He said he can be free with his speech, but he considers his audience before speaking. said that if he has ever used vulgar language in front of it would've been a slip. said that is a "nice lady" and they had a very good working relationship. He said he has nothing against her and he is sorry for having offended her. said that he feels bad because he knows what was in his heart and mind and it wasn't to make her feel bad. He said that he will not approach her at all. (Exhibit 8)

### Referrals

None

### Judicial Action

None



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Findings

Investigation determined the allegations of assault could not be substantiated, although, improper behavior, relating to the pinching of [REDACTED]'s cheek, was substantiated.

By definition, assault is described as any willful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon the person or another, when coupled with an apparent present ability to do so, and any intentional display of force such as would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm without legal excuse of justification. Based on investigation, there is no indication that there was a willful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon [REDACTED]

Based on the findings of our investigation, it appears that the following pertinent statute(s), regulation(s) and/or policy(ies) were violated or could be applied to the case:

- 5 C.F.R. 735.203, Conduct prejudicial to the Government

Distribution

[REDACTED] Manager, Security Investigations Division, Office of Security, BEP.

Report of Investigation

[REDACTED]  
BEP-13-1243-1


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Signatures

Case Agent:   
  


6/18/13  
Date

Supervisor:

  
John L. Phillips

6/21/13  
Date

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Report of Investigation

[REDACTED]  
BEP-13-1243-1


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Exhibits

1. Complaint document, BEP Police Report, dated April 18, 2013.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated April 30, 2013.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated May 8, 2013.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated May 8, 2013.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 8, 2013.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated May 8, 2013.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Email from [REDACTED] dated May 17, 2013.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated May 22, 2013.



# Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of the Treasury



## Report of Investigation

Case Title: [REDACTED]  
Book Binder / WE-2  
Bureau of Engraving and Printing

Case #: BEP-13-1699-I  
Case Type: Criminal   X    
Administrative         
Civil       

Investigation Initiated: June 20, 2013

Conducted by: [REDACTED]  
Special Agent

Investigation Completed: NOV 08 2013

Approved by: Jason J. Metrick  
Special Agent in Charge  
(Acting)

Origin: Anonymous

### Summary

On June 20, 2013, the Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG) received an anonymous complaint that a Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) employee was operating an unlicensed home improvement business. Specifically, it was alleged that [REDACTED] Book Binder, BEP, does home improvement work for numerous BEP employees as a side profession. (Exhibit 1)

The investigation determined that the allegation is unsubstantiated. There was no direct evidence developed that [REDACTED] owns and/or operates an unlicensed home improvement business. [REDACTED] has worked on approximately six home improvement projects for other BEP employees as favors. However, based on the information discovered during the course of this investigation, it was also determined that [REDACTED]'s activities did not warrant a Request for Approval to Engage in Outside Employment or Other Activities

### Basis and Scope of the Investigation

TOIG received an anonymous complainant that [REDACTED] is operating an unlicensed home improvement business, and has done work on numerous BEP employee's homes. Furthermore, [REDACTED] is accused of not reporting his outside activities to agency officials as required by BEP policy.

[REDACTED] has been employed by BEP for the last 19 years. During this time, he has worked a variety of jobs to include his current position as a Book Binder. As a Book Binder for the BEP, [REDACTED]'s duties include but are not limited to: perform operations in the production, processing and finishing of high-quality security-printed items.

During the course of the investigation, interviews were conducted with:

- [REDACTED], Book Binder, BEP
- [REDACTED] Manager, Office of Security Printing, BEP
- [REDACTED] Office of Security Printing, BEP
- [REDACTED] Book Binder, BEP
- [REDACTED] Counter/Examiner, BEP
- [REDACTED] Book Binder, BEP
- [REDACTED] Book Binder, BEP
- [REDACTED], Book Binder, BEP
- [REDACTED] Sheet Examiner, BEP
- [REDACTED], Foreman Currency Production, BEP
- [REDACTED] Stock Controller, BEP
- [REDACTED], Counter/Examiner, BEP
- [REDACTED] Counter/Examiner, BEP.
- [REDACTED], Book Binder, BEP
- [REDACTED], Assistant Supervisor, BEP
- [REDACTED], Book Binder, BEP
- [REDACTED] Counter/Examiner, BEP
- [REDACTED], Book Binder, BEP
- [REDACTED] Examining Supervisor, BEP
- [REDACTED] Counter/Examiner, BEP
- [REDACTED] Attorney Advisor (Ethics Official), BEP

In addition, TOIG reviewed pertinent documents, including:

- BEP records relating to [REDACTED]

### Investigative Activity

In interviews with TOIG, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both stated that they had neither seen nor approved an outside employment form from [REDACTED]. Each confirmed that any BEP employee

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who's involved in a business outside of the bureau is required to submit, and have approved, a Request for Approval to Engage in Outside Employment or Other Activities. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stated that they had no knowledge of [REDACTED] owning and/or operating a home improvement business. They also stated that [REDACTED] has never done any home improvement work at their respective residences. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stated that they have never seen and/or heard of [REDACTED] soliciting work from other BEP employees.

TOIG advised [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] assisted a few BEP employees with home improvement projects, but [REDACTED] considered each a friend and charged them a below market rate. Additionally, [REDACTED] did not solicit work from these individuals. [REDACTED] stated that he did not believe [REDACTED] needed to submit an outside employment request because it appears that [REDACTED] was not operating a business. (Exhibits 2 and 3)

In interviews with TOIG, 13 of [REDACTED]'s co-workers had no knowledge of [REDACTED] owning and/or operating a home improvement business. [REDACTED] never completed any home improvement projects at their residences, nor had he solicited any such work. (Exhibits 4-16)

In interviews with TOIG, four of [REDACTED]'s co-workers believed [REDACTED] owned and/or operated a home improvement business. Each reported that [REDACTED] had not completed any home improvement projects at his other residence, nor had [REDACTED] solicited any such work. However, these individuals reported that [REDACTED] has had conversations directly with them and/or they have overheard him talking about work he has completed for BEP employees. (Exhibits 17-20)

In an interview with TOIG, [REDACTED] denied owning and/or operating a home improvement business. [REDACTED] admitted that he has worked on approximately six home improvement projects for other BEP employees as favors. He denied that he solicited work from other BEP employees. [REDACTED] considered each person a personal friend who came to him for assistance. [REDACTED] continued that he had a difficult time saying no, because they are his friends and he wanted them to like him.

[REDACTED] charged each person for his time, but it was minimal compared to what a general contractor would charge. [REDACTED] stated that he often misquoted the prices in his co-workers favor because he was not doing it to make a profit. [REDACTED] did not consider his activities as outside employment, based on his understanding of the outside employment or other activities rules. Therefore, [REDACTED] admitted that he never filed a Request for Approval to Engage in Outside Employment or Other Activities. (Exhibit 21)

[Agent's Note: On November 8, 2013, [REDACTED], Attorney Advisor (Ethics Official), BEP was informed of the facts relating to this investigation. Based on the facts of this investigation, [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED]'s activities did not warrant a Request for Approval to Engage in Outside Employment or Other Activities.]

Referrals

N/A

Judicial Action

N/A

Findings

The investigation determined that the allegation is unsubstantiated. There was no direct evidence developed that [REDACTED] owns and/or operates an unlicensed home improvement business. [REDACTED] has worked on approximately six home improvement projects for other BEP employees as favors. However, based on the information discovered during the course of this investigation, it was also determined that [REDACTED]'s activities did not warrant a Request for Approval to Engage in Outside Employment or Other Activities

Distribution

[REDACTED], Chief, Office of Security, BEP.


Signatures

Case Agent:

[REDACTED]   
[REDACTED]

11/8/13  
Date

Supervisor:

  
Jason J. Metrick

11/8/13  
Date

**Exhibits**

1. Complaint documentation, dated June 17, 2013.
2. Memorandum of Activity, Interviews of [REDACTED], dated July 29, 2013.
3. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 5, 2013.
4. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 7, 2013.
5. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 7, 2013.
6. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
7. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
8. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 7, 2013.
9. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
10. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
11. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
12. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 7, 2013.
13. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
14. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 7, 2013.
15. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
16. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
17. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
18. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.
19. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated August 7, 2013.
20. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated August 7, 2013.



Report of Investigation

Case Name: [REDACTED]

Case #: BEP-13-1699-1

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21. Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated July 29, 2013.