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US Army Special Operations Command FOIA/Privacy Act Request Form
August 19, 2014

Freedom of Information Act
Office

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request), U.S. Army Special Operations Command FOIA Case #09-78. You requested the first 100 pages of the Multipurpose Force Study, the U.S. Army Special Forces, a Review of the Indochina Commitment and Projection of the Future Task, October 1976.

A releasable copy of the documents is enclosed. Information withheld pursuant to FOIA Exemption 5 USC 552 (b)(1), classified in the interest of national defense as specifically authorized under the criteria established by Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4; and Section 3.3(b). Also, information is withheld under FOIA Exemption (b)(6), for privacy concerns.

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If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact Mr. Chris Nesbitt, FOIA Officer, at (910) 432-9233, email: christopher.nesbitt@us.army.mil.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
David W. Treese
GS-15, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

Enclosure
The views and conclusions expressed in this document are those of the Commander, US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance and the authors concerned, and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the United States Government.

USASOC TS-11-91

MULTI-PURPOSE FORCE STUDY

THE US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

A REVIEW OF THEIR INDOCHINA COMMITMENT

AND

A PROJECTION OF FUTURE TASKS (U)

National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions

Classification by Joint Chiefs of Staff

SCHEDULE OF DECLASSIFICATION

RECLASSIFY 31 December 2000

TOP SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS.
1. In response to your direction of May 28, 1976, I am pleased to submit this report entitled, "Multi-Purpose Force: The US Army Special Forces--A Review of their Indochina Commitment and a Projection of Future Tasks."

2. While the initial purpose of the study was the evaluation of the Special Forces experience in Southeast Asia, I believe the study has produced considerably more and is a credible document.

3. As Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, I bear final responsibility for the study's content. Interpretations or conclusions should be understood to be solely mine and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

ROBERT C. KINGSTON
Major General, USA
Commanding
MULTI-PURPOSE FORCE STUDY

The U.S. Army Special Forces

A Review of Their Indochina Commitment
and
A Projection of Future Tasks

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This study identifies alternatives which could reduce or negate the need for conventional force commitments in response to threats to our national interests. It emphasizes the role of US Army Special Forces and how its capabilities provide flexible, existing means to respond to contemporary contingencies. The US political and military experience during 1954-1973 is reviewed with emphasis on US Army Special Forces employment. Included is not only an analysis of those tasks performed, but also those which Special Forces could have productively undertaken. The conditions and restraints affecting these tasks and their applicability in future exigencies are assessed. While this study portrays that the capabilities required to meet the myriad requirements of the international milieu are currently possessed by US Army Special Forces, it also delineates recommendations which, if implemented, would greatly increase its effectiveness. Research was limited to assets available within the Department of Defense and unclassified sources.
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(U) The US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance was directed to conduct a study to delineate the capabilities of the US Army Special Forces by analyzing the Special Forces experience in Indochina together with an assessment of the current stability of Southeast Asia. These assessments were undertaken to demonstrate that Special Forces is a multi-purpose force which offers a viable military response option to the National Command Authority.

(U) As a result of the Vietnam experience, the slogan "No More Vietnams" reflects the widespread feeling and public attitude that no US commitment abroad is worth the cost of armed intervention. Unfortunately, this attitude is often carried beyond direct intervention with US combat forces and includes such circumscribed forms of involvement as the provision of military training and advice to foreign governments.

(U) A cursory review of the world situation illustrates that the potential for trouble in various regions renders dubious any firm prediction that the United States would not project US military power into a situation that is perceived as seriously threatening to American interests. The military power projected, however, must be that which offers the least risk, greatest responsiveness, highest cost effectiveness and best opportunity for success while being acceptable to the US public.

(U) The increase of transnational terrorism, which transcends international boundaries, and its potential for serious or catastrophic consequences is of significant concern to the United States. Terrorists are engaged in the assassination of governmental decision makers, sabotaging critical public and military facilities, skyjacking, kidnapping diplomats, and occupying embassies while holding the diplomatic personnel legation for ransom. Of rising concern is the possibility of nuclear blackmail where millions of individuals could become hostage as a result of terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon by theft or other illegal means. Although no one nation can feel perfectly safe from terrorist acts, western industrialized nations are the most popular targets of attacks. The United States alone has witnessed its citizens fall victim in over 30 percent of all terrorist actions since 1968. Traditional international law requires a government to seek to prevent its subjects or other residents within its sovereignty from committing acts injurious to other nations and to take sanctions against them for doing so. Sovereign nations, however, often provide facilities and are sympathetic to the objectives of the terrorists, yet deny responsibility for specific violent acts that are committed. Failure of a sovereign nation to effectively deal with such actions occurring on its soil requires other nations to act unilaterally to protect national interests and the lives of its citizens which the Israeli raid into Uganda vividly demonstrates.

(U) There is potential for insurgent conflict in many of the less developed countries of Southeast Asia, southern Africa and Latin America.
because socio-economic and political problems such as racism, over population and poverty, and minority or autocratic rule provide issues that can be exploited by nationalist or Communist groups against established governments. In Malaysia, there is a Communist insurgency that is directed toward establishment of a Communist state that would include Singapore. Although Malaysia in itself may not be vital to US interests in Southeast Asia, the fact that it, along with Indonesia and Singapore, are astride strategic international lines of communication in the Pacific, may become vital under certain circumstances. In southern Africa, insurgent warfare will in all probability increase in force and intensity. As military operations in Angola have decreased, the situation in Rhodesia has intensified. United States intermediary assistance is focused primarily on fostering black majority rule in order to divert a race war threatened by the leaders of neighboring black African states. Indications are that despite peace attempts, significant racial issues remain. Foreign powers have found it expedient to intervene in African affairs which has resulted in substantial expansion of Soviet-Cuban influence in the region which directly affects US interests.

(U) Terrorism, revolution and insurgency are likely to remain frequent forms of military challenge to US interests during the foreseeable future. It is clear that the National Command Authority when confronted with a situation requiring response, is likely either to abstain at high cost or to commit power both excessive and ineffective if it has failed during periods of non-hostilities to preserve a less costly, less risky, and less visible option by ignoring or disregarding the institutional and individual capabilities that have emerged from more than two decades of American experience in revolutionary conflict.

(U) Since Vietnam, the United States Army has recognized the requirement for an unconventional warfare capability and has retained Special Forces in the force structure. This multi-purpose force, though a small segment of the US Army, is the major element of the US military's unconventional warfare capability and represents a responsive and flexible instrument of national power with a potential for employment in situations ranging from humanitarian assistance to general war.

(U) Although retained, there is a pervasive lack of understanding, interest and support of unconventional warfare and Special Forces as a valid national response option. Based on research conducted for the study, this state-of-mind is nearly identical to that which existed in the mid-1950's when the United States became involved in Indochina in the struggle against Communism.

(U) The period 1954-1965 was a critical period in the history of Indochina. It was during this period that the Communist insurgency developed in South Vietnam to the point that required the escalation of US involvement from a small Military Advisory Group, through various levels of advice and assistance, to large scale deployment and intervention with conventional forces.

(U) Most authorities agree that United States policy during the early stages reflected a lack of knowledge about revolutionary warfare and realization
that an integrated, pacification (or counterinsurgency) plan directed toward elimination of existing socio-political and economic ills as well as destroying the armed insurgents is required in order to defeat an insurgency. An interdepartmental organization was not initially established in South Vietnam for the purpose of coordination and administration of development and pacification plans.* As a result, short-range strategies in South Vietnam were often inconsistent with long-range objectives in Washington and were counterproductive when compared to the more consistent objectives and strategies of North Vietnam. Political constraints generated at national level, such as respecting national boundaries, resulted in provision of sanctuaries to the enemy that afforded North Vietnam numerous opportunities to greatly moderate the adverse effects of war. On the other hand, changes in national objectives were not always accompanied by corresponding changes in strategy. As a consequence, operations and actions directed at the insurgency in the field, away from Washington and headquarters in Saigon, were often uncoordinated, fragmented and duplicative. An additional major deficiency, manifested by conventional institutional memory, was the concentration of military efforts toward the organization and training of South Vietnam's armed forces in the image of US forces and oriented toward stopping an invasion from the north, rather than along more unconventional lines aimed at defeating the armed insurgency in the South. The State Department was also guilty of mirror-imagery. Its concept of institution-building based upon the American democratic form proved hard to apply to the conditions of South Vietnam.

(U) Special Forces capabilities are generally perceived by many to be limited to the conduct of guerrilla warfare in support of conventional forces. This misconception leads to undue concentration on the classic aspects of unconventional warfare, i.e., guerrilla warfare in support of conventional forces in the image of World War II, and has all but eliminated unconventional warfare forces from consideration for employment in the limited war scenario which should not be the case.

(U) Not only is Special Forces organized, trained and equipped to conduct unconventional warfare, but it can provide direct assistance to a nation's internal defense effort in the face of an insurgency. This assistance can vary from the provision of advice to military units to controlling them by control of critical assets or encadrement. Foreign internal defense missions appropriate to Special Forces include: provision of capability to rapidly train reserves, replacements or paramilitary personnel in a nation undergoing mobilization; training military and paramilitary units in internal defense fields such as population denial, counterguerrilla operations, border and rear area security operations; training host country Special Forces units in internal defense, guerrilla warfare and special operations; and, reconstituting and retraining defeated

*By the time that CORDS was established for this purpose in 1967, the enemy was well entrenched in South Vietnam.
or disorganized units. The Indochina experience is replete with examples that validate the responsiveness and effectiveness of Special Forces in unconventional warfare, in a counterinsurgency role, and as special operations forces.

Special Forces was committed to Laos in July 1959, initially providing mobile training teams to conduct basic training of the Laotian Army. It expanded further and provided field training teams to each battalion of the Laotian Army. The assignment of Special Forces in a training and advisory role with conventional army units represented a sharp deviation from their normal mission of organizing and training guerrilla forces behind enemy lines in time of general war. It demonstrated that Special Forces is highly responsive and flexible, well suited for counterinsurgency operations and ideally suited for conducting unit training in remote areas. They provided detachments to train the Meo (northern highland tribesmen) and the Kha (southern highland tribesmen) in unconventional warfare.

In response to immediate requirements for increased US assistance, Special Forces began to deploy mobile training teams to Vietnam in June 1957 as augmentation to the MAAG to advise, organize and train the Vietnamese Army. The initial training teams, deployed from Okinawa and the United States, trained Vietnamese Special Forces and established and conducted a Ranger training program.

Special Forces also became involved in the organization and training of ethnic minority groups. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) lacked control and close contact with the Montagnards in the central highlands which was a natural buffer zone against the southward expansion of North Vietnamese Communism. By the end of 1961, the entire highlands were close to total Viet Cong domination. As a result, the Village Self-Defense Program, later called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), was approved by the government and instituted with advice and assistance provided by the US CIA. The program soon outgrew CIA capability, and responsibility for its continued operation passed to Special Forces in July 1962. During the 9-year period of the CIDG program which eclipsed other programs in size and scope, Special Forces became involved in every conceivable aspect of counterinsurgency -- military, economic, psychological and political. The Special Forces "A" Detachment provided advisory assistance at hamlet and village level and was the mechanism for combining grass-roots civic action, PSYOP, and intelligence operations oriented to population control with the more purely military activities necessary to counter the armed guerrilla threats. In this way, Special Forces teams provided the means for conducting an integrated, self-contained counterinsurgency effort within
a given and limited area. This contrasted sharply to the uncoordinated effort that existed at the national level. The CIDG program generally succeeded where it was concerned with mobilizing paramilitary forces for the purpose of population and area denial, so important to the counterinsurgency effort. There is no doubt that security was improved and that the CIDG program represented a significant economy of force employment of US forces in Vietnam. At its high point, CIDG forces numbered nearly 50,000. The study shows that overall the United States received a better return on the CIDG dollar than it did on any other project. For example, the cost per day to maintain a US soldier in Vietnam was nearly $13.00 while the similar cost for the CIDG soldier was approximately $3.00. This remained true in spite of later diversion of the irregular forces to other purposes.

Additional missions were placed upon the CIDG forces in 1964 such as border surveillance, operations against enemy war zones and interdiction of north-south interior infiltration routes. The trend toward conventional use of irregular forces was inconsistent with the original purpose of the CIDG program. After 1964, the political, economic, and psychological aspects of the program were subordinated to purely military considerations. When the CIDG forces were employed outside their home districts, combat effectiveness was generally less than desirable.

This lesson was not applied in Vietnam. The CIDG program did not develop assets that were decidedly committed to the Government of South Vietnam. The CIDG forces and area development program which were established remained effective until departure of Special Forces. When the detachment moved and the CIDG physical assets and trained personnel placed under the control of Vietnamese province chiefs, effectiveness rapidly deteriorated, thus nullifying previous accomplishments.
Special Forces was also responsible for the organization of special ground reconnaissance and intelligence units that were composed of both indigenous and US personnel. The units were established to acquire intelligence on enemy order of battle, to identify elements of the enemy infrastructure, and to develop intelligence pertaining to US prisoners of war so that operations could be conducted to secure their release. These special intelligence units were credited with producing a significant portion of ground combat intelligence acquired in Vietnam.

The Studies and Observation Group, a subordinate organization of MACV commonly referred to as MACSOG, was established in 1964 to conduct unconventional warfare operations in Southeast Asia. During

Psychological operations conducted against North Vietnam were effective. On the other hand, although policy guidance directed the formation of resistance networks, and teams for sabotage and light harassment in North Vietnam, attempts were not made to exploit the resistance potential of the Maquis Commandos originally trained by the French, by conducting guerrilla warfare in North Vietnam.

Although singular programs were successful, there was an uncoordinated UW effort in Vietnam which was directly related to the absence of a single authority for the control of UW operations throughout the combined area of South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam. The requirement for centralized command and control headquarters was recognized from the beginning of Special Forces involvement there. Although plans were made, and there were numerous opportunities to consolidate UW activities under a single command, it never occurred.
The decision to withdraw the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) on 3 March 1971 from Vietnam was premature. A review of the following missions that required, or were suited to, Special Forces would substantiate this statement:

- A border control system using Vietnamese Ranger battalions was implemented as a successor to the CIDG program in January 1971 and CIDG forces were integrated into the Ranger battalions. As a result, a 3-man advisory detachment was required with each battalion. Seventeen of 37 advisory detachments were manned by Special Forces.

- MACVSOG, although it changed names in April 1972, continued operations until March 1973. It was manned primarily by US Army personnel, most all of whom were Special Forces.

- At the time of Special Forces withdrawal, valid requirements still existed for target acquisition and designation, training of regional and popular forces, and other UW missions. These were the very missions which established the initial requirement for Special Forces in Vietnam.

Although the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was officially withdrawn on 3 March 1971, the task of training Cambodian Army battalions initiated in March 1970 remained and 423 Special Forces personnel extended their tours to provide the nucleus for the successor training command, the USARV Individual Training Group. Following the North Vietnamese "Easter Offensive" of 1972, the training group provided mobile training teams to retrain the 3d ARVN Infantry Division and the 20th Tank Regiment. To meet the dual mission requirements of training Cambodian Army battalions and providing mobile training teams to the Vietnamese Army, 100 Special Forces personnel from the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) on Okinawa were deployed in July 1972 to augment the combined United States-Vietnamese mobile training program.

Between March 1970 and January 1973, 86 Cambodian battalions and numerous other specialized personnel, in all a total of 84,000 combat troops, were trained by the training group. During the nine-month period preceding the January 1973 ceasefire, the mobile training teams retrained 40 percent of the Vietnamese ground maneuver battalions which included all battalions and separate companies of the 9th, 21st, 22d, and 23d ARVN Infantry Divisions and the 20th Tank Regiment; 75 percent of the Airborne, 3d, 5th, and 25th Division battalions; and 14 Ranger battalions and 8 reconnaissance companies.
As a result of operational experience gained during periods of war and non-hostilities, there must be a permanent unconventional warfare command established to employ and direct Special Forces, with intermediate echelons of command headquarters removed. The Son Tay prisoner of war rescue operation illustrates the success achieved by a joint task force operating under direct control of the JCS.

The Son Tay prisoner of war rescue operation failed in its primary mission: the rescue of US prisoners of war. But it demonstrated to North Vietnam its vulnerability; precipitated the concentration of prisoners into two prisons in Hanoi which enabled them to organize against their captors, to communicate, and to care for each other; facilitated planning of air strikes against the North; and demonstrated the US concern and resolve to free the POW's, results which in themselves justified the mission. The extensive and detailed rehearsals conducted by the joint force provided for every conceivable contingency. The most significant organizational aspect of the Son Tay rescue operation was its command and control arrangements. These arrangements not only permitted the necessary responsiveness to the National Command Authority, but also allowed the required operational discretion by the mission commander. In addition they precluded unnecessary interference by intermediate headquarters throughout the preparation and execution phases.

The Son Tay raid further illuminates the Special Forces capability to undertake special operations that require surgical precision for success. Since the importance and necessity for such an operational capability is recognized at higher levels, provision should be made for a permanent force within Special Forces, immediately responsive to JCS tasking, that is organized, trained and equipped to conduct special operations.

Unconventional warfare forces represent a valuable pool of low cost resources particularly useful in assisting an endangered, less developed country. Foreign assistance missions that require skilled and mature instructor personnel with foreign language capabilities are more practical for Special Forces than conventional units. The flexible, cellular organization and high density of officers and non-commissioned officers allows for tailoring to meet the specific requirements. Deployment of Special Forces on foreign assistance missions not only improves unit readiness and capability, but also improves individual proficiency since it affords the individuals the opportunity to use and further develop their unconventional warfare skills. If a conventional unit was tasked with the mission, it would degrade the unit's training, readiness and mission capability since the leadership and senior, skilled non-commissioned officers of the unit would be depleted while on the mission.

In addition to classic guerrilla warfare, Special Forces are highly qualified for such missions as foreign internal defense, foreign and domestic training, humanitarian assistance and special operations. It appears, however, that these missions are outside the principal...
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interests of the US Army and as a result are not a major factor in its evaluation of tasks that Special Forces should be prepared to perform. Ready, flexible and adaptable, they constitute an economical and effective instrument of national power and must be maintained for support of existing and future commitments. Realistic priorities coupled with organizational modifications will insure that the institutional capability so painfully acquired from nearly 16 years of combat will be available and ready in time of national emergency.
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INTRODUCTION

This study is intended to illustrate military options available to the National Command Authority that are appropriate and applicable in the contemporary international environment. These options are based on existing capabilities of the US Army Special Forces and are discussed in considerable detail with regard to commitment prospects.

The history of the US involvement in Indochina, with particular emphasis on Vietnam and Special Forces involvement there, serves to illustrate options available and the significant value offered by the multipurpose capabilities of Special Forces. This history is assessed not to second guess the decision makers but to benefit from this national experience. The changing intensity, character and duration of the overall US involvement, while necessary to the assessment, are of secondary impact to the revolutionary insurgent nature of that conflict. For various reasons, including economic practicality and apparent efficacy, this form of warfare is considered likely to remain the most frequent form of military challenge to US interests during the foreseeable future. While the theme of this study is overwhelmingly military, it is fully recognized that military options are not exercised in a vacuum but are both preceded and concurrent with political, diplomatic, and economic actions, all of which must be closely coordinated.

The Indochina conflict presented the US Government with a series of challenges that varied in magnitude, geographic relevance, time, complexity and relative restraints.

Within constraints, the US Government successively exercised numerous options ranging from the provision of monetary and military aid through a substantial advisory effort to the commitment of combat forces. Of the available options, unconventional warfare (UCW) was the least considered or utilized. A primary aspect of this study is the assessment of those actual and potential uses for unconventional warfare and US Army Special Forces in the counterinsurgent environment as well as in more offensively oriented operations. The underutilization as well as the misutilization of this capability, stemming from the lack of acceptance and understanding of its applicability, is discussed.

While timing, location and specific nature of US interests which may be subjected to external threats cannot be predicted, an analysis of the world situation is made. This analysis illustrates a number of areas where US international commitments, security interests, or as a minimum, US property and lives may at some proximate time demand a response beyond that offered by diplomatic or economic means but short of that offered by conventional forces. Our nation's experience in Indochina and its effect on the attitudes of our society and leadership relative to future commitment of US military forces by no means reduces the possibility for such a commitment. On the contrary, the awareness on the part of international antagonists of this attitude makes challenges to our national resolve more likely. This attitude requires that options available to our National Command Authority be those which offer the least risk, greatest responsiveness, highest cost effectiveness, and best probability of success while being acceptable to the US public.

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These, then, are the parameters within which this study is made. While it traverses the complicated aspects of the Indochina War, assessing primarily the Special Forces commitment, the study principally focuses on how this flexible and skilled organization can best be tasked to meet current requirements. Special Forces capabilities, designed to satisfy the unconventional mission requirements of the international milieu, offer such a wide range of mission options that Special Forces is clearly a multipurpose force.
(U) In order to effectively analyze Special Forces involvement, it is essential to understand not only the military situation, but the socio-political environment in which it occurred. The information presented here is intended to provide the background necessary to understand why programs were adopted, why they succeeded or failed and insights as to why decisions were made. Information is also provided to indicate the existence of parallel situations and events in other parts of the world so that they may be avoided or exploited in the future.

The Vietnamese and Vietnamese

(U) For over 1000 years after the 1st Century B.C., the Vietnamese in the North were ruled by the Chinese. Yet they were not docile subjects, they staged at least ten major rebellions and forced the Chinese out on several occasions for short periods of time. The Vietnamese finally achieved independence in 938 A.D., but were required to pay tribute until the middle of the 19th Century. During these ten centuries of Chinese suzerainty the Viet peoples settled slowly into a new ethnic and cultural pattern.

(U) Unlike Western life, which is oriented toward the future, the Vietnamese life is oriented on the past. Given a static technology and a limited amount of land, the Vietnamese for centuries lived in a closed economic system, which meant to accumulate wealth was to deprive the rest of the community. Great social wealth was not a sign of success, but a sign of selfishness. Private property did not exist, for the father was less an owner than a trustee of the land, which was to be passed on to his children. Buried in the rice fields that sustained his family, the father would live on in the bodies of his children and grandchildren, who came to worship him as the source of their lives, their fortunes, and their civilization. To the Vietnamese, the land itself was the sacred, constant element. This basic tie to the land and to one's ancestors doomed to failure any attempts to increase government control or security by means of population resettlement.

(U) Though Vietnam was often divided between warlord families, the disputes were never resolved by a sharing of power, but always by the restoration of an absolute monarch. Even when Vietnam was divided for two centuries between the dynasties of the Trinh in the North and the Nguyen in the South, the Vietnamese would not acknowledge the legitimacy of both sovereigns.
There was somewhere, a single correct answer to every question, and the mandarin studied the past in order to learn how to act in the present. It was for the mandarins to interpret history and to make decisions of social importance to the people. The system relied on a consensus of the educated elite -- the mandarins. The imposition of the Western ideal of universal suffrage was alien to the Vietnamese culture, and thus, all the votes in the world could not have legitimized the regime in the South.

As there was a correct answer, so there were correct personal actions. The Vietnamese did not, as Americans came to expect, look for a charismatic leader, but for a man who expressed in his life how the government and the society ought to behave. Ho Chi Minh, as contrasted with Ngo Dinh Diem or Nguyen Van Thieu, presented such behavior, both in his austere dress and in his fatherly demeanor toward ordinary citizens. This was important in that Vietnamese do not differentiate between a man's private and public life. The Southern leaders, Bao Dai, Diem, and Thieu were more representative of their European influence. Their Westernization, which elicited for them the support of the French and the French-backed Vietnamese landowners and later the US, is exactly what alienated them from the people of the countryside.

After 90 years of French rule, Vietnamese society in the South developed entirely differently from the remainder of the country, the majority of the population was landless, dependent for wages or tenant's rights on the French and their Vietnamese proteges. The old elite had vanished, giving place to leadership by a small but very wealthy class of Vietnamese landlords and civil servants.

The French and Indochina

During their presence in Indochina, the French controlled and administered the country as a French colony with a minimum of Vietnamese self-rule. The area's rubber and tin were necessary for her industry, while Indochina was also needed as a market for French goods. As such, France firmly intended to retain Indochina as a colony and thus, deliberately failed to develop local institutions or prepare the area for self-rule.

The Japanese invasion of Indochina in 1941 interrupted the French rule, and provided an opportunity for the birth of many nationalist groups. Several of these were later united by Ho Chi Minh into the League for the Independence of Vietnam, which became better known as the Viet Minh. During the war the "league" received US and other allied support for its anti-Japanese guerrilla activities. By war's end, the Viet Minh had gained sufficient strength to supplant the regime of Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai, to whom the Japanese had granted independence in 1945 in the face of an anti-Japanese movement.
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(U) When the French reappeared after WWll, with only the promise of a vague political and economic autonomy within the recreated French empire, the Viet Minh resisted. France recognized the Communist nature of the Viet Minh, and used this as an excuse to disguise her colonialism. Although the French Commissioner for Northern Indochina had agreed in March 1946 to independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) within the French Union after five years of French Army presence, France could not accept the idea of sovereign nations, equal in law, in a confederation with herself as the head. France reoccupied Vietnam, sponsored the autonomous "Republic of Cochin China" in the South in rivalry with Ho Chi Minh, and precipitated 8 years of hostilities. The resulting "war of national liberation" received a significant boost when the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse Tung reached the Sino-Vietnamese border in late 1949 to begin actively supporting and affording sanctuary to the Viet Minh. Fighting continued for another 5 years until the defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954 so weakened the French national will that she signed a cease-fire in Geneva (Geneva Accords) on 21 July 1954. These accords provided for the partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, elections in July 1956 to determine national leadership for a unified Vietnam, the disengagement of Laos, and the pacification of Cambodia.*

(U) The situation in Laos was important primarily for its impact on the remainder of Indochina. The political turbulence in Laos developed much more rapidly than in Vietnam. In fact, prior to 1962, much more was written about Laos than Vietnam, and President Kennedy considered it the major problem in Indochina. Unable to achieve a pro-West coalition among the three competing factions, the US settled for a neutral coalition in the Geneva Accords of 1962 as the best of a bad situation. This coalition was not able to preclude Viet Minh Communist domination over Eastern Laos, and the Western powers feared they could not intervene to prohibit this without inducing Chinese involvement and escalating the conflict out of proportion to any possible gains to either side. This fear of Chinese intervention later affected US strategy by resulting in the imposition of critical constraints on the conduct of the Vietnam War. It provided the North Vietnamese with sanctuaries from which they could take as much of the war as they desired, when they desired. It also severely limited the ability of the United States to apply pressure to the North Vietnamese either by bombing, naval action, or by the use of ground forces in the North.

*For further information pertaining to the sequence of events in Southeast Asia, see Appendix A, Chronology.
The internal situation in Cambodia similarly affected the conduct of the war. As early as January 1958, the use of Cambodia as a sanctuary was supported by Cambodian Prince Sihanouk, who feared an invasion by South Vietnamese forces. It was not until 1970, after the US-backed Lon Nol Regime came to power in Cambodia, that the United States was willing to invade the NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia.

The US Involvement

During WWII, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated the US goal for post-war Indochina -- ultimate independence. The United States attempted to harmonize this goal with the need for the cooperation of France in Europe, but when it became apparent that such independence would be under Communism, the United States responded to the greater danger and began active support of the reestablishment of French control. Fear of involvement in an Asian land war was of paramount concern for US policy makers during this period. The concern was that a US presence would provoke hostilities with China and the Soviet Union. This policy was further exacerbated by the United States viewing the area as outside its core interest, while the Sino-Soviet faction looked upon the region as within its sphere of influence.

In December 1950, the United States was signatory to the Pentalateral Agreement with France and the Associated States of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In accordance with this treaty, the United States committed itself to furnish military materiel and equipment to combat the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina as a small logistical group to administer provision of this equipment to the French, and to explain to Congress, as necessary, how the equipment was used.

By the time of the Geneva Accords of 1954, Ho Chi Minh was in a commanding position. By having gained clear control over the North and leaving 10,000 personnel behind in the South, he was able to direct his activities toward gaining control of the South through the scheduled elections of 1956. The Viet Cong, as they had become known (a contraction from Viet Nam Cong Son, meaning Vietnamese Communist) reorganized and emphasized political subversion. When the newly independent regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, who had replaced Emperor Bao Dai, refused to hold the elections, the Viet Cong renewed its insurgency. Although Diem refused to recognize the Geneva Accord because he was not a signatory, he was able to do so only with the backing of France and the United States, who greatly feared the fall of Indochina to the Communist monolith.
Although the United States successfully avoided direct military intervention at the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the United States was nevertheless underwriting 78 percent of the French war effort. When the Geneva Accords were reached shortly thereafter, Washington concentrated on continuing to aid France in consolidating South Vietnam. Responsibility for security matters in the newly created Republic of Vietnam was transferred to the US military mission, with the French withdrawing their combat forces and the South Vietnamese taking command of their own troops. MAAG Indochina split into MAAG Vietnam (MAAGV) and MAAG Cambodia. MAAGV's mission was to assist the Vietnamese Government in raising the military capabilities of Vietnamese Armed Forces through planning for, developing, and administering the Military Aid Program (MAP).

In early 1955, JCS made plans for the training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Because of an acute shortage of personnel to accomplish the training assignment, a separate Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) to the Armed Forces of Vietnam was inaugurated under the direction of Chief, MAAG. TRIM was a tri-country effort consisting of personnel from the United States, France, and Vietnam, but was predominantly French led and staffed under the responsibility of USMAAG Indochina. It was believed that a combined effort of all three nations was necessary to produce rapid training progress. TRIM's mission was assistance, development, and improvement of the Vietnamese Command and Staff organization, and the training of all units and individuals. This arrangement continued until French advisors to TRIM withdrew in April 1956, terminating TRIM and leaving MAAGV solely responsible for training the Vietnamese Army.

The Geneva Accords limited the number of foreign military personnel permitted in-country, so the Department of State established a separate organization entitled Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) to provide the additional personnel required. Overtly, TERM was created to assist MAAGV in recovering excess war materiel the French were discarding. Covertly, TERM's real mission was to provide vital assistance in developing an adequate and effective Vietnamese logistical support system. TERM thus had the effect of releasing MAAGV personnel engaged in logistical activities for advisory duties elsewhere.

Meanwhile, MAAGV advisors assisted the Vietnamese staff in preparing a 31-week program that provided training for all arms and services, and developed a plan for a Special Forces organization. Mobile Training Teams and American contract civilians became increasingly active in providing specialized advice and assistance supplemental to that of assigned MAAGV personnel.
(U) Increasing Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam necessitated an increase in the strength of MAAGV. By May 1959, plans were implemented to provide advisors down to Infantry regiment level and to Artillery, Armored, and separate Marine Battalion level. Orders forbade the advisors to participate directly in combat operations or to accompany units on anti-guerrilla forays immediately adjacent to national boundaries. It was at this time that CINCPAC took steps to obtain Special Forces Mobile Training Teams from USARPAC and CONUS sources to assist in training indigenous Ranger Companies for counter-guerrilla warfare (See Chapter 2).

(U) In May 1960, the United States officially announced that, at the request of the Government of South Vietnam, US MAAGV strength would be increased. TERM was phased-out, and personnel assigned to TERM were converted to MAAGV status to implement the increase.

(U) The United States was now officially involved. Justification for the MAAGV increase was that US assistance was needed because the Viet Cong terrorist activities threatened the existing RVN government. In fact, the increased tempo of VC activity diverted the Vietnamese military forces in 1960 from a role of external defense to internal security, despite US developed plans that gave primacy to defense against external invasion.

(U) Throughout 1960, the Eisenhower Administration pledged continuous support to the RVN. It should be noted that the only formal US commitment to Vietnam was the protocol of the SEATO Treaty obligating the United States, subject to its constitutional processes, to come to the aid of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam if they became the victims of Communist aggression. The United States had no formal commitments to provide military aid or monetary support to the Republic of Vietnam.

(U) It was during the Kennedy Administration that the United States established a significant presence in Southeast Asia. Counterinsurgency was a new term and a new concept, fully understood by almost no one, not even the military. Thus, opinions on how the insurgency should be fought varied widely between and within government agencies. As a result, President Kennedy formed a Defense Department task force to recommend how to deal with the insurgency problem. The recommendations of this group included US support for an increase in the size of the South Vietnamese Army, an increase in the size of the MAAG mission, the initiation of CIA-aided covert actions against lines of communications in North Vietnam and Laos, and the formation of a presidential task force to direct the program. Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatrick was to be in charge with BG Edward Lansdale as the operations officer in Vietnam. This last recommendation, if implemented,
would have resulted in the State Department losing control of the Washington-based interdepartmental effort, as well as control of the in-country effort, normally in the purview of the ambassador. The State Department countered by proposing a conventional interagency working group with a State Department director, thereby eliminating the functions to be performed by General Lansdale. It was primarily this State Department view which prevailed, thus eliminating the US's greatest opportunity for centralized planning and execution of the war effort and resulting in a lack of coordination and control of the massive effort which followed.

(U) Subsequent increases in enemy activity resulted in Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's requesting support for an increase in the size of his Army and a corresponding increase in the MAAG. Although most decision-makers agreed that economic and social measures were the primary tool to be used against insurgency, and the President and Congress clearly indicated their desire to progress in those areas, the response became increasingly military. Many studies have pointed to this, blaming the failure on the US/GVN bureaucracies to learn from the French and British experiences, and alleging that..."since we didn't know what to do, we did what we knew." During this period, despite the urging of President Kennedy, the US Army did not have a counterinsurgency capability.

(U) By the early 1960's, the enemy insurgency was well into Phase II (guerrilla warfare) and was close to attempting the conventional offensive called for in Phase III. It thus becomes easier to understand why Diem wanted a larger Army, as opposed to police forces (which had by this time been infiltrated by the VC), why the US and GVN military efforts became conventionally oriented toward the expected NVA invasion, and why the military effort predominated over pacification.

(U) The focus of US advisory support during the late 1950's and early 1960's was primarily upon the development of a US-type conventional military force which could meet the anticipated North Vietnamese threat. Special forces and regional and local paramilitary forces, newly established to relieve the Army of the internal security mission, met with a lack of success in the face of the increased Viet Cong threat, resulting in a reorientation and retraining of the ARVN which took nearly two years. It was not until early 1963 that the ARVN was employed against the Viet Cong; this required a substantial increase in ARVN size and the commitment of USA helicopter companies starting in late 1961.

(U) Up to 1963 the Viet Cong had received only limited logistical support from the North, and had been fighting with weapons remaining from the French-Indochina war or captured from the South Vietnamese forces. When it became apparent that more was required, the North Vietnamese greatly increased the level of supply. They expanded the infiltration route through Laos and provided trained replacements, fighting units, and better quality, standardized arms.

(U) The US force buildup continued with the establishment of a support group (USASGV) in 1962, followed by a command headquarters, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV). The Commander, USMACV, LTG Paul D. Harkins, was directly responsible for all US military policy, operations, and assistance in the RVN (but not all Southeast Asia, as the war was divided by boundaries). As such, he was authorized direct access to President Diem and other RVN leaders, as well as to the US JCS and Secretary of Defense through CINCPAC. However, since the US Ambassador to South Vietnam was responsible for American political and basic policy matters, COMUSMACV was to consult with him on these matters. Washington retained the right to decide differences between the two. Meanwhile, combat support units continued to arrive throughout 1962 and 1963, including the introduction of armed helicopter gunships in late 1962, followed by several types of fixed-wing Army aircraft.

(U) The inability of the US government to pressure the Diem government into implementing necessary reforms severely limited the ability of the GVN to absorb and effectively utilize all this support. Diem continued to play the many sects against one another until the political scene exploded in June 1963, with the self-immolation of a Buddhist Monk in downtown Saigon as a protest against the government. This activated the heretofore passive Vietnamese city-dwellers, who swarmed back to the pagodas to pray, weep, and then, following the Buddhist Monks, burst forth into the streets calling for the overthrow of Diem and his nepotistic government. Dissention spread, and when the Vietnamese Special Forces were ordered to surround and storm the central pagodas of the major cities in retaliation, the days of Diem's rule became clearly numbered.

(U) In November 1963, the Army staged a coup d'état and assassinated Diem, whose failure to institute the necessary political reforms had already cost him much of the support from the United States he needed to remain in power. Shortly afterward, President Kennedy was also assassinated. The Communists took advantage of the resulting turbulence and increased their forces by leaps and bounds to the point that by 1965, VC had gained control of a population base of five million and two-thirds of the territory. Government efforts under the civilian Premier Tran Van Ho to regain control of the lost countryside were at a standstill; the country was in political turmoil. South Vietnamese
forces were no longer in a position to save the country and, if faced by a conventional attack by the enemy upon the cities, were likely to disintegrate. After a succession of government changes through 1964 and early 1965, Air Vice-Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky took over as Prime Minister in June 1965. To the surprise of most observers, he remained in office for over 2 years until the elections in September 1967.

-President Johnson was compelled to make the critical decision on which previous Presidents had procrastinated, for he could not allow Indochina to fall to the Communists without weakening US commitments worldwide. On 26 July 1964, over 5,000 US troops were ordered to Vietnam. When the North attacked a US warship in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson immediately reacted with retaliatory bombing.

-Bombing of Viet Cong strongholds in the South continued throughout the war, along with the intermittent bombing of selected targets in the North. The bombing in the North, although of strategic value, was primarily a psychological attempt to erode the will of the North Vietnamese to carry on the war in the South. It was used, rather ineffectively, as a pressure for negotiation. The bombing was also of limited effectiveness and extremely expensive, especially in operations in the North where multimillion dollar aircraft were lost while dropping bombs on relatively inexpensive targets. Although anti-NVN groups were known to have existed in the North, and could have brought the war to the North without invoking Chinese intervention, they were not exploited.

-The deployment of American forces was initially successful in its purpose of gaining time to prevent the demise of the GVN, but the enemy's ability to utilize sanctuaries to his advantage, coupled with a population amenable to providing him support, enabled him to drag the war out for years. From the North Vietnamese viewpoint, a victory could be achieved by attrition of the American national will, or by the fall of the unstable GVN.

-In 1966, agreement was reached with the Buddhists for the formation of a Constituent Assembly to draw up a new Constitution for South Vietnam. When elections for this Assembly were held in September 1966, 81 percent of over 5 million registered voters, in spite of Viet Cong intimidation and terrorism, went to the polls to elect representatives. The subsequent constitution was accepted by the military junta, and in September 1967, elections were held and General Nguyen Van Thieu was elected President with Ky as his Vice-President. Sixty Senators were also elected to the Upper House, and elections to the National Assembly were successfully held in the following month. For the first time in 4 years, Saigon again had a government.
(U) During 1966-67, while the US Special Forces developed paramilitary units from the Montagnards in the highlands and US units conducted offensive operations against the VC and NVA, GVN troops operated near the population centers where they could also conduct pacification projects. Though nearly every analyst and political and military leader agreed that pacification was the key requirement for building a viable government and defeating the insurgency, the overwhelming majority of the effort was still on military operations against VC and NVA forces.

(U) The reports of slow but steady progress were shattered on 31 January 1968, at the start of Tet, the Vietnamese New Year. At this time the Viet Cong and NVA launched a coordinated attack on the cities, penetrating Saigon-Cholon, Hue, and nearly all provincial capitals, hoping to spark a mass uprising which did not occur. Although the recapture of these areas resulted in much devastation, activities of the next year showed the Viet Cong infrastructure had been severely depleted. Both sides claimed victory. The South Vietnamese based their claim on their successful prevention of the mass uprising and the severe casualties inflicted on the enemy. The North claimed the shock of the complacent city population, the loss of faith in the GVN to provide security, the halting of the pacification programs, and the creation of hundreds of thousands of refugees through the lack of security. US public opinion was another casualty.

(U) Shortly after Tet, in May 1968, President Johnson took drastic steps to force negotiation of the war's end. He announced a pause in the bombing to elicit a response from North Vietnam, and stated his intention not to seek reelection to the Presidency. This removed him from the pressures of the Presidential election and reduced the dissent within the United States as a force for a sellout. On 10 May 1968, talks began, while the fighting continued as each side tried to improve its bargaining position. US forces built up to 525,000 men as the North Vietnamese continued to infiltrate replacements for the VC as well as their regular NVA units.

(U) Politically unable to recharge the war to meet the specifications of the Joint Chiefs for a quick military victory, the new President, Richard Nixon, adopted a policy of scaling down the participation of American ground troops while increasing every other form of military pressure on the enemy. His aim was still to force Hanoi to accept an American-supported government in Saigon, and his strategy was still that of attrition.

(U) The centerpiece of this policy was "Vietnamization," the slow withdrawal of American ground troops and the buildup of Vietnamese armed forces to fight an American-directed war in their stead. It was, of course, the same strategy the French officials had attempted in 1950, when the war began to seem too expensive and too politically
divisive for their country; and it was the same strategy that led to the situation the United States inherited in 1954. Still, unlike the French, the Americans dominated South Vietnam militarily. At the height of their strength in 1968-69, they had the troops, the air power, and the money to maintain the Saigon government for a number of years, even with a schedule of troop pullouts.

(U) For the first 16 months events played in President Nixon's favor. Nineteen sixty-nine was a year of military success for the Allies in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese units remained relatively inactive while the VC showed an appreciable decline in strength following the bloody campaigns of 1968. Seizing the initiative, General Creighton Abrams, the successor to General Westmoreland, diverted the American forces from the large-scale border battles to an all-out attempt to destroy enemy base areas and supply lines in the South, and to put as much South Vietnamese territory as possible under GVN control.

(U) At the same time, the United States began to arm the Vietnamese with the M-16 automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and machine guns that the Americans used. It imported helicopters, patrol boats, tanks, APC's, artillery pieces, air transports, and squadrons of F-5s. New advanced military training courses were set up in South Vietnam, and 100 Vietnamese soldiers a week went to the United States for 6 to 18 months of technical training. The greatest benefit to the Vietnamese was not, however, in the area of sophisticated armament, but in that of conventional infantry weapons. For the first time the ARVN battalions had the necessary tools to take the war to the Viet Cong.

(U) Upgrading the Vietnamese forces enabled the United States to announce the withdrawal of 25,000 men in June 1969. Within 2 years, by the summer of 1971, the total forces had been halved, and by the beginning of 1972 were down to under 100,000.

(U) Implementing this US policy designed to save American lives while continuing the war, the Vietnamese paramilitary regional, popular, and police forces were increased. The upkeep of these security forces was extremely expensive, but it did not begin to compare with the cost of keeping American troops in Vietnam. In 1971, at a time when advice to these paramilitary forces was most critical, the US Special Forces were withdrawn.

(U) The US incursion into Cambodia in 1970 severely disrupted the enemy's logistical system, and in 1971 the South Vietnamese crossed the border into Laos in an abortive attempt to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By mid-1971 the enemy had fallen back on terrorist tactics, unable to launch a major offensive until 1972.
The following analysis is by no means an attempt to justify that what the US gained or learned in Vietnam has been worth its cost in lives, dollars, and domestic discord. Indeed, it is clear that many Americans at this time do not believe that it has been. It must be taken into consideration, though, that the perspectives of future decision-makers may be formed by the wrong or incomplete conclusions about Vietnam. Vietnam did more than demonstrate the limits of certain politico-military policies: it also revealed rather clearly some of the United States' strength.

Concerning policy implications, there are a number of broader features of the Vietnam experience which could bear considerably on future policy. The analysis of ground power in Vietnam throughout the study has not dealt with the crucial roles of air-or seapower. Both were vital to the kind of effort the US ground forces achieved. US strategic lines of communication were adequately and primarily protected by naval forces. Tactical lines of communication within South Vietnam were primarily protected by air with Air Force fixed-wing aircraft providing absolutely essential support. This enabled ground forces to devote their efforts to the tactical mission without applying large resources to securing and maintaining secure supply routes. Lastly, air and seapower provided the crucial support to the Vietnamese Army which permitted the success of Vietnamization in the 1972 offensive. Likewise, the Army strategy described within the study was made possible in a large degree because of complete air superiority, which permitted vast helicopter formations and open movement on the ground, and also because of massive, close tactical air support. Integrated interservice operation was a success. The degree to which this integration was achieved in Vietnam was due to great strides in command and control procedures and technical development, principally in communications. American ground power was projected, sustained, and protected thousands of miles from the United States for a period of years. The efforts and resources necessary for this success cannot be taken for granted in developing strategic concepts for the future.

Unfortunately, however, the contention and discord over US goals in Vietnam often tend to inhibit an honest appraisal of the means employed in support of policy. This has been particularly true with regard to the ground war, which has been viewed principally in terms of either scandalous vignettes or dramatic atypical episodes. General understanding of the more typical operational features remains obscure despite repeated successes.

As has been stated in the preceding pages, by mid-1965 the communists could field more forces than could the ARVN. It was at this point that the US entered in force. The conflict had, therefore already reached its final stages, as far as Hanoi was concerned, when the US intervened. In 1966, some 15 Communist regiments infiltrated
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or formed within South Vietnam. The US went on the offensive, and after having taken heavy losses, the enemy was forced to reassess his entire approach to the war. He could not get at the vitals of South Vietnam -- the populated areas -- without exposing his large units to disastrous defeat by American firepower. ARVN forces also took on a renewed vigor. In addition, there was an increasing amount of coordination between the South Vietnamese and US within all sections of the entire effort that was to last up until the US phase-out -- that is, on the civil side, the police side, the military side, etc.

(U) It is said that the Tet offensive brought to a head the compound weaknesses -- or, as the North Vietnamese reiterate, the internal contradictions -- of the American position. While the Tet offensive was a historic turning point in the war, and may in the perspective of history be viewed as a psychological success for the Communists, it did not produce what they planned and hoped it would in the short run a general uprising of the populace, large-scale disintegration of the ARVN, and a dramatic defeat of US units. Instead, staggering losses were suffered by both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units and by the political infrastructure which had surfaced to support them in taking the cities.

(U) During the early 1970's the Government of South Vietnam was not only more stable than any Vietnamese government had been for a number of years, but it became more effective and actually improved its performance. After Tet, the enemy apparently put aside his hopes for victory against US ground forces on the pattern of Dien Bien Phu. Throughout the period 1968-72, the US placed an emphasis not only on military operations, but on pacification and nation building efforts in South Vietnam. Programs initiated for the first time reflected an adequate priority for achieving a stable framework on which self-reliance would be built. As Vietnamization progressed, socio-political considerations came into the forefront. South Vietnamese policies began to assume a more independent shape. Vietnamization paved the way for US military disengagement, and after more than fifteen years of US participation, the majority of American forces were withdrawn. After the Easter 1972 invasion by the NVA -- when the ARVN held firm and provincial capitals remained in friendly hands -- Thieu emerged from the struggle maintaining his stability. Vietnamization was vindicated.

(U) In conclusion, from the Tet offensive until the spring of 1972, when Vietnamization was tested by massive conventional attack, the war changed in character. It became increasingly that of small-unit actions and devolved to a far greater extent to South Vietnamese local forces who held their own as US forces withdrew under the Vietnamization program.

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(U) In the spring of 1972, the NVA, resupplied with Russian tanks and 150mm artillery, attacked on several fronts, attempting to overwhelm the ARVN before it could adjust to the absence of US forces. After significant early gains, the diluted front and lack of knowledge of armor tactics proved too much for the NVA. The stronger ARVN and regional and popular forces halted the enemy. The NVA successfully prevented a GVN counterattack through a series of minor actions. However, the attack, coupled with the mining of Haiphong Harbor and the use of "smart bombs," so weakened the military situation that Hanoi was convinced of the need to negotiate in order to retain its ability to achieve its strategic goals.

(U) Although a cease-fire-in-place agreement was signed in January 1973, Hanoi's disrespect for the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia continued. She continued the replacements of units and equipment at a level well above the one-for-one replacement level agreed to; while the US replaced equipment at a level below the agreed level. The International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS), established to police the cease fire, was ineffective in preventing another massive buildup over the next 2 years.

(U) When the NVA attacked again in 1975, the GVN forces sometimes fought valiantly, but were no match for the NVA tanks and longer range artillery. On 30 April 1975, the fall of Saigon signalled the end of the Vietnam War.

(U) The fall of the South Vietnamese government did not come about until two years after the American withdrawal, and even then it required a conventional attack by eighteen NVA divisions. Still, the victory carries heavy implications toward the US conduct of the war. It was the failure of the US and GVN programs to defeat the insurgency in its infancy between 1954 and 1962 which enabled the war to continue until an ultimate enemy victory could be achieved. This Communist success may be expected to encourage "wars of national liberation" in other parts of the world, yet the US choice of military response to such situations, remains essentially the same as it was in 1957 when Special Forces first entered Vietnam.
(U) The US involvement in unconventional warfare in Indochina evolved from the deployment of the Saigon Military Mission (SMM) on 1 June 1954. The SMM directed sabotage and black psychological warfare operations in and around Hanoi prior to the French evacuation of the city, and at the same time, recruited, trained, and organized two indigenous paramilitary groups to conduct stay-behind operations in North Vietnam.

(U) From the austere staffing of the SMM (less than 15 personnel), the US Army Special Forces (USASF) participation in unconventional warfare escalated to over 3,000 personnel in 1967. This chapter presents an overview of the Special Forces experience in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, including the Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG), the Son Tay raid, and the training advisory effort from 1970 to 1973. The inclosed chart presents an historical overview of the evolution of the US unconventional warfare/counterinsurgency involvement in Indochina. A chronology of major events and a detailed discussion of this chapter are included at Appendixes A and B.

(C) USASF in Laos (U)

In 1959, the first USASF Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) arrived in Laos under light civilian cover using the name Laos Training Advisory Group (LTAG). The split Special Forces "A" Detachments, called Field Training Teams (FTT's), were dispersed to the regional Laotian Army training centers and began a basic training program for the Army in cooperation with the French. In theory, training was to be a combined effort with the French advisor in the senior role; however, the French and US programs were essentially carried out as separate efforts under their respective advisors.

Many difficulties in training soon arose. The arrival of the USASF teams coincided with increased insurgent action. The Laotian Army contended that the required intensification of counterinsurgency operations prevented selected personnel from attending cadre training. Differences between French and US training philosophies were also apparent. They did not require officers and NCO's to attend training and this greatly influenced the actions of their Lao counterparts. The French lacked interest in training an indigenous officer corps, and further hampered leadership development by using local military only in subordinate roles.
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**ADMINISTRATION**

**TRUMAN**

**EISENHOWER**

**COLD WAR**

**KOREA**

**LAOS**

**TOP SECRET**
As a result of the August 1960 coup d'etat, all Special Forces training was suspended until a successful counter-coup was initiated approximately 3 months later. Following the coup, France began withdrawal from the training program, leaving the entire burden to Special Forces. Previous restraints were relaxed allowing the FIT's to be assigned to Laotian Army units engaged in combat. With this assignment, the FIT mission was expanded to include the collection of intelligence and the conduct of civic action operations.

Forces support was expanded to provide an FIT to each battalion of the regular Laotian Army. This increased involvement was essential since the Communist Pathet Lao (PL) - Viet Minh (VM) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) were in control of more than one-half of the country.

In addition to training regular Lao Forces, USAF trained the Meo (northern highland tribesmen) and the Kha (southern highland tribesmen) in unconventional warfare (UW). From May to September 1962, six USAF FIT's trained eight 100-man Meo self-defense companies. Problems not encountered in training conventional forces appeared in training the Meo: (a) USAF/CIA shared responsibilities which were not clearly defined; (b) the low level of skills and education of the Meo; (c) the lack of a written Meo language; and (d) few trained leaders were available. Conversely, USAF FIT's exercised greater control over the Meo units undergoing training.

The Kha UW Training Program attempted to establish friendly control over southern Laos to provide a means for interdicting the Ho Chi Minh trail. Traditional animosity between the Lao and the Kha made it necessary to keep Laotian Army participation in the program to a minimum. From December 1961 until September 1962, 12 100-man Kha guerrilla companies were trained.

The concept of the program was that as each Kha guerrilla company completed training, it would return home and commence operations under the supervision of Special Forces. This was an attempt at area control and, hence, village defense, through patrolling and ambushing. In contrast to their role with regular and Meo units, USAF exercised complete control over the Kha UW Training Program. They organized, equipped, trained, supported, and directed the Kha tribesmen in UW operations, and even exercised some influence over the selection of leaders for the companies formed.
Laotian political conditions remained in a state of chaos while Special Forces were conducting these training programs. The "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos" and its "Protocol," signed by the 14-nation Second Geneva Conference on 23 July 1962, stabilized the situation. As a part of the agreement, all foreign regular, irregular, and paramilitary troops were to be withdrawn within 75 days -- or by 6 October 1972. USASF participation in Laos ended with the withdrawal of all WSMIT's by the October deadline.

USASF in Vietnam

The first direct USASF involvement occurred in June 1957 when the 1st SFG (Abn) deployed an MTT from Okinawa to train Vietnamese Special Forces and Rangers. Until 1961, subsequent MTT's conducted similar training.

By the Fall of 1961, the entire central highlands of South Vietnam were close to total Viet Cong (VC) domination. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) realized, extremely late, that it had to gain control of these highlands and win the support of the Montagnard tribesmen. In October 1961, with GVN approval, CSD began its covert paramilitary program with one CSD agent and one USASF medical NCO. The test site for this program was the village of Buon Enao in Darlac Province. In December, one USASF detachment was assigned to this program to provide training and advisory assistance which eventually evolved into the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Program.

The CIDG Program was characterized by numerous changes in control, missions, and objectives. A new mission was assigned to the CIDG in the Fall of 1964 -- to conduct operations against VC war zones and interdict their north-south infiltration routes; thus began the misuse of CIDG in the role of conventional forces. They were not organized, trained, or equipped for such tasks, and were not, by virtue of their ethnic beliefs, amenable to fighting away from their area of interest. The USASF-CIDG commitment to the Border Surveillance Program also resulted in serious departures from doctrine and became a purely military and hence, a conventional mission.

The deployment of US combat forces in 1965 resulted in a noticeable shift in priorities for the CIDG Program -- that of locating enemy forces so that conventional units could then engage and destroy them. Conventional units deployed to Vietnam had little knowledge of the operational environment and, of necessity, had to depend on the area knowledge and intelligence gathering capabilities of the USASF-advised CIDG. This, in turn, caused the VNSF/USASF to devote increased efforts to the support of conventional units, at the expense of the area development mission.
The Tet offensive of 1968 saw widespread employment of CIDG forces in conventional roles. Although untrained for operations in built-up areas, the CIDG proved to be very adaptable to this form of warfare and significantly contributed to the success of the Allied post-Tet counteroffensive. In 1970, at the peak of the CIDG Program, it numbered over 50,000 irregular forces organized into 272 CIDG companies and 47 Mobile Strike Force companies.

A combined Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) - US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV) Planning Committee was convened on 20 March 1970. Its purpose was to effect a smooth and orderly transfer of the CIDG Program to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). The committee recommended that all remaining CIDG camps be converted between August and December 1970. A border control system using ARVN Ranger battalions was decided upon as the appropriate successor to the CIDG Program. The CIDG Program ended on 31 December 1970.

USASF expanded its intelligence efforts to meet the increased demands for a sophisticated intelligence and reconnaissance system. The requirements also existed for a responsive force to relieve besieged camps. These added missions led to the creation of various classified special operations. Begun on a relatively small scale, they soon encompassed all of South Vietnam and parts of North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

In 1964, Project DELTA was initiated under the name LEAPING LENA to train CIDG and Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) in long range reconnaissance patrol techniques and to conduct covert reconnaissance and intelligence collection. The teams were used to locate enemy units, installations, and activities for strategic or tactical exploitation, and were under the combined USAASF-VNSF command.

In 1966, Projects OMEGA and SIGMA were organized to augment Project DELTA operations in Military Regions (MR's) II and III. Their mission and organization were almost identical to those of Project DELTA. The only exceptions were that OMEGA and SIGMA had Mobile Strike Force companies for reaction/exploitation missions instead of the ARVN Ranger Battalion as in DELTA, and they were controlled entirely by USASF. Projects OMEGA and SIGMA passed to the control of MACSOG in November 1967.

Special Task Force RAPIDFIRE, Detachment B-56, 5th SFG (Abn), was organized to provide a long range reconnaissance patrolling and special mission capability in MR III to fill the void caused by the transfer of Project SIGMA to MACSOG. In 1968, RAPIDFIRE was converted to a Mobile Strike Force Command. During its existence, RAPIDFIRE conducted numerous successful operations until it was deactivated in December 1970.
The Mobile Strike Force (MSF) concept grew out of the EAGLE FLIGHT Detachments which had been formed at Pleiku. The MSF was designed as a multi-purpose reaction force to be stationed in each MR, as well as at the 5th SFG (Abn) headquarters in Nha Trang. Its mission was to constitute a corps reserve force; conduct raids, ambushes and combat/reconnaissance patrols; and reinforce besieged camps and ambushed units.

In August 1965, a total of 10 MSF companies was authorized; this later increased to 19 companies by the Summer of 1967. The MSF experienced enormous growth during the remainder of 1967 and by December, a total of 47 companies had been formed. In 1968, MACV approved the 5th SFG (Abn) recommendation for reorganization of the MSF which consolidated the companies into Mobile Strike Force Commands (MSFC's). Additional missions were assigned the MSFC's -- operations between camp tactical areas of responsibility, rapid reaction to confirmed intelligence targets, operations in conjunction with conventional forces, and relief of urban areas under enemy attack when conventional forces were not available. During the phasedown of the 5th SFG (Abn), the MSFC's were integrated into ARVN Ranger or RF/PF units.

In mid-1966, the Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF) concept was created to provide reconnaissance as well as to harass the enemy within his sanctuaries, thereby forcing him to divert resources from offensive to defensive operations. The MGF concept, however, was not as profitable as planned, and in 1967 was integrated into the MSF.

The mission of the 5th SFG (Abn) ended on 31 December 1970. Their withdrawal from Vietnam on 3 March 1971 was less adversely affected by the manner in which it was conducted than by its timing. In Laos, the withdrawal of USASF WSMIT's was delayed as long as possible and they were held in place until the last 15 days to act as a deterrent to further PL-VM inroads. This should have been the case in Vietnam.
A review of the missions that required USASF during the remaining 2 years of US combat participation in RVN indicated that their withdrawal was premature. The continued reliance on Special Forces in-country assets and temporary duty MIT's clearly demonstrated that there was a valid requirement for them after their departure. The end of the CIDG Program and resulting reduction of USASF would have marked the optimum time to consolidate all in-country Special Forces assets under a single headquarters. This could have permitted internal reallocation of these assets to meet varying requirements.

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TOP SECRET

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Policy decisions by the National Command Authority to conduct unconventional warfare operations in Indochina led to the creation of MACSOG in January 1964. Initially, MACSOG was assigned the following mission:

OMUSMACV (b)(1)1.4c, 3.3(b)(6) will provide necessary advice, assistance, training and materiel support to enable the RVN to conduct a graduated and intensified program of actions against the DRV which, in conjunction with other military and diplomatic actions in Southeast Asia, will lead to a judgement on the part of the DRV leadership that the direction and support of insurgent activities in RVN and Laos should cease.

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TOP SECRET

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During its existence, MACSOG was responsible for four basic programs: operations against NVN, cross-border operations into Laos, cross-border operations into Cambodia, and Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) operations. MACSOG conducted maritime, psychological, airborne/agent team, and air operations against NVN. Except for certain psychological operations, MACSOG activities against NVN were greatly reduced after the 1 November 1968 bombing halt.

On 27 March 1965, OMUSMACV assigned MACSOG the responsibility to conduct cross-border operations into Laos. These operations, under the code name SHINING BRASS (later changed to PRAIRIE FIRE), were designed to be conducted in three phases beginning with short-stay
tactical intelligence missions. In 1966, authorization was given for Phase II operations -- long-stay intelligence and sabotage missions. Phase III operations, development of resistance cadres, were never authorized. In 1967, SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE elements conducted operations south of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line to counter enemy infiltration and provide early early warning.

On 22 May 1967, JCS approved, with concurrence of the State Department, the conduct of cross-border operations into Cambodia. These operations, under the code name DANIEL BOONE (later changed to SALEM HOUSE), were conducted under many constraints, e.g., no tactical air strikes or exploitation forces authorized, teams engage in combat only as a last resort, no more than 10 missions in any one month, etc. With the passage of time, almost all of the constraints on operations in Cambodia were removed.

The JPRC was activated by COMUSMACV on 17 September 1966. It became the focal point for all intelligence related to detached or missing personnel in the Southeast Asia theater of operations. The JPRC recovery operations generally took one of two forms: raid-type operations against known or suspected enemy PW camps, or the search for known evadees.

MACSOG ceased active operations in April 1972, and was redesignated the Strategic Technical Directorate Advisory Team 158 (STDAT-158). STDAT-158 closed operations in March 1973.

As a result of intelligence obtained in May 1970, an operation was organized to rescue US PW's being held in a prison camp at Son Tay, North Vietnam. A Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG) was formed to conduct detailed planning and training, as well as the actual raid. The Army element was composed of 56 primary mission troops with an additional 47 alternate and support personnel. Almost all of the Army personnel were selected from Special Forces units at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The actual rescue operation was conducted on 21 November 1970. The ground operation, basically a long distance heliborne raid, was characterized by tactical surprise, violent execution, and swift withdrawal. Complete tactical surprise was achieved by the manner in which the raiding force was transported and inserted into the target area. The operation was conducted almost exactly as planned, and no losses of aircraft or personnel were sustained in the objective area. Unfortunately, no PW's were rescued; they had been moved from Son Tay months prior to the operation.
In March 1970, the 5th SFG (Abn) was tasked with organizing and conducting a program to train Army battalions of the Khmer Republic. By the end of October 1970, eight battalions had completed training and returned to combat and further plans made and approved to train an additional 30 battalions. Although the 5th SFG (Abn) was officially withdrawn on 3 March 1973, the mission remained and 423 Special Forces personnel voluntarily extended to provide the nucleus for the successor training command, the USARV Individual Training Group (UITG). The UITG also conducted special training programs at the request of the Cambodian Government which included the training of: 60 nurses for field hospital work; 500 officers and NCO’s for duties as instructors for Khmer training camps; 75 instructors and crew members for field employment of 75mm pack howitzers; 30 counterintelligence agents; 280 junior officers in basic leadership skills; and, a Special Forces-type reconnaissance company which was later used to form the cadre for Special Forces training in the Khmer Republic.

Following the North Vietnamese offensive during Easter 1972, an urgent requirement developed to retrain and reequip the 3d ARVN Division and the 20th Tank Regiment which bore the initial NVA onslaught in I Corps. As a result, two MTT’s, constituted of Special Forces personnel, moved north to conduct the training. Based upon the initial Special Forces success, the training program was expanded and augmented by hand-picked ARVN trainers from the RVNAF Central Training Command (CTC).

On 15 May 1972, UITG was placed under command of the MACV Director of Training and Special Assistant to COMUSMACV. The name was changed to Forces Armee Nationale Khmer (FANK) Training Command. To meet the dual mission requirements for training Cambodian Army battalions and providing MTT’s to ARVN units, 100 Special Forces personnel from the 1st SFG (Abn) on Okinawa were deployed in July 1972 to augment the combined United States-Vietnamese MTT program which eventually involved the on-site retraining of ARVN Infantry, Armor, Airborne and Ranger units in every Military Region in RVN. Vietnamese units completing the retraining program consistently turned in better performance on the battlefield when returned to action.

On the day of the ceasefire of 28 January 1973, four MTT’s were still in operation retraining elements of the 5th ARVN Infantry Division and 25th ARVN Infantry Division, battalions of the Airborne Division, and had begun the first day of retraining the 7th ARVN Infantry Division.

In recapping the accomplishments of the USASF between March 1970 and January 1973, the record shows that 86 Khmer battalions and numerous other specialists, in all a total of 84,000 combat troops, were trained from the ground up and redeployed into combat within Cambodia. In RVN during the nine months immediately preceding the January 1973 ceasefire, the Field Training Command (FTC) and its ARVN augmentation, reinforced with 1st SFG (Abn) personnel, retrained 40 percent of the ARVN ground maneuver battalions. All battalions and separate companies of the 9th, 21st, 23d and 23d ARVN Infantry Divisions and the 20th Tank Regiment were retrained;
the Airborne, 3d, 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions were 75 percent retrained; and, 14 Ranger and 8 reconnaissance companies completely retrained.

(ii) Following the 28 January 1973 ceasefire, all training elements of the FIC were ordered to cease training, stand down, and prepare to redeploy to the United States within 25 days. Special Forces involvement in Indochina was thereby ended.

(S) USASF Training Advisory Effort, Thailand (U)

(Frequently overlooked are the contributions of Special Forces in Thailand to the US efforts in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Special Forces trained Lao military |

(b)(1)1.4a, 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, 3.3(b)(6)and the original Thai Volunteer Force which was deployed to RVN.

(b)(1)1.4a, 3.3(b)(6)

(TS) Summary (U)

The development of USASF activities in Indochina was traced from the deployment of a small MTT in June 1957 to over 3,000 personnel until the phasedown of all US forces in 1973. Special Forces participation included the training of military and paramilitary units, long range reconnaissance and intelligence collection, covert operations against NVN, and even the conduct of conventional infantry-type operations using paramilitary forces. One area not addressed was the command and control of USASF activities. It is appropriate that this subject be discussed here since it was the primary cause of problems throughout USASF involvement in Indochina.

Command and control problems first surfaced with the commitment of Special Forces to Laos. The PEO-MAAG organization in Laos used regional advisors for control in the field. The normal USASF chain of command required adjustment to this procedure; operational control was assigned to regional advisors with administrative control by the USASF command element in Vientiane. Although important problems arose between regional and USASF advisors, they were not critical to the overall mission.

In Vietnam, the problems of command and control did affect USASF mission accomplishment. The CIDG Program was less than successful in coordinating its activities with other counterinsurgency efforts. Multiple chains of command and programs, administered by various GVN/US military and nonmilitary agencies, were major obstacles to a fully integrated counterinsurgency effort.
The combined USASF-VNSF command of Project DELTA caused delays in committing the ARVN Ranger battalion on reaction/exploitation missions. There were also political conflicts between the VNSHIC and GVN district/province officials which resulted in the cancellation of many missions. Other special operations were under unilateral USASF command. This eliminated the problems caused by the combined USASF-VNSF chain of command, but often resulted in Special Forces elements being employed as conventional infantry when placed under operational control of US or ARVN units. Efforts were made to educate US commanders on the capabilities and limitations of USASF-advised elements; however, misuse remained a continuing problem.
Chapter 3
ASSESSMENT (U)

(U) The Vietnam War vividly demonstrated to the world that the resources and capabilities of the United States do indeed have limitations. It further emphasized to this country the extreme commitment required to attain national objectives when faced with the smallest but determined adversary; a commitment so extensive that efficiency is required from even the most powerful of nations.

(U) The objective of gaining time for the establishment of a free South also required efficiency. This goal engendered constraints not originally anticipated. The amount of time was never defined because it was presumed that the goal would be achieved. When it became apparent that the increasing cost in money, materiel, and men's lives would continue indefinitely, public opinion indicated that time had run out. Our objective did not change, it simply expired. Whether more effective utilization of our assets could have achieved our ultimate goal is conjecture; however, it certainly could have increased the pressure on the enemy earlier, thus negating the increasing adverse effects of public opinion.

(U) The inadequacy of the US effort to halt Communism in Indochina was the result of a multiplicity of errors, the most significant of which was the failure of the US government to develop a coordinated plan for US involvement. The following chart illustrates salient United States and North Vietnamese objectives and strategies during the period 1950 to 1975. The short-run strategies frequently became inconsistent with long range objectives, and were counterproductive when compared to the more consistent enemy strategies. On the other hand, changes in objectives were not always accompanied by corresponding changes in strategy. As a result, US policy vacillated until President Nixon announced a policy for Vietnamization and US troop withdrawal. Compounding this error was the government's failure to provide a centralized management agency to control the many US departments and agencies in the execution of national policy once it was made. Further failure to establish combined management at subordinate levels resulted in an uncoordinated, fragmented, and at times duplicated approach to the insurgency. Unfortunately, this confusion did not extend to the enemy.
- Blocking the conventional NVA aggression cont'd as obj but blocking insurgency ceased in 1969

Maintenance of balance of power cont'd only while Sino-Soviet solidarity existed

Est. early but not supported by methods (strat)

Lack of meaning after efforts to block communism in sea slackened - and decision made to pullout

US limited war policy fostered numerous political, economic, military and geographic constraints - it permitted the enemy sanctuaries, precluded ground combat in North Vietnam.

The limited war policy dictated gradual military commitment, it limited national involvement and limited support

This limited response to the enemy's total war policy, his deliberate strategy and consistent objectives proved counterproductive

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| | CONTINUE COMMUNISM OR VIETNAMIZATION |

Period of strategic opportunity

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CONVENT | INTRELLA | STRA. DEF |
| PRIMA MILITA | COMPATI | N/A OBJEC |

| PERIOD OF OPPORTUNITY |
| NORTH VIETNAM | 2 REVOLUTION |
| | INTRELLA |
| | N/A MILITA |
| | STRATEGIC OPIFENSIVE |

| TOTAL WAR | AVOID SINO-SOVIET DOMINATION |

(1) The Tet Offensive was a turning point while Hanoi psychologically took to the US, the VC infrastructure dealt a severe blow.
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<td>But Not Its Strategy</td>
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**Legend**
- **US Mil. Experience**: Conventional Methods Against the Threat
- **US Relied On**: Military Action (Goals) Directed Toward Nation Building
- **Unsuccessful**: Strategy Proved Incompatible
- **In Conventional Situation**: An Armed Force Cannot Succeed Unless Complemented by Political, Social, Economic, and Psychological Campaigns
- **Period of Initiation or Decline**: Effective Periods
- **Period of Strategic Opportunity**: Strategic Overlap
- **US/ RVN**: US and RVN

**Military Capabilities**
- To Resist Aggression
- Using Techniques Emphasized

**US/RVN**
- Conventional
- Integrated
- Multifaceted
- Revolutionary

**NVA**
- Compatible
- Objectives

**STRATEGY**
- Integrated
- Conventional
- Non-Defensive

**LEGEND**
- Period of Strategic Opportunity
- Period of Initiation or Decline
- US Relied on Military Action (Goals) Directed Toward Nation Building
- But not Its Strategy
(U) Other problems generated at the national level concerned the political constraints imposed on the conduct of the war because of the proximity of China, a sizeable hostile power whose intervention was feared. This caused the United States to pursue the war on a narrow country-by-country basis, respecting political boundaries which did not represent divisions in population and which were not respected by the enemy. The sanctuaries afforded to the NVA enabled Hanoi to greatly moderate the adverse effects of the war.

(U) Problems which originated at lower levels were also significant. Military as well as civilian agencies repeatedly failed to learn from previous encounters with insurgencies in Malay, the Philippines, and Indochina itself. Mistakes made by the United States in Laos were repeated in South Vietnam. US organization and policy allowed the military effort to dominate the very pacification program which was universally acclaimed as necessary. Pacification programs, when they were initiated, became overmilitarized and misapplied in response to a growing enemy main-force threat.

(U) Special Forces were well established when US conventional combat forces arrived in 1965, yet they were frequently at odds with the regulars because of differences in basic philosophy, doctrine, and tactics. These two very dissimilar organizations were superimposed upon the same terrain and populations; the result was an uneasy truce which ultimately led to the withdrawal of the USASF from RVN in 1971. Most USASF activity had been conducted among the ethnic minorities in remote highland regions away from the major population centers along the coast. Their operations were in sharp contrast to the "search and destroy" tactics used by the regular American units. As time went on and the pattern of the war and US involvement changed, USASF found themselves in all kinds of roles and mission. This is understandable, as the very term unconventional warfare is as clouded with ambiguities as the historical movements which gave shape to it. Special Forces doctrine was and still is argued within military and non-military agencies, and unconventional warfare has come to mean different things to different people. Some contend that it is a type of warfare, while others contend that it and its practitioners comprise a political-military force, autonomous of, though at times complementary to, land armies. Though the US Army resolved the official doctrinal problem in favor of the latter interpretation, it was and remains a controversial topic.

(6) USASF in Laos (U)

(6) The question of US success or failure in Laos must be examined in terms of the various objectives sought. For over 20 years, the United States was able to prevent Laos from falling completely to the Communists, thus an objective was achieved. On the other hand, the objective of
attaining a Western-oriented Laos was not achieved, reflecting primarily on the limited price the United States was willing to pay in men, material, and prestige to ensure its attainment. Of importance then was the degree of success attained by the limited amount of assets committed.

-US attempts to defeat the threat to the internal security of Laos posed by the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh were concentrated on the establishment of a viable Laotian Army. Longer range civic action and governmental development plans for neutralizing the insurgency were halted by the US withdrawal required by the Geneva "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos" and its "Protocol." By 1962, the United States recognized the infeasibility of attempting to solve political problems by military means which by design were not aimed at clear victory.

- In spite of a lack of such victory, the experience in Laos clearly established the suitability of Special Forces personnel for counter-insurgency operations. Two circumstances made their selection for operations in Laos most appropriate. The first was the opportunity that eventually arose in the tribal training programs; the second was the primitive state of the Army and the backwardness of the country. Although the assignment of Special Forces in a training and advisory role with conventional Army units represented a sharp deviation from their normal mission of organizing and training guerrilla forces behind enemy lines in time of general war, USASF were ideally suited for unit training in the remote areas of Laos, where the mission called for instruction in the basic skills of soldiering and much improvisation. The employment of USASF in regional training centers, on the other hand, did not appear to offer any unique advantages over the use of conventional US combat arms personnel.

-The employment of USASF also raised the question of command and control relations within the PEO-MAAG organization which used regional advisors for control in the field. The Special Forces chain of command required adjustment to this operating procedure. The result was assignment of operational control to the regional advisor and administrative control to the USASF command element in Vientiane. Important but not critical difficulties arose between regional and USASF advisors. In the case of the Kha Program, which had a different mission orientation and tended to be geographically separated from the operations of conventional Army forces, Special Forces concepts including command and control worked well. Training and advisory operations with conventional forces, on the other hand, proved to be most effectively carried out when the principle of unity of command over all MAAG activities in the field was enforced.
-T-S. Added to the problem of control was the difficulty in establishing proper counterpart relations. This problem was a result of several factors. French use of Lao military forces in only subordinate roles resulted in the absence of a developed junior officer corps. Cultural factors dictated separate training for officers, and when this was not provided, training for enlisted personnel lost the necessary emphasis and reasonably well trained NCO's were led into combat by untrained officers. Complicating this problem was the absence of clear guidance to the USASF advisors on such matters as how involved to become in combat situations. Even when increased control was deemed necessary, the lack of advisor control of the US supplies prevented him from using them as a lever to compel satisfactory performance, a problem that was to be repeated at all levels throughout the Vietnam conflict.

- T-S. Compounding the difficulties in training were the operational needs which superseded the available time and manpower for effective training. Only when entire battalions were sent to a third country for complete training cycles were USASF able to conduct effective training programs. The use of third-country personnel in these programs, due to cultural, ethnic, and linguistic similarities, proved highly effective.

- S). USASF in Vietnam (U)

(S). Lack of a centralized unconventional warfare headquarters, coupled with an inability to properly utilize unconventional warfare assets, led to the misuse of USASF in Vietnam. Until the application of a coordinated effort under Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) in 1967, there was an overreliance on and overextension of CIDG-type programs to fill the need for pacification programs. This detracted from the overall UN effort, and resulted in the failure to develop a significant organized resistance among the tribal groups along the Laotian and Cambodian borders and within North Vietnam.

(S). The CIDG Program (U)

(U) The CIDG Program eclipsed the other USASF activities in RVN in both size and scope. In the conduct of this unique program over a period of 9 years, USASF became involved in every conceivable aspect of counter-insurgency -- military, economic, psychological, and political.
The CIDG Program generally succeeded where it was concerned with mobilizing irregular paramilitary forces for the conduct of counter-insurgency, containing the spread of VC control among minority groups and improving the security of the population in contested areas. The psychological impact on the local population was of equal success; the USASF/CIDG presence provided visible evidence of GVN/US support and concern. The later deterioration of relations between the GVN and Montagnards leading to a brief uprising, and the apparent continuation of this trend, reflected a subsequent failure in population control; however, it does not diminish the initial success achieved by USASF.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the CIDG Program was the employment of USASF advisory assistance at hamlet and village levels. Prior to this program, direct US assistance was not generally available at these critical lower levels of the insurgency-counterinsurgency conflict. The USASF "A" Detachment provided the mechanism for combining grass-roots civic action, PSYOP, and intelligence operations oriented to the population control problem with the more purely military activities to counter the armed guerrilla threats. In this way, the USASF provided the means for conducting an integrated self-contained counterinsurgency effort within a given area. Earlier in Laos, USASF detachments were used in a similar role to support the Kham Program; however, their more extensive use in RVN demonstrated the feasibility of deploying USASF at the lowest levels to participate actively in such operations.

Although successful in some areas, the CIDG Program was not, as many believed, the only solution to the complex problems of counter-insurgency in RVN. There were a number of shortfalls and failures associated with the program. The CIDG effort was unsuccessful in its ultimate goal of developing assets which were committed to the GVN. The CIDG forces and area development programs which were established remained effective until the departure of the USASF. When USASF detachments moved and the CIDG physical assets and trained personnel were placed under the control of province chiefs, effectiveness rapidly deteriorated thus nullifying previous accomplishments. The lack of success was evidenced on numerous occasions by the unwillingness of CIDG personnel to be transferred or integrated into the RF/PF and by the mass desertions which accompanied some of the turnovers. This was not a USASF failure except to the doubtful extent that their presence tended unwittingly to inhibit the development of loyalties toward the GVN. At a higher level, the US United States did bear some responsibility for initial and continuing failure. The US Country Team undoubtedly over-estimated the GVN's capability and motivation to take over CIDG projects and continue them after the departure of USASF. Another contributing factor was the failure of the GVN to take effective measures early in the CIDG Program to lessen the traditional hostility between the tribal minority groups and the Vietnamese. Specific aspects of the program are assessed below.
SECRET

(S) Command, Control, and Coordination. The CIDG Program was less than successful in coordinating its activities with other counter-insurgency efforts. Local military commanders and civil officials were not always fully informed about projects initiated in their areas of responsibility. Multiple chains of command and multiple programs administered by a variety of GVN ministries and agencies were obstacles to a fully integrated counterinsurgency effort. On the US side, there were instances when conventional force commanders attempted to use CIDG assets as regular infantry and to improperly take control of CIDG camps. Both USASF and conventional force commanders failed to understand the capabilities and limitations of employing CIDG assets in support of conventional operations.

(S) The initial command and control arrangement for USASF in RVN, until modified in May 1964, was a special purpose unconventional command chain functioning within a conventional command structure. This worked effectively when CIDG operations were conducted in remote areas apart from the operations of the regular Army and other GVN security forces. However, when regular units were near CIDG sites, this system placed an exceptional burden of coordination on USASF and other advisory personnel.

(S) The USASF command organization in RVN was handicapped from the very beginning by the divided command and control line between itself and MACV, where all US military advisory and assistance activities were planned, coordinated, and controlled. This division at the top of the MACV structure made it inevitable that the command and control split would eventually extend to lower levels. The USASF "B" Detachments, located at the ARVN corps headquarters, were able to represent the CIDG Program directly to senior corps advisors and for this reason probably prevented a further split down to the "A" Detachment level. The question of operational control on the US side was, in the experience of "A" and "B" Detachments, less important than the individual willingness of both MACV and USASF personnel to work together to achieve full coordination of their different programs.

(S) The CIDG Program was conducted through an intermediary host-country organization, the VNSF; this was an exception to the general US advisory pattern in RVN. In addition, the US role was more central and the participation of USASF detachments was generally greater than in the regular US advisory effort. This resulted in a two-step advisory role that diminished and in some cases negated the impact of USASF advice and assistance. The consequences of this arrangement were that USASF developed and supported programs in a given area with little or no GVN input. When the time came for local GVN officials to assume control of ongoing programs, there were no trained indigenous personnel to keep them going. Since the ultimate aim of the CIDG Program was to develop a people committed to the GVN, it was necessary that these same people be aligned with and under the influence of an arm of the GVN as early as possible. The VNSF detachment was not an adequate GVN presence for this purpose since it had no lasting interest in the area.

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III-7
The relationship between USASF personnel and their VNSF counterparts posed one of the major problem areas in the CIDG Program. The role of the USASF detachment commander was supposed to have been strictly advisory with the VNSF counterpart personnel assuming all important responsibilities. Unfortunately, these responsibilities were rarely shouldered by the VNSF alone.

To complicate matters, there were two vertical chains of command, the VNSF and the USASF, with appropriate levels of horizontal counterpart coordination required up through the two commands. Frequently, the VNSF camp commander did not receive the same instructions from the VNSF "B" Detachment that the USASF "A" Detachment received from the USASF "B" Detachment, or word came down more slowly on the Vietnamese side. In addition, the VNSF officers were often under pressures and restrictions from their own higher headquarters that were not known to their USASF counterparts. The physical separation of the USASF and VNSF detachments at most camps also inhibited close relations, and the vast differences between the Vietnamese standard of living and that of USASF personnel tended to widen the gulf between them.

In summary, it appears that the VNSF tended to resist the joint approach at all operating levels, and there were policy differences at the highest command level that worked against it. At the lowest but most crucial level, the VNSF often failed to shoulder their responsibilities during operations, resulting in USASF personnel frequently assuming command to maintain control in combat situations.

Operations. The CIDG Program was characterized by changing mission and program objectives. The initial mission was area development, a forward pacification concept that placed primary emphasis on village defense tactics and techniques and on civic action to gain a foothold with the population and win popular support for the GVN. The first application of this concept was aimed at the Montagnard population in the highlands.

In the post-Buon Enao period, a shift in emphasis occurred from expanding village defense systems to the primary use of area development camps as bases for offensive Strike Force operations. At that time, the principal task as seen by higher headquarters was to supplement the GVN Pacification Program with intensified counterguerrilla warfare.

A second major shift in mission emphasis to border surveillance occurred in 1963, as area development projects were expanded toward the western border of RVN and new CIDG camps were established in these border areas. Although area development continued in other localities and was combined with border surveillance when feasible, the latter received primary emphasis in 1964. In sufficient numbers, the lightly armed irregulars might have successfully accomplished a purely border
surveillance mission but they could not have aspired to control the border. During the period 1961-1964, however, CIDG strength was inadequate for the border surveillance mission; the low level of small unit leadership and the irregular character of the CIDG forces rendered a border control mission infeasible.

---(S)--- Finally, in the Fall of 1964, CIDG forces were assigned a new mission -- operations against VC war zones and the interdiction of VC north-south interior infiltration routes. All operations were overt and conventional, conducted from fixed bases against an enemy who concealed himself in the jungle and reduced his fixed bases to a minimum. The major limitation of operational effectiveness was always the lack of good intelligence on the enemy's location. Where it was possible to develop an intelligence net among the local population, success could be achieved. Otherwise, CIDG operations were based on area coverage.

---(S)--- From the days of Buon Enao onward, there was a trend toward employing CIDG forces in conventional roles. There was a parallel trend to conventionalize the forces themselves. Both trends were inconsistent with the original intent of the CIDG Program. The war in RVN was a political war, a war for popular support. Political ends should have shaped the military actions, not the reverse. After 1964, the political, economic, and psychological aspects of the program were subordinated to purely military considerations. CIDG camps were established solely to accomplish the military mission with little or no regard for the socio-political considerations. In addition, CIDG forces were employed in areas other than their home districts. Their combat effectiveness in these situations was generally unacceptable.

(U) The economy of force role of USASF was one of the most significant successes of the CIDG Program. This success can best be shown by the following table which compares the operational effectiveness of Company B, 5th SFG (Abn) to that of the 4th Infantry Division for March 1969 (Senior Officer Debriefing Report of COL Harold R. Aaron, CO, 5th SFG (Abn), 4 June 1968 to 29 May 1969).
Company B, 5th SFG (Abn) vs 4th Infantry Division (March 1969)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Company B</th>
<th>4th Inf Div</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US KIA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US WIA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG KIA</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG WIA</td>
<td>123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Friendly Casualties</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy KIA</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy to US KIA Ration</td>
<td>76.7:1</td>
<td>5.6:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy to Total Friendly KIA Ratio</td>
<td>5.5:1</td>
<td>5.6:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the preceding table, the enemy to total friendly KIA ratio is approximately the same (5.5:1 and 5.6:1). However, the significant point is the enemy to US KIA ratio; Company B had a ratio of 76.7 enemy killed for each US while the 4th Infantry Division's ratio was 5.6 enemy for each US. The operational effectiveness of the entire 5th SFG (Abn) with respect to the enemy-to-US KIA ratio was 76:1 (1967), 98:1 (1968) and 115:1 (January - April 1969). Such figures demonstrate that USASF provides a means for waging effective war against the enemy at a minimum cost in American lives.

In addition to this economy of manpower, considerable cost savings were realized in the equipping and maintenance of a CIDG soldier as compared to a US soldier. As shown in the following table, the price of initial issue for a CIDG soldier was about 71 percent of the cost to equip a US soldier, while daily maintenance, subsistence, and pay was about 16 percent of the US cost.
(U) Cost Comparison - CIDG vs US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIDG Costs</th>
<th>Initial Issue</th>
<th>US Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$ 22.67</td>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>$ 81.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124.00</td>
<td>M-16 Rifle</td>
<td>124.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$146.67</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$205.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CIDG Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Per Day</th>
<th>US Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$ .55</td>
<td>Base Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.29</td>
<td>Jump Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.29</td>
<td>Combat Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.38</td>
<td>Cost of Living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Foreign Duty Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>Partial Ration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ 2.81</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(S) Intelligence. Intelligence operations were indispensable to the accomplishment of the CIDG mission. At the intelligence collection level, combat reconnaissance patrols generated the most reliable intelligence on enemy armed strength and dispositions, but patrols are less effective as producers of the kinds of intelligence required in this type of warfare. Intelligence nets among local inhabitants were needed to determine enemy intentions and strengths, identify guerrillas, and track enemy movements within the operational area.

(S) The general failure to develop informant intelligence at village level in RVN permitted VC units to avoid contact with superior friendly forces, ambush weaker forces, and launch surprise attacks in strength against CIDG camps. Camps that were successfully attacked and overrun usually lacked adequate intelligence systems, including counterintelligence nets, within the camp to ferret out enemy infiltrators and sympathizers.

(S) The major obstacle to the establishment of informant intelligence nets that was not overcome except in rare instances was the VC control of the rural population countrywide. The general failure of PSYOP efforts in support of the GVN to convince the rural population that the GVN could protect them contributed to the difficulty in recruiting informers.
The USASF intelligence effort was limited by a lack of sufficiently qualified personnel at all levels. The VNSF possessed even fewer, and were reluctant to accept advice and assistance or to engage in joint intelligence efforts. A policy agreement on the role of USASF in the intelligence effort was finally reached in the spring of 1964, but even after this date the VNSF were slow to accept USASF participation. In the absence of a joint intelligence policy, each detachment commander had to work out with his counterpart the arrangements that would prevail at his camp. Every command change on either side at camp level required new working agreements.

Language was a major obstacle to the direct recruitment of agents and the acquisition of information by US personnel. In the rare instances where an "A" Detachment member possessed an adequate language capability to approach the indigenous population directly, some outstanding successes were achieved. For the most part, however, USASF required interpreter assistance to initiate the recruitment effort. Because they were privy to the entire operation, interpreters had to be carefully screened, evaluated, and approached.

Psychological Operations. PSYOP conducted in support of the CIDG Program began with emphasis on the direct day-to-day, person-to-person approach based on a thorough knowledge and understanding of the customs, habits, and thought processes of the local villagers and their leaders. Later, under ARVN and VNSF management, it became largely a mass-media program. In dealing with people at village level, the direct but more subtle and frequently repeated personal approach used by the VC was more effective than this mass-media program.

In the early 1960s, Vietnamese military interest in PSYOP programs among the civilian population was minimal; most of the initiative had to come from USASF personnel. Lacking professional guidance, they depended on their own initiative in the implementation of ad hoc efforts. Limited MAAG advice and later that of PSYOP augmentation officers provided USASF with some assistance, although some of the younger augmentation officers acknowledged that they were not well qualified. Not until 1964 had arrangements been made to provide qualified personnel trained in PSYOP for RVN.

One of the major problems with PSYOP in RVN was that whatever goodwill could be generated by the various programs centered on the USASF, and credit could seldom be transferred to the GVN. Another factor, applicable not only to the CIDG Program but also to the total counterinsurgency effort, was that to win back the active cooperation of villagers under VC control, it was necessary to convince them that they would be protected from VC acts of reprisal. The cumulative evidence tends to support the view that although PSYOP may have succeeded in making thousands of villagers temporarily sympathetic to the
GVN, the villagers would not cooperate beyond the point of VC tolerance, i.e., they might come to the dispensary for medical aid or even provide harmless after-the-fact information on the VC, but they would not identify guerrillas or report the presence of armed units. A major reason the effort extended in PSYOP did not produce greater results was the lack of adequate military, paramilitary, police, or self-defense forces to ensure protection to the people. This problem, coupled with the failure of successive Saigon governments to institute desired reforms, indicated that active support required more than PSYOP.

Although there were severe constraints limiting US PSYOP support to the CIDG program, the major difficulties appear to have been of GVN origin. The most frequently noted problem was the apparent lack of sympathy on the part of ARVN officers and GVN officials for the peasantry and minority groups of the country. Although ARVN and VNSF personnel were in many instances willing to cooperate with USASF, they lacked initiative and an awareness of the potential inherent in an active PSYOP program for gaining control of the population. Other difficulties on the Vietnamese side which adversely affected the PSYOP effort were inadequate staffing of PSYOP sections in terms of numbers, competence, and interest; grade differential between US advisors and their counterparts; and frequent replacement of the Vietnamese assigned.

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Support.

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The Military Assistance Program (MAP); however, it was not designed to either fund or support the requirements of an ongoing insurgency. Further, US legislation prohibited the expenditure of MAP money to pay indigenous forces directly.
It is the fond and perhaps vain hope of many who know and understand the unique nature of the CIDG funding system, that it might serve as a model for providing support to any future US operation struggling with the complex problems of counterinsurgency.

The logistical system included informal procedures for accountability, authority for local purchase in the field, and the Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO) in Okinawa, all of which contributed to the flexibility and responsiveness of the system. This system was particularly appropriate for the CIDG Program, where nonstandard supply items were issued and where the nature of the mission imposed sudden and unforeseen requirements.

On the other hand, there were weaknesses that a more conventional logistical system might have forestalled or corrected. One of these was the loose control, which, when coupled with the lack of formal accountability in the country, may have been responsible for some of the reported losses of equipment. The repackaging of standard lots of equipment, although effective for ensuring rapid loading and delivery resulted in oversupply of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment at some camps.

The flexibility provided by the liberal use of cash for local purchases was of mixed benefit to the local economy, and its usefulness in winning the support of the people for the GVN was open to question. There were also instances of overpayment. For example, the pay scales for CIDG enlisted personnel were in some cases as high as those for the VNSF officers.

The issue of obsolete, foreign, and commercial types of equipment to CIDG units and "A" Detachments added to the burdens of maintenance and resupply. The lack of spare parts, not only for the nonstandard materiel but also for standard items, increased the number of unserviceable items in the hands of detachments, complicated the maintenance problem, and introduced avoidable delays in returning items to service.

The maintenance-by-replacement system was basically sound in principle as a way of relieving "A" Detachments of an otherwise heavy maintenance workload. This system entailed additional requirements, however, in that larger stocks of complete replacement items had to be available in supply depots and more aircraft had to be available to perform resupply missions than would be required for a maintenance-on-the-spot system. The use of traveling augmentation teams (Eastern Construction Company (ECO) teams) to perform repairs and other maintenance on site partially offset these additional requirements.
Special Forces Operations (U).

The USASF participation in special operations in Indochina ranged in size and scope from small long-range reconnaissance patrols to multi-company operations. In general, USASF special operations were effective; however, certain problem areas did surface. The purpose of this section is to assess these successes and failures.

Project DELTA conducted numerous successful operations throughout RVN for over 6 years. Although successful, a number of closely related problem areas have been identified. First, reaction times were slowed by the number of major commands through which operations had to be coordinated. Second, the ARVN Ranger battalion, in its role as a reaction/exploitation force, saw little action; the major obstacle being the joint VN-US chain of command approval needed to commit them. This problem was eventually overcome by the decision that once an operation was approved and the teams committed, the employment of the Rangers became the prerogative of the VN-US field commanders. Third, the high level of authority required to conduct operations resulted in many missions being aborted by political crisis or conflict between the VNSFHC and district/province officials.

Project OMEGA and Project SIGMA were also very successful in their conduct of special operations. These two projects were controlled entirely by USASF, and therefore the problem of joint US-VN control encountered in Project DELTA was eliminated. However, this arrangement did not eliminate all command and control problems. Although commanded by USASF, Project OMEGA and Project SIGMA were placed under the operational control of CG, IFFV, and CG, IIFFV, respectively. This often led to the employment of the two projects on missions which could have been accomplished by conventional force LRRP units.

The Mobile Strike Force (MSF) units were very effective when employed in the roles for which they were trained, i.e., reconnaissance and rapid reaction missions. Unfortunately, when these forces were attached to US or ARVN units, they were often used as conventional infantry over extended periods of time. This put considerable strain on the MSF and occasionally resulted in criticism from US conventional unit commanders. Efforts were made to educate US commanders about the capabilities and limitations of the MSF; however, misuse remained a continuing problem.
The multiple command lines and lack of cohesive effort also extended to MACSOG. The 5th SFG (Abn) provided the majority of personnel for MACSOG ground elements and a large part of the planning and training staffs. However, it exercised no command over these elements. MACSOG's full potential was never realized although several programs were very successful, e.g., cross-border reconnaissance programs in Cambodia (DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE) and Laos (SHINING BRASS/ PRAIRIE FIRE).

There were a number of specific problems which adversely affected MACSOG's operation. Perhaps the most important were those concerned with command, control, and coordination. First, since CINCPAC never prepared implementing instructions for OPLAN 34A, MACSOG was forced to operate under a MACV plan which was not clear with respect to mission or tasking and which was subject to various interpretations by supporting agencies. In addition, the lack of a comprehensive strategic war plan for SEA severely restricted the integration of MACSOG activities into the overall conventional effort.
The next major problem area concerned operational employment of MACSOG's cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia, as well as its psychological warfare operations against NVN were very effective.

The long extended chain of command for obtaining approval of small maritime operations (PARBOIL) caused extreme frustration to personnel at the MACSOG Naval Advisory Detachment in Da Nang. It resulted in a lack of motivation and a loss of incentive to plan in detail.

With respect to air operations (MIDRIFF), MACSOG was extremely limited in the beginning because of the shortcomings of the C-123 aircraft, particularly the limited range/payload and navigational aids. This problem was eventually overcome by the replacement with C-130's.

The final major area of analysis is the problem of constraints on MACSOG operations. In the early days of MACSOG, the time required to staff and approve action programs in Washington often precluded timely implementation. The imposition of restrictions specifying the distance north of the 17th Parallel for maritime operations and the depth of ground penetrations into Laos and Cambodia resulted in the enemy easily ascertaining MACSOG's area of operations and establishing their sanctuaries accordingly.

In several documents, it was noted that US national policy opposed the development of a resistance movement in NVN. However, the various policy decisions discussed in Chapter 2 specifically directed the formation of networks of resistance, covert bases, and teams for sabotage and light harassment in NVN. There were no policy decisions cited which altered this direction. Whatever the reason, there is no indication that the resistance potential in NVN was ever exploited. This negated one of the most effective UW measures that could have been employed against NVN, especially since Montagnard resistance forces, the Maquis Commandos, initially organized and trained by the French under the Composite Airborne Commando Group (GQ4A) programs, still existed and actively opposed the NVN government.
This duplication of effort directly related to the absence of a single authority for controlling UW operations throughout the combined area of RVN, NVN, Laos, and Cambodia. The requirement for a centralized command and control headquarters was recognized almost from the beginning of USASF involvement in RVN. On 23 November 1961, JCS directed CINCPAC to be prepared to establish a unified command and develop a proposed Joint Table of Distribution for the staff of a Commander, US Forces in Vietnam (COMUSVN). More importantly, CINCPAC was also directed to plan for a JUWTF which included representation from USCM, USOM, and USIA. On 13 December 1961, CINCPAC recommended to JCS that the JUWTF not be established until US combat forces were committed to RVN. Although DOD favored the proposed command arrangement, US Ambassador Nolting opposed the plan. Consequently, the final decision had to be made at the State-Defense level.

No further action was taken until 8 February, when DOD established the USMACV. On 2 May 1962, Generals Rosson and Yarborough identified a need for a US unified command for Southeast Asia reporting directly to JCS. Again, CINCPAC opposed this command arrangement. Unfortunately, the concept for the establishment of a JUWTF was shelved until 1965.

In November 1965, CINCPAC/COMUSMACV tasked MACSOG to be prepared to activate and command the JUWTFSEASIA. Although MACSOG prepared UW plans to support the overall COMUSSEASIA war plan, JUWTFSEASIA was never activated.

At about the same time, CINCPAC established the Special Operations Center, Pacific Command (SOCPAC) on Okinawa. SOCPAC was responsible for all aspects of UW and was prepared to form the nucleus of a JUWTF which could be passed to a subordinate unified commander when directed. In over 3 years of existence, SOCPAC was never directed to deploy as a JUWTF.

From the above discussion, it is obvious that there were numerous opportunities to consolidate UW activities in Southeast Asia under a single command and control authority.
(S) Son Tay Prisoner of War Rescue Operation (U)

(S) The raid on Son Tay failed in its primary mission, the rescue of US prisoners of war (PW's). However, it succeeded in other ways few people anticipated. The Son Tay rescue operation:

- Demonstrated the vulnerability of NVN; the raid was conducted within 23 miles of Hanoi.

- Precipitated the concentration of PW's into two prisons in the heart of Hanoi. Some of the PW's had been held in solitary confinement for years and this concentration enabled them to organize against their captors, to communicate, and to care for each other. The concentration of PW's also facilitated the planning of air strikes against the North.

- Demonstrated the US concern and resolve to free the PW's.

(S) Other than the absence of PW's at the objective, there were no major surprises in the operation. Service and national intelligence agencies accurately assessed the enemy capabilities and reaction. The ground operation was basically a long distance heliborne raid characterized by tactical surprise, violent execution, and swift withdrawal. The extensive and detailed rehearsals conducted by the joint force provided for every conceivable contingency. The rapid and smooth transition to an alternate plan at the objective demonstrated the ability of the force to adapt to varying conditions.

(S) The key to the success of the Son Tay rescue operation was the flexibility of command and control arrangements. The Task Group was given maximum freedom in developing concepts of employment. Once these concepts were approved by the NCA, COMJCTG was given the "go/no-go" prerogative and operational control over all forces with authority to make all tactical decisions from launch to recovery. In addition, COMJCTG was authorized to request support from the services on a "no questions asked" basis.

(U) USASF Training Advisory Effort, 1970-73 (U)

(U) In recapping the accomplishments of USASF members of the Army Advisory Group between March 1970 and January 1973, the record shows that 86 Khe me, battalions and numerous other specialists, in all a total of 84,000 fighting men, were trained from the ground up and redeployed into combat within the Cambodian borders. Beyond question, survival of the Lon Noi free Republic until April 1975 was direct proof of the effectiveness of that training.

(U) The record also shows that the MTT/STT programs were the 1972 highlights of the Vietnam War. Although the total number of Special Forces trainers deployed to the field in an MTT/STT role never exceeded 150, the volume of training conducted under the mobile training concept is an
astonishing footnote to the allied record in Indochina. During the 9-month period immediately preceding the January 1975 ceasefire, the Field Training Command and its ARVN augmentation, reinforced by 1st SFG (Abn), retrained 40 percent of the ARVN ground maneuver battalions (68 of 170). All battalions and separate companies of the 9th, 21st, 22d and 23d ARVN Divisions were retrained; the Airborne, 3d, 5th and 25th Divisions were 75 percent retrained; 14 Ranger battalions, 8 reconnaissance companies, and the 20th Tank Regiment were also completely retrained. Based on the outstanding success of the first MTT's sent to retrain the 3d ARVN Division and the 20th Tank Regiment, the Vietnamese JGS ultimately requested FTC help in retraining their entire ground maneuver force. Had not the ceasefire intervened this request would have been met.

(U) Vietnamese units completing the retraining program consistently turned in better performance on the battlefield once returned to action. In June 1972, General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff, and General Creighton Abrams, then winding up his duties as COMUSMACV preparatory to assuming the position of Chief of Staff, United States Army, issued a joint communique crediting the FANK Training Command's swift and professional response to the need for ARVN retraining as being a key factor in stopping the enemy north of Hue. Lieutenant General Truong, OG, I Corps, and Lieutenant General Chinh, Chief of CTC, stated that, "If it had not been for the FANK Training Command, there would not be a South Vietnamese I Corps today." General Abrams, General Vien, Marshal Lon Noi, and President Thieu commented to BG Stan L. McClellan, Director of Training and Special Assistant to COMUSMACV, that if it had not been for the retraining provided by USASF in 1972 to Vietnamese and Cambodian forces, both countries would have been lost then.

(U) It is perhaps futile to attempt to adequately measure the positive contribution made by Special Forces trainers to the combat power of the Republics of Vietnam and Khmer, particularly in view of the subsequent loss of both countries to the foe in 1975. However, there is adequate reason to question whether the loss of either country was the result of training deficiencies. In his report, "Great Spring Victory," the Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army and primary field commander during the 1975 offensive, Senior General Van Tien Dung, credits the forces of the South with sufficient strength and professionalism as to necessitate commitment of "...infantry, the ratio was 5.5 of our troops for each enemy soldier...(and) in heavy artillery, the ratio was 2.1 to 1." In any event, all who were there during those final years of crisis will attest to the peerless accomplishment of Special Forces into whose hands was passed the most demanding of training missions.

--- Withdrawal of USASF (U) ---

--- Withdrawal of USASF from its Vietnam involvement on 3 March 1971 was less adversely affected by the manner in which it was conducted than by its timing. In Laos, the withdrawal of USASF was delayed as long as
possible and they were held in place until the last 15 days to act as a deterrent to further Pathet Lao - Viet Minh inroads. This should have been the case in Vietnam. A review of the missions that required USASF during the remaining 2 years of US combat participation in RVN indicated that the withdrawal of the 5th SFG (Abn) was premature:

By January 1971, a border control system using the ARVN Ranger battalions was decided upon by JGS-MACV as the appropriate successor to the CIDG Program. However, the Ranger battalions required a 3-man advisory detachment. Because of the shortage of MACV advisors, 17 of the 37 advisory detachments were manned by USASF personnel; their familiarity with the camps, minority groups, and methods of operation were important and made the transition to Ranger status a success. These USASF advisors remained until the withdrawal of all advisors in 1973.

Concurrently, MACSOG continued operations until April 1972 when they closed operations and were redesignated the Strategic Technical Directorate Advisory Team (STDAT-158). STDAT-158 closed operations in RVN in March 1973. STDAT-158 was manned primarily by US Army personnel, almost all of whom were USASF.

USASF training advisory effort to ARVN and Cambodian units.

During the 1971-1973 period, a previously delayed training mission which required quality trainers of indigenous personnel but which was not assigned to USASF was the expansion and upgrading of the territorial forces, the RF/PF. The strength of the RF/PF had been increased to approximately 29,000 personnel, and a new advisory element, the Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) was created to support this expansion. The MAT consisted of two combat arms officers, a light weapons NCO, and a communications NCO.

At the time of the USASF withdrawal, valid requirements also existed for target acquisition and designation, intelligence, border operations, training Cambodian forces, and other UW missions. These were the very missions which justified initial USASF involvement and later expansion.

Conclusion (U)

(U) The employment of Special Forces permitted the US government to offer military assistance to the unstable governments of Indochina during the period of French withdrawal. The regular military forces
trained by these personnel significantly upgraded the ability of the host countries -- Laos and South Vietnam -- to resist Communist subversion. In each country, when the Communists increased their efforts, USASF was called upon to train in excess of 50,000 paramilitary forces from remote ethnic minorities. In doing so, the USASF denied such populations to the insurgents, created additional effective defense forces, provided essential intelligence, and greatly increased the scope of local government influence.

(U) Despite the significant contribution of USASF to the conduct of our first encounter with Communism in a "war of national liberation," there were many problem areas which adversely affected the ability of this force to rapidly attain its full potential. The most important of these problems was the failure of the US government to centralize the planning and execution of the total US effort. Centralized management at the national level could have:

- Precluded US interagency competition and its resulting conflicts and duplication.
- Reduced conflicting US and GVN objectives, strategies, and programs.
- Precluded overmilitarization of the war effort.
- Enabled the United States to effectively apply leverage on the GVN to produce needed governmental reforms and elicit satisfactory performance from its forces.

(S) More specifically applicable to the Special Forces contribution, a joint UW headquarters, encompassing all US agencies could have:

- Eliminated conflicting chains of command.
- Reduced or eliminated duplication of intelligence functions.
- Reduced overmilitarization of the CIDG Program.
- Conducted operations on an area basis.
- Controlled all UW assets in SEA, eliminating competition for Special Forces and other UW resources.
- Increased emphasis on guerrilla warfare, reducing the effectiveness of the enemy's sanctuaries.
- Applied lessons learned in Laos to the Vietnam situation.
Better used USASF capabilities during the Vietnamization phase of the war to assist in training expanded forces and conducting intelligence operations.

(U) In spite of the difficulties encountered in Vietnam, Special Forces displayed an ability to respond to varying, often undeveloped requirements for a well organized, highly trained force to conduct unconventional warfare operations or provide internal security assistance.
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL STABILITY (U)

(U) Introduction (U)

(U) An examination of current political, socio-economic and military aspects of several countries and global regions indicates that a valid need for security assistance still exists. The key areas discussed are the degree of governmental stability and the potential for internal conflict. This chapter assesses these implications with regard to US interests and policies. An internal conflict in a less developed country of the world need not of itself threaten US interests, but may become injurious to US interests when exploited by powers hostile to the United States so that diplomatic or economic confrontation or direct military threat evolves. Therefore, the United States has a significant interest in forestalling the transformation of internal conflicts to the state of escalation that would risk direct intervention of American combat forces. Not only is Communist inspired insurgency in less developed countries of interest to the United States, but the United States is also concerned with the significant outgrowth of international terrorism which transcends international boundaries. Since terrorism and its effects impact on national interests, it is discussed in this chapter first because of its immediacy.

(U) International Terrorism (U)

(U) Currently, a new type of phenomenon has emerged in the international arena: the transnational terrorist group. These terrorists, acting individually or in cohesive units are involved in numerous types of activities to gain headlines and increase public awareness of their cause. Terrorists are engaging in the assassination of governmental decision makers, sabotaging critical public and military facilities, skyjacking, kidnapping diplomats or businessmen and occupying embassies, while holding the diplomatic personnel legation for ransom. Of rising concern is the possibility of nuclear blackmail where millions of individuals could become hostage as a result of terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon by theft or other illegal means. The result of such an action could be catastrophic.

(U) Transnational terrorism has often been described as violence for effect. It differs from purely military strategic concepts in that it does not attempt to hold a specific piece of territory by force of military engagement. Rather, it attempts to give the impression that the terrorist group is able to strike with impunity, that the small numerically weak band of terrorists should be considered a credible threat; and that governmental authorities cannot guarantee security to members of the society under its protection.
While many nations have suffered in one or two incidents, Western industrialized nations are the most popular targets of attacks. The United States alone has witnessed its citizens fall victim in over 50 percent of all events, with the British also facing a serious problem. Transnational terrorism has not yet affected the Afro-Asian states to the extent it has in other regions, notably Latin and North America. Eastern European Communist nations have been relatively safe when one discounts skyjacking by domestic dissidents. The immunity of these nations, as well as those in Asia or Africa, may be due to their verbal and material support to many of the contemporary terrorist groups. In the Middle East, it is not surprising to find Israeli and American citizens most harassed. The more moderate as well as radical nations in the Arab-Israeli conflict also find themselves singled out for attack by Palestinian terrorists. In Latin America, the incidents most frequently involve non-Latins as victims, with those perceived to be 'rich capitalists' or diplomatic personnel singled out. Overall, nationals of the lesser developed countries who are victimized are most often their nation's diplomatic representatives or an executive of a multinational corporation's local subsidiary. Hence, although no one nation can feel perfectly safe from terrorist incursions, the problem appears to be primarily one involving attacks against personnel from Western, industrialized states.

Traditional international law requires a government to seek to prevent its subjects (or other residents within its sovereignty) from committing acts injurious to other nations and to take sanctions against them for doing so. The numerous international terrorist groups, however, operate from bases in sovereign nations. These states provide facilities and are sympathetic to the objectives of the terrorists, yet deny responsibility for specific violent acts that are committed. Unless there is extensive international coordination irrespective of political purpose or complexion, incidents such as kidnapping of US citizens abroad or other coercive acts will continue to be a problem with which the US government must contend. Failure of a sovereign nation to effectively deal with such actions occurring on its soil will require other states to act unilaterally in order to protect national interests and the lives of its citizens. The Israeli incursion into Uganda is the most recent example of such a unilateral action.

Southeast Asia

The Southeast Asian Region is seen as a major source of raw materials for the remainder of the world. Its location amid some of the world's major trading routes and its pivotal position in relation to the spheres of influence of major powers are also recognized as contributing to its economic and strategic importance. The United States and the countries of East Asia and the Pacific are bound together
by a complex of economic, political, security, and historical ties which makes it inevitable that the United States will continue to play a significant role in the region. The United States is pledged to maintaining strength and continuity of the American role in the whole of Asia. In addition to foreign trade and investment, the United States is interested in preserving a stable balance of influence and interaction among the People's Republic of China (PRC), the USSR, Japan, and the United States by promoting conditions of peace and economic well being, free of outside interference and pressure.1

(U) Goals and objectives of US foreign policy in the region are to promote the stability of non-Communist governments that are friendly to the United States, or at least neutral in the realm of major-power or balance-of-power politics; facilitate trade and investment in the region by the United States and its principal allies, especially with regard to retaining or acquiring access to strategic raw materials; and retain at least a residual military presence, either directly via basing rights or indirectly via alliances (e.g., ANZUS, United States Philippines), in order to have access to possible bases of operations in the region for contingency purposes.2

(U) The majority of the non-Communist states in Southeast Asia have enjoyed independence for three decades or less. All chose democratic institutions in one form or another at the beginning of their independence, but none have enjoyed complete peace and stability in the classical sense since independence was gained. Internal cleavages due to ethnic, religious, and ideological differences coupled with variations of the level of economic development and modernization contribute to the fragility of the region's political and economic institutions and provide fertile ground for stimulating and exacerbating unrest in each state in the region. Domestic political instability results in civil disorders, coups, insurgencies or incursions that make the region highly susceptible to pressure from external powers. For most of Southeast Asia, meeting the dual requirements of political stability and economic development remains difficult, even with external developmental aid and security assistance.

(U) Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are of particular importance to the United States because of the strategic Malacca-Singapore Straits, a choke point in the most direct maritime route between the Northern Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean (Refer to Map, Figure 1). In the following sections, each of these countries is discussed in more detail, specifically with regard to US interests, social-political-economic trends, instability and insurgency trends and activities, capabilities and limitations for internal/external security, and external power influences.

*Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty.
Socio-Political-Economic Trends. Although Indonesia has achieved significant and sustained economic growth, the country still faces enormous problems of overpopulation, unemployment, lack of social services and educational opportunities, and widespread poverty in rural areas. A large majority of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture with a per capita income under $200 in 1974. Three percent of the population is Chinese; yet they exercise crucial influence on key sectors of the economy. The government, dominated by the military, is strongly anti-Communist and tightly controls and closely monitors the country's secular and religious political parties. Military officers occupy positions in the legislature and cabinet, as well as performing in such functions as governors, mayors, village heads and directors of state-owned enterprises under the concept of "Dual Function." Since the members of the military are strongly nationalistic and anti-Communist, they generally oppose a return to a traditional political party system. Although there is considerable dissatisfaction with the political practices of the government, opposition groups which include devout Muslims, the old nationalists and Western intellectuals, are generally weak and divided and have not shown serious signs of organizing a credible threat to the government.4

The government does not believe that there is an external threat to Indonesia's security. Therefore, it recognizes the need to channel more national resources into economic development. There has been considerable economic progress, but economic growth has been generally offset by a high birth rate. At the current rate of 2.2 percent increase per year, the population of 132.1 million will double in

*Although Indonesia is an OPEC member, it did not participate in the oil boycott following the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
There is no active insurgency that directly threatens effective government control in Indonesia. There are an estimated 150 guerrillas of the Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force operating along the border between Indonesia's West Kalimantan state and Malaysia's Sarawak state (Refer to Map, Figure 2). Less than 100 guerrillas are believed to operate on Indonesia's territory, but they are kept on the defensive by government counterinsurgency efforts. Close cooperation with Malaysian forces in joint operations and effective liaison and intelligence exchange have contributed to government successes. The deployment of Army troops in small, remote settlements has also contributed to keeping the insurgents off balance and essentially ineffective. Indonesia does not face a direct external threat to its security, but internal economic and social problems could have serious impact on its stability.

The Indonesian Armed Forces consist of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. Although they have equal status, the Army is the dominant military organization that insures political stability and loyalty to the government of President Suharto. They have no organized reserve force, but there exists a sizeable pool of former active duty personnel. The Mobile Brigade of the Indonesian State Police is well
organized and disciplined and assists in maintaining internal security and safeguarding the national borders. Plans call for the eventual disbanding of this paramilitary force with the personnel being transferred to Army units or to the Police. The only foreign military presence in Indonesia is a small Australian advisory contingent to the Air Force.
Socio-Political-Economic Trends. Malaysia faces a number of problems that must be solved; the most important is internal friction caused by disproportionate balance of races in the country (54 percent Malay, 36 percent Chinese, 10 percent Indian). While the Chinese community controls the distribution of wealth, efforts are currently in progress by the Malay-controlled government to alter the socio-economic situation in favor of the Malay majority. Barriers to integration arising from different ethnic and religious beliefs have not been lowered to any appreciable degree. The risk of racial violence and the breakdown of internal security could increase should pressures on either the Malay or the Chinese segments of the population reach unacceptable levels.

Government economic and social policies are directed to restructure society and help Malays progress faster. This program has two key aspects: the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the general advancement of Malay culture and educational opportunities. The ultimate objectives of the NEP are to eradicate poverty irrespective of race and to correct the economic imbalance between the Malay and Chinese communities. To date, emphasis has been placed on the latter objectives, and there are growing Chinese fears that their own business opportunities will be seriously eroded.

There is also Chinese concern at the changes being made in the educational system. The government aims at giving priority to Malays and to enforce wider use of Malay as the official national language. These policies spell further reduction in social position and opportunity for the Chinese. As in other aspects of its pro-Malay policy the government will have to tread with extreme care to avoid seriously alienating the Chinese community.

The present government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn, is moderate and has dealt firmly with corruption and insurgency. It also recognizes the need to meet Malay aspirations while containing Chinese fears and maintaining peaceful intercommunal relations. During calendar year 1976, the National Front coalition government moved against two powerful political figures who threatened
the authority of the federal government: Chief Minister Mustapha of Sabah in East Malaysia and Chief Minister Idris of Selangor in peninsular Malaysia. Mustapha was critical of the exchange of diplomatic missions with Peking and had talked of withdrawing Sabah from Malaysia. Under government pressure and by assignment of new chiefs of police and armed forces not controlled by him, Mustapha resigned and his ability to manipulate events in Sabah was effectively diminished. Charges of corruption and malfeasance were brought against Idris which led to his removal as Chief Minister and his expulsion from the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) Party.*

(S/NA) The Prime Minister is straightforward, strongly anti-Communist and Western-oriented. Although the government has neither officially nor publicly abandoned its policy of nonalignment and equidistance in foreign affairs which it has followed since the late 1960s, tacit modification of its hope for early creation of a Southeast Asian zone of peace, freedom and neutrality seems to have occurred. Although never officially acknowledged, government policy has moved closer to the views of Indonesia, its principal ally in the region**, and to the other ASEAN states with the possible exception of Thailand. This view is that great power support of an ASEAN*** zone of peace would probably not be successful, or if successful, would not result in real enhancement of the country's security and independence. 16

(S/NA) Insurgency. The increased frequency and nature of terrorist incidents in Malaysia have focused the attention of the Malaysian government, as well as that of neighboring Singapore and Indonesia, on the Communist insurgency in peninsular Malaysia. The insurgency is principally an ethnic Chinese phenomenon with the objective of establishing a Communist state comprising peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. A highly successful British-led counterinsurgency effort (1948-1960) virtually destroyed the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and forced about 600 of its remnants into jungle sanctuaries in Thailand. After years of recruiting, reorganizing, and rebuilding an infrastructure the CPM reemerged in 1968, when it dispatched cadres from its Thai sanctuaries to the northern states of Malaysia to revive old contacts and establish new bases (Refer to Map, Figure 3). The combined strength of the armed Communists, exclusive of clandestine support groups, is conservatively estimated at about 2400 -- 1700 in the original CPM, 300 members.

*On 18 May 1976, Idris was found guilty and sentenced to two years imprisonment.

** In December 1974 Malaysia and Indonesia signed an agreement for a five year security development program (1975-1979).

***Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formed in 1967. Member states include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore.
in CPM-RF, and 400 in the CPM-ML.* Close to three-fourths of the active
armed insurgents are ethnic Chinese, the remainder being ethnic Malay.
Of the identified armed insurgents the majority of the Malays (509 of
619) and nearly half of the Chinese (661 of 1416) are Thai nationals.17

(S) From the sanctuary of their Thai bases, the insurgents have
penetrated deeper into Malaysia and increased the boldness of their attacks
during the past two years (1974-1975). Most incidents have been con-
centrated in the five northern states. The activity most worrisome to
the Malaysian government has been the increase of terrorism in densely
populated areas. This indicates more extensive and dedicated urban
clandestine support and constitutes the most recent major improvement
in Communist capabilities.

(S) Although the economic position of the Malay population has improved,
the gap between the urban Malays and the rural poor is growing. Communist
propaganda has accused the Malay elite of corruption, greed, and an
"un-Islamic" lifestyle maintained at the expense of the poor Malay.
There are reports of active recruiting of Malay ex-servicemen who are
discontented with their meager retirement benefits. The racial and
national composition of the Communist force may well reflect the local
job market and territorial location of the base camps than the success
of ideological appeal, but the presence of Communist Malays could enhance
access to Malay villages in Malaysia. The threat to the Malaysian govern-
ment would increase, if the CPM succeeded in expanding its appeal to
the Malay population of Malaysia.

(S/NI). Although the Communists are handicapped in total size and by
the lack of secure jungle bases within Malaysia, as long as the secure
sanctuaries in Thailand remain, the CPM movement will never be
eliminated.** A bilateral agreement signed in Bangkok in February 1976
confirms an older arrangement of cooperation on the Thai-Malaysian
border: "Little is accomplished in the field, since in reality the Thai
military" and police are more concerned with the Thai Communist Party
threat, the Muslim separatist movement (especially in the south), and
general lawlessness than with CPM groups whose activities are targeted
against Malaysia. Also, suspicion and mutual distrust prevail at the
operational level -- the Thai suspect the Malaysians of assisting the
Muslim separatist movements and the Malaysians believe that Thai
security forces avoid contact with CPM groups.18

*Insurgent operations in Malaysia have been competitive rather than
cooperative. There are two splinter groups that have broken away
from the CPM. They are a Marxist-Leninist (ML) faction and a
revolutionary faction (RF).

**A similar situation occurred in RVN, Cambodia, and Laos.

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(5) East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak). The government has long had problems in its relations with East Malaysia. The two states have a very different racial composition from that of peninsular Malaysia. Indigenous and Chinese races predominate; Malays form only 3 percent of the Sabah population and 18 percent of Sarawak's. Although the states have been allowed a considerable degree of autonomy, the Malay minorities control state politics causing interracial friction and emergence of autocratic leadership which poses a potential challenge to ultimate federal control. In Sabah the dictatorial hold of the former Chief Minister has been weakened and threats of secession have receded. Government control appears to be reestablished. In Sarawak, the Communist insurgency, which became widespread during the early 1970's, has been successfully brought under control, if not wholly suppressed, and there seems no short-term threat of its revival. Less than 200 armed insurgents remain and they are kept on the defensive by active security operations. In contrast to peninsular Malaysia, close cooperation, exchange of liaison and intelligence, and joint operations with the Indonesians have contributed to the success in dealing with the insurgents and bringing the situation under control.19

* A parallel may exist here to the CIDG Program in RVN, i.e., organizing ethnic groups into effective units to support the government.
Kuala Lumpur is evidently looking for 'quick-fix' solutions that in themselves are no guarantee of a more effective counterinsurgency. Unless the field performance of both the Army and Police improves, no significant reduction in the level of the insurgency will result from security force operations.

Tighter border control and more effective counterguerrilla operations, however, could preclude any significant resurgence of the Communist terrorists in Malaysia. This presumes that the Malaysian government continues to orchestrate its racial policies with sufficient finesse to preclude alienating any single race, but particularly the Chinese, to the degree that it would fully support the insurgents.

**Similar to approach taken in RVN, i.e., reaction to insurgents instead of developing complete program for the long haul.**
The USSR has not demonstrated any great desire to become materially involved with the Malaysian insurgency. Its policy had been one characterized by a proper business-like state-to-state approach emphasizing economic, cultural, and technical relations. There are indications, however, that this policy is changing and Malaysia is concerned over possible penetration of its government and political parties. It is apparent that Moscow desires to increase its foothold in Malaysia to offset Chinese influence among Malaysia's three million Chinese.
(S/NID) The DRV does not appear to be involved or providing material support to the insurgency. It does appear, however, that Hanoi will be concerned with internal problems associated with the consolidation and socialization of Vietnam rather than support to the Malaysian Communist insurgency.

(S/NID) The ASEAN nations have a vested interest in the maintenance of Malaysian communal peace and none would profit in disturbing it. Singapore recognizes that its well-being is bound up with Malaysian stability and views the Malaysian insurgency and anti-Chinese government politics in Malaysia with concern.

(S/NID) Singapore

(S/NID) Socio-Political-Economic Trends (U). Singapore has a considerable market for US products and private investment and has developed a successful and dynamic economy. Although the Chinese are an ethnic minority in Indonesia, and to a lesser extent a minority in Malaysia, they comprise approximately 75 percent of the population of Singapore. The Chinese exercise political and economic control of Singapore, although the Malays are indigenous to the islands. The internal political situation in Singapore remains stable and under firm control of the People's Action Party (PAP). Although the government has made efforts in the past year to bring forward new and younger blood into the cabinet, there are indications that the political leadership is growing away from the electorate as a whole, leading to certain disenchantment on the part of the people. The government is concerned over the potentially serious political instability and communist insurgency in Thailand and Malaysia.
Prime Minister Lee has sought to influence the Malaysian government to agree to joint cooperation to combat Communist subversion and insurgency, and to alter its communal policies to give the Chinese community a greater stake in the future. The diplomatic efforts have achieved limited results to date.25

(C) Insurgency. Singapore has for many years been run as a one-party state by the PAP led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. There are small opposition parties, one of which, the Barisan Sosialis, is Communist-dominated; but the opposition parties are essentially inactive and do not offer any prospect of effective challenge to the PAP. The government maintains a stern attitude toward any opposition or criticism. There is a limited subversive threat from the Communist Party of Malaya, which has as its aim the establishment of a Peking-oriented state combining Singapore and peninsula Malaysia. Although the government acknowledges that the Communists have made some progress in infiltrating the armed forces and professional and commercial classes, the security forces have been quick to detect and break up any preparations for subversive or terrorist activity.26

(C) The government appears to be principally concerned with the possibility of racial strife or terrorism spilling over from Malaysia. Responsibility for internal security rests formally with the police force and supporting vigilante corps although the Army would be used in the event of an extreme security problem.29

(C) External Factors. Relations with China are a delicate issue for Singapore. Suspicious of Communism, the Prime Minister fears that the presence of a Chinese Mission would complicate his efforts to create a sense of national identity among the Chinese population and that it might be used for subversive purposes. For these reasons, formal diplomatic ties have not been established. Attitudes toward the USSR are equally cautious. The two countries have diplomatic relations, but Soviet attempts to extend their influence have not made much headway.
For this study, the insurgency criteria listed in Figure 4 have been selected to compare the Vietnam situation during the period 1954-1963 with the contemporary Malaysian situation. Certain criteria, such as number of armed insurgents or acts of terror, lend themselves to objective assessment, but others, such as popular support, socio-economic-political indicators, or effectiveness of government programs, are highly subjective. Items 1 through 7 are considered to be descriptive indicators that provide the measure for the relative existence and strength of an insurgency; items 8 through 10 are the classical indicators used to measure the degree of demand-output imbalance that exists and contributes to deprivation and instability, while Items 11 and 12 are indicators which measure the government's capability to deal with insurgent movements. Items 13 through 16 are external factors which influence the government's, or other governments' capabilities to effectively deal with the problems at hand.

Southeast Asian Summary

The probability of an interstate conventional conflict occurring in the region is extremely low. Although there are historic interstate rivalries (e.g., the Philippines and Malaysia concerning Sabah), none are considered intense enough to cause direct, all-out confrontation. In addition, none of the less developed countries appears to have the independent power and diplomatic freedom of action necessary to give it the option of pursuing an aggressive policy that would escalate a crises into open warfare. Although all of the less developed, non-Communist countries are faced with varying degrees of internal stress, three likely internal low-intensity conflict situations which should be of US concern insofar as prospects for regional stability are concerned are: (1) the Malaysian insurgency, (2) the Thai insurgency, and (3) the Philippines insurrection. The intensity of these conflicts and their potential destabilizing influence on the region will be determined by the degree of internal instability created as a result of socio-political-economic stress as well as external influences. External influence could take the form of direct involvement (e.g., advisors; air, ground or naval combat units; etc), or indirect support provided in varying degrees (i.e., overtly in the case of aid provided to established governments or covertly in the case of assistance given to insurgent or irregular forces).

The Southeast Asian insurgents are generally formed from small and discrete groups with an ethnic, religious, or Communist-inspired base. There is no evidence that the Thai Communist insurgents, either in the north-northeast or the south, and the Malaysian Communist insurgents operating out of southern Thailand are centrally coordinated and controlled. Further, evidence does not indicate that they have developed to the extent that the established governments are unable to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATOR</th>
<th>MALAYSIA</th>
<th>VIETNAM (1954 - 1963)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Presence of Armed Insurgents</td>
<td>About 2500 - split into three groups (CPM, CPM-ML, and CPM-RF) - primarily ethnic Chinese. Less than 5 percent are Malaysian nationals.</td>
<td>Nearly 10,000 Viet Minh stayed behind after 1954 -- also more infiltrated from NVN -- never split into factions -- and ethnic Vietnamese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Presence of Infrastructure</td>
<td>Effectively destroyed by British -- since 1968 have been rebuilding but not extensive. Most significant improvement appears in urban clandestine support to terrorists.</td>
<td>Never effectively destroyed by French -- left over from Viet Minh and expanded -- National Liberation Front (NLF).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Popular Support to Insurgents</td>
<td>Does not have popular support -- probably because admitted Communist insurgency. Have not been too successful in expanding its appeal to Malay population.</td>
<td>Probably more anti-Diem than support to NLF -- could characterize as apathy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Base Areas and Sanctuaries</td>
<td></td>
<td>Considerable areas in South Vietnam and Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam -- There was not coordinated effort to eliminate United States recognized international boundaries; North Vietnam did not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. External Support and Ease of Supply</td>
<td>Very little evidence of third-country direct support because: (1) No contiguous border to a Communist (or hostile) country; (2) Supplies easy to obtain by illegal means in Thailand; (3) Formal diplomatic relations with China and Soviets places some constraints on support to an insurgency.</td>
<td>Considerable support from North Vietnam provided by China and the Soviets -- Communist country (North Vietnam) adjacent to South Vietnam and neutrality of Laos and Cambodia continually violated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Subversion - Terrorism - Military Operations</td>
<td>On the increase; directed toward economic programs; selective assassinations; urban terror; ambushes of Police Field Forces and Army -- limited primarily to northern Malaysia, but has extended as far south as Kuala Lumpur.</td>
<td>Selective assassinations; ambushes; agitation of religious groups and minority groups -- country-wide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Insurgent's Objective</td>
<td>Form a Communist State of Malaya, to include Singapore. Identified as Maoist insurgency -- receive rhetorical support from China.</td>
<td>National Liberation Front; Form one State of Vietnam; always a nationalist movement; never admitted Communist movement; but under control of North Vietnam.</td>
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Figure 4 (Insurgency Comparison)
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<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. Social</td>
<td>Divisions along ethnic lines -- Malay outnumber Chinese -- many programs favor Malay over Chinese -- exploitable issue by insurgents since policies spell reduction in social position and opportunity for Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Political</td>
<td>Control by one-party (Malay) -- anti-Communist -- Success of government programs to eliminate poverty and correct economic imbalance necessary to maintain peaceful inter-communal relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Organization of Army</td>
<td>Light Infantry -- Majority ethnic Malay -- require improvements in ammo, weapons, logistics, techniques and training and intelligence -- retain some experience from successful British counterinsurgency effort. Operations against insurgents have been barely adequate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Coordination/Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Effort</td>
<td>Program to deal with insurgency exists -- involves civilians as well as military (mostly Malay). There is jealousy/lack of complete coordination between Army and Police Field Forces which have responsibility for internal security -- limits effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. External Counterinsurgency Support</td>
<td>United States provides civil programs (Peace Corps) -- no military advisors, but provides foreign military sales and some grant aid military training in United States. Singapore, Indonesia and Australia concerned -- there is cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Diplomatic Relations with Communist China and the Soviets</td>
<td>Has formal relations with each country -- therefore maybe a prohibiting factor to legitimacy of Communist Party of Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Treaties or Alliances</td>
<td>Five Power Defense Agreement (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Singapore and Malaysia) -- Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) includes Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia has AF units stationed in Malaysia. 5-Year Mutual Security Pact between Malaysia and Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. United States Treaties/Alliances in Area</td>
<td>United States -- the Philippines United States -- South Korea United States -- Japan Australia -- New Zealand -- United States (ANZUS) Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)</td>
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Figure 4 (cont)
effectively deal with the insurgencies. It must be recognized, however, that the seeds for instability, insurrection and civil war have been sown in the form of insurgent groups and that with proper nutrition, resulting from inadequate government response to existing socio-political-economic ills, can grow to unmanageable proportions. The strategy of building a base of popular support by the use of local persuasion combined with terrorist action is in evidence.

(U) The US military withdrawal from Indochina and subsequent Communist successes there appear to have stimulated the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia to undertake actions that will deal more effectively with the conditions that contribute to insurgencies.

(U) It appears that Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore will be concerned with maintaining internal stability by promoting social mobility and the assimilation of minority groups by furthering economic development and modernization programs. These programs will be intended to promote national unity and legitimacy in the institutions of government.

(S/NF) Communism, as an external or internal threat, will remain as a disruptive influence. Although there is no evidence to indicate that materiel or personnel support is being provided. Current information indicates that the continuance of Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Southeast Asia, coupled with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's preoccupation with its task of political reunification and socialization at home, preclude outright external support to the insurgencies. Each will continue, however, to gain influence through open state-to-state relations.

(S/NF) It appears that the trend toward one-party states with the dominant party under the leadership of strongly anti-Communist military or civilian elites will continue. Although authoritarian, such political systems in less developed countries are considered essential by leaders if national integration and political stability are to be achieved.
(U) Before undertaking an assessment of southern Africa, it is appropriate to make some general statements concerning the underdeveloped regions that comprise the Third World. The underdeveloped regions of the world, lacking cohesion and purpose, cannot be regarded as a power center. The phrase "Third World" is deceptive, for what is being described is a heterogeneous group of nations having different ethnic origins, cultures, religions, languages, and colonial backgrounds. To generalize at all, one would characterize the nations of the underdeveloped regions as military, bourgeois, and nationalistic. Communal, racial, religious, and linguistic differences create divisiveness that tends to strengthen the cause for liberation movements as well as the military's role in established governments.

(U) The conflict potential in the underdeveloped areas of the world is increasing. In a study by Johnson Research Associates, 175 cases of possible limited war and insurgency between 1970 and 1990 seemed sufficiently plausible to merit consideration by contingency planners. Some 50 percent were insurgencies and more than 90 percent would fall below the category of major interstate war. Analyses of conflicts have detected a rising frequency of conflict. The greatest frequency has occurred among the poor nations; the vast majority have been low in intensity -- insurgencies, insurrections and coups.

(U) Further analysis of developing potential trouble areas in Africa suggests that these trends will continue. Nowhere is the impact of the physical world felt more strongly on the political world than in Africa. The dissolution of the colonial empires has left a number of nation-states whose boundaries were arbitrarily created during the colonial era without regard to tribal and cultural unity. The various political systems must function within limits imposed by poverty. The need for economic assistance from the West and from the Soviet Union has created a sort of neocolonialism that is resented by the Africans. The twin mystiques of race and continent have produced a radicalism among certain leaders -- and Havana, as well as Moscow, is attempting to capitalize on this. The lack of administrative competence in dealing with the almost insurmountable internal problems is partly compensated for by exploiting racialism as a unifying sentiment. Opposition to factionalism in any form has resulted in one-party governments, civil strife or out-right insurgency.

(U) The central, political fact about contemporary southern Africa has been the ability of its white minorities to impose or perpetuate their rule over preponderant African majorities. The time frame between the 1960-1970s brought an anticlimatic end to a half century of legal, non-white political protest in South Africa and witnessed the suppression
of all African nationalist movements within South-West Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. Denied hope for nonviolent change, African nationalists, where not wholly crushed, went underground to organize, surfaced, and are turning to insurgency goals and strategies.

Thus, a combination of conflicting pressures that has been building for years is almost certainly leading southern Africa into a prolonged period of instability. In southwestern Africa, there is newly independent Angola led by the Soviet and Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). More than sufficient Soviet weaponry coupled with an estimated 13,500 Cuban forces has created a military power in Angola which was not envisioned a year ago.

Currently, there is a good chance that a substantial Soviet-Cuban military presence will remain in Angola indefinitely to assist the MPLA both with security problems and with the actual administration of the country. The Soviet Union and Cuba have a potential base for providing support to neighboring insurgent groups in Namibia (South-West Africa), and also to insurgent organizations located in Mozambique but directed against Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (Refer to Map, Figure 5).

Rhodesia (U)

The white settlers of Rhodesia presently account for less than 5 percent of the country's 63 million inhabitants. But they have controlled the government for over four decades and entrenched their privileges through such legislation as a land apportionment act which reserved more than a third of the entire nation for white ownership. In 1965, the white regime cut ties with Great Britain and unilaterally declared sovereignty after London's refusal to grant independence unless the white settlers accepted a formula for gradually broadening the franchise that would guarantee a transition to "majority rule" -- genuine political power for the black majority.

One of the most clearcut expressions of the limits white Rhodesians have placed on the black majority is the present constitution which was approved by a referendum in 1969. The House of Assembly -- the principal legislative body -- has 50 members elected by whites, 8 members elected by a tiny minority of the black population who qualify for a much restricted franchise, and 8 members who represent the traditional tribal leaders. Representation for blacks meets the income, property, or education criteria for the franchise, but the present constitution absolutely precludes a black majority in the legislature. Most of the Rhodesian white community supports Prime Minister Ian Smith despite cumulative pressures from international sanctions and a simmering insurgency that has necessitated extensive counterinsurgency operations.
US intermediary assistance is focusing primarily on fostering black majority rule in order to divert a race war threatened by the leaders of neighboring black Africa states. Indications are that despite peace attempts by the United States and Great Britain, significant racial issues remain. These issues are not likely to be abated by the step-down of white power, but will more likely intensify.

(U) When accommodation is finally reached, the semblance of cooperation among the Rhodesian black nationalist groups is likely to be on the same tenuous scale as those factions in Angola who have spent more energy competing among themselves than fighting the Portuguese. Parallel to the Angola episode, the solidarity of white Rhodesians constrasts with a divisiveness that is beginning to manifest itself among black nationalists. This inclusive antagonism is hampering the nationalists effort on a scale only slightly lower than Salisbury's manifold suppressive measures. Since the mid-1950's, five successive organizations have claimed to speak for black Rhodesians in their struggle to supplant white rule, but none has actually surmounted the traditional ethnic divisions of language and culture.

(S) As military operations have decreased in Angola, the situation in Rhodesia has intensified. Since December 1975, fighting along the Rhodesian-Mozambique border has steadily increased with two major nationalist groups attempting to liberate the blacks in Rhodesia. In addition, Cuba is offering the insurgents military aid and assistance and will probably continue its attempt to undermine US peace efforts. Due to lack of ability to undermine US efforts in the mid-East, the USSR has shifted emphasis to the Afro-Asian littoral, and indications are that the USSR will attempt, either directly or indirectly, further encroachment into the region.

(U) South Africa: Soweto

(U) No area in South Africa currently exposes the reality of apartheid more than Soweto. A vast conglomerate of boxed-up townships, Soweto houses an official population of 650,000, but its probable population of more than a million blacks is served by poor community services. Streets are poorly lit and public transportation is crammed and expensive. With a high crime rate, Soweto is a concentrated complex of frustration, anger and deprivation -- on the edge of, and constant servant to, white Johannesburg's affluence.

(U) The recent agitation appears to be spontaneous, but there is an acknowledged link to demonstrators belonging to the South African Students Movement (SASM), of which some Soweto youths are members. A link further exists with the South African Students Organization (SASO), which is a radical black movement. It should be pointed out that several SASO members have been on trial under the Terrorism Act for their part in a pro-Frelimo rally in Durban on behalf of agitating for Mozambique.
(U) It is not clear how far the above organizations were instrumental in organizing the demonstrations, including a boycott of Soweto schools because of discriminations encountered there. This will doubtless emerge when some of the many detained during the recent configurations are brought to trial. SASM appears to be involved, as is SASO -- but present indications are that this is on a limited scale.

(S) Namibia (Southwest Africa) (U)

(U) Namibia, the sparsely populated, former German colony of South-West Africa, has for years been an object of contention between South Africa and international organizations. The term "Namibia" (after the Namib Desert) was given to the territory by the United Nations' General Assembly which established a UN council to prepare it for independence despite Pretoria's unwillingness to relinquish control. Pretoria acknowledges the international status of the region, but nevertheless has rebuffed UN assertions of control. Administration by South Africa is virtually all-encompassing and Namibia is treated almost as a fifth province of the Republic of South Africa.

(U) South Africans regard Namibia as a substantial economic asset as well as a buffer, shielding the Republic from potential adversaries to the north. Its uranium resources, located at the Rio Tinto Zinc Rossing mine still being explored, are extensive.

(U) Since the mid-1960s, Pretoria has systematically extended to Namibia the policy of separate development which was previously initiated in South Africa proper. The demarcation of separate geographical sectors for most of the ethnic groups, as well as the fostering of more or less autonomous governmental units for each group, has tended to maintain not only the traditional cultural divisions but also the extreme disparities in economic conditions. The Ovambo tribe -- traditionally settled farmers -- comprises almost half of the territory population. Although the whites comprise about 12 percent of the total citizenry, the sector of Namibia that is reserved for white settlers includes much of the better grazing land as well as most of the known mineral deposits. Further, some of the smaller tribes, although traditionally nomadic, have been restricted to homelands that are virtually barren.

(U) Among Namibians, the most articulate opposition to separate development has derived from the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO). This group, whose membership is predominantly Ovambo, wants Namibia to have a unified, popularly elected government. Largely as a result of its persistent international lobbying, SWAPO is the only Namibian nationalist group recognized by the UN or the Organization of African Unity (OAU). SWAPO leaders who are in exile have advocated violent revolt against the South African government and maintained a small guerrilla force in Zambia.
In recent speeches from Havana, wars of national liberation are to be fostered and mention has been made of supporting the full liberation of Namibia in the form of arms, training and technicians.

Nigeria (U)

The significance of the most populous black African nation, Nigeria, should neither be overlooked nor underestimated. Nigeria, which provides an estimated 20 percent of US exported oil needs and which has the largest Army in Africa south of the Sahara, is one of the most powerful nations in Africa. The attempted coup of 13 February 1976, which resulted in the death of Head of State Murtala Mohammed, has surfaced ethnic and religious tensions. It is probable that political upheaval could occur again in the near future unless the new leadership of LTG Obasanjo undertakes aggressive action to quell rumors of an insurrection and allay fears.

African Insurgency Development (U)

The goals of an insurgent struggle, whether it be a war of liberation against a colonial power or a revolutionary conflict to destroy the minority ruling class of a nominally independent government, involve both the necessity to organize the masses to win battles in the field and the need to establish and maintain political order in those areas wrested from the control of the central government.

The most fundamental divisions that arise over the issue of political-military interaction revolve around the matter of priorities and the initiation of the struggle. One group of African leaders argues that emphasis must be placed on establishing a sound popular base in
order to facilitate successful military operations. The other
persuasion contends that a vanguard of dedicated insurgents can, with a
few well-planned military operations, actually precipitate a revolu-
tionary response from the populace despite their initial lack of political
involvement. Regardless of general preferences, both viewpoints concede
that political support and military success are essential ingredients
of a dynamic movement.

(U) Emphasis on the political arm is the traditional Marxist-Leninist
position, although acceptance of this view does not necessarily make
one an African Communist. It has long been a tenet of Communist
revolutionary thought though that insurgency is difficult without a
revolutionary situation. The citizenry must be aware of their depriva-
tion, conscious of their class status, convinced that violence is the
possible remedy, and that insurgency can succeed if supplied with the
proper leadership and organization. An example of this rationale was
expressed in 1967 by the leader of the South African guerrilla organi-
ization called the African National Congress "...there does not exist
a revolutionary situation in South Africa at the moment, a revolutionary
situation which is the essential precondition of an insurrection....
But there is the case in which conditions exist for the organization of
an armed revolutionary struggle, extending over a period of years."*
The prophesy is proving correct that South Africa is becoming ripe for
insurgency and certainly will be more so within the near future.

(U) In such a situation as in Soweto, South Africa, a premium is placed
on preinstruction, political education, and organization. Insurgent
leaders have made the masses conscious of their relative condition, and
more importantly, made them cognizant that organized riots and insurgent
activities can improve their lives.

(U) Indeed, African guerrilla leaders have carried the message to the
peasantry before the outbreak of hostilities. In Guinea Bissau, the
insurgent group PAIGC, in its successful campaign against the
Portuguese, carefully prepared the peasantry before the war. In the
Kwila rebellion in the Congo, the revolutionaries concentrated on the
ideological indoctrination of insurgents and the populace. In training
camps, recruits were given systematic instruction constantly relating to
the village. Trainees periodically returned to local villages to
proselytize and to learn from the people.

*Joe Matthews, "Forward to a People's Democratic Republic of South
Africa, SEGABABA (London) 1, No. 9 (September 1967), as quoted in
Martin Tegassick, "The Consequences of African Guerrilla Activity
for South African's Relations With Her Neighbors, African Studies
Assoc. Nov 67.
In Mozambique during their early stage for independence, three signposts or victories were apparent: first, the formation of a liberation movement by individuals disenchanted by the governmental policy; second, the unity of the educated and uneducated masses; and third, the emergence of a nationalistic spirit. With these three victories the real fight for the independence for Mozambique began. Conversely, a new innovation in African guerrilla thought as seen by Regis Debray, the interpreter of Che Guevara, is viewed in a different milieu. Based on his Latin American exposure, insurgency movements must be structured so that the people are not aware of guerrilla activities. Political propaganda is unnecessary to win over a quiescent populace. The war itself, the very reality of fighting on behalf of the people's interests, serves political purposes. First of all, it is visible, tangible evidence that the regime is not invulnerable. The longer the fighting continues, whether or not real victories are registered, the better the chances of convincing the masses that insurgent warfare can succeed. Secondly, fighting is catalytic. It sets in motion a series of actions and reactions that increase political consciousness, grievance, economic dislocation, and governmental repression--just what the insurgents desire. Unwittingly, as in the case of Rhodesia, the government in a sense takes over the responsibility of radicalizing the masses.

Thirdly, in what appears to be the operating methodology of the Rhodesian Zimbabwe African National Union, insurgent operations are designed to liberate enough territory to create an internal base area. This would have the propaganda effect of denying the government forces access to a segment of the population, as well as providing the insurgents with free access to them. If a liberated area is organized well, it represents an object lesson to other peasants of what life might be like in, as in the case of Rhodesia, a black ruled nation. But this course involves a high measure of risk because if hostilities are begun too soon and are squelched by anti-insurgent forces, a negative object lesson will be registered, making future efforts that much more difficult.

By and large, current African insurgent movements would prefer to begin with political organization primarily, although some behave as though they prefer the second position. Each leader, as well, appears aware of the political ramifications of successful military performance. The mix is complicated, often implicit, and generally pragmatic, depending on the necessities of the day.

Summary (U)
(U) External powers still find it expedient to intervene in African affairs. Into the next decade, the African states in general will continue to expose nonalignment, but will receive assistance from third parties in an attempt to settle their own problems. But the outlook is for more instability, coups and low intensity conflicts. Moreover, the weaknesses of some regions offer further opportunities for penetration by Cuban and Soviet influence.

(U) On balance, a combination of conflicting pressures which have been building for years is almost certainly leading southern Africa into a period of prolonged instability. In the past 15 years the political map of Africa has changed beyond recognition. Such geographical names as French and Spanish Guinea, British and Italian Somaliland, the Belgian Congo, the French Cameroons and others which served as dependent territories have disappeared from the map. But the price of self-determination has been high, often attained by force and third party intervention leading to regional instability.

(U) A widening black-white schism in southern Africa is presenting the USSR, Cuba and the Chinese with opportunities (and arenas for competition) that they would find hard to resist in exploiting. In such a situation, US relations with southern Africa will, in the foreseeable future, be difficult and complex.

(U) The foregoing observations and analysis adumbrate certain possible future developments. First, an intensified black-white conflict in sub-Saharan Africa would inevitably be accompanied by strenuous efforts on the part of many black Africans to lump the US in the white camp, a move which the USSR and Cuba would encourage. Further, the black-white struggle and any insurgencies thereby engendered would also inevitably be aired at great length in the UN forum, where passions would run high and almost certainly take precedence over rational efforts to reach some type of equitable resolution of the problem -- probably without much success.

(U) The USSR, if it so decides, coupled with Cuba as the proxy force, can bring greater resources to bear in southern Africa than China or other third party states. Given this hypothesis, a substantial expansion of Soviet-Cuban involvement in, and influence over developments in this part of the world is a very real possibility over the next few years. Further, in Soviet thought, preeminence is given to "... eradication of the remnants of colonialism" by the forces of national liberation.
(U) The old order in Latin America is changing under social demands, economic distress, ideological calls for revolt, and terrorist violence. About one-third of the population lives in slums around cities and another third resides in the hinterland outside of the money economy. With the exception of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and possibly the Dominican Republic, the countries are ruled by one-party oligarchies or conservative military regimes. (This does not take into account the Dutch, British, and French territories.)

(U) Attempts at regional economic integration on the model of the European Economic Community have not been conspicuously successful, and the initial success of the Central American Common Market has slowed considerably. Nationalism is on the rise, and many Latins have viewed the Alliance for Progress with distrust. There is resentment toward the United States which has turned into terrorist acts against US citizens and American interests. The reason given for the relatively new phenomena is that some American corporations have extracted wealth from the Caribbean and the South American region, thus depriving the masses.

(U) The outlook for the near future (to 1980) is one of mounting attacks by revolutionary movements against the various 'establishments. In some areas, violent conflict coupled with increased terrorist activities may be expected to occur frequently. As the society fragments, opportunities will arise for extremist elements -- both right and left -- to seize power.

(U) Unfortunately, there is no well-developed theory which suggests why some groups in the Caribbean and South American regions choose to engage in terrorist and insurgent activities. In Latin America, though, the destabilizing effect of such groups can come about by the manifestations of relative deprivation as well as the inequality of distribution of land and income, lack of political participation of the masses, the shock of changing societies, etc. Insurgencies in the area may be promulgated by recalling racial, religious, ethnic or linguistic antagonisms within the society. These macro-level explanations should then be linked to a brief discussion of the groups which are currently attempting to articulate their grievances.

(U) While most countries in the Americas have active insurgent organizations, the leading organization presently is the JCR. This is the name given to a coordinating group founded and dominated by the Argentinian People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). The JCR also includes the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the Uruguayan Tupamaros (TUPS) and the Bolivian National Liberation Front (ELN).
Through the JCR, the ERP hopes to unify Latin American "revolutionary movements." Over the years, the JCR has maintained close ties with Cuba to include Cuban training and material support for their activities. Recent information indicates that this coordinating group of organizations is continuing to expand its scope of operations and influence in both Latin America and western Europe. Further, the relative instability of several Latin American regimes coupled with the discrepancies between the "have-and-the-have-nots" foster a discontent that is manifesting itself in the divisiveness which may lead to increased hostility in the area.

(U) Current US strategy toward the region centers on two basic features: strengthening Brazil as a counterrevolutionary center and insulating Latin insurgencies from spreading. The present Brazilian government fears that in several years it may be surrounded by hostile regimes in Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia, and has adopted with strong US support, a program for constructing strategic infrastructures consisting of roads and communications facilities within its remote frontiers. Increasing US economic aid has contributed to Brazil's surpassing of Argentina as the continent's leading economic power. Brazil is now leading all its neighbors in capital formation, growth in industrial base, and progress toward modern commercial institutions. Washington's engagement in Brazil has reached an all-time high which is likely to continue. Currently, the following insurgents in Brazil are operative, their operations mostly in the form of kidnapping: ALN -- Action for National Liberation; MR-8 -- Revolutionary Movement of the 8th; VAR -- Palmares -- Armed Revolutionary Vanguard. Though not a direct military threat, in the long run the growth of Communist political influence poses a greater danger to Brazil and the Southern Hemisphere than the insurgent military organizations.

(U) Several conclusions can be drawn regarding current US policy in Latin America. Primarily, the policy of drawing down commitments is likely to be the dominant feature of long-term US objectives in the hemisphere, despite occasional alterations of emphasis. But the outer limits of US interests have been tentatively outlined mainly in the economic and commercial areas. The US will continue to place a high priority on economic stability and development, and contributions to investment and growth will come increasingly from private rather than public sources. Accordingly, Washington is likely to continue to deal firmly with policies that are detrimental to these commercial interests.

(U) For the first time, though, Latin Americans perceive threats to national security that are neither 'Yankee imperialism' nor Soviet expansionism. Many Latin Americans now visualize equally dangerous threats arising from their immediate neighbors and are organizing alliances and alignments for their protection.
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(U) But the employment of political alignments along ideological lines as a solution for local problems may have the adverse effect of polarizing the region into contending blocs with internal instability manifested by an increase in insurgent activity. It is conceivable that in the latter half of the decade, tensions among Latin Americans will actually increase to the point that the United States may feel compelled to take sides for the protection of its interests. Intervention on the scale of the US occupation of Nicaragua during the 1920s, will probably not take place. But sporadic and possibly intensive reengagement with all the levers of influence may be required.

(U) Further, a particularly divisive issue is the Panama Canal (Refer to Map, Figure 6) which has divided Panama geographically for more than half a century. Ellsworth Bunker, former US Ambassador to Vietnam and the current American negotiator for a new treaty with Panama voiced his view that in maintaining our present position with regard to the Panama Canal, "...we would have to do so in an increasingly hostile atmosphere. In these circumstances, we would likely find ourselves engaged in hostilities with an otherwise friendly country -- a conflict that, in my view the American people would not long accept." The Panamanian riots of 1959, 1964, and September 1975 provide an ominous suggestion of what could transpire if this volatile issue is not settled. It is conceivable that radical Panamanian student groups will increase the tempo of their demonstrations, marching on the Zone, and forcing an incident. This could lead to the multiplication of militant groups and eventually to terrorist activity.31

(U) In June 1970, the National Defense Study Group for the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission concluded: "The present lock-canal could be closed by the use of relatively unsophisticated weapons. . . . and this could be achieved with relative ease."

(U) General Torrijos Herrera (who has governed since 1968), is aware of the Canal's importance to Panama, thus, a direct military confrontation is as unlikely as government-sponsored sabotage. Nevertheless, given an atmosphere of escalating violence, the probability of an irrational act by an extremist Panamanian group would be high. It's also uncertain whether the current Panamanian leadership could control -- or risk the government's survival by trying to contain -- a popular ground swell.

(U) Washington's interest in Latin America, in general though, will remain high, perhaps more so than in any other developing region. The economic involvement in the hemisphere, though important, is not vital to the United States. From a national security perspective, the most important US interest is the preventing of any hostile power encroachment in a region so close to the United States.
Cuba's foreign incursions, as evidenced in Africa, are taking on an added perspective in the Caribbean where it has been gaining ground due to the trend toward terrorist activity in Guyana, Jamaica and Puerto Rico. In Guyana, Cuba is expanding ties with the Guyanese Prime Minister and his ruling People's National Congress. The major danger is that Guyana can be used as a springboard to subvert neighboring states. The propensity for violence is heightened in Jamaica with evidence that leftist members of the ruling People's National Party have been trained in Cuba for insurgent activities. Terrorism has become the trademark of several Puerto Rican revolutionary groups trained by Cuba. Attacks have not been limited to Puerto Rico proper; numerous banks, department stores and public buildings in the United States have also been subjected to attack. Foremost among the terrorist movements in Puerto Rico is the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN) which was organized in Cuba in 1966. Its members were then returned to Puerto Rico and US cities to initiate an underground campaign directed at obtaining support for the Puerto Rican liberation movement. Cuba's relationship and support to the FALN and other terrorist groups is illustrated by its development of a separate department to supervise the training, financing, and provision of support to such organizations.
Figure 6