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Description of document: List of Department of the Treasury Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigations closed during CY 2013

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FOIA Request
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From: "Delmar, Richard K."
Date: Jun 9, 2014 12:56:51 PM
Subject: FOIA - Treasury OIG closed cases - CY13

Per your FOIA request, docket number 2014-06-026, attached is a list of Treasury OIG investigations closed in CY 13. The data fields you asked for are all incorporated in the list.

Names and other identifying information regarding subjects, witnesses, etc., have been redacted per FOIA Exemption 7C.

If you disagree with this resolution of your FOIA request, you can appeal the matter pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Section 552(a)(6)(A)(i). Pursuant to the Department's FOIA appeal process set forth in 31 C.F.R. Section 1.5(i), an appeal must be submitted within 35 days from the date of this response to your request, signed by you and addressed to: Freedom of Information Act Appeal, DO, Disclosure Services, Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C. 20220. The appeal should reasonably describe your basis for believing that Treasury OIG possesses records to which access has been wrongly denied, that the redactions are improper or contrary to law, or that we have otherwise violated applicable FOIA law or policy.

Rich Delmar
Counsel to the Inspector General
Department of the Treasury
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Office of Investigations Activities
FOIA Report
For the Period Between: 01/01/2013 and 12/31/2013

Case Number	Title	Summary	Closed
INTR-10-1448-I	[REDACTED]	On 9/3/09, the TOIG received information from the NYPD Auto Crimes Division that it had information concerning a Treasury Department employee. According to the NYPD, it had obtained information that it had acquired via a wire tap that alleged that the Treasury employee is married to the subject of an investigation involving the buying and selling of vehicles and using credit histories of unsuspecting customers to purchase additional vehicles and vehicle titles. The Treasury employee has been recorded moving money and conducting financial transactions on behalf of her husband's criminal enterprise.	7/17/2013
TTB-13-0539-I	[REDACTED]	Check cashing business, [REDACTED], assisted with obstructing a TTB examination by engaging in a Money Laundering scheme with [REDACTED]	12/5/2013
TTB-13-1392-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the TTB regarding the following:	12/3/2013

		Compromise of one of TTB regulatory investigations.	
BANK-11-1027-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED], OTS regarding the following: The OTS conducted three comprehensive or limited examinations of American in 2009 and 2010. OTS examiners noted a number of instances where bank employees provided inconsistent information on the same topic at different examinations. In at least two cases, it appeared that board minutes were modified to reflect the discussion of topics that were not in the previous versions in response to questions from the OTS. OTS examiners were told that bank employees were instructed to limit discussions with examiners, and all information requested by examiners was allegedly reviewed by the bank president prior to being presented to the OTS.	1/15/2013

BANK-11-1031-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED], OTS regarding the following: "the OTS examiners encountered numerous instances of: (1) significant delays in receiving information and documents, (2) management providing information and documents that are not responsive to the examiners' request, and (3) non-receipt of information and documents after repeated assertions by [REDACTED] management that the request was in process" and that "[t]he OTS examiners have also had difficulty setting up meetings with [REDACTED] employees." The information not provided related to the OTS's compliance review of the institution and to safety and soundness issues, including, but not limited to, missing assessments of value in loan files, which was an issue identified in the August 23, 2010 limited examination of the institution as well.	7/26/2013
BANK-11-1365-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED], OA regarding potentially fraudulent activities identified during loss review of [REDACTED]	3/8/2013

BANK-13-1442-I	FY 2013 BANK INITIATIVE	<p>During this reporting period, the OIG's for FDIC, FRB, and Treasury started an initiative to conduct the investigations of failed banks jointly. The OIG has partnered with these agencies to bring to justice individuals who have defrauded the financial institutions within the jurisdiction of the three agencies, which includes circumventing or impeding the regulators examination processes. The joint initiative's collective efforts will be a deterrent to others contemplating criminal activity and help maintain the public's confidence in the nation's financial system. Our oversight includes Treasury's financial institution regulators—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and legacy Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (OTS was merged with OCC in 2012). In addition our office receives information regarding regulator obstruction from DOJ, law enforcement agencies, and other sources.</p>	10/8/2013
BEP-12-2448-I	<p>████████████████████</p>	<p>Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with BEP regarding the above named subject and allegations of sabotage of government equipment.</p>	10/18/2013

		DCF-SI-2012-040 also DCF-SI-2012-040	
BEP-13-0208-I	██████████	<p>On October 26, 2011 the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), Office of Security was notified that the Treasury computer monitoring station (GSOC) had picked up computer traffic potentially related to child pornography.</p> <p>TOIG seized and conducted a forensic examine on three BEP computers. The forensic examination did not reveal images depicting child pornography but did reveal numerous pornographic images. The forensic examination also revealed pornography associated with the user profile ██████████.</p> <p>Complaint 13-0208 is cross referenced with case number BEP-12-0128-I.</p>	5/2/2013
BEP-13-0269-I	██████████: DISABILITY FRAUD	Former Bureau of Engraving and Printing Police Officer ██████████, who retired with a knee disability which left him unable to perform his duties, was seen performing a choreographed color guard routine on the Bill Cunningham show.	2/20/2013

		BEP Case Number BEP-SI-2013-002	
BEP-13-0990-I	██████████	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with the BEP regarding the above named subject and allegations of employee misconduct.	6/19/2013
		BEP Case Number BEP-SI-2013-020	
BEP-13-1243-I	██████████	██████████ stated to BEP Police that ██████████ waved pocket knife at her in elevator and pinched her cheek (face) as leaving the elevator.	10/18/2013
		BEP-SI-2013-022 also DCF-SI-2013- 022	
BEP-13-1699-I	██████████	Complaint received 6/18/2013, via email Anonymous complainant alleges - ██████████ operates an unlicensed home improvement business. He has done work on numerous BEP employees homes. ██████████ brags about not paying or reporting taxes on the business or his personal income taxes. He also has five or more employees in the business who pay no taxes and I believe he refers to them as being illegal.	11/8/2013

MSB-11-1209-I	[REDACTED]	On June 2, 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG) initiated an investigation into [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for operating as an unregistered money services company, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C § 1960 – unlicensed/unregistered Money Services Businesses, and other related U.S. Codes.	5/6/2013
USM-13-2316-I	[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	Complaint received 9/12/2013, via email Complainant alleges - [REDACTED] submitted a proposal for solicitation #USM-HQ-13-0034 and the BPD and Mint contracts are likely to award a contract to this company although they do not have the relevant past performance for size/scope of work. The company has some ties to individuals at the Mint and there is some foul play at hand.	11/21/2013
BPD-11-1240-I	[REDACTED]	Complaint received 6/29/2011, via email	12/23/2013

		Reason for Referral: 75 Payments received by the nephew ██████████ of the deceased ██████████. ██████████ did not report his aunt's death and continued to draw her pay. An attempt was made to reclaim the ACH deposited payments made from January 4, 2010 through May 2, 2011 but there were no funds in the bank account.	
BPD-12-0722-I	██████████ ET AL	BPD informs us of the seizure by the IRS of 212 Series I Savings Bonds as part of an identity theft investigation involving fraudulently-obtained tax refunds that were used to purchase paper savings bonds.	1/18/2013
BPD-12-2492-I	████████████████████	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with the Bureau of Public Debt regarding the following: On August 27, 2012, the Bureau of Public Debt's Risk Mitigation and Investigations Section received a fax from ██████████, located in Greenville SC, wanting to verify that a money order received on August 23, 2012 in the amount of \$16,500.00 was valid. They received the money	12/2/2013

		<p>order from [REDACTED] for the purchase of a car. The dealership did not release the car to [REDACTED]. The money order has the Bureau of the Public Debt - TreasuryDirect routing number ([REDACTED]) and [REDACTED] social security number as the account number on it.</p>	
<p>BPD-12-2505-I</p>	<p>[REDACTED]: FRAUDULENT CHECKS AND LOSS TO GOV'T</p>	<p>Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the Bureau of Public Debt regarding the above named subject and allegations of the following:</p> <p>The Bureau of the Public Debt (BPD) has received nine (9) bogus checks from a customer, identified as [REDACTED], SSN# [REDACTED], DOB: [REDACTED] (age 26) residing at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED], (Los Angeles County) utilizing what appears to be a Sovereign Citizen-type redemption scheme that has resulted in a government loss of</p>	<p>3/13/2013</p>

		\$1,300.	
		BPD ROI#: 12-044 Keyword: Sovereign Citizen	
BPD-12-2515-I	██████████	SAC/OI, Matter in connection with ██████ investigation; BPD-12-1078-I. When interviewed, ██████ stated that she also worked at the ██████████ during work hours and held an official position with the ██████████, Thus, raising two "potential" issues that must be resolved seperatly from the ██████ investigation; Time and Attendance fraud and outside work issues by a senior manager. ██████	4/2/2013
BPD-12-2710-I	██████████	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with the BPD regarding "lost" and replacement bonds both being cashed by the same parties. Referral No.: RM-2012-034	9/9/2013

		<p>At the request of the Chief Counsel of the Bureau of the Public Debt, the Risk Mitigation and Investigations Section (RMIS) reviewed the case of [REDACTED] for possible referral to the Office of Inspector General (OIG). RMIS determined from the information below that the case warranted review by OIG.</p> <p>In November of 2007, the Division of Customer Service (DCA) processed a claim for 49 lost series EE bonds with a face value of \$49,000 for a [REDACTED]</p>	
BPD-13-0111-I	MISSING COMPUTER SERVERS-KANSAS CITY	<p>Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with BPD regarding the following:</p> <p>In September 2012, the Security Office at Public Debt about two missing computer servers from the Kansas City Regional Operating Center (KROC). The computers were purchased though BPD funding and the employees involved were Public Debt employees at the time of the incident. Each server costs \$19,800.</p> <p>KROC ordered and received two servers in September 2011. Due to a double shipment, the facility received two more servers a month later. The servers were not inventoried and one employee returned one server and one was placed in service. Two servers remain unaccounted for at this time.</p>	7/10/2013

BPD-13-0414-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the BPD regarding the above named subject and allegations of a fraud incident involving a total of 13 EE bonds	5/16/2013
BPD-13-0506-I	[REDACTED]	<p>Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the Bureau of Public Debt regarding the above named subject and allegations of the following:</p> <p>On January 3, 2013, employee [REDACTED] reported to the Security Branch her concerns about the agitated behavior and comments that were allegedly made by another employee, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] made statements that [REDACTED] wanted to shoot somebody.</p> <p>[REDACTED] was immediately interviewed to assess any threat or danger to Public Debt. She states she is aware of Public Debt's policy regarding workplace violence and does not recall making any statements about shooting anyone or anything. [REDACTED] was interviewed a second time during which time she reiterated her earlier statement.</p>	4/8/2013

		<p>Three employees in the work area were contacted and interviewed, two of whom recall ██████ making some statements associated with shooting but there is disagreement over the context and implications of ██████ statements. A secondary issue surfaced during the interview about ██████ having posting anti-government statements on the internet and disclosing her position with the Treasury Department.</p>	
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BFS-13-0144-I	BUREAU OF FISCAL SERVICE - PAYMENT FRAUD CASE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE	<p>In October 2012, the Office of Investigations (OI) embarked on an initiative surrounding fraud related to the payments made by the Bureau of Fiscal Service (BFS). This initiative will cover payments made including U.S. Treasury checks (CFIF & Non-CFIF) and ACH fraudulent payments including redirected benefit fraud. Tax refund fraud schemes paid by Treasury check or ACH payment are included. The ACH and Treasury check payment system is managed by the BFS and creates a mechanism for BFS to send payments authorized by a federal paying agency to authorized payees. As such OI receives information from BFS and a number of other sources on a monthly basis related to the investigative leads involving ACH and Treasury check fraud. Branch 3 is opening a case number in the case management system for OI to allow agents to utilize it for case development, and to document agent activities. This case will be closed at the end of the fiscal year with a brief memorandum summarizing the year's activities.</p>	10/10/2013
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BFS-13-0505-I	SSA/TOIG ACH FRAUD TASK FORCE - CASE DEVELOPMENT - FY13	<p>In October 2012, the Office of Investigations (OI) continued an initiative surrounding fraud related to the ACH payments made by the Bureau of Fiscal Service (BFS) to Social Security Administration (SSA) and other federal paying agency recipients where the payments are being re-routed to fraudulent accounts and pre-paid access device cards. The ACH payment system is managed by the BFS and creates a mechanism for BFS to send payments authorized by a federal paying agency to authorized payees. As such OI receives information from BFS, SSA and other sources monthly related to the investigative leads involving ACH fraud. Branch 3 is opening a case number in the case management system to allow agents to utilize it for case development, and to document agent activities. This case will be closed at the end of the fiscal year with a brief memorandum summarizing the year's activities.</p>	10/10/2013
BFS-13-0514-I	<p>██████████</p>	<p>Complaint received 1/10/2013, via email</p> <p>Complainant alleges - Identity Theft of SSA and VA check</p>	9/26/2013

BFS-13-0561-I	[REDACTED]	<p>On December 11, 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG) was requested to assist in a check fraud case by the [REDACTED], a company that services federal student loans. [REDACTED], the recipient of a federal student loan, had his loan discharged due to total and permanent disability (TPD). After the loan was discharged [REDACTED] mailed a claim that \$10,844 of his wages were garnished by the Department of Education (DOE) and he was entitled to a refund. [REDACTED] was mailed a U.S. Treasury check for \$10,844 on August 3, 2012. A further review of the paperwork provided by [REDACTED] showed that the \$10,844 was garnished by the South Carolina Department of Social Services and not the DOE.</p>	5/13/2013
BFS-13-0924-I	[REDACTED]	<p>On March 11, 2013, SA [REDACTED], SSA-OIG, contacted the Richmond ID Theft Task Force members for assistance in locating [REDACTED], DOB: [REDACTED], SSN: [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is the subject of an investigation in which she received the Social Security benefits of her deceased Mother, [REDACTED] (SSN: [REDACTED], DOB: [REDACTED], DOD: [REDACTED]) totalling over \$50,000.00.</p>	12/23/2013

BFS-13-0943-I

[REDACTED]

The Complainant, [REDACTED], stated that the Subject, [REDACTED], stole 3 US Treasury checks from the Victim, [REDACTED], between September 2012 and November 2012. [REDACTED] is the son of [REDACTED], and the grandson of [REDACTED]. The Complainant said the Victim is blind, has difficulty moving around, and could not have endorsed the checks on the signature line. The Complainant stated that Subject periodically lived with the Victim in an apartment in New York. The Subject had access to the Victim's mail and stole 3 US Treasury checks. The checks were monthly Social Security benefit checks, each for \$1047. The Complainant said she has power of attorney over the Victim and has enrolled the Victim in the Direct Express program since the thefts occurred.

12/18/2013

		<p>The Complainant stated that her ex-husband, ██████████, may have aided the Subject in cashing at least one of the checks. The Complainant said she was threatened via text message by ██████████ after he learned that she was going to notify the police about the thefts. The Complainant also said the Subject's girlfriend, ██████████, may have aided the Subject in cashing at least one check.</p> <p>The Subject allegedly has an open warrant for violation of probation. The Subject has been arrested for robbery and assault in the past, and served 6 months in prison. The Subject's probation officer in New York is Officer ██████████. Officer ██████████ can be reached at ██████████ (██████████ ██████████ ██████████).</p>	
BFS-13-1177-I	██████████	<p>Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with BPD regarding allegations of FAS Fraud and possible monetary loss to the government.</p> <p>FAS-2013-001</p>	12/4/2013

BFS-13-1211-I	[REDACTED]	<p>My agency has an investigation under case # GRO-12-00040-J. [REDACTED] died on [REDACTED]. She was in pay for SSA Title 16 as a widow SSN [REDACTED]. SSA has certified that payments totaling \$179,830.80 were paid after her death. SSA reported the payments were all paper checks. I would request copies of checks (front & back) at least 4 per year or as many as available to assist in this investigation. The main subject is the payee's daughter [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] who has claimed during an interview that her mother is living in Florida. She could not explain why her name appeared on the state death certificate as Informant who reported the death.</p> <p>The assigned AUSA [REDACTED] in Charlotte, NC 704/344-6222</p>	12/13/2013
BFS-13-1517-I	[REDACTED]: THREAT	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with BPD regarding the above named subject and allegations of threats.	9/19/2013

BFS-13-1574-I	[REDACTED]	<p>A Special Agent [REDACTED], from the Department of Veteran's Affairs contacted TOIG SA [REDACTED] regarding US Treasury check number 2221-41980317, issued to [REDACTED] at [REDACTED], in the amount of \$10,000.00. [REDACTED] claimed that she was the sister of deceased veteran [REDACTED]. SA [REDACTED] confirmed [REDACTED] is not related to [REDACTED] and should not have received the insurance payment upon the death of [REDACTED].</p>	12/4/2013
CFIF-10-2786-I	[REDACTED] (CFIF)	<p>On August 2, 2010, the Financial Management Service (FMS) provided the Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI) with information regarding United States Treasury Checks charged against the Check Forgery Insurance Fund (CFIF) overseen by the FMS. More specifically, [REDACTED] of Boaz, Alabama made a claim with FMS stating he did not receive 5 United States Treasury checks intended for him between December of 2009 and May of 2010. Each check was payable to [REDACTED] in the amount of \$1259.00.</p>	1/23/2013

CFIF-12-0591-I	[REDACTED]	<p>Correspondence received from Financial Management regarding allegations of the above-named subject and allegations of her not receiving a negotiated check in the amount of 4914.00</p> <p>CFIF</p>	1/18/2013
CFIF-12-2096-I	[REDACTED], ET AL.	<p>After reviewing CFIF data it was revealed claims were made concerning several T Checks issued to subject [REDACTED]. The original checks and replacement checks were all negotiated. All checks were cashed by a different third party and it appears that [REDACTED] endorsement is on all checks.</p> <p>Check #2049 48904346, issued 11/01/11, was replaced by courtesy disbursement check #2057 01784608 on 02/13/12.</p> <p>Check #2055 52936516, issued 12/28/11, was replaced by courtesy disbursement check #2057 02144369 on 04/23/11.</p>	12/2/2013

		Check #4500 55578932, issued 02/22/12, was replaced by courtesy disbursement check #4500 99572625 on 03/01/12.	
CFIF-12-2569-I	██████████	Complaint received 9/11/2012, via email Check Forgery	1/30/2013
CFIF-12-2692-I	██████████		2/11/2013

CYBER-12-0077-I

[REDACTED]

On 10/19/11, SA [REDACTED] spoke w/ Detective [REDACTED] of the Dallas PD/Internet Crime Task Force. [REDACTED] provided information regarding an OCC employee posing as a 15 yo male on a social networking site geared toward high school individuals. This website has a webcam function which enables individuals to speak to each other live. Two complaints were received regarding the above referenced individual which claim he exposed himself during these "chats". The website monitors these chats and was able to snapshot the individual, but his face was not visible. [REDACTED] was able to trace the individuals profile to an email and facebook account as belonging to [REDACTED] of OCC. [REDACTED] is in the process of obtaining information from the internet provider; [REDACTED] and will have the results in approximately 1 week.

10/7/2013

CYBER-13-1374-I [REDACTED]: INFORMATION
SECURITY BREACH

On 04/24/2013 Bureau of the Fiscal Service (BFS) employee [REDACTED] was seen attempting to transmit network infrastructure configuration data (sensitive-but-unclassified) to his personal electronic mail account. Although he was informed of the impropriety of his actions, he appeared unconcerned, and the matter was escalated to his supervisor, [REDACTED], Director, Communications Branch. Thirty (30) days of [REDACTED] electronic mail logs were subsequently reviewed resulting in the discovery of other, successful, inappropriate transmittals of network information to his personal electronic mail account. The matter was reported to TCSIRC immediately and was given TCSIRC Ticket Number 82858. However, due to an inaccurate understanding that the TOIG/OI automatically reviews all submissions to TCSIRC, the matter was not reported separately to the TOIG/OI until 05/07/2013, when the BFS called TOIG/OI to find out what actions we had taken on the matter. BFS has already started its own internal investigation of the matter, covering not only employee discipline but also the amelioration of the inappropriate data transmission; BFS will provide to the TOIG/OI the status and/or results of its internal investigation ASAP.

9/26/2013

		TCSIRC Ticket Number 82858	
CYBER-13-1408-I	██████████	<p>The subject was hired to develop cost modeling tools and provide other financial support services for the Enterprise Business Solutions (EBS) ACIO. The subject's federal manager is ██████████ and the EBS ACIO is ██████████. The contract period of performance began 9/27/11 and ended on 3/31/13. The contract scope and purpose was to provide EBS with Financial Support Services to include assistance with requisition, invoice, and other financial management activities. Therefore, the subject was provided information that included EBS program operations, federal managers and subject matter experts' names and meetings were held to discuss roles responsibilities and program operations at a high level. See attachment TIRNO11D00080do003.pdf for contract services outline. The subject did sign a non-disclosure agreement regarding information ownership. See attachment ██████████ NDA PDF.</p> <p>In December, 2012 the subject traveled to China for one month. It appeared the Treasury Information was sent to the gmail account before the Trip to China in December, 2012.</p>	12/23/2013

DO-10-1743-I	██████████ MISCHARGING ON THE TIPSS CONTRACT	██████████ is engaging in cost mis- charging/over-charging by billing for unqualified employees working on the TIPSS contract.	4/16/2013
DO-11-1239-I	████████████████████	Complaint received 6/29/2011, via email ██████████ received and cashed annuity checks receiving funds that she was not entitled to.	2/12/2013
DO-12-1566-I	████████████████████ (ARRA)	Complaint received 4/24/2012, via mail	6/24/2013

		Anonymous complainant alleges [REDACTED] has filed fraudulent forms in order to obtain Federal Grants for Solar Installations.	
DO-12-1869-I	[REDACTED] (ARRA)	Complaint received 5/30/2012, via email Complainant reporting fraud on section 1603 Grant	12/13/2013
DO-12-2212-I	[REDACTED] POLICE DEPARTMENT: ASSET FORFEITURE NONCOMPLIANCE	The [REDACTED] Police Department in South Carolina may have violated Treasury equitable sharing guidelines with respect to forfeited assets.	1/17/2013
DO-12-2326-I	[REDACTED]	Complaint received 8/1/2012, via email Anonymous complainant alleges [REDACTED] uses inappropriate behavior and language.	1/4/2013
DO-12-2531-I	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (ARRA)	On August 31, 2012, TOIG received an email from [REDACTED], DO Section 1603 Program Manager, regarding an allegation of fraudulent 1603 applications. [REDACTED] of [REDACTED], Scottsdale, AZ, alleges that [REDACTED] may have fraudulently submitted applications to Treasury for 1603 funds. [REDACTED] alleges that [REDACTED], working as an agent of [REDACTED], illegally filed for the 1603 funds without actually owning the solar	1/17/2013

		assets.	
DO-13-0424-I	██████████ (ADMIN)	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with TOIG, Counsel regarding the above named subject and allegations of unauthorized personal purchases on a government issued travel card	8/27/2013
DO-13-0848-I	████████████████████	Complaint received 2/27/2013, via email Complainant alleges 1603 fraud.	8/19/2013
DO-13-0961-I	████████████████████ ██████████	████████████████████ attempted to pay a property tax bill in York County (SC) using a fraudulent check. The fraudulent check was processed by the York County Tax Collector's Office, and later identified as fraudulent by a bank. The fraudulent check included a Federal Reserve routing number, and the name of Treasurer ██████.	9/26/2013
DO-13-1744-I	██████████	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with SBLF, Treasury OIG regarding an application submitted to us for small state business credit initiative with false information	11/29/2013
BFS-13-0032-I	██████████, ET AL	Complaint received 10/4/2012 Complaint Unknown subject cashing checks at various ██████ locations in the Washington DC area.	7/17/2013
FMS-11-1437-I	██████████ (A.K.A ██████████)	A Federal Reserve Bank contract	3/13/2013

		employee downloaded FMS government-wide accounting source code to to hard drive that was subsequently stolen.	
FMS-12-0829-I	SSA/TOIG ACH FRAUD TASK FORCE - CASE DEVELOPMENT - FY 2012	In January 2012, the Office of Investigations (OI) embarked on an initiative surrounding fraud related to the ACH payments made by FMS to SSA and other federal paying agency recipients where the payments are being re-routed to fraudulent accounts and pre-paid access device cards. The ACH payment system is managed by the Financial Management Service (FMS) and creates a mechanism for FMS to send payments authorized by a federal paying agency to authorized payees. As such OI receives information from FMS, SSA and other sources monthly related to the investigative leads involving ACH fraud. Branch 3 is opening a case number in the case management system to allow agents to utilize it for case development, and to document agent activities. This case will be closed at the end of the fiscal year with a brief memorandum summarizing the year's activities.	1/7/2013
FMS-12-1199-I	████████████████████	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with FMS regarding the following:	4/9/2013

		<p>a frb OF philadelphia system administrator (contract EMPLOYEE) accessed several servers of which some supported the Treasury Check Information System (TCIS) application and transferred some files to his home computer from the frb computer. the National Incident Response Team (nirt) notified the frb of the incident.</p> <p>TCSIRC #79150</p>	
FMS-12-1886-I	<p>[REDACTED]</p>	<p>Investigated initiated by Army CID based upon information provided by FinCEN Eagle Cash Card (ECC) Liaison, [REDACTED] who reported \$32,300 in fraudulent ECC electronic funds transactions. The Eagle Cash Card is a stored cash program so military, contractors, and civilians in areas such as Afghanistan do not have to carry cash. It is operated by the Financial Management Service.</p>	11/12/2013

		<p>Two ECC laptops were utilized to process the transactions, ██████████ ██████████, a finance soldier and only operator of the two laptops, loaded a total of \$25,300 on to two separate ECCs of ██████████, \$6000 to an ECC belonging to ██████████ ██████████ and \$1000 to his personal ECC. None of the transactions were posted to the daily transaction log and therefore not submitted to US Treasury Department.</p> <p>A review of ECC transaction logs pertaining to these three individuals disclosed ██████████ and ██████████ initiated card-to-card transfers to ██████████ prior to their departure from Afghanistan.</p>	
FMS-12-2543-I	██████████	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ ██████████ with the FMS regarding allegations of a threatening phone call received in their dispatch center	1/8/2013
FMS-12-2644-I	██████████	Complaint received 9/20/2012 Payee alleged non receipt of Social Security checks issued from 10/3/2011 to 6/1/2012 (9 checks)	5/14/2013

FMS-13-0005-I	[REDACTED]	<p>Complaint received 10/1/2012, via email</p> <p>Complaint - DEA Oakland Investigator conducting an investigation of a drug trafficker that DEA has thus far seized more that \$120,000 and vehicles. An anonymous tip pointed out the target of the investigation and outlined information relevant to the mailing of drugs to NY and then primary target and his wife an employee of the Treasury.</p> <p>Key Words: Law Enforcement Contact Liaison</p>	4/8/2013
FMS-13-0090-I	[REDACTED]	<p>Complaint received 10/12/2012, via email</p> <p>Check Forgery</p>	4/16/2013
FMS-13-0093-I	[REDACTED]	<p>Complaint received 10/15/2012, via Mail/Fax</p> <p>Check Fraud-Forged Endorsement</p>	9/9/2013
BPD-12-1658-I	[REDACTED]	Complaint received 5/2/2012, via email	4/10/2013

		Law enforcement inquiry: Complainant alleges subject [REDACTED] claims to have account number with the US Treasury.	
INTR-13-1377-I	[REDACTED]: INSTALLATION OF UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE	On May 6, 2013, the Office of Management notified OI that, in the course of a routine audit, the Information Technology Department had identified the installation of unauthorized software on the TOIG-issued laptop computer of Office of Audit Information Technology Audit Manager [REDACTED].	8/2/2013
INTR-13-2188-P	ALLEGED ASSAULT	Information recieved regarding potential employee misconduct	9/3/2013
BFS-13-1528-I	[REDACTED]	On 5/7/2013, citizen [REDACTED] called duty phone in reference to a tax refund check she received via mail that she didn't think she was supposed to get. SA [REDACTED] validated check through TCIS and contacted IRS-CI. IRS-CI advised to send them the check.	11/8/2013

		<p>On 5/21/2013, IRS-CI SA [REDACTED] contacted SA [REDACTED]. The check appears to be part of a scheme that involves 180 returns in Raleigh, NC, totalling ~\$1.1 Million. NY, NJ, PA, and MA are also involved, with over 1,500 returns filed totalling \$11.5 million.</p>	
MSB-13-0164-I	FY 2013 MSB INITIATIVE	<p>In October 2010, the Treasury Office of Investigations (TOIG) embarked on an initiative surrounding fraud related to unlicensed/unregistered Money Service Businesses (MSB) in violation of 18 USC § 1960, or licensed/registered MSBs that are involved in unlawful activities. The current rules amended in 1999 by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) revised the regulatory definitions of certain non-bank financial institutions for purposes of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and grouped the definitions into a separate category of financial institution called MSBs.</p>	10/8/2013

A business that meets one or more of the definitions of a type of MSB is an MSB and must comply with BSA requirements applicable to it as an MSB, as a financial institution and as a specific type of MSB. An MSB includes any person doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an organized business concern, in one or more of the following capacities: (1) currency dealer or exchanger, (2) check casher, (3) issuer, seller or redeemer of traveler's checks, money orders or stored value, (4) money transmitter, or (5) US Postal Service. Furthermore, an activity threshold of greater than \$1,000 per person per day in one or more transactions applies to the definitions of: currency dealer or exchanger; check casher; issuer of traveler's checks, money orders or stored value; and seller or redeemer of travelers' checks, money orders or stored value.

		<p>This case will be closed at the end of the fiscal year with a brief memorandum summarizing the year's activities.</p>	
MSB-13-0349-I	[REDACTED]	<p>Prior to its acquisition by and merger into [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (" [REDACTED] ") on August 31, 2012, [REDACTED] (" [REDACTED] ") had a depository relationship with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (" [REDACTED] "), a commercial entity operating as a money service business. Prior to the acquisition, [REDACTED] instructed [REDACTED] to terminate all depository relationships with all money service businesses including [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] deposit account was closed in September 2012.</p>	7/1/2013

		<p>Since September 28, 2012 [REDACTED] has received and paid on seven (7) notices of reclamation of U.S. Treasury checks totaling \$46,015.61 (includes a \$300 payment made by [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]). Such amount represents a loss to [REDACTED]. Images of these checks and notices are attached to and made a part of this report</p> <p>[REDACTED] staff has contacted the principal owner of this entity, [REDACTED], regarding these checks. [REDACTED] made a verbal commitment to repay [REDACTED] in the amount of \$2,500 per month. After [REDACTED] requested [REDACTED] to execute loan documents and provide collateral on behalf of [REDACTED] and/or himself, he has not responded to [REDACTED] requests.</p> <p>We suspect, but do not know, that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] negotiated these U.S. Treasury checks in a knowingly fraudulent manner.</p>	
BANK-12-2332-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with TOIG regarding the following:	11/8/2013

		Suspected Fraudulent Activities Identified During Our Non-Material Loss Review of [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	
BFS-12-2691-I	[REDACTED]	On September 20, 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations was requested to assist in a check fraud case by the U.S. Postal Service, Office of Inspector General. Former USPS employee, [REDACTED] was receiving disability payments from the USPS which continued after her death on [REDACTED] up until June 30, 2012.	12/23/2013

BFS-13-0677-I	[REDACTED]	<p>On March 8, 2011, U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Baltimore Field Office received case number 101-750-39674, regarding a preliminary settlement report for U.S. Treasury check number 2309-93368812. The Financial Management Service (FMS) referred the case to USSS on September 6, 2010. Payee [REDACTED] filed an FMS 1133, Report of Lost or Stolen Check, dated May 26, 2010. [REDACTED] included a statement alleging her tax preparer, [REDACTED], negotiated U.S. Treasury check number 2309-93368812.</p> <p>On July 6, 2011, USSS requested assistance from Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG). TOIG agreed to provide USSS with investigative support.</p>	7/16/2013
SCAM-13-0358-I	[REDACTED]	<p>Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with Counsel, OIG regarding the above named subject and allegations of a fraudulent scam.</p> <p>Keywords: Media Reporter</p>	11/21/2013

<p>ZZZ-13-1112-I</p>	<p>██████████: INTERNATIONAL BILL OF EXCHANGE</p>	<p>The Office of the Inspector General for the Export-Import Bank of the United States invites OI in on an investigation involving a fraudulent International Bill of Exchange. In particular, they seek Treasury confirmation of the document's fraudulence, and information regarding any cases that we might have involving ██████████.</p> <p>Their Case Number is 12-0015</p>	<p>6/3/2013</p>
<p>ZZZ-13-1652-I</p>	<p>██████████</p>	<p>Correspondence received via OIG Intake from the Front Office regarding allegations of the following:</p> <p>a copy of a complaint letter that was sent to the GSA Inspector General concerning allegations of possible kickback violations relating to Government contracts.</p>	<p>10/8/2013</p>
<p>BANK-12-0423-I</p>	<p>██████████ ██████████ (██████████)</p>	<p>On December 5, 2011, FDIC spoke to AUSA ██████████ of the US Attorney's Office in Scranton, PA. They have an open investigation into ██████████ (██████████). ██████████ is a \$1.1 billion institution. Per AUSA ██████████ it is a "5" rated institution. It does not appear on the Chairman's Failing Bank List at this time.</p> <p>Their investigation has two parts. The first part involves failure to file suspicious activity reports. That part of the investigation is being led by IRS-CID but per AUSA ██████████ is not really going anywhere.</p>	<p>7/29/2013</p>

		Pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between your office and the OCC, I am referring matters to you that [REDACTED], Little Rock, AR may have obstructed OCC supervision.	
BANK-13-0272-I	[REDACTED] : OBSTRUCTION	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the OCC regarding the above named subject and allegations of obstruction by [REDACTED]	10/8/2013
BANK-13-1200-I	[REDACTED]	On April 11, 2013, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Inspector General (TOIG), Office of Investigations (OI), received information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that [REDACTED] reportedly processed transactions amounting to \$92 million in an attempt to deceive Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) examiners conducting an exam of the bank.	12/12/2013
BANK-13-1249-I	[REDACTED] (OCC SAR)	"Today the OCC filed a SAR with FinCEN concerning [REDACTED] for potentially obstructing the OCC's examination process and making false statements in connection with activities of the Chief Investment Office." Tracking ID: BS13-00068756	12/3/2013

OCC-11-0982-I	[REDACTED] - COMPROMISE OF EMAIL SYSTEM	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the OCC regarding the following: [REDACTED], Senior Financial Analyst, filed an EEO complaint. In connection with the complaint, she was deposed by [REDACTED], an OCC attorney. [REDACTED] shared e-mail messages with [REDACTED] in support of her case. Since [REDACTED] was neither the recipient nor the author of the e-mails, [REDACTED] asked where she got them. She said that they were provided to her on a CD that was slipped under her door anonymously. She said that she destroyed the CD.	4/11/2013
OCC-12-0618-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake regarding the following: The following information was reported to me by [REDACTED], Counsel in our Northeastern District, for forwarding to you. Please let me know what additional information you need.	5/16/2013
OCC-12-0766-I	[REDACTED] ET AL	TOIG was notified by IRS-CI that a person of interest in a Grand Jury investigation they are working is a Treasury employee. A database check with Workforce Analytics determined the person of interest in the IRS-CI case is an employee of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency	7/16/2013

OCC-12-1028-I	[REDACTED]	The OCC's [REDACTED] informs us that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives informed her of their intent to interview, then likely arrest, recently-hired OCC Bank Examiner [REDACTED]. Evidently the ATF attempted also after hours yesterday to coordinate with the TOIG, but was unable to reach anyone and no-one responded to a VoiceMail message that they left.	5/22/2013
OCC-12-1404-I	[REDACTED]	Office of the Comptroller of Currency bank examiners behaved in an unprofessional manner during a 2010 examination of [REDACTED] in Anniston, AL. The allegations include bullying and sexual harassment.	3/13/2013
OCC-13-0002-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the OCC regarding the above named subject and allegations of travel card misuse.	10/18/2013
OCC-13-0296-I	[REDACTED]: LOAN FRAUD	AUSA [REDACTED] (Iowa) contacted TOIG regarding whether we would work the following case:	11/8/2013

		<p>In March 2004, ██████████ obtained loans and a line of credit from ██████████, which latter he defaulted on in February 2009. ██████████ subsequently discovered multiple apparent frauds that ██████████ had employed to establish and to maintain his qualification for the funds.</p>	
OCC-13-0519-I	██████████ (ADMIN)	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with the OCC regarding the above named subject and allegations of government travel card misuse in the amount of \$31,665.	8/1/2013
OCC-13-0739-I	██████████	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with the OCC regarding the above named subject and allegations of violating the Hatch Act.	7/1/2013
OCC-13-1241-I	██████████	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████████ with the OCC regarding the above named subject and allegations of travel card misuse.	10/9/2013
OCC-13-1250-I	██████████	Correspondence received via OIG Intake regarding the above mentioned subject and allegations of violation of 18 USC 208 (a)	6/13/2013
SCAM-12-2356-I	██████████	On August 1, 2012, Special Agent ██████████ received a phone call from ██████████, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of Florida, regarding a current	6/24/2013

		investigation of a possible impersonation of a Treasury Investigator.	
SCAM-13-0780-I	██████████ - SCAM	On February 15, 2013, the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG) received an allegation regarding an international "419" consumer/lottery scam. Letters were sent to from the ██████████ ██████████, a company name who is known to be affiliated with "419" scams, to two separate individuals. Both letter contained identical verbiage relating to the receivers winning \$120,000.00, however each needing to endorse an enclosed check for \$1,975.00 and send \$1,800.00, via ██████████, to ██████████. ██████████ is listed as a claims officer on both letters.	7/26/2013
OIG-13-1529-I	THEFT OF BALLISTIC VEST	May 21, 2013 government owned vehicle (GOV) G130074B was parked on the 3300 block of Elliott Street, Baltimore, MD 21224.	8/27/2013

		<p>On the morning of May 22, 2013 I noticed a black boot on the ground behind the GOV. I recognized the boot as one of my work issued boots. I approached the GOV and determined that the trunk of the vehicle was open. I examined the contents of the trunk and was able to determine that the following items were missing from the trunk:</p>	
USM-10-0863-I	US AND ██████ VS. ██████	<p>████████ filed a complaint in the US District Court for the District of Columbia in behalf of the United States, on October 21, 2009. ██████ alleges that ██████ violated the false Claims Act 31 USC 3729-3733, by knowingly providing false statements to the government regarding labor hours.</p>	8/7/2013
USM-11-1638-I	████████ (ADMIN)	<p>Correspondence received via OIG Intake from ██████ with the USM regarding allegations against the Procurement Office in Philadelphia. US Mint Police Incident Number 11-HQ-011</p>	10/18/2013
USM-12-0120-I	████████: PENNY EXCHANGE (COPPER HOARDING), QUI TAM	<p>████████ files a Qui Tam action against ██████ (and others), accusing them of hoarding and melting-down older pennies that have a higher copper content, and substituting for them new pennies that have a lower copper content.</p>	2/12/2013

USM-12-1800-I	[REDACTED] ET AL.	On May 2, 2012, the Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations (TOIG), received information from an anonymous complainant alleging employee misconduct and misuse of federal welfare benefits by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], U.S. Mint (USM) employees.	10/24/2013
USM-12-2517-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the USM regarding the above named subject and allegations of his computer bieng held for evidence in an ongoing investigation. 12-PM-372	7/1/2013
USM-12-2700-I	[REDACTED]; [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the United States Mint Police regarding the above named subject(s) and allegations of WSD award issue (minor revisions)	4/3/2013
USM-13-0066-I	[REDACTED]	Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the USM regarding the above named and allegations of improper disclosure of information. 12-HQ-180	5/3/2013

USM-13-0395-I	[REDACTED]	Congressional Correspondence received via OIG Intake from [REDACTED] with the USM. 12 HQ 193	4/10/2013
USM-13-0586-I	[REDACTED]: ATTEMPTED THEFT OF TOOLS	On 01/23/2013 US Mint (USM) employee [REDACTED] was stopped while exiting and his bag was searched, revealing thirty-three (33) USM cutting tools having a collective value of approximately \$2,200. The tools were seized. US Mint Police Incident Number 13-PM-028	7/12/2013
USM-13-0840-I	[REDACTED]: FALSE OFFICIAL STATEMENT	This case arose out of Case No. USM-13-0444-R, which we originally referred back to the US Mint for investigation. However, when the US Mint's investigation indicated that the subject, Lieutenant [REDACTED], may have violated 18 USC 1001 - False Official Statement, on more than one occasion, the US Mint returned the case to the TOIG for further investigation, we closed out our referral, and created this new case for investigation.	12/20/2013

USM-13-1638-I	[REDACTED]	On June 7, 2013, while reviewing documents at the USAO-EDVA for DO-12-0046 ([REDACTED] qui tam), TOIG discovered internal [REDACTED] emails implicating USM employee [REDACTED]. TOIG has been working with [REDACTED] throughout the course of an investigation, and notified [REDACTED] about the sensitive nature of the investigation and the need to keep the information private. However, in internal [REDACTED] emails [REDACTED] allegedly told [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] Account Manager), that "the OIG was auditing [REDACTED]' performance," and sending test packages to test delivery times by [REDACTED]. In the email, [REDACTED] further indicates that [REDACTED] stated she should not have revealed that information.	8/28/2013
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Date Report Run: Friday, June 6, 2014