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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC 20330-1000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

November 12, 2014

SAF/ AAI (MDR)
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Washington DC 20330-1000

This is in response to your 7 September 2008 Mandatory Declassification review request.

The appropriate agencies conducted a review of documents 1, 3, and 5 and recommend withholding portions of these documents (redacted) from public disclosure under Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4 (c) and 3.5 (f).

The document responsive to #4 is withheld in full the information is properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. The documents response to #2 the Air Force conducted a search for the document and no was found therefore a no record determination is made.

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Secretary of the Air Force
THRU: SAF/AAI (MDR)
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Address Questions concerning this review to the undersigned at (703) 693-2560 and refer our case number 09-MDR-007.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "PJ", written over a horizontal line.

PENNY JENKINS
Mandatory Declassification Review
Program Manager

Attachment:
1, 3 and 5

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USAF REVIEWED 22 OCT 2013 NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED

HISTORY
OF
SPECIAL 7TH AF MISSION
OPERATION BOLO
ON 2 JANUARY 1967



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HISTORY
of
Special 7th AF Mission
Operation BOLO
on
2 January 1967



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
History
of
Special 7th AF Mission
Operation BOLD
on
2 January 1967

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Prepared by
SMEgt James E. Pierson
Office of Information
Headquarters Pacific Security Region

Approved by:


EDWIN H. GARRISON, Colonel USAF
Commander

8 February 1967

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FOREWORD

This history of the "Special 7th AF MIG Strike," Operation BOLO, on 2 January 1967 was written at the request of the Commander, Pacific Security Region. He felt that the history of Operation BOLO should be written while all facts were still fresh in the minds of the personnel involved and while all correspondence and messages were still available.

Although it is unusual to write the history so soon after completion of an operation, it is in line with USAFSS "historical philosophy." Experience has shown that near-current histories of major developments affecting USAFSS are valuable, useful, and appreciated by operating and policy-making officials directly concerned with the problem of operation.

This history covers Operation BOLO from the time that Security Service forces were informed of the operation, until its successful conclusion on 2 January 1967. There has been no attempt at historical analysis, nor would such analysis be practical at this early date. The international political overtones have been played down; in fact, they were only touched on in passing. Early messages contained hints that 7th AF officials were afraid that this mission might be considered an escalation of the war, but this has not happened to any great extent.

The author has attempted to include every detail of the complex planning and coordination that went into Security Service's support to 7th AF on Operation BOLO.

All source material used to compile this history was obtained from DCS/Operations, Hq Pac Scty Rgn.

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INTRODUCTION

Unlike World War II and Korea, when enemy aircraft aggressively contested its control of the skies, the United States in 1966 found the air over North Vietnam relatively empty of challenge from enemy aircraft. Most of the American planes which were shot down fell to antiaircraft fire and SAM missiles.

(TSCW) Until 2 January 1967, the entire 23 months of the air war had produced only 27 air-to-air "kills" against the North Vietnamese and only 10 U. S. aircraft had fallen prey to the MIGs. Shying away from dogfighting, the North Vietnamese pilots preferred to harass U.S. fighter-bombers on their runs over the North, attempting to make the U.S. planes jettison their bombloads short of their targets or burn extra fuel in evasive maneuvers.

(TSCW) On 2 January, 7th Air Force set an aerial ambush to end that harassment. The result: destruction of seven MIG-21s, representing nearly one-third of the MIG-21 inventory, North Vietnam's best fighter aircraft (intelligence estimates placed 20 to 25 MIG-21s in the North Vietnamese inventory).

(TSCW) The ambush was simple. Flights of F-105s and F4Cs, electronically disguised as F-105s, swept into North Vietnam from South Vietnam and Thailand. To North Vietnamese radar, they all looked like F-105 fighter-bombers, and up came the MIGs to harass them. What resulted was the first pitched battle between the two best operational fighters in the world: the Communist MIG-21 "Fishbed" and the U.S. F-4C "Phantom."

(TSCW) As the MIGs streaked in for the kill, they discovered

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that this was not a standard U.S. bombing mission -- but a "fighter sweep" cleverly disguised to look like one. And instead of encountering the slower F-105s, the North Vietnamese pilots found themselves lured into a dogfight with the 1600-mph F4C Phantoms.

(TSCM) The success of the operation was spotlighted by monitored communications between the MIG pilots and the ground controller at Kep airfield. "They are F-4s, F-4s -- not F-105s," one North Vietnamese pilot screamed over his radio. "Where are the F-105s? You briefed us to expect F-105s. The sky is full of F-4s." Said another pilot: "I'd like to come down." "We've got F4Cs overhead, try to hide in the clouds," came the answer from the control tower.

(TSCM) But the clouds didn't help. The 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, led by Col. Robin Olds, shot down seven MIGs in 12 minutes. A highly successful and simple mission? Successful yes, simple no. A great deal of planning went into that mission, planning that very few people will ever hear about. The story of that "behind the scenes" planning is told in the following pages of this history.

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Chapter I

SPECIAL MIG HUNT PLANNED

(TSNVOOO) The exact date that Seventh Air Force (7th AF) started planning Operation BOLO* was not available at the Headquarters Pacific Security Region (Hq Pac Scty Rgn). The Region received its first indication that such a mission was planned in a rather "round about way. On 22 December 1966, the 6988th Scty Sq said it had received information from the SILVER DAWN project officer that "7th AF is planning a special operation on 26 Dec."¹ According to the 6988th Scty Sq, the plan was to "Send several F/C's up disguised as F105's and attempt to shoot down all MIGs that react to them."

7th AF Considers Use of SILVER DAWN

An Airborne GCI Station

(TSNVOOO) Security Service was drawn into the picture when 7th AF said it wanted someone to act as an airborne GCI station for the F4C aircraft, and Lt. Gen. William W. Momyer, 7th AF commander, said he was considering the SILVER DAWN aircraft. As a first reaction, when SILVER DAWN was mentioned for this role, Maj. John (Jack) E. Chausteur, the Security Service Liaison Officer (SSLO) at 7th AF, was apprehensive because of NSA's past objections to using SILVER DAWN in any such capacity.³

* It wasn't until 1 Jan 67 that this mission was named Operation BOLO.

1. Msg OPR 05625 Dec 66, 6988th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 22 Dec 66 (TSNVOOO). Dec. 1.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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(TSRVCCO) Meanwhile, on the same day, 22 December, Brig. Gen. Jamais M. Philpott, Director of Intelligence, 7th AF, told General Momyer that SILVER DAWN would act as the GCI controller for the operation. However, when approached by General Momyer as to how SILVER DAWN would do this, Major Chansteur had no information on which to base his answer. In fact, he still wasn't even sure that SILVER DAWN could be used. From his standpoint, the key question still remained unanswered: was SILVER DAWN authorized to provide this type of support? Major Chansteur knew that NSA was opposed to SILVER DAWN being used in this capacity, but he did not want to mention it to 7th AF unless it was absolutely necessary. Apparently, 7th AF was under the impression that SILVER DAWN was under its operational control and strongly objected to what it considered NSA's interference. In fact, to use the words of the 6988th Scty Sq operations officer, "Chansteur gets 'clobbered' every time he uses NSA as a reason for not doing something that 7AF wants done."⁴

Region Grants Interim Approval

(TSRVCCO-LIMDIS) Immediately upon learning that 7th AF planned to use SILVER DAWN for this operation, the Region contacted USAFSS and PACAF for their policy on the matter. And then, because of the urgency of the operation, the Region granted interim authority for SILVER DAWN support as requested by 7th AF. The reason for doing this was to allow time for planning pending final approval from USAFSS for deviation from the normal SILVER DAWN role and method of

4. Msg OPR 05630 Dec 66, 6988th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 22 Dec 66 (TSRVCCO). Doc. 2.

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operation.⁵

(TSHVCCO-LIMDIS) In granting this interim authority, the Region told its SEA units that in the event the "... role of Silver Dawn in this operation is pursued by 7AF, combat in Silver Dawn providing direct tactical support for this 7AF operation. ...⁶ At the same time, the Region emphasized to Hq USAFSS that:⁷

This operation is in direct support role to 7AF and believe ACRP should participate if required. Communications to strike force asst by Silver Dawn, through relay of border violator warnings via guard channel, have voided the normal silent role of ACRP. Silver Dawn will be normally scheduled in the Gulf of Tonkin and will be used in a close support tactical role as opposed to the more routine collection activities. Request immediate authority for deviation in Silver Dawn normal operating procedures to allow to act as airborne OOI controller.

Hq USAFSS Concurs

(TSHVCCO-LIMDIS) The next day, 23 December, Hq USAFSS informed the Region that it concurred "... in the use of SILVER DAWN as airborne OOI if 7AF determines that ACRP is most suitable vehicle available."⁸

(TSHVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY) Meanwhile, Major Chausteur was becoming concerned about the number of people being brought into the plan and cautioned the Region that:⁹

... There are not over a dozen people in 7AF who are aware of this plan. Due to rules of engagement/politics, do not be-

3. Msg OPR 33164 Dec 66, Pac Scty Rgn to 6924th Scty Sq, 6988th Scty Sq, 6994th Scty Sq, & USAFSS, 22 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO LIMDIS). Doc. 3.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Msg TDC/TMC CP 18242 Dec 66, USAFSS to Pac Scty Rgn, 23 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO LIMDIS). Doc. 4.

9. Msg BSLO 00450 Dec 66, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 23 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY). Doc. 5.

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lieve comdr plans to go to PACAF for approval of anything but normal fighter sweep operations. Trap aspect to be played down. I specifically told SDPO /SILVER DAWN project officer/ not to mention this operation to the point of being sure to destroy his chatter roll. If word gets back here that this has been discussed by us with PACAF, I have had the course. Do not know your contacts at PACAF, but please play down/r each extent of info available to you if possible.

(TSRVCCO USAFSS EYES ONLY) The Region immediately tried to ease Major Chansteur's fears by informing him that selected members of the PACAF operations staff were already aware of the details of the plan, with the exception of the possible SILVER DAWN participation. Further, the Region said it had not included PACAF as an addressee on any of its messages on this subject because of the sensitivity and possibility of inadvertent distribution to the PACAF staff. However, the Region emphasized that it was necessary to contact PACAF because of SILVER DAWN's involvement and deviation from normal operating procedures. 10

PACAF Has no Objections

(TSRVCCO USAFSS EYES ONLY) Members of the PACAF operations staff recognized that SILVER DAWN would be on orbit and would participate by virtue of its strike support responsibilities. However, they felt that it was simply a question of whether it deviated from modus operandi and functioned as an airborne GCI station or whether it functioned in its normal collection role. They considered any possible added risk and concluded that there was none. Thus, PACAF was not concerned with the SILVER DAWN role and decided that any

10. Msg CPH 33211 Dec 66, Pac Secty Rgn to 6994th Secty Sq, 23 Dec 66 (TSRVCCO USAFSS EYES ONLY). Doc. 6.

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planning in this regard should be at the 7th AF level.¹¹

(TSHVCCO USAFSS EYES ONLY) PACAF operations personnel did not foresee any further PACAF involvement or requirement for approval of the special mission. They seemed to feel that 7th AF was responsible for fighting the war in whatever way was necessary. Personnel in the PACAF Reconnaissance Division assured the Region that they would play down any prior knowledge of SILVER DAWN involvement or deviation from normal operation.¹²

USAFSS Wants Advisory Role Only

(TSHVCCO) Meanwhile, USAFSS had become concerned that, in deviating from standard procedures, USAFSS personnel might assume control functions and told the Region it "... should assure our traditional advisory role is maintained and COMINT limitations were well recognized."¹³

6922nd Scty Wg Removes Itself from Chain-of-Command

(TSHVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY LIMDIS) On 24 December 1966, the 6922nd Scty Wg took itself out of the chain-of-command for this operation saying:¹⁴

Since we have not been addressees on all messages this subject, it is difficult for Col Small or I to give meaningful/appropriate guidance to Maj Chauteur. Therefore, believe it desirable for guidance to be furnished direct from PSR to Chauteur. This will ensure same policies/rationale being used at PSR/PACAF level is also used at Chauteur/7AF level.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Msg TDC/TSD 51653 Dec 66, USAFSS to Pac Scty Rgn, 23 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO). Doc. 7.

14. Msg CPR 03197 Dec 66, 6922nd Scty Wg to Pac Scty Rgn, 24 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY LIMDIS). Doc. 8.

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(TSRVCCO-USAFSS PRIVACY LMDIS) The 6922nd Scty Wg said, however, that it was still available to assist in any way desired. Its main concern was to ensure that the necessary and appropriate support and guidance was furnished to Major Chausteaur on this operation.¹⁵

(TSRVCCO-USAFSS PRIVACY LMDIS) Frankly, Major Chausteaur was sitting in a hot seat. Seventh Air Force expected him to have all the answers and have them at his fingertips. Many times the urgency of the situation forced him to seek advice and assistance from the closest knowledgeable USAFSS unit or individual, and often there was not time to go through proper channels. Sometimes this put people on the spot for immediate decisions. Unfortunately, some people objected to this, but actually Major Chausteaur had no choice; he could not always afford the time required to go through channels.¹⁶

Revision of MIG Warnings Proposed for this Mission

(TSRVCCO) On 25 December 1966, Major Chausteaur requested the Region's approval on a proposal to modify SILVER DAWN MIG warnings for this operation. His proposed change was minor: the color degree of threat would be deleted. This would add altitude and heading to MIG warnings and would constitute very little change from the existing system.¹⁷

(TSRVCCO) The 7th AF Director of Combat Operations, Brig. Gen.

15. 1612.

16. Msg OPR 36228 Dec 66, Pac Scty Rgn to 6922nd Scty Wg, 24 Dec 66 (TSRVCCO). Dec. 9.

17. Msg SSLO 00454 Dec 66, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 25 Dec 66 (TSRVCCO). Dec. 10.

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Edward A. McGough, was particularly eager to catch the MIGs short on fuel. To do this, Major Chansteur proposed giving each airfield in North Vietnam a one-time code name, i.e., Phuc Yen - Bacardi, Gia Lam - Shenleys, Kep - Panatella, Hai Phong - Rutgers, Cat Bi - Motorola. This code name would replace the daily MIG alert codeword in the warning when the SILVER DAWN wanted to identify activity at a specific airfield.¹⁸

(TSRV000) To identify the type of activity, since location was known and the GEORGE was not needed, the numeral in the GEORGE would indicate MIG activity; odd numbers one or three would indicate launch, and even numbers two or four would indicate recovery of MIGs. In all cases, a complete warning would be given. Major Chansteur felt that this would greatly expand the service provided and would not burden pilots with memorizing a lot more code names, and it was simple. From a TRANSEC viewpoint, there didn't seem to be any increased probability of compromise. Further, brevity was retained, keeping transmission time to a minimum.¹⁹

(TSRV000) A further expansion of this, Major Chansteur said, could be the advising of fighters of the location of a MIG, which was low on fuel and away from the field, and which was ordered to recover at a specific airfield. Again, the airfields would be code worded, this time to correlate with the first codename, i.e., Phuc Yen - Rum, Gia Lam - Gin, Kep - Cigar, Hai Phong - College, and Cat Bi - Radio. The codename would replace the regular daily MIG alert word. In this case, the location of the MIG would be given in valid

¹⁸. Ibid.

¹⁹. Ibid.

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GREY. This would tell the pilot that there was a MIG at "X" location, low on fuel, and returning to "Y" airfield. The cover story to pilots and other nonindoctrinated personnel was that BIG EYE radar was monitoring all MIG flights and knew how long they had been out and, from experience, when and where they should be returning to base.²⁰

(TSHVCCO) The strong point of this system was that it fixed the MIG's position and recovery base and permitted the F4C pilot to get into position to intercept. Even if the F4C pilot couldn't shoot down the MIG, it was hoped that he might be able to harass it long enough that it would run out of fuel.²¹

(TSHVCCO) Immediately upon receiving Major Chausteur's proposal, the Region told him to "Proceed with whatever coordination necessary to satisfy 7AF operational requirements."²²

Mission Delayed; New SILVER DAWN Support Plans Necessary

(TSHVCCO- USAFSS PRIVACY) On the same day, however, Major Chausteur informed the Region that the "Mission has slipped from 26 Dec due to problem of dropping SRC-160 pods from F-105's and transporting to F4C bases."²³ A new date for the mission was not given at that time.

(SHVCCO) The mission slippage also caused some changes in the

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Mag OPRG 35233 Dec 66, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994th Scty Sq, 25 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO). Doc. 11.

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SILVER DAWN support plans because, according to Major Chansteur, the "Concept of operations had not jelled to a point where definite support requirements can be defined. Proposals made in my . . . [earlier message] now appear impractical and require modification."²⁴

24. Msg. BSID 00459 Dec 66, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 28 Dec 66 (SHVCOO). Doc. 12.

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Chapter II

PLANS ARE FINALIZED

(TS//VCCO USAPSS PRIVACY) By 31 December 1966, 7th AF's planning for Operation BOLD was nearly completed. Major Chamsteur reported to the Region that General Homyer had been briefed by the commander of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing on the concept of the proposed operation.¹

The Plan

F4Cs to Simulate F-105 Profile

(TS//VCCO USAPSS PRIVACY) Basically, the plan called for 32 F4Cs and 24 F-105s to fly up the Laos and Gulf routes, simulating F-105 profile and bomber stream. The first three flights through Laos would proceed to the northern tip of the mountain located north of Phuc Yen. Their job was to engage the Phuc Yen MIG cover air patrol.²

(TS//VCCO USAPSS PRIVACY) The second flight would continue north and then break right to engage MIGs loitering in the MIG defensive patrol area about 10 miles north of the mountains. The third flight, which would be trailing the first two flights, would suddenly break right to engage MIGs loitering in the second MIG defensive patrol area over the Red River west of Phuc Yen and south of the mountain. By this time, if everything went as planned, the

1. Msg 8810 00464 Dec 66, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 28 Dec 66 (SHVCCO). Dec. 13.

2. Ibid.

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MIGs would have taken their usual positions in these three areas, anticipating the daily F-105 strikes and the fight would be on.³

(TS//FOUO-USA/SS PRIVACY) Meanwhile, two flights from Danang would have come up the Gulf and stationed themselves northwest of Haiphong in case any MIGs tried to run in that direction. At the same time, IRON HAND* flights would have come up the Laos path and would be trolling for SAMs northwest of Phuoc Yen, north of Kep, and southeast of Kep. Also, more F4C flights were to relieve the first wave.⁴

(TS//FOUO-USA/SS PRIVACY) At this point, the North Vietnamese would have to decide whether to send out more MIGs to protect their first defensive patrols or call off the engagement. Should NVN commit more MIGs to the fight, they would run into more F4Cs coming in. Seventh Air Force hoped to cover the NVN airfields with F4Cs for 53 minutes to keep the MIGs from landing.⁵

Colonel Olds Outlines Desired SILVER DAWN Support

(TS//FOUO-USA/SS PRIVACY) Commander of the strike force was to be Col. Robin Olds, commander of the 8th TFW at Ubon, Thailand. At the pre-briefing conference, Colonel Olds outlined four things he wanted from SILVER DAWN. They were:⁶

1. Inbound, about the time he hit the Red River, he wanted to know if the North Vietnamese had taken the bait and were reacting

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

* IRON HAND flights were Hunter/Killer missions against SAM

sites.

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as expected. If not, he would have to decide whether to turn around and lead the force home rather than expose it for no purpose.

2. If the engagement was real and the North Vietnamese suddenly figured out what was going on and wanted no part of it, he wanted to know if the MIGs had decided to disengage and go home, and, if so, to which home(s).

3. He wanted to know where the MIGs were by area. He said he did not want continual GEORGE MIG warnings as the pilots were too busy to sit there plotting them out. He prepared a simple codeword map (discussed below) of the area which he planned to use to control his forces, and wanted it used since his pilots would have it fixed in their minds.

4. He wanted this information passed to his forces on a discrete frequency and not on the guard channel.

Major Chansteur Explains SILVER DAWN Support Plan

(~~USAFSS~~ USAFSS PRIVACY) To meet these requirements, Major Chansteur proposed the following:⁷

1. MIG alerts would be made by SILVER DAWN on a discrete frequency 273.2 (primary) or 276.2 (alternate).

2. For the purpose of passing these alerts on the discrete frequency, SILVER DAWN would use BIG EYE's callsign of Ethan Bravo.

3. The following format was to be used for all MIG alerts on the discrete frequency:

a. The originator would transmit Ethan Bravo Bravo along with the daily MIG codeword or information codeword. This latter

⁷ Ibid.

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codeword was to be taken from the 8th TFW codeword map. In addition, four special codewords were developed: (1) Las Vegas meant "situation as expected/MIGs reacting"; (2) El Paso meant "situation not as expected/MIGs quiet"; (3) Los Angeles meant "MIGs disengaging"; and (4) New York meant "Chinese aircraft coming over border."

b. The MIG location in GEORGE would consist of two letters and two numbers. The numbers would be degrees rounded off at the 10's digit and read right and up. Thus, 4050 would be an area immediately south of Hanoi.

c. The heading of the MIG would be given to the nearest 10 degrees. If the heading was unknown, an exceedingly high two digit number (higher than 36) would be used, i.e., 89. Altitude was to be given in thousand foot increments and passed as digits. If unknown, an exceedingly high number would be passed, i.e., 99.

(TSHVCCO USAFBS PRIVACY) If specific airfield activity could be determined, the codewords established by the 8th TFW would be used as follows:⁸

1. Ethan Bravo Frisco AG 33 85 99 would mean "MIGs scrambling from Phuoc Yen."
2. Ethan Bravo Chicago YG 44 99 88 would mean "MIGs landing Kep."
3. Ethan Bravo (daily MIG callword) AG 42 27 15 would mean "MIGs over mountain heading 270 degrees at 15,000 feet."
4. Ethan Bravo Big Box AG 21 88 15 would mean "MIGs in Big Box are at AG 21, heading unknown at 15,000 feet."

8. Ibid.

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5. Ethan Bravo Las Vegas AO 99 88 99 would mean "MIGs are reacting and should be passed as lead flight approaches Red River."

(TSRVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY) When Colonel Bida was briefed on this proposed SILVER DAWN support, he said it was just what he wanted. When General Momyer was briefed on the same plan, he said this was exactly the role he envisioned SILVER DAWN playing and was very happy with it.⁹

(TSRVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY) During the operation, SILVER DAWN was to continue to support Navy missions in route package 65 with SAM Hunter/Killer Lead, and Valid MIG alerts broadcast on the guard frequency.¹⁰

(TSRVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY) On 1 January 1967, the Region informed Major Chausteur that it concurred in the procedures outlined. At that time, the mission was planned for 3 January 1967, weather permitting.¹¹

Mission Launched

Early Reports Hint Success

(TSRVCCO) By 1 January 1967, everything was ready to go, and the mission had been given a name -- Operation BOLD. On 2 January 7th AF sent its planes northward, and, as post mission reports started to filter in, it was obvious that the mission was a success. The first report to reach the Region was from Major Chausteur. He reported that Operation BOLD was a success, but exactly how successful.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid; Msg OPR 00001 Jan 67, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994th Scty Sq, 1 Jan 67 (TSRVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY). Doc. 14.

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had not been determined. He praised the 6924th Scty Sq for "... an outstanding job of collecting and reporting air defense trackings to the 7AF warning center so activity could be followed here."¹²

(TSHVCCG) He had glowing praise for the SILVER DAWN crews.

"Both early and late SILVER DAWNs were on stations during this activity," he reported, "and did outstanding job of collecting and reporting MIG alerts under criteria outlined. ... Considering the short lead time available to them for planning, briefing and rearrangement of internal procedures, they did a fantastic job."¹³

(TSHVCCG) The only thing that went wrong with the whole exercise was that the fighters did not hear the alerts being issued from SILVER DAWN. The morning after Operation BOLD, Major Chausteur said he:¹⁴

... attended special debriefing of Col Olds, (Comdr 81FW), in Gen McGough's (Dir Combat Ops) office. Col Olds stated he was tuned on our primary freq and his back seat man was on alternate and not a peep was heard. The BIG EYE commander said he read all the SILVER DAWN alerts five by and provided a list of those heard. These match exactly with the list provided me by the SUPO. Best guess here at present time is that auxillary receiver in the F4C's is no good. Gen McGough has ordered a check out of these receivers and the problem corrected immediately.

(TSHVCCG) "I thought Col Olds would cry when he saw the list of MIG alerts that had been transmitted by SILVER DAWN," Major Chausteur said. "He pretty well summed up the attitude and feelings of everyone here when he said 'If we'd only gotten that information,

12. Msg 8810 00001 Jan 67, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 3 Jan 67 (TSHVCCG). Doc. 15.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

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I wonder how many more MIGs we'd have gotten.¹⁵

(TSHW000) Meanwhile, when 7th AF checked into the problem, it found that the auxillary receiver used on the F4Cs for the exercise was a low power back-up beacon receiver that the Navy used for carrier recovery. It had a small stub antenna on the bottom of the fuselage. SILVER DAWN's broadcast was with 10 watts at about 30,000 feet, and the fight between the MIGs and F4Cs took place east and north of Hanoi at 5-16,000 feet. The F4Cs from DaNang that were near Hai-phong reported that they heard the SILVER DAWN transmissions, but they were not in the fight. Should a similar exercise be conducted in the future, 7th AF felt that the problem could be solved by having the SILVER DAWN's broadcast relayed through the C-135 aircraft orbiting in the Gulf of Tonkin. Using the C-135's instant relay on high power would, 7th AF felt, insure receipt of the transmissions by the F4C.¹⁶

15. Ibid.

16. Msg 8810 00012 Jan 67, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 8 Jan 67 (TSCW). Doc. 16.

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Chapter III

SECURITY SERVICE SUPPORT TO OPERATION BOLO

(TSCW) Up to this point, this history has dealt primarily with 7th AF's part of the operation and Major Chansteur's negotiations with 7th AF for SILVER DAWN support. But, as in any operation of this magnitude, there was considerable work and planning done "behind the scenes." This part of the history will present that "behind the scenes" role played by Security Service forces in support of Operation BOLO.

SILVER DAWN Support

Changes Necessary

(TSCW) SILVER DAWN support of Operation BOLO required several changes from the normal pattern of operation. Perhaps the greatest departure from normal operational procedures was that two SILVER DAWN aircraft had to fly simultaneous missions on the same orbit, but at different altitudes.*

(TSCW) Other changes were concerned more with the internal (personnel) environment of the aircraft. For example, normal manning for SILVER DAWN missions required the following personnel:¹

1. One master operator (Bat One), who gave position assignments, fused all information, passed all alerts, copied traffic, and coordinated with the aircraft commander on any orbit deviation.

* See p. 20, this chapter.

1. Msg 8310 00016 Jan 67, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 9 Jan 67 (TSCW). Doc. 17.

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2. One airborne analyst (Bat Two), who operated the ARC-106, analyzed traffic in flight, copied traffic, and served as back-up for the master operator. In addition, on manual Morse operations (internal warnings) he plotted hostile and friendly aircraft.

3. Four Vietnamese linguists (two multichannel and two tactical voice).

4. One direction finding operator (Bat Five).

5. Three CHICOM linguists (Bats one, two, and five also were CHICOM linguists).

6. One Russian linguist.

7. One KORCOM linguist.

8. Two maintenance men.

(TSCW) For Operation BOLD, however, one additional manual Morse operator was required on the early flight, and one additional Vietnamese linguist for tactical voice was required on both flights. Also, one less CHICOM linguist was required on each flight. On one aircraft, two 7th AF officers were aboard as advisors; on the other, an additional airborne analyst was required.²

(TSCW) Special arrangements were made to fly one highly qualified multi-channel linguist from Phu Bai to Danang in time to be on the second SILVER DAWN aircraft. Because of the shortage of experienced personnel, several operators were required to fly three consecutive missions without proper crew rest. This was necessary because there was not enough time to get equally qualified operators from

2. Ibid.

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25x1 to Danang. In addition, the SILVER DAWN ground analysts went about 40 hours without sleep, to get out the necessary coordination messages and give special briefings to the crews, plus providing necessary coordination with the 6924th Scty Sq on technical information and communications with the aircraft via the URC-53 system.³

(TSCW) Since both the special alerts on a discrete frequency and the regular MIG, SAM, and Hunter/Killer alerts on the guard channel had to be sent simultaneously, two UHF transceivers had to be used on each aircraft. This was accomplished by using the pilot's UHF transmitter with a special, extra long patching cord hooked to the airborne analyst's position, which was far aft in the aircraft. Maintenance men worked extra hours to provide this modification for both aircraft before take-off.⁴

(TSCW) During Operation BOLD, the master operator passed all special alerts on the discrete frequency. The master operator on the first SILVER DAWN mission passed 13 special alerts, and the airborne analyst passed two MIG, five SAM, and six Hunter/Killer alerts during the operation. On the second SILVER DAWN aircraft, the master operator passed five special alerts, and the airborne analyst passed one MIG alert, seven SAM alerts, and one Hunter/Killer alert. Also, a VHF receiver had to be set up in the maintenance compartment of one aircraft so the KORBOM activity could be monitored. And then the information had to be hand carried to the master operator

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

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because of an insecure inter-comm in the maintenance compartment.⁵

Two SILVER DAWN Used During Mission

(TSCW) Two SILVER DAWN aircraft were on station at the same time during Operation BOLD, and, for maximum results, they flew the same leg of orbit 5F4401 between points Delta Delta and Delta Echo at different altitudes. This necessitated advancing the take-off of the second mission two hours and 10 minutes from its normal take-off time. Take-off and altitude had to be closely coordinated with the commander of Det 1, 41st Air Division on a very short notice. When Operation BOLD was delayed one hour, the first SILVER DAWN mission had to extend orbit time 30 minutes to provide primary support to the 7th AF strike forces.⁶

(TSCW) Since each SILVER DAWN aircraft was configured with different mission equipment, it was necessary to ensure that the two best available for the job were on station. There were three SILVER DAWN aircraft at Denang. Normally there were four, but the fourth one was delayed 24 hours at Kadena AB, Okinawa. Two of the three were equipped with three HF receivers; the other had only two. One aircraft with three HF receivers was sent up early, and the other was preflighted and ready for backup in case the first aircraft aborted. The third aircraft was scheduled for the second mission, and it contained spare equipment for the ARC-106 because it had primary responsibility for reporting all activity to the ground as soon

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

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as possible after the activity was over.⁷

(TSCW) A pre-coded message, decrypted to mean "KORCOM engaging with U.S. aircraft," was set up with the 6994th Scty Sq prior to take-off so HF would not have to be used for transmitting on the ARC-106 during strike activity. The reason was that ARC-106 transmissions blocked out all HF signals and this would have interfered with manual morse trackings. A pre-arranged signal between the SILVER DAWN aircraft was set up on the ARC-34 so one aircraft could inform the other if it lost the capability to provide warnings to the strike aircraft due to internal problems, such as equipment outage. Also, a second signal was set up to be used if the warning capability was restored.⁸

(TSCW) Mission results for the two SILVER DAWN aircraft during Operation BOLO were as follows:⁹

1. Manual morse intercept - 18.4 hours.
2. CHICOM VHF intercept - 2.8 hours.
3. Vietnamese VHF intercept - 11.1 hours (this included 10 hours of KORCOM intercept).
4. Russian VHF intercept - 0.2 hours.
5. Vietnamese multi-channel 25x1 intercept - 15.2 hours.
6. Vietnamese multi-channel 25x1 intercept - 10.7 hours.

P.L. 86-36
EO 1.4.(c)

This included three CHICOM tactical frequencies, seven North Vietnamese tactical frequencies, one Russian Naval frequency, and one KORCOM

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

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tactical frequency.¹⁰

6924th Soty Sq Support

(TSGW) The 6924th Soty Sq also was very much involved in Operation BOLD. In getting ready for Operation BOLD the squadron,¹¹

1. Canned some Orion message which were to be passed from the SILVER DAWN aircraft in the event either KORDON or Soviet pilots entered the fight.
2. Agreed on what information would be passed from the Main site (Danang) to the aircraft.
3. On the morning of 2 January 1967, briefed the flight on duty, the exploitation personnel involved, and the voice processing personnel.
4. Briefed Colonel Williams at TACC (NS) and coordinated on the modified MIG alert procedures.
5. Acted as a relay for all communications between Saigon (7th AF) and SILVER DAWN during the pre-strike period.
6. Modified internal telephone installation to allow a conference hook-up between the NVN air defense van, the ARC-106, and the GRC-137.
7. Installed a temporary plug-in at the 7th AF opscom to permit monitoring of KY-8 transmissions to TACC (NS) and relay to 7th AF.
8. Determined whether the ARC-106 or the GRC-137 offered the best chance for reliable contact with the SILVER DAWN aircraft and selected the best frequency based on atmospheric conditions, etc.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

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9. Determined, based on strike posture, what emphasis to place on collection facilities.

10. Expended maximum effort to recover from a communications change, in progress at that time, to ensure the best possible support to Operation BOLO.

(TSCW) During Operation BOLO, the 6922nd Scty Sq;¹²

1. Advised the SILVER DAWN aircraft of all codes and frequencies tracking MDSs, plus all SRG changes.

2. Augmented flight personnel with day personnel for passing information to the aircraft (the squadron used van analysts and URC-53 operators).

3. Provided immediate plot-by-plot tracking to 7th AF.

4. Carried on all normal direct service and SIGINT reporting tasks.

(TSCW) Post strike activity by the 6922nd Scty Sq included immediate transcribe, analysis, and reporting of all traffic collected by the SILVER DAWN aircraft.¹³

6922nd Scty Wg Support

(TSCW) The 6922nd Scty Wg also provided support to Operation BOLO. This included the following:¹⁴

1. One hour prior to the time-over-target, the 6922nd Scty Wg implemented the alternate plan covering the manual morce mission

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

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of the 6924th Scty Sq to insure complete coverage not only of NVN, but the China periphery as well. This involved diverting four manual Morse positions from other missions to insure complete coverage of the area.

2. The AFSSO 13/AFSSO 7th AF circuit was red-patched directly to the 6922nd Scty Wg so the Wing could have direct communications with 7th AF. This was done in case there was a circuit outage or distortion between the 6924th Scty Sq and 7th AF. Thus, the 6922nd Scty Wg would have been able to continue passing, on a real time basis, tracking of U.S. and NVN aircraft directly to command and control elements at 7th AF. The 6922nd Scty Wg maintained contact with the 6924th Scty Sq via its direct opscom circuit throughout the operation.

3. The 6922nd Scty Wg plotted each air defense grid passed over

25x1

NVN communications and closely monitored the activity.

P.L. 86-36
EO 1.4.(c)

This was done not only to fulfill any reporting requirements, but to enable the 6922nd Scty Wg to take over the mission of the 6924th Scty Sq without any delay should it become necessary. There was extensive tracking by the North Vietnamese 25x1 and sometimes they became confused. One NVN operator started passing traffic with a "B" (high speed key) in order to keep up with the extremely large amount of radar reflections.

4. The 6922nd Scty Wg reviewed all intercepted material.

5. The 6922nd Scty Wg maintained constant communication with the 6924th Scty Sq to ensure that the Squadron had the same information that the Wing had.

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6. The Wing continued the mission until 30 minutes after time-off-target and then reverted to its normal mission.

7. The Wing made every possible effort to ensure that, should the 6924th Scty Sq be neutralized or experience a communications outage, there would be continuous direct SIGINT service to 7th AF. In addition, the Wing was in constant contact with SILVER DAWN to be certain it could receive or pass any perishable information via the URC-53 system.

Region Units' Performance Outstanding

(SHVCCO) When all the reports were in, it was obvious that the Region's SEA units had done an outstanding job. In appreciation, the Region praised its SEA units saying:¹⁵

Your participation in operation BOLO did much to enhance USAFSS's operation in SEA. The initiative displayed by the SSIO and the Silver Dawn Project Officer in meeting the timely response on this important operation is readily apparent and deeply appreciated. Your excellent redirection of resources needed to support 7AF is highly commendable. Please convey my congratulations to all who took part in this successful demonstration of our unique capability to support tactical air operations.

(SCW) On 13 January 1967, DIRNSA passed on its appreciation for the support given to 7th AF. Said DIRNSA:¹⁶

Most gratified by receipt of . . . status report which outlined considerable effort on part of the SSQ Det in providing assistance to the Seventh Air Force in their conduct of the "Special MIG strike on 2 Jan". The degree of success enjoyed by 7th AF pilots on that date is evidence of the value of the SIGINT support provided by the SSQ Det and the professional manner in which that support is given. Please extend our appreciation to all concerned for a job well done.

15. Msg VCO 06Z11, Pac Scty Rgn to SEA Units, 11 Jan 67 (SHVCCO). Doc. 18.

16. Msg ADF/C12 D/746/59, DIRNSA to NRV (C), 13 Jan 67 (SCW). Doc. 19.

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Thus, a successful operation was concluded, and the value of SIGINT support to tactical forces became even more apparent than before.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. Msg OPR 05625 Dec 66, 6988th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 22 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO).
2. Msg OPR 05630 Dec 66, 6988th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 22 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO).
3. Msg OPR 35164 Dec 66, Pac Scty Rgn to 6924th Scty Sq, 6988th Scty Sq, 6994th Scty Sq, & USAFSS, 22 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO LINDIS).
4. Msg TDC/TMD GP 48242 Dec 66, USAFSS to Pac Scty Rgn, 23 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO LINDIS).
5. Msg SSLO 00450 Dec 66, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 23 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY).
6. Msg OPR 35211 Dec 66, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994th Scty Sq, 23 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO USAFSS EYES ONLY).
7. Msg TDC/TMD 51653 Dec 66, USAFSS to Pac Scty Rgn, 23 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO).
8. Msg OPR 03197 Dec 66, 6922nd Scty Wg to Pac Scty Rgn, 24 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY LINDIS).
9. Msg OPR 35228 Dec 66, Pac Scty Rgn to 6922nd Scty Wg, 24 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO).
10. Msg SSLO 00454 Dec 66, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 25 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO).
11. Msg OPR 35233 Dec 66, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994th Scty Sq, 25 Dec 66 (TSHVCCO).
12. Msg SSLO 00459 Dec 66, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 28 Dec 66 (SHVCCO).
13. Msg SSLO 00464 Dec 66, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 28 Dec 66 (SHVCCO).
14. Msg OPR 00001 Jan 67, Pac Scty Rgn to 6994th Scty Sq, 1 Jan 67 (TSHVCCO USAFSS PRIVACY).
15. Msg SSLO 00001 Jan 67, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 3 Jan 67 (TSHVCCO).
16. Msg SSLO 00012 Jan 67, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 8 Jan 67 (TSCW).
17. Msg SSLO 00016 Jan 67, 6994th Scty Sq to Pac Scty Rgn, 9 Jan 67 (TSCW).

18. Msg VCO 00411, Pac Scty Rgn to SEA Units, 11 Jan 67 (SHVCCO).
19. Msg ADF/012 D/F46/59, DIRNSA to MRV (C), 13 Jan 67 (ECW).

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FM 6988SS

TO PACSCYRGN

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TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS OPR 05826 DEC 66.
FOR OPRO, PASS IMMEDIATELY TO R T WILLIAMS. FOLLOWING
MSG FROM SILVER DAWN PROJ OFFICE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR
INFO/NECESSARY ACTION:

TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS OPR SD 06671 DEC 66.

7TH AF IS PLANNING A SPECIAL OPERATIONS ON 26 DEC. SEND
SEVERAL FAC'S UP DISGUISED AS F105'S AND ATTEMPT TO SHOOT
DOWN ALL MIGS THAT REACT TO THEM. IN ADDITION THEY WANT
SOMEONE TO ACT AS AN AIRPORT CCI STATION FOR OUR ACFT
(F4C). SILVER DAWN IS BEING CONSIDERED BY GEN MONEYER.
MAJOR CHAUSTEUR IS TRYING TO GIVE HIM REASONS WHY WE CAN
NOT DO THIS. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS ASAP. THIS
STILL IN THE PLANNING STAGES. UNQUOTE.

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TO PACSOTYRCN

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~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS OPR-05650 DEC 66~~

PASS IMMEDIATELY TO MAJ WILLIAMS.

FOLLOW- ON TO MY OPR-05626 DEC 66. S-O PROJECT OFFICER

ADVISES FOLLOWING WHICH IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE:

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS OPR-SD 06673 DEC 66~~

FOR MAJOR ENGLAND OR CAPT ROBINSON. REF MY OPR-SD 06611

DEC 66. THIS IS A FOLLOW UP ON REF MSG. TODAY MAJOR

CHAUSTEUR TOLD ME THAT GEN PHILPOTT TOLD GEN MOMEYER THAT

SILVER DAWN WOULD ACT AS THE CCI CONTROLLER FOR THE 26 DEC

OPERATIONS. THE DEPUTY OI AT 7TH AND CHAUSTEUR WERE BOTH

IN THE DARK WHEN MOMEYER APPROACHED THEM AS TO HOW SD WUD

DO THIS. CHAUSTEUR THEN CAME TO ME ASKING FOR REASONS

WHY HE CUD NOT ACT IN THIS CAPACITY. HE HAD ONLY ONE AT

LTHE TIME, NAMELY CAUSE NSA IS DEAD SET AGAINST OUR BIRDS

ACTING IN ANY SUCH CAPACITY, BUT HE DIDN'T WANT TO BRING

THAT UP JUST YET. I TOLD HIM WE HAD ONLY ONE MM POSITION

ABOARD EACH ACFT WITH TWO SOMETIMES THREE HF RECEIVERS.

I EMPHASIZED THAT THIS MAN'S SOLE PURPOSE WAS TO PROVIDE

INTERNAL WARNINGS AND I WUD HAVE TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM

SOMEONE OTHER THAN 7TH AF BEFORE I CUD TASK THIS MAN WITH

ADDED RESPONSIBILITY. HE ALSO WANTED TO KNOW (REDACTED)

	ACTION	INITIALS
COMDR		
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SAID IT HAS BEEN DONE ON SPECIAL OCCASIONS. HE SPECIFICALLY
ASKED WHAT PERCENT OF THE TIME DO WE CORRELATE VOICE
REFLECTIONS WITH MM TRACKINGS OF MIGS. I SAID APPROXIMATELY
NINETY FIVE PERCENT PLUS, BUT IT DEPENDS ON THE MM OP AND
WHETHER OR NOT THE ZIPS ARE TRACKING ALL THEIR ACFT.
HE SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT LT COL RASCHKE AND PARTY WOULD
ACT AS THE GCI CONTROLLERS IF SO WERE TASKED WITH THIS.
HE DIDNT SAY WHY BIG EYE HAS NOT CONSIDERED OR WHY THEY
DONT PLAN TO SEND A SPECIALLY EQUIP ACFT UP FOR THIS
PURPOSE. I'M AFRAID A LOT MORE COULD COME THAN RIGHT
WITH THIS SHORT OF NOTICE. WUD APPRECIATE ANY ADVICE
YOU HAVE ON THIS MATTER. CHAUSTEUR EMPHASIZED THE SENSI-
TIVITY OF THIS INFO. END QUOTE.

(COMMENTS) FEEL THAT 7AF SHUD BE ADVISED THAT
SILVER DAWN DOES NOT FALL COMPLETELY UNDER THEIR CONTROL
TO USE AS THEY SEE FIT. IT MAY TAKE JCS DIRECTION TO
CHANGE THIS CONCEPT. CHAUSTEUR GETS "GLOBBED" EVERY
TIME HE USES NSA AS A REASON FOR NOT DOING SOMETHING. LZAT
7AF WANTS DONE. SOMEWHERE, SOMETIME, THERE HAS TO BE
A "STATUS QUO" ESTABLISHED. MAYBE THIS IS IT. ENGLAND
SENDS.

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LEADS

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USA F89

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DEC 66.

6894 Scty Sq for SSLO.

Subj: Silver Dawn Tactical Support to 7AF.

Ref: A. 6988 Scty Sq OPR 05620, 220725Z Dec 68 (NOTAL).

B. PacSctyRgn OPR 35145, 220919Z Dec 68 (NOTAL).

C. PacScty Rgn OPR 98144, 220919Z Dec 66 (NOTAL).

1. Ref A advised that 7AF was planning a tactical fighter mission 26 Dec 86, and was considering Silver Dawn direct

support by operating as airborne GCI controller aircraft. Ref

B advised 3988 Scty Sq that subj supporting role of SD would be

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MAJOR MCFADYEN, /da

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 PACAP Form 40
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ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
INFO			

operations staff recognized that Silver Dawn would be on orbit and consequently participate by virtue of its strike support responsibilities. It was their feeling that it was a question of whether it deviated from normal operations and functioned as an airborne GCI station or in its normal collection role. They considered any possible added risk and concluded that there was none and thus PACAF was not concerned with the Silver Dawn role and any planning in this regard, was at the 7AF level. They did not envision any further PACAF involvement or requirement for approval of the special mission - that was 7AF responsibility i.e., to fight the war whatever way was necessary. Contacted PACAF Recon Shop this date and was assured that they would play down any prior knowledge of Silver Dawn involvement or deviation from normal operation.

M/R: Responding to SSLO msg expressing concern for PACAF knowledge of special mission being considered by 7AF on 26 Dec 86. PACAF Ops members were aware of proposed special mission (except for possible Silver Dawn involvement) and have been assured by phone contact to Maj Eaton (DORC) that they will "throw cold water" on any prior knowledge/discussions from ProSctyRgn sources. This should be put to the SSLO more at ease. MAJ MCPADYEN
COORD: OPRO OPR

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REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

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FORM 1 NOV 67

177-1

NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

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FM USAFSS

TO PACSCTMGN

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66 Dec 23 07 03z

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~ LINDIS TOU/TMO CP 48242 DEC 66

REF A: P.R. UPR 35144, 220919Z DEC 66

REF B: P.R. UPR 35164, 230104Z DEC 66

SUBJECT: SILVER DAWN TACTICAL SUPPORT TO 7AF.

CONCERN IN USE OF SILVER DAWN AS AIRBORNE GCI IF 7AF DETERMINES THAT AORP IS MOST SUITABLE VEHICLE AVAILABLE. IF COMINT SUPPORT IS PROVIDED IN SCOPE AND FORMAT ALREADY COMSEC APPROVED FOR HANNING'S ETO, NO REQUEST FOR NEW AUTH. DEEMED NECESSARY. REQUEST FOR NEW FORMATS REQUIRING COMSEC APPROVAL COULD RESULT IN DELAYS AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE AVOIDED. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, REQUEST ADDITIONAL DETAILS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE TO INCLUDE RESPONSE TO FOLG:

1. WILL 7AF PROVIDE AIRBORNE CONTROLLERS ABOARD SILVER DAWN.
2. WILL SILVER DAWN BE USED TO RELAY INFO FROM PANAMA AND OTHER GROUND RADARS.
3. HAS MRV (C) BEEN BROUGHT INTO PICTURE.
4. WHAT IS PROPOSED SILVER DAWN ORBIT AND
5. DO YOU HAVE A PROPOSED BREVIDITY CODE.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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FM 6994 SCTYSQ

TO PACSOTYRGN

INFO 6988 SS

6924 SS

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ZEM

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~ USAFSS PRIYAOY CITE SSLO 02450 DEC
PACSOTYRGN FOR COL BOWERS - 6988 SS FOR MAJ ENGLAND - 6924 SS FOR
LT BEACH - 6922 SW FOR LT COL LILLEY. REF YOUR OPR 35164 DEC 66.

(NOTAL). THERE ARE NOT OVER A DOZEN PEOPLE IN 7AF WHO ARE AWARE
OF THIS PLAN. DUE TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/POLITICS, DO NOT BELIEVE
COMOR PLANS TO GO TO PACAF FOR APPROVAL OF ANYTHING BUT NORMAL
FIGHTER SNEEP OPERATIONS. TRAP ASPECT TO BE PLAYED DOWN.

I SPECIFICALLY TOLD SDPO NOT TO MENTION THIS OPERATION TO THE
POINT OF BEING SURE TO DESTROY HIS CHATTER ROLL. IF WORD GETS BACK
HERE THAT THIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY US WITH PACAF, I HAVE
HAD THE COURSE. DO NOT KNOW YOUR CONTACTS AT PACAF, BUT PLEASE
PLAY DOWN/SQUELCH-EXTENT OF INFO AVAIL TO YOU IF POSSIBLE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Message Form
Guide Line

COMDR

DEPUTY

EXERCISE

PERS

INTEL

OPNS

MAY

SUPPLY

MAINT

TRANS

COMM

EMPTY

STAT/SV

INSTAL

CAS

JA

INFO/SV

INSP

PM

SAFETY

CHAP

SURG

TOP SECRET
TS HVCCO

23 DEC 66 23 00

PRIORITY
PRIORITY

PACSECTYRCN

690430CTYSQ

INFO 690820CTYSQ

69245CTYSQ

69223CTYWG

~~HANDLE
VIA
COMINT
CHANNELS
ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS USAFSS EYES ONLY~~

OPR 35211 DEC 66

6904 Scty Sq for SSLO. Ref SSLO 00450, 230810Z Dec 66.

Selected members of PACAF Operations staff were aware of details of proposal, with exception of possible Silver Dawn participation, and provided amplifying operational information. You with non PACAF was not included as an addressee on exchanges of messages this subject because of sensitivity and possibility of inadvertent distribution of message in PACAF staff. However, it was necessary that they be contacted due to Silver Dawn involvement and deviation from normal operating procedures. Members of PACAF

23
Dec 1966
1 2

JAMES D. MCFADYEN, Major, USAF
Director of Operations/dsk

WILLIAM R. HOWERS, Colonel, USAF
DCS/Operations

Message Form
Guide Line

PACAF Form 40n
JAN 67 FC4750

MA RECORD COPY

ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
INFO			

coordinated with PACAF. Ref C advised PACAF and USAFSS of Ref A.

2. Discussions with PACAF indicate CINCPACAF prior knowledge and acquiescence by silence to the concept for the tactical fighter mission contained in Ref A. If role of Silver Dawn in this operation is pursued by 7AF occur in Silver Dawn providing direct tactical support for this 7AF operation and offer the following for your planning and coordination with 7AF. This will afford time for preplanning pending formal authority to implement.

A. Coordinate with 7AF to provide a method of passing GCI data to tac fighters on the most timely basis possible.

B. Reflecting this activity for in-flight fusion will require an additional 202 for HF MM trackings.

C. It is assumed no Rolling Thunder/Hunter Killer ops are to be scheduled this date so front end transmitter will be fully available to Bat one and two.

D. If 7AF desires assistance in brevity code, if required, suggest only bearing, distance, and altitude of hostile from friendly as F4Cs have radar target acquisition capability.

CONTROL NO.	FOR/TO	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIAL
		2	3	TOP SECRET	
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
				TOP SECRET	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 60

ABBREVIATED MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
INFO			

3. For USAFSS. This operation is in direct support role to 7AF and ^{BELIEVE} ACRP should participate if required. Communications to strike force acct by Silver Dawn, through relay of border violator warnings via guard channel, have voided the normal silent role of ACRP. Silver Dawn will be normally scheduled in the Gulf of Tonkin and will be used in a close support tactical role as opposed to the more routine collection activities.

4. Request immediate authority for deviation in Silver Dawn normal operating procedures to allow to act as airborne GCI controller.

M/R: The 7AF is planning a special mission on 26 Dec using F4Cs disguised as F105s to attempt destruction of MIGs that react and are considering the use of Silver Dawn as an airborne GCI. We have coordinated with PACAF (DORC) and learned that they had prior knowledge of the special mission but not of possible Silver Dawn participation. PACAF Operations people read themselves out of the problem since Silver Dawn will fly in the Gulf anyway and it is a question of the role it will play - not a decision for PACAF to make. We are advising that we favor the Silver Dawn support as GCI controller if pursued further by 7AF. This message is to grant interim authority to allow for pre-planning pending final approval from USAFSS for deviation in the normal Silver Dawn role and method of operation.

MAJ MCFADYEN

COORD: OPR-05 OPR-0 OPR

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOO	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIAL
		3	3		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES DD FORM 173-1

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION		INIT
COMDR		
OPR		
COMM		
328		
115	5	
SECY		
PLAT		
ADMIN		
COMPT		
PLT/SEC		
OI		
3433	10	02
65 DEC		
65 DEC		
SJA		
CH		

P.L. 86-36

ZCZCLAA014QAA883AK260KA515

PP

25x1

DE 63 3571815

P 231611Z

FM USAFSS

TOPACSCITYRGN

INFO 6924SCITYSQ

6988SCITYSQ

6994SCITYSQ

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~ TDC/TMO 51653 DEC 66

REFERENCE TDC/TMO CP 48242 LINDIS DEC 66 AND RELATED MESSAGES.

ASSUMPTION HELD HERE THAT TACTICAL SUPPORT PROCEDURES DEVELOPED WOULD NOT PLACE USAFSS PERSONNEL ~~IN CONTROL~~ IN CONTROL FUNCTION. YOU SHOULD ASSURE OUR TRADITIONAL ADVISORY ROLE IS MAINTAINED AND COMINT LIMITATIONS ARE WELL RECOGNIZED.

078

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT~~
~~CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~LIMDIS~~

((CCN: 839/24 DEO))

((TOR: 248705Z))

P.D. 86-36

PP

25x1

DE

125 3580326

P 240426Z ZFF-1

FM 6922 SN

TO PACSCTYRGN (OPR)

FO 6994 SCTYSQ

USAFSS (LO)

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS USAFSS PRIVACY LIMDIS.~~

CITE OPR 03197 DEC 66.

FOR COL BOMERS FM LT COL LILLEY; 6994 TH FOR MAJOR CHAUSTER.

SUBJ: AIRBORNE GCI/DIRECT SUPPORT OF 7AF.

SINCE WE HAVE NOT BEEN ADDEES ON ALL MSGS THIS SUBJ,

IT IS DIFFICULT FOR COL SMALL OR I TO GIVE MEANINGFUL/APPROPRIATE

GUIDANCE TO MAJ CHAUSTER. THEREFORE, BELIEVE IT DESIREABLE FOR

GUIDANCE TO BE FURNISHED DIRECT FM PSR TO CHAUSTER. THIS WILL

ENSURE SAME POLICIES/RATIONALE BEING USED AT PSR/PACAF LEVEL

IS ALSO USED AT CHAUSTER/7AF LEVEL. WE STAND READY TO ASSIST

AS YOU MAY DESIRE. OUR CONCERN IS TO ASSURE NEC/APPROP SPT

AND GUIDANCE IS FURNISHED TO CHAUSTER ON THIS VOLATILE SUBJ.

HE IS IN A DIFFICULT POSN/UNDER THE GUN AND BY NEC MUST UTILIZED

EXPERIENCE/BEST JUDGEMENT IN REACTING TO 7AF URGENT QUERIES.

AT TIME THESE URGENT QUERIES HAVE REQUIRED HIM TO SEEK ADVICE/
ASSISTANCE FM CLOSEST KNOWLEDGEABLE USAFSS UNITS/INDIV. BELIEVE
ALL CONCERNED SHOULD UNDERSTAND AND APPREC CHAUSTEUR'S POSN AS
L/O TO 7AF. WOULD APPREC BEING INFO ADDRESSEES ON TFO REGARDING THIS
SUBJ. COL SMALL HAS SEEN THIS MSG AND APPROVES THE ACTION
RECOMMENDED.

488

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT~~
~~CHANNELS ONLY~~

END 12 YKS

((1001 3401001))

((0001 600100 000))

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JOINT COMMUNICATION CENTER		RECEIVED JOINT COMMUNICATION CENTER	
<p>FROM: DAC 5017 RGN</p> <p>TO: 6922 ST</p> <p>INFO: 6994 SS</p>		<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p>	
<p>Top Secret Control Channel 021 35223 Dec 66</p> <p>From Col Bower's to Lt Col Linley</p> <p>Appreciate your position in this matter. You may be assured that SSLO acted with utmost efficiency in this operation. From start the very limited knowledge of subject, was recognized and we first acted to get the operation underway. Will insure your are addressed on any future message, this subject.</p> <p>Mr. Advancing 6922 ST that the actions on subject were first, satisfy the immediate operational requirement. Then for the operation underway. The oversight of affairs within the technical coordination was an oversight. This message should let 6922 ST know that there was, out of necessity, direct coordination with SSLO.</p>			
<p>TYPE3 NAME AND TITLE</p>		<p>PHONE</p>	
<p>NAME AND TITLE</p>		<p>PHONE</p>	

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

CCN 03472

ZCZCLAA 120VZAA953ZA0895

PP

25x1

DE

11 3591330

ZKZK PP NRL DE

P 25 1040Z

FM 699A SCTY SQ

TO PACSCTYRGN

INFO USAFSS

6922 SCTY NG

6921 SCTY NG

6988 SCTY SQ

6924 SCTY SQ

ZEM

UNCLASSIFIED PORTION(S) IS (ARE)
CIRCLED. SERVICE ACTION WILL
BE INITIATED UPON REQUEST

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS SSLO 0345A DEC 66.~~

6924SS PASS TO SILVER DAWN PROJECT OFFICER.

FOLLOWING IS TENTATIVE PROPOSAL TO MODIFY SILVER DAWN MIG WARNINGS.

1. REINSTATE CHANGE 7 TO 7AF OPORD 100-66 (REF 7AF MSG DOCCO-A-66-
TS-22697 MAY 66 DTD 30 MAY 66) (NOTAL).

NATURALLY, THE COLOR DEGREE OF THREAT WILL BE DELETED. THIS WOULD ADD
ALTITUDE AND HEADING TO MIG WARNING AND CONSTITUTE NO BIG CHANGE
FROM PRESENT SYSTEM.

2. DIR COMBAT OPS PARTICULARLY EAGER TO CATCH MIGS IN PRECARIOUS
POSITION - IE SHORT OF FUEL. PROPOSE GIVING EACH AIRFIELD A ONE TIME
CODE NAME - PHUC YEN/BACARDI, GIA LAM/SHEMLEYS, KEP/PANATELLA

PHU PHONG/RUTGERS, CAT BI/MOTOROLA. THIS CODENAME WOULD REPLACE THE
DAILY MIG ALERT CODEWORD IN THE WARNING WHEN THE SILVER DAWN WANTS
TO IDENTIFY ACTIVITY AT A SPECIFIC AIRFIELD. TO IDENTIFY TYPE OF

ACTIVITY. AIRFIELD LOCATION IS KNOWN AND THE CODENAME IS NOT NEEDED

ACTIVITY - AND SINCE LOCATION IS KNOWN AND THE GEOREF IS NOT NEEDED EXCEPT FOR TRANSECO - THE NUMERAL IN THE GEOREF CAN INDICATE FLDS, 21 - 58, 556 - ODD NUMBERS 1 OR 3 TO INDICATE LAUNCH AND EVEN NUMBERS 2 OR 4 TO INDICATE RECOVERY OF MIGS. IN ALL CASES, A COMPLETE WARNING WILL BE GIVEN. BELIEVE THIS GREATLY EXPANDS OUR INFORMATION SERVICE WITHOUT BURDENING PILOTS WITH MEMORIZING A LOT MORE CODE NAMES. IT IS SIMPLE. FROM TRANSEC VIEWPOINT, DO NOT THINK IT INCREASES PROBABILITY OF COMPROMISE. IT RETAINS BREVITY, THUS KEEPING TRANSMISSION TIME TO MINIMUM.

3. A FURTHER EXPANSION OF THIS COULD BE ADVISING THE FIGHTERS OF THE LOCATION OF A MIG AWAY FROM THE FIELD AND IS LOW ON FUEL, AND HAS BEEN ORDERED TO RECOVER AT A SPECIFIC AIRFIELD. AGAIN, THE AIRFIELDS WOULD BE CODE NAMED - BUT THIS TIME TO CORRELATE WITH FIRST CODENAME - PHUC YEN/RUM, GIA LAH/CIN, KEP/CIGAAAR, HAI PHO/COLLEGE AND CAT BI/RADIO. AGAIN, THE CODENAME REPLACES THE REGULAR DAILY MIG ALERT WORD. IN THIS CASE THE LOCATION OF THE MIG IS GIVEN IN YAL ID GEOREF. THIS TELLS THE PILOT THERE IS A MIG AT X LOCATION, HE'S LOW ON FUEL AND RETURNING TO Y AIRFIELD. THE COVER STORY TO PILOTS AND NON-INDOCTRINATED IS THAT BIG EYE RADAR IS MONITORING ALL MIG FLIGHTS AND KNOWS HOW LONG THEY HAVE BEEN OUT AND - FROM EXPERIENCE - WHEN THEY SHOULD BE RETURNING TO BASE. THE BEAUTY OF THIS SYSTEM, IT FIXES THE MIGS POSITIONS AND HIS RECOVERY BASE AND PERMITS THE PILOT TO SET UP INTERCEPTION. EVEN IF HE CAN'T SHOOT HIM DOWN, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HARASS THE MIG ENOUGH TO RUN OUT OF FUEL.

4. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS.

480

Guide Line

25 DEC 66 27 58

COMDR

DEPUTY

EXEC/C/S

PERS

TOP SECRET HYCCO

INTEL

OPNT

MAT

SUPPLY

MAINT

TRANS

COMM

COMPT

BYA

INTEL

CAS

JA

INFO/SV

INSP

PM

SAFETY

CHAP

SURO

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

PAC SGT HIGH INSECT AND FAW II

6994 SGTY RQ

INFO: USAFSS

6922 SGTY RQ

6921 SGTY RQ

6988 SGTY RQ

35233

SECRET COMINT CHANNELS OPRO

Dec 66.

BYA for SLO. Ref: SLO 8/454, 251338 2 Dec 66. Concur in your

INTEL reporting 7AF as per SLO 8/454. Our 35164 was offered as

assistance only. Proceed with what ever coordination necessary to

satisfy 7AF Operational Requirements.

MR: Responding to SLO on his info, and coordination with 7AF on
INFO/SV Operational Planning for 7AF strikes.

INSP

PM

SAFETY

CHAP

SURO

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

ADJ

Originator

JAMES D McFADYEN

667791

Office

Phone

35 33

Message Form
1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 1g 1h 1i 1j 1k 1l 1m 1n 1o 1p 1q 1r 1s 1t 1u 1v 1w 1x 1y 1z

PACAF Form 10a
MAY 60 FC4750

RECORD COPY
Previous editions may be used.
DIV OF INT OPERATIONS

ZUZU AB532ZAM 489Z WRB 23 7KA9 62

P.L. 86-36

PP

25x1

DE

6 36203 15

P 280300Z

FM 699433

TO PACSUTMGN

INFO 6922 SA

ZEM

03707

JPR	
COMM	
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FLT/SEC	
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HSS	
C/ENGR	
SJA	
CH	

~~SECRET~~ COMINT CHANNELS/SSLO 80459 DEC 66.

REF USAFSS TOC-TMC-OP48246 DEC 66. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS HAS NOT
JELLED TO A POINT WHERE DEFINITE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS CAN BE
DEFINED. PROPOSALS MADE IN MY SSLO 80454 DTG 25 174 7 NOW APPEAR
IMPRACTICAL AND REQUIRE MODIFICATION. FOR INFO, THE FOLLOWING
ANSWERS APPLY TO THE USAFSS MESSAGE.

A. ONE TIME

B. ONE TIME

C. BOTH LETTERS AND NUMERAL GIVEN. LETTERS WOULD HAVE BEEN MEANING-
LESS, BUT INCLUDED FOR TRANSEC PURPOSES.

D. NO NEED TO GIVE IF UNKNOWN

E. NEGATIVE (QUESTION F NOT INCLUDED IN MSG RECEIVED HERE)

G. HAD REFERENCED CHANGE 7 TO 7AF OPORD 100-66 ONLY TO CONVEY SYSTEM
WITHOUT QUOTING TO LATER QUOTED IN MY SSLO 80457 DEC 66.

H. ONLY WITH 7AF

I. YOU HAVE ANSWER

J. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

158

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



NUNN

GONG2/82

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25x1

DE

132 881455

O 518939Z ZFF

FM 6994 SS

TO PACSOTYRGN

INFO 6988 SS

6922 SM

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS USAFSS PRIVACY~~

SECTION ONE OF THREE SSLO 00464 DEC 86

FOR COL BOMERS. 6992 FOR COL SMALL. 6988 FOR MAJ ENGLAND.

1. GEN MOWYER BRIEFED BY COMOR, 8TFW ON CONCEPT OF PROPOSED OPERATION OVER NVN. BASICALLY, PLAN CALLS FOR A TOTAL OF 32 F4C'S AND 24F-105'S TO STREAM UP THE LAOS ROUTE, SIMULATING F-105 PROFILE, AND UP THE GULF ROUTE. FIRST 3 FLIGHTS THRU LAOS PROCEED TO NORTHERN TIP OF MOUNTAIN LOCATED NORTH OF PHUC YEN. THEIR JOB IS TO ENGAGE THE PHUC YEN MIG CAP. THE SECOND FLIGHT CONTINUES NORTH THEN BREAKS RIGHT TO ENGAGE MIGS LOITERING IN THE MIG DEFENSIVE PATROL AREA ABOUT TEN MILES NORTH OF THE MOUNTAINS. THE THIRD FLIGHT, WHO HAS BEEN TRAILING, SUDDENLY BREAKS RIGHT TO ENGAGE MIGS LOITERING IN THE SECOND MIG DEFENSIVE PATROL AREA OVER THE RED RIVER WEST OF PHUC YEN AND SOUTH OF THE MOUNTAIN. IF ALL GOES RIGHT, THE MIGS WILL HAVE TAKEN THEIR USUAL POSITIONS IN THESE 3 AREAS IN ANTICIPATION OF THE DAILY F105 STRIKES AND THE FLIGHT WILL BE ON. DURING THIS PERIOD. 2 FLIGHTS FROM DANANG WILL HAVE COME UP THE GULF AND STATIONED THEMSELVES NORTHWEST OF HAIPHONG IN CASE ANY MIGS TRY TO RUN IN THAT

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19 : MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-3

DIRECTION. MEANWHILE, IRON HAND FLIGHTS WILL HAVE COME UP THE LAOS PATH AND WILL BE TROLLING FOR SAMs NORTHWEST OF YHUC YEN, NORTH OF KEP AND SOUTHEAST OF KEP. ALSO, MORE F4 FLIGHTS ARE TO RELIEVE THE FIRST WAVE. AT THIS POINT THE NVN HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND OUT MORE MIGS TO PROTECT THEIR FIRST DEFENSIVE PATROLS OR CALL OFF THE ENGAGEMENT. HOPEFULLY, THEY WILL CHOOSE TO COMMIT MORE MIGS TO THE PRAY. THESE WILL THEN RUN INTO MORE F4'S COMING IN. IT IS HOPED TO COVER THE AIRFIELDS WITH F4'S FOR FIFTY THREE MINUTES DEPRIVING THE MIGS THE OPPORTUNITY OF RECOVERING. COMMANDER OF THE FORCE WILL BE CONDR STFW AT USON. AT PRE BRIEFING CONFERENCE HE STATES FOUR THINGS HE WOULD LIKE: (1) INBOUND, ABOUT THE TIME HE HITS THE RED RIVER, HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF THE NVN HAVE TAKEN THE BAIT AND ARE REACTING IN THE EXPECTED MANNER. IF NOT HE MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO TURN AROUND AND LEAD THE FORCE HOME RATHER THAN EXPOSE IT FOR NO PURPOSE. (2) IF THE ENGAGEMENT ARE MADE AND THE NVN SUDDENLY FIGURE OUT WHAT IS GOING ON AND WANT NO PART OF IT, HE WANTS TO KNOW IF THE MIGS HAVE DECIDED TO DISENGAGE AND GO HOME, AND IF WHICH HOME(S). (3) WHERE THE MIGS ARE BY AREA. HE SAYS HE DOES NOT WANT CONTINUAL GEOREF MIG WARNINGS AS THE PILOTS ARE TOO BUSY TO SIT THERE PLOTTING THEM OUT. HE HAS PREPARED A SIMPLE CODEWORD MAP (BELOW) OF THE AREA WHICH HE WILL USE TO CONTROL HIS FORCES AND WANTS THAT USED SINCE PILOTS WILL HAVE IT FIXED IN THEIR MINDS. (4) HE WANTS THIS INFO TO HIS FORCE ON A DISCRETE FREQ AND NOT ON GUARD. 2. IN MEETING THESE REQUIREMENTS I HAVE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING: 1. MIG ALERTS WILL BE MADE BY SILVER DAWN DURING THIS PERIOD ON DISCRETE FREQUENCY OF 275. 2. (PRIMARY) OR 276. 2. (ALTERNATE). 2. FOR PURPOSE OF PASSING THESE ALERTS ON THE DISCRETE FREQ, SILVER DAWN WILL UTILIZE BIG EYES CALLSIGN OF "ETHAN BRAVO". 3. FOLLOWING FORMAT WILL BE USED FOR ALL MIG ALERTS ON DISCRETE FREQ: A. ORIGINATOR-ETHAN BRAVO BRAVO. MIG DAILY CODEWORD OR INFORMATION CODEWORD. THIS LATTER WILL BE TAKEN FROM STFW CODEWORD MAP. IN ADDITION, 4 SPECIAL CODEWORDS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED: (1) LAS VEGAS MEANS "SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT~~
~~CHANNELS ONLY~~

[illegible]

~~TOP SECRET~~

PORTION(S) IS (ARE)
CARRIED SERVICE ACTION WILL
BE INITIATED UPON REQUEST

NNNN

CCN02/01

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25x1

DE 133 00:1220

O 310930Z ZFF1

FM 6994 SS

TO PACSCTYRON

INFO 6988 SS

69,2 SW

ZEN

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS USAFSS PRIVACY~~

SECTION TWO OF THREE SSLO 00464 DEC 66.

(3) LOS ANGELES MEANS QUOTE MIGS DISENGAGING. QUOTE (4) NEW YORK

MEANS QUOTE CHINESE AIRCRAFT COMING OVER BORDER. QUOTE C. MIG

LOCATION IN GEOREF. WILL CONSIST OF 2 LETTERS AND 2 NUMBERS.

NUMBERS WILL BE DEGREES ROUNDED OFF TO FIRST DIGIT AND READ

RIGHT AND UP. AG33 WOULD BE A EA IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF HANOI.

D. HEADING OF MIG TO NEAREST TEN DEGREES. IF HEADING IS UNKNOWN,

AN EXCEEDINGLY HIGH 2 DIGIT NUMBER HIGHER THAN 36 WILL BE USED.

I. E. 89E. ALTITUDE IN THOUSAND ~~FOUR~~ ^{FOUR} ~~THOUSAND~~ ^{THOUSAND} TS AND PASSED AS

DIGITS. IF UNKNOWN, AND EXCEEDINGLY HIGH NUMBER WILL BE PASSED

I.E. 99F. IF SPECIFIC AIRFIELD ACTIVITY CAN BE DETERMINED, THE CODEWORDS

ESTABLISHED BY 8 TFW WILL BE UTILIZED AS FOLLOWS: (1) PHUC YEN/FRISCO(?)

GIA LAM/BURBAN/ (3) KEP/CHICAGO (4) CAT BI/MIAMI C. IF MIGS ARE DETECTED

SCRAMBLING FROM A SPECIFIC AIRFIELD. THE 2 DIGITS OF THE GEOREF WILL

BE ODD. THESE NUMBERS WILL BE PAIRED I.E. 33H. IF MIGS ARE DETECTED

RECOVERING AT A SPECIFIC AIRFIELD. THE 2 DIGITS, I.E. 44. 3. EXAMPLES:

A. ETKAN B FRI 3 AG 33 85 99 MEANS MIGS SCRAMBLING FROM

PHUC YEN. B. 5 HANOI CHICAGO Y3 44 99 88 MY ECTFR LANDING KEP. C.

ETHAN B (DAILY MIG CALLWORD (AG42 27 93 MEANS MIGS
OVER MOUNTAIN HEADING 270 DEGREES AT 15000 FT. D. ETHAN B BIO BOX AC12
MEANS MIGS IN BIO BOX AREA AT AG 41, HEADING UNKNOWN, AT 15000FT.
3. ETHAN B LAS VEGAS AG 99 88 99N MEANS MIGS ARE REACTING AND SHOULD
BE PASSED AS LEAD FLIGHT APPROACHES. RED RIVER. 4. WHEN DESCRIBED TO
COMDR. 8 TFW HE SAID THIS WAS JUST WHAT HE WANTS. WHEN BRIEFED TO
GEN MONYER HE SAID THIS IS JUST THE ROLE HE ENVISIONED SILVER DAWN
PLAYING AND IS VERY HAPPY. 5. DURING THIS PERIOD SILVER DAWN SHOULD
BROADCAST SAM, HUNTER/KILLER LEAD, AND VALID MIG ALERTS IN ROUTE PACKAGE
ON GUARD SINCE NAVY WILL NOT BE TOLD OF THIS IN ADVANCE AND WILL
PROBABLY BE BUSY WITH F4S, ONE MIGHT STRAY INTO NAVY TERRITORY AND WE
DON'T WANT TO BE ACCUSED OF NOT PROVIDING SERVICE. BY SAME TOKEN,
COMDR 8 TFW SAYS SAM CALLS SHOULD BE KEPT TO MINIMUM WITH MAJOR
DEPENDENCE ON IRON HAND/APR 25/26 GEAR/VISUAL SIGHTINGS DURING THIS
PERIOD. HIS MAIN CONCERN IS TO GET EVERYTHING POSSIBLE OFF GUARD.
WE WILL HAVE TO COMPROMISE OUR POSITION BETWEEN
888

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT~~
~~CHANNELS ONLY~~

TO 410000Z 1111

DE 122 0011000

25x1

P.L. 86-36
EO 1.4. (c)

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COMINT

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100 000000 12 0000

~~TOP SECRET~~

CCN02/01

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9 011215Z ZFF1

FM 6994 SS

TO PACSCTYRGN

INFO 6988 SS

6922 3W

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS USAFSS PRIVATE~~

FINAL SECTION OF THREE SSLO 00464 DEC 66.

6. DESIRE AND CONTINUING TO SERVE THE NAVY. 6. WAS NOTIFIED BEFORE NOON THEY HOPE TO EXECUTE THIS MONDAY, SO I HAVE ASKED LT BEYER TO COME ON THE T-39 COURIER THIS AFTERNOON. I WILL LAY THE WHOLE THING OUT FOR HIM THEN. HE WILL RETURN TO DANANG ON COURIER TOMORROW. I HOPE HE FINDS THIS PLAN FEASIBLE FROM THE ABILITY VIEWPOINT. 7. BELIEVE MAXIMUM SILVER DAWN POSITIONS SHOULD BE DIVERTED TO COVER THIS ACTIVITY. WILL ALSO PROBABLY NEED TO CARRY AN EXTRA MANUAL MORSE OPERATOR, INTERACTION/ANALYST TYPE AND DEFINITELY A KOREAN LINGUIST. WHILE PROBABLY LATE AFTERNOON, TIME OF MISSION WILL BE DEPENDENT ON WEATHER, BUT WILL TRY AND HAVE SILVER DAWN SKEDS ALLOW FOR HAVING TWO BIRDS ON STATION DURING THIS PERIOD. 8. SOMEONE SHOULD INSTRUCT SILVER DAWN/6924TH ON PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING ALERTS MADE. MIGHT SUGGEST CONVERTING TO NORMAL MIG FORMAT BEFORE REPORTING TO THE WORLD. 9. AM SURE YOU CAN THINK OF MANY MORE ITEMS I HAVE NOT MENTIONED, BUT HOPE I HAVE GIVEN YOU ENOUGH FOR YOUR EXPERTS TO SCRUB THIS DOWN AND BE ABLE TO TASK/ADVISE

SILVER DAWN ACCORDINGLY. IF I HAVE OVER ESTIMATED OUR CAPABILITY OR GLARING OMISSIONS/ERRORS ARE OBVIOUS, PLEASE LET ME KNOW ASAP.

10. DURING HIS BRIEFING-ANDWHILE RAMBLING OVER PROS AND CONS OF INFORMING PACAF OR NAVY IN ADVANCE-GEN MOMYER TURNED TO ME AND SAID QUOTE I DON'T WANT YOU TO SAY A WORD ABOUT TO OUR PEOPLE ON UP THE LINE NOW, OR IT WILL BE ALL OVER THE PLACE TOMORROW AND I HAVEN'T DECIDED YET WHETHER TO TELL PACAF OR NOT. SINCE THIS WAS NO TIME TO GO INTO OUR COMMAND OR TASKING STRUCTURE, MY RESPONDING QUOTE YES SIR QUOTE WAS INTENDED TO GIVE THAT DEGREE OF ASSURANCE IN HIS MIND WHICH I WISH I CONTAINED IN MY HEARTS AT ANY RATE IT IMPRESSED ON ME THE CONTINUING NEED FOR OUR KEEPING THIS IN PRIVACY CHANNELS. QUERY : WILL GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT BE AVAILABLE AT REGION FOR A PERSONA NON MAJOR FROM THE BOONIES? 11. REALIZE THIS IS A HECK OF A WAY TO RUN AN EXERCISE, BUT KEEPING IN MIND GENERAL COIRA'S MESSAGES REGARDING DIRECT SUPPORT TO 7AF, PLUS THE WAY WE HAVE HAD TO PLAY THE GAME HERE, SEE NO OTHER WAY IT COULD BE HANDLED. THIS IS SILVER DAWN'S BIG MOMENT AND IF IT COMES OFF SUCCESSFULLY SHOULD PROVE TO ONE AND ALL-ESPECIALLY HERE-JUST HOW IMPORTANT A SYSTEM IT IS TO THIS WAR EFFORT AND WILL BE WORTH THE COST IN MIG CAP. 12. CAT HAS JUST BEEN SLIPPED 244'S. 13. HAPPY NEW YEAR TO ONE AND ALL. FOR DOWERS FM SMALL. ABOVE MSG TRANSMITTED FROM HERE DUE TO COMM PROBLEMS AT 7AF. PROPOSAL IN MSG LOOKS OK TO US HERE. TIME FOR PROJECT IS NOW SLIPPED TO 3 JAN AND MAYBE LONGER DEPENDING ON WX. I TOLD CHAUSTUER THAT WE AGREED BUT NO COMMITMENTS COULD BE MADE UNTIL APPROVAL RECEIVED FROM PSR. PLEASE RESPOND DIRECTLY TO CHAUSTUER INFO US. CANNOT OVER EMPHASISE NECESSITY OF KEEPING PACAF OUT OF THIS.

800

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT~~
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IMMEDIATE

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~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~ USAPSG PRIVACY OPR Jan 67

COMM FOR Skell, England and Chausteur from Bowers, Ref SSLO 0044,

SECY Dec 66 and SSLO 00465, Dec 66. Concur in procedures outlined

STAT/SECY msg. PACAF nor NSAPAC has been contacted this phase of the

INSTAL operation nor have details of Silver Dawn, participation been

discussed with them. For England - 6988 SS: Please provide any

CAS Amplifying instructions you deem appropriate. For All: Good

JA MD: Some details are missing which can (will) be worked out

INFO/DEV local. However, any mt picking from here would possibly

INSP confuse and complicate the situation. Maximum support of

PM 7AF is paramount.

SAFETY

CHAP

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WFO

Originator

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PACAF Form 40a
MAY 60 PC4750

RECORD COPY WILLIAM R. BOWERS, Colonel, USAF
DIV.DCS-0

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1977 JUN 29

4. There are 27,000 feet of water in the lower extension and
the 100 feet of water in the upper extension.

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~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~ SSLO 00212 JAN 67.

REF PARA 4 MY SSLO 00201.

THEY HAVE FOUND THAT THE AUXILIARY RECEIVER ON THE FAC USED FOR THE EXERCISE IS A LOW POWER BACK-UP DEACONIECEIVER NAVY USED FOR CARRIER RECOVERY/P HAS SMALL SEUR ANTENNA ON BOTTOM OF FUSELAGE. SINCE SILVER DAWN BROADCASTED WITH TEN WATTS AT ABOUT 30,000FT AND ACTIVITY TOOK PLACE EAST AND NORTH EAST OF HANOI, AT FIVE TO SIXTEEN THOUSAND FT THIS EXPLAINS NON RECEIPT BY THE WESTERN FORCE. THE FAC FROM DANANG WHO GOT TO COAST AROUND HAIPHONG REPORT THEY HEARD-BUT THEY WERE NOT IN THE SCRAP. SILVER DAWN CAN BROADCAST THRU THE C-135 RELAY BIRD. ORBITING IN THE GULF. USING THIS AIRCRAFTS INSTANT RELAY ON HIGH POWER WILL SOLVE PROBLEM IF A DISCRETE FREQUENCY NEEDED AGAIN.

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TO PACCOMKGN

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~~TOP SECRET~~ THE SECTION ONE OF THREE 00010 JAN 67.

FOR COL SOHERS. 0922 FOR YOU. SMALL. SUBJECT OPERATION BULO.

1. AFTER THIS OPERATION, DT 7AF REQUESTED A HISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE CONTRIBUTION BE MADE AND FORWARDED TO PACAF AND USAF. HE WANTED A COMINT ANNEX TO INCLUDE AFSS AND THE SSC CONTRIBUTION. NEXT PLANNING AND ACTIONS CONTRIBUTED BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE ACTION. I WENT TO OUR UNITS INVOLVED AND ASKED FOR THEIR INFORMAL COMMENTS. WHILE THE "HISTORY" HAS BEEN LIMITED TO A FEW STATEMENTS ABOUT SILVER DAWN HARRING PROCEDURES BEING MODIFIED AND CONTINUOUS TRACKING BEING PASSED TO 7AF, I THINK YOU SHOULD KNOW JUST

I WAS THERE BEHIND THE SCENES. AS FOR THE MODIFICATIONS TO SILVER DAWN PROCEDURES AND MAKEUP - OUTPUT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT USED - I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY. I GAVE LT BRACH HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND ASKED HIM TO "PULL ALL THE STOPS" AS I CAN FIT TO INSURE HE HAD THE VERY BEST COMMAND RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR THIS EXERCISE - INCLUDING THE BRINGING OF A IRMAN MILLS FROM PHU BAI. FROM SILVER DAWN PROJECT OFFICER:

27/1/74

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

THIS MSG IN SIX PARTS

FOR SILVER DAWN'S PART IN OPERATION SOLO TO BE

SUCCEESSFUL; SEVERAL CHANGES TO THE NORMAL PATTERN OF OPERATIONS HAD TO BE MADE:

1. MANNING: NORMAL SO MANS REQUIRE: ONE MASTER OPERATOR (BAT ONE) (GIVES POSITION ASSIGNMENT, FEEDS ALL INFO, PASSES ALL ALERTS, COPIES TRAFFIC AND COORDINATES WITH AFT. COMMAND ON ANY ORBIT DEVIATION) AIRBORNE ANALYST - BAT TWO - (ONLY OPERATES AWC-126, ANALYZES TRAFFIC IN FLIGHT, COPIES TRAFFIC, BACK-UP FOR MASTER OP); ON MANUAL BURST OF CENTRAL WARNING - PLUTS, JUST ICB AND FRIENDLY ALERTS; FOUR VIET LINGUISTS (2 M/C, 2 TAC VOICES); ONE DUTY MAN (BAT 5); THREE CHINA LINGUISTS; BAT'S ONE, TWO AND FIVE ARE ALSO ON COMINT IN THE AIR; ONE RUSSIAN LINGUIST; ONE RUSSIAN AND TWO MAINT MEN; FOR OPERATION SOLO IT REQUIRED ONE ADDITIONAL MANUAL M/C OP ON EARLY FLIGHT; ONE ADDITIONAL VIET LINGUIST FOR TAC AND ONE LESS CHINA LINGUIST ON EACH SILVER DAWN AFT. ON ONE AFT, TWO OFFICERS WERE ABOARD AS ADVISORS. ON THE OTHER AN ADDITIONAL AGRN ANALYST WAS REQUIRED. ONE HIGHLY QUALIFIED MULTI-CHANNEL LINGUIST (AM. MILLO) WAS LOCATED AT PHU BAI AND SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD TO BE MADE TO FLY HIM TO DANANG IN TIME TO BE ON THE SECOND SO AFT. SEVERAL OPERATORS DUE TO THEIR EXPERIENCE LEVEL, WERE REQUIRED TO FLY THREE CONSECUTIVE MISSIONS WITHOUT PROPER REST. THIS WAS BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO GET EQUALLY QUALIFIED OPERATORS TO DANANG FROM OKOTA. IN ADDITION THE SILVER DAWN GROUND ANALYSTS WERE APPROXIMATELY FORTY HOURS WITHOUT SLEEP TO GET OUT NECESSARY COORDINATION MESSAGES AND MAKE SPECIAL BRIEFINGS TO THE CREWS, ALSO PROVIDE NECESSARY COORDINATION WITH THE 6924TH ON TECHNICAL INFO AND COORDINATIONS WITH THE AFT VIA UIC-55 SYSTEM.

2. EQUIPMENT MODIFICATION: SINCE BOTH SPECIAL ALERTS ON A SEPARATE FA

AND REGULAR WING, AND ALL HUNTER KILLER ALERTS WING AND HAD TO BE SENT
 SIMULTANEOUSLY, TWO WING TRANSMITTERS HAD TO BE USED ON EACH ACFT. THIS
 REQUIRED USING THE FRONT END'S OFF, WITH A SPECIAL EXTRA LONG PATCHES
 WERE PLUCKED UP AND RUN BACK TO THE BAT TWO'S POSITION, MAINT. MEN WORKED
 EXTRA HARD TO PROVIDE THIS MODIFICATION FOR BOTH ACFTS BEFORE TAKE-OFF.
 DURING OPERATION SOLO, THE BAT ONE PASSED ALL SPECIAL ALERTS ON THE
 DISCRETE FREQ (215.2). BAT ONE OF THE 10TH SQUADRON PASSED THIRTEEN
 SPECIAL ALERTS AND THE BAT TWO PASSED TWO. BOTH ACFTS PASSED SIX
 AND SIX HUNTER KILLER ALERTS DURING OPERATION SOLO. ON THE SECOND DAY
 ACFT, BAT ONE PASSED FIVE SPECIAL ALERTS AND BAT TWO PASSED ONE. BOTH
 SEVEN SAM ALERTS AND ONE HUNTER KILLER ALERT. ALSO A WING RECEIVER
 HAD TO BE SET UP IN THE MAIN SUPPORT AREA ON THE ACFT, SO THAT
 WING ACTIVITY WOULD BE MONITORED. THIS PASSED OFF AND CARRIED TO THE
 BAT ONE, DUE TO THIS ONE INTERFERENCE WITH WING COMMUNICATIONS.
 2. TAKE-OFF AND ORBIT TIMES: TWO SEVEN DAY ACFT WERE REQUIRED TO
 BE ON STATION AT THE SAME TIME FOR OPERATION SOLO. AND FOR A KING
 RESULTS IT WAS BEST THEY FLY THE SAME LEG OF ORBIT. OF 4501 DUTY.
 DURING DELTA DELTA AND DELTA ECHO AT DIFFERENT ALTITUDES. THIS REQUIRED
 ADVANCING THE TAKE OFF OF THE SECOND ACFT TWO HOURS THIRTY MIN FROM
 ITS NORMAL TAKE OFF. SINCE TAKE OFF AND ALTITUDE HAD TO BE COORDINATED
 CLOSELY WITH GROUND CTR 1, 215.2 AND 10. VERY SHORT NOTICE. WHEN OPERATION
 SOLO WAS DELAYED ONE HOUR, THE FIRST ACFT HAD TO EXTEND ORBIT TIME
 THIRTY MIN IN ORDER TO PROVIDE PRIMARY SUPPORT TO THE 7TH AF STRIKE
 FOR

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FORCES.

4. AFT SCHEDULE: DUE TO THE DIFFERENT CONFIGURATION OF EACH AFT BY POSITION, IT WAS NECESSARY TO ADOPT THE AFT SCHEDULE FOR THE JOB WERE ON STATION. WE HAD THREE AFT SCHEDULES. WE HAVE FOUR, BUT THE FOURTH ONE WAS DELAYED THE NEXT DAY. WE HAD THREE. TWO OF THE THREE WERE EQUIPPED WITH THREE HF AFTS. THE OTHER HAD ONLY TWO. ONE AFT WITH THREE HF AFTS WAS SENT UP EARLY WITH THE OTHER AFT HAVING THREE AFTS, PREFLIGHTED AND READY FOR BACK-UP IN CASE OF AN AFT BY EARLY MON BEFORE TOT. THE THIRD AFT WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE SECOND MON, AND IT CONTAINED SPARE EQUIP FOR THE ARC-100, BECAUSE IT HAD PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPORTING ALL ACTY TO THE GROUND ASAP AFTER ACTY WAS OVER.

5. PRE-ARRANGED MSGS: A PRE-CODED MSG, WE CRYPTED TO VERN. "K1000. ERGASING WITH US AFT" WAS SET UP PRIOR TO TAKE OFF WITH THE AFT, SO THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE USED FOR TRANSMITTING ON ARC-100 DURING STRIKE ACTY. ARC-100 TRANSMISSIONS BLOCK OUT ALL HF SIGNALS AND THIS WOULD INTERFERE WITH MANUAL MORSE TRACKING. ALSO, A PRE-ARRANGED SIGNAL BETWEEN US AFT WAS SET UP ON THE ARC-100 TO ENABLE ONE GROUND TO TELL THE OTHER THEY WERE LOST CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE ANYTHING TO THE STRIKE

- AOPT DUE TO INTERNAL PROBLEMS - I.E. EQUIPMENT OUTAGE. ALSO A SECOND SIGNAL IF CAPABILITY WAS RESTORED.

5. MISSION RESULTS:

FOR THE DAY, AND A TOTAL OF THE TWO AOPT.

10.4 HRS OF MV

2.4 HRS OF VHF (CH 100)

11.1 HRS OF VHF (VICT) INCLUDING 10 HRS OF KORCOM.

4.2 HRS OF VHF (RUSSIAN)

10.2 HRS OF [REDACTED] (VICT)

10.7 HRS OF [REDACTED] (VICT)

THIS INCLUDED THREE CH 100/ TAO FREQS, SIX VICT TAO FREQS, ONE RUSSIAN

NAVAL FREQ AND ONE KORCOM TAO FREQ. MONITORED AND COPIED.

UNQUOTE

FROM 6924SS

QUOTE

FOLLOWING BRIEFLY SUMMARIZES PREPARATIONS FOR AND ACTIVITIES DURING OPERATION BOLD BY THE 6924TH SGTY SQ.

1. BRIEFED BY LT BEACH ON THE OPERATION APPROX 2000 LOCAL TIME 31 JAN,

2. PREPARATIONS FOR PROJECT:

A. OBTAINED SOME ORION MSGS TO BE PASSED FROM SILVER DAWN AOPT IN EVENT OF ENTRY BY EITHER KORCOM OR SOVIET PILOTS INTO ACTION. ORIONS NECESSARY TO SAVE TIME SINCE STRGS WOULD BE ON RADIO SILENCE AS FAR AS UNO-22 IS CONCERNED AND WOULD GO THRU MOTEL ON HF.

3. AGREED ON INFO TO BE PASSED FROM MAIN SITE TO AOPT.

4. ON MORNING OF 30 JAN 1967 BRIEFED FLIGHT ON DUTY, EXPEDITION. PERSONNEL INVOLVED AND VOICE PROCESSING PERSONNEL.

5. BRIEFED CGL WILLIAMS AT TAOO (NS) AND COORDINATED ON MODIFIED PROCEDURES. (ON MIG ALERTS)

6. ACTED AS RELAY FOR ALL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SAIGON AND SILVER DAWN DURING PRE-STRIKE PERIOD.

7. MODIFIED INTERNAL PHONE INSTALLATION TO ALLOW COMPREHENSIVE WOOK-UP

BETWEEN DRY AIR DEFENSE VAN, AND-100 AND SAC-127.

3. INSTALLED TEMPORARY PLUS-IN AT 7TH AF OPS ROOM TO FOLLOW TWO INTERCOM-
RY-8 XIONS TO TACC (NS) AND LAY TO.

4. ESTABLISHED WEATHER AND-100 ON OPS-127 OFFERED BEST CHANCE FOR
RELIABLE CONTACT WITH ACFT AND SELECT BEST FREQ, CONSIDERING ATOS-
PERIOS, ETC.

5. DETERMINED, BASED ON STRIKE POSTURE, WHAT EMPHASIS TO PLACE ON
COLLECTION FACTS.

6. EXPENDED MAXIMUM EFFORT TO PART OF DRY DAY ANALYSTS TO RECOVER
FROM COMM CHANGE IN PROGRESS TO ENSURE BEST SUPPORT POSSIBLE TO PROJECT
7. DURING PERIOD OF ACTY.

8. ADVISED SILVER DAWN ACFT OF ALL CASES AND FREDS TRACKING MICS PLUS
ALL ORG CHANGE.

9. AUGMENTED FLIGHT PERSONNEL WITH DAY TROOPS FOR MISSING INFO TO
ACFT (VAN ANALYSTS AND ORG-33 OPS).

10. PROVIDED PLOT-BY-PLOT TRACKING TO 7AF ON IMPED BASIS.

11. CARRIED ON ALL NORMAL DIRECT SERVICE AND SIGINT REPORTING TASKS.

12. POST STRIKE ACTY.

13. MUSTERED MAXIMUM EFFORT FOR TRANSMISSION/ANALYSTS/REPORTING CLEAR
OF ALL INFO COLLECTED BY THE ACFT.

UNQUOTE

QUOTE FM 5922 SW

SECRET DAYTIME OPS-100 JAN 67.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN IN PROJECT SOLO:

1. ONE HOUR PRIOR TO TIME-OVER-TARGET THIS UNIT IMPLEMENTED THE
ALTERNATE COVERAGE PLAN COVERING THE MANUAL FORCE DIVISION OF
TO INSURE COMPLETE COVERAGE OF NOT ONLY THE DRV, BUT THE OTHER RELEVANT
AREA AS WELL. THIS INVOLVED THE DIVERSION OF FOUR MANUAL FORCE
POSITIONS FROM OTHER MISSIONS TO INSURE COMPLETE COVERAGE OF AREA OF
INTEREST.

2. THE AND-100/AFSAC 75F CIRCUIT WAS RED-PATCHED DIRECTLY TO THE

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0922 01 30 THE 092201 HAD DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH 7AF. THIS

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TARGET, AT WHICH TIME WE REVERTED TO NORMAL MISSION.
7 WE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO INSURE THAT IF 692488 WAS TO BE NEUTRALIZED
OR EXPERIENCED A COMMUNICATIONS OUTAGE THERE WOULD BE AN UNINTERRUPTED
DIRECT SIGINT SERVICE TO TK. IN ADDITION WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH THE
ACRP "FIVEAS" TO INSURE WE COULD RECEIVE OR PASS ON THE ACRP "SILVER
DARND ANY PERISHABLE INFORMATION VIA THE URC-33 SYSTEM.

UNQUOTE

PART TWO FOLLOWS IN SEPERATE MESSAGE.

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~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS YCO~~

Subj: Operation Bolo.

6994 Scty Sq pass to SSLO.

Your participation in operation BOLO did much to enhance USAFSS's operation in SEA. The initiative displayed by the SSLO and the Silver Dawn Project Officer in meeting the timely response on this important operation is readily apparent and deeply appreciated. Your excellent redirection of resources needed to support TAF is highly commendable. Please convey my congratulations to all who took part in this successful demonstration of our unique capability to support tactical air operations.

Passing on kudos to units and individuals who played a significant role in Operation Bolo. WILLIAMS

Signed

G. G. ISENHOWER, Colonel, USAF
Vice Commander

Originator

SECRET

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ADP/012 D/F46/59

REF SSC DET STATUS REPORT NR FORTY-THREE

1. MOST GRATIFIED BY RECEIPT OF ABOVE STATUS REPORT WHICH OUTLINED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT ON PART OF THE SSC DET IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE SEVENTH AIR FORCE IN THEIR CONDUCT OF THE "SPECIAL MIG STRIKE ON 2 JAN". THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS ENJOYED BY 7TH AF PILOTS ON THAT DATE IS EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF THE SIGINT SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE SSC DET AND THE PROFESSIONAL MANNER IN WHICH THAT SUPPORT IS GIVEN.

2. PSE EXTEND OUR APPRECIATION TO ALL CONCERNED FOR A JOB WELL DONE

148

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CONTAINS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

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