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A SPECIAL HISTORICAL STUDY

OF

AFSS-NSA RELATIONS

October 1952 - September 1954

Volume I

USAF REVIEWED 22-Oct-2013: NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED



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INFORMATION

USAF SECURITY SERVICE

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FOREWORD

This study was prepared by the Historical Division, Office of Information Services, at the request of the Commander, USAFSS. It reflects, in a general manner, policy negotiations that occurred between the USAF Security Service and the National Security Agency between October 1952 and September 1954.

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FOREWORD

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I REALIGNMENT OF THE AFSS COMINT STRUCTURE

On 24 October 1952, the National Security Council Intelligence Directive was revised by Presidential directive. This action authorized the following acts: (a) Redesignation of the old Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) as the National Security Agency (NSA); (b) delegation of the operational and technical control of all COMINT collection and production resources of the Department of Defense to the Director, NSA; (c) designation of the Department of Defense as executive agent of the Government for production of COMINT information and (d) reconstitution of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) as a body acting for and under the Special Committee of the National Security Council. The revised directive authorized DIRNSA, where necessary for close support purposes, to delegate direct operational control of specified COMINT facilities to military Commanders or other agencies supported. (Ref: Appendix, NSCID No. 9 (Revised) 24 October 1952).

The Secretary of Defense, on 4 November 1952, directed the Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and DIRNSA to each appoint a representative to a working group, to be chaired by DIRNSA, to develop all appropriate and necessary directives for formal implementation of the provisions of NSCID No. 9 Revised.

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(Ref: Memo for the Secretary of the Army, et al, subj: Interim Implementation of NSCID No. 9 Revised, 4 November 1952). As a result, the Commander, AFSS and his Staff were given a preview of the revised directive early in November 1952, and AFSS was requested, presumably by the D/I, USAF, to draft pertinent Air Force recommendations for the unified collection, production and control of U. S. COMINT. (This information was supplied by ODC representatives, who attended the preview in November 1952).

AFSS (ODC) immediately began drafting recommendations which would allow the AFSS to collect, process and control that part of the U. S. COMINT effort related to the USAF requirements. Subsequently, on 21 November 1952, NSA submitted to AFSS by telecon a tentative tasking mission for Headquarters, AFSS to accomplish "in the fulfillment of unified intelligence requirements." The tentative tasking plan did not reflect the whole or entirety concept of analysis as had been agreed upon by NSA-AFSS Operations people on 12 November. (Ref: Telecon, WDC/CCO to CG, USAFSS, Cite: WDC/CCO 3680, 21 Nov 1953).

Therefore, it was strongly opposed by the Analysis-Control Agencies within ODC. On 26 November 1952, the Analysis-Control Agency recommended to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations that AFSS request responsibility for the entire air problem, but agreed that it would be wise to accept the Long Range Air Problem, selected European Air problems and the 25x3 problem as an interim mission for

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problem as an interim mission for 38 135

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Headquarters AFSS. (Ref. Memo to DC/S, Operations, subj: NSA-AFSS Allocation of Analytic Tasks, 26 Nov 1952). The above recommendation was based on the assumption that these tasks would be whole problems, including development, technical support and final reporting.

On 3 December 1952, a special conference of representatives from NSA and AFSS (ODC) was convened at Brooks AFB to explore the division of analytic responsibility issue from an operational point of view. NSA was represented by Mr. Herb Conley, Chief of the Russian Air Traffic Branch and NSA authorities on Russian Tactical Air, Civil Air, Machine processing and reporting activities. AFSS was represented by Colonel Gordon W. Wildes, DC/S, Operations and AFSS authorities on similar activities performed at AFSS Headquarters. Within three days, the joint committee adopted a mutually acceptable air COMINT production mission for Headquarters, AFSS, which in essence was the interim recommendations made by the Analysis Control Division to the DC/S Operations on 26 November.

On 12 December, NSA submitted another proposed analytic task assignment to AFSS, which had been approved in general by the DIRNSA. This proposed mission generally delegated to AFSS the responsibility for analysis and reporting on the three Russian Long Range Air Armies, the Long Range Flying Schools, the European Civil Air Directorates, the independent Air OTRYADS in the European area and certain special studies which would be assigned later by DIRNSA. Further, this mission

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stipulated that AFSS would "control the assignment of the intercept tasks to the positions allocated to the unit frequencies of the Long Range Air Force and the European Civil Air nets by DIRNSA." (Ref: Telecon, Colonel Weeks to Colonel Wildes, Cite: WDC/CCO 4062, 12 Dec 52).

However, the proposed mission stipulated that NSA would closely monitor the Long Range Problem because of its importance to Departmental Intelligence Consumers by performing current studies on Technical Daily Summaries from the field units and reports published by the operating agencies.

At this point in negotiations (12-20 December 1952), NSA began determining the entire mission and overall control of the Service COMINT agencies. General Canine visited Headquarters, AFSS, on 11 December and indicated to General Lynn that the primary AFSS mission would be one of Close Support of ADC, SAC and overseas Air Force Commands. This concept was further discussed by NSA and AFSS staffs in Washington on 19-20 December. However, according to the AFSS viewpoint, the proposed NSA Directive No. 1, under consideration at that time, was inconsistent with the projected AFSS mission. Therefore, AFSS prepared a list of tasks or requirements deemed necessary for support of Military Air Operations. These proposed tasks or requirements to be fulfilled by AFSS were expressed in terms of mission, units, external support and operational concepts. The list was to be presented

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to DIENSA in an effort to obtain a favorable interpretation of NSCID No. 9. (Information furnished by Colonel Gordon W. Wildes, and his Staff in December 1952).

Before the list of AFSS recommendations were presented to NSA, the DIENSA approved NSA Directive No. 1, which established procedures for delegation of COMINT missions by NSA. Although the Directive did not delegate a mission per se, some of its provisions were viewed as favorable to the AFSS objective. This Directive stipulated that DIENSA would delegate operational control of specific tasks as necessary for close support. In general, the delegation of such control was dependent upon "requirements expressed by appropriate authority and upon certain operational considerations," i.e., economy, ability, etc. (Ref. NSA Directive No. 1, Title: Procedures for Delegation of COMINT Mission by NSA, 1 January 1953). Simultaneously, on 1 January 1953, DIENSA requested AFSS to submit a list of Close Support Air requirements for consideration.

Therefore, AFSS (ODC) renewed its efforts to obtain the Close Support air problem as its exclusive mission by revising the study compiled in December 1952 to define Close Support and to illustrate the Air Force concept of applying Close Support to Air Commanders. Briefly, this study maintained that fulfillment of Tactical COMINT support requirements of various Air Commands necessarily involved

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the fullest possible exploitation of pertinent Soviet and directly related communications entities. Consequently, the support could only be performed effectively by an integrated organization specifically designed to accomplish these air tasks. The study further maintained that there was no logical basis for any substantial division of responsibility on the problem. It also recommended that the exploitation of foreign communications entities of vital interest to Air Commands be made the responsibility of AFSS, except for those functions which involved technical personnel, equipment, or facilities not available for use by AFSS, or functions which must be accomplished by another Agency. (Ref. USAFSS Staff Study, subj: COMINT Close Support Requirements, 17 January 1953).

The "Statement of Operation and Control Concept" accompanying the study proposed that NSA be given control of Air Force field COMINT facilities concentrated on non-air targets and that AFSS be given control of those facilities concentrated on air targets, viz., the interception and processing of Air Defense Strategic Air, Tactical, Air, Navigational and Flight Service Air and Weather Communications targets. (Ref: USAFSS Staff Study, subj: COMINT Close Support Requirements, 17 January 1953). The statement did stipulate that NSA should issue directives and furnish technical guidance necessary to insure the Air Force effort was in support of the overall U. S. COMINT mission.

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This study was presented to DIRNSA on 16 January 1953. Although the DIRNSA accepted (agreed to) most of the principles in the proposal, three specific exceptions were registered. These exceptions were categorized as organizational, geographical and political. Organizationally and/or geographically, NSA believed that technical integration at the top of the national COMINT structure was mandatory and required collocation of all processing operations at that level. The arguments advanced in support of this concept were that: (a) solution of basic cryptographic techniques transcends the attack upon any one of the related systems; (b) the limited number of qualified personnel must be concentrated at one point in order to realize maximum utilization of skills.

In rebuttal AFSS pointed out that basic research could be accomplished at one place and the exploitation of a body of traffic for intelligence purposes could be accomplished at another point. Therefore, the separation of these functions would only determine the communications required and not necessarily the efficiency of the operation.

The political exception by NSA representatives was that the USAF was not the only U. S. aerial activity with an interest in the opposing air power. AFSS believed the NSA argument completely missed the point because the Air Force COMINT agency was part of NSA and was as responsible to NSA requirements as any other agency. (Ref: Memo for Record, subj: Reference DIRNSA Discussions of USAFSS Briefing, 16 Jan 53).

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The AFSS concept of Air COMINT operation was reiterated by the Chief of Staff, USAF in a letter to DIRNSA on 21 January 1953. At that time, the Chief of Staff strongly urged DIRNSA to delegate the air problem to AFSS, including total operational control and responsibility for Air Force coverage. (Ref: R&R, VCS to DC/S, Operations, subj: Our Approach to NSA Problem, 20 February 1953).

On 17 March 1953 the DIRNSA called a conference to discuss the close support mission requirements advanced by AFSS in January. At that time, the DIRNSA disapproved the concept of Air COMINT operations and requirements advanced by AFSS on 16 January and emphasized that NSA would assume full responsibility for processing normal, recurrent air intercept and related material which must be performed at a central Zone of Interior location in order to fulfill peacetime requirements of the Air Force for timely COMINT. The DIRNSA also reiterated that AFSS would perform such tasks as specifically assigned by NSA, tasks considered inherent functions of a Service COMINT Headquarters and tasks assigned by USAF. The DIRNSA also indicated that Headquarters AFSS would eventually be delegated the responsibility for fulfilling ADC requirements for timely COMINT. (Ref: Ltr., Hq USAFSS to DIRNSA, subj: Processing Functions to be Accomplished in Headquarters, USAF Security Service, 7 April 1953).

Therefore, on 7 April 1953, AFSS embodied these tentative understandings in a letter to DIRNSA and requested that an Ad Hoc committee

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be established to formulate tasks, both interim and ultimate, to be performed by Headquarters, AFSS. The point of departure suggested by AFSS for the interim tasks was the mission tentatively suggested for AFSS by NSA on 12 December 1952, while the point of departure for the ultimate tasks was the size and composition of a unit to accomplish emergency air processing functions in event NSA suffered a disaster and the tasks which such a unit could accomplish adequately and profitably while maintaining the emergency capability. (Ref: Ltr., Hq USAFSS to DIRNSA, subj: Processing Functions to be Accomplished in Headquarters, USAF Security Service, 7 April 1953).

The above letter was delivered to General Canine by General Bassett on 8 April and discussed by the two General officers and their staffs on 9 April. At that time DIRNSA indicated that he would task AFSS Headquarters to do processing and reporting in direct support of ADC only, viz., assign the Russian Long Range Air and associated navigational air problem to AFSS. Also, DIRNSA agreed to appoint an Ad Hoc committee to formulate processing tasks (ultimate) to be performed at Headquarters, AFSS. (Ref: Memo for Record by Colonel Gordon W. Wildes, 13 April 1953).

Subsequently, on 15 April the acting DIRNSA assigned the Russian Long Range Air Problem to AFSS as an interim task in a letter to the Commander, USAFSS. However, the acting DIRNSA stipulated that, other

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than timely reporting in connection with close support of ADC, Air COMINT processing would eventually be accomplished at NSA. (Ref: Ltr., Hq NSA to CG USAFSS, subj: COMINT Processing Functions to be Accomplished in Headquarters, USAF Security Service, 15 April 1953). On 15 April 1953 NSA Circular No. 21-1 was also promulgated. This Circular defined the control of COMINT activities conducted for Close Support purposes and established the procedures and principles for delegation of such control.

Actually, the provisions of the Circular limited the COMINT mission of the USAF Security Service to one of producing Tactical Communications Intelligence, for Section I of the Circular defined Close Support as: "Support provided a military commander in satisfaction of the immediate operational requirements of combat forces under his command for COMINT information relative to foreign forces directly opposing or of direct tactical concern to the Commander. . . ." (Ref: NSA Circular No. 21-1, Title: Control of COMINT Activities Conducted for Close Support Purposes, 15 April 1953). Section III also stipulated that "Operational Control of COMINT Support Activities will be exercised by DIRNSA, except where specifically delegated by him to other authorities. . . for Close Support purposes."

On 16 April 1953 an Ad Hoc committee, appointed by DIRNSA and composed of seven representatives from NSA and five from AFSS, convened to prepare AFSS and subordinate unit Operation Orders. At

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that time NSA proposed to write Operation Orders for all TO&E units of AFSS and to authorize direct reporting to ADC and SAC by both Groups and the 3rd RSM. However, the AFSS representatives objected to the latter NSA desire and recommended that the Operations Orders for the subordinate units be given to the Group Commanders, who would prepare the Operations Orders for his subordinate units. Although the NSA representatives did not agree to this point, they did agree that the orders should be reviewed by AFSS while in draft form and distributed through Headquarters, AFSS. (Ref: Trip Report, subj: Report of Visit to NSA 16-24 April 1953, 4 May 1953).

The committee did adopt a COMINT Operations Order (analytical task) for Headquarters and drafted a letter of instructions for the Order for the signature of the DIRNSA. This order, NSA No. 301, was promulgated by letter on 1 May 1953. It delegated two types of missions to AFSS, i.e., Close and General support. The Close Support mission included processing and reporting of pertinent raw material of a rapidly and continuously exploitable nature in close COMINT support of the ADC, viz., the Russian Long Range Air Force and the Soviet European Civil Air problem. For execution of these tasks, AFSS was delegated operational control over facilities (AFSS) allocated to the Soviet LRAF and European civil air nets. The general support task was to process and exploit, within capabilities, other raw material from specified foreign communications targets in support of the overall COMINT mission of NSA.

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This latter task was subject to changes. The AFSS Operations Order was also subjected to revision after AFSS adopted and presented its plan for close support of ADC. (Ref: Ltr, Hq NSA to CG USAFSS, subj: COMINT Operations Orders No. 1 for Headquarters, USAFSS, 1 May 1953).

Subsequently, on 1 June 1953, the DIRNSA informed the Chief of Staff, USAF that the COMINT support requirements for air operations, particularly ADC and SAC, were generally more urgent and extensive than those of most other military operations. Therefore, the support for these commands must embrace the worldwide resources of NSA. Consequently, AFSS would be delegated the timely LRAF reporting to ADC. In addition, DIRNSA proposed to assign Far Eastern and European Russian and Satellite PVO problems to AFSS field units in support of SAC requirements. Close COMINT support requirements of tactical air commanders would also be met by assignment of appropriate tasks to AFSS overseas units. This latter mission was to include weather support in the Far East.

Although operational control of the AFSS facilities necessary to accomplish the above tasks would be delegated to the Commander, USAFSS for further assignment, the number and location of the facilities would be determined by DIRNSA in consultation with the Commander, USAFSS. The DIRNSA further indicated that NSA would fulfill some SAC, and to a lesser degree, ADC requirements for COMINT information and stated

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that timely COMINT support to various Air Force Commands required the dissemination of selected COMINT information from NSA directly to the Air Force recipients, including SAC and ADC. (Ref: Ltr., Hq NSA to C/S USAF, subj: COMINT Support for the Department of the Air Force, 1 June 1953).

Two days later, the Director of Intelligence, USAF forwarded the letter to the Commander, USAFSS with a request to provide information upon which to base a reply to DIRNSA. (Ref: Ltr., Hq USAF to CG, USAFSS, subj: COMINT Support for the Department of the Air Force, 3 June 1953). The AFSS answer was embodied in a proposed answer to the letter by the Chief of Staff, USAF, dated 6 June 1953. The letter suggested that NSA delegate authority commensurate with responsibility in respect to assigning tasks and operational control of facilities to AFSS. It emphasized that overall responsibility for providing timely information on the Soviet Air defense system to SAC should be a function of AFSS and not just fragmentation assignments and requested further clarification from NSA on that point. It also stressed the importance of Special Weather Intelligence in air operations and requested clarification on NSA plans for weather support in Europe and Alaska. Finally, it informed DIRNSA that the Air Force had established a world wide SSO System for rapid dissemination of COMINT within the Air Force which was operating efficiently and effectively. (Ref: 1st Ind & Incl, Hq USAFSS to D/I, USAF, subj: COMINT Support for the Department of the Air Force, 6 June 1953). AFSS also informed the Director of Intelligence

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USAF that, if the ambiguities of the NSA plan were resolved, the plan would be operable.

On 2 July 1953, the Chief of Staff in a letter to DIRNSA, emphasized the need for a broader Air Force responsibility in producing COMINT information for Air units. Moreover, the General requested that the task of AFSS be broadened to include Soviet and Satellite Air Defense systems, including, but not limited to, the PVO. This was a reflection of the requirements for COMINT support of ELINT functions assigned exclusively to AFSS by USAF. The Chief of Staff also urged DIRNSA to follow normal Command channels in delegating operational functions, i.e., not delegate responsibilities directly to overseas units of the AFSS and at the same time hold the Commander, AFSS responsible for the operational readiness and efficiency of these units. However, the Chief of Staff did agree that liaison between air commands and NSA was desirable and could prove mutually beneficial. He also stated that the Director of Intelligence would arrange such liaison. (Ref: Ltr., General Twining to General Canine, 2 July 1953).

Concurrently, the DIRNSA published operations orders for AFSS field units and dispatched them to the Commander, USAFSS for execution. The letter of promulgation stated that these orders could be amplified and issued, as required, to insure the proper accomplishment of the assigned tasks. (Ref: Ltr., Hq NSA to CG USAFSS, subj: NSA Operations Orders, Air Force Units, 2 July 1953). However, the above orders were not distributed as planned, for the Commander, USAFSS discussed the issue (direct reporting and Command Authority) with the DIRNSA early in July 1953.

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It was agreed that the Operations Orders for the Groups and 3rd RSM would be rewritten by Headquarters, AFSS for the signature of the Commander, USAFSS. Although these Orders would be substantially the same as the NSA drafts, the section relative to distribution of end products would be modified to eliminate direct reporting to SAC and ADC from AFSS field units.

Further, it was agreed that the Squadron Operations Orders would be prepared by the Appropriate Group Commander in accordance with form and substance of the drafts prepared by NSA. (Ref: R&R, OI to OI-3, Subj: AFSS Operations Orders, 8 July 1953). Subsequently, on 20 July 1953, the two Groups (i.e., 6910th and 6920th Security Groups) and the 3rd RSM, were delegated analytical missions by AFSS Operations Orders No.1-53 series. These units were generally delegated the missions of providing operating and controlling intercept facilities and conducting such processing as may be required to produce COMINT and ELINT in Close and General Support of their theater customers, of performing tasks in support of the Headquarters mission and of providing and operating additional intercept facilities and conducting such processing as may be directed by DIRNSA in support of the National COMINT effort. The European Group was to concentrate primarily on the Russian and Russian Satellite air, air defense and other targets, including weather. The Far East Group was to concentrate on Russian, Chinese Communist and North Korean air, air defense and other targets, including weather, while the 3rd RSM was to concentrate on Russian Air and air defense, including weather, in the Churhotsk, Northern Kuril and Northern Sakhalin areas. (Ref: USAFSS Operations Orders Nos. 1-53 Series, 20 July 1953).

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Re-assessment of Position Requirements (Feb-Aug 1953)

The reorganization of the U.S. COMINT Structure also caused a re-evaluation of the intercept position requirements of the United States. The COMINT collection program in effect at the time NSCID No. 9 was revised was based primarily on JCS 2010/46, dated 6 November 1951, which provided for 3560 U. S. Intercept positions of which the Air Force would supply 1420 positions. Since many changes in foreign communications of priority had occurred as well as control of collection facilities, the DIRNSA caused a new study of the intercept requirements to be made in February 1953. This study indicated that several discrepancies existed in JCS 2010/46. Although the "New Link Study" increased the total U.S. intercept position requirements by 139 positions (Total 3699), it decreased the Air Force requirements by 100 positions (Total 1320). (Ref. Tab 2, NSA Commanders Conference, dated 5 August 1953.)

Subsequently, on 31 March 1953, the DIRNSA instructed the General Priorities Committee (GPC)\* to provide NSA with a revised U. S. COMINT collection program based on the New Link Study and reflecting the following factors: (a) Total U. S. requirements; (b) British and Third Party participation; (c) Search and development and (d) Stated USCIB requirements. (Ref. Memo for Chairman, GPC, Subj: Revised U. S. COMINT Collection Program, 31 March 1953.)

\* The Air Force was represented on this Committee by Mr. David Clark, AFOIN.

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Prior to February 1953 AFSS had prepared OP 6-51 (requiring 1495 positions) for support of the FY 53 program. This increase, according to the planning records, resulted from the Air Force exception to the old AFSAC definition of a Link, e.g., "a radio circuit or that part of a radio circuit which is interceptable by one manned position." The AFSS believed a Link could consist of as many as 300 stations and as few as two. (Ref: Memo for DC/S Operations, Subj: Facts Bearing on Security Service Requirements for 1495 positions, 17 April 1953). Therefore, AFSS queried the DIRNSA in March 1953 about the decrease in Air Force positions reflected in the New Link Study. The DIRNSA stated that the positions required to cover a Link would be determined by the GPC in the manner referenced above. (Ref: Trip Report, subj: Position Requirements, no date).

The Committee released its preliminary report on 4 May 1953. It used the AFSAC definition of a link, but arrived at new figures. It estimated that 4102 positions were required for coverage of developed links of USCIB value, 135 positions were required for general search, 254 positions were required for RDF, RFP and MOA, 30 positions were required for coverage of exclusive NSA targets and 275 positions were required for coverage of newly developed links. This total (4796) could be reduced by 800 positions to allow for British and Third Party coverage. (Ref: Telecon, Mr. Miller to Colonel Wildes, Cite: WDC/CCO 1842, 4 May 1953). Also, the committee estimated that Air Force would require 913 positions, excluding those needed for Close Support and training purposes

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Again, AFSS computed its needs, using pertinent active cases as a basis. This estimate was stated as 1540 positions. (Ref: Memo for CG, USAFSS, subj: Air Force Security Service Link Study, 6 June 1953). This estimate was modified (reduced to 1523 positions) and submitted to the DIRNSA via Headquarters, USAF, on 9 June 1953. At that time AFSS pointed out the danger of relying on proposed British coverage, especially in relation to combat or tactical COMINT requirements of the USAF. (Ref: Ltr., Hq USAF to DIRNSA, subj: Intercept Requirements, 9 June 1953).

On 24-25 June NSA acquainted AFSS with the British Intercept Plan and AFSS reassessed its positions requirements on 3 July 1953, i.e., used the GPC figure of 1349 as a basis for planning. To this AFSS added 73 training positions, 95 Close Support (overseas) positions, 30 Zone of Interior (ADC) positions and 12 additional weather positions for a total of 1585. (Ref: Telecon, CCS to WDC/CCO, Cite: CCS 1478, 3 July 1953).

On 7 July 1953, WDC/CCO informed AFSS that the GPC had agreed to accept the AFSS estimate with the possible exception of the 12 additional Weather positions (AFSS originally included 25 positions for weather) and would consider AFSS requirements for 1295 operational positions and 73 training positions. (Ref: Telecon, WDC/CCO to CCS, Cite: WDC/CCO 2936, 7 July 1953). However, between 7 July and 5 August 1953, a working Committee decided that the Air Force requirements could be satisfied with 1320 positions. (Ref: Tab 2, NSA Commanders Conference, 5 August 1953).

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Modification of Operational Concept  
December 1953 - August 1954

On 3 December 1953 AFSS submitted its plan and concept of operations for Close COMINT Support of ADC to DIRNSA for review and approval. The DIRNSA approved the AFSS concept and plan relative to immediate deployment of COMINT support teams to selected points within the Western Hemisphere to work in conjunction with ADC Aircraft Control and Warning networks. Moreover, the DIRNSA authorized the Commander, USAFSS to proceed with the necessary arrangements in conjunction with ADC and stated that early action would be taken to delegate operational control of 30 intercept positions to Commander, USAFSS to fulfill the mission. (Ref: Ltr., General Canine to General Bassett, 5 January 1954).

However, the DIRNSA did not agree to the AFSS concept and plan for COMINT support of ADC from AFSS units outside of the Western Hemisphere. The General's stated objections were that the effective COMINT support of SAC and ADC involved the total COMINT resources, the continued, timely cross-analysis of all products and adequate provisions for at least selected first-instance reporting direct from producing units to operational Commanders concerned. Simultaneously, the DIRNSA expressed his intent to decentralize COMINT production to the maximum practical extent, primarily to increase the timeliness of the end products. Further, the DIRNSA stated he was forwarding revised Operations Orders to the 6910th and 6920th Security Groups which made adequate provisions for direct reporting and cross-servicing problems. Finally, the DIRNSA requested

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the appointment of an Ad Hoc Committee to work out the missions of the AFSS units and revise Operations Order 301 to reflect the NSA concept of direct-reporting and the ADC Close Support Mission of AFSS. (Ref: Ltr., General Canine to General Bassett, 5 January 1954).

On the same day (5 January 1954) the DIRNSA officially informed the Commander, USAFSS that cross-servicing responsibilities placed on the 6910th and 6920th Security Groups and the SWI responsibilities placed on the 6920th Group required the revision of the NSA Operations Orders for these units. The DIRNSA also pointed out that the implementation principles employed in the past by AFSS were inconsistent with established NSA Operational policy, viz., AFSS Operations Orders did not provide for direct reporting of significant activity to SAC and ADC, delegation of routine operational control (by NSA) to RSMs and Detachments, assessment of technical and end product requirements by NSA against Groups or comparable echelons and control of distribution of COMINT information by DIRNSA. (Ref: Ltr., Hq NSA to Comdr, USAFSS, subj: NSA Operations Orders for USAFSS Units, 5 Jan 1954).

Concurrently, the NSA production Division was instructed to proceed with decentralization of COMINT problems to U. S. COMINT units as a matter of priority. This decentralization would be accomplished gradually except for the following exceptions: (a) when step two indicated that the field unit already possessed the capability, the problem would be decentralized at once; (b) when the capability could be made effective by the addition of a few NSA analysts and the analysts could be made available,

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the problem would be decentralized at once; (e) when a problem could be decentralized as a training project and a full effort maintained at NSA, the problem would be gradually decentralized. (Ref: Telecon, AFSSOP to Comdr, USAFSS, Cite: AFSSOP-1-0181, 18 Jan 1954).

Subsequently, NSA revised Operations Order 301 on 12 January 1954 to reflect the AFSS responsibility for Close Support of ADC in the Western Hemisphere. The revised orders and changes thereto also reflected some AFSS desires in respect to Weather and PVO responsibilities,\* while the Long Range Air Army and European Civil Air problems delegated by the original Order remained approximately the same. The major deviation from the old order concerned distribution of end products. (Ref: Draft Revision, NSA Operations Order No. 301, 12 January 1954).

On 5 March 1954 the Commander, AFSS submitted to DIRNSA tentative AFSS plans for expansion of processing activities at Squadron level and for direct reporting from point of intercept to consumers. At that time, AFSS pointed out the major changes in Operational concepts that would likely result from the rapid implementation of the program. A reply to the above letter was prepared by NSA and later in March, during a discussion of the program, it was given to the Commander, AFSS, by the DIRNSA. The general tone of the draft letter indicated an NSA desire to proceed with the

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\* Currently, the AFSCC concept in that COMINT-ELINT operations, performed exclusively by AFSCC, require that more PVO responsibilities be delegated to Headquarters, AFSS (AFSCC), because of PVO influence on the performance of the ELINT mission.

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program over and above the experimentation stage, i.e., tooling one squadron in each theater to the program. At that time, the DIENSA wanted to begin with one squadron in each theater and include an additional squadron in each theater approximately every 30 days thereafter until all the AFSS units were participating. (Ref: Ltr, unsigned, General Canine to General Bassett, no date). The AFSS objection to the rapid implementation of the program was based on the inadequate analyst factor and the lack of a clear-cut squadron reporting responsibility. (Ref: DF, Comdr to DC/S Operations, subj: "Direct Reporting" Experiment - 41st RSM, 18 March 1954).

On 2 April 1954 a conference was called at AFSS on the problem. It was agreed by AFSS and NSA representatives that a program should be implemented to develop squadron processing effort for timely intelligence reporting direct to consumers on reportable entities, e.g., numbered Air Forces, Air Armies, etc. (Ref: Minutes of Conference to Determine Procedures to Initiate Direct Squadron Level Reporting, subj: Conference Report, 2 April 1954). Therefore, the Squadron mission would have to be tailored to reflect the above responsibility. It was also agreed that squadron and field processing headquarters concerned must have the necessary authority to control intercept assignments.

Between 2 and 21 April, NSA wired AFSS that NSA was planning eventual decentralization of intercept control to field Headquarters.

[That is, relax NSA Circular No. 51-10 enough to allow intercept stations more direct control of intercept assignments. (Ref: TWX, Comdr USAFSS to Comdr, 6920th SG, Cite: OOD-20282, 21 April 1954<sup>7</sup>. On 27 April

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NSA instructed AFSS to plan for the squadron level program on the basis of grouping assignment categories at a station with a view toward enhancing first instant reporting. (Ref: TWX, DIRNSA to Comdr, USAFSS, DTG 272126Z April 1954).

The first mission of the above nature was forwarded to the 6920th Group on 5 May 1954 for implementation at the 1st RSM. (Ref: TWX, Comdr, USAFSS to Comdr, 6920th SG, Cite: OOA-20316, 5 May 1954).

The program was begun at the 41st RSM on 1 June 1954 and at the 1st RSM on 9 June 1954. By late June both the Far East Group and 6900th Wing had determined that a 24-hour Situation Summary was preferred by theater customers rather than the 8-hour Situation Summary specified in the original implementation orders. Special USAFSS Operations Orders 54-11 (Europe) and 54-12 (Far East) required 8-hour reports from points of intercept. Hence, NSA acting upon requests from AFSS field units rescinded the agreement. Also, the field units had supplied Headquarters, AFSS enough criticism and recommendations by late June 1954 to cause Headquarters to recommend another NSA-AFSS conference on the program. (Ref: TWX, COMUSAFSS to DIRNSA, Cite: OOD 20486, 22 June 1954). Generally, AFSS proposed to discuss or stress the following points in the conference, as a result of field unit recommendations: (a) Entirety missions for squadrons; (b) Analysis at squadron level to enhance spot items; (c) Reports to next higher echelon, and (d) higher echelon exploitation of data and submission of 24-hour reports. (Ref: 58 135 TWX, COMUSAFSS to COMSETYGRU, Cite: OOD-20651, 29 July 1954).

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On 3 August 1954 representatives from NSA and AFSS met at NSA. The conference took up four major problems, i.e., Squadron Direct Reporting, Intercept Control, Alert Reporting and the Proposed Concept of Security Group Operations in Europe, the UK and

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The discussions were keynoted by three terms - Speed, Flexibility and Non-Duplication -- and their influence on overall COMINT operations. In respect to Squadron Reporting, it was agreed that the program had been successful, but the missions of the Groups must be altered in some cases to prevent duplication of squadron effort. This was particularly applicable to the situation in Europe wherein the division of processing responsibilities had become a problem. It was further agreed that NSA Circular 51-10 would be modified to allow more flexibility of intercept control on the part of participating field units, and that provisions of NSA Circular 53-2 (Alert Reporting) would be restricted to Group level, viz., the Air Force Group would normally declare alerts and RSM's would prepare spots. However, a flight could be elected to declare alerts by reason of its location or mission. Also, it was agreed that the program implementation would proceed more slowly. (Ref: Conference Report, NSA (PROD) - USAFSS Conference 3-6 August 1954, 9 Aug 1954).

## II REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES (COMINT End Products)

### From Revision of NSCID #9 Through 1953

The provisions of NSCID No. 9 (Revised) 24 October 1952, gave firm control of COMINT collection and processing to NSA. Distribution and

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reporting of the finished information (COMINT end products) received little, if any, attention. Paragraphs 2b and 2j did imply that NSA was responsible for production of COMINT information.

On 1 January 1953, NSA issued its Directive No. 1 which contained positive statements on reporting. Section II, paragraph 18, stipulated:

"The following factors will govern processing and reporting operations for intelligence purposes, and will be prescribed by the Director, NSA, in every instance to the appropriate COMINT authorities. . . . (e) The Distribution of the COMINT information produced."

The NSA Operations Order No. 301, dated 1 May 1953, outlined the USAF Security Service mission, and also reiterated (Section V, paragraph 3) that "COMINT information will be provided by the Director, NSA, and by other COMINT centers as designated by the Director, NSA." No details or procedures were given as to how NSA would implement the "reporting operations," or provide the "COMINT information."

The Security Service Dissemination Chief, Major W. P. Fife, voiced his opinion in February 1953 as follows: "I am quite sure that its ultimate objective is to take over virtually the entire COMINT reporting function." (R&R, ODD to ODC, sub.: NSA Interest in Intelligence Reporting, 25 Feb 1953). In March, 1953, the same individual observed that: "An examination of projects now being carried out by NSA shows that it is intelligence (information) reporting in every sense of the word. It certainly serves to point out that

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NSA and USAF are not in agreement as to what responsibility each has for reporting." (R&R, OOD to Colonel Wildes, ODC, subj: NSA Directive No. 1, 20 March 1953).

A statement in April 1953 by Admiral J. N. Wenger, Acting DIRNSA, indicated that NSA was primarily interested in COMINT collection and processing:

"The Director, NSA, has no comment to make regarding the responsibilities assigned by the Chief of Staff, USAF, which are not a part of COMINT collection and processing, nor is he particularly interested in the number of personnel required for these responsibilities. The Director believes that the overall operational effectiveness of your units /AFSS/ can best be determined at his Headquarters. Therefore, he urges you to place personnel here for that purpose." (Ltr., DIRNSA to CG USAFSS, sub.: COMINT Processing Functions To Be Accomplished in Headquarters, USAF Security Service, 15 April 1953).

By June, 1953, NSA wrote to the Chief of Staff, USAF, and recommended that direct liaison be permitted between NSA, SAC and ADC "As a further step toward improving the effectiveness of NSA to support SAC and ADC. . . ." (Ltr., NSA (Gen Canine) to Chief of Staff, USAF, sub.: "COMINT Support for the Department of the Air Force, 1 June 1953).

The NSA letter was forwarded by the D/I, USAF, General J. B. Ackerman, to Security Service for information upon which USAF could base a reply to NSA. (Ltr., Hq USAF, General Ackerman to CG USAFSS, sub.: "COMINT Support For the Department of the Air Force, 3 June 1953). On 6 June, Security Service forwarded a 4-page draft letter as a proposed USAF reply to the NSA letter of 1 June. The draft letter

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Hq USAFSS, 10 June 1953

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emphasized the speed, efficiency and adequacy of the Air Force SSO system and its worldwide communications system for responsive, timely reporting of COMINT. Hence, the role of NSA in providing COMINT would be effectively met by delivering NSA COMINT to the appropriate AFSS representatives. (1st Ind, Gen Bassett to D/I, USAF, same subject, 6 June 1953).

The official USAF reply on 2 July consisted of a 1-page letter signed by General N. F. Twining. After recommending a broader COMINT assignment for AFSS and the utilization of regular Command channels by NSA, the letter concluded as follows:

I welcome your suggestion on liaison between the Air Commands and your Headquarters, and will make provisions for the Director of Intelligence to arrange such liaison as may prove desirable and mutually beneficial. (Ltr., General N. F. Twining, C/S USAF, to General R. J. Canine, DIRNSA, 2 July 1953).

#### WDC-CCO and AFSSOP

Concurrent with the NSA interest in reporting, the D/I, USAF, and Security Service, were engaged in the establishment of a COMINT liaison activity; namely, an AFSS Washington, D.C./Control-Collection Office.

WDC/CCO was the successor to three separate AFSS liaison activities in Washington: (1) Operations Liaison Office, charged with COMINT liaison with the D/I, USAF, (2) Intercept Control Liaison Office, charged with liaison on intercept control with AFSA, (3) and the USAF Liaison Office, charged with Command liaison with the

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Air Staff. (Top Secret History, WDC/CCO, Ex No. 3671, Feb-June 1952).  
The organization of WDC/CCO was prompted by a letter (AFOIN-C/SR to  
CG, USAFSS, Transfer of Operational Control of Special Research  
Section of the Directorate of Intelligence at Arlington Hall, 28 March  
1952) which provided for transfer of the SRS to Security Service,  
effective on 1 April 1952. The AFOIN letter of 28 March outlined the  
mission as follows:

The mission of the Special Research Section will be to  
conduct such research and collation services as may be  
necessary in the preparation of information summaries,  
digests, compilations, and special reports required to  
furnish COMINT information of special interest to air  
intelligence production agencies and other authorized  
consumers. Detailed operating procedures will be deve-  
loped in coordination with your representatives  
at Arlington Hall.

On 12 February 1952 Colonel J. L. Weeks and a small cadre arrived  
in Washington and WDC/CCO became operational. On 14 April, WDC/CCO  
was joined by the SRS personnel.

By July 1953, the question of returning some of the functions and  
personnel of WDC/CCO to the D/I, USAF, was discussed by a group of  
officers from the D/I office and AFSS. The consensus of the meeting  
was that such a transfer was desirable and the conclusions of the  
group were formulated into a working paper for implementing the trans-  
fer. Further policy guidance on the overall objective was requested  
from the D/I, USAF on 1 September 1953. (Ltr., Gen Bassett to General  
Samford, 1 September 1953).

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The reply from the DFI on 23 September outlined the general operational functions to be performed and stated that Colonel Neely and Lt Col Sauer would be placed on duty with the AFSS activity, Arlington Hall, effective 1 October 1953. (Ltr., General Samford to General Bassett, 23 September 1953). Among the functions enumerated the following were significant: (1) . . . provide direct research support to AFOIN-2, AFOIN-3, and ATIC, as they may require in the exploitation of special intelligence information available at NSA. (2) In constant coordination with AFOIN-2 and AFOIN-3, the function should provide the support of special intelligence information to the intelligence activities of Headquarters SAC and Headquarters ADC, as you direct. (3) The function should be coordinated with AFOIN-1 in matters concerning collection activities and the establishment of collection priorities and requirements.

A mission letter was dispatched on 2 October 1953, which established the Air Force Security Service Office of Production (AFSSOP) as an element of Headquarters AFSS. The new office replaced WDC/CCO. (Ltr., CCO 322, Hq USAFSS to AFSSOP, sub.: Mission of The Air Force Security Service Office of Production, 2 October 1953).

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#### COMINT Reporting; Changes and Proposals, 1954.

In 1954 the question of COMINT reporting became a defense-wide topic of primary importance. Close support of SAC and ADC, cross-servicing arrangements between COMINT field units, squadron analysis, and decentralization of COMINT production were among the many factors which imported new vigor to the topic. (See Part I of this brief).

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By February 1954, NSA had made arrangements for direct dissemination of COMINT from NSA to the AF SSO at SAC and ADC. The AF SSO at SAC and ADC were also expected (by NSA) to place intelligence requirements with NSA in accordance with PROD Regulation No. 50-1, dated 12 February 1954 (TWX, AFSSOP 0616, AFSSOP to SSO's at ADC and SAC, 15 Feb 54). A clear and specific policy for reporting of COMINT and products was still being discussed between NSA, AFSS and USAF on 30 April 1954. (Memo for DC/S Operations from Dir/Oper, 30 April 1954).

Service-wide reporting by NSA of COMINT and products was proposed in May. The DIRNSA expressed his concern about the timeliness and completeness of COMINT support ". . . both from my Headquarters and from the COMINT activities in the field." Cross-servicing and decentralization had improved the situation in the field. Therefore, DIRNSA advocated a system whereby ". . . the COMINT produced at NSA can be transmitted as rapidly as possible to all Commanders in the field" (Ltr., DIRNSA to CNO and C/S USAF, sub.: NSA COMINT Support to Field Commanders, 7 May 1954). Such an arrangement had been made with ASA and the DIRNSA stated that he would take similar steps (through AFSS and NSG) to insure that all COMINT produced by NSA and transmitted to Air Force and Navy overseas COMINT units ". . . will be passed automatically to the local Commands being supported by those units. If, for any reason, there are commands overseas to which you do not desire this service to be extended, I will exclude them from the program upon your request."

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The D/I, USAF, agreed to the NSA program, but placed several limitations upon the plan to provide "all COMINT information" to overseas commands. To insure both quality and timeliness, USAF divided the NSA end products into two types; SPECIAL DELIVERY and NORMAL DELIVERY. The first type was to be sent by rapid means to designated recipients, and the second type by regular channels to Security Service locations. In each case USAF would specify the information desired, by categories, and the addressees to which each type should be transmitted. (Ltr., D/I, USAF, Gen Lewis, to DIRNSA, General Canine, 7 July 1954).

Security Service dispatched a message to the D/I USAF, which strongly supported the Air Force concept. It was also felt that such procedures would tend to alleviate the serious congestion of the AF SSO distribution and processing system. (Msg for AFOIN, Colonel Sirmyer to General Lewis, no date). It would also prevent the overloading of communications circuits with routine information from the numerous sections and divisions of NSA. Furthermore, the AFSS field units and the AF SSO personnel could screen and select certain information according to the immediate or changing needs of local consumers.

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Impact of NSCID (Revised) On the Organizational  
Structure of USAF Security Service

The major influence of the revision of NSCID No. 9 on the organizational structure of the Command was its designation of the Director of NSA as having operational and technical control over AFSS. Because of this factor, it was necessary that the developments relative to the planning and activation of AFSS field units meet with the approval of the National Security Agency before concrete action could be taken to implement new changes in the Command structure.

During the period December 1952 to August 1954, three major courses were pursued in attempting to develop an effective, productive organizational Command structure for the European-Mediterranean area. These developments concerned (1) the establishment of a Headquarters USAFSS representative organization in the European theater of operations; (2) the activation of the 6950th Security Group and difficulties experienced in establishing a satisfactory mission for that organization, and (3) the establishment of a single or central processing activity in the European area of operations.

The Establishment of an AFSS Representative  
Agency in Europe

On 4 December 1952, the Commander AFSS (General Lynn) proposed that the 6950th Security Wing be established in the United Kingdom (collocated with the 10th RSM) to: (a) accomplish the function of command over all

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USAF Security Service Units in the European area; (b) act as the command representative in the European area on all Security Service matters; (c) provide a central processing center for the production of air communications intelligence for the European area (including the United Kingdom, Europe proper, North Africa, Mediterranean, and the Middle East areas); (d) provide through centralized processing certain tactical air communications intelligence required by Air Force organizations in the European area and by the Air Defense Command and Strategic Air Command in the United States. (Ref: Ltr., CCG USAFSS to DIRNSA, subj: Establishment of the 6950th Security Wing, 4 Dec 1952).

The DIRNSA did not concur with this proposal to establish an operational Wing. On 29 December 1952 he stated that:

"At the conferences held at your Headquarters on 11 December 1952, it was decided that the early establishment in the UK of a Security Group instead of a Wing was highly desirable." (Ref: 1st Ind (Ltr CCG to DIRNSA, subj: Establishment of the 6950th Security Wing, 4 Dec 52), 29 Dec 1952.)

On 23 February 1953 the 6910th Security Group proposed that an AFSS Europe should be established and on 2 March, at a conference held at AFSS Headquarters it was decided that a Wing in Europe was essential. The Vice Chief of Staff (Colonel H. H. Towler) advised the Commander that:

a. A continued attempt should be made to establish the Wing in the United Kingdom;

b. As a second solution, an attempt should be made to establish the Wing in Europe as an interim measure. (Ref: Ltr., Comdr 6910th SG to CCG USAFSS, subj: Organizational Concept, 25 Feb 53; Memo VCS to CCG, subj: Implementation of the Wing Concept, 3 March 1953).

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On 6 March, the Commander AFSS suggested that a Security Service Headquarters agency be established at Wiesbaden Germany, utilizing the element (administrative) of the 6910th Security Group that was currently at the location as the nucleus of the agency. (Ref: Ltr., Comdr USAFSS to DIRNSA, subj: USAFSS Organizations in Europe, 6 March 1953).

On 27 March 1953, the DIRNSA concurred with the proposal to establish a Security Service Headquarters Agency in Europe and stated he recognized that the Command would eventually require an administrative Wing Headquarters to Command the three USAFSS groups in Europe. (Ref: 1st Ind (Ltr CCG to DIRNSA, subj: USAFSS Organizations in Europe, 6 March 1953) 27 March 1953 - Serial 0001928).

Consequently, on 1 April 1953, the Commander AFSS requested authority from USAF to establish the 6900th Security Wing at Wiesbaden to coordinate and control the Operations and administration of the three Security Service Groups and to act as the area representative of AFSS on all Security Service matters. (Ref: Ltr., Hq USAFSS to C/S, USAF, subj: Organization of the 6900th Security Service Wing, 1 April 1953). The approval was granted by USAF on 6 May 1953. (Ref: 1st Ind to above letter, 6 May 53). Further, on 1 May 1953, the Commander USAFSS requested the Commander-in-Chief, USAFE to provide housing space in the Wiesbaden area for a Security Service Wing, giving as a justification for the location the proximity of ASA Europe, NSA Europe and USAF Europe. (Ref: Ltr., Hq USAFSS to CINC USAFE, subj: USAF Security Service Wing, 1 May 1953).

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The Wing was activated on 1 August 1953 (Ref: GO 40, Hq USAFSS, 10 June 1953) and on 1 October 1953, the 6910th, 6930th and 6950th Security Groups were assigned to the organization.

**Establishment of the 6950th Security Group And The  
Difficulties Encountered in Assigning It a Suit-  
able Mission**

In November and December 1952, NSA and AFSS were attempting to establish an overall COMINT mission for AFSS under the terms of NSCID No. 9, Revised. In a conference on 11 December 1952, General Canine concurred in the establishment of a Group in the UK. (Ref: Memo VCS to CCG, subj: Implementation of the Wing Concept, 3 March 1953).

On 24 December 1952, the DIRNSA informed SUSLO that the 6950th would be a Group, would exercise control over the RSMs in the UK, would provide close support PVO service for SAC elements and would coordinate various matters with the British. (Ref: TWX, DIRNSA to SUSLO, DTG 241516Z Dec 1952, SAG 3669).

On 29 December, the DIRNSA indicated that the establishment of a Security Group in the UK was highly desirable. He stated that:

The primary mission of the 6950th Security Group would be to exercise normal command control over all Air Force Security Service units located there and to provide the COMINT close support requirements of U.S. Air Force Commanders in the UK. The proposed Security Group, when established, will afford direct support to local SAC elements, with primary emphasis on the European PVO problem. The intercept and analysis required for this and other missions of the Group will be coordinated with GCHQ in order to effect maximum utilization of the combined COMINT resources. (Ref: 1st Ind (Ltr CCG to DIRNSA, subj: Establishment of 6950th Security Wing, 4 Dec 1952) 29 Dec 1952).

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Concurrently, the British were attempting to obtain assurance that USCIB would support British requirements for exchange of personnel (6950th and GCHQ) authorize direct PVO technical support of the 6950th Group by GCHQ, accord equal treatment of RAF and USAF PVO intelligence requirements by the Group and maintain close coordination by the Group and UK field stations on coverage. (Ref: TWX, DIRNSA to CG USAFSS, DTG 221630Z Jan 1953). On 9 January 1953, the USCIB coordinator reiterated the NSA concept of Operations for the 6950th Group to SUSLO. At that time, the coordinator assured SUSLO that the minimum assigned responsibilities of the 6950th Group would be to provide analysis and current reporting of PVO material taken by US/UK stations in the UK and such other intercept as might be desirable and feasible to provide. (Ref: Tech Note, CCO to VCS, Cite: WDC/CCO 0115, 9 Jan 1953, TSC 130).

By late February 1953, the 6910th Group had developed a Plan of Operations for AFSS in Europe. It was forwarded to AFSS on 25 February. Generally, the plan envisioned three operational Groups -- two primarily concerned with TAC Air requirements or problems and the third (6950th) chiefly concerned with PVO, Long Range Air and civil air projects. (Ref: Ltr, Comdr 6910th SG to CG USAFSS, subj: Organizational Concept, 25 Feb 1953).

The 6950th Security Group was activated on 1 May 1953, was set up in the UK at Chicksands in October and November and became partially

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operational in December 1953. (Hq USAFSS, History, Vol. VIII, 1 Jan - 30 June 1953, p. 215). At the time of the deployment of the Group a mission had been planned for the organization that later proved to be an assignment (primarily PVO) that was technically undesirable.

On 3 December, Colonel Evans, (6900th Security Wing) stated that mission assignments of the 6910th and 6950th Groups should be divided in such a manner that they would parallel the Russian integrated systems of PVO and TAC air. He recommended that the mission of the 6950th only include CivAir, LRAF and NAVair processing. (Ref: Msg 6900th Comdr, 1001Z, DTG 021545Z Dec 53).

On 20 January 1954 the Commander USAFSS and representatives of USAFSS units held a conference with NSA representatives in Europe concerning the mission of the 6950th Group. It was agreed to task the 6950th Group with LRAF, NAVair and Civil Air and Russian PVO processing in USSR proper and to assign processing of satellite PVO and TAC air to the 6910th Group. This suggestion was not coordinated with GCHQ. It was agreed that the assignment of Russian PVO to the 6950th be made immediately. (Ref: Msg Cite Comdr 10021. Munson from Wildes).

Afterwards, NSA attempted to incorporate the responsibilities outlined in the meeting of 20 January into a mission for the 6950th Security Group.

By 16 February this Headquarters agreed that the sole remaining point of difference on the Group mission was the degree of duplication

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of satellite PVO processing between the 6910th and 6950th Groups.

(Ref: Msg, Comdr USAFSS to AFSSOP, Cite 00020101, DTG 162200Z February 1954).

On 26 February, AFSS advised the 6900th Wing of negotiations with NSA concerning the mission of the 6950th Group and requested that the Wing prepare a tentative phasing of the efforts of the two Groups. (Ref: Msg, Comdr USAFSS to Comdr 6900th Security Wing, Cite OOD 20127, DTG 261715Z, February 1954).

In March, Commander, USAFSS, discussed the mission of the 6950th Group with DIRNSA. At that time DIRNSA indicated that NSA had only planned to assign CivAir to the 6950th. The Commander USAFSS recommended that LRAF be added to the mission. Later, a study was prepared at NSA concerning the effects of transferring LRAF field processing to the 6950th as an assignment. A conference was held 5-7 April between NSA and AFSS representatives to prepare the study. It was completed on 7 April and an interim mission of Soviet European CivAir, Soviet proper PVO problems (being accomplished by 10th RSM) was established for the 6950th Group. (Ref: Comdr USAFSS to Comdr 6900th Wing, Cite OOD 2024Z). (D/F, Comdr from DC/S Operations, Subj: 6950th Security Group Mission, dated 16 Apr 1954).

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On 18 May the Wing forwarded information relative to requested circuit needs but indicated uncertainty as to whether increased capacity would handle total requirements for the proposed Chicksands centralized processing activity. (Ref: Msg Cite Comdr 10087, DTG 181500Z May 54).

On 2 June 1954, DIRNSA informed this Headquarters that a study of the program for the COMINT support of all echelons of the U. S. Air Force in the European and Mediterranean areas had recently been completed. The results of the study necessitated the initiation of changes in COMINT planning. The main changes cited in the correspondence were: (a) The long range program for Air Force COMINT support would now reflect a major COMINT processing

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(b) There would be two (2) subordinate processing centers (located in the UK [25x3] which would perform reporting tasks in accordance with specific missions to be assigned in appropriate operations orders. (The center established in the UK would have the capacity of expanding rapidly to assume the complete COMINT processing mission in support of the Strategic Air Command if and when the latter should move to the U.K.) In order to implement the new program expeditiously DIRNSA desired that this Command: (a) proceed with the construction of suitable facilities in the UK for the establishment of a processing center of Group level.

(b) Initiate action immediately to have the funds previously scheduled for the construction of a COMINT processing center at [25x3] Air Force Base transferred to a similar project in [25x3] and "push with all celerity" the construction of this project. (c) Initiate immediate steps to have the 6910th Security Group removed from Landsberg without delay. (preferably to a suitable location in [25x3] but in any event, [25x3]

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The operational functions of the Security Groups during periods of normal (peace time) operation would be: (a) Liaison with the air commanders, to ascertain their requirements for COMINT information by subject and type of report, (b) informing COMINT activities of normal and special delivery needs of the Air Commanders in the Groups' area of responsibility, (c) receiving all normal delivery COMINT made available for distribution to the air commanders in the area from all levels of COMINT procedures, (d) screening the COMINT so received, selecting and forwarding that which pertains to the requirements of the commanders being served, (e) and collating selected intelligence information when necessary.

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In time of war, the Security Groups would be given a processing mission and would be placed in close support status with respect to their support commands. To accomplish this close support mission, the Groups would be given personnel from the center to be utilized in processing activities on designated close support problems.

During periods of normal operations, the AFSACE would deal directly with all Squadrons in the UK/European/25x3 area on operational and technical matters, with the following specific functions.

"(a) Second echelon mission control in assigning and altering the tasks among Squadrons. (b) Second echelon technical support of AFSS COMINT - producing units in the area. (c) Second echelon processing - T/A, C/A, language exploitation reporting - for AFSS effort in the area. (d) Issuance of local COMINT operating procedures for all Squadrons in the area. (e) Direct and monitor implementation of routine and non-routine operational control instructions from higher headquarters among Squadrons in the area. (f) Second echelon authentication of technical and intelligence information for all AFSS COMINT-producing activities in the area. (g) Preparation and dissemination of timely collated wrap-up reports, special and term studies on all problems assigned to AFSS activities in the area."

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During periods of normal operations, squadron facilities would be under direct operation supervision of the AFSACE. Analysis and control would be confined to two (2) field levels, the normal peacetime operational functions of the Group being analogous to those of AFSSOP for the Air Force in Washington.

Until such time as the AFSACE was permanently located and operational in [25x3] there would be two stand-by centers (namely 10 RSM in UK and 34 RSM in [25x3]. After its establishment there would be only one stand by center, the 10th RSM. (Reference, appendix E to NSA-AFSS conference report 3 - 6 Aug 54).

On 11 August the 6900 Wing (Col Evans) informed the Commander USAFSS that overall reaction of JUSMG to establishing a centralized processing agency in [25x3] was favorable. Suggested locations were either [25x3] [25x3] Logistical support of the center would pose no untoward problems at either site. A communications system could be provided for all required circuits. The only limitations that would be imposed by the [25x3] would be for AFSS units to utilize native sons to the maximum in non-sensitive activities. (Ref: cite comdr 20043, Bassett from Evans DTG 111000Z Aug 54).

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The Commander USAFSS forwarded this information to the DIRNSA on 13 August indicating that [25x3] appeared to be a suitable site for the major processing center, and requested DIRNSA'S comments on the subject. ((Ref: Msg Cite CCG 20694 (Canine from Bassett) (DTG 132213Z Aug 54)). A similar message was also sent to AFSSC USAF (AFOIN Lewis from Bassett)(CCG 20695, TSC 54-8221.)

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SECTION II

- I PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AFSS REPRESENTATIVE AGENCY TO CINCPAC AND USAPPAO.
- II DECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL COMINT EFFORT
- III FIRMING OF PLANS RELATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL PROCESSING ACTIVITY IN THE EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA.

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- 3-9 Aug 54 - (1) Conference held on squadron processing and reporting program. . . . . 24  
 (2) Proposed single processing center concept prepared . . . . . 47-49
- 5 Aug 54 - DIEMSA proposed the establishment of an Air Force COMINT unit in Hawaii and the subordination to the newly established activity of all AFSS COMINT units which were or may be later committed to the CINCPAC area . . . . . 52-53
- 18 Aug 54 - DIEMSA stated in a message to this Headquarters that he does not preclude site surveys to be conducted in [25x3] or [25x3] for possible location of major processing center. . . . . 50
- 26 Aug 54 - AFSS recommended to DIEMSA that (1) Move of the 6910th Security Group to France be abandoned; (2) the processing effort in connection with the Soviet Long-Range Air Force and the Soviet Air Navigation Nets be transferred from the 6910th Security Group to the 6950th Security Group on an interim basis pending the establishment of a permanent major processing center; (3) vans be allocated the 6910th Security Group to expedite evacuation of operational activities in the event of an emergency. . . . . 39
- 30 Aug 54 - Comments from Hq AFSS concerning NSCIB 9 (Revised). . . . . 51
- 30 Aug 54 - DIEMSA directed the three cryptologic agencies to decentralize the National COMINT effort. . . . . 53-54
- 3 Sept 54 - DIEMSA reaffirmed his contention that the European-Mediterranean central [25x3] 60

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8 Sept 54 - DIRNSA approved the concept of operations wherein first echelon processing and reporting is accomplished at squadron level and second-echelon processing and reporting is concentrated at one central location. However, he did not approve of the AFSS recommendation of the establishment of a separate central processing center as such. He implied that the major processing center would be a Group and that the 6910th and 6950th Security Groups would continue to be assigned processing missions. 61-62

- 13 Sept 54 - A. AFSS answered DIRNSA's proposal on establishing AFSS separate unit in Hawaii. AFSS suggested (1) that central processing center be established in the Pacific at a later date; (2) until that time, the 6920th Security Group continue to function as the major USAFSS COMINT center in the Pacific. . . . . 52-53
- B. AFSS requested that Hq USAF conduct negotiations with NSA relating to such critical questions as (1) location for major processing centers in the European-Mediterranean area; (2) relocation of the 6910th Security Group and (3) the assignment of the interim central processing mission to the 6950th Security Group until the major processing center could be established. AFSS also requested that Hq USAF issue appropriate directives to all USAF organizations that may be affected by the new plans concerning the USAF COMINT structure. . . . . 62-63

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**I PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AFSS REPRESENTATIVE  
AGENCY TO CINCPAC AND USAFPAC.**

In August, DIRNSA informed the Commander USAFSS that a survey of existing COMINT support to CINCPAC had been completed. He stated that at the time of the review, no COMINT structure existed in CINCPAC comparable to that found in other unified commands. In an effort to alleviate this situation he proposed (a) The establishment in Hawaii of an Air Force COMINT unit and (b) The subordination to the newly established activity of all AFSS COMINT units which were or might be later committed to the CINCPAC area. He further proposed that the new unit be allocated group or independent status and that it be provided a mission (a) to exercise normal command and administrative functions over all AFSS COMINT units in the CINCPAC area; (b) to act as a COMINT "Interpretive Unit" for both CINCPAC and Headquarters, US Air Forces Pacific (USAFAC) on all COMINT problems dealing with foreign air forces, and (c) to conduct processing of selected communications material as required and to maintain a state of readiness in the event that future developments made it necessary to conduct both processing and reporting in Hawaii. He did not feel that the new support to CINCPAC should be subordinated to the 6920th Security Group. (Ref: Ltr, DIRNSA to Comdr USAFSS Subj: COMINT Support to CINCPAC and USAFPAC, dated 5 Aug 54).

Upon receipt of the correspondence cited above this Headquarters initiated action to prepare a plan that would implement the proposals of DIRNSA relating to COMINT support, by this Command, for CINCPAC

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and USAFPAC. In September, the Commander USAFSS informed DIINSA of the preparation of the plan but stated that there was little need for establishing the Hawaiian facility until such time as it had more than one subordinate unit under its control. Furthermore, he questioned the proposal of maintaining two more or less equal and independent USAFSS COMINT organizations in the Pacific area (i.e., 6920th Security Group and the new facility to be located in Hawaii). He implied that difficulty would arise when NSA-USAFSS staff personnel began assigning the second echelon Air COMINT processing effort between the two organizations, and cited the difficulties experienced in assigning particular missions to the 6910th and 6930th Security Groups as an example of this type planning problem. In order to alleviate this problem, the Commander USAFSS recommended the establishment of a single USAFSS COMINT processing center in the Pacific area and suggested that the 6920th Security Group continue to function as the major USAFSS COMINT Center in the Pacific until such time as such a center may be established. (Ref: Ltr., Comdr USAFSS to DIINSA, Subj: COMINT Support to CINCPAC and USAFPAC, 18 Sept 54).

## II DECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL COMINT EFFORT

On 30 August the DIINSA informed the three Cryptologic Agencies that he had concluded that the "over-all efficiency and effectiveness of the National COMINT effort . . . be markedly improved by putting into effect an expanded decentralization program for COMINT

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processing." (Ref: Ltr., DIRNSA to Chief, ASA: Director, Naval Communications and Commander, USAFSS, Subj: Decentralization of the National COMINT Effort, 30 August 54).

DIRNSA stated that the problem of COMINT decentralization was complicated by the continually changing nature of foreign Communications. This factor conditioned detailed long range planning and imposed a major requirement upon NSA and the cryptologic agencies to develop and maintain a high degree of COMINT capability in field resources. In order to achieve optimum benefits from the National COMINT effort he emphasized that continued technological advancement within the National COMINT Center and COMINT competency in the field would be necessary. He contended that "an incentive for continuous growth and development" of COMINT resources outside the National COMINT Center could be provided by assignment of processing and reporting responsibilities for COMINT problems to field COMINT units. He defined this decentralization process as the assignment of COMINT production responsibilities to a field COMINT unit for a complete COMINT problem and would normally include the attendant delegation of operational control of the personnel and facilities required for the problem. (Ref: Ltr., DIRNSA to Chief, ASA: Director, Naval Communications and Commander, USAFSS, Subj: Decentralization of the National COMINT Effort, 30 August 54).

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DIRNSA maintained that the capabilities of field units could be increased through a COMINT decentralization program which contained the following objectives:

- a. To facilitate a direct and timely response to the COMINT requirements of military commands and other organizations receiving COMINT support by assigning COMINT processing and reporting responsibilities of exploitable material to field COMINT units as close as practicable to the point of intercept.
- b. To prevent unnecessary duplication of effort at the various echelons of COMINT processing and reporting and to insure continuity of effort at all echelons by broadening the scope of National COMINT coverage within existing ceiling and budgetary limitations.
- c. To develop and to maintain a high degree of COMINT capability and resourcefulness in the field to insure satisfactory response at all times to COMINT requirements.
- d. To achieve greater efficiency and responsiveness of operations through the experience gained by COMINT producers and consumers working together on problems of immediate and common interest.

The DIRNSA outlined the fundamental principles of the program as follows:

- a. The U. S. COMINT effort must produce timely and accurate response to COMINT requirements.
- b. Intercepted materials which are quickly exploitable should in general be processed for intelligence reporting at the first point of intercept where substantially all the intercept necessary for such reporting can be brought rapidly together and the requisite analytic and reporting capability exists.
- c. COMINT analytic and reporting capabilities must be established as close as practicable to the point of intercept.
- d. Unnecessary duplication of both technical and intelligence COMINT processing and reporting must be eliminated.

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e. The National Center will maintain essential technical support and research programs on all decentralized COMINT problems.

f. The National Center will, on a continuing basis, review and evaluate the capabilities of field COMINT units to execute delegated tasks, and provide such guidance and support as is required by these units in performing their mission.

g. Service Cryptologic Agencies must develop and maintain the capability to assume the responsibility for decentralized COMINT problems from within their own resources.

h. The National Center will provide the necessary guidance for advanced planning by the Service Cryptologic Agencies and will support their decentralization programs.

i. Decentralization of COMINT problems to field COMINT units will normally include the attendant delegation of operational control of the personnel and the facilities required for the problem.

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j. NSA will initiate the assignment of problems for decentralized COMINT processing and reporting and will terminate such delegation when changes in the scope or nature of a problem make continued assignment impractical or undesirable.

For accounting and assignment purposes foreign Communications were to be grouped into separate and distinct "COMINT entities," and COMINT entities were to be normally divided into separate "COMINT problems". The DIRNSA defined a "COMINT entity" as any Communications Complex which was distinguishable within National and in some instances, international Communications structures. (Examples: The North Korean Ground Force Communications; [redacted] Police Communications; Soviet 24th Air Army Communications; Intersatellite Air Warning Net, etc.)

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A COMINT problem was defined as any COMINT operation which involved processing and reporting activity sufficient to produce a single, unique type of COMINT end-product. (Examples, complete translations of Korean military messages, term reporting based on 25x3 Police traffic, daily spot-reporting based on Russian PVO Voice-intercepts, etc. Normally only those COMINT problems which involve the Communications of foreign military and paramilitary formations were to be decentralized to field units. As a rule, no COMINT problems of a purely research nature were to be decentralized.

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The DIRNSA also issued a statement of responsibilities that would be recognized in the implementation of the COMINT decentralization program. They revealed that:

a. NSA is responsible for determining criteria for decentralization of individual problems.

b. NSA is responsible for the determination of the delegation or termination of assignments for decentralized COMINT processing and reporting.

c. NSA is responsible for planning for the projected decentralization of COMINT problems. In such planning, NSA, advising with the Service Cryptologic Agencies, is responsible for establishing and observing realistic phasing for the decentralization of COMINT problems.

d. NSA is responsible for placing decentralization requirements upon the Service Cryptologic Agencies and for providing the information and guidance essential to advanced planning and programming by these Agencies.

e. The Service Cryptologic Agencies are responsible for the integration into their own COMINT activities of decentralization requirements placed upon them by NSA.

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f. The Service Cryptologic Agencies are responsible for developing and maintaining the capability of field COMINT units to accomplish assigned missions.

g. NSA is responsible for technical control and support of all COMINT problems delegated.

The DIRNSA stated that a plan was being prepared that would outline a project assignment of COMINT problems to each Service Cryptologic Agency for a two-year period. One of the main purposes for preparing the plan was for it to serve as a basis for the integration of decentralized COMINT processing and reporting requirements into the program of each Service Cryptologic Agency. (Ref: Ltr., DIRNSA to Chief, ASA, Director, Naval Communications, Commander, USAFSS, Subj: Decentralization of the National COMINT Effort, 30 Aug 54).

On 8 September, DIRNSA reemphasized his interest in the decentralization Program and stated, "It is particularly essential that the program for direct reporting by the Radio Squadrons proceed without delay. I. . . [DIRNSA] consider this program, because of its direct connection with our attempts to improve our early warning capabilities, to be the most important of your current undertakings." (Ref: Ltr., DIRNSA to Comdr USAFSS, Subj: USAFSS Operation in Europe, 8 Sept 54). He also indicated general areas of responsibility after the program was implemented. (a) The COMINT production undertaken at the Central Processing Center in the European-Mediterranean area

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would be a second-echelon processing activity insofar as practical. Under no circumstances was it to duplicate those reports produced at squadron level. Furthermore, first-echelon reports were not to be prepared at the major processing center except as dictated by operational and technical necessity; (b) Preparation of certain longer-term studies, Example (PVO "Satination Studies") were to be permitted at the major processing center under certain conditions, however, when such studies were decentralized to the field, they were not to be duplicated at this Headquarters; (c) operations order No. 301 to this Headquarters was to be revised by NSA to reflect the division of responsibility for the air problems among this Headquarters, USAFSS field units and the NSA Center.

The DIHNSA concluded that the implementation of the decentralization program and application of the responsibilities cited above would result in the most acceptable solution for the conduct of the Air Problem in the European area under the circumstances at that time.

(Ref: Ltr., DIHNSA to Comdr USAFSS, Subj: USAFSS Operation in Europe, 8 Sept 54).

The basic objections that this Headquarters maintained against this division of responsibilities were (a) the limitations placed on the use of first-echelon reports in the preparation of area "wrap-ups" or pertinent studies in second echelon reports and (b) the span of operational control by NSA over USAFSS field organizations (namely first-echelon reporting

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units i.e. RSM's). (Ref: Comments by Deputy Commander USAFSS (to Ltr  
DIRNSA to Comdr USAFSS, Subj: USAFSS Operation in Europe, 8 Sept 54).  
15 September 1954).

III FIRMING OF PLANS RELATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF A CENTRAL PROCESSING ACTIVITY IN THE EUROPEAN-  
MEDITERRANEAN AREA.

On 2 June 1954 the DIRNSA advocated the establishment of a major  
COMINT processing center in [25x3] the main-  
tenance of two subordinate processing centers (United Kingdom and  
[25x3] relocation of the 6910th Security Group west  
of [25x3] and designation of the  
6910th Security Group Center as the nucleus of the interim Central  
processing center until the main central processing center would become  
operational in [25x3] after exchanging correspondence and  
discussing major operational and organizational problems relative to  
the central processing concept at a conference between NSA and AFSS  
on 3-6 August 54, this Headquarters recommended the following in a  
message to DIRNSA: (a) The relocation of the 6910th to [25x3] be  
abandoned; (b) The interim central processing mission be assigned to  
the 6950th Security Group instead of the 6910th Security Group.

On 3 September DIRNSA reaffirmed his desire to locate the central  
processing activity in [25x3] and informed this Headquarters  
that negotiations were being conducted which might result in raising  
the ceiling of U. S. personnel in the [25x3] area, (a limiting

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factor offered by AFSS for the establishment of a processing center in [25x3]. He also stated that this Command should initiate procedures to indicate requirements in its planning program for the activity to be established in [25x3] with alternate requirements for a center in [25x3] (Ref: Msg DIRNSA to COMUSAFSS, DTG 031655Z Sept 54). On 8 September a message was received from DIRNSA in which he stated his approval of the concept of operations for the conduct of the European Air Problem "wherein first echelon reporting is performed at squadrons" . . . [RSM's] and second echelon reporting . . . [is accomplished] at one central location." However he did not accept a proposal by this Headquarters (outlined in Msg Comdr USAFSS to DIRNSA, cite CCG 20737 DTG 262112Z Aug) that the 6950th Security Group perform the mission of the central processing activity in Europe on an interim basis until a major processing center could be established. (Ref: Msg DIRNSA to COMUSAFSS, DTG 081746Z Sept 54). In a letter also dated 8 September 1954, the DIRNSA qualified his approval of the concept of operations wherein first echelon processing and reporting is accomplished at squadron level and second-echelon processing and reporting is concentrated at one central location by implying that the 6910th and 6950th Security Groups would also be involved in future processing activities. He stated that the 6910th Security Group would form the nucleus of the centralized processing activity in the European and [25x3] areas until a major processing center (a Security

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Group) could be established in 25x3 Upon the establishment of a major processing center, the mission of the 6910th Security Group would be revised to conform to the type of mission which was being drafted for the 6950th Security Group.

He did not approve of the establishment of a separate "center," as such, in that he considered it sufficient to differentiate between the missions of USAFSS Security Groups in their respective operations orders. DIRNSA indicated that the implementation of this new processing concept would not alter the status of the Wing. (That organization would continue to handle administrative and related matters but would not participate in COMINT operational and technical matters).

On 13 September the Commander USAFSS informed the Chief of Staff, Headquarters USAF, of the recent developments relative to the changes in AFSS operational concepts directed by NSA and the problem of determining a suitable location for a major USAFSS COMINT processing center in the European-Mediterranean area.\*

\* In an appendix to this correspondence estimated requirements for a major USAFSS COMINT processing center were cited as follows:

1. Operational Facilities: (Approx)  
(1) Processing Center administration & operations space - 21,000 sq ft.  
(2) Support Squadron administration & operations space - 11,000 sq ft.
2. Communications: 15 full duplex circuits.
3. Personnel (Operational only - does not include administrative and support personnel):  
37 officers  
344 airmen  
7 civilians  
388 Total  
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4. Housing and Messing: Normal requirements for personnel indicated above. (Ref: Appendix No. 5, Annex B, Ltr., Comdr USAFSS to Chief of Staff, Hq USAFSS, Subj: Air Force Communications Intelligence Program in the European and Mediterranean areas, 13 Sept 54).

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The Commander USAFSS urgently recommended that negotiations at the USAF-NSA level be accomplished in order to:

(a) Determine a suitable location in the European-Mediterranean area for the processing center.

(b) Relocate the 6910th Security Group in the

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(c) and assign the 6950th Security Group the interim central processing mission instead of the 6910th Security Group until the major processing center could be established in the European-Mediterranean area.

He also recommended that upon resolution of these matters, "appropriate instructions be issued to USAFE, USAFSS, and any other air commands which may be involved in implementation of the final decision."

(Ref: Ltr., Comdr USAFSS to Chief of Staff, Hq USAF, Subj: Air Force Communications Intelligence Program in the European and Mediterranean Areas, 13 Sept 1954).

*On 30 September 1954*  
the Commander USAFSS commented on DIRNSA's concept of the major processing center being an operational unit as an integral activity within a group headquarters. He indicated that this organizational concept would cause many difficulties in administration, logistics, manning, movement and support. He stated that this Headquarters had visualized that the central processing activity in the European area would be organized as an operational unit, co-equal to the present

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security groups and under the administration and logistic structure of the 6900th Security Wing. This would conform closely to standard Air Force practice and would fully satisfy NSA operational requirements. At the same time, it would simplify considerably problems in the activation, manning, and general support of this unit. In this connection, the Commander, USAFSS suggested that the simplest and most effective way of handling this type of problem would be for NSA Headquarters to state its operational requirements and have this Headquarters fulfill those requirements within the overall USAF structure. This would not infringe in any way upon NSA's recognized operational control of the National COMINT activity, but would, rather, give this Headquarters and Headquarters, USAF, considerably more flexibility in the implementation of NSA directives.

The Commander USAFSS also expressed interest in the development of the program for direct reporting by the Radio Squadrons, Mobile. Furthermore, he implied that these organizations should be allowed considerable operational flexibility. (Ref Ltr., Comdr USAFSS to DIRNSA, Subj: USAFSS Operations in Europe, 30 Sept 1954).

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