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A HISTORICAL STUDY  
OF  
THE AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE AND KOREA

June 1950 - October 1952

RETURN TO THE  
ESC HISTORICAL OFFICE

BY: Hop ~~HARRINGER~~ HARRIGER



2 October 1952

**CONTAINS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE**

6920th Security Group (USAFSS)

USAFSS FORM 86  
1 JUN 57

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"AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE AND KOREA"

TOP SECRET
AUTH: 6920th SSG
Initials: JWB
Date: 28 Oct, 52

- I. IN THE BEGINNING
- II. SOUTH KOREAN COMINT
- III. PROJECT WILLY
- IV. FATHER HENRY'S ERA
- V. BACK TO KOREA
- VI. YCKE SERVICE
- VII. INDIGENOUS TERMS
- VIII. DET 151 ~
- IX. SPECIAL WX
- X. LESSONS

APPENDIX

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Has USAF	59-709344331	OF 1
Copy	103	PAGES
Page	2	104 Pages
6920TH SSGT. GP.		
E-5204		

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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REF: USARF TRO 155.9- 3.0.9.4  
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Page.....3.....of.....104.....Pages

IN THE BEGINNING.....

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean Military Regime launched an attack on the Republic south of the 38th parallel. This had many varying effects, each dependent upon who you were and what you were doing. The COMINT agencies in the Far East were concentrating on Russian cases; Brooks Field was expanding its expanded program, but not including satellite countries; AFSA was arguing as usual over mission assignments; 1st Radio was busy fighting the PEAR and FEC SSO's, in other words, everything was normal....nil heard, searching all.

The first operational message dispatched by 1st RSM after hostilities began was apparently TS-054; however, subject message could not be located in present files. Security Service's surprise was well portrayed in their reply to the above cited message, (ST-769 dated 25 June). "Refer TS-054, Submit four times daily (until return to normal) operational report covering conditions enumerated in referenced message, including results special search for communist air activity in Korea. Devote minimum of two positions to Korean communist air activity search, exploiting any favorable results with not to exceed two additional positions, making a total of four positions maximum. Current mission assignment priority listing, cut from bottom to accomodate Korean activity. Especially desire any solid indications of Communist air ground support. Check with ASAPAC and Yokosuka to determine possibility of ground circuits developing into air ground circuits. Also advise if ASAPAC had advanced information of Korean communist attack and if yes, did ASAPAC alert you? Sole basis these instructions and questions by this headquarters is

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newspaper reports. If press reports in this country exaggerated, you are authorized to modify these instructions to conform with information available." 7 0 8 4

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This message, written the day the show started in Korea from an intelligence organization, is indicative of the conceptual handicap under which units had to begin work. AFSS was in its infancy, under-staffed and with a large proportion of unskilled personnel. Its whole limited capacity was devoted to the primary mission of early warning of Russian attack. Preparation for satellite action was beyond its capabilities.

Although the message clearly indicated that neither AFSA or AFSS had placed any intelligence importance on Korea; the important point is that neither FEAF nor GHQFEC had laid on any COMINT requirements regarding Korea. The tip-off was expected to show up in Russian nets. At that time we had a max-effort on Russian Navigational nets (our AACs) and value was sacrificed for volume. This message also highlighted the fact that inter-service rivalry existed then as now. <sup>3</sup> If ASAPAC had fore-warning, wasn't there any working agreement or liaison between the two agencies that would provide for passing such information? Would ASAPAC sit on such information? Would Navy? If ASAPAC did have it....and did pass it....would RSM sit on it? Interservice distrust was obvious as was the implication that the 1st RSM had dropped the ball. Equally apparent was the fear that higher-ups would ask why no early warning was forthcoming. Brooks Field readily admitted that all they knew was what they read in the newspapers, and there wasn't enough intelligence data on hand to properly evaluate that! The Russians had thoroughly outmaneuvered us. Anyway, the panic button had been pushed.

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On 27 June 50, Supplemental Research Section, FEAF, decided the time had come for them to get in the act. Message Cite MH-113 follows: "Deputy for Intelligence has ordered that the first RSM go into a full war alert status, effective immediately. All indications of impending hostilities should be kept in mind at all times. Any information of Soviet movements, especially during the next 24 hours should be sent immediately. Information which pertains to Soviet movement against Japan should be sent by "FLASH" precedence. This office will be open any hour, day, or night to take care of incoming messages." The AFSS Liaison Officer here demonstrated his habitual distrust of RSM intelligence which was to add to AFSS difficulties throughout his tenure.

On 28 June Brooks Field, in ST-780, advised that "USAF was extremely interested in maintaining fullest possible coverage of Soviet Air Force activity in the Far East for any reaction to U.S. forces in South Korea." The last portion of that wire was indicative of the extent of our information on North Korea. "New Subject: Location of known North Korean airfields: Konan; Sinjiju; Gengan; Kaibon; Seishin; and Sondok." All these were old Japanese fields known in World War II.

First RSM queried ASAPAC and Navy on any reflection they may have noted on impending hostilities prior to the actual offensives being launched. ASAPAC's message on 28 June Cite TLJ-076 follows: "No obvious indications in traffic intercepted of Korean communist attack. Noted radio silence on voice transmissions 22-26 June with silence broken 27 June. Except for following two incidents air circuits were normal; 25 June RUAB-2504 station Dog, believed in Hanko area, was more active than normal. On 26 June slight traffic increase on RUAB-2504 since message number 46 was observed. Numbers normally not higher than 30-35." P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

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A message from Supplemental Research Section, FEAF, on 29 June (cite)

MH-199) pointed out quite aptly that all three services supplying COMINT in the Far East gave NO pre-warning on the Korean attack. It also pointed out quite well that regardless of accuracy or value... 1st RSM was doing the most reporting. SRS message follows; "During the radio silence of 3rd Long Range Admin Net, what was activity of the 9th and 10th Air Army nets; when aircraft were <sup>e</sup>bing heard on unknown frequency, what was the activity on other nets; would the possible recon type aircraft be transport type to transfer material to North Korea, which may explain the unknown frequency? Information in your messages quite interesting, request an analysis of 9th 10th and 3rd long range safety of flight nets for comparison with this one <sup>\*</sup> and that daily summary of aircraft days for each net. New Subject: SSO just informed that Yokosuka reported as of 0630K that all nets had become silent. No times were given. Can you confirm or has he just woke up to your 3rd long range activity? This is first information from Yokosuka to GHQ and as yet none from ASAPAC since the Korean incident."

On 14 July (Cite: MH-177) SRS-FEAF queried COMINT agencies on the who, what, where, why and how of the North Korean Air Force: "CG FEAF urgently requires the following information: where are aircraft of North Korea based; if camouflaged fields are used where are they located; are aircraft flying to Manchuria or other parts for re-service or refueling and then returning to North Korea for combat; if so, from what fields are they using for re-service; assuming radio silence is absolute, what fields in North Korea were formerly engaged in heavy aircraft traffic? Probably best indications from your source are air movements into or out of North Korea; Aircraft heard contacting ground stations in North Korea or near airfields adjacent thereto. Even though traffic today may be

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SECURITY INFORMATION

at a standstill, what is your estimate as to airfields most frequently contacted prior to hostilities? Please list all indications and label firm, probable or possible. This information will be checked against open source material. Negative or positive report is required at 1100K 15 July. Please pass to ASAPAC and NAVCOM with request for assistance if necessary."

This message was passed to other agencies as requested. RSM's reply to the query was "send us the open source material so we'll know what and where to look". ASAPAC's answer could not be located. Navy's answer follows; "15 July 50 Cite; SM-3. The only recent information regarding air bases in North Korea adjacent areas was derived from study of intercepted communications from Soviet Naval air transport flights

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These air-

craft were indicated as using the following air bases: Firm: Heijo, Kanko and Genzan. Probably: Seishin and Shingishu. Possible: Rashin and Joshin. There have been no indications of Soviet Naval air activity in North Korea since January 1949, when fighter regiments based at Genzan were apparently disbanded or transferred to other unknown bases".

In all probability the longest wire dispatched by any COMINT agency during this confused period, was written to Hq AFSS (P) 30 June by Captain Reed, then 1st RSM Operations Officer. "Amber alert, no change. Summary and analysis of Korean situation to date follows: Analysis of traffic since the Korean offensive began on 25 June has failed to show any definite trends to the effect that Soviet forces are going to support the North Koreans in any active or all out manner. It is believed that the Soviets did not expect the United States to intervene with armed might. Therefore, it is supposed that they were faced with a shortage

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of sufficient materials to support full scale war in the Korean area without additional buildup. Points which indicate a lack of intention to support the North Koreans by the Soviets follows: (A) the following nets undoubtedly would reflect an increase in activity if hostilities

25x3

Otherwise the circuit is normal. (C) Analysis of aircraft travel into North Korea, [25x3] has failed to show an increase in volume. On 30 June 50, during the nine hours of excellent daylight flying weather, no aircraft were observed south of [25x3]. In fact, less air traffic has been noted in the area south of [25x3] during the five days after 25 June than during the five days previous. There have been no definite trends of air travel which might indicate staging or stock-piling at any particular point. (D) ASAPAC reports that with one possible exception, radio printer activity between Moscow and the Far East has remained normal or decreased."

And there we have heard the voice of "COMINT" speak in reference to the first three weeks of the Korean incident. FEAF asked a lot of questions they should have had the answers to years ago; Navy, RSM and Army tried to find all the answers in Russian traffic; and Brooks Field had to read the newspapers.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

It appeared that Korea, like the other satellites, had been completely ignored because only Russia could be considered to be the true threat to peace. While we were watching the "big picture" for clues as to who could shoot whom, the "little picture" lifted our wallets to the tune of goodly number of millions in equipment, and countless lives.

It seems almost too fantastic to believe that SCAP's G-2 didn't at least suspect that something was hot in frozen Chosen. If he did, why wasn't someone, somewhere in Intelligence circles, interested in whether the "Peoples Liberation Army" had any radio communications? No one appeared to think there were possibly airfields in North Korea that might be used to stage aircraft; no one seemed to figure that a well organized and equipped army might decide to migrate south.

It is interesting to conjecture what the outcome would have been had COMINT agencies been committed to cover Korea then as they are now.

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increasingly more difficult.

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up 25x3 Possible reasons and contributing factors will be discussed later.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

There is no doubt that early warning would have been forthcoming had a COMINT effort been directed to Korean air and ground activity, for since committed, we have been successful in catching their major ground and air attacks. There is positive proof that no tip-off came from

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Page 9 of 104 Pages

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SECURITY INFORMATION  
SOUTH KOREANS COMINT

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Prior to the Korean War the ROK'S were making feeble attempts to develop the COMINT picture. Whether this information ever reached American hands prior to the outbreak of hostilities is uncertain; however, in view of the type of traffic being copied, it is doubtful if it would have been of any value as far as early warning was concerned. Major Cho Yong II, Commanding Officer, ROKAF Det 3, (attached to Det 151, 15th RSM), prepared the following resume of their early activities through the first six months of the war. The validity is uncertain and in many instances the information is quite vague; however, Mr. Donald Nichols of OSI assured us that it was fairly accurate. According to Mr. Nichols, Cho had defected from Communist territory, in 1948, and prior to this time had been a radio operator and cryptanalyst with the North Koreans at Chinnampo. Cho has always been reluctant to discuss his past, but it is known that he was a private in the Japanese Army and later a merchant seaman with the Russian Navy. His narrative regarding the early development of ROK intercept follows verbatim:

"In December 1949, approximately four months after the Republic of Korea had become recognized by international authorities, a rebellion movement started in the area around Yosu and Suchon, in South Korea. When this situation had settled down, the Republic of Korea Army and Navy took steps to intercept communications information that the North Korean Agencies had used to start the rebellion".

"The ROK Army established their communications watch station at Tuk Som in the outskirts of Seoul; the Navy set up their similar agency with 15 men under control of a Lt Kang Yong Jip".

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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"On 1 October 1949, the ROK Air Force was founded independent of the ROK army aviation troop and the task of collecting communications intelligence was assigned to Section four under the intelligence department of ROKAF Headquarters. On or about 1 April 50, this unit began to function".

"On 1 June 1950 Major Cho Yong II (then 2d Lt) was appointed officer in charge of Section four. During the month of June when much work was being performed collecting qualified personnel and equipment, Section four was forced to evacuate Seoul due to the unexpected aggression of the North Korean Army against unarmed South Korea on 25 June 50".

"At the time the ROK army communications intelligence agency had been organized with 30 men (including three officers) under Maj Han Kwang II. They lost the majority of their equipment at Tuk Son, in Seoul, during their withdrawal, but were able to set up five more radio positions at Taegu, Korea".

"The ROK Naval intercept unit also lost the majority of their equipment; however, they rebuilt at Chinhae Naval Communications Installation under the leadership of the same Lt Yang. During their stay in Pusan, they became attached to an ASA agency under EUSAK. Commander Kim Sae Won, an Adjutant of Pusan Port Constabulary Hqs, became the leader of the Navy detachment under EUSAK".

"Section four of the ROKAF intelligence department had three receivers and a few qualified personnel. During this time, our unit intercepted an enemy C/W report that was transmitted by the Hwanghae Do (Province) Guard Troop. This message dealt with the UN bombing. We (ROKAF) reported this serious matter to Mr Nichols, who was an advisor to the South Korean Air Force. (Note: The message Cho made reference to was the enemy reporting the bomb damage caused by one of our early strikes)".

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"The very day this message was delivered, I was ordered by Mr. Nichols to move our equipment and members to his house. Here I received part of the old lesson "Now the emergency is here, come on to my house." This I could not refuse, so on 17 July 1950, we moved to his house".

"Maj Han (of ROK Army) could hardly decipher the current enemy codes so the messages were sent to us (me) to be decrypted. These deciphered reports were submitted to General Chang Do Yong, who was Deputy for Intelligence, ROK Army."

"9 August 50, in order to get better results, ROK Air and Naval Forces (4 Air-16 Naval) had cooperated at Mr Nichols house to get the better results. For a short time all worked at the same table; however, 18 August, the Naval Detachment returned to EUSAK".

3 September 50, 9 more men were added to my section and on 13 October the section advanced to Seoul."

"Since the front had rapidly advanced north according to the victorious war situation, Lt Han Dong Jin (now Captain), 2 operators and one translator (Korean-English) moved up to Sinanju with a U.S. (OSI) Sgt Peterson, to carry on the intercept work on 17 November."

"On 31 November 50, the Sinanju Detachment (Then under 1st Radio and commanded by S/Sgt Schumann) <sup>(4)</sup> evacuated and returned to Pyongyang. During the period beginning in October to 20 November, it was almost a recess time for us because the NK forces were overwhelmingly pressed or evacuated owing to the UN's mighty advance. However, on approximately 20 Nov, as soon as the Chinese Communist Forces intervened in Korea the remarkable change had appeared in communications networks. Their communications nets were widely extended due to the powerful assistance of CCF and 8 Corps

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of North Koreans".

"Once we had evacuated Pyongyang, we became operational at Seoul and continued our heaven given mission at Ewha University as Detachment 3 of the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile".

/s/ Cho Yong II  
Capt, ROKAF

Cho's comment regarding lack of pre-warning was centered around the "type of traffic being copied". The ground work for full coverage of Army, Air, and Naval nets had not been completed, and in the main, only political and more or less "suspected subversive" links were being monitored.

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Page.....13.....of 104.....Pages

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SECURITY INFORMATION III

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PROJECT WILLY: ⑤

On 1 July 1950, The Security Service decided to enter the Korean War. The idea in itself was excellent; however, the cloak and dagger method selected to carry it out helped retard our COMINT entry in Korea by a good five months. We were still amateurs.

In collecting the material needed to write this portion of the report, the files of the 1st Radio Squadron were the main source. There was nothing to be found in the files belonging to Fifth Air Force, and a thorough check on SRS-FEAF files revealed very little. Maj Vandiver, FEAFS SRS during this period, has returned to the ZI, and messages passed between his shop, Korea, and AFSS, are not available. Maj Paul A. Tisdale, current SSO -FEAF, stated that, in his belief, a majority of the non-current wires had been destroyed. Some of the wires and other correspondence, passed between FAF-EUSAK and FEAF, dealing with the ejection of Project Willy from Korea, would be of great interest in determining who did what to whom and why.

The first foot-in-the-door message came from Brooks Field on 1 July, 1950, Cite ST-301. "Have obtained air priority 2-D for Captain

Charles Willis and Lt Edward Murray who will arrive Fairfield-Suisun 3 July and proceed to 1st RSM for 30 dys TDY to assist your analysis effort. Investigate the possibility of obtaining 8 loyal, English speaking South Koreans for the purpose of manning 2 intercept positions in Korea under cover of U.S. Military Advisors to Korea. If concurrence obtained from Rogers A-2 FEAF this Hqs authorizes Lt Murray to proceed to Korea for the purpose of implementing intercept effort.

Utmost discretion required and, if good possibility of capture

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exists, Murray cannot go to Korea. Authority granted for Murray only as he recently returned from Europe and is not known locally in Japan. Supply of intercept equipment, courier on radio traffic return and so on will be your responsibility."

The manner in which this project was greeted by FEAF is fairly well shown in a wire Willis sent to McCartney shortly after arrival in Japan.

Cite: TS-338 dated 25 July 1950: "Herewith details of Murray Project: On arrival in Japan Murray, Willis, and Jameson reported to Col Rogers. Rogers was briefed on necessity of high classification for project and nonexposure of Murray to capture. Rogers was in full accord and enthusiastic and advised that 8 Koreans of unquestionable loyalty were awaiting Murrays arrival in Korea but he would not release Murray until such time as the 25th Division could be committed and our lines firmly established. At that time Murray would report to Col Simpson at 5th Air Force. Simpson was expecting Murray and was to provide full support. Murray was to report all operational matters to Gen Partridge direct. Required equipment was to have all 1st RSM markings removed, then turned over to 5th Air Force for shipment. No communications between Murray and 1st RSM were authorized. All material was to be passed via special channel from 5th Air Force to FEAF. Murray departed for Korea 15 July and reported to Simpson and Partridge. Partridge was very enthusiastic and stated this project just what he wanted. Have had no further information from Murray since, but believe he departed from Korea about 19 July. Will advise as soon as some word is received."

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There were a few errors in that wire, though at the time they were not known. Note the lack of communications with 1st RSM. Since that wire was written a major problem has been the establishment of communications between Korea and 1st RSM. We were sticking our heads in the sand.

Shortly thereafter 1st RSM saw an opportunity to get into field processing. TS-406 dated 2 August: "Lt Murray returned with North Korean Code books.

We are now using 2 twenty-four hour positions for Korean search in hopes of exploiting that material. In addition, 4 practice positions are aiding in search. This necessitates curtailed copy of regular assignment. Request consideration of this situation in August mission. We need 4 positions controlled locally for theater exploitation. New Subject: Request Korean and Chinese dictionaries soonest. Also urgently request all 8 volumes of "preliminary NIS Gazetter of the USSR" published by CIA. Map supplies in theater are limited therefore request any applicable maps available your headquarters. Collateral intelligence sources also limited. Request distribution Air Force Intelligence Summaries and any other applicable collateral."

With work already underway to locate a translator for use at RSM, the above code books and request for freedom of use in positions was a step toward processing locally. The balance of the wire sounds like a supply requisition. Collateral was meager. Maj Vandiver, RSM's only contact with FEAF, was a great believer in keeping current secrets to himself. He believed RSM's had no business in the processing or intelligence game, and should have no collateral, for it might distort RSM reporting. RSM

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SECURITY INFORMATION

should give him all the fragments and he'd decide what FEAF should get.

The next communication from AFSS (ST-940 dated 3 Aug 50) was a personal Jameson from Laird: "Reference letter received this Headquarters from Murray (Project Willy) dated 20 July, covering the mission, equipment, personnel, reports, procedures, classification and transmission of material as programmed for project Willy and requesting concurrence direct to you in the action taken in the above items. Concurrence given. Believe Project very well handled thus far. Murray further requested information on his replacement. Original plan was for Murray to set up Project and if productive to be replaced by officer from your squadron. Captains Tisdale and Faymen are PCS enroute your headquarters and Thigpin leaves about 15 August. Selection Murrays replacement will be left to your judgement but if selection of one of the three officers, recommend Tisdale for his intelligence and linguistic experience. He lacks intercept and equipment experience but believe overlap with Murray 10 to 15 days could partially make up deficiency. Request you make replacement soon as practicable".

The initial difficulty in the establishment of Project Willy was the lack of aggressive leadership. Since the status of US forces in the Pusan perimeter was continually in doubt, no one was eager to place indoctrinated personnel in an area with so great a risk of capture.

The effect of this reluctance became apparent on 3 August 50, in TS-409; to Brooks Field: "Voice intercept produced negative results. All facilities now devoted to C/W under control of Koreans. Material included in TS 380. Results of decrypts sent to FEAF by OSI for whom Koreans work. Channel established for passing codes and information to RSM from Detachment in Korea. Maximum effort now being made to exploit that material. Complete report and results will follow."

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TS-418, on 4 August 50, (Laird from Jameson) was an indication of the collapse of Project Willy and a plea for support in setting up processing in Japan as a substitute: "Plans changed by fluid combat situation. Murray returning to Korea immediately. Attempting to exploit Korean traffic at this station. Have urgent requirement for Korean translator cleared, officer, airman or civilian. Complete exploitation requires translator and dictionaries. Attempting to obtain translator locally. More info will follow when available". The panic button was being pushed around RSM in an effort to locate Korean translators.

Now things began to go astray. COMINT (classified secret) was getting out of COMINT channels and AFSS was not getting the credit line. ST 901 dated 4 August was Rogers from Hetherington. "I wish to point out that OSI dissemination of results of Project Willy as outlined has the following deficiencies: (A) Material being received in Washington through N&N Air Force Channels as soon as, if not before, receipt at 1st RSM and this Headquarters; (B) Local exploitation by 1st RSM not receiving full Air Force support due to concurrent dissemination to other agencies by OSI; (C) Continued receipt results of this project in Washington through N&N Air Force channels prejudicial to this Headquarters efforts. Appreciate you advise means by which this project may be brought under joint A-2, FEAF and AFSS scrutiny as originally planned".

Almost the same information was received from Brooks by the 1st RSM on the same date in the form of SF-945. It did give a little more detailed information as to why the Willy product should be kept in Air Force channels. Unfortunately this was impossible.

Message follows: "Results project Willy very gratifying. Can you reproduce locally code sheets, net diagrams and code substitution prior

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SECURITY INFORMATION

to forwarding this headquarters or do you wish reproduction and pass to you by this headquarters when material received? Reference channels through which results of project are being disseminated. Wish to point out that CSI dissemination results in receipt of data in Washington before available to 1st RSM or this Headquarters. Certain your aware of deficiencies in CSI dissemination since much value thus lost through failure to provide means of evaluation and maintenance day to day status of results of the project from standpoint of broad COMINT picture. Moreover, dissemination of COMINT through other than secure COMINT channels could be embarrassing to the Air Force policy level determining present method. (A) Unauthorized and (B) insecure. Realize of course that discussion of these features with CSI and FEAF one of the most delicate nature. However, would appreciate you discuss the matter with Col Rogers in an effort to (A) determine present CSI dissemination list (B) manner in which material is being disseminated, that is, safehand, or normal communications channels (C) secure Rogers reaction to present arrangement and if he is displeased, solicit his requests for any assistance this headquarters can provide in arriving at more desirable and secure procedure for handling project data after it is in condition to hand over to a project officer; (D) advise results above along with any other comments you feel pertinent in keeping results of Project Willy in proper Air Force channels".

On 5 August, MH 202 (AFSS from FEAF, "Hetherington from Rogers"... "Refur ST-901 (already cited) Concur with all three points. CSI prepared and disseminated first reports of intercept unknown to this headquarters prior to the arrival of Project Willy. CIC Project Willy learned of CSI function and joined forces, pooling his equipment since CSI was already a going concern with South Korean personnel obtaining some success. Co-

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ordination with OSI director, further merger two functions with result that info obtained is classified TOP SECRET and forwarded this Headquarters direct to A-2. Local dissemination is made by OIC, Willy, to General Partridge, who probably informs General Walker. Though General Partridge is briefed, this info is provided cover for field dissemination. Information disseminated locally has no communications tie in associated with project except in the TOP SECRET report from OSI local director in Korea to A-2 FEAF. OIC, Willy, upon return to Korea will have full control over all future dissemination of results (this did not prove true). Do not believe Project Willy is being followed prejudicial to your interests. For your information ASAPAC received first two OSI reports through GHQ ATIS channels. In as much as ASAPAC is presently monitoring Korean circuits in Japan (from Japan), and has trained Korean linguists assigned their Headquarters, see no reason why technical data should not be passed to them for further assistance. As of now, ASAPAC is unaware of FEAF or RSM connection with this project, but believe it is to be strictly OSI project. Results thus far passed by ASAPAC to GHQ on Korean decrypts is apparently negligible. This Headquarters is providing Korean linguist to local OSI Det at Johnson for use by 1st RSM in their translations. Proper cover is being provided by 1st RSM on material passed to local OSI for translation. (This was not done). See no reason why Cabell should not be informed of this project. Your comments welcomed."

The point that processing had to be done daily and kept current for backup purposes was a good one. OSI merely put out a decrypt. In regard to distribution of the product Mr. Nichols states that the only distribution he made was: Fifth; FEAF, GHQ, EUSAK, and a Korean copy to ROKAF A-2. Cho says a copy also went to ROK Army G-2. Apparently the local director

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of OSI got a copy too. Why we were placing so much "hush-hush" around a product that was classified "SECRET" and floating all over the Far East, is still a mystery.

On 10 August, TS-467 indicated "Project Willy" at a standstill pending determination by FEAF where and if support can be given the Project. Lt Murray is ready to take replacement back to Korea when FEAF given the go ahead. Presently contemplated that Captain Fayman will be his replacement if his arrival coincides with timing of Murrays return. Code sheets for brevity code not yet received by Sqdn. Exploitation of Korean traffic held up pending authority to grant clearance to Korean translator. In meantime, all results Korean search are reported daily in traffic analysis report".

There were only two additional wires that could be located which dealt with Project Willy; both were Hetherington from Rogers type. On 12 August MH-217 sent Murray back to Korea: "Lt Murray is proceeding to Korea to assume overall direction of Project Willy. OSI is being relieved of this function with all equipment, personnel, and documents to become Murrays responsibility and he will direct all activity. All results obtained will be given Captain <sup>Cleveland A. Army</sup> Harris, Special Security Officer, GHQ, who is presently in Korea to brief indoctrinated personnel. After briefing local personnel, SSC will transmit information thru his Channel 1 (EUSAK) to ERS GHQ, who will disseminate it to 1st RSM, (This never happened), ASAPAC, and indoctrinated personnel. Above measures taken to insure maximum security and to preclude discontinuance of this project. Request Murrays TDY be extended 60 days until new officer can permanently be assigned this activity."

It is to be remembered this wire was written 12 August 1950. It clearly pointed out that neither FEAF or Fifth had the personnel or

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SECURITY INFORMATION

equipment to keep the Willy product in Air Force channels. This factor was always a thorn in RSM's side, and rightfully so. It was not until June of 51 that Air Force got an SSO setup in Korea and then and only then could they store COMINT. This is discussed at greater lengths in a later portion of this report. As already pointed out in his own words, Col Hetherington was unhappy about the product getting out of Air Force channels, but Air Force Security Service was not set up in Korea or Japan to handle the traffic.

MH-224 dated 17 August, five days after the above wire, was the end of Willy. "Rogers to Hetherington. Reference project Willy. There are now three radio intercept teams operating in Korea for UN forces; these teams are operated by OSI representatives in Korea, and Eighth Army Signal Unit (60th Signal), and by Kim, (South Korean Naval Unit). When Murray reported to Korea and found results were already being processed by OSI, Korea (Mr. Nichols) he pooled equipment and "joined forces". Murray returned shortly thereafter, bringing code books and technical data back to the Squadron. While in Japan, OSI representative (Nichols) in Korea relayed some information to FEAF and GHQ thru irregular channels, none of which was being received by 1st RSM. Murray was again sent to Korea to take full charge of the Local OSI intercept unit (Section 4 ROKAF -- headed by Cho) on General Banfill's orders and with concurrence of the <sup>SSR</sup>~~SSR~~ GHQ (SSC-). Instructions were sent by FEAF Director of OSI to Director of OSI in Korea to comply with classified letter of instructions from Banfill to Murray. Upon Murray's arrival in Korea, he apparently found that local OSI representative (Nichols) was reluctant to relinquish control, since all three units had been consolidated during his absence under the overall direction of the local OSI Representative, who reported

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directly to Eighth Army G-2. (This gave to ASAPAC and ~~SSR~~GHQ full control of COMINT in Korea). The local OSI director and Eighth Army G-2 sent Query to GHQ G-2 requesting clarification of status and that a reply coordinated with FEAF be relayed. G-2 GHQ was appraised of facts and ordered Lt Col Rubin from ASAPAC to go to Korea for purpose of making first hand report. Rubin presently in Korea. At 0945K, 17 August, Murray telephoned and stated that G-2 GHQ had replied to the joint Query and in effect told Murray to keep hands off the monitoring project. Thereupon Murray was ordered by this office (FEAF D/I) to catch the next plane back to Japan".

Exit USAF Security Service from Korea, and only a direct request from General Partidge in late November 50, got us back.

It is apparant that EUSAK (ASAPAC) and Mr. Donald Nichols, in all probability with ~~SSR~~GHQ's consent, joined forces to eliminate the United States Air Force Security Service from Korea. Murray was in Japan on 9 August; on 12 August he was ordered to return to Korea. While he was gone, ASAPAC had merged their ROK effort (Commander Kim's "M" Unit) with Nichols to form a combined effort for "better results". Naturally, with a setup like this, an Air Force officer would have no business in control. The old "for the good of the service" routine was used, and apparently everyone bought the new setup, leaving us out in the cold ... as planned. If the new setup, which excluded Air Force, was so valuable ... why did it only last nine, repeat nine, days? Let me again quote Major Cho (and Nichols agreed this info is correct):

"9 August (Murray in Japan) in order to get better results, ROK Air and Naval Forces had cooperated at Mr. Nichols house to get the better results. For a short time all work at the same table; however, 18 August (Murray left Korea the 17th on FEAF's order)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

the Navy Detachment returned to its original unit."

End result, ASAPAC kept their finger in the pie ... Nichols remained "king" ... and USAFSS was sold right down the river!

It would be interesting to see the "Rubin Report" (GHQ investigation). It was obvious that Security Service was not wanted in Korea, and not wanted is probably one of the world's greatest understatements. GHQ had no intention of cutting loose with such a lucrative product. OSI was making points and had no intention of seeing anyone else cut in either. Why a senior Air Force officer or an Air Force and an Army officer were not sent over to investigate thoroughly is quite obvious. Naturally an RSM officer would not be sent, and the only other Security Service COMINT man available was the Liaison Officer to FEAF, who was pro anything but Security Service.

One cannot lose sight of the odds Murray had to face in getting AFSS control of Project Willy. No support from Fifth, little from FEAF, and absolutely minus one hundred percent from EUSAK. With Nichols in charge of Cho and ASAPAC in charge of KIM, Army could control all COMINT released from Korea. No wonder they did not want AFSS to get in the picture too and compete for appropriations. FEAF was getting the product anyhow ... so why worry about who ran the show? The early COMINT story in Korea was a struggle for empire, and Mr. Nichols and ASAPAC won.

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FATHER HAROLD HENRY ERA

While all the rumpus was being raised about Project Willy, RSM was still trying to forge ahead in the processing of Korean Air traffic at Johnson Air Base in Japan. After running down all leads on any and all who could possibly develop into translators, we fell heir to a versatile Catholic Father by the name of Harold Henry, who belonged to an Irish order and had spent a goodly number of years in Korea. He was a former US Army Major (Chaplain) during World War II and his loyalty was unquestionable. A wire from AFSS to FEAF about this time, makes reference to FEAF obtaining a translator for the RSM who would work through the local OSI. We would also, the wire said, "give good cover" to anything the good Father received to translate. Father Henry filled out 643-A's and fingerprint cards and submitted them to Brooks Field. The 1st RSM then issued him an "unclean" pass and a quartermaster issue desk piled high with Korean Air Traffic. The cover provided was negligible.

We had obtained a few North Korean code books through Project Willy and had received all of AFSA's recoveries. The Father was quite a brilliant man, and decrypts began rolling out in a steady stream. He needed no help outside of the raw traffic and the recoveries. <sup>③</sup> AFSA kept us supplied with recoveries.

Although FEAF got a courier copy of everything, those messages of obvious immediate tactical value were fired down town by wire where the AFSS Liaison officer would bring them to the D/I if he saw fit. In case of controversial decrypts he almost invariably took RSM traffic to ASAPAC for a rerun.

A good example of this was SSO to 1st, 20 October 1950, Cite: MH 313:

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Col Holsclaw requests that raw traffic on your Korean translation 306 be forwarded to ASAPAC for translation check with instructions to ASAPAC to relay their translation to the SRS soonest." The message he referred to follows:

KOREAN

KOREAN TRANSLATION NR 306

TO: 99X

INTER: 15 Oct 1016Z

FROM: 88H

Wait for the opportune time for the (msg apparently not complete) as regards the tentative fixed day for the public announcement (3 U-verbs) between the 20th and the 22nd day (7 garbled and U/I groups).

On 23 October, ASAPAC's MEMO 978 gave us their translation as per "SSO's Request".

Their translation of the same message follows: "You will relay this message to Conrad Ho Min Gul, Training regiment Commander, at Yonkil. Please send all the members of the Kim Dal Won crew at once to Antung. In the event that the IL-10 is delivered to Antung by Soviet Pilot, then the Kim Dal Won crew will immediately come to Antung by train, or if (the plane) is delivered by our pilot, you will complete all the necessary preparations and wait for orders. The expected date of delivery is between 20 and 22 October.

Both <sup>Talk</sup>Mr Creech and <sup>Holsclaw</sup>Father Henry swore that the raw traffic from which Father Henry translated 306 did not contain half enough groups to contain the above information. How ASAPAC got that translation no one knows.

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On 2 November, we reopened the discussion. Collateral was tied up with 306 and info copies sent to AFSS and SSU-GHQ ATTN: Holsclaw.

In the following wire to Vandiver and the others (2 November, 1950 1st RSM HM 246) "Reference is made to an item from the GHQ Intsum Nr 2975 dated 1 Nov. Quote "Chinese communist govt affairs council of Peiping on 20 October ordered 2 Chinese Army groups totaling 200,000 troops stationed on the Manchurian-Korean border to enter Korea and aid the North Koreans." Unquote. Suggest possibility that public announcement between the 20th and 22nd day referred to in our Korean translation Nr 306 dated 15 October had direct bearing on announcement of Chinese Military Affairs Council."

We found out later our 306 translation had been forwarded by fastest means from FEAF to USAF and ended up with the president. Too bad SCAP didn't read it and heed it. Collateral had been screaming for weeks that the Chinese were in Korea. We didn't know what the significance of the message was, but if it had any bearing on that score, we could not afford to sit on it. When we did send it out we made no comment as to what it might mean. Apparently FEAF felt it had to do with the Chinese entry into the war or they wouldn't have fired it to Washington so fast. There were at least <sup>50</sup> fifty different intelligence reports which came through during the next week indicating that the commies came into Korea between 20-22 October. Most of them were POW reports.

In early November, 1950, we were getting little or nothing from the Korean air nets. The line had pushed further north and Father Henry was becoming anxious to return to his mission. As "Operation Henry" phased out here at Johnson, we received one more jolt from Vandiver. Mr Creech provided the following information, since he had first hand knowledge and worked directly with the Father.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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We decrypted a message which stated there were approximately 100  
acft on Antung airfield. Vandiver refuted it, and it is doubtful the  
D/I ever saw it. ASAPAC's translation was again accepted and they came  
up with just a couple of planes. Three days later photo recon showed  
101 aircraft on Antung. *(I handed this msg to Col Roger  
myself - JSA)*

It was not only Korean decrypts and collateral over which we were  
forced to fight Supplemental Research Section, FEAF. Vandiver continued  
to distort our reporting, show false reflections, and belittle us in every  
way, shape or form. On a May 51 visit to the Far East, Col Smith, then  
Vice Commander AFCS, was informed by Major Reed the exact extent of some  
of his doings, and the danger therein.

MEMO TO COLONEL SMITH:

13 May 1951

The following points are offered for your consideration per our  
conference 12 May 1951.

1. A potentially dangerous situation exists if FEAF reaction  
to COMINT is influenced substantially by Supplemental Research  
Section. We have been advised that Supp Res has briefed FEAF to  
the effect that there has been no Soviet air build-up in the  
Far East for the past several months. This, in spite of the fact  
that Safety of Flights activity for March reached an unprecedent-  
ed high and every months activity since January has been well  
over the average for the past year. Tactical activity increased  
from 161 aircraft in December 50, 507 in March 51 (April was  
considerably below March figure) with a total of 22 NEW units  
identified in the Far East since 1 Jan. Attempting to reconcile  
these increases by citing increased intercept facilities is com-  
pletely invalid. The increase cited above are from C/W sources

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SECURITY INFORMATION

only and do not reflect the additional coverage resulting from increased voice intercept capability.

2. In respect to the above point, it is interesting to note that on 1 Nov, MH 328 included the following Supp Res comment: "It is believed that perhaps a few troops have been induced on a volunteer basis to form cadres or units similar to an international brigade, possibly without overt approval, to assist the North Koreans. That Chinese Communists will not intervene officially in Korea at this time". This, in spite of repeated mentions in collateral of Chinese Communist troop concentrations on the Korean border and even small forces in Korea throughout October.

3. Reference FEAF reaction mentioned in MH 554. The presence of the 7th Bomber Corps at Dairen (last confirmed April 1949 with a "five" validity) has been recognized by this Headquarters also, on the basis of COMINT AOB. However, it should be recalled that several Ninth Air Army Units were carried in North Korea, by the same source and with higher validities, immediately before the Korean war; yet no proof has been advanced that those units actually existed in Korea or departed there from following the opening of hostilities. AOB information is admitted by most agencies to be inconclusive and incomplete. Reference "1 number" grids: The use of the term "zone three" by one of the aircraft, was the only indication of the type of activity in which they were engaged since the remainder of the transmissions were coded groups. In the light of several days

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INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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retrospect, the activity admittedly resembles training exercise activity. However, at the time, the most logical association of the term "zone three" was with the zone system in use by the Russian aircraft operating in North Korea against United Nations aircraft. Under these conditions we would have been guilty of gross negligence not to have alerted FEAF. Even in retrospect, this particular activity was not similar in any way to GCI activity cited in your summary NR 14 or to that observed every day on voice links intercepted by this Squadron.

4. This Squadron has never denied that the Soviet build-up in the Far East might be entirely defensive in nature. We have merely pointed out the offensive potentialities of the situation. Defensive capabilities cannot entirely be divorced from offensive capability. The fact that elements of the Ninth Air Army probably are actively engaged in the Korean conflict, plus evidence that CIOP's for the Manchurian/Korean area have had wide spread distribution among other units of the Russian Air Force, indicates that the Russians are giving more than tacit approval to the air war in Korea.

5. Supplemental Research reaction to the only two alerts this Squadron has declared have been discrediting and disparaging in nature. On the occasion of the declaration of Blue Alert (12 Sep TS-722), Supp Res refuted ten of thirteen points which were the basis for declaration of that alert. This fact was not discovered until several days after FEAF had been briefed along derogatory lines concerning the reasons for that alert.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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When his "facts" were refuted in conference, Supp Res acquiesced with the statement "We didn't know all the facts".

Now, on the occasion of the Red Alert, the comments are to the effect that the material is not new and is in reality a routine exercise similar in nature to those reported many times by other agencies. The significant consideration in regard to the fact that NEW activity was intercepted in the Dairen/Antung area which easily could have been an indication of immediately impending hostilities. Little imagination is required to construe that activity as possible staging for early morning attacks against UN forces in Korea. AFSS criteria for declaration of a red alert is the cognizance of a situation which might develop imminently into an attack upon the US or its forces. No amount of "Monday morning quarterbacking" can nullify the justification for the declaration of that alert.

6. Since the reputation of AFSS and the 1st RSM is at stake with the intelligence users in this theater, it is recommended that any material of conflicting nature be cleared with the originating agency before dissemination. That requirement was established by Col Hetherington on the occasion of his visit, but has never been complied with. Further, the practice of publishing material under a WEA letter head by the Supplemental Research section does not effectively remove the USAF Security Service trademark from that material.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

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SECURITY INFORMATION

/s/ D. A. REED, Major, USAF  
Operations Officer  
1st Radio Squadron, Mobile

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Prior to Col Smith's departure from Japan, he did the Security Service, FEAF and Fifth Air Force a great service. He relieved Vandiver and replaced him with Major Tisdale.

64

May Vandiver had requested numerous times for a transfer from the USAFSS since he felt that he was not well received by the 1st RSM and in the interest of his own career. Col Smith, in May 1951, approved this transfer after having it recommended very strongly by both Col Rogers and Gen Banfill. Following his transfer, Vandiver was retained as the Chief of 2RS FEAF inagite. The fact that 2RS was regarded as the AFSSCNO with Tisdale also presented Vandiver with Banfill for his work in the 2RS. Incidentally, Vandiver was commended numerous times by FEAF and FEC for his efforts in finally establishing the name of the 1st RSM in the Far East as a capable unit. This, incidentally, took much effort since the very name was a "stain" in FEAF and FEC a long time.

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BACK TO KOREA

Three months had gone by since Security Service had been booted out of Korea. During this interim the Air Force COMINT agency made no progress with 25x3 Traffic. We were still almost completely in the dark as far as North Korean communications was concerned. The limited volume of traffic processed during the "Father Henry Era" was on a catch-as-catch-can basis and lacked continuity essential to net reconstruction and current call sign identification. In other words, T/A have-no!

In the meantime, Mr Nichols was running the Air Force COMINT show in Korea. As previously pointed out, he was running it because he chose to do so; Fifth was in accord with his inflated beliefs; FEAF was in accord with Fifth; and apparently anything that would keep Air Force COMINT out of AFSS hands, was given top priority by Army.

By early November 50, it became apparent even to the A-2 Fifth Air Force that all was not well with his Korean COMINT EFFORT. On 20 November an operational immediate wire (TOP SECRET) came into the base comm center at Johnson. General Partridge realized the past error, and AFSS was asked to come back to Chosen and revive a dying horse. On 28 November 50, Detachment "Charlie", 1 RSM, was air lifted to Korea.

There can be little said for the operational function of Detachment Charlie until they set up at Seoul. The original sites Fifth had requested we utilize were at Sinanju and Pyongyang, but someone had miscalculated the number of Chinese north of the MLR since the confusion that existed in the

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Sinanju and Pyongyang evacuation was terrific, little or no traffic was processed prior to setting up at Seoul.

Detachment "C" (Later Det 13 and now Det 151) was supposed to take over ROK Det 3 under Maj Cho and the equipment left behind on the defunct Project Willy. This equipment was found to be almost nonexistent, since OSI had worn out and stripped it of all good parts for use in other projects. 1st RSM was therefore committed to completely reequip Det "C". In addition to entering the Korean COMINT field late, Security Service also lost numerous radio sets, a TC-9, a 6x6 truck, a Jeep and power equipment. "Willy" hurt our pocket book as well as our prestige.

On 1 December 50, Det "C" was in operation at Ewha University near Seoul, and we became at long last producers of Communications Intelligence in Korea.

At this point this report should be broken down in detail. There were numerous things that had a direct effect on the Detachment product. It is to be remembered that Det "C" was the only unit in the Security Service attached to a combat Air Force. In other words, Detachment "Charlie" was tactical, and as a selling point, the most important unit in the development of the entire command. Apparently few people, even in the Far East, recognized this fact.

A. PERSONNEL

The Korean Detachment was not given the support it so richly deserved in qualified personnel and serviceable equipment. Though ASAPAC and AFSA both have, and have had for a long time, fully qualified and completely indoctrinated Korean linguists, we have never had one.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

As a result we have been unable to exploit back-up material fully, and have relied completely on uncleared Koreans. The war is two years old, and, with the exception of one on loan from time to time from AFSAFAPF, Security Service still does not have a cleared Korean linguist. Apparently neither a C/A, T/A nor Intelligence back-up section was created at either Headquarters to support detachment analysis. Any information requested came from AFSA and could not be utilized due to uncleared people. There was little or now technical support from ASAFAC in Korea.

When the Detachment was air-lifted to Korea, the enlisted men were of the best caliber. Most of the officers, unfortunately, were not. The CO had attended communications school but had never been exposed to COMINT. Captain Gilbert, operations officer, had been assigned duties as Utilities Officer due to his clearance status. Although Gilbert never had any actual operational experience in COMINT, the things he taught himself are still reflecting in his superior handling of the COMINT problem.

After the original enlisted men had served their six months Korean tour, their replacements were in many instances not qualified. The original Det 13 crew was with few exceptions, an all volunteer outfit, and although 1st RSM morale was always extremely high...Det 13 led the field. Lack of good operators to replace the original cadre was due in part to the fact that some people at RSM were of the opinion "Korea would be an excellent place to train operators under field conditions" and some felt it was an ideal place to unload undesirables. 1stRSM furnished about all the support it could afford and still accomplish the heavy requirement load laid on such a small unit. Although RSM operations people were well aware of the Korean problem Higher Headquarters precluded any deviation from the norm on Russian cases.

Where traffic is being decrypted for tactical use you must have your best men. EXAMPLE: ASAFAC garbled the time group on an intercept 19 June 51 which indicated the NKAF was cutting loose on

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Sinmi-do. They were sitting on a powder keg and didn't know the length of the fuse. We did not garble it. Results: 7 NK Aircraft shot down by Fifth Air Force. Even with this example, few good operators were provided.

By having to use "unclean" Koreans, we naturally depended on ROK Air Force personnel, but neither RSM nor Security Service ever requested more personnel from Gen. Kim.

It was very difficult for Captain Cho to go to the ROKAF Commanding General and ask for more bodies, especially when that same Captain had to inform him that ROKAF could not receive our product. A request from Det 13 through the AFSSING to General Everest CG Fifth Air Force resulted in a letter to Gen Kim requesting more people, and thanking him for what he had done in the past.

There has never been an accurate or legal order published assigning ROK Det 3 to AFSS units. The original order, now worthless and outdated, is attached at the rear end of this report as a matter of interest. The old question has only now begun to be answered--what will we do if a cease fire occurs and we pull out of Korea? The best answer in regards to personnel is a "pure" U.S. effort, but the present solution is an attempt to evacuate Cho and company to Japan.

G. COMMUNICATIONS:

As pointed out in the early paragraphs of this report, Col Hetherington was unhappy because the "Willy" product was not being disseminated through Air Force Channels. This was due in part to the fact that neither the project nor Fifth Air Force had communications to handle said material. Since Fifth Air Force had no SSO, even had we remained in control of

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Project Willy, at least the advanced dissemination would have had to be done thru Army channels.

When AFSS went into Korea with Det "C"...the only communications with the outside world was a 399 C/W link with RSM. This link operated on a daily schedule and utilized one time pads. The system was so slow it was worthless for anything but routine administrative queries. <sup>(15)</sup> All operational messages went from 1st RSM to FEAF to Bellomy (SSC GHQ) to Sullivan (SSC EUSAK) to Det "C". From Det "C" to RSM it was just the reverse. Again we were in Army channels.

Up to and including the time we received our crypto machines and ANGR/26, Army had her fingers in everything we did. She enjoyed the habit of "scooping" us on our own material, due again to Air Force productivity outgrowing its communications. We were producing excellent material, but Army disseminated it electrically to the consumers. We couldn't. Fifth, FEAF, and RSM (AFSS) never offered the Detachment any alternative. SSC EUSAK would send any "hot" Det "C" decrypts to Bellomy (SSC GHQ)...who would relay them to Washington. Air Force got no credit, and Col Bellomy never had the courtesy even to info RSM or Security Service on the information obtained from us. The analysts in Korea felt they were pouring their material into a bottomless pit and never saw the fruits of their work. Army was laying on strikes, on Air Force intelligence, because 5th was not set up to handle it. We often felt we had the world's most thankless job. When RSM in Korea finally received communications equipment Army was no longer the only agency in Korea who could disseminate COMINT. They did not like it. This is discussed more in detail later on, under ARMY VS AIR FORCE.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

The story of how and why a radio teletype link was installed between Korea and Japan is interesting.

In May of 51, RSM declared a "RED ALERT" in Korea. Due to errors in D/F sets at Ashiya, Misawa, Chitose, Johnson and Kyoto, it appeared to RSM that several bombers were headed into the North Korean area. The alert plan was immediately implemented and warning sent to 5th Air Force. Due to lack of direct communications with Det 13 (formerly "C") this FLASH message was passed through other communications channels and took five hours to reach 5th Air Force. Naturally FEAF and Fifth were annoyed at this dangerous delay. We were then required to have rapid communications between the Det and RSM. Why this was not recognized prior to the above FLASH message is a mystery. <sup>(17)</sup> That incident alone gave us communications that enabled us to beat Army to the punch.

The planning that went into setting up the radio teletype link between Korea and Japan was not coordinated. It was conceived at high levels without the working people being informed. FEAF furnished frequencies and air lift...FAF furnished nothing...Det 13, the recipient, wasn't even informed. <sup>(15)</sup> A telephone call from RSM to Taegu informed the Det they should locate a "close in" transmitter site, for Fifth Air Force Comm was left completely out of the planning. Capt Small (EUSAK) informed us that they, not FEAF, assigned all frequencies in Korea, and furthermore, we could not have our transmitter within 10 miles of Taegu. After much unnecessary delay due to poor coordination (between RSM-FEAF-FIFTH-EUSACK) the transmitter was finally remoted out to K-2, and we went on the air. Tact had to be used to sooth the feelings of the FAF Deputy for Comm, since he had been ignored completely on the entire matter.

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FEAF provided frequencies only a mother could love, which was possibly one of the reasons EUSAK let us keep them. Every UN and Communist unit in the Orient appear to be fighting over them. The circuit was out an average of eight hours a day, usually due to QRM.

After Det 13 returned to Seoul their comm center was established in Fifth Air Force Hqs with the transmitter (AN/GRC 24) remoted to Ewha University, traffic was then intercepted and partially processed at Ewha, couriered into Fifth, then piped back through Ewha by landline for transmission to RSM.

In March 1952, the Detachment (now 151) was relocated and consolidated at Chosen Christian University with its own comm center. A landline was set up into SSC, since that office had become dependant on the circuit for rapid communications with Japan. Special Weather from RSM now had to be couriered in from 151 to Fifth because SSC lacked a common weather system. Group attempts to obtain such a system resulted in a Hq AFSS decision to eliminate the SSC-151 link entirely (June-Aug 1952), so weather is still being couriered. FEAF has now provided a direct Group to SSC Fifth Air Force circuit (Sept 52).

C. Dissemination and Utilization of COMINT:

The dissemination and utilization of Intelligence produced by Detachment 13 was far from satisfactory. Our dissemination leaks played at least a minor roll in drying up North Korean traffic, and/or causing it to be 25x3 Dissemination under Nichols has already been discussed, so we shall take it from the time RSM (AFSS) assumed control. In December 1950, the Det CG held a conference with General Kim, CG-ROKAF, and agreed to ROKAF's remaining on distribution for the product. The fact that ROKAF was a recipient of Det 13 Intelligence

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SECURITY INFORMATION

was well known at RSM. Since Nichols has always kept his thumb on the pulse of ROK A-2, he also had access to everything we produced in Korea. This resulted in a compromise that could have snow-balled into a catastrophe, had the matter not been immediately stopped. In early summer of 51, a SECRET report written by Maj Brown, US Air Attache to Korea, arrived in 5th Air Force Headquarters. Everyone hit the panic button and took immediate steps to intercept and destroy all copies. Information contained in the report was obtained from Korean Air Force A-2 by Major Brown. He stated that, "Enemy codes were broken in the early days of the war and the enemy not being aware of this, continued to use the same codes, as a result the ROK's were obtaining valuable information.".....A rather detailed rundown of NKAF personnel then followed...a majority of which was poor COMINT. Wires were sent to all interested parties to intercept the pouches and destroy them. Fortunately they were all located in Fussen and destroyed. A letter was written Brown to get out of any business dealing with codes and ciphers and stay out! A similar strong letter was sent to Mr Nichols, and in addition he was forced to sign debriefing oaths for Communications Intelligence. It seemed there was a portion of the report that went something like this... "much of this information was collected by Mr. Nichols etc. etc. etc." Poor Brown thought the world had come to an end. Several of his queries directed to the D/I, USAF, indicated he thought he had fallen heir to an amazingly new source of intelligence and suggested Air Force should get in this business too.

There is little doubt that Cho still passes all information to Korean Air Force A-2, even though he has been ordered verbally and in writing by Lt Col H. F. Brown, former PAF-D/I, to desist. There is little doubt

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SECURITY INFORMATION

that there are at least a few communists in the South Korean Government and doubtless some of them have passed the word "north" that the war-mongering Americans were reading their mail. The decreased value of the current Detachment NK C/W product is a strong indication the word got north. As long as we are forced to use indigenous personnel to work our traffic, we'll have little control of its dissemination. We can pat their backs, decorate them and in general treat them like royalty, but their bread and butter, now and future, rests with their own country's leaders. In spite of everything they'll pass hot results on to their higher ups. Cho's career rests with Maj Gen Kim; ROKAF CG; as long as we must have ROKAF personnel Kim will know everything they know. Cho has been warned repeatedly, but almost certainly reports verbally to Gen Kim during his leaves. Unfortunately, until his unit can be replaced by Americans, we cannot provide TACCOMINT without him.

In addition to under the table distribution to ROKAF, the following other dissemination was made of our SECRET decrypts: AFS, RSM, SSO-FEC, SSO-FAAF, A-2 5th AF, EUSAF SSO and G-2.

The copy we gave the A-2 5th AF, may as well have been burned. There was no one in 5th Col Hubbard would authorize to see the stuff other than himself. No one could persuade him that hoarding COMINT was about as profitable as hoarding eggs, but rather than devise adequate cover for its use he insured its security negatively.

Col Myers, D/O, was cleared and indoctrinated. Myers made numerous trips to our office and requested reliable targets. He stated he had aircraft on the ground and he wanted targets, any targets. We were aware our material was not being utilized by 5th...but to go over the D/I

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direct to the D/O in the face of COMINT regulations would have been suicide for the Det CG. Eighty to one hundred and eighty decrypts daily were taken to the A-2 -- he filed them. There were firm and fleeting targets in great quantity, yet 5th was doing nothing about it. Any target laid on locally from COMINT came from EUSAK. Col Myers was a believer and wanted to use the stuff, but the A-2 forbade it. For seven months, the AFSS unit in Korea was producing invaluable tactical COMINT that was going down the drain as far as Air Force was concerned. Most of it became historical material and lost its value if not utilized within a week. It was not until 15 April 1951 that a message (Banfill to Hubbard) authorized Captain Robert D. Thresher at SAC, 5th AF (cite TSW-22 dated 15 April). This meant code word material could be disseminated to 5th Air Force and stored. It still did not provide an SRS shop to evaluate COMINT and collateral, and to exploit it tactically. AFSS did not provide a Liaison Officer until 15 August 1951.

*I sitting crypt. for etc  
for Thresher in June 51*

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SECURITY INFORMATION

With Threshers arrival, 5th had an SEC and, to a certain extent, Det 13 had an ally at last. One small item was overlooked...not until late July did Thresher get crypto machines. In the interim, he was forced to use EUSAK's equipment. Any COMINT material he wished to disseminate by electrical means had to be hand carried to SSC EUSAK and sent through SSC CHQ to FEAF. Until he got his secure room Thresher had to go to EUSAK daily, read up on all the material and come back and brief the General. (1)

The assumption of command by Maj Gen Everest ( 1951) opened up tactical exploitation of COMINT in Korea. He knew what it was and intended to make use of it. It was his only advantage over a numerically superior enemy. He proposed to set up his own COMINT organization if he were not permitted to exploit AFSS' product. Hubbard protested himself out of his job, and tactical employment of COMINT was underway. The new D/I (Lt Col Brown) couldn't have prevented exploitation if he'd wanted to do so--he couldn't even see code word material. When he finally could be indoctrinated his tour was virtually over.

The present D/I FAF (Col. Daugherty) has done much to assist in the growth of tactical COMINT. He suffers a little from over eagerness and does not hesitate to attempt to exploit not only AFSS product but AFSS personnel as well to accomplish his mission.

One of our other customers, G-2 EUSAK, was a walking security branch as far as our product was concerned. Of course since uncleared Koreans produced it, and it was only SECRET there wasn't much we could do. The decrypts were delivered to personnel in G-2 who were not indoctrinated and, on numerous instances, the decrypt ended up in AG channels.

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After the arrival of an AFSS Liaison Officer our product was utilized to a greater extent, but often its value was lowered because of the lack of an experienced evaluator. Unskilled handling of COMINT creates an unhealthy situation and could create a catastrophe.

D. REQUIREMENTS:

FEAF has well written requirements on record and forwarded to AFSS. Although firm intelligence requirements are essential to efficient production of COMINT, it was not until 25 November 1951, that 5th finally got their intelligence requirements into writing, and then only after continued probing. (12) Prior to this date 5th never asked us for intelligence.

The Security Service is dedicated to the production of reliable COMINT and within the limits of its facilities it is quite able to complete this mission. Had Col Hubbard stated his desires intelligence wise, instead of often personnel wise, we could have gone all out to help them. Had 5th Air Force, immediately upon being committed to combat, put a request through FEAF for COMINT, and had they outlined what they wanted (one year before they did), AFSS would be far ahead of their present level in Korea. Here I would like to repeat several points:

- (1) USAFSS, on its own initiative, tried to get into the tactical COMINT business in Korea at the outbreak of the war.
- (2) EUSAF, FEAF, and PAF, prevented our doing so. Perhaps all three above cited commands are not equally guilty...but none are void of blame. (5)
- (3) On request from Fifth Air Force, we were asked some months later to come back and take over a dead project.
- (4) USAFSS and RSM screamed to keep the product in Air Force channels...yet did little to supply the personnel or communications necessary.
- (5) One of our primary reasons for assuming command of the ROK decrypt effort was to perform T/A to maintain continuity, idents, better intelligence product etc. etc. We then failed to provide adequate personnel and equipment to do this job. (12)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Not having written requirements from Fifth contributed seriously to the above five points. Had we had them on record, we would have had a lever with which to move GHQ, Washington, and our own Hqs at Brooks Field. You must have a mission before you can start demanding personnel, space and equipment. We were in Korea, trying to service a fighting Air Force, with nothing but word of mouth intelligence requirements. A written request from Fifth would have tilted the scales in favor of AFSS COMINT. This lesson is learned slowly: only recently have we obtained written requirements from JADF. It is dangerous and it is unhealthy to operate without having a written record of the consumer's needs, for it allows him to blame us whenever he thinks he lacks vital information. Korea should have proved that to us.

The first written requirement Fifth laid on 1st RSM was in the form of a combined "operational order" "supply requisition", and "a redeployment plan", written by that energetic Captain Thresher to the Commanding Officer Det "C" on 22 May 1951 (another copy was sent direct to the VICE COMMANDER USAFSS). The gist of the entire "requirement" was:

- (1) Det C should include Russian, Chinese, Korean C/W and Voice processing in Korea.
- (2) Det C should be a Radio Squadron, Mobile.
- (3) Det C should move as far north as possible.
- (4) Det C needed so many of this and so many of that. (Positions, T/A and C/A people, etc.)

Some of the items were sound logic, but were not an intelligence requirement. You must tell the producer you would like information on this and this, you cannot tell the producer how to go about obtaining it. However this was typical of 5ths early methods of requesting intelligence because of their untrained intelligence people.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Another example of how the A-2 5th Air Force took Det C under his wing and attempted to assume command jurisdiction (egged on by Thresher) was clearly set forth in his 7 July 51 message to FEAF.....

Cite: KIT-1324: "Banfill from Hubbard. Team #1 of 1st RSM now located at Radar site near Kimpo is unable to read Antung GCI from 1000-1600 hours this time of year and have only occasionally read airborne MIG type and ground control stations this side of the Yalu. I have proposed many times to 1st RSM commanders and Col Smith that they move to Paengnyong-do (XC 5000) since early last May. How much control 5th Air Force has is unknown. Our suggestion is for Team #1 to put on this island one receiver two linguists, operators and portable tape recorder machine. Our ACGW will furnish two controllers and VHF for direct passing of info as radar plots to aircrews. This island has lightweight radar and FM link to Kimpo site. If results unsatisfactory on this island suggest Chodo (XC 6070) and if necessary Taehwaso (XD 4065). Gen Everest vitally concerned and has written Gen Lynn regarding increasing this tactical effort and including Chinese end."

It is of interest to note that the Detachment and RSM were not info addressee on this message. The message (as usual) was from D/I FA-F (Thru EUSAK-SSC) To: D/I FEAF (ATTN: SAC FEAF), and Vandiver did not advise RSM that that this message was in the mill.

Capt Thresher's replacement had some brilliant ideas too; fortunately Col Daugherty, the new A-2, 5th AF, never carried them out. While Security Service had over four hundred men tied up on certain phases of analysis, and still had not met all requirements, the new 5th Air Force SRC was going to

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

"screen, collate, and evaluate raw traffic" by himself. In his own words:

SUBJECT: USAFSS As a Producer of COMINT DTD 30 Dec 51

TO: D/I FROM: SRS

"This date Lt Col Shepard, Majors Brooks, Hamilton, and Nixon, all of 1st RSM, on their own initiative, approached me and brought this matter up for informal discussion: That Fifth Air Force should accept from Air Force Security Service evaluated intelligence, developed from communications intelligence sources at their disposal. Implicatory in their contention were the following ideas: That FAF does not desire nor need raw traffic. That FAF should accept the developed COMINT without reference to the information based on such intelligence. That by reason of being the collector of COMINT AFSS is best qualified to evaluate the same. I believe that we should receive, evaluate, collate, and utilize communications information data, including the raw traffic, and retain a file of this information to the extent that we deem necessary. I do not feel that we should, or even that it is within our jurisdiction to, shift to another agency anypart of the responsibility of FAF to produce the intelligence which it needs and uses.

The basis of my argument rests upon this fact: the most accurate estimate of the situation is derived from comparison of all the information available without regard to source. To accept developed or evaluated intelligence from a collector which evaluates that intelligence on the basis of information which that agency alone collects, is to destroy the very fabric of intelligence. To follow the metaphor through, you will have a fabric which is all wool and no warp, in actuality a handful of threads.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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This picture may be overdrawn, but it exemplifies the idea; derive an estimate of the enemy situation from PW reports, and another estimate from photo interpretation, and possibly another estimate from aerial observation. In deriving these estimates, numerous bits of information were discarded within each category as being trivial and meaningless. Probably the broad outline that is derived from such source will be similar to that derived from others; however, a careful comparison of the bits of information falling within these categories which have been discarded, will probably result in the discovery of certain details which were missing heretofore; a better estimate will result because of the comparison of all facts, since then the related facts within each source can be juxtaposed and their true relationship determined.

I do not subscribe to the idea that the collector of information is the agency best fitted to evaluate it. Col Shepard stated emphatically that they were not interested in collateral information, yet in order to produce properly evaluated intelligence I believe that they have to be interested in collateral information.

In the course of the discussion they brought up the point that they have hundreds of persons collecting, receiving, collating and evaluating information derived from COMINT. I believe that these people are working on many and diverse problems, many of which have only a very remote bearing upon our problems in this theater. The organizations which are attached to this headquarters are very co-operative and responsive to our needs, and are performing their function in a highly efficient manner. However, I do not believe that it follows that we

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

can expect our problems to receive the same degree of attention if delivered to organizations outside of our control and outside of our area of activity.

Although not presented in precisely this fashion, the ideas set forth above were brought out in the discussion. I agree that we should accept finished COMINT from them to whatever degree they chose to bestow it however, I would not agree to relax our request for all traffic (voice and code) which bears upon the tactical situation directly, or which could potentially bear upon it directly. (All present recognized that my opinions and attitudes on these matters are my personal opinions, and not those of the Deputate).

I will point out here that the T/O for the SR Directorate calls for one (traffic) analyst and one assistant (traffic) analyst, Captain and 1st Lt respectively, and I believe that the justification for these two officers is contained in the idea that they will receive, screen, collate, and evaluate raw traffic, and integrate it in the function of supplemental research.

Although our discussion was informal, I felt that you should have been present; in lieu thereof, I have composed this resume.

I have been unable to locate in our files any letter giving the requirements of this Headquarters to Air Force Security Service."

/s/ F. S. Workman, Jr  
F. S. WORKMAN, JR  
1st Lt, USAF  
Dir SR

We can well visualize the end product had Lt Workman been allowed to carry out his scheme; the SRS shop at 5th Air Force would have been piled high with raw traffic from the three teams, Det 3, ORICOM and Russian. What would he have done for linguists, C/A people etc? Did Workman think we

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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copy all Russian, Chinese, and Korean already broken out and in plain text ENGLISH? It is obvious that he was not aware of just what constitutes "RAW TRAFFIC". Why didn't he propose to interrogate his own POW's, make his own photo reconnaissance, go behind the lines and get his own reports, and copy his own circuits as well?

Uninformed requests and demands by consumers who didn't know what they were talking about have cost us countless man hours and dollars. AFSS people must educate the D/I's to understand COMINT; when they understand fully what we can and cannot do, it will make for a better product and happier relations in this global intelligence family.

E AIR FORCE VS ARMY:

The inter-service rivalry (COMINT) in the Far East has been touched upon; the fact that all was not unified was evidenced in the SNAPU of project Willy; the fact that AFSS units were not looked upon as brothers by ASAPAC was brought to a rapid boil in Korea. (2)

Army held on to the last to keep USAFSS out of Korea; however USAFSS displayed little skill in their effort to get into the COMINT game in Chosen. Both factors contributed to the initial debacle.

The Kim-Cho squabble was directly related to the RSM-ASAPAC squabble. Kim's unit (RUK "M") belonged to ASAPAC, and Cho's (Det 3) was the C/W operational arm of Det "C" (Later Det 13, and presently Det 151). There was never a free exchange of material between COMINT units in Korea. This was understandable in view of Det 3 RUK's clearance status; however, there could have been a free exchange between Det 3 and RUK "M". This was precluded due to near hatred between Kim and Cho. Neither ASAPAC nor

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

RSM ever did anything to soothe the strained relations between their respective indigenous teams.

ASAFAC refused to place Det "C" on distribution for the ROK "M" product due to this estranged relationship; however, since ASAFAC wanted (and got) our decrypts we used that as a wedge to get Kim's decrypts.

Major Thresher (AFSS units and products had gotten him promoted and decorated), SSC FAF, screened his ROK "M" decrypts for anything they had uncovered regarding new air links or systems that were giving excellent target information. In the event Det "C" was not covering that particular link or had not picked it up on search...he would give the Det Ops Officer calls and frequencies and request we try that particular link. This was done entirely on his request, since we were giving him decrypts almost 24 hours in advance of ASAFAC and "M". There was no information taken from ROK "M" decrypts that we claimed as our own; all we were given was the frequencies and call signs. We did not even see the traffic. Thresher's request was justified and in keeping with agreements he had previously made with ASAFAC. There was certainly no security violation involved. ASAFAC's 60th Signal found out that this was being done. The letter that follows (from files SSC FAF) is a perfect example of petty things that went on in Korea to hinder the COMINT effort.

HEADQUARTERS

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY PACIFIC ADVANCE

APC

301

8 Jul 1951

SUBJECT: Recipients for Special Intelligence

TO : Security Officer  
5th Air Force

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1. This headquarters has been informed that data taken from translations processed by Commander Kim's South Korean intercept unit and delivered to your office were used as the basis for intercept and traffic analysis work by the RSM advance.

2. The data referred to in the preceding paragraph were delivered to your office in accordance with your undated memorandum, subject: "Fifth Air Force Comint Recipients" addressed to the undersigned. It is felt that the disclosure to and use of such data by other than those listed in your memorandum are in violation of the agreement contained therein.

3. It is hoped that data extracted from Commander Kim's material will not again be used for further intercept and or traffic analysis work by the RSM advance.

/s/ Mannie L. Raley

/t/ MANNIE L. RALEY

Major Sig C.  
Commanding

Prior to this incident ASAFAC completely ignored us and assumed the attitude that we were nothing more than a small problem child who could not harm their prestige as long as they still controlled all electrical dissemination. Once we received crypto machines and a radioteletype link with the outside world, we ceased to be a problem and became an outright monster.

From the date of the above letter, 8 July 1951 until early 1952, it was a knock down, drag out affair.

Instead of asking us directly, ASAFAC's 501st Comm Recon Group chose, until recently, to request AFSS material through ASAFAC in Tokyo..who would coordinate with ASA...to AFSA...to AFSS...to 1st RSM...and back to Korea. By the time it reached RSM it looked like a direct order. Naturally Hq USAFSS was forever requesting information as to whether the Detachment was cooperating with sister COMINT units in Chosen. ASA units usually made it

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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look as if we were not.

The dam really broke when Det 13

25x3

The entire COMINT world exploded over the efforts of Capt (then Lt) Lee. To really understand this mess one must go back to the beginning.

Gen Ridgway sent the communists a message to the effect he was ready to call a halt to the fighting and hold an armistice conference. This was radiced all over the Far East. Outside of a direct answer, the first indications that Kim Il had received the word would in all probability come from COMINT.

Shortly thereafter a

25x3

was delivered to the Det Ops Officer by 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

the ECKAF team:

25x3

25x3

there was no indication then that Nam Il would be senior communist representative at the peace talks; it wasn't even an indication there was going to be a conference. We figured Kim had received the proposal and since Nam was his Chief of Staff, he'd be a logical choice to handle the talks. This educated guess was forwarded "FLASH" precedence. ROK "M" also got the message, but there was some delay in getting it to EUSAK, so one of the biggest COMINT scoops of the Korean War had been made by little Det 13. Coming within a week of our scoop on the biggest North Korean air effort of the war, it did little to ingratiate us with ASA. The conference got under way. We knew there would be a link out of Kaesong and assigned two positions to search for it. It was located and identified by two North Korean operators chattering in clear text giving exact locations.

By the time the conference was a week old, we were reading their mail.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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We had no idea whether or not ASAPAC had entered the system since there was no liaison or exchange of information between the two services. However, they did know we had entered it since we delivered all decrypts to EURAK immediately and they were flown to Admiral Joy daily in a helicopter. As a matter of interest, they were of great aid to Joy in finding out whether or not the communists understood his speeches, and, further, whether or not they were distorting his views in their reports to higher Hqs. RSM had ordered all decrypts sent FIASH, and we were putting out about ten a day.

After about three days we made a rather unusual discovery. We were the only ones reporting. AFSA and ASAPAC couldn't enter the system. USAFSS was in the chips, and ASA didn't like it one bit. Apparently in order to cover up for their own inability to break the code, they suggested we had obtained it through covert means. Who first suggested we stole the code is unknown; however, AFSA was among those who swore it was impossible for us to have broken it. Since AFSA couldn't read it they agreed with Army that we had a book and all hell broke loose. (Admiral Wenger later explained the mixup as follows: AFSA requested Det 13 through AFSS to forward a copy of the Keesong traffic. Shortly thereafter AFSA sent a request for our suspected code book. Det 13, in answer to the first request, advised "we have only one copy (in pencil and Korean) and cannot duplicate". AFSA took this as an answer to their query re code books and accepted it as confirmed that we had one and were hoarding it.) Results were that everyone was clawing at Hq AFSS and RSM. The Detachment answered an average of five wires a day from AFSS and RSM. "Yes, we broke it". "No, we did not steal it". "Honest, fellows". "No, it was not a new code." "It was a combination of several old

*Adm. Wenger*

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SECURITY INFORMATION

P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

systems...all of which we were reading". On and on and on. It became so serious that one of AFSA's big cryptanalysts came to Brooks Field, got our D/C and new Group CO, and came all the way to Korea just to find out that what we had been telling them all along was the truth.

By this time ASA had probably put so much pressure on ASAFAC that they had to do something. ASAFAC was apparently instructed by ASA to ask us for the recoveries so they could disseminate some of the lucrative product under an Army heading. They never, repeat never, approached us for anything. They did however attempt to obtain the recoveries by stealing them. (For which they were reprimanded by SSG EUSAK).

We received a strongly worded wire from RSM to the effect that AFSS had decreed we would give 60th Sig all the recoveries..including raw traffic. Since we did not have the crypto system to forward it electrically to AFSA.. 60th Signal would do that. Again Air Force product disseminated by Army, and again it was our own fault. Again we were forced to deliver everything to ASAFAC.

It will be noted:

- (1) Never did 60th Sig ask Det 13 for anything.
- (2) Never did 60th Sig ever tell us they were  
25x3
- (3) Never did they indicate they wanted the recoveries, the raw traffic, and or the  
25x3 until they tried to steal it.
- (4) When ordered to turn over all three of the above (code-tfc-  
25x3) we delivered it to them. They never came to us.

The bad taste Army left in everyone's mouth over the Kaesong deal lingered on for some time. They retaliated through Col Bellomby (SSG GNC who was ever willing) to have us investigated as being "unclean". They couldn't whip us professionally, so in return they tried to brand us as security hazards. To write up the great lengths to which this mess went

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SECURITY INFORMATION

would take volumes. The wires that went back and forth in Air Force channels are in the files. SSC-GHQ's wires are not available.

It is of interest that the only times ASAFAC and SSC GHQ (CRS) got up in arms about our tainted modus-operandi is when we scooped them on some important COMINT matter. Now that Kaesong is history, and the C/W COMINT picture, as far as Korean traffic is concerned, has largely dried up, the feud is quiescent, though occasional attempts are made to revive it. But should activity again go up and such traffic again become important, there is every indication of a flareup.

Another instance in which we looked bad in AFSA's eyes was created by assistant EUSAK SSC's. Since we did not have the apollo system to send back raw traffic we delivered the Kaesong material to EUSAK SSC, who relayed it to 60th Sig for transmission. After about a week with no static from AFSA or AFSS, AFSA jumped AFSS and they in turn hit us. Again we were "withholding info and not living up to previous orders, which were cited in great detail." AFSA had received no raw traffic from the Kaesong link in quite a while. They were irate and so was Brooks Field. We replied that we were delivering as agreed. AFSA queried 60th Sig and of course we were liars. AFSA told AFSS, who told RSM, who told us we were liars. When we checked with EUSAK SSC, one of the officers pulled open a drawer and that was piled full of "oh-you-mean-this" traffic! He hadn't been told what to do with it!

Related to SSC GHQ's attempts to burn AFSS for security violations, there are a few violations on Army's part to be cited. Their main argument was based on our co-location with Cho's Det 3. They insinuated we gave T/A support to Cho. This was not true. While ASAFAC was chanting the old security song at RSM, they were guilty of the same offense themselves.

The NCIC T/A at Det 13, while visiting 60th Signal, saw one of Kim's

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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ROK's come in with a sheet containing numerous call signs. The T/A section at 60th Sig proceeded to place idents, locations and validity behind each of the calls. The sheet was then returned to ROK "M". This is giving code-word material to "unclean" Koreans. It apparently is only a security violation when done by AFSS units.

Since ASAPAC could not assist our C/A effort due to clearance status, and since they themselves would not admit we had anything they needed, they decided to go through ROK "M" to get Cho and Kim to have a free exchange. Kim had nothing in the line of recoveries that we wanted, but Cho had everything that ASAPAC wanted. If they could then get all our stuff from Kim it would be a complete ASAPAC victory. Cho repeatedly reiterated that he didn't trust Kim and that Kim was a phoney. Cho would have quit had he been forced to give Kim everything. Kim could hand Cho's recoveries to ASAPAC and claim them as his own. It was a smooth deal and it would have helped ASAPAC and the COMINT effort world wide. <sup>IF CHO HAD APPROVED AND CONTINUED IN WORKING THE MATTER,</sup> Had it been put into effect without Cho's approval, and had he been ordered to do it as a result of high level policy made in Washington and Brooks Field, by people who did not understand the problem, it would have been a complete loss to the COMINT world. CG ROKAF was fighting to establish his own COMINT organ, and would have (and will) jumped at any excuse to withdraw Cho and his team. Air Force would have lost the services of Cho, Han, and the two Lees. ASAPAC would have been exactly even with the board, and Det 13 would have been out of business. Everytime I was ordered to look into it again, I queried Cho. When his answer was no, mine was no. He stated he could not see his men working on a one way exchange, since the value of Kim's product was nil. That was part truth and part Cho's inflated ego, but he has been our main

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SECURITY INFORMATION

stay in Korea, and to sell him down the river would have been suicide in the KC picture. Perhaps that's what ASAPAC was striving for, perhaps too many stabs have made us cynical. If we were not producing, Washington would have assigned the air coverage back to ASAPAC and the duplication, if any, would have put us out of business.

All this bickering and inter-service rivalry played havoc with our ROK effort. They often lost the will to work as a result of constant demands and accusations.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

F. SECURITY:

It is an established fact that Air Traffic 25x3 and worthwhile military traffic 25x3 has almost completely dried up. This is due in the main to increased security through Soviet supervision and through use of land line communications, but our security breaches could easily be the direct reason for the increased vigilance on the part of the communists regarding their electrical communications.

Numerous contributing factors were pointed out earlier in this report: Mr Nichols, ROKAF A-2, ROK G-2, our methods and recipients in dissemination, etc.

There were other violations of security through operational necessity. A number of personnel were utilized without proper clearances, and operational necessity was broadly interpreted. Access was permitted not only to ROKAF product but to codeword material, with the tacit approval of the unit commander. This situation was not cleaned up till mid 1951, when new officers took command of the RSM and the Detachment.

Army's handling of COMINT was not in keeping with all security regulations either; one incident regarding dissemination of T/A material to ROK "M" has already been discussed. There were other occurrences in units under 8th Army jurisdiction. To have an incident, such as the one

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SECURITY INFORMATION

that follows, occur in front line units full of defectors and infiltrated subversive personnel, may well have played a great roll in drying up the the North Korean traffic.

HEADQUARTERS  
501st ORG

18 October 1951

Subj: "Radio Interceptions"

P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

To : AC of S, G-2 EUSAF:

(1) It has come to the attention of this organization that at least two separate units of this organization are on their own initiative intercepting enemy radio communications, and are making distribution of their product to a considerable number of consumers.

(2) In one of these cases, the traffic being intercepted by the [25x3] is a source of great value to 5th Air Force. Detachment 13, 1st RSM, in their handling of this material, give it a classification of "Top Secret Code-Word" while, as can be seen from the enclosed document, the [25x3] has classified theirs only "RESTRICTED". We are also informed that mention was made of this intercept in the Corps PIR (assured to mean periodic intelligence report). The security risk, both in classification and dissemination is obvious, and may result in compromise and a complete closing up of the source of any intelligence derived.

(3) The second intercept case is in the 2nd U.S. Infantry Div. The traffic forwarded us has been completed at least over a period of three days, to our knowledge. A sample of this traffic is also enclosed.

(4) In order that these intercept activities, if continued,

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be directed toward the best interests of the intelligence effort, it is recommended that henceforth all intercepted enemy communications be forwarded at once to the nearest Army Security Agency unit or liaison officer for exclusive handling through Army Security Agency channels.

(5) Request that enclosures be returned to this headquarters.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

/s/ Howard A. Walters  
HOWARD A. WALTERS  
RCJG USA  
ASST ADJ

Fifth Air Force aided in drying up 25x3 air traffic. The turkey shoot at Sinmi-do on 20 June 51 may well have been a horrible blunder. Although Gen Timberlake made the decision, the SAC did not advise him against it. About 2100 on the night of 19 June, the NKAH Hqs at Pyongyang decided to have a go at air war, offensive style. They laid an operational order on their unit at Sinuiju, who at the time had all the "Bulls, Stones, Kites, Butterflies" and numerous other NKAH "cover words" for aircraft. At 0600 the next morning they were going to launch a flock of conventional bombers against the Island Chain with MIG escort. Within 30 minutes after the operator at Pyongyang sent AR we delivered the message to SAC Fifth. The CG 5th Air Force probably knew the attack was coming off before Lee Yong II (Commander of the Air Division at Sinuiju) did. Since the enemy was sending conventionals, FAF ordered 18th Ftr Bmr Wing's F-51's diverted from ground support missions. They were to handle the bombers while the 4th Ftr jets took care of top cover MIG's. Approximately nine hours lapsed from the time the strike was ordered until it was in progress. The next morning when the communists met F-51's and F-86's, on schedule, it undoubtedly looked suspicious. The Reds should have been able to put two and two together

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and figure out we had broken their codes. The time lag was too short for the information to leak out by any other means. The thing that really compromised the whole action was F-51's flying counter air patrol! Why would 51's be out over water, headed north, no bombs, no rockets, just machine guns? It had not happened since early in the war, and has not happened since. Had they carried rockets, bombs or something, and dropped them prior to the encounter, and then been diverted to meet the conventionals, some cover would have been provided. The wisdom of using ground support aircraft in that manner was extremely doubtful, but in the "heat of the chase" caution was thrown aside. One of the SSU's remarks was to the effect that "We've been reading their stuff for months, if they haven't tumbled yet, they never will."

P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

There were a lot of queries between Pyongyang and Sinuiju as to what happened to the North Korean Air Force. Sinuiju replied "we were met by F-51's etc etc etc". Three days later Wang Ryon, CG NKAF, fired a query to Sinuiju wanting to know the status of the land line communications. Shortly thereafter KCA3 lost almost all value. What we read were purely administrative queries, and the

25x3

Today the volume is low. Air has dried up almost completely, at a time when it hurts. If we were reading as we used to there would be some wonderful tie ups on our COMINT nets, and we'd have a better picture of who's who in the Antung Complex.

F-86's in the Mig Alley coastal areas are commonplace and nothing serious would have resulted from their use alone. However, to have 51's at one altitude and Sabres at another, must have been obvious to anyone. 5th and 7th AF were so elated over the largest air to air victory of the war they forgot they may have shut off the COMINT source. It is my opinion that this incident

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P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

SECURITY INFORMATION

had more to do with drying up [25x3] than all our unclean people and broad dissemination. Again, SSO's and SRS shops, staffed with people who did, and do not, fully understand COMINT, dropped the ball. USAFSS' taking over at least part of this function will help. Why struggle to produce a good product if you haven't the representatives or recipients who understand it? 5th Air Force, as pointed out previously, was guilty of non-use of COMINT in the early days. Here we have them guilty of over-use.

In the CHICAM Tu-2 kills later in November, we do not feel a compromise occurred. F-86's only were used, [25x3] could probably have spotted them while on routine patrol. The major threat to the CHICAM effort is the [25x3]. Their [25x3] were being disseminated through "open source", and were classified SECRET. This could easily [25x3]

There were numerous other minor items that could have been contributing factors in drying up [25x3] but these are the major ones. You never know when a compromise has resulted, or what caused it. COMINT is a unique product that should have greater security than it has, in some instances, and greater freedom in others. The new TACCOMINT policy is a long step in the right direction.

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SECURITY INFORMATION VI

"YOKE" SERVICE

Since its inception, the YOKE service provided by us to the Fifth Air Force in Korea has been comparable to the football team of a Big Ten University. The other portions of the integrated educational program may be esthetically and culturally more important, but football supports them. Other aspects of our intercept and analysis program may be more important to sophisticates in the business, but it cannot be denied that the <sup>item</sup> that sells our Command to those we support is the YOKE service. It's the service that beats the wolf from their door — not some imagined or future monster, but the nasty customer who is there right now. Hence, in a very real sense to tactical air commanders, our YOKE service is the Security Service. Its value is brought to their attention every day, and on occasions in a most spectacular fashion.

At the start of the Korean War there was nothing to monitor which would provide a basis for this service. However, when the Russian control net in North Korea began to crystalize and the Russian Migs became operational under its active control, the possibility of limited YOKE service presented itself.

For some time we were not in a position to offer YOKE service. The net was not sufficiently reconstructed to permit immediate exploitation, there were insufficient voice intercept personnel on hand, and those who were in the theater were not sufficiently skilled. Actually, our voice intercept effort was in the most rudimentary stage of development when the enemy began his operations.

A wire from the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile to FEAF dated 31 March 1951 (Cite: HM-772) stated voice intercept in Korea could not be estab-

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lished due to a lag in equipment and personnel, but suggested relay to 5th Air Force, by telephone, of alerts concerning enemy air activity based upon voice intercept at Ashiya. This system was started on 4 April and lasted until Team #1 became operational about 26 April. A simple cover system alerted Detachment "C" whenever enemy aircraft were noted at Ashiya as being operational in the North Korea area. This system was obviously unsatisfactory, since it did not fulfill the YOKE requirement, was of doubtful security, and was not timely.

As a result of a conference held 4 April 1951 at FEAF Hqs with representatives from the Security Service, a message was sent from General Stratemyer to General Vandenberg wire, (Cite: TSW 177), 4 April 1951, (Personal), requesting voice operators and analysts be sent to 1st RSM to operate tactical air services in Korea in conjunction with the ground control.

At the meeting the difficulties of providing Korean YOKE service (sensitivity of the intercept material, lack of cleared and indoctrinated personnel, lack of control of tactical air control center (Korea) personnel, and equipment and intercept personnel shortages) were stressed by Security Service personnel. Representatives of the 1st RSM were still not certain that the analysis of the system in use by the Russian ground controller was sufficiently accurate to provide the desired YOKE services to the tactical controller. They were also leery of the compromise possibilities, inasmuch as we did not have adequate experienced personnel of our own to provide a tactical controller for 5th Air Force, who could receive, disguise and pass this material.

On 5 April, a wire from Hqs, USAF Security Service to 1st RSM and FEAF: Cite: OAD OSC 708, informed 1st RSM and FEAF that AFSS had been

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ordered to send voice personnel to the Far East and set up a team for YOKE services in Korea, and informed 1st RSM that the number required by General Vandenberg could not be furnished. They did state that there were eight airmen and one officer leaving AFSS Hqs 9 April, but stressed the critical shortage of Russian voice personnel, world wide, and advised that this number of people was all that could be supplied immediately without jeopardizing the command requirement for early warning defense of the United States.

A 5 April wire, MH-512 from Hqs FEAF to 1st RSM (Deputy Intelligence FEAF to CO 1st RSM) ordered Major Jameson to accompany FEAF representative to Korea and coordinate with Director of Intelligence 5th Air Force to provide spot YOKE services. It also requested CO 1st RSM to provide technical advice as required, to prepare an SOP for interim alerting measures to be coordinated with D/I 5th Air Force and FEAF representatives, to coordinate with D/I 5th Air Force on 1st RSM requirements for implementing a voice intercept station in Korea, and to provide full spot services.

The FEAF representative, stated 6 April that the meeting with 5th Air Force was satisfactory to the D/I 5th Air Force.

On 7 April Major Robert S. Vandiver, AFSS LNO FEAF, prepared a memo for the Deputy for Intelligence, FEAF, signed by Colonel V. W. Howard, Executive Officer, D/I FEAF, stating that it was the function of 1st RSM, or any RSM, to assign detachments to tactical control groups to provide YOKE type service, according to paragraph 95f Joint Training Directives for Air-Ground Operations, (dated 1 Sept 49), and outlined the role of such detachments, i.e. to monitor and locate enemy intercept by use of radio receivers and direction finding equipment and forward traffic to the TACC for evaluation and utilization. This memo recommended that the

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Radio Squadron Mobile team be under the direct control of the Tactical Control Group or the Joint Operations Center at 5th Air Force, with a primary mission of furnishing information from voice intercepts to provide a vectoring service for UN aircraft to airborne targets, and with a secondary mission of relaying traffic to the 1st RSM for further processing. The memo also recommended an SOP be devised for security measures, and forwarded to the Director of Intelligence, USAF, stating that security could be obtained by provision of a simple, daily-changing code for flashing voice intercepts to JOC, and that collateral and byproducts developed should be protected and relayed only in accordance with current special intelligence regulations.

A message from the FEAF LNO (Vandiver) to the CG, USAFSS and the CO, 1st RSM, advised that FEAF had transmitted a message to AFOIN, USAF (TSW 223) "Personnel for augmentation of voice intercept team have now arrived in theater (20 April) and expect to begin operating 23 April. It is planned to establish this voice team separately and apart from other agencies in Korea so that JOC may make maximum use in vectoring UN aircraft to airborne targets, providing security service regulations permit voice intercept to be used. This information will be passed direct to JOC, who will further relay information to UN aircraft. Simple code for voice transmissions presently being devised by local COMINT agencies."

About 15 April Major Jameson appointed Captain Tisdale project officer. He immediately began preparing requirements for equipment and huts and coordinating the supply of transportation, personnel and QM supplies to be included on the initial shipment. The 1st RSM voice analysis section began preparing all technical aids that would be needed to accomplish

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SECURITY INFORMATION

the mission in Korea, including up to date analysis devices and COMINT data, and recommendations for operational techniques. The equipping of this team<sup>I</sup> presented unique problems since no one had given any clear idea of exactly how this operation was to be conducted in Korea. It was decided that with available equipment, the most feasible means of passing the information to TACC would be by simultaneous transmission on land line as the traffic was intercepted. A system utilizing a telephone operator's mouth piece for the intercept operators and a squawk-box at TACC on the desk of the Tactical Air Controller was devised to implement this plan.

Basic equipment of the team consisted of two 6x6 trucks, jeep and jeep trailer, two P95s (power units), an HO 17 hut, a dipole antennae, two squad tents, and two radio receivers. In the hut were mounted (on steel racks) two radio receivers (1 super-pro and 1 51j), two RT11A recorders and two radio operator intercept desks with typewriters. The operational plan included the simultaneous interception, recording, translation and relay in English on landline to TACC of the messages on the Russian voice GCI net in North Korea.

Since we had no six-armed personnel, a system of automatic switch devices was incorporated into the recorder, leaving one hand free to operate the telephone headset. A second man in the hut would work current analysis on the material intercepted, keep the field team up to date on the tactical changes occurring on the enemy net, and keep the grid zone chart accurate and timely without relying on the analysis of the parent unit with its attendant delays. The second man, during aircraft activities in North Korea, was also to plot all UN and enemy aircraft, and log a current and concise picture of those activities as they progressed.

On 21 April, transportation, QM supplies, tentage, etc., were loaded aboard trucks and shipped by rail under armed guard to Ashiya. A great deal

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SECURITY INFORMATION

of difficulty arose in getting this equipment shipped from Johnson railhead due to lack of understanding of the urgency of the mission on the part of local transportation people. This equipment had to be sent to Ashiya for airlift because Troop Carrier was restricted from landing C-119's at bases in the Tokyo area. The Troop Carrier unit at Ashiya had not been advised of the shipment, but Major Carsner, CO, 1st RSM detachment at Ashiya, managed to procure air shipping space, and it was enroute without appreciable delay.

On the morning of 23 April, one C-119 and one C-46 landed at Johnson Air Base (through special authorization) and the hut was loaded on the 119. The jeep and trailer were placed on the 46 along with the personnel. Lt Nicola had gone over as advance party, alone, on 22 April, to coordinate the landing of the equipment from Ashiya and Johnson at K-13 (Suwon). Two Russian Voice Intercept Operators took over the shipment of the trucks and supplies at Ashiya and accompanied them on the airlift to Korea.

The team and its equipment was moved by road to K-6 (Pyongtaek), where they set up adjacent to the tactical air controller.

By eleven AM, 24 April, 1951, the unit was patched in to the tactical air controller by landline, and was operational as planned.

While the equipment was being set up, Major Jameson and the team NCOIC went over to the 606th AC&W unit and attempted to determine exactly how such information as we could provide could be worked in with their radar information and transmitted to the aircraft in a secure manner, while still fulfilling the requirements of 5th Air Force Fighter Units. The 606th Tactical Controller had absolutely no idea of how we operated or controlled such information, prior to this meeting.

Fortunately, in this instance, the tactical air controller (Major Mack) was discreet, highly skilled and fully cognizant after his minimum

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SECURITY — INFORMATION

briefing of the sensitivity of and the necessary restrictions surrounding such an operation.

Major Jameson also coordinated with the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander and Operations Officer, to acquaint them with the minimum amount of information they would need to utilize successfully the information received in the air from the tactical air controller. Neither of these officers were indoctrinated for communications intelligence. Almost immediately after inception of YOXE type services, the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing began to have tactical successes directly resulting from the improved services from the tactical air controller, and on several occasions the CO of the unit expressed his appreciation by buzzing our detachment in his F-86.

Originally, since neither AC&W people nor ourselves were exactly sure of just what was required, enemy reports on both our own aircraft and enemy aircraft were passed to the tactical air controller. Information on friendly aircraft, while useful in establishing the validity of the grid zone system in use by the enemy, was soon determined not to be required by the tactical air controller, and passing of such information was discontinued.

A simple word substitution code was used to identify enemy and friendly aircraft and ground check points. Raw intercept material was never passed.

These security measures did not anticipate the conclusions to be reached by the normal, intelligent American male in the jet fighter when he began to note, over a period of time, that the tactical air controller had suddenly developed the capability of seeing through hills, mountains, etc, at low altitudes. We could not brief the enemy intercept operators

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SECURITY — INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

on our GCI frequencies, but we should have foreseen the possibility of speculation by our own pilots, and prevented that by minimum security briefings in advance of the actual implementations.

Much later, due to flagrant loose talk by 5th Air Force pilots concerning the excellent services received from TACC, a system of minimum security briefing and oaths, executed by combat crew members, was conceived and enforced. Before 5th Air Force was completely sold on the necessity for this rigid security system successive compromises had driven the enemy to a system of numerous, rapidly changing cover words which almost put us out of business. It was finally necessary (end of October, 1951) to suspend YOKE services for a few days. This suspension quickly convinced all 5th Air Force personnel concerned of the desirability of going along with our desires in regard to minimum security measures, such drastic action was later disowned by Hqs AFSS, but it was necessary to prevent complete loss of the YOKE service. Antung soon found their new security techniques too cumbersome and reverted to the old system.

The team remained at Suwon until the 2nd of June, at which time it moved with the 606th AC&W Squadron to a hill four miles northeast of Kimpo Air Field. This new site afforded improved radar and intercept coverage.

Reception of the Soviet net work and our controller communications with UN aircraft continued to deteriorate throughout the summer months until it became advisable to search for a better location. ~~The decision~~ For a time an aircraft was used in the Pyongyang area to relay TACC controller instructions. Team 1 experimented with numerous antenna arrays, shielding, daily receiver maintenance, and elimination of local interference sources in an attempt to improve reception of the enemy nets.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

None of these endeavors were successful, and a search for a better site continued. The island of Paengyang Do was tested for reception and found to be a considerable improvement over the Kimpo site. This site had communications direct to the 606th AC&W Squadron by FM carrier transmitter with scrambler and directional transmission characteristics, and a beach suitable for the operation of C-47 aircraft at low tide.

The main drawback of this site was the problem of rapid evacuation of personnel, since enemy held territory was only six miles away. Fifth Air Force promised to provide adequate air evacuation facilities, but these were never provided. A team was installed on this island on 6 August 1951, by direct orders of CG 5th Air Force.

The movement was accomplished by IST. The 606th provided transmitters and a power unit, but it was necessary for the team to provide its own shelter, motor transport, and technical equipment. The original team at K-6 consisted of five voice intercept technicians, a radio repairman, a motor pool driver, a mechanic, and the OIC, Lt Nicola. The advance team, established on the island, consisted of two voice intercept operators, one CW intercept operator and a motor mechanic and driver. The site at Kimpo continued to remain on a full operational basis, with Lt Nicola and the radio repairman dividing their time between the two sites.

During the latter part of August a new system was devised for passing information to the tactical air controller, whereby security service personnel of the detachment translated the intercepted information into radar-type plotting information themselves, prior to passing the information to TACC. This prevented any breach which might have arisen under the stress of combat situations, when the tactical air controller might forget to

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SECURITY INFORMATION

disguise our information. It was assumed at all times that the enemy was fully cognizant of all transmissions from TACC control to our friendly aircraft.

These security risks could perhaps have been anticipated, but it is extremely doubtful that sound techniques could have been devised without operational experience. It is felt that the system of security briefings evolved, and our control of the disguising of the intercepted information, down to and including the exact format to be transmitted by TACC, are two of the most profitable lessons of this entire operation.

During July the enemy started training in night operations, and became operational in August. The team began a full twenty-four hour operation, no longer being on an alert status at night. A new system of informing the UN aircraft in the MIG Alley area of imminent danger was devised. This consisted principally in the establishment of an arbitrary zonal system to cover the North Korean area, and a simple daily changing warning word to be passed to night flying UN aircraft to indicate the approximate zonal area of danger.

These warnings were instrumental in enabling night flying B-26's to avoid attacks and to return to the area and continue the mission when the danger subsided. This service was much appreciated by all tactical units concerned, but it proved inadequate for Medium Bomber type operations. Since these latter were scheduled for a definite target, they required a full YOKE service and not merely zone type warning. Full YOKE service was later coordinated with FEAF Bomber units operational in Korea, and is currently in use, providing them with complete information on enemy air activities at night. The same crew compromises have arisen in Bomber

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Command as were encountered in Fifth Air Force. Enforcement of similar oaths and briefings is now being coordinated.

Atmospheric conditions reverted to normal with the approach of the winter, and the team on the island was withdrawn to Kimpo on 18 September. Operations remained fairly static at Kimpo throughout the winter months.

In spring of 52, to improve communications with Hq 5th AF and consolidate AFSS units, and in order to fully exploit the analysis of by-products of the YOKE team, the team was moved to Chosen Christian University in Seoul. A line of site FM transmission system was installed between the new site and the TACC at Kimpo.

Since the move the team has been able to coordinate its efforts with the Chinese Voice and CW intercept efforts of the rest of the Detachment, in such a manner as to exploit simultaneously intercept of CW Chinese PVO, Chinese Voice, Russian CW and Russian Voice. Korean early warning is also intercepted at this site, and will be integrated if it becomes tactical.

Incorporation of these other materials in the "radar plots" furnished to TACC has increased the capability of the YOKE type service to the point where the tactical air controller has the equivalent of friendly radar installations located along the Yalu River. The successes of F-86's over MIG-15's have increased lately, and in no small measure these successes can be directly attributed to the vastly improved YOKE type services now being rendered. AFSS is the "new gadget" referred to by Secretary *Field* ~~Symington~~ as having been developed and incorporated into the F-86. The present top-heavy successes of the F-86's against MIG-15's dates almost from the day of inception of the new integrated Voice-CW YOKE service.

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One of the outstanding lessons to be learned from this YOKE operation is that when a major commander in an operational theater begins to agitate for a service of any kind that is even remotely within our capabilities, we should make an immediate effort to devise means to exploit our capabilities in that direction, even though we may object to the proposal at the time. The tactical commander at war will have a high degree of success in obtaining authority to exploit the capabilities of support organizations, so we should make every effort to provide for an efficient solution, with maximum security, for the service desired. Of course we must <sup>refer</sup> ~~for~~ an issue regarding COMINT security to a decision by Hq USAF, but we lose much by failing to plan in advance how we should operate if the decision goes against us. Such planning would prevent recurrence of the panic button operations by which Team 1 was organized.

Our experienced YOKE service personnel concur in the desirability, from a long range standpoint, of having only cleared and indoctrinated people in tactical air control centers, so that centers <sup>CAN</sup> receive all forms of intercepted material (Voice, CW, radar) and plot them on their screens in the form of tracks for the direct use of the tactical air controller. Until the controller center people are cleared and indoctrinated, maximum security can never be realized, full understanding of the tactical situation by the controller cannot be achieved, and we will have to operate a duplicate plotting board with consequent waste of time and personnel. AFSS's operation of TACC's has been proposed as an alternate solution, but this would involve us too deeply in the exploitation of COMINT to be feasible.

The detachment commander should have full responsibility and control in regard to physical security. The physical security of the area should

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be subject to no interpretation by personnel of other commands, regardless of their station. Evacuation of personnel and vital equipment should be at the discretion of the detachment commander. We can never depend fully on other commanders to provide our evacuation facilities. Adequate transportation for ground evacuation of such teams should be an integral part of a detachment's equipment, to insure protection of the operation if the local command fails to provide air transport when it is required.

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SECURITY — INFORMATION

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P.L. 86-36  
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INDIGENOUS TEAMS:

A. 25x3 Team Two

1. Due to the insistant demands by CG, Fifth AF, Major General Frank Everest, that personnel be secured who could provide Chinese and Korean to English translations of ground controlled intercept information for relay to the TADC for utilization by friendly aircraft, twelve

25x3

largely of high level analysts. They were not academically trained Chinese linguists, but had acquired the language through association during military tours of from three to five years in China.

By 3 August 1952, the equipment and personnel of Team Two were airlifted from Johnson AFB, Japan to K-14 (Kimpo).

3. Upon arriving in Korea, the team was assembled at Detachment 13, and moved to 10th AAA Group Hqs where they set up a limited operation. Because of a high noise level, proximity of buildings, trees, etc., Lt. Holbert, (Team OIC), relocated the small installation approximately fifty (50) yards from the location of Team One. They were set up in two huts containing two (2) radio receivers and one (1) tape recorder. This move was made 7 August. Team One at that time was located approximately one hundred (100) yards from the 606th AAC&W unit on "Radar Hill" overlooking K-14.

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P.L. 86-36  
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4. 25x3 immediately began monitoring the HF band for Air to Air, Air to Ground, or Ground to Air Chinese Voice.

5. The Commanding Officer, 1st Radio Squadron and the newly arrived Liaison Officer to Fifth AF inspected units in Korea on 17 August, and decided the proximity of Teams One and Two was a serious security risk. Efforts were begun immediately to secure another site for Team Two personnel. Upon the recommendation of Mr. Jack Creech, Chosen Christian University near Seoul Area was examined and real estate rights secured. Arrangements were made with the 440th Signal Construction Battalion, Area "E", to provide messing facilities, guards and electrical power. The physical move was made 21 August 1951.

25x3

This was done on 25 August.

7. On 26 August 1951, a conference was held by Major General Everest, Commanding General Fifth Air Force, Brigadier General Banfill, D/I FEAF, Lt. Colonel Brown, D/I Fifth Air Force and Major Nixon AFSS Liaison Officer, Fifth AF, to discuss securing new personnel to continue Team Two operation. It was decided to search for qualified Korean personnel that were fluent in Chinese, Korean and English. Meanwhile, a letter was written by Major General Everest to General Ridgeway requesting him to revoke his decision 25x3

8. General Ridgeway reversed his decision on 15 September, and

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the twelve [25x3] were returned to Korea on the 18th. Operation was resumed immediately. Captain Weber replaced Lt. Holbert as CIC the following week.

9. Team Two continued to monitor Chinese Air Voice and to supply written translations to Group until the end of May, 1952, but were never utilized to transmit information to TADC for two (2) reasons:

- a. Their incapability to translate from Chinese to English rapid by enough to pass this information to TADC. In many cases they had to translate from Chinese [25x3] to English.
- b. The Chinese Air Voice GCI nets were neither sufficiently developed nor active enough to warrant the passage of information.

Because of the high caliber, COMINT wise, of the personnel, and the lack of qualified American linguists, the Group Commander proposed to Hq, USAFES that we provide the necessary CW intercept of Chinese nets and establish Team Two at [25x3] to work the Chinese problem in the same manner that CHC was working the Korean. The clearance difficulties preclude this solution, but the proposal did pry loose adequate linguistic support from AFSA and ASAPAC to cover the requirement until AFES had linguists available. Why [25x3] were greater security risks than Koreans has not been explained.

10. US Air Force Chinese linguists (Yale graduates) arrived in Korea during the third week in April. The [25x3] were phased out and [25x3] 24 May 1952.

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Because no qualified American personnel were available we were forced [25x3] to monitor and develop the Chinese Air Voice nets as an interim measure. It was another "thumb in the leaking dike" effort to cover gaps left by our failure to provide for Satellite adventures. We were forbidden to exploit to the fullest the vast experience in Chinese COMINT problems which [25x3] had acquired from 1930 on, while we deluded ourselves that we could take COMINT experts and put them to work on a COMINT problem without compromising our mission.

#### B. Korean Team Three

The decision by General Ridgeway to [25x3]

[25x3] on 23 August 1951 produced a concentrated effort to secure Korean Nationals that were fluent in Korean, Chinese, Russian and English. This decision was reached during a conference between General Everest, Commanding General Fifth Air Force, Brig. General Banfill, D/I FEAF, Lt. Colonel Brown, D/I Fifth Air Force, and Major Nixon, USAFSS LNO, 26 August 1951.

Colonel Brown had served a previous tour in Korea, and was familiar with a number of qualified personnel by name and reputation. Upon his recommendation, [25x3] was located and persuaded to act as leader of the unit. [25x3] was at that time serving as an honorary Captain in the 1st Marine Division as interpreter-translator. Permission was received from his Commanding Officer to release him to Fifth Air Force.

[25x3] as evacuated from the Punch Bowl area by helicopter on 2 September 1952.

He was given orders of doubtful legality, money, and rations and flown to Pusan to attempt to locate other personnel. The AISS Detach-

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ment in Pusan agreed to provide him with transportation.

On 24 September, Captain Hahn was returned to Seoul. He had selected seven (7) personnel and obtained the necessary personal history statements for submission to the OSI clearance checks.

During the second week in October, S/Sgt Hester, NCOIC Team Three, arrived in Korea with equipment supplied by the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, consisting of one (1) Jeep, one (1) 6X6 truck, four (4) radio receivers and two (2) tape recorders. These were installed in a building adjacent to that utilized by Team Two at Chosen Christian University.

Clearance for indigenous personnel in a war-torn country can be expected to be less than satisfactory. Personal recommendations, a local police check and a local military OS or CIC check were considered adequate. Final approval by the local Air Force was obtained mainly to distribute the responsibility placed on other clearance organizations.

This casual clearance was finally received on the seven (7) Korean personnel on 5 November. Captain Hahn was flown to Pusan on 6 November and returned to Seoul by air with his team on the 10th. Team Three began monitoring the HF band for Korean Air to Air, Air to Ground, Ground to Air Voice on 11 November 1951.

A contract was drawn up by A-2 Fifth and AFSS LNO containing the following provisions: P. I. privileges, American messing facilities, specified amount of Won per month, specified amount of dollars per month, privilege of depositing any or all the monthly dollar salary in the Bank of Chosen, six (6) mauls of rice per month, (approx, 125 lbs.), the contents of which was to contain no more than 50% of inferior or other type grains, housing, (Personnel only) and clothing. When the normal relief rice was examined, it was found to be of such inferior grade, both in rice

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content and assorted grains, that a verbal commitment was made to pay in Won the current market price of six (6) mauls of rice per month. The monetary account for this team was handled entirely by a finance representative of the 6004th AISS. All vouchers were cosigned by D/I Fifth Air Force, USAFSS LNO and the finance representative.

Due to the varied linguistic abilities of these personnel, they were permitted to monitor any suspected Air Voice transmission which they were capable of understanding. This procedure proved to be very lucrative. A definite inter-relationship was established between the Russian, Chinese and Korean GCI Voice nets. Operational control consisted of the following:

1. Forbidding certain frequencies to be monitored. (These frequencies had been previously identified as Army Ground nets and were considered of no value to this project.)
2. Requiring an English translation of all voice transmissions, listing the frequencies and exact times.

As the proficiency of the personnel increased, they were permitted to attempt the correlation of the information and preparation written reports. These reports were examined and portions extracted which were considered correct and of value by Group analysts.

To date, except for the release of two (2) of the original seven (7) personnel (one (1) because of excessive drinking, and the other by request); the team remains approximately the same.

The linguistic abilities of Team Three has enabled this team to be of inestimable value. American personnel were not and are not available to provide this needed language ability. If the target is of sufficient importance, the expense and effort required to organize such a team and

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the security risks involved can be considered justified. Without them  
we are helpless in the face of possible Korean GCI envelopment.

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The new chain of command initiated a number of improvements. Various  
to be scattered throughout the local area and were concentrated at 3 cross  
positions, including machine gun positions, and a light mortar and anti-  
aircraft. The operations of the command were also re-organized through  
the use of the joint service, and a number of the original units were  
re-organized to be more effective. The new chain of command was also  
re-organized to be more effective.

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It is interesting to note that shortly after all three projects reported negatively on enemy use of VFP, we began to discover considerable VFP in the enemy GCI system from Code 121-1.

In April 1952, a team of American linguists and a team of Japanese linguists arrived in a team of various Chinese linguists and followed the Japanese team very successfully after a short overlap. The increased exploitation and control possible with cleared personnel highlights the requirement for a fully qualified and capable team to deal with Russian satellite problems.

During this period 1952, because of the failure of the USAF to provide indoctrinated intelligence personnel to 1-2 Fifth Air Force, entered temporarily the personnel supply business. The Washington expected the Air Force at war to operate without an intelligence section who could not employ or rely on the security. Our entry into supplementary research in Korea was a case (in other words) politically available to the Group Command, but it caused a long and difficult fight to persuade the Air Force that it

also should be allowed to have and use his own license right.

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19 : MDR-USAF-MDR-62597-1-1  
Progress of the activities can be seen from the following summary of the various operations. The first was an increasing number of the 3rd Air Division which was then to conduct new operations in Laos and, as the 1950s were directed to establish another team to be shifted to any South East Asia trouble spot. This was requested to procure 100 linguists to operate the requirement for further indigenous teams. This "Pine Brigade" was subsequently established as Det 152 in Vietnam, and was eventually be replaced as the enemy moved into 1950s.

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From October 1951 the AFSSMO, as senior COMINT officer in Korea, was also designated as officer in charge of all AFSS CO. RT and G. SIG units there. This was essential to provide a single command and control system. It was also necessary to provide a single COMINT group to local units. The consolidation of all units in one area eliminated the requirement for this manual command set up in the spring of 1951.

In mid 1951, the advance intercept team, which had been received from the 1st AF in the F.I. of 1951, was re-established with the forward of the 1st AF at Chong. Within range of North Korean secret batteries. The success of this move was attested by the development of enemy VLF air to air and air to ground transmissions in September 1951. ✓/H

A few difficulties arose with F.I.F. over the revelation in Great reports of forbidden sorties beyond the L.I. Since many of our own units were compromised, our basis on this was forced to prove these border violations to F.I.F. on the basis of a claim.

Bomber Command (B.O.) at Yokota received a committed list in August, 1951. The list was to extend to include all units which were compromised.

On the other hand, the list was also for the same reason of compromise.

Which was the same as the list for the early days of the service. Our hats are still off to the B-29 boys who have remained throughout both the first and second.

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The 1st RSM weather section, consisting of one officer and three airmen, was organized in Sept, 1950. The officer in charge, out-ranked the operations officer so the weather section was made into a separate section on an equal level with Operations. This arrangement caused some jealousies and lack of cooperation. The weather intercept positions were used for training operators, therefore, the traffic was a very poor quality and at times, of little value. The weather section also received the last copy of intercepted traffic, even though the traffic was a pure weather broadcast which was of no interest to other sections. The print on this last copy was very dull, and considerable difficulty was encountered in distinguishing various numbers which substituted for weather elements. 36  
When Major Young (then Capt.) and other weather personnel arrived at the 1st RSM in Oct. 1950, for a three month TDY tour to assist in organizing the weather section before assignment to the 3rd RSM, the future for a weather section at the 1st RSM and Hqs AFSS did not look very promising. Although the team was given a nice reception, no one seemed very interested in the weather effort. This attitude was understandable as it was a new field for the Security Service and, because of this and the difficulties mentioned above, little had been accomplished. A few weeks later the 1st RSM executive officer departed for the ZI and was replaced by the operations officer. The weather section was then placed under operations, and it was decided that the weather personnel sent over for a three month period would remain and complete a regular tour in the Far East. As an integral part of operations, cooperation improved and the weather section rapidly developed.

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Being the first AFSS weather unit, the 1st RSM weather section believed that AFSS and AFSA should be thoroughly informed about their activities; however, all reports originated by this section were proof-read by operations and frequently information was omitted which the weather section thought AFSS and AFSA should know. This was not a deliberate attempt to disguise our activities, but was caused by the lack of weather knowledge on the part of the operations personnel. This entailed considerable embarrassment and unnecessary communications in answering queries from AFSS and AFSA. These agencies would also request clarification occasionally on a certain operation which had been thoroughly explained in a report previously sent to them. This indicated that either the reports were not being read by AFSS and AFSA, or that they were not being distributed to the proper sections.

The 1st RSM Commanding Officer, Lt Col Jameson (then Major) became very interested in our effort and through his frequent visits to the weather section the spirit of the weather intelligence personnel improved very rapidly. He saw to it that the proper publicity was disseminated to authorized and interested agencies. This was an important factor as we were disseminating SWI reports to 2143rd AWW through FWPU. Frequently FWPU would be unable to transmit our SWI reports to the 2143rd AWW because of the circuit being loaded by the transmission of their own traffic. When our traffic exceeded the useable time limit, it was destroyed. Actually some of our SWI reports should have had a higher precedence than FWPU's due to the geographical location of these reports and their usefulness for forecasting weather for the Korean-Japan Area. However, FWPU had a world wide responsibility and was not too concerned with the local requirements. This was a constant source of trouble as the weather intelligence airmen, knowing the SWI was being held at FWPU and then thrown away when the useable time



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limit expired, would wonder why they should devote so much effort to expediting the cipher recoveries and processing the traffic. The weather section requested a direct line from the 1st RSM to the 2143 AWW, thereby eliminating the relay through FWP<sup>41</sup>U. Due to the publicity mentioned above and the importance of our product, a direct line was immediately established. Professional jealousies and empire building tendencies on the part of FWP<sup>41</sup>U continued to plague our weather people until the Group was firmly established.

As progress continued, it appeared to personnel of the weather section that most of this information could also be of vital importance to the forecasters stationed in Korea who had the responsibility of preparing forecasts for the tactical air activity. This was suggested to the CO of Det "C" (now Det 151) and was not very enthusiastically received. He stated that they had weather reconnaissance aircraft ~~flying~~ flying over North Korea most of the time and there was no need for our SWI. Naturally, from a meteorological viewpoint, this answer was not satisfactory, and the 2143rd AWW personnel were consulted. They agreed that this information would be of extreme value to their forecasters in Korea and took immediate steps to obtain clearances for their forecasters stationed at the 30th Weather Squadron, then at Taegu, Korea. FWP<sup>41</sup>U was asked if they could add to the Korean SWI program, but they were only committed to world wide dissemination. When forecasters were cleared at the 30th Weather Squadron, a SWI section was organized at Det C. A complete report was written on the establishment of this section; however, the report was edited by 1st RSM operations personnel and only a little information was sent to AFSS and AFSA. Due to limited intercept facilities, insufficient intercept operators and weather personnel and duplication of effort, a rapid and secure crypto system was requested and established to transmit SWI reports directly from the 1st RSM

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P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

SECURITY INFORMATION

to Det C. When this system became efficiently operational, it was planned to eliminate the weather section at Det C and transmit all SWI reports that were processed at the 1st RSM to this Det to be utilized by the cleared forecasters of the 30th Weather Squadron. Because of communications difficulties, overloading of the circuit with other types of traffic and later separation of the Det C weather section from the message center so that officer courier was the only means of delivering this traffic to the consumers, plans for elimination of this duplication of effort were discontinued. This weather section now consists of three weather airman, nine intercept operators and four positions which all could be eliminated if adequate communications was established between the 6920th Security Group and the 500, 5th Air Force. The Group Communications officer, Major Bolstridge, is presently working on a communications system that should relieve this situation.

During the summer of 1951, the weather section was extremely busy but they willingly accepted an additional burden upon the request of the 2143rd AWW. FWPV had the responsibility of decrypting and disseminating SWI appearing in the [REDACTED] which was at that time

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According to Lt Col Kuns, (OIC of FWPV)

unless they had a crib for this broadcast, they could not decrypt certain important weather elements by cryptanalysis under existing AFSA directives. In many instances cribs were not available, and the reports being disseminated to the Air Weather Service were very incomplete and of little value to the forecasters. Personnel from the 2143rd AWW requested that the weather section of the 1st RSM attempt the decryption of this broadcast, as they were not bound by any directives. The 1st RSM weather section, realizing the importance of this weather and enjoying the cryptanalysis challenge it presented, worked this broadcast on a twenty four hour a day basis, mainly

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P.L. 86-36  
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during their off duty hours, and the results were extremely satisfactory. When the AFSS and AFSA heard about this process, they informed the weather section that they had usurped the FWPu responsibility and that they were limited to a thousand mile range. This was a great morale factor as the weather personnel were only interested in doing a job that was needed and did not intend to usurp any responsibility. This problem was presented to Col Weeks and the weather section was given permission to continue because of the urgent need for this information in this theater.

25x3

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FWPU did not like this decision, but it was for the best interests of the service that responsibilities should be given to the best qualified organization.

During the fall and winter of 1951 the FWPu-AFSS Special Weather controversy reached its peak. DIRAFSA appeared to doubt Group's weather capability, the Navy refused to accept a solely Air Force SWI organization, and OIC FWPu was empire-building. Group realized that as a service organization the ability to fulfill customer requirements was the paramount issue. We therefore requested CO, 2143rd Air Weather Wing to write out his requirements and send them to FWPu for comment. When this was done it became evident immediately that we were better able to supply the theater requirements than FWPu, and the CO, 2143rd said he would not stand still for FWPu as sole source. Hq, USAFSS backing was also forthcoming and the FWPu empire went into a decline marked by its redesignation as the 6905th Security Flight attached to Group.

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P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

SECURITY INFORMATION

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The present communication problem caused by new crypto procedures has hindered the Group weather effort considerably. The receipt of raw traffic from the various outlying intercept sites and the transmission of the SWI to the consumers are being delayed. In order to eliminate this difficulty to some extent, weather personnel have been assigned to the 15th RSM, where they are processing the traffic and sending only the SWI to this location for transmission to the 2143rd AWW. Although this has decentralized our analysis, by working directly with the intercept operators these airmen have

25x3

and have decreased the time lapse from intercept to the consumer by eliminating excessive and unnecessary groups and transmitting only the decrypted weather reports.

Most of the above problems were not very serious and were rapidly overcome; however, from its existence to the present time, the weather section has had two problems which directly influenced its morale and efficiency. An applicable career field has never been established for these personnel. Highly trained weather personnel have already been lost to the command and others will follow unless suitable career field is established. The T/D's and T/O & E's have never authorized sufficient personnel to fulfill adequately the commitments placed upon the section. Presently there are two officers and twenty eight airmen assigned. The combined authorization for the Group and the two squadrons consists of four officers and eighteen airmen. Ten airmen now assigned to this section are not filling any authorized vacancies, although they are required. This situation will continue to influence their advancement, as it has in the past, and offers little incentive to do any more than is necessary to get

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LESSONS

In summary, let us underline what we believe are the COMINT Lessons of the Korean War.

A. Of primary importance is the need to provide capabilities, in being, for dealing with Soviet [25x3] It is obvious that we cannot continue to confine our efforts to Russian cases without inevitably suffering surprise attacks from all the Soviet [25x3] agree that the big picture is Russia....but Russia has numerous widely dispersed [25x3] who speak many strange and garbled tongues. In all probability there will be a number of future "Koreas", should the all out show be delayed, and they will happen in much the same manner. The tip-off will come from Russian nets only when Russia is ready to roll. A Chinese communist all out effort at [25x3] might reflect in Russian traffic as "aircraft activity unusual" or "out of area", but the real meat will appear in [25x3] we have aircraft out of area almost daily on most nets. The chance of a surprise attack by the Chinese is daily growing less; but it took the first year of the Korean war for AFSS to organize a Chinese section. In the light of the Korean experience a sound yardstick for future AFSS capabilities is the number of persons acquired by AFSS who speak the language of Soviet [25x3] and how many are earmarked for training in other than Russian and Chinese. If the answer is none, then we have missed the major lesson and our only hope is to issue a general order forbidding war in such countries as Indo China, Burma, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and a dozen or so assorted others, all potential Koreas. It is fully realized that numerous [25x3] are currently being monitored by

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"allied" countries and that Directors of Intelligence in Washington have access to at least part of the end product, but, it is a certainty that Russia will eventually equip East Germany (and others) with fairly first rate air forces with good, workable communications. We cannot wait until those [25x3] are committed to prepare to furnish personnel and backup of a tactical nature similar to our present Team #1 in Korea. It has paid off there, and every air force commander is going to scream for it once he is under the gun. We may be able of course to find indigenous teams <sup>as</sup> we have here, but can they speak English well enough? and can we always depend on using foreign nationals?

As long as indigenous personnel are used in the production of any form of intelligence, the compromise factor will be ever present. It is an established SOP that a calculated risk must be assumed in times of emergency; however, how long can the same personnel be utilized in the same classified function by using the word "emergency" as a justification?

A related problem pertains to our Korean Team.

What are we going to do for cryptanalysis translators in Korea once an armistice is signed? Are we going to continue to copy [25x3]

We'll never read it after we lose [25x3] detachment unless we get some sharp C/A people and translators. If we continue to use indigenous personnel we will always have lax control over dissemination and security. Once things return to normal the logistics picture will also pose a difficult problem. There is no guarantee we can get real estate in Korea. COM will in all probability become a college again. Fifth Air Force will probably leave a house keeping unit and return to Japan. Who will work the traffic? Will we run the Korean [25x3] and voice nets, or will we drop

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that once the tactical value is gone? The standard and stock answer from Eighth Army, who controls the real estate, to the problem of retaining a post-treaty unit in Korea, is "We'll take that up when we get to it", or, "We haven't time for post-war plans".

B. With USAFEC in its relative infancy at the beginning of the Korean War we were an easy prey to the aspirations of established service agencies and opportunists. It is unfortunate that a few individuals are willing to put interservice rivalries ahead of National interest. We won

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have it in the to do list and then) Further more, and, and before it is  
of the Air Force Command. I prevent the use of other agencies to  
be in the Air Force Command. I prevent the use of other agencies to  
be in the Air Force Command. I prevent the use of other agencies to

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To this day no one at tactical air control center is really thoroughly familiar with communications intercept methods or capabilities. The majority of AC&W people are cleared only up to and including SECRET; the tactical controller however being cleared for TOP SECRET. This imposes unnecessary difficulty on coordinating the setting up of a joint tactical Yoke type service by AFSS and AC&W units. The concept of minimum knowledge is a theory that was forced upon us by the circumstances, however the information acquired by the tactical air controller, when he is used as a link between a COMINT unit and tactical aircraft, exposes him to highly sensitive information to say the least.

g. Most of our major difficulties have originated through inadequate coordination. The indoctrinated chiefs would work up plans that could not be implemented because the uncleared indians were not advised for security reasons. There is a wide spread tendency to resist helping an organization which is prevented by security regulations from justifying its requirements. Smoothly operating support in such cases can only be obtained through firm and detailed directions from higher authority.

h. A thorough study of special weather requirements, intercept, analysis and dissemination-wise, must be made for all theaters, and adequate preparation made to provide for them. A unified special weather organization should have sole responsibility for this problem. Since most of the information comes from air nets, it is recommended that AFSS combine world-wide responsibility for it.

i. Hq, USAF must understand that COMINT is useless unless they provide sufficient indoctrinated personnel to the consuming headquarters

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to use it.

P.L. 86-36  
EO 3.3b(3)

j. A thorough study must be made of the effects on future AFSS operations of the present enemy trend toward extensive use of

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similar to our Bittersweet.

k. Our experiences in the Far East Theater demonstrate conclusively the necessity for wise and careful selection of our SSO-Liaison officers. Major Vandiver apparently used his position to carry out a ~~find~~ <sup>lead</sup> with RSM, and by his arbitrary selection of reports, he disseminated aroused the complete distrust of SSO, GHQ and a number of other key Air and Army officers. It has taken the finest type of diplomacy and continuing demonstration of trustworthiness on the part of the present SSO, FEAF (Major Tisdale) to overcome the previous ill will. A good SSO must be completely loyal to AFSS, he must maintain the confidence of the D/I and of the Air Commander, and he must instantly advise the AFSS Commander of any and all actions being taken or contemplated in the Headquarters he serves which affect the AFSS units or COMINT in any way. A combination codeword control officer and courier officer is not adequate; we must have salesmen and troubleshooters of the highest caliber if we are to have our material used properly and not be made the scape goats for the results of other's ignorance.

l. We must have complete honesty in reporting. Efforts have been made to have us delete references to Yalu violations because of the Political difficulties such reports cause the theater air commanders. We cannot distort the facts and still produce a trust worthy product. Withholding

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information or deliberately distorting it is too dangerous to be condoned in an organization that is assigned our mission. Our attitude in this regard has caused some hard feelings among the few who were reprimanded, but it will prevent Washington from being caught unaware if the enemy decides to take exception.

m. In line with the foregoing we strongly recommend that senior AFSS Commanders in overseas theaters be primarily selected for complete loyalty to Air Force Security Service. There are numerous occasions when high ranking officers in the theater will attempt to pressure the AFSS units into actions favorable to their pet projects. Intelligent singleness of purpose is essential. An AFSS commander is operationally apart from the theater command, and he must use his position tactfully but firmly to insure that he is not stampeded into actions of momentary advantage in the local area which may harm the overall Comint capabilities of the U.S. He cannot permit local attempts to control his units or interfere with his accomplishment of his mission. He must make every effort to fulfill the theater requirements, but the internal operation of his command in meeting those requirements is his responsibility alone.

CONCLUSIONS.

This History was written at the suggestion of Brigadier General Charles Y. Banfill, Deputy for Intelligence, Far East Air Forces, to provide a consolidated History of the growth of Air Force COMINT under the pressures of the Korean War. Personalities have been introduced only when they had a profound positive or negative effect on the effectiveness of COMINT support of Far East Air Forces. Lessons drawn, have, in-so-far as is possible, been generalized to permit application in any future operation.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Since much of the preparation was done by those intimately acquainted with the Detachment in Korea, aspects of the overall picture are not always in proper perspective, but we feel this study will provide valuable data for the further development of AFSS. Group is now attempting to arrange to bring Cho and Company back to Japan if UN forces depart Korea entirely, but the probability that we can get theater support, once tactical pressure is off, is Zero.

The U.S. Air Force Security Service has come a long way since February, 1949. It has become a highly effective organization, but still has a long way to go. In spite of our short length of activity we are head and shoulders above <sup>any</sup> other COMINT agency in the Far East. Our success has been in great part due to the outstanding skills of such men as Brady, Brooks, Tisdale, Young, Gilbert, Reiskis and others, based on the firm foundation of devoted, hardworking operators, analysts and housekeepers. The more experience we have in the production of COMINT the more apparent it becomes that we are dependent in the end upon a limited number of skilled artists. The intercept, support and management aspects follow familiar rules, but outstanding analysis and evaluation are rare individual skills. Our <sup>R</sup>COMINT success will always be determined by strength in personalities, rather than in personnel.

*Willis B Sawyer*  
WILLIS B SAWYER  
Colonel, USAF  
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCE  
TAEJU, KOREA

~~CANCEL~~

1 May 1951

SPECIAL ORDERS

NUMBER 109

1 Detachment Confirmed

1. Detachment confirmed--It is hereby confirmed and made a matter record that the following named officers and enlisted men of the Republic of Korea Air Force have been placed on detached service with the Detachment 13, 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, FAFIK, and are so attached for duty and rations as of the above date: (Auth: Verbal Agreement ROKAF and Appropriate Radio Squadron FAFIK)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>
CHO YONG ILL	Captain	50241
HAN DONG JIN	1st Lt	50194
LEE YONG JAE	1st Lt	50442
Lee AN SEI	2nd Lt	50267
YOON KUNG SICK	1st M/Sgt	3200959
HONG UNG PYO	M/Sgt	3200249
CHANG YONG JUN	M/Sgt	3200254
KIM MU HYON	M/Sgt	3200233
OU SANG SULL	M/Sgt	3200717
LEE SUNG RAI	M/Sgt	3200255
LEE JAI HONG	T/Sgt	3200221
YOON BYONG CHUL	T/Sgt	3200407
HAN SIN CHOO	S/Sgt	3200559
LEE KI OK	S/Sgt	3200918
PAK WON KYUN	Cpl	3202461
KIM DONG CHILL	Cpl	3202819
LEESANG JOON	Cpl	3202445
CHOI SUN YOUNG	Cpl	3202455
LEE CHANG SEI	Pvt	3202446

BY COMMAND OF CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF:

OFFICIAL:2

/s/Yu Han Jong  
/t/Yu Han Jong  
Major, ROKAF  
ADJUTANT GENERAL

YU HAN JONG  
MAJOR, ROKAF  
ADJUTANT GENERAL

THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

/s/Russell E. Harriger  
/t/RUSSELL E. HARRIGER  
Captain, USAF

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SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
APO 970

~~CANCEL~~

22 October 1951

Major General Kim Chung Yul  
Chief of Staff  
Republic of Korea Air Force  
Taegu, Korea

Dear General Kim:

Much valuable intelligence has been furnished Fifth Air Force in the past due to the efforts of the Republic of Korea Air Force personnel assigned and attached to Detachment "13" of Fifth Air Force Headquarters.

Recent operational commitments and requirements on Detachment "13" have been made by this Headquarters and, as a result, the workload has increased to such an extent that the number of personnel presently assigned is inadequate.

In order to alleviate this situation, you are requested to furnish Fifth Air Force Headquarters with the following personnel cleared for positions of trust:

1. Six (6) Radio Operators (C/7).
2. Two (2) Cryptanalysts.
3. One (1) Korean-English translator.

Your cooperation in the past in furnishing the personnel already assigned to Detachment "13" is deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

/S/F.F. Everest  
Major General, USAF  
Commanding

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

*Russell E. Harriger*  
RUSSELL E. HARRIGER  
Captain, USAF

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CANCEL~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ (Un-Classified)

~~CANCEL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS

Republic of Korea Air Force  
Taegu, Korea

4 November 1951

Major General F.F. Everest  
Commanding General  
Fifth Air Force  
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Everest:

In reply to your letter of 22 October 1951, I have the pleasure to inform you that six (6) Radio Operators (C/W), cleared for positions of trust, have already reported to Capt Cho Young-Il on 17 October 1951. In view of the difficulty of obtaining cryptanalysts I have instructed Capt Cho to train his men to meet the requirements of Detachment "13" of Fifth Air Force. One (1) Korean-English translator will be assigned to Detachment "13" as soon as available.

Your continued cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,

/s/ Kim Chung Yul  
/t/ Kim Chung Yul  
Maj Gen, ROKAF  
Chief of Staff

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

*Russell E. Harriger*  
RUSSELL E. HARRIGER  
Captain, USAF

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CANCEL~~