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Description of document: The first five pages of closing documents associated with each Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) investigations closed during CY 2014 (to date)

Request date: 08-October-2014

Released date: 08-December-2014

Posted date: 22-December-2014

Source of document: Office of Privacy, Records, and Disclosure
SIGAR
400 Army Navy Drive, CP6
Arlington, VA 22202-4704
Email: FOIA@SIGAR.mil

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

November 21, 2014

Re: FOIA Request #2015-F-001

This is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), seeking the following information:

“A copy of the first five pages of the closing document (Report of Investigation, Closing Memo, Final Report, Referral Memo, Referral Letter, etc.) associated with each SIGAR closed investigation closed during calendar year 2014 to date.”

Your request is dated October 8, 2014. However, this office did not officially receive your request until October 16, 2014.

We have granted your request under the FOIA, Title 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. Our search identified 27 pages of electronic information responsive to your request. After a thorough review of the identified files, I have determined that portions of them are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4), (b)(7)(A), and (b)(7)(C). We are releasing 27 pages in part.

On pages containing redacted information, we have provided the FOIA exemption upon which we have relied: Exemption 4 – protects information “such as trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a company on a privileged or confidential basis which, if released, would result in competitive harm to the company.” Exemption 7(A) – protects information compiled for law enforcement purposes that could “reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” Exemption 7(C) – protects law enforcement information that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

Under the FOIA’s administrative appeal provision, you have the right to administratively appeal any adverse determination(s) that an agency makes against this FOIA request. If you are not satisfied with this determination, you may appeal to the appellate authority within 60 days from the date of this letter. Your appeal should include the original copy of your request, the final response letter, and a detailed justification supporting your appeal. The envelope should be plainly marked, indicating that it is a FOIA appeal. If you decide to appeal, please send your appeal to:


Office of Privacy, Records & Disclosure

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
2530 Crystal Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-3940

Provisions of the FOIA allow us to recover part of the cost of complying with your requests. In this instance, because the cost is below the fee threshold, no fee will be charged.

We will continue processing your request and will follow up with you no later than December 8, 2014, regarding the status of your request. If you have any questions concerning this request, please contact the Office of Privacy, Records & Disclosure at (703)545-6046, or sigar.pentagon.gencoun.mbx.foia@mail.mil. Please subject all inquiries using the assigned request number above. We appreciate your patience as we proceed with your request.

Sincerely,



Shamelle S. Tarver
Public Information Manager



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

November 14, 2014

Re: FOIA Request #2015-F-001

This is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), seeking the following information:

“A copy of the first five pages of the closing document (Report of Investigation, Closing Memo, Final Report, Referral Memo, Referral Letter, etc.) associated with each SIGAR closed investigation closed during calendar year 2014 to date.”

Your request is dated October 8, 2014. However, this office did not officially receive your request until October 16, 2014.

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that an extension (of up to ten working days) is being invoked, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B), to ensure the orderly processing of your request. This extension is necessary to search a voluminous amount of records, and examine the information responsive to your request.

We plan to respond to your request by November 28, 2014. If you have any questions concerning this request, please contact the Office of Privacy, Records & Disclosure at (703)545-6046, or sigar.pentagon.gen-coun.mbx.foia@mail.mil. Please subject all inquiries using the assigned request number above. We appreciate your patience as we proceed with your request.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Shamelle Tarver".

Shamelle Tarver
Public Information Manager



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

December 8, 2014

Re: FOIA Request #2015-F-001

This is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), seeking the following information:

“A copy of the first five pages of the closing document (Report of Investigation, Closing Memo, Final Report, Referral Memo, Referral Letter, etc.) associated with each SIGAR closed investigation closed during calendar year 2014 to date.”

Your request is dated October 8, 2014. However, this office did not officially receive your request until October 16, 2014.

We have granted your request under the FOIA, Title 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. Our search identified 29 pages of electronic information responsive to your request. After a thorough review of the identified files, I have determined that portions of them are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4), (b)(7)(A), and (b)(7)(C). We are releasing 29 pages in part.

On pages containing redacted information, we have provided the FOIA exemption upon which we have relied: Exemption 4 – protects information “such as trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a company on a privileged or confidential basis which, if released, would result in competitive harm to the company.” Exemption 7(A) – protects information compiled for law enforcement purposes that could “reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” Exemption 7(C) – protects law enforcement information that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

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Office of Privacy, Records & Disclosure

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
2530 Crystal Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-3940

Provisions of the FOIA allow us to recover part of the cost of complying with your requests. In this instance, because the cost is below the fee threshold, no fee will be charged.

We will continue processing your request and will follow up with you no later than December 22, 2014, regarding the status of your request. If you have any questions concerning this request, please contact the Office of Privacy, Records & Disclosure at (703)545-6046, or sigar.pentagon.gen-coun.mbx.foia@mail.mil. Please subject all inquiries using the assigned request number above. We appreciate your patience as we proceed with your request.

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
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Shamelle S. Tarver". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name being the most prominent.

Shamelle S. Tarver
Public Information Manager



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

November 14, 2014

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Sincerely,

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Shamelle Tarver
Public Information Manager



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - Report of Investigation

Precedence: Routine

Date: 1/27/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: Special Agent in Charge, Afghanistan

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0167-13-KAF-6-0078

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(A), LLC, KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN

Synopsis: Request case be closed.

Details: From January 2012 until May 2012, (b) (7)(A) a U.S. based company, allegedly engaged in the procurement and use of stolen meal cards. In addition, Letters of Authorizations (LOA) were used to feed higher ranking (b) (7)(A) employees. A former (b) (7)(A) employee, (b) (7)(C) claimed to be intimately involved in the procurement and tracking of the stolen meal cards. (b) (7)(C) initially denied (b) (7)(C) had a spreadsheet detailing the stolen meal cards. During Facebook contact with a friend, (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) had the spreadsheet. During a second interview, (b) (7)(C) admitted the spreadsheet existed but (b) (7)(C) did not have possession of the spreadsheet. (b) (7)(C) referred Case Agents to the (b) (7)(A) computers. Prior Case Agent obtained computers from (b) (7)(A) but was unable to have the computers analyzed. The computers were returned to (b) (7)(A) without review. Without the spreadsheet, it is impossible to determine what entities (U.S. or not) were charged for the use of the stolen meal cards or the loss amount.

CLASSIFICATION:
CUI // FOUO

WARNING

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 1/27/2014

Title: (b) (7)(A), LLC,
KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN

A fraudulent LOA was located in the possession of an (b) (7)(A) employee. This LOA indicated the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) was fraudulently charged for the use of the LOA. Army CIV CID interviewed USACE who indicated they could not locate any charges related to the fraudulent LOA.

Information obtained from the TCNs and other witnesses indicates (b) (7)(C), the ranking (b) (7)(A) manager at KAF and a U.S. Citizen, condoned the purchase of the stolen meal cards and the use of the counterfeit LOA's. Although witness testimony indicates TCNs at (b) (7)(A) engaged in the purchase and use of stolen meal cards and LOAs, with the full knowledge and consent of U.S. citizen (b) (7)(C), no documentation or affirmation of any entity being defrauded can be obtained. Any prosecution would rely on the testimony of TCNs whose whereabouts are currently unknown. Identification of a victim and a loss amount cannot be determined.

On January 22, 2014, (b) (7)(C), SIGAR Attorney (b) (7)(C), declined to pursue debarment action in this matter. (b) (7)(C) concurred this matter should be closed.

On January 23, 2014, Assistant United States Attorney (b) (7)(C) (AUSA (b) (7)(C)) declined prosecution in this matter. On January 27, 2014, AUSA (b) (7)(C) concurred with SA (b) (7)(C) request to destroy the LOA currently maintained in evidence.

LEAD(s):**Set Lead 1: (Info)**SIGAR HQ, AT ARLINGTON, VA:

For information and closure.

Set Lead 2: (Info)SIGAR Kabul:

For information.

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - General

Precedence: Routine

Date: 8/1/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: SIGAR Investigations Directorate Washington Field Office

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0018-12-WFO-3-0002

Lead Agency: DCIS - Defense Criminal Investigative Service

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Details: Investigation initiated by DCIS Resident Agency Tampa, FL subsequent to receipt of information from a confidential source that (b) (7)(C) was engaged in a scheme to launder approximately \$39,080.00 through a bank account established in Kosovo. (b) (7)(C) wired the funds from the Kosovo bank to three separate U.S. bank accounts held by himself and spouse (b) (7)(C), between September 15, 2010, and January 19, 2011. At the time the funds were wired to the U.S. bank accounts (b) (7)(C) was performing duties as U.S. Army contractor with (b) (7)(C) Federal Global Projects, Inc. (b) (7)(C) at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.

During May 2011 the investigation determined that (b) (7)(C) wired nearly \$40,000 in amounts under \$10,000.00 through an account opened in Kosovo to accounts held with Achee in the U.S.

During July 2012 (b) (7)(C) was interviewed at home in Tampa, FL. During the interview (b) (7)(C) admitted to sending money to the U.S. through a Kosovo bank account in increments under \$10,000. (b) (7)(C) admitted knowledge of the reporting currency requirements; however,

CLASSIFICATION:
CUI // FOUO

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 8/1/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C) stated the money was obtained legitimately through an allotment from (b) (7)(C) salary. (b) (7)(C) denied receiving any bribes; however explained (b) (7)(C) started the allotment because (b) (7)(C) was hiding money from (b) (7)(C) spouse, whom (b) (7)(C) intended to divorce.

During August/September 2012 the investigation determined, through the review of (b) (7)(C) documents, that (b) (7)(C) statement regarding (b) (7)(C) allotment was accurate.

During October 2012, Assistant U.S. Attorney (b) (7)(C) declined criminal prosecution of this matter. No additional civil or administrative action was contemplated.

Exhibits(s):

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

SIGAR Washington Field Office – Close Case

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SIGAR

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - General

Precedence: Routine

Date: 6/17/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: SIGAR Investigations Directorate – Washington Field Office

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0080-12-SLO-3-0030

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title:

Details: This investigation was initiated based on information provided to SIGAR Investigations by (b) (7)(C) Director of (b) (7)(C) on or about January 19, 2012.

(b) (7)(C) reported (b) (7)(C) was approached by (b) (7)(C), an interpreter for the (b) (7)(C) Salerno sometime in June 2011. (b) (7)(C) told (b) (7)(C) needed to pay (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) USA, \$50,000 or (b) (7)(C) might cancel (b) (7)(C) contracts. (b) (7)(C) refused to pay and was later informed by (b) (7)(C) that (b) (7)(C) was upset with (b) (7)(C) because (b) (7)(C) had sent an email to (b) (7)(C) personal email account. (b) (7)(C) was told (b) (7)(C) would be blacklisted by the JCCS. (b) (7)(C) claimed two of (b) (7)(C) contracts were cancelled around that time.

(b) (7)(C) met with (b) (7)(C) again on or around December 11, 2011 at which time (b) (7)(C) told (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) replacement, Captain (b) (7)(C) USAF, was asking for \$50,000 in order for (b) (7)(C) to get more contracts. (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) refused to pay.

Prior to this interview with SIGAR Investigations, (b) (7)(C) contacted or met with SIGAR on the following occasions:

On December 1, 2011 (b) (7)(C) filed a complaint with the SIGAR Hotline alleging (b) (7)(C) had been unfairly denied the ability to continue to bid on U.S. Government contracts. (b) (7)(C) described the

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CUI // FOUO

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 6/17/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

email incident with Captain (b) (7)(C) and said most of (b) (7)(C) contracts were cancelled at that time. (b) (7)(C) failed to report (b) (7)(C) June encounter with (b) (7)(C)

On December 8, 2011 (b) (7)(C) met with SIGAR (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (7)(C) regarding (b) (7)(C) Hotline complaint. (b) (7)(C) was told by ASAC (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) issues were not criminal and there was nothing SIGAR could do for (b) (7)(C). When asked if (b) (7)(C) knew of any other criminal activity involving bribes by contractors or kickback demands by contracting officers in return for contracts, (b) (7)(C) reported the following:

(b) (7)(C) was the former interpreter for (b) (7)(C), a (b) (7)(C) employee. (b) (7)(C) had been at Salerno for approximately six years and was friends with (b) (7)(C) contracting officer (b) (7)(C). Both (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) were (b) (7)(C). During (b) (7)(C) deployment (b) (7)(C) resigned from (b) (7)(C) and started (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) worked with (b) (7)(C) to get contracts for (b) (7)(C). Within six months (b) (7)(C) was awarded about 25 contracts, some without bidding. (b) (7)(C) would pay bribes to (b) (7)(C) via (b) (7)(C). Once (b) (7)(C) left Afghanistan, (b) (7)(C) continued to get contracts with (b) (7)(C)'s help. (b) (7)(C), the (b) (7)(C) Afghan quality assurance engineer, was a (b) (7)(C) partner and in (b) (7)(C) position with the (b) (7)(C) approved poor work performed by (b) (7)(C)

(AGENTS NOTE: (b) (7)(C) was assigned to (b) (7)(C) Salerno from June-December 2011 and in place at the time of this interview. (b) (7)(C) began contracting with (b) (7)(C) Salerno in April 2009. (b) (7)(C) is Caucasian).

(b) (7)(C) did not mention (b) (7)(C) encounters with (b) (7)(C) during this interview.

On December 15, 2011 (b) (7)(C) met with ASAC (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (7)(C) again; however, no additional information was obtained. (b) (7)(C) did not mention either of (b) (7)(C) encounters with (b) (7)(C)

On December 20, 2011 (b) (7)(C) met with ASAC (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (7)(C) for a third time. During this interview, (b) (7)(C) finally told about (b) (7)(C) encounters with (b) (7)(C) in June and December 2011 and Basit's request for \$50,000 on behalf of Captains (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) indicated (b) (7)(C) was also the facilitator for bribes between local contractors and the (b) (7)(C) contracting officers; in doing so (b) (7)(C) received a portion of the bribe money. (b) (7)(C) said that the (b) (7)(C) spoke of during the December 8, 2011 meeting with SIGAR was SSgt (b) (7)(C)

(AGENT'S NOTE: There was no explanation in the report as to why (b) (7)(C) misidentified (b) (7)(C) as (b) (7)(C) in the December 8, 2011 interview)

Based on the above referenced interviews, an investigation was initiated to examine allegations of corruption within the (b) (7)(C) Salerno. (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C)

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 6/17/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) were all listed as subjects of the investigation.

On January 22, 2012 (b) (7)(C) met with ASAC (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (7)(C) regarding fuel theft issues at FOB Salerno. During the interview, (b) (7)(C) alleged (b) (7)(C) went to Dubai on January 16, 2012 to meet with Americans involved with the theft.

On February 6, 2012 (b) (7)(C) met with ASAC (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (7)(C) and provided copies of five construction contracts (b) (4)

(b) (4) awarded to (b) (7)(C) by the (b) (7)(C) Salerno from June through October 2009. (b) (7)(C) believed there was a complex bribery scheme at Salerno involving these contracts. (b) (7)(C) also advised (b) (7)(C) knew of a former (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) who had knowledge of the scheme and additional documentation.

Review of the above listed contracts determined that (b) (7)(C) was the contracting officer on only two of the contracts (b) (4) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) USAF, awarded two of the contracts (b) (4) and (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) USA, awarded one (b) (4) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) were both added as subjects of the investigation.

On February 14, 2012 SAs (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (7)(C) interviewed (b) (7)(C) President of (b) (7)(C) and friend of (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) provided the following information:

(b) (7)(C) knew (b) (7)(C) from the United States and introduced (b) (7)(C) to (b) (7)(C). When (b) (7)(C) started (b) (7)(C) company (b) (7)(C) did not have any money to work on projects. (b) (7)(C) approached (b) (7)(C) father, (b) (7)(C), to set up an agreement to work together. (b) (7)(C) would be the financier. Formal agreements between (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) were made indicating the following: (b) (7)(C) would be awarded the contracts through (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) would receive solicitations from companies who bid on proposals and tell (b) (7)(C) of bid prices; (b) (7)(C) would provide the quality assurance for ongoing projects; the profits would be equally divided into thirds, 1/3 to (b) (7)(C) 1/3 to (b) (7)(C) and 1/3 to (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) provided copies of six (6) agreements written in Pashtu.

The first agreement (translated) described the overall arrangement between (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) and laid out the division of profits between (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C)

The second agreement (translated) reported a total profit of \$40,500 for the three buildings under contract W91B4P-09-C-0152 and allowed for the disbursement of \$13,500 to (b) (7)(C) \$13,500 to (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) with the remaining \$13,500 to (b) (7)(C) "for our partners."

(AGENT'S NOTE: this contract was awarded by TSgt (b) (7)(C) on June 22, 2009; three

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Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 6/17/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

days after (b) (7)(C) arrived at the (b) (7)(C) Salerno)

The third agreement (translated) reported a total profit of \$125,000 for the five buildings under contract (b) (4) and allowed for the disbursement of \$41,666 for (b) (7)(C) \$41,666 to (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) with the remaining \$41,666 to (b) (7)(C) for "our local nationals and foreign partners."

The fourth agreement (translated) reported a total profit of \$90,000 for the two buildings under contract (b) (4) and allowed for the disbursement of \$30,000 to (b) (7)(C) \$30,000 to (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) and the remaining \$30,000 to (b) (7)(C) for "our local nationals and foreign partners."

(AGENT'S NOTE: this contract was not among those identified by (b) (7)(C) during (b) (7)(C) February 6, 2011 interview)

The fifth agreement (translated) reported a total profit of \$17,000 for the (b) (7)(C) under contract (b) (4) and allowed for the disbursement of \$5,666 to (b) (7)(C) \$5,666 to (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) and the remaining \$5,666 to (b) (7)(C) for "our local nationals and foreign partners."

The sixth agreement (translated) reported a total profit of \$40,000 for (b) (7)(C) under contract (b) (4) and allowed for the disbursement of \$13,333 to (b) (7)(C) \$13,333 to (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) and the remaining \$13,333 to (b) (7)(C) for "Sgt (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C)"

(AGENT'S NOTE: This contract was issued by SSgt (b) (7)(C) on October 22, 2009)

(b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) were kicked out of the partnership when (b) (7)(C) went to (b) (7)(C) asking (b) (7)(C) to provide a \$300,000 bribe payment in advance for a three million dollar contract for (b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(A). The payment was to be paid to (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) refused to provide the funding and (b) (7)(C) went to (b) (7)(C) for further financing

(AGENT'S NOTE: The (b) (7)(A) contracts were issued on September 21, 2010 by contracting officer (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) left Afghanistan in December 2009).

On March 12, 2012 (b) (7)(C) met with (b) (7)(C), US Army CID, ASAC (b) (7)(C) and Investigator (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) served as the Vice President of (b) (7)(C) until (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) had a falling out. The information (b) (7)(C) provided was very similar to that previously provided by (b) (7)(C) but (b) (7)(C) added the following:

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Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 6/17/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) met with (b) (7)(C) and came back with a contract to (b) (7)(A)

(AGENT'S NOTE: This (b) (4) -was issued by (b) (7)(C) on June 22, 2009, three days after (b) (7)(C) arrived in Afghanistan).

In addition to (b) (7)(C) several contracts were awarded by contracting officers (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) was one of the contracting officers paid by (b) (7)(C) owned 6 or 7 companies but (b) (7)(C) could not identify them by name. (b) (7)(C) planned to send \$150,000.00 to Mitchell's brother in the United States within a few days. (b) (7)(C) told (b) (7)(C) the money was for the purchase of equipment for the (b) (7)(C) that would be shipped to Salerno. (b) (7)(C) believes this money is payment to (b) (7)(C). When shown photos of various subjects, (b) (7)(C) was able to identify (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) but (b) (7)(C) could not identify (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) or (b) (7)(C)

(AGENT'S NOTE: (b) (7)(C) USAF, issued five (5) contracts to (b) (7)(C) during (b) (7)(C) deployment at (b) (7)(C) Salerno (March-August 2010). Although (b) (7)(C) was never formally listed as a subject of the investigation, (b) (7)(C) bank statements were subpoenaed)

On February 8, 2012 SA (b) (7)(C) received an email from (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command regarding a conversation (b) (7)(C) had with (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) was requesting a sole source award for (b) (7)(C) company) even though there was a debarment package pending and (b) (7)(C) was listed as C2X (rejected). No other information was provided. As a result of this contact, (b) (7)(C) was added to the subject list.

The Investigation

The ICCTF (SIGAR, Army CID, DCIS and the FBI) launched an extensive investigative effort to gather background information on the above referenced subjects. Queries of DEIDS, DCII, REDD, JPAS, JAMMS, FinCEN, Boarder Crossing and CLEAR were conducted for all American service members. Eagle Cash Card applications were reviewed to identify possible bank accounts. Grand Jury subpoenas were served on the three credit reporting companies for all subjects to identify additional financial sources. Requests for mail covers were submitted to the US Postal Service for APO and US addresses. Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmail and Facebook preservation letters were issued in hopes of capturing relevant emails between listed subjects. The investigation disclosed the following:

(b) (7)(C), USA - (b) (7)(C)

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Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 6/17/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C)

The allegations raised against (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) lacked any direct evidence. According to (b) (7)(C) the demand for \$50,000 came from (b) (7)(C) who inferred (b) (7)(C) was speaking for (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C). These alleged incidents occurred in June 2011 and on or about December 11, 2011. (b) (7)(C) failed to report either incident when (b) (7)(C) filed (b) (7)(C) Hotline complaint with SIGAR or when (b) (7)(C) met with SIGAR agents on December 8 and 15, 2011; (b) (7)(C) waited until December 20, 2011. The fact that both demands were for \$50,000 is suspect.

In a Department of Defense Memorandum dated June 27, 2011 (copy provided by (b) (7)(C) Task Force 2010, Kabul, Afghanistan, referred (b) (7)(C) its president and job supervisor at FOB Salerno for proposed debarment based on evidence of direct connections to nefarious individuals and indirect connections to the Haqqani Network and Taliban insurgents. This is the reason why (b) (7)(C) was not allowed to contract with the (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) had full knowledge of this. Neither (b) (7)(C) nor (b) (7)(C) effected the action against (b) (7)(C) nor could they do anything to help (b) (7)(C). On November 19, 2011 Capt. (b) (7)(C) sent an email to (b) (7)(C) regarding a series of emails the (b) (7)(C) received in August 2011 from (b) (7)(C). The writer alleged a scheme perpetrated by (b) (7)(C) to award contracts to (b) (7)(C) own construction company, (b) (7)(A). The author of the emails claimed to have evidence of audio recordings and written agreements of the scheme. (b) (7)(C) feared (b) (7)(C) gained access to the writer and may have made contact with (b) (7)(C). Unfortunately (b) (7)(C) did not receive the email until March 7, 2012 (the email had been directed to an account SA (b) (7)(C) did not have access to). (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) made attempts to contact the complainant through email but were unsuccessful.

The fact that (b) (7)(C) referred the above incident to SIGAR would indicate (b) (7)(C) had suspicions about (b) (7)(C) trustworthiness.

Bank records for both (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) were subpoenaed. Records for (b) (7)(C) disclosed no significant findings or questionable financial activities. Records for (b) (7)(C) were never produced and therefore, never reviewed.

On October 3, 2012 (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) names were removed from the subject list. (b) (7)(C) was interviewed on April 15, 2013. (b) (7)(C) provided no derogatory information regarding (b) (7)(C) and could not recall (b) (7)(C).

(b) (7)(C) was interviewed on February 13, 2014. (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (7)(C) had no knowledge of any illegal activity in the contracting office during (b) (7)(C) deployment.

(b) (7)(C) , SSgt, USAF – (b) (7)(C) :

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Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 6/17/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C) was the contracting officer for six (6) contracts awarded to (b) (7)(C) to include (b) (4) and (b) (4) five (5) of these contracts were awarded before (b) (7)(C) was deployed to (b) (7)(C) Salerno and/or became involved with (b) (7)(C) contracts.

(b) (7)(C) was never specifically identified by either (b) (7)(C) or (b) (7)(C) as being part of the complex bribery scheme. (b) (7)(C) did recall contracts being issued by (b) (7)(C) but (b) (7)(C) did not say (b) (7)(C) was paid nor could (b) (7)(C) identify (b) (7)(C) in a picture line up.

The Pashtu agreement associated with (b) (4) made no reference to (b) (7)(C) by name. (b) (4) was not among the contracts associated with the Pashtu agreements.

Review of (b) (7)(C) bank accounts disclosed no significant findings or questionable financial activities during or immediately following (b) (7)(C) deployment.

On October 2, 2012 (b) (7)(C) name was removed from the subject list.

(b) (7)(C) was interviewed on April 17, 2013, and provided no derogatory information.

(b) (7)(C), USAF – Deployed to (b) (7)(C) Salerno August 2009 – February 2010 (b) (7)(C) awarded one (1) contract to (b) (7)(C) (b) (4) (b) (7)(C) was never specifically identified by either (b) (7)(C) or (b) (7)(C) as being part of the complex bribery scheme. The Pashtu agreement associated with contract (b) (4) made no reference to (b) (7)(C) by name. Instead, the agreement specifically mentioned (b) (7)(C) who did not award the contract. (b) (7)(C) recalled (b) (7)(C) being one of the contracting officers paid by (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) also stated (b) (7)(C) had no contact with the Americans and (b) (7)(C) did not handle anything financial, like payment to the partners. (b) (7)(C) could not identify a photo of (b) (7)(C) Review of (b) (7)(C) bank accounts disclosed no significant findings or questionable financial activities during or immediately following (b) (7)(C) deployment.

On October 2, 2012 (b) (7)(C) name was removed from the subject list.

(b) (7)(C) SSgt, USAF (b) (7)(C)
(b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C) awarded only three (b) (7)(C), (b) (4)

(b) (7)(C)s claim, TSgt (b) (7)(C) awarded the contract for the (b) (7)(A)

on June 22, 2009. (b) (7)(C) arrived in Salerno just a few days prior to this.

(b) (7)(C) name (no signature) does appear on the Pashtu agreement describing the scheme and the

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Title: (b) (7)(C)

division of profits. (b) (7)(C) name also appears on the Pashtu agreement referencing contract (b) (4); however, (b) (7)(C) did not award this contract, SSgt (b) (7)(C) did. (b) (7)(C) name does not appear on the Pashtu agreements referencing contracts (b) (4)

Review of (b) (7)(C) addresses and assignments prior to 2009 disclosed no commonalities with those of (b) (7)(C). It is questionable as to whether the two knew each other prior to Salerno.

(b) (7)(C) returned to the United States on December 16, 2009. The (b) (7)(A) contracts were awarded on September 21, 2010 by contracting officer (b) (7)(C)

Review of (b) (7)(C) bank accounts disclosed no significant findings or questionable financial activities during or immediately following (b) (7)(C) deployments.

(b) (7)(C) was interviewed on December 18, 2012 by (b) (7)(C). The interview disclosed the following:

(b) (7)(C) did not recall if (b) (7)(C) awarded or supervised any contracts associated with (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) company, (b) (7)(C). If (b) (7)(C) had, the number would be minimal. When shown copies of the Pashtu agreements, (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) had never seen the documents before and was never involved in accepting money from anyone. (b) (7)(C) knew of and dealt with (b) (7)(C) but never had a face-to-face meeting with (b) (7)(C). When (b) (7)(C) inspectors either didn't show or did a less than adequate job, (b) (7)(C) would have email traffic with (b) (7)(C) to get the matter straightened out. (b) (7)(C) remembered (b) (7)(C) as doing half decent work when (b) (7)(C) wanted to. (b) (7)(C) prices were usually very high and all (b) (7)(C) wanted was money. (b) (7)(C) was always in the (b) (7)(C) office looking for work. At one point (b) (7)(C) got arrested in a dispute over equipment and wanted the U.S. to bail (b) (7)(C) out. When that did not happen, (b) (7)(C) was upset with (b) (7)(C). Prior to (b) (7)(C) deployment, (b) (7)(C) was put on the "do not hire" list twice. (b) (7)(C) filled in last minute for a contracting job at FOB Shank. (b) (7)(C) answered one solicitation when (b) (7)(C) was at there, but did not receive the contract. (b) (7)(C) recalled a situation where (b) (7)(C) company was extended on a contract. The contract was for portable latrine maintenance which was coming to an end. If the contract was put out to bid without an extension, the latrines would have had about a month without maintenance.

(b) (7)(C), USAF - (b) (7)(C) one of the officers who awarded (b) (7)(C) contracts but did not indicate (b) (7)(C) was paid. There were no other allegations involving (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) was never listed as a subject of the investigation. Review of (b) (7)(C) bank accounts disclosed no significant findings or questionable financial activities during or immediately following (b) (7)(C) deployment.

(b) (7)(C), USAF - Deployed to (b) (7)(C) Salerno 2010
(b) (7)(C) awarded six (6) contracts to (b) (7)(C) to include the three (b) (7)(A)

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(effective September 21, 2010). (b) (7)(C) alleged \$300,000 was to be paid to (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) for that award. (b) (7)(C) left (b) (7)(C) Salerno in December 2009 and had no involvement with the award. (b) (7)(C) bank records were subpoenaed to determine if (b) (7)(C) benefited from the award

(AGENT'S NOTE: (b) (7)(C) was never listed as a subject of the investigation).

Review of (b) (7)(C) bank accounts disclosed no significant findings or questionable financial activities during or immediately following (b) (7)(C) deployment.

(b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) Contractor, (b) (7)(C) Industries – Assigned to FOB Salerno 2006 – present (b) (7)(C) is a (b) (7)(C) contractor and has been assigned at FOB Salerno since 2006. Review of (b) (7)(C) addresses prior to 2009 disclosed no commonalities with (b) (7)(C) and it is questionable as to whether the two actually knew each other prior to Salerno.

Review of (b) (7)(C) bank accounts disclosed no significant findings or questionable financial activities to include any association with (b) (7)(A)

(b) (7)(C) was interviewed on January 16, 2013 by (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(A). The interview disclosed the following:

(b) (7)(C) met (b) (7)(C) in January 2007 when (b) (7)(C) was an interpreter for (b) (7)(A) and later (b) (7)(C) left (b) (7)(C) to work with the US Military. (b) (7)(C) then started (b) (7)(C) own construction company. (b) (7)(C) told (b) (7)(C) worked for (b) (7)(C) in 2007-2008. (b) (7)(C) bid on and was awarded the contract to build the (b) (7)(A). Last year (b) (7)(C) approached (b) (7)(C) and asked if (b) (7)(C) knew anyone in the US who could assist (b) (7)(C) with obtaining materials and an electrician. (b) (7)(C) went to (b) (7)(C) father who suggested (b) (7)(C) go to (b) (7)(C) brother for help. (b) (7)(C) was hired by (b) (7)(C) to acquire, purchase and ship materials to (b) (7)(C) for the (b) (7)(A) project (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) has never received any money from (b) (7)(C) in connection with contracts awarded to (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) received no compensation from (b) (7)(C) brother on the (b) (7)(A) project. (b) (7)(C) described (b) (7)(C) as a close friend.

(b) (7)(C) was questioned about (b) (7)(C) relationship with the Regional Contracting Office (b) (7)(C) FOB Salerno. (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (7)(C) did not know any contracting officers at the (b) (7)(C) FOB Salerno. Specifically, (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) did not know (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) did not know (b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(C) the Cultural Advisor at the (b) (7)(C) FOB Salerno. (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (7)(C) knew of (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(A) described (b) (7)(C) as the Afghan (b) (7)(A) who works on projects at FOB Salerno. (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(A) office is (b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(A) at FOB Salerno

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Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 6/17/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C)

On March 20, 2012 SA (b) (7)(C) received an email from SFC (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C) Salerno. (b) (7)(C) received an email from (b) (7)(C) advising (b) (7)(C) had purchased all of the materials needed for the (b) (7)(C) contract. Copies of an invoice from (b) (7)(C), TX and the related wire transfer were attached. The invoice disclosed the purchase of (b) (7)(C) and shipping fees totaling \$146,772.00.

Review of all bank statements and documents pertaining to (b) (7)(C) disclosed the company is owned by (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) ((b) (7)(C)). It was registered with the State of Nevada on February 27, 2012. No other connection to (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) could be substantiated.

On or about October 10, 2012 SA (b) (7)(C) observed the installation of rollup doors on the (b) (7)(C) sites at (b) (7)(C) Salerno.

(b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C) was awarded a total of 31 contracts by the (b) (7)(C) Salerno between April 22, 2009 and December 11, 2011. Eleven (11) of those contracts were awarded between April and October 2009. All 31 contracts were competitively bid. The (b) (7)(C) had no issues with the quality of construction provided by (b) (7)(C)

SAs (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) interviewed (b) (7)(C) on August 31, 2012 following (b) (7)(C) release from the detention facility at FOB Salerno where (b) (7)(C) was held for approximately two weeks and questioned about insurgent activities and contracts (b) (7)(C) had on FOB Salerno. (b) (7)(C) stated the following:

Prior to starting (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) worked as an interpreter for (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) at (b) (7)(A). Shortly after being approved to bid on contracts, (b) (7)(C) was awarded a small fence contract by contracting officer Sgt (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) split the profits from this contract with (b) (7)(C) business partners (b) (7)(C) (VP), (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C)

Sgt (b) (7)(C) told (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) did a good job and would include (b) (7)(C) on future contract solicitations. (b) (7)(C) bid on and was awarded numerous subsequent contracts. According to (b) (7)(C) neither Sgt (b) (7)(C) nor (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (7)(C) for money. (b) (7)(C) consulted with (b) (7)(C) cousin, (b) (7)(C) on larger projects. (b) (7)(C) was an (b) (7)(C) and worked for (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) at (b) (7)(C). At that time, (b) (7)(C) had a large number of projects at FOB Salerno.

Farhad's relationship with (b) (7)(C) deteriorated to the point of having to use the local jirga to settle differences. At one point, (b) (7)(C) threatened to kill (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) expects additional

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Contact: (b) (7)(C)

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Title: (b) (7)(C)

issues with (b) (7)(C) once the (b) (7)(A) contract is completed.

The (b) (7)(A) project called for materials with US electrical standards which could not be purchased in Afghanistan. (b) (7)(C) contacted (b) (7)(C) and asked if (b) (7)(C) had any contacts in the US who could help (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) told (b) (7)(C) that (b) (7)(C) brother (b) (7)(C) had a company in the construction and music industry that could acquire the materials and ship them to Afghanistan. (b) (7)(C) wired (b) (7)(C) company, (b) (7)(C) \$150,000 which included \$8,000 for (b) (7)(C) salary and expenses

(AGENT'S NOTE): At the time of the interview, (b) (7)(C) was still waiting delivery of the (b) (7)(C) to Salerno).

When shown copies of the documents alleged to be contracts signed by (b) (7)(C) partners, (b) (7)(C) said the signatures were valid but the agreements were forgeries and in the handwriting of (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) never paid money to the contracting officers, the interpreters at the (b) (7)(C) or to (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) believes (b) (7)(C) and others want (b) (7)(C) to be blacklisted so they can get more contracts from the (b) (7)(C).

(b) (7)(C) started contracting with (b) (7)(C) Salerno about the same time as (b) (7)(C). They both used (b) (7)(C) cousin as an engineer. As (b) (7)(C) began receiving larger contracts, (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) stopped talking to one another.

(b) (7)(C) said (b) (7)(C) did not use (b) (7)(C) for anything because (b) (7)(C) speaks fluent English. Bank statements for (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) were obtained through (b) (7)(C). Review of these records failed to disclose evidence of bribes.

(b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) Salerno
Bank statements for (b) (7)(C) were obtained through (b) (7)(C). Review of these records failed to disclose evidence of bribes. (b) (7)(C) application for an American visa is on hold pending the outcome of this investigation. (b) (7)(C) contract was not renewed in January 2013 and (b) (7)(C) no longer works at FOB Salerno. (b) (7)(C) contract was not renewed because of downsizing, and was unrelated to this investigation.

(b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) Salerno
Bank statements for (b) (7)(C) were obtained through (b) (7)(C). Review of these records failed to disclose evidence of bribes. (b) (7)(C) application for an American visa is on hold pending the outcome of this investigation.

(b) (7)(C) was interviewed on March 9, 2013. (b) (7)(C) denied ever receiving anything of value from any Afghan contractors. (b) (7)(C) is a (b) (7)(C) and would only interact with the Afghan contractors when the contractors could not speak or read English. (b) (7)(C) believed that someone was trying to get (b) (7)(C) in trouble with the military because (b) (7)(C) a good paying job at FOB Salerno.

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 6/17/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C), USAF – (b) (7)(C)
(b) (7)(C) was deployed to (b) (7)(C) Shank when (b) (7)(C) made contact with the (b) (7)(C) to request a sole source contract for (b) (7)(C)

(AGENT'S NOTE: (b) (7)(C) re-deployed to Shank at this time and worked for (b) (7)(C)

Review of (b) (7)(C) bank accounts disclosed no significant findings or questionable financial activities during or immediately following (b) (7)(C) deployment.

On October 2, 2012 (b) (7)(C) name was removed from the subject list.

(b) (7)(C) reviewed the file and declined prosecution due to none of the allegations being substantiated.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

SIGAR at Washington Field Office
Close case.

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**SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTORATE**

Precedence: Routine

Date: 12/26/2013

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (7)(C)

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0288-12-BAF-5-0131

Lead Agency: Choose Lead Agency

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(A)

Synopsis: Investigation was initiated after it was revealed an Afghan company was stealing U.S. (b) (7)(A). A SIGAR source was providing details of the theft operation. Efforts to have Afghan authorities to assist with the investigation were unsuccessful. All logical investigative leads completed. This investigation is closed.

Details: This investigation was initiated in August 2012, after a SIGAR (b) (7)(A)

Kabul, AF, reported that [redacted] company was stealing (b) (7)(A) that were to have been delivered to various Forward Operating Bases (FOB) within Afghanistan.

(b) (7)(A) advised that between 4-5 times per week, [redacted] supervisor would direct [redacted] and other drivers to load (b) (7)(A) and drive them to designated trucking yards to be off loaded. (b) (7)(A) and the others would then be met by the "buyer" of the goods, who had [redacted] own trucks and drivers. The goods would then be off loaded from (b) (7)(A)s truck and into smaller Afghan trucks, known as "jingle trucks". (b) (7)(A) would then drive the empty (b) (7)(A) to yet another location, where the person would purchase and remove the empty (b) (7)(A). (b) (7)(A) reported the type items that were stolen as plywood, power drinks, foot lockers, wall lockers, trash bags, etc.

(b) (7)(A) advised that the company supervisors would identify which (b) (7)(A) and their contents would be stolen and which (b) (7)(A) would be delivered to the various FOBs. (b) (7)(A)

Page 1 of 3

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 12/26/2013

Title: (b) (7)(A)

(b) (7)(A) explained that if 4 (b) (7)(A) were to be delivered to FOB Shank, then the supervisors would have two of them stolen and two of them properly delivered. After the drivers returned from delivering the two (b) (7)(A) to FOB Shank, they would provide the signed paperwork confirming receipt by the FOB Shank personnel. (b) (7)(A) explained that the supervisors would then take the paperwork from the 2 stolen (b) (7)(A) and forge the same signature of the soldier whom took delivery of the delivered (b) (7)(A). They also had counterfeit stamps for various FOBs by which they would stamp the corresponding document to reflect the goods had been delivered. The company would then send the legitimate and forged documents to the U.S. government for payment.

During the course of several months, (b) (7)(A) would call SIGAR and report the number of (b) (7)(A) stolen from the previous night and the location from which the goods were transferred onto the "jingle" trucks. (b) (7)(A) would also provide the names of the other drivers and they type contents stolen. (b) (7)(A) advised that (b) (7)(A) sole responsibility within the company was to steal these (b) (7)(A) at the management's request. (b) (7)(A) had been doing this since January 2012.

Eventually, (b) (7)(A) was able to provide shipping documents that were to have been destroyed. The documents reflected the (b) (7)(A) having belonged to (b) (7)(A) and (b) (7)(A) as part of shipments to be made. (b) (7)(A) explained that these particular shipments had been stolen. Efforts to have investigators with both (b) (7)(A) and (b) (7)(A) to track these items were unsuccessful. Thus, efforts to identify the company that had the prime shipping contract were unsuccessful as well.

In addition, SIGAR leadership met and briefed the Afghan Ministry of Interiors (MOI) Transnational Criminal Investigations Unit (TCIU) leadership on this criminal enterprise and its operation. TCIU initially agreed to assist in this joint effort. However, several TCIU investigators were roughed up by local Afghan police when they were caught following a couple of the trucks loaded with the (b) (7)(A). The TCIU commander subsequently shut their case down. The TCIU commander shared that the owner of the moving company was very well connected with powerful figures within the Afghan government and recommended senior Embassy and U.S. Forces leaders meet with the head of MOI to express the need for support. Subsequent efforts to receive this support were unsuccessful.

(b) (7)(A) eventually resigned from the company. In addition, (b) (7)(A) advised that the company no longer had the subcontract to transport the (b) (7)(A).

Due to the lack of support from Afghan authorities to pursue the company for theft and fraud, the company no longer having a shipping contract to move U.S. goods, the inability to determine the prime contractor and the contract, and (b) (7)(A)'s resignation, this investigation is closed.

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

(b) (7)(C)

Date: 12/26/2013

Title: (b) (7)(A)

Attachment(s): None.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

SIGAR Kabul: For information and tracking.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SIGAR Headquarters: For information and tracking.

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**SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTORATE**

Precedence: Routine

Date: 12/28/2012

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (7)(C)

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0361-11-WFO-6-0064

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C)

Synopsis: This investigation was initiated based on a report that (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(A) to be awarded CERP contracts. (b) (7)(C) allegedly told a team member that while enroute to CONUS (b) (7)(C) was stopping in Singapore, the headquarters of (b) (7)(A) for an interview for a post retirement job. There is a possible conflict of interest. Suspected violation of 18 USC 208, prohibitions on executive branch employee from participating personally and substantially in a particular Government matter that will affect (b) (7)(C) own financial interest, as well as the financial interests of (b) (7)(C) spouse or minor child.

Details: Interviews were conducted in Afghanistan and the U.S. Interviews conducted with Government of Singapore officials confirmed that (b) (7)(C) was invited by the Government of Singapore to conduct an official visit to Singapore following (b) (7)(C) Afghanistan deployment. (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (7)(C) chain of command of this trip and that funding would be borne by the Government of Singapore. A review was conducted of (b) (7)(C) work computer and disclosed that (b) (7)(C) immediate superior (b) (7)(A) upon notification of (b) (7)(C) trip to Singapore requested that (b) (7)(C) meet with (b) (7)(A) officials while in Singapore. Grand Jury subpoenas were issued for financial documents related to (b) (7)(C) and family members as well as (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) was assigned to the

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact:

Date: Click here to enter a date.

Title:

Kandahar Regional Contracting Center (b) (7)(C) and awarded numerous contracts to (b) (7)(A) just prior to (b) (7)(C) departure from Afghanistan in May 2011. Review of these financial documents disclosed nothing of evidentiary value. (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) was interviewed in June 2012 and denied that contracts were awarded to (b) (7)(A) in return for anything of value or in violation of the Federal Acquisition Regulations. (b) (7)(C) U.S. Army (Ret) was interviewed in September 2012 and denied any conflict of interest and stated that (b) (7)(C) did not receive a post-retirement position with (b) (7)(A). A briefing on the results of this investigation was provided to Special Trial Attorney (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) disclosed that the Department of Justice would decline to prosecute. On December 28, 2012 (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) was briefed on captioned investigation and concurred that no S&D action is warranted. This investigation is closed as unfounded.



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - Report of Investigation

Precedence: Routine

Date: 5/20/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (7)(C)

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0445-13-BAF-1-0163

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Synopsis: This investigation was opened based on complaints of attempted bribery of soldiers from (b) (7)(A) assigned to the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Goode fuel point. The soldiers notified their leadership that Afghan truck drivers delivering fuel to FOB Goode were constantly offering bribes in exchange for allowing them to leave the base with large quantities of stolen fuel. The fuel in turn was to be sold on the black market. The (b) (7)(A) contacted the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) for assistance. The SIGAR investigation resulted in the arrest of two (b) (7)(A) drivers and the recovery of 6,000 gallons of fuel and the seizure of two Mercedes Benz trucks and fuel tankers. All investigative, judicial and administrative activity on this case has been completed; thus, it is requested this case be closed.

Details: On June 27, 2013, SIGAR and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) initiated a "sting" operation at FOB Goode based upon complaints of bribe offers from Afghan fuel truck drivers. (b) (7)(A)

(b) (7)(A) SIGAR agents contacted the Afghan Attorney General's Office in Kabul requesting the assistance of the Paktiya Provincial Prosecutor to arrest and prosecute any

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 5/20/2014

Title: (b) (7)(A)

(b) (7)(A)

On June 27, 2013, two (b) (7)(A) 12,000 gallon fuel trucks arrived at the FOB Goode fuel point to be downloaded. The first truck, driven by (b) (7)(C) was downloaded by US soldiers. After the downloading was complete the fuel point soldiers found (b) (7)(C) truck to be 353 gallons short of fuel. When (b) (7)(C) was informed of the shortage (b) (7)(C) asked the soldiers if they could fix the paperwork to reflect that they had downloaded the correct amount of fuel. At that point (b) (7)(C) offered one of the soldiers a small quantity of hashish to correct the paperwork. (b) (7)(C) was observed conferring with (b) (7)(C), the driver of the second fuel truck. After conferring with (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C) gave the fuel point soldiers 95 USD and 9,500 Afghani in order to leave fuel in (b) (7)(C) truck.

The soldier accepted the US Currency, Afghani and hashish as instructed by SIGAR agents. (b) (7)(C) then told the soldier that (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) would return to FOB Goode in two days with more money and hashish to exchange for the fuel left in (b) (7)(C) truck. (b) (7)(C) also stated that they could continue this type of cooperation in the future.

On June 27, 2013, (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) were arrested after they exchanged the drugs, Afghani and U.S. cash with the US soldiers in return for leaving 6,000 gallons of fuel in the truck. The drugs, cash and two trucks were seized as evidence. The value of the fuel saved, \$90,000, was claimed as a recovery in this case. The Afghan prosecutor, investigator and police officer transported (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) to the Paktiya Provincial Detention Center.

The two trucks, both Mercedes Benz, were seized by the Paktiya Provincial Prosecutor.

There are no additional suspects or investigative leads. There is no evidence in SIGAR custody. It is requested this case be closed.

Attachment(s): None

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)
SIGAR-Kabul. Close Case.

Set Lead 2: (Info)
SIGAR Headquarters. For information and awareness.



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Date of Transcription:
12/10/2013

Administrative Correspondence

Precedence: Routine

Date: 12/10/2013

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (7)(C)

Approved By: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

Case Number: 0149-12-WFO-5-0078

Case Status: Closed (C)

Lead Agency: FBI - Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations

(b) (7)(A)

SIGAR Lead Agent: (b) (7)(C)

Title: (b) (7)(A)

Date of Investigation: 12/10/2013

By: (b) (7)(C)

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Synopsis:

This investigation was initiated after the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Fayetteville RA, Charlotte Division, provided a copy of a US Army “15-6 Investigation” which [REDACTED] had previously received from the Judge Advocate Generals (JAG) office at Ft. Bragg, NC. The information indicates (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED] drawn by (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED] (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], U.S. Army during a 2010 military deployment to Afghanistan are unaccounted for, amounting to approximately \$165,000 USD. SF Operational Detachments-Alpha (ODA) are the basic SF operational units and are routinely deployed throughout Afghanistan to conduct a variety of missions. In support of these missions, ODAs are provided OPFUNDS for various purposes such as paying local labor, heavy equipment purchases/use and CERP funds. Designated ODA members are assigned to draw these funds from military finance offices and make payments for approved items and projects and then reconcile the funds through proper accounting and paperwork. While deployed, this accounting occurs approximately every 60 days. In all cases without exception, a soldier is required to fully clear these funds prior to departure from overseas.

Further review of the 15-6 report determined (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED] departed Afghanistan in July, 2010, without clearing funds of approximately \$165,000. (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED] last accounted for [REDACTED] funds on July 28, 2010, when [REDACTED] did clear \$50,000 of the outstanding balance. At the time (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED] was assigned to the [REDACTED]. However, since returning to the US, [REDACTED] has been transferred to the (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED], where venue for prosecution will be located.

Details:

(b) (7)(A) [REDACTED] was contacted during the military administrative investigation in October, 2011 by the assigned investigating officer but declined to be interviewed or provide an explanation/statement regarding the missing funds. [REDACTED] has been uncooperative to date.

Since the initiation of the investigation, numerous interviews of key individuals associated with this issue were located and interviewed. The results of this investigation thus far to develop any malicious intent on the part of (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED]. The investigative findings to date have been discussed with an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Due to the lack of prosecutive merit, the AUSA has provided a declination for this case. As a result, this case is closed to file.

Date of Investigation: 3/14/2013
CCN#: 0149-12-WFO-5-0078

By: (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]
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CLASSIFICATION:
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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - General

Precedence: Routine

Date: 9/8/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C) – Investigations

From: SIGAR Investigations Directorate – Washington Field Office

Contact: (b) (7)(C) – (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C) – Special Agent

CCN: 0336-11-KBL-3-0057

Lead Agency: USACIDC - US Army Criminal Investigation Command

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Details: Investigation determined that on May 1, 2011, (b) (7)(A) knowingly packaged and mailed \$150,000 in cash from Bagram Air Field (BAF), Afghanistan, to Topeka, KS, but represented on the DHL forms that the contents of the package did not exceed \$1,000 in value. (b) (7)(C) admitted intentionally failed to declare the \$150,000 in order to conceal the contents of the package because (b) (7)(C) received the money from (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(A), in the form of a kickback. (b) (7)(C) was allowed to plead guilty to one count of Bulk Cash Smuggling in violation of 18 USC 5332. On February 12, 2013, (b) (7)(C) was sentenced to 30 months confinement and is currently serving sentence at the Federal Correction Institution in Forest City, Arkansas.

Information developed during the course of the investigation implicated (b) (7)(C) employee, as assisting (b) (7)(C) with the mailing. (b) (7)(C) was interviewed via Video TeleConference (VTC) at the Embassy Branch Office of the United States in Banja Luka, BiH and denied culpability.

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 9/8/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

In May 2013, (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) of (b) (7)(A) were suspended and debarred from conducting business with the U.S. Government. On August 26, 2014, the Fraud Section, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), declined prosecution of (b) (7)(C) based on the information provided during the July interview. On September 5, 2014, Suspension & Debarment action related to (b) (7)(C) was declined. This case will be closed.

Exhibits(s): None

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

SIGAR HQ:

Close case.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SIGAR – Kabul:

For information, awareness and record.

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - General

Precedence: Routine

Date: 8/25/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (7)(C)

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0049-13-WFO-0023

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Reference:

(A) SIGAR AC, 19FEB13

Synopsis:

Investigation was initiated subsequent to the review of Postal Money Order transactions denoting suspicious financial activity.

Details:

SIGAR's Postal Money Order (PMO) assessment analyzes purchase patterns that meet predetermined criteria in all US mail facilities in Afghanistan. They may be high volume purchases coupled with the failure to file the USPS Form 8105A, "Funds Transaction Report", as required by federal law. Form 8105A are required when purchases meet or exceeds \$3,000 per transaction or per day. The assessment also identified sequential money orders purchased at its limit, \$1,000, to determine if it was made by the same person. According to USPS records, the

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 8/25/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

PMOs were often made payable to the purchaser, family members, creditors or other non-vendors.

Interviews to date and analysis of financial records, reflected the only funds received by [redacted] were from the salary of [redacted] employer. DCIS briefed this matter with the AUSA, [redacted] New York, that provided oversight on PMO investigations. Based on no criminal activity being noted, she declined this case for further prosecution. No further investigation action will be conducted. Investigation is recommended for closing. This investigation was provided to (b) (7)(C) Counsel for Investigations, for Suspension and Debarment consideration. [redacted] concurred with case closure. Investigation is closed.

Set Lead 1:

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**SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTORATE**

Precedence: Routine**Date:** 9/4/2013**To:** SIGAR Investigations Directorate**Attn:** (b) (7)(C)**From:** SIGAR Investigations Directorate, (b) (7)(C)**Contact:** (b) (7)(C)**Created By:** (b) (7)(C)**CCN:** 0024-12-WFO-1-0004**Lead Agency:** SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Synopsis: This investigation was initiated in conjunction with with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and the US Army Criminal Investigative Detachment (CID). Reportedly, a package in transit from Afghanistan to the US was intercepted in Dubai after there was an indication of explosive residue on/in the package. Subsequent search of the package contents revealed \$12,000 cash inside which also had a fictitious sender name and address and a declared value of \$500. After a controlled delivery was made, the investigation indicated the sender to be the captioned subject and the person receiving the package to be (b) (7)(C) who denied knowledge of the contents.

Details: Subsequent interviews of six witnesses were conducted which later led to the prosecutive acceptance and federal indictment of (b) (7)(C) by the (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) On January 29, 2013, (b) (7)(C) plead guilty in the (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) to one count if Bulk Cash Smuggling, Title 31 USC 5329(a). On June 4, 2013, (b) (7)(C) was sentenced to five years probation and the forfeiture of \$12,000 in U.S. currency.

On April 10, 2013, (b) (7)(C) was indefinitely debarred by the U.S. Army Contract and Federal Law Division, Ft. Belvoir, VA. With all logical leads and prosecutive actions completed, this investigation is closed.

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - General

Precedence: Routine

Date: 5/7/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (7)(C)

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0037-12-KAF-1-0029

Lead Agency: SIGAR

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Details:

This investigation was predicated upon a December 2011 complaint by (b) (7)(C) Company, that the Army failed to pay [redacted] company in full for several CERP projects [redacted] performed. [redacted] alleged that (b) (7)(C) only paid [redacted] \$44,000 of the \$165,000 that [redacted] was promised and that (b) (7)(C) requested a \$30,000 bribe to have [redacted] company paid in full for the CERP projects. (b) (7)(C) was interviewed by SIGAR investigators in April 2014, and stated that [redacted] had several problems with the work performance of (b) (7)(C) Company. (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (7)(C) was one of the few companies willing to perform the work in a dangerous area, but that [redacted] took issue with both the quality and quantity of the work and materials. For example, truck deliveries for gravel were consistently less than what was claimed for payment, and gravel specifics were not met. When confronted by (b) (7)(C) [redacted] blamed the gravel company owners for the issues.

(b) (7)(C) detailed the three projects assigned to (b) (7)(C) as well as the shortcomings of two of the projects. (b) (7)(C) stated that [redacted] provided full compensation for the amount of work completed and the actual amount of gravel delivered. Regarding the

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 4/23/2014

Title: Special Agent

\$30,000 requested, (b) (7)(C) stated that it was actually a price reduction that suggested because of the under-performance and overbilling by (b) (7)(C) on the contracts and that it was not a bribe solicitation. Two of (b) (7)(C) interpreters, both of whom had personal knowledge of dealings with (b) (7)(C) were interviewed and both stated that they did not recall any unusual requests made by (b) (7)(C). One interpreter stated that recalled (b) (7)(C) informing Jawad that would deduct \$30,000 from the total amount owed. A review of the CERP contract files revealed no suspicious activity.

Based on an evaluation of case file by (b) (7)(C) and the request to close the case, she determined insufficient evidence existed to meet the burden of proof available to support a referral for fact-based debarment. Nor did the exigent circumstances exist to support a fact-based suspension. The suspension and debarment program concurred with the request to close case number 0236-14-KBL-3-0072.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter, (b) (7)(C) did not request any further investigative efforts be undertaken and concurred with closing the case. It is requested this investigation be closed based upon the declination by the prosecutor.

LEAD(s):**Set Lead 1: (Info)**SIGAR

This case is recommended for closing based on the above referenced facts and circumstances.

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Page 2 of 2

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - General

Precedence: Routine

Date: 4/22/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: SIGAR-Investigations Directorate – Washington Field Office, Arlington, VA

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0158-11-WFO-7-0022

Lead Agency: USPIS - United States Postal Inspection Services

(b) (7)(A)

Title: Money Laundering Via Postal Money Orders Assessment

Details: Closing AC

SIGAR Investigations Division (ID) identified various methods United States (U.S.) personnel were using to launder proceeds of their illegal activities in Afghanistan. The methods by which proceeds are transferred from Afghanistan to the U.S. include the use of the Hawala system, the U.S. Mail, and Postal Money Orders (PMOs). The review of PMOs has proven to be an effective tool in detecting questionable monetary transactions. The U.S. Postal Service has incorporated safeguards within their PMO products to prevent its use for illegal purposes. The Postal Inspection Services (PI) and SIGAR leveraged those safeguards to help detect and prosecute personnel involved in corrupt activities associated with Afghanistan reconstruction efforts.

The U.S. Postal Inspection Services was initially requested to identify PMO purchases that met predetermined criteria in all Afghanistan Zip Codes. The initial result indicated that in the Kandahar Zip Code alone, purchases meeting that profile totaled \$822,000 for the period from February 2009 to October 2010. That amount constitutes 19% of all PMOs purchased

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 4/22/2014

Title: Money Laundering Via Postal Money Orders

during the time period and likewise represented 40% of the total dollar value (\$2,067,000). PMOs can be purchased throughout Afghanistan at Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA) facilities in amounts up to \$1,000 USD. SIGAR's preliminary review of PMO data revealed numerous instances of the purchase of sequentially numbered Money Orders in \$1,000 amounts. On many occasions as many as 10 to 20 sequentially numbered money orders were purchased having a value of \$10,000 to \$20,000 collectively.

As a result of these initial findings, a task force was formed to review all high value PMO purchases in Afghanistan. (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(A)

The review lead to the identification of both military and civilian personnel and numerous cases were opened. New York, Washington, D.C., and North Carolina were some of the prosecutorial venues for the PMO cases and subjects.

Subsequent efforts to have the PIs run additional database queries based upon the zip codes for the post offices on U.S. military bases in Afghanistan were unsuccessful. It has been several years since any new cases have been identified and opened based upon a database run. The (b) (7)(C) advised the former SIGAR case agent that they could no longer seek a general query of the PMO database and, accordingly, could not generate a report similar to the original report. The task force has discontinued its efforts to generate additional data-base originated PMO cases and is only working cases based upon specific individual allegations of criminal activity.

This case agent telephonically contacted (b) (7)(C), the Postal Inspection Services Anti-Money Laundering Program Manager on 4/17/2014. (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (7)(C) has helped investigators in the past with allegations of criminal activity involving PMOs originating in Afghanistan and will continue to do so but (b) (7)(C) does not have the resources to assign a body full-time to Afghanistan matters. (b) (7)(C) also advised there now has to be a report of suspicious activity involving specific individuals or transactions before a PI can request the PMO information; no longer can the entire PMO database be queried for any and all transactions from military Post Offices in Afghanistan.

During discussions with prosecutor (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C), it was determined the captioned assessment should be closed and, henceforth, all PMO investigations would be predicated on specific allegations against one or more individuals and opened on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, it is requested this assessment be closed.

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 4/22/2014

Title: Money Laundering Via Postal Money Orders

Exhibits(s): none

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

SIGAR – Washington Field Office

It is requested captioned assessment be closed due to the inability to obtain non-specific Postal Money Order database information related to U.S. Post Office Postal Money Order sales on U.S. military bases in Afghanistan.

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Date of Transcription:
12/3/2013

Administrative Correspondence

Precedence: Routine

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate (ID)

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: Bribery and Public Corruption Division

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Approved By: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

Case ID: N/A

Complaint #: 0285-13-WFO-6-0096

Case Status: Closed (C)

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

SIGAR Lead Agent: N/A

SIGAR Co-Lead: N/A

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Date of Investigation: 3/1/2013

By: (b) (7)(C)

Page 1 of 2

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Synopsis: The following SIGAR HCMS complaint information is referred to SIGAR Investigations for the consideration of an investigation of Subject for potential use of Postal Money Orders to facilitate money laundering.

Details: SIGAR's Postal Money Order (PMO) assessment analyzes purchase patterns that meet predetermined criteria in all US mail facilities in Afghanistan. They may be high volume purchases coupled with the failure to file the USPS Form 8105A, "Funds Transaction Report", as required by federal law. Form 8105A are required when purchases meet or exceeds \$3,000 per transaction or per day. The assessment also identified sequential money orders purchased at its limit, \$1,000, to determine if it was made by the same person. According to USPS records, the PMOs were often made payable to the purchaser, family members, creditors or other non-vendors. During the PMO assessment, information was developed that (b) (7)(C) may have engaged in suspicious financial transactions currently estimated at \$9,000.

On December 3, 2013, (b) (7)(C) was located and interviewed in (b) (7)(C). During the interview, (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that (b) (7)(C) purchased numerous PMO's during (b) (7)(C) military deployment to Afghanistan during 2010. However, (b) (7)(C) denied the funds originated by any illegal enterprises. (b) (7)(C) advised that the financial amounts stemmed from various gambling winnings and repayments of loans by coworkers. (b) (7)(C) added that the recipient of the PMO's was (b) (7)(C) who lives in (b) (7)(C).

Based on the above information and other investigative efforts conducted thus far, this case is closed.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

SIGAR

ARLINGTON, VA

Close investigation.

Date of Investigation: 3/1/2013

By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN#: 0285-13-WFO-6-0096

Page 2 of 2

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Date of Transcription:
10/17/2013

Closing Administrative Correspondence

Precedence: Routine

Date: 10/17/2013

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (7)(C)

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0447-13-WFO-3-0156

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Synopsis: SIGAR's Postal Money Order (PMO) assessment analyzes purchase patterns that meet predetermined criteria in all US mail facilities in Afghanistan. They may be high volume purchases coupled with the failure to file the USPS Form 8105A, "Funds Transaction Report", as required by federal law. Form 8105A are required when purchases meet or exceeds \$3,000 per transaction or per day. The assessment also identified sequential money orders purchased at its limit, \$1,000, to determine if it was made by the same person. According to USPS records, the PMOs were often made payable to the purchaser, family members, creditors or other non-vendors. During the PMO assessment, information was developed that Carmelo Salva, Contractor for GD Information Technology, may have engaged in suspicious financial transactions currently estimated at \$32,000.

Date of Investigation: 07/08/2013

By: (b) (7)(C)

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Arlington, Virginia 22202

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Arlington, Virginia 22202-3940

Tel 703 545 6000

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Details: Preliminary inquiries were conducted to fully identify (b) (7)(C) using various data mining search engines and agency inquiries. As a result of liaison with other federal agencies associated with this proactive program, it was learned that this allegation had already been addressed. Based on their investigative findings, (b) (7)(C) PMO transfers stemmed from (b) (7)(C) sales and distribution of liquor while deployed in Afghanistan. Based on this receipt of information and the lack of substantive leads that fall under the investigative mission of this agency, this investigation is closed.

Date of Investigation: 7/813

By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN#: 0447-13-WFO-3-0156

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - Report of Investigation

Precedence: Routine

Date: 7/1/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate – Washington Field Office, Arlington, VA

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: SIGAR investigations Directorate - Bagram

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0081-13-BAF-1-0094

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C); Contract Fraud

Synopsis: This investigation is closed.

Details: On December 2, 2012, an anonymous complainant contacted SIGAR Hotline and alleged (b) (7)(C) submitted proposals containing false documentation to the (b) (7)(C). The false documents were resumes for professionals purported to be employees of (b) (7)(C) however, were not. Complainant further alleged (b) (7)(C) was awarded several (b) (7)(C) contracts and (b) (7)(C) sub-contracted the entire projects to less qualified Afghan companies. Complainant believed sub-contracting the entire project to another company was a contract violation. (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) was briefed on complainant's allegations. (b) (7)(C) explained the contract requires the prime contractor to perform 25 % of the project and is required to have a quality control and safety officer on site during all construction. (b) (7)(C) functions as the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) for contracts (b) (4) for the design and construction of the (b) (7)(A) and contract (b) (7)(A) for the design and construction of the (b) (7)(A). Due to

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 7/2/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C); Contract Fraud

security issues (b) (7)(C) personnel cannot travel to the sites and must rely on local nationals for status reports. (b) (7)(C) reported (b) (7)(C) submitted Request for Equitable Adjustment on both contracts and heard comments from local nationals that (b) (7)(C) did not have the robust staff as purported. Complainant was contacted and provided site staffing and equipment/housing information. Complainant stated (b) (7)(C) sub-contracted the entire projects to less qualified Afghan companies and that (b) (7)(C) had minimal personnel at both construction sites. Complainant's information was compared to the overhead costs submitted by (b) (7)(C) and the costs submitted by (b) (7)(C) were much higher than the information provided by the complainant in respect to personnel on site and overhead expenses for communication equipment, security, vehicles and housing. Subsequently (b) (7)(C) met with representatives of (b) (7)(C) to discuss and settle the (b) (7)(C) previously submitted. (b) (7)(C) provided the following information regarding the (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (4)

(b) (7)(C), (b) (4)

According to (b) (7)(C) the (b) (7)(C) contract files were not properly annotated and proper procedures were not followed to address contractor deficiencies. (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(C) would address the file discrepancies so that in the future (b) (7)(C) could pursue adverse action if needed. Subsequently (b) (7)(C) completed the work on Contract (b) (4) and contract (b) (4) was terminated for convenience. This investigation is closed.

LEAD(s):**Set Lead 1: (Info)**SIGAR HQ: This investigation is closed**Set Lead 2: (Info)**SIGAR Kabul: This investigation is closed**WARNING**

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - Report of Investigation

Precedence: Routine

Date: 4/11/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: Bagram Field Office

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0315-13-BAF-1-0112

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Synopsis: All logical investigative leads completed. This investigation is closed.

Details: In May 2012, the (b) (4) Shank, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shank, Logar, Afghanistan, awarded (b) (4) a \$455,000.00 contract to build a four (4) building (b) (7)(C). The Adobe compound was to be part of the (b) (7)(C) where trainees would train on how to “clear” the buildings of insurgents or criminals.

In February 2013, a U.S. Army representative, assigned to the (b) (7)(C) as a mentor, notified RCC Shank officials that the Adobe compound was “falling apart”. (b) (7)(C) Shank officials then sent representatives to the (b) (7)(C) facility, where the building flaws were documented and photographed. It was determined the mixture of sand, clay and water to make the adobe bricks was insufficient and not in accordance with the contract’s statement of work (SOW). Furthermore, the size of the brick used was smaller than what was required. In addition, the roof was not built to standard, which caused the water to drain down the side of the adobe brick causing it to deteriorate. This caused the building to be unstable, determined “unsafe” and was

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 4/9/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

no longer being used for training.

(b) (7)(C) Shank leadership then notified SIGAR to report that (b) (7)(C) had used inferior products to build the Adobe compound. They advised that the compound was still under warranty. They contacted the owner of (b) (7)(C) who advised (b) (7)(C) built the compound correctly and it had been approved by the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR). The owner did not feel (b) (7)(C) was obligated to make any repairs to the compound. (b) (7)(C) Shank officials feared the costs to repair the compound would be high and feared (b) (7)(C) would "walk away" from the project. They requested SIGAR assistance.

A contract review revealed (b) (7)(C) completed the Adobe compound construction project on October 20, 2012 and was paid the full amount. There were 3 separate invoices submitted and 3 DD 250s that were signed off on by either the contracting officer or the COR. In addition, the original COR returned to the U.S. on emergency leave and was gone during a portion of the construction. In (b) (7)(C) absence, the Contracting Officer signed off on the initial DD 250 based on the advice of a (b) (7)(C) Shank construction specialist. Until the COR's return, a (b) (7)(C)

In early April 2013, (b) (7)(C) Shank leadership advised SIGAR that recent rains had increased the damage to the Adobe compound. On April 11, 2013, Reporting Agent (RA) traveled with (b) (7)(C) officials to the (b) (7)(C) where the damage to the adobe compound was assessed and photographed. A report detailing the damage was generated.

In May 2013, RA interrogated (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C), regarding the use of inferior products to build the adobe compound. (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (7)(C) built the compound correctly and was approved by the COR, a soldier named (b) (7)(C) and a (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C), whom was helping (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) advised that (b) (7)(C) proposed to (b) (7)(C) they use a smaller brick than the one proposed in the SOW. According to (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C) agreed and (b) (7)(C) then used the smaller brick. (b) (7)(C) advised (b) (7)(C) would provide RA email correspondence reflecting the approval. (b) (7)(C) admitted that there was never a modification to the contract authorizing the smaller sized brick. (b) (7)(C) advised that (b) (7)(C) would honor the warranty work and repair the building.

(b) (7)(C) subsequently forwarded email correspondence between (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C). A review of the email disclosed (b) (7)(C) recommendation to utilize the smaller brick and (b) (7)(C) concurrence that the smaller brick should be used; however, (b) (7)(C) explained (b) (7)(C) needed to have the contracting officer (b) (7)(C) concur with the recommendation. There was not email correspondence between (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) on this issue. In addition, it should be noted a contract modification reflecting smaller brick was never located in the case file and never generated.

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 4/9/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C) Company

The contracting officer, (b) (7)(C), SFC, U.S. Army, was interviewed telephonically. (b) (7)(C) recalled the COR, (b) (7)(C) going on emergency leave and was going to assign (b) (7)(C) as the new COR, however, (b) (7)(C) had not completed the mandatory COR training. (b) (7)(C) recalled (b) (7)(C) assisting (b) (7)(C) with the COR responsibilities, but (b) (7)(C) was responsible for the project. (b) (7)(C) provided additional information reflecting other personnel having involvement in the project.

During the course of the investigation, RA communicated with (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) officials as a facilitator with having the warranty work completed. (b) (7)(C) did complete much of the required warranty work. However, when attempting to place asphalt on the adobe roof, (b) (7)(C) was denied access by the Afghan gate guards and was threatened to be arrested. In the meantime, (b) (7)(C) Shank closed down and contract files were transferred to (b) (7)(C) Bagram. Efforts to have (b) (7)(C) Bagram engage in the issue were challenging.

In December 2013, RA spoke with (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(C), Construction, (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(A) about having the work completed (asphalt on the roof) prior to the snow and rains. (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) advised the contract was closed and the warranty was expired; RA was not in a position to serve as the "requesting activity." RA explained that (b) (7)(C) was still willing to complete the warranty work despite its expiration. (b) (7)(C) stated that if (b) (7)(C) completed the work, then they could come back with a bill for the U.S. Government claiming the work was an unobligated commitment.

In December 2013, RA subsequently spoke with (b) (7)(C), Regional Contracting Center – East, who advised (b) (7)(C) would speak with the lawyers to determine a course of action.

On March 25, RA met with (b) (7)(C), who reported that the (b) (7)(C) lawyers advised against having (b) (7)(C) do any additional work on the compound since the warranty had expired. (b) (7)(C) thanked SIGAR for its teaming with (b) (7)(C) Shank officials to have a majority of the warranty work completed. (b) (7)(C) followed the meeting up with an email to RA expressing (b) (7)(C) gratitude.

On April 10, 2014, (b) (7)(C), reviewed the file and advised that there was insufficient evidence to pursue a "fact-based debarment" against (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) recommended the case be closed.

This investigation is closed.

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 4/9/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C) Company

Exhibits(s): NA

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

SIGAR Investigation is closed.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SIGAR Investigation is closed.

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - General

Precedence: Routine

Date: 4/15/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C) Investigations

From: SIGAR Investigations Directorate-Washington Field Office

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: [REDACTED]

CCN: 0293-12-WFO-3-0154

Lead Agency: AFOSI - US Air Force, Air Force Office of Special Investigations

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Corruption, Fraud

Details: This case was initiated when a complainant contacted SIGAR audit which referred contact to Investigations. Complainant was interviewed at SIGAR on 8/14/2012. Complainant expressed concern about conflict of interest, corruption and bribery involving two companies which received U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) contracts for work in Afghanistan. The contracts were awarded to (b) (7)(C), which has an (b) (7)(C) office, and (b) (7)(C) of (b) (7)(C). The complainant alleged neither (b) (7)(C)-owned company was qualified but had been chosen by (b) (7)(C). The contracts were for training (b) (7)(C) how to seek contracts with the U.S. government. (b) (7)(C) allegedly had a corrupt relationship with these companies.

(b) (7)(A)

In December, 2012, agents from Air Force Office of Special Investigations

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 4/15/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

(OSI) (b) (7)(A) came to SIGAR - WFO and were briefed on the allegations. OSI (b) (7)(A) agents subsequently recommended the case be handled by OSI at (b) (7)(A) in (b) (7)(A) due to subject (b) (7)(C) former position there as well as the contracts being awarded there. SIGAR case agent agreed and OSI (b) (7)(A) took the lead in the investigation and advised it would conduct contract and other document reviews at the (b) (7)(A) contract office.

An April, 2013 status meeting was held at (b) (7)(A) between the SIGAR agent and the (b) (7)(A) OSI agent (b) (7)(A). (b) (7)(C) advised it did not appear there was any conflict of interest involving (b) (7)(C) nor was any contract impropriety found related to the awarding of the contracts. (b) (7)(C) presented the results of (b) (7)(C) investigation and the allegations to (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) found there were not any violations so OSI closed the matter. SIGAR case agent presented the matter to prosecutor (b) (7)(C) and (b) (7)(C) declined prosecution in this matter on 12/18/2013 citing unsubstantiated allegations and a lack of prosecutive merit. This information has been presented to SIGAR's Suspension and Debarment (S&D) counsel seeking that office's opinion. As there is no additional investigative work to be done, it is recommended this matter be closed upon receipt of a concurring opinion from S&D.

Exhibits(s): none

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

SIGAR at Washington Field – It is requested this case be closed following receipt of a concurring opinion from SIGAR's Suspension and Debarment counsel.

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**SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTORATE**

Precedence: Routine**Date:** 6/19/2013**To:** SIGAR Investigations Directorate**Attn:** (b) (7)(C)**From:** (b) (7)(C)**Contact:** (b) (7)(C)**Approved By:** (b) (7)(C)**Created By:** (b) (7)(C)**Case ID:** 0011-10-WFO-1-0001**Case Status:** Closed (C)**Lead Agency:** SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

SIGAR Lead Agent: (b) (7)(C)**Title:** (b) (7)(A)

Synopsis: Investigation predicated upon receipt of a complaint from the SIGAR Hotline and SIGAR Inspection Division.

Information indicates (b) (7)(A), a former prime sub-con tractor on the (b) (7)(A), aka, the (b) (7)(A) contract, knowingly caused a false claim for payment to be presented by the contractor to the U.S. Government for building materials received by (b) (7)(A) but not paid for even though (b) (7)(A) had received funding for the items. In addition, (b) (7)(A) submitted invoices to the contractor and received payment for reportedly percentages of completed construction which was incomplete.

Details: Reference is made to a Case Activity Summary created by SIGAR (b) (7)(C) on June 29, 2012, where it is memorialized that the Department of Justice declines instant investigation on October 6, 2011,

Matters addressed in this investigation were merged under 0013-10-WFO-4-0002, (b) (7)(A)

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Released by SIGAR

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 6/19/2013

Title: (b) (7)(A)

POWER (CIVIL).

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

SIGAR HQ: Close this investigation.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTORATE

Precedence: Routine

Date: 1/15/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0461-13-BAF-1-0162

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: Fraudulent TMRs at (b) (7)(A)

Synopsis: Special Agents (SA) assigned to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) at the (b) (7)(A) were apprised of fraudulent transportation documents being utilized to access (b) (7)(A) and steal materials/supplies/equipment. Tailored fraud awareness briefings were provided to the affected units. Subsequently, SIGAR was notified of a truck in-gating with fraudulent documentation. (b) (7)(C) attempted to steal \$42,000.00 of construction wood from (b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(A) and the (b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(A) Bagram were notified and participated in the surveillance and arrest of the truck driver. (b) (7)(C) was barred from (b) (7)(A) and all installations in the (b) (7)(A) however, (b) (7)(C) was not prosecuted by the Afghan authorities. SIGAR Suspension and Debarment program concurred with closing this investigation. Request this investigation be closed.

Details: Special Agents assigned to SIGAR (b) (7)(A) were apprised of fraudulent Transportation Movement Release (TMR) forms being utilized at (b) (7)(A) to load out material/supplies/equipment. The TMR initiates the shipping process of materials/supplies/equipment within Afghanistan. Each TMR is assigned a unique number. The (b) (7)(A) is the contracting vehicle for transportation services. The TMR is assigned to 1 of the 15 trucking companies under the (b) (7)(A) contract. The TMR, along with other documents, authorizes a truck to gain access to (b) (7)(A) to pick up or drop off materials/supplies/equipment. The fraudulent TMRs provided to SIGAR had identifiable errors. Tailored fraud briefings were provided to (b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(A) which is where trucks enter and exit (b) (7)(A)

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 1/15/2014

Title: Fraudulent TMRs (b) (7)(A)

Further, briefings were provided to the (b) (7)(A) ; the (b) (7)(A) and the (b) (7)(A) yard which is also a supply yard.

Subsequently, personnel at (b) (7)(A) notified SIGAR a truck had in-gated with a fraudulent TMR to pick up supplies at the (b) (7)(A) yard. (b) (7)(A) surveiled the truck and monitored the truck being loaded with construction wood valued at approximately \$42,000. The truck was stopped by Special Agents with SIGAR, FBI and the (b) (7)(C) prior to exiting (b) (7)(A). The (b) (7)(C), identified as (b) (7)(C), was questioned and stated (b) (7)(A) was hired by an unknown Afghan outside of the (b) (7)(A) cool-down yard to drive the truck onto (b) (7)(A) load the materials and return the truck back to this unknown individual. (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(A) had done this a couple of times before and was paid 2,000 Afghani per trip. The (b) (7)(C) Investigator arrested and jailed (b) (7)(C). The truck and 40' flatbed trailer were seized by the (b) (7)(A) and held/stored at (b) (7)(A). The construction wood valued at \$42,000.00 was off-loaded and returned to the (b) (7)(A) yard. Efforts to identify the individual outside of (b) (7)(A) who reportedly hired (b) (7)(C) to drive the truck onto (b) (7)(A) to load with stolen wood met with negative results. The (b) (7)(A) Garrison Commander barred (b) (7)(C) from the installation and this barmment was entered into the DoD electronic base access system. The (b) (7)(A) CID Investigator who interviewed (b) (7)(C) and reported (b) (7)(C) was charged and placed in jail left (b) (7)(C) position with (b) (7)(C). Subsequent follow up with (b) (7)(A) regarding the status of this investigation revealed there was no record of (b) (7)(C) arrest or prosecuted. On January 11, 2014, (b) (7)(C), retrieved the truck driven by (b) (7)(C).

LEAD(s):**Set Lead 1: (Info)**

SIGAR AFGHANISTAN: Request this investigation be closed.



SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - Report of Investigation

Precedence: Routine

Date: 2/12/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (7)(C)

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0043-13-WFO-6-0017

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Synopsis: SIGAR's (b) (7)(A) project analyzes (b) (7)(A) data in conjunction with DOD deployment data to develop investigative leads regarding suspicious financial transactions involving possible fraud and corruption activity by individuals who have been deployed to Afghanistan.

During (b) (7)(A) analysis, information was developed on suspicious financial transactions relating to (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) was deployed to Afghanistan as an interpreter in 2008. (b) (7)(C). In May 2010, (b) (7)(C) purchased twenty money orders totaling \$9,960 at a Western Union location in Fremont, CA.

Statutes: 18 USC 1956

Details: On November 1, 2012, this investigation was initiated to determine if (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(C) was involved in corruption or money laundering as a result of (b) (7)(C) purchase of twenty money orders totaling \$9,960. Financial information was obtained and reviewed concerning the multiple transactions (b) (7)(C) engaged in.

On December 12, 2013, (b) (7)(C) was interviewed concerning the twenty

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 2/12/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

money orders purchased totaling \$9,960. From 2008 through April 15, 2013, (b) (7)(C) was employed by Mission Essential Personnel (MEP), a U.S. Government contractor, and worked as a (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) also worked at (b) (7)(C). With regards to the twenty money orders purchased totaling \$9,960 in May 2010, these transactions were conducted in order to purchase a vehicle for (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) recalled the money orders were limited to a maximum amount of \$500 each. As a result, (b) (7)(C) purchased twenty for a total of \$9,960; the purchase price of the vehicle. (b) (7)(C) purchased the money orders from a location identified as (b) (7)(A). The money orders were payable to a company identified as (b) (7)(A). (b) (7)(C) provided the vehicle identification number of the vehicle purchased for brother as (b) (7)(A) and the license plate assigned to the vehicle as (b) (7)(A). In addition, (b) (7)(C) withdrew \$9,165 from (b) (7)(C) financial account in October 2011. This withdrawal was used to purchase a wrecked automobile from a company identified as (b) (7)(A). (b) (7)(C) purchased a Toyota Camry for (b) (7)(C) at a salvage auction. The State of (b) (7)(A) plate currently on the Toyota Camry was identified as (b) (7)(A). (b) (7)(C) provided a copy of a (b) (7)(A) in the amount of \$9,165. The remitter on the cashiers check is identified as (b) (7)(C). (b) (7)(C) and the payee is listed as (b) (7)(A). (b) (7)(C) added, the salvage auction handled the financial transaction.

On January 31, 2014, the Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC) was requested to query (b) (7)(A), Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV), for the VIN and license plate information provided by (b) (7)(C). It was learned that (b) (7)(A) was not found in the (b) (7)(A) DMV records. After querying for (b) (7)(A) license plate (b) (7)(A) it was determined the number 2 had been left off the VIN. In conclusion, it was verified that a 2010 Toyota is owned by (b) (7)(C) bearing (b) (7)(A) plate (b) (7)(A) with (b) (7)(A). Also, (b) (7)(A) license plate (b) (7)(A) was determined to be assigned to (b) (7)(C). The vehicle is a 2009 Toyota. Both vehicles have valid (b) (7)(C) registrations.

On February 12, 2014, SIGPRO (b) (7)(C) was briefed on the facts of this investigation. (b) (7)(C) declined prosecution of this matter due to lack of evidence that a crime was committed.

This matter will be referred to the SIGAR Suspension and Debarment Counsel for any action deemed appropriate.

This investigation is closed as unfounded.

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 2/12/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

Exhibits(s): None

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

SIGAR: None

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SIGAR: None

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SIGAR

Office of the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Administrative Communication - Report of Investigation

Precedence: Routine

Date: 4/18/2014

To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Attn: (b) (7)(C)

From: SIGAR Investigations – Kabul

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Created By: (b) (7)(C)

CCN: 0465-13-KBL-5-0165

Lead Agency: SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

(b) (7)(A)

Title: (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(A)

Synopsis: Subjects received U.S. Department of State (DoS) grant to produce 100 radio programs on legal and religious rights of women and children in Afghanistan. Subjects failed to perform any work related to the grant and absconded with the U.S. funds. The DoS debarred subject from further contracts or grants with the DoS for a period of 3 years.

Details: This investigation was initiated based on information received from the DoS - Office of Inspector General (OIG). (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C) alleged that (b) (7)(C) did not perform any work related to a grant they received and absconded with the grant money. (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (7)(A) was awarded (b) (7)(A) in October of 2012, in the amount of \$49,130. (b) (7)(C) and other (b) (7)(A) staff have been unable to contact (b) (7)(A) and (b) (7)(C) to conduct monitoring visits on the grant, despite numerous attempts by telephone and e-mail. (b) (7)(C) visited the (b) (7)(A) office in February of 2013, but the office was closed and (b) (7)(A) was no longer located at that address.

On December 12, 2013 the DoS Suspension and Debarment Official debarred (b) (7)(C) and

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To: SIGAR Investigations Directorate

Contact: (b) (7)(C)

Date: 4/18/2014

Title: (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(A) for a period of three years. This case was referred to the Afghan Attorney General's Office for prosecution; however, to date, no action has been taken by that office pursuant to the allegations provided in this matter. The Department of Justice declined this matter for prosecution.

All investigative work has been accomplished in this case; thus it is closed with the submission of this document.

Exhibits(s): None

LEAD(s):

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SIGAR –HQ: For information.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

SIGAR -Kabul: For case closure.

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