Description of document: Special History of The Pueblo Incident
23 January - 1 March 1968, Volume I - Narrative

Request date: 07-September-2008

Released date: 12-November-2014

Posted date: 15-December-2014

Source of document: Mandatory Declassification Review
Department of the Air Force
HAF/AAII
1000 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1000

The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.
November 12, 2014

This is in response to your 7 September 2008 Mandatory Declassification review request.

The appropriate agencies conducted a review of documents 1, 3, and 5 and recommend withholding portions of these documents (redacted) from public disclosure under Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4 (c) and 3.5 (f).

The document responsive to #4 is withheld in full the information is properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. The documents response to #2 the Air Force conducted a search for the document and no was found therefore a no record determination is made.

Should this decision be appealed, write to the address listed below within sixty (60) calendar days from the date of this letter. Please include your reason for reconsideration and attach a copy of this letter:

Secretary of the Air Force  
THRU: SAF/AAII (MDR)  
1000 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1000

Address Questions concerning this review to the undersigned at (703) 693-2560 and refer our case number 09-MDR-007.

PENNY JENKINS  
Mandatory Declassification Review  
Program Manager

Attachment:  
1, 3 and 5
RETURN TO THE
ESC HISTORICAL OFFICE

SPECIAL HISTORY OF THE PUEBLO INCIDENT
23 JANUARY - 1 MARCH 1968
Volumn I - Narrative

SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED - NOT
RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONS

THE INFORMATION CON­
TAINED IN THIS DOCU­
MENT WILL NOT BE
DISCLOSED TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS OR THEIR
REPRESENTATIVES.

29 APRIL 1968

6988 SECURITY SQUADRON

TOP SECRET
CONTAINS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
SPECIAL HISTORY OF THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

23 January – 1 March

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., Section 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Prepared by
MSgt Joseph L. Dean
&
Sgt Le Baron Anderson

CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAP OF KOREA--USS PUEBLO CAPTURE ........................................... V
Route 25x6 ..................................................................................... VI

I. THE PUEBLO INCIDENT ................................................................. 1
  Project 53M2A8 ............................................................................. 2

II. MISSION TASKING ......................................................................... 6

III. COMMANDO ROYAL RESPONSE ................................................ 24
  Crew Alert .................................................................................... 24
  Mission Scheduling ...................................................................... 25
  Commando Royal Operations Terminated ....................................... 25
  Commando Royal Missions Resumed ............................................. 26
  Emergency KorCom Coverage Implemented .................................. 27
  Personnel ..................................................................................... 29

IV. ROUTES ..................................................................................... 32
  25x6 .............................................................................................. 32
  32 ............................................................................................... 35

V. FIGHTER COVER .......................................................................... 37

VI. 25x6 OPERATION ESTABLISHED ................................................. 39
    Mission Status ............................................................................ 40

VII. PERSONNEL ................................................................................ 43
    Logistics .................................................................................... 43
    Equipment ................................................................................ 44
    Transportation .......................................................................... 45

VIII. HOT ROD COURIER SERVICE ................................................ 50

IX. DIRECT SIGINT SUPPORT .......................................................... 52
    Commando Royal Mission Results Summary ................................ 53
    Commando Smg Coordination .................................................... 53
    Border Violation Reports (BOCOVIRs) ....................................... 54
    Tactical Reports (TACREPs) ....................................................... 55
    SIGINT Information to Specific PACCOM Commands ................. 56

X. COLLECTION AND PROCESSING .................................................. 57
    Commando Royal Transportation and Tapes 25x6 ....................... 57
    Transmission Security (TRANSEC) .............................................. 57
    Post Mission Flight Reports (PMFR) .......................................... 57
**CONFIDENTIAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XI. SIGNIFICANT INTERCEPTS</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. RELATED ITEMS OF INTEREST</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. SUMMARY</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL CONTROL</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS ORDER</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTRIBUTION</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAP OF KOREA - USS PUEBLO CAPTURE

LEGEND:
ACRP AIRCRAFT  —  USS PUEBLO  —
"REACTING FIGHTERS"  —  N KOREAN SUN BOATS
THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

(SEC) THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE NORTH KOREAN SEIZURE OF THE USS PUEBLO AS REPORTED IN FOLLOW-UP NUMBER 6 TO CRITIC 1-68. THE USS PUEBLO, WHILE CONDUCTING ROUTINE OPERATIONS OFF NORTH KOREA, ENCOUNTERED ONE 50-1 CLASS NORTH KOREAN PATROL CRAFT AT 230300Z, POSITION 3925N-12755E DWN (DEAD IN WATER). 50-1 PENDANT NUMBER (PN) 35 APPROACHED THE USS PUEBLO AND CIRCLED ONCE. ON THE SECOND TRIP AROUND, PN 35 HOISTED FLAG CODE REQUESTING NATIONALITY. THE PUEBLO ANSWERED BY HOISTING US ENSIGN AND THEN THE FLAG CODE MEANING "HYDROGRAPHER." ON THE THIRD SWING, 50-1 HOISTED FLAG CODE MEANING "HEAVE-TO OR I WILL OPEN FIRE ON YOU." THE PUEBLO ANSWERED, "I AM IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS." THE 50-1 CONTINUED TO CIRCLE THE PUEBLO. THE PUEBLO INTENDED TO REMAIN IN THE OPERATING AREA IF CONSIDERED FEASIBLE, OTHERWISE TO WITHDRAW. AT 230400Z 50-1 PN 35 WAS JOINED BY THREE OTHER CRAFT. THE USS PUEBLO WAS REQUESTED TO FOLLOW. TWO MIG AIRCRAFT THEN APPEARED AND BEGAN TO CIRCLE THE PUEBLO. THE NORTH KOREAN PATROL CRAFT THEN BACKED TOWARD THE BOW OF THE PUEBLO AND ATTEMPTED TO BOARD WITH ARMED LANDING PARTY. THE PUEBLO PULLED AHEAD ONE THIRD, ATTEMPTING TO DEPART THE AREA. AT APPROXIMATELY
230428Z, position 3912N-12821E, the USS Pueblo reported North Koreans were planning to open fire on her. A few minutes later she reported that boarding had commenced and sent SOS. Emergency destruction of classified material was underway. She reported that she was "destroying all crypto key lists and as much elec equip as possible." The Pueblo reported that four men sustained injuries, one critically.

SCW: From information received, it appeared that the USS Pueblo did not use any weapons in her defense. At approximately 230532Z the Pueblo was directed to stop and reported she was being boarded. This was the second time the Pueblo reported being boarded. It is possible she was not boarded until 0532Z after coming to a full stop. An alternate possibility is that North Koreans entered secure spaces at this time.

SCW: Communications with USS Pueblo ceased at 230532Z.

Project 53M2A8

SCW: Fortuitous scheduling and an unexpected maintenance problem which delayed the scheduled take-off resulted in Commando Royal Project 53M2A8 orbiting on route between 3900N-12949E and 4130N-13148E off the East Coast of North Korea at the time of the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo.
(SW) The Commando Royal aircraft was located approximately 110 NM east of the Pueblo at 0501Z when North Korean Naval communications were detected on 132.00 Mcs. Intercept of the activity was continued until 0529Z. The Commando Royal mission then advised 25x1 via URC-53 system that significant intercept had been obtained. 25x1 Immediately flashed the following report received from the Commando Royal mission to NSAPAC Rep Korea: quote, have probable "hot stuff" intercepted on KorCom Naval frequency 132.00 Mcs. Taken btw 0501Z-0529Z. If want courier to 25x1 upon our recovery, pls advise 25x1 Will recover at approx 0640Z. unquote. 2

(TSCW) Almost simultaneous with the detection of the KorCom Naval activity, an external condition five was received by Commando Royal Project 53M2A8, 25x1 (Osan, Korea) had intercepted North Korean radar tracking of KorCom fighters initially reported at 3912N-12723E at 0448Z. Subsequent tracking data reflected the fighters on an intercept course with the Commando Royal aircraft. At 0501Z the KorCom fighters were reported at 3942N-12958E while Project 53M2A8 was located at approximately 3938N-13018E resulting in a condition five being generated by 25x1 a Condition Five (in this case indication of KorCom fighters within 50 NM of the mission aircraft) is a mandatory abort condition. The condition
was received by the Commando Royal aircraft at 0530Z and the mission was immediately aborted. The air defense net being monitored by the Commando Royal internal warning operator at no time had reflected the KorCom fighters which generated the external condition Five.

(SCW) Project 53M2A8 recovered at 0645Z. It was soon recognized that we would not be able to provide the high quality transcript of the KorCom naval activity which the situation demanded. The 347 Tactical Fighter Wing was contacted to provide "hot-rod" delivery of the intercept to 25x1 however, NSAPAC Office Japan called and advised that they would bring one of their Korean linguists to this station to assist in transcription. Hot-rod delivery was, therefore, delayed. Hot-rod service, however, was again requested when the NSAPAC linguist also determined that he would be unable to provide a high quality transcript of the activity. Hot-rod service was immediately provided and the intercept was delivered to 25x1 Korea at approximately 1400Z.

(SCW) At 231745Z, 25x1 issued the following report derived from the Commando Royal KorCom naval intercept:

Reflected of the capture of a US vessel by KorCom naval vessels have been identified in COMINT between 230501Z - 0529Z JAN 68. An unidentified personality at possible Wonsan naval base instructed an unidentified North Korean Naval (NKN) vessel(s) that one of their
CREWS WAS TO IMMEDIATELY BOARD THE (SAID BOAT) SO THAT IT COULD BE BROUGHT TO PORT. THE NKN VESSEL REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO BOARD THE BOAT, BUT THE BOAT WOULD BE BROUGHT TO PORT. THE PROBABLY WONSEN NAVAL BASE THEN INSTRUCTED THE NAVAL VESSELS TO MANEUVER ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE BOAT AND PULL IT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE NAVAL VESSELS WERE ALSO TOLD TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE BOAT BY HAND SIGNALS. SUBSEQUENTLY, AN UNIDENTIFIED NKN VESSEL REPORTED THAT IT WAS INCREASING SPEED TO CATCH UP WITH THE BOAT WHICH WAS ALSO INCREASING SPEED. ANOTHER NKN VESSEL THEN REPORTED THAT THE BOAT WOULD HAVE TO BE WATCHED CAREFULLY TO SEE IF ANYTHING WAS THROWN OVERBOARD. LATER, PROBABLE WONSEN NAVAL BASE QUERIED IF AN NKN VESSEL COULD GET CLOSE ENOUGH TO SEND A BOARDING PARTY OF ARMED PERSONNEL ON THE US BOAT. WONSEN NAVAL BASE THEN RECEIVED A REPORT THAT US PERSONNEL ON THE BOAT WERE BURNING THINGS ABOARD THEIR BOAT AND THROWING UNIDENTIFIED OBJECTS INTO THE SEA.

COMMENTS: THE ABOVE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THE US VESSEL HAD NOT BEEN BOARDED AS OF 230529Z JAN 68

(SEC) ONE AREA OF VITAL CONCERN REMAINED TO BE ANSWERED -

HOW DID THE KORCOM FIGHTERS EFFECT A SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPT OF THE COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION WITH ABSOLUTELY NO REFLECTION, VOICE OR AIR DEFENSE TRACKING, OBTAINED BY THE MISSION AIRCRAFT. THIS WAS RESOLVED ON 28 JANUARY WHEN THE FOLLOWING REPORT AS A FINAL WRAP-UP TO THEIR RECON REACTION REPORT ON PROJECT 53M2A8:

FURTHER ANALYSIS HAS REVEALED THAT THE KORCOM FIGHTER REACTION TO THIS MISSION WAS SIMULATED AND NOT AN ACTUAL REACTION AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. A STUDY OF ALL ASPECTS OF THIS ACTIVITY INDICATES THAT THE EAST COAST FILTER CENTER SIMULATED THE AIR SURVEILLANCE REFLECTIONS OF KORCOM FIGHTERS REACTING TO THE ACRP MISSION DURING THE TIME FRAME OF THE KORCOM ATTACK/ CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO.
MISSION TASKING

(NUSW) Numerous tasking instructions and proposal were passed within and between all echelons of command during the initial reaction to the Pueblo incident. The following chronology recaps the various tasking instructions received. Times indicated are CAGE time groups of pertinent messages unless otherwise indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE-TIME</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>230550Z (JANUARY)</td>
<td>Report received from NSAPAC Office Japan that USS Pueblo being taken to Wonsan under escort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230600Z</td>
<td>NSAPAC Office Japan contacted Operations Officer by telephone to advise him to stand-by for important message of immediate significance. This was in reference to DTG 230550Z.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230653Z</td>
<td>NSAPAC Office Japan requested continued coverage of the Pueblo situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231005Z</td>
<td>DIRNSA stated requirement to JCS for continuous orbit coverage effective immediately with drop-off of mission materials at Korea to expedite processing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231058Z</td>
<td>ADMINO CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF that Route 5G3222 was to be flown on as near continuous basis as possible with other Commando Royal missions cancelled as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231238Z</td>
<td>PACAF advised 5 Air Force to take ADMINO CINCPAC 231058Z for action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19: MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-2
WE ADVISED USAFSS AND PACSSTRN that we were prepared to launch next mission at 1500Z; however, 5th Air Force had instructed 6091 RECON Sq not to launch any missions until specifically authorized.

RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM USAFSS (TAD) QUERYING STATUS OF AG-118 PORTABLE TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS. THE FIVE AG-118s ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT WERE ON LOAN AS FOLLOWS: ONE TO PROJECT 231615Z AND FOUR TO 6924 SOT SQ.

USAFSS ADVISED DNCNSA THAT A COMMANDO ROYAL AIRCRAFT WAS CURRENTLY ON ORBIT (PROJECT 53T1A8) AND INDICATED JCS/JRC WAS CONSIDERING USE OF FIGHTER CAP FOR THIS PARTICULAR ORBIT. WE WERE ADVISED TO ENSURE NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN TO LAUNCH ADDITIONAL MISSIONS OTHER THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED AND APPROVED UNTIL AUTHORITY WAS GRANTED BY JCS AND TO ENSURE THAT NO DROP OFF OF MISSION MATERIALS WAS MADE AT KOREA UNTIL FURTHER DIRECTED. USAFSS ALSO STATED PREFERENCE FOR RECOVERY OF MISSION AIRCRAFT AT VICE OSAK DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TRANSCRIPTION FACILITIES AT THE LATTER BASE.

NSAPAC REP KOREA TASKED WITH TRANSCRIPTION OF ACRP TAKE-DROPPED OFF AT OSAN AND REQUESTED ACTION BE INITIATED TO IMPLEMENT ACRP PROGRAM SOON-EST.

WE ADVISED USAFSS AND PACSSTRN THAT A MISSION (PROJECT 53N5A8) HAD BEEN LAUNCHED TO RELIEVE PROJECT 53T1A8 TO ENSURE CONTINUING COVERAGE AND THAT THIS MISSION WAS COMMITTED TO STOP OFF AT OSAN BECAUSE OF FUEL REQUIREMENTS. IN VIEW OF USAFSS 231545Z, WE ASKED IF SUBJECT MISSIONS SHOULD BE RECALLED AND IF PLANNED DROP-OFF AT OSAN BY PROJECT 53T1A8 SHOULD BE CANCELLED.
PACSTORYGN 232028Z quoted ADM: NO CINCPAC 231935Z which cancelled tasking contained in ADM: NO CINCPAC 231058Z and directed recall of Commando Royal Mission currently airborne on track (Project 53N5A8) and termination of all Commando Royal Operations until further notice.16

NOT BEING IN RECEIPT OF ADM: NO CINCPAC 231935Z, WE QUERIED STATUS OF OUR 231705Z AND INFORMED USAFSS THAT A MISSION WAS SCHEDULED FOR A 232230Z LAUNCH.17

CINCPAC directed recall of all peripheral reconnaissance flights in the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, or over Korea with stand-down of recon flights into these area until further advised and pending decision concerning fighter escort.18

DIRNSA stated their minimum requirement for ACRP coverage to JCS as one ten hour sortie per day during daylight hours on Orbit flying legs Bravo-Bravo thru Bravo-Delta (3900N-12949E thru 3715N-12600E) with take-off from At approximately 0600 local and recovery of missions at VI-CE Oshen.19

DIRNSA advised USAFSS that JCS had authorized launch of Project 53N5A8 which departed at 231630Z with requirement that the aircraft depart the orbit area by daybreak if no fighter cap provided.20

PACSTORYGN advised that the recall of the Commando Royal missions was due to the highly vulnerable position of mission aircraft without fighter cap and indicated that Commando Royal missions would be implemented with fighter cap in the near future.21

WE QUERIED PACSTORYGN if consideration had been given to flying Commando Royal Route with mission aircraft holding over South Korean Land.22
MASS BETWEEN POINT BC-BO (3742N-12917E THRU 3715N-12600E). FROM THIS LOCATION WONSAN AND PYONGYANG AREAS WOULD BE WITHIN INTERCEPT RANGE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THE MISSION AIRCRAFT COULD REMAIN OVER FRIENDLY TERRITORY. THIS WAS PRESENTED AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO A COMPLETE STAND-DOWN OF COMMANDO ROYAL PENDING RESOLUTION OF DIRNSA REQUIREMENT STATED IN THEIR 232100Z AND FIGHTER CAP REQUIREMENT.22

240515Z

DIRNSA 241956Z QUOTED JCS MESSAGE TO CINCPAC AUTHORIZING RESUMPTION OF COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS WITH EXCEPTION OF ROUTE .

241529Z

WE ADVISED USAFSS AND PACSCTYRGN THAT 24 HOUR CREW ALERT WAS BEING MAINTAINED. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PLANNING AND COORDINATION WITH 6091 RECON SQ. WE REQUESTED ESTIMATE OF PROBABLE TASKING.24

242015Z

USAFASS ADVISED THAT JCS HAD INFORMED CINCPAC TO RESUME COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS WITH EXCEPTION OF ORBIT 5C3222 AND REQUESTED PACSCTYRGN TO TAKE ACTION TO DETERMINE WHAT ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN TOWARDS RESUMPTION OF COMMANDO ROYAL.25

242025Z

PACSCTYRGN RETRANSMITTED ADMINO CINCPAC 241625Z TO THIS UNIT WHICH STATED CINCPAC 232046Z RECALLING ALL PARPRO FLIGHTS WAS CANCELLED. APPROVED PARPRO SCHEDULE WAS TO BE RESUMED WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT ROUTE WAS NOT TO BE EXECUTED UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED. SUBJECT MESSAGE ALSO DIRECTED DEVIATION FROM STANDARD TRACK AS APPROPRIATE TO COMPLY WITH ADMINO CINCPAC 240840Z.26

242330Z

PACSCTYRGN RETRANSMITTED ADMINO CINCPAC 240340Z TO THIS UNIT. SUBJECT MESSAGE DIRECTED AIRBORNE UNITS TO REMAIN OUTSIDE OF THE AREA WITHIN 50 FLM OF THE COAST OF NORTH KOREA NORTH OF A LINE EXTENDING EAST FROM THE DMZ.27
PacSctyRgn requested USAFSS to provide further guidance re specific orbit requirements in view of conflict between DIRNSA tasking (NSA 232100Z) and CINCPAC tasking (PSR 242025Z). Pending receipt of further guidance PacSctyRgn requested that we initiate action to schedule and implement daily missions on Route 25x1 in accordance with proposals outlined in our 240430Z.

251745Z

JCS requested CINCPAC to initiate 24 hour per day ACRP coverage of the East Coast and DMZ area of North Korea. Fighter escort for all flights was directed. Commando Royal was restricted to flying only that portion of track between point Bravo-Bravo (3900N-12949E) and Bravo-Delta (3715N-12600E).

252010Z

In response to JCS tasking requiring 24 hour coverage, USAFSS presented several alternatives which included flying 25x1 missions or flying mission from 25x1 to 25x1. The final alternative, and the one considered to provide the most satisfactory solution, was to stage all missions from 25x1 USAFSS requested PacSctyRgn to "give every consideration possible to establishing this operation as soon as possible thru coordination with PACAF."

252131Z

USAFSS concurred with 6988 SctySq 251941Z which proposed suspension of all other Commando Royal flight activity effective immediately due to 24 hour coverage requirement.

252220Z

We advised PacSctyRgn that crews had been alerted to commence 25x1 coverage as soon as operating procedures clarified. We anticipated approximately 50 personnel would be required to establish operation out of 25x1 in accordance with USAFSS 252010Z.

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19: MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-2
JCS advised CINCPAC that due to operational considerations 24 hour ACRP operation directed in their 251745Z was amended to provide for ACRP flights only during daylight hours. Requirement for fighter escort of all ACRP flights flown in area of Korea at all times was reiterated.

USAFSS again stated that collection and processing of the KorCom ACRP missions required staging from 25x1 and requested PACStcyRgn to coordinate with PACAF to establish the operation. USAFSS also requested action be taken as necessary to provide with supplementary transcribe positions.

PacStcyRgn recommended establishment of ACRP operation out of 25x1 be delayed with immediate plans geared toward a operation with hot-rod service to 25x1. They expected requirement stated in JCS 252235Z would require two sorties per day.

We advised PacStcyRgn that 6091 Recon Sq had cancelled orbit mission scheduled for 252100Z. Take-off and that no missions were now scheduled to provide KorCom coverage. 6091 Recon Sq had been directed by 5 Air Force to launch no missions unless specifically directed by that Headquarters. We were not aware of any reasons or authority for this hold on missions and requested PacStcyRgn advise of status.

CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF to commence immediate Commando Royal flights on track and modified as follows: straight line from 3715N-12600E to 3742N-12917E to 3900N-12949E (points Bravo-Delta, Bravo-Charlie, Bravo-Bravo, respectively). Commando Royal was not to fly north of 3900N-12949E. This route was to be flown on as nearly a continuous basis as possible, during daylight hours only, with fighter escort.
REQUIRED ON ENTIRE TRACK. AT THE SAME CINCPAC REQUESTED JCS AUTHORIZE DEPLOYMENT OF COMMANDO ROYAL TO KOREA. 37

260624Z

BEING IN RECEIPT OF CINCPAC 260436Z WE WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND ABSENCE OF ACTION BY 6091 Recon Sq/5 Air Force To PLAN FOR LAUNCH OF SPECIAL MISSIONS. AT THE TIME OF THIS MESSAGE 6091 Recon Sq WAS PLANNING FIRST MISSION TO BE LAUNCHED AT 261815Z. WE QUERIED PACSCTYRGN IF THEY WERE AWARE OF WHAT FACTORS WERE CAUSING THIS FAILURE TO REACT TO WHAT APPEARED TO BE CLEAR TASKING. 38

260730Z

PACSCTYRGN STATED THAT PACAF HAD ADVISED THAT DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ACRP SCHEDULE WAS DUE TO NECESSITY TO COORDINATE FIGHTER ESCORT REQUIREMENT AND THAT PACAF WAS WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME PACSCTYRGN ADVISED THAT THEY WOULD MOVE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF OSAAN OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE, ACRP OPERATIONS WERE TO CONTINUE UNTIL FINAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE FOR STAGING. 39

262040Z

CINCPACAF DIRECTED 5 AIR FORCE TO TAKE ACTION TO IMMEDIATELY COMMENCE COMMANDO ROYAL FLIGHTS ON TRACK AS MODIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CINCPAC 260346Z. FIFTH AIR FORCE WAS ADVISED TO RESTRICT LENGTH OF MISSION TO TIME OF FIGHTER ESCORT AVAILABILITY. 40

270140Z

PACSCTYRGN ADVISED THAT MEETING AT CINCPAC JRC HAD CONFIRMED THAT LACK OF FIGHTERS WAS PRIMARY REASON FOR HOLD ON COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION IN KOREAN AREA. FURTHER, JCS HAD EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS TO FLY ROUTE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS WHILE FLYING OVER LAND WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT. SINCE REQUIREMENT WAS FOR DAYLIGHT COVERAGE, THIS CONCESSION PROVIDED NO IMPROVEMENT IN COMMANDO
ROYAL MISSION HOLD. CINCPAC JRC INDICATED THEY WOULD REQUEST JCS TO ESTABLISH A ROUTE SOUTH OF THE DMZ ON WHICH COMMANDO ROYAL COULD FLY WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT IN ORDER TO SATISFY DAYLIGHT COVERAGE REQUIREMENT. PACSCTYRGN FURTHER ADVISED THAT UPON RECEIPT OF FORMAL JCS AUTHORIZATION FOR OPERATION, IT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS CONDITIONS ALLOWED. IN THE MEANTIME, COMMANDO ROYAL WAS TO CONTINUE STAGING OUT OF YOKOTA WITHIN THE FIGHTER ESCORT LIMITATIONS OUTLINED IN CINCPACAF 262040Z.

CINCPAC ADVISED CINCPACAF THAT JCS 270044Z MODIFIED CINCPAC 260346Z ESCORT REQUIREMENT AS FOLLOWS:

A. ALL COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS TO HAVE PROTECTIVE COVER BY EITHER FIGHTER ESCORT OR COMBAT AIR PATROL DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.

B. MISSIONS AUTHORIZED DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT OR COMBAT AIR PATROL PROVIDED:

(1) MISSION AIRCRAFT COVERED BY FIGHTERS ON STRIP ALERT.

(2) MISSION AIRCRAFT REMAIN AT LEAST 25 NM SOUTH OF DMZ AND REMAIN OVER THE KOREAN LANDMASS.

(3) ENTRANCE TO AND EXIT FROM THE ORBIT IS ACCOMPLISHED FROM/TO THE SOUTH.

(4) TRACKS MAY BE MODIFIED TO REMAIN 25 NM SOUTH OF DMZ WHILE OVER KOREAN LANDMASS. OVER WATER PORTION OF THESE TRACKS TO REMAIN UNCHANGED.

WE ADVISED PACSCTYRGN THAT 6031 RECON SQ WAS PREPARED TO FLY NIGHT MISSION ON THIS DATE AS RESULT OF AUTHORIZATION.
TO FLY DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS; HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF DAYLIGHT TASKING ONLY WE PROPOSED TO HOLD FOR DAYLIGHT COVERAGE.43

270858Z 
PacSctyRgn concurred with proposal outlined in our 270553Z to take no action to fly other than daylight hours.44

270930Z 
PACAF directed 5 Air Force to take CINCPAC 270413Z for action with exception that over water portions of CINCPAC 250413Z over Water Port 1.0ns of would be as modified by CINCPAC 260346Z. Over water portion of the western leg of Track 5C3222.45

271517Z 
Advised PacSctyRgn that 6091 Recon Sq had concurred with our proposal to launch three mission a day to provide 20 to 21 hours of coverage as follows: one mission launched at 1400Z with one to follow at 2000Z and one at 280200Z. Next mission then programmed for 281800Z take-off followed by launches at seven hour intervals through 0800Z each day. This proposed schedule, although agreed upon by 6091 Recon Sq, had not been verified by 5 Air Force; therefore, we requested PacSctyRgn to secure PACAF approval to ensure schedule could be met. This action was considered necessary in view of past reluctance by 5 Air Force to respond to tasking requirements received by this unit which were not addressed to them.46

280110Z 
PacSctyRgn advised that PACAF supported schedule as outlined in our 271517Z and would advise 5 Air Force via telcon. PACAF had also agreed that formulation of schedule should be primarily based upon requirements received by this unit.47

280114Z 
PacSctyRgn retransmitted following messages to 6988 Scty Sq: JCS 270034Z,
USAFSS TDC 270458Z and TAD 270307Z.
The JCS Message contained those instructions previously received in CINCPAC 270413Z. USAFSS 270458Z indicated subject JCS instructions would not provide maximum utilization of ACRP resources and urged reclamation on JCS decision to ensure that staging from 25x1 with a full launch, recovery and processing contingent be established. USAFSS TAD 270307Z provided alternative concept of operations including:

A. Operation Strictly from 25x1
B. Operation from 25x1 and
C. Operation from 25x1 and

Preference was for full launch, recovery and processing capability at 25x1 provided for in concept B and C which was fully endorsed by DIRNSA.48

280337Z
CINCPAC went to JCS indicating that operation was desired for most effective Korean ACRP collection. CINCPAC requested authority to deploy four C-130 aircraft to 25x1 to meet 24 hour collection requirement or two C-130s to meet twelve hour requirement. Until further advised CINCPAC stated that, during hours of darkness, only the overland portion of modified track authorized with mission to be covered by fighters on strip alert. During daylight hours all missions on modified track to have either fighter escort or 25x1.

280640Z
Fifth Air Force advised they were implementing a three mission per day schedule which would provide orbit times as follows:

281800Z thru 2400Z
290100Z thru 0700Z
FIFTH AIR FORCE INDICATED THEY WOULD CONTINUE THIS SCHEDULE INDEFINITELY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AIRCREW AND AIRFRAME CAPABILITY.

DIRNSA WENT TO JCS RE CINCPAC 280337Z AND NSA 231200Z RESTATING REQUIREMENT FOR NORTH KOREAN COVERAGE ONLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS WITH ACFT STAGING FROM 290800Z THRU 1400Z (REPEAT EACH 24 HOURS).

DIRNSA REQUESTED ACTION BE TAKEN TO DEPLOY ACRP AIRCRAFT FROM OSAN FOR FLIGHTS ON MODIFIED ORBIT WITH AIRBORNE COVERAGE CONFINED TO DAYLIGHT HOURS (APPROXIMATELY 10 HOURS). ALL REMAINING AIRCRAFT TIME WAS TO BE APPLIED EQUALLY AGAINST ORBITS.

PacSctyRgn stated that until JCS approval for staging out of received, the drop-off was to be discontinued with KORCOM coverage continuing with missions. Further, PacSctyRgn directed that we fly minimum number of missions needed to provide daylight only orbit time. We were requested to establish schedule with 6091 Recon Sq along above lines.

We advised PacSctyRgn that 6091 Recon Sq and 5 Air Force had refused to change established schedule. 6091 Recon Sq advised that PACAF and 5 Air Force was considered to be their scheduling authority and they would respond only to tasking received from them. We, therefore, advised PacSctyRgn that we would man scheduled missions until this problem was resolved.

We advised PacSctyRgn that the drop-off of mission materials was accomplished in conjunction with refueling stop which thereby eliminated...
The requirement for hot-rod service. We further advised that we would attempt to implement two missions per day schedule. We anticipated, however, that instruction to 5 Air Force from PACAF channels would be essential if two per day schedule was to be established.

PacSyRgn concurred with action to man scheduled missions and indicated that problem would be resolved with PACAF at earliest opportunity.

PacSyRgn indicated scheduling conflict indicated in our 250300Z was discussed with PACAF and that PACAF had agreed that schedule was to be based on SIGINT collection requirements levied on 6988 ScTY Sq in concert with airframe availability. PacSyRgn also advised there was a JCS message 291633Z that authorized two aircraft to stage from 20x1 to fly ten hour orbit during daylight hours only. We were directed to take no action on this item until advised thru normal channels on implementation.

PACAF advised 5 Air Force that CINCPAC had received clearance and authority to deploy two Commando Royal C-130 aircraft to 25x1.

We provided PacSyRgn with CONOP for staging and at the same time advised that the two missions scheduled for 1 February would remain in place at 25x1. Also, 5 Air Force had indicated they desired coverage earlier than the daylight hours and would seek to have the ten hour requirement increased. This would require two missions per day from 25x1 vice the one mission presently planned.

We advised PacSyRgn that 6092 Recon Sq intended to recover 2 February mission.
PACScyRgn advised we were authorized to stage Commando Royal operations out of 310025Z.60

PACScyRgn concurred with our 310310Z and requested to impress upon 5 Air Force the need to conserve airframe hours to fulfill collection requirements against 25x1 targets. We were requested to advise 5 Air Force that, if they intended to pursue collection outside of the authorized daytime coverage, that they should submit requirement to PACAF for validation and forwarding to CINCPAC for submission to DIRNSA for validation and tasking.

USAFSS outlined impact of 5 Air Force proposal for two missions daily out of 62.

The 6091 Recon Sq provided following Condition Four exception for 5C3222M enter 3730N-12700E, exit 3750N-12855E then return, enter 3750N-12855E, exit 3730N-12700E and then return same route as appropriate.

PacScyRgn requested we determine 6091 Recon Sq plans to continue as result of planned Osan deployment.

We advised that 6091 Recon Sq had terminated maintenance support at and moved it to to support deployment there. As a result of their inability to support further deployments we advised that we were planning on flying a modified route normally.

We submitted revised schedule including provision to fly route.
TOP SECRET

PacSctyRgn queried scheduling of mission for 9.5 hours on 2 February vice full ten hours. 67

USAFSS advised that modified orbit unsatisfactory and requested either route be used with entry Bravo-Golf and Bravo-Foxtrot respectively. 68

We advised USAFSS that would not be flown in accordance with 031446Z.

We advised PacSctyRgn that 6091 Recon So desired all missions to be flown on modified orbit to be scheduled for 9.5 hours. We had stated requirement for ten hour missions; however, 6091 Recon Sq indicated they would submit schedule to 5 Air Force for 9.5 hours. 69

PACAF advised that 5 Air Force advon concerned that any hostile action on part of KorComs would probably occur during first light in the morning or last light just prior to dark. They, therefore, requested CINCPAC to take immediate action to change Commado Royal schedule on to accommodate tactical requirement for on orbit coverage a minimum of two hours prior to dawn and minimum two hours prior to and thru last light each day. 70
090325Z  PacSctyRgn requested we provide concept to support requirement stated in PACAF 082115Z with minimum impact on other Orbit requirements.  

090411Z  CINCPAC requested CINCPAC to provide concept of operation for implementation of plan to provide coverage requested in PACAF 082115Z.  

090757Z  We advised PacSctyRgn that two KorCom missions daily would allow for maximum of ten missions to be used to cover other orbit requirements.  

100335Z  PacSctyRgn outlined options to satisfy PACAF 082115Z which included:  

A. Two five hour sorties daily from 23hr to cover dawn and dusk requirement. This would satisfy the tactical requirement and partially satisfy the NSA requirement of approximately ten hours per day.  

B. Cover both PACAF requirement and NSA ten hour daylight coverage with one ten hour and one five hour sortie per day.  

C. Two ten hour missions per day.  

D. Variations of options B and C above to include portions of route to permit the remaining air-frame/crew availability to meet other outstanding national requirements.  

102235Z  PacSctyRgn advised USAFSS that option Alpha contained in their 100336Z appeared to be best CONOP to satisfy PACAF requirement with minimum impact on NSA requirement and current resources and that this unit would be directed to implement option Alpha upon CINCPAC validation of PACAF requirement.  

102317  AFSSO PACAF provided following CONOP
FOR MINIMUM COMMANDO ROYAL COVERAGE OF TWO HOURS PRIOR TO DAWN AND TWO HOURS PRIOR AND THROUGH LAST LIGHT EACH DAY. PACAF PROPOSED TO LAUNCH TWO SORTIES PER DAY WITH EACH PROVIDING FIVE HOURS ON ORBIT FOR DAILY TOTAL OF TEN HOURS. THE MORNING SORTIES WILL BE LAUNCHED TO BE ON ORBIT TWO HOURS PRIOR TO DAYLIGHT FOR TOTAL OF FIVE HOURS WHILE THE AFTERNOON SORTIE WOULD BE ON ORBIT FOR FIVE HOURS TO INCLUDE COVERAGE THROUGH LAST LIGHT. PACAF FURTHER STATED BOTH FRONT AND BACK END CREWS WERE ADEQUATE FOR TASK AND COULD IMPLEMENT THESE REQUIREMENTS IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF APPROVAL.76

110741Z
WE PROPOSED THAT PACAF/CINCPAC REQUIREMENT FOR COVERAGE TWO HOURS BEFORE DAYBREAK AND TWO HOURS AFTER SUNSET COULD BE SATISFIED WHILE AT THE SAME TIME FULFILLING DIRNSA REQUIREMENT FOR TEN HOURS OF DAILY COVERAGE ON ORBIT BY LAUNCHING MISSIONS ON ROUTE TO ARRIVE ON STATION AT POINT BRAVO-CHARLIE TWO HOURS BEFORE DAYBREAK LOITERING BETWEEN BRAVO-BRAVO AND BRAVO-CHARLIE UNTIL AFTER DAYBREAK AT WHICH TIME IT WOULD PROCEED NORTH TO POINTS ALPHA-LIMA AND ALPHA-MIKE. AN MISSION THEN TO BE LAUNCHED ON FOR A TEN HOURS SORTIE TO PROVIDE THE TEN HOUR COVERAGE TO INCLUDE TWO HOURS AFTER SUNSET.77

111925Z
CINCPAC TO JCS RECOMMENDING APPROVAL OF PACAF 082115Z AND PACAF 102317Z.78

120239Z
PacStyrRgn ADVISED THAT PACAF 102317Z MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN PROPOSAL OUTLINED IN OUR 110741Z AND REQUESTED ACTION OUTLINED BY PACAF BE ACCOMPLISHED UPON RECEIPT OF AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT BY 5TH AIR FORCE.79

130150Z
CINCPAC APPROVED PACAF 082115 AND 102317.80
132110Z
AFSSO PACAF informed 5 Air Force of CINCPAC approval of PACAF 102317Z and requested 5 Air Force to initiate coverage as requested.

140215Z
AFSSO 5 Air Force stated operational control of Commando Royal operation on rests with Fifth Air Force ADVON.

On 12 February, 6091 Recon Sq indicated that Commando Royal would fly overland portion of primary route during times when fighter cap not available providing strip alert available in support of Commando Royal missions and further stated that if strip alert is not available, mission aircraft to abort. Fifth Air Force ADVON in response to this message advised that escort or cap was to be provided during all portions of Commando Royal route of flight during daylight hours and further that Fifth Air Force ADVON or higher authority reserved the authority to change this mission. (Det 1, 6922 Scty Sq 130845Z)

160605Z
We advised that PACAF 102317Z CONOP was implemented 16 February and advised USAFSS that delay in implementation was due to 5 Air Force/6091 Recon Sq delay in implementing the new schedule.

200230Z
Quoted 5 Air Force ADVON do:

170720Z:

Commando Royal aircraft will fly route between 3900N-12949E, 3742N-12917E, 3742N-12900E, 3756N-12848E, 3712N-12648E, and 3710N-12600E under these conditions: Popeye, night, and non-Popeye during daylight with fighter escort. Popeye is defined as in clouds, in and out of the clouds every 13 seconds, or in visibility of less than one mile.

Commando Royal aircraft will fly route between 3702N-12917E to 3635N-12600E.
DURING NON-POPEYE DURING DAYLIGHT WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT, REPEAT WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT. GP-3 END QUOTE.

THIS ROUTE WAS INITIATED WITH COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT 25x1 ON 20 FEBRUARY 84.

ADMINO CINCPAC ADVISED THAT AIR FORCE REQUEST TO ASSIGN A NEW TRACK NUMBER TO THE MODIFIED 25x1 ORBIT HAS BEEN APPROVED BY JCS 192012Z AND THAT THE 25x1 HAD BEEN ASSIGNED NUMBER 25x1 NEW ROUTE NUMBER WAS AUTHORIZED TO BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY.
CHAPTER III
COMMANDO ROYAL RESPONSE

(SCW) The 6988 Scty Sq response to the USS Pueblo capture and the subsequent KorCom emergency tasking was essentially a "two-phase" action. The first phase covers the period 23 January to 1 February during which time Commando Royal missions continued to be staged from Yokota. The second phase, the Operation, began on 1 February when Commando Royal C-130B aircraft and crews were deployed to Korea to provide required KorCom coverage.

(C) The following is a summary of the "first-phase" reaction to the Pueblo Incident.

Crew Alert

(SCW) Immediately upon receipt of a message reporting that "the Pueblo being taken to Wonsan under escort," action was taken to form and alert crews in anticipation of emergency ACRP tasking. All airborne operators were placed on alert and two crews were alerted to prepare for immediate launch. In order to ensure positive control and to minimize confusion, an Operations Control Center was established to coordinate all crew scheduling and to review all messages pertaining to the Pueblo Incident. The Control Center was manned by an officer or senior noncommissioned officer on a 24 hour basis until 1 February.
MISSION SCHEDULING

(SCW) Coordination with 6091 Reconnaissance Squadron was effected to provide a mission to fly Route 25x1 upon recovery of Project 53M2A8 which was returning from orbit due to a Condition Five. Immediate action included the rescheduling of Project 53T1A8 (originally programmed for Route 503222 on 30 January) for a 230830Z take-off. This mission was launched at 0912Z and remained on-watch from 231134 to 231829Z. In addition, action was taken to add the following projects to the schedule to fly Route 25x1: 53N5A8, take-off 231630Z; 53N6A8, take-off 232230Z; 25x1, take-off 240430Z. Project 53N5A8 was launched as scheduled at 1630Z and, as did Project 53T1A8, landed at 25x1 Korea to drop-off KorCom intercept.

COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS TERMINATED

(SCW) On 24 January, CINCPAC recalled Project 53N5A8 on Route 25x1 as well as Project 53N4A8 on Route 25x1 due to directive to terminate all Commando Royal operations until further notice. 13/15/16/18/20/21 A result of the directed stand-down, the following missions were cancelled: 53N2A8, take-off 232100Z, Route 25x1, take-off 240900Z, Route 25x1; Project 5301A8, take-off 242100Z, Route 25x1 and Project 5302A8, take-off 242200Z, Route 25x1. In addition, the scheduling action to add projects 53N6A8 and

SECRET GAVIN
5303A8 to fly Route [25x1] on 24 January 1968, was cancelled and subject missions were never officially added to the PARPRO monthly schedule.

Commando Royal Missions Resumed

(SCW) The last ACRP coverage of North Korea was provided by Project 53N5A8 which went off-watch at 232107Z. On 25 January we were advised that normal Commando Royal scheduling could be resumed with exception of Route [25x1] which was not to be flown until further advised. 25/26 As a result, Project 53T3A8 was rescheduled to take-off at 250335Z on Route SC3121 in order to provide coverage of possible Soviet surveillance of the Enterprise Task Group and/or other Soviet activity related to the Pueblo incident. Collection of communications by this mission was highly productive (36.4 hours VHF R/T collected); however, intercept was negligible (0.3 hours).

(SCW) Project 53P1A8 originally scheduled for Route 5C3220, take-off 250800Z, was launched at 250335Z to provide coverage during a more favorable time frame. This mission provided the first worthwhile coverage of North Korean communications since 232107Z. The only other mission flown before tasking again changed was Project 53P2A8 which flew Route [25x1] round-robin from [25x1] on 25 January.
EMERGENCY KORCOM COVERAGE IMPLEMENTED

(SCW) On 26 January a JCS request to initiate 24 hour ACRP coverage of KorCom targets resulted in the cancellation of all other Commando Royal missions in order to ensure airframes would be available for the proposed coverage. 29/31

This action resulted in the termination of all Commando Royal missions other than those transiting to and from Southeast Asia and those in support of the KorCom tasking. Commando Royal missions in other areas was not resumed until 5 February. Due to operational considerations, however, JCS reduced the KorCon coverage requirement to daylight coverage only. 33

(SCW) In order to ensure aircraft availability to respond to the special KorCom tasking, the Commando Royal aircraft deployed on 25 January to provide route coverage was recalled to Yokota on 27 January. In addition, the following missions were cancelled (read Project number, route, take-off time):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flight Number</th>
<th>Take-Off Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53P3A8</td>
<td>252100Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53P4A8</td>
<td>252200Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53Q1A8</td>
<td>260400Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53Q2A8</td>
<td>262100Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53Q3A8</td>
<td>262200Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53Q4A8</td>
<td>262200Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53J1A8</td>
<td>272100Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53S2A8</td>
<td>282100Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53S1A8</td>
<td>282200Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53S3A8</td>
<td>282200Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53N1A8</td>
<td>290330Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Also, the following missions were cancelled by 5 Air Force as a result of their intention to program three KorCom missions daily:

- 53U3A8
- 53T2A8
- 53U1A8
- 53L2A8
- 53V1A8

On 27 January, two Commando Royal missions were flown on modified route 5C3222 (take-off: 270800Z and 292100Z).

During the period 28 thru 31 January modified route missions were launched as follows: 272000Z; 280200Z; 281500Z; 282200Z; 290545Z; 291500Z; 292200Z; 300505Z; 301830Z; 302345Z; 311815Z; and 312355Z. The mission launched at 292200Z was forced to recover at due to a partially inflated life raft which caused wing vibrations. This mission returned to orbit after refueling and was, therefore, able to provide coverage until darkness. As a result, the mission launched at 300505Z returned to prior to reaching orbit.
THE MISSION LAUNCHED AT 300505Z WAS ADVISED TO RETURN TO BASE THROUGH COORDINATION BETWEEN THE AIRBORNE MISSION SUPERVISORS OF THE TWO MISSION AIRCRAFT VIA URC-53 COMMUNICATIONS.

PERSONNEL

(SCW) THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY THE INCREASED ALERT POSTURE RESULTING FROM THE PEUBLO INCIDENT WAS THE A203X1MI (KOREAN LINGUIST) AND A292X1 (MANUAL MORSE) PERSONNEL SHORTAGE. THE EMERGENCY KORCOM TASKING WAS EXPECTED TO BRING THE KORCOM INTERCEPT BACKLOG TO UNACCEPTABLE PROPORTIONS UNLESS PROMPT MANNING RELIEF WAS PROVIDED.

On 23 January, 15 A203X1MI personnel was assigned to this unit including one TDY to Project Rivet Top in Southeast Asia. On 24 January, we advised PACSCTYRGN that a serious Korean linguist shortage was anticipated as a result of the emergency tasking. In addition, it was pointed out that, if coverage was to be provided on a three mission daily basis, each manned with three A203X1MI operators, it would be necessary to terminate virtually all KORCOM TRANSCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS AT THIS UNIT. PACSCTYRGN requested we reevaluate the A203X1MI requirement based on DIRNSA REQUIREMENT FOR ONE TEN HOUR SORTIE PER DAY DURING DAYLIGHT.
HOURS WITH PROCESSING IN ADDITION PacSctyRgn directed the return of the A203X1M1 assigned TDY to Project Rivet Top.\(^7\) We did not require emergency A203X1M1 manning assistance under the one sortie per day DIRNSA concept; however, the backlog of Korean Intercepts was expected to become an increasing problem.\(^8\) The requirement for 203X1M1 manning assistance was renewed on 26 January when JCS directed CINCPAC to initiate 24 hour ACRP coverage of North Korea.\(^9\)

We informed PacSctyRgn that the JCS requirement would virtually eliminate this unit's KorCom transcription effort and that A292X1 manning would also be critical with only eight qualified A292X1 personnel available. To resolve the manning problem, we proposed the following actions be taken: 1. Recall of aircraft and crew deployed to substitute recall of 292X1 operator TDY to Project Rivet Top in addition to the A203X1M1 TDY to that project. 3. Suspension of all Commando Royal Missions not being flown in support of the Emergency Korean tasking. The A292X1 and A203X1M1 operators TDY to Rivet Top returned on 1 February.

\(^{(6HV666)}\) On 26 January PacSctyRgn requested USAFSS to provide available CONUS 203X1M1 resources TDY to this unit.\(^{89}\) USAFSS then queried units on availability of personnel possessing a second language capability of Korean for TDY to this unit and at the same time advised PacSctyRgn that nine Korean
LINGUISTS WERE AVAILABLE IN THE CONUS AND READY FOR SHIPMENT AS SOON AS A BASE OF OPERATIONS WAS DETERMINED. On 27 January, USAFSS identified eight 203X1MI personnel who were being sent TDY to this unit for 60 days.

Two of the 203X1MI augmentees arrived on 27 January, five on 28 January and one on 30 January. These augmentees were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>PARENT UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Longstreet, John M</td>
<td>SSgt</td>
<td>6948 SCTY SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touchberry, Thomas</td>
<td>SSgt</td>
<td>6948 SCTY SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganos, Michael C</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>6948 SCTY SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grayson, Daniel J</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>6948 SCTY SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton, Daniel J</td>
<td>SSgt</td>
<td>6993 SCTY SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luke, Charles F</td>
<td>SSgt</td>
<td>6993 SCTY SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tillman, Terry W</td>
<td>SSgt</td>
<td>6940 TECH TNG GP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Camille L</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>6940 TECH TNG GP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the tense posture resulting from the Pueblo seizure, we manned all Commando Royal missions against North Korean targets with two 292X1 operators to ensure optimum internal warning capability. It was suggested that 292X1 Manning Relief could be provided by reducing the number of such operators on each mission to one; however, it was decided to continue to use two 292X1s per mission at least until the situation stabilized. Two 292X1s were assigned to each mission until 14 February when we returned to the normal one per mission.
(SHVCCC) During the period of the "hold" on all missions, further restrictions on this orbit were imposed. On January, ADMINO CINCPAC directed airborne units to remain outside of the area within 80 NM of the coast of North Korea north of a line extending east from the DMZ. The JCS request of 26 January for twenty-four hour coverage of North Korea also included the restriction to fly only that portion of Track between points Bravo-Bravo and Bravo-Delta.
CINCPAC then authorized modification of tracks 25x1 TO PERMIT AIRCRAFT TO REMAIN 25 NM SOUTH OF DMZ WHILE OVER KOREAN LAND MASS. AS A RESULT, WHEN OPERATIONS ON Route 25x1 WERE RESUMED ON 27 JANUARY, THE FIRST TWO MISSIONS HELD 25 NM SOUTH OF POINTS BRAVO-CHARLIE AND BRAVO-Delta.

(Shwcco) On 27 January DIRNSA requested an evaluation of Route 25x1 AS MODIFIED BY JCS (ORBIT BETWEEN BRAVO-BRAVO AND BRAVO-Delta only). 94 We advised that the track between points BRAVO-BRAVO AND BRAVO-CHARLIE OFFERED NO COVERAGE NOT AFFORDED BY THE TRACK BETWEEN POINTS BRAVO-CHARLIE AND BRAVO-Delta. IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT FUTURE MISSIONS BE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD BETWEEN POINTS BRAVO-CHARLIE AND 12800E IN ORDER TO PROVIDE OPTIMUM INTERCEPT OF THE Wonsan Area Targets. 95 DIRNSA CONCURRED WITH THIS PROPOSAL AND BEGINNING 28 JANUARY Route 25x1 WAS FLOWN BETWEEN THESE POINTS.

(Shwcco) On 28 January CINCPAC authorized Route 25x1 TO BE FLOWN AS FOLLOWS: A. MISSION AIRCRAFT TO REMAIN AT LEAST 25 NM SOUTH OF THE DMZ WHILE OVER KOREAN LAND MASS; B. ENTRANCE TO AND EXIT FROM ORBIT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED FROM AND TO THE SOUTH; C. WESTERN POINT OF TRACK: 3715N-12600E; D. NORTHERN POINT OF TRACK: 3900N-12949; AND E. MODIFIED TRACK FROM WEST TO EAST AS FOLLOWS: (1) COMMENCE AT 3715N-12600E; (2) THEN EAST ALONG AND AT LEAST 25 NM SOUTH OF DMZ TO EAST COAST; (3) THEN SOUTH ALONG COASTLINE TO 3742N; (4)
THEN DUE EAST TO 3742N-12917E; AND (5) THEN NORTH ON ORIGINAL
TRACK TO 3900N-12949E. THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTION TO THE CON-
DITION FOUR WARNING LINE WAS ESTABLISHED AS A RESULT OF THE
ABOVE MODIFICATION: ENTER 3730N-12700E; EXIT 3750N-12855E,
THEN RETURN, ENTER 3750N-12855E, EXIT 3730N-1200E. A FALL-
BACK ROUTE WAS ESTABLISHED TO BE FLOWN WHEN FIGHTER COVER WAS
NOT AVAILABLE ON WITH COORDINATES AS FOLLOWS: 3702N-
12917E TO 3635N-12600E.

(SHV666) On 16 February a new modification to Route 5C3222 was implemented at the direction of 5 Air Force ADVON. COORDINATES FOR ROUTE [MODIFIED] WERE NOW AS FOLLOWS:
3900N-12949E; 3742N-12917E; 3742N-12900E; 3756N-12848E; AND
3712N-12648E. This route to be flown under following con-
ditions: POPEYE, NIGHT, AND NON-POPEYE DURING DAYLIGHT WITH
FIGHTER ESCORT. A POPEYE CONDITION WAS DESCRIBED AS IN CLOUDS,
in and out of the clouds every 13 seconds, or in visibility of
LESS THAN ONE MILE. DURING NON-POPEYE CONDITION DURING DAY-
LIGHT WITHOUT FIGHTER ESCORT COMMANDO ROYAL WAS REQUIRED TO
FLY ON THE FALL-BACK ROUTE (3702N-12917E TO 3635N-12600E).

(SHV666) On 26 February, ADMN C!NCPAC ADVISED THAT JCS
HAD APPROVED 5 AIR FORCE ADVON MODIFICATION TO ROUTE
AND HAD REQUESTED THAT THE MODIFIED TRACK BE ASSIGNED A NEW
ROUTE DESIGNATOR. THE MODIFIED ROUTE WAS THEREFORE,
REDESIGNATED ROUTE AND WAS FLOWN FOR THE FIRST TIME.
UNDER THIS DESIGNATION ON 25 FEBRUARY, THE FOLLOWING DIGRAPHS WERE ASSIGNED TO ROUTE 5C3223:

BRAVO BRAVO 3900N-12949E
BRAVO CHARLIE 3742N-12917E
BRAVO MIKE 3742N-12900E
BRAVO NOVEMBER 3756N-12848E
BRAVO OSCAR 3712N-12648E
BRAVO PAPA 3710N-12600E

(SHVGCO) DUE TO THE NECESSARY KORCOM TASKING AND SUBSEQUENTLY FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED UPON AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER KOREA, SEVERAL ADJUSTMENTS TO OTHER ROUTES WERE REQUIRED.

UNABLE TO SUPPORT BOTH THE AND DEPLOYMENT, THE 6091 RECON SQ TERMINATED OPERATIONS OUT OF (ROUTE 5C3340). WE, THEREFORE, PROPOSED TO MODIFY ROUTE

GOLF. IT WAS ALSO PROPOSED TO MODIFY ROUTE TO FLY THAT PORTION OF THE ORBIT OUTSIDE THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY CINCPAC WITH ENTRY POINT BRAVO-FOXTROT. ROUTE WAS MODIFIED TO EXCLUDE THAT PART OF THE ROUTE WEST OF 13212E WITH ENTRY POINT ALPHA-LIMA VICE ALPHA-MIKE. USAFSS DID NOT CONSIDER THE MODIFIED ROUTE TO BE SATISFACTORY AND DIRECTED USE OF ROUTE

SECRET

CIA OFFICIALS ONLY

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19: MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-2
SECRET

TO PROVIDE COVERAGE UPON RESUMPTION OF COMMANDO ROYAL MISSIONS IN THAT AREA.

(SHVC66) SUBSEQUENTLY COORDINATION WITH 6091 RECON SQ resulted in entry point for routes being changed to BRAVO-KILO (3120N-12400E) and BRAVO-FOX Trot (3618N-12400E) respectively. Following is status of these routes when resumed on 5 February:

- ENTER ALPHA-LIMA. EXCLUDE PORTION OF ROUTE WEST OF 13212E.
- ENTER BRAVO-FOX Trot. FLY 25x1
- NO MISSIONS TO BE FLOWN ON THIS ROUTE UNTIL
- ENTER BRAVO-KILO. FLY 25x1
CHAPTER V
FIGHTER COVER

—(SCW)—On 24 January, PacSctyRgn advised that the recall of the Commando Royal mission on Route [redacted] the previous day was due to the highly vulnerable position of the aircraft without fighter cap. 21 Commando Royal KorCom coverage was terminated after recall of mission on 23 January until the fighter cover problem could be resolved. On 26 January, JCS directed that ACRP coverage of North Korea be resumed with all flights to be escorted by fighter aircraft at all times. 29/33 CINCPAC was authorized to increase fighter aircraft strength in South Korea by a total of twelve aircraft to provide ACRP escort duty. 33/37

—(SHVCCO)—On 27 January CINCPACAF outlined fighter cover requirements in detail which included: A. Cover to be provided by F-4C aircraft based at Kunsan, Korea; B. Minimum of two of four F-4 aircraft to be airborne and in position to provide escort for Commando Royal at all times when mission operating above 37 degrees North; C. Minimum of two fighters to remain in position to intercept hostiles while other element of two fighters is with tanker; D. If less than four fighters available, mission to abort or both Commando Royal and tanker will withdraw to a position south of 37 degrees.
NORTH UNTIL FIGHTER FORCE IS RECONSTITUTED. 40

-(SHV660) On 27 January, PacSctyRgn reported that CINCPAC
JRC was requesting JCS to establish a specified distance
South of the DMZ at which Commando Royal could fly without
fighter escort while remaining over the South Korean land
mass. It was also noted that JCS had authorized Commando
Royal operations 25 NM South of DMZ during night hours with­
out fighters. 41 CINCPAC, therefore, authorized Commando
Royal missions during hours of darkness without fighter
escort or combat air patrol provided: a. Mission aircraft
covered by fighters on strip alert; b. Mission aircraft re­
main at least 25 NM South of the DMZ and remain over the
Korean land mass; and c. Entrance to and exit from the
orbit accomplished from and to the South. 42

-(SHV660) On 16 February, the fighter cover requirement
was amended to allow Commando Royal missions to fly the
modified route 25x1 without fighter cover during the day
under IFR conditions. 83 On 1 March, 5 Air Force Advon pub­
lished Operations Order 501-68, Commando Royal Escort,
which provided details of fighter escort requirement. This
publications consolidated that information on fighter escort
requirements previously provided in various messages. It
did, however, require that Commando Royal remain at least
30 NM vice 25 NM South of the DMZ.

HAND A COM
CHAPTER VI
OSAN OPERATION ESTABLISHED

-(SHV660)- On 26 January, USAFSS proposed that an operation location be established at Korea to support JCS requirement for 24 hour daily coverage of the East coast and DMZ area of North Korea. This unit advised that approximately 50 personnel would be deployed if operation was established. USAFSS then requested PacSctyRgn to coordinate with PACAF to establish the operation and to take necessary action to provide Osan with supplementary transcribe positions. This was followed by a CINCPAC request to JCS for authorization to deploy Commando Royal resources to Korea as necessary to support tasking. On 27 January, PacSctyRgn indicated that, upon formal authorization by JCS, and operation would be established as soon as possible. Several messages on this subject were received concerning concepts and requirements and then, on 30 January, PacSctyRgn informed this unit that JCS had authorized two aircraft to be deployed to provide ten hours of daily daylight coverage. This was soon followed by a message from PACAF to 5 Air Force providing clearance to deploy two C-130 aircraft to PacSctyRgn then advised that we were authorized to stage
Commando Royal missions out of Osan as directed by PACAF. 60

On 31 January, one officer and one non-commissioned officer from this unit were sent to 25x1 to prepare for the impending deployment of Commando Royal aircraft and crews. A preliminary concept of operation was formulated and forwarded to PacSctyRgn outlining personnel requirements, reporting and transcription procedures, and facilities available at 25x1 to support the Commando Royal deployment. Billeting and transportation for crews and project personnel were expected to be especially critical problem areas. 59/97/98

On 1 February two missions were launched 25x1 to fly a modified route 25x1. Daily missions were then implemented on 2 February from that base. 59/99 Effective 010800Z the 6988 Scty Sq element deployed to 25x1 assumed responsibility for collection, transcription, and reporting of all ACRP KorCom tactical voice intercept. 100 On 4 February the Commando Royal Officer (CRPO) at 25x1 implemented a daily status report to this unit. 101 The 6091 Reconnaissance Squadron established a detachment (Detachment 3) at 25x1 to conduct Commando Royal operations and on 14 February, 5 Air Force advised that operational control of the Commando Royal element rested with 5 Air Force ADVC at 25x1 82

Mission Status

While the operation was established on the
SECRET

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19: MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-2
SECRET

Basis of Providing One Mission Daily for Daylight Coverage,
we were aware, as early as 31 January, that 5 Air Force desired
expanded coverage which would require two missions daily.
This proposal generated some concern on the effect it would
have on other Commando Royal collection requirements. 61/62

(64460) The expanded coverage requirement was formally
stated by PACAF on 9 February when they requested immediate
action to change the Commando Royal schedule to provide
coverage a minimum of two hours prior to dawn and a minimum
of two hours prior and thru last light each day. PACAF
stated that this requirement was based on 5 Air Force ADVON
concern that any hostile action by the KorComs would probably
occur during first light. 70 Several messages were exchanged
on this proposal with PacStyRgn recommending two five-hour
sorties be launched daily from 25x1 to meet the dawn and dusk
requirement. 71/72/73/74/77 PacStyRgn advised USAFSS that,
upon validation of PACAF requirement by CINCPAC, the 6988
Scty Sq would be directed to implement the two sortie daily
proposal. 75 On 11 February, PACAF provided the following
concept of operation to CINCPAC: two sorties per day to be
launched with each obtaining five hours on orbit time; the
morning sorties to be launched two hours prior to daylight
with the late sorties on orbit five hours to provide cover-
age through last light. PACAF also advised that this

SECRET

Handout Only
Channel S Only

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19: MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-2
SECRET

REQUIREMENT COULD BE MET WITH THE AIRCRAFT (TWO) THEN IN PLACE AT USAFSS CONCURRED WITH PACAF CONCEPT AND PACAF CONCEPT AND
CINCPAC RECOMMENDED TO JCS THAT THE PACAF PROPOSAL BE APPROVED.78/79 ON 13 FEBRUARY APPROVAL OF THE PACAF REQUIREMENT WAS PROVIDED BY CINCPAC.80 ON 14 FEBRUARY PACAF DIRECTED 5 AIR FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THIS COVERAGE.81 TWO DAILY SIX-HOUR MISSIONS WERE BEGAN ON 16 FEBRUARY.82

Commando Royal Was Initially Scheduled to Take-Off at 1930Z and 0430Z; however, Take-Off Times Were Adjusted to 1900Z and 0500Z on 18 February.
CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL

(SCW) As indicated previously, the initial personnel requirements to support the ... operation were provided on 31 January when a project officer and project non-commisioned officer were deployed to ... followed by two crews on 1 February. On 2 February, the eight 203X1MI augmentees TDY to this unit from CONUS resources, along with four additional 6988 SCTY SQ A203X1MI personnel, were deployed to provide transcription and reporting support.

The station backlog of KorCom intercept (87 tapes) was also forwarded to Osan to be transcribed on a time available basis. This backlog was completely eliminated by 12 February.

(Shycco) As of 2 February the personnel status at Osan was as follows:

- E8035: 1 (Project Officer)
- A203X1MI: 14
- 203X1MI: 8 (CONUS TDY augmentees)
- A203X1MB: 9 (Includes one project NCO)
- A203X1MA: 4
- A292X1: 4
- A294X0: 4
- A301X3: 7
- Total: 49
Commando Royal crew composition on missions staging from Osan was as follows: A203X1M1 - 3; A203X1MB - 3; A203X1MA - 2; A301X3 - 2; A292X1 - 2; and A294X0 - 1. The first crew exchange was effected on 13 February with the number of A292X1s per crew reduced from two to one. On 14 February an additional crew was deployed due to an increase to two missions daily beginning 16 February. On 31 January PacSctyRgn advised that USAFSS had requested the 6922 Scty Wg to alert two A203X1M1s from the 6990 Scty Sq for deployment to Det 1, 6922 Scty Wg. PacSctyRgn indicated they intended to assign these personnel to the 6988 Scty Sq vice Det 1, 6922 Scty Wg since they were airborne qualified with two of the non-crew augmentees TDY to the 6988 Scty Sq to be reassigned to Det 1, 6922 Scty Wg as replacements. The 6990 Scty Sq indicated that deployment of two A203X1M1s from their limited resources could cause flying hour problems. We, informed PacSctyRgn that TDY assistance from 6990 Scty Sq was not required and this action was, therefore, cancelled.

On 28 February, 6948 Scty Sq concurred with our request to check-out one of the 203X1M1 augmentees TDY from their unit for airborne duties.

Logistics

The rapid and large build up of personnel at
PLACED A SEVERE STRAIN ON BASE SUPPORT FACILITIES, PARTICULARLY BILLETING AND TRANSPORTATION. THE OUTSTANDING COOPERATION AND SUPPORT PROVIDED BY DET 1, 6922 SCTY WG SERVED TO LESSEN THE IMPACT OF THE LIMITED BASE SUPPORT AVAILABLE IN THESE AREAS. THE EXPANDED MISSION AT DET 1, 6922 SCTY WG PLUS COMMANDO ROYAL PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS ALSO REQUIRED THAT SUPPLEMENTARY EQUIPMENT BE PROVIDED.

{SHY600} EQUIPMENT. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATIONS AT DET 1 REQUIRED THE TRANSFER OF ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS TO DET 1, 6922 SCTY WG. ON 26 JANUARY, USAFSS PROPOSED THAT TWO MOBILE TY0018 HUTS BE FURNISHED BY 6990 SCTY SQ PLUS ONE HUT. EITHER ALTERNATIVE WAS TO PROVIDE A CAPABILITY TO HAVE A MINIMUM OF NINE TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS AVAILABLE AT 34. ON 27 JANUARY, PACSCTRYRGN DIRECTED 6990 SCTY SQ TO PLACE FOUR AG-118S, TWO SPARE KITS AND FOUR PORTABLE MC-88S ON 180 DAY LOAN TO 6988 SCTY SQ WITH IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT OF THIS EQUIPMENT FROM 6988 SCTY SQ TO 6924 SCTY SQ. IN ADDITION, 6924 SCTY SQ WAS REQUESTED TO DETERMINE IF ONE OF FOUR AG-118 POSITIONS ON LOAN FROM 6988 SCTY SQ TO THAT UNIT COULD BE RELEASED FOR RETURN TO 6988 SCTY SQ. THIS ACTION WAS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE TO SATISFY THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE COMMANDO ROYAL OPERATION WITH ADDITIONAL PROCESSING CAPABILITY TO BE PROVIDED AS NECESSARY.
THIS UNIT WAS ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE AND
SUPPLY SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION TO INCLUDE THE FOUR
AG-118 POSITIONS ON LOAN FROM THE 6990 Scty Sq. On 28
JANUARY, PacSctyRgn directed 6922 Scty Wg to move two Comfy
Card huts and generators to AND THE 6990 Scty Sq to
PLACE THE AG-118s ON LOAN AS DIRECTED. THE AG-118s WERE TO
BE RETURNED TO THE 6990 Scty Sq AS SOON AS THE COMFY CARD
HUTS WERE IN PLACE AND HAD PROVEN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.
THE 6924 Scty Sq was directed to return one AG-118 with
PORTABLE MC-88 and one G-276 demodulator to the 6988 Scty Sq.
THIS POSITION WAS RECEIVED ON 5 FEBRUARY; HOWEVER, DUE TO
CONDITION OF POSITION, IT WAS RETAINED AT THIS UNIT FOR
REPAIR. WHEN REPAIRED, THIS POSITION WAS TO BE SHIPPED TO
(SMYCCO) ON 2 FEBRUARY, THE COMMANDO ROYAL PROJECT
OFFICER AT OSAN ADVISED THAT THE COMFY CARD HUTS COULD NOT
BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED SINCE ONLY ONE POSITION IN EACH HUT
WAS CONFIGURED FOR TRANSCRIPTION AND THAT OTHER POSITIONS
HAD BEEN MODIFIED SO THAT FOUR COULD BE USED. ON 3
FEBRUARY, IT WAS REPORTED THAT FIVE TRANSCRIBE POSITIONS
IN THE COMFY CARD HUTS WERE BEING FULLY UTILIZED FOR TRANS-
SCRIPTION AND THAT, UPON RECEIPT OF THE AG-118s, THE COMFY
CARD POSITIONS WOULD BE TAKEN OVER BY AS A RESULT
OF THEIR EXPANDING REQUIREMENTS. ON THE SAME DAY THE

HANDWRITTEN
FOUR AG-118 POSITIONS ON LOAN FROM THE 6990 SCTY SQ WERE RECEIVED. ON 6 FEBRUARY THE COMMANDO ROYAL OSAN PROCESSING CAPABILITY CONSISTED OF EIGHT POSITIONS. THIS INCLUDED FIVE COMFY CARD POSITIONS AND THREE AG-118S (ONE AG-118 AT 25X1 WAS OUT FOR A POWER CABLE WITH THE FIFTH AG-118 PROGRAMMED FOR 26X1 STILL AT 25X1 AWAITING PARTS). 114

(SHwegian) On 13 February, PacSCTyRgn queried if the two Comfy Card huts would satisfy Commando Royal processing requirements at 25X1 and, if not, how many AG-118s would be needed to satisfy this requirement. 115 The Commando Royal Project Officer at 25X1 indicated that both Comfy Card huts were being utilized for transcription of Commando Royal intercept. Of the eight positions available, five were being used for transcription with the three remaining positions used by 25X1 in support of their transmission security effort. With the four AG-118 positions operational and the fifth programmed to be forwarded from 25X1 after repair, it was determined that all KorCom intercept could be processed on these positions. 116

(SHwegian) On 15 February, USAFSS requested that the AG-118 positions on loan to 25X1 operation be returned to 6990 SCTY SQ and that consideration be given to prepositioning the AG-118s at 6922 SCTY WG to be used during unexpected Combat Apple recoveries at that location. 117
THE CRPO OBJECTED TO THIS PROPOSAL, POINTING OUT THAT THE AG-118s WERE BEING UTILIZED APPROXIMATELY SIXTEEN HOURS DAILY.

This problem was resolved on 24 February when PacSctyRgn directed 6924 Scty Sq to return the three AG-118s on loan from the 6988 Scty Sq immediately. Further, we were advised to hold shipment of the AG-118 previously received from the 6924 Scty Sq for shipment to the upon receipt, inspection, and repair of subject positions by this unit we were then to ship the four AG-118s to 6990 Scty Sq and 6922 Scty Wg as replacements for the four AG-118s provided by the 6990 Scty Sq to the operation. Accountability was then to be transferred with the four AG-118s at on loan from 6990 Scty Sq becoming the property of the 6988 Scty Sq and the four AG-118s returned from the 6924 Scty Sq to this unit for shipment to 6990 Scty Sq (two each) and 6922 Scty Wg (two each) becoming the property of the 6990 Scty Sq. The three AG-118s returned by the 6924 Scty Sq were received on 3 March. On 13 March, two AG-118s were shipped to 6922 Scty Wg. Shipment of the remaining two positions to the 6990 Scty Sq was delayed pending completion of inspection and repair and receipt of parts for spare parts kit.

(c) Transportation. Due to a vehicle shortage at Osan, Det 1, 6922 Scty Wg shared a step van with the Commando Royal Operation. This was an interim measure unsuitable for
ANY LONG TERM OPERATION. A TRANSPORTATION REPRESENTATIVE FROM PachtYRgn VISITING OSAN INDICATED THAT AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO GET ADDITIONAL VEHICLES WITH THE AIR LIFTING OF VEHICLES TO OSAN FROM THE 6922 Scty Wg OFFERED AS A POSSIBILITY. Commando Royal transportation requirements were established as one crew bus, one six pax crew cab, and one metro van. This requirement was partially satisfied when we were provided one three pax pickup and one small metro. While this provided some relief, it was barely adequate for our needs. The vehicle control officer at [REDACTED] advised that a large step van would be issued to the Commando Royal operation when available. A step van was provided by 14 March. Continuing efforts were made to obtain a 29 passenger crew bus for [REDACTED] However, as of 15 March the vehicle problem appeared to be one which could not be expected to be satisfactorily resolved in the immediate future.
HOT ROD COURIER SERVICE

The establishment of the ACRP operation required a means of providing tapes and mission materials to the Osan element as well as a means for the timely delivery of mission intercept (non-KorCom) to this unit. Frequent C-130 trainer aircraft support flights to and from provided a convenient means for exchange of mission materials and were utilized whenever possible. A supplementary courier system, however, was required.

On 3 February, the Commando Royal Project Officer reported that regular courier arrangements from Osan would be tenuous with the Armed Forces Courier Service requiring at least one week. On 11 February, we reported that linguists had been deployed to Osan to accomplish

Timeliness of these routine reports was being effected due to the absence of timely courier service from Osan. On 15 February, PacSctvRgn requested PACAF assistance to establish daily hot-rod
SERVICE BETWEEN 25x1 DAILY HOT-ROD SERVICE WAS
ESTABLISHED ON 20 FEBRUARY; HOWEVER, DUE TO 25x1
INTERCEPT FROM THE KORCOM ORBIT A DAILY HOT-ROD
SERVICE WAS NO LONGER REQUIRED. HOT-ROD SERVICE WAS COORDI-
NATED WITH 25x1 PERSONNEL AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS SERVICE
WOULD BE PROVIDED ON AN AS REQUIRED BASIS. 123/124

P.L. 86-36
EO 1.4.(c)
CHAPTER IX
DIRECT SIGINT SUPPORT

(TSCW) On 26 January, PacSctyRgn directed that the USAFSS and PacSctyRgn SIGINT Support Plan 27-66 for Korea be reviewed with view towards possible implementation of this plan or similar procedures. On 29 January we received a USAFSS draft of a plan providing for direct SIGINT service for US forces operating in Korea should hostilities develop. This plan was similar to the PacSctyRgn Operations Order 101-66 presently in effect in Southeast Asia. Discussions concerning direct SIGINT support possibilities were discussed with 5 Air Force at Fuchu, Japan and 314 Air Division and 5 Air Force ADVON at Osan, Korea. These preliminary discussions were focused on the capabilities and potential of SIGINT support. While this planning was being conducted primarily to establish procedures in the event of hostilities, some procedures were implemented to provide SIGINT information and support to theater commanders. These actions consisted of issuing border violation information, tactical reporting (TACREPs), initiation of the Commando Royal Mission Results Summary (CRMRS) and coordination of Commando Royal missions with Commando Smog (C-47 photo reconnaissance) missions for advisory warning.
COMMANDO ROYAL MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY

(SCW) - The ACRP MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY, implemented in Southeast Asia to provide selected consumers with timely, preliminary, mission results and an authoritative summary of ACRP contributions, was recognized as a reporting vehicle appropriate to the Korean operation. We, therefore, prepared to implement mission results summary reporting with the first mission terminating at [25x1] on 1 February; however, PacSctyRgn requested implementation of this report be delayed until further coordination was effected. 128/129 On 2 February, USAFSS approved Commando Royal Mission Results Summary implementation to be limited to intercept derived from Korea deployed missions. 130 PacSctyRgn provided distribution for this report pending DIRNSA action on establishing a new CAG. The first Commando Royal Mission Results Summary was issued on 3 February. 131/132 On 8 February, a CAG (VALON) was established by DIRNSA for this report. In order to expedite delivery to PACAF, the precedence of the report was upgraded to "IMMEDIATE." 133/134

COMMANDO SMOG COORDINATION

(TSHVCGG) On 1 February, 5 Air Force inquired if we had capability to provide air-to-air advisory warnings to C-47 photo reconnaissance missions (Commando SMOG) operating out of Osan, Korea along the DMZ. The ACRP airborne advisory
WARNING CAPABILITY WAS DISCUSSED AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT

FIFTH AIR FORCE DIRECTED THAT LOSS OF CAPABILITY OF COMMANDO
SMOG AIRCRAFT TO RECEIVE WARNINGS AND/OR RECEIPT OF A CON-
DITION WAS TO BE IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR ABDUCT OF THE COMMANDO SMOG MISSION.

On 2 February, the Commando Royal Project Officer contacted
312 Air Division and 5 Air Force ADVON representatives at
TO ESTABLISH COORDINATION PROCEDURES. THE FIRST CO-
ORDINATED MISSION WAS FLOWN ON 4 FEBRUARY.

BORDER VIOLATION REPORTS (BOCOVIRS)

(SGW) On 18 February, the Commando Royal Project Officer
ADvised THAT DUE TO INCREASED EMPHASIS ON BORDER
VIOLATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, 5 AIR FORCE ADVON,
HAD REQUESTED THAT A REPORT BE IMPLEMENTED TO PROVIDE 5 AIR
FORCE ADVON WITH ANY INFORMATION COLLECTED BY COMMANDO ROYAL
CONCERNING BORDER VIOLATIONS. FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVON DID NOT
WANT A FORMAL END PRODUCT REPORT BUT A TIMELY INPUT WHICH
WOULD AMPLIFY GROUND STATION BORDER VIOLATION REPORTS (BOCOVIRS).
IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS REPORT WOULD BE SIMPLE AND ESSEN-
TIALY NARRATIVE IN FORMAT. REPORT WAS TO BE ISSUED WHEN
ANY SIGINT GROUND STATION INITIATED A BOCOVIR WHICH TOOK PLACE
WHILE COMMANDO ROYAL WAS AIRBORNE OR WHEN COMMANDO ROYAL

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19: MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-2
Provided input to a ground station BOCOVIR. A report was also to be issued upon request of 5 Air Force ADVON. Negative reports were to be required only if above criteria was met. The following is a sample format of the Commando Royal Report:

TACTICAL REPORTS (TACREPs)

(TACREPs) To provide immediate tactical intelligence information to tactical commanders. Tactical Reporting (TACREPs) contingency plan was established on 6 March. The TACREP was described by DIRNSA as "a short SIGINT report designed to provide designated operational commands with information relevant to the safety of their forces, or on fast-moving enemy activities which directly relate to the commander's tactical operations." DIRNSA provided details on selecting.
SUBJECTS FOR TACREPS, DISTRIBUTION, HANDLING PROCEDURES, AND EXAMPLES.

SIGINT INFORMATION TO SPECIFIC PACOM COMMANDS

(SHVCO) On 3 February, DirNSA advised that

been directed to respond fully to the requirements for timely
KorCom Air SIGINT of PACOM commands as designated by CINCPAC.

AFSSO 314 Air Division and 5 Air Force ADVON queried if this
instruction applied to deployed ACRP resources of

as well as

and were advised that the ACRP resources de-
ployed to

would be responsive to SIGINT requirements
levied by specified commands.
CHAPTER X

COLLECTION AND PROCESSING

**Commando Royal Transcription and Tapes**

- **(SCW)** During early February procedures were coordinated to routinely provide Commando Royal Transcripts and selected tapes. It was initially proposed that following processing of Commando Royal take by of North Korean air and North Korean navy and military, respectively that these units would prepare dupe tapes on all North Korean entities.

- **25x6** It was determined, however, that preparation of tape dupes would be time consuming and that providing transcripts of North Korean activity would be adequate.

**Transmission Security (TRANSEC)**

- **(SMYCCO)** On 8 February, PacSctyRgn advised that high interest in the Communications Security (COMSEC) posture of USAF activities in Korea made coverage of VHF and UHF Communications, not obtainable by TRANSEC units, highly desirable. We, therefore, tasked the Osan ACR? operation to designate one position for COMSEC coverage on a full time basis when priority of intercept permitted.

**Post Mission Flight Reports (PMFR)**

- **(CHVCCO)** On 17 February, PacSctyRgn pointed out that the PMFR was the only timely source of information on mission...
status. They, therefore, requested that section one of the PMFR which provides particulars on the mission be forwarded as a separate report at immediate precedence with distribution limited to PacSctyRgn, USAFSS, and 6988 Svty Sq. 147 The Commando Royal Project Officer advised that effective with mission on 16 February, the PMFR was being released at "immediate" precedence. 148 In view of increased precedence, PacSctyRgn deleted their requirement for a separate report of the PMFR data. 149

Significant Intercepts

(TSCH) The following is a brief summary of significant ACRP intercept obtained beginning with the capture of the USS Pueblo.

23 Jan - Reflection of the capture of the USS Pueblo by KorCom Naval vessels. 5
chapter XI

related items of interest

23 jan - SIGHT READINESS ALPHA DECLARED TO DIRNSA DUE TO CAPTURE OF USS PUEBLO BY NKF. 161

23 jan - DIRNSA ADVISED THAT CTF 77 HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DIVERT TASK GROUP 77.5 TO 3230N-12730E. TASK GROUP EXPECTED TO CONSIST OF ENTERPRISE, TRUXTON WITH COLLINS JOINING AS FEASIBLE. 162

23 jan - DIRNSA ADVISED OF POSSIBILITY THAT ALL OF THE COMINT MATERIAL ON BOARD THE USS PUEBLO MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND DIRECTED UNITS BE PARTICULARLY ALERT TO POSSIBILITY OF KORCOM COMM CHANGE PRECIPITATED BY COMPROMISE OF PUEBLO MATERIALS.

23 jan - DIRNSA QUOTED CINCPACFLT DIRECTIVE TO PLACE AND SUPPORT DESTROYER OFF WONSAN IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE TWELVE MILE LIMIT AND DIRECTED UNITS TO BE ALERT TO ANY SIGINT REFLECTIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY. 164

23 jan - DIRNSA SPOT REPORT FOLLOW-UP PROVIDED LIST OF NORTH KOREAN VESSELS INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES SURROUNDING THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO.

25 jan - PORTED DETAILS OF AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY NORTH
KOREAN AREA

26 JAN - 25x1 extended SIGINT Readiness Alpha to ensure optimum attention given to 25x1 activity occurring in the aftermath of the Pueblo incident.

21 FEB - DIRNSA terminated Readiness Alpha extensions for those units in the Far East intercepting Soviet 25x1 entities. The declaration for units covering KorCom entities remained in effect.

P.L. 86-36
EO 1.4.(c)
CHAPTER XI
SUMMARY

SUPPORT

Limited base support, primarily in the areas of transportation and billeting, made the Commando Royal deployment considerably more difficult than it might have been and tended to impair overall efficiency. From the outset of the deployment, the support provided by Det 1, 6922 SCTY Wg was never less than outstanding. The transportation problem which otherwise might have been impossible was resolved on a day-to-day basis only through the cooperation and support provided by Det 1, 6922 SCTY Wg. We do not feel, however, that ACRP deployments should be dependent upon host Security Service units to satisfy support requirements during deployments of this nature. We strongly recommend that a basic ACRP deployment Operations Order be published by HQ USAFSS to outline basic support requirements for ACRP deployments. These requirements would then be presented directly to the host base by the Command deploying the ACRP aircraft. In the case of the Osan deployment, PACAF, under this concept, would have coordinated all Commando Royal requirements for both front and back-end crews directly with the host base. Security Service units, located on the host base, would be

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19: MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-2
EXPECTED TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL SUPPORT, WORKING AREA, AND COMMUNICATION FACILITIES ONLY. MORE ADEQUATE SUPPORT COULD BE ANTICIPATED IF THE REQUIREMENTS WERE BASED ON AN INTEGRATED CREW CONCEPT (SECURITY SERVICE AND FRONT-END CREW MEMBERS) RATHER THAN EACH ELEMENT OBTAINING NECESSARY SUPPORT THROUGH SEPARATE CHANNELS.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

(SHVECO) DIRNSA, USAFSS, PacSctyRgn, JCS, CINCPAC, PACAF, 5 Air Force - DIRECTIONS OUTLINING ACRP RESPONSE TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT WERE BEING PROVIDED BY EACH OF THESE HEADQUARTERS TO THIS UNIT, RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTING, AND 6091 RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON, RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE TRANSPORTATION. THE INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE PUEBLO SEIZURE WAS HANDLED IN A ROUTINE MANNER WITH LOCAL COORDINATION EFFECTED BETWEEN THE 6988 SCTY SQ AND 6091 RECON SQ TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUOUS ACRP COVERAGE AS REQUESTED BY DIRNSA AND CINCPAC. For the next several days, however, considerable confusion at this level resulted from various tasking messages and instructions being received. We frequently received instructions which did not include 6091 Recon Sq/5 Air Force as addressees. The 6091 Recon Sq, on the other hand, was receiving instructions which were not available to this unit. Briefly, the entire exercise emphasized the necessity for one channel of direction to
both the 6988 Scty Sq and 6091 Recon Sq when immediate response to an emergency situation becomes necessary. At the very least, all Security Service direction to this unit should include the 6091 Recon Sq and their chain of command as info addressees with Security Service units included as info addressees on directives passed to 6091 Recon Sq/5 Air Force by their higher headquarters.

(S) As the Pueblo incident developed, close coordination was not a crucial element; however, it was apparent that needless confusion could be eliminated in the future if a single OPR was designated to receive all tasking concerning mission operation (how many, where, when, etc) with the 6988 Scty Sq and 6091 Recon Sq responding only to tasking received from the designated OPR.

DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS ORDER

(C) Should the publication of a HQ USAFSS ACRP DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS ORDER be considered feasible, recommend the following items be considered for inclusion:

1. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
   a. TRANSPORTATION FOR CREW AND PROJECT PERSONNEL
   b. BILLETING
   c. MESSING

2. REPORTING
   a. AUTOMATIC UPGRADING OF PRECEDENCE OF ESTABLISHED
REPORTS, E.G., PMFR

B. AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIAL REPORTING, E.G., MISSION RESULTS SUMMARY

3. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY SERVICE UNIT IF LOCATED ON HOST BASE

A. COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
B. TECHNICAL SUPPORT
C. WORKING AREA
D. PERSONNEL SUPPORT

4. OPERATIONAL CONTROL

A. DESIGNATION OF UNITS TO BE INCLUDED AS ADDRESSEES ON ALL MESSAGES INVOLVING TASKING AND POLICY
B. DESIGNATION OF A SINGLE UNIT AS OPR TO COORDINATE AND CONSOLIDATE TASKING.

5. DOCUMENTATION

A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY TO BE PREPARED AT CONCLUSION OF DEPLOYMENT OR AS DIRECTED

CONCLUSION

By March, the Korean ACRP deployment had settled into a routine operation and the increased Commando Royal commitment for providing KorCom coverage was being reassessed. On 19 March, USAFSS requested assessment of planned reduction of 5 Air Force ADVON on 1 April 1968 and impact of withdrawal of ERU forces/equipment from [25x1].
USAFSS requested estimate of when Commando Royal element deployed to 25x1 could be returned 25x1 with normal scheduling resumed. During a visit to this unit by PacSctyRgn, personnel, we suggested consideration be given to continuing normal Commando Royal operations out of 25x1 upon termination of the present commitment. In view of the ability to go "on-watch" within 30 minutes following take-off from 25x1, it was felt that a continued operation from that base would provide considerably more coverage than provided by missions 25x1. On 20 March, PacSctyRgn requested we provide details of a Commando Royal operation from 25x1. A summary of benefits and support required for an operation was provided on 22 March. 172 In any event, it appears, barring unforeseen circumstances, that the deployment and increased ACRP coverage resulting from the increased defense posture in Korea may soon be terminated. While this narrative is intended primarily to document the ACRP response to the Pueblo Incident and subsequent developments, we believe that a thorough review of the entire operation might serve to ensure that basic procedures are established to ensure that future ACRP deployments of this nature are effected with operational control and support requirements established in advance.

SECRET

HAII II COMINT

CHARGED ONLY

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19 : MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-2
No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/11/19: MDR-USAF-MDR-63590-1-2

DISTRIBUTION

PacSctyRgn
OPS
OFSA
ROI
LOC

6921 Scty Wg
OPS
OFSM

6922d Scty Sq
OF-5
OPSM
MAT
Stock

6922nd Scty Wg

Det 1, 6922nd Scty Wg

Hq USAFSS (COI-5)