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Description of document: National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) The Final Report, Closing Memo, Referral Letter, Referral Memo and Report of Investigation" for thirty NRO Office of Inspector General (OIG) Investigations, 2011-2012

Requested date: 28-March-2013

Released date: 06-November-2013
06 December 2013

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Note: Material released 12-October-2015 begins on PDF page 65

Source of document: National Reconnaissance Office
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[Online Request Form](#)

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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

6 November 2013

This is in response to your letter dated 28 March 2013, received in the Information Management Services Office of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) on 4 April 2013. Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), you are requesting "The Final Report, Closing Memo, Referral Letter, Referral Memo and Report of Investigation" for thirty specific NRO OIG Investigations listed in your letter.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. A thorough search of our files and databases located eighty-three pages that are responsive to your request.

As an interim release, sixty-one pages are being released to you in part. Material being withheld is denied pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(7) as explained herein.

FOIA exemption (b)(1) is the basis for withholding information that is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c) and (e);

FOIA exemption (b)(3) is the basis for withholding information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant withholding statute is 10 U.S.C. § 424, which provides (except as required by the President or for information provided to Congress), that "no provision of law shall be construed to require the disclosure" of the organization or any function of the NRO, including the function of protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, or the name, official title, occupational series, grade, salary or numbers, official title, occupational series, grade, salary or numbers of persons employed by or assigned or detailed to the NRO;

FOIA exemption (b)(6) is the basis for withholding information which, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals; and

FOIA exemption (b)(7)c, which applies to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes and that could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal

privacy of others, FOIA exemption (b)(7)d, which applies to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes which could reasonably disclose the identity of a confidential source, and FOIA exemption (b)(7)e, which affords protection to all law enforcement information that would disclose investigative techniques and procedures.

Additionally, twenty-two pages are being forwarded to other agencies for their review and treatment for their equities and return to the NRO for our final release determination. We will provide our response to you with regard to these records upon receipt from the other agencies.

Since we are unable to provide a complete response to your request at this time, you have the right to consider this interim response to be a denial of your FOIA request and may appeal to the NRO Appeal Review Panel. It would seem more reasonable, however, to allow us sufficient time to complete our processing of your request. You may appeal any denial of records at that time. Unless we hear from you otherwise, we will assume that you agree to permit us sufficient time to continue processing your request, and will proceed on that basis.

If you have any questions, please call the Requester Service Center at (703) 227-9326 and reference case number **F13-0072**.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Douglas J. Davis", written in dark ink.

Douglas J. Davis
Chief, Information Review
and Release Group

Enclosure: Interim Release - NRO OIG Investigations totaling sixty-one pages

ROI DocLink			
Case Number:	2006-089	Case Title:	Cost Mischarging
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Other Criminal
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
		Personnel Assigned:	
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	03/08/2012

[illegible]

Resolution: ● Substantiated Unresolved
 ○ Unsubstantiated

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Investigation Closure Justification:
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 06/26/2012 07:57:23 AM

History

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 03/08/2012 10:29:43 AM



NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Office of Inspector General
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715



27 March 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CONTRACTS
GENERAL COUNSEL
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigative Summary: Mail Fraud
(Case Number 2006-089 I)

(~~U//FOUO~~) On 28 February 2011, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG), in partnership with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the United States Attorney's Office, Central District of California, completed a five-year investigation of a former Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems (Raytheon) employee for mail fraud related to the embezzlement of funds from Raytheon related to NRO programs. The attached NRO OIG investigative summary report details the investigation results.

(~~U//FOUO~~) We request that the Director, Office of Security and Counterintelligence, place a copy of this report in the security file of the individual identified within along with a notation in the appropriate security databases. All other copies of this report are for informational purposes and should be returned to the OIG.

(~~U//FOUO~~) The OIG investigative reports are to be read only by the individuals to whom the OIG provides them, or to whom the OIG specifically authorizes their release. If you believe other individuals require access to this report as part of their official duties, please let us know and we will promptly review your request.

(~~U//FOUO~~) Please direct any questions regarding this summary to Special Agent (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6) (secure), or to (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6) Assistant Inspector General for Investigation, at (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6) (secure).

Lanie D'Alessandro
Inspector General

Attachment:

(~~U//FOUO~~) Investigative Summary

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigative Summary: Mail Fraud
(Case Number 2006-089 I)

OIG (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6) [REDACTED] March 2012

DISTRIBUTION:

Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Principal Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Director, Office of Contracts
General Counsel
Director, Office of Security and Counterintelligence
Lead Special Agent - (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6) [REDACTED]

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

Mail Fraud (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

(Case Number 2006-089 1)

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U//FOUO) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG), in partnership with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), Central District of California, completed a five-year investigation into allegations that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c a former employee of Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems (Raytheon), engaged in fraudulent financial activity. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was solely responsible for a financial scheme perpetrated via the US Postal Service between 1989 and 2006, in which he billed Raytheon on multiple occasions for the same cellular telephone (cell phone) invoices related to an NRO program. As a consequence, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c illegally obtained payments indirectly from the Government by submitting fraudulent invoices to Raytheon.

(U//FOUO) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which makes it illegal to engage in fraud via the U.S. Postal Service or a private or commercial interstate carrier. He pled guilty on 30 November 2010 and was subsequently sentenced to nine months imprisonment followed by six months home confinement. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was also ordered to pay \$264,825 in restitution to Raytheon. These funds were ultimately credited back to NRO.

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

Mail Fraud (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C
(Case Number 2006-0891)

(U) BACKGROUND

(U//FOUO) On 17 July 2006, (b)(6), (b)(7)C contacted the OIG to disclose suspicious financial activity on the part of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C and to advise that Raytheon could not proceed further with its investigation due to a lack of access to records. Raytheon requested OIG assistance in furthering the investigation. The OIG opened an investigation into the matter on 18 July 2006.

(U//FOUO) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C was a manager in the Security Department within Raytheon. As such he was responsible for overseeing the special security requirements for classified programs. From 1989 to 2006, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C acquired cell phones for use by Raytheon employees assigned to these classified programs. All cell phone bills addressed to the individual Raytheon employees were sent to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C home address. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C paid the bills for the cell phones from both his personal funds and on his corporate credit card and then requested and received reimbursement from Raytheon for the paid cell phone bills. In 1989, when the program began, the cell phones were acquired and billed in this way to maintain confidentiality of the relationship between Raytheon and the NRO at a time when the NRO was an unacknowledged organization. Although the program began with one or two phones, eventually it grew to 49 phones. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C retained complete and sole cognizance over the cell phone program. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C received all billings, paid the invoices, and received reimbursement with no oversight from Raytheon or the NRO. These expenses were ultimately billed to the NRO as an indirect charge over multiple contracts.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

(U//FOUO) The investigation revealed that from 1989 to 2006, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C unilaterally administered the cell phone program in support of an NRO program under contract with Raytheon. Upon making payment on cell phone invoices from an account in his name, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C would then seek reimbursement from Raytheon; as the sole control point, he was able to repeatedly file multiple reimbursement requests on single invoices. As a result, the fraudulent claims for payment allowed him to receive money from Raytheon to which he was not legally entitled. These expenses were unknowingly billed by Raytheon to the NRO. These transactions typically involved the mailing of invoices and checks between the cell phone providers, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C and Raytheon.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE DETAILS

(U//FOUO) The OIG began its investigation by reviewing the investigative work that the Raytheon Corporate Office of Business Ethics and Compliance had completed. The OIG found that Raytheon became suspicious when their auditors performed a routine audit of a petty cash fund in June 2006. The audit covered the period from May 2005 to

June 2006 and revealed large amounts of reimbursement payments for cell phone bills without supporting documentation attached to the accounting copy. The reimbursements were paid by Raytheon to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

(U//FOUO) Based on the audit findings, Raytheon's Corporate Office of Business Ethics and Compliance immediately began an investigation into the matter. That investigation included an expanded review of all petty cash requests, check requests, and expense reports processed for payment to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c from 2003 through May 2006. To the extent that supporting documentation was available, cell phone bills were charted to identify amounts, employees to whom the phones were assigned, and approvers of the reimbursement documents. Raytheon also interviewed personnel who processed or approved the payment documents, and then interviewed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. Upon completion of the review, Raytheon believed the total of reimbursements paid to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c with no supporting documentation was \$257,172.

(U//FOUO) During the course of Raytheon's investigation (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c made several oral and written statements regarding the matter. These statements presented conflicting information about the program, his reimbursement requests, documentation notes, and retention statements. The investigation concluded at the end of 2006. Raytheon terminated (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c employment on 19 January 2007 for being unable to account for company monies paid to him, for violating company policy regarding the destruction of documents, and for making contradictory/misleading statements during the investigation of this matter.

(U//FOUO) In order to support a request for subpoenas for full cell phone records from the service providers, the OIG conducted analysis of available Raytheon records to determine the range for reasonable reimbursement for 49 cell phones during 2003-2006. The OIG estimated the proper costs, given the average bill, capital equipment costs, and termination fees, would have been between \$140,000 and \$160,000. This estimate was consistent with the \$141,430 that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c had been reimbursed via checks. However, the total amount received by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was \$398,602. This was paid through three separate reimbursement methods (checks, petty cash disbursements, and payment of expense reports). In sum, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was overpaid for the cell phone costs by \$257,172.

(U//FOUO) In examining the data provided from the company investigation, the OIG determined that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c had engaged in a fraud scheme against the NRO by requesting multiple reimbursements from Raytheon for many of the cell phone invoices. In addition to receiving proper reimbursement to cover his valid expenses under the terms of the program, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c resubmitted these invoices through other company reimbursement mechanisms, such as petty cash disbursements and expense voucher claims, for the purpose of receiving payment again for charges he had already been reimbursed by Raytheon. Both the legitimate and illegitimate payments made to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c were unwittingly passed as an indirect charge to NRO contracts.

(U//FOUO) On 3 May 2007, the OIG briefed the USAO for the Central District of California on the nature of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c suspected fraud scheme and presented the summary overbilling illustrated by the evidence to date. The USAO agreed in principle with the merits of the case and concurred with moving forward with grand jury subpoenas to further develop evidence. A grand jury subpoena was served to Raytheon for work papers, interviews, reports, and notes from its internal investigation of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. The subpoena included a request for documents, vouchers, expense reports, and receipts, illustrating the different company mechanisms used by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c to request and receive multiple reimbursements from the company. Throughout the fall of 2007, the subpoenaed materials were reviewed and additional subpoenas were prepared for the cell phone providers under the advisement of the USAO.

(U//FOUO) In early 2008, extensive grand jury subpoenas were served on T-Mobile, AT&T, and Verizon for records related to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. The investigative team also requested information associated with 39 individuals known to have received cell phones from (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and information associated with 51 cell phone numbers and 48 accounts associated with cell phones issued by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

(U//FOUO) Throughout the remainder of 2008 and into 2009, the investigation continued with a detailed review of the boxes of subpoenaed materials. Based on the newly gathered data, investigators and supporting auditors conducted another extensive review and financial analysis incorporating the new information. In addition, numerous interviews were conducted of persons with knowledge of the cell phone program, as well as with company financial officers involved in the reimbursements. During the analysis, the OIG identified a total amount of \$264,825 of fraudulent claim.¹ The OIG was ultimately able to identify seven distinct duplicate and triplicate reimbursements that became the basis for the case. Each of these represented a false claim.

(U//FOUO) The OIG analysis was supported by a litigation consulting firm hired independently by Raytheon to support their basis for termination of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. This firm found the same seven instances of multiple reimbursements.

(U//FOUO) In the fall of 2009, the USAO began a pre-indictment review of the evidence and prepared to take the case before the grand jury. The USAO was concerned that the charges of false claims would be difficult to prosecute because the charges had been indirect. Since the OIG had sufficient evidence to illustrate multiple instances where (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c utilized the U.S. Postal Service to perpetrate his false claims of reimbursement, the USAO chose to focus on the associated mail fraud for each of the seven fully supported false claims. On 27 April 2010, the lead OIG agent testified before a Federal grand jury and a seven-count indictment for mail fraud was returned against (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

(U//FOUO) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c pleaded not guilty to the charges and refused to consider a plea agreement during a reverse proffer meeting conducted by the USAO and supported by the OIG. Following this meeting, a lengthy trial preparation ensued. The NRO OIG remained fully

¹ (U//FOUO) This amount is higher than the \$257,172 previously identified by Raytheon because the OIG expanded the period of review beyond the time period of the Raytheon audit.

engaged, supporting production of evidence and exhibits and preparing for testimony. On 30 November 2010, only days before the scheduled trial, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c, pled guilty to one count of mail fraud and agreed to pay restitution.

(U) CONCLUSION

(U//~~FOUO~~) The investigation revealed that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c committed mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. On 28 February 2011, a federal judge sentenced (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c to nine months imprisonment, followed by six months of house arrest. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$264,825 to Raytheon. In turn, Raytheon made the government whole by returning the funds that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c had misappropriated by making adjustments to the appropriate indirect accounts. There is no further investigative action required. The OIG considers this investigation closed.

ROI DocLink			
Case Number:	2009-040	Case Title:	Western Titanium: False Certification
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	False Certification
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	07/19/2011

[illegible]

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☒ Unresolved
☐ Unsubstantiated

(U) On 22 December 2008, the NRO OIG received notification from (b)(3) 19 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding a criminal indictment against Western Titanium Incorporated (WTI). The indictment was for false certification of the grade of metals sold by WTI to various government agencies. Specifically, titanium originates as ingots that are forged into billets, which are then hot rolled (rolled plate) or hot forged (forged bar) for use in aerospace products. WTI was not performing the hot rolling or hot forging process, but instead was sawing the material from billets for use in finished products. The less expensive process of sawing the materials from billets changed the physical properties of the titanium, so the finished product no longer met aerospace qualification standards. Despite this, WTI knowingly certified this titanium as aerospace qualified. The OIG opened this case to determine if NRO programs would be or had been negatively impacted by the purchase and/or use of the falsely certified titanium.

~~(S//TK//NOFORN)~~ Although all NRO programs were required to check for WTI parts and if used, review potential impact, the most immediate concern was with

upcoming launch (L-26) slated for 13 January 2009. Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] learned that there were 18 isolator shocks on the L26 launch vehicle that included WTI titanium. The shocks were purchased through Boeing Co., Huntington Beach, California at a cost of [REDACTED]. Upon learning of the problems with the titanium, Aerospace Corporation principle engineer [REDACTED] was put in charge of determining whether or not the isolator shocks could be used on the launch vehicle. He had approved the use of the shocks because ULA had performed 100% acceptance testing on the parts and 100% load testing on the flight units and the parts passed. To replace the shocks would have caused a three to six month launch delay at a cost of approximately \$1 million per day. The launch took place as scheduled on 17 January 2009.

(U) From January through June 2009, all NRO programs using WTI titanium undertook impact assessments. On 23 June 2009, representatives from the federal agencies investigating WTI met with the AUSA assigned to the case to discuss specifics. Although the NRO was not included in the original indictment, the AUSA noted that she was willing to file a superseding indictment against WTI for any unqualified titanium provided to the NRO. On 6 July 2009, the AUSA was contacted and updated on the status of the NRO impact assessments. The AUSA stated that because the isolator shocks had basically become floating space junk, they could not be used for a superseding indictment, but that any other WTI falsely certified titanium parts could still be used. She noted that this was the case even if the parts had been exonerated in order to not impact critical development or launches.

(U) Following that meeting, SA [REDACTED] prepared a classified list of potentially impacted parts, which contained classified material. The AUSA was not cleared and could not review the list. The OIG attempted to facilitate the clearance process for the AUSA, but the AUSA failed to complete the process. In July 2009 and in February 2010, superseding indictments took place. Despite the AUSA's continued promise to indict on NRO issues, neither superseding indictment covered NRO programs. The superseding indictments were followed by a three-month trial in October 2010 that ended in a plea agreement on 12 January 2011. WTI pled guilty to one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1342. On 7 June 2011, the AUSA was asked about prosecution of NRO false claims. The AUSA referred the OIG to the Chief of the Major Frauds Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney's Office San Diego, who stated that further prosecution was barred by the plea agreement. As a result, we recommend closure of this case as unresolved.

Additional Information :



PUMP report WTI.pdf

Justification Comments History

Investigation Closure Justification: Unresolved. Subject pled; NRO not part of case; plea agreement bars additional cases on same issue.

[REDACTED] 10/24/2012 02:05:23 PM
[REDACTED]

History

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
(b)(7)C 07/19/2011 12:59:15 PM



NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Office of Inspector General
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715



7 September 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
DIRECTOR, MISSION OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
GENERAL COUNSEL
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigative Summary: Child Pornography
(Case Number 2010-015 I)

(~~U//FOUO~~) On 9 November 2009, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated an investigation based on a report from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that a Lockheed Martin employee assigned to the NRO had been arrested for possession of child pornography at his home. The OIG investigation was in support of a request from ICE and the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Mexico. Please see the attached NRO OIG investigative summary report, which details the investigation results.

(~~U//FOUO~~) We request that the Director, Office of Security and Counterintelligence place a copy of this report in the security file of the individual identified within along with a notation in the appropriate security databases. All other copies are for informational purposes only and should be returned to the OIG.

(~~U//FOUO~~) OIG investigation reports are to be read only by the individuals to whom OIG provides them, or to whom the OIG specifically authorizes their release. If there are other persons who you believe require access as part of their official duties, please let us know, and we will promptly review your request.

(~~U//FOUO~~) If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6) Assistant Inspector General for Investigations at (b)(6) (secure).


Lanie D'Alessandro
Inspector General

Attachment:
(~~U//FOUO~~) Investigative Summary

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Investigative Summary: Child Pornography
(Case Number 2010-015 I)

OIG (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 7 Sep 2011

DISTRIBUTION:

Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Principal Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Director, Mission Operations Directorate
General Counsel
Director, Office of Security and Counterintelligence
OIG Official Record (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

(U//FOUO) Investigative Summary:
Child Pornography (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 (Case Number 2010-0151)

(U) BACKGROUND

(U//FOUO) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) participated in a joint investigation with the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for the District of New Mexico and several law enforcement agencies regarding allegations that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c a Lockheed Martin employee assigned to the Aerospace Data Facility – Southwest (ADF-SW) in support of the A2 program, had been regularly downloading, storing, and viewing child pornography (CP) on his home computer.

(U//FOUO) The investigation into (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c activities was initiated as a result of a search warrant executed at his residence in Las Cruces, New Mexico on 5 November 2009 in connection with a different matter. This warrant was executed by Las Cruces Police Department (LCPD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) while investigating an adult male who lived in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c home as (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c adult daughter's boyfriend. The boyfriend was under investigation for having inappropriate contact with an underage female. The results of the search warrant revealed CP attributable to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. He subsequently admitted to possessing CP and was taken into custody by local law enforcement on 9 November 2009, removed from access at ADF-SW, and his employment was subsequently terminated with Lockheed Martin.

(U//FOUO) At the time of the search warrant (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c attempted to dissuade law enforcement agents from seizing one of the computers in his home by claiming that it was used by him for his classified work on a government program. As a result, this case was also addressed as a security and counterintelligence matter. At the request of the USAO, the OIG conducted an investigation into (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c actions at ADF-SW to determine if there was any evidence internal to NRO that could facilitate the CP investigation. The Office of Security and Counterintelligence was similarly engaged given (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c claim of having classified materials on his home computer.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

(U//FOUO) The joint investigation revealed evidence supporting the conclusion that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c had violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, *Certain Activities Relating to Material Constituting or Containing Child Pornography*, which makes it unlawful for anyone to knowingly receive CP via a computer. Evidence seized from (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c home indicated that he had been downloading, storing, and viewing millions of CP images via the Internet for many years.

(U//FOUO) Beyond uncovering limited background information regarding (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c general presence and patterns of work at ADF-SW and Lockheed Martin, the OIG found no evidence that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c had used any NRO or Lockheed Martin networks to engage in any aspect

¹ (U//FOUO) ICE is the principal agency chartered for investigating child exploitation matters at the federal level because of the amount of child pornography that is transmitted to and from locations outside of the United States.

of the crime. Additionally, the joint investigative team found no evidence supporting (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c claim that he had used a personal computer to process classified information outside of a secure environment.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE DETAILS

(U//FOUO) As directed by the USAO, District Of New Mexico, the OIG obtained information regarding (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c activities at ADF-SW and with Lockheed Martin. The OIG also examined the content of several government computers used by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c to connect to the Internet for his assigned place of duty.

(U//FOUO) The OIG interviewed coworkers and supervisors with immediate knowledge of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c activities at ADF-SW. Generally, all sources reported that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c seemed to have a clear division between his professional and private life and spoke very little of his life outside of work. He had limited administrative access to the ADF-SW networks as a system administrator in order to do maintenance and upgrade software applications. He also had the ability to download and copy data onto removable media such as compact disks.

(U//FOUO) The OIG interviewed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c on-site Lockheed Martin supervisor at ADF-SW. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c opined that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was a reliable employee who never engaged in any activity that warranted suspicion. When asked if (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was permitted or required to conduct any government or company business from home, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that doing so would have required documentation with Lockheed and that the requirement would have to be related to a government contract. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was not aware of any such requirement or approval.

(U//FOUO) The OIG conducted a forensic examination of two hard disk drives (HDD) from two separate computers known to have been regularly used by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c to connect to the Internet from ADF-SW. The HDDs were initially seized by ADF-SW security personnel and collected as evidence by OIG shortly after (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was taken into custody in November 2009. The forensic examination did not reveal any evidence indicating (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c used these computers to engage in acts of child exploitation or any overt criminal matters from ADF-SW.

(U//FOUO) External to the NRO, LCPD conducted a forensic examination of the computers and other assorted devices (memory cards, cellular phones, and items capable of storing electronic images) seized from (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c home at the time of the November 2009 search warrant. The first HDD was processed by LCPD and further reviewed in tandem with the OIG and ICE. The drive contained over 1,000,000 pornographic images, the vast majority of which involved prurient depictions of children. In many cases (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c had organized the images in various subfolders based on genre and assorted categories.

(U//FOUO) While none of the aforementioned images appeared to have been produced by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c he had used a camera to take digital photographs of children in public places around his neighborhood in Las Cruces. While not prurient in nature, the photographs were taken surreptitiously from a distance using a telephoto lens. There was no evidence that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c had any direct contact with these children.

(U//FOUO) Given (b)(3) 18 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c initial claim that he used at least one of the computers found in the home to process classified information for his work at ADF-SW, the contents of the HDDs were further reviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and (b)(3) 18 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c assigned to ADF-SW. No classified information was found on the HDDs. When interviewed in June 2010, (b)(3) 18 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated that he had not used the computer to process classified information as originally reported. As a result, the FBI closed its espionage case on (b)(3) 18 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

(U//FOUO) On 9 June 2010, (b)(3) 18 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed to plead guilty to receiving CP in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, *Certain Activities Relating to Material Constituting or Containing Child Pornography*. As a result of some health considerations, his pre-sentence investigation² was protracted over several months and final sentencing was not reached until February 2011.

(U) CONCLUSION

(U//FOUO) The extensive joint investigation executed by the OIG, ICE, LCPD, and the USAO led to (b)(3) 18 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c conviction for downloading and storing over one million CP images via his home computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, *Certain Activities Relating to Material Constituting or Containing Child Pornography*. On 16 February 2011, (b)(3) 18 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was sentenced to 78 months in a federal prison. Upon his release, he will be required to register as a sex offender and to participate in counseling commensurate with the nature of his sexual offense. This concludes the investigation without need for further action by the OIG.

² (U//FOUO) A pre-sentence investigation provides the court with background information to be considered at the time that sentencing is determined. This includes personal factors which are used to determine the Bureau of Prisons facility in which the sentence will be served.

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2010-162	Case Title:	Insider Trading
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Other Criminal
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	06/29/2011

Allegation Information**Individual/Entity Name:**(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
(b)(7)c

TASC employee assigned to Office of Policy and Strategy

Component/Employer:(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
(b)(7)c**Narrative:**

On 18 August 2010, OIG Investigations received a Hotlink email on the GWAN from (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) Office of Policy and Strategy (OP&S) wherein he alleged that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) (b)(7)c a TASC employee assigned to OP&S, was engaged in fraud. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) explained that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) spent large amounts of time on the telephone and on the internet from his assigned workspace engaged in personal business. This consisted of researching stocks and "day trading." (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) also explained that the TASC program manager was aware of the issue, but had chosen not to address it and dismissed it because "the government is not giving him anything to do." (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) also believed that a government manager was likely aware of the issue, but he was uncertain as to what actions had been taken.

OIG Investigators (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) subsequently interviewed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) on the afternoon of 19 August 2010. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) explained that he is an independent consultant to TASC in OP&S and has had daily contact with (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) either directly or in passing since (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) arrived to NRO with TASC in May 2009. Since that time (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) has made a habit of using his unclassified (nro.mil) account to overtly research stocks. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) stated that he had personally witnessed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) do this for up to 90 minutes a day. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) also noted that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) is regularly away from his desk without explanation for large amounts of time; his government point of contact (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) is constantly trying to determine (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) whereabouts. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) understands from conversations with (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) whereabouts. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) has been seen in the NRO library doing on-line stock research similar to what he does in the office. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) work with (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) on a regular basis and have heard him speaking to his broker on numerous occasions.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) stated that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) does have some minimal meetings outside of NRO, but these are once a week at best and do not account for the prolonged absence. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) occasionally meets with the DNI at Liberty Crossing because his position requires him to coordinate policy with that office. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) also states on occasion that he is going to a TASC facility to do some work there, but (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) had his doubts about that claim. On the day of this interview, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) stated that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) had claimed that he had a meeting in

Crystal City for approximately one hour. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c later called the office and stated that he would not be returning. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c also stated that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c often comes in late and leaves early. He is not known to have any personal or medical issues that would keep him on leave and out of the office. He is not known to have outside employment.

As noted in the Hotlink, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c explained that the TASC team lead (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c was ostensibly turning a blind eye to the matter. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c believes that this is because (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c is considered an experienced employee who can assure further contracts so long as he is present on the team. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c explained further that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c have not come forward to the government because they fear any repercussions resulting in loss of employment.

Following this interview, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c contacted (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c Incident Response Team (IRT), for support in collecting computer network data. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c stated that IRT had communicated this issue to OIG Investigations earlier this year (January/February 2010) and that no case had been undertaken. While (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c could not recount sufficient details to reconcile his position, he did note that IRT still had the data from (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c computer activity. It illustrated that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c made very liberal use of the NRO Unclassified Management Information System (UMIS) to engage in stock trading via a Scottrade account. He used UMIS machines in his office and in the NRO library. Moreover, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c stated that the activity illustrated that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c was researching stocks linked to NRO contract and policy decisions. In the aggregate, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c believed that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c was engaged in insider trading because he was making stock decisions based on privileged information.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c stated that he had informed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c his government and TASC managers respectively, of his Hotlink contact with the OIG; however, they did not know of this interview, only the Hotlink. He believed that they might take action in the near future and explained that it would be prudent to contact (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c early in the investigation to preclude any complications.

Investigator Recommendation: ☐ Close ☒ Open

Reason for recommendation: This case is being open to investigate the allegation that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c is using his access to NRO information to engage in insider trading under 17 USC, 240.10b5-1, which prohibits the use of "nonpublic" information gathered by virtue of "breach of a duty of trust or confidence." It is also likely that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(5), (b)(7)c absence and claim of time constitutes fraud under 18 USC 287.

Resolution Deadline: 11/21/2010

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☐ Unresolved
☒ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

Recommend closing this case as the allegation was unfounded. The NRO/OIG interviewed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) government manager (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Policy and Analysis Group, and explained the allegations of insider trading and internet usage concerning (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was aware of the internet usage allegation as (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who brought the concern to the OIG, also brought the concern to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) attention. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) explained that the office requirements recently changed, and management is unsure of the direction the office should pursue; therefore there is a lot of downtime. He further explained that while (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is not one to take initiative, he completes any task assigned to him. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) said they try to keep everyone gainfully employee, but everyone in the office has downtime. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not believe that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had access to any information that would contribute to insider trading.

The NRO OIG reviewed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) email (unclassified and classified), and found no evidence that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was involved in insider trading; however, evidence clearly showed that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was significantly involved in stock trading. He received stock information daily on his unclassified system, and researched stock information daily; however, there was no evidence that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) researched information gained from the Office of Policy. OIG will not pursue cost mischarging for (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) activities because (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) government manager could not substantiate a loss to the government. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) component was in a transitional period and there was a lack of work to be performed.

During the investigation (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was released from the contract for performance problems. According to the COTR (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) performance issues were not related to the investigative matters. The COTR explained that he focused on specific areas of work in which he was interested, but was not interested in performing his entire realm of tasks.

Recommend closing this case as (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) no longer works on the Office of Policy contract, and due to the lack of insider trading evidence.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Unsubstantiated

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/26/2012 08:43:03 AM

Complaint Closure Justification: no insider trading; government actions undercut any case on basis of cost mischarging

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/30/2012 03:53:20 PM

IG-INV Approval: Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

01/26/2012 08:42:38 AM

IGC Concurrence: Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

01/30/2012 03:56:57 PM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2011-065	Case Title:	Cost Mischarging
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Procurement Fraud - Cost Mischarging
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	02/22/2012

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
(b)(7)(C) Contractor
Mantech/Integrity Applications Inc.
Security Engineering Division (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424
(Division (SED) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

Component/Employer:

National Reconnaissance Office (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424
(NRO) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) Deputy Chief

Narrative:

~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~ On 9 March 2011, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received information via internal classified email from NRO (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 Deputy Chief (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) alleging cost mischarging by Subject. According to the referral from Source, Subject disclosed this information during a polygraph pretest interview conducted in September 2010, while employed by Mantech, Inc. and Integrity Applications, Inc. The information provided indicated that Subject advised he had knowingly and deliberately overcharged his US Government customers approximately thirty minutes or \$50.00 daily beginning in early 2007 until two days prior to his second polygraph session.

~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~ Additionally, information provided by Subject included a timeline of his "most serious concerns" regarding misuse of Government Information Systems. According to the information derived during the polygraph interview, Subject initially estimated that he viewed what he deemed adult pornography daily adding he had occasionally viewed pornographic images, pictures and videos of children (not age specific). Information provided from the polygraph report indicated Subject claimed he could not recall specific details of his first experience related to child pornography, but indicated Subject attempted to "carefully chronicle" his exposure to child pornography for reporting accuracy during his polygraph interview.

~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~ The information provided by Source indicated Subject confirmed that he has used his unclassified IAI-issued laptop to access adult pornographic websites and commercially available online movies via the internet. Subject is reported

to have stated the movies generally included adult nudity and depicted graphic sex acts which he used to engage in masturbation or self-gratification. Subject is also reported to have stated he had occasionally used the same laptop in accessing several US Government sponsored programs to include: RPG.net, Iron Curtain, Vulture (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/UAV Program), and C-Sniper.

Investigator Recommendation: Close ☒ Open

Reason for recommendation: Recommend opening a case initially to determine if Subject submitted false claims as described in *Title 18 USC, Section 287* - False Claims; the investigation will also address any child exploitation matters and coordinate them with law enforcement as appropriate.

Resolution Deadline: 06/13/2011

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: Substantiated ☒ Unresolved
Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

(U//FOUO) 11 March 2011- At the direction of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) AIG for Investigations, Subject's IAI issued laptop was delivered to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) (USAF), F&ISD with a request for his forensic review and analysis of the data on the device in support of the investigative effort. The forensic analysis, according to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) report, did not reveal any matters of evidentiary value.

(U//FOUO) 22 April 2011- The criminal activity concerns regarding Subject's admission(s) to multiple viewings of child pornography, were forwarded in a summary format via NMIS email to Special Agent (b)(6) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Innocent Images Section for their review and consideration following consultation with (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) AIG/INV and SA (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6).

(U//FOUO) Under current protocol, OIG refers these cases to FBI when notified by the NRO Office of General Counsel (OGC) that Department of Justice (DOJ) has not responded to the initial referral made to DOJ by OGC. OIG maintains an open case file for 90 days to support a joint investigation with FBI and other law enforcement as required. No immediate request was made within the past 90 days; however, this case may be re-opened as warranted.

Additional Information:

(U//FOUO) On 4 May 2011, SA (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) consulted with (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) PSD/SAS at which time she verified that Subject's security processing had been "self-terminated". She added that based on the "significant admissions" obtained during Subject's NRO polygraph sessions from August and September 2010, his file will be "flagged" at NRO and this action will be noted in Scattered Castles in the event of a future effort by Subject to apply for a security clearance with the US Government. The investigative efforts determined that Subject's work, predominantly applies to his tenure as an employee of Mantech SRS, relating to a DARPA contract in Boston, MA, and that only a nominal amount (estimated at \$3,000+/-) is attributable to the NRO while an employee with Integrity Applications, Inc. As such, with the concurrence of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) D-AIGI,

no further action is warranted by OIG/INV subject to any findings or request for support by the FBI-Innocent Images Task Force.

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Does not rise to the level to justify additional resources and investigation. Subject no longer in access. Security file documented.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 06/18/2012 12:45:38 PM

Complaint Closure Justification:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 07/13/2012 01:00:11 PM

IG-INV Approval:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	06/18/2012 11:55:20 AM
IGC Concurrence:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	07/13/2012 01:00:17 PM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number: 2011-084	Case Title: Contractor On-the-Spot Award
Lead Agency: NRO IG	Case Category: Regulatory Violations
Investigator: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Personnel Assigned: [REDACTED]
	Date of Entry: 01/11/2012

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

TASC contractor assigned to COMM

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

Component/Employer:

Anonymous - IG Hotlink

Narrative:

(U//FOUO) On 24 March 2011, the National Reconnaissance Office, Office of Inspector General (NRO/OIG) received information from an anonymous source via IG Hotlink advising the following:

"I over heard my manager say a contractor in the COMM Front Office who departed the NRO was given an On-The-Spot award, but the way COMM got away with it was the award was handed to a government employee first who supposedly selected the award as her On the Spot award and then the government employee handed it to the contractor as a personal gift. Not sure if this is ethical or the right thing to do, but I am in charge of the On the Spot award supply list and feel uncomfortable with the situation. When I asked my manager, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) if we checked with OGC on this he said that contacting OGC was not necessary."

NRO Policy dictates that On-The-Spot Awards can not be given to contractors by the government. The inquiry would be initiated to determine if COMM used a government employee to intentionally maneuver around the On-The-Spot Award policy.

(Ref ID # 220)

Investigator Recommendation: Close <input checked="" type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation: Recommend opening this case to determine if there was a violation of the NRO awards policy (NRO Awards e-Handbook, Section 15, Sub-section B) prohibiting contractors from receiving On-The-Spot Awards.
Resolution Deadline: 07/24/2011

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: Substantiated Unresolved

☒ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

(U//~~FOUO~~) This complaint alleged that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) a TASC employee supporting COMM (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) received a COMM polo shirt as an On-the-Spot award as a departure gift. Section 15 of the NRO Awards e-Handbook titled "Non-Monetary Awards" states that "contractors may not receive On-The-Spot Awards."

(U//~~FOUO~~) Investigator (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) conducted three subject interviews as part of this investigation. The investigation showed that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) made an innocent comment to a co-worker (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) (government), that she liked the COMM polo shirt that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) received on 23 March 2011 as an On-The-Spot Award (See attached Certificate of Appreciation given to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) by COMM with her On-The-Spot Award). Recalling (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) fondness of the COMM polo shirt (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) gave (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the shirt as a personal gift during a 24 March 2011 going away party in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) honor. The party for (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was a result of her leaving COMM to work on another contract.

(U//~~FOUO~~) OIG found no corroborating information supporting the allegation that COMM provided a contractor with an On-the-Spot Award. The case is therefore closed as unsubstantiated and no further action is deemed necessary.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Unsubstantiated
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 02/06/2012 09:04:21 AM

Complaint Closure Justification:
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 02/21/2012 04:00:14 PM

Re-Open Justification: AIMS did not close correctly on first attempt
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 02/21/2012 04:14:24 PM

Case Type Change: Aims did not close correctly
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 02/21/2012 04:14:24 PM

Recommend Closure Justification: Unsubstantiated
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 02/22/2012 09:50:34 AM

Complaint Closure Justification:
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 02/22/2012 11:36:25 AM

IG-INV Approval: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 02/06/2012 09:03:28 AM

IGC Concurrence: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 02/21/2012 04:00:19 PM



NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Office of Inspector General
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715



19 September 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

(b)(1)14c, (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(7)c

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CONTRACTS
GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: (U) Investigative Summary: Procurement Integrity Act-
Theft of Electronic Documents (Case Number
2011-106 I)

~~(S//REL)~~ The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of
Inspector General (OIG) initiated an investigation based on
allegations of potential violations of the Procurement Integrity
Act by employees of Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems (RSAS)
supporting the

(b)(1)14c, (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(7)c

(b)(1)14c, (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(7)c

RSAS is a competitor of Ball Aerospace

Corporation in

(b)(1)14c, (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(7)c

(b)(1)14c, (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(7)c

procurement.

The two companies are actively engaged in a competitive effort
for future subcontract work under the oversight of the prime
contractor, Lockheed Martin Corporation. The attached NRO OIG
Investigative Summary details the results of this investigation.

(U//FOUO) OIG investigation reports regarding this matter
are to be read only by the individuals to whom the OIG provides
them, or to whom the OIG specifically authorizes their release.
If there are other persons who you believe require access as
part of their official duties, please let us know, and we will
promptly review your request.

CL BY: (b)(3) 10 USC
424, (b)(6)
DECL ON: 25X1 20611019,
RRG dated July 2005
DRV FROM: NCG 6.0, 21 May 2005

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

SUBJECT: (U) Investigative Summary: Procurement Integrity Act-
Theft of Electronic Documents (Case Number
2011-106 I)

(U//FOUO) If you have any questions concerning this report,
please contact Special Agent (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (secure)
or (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations, at (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c (secure).



Lanie D'Alessandro
Inspector General

Attachment:

(U) Investigative Summary:
(Case Number 2011-106 I)

~~(SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

SUBJECT: (U) Investigative Summary: Procurement Integrity Act-
Theft of Electronic Documents (Case Number
2011-106 I)

DIG (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [REDACTED] 19 Oct 11

DISTRIBUTION:

Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Principal Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office

(b)(1)(4), (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(7)c [REDACTED]

Director, Office of Contracts

General Counsel

Lead Agent - (b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6),
(b)(7)c [REDACTED]

~~(U//FOUO)~~ INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY
PROCUREMENT INTEGRITY ACT –
THEFT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
(CASE NUMBER 2011-106 I)

(U) BACKGROUND

~~(S//REL)~~ On 27 May 2011, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a complaint alleging that four employees of Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems (RSAS) improperly accessed “competition sensitive information” belonging to Ball Aerospace Corporation (Ball) via NRO’s Contractor Wide Area Network (CWAN). Both RSAS and Ball are currently subcontractors to Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) providing a proprietary (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E solution to the (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E

(b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E acquisition in the (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E

According to (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E the contractor that provides the better (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E solution is expected to be awarded future related work from LMC, which is conducting the subcontract competition. In May 2011, two separate incidents occurred wherein RSAS employees accessed documents containing Ball’s competition sensitive information related to the (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E acquisition. The OIG initiated an investigation as the alleged actions potentially violated 41 U.S.C. § 2102, Procurement Integrity Act (as amended by Pub. L. 111-350), which prohibits any person from knowingly obtaining contractor bid or proposal information or source selection information before the award of a Federal agency procurement contract to which the information relates.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The OIG inquiry included extensive interviews with multiple witnesses as well as forensic examinations of the networks and servers involved in the incidents. The facts in this case did not indicate that the four individuals violated 41 U.S.C. § 2102. While RSAS personnel did access Ball’s competition sensitive information, this exposure was inadvertent; we found no evidence suggesting in either incident that RSAS knowingly obtained the information. In both incidents, two of the four RSAS engineers who found the Ball documents were not included on the RSAS (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E team and were working on matters unrelated to the (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E acquisition. They were conducting searches on other websites available to them on the CWAN and discovered several documents, some of which contained (b)(1)(1) 4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)E information, specifically Ball’s “competition sensitive information.” The files were not encrypted, nor were the file names distinctly labeled. Consequently, it was not initially apparent to the engineers that the content of the documents included Ball’s sensitive proprietary information. In two independent incidents--after the engineers opened the documents, they saw the “competition sensitive” markings and realized the documents contained Ball’s “competition sensitive information” all parties took the proper precautions and reported the incidents appropriately--although each did so through different channels. This caused some initial confusion about the fact that two separate incidents had occurred. Consequently, the affected NRO program learned of the second incident approximately one week after being notified of the first incident.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG investigation also revealed that RSAS personnel made a legitimate effort to remove the Ball information from all its computer systems. However, at the request of the OIG, the NRO's Defensive Operation Flight Incident Response Team (DOF/IRT) provided additional technical guidance to further assure that all the Ball information has been removed from RSAS systems and cannot be retrieved.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Finally, the OIG investigation revealed a lack of formal NRO policy and clear guidance to contractors governing the use of network sites like the ones utilized in these instances. The engineers told OIG agents that they believed that files not protected by passwords or similar control mechanisms were considered accessible to all for common use on these sites. Indeed, that seems to be the practice.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE DETAILS

(U//~~FOUO~~) Two separate but similar incidents occurred where employees of RSAS inadvertently obtained competition sensitive information belonging to Ball Aerospace. Both occurred during the week of 11 May 2011.

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Incident Number One:** The first incident occurred over two days, 11 and 12 May 2011. RSAS engineer, (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c, was conducting general research on a website called the NRO System Integration Environment (NSite) that is controlled and administered by the System Integration Organization, Inc. (SIO). He accessed NSite from a CWAN terminal within a Raytheon facility. On 11 May 2011, (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c, searched the term "RSAS" and several links to folders appeared. One of the folders was related to the (b)(1)14c, (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c acquisition and (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c opened it to find a Raytheon document that contained competition sensitive information related to (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c contacted (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c on 12 May 2011, whom he knew to support the RSAS (b)(1)14c, (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c effort, to alert him that Raytheon's information was on the open NSite where it should not be.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c could not initially open the folder (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c told (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c that he had to first establish an NSite account. In the interim, (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c opened the folder to determine its accessibility without realizing that (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c has successfully established his NSite account and had been able to view the folder at around the same time. Consequently, both men had accessed a document in the folder titled "06_PMR (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c v5." In conducting separate cursory examinations of its content to determine the extent of Raytheon competition sensitive information contained in the document, both men also separately realized that the document included Ball's competition sensitive information. Before one could warn the other, it was too late; both men had been exposed to the Ball information in a very short window. They immediately reported the incident to their management chain within RSAS. The incident was reported by RSAS management to LMC on 13 May 2011, with follow up on 16 May 2011 via teleconference and email.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Forensic analysis of the NSite was conducted by the SIO as that organization administers the site. SIO's analysis indicated that the document containing the Ball information was accessed three times by the Raytheon Internet Protocol (IP) addresses on the CWAN associated with the computers used by (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. This is consistent with the

number of times (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c told OIG investigators that they accessed the document.

(U//FOUO) Incident Number Two: The second incident occurred on 13 May 2011. RSAS engineer (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was reviewing several folders on the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) site on his CWAN computer. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c explained that he routinely used the FTP site to look for openly available technical materials related to his professional requirements and interests. He told OIG that he opened the FTP site and numerous folders appeared. He arbitrarily began to open folders. One of the folders was labeled (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and in it was a document titled "SDRL_EO44_2356154_Rev A_SRR_Presentation". The document was of such a significant size that he was unable to open it on the FTP without slowing down the system. In an effort to view the document, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c downloaded the file to another computer in his office based on a personal preference for an older model Apple Macintosh (Mac). Although the Mac was considerably antiquated when compared to current hardware, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c explained that he had a level of comfort and affinity for the computer; it was his computer of preference at work. Once loaded, he was able to open and view the document on the Mac. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c told OIG agents that a compatibility conflict between the Mac Hardware and the Microsoft application resulted in a screen that had a green background, which made viewing problematic, but he could tell that the document was related to the (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c acquisition. He also told OIG agents that it had the Ball Aerospace logo, but he did not see any restrictive markings and believed that since the document was not encrypted, he was allowed to view it.¹ As such, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c contacted (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c another RSAS engineer who supported the RSAS piece of the (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c acquisition, and told (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c he may have something of interest to him.

(U//FOUO) Together (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c scanned through the document quickly and neither was certain of the exact content they saw. They eventually came to a page that no longer had a green background, but was white and contained the "competition sensitive" marking. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c observed the same "competition sensitive" marking on two other pages. At that point, they immediately stopped browsing the document and proceeded to encrypt it to prevent any other RSAS personnel from inadvertently accessing it.

(U//FOUO) This incident occurred late on Friday afternoon. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c immediately attempted to contact RSAS legal counsel (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c however, he was unsuccessful in doing so until Monday, 16 May 2011. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c departed for a trip soon after discussing the incident with (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c and could provide no further guidance until the following week. Additionally, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c participated in a teleconference on May 16th involving several LMC and RSAS managers and did not effectively clarify that this incident was separate and distinct from the initial incident involving (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c although he was aware of this. As a result, during a follow up conversation with LMC on 23 May 2011, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c referenced this second incident and it appeared to LMC and the NRO program to be an intentionally delayed reporting. No one interviewed from NRO or LMC was aware of the internal reporting at Raytheon regarding both of these incidents.

¹ (U//FOUO) LMC, Ball, and Raytheon have entered into a Proprietary Information Agreement (PIA), which allows personnel from each contractor to view certain data from each other as long as it is appropriately marked.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated he often views Ball data as a result of the PIA.

(U//FOUO) Forensic analysis was conducted on the FTP by the NRO's Defensive Operation Flight Incident Response Team (DOF/IRT). The DOF/IRT reported that the "SDRL_EO4_2356154_Rev A_SRR_Presentation" document was accessed on the FTP only once on 13 May 2011, which is consistent with what (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c told the OIG.

(U//FOUO) In both incidents, these documents were inadvertently accessed by the two sets of two RSAS engineers because the proper handlers of the documents failed to exercise internal company procedures when dealing with sensitive documents on the networks. With regard to the first incident, an employee of the SIO put several documents on the NSite in conjunction with a recent Program Management Review. As part of the review, his intent was to openly share information with other involved personnel via the collaborative environment of NSite. The employee admitted that he had a large number of files, failed to review the documents thoroughly for any restrictive markings or content, and accidentally put competition sensitive information files on NSite. The OIG found that NSite users are instructed against placing proprietary or competition sensitive information on the system regardless of whether or not it is protected. Consequently, the documents involved in the first incident should never have been placed on NSite.

(U//FOUO) In the second incident, a Scitor employee placed the document in question on the FTP in order for a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) employee to review the document. The NGA employee was unavailable for a meeting where the information contained in the document was going to be discussed; therefore, he requested access to the information planned for presentation. The Scitor employee advised investigators that he created a file, put the document in the file, and instructed the NGA employee to retrieve the document and then delete it after he had accessed it. The Scitor employee told the OIG that he put the document on the FTP with a generic label and failed to observe proper policy protocol by password protecting or encrypting the file. The NGA employee did not access the file or delete the file from the FTP as he had been instructed by the Scitor employee.

(U) CONCLUSION

(U//FOUO) The OIG investigation did not produce any evidence supporting violations of 41 U.S.C. § 2102. Rather, the investigation demonstrated that the disclosures were inadvertent and each reported in a timely manner within RSAS. Confusion among RSAS and LMC with the existence of two incidents in such a short time frame contributed to the appearance that one of the incidents was not reported in a timely manner. Moreover, the OIG found that the NRO lacks formal policy or sufficient guidance regarding the use of communal websites and servers such as NSite and the FTP. This deficiency contributed to the problem and was brought to the attention of the NRO Corporate Council, the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(7)c as well as the Office of Contracts and Office of General Counsel. The OIG considers the matter concluded without need for further investigation.

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2011-122	Case Title:	Child Pornography
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Other Criminal
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	09/28/2011

Allegation Information**Individual/Entity Name:**

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Lockheed Martin

Component/Employer:

NRO/OGC, NRO/OS&CI

Narrative:

On 5 July 2011, The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a copy of a referral that NRO Office of General Counsel sent to Department of Justice. During NRO polygraph interviews, Subject admitted to viewing child pornography, and downloading illegal programs such as music, videos etc., on the internet.

Recommend opening this case to refer to Federal Bureau of Investigation, Innocent Images Program.

Intake number 327.

Investigator Recommendation:	<input type="radio"/> Close <input checked="" type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation:	Recommend opening this case to assist FBI Innocent Images. Viewing child pornography violates Title 18 USC, sec 2252 and 2252a.
Resolution Deadline:	10/09/2011

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☒ Unresolved
☐ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 September 2011, OIG referred this case to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Innocent Images Task Force, Special Agent (b)(6). Under current protocol, OIG refers these cases to FBI when notified by the NRO Office of General Counsel (OGC) that Department of Justice (DOJ) has not responded to the initial referral made to DOJ by OGC. OIG maintains an open case file for 90 days to support a joint investigation with FBI and other law enforcement as required. No immediate request was made within the past 90 days; however, this case may be re-opened as warranted.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Referred to FBI - No further OIG action required

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/10/2012 09:16:48 AM

Complete Closure Justification:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/10/2012 02:04:15 PM

IG-INV Approval: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/10/2012 09:15:34 AM

IGC Concurrence: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/10/2012 02:04:21 PM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number: 2011-124	Case Title: Child Pornography
Lead Agency: NRO IG	Case Category: Other Criminal
Investigator: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Personnel Assigned: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
	Date of Entry: 09/28/2011

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Aecom

Component/Employer:

NRO/OGC

Narrative:

On 1 June 2011, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received a copy of an NRO Office of General Counsel (OGC) referral to Department Of Justice (DOJ), involving criminal activity of an NRO contractor. During a 5 May 2011 polygraph interview, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) admitted to viewing child pornography on a monthly basis.

(Refer to Intake Database #339)

Investigator Recommendation: <input type="radio"/> Close <input checked="" type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation: Recommend opening this case to assist FBI Innocent Images. Viewing child pornography violates Title 18 USC, sec. 2252 and 2252a.
Resolution Deadline: 10/19/2011

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☒ Unresolved
☐ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

(U//FOUO) On 28 September 2011, OIG referred this case to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Innocent Images Task Force, Special Agent (b)(6). Under current protocol, OIG refers these cases to FBI when notified by the NRO Office of General Counsel (OGC) that Department of Justice (DOJ) has not responded to the initial referral made to DOJ by OGC. OIG maintains an open case file for 90 days to support a joint investigation with FBI and other law enforcement as required. No immediate request was made within the past 90 days; however, this case may be re-opened as warranted.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ Closure Memorandum

Recommend Closure Justification: Referred to FBI - No further OIG required
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/10/2012 09:18:22 AM

Complaint Closure Justification:
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/10/2012 02:04:48 PM

IG-INV Approval:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	01/10/2012 09:18:09 AM
IGC Concurrence:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	01/10/2012 02:04:52 PM

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ Closure Memorandum

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2011-125	Case Title:	Child Pornography
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Other Criminal
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	05/14/2012

Allegation Information**Individual/Entity Name:**(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6),
(b)(7)(C)

Northrop Grumman, Linthicum MD

Component/Employer:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) and OGC

Narrative:

On 1 June 2011, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received a copy of an NRO Office of General Counsel (OGC) referral to Department Of Justice (DOJ), involving criminal activity of an NRO contractor. During 4 and 12 May 2011 polygraph interviews, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) admitted to viewing child pornography. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said that he has viewed between 500 to 1,000 images of girls between 12 and 18 years old. He admitted the last time he viewed "teenage" pornography was a few days prior to his second polygraph session. He views these images at home and on his company computer.

(Refer to Intake Database #344)

Investigator Recommendation:	<input type="radio"/> Close <input type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation:	Recommend opening this case to assist FBI Innocent Images. Viewing child pornography violates Title 18 USC, sec. 2252 and 2252a.
Resolution Deadline:	10/19/2011

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☒ Unresolved
☐ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

~~(U//FOUO)~~ On 10 January 2012, The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of Inspector General (OIG) referred this case to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Innocent Images Task Force, Special Agent in Charge (b)(6). Under current protocol, OIG refers these cases to FBI when notified by the NRO Office of General Counsel (OGC) that Department of Justice (DOJ) has not responded to the initial referral made to DOJ by OGC. OIG maintains an open case file for 90 days to support a joint investigation with FBI and other law enforcement as required. No immediate request was made by FBI within the past 90 days; however, this case may be re-opened as warranted.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Referred to FBI - no further OIG action required
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 05/15/2012 04:25:04 PM

Complaint Closure Justification:
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 05/23/2012 03:59:24 PM

IG-INV Approval: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 05/15/2012 04:24:46 PM

IGC Concurrence: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 05/23/2012 03:59:28 PM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2011-145	Case Title:	Anti-Deficiency Act Violation
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Regulatory Violations
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	11/16/2011

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] Purchase Card Holder

Mission Operations Directorate (MOD), Network Operations Group (NOG),

Component/Employer:

(U//FOUO) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted]

Narrative:

(U//FOUO) During interviews on 13 and 14 September 2011, CS brought the following information to the OIG's attention.

(U//FOUO) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] a government purchase card holder assigned to Mission Operations Directorate (MOD), Network Operations Group (NOG),

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 [redacted] purchased cold weather gear (boots and jackets) for (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 [redacted] personnel with a Government Purchase Card (GPC). Purchase price was approximately \$3,000. Prior to the purchase (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] coordinated the purchase through (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] the Government Purchase Card Coordinator. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] approved the use of the Government Purchase Card for the purchase of the cold weather gear. After the credit card statement was received (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 [redacted] submitted the statement for payment by Business Plans and Operations (BPO), Finance (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] BPO Finance Policy, rejected the payment as his office determined that the material purchased was not allowed to be procured through the GPC. The GPC was cut off due to the payment not being made and, approximately three months after the purchase, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] Commander of NOG, paid the credit card bill with his personal funds. The use of his personal check to pay the GPC bill must be coordinated through BPO as the card company cannot accept personal checks for payment. CS stated that NOG was able to return approximately \$1,700 of the \$3,000 of material purchases and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] only paid \$1,300. The payment by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] was ultimately over the amount owed and CS believes that the overpayment was credited to the GPC and not returned to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted]. The material not returned is held within a (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted] office in the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted]. The person in possession of the items is (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c [redacted].

(U//FOUO) CS believes that at some point NRO Office of General Counsel was notified

about the issue.

Investigator Recommendation: Close ☒ Open

Reason for recommendation: (U//~~FOUO~~) This case is recommended for opening in order to determine if government authorities required a government official to use personal funds for the purchase of official property, a potential augmentation of NRO funds and a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

Resolution Deadline: 12/13/2011

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: Substantiated Unresolved

☒ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NRO/OIG reviewed Mission Operations Directorate (MOD), Network Operations Group (NOG), (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 use of a Government Purchase Card (GPC) for the purchase of uniform items (winter coats, gloves, overalls, and hats) and determined no fraudulent activities or violation of law.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The investigation showed that MOD/NOG (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 received approval from the NRO's GPC Coordinator to purchase the uniform items in question. However, after the purchases were made and the credit card statements were submitted to BPO accounts payable, BPO Policy disapproved the use of NRO Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds for clothing purchases. NRO OGC agreed with BPO Policy's decision. MOD/NOG (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 also submitted a request to Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and AFSPC denied the use of O&M funds for the purchase of the uniform items.

(U//~~FOUO~~) When questioned, BPO Policy stated that even though the GPC Coordinator approved the purchases, the ultimate responsibility for the appropriate use of government credit cards and use of federal funds associated with the use of the credit cards resides with the government approving officer within the component.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Based on the disapproval of payment by BPO, MOD/NOG (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 returned the clothing items; however, approximately \$1,000 of items could not be returned. For nonreturnable items, the Commander of MOD/NOG used his personal funds to pay for the clothing items. We identified that this payment included approximately \$100 in overpayment and that this overpayment is in the process of being reimbursed to the Commander of MOD/NOG.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As a result of this issue, BPO Policy issued guidance on the use of funds for clothing purchases. Specifically, the guidance outlines a general prohibition on clothing purchases unless three conditions are met: 1) the item must be special and not part of the ordinary and usual furnishings an employee may reasonably be expected to provide for himself; 2) the item must be for the benefit of the government that is

essential to the safe and successful accomplishment of the work, and not solely for the protection of the employee; and 3) the employee must be engaged in hazardous duty (GAO defines as "...a duty that (is) performed under circumstances in which an accident could result in serious injury or death...").

(U//~~FOUO~~) Further, on 30 September 2011, Office of Contracts Policy issued NAC 2011-03 that contained a full prohibition of purchase card use for uniform purchases.

(U) No fraud or intentional misrepresentations were identified and this case is recommended for closure.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Policy issue addressed - No further OIG action warranted

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/10/2012 08:57:05 AM

Complaint Closure Justification:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 01/10/2012 02:05:46 PM

IG-INV Approval:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	12/05/2011 02:10:12 PM
IGC Concurrence:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	01/10/2012 02:05:50 PM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number: 2012-047	Case Title: Govt Purchase Card Fraud
Lead Agency: NRO IG	Case Category: Theft/Misuse of Govt Property
Investigator: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Personnel Assigned: [REDACTED]
	Date of Entry: 03/06/2012

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name:

UNKNOWN

Component/Employer:

(U//FOUO) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

ODIR (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

Narrative:

(U//FOUO) On 23 January 2012, the Office of Inspector General (OIG), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), received a complaint from source alleging fraudulent charges were made on two Government Purchase Cards (GPC) used by the front office. Both cardholders have contacted US Bank (USB) to report the fraudulent charges. One card had \$981.01 in fraudulent charges; the other had over \$8,000. All of the charges were made at various establishments in Texas. USB opened a fraud investigation on both cards.

(Ref Intake ID #498)

Investigator Recommendation: ☐ Close ☒ OpenReason for recommendation: Determine if there was a violation of *18 U.S.C. § 287, False, Fictitious, and Fraudulent Claims*, and whether the culprit is an NRO employee.

Resolution Deadline: 04/23/2012

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: ☒ Substantiated ☐ Unresolved
☐ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

(U//FOUO) OIG contacted both GPC cardholders and determined that one was used by Director's Action Staff for training only and was kept in a cypher-locked office on the 4th Floor; the other, was used by ODIR for non-monetary awards, office supplies and for the Honor Guard and was locked up in an office on the 5th floor. Neither of the GPC cardholders suspected their office mates or any other NRO employees of misusing the cards. All of the charges were made in various establishments in Texas. Both cardholders have filed affidavits with USB which has credited the charges to the GPC and has the lead in investigating this matter. No further OIG action is warranted.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: No further OIG action required
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 03/12/2012 12:38:17 PM

Complaint Closure Justification:
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 03/29/2012 03:11:20 PM

IG-INV Approval: Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

03/12/2012 12:37:20 PM

IGC Concurrence: Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

03/29/2012 03:11:24 PM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2012-052	Case Title:	Alleged Child Abuse
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Other Criminal
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Personnel Assigned:	
		Date of Entry:	02/22/2012

Allegation Information**Individual/Entity Name:**

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Lockheed Martin

Component/Employer:

Confidential Source (CS)

Narrative:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

On 27 January 2012, [redacted] was contacted by a CS regarding allegations of child abuse involving [redacted] a contractor working for NRO at the Westfields

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

The CS is involved in the NRO Workplace Violence Assessment Team (WVAT) and became aware of the allegation on Monday, 23 January 2012.

According to what the CS has collected from several sources involved, in the Fall of 2011, [redacted] is alleged to have engaged in some sort of injurious physical abuse of [redacted]

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

[redacted] is the biological son of [redacted]

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[redacted] is also working somewhere in security at Westfields. The CS understood [redacted] has also been the victim of [redacted] abuse both physical and verbal.

As a result of the abuse, the couple separated; however, [redacted] still has access to [redacted] home and [redacted] lives with her. The CS was not aware of any reporting to

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

law enforcement, social welfare, or if either [redacted] or [redacted] sought medical assistance. There are [redacted] other children in the marriage - [redacted].

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

The CS also stated [redacted] is apparently stalking [redacted]. He was engaged in surveillance of her home and has used his key to gain access to her home and sort through her personal items in an effort to determine her activities. The WVAT intends to review [redacted] behavior at work, which parallels some of these reports. For example, [redacted] is reported to be observing [redacted] movements, coming and goings, etc. while at Westfields. He has also made entries in his Facebook page which illustrates suicidal thoughts - stating he envisioned a tombstone with his name on it. There were also reports he had acquired a firearm and then disposed of it after [redacted] told him he could not see the kids. The CS further related [redacted] is seeking help from the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) because of underlying emotional issues.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

This matter was referred to the Prince William County Sheriff's Department (PWCS), who initiated case #: [redacted]

Intake Database#: 504

Investigator Recommendation: Close ☒ Open

Reason for recommendation: Recommend opening so as to facilitate the referral to the appropriate law enforcement entity.

Resolution Deadline: 05/02/2012

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: Substantiated Unresolved

☒ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

On 22 Feb 12, this office was notified contact by the PWCSO and informed contact with both parties was made. The case was ultimately closed as unfounded.

Recommend closure as no further assistance is needed from this office.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Unsubstantiated

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 (b)(6) 03/12/2012 12:28:38 PM

Complaint Closure Justification:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 (b)(6) 03/29/2012 03:14:09 PM

IG-INV Approval: Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 (b)(6)

03/12/2012 12:28:24 PM

IGC Concurrence: Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 (b)(6)

03/29/2012 03:14:13 PM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2012-054	Case Title:	Child Pornography
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Other Criminal
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Personnel Assigned	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
		Date of Entry:	05/15/2012

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name:
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Northrop Grumman, Fairfax, Virginia

Component/Employer:

NRO (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 and Office of General Counsel

Narrative:

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of General Counsel (OGC) notified the NRO Office of Inspector General (OIG) at Westfields of a referral OGC sent to the Department of Justice regarding (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c who in a 3 November 2010 polygraph interview admitted to viewing child pornography, including viewing approximately 3,000 images, pictures, or videos of children or minors who appear below the age of informed consent. He also noted viewing approximately 30 images or videos of children who he considered to be clearly below the age of informed consent. He further noted use of internet search terms such as "innocent", "amateur", "young", "barely legal", and "fresh."

Recommend examining all existing evidence, and referring this case to FBI Innocent Images for action.

Ref Intake 493

Investigator Recommendation:	<input type="radio"/> Close <input checked="" type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation: Recommend opening this case to assist FBI Innocent Images. Viewing child pornography violates Title 18 United States Code, sections 2252 and 2252a.	
Resolution Deadline: 05/02/2012	

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☒ Unresolved
Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

On 1 February 2012, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of Inspector General (OIG) referred this case to (b)(6) Special Agent in Charge, Innocent Images Task Force, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Under current protocol, OIG refers these cases to FBI when notified by the NRO Office of General Counsel (OGC) that Department of Justice (DOJ) has not responded to the initial referral made to DOJ by OGC. OIG maintains an open case file for 90 days to support a joint investigation with FBI and other law enforcement as required. No immediate request was made by FBI within the past 90 days; however, this case may be re-opened as warranted.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Referred to FBI - no further OIG action required
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 05/15/2012 04:26:55 PM

Complaint Closure Justification:
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 05/23/2012 04:01:56 PM

IG-INV Approval: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 05/15/2012 04:26:40 PM

IGC Concurrence: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 05/23/2012 04:02:00 PM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2012-071	Case Title:	Theft- Conversion
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Theft/Misuse of Govt Property
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
		Date of Entry:	04/18/2012

Allegation Information**Individual/Entity Name:**

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

CIA

Special Comms (SCO)

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

Component/Employer:

Hotlink

Narrative:

On 26 March 2011, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Denver Office, received an anonymous hotlink complaint regarding potential misuse of government travel funds. According to the hotlink complaint, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c accepts travel advances in excess of actual incurred costs and then fails to make restitution back to the U.S. Government.

REF ID#: 552

Investigator Recommendation: ☐ Close ☒ Open

Reason for recommendation: Recommend opening in order to determine if Subject is converting federal funds for personal use; a violation of Title 18 Sec. 641 Public money, property or records.

Resolution Deadline: 07/01/2012

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☐ Unresolved
☒ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

On 3 Apr 12, this office was notified (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was denied a Government Travel Card (GTC), contrary to the belief of the complainant.

On 18 Apr 12, SA (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) interviewed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c travel processor, who had processed about 4-5 travel advance requests to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c over the last two years. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c further confirmed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c had no GTC. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated once, possibly twice, in the last two years, it took a couple of weeks to get an overpayment back from (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

Additionally, as noted in the original complaint, there was one time when [REDACTED] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) check for the reimbursement back to the government bounced. Once [REDACTED] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) was contacted about the bounced check and he confirmed it with the bank, he immediately obtained a cashier's check for the amount he owed. [REDACTED] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) has always paid back any money due to the government from his travel and there has never been an issue with questionable expenses with [REDACTED] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) travel vouchers.

Base on the above listed information, recommend closure of this investigation as an Unfounded complaint.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Unsubstantiated
[REDACTED] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 06/18/2012 10:22:41 AM

Complaint Closure Justification:
[REDACTED] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 07/05/2012 10:56:13 AM

IG-INV Approval:	Approved	[REDACTED] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	06/18/2012 10:21:57 AM
IGC Concurrence:	Approved	[REDACTED] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	07/05/2012 10:56:18 AM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2012-072	Case Title:	Regulatory Violations
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Regulatory Violations
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	11/16/2012

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name :
RAF-MHS Personnel

Component/Employer:
Anonymous

Narrative:

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 26 March 2012, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received an anonymous complaint that contractor employees assigned to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 may be allowing non-dependent relatives (in-laws) and boyfriends/girlfriends to use (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 services. These services were identified as the base commissary, the base exchange, and the base gas station. The allegations also stipulated employees may be purchasing the items and providing the items to their in-laws or boyfriend/girlfriend.

Intake #548.

Investigator Recommendation :	<input type="radio"/> Close <input checked="" type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation :	(U// FOUO) If contractors are allowing non-dependents to use base services or providing non-dependents with purchases from base services, this may be a violation of the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 or other regulations.
Resolution Deadline :	07/03/2012

Last Investigative Step :
Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☒ Unresolved
☐ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

Based on the allegation of potential improper use of bases services at (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 the OIG referred the complaint to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provided a notice to the workforce, dated 13 November 2013, providing warnings and guidance on the proper use of the base commissary, the base exchange, and the base gas station.

No further investigative activities will be conducted and this case is recommended for closure.

Additional Information :

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Management action taken

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424,
(b)(6)

12/18/2012 03:42:28 PM

Complaint Closure Justification: Management action taken

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424,
(b)(6)

12/18/2012 03:43:38 PM

IG-INV Approval:

Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

11/21/2012 09:48:23 AM

IGC Concurrence:

Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

12/18/2012 03:43:51 PM

Closure Memorandum	
Case Number:	2012-077
Case Title:	Theft/Conversion
Lead Agency:	NRO IG
Case Category:	Theft/Misuse of Govt Property
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Date of Entry:	07/18/2012

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Government Civilian AST (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

Component/Employer:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Contracting Officer AST (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

Narrative:

On 27 April 2012 the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of the Advanced Systems and Technologies (AST) directorate contracts staff in the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 reported that one of her Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives (COTR) (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had a contractor (Scitor) purchase computer equipment for his personal use. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) opined the equipment could have been for work related functions but was not sure. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is in the process of closing out contract 06-C-0024 with Scitor and she along with property analyst (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were attempting to decide what to do with several items of property acquired by Scitor in performance of the contract. Some of the equipment on the property list had no paperwork associated with the purchases that would normally be found. When she asked (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the Scitor program manager, about the property, he told (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the COTR requested the items via email from a gentleman named (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) last name unknown. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has not been asked to return the property to her knowledge. Finally (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated the equipment in question was not listed in the contractor's original proposal.

REF Intake ID #592.

Investigator Recommendation :	<input type="radio"/> Close <input checked="" type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation :	Recommend opening this case to determine if Subject's actions violated 18 U.S.C. § 641, Theft of public money, property or records.
Resolution Deadline :	08/07/2012

Last Investigative Step :

 Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☐ Unresolved
☒ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

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On 27 April 2012, contracting officer (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) came to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) to report potential conversion of Government equipment by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) on one of her contracts. Specifically, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) told OIG that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) requested one of his contractors to purchase some computer equipment for his use. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also requested Scitor take contractual ownership of a digital camera from another contract for (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) use. Requesting a contractor purchase items via a contract line item for a Government employee's personal use is a prohibited contractual practice. Such items should be purchased through Government sources. As a result, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was suspicious that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) might be involved in more than a contracting irregularity. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) asked (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to return the items to her and after he did such, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a written explanation to why he requested the equipment. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) cited work related to his NRO program as the purposes for the equipment. OIG took possession of the equipment from (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to determine if (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had converted these items for his or any family member's non-work related, personal use.

A forensic review revealed that the majority of the content on the computer consisted of email and internet searches. The email and searches appeared to be primarily NRO business related corroborating what (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) told (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in his written explanation. Very little of the content was personal in nature and allowable per NRO policy dictating personal use of Government equipment. There is no evidence to suggest (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) converted this equipment solely for his personal use.

Additional Information :

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Unsubstantiated

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 10/01/2012 08:53:20 AM

Complaint Closure Justification: File

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 10/01/2012 08:53:54 AM

IG-INV Approval: Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

09/26/2012 01:16:08 PM

IGC Concurrence: Approved

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

10/01/2012 08:54:00 AM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2012-081	Case Title:	COI
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Conflict of Interest - Financial
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	05/22/2012

Allegation Information**Individual/Entity Name:**

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c COTR for the Ground Enterprise Directorate (GED) Contract Number NRO000-09-C-0061 with Harris Corporation

Component/Employer:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Senior Contracting Officer (SCO) for NRO Corporate Contracts

Narrative:

On 16 May 2012, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Westfields Office, was called by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c Senior Contracting Officer (SCO) for NRO/Corporate Contracts. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c called SA (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c regarding an issue that his Property Management personnel had uncovered. While conducting a Property Audit at the Harris Corp. facility in Melbourne, FL they came across "Kindles, iPads, and Smartphones" listed as property acquired under NRO/Ground Enterprise Directorate (GED) contract NRO000-09-C-0061 (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c discussed the matter. A summary of their conversation follows: The above mentioned items were properly accounted for but their existence on the contractor acquired property list was an anomaly to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c given GED's mission. GED is all about the Mission Ground Stations (MGSs). You cannot take wireless devices (Kindles, iPADS and Smartphones) onto an MGS. All the data transmitted/collected/ processed at the MGSs is CLASSIFIED and cannot be transmitted to any of these devices. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c could not understand how the acquisition could be within the scope of the contract.

When the GED contract specialist (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was asked about it, she asked the Harris Contracting Officer (CO) and was directed to contract modification P 00046.

(b)(6), (b)(7)c Lead Contracts Manager for Harris wrote in an 8 May 2012 email to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c "...P00046 ...was issued unilaterally. ...the items purchased to demo the High Density Terrain 3-D modeling tool ...were approved by the program office using CLIN 0001AA underrun (e.g. smartphones, iPADS and Kindles) ...These technological items were needed for the demo environment."

(b)(6), (b)(7)c sent another email on 9 May 2012 to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c that stated:

"For additional information ...and why the specific devices were requested ...; to support the Harris Terrain Model Rapid Delivery application, or HTMRD product digital publications ...The devices ordered support production for these products, ensure product compatibility and serve as demonstration for customer outreach."

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c SCO for GED, emailed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c that "The govt PM authorized the

purchase of these items for the system demo. Apparently the use of the Kindle and iPADS were necessary to demonstrate access to the application wherever needed with handheld mobile devices."

The Statement of Work (SOW), the Price Negotiation Memorandum (PNM) for the Base Contract, and P00046 (referenced in the email stream as authorizing this activity) were all reviewed on-line by Investigator (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).

- Nothing in any of these documents support the acquisition of the equipment acquired (Kindles, iPADS, Smartphones) or the activity supported by the equipment (production, compatibility and demonstration of the Harris Terrain Model Delivery App).

- The activity appears to be out of scope. [the activity was executed under CLIN 1AA; this CLIN is for "Echelon 2 Maintenance".]

- The activity appears to be direct support to the development and marketing of a Harris proprietary product.

(Ref Intake Database ID#597)

Investigator Recommendation : <input type="radio"/> Close <input checked="" type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation : Recommend opening a case to see if the COTR violated 18 U.S.C. § 208, Acts Affecting a Personal Financial Interest, Conflict of Interest - Financial.
Resolution Deadline :

Last Investigative Step :
 Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☐ Unresolved
☒ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification:

This investigation was initiated subsequent to a contact by the Senior Contracting Officer (SCO) for NRO/Corporate Contracts (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). The NRO Property Management personnel reported to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that while conducting an audit of NRO property at Harris Corp., they found some unusual items on Harris' property book: six (6) Kindles, iPads and Smartphones. These items were carried by the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) contract, contract number NRO000-09-C-0061 (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) expressed misgivings about why the NRO's Ground Enterprise Directorate (GED) might have a need for such items and reported it to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

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Discussions were held with GED's SCC (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C, the cognizant GED Contracting Team Chief (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C, the Contract Specialist presently responsible for (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C, and the current COTR, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C. Although a review of the contract and the Statement of Work (SOW) failed to identify the rationale for acquiring items such as these in support of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C activities, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C asserted in an email (see case file) dated 14 May 2012 that one of the documents incorporated by reference into the contract (SR-130E) did provide the basis for the acquisition of such items. In addition, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C provided an email (see case file) dated 11 Apr 2011 addressed to the D7/GED (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C and the DD/GED (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C that identified the location of briefing charts to be presented at the quarterly Program Management Review (QPMR) in May 2011 at ADF-SW. One of the charts specifically addressed the use of an "iPhone, iPad, Kindle and more." Copies of the charts are also included in the case file.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C admitted that the briefing was not a decision briefing. She did feel that the briefing communicated to GED Senior Management the Program's intent to acquire the items which she felt was within the scope and cost of the contract. When asked why the acquisition of the devices was charged to CLIN 2 of the contract [CLIN 2 was for Echelon Level Two Maintenance], (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)C stated that it was because that CLIN was underrunning and funding was available on the CLIN.

Executing the specific costs of a contract against a particular CLIN solely because the CLIN is underrunning is not an appropriate contracting practice. However, based on the aforementioned discussion and emails, the acquisition of these items do appear to be within the scope of the contract. There is no reason to suspect that the COTR engaged in any inappropriate activity when she directed Harris Corp. to buy the Kindles/iPads/Smartphones. Recommend this case be closed.

Additional Information :

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Unsubstantiated

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 06/18/2012 12:03:56 PM

Complaint Closure Justification: Certain aspects referred for GED Special Review, so closure of this case is appropriate.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 07/13/2012 12:56:59 PM

IG-INV Approval: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 06/18/2012 12:03:33 PM

IGC Concurrence: Approved (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 07/13/2012 12:57:50 PM

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Closure Memorandum

Case Number:	2012-083	Case Title:	Alleged IPA Violation
Lead Agency:	NRO IG	Case Category:	Other Administrative
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Personnel Assigned:	
		Date of Entry:	06/25/2012

Allegation Information**Individual/Entity Name:**

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

MSD

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

Component/Employer:**Anonymous HotLink****Narrative:**

(U//FOUO) On 22 May 2012, the National Reconnaissance Office, Office of Inspector General (NRO/OIG) received an anonymous OIG Hotlink alleging the following:

There is a "NRO Employee" named (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) who is the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of MSD (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is believed to be an "IPA employee". (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has been serving in the NRO since at least 2004, for far longer than the 2 year period (with 2 year extension) permitted by the IPA Act of 1997 and certainly in excess of the 6 year total service limit. As MSD is undertaking another reorganization, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is again taking a leadership role in determining how the MSD is going to organize itself to do business (and continue his services). The facts of his employment status should be researched and a determination made with the agency holding his IPA agreement as to his tenure in the IPA program and advisability (sic) of its continuance. Having observed (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for a number of years he appears to be a conscientious (sic) servant who may be unwittingly straying afield of IPA provisions. But are good reasons for the legal limitations of service and I am aware of no special skills or degrees held by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) not available thru normal OPM personnel hiring practices.

Intake Database ID# 598

Investigator Recommendation: ☐ Close ☒ Open

Reason for recommendation: To determine if the circumstances regarding (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) employment is violating the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1997.

Resolution Deadline: 09/13/2012

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☐ Unresolved
☒ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

(U//FOUO) On 22 May 2012, the National Reconnaissance Office, Office of Inspector General (NRO/OIG) received an anonymous OIG Hotlink alleging that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of MSD (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was in violation of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) Mobility Program. The US Office of Personnel Management described the purpose of the IPA program as the following:

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Agencies can bring in temporary assignees from State and local governments, colleges and universities, Indian tribal governments, and other not-for-profit organizations under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) Mobility Program. Assignments should be made for the mutual benefit of the Federal Government and the non-Federal entity, and are for 2 years duration. However, assignments may be extended for an additional 2 years, allowing for a maximum term of 4 consecutive years. Assignees are either temporarily appointed to the Federal agency or serve while on detail. Cost-sharing arrangements for mobility assignments are negotiated between the participating organizations. The Federal agency may agree to pay all, some, or none of the costs associated with the assignment. Such costs may include basic pay supplemental pay, benefits, and travel and relocation expenses. (5 U.S.C. 3371-3375; 5 CFR 334)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG confirmed that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c is a Federal Government employee working for the Department of Navy, Space Field Activity (SPAWAR). (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 (b)(6), (b)(7)c has been working for SPAWAR since July 1985. Since (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c is a federal government employee, he is not in violation of the IPA.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Therefore, the OIG has determined that the above allegation is unsubstantiated and has no further action.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: Unsubstantiated

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 06/28/2012 01:18:55 PM

Complaint Closure Justification:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 07/13/2012 01:03:31 PM

IG-INV Approval:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c	06/28/2012 01:18:31 PM
IGC Concurrence:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	07/13/2012 01:03:35 PM

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Closure Memorandum	
Case Number: 2012-084	Case Title: Request for Assistance
Lead Agency: NRO IG	Case Category: Other Criminal
Investigator: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry: 10/03/2012

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

Deloitte Consulting, LLP, BPO-WF

Component/Employer:

Fairfax County Police

Narrative:

On 5 June 2012, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Westfields Office, received an e-mail from the Fairfax County Police (FCP) regarding the arrest of an NRO contractor at a local protest. The FCP reported (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was arrested for Trespassing on 1 June 2012, in conjunction with a protest against the Bilderburg Conference, held at the Chantilly Marriott Hotel. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was inside one of the meeting rooms and claimed she was asked to monitor the meeting by the "government". FCP seized (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c IC Badge and CAC card and requested this office offer verification of the identifications and her story.

REF ID#: 609

Investigator Recommendation: <input type="radio"/> Close <input checked="" type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation: Recommend opening this investigation to offer assistance to FCP as needed.
Resolution Deadline: 09/13/2012

Last Investigative Step:

Resolution: ☒ Substantiated ☐ Unresolved
☐ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of Inspector General (OIG) and NRO, Office of Security and Counterintelligence (OS&CI), (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c conducted a joint interview of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c regarding her arrest. After the interview, it was determined that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c arrest by the Fairfax County Police Department was an issue best handled by OS&CI, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

However, during (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interview, there were indicators that her time and attendance (T&A) submissions may not be accurate. For example (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that she charged the Government for the time she spent at the conference. According to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) she departed work early to attend the conference but claimed a full day of work. Based on her admissions, the OIG conducted a preliminary cost mischarging inquiry.

The OIG conducted a preliminary time and attendance (T&A) inquiry from 26 March 2012 (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NRO EOD) through 1 June 2012. The OIG utilized NRO badge record data and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) T&A records provided by her company, Deloitte Consulting. The analysis resulted in (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) shorting five hours during the period under review which resulted in a \$560.30 loss to the Government.

Since the loss to the Government is *de minimus*, the OIG will not pursue a full investigation. Rather (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) government and corporate supervisors were briefed on the results of the preliminary inquiry and they can take any action deemed necessary.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: de minimus
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 11/05/2012 11:53:58 AM

Complaint Closure Justification: de minimus
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 11/05/2012 11:54:43 AM

IG-INV Approval:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	11/05/2012 11:53:40 AM
IGC Concurrence:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	11/05/2012 11:54:50 AM

Closure Memorandum

Case Number: 2012-089

Date of Entry: 07/10/2012

Investigator: (b)(3) 10
U.S.C. 424,
(b)(6)

Allegation Information

Narrative:

Subject(s): (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), Civilian (GS-15)
(b)(7)c
Office of Security & Counterintelligence (OS&CI)

Source: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c OS&CI

Narrative: (U//FOUO) On 13 June 2012, the Office of Inspector General (OIG), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), received information from a confidential source reporting that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, Deputy Chief (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 OS&CI, may be engaged in time and attendance fraud. Source provided copies of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, calendars and Electronic Management Tracking System records (attached).

Reason for Recommendation: (U) Determine whether Subject violated 18 USC 287 and/or AF time and attendance policies.

Last Investigative Step:

6/29/2012

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☐ Unresolved ☐ Unsubstantiated ☒ Referred

Case Closure Justification:

Additional Information:

(U//FOUO) OIG analyzed the time and attendance (T&A), badge records, eTRIP, and calendar entries for (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 from June 2011 through June 2012. Based on the records and information provided by his managers, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 had 30.4 questionable hours charged representing approximately 3 percent short of his tour. OIG referred this matter to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 manager in accordance with current OIG policy to refer shortages under five percent for management action. Recommend this matter be closed.

OIG Management Approval

Effective Date	Signature	Notes
07/13/2012	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)

OIG Management Approval

Effective Date	Signature	Notes

IG Counsel Approval

Effective Date	Signature	Notes
07/13/2012	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)



NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

06 December 2013

This is in response to your letter dated 28 March 2013, received in the Information Management Services Office of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) on 4 April 2013. Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), you are requesting "The Final Report, Closing Memo, Referral Letter, Referral Memo and Report of Investigation" for thirty specific NRO OIG Investigations listed in your letter.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. On 6 November 2013 we released to you twenty-one documents, totaling sixty-one pages that are responsive to your request. At this time, as a second interim release, we are forwarding two additional documents. These documents, consisting of six pages, are being released to you in part.

Material denied in the responsive documents is withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions:

FOIA exemption (b)(3) is the basis for withholding information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant withholding statute is 10 U.S.C. § 424, which provides (except as required by the President or for information provided to Congress), that "no provision of law shall be construed to require the disclosure" of the organization or any function of the NRO, including the function of protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, or the name, official title, occupational series, grade, salary or numbers, official title, occupational series, grade, salary or numbers of persons employed by or assigned or detailed to the NRO;

FOIA exemption (b)(6) is the basis for withholding information which, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals; and


FOIA exemption (b)(7)c, which applies to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes and that could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others.

Additional responsive documents are currently being coordinated with other agencies for their review and treatment for their equities and return to the NRO for our final release determination. We will provide our response to you with regard to these records upon receipt from the other agencies.

Since we are unable to provide a complete response to your request at this time, you have the right to consider this interim response to be a denial of your FOIA request and may appeal to the NRO Appeal Review Panel. It would seem more reasonable, however, to allow us sufficient time to complete our processing of your request. You may appeal any denial of records at that time. Unless we hear from you otherwise, we will assume that you agree to permit us sufficient time to continue processing your request, and will proceed on that basis.

If you have any questions, please call the Requester Service Center at (703) 227-9326 and reference case number **F13-0072**.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Douglas J. Davis for". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the last name "Davis" being particularly prominent.

Douglas J. Davis
Chief, Information Review
and Release Group

Enclosure: 2nd Interim Release - NRO OIG Investigations totaling six pages

ROI DocLink			
Case Number:	2009-021	Case Title:	False Degrees
Lead Agency:	CIA IG	Case Category:	False Statements
Investigator:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By:	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry:	06/28/2012

Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☒ Unresolved
☐ Unsubstantiated

(U//FOUO) In November 2008, CIA OIG interviewed [redacted] Ms. [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] claimed that she was unaware that PWU was a non-accredited institution. [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] acknowledged that the CIA reimbursed her for all of the PWU classes. It was determined that [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] did not hold a degree that satisfied the minimum education requirements of the position she held. [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] profited from the fraudulent degree because she applied for and approved to convert from the general pay schedule (GS) to the engineering

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pay schedule (GSE), which was a pay increase. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c obtained positions within the GSE pay schedule for 11 years for which she was not qualified based on two fraudulent degrees from PWU. The GSE pay schedule does not allow for equivalent experience, and OPM requires an accredited degree, which (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not possess. According to CIA/OIG, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c obtained \$46,372 from the Agency on false pretenses, in addition to the positions she obtained because of her false degrees.

(U//FOUO) Furthermore, CIA OIG reported that (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c falsely stated on numerous official documents and to Office of Security background investigators that she was pursuing and/or had obtained degrees from George Washington University, George Mason University, and the University of Maryland. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c admitted to CIA OIG that she never obtained these degrees and that she had never enrolled in the programs she claimed.

(U//FOUO) As of 29 June 2012, the CIA/OIG has not released the final report on (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. The NRO OIG has no further actions except case closure.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Investigation Closure Justification:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c 07/13/2012 01:10:45 PM

History

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 06/28/2012 04:17:58 PM

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~~TOP SECRET//25X1~~ Comment

<i>Comment</i>	
Case Number: 2009-021	Case Title: False Degrees
Lead Agency: CIA IG	Case Category: False Statements
Investigator: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG Personnel Assigned: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Date of Entry: 07/02/2012

Subject: *ROI DocLink Comment

DocLink: ☐

Comment/Question	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	07/02/2012 01:14:50 PM
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This is a CIA OIG investigation. NRO supported CIA's investigation and has no further actions. Closure was coordinated with CIA.

Additional Comments:

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<i>Closure Memorandum</i>	
Case Number: 2012-002	Case Title: COI
Lead Agency: NRO IG	Case Category: Conflict of Interest - Financial
Investigator: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Other OIG: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)
Entered By: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	Personnel Assigned: [REDACTED]
	Date of Entry: 01/10/2012

Allegation Information

Individual/Entity Name: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c
 Chief, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c

Component/Employer:
 NRO/OIG, Audit

Narrative:

On 6 Oct 11, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received information from the NRO/OIG Audit staff regarding a possible Conflict of Interest by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c in the hiring of his daughter, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c as in intern for the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424.

Intake Database ID: #398

AGENT'S COMMENT: This issue was first raised in June 2011, however the hiring mechanism for the interns, the POC for the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 intern program, and whether or not OGC (or others within the organization) was consulted in any fashion prior to the hiring of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c daughter, was known when the information was first presented to Investigations. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c agreed at that time to continue to pursue additional answers via the ongoing audit of (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 and get back to SA (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) with any additional information found.

Investigator Recommendation: <input type="radio"/> Close <input checked="" type="radio"/> Open
Reason for recommendation: To determine if there was a violation of 5 CFR §2635.502, Personal and business relationships.
Resolution Deadline: 01/09/2012

Last Investigative Step:
 Resolution: ☐ Substantiated ☒ Unresolved
☐ Unsubstantiated

Case Closure Justification

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The investigation established (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was given detailed legal guidance on the allowable actions by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c from CIA/OGC. Part of the instructions given included the following statement: "should the daughter go before any panels (promotion, hiring, awards), the father may not play a role in that panel. Recusing himself from his daughter's consideration alone does not resolve any conflicts of interest concerns--he must recuse himself from these panels altogether." The interview records of several interns who applied at the same time (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c were reviewed. The review determined (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c signed his name to several of the records as the interviewer--in apparent conflict with the guidance noted above. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was not interviewed by her father nor did he passively participate in any interview for (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was interviewed regarding the OGC guidance. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c admitted he did not forward the CIA/OGC guidance to (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c--it was merely discussed with (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c believed there was not a violation because none of the interns were interviewed via a panel. All interviews were conducted on an individual basis either in person or telephonically. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated if CIA/OGC wanted to prohibit any other mechanism aside from "panels", those avenues should have been outlined in the guidance.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c denied there was any real or appearance of a conflict with (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c participation in the interviews of those who directly competed with his daughter for an limited number of internships. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated the final decision did not rest with (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c reviewed the assessments of all the candidates and did not suspect any impropriety on (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c part.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was interviewed and stated he did not see the CIA/OGC guidance until it was shown to him by the IG Special Agents. After being shown the guidance (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated panels were not used. All prospective (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c interns were either interviewed via telephone or individually in person.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c stated the only restrictions he was aware of when it came to his daughter was (1) he was not to be in her chain of command, (2) he had no input into her projects, (3) he was not involved in her PAR, and (4) he could not be part of any recommendation for award or advancement. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c added he was also verbally instructed not to participate in his daughter's interview by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c.

CIA/OGC was contacted regarding the guidance given to determine if interviews of the other applicants via means other than a panel would have been acceptable. Additionally, CIA/OGC was asked if since the panel process was not the method employed by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c was follow-up guidance sought which specifically addressed the mechanism by which (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c interviewed the intern applicants. CIA/OGC determined any participation by (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c would have been considered prohibited by that office. CIA/OGC did not have a record or communication from (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c requesting clarification on the guidance since (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6), (b)(7)c did not use a panel for the candidate interviews.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ Closure Memorandum(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424,
(b)(6) (b)(7)C

agreed, in retrospect, a clarification of the guidance would have been beneficial as the process used was not specifically addressed.

The results of the investigation were provided to the Director, Business & Policy Office (BPO), for management action.

The OGE legal referent within the CIA OGC regarding the potential Conflict of Interest. It was determined this matter does not rise to the level of a criminal violation.

Additional Information:

Justification Comments History

Recommend Closure Justification: BPO management has been briefed on this matter. Briefing occurred during the (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. Special Review brief that was conducted by Inspections.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 05/18/2012 08:14:44 AM

Complaint Closure Justification:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6) 06/18/2012 10:02:29 AM

IG-INV Approval:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	05/18/2012 08:14:28 AM
IGC Concurrence:	Approved	(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424, (b)(6)	06/18/2012 10:02:33 AM

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