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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

27 OCT 2015

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of June 10, 2008, for a copy of the INSCOM Annual History for FY1991 and supplements our letter of June 11, 2009.

Coordination has been completed with other elements of this command and other government agencies. The records have been returned to this office for our review and direct response to you.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of our review information has been sanitized and 48 pages are being withheld in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2(a)(1), 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 13526. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(1) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified TOP SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 13526, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Information has been withheld that would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

In addition, information has been sanitized from the records as the release of the information would reveal sensitive intelligence methods. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(E) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of sensitive investigative methodologies.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General George J. Franz, III Commanding, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the Freedom of Information Act and may be appealed to the Secretary of the Army. If you decide to appeal at this time, your appeal must be post marked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of our letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis for your disagreement with the response and you should provide justification for reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office to the below listed address for forwarding, as appropriate, to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office (APPEAL)
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

We have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) of the FOIA. The applicable Sections of the Executive Order are Sections 1.4(c) and 3.3 (b)(1). Additional information, while no longer meeting the requirements for declassification, must be withheld on the basis of Section 3.5(c).

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to this office and we will coordinate with the CIA on your behalf. Please cite CIA #EOM-2011-00283/Army #584F-08 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has informed our office that their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Attention: DAN-1A, FOIA, Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA Case #MDR-0044-2011 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

Additionally, we have been informed by the National Security Agency (NSA) that portions of their information has been sanitized from the records pursuant to the exemptions listed below:

5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1) – The information is properly classified in accordance with the criteria for classification in Section 1.4(c) of Executive Order 13526.

5 U.S. Code 552(b)(3) – The specific statutes are listed below:

50 U.S. Code 3605 (Public Law 86-36 Section 6)

50 U.S. Code 3024(i)

18 U.S. Code 798

The initial denial authority for NSA information is the Director Associate Director for Policy and Records. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSA/CSS FOIA/PA Appeal Authority. The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days of the date of the initial denial. The appeal shall be in writing to the NSA/CSS FOIA/PA Appeal Authority (DJP4), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Mill Road, STE 6248, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-6248. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes release of the information is required. The NSA/CSS FOIA/PA Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 20 working days after receipt, absent unusual circumstances.

We apologize for any inconvenience this delay may have caused you.

Copies of the records are enclosed for your use. You have received all available Army intelligence investigative records concerning this subject at this headquarters.

There are no assessable FOIA fees.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651, or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp-mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #584F-08.

Sincerely,



Joanne Benear

Chief

Freedom of Information/Privacy Office

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FISCAL YEAR 1991

History Office
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Nolan Building
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5370

(RCS CSHIS-6(R34))

APPENDED DOCUMENT
CONTAINS SPECIAL
INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

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NATIONALS~~

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WARNING

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
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Regraded SECRET on
22 October 2015
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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
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Chapter I

MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

(b)(1)



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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

Other:

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(b)(1)

(U) During the course of the reporting period, the CG INSCOM gained the additional mission of managing U.S. Army intelligence production activities, as a result of realignment actions that provisionally subordinated the Army Intelligence Agency and its subordinate production elements to INSCOM.

Location. (U) All elements of Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command were located on the North Post of Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060. The command group and principal staff elements occupied the four floors of the Nolan Building (Building 2444) on Beulah Road. Headquarters support elements that could not be housed in the Nolan Building occupied reconverted structures elsewhere on North Post (Buildings 1809 and 2101C). Unmarried troops assigned to INSCOM were billeted in McCrae Barracks, also on North Post.

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Chapter II

COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

Command and Staff Relationships. (U) The CG, INSCOM is under supervision of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Directives, authorities, policy, planning, and programming guidance, approved programs, resource allocations, and other methods of command direction are issued to CG, INSCOM by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

(U) The CG, INSCOM--

1. Commands all assigned units and activities.
2. Is subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS) for the conduct of SIGINT operations.
3. Manages SIGINT resources to accomplish SIGINT operational tasks assigned by DIRNSA/CHCSS.
4. Provides specified military personnel and administrative, logistic, and operational support to the DIRNSA/CHCSS.
5. Deals directly with the Director, DIA for the coordination of HUMINT operational proposals.

(U) INSCOM and other major Army commands (MACOM's) are coordinate elements of DA. The CG, INSCOM is authorized to communicate directly with other major Army commanders or with heads of Army Staff agencies on matters of mutual interest.

(U) The CG, INSCOM will maintain liaison as necessary with other MACOM's, field operating agencies, other cryptologic and intelligence activities, and other foreign domestic governmental agencies to maintain an awareness of, to exchange information on, and to ensure coordination of matters of mutual concern.

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(U) The CG, INSCOM acts as executive agent for logistic support, SIGINT technical support, and mission steering for the DA TROJAN program, an effort to provide units in garrison with live signals for training (and possibly operational) purposes. INSCOM has the responsibility to ensure adequate SIGINT technical support and mission steering to TROJAN users.

(U) INSCOM does not have a responsibility in the areas of developing, fielding, and testing the TROJAN systems nor for any product improvement plans (PIP); these are the responsibility of the Army Materiel Command's U.S. Army Electronics Research and Development Command which implements these activities through its project manager, the U.S. Army Signals Warfare Laboratories. The U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) has full responsibility for communications support to include: cryptonet establishment, Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) requirements, commercial communications contracts, and overall communications monitoring requirements.

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Chapter III

ORGANIZATION

INSCOM Organization. (U) At the close of FY 1991, there was a total of 70 units (19 TOE and 51 TDA) within INSCOM. The TDA figure does not include Provisional units. All types of units are listed in appendix A. For individual lists of TOE, TDA, and Provisional units at the close of FY 1990, see appendices B, D, and E respectively. Changes in the status of TOE, TDA, and Provisional units are listed in appendices C, E, and G.

(U) MG Charles F. Scanlon assumed command of INSCOM on 11 October 1990, succeeding MG Stanley H. Hyman. BG Floyd L. Runyon was replaced as Deputy Commanding General by BG Michael M. Schneider on 18 March 1991. As a result of the provisional resubordination of the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA) to INSCOM on 1 April 1991, AIA's commander, COL(P) (b)(6) became Deputy Commanding General, Production. COL (b)(6) was appointed Chief of Staff on 7 November 1990. His predecessor, Mr. (b)(6) (b)(6) became Deputy Chief of Staff. CSM (b)(6) (b)(6) held the post of Command Sergeant Major throughout the reporting period.

(U) At the end of FY 1991, Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command was organized to consist of a Command Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, Special Staff, Personal Staff, and Coordinating Staff as shown below.

Command Group:

Commanding General (CG). (U) The CG, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command was responsible to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army for accomplishment of the missions and functions prescribed by AR 10-53 and was concurrently responsible to the Chief, Central Security Service for all SIGINT activities for which the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSACSS) were responsible.

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Deputy Commander (DCG). (U) The deputy commander assisted the commander in the management of all intelligence and support operations of INSCOM to include the review and execution of all tasked and delegated operations and the determination of future requirements.

Command Sergeant Major (CSM). (U) The Command Sergeant Major as the senior enlisted person in the command provided advice and assistance to the CG on all matters involving enlisted personnel.

Office of the Chief of Staff:

Chief of Staff (Cofs). (U) The Cofs acted as the principal coordinating agent of, and advisor to, the CG and DCG on those matters pertaining to INSCOM; directed and coordinated the staff to achieve efficiency and unity of action; and assisted the CG and DCG in the supervision of the execution of orders. Directly subordinate to the Cofs were the Office of Public Affairs, the Intelligence Oversight Office, the Internal Review Office, and the Army Liaison Office.

Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS). (U) The DCS acted for the Chief of Staff during his absence and assisted to coordinate all actions of the HQ INSCOM staff, and supervised the activities of and provided support to the Secretary of the General Staff.

Secretary of the General Staff (SGS). (U) The SGS acted as executive officer for the Cofs and as office manager for the offices of the CG, DCG, and Cofs.

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff. (U) The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (formerly the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff) acted as special advisor and consultant to the commander, deputy commander, and the Chief of Staff.

Protocol Office. (U) The Protocol Officer served to advise the Command Group on matters related to protocol.

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Special Staff:

Deputy Director for Policy and Development. (U) Served as the principal civilian advisor to the CG, INSCOM and his staff on policy matters. At the end of the reporting period, the incumbent, Mr. Harry A. Lancaster, was seconded to the National Security Agency on a 2-year exchange program. In return, the National Security Agency provided INSCOM with a Senior Cryptologic Advisor who would also serve for 2 years.

Chief, Internal Review (IR) Office. (U) Served as the principal advisor to the CG, INSCOM on internal review matters. Conducted independent review and examination of command operations and internal controls to provide the commander with an objective evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency with which his financial and related functions were being performed.

Public Affairs Officer (PAO). (U) Served as the Public Affairs Officer of INSCOM, advising the commander and staff on all public affairs matters.

Command Chaplain. (U) Served as the chaplain of INSCOM providing advice and assistance to the commander and his staff on religious, moral, moral leadership, and human self-development matters.

Chief, Intelligence Oversight (IO) Office. (U) This office exercised supervision over the propriety and conformity to law and regulations of all INSCOM activities.

Personal Staff:

Inspector General (IG). (U) The IG, as member of the personal staff, inquired into and reported upon matters affecting the performance of mission and state of the economy, efficiency, discipline, and morale of every phase of activity which was within the sphere of responsibility of the commanding general and as prescribed by law. The IG Office consisted of the Plans and Analysis Division, the Inspections Division, and the Assistance and Investigations Division.

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Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). (U) The SJA served as legal advisor to the CG, DCG, Cofs, and all staff elements of HQ INSCOM and, as necessary, to subordinate elements of the command.

Principal Advisor Responsible for Contracting (PARC). (U) The PARC served as procurement "czar" for the command, acting in his personal capacity as advisor to the CG, INSCOM on all aspects of contracting. The PARC was also dual-hatted as Deputy Chief of Staff, Contracting, a new position.

General Staff:

(U) INSCOM Headquarters was comprised of seven major staff elements. These were as follows:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER). (U) The DCSPER served as the principal staff officer for the administration of military and civilian personnel. Acted for the CG, INSCOM in the direction, supervision, and coordination of plans, policies, and procedures for personnel administration, distribution, and management; maintenance of order and discipline; safety; welfare; morale; human affairs; and nonappropriated fund activities. DCSPER elements consisted of the Military Personnel Division, Plans and Proponency Division, Human Resources Division, Equal Employment Opportunity Division, and Civilian Personnel Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS). (U) The DCSOPS was the principal coordinating staff officer responsible for current intelligence collection, electronic warfare, counterintelligence, and security support operations. On 1 October 1990, the position was merged with the former Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Integration (DCSFI), considerably expanding the scope of the incumbent's duties. As a result he now performed the following functions: provided operational policy guidance and direction and coordinated and supervised current operations; managed the REDTRAIN program as Army executive agent and coordinated and supervised its current operations; provided operationally

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oriented INSCOM interfaces between national, departmental, theater (echelon above corps), and tactical (echelon corps and below) intelligence organizations; served as the staff budget director (current and budget year) for allocation and employment of Program 2, 3, and 8 operational resources; coordinated operational matters with Department of the Army, NSA/CSS, Department of Defense, DIA, CIA, FBI, joint/combined commands, other MACOM's, and other governmental agencies; supervised command aviation activities; prepared and coordinated command operational plans and managed the command operational planning system.

(U) Additionally, he supervised the command historical program; exercised staff proponentcy over the Intelligence Exchange Support Center, counterintelligence support to several "black" special access programs (SAP's), and the Field Support Center. As a result of the assimilation of DCSFI, he became principal coordinating staff officer responsible for USAINSCOM force integration, threat coordination, force and material requirement identification, operational concepts, long- and mid-range planning, force design and doctrine, resource program development, materiel acquisition, materiel requirements documentation, and management of fixed and tactical systems.

(U) At the close of FY 1991, DCSOPS consisted of the following major divisions: Administrative Office, History Office, Management Office, Intelligence Operations Center (IOC), ADCSOPS Counterintelligence (CI), ADCSOPS Human Intelligence (HUMINT), ADCSOPS Signal Intelligence and Technical Operations (SIGINT/TO), ADCSOPS Force Management (FM) and a field operating agency, and the Force Modernization Activity (FMA).

Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG). (U) DCSLOG was the principal coordinating staff officer for logistics, and was responsible for integrated logistics planning policy; procurement/contracts; budgeting; distribution, storage, and maintenance of electronic equipment systems (less telecommunications); engineering; construction; support services; transportation; logistics oversight/compliance; and supply and maintenance management. The DCSLOG also had staff supervision of the Materiel Support Activity at Vint

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Hill Farms Station and the Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team Activity (MAIT) at Fort Belvoir. On 1 October 1990, MAIT operations in CONUS were suspended, and personnel detailed to various divisions of DCSLOG to support DESERT SHIELD operations. The MAIT program was terminated effective 1 January 1991.

(U) During FY 1991, the organization of the DCSLOG consisted of the following: Supply and Services Division, Maintenance Division, Engineer and Housing Division, Systems Engineering Division, Management and Plans Division, and Administrative Office.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM). (U)

The DCSRМ was the principal staff officer in matters concerning management, financial management, and manpower management. The DCSRМ established and maintained administrative control of appropriated funds, exercised responsibility for manpower management and The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), developed and supervised the implementation of force requirements, administered the structure and strength program, exercised control over the manpower and equipment survey programs, and reviewed and prepared financial and/or manpower annexes for operational and force development plans. During FY 1991, DCSRМ was composed of the following elements: Administrative Office, Budget Division, Finance and Accounting Division, Management Engineering and Analysis Division, and Manpower Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management (DCSIM). (U)

The DCSIM was the principal staff assistant to the Commander, INSCOM for all matters pertaining to information management. The position was dual-hatted since the DCSIM concurrently served as Director, U.S. Army Information Services Command, INSCOM (USAISC-INSCOM). DCSIM served as Program Area Director for command programs, budgets, and the Army Management System as they relate to telecommunications/automation. The DCSIM discharged primary staff responsibilities for engineering, installation, and maintenance of INSCOM information systems. He also exercised staff supervision over operation of the Defense

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Special Security Communication System (DSSCS), CRITICOMM, and other telecommunications activities of the command.

(U) Additionally, he directed development of tactical information systems objectives, concepts, and requirements within INSCOM areas of interest. Finally, the DCSIM exercised operational control over the USAISC Communications Center. The staff element also exercised control over the Automated Systems Activity (ASA). The former Administrative and Visual Information Systems Activity (AVISA) had been discontinued on 30 September 1990. At the end of FY 1991, DCSIM consisted of an Administrative Branch, an ADCSIM Telecommunications, an ADCSIM Automation, and an ADCSIM Information Services.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Reserve Affairs (DCSRA). (U) Formerly the Office of Reserve Affairs, the element was elevated to Deputy Chief of Staff status in FY 1990. The primary mission of DCSRA was to coordinate reserve component support to INSCOM current operations and to advise the Commanding General on matters relevant to the reserve components. The DCSRA managed more than 700 Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA's) for HQ INSCOM and the command's subordinate elements. Additionally, DCSRA served as interface between INSCOM's Major Subordinate Commands (MSC's) and their reserve component CAPSTONE units in order to assist in training programs and enhance unit readiness. At the end of the reporting period, the element had been redesignated as the Intelligence Directorate, Reserve Affairs (IDRA).

Deputy Chief of Staff, Security (DCSSEC). (U) This element was formerly known as the Command Security Office. It was redesignated in 1990 as a result of the consolidation of the CSO with the INSCOM Special Security Office. The DCSSEC provides MACOM level and HQ-specific security management and support to the CG, INSCOM. The DCSSEC formulated, implemented, and supervised policies and procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and collateral material in the functional areas of personnel, physical, information, industrial, TEMPEST, automation, and operations security. On 8 August 1991, DCSSEC was realigned into three

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separate divisions: Personnel Security, Information Security, and Facilities/Physical Security.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Contracting. (U) On 1 October 1990, the former Contract Support Activity (CSA) was upgraded to deputy chief of staff status. The DCSCON provides contract support not only to CG INSCOM, but to AIA headquarters and to DA DCSINT. On 1 June 1991 the element was provisionally organized into three divisions: Contracting Division A, Contracting Division B, and the Policy and Oversight Division.

Command Organizational Issues. (U) The following changes occurred in the organization of INSCOM's major subordinate units in the field during the reporting period. While deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of Operation DESERT STORM, the 513th MI Brigade formed a provisional operations battalion in December 1990, using the 174th Military Intelligence Center as its nucleus. On 16 October 1990, the 29th MI Battalion (CEWI), a U.S. Army South (USARSO) unit previously under operational control (OPCON) of the 470th MI Brigade, was resubordinated to INSCOM. On 10 May 1991, the unit was inactivated and replaced by the 308th Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional) and its attached 408th MI Company. In July 1991, headquarters elements of the Military Intelligence Battalion (Low Intensity) redeployed from Soto Cano Airbase in Honduras to the battalion's rear base at Orlando, Florida. Concurrently, the battalion's "A" Company was reorganized as a seaborne rather than an airborne intelligence collection unit. As part of the general drawdown of assets in Europe, the 701st MI Brigade's 712th MI Battalion was discontinued on 30 September 1991. Finally, on 1 October 1990, the USAINSCOM Activity, Fort Belvoir, was redesignated as the USAINSCOM Headquarters Support Activity.

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Chapter IV
RESOURCE AND MANAGEMENT

Inspector General Action Requests (IGAR's). (U) The Office of the Inspector General closed 228 IGAR's during FY 1991, a decrease of 7 percent over FY 1990. A total of 298 issues/allegations were addressed in the IGAR's. Of the 298, 195 were assistance issues, 49 were non-substantiated complaint allegations, and 54 were substantiated allegations. An analysis of assistance cases (which experienced an 18 percent decrease over FY 1990) revealed that the vast majority of the allegations could have been resolved by the chain of command, most at company level or below.

(U) The top IGAR categories were military personnel management (28 percent), personnel conduct (12 percent), command/management of organization (18 percent), finance and accounting (8 percent), personnel management civilian (12 percent). Top categories are consistent with the experience of previous years both within INSCOM and the Army in general.

IG Training Books. (U) The IG's office developed six inspection training books based on analysis of data from the IG data base, extracts from the units' history reports, and other pertinent documents for almost every unit inspected.

DAIG Fix-It Findings. (U) The IG continued to serve as the INSCOM point of contact for DAIG Fix-It findings developed as a result of inspections conducted by HQDA (SAIG-IO) on behalf of the Chief of Staff, Army. The status as of 30 September 1991 were as follows:

a. Closed Findings were 2,935--Personnel, Administration, and Financial Operations; 2,938--Control of Badges and Credentials; 2,976--USAINSCOM Pam 380-6, 5 January 1991, Security Classification Guide for HUMINT and CI Activity; and AAA004--Financial Transactions, TECRAS.

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b. Findings added in FY 1991 were 3,018--Property Administration; 3,019--Assignment and Training of Acquisition Functions; 3,021--Top Secret Document Accountability.

c. 3,018--Property Administration remains open.

Public Affairs Office. (U) In May 1990, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) Chief Public Affairs, was deployed in support of 21st Support Command in Saudi Arabia. During his absence, Major (b)(6) served as the command's Chief of Public Affairs.

INSCOM Keith L. Ware Competition. (U) The INSCOM Journal won first place in the INSCOM Keith L. Ware competition for magazines. Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) won first place in the INSCOM Keith L. Ware competition for cartoonist.

(U) The Keith L. Ware Competition is a journalist and photojournalist competition held by the department of the Army every year. The Keith L. Ware competition consists of entries from unit newspapers and magazines in a variety of areas. Awards are given for print journalism, broadcast journalism, and photojournalism, to name a few. Entries are judged on the support of command information, professional excellence, and originality. The winners are given plaques, letters, and certificates. First place winners are then forwarded to the Defense Information School to represent the Army in the annual Thomas Jefferson Awards Competition. Along with the Department of the Army awards, INSCOM presents its own awards for the Keith L. Ware competition. These awards are given to INSCOM units for the best entry in each category.

(U) Keith L. Ware was a major general in the U.S. Army. He was a Medal of Honor recipient during World War II, and was killed in Vietnam in 1968 while commanding the 1st Infantry Division. He was the Army Chief of Information from February 1966-November 1967.

INSCOM Journal. (U) The Public Affairs Office published 11 issues of the INSCOM Journal during FY 1991, to include a special issue dedicated to the Combined Federal Campaign.

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The Journal went from 10 issues per year to 12, with an average of 32 pages per issue. The number of issues per month was reduced from 6,000 to 4,500. There were also new departments in the Journal: *Commanding General's Corner*, *Historian's Corner*, *Security Reminder*, *Chaplain's Note*, *In Your Opinion*, and *Civilian Personnel Office*.

Military Justice. (U) The Command Staff Judge Advocate's Office gave out a total of 477 Articles 15's during FY 1991.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Contracting (DCSCON). (U) Effective 1 June 1991, a provisional reorganization was established by reorganizing DCSCON into three divisions: Contracting Division A, Contracting Division B, and Policy and Oversight Division. The reorganization became permanent on 1 October 1991, resulting from the impacts of Quicksilver I, Vanguard, and the assumption of the contracting support for ODCSINT and AIA Headquarters.

(U) As of the end of FY 1991, DCSCON had the responsibility for appointment and oversight of Secure Environment Contracting Officers and Ordering Officers at field stations worldwide. There are approximately 25 Contracting Officers and 300 Ordering Officers.

Intelligence Oversight Procedure 15 Cases. (U) During FY 1991, there were 28 Procedure 15 cases opened and monitored by the Intelligence Oversight Office. As of the end of the year, 21 of those cases were closed and seven remained open. Five cases were carried over from the previous year, of which four were closed and one remained open.

DCSSEC. (U) The office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Security was redesignated on 1 October 1990 as a result of the consolidation of Command Security Office (CSO) and Special Security Detachment, INSCOM. The mission of the DCSSEC changed to provide MACOM level and headquarters with specific security management and substantial support to the Commander, INSCOM.

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DESERT SHIELD/STORM Budget. (U) INSCOM's FY 1991 requirements for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM totaled \$7.9M (\$4.9M--P2 and \$3.0M--P38).

Counternarcotics Budget. (U) During FY 1991, INSCOM received an additional \$8.6M for counternarcotics from HQDA.

Turkish Base Maintenance Contract (TBMC). (U) The TBMC is managed by the U.S. Air Force with no Army input. NSA provided \$10.3M for FY 1991 execution; however, the actual cost is \$16.M. The \$5.8M shortfall was absorbed internally by INSCOM. The TBMC cost growth was due to a 143 percent negotiated cost of living allowance increase. In January 1991, INSCOM sent a message to NSA identifying the problem and requesting additional funding to cover the TBMC. However, NSA, per law, could not supplement the Army's appropriation to cover a support function without Congressional action.

Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds. (U) \$261,456 of direct funds and \$39,000 of funded reimbursements for INSCOM's OMA funding program at the close of FY 1991 consisted of a total of \$261,495. The following table provides a breakdown of direct funding by subprogram at the close of FY 1991.

Table 1. - Direct Funding by Subprogram.

<u>Subprogram</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
P2 General Purpose	\$ 75,354
P38 Intelligence Activities	181,064
P39 Communication Security	744
P7 Supply 1,208	
P81 Military Training	1,254
P87 Civilian Training	630
P9 Admin (incl GSA Lease)	1,202
TOTAL	<u>\$261,456</u>

FY 1991 Command Operating Budget (COB)/Annual Funding Program (AFP). (U) The following is an audit trail from DA Dollar Guidance used for preparation of the FY 1991 COB to final FY 1991 Annual Funding Program (AFP):

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Program 2

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1991 COB</u>	\$ 68,461
Inflation	(147)
Guard/Reserves	(135)
FY 1990 Hiring Freeze	(56)
ADP	(1,783)
TROJAN	(2,623)
VCAC	803
USARI	500
JCS	(154)
Printing and Repro	(90)
TDY	(1,957)
Counternarcotics	8,600
DESERT SHIELD/STORM	2,253
DESERT SHIELD/STORM - Arabic Trng	300
DESERT SHIELD/STORM - TROJAN	500
DESERT SHIELD/STORM - Fuel	882
<u>FY 1991 Final AFP</u>	\$ 75,354

Program 38

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1991 COB</u>	\$183,790
Program 39 Transfer	56
Canal Pilot	1,591
Restore VCAC	1,856
TECRAS Trans to AMC	(3,280)
SAP Reprogramming	200
Hqs Management	(3,758)
End Strength Correction	35
Travel	(5,479)

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ARCENT DIDHS	96
HF/DF Operations	(2,000)
CCP Reduction	(2,314)
P393998 Transfer	(768)
Emigree Debriefing	2,400
Inflation Reduction	(173)
TROJAN	4,000
CCP Operations	183
FCF Training	43
Source Payments	900
STU III	105
S&IA Support	582
DESERT SHIELD/STORM Fuel	895
DESERT STORM/STORM	2,000
Support to SOUTHCOM	100
<u>FY 1991 Final AFP</u>	\$181,064

Program 39

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1991 COB</u>	\$ 586
Transfer IMSA	(530)
Transfer to P38	(56)
P39 Transfer	768
Hqs Mgmt Reduction	(166)
Travel Reduction	(10)
Inflation Reduction	(4)
Strategic C3	219
Turn In	(63)
<u>FY 1991 Final AFP</u>	\$ 744

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Program 72

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1991 COB</u>	\$ 1,446
Restore VCAC	15
Travel Reduction	(17)
Turn In	(236)
<u>FY 1991 Final AFP</u>	\$ 1,208

Program 81

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1991 COB</u>	\$ 1,729
Restore VCAC	17
Travel Reduction	(400)
Inflation	(8)
Turn In	(84)
<u>FY 1991 Final AFP</u>	\$ 1,254

Program 87

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1991 COB</u>	\$ 0
ACTEDS	630
<u>FY 1991 Final AFP</u>	\$ 630

Program 95

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 1991 COB</u>	\$ 955
Transfer to ISC	(200)
Restore VCAC	10
Disability Comp	282
Telephones Reinstated	200
Turn In	(45)
<u>FY 1991 Final AFP</u>	\$ 1,202

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FY 1991 Direct Obligations. (U) The following table reflects direct obligations by elements of resource (EOR) for FY 1991 (\$ in thousands). Obligations of \$261,341 and an Annual Funding Program of \$261,456 resulted in an obligation rate of 99.9 percent.

Table 2. - Direct Obligations for FY 1991.

<u>Element of Resource</u>	<u>P2</u>	<u>P38</u>	<u>P39</u>	<u>P7</u>	<u>P81</u>	<u>P87</u>	<u>P9</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Civ Pay	4,215	77,331	498	962	0	596	0	83,602
TVL	5,735	14,696	117	62	1,082	18	0	21,710
T/T	292	792	0	137	0	0	0	1,221
Rt/Co/Ut	609	2,527	27	0	0	0	864	4,027
Ctr Svc	54,100	61,079	100	43	155	15	17	115,509
Sup/Eq	10,057	18,804	65	5	4	0	31	28,901
FNIH	315	5,984	0	0	0	0	0	6,299
Land/Str	7	15	0	0	0	0	0	22
Printing	20	30	0	0	0	0	0	50
TOTAL	75,350	181,258	742	1,209	1,241	629	912	261,341

INSCOM Program and Budget Guidance, FY 1990 (Authorized Strength). (U) The manpower data shown in the following table depicts the authorized level for FY 1992, as allocated in the DA Program and Budget Guidance, March 1991 (includes transfers in/out).

Table 3. - INSCOM Program and Budget Guidance, FY 1990.

<u>Program</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>MIL</u>	<u>USCIV</u>	<u>FNCIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
P2 Gen Purpose Forces	456	286	3869	4618	92	12	4722
P3 Intel & Info Mgt	997	435	5434	6866	3102	377	10345
P7 Cen Sup & Mgt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P8 Training	3	3	5	11	0	0	11
P3 Support to NSA	151	29	952	1132	0	0	1132
TOTAL	1607	753	10260	12627	3194	389	16210

Productivity Capital Investment Program (PCIP). (U) The PCIP available funding for FY 1991 was \$40K (FY 1988-\$627K; FY 1989-\$361K; and FY 1990-\$1,023K). DA withdrew most of INSCOM's AFP for FY 1991 PCIP OPA to fund higher priority requirements. The AFP was reduced to \$40K. One project has

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been approved with \$36K committed. DA tentatively plans to restore some of the FY 1991 OPA funds to INSCOM's FY 1992 AFP.

Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) Procurement. (U) The CCP procurement available funding in FY 1991 was \$3,176K (FY 1988-\$3,771K; FY 1989-\$1,899K; and FY 1990-\$1,228K). Items associated with these dollars were approved by NSA. At year end \$137K was committed (3 percent and \$137K was obligated (3 percent)).

OPA General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). (U) The OPA GDIP available funding in FY 1991 was \$4,905K (FY 1988-\$3,325K; FY 1989-\$2,793; and FY 1990-\$1,308K). At year end \$2,548K was committed (52 percent and \$2,164K was obligated (44 percent)).

Funds for Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) and Security and Investigative Activities (S&IA). (U) The FCI and S&IA FY 1991 funds were \$1,414K (FY 1988-\$1,656K; FY 1989-\$290K, and FY 1990-\$1,787K). At year end \$1,272K was committed (90 percent).

Command Travel Program Fund. (U) The command in FY 1991 obligated \$21,548K for travel of which \$2,462K was in direct support of DESERT SHIELD/STORM. HQDA guidance was that command's travel program expenditures stay within the FY 1988 obligations (\$19,675K). INSCOM's FY 1991 travel, less DESERT SHIELD/STORM was \$19,086K or 97 percent of FY 1988 funding level.

CONUS/OCONUS Branches. (U) As of 30 September 1991, there were 51 TDA's, 25 TDA Augmentations, 19 MTOE's, and 25 Mobilization TDA's in the organizational structure of INSCOM.

Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement (MOU/MOA) Program. (U) DCSRM has the responsibility for maintaining and staffing those MOU/MOA's made between the headquarters and other commands, agencies, and organizations. During the year, an inventory was conducted through all MSC's and headquarters staff elements to ensure an updated repository. At the end of the fiscal year, there were 146 MOU/MOA's in

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the active files and 21 MOU/MOA's in the inactive files. During the reporting period, branch personnel provided assistance to staff elements in processing 22 new or revised MOU/MOA's. Plans are underway to revise USAINSCOM Reg 1-7.

Organization and Functions Program. (U) This program ensures that INSCOM, as well as its subordinate units and activities maintain current organizations and functions regulations. The INSCOM mission and responsibilities are contained in AR 10-87, MACOM's in CONUS, chapter 7. Chapter 7 was completely rewritten and concurred in by the HQ staff. Revised chapter 7 was transmitted for staffing and publication through the DCSINT to HQDA. In addition, nine organization and functions regulations of subordinate units have been staffed during FY 1991. Four regulations (10-41 MSAV, 10-42 Field Support Center, 10-64 MAIT, and 10-66 FS Sinop) have been published.

Productivity Capital Investment Program (PCIP). (U) This program involves identifying areas for investment which will yield a higher productivity return. PCIP was incorporated into this branch late in the fiscal year. However, during this period, 22 potential initiatives for a total of \$2,754K were considered for FY 1992 funding.

Heraldry. (U) The DCSPER heraldic concerns for FY 1991 were to ensure that assigned and attached INSCOM soldiers received proper credit and entitlement for service in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Those entitlements included wear of Shoulder Sleeve Insignia--Former Wartime Service, Southwest Asia Service Medal, and associated campaign service stars. DCSPER also coordinated with The Institute of Heraldry and the U.S. Army Support Activity, Philadelphia, to ensure proper issuance of campaign streamers and silver bands for INSCOM organizational flags and guidons.

Casualty Report for Operation DESERT STORM. (U) In anticipation of casualties from Operation DESERT STORM, casualty reporting procedures and responsibilities for subordinate units and for the headquarters were reviewed. Revised instructions and reminders were dispatched to field units. Fortunately, all of the casualty reporting

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precautions proved to be unnecessary, as INSCOM suffered no casualties in conjunction with the Persian Gulf War.

INSCOM Military/Civilian Awards. (U) A total of 4,285 military awards were approved for FY 1991. An additional 1,265 awards were presented to INSCOM soldiers for service in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The command approved a total of 1,298 civilian awards. The total includes sustained superior performance, special acts, on-the-spot, and quality step increase awards.

INSCOM Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement. (U) The INSCOM Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement was presented to First Warrant Officer Kenneth Miller, 513th MI Brigade, during the INSCOM Commander's Conference.

General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award. (U) The INSCOM recipient of the General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award for CY 1990 was Captain William R. Jones, 29th MI Battalion, Panama. The MacArthur award is presented to a company grade officer in each major Army command who demonstrates the ideals for which General MacArthur stood (duty, honor, and country).

INSCOM Family Action Plan. (U) The INSCOM Family Action Plan was developed in support of the Army Family Action Plan. The first written plan was published in September 1991 and was distributed during the INSCOM Commanders' Conference. The plan contained 49 issues that surfaced during the INSCOM Regional Seminars conducted in Europe (May 1991), Americas (June 1991), and Pacific (July 1991). Eight of the issues were considered to merit higher level consideration and were forwarded to HQDA for discussion at the Annual Army Family Action Plan Conference. There were 16 issues which required follow-up action by the INSCOM HQ staff. Another 25 issues were considered to be local or were already being considered in the Army Family Action Plan.

13th Annual Military/Civilian Command Awards Ceremony. (U) The 13th Annual Military/Civilian Command Awards Ceremony/INSCOM Organization Day was held in mid-August 1990 at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Among the notables present were

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Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster, former commander of INSCOM; retired Brigadier General James W. Shufelt, INSCOM's Chief of Staff in the early 1980's; and Mr. Jim Davis, former INSCOM employee who is now Special Assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. Eight command awards and one plaque were presented to worthy INSCOM recipients. The presentations included two **Colonel Richard F. Judge Military/Civilian Team Improvement Awards**--one military and one civilian--which were presented to Sergeant First Class (b)(6) U.S. Army Central Security Facility and to Mr. (b)(6) Hqs INSCOM, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics; the **Jackie Keith Action Officer of the Year Award** was presented to Mr. (b)(6) Hqs INSCOM, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations; the **Virginia McDill Award** was presented to Mr. (b)(6) 500th MI Brigade; the **Equal Employment Opportunity Award** presented to Mr. (b)(6) Hqs INSCOM, Director, Force Modernization Activity; **Annual Wage Grade Award** presented to Ms. (b)(6) 701st MI Brigade; and the **Local National Employee of the Year Award** was presented to Mr. (b)(6) 66th MI Brigade. Also presented by Major General Hyman was the **Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement** to Staff Sergeant (b)(6) Field Station Berlin.

14th Annual Military/Civilian Command Awards Ceremony. (U)

The 14th Annual Military/Civilian Command Awards Ceremony/INSCOM Organization Day was held on 23 August 1991. The keynote speaker was Brigadier General John F. Stewart, Jr., the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Agency and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC. The annual award recipients were Mr. (b)(6) 66th MI Brigade for the **Albert W. Small Award**; Staff Sergeant (b)(6) 500th MI Brigade and Mr. (b)(6) 500th MI Brigade, for the **Colonel Richard F. Judge Military/Civilian Team Improvement Awards**; Mr. (b)(6) HQ USAINSCOM, ODCSOPS, for the **Jackie Keith Action Officer of the Year Award**; Ms. (b)(6) 66th Brigade, for the **Virginia McDill Award**; Mr. (b)(6) 66th MI Brigade, for the **Local National Employee of the Year Award**; Mr. (b)(6) USA Operational Group, for the **Equal Employment**

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Opportunity Award; and Mr. Wade H. Green, 66th MI Brigade, for the Annual Wage Grade Award.

Enlisted Personnel Strength Posture. (U) Enlisted Personnel posture by MOS (EW/Crypto and HUMINT MOS's):

Enlisted Personnel Strength Posture by Area and Unit
(As of 30 September 1991)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTHORIZATIONS</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
A. <u>European Area</u>		
701st MI Brigade	1538	1521
Field Station Berlin	781	878
Field Station Sinop	255	213
USA Cryptologic Support Group	11	11
66th MI Brigade	1445	1506
USA Russian Institute	5	6
USA Foreign Lan Tng Ctr Europe	8	7
TOTAL	4043	4142
B. <u>Panama Area</u>		
470th MI Brigade	999	957
TOTAL	999	957
C. <u>Pacific Area</u>		
703d MI Brigade	1018	1923
500th MI Brigade	275	277
501st MI Brigade	1320	1268
TOTAL	2613	2568
D. <u>CONUS Area</u>		
FAOD	10	9
Central Security Facility	9	10
704th MI Brigade	1334	1754
513th MI Brigade	1086	1184
HQ INSCOM/HSA/FOA	250	248
AIA	174	176

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTHORIZATIONS</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
902d MI Group	344	389
Foreign Intelligence Agency	40	47
Foreign Counterintelligence Act	33	35
<u>Special Security Group</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>33</u>
TOTAL	3350	3887

E. INSCOM Consolidated

European Area	4043	4142
Panama Area	999	957
Pacific Area	2613	2568
<u>CONUS Area</u>	<u>3350</u>	<u>3887</u>
TOTAL	11005	11554

Realignment/Resubordination of AIA. (U) The U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (USAIA) became a major subordinate command (MSC) under Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) on a provisional basis effective 1 April 1991. The resubordination was designed to support and align command and control relationships as outlined in the 4 March 1991 OSD plan for restructuring Defense Intelligence and Project Vanguard restructuring initiatives thereby improving intelligence production by strengthening intelligence collectors and producing interfaces. AIA has placed a transition/planning team at INSCOM HQ to address HQ realignment and resubordination issues.

AIA Additional Manpower. (U) The consolidation of the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA) with INSCOM was scheduled for 1 October 1991. The addition of the AIA headquarters and the three AIA centers (the Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center, the Missile Science Intelligence Center and the Foreign Science and Technology Center) will add approximately 1,400 civilian positions to the INSCOM workforce. Considerable effort was spent in preparing for this consolidation.

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Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS).

(U) By the close of FY 1991, all INSCOM civilians were converted to CIPMS, including all civilian employees of the Army Intelligence Agency. Minor difficulties arose in the conversion effort due to the simultaneous implementation of ACPERS in the servicing CPO's. DCSPER was involved in three major areas: training/briefings on CIPMS, development of command policy and guidance, and participation in the development and implementation of the Army Occupational Guides. Training efforts were focused on ad hoc briefings to managers, supervisors, and employees. The briefings, tailored to the concerns and issues of each group, covered the similarities and differences between the excepted service under Title 10 and the competitive service under Title 5. Numerous sessions were conducted in and around the headquarters and at Fort Meade as well as follow-up sessions at major subordinate commands throughout Europe. Update training was also provided to the Intelligence Community as a whole in a series of joint sessions sponsored by the IPMO and by INSCOM. These update sessions began in 3d Qtr, FY 1991 and will continue into 2d Qtr, FY 1992.

(U) A specific training objective during FY 1991 focused on spreading the word throughout the command about the Defense Intelligence Special Career Automated System (DISCAS). A push to have conversion SF 50's sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency resulted in a large increase in registered employees. Advice and assistance was available on the completion of the DISCAS forms and their submission to DIA. Full registration in DISCAS is mandatory for civilian employees in Career Program 35. Full registration in DISCAS for non-Career Program 35 employees is optional, however, advantageous to the employee who desires career opportunities in the intelligence community. The CIPMS program evaluation effort is being focused on how well managers recruit and retain top quality employees. This effort will increase during the next fiscal year.

Intern Program. (U) As a result of downsizing of the Army, many interns were declared surplus throughout the Army. The Civilian Personnel Division staff took the lead in the identification of potential slots for surplus interns. Arranged meetings between selected surplus interns and

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functional managers were held within the headquarters and Fort Meade based units. Five surplus interns were placed within the command (three security and two communications).

(U) Due to reduced funding, HQDA reduced the period of central funding from 24 to 18 months. This required an acceleration of the dates for placing interns on command spaces. Every unit was contacted and arrangements were discussed relative to the need to place interns at the end of a 18-month period vice 24 months. The major funding change was accomplished smoothly without incident. Every intern scheduled for graduation in FY 1991 was permanently placed within the command. No INSCOM interns were declared surplus.

INSCOM Manpower Chart. (U)

As of September 30, 1989

	GS-09	GS-10	GS-11	GS-12	GS-13	GS-14	GS-15	TOTAL
White Women	43	0	65	87	25	6	0	226
Black Men	12	0	11	20	6	1	0	50
Black Women	16	0	12	9	2	0	0	39
Hispanic Men	1	0	4	6	2	1	0	14
Hispanic Women	2	1	3	2	0	0	0	8
AA/PI Men	2	0	12	10	4	2	0	30
AA/PI Women	8	0	6	2	0	0	0	16
AI/AN Men	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
AI/AN Women	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2

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As of September 30, 1990

	GS-09	GS-10	GS-11	GS-12	GS-13	GS-14	GS-15	TOTAL
White Women	59	0	57	74	23	6	0	219
Black Men	12	0	7	23	9	1	0	52
Black Women	14	0	11	9	2	0	0	36
Hispanic Men	2	1	- 1	15	4	2	2	27
Hispanic Women	0	0	3	1	1	1	2	8
AA/PI Men	5	0	14	26	8	3	0	56
AA/PI Women	7	1	3	3	0	0	6	20
AI/AN Men	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	4
AI/AN Women	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3

Army Management Staff College. (U) Special effort was taken to emphasize the value of attendance at the Army Management Staff College. Program announcements signed by the Chief of Staff was issued for each class as opposed to an annual announcement of the program. Three announcements issued during the year would increase workforce awareness of the program. Efforts were successful. There were 100 percent in applications received; seven attended in FY 1991.

INSCOM Equal Employment Opportunity Award. (U) The INSCOM Equal Employment Opportunity Award for FY 1991 was presented to Mr. Dennis L. Roeding, U.S. Army Operational Group.

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Force Modernization Reorganization. (U) On 1 October 1990, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Integration was absorbed into the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) and renamed as the Assistant DCSOPS for Force Modernization (ADCSOPS-FM).

Army Intelligence Ball. (U) In December 1990, the DA DCSINT assigned sponsorship of the 1991 Army Intelligence Ball (AIB) to INSCOM. The overall planning and coordinating functions were assigned to the DCSOPS, with the IFMA assigned the task of actually planning and prosecuting the AIB for 1991. The event was successfully planned and executed on 21 September 1991. The AIB was a tribute to Lieutenant General Charles B. Eichelberger, the DA DCSINT, who was scheduled to retire on 1 October 1991. The theme of the AIB was "***Patriotism Alive and Well in America.***" and the master of ceremonies was Colonel (b)(6) (b)(6). The Army Chorus and the Harold Ballen Combo provided music throughout the evening.

Annual Chief of Staff, Army Supply Excellence Award. (U) The following units were nominated in the DA Supply Excellence Award competition and were awarded the INSCOM Commanding General's Supply Excellence Award: MSA-V, TDA/Co; 751st MI Bn, TDA/Bn; 766th MI Det, MTOE/Co; 18th MI Bn, MTOE/Bn.

Philip A. Connelly Awards Program. (U) An annual food service evaluation was conducted as part of the Command Logistics Program (CLIP) to select the INSCOM nominees for the ***23d Annual Philip A. Connelly Awards*** Competition. Selected were the Andrews Barracks Dining Facility, large category nominee, and Teufelsburg Dining Facility, both of Field Station Berlin. Throughout the year, the Teufelsburg Dining Facility excelled in every aspect of food service. The dining facility received 94 percent on the 2d Qtr, FY 1991 Berlin Dining Facility of the quarter inspection; the highest score for any Berlin food service organization in the small category. In July 1990, Andrews Barracks dining facility consolidated with the 6/40th Armor Battalion, Berlin Brigade which more than doubled the daily headcount. Despite the increased headcount, the dining facility won the Berlin community's award for the Best Decorated Dining

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Facility on Thanksgiving 1990. The Andrews Barracks dining facility was named the runner-up in the large category of the 1991 Connelly Awards Program. The dining facility manager, food service officer and one cook attended the awards ceremony in New Orleans, Louisiana, on 26 August 1991 to receive an engraved plaque in recognition for being one of the best dining facilities in the Army.

Configuration Management System (CMS). (U) The CMS, a portion of the INSCOM database system, was justified as part of the Life Cycle Management Information System (LCMIS) and incorporated into the INSCOM HQ mainframe computer. It is envisioned that the CMS will eventually encompass INSCOM unit assets: the Configuration Equipment Database (CED), drawing control database, Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) database, and wire list database. The CED is a collection of functional databases developed by Systems Engineering Division to ensure worldwide Configuration Management Control of INSCOM mission and support equipment. The CED was standardized by regulatory guidance and incorporated into the mainframe as a management tool in FY 1991.

U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame Ceremony.

(U) The Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony was held on 12 July 1991 at the Fitch Auditorium at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Seven distinguished intelligence professionals were inducted into the Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame. The honorees each made exceptional contributions to the intelligence profession: Lieutenant General (Retired) Sidney T. Weinstein, Command Sergeant Major (Retired) (b)(6), Colonel (b)(6), (b)(6), Chief Warrant Officer (b)(6), (b)(6) Colonel (b)(6), Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6), Colonel (b)(6) and Mr. (b)(6). The ceremony was also in celebration of the 29th anniversary of the MI Branch and its 4th anniversary as a corps within the U.S. Army Regimental System.

INSCOM Designated Contracting Support Mission. (U) The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is designated the contracting support activity for mission requirements of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

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(DCSINT) and the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA) effective 1 October 1990. As the Head of Contracting Activity, INSCOM is responsible for execution of this mission within all applicable laws, statues, and regulations and for providing the required oversight and resources. The DCSINT and Commander, AIA will transfer 12 personnel authorizations and funding resources associated with this mission in their organizations to INSCOM by 1 October 1991. All new requirements after 1 October 1990 will be the responsibility of INSCOM. Current contracts will transition as these supporting assets are made available to INSCOM. This workload is currently anticipated at 35 contracts a year and 12 contracting personnel.

Army Superior Unit Award. (U) The 18th MI Battalion won the *Army Superior Unit Award* for significant accomplishments between November 1988 through November 1989. Field Station Berlin has been awarded the two superior unit awards.

Field Station Berlin's Newspaper. (U) "*The Sentinel*," in its second fiscal year of publication, won a host of awards at INSCOM and Army levels. "*The Sentinel*" took first place at the DA-level Keith L. Ware competition. First place categories were: Small Army-funded papers, news articles, Staff Sergeant (b)(6) feature articles, Staff Sergeant (b)(6) editorials/commentaries, Staff Sergeant (b)(6)

DESERT SHIELD/STORM After Action Team. (U) In March 1991, Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) Chief, IEW Division, was assigned on temporary duty as Chief of the After Action Team for DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Besides Lieutenant Colonel (b)(6) the team consisted of Mr. (b)(6) Command Historian; Major (b)(6) INSCOM Operations Center; and Sergeant (b)(6) Command Group. In the closing days of the war, the team deployed to Saudi Arabia to document the Echelons Above Corps (EAC) IEW experience and determine Lessons Learned. The team deployed from 12 March 1991 to 8 April 1991. After the deployment, IEW Division, with assistance from INSCOM subordinate commands and the INSCOM HQ Staff, produced the official INSCOM After Action Report for DESERT SHIELD/STORM as required by AR 11-33 and specifically tasked by the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. On 20

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June 1991, the INSCOM report was submitted to the Army After Action Study Group which was established at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Headquarters INSCOM ADP Configurations. (U) Tasked to plan and assess a new ADP configuration for Headquarters, INSCOM in February 1990, this initiative was to modernize the headquarters; to get the power of the desktop computer into the users hands and provide them access to the power of mainframe applications including worldwide communications. A plan was completed and encompassed the consideration of limited resources, used the existing cabling plan and would have provided automation support to nearly all Nolan Building personnel in a short period of time. A local area network (LAN) TESTBED which utilized the structure scope presented last year to the HQ INSCOM Chief of Staff was acquired and made operational. This system was relatively inexpensive as compared to the resultant ODIN plan. Efforts to make such a system supportable, with the existing and projected financial and technical resources projected, were curtailed and redirected by our parent staff element.

Central Security Facility CSF SCIF/Vault Construction. (U) In September 1989, a SCIF/Vault construction contract was awarded to Harvey Harris Contractor, Inc., (HHCI) with an anticipated completion date of January 1990. Construction was delayed due to sequence of work, specifications not being met and discovery of asbestos in duct work. In November 1990, asbestos removal was completed and construction resumed. On 15 March 1991, contracting officer from Fort Meade, Director of Contract (DOC) Office, terminated this contract for the convenience of the government. Project continues to require DOC and Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH) support. In August 1991, DOC and DEH representatives met with the HHCI to negotiate contract reduction price for work remaining. When the government receives all documentation from Contractor, DEH will review and submit to DOC for processing.

Special Background Investigations. (U) From 1 October 1990 through 30 September 1991, 16 Special Background Investigations (SBI) were completed (including 3 Periodic

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Reinvestigations). Two requests are pending completion of Defense Investigative Service investigation prior to adjudication satisfactorily accomplishing its security mission.

Investigative Records Repository (IRR). (U) During FY 1991, IRR reviewed 334,556 dossiers for release, control, accession, consolidation, permanent transfer or destruction. This was an increase of 9,663 from FY 1990. The total dossier actions were based on the following categories:

Special Actions Requests	91
Records Processing Division Requests`	21,234
Reconciliation Actions`	7,148
Reviews of Supplemental Material	50,447
Special Records Division Requests`	1,791
Special Records Division Reconciliation Actions	10,082
Files Maintenance Review Division Actions	243,763
TOTAL	334,556

File Procurement Accounts. (U) IRR's primary support to the intelligence investigative and adjudicative community continued to be through the File Procurement Activity (FPA) system. As of 30 September 1991, 359 FPA's were accredited with IRR. During the year, 25 accounts were added and 6 deleted. Of its 359 FPA's, IRR received requests from only 109, less than 31 percent. These accounts generated 41,373 requests for dossiers on the IRR Audit Trail System (IRRATS):

<u>Account</u>	<u>Requests</u>
U.S. Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF)	15,855
Defense Investigative Service (DIS)	8,012
U.S. Army Crime Records Center	5,801
Personnel Investigations Center (NAC Center)	2,883
Office of Personnel Management (OPM)	2,773
Freedom of Information and Privacy Office	1,183

IRR Reviewed and Processed. (U) IRR reviewed and processed 50,447 pieces of supplemented and adjudicative material resulting in the creation of an additional 36,790 new dossier accessions into the repository.

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Purge Dossier Review. (U) During this fiscal year, the purge reviewed 243,763 dossiers with deletions totaling 157,151. This is a deletion rate of over 64 percent. Total reviews in FY 1991 reflect an increase of 14,231 from FY 1990. On 8 February 1991, a total of 816 dossiers determined to be of historical value were transferred to NARA.

Polygraph Reports. (U) In June 1989, HQDA DCSINT directed the coding of files containing the results of polygraph examinations in the DCII using unique suffixes to identify to an adjudicator whether review of the file was necessary in the adjudicative process. While accomplishing this task, IRR simultaneously consolidated polygraph examination reports, previously filed separately with their subject file. During the fiscal year, the IRR consolidated 4,989 polygraph reports and completed the corresponding DCII updates.

Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Nondisclosure Agreements (NDA). (U) During FY 1991, Special Security Group (SSG) forwarded over 8,000 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Nondisclosure Agreements to IRR for storage and indexing within IRR's automated indexing system. Total holdings indexed and filed now number 152,437.

(U) Additionally, and of particular significance to IRR, SSG decentralized on 1 February 1991. Effective that date, Special Security Commands forwarded NDA's completed by their Special Security Offices directly to the IRR instead of SSG. The IRR assumed responsibility for conducting quality control checks and returning incorrectly completed NDA's to the submitting agency.

Litigation Cases. (U) IRR entered FY 1991 with four open litigation cases. On 3 April 1991, DCSINT closed out CENTIMETER FIVE, reducing the number to three. Requested the status of U.S. vs Bowitz to HQ INSCOM, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate; awaiting the results.

Microfilm Holdings. (U) At the completion of the 1991 microfilm holdings inventory, there were 1,742 pieces of microfiche in the Source Locator Index, except the one

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discovered missing during the 1989 inventory which was never found. 7,911 microfilm records were deleted from holdings during purge and consolidation reviews.

FOIA/PA Requests. (U) The number of FOIA/PA requests received during FY 1991 did not increase over the previous fiscal year; however, the complexity in the overall cases processed did increase. A total of 3,428 requests for records under the provisions of the FOIA and PA's were received and processed during the fiscal year. PA requests decreased by 279 under the previous fiscal year figure for a total of 4,409 cases processed. FOIA requests continue to increase each year. Requests increased from 1,904 in FY 1990 to 2,019 in FY 1991. Fifty-one Australian and Canadian Governments are requesting files on former German personalities of World War II for possible prosecution as war criminals. Pages processed by the FOI Division in FY 1991 included 355,257 classified and 367,285 unclassified pages totaling 722,542.

Appeals. (U) During FY 1991, 78 FOIA and 2 PA appeals were received in the FOI/PO. All appeals have been decided to date in the CSF favor. FOI/PO received its first "NO RECORD" appeal on 30 May 1991. The appeal was prepared and forwarded to the Office of the Army General Counsel pertaining to the disappearance of Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Milian T. Vucurenieh' son off the coast of Hawaii on 3 June 1984.

ADP Equipment at Defense Investigative Service (DIS). (U) Effective 1 October 1990, DIS in Baltimore, Maryland, which operated the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII), no longer possessed the capability to process punched card input to update the DCII database. This index is critical to the performance of the Investigative Records Repository's (IRR) mission to store and, upon request, retrieve records of U.S. Army intelligence investigations and operations during much of the 20th century.

(U) With the discontinuation of punched cards, each action required individual entry by an IRR computer assistant. IMO developed the DCII Update Transaction System (DUTS), which reduced by approximately 80 percent the characters needed to

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locate a desired record for update or purge actions, compared to entering data directly to the DCII through CSF's telecommunication line. DUTS not only reduced the effort to locate the desired record but also emulated punched card capabilities which are not included in the vender telecommunication software. This application software improved data entry efficiency and, thereby, contributed to managing a task with the potential of overwhelming IRR's data entry personnel. An accurate, up-to-date index is essential for IRR to locate dossiers and respond to information requests in a timely manner.

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Chapter V

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Multidiscipline

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. (U) The most significant historical event affecting INSCOM during the reporting period was Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, in which a U.S. expeditionary force deployed to the Middle East in response to Iraqi aggression and ultimately liberated the Emirate of Kuwait in an unprecedented lightning air and ground campaign. A full account of INSCOM's role in this campaign is contained in Appendix K. Appendix L contains the text of the History Office's after-action oral history interview with MG Charles F. Scanlon, in which the CG INSCOM makes his own assessment of the support provided by INSCOM to the war in the desert.

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(b) (1) Per NSA, (b)(1), (b)(3); 50 USC 3024(i), (b)(3); P.L. 86-36

Restructuring MI. (U) DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM proved to be only a momentarily spectacular "blip" in the post-Cold War drawdown of the Army. Planning for retrenchment of the force continued throughout the operation. In January 1991, staff heads at HQ INSCOM were directed to identify 25 percent of their authorized positions for future elimination, in order to comply with the Project VANGUARD initiative to reduce the TDA of HQ INSCOM by 117 spaces. Meanwhile, study as to the possibility/desirability of transferring INSCOM's U.S. Army Russian Institute and the Foreign Language Training Center, Europe to TRADOC continued. Overall, the personnel situation in Europe showed an extreme fluidity. As one INSCOM officer noted, "'Ground Truth' is measured on the clock: we don't lie, the truth changes."

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Counterintelligence/Operations Security

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Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Conference. (U) During 10-13 June 1991, ADCSOPS-CI hosted the second annual Foreign Counterintelligence Conference. A total of twenty personnel from INSCOM subordinate units attended. Objectives of the conference were to discuss and validate the CI mission area analysis (MAA) that INSCOM had initiated in December 1990; discuss future CI requirements in each theater; clarify the role of CI in support of the Counter Drug program; and discuss the establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Command (FIC).

Relocation of Badge and Credentials (B&C) Office. (U) At the end of the reporting period, ADCSOPS-CI initiated action to move the Military Intelligence Badge and Credentials Office from the Foreign Counterintelligence Activity at Fort George G. Meade, MD, to HQ INSCOM at Fort Belvoir. The relocation was designed to enhance staff oversight capability. Coordination of the action began in July 1991, and it was anticipated that physical relocation of office equipment and the seven safes containing badges and credentials would be accomplished 3 October 1991.

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(U) The last-named project, undertaken in conjunction with Air Force and Navy counterintelligence personnel, resulted in the first Intelligence Information Report (IRR) issued by the 902d MI Group in some years. Additionally, as part of the Project GROUPIE STYLE effort to detect and neutralize known FIS activity at the Defense Language Institute, the 902d contributed personnel to a multiservice task force which conducted an in-depth security survey of the Institute. Finally, the Group developed and conducted exercises in Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. to provide selected Defense Intelligence College attache' personnel with realistic surveillance, countersurveillance, and antiterrorism training support.

Mission Transfers. (U) The Army promulgated its new COMSEC regulation, AR 380-40, in November 1990. As a result of changes in the language of the regulation, it was determined by DCSINT that there was no longer any need for INSCOM to approve Army requests to establish cryptonets and obtain cryptomaterial. Evolving changes in keying materiel and the key management process had rendered current procedures inappropriate. These changes were brought about by the Army's shift from paper to electronic key. Accordingly, in February 1991, ADCSOPS-CI transferred the functions of cryptonet approval and requisition of COMSEC material from INSCOM to CECOM's Communication Security Logistics Activity. The new AR also significantly reduced INSCOM's role in inspecting cryptofacilities. INSCOM would no longer routinely inspect every Army cryptofacility, but confine its efforts to cyclical inspections of the most important or endangered ones. It was anticipated that the change would reduce the workload by a factor of 1/3 to 1/2.

(U) Additionally, the publication of AR 380-19-1, Information System Security (C), on 4 October 1990 led to another mission divestment by INSCOM. The Controlled Environmental Testing Laboratory of the TEMPEST mission was transferred from the 902d MI Group's TEMPEST Test Detachment at Vint Hill Farms Station to the Army Materiel Command (AMC).

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Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) and TEMPEST Issues. (U) In May 1991, as part of the CI Mission Area Analysis, the CG INSCOM approved the consolidation of the TSCM and TEMPEST programs. On 31 August 1991, ADCSOPS-CI directed major subordinate commands to consolidate management of TSCM and TEMPEST down to the lowest practical

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level, and to combine and collocate TSCM and TEMPEST personnel to the greatest extent practical under common supervision and management. All TSCM personnel would be cross trained to conduct TEMPEST inspections. Concurrently, the TSCM and TEMPEST branches of ADCSOPS-CI's Technical Division were consolidated.

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Mobile Tempest Testing System (MTTS). (U) This program had dragged on since 1979, continually plagued by cost overruns and erratic contractor performance. Details of the tedious process can be found in previous annual historical reports. In August 1991, the original requirement for ten MTTS units and transporters was reduced to two by INSCOM.


INSCOM Polygraph Program. (U) During the course of the reporting period, the INSCOM Polygraph program labored under constraints imposed by Congressional mandates. Congress annually places a limit on the number of Counterintelligence-Scope (CSP) examinations that the Department of Defense (DOD) can administer each fiscal year. Only personnel assigned to NSA, (b)(1) Per CIA or involved in national reconnaissance programs were not subject to the ceiling. Since the DOD-wide Congressional ceiling for Fiscal Year 1991 was 5,000, INSCOM received a fair-share quota of 1200. This had been reached by April 1991. Although 200 additional exams were performed as a result of the inability of DIA and the Air Force to meet their own quotas, there were still not enough exams to keep INSCOM's polygraph personnel productively utilized until the end of the fiscal year, and units were directed to "take dramatic and decisive action to cut production." Meanwhile, the command's inability to administer CSP examinations normally required for access to the INSCOM TIGHT DOOR Special Access

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Program led INSCOM to propose that the requirement be temporarily waived. Prospects for the future did not look much brighter, since INSCOM's quota for CSP exams in FY 92 was set at 1300.

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The Resources Crunch. (U) Army force cuts, new mission formulation, and a larger military intelligence restructuring brought about significant counterintelligence budget program turbulence during the reporting period. Personnel decrements imposed by the Army VANGUARD study led ADCSOPS-CI to recommend a 24 percent reduction in the counterintelligence mission. This was necessary because the Security and Investigative (S&I) program was due to experience a loss of 448 spaces, which had been reprogrammed to support the new INSCOM Living TOE (LTOE) structure. On the other hand, as a result of Congressional mandates, the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP) grew by 5 percent, a step that would allow the Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity to conduct two major espionage investigations concurrently.

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
HUMINT/TAREX

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HUMINT Intelligence Information Report (IIR) Production.

(U) During the course of the reporting period, INSCOM generated 16,282 IIR's based on HUMINT. Almost half came from the 66th MI Brigade. However, the U.S. Army Operational Group, together with the Operational Support Detachment under its OPCON, was the largest source of IIR's obtained from clandestine sources.

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Other: (b)(1) Per CIA

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Page(s) 62

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Other: (b)(1) (b)(3) Per NSA (b)(1) Per CIA

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Page(s) 63

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Page(s) 64

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Other: (b)(1) (b)(3) Per NSA

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Page(s) 65

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Other: (b)(1) (b)(3) Per NSA

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Page(s) 66-77

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
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
Page(s) 78

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



U.S. Army Strategic Imagery Detachment, Pacific (SIDPAC).

(U) The U.S. Army Strategic Imagery Detachment, Pacific (SIDPAC) of the 500th MI Brigade is manned by 17 INSCOM imagery analysts and has operational control of 3 to 8 other imagery analysts from U.S. Army Pacific. During the course of the reporting period, SIDPAC was integrated into the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. The JICPAC began initial operations in July 1991 and was scheduled to obtain full operational capability in 1993.

~~SECRET~~

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Other:


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Page(s) 80-81

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APPENDIX A

(b)(1)



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82

82

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
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Page(s) 83-88

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APPENDIX B

(b)(1)



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Other:

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Page(s) 90

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APPENDIX C
CHANGES IN STATUS OF TOE UNITS

No Changes.


UNCLASSIFIED

91

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APPENDIX D

(b)(1)



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
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Page(s) 93-94

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APPENDIX E

(b)(1)




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APPENDIX F

(b)(1)




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APPENDIX G



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APPENDIX H
USAINSCOM KEY PERSONNEL

<u>Position/Name</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
COMMANDING GENERAL	
MG Charles F. Scanlon	11 Oct 90 - Present
MG Stanley H. Hyman	22 Nov 88 - 10 Oct 90
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL	
BG Michael M. Schneider	18 Mar 91 - Present
BG Floyd L. Runyon	22 Aug 88 - 11 Jan 91
SENIOR CRYPTOLOGIC ADVISOR	
Mr. (b)(6)	Sep 91 - Present
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT	
Mr. (b)(6)	06 Apr 87 - Present ^{Sep 91}
COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR	
CSM (b)(6)	17 Jul 87 - Present
CHIEF OF STAFF	
COL (b)(6)	07 Nov 90 - Present
Mr. (b)(6)	04 Jul 89 - 06 Nov 90
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	
Mr. (b)(6)	07 Nov 90 - Present
LTC (b)(6)	21 Aug 89 - 06 Nov 90
COMMAND GROUP ACTION OFFICER	
Mr. (b)(6)	07 Mar 83 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESERVE AFFAIRS	
COL (b)(6)	21 Aug 89 - Present
INTERNAL REVIEW OFFICE	
Mr. (b)(6)	01 Apr 84 - Present

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Position/Name

Dates Served

SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF

CPT (b)(6)

MAJ

07 May 90 - Present
01 Mar 89 - 06 May 90

PRINCIPAL ADVISOR RESPONSIBLE FOR
CONTRACTING (PARC)

Mr. (b)(6)

Jul 87 - Present

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT OFFICE

Mr. (b)(6)

10 Oct 88 - Present

INSPECTOR GENERAL

COL (b)(6)

COL

26 Aug 91 - Present
20 Jul 87 - 25 Aug 91

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

COL (b)(6)

Jun 88 - Present

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

LTC (b)(6)

01 Sep 87 - Present

COMMAND CHAPLAIN

COL (b)(6)

20 Jul 89 - Present

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL

COL (b)(6)

24 Jul 89 - Present

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT

COL (b)(6)

01 Jun 89 - Present

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, FORCE
INTEGRATION

COL (b)(6)

Jun 89 - ~~Present~~ 1 Oct 90

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS

COL (b)(6)

16 Aug 90 - Present

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<u>Position/Name</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, LOGISTICS COL (b)(6)	10 Apr 89 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COL (b)(6) COL	15 Nov 90 - Present 19 Sep 88 - 14 Nov 90
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, SECURITY COL (b)(6) Mr. LTC	Jul 91 - Present Apr 91 - Jul 91 01 Jul 90 - Apr 91
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, CONTRACTING Mr. (b)(6)	01 Oct 90 - Present
<u>Unit/Commander</u>	
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (EAC) COL (b)(6)	27 Jul 90 - Present
470th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (EAC) COL (b)(6) COL	17 Jul 91 - Present 11 Jul 89 - 16 Jul 91
500th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (EAC) COL (b)(6)	19 Jul 90 - Present
500th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE, HAWAII LTC (b)(6) LTC	07 Jul 91 - Present 23 Jul 90 - 06 Jul 91
501st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (EAC) COL (b)(6)	14 Jun 90 - Present
513th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (EAC) COL (b)(6)	12 Sep 90 - Present

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Unit/Commander

Dates Served

701st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE
COL (b)(6)
COL [redacted]

Jun 91 - Present
14 Jul 89 - Jun 91

703d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE
COL (b)(6)
COL [redacted]

09 Jul 91 - Present
16 Jun 89 - 08 Jul 91

704th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE
COL (b)(6)
[redacted]

20 Jun 90 - Present

902d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
COL (b)(6)
[redacted]

Dec 89 - Present

U.S. ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP
COL (b)(6)
COL [redacted]

14 Jun 90 - Present
01 Jul 88 - 13 Jun 90

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL SECURITY GROUP
COL (b)(6)
[redacted]

10 Jul 89 - Present

U.S. ARMY CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT GROUP
COL (b)(6)
COL [redacted]

15 Jul 91 - Present
Jul 88 - 14 Jul 91

USAINSCOM FOREIGN MATERIEL INTELLIGENCE
GROUP (b)(6)
LTC [redacted]
LTC [redacted]

16 Aug 91 - Present
14 Jul 89 - 15 Aug 91

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION BERLIN
COL (b)(6)
[redacted]

25 Jul 90 - Present

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION SINOP
COL (b)(6)
COL [redacted]
COL [redacted]
COL [redacted]

22 Jun 91 - Present
Jul 90 - 21 Jun 91
31 Jul 89 - Jul 90

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Unit/Commander

Dates Served

3d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
(AERIAL EXPLOITATION)

LTC (b)(6)
LTC [Redacted]

Jun 91 - Present
Jun 89 - Jun 91

18th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
(INTG/EXPL) (EAC)

LTC (b)(6)
[Redacted]

22 Jun 90 - Present

201st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
(SIGINT) (EAC)

LTC (b)(6)
LTC [Redacted]

28 Sep 90 - Present
05 Aug 88 - 27 Sep 90

202d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
(INTG & EXPL) (EAC)

LTC (b)(6)
LTC [Redacted]
LTC [Redacted]

28 Sep 90 - Present
05 Aug 88 - 27 Sep 90
24 Jun 88 - 04 Aug 88

204th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
(EAC)

(b)(1) [Redacted]
LTC (b)(6)
LTC [Redacted]

17 Jul 91 - Present
17 Jul 89 - 16 Jul 91

308th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

LTC (b)(6)
MAJ [Redacted]

10 May 91 - Present
16 July 89 - 09 May 91

524th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
(COLL/EXPL)

LTC (b)(6)
[Redacted]

27 Jun 90 - Present

527th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (CI)

LTC (b)(6)
[Redacted]

18 Jul 90 - Present

532d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
(OPERATIONS)

LTC (b)(6)
LTC [Redacted]

21 Jun 91 - Present
21 Jun 89 - 20 Jun 91

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Unit/Commander

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701st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	12 Jul 90 - Present 12 Jul 88 - 12 Jul 90
711th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	20 Jun 90 - Present Jun 88 - 19 Jun 90
712th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	Oct 90 - 30 Sep 91 18 Sep 89 - Oct 90
713th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	Oct 90 - Present Jun 88 - Oct 90
714th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	Oct 90 - Present Jul 88 - Oct 90
730th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	29 Jun 90 - Present
731st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	19 Jun 90 - Present
732d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	09 Nov 90 - Present 06 Oct 88 - 08 Nov 90
741st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	29 Jul 91 - Present 24 Aug 89 - 28 Jul 91
742d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC (b)(6) LTC [redacted]	02 Jul 91 - Present 02 Aug 89 - 01 Jul 91

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743d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

LTC (b)(6)

LTC

18 Jun 91 - Present
Aug 89 - 17 Jun 91

746th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

LTC (b)(6)

LTC

17 Jun 91 - Present
30 Jun 89 - 16 Jun 91

747th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

MAJ (b)(6)

CPT

LTC

MAJ

23 Jul 91 - Present
17 Jun 91 - 22 Jul 91
15 Jun 90 - 16 Jun 91
30 Jun 88 - 14 Jun 90

748th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

LTC (b)(6)

LTC

21 Mar 91 - Present
06 Jul 89 - 20 Mar 91

750th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

LTC (b)(6)

LTC

Jun 91 - Present
May 89 - Jun 91

751st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

LTC (b)(6)

12 Jul 90 - Present

USAINSCOM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) (TECHNICAL)

LTC (b)(6)

LTC

22 Jun 91 - Present
26 Jun 89 - 21 Jun 91

USAINSCOM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) (COUNTERESPIONAGE)

LTC (b)(6)

06 Dec 89 - Present

IMAGERY AND ANALYSIS BATTALION

MAJ (b)(6)

01 Oct 90 - Present

U. S. ARMY FOREIGN MATERIEL INTELLIGENCE BATTALION

LTC (b)(6)

LTC

16 Aug 91 - Present
14 Jul 89 - 15 Aug 91

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<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
USAINSCOM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (SECURITY)	
LTC (b)(6) [redacted]	23 Jul 90 - Present
U. S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (LOW INTENSITY)	
LTC (b)(6) [redacted]	20 Jul 91 - Present
LTC [redacted]	Jun 90 - Present
5th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (INTG & EXPL) (EAC)	
CPT (b)(6) [redacted]	21 Sep 90 - Present
11th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (TECH) (INTEL)	
CPT (b)(6) [redacted]	15 Jul 91 - Present
CPT [redacted]	09 Jul 90 - 14 Jul 91
CPT [redacted]	16 Aug 88 - 08 Jul 90
17th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (IMAGERY INTERPRETATION)	
CPT (b)(6) [redacted]	10 Aug 90 - Present
CPT [redacted]	06 Jul 89 - 09 Aug 90
174th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
CPT (b)(6) [redacted]	01 Oct 90 - Present
164th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (CI)	
CPT (b)(6) [redacted]	
CPT [redacted]	23 Sep 88 - Present
749th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
CPT (b)(6) [redacted]	06 Dec 88 - Present
181st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT	
CPT (b)(6) [redacted]	10 Jun 91 - Present
CPT [redacted]	29 Jun 90 - 09 Jun 91

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<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
581st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT (II) CPT (b)(6)	09 Jun 89 - Present
584th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT MAJ (b)(6) CPT LTC	27 Aug 91 - Present May 91 - 26 Aug 91 30 Jul 87 - May 91
766th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT MAJ (b)(6) LTC	02 Aug 91 - Present 04 Dec 89 - 01 Aug 91
U.S. ARMY ASIAN STUDIES DETACHMENT Mr. (b)(6)	14 Jan 89 - Present
WOBECK DETACHMENT CPT (b)(6)	21 Mar 88 - Present
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, DETACHMENT HAHN LTC (b)(6)	21 Jul 88 - Present
FOREIGN LANGUAGE DETACHMENT Mr. (b)(6) (Acting)	Sep 90 - Present
POLYGRAPH DETACHMENT MAJ (b)(6) LTC	05 Aug 91 - Present 16 Feb 90 - 04 Aug 91
DETACHMENT HAHN CPT (b)(6)	
U.S. ARMY SPECIAL SECURITY DETACHMENT MAJ (b)(6)	08 Jul 90 - Present
DETACHMENT, HAWAII CPT (b)(6) CPT CPT	12 Jul 91 - Present 30 Jun 91 - 11 Jul 91 Jul 90 - 29 Jun 90

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<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
USAINSCOM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE), SUPPORT CPT (b)(6)	22 Aug 90 - Present
USAINSCOM THEATER INTELLIGENCE CENTER- PACIFIC CPT (b)(6)	Jul 89 - Present
3d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTER (EAC) MAJ (b)(6) CPT	15 Jul 90 - Present 19 Aug 89 - 14 Jul 90
174th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTER (EAC) LTC (b)(6)	25 Aug 88 - Present
U.S. ARMY FIELD SUPPORT CENTER COL (b)(6) COL	01 Jun 91 - Present Jun 89 - 31 May 91
USAINSCOM FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING CENTER EUROPE LTC (b)(6) LTC	18 Jul 91 - Present 01 Jun 89 - 17 Jul 91
USAINSCOM AUTOMATED SYSTEMS ACTIVITY Mr. (b)(6)	May 89 - Present
USAINSCOM FORCE MODERNIZATION ACTIVITY Mr. (b)(6)	01 Jan 89 - Present
USAINSCOM MISSION SUPPORT ACTIVITY Mr. (b)(6)	01 Jan 89 - Present
USAINSCOM CONTRACT SUPPORT ACTIVITY Mr. (b)(6)	Jul 87 - Present
U.S. ARMY FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY COL (b)(6)	08 Feb 88 - Present

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Unit/Commander

Dates Served

USAINSCOM MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE AND
INSTRUCTION TEAM (MAIT)

CPT (b)(6)

30 Mar 88 - Present

U.S. ARMY CENTRAL SECURITY FACILITY

COL (b)(6)
COL

20 Jun 91 - Present
03 Jun 86 - 19 Jun 91

U.S. ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

COL (b)(6)
COL

19 Jun 91 - Present
15 Oct 86 - 18 Jun 91

INSCOM ACTIVITY FORT BELVOIR

MAJ (b)(6)

09 Jun 89 - Present

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APPENDIX I

TRAVIS TROPHY WINNERS

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Winner</u>
1964	6988 U.S. Air Force Security Squadron (USASA NOMINEE: 53d USASA Special Operations Command)
1965	313th ASA Battalion (Corps)
1966	1st Radio Company Fleet Marine Force (USASA NOMINEE: USASA Training Center and School)
1967	509th USASA Group
1968	6990th U.S. Air Force Security Squadron (USASA NOMINEE: USASA, Europe)
1970	USASA Field Station, Udorn
1971	U.S. Naval Security Group Activity, Bremerhaven, Germany (USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Vint Hill Farms)
1972	6916th U.S. Air Force Security Squadron (USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Udorn)
1973	USASA Field Station, Berlin
1974	U.S. Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan (USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Augsburg)

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<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Winner</u>
1975	Consolidated Security Operations Center, San Antonio (USASA Field Station, San Antonio/6993d U.S. Air Force Security Squadron)
1976	USASA Field Station, Sobe
1977	470th Military Intelligence Group
1978	6903 U.S. Air Force Security Squadron, Osan Air Base, Korea (USASA NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg)
1979	U.S. Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan (USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Sobe)
1980	U.S. Air Field Station Misawa
1981	U.S. Army Field Station Berlin
1982	6912 Air Force Electronic Security Group, Berlin (USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Berlin)
1983	6920 Air Force Electronic Security Group, Misawa, AB, Japan (USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg)
1984	Naval Security Group Activity, Edzell, Scotland (USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Kunia)
1985	U.S. Army Field Station Berlin

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Calendar Year

Winner

1986

6912th Electronic Security Group, Berlin

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1987

Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan
(USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station
Kunja)

1988

701st Military Intelligence Brigade

1989

1990

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APPENDIX J

DIRECTOR'S TROPHY WINNERS

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Winners</u>
1979	Staff Commander Middle East Force, Jufair, Bahrain (ARMY NOMINEE: 193d Brigade Support Company, Fort Amador, Panama)
1980	69616 Electronic Security Squadron, Hellenikon Air Base, Greece (ARMY NOMINEE: 372d ASA Co, 25th Inf Div, Oahu, Hawaii)
1981	Navy Security Group Activity, Athens, Greece (ARMY NOMINEE: 372d ASA Co, 25th Inf Div, Oahu, Hawaii)
1982	Task Force 138, U.S. Southern Command
1983	2d Radio Battalion Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Camp Lejuene, North Carolina (ARMY NOMINEE: 193d Military Intelligence Company (CEWI), Panama)
1984	224th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)
1985	525th Military Intelligence Brigade
1986	6916th Electronic Security Squadron, Hellenikon Air Base, Greece (ARMY NOMINEE: 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (AE), Wiesbaen Air Base, Germany)
1987	224th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)

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PART I - SECTION G

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

1. (U) The Prelude

(U) On 2 August 1990, three heavy divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard executed a land and amphibious invasion of the Emirate of Kuwait. Subsequently, Saddam Hussein, Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, annexed Kuwait and proclaimed it to be Iraq's nineteenth province. This action was a direct violation of international law and a challenge to the stability of the Persian Gulf. Hussein's troops were now positioned on the border of Saudi Arabia, and threatened the largest concentration of known oil reserves in the world. Since Iraqi forces had violated one international boundary, there was no guarantee they might not cross another. The President of the United States immediately determined that the Iraqi aggression would not be allowed to stand. On 7 August, he ordered deployment of U.S. forces to Southwest Asia.

(U) Intervention in Southwest Asia confronted the United States Army with substantial problems. From a military point of view, this was an underdeveloped theater with no significant U.S. forces deployed. Troops and supplies would have to travel 8,000 miles from CONUS to reach their destinations. The unified command responsible for defense of the Southwest Asian Area of Responsibility was U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), with its headquarters in Tampa, Florida. From the intelligence perspective, this meant that the Army would be forced to fight on unfamiliar ground. Because there were no forward deployed troops in the area, the Persian Gulf had been, at best, a peripheral target for U.S. Army intelligence. In particular, the Echelons Corps and Below (ECB) intelligence elements of the tactical units assigned to CENTCOM lacked any experience with the target.

(U) This fact meant that the burden of providing intelligence for the Army within theater would fall upon the Army's strategic and operational level collection and production elements. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is the major Army command with the mission to conduct intelligence, security, and electronic warfare activities at Echelons Above Corps with the command's worldwide brigades, and other specialized units. One of INSCOM's major subordinate commands was the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, with the assigned contingency mission of providing intelligence support to CENTCOM's Army component, U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT). At the time the crisis broke, INSCOM's production element, the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA), was a Field Operating Agency of the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

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2. (U) DESERT SHIELD

(U) As the Army's MACOM for intelligence, INSCOM became involved in the crisis immediately. On 3 August, human intelligence (HUMINT) assets of the U.S. Army Operational Group were tasked to begin collection operations against the CENTCOM area of responsibility. A little later, counterintelligence personnel from INSCOM's 902d Military Intelligence Group began to conduct port security surveys of the embarkation points in CONUS from which the Army's heavy equipment would be shipped. INSCOM's involvement in Operation DESERT SHIELD quickly became more direct. Under previously approved command arrangements, U.S. Army forces assigned to contingency operations in Southwest Asia would be assigned to ARCENT (Third U.S. Army). The principal intelligence element designated to support ARCENT was INSCOM's 513th Military Intelligence Brigade. On 6 August 1990, this unit received an alert order. Two days later, a three-person cell from the brigade went to Saudi Arabia with elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Additionally, the detachment of INSCOM's Special Security Group that supports ARCENT headquarters with the mission of securing and disseminating Sensitive Compartmented Information deployed from CONUS on 14 August 1990 to join forward headquarters elements in Saudi Arabia.

(U) The 513th Military Intelligence Brigade marshalled substantial assets for its mission. Headquartered at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, the brigade commanded the 174th Military Intelligence Company (Echelons above Corps Intelligence Center - EACIC), the 201st and 202d MI Battalions (respectively with signals intelligence and counterintelligence/HUMINT missions), the 17th Military Intelligence Company (imagery); and two TDA units: the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Battalion and the Military Intelligence Battalion Low Intensity. These units were rather widely dispersed. Brigade headquarters, the EACIC, and the 202d MI Battalion were at Fort Monmouth; the 201st MI Battalion was at Vint Hill Farms Station in Virginia; and the 17th MI Company was partially at Monmouth and partially at two Air Force bases in the South. The MI Battalion - Low Intensity (a specialized aviation element) was attached to the 470th MI Brigade in SOUTHCOM. Although the arrangements presented possible span-of-control problems, the real drawback was the fact that the 174th was physically located several hundred miles away from the Army headquarters it was intended to support, ARCENT headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia.

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(U) Finally, brigade deployment did not go as planned. This was thwarted by the nature of the crisis. The initial U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had been to rush its strategic contingency forces--the troops of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps--to Saudi Arabia. But this meant that only a thin screen of lightly armed troops stood between an enormous mass of Iraqi armor and the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia. Because of this, CENTCOM decided it was imperative to build up warfighting strength as quickly as possible, even though this had to be accomplished by deferring movement of combat support elements such as the 513th MI Brigade. Under the existing OPLAN for contingency support to a Southwest Asia commitment, the brigade had been slated to deploy as a unit relatively early on in the cycle, but now it would be forced to deploy piecemeal. This piecemeal deployment would make it difficult to establish an intelligence structure in the AOR and slow the development of intelligence operations.

(U) Fortunately, the brigade did not have to carry the burden of Army intelligence all by itself. Even though the brigade had been attached to ARCENT, its parent command, INSCOM, stepped in to provide critical support from the outset. MG Stanley H. Hyman, INSCOM Commanding General until 11 October, and his successor, MG Charles F. Scanlon, threw the resources of the MACOM into making the brigade well and supporting the intelligence effort of ARCENT in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. INSCOM had worldwide collection assets, a concentration of the necessary low-density military operational specialties in intelligence, and control of unique and specialized equipment. Because of this, the command was able to begin intelligence and security operations as soon as the crisis broke. As a focus for asset management and control, INSCOM utilized its Intelligence Operations Center (IOC). Initially a watch center, the IOC was augmented by personnel from the headquarters staff and reservists and transformed into the command post that directed all of INSCOM's DESERT SHIELD-related activities.

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(U) This process was not accomplished without a certain amount of pain. Theater commanders were not always happy to see key intelligence assets drawn off to Southwest Asia. However, Southwest Asia was the area in which the shooting war was about to begin. INSCOM's commanders adhered to the tried-and-true military principles of concentration and economy-of-force. Intelligence assets were massed at the decisive point. The accomplishment reconfirmed the importance of INSCOM's role as manager of the Army's echelon-above-corps collection assets worldwide. Without the flexibility afforded by INSCOM's capacity to cross-level its forces, the Army would have been hard put to meet its intelligence requirements.

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(U) On 12 September, as part of a programmed rotation, COL (b)(6) (b)(6) assumed command of the 513th MI Brigade from COL (b)(6) (b)(6). At the end of the month, the new commander joined the forward element of his brigade in Riyadh. Realizing that the task force did not have enough senior officers to execute its mission, the colonel ordered the battalion commanders in CONUS to move forward to Saudi Arabia and take command of the advance echelons of their units in country.

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3. (U) STRENGTHENING THE SHIELD

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4. (U) DESERT STORM/DESERT SABER

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5. (U) THE AFTERMATH

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(U) The following interview was conducted on 23 July 1991 at Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The subject was INSCOM's role in DESERT SHIELD/STORM Operations. The interviewee is Major General Charles F. Scanlon, Commanding General, INSCOM. The interview was conducted by the INSCOM History Office (Mr. (b)(6) and Dr. (b)(6) with Dr. (b)(6) posing the questions.

(U) Dr. (b)(6) Sir, could you give us an overview of the status of INSCOM support to DESERT SHIELD as you assumed command on 11 October 1990?

(U) General Scanlon: As you know, we have documented our INSCOM support to DESERT SHIELD in many ways including the preparation of formal lessons learned and numerous briefings. As I took command of INSCOM, I received advice from the leadership of the Army, in this case the former Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono. He said, "You have to do two things for us at INSCOM: You have to provide the best possible intelligence support from INSCOM to DESERT SHIELD. At the same time, you need to maintain the operational capabilities of the other INSCOM units worldwide to ensure that we don't neglect support to other theaters and Army commanders while preoccupied with DESERT SHIELD operations." I think that INSCOM achieved these objectives in a superb manner. I was very impressed. As you know, INSCOM's forward element that provided support for DESERT

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SHIELD/DESERT STORM was the 513th MI Brigade. This was our contingency brigade designated to support CENTCOM and its Army component in the desert. As the 513th moved out, it decided in conjunction with ARCENT how much intelligence support would be required. INSCOM then reinforced the 513th MI Brigade forces in the desert and also reinforced other ARCENT and CENTCOM elements. Additionally, we looked at ways in which we could provide multidiscipline intelligence support both from the CONUS base and from the rest of the world to the conflict that was taking place in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

(U) From our perspective, INSCOM had a good track record in doing this. In addition to providing intelligence support, INSCOM was instrumental in assisting CENTCOM, ARCENT, and especially the 513th MI Brigade receive the total products of the National intelligence effort. We did that by looking at innovative ways in which we could improve the existing communications system on the ground. As we enhanced the TROJAN system and made it into TROJAN SPIRIT, we were able to move closer to a dedicated all-source intelligence system. This not only benefitted INSCOM's support to the Army forces and the 513th MI Brigade, but facilitated the transmission of imagery, ELINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, and counterintelligence information to the desert forces. A large part of INSCOM's support involved the intelligence logistical considerations necessary to support an operation of that magnitude.

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(U) A second problem that we encountered was the question of whether the mobile intelligence systems that we deployed to the desert were up to the task of providing intelligence support in that type of environment. Although we had deployed most of those systems in other areas of the world, they had never been operated under adverse desert conditions. The answer which came back was that some performed very well; others did not perform as well; and a few didn't perform at all. That was certainly a problem for us. Maintaining the various intelligence systems in this type of operational environment also caused some difficulties. We found that it took continuous logistical support, military as well as contractor, to maintain some of our more sophisticated systems normally dependent upon a contractor-related logistics team. Most of the contractor efforts worked. But, in extreme cases, it was found that some of our contractors had neither the right set of people willing to be deployed under combat conditions nor people who had the right expertise to maintain the sophisticated systems we had. Certainly that was a second problem set for us.

(U) As always when you go to war, there is often a need to find the proper mix and match of the right kinds of people to run the intelligence effort. We found that there was considerable need at the Army component level for what we call the Echelon Above Corps Intelligence Center (EACIC). We discovered that the 513th MI

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Brigade's EACIC capabilities were quickly exceeded. It soon became clear that we needed to greatly augment the G2 staff of the Army component and, to a degree, the joint staff's J2 intelligence component at CENTCOM headquarters with more senior people. We needed people who had a higher level of experience and maturity in both battlefield operating experience and individual disciplines. We found that the experience level needed in both the human and counterintelligence areas was one that was not present early enough in theater. As a result, INSCOM had to continue to augment the brigade, the Army component, and CENTCOM with personnel possessing that level of experience.

(U) Another problem we encountered concerned Reserve units which had been identified as CAPSTONE augmentation for the INSCOM elements deployed to the desert. In some cases, we found that the call-up process did not necessarily produce the correct unit or the unit we needed first. There were a number of instances where the Reserve unit called-up was neither the first one needed nor the best one qualified to carry out the mission. Also we found that some Reserve units had antiquated intelligence equipment. We found that they did not have the desired capability to execute their assigned missions in the sophisticated environment of DESERT STORM. Again, under the category of lessons learned, we know in any future contingency, INSCOM must play a more dynamic, active role to ensure we have the

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right mix of Active and Reserve Component intelligence forces commensurate with the mission we face.

(U) It's probably worth saying that other than those types of major problems, there were a number of smaller problems. We were concerned about the fact that there was a shortfall of Arab linguists; we also had to consider the adequacy of our inventory of some items of highly specialized equipment. We went through a great deal of trial and error as we attempted to make sure the right people, the right equipment, and the right mission capability were in the hands of the commanders on the ground. To the credit of the campaign plan, and our nation's ability to move large amounts of equipment rapidly to the desert, it is fair to say we were confident we had provided commanders with all, or certainly most, of the intelligence tools they needed well in advance of the start of hostilities.

(U) Dr. (b)(6) I know that while in Saudi Arabia the 174th EACIC was expanded to a full operations battalion (the 297th). Was this as a result of the DESERT STORM experience or was this already in the works?

(U) **General Scanlon:** I think, based on experience gained in earlier 513th/CENTCOM exercises, we had already anticipated this expansion prior to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. This experience

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indicated once the force was deployed, there would be a need to expand the 513th's EACIC capability into something larger. Some pretty good planning had already been done, and the framework for expansion was already in place. The EACIC expansion which took place during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was one that was done fairly rapidly. We possessed a good degree of confidence that we knew what needed to be done and to what extent the existing EACIC should be augmented. Obviously it moved to a full size battalion.

(U) Dr. (b)(6) There is another 513th-related question here regarding what we might call the "missing battalion," since the Low Intensity MI Battalion was in theory a part of the 513th but attached to the 470th MI Brigade. Was the fact that it did not deploy due to the importance of the CENTAM mission or the fact that the mission profiles of the battalion's equipment did not match Saudi conditions?

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(U) Dr. (b)(6) Another question to which you may have already spoken is what were the major lessons learned? Since you have already addressed the Army perspective, is there anything you may wish to bring up from a broader intelligence community perspective?

(U) General Scanlon: In that category, when I briefed General Sullivan, now the Army Chief of Staff, on INSCOM's participation in

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DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, I think he was most impressed by the fact that INSCOM, even though it was dispersed in 170 places around the globe, could marshal sufficient forces to meet contingency requirements in a distant theater while still maintaining an acceptable tempo of continued intelligence operations throughout the rest of the world. I think those of us who were serving in INSCOM were particularly gratified that the Army leadership recognized and acknowledged this fact. INSCOM's performance during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM more than fulfilled the expectations held by the command's 1977 architects and designers. At a time when resources may be scarce, a smart way to do intelligence business is to have a single intelligence MACOM in the U.S. Army, and allow that MACOM to have capabilities in all the intelligence disciplines. Although its assets are dispersed in supporting many commands and many customers, when the time comes, you can marshal those resources and apply as many as necessary to take care of any crisis or contingency. That was what INSCOM did in support of the forces in DESERT STORM. I think our most significant lesson learned is that INSCOM is still a good idea and we have revalidated the concept. I believe it is fair to say that INSCOM's performance throughout DESERT STORM has served as the model for intelligence operations for the Defense Department. In fact, the Defense Department has now suggested to the Air Force and Navy that they should move to single intelligence commands and emulate INSCOM's arrangements for intelligence support.

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(U) Dr. (b)(6) As you undoubtedly know, General Schwarzkopf appeared to express some dissatisfaction about the level of intelligence support he received during the operation. Other criticisms have surfaced in the media. What would your response to this line of criticisms or comments be?

(U) General Scanlon: Speaking as a professional intelligence officer, we clearly have to be concerned if the senior military commander in any conflict indicates any unhappiness with his intelligence support for any reason. We are all obliged, professionally and otherwise, to examine our capabilities and answer the question, "If the intelligence provided was not as the commander wanted it, what are the things which we could do in any future conflicts to make it better?" I think that General Schwarzkopf's observations are worth examination. However, I also feel it's worth trying to place that criticism into a larger context. Other authorities have evaluated intelligence support to the war more positively. The President, a man not without considerable experience in the intelligence business, since he was once the Director of Central Intelligence, said in his judgment, intelligence support to the United States and its military commanders was absolutely outstanding. Secretary of Defense Chaney, when he presented the Defense Department perspective on the overall lessons learned from DESERT STORM, said he thought the report indicated that there were improvements needed in intelligence. But, he added, it

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was clear the intelligence support provided to DESERT SHIELD and STORM was the best the United States had ever received during any conflict.

(U) I think we have to look at intelligence support in the context of trying to bring about a continuing improvement of our capabilities. This effort is assisted by the commitment, excellence, and capability of all the military and civilian folks in the United States involved in intelligence support. My own observations are that the military commanders of DESERT SHIELD and STORM were better able to leverage the national collection systems and secure better and more direct support from those national systems than at any other time in our history. So I see continued improvement and progress in those areas.

(U) The specifics that General Schwarzkopf was critical about, to a certain extent, involved some of the internal mechanics of national-level intelligence and the debate that ensued during the conflict over who was responsible for bomb damage assessments (BDA). General Schwarzkopf argued that commanders in the theater should be the better authority because they were reporting bomb damage assessment based on the actual observations of pilots who were carrying out the bombing raids. The Central Intelligence Agency, and to a certain extent the Defense Intelligence Agency, countered with the argument that a better way to conduct the BDA was an objective,

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after-the-fact look at overhead photography that would allow counting and confirmation of actual destroyed equipment. The debate that ensued caused the two parties, the theater commander and the national agencies, to conclude that the figures were different. As the disagreement continued, it escalated to the NSC (National Security Council). It was the President who put it in the proper perspective by pointing out that the underlying differences between the parties were small. The object was to win the war and continue to prosecute the war, so he told the participants to "knock that argument off and get on with your business."

(U) I think General Schwarzkopf took continuing exception to the suggestion on the part of the national intelligence people that the theater numbers might be inflated, and that this was a part of his criticism after DESERT STORM. He also took exception, I think, to some of the estimates of the Iraqi military-political situation and to the "footnoting", as he phrased it, appended by various agencies to some of the key judgments coming out of the process. He hammered away, if you will, at some of those internal mechanics and the way that intelligence support works. However, there is another side to the coin; one that the intelligence community is very proud of. There were no casualties as a result of any bad intelligence information. No battle was lost based on the lack of intelligence information. No one ever claimed that they did not know the complete disposition and order of magnitude of the Iraqi forces or

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where they were on the ground. There were no undiscovered intentions on the part of enemy forces that worked to the disadvantage of the Allied or U.S. forces. So I think for all the intelligence people involved in the process, it is absolutely fair to say that this was our best endeavor. Also, I believe, there will be a genuine effort on the part of the intelligence community to continue to try to improve upon our efforts and our support to the battlefield commanders.

(U) I have no doubt that intelligence is up to the task of successfully supporting military commanders anywhere in the world. I think our apparatus for accomplishing this, and INSCOM's portion of it, is certainly not deficient. Can we make improvements for the future? Clearly we can. It is to our great credit that we have continued to make dramatic improvements in intelligence, intelligence technology, and applications since World War II. If you, as we did, ask the Iraqis what they thought of our intelligence effort versus theirs, one captured Iraqi general officer said there was no comparison. "We had a great appreciation of your intelligence system; we knew from our experience in the Iranian war that at all times you could see us during day and night and knew where we were on the ground. If we communicated, you could both hear us and target us, and if we talked too long, you would target us and destroy us with your ordnance. On the other hand, as we looked at our intelligence system, we had no idea where you were on

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the ground, we had no intelligence system capabilities to see what your dispositions were, and we had no way to monitor your communications. We knew you were going to attack only when you overran our front line positions, or we found out our individual positions were under attack when the incoming rounds destroyed our bunkers and equipment." That was from an enemy with some sophisticated war fighting equipment and some sophisticated communications and missile systems. So I would say to all of those involved in this war, on a comparative basis between the U.S. and Iraq, there was no comparison. The intelligence forces which took part in this war in support of the United States and its military commanders have absolutely nothing to be ashamed of.

(U) Dr. (b)(6) Are there any other issues to bring up at this time?

(U) **General Scanlon:** The real success of an INSCOM always has been and always will be the sum total of the many talents of the people it brings together. The performance of INSCOM as a military command was remarkable if taken down to the individual soldier, civilian, officer, and NCO who participated in the war. I marveled at the talent, dedication, and experience that was brought to bear in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Certainly we count ourselves fortunate here at INSCOM to have such an overwhelming sample of great American talent present in the Intelligence and Security Command. The real

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
key to success of that was the trained and ready intelligence force which complemented the trained and ready combatant force that resulted in a predictable victory over the Iraqi forces in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The real credit, I think, for the successes that came from that has always belonged to the people who took part in it, supported it, and participated in these efforts.

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) (b)(7)(e)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

Other: (b)(1) Per CIA

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Page(s) 146

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Other:

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Page(s) 147-149