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Description of document: Each written response or letter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to a Congressional Committee (not a congressional office or Committee Chair), 2012-2013

Requested date: 20-April-2013

Released date: 20-November-2015

Posted date: 21-December-2015

Source of document: Freedom of Information Act Request
Director, Information Management Division
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20511
Fax: (703) 874-8910
Email: dni-foia@dni.gov

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Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

NOV 20 2015

Re: ODNI case DF-2013-00106

This responds to your email dated 20 April 2013 (Enclosure 1) to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), received in our office 22 April 2013, requesting, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), ***“a copy of each written response or letter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to a Congressional Committee (not a congressional office) (or Committee Chair) in calendar years 2012 and 2013 to date.”***

Your request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. A search of our records returned documents responsive to your request (Enclosure 2). Upon thorough review, ODNI identified material requiring withholding, pursuant to the following exemptions:

- (b)(1), which applies to information that is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c); and
- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, specifically: the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.
 - § 3024(m)(1), which protects, among other things, the names and identifying information of ODNI personnel; and
 - § 3024(i)(1), which protects information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods.

If you wish to appeal our determination on this request, please explain the basis of your appeal and forward to the address below within 45 days of the date of this letter:

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Information Management Division
Washington, DC 20511

Documents were also sent to other agencies for their review. Redactions were taken by those agencies pursuant to (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(7)(E). These portions are indicated within the documents.

If you have any questions, email our Requester Service Center at DNI-FOIA@dni.gov or call us at (703) 874-8500.

Sincerely,

ba

Jennifer Hudson
Director, Information Management Division

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

2

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

3 January 2012

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(U//FOUO) The ODNI office of Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) recently completed the attached review [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(U//FOUO) This evaluation represents the most thorough review of a single analytic product to date. AIS evaluated analytic tradecraft, checked all source citations, and conducted interviews with IC analysts and managers involved in the Memorandum's production and coordination.

(U) AIS is prepared to brief the Committee on this evaluation at your convenience. If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me on [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure: As Stated

U//FOUO when separated from enclosure

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

3 January 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madame Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(b)(3)

(U//FOUO) The ODNI office of Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) recently completed the attached review [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) This evaluation represents the most thorough review of a single analytic product to date. AIS evaluated analytic tradecraft, checked all source citations, and conducted interviews with IC analysts and managers involved in the Memorandum's production and coordination.

(U) AIS is prepared to brief the Committee on this evaluation at your convenience. If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me or [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure: As Stated

U//FOUO when separated from enclosure

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

JAN 10 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. If you have any questions regarding this matter or would like a briefing on this report, please contact the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

Sincerely,

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

DRV FROM:ODNI-COL T-08
DECL ON: 39480914

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

JAN 10 2012

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Select Committee on Intelligence
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. If you have any questions regarding this matter or would like a briefing on this report, please contact the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED]

Sincerely,

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Enclosure:
(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]

DRV FROM: ODNI-COL T-08
DECL ON: 39480914

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20512

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

JAN 24 2012

The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515


Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

Thank you for your December 19, 2011 letter outlining your support for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's EnhancedView Commercial Imagery Program. I am aware of the utility and contributions of commercial imagery to the Intelligence Community (IC), the Department of Defense (DoD), and our allies and coalition partners.

Please be assured that the IC is working collaboratively with DoD to address current budgetary challenges, and adjust funding priorities in a balanced and objective manner. We will balance the investment necessary to ensure the security of the United States and make sure our nation has the best and most cost effective mix of intelligence capabilities possible. These critical considerations will drive each programmatic decision regarding the U.S. overhead imagery architecture, including the commercial imagery program funding.

I look forward to working with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on this important issue.

Sincerely,



James R. Clapper

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

February 15, 2012

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(U) The enclosed report responds to congressional direction in the Classified Annex to the Explanatory Statement for H.R. 2055, "Making Appropriations for Military Construction, and the Department of Veteran Affairs, and related agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2012 and for other purposes", P.L. 112-74, which reads:

(U) "The conferees believe that the ODNI must take steps to reduce its use of core contractors and develop a strategic human capital plan for its own workforce. The conferees direct the ODNI to conduct a zero-based review of its core contractors and report its findings to the congressional intelligence committees not later than February 15, 2012."

(U) Preparation of this report cost the Intelligence Community approximately \$13,071.50 in Fiscal Year 2012.

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED] in the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure
UNCLASSIFIED when separated from Enclosure

Declassify On: 20370215
Derived From: ODNI COL S-08

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

6

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

February 15, 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) The enclosed report responds to congressional direction in the Classified Annex to the Explanatory Statement for H.R. 2055, "Making Appropriations for Military Construction, and the Department of Veteran Affairs, and related agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2012 and for other purposes", P.L. 112-74, which reads:

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(U) Preparation of this report cost the Intelligence Community approximately \$13,071.50 in Fiscal Year 2012.

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED] in the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure
UNCLASSIFIED when separated from Enclosure

Declassify On: 20370215
Derived From: ODNI COL S-08

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

①

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

FEB 17 2012

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppensberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppensberger:

(U) The enclosed report responds to congressional direction in the Classified Annex of the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, P.L. 112-87 which states:

(b)(1)

(S//NF)

(U) I hereby certify that Fiscal Year 2012 DHS I&A intelligence products produced to date correspond with the Fiscal Year 2012 DHS I&A Program of Analysis. I have enclosed a copy of the independent review of the DHS I&A Program of Analysis conducted by the Analytic Integrity and Standards Office.

(U) Preparation of this report cost the Intelligence Community approximately \$4,100 in Fiscal Year 2012.

Classified By: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20370207
Derived From: ODNI ANA S-08

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


(S)

The Honorable Mike Rogers
The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact [REDACTED], in the Office of Legislative Affairs [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,



James R. Clapper

Enclosure:

(U) Evaluation of the Fiscal Year 2012 Department of Homeland Security Intelligence & Analysis Program of Analysis

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

FEB 17 2012

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) The enclosed report responds to congressional direction in the Classified Annex of the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, P.L. 112-87 which states:

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

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(U) Preparation of this report cost the Intelligence Community approximately \$4,100 in Fiscal Year 2012.

Classified By: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20370207
Derived From: ODNI ANA S-08

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

7

TOP SECRET//SI//NF//ORCON//NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAR 02 2012

The Honorable Marco Rubio
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Rubio:

(b)(1)

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ During the 31 January Annual Threat Assessment Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, you raised concerns about [REDACTED]. I responded that I would research the financial connections further and get back to you.


(b)(1)

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ I share your concerns, and have enclosed a paper on [REDACTED]. The Intelligence Community is focusing on these issues and will ensure the Committee receives updates.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter or any others, please contact [REDACTED] the Director of Legislative Affairs, on [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

Enclosure:
Hearing: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

cc: Senator Feinstein
Senator Chambliss

Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20370224
Derived From: ODNI FIN T-08

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

2 March 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

The enclosure to this letter responds to questions originating from the Committee's 26 January 2012 North Korea hearing.

If you have any questions on this response, please contact me on [REDACTED].

Sincerely,

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosures

DECL. ON: 20370302
DRV FROM: HCS 13-04, COL
T-06

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MAR 22 2012

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(U) The enclosed report responds to congressional direction in the Classified Annex to the Explanatory Statement for H.R. 2055, "Making Appropriations for Military Construction, and the Department of Veteran Affairs, and related agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2012 and for other purposes", P.L. 112-74, which reads:

"(U) In addition, the conferees note that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) does not have a strategic human capital plan, nor is there enough visibility into the policies, standards, and procedures used to determine the organizational and grade structure for the ODNI. While, the conference agreement does not include language proposed by the House regarding a cap on the number of General Schedule-15 positions, statutory language is included that requires the DNI to submit, within 90 days of enactment of this Act, a Strategic Human Capital Plan for the ODNI as well as a report on the current and future grade structure for the ODNI. Such report shall include at a minimum:

(U) 1. An explanation of the standards, policy guidance, and process used to determine position classifications and corresponding grade levels used by ODNI components;

(U) 2. A comparison of ODNI standards to the position classification standards and grade structure policy guidance employed by the CIA, NSA, DIA, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

(U) 3. An explanation of how ODNI standards conform, or differ, with the position classification standards and grade structure guidance established by the Office of Personnel Management;

(U) 4. A listing of the total number of positions, by position classification and grade level, for each office or component of the ODNI;

(U) 5. The total number of positions at each grade level and SNIS or equivalent level for the ODNI, CIA, NSA, and DIA for fiscal year 2012 and requested for fiscal year 2013; and

(U) 6. Actions being taken by the ODNI to reduce the number of highly graded individuals, and to ensure consistent position classification standards and grade levels across the Intelligence Community."

Derived From ODNI ANA S-08
Declassify On: 20370322

(U) The ODNI Strategic Human Capital Plan will be provided under separate cover.

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED], in the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
UNCLASSIFIED when separated from Enclosure

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

MAR 22 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) The enclosed report responds to congressional direction in the Classified Annex to the Explanatory Statement for H.R. 2055, "Making Appropriations for Military Construction, and the Department of Veteran Affairs, and related agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2012 and for other purposes", P.L. 112-74, which reads:

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- (U) 1. An explanation of the standards, policy guidance, and process used to determine position classifications and corresponding grade levels used by ODNI components;*
- (U) 2. A comparison of ODNI standards to the position classification standards and grade structure policy guidance employed by the CIA, NSA, DIA, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense;*
- (U) 3. An explanation of how ODNI standards conform, or differ, with the position classification standards and grade structure guidance established by the Office of Personnel Management;*
- (U) 4. A listing of the total number of positions, by position classification and grade level, for each office or component of the ODNI;*
- (U) 5. The total number of positions at each grade level and SNIS or equivalent level for the ODNI, CIA, NSA, and DIA for fiscal year 2012 and requested for fiscal year 2013; and*
- (U) 6. Actions being taken by the ODNI to reduce the number of highly graded individuals, and to ensure consistent position classification standards and grade levels across the Intelligence Community."*

Derived From ODNI ANA S-08
Declassify On: 20370322

(U) The ODNI Strategic Human Capital Plan will be provided under separate cover.

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED], in the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

UNCLASSIFIED when separated from Enclosure

APR 19 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) This letter and attachment are in response to the Committee's February 16, 2012 letter forwarding Questions for the Record (QFRs) from the World Wide Threat hearing on January 31, 2012.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me on [REDACTED]

Sincerely,

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure: QFR Responses
UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

April 19, 2012

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6475

Dear Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) Enclosed please find National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Chief of Staff [REDACTED] [REDACTED] response to the question you asked for the record about the Executive Order on National Defense Resources Preparedness, from the 20 March 2012 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Closed Hearing regarding Domestic Intelligence Budgets. (b)(3)

(U) Please don't hesitate to contact me if you have any additional questions on this matter.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

(U) Response to Question for the Record from 20 March 2012 Hearing

UNCLASSIFIED

15

APR 26 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) This letter and attachment are in response to the Committee's April 9, 2012 letter forwarding Questions for the Record (QFRs) from the Syria Member briefing on March 6, 2012.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me on [REDACTED].

Sincerely,

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure: QFR Responses
UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosure

APR 26 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) This letter and attachment are in response to the Committee's April 9, 2012 letter forwarding Questions for the Record (QFRs) from the Syria Member briefing on March 6, 2012.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me on [REDACTED].

Sincerely,

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure: QFR Responses
UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosure

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

MAY 3 2012

Dear Madam Chairman:

(U) In response to your request to the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) for information concerning support provided by the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Laboratories to the Intelligence Community (IC), I am enclosing the attached document, titled "Key DOE National Laboratory Contributions to Intelligence Community Missions." This was prepared by NCPC with extensive contributions by DOE, the National Laboratories and other IC elements. The document does not cover the universe of support to the IC by the National Laboratories, but rather notes the most significant contributions to the various IC missions.

[Redacted line]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[Large redacted block]

(U) Please contact me at [Redacted] if you require additional information. We would be pleased to arrange a briefing to address any questions you may have.

Sincerely, (b)(3)

[Redacted signature block]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

(U) Key DOE National Laboratory Contributions to Intelligence Community Missions

Cc: The Honorable Saxby Chambliss

CLASSIFIED BY: [Redacted] (b)(3)
DERIVED FROM: ODNI ANA T-08, ODNI COL T-08, ODNI FOR S-08
REASON: 1.4 (c), (d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20370501

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives

APR 24 2012

The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

Thank you for your April 2, 2012 letter regarding Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 112, *Congressional Notification*. I agree completely with the Committee's view on the importance of complying with the statutory requirement to keep the intelligence committees fully and completely informed of all intelligence activities.


As you are aware, Congressional notification procedures and practices have been in place across the Intelligence Community (IC) for some time. I directed the preparation of ICD 112 to establish a policy framework for consistent discharge of notification responsibilities across the IC, particularly for the provision of written notifications. As the ICD states, I am committed to full and current notification of all intelligence activities as required by the National Security Act. The ICD emphasizes that its provisions are to be interpreted with a presumption of notification for all intelligence activities. I have made it a point to discuss Congressional notifications with the Intelligence Community's leadership, stressing the need for open and regular communications and effective training.

I also share the Committee's view that notifications related to covert action matters are subject to separate procedures and requirements. The ICD specifically notes that its provisions do not apply to covert action reporting, and its guidance will not affect such notifications.

A key provision of ICD 112 is the requirement that all IC elements provide the ODNI Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) with copies of all written notifications and summaries of all oral notifications. OLA has been tracking these notifications, and I am pleased to report that OLA has observed an increase in the number of notifications and the substantive depth of the notifications.

I am confident that the Intelligence Community policies and procedures currently in place meet our mutual notification objectives and complement the statutory requirement that each IC element head certify annually that their element is in full compliance with oversight requirements. I am committed to working with the Committee to ensure the highest standard of notification.

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DIANNE FEINSTEIN
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

MAY 3 2002

Dear Madam Chairman:

(U) In response to your request to the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) for information concerning support provided by the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Laboratories to the Intelligence Community (IC), I am enclosing the attached document, titled "Key DOE National Laboratory Contributions to Intelligence Community Missions." This was prepared by NCPC with extensive contributions by DOE, the National Laboratories and other IC elements. The document does not cover the universe of support to the IC by the National Laboratories, but rather notes the most significant contributions to the various IC missions.

[Redacted line]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[Large redacted block]

(U) Please contact me at [Redacted] if you require additional information. We would be pleased to arrange a briefing to address any questions you may have.

Sincerely,

(b)(3)

[Redacted signature block]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

(U) Key DOE National Laboratory Contributions to Intelligence Community Missions

Cc: The Honorable Saxby Chambliss

(b)(3)

CLASSIFIED BY: [Redacted]
DERIVED FROM: ODNI ANA T-08, ODNI COL T-08, ODNI FOR S-08
REASON: 1.4 (c), (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20370501

20

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

MAY 17 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510


The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chambliss
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) Attached please find the responses to the Questions for the Record from the February 9, 2012 Committee hearing on reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and unauthorized disclosures of classified information. These responses reflect the coordinated views of the Office of the DNI (ODNI), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Department of Justice (DoJ).

(U) Please contact the Legislative Affairs Offices of the ODNI, NSA or DoJ if you have any questions or require additional information.

Sincerely,



(b)(3)


Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure
UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosure

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

21 May 2012

The Honorable Ron Wyden
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Mark Udall
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senators Wyden and Udall:

~~(S//NF)~~ Thank you for your 4 May 2012 letter regarding the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Pursuant to your request, I will coordinate with the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) Inspector General (IG), Dr. George Ellard, and assess the feasibility of estimating the number of people inside the United States whose communications may have been collected or reviewed under the authorities granted by section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ In order to provide an expedited response to you, Dr. Ellard's office will take the lead on this feasibility assessment as his personnel are already engaged with NSA subject matter experts and have immediate access to data at Ft. Meade.

Classified By: [REDACTED]
FBI SCG 15 June 2009
Declassify On: 20370521

(b)(3)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

AC
10/1

The Honorable Ron Wyden
The Honorable Mark Udall

(U) If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED] or
Dr. Ellard at [REDACTED]

Respectfully, (b)(3)



I. Charles McCullough, III
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

cc: The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
The Honorable Mike Rogers
The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Inspector General, NSA

~~SECRET NOFORN~~



MAY 21 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman:

(b)(1)

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassify On: 20320108
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

(b)(3)

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

23

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

(S/NF)

[REDACTED]

(S/NF)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

(S NF)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S) We look forward to working with you and your staff as Congress deliberates on reauthorizing this critical legislation.


Sincerely,

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

Director of Legislative Affairs
Office of the Director of National
Intelligence

Ronald Weich
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs
Department of Justice



INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

June 15, 2012

The Honorable Ron Wyden
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Mark Udall
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Wyden and Senator Udall:

Thank you for your 4 May 2012 letter requesting that my office and the National Security Agency (NSA) Inspector General (IG) determine the feasibility of estimating “how many people inside the United States have had their communications collected or reviewed under the authorities granted by section 702” of the FISA Amendment Act (FAA). On 21 May 2012, I informed you that the NSA Inspector General, George Ellard, would be taking the lead on the requested feasibility assessment, as his office could provide an expedited response to this important inquiry.

The NSA IG provided a classified response on 6 June 2012. I defer to his conclusion that obtaining such an estimate was beyond the capacity of his office and dedicating sufficient additional resources would likely impede the NSA’s mission. He further stated that his office and NSA leadership agreed that an IG review of the sort suggested would itself violate the privacy of U.S. persons.

As I stated in my confirmation hearing and as we have specifically discussed, I firmly believe that oversight of intelligence collection is a proper function of an Inspector General. I will continue to work with you and the Committee to identify

The Honorable Ron Wyden
The Honorable Mark Udall

ways that we can enhance our ability to conduct effective oversight. If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact me at [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "I. Charles McCullough, III". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent "I." at the beginning and "III" at the end.

I. Charles McCullough, III
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

19 June 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

The enclosure to this letter responds to questions originating from the Committee's 14 April 2012 North Korea briefing. Questions 5-8 will be provided in separate correspondence.

If you have any questions on this response, please contact me on [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosures

DECL ON: 20370618
DRV FROM: HCS 13-04, COL
T-06

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511

June 26, 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) In response to your request to provide additional information from the 17 April 2012 briefing on the North Korean missile launch, I am enclosing responses to questions 5 through 8. This is the follow-on material promised in the June 19 initial QFR response, which contained questions 1-4 and 9-12. We believe the two sets of responses complete the committee's request regarding the North Korea launch.

(U) Please do not hesitate to contact me at [REDACTED] if you require additional information.

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure

(Letter is UNCLASSIFIED without the enclosure)

26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

JUL 03 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) The enclosed report "*Independent Review of Security Implications of "Cloud" Based Architecture*" is in response to congressional direction found in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, P.L. 112-87, Classified Annex to Accompany H.R. 1892 and Senate Report 112-43 to S. 1458 which requested the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) "commission an independent review of the efficiency and security implications of moving sensitive government information-including information dependent upon or residing upon classified networks-to a cloud-based architecture."

(U//~~FOUO~~) The ODNI selected Aerospace Corporation, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center to conduct the independent review and prepare the attached detailed report.

(U) Preparation of this report cost the Intelligence Community approximately \$108,649 in Fiscal Year 2012.

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED] in the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~ when separated from Enclosure

DERIVED FROM: ODNI INF C-08
DECLASSIFY ON: 20370622

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

JUL 03 2012

The Honorable C. A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(U) The enclosed report "*Independent Review of Security Implications of "Cloud" Based Architecture*" is in response to congressional direction found in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, P.L. 112-87, Classified Annex to Accompany H.R. 1892 and Senate Report 112-43 to S. 1458 which requested the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) "commission an independent review of the efficiency and security implications of moving sensitive government information-including information dependent upon or residing upon classified networks-to a cloud-based architecture."

(U//FOUO) The ODNI selected Aerospace Corporation, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center to conduct the independent review and prepare the attached report.

(U) Preparation of this report cost the Intelligence Community approximately \$108,649 in Fiscal Year 2012.

(U) Originals of this letter are being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. If you have any questions, please contact Lillian Jones in the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO when separated from Enclosure

DERIVED FROM: ODNI INF C-08
DECLASSIFY ON: 20370622

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28

AUG 23 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

Thank you for your July 5, 2012 letter regarding the methodology for funding intelligence activities in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The enclosure provides an Office of the DNI and DHS coordinated response to your questions.

I appreciate the Committee's continuing support for the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis' important work. If you have any questions, please contact the undersigned.

Sincerely,



(b)(3)

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure: a/s



~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

DIRECTOR
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Washington DC 20505

JUL 08 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(S//NF) I am writing in response to your June 28, 2012, letter in which you requested copies of several strategies produced by the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP).

(S//NF) Enclosed please find the following strategies, which were specifically requested by your staff:

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

(U) The National Counterterrorism Center is committed to providing periodic updates to your committee to assist with your oversight responsibilities and to provide information about NCTC's strategic operational planning efforts in accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. As you know, we previously provided your committee with various briefings and reports about DSOP activities. We would be happy to schedule additional briefings at your convenience to discuss the enclosed documents or other DSOP initiatives.

This document is SECRET//NOFORN upon removal of Enclosures.

Classified By: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Declassify On: 20370706
Derived From: COL 6-06, ODNI ANA T-08,
ODNI COL T-08, ODNI MIL T-08, ODNI POL S-08

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

30

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss

(U) If you have any questions, please contact me directly, or [REDACTED] in the
Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Sincerely,



Matthew G. Olsen

Enclosures:

(b)(1)

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
(S//NF) [REDACTED]
(S//NF) [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

SEP 07 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

Thank you for your July 5, 2012 letter, regarding the methodology for funding intelligence activities in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Enclosed is a coordinated response to your questions from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and Department of Homeland Security.

I appreciate the Committee's continued support for the important work of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

Enclosure: a/s

cc: The Honorable Caryn Wagner

31

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505

SEP 11 2012

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(S//NF) This letter is in reference to the 11 July 2012 letter we received from Senators Warner, Coats, Mikulski, Udall of Colorado, Nelson of Florida, Snowe, and Wyden requesting specific intelligence assessments on Syria. We subsequently received the language below found on page 22 of your Committee's FY 2013 Classified Annex, which highlights the same concerns from the 11 July 2012 letter.

"(U) Intelligence Community Assessments on Syria

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

3

(b)(1)

(S//NF) To address both the letter and the text in the draft Classified Annex, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) prepared and coordinated the two enclosed Intelligence Community Assessments: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We respectfully ask that you consider our enclosed NIC Assessments as addressing the Committees requests and remove the referenced Classified Annex text in conference.

(U) We recognize that the question of Syria's fate is at the forefront of Congress' concerns, and the NIC will continue preparing Intelligence Community-coordinated analyses tailored to assist Executive and Legislative Branch policymakers. Please do not hesitate to contact me at [REDACTED] if you require additional information.

(b)(3)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosures:
SECRET//NOFORN upon removal of enclosures

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20517

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

JAN 31 2013

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

Thank you for your invitation to testify before the Committee on the current and projected national security threats facing the United States.

Given the increasingly complex nature of the threats we face, and the challenges associated with discussing inherently classified matters at the unclassified level, I feel strongly that we should refrain from having open global threat assessment hearings. We have learned that we can discuss matters pertaining to national security threats candidly and accurately most effectively only in closed sessions.

As we have seen in the public discussion of national security events during the past several months, the difference between what we can say at the unclassified level in relation to what we can say at the classified level, can and often does lead to confusion and misunderstandings about intelligence matters. In recent years, detailed questions about sensitive intelligence issues have become the standard in open hearings. Oftentimes, stating during public hearings that we are unable to discuss national security matters serves as a catalyst for increased information seeking and speculation by the press pertaining to classified matters. Moreover, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs' recent report on Benghazi states that "it is not the responsibility of the IC to draft unclassified talking points for public consumption" and that "the IC should decline to do so in the future." I agree with this recommendation, as I think you both do, and would point out that the open threat assessment hearings are, by their very nature, a series of unclassified talking points.

Despite the inherent difficulties of discussing sensitive information in open hearings, I recognize that we have an obligation to keep the American public informed about the threats we face. I can assure you that I take this responsibility seriously. I have directed my staff to prepare a comprehensive, unclassified Statement for the Record that provides the maximum amount of information available on threats to our security without revealing sensitive details.

Our shared experience is that when the Intelligence Community discusses sensitive information in the public arena, the results are generally less than optimal for both the public and the IC and can present challenges for our oversight committees.

For all of these reasons, I hope the Committee will reconsider its invitation to an open hearing. I look forward to a frank and open discussion on the global threat with the Committee in closed session. Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, [REDACTED], at [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Sincerely,



James R. Clapper

Distribution:

**The Honorable Mike Rogers
The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
The Honorable Adam Smith
The Honorable Carl Levin
The Honorable James Inhofe
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency**

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20517

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

JAN 18 2013

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

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For all of these reasons, I hope the Committee will reconsider its invitation to an open hearing. I look forward to a frank and open discussion on the global threat with the Committee in closed session. Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, [REDACTED], at [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Sincerely,



James R. Clapper

Distribution:

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
The Honorable Mike Rogers
The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
The Honorable Carl Levin
The Honorable James Inhofe
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
The Honorable Adam Smith
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Counterterrorism Center
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

20 March 2013

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) The attached information responds to questions submitted following the 14 February hearing on Iran.

(U) Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require further assistance regarding this or any other matter.

(b)(3)



Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

(U) Responses to Questions for the Record from 14 February 2013 Hearing

UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosures

DRV From: HCS 4-04
DECL On: 25X1-human

Director, National Intelligence Integration
1600 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1200
Arlington, VA 22204

APR 03 2013

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U//FOUO) Enclosed are the 16 updated Unifying Intelligence Strategies (UIS), building on the UIS we distributed to your Committee in December 2011. The UIS are the National Intelligence Managers' primary tool to align the Intelligence Community's (IC) efforts on the most critical intelligence questions. We will use the UIS to continue to integrate the efforts of the IC in both the near-term (now to two years out) and the longer-term (two to five years out) on priority areas.

(U//FOUO) Responding to feedback on the previous UIS, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration and the NIMs adjusted the structure of the UIS to better focus efforts across those regions and functions with significant implications to our national security. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: ODNI ANA T-08, ODNI POL S-08
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20380214

Madam Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss

(b)(3)

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) As part of their role in leading integration across the Community, the NIMs offer me and the rest of the IC leadership significant advice on both near and long-term resource decisions for the IC. The NIMs' substantive expertise is also vital in advising the Functional Managers on collection, analysis, and counterintelligence efforts, often within existing or declining resource baselines.

(U//FOUO) The goal of intelligence integration is to deliver the most insightful intelligence possible against key national security issues facing the United States today and in the future. These UIS are strategies that evolve as issues and priorities change in the various missions.

(U//FOUO) I am pleased with the progress we have made to put these strategies into action. My focus remains on further integrating this great Intelligence Community.

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

Enclosures: See page three:

UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY when separated from enclosures

Madam Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss

Enclosures:

(U//FOUO) Unifying Intelligence Strategies:

(b)(3)



TOP SECRET//SI//TK//ORCON//NOFORN
12/11/2013

APR 03 2013

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

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(b)(3)

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20361207
Derived From: ODNI POL S-08

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(b)(3)

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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Sincerely,


James R. Clapper


Enclosures: See page three:

UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY when separated from enclosures

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger

Enclosures:
(U//FOUO) Unifying Intelligence Strategies:

(b)(3)



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

8 April 2013

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) The attached information responds to questions submitted following the 24 January hearing on China.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter, please contact the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

(U) Responses to Questions for the Record from 24 January 2013 Hearing

UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosure

CL BY: [REDACTED] (b)(3)
CL REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECL On: 25X1-human
DRV From: HCS 4-04, COL T-08

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

APR 24 2013

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) I am writing in response to your 28 March 2013 letter requesting an update on the policy and steps by the Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) to administratively investigate select unauthorized disclosure cases when prosecution is declined by the Department of Justice (DOJ).

(U//~~FOUO~~) In May 2011, I issued a memorandum to the Intelligence Community that established a tiered process for evaluating and referring unauthorized disclosure cases to DOJ for prosecution. The review process I set forth ensures administrative investigation is considered before closing those cases declined by DOJ for prosecution.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In June 2012, I issued a memorandum directing the IC IG, in coordination with the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), to ensure cases that DOJ declines to prosecute undergo an administrative investigation when warranted. The following steps have been taken in this regard:

- The IC IG performed a cursory review of a group of "cold" ONCIX unauthorized disclosure files dating from 2004 to 2012. The purpose of this review was to identify the character, scope, and common procedures used in the former cases so as to determine where any supplemental IC IG administrative inquiries might be incorporated into existing processes. Based upon this review, the IC IG established internal standard operating procedures for the administration of any supplemental inquiries. While conducting this file review, IC IG investigators noted two recent cases that warranted further inquiry. Neither of these cases were substantiated.
- ONCIX now provides the IC IG real-time access to its unauthorized disclosures database so that when a DOJ declination letter is received, the IC IG can initiate a review of the case to determine if an administrative investigation is appropriate.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

39

Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Honorable Saxby Chambliss

- The IC IG reviewed the five cases declined by DOJ since June 2012 and determined that two cases that affected CIA merited further administrative investigation. The IC IG and CIA IG are conducting a preliminary inquiry into these cases. One case involves information used only by government officials that was later published in two major U.S. newspapers. [REDACTED]


(b)(3)
CIA

- The policy guidance contained in these memoranda will be reflected in our next update of general IC policy on unauthorized disclosures.

(U) I appreciate your support of our efforts to stem the flow of unauthorized disclosures. Should your staff require additional information, please have them contact [REDACTED] ONCIX/Special Security Directorate, at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

MAY 23 2013

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Vice Chairman Chambliss:

I write in response to your letter of May 15, 2013, requesting that we provide to the full Congress the emails relating to drafting and editing of the Benghazi talking points. As you know, the White House released those documents that day.

I feel it is important, however, to respond to your allegations about distortion of the analytic process and improper influence on the Intelligence Community. These allegations are unfounded and simply not supported by the documents. This was not an intelligence "analytic process," but rather the product of the inter-agency preparation of unclassified talking points for public consumption. As I have said many times, I think that it is inherently problematic if not illogical for the Intelligence Community to do this – a lesson learned from this experience.

Moreover, the critical judgment in the talking points – that the attacks on our mission facility in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo – was in fact the judgment of the Intelligence Community at the time, based on both multiple classified and open sources. That judgment was contained in the talking points from the very first draft prepared by the subject matter experts and was not imposed by outside officials, nor was it changed as a result of the interagency process. And as you know, the final version of the talking points was cleared not only by every agency involved, but specifically by the analyst who had drafted the original version.

The men and women of the Intelligence Community work hard to protect the nation and to deliver policymakers the best possible intelligence, free from political influence. I am proud to have the privilege to lead such a group of dedicated Americans.

Sincerely,

Jim

James R. Clapper

40

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

JUN 8 2013

Dear Chairman Rogers:

(S//NF)

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

(U) If you have any questions on this matter, please contact [REDACTED], my Director of Legislative Affairs, at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

Enclosure:

(U) Response to HPSCI Chairman Roger's Question for the Record (TS//SI//NF)

cc: Ranking Member Ruppersberger

SECRET//NOFORN when separated from Enclosure.

(b)(3)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: ODNI ANA S-08
Declassify On: 20380529

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20511

JUN 21 2013

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Rogers:

Because of the charged rhetoric and heated controversy prompted by my response to a question Senator Ron Wyden asked me last March 12th during an unclassified threat assessment hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am using this direct means of communication with you to set the record straight.

Near the end of the hearing, Senator Wyden asked the following question:

And this is for you, Director Clapper, again on the surveillance front. And I hope we can do this in just a yes or no answer because I know Senator Feinstein wants to move on.

Last summer, the NSA director was at a conference, and he was asked a question about the NSA surveillance of Americans. He replied, and I quote here, "The story that we have millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is completely false."

The reason I'm asking the question is, having served on the committee now for a dozen years, I don't really know what a dossier is in this context. So what I wanted to see is if you could give me a yes or no answer to the question, does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?

I have thought long and hard to re-create what went through my mind at the time. In light of Senator Wyden's reference to "dossiers" and faced with the challenge of trying to give an unclassified answer about our intelligence collection activities, many of which are classified, I simply didn't think of Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Instead, my answer addressed collection of the content of communications. I focused in particular on Section 702 of FISA, because we had just been through a year-long campaign to seek reauthorization of this provision and had had many classified discussions about it, including with Senator Wyden. That is why I added a comment about "inadvertent" collection of U.S. person information, because that is what happens under Section 702 even though it is targeted at foreigners.

That said, I realized later that Senator Wyden was asking about Section 215 metadata collection, rather than content collection. Thus, my response was clearly erroneous --for which I apologize. While my staff acknowledged the error to Senator Wyden's staff soon after the hearing, I can now openly correct it because the existence of the metadata collection program has been declassified.

42

Next month will mark for me 50 years of service to this country, virtually all of it in intelligence. In the last 20 of those years, I have appeared before Congressional hearings and briefings dozens of times, and have answered thousands of questions, either orally or in writing. I take all such appearances seriously and prepare rigorously for them. But mistakes will happen, and when I make one, I correct it.

I am sending originals of this letter to the other leaders of the intelligence oversight committees. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

Respectfully,
Jim
James R. Clapper

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20511

JUN 21 2013

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman:

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I have thought long and hard to re-create what went through my mind at the time. In light of Senator Wyden's reference to "dossiers" and faced with the challenge of trying to give an unclassified answer about our intelligence collection activities, many of which are classified, I simply didn't think of Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Instead, my answer addressed collection of the content of communications. I focused in particular on Section 702 of FISA, because we had just been through a year-long campaign to seek reauthorization of this provision and had had many classified discussions about it, including with Senator Wyden. That is why I added a comment about "inadvertent" collection of U.S. person information, because that is what happens under Section 702 even though it is targeted at foreigners.

That said, I realized later that Senator Wyden was asking about Section 215 metadata collection, rather than content collection. Thus, my response was clearly erroneous—for which I apologize. While my staff acknowledged the error to Senator Wyden's staff soon after the hearing, I can now openly correct it because the existence of the metadata collection program has been declassified.

W3

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I am sending originals of this letter to the other leaders of the intelligence oversight committees. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

Respectfully -
Jim
James R. Clapper

DIF
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIA

~~SECRET//OC/NOFORN~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(S//NF) [Redacted]

(S//NF/OC) [Redacted]

(S//NF/OC) [Redacted]

(S//NF/OC) [Redacted]

(b)(3)

Classified By: [Redacted]
Derived From: ODNI COL S-08
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20380708

~~SECRET//OC/NOFORN~~

44

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

(S//NF//OC) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF//OC) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sincerely,

Robert S. Litt

DIF
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIA

~~SECRET//OC/NOFORN~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(b)(1)

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

(S//NF/OC) [REDACTED]

(S//NF/OC) [REDACTED]

(S//NF/OC) [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: ODNI COL S-08
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20380708

~~SECRET//OC/NOFORN~~

45

(b)(1)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

(S//NF//OC)

[Redacted]

(S//NF//OC)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

Sincerely,



Robert S. Litt

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

DIF
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIA

Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(S//NF)

(b)(1)

[Redacted]

(S//NF/OC)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

(S//NF/OC)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

(S//NF/OC)

[Redacted]

Classified By: [Redacted]
Derived From: ODNI COL S-08
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20380708

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

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(S//NF/OC)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

(S//NF/OC)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

(S//NF/OC)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)
(b)(7)(E)
FBI

Sincerely,

Robert S. Litt

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(U//FOUO) At the request of Chairman Feinstein, Mr. Litt sent a revised version of that letter with additional information regarding this program to the SSCI on August 2, 2013. Please find attached for your use a copy of that letter.

(U) Please contact me if you have any further questions regarding this program. I can be reached at [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
Director, Office of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure

(b)(3)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: ODNI COL S-08
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20380805

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

SEP 27 2013

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(b)(1)
1.4c
1.4g
NRO

~~(TS//SI//TK//NF)~~ In response to your September 12, 2013 inquiry about the SPECTRE system operated and maintained by the National Reconnaissance Office, SPECTRE meets or exceeds its requirements. While there were [REDACTED] concerns with the first two releases, those concerns were resolved. SPECTRE provides significant improvements over its predecessors [REDACTED]. It has already been contributing to the [REDACTED] mission.

~~(TS//SI//TK//NF)~~ We understand that the Inspector General offices at both NRO and NSA will soon conduct a comprehensive review of the SPECTRE program. We welcome their independent review, and the findings will be made available for your review.

(U) If you have any additional questions, please contact [REDACTED], in the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,



James R. Clapper

cc: Michael G. Vickers, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Betty J. Sapp, Director, National Reconnaissance Office

Derived From: ODNI INF T-08
Declassify On: 20380923

48

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20511

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Rogers:

I am writing in response to your letter of October 7, 2013 in which you asked questions regarding the Intelligence Community's planning for the government shutdown and its impact on Intelligence Community (IC) operations. I share your concern that the lapse in appropriations has had a significant impact on the operations of the IC, and I might add, on the morale of the intelligence work force.

In preparation for the lapse, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided orderly shutdown guidance to the Executive Branch in mid-September. That guidance applied to the 17 elements of the IC and was specific on the need to comply with the legal requirements imposed by the Antideficiency Act. Those requirements include a case-by-case determination of which employees are necessary to perform "excepted" functions that are narrowly defined and highly restricted. The IC elements followed OMB's guidance and, where appropriate, that of their departments.

In reviewing the requirements to operate during a lapse in appropriations, as measured against the legal standard for permissible activities and the need to meet core responsibilities, the initial determination in the IC was that relatively low initial levels of civilian staffing were all that could be justified under the Antideficiency Act. We judged that such staffing was an acceptable risk, with the expectation that the shutdown would be of short duration, just as when we operate at reduced staffing over weekends or holiday periods.

To the degree there was any variation in the application of OMB's guidance and the IC's determinations, it was due to the legal interpretation of the "exceptions" as they pertained to each individual department and agency. As you know, the DNI does not have the authority to impose an interpretation of law on other Executive Branch departments. For example, passage of the Pay Our Military Act (POMA) has allowed the Defense elements of the Intelligence Community to recall more employees, but that recall has been based on Defense Department guidance, and on authority provided by the Congress to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretary of Homeland Security as it relates to the Coast Guard.

I believe that as the shutdown continues, any judgment made previously, although well-founded at the time, has diminishing relevance. As I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on October 2, 2013, we are constantly re-evaluating our posture in the context of changing circumstances and the statutory prohibitions imposed on IC activities. Based on those evaluations, it is clear that additional staffing has become necessary with the continuation of the shutdown. Such increases are essential both to protect against the varied threats to the Nation that could imminently threaten life or property, and to provide the President with the intelligence

he needs to perform his constitutional functions. We cannot sustain dramatically reduced staffing levels in a complex security environment that includes terrorism, cyber attacks, and substantial volatility in the face of an extended period of shutdown—and unclear prospects for its termination.

Accordingly, within ODNI, I have ordered the recall from furlough of additional personnel at the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Counterproliferation Center, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, and the National Intelligence Council, to the extent that they are necessary to protect against imminent threats to life or property, or to provide the President with the intelligence he needs to carry out his constitutional functions. Support and oversight personnel who are necessary to support that mission will also be recalled.

Other IC agencies have similarly revisited their plans. With the passage of POMA, and the recall of certain employees based on assumptions that the shutdown will continue, the number of furloughed IC employees has decreased significantly. We have provided the Committee a classified summary of these increases at the principal agencies and will continue to update that summary as significant changes occur.

With regards to your specific questions, the ODNI would have to conduct a data call within the IC to answer some of them. I would hope, however, that with the explanations contained in this letter and with over 70% of the IC's civilian workforce recalled to work, this information will no longer be required by the Committee. If the Committee believes it still requires this information, please let us know. However, given that many employees who would normally perform these functions may still be furloughed, it will likely be some weeks before the ODNI is able to collect and collate the data and deliver a response to the Committee. I appreciate your patience as we work through the challenges caused by the lapse in appropriations.

Please be assured that I will make every effort to ensure that the IC is postured to meet any imminent threats our nation may face, regardless of our fiscal situation. I greatly appreciate your continued support for the men and women of the IC. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20511

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

I am writing in response to your letter of October 4, 2013 concerning the impact of the ongoing lapse in appropriations on the Intelligence Community (IC). I share your concern that the lapse in appropriations has had a significant detrimental impact on the operations of the IC and the morale of the intelligence work force.

In preparation for the lapse, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided orderly shutdown guidance to the Executive Branch in mid-September. That guidance applied to the 17 elements of the IC and was specific on the need to comply with the legal requirements imposed by the Antideficiency Act. Those requirements include a case-by-case determination of which employees are necessary to perform "excepted" functions that, as you indicate in your letter, are narrowly defined and highly restricted. The IC elements followed OMB's guidance and, where appropriate, that of their departments.

In reviewing the requirements to operate during a lapse in appropriations, as measured against the legal standard for permissible activities and the need to meet core responsibilities, the initial determination in the IC was that relatively low initial levels of civilian staffing were all that could be justified under the Antideficiency Act. We judged that such staffing was an acceptable risk, with the expectation that the shutdown would be of short duration, just as when we operate at reduced staffing over weekends or holiday periods.

To the degree there was any variation in the application of OMB's guidance and the IC's determinations, it was due to the legal interpretation of the "exceptions" as they pertained to each individual department and agency. As you know, the DNI does not have the authority to impose an interpretation of law on other Executive Branch departments. For example, passage of the Pay Our Military Act (POMA) has allowed the Defense elements of the Intelligence Community to recall more employees, but that recall has been based on Defense Department guidance, and on authority provided by the Congress to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretary of Homeland Security as it relates to the Coast Guard.

I also share your view that as the shutdown continues, any judgment made previously, although well-founded at the time, has diminishing relevance. As I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on October 2, 2013, we are constantly re-evaluating our posture in the

context of changing circumstances and the statutory prohibitions imposed on IC activities. Based on those evaluations, it is clear that additional staffing has become necessary with the continuation of the shutdown. Such increases are essential both to protect against the varied threats to the Nation that could imminently threaten life or property, and to provide the President with the intelligence he needs to perform his constitutional functions. We cannot sustain dramatically reduced staffing levels in a complex security environment that includes terrorism, cyber attacks, and substantial volatility in the face of an extended period of shutdown—and unclear prospects for its termination.

Accordingly, within ODNI, I have determined that additional personnel at the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Counterproliferation Center, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, and the Office of the DDII including the National Intelligence Council, should be recalled from furlough, to the extent that they are necessary to protect against imminent threats to life or property, or to provide the President with the intelligence he needs to carry out his constitutional functions. Support and oversight personnel who are necessary to support that mission will also be recalled.

Other IC agencies have similarly revisited their plans. With the passage of POMA, and the recall of certain employees based on assumptions that the shutdown will continue, the number of furloughed IC employees has decreased significantly. We have provided the committee a classified summary of these increases at the principal agencies and will continue to update that summary as significant changes occur.

Despite these improvements in the IC's staffing posture, I strongly believe that as additional time passes without the enactment of appropriations legislation, the threat to the United States will grow. I will continue to make every effort to ensure that the Intelligence Community is postured to meet any imminent threats the Nation may face. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

Sincerely,



James R. Clapper

~~TOP SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

OCT 23 2013

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman and Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(U) The attached information responds to questions submitted following the 16 April hearing on the Intelligence Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2014.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter, please contact the Office of Legislative Affairs at [REDACTED].

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
Director of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

(U) Response to SSCI QFRs

UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosure.

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: ODNI FIN T-12
Declassify On: 20381231

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN~~

51

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20517

DEC 06 2013

The Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppertsberger
Ranking Member
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Ranking Member Ruppertsberger:

(U//~~FOUO~~) I received your letter of 31 October 2013 concerning the viability of the U.S. commercial imagery industry, and value your input. As you indicate, this is a highly complex issue with a number of disparate viewpoints. I directed an expedited review with the goal of issuing an Intelligence Community recommendation on DigitalGlobe's current WorldView license amendment request to the Department of Commerce, which would allow for the commercial sale of 0.25-meter resolution imagery. We are engaging with senior members of the stakeholder intelligence elements, and I plan to establish a recommendation on behalf of the IC early next year.

NGA ok'd
release of
para

(S//~~TK//NF~~) As expressed in the Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Commission's final report, commercial imagery could play a significant role in the collection architecture of the future. Loosening resolution restrictions on U.S. commercial data providers is at the core of our planning efforts for this future architecture, and we understand that commercial imagery may be a significant contributor to cost control in a resource-constrained environment.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Be assured that my recommendation will not lose sight of the importance of ensuring that the U.S. commercial imagery industry dominates the global market, as well as the risks to national security activities posed by allowing broad distribution of high resolution data.

Sincerely,

JIN

James R. Clapper

(b)(3)

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: ODNI COL S-12
Declassify On: 20381231

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NOV 20 2013

Dear Vice Chairman Chambliss:

(S//NF)

(b)(1)

[Redacted]

(S//NF)

(b)(1)

[Redacted]

(U) I look forward to continuing to work with you on this important issue. If you have additional questions, please contact [Redacted], the Director of Legislative Affairs, on [Redacted].

(b)(3)

Sincerely,


James R. Clapper

cc: Distribution

(b)(3)

Classified By: [Redacted]
Derived From: ODNI MET S-08
Declassify On: 20381108

Distribution:

The Honorable Richard M. Burr
The Honorable James E. Risch
The Honorable Daniel R. Coats
The Honorable Marco A. Rubio
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
The Honorable Thomas A. Coburn
The Honorable Angus S. King
The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Director, Central Intelligence Agency