<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description of document:</th>
<th>Records indicating the impact of federal budget sequestration upon United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) operations and functions, FY 2013</th>
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<tr>
<td>Requested date:</td>
<td>27-April-2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Released date:</td>
<td>14-December-2015</td>
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<td>Posted date:</td>
<td>29-February-2016</td>
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| Source of document:     | HQ USNORTHCOM/CS FOIA Officer  
                          250 Vandenberg Street  
                          Suite B016  
                          Peterson AFB CO 80914-3804 |

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We received your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated 27 April 2013. Your request was assigned USNORTHCOM FOIA case number FY13-30APR2013-NNC46. In your request letter you asked for the following: A copy of the memo(s) and documents(s) describing the impact of federal budget sequestration upon NORTHCOM operations and functions.

After performing a search of our systems of records we found 11 responsive documents. The documents were complex and required consultation with additional Department of Defense agencies. Upon review of the documents by USNORTHCOM, Mr. Jerry J. Walsh, Director, Defense Domains, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Mr. Mark S. Patrick, Chief, Information Management Division, Joint Staff it was determined portions within the documents are currently and properly classified and should remain exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Executive Order 13526, Sections 1.4(a), (b), (d), and (g). Additionally, portions were identified as exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA Exemption 5 as they pertain to the deliberate and decision-making process. Lastly, portions are exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA Exemption 6 and withheld as the release of the exempted information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The authority for these exemptions can be found in United States Code, Title 5, Section 552 (b)(1), (b)(5), and (b)(6). One document originated from the Air Force and has been sent to them for review and direct response to you.

There are no assessable fees for processing your request. If you have any further questions concerning your request, please do not hesitate to contact our FOIA Request Service Center at the above address.

If you are not satisfied with this action, you have the right to appeal to the appellate authority, the Director of Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), by writing directly to OSD/Joint Staff Freedom of Information, ATTN: Appeals Office, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington DC 20301-1155. Your appeal must be postmarked within 60 calendar days of the date of this response. Alternatively, you may also submit
your appeal electronically, within 60 calendar days of the date of this response, at the following link: http://pal.whs.mil/palMain.aspx. Your appeal should cite our case number FY13-30APR2013-NNC46, and be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" on the request.

Attachment:
Responsive Documents

CHARLES D. LUCKEY
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Purpose. To solicit detailed impacts that COCOMs will experience as a result of the potential combined year-long Continuing Resolution (CR) and Sequestration.
2. Bottom Line. Per agreement by the JCS Tank (1Feb), the Joint Staff will collect all COCOM related impacts and assess impacts on the Joint Force.
3. Background. On January 10th 2013, DEPSECDEF issued the memo, “Handling Budgetary Uncertainty in Fiscal Year 2013”, directing Services to provide draft Component plans by 1 February.
   - Each COCOM is requested contact their supporting Service to obtain the Service inputs provided to OSD Comptroller. Using these Service inputs, provide specific level of impacts on each individual COCOM. These inputs will support upcoming DMAGs and Congressional engagements. The detail provided in the impact response should be very specific in nature to include but not limited to:
     - inability to support real world operations
     - inability to support exercises
     - impacts of Service deferred maintenance and training
     - impacts to your bases and facilities that will cause mission degradation
   - Joint Staff Directorates included in this JSAP are directed to reach out to the corresponding staffs in each COCOM to develop a consolidated Joint Force impact in the following areas:
     - J-1 will coordinate and assess the impacts to civilian manpower across the Joint Force
     - J-3 will coordinate and assess the impacts to readiness across the Joint Force
     - J-4 will coordinate and assess the impacts to logistics, facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization across the Joint Force
     - J-5 will coordinate and assess the impacts on partner relationships
     - J-7 will coordinate and assess the impacts on training and exercises across the Joint Force
   - Due to the time requirements associated with the upcoming DMAGs and Congressional engagement, responses are requested by 8 February, 2013.
   - GOFO level inquiries should be directed to RDMIL, Fanta, J-8 DDRA, (703) 695-9162.
   - AO level inquiries should be directed to CAPT J-8 PBAD (703) 695-9166, or COL (703) 693-9335, at the above email addresses
   - **Send inputs directly to CAPT J8DDRA and COL J8PBAD at the above email addresses**
Date: 26 APR 13

//APPROVAL/ROUTING//

TO: ACTION: LAST NAME, RANK, and DATE
JA COORD DAFC, 2 May 13
N-NC/SJS COORD
CS COORD
DC COORD
ND COORD
CDR INFO

SUBJECT: TMT 6005 – 4-Star Roll-up Sequestration Costs

BLUF/J-DIR PUSH NOTE: Reviewed nearly 70 events identified through the Directorates, Staff, Components, Regions and Subordinates resulting in two primary areas of concern: potential furloughs and reduced/cancelled Defense CBRNE Response Force events. The Air Force bought back: FAA reimbursement for JSS Radars, North Warning System Airlift contracts and NCR-IADS contracts.

SUSPENSE: 3 May 13

BACKGROUND/ DISCUSSION:

1. On 2 Apr 13, the CDR asked for a more deliberate accounting of sequester impacted events (i.e., RED FLAG cancellation, etc.) so that he is appropriately armed for discussions with SecDef, et al.

2. Nearly 70 events were identified however due to limited impact or sound mitigation strategies these events do not warrant additional attention this fiscal year (2013).

ACTION OFFICER: (U) GS-13, N-NC/J83, 554-8018

APPROVED/SIGNED: Mr J8, 1 May 13

2 TABS:
1 – Roll-up Sequestration Costs (Impacts)
2 – Areas of concern additional detail
1. (U) **Purpose**: Provide Joint Staff J3 potential operational impacts of budget reduction decisions made by the Services.
2. (U) Structured around the Chairman's National Security Interests (NSIs), most reductions would impact our ability to support NSI 3, "Prevent Catastrophic Attacks on the US." Reductions focused on operational support to Government of Mexico would negatively impact our ability to support Mexico's efforts in countering Transnational Criminal Organizations. This would degrade support to NSI 4 (Secure, confident, reliable allies and partners), NSI 5 (Protection of American citizens abroad) and NSI 6 (Preserve / extend universal values).

3. (U) NORAD and USNORTHCOM are responsible for Homeland Defense, Aerospace Warning and Control, Maritime Warning, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, and Theater Security Cooperation. We've outlined below how the proposed Service reductions significantly reduce our capabilities across the entire spectrum of those assigned missions.

**Ability to Support Real World Operations and Readiness**

**Homeland Defense:**
Theater Security Cooperation/Partner Relations:

Impacts to Support Exercises and Deferred Facilities Maintenance

(U) In meeting a year-long CR and Sequestration, the Services have also reached into several cross cutting areas that will have significant second and third order effects upon NORAD and USNORTHCOM Mission capabilities. Proposed reductions and cancellations of exercises, maintenance, logistics and facilities will reduce capabilities, extend or eliminate certifications, and ultimately increase risk across our entire portfolio, but at this point the full magnitude of impact is not quantifiable.

Exercises:
(U) Facilities and Logistics:

q. From a transportation perspective the loss of support from Air Force Reserve Component (AFRC) will require a shift to commercial transportation resulting in a 40% to 850% increase in transportation costs per Joint Task Force - North mission. These costs are not sustainable and may result in cancellation of 3rd and 4th quarter missions.

4. (U) Our analysis does not include impacts of OSD and 4th Estate plans and has only broad insight to Service proposals. Further study is necessary to assess final implications. However, the proposed reductions outlined will undoubtedly impact our operational capability. There are many "unknown, unknowns" and "broken glass" which will only be revealed with the passage of time.

Classified by: GS-13
Budget Analyst
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 18 Jan 2038
1. **(U) Purpose**: Provide Joint Staff J1 potential operational impacts of budget reduction decisions made by the Services.

2. **(U) Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF)**: Working with Headquarters and Subordinate Command locations our ability to support training and real world events with impending furlough reduces the personnel available to support the missions and attend training.

3. **(U) Background**: NORAD and USNORTHCOM currently employ over 900 civilians at the Headquarters and Subordinate Commands, equating to approximately 50% of the commands' assigned forces. Staff plays vital role in supporting exercises and real world operations with training being a key function to ensure preparedness for these events.

- **(U) Civilian Workforce Furlough**:
  - (U) NORAD and USNORTHCOM employ over 900 civilian employees at the Headquarters and Subordinate Command locations. This equates to approximately 50% of the commands' current assigned forces. As limited exceptions to the furlough are expected, the impact on the commands' ability to support command missions will be significant.
  - (U) The military force will be required to make up the equivalent of about 77 FTEs over the 22 week furlough period. As the commands' approach hurricane and wildfire season, it will be a challenge to provide required DSCA support with reduced resources. The loss of the continuity and expertise of the civilian force will reduce the value of lessons learned from previous events – potentially impacting timely and efficient response to life-threatening situations.
    - (U) ARNORTH provides Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) augmentation support during natural/man-made disasters providing a front-line DOD response team. Exercise Vigilant Response, scheduled for Jul-Aug 13, provides training to over 8,000 soldiers/civilians on CBRNE Homeland response. Furlough actions place DCO support at risk as military personnel do not have the skill set to fill the DCO role.

- **(U) Impact of Service deferred training**
  - (U) Restrictions on training pose risk to force sustainment and development. As required workforce efficiencies and realignments are considered to provide continued mission support, professional training and education are necessities in maintaining core competencies and skill requirements. This loss results in fewer staff to support critical missions due to furloughs, impacting future promotion opportunities for military force as well as endangering the overall readiness.
INFORMATION PAPER ON CONTINUING RESOLUTION AND SEQUESTRATION IMPACTS TO LOGISTICS, FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION (FSRM) (J4)

1. (U) **Purpose.** Provide Joint Staff J4 potential operational impacts of budget reduction decisions made by the Services.

2. (U) **Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF):** FSRM continues to be reduced funding program and increased facility down time. Facility project repairs cost more as we push them off.

3. (U) **Background:** Services have a history of less than 100% FSRM creating increased backlog of repair and maintenance projects.
   - Impacts of Service deferred maintenance and training.
     - (FOUO) The details on specific impacts to NORAD-USNORTHCOM missions will not develop until the Services start to implement their response.
   - (U) Timeliness of response to operations / contingencies due to Force Resource cutbacks
     - (U) JTF-N engineer support to Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) for Southwest Border infrastructure is provided by Title 10 engineer forces based on training value and unit availability. Cost constraints additionally impacted by a year-long CR and Sequestration would severely impact discretionary training events and may cut off Title 10 support to CBP. Detailed analysis is currently being conducted by in conjunction with ARNORTH and JTF-N engineers.
     - (U) From a transportation perspective the loss of support from Air Force Reserve Component (AFRC) would result in a 40% to 850% increase in JTF-N transportation costs per mission if JTF-N shifted to commercial.

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transportation. However, these increased costs are not sustainable under JTF-N's current budget and would potentially lead to cancellations of 3rd & 4th quarter missions if NORTHCOM is unable to provide additional funding (UFR)

- (U) Lack of familiarity with Service capabilities and plans
- (U) Upon review of Service specific CR & sequestration Courses of Action (COAs), it is unknown the extent reductions will have on USNORTHCOM’s mission capabilities, however:
  - (U) As of 1 March 2013, indications are the Marine Corps will cancel, extend, or reduce deployments and exercises for the remainder of FY13, including USNORTHCOM major annual exercises
  - (U) Possible delay of an Army missile defense plan support to USNORTHCOM
  - (U) Possible furloughs of ANG Title 32 dual status technicians would degrade mission readiness

- (U) Limited support of Guard/Reserve forces to augment/train during an exercise which contributes to an issue with the "Total Force" concept. Services are implementing a cut-back in reserve days allowed. This strips a vital component to meeting our surge capacity (DSCA) and exercise training. Added to this, National Level Exercises will be scaled back (or cut all together) decreasing the readiness state for the COCOMs.

- (U) Simultaneous demand created by a national-level DSCA and/or Homeland Defense incident would result in mission degradation or mission failure without the supplementation of Guard/Reserve forces.
INFORMATION PAPER ON CONTINUING RESOLUTION AND SEQUESTRATION IMPACTS ON PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS (J5)

1. (U) **Purpose:** Provide Joint Staff with the potential impacts on partner relationships of budget reductions due to sequestration.

2. (U) **Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF):** A yearlong CR and Sequestration would have a detrimental effect on USNORTHCOM's ability to conduct the Theater Security Cooperation Mission.

3. (U) **Background:** The J5 depends heavily on civilian personnel to conduct security cooperation. The on hand personnel in the J59 consist of 10 military and 19 civilians. Losing 22 days per civilian would result in a net loss of 418 days during the third and fourth quarters of FY13.

4. **DISCUSSION:**

   - (U) **Personnel:**
      - (U) To accomplish the J59 mission would require each of the military personnel to work an additional 41.8 days over the 6 month period beginning in April, which amounts to an additional two months of work for each of J59 military personnel.

   - (U) By losing 418 work days over a 22 week period J5 and by extension USNORTHCOM's ability to conduct the Theater Security Cooperation mission would be seriously degraded.

   - (U) **Partner Nation Impact:**
      - (U) Continuing Resolution and Sequestration will impact our Partner Nation relationships. Our partners are aware of the USG current financial difficulties and anticipate some impact on USG funded and sponsored programs with Partner Nations. The impact will be more pronounced on NORTHCOMs efforts.
to develop Partner Nation Capacity to meet COCOM desired end states, particularly with regard to the Service's ability to conduct engagements. All Military Departments have stated that they will only be able to support engagements that are in direct support of OEF.

- (U) Recent actions taken in advance of the budget challenges have already had an impact on exercises that include NORTHCOM Partner Nations. Cancelation of these exercises is a step backwards in furthering COCOM and partner Nation interoperability. Future cuts due to budget constraints in terms of training and engagements will impact the COCOMS Theater Security Cooperation Plans.

(U) **Conclusion**: It is possible to absorb a 20 percent reduction in personnel and funding but the TSC mission will be significantly impacted. The situation will require significant weekly planning efforts to minimize furlough disruption upon taskings.
INFORMATION PAPER ON CONTINUING RESOLUTION AND SEQUESTRATION IMPACTS ON TRAINING AND EXERCISE (J7)

1. (U) **Purpose.** Provide Joint Staff J7 potential operational impacts of budget reduction decisions made by the Services.

2. (U) **Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF):** Reductions impact our ability to support COCOM Exercises impacting readiness to support Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions.

3. (U) **Background:** Exercise support and training provides personnel with the tools required to support Real World Events. They include HQ staff, Subordinate Command, Components and other Government Agencies to provide personnel the readiness required to support events in the NORTHCOM AOR.

- **(FOUO) Ability to support exercises:**

  - **(FOUO)** The Services' proposed reductions or cancellations of support to COCOM Exercises will reduce readiness of forces assigned to respond to Homeland Defense (HD) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Response. These exercises are designed to train and integrate forces capable of conducting operations, including federal agencies (DOS, DHS, FEMA), Canada, Mexico, The Bahamas, and the Arctic.

  - **(FOUO)** Army currently participates in ARDENT SENTRY (Tier 1 DSCA), VIGILANT SHIELD (Tier 1 HD), VIGILANT GUARD (Tier 2 HD, DSCA), and VIBRANT RESPONSE (CBRN). Army’s cancellation of support to COCOM Exercises is unacceptable. ARNORTH and NGB are critical role players in all the following major exercises:

    - **(FOUO)** ARDENT SENTRY is a Tier 1 DSCA command post, battle staff exercise currently scheduled for May 2013. It incorporates Canada, Mexico, and their civilian and military organizations, as well as the U.S. states and territories, DOS, DHS, FEMA, the NMCC, and other combatant commands.

    - **(FOUO)** VIGILANT SHIELD is a Tier 1 HD command post, battle staff exercise currently scheduled for Oct 2013. It brings together Canada, OSD, DOS, DHS, FEMA, the NMCC, and other combatant commands to ensure N-NC battle staff, components, subordinates, and supporting commands at all levels are trained and ready to successfully execute the N-NC missions.

    - **(FOUO)** VIGILANT GUARD is a Tier 2 DSCA exercise, which specifically reinforces National Guard’s ability to support their local and state partners.

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during significant domestic incidents. It directly supports the National Response Framework, which establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. Local VIGILANT GUARD exercises are scheduled throughout the remainder of the year in six states.

- (FOUO) As indicated above, ARDENT SENTRY and VIGILANT SHIELD are primary N-NC exercises. USMC proposes to cancel or reduce support for these Tier 1 exercises. MARFORNORTH, and our other Functional Components, are critical role players in achieving integrated operational response.

- (FOUO) Training and Readiness

- (FOUO) As indicated above, ARDENT SENTRY and VIGILANT SHIELD are primary N-NC exercises. USMC proposes to cancel or reduce their support for these two Tier 1 exercises. MARFORNORTH, along with our other Functional Components, are critical role players to achieve integrated operational response.

4. DISCUSSION:

- (UFOUO) Impact to the Commands due to our CCSA topline reduction of our headquarters/subordinate accounts totaling $9.9M.
- (UFOUO) For N-NC J7: UFRs will have to be internally sourced within the J7 therefore no J7 UFRs will be funded
(U) Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement Funds (CE2): Exercise Engagement Program $ (JETP +SIF)

(U) 10% reduction impact

- (U/FOUO) INCREASE IN RISK TO THE CAPABILITY OF HOMELAND DEFENSE (HD), DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA), AND CBRN RESPONSE FORCES. This will reduce the scope of all exercises and leads to marginal replication/simulation by role players. Reduction in programs taken across all aspects of current program.
- (U/FOUO) One Tier 1 exercise becomes a CPX.
- (U/FOUO) VIGILANT GUARD exercises only capable of exercising NG units within exercise local area. Loss of capability to incorporate out-of-region NG units into training scenarios, greatly reducing capability and force readiness.

(U/FOUO) Reduction in exercise support to include reducing critical role players, limiting exposure of responders to search and extraction facilities, and reducing scenario development necessary to realistically train the CBRN Response Enterprise and meet HD requirements.
- (U/FOUO) Loss of ability to provide semi-annual ARCTIC EDGE exercise with JETP resources. Exercise will become strictly localized to Alaskan Guard forces reducing the capability for other critical national assets to respond to the Alaskan and Arctic environment. Loss of limited Arctic capability requirement identification and validation.
(U) 20% reduction impact
- (U/FOUO) HIGH RISK TO THE CAPABILITY OF HD, DSCA, AND CBRN RESPONSE FORCES. This will significantly reduce the scope of all exercises, limit participants, and eliminate engagement efforts conducted across all 54 state, territory, and tribal lands.

(U) 30% reduction impact

UNCLASSIFIED
• (U/FOUO) Significant reduction in capability to provide integrated training to the state and regional responders (HRFs and CERFPs). Training requirements would have to be assumed by the states, regions, and NG. Dangerous loss to integrated C2 in a catastrophic CBRN or all-hazards environment.

(U) Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement Funds (CE2): Headquarters Support $ (O/M)

10% reduction impact

• (U/FOUO) One Tier 1 exercise becomes a CPX. CT, DSCA, or HD exercise substantially de-scoped
• (U/FOUO) VIGILANT GUARD exercises only capable of exercising NG units within exercise local area. Loss of capability to incorporate out-of-region NG units into training scenarios greatly reducing capability and force readiness.
• (U/FOUO) Loss of ability to provide semi-annual ARCTIC EDGE exercise with O/M resources. Exercise will become strictly localized to Alaskan Guard forces, reducing the capability for other national asset to respond to the Alaskan and Arctic environment.
• (U/FOUO) Total contract reductions: five exercise planners and/or JTSS, one support contractor, one Modeling and Simulation contractor, one JCTC/ JSTC contractor. Loss of Lessons Learned capability, limiting effectiveness of exercise program.
• (U/FOUO) Loss of exercise planners and trainers, reducing capability to perform the priority training requirements of HD, DSCA, and CT as listed in the strategic documents.
• (U/FOUO) Reduction in Modeling and Simulation program created to provide efficiencies and save money in AMALGAM ARROW exercises used to train GO/FOs to perform Operation NOBLE EAGLE mission requirements.

(U) 20% reduction impact
• (U/FOUO) Cancel one of the three Tier 1 exercises. Rotate holding only two Tier 1 exercises per year (ARDENT SENTRY, VIGILANT SHIELD, or VITAL ARCHER) and increasing risk in either HD, DSCA, or CT readiness depending on exercise cycle.
• (U/FOUO) Required reduction in personnel would mandate the elimination of personnel used to create scenarios, plan exercises and execute exercises. Ability to plan and execute more than one exercise per year would be eliminated.
• (U/FOUO) 50% Reduction in TDY. Planning capability severely limited.
• (U/FOUO) 50% reduction to the National Guard Homeland Defense Training and Exercise Program. Program would be reduced to two VIGILANT GUARD exercises per year.
• (U/FOUO) DSCA Level II course used to train and integrate state, tribal, and territory leaders with DOD response forces during emergency would be reduced 50% to seven courses.

(U) 30% reduction impact

• (U/FOUO) Cancel two of the three Tier 1 exercises. Rotate tri-annually holding one Tier 1 exercise per year (ARDENT SENTRY, VIGILANT SHIELD, or VITAL ARCHER). Additionally, required reduction in personnel would mandate the elimination of personnel used to create scenarios, plan exercises, and execute exercises. Ability to plan and execute more than one exercise per year would be eliminated.
• (U/FOUO) Failure to meet the intent of strategic documents and DOD training priorities requiring HD mission. VIGILANT SHIELD would be held on a national level once every three years.
• (U/FOUO) CT training venue for the homeland would shift to once every three years.
• (U/FOUO) Could not accept a 30% cut and keep CBRN response intact (see HQ Support CBRN program).
Failure to meet the intent of strategic documents and DOD training priorities requiring DSCA mission. ARDENT SENTRY would be held on a national level once every three years.

National Guard Homeland Defense Training and Exercise Program would be reduced to one VIGILANT GUARD exercise per year. Education program would be eliminated, to include DSCA Level II course used to train state, tribal, and territory leaders in integrating with DOD during emergencies.

Modeling and Simulation program used to support Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) and AMALGAM ARROW training venues would be cancelled. All further AMALGAM ARROW training would have to be done as more expensive live-fly events.

(U) Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement Funds (CE2): Headquarters Support CBRN $

(U) 10% reduction impact

(U) INCREASE IN RISK TO THE CAPABILITY OF THE CBRN RESPONSE ENTERPRISE. This will reduce the scope of all exercises and limit participants. Reduction in programs taken across all aspects of current program.

(U) Reduction in exercise support to include reducing critical role players, limiting exposure of responders to search and extraction facilities, and reducing scenario development necessary to realistically train the CBRN responders.

(U) 20% reduction impact

(U) HIGH RISK TO THE CAPABILITY OF THE CBRN RESPONSE ENTERPRISE. This will significantly reduce the scope of all exercises, limit participants, and eliminate training efforts conducted across all 54 state, territory, and tribal lands.

(U) Reduction in the VIBRANT RESPONSE exercise program. DCRF and C2CRE annual certification requirements shifted to a biennial requirement.

(U) Reduction in capability to provide integrated training to the State and Regional Responders (HRFs and CERFPs) Training requirements would have to be
assumed by the states, regions, and NG. Dangerous loss to integrated C2 in a catastrophic CBRN or all-hazards environment

(U) 30% reduction impact

- (U/FOUO) Significant reduction in the VIBRANT RESPONSE exercise program. DCRF and C2CRE annual certification requirements shifted to a biennial requirement.
- (U/FOUO) Significant reduction in capability to provide integrated training to the state and regional responders (HRFs and CERFPs). Training requirements would have to be assumed by the states, regions, and NG. Dangerous loss to integrated C2 in a catastrophic CBRN or all-hazards environment.
- (U/FOUO) Elimination of all Modeling and Simulation capability used to streamline training and provide scenario enhancement to CBRN exercises.
1. (U) **Purpose.** Provide Joint Staff J8 potential operational impacts of budget reduction decisions made by the Services.

2. (U) **Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF):** In our headquarters and subordinate commands, we incurred a top-line reduction of $9.9M to our non-civilian pay O&M accounts, approximately 10 percent. We complied with implemented hiring restrictions, curtailed travel and minimized supply and equipment purchases and Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM).

3. (U) **Background:** See Below

   - (U) We deferred implementation of emergent Cyber defense capabilities and evolving communication and situational awareness tools potentially delaying our ability to meet new missions; standup of Theater Special Operations Command (SOCNORTH) and operations of the Joint Cyber Cell (JCC).

   - (U) We employ over 900 civilians, approximately 50 percent of assigned manpower. As limited exceptions to the furlough are expected, the impact of reduced forces to augment missions with military forces (covering approximately 77 FTEs over the 22 weeks) in order to provide required DSCA support (hurricane and wildfire) will be a challenge

     - The loss of the continuity and institutional expertise the civilian workforce provides will reduce the value of lessons learned from previous events – potentially impacting timely and efficient response to life-threatening situations. Additionally, long term degradation in mission capability can be assumed from less effective pursuit of headquarters-related responsibilities, such as articulating and reviewing requirements to the services; developing plans and OPORDs, and testing them in exercises
NORAD and USNORTHCOM
Roll-up Sequestration Costs

1 May 2013
INTENT: Decision / Information

PURPOSE: To provide CDR a rollup of FY13 sequestration costs impacting NORAD and USNORTHCOM

DECISION POINTS / TIMING IMPACTS: None

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Develop a roll-up of what are the "true" costs/impacts of cancelled or reduced events for the Commands as a result of the sequestration

BACKGROUND

1. CDR asked Staff, Components, Subordinates and Regions to make a more deliberate accounting of sequester impacted events.
2. Nearly 70 events were identified. Impacts and mitigation action were analyzed and two items surfaced as concerns: Furloughs (submitted by several organizations) and DCRF submitted by JTF-CS (ARNORTH and NC/J3 do not concur with JTF-CS's assessment in this area).
3. Three major items of concern: FAA reimbursement for JSS Radars, contracts for North Warning System Airlift and NCR-IADS support were reversed by the Air Force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

All sequester reductions that would have resulted in unacceptable risk to operational capabilities have been reversed by the Services (FAA reimbursement for JSS Radars, North Warning System Airlift contracts and NCR-IADS support). Civilian Furloughs remain a significant concern across all organizations. One potential reduction is still under review, reduced/cancelled DCRF events.

No 4-Star engagement is recommended at this time.
Executive Summary

- Reviewed Services and Partner impacts to NORAD and USNORTHCOM Mission Areas with two potential concerns: Furloughs and Defense CBRNE Response Force (DCRF)
  - Furloughs continue to be a concern across the Services since the timing is during heightened contingency season
  - JTF-CS rates reduction in DCRF flying hours, training and available forces as severe impacts to our DSCA mission, however ARNORTH and NC/J3 do not concur with Severe Impact assessment
- Three previous item of concern were restored by the Air Force: FAA reimbursement for JSS Radars, North Warning System contract and NCR-IADS contract
# Service Impacts to N-NC

## Areas of Concern

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<th>SVS</th>
<th>OPR</th>
<th>EVENT - ISSUE</th>
<th>RISK</th>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Furloughs</td>
<td>Various</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>JTF-CS</td>
<td>Defense CBRNE Response Force Flying Hours, Training and Forces</td>
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<td><em>(ARNORTH and NC/J3 do not concur with Severe Impact assessment)</em></td>
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## Restoral Successes

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<tr>
<th>SVS</th>
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<td>DAF</td>
<td>AFNORTH N/J3</td>
<td>Suspend Funding to FAA for JSS Radars</td>
<td>Increased Capability Degradation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>N/J3</td>
<td>Suspend Funding for North Warning System Airlift Contracts</td>
<td>Increased Capability Degradation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>AFNORTH N/J3</td>
<td>Terminate NCR-IADS Contracts</td>
<td>Increased Capability Degradation</td>
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</table>
## Acceptable Impacts to N-NC

(Submitter Assessment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVN</th>
<th>OPR</th>
<th>EVENT - ISSUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>NC/J3</td>
<td>Reduce support to 2013 National Scout Jamboree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>ARNORTH, SG</td>
<td>Reduce CBRN Training and Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Stop advance funding for Base Support Installation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NUJ3</td>
<td>Fund NORAD Tactical Data Link (TDL) Wide Area Network (WAN) Convert 3060 to 3400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NC/J3</td>
<td>Curtail Multiple ISR allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>JTF-N</td>
<td>Cancel/Deferrals MCTT and the new NORCOM MCCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>WO</td>
<td>Reduce FY13 FEMA NED planning and execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NUJ3</td>
<td>50% Reduction to 84 RADES</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NUJ3</td>
<td>Reduce NORAD Aerospace Control Alert (ACA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NUJ3</td>
<td>Reduce PERMIT, Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization Sys (PARCS)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NUJ3</td>
<td>Reduce Cobra Dane support (Power Reduction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>J7</td>
<td>Cancel DMO Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>AFNORTH</td>
<td>Reduce Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFREC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>JTF-AK, J7</td>
<td>Cancel NORTHERN EDGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NUJ3</td>
<td>Cancel RED FLAG - Alaska</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NUJ3</td>
<td>Cancel Blue Flag Exercise 13-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NUJ3</td>
<td>Impact to Cheyenne Mt I TWIAA Systems (NCMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NJ3</td>
<td>Cancel Green Flag Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAF</td>
<td>NJ3</td>
<td>Delay NORAD Enterprise Network Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J6</td>
<td>Reduce/Cancel SOUTHCOM Exercises: Fuerzas Commando, PKO Americas, Partnership of the Americas, UNITAS and PANAMAX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Cancel US Embassy / USNORTHCOM co-hosted reception held annually on a US Navy vessel in BHS</td>
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<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Reduce Steaming Days</td>
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<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Reduce Mil-to-Mil Events &amp; Port Visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Cancel / delay deployments to include TRUMAN CSG and cancelling BATAAN ARG deployments</td>
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<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Reduction to Maintenance and Training on Arleigh Burke Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Cancel 3 ships depot-level maintenance and delay 20 CVN / Submarine shipyard availabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Defer emergent repairs to USS PORTER, DDG 78, (saving $126M) and USS MIAMI, SSN 775 (saving $339M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Lay-up 4 combat logistics force ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Reduce flying hours include shutting down 4 of 9 Carrier Air Wings (CVWs) in support of STENNIS, EISENHOWER, REAGAN and ROOSEVELT CSGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>WO</td>
<td>Reduce FY13 FEMA National Exercise Division (NED) Exercise Planning and Execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>J7</td>
<td>Delay funding Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>NUJ3, J8</td>
<td>Defer Faceted Control TTX</td>
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