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William A. Cira,
Acting Director
**INFORMATION SECURITY
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March 1, 2016

Please be advised that the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) has concluded its consideration of the first part of mandatory declassification review appeal 2002-0049 filed by you and that the 60-day period during which an agency head may appeal an ISCAP decision to the President has expired. Enclosed is a chart that outlines the ISCAP decisions on the documents under appeal and details the information declassified by the ISCAP. With the exception of any information that is otherwise authorized and warranted for withholding under applicable law, we are releasing all information declassified by the ISCAP to you. If you have questions about this appeal, please contact William Carpenter of my staff at (202) 357-5250.

Sincerely,



WILLIAM A. CIRA
Executive Secretary

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Joseph Lambert
Director, Information Management Services
Central Intelligence Agency Member of the ISCAP

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DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

DDS&T Historical Paper
No. OSA-1
Vol. I of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities

(SUBTITLE)
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Chapters I, II, and III

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

Controlled by : DDS&T
Date prepared : 1 April 1969
Written by : Helen Kleyla
Robert O'Hern

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This OSA History was delivered as a first draft to the Chairman of the DD/S&T Historical Board, [REDACTED] in April 1969. It has never been critically edited for errors of fact or form, and therefore should be considered in this light by any future readers.

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[REDACTED]
Helen H. Kleyla

May 1974

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- IV. Budgeting and Planning
- V. Development and Procurement: Contracting
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15 January 1968. (BYE-8725-68)

Appendix II. Advanced Reconnaissance Aircraft Study -
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1954-1968CHRONOLOGY1954

- 1 Feb Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., is named Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination (SA/PC/DCI) by the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles.
- 1 Jul SA/PC/DCI absorbs the Office of Intelligence Coordination (except the Intelligence Advisory Committee Secretariat) and the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination, Mr. James Q. Reber, joins the Planning and Coordination Staff as Mr. Bissell's Assistant.
- 4 Jul The Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch establishes a task force under General Mark Clark to investigate CIA and answer Congressional criticism of the Agency. A Special Study Group, chaired by General James H. Doolittle, is assigned to investigate CIA's covert activities.
- 30 Sep The Doolittle group reports on its investigation of CIA and expresses the belief that every known technique should be used, and new ones developed, to increase U.S. intelligence by high altitude photographic reconnaissance and other means.
- 9 Oct A Technological Capabilities Panel of the Office of Defense Mobilization's "Surprise Attack Committee" under Dr. James R. Killian is set up with Dr. Edwin H. Land, President of Polaroid, as Chairman.
- 5 Nov The Technological Capabilities Panel, Project 3, in a letter to the DCI, proposes a program of photo reconnaissance flights over the USSR and recommends that CIA, with Air Force assistance, undertake such a program.
- 19 Nov CIA and USAF agree to pursue the TCP's proposal jointly; a meeting is held in the office of Secretary of the Air Force Harold Talbott with the DCI and DDCI present.

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- 23 Nov Members of Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) (forerunner to USIB) sign an open memorandum in support of a program of photographic reconnaissance of the Soviet Bloc.
- 24 Nov A meeting is held at the White House with President Eisenhower to present the CL-282 photo reconnaissance proposal of the Land Panel; the President approves the proposal as presented subject to a final look after the materiel is procured and before launching operations; approval is given verbally, not in writing.
- 3 Dec Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr., having been directed by the DCI to take charge of the photo reconnaissance project, meets with Mr. Herbert I. Miller, Chief, Nuclear Energy Division, OSI, to arrange for management of the project on the CIA side.
- 4 Dec A meeting is held in the Pentagon to launch the joint CIA/USAF reconnaissance project; go-ahead is given to Lockheed and to Pratt & Whitney to proceed with manufacture of the aircraft and jet engines by Mr. Trevor Gardner, Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for R&D.
- 6 Dec Cryptonym AQUATONE is assigned to the CL-282 project under Mr. Bissell's direction; a first headquarters of the project is set up as an adjunct to SA/PC/DCI in Administration (East) Building at 2430 E St., N. W.; Messrs. [redacted] Assistants to Mr. Bissell, and Miss Helen Hill, secretary, comprised the initial project staff.
- 27 Dec A letter from Mr. Trevor Gardner to the DCI promises that the Air Force will furnish jet engines for the CL-282 aircraft as part of its contribution to the joint project.
- 27 Dec Mr. Bissell meets with the Director of the Budget, Mr. Rowland R. Hughes, to obtain release from the CIA Contingency Reserve of \$35 million for Project AQUATONE.
- 29 Dec The Bureau of the Budget approves withdrawal of \$35 million from the Reserve for aircraft and equipment.

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- 2 Jan The DCI invokes provisions of Section 10(b), Public Law 110 with regard to certification of costs under the Lockheed contract for 20 aircraft.
- 3 Jan Letter contract with Lockheed is signed; negotiations carried out by Mr. Lawrence Houston for CIA and Mr. Robert Bias, Lockheed Vice President; signed by General C. P. Cabell (in alias) for CIA.
- 10 Jan AQUATONE Project Outline, drafted by Mr. Bissell, is signed by the DCI, Mr. Allen W. Dulles; sets forth in broad terms the plans for the management and operation of the project.
- 10 Jan Lockheed Aircraft Corporation presents the Work Statement for production of 20 aircraft, reconnaissance type (no model designation yet assigned).
- 14 Jan Summary of plans and specifications for photographic equipment to be carried by the AQUATONE aircraft is presented by Dr. James G. Baker, Professor of Physics, Harvard University, and member of the Land Technological Capabilities Panel.
- 14 Jan Lt. Gen. Don Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, USAF, endorses the proposed photographic equipment.
- 26 Jan First cover story for Project AQUATONE is promulgated by Project Staff and distributed to cleared staff and contractor personnel.
- 7 Feb The Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, is briefed on AQUATONE and CIA interest, particularly with regard to activities at the Lockheed Burbank plant; Los Angeles FBI office assigns espionage squad officers to monitor.
- 2 Mar Definitive contract is signed with Lockheed for 20 aircraft by Contracting Officer George F. Kucera in alias, for estimated price of \$22.5 million.
- 2 Mar Approval is obtained from the Deputy Director for Support (Col. Lawrence K. White) for AQUATONE to operate as a special project with personnel and operating costs segregated from regular accounts.

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- 7 Mar A CIA/USAF meeting to discuss AQUATONE organization considers, without reaching a decision, the use of the Strategic Air Command as the USAF entity to support the project. Mr. Bissell recommends against, but the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Nathan Twining, is in favor.
- 17 Mar Director of Communications, CIA, Gen. Harold M. McClelland, submits support plan for project communications and names [redacted] of the Office of Communications as Project Communications Officer.
- 31 Mar Definitive contract is signed with Ramo-Wooldridge (forerunner to TRW) for 12 sets of Elint System I.
- 6 Apr Chairman Lewis Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission is briefed on AQUATONE and agrees to the use as a test site of a dry lake bed area (Groom Lake) inside the Nevada Proving Ground.
- 13 Apr An inspection group of Lockheed and Project AQUATONE leaders choose a site on the west side of Groom Lake known as "Watertown" on which to build the test base.
- 23 Apr Discussions are initiated with Eastman Kodak Company officials looking toward a contract for processing AQUATONE film.
- 25 Apr Col. Robert B. J. Hopkins is nominated by the DD/S as Project AQUATONE Administrative Officer; he is relieved after two weeks at his own request due to poor health. Replaced by James A. Cunningham, Jr.
- 28 Apr First Table of Organization for AQUATONE provides for a Headquarters, a U.S. Field Test Site, and three foreign field bases, with 357 total personnel.
- 29 Apr Agreement is signed with USAF/OSI and the Office of Naval Intelligence that CIA will have primary responsibility for all security for the project.
- 1 May Project AQUATONE staff sets up headquarters in the small red brick building at 2210 E St., N. W., on the third floor.

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- 5 May Definitive contract is signed with Perkin-Elmer for 75 various type cameras to be carried by the AQUATONE aircraft; target price is \$5,085,000.
- 12 May [redacted] is assigned as Project AQUATONE Comptroller by Mr. Edward R. Saunders, CIA Comptroller, with the approval of Project Director Bissell, and is named Certifying Officer for project accounts.
- 2 Jun AEC agrees to arrange for housekeeping and maintenance services at the test site through their contract with Reynolds Electric and Equipment Company (REECO), reimbursable by CIA.
- 3 Jun Contract is initiated, on recommendation of the Land Panel, with Westinghouse Electric for an APQ-56 side-looking radar for the AQUATONE aircraft.
- 13 Jun Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, USAF, Lt. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, agrees to the recruitment of USAF Reserve pilots from SAC for the AQUATONE program.
- 17 Jun Contract is initiated with Eastman Kodak Co. for an engineering study of film processing and data recording operations, and design and installation of equipment; cost estimate, \$250K(+).
- 27 Jun Secretary of the Air Force letter urges Gen. Twining and his Deputy Chiefs to reach agreement with CIA on AQUATONE management, and names Col. Osmond J. Ritland to head the Air Force group and serve as deputy to the senior project officer, Mr. Bissell.
- 29 Jun Contract is initiated with Eastman Kodak Co. for procurement of film and other supplies; a new thin base film is developed under this contract.
- 21 Jul Watertown Strip joins the HBJAYWALK communications network established for Project AQUATONE; cable address is KWCABLE.
- 25 Jul First U-2 aircraft is delivered to Watertown by USAF C-124 from Burbank; because of water on lake bed, landing is made on new runway before it is sealed and armored leaving deep wheel marks.

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- 27 Jul Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. (retiring Senior Representative, CIA, Germany) temporarily placed on Mr. Bissell's Planning and Coordination Staff, O/DCI.
- 1 Aug First taxi trials of first U-2 are held; plane, on high speed taxi run, inadvertently leaves the ground by 30 feet and flies 1200 feet. Transition to flight is so smooth pilot does not notice, and a hard landing results when pilot cuts power at low speed and tires blow on landing.
- 3-4 Aug "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities" with regard to Project AQUATONE is signed by General Twining for the Air Force 3 August and by DCI Allen W. Dulles for CIA on 4 August 1955.
- 3 Aug Col. Russell A. Berg, USAF, is named to head the Air Force Project Group, acting in the name of the Chief of Staff, USAF, and SAC, to support AQUATONE in the training and operational phases.
- 4 Aug Col. Osmond J. Ritland, USAF, is confirmed as Deputy Project Director for AQUATONE by Chief of Staff, USAF, Gen. Twining; position and title are ratified in the USAF/CIA agreement.
- 5 Aug First flight of U-2 No. 1 for approximately 30 minutes is successfully and smoothly accomplished. Further low level tests are run on 6 August.
- 8 Aug U-2 No. 1 performs successfully at 35,000 feet; Mr. Bissell and Headquarters party are observers.
- 12 Aug Agreement with AEC for reimbursable housekeeping, new construction and maintenance, at Watertown Strip is signed by Mr. Bissell for CIA, and Col. Alfred D. Starbird for AEC.
- 19 Aug Executive Order 10633 authorizes the setting aside of the prohibited area required for the Project AQUATONE test site.
- 1 Sep U-2 No. 1 reaches 60,000 feet.

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- 2 Sep Letter from Headquarters, USAF, to AEC, copy to Flight Service, establishes Watertown Strip (Unclassified) as a USAF installation assigned for classified functions; prior approval of Headquarters, USAF, is required for its use.
- 7 Sep General Orders No. 1 of 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group, HEDCOM, designate Watertown Strip base complement as "Flight D, Project Squadron Provisional." (Later changed to Detachment D.) Also designated is Flight A (later Detachment A), the first group to train for overseas operations.
- 8 Sep U-2 No. 1 reaches initial design altitude for take-off weight -- 65,600 feet.
- 22 Sep First engine flame-out is experienced on the U-2; descending from 64,000 feet, engine flames out at 60,000 feet, and restarts promptly at 35,000 feet according to specifications.
- 1 Oct Contract is initiated with Eastman Kodak for the operation and maintenance of the film processing plant to handle U-2 mission film at Rochester.
- 1 Oct Col. Frederic E. McCoy, USAF, assumes command of Watertown Strip, at the same time having initial responsibility as Commander of Detachment A.
- 3 Oct Landline communications are established between Watertown Strip and Burbank, California.
- 3 Oct MATS inaugurates air shuttle from Burbank to Watertown for transporting contract employees and project staff to and from the test site, using an Air Force C-54 and cleared crew.
- 3 Oct Project Staff re-establishes Project Headquarters in Wings A and C of Quarters Eye, on Ohio Drive, West Potomac Park, Washington. Col. Osmond J. Ritland, Deputy Project Director, physically joins the staff at the new Project Headquarters.
- 17 Oct Contract is initiated with Baird Atomic, Inc., for production of an automatic celestial navigation

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~~TOP SECRET~~1955 (cont'd)

- system; initial order for 8 increased to 24, including sextants, spare parts, rear view mirrors, and the overseas services of company techreps.
- 21 Oct Proposal for a central interpretation unit to handle film from AQUATONE missions is presented to the DCI for approval (Project HTAUTOMAT).
- 7 Nov First recruitment trip for USAF Reserve pilots from SAC is made by project team to Turner Air Force Base, Albany Georgia, netting four candidates.
- 11 Nov Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr., suggests creation of a single operating organization to carry out all peacetime overflight activities, using civilian personnel in a clandestine manner; a joint task force outside the framework of the regular military services but with the Air Force owning a majority of the common stock.
- 11 Nov Agreement is reached between the DCI (Dulles) and the Secretary of the Air Force (Quarles) that CIA will continue to be responsible for AQUATONE budget and management through FY 1957 to avoid the disruption of a change of command just prior to the beginning of overseas operations.
- 17 Nov The MATS shuttle from Burbank to Watertown Strip crashes on the south slope of Mt. Charleston and all 14 aboard are killed, including the Project Security Officer, Mr. William H. Marr.
- 19 Nov Decision is made to use American pilots for AQUATONE overflights, keeping a few foreign pilots in reserve (those then available); this decision has the approval of General Cabell, the DDCI. 50X1 and 6, E.O.13526
- 28 Nov Contract is initiated with the Lovelace Foundation, Albuquerque, N. M., for medical and clinical services at the Watertown test base, and for U-2 pilot physical and psychological examinations.

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- 1 Dec Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) is established by Project Director Bissell with the DDCI's approval and concurrence of USAF. Mr. James Q. Reber is named Chairman.
- 15 Dec SAC's 4070th Support Wing issues its Operational Plan for training, deployment, and operational support for AQUATONE detachments.
- 22 Dec Col. Landon B. McConnell, USAF, is assigned as Base Commander at Watertown Strip.

1956

- 1 Jan Decision becomes effective making Washington the permanent station of AQUATONE personnel on temporary duty at Watertown Strip, in order to try to equalize per diem rates for all categories of personnel.
- 10 Jan Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr., visits London to seek permission from the British to operate with AQUATONE Detachment A out of a SAC base in England. Informal approaches are made to MI-6 and to the RAF and USAF commanders.
- 11 Jan Initial three contract pilots arrive at the test site and begin transition training to the U-2.
- 11 Jan USAF (through Mr. Trevor Gardner) requests CIA assistance in procuring U-2 aircraft for SAC, through AQUATONE procurement channels; approval is given by the DCI on 30 January 1956.
- 26 Jan General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston of CIA reviews legal aspects of CIA procurement on behalf of the Air Force of U-2 aircraft systems and renders the opinion to the DCI that, in the national interest, there is legal authority for CIA to enter into such an arrangement on a reimbursable basis.
- 1 Feb First full-dress meeting of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) for AQUATONE targets is held.
- 2 Feb Discussion of AQUATONE by DCI Dulles with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd is held; Mr. Lloyd is favorably disposed but says Prime Minister Eden must approve.

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- 8 Feb Basic understanding between CIA and Air Force is reached in connection with procurement under the U-2 project; contained in Memorandum for Record TS-143314.
- 8 Feb Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is requested by the DCI to approach the British through their Ambassador in Washington, Sir Roger Makins, for a report on the British position with regard to cooperating in Project AQUATONE. The Secretary makes a verbal request to Makins rather than a written one drafted by CIA.
- 25 Feb Project Headquarters AQUATONE is again moved, this time to the 5th floor, Matomic Building, at 1717 H Street, N. W.
- 27 Feb AQUATONE Special Signal Center (serving the HBJAYWALK channel) is opened in new Project Headquarters with ZI communications channels open to Watertown Strip, Lockheed Burbank, Ramo-Wooldridge, Hycon, [redacted] Pratt & Whitney, and with overseas stations [redacted].
[redacted] Commo Net cleared to receive AQUATONE (HBJAYWALK) traffic.
- 29 Feb Cover story for U-2 overseas mission is promulgated; it is reviewed and revised in March to include Air Weather Service recommendations.
- 1 Mar Project HTAUTOMAT (Photo Interpretation Center) is activated at the Steuart Building, 5th and K Sts., N.W., with a staff of 30.
- 1 Mar Contract is initiated with Eastman Kodak for equipment required to set up film processing centers at Eastman Rochester, and at PIC.
- 2 Mar British Ambassador Makins delivers indefinite response to request for U.K. cooperation; on same day Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., sends Project-drafted request to British for definite answer, and meanwhile, fall-back plans are instituted looking toward basing in Germany.

50X1, E.O.13526

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~~TOP SECRET~~1956 (cont'd)

- 5 Mar Director of Communications, General McClelland, recommends use of Army-Airways Communications System personnel to reinforce CIA commo technicians, in short supply, to service Project AQUATONE; Mr. Bissell agrees as a temporary measure but recommends that O/C recruit and train replacements.
- 6 Mar Col. Edward A. Perry, USAF/SAC, is assigned as Commanding Officer of Detachment B (WRSP II).
- 6 Mar approval by the British for operations by Detachment A from Lakenheath RAF Base.
- 50X1, E.O.13526
- 29 Mar Detachment A is reconstituted under the name "Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (1st)" by authority of Air Weather Service General Order No. 7.
- 30 Mar Deputy Project Director, Col. Osmond J. Ritland, USAF, returns to the Air Force and is replaced by Col. Jack A. Gibbs, USAF.
- 4 Apr Contract is initiated with General Precision Laboratories for Radan equipment for the U-2 and P2V programs.
- 12 Apr Cover for the contract U-2 pilots is achieved by arrangements with Lockheed for the ostensible hiring and salary payments to the pilots as "Flight Test Consultants."
- 24 Apr Unit Simulated Combat Mission tests by Detachment A are completed and the unit is declared operationally ready.
- 29 Apr Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath Air Base in England begins; it is completed 7 May 1956.
- 1 May Approval for Detachment B to operate from a Turkish base is obtained from Prime Minister Menderes by U.S. Chargé Foy Kohler, after an attempt to gain permission at the USAF/Turkish Air Force level is abandoned because the Prime Minister's approval is required in any event.

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- 2 May Instructions are issued to Detachment Commander, WRSP I, concerning use of lethal device ("L Pill") by pilots.
- 5 May British frogman incident is surfaced by Soviet protest note; the ensuing furor causes Prime Minister Eden to cancel permission for Detachment A to operate from a base in the U.K.
- 7 May National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) issues press release detailing program of high altitude research using Lockheed U-2, as part of the AQUATONE cover plan.
- 7 May Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional, II, (also known as Detachment B) is activated at Watertown Strip.
- 15 May First U-2 loss is suffered, No. 345, with Wilburn Rose, trainee pilot. Pogos fail to release after take-off and in second effort to release them, pilot fails to maintain adequate airspeed and altitude, and crashes near Watertown Strip.
- 15 May Contingency procedures in the event of pilot emergency are issued as Operations Policy Letter No. 6, giving permissible and impermissible information to be disclosed by a captured pilot and other emergency procedures to be followed.
- 16 May Prime Minister Eden writes to President Eisenhower requesting postponement of Detachment A operations from the U.K. because of his current embarrassment with the frogman incident vis-a-vis the USSR.
- 31 May Government Employees Health Association (GEHA) rules AQUATONE contract pilots ineligible for UBLIC insurance coverage.
- 11 Jun Detachment A is airlifted from Lakenheath to Wiesbaden AFB as an interim measure until a more permanent and suitable base at Giebelstadt is made ready; the airlift is completed 13 June.

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- 22 Jun White House approval to proceed with operational flights is received via Col. Goodpaster, speaking for the President; no deep penetration of the USSR is to take place, however, until Chancellor Adenauer is briefed, and agrees to such flights from West Germany.
- 26 Jun General Albert Gruenther, head of NATO forces, is briefed on AQUATONE by Mr. Bissell and Gen. Cabell, particularly concerning a possible approach to the Norwegians for use of a base to operate against the USSR. Gruenther is not encouraging, but says the approach, if made, should be made at the highest level of the Norwegian Government.
- 26 Jun First U-2 overflight mission from Wiesbaden over Poland and return is flown by Carl Overstreet, using the A-2 camera, with good photographic results.
- 27 Jun Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Foreign Minister Hans Globke are briefed on AQUATONE and approve operations from West Germany. Present: Gen. Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Tracy Barnes (COS, Frankfurt), and Interpreter.
- 29 Jun Emergency procedures in the event of aircraft loss over hostile territory are issued to Detachment A.
- 4 Jul First U-2 overflight of Russia by Hervey Stockman with targets Moscow and Leningrad is flown with cloud cover being experienced over Moscow.
- 5 Jul Second U-2 overflight of Russia by Carmine Vito, covers Moscow with weather clear and photography excellent.
- 11 Jul General Reinhard Gehlen, Chief of West German Intelligence, is briefed on AQUATONE by Chief of Station, Frankfurt, Mr. Tracy Barnes.
- 11 Jul Ambassador Georgi N. Zaroubin presents protest note to Secretary of State charging a "twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force" had

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grossly violated Soviet air space on 4, 5, and 9 July with flights up to 200 miles into Soviet territory. Secretary of State, on the President's instruction, calls for grounding of all overflight operations immediately.

15 Jul

50X1 and 6, E.O.13526

Col. William Yancey (USAF/SAC), Training Unit Commander for U-2 pilot training, rules four [] [] unqualified to continue in U-2 program due partly to language difficulties.

16-21 Jul

Polish and Czech Governments deliver notes of protest to the State Department on overflights of their territory 4, 5, 9, and 10 July 1956.

1 Aug

FY 1956 requirement for AQUATONE of \$15.8 million is supplied from the Contingency Reserve after presentation of the budget to the CIA Comptroller and to the BOB for approval.

8 Aug

Col. Stanley W. Beerli, USAF/SAC, is assigned as Commanding Officer, Detachment C (WRSP III); his tour with CIA extends eventually to 10 August 1962.

13 Aug

Detachment B begins deployment to Incirlik AFB at Adana, Turkey.

31 Aug

Second U-2 loss is suffered, No. 354, with Frank G. Grace, trainee pilot. On night training flight, pilot loses night vision in initial climb, left wing drops and aircraft stalls into the ground.

11 Sep

First U-2 operational mission is flown by Detachment B covering Middle East targets.

17 Sep

Third U-2 loss is suffered, No. 346, with Howard Carey, Detachment A pilot. After take-off from Wiesbaden, the U-2 is seen by two American pilots in T-33's and four Canadian pilots in a flight of RCAF F-86's at 35,000 feet, after which the plane disintegrates with wreckage falling over a wide area; cause not definitely determined; sabotage investigated and ruled out.

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- 17 Sep President Eisenhower is briefed on AQUATONE to date and is asked to approve further overflights; he postpones his decision.
- 30 Oct Decision at highest level is to deny the British any further intelligence from U-2 collections over the Middle East due to the trend of British/French action in the Suez area.
- 28 Nov Chief of Staff, USAF, Gen. Nathan Twining, turns down the AQUATONE request for base rights in the Far East.
- 5 Dec Gen. Twining agrees, with DCI and DDCI persuasion, to allow Detachment C to deploy to the Far East, but not to Yokota. Atsugi Naval Air Station is then sought, and CNO, Adm. Arleigh Burke, gives his blessing provided the Air Force agrees.
- 15 Dec DCI memorandum establishes procedures for scheduling certification of AQUATONE vouchers for covert procurement by the DCI, thus eliminating voucher audit by the General Accounting Office.
- 18 Dec Project BLACK KNIGHT (SAC RB-57D overflight program) runs its first and last mission, using three aircraft over Soviet Far East territory and provoking a protest which halts the program and also delays Detachment C's deployment still further.
- 19 Dec Fourth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 357, non-fatal to Robert Ericson, Detachment B trainee pilot. Excessive oxygen consumption leads pilot to make emergency descent during which airspeed exceeds limits, causing buffet and loss of control; pilot is blown out as plane disintegrates, descends without serious injury, and is picked up near Grant's Pass.
- 22 Dec First U-2 mission solely for Elint collection is flown from Adana, Turkey, along the Soviet Border carrying Elint System V.
- 31 Dec Project AQUATONE staff reaches the high point of 600 personnel.

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- 18 Jan The DCI approves underwriting GEHA payment of death benefits to contract AQUATONE pilots with CIA funds; a reserve is set up under the code name JB MAYBUSH and \$1,000 per man per year in the form of premiums is paid in. (JB MAYBUSH closed 1 June 1964 when GEHA accepts pilots for coverage.)
- 2 Feb Agreement is reached with USAF for deployment of Detachment C to Japan; USAF is persuaded to act due to SAC's desire to get Detachment C out of Watertown Strip so that SAC's U-2 group can begin their training there.
- 22 Mar Air Research and Development Command, USAF, agrees to the transfer of residual U-2 test and training activities to Edwards Air Force Base (North), California.
- 27 Mar WRSP III (Detachment C) completes deployment to Atsugi Naval Air Station, Japan, with all personnel and equipment in place.
- 4 Apr Fifth U-2 loss is suffered: No. 341 with Robert Sieker, Lockheed test pilot; on test flight from Watertown, pilot believed to have suffered hypoxia due to malfunction of one or more systems, radio contact between base and aircraft lost, and aircraft crashed in the desert.
- 19 Apr Project Director Bissell recommends to DCI that he seek high level decision on project's future, whether to remain under civilian control or be transferred to the military, and whether to maintain standby capability or begin to phase project out of existence.
- 19 Apr Mr. Bissell advises the DCI that the surfacing of the Air Force U-2 capability will compel the liquidation of Project AQUATONE under its NACA/AWS cover.
- 3 May A meeting is held with the President on the future of AQUATONE, ending with Agency and Air Force participants putting different interpretations upon the President's intent, which had to be ironed out at a subsequent meeting on 29 May. At the 6 May meeting approval for further overflights of the USSR is given.

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- 10 May Detachment G, residual Watertown group, is reconstituted as Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional, IV, with Lt. Col. Roland L. ("Si") Perkins, USAF, as Commanding Officer.
- 29 May A meeting of CIA and USAF principals is held to reach agreed interpretation of the President's intention with regard to the future of AQUATONE. The conclusion reached is that higher authority, for political reasons, wishes the project to remain under civilian direction.
- 3-7 Jun Project AQUATONE team visits Pakistan and obtains permission from President Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawardy to stage Detachment B operations from Lahore.
- 10 Jun The SAC group training in USAF U-2's at Watertown Strip departs for its new base at Laughlin AFB, Del Rio, Texas, with assignment to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (Light), 4028th Squadron.
- 20 Jun First U-2 overflight by Detachment C is staged from Eielson AFB, Alaska, over Kamchatka Peninsula of the USSR.
- 20 Jun Detachment G (WRSP IV) completes move to Edwards Air Force Base (North) from Watertown Strip.
- 21 Jun Watertown Strip, having been evacuated by CIA and SAC U-2 units, is mothballed under a caretaker in preparation for a nuclear test series planned by AEC for the Nevada Proving Ground.
- 18 Jul Memorandum of Understanding on procurement for the Navy by Project AQUATONE Staff is signed by the DCI, following the same lines as for Air Force procurement.
- 19 Jul The DDCI, Gen. C. P. Cabell, meets with Air Force Generals Bergquist, LeMay, and Lewis to argue the case for civilian control of AQUATONE and succeeds in getting their acceptance on the basis of agreed interpretation of the President's and Secretary of State's intent that the project remain under CIA.

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- 29 Jul DCI Dulles advises General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF, that Project AQUATONE will maintain two detachments at reduced strength under continued CIA direction, in accordance with the wishes of the White House and State Department.
- 2 Aug The DDCI, Gen. Cabell, approves CNO Adm. Burke's recommendation for developing a carrier-based U-2 capability. A later Navy approach for USAF approval to carry this out is turned down by the Air Force.
- 4-28 Aug Nine overflight missions (Operation SOFT TOUCH), principally over the USSR, are carried out from Lahore Air Base, West Pakistan, by Detachment B.
- 16 Sep Second staging by Detachment C from Eielson AFB, Alaska is carried out with one successful mission over Klyuchi, USSR.
- 16 Sep VHF recorder developed as a COMINT collection package for the U-2 by Ramo Wooldridge (System III) is eliminated from the program by the Project Director as of less than marginal intelligence value.
- 24 Sep The Deputy Director for Support is asked to approve the decision to allow dependents of AQUATONE detachment personnel to accompany their sponsors overseas; approval is given.
- 11 Oct Electronic System IV, unattended airborne FERRET system, is first used over the Barents Sea with good results; all System IV equipment is transferred to the Air Force U-2 group in March 1962.
- 11-13 Oct Last two overflights performed by Detachment A from Giebelstadt are flown over the Barents Sea (System IV covering Soviet Navy Maneuvers), and over Murmansk (the A-2 camera).
- 15 Nov Detachment A operations are phased out, all personnel and equipment are returned to the ZI and the facility at Giebelstadt is turned back to the U.S. Air Force.
- 19 Nov An advanced reconnaissance system study (Project GUSTO), developed from radar camouflage studies

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(RAINBOW) is reported by Mr. Bissell to Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles, who agrees that it be reported to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

26 Nov Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles supports CIA efforts for a low reflectivity reconnaissance aircraft (GUSTO/OXCART) and expresses desire to participate in definitive design decision; the A-12/SR-71 aircraft resulted.

27 Nov British Prime Minister Macmillan and members of his cabinet are briefed on intelligence obtained from Detachment B's SOFT TOUCH operation from Pakistan.

1958

50X1, E.O.13526

7 Feb

[redacted] is requested to approach Air Vice Marshal MacDonald, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, with a view to possibly training 3 to 5 British pilots for future operational use in the U-2.

21 Feb

Permission to operate from Peshawar, West Pakistan, is negotiated with President Mirza and Prime Minister Noon [redacted]

50X1, E.O.13526

and Robert W. King, Assistant to Mr. Bissell. Operation is called off due to Soviet protest of Detachment C mission over USSR 1 March 1958.

1 Mar

First (and last) overflight of the USSR from Japan by Detachment C, over Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, and Ukraina, is tracked and protested in note delivered to Department of State by Ambassador Menshikov; all U-2 overflights ordered to cease indefinitely by highest authority.

28 Mar

Deployment of Detachment C to Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines, begins; 30 missions flown over the islands of Indonesia, ending 11 June 1958 with return to Atsugi.

1 Apr

Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr., is given additional duties in stimulating exploitation in CIA of advanced

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1958 (cont'd)

technology, and retitled "Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Development (SA/PD); at the same time AQUATONE staff becomes the Development Projects Staff.

- 1 Apr A new cryptonym, CHALICE, is assigned to the U-2 project, and AQUATONE is cancelled.
- 1 Jun Col. William Burke, USAF, is named Deputy Project Director of CHALICE and Chief of the Development Projects Staff vice Col. Jack A. Gibbs, who returns to the Air Force.
- 16 Jun Project KEEPER is jointly agreed between the British (Air Ministry and MI-6) and CIA representatives. (Name changed to Project OLDSTER due to conflict discovered with a British cryptonym.)
- 26 Jun Contract is let with Granger Associates for an electronic countermeasures device for the P2V and the U-2 (Granger Model 504) which returns false angle information to airborne intercept radars. (This equipment is aboard U-2 #360 when it is shot down over Sverdlovsk.)
- 30 Jun Supply depot for U-2-peculiar equipment and supplies is shifted from [redacted] with [redacted] Maj. Robert Welch, USAF, continuing in charge.
- 50X1, E.O.13526
- 10 Jul Hycon subcontract with Perkin-Elmer for the first order of U-2 cameras is settled for \$4,106,000; dealings with Hycon thereafter are by direct contract with Project CHALICE.
- 14 Jul First of four typhoons over the South Pacific is tracked and photographed by Detachment C with A-1 camera; Winnie, Alice, Grace, and Ida are covered between July and September.
- 15 Jul U. S. Marines are ordered by President Eisenhower to Beirut to protect Lebanon's independence. (British intervene in Jordan with paratroopers on 17 July.)

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- 23 Jul First Perkin-Elmer prime contract for U-2 cameras is settled for \$2.6+ million; 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ % of cost represents procurement for the Air Force.
- 31 Jul Advisory panel with Dr. Edwin H. Land as Chairman is organized by Mr. Bissell to advise on a successor reconnaissance aircraft to the U-2; holds its first meeting but no firm recommendations come out of it.
- 27 Aug Prime Minister Harold Macmillan approves British participation in Project CHALICE, provided missions are flown by civilian pilots without RAF markings and no operational flights are made without his specific permission. President Eisenhower approves British participation the same day, subject to the Secretary of State's concurrence.
- 29 Aug President Eisenhower is briefed on results of U-2 China Mainland coverage and agrees to the continuation of tactical missions over China.
- 2 Sep Bureau of the Budget questions the continuance of the U-2 project under CIA instead of its transfer to the Air Force and requests statement outlining past, present, and future plans for CHALICE; reply delivered to BOB 2 September 1958 satisfies this request.
- 11 Sep Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of Turkey is briefed on the plan to add British element to Detachment B at Adana and raises no objection.
- 15 Sep Detachment B staging party arrives at Bodo Air Force Base in Norway, performs one air sampling mission over Greenland, two Elint collections over the Kara Sea, and the Baltic Sea, and returns to Adana on 6 November 1958.
- 12 Nov Land Advisory Panel recommends investigation of Convair proposal for small aircraft to be launched from a B-58, and of Lockheed proposal for a supersonic unstaged design (the A-3).
- 10 Dec Critical Collections Problems Committee and USIB Elint Committee approve initiation of System VII for intercept and recording of missile telemetry signals during pre-burnout stage of missile launching.

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- 12 Dec USAF/SAC initiates proposal to JCS for Chinese Nationalist participation in a U-2 overflight program.
- 16 Dec BOB/CIA agreement is signed for \$75 million DOD FY 1959-60 funds to be made available for the second phase of GUSTO (OXCART) if approval is received from higher authority. These funds are not to be a part of FY 1960 CIA budget and in no way affect the Agency Reserve, but CIA is to have effective control over use of the money just as though it were from the CIA Reserve.
- 31 Dec British pilot flies the first operational mission over Middle East targets. The British fly a total of 28 missions with Detachment B (4 weather missions over England, 2 photo reconnaissance missions over the USSR from Peshawar, and the balance over the Middle East.)

1959

- 1 Jan Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr., is named Deputy Director for Plans, succeeding Mr. Frank Wisner.
- 16 Feb Development Projects Division is established as a division of DD/P, effective 16 February 1959, amalgamating all Agency air operations including special projects CHALICE and CORONA.
- 16 Feb Col. William Burke, USAF, is appointed Acting Chief of Development Projects Division, DPD/DDP. Mr. James Q. Reber is appointed Chief, Special Requirements Staff, and continues as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC).
- 1 Mar Conversion is begun to put Pratt & Whitney J-75 engines in the U-2 aircraft to add 2,500 feet altitude; conversion is to be done in small increments of three or four aircraft at a time.
- 6 Mar Consideration of development of a bombing capability for the U-2 is discontinued with the concurrence of the DCI.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1959 (cont'd)

- 22 Mar Mr. John Parangosky is assigned as Deputy Chief, Development Branch, DPD; formerly Executive Officer of Detachment B at Adana.
- 12-14 May Two missions are staged by Detachment C from Cubi Point, Philippines, covering Tibet and Southwest China in support of FE Division, DD/P, projects.
- 18 May CIA/USAF working level technical panel is formed, at the request of Gen. Thomas D. White, to provide expert advice looking toward design selection for GUSTO (renamed OXCART in development/operational phase).
- 22 May The DDCI, Gen. C. P. Cabell, approves the DD/P proposal for a combat air asset stockpiling program including the procurement of AD, P2V, B-26 and F-86 aircraft; Development Projects Division is made responsible.
- 25 May Establishment of Detachment 1 at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is approved by the DDCI; activated as 1045th Operations Evaluation and Training Group, Detachment 1, with Col. Theodore Erbe, USAF, in command; composed of personnel and assets transferred to Eglin from the European Air Operations Base at Wiesbaden (7405th Support Group).
- 29 May First shoot-down of a P2V aircraft occurs over China Mainland; flown by CAF pilot assigned to the 34th Squadron of CAF at Hsinchu Air Base, Taiwan.
- 9 Jun Joint collection mission by CIA and USAF is flown by CHALICE U-2 with System VII and SAC RB-47, successfully acquiring missile telemetry on Soviet ICBM launching, the first such intercept recorded by the U.S. Intelligence Community.
- 17 Jun The 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group (AISG), HEDCOM, is replaced as cover unit for DPD Air Force assignees by the 1149th Special Activities Squadron, HEDCOM.
- 23 Jun [redacted] replaces Mr. George F. Kucera as Chief, Contracts Branch, DPD.

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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- 20 Jul President Eisenhower is briefed on GUSTO (later renamed OXCART) and approves continuation of studies if funds are available.
- 30 Jul The DCI approves establishment of a 45-man detachment at Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, under Air Force cover as the 1045th Operations Evaluation and Training Group, Detachment 2; mission, to serve as a central air operations support base [redacted]
- 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted]
- 31 Jul Col. William Shelton, USAF, replaces Col. Stanley W. Beerli, USAF, as Commander of Detachment B at Adana.
- 20 Aug DOD/USAF/CIA selection board on GUSTO/OXCART approves the Lockheed design (A-12) as the follow-on system to the U-2.
- 21 Aug The cryptonym OXCART is assigned to the development phase of the A-12 advanced reconnaissance system.
- 29 Aug Detachment C stages from Atsugi to Ban Takhli, Thailand, flies 6 missions over Tibet, Northwest China, North Vietnam, and Laos, and returns to Atsugi 12 September 1959.
- 31 Aug Project GUSTO's termination is announced.
- 3 Sep Letter contract with Lockheed Aircraft Company is initiated for design and production of the A-12 aircraft.
- 24 Sep Non-fatal U-2 accident of No. 360. Returning to base at Atsugi from test flight with too little fuel, Detachment C pilot makes emergency landing in a potato field; he is not injured and aircraft is repairable.
- 18 Nov Ambassador to Norway, Miss Frances Willis, recommends briefing Norwegian Cabinet members on U-2 in order to circumvent the use of Col. Evang as a sole source of approval for U-2 operations from Norway; this recommendation is not carried out and Evang is again approached for use of Bodo in February 1960 looking toward April operations by Detachment B.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1959 (cont'd)

- 24 Nov Joint agreement is signed between Far East Division and Development Projects Division, delineating functions and responsibilities regarding Far East air operations of DD/P.
- 6 Dec First mission over Russia by Detachment B U-2 with British pilot is flown staging through Peshawar, and covers Kuybyshev and Kapustin Yar with excellent results.
- 23 Dec The DD/P approves the reopening and renovation of Watertown Strip for use as the OXCART test and training facility.

1960

- 14 Jan U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo, Douglas McArthur, is briefed on CHALICE by Mr. Bissell. The Ambassador does not at that time recommend withdrawal of Detachment C from Japan.
- 30 Jan Lockheed Aircraft Company is given firm go-ahead for the production of 12 OXCART aircraft.
- 5 Feb Second overflight of the USSR by U-2 with British pilot, staging from Peshawar, is carried out by Detachment B, covering Tyura Tam, Kazan, and Ukraine with excellent results.
- 19 Feb Presidential approval is given for one of three planned overflight missions of the USSR in order of priority, subject to take-off, route, and terminal weather; third choice is finally flown over Sary Shagan from Peshawar on 19 April 1960.
- 25 Mar P2V7 aircraft #7101 crashes into mountain in South Korea on ferry flight from Hsinchu to Kunsan; aircraft and full crew, 11 CAF officers and men assigned to STPOLLY overflight program, are lost.
- 5 Apr Non-fatal U-2 accident, No. 349. Detachment C pilot on mission flown from Ban Takli crashlanded in rice paddy short of base; pilot is not injured and aircraft is retrieved in sections, aided by natives with oxcarts, requiring a nine day trek.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1960 (cont'd)

- 25 Apr Presidential approval is given for one out of three planned missions before midnight 1 May 1960: (1) TIME STEP; (2) GRAND SLAM; and (3) SUN SPOT. Long-range weather forecast is against (1), so planning goes ahead for (2).
- 1 May Operation GRAND SLAM, postponed due to weather from 27 April to 1 May 1960, takes off from Peshawar at 0159Z; Soviet tracking begins at the border and continues without interruption until last reported position of aircraft at 0629Z.
- 1 May Sixth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 360, non-fatal to pilot, Francis Gary Powers, Detachment B. Aircraft is downed near Sverdlovsk, USSR, by surface-to-air missile action, pilot ejects as aircraft disintegrates and lands uninjured.
- 2 May Press release by C/O of Detachment B announces a U-2 missing as drafted and cabled from Headquarters; it is not published in the press until 3 May with an Istanbul dateline.
- 4 May Gen. Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, is briefed on U-2 loss because the flight departed from Peshawar; briefing is given by [REDACTED] Mr. Frank Wisner. 50X1, E.O.13526
- 5 May FBIS picks up Soviet broadcast on Radio Moscow of announcement by Khrushchev of shooting down of American plane which had crossed the Soviet frontier "from Turkey, Iran or Pakistan."
- 7 May Soviet radio broadcast says Russians have captured the spy pilot alive and are interrogating him; this fact is revealed in a speech by Khrushchev at the 5th Session of the Supreme Soviet's Fifth Convocation.
- 7 May Detachment B is directed by Headquarters, Washington, to remove British cadre from Turkey by black flight to London, for Air Ministry debriefing and further disposition.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1960 (cont'd)

- 9 May Congressional leaders are briefed by DCI Dulles on the U-2 May Day incident.
- 10 May Director of Personnel, CIA, certifies to the Comptroller, CIA, that Francis G. Powers qualifies under the terms of P.L. 490, 77th Congress for status as a Missing Person and the benefits related thereto.
- 11 May President Eisenhower holds a press conference and, on his own unilateral initiative, admits to pre-knowledge and agreement to the U-2 overflights of the USSR.
- 15 May Cryptonym IDEALIST is assigned to the U-2 program in lieu of CHALICE which has been exposed.
- 23 May General Chiang Ching-kuo on behalf of his father, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, suggests the U-2 aircraft based in Japan be moved to Taiwan and assures complete cooperation of the GRC.
- 25 May President Eisenhower addresses the nation on the collapse of the Summit Meeting scheduled to be held in Paris May 16, but which Khrushchev refuses to attend.
- 31 May The DCI testifies regarding the U-2 May Day incident before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session with testimony classified Secret.
- 1 Jun Col. Stanley W. Beerli, USAF, is assigned as Acting Chief, DPD, vice Col. William Burke, who returns to the Air Force.
- 8 Jun Ambassador McArthur recommends that Detachment C U-2's be withdrawn from Japan immediately; the State Department favors phased withdrawal on a schedule put forward by CIA.
- 14 Jun Senator John F. Kennedy, in a speech on the collapse of the Summit due to the U-2 affair, issues his challenge to Republicans and Democrats to engage in a "Great Debate" on the issues before the United States.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1960 (cont'd)

- 23 Jun The DDCI approves expenditure from Agency funds of \$50,000 in defense of Frank Powers, through cover mechanism; only \$30,000 is advanced to the lawyers and only \$23,094.31 of that is expended.
- 27 Jun The CI Staff and Office of Security submit initial assessment of damage from the U-2 incident.
- 1 Jul Soviets shoot down USAF RB-47 over the Barents Sea.
- 7 Jul Indictment of Frank Powers is published by the USSR and trial set for 17 August 1960.
- 8 Jul Japanese Foreign Office formally requests the removal of U-2 aircraft from Japan due to public pressure on the government.
- 9 Jul Detachment C U-2 aircraft are removed from Atsugi by C-124 airlift and returned to the U.S.
- 11 Jul Development Projects Division's Air Support Branch establishes a separate unit (JMCLEAR) to support Western Hemisphere Division's Cuban counterrevolutionary invasion project.
- 18 Aug Francis Gary Powers, U-2 pilot, is sentenced by Soviet judges to ten years' loss of liberty, the first three years to be spent in prison.
- 19 Aug The last of Detachment C staff departs from Atsugi and the facility is turned back to the Navy.
- 26 Aug Proposal in principle for a Taiwan-based U-2 detachment is approved by the State Department and by President Eisenhower.
- 13 Sep Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek approves the proposal for a joint US/GRC U-2 project as outlined by the Chief of Station, Taipei, Dr. Ray Cline.
- 27 Sep Mr. Oliver Powers, father of Frank, reads a letter to Khrushchev on the NBC Morning Show, asking for his son's release.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1960 (cont'd)

- 27 Sep New security guidance is issued in light of the U-2 trial revelations in order to prevent further damage to the project.
- 11 Oct Continued British participation in the U-2 program is approved by the U.K. Foreign Ministry (although Project Headquarters felt the Prime Minister should approve). A new codeword for British participation is assigned -- JACKSON in lieu of OLDSTER.
- 14 Oct Organization and delineation of responsibilities for Project OXCART are formalized. Direction and control is to be exercised jointly by the DCI and the Chief of Staff, USAF, subject to guidance from higher authority and coordination with other departments as appropriate.
- 24 Oct The cryptonym TACKLE is assigned to the joint US/GRC U-2 project.
- 26 Oct First operational mission by Detachment G is flown over Cuba (one of five missions) from staging base at Laughlin AFB, Del Rio, Texas.
- 4 Nov President Eisenhower approves joint US/GRC U-2 project. General Goodpaster informs CIA of the approval on 8 November 1960.
- 9-28 Nov Air sampling missions are flown by Detachment G from Hawaii
50X1, E.O.13526
- 10 Nov Phase-out of Detachment B to a small holding unit at Adana is begun. Efforts to unground the U-2 for further flights from Turkey, although approved by the Special Group in August 1961, do not receive Turkish approval.
- 18 Nov President-elect Kennedy is briefed on CIA operations by DCI Dulles and Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr., at Palm Beach, Florida.
- 22 Nov GRC officials (President Chiang, General Chiang Ching-kuo, Maj. Gen. S. K. Hu, Lt. Gen. Ch'en Chia-shang, and Maj. Gen. I Fu-en) are given

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~~TOP SECRET~~1960 (cont'd)

- a TALENT briefing by Cdr Robert Neasham of PIC, to impress on them the value of sophisticated film processing, as well as the capabilities of the U-2.
- 29 Nov NBC "White Paper" - "The U-2 Affair" -- aired for one hour on TV.
- 7 Dec Export license issued for shipment of two U-2 aircraft to the GRC by Lockheed through arrangements with State Department and Commissioner of Customs.
- 14 Dec Detachment H (U-2) is established on Taiwan at Tao Yuan Air Base jointly with the GRC's CAF.

1961

- 1 Jan Logistics support for CIA U-2 operations and SAC U-2 operations are consolidated under a single Weapons System Support Center at Warner Robins Depot, Georgia, in order to separate U-2 and A-12 materiel operations, and to effect economies.
- 3 Jan President Eisenhower severs relations with Cuba.
- 3 Jan First U-2 coverage of North Vietnam by Detachment G staging out of Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines, is carried out.
- 7 Jan State Department White Paper on U.S. aid to Laos forms the basis for a joint CIA/DOD program to build up a Laos Air Force, from a nucleus of B-26 aircraft stored in the Far East.
- 25 Jan Joint agreement reached between U.S. and GRC, couched in sterile terms, unsigned, and one copy held by COS Taipei, one by CAF.
- 31 Jan Military Aide to the President, Brig. Gen. Chester V. Clifton, USA, briefed on IDEALIST and other reconnaissance programs at request of Gen. Goodpaster by Mr. William J. Cotter, Chief, DPD Security.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1961 (cont'd)

- Gen. Clifton is advised by Goodpaster that Mr. Bissell will be his contact on overflight programs, but that Mr. McGeorge Bundy will coordinate all IDEALIST flights for the White House.
- 1 Feb U-2 modification to allow for in-flight refueling is initiated in order to add to aircraft's range.
- 10 Feb Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson is briefed by Mr. William Cotter of DPD Security on IDEALIST and the satellite program, but not on OXCART; the Vice President's military aide, Col. Howard Burris, USAF, is also briefed at the same level.
- 13 Feb DPD/Contracts and USAF/Air Materiel Command sign memorandum of understanding on consolidation of materiel support for CIA and SAC U-2's at Warner Robins Depot, Georgia.
- 18 Feb USAF/CIA agreement on OXCART management is signed by DCI Allen W. Dulles for CIA, having been signed on 15 February by General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF.
- 19 Feb Operations Coordinating Board is dissolved by President Kennedy and the Special Group for coordinating covert activities is reactivated under Mr. McGeorge Bundy (who receives CIA briefing along with NSC members on 14 February); Thursday meetings of the Special Group are initiated 23 February 1961.
- 21 Feb First instructions are issued for handling documents in the BYEMAN Control System.
- 19 Mar Seventh U-2 loss is suffered (first under TACKLE), No. 351, with CAF pilot, Maj. Chih. On night transition landing practice, pilot allows wing to drop and aircraft is flown into the ground and demolished by fire, and pilot is fatally injured.
- 5-30 Apr Detachment G flies 15 missions covering the Cuban counterrevolutionary activities.
- 12 Apr President Kennedy pledges non-intervention in Cuba.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1961 (cont'd)

- 16 Apr Dr. Miro Cardona, Cuban exile leader in the U.S. announces invasion of Cuba by counterrevolutionaries.
- 17-19 Apr Attempted landings without expected air cover turns into fiasco at "Bay of Pigs" and counterrevolutionaries are massacred by Castro forces.
- 11 May Special Group of NSC approves indefinite continuation of STPOLLY (P2V) flights under the Special Group's continual and mission-by-mission scrutiny and evaluation.
- 23 May Detachment G begins its U-2 coverage of the Cuban missile build-up and accomplishes 28 overflights up through 7 October 1963.
- 28 Jun General Maxwell D. Taylor is appointed Chairman of the NSC Special Group (and Military Representative of the President).
- 30 Jun CI Staff of CIA recommends to DCI that proposed exchange of Col. Rudolf Abel for Francis Gary Powers not be negotiated due to Abel's being a potential source of information of great value.
- 16 Aug U-2 flights over Vietnam are initiated by Detachment G from Cubi Point, Philippines. Intermittent coverage of Vietnam is continued by CIA to 1968.
- 6 Sept Initial NRO agreement is signed by Gen. Cabell for CIA and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric for DOD.
- 14 Sep Eighth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 353, with Detachment G pilot, Buster Edens. Returning from an air sampling mission to Edwards AFB, the aircraft stalls and strikes the ground short of the runway; pilot ejects and is uninjured; aircraft burned beyond repair.
- 4 Oct President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommends Special Group re-evaluate proposal for photographic coverage of selected China Mainland targets; President Kennedy approves the Board's recommendation.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1961 (cont'd)

- 2 Nov Acting DCI Cabell, in a letter to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, recommends pursuit of a prisoner exchange of Abel for Powers using the channel set up through correspondence between Attorney James Donovan and Col. Abel's wife, who is apparently under Soviet control.
- 15 Nov Col. Robert J. Holbury, USAF, is assigned to duty as Chief of Base at Watertown Strip with status of Commanding Officer, Detachment 1, 1129th (USAF) Special Activities Squadron.
- 24 Nov Secretary of State Rusk recommends to Attorney General Robert Kennedy that efforts for Abel/Powers exchange be pursued through the James Donovan/Mrs. Helen Abel correspondence channel.
- 29 Nov Mr. John A. McCone becomes Director of Central Intelligence on retirement of Mr. Allen W. Dulles.
- 20 Dec BYEMAN Control Manual is issued to the Intelligence Community.

1962

- 5 Jan The Special Group of the NSC approves three TACKLE U-2 missions from Taiwan with the proviso that each mission must have specific approval prior to launch from the Special Group.
- 12 Jan First U-2 flight over China Mainland by CAF pilot covers the Shuang Ch'eng Tzu Missile Test Range.
- 20 Jan The PFIAB registers the concern of the President for the security of the sensitive reconnaissance projects being conducted by CIA; Mr. Bissell replies, citing the setting up of the BYEMAN control system for those sensitive projects.
- 10 Feb Exchange of Soviet spy, Col. Rudolf Abel, for U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, is consummated at the center of the Glienecke Bridge connecting East and West Berlin, having been engineered on behalf of the U.S. Government by New York Attorney James Donovan.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1962 (cont'd)

- 17 Feb Resignation of Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr., as DD/P is effective this date; he is replaced by Mr. Richard Helms.
- 19 Feb Office of Deputy Director (Research) is established.
- 5 Mar Mr. Bissell recommends to DCI that division of DPD projects and assets between DD/P and DD/R be as follows: special reconnaissance projects and R&D to support their operation to go to DD/R; air support to the Clandestine Services to stay in DD/P.
- 15 Apr Development Projects Division's special reconnaissance projects, including CORONA, are transferred to the DD/R.
- 26 Apr First flight of the A-12 (#121) is performed satisfactorily for a duration of 40 minutes.
- 30 Apr First official flight of the A-12, with Lockheed test pilot, Louis Chalk, takes off with gross weight of 72,000 pounds, climbs to 30,000 feet, and achieves top speed of 340 knots, with a flight duration of 59 minutes.
- 29 May Project OXCART is added to the BYEMAN/BYECOM systems for control of documentation and communications.
- 12 Jun First Ramo-Wooldridge contract for U-2 electronic systems is settled in the amount of \$20.4+ million; this includes costs incurred on behalf of the Air Force, the Office of Communications, and STPOLLY.
- 27 Jul CSN 1-494 establishes Special Operations Division, DD/P, which takes over the air support functions for the Clandestine Services previously carried out by Development Projects Division; [redacted] is named Chief of SOD.
- 30 Jul Office of Special Activities is established under the DD/R; Development Projects Division activities other than air support functions transferred to SOD are made the responsibility of the new Office of Special Activities.

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U.S.C., section 403g)

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1962 (cont'd)

- 1 Aug Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., is named Acting Assistant Director for Special Activities, DD/R.
- 29 Aug Detachment G mission over Cuba confirms the existence of numerous SAM sites.
- 1 Sep OSA Contracts Staff [] at Headquarters and [] on the West Coast) are authorized by the Acting DCI, General Marshall Carter, to do covert procurement in furtherance of NRP objectives.
- 4 Sep Col. Jack C. Ledford, USAF, is named Assistant Director for Special Activities, DD/R, and Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., is named Deputy Assistant Director for Special Activities, DD/R.
- 4 Sep Special Security Center is established by Office of Security and OSA Security Staff is relieved of record-keeping and paper work involved with clearances which it had previously been responsible for, with the exception of those instigated by OSA.
- 9 Sep Ninth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 378, with CAF pilot, Lt. Col. Ch'en. Lost on operational mission over Nanchang, China, cause unknown.
- 30 Sep Reorganization of OSA is completed, reducing number of division and staff heads reporting directly to the front office (10) to a more manageable arrangement. Materiel is placed under Field Activities.
- 7 Oct Last CIA-operated U-2 mission is flown over Cuba by Detachment G.
- 8-9 Oct Although weather is good for coverage of Cuba, no U-2 aircraft are in commission and no flights are made.
- 10 Oct The Joint Chiefs of Staff and USIB meet on the Cuban situation.
- 10-12 Oct Weather is unfavorable for Cuban coverage. Detachment G supervises requalification of two SAC pilots in CIA's U-2C aircraft at Edwards AFB in preparation of future Cuban coverage by SAC.

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U.S.C., section 403g)

~~TOP SECRET~~1962 (cont'd)

- 12 Oct Recommendation by the JCS to turn Cuban coverage over to SAC is ordered carried out by Secretary of Defense McNamara and agreed by the White House.
- 14 Oct Overflight of Cuba by SAC pilot in a CIA U-2, flying a mission as plotted by OSA/Operations Intelligence Staff, brings back photography which proves the presence of a Soviet MRBM in Cuba.
- 15 Oct A special meeting of the NSC Special Group approves two U-2 missions for Cuba for 16 October.
- 16 Oct A meeting at 1300 in Secretary McNamara's office to consider stepping up coverage of Cuba results in authorization by McNamara of up to 6 missions of all types each day for the 17th and 18th of October.
- 17 Oct Management and operation of all FIRE FLY drones against Cuba under NRO supervision is assigned to DOD with CIA assistance in Elint, contracting, and security.
- 17 Oct The AQ-12 drone project management is assigned to the Director of Program B (CIA), Col. Jack Ledford, with Lt. Col. Henry Howard of the NRO Staff as Project Officer.
- 22 Oct President Kennedy makes public disclosure of the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba and invokes a quarantine on shipping to Cuba.
- 20 Nov The NRO Ad Hoc Cover Committee is established to coordinate contingency procedures for all NRO reconnaissance operations.
- 5 Dec First coverage of Tibet by Detachment G is carried out from Ban Takhli, Thailand. Six missions are flown between 5 December and 22 January 1963 covering Tibet, Kashmir, and the NEFA.
- 17 Dec The Special Group assumption for FY 1963-64 includes requirement for photo coverage of Mainland China and maintenance of two operational aircraft by Detachment H for the TACKLE U-2 program.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1962 (cont'd)

18 Dec OSA Activity Program 63-1 is approved for an Electronic Data Processing Branch in OSA Operations Division to do flight planning for OXCART and IDEALIST, and ephemeris plotting for satellite projects.

1963

15 Jan First A-12 flight is made using a J-58 engine.

Mar Prime Minister Nehru, having been briefed in January and March on Detachment G's Sino-Indian border coverage, informs the Indian Parliament of the Chinese border movements disclosed by U-2 photography (without attribution of source); however UPI publishes story surmising use of U-2 by U.S. from Okinawa, or Chinese from Taiwan.

24 May First A-12 loss is suffered. Pilot bails out and lands unhurt during routine training flight from Area 51 (formerly Watertown Strip), due to erroneous air speed indication.

20 Jul A-12 achieves Mach 3 in flight test at Area 51.

23 Jul General Marshall Carter, DDCI, approves the OSA staff study and recommendation for initiation of a development program for a carrier-based U-2.

3 Aug First flight of U-2G from deck of Aircraft Carrier USS KITTY HAWK is successfully accomplished by Lockheed test pilot, Bob Schumacher, retrieving at Burbank.

29 Aug Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson and Defense Minister Paul Hellyer are briefed on OXCART/KEDLOCK programs in order to obtain approval for any necessary overflights of Canadian air space by the A-12.

29 Sep First of four missions flown by Detachment G over India to cover Tibet, Kashmir, and the NEFA. with refueling at Charbatia approved by the Indians. Series of missions completed 10 November 1963.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1963 (cont'd)

- 1 Nov Tenth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 355, with CAF pilot, Maj. Yeh. Returning from coverage of SCTMTR, tracking stopped southeast of Nanchang; fate of pilot unknown.
- 30 Nov DCI McCone sees President Johnson and receives his reaffirmation of the Special Group's approval of TACKLE U-2 overflights; the Special Group reaffirms approval on 6 December 1963 and State Department approves on 9 January 1964.
- 30 Nov Special Group approves six missions to cover guerrilla build-up across the northeast Venezuelan border into British Guiana; Detachment G stages missions from Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico.
- 3-19 Dec Detachment G coverage of Venezuela/British Guiana guerrilla activities is carried out.

1964

- 1 Jan Supply depot for A-12-peculiar equipment and supplies is moved from [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] and the Air Force Logistics Command at Wright-Patterson assumes full manpower and logistics control at the new depot for OXCART, TAGBOARD, and the SR-71.
- 3 Jan NRP Monthly Forecast of all reconnaissance overflights for approval by the Special Group is promulgated.
- 3 Feb The A-12 sustains flight at design conditions of Mach 3.2 at 83,000 feet for 10 minutes.
- 29 Feb President Johnson surfaces the existence of the A-11 (YF-12A) version of the OXCART aircraft to the press and public.
- 12 Mar OSA prepares a report on the vulnerability of satellites to the Soviet threat.
- 16 Mar First operational use is made of the BIRDWATCHER on U-2 mission over South China.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1964 (cont'd)

- 22 Mar Eleventh loss of U-2 is suffered, No. 356, with CAF pilot, Capt. Liang. Aircraft and pilot are lost off the south coast of Taiwan on a training mission.
- 24 Apr The Special Group approves an operation to obtain coverage of the French Nuclear Test Area, Tuamotu Archipelago.
- 30 Apr Detachment G activates a staging base at Charbatia, India; the staging team arrives at base 19 May 1964.
- 19-22 May Detachment G carries out coverage of the French nuclear test at Tuamotu Archipelago with Operation FISH HAWK, launched from the USS RANGER in the Pacific.
- 24 May Detachment G accomplishes one successful mission from Charbatia over Tibet and Lhasa; the mission U-2 aircraft is damaged on landing.
- 27 May Prime Minister Nehru dies; Detachment G operations from Charbatia are called off and the staging party returns to home base.
- 7 Jul Twelfth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 362 (U-2G) with CAF pilot, Lt. Col. Lee. Aircraft and pilot are lost on operational mission over East Coast of China across the Straits of Quemoy.
- 9 Jul Second A-12 loss is suffered, No. 133. Lockheed test pilot ejects safely as aircraft crashes on approach to runway at Area 51.
- 1 Sep Executive Committee, NRP, votes against procurement of new U-2 version and puts it off in favor of a temporary, piece-meal solution of modifications.
- 5 Nov A limited capability of the A-12 to cover Cuba, if required, is established, but decision is made not to expose this capability until the A-12 has reached its maximum operational capabilities.
- 16 Dec Detachment G begins 3-mission coverage of Tibet, Lhasa, and the NEFA from Charbatia, ending on 20 December 1964.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1965

- 10 Jan Thirteenth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 358 (U-2C) with CAF pilot, Maj. Chang. Aircraft and pilot are lost on infra-red camera mission over Pao Tou, probable cause believed to be a hit by surface-to-air missile.
- 3 Feb Col. Jack C. Ledford, Director of Program B under NRO, forecasts the life expectancy of the U-2 to be about two more years; no successor with the U-2's capability is expected to be available in the immediate future.
- 18 Mar DOD/CIA heads agree to take preparatory steps toward operating the A-12 over Communist China, flying out of Okinawa.
- 25 Apr Fourteenth loss of U-2 is suffered, No. 382 (U-2G), with Detachment G pilot, Buster Edens. Test flight of carrier-configured aircraft goes out of control, pilot bails out but chute does not open.
- 28 Apr Admiral William F. Raborn replaces John A. McCone as Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Helms replaces Gen. Carter as DDCI.
- 21 Jun Recommendation for procurement of an improved version of the U-2 is made to the DNRO by Director, Program B (Col. Ledford), and Director, Program D (Col. Leo P. Geary).
- 27 Jul Title of Assistant Director, OSI, is changed to Director, OSA, along with similar changes in all DDS&T Offices.
- 15 Sep Office of Special Projects (OSP) is established and satellite activities previously under OSA's direction are transferred to OSP. OSA retains manned reconnaissance programs.
- 1 Oct Joint agreement between OSP and OSA on management concept and transfer of resources, responsibilities, and authorities regarding satellite activities is signed.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1965 (cont'd)

- 2 Oct Joint OSA/OSP agreement is signed giving OSP responsibility for development and modification of computer programs in support of satellite operations and for response to Satellite Operations Center requirements; OSA to supply programmers and computer operators for OSP input data.
- 6 Oct Headquarters Notice is issued announcing the establishment of OSP.
- 22 Oct Fifteenth loss of U-2 is suffered, No. 352 (U-2C), with CAF pilot, Col. John Wang. On a training mission from Taiwan, pilot and aircraft are lost in the sea off Taiwan, cause uncertain.
- 15 Nov Revised guidance for project pilots down in hostile territory is approved within CIA and cleared with the NSC Special Group on 16 December 1965.
- 20 Nov The A-12 aircraft reliability validation is completed for deployment to the Far East and certified by contractor engineers.
- 3 Dec The Special Group (303 Committee) approves all steps being taken toward OXCART Far East deployment short of actually moving the aircraft to Okinawa.
- 28 Dec Third A-12 loss is suffered, No. 124. Aircraft crashes following take-off due to faulty wiring connection in yaw and pitch gyros; pilot ejects safely.

1966

- 17 Feb Sixteenth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 372, (U-2F), with CAF pilot, Maj. Wu. Training mission crashes after overshooting runway on landing following flame-out and emergency landing; pilot is killed, plane demolished.
- 25 Feb Seventeenth U-2 loss is suffered (non-fatal to pilot), No. 342 (U-2F), with Mr. Hall of Detachment G. Structural failure to aircraft occurs following practice refueling with KC-135, aircraft disintegrates, pilot bails out safely.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1966 (cont'd)

- 16 May DDS&T recommends to DNRO that U-2R as described in Lockheed 27 December 1965 proposal be procured. No action is taken until August 1966.
- 17 Jun Chinese pilot training program in the U-2 is re-located at Detachment G Headquarters at Edwards North Base, being withdrawn from the Air Force training program at Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona.
- 21 Jun Eighteenth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 384 (U-2C), with CAF pilot, Maj. Yu. On training flight from Taiwan, aircraft goes out of control, pilot bails out too low and chute fails to open. Both aircraft and pilot fall into the sea off Naha, Okinawa.
- 30 Jun Mr. Richard Helms is appointed DCI, vice Adm. Raborn.
- 21 Jul Revised BYEMAN Control System Manual is issued.
- 1 Aug NRP Executive Committee approves a first U-2R procurement of 8 aircraft with the understanding that additional procurement will be considered in conjunction with the 1968 budget.
- 1 Aug OSA staff changes occur: Col. Paul N. Bacalis, USAF, is named Director, OSA, vice Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, who returns to the Air Force; Mr. John Parangosky is appointed Deputy Director, OSA, vice Mr. J. A. Cunningham, Jr., reassigned to O/DDS&T; and [redacted] is appointed Deputy for Technology of OSA, vice Mr. Parangosky.
- 12 Aug Divergent views on deployment of OXCART to the Far East to cover North Vietnam and South China are presented for Presidential decision and Mr. Johnson decides against deployment for the time being.
- 15 Sep The 303 Committee votes not to commit OXCART aircraft to Cuban coverage as it might disturb the existing calm prevailing in that area of foreign affairs.
- 26 Sep Mr. Carl E. Duckett is appointed Acting DDS&T vice Dr. A. D. Wheelon, resigning to return to industry.

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1966 (cont'd)

- 15 Oct [redacted] is named Chief, Contracts
Division, OSA, vice [redacted]
reassigned to the West Coast office.
- 23 Nov The NRP Executive Committee approves procurement
of 4 additional U-2R's with total of 12 deliveries to
be stretched out in order to maintain a follow-on
procurement order for the next year.
- 12 Dec At a meeting to consider the Fischer-Bennington-
Parangosky Report on OXCART/SR-71 comparison,
Messrs. Vance (DOD), Schultze (BOB), and Hornig
(White House) vote to cancel OXCART; Mr. Helms
(CIA) votes to share the eventual fleet of A-12
and SR-71 aircraft between SAC and CIA.
- 20 Dec DCI letter to Mr. Schultze, BOB, states the view
that CIA should remain in the reconnaissance business.
- 22 Dec The British JACKSON unit, in a meeting at OSA office,
favors continuance of British participation with the
Middle East and Africa being named as likely areas
where the British could obtain approval for opera-
tions.
- 28 Dec President Johnson accepts the recommendations of
Messrs. Vance, Hornig and Schultze and directs
the termination of OXCART by 1 January 1968. (A
six-month extension of OXCART occurs due to the
SR-71 system not being prepared to take over on
time.)
- 31 Dec The OSA T/O ceiling shows 761 authorized, largely
for OXCART; only 130 are engaged in U-2 activities.

1967

- 5 Jan Fourth A-12 loss is suffered, No. 125, with contract
pilot Walter L. Ray. Pilot ejects when aircraft
crashes near Leith, Nevada, but failure of separa-
tion from ejection seat causes his death on impact.
News release describes aircraft as SR-71 operating
out of Edwards AFB with Lockheed test pilot.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1967 (cont'd)

- 17 Mar Revised TACKLE agreement for operation of joint US/GRC U-2 project is signed by Lt. Gen. Yang Shao-lien, COS, CAF, [REDACTED].
- 50X1, E.O.13526
- 20 Apr Mr. C. E. Duckett is confirmed as DDS&T.
- 16 May Presidential approval is received for immediate deployment of OXCART BLACK SHIELD contingent to obtain photo coverage of North Vietnam.
- 17-19 May Airlift to Kadena, Okinawa, of BLACK SHIELD contingent is accomplished. First A-12 is ferried over on 22 May, second on 24 May, third on 26 May. Total of 260 personnel are deployed.
- 31 May First BLACK SHIELD mission is flown over North Vietnam and the DMZ. Seventy of 190 known SAM sites in North Vietnam are photographed and nine out of 27 COMIREX top priority targets are covered.
- 30 Jul All property of IDEALIST is removed from Charbatia, India, and the operation there is closed out.
- 8 Sep Nineteenth U-2 loss is suffered, No. 373, with CAF pilot, Capt. Huang. On operational mission over Mainland China, aircraft is shot down in vicinity of Shanghai by surface-to-air missile; fate of pilot unknown but presumed dead.
- 30 Oct Post-flight inspection of A-12 aircraft reveals that a piece of metal penetrated the lower wing surface--possibly part of the debris from a missile detonation, since 8 missiles were reported launched during the aircraft's mission.
- 6 Nov Discovery of cracked wing in a SAC U-2 at Bien Hoa causes grounding of all U-2's effective 6 November 1967 and subsequent ultrasonic inspection at Lockheed to check metal fatigue. (Mr. C. L. "Kelly" Johnson had estimated the wing life of the U-2 at about 5,000 hours.)

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- 21 Jan OSA moves from the 6-B corridor of Langley to the Tyler Building at Westgate, Tyson's Corner.
- 16 Mar Last U-2 overflight of China Mainland is flown by CAF pilot; flights later restricted to peripheral offshore missions.
- 18 Apr DCI Helms expresses the view to the NRP Executive Committee that the OXCART capability should be maintained at Area 51 under CIA management.
- 29 Apr SAC's SR-71 deployment to Kadena without incident is reported to the NRP Executive Committee.
- 29 Apr DCI Helms recommends retention of Area 51 for exotic testing, such as the MIG-21.
- 8 May Last mission flown by an A-12 aircraft from Kadena covers North Korea.
- 16 May Secretary of Defense reaffirms the necessity to terminate the OXCART program on budgetary grounds.
- 21 May President Johnson reconfirms the cancellation of the OXCART program.
- 4 Jun Fifth A-12 loss is suffered, No. 129, with contract pilot Jack W. Weeks. Lost on overwater test flight after engine change; last known position 520 n.m. east of the Philippines.
- 26 Jun Intelligence Star for Valor is awarded to OXCART pilots Collins, Layton, Murray, Sullivan, and Vojvodich, and posthumously to Jack W. Weeks, accepted by his widow, in a presentation held at Area 51.
- 12 Jul Col. Donald H. Ross, USAF, is designated Director of Special Activities, DDS&T, vice Brig. Gen. Paul N. Bacalis, who returns to the Air Force SR-71 program.
- 13 Nov The NRP Executive Committee votes a 50-50 split of U-2R's between CIA and SAC and maintenance of 6 active U-2's by each with the U-2/C-G versions to be used as replacements for losses. A grant of \$1 million FY 1970 funds for OSA's [redacted] [redacted] is approved and \$500K for a QRC program.

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CHAPTER I. BACKGROUND

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CHAPTER I. BACKGROUND

Surprise Attack

During the year 1954, as for some years previous to that time, the urgent problem of defense against surprise attack by the Soviet Union continued to occupy the attention of all those in Washington who bore the responsibility for the nation's security. High level commissions, whose memberships represented the best minds in the country, continually met in Washington to study every facet of cold war strategy and advise the President. There was no lack of brainpower available for this task, but there was one shortage which was recognized by all concerned and which came to be known as the "Intelligence Gap".

The existence of the Iron Curtain and the growing hostility of the Soviet Union toward the West had made it increasingly difficult to mount classic intelligence collection operations against the U. S. S. R. How, then, was the United States to obtain the vital intelligence on major military, political and economic activities within the Soviet Union which it must have to maintain its own national security? In the summer of 1954 the U. S. Intelligence Community had come around to the view that the only prospect of gaining this vital intelligence was through systematic aerial reconnaissance over the U. S. S. R.

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The Special Study Group of the Hoover Commission set up under the chairmanship of General James H. Doolittle to investigate CIA's covert activities, in its report of 30 September 1954 expressed the belief that every known technique should be used, and new ones developed, to increase our intelligence by high altitude photographic reconnaissance and other means, and that no price would be too high to pay for the knowledge to be derived therefrom.

Land Panel Proposal

On 5 November 1954, Dr. Edwin H. Land, Chairman of the "Project 3" Technological Capabilities Panel,^{1/} wrote to Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, proposing a program of photo reconnaissance flights over the U.S.S.R., and recommending that CIA, with Air Force assistance, undertake to carry out such a program. The Land Panel's proposal (Annex 1), entitled "A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence", recognized the risk of provocation toward war that such an intensive program of overflights might run, as well as the dangers involved should one of our military arms engage in such activities, especially in view of the tense political situation existing vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

^{1/} This Panel was a sub-group under the Office of Defense Mobilization's "Surprise Attack Committee".

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"On the other hand," the proposal continued, "because it is vital that certain knowledge about industrial growth, strategic targets, and guided missile sites be obtained at once, we recommend that CIA, as a civilian organization, undertake (with the Air Force assistance) a covert program of selected flights. Fortunately a jet-powered glider has been carefully studied by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for overflight purposes. This manufacturer proposes to take full responsibility for the design, mock-up, building, secret testing and field maintenance of this extraordinary and unorthodox vehicle, making it feasible for a CIA task force to undertake this vital activity... The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of reach of present Russian interception and high enough to have a good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light (15,000 pounds), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if through some remote mischance it were detected and identified." ^{1/}

Appended to the Panel's proposal were photographs that demonstrated the great information content of pictures taken from extreme

^{1/} Annex 1, page 2. of Attachment 1.

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altitude. The proposal affirmed that a single mission of the Lockheed vehicle with cameras employing the most recently developed optical designs could photograph in revealing detail a strip of the Soviet Union 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long, clearly identifying roads, railroads, power lines, industrial plants, airfields, parked aircraft, missile sites, etc., and detailing concentrated areas down to objects as small as a man.

In Dr. Land's letter to Mr. Dulles submitting the proposal he made clear the Panel's belief that this activity was appropriate for CIA (always with Air Force assistance) and was "the kind of action and technique that is right for the contemporary version of CIA; a modern and scientific way for an Agency that is always supposed to be looking to do its looking. Quite strongly, we feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in scientific techniques for collecting intelligence—and choosing such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present opportunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to start." ^{1/}

The Panel's recommendation was for immediate action, through CIA covert means, to procure the aircraft and equipment and set up

1/ Annex 1.

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a task force. The opportunity for safe overflight was estimated as only a few years since the Russians were expected to develop radars and interceptors or guided missiles which would reach to the 70,000 foot region.

Lockheed Profile

The aircraft proposal by Lockheed, which was the basis for the Land Panel recommendation, envisaged a modification of the F-104 (Lockheed Starfighter) with long, glider-like wings, powered by a single jet engine. (The Pratt & Whitney J57/P37 was later chosen as the power plant and was provided through an existing USAF contract.) The drawing board concept of this aircraft, designated by Lockheed as the CL-282, originated with Mr. Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, chief design engineer and head of Lockheed's Advanced Development Projects group. (CL-282 profile is Annex 2.) It was submitted to the Air Force early in 1954 along with several other design proposals, some of which were accepted; however the CL-282 was shelved by the Air Force at that time.

Later in 1954, when the Land Panel was searching for a technical capability for collecting intelligence on the U.S.S.R., the CL-282 proposal was reviewed with Mr. Johnson and the Panel concluded

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that such a program was feasible and should be pursued by the U. S. Government. In presenting their recommendation to the CIA the Panel noted that no proposal or program that they had investigated appeared to hold as much promise for acquiring as much vital intelligence information at so little risk and at so little cost. They believed that the proposed aircraft could go where it was needed to go efficiently and safely, and that no amount of fragmentary and indirect intelligence could be pieced together to be equivalent to the positive photographic evidence obtainable by this reconnaissance system.

Optics Research

For some years prior to the Land Panel's establishment, optical systems and photographic techniques had been the subject of intensive study by specialists in the armed services as well as those in civilian organizations engaged in research and development and fabrication of photographic systems. Dr. Land, President of the Polaroid Corporation, and Dr. James G. Baker, Professor of Physics at Harvard University, both as members of civilian organizations thus engaged and as members of the United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, had continuously reviewed all the advances made, the possible course of future developments, and the application of these to photo reconnaissance overflights.

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Dr. Baker pointed out in a paper summarizing the types of photographic equipment to be built (see Annex 3) that camera configuration "A" would be made up from standard equipment already available, in accordance with the desire of all concerned to make use of cameras with proven reliability, as well as to make sure of having some equipment ready to meet the program's deadline. The other configurations, "B" and "C", were being specifically designed for the vehicle and missions contemplated and would not duplicate other developments. Dr. Baker emphasized that these new developments would be welcome and readily taken over by the Air Force. In some cases they were years ahead of present research and development, but on the other hand these systems were the outgrowth of many years of experience gathered from Air Force sponsorship of basic research and development programs and were therefore implicitly Air Force products. This was particularly true with regard to achievements in the electronic computing of optical systems by a joint research effort between the Air Force and the Perkin-Elmer Corporation of Norwalk, Connecticut. The development of the "C" configuration, for instance, would have taken years using the old German methods, or months using desk calculators. With the IBM CPC computer, however,

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Dr. Baker and his co-workers were able to do their computations in about 16 days.

When the Land Panel proposal was submitted to CIA, the design results obtained by Dr. Baker were considered by him to be adequate for providing satisfactory pictures, but seeking the ultimate in quality, he continued his research and computations as the program developed.

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ANNEX 1

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November 5, 1954

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think overflight is urgent and presently feasible. I am not sure that we have made it clear that we feel there are many reasons why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force assistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action and technique that is right for the contemporary version of CIA; a modern and scientific way for an Agency that is always supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in scientific techniques for collecting intelligence--and choosing such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present opportunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to start.

With best wishes,

/s/ Edwin H. Land

Edwin H. Land, Chairman

For: Project 3, Technological
Capabilities Panel
Office of Defense Mobilization
Executive Office of the President

Project Members:

E. H. Land
James G. Baker
Joseph W. Kennedy
Edward M. Purcell
John W. Tukey

1 Attachment
Report

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Attachment 1

5 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence

For many years it has been clear that aerial photographs of Russia would provide direct knowledge of her growth, of new centers of activity in obscure regions, and of military targets that would be important if ever we were forced into war. During a period in which Russia has free access to the geography of all our bases and major nuclear facilities, as well as to our entire military and civilian economy, we have been blocked from the corresponding knowledge about Russia. We have been forced to imagine what her program is, and it could well be argued that peace is always in danger when one great power is essentially ignorant of the major economic, military, and political activities within the interior zone of another great power. This ignorance leads to somewhat frantic preparations for both offensive and defensive action, and may lead to a state of unbearable national tension. Unfortunately, it is the U.S., the more mature, more civilized, and more responsible country that must bear the burden of not knowing what is happening in Russia. We cannot fulfill our responsibility for maintaining the peace if we are left in ignorance of Russian activity.

While aerial photography could be the most powerful single tool for acquiring information, it has until now been dangerous to fly over Russia. Up till now, the planes might rather readily be detected, less readily attacked, and possibly even destroyed. Thus no statesman could have run the risk of provocation toward war that an intensive program of overflights might produce. The Air Force has, for a long time, studied a program of overflight as a natural aspect of its Reconnaissance mission and has, in recent months, considered several proposals for airplanes designed for this purpose. While it is important that such research and development continue in the Air Force, for the present it seems rather dangerous for one of our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight.

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On the other hand, because it is vital that certain knowledge about industrial growth, strategic targets, and guided missile sites be obtained at once, we recommend that CIA, as a civilian organization, undertake (with the Air Force assistance) a covert program of selected flights. Fortunately a jet-powered glider has been carefully studied by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for overflight purposes. This manufacturer proposes to take full responsibility for the design, mock-up, building, secret testing and field maintenance of this extraordinary and unorthodox vehicle, making it feasible for a CIA task force to undertake this vital activity. Such a task force requires highly specialized and able guidance in procurement and operation (by Air Force officers for aircraft, by scientists for photographic and electronic equipment). The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of reach of present Russian interception and high enough to have a good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light (15,000 lbs.), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if through some remote mischance it were detected and identified.

Since the proposed mission of this plane is first of all photographic, and only secondarily electronic, a word should be said about the information expected from the photographs, as well as about the effects of the cloud cover over Russia. Photographs are appended that demonstrate the large information content of pictures taken from these great altitudes. A single mission in clear weather can photograph in revealing detail a strip of Russia 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long. Cloud cover will reduce completeness, of course, but clouds are not a serious obstacle because one can afford to wait for good weather; alternate routes over clear areas can be selected in flight; and finally, the number of intelligence targets accessible during a single mission is so large that even a partial sampling would yield an extraordinary amount of intelligence.

The opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years, because the Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided missile defenses for the 70,000 foot region. We therefore recommend immediate action through special channels in CIA in procuring the Lockheed glider and in establishing the CIA task force. No

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proposal or program that we have seen in intelligence planning can so quickly bring so much vital information at so little risk and at so little cost. We believe that these planes can go where we need to have them go efficiently and safely, and that no amount of fragmentary, and indirect intelligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to such positive information as can thus be provided.

It is recommended that

(a) The Central Intelligence Agency establish an initial task force to complete any necessary feasibility studies in a few weeks, and that, assuming successful completion of the studies, the following further actions be taken.

(b) A permanent task force, including Air Force supporting elements, be set up under suitable cover to provide guidance on procurement, to consolidate requirements and plan missions in view of priority and feasibility, to maintain the operation on a continuing basis, and to carry out the dissemination of the resulting information in a manner consistent with its special security requirements.

(c) The procurement of a coordinated system from Lockheed, consisting of CL-282 aircraft with photographic and electronic equipment, be authorized.

(d) Such high altitude overflights be authorized in principle.

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A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE -- A SUMMARY
OPPORTUNITY

Collection of large amounts of information at a minimum of risk through prompt development of a special, high altitude airplane. Assurance of thousands of photographs that will yield critical analysis of vast Soviet complexes. Protection of mission by decisive altitude advantage over Soviet interception. This protection good for only a few years, thus assured only through very prompt action.

OBJECTIVES

Providing adequate locations and analyses of Russian targets including those newly discovered.

More accurate assessment of Soviet Order of Battle and of early warning indicators, thus improving our defenses against surprise attack.

Appraising Soviet guided missile development (through photos of test range, etc.).

Improving estimates of Soviet ability to deliver nuclear weapons and of their capacity to produce them.

Disclosing new developments which might otherwise lead to technological surprise.

Appraising Soviet industrial and economic progress.

ORGANIZATION

Secret task force under Central Intelligence Agency with strong Air Force staff assistance to equip and carry out entire mission up to point where flow of useful new intelligence is established. Task force to include top experts selected from Government agencies, armed services, universities and industry to provide for most effective application of science and technology toward fulfillment of this objective.

VEHICLE

Special "powered glider" CL-282 aircraft proposed by Lockheed. ALTITUDE - 70,000 feet. SPEED - 500 kt. RANGE - 3,000 n.mi. GROSS WEIGHT - 15,000 lbs. TAKE-OFF DISTANCE - 1,200 feet. CREW - lone pilot in heated, pressurized suit. AVAILABILITY - four aircraft for field use in 17 months assured by Lockheed.

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~~TOP SECRET~~CAMERAS

Standard Trimetrogon for charting entire overflow strip. Focal lengths from 12 - 48 inches to be used in multiple mounts for main work load. Special long focal length spotting camera for detailing concentrated areas down to objects as small as a man. Clear identification of Roads, Railroads, Power Lines, Industrial Plants, Airfields, Parked Aircraft, Missile Sites and the like within a strip 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long per flight.

ELECTRONICS

Electronics intercept and communications intercept data to be recorded on special automatic recorders preset for selected frequencies. More extensive electronic data available by optional use of additional electronic gear in place of photographic gear.

SCHEDULE

New intelligence to start flowing within twenty months.

COST

\$22,000,000 to initial flow of significant intelligence. (Includes procurement of design, development and test of six CL-282 aircraft, training and operation of special task force and initial logistic support.)

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ANNEX 2

Because of the folio size of Annex 2,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's
specifications for the U-2, it is
included with the Appendices at the
back of this history.

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ANNEX 3

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14 January 1955

PHOTOEQUIPMENT

The following is a brief summary of equipment and planning. The Hycom perspective and lay-out drawings of January 13 should be referred to for more complete details.

For reasons discussed below we have planned for a total of 20 separate payloads made up from 8 kinds of payloads. The tentative designation and the distribution are as follows:

A-1a	A-1b	A-2a	A-2b	A-3a	A-3b	B	C
2	2	2	2	2	2	4	4

After considerable study and numerous revisions we have found that minimum weight and maximum logistical simplicity are obtainable if each payload has its own bottom with its own windows for the camera bay. Thus, we must have made up 20 separate bottoms of which there are 8 kinds.* The bottoms are to be designated with the same notation used above, such as A-1a, etc. Although it is possible to have but a single kind of bottom servicing all kinds of payloads, the plane would be carrying quite a lot of dead weight for the simpler missions, there would be much increased danger of window breakage and loss of pressurization, and finally, there would result a much increased cost in manufacture of the numerous windows and possible delays in procurement.

The "A" designation comprises payloads made up from standard equipment in accordance with everyone's desire to make use of cameras with proved reliability. "B" refers to the intermediate reconnaissance camera combining intermediate focal length with maximum coverage. "C" refers to the long focal length spotting camera to be used for limited coverage at maximum resolving power.

The quantities given above are derived from a concept of outfitting 3 widely separated and independent bases with adequate equipment to provide for the missions of pioneer search and mapping, intermediate reconnaissance and spotting of critical areas. Furthermore, at all times we must strive

* A 9th kind is probably needed.
See below.

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to obtain the maximum information return per mission, picking a few days with exceptionally clear air, and making use of these vigorously when they occur. For that reason each base ought to have at least two or at most four aircraft, having available the 5 payloads (A-1a, A-2a, A-3a, B and C, or the equivalent). Maintenance should be accomplished during the numerous photographically unfavorable days of which there will be many suitable for check flights. Any one of the first four payloads covers a wide area, so that as many as four planes can be sent in simultaneously to photograph as many as 2 million square miles in 6 hours at altitude. Even "C" can be used right away for going after known critical targets, or for covering a small target area in great detail, or for following along rivers, roads or rail lines for associated industrial complexes. The various payloads are interchangeable among the 2 to 4 aircraft as needed, the change-over time amounting at most to several hours.

A-1a. Camera Bay #1 contains a rockable K-38 with 24-inch lens cone, making use of a modified A8-B magazine with 2000' of thin base film. Bay #2 contains both a split vertical pair of 12-inch cameras, and a single vertical 6-inch K-17. Bay #3 contains the side oblique 6-inch K-17's completing the Tri-Met installation.

A-1b. The same, except that the rockable K-38 has a 36-inch cone.

A-2a. Camera Bay #1 contains the rockable K-38 with 24-inch lens cone again, but the mount now is changed to go with another rockable K-38 with 24-inch lens cone in Bay #2. The forward K-38 is for the right-looking obliques, and the center K-38 for the left-looking obliques. Bay #3 now contains the split vertical 12-inch pair. Bay #4 contains a small charting camera to be described below.

A-2b. The same, except that the two K-38's are equipped with 36-inch lens cones.

A-3a. Camera Bays #1 and 2 still contain the rockable K-38's. Bay #3 now has a fixed vertical K-38. Bay #4 has the charting camera.

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A-3b. The same, except that the 3 K-38's are equipped with 36-inch cones.

B. This is an entirely new camera where intermediate focal length and extreme coverage are combined. The optical system is light for what it accomplishes. The maximum film load of 9000' per spool, or 18000' altogether, accounts for more than 60% of the weight of the payload, including windows. Hence, the maximum information return per pound has been realized. By the same token, the payload can only be made lighter by decreasing the film supply, but for extreme altitude missions, or later retake missions of smaller areas, a reduced film supply will be satisfactory. Some further attention might be given to use of still thinner film, say of 2 mil base thickness, to take away another 75 lbs. B makes use of a 36-inch lens. Space is provided for substitution later of a 48-inch lens, if found desirable. The format is essentially 18x18, but is covered by two 9x18's photographed simultaneously. The 18x18 permits slower cycling and twice the stereo base line. The use of 9-inch film is better all around, particularly with thin base film. The two spools are contra-winding to maintain the c.g. accurately without further mechanical parts.

The transverse coverage in B is provided by means of a rockable 45-degree mirror that assumes any one of 7 transverse positions in turn and then resets. The windows are small and discrete at these 7 positions. Because of weight restrictions we have discarded the heavy double dove prism, and instead must put up with having the field rotate on the 18x18 format, and with a reversed image. Both can be overcome in later laboratory printing without loss of information. B is accompanied by the charting camera with its total coverage. Further study of programming technique will probably reduce the film weight.

C. This is also an entirely new camera. The problem has been to get the longest possible focal length in round numbers into the camera compartment given us, the maximum format size, and the maximum number of pictures. The result has been a 200-inch lens of f/16 speed covering an 18x18 format, and film spools accommodating up to 4000 pictures. From altitude each picture will cover approximately one square mile and show a resolution at least as good as one foot on the ground, which corresponds to about 3 seconds

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of arc. We are gunning for 1 second, however. The camera has a side-sweeping quartz mirror giving access to transverse coverage from horizon to horizon. The pilot is to select the interesting areas through a periscope having two degrees of freedom. Thus, he can look ahead and sweep from side to side to pick out suitable targets up to a minute ahead of time. When he centers the area on his cross-wires and pushes a button, he programs the camera to take the picture when the area crosses the transverse line. Thus, the pilot can stay comfortably ahead of picture time by an arbitrary number of seconds, and not worry about more than simple "shooting."

C can be programmed to take a number of pictures in a burst, or continuously. One might simply fly along a river and take high resolution pictures of both river banks for hundreds of miles. The same holds true for roads and rail lines. The pilot simply can keep the river on his cross-wires, more or less, when he flies.

C is also accompanied by the charting camera that will help determine later just where the large pictures were taken.

Reference to the summaries of equipments given in the Hycon report indicates the magnitude of the camera and optical work to be accomplished. Although A is always comprised of standard equipment, we plan to make many modifications to lighten the systems, improve reliability, increase film capacity, image quality* and to perfect hundreds of windows and filters. The large windows for C must be exceptionally precise, allowing no optical deviations greater than a fraction of a second of arc, and slightly wedged to eliminate image twinning due to pressurization. The other windows are fairly easily made to optical standards but there are several hundred of them. The shutter problem must be given considerable attention owing to the large numbers of exposures. A full mission may bring back as many as 6,000 pictures or a 4-plane sortie may bring back as many as 20,000 pictures in six hours. Even one plane in six hours

* Lenses and filters will be matched and calibrated. Lenses will be set at f/8, adjusted and figured for optimum performance. Magazine platens will be curved as needed.

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can bring back the equivalent of our present annual take in peripheral photography all in 6 hours, not to mention location. Hence, the equipment must be 100% reliable.

Considerable attention will be given to vibration elimination and to control of the low frequency oscillations. We plan to develop a triggering device that makes exposures during selected moments of minimum angular rate of the airplane. The larger cameras are in isolated mounts more or less on a c.g. principle, and have IMC. C will contain quartz mirrors in invar mount to stabilize focus thermally. Very close attention must be given to thermostating the cameras, providing proper environmental conditions for the film, and keeping windows clean and free of moisture. The periscope design and linkages with the camera must be done with extreme care, and provision must be made to allow the pilot to see essential instruments while using his periscope. In addition there will be a good deal of ground equipment needed, including maintenance facilities, spare parts, film storage, some processing units etc. Also, we plan to have test devices made up for checking the vibration and resolution performance of the various installations. It will be necessary to construct collimators for focusing cameras in the field. Hycon plans to train tech representatives for field service and to equip GFE vans with everything needed. When all this is accomplished, we shall have a most extraordinary means for gathering information, and in particular for obtaining the most information per hour at altitude. It will take only a few missions on perfect days to return more information than we have ever managed to collect photographically from earlier efforts, range excepted, and this information will all be up-to-date. Weather observations should begin even right away in order to determine what the frequency distribution seasonally is of "perfect" days where there is minimum haze. It should be emphasized that minimizing atmospheric haze by selection of observing times is much more important than further increase in quality of optics, and that a few perfect hours in the air are more important than dozens of days where haze is present. In the overall planning, expert weather analysis and weather information gathering should be given as much attention as the aircraft and camera effort, or the data reduction effort.

Charting Camera. This is a small panoramic system making use of 1000' of 70 mm film. Each picture is a sweep from

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horizon to horizon transverse to the line of flight. The successive pictures have 60% overlap. The film supply will provide continuous coverage for up to 4000 miles. The pictures will be useful for recording navigational and weather conditions, as well as helping tremendously in the plotting of the thousands of larger scale pictures. The charting camera will be indispensable with C for locating the critical areas photographed somewhat at random by the pilot in flight. This is a brand new development. The camera will be very useful later to the Air Force in low altitude coverage, being small and light, and providing complete coverage. For this latter reason, attention ought to be given to fast cycling rate, or at least designing the camera in such a way that fast cycling can later be incorporated.

Part of the optical development will include laboratory copying systems for projection printing and preparation of master negatives from which contact printing can be done. Two systems in this country operated full time can accommodate all of the work in the field, and hence should be located in the main processing center.

We believe that we have as good a team as can be found in the country for carrying through this large photographic program on a crash basis. Already by this date we have completed the basic plans and are ready to start detailing of many parts. The design of the optics for C is well along, 11 days of electronic computing already having been put in, with about 5 more to go. Materials will shortly be ordered for windows and mirrors. More effort will soon be required in the problem of the thin film base and special emulsions, and particularly on the elimination of vibration from the pictures. Now that the basic plans are in hand, we know what the task is for isolation of the inertial mass, damping, and exposure control, and can go into this problem in the greatest detail. We are targeting for 60 lines/mm on the special lenses, including the 36-inch f/8 modified standard lens, and at least for 25 lines at f/8 with the standard lenses. This is to be compared with an average of 10 lines/mm in the usual course of events in previous practice. Furthermore, we shall know why we cannot do better, from vibration analysis, contrast studies, and film properties.

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We should like to emphasize that the developments referred to above are very desirable ones for the Air Force and can be taken over readily. These developments in some cases are years ahead of the present R & D program. Conversely, the above systems are the outgrowth of many years of experience gathered from Air Force sponsorship of basic R & D programs, and are therefore implicitly Air Force products. This is particularly true of the electronic computing of optical systems, where for several years the Air Force has backed fundamental research with the Perkin-Elmer Corporation. The development of the complicated optical system in C would have taken years in Germany by the older methods, and many months here by design methods using desk calculators, but now is about to be accomplished in 16 full working days with our IBM computers (the CPC), which in a year or two might be reduced to only a few hours. Already, the design results obtained would provide quite satisfactory pictures, but we seek extreme quality.

Recent work indicates that the use of high contrast emulsions with finer grain will help overcome resolution and contrast losses caused by haze. We fully expect to use the new technique in B and C, where the optical systems are designed to have almost no vignetting. For B where wide angle coverage is involved, we can only increase gamma slightly above previous practice, and hence can employ ordinary exposure control. For C with its narrow angle coverage, we can use quite high gammas, but must have a photoelectrically operated shutter. Such a shutter is planned as part of the program.

On scheduling it seems easily possible to meet the aircraft scheduling with the A configurations. We expect also that the first B and C units will be ready before the end of the year in time for field use with the first several airplanes as needed and for tests. The A units are given priority, however, in order to be 100% sure that we have reliable payloads at hand.

Weight Restrictions:

We have followed a policy in planning that it is easier to take out a camera to reduce weight than it is to add one later for a more effective use of the mission at somewhat reduced altitude. Therefore, it is not surprising that our

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present weight figures add up to something more than the 550 lbs. allowed for the reduced altitude maximum weight, and substantially more than the 450 lbs. for extreme altitude. Furthermore, since so much planning has gone into fitting the space allowed us with logistically acceptable and practicable configurations, we have not really had the time to begin cutting weight. For one thing our film capacities are at maximum values in footage and weight, and later missions over territory already covered will, in general, use less film. For example, one B mission per year may be all that is required over a given flight line, and other uses of B in the interval will be for much smaller film supplies.

Before long we shall have much more carefully prepared weight figures on the various configurations, with additional columns to show weight figures for partially stripped configurations, and reduced film supply. Thereafter, judgment in the field will be all that is required to meet altitude performance where weight is a factor. For example, in A-1a the K-38 can be eliminated in about ten minutes of working time, and the resulting payload comes down to less than 400 lbs. In an extreme case, only the charting camera might be taken along, reducing the payload to 40 lbs. or so.

We have agreed to and will certainly follow the 450-lb. limit placed on the payload for maximum altitude, and will therefore list the partially stripped configurations that will meet this requirement. Similarly, we expect to give maximum attention to meeting the 550-lb limit for full payload. Perhaps we have given a wrong impression of our good intentions in meeting weight requirements by describing mostly the maximum payloads, but it is the latter that has occupied our attention because of systems planning. It is hoped that this description will clarify matters.

For most mapping runs, it is recommended that we use the thicker base film on the new low shrinkage base manufactured by Eastman, instead of trying to do mapping with thin base film. The 600' spools with standard film thickness are already adequate to cover the entire mission, and the extra weight will not be serious for the advantages gained.

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We might have planned for a lighter A-1 configuration if we used only one 6-inch K-17 with 1000' thin film magazine, in a rockable mount for the equivalent of a Tri-Met installation. However, we might lose precision in so doing, and certainly lose simultaneity on which mapping precision depends, and would have to use the thin base film. We feel we have made the better choice in spite of the weight problem.

As a final comment, we probably should get a ninth kind of bottom for C, consisting of a single horizontal large window for maximum spotting precision for near vertical photography. Missions sent out to obtain technical intelligence over very restricted areas ought to obtain the very best optical results, and the split window in our C system above is not at all desirable. We have used the split pair of windows to provide maximum resolution for the longest range side looks, and the vertical results through the V will still be very good. However, if we are really looking for details in terms of inches on ground objects such as missiles, aircraft, etc., we should have the single horizontal window that allows a plus or minus ten degree transverse sweep with full aperture and perfect optics. The decision as to getting the ninth bottom ought to be made soon as a request from the planning group, since already the aircraft people feel hardpressed by our requirements.

Prepared by Dr. James G. Baker

Addendum:

Maximum payload return	
A-1a	5,250 pictures
A-1b	" "
A-2a	6,000 "
A-2b	" "
A-3a	4,750 "
A-3b	" "
B	7,000 " (all 18x18)
C	5,000 " (all 18x18)

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CHAPTER II. INITIAL APPROVAL

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CHAPTER II. INITIAL APPROVAL

USAF/CIA Approval

In the two weeks following the Land Panel's submission of its proposal to CIA, discussions took place between the Agency and the Air Force as to the feasibility of undertaking the recommended program. On 19 November 1954, a luncheon meeting was held in the office of Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott. Those present included Mr. Dulles and General Cabell for CIA; Secretary Talbott, Mr. Trevor Gardner, Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Development, Mr. Fred Ayers, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, and Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, for the Air Force; and Mr. C. L. (Kelly) Johnson of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Agreement was reached at the meeting that the CL-282 proposal was practical and desirable and should be contracted for (along with the modified Canberra recommended by General Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff of the Air Force). It was further agreed that the project should be a joint Air Force/CIA effort and that regardless of the source of the funds to support it, CIA unvouchered channels should be employed for passing the funds. (Sec Annex 4).

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A separate meeting was held with General Twining and Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, USAF, attended by Mr. Dulles and General Cabell for CIA. This meeting also resulted in agreement that the project was essential and that it should be undertaken jointly by CIA and the Air Force. (See Annex 5). General Cabell agreed to prepare a memorandum for the President, outlining the project for his consideration and requesting his approval to proceed with it. The final version of the memorandum for the President was cleared for the Air Force by General Samford, Lieutenant General Frank F. Everest, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and General Thomas D. White, Vice Chief of Staff, and was signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Dulles. The text of this memorandum is at Annex 6.

Mr. Dulles, on 23 November 1954, also obtained from the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) a memorandum for the President in support of the proposed reconnaissance program (Annex 7). The members of the IAC expressed the belief that a substantially improved capability for filling the "Intelligence Gap" on the Soviet Bloc could be achieved through the use of aerial reconnaissance and photography.

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~~TOP SECRET~~White House Approval

An appointment was made for 24 November and the members of the group waiting upon the President to present the reconnaissance proposal were: the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Director and Deputy Director of CIA. Also present were Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, and the President's Aide, Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster. General Goodpaster, during the course of the project, came to be the principal White House liaison officer and acted in many instances as the transmitter and interpreter of Presidential decisions concerning the project during the Eisenhower Administration.

The only document relating to the meeting at the White House which was placed in the CIA files at the time was a hand-written memorandum for the record, penned by General Cabell, which simply stated that the project was approved subject to the reservation of the Secretary of Defense that a final look should be taken before the operation was actually launched, but after the materiel etc. were procured and readied (Annex 8). The memorandum submitted to the President contained the following specific recommendations: that the President would

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"a. Approve the existence of a national requirement for the above reconnaissance overflights.

"b. By approval of this document, direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of Central Intelligence to establish as a matter of urgency, a collaborative project for the procurement and testing of the necessary aircraft and equipment, and for the procurement and training of the necessary crews (such crews to be non-U.S. nationals to the extent practicable). The Director of Central Intelligence is also hereby authorized to obligate in Fiscal Year 1955 an amount not to exceed \$35 million from the Reserve Fund for aircraft procurement, and it is expected as the project develops, additional authority will be sought by him for funds for maintenance, training, operations, etc.

"c. By approval of this document, direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of Central Intelligence, subject to appropriate policy guidance as directed, to conduct at the earliest possible date, the reconnaissance overflights, and to do so in such a way as to reduce the risk of involvement of the U.S. to the minimum practicable." 1/

Although these recommendations received the verbal approval of the President at the meeting of 24 November, his signature does not appear on any project documentation showing either the initial approval in principle, or subsequent approvals for expenditures of funds or for specific overflight missions.

1/ Annex 6, page 3.

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ANNEX 4

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/HAND-WRITTEN MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD BY THE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE/

19 Nov 54

Memorandum for Record:

Following attended luncheon given by Secretary
of Air Force, Talbot:

Mr. Trevor Gardner, Asst. to Sec. AF
Lt. Donald Putt, AF [should be Lt. Gen.]
Dr. Land
Mr. Clarence Kelly Johnson, Lockheed A/C Co.
Mr. Fred Ayers, Asst. to Sec. AF
" Allen Dulles, DCI
Lt. Gen. C. P. Cabell, DDCI

It was agreed that the special item of materiel
described by Lockheed was practical and desirable &
would be sought in addition to the materiel item
suggested by Gen. Twining at the earlier meeting
with him.

It was agreed that the Project should be a
joint Air Force-CIA one but that regardless of the
source of the funds, whether A.F. or CIA, CIA
unvouchered channels would be needed to pass the
funds.

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19 Nov 54

Memorandum for Record:

Following attended luncheon given
by Secretary of Air Force, Talbot:

~~Mr. Twinning~~ a.f. cpc

Mr. Trevor Gardner, asst. to Sec. A.F.

Lt. Donald Pitt a.f.

Dr. Land

Mr. Clarence Kelly Johnson, Lockheed a/c Co.

Mr. Fred Myers, asst. to Sec. A.F.

" Allen Dulles D.C.I.

Lt. Gen. C.P. Cabell D.D.C.I.

It was agreed that the special
item of material described by
Lockheed was practical & desirable
& would be sought in addition
to the material item suggested by
Gen. Twinning at the earlier meeting
with him.

It was agreed that the Project should
be a joint Air Force - CIA one but
that regardless of the source of the funds,
whether A.F. or CIA, CIA unvouchered channels
would be needed to pass the funds.

cpc

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ANNEX 5

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HAND-WRITTEN MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD BY THE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Nov 54

Memorandum for Record:

Following met with Gen. Twining in his office:

Mr. Allen Dulles, DCI
Lt. Gen. C. P. Cabell, DDCI
Maj. Gen. John Samford, AF

Project was discussed and all agreed that it was essential and should be pursued jointly by the Air Force & CIA.

I was to prepare a draft memo for consideration by higher authority. I did so and later showed copy to Samford, who in turn discussed it with Gen. Thomas D. White & Lt. Gen. Frank Everest. Corrections were suggested by them which were incorporated in final draft submitted to higher authority.

CPC

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Nov 54

Memorandum for Record:

Following met with Gen Twining
in his office:

Mr. Allen Dulles, DCI

Lt. Gen C.P. Cabell, DDCI

Maj. Gen John Sampford, AF.

Project was discussed and all
agreed that it was essential and
should be pursued jointly
by the Air Force + CIA.

I was to prepare a draft
memo. for consideration by
higher authority. I did so and
later showed copy to Sampford.
who in turn discussed it with
Gen. Thomas D. White + Lt. Gen.
Frank Everett. Corrections were
suggested by them which were
incorporated in final draft
submitted to higher authority.

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ANNEX 6

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.
Office of the Director

24 November 1954

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance

You are familiar with the large gaps in our Intelligence coverage of the Soviet Union which prevent us from obtaining adequate knowledge of Soviet intentions and, in important respects, of Soviet capabilities; and in particular, with respect to their capabilities and intentions to launch nuclear attacks on the United States. You are familiar, too, with the current and growing difficulties in the way of filling those gaps by the more classic means.

In my considered judgment, as well as that of the other members of the Intelligence Community, there is not the prospect of gaining this vital Intelligence without the conduct of systematic and repeated air reconnaissance over the Soviet Union itself. (Even this does not assure adequacy, but will certainly provide a much closer approach to adequacy.) The members of the Doolittle Committee in their report, expressed their belief that every known technique should be used and new ones developed to increase our Intelligence by high altitude photographic reconnaissance and other means, and that no price would be too high to pay for the knowledge to be derived therefrom. Thus, there is a definite and urgent National requirement for photographic and electronic reconnaissance overflights of the Soviet Bloc.

While we have been considering the problem for a long time (you may recall a discussion I had with you some months ago concerning overflights), Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., and members of Project 3, Technological Capabilities Panel, Office of Defense Mobilization, (E. H. Land, James G. Baker, Joseph W. Kennedy, Edward M. Purcell and John W. Tukey) have independently arrived

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at essentially the same conclusion. I have also discussed it with Secretary Talbott and with General Twining. We are all agreed that the requirement is an urgent one and that with suitable direction and support, it is feasible of accomplishment with minimum risk.

An existing Air Force aircraft type (the Canberra) is considered capable of modification to give it a ceiling of around 65,000 feet. At such an altitude now, the expectation that it would be detected is very low indeed, and the possibility that it would be intercepted and shot down is practically nil. The possibility of forced landing in enemy territory exists, but the chances of that are low. The repercussions of its falling into enemy hands can be mitigated if the aircraft should be manned by non-official U.S. personnel. To the extent practicable, we would try to man the aircraft with Poles or other non-U.S. nationals. The aircraft itself, if not completely destroyed, would bear no markings that would clearly identify its origin. (The Canberra itself is nearly identical with its British prototype.)

As a follow-on to the Canberra, we would simultaneously proceed with the procurement of specially designed reconnaissance aircraft with more advanced performance characteristics, that would take it to around 70,000 feet.

In addition to this high altitude day reconnaissance, we would resort to very low altitude reconnaissance at night with appropriate aircraft. Whereas the night reconnaissance would not provide a substitute for the high altitude day photography, nevertheless it would give an opportunity for supplementary reconnaissance, exploiting such technical developments as infrared photography and certain electronics techniques.

Of course, not even the 70,000 foot opportunity will be of indefinite duration. Our problem will be one of keeping ahead and creating new opportunities as the old disappear.

We are all agreed also that, in order to attain a status of readiness to launch these flights as early as

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desired, and then to conduct them, extraordinary procedures would have to be adopted for aircraft, crew and equipment procurement, testing, training, and for operations. This would require the greatest possible collaboration between the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency.

I recommend that you:

a. Approve the existence of a National requirement for the above reconnaissance overflights.

b. By approval of this document, direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of Central Intelligence to establish as a matter of urgency, a collaborative project for the procurement and testing of the necessary aircraft and equipment, and for the procurement and training of the necessary crews (such crews to be non-U.S. nationals to the extent practicable). The Director of Central Intelligence is also hereby authorized to obligate in Fiscal Year 1955 an amount not to exceed \$35 million from the Reserve Fund for aircraft procurement, and it is expected as the project develops additional authority will be sought by him for funds for maintenance, training, operations, etc.

c. By approval of this document, direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of Central Intelligence, subject to appropriate policy guidance as directed, to conduct at the earliest possible date, the reconnaissance overflights, and to do so in such a way as to reduce the risk of involvement of the U.S. to the minimum practicable.

(Signed)

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

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ANNEX 7

23 November 1954

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Intelligence

In our opinion there are serious gaps in our Intelligence covering the Soviet Bloc areas, particularly in relation to our ability to determine the capabilities of the Soviet Union to launch nuclear attacks against the U. S. and to detect indications of their intentions to do so. We believe that we could have a substantially improved capability of filling these gaps through the use of aerial reconnaissance and photography, and that today these methods are the most practicable additional means to this end.

Allen W. Dulles
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central
Intelligence

W. Mark Armstrong, Jr.
W. MARK ARMSTRONG, JR.
Spec. Asst. for Intelligence
Department of State

Arthur G. Trudeau
ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
Major General, USA
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army

John A. Sanford
JOHN A. SANFORD
Major General, USAF
Director of Intelligence
Department of the Air Force

Carl F. Espe
CARL F. ESPE
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Naval Intelligence

Edwin T. Layton
EDWIN T. LAYTON
Rear Admiral, USN
Dep. Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff, JCS

Harry S. Traynor
HARRY S. TRAYNOR
Atomic Energy Commission
Representative to the IAC

RALPH R. ROACH
Acting Asst. to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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ANNEX 8

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/HAND-WRITTEN MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD BY THE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE/

24 Nov. 54

Memo. for the Record:

The Intelligence project was discussed in the President's office this date. Attending were:

The President
" Secretary of State
" " " Defense
" " " the Air Force
Mr. Allen Dulles, DCI
Gen. Nathan Twining, AF
Lt. Gen. Donald Putt, AF
" " C. P. Cabell, DDCI
Brig." Goodpaster, Aide to the Pres.

The project was approved subject to the reservation of the Secretary of Defense that a final look should be taken before the operation is actually launched, but after the materiel etc. are procured and readied.

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14 Nov. 54

Memo. for the Record:

The Intelligence project was discussed in the President's office this date. Attending were:

The President

" Secretary of State

" " " Defense

" " " the Air Force

Mr. Allen Dulles, DCI

Gen. Nathan Twining, A.F.

Lt. Gen. Donald Pate, A.F.

" " C.P. Caswell, DDCI

Brig " Goodposter, Aide to the Pres.

The project was approved subject to the reservation of the Secretary of Defense that a final look should be taken before the operation is actually launched, but after the material etc. are processed and ready.

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CHAPTER III. ORGANIZATION AND
PROJECT MANAGEMENT STAFF

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MANAGEMENT STAFFThe Project Director

Shortly after the President's approval of the project was obtained, three additional CIA officers were brought into the knowledgeable circle by General Cabell to assist in planning: Mr. Herbert I. Miller, Chief of the Nuclear Energy Division of the Office of Scientific Intelligence; Mr. Edward Saunders, Comptroller of CIA; and Col. George O. McCafferty, Chief of the Air Maritime Division, DDP/CIA. At that point, before any substantive action had been taken towards organizing a joint task force with the Air Force, General Cabell had to be away on Agency business in South America. During his absence, the Director, prompted by the need to move ahead on the project with all speed, called in Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination, and asked him to take charge of the project. (See Annex 9 for biographic summary on Mr. Bissell). After laying great stress on the security aspects, Mr. Dulles gave Mr. Bissell some documents to read, including the Land Panel recommendation, a copy of the Director's Memorandum for the President, and some hand-written notes by General Cabell.

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Having received his directive, Mr. Bissell's first action was to meet on 3 December 1954, with Mr. Herbert Miller who, it developed, had until that time been under the impression, as a result of conversations with General Cabell, that he was to manage the project. At the meeting the two men quickly patched up a temporary working agreement between them, in General Cabell's absence. (Mr. Miller, once the project staff was set up, became the Executive Officer and served as an expeditor in all the engineering and development aspects of the project for a number of years.)

The following day, 4 December 1954, Mr. Bissell represented the Agency at a meeting in the Pentagon called to launch the project by Mr. Trevor Gardner. As the moving spirit on the Air Force side, Mr. Gardner during the meeting took the initiative to telephone Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney and tell them that the project had been approved and that they should go ahead with plans for producing the air frames and engines. No mention was made as to availability of funds. The discussion during the meeting concerned itself principally with the technological aspects rather than the management and financing of the project. Convinced that the first thing needed to get the project off the ground was money, Mr. Bissell went back to the Director with

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the recommendation that he arrange to draw funds from the Agency Reserve and that he authorize Mr. Bissell to go back to the Air Force planning group and say that the Agency would pay the major part of the project costs. This was done, and as a result the Agency project staff held the purse strings at the beginning and was able to call the shots during the initial organization period.

In early December 1954, a Project Headquarters was set up as an adjunct to Mr. Bissell's office in his capacity as Special Assistant to the Director (first in the old Administration Building at 2430 E Street, Northwest, and shortly thereafter in larger quarters on the second floor of old South Building). The cryptonym AQUATONE was procured for the project and daily staff meetings were instituted with an ever-widening membership in attendance as the tempo of activities began to build up. From the beginning these meetings were attended by Colonel Osmond J. Ritland of General Putt's office and he played a very valuable role in the early stages as the Air Force representative. (He was slated to become the first Deputy Project Director, but before his appointment to that position was made official, a written agreement with the Air Force on areas of responsibility within the project had to be negotiated—which took the better part of six months.)

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Project Outline

The internal Agency charter for Project AQUATONE went through approximately twelve drafts during the first month of planning before it was presented to the Director and approved by him on 10 January 1955. The refining process carried out by Mr. Bissell was well worth the effort since the comprehensive six-page document, which had been expected to remain valid for about three months, was in fact never altered for the seven years of its duration. The text of the Project Outline is at Annex 10.

The approval of the President had been based on an authorization to the Director of Central Intelligence to obligate in Fiscal Year 1955 an amount not to exceed \$35 million from the Reserve for aircraft procurement. The Project Outline estimated the cost of the airframes, photographic and electronic equipment and some field maintenance equipment at \$31.5 million with a margin of error of \$2 million, safely within the \$35 million limit. These estimates assumed that the Air Force would furnish technical assistance and supervision, all government furnished equipment (GFE), including especially forty jet engines, and transportation of materiel and personnel to the test site. Pilot recruitment and training costs were estimated

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at \$600,000. If the Air Force would underwrite the flight training, this charge to the Agency would be reduced to \$100,000 for the initial period.

The estimates in the Project Outline contained no allowance for the testing program since it was expected to fall entirely within Fiscal Year 1956, nor any allowances for acquisition or preparation of bases, operational costs, or costs for processing the photographic and electronic products to be obtained from overflights.

The Project Outline designated Mr. Bissell as the officer in charge of the project and as Approving Officer, subject to the guidance of the Director and Deputy Director. He was authorized to obligate funds in amounts up to \$100,000; any items in excess of that amount would be approved by the Director. The Comptroller was authorized to expend funds in the manner and to the extent approved by the Approving Officer within the limitations as to quantity and procedures set forth in the Project Outline. All contractual documents were to have the approval of the General Counsel.

Mr. Bissell, as Approving Officer, was authorized to arrange for the collection of intelligence requirements and for mission planning in cooperation with the Air Force as appropriate. (In later days, the simple system envisaged by Mr. Bissell for establishment

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of requirement priorities grew into a bureaucratic committee with representation from every intelligence agency of the government.)

The last responsibility placed upon Mr. Bissell by the initial charter was that of maintaining the closest possible security control over all phases of AQUA'TONE—one of the most difficult tasks, and yet almost unbelievably successful for quite a number of years.

Project Staff and Headquarters

The project's operating organization evolved slowly from January to April 1955, with the majority of the individuals working on AQUA-TONE remaining on the rolls of their own Agency components. On 2 March 1955 Mr. Bissell discussed with the Deputy Director for Support, Colonel Lawrence K. White, his plans for the project's organizational structure, funding and staffing, and they agreed that personnel and operating costs should be charged to separate accounts and that both should be segregated from those of other regular components (the "special project" concept). Col. White promised to name an administrative officer for the project who would initially help part time on current administrative matters and the development of an organizational plan, and later be assigned full time to the project. Such an officer was sorely needed since most of the problems being faced were either wholly or partly administrative ones.

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During the last week of April 1955, Colonel Robert B. J. Hopkins was named by the DD/S as Administrative Officer. Col. Hopkins had just returned to duty from a recuperative leave following an illness, and he stayed with the project only long enough to find that it was a "pressure" job and after approximately two weeks he asked to be relieved. The DD/S then nominated Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., who proved a hardier candidate and, in fact, held up under pressure for more than ten years.

Space was badly needed and about the first of May 1955 the project staff moved to separate quarters on the top floor of 2210 E Street, Northwest (where Mr. Arthur C. Lundahl had already set up a nucleus of a photo interpretation staff). Through the summer of 1955 additional staff entered on duty and by October more space was needed. At that time the headquarters office was composed of Administration, Personnel, Finance, Logistics, Contracts, and Operations (including Intelligence, Weather and Photo-Interpretation). Security and Communications staff assigned to work on the project were still working out of their own offices. On 3 October 1955 the headquarters was moved to Quarters Eye, Wings A and C, on Ohio Drive, and Colonel Ritland joined the staff and began to take a more active part as Deputy Project Director.

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In December 1955, with a view to providing the kind of quarters which would be required for the operational phase (i. e., an entirely restricted area in a fire-resistant building with adequate facilities for an operations center and a communications center, and with a minimum of 9600 square feet), it was arranged to lease the fifth floor of the Matomic Building at 1717 H Street Northwest. On 25 February 1956 the project staff moved into these offices which remained "Project Headquarters" through all the operations and organizational changes until the eventual move to the Headquarters Building at Langley in the spring of 1962.

Air Force/CIA Agreement

Concurrent with the effort at Project Headquarters which was going forward from the beginning of 1955 toward procuring the aircraft and equipment, recruiting personnel and planning for the testing and operational phases, Mr. Bissell also began what he later described as "a rather remarkably civilized and amiable battle"* with the Air Force to hammer out a charter for the joint USAF/CIA project participation.

* From the notes on Mr. Bissell's "Dining In" speech of 12 Oct 1965.

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The first major encounter was with General Twining on 7 March 1955. In preparation for this meeting Mr. Bissell had on 25 February prepared a briefing paper summarizing project developments to date and recommending that attention be given to the requirements for Air Force support in the operational phase for which advance preparations should be undertaken with some urgency. Research and planning must be completed in the fields of aeromedicine, intelligence requirements and mission planning, meteorology and logistics. Pilots must be recruited, trained and tested, and Air Force personnel who were to hold important positions during the operational phase must be selected and an organizational structure completed.

The briefing paper, which was passed to General Twining in advance of the meeting, finished by recommending that

"...a single officer be designated who will have responsibility for all of the activities of the Air Force in support of and as a participant in the project. Clothed with this authority and responsibility, the officer would be better placed to arrange in the most secure manner possible for access to the varied resources of the Air Force upon which it is hoped to draw. He should be authorized to join with the CIA Project Officer in developing organizational plans for approval by appropriate authorities in the CIA and the Air Force and he should be in a position to secure the assignment to the project at an early date of other Air Force personnel as required." 1/

1/ TS-103263, 25 February 1955. Briefing Paper by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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In further preparation for the meeting, Mr. Bissell prepared a background paper for the Director and General Cabell. He first warned them that General Twining would probably indicate his feeling that the responsibility for Air Force support of AQUATONE should be turned over to one of the operational commands, specifically to the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Mr. Bissell then recommended that the Director take the following general line with the Chiefs of Staff:

"a. It is, of course, none of CIA's business how the Air Force organizes its activities but the character of the project imposes certain requirements which have a bearing on organization.

"b. This project has been conceived as a clandestine, intelligence-gathering operation in which missions will be flown only by non-military, and if possible non-American, pilots, and the initial policy decision to proceed was made on this basis. In order to conform to this concept it would seem desirable to avoid arrangements of such a character that the project could be described as a military operation conducted by the offensive air arm of the regular military establishment.

"c. There is a vital necessity for security. This requirement would seem to have two implications for organization. First, knowledge of the project must be limited to the narrowest possible circle of those who need to know, a category which should include only those individuals who are actually working on some aspect of it and a very few top policymakers. . . . Second, it is desirable for the project to be so organized that it is given the best possible cover. . . .

"d. Not only should the project have as little military aura as possible and be rigorously secure, it must also be subject to close and continuous policy control by the senior

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policymakers of this Government. . . Such control is going to be very much easier to maintain if the project headquarters is in Washington.

"e. Primarily to maintain security but also to ensure close control, it is probably not going to be possible to use established command channels in either the CIA or the Air Force. . . Accordingly, whatever focus of responsibility within the Air Force, it will probably continue to be necessary to use special channels. . .

"f. To summarize: The character of the project would seem to require that the officer immediately in charge of Air Force participation be stationed in Washington, that he have authority to deal directly with the CIA and with other components of the Air Force on project business, that if he is in an operational command his connection with it be played down so as to avoid identification of the project with it, and that there be a direct channel from the Washington project headquarters to overseas units. . .

"It is most important to emphasize that the cooperation we have been and are receiving from the Air Force simply could not have been more complete or more effective. . . In making this point, I suggest that you mention Colonel Ritland by name. If you feel it is appropriate, you might contrive to suggest that he would be in our eyes an admirable project officer." 1/

No substantial agreement came out of the first meeting with General Twining and one month later Mr. Bissell fired his second shot, a memorandum addressed to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, which was handed informally to Generals Everest and Putt for discussion purposes. Its opening paragraph began:

1/ TS-103274, 3 March 1955. Memo for DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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"It is understood to be the view of the Air Staff that Air Force support for Project AQUATONE in its operational phase should be the responsibility of the Strategic Air Command. Assistance and support in research, development and procurement will, however, continue to be the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development." 1/

Accepting this premise, Mr. Bissell went on to explain that, based on the original concept of the project—that it would be a clandestine intelligence-gathering operation to be conducted in such a way as to minimize the risk of detection and of plausible attribution to the U.S. Government—the CIA had made certain assumptions with regard to the character of project operations. These included numbers of aircraft, equipment and operating bases, and specific functions to be performed by the Agency, such as the recruiting and administration of civilian pilots, furnishing maintenance personnel for primary mission aircraft and equipment, project security control, project communications and the collection and coordination of requirements and intelligence. Certain suggestions and recommendations were made as to the most effective and most secure manner (from the Agency viewpoint) for channeling Air Force support.

1/ TS-103292/A, 25 March 1955. Memo for DCS/Operations, USAF, from R. M. Bissell, Jr. (Annex 11).

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Differences of opinion among the Air Force generals were such that they would neither accept the Agency's proposals as presented nor put forward an agreed counterproposal of their own. At a meeting of the project staff on 8 June 1955, Colonel George McCafferty reported to Mr. Bissell that Generals Twining, White and Everest were engaged in a controversy over what role the Air Force should play in the project and that the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, had been instructed to take no further action on the project's personnel requirements pending a settlement of the issue.

Mr. Bissell then sought the assistance of Mr. Trevor Gardner in trying to reach an agreement. A letter signed by the Secretary of the Air Force on 27 June 1955 addressed to General Twining urged that the Chief of Staff and his Deputies reach an agreement with the CIA as quickly as possible. The formula laid down by the Secretary contemplated that the operational phase of Project OILSTONE (the Air Force cryptonym for AQUATONE) would be carried out by a joint task force of the CIA and the Air Force, that Colonel Ritland be assigned to head the Air Force portion of the task force and that he serve also as deputy to the senior project officer designated by the DCI for all operational activities.

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In an effort to hasten an Air Force decision, Mr. Bissell drafted a memorandum outlining specific organizational arrangements based on the Secretary's formula, and sent copies to Mr. Gardner and Generals Everest and Putt as preparation for another meeting the first week of July (text of this paper at Annex 12). There was still no agreement and at the same time the attitude of General Curtis LeMay, Commander of SAC, was causing some concern since he had made it clear at a meeting with Mr. Bissell that as soon as CIA had paid for the U-2* he planned to take it over, and he didn't expect that date to be too far in the future.

On 9 July 1955, the Director of Central Intelligence attended a conference at Air Defense Command Headquarters in Colorado where the U-2 project was the number one agenda item. In order to prepare the Director for the task of getting from the Air Force the decisions so urgently needed to move the project forward, Mr. Bissell wrote still another briefing paper for the Director (see Annex 13) outlining the proposals advanced to date and strongly recommending that the task force responsible for the project have a clear responsibility for both operational planning and actual conduct of operations and have a

* The Air Force designation for the Lockheed CL-282.

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clear and direct line of command from headquarters to the field detachments. Within that premise, he saw three feasible alternatives: a CIA-controlled task force drawing upon Air Force personnel and support; an Air-Force-controlled task force drawing upon CIA for support; or a jointly-controlled and jointly-staffed task force drawing on both agencies for support.

The face-to-face meeting of Mr. Dulles and the top Air Force officials concerned brought results finally, and a joint agreement entitled "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities -- Project OILSTONE" was approved and signed by General Twining for the Air Force on 3 August 1955 and by Mr. Dulles for the CIA on 4 August 1955 (Annex 14). The agreement gave the responsibility for general direction and control of the project to the DCI, and the Chief of Staff, USAF, to be exercised jointly. The Agency-appointed Project Director and the Air-Force -appointed Deputy Project Director would be responsible for conduct of the project through all of its phases, subject to guidance from higher authority. The Air Force Project Group (headed by Colonel Russell A. Berg) was to act in the name of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and SAC was to perform a supporting (not a controlling) role in the training and operational phases.

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Commenting on how this agreement worked in practice,

Mr. Bissell some years later said:

"In the negotiations with the Air Force... a concept emerged which really worked well for five years. The U-2 project was quite explicitly set up as a joint Air Force/CIA project... Throughout the U-2 phase the Air Force wasn't just in on this as a supporting element... but held, if you want to be precise, 49% of the common stock. Quite aside from interdepartmental clearance obligations of the normal sort, I had to clear every major policy decision with two bosses. It was done, and it did work, and it worked extremely smoothly and well. Whether it ever could again is something I won't comment on because I don't know." 1/

Personnel

The first Table of Organization for Project AQUATONE, approved by the Deputy Director, Support, at the end of April 1955, provided staff for a Headquarters office, a U.S. field test site, and three foreign field bases (92 Agency staff, 109 Air Force officers and enlisted men, and 156 contract, including techreps, guards and primary aircraft pilots, totalling 357. (See Annex 15).

Within a month the T/O was revised in light of changed requirements: (a) Support aircraft crews deleted (to be furnished as an Air Force contribution); (b) small increase in the administrative support

1/ From the notes on Mr. Bissell's "Dining In" speech of 12 October 1965.

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area (particularly clerical); (c) addition of a Communications Reserve Cadre to permit retention of personnel while training on project equipment prior to their assignment to the field; (d) substitution of staff security investigators in place of contract civilian guards for the four bases; and (e) addition of a supply depot.

A sterile version of the T/O was given to the Director of Personnel so that he might produce Agency candidates to fill the vacancies and provide support in keeping personnel records. The highest priority was assigned to the project's requirements and every effort was made to staff it with the best candidates; however, for the first year it was easier to get approval for additions to the T/O than to get the actual bodies on board.

Because of the large numbers of communications engineers and technicians and security investigators which the T/O called for, the Offices of Communications and Security set up their own recruiting and training programs in order to meet the requirements for personnel without depleting their own staffs. An early decision was reached that dependents would not be allowed at either the ZI or foreign bases and therefore single men were chosen wherever possible and good usage was made of Air Force enlisted men in clerical

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slots. The "no dependents" rule continued in effect until the end of 1957.

Military Personnel

In February 1955 Colonel Ritland urged the opening of a direct line to the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCS/P) in order to get the best candidates available and to expedite the paper work required to transfer them to the project. The CIA Military Personnel Division (headed by Colonel Jack Dahl) set up procedures for handling the nominees separately from regular military assignees to other duty in the Agency. Requirements were placed with the DCS/P liaison officer in the Pentagon who furnished candidate files to Colonel Dahl for review by project senior officers. In June 1955 word was passed to the Project Director that the DCS/P (Gen. John S. Mills) was concerned over the size and phasing of project military personnel requirements. The Air Force reluctance to release so many good men from critical categories was largely overcome with the signing of the joint agreement in August 1955, but the early delays had effects which were felt sharply at the time the first two detachments were being trained, equipped, and deployed.

Air Force personnel assigned to the project were attached initially to the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group, Headquarters

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Command, and their records were handled by a special unit of MPD. The selectees were approached through a form letter indicating their proposed assignment to the Agency, serving overseas (without dependents) in a sensitive activity. Personal History Statements were requested, on receipt of which a Security Office investigation was made and preliminary approval for administrative processing given. The candidate was then ordered to Washington and completed the entry-on-duty processing, including physical and psychological examination, security briefing and voluntary participation in a polygraphic interview. (Refusal to be polygraphed did not automatically exclude an individual from the project.) After final security clearance the individual entered on duty and was briefed on his assignment.

In the first few months of this procedure, there was a moderately high rate of wash-outs of military personnel for various reasons when subjected to Agency tests. Very little could be done to make this type of examination more palatable to senior Air Force officers although efforts were made to explain the necessity for it and to minimize the reaction to it. It was patently difficult for career Air Force officers to accustom themselves to civilian command with

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stringent security control over all their activities and movements, and it was fortunate that only a moderate number of problem cases came through the screening to give trouble later.

A shortage of supply personnel was a recurring problem, beginning with the setting up of the depot. 50X1, E.O.13526 and the assembling of supplies for Detachment A early in 1956, continuing through the training and deployment of Detachment B. In the face of this shortage, the SAC support group, headed by Col. Herbert Shingler, carried the burden of getting Detachment A logistically ready to deploy. There were also shortages in the aeromedical staff and personnel from the test site had to be borrowed to staff Detachment A at the time of deployment.

In Col. Ritland's report to the Project Director on 30 March 1956, he said:

"Because of the over-all expansion and the lack of sufficient personnel, we have drawn on our Air Force commands to assume definite project responsibilities. It is apparent that although work is proceeding rapidly, much of the build-up is being accomplished with personnel outside of the project and not directly under the control of the Project Director. This is not an entirely satisfactory situation and should be closely watched as the scope of the project expands." 1/

1/ TS-143306, 30 March 1956. Comments by Col. Ritland at the time of his departure from the project.

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Contract Personnel (Techreps)

The furnishing of contract techreps to maintain and service project equipment at the test site and overseas bases was handled through the medium of separate service contracts with each of the suppliers. It was impressed upon the companies that the personnel for overseas should be drawn from the ranks of their current employees, rather than from new recruits, in order to expedite security clearance and training.

Each company had its own policy regarding pay scales and other employee benefits. Lockheed developed a plan whereby a certain part of the overseas pay was held back and upon completion of an 18-month contract the withheld portion plus a bonus would amount to \$5,000, an incentive to finish the contract. If the employee elected not to finish his term or was fired for cause, his transportation home would be taken out of the amount withheld and no bonus would be paid.

Besides Lockheed, which furnished a five-man crew for each U-2, service contracts or other arrangements were made with Perkin-Elmer and Hycon for photo equipment, Ramo-Wooldridge for electronics, Firewel for pilot equipment, Baird Atomics for

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the sextant, Westinghouse for side-looking radar, and Pratt & Whitney for engines. Other service contracts were signed later for subsequently developed equipment.

The techreps assigned to overseas duty were documented as Department of the Air Force Civilians, accredited to the Air Weather Service. While assigned with the detachments overseas, they enjoyed whatever benefits, privileges and other entitlements were available to other detachment personnel. The ZI test site and each foreign field base presented different situations with regard to billeting, messing, per diem, working conditions, recreation, etc., and a constant effort had to be made by administrative and personnel officers to equalize the treatment of all personnel, and take care of major complaints.

The Project Director described the cohesion achieved within these mixed task forces as follows:

"We had to put into the field detachments which were roughly one-third CIA civilian personnel, one-third Air Force uniformed personnel, one-third contractor personnel. These people had to preserve the tightest kind of security; they were expected to achieve a standard of maintenance that three successive SAC colonels fresh to the project admitted were above any they had seen achieved in a 100% military operation. To do these things, they had to be a disciplined and hard-working organization. We had to cope with the fact that all three pay systems were different, all sorts of standard arrangements for fringe benefits (including most

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notably R&R leave) were totally different. We averaged the regulations up until each of the three components was getting all the privileges it was used to under its union contract, plus all the privileges that both of the other union contracts afforded. This was, needless to say, an expensive operation for the U.S. Government, but I'm here to say it really did work. I think it worked as measured by maintenance standards achieved and maintained, and obviously, I think, by accomplishment. But I think it worked in terms of human relationships and morale." 1/

Full Complement Achieved

The project Table of Organization gradually increased in all categories to a total of 444 at the end of 1955. With the staffing of Detachment A through the winter and spring of 1956 and the selection of cadres for two more detachments, the end of March 1956 found the T/O at 546. By October 1956, with both Detachments A and B in the field and Detachment C awaiting deployment, a high water mark of approximately 600 personnel was set for the U-2 program. By that time, however, the operational pace had slowed down due to the political stand-down of overflights of the Soviet Union, and consideration had to be given to a reduction in force.

On 5 October 1956, Colonel Jack A. Gibbs (then Deputy Project Director), advised Mr. Bissell as follows:

1/ From notes of Mr. Bissell's "Dining In" Speech of 12 October 1965.

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"If operations do not increase and involve deep penetrations of the USSR next spring, I believe we should review our Headquarters personnel roster with a view to initiating a reduction in force. I believe the front office in Project Headquarters has sufficient manning for the present work load. Delineation of responsibilities generally is good throughout the staff. Occasionally we find Administration usurping some of Operations' prerogatives, and at times the front office has issued similar action instructions to several different individuals, but these are isolated cases and happen in any organization that is busy and moving fast." 1/

PCS and TDY Basis for Field Assignment

Beginning in 1955, the permanent cadre of the test site, located in a remote part of the Atomic Proving Ground in Nevada, were assigned on permanent change of station orders (PCS) to Los Angeles, where their families were settled, and on temporary duty orders (TDY) to the test site. Other personnel assigned to the test site for training before going overseas were PCS Washington and TDY at the test site. In an effort to equalize per diem rates among all categories of personnel, in January 1956 the following policy was affirmed: Any employee, civilian or military, reporting to the test site on or after 1 January 1956 would receive per diem at the rate of \$12 a day for the first 30 days and \$10 a day thereafter. (The same per diem was approved for

1/ TS-143451/1, 5 October 1956. Review of Ritland Report by Col. Jack A. Gibbs.

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Edwards Air Force Base when the test site was reestablished there in July 1957). This policy was questioned by Mr. Robert Macy of the Bureau of the Budget during a visit to Watertown in February 1956, since individuals were only paying \$4.25 room and board at the base; after an explanation of the philosophy behind the policy, Mr. Macy said he would not bring the matter up in his report.

When Detachment A deployed to England, it was on a PCS basis (without dependents or household effects) and it was anticipated that a full tour in England would ensue. A hurried move to Germany was necessitated by unforeseen events and a later move to another German base took place, all within a year; the unit returned to the ZI after 18 months overseas. This experience led to the decision that detachments should be deployed TDY rather than PCS in view of inability to predict length of stay at a given base. General Cabell approved this change of policy in August 1956 when Detachment B deployed TDY to Adana, Turkey, without dependents or household effects. In March 1957, Detachment C deployed to Japan on the same basis.

On 24 September 1957, the Project Director wrote to the Deputy Director, Support, to advise him of a desired change in policy:

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"With the prospect of continuing Project AQUATONE operations overseas at least through calendar year 1958, plans have been made to have the dependents of project personnel join them at overseas locations. As you know, our concept to date has been centered about the maintenance of a high degree of mobility for personnel and equipment. Events of the past eighteen months have shown that the political impact of having an AQUATONE unit within the borders of a friendly country is less than we had anticipated, and consequently, we are shifting to a concept of a fixed base with a forward staging capability. In a fixed base operation, we are being consistent with cover to include dependents for unit personnel. Among those affected by this change will be the contract pilots, many of whom are married and whose dependents will join them overseas." 1/

With the approval of the DD/S, this policy was established and a crash program was instituted to prepare dependent housing. This was accomplished at Adana by rental and renovation of local economy houses and by use of trailers shipped from the U. S.; at Atsugi by remodeling of existing Agency billets and construction of more units through a local builder. This program cost several hundred thousand dollars in each case, which could not be recouped by the Agency when the two detachments were returned to the ZI.

When Detachment H was set up in Taiwan for joint operations with the Chinese Nationalists at the end of 1960, personnel were deployed on a TDY basis without dependents or household effects.

1/ SAPC-19339, 24 September 1957. Memo to DD/S from Project Director.

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Cutbacks and Later Increases

At the time of the amalgamation of Agency air operations under one division (Development Projects Division, DDP), one of the purposes was a saving of personnel. From the high mark of 600 at the end of 1956, the T/O fell to 412 at the beginning of 1958, and to 371 in March 1959 when the amalgamation went into effect. Further reductions were made through 1959 and the T/O stood at 362 at the end of that year. Four months later the May Day incident caused a cessation of overflight operations, the reduction of Detachment B, and the return to the ZI and reduction of Detachment C; however, other air activities were building up, including the U-2 successor program, the satellite activity, clandestine air operations in various areas of the world (notably the Far East), and the staffing of cadres for the detachments at Eglin and Kadena, and the new detachment on Taiwan. Annex 16 shows the T/O strength by activity as of October 1960.

In November 1960 the Deputy Director for Plans (Mr. Bissell) notified the Chief, Development Project Division (Col. William Burke), that he intended to take advantage of the reduction of Detachment B to achieve a reduction in the authorized strength of the division, thus reflecting the gradual shift of resources away from the U-2 into new

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programs, as evidenced by the sizeable build-up at Watertown (renamed "Area 51") for the OXCART program. At that time the T/O had increased to 656, but a cut of 60 slots was made at the end of 1960 as a result of a continuing over-all personnel review within the DD/P complex.

The staff remained fairly static until February 1962 when Mr. Bissell left the Agency and a six-month period of reorganization ensued. The end result was the transfer of DPD's special projects staff to the newly formed Deputy Director for Research, while the air support functions remained within the DD/P. The allocation of the DPD authorized strength at the time of the turnover was:

	Air Support (now SOD)	DPD (now OSA)
Headquarters	46	130
U. S. Field	99	184
Foreign Field	117	34
	<u>262</u>	<u>348</u>

Annex 17 contains the announcement of the establishment of the Office of the Deputy Director for Research on 16 February 1962 (HN 1-9), the terms of reference of that office and the establishment under it of the Office of Special Activities (OSA), (HN 1-23 dated 30 July 1962), and the change of name of the Directorate from Research to Science and Technology (HN 1-36, dated 5 August 1963).

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The position of Acting Director, OSA, remained vacant for several months and was finally filled as one of the recommendations of the Inspector General's survey of the spring of 1962. The first incumbent was Colonel (later Brigadier General) Jack C. Ledford, who served from September 1962 to August 1966. (By DD/S&T General Order No. 37 dated 27 July 1965, the title of the Acting Director for Special Activities was changed to the Director of Special Activities.)

Two increments of personnel were approved for OSA during the latter part of 1962, almost entirely for the OXCART program, bringing the T/O back up over 500. In 1963 an additional 217 slots were requested, 121 of which were approved, making the total strength 629 instead of the 725 considered absolutely essential by June 1964. Only 22 of these additional positions were exclusively for U-2 activities, which were then completely overshadowed by the successor program in terms of budget and personnel. Further increases in preparation for the deployment of the OXCART aircraft were made in 1964 and 1965.

In May 1965, satellite operations were separated from the other activities within OSA under the Special Projects Staff (SPS) and

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effective 15 September 1965 the Office of Special Projects was established within the DD/S&T to carry on these operations. A total of twelve positions was transferred from the OSA Table of Organization to help staff this new office.

In July 1966, a reorganization plan for OSA within the T/O ceiling of 761 was proposed by Gen. Ledford (see Annex 18 for the basic concept and organizational chart of this reorganization). Certain upgradings of slots (including the three top military designees in OSA) were not approved by the Director of Personnel as requested in that reorganizational proposal. At the end of 1966, only about 130 of the total 761 personnel authorized to OSA were exclusively engaged in U-2 activities, including Headquarters and the Edwards and Taiwan detachments.

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ANNEX 9

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RICHARD MERVIN BISSELL, JR.

DOB: 18 September 1909 POB: Hartford, Conn.

Married: Ann Cornelia Bushnell Children: Richard Mervin
 6 July 1940 Ann Harriet
 Winthrop Bushnell
 William George
 Thomas Eric

Education: Yale University, B.A. Economics, 1932
 London School of Economics
 Yale University, Ph.D., 1939

CIA Experience: Served as an intermittent Consultant to the Office of National Estimates, 1952-54; Special Assistant in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 1954-59; Deputy Director (Plans), 1959-61.

Non-Agency Experience: Instructor and Assistant Professor, Yale University, 1934-42; served as Chief Economic Analyst, Bureau of Foreign & Domestic Commerce, Dept. of Commerce, 1941-42; Assoc. Professor and Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1942-48; Assistant to the Deputy Director, other executive positions, War Shipping Administration, 1942-45; Economic Adviser, Deputy Director Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 1945-46; President's Committee on Foreign Aid, Executive Secretary, 1947-48; Deputy Administrator, Acting Director, Economic Cooperation Administration and Mutual Security Agency, 1948-52; Consultant concurrently with Ford Foundation, Mutual Security Agency and ONE/CIA, 1952-54. Also Consultant to Fortune Magazine, 1937-39, 1943-46; Economic Adviser to the Connecticut Public Utilities Commission, 1936-41; Staff Member of Committee on Employment, Social Science Research Council, 1939-41; Consultant to Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 1946; U.S. Steel Corp. of Delaware, 1948; Scudder, Stevens & Clark, 1947-48; Coordinator of Exports, 1947; Brightwater Paper Co., 1947-48; Asiatic Petroleum Co., 1948; Gray and Rogers, 1948; President, Institute for Defense Analyses, 1961-64; Director of Marketing and Economics, United Aircraft Corporation, 1964 to present.

Author of: "The Rate of Interest," "The Theory of Capital Under Static and Dynamic Conditions," "Price and Wage Policies" and the "Theory of Employment," "Price, Costs and Investment," "The Anatomy of Public Spending," "The Impact of Rearmament on the Free World Economy," "European Recovery and the Problems Ahead," "Foreign Aid: What Sort? How Much? How Long?"; Contributor and Editor of "Report of President's Committee on Foreign Aid."

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ANNEX 10

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7 January 1955

PROJECT OUTLINEPROPOSAL

In collaboration with the Air Force, to undertake the procurement of (a) 20 high altitude aircraft, (b) photo-reconnaissance equipment, and (c) electronic-reconnaissance equipment, and to prepare for and conduct extensive overflights of the Soviet Bloc in order to provide photographic and, secondarily, electronic intelligence. (Project AQUATONE)

SITUATION

The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation has proposed a very-high-altitude, jet-powered aircraft (designated CL-282). The Corporation is willing to take full responsibility for the design, mock-up, building, secret testing, and field maintenance of this unorthodox vehicle. It therefore appears entirely feasible for a CIA task force to undertake a covert overflight program based upon the CL-282, which will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of reach of present Russian interception and high enough to have a good chance of avoiding detection.

Photographic equipment can be developed which will enable extraordinary intelligence content to be obtained with pictures taken from great altitudes. A single mission in clear weather can photograph a strip of Russia 200 miles wide and 2200 miles long. A spotting camera will take pictures in which the individuals in a city street can be counted from 70,000 feet. Cloud cover will reduce completeness but is not a serious obstacle because missions can be scheduled for good weather and alternate routes for clear weather can be selected in flight.

Analogously, it is believed that automatic electronic intercept equipment (ELINT gear) can be developed which will provide from each overflight essential intelligence data as to locations, characteristics, capabilities, ranges and purposes of Soviet radar, homing identification and missile guidance systems. The possibility that otherwise inaccessible internal U.S.S.R. ultra-high-frequency links might be intercepted and recorded for communications intelligence analysis will also be explored.

The opportunity for safe overflight with the best equipment that can be built at this time will last only a year or

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so because the Soviets will develop radar and interceptors or guided missiles effective for the 70,000-foot region. The CL-282 can be developed and produced extraordinarily rapidly because it is based on a fighter aircraft already in production and uses an engine already tested. Moreover, experience with this aircraft will contribute significantly to the ability of the United States to maintain a lead in the development of still higher altitude aircraft and thus to maintain a safe overflight capability. Therefore, time is of the essence if the existing opportunity is to be exploited and to be extended by continuing development.

OBJECTIVES

Although undertaken primarily to collect photographic and electronic intelligence, this operation will serve a variety of purposes of interest to various parts of the United States Government. The CL-282 will have major utility as a high altitude test platform. The research to be undertaken will include the testing of engine performance, pressurization, and the functioning of auxiliary equipment of all kinds as well as of electronic and photographic equipment at high altitudes. It will also include a study of the capabilities of personnel to perform missions requiring sustained flight at high altitudes and of the utility of equipment furnished to permit personnel to function more effectively. The aircraft will probably be useful also for high altitude air sampling. In the field of intelligence, the operation should contribute significantly to the attainment of the following objectives:

- a. Improve estimates of Soviet ability to deliver nuclear weapons and their capacity to produce them.
- b. Appraise Soviet guided missile development through photographs of testing ranges, etc.
- c. Assess the Soviet order of battle as an early warning indicator.
- d. Provide adequate locations and analyses of Russian targets.
- e. Disclose new developments which might otherwise lead to technological surprise.

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f. Appraise Soviet industrial and economic progress.

COST

The cost of procurement of materiel by this Agency under the program here proposed is expected to total approximately \$31,500,000, virtually all of which will have to be obligated in FY 1955. It can be broken down as follows:

20 Airframes, together with maintenance and testing equipment for the testing of the first one to be delivered	\$22,500,000
6 complete sets of photographic equipment, each set consisting of 3 configurations	5,500,000
12 sets of electronic search equipment to be used on photographic missions, together with 3 sets of automatic FERRET equipment	3,000,000
Additional field maintenance equipment	500,000
TOTAL	\$31,500,000

The margin of error in these figures probably does not exceed \$2,000,000 and it is believed highly unlikely that the total materiel costs could amount to more than \$35,000,000. The estimates assume that the Air Force will furnish as a contribution to the project and without cost to the Agency (a) technical assistance and supervision, (b) all equipment regularly furnished as government furnished equipment, including especially 40 engines, and (c) transportation of materiel and personnel to test sites.

In addition to the above, certain non-materiel costs will be incurred in the course of preparation for the mounting of the operation. These will be primarily (a) administrative costs, including especially the cost of developing photo-intelligence and electronic-intelligence requirements, and of mission planning; (b) the cost of pilot recruitment and training, and (c) some part or all of the cost of testing initial items of equipment in the United States. It is expected that

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administrative costs can be largely absorbed in existing budgets. Pilot recruitment and training costs might reach a total of \$600,000, of which the major part would represent the cost of flight training which is provided by the Air Force and for which the Air Force is normally reimbursed. If the Air Force is prepared to absorb this item, the cost to the Agency of recruitment and training should not exceed \$100,000, of which the major part will fall in FY 1955. The cost of the testing program has not yet been estimated. It will fall entirely in FY 1956.

The above figures contain no allowance for (a) any major costs that may be incurred in the acquisition or preparation of operational bases, (b) the cost of actually mounting the operation, including pay and subsistence of personnel, transportation of personnel and materiel to and between operational bases, and field maintenance, and (c) the cost of processing photographic film and electronic tape.

ORGANIZATION

In view of the clandestine character of the proposed operation, its nature, and the varied results expected to flow from it, it is proposed that this undertaking be organized as (a joint CIA/Air Force project in which the CIA will undertake procurement as indicated above, with the assistance of the Air Force in all phases, and will conduct overflights as a clandestine operation.) Within the CIA, the Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination, (SA/PC/DCI) will be in charge of the project, with Mr. Herbert Miller as Executive Officer. He will be supported by other officers temporarily assigned on a part-time or full-time basis as appropriate. Sub-projects will be organized forthwith as components of AQUATONE covering the performance of all the following functions:

1. Airframe procurement (Project OARFISH)
2. Procurement of photo-reconnaissance equipment (Project OCTROI)
3. Development and procurement of electronic equipment (Project AZAROLE)
4. Assembly and formulation of photo-intelligence requirements (Project EQUINE)
5. Assembly and formulation of electronic-intelligence requirements (Project LYRISN)
6. Pilot recruitment and training (Project ZESTFUL)

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At a later stage, other component projects will be organized as required.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended

- a. That the project be approved as outlined above.
- b. That the Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination be designated as the official in charge of the project and as Approving Officer, subject to the guidance of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of Central Intelligence.
- c. That the procurement of the airframes, photo-reconnaissance equipment and electronic equipment up to the amounts indicated above be authorized, subject to the following provisions:
 - (1) Procurement and contractual arrangements will be those normally employed by the Agency, with such exemptions and restrictions designed to achieve maximum security as may be approved by the Approving Officer.
 - (2) All contractual and procurement documents, arrangements and commitments will be specifically approved in advance by the General Counsel.
 - (3) All commitments and documents which obligate funds in excess of \$100,000 will be approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
 - (4) Appropriate documentation will be obtained from the Air Force and from competent technical advisers in support of procurement contracts and the specifications and descriptions of materiel to which they refer.
- d. That the recruitment and training of pilots and any other action necessary in preparation for the mounting of overflights be authorized, together with expenses incidental thereto initially up to the amount of \$100,000.
- e. That the Comptroller be authorized to expend funds in the manner and to the extent approved by the Approving Officer within the limitations as to quantity and procedure set forth above.

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f. That the Approving Officer be authorized to arrange for the necessary gathering and formulation of intelligence requirements and mission planning, in cooperation with the Air Force as appropriate.

g. That the Approving Officer be directed to maintain the closest possible security over all phases of AQUATONE.

(Signed)

R. M. BISSELL, JR.
Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Coordination

CONCUR:

/s/ C. P. CABELL
Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence

/s/ ROBERT AMORY
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

/s/ RICHARD HELMS for
Deputy Director (Plans)

/s/ LAWRENCE K. WHITE
Deputy Director (Administration)

/s/ LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

APPROVED: 10 Jan 1955

/s/ A. W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

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ANNEX 11

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25 March 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations
Hqs, U. S. Air Force

SUBJECT: Air Force Support of Project AQUATONE

1. Purpose of this memorandum: It is understood to be the view of the Air Staff that Air Force support for Project AQUATONE in its operational phase should be the responsibility of the Strategic Air Command. Assistance and support in research, development, and procurement will, however, continue to be the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff/Development. The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth various kinds of support that will be required, to outline the organization which is proposed to handle the project within the CIA, and to indicate proposed relationships between the CIA and the Air Force.

2. Basic Concept of the Project: In all of its phases, including development, procurement and testing of material, training of personnel and actual conduct of overflight missions, AQUATONE has been conceived of as a clandestine intelligence-gathering operation to be conducted in such a way as to minimize the risk of detection and of plausible attribution to the U.S. Government. The initial policy decision to proceed with the project was made on this basis. In order to conform to this concept, missions will be flown only by civilian and if possible non-U.S. pilots. If U.S. pilots are used who have previously served with the armed forces, their separation from the armed forces must be fully documented in advance. Knowledge of the project will be limited to the narrowest possible circle of those who need to know. The circle would be widened dangerously if staff elements at several levels in a long chain of command had to be included. Largely for this reason, the project has been organized outside of established command channels in both the CIA and the Air Force. Activities which appear unusual and which it therefore becomes necessary to explain either to unwitting individuals within the Government or to others, will be associated with high altitude air sampling and the development of a high altitude test bed. In accordance with this basic concept, it will be important to

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minimize the appearance of military activity especially in the actual conduct of operations overseas.

3. Assumptions as to the Character of the Operations:

a. Operations will be conducted from two to four rear bases, at each of which there will have to be provision for: the maintenance of aircraft and of photographic and electronic equipment, the storage and handling of specialized supplies, the housing of personnel, and possibly other functions. Such bases may be needed in northern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, Japan or Okinawa, the Philippine Islands, Alaska and Thule, although it is highly doubtful whether operations will ever be conducted out of more than three, or at the most four, bases simultaneously.

b. As a rule, actual missions will be flown from forward staging bases, or else reconnaissance aircraft will be towed by other aircraft and released close to the enemy's border. Provision will have to be made, therefore, for the operational use of suitable large transport aircraft and of other aircraft capable of towing the reconnaissance vehicle.

c. The rear bases will in all cases be USAF installations where it is to be hoped that the facilities and personnel required for this operation can be installed and maintained under Air Force cover without the necessity of special additional arrangements with the local governments.

d. It will be necessary to make secure approaches to the governments of countries in which access will be required to staging bases or other non-USAF installations. In the case of each such country, a suitable cover story will have to be developed for use with partially witting officials and another for public use. Appropriate activities may have to be undertaken to lend substance to these cover stories.

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4. Assumptions as to Procurement:

a. The CIA is procuring airframes, photographic reconnaissance equipment, electronic search gear, specialized communications equipment, spares for the above, specialized field maintenance equipment, specialized ground handling equipment, and specialized supplies such as photographic film and electronic tape.

b. The USAF will procure GFE including especially engines, spare parts therefor and certain standard photographic reconnaissance equipment (to be modified for use in this project).

c. Responsibility for the procurement of non-specialized supplies, including fuel, standard ground handling equipment, and maintenance materiel will be divided between the Air Force and the CIA on the basis of convenience and security.

5. CIA Organization and Functions: Within the CIA a Project Organization has been established which will consist eventually of a Project Headquarters in Washington and three Special Detachments in the field, each located at a particular rear base. The Project Headquarters will exercise control over operations through a line of command that will run directly to the field detachments. The Headquarters will be responsible specifically for operational planning (with the assistance of the Air Force), for the clearance of policies and of operational plans with other departments and with higher authority to ensure conformity to national policy, and for the coordination of operations and the allocation and movement of personnel and materiel among the field detachments. The Project Headquarters will also be responsible, with the assistance of the Air Force, for continuing development, procurement and recruitment activities in connection with this Project. The Field Detachments will be responsible for the final determination of specific flight plans within the limits of a general plan of operations and subject to specific Headquarters instructions, for the actual conduct of missions, and for the maintenance of primary mission aircraft. Through this Project Organization the CIA will perform the following specific functions:

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a. Recruit and administer civilian pilots (both U.S. and foreign) for primary mission aircraft. Recruitment is already in process and arrangements have been made for the screening and testing of foreign recruits and for their basic training by the Air Training Command.

b. Secure and administer maintenance personnel for primary mission aircraft (including engines) and for photographic reconnaissance and electronic search equipment. These will be suppliers' employees furnished by them under contract. The CIA will also procure from suppliers specialized maintenance and ground handling equipment.

c. Maintain communications through CIA channels between the Headquarters and field detachments; develop and operate secure ground-to-air and limited air-to-ground operational communications (other than UHF/VHF facilities for use in the immediate neighborhood of bases); develop and operate a system employing the RANOL technique for tracking primary mission aircraft throughout their missions from a master station outside enemy territory.

d. Maintain security control over all aspects of the project including the investigation of all knowledgeable individuals, arranging for or monitoring security arrangements at suppliers' plants, at a test base to be established, and at overseas bases.

e. In conjunction with the Director of Intelligence, USAF, A-2, SAC, and other intelligence components as appropriate, assemble reconnaissance objectives, determine priorities between objectives, and assemble intelligence on enemy detection facilities and air defense order of battle. This task is already well advanced.

6. Required Air Force Support: The CIA will require extensive Air Force support to enable the project to be carried out in a professional manner and to ensure against any attempted duplication of skills and facilities presently available in the Air Force. The principal forms in which the support will be required will be the following:

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a. Continued administrative and technical assistance in development and procurement, together with substantial Air Force procured materiel (as listed in para 4b above). This support includes the benefit of the judgment of experienced Air Force specialists in R&D, materiel, and aeromedical sections.

b. The services of fifteen to twenty Air Force Officers who can be assigned to the Project Organization and help in the actual conduct of operations. This number should probably include five or six men who can serve as operational planners at headquarters and as operations officers overseas, three or four intelligence officers, three aeromedical officers, and four or five meteorologists.

c. Assistance of the Operational Planning Group, SAC, in developing operational plans. It is anticipated that much of the material required for reconnaissance target folders will be readily available at SAC Headquarters and that with the assistance of this material and of the SAC planners, only a small operational planning group will be required at CIA Project Headquarters.

d. Operational support aircraft, together with their air crews and provision for their maintenance. There will probably be a requirement for: two to three aircraft equipped to two primary mission aircraft and six to ten transport aircraft (C-124's and C-54's) to permit the rapid movement of personnel and materiel into and out of staging bases. The precise numbers will depend upon the operational concept finally developed. These aircraft should not have military insignia and their crews will be fully witting of the character of the missions being flown by primary mission aircraft. Accordingly, aircraft and crews should be assigned to field detachments on a continuing basis with a minimum of rotation to other assignments.

e. The use of facilities and Air Force bases abroad and cover at those bases.

f. A variety of supporting services during the operational phase, including transportation of

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personnel and materiel to and between bases, current intelligence, weather information, and probably some housekeeping.

7. Channels for Air Force Support: It is assumed (as stated in para 1, above) that these various kinds of support will be provided in the main through two channels, which will however be supplemented by several established contacts.

a. The CIA Project Organization will continue to look to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff/Development for support listed in para 6a, above; that is assistance in development and procurement, including Air Force procurement of engines, other GFE, personnel equipment, and other items as may be agreed. It is understood that this office will continue to coordinate supporting activities of the materiel and supply sections of the Air Staff and of the Surgeon General's office.

b. The Project Organization will look to a unit to be established or designated in the Strategic Air Command for support listed under paragraphs 6c, d, and e, above; that is, for operational support aircraft, facilities at USAF bases, and supporting services including current intelligence and weather. It is presumed that where such support should be provided by other commands, SAC will arrange for it as necessary, notably for transportation by MATS.

c. The CIA will look to SAC for the majority of the officers required as indicated under para 6b, above, but may as agreed secure certain specialists from other components, such as aeromedical officers from the Surgeon General. A number of officers have already been assigned to the project and will continue with it.

d. Existing channels between the CIA and AFOIN and to other intelligence components will continue to be used in the assembly of intelligence on enemy means of detection and defenses, and on reconnaissance objectives.

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e. Arrangements for the basic training of civilian pilots recruited by the CIA for this project will be made directly by the Air Maritime Division of CIA with the Air Training Command, USAF, in accordance with established procedure.

8. Physical and Administrative Arrangements for Liaison: To enable business to be transacted efficiently through these channels, the following arrangements are suggested:

a. It is assumed that the present Project Officer will continue to be the point of contact with the Office of the DCS/Development.

b. Presumably the Commanding General, SAC will form a unit in SAC Headquarters or designate an existing unit in SAC to be the point of contact with the CIA Project Organization and to arrange for support by SAC. Considerations of security will require that other than the members of this unit (which should itself be of minimum size) only an absolute minimum number of officers in SAC be knowledgeable of AQUATONE.

c. Since the Project Headquarters will be in Washington, it will be necessary for the supporting unit in SAC to maintain a liaison office in Washington. The Officer in Charge should have the largest feasible delegation of authority to enable him to deal with CIA and to make or obtain decisions with the least possible delay.

d. It would be highly desirable to have the Project Officer under the DCS/Development and the SAC liaison office physically housed together and it may turn out to be desirable to have them located at the Project Headquarters.

(Signed)

RICHARD M. BISSELL
Officer-in-Charge
Project AQUATONE

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ANNEX 12

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29 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Research and Development
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, USAF

1. Attached herewith is a memorandum on Project OILSTONE which outlines proposed organizational arrangements in accordance with the memorandum on this same subject directed to the Chief of Staff from the Secretary of the Air Force, dated 27 June 1955. The attached memorandum was prepared as a basis for discussion at the meeting shortly to be held with Mr. Gardner, who suggested that it might be useful if those who were to be present at the meeting had a chance to read this proposal in advance.

2. It is requested that this be handled on an "EYES ONLY" basis.

(Signed)

R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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29 June 1955

SUBJECT: Project OILSTONE

Reference: Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, from the
Secretary of the Air Force, dated 27 June
1955

1. The referenced document contemplates that the operational phase of Project OILSTONE be carried out by a joint Task Force of the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Project Organization), that Colonel Ritland be assigned to head the Air Force portion of the Task Force, and that he serve also as Deputy to the Senior Project Officer (designated by the Director of Central Intelligence) for all operational activities. The purpose of this memorandum is to outline specific organizational arrangements in accordance with this concept.

2. The Project Organization will include CIA civilian employees and civilian contractors' employees as well as Air Force personnel. (It is now estimated that there will be, at peak strength, approximately 135 CIA employees, 115 contractors' employees, and perhaps 50 Air Force personnel.) Operational effectiveness requires that these several categories of employees be integrated into a single organization. On the other hand, in order to minimize both the dislocation of existing organizational structures and the size of the Project Organization, it should undertake to perform for itself no functions that can be efficiently performed by existing Air Force and CIA components. Present plans reflect this principle. Accordingly, the Project Organization will require considerable support from other components of CIA and the Air Force and channels for the provision of the required support are proposed in this outline.

3. In order to achieve the desired integration of Air Force personnel into the Project Organization with maximum security, they will be assigned for administrative and cover purposes to the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group, Headquarters Command. Within this organization, however, they will constitute a special unit of which Colonel Ritland will be the commander. Overseas,

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their orders will show only that they are a part of the Headquarters Command, USAF, on assignment to the designated overseas base to conduct operations under a named project. Under this procedure Air Force personnel will be charged against the Central Intelligence Agency's already established and fully adequate military personnel ceiling rather than against the T/O or personnel ceiling of any Air Force Command. Moreover, salaries will be paid (or more precisely reimbursed) by the CIA as provided for in the Agency's operational budget.

4. As presently planned, the Project Organization will consist of a Headquarters in Washington, a test and training base in Nevada and three Detachments in the field presumably located at USAF bases. The organization will include: on the operations side, operational planners, one or two air weather officers in each Detachment, aero-medical personnel, pilots (all civilian), and communications and electronics technicians; on the support side, a supply officer and a few supply records specialists in each Detachment, photographic technicians, field maintenance crews and security personnel. This summary is indicative of the functions to be performed by the Project Organization itself. Colonel Ritland will be the Deputy Project Officer stationed at Headquarters. Each Field Detachment will have as its commander a Colonel (also assigned to the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group).

5. The joint Project Organization will require support from the Air Force principally in three forms. First, it will require the use of a number of cargo aircraft to perform a multi-purpose air support task. No provision has been made in the T/O of the Project Organization either for crews or for the maintenance of these aircraft. It is estimated that at full strength, three KC-97-G's, two C-97's, three C-54's and two C-124's will be required continuously. Additional lift by C-124's and possibly C-97's and C-54's will be required in connection with initial deployment overseas. These aircraft will be required both for operational staging from regular overseas bases to advanced, temporary, staging bases and for the transportation of specialized equipment and personnel between the ZI and the several overseas Detachments. Since the crews will almost certainly become fully witting of the nature of the operation they are supporting, they should be assigned to the project on a continuing basis

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with an absolute minimum of rotation. Second, the Project Organization will obviously require the use of base facilities abroad and of housing for personnel and no provision has been made in the T/O for the performance of housekeeping functions or such logistical functions as the handling of non-specialized supplies, the storage of spares in depots overseas, etc. Third, the Air Force will probably continue to provide support to the project in the form of Government-furnished-equipment (including both aircraft components and ground handling and maintenance equipment) and, perhaps, Air Force procured fuel and non-specialized supplies, as may be subsequently agreed. In the case of certain of these items, the Air Force will presumably make the necessary logistical arrangements to deliver them to overseas bases.

6. Although it has been assumed (in accordance with the principle stated in paragraph 2 above) that these functions would not be performed by the Project Organization itself, this preliminary decision could be reversed. The organization could be made more nearly self-sufficient by enlarging its T/O to include air crews for support aircraft and housekeeping personnel. If the decision stands, however, planning for the provision of these three types of support by appropriate components of the Air Force should begin at once. Presumably these tasks could be assigned to an operational command or to theater commanders overseas or handled in other ways. Whatever the assignment of responsibilities, consideration should be given to the assignment by the supporting organization of a liaison officer to the Project Headquarters in Washington to participate in operational planning and to serve as the channel for transmitting support requirements and working out detailed arrangements for the furnishing of support.

7. By all means the most important contribution of the Air Force to this project will be the participation of its personnel. It is recognized that the requirement for some 30 officers of proven ability, many of them with special skills, is a burdensome one for the Air Force to meet. Up to the present time, requirements for personnel, which have been transmitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, have been based upon a provisional T/O for the Project Organization. Upon Colonel Ritland's assignment, manning levels will be reviewed with him so as to develop a jointly agreed basis for staffing. The present procedure for reviewing requirements for Air Force personnel

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could remain in effect or, if desired, primary responsibility for meeting requirements could be assigned to an operational command with the understanding that requirements which could more appropriately be filled from other components will be levied on the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel. A decision on the procedure to be employed in this manner is urgently required so that staffing of the joint Project Organization can go forward with minimum inconvenience to the personnel involved.

8. The Project Organization will continue to employ certain already established channels with certain Air Force components to secure types of support not covered by paragraph 5, above, as follows:

a. The Organization will maintain direct contact with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, and this will be the channel through which requirements for major and specialized materiel will be submitted. It will probably be desirable at a later date to establish procedures whereby Field Detachments can requisition non-specialized and locally available supplies through the overseas bases where they are stationed.

b. The Organization will use existing channels with the Office of the D/I, USAF, and with other intelligence components, for the assembly of intelligence on enemy means of detection and enemy defense and on reconnaissance objectives.

c. The Organization will look to General Flickinger, ARDC, for assistance on aeromedical matters and will work out with him appropriate arrangements for the procurement of personal equipment for primary mission air crews.

d. Arrangements for basic training of civilian pilots recruited by the CIA for this project will be made directly by the Air Maritime Division of CIA with the Air Training Command, USAF, in accordance with established procedures.

(Signed)

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Special Assistant to Director

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ANNEX 13

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7 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Organizational Concept for Project
AQUATONE

1. The Secretary of the Air Force in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, dated 27 June 1955, stated he had reached the conclusion, on the basis of conversations with you, "that the operational phase of this project should be carried on as a joint task force operating between the Air Force and CIA". As yet, however, there is not a complete meeting of minds on what would be the most appropriate organizational concept within the Secretary's formula. This subject will presumably be the main topic at the meeting to be held in Colorado Springs on 9 July. Clear-cut decisions are now urgently required, and it is to be hoped that they can be arrived at on that occasion.

2. Partially or wholly inconsistent proposals have been advanced and positions taken as follows:

a. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, (in consultation, I believe, with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development) has proposed that the general direction of the project be exercised by a jointly staffed headquarters which would, however, be under the control of the DCI, but that full operational responsibility be assigned to the Commander, Strategic Air Command. This plan would provide for three elements:

(1) A Project Headquarters under the full control of the DCI but jointly staffed and with an Air Force Officer as Deputy Project Officer;

(2) A small task force in the Air Force reporting to the Chief of Staff to maintain liaison with the Project Headquarters and to arrange for the provision of those types of support which could best be handled through Air Force Headquarters;

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(3) A special operating organization designated the XXXth Air Division which would be established by and be under the operational control of the Commander, SAC.

The XXXth Air Division would have its own headquarters (at a location to be recommended by the Commander, SAC) which would exercise direct command over the Field Detachments and the Test Base. It would be responsible for the execution of all operations subject to the general direction and control of the Project Headquarters.

b. Prior to the submission of this proposal, the CIA submitted on 29 June an outline of suggested organizational arrangements intended to be in accordance with the memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force referred to above. The CIA outline provided for a single joint task force to plan and conduct operations. The task force would consist of a Project Headquarters in Washington exercising direct command over the Test Base and the three overseas Field Detachments. It would be a fully integrated organization jointly staffed by CIA and the Air Force and include contractor personnel. The Senior Project Officer would be designated by the Air Force and would be the military commander of all Air Force personnel assigned to the task force. This organization would draw upon appropriate elements of both CIA and the Air Force for support. Within the Air Force the major support responsibility could be assigned to SAC or any other operational command, although the task force would look to certain elements of the Air Staff for specialized types of support more appropriately furnished by them.

c. In the course of discussion of these and other proposals the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development has expressed the view that the Air Staff should retain primary responsibility for Air Force support of, and participation in, this project. Although he did not formulate a detailed proposal, he suggested (as envisaged in the CIA outline summarized in subparagraph b, above) that the project be carried out by a joint task force in which the Senior Project Officer would be an Air Force Officer who would also serve as military commander of the Air

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Force personnel assigned to the task force. This Air Force Officer would look to the Chief of Staff (or a designated Deputy Chief of Staff) for Air Force guidance in the conduct of the project. Support for the task force by various elements of the Air Force would be arranged through the appropriate Staff Offices and Directorates.

3. The proposal of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, outlined in paragraph 2, a, above, raises sharply the question of what is meant by a "joint task force" and what the internal organization and lines of command within such a task force should be. Under the terms of that proposal, the Air Force and CIA would jointly staff the field detachments and a headquarters staff in Washington but there would be interposed between these elements another operational headquarters which would in fact exercise command authority over all personnel in the field and over all actual operations. In effect, therefore, there would not be one joint task force but two: a jointly staffed planning group in Washington under full control of the DCI and a jointly staffed operating organization (the XXXth Air Division) under full control of the Commander, SAC, the former giving general direction to the latter. The XXXth Air Division would be under the command of one headquarters at Omaha yet subject to the control in a degree most difficult to define of another headquarters in Washington. Such an arrangement would, I believe, involve duplication between the two headquarters, confusion as to their functions, a diffusion of responsibility, and friction between them. I strongly recommend that wherever it be located and however it be controlled and supported, the task force responsible for this Project have a clear responsibility for both operational planning and the actual conduct of operations, and that it be coherently organized with a clear and direct line of command running from its headquarters to its field detachments.

4. Within this basic principle, the following would appear to be the three feasible alternatives:

a. The task force could be wholly controlled by the CIA but draw upon the Air Force for personnel and support.

b. It could be a joint task force, jointly staffed and jointly controlled drawing upon elements of both CIA and the Air Force for support.

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c. It could be an Air Force task force drawing upon the CIA for support, especially for help in all those aspects of the Project which partake of the character of clandestine operations.

If alternative (c) is adopted, the task force could well be organized as an Air Division under the operational control of the Commander, SAC. The CIA could then assign personnel to this organization to perform such duties as the planning of suitable cover, the conduct of negotiations with the security services of other governments looking toward the acquisition of access to bases, and the monitoring of operations for conformity with clandestine practice. To insure effective support by CIA to such an Air Force unit and to enable the DCI to give it such policy guidance as might be appropriate, a very small staff unit would probably be necessary in the CIA. Likewise if alternative (a) were adopted a small special staff would be required in the Air Force to insure support to the CIA Project Organization and to monitor its activities as appropriate on behalf of the Air Staff.

5. If the decision is in favor of a joint task force, alternative (b), certain other decisions must be made as to (a) the manner in which the organization will be jointly controlled by the CIA and the Air Force and (b) the arrangement for its support, especially by the Air Force. With respect to the first of these problems it is generally agreed that one of the two senior officers of the task force should be designated by the DCI and the other by the Chief of Staff, or the Commander, SAC, or other appropriate authority in the Air Force. Although for internal operational matters one of these individuals must be the Senior Project Officer and the other must be his Deputy, the concept of joint control clearly requires that the Deputy have the right and the duty of keeping his principals informed of the progress of the Project, calling to their attention actual and prospective issues requiring policy determination, and seeking policy guidance from them. Thus, the individual would be for internal purposes the Deputy Director of the Project but would also represent the policy views of his Service. As to arrangements for support, it is clear that no joint task force can be given a blank check in the form of unlimited authority to call for personnel, services, and materiel from either CIA or the Air Force. What can be done is to arrive at agreed staffing levels and estimates of requirements for supporting services and materiel and

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then to place responsibility for providing support in accordance with these requirements either at one central point in each parent Service or at several points as may be appropriate. Within the Air Force a possible arrangement would be to place the major responsibility for support upon an operational command (presumably SAC) and to establish under the Chief of Staff a small unit to arrange for specialized support that could not appropriately be provided by the designated operational command. Such an arrangement will not, of course, solve in advance the problem of dealing with urgent, unforeseen requirements. But there is, I submit, no form of organization that will solve such problems in advance. When critical unforeseen needs arise, the task force (wherever it is constituted) will initially seek to have the need met through established support channels. If the need turns out to compete with other top-priority requirements, the conflict can only be resolved at a very high level. These facts of life are not much affected by the location of the task force or even by the assignment of support responsibility.

6. Recommendations: It is recommended that, as a matter of urgency, decisions be made as follows:

a. That the Project will be entrusted to an integrated task force with clear and direct internal lines of command (consistent with the requirement that all military personnel be under the military command of the senior Air Force Officer assigned to the task force).

b. That the task force be either controlled by the CIA, or jointly controlled by the CIA and the Air Force, or formed as an element of the Air Force.

c. That if it is not to be an element of the Air Force, Air Force support will be provided to the task force through designated channels.

d. That if it is to be a jointly controlled task force, the mechanism of control shall be that outlined in paragraph 5, above, or some other as may be agreed.

(Signed)

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.

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ANNEX 14

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2 August 1955

ORGANIZATION AND DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

PROJECT OILSTONE

1. General direction and control of the Project shall be exercised jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chief of Staff, USAF, subject to guidance from higher authority and coordination with other departments of the Government as appropriate. They shall furnish policy guidance to lower echelons, ensure the conformity of operations under this project with national policy, and make recommendations to higher authority on matters transcending their own authority. Further, it shall be their joint responsibility to resolve differences that may arise at lower staff and operating levels.

2. The following are the organizational elements which shall be responsible for the conduct of the project:

a. There is in existence a Project Headquarters, headed by a CIA Project Director to which an Air Force Officer will be assigned to serve as Deputy Project Director. The Project Headquarters will establish operational units, stationed at bases overseas after the completion of training in the ZI. These operational units will be manned by USAF and CIA personnel in numbers, proportions and skills as agreed between the Project Director and the Air Force Project Officer.

b. All military personnel assigned for full-time duty to the project for duty under CIA direction on permanent status shall be carried on the rolls of a newly activated support squadron in accordance with current procedures. The Air Force Deputy to the CIA Project Director will command this administrative squadron.

c. There will be established an Air Force Project Staff headed by a Project Officer who will act in the name of the Chief of Staff, USAF. The Project Staff will include selected officers designated by certain of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff to act as points of contact within their several offices.

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(DX-TSC-3014)

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d. The Commander, SAC, will form a new subordinate headquarters to be manned by him from resources available to him through which he will participate in the project. He will also establish a support unit for each operational unit established by the Project Headquarters. Support units will be controlled by him through the commander of his subordinate headquarters and will perform support functions as required by the Project Headquarters and agreed by Commander, SAC, or the Chief of Staff, USAF.

3. The functions and responsibilities of these elements will be as follows:

a. The CIA Project Director and the Air Force Project Officer shall have primary responsibility for the development and execution of all activities concerning the project within their own organizations; the resolution of differences that may arise at lower echelons; and the reporting of progress and the making of recommendations to their respective chiefs.

b. The Project Headquarters will be responsible for any continued research and development, operational planning, and the direction and control of operations in the final phase of the project when overflights are being launched from bases overseas.

c. The Air Force Project Staff shall be responsible for implementing plans approved by the CIA Project Director and the Air Force Project Officer and arranging for Air Force support of Project activities which can appropriately be furnished through staff channels or by commands other than SAC.

d. Commander, SAC, will be assigned primary responsibility for providing and coordinating Air Force support of the project, including training, through the subordinate headquarters to be formed by him. Requirements for certain types of personnel and equipment not under his control will be stated to Headquarters, USAF (the Air Force Project Officer) and will be met from other resources.

4. Activities under this project fall into three phases. These overlap one another in time but may be distinguished on the basis of the kinds of activities involved in each. The following are the specific authorities and responsibilities of the several organizational elements in the successive phases of the project.

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a. The first phase, now well advanced, is that in which the major activities are research and development, procurement, the construction and activation of a test and training base, the testing of equipment, and operational planning. The Project Director shall have control of these activities including the planning and recruiting of personnel under his control. The Air Force will furnish necessary support which will be a matter for agreement between the Project Director and the Project Officer. Full and complete coordination of all Air Force elements during this phase is essential.

b. The second phase will be devoted to training, the shakedown of equipment, and deployment overseas. These activities will be carried on mainly at the test and training base. Commander, SAC, through his subordinate headquarters, will (1) direct and supervise the training of operational units, (2) provide and coordinate Air Force support of the project, and (3) arrange for the deployment of operational units overseas for the initiation of the final phase. In the light of these responsibilities Commander, SAC, will be kept fully informed of operational plans, through his subordinate headquarters. Phase II terminates with the decision that crews and equipment are operationally ready and in place at overseas bases. During Phase II the line of command on matters concerning the scale and character of training, Air Force support, and the mechanics of deployment shall be from the Chief of Staff, USAF, through the Commander, SAC, and his subordinate headquarters.

c. The third phase will be that of active operations from overseas bases. This phase follows the decision as to operational readiness. In this third phase, the final decision as to execution and timing of actual over-flight missions shall rest with the Project Director, subject to such guidance as he may receive from higher authority. The line of command shall be direct between operational units and the Project Director. Each operational unit will continue to be dependent upon its corresponding SAC support unit.

APPROVED FOR USAF:

N. F. Twining

Aug. 3, 1955

APPROVED FOR CIA:

A. W. Dulles

August 4, 1955

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ANNEX 15

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28 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT: Table of Organization - Project AQUATONE

1. The requirements for the Table of Organization for Project AQUATONE are submitted for your approval. The Office of the Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination is not listed although it is responsible for the project's operation.

2. It is expected that some of the people who will be used in Headquarters will be assigned to authorized slots; however, where short term use of individuals with particular skills may be necessary it is believed desirable to arrange for their services on a detail basis. U.S. Air Force personnel will be assigned to the 1007th Air Intelligence Group, in accordance with established procedures. This Table of Organization does not make provision for the following functions which will be performed by the U.S. Air Force: base housekeeping, aircraft transport, towing, and general maintenance.

3. At a later date it may be necessary to augment the Table of Organization with additional personnel such as communicators or other specialists. Communications station personnel located overseas may also assist in the project but those people directly responsible for the work involved can be used on a reimbursable basis. Additional U.S. Air Force personnel may be required to support the project on a detail basis to receive, identify, store, and issue supplies in a storage warehouse.

4. It may be possible at a later date to reduce the total number of slots requested by absorbing some of the project people located at Headquarters into the overseas organization.

(Signed)

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Coordination

Attachment:
T/O

APPROVED:

(Lawrence K. White)
Deputy Director (Support)

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TABLE OF ORGANIZATION - PROJECT AQUATONE

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SA/PC/DCI

PROJECT AQUATONE HEADQUARTERS	
CIA Employees	18
USAF Employees	7
	<u>25</u>

US FIELD - TEST BASE	FOREIGN FIELD-BASE A	FOREIGN FIELD-BASE B	FOREIGN FIELD-BASE C
CIA Employees 26	CIA Employees 16	CIA Employees 16	CIA Employees 16
	USAF 34	USAF 34	USAF 34
	Contract Empl. 52	Contract Empl. 52	Contract Empl. 52
<u>26</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>102</u>

TOTALS:	CIA Employees	92
	USAF	109
	Contract	<u>156</u>
		<u><u>357</u></u>

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28 April 1955

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION - PROJECT AQUATONE

HEADQUARTERS

<u>Slot No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Grade or Rank</u>
-----------------	--------------	----------------------

OPERATIONS DIVISION

1	Operations Officer	Col. USAF
2	Asst. Operations Officer	Col. USAF
3	Asst. Operations Officer	GS-15
4	Weather Officer	Lt. Col. USAF
5	Flight Surgeon	Lt. Col. USAF
6	Intelligence Officer	Lt. Col. USAF
7	Photo-Navigator	Major USAF
8	Intelligence Officer	GS-13
9	Intelligence Officer	GS-12
10	Commo Specialist	GS-14
11	Electronic Engineer (Radio)	GS-13
12	Secretary	GS-7
13	Secretary	GS-7

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

14	Administrative Officer	GS-15
15	Administrative Officer (Materiel)	Lt. Col. USAF
16	Administrative Officer (Materiel)	GS-14
17	Administrative Officer (Finance)	GS-14
18	Security Officer	GS-14
19	Security Officer	GS-13
20	Secretary	GS-7
21	Courier	GS-5

DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT DIVISION

22	Director of Development and Procurement (also Executive Officer)	GS-17
23	Contracting Officer	GS-13
24	Secretary	GS-7
25	Engineering Officer	GS-14

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~~TOP SECRET~~US FIELD - TEST BASE

26	Administrative Officer	GS-14
27	Asst. Administrative Officer	GS-13
28	Security Officer	GS-14
29	Asst. Security Officer	GS-13
30	Commo Technician (Radio)	GS-9
31	Commo Technician (Radio)	GS-9
32	Commo Technician (Crypto)	GS-8
33	Commo Technician (Crypto)(L.A.)	GS-8
34	Commo Technician (Crypto)	GS-7
35	Secretary	GS-5 or Sgt.
36	Secretary (Security)	GS-5
37-51	Investigators (15)	GS-7

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~~TOP SECRET~~FOREIGN FIELD - BASE A

52	Commanding Officer	Col. USAF
53	Deputy Commanding Officer	GS-14
54	Secretary	GS-7, or Sgt.

OPERATIONS SECTION

55	Operations Officer	Lt. Col. USAF
56	Photo-Navigator	Major USAF
57	Intelligence Officer	Major USAF
58	Flight Surgeon	Lt. Col. USAF
59	Weather Officer	Lt. Col./Maj. USAF
60	Personal Equipment Specialist	Sgt. USAF
61	Personal Equipment Specialist	Sgt. USAF
62	Clerk - Operations	USAF
63	Clerk - Operations	USAF
64	Clerk - Operations	USAF
65	Clerk - Intelligence	USAF
66-71	Pilots- Recon (6)	Contract Civilian
72	Commo Team Leader	GS-13
73	Commo Technician	GS-13
74-75	Commo Technicians (2)	GS-12
76-80	Commo Technicians (5)	GS-9

MAINTENANCE - SUPPORT SECTION

81	Support Officer	GS-13
82	Administrative Asst.	GS-11
83	Administrative Asst.	GS-9
84	Security Officer	GS-13
85	Asst. Security Officer	GS-11
86	Materiel Officer	Maj. USAF
87	Supply Technician	Master Sgt. USAF
88	Supply Technician	A/1st USAF
89	Clerk	USAF
90	Clerk	USAF
91	Clerk	USAF
92	Clerk	USAF
93-97	Photo Technicians (5)	Contract Civilian
98-99	Engine Technicians (2)	Contract Civilian
100-123	Aircraft Technicians (24)	Contract Civilian
124-138	Guards (15)	Contract Civilian

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NOTE: There is listed below an additional requirement for 15 USAF aircrewmembers. It is hoped that these people will be supplied by USAF as support and will not be chargeable to the project.

139-141	Pilots (3)	
142-144	Co-pilots (3)	USAF
145	Navigator	USAF
146-148	Flight Engineers (3)	USAF
149-151	Radiomen (3)	USAF
152-153	Aircrewmembers (2)	Sgt. USAF Sgt. USAF

FOREIGN FIELD - BASE B

154-255 Identical to Base A

FOREIGN FIELD - BASE C

256-357 Identical to Base A

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ANNEX 16

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TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
On Board Versus Authorized Strength
14 October 1960

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>	<u>Over</u>	<u>Under</u>
<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>159</u>	<u>153</u>		6
<u>U.S. Field:</u>				
Edwards	38 *	53 <u>1/</u>	15	
Base D (Area)	70	13 <u>2/</u>		57
Supply Depot	41	43	2	
Field Sup Compl	9	8		1
Base E (Eglin)	97	91		6
Subtotal:	<u>255</u>	<u>208</u>		47
<u>Foreign Field:</u>				
Base B	54 **	53 <u>3/</u>		1
Taiwan	21 ***			21
STPOLLY	21	20		1
Kadena	69	52 ****		17
Clark Field	5	4		1
Tokyo	3	3		
[REDACTED]	9	7 *****		2
Subtotal:	<u>182</u>	<u>139</u>		43
<u>Totals</u>	<u>596</u>	<u>500</u>		96

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- 1/ Does not include 5 contract pilots.
 2/ Does not include 14 contract guards.
 3/ Does not include 5 contract pilots & 16 contract guards.

- * Additional 7 positions required according to most recent estimate.
 ** Additional 1 position required according to most recent estimate.
 *** Additional 6 positions required according to most recent estimate.
 **** Includes 9 on duty but not fully cleared as yet and consequently carried on the Development Complement.
 ***** This figure not previously included on DPD strength in view of recent transfer of [REDACTED]

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ANNEX 17

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ORGANIZATION

HN 1-9
16 February 1962

1. There is established effective 19 February 1962 the Office of Deputy Director for Research. Certain of the activities of the Development Projects Division, DD/P, will also be transferred to DD/R. In the interest of strengthening the Agency's technical and scientific capabilities by centralizing such effort in one division, other activities in Research and Development will be placed under DD/R as appropriate.

2. Effective 19 February 1962, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., is appointed Deputy Director (Research).

3. Dr. Scoville will continue to act as Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence.

(Signed)

JOHN A. McCONE
Director of Central Intelligence~~SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
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ORGANIZATION

HN 1-23
30 July 1962

DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)

1. The mission of the Deputy Director (Research) is to conduct in depth, research and development in the scientific and technical fields to support intelligence collection by advanced technical means, exclusive of those R&D activities to support agent operations. The Deputy Director (Research) will carry out those operations strictly in the scientific and technical fields which do not involve clandestine agent operations, or those functions of the Office of Communications as contained in HR 1-14g except ELINT activities. The Deputy Director (Research) will coordinate such operations carried out overseas with the Deputy Director (Plans) and through the Chief of Station concerned. There is established under the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director (Research) the Office of Research and Development (ORD).

2. The Deputy Director (Research) will have primary responsibility for Agency ELINT activities, including requirements, subject to policy guidance from the Agency SIGINT Officer. Clandestine agent operations and liaison with foreign governments will remain under the direct control of the Deputy Director (Plans). Accordingly, there is established immediately under the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director (Research) the Office of Elint (OEL) to which all such activities will be transferred.

3. The Office of Special Activities (OSA) is hereby established under the Deputy Director (Research). All functions and personnel of the Development Projects Division of the Deputy Director (Plans) are hereby transferred to OSA except those of the Air Support Branch and its supporting staff elements which remain the responsibility of the Deputy Director (Plans).

(Signed)


Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

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OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES - DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)



Titles & Symbols

Asst. Director for Spec. Activities	- AD/OSA	Engineering & Analysis Div.	- EAD/OSA
Deputy Assistant Director	DAD/OSA	Contracts Division	CD/OSA
Executive Officer	EXO/OSA	Materiel Division	MD/OSA
Special Requirements Staff	SRS/OSA	Operations Division	OD OSA
Technical Analysis & Eval. Staff	TAES/OSA	Administrative Division	ADMIN/OSA
Special Assistant for Intelligence and Liaison	SAIL/OSA	Communications Staff	COMMO/OSA
Development Division	DD/OSA	Intelligence Staff	INTEL/OSA
		Weather Staff	WEA/OSA

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ANNEX 18

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ORGANIZATION

HN 1-36
5 August 1963

Effective 5 August 1963, the following organizational changes are announced:

1. The Deputy Directorate for Research is renamed the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology.
2. The Office of Scientific Intelligence is transferred from the Deputy Director for Intelligence to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology.
3. The Automatic Data Processing Staff is renamed the Office of Computer Services and is transferred from the Deputy Director for Support to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology.

(Signed)

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

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BYE 2548/66

13 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Proposed Reorganization of Headquarters
and Field Detachments of the Office of
Special Activities

1. Submitted herewith are proposed changes to the OSA Staffing Complement. (Attachment A). The proposed Staffing Complement provides for a personnel ceiling of 761 approved by the DDS&T and a proposed reorganization also approved by the DDS&T.

2. The basic concept of the Headquarters organization remains that of a single manager type which has proven so successful in the past for both the development and operation of weapons systems. Such an organization with the authority and resources required for the type of mission within OSA has resulted in the development of the OXCART vehicle in approximately one-half the time required for the development of the B-58, and is similar to the single manager type organization used so successfully by Admiral Raborn in the development of the Polaris program, General Schriever in the Air Force ICBM program, and General Medaris in the development of the Redstone Missile.

3. The Headquarters' organization is designed around four principal Deputies. The Deputy for Research and Development remains for all practical purposes in its present form. The Comptroller is evolved from the present OSA Program Staff and collects together all business functions within OSA. The Deputy for Materiel has been broken out from the former Deputy for Field Activities because of the increasing importance and emphasis on Aircraft and Systems Maintenance Engineering. The Deputy for Field Activities has been renamed as the Deputy for Operations.

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4. The organizations in the field have undergone only minor changes in order to have all detachments organized in the same manner. In each detachment, the Deputy for Support is the senior Agency officer within the detachment and acts as the second in authority to the Commander, excluding actual air operations which always comes under the Deputy for Operations.

5. The requested increase in GS-14's and above can be accommodated within the DDS&T except for three GS-14's. To alleviate this problem the Ops Officer position, Plans Staff, Deputy for Operations; Transportation Officer position, Travel Branch, Comptroller, and Ops Officer position, Budget and Programs Division, Comptroller, can be listed as 13/14 positions. Attachment B is a statistical comparison of current and proposed GS grades. Two GS-15 positions in the Deputy for Research and Development, position No. 0339, IO - Physical Scientist, Aircraft Systems Division and position No. 0344, Sensor Systems Division, have been identified as SPS positions.

6. The Director of the Office is rated as a Major General and the Headquarters Deputies for Operations and Materiel are rated as Brigadier Generals. The Commander of Area 51 is rated as a Brigadier General. Such ratings are consistent with the responsibilities of these positions and more compatible with Agency counterparts within the organization. It is not intended that any of these positions, with the exception of the Director, would ever actually be filled with General Officers. For administrative purposes and prestige, however, it is felt that such ratings are justified.

7. Your approval is respectfully requested.

(signed)
EDMUND D. DUCKETT
for
JACK C. LEDFORD
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Special Activities

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Page 3

Attachments:

Organization Chart - Headquarters - OSA
Organization Chart - Field Units
Attachment A
Attachment B

APPROVED:

*

(Signed) PAUL H. HILDEBRAND
for Deputy Director for Science and Technology

- * Provided the establishment of Brig. Gen. positions is consistent with military practice and does not result in a charge against DD/S&T supergrade ceiling.

Director of Personnel

NOTE: Approved by D/PPB on 31 August 1966.

Distribution:

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DDS&T/D/SA/JCLedford:nl (12 July 1966)

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HEADQUARTERS Office of Special Activities

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APPROVED:

ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

DIRECTOR
* M/Gen Jack C. Ledford (B/G)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
17 J. A. Cunningham, Jr. (17)
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
15 E. D. Duckett, Jr. (15)

REGISTRY
12 R. J. Swain
(11)

SECURITY
15 William R. Kotapish
(15)

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

DEPUTY for RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
17 J. Parangosky (16)
Assistant Deputy for R&D (16)

ASST. for PROGRAMS
15 (13)

ASST. for TECHNOLOGY
16 (15)

ADVANCED PROJECTS DIV
15 (15)

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS DIV
15 (15)

SENSOR SYSTEMS DIV
15 (15)

PROPULSION SYSTEMS DIV
15 (15)

COMPTROLLER
16 (15)
Assistant Comptroller
15 (14)

INDUSTRIAL AUDIT DIV.
15 (15)

CONTRACTS MANAGEMENT DIVISION
16 (16)

BUDGET & PROGRAMS DIV
15 (14)

MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS & REPORTS DIV
15 (14)

FINANCIAL OPNS. DIV
15 (15)

PERSONNEL DIVISION
15 (14)

TRAVEL Branch
14 (13)

DEPUTY for MATERIEL
* B/Gen (C/O)
Assistant Deputy for Materiel
15 (14)

MAINTENANCE DIVISION
Col (L/C)

SUPPLY DIVISION
Col (L/C)

INSTALLATIONS DIVISION
15 (14)

AVIONICS DIVISION
15 (14)

DEPUTY for OPERATIONS
* B/Gen (Col)
Assistant Deputy for Operations
Col (L/C)

CONTROL CENTER
Maj (Maj)

OPERATIONAL PLANS DIV
Col (L/C)

OX CART DIVISION
Col (L/C)

ADP DIVISION
Col (L/C)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
15 (Lt Cmdr.)

WEATHER DIVISION
Col (L/C)

COMMUNICATIONS DIV
15 (15)

IDEALIST DIVISION
Col (C)

* Recommendation to upgrade these three slots was not approved.

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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DDS&T Historical Paper
No. OSA-1
Vol. II of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
Chapter IV

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 2
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T
Date prepared : 1 April 1969
Written by : Helen Kleyla
Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER IV. BUDGETING AND
PLANNING

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CHAPTER IV. BUDGETING AND PLANNING

Initial Funding: Use of Agency Reserve

There was no directive from higher authority spelling out funding sources and responsibilities, as between CIA and the Air Force, for carrying out the reconnaissance project. Acting on the verbal approval of the President that funds from the CIA Contingency Reserve could be used, the Director of Central Intelligence initiated negotiations for release of funds with the Bureau of the Budget.

On 27 December 1954, Mr. Bissell delivered to the Director of the Budget, Mr. Rowland R. Hughes, a letter from Mr. Dulles requesting release from the Reserve of \$35 million for the procurement of aircraft. Without alluding to the ultimate purpose of the project, Mr. Bissell explained the necessity to sign contracts promptly with suppliers and outlined the form of contract being negotiated and the part played by the Air Force in working out the arrangements. Mr. Hughes saw no problem but wished to consult with the Chief of the International Division, Mr. Robert M. Macy, who was principal liaison officer between the Bureau of the Budget and CIA. Mr. Macy had a further discussion with Mr. Bissell and Colonel White, and having satisfied himself of the appropriateness of the use of the Reserve for a type of procurement not hitherto undertaken by the CIA,

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he advised Mr. Hughes affirmatively in the matter and the funds were made available on 29 December 1954.

The initial \$35 million was almost fully committed to the procurement of airframes, photographic and electronic equipment, as spelled out in the Project Outline (Annex 10). By the end of June 1955, only six months later, commitments for Fiscal Year 1955 totaled more than \$32 million (\$800,000 of which represented construction, operation and maintenance at the test site for which no allowance had been made within the initial \$35 million).

The provisions of Public Law 81-110, Section 8(b) were invoked as a security precaution with regard to expenditures under the principal contracts as well as the agreement with the Atomic Energy Commission for construction, operation and maintenance of the test site. The first part of this provision extended to the Agency the authority to expend funds without regard to law and regulations for Agency functions. The second part extended to the Agency authority to expend funds for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, without review by the General Accounting Office, when so certified by the Director.

Speaking about the use of the Agency Reserve for projects such as AQUATONE, Mr. Bissell in 1965 remarked that the Agency should

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learn that the Reserve is a potent weapon.

"If you want to be narrow about it, you can say it is a potent weapon for advancing the interests of the Agency. If you want, as I rather prefer, to speak as a citizen, it is a potent weapon for getting something moving fast if the national interests ever call for it... There were then people around Washington who were willing to get things moving fast, but there wasn't anybody else who could, and more than once the Agency's Reserve made exactly this kind of thing possible." 1/

Air Force Support

The understanding from the beginning of the joint effort had been that the Air Force would supply Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), including forty jet engines, technical advice and personnel. The fact that the joint agreement was not signed until August 1955 left some uncertainties in the early budgetary exercises as to who would pay for what. Mr. Gardner, in a letter to Mr. Dulles dated 27 December 1954, wrote:

"I assure you that the Air Force is keenly interested in this development from the point of view of its own mission as well as yours, and to that end is furnishing the engines as part of its contribution and will provide such other assistance as required." 2/

1/ From notes on Mr. Bissell's "Dining In" Speech of 12 October 1965.

2/ Letter from Mr. Trevor Gardner, 27 December 1954, to the Director of Central Intelligence (Annex 19).

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Mr. Bissell had listed for a meeting with General Twining on 7 March 1955 the contributions he believed the Air Force would have to make, the more important of which were: (a) Continued help in the whole development and procurement process in the form of judgment, services of many kinds, and equipment; (b) help in the selection, testing and training of pilots; (c) the services of a number of competent officers (say 10 to 20) to help in the actual conduct of operations; (d) the use of certain Air Force facilities abroad and cover at those bases; and (e) support during the operational phase in many forms including transportation, intelligence, weather information, and housekeeping.

The largest single item for which the Air Force had accepted funding responsibility, the jet engines, presented several problems, according to Col. Ritland: (1) The total cost of \$18 million was hard to bury in the Air Force budget; (2) the Air Force, as a result of furnishing these engines for the U-2, would not be able to equip one squadron with F-100's, thus delaying the completion of the 137-wing program; and (3) the total production of the J-57/P-31 series of engines was due for delivery to Martin Aircraft for the USAF's modified Canberra program (BLACK KNIGHT), and an explanation would be required when they were delivered elsewhere. The task

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of making these explanations and justifications fell to Mr. Gardner and General Putt and was accomplished without serious repercussions through briefings of key officials in the Air Force and the cooperation of Pratt & Whitney officers and engineers in the cover story on engine delivery.

Early in January 1955 a complete list of aircraft-associated GFE was furnished by Lockheed and a list of photographic GFE (amounting to approximately \$1-1/2 million) was furnished by Perkin-Elmer. The aircraft list was turned over by General Putt's office to Colonel Gerald F. Keeling of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel's office, and he began work immediately arranging for delivery of the required items to Lockheed at Burbank, California. It was decided, principally for reasons of security, that the Agency would procure the photographic GFE from Air Force depot stocks through its normal channel (i. e., the Air Maritime Division/DDP to Air Force Intelligence). The amounts of this equipment ordered by Perkin-Elmer appeared excessive and after delivery of a large quantity to the subcontractor (Hycon), much of it had to be returned to Air Force stocks as unneeded or unsuitable for project cameras. Instead of \$1-1/2 million, the project budget at the end of June 1955 showed only \$315,000 committed for photographic GFE.

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Although there was no agreement in force until August 1955 Air Force support was forthcoming from the beginning of the year, not only in the provision of GFE but in the areas of research and development, aeromedical and weather planning, provision of personnel, and the setting up of the test site. After the joint agreement was signed, this support broadened and included the selection and training of primary mission pilots and other cadres; logistical and operational support of all kinds in the deployment of detachments to overseas bases and in the staging of missions; targeting requirements and intelligence; and support for the system set up to handle the intelligence obtained. Most of these areas of support will be detailed in subsequent chapters.

The timely and successful accomplishment of the Air Force contribution to the U-2 mission was engineered by the Headquarters USAF Project Officer, assisted by a small staff of Air Force officers, acting in the name of the Air Staff. The position of Project Officer was held in turn by: Colonel (now Brigadier General) Russell A. Berg, 1955-56; Lt. Col. (now Brigadier General) Leo P. Geary, 1957-1965; Colonel Clason B. Saunders (now retired), 1965-67. The positive and aggressive approach of this small staff (particularly during General Geary's tenure) toward fulfilling

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project support requirements and solving related problems, greatly facilitated the accomplishment of the joint mission.

In preparing Status of Funds Reports in the early days, the Project Comptroller, [REDACTED] at Mr. Bissell's behest, had attempted to include figures on the USAF share of project costs. Finding this a cumbersome task, and almost meaningless in that insufficient figures were available to him to give a reasonable estimate of Air Force participation, he requested that the practice be discontinued, or else that the Air Force be requested to provide current and factual cost information. [REDACTED] advised against the latter since he felt the Air Force could very well request in turn that Agency cost data be furnished the Air Force and unless there was assurance that such data would be rigidly controlled, he did not feel that it should be released.

At that point the effort to document Air Force contributions to the project in dollars along with Agency costs was discontinued. One rough estimate was prepared from incomplete figures provided by Lt. Col. Geary covering the two year period July 1955 through July 1957, and showing total major materials provided at \$18,527,232 and operating costs at \$4,016,215 for a total of \$22,543,447. For purposes of a high level briefing by the Director at the end of

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March 1956, Mr. Bissell estimated total costs of the project from inception through FY 1957 (not broken down between Agency and Air Force) to be \$73 million for major materials and \$25 million operating costs, for a total of \$98 million. (A break-down by items of these two estimates is shown in Annex 20.)

Project Comptroller

In the first months of the project the Agency Comptroller's concurrence or approval was obtained on contracts and other obligating documents originating with the project, but by March 1956 the volume of work being generated was such that he could no longer cope with it and he therefore recommended [redacted] to be official representative of the Comptroller's Office, to handle the financial and related functions of Project AQUATONE. Mr. Bissell concurred in the appointment of [redacted] as Project Comptroller and Certifying Officer, appropriate bond was set, and the delegation of authority issued on 12 May 1955 and circulated to appropriate officials of the Agency.

At a later point in the history of the project, Gen. Cabell raised the question whether contracts and other financial documents requiring the Director's signature should not first be signed by the

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Agency Comptroller, himself, rather than by a member of the AQUATONE staff. Mr. Saunders, the Comptroller, said he had complete confidence in the abilities of [] and other personnel assigned from the Comptroller's office to the project staff.

Mr. Bissell added that he was confident [] certification was in all cases completely supportable by appropriate documentation and most conservatively given, as confirmed by the Agency Auditor-in-Chief's review. It was agreed that no change would be necessary in the current arrangement.

The problems relating to budgeting for AQUATONE (and successor organizational entities) were complex enough due to the many phases of the project where no previous experience availed for guidance; but they were complicated by the constant change of pace imposed by the international political situation, which became the controlling factor in securing permission to operate.

First Budget Presentation: FY 1955-56

On 18 July 1955 the operational requirements for FY 1956 were presented to the CIA Comptroller along with a tabulation of commitments for FY 1955 (see Annex 21 for figures). In the preparation of these first estimates there were naturally items on which

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costs would only be learned through experience. Included also were substantial add-on's not covered in the original Project Outline: FY 1955 obligations of \$2.3 million and an additional \$5.1 million for FY 1956 representing the development and production of a communication and navigation system for the U-2, a radar photographic system, photographic processing, construction of a domestic test site, and ground support at overseas bases.

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U.S.C., section 403g)

These estimates were presented to the Bureau of the Budget, represented by Mr. Macy, on 20 July 1955, and defended by Mr. Bissell, Col. White, Mr. Saunders and [] for CIA. The principal single item questioned by Mr. Macy was the \$3.5 million for development of a radar photography system. He was assured by Mr. Bissell that all possible precautions were being taken to preclude any duplication in development of project equipment, all of which was being closely coordinated with the Air Force. The original project proposal had indicated that research on the equipment to be procured had been completed in large part; however, it was obvious that in the drawing-board-to-operations type of project which evolved there would be research and development costs, though some were difficult to separate.

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Mr. Macy's greatest concern in approving the FY 1956 budget was in regard to the over-all authority for the project. He noted that the original concept had changed somewhat in the six months of the project's life, and he wanted to assure himself that those responsible were not exceeding their authority. Mr. Bissell pointed out that discussion had been held with the President not more than five days before by Mr. Allen Dulles, and that the President was still most interested in and continued to sanction the undertaking.

The efforts of the Bureau of the Budget to keep the project within the bounds of the original concept did not end with this meeting, but the unwritten approval of the President proved to be quite elastic, by interpretation. Mr. Bissell said later:

"The Presidential approval had been obtained... on really quite a permanent basis. This approval endured for a good many years and it was ultimately good for something over \$300 million, and it would never have been given if this had been known in advance." 1/

The \$15.8 million required for FY 1956 was supplied from the Reserve for Contingencies on 1 August 1956. As the year progressed, it became clear that the needs had been underestimated since additional firm requirements of \$3.6 million developed (due mainly to

1/ From notes on Mr. Bissell's "Dining In" Speech, 12 October 1965.

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unanticipated research and development of electronic equipment). These additional funds were made available through re-evaluation and reprogramming of regular operations already budgeted for.

FY 1957

In November 1955, the funding of the project for FY 1957 was the subject of a meeting between the DCI and Secretary of the Air Force Donald A. Quarles. Messrs. Bissell and Gardner were also present. The practical question to be settled was whether the direct costs of the project for FY 1957, estimated at \$15 million, should be included in the CIA budget or in the Air Force budget. Before agreement could be reached on this question, however, other basic issues had to be considered.

In briefing the Director before the meeting, Mr. Bissell recommended strongly that, if present administrative arrangements for the project were to continue for another year, either funds be included in the CIA budget or the turn-over of full control of the project to the Air Force be set in motion immediately. He submitted several considerations in favor of continuing present arrangements: The difficulties which the Air Force would experience in continuing secure procurement methods, in making use of the predominantly civilian maintenance and support organization in

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being, and in preserving the "plausible denial" concept once the project had become the responsibility of SAC or another operational USAF command. He felt the status quo should be maintained long enough to prove or disprove the AQUATONE capability and allow for the emergence of a sound, over-all plan for peacetime overflights. If responsibility changed hands at the beginning of the next fiscal year, this would occur just as overflight operations were getting underway with consequent disruption of command channels and organizational arrangements, and delay in completing the primary mission.

As to the Agency's problem of getting money from the Bureau of the Budget and Congress, Mr. Bissell emphasized three points:

"First: It should be made absolutely clear to the Director of the Budget that... the issue is not merely a financial one of which Agency shall budget for a required expenditure but is basically one of organization and ultimate responsibility. If the Bureau of the Budget recommends Air Force financing it is in fact making a recommendation about the character of and the responsibility for this project. The issue should be discussed in these terms.

"Second: It should be kept in mind at all times by all concerned that we are making a choice between (a) burying X dollars for CIA in the Air Force budget, and (b) adding the same X dollars to the Air Force budget. Whatever the outcome, the Congress is going to be asked to vote X dollars in the Air Force budget. More-over X dollars is far too big to get by on any basis

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without explanation to someone. I am unable to see why security is served by explaining the purpose to which the X dollars will be put to the whole Armed Services and Appropriations Committees instead of to the smaller number of Congressmen and Senators who pass on the CIA budget.

"Third: No matter how the accounts are set up, this project should be supported before the Bureau and before Congress by the Air Force and the CIA jointly and their joint support should be in such terms as to make it unmistakably clear that they are agreed on the urgency of the requirement, the size of the budget, and the organizational arrangements under which the project is being carried on. If this is done, I believe there is little bearing on purely political grounds between one choice of financing and another." 1/

The meeting with Mr. Quarles resulted in agreement that CIA should be responsible for the project budget through FY 1957.

At the beginning of FY 1957, operations by the first field detachment over Soviet Russia and the Satellites began with excellent results, but due to protests received by the State Department from the Soviet, Czech and Polish Governments, overflights of primary targets had to be suspended. For the remainder of the year, restricted operations continued and two more detachments were readied and one deployed to Turkey. With the slower pace of operations thus imposed, expenditures for FY 1957 were kept within the budget of \$15 million. (The

1/ TS-142628, 11 November 1955. Memo to the DCI from Project Director, Subject: Meeting with Messrs. Quarles and Gardner.

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original amount budgeted had been approved at \$18.3 million but this had been reduced by \$3.3 million at the Project Director's urging.)

FY 1958

By January 1957, with a new fiscal year approaching, future plans for the project were still uncertain, Agency budget estimates had only been made for the first half of FY 1958, and a date for turn-over of responsibility to the Air Force had not been established. Efforts to lift the political restriction on primary missions had not succeeded; on the other hand, higher authority had not called for outright cancellation of the program. Many alternate plans were being considered with a view to keeping the capability in being in a more economical way.

In April 1957 Mr. Bissell wrote the Director and Deputy Director of CIA a memorandum pointing out the increasing urgency for reaching a decision on whether the U-2 capability was to be maintained in civilian hands beyond the end of the current photographic season, and if so, on what scale and in what form. The existing organization had been geared to a relatively brief, intensive operation. Faced with protracted inactivity and uncertainty, and with repeated postponement

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of decision, its morale and effectiveness were already impaired. He felt it essential to convert the organization to one designed to maintain a standby capability for occasional and limited use, or else begin to phase it out of existence. He concluded:

"a. It would be feasible to reorganize and to develop a new cover for AQUATONE with the mission of maintaining a substantial U-2 capability throughout the effective life of the aircraft in such a way as to support continued operations at a low rate if permitted and bursts of intensive operations if and when required. It is tentatively proposed that the reorganized project would have one detachment readied for carrier operations, one stationed in the Far East, probably at Okinawa, and one operating and ready to operate in Europe but probably stationed in the ZI and trained and equipped for extreme mobility.

"b. The extension of AQUATONE in this fashion would permit a significant reduction of manpower, amounting perhaps to a quarter to a third of present strength. It could probably be financed through FY 1958 within the limits of the present amounts budgeted for AQUATONE but would preclude the turnback of any surplus funds from the AQUATONE FY 1957 budget because the FY 1958 budget provides for only 6 months' operation at roughly present strength. Some financial provision would be required in the FY 1959 budget but an annual rate probably no more than half that budgeted for the current fiscal year." 1/

Finally, on 6 May 1957, a meeting was arranged with the President, to urge a definite decision on the project's future. (See Annex 22 for position papers prepared for that meeting.) The Agency

1/ TS-164213, 19 April 1957. Memo for DCI, DDCI from Project Director.

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and Air Force participants came away from the White House meeting with different ideas of the President's intent. On 29 May the Air Force and Agency participants met again to reach an agreed interpretation of the decisions rendered at the 6 May meeting. As a result of the second meeting, it was agreed between the two agencies' representatives that the President and the Secretary of State, for political reasons, wished the project to remain under civilian direction. In addition, Presidential approval had been given for staging a series of overflights from Pakistan (provided approval of that country could be obtained) during the current photographic season.

On 19 July 1957 General Cabell met with Generals Bergquist, LeMay, and Lewis to argue the case for civilian control and, fortified by the agreed interpretation of Presidential desires, was able to prevail over General LeMay's recommendation that all reconnaissance, including overflight and peripheral Elint missions, be put under SAC control. Plans for operations made subsequent to this meeting are outlined in Annex 23.

The forecast then was for another year of operations, which would carry into FY 1959, and with this mandate the FY 1958 and 1959 budget estimates required reorientation. The FY 1958 requirements had been set at \$10.8 million on the assumption that the project would operate at

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full strength during the first half of the fiscal year only, but the eventual obligations amounted to \$18.9 million. This represented an over-run of more than \$2 million on CHALICE (AQUATONE re-named in April 1958) and the initiation of three new projects: CORONA, CHAMPION, and GUSTO (satellite and follow-on manned reconnaissance aircraft). Funds in the amount of \$7 million to cover the initial costs of CORONA were transferred from the Agency Reserve. Also in April 1958, Mr. Bissell's organizational and functional scope within the Office of the Director was broadened to include besides the special projects: (a) the exercise of general supervision of all research and development activities of the Agency, and (b) a continuing search for fresh approaches to the Agency's tasks. His title was changed to "Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Development" and the Project Staff became the Development Projects Staff. Annex 24 contains the Headquarters Notice setting forth the terms of reference.

FY 1959

In May 1958, faced with the problem of drawing together budget estimates for the next presentation, Colonel Jack A. Gibbs, then Deputy Project Director, wrote to Mr. Bissell:

"While the concept of CHALICE operations is not too clear for the next year...we can still prepare a reasonable

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budgetary document. On the other hand, GUSTO* is very foggy both as to technical feasibility and future mode of operations. Accordingly, nothing has yet been placed on paper in meaningful form and until we know a little more about the technical possibilities, little more than an estimated cost of opening Watertown and some development and production estimates can be rightfully entered on paper." 1/

It was not until the middle of August 1958 that budget figures (even then not firm) received the Director's approval. In submitting the estimates to the Director, Mr. Bissell said, by way of background:

"During the past year the activities for which I have been responsible as the Director of Project AQUATONE have multiplied. Certain new tasks were handled as subprojects of AQUATONE without formal approval by you as separate projects, and with no separate funding or accounting. Others were handled in an ad hoc manner as new projects but with approval by you of only the sums initially provided therefor. It appears desirable in the current fiscal year to handle these several tasks as separate projects. The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the estimated operating budget for each such project for FY 1959, to request approval of the projects, and to recommend appropriate funding action." 2/

(The full text of this memorandum with a description of the tasks to be performed under each of the special projects is in Annex 25.)

Only \$5.9 million had been included in the approved Congressional budget for CHALICE on the assumption that U-2 operations

* Code name of feasibility study of U-2 successor aircraft.

1/ DPS-0413, 9 May 1958. Memorandum for Project Director from Col. J. A. Gibbs, Subject: FY 1959 Budget.

2/ DPS-3074, 12 August 1958. Memo for DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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would be closed out at the end of December 1958. Extension of this activity for another season with detachments operating on a limited basis from Turkey and Japan and a small unit carrying out development and testing at Edwards Air Force Base, California, and activation of a British unit within Detachment B, at Adana, raised the estimates to more than double that figure. Requirements for all projects were estimated roughly at \$16 million and a recommendation was made to withdraw funds from the Agency Reserve to cover the additional \$10,250,000 required. It was also noted that if the feasibility study on the U-2 successor aircraft proved successful and a decision were made by the advisory panel at their meeting in September, a quite substantial financial requirement would develop later in Fiscal Year 1959. (Delay in this decision put the first large outlay for the successor program forward into FY 1960.)

When the Bureau of the Budget was considering the FY 1959 estimates, Mr. Macy questioned the continuation of the U-2 activities and said he had the impression that the Agency's program would be terminated and the Department of Defense would take over. Col. William Burke, who replaced Col. Gibbs as Deputy Project Director on 1 June 1958, in reply to Mr. Macy's question, said the extension of the project

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was a reflection of the capability of the U-2 to survive and that present intelligence community estimates were that it would be useful until about January 1960. He pointed out that a SAC U-2 unit operating outside the Western Hemisphere would jeopardize CHALICE security. Mr. Macy said he would like, for the record, a statement outlining CHALICE past, present, and future plans. Such a paper was prepared by Col. Burke and cleared through Mr. Bissell and Gen. Cabell. It contained the following paragraphs:

"The original assignment for employment of the special aircraft for overflight activities was made to this Agency. This was based on the covert nature of the proposed overflight activities. At that time it was the intelligence estimate that the Soviets would have the capability to intercept the special aircraft by the fall of 1957. Since it would then not be possible to continue these operations on a covert basis, the plan was for all aircraft, equipment and military personnel to revert to the Air Force.

"As the fall of 1957 approached, actual operating experience caused revisions to intelligence estimates extending the useful life of the special aircraft for overflight beyond that date. The present estimate is that the Soviets will not have an effective intercept capability until January 1960. In view of the continued life span of the special aircraft and the fact that the majority of the targets in the USSR had not been covered, it was agreed to extend the program under the direction of this Agency, the termination of which to be dictated by the situation. This was decided at a White House meeting attended by high level representatives of the agencies involved.

"This Agency is prepared to turn over CHALICE assets to the Air Force at such time as the validity of the facts

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dictating the original assignment to this Agency have expired." 1/

(A year later, when Col. Burke was preparing to brief the Bureau of the Budget on FY 1960 plans, Mr. Bissell warned him to brief the BOB people fully, but not to allow any give and take on the question of management of CHALICE.)

In the middle of FY 1959 (on 18 February 1959) the long-debated proposal for the consolidation of all Agency air activities (which had the strong backing of General Cabell) took effect with the amalgamation of the Development Projects Staff (CHALICE and other projects), the Air Maritime Division of DD/P, and the Aircraft Maintenance and Support Division of the Office of Logistics, into a single component—the Development Projects Division, DD/P. (See Notice No. N 1-120-2, Annex 26). Mr. Bissell, meanwhile, had been made Deputy Director for Plans effective 1 January 1959 but continued to carry the title and authority of "Project Director" of CHALICE and the other DPD special projects. Col. William Burke was named Acting Chief, DPD, with Mr. James A. Cunningham as Assistant Chief.

1/ CHAL-0309, 2 Sept 1958. Memo for Mr. Robert H. Macy, from Deputy Director, DPS/DCI.

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At the end of FY 1959 actual obligations incurred by DPD were:

CHALICE	\$12 million
GUSTO	6.3 million
CORONA (incl. \$4.1 DOD)	8.1 million
Other	1 million
	<u>\$27.4 million</u>

Air Section (budgeted separately)	4.6 million
	<u>\$32 million</u>

Fiscal Year 1960

The first budget submission by DPD as a new member of the Clandestine Services (DD/P) got off to a poor start. Upon receiving the estimates for FY 1960 Mr. Bissell, after a preliminary review, immediately wrote to Col. Burke to "register his alarm at the tendencies therein apparent". After studying the figures at length, he returned them to DPD to be reworked with specific instructions on the line items which must be cut.

"The DPD submissions are in the worst shape they have been in for some years. In major part... it reflects what I regard as extremely bad past accounting practices with respect to air assets... brought about by accounting for costs for assets and operations through at least four or five different components of the Agency..." 1/

He requested that the following cuts be made:

1/ DD/P-4-6650, 20 Aug 1959. Memo to AC/DPD, from DD/P,
Subject: FY 1960 Budget.

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Reduce by:

Domestic construction	\$200,000
Government salaries (These were \$300,000 higher than FY 1959 plus \$480,000 in flight pay)	200,000
Operating cost Eastman Facility	300,000
Travel and Base Maintenance and Operations	300,000
CORONA Contingency (\$1 M)	200,000
S. E. I. Contingency	200,000
Air Section Development	200,000

These cuts added up to \$1 million from CHALICE and \$600,000 from other activities, and reduced the total budget request to \$122.5 million.

After directing these cuts, the DD/P went on to say:

"I am absolutely determined that such items as increasing personnel and administrative costs at Headquarters, running low priority backlogs through the Eastman facility, survey trips and excessive delegations at meetings, and the storage of obsolete aircraft shall not be allowed either to cause a cancerous growth in the total DPD budget or to displace more promising and important activities. We have accomplished what we have in the past largely by being small and hardworking. I realize that the absorption of the Air Section and certain divisional responsibilities not only add to the permanent workload of your Division but give rise at this juncture while the change is taking place to enormous confusion and a heavy temporary load of extra work. I am convinced, however, that with good management you can exercise effective cost control and it is absolutely essential that you do so." 1/

1/ DD/P-4-6650, 20 Aug 1959. Memo to AC/DPD from DD/P,
Subject: FY 1960 Budget.

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After resubmission, the FY 1960 budget was approved on 1 September 1959 for "planning purposes," but a list of excepted items requiring clarification or justification was forwarded to Col. Burke for action with a reminder to him (and his branch chiefs) that program approvals not only authorized the obligation of funds, but also required the monitoring of the rate of obligation so as to remain within the totals allowed for the year.

An effort was made by the DD/P in November 1959 to bring the budgetary affairs of the DPD more nearly into line with standard Clandestine Services practices. All activities of the DPD were brought together into a list of "Activity Programs" which was meant to parallel the DD/P area divisions' presentations of annual "Operational Programs." (See Annex 27 for the DD/P's explanation of the new approval procedure.) The very nature of DPD's business, however, with its heavy emphasis on industrial procurement, and a budget which never remained static, but in a constant state of change, made it very difficult to fit DPD and its activities into the mold of a DD/P division (although the effort continued until February 1962, when Mr. Bissell left the post of DD/P (and the Agency), and DPD was reorganized under the Deputy Director for Research (DD/R)).

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Total obligations for FY 1960 amounted to approximately \$118 million (a saving of about \$4 million from the requested \$122 million); Defense Department financing of OXCART represented \$75 million of the total, and \$43 million came from Agency funds.

Fiscal Year 1961

Planning and budgeting for DPD's FY 1961 activities took place in the backwash of the May Day 1960 incident and subsequent publicity. The Director approved maintaining the IDEALIST* capability on a limited scale at least through the summer of 1961. The U-2 was grounded until September 1960 when Detachment G became operational and Detachment C phased out. Hopes were pinned on the follow-on vehicle to take over the reconnaissance program by 1962. The satellite reconnaissance program was continuing; full policy clearance had been given the P2V program based in Taiwan; and air activities in the Far East were generally on the increase (e. g., STBARNUM, the Tibetan operation). Approval for a joint U-2 program with the Chinese Nationalists was received at the end of 1960 and a detachment was deployed to Taiwan in December. Requirements for U-2 coverage of Cuba began and continued through the fiscal year. Plans were made for a long-range replacement program for obsolete aircraft in the Agency inventory (on the Air Support

* New crypto for CHALICE.

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side) although the accent was on more use of MATS and other USAF air support in the interest of economy.

The initial submission of the FY 1961 Operational Program drew the following reaction from the DD/P (Mr. Bissell):

"I cannot in good conscience recommend that the Director approve the DPD budget for FY 1961... We are assuming that our inventory of U-2 aircraft is cut from 13 in FY 1960 to 7 in FY 1961, that the number of pilots is reduced by about one-third, that the total personnel are reduced by about one-sixth, and that operations conducted are at a reduced rate. Yet the numbers your Division has presented show only a 20% reduction in the cost of materiel and an actual increase of \$400,000 in overhead other than headquarters. I can predict with certainty that the DCI would not approve these figures... I would like responsible section heads to show cause for these extraordinary estimates... If we cannot cut the costs for FY 1961 below \$8.5 million, I will recommend that the project be terminated at an indicated savings of some 200 personnel. We have reached a phase in this activity where we must simply find ways to achieve at least a 15% reduction in costs when we are reducing our capability by 45%." 1/

The figures were reworked, sent forward and approved by the Director on 16 July 1960 with the proviso that every effort should be made to reduce the IDEALIST budget further and that a report should be made on such efforts by 1 January 1961. The FY 1961 approved DPD budget totaled \$30.85 million in Agency funds plus \$65 million of DOD funding for OXCART. The DOD funding was later increased to

1/ CHAL-1082-60, 8 July 1960. Memo to AC/DPD from DD/P.
Subject: FY 1961 Operational Program.

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
 U.S.C., section 403g)

\$85 million, and actual obligations at the end of FY 1961 totaled \$119.9 million.

In January 1961, [] was nominated by the CIA Comptroller to replace [] who had resigned from the Agency.

Fiscal Year 1962

The DPD concept of IDEALIST operations for FY 1962 anticipated the continued exploitation of the operational capability of the U-2 aircraft and associated special equipment, requiring permanent operating detachments in the ZI and at overseas bases, equipped and manned to accomplish photographic and electronic reconnaissance. Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base was expected to maintain the capability to stage to forward bases anywhere in the world and also to continue the development program as new equipment was required. Overseas bases at Adana (very limited) and at Tao Yuan, Taiwan, were expected to be maintained.

The FY 1962 Congressional Budget submission estimated requirements for all DPD projects to be:

Special Projects (principally IDEALIST, OXCART, and CORONA)(\$50M from DOD)	\$71.82M
Air Support	9.11M
Special Requirements	<u>1.47M</u>
TOTAL	\$82.40M

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These figures represented a \$14 million reduction from the previous year's requirements for special projects and a \$1.4 million increase in Air Support (principally for Far East programs). Actual obligations at the end of FY 1962 showed a total of \$85 million, of which DOD funds represented \$67.5 million.

Fiscal Year 1963

The outlook for Fiscal Year 1963 was that exploitation of the U-2 intelligence gathering capabilities would continue and probably increase. Planning was for a minimum of seven operational, J-75-equipped aircraft, allowing for continuing test programs as well as overflight operations. The aircraft utilization rate for FY 1963 was estimated at a total of 457 sorties for a total of 676 flying hours of all types in the U-2. The development of the OXCART vehicle and related equipment would continue at an accelerated pace with that program being given top priority by highest authority. A CORONA follow-on program was also projected.

Increases in budget estimates covered:

- a. Administration and support: Increases in average employment, periodic pay increases, increased travel.
- b. Development: Increased research and development, mainly in support of the Scientific Engineering Institute (a

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proprietary company set up to do research and testing for
DPD).

c. Air Support: Increased employment, travel, transportation, aircraft maintenance, and procurement of aircraft, and modernization of facilities.

d. Air Proprietaries: Development of indigenous air proprietaries in East Africa, Middle East and South America.

The only forecast reduction was in construction for special projects which was expected to taper off.

Midway into FY 1963 an activity program was approved for setting up an Electronic Data Processing Branch in OSA Operations Division with the mission of providing planning data for OXCART and IDEALIST missions, ephemeris plotting for satellite projects and such other future programs as might be developed.

Also midway through FY 1963, the National Reconnaissance Office* having come into being, the budgetary procedures for the CIA portion of the National Reconnaissance Program were finally ironed out and an agreement signed in April 1963. The Director of Program B (covering those CIA projects falling under the control of the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (D/NRO) was to prepare a definitized program

* See section on NRO at the end of this chapter.

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document including estimate of funds required. The funds to finance the National Reconnaissance Program were appropriated to the Department of Defense and the funds required by CIA to carry out its portion of the program were to be transferred by means of Standard Forms 1080. Monthly reports were to be furnished D/NRO on the fiscal status of each project. This system was to be effective with the FY 1964 appropriations. FY 1963 funds appropriated to CIA for programs falling under NRO control were to be obligated in accord with specific instructions issued by DNRO. There was no flexibility available to the Director, Program B, in the use of funds between specific projects or tasks. Any adjustments required specific approval of the DNRO.

Following the setting up of budgetary procedures for CIA's NRP participation, long-range funding requirements for 1964 through 1968 were requested for presentation by the Director of Program B (the DD/R). The IDEALIST program was expected to operate throughout the five year period engaging in approximately 60 missions per year with nine aircraft assigned: two at Detachment H, four at Detachment G at Edwards supplying a dual staging capability, and three remaining U-2's stationed at Lockheed for systems testing, replacement for rotational maintenance and a backup for operations.

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MAJOR MATERIEL COMMITMENTS & BUDGET
FY 1955-1956

	FY 1955			FY 1956				Total	
	Hq	Test Base	Total	Hq.	Test Base	Base A	Base B		Base C
1. Aircraft									
a. Airframe and test	\$22,500,000.00		\$22,500,000.00						
b. Advance Engineering and design				\$ 250,000.00					\$ 250,000.00
2. Photographic Equipment and Test									
a. GFE Cameras (Procured from Air Force)	315,000.00		315,000.00						
b. Cameras and Windows	5,085,000.00		5,085,000.00	415,000.00					415,000.00
c. Ground Handling Equipment	100,000.00		100,000.00	261,000.00					261,000.00
3. Photographic Processing									
a. Special Chemical Processing Equipment	447,000.00*		447,000.00						
b. Standard Processing Equipment	175,000.00*		175,000.00						
c. Minicard Equipment	128,000.00*		128,000.00						
d. Special Optical Rectification Equipment				300,000.00*					300,000.00
4. Electronic Equipment									
a. S & X Band Elint (6 units each)	355,000.00		355,000.00						
b. C & N System (2 prototypes and units for all aircraft)	861,000.00*		861,000.00	1,000,000.00*					1,000,000.00
c. VHF Comint Systems (6 units)	451,000.00		451,000.00	250,000.00					250,000.00
d. Elint Search & Lock-on (6 units all bands)	54,175.00		54,175.00	2,500,000.00					2,500,000.00
5. Radar Photography				3,500,000.00*					3,500,000.00
6. Test and Training Base									
a. Base Facilities (construction)		\$725,000.00							
7. Ground Support Facilities						\$25,000.00*	\$250,000.00*	\$25,000.00*	300,000.00
	\$30,471,175.00	\$725,000.00	\$31,196,175.00	\$8,476,000.00		\$25,000.00	\$250,000.00	\$25,000.00	\$8,776,000.00

* Items not covered in Project Outline:
 FY 1955 - \$2,336,000.00
 FY 1956 - 5,100,000.00
 \$7,436,000.00

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	FY 1955			FY 1956						
	Hq	Test Site	Total	Hq	Test Base	Base A	Base B	Base C	Total	
1. Personnel										
a. Government Employees:										
Salaries	\$ 5,064.22	\$ 369.23	\$ 5,433.45	347,011.53	\$ 208,833.17	\$ 323,096.23	\$ 163,962.52	\$ 53,901.75	\$1,096,805.20	
Travel & Allowances	15,529.11	483.00	16,012.11	66,098.20	126,346.88	289,868.24	167,620.43	50,364.32	700,298.07	
U. S. Civilian Pilots						180,000.00	90,000.00	45,000.00	315,000.00	
Contractor Employees (Training & Overseas)										
(1) Lockheed										
Salaries		447,000.00	447,000.00			153,408.00	81,667.00	25,845.00	260,920.00	
Travel & Allowances						75,135.00	66,410.00	33,990.00	175,535.00	
Burden and Profit		203,000.00	203,000.00			76,704.00	40,831.00	12,923.00	130,458.00	
(2) Hycon										
Salaries	37,500.00	38,500.00	76,000.00			36,000.00	25,200.00	12,600.00	73,800.00	
Travel & Allowances						12,805.00	13,275.00	9,162.00	35,242.00	
Burden and Profit	28,717.00	29,483.00	58,200.00			27,580.00	19,306.00	9,653.00	56,539.00	
(3) Ramo-Wooldridge										
Salaries						16,000.00	11,110.00	5,535.00	32,645.00	
Travel & Allowances						7,615.00	7,965.00	5,498.00	21,078.00	
Burden and Profit						12,253.00	8,510.00	4,255.00	25,018.00	
						(over)	66,120.00	38,280.00	29,000.00	133,400.00
2. Fuel (including Transportation)										
3. Film										
a. Test and Training		90,000.00	90,000.00		24,000.00				24,000.00	
b. Operational	40,000.00		40,000.00			67,200.00	28,800.00	19,200.00	115,200.00	
4. Processing Plant Operation										
a. Process Film & Paper	280,000.00		280,000.00	700,000.00					700,000.00	
b. Process Chemicals & Supplies				50,000.00					50,000.00	
c. Salaries				180,000.00					180,000.00	
d. Burden & Profit				225,000.00					225,000.00	
e. Plant Rental & Security				90,000.00					90,000.00	
5. Logistics										
a. Warehousing (Space etc.)				30,000.00	18,750.00				48,750.00	
b. Air Support Operational Cargo						522,900.00	301,500.00		824,400.00	
c. Air Support (Airlift)						270,300.00	178,398.00	91,902.00	540,600.00	
6. Base Operations & Maintenance										
a. Fuel for Electricity, Vehicles and Water					105,000.00				105,000.00	
b. Shuttle & Training Aircraft					135,000.00				135,000.00	
c. Maintenance (Camp & Equipment)					192,000.00				192,000.00	
d. Messing & Housing (Cost & Subsidy)		75,000.00	75,000.00		395,280.00				395,280.00	
e. Heavy Equipment (USAF to furnish)										
f. Station Wagon & Autos (Procurement)					5,700.00	5,700.00	5,700.00	5,700.00	22,800.00	
g. Safeshouse Rental & Housekeeping					7,000.00	9,000.00	9,000.00	12,000.00	37,000.00	
h. Special Clothing (Guards etc.)					3,000.00	3,000.00	3,000.00	3,000.00	12,000.00	
i. Study and/or Recreation Facilities					4,000.00	2,000.00	2,000.00		8,000.00	
j. Communication Lines (LA to site)					47,460.00				47,460.00	
k. Fire Protective Equipment (USAF)										
7. Hq and Vicinity Operational Expense										
a. Car Rental (Security)				500.00	300.00				900.00	
b. Office Space (L. A. Vic., Security)						2,350.00			2,350.00	
c. Apt & Housekeeper, site & E. Coast				5,000.00	5,000.00				10,000.00	
d. Commercial Communications				5,000.00					5,000.00	
	\$406,810.33	\$883,835.23	\$1,290,645.56	\$1,668,709.73	\$1,280,020.08	\$2,156,684.47	\$1,262,534.95	\$429,529.07	\$6,797,478.27	

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	FY 1955			FY 1956					Total
	Hq	Test Site	Total	Hq	Test Base	Base A	Base B	Base C	
B. Plant Overhaul of Equipment									
a. Airframes				\$ 100,000.00					\$ 100,000.00
b. Electronic				25,000.00					25,000.00
c. Photographic				125,000.00					125,000.00
Total, page 3	\$ -0-	\$ -0-	\$ -0-	\$ 250,000.00	\$ -0-	\$ -0-	\$ -0-	\$ -0-	\$ 250,000.00
Total, page 2	\$ 406,810.33	883,835.23	1,290,645.56	\$ 1,668,709.73	\$ 1,280,020.05	\$ 2,156,684.47	\$ 1,262,534.95	\$ 429,529.07	\$ 6,797,478.27
Total, page 1	30,471,175.00	725,000.00	31,196,175.00	8,476,000.00	-0-	25,000.00	250,000.00	25,000.00	8,776,000.00
Grand Total	\$ 30,877,985.33	\$ 1,608,835.23	\$ 32,486,820.56	\$ 10,394,709.73	\$ 1,280,020.05	\$ 2,181,684.47	\$ 1,512,534.95	\$ 454,529.07	\$ 15,823,478.27

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XCART was expected to reach operational peak in FY 1965 and continue with an average of 60 operational missions per year (an over optimistic estimate). Modification and development would continue on airframe and engine as well as subsystems. Two permanent staging bases and five pre-strike and post-strike bases were planned. The TAGBOARD drone and related systems were expected to be developed by FY 1965 and put into operation the latter part of the period with a squadron of launchers to be organized by FY 1966. (As it developed, the D/NRO transferred the TAGBOARD program to the Air Force in 1963— see Annex 28 for chronology of that program.)

An advanced manned reconnaissance vehicle would be studied in FY 1965 and a prototype produced in FY 1966, with ten vehicles to be produced in FY 1967. (Research on this project—ISINGLASS—was phased over to the Air Force by mutual agreement between the DD/S&T/CIA and the D/NRO in April 1967. Since there was no established Air Force requirement for a vehicle of this kind, according to the D/NRO, the further development in this field has been a unilateral effort by the original contractors with no governmental financing.)

Follow-on satellite systems were to be studied with development and eventual operation to be achieved commencing in FY 1966, with an

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anticipated 24 launchings per year from surface vehicles, static launch pads or possibly submarines.

Photographic processing would continue for all reconnaissance programs throughout the five year period and in addition infra-red, ultra-violet and side-looking radar capabilities would be developed with processing initially resting with the developers of the systems until FY 1966 when processing might be consolidated into a government or contractor facility.

Countermeasures to disguise and defend all reconnaissance systems would be developed simultaneously with each system.

Amounts forecast in this long range program (in millions of dollars) were:

<u>Project</u>	<u>FY 1965</u>	<u>FY 1966</u>	<u>FY 1967</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
OXCART	\$83.7	\$ 84.3	\$ 77.8	\$ 81.8
IDEALIST	15.1	13.015	16.48	16.33
TAGBOARD	25.45	40.25	43.6	44.25
Advanced Manned Recon Vehicle	27.55	81.0	110.3	140.7
Follow-on Satellite Processing	50.0	100.0	250.5	250.5
Countermeasures	30.9	11.8	13.75	16.25
Communications in support of NRO	2.0	1.0	.50	.50
	.45	.40	.70	.80

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Of the total actual obligations under Program B (CIA) for FY 1963 of \$158 million, \$148 million was provided through NRO with only \$10 million in the CIA budget for OSA. For subsequent years obligations of CIA funds by OSA ran to \$9 million in FY 1964, \$10 million in FY 1965, \$11 million in FY 1966, and \$12.6 million in FY 1967.

Fiscal Year 1964: NRO

The Program B submission to NRO in June 1963 requested \$520 million for FY 1964; the DNRO immediately made a cut of \$136 million from this request, establishing a system of quarterly funding as opposed to annual funding due to limitation of allocations to the Comptroller, NRO. Because of non-availability of funds, the DNRO was obliged to reduce some items in Program B to what were considered by OSA officers as unrealistic levels (for example the Eastman contract for processing overflight photography was cut by \$1.25 million). General Jack Ledford (then Director of Special Activities) recommended as an alternative to operating at these levels that certain projects be cancelled or suspended to provide the necessary funds for forecast expenditures. The largest cuts made were in the OXCART program but IDEALIST also suffered a \$4 million cut, which was equal to the amount budgeted for a permanent base in India, and the purchase price of two electronic collection systems (System X).

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Program B obligations for FY 1964 (NRO Budget) were:

OX CART/WEDLOCK*	\$215,536,700*
IDEALIST	10,600,000
CORONA	33,029,043
KOBOLD (Electronics)	6,990,000
URANIUM	1,000,000
ISINGLASS	750,000
TAGBOARD	33,590,000
EUCOLITE	13,520,000
Eastman (R&D)	2,000,000
STPOLLY	5,757,524
	<u>\$322,773,267</u>

* Includes Air Force procurement.

Dissatisfaction with having to operate under the fiscal restrictions imposed by the DNRO led OSA officials to consider the pro's and con's of CIA's voluntarily withdrawing from the entire National Reconnaissance Program and transferring its programs to the Air Force. On 7 October 1963, Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, appointed as the first Deputy Director for Science and Technology in August 1963, outlined the considerations of such action to the DCI among which were the saving of about 700 personnel slots and of approximately \$12 million in the CIA budget for FY 1965. He concluded, however, that:

"... OSA represents a unique national asset: an experienced, integrated organization with a demonstrated capability for developing and operating reconnaissance systems which produce intelligence data upon which this country has come to rely. Until that record is matched, I

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submit that we can find better opportunities to save \$12 million and 700 positions somewhere else in the Federal Government. " 1/

Fiscal Year 1965

The original submission to NRO for the FY 1965 budget for the IDEALIST program was for \$38.9 million and included \$13.5 million for procurement of new U-2 aircraft. The cost of this new aircraft procurement, plus \$9.8 million of the total electronics program were disallowed by NRO.

The concept of operations for IDEALIST remained approximately the same as for the previous two years with five out of the nine available U-2's configured for inflight refueling and two for aircraft carrier operations. The mission remained the same with requirements furnished by the intelligence community through USIB and COMOR, and with approvals for overflight operations being sought through the DNRO from the Special Group. Sortie estimate for FY 1965 was for a total of 152 sorties of approximately 1342 total hours duration; plus 321 test and training missions of 963 total hours duration.

Total funds obligated by the Director of Program B at the close of FY 1965 were:

1/ BYE-0206-63, 7 October 1963 (see Annex 29).

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	OX CART	\$112,829,000
	IDEALIST	16,395,000
	J58 Engine R&D	84,000,000
50X1, E.O.13526	[REDACTED]	3,875,000
	Photo Processing	12,392,193
	Eastman Kodak R&D	3,500,000
	Countermeasures	11,000,000
	CORONA	26,479,000
	IUPOLLY	1,200,000
	STSPIN	11,957,807
	FULCRUM	8,158,000
	Total	<u>\$291,786,000</u>

The Auditor's Report on OSA operations for the FY 1965 period showed a total allotment from NRO of \$719 million, more than \$400 million of which represented OSA procurement for other programs under NRO jurisdiction. The OSA staffing complement during this period consisted of 300 staff employees and 379 assigned military personnel divided among the Headquarters office, four domestic installations, and five overseas bases, with physical support also being provided to about 1500 contractor techreps at various locations.

During this period the Office of Special Projects (OSP), which had responsibility for the Agency's satellite activities, was separated from the Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T, effective 15 September 1965. OSP continued to rely on OSA for financial and security administration of its contracts and its telegraphic communications support.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Fiscal Year 1966

The outlook for the IDEALIST program for FY 1966 assumed the life expectancy of the U-2 would carry through at least two more years. Beyond 1966 the picture became less clear as to the identification of specific targets for the U-2 system. The useful life was expected to become more limited as the introduction of enemy defensive measures increased, and the areas for safe operations diminished. (See Annex 30 for estimate by the Director of Program B.)

A significant increase in the OXCART budget for FY 1966 represented the funding of an expected staging/operating base at Kadena for the purpose of China Mainland reconnaissance, while a \$7 million increase for IDEALIST represented principally improved Elint, countermeasures and camera systems. The NRO budget for Program B for FY 1966 covering all OSA and OSP projects and OSA procurement for the Air Force, amounted to \$727 million. OSA's obligations at the end of FY 1966 were:

OXCA RT	\$ 92,622,036
IDEALIST	16,026,556
Photo Processing	16,564,890
Eastman R&D	4,100,000
General R&D (U-2R)	100,000
KOBOLD (Electronics)	10,471,038
STSPIN	4,788,065
IUPOLLY	1,143
Total	<u>\$144,673,728</u>

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~~TOP SECRET~~Fiscal Year 1967

Program B's NRO budget for FY 1967, including OSA and OSP projects, and Air Force projects funded through OSA, amounted to a total of \$484,332,856. Obligations for OSA projects alone were as follows:

OX CART	\$ 68,455,735
IDEALIST	10,320,850
KOBOLD (Electronics)	10,911,921
General R&D (Sensors)	2,048,238
Photo Processing	17,000,000
Eastman Kodak R&D	1,375,053
U-2R Procurement	35,347,850
IUPOLLY	638
STSPIN	1,275,236
Total	<u>\$146,735,521</u>

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NRO Establishment: Principal Events to December 1966

Background

When consideration was being given late in 1955 to the continuation of the U-2 project as currently set up, with costs being budgeted by CIA and in turn buried in the Defense Department budget, Mr. Bissell in a memorandum to the DCI made the following suggestion with regard to the long-term management of all U.S. reconnaissance programs:

"The present dispersion of responsibility, whereby activities of the sort here under discussion are being carried on by USAFE, FEAF, SAC, and ourselves, is uneconomic and involves considerable risk of duplication of effort and of inadequacy of central control. It would probably be desirable in the long run to create a single operating organization, controlled directly from Washington, which would carry out all overflight activities involving penetrations of more than a few miles in depth in peacetime. This organization could draw heavily on existing commands (and on the CIA) for support.

"The argument against the conduct of overflights by strictly military organizations with air crews that are members of the Armed Services of the United States is even more powerful today than it was a year ago. Though the second Geneva Conference has demonstrated that the Russians are nearly as unyielding as ever, enough of the spirit of the first Geneva Conference is still adrift so that anything that could be identified as an overt act of military aggression would call down serious political penalties upon this country. Accordingly, if there is to be a single organization responsible for overflights, its aircrews should be civilians; it should be organized to as great an extent as feasible with civilian personnel; and its activities should be regarded as clandestine intelligence gathering operations.

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"The foregoing considerations lead me to the conclusion that the single organization here proposed should be a mixed task force, organized outside of the framework of any of the regular military services though drawing extensive support from them. On the other hand, I am inclined to believe that the Air Force should own a majority of the common stock in this organization, by contrast with the present situation in which the CIA owns the majority of the common stock in AQUATONE. In any event, however, I believe that both CIA and the Air Force should contribute personnel and support and consideration might even be given to bringing the other services in as minority stockholders.

"One further argument in favor of some such arrangement as that here proposed is that an organization with a permanent interest in this activity would be in a position to stimulate continuing research and development. It is worth noting that with two early and unimportant exceptions the aircraft under production for AQUATONE are the first ever designed exclusively for a reconnaissance mission and, of course, are the only ones that have ever been designed to meet the requirements of altitude, range and security imposed by the contemplated mission.

"The views advanced in the preceding paragraphs have to do with the ultimate organization (and by inference financing) of overflight activities..." 1/

In light of the above arguments, Mr. Bissell proposed that the DCI examine, together with Messrs. Quarles and Gardner of the Department of the Air Force, the organization for overflight reconnaissance and endeavor to arrive at a rational and orderly pattern for the longer run no later than Fiscal Year 1957.

1/ TS-142628, 11 November 1955, Memo for DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr. (See Annex 31).

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NRO Agreement

Six years passed before the organization proposed by Mr. Bissell received active consideration by the Defense Department and CIA. On 6 September 1961 a letter of agreement was signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric and the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Gen. Cabell) with respect to the setting up of a "National Reconnaissance Program". The agreement was that a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was to be established on a covert basis to manage this program and that it was to be under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force (then Dr. Joseph V. Charyk), and the Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA (Mr. Bissell), acting jointly and supported by a small special staff drawn from Defense and CIA personnel. The NRO would have direct control over all elements of the total program. (See Annex 32 for letter of agreement.)

Within the framework of this agreement, drafting sessions began, looking toward an agreed division of responsibilities between Agency and Air Force. On 22 November 1961, an eleven-page working draft of "NRO Functions and Responsibilities" was presented by the Air Force side and a meeting was requested between Mr. Bissell and Dr. Charyk to consider the draft. This paper went into great detail

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on all aspects of the total reconnaissance program, even to establishing responsibilities for the formatting of the collected product.

The DD/P countered with a two-page "Division of Responsibilities Within NRO" drafted by Mr. Eugene Kiefer in collaboration with a DPD working group of Messrs. Cunningham and Parangosky, and Colonel Beerli. This paper (see Annex 33 for text) recommended the continuation under NRO direction of the current workable and well understood allocation of responsibilities between the Air Force and CIA based on existing agreements, with consideration being given to redefinition of responsibilities for developing programs in order to make the best use of both agencies' capabilities. The DD/P sent copies of this statement, with Dr. Charyk's agreement, to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as requested by General Maxwell Taylor, then Special Assistant to President Kennedy.

Meanwhile at the end of November 1961, Mr. Allen Dulles had retired as Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. John A. McCone had succeeded him. Also the imminent departure of Mr. Bissell from the CIA was forecast, becoming effective 17 February 1962, and a period of change and reorganization intervened before the conclusion

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of an NRO agreement. Following the departure of Mr. Bissell, the Agency's reconnaissance projects were separated from the DD/P's management control and placed under the aegis of the newly assigned Deputy Director for Research (DD/R), Dr. Herbert Scoville.

Dr. Scoville, at a meeting with Mr. McCone on 19 March 1962 to discuss NRO planning, was told that the DCI did not favor a dual chairmanship for NRO but believed a single chairman with the other agency's senior representative as deputy should be the management set-up. The language of the agreement should not mention individuals by name, but Mr. McCone was willing to concede Dr. Charyk the Directorship with Dr. Scoville as Deputy Director. Within this general set-up, the DCI insisted that projects be assigned specifically to each agency, e.g. OXCART to CIA and SAMOS to USAF. He also wished to have language written into the agreement whereby advance planning would be done jointly by the DNRO and the DD/NRO. Lastly it was the DCI's wish that CIA, through the BYEMAN system, should control all security clearances for all programs within the purview of the NRO.

The DD/R on 20 March 1962 sent to the DCI a new draft agreement based on the letter agreement of 6 September 1961, and including the desired changes of the DCI. Dr. Scoville noted to the DCI:

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"I have discussed this with Dr. Charyk who generally concurs and believes that it is a good working document on which to develop the specific plans for the National Reconnaissance Office. I made it clear to him that, although the document does not specify that he will be the Director, this is our intention. He concurred in the philosophy that both the Director and the Deputy Director should be involved in the advance planning and that one Agency or the other should be given primary responsibility for all approved projects..." 1/

The agreement of 2 May 1962 (see Annex 34) signed by the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Roswell Gilpatric), which was Dr. Scoville's draft as rewritten in the Pentagon, said that the DNRO would be designated by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and would be responsible directly to them for the management and conduct of the NRP. However, no mention was made in the agreement of a Deputy Director. CIA would be the Executive Agent for DNRO for those covert projects already under its management and such additional covert projects as might be assigned to it.

On 3 May 1962, the DCI confirmed to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric his agreement that Dr. Charyk be named DNRO. On 14 June 1962, the Secretary of Defense issued the Department of Defense internal directive regarding NRO and announced the designation of Dr. Charyk as DNRO in addition to his other duties as Under Secretary.

1/ TS-155848, 20 March 1962. Memo for DCI from DD/R.

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Prior to scheduled meetings between Drs. Charyk and Scoville on 22 and 23 May 1962 to iron out some of the working arrangements on NRO, Mr. James Cunningham noted to the DD/R that, assuming the greatest concession to date was yielding the position of DNRO to Dr. Charyk and thus to the Air Force, the Agency should seriously consider seeking the Chief of Staff position in NRO lest the CIA contribution be so fully subordinated to Air Force interests that the only influence it could exert would be through the DD/R's personal relationship with the DNRO in the person of Dr. Charyk. Mr. Cunningham was not insistent that the slot be filled by an Agency staff civilian, although this was certainly reasonable, but he felt strongly that if the individual assigned belonged to the military he should certainly be on the Agency payroll, seconded to NRO, and responsive to CIA policy views.

During the 22-23 May meetings Dr. Scoville agreed with Dr. Charyk that the NRO Staff should be located in a single office, which should be adjacent to the DNRO (in the Pentagon).

On 6 July 1962, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, directed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence wherein he took note of the

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agreements made to date between them regarding NRO (which had been reported to the President by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) and commented:

"We believe that the actual structure of the documents is inadequate to support an efficient organization when the present experienced and distinguished group moves on to other tasks. We therefore recommend a continuing study of a more satisfactory, permanent, documentary basis for the NRO with particular references to existing NSC directives with which the present NRO plan may be in conflict." 1/

The President had approved the Board's report and Mr. Bundy requested that the Secretary of Defense and the DCI take appropriate action concerning NRO documentation and make a joint report to the PFIAB by 15 September 1962.

The view which had been expressed by Mr. Cunningham regarding Agency acquisition of the NRO Chief of Staff slot was not strongly supported by either the DD/R or the DCI. When Dr. Charyk issued his first draft memorandum on organization and functions of the NRO on 23 July 1962 for DOD/CIA concurrence, the Chief of Staff position had been assigned as follows:

"The NRO staff will be covered by the overt title of Office of Space Systems, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Director, Office of Space Systems will be the

1/ BYE-0029-62, 6 July 1962. Memo from McGeorge Bundy to DCI and Secretary of Defense.

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overt title of the Director, NRO Staff. The NRO Staff will receive all administrative and logistic support from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force." 1/

The Office of Space Systems had been set up under the Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force to manage the satellite program. Its Director was Brig. Gen. Richard D. Curtin, USAF, who thus became the first Director of the NRO Staff.

The DNRO's draft also established Program A (satellite effort) under USAF management, and Program B (CIA assets) whose Director was the Deputy Director for Research, CIA, and proposed setting up Program C (Navy assets). In his memorandum to the DNRO of 29 August 1962, the DD/R commented on the proposed organization and functions of NRO as follows:

"In general I concur with the referenced paper... and think it is a good and useful basis for initial NRO operations. It is probable that over a period of time some changes will occur, particularly in the staffing pattern which must be responsive to the particular current requirements...

"In connection with the CIA participation in the NRO, I should like to suggest that the DD/R's position be designated as Senior CIA Representative reporting directly to DNRO rather than as Director of Program B since this would give him the responsibility as the DCI's representative with responsibilities across the entire NRO. The Assistant Director of Special

1/ BYE-1733-62, 23 July 1962. Memo from DNRO to Program Directors and NRO Staff Director, para 2 d (2), full text at Annex 35.

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Activities, CIA, who within the Agency has direction of Agency reconnaissance activities under the DD/R, should be designated as Director of Program B.

"In view of the fact that the Agency is a legally separate entity budget-wise from the Defense Department, I believe that the NRO budgetary procedures insofar as they apply to CIA should be spelled out in more detail than currently is the case in paragraph 2 i, on page 4..." 1/

The DD/R appended to his memorandum a proposed procedure for budgeting for the CIA portion of the National Reconnaissance Program:

"The over-all NRP will be prepared based on proposals from the various Program Directors... These will be reviewed by Drs. Charyk and Scoville and incorporated into the NRO proposed program. This program will be presented by Dr. Charyk to the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, at which point it will then become the official program.

"DNRO will present and defend this program to the Bureau of the Budget indicating which portions will be the responsibility of CIA. CIA will place in its annual budget funds necessary to carry out its portions of the program. In the presentation to Congress CIA will defend its program before its committees with an indication that they are approved parts of the over-all NRP.

"After Congress has approved the CIA programs including those for NRO and provided the funds, the Agency will look to the Bureau of the Budget to apportion those funds in the normal manner. The funds contained in the CIA Budget for NRO activity will be expended under the direction of the DD/R in accordance with approved programs and NRO will be kept advised by Dr. Scoville as appropriate.

1/ BYE-3545-62, 29 August 1962. Memo for DNRO from DD/R.

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"In cases where budgeted amounts are not sufficient to meet the program aims of NRO, e. g. where policy or program shifts have taken place which required alterations in scope, etc., the Agency would look to NRO to provide the flexibility or, as appropriate, take steps with the Bureau of the Budget and/or Congress to acquire supplemental funds. Where NRO either supplements Agency funds or uses the Agency as an executive agent for contracting purposes under the NRO agreement, DNRO will advance funds in the same manner employed in the past." 1/

Commenting on the DD/R reply to the Charyk paper on organization and functions, Mr. Cunningham agreed that the DD/R position in the NRO should be elevated to Senior CIA Representative if it were not desired by CIA to make a frontal attack on the problem and secure the post of Deputy Director of NRO for the DD/R (which he still felt to be the proper set-up). Mr. Cunningham also questioned the provision in the paper that prior specific approval of the DNRO will be required for any matter of the NRO or NRP to be processed to higher authority. He felt that tied the DCI's hands to a degree inconsistent with his role not only in the intelligence community but more particularly as senior action official on programs of primary concern to CIA.

1/ BYE-3544-62/A, Att. A, 29 August 1962. DD/R Memo to DNRO.

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On 11 September 1962, Drs. Scoville and Charyk agreed to the following: (1) Dr. Charyk would propose to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) that Dr. Scoville be made Deputy Director of NRO; (2) that the budgeting for CIA portion of NRP because of its complexity should be studied further; (3) that the Agency would not contract for GAMBIT and [] (satellite) programs; (4) that the minor Agency changes to the Charyk paper were accepted; (5) that a high level liaison individual from CIA to NRO was acceptable to DNRO; (6) that the Operations Center for satellite control would be transferred to the Pentagon when NRO was sufficiently set up, approximately four months hence.

On 5 October 1962 at a meeting with Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Dr. Charyk, DCI McCone and DD/R Scoville present, a CIA paper was presented by Mr. McCone on reorganization of NRO to eliminate dual reporting by the DNRO and establishing the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent to the National Reconnaissance Planning Group. Secretary McNamara said that from the outset of NRO he had had reservations on the requirement for a special organization for reconnaissance and did not understand why in the long run this could not be handled by normal intelligence organizational procedures.

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He said while he was satisfied with the existing NRO organization for the present, he would review Mr. McCone's paper and discuss it with him at a later date. He suggested the possibility that perhaps NRO and NSA should both be subordinate to DIA. Mr. McCone rebutted this suggestion on grounds that the activities of these two organizations transcended the strictly military intelligence sphere and also because of the difficulties DIA was having in becoming functional.

On 17 October 1962 DNRO assigned DOD to manage and operate all FIREFLY drones against Cuba under NRO supervision with CIA Elint assistance. On the same day DNRO refused the assignment of Mr. Robert Singel of CIA to the NRO Staff as a liaison officer (after previously agreeing to such an appointment) because he felt he already had all the full-time staff personnel necessary to accomplish the functions assigned by the 23 July 1962 memorandum. Also on the same day he assigned the AQ-12 (TAGBOARD) drone project management to the Director of Program B (CIA).

During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the NRO was put to its first test regarding timely flow of information on the reconnaissance program between the Air Force and CIA, and came up sadly lacking in the view of OSA. When Dr. Scoville protested to Dr. Charyk

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the latter stated clearly that he was not attempting to keep CIA informed on all that NRO was doing but only on those programs which were specifically CIA's responsibility. He added that he only reported to Secretary McNamara and that the NRO was not a joint operation at all. If Mr. McCone had any other understanding, Dr. Charyk said, he should speak to Secretary McNamara.

On 17 October 1962, Dr. Charyk agreed, with several minor changes, to the redraft of the NRO Agreement furnished the Secretary of Defense by Mr. McCone on 5 October, and in a memorandum accompanying the draft addressed to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric said that he felt the establishment of the National Reconnaissance Planning Group was a good step, and one which should satisfy the concern expressed by the PFIAB. However, he considered the proposed paragraph on financial management to be completely unacceptable.

On 23 November 1962, Dr. Charyk, as a result of a letter from Mr. McCone on procedures governing CIA's responsibilities for funding projects under the NRO agreement, explained the problem to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the following terms:

"...Mr. McCone again proposes to budget for those programs which are the responsibility of the NRO; to justify the amounts in their budget submission to Congress; and to

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have full fund control over amounts contained in their budget. This, in effect, gives the DNRO a financial function in advance budget planning but not a responsibility for financial control and administration of the National Reconnaissance Program. The points raised here appear to me to be fundamental. Either the DNRO has financial control and, hence, possesses the essential management tools required, or the NRO becomes a 'paper concept'.

"With respect to the current fund problem, it is true that no funds have actually been issued although the NRO Comptroller has advised the CIA that funds are available for approved programs and has also advised them of the amounts which would be released at this time. No action to request transfer of these amounts has been taken by CIA. This, I believe, is because the Agency desires the release of all funds without restriction. I am prepared to release funds only as requested and justified and I believe the Bureau of the Budget is sympathetic to this position. In this respect I am advised by my Comptroller that CIA is utilizing other funds to finance contractual documents under the responsibility of the NRO and that at the present time they are in a deficiency position. My Comptroller has notified the CIA Comptroller that if funds are not requested on Form 1080's by November 26th, the interim Joint Resolution Authorization will be withdrawn. The CIA may find itself in a highly vulnerable position as to violations of financial procedures for Government operations..." 1/

As a result of Dr. Charyk's memoranda to Under Secretary Gilpatric, the latter requested a conference with Mr. McCone for the purpose of ironing out the differences regarding CIA participation in the NRP. Meanwhile, the role cast by Dr. Charyk for CIA in the program was not sitting well with OSA and there was a good bit of

1/ BYE-0356-62, 23 Nov 1962. Memo to Mr. Gilpatric from Dr. Charyk.

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frustration at the working level. In the first week of January 1963 a memorandum was drafted in OSA for the DD/R's signature which set out for the DCI the modifications to the NRO organization believed necessary if CIA was to play an active role, not only as a participating member in the NRP through IDEALIST, OXCART and CORONA projects, but also in the management, direction and coordination of the total national reconnaissance effort. Due to the imminent resignation of Dr. Charyk, the time was felt to be propitious to effect the changes (foremost among these being the designation of the DD/R as Deputy Director of NRO, so as to give the Agency a day-to-day voice and vote in the decision-making process within the NRO). This memorandum to the DCI was signed by Dr. Scoville, but subsequently he had second thoughts and did not send the memorandum to Mr. McCone.

On 24 January 1963, Mr. Cunningham addressed a memorandum to the Executive Director, Mr. Kirkpatrick (BYE 2164-63/A), which set forth the history of the Agency's joint participation in reconnaissance projects beginning in 1954, and making several proposals which would offer CIA a greater role in the NRP than it currently enjoyed. He pointed out the deterioration in CIA/USAF relations under the NRO as follows:

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"With the advent of the National Reconnaissance Office certain problems and incidents have occurred which would suggest that the NRO in its present form is not functioning as desired, and too often has been the arena for misunderstanding between the Air Force and the CIA. Resolution of differences has not been without a price paid in widening the gulf which is rapidly increasing between a once harmonious USAF and CIA relationship.

"Possibly this condition is more properly a sign of the times and not the NRO. Possibly the responsibilities of the reconnaissance programs have evolved to the stage where their size and operation make clear-cut management no longer realistic or obtainable within the Governmental environment that presently exists.

"It is difficult to isolate a turning point in the USAF/CIA relationship and to point to any one act or series of acts which have prompted the erosion that has taken place. Whatever the reason, it is fair statement of fact to conclude frankly that during the short reign of the NRO the USAF/CIA relationship has deteriorated to the point where mutual trust is now hesitant and there is speculation on either side of 'power grabs' by the other." 1/

The proposed courses of action to improve the situation were:

1. Appointment of D/NRO and DD/NRO as full-time positions, with CIA and DOD respectively represented in the two slots.
2. Make the NRO Staff an executive and administrative body but not involved in day-to-day operational and contractual decisions.
3. Equalize the representation on the NRO Staff between the participating agencies.

1/ BYE-2164-63/A, 24 January 1963. Memo to Executive Director.

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4. Assign all Program Directors to the Washington area to simplify coordination processes.

5. Use Joint Reconnaissance Center for coordinating activities rather than maintain a duplicate NRO facility.

6. Assign all national reconnaissance to NRO Program Directors, including SAC.

7. Locate the whole NRO Staff in one office area on neutral ground.

8. Designate Director of Program B (CIA) responsible for processing and disseminating intelligence product from all national reconnaissance programs.

As a result of direct conferences between Mr. McCone and Mr. Gilpatric, a new agreement was staffed out and signed by them on 13 March 1963. It provided for the DD/NRO slot to be filled by a CIA appointee (the DD/R), but placed the executive direction of the whole National Reconnaissance Program in the hands of the Secretary of Defense, or his appropriate deputy, with policies and guidance to be jointly agreed with the DCI. A separate agreement was reached on 5 April 1963 as to program funding with particular relation to Program B (CIA) and was made an appendix to the full agreement. (See Annex 36 for text of these agreements.)

On 10 May 1963, a paper outlining the duties of the DD/NRO, as approved by the DNRO, was passed to Col. Ledford, AD/SA, by the

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new Director of the NRO Staff, Col. John L. Martin, Jr. (See Annex 37 for terms of reference). This paper, which had originated with Dr. Scoville, had been redrafted by the NRO Staff and it omitted any requirement for coordinating DNRO papers with the DD/NRO. When Dr. Scoville protested, Col. Martin argued that there was never time for coordination (despite the fact that NRO staff work was always a lengthy and time-consuming process). In many cases, as a result, the DNRO signed papers concerning Agency activities which were factually incorrect, having never been cleared with the Agency's senior NRO representative.

On 24 May 1963, the new DNRO, Dr. Brockway McMillan, noted to Dr. Scoville three reasons why he intended to follow the policy of using CIA contracting authority for other than Program B tasks:

(1) To provide essential security to NRO matters not possible otherwise; (2) to provide speed of response not obtainable through DOD contractual channels for urgent cases; and (3) to obtain significant savings to the government or improvement in management by use of such contracting authority in joint procurement actions.

In June and July 1963 discussions and drafting sessions took place between the NRO Staff and the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center to

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develop a working agreement for JRC support of the NRP. A draft agreement was presented for Mr. McCone's comments on 8 July which was characterized by Col. Giller (Acting DD/R on Dr. Scoville's departure from the Agency) as being sufficiently vague and general to permit any interpretation desired. He recommended that the paper be rewritten, following a clearly-stated purpose for such an agreement, and that the CIA Air Operations Center (within OSA), which had for ten years planned and executed all covert overhead reconnaissance, be designated the NRO Operations Center and source of support vis-a-vis the JCS/JRC. Also that only in times of actual hostilities should there be automatic transfer to the JRC of NRO operational assets.

On 17 August Col. Ledford wrote at length to the DDCI concerning the disputes, confusion and slow-downs in the National Reconnaissance Program. He said that steps should be taken to make the organization work, or else it should be abandoned and a return to independent action by DOD and CIA should be made. It was felt among the OSA Staff that the basic difficulty in the entire situation was the dual role of the DNRO. It was difficult for him to function impartially when on one hand he was responsible for USAF interests as Under Secretary, and on the other he was responsible for over-all government interests in the role of

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DNRO; the two functions were not always compatible and in fact were quite often diametrically opposed.

At a meeting on 15 October 1963 where the above DD/S&T views were aired, Mr. McCone expressed the view that the Agency staff should spend more time pre-empting its position in NRO with ideas and spend less time complaining about projects and programs which might be taken away from them. This resulted from the withdrawal by the DNRO of the TAGBOARD program from CIA direction and its assignment to the newly designated Program D (USAF) under the direction of Colonel Geary.

Although the position of Deputy Director, NRO, was awarded to CIA, to be filled by the DD/R, Dr. Scoville found it impracticable to do justice to both jobs at once, and furthermore he very soon after his appointment as DD/NRO resigned from his position in the Agency. On the appointment of Dr. Albert D. Wheelon to head the renamed Directorate of Science and Technology, Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer of that Directorate was assigned to the position of DD/NRO and served in that capacity between August 1963 and the spring of 1965. Upon his departure, Mr. James Q. Reber was nominated to the DD/NRO slot from his current position as Chairman of the Committee on Overhead

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Reconnaissance (COMOR) and has served in that capacity at NRO since September 1965. (Note: His tour ended in July, 1969.)

Monthly Forecast

The system of the monthly forecasting of aircraft and satellite activities under the National Reconnaissance Program was promulgated on 3 January 1964 by the DNRO, whereby each Program Director would submit his schedule to the DNRO for amalgamation with all others and for processing through the Special Group for approval. The Standard Operating Procedures for the Forecast of NRO Air and Satellite Activities were issued on 16 April 1964 by the Director of the NRO Staff, then Brigadier General John L. Martin, Jr.

Land Panel for Overview of NRP

Early in 1965, at the instigation of Mr. McCone, then DCI, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Dr. Donald Hornig, set up a panel under the chairmanship of Dr. Edwin H. Land, the broad charter of which was to maintain an overview of the National Reconnaissance Program with particular interest in technical characteristics of intelligence requirements, the status of existing projects, and the adequacy of research and development programs. The panel was not subordinate to the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) but reported directly to Dr. Hornig, and staff support for this panel

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was provided at the White House level by Dr. Don H. Steininger of Dr. Hornig's staff.

NRO Agreement of August 1965

The continued dissatisfaction on the part of CIA with the working of the NRO led to the promulgation of a further revision of the agreement in August 1965. On 6 August a new draft was discussed between Mr. John Bröss on behalf of CIA and Mr. Cyrus Vance, successor to Mr. Gilpatric as Deputy Secretary of Defense. The draft was agreed to and signed by the DCI, then Admiral William Raborn, and Mr. Vance on 11 August 1965. Among other changes, the new agreement provided for the Executive Committee of NRO to guide and participate in the formulation of the National Reconnaissance Program through the DNRO. The DNRO was to sit with the Executive Committee but not as a voting member. (See Annex 38 for text of the agreement.)

On 1 October 1965 Dr. Alexander Flax succeeded Dr. Brockway McMillan as DNRO, and on the same day a letter was sent to him by the DCI outlining the changes in the Agency's organizational structure in support of the NRP; i. e., the consolidation of satellite activities under OSP, the manned reconnaissance under OSA and SOD, and all these activities coming to a head under the management of the Director

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of CIA Reconnaissance Programs. Mr. Huntington Sheldon was appointed to this new position. (See Annex 39 for letters to Dr. Flax and Mr. Sheldon.) In January 1967 Mr. Sheldon's appointment was rescinded and the position of Director of Reconnaissance for CIA was abolished. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology (then Mr. Carl E. Duckett) was authorized to deal directly with the DNRO on behalf of the DCI in the management of all CIA programs under the National Reconnaissance Program.

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ANNEX 19

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Washington

Office of the Secretary

27 December 1954

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I am familiar with the proposed agreement with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in behalf of the Government. Although the aircraft covered thereby are required so urgently that neither you nor we have been able to examine the cost estimate in detail, a fixed price agreement with a price redetermination clause and a stipulated maximum price appears to afford adequate protection to the Government, and to be the most suitable form of contract from an administrative and security standpoint. As you undoubtedly are aware, the construction and testing of aircraft of new design is most expensive, especially when time is a vital factor and the production of so limited a number as here contemplated renders the aircraft virtually handmade.

The fact that known structural and aerodynamic know-how is incorporated in the design proposal does not preclude pioneering problems associated with an entirely new area of performance and altitude. Therefore, on the basis of our knowledge of similar Air Force contracts for research and development and for procurement, I believe that the terms and the estimated cost are reasonable.

Although the requirements both of speed and security make it necessary to give the supplier considerable freedom of action to proceed without detailed supervision at every stage, our opinion, based on a large amount of business over a period of many years, is that Lockheed is a reliable and efficient producer accustomed to keeping its books and records in accordance with standard Government accounting practices.

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It is understood that the size of this procurement program is based in part on the assumption that the results expected to be obtained with these aircraft will be of interest to other Departments and Agencies of the Government, and that the aircraft will probably be useful for various purposes in addition to the mission for which they are primarily intended. I assure you that the Air Force is keenly interested in this development from the point of view of its own mission as well as yours, and to that end is furnishing the engines as part of its contribution and will provide such other assistance as required.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

Trevor Gardner
Special Assistant (Research and Development)

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DX-101

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

27 December 1954

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I am familiar with the proposed agreement with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in behalf of the Government. Although the aircraft covered thereby are required so urgently that neither you nor we have been able to examine the cost estimate in detail, a fixed price agreement with a price redetermination clause and a stipulated maximum price appears to afford adequate protection to the Government, and to be the most suitable form of contract from an administrative and security standpoint. As you undoubtedly are aware, the construction and testing of aircraft of new design is most expensive, especially when time is a vital factor and the production of so limited a number as here contemplated renders the aircraft virtually handmade.

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It is understood that the size of this procurement program is based in part on the assumption that the results expected to be obtained with these aircraft will be of interest to other Departments and Agencies of the Government, and that the aircraft will probably be useful for various purposes in addition to the mission for which they are primarily

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intended. I assure you that the Air Force is keenly interested in this development from the point of view of its own mission as well as yours, and to that end is furnishing the engines as part of its contribution and will provide such other assistance as required.

Sincerely yours,



Trevor Gardner
Special Assistant (Research and Development)

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ANNEX 20

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8 August 1957

MEMORANDUM TO: Project Director

SUBJECT: USAF Contribution - Project AQUATONE

1. Attached is a schedule showing the major items contributed by the USAF to Project AQUATONE during the period August 1955 through 31 July 1957. This schedule was prepared on the basis of information furnished by Colonel Geary and represents actual value where known and the best estimates available on those few items where the value was unknown.

2. The schedule does not contain general support items such as salaries and travel of participating military personnel not carried on the Project Table of Organization.

3. There may be some few additional items that were overlooked and are therefore not incorporated in the attachment. The elements considered were selected for the most part from memory, and we could have failed to recall some very important and costly considerations. Colonel Geary has advised that if more exacting figures are required for your purposes, he will be pleased to take necessary steps in the USAF to insure that more reliable cost figures are produced.

(Signed)

[Redacted]
Project Comptroller

Attachment:
TS-164300

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

TS-164616

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TS-164616USAF CONTRIBUTION - PROJECT AQUATONE
AUGUST 1955 THROUGH 31 JULY 1957I. MAJOR MATERIALS

A. Engines - 45 (40 in operation, 5 lost) @ \$400,000	\$18,000,000
B. Construction:	
1. Edwards Air Force Base	27,232
2. Adana	500,000
	<u>\$18,527,232</u>

II. OPERATING COSTS

A. Training - Watertown (SAC 4070th Sup. Wg.)	\$ 500,000
B. Fuel - 5 million gallons @ 40¢	2,000,000
C. Flight Costs	
1. C-124 - 500 hrs. @ \$425 per hr.	212,500
2. C-54 (shuttle) 20 mo. X 120 hrs. @ \$195	468,000
3. C-54 (unit) 11 mo. X 75 hrs. @ \$195	160,875
4. T-33 (8 units) 16 mo. X 40 hrs. @ \$102	522,240
5. C-47 - 5 mo. X 50 hrs. @ \$100	25,000
6. L-20:	
a. Base A - 15 mo X 50 hrs. @ \$20	15,000
b. Site - 16 mo X 50 hrs. @ \$20	16,000
D. Use of Government Furnished Equipment	
1. Fuel trailers (Watertown) 690 days @ \$17	11,730
2. Firefighting equipment 690 days @ \$23	15,870
3. Storage - 23 mos. @ \$3,000 per mo.	69,000
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS	<u>\$ 4,016,215</u>

SUMMARY

TOTAL MAJOR MATERIALS	\$18,527,232
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS	4,016,215
	<u>\$22,543,447</u>

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SAPC-4637

24 March 1956

ESTIMATED COST OF PROJECT - FY 1955-1956-1957

MAJOR MATERIEL COSTS:

Aircraft	\$23,250,000
Engines	29,232,000
Photographic Equipment	6,526,000
Electronic Equipment	6,221,175
Radar Equipment	3,150,000
Navigation Equipment	250,000
Personal Equipment (Pilots)	300,000
Photographic Processing Plant	1,200,000
Base Construction - U.S.	1,125,000
Base Construction - Foreign	460,000
GFE and Components	1,193,720
	<u>\$72,907,895</u>

OPERATING COSTS:

Personnel, Government	\$ 5,779,728
Medical Support (Domestic)	50,000
Personnel, Contractors	3,442,837
Fuel	470,960
Film	911,280
Processing Plant Operations	6,282,480
Logistics	4,958,000
Domestic Base Operations & Maint.	1,378,025
Foreign Base Operations & Maint.	99,100
Hqs Operational Expenses	31,767
Plant Overhaul of Equipment	1,787,102
	<u>\$25,191,279</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u>\$98,099,174</u>

Prepared by
Richard M. Bissell, Jr. 7

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ANNEX 21

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ANNEX 22

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3 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: High Level Meeting on Project AQUATONE

1. As explained to you on 2 May, the paper to be handed by you to the President at the May 6th meeting has been cut down to a brief status report. A copy is attached hereto and copies have been sent to the Air Force (Tab A).

2. It is understood that the following topics which are now excluded from the formal paper will be raised by you, probably in this order, for discussion at the meeting:

- a. Alternative Lower Priority Targets.
- b. The RAINBOW Program.
- c. Maintenance of a Non-Military Overflight Capability.
- d. Proposed Modification of Operational Concept.

I have drafted a separate paper on these four topics indicating the line I believe we should take on each. Copies of this paper have gone to the Air Force who are fully aware of our views. This paper is also attached hereto. (Tab B)

3. I hardly need remind you that the third of these topics is the sensitive one because there is not full agreement between the Air Force and ourselves on this matter. I have drafted the paragraph on this topic with great care in an attempt to emphasize that the difference between the Air Force and ourselves is a difference in our estimate of what our own political authorities would prefer. I urge you to emphasize that our disagreement is of this nature, since we have no desire to maintain an overflight capability unless we stand a better chance than the Air Force of being allowed to use it, while the Air Force has no desire to stop us if they are convinced that this is the case. It follows that instead of having a debate with the Air Force about the views of the political authorities it is simpler to ask what they are.

4. I know that it is difficult to control the course of such a meeting as the one planned for the 6th but I would urge you to make a major effort at least to raise all four

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of these topics so that we can try to get, if not clean-cut decisions, at least some feeling for the President's views. I repeat, the Air Force is well aware that these issues will be raised.

5. I have prepared still a third piece of paper which contains a number of arguments I hope you will have an opportunity to use in favor of letting us operate. (Tab C)

(Signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director

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3 May 1957

AQUATONE/OILSTONE PROJECT

1. Status:

a. Weather conditions are generally favorable for aerial reconnaissance over Europe and most of Siberia from April through October and in the Far East are moderately good in summer and at their best during the autumn.

b. AQUATONE Detachments are now in place and operational in Germany and Turkey with four aircraft each and in Japan with three aircraft. They fly occasional weather missions in support of their cover and high altitude air sampling missions, all over friendly territory. The Detachment in Turkey carries out occasional reconnaissance over the Middle East.

c. At the Bermuda Conference in March, the British Government on its own initiative offered to permit operations under AQUATONE to be conducted from bases in the United Kingdom, thus reversing the earlier negative decision.

d. A similar military capability is currently being developed by the Air Force which is equipping a SAC squadron with Air Force procured U-2 aircraft. This unit will be operationally ready and available for deployment by 1 August 1957.

e. It now appears that the U-2 will be relatively safe from interception at least through the present reconnaissance season and possibly, under certain circumstances, considerably longer. Nevertheless, both its margin of advantage and the security surrounding this operation are subject to continuous erosion so the AQUATONE capability must be regarded as a wasting asset.

2. Plans for the Current Season: Additional hard intelligence obtainable only through aerial reconnaissance is urgently required, especially on developments and installations having to do with Soviet guided missiles, nuclear weapons, and intercontinental bombers. To cover thirty-five such targets which have been selected by the Intelligence Community as having the highest priority should require some twelve to fifteen successful missions, taking account of normal weather patterns. If permission is granted to conduct

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these overflights it is proposed that they be undertaken only as highly favorable weather materializes so as to obtain maximum coverage with a minimum number of sorties. This would imply a rate of operation of only one to three missions per week.

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3 May 1957

ADDITIONAL BUSINESS CONCERNING PROJECT AQUATONE/OILSTONE

The paper on AQUATONE prepared for submission to higher authority contains a brief account of the current status of the Project and plans for operations during the current season. All other issues were excluded in order to focus attention on the major decision required at this time. It was agreed, however, in conversations with representatives of the Air Force that the following additional matters be discussed orally with the political authorities along the lines indicated under each heading.

1. Alternative Lower Priority Targets: If authority cannot now be granted to overfly some or all of the highest priority targets in the USSR, it is important to determine whether:

(a) Overflights of the following lower priority areas (listed in the order of priority) should not be conducted:

- (1) Specified peripheral areas of the USSR,
- (2) China,
- (3) European Satellites, or

(b) There is sufficient prospect of receiving at a later date authority for overflights of the USSR to warrant postponing operations over lower priority areas.

2. The RAINBOW Program: During the last nine months significant progress has been achieved through this Project in the development of radar camouflage. It is believed that the radar reflectivity of the U-2 aircraft can be so reduced as to create a good chance that a majority of overflight missions will avoid detection entirely. Nevertheless, it must be anticipated that at least a certain proportion of them will be detected, although their continuous tracking should be extremely difficult. Our plan is to equip the U-2 aircraft with this protection if and as it is operationally developed. If it is effective, it will reduce not only the

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likelihood of detection and tracking but also the possibility of interception even after the Soviets have developed aircraft or missiles capable of operating at extreme altitudes.

3. Maintenance of a Non-Military Overflight Capability: The principal reason for developing the AQUATONE capability originally within a CIA framework (but as a joint Air Force/CIA Project) rather than in the Air Force was to maintain greater security, employ deeper cover, use civilian pilots, keep the aircraft outside of military control, and therefore, make possible more plausible denial of U.S. military responsibility in the face of any Soviet charges. On the other hand, it can be argued that an operation of this character can be conducted as securely by military units operating under military cover as by the Clandestine Service, that the distinction between military and civilian control is irrelevant to the possibility of denial and therefore that this tool is politically no more usable for overflights in the hands of the Clandestine Service than in the regular military establishment. Although this issue could be debated at length between this Agency and the Air Force, what is really important is the attitude of the political authorities of our Government. The decisive question is whether they believe (rightly or wrongly) that the use of U-2 aircraft for overflights by the Clandestine Service will give rise to lesser risks of embarrassment or counteraction than their use by a tactical military arm. If this does turn out to be their view, it would seem to be worthwhile to continue the present joint operation through 1958, probably with some changes in organization and cover and on a reduced scale, in order to maintain the capability where it would be most likely to be used. Meanwhile the parallel Air Force capability would be developed separately. If, however, the political authorities believe that the political risks are the same for nonmilitary as for military overflight operations, then it is proposed that CIA's equipment be transferred to the Air Force at the end of the current reconnaissance season.

4. Proposed Modification of Operational Concept: If the present joint project organized within a CIA framework is continued beyond the present season, consideration will be given to the following modifications of present operational concepts. Their purpose would be to reduce the political hazards to which overflights give rise or to be

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prepared for unfavorable political developments and thus to render the U-2 capability politically more usable.

a. The use of non-U.S. pilots (possibly British) in order to heighten the possibility of plausible denial.

b. The modification of a few of the Agency's aircraft to permit basing them on an aircraft carrier and thereby to avoid the exposure of friendly governments to political and diplomatic pressures.

c. The occasional use of a commercial air survey corporation as cover.

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3 May 1957

AQUATONE MEETING
9:30 a.m., Monday, 6 May 1957

BRIEFING NOTES FOR DCI

The following are points you may wish to make orally in the forthcoming meeting on AQUATONE.

1. Russian awareness of U.S. overflights, though undoubtedly a source of irritation, should increase their willingness to consider a realistic mutual inspection system and in particular an effective version of the open skies proposals. The knowledge that they cannot altogether prevent aerial reconnaissance should increase the attractiveness to them of a plan to control and regularize it.

2. Although overflights can be regarded as provocative, it is difficult to understand how they could provoke any counter action except the most vigorous efforts at interception. The Russians know, even if no overflights are conducted, that our offensive air capability exists. They have given every evidence of believing correctly that overflights are conducted only for reconnaissance purposes. Above all, knowledge that it is possible for our aircraft to overfly their country beyond the reach of interception, perhaps carrying high yield weapons, would be a powerful deterrent to overt attack no matter how "provoking".

3. Two missions over Bulgaria, one over the Caucasus area of the USSR in December and one inadvertent overflight of the Caucasus in April have been detected by the Soviets without, however, provoking any diplomatic protest. This may suggest only that deep penetration missions over a few sensitive areas, or missions which penetrate the USSR after being tracked by the Satellites, are apt to provoke a diplomatic reaction. It may also be evidence of greater sensitivity to missions flown from Germany where there are known to be a number of U.S. bases than from other extreme locations.

4. The President's Advisory Committee on Foreign Intelligence has unanimously recommended that overflight missions be resumed.

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29 July 1957

MEMORANDUM TO: General Thomas D. White
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force

SUBJECT: Future Plans for Project AQUATONE/OILSTONE

A variety of circumstances make it necessary at this time to go forward with plans and preparations for the future of Project AQUATONE/OILSTONE. This matter was discussed on 19 July by the DDCI with the Vice Chief of Staff. In confirmation of their conversation, this memorandum summarizes the considerations which lead us to believe that the present joint Project should be continued next year, and our plans for its continuation. We will have a much firmer basis for such judgments as this in a few weeks and it goes without saying that any decisions made at this time may have to be modified.

A decision on the future of this Project clearly should be based on our joint estimate of the probability that overflight operations will be permitted next year by the political authorities and of the advantages they see in having such operations conducted by a civilian agency using civilian pilots rather than by a military organization. Whether overflights are permitted will, in turn, depend largely on: the risk of loss of an aircraft by enemy interception or otherwise; and the risk of strong Russian diplomatic or political reaction to such activities. Our present views on these points are as follows:

a. As to risk of loss, we have as yet seen no hard evidence that the Russians have developed an interception capability effective above 65,000 feet and we believe that there is a chance that electronic countermeasures may reduce the effectiveness of such an interception capability when developed. We estimate therefore, that the risk of interception will be low enough to be acceptable. The risk of loss through malfunction is always present but will be no greater than heretofore and appears to be acceptable.

b. As to risk of diplomatic protest, we are still hopeful that the experience of the current season will demonstrate that at

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least occasional overflights of the USSR can be conducted without eliciting embarrassing diplomatic protests provided a few of the most highly sensitive areas (such as Moscow itself) are avoided and provided overflights of the USSR are not tracked by one or more of the Satellite governments to the embarrassment of the Russian military establishment. We also hope that the Russian tracking ability will be impaired by electronic countermeasures to a point where they will not have solid evidence on which to base protests.

c. As to sponsorship, it is our understanding that the political authorities prefer to have this mission performed under civilian sponsorship as at present, and that such sponsorship therefore increases the likelihood of obtaining permission to operate.

We conclude from the foregoing that sporadic overflight activity, at least, is quite likely to be permitted by our political authorities but that there is little prospect for an intensive overflight program. Accordingly, we believe the present joint project should be continued for another season in order to maintain an overflight capability in what we believe to be the most acceptable form, but on a reduced scale appropriate to a variable, and on the average low, level of activity.

To give effect to these conclusions, we propose to maintain only two Detachments at reduced strength instead of three as at present. On the basis of this planning, one of the two units now stationed in Europe will be phased out in October 1957 and the other will be based at Giebelstadt. The Detachment now in the Far East will remain at Atsugi NAS at least until January 1958 and probably longer. Should it be deemed feasible for political or security reasons to move this unit out of Japan, it will be redeployed to Edwards Air Force Base or some other suitable base in the ZI. Any continuing research and development will also be conducted at Edwards Air Force Base. We plan certain changes in both organizational arrangements and ground support equipment designed to maximize the mobility of the two remaining Detachments so they will be ready on short notice to stage through advanced bases in the Far East and Near East and will be able in this way to obtain coverage of any part of the Soviet Bloc accessible from friendly territory.

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This contemplated reduction in scale will render a number of aircraft and other items of equipment surplus to this program. It appears that an initial transfer of five aircraft can be made in November of this year. Further transfers will of course be made as and when additional aircraft and other items become surplus. It is our hope that we can arrive at an agreement with you whereby equipment turned over to the Air Force by this Project can be borrowed back at a later date if a requirement for it should arise.

The execution of these plans obviously depends on continued Air Force support. They are based on the assumption, as indicated above, that this Project will be able to retain the facilities now occupied by it at Giebelstadt and Edwards Air Force Base and possibly to obtain some additional facilities at Edwards Air Force Base. If feasible, arrangements should be made to leave certain supplies and ground equipment in place at Adana and at a Japanese or other Far Eastern base and to obtain the temporary use of certain facilities at these bases when required for staging operations. I recognize the burden that the provision of this support places upon the Air Force but hope it will be appreciably reduced by the planned reduction in the scale of this activity.

The Air Force has been a full partner in this enterprise from the beginning and I will of course be happy to discuss any of these points with you if you so desire. I will look forward to receiving your comments.

(Signed)
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

CONCUR:

CPC
Deputy Director

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ANNEX 24

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N-1-110-11

NOTICE
NO. 1-110-11ORGANIZATION
8 April 1958

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

1. POSITION

Effective 1 April 1958, there is established in the Office of the Director the position of Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Development. The incumbent of this position will be responsible for the functions hitherto performed by the Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and also for (a) the exercise of general supervision of all research and development activities of the Agency and (b) a continuing search for fresh approaches to the Agency's tasks. The following outline of objectives and authorities elaborates and defines these new responsibilities.

2. PRIMARY PURPOSE

The primary purpose of this action is to stimulate the exploitation by the Agency of advanced technology and the invention, development, and operational employment of new methods of performing its tasks. It must be expected that progress toward this objective will require the use not only of new or different tools but also of new or different operational concepts, human skills, and organizational devices. Accordingly, there is need for the creative and imaginative study of all promising possibilities of innovation and of the interrelated changes in techniques and in ways of exploiting techniques that go to make up important innovations. The primary effort of the SA/PD should be to meet this need and to set in motion research and development that holds promise of opening up entirely new approaches. He should also endeavor to insure that work carried on to meet already recognized requirements is focused on the highest priority needs. An important part of this task will be to encourage fundamental reconsideration of needs and possibilities by experienced operators as well as by researchers and to achieve a more effective interchange of ideas between them.

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3. AUTHORITY

a. Studies and Recommendations

The SA/PD will have access to information on operational concepts and techniques and on Agency organization as required for investigations of the sort referred to above. He is authorized to make recommendations for modifications in operational concepts and for the development and use of particular skills or organizational devices where in his judgment changes of this character are required as elements of promising innovations in the Agency's method of performing its tasks. In general it is not intended that he will concern himself with organizational problems except as they relate to possible innovations nor is it anticipated that he will review specific current projects except in connection with the above purposes. Studies and recommendations of the sort here characterized, the scope of which extends beyond research and development, will in all cases be made available to the Deputy Directors concerned before submission to the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Research and Development

In the narrower field of research and development, the SA/PD will review programs covering the specifically research and development activities of all components within the Agency. He may direct modifications in programs proposed to him and after such review, modification, and approval, will act as the sponsor of Agency research and development programs at the Deputy Director level. Within the latitude ordinarily granted in the execution of programs, he will have general authority to disapprove or direct modification or undertaking of projects. This authority will be limited to the reallocation of personnel and funds already committed to approved research and development programs or provided for in such programs. All of the foregoing authority is subject to coordination with the Deputy Directors concerned where changes in research and development activities would have a significant effect on their organizations or operations, and is subject to existing requirements for review by the Project Review Committee and by the Director of Central Intelligence.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

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ANNEX 25

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DPS-3074

12 August 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Financing of Special Projects - FY 1959

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation (paragraph 9) submitted for the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Background: During the past year the activities for which I have been responsible as the Director of Project AQUATONE have multiplied. Certain new tasks were handled as subprojects of AQUATONE without formal approval by you as separate projects, and with no separate funding or accounting. Others were handled in an ad hoc manner as new projects but with approval by you of only the sums initially provided therefor. It appears desirable in the current fiscal year to handle these several tasks as separate projects. The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the estimated operating budget for each such project for Fiscal Year 1959, to request approval of the projects, and to recommend appropriate funding action.

3. Estimated Operating Budgets: The special project activities currently in progress under my direction will be treated as five separate projects. For security purposes the nature of the activities being carried on under these projects is summarized in a separate document (TS-155106). The proposed operating budgets for these five projects and the Congressional budget for this office for special projects are as follows:

	<u>Operating Budget</u> <u>FY 1959</u>	<u>Congressional</u> <u>Budget</u>	<u>Additional</u> <u>Requirement</u>
CHALICE	\$ 12,588,599	\$5,924,281	\$
THERMOS	111,000		
GUSTO	1,882,925		
CHAMPION	72,360		
CORONA	1,519,640		
TOTAL	<u>\$16,174,524</u>	<u>\$5,924,281</u>	<u>\$10,250,243</u>

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4. Explanation of Increased Requirements: It will be seen that the presently estimated operating budgets total nearly three times the budgetary total submitted to Congress. The reasons why these large additional requirements have materialized may be summarized as follows:

a. CHALICE: The whole amount included in the Congressional budget was originally intended for this Project. It was computed on the assumption that CHALICE would be terminated on 31 December 1958. It now appears that operations will continue throughout the fiscal year. Moreover, steps are being taken to associate appropriate agencies of the British Government with us in this Project and the British participation will give rise to certain unforeseen additional costs. Accordingly, it now appears that somewhat more than twice the amount originally requested will be required.

b. THERMOS: All active work on this program has been terminated. It has been necessary, however, to remove THERMOS provision from certain items of equipment which gives rise to the cost indicated above.

c. GUSTO: The feasibility studies which constitute this Project have involved extensive and costly engineering and scientific studies by the contractors concerned. This Project has also required in the current fiscal year the augmentation and completion and the subsequent operation of highly sophisticated test facilities at a location in the western part of the country. The Project is expected to involve the construction of mock-ups and measurement of certain of their characteristics. The extent and duration of this work could not have been foreseen when the Congressional budget was submitted.

d. CHAMPION: This feasibility study was undertaken with little warning in the latter part of fiscal year 1958. Some \$270,000 was obligated in that fiscal year, the bulk of the funds having been obtained with your concurrence from the Agency Reserve. It now appears that the scope of the feasibility study should be expanded and considerable experimental work authorized looking toward the eventual development of a highly sophisticated intelligence collection system.

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These costs are highly unpredictable and the estimate of probable cost is subject to further change.

e. CORONA: This Project was initiated in the last half of Fiscal Year 1958. It was financed by the Agency in the amount of 7 million dollars which was released for the purpose from the Agency Reserve. At the time of that release, it appeared that little additional funds would be required. It now appears, however, that there may be modest over-runs on contracts already entered into and that the Agency may have to cover costs originally expected to be assumed by the Department of Defense. Accordingly, additional funds in at least the amount indicated above will be required in the current fiscal year.

5. Shifts Between Projects: By way of general comment on the above requirements, it should be stated that the totals for the several projects are by no means firm even at this date. On the basis of estimates even more current than the above, it would appear that the requirement for GUSTO may be somewhat less than shown above and those for CORONA and CHAMPION will certainly be greater. Accordingly, this Office desires freedom to shift funds between projects, provided no major change in the scope of the projects will be made without the approval of the DCI.

6. Contingency: It is hoped that the feasibility studies being conducted under Projects GUSTO and CHAMPION will reach a point during the current fiscal year which will permit the development and procurement of a major new intelligence collection system to be undertaken. Such an outcome would give rise to large additional financial requirements during the current fiscal year. No meaningful estimate can be made at this time, however, of this contingent requirement since no calculation can be made of the total cost of such a system until its character is well defined and no decision has been made as to whether and how this cost might be shared with the Department of Defense.

7. Withdrawals from the Reserve: It is believed that all of the above requirements which are excess to the Congressional budget can appropriately be financed through the release of funds from the Agency Reserve. As indicated above, the decision to extend CHALICE to the end of the year was not made, even for planning purposes, until the beginning of the

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fiscal year; the magnitude and duration of THERMOS and GUSTO were altogether unpredictable; and Projects CHAMPION and CORONA had not even been conceived when the budget was submitted. My basic recommendation, therefore, is that a release of funds from the Reserve in the amount of \$10,250,243 be sought for the above purpose.

8. Timing: Although substantial additional funds will unquestionably be necessary, it is believed that it would be premature to seek the above recommended release of funds from the Reserve at this time. As indicated above, the firm requirements for the five projects listed are still subject to change. More important is the large contingent requirement referred to in paragraph 6. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to postpone the release until approximately 1 October by which time the magnitude of the requirement should be more clearly defined. In the meanwhile, funds can be obligated as needed for all of the above projects making use of a total allotment to this Office no greater than the Congressional budget figure. This will mean in effect borrowing from CHALICE to finance the other four projects for the first third of the fiscal year since the allotment was originally approved for CHALICE alone. Such action will require approval of the above projects and of the proposed operating budgets by the DCI, subject to the availability of funds and his approval to transfer funds among them as needed.

9. Recommendations: That the DCI:

a. Approve the five projects listed in paragraph 3, above and the operating budgets for Fiscal Year 1959 therein submitted subject to the availability of funds.

b. Authorize an allotment to this Office for the above projects not to exceed the total of the Congressional budget and the obligation of funds thus allotted for the several projects as required.

c. Authorize a request to the Bureau of the Budget on or about 1 October 1958 for the release of supplementary funds for the above projects in the amount indicated above, subject to final review of this request by the DCI prior to submission.

Approved:
Allen W. Dulles

(Signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
SA/PC/DCI

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13 August 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Identification of Special Projects

REFERENCE: Memorandum for DCI from SA/PD/DCI dated
12 August 1958 (DPS-3074)

1. This memorandum is for information only. Its purpose is to identify the special projects referred to in a separate memorandum on the financing of these projects (DPS-3074). The tasks to be performed under these several projects were not described in the referenced memorandum on financing because of their extreme sensitivity and because the recommendations on financing, if approved by you, should be in such a form that it could be circulated to a number of unwitting individuals within and outside of the Agency. The five projects therein referred to are identified in the following paragraphs.

2. CHALICE. This is Project AQUATONE renamed. The activities comprised in this project include:

Personnel and support of the two CHALICE Detachments overseas, the ZI base at Edwards Air Force Base, and almost all of the Development Projects Staff;

The operation and maintenance of the U-2 aircraft remaining in possession of the Agency (currently thirteen in number);

Any remaining development work on U-2 aircraft and other sub-systems employed in CHALICE (notably a new ECM device and considerable production flight testing of items to be delivered to the Strategic Air Command);

Costs of British participation, such as personal equipment for British pilots and possibly some modifications to an additional overseas base.

3. THERMOS. This was the name given to the extensive studies we have conducted over the past two years in an effort to develop an effective radar camouflage for the U-2

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aircraft and other conventional aircraft. As explained in the memorandum on financing, most of the costs of THERMOS have been incurred in preceding fiscal years when this was carried on as a subproject under AQUATONE and financed out of AQUATONE funds. These costs included:

Sizable contracts with Scientific Engineering Institute, International Telephone & Telegraph Company, Eastman Kodak Company, and the A. D. Little Company for the production of camouflage;

Costs in excess of \$1 million incurred under contracts with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for the application and removal of camouflage and for the measurement of radar reflectivity;

The construction and installation of highly sophisticated test facilities at Indian Springs Air Force Base and their operation by the firm of Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier under contract with us.

Since we have now abandoned efforts to develop an effective camouflage, the only costs remaining to be incurred under this project in FY 1959 are those of removing the THERMOS covering from the two aircraft on which it remains. We also expect to incur modest additional costs to permit the Scientific Engineering Institute to write up in useful form the results of two years of highly significant work.

4. GUSTO. This project, which is nearly a year old, consists of feasibility studies looking toward a successor aircraft to the U-2. The major expenses that have been incurred have been the costs of work performed by the Scientific Engineering Institute; Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier; and the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Lockheed has conducted an extensive program involving at least preliminary design of no less than 30 to 40 configurations of aircraft. It has also carried out an extensive program of model building and of measuring radar reflectivity of models. Lockheed also built a partial full-scale mock-up of a possible GUSTO aircraft. SEI and EG&G's costs have been for model testing and for extensive radar measurements on the above-mentioned mock-up. Additionally, some funds have been spent (under subcontract to Lockheed) for studies by NARMCO, Incorporated of the feasibility of certain types of plastic structures. Lastly, \$100,000 was obligated under this project to match an equal sum obligated by the Air Force for the construction of a pilot plant

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to produce beryllium oxide fibers for possible use in high strength plastic structures. Virtually all of the above costs are continuing in the current fiscal year.

5. CHAMPION. Under this project a feasibility study (parallel to GUSTO) is being made of a possible extremely radical, high-performance reconnaissance aircraft which might achieve an operating altitude in excess of 125,000 feet and would operate at Mach 3. This study is based on a design concept that originated with the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy. The study was initiated only after this design concept had been reviewed by the then National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics which strongly recommended that the study be made. This project is being carried out in cooperation with and with the technical assistance of the Bureau of Aeronautics. Study contracts have been let with Convair, Boeing, Hughes, Marquardt, and Goodyear. \$270,000 was obligated for CHAMPION in 1958, of which \$200,000 was released by the Director of Central Intelligence from his special reserve and the balance was supplied from AQUATONE funds. The project has been closely followed in recent months and has been reviewed by the special panel under the chairmanship of Dr. Edwin Land. It is believed to be highly promising. Substantial additional costs are required and are believed to be justified in the current fiscal year to permit the feasibility studies to be continued. It should be possible within approximately two months' time to complete most of the studies now in progress or proposed. At that time, a decision will have to be made as to whether to proceed to a preliminary design study and to experimental work with gliders. These activities would involve substantially larger funds than presently proposed in the operating budget for FY 1959.

6. CORONA. This name covers all aspects of the program for the launching of 12 reconnaissance satellites which will take photography during their overflights of the Soviet Bloc and will contain provisions for storage of the exposed film in a capsule which will re-enter, drop in a preselected ocean impact area, and be recovered. This project was approved at the highest level and \$7 million released from the Agency Reserve was obligated in FY 1958, almost all for prime contract to Lockheed's Ballistic Missile Division. Although the total of \$7 million contained some reserve over the then available estimate of the Agency's share of the costs of the program, it now appears that there will be some overrun. Moreover, ARPA is in grave trouble with its biomedical program

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and there is a real possibility that the Agency will have to pick up certain costs which were originally planned to be charged to the biomedical program. Finally, the Agency will probably incur some operational costs, for which no firm estimate is yet available.

7. GENERAL COMMENT. The above outline may help to make clear both the reason that such large costs for the above projects have materialized in the last few months, well after the budget for FY 1959 was presented to Congress, and the difficulty of estimating even at this date just what the cost of these projects will be. It is understood that activities of the sort herein described are in no sense exempt from the requirement for economical administration and the need to restrict our outlays within reasonable and approved limits. Nevertheless, if CHALICE is to be continued through the full fiscal year and if CORONA is to be carried through, there is little room for maneuver in the reduction of their costs. With respect to feasibility studies, the philosophy of this office has been that the objective in view is so important, and the cost of exploring technical possibilities is so small a part of the cost of a whole new reconnaissance vehicle, that any and all promising technical opportunities should be explored with urgency.

(Signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Development

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ANNEX 26

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No. 1-120-2

N-1-120-2

ORGANIZATION
18 February 1959ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DIVISION

- Rescissions: (1) Paragraphs 6 and 7 of R 1-110 dated
21 May and 8 April 1958
(2) Paragraph 9b(17) of R 1-140 dated
27 December 1956

1. The Development Projects Division (DPD) is established in the Office of the Deputy Director (Plans), effective 16 February 1959. The Development Projects Division combines the following components which, with their functions and responsibilities, are transferred to it.

Development Projects Staff, DPS/DCI
Planning Staff, PS/DCI
Air Division, OPSER, DD/P
Aircraft Maintenance Support Division, OL, DD/S
Supplemental Activities Branch, FI/D, DD/P

2. Colonel William Burke, USAF, is appointed Acting Chief, Development Projects Division. He will be directly responsible to the Deputy Director (Plans). Colonel Burke is located on the fifth floor of the Matomic Building, 1717 H Street NW, extension 4207.

3. Mr. James Q. Reber, who is appointed Chief, Special Requirements Staff, DPD, will continue as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

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ANNEX 27

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DD/P 4-9575

30 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: DPD Activity Programs FY 1960

1. PURPOSE:

To formalize approval of the Activity Programs of the DPD-DD/P for FY 1960.

2. BACKGROUND:

a. The project outline for AQUATONE, dated 7 January 1955, established the basic grant of authority to Richard M. Bissell, Jr., in his capacity as Project Director to serve as approving officer for AQUATONE. The original project outline authorized the Project Director to approve expenditures up to \$100,000 without referral to the DCI, but required DCI approval of any contracts or other commitments in excess of that amount. This authority was, in effect, amended and extended by a paper approved by the DCI on 12 August 1958 (DPS-3074) which gave provisional approval to the budgets for Projects CORONA, GUSTO, CHAMPION and other projects to be administered by the Development Projects Staff. This component had been established in the O/DCI under the AQUATONE Project Director to assist in administering AQUATONE and several other sensitive projects including those enumerated immediately above.

b. Several defects were later identified in the approval procedures called for in the 7 January 1955 AQUATONE Project Outline and in the 12 August 1958 amending paper. These defects were discussed in considerable detail in a memorandum for the DCI entitled "Approvals procedure for Development Projects Division" (DPD 0596-59) which recommended changes in the then established procedures. This latter paper was approved by the DCI on 17 February 1959 and is the presently governing document for the approval of DPD activities.

c. The major change embodied in the 17 February 1959 document was to organize DPD's rapidly growing activities into so-called procurement programs. Under this system

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each identifiable operational effort, even though it may involve many separate contracts, is made the subject of a so-called Activity Program, often set forth in a document entitled a "Program Approval". This document (which is in intent similar to the Project Outline used elsewhere in the Clandestine Services) shows the major purpose, the contractors, the funds required and the source, and other related information. Each such Program, if the cost of the activity will exceed \$100,000, is submitted to the DCI for approval. Once such approval is obtained the individual contracts let in pursuance of the Program do not require DCI approval even if they exceed \$100,000. The obvious advantage to be gained by this system is to pull together the various contracts in a single undertaking so that the DD/P and the DCI may exercise judgment on a more coherently organized basis than was possible under the old system, which required the Director to sign all individual contracts of more than \$100,000 even if they were all part of a related effort. The 17 February 1959 document continued the delegation to the DD/P (in his capacity as Project Director) to approve activities up to \$100,000.

d. These changes had the effect of organizing DPD business more nearly along the lines followed by the rest of the Clandestine Services, DPD having "joined" the CS upon the assumption of Mr. Bissell of the position of Deputy Director (Plans) on 5 January 1959.

3. PROPOSAL:

In a further attempt to bring DPD more closely in line with standard CS practice, the present document is being submitted for the approval of the Director. Its purpose is similar to an area division's Operational Program, although the very heavy emphasis on industrial procurement in DPD requires that there be some substantial differences. In the table following there appears a listing of DPD Activity Programs. These are of two sorts. On the one hand are included the individual projects or activities for which DPD is currently responsible. On the other hand, as in the case of CHALICE (the renamed AQUATONE) there are three Activity Programs corresponding to the responsibilities of different branches within DPD. At the conclusion of the chart there is a short description of each one of the Activity Programs. This is in turn followed by a request for the DCI to approve,

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with certain exceptions, the Programs as listed. (N.B. This chart does not show certain activities for which DPD has certain contracting and/or technical monitoring responsibilities, but into which no Agency money is put. Primary among these are ARGON, a mapping satellite program, and FOG, the Air Force U-2 procurement program.)

(See attached Chart of DPD Activity Programs as of 1 November 1959 to which the following numbered items refer.)

- a.(1) CHALICE Development. Completion of J-75 engine procurement and installation; furnish a jamming (ECM) device against intercept aircraft; modify system to read electronic data transmitted by ICBM's.
- a.(2) Materiel. Maintenance, overhaul and supply of all systems, air frames and facilities for CHALICE operations at two overseas and one domestic installation.
- a.(3) Operations and Administration. Funds for maintenance of complete staffing of all DPD missions including technical representatives for two domestic and two overseas bases; provision of necessary maintenance facilities and other operational support items.
- b. NIGHTLATCH Development of a second phase of a system to measure sophisticated Russian radar characteristics.
- c. CHAPLAIN. Deployment of a unit to operate a pulsed ionospheric radar utilizing back-scatter techniques to detect missile launches
- d. CORONA. Further development of a satellite-borne reconnaissance camera with recovery of exposed film carton.
- e. Air Section. Maintenance of worldwide support, capability and of Agency detachments in Eglin AFB, Florida, and Kadena AFB, Okinawa; maintenance, overhaul and modification of 10 Agency-owned or

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controlled aircraft; R & D of countermeasures against ground and air intercept.

- f. & g. External Research. Funds for CENIS and Department of State; support for Scientific Engineering Institute.
- h. C-130. Procurement and modification of two C-130B aircraft.
- i. OXCART. Development of a successor aircraft to the U-2 together with photographic and electronic gear.

4. APPROVAL STATUS:

Under the approvals procedure discussed above, the DCI has received and signed Activity Programs for a portion of CORONA. Activity Programs will be forwarded shortly covering CHALICE Development, NIGHTLATCH, OXCART, CHAPLAIN (operational phase), SEI, and C-130B procurement (if approved by the DD/P after further study). Because of their well-established status and continuing nature, it is proposed to submit to the DCI no separate Activity Programs containing detailed budgets for the other Activity Programs listed on the above table, that is for CHALICE Materiel, CHALICE Operations and Administrative Overhead, Air Section, and External Research. It is believed to be more appropriate to handle the activities covered under these headings in the same manner as the non-project activities of other divisions in the CS. If this procedure is acceptable, the approval by the DCI of the DPD Operational Program for FY 1960 will satisfy all internal requirements for approval of the Activity Programs listed above as not requiring separate project handling.

5. It is recommended that the DCI approve:

- a. The procedures proposed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.
- b. DPD Activity Programs for FY 1960 listed in the chart in the amounts shown with exception of items:

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- a. (1) CHALICE Development
- b. NIGHTLATCH
- c. CHAPLAIN (operational phase)
- g. S.E.I.
- i. C-130B Procurement
- j. OXCART.

(Signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Recommendations in para 5 approved:

(Signed)
ALLEN W. DULLES
DCI

Attachment:
Chart

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DPD ACTIVITY PROGRAMS
(As of 1 November 59)

FY '60 SOURCES OF FUNDS

ACTIVITY	Budget FY 59	Total Rqmts FY 60	Budget FY 61	Available for '60 Appr. Funds	Release fr CIA Reserve or other Agencies	Addtl. Re- leases fr Reserve FY 60	Total Rqmts. FY 60
a. CHALICE							
(1) Development	10,000	919,685	437,000	919,685			919,685
(2) Materiel	3,787,086	3,884,850	3,844,850	3,884,850			3,884,850
(3) Ops & Admin (incl. all DPD) Overhead	8,794,546	9,012,191	8,871,327	9,012,191			9,012,191
Sub-total	12,591,632	13,816,726	13,153,177	13,816,726			13,816,726
b. NIGHTLATCH	-0-	165,000	-0-	165,000			165,000
c. CHAPLAIN	-0-	306,800 ⁴⁾	254,300 ⁵⁾	-0-		306,800	306,800
d. CORONA	8,180,000 ¹⁾	5,835,250	640,000	1,611,000	4,224,250		5,835,250
e. Air Section	4,907,186	4,949,635	4,727,635	4,949,635			4,949,635
f. External Research							
(1) CENIS	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000			250,000
(2) State	87,275	85,836	86,000	85,836			85,836
g. S.E.I.	350,000	726,246	825,000	726,246			726,246
h. C-130B	-0-	8,981,095	-0-	-0-		8,981,095	8,981,095
i. OKCART	7,041,463	93,150,000	73,510,000 ²⁾	-0-	75,000,000	18,150,000	93,150,000
	33,407,556	128,266,588	93,446,112	21,604,443 ³⁾	79,224,250	27,437,895	128,266,588

1) Of this total \$4,100,000 is DOD money.

2) Of this total, \$65,000,000 is to come from DOD.

3) Of this total, \$21,000,000 has been allocated from the DD/P allocation. It is expected that the difference will be made up from savings.

4) Does not include development costs of \$664,444 which were approved as part of TSS FY 60 budget.

5) Not included in FY 61 budget submission.

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ANNEX 28

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17 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: TAGBOARD Program

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. This Office has little information about the TAGBOARD program since its transfer to Director, Program D, NRO, in 1963. However, since the Agency handles contracting for TAGBOARD, some background information is available. A significant events summary chronology of the program is attached, based largely on information available to the Office of Special Activities Contracting Officer.
3. Additional comments about the program that follow are based on informal remarks made in the past several weeks by Kelly Johnson, Col. Clason B. Saunders, Director, Program D (case officer of the program) or as indicated.
4. Initially the TAGBOARD D-21, Mach 3.3 drone was to be carried on top of and launched from specially modified A-12 aircraft (originally two) which were designated M-21's. In this configuration the D-21 drone ramjet engine was to be ignited, checked out while attached to the M-21 and launched at speeds of Mach 3 - 3.2 for cruise flights at altitudes of 85-95,000 feet for a distance of about 3,000 miles. At recovery, camera, payload and certain equipments are ejected and retrieved, by a parachute air snatch accomplished by special C-130 aircraft, with the basic D-21 drone vehicle being destroyed.
5. After loss of an M-21 aircraft during a flight test launch in 1966, the program was reviewed by NRO and reoriented. Two B-52-H aircraft were substituted in place of the M-21 launch aircraft and configured to accommodate a modified D-21 drone, redesignated the D-21B, which would be gravity dropped from the B-52H launch vehicle. The reoriented program required an addition to the D-21B drone of a solid propellant

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Page 2

rocket booster (in essence a second stage) and associated equipment to enable the drone to be accelerated, after drop from the B-52H, to an appropriate altitude and ram pressure (to start the inlet) at which time the D-21B drone ramjet engine would be ignited. The program called for the use of a solid rocket, which had been previously qualified and man-rated for the Apollo program. However, according to Col. Saunders, sometime after the reoriented program was under way, Kelly Johnson ascertained that the new D-21B configuration needed more thrust and, as a result, the rocket had to be redesigned and increased in size to accommodate the new requirement. Recently problems have been encountered with qualifying the redesigned rocket. Kelly Johnson said that quality control problems were encountered in the rocket case materiel but corrective action has been undertaken. Also according to Col. Saunders, it was necessary to add a flame shield type of nozzle to the aft end of the rocket to protect the drone from hot exhaust temperatures of the rocket. Aside from the aforementioned major redesign effort, we have been hearing (off the record) of some concern being expressed by Lockheed performance people about the eventual range of the D-21B drone, originally forecast at 3000 nm. OXCART practical flight experience in Southeast Asia indicates that the severity of upper air hot day temperatures (above standard day) encountered may reduce D-21B specification range by as much as 10% in similar situations. Also, there is some concern that wind shears or rapid temperature changes may possibly induce flameouts when operating in areas of the world where these situations are encountered.

6. Step by step, the TAGBOARD reoriented program has evolved from a purported initial simple second stage configuration, with an on-the-shelf qualified rocket capability, into a redesigned one of increased size and complexity. It is not known to what extent Kelly Johnson returned to the wind tunnel to verify these rather major changes from the initial approved reoriented TAGBOARD program. Kelly Johnson, however, exudes his usual confidence forecasting the satisfactory demonstration of the D-21B in four test flights scheduled later this year. It is a rather optimistic feeling for such a complex reoriented program (new first stage, i. e., B-52H, and addition of a second stage, i. e. rocket et al).

(Signed)

JOHN PARANGOSKY

Deputy Director of Special Activities

Attachment

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EYE-2559-67I. Summary TAGBOARD ChronologyA. July 1962

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (LAC) authorized to perform a drone configuration and feasibility study for approximately six months.

B. December 1962

LAC authorized to proceed towards design and fabrication of 20 drones and conversion of two A-12 aircraft (WEDLOCK) to launch vehicles. Definitive contract later provided essentially for the following:

1. Conversion of two A-12 aircraft to M-21 launch aircraft
2. Fabrication of 20 D-21 drones
3. Static testing of one of the 20 drones
4. Flight test of 12 airplane months, including demonstration of specifications
5. Initial spares, AGE, manuals, facility construction (Bldg. 199 and Area 51) and other related items.

C. March 1963

Hycon authorized to proceed with fabrication of cameras. Definitive contract later provided essentially for:

1. One prototype HR-335 camera
2. Nine production HR-335 cameras
3. Flight test program
4. Initial spares, AGE, manuals, etc.

D. October 1963

At NRO request technical responsibility for the program was

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BYE-2559-67
Page 2

transferred from CIA/OSA to General Geary (now Col. Saunders), Program D Director, with contracting to remain with CIA/OSA.

E. April 1966

LAC authorized to proceed with production of 15 additional Model D-21 drones.

F. August 1966

On fourth test drone launch over PMR the M-21 launch aircraft (S/N 135) was destroyed leaving one M-21 aircraft S/N 134 as the only launch vehicle. Of the initial 20 drones fabricated, this left 15 D-21 drones (one used for static testing and four for launches). Without a back-up launch vehicle, program was re-evaluated.

G. September 1966

LAC advised to continue program on a limited basis.

H. December 1966

LAC provided with one B-52H aircraft (as a replacement for M-21 launch aircraft) for modification to a launch configured aircraft, but to continue program on a limited basis.

I. January 1967

After NRO review program reoriented: LAC authorized to:

1. Retrofit the 15 remaining D-21's to D-21B configuration
2. Fabricate seven additional D-21B's in lieu of the 15 D-21's previously authorized
3. Modify the B-52H aircraft
4. Produce long lead items for modification of second B-52H launch aircraft

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 Page 3

J. May 1967

LAC advised to procure long lead items for eight additional drones. (15 retrofit, 7 production and long lead for 8)

K. July 1967

LAC advised to proceed with twelve additional drones (15 retrofit and 19 production).

L. August 1967

LAC delivery schedule received for current approved program:

Drone Delivery Schedule

Retrofit D-21 Drones to D-21B Aircraft Configuration:

<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>Date</u>
501	1967 July
507	August
508	August
509	September
510	September
511	October
512	October
513	November
514	November
515	December
516	December
517	1968 January
518	January
519	February
520	February

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BYE-2559-67
Page 4Production D-21B Drones:

<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>Date</u>
521	1968 March
522	April
523	May
524	June
525	July
526	August
527	September
528	October
529	November
530	December
531	December
532	1969 January
533	February
534	March
535	March
536	April
537	May
538	June
539	June

M. August 1967

Proposal received from Hycon to finish the updating of the ten cameras previously furnished under the initial contract and to deliver eleven additional cameras. (After the loss of launch aircraft S/N 135 Hycon was also advised to work on a limited basis, i. e., procurement of long lead items, etc., until approval to proceed with reoriented program was received.)

N. A second B-52H launch aircraft has been assigned to the program and furnished to LAC for modification in September 1967. Estimated completion of modification is December 1967 including check-out.

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 Page 5

II. General

A. Initial D-21B drone flight testing will be conducted from Area 51 through December 1967 and later at Beale Air Force Base. Four drone test launches are scheduled to be made by the end of December 1967 to demonstrate specifications. It is also planned that two of the launches will include Hycón camera tests.

B. The following NRO funding has been allocated, thus far, to the TAGBOARD program as indicated:

FY 1963	6,415,000
FY 1964	33,475,000
FY 1965	34,300,000
FY 1966	22,208,000
FY 1967	48,516,000
*FY 1968	36,733,400**
	<u>\$181,647,400</u>

*As of 15 August 1968

**Includes \$2,000,000 for long lead items for procurement of sixteen drone systems to be procured in FY 1969. (Contractors, LAC and Hycón, have been advised that future procurements are anticipated to be sixteen drones and eight cameras per year.)

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ANNEX 29

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7 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Abolition of the Office of Special Activities - Pros and Cons

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. In connection with FY 1965 budget and manpower limitations, it has been suggested that CIA withdraw voluntarily from the entire National Reconnaissance Program, and that the assignments of the Office of Special Activities be transferred to the United States Air Force.
3. Such an action would reduce the CIA manning table by approximately 700, half of them Air Force personnel on assignment to whom we have made no career commitment. By doing so, we would save only \$12 million in FY 1965, since all of the developmental and operational programs are now funded in the Air Force (NRO) budget. This elimination would reduce DD/S&T by one half and eliminate our residual substantive influence on the reconnaissance program.
4. However, the tragedy in such an elimination would be a national one. The Intelligence Community now depends on satellite and aircraft photography for the majority of its raw intelligence on the Soviet-Sino Bloc. Two systems have produced all of this photography to date - the U-2 and CORONA - both products of the Office of Special Activities and its predecessor, the Development Projects Division. These two systems also provide an unusual amount of hard intelligence on the uncommitted and semi-friendly world. Were it not for an in-house CIA developmental and operational capability, albeit strongly supported by the Air Force, there is real question in everyone's mind whether we would now have either of these priceless national assets.
5. The U-2 flew higher and farther and took pictures because intelligence was its only mission. Likewise, the CORONA succeeded and was gradually improved because national intelligence was its only mission. On the other hand, intelligence will always rank fourth or fifth on

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the Air Force priority list, as compared with strategic and tactical warfare, not to mention military space. This is as it should be, but it does not presage a dramatic change in Air Force policy.

6. The essential fact in evidence is that CIA (Office of Special Activities) has demonstrated by performance an ability to identify, pursue and operate reconnaissance programs which provide the majority of our national intelligence. I submit that they do so because they are in the intelligence business. The OSA represents the only proven group in the Government - or at least outside the Air Force - which can carry a development program through from conception to operation. Continuity of civilian personnel in the organization and CIA flexibility in bringing outstanding non-Government people into participation on a meaningful basis are major reasons for this record. The argument that this activity is a parasitic one is handily abolished by OXCART which is leading both DOD and civilian (SST) supersonic aircraft by a wide margin. This capability has been painfully developed over the past ten years and now represents a major national resource. It is not a resource to be brokered away lightly.

7. The transfer of the assignments of OSA to the Air Force would do little to enhance their capabilities and would assure no greater control of the NRP for the Intelligence Community. Neither is it a factor in influencing the NRO, for its role has been progressively reduced from that of a wife to a domestic. Rather, it would remove the one pacing group from the reconnaissance field. By executive decision, manned overflights of denied territory have been carried out only by the CIA since 1956 so as to assure maximum secrecy and permit plausible denial. To transfer this function to the Air Force should be made a matter of Presidential decision.

8. It is not clear that the operational role played by OSA, especially in the U-2 program, could be effectively handled by the Air Force. Elaborate base negotiations and use of foreign national pilots is a new assignment for the Air Attaches in areas where DD/P coordination of intelligence activities is already strained. It is not clear that adequate secure Air Force communications exist to existing and planned bases. Certainly, there is question in my mind whether an Air Force U-2 program could or would exploit the opportunities offered by U. S. Navy carrier platforms.

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9. There is also a very serious question whether covert contracting, under CIA's unique legislation, and proper security could be maintained if OSA were abolished, since these functions are now performed in-house by special arrangement and appear in the OSA personnel budget. CIA security influence over the entire National Reconnaissance Program would certainly diminish if the structure of security controls were transferred to the Air Force.

10. The basic argument against abandoning OSA to the Air Force is not a bureaucratic one. Rather, it is that OSA represents a unique national asset: an experienced, integrated organization with a demonstrated capability for developing and operating reconnaissance systems which produce intelligence data upon which this country has come to rely. Until that record is matched, I submit that we can find better opportunities to save \$12 million and 700 positions somewhere else in the Federal Government.

(Signed)
ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director
(Science and Technology)

cc: DDCI
EX DIR
Deputy to DCI/NIFE

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ANNEX 30

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BYE 2165-65

3 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, NRO

SUBJECT: IDEALIST Program Summary

1. In order to forecast the life expectancy and utility of the U-2, it is necessary to assess briefly the capabilities of other covert reconnaissance systems in being, both satellite and manned.

a. CORONA. Basically, the KH-4 role is one of search reconnaissance and broad area surveillance. Presumably, the system has nearly reached the ultimate in its performance. The results of NPIC comparison of the KH-4 product to U-2 photography over Cuba demonstrate that KH-4 is not the successor to manned aircraft reconnaissance.

b. GAMBIT. KH-7 is the system which most closely approximates U-2 quality. However, it has been the least reliable reconnaissance system and remains in R&D status. Even upon achieving operational readiness, KH-7's lack of quick response and its subjection to perishable weather forecasts make it unlikely that KH-7 will be an early successor to the U-2 other than in areas now denied the latter.

c. Albeit a SKYLARK capability is being developed, and the general OXCART capability is being improved, it is not foreseen within the immediate future that the OXCART will be technically ready for employment over the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

2. It is apparent from the above that there is no successor to U-2 reconnaissance in the immediate future. It may be therefore assumed that the life expectancy for the U-2 will be at least two more years, operating in the same general areas as at present--China, North Korea, Sino-Indian border, SEA, Cuba, Tuamotu Archipelago, and wherever a requirement may be generated.

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3. Beyond 1966, the requirement for the U-2 becomes less clear as to identification of specific target areas. It can be assumed, however, that the international scene will be no less parlous than it is now, and crises will continue to occur which will require covert reconnaissance. They could occur in South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Indonesia. For reasons of mobility, economy, reliability, and quick response, the U-2 would be the appropriate reconnaissance vehicle.

4. The useful life of the U-2 is limited by the introduction of unfavorable defensive environments. As such defenses develop, this will shrink the areas in which the U-2 may safely operate. In light of the history of surface-to-air missile deployment outside the communist sphere, it seems doubtful that by 1970 the areas of safe operation for the U-2 will be much more circumscribed than at present.

5. To supplement future intelligence gathering reconnaissance, there exists a long-standing requirement for base-line photography of broad areas of the earth, particularly in Africa and South America. National sensitivities will preclude, in all probability, such acquisition other than by covert means. The U-2 provides the best vehicle for an enterprise of such magnitude.

6. The five-year forecast submitted to the Executive Committee on 1 September 1964 is still considered valid, and the utility life of the U-2 will depend largely on availability of aircraft as attrition takes its toll in the ensuing years.

(Signed)
Jack C. Ledford
Colonel, USAF
Director, Program B

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ANNEX 31

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11 November 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Meeting with Messrs. Quarles and
Gardner on 14 November 1955

1. You will remember that the basic purpose of this meeting is to try to reach agreement on the manner in which the budget for Project AQUATONE/OILSTONE for Fiscal Year 1957 will be handled. The major practical question at issue is whether this budget (which will amount to about fifteen million dollars) is to be included in the CIA budget, which in turn is buried in the Defense budget or, alternatively, whether the whole amount is to be included in the Air Force budget. I have discussed this matter at some length with Colonel Ritland and with Colonel Berg (the Air Force project officer for AQUATONE) and it has appeared to all three of us that a number of rather far-reaching underlying issues must be considered in order to arrive at a sensible conclusion on the immediate practical question. I comment briefly on these issues in the following paragraphs.

2. One point on which I feel extremely strongly, and on which Colonel Ritland and Colonel Berg agree with me, is that the budget for this project must be included in the CIA budget if the present administrative arrangements are to continue in effect during Fiscal Year 1957. At the present time AQUATONE is housed in CIA space, governed by CIA security regulations, and placed in a line of command outside of the regular Air Force line of command. This arrangement was the one contemplated in the proposal originally approved by higher authority and it is the one you have favored throughout our discussions with the Air Force. It is working smoothly and effectively with the basic principle of conducting AQUATONE as a clandestine intelligence gathering operation accepted by all concerned. It is, however, out of the question that this Agency should continue to play its present part in the administration and control of the project unless it is budgeting for at least a sizeable part of the cost. Actually, I believe that on the basis of our present planning the Air Force will incur at least half of the cost of the project throughout its life since the Air Force is furnishing some thirty to forty million dollars worth

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of materiel, existing and newly built facilities at overseas bases and operational support which will probably cost more than the direct operational activities for which we have budgeted. Accordingly, I must recommend to you in the very strongest terms can employ that we either budget ourselves for the direct cost of this project for Fiscal Year 1957 or set in motion immediately the turn over of the full control of the project to the Air Force. Only a fiscal theorist could even seriously suggest an intermediate alternative.

3. The foregoing recommendation defines the practical question that must be decided at this time. Contemplation of this practical question, however, inevitably involves thought as to what is to be the ultimate fate of AQUATONE (if it turns out to be feasible to continue the operation of this project for a number of years) or of the successor activities which surely must be contemplated if AQUATONE itself turns out to have a short life. Moreover, this question cannot be disentangled from that of the manner in which similar activities are organized and carried out within the Air Force. In short, it is hard to chart a sensible course for AQUATONE without trying to decide how all activities of this sort could best be organized within the U.S. Government.

4. Without attempting to lead you through extensive argumentation, I will summarize my own views on this matter as follows. I might say that these are concurred in by Colonel Ritland and I believe they are regarded as sensible by Colonel Berg.

a. The present dispersion of responsibility, when by activities of the sort here under discussion are being carried on by USAFE, FEAF SAC, and ourselves is uneconomic and involves considerable risk of duplication of effort and of inadequacy of central control. It would probably be desirable in the long run to create a single operating organization, controlled directly from Washington, which would carry out all overflight activities involving penetrations of more than a few miles in depth in peacetime. This organization could draw heavily on existing commands (and on the CIA) for support.

b. The argument against the conduct of overflights by strictly military organizations with air crews that are members of

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the Armed Services of the United States is even more powerful today than it was a year ago. Though the second Geneva Conference has demonstrated that the Russians are nearly as unyielding as ever, enough of the spirit of the first Geneva Conference is still adrift so that anything that could be identified as an overt act of military aggression would call down serious political penalties upon this country. Accordingly, if there is to be a single organization responsible for overflights, its aircrews should be civilians; it should be organized to as great an extent as feasible with civilian personnel; and its activities should be regarded as clandestine intelligence gathering operations.

c. The foregoing considerations lead me to the conclusion that the single organization here proposed should be a mixed task force, organized outside of the framework of any of the regular military services though drawing extensive support from them. On the other hand, I am inclined to believe that the Air Force should own a majority of the common stock in this organization, by contrast with the present situation in which the CIA owns the majority of the common stock in AQUATONE. In any event, however, I believe that both CIA and the Air Force should contribute personnel and support and consideration might even be given to bringing the other services in as minority stockholders.

d. One further argument in favor of some such arrangement as that here proposed is that an organization with a permanent interest in this activity would be in a position to stimulate continuing research and development. It is worth noting that with two early and unimportant exceptions the aircraft under production for AQUATONE are the first ever designed exclusively for a reconnaissance mission and, of course, are the only ones that have ever been designed to meet the requirements of altitude, range and security imposed by the contemplated mission.

5. The views advanced in the preceding paragraphs have to do with the ultimate organization (and by inference, financing) of overflight activities. Meanwhile, how is AQUATONE to be carried on for another fiscal year? The following considerations, I submit, all suggest that the present arrangement should be continued through Fiscal Year 1957 or until such time as a more permanent arrangement can be arrived at.

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a. At the present time it would be difficult if not impossible for the Air Force to take over the responsibility for AQUATONE and to carry the project on in anything approaching the present fashion. Air Force procurement procedures differ sharply from those that have been employed in this project. The Air Force is less well organized to make use of a predominantly civilian maintenance and support organization, which has been developed in this case for well considered and solid reasons. Within the Air Force an operational activity of this sort would undoubtedly be made the responsibility of SAC or of another operational command. In this way the project would become a direct military activity and the advantages of plausible denial by the military establishment and of attributability only to the civilian intelligence arm would be lost.

b. Although the present arrangement cannot be regarded as a permanent one, it will take time to evolve either the pattern proposed above, or any other arrangement that will perpetuate certain of the advantages of the present one. The surest way to encourage some sound and well-thought-through plan of overflight organizations is to maintain the status quo long enough (a) to prove (or disprove) the AQUATONE capability and (b) to allow the emergence of a carefully-thought-out plan for the longer run.

c. Regardless of these considerations, grave practical difficulties would confront a shift of responsibility as early as the summer of 1956. The end of this fiscal year will occur only two and a half months after the target date for the initiation of operations. It is vital that command channels and organizational arrangements not be disturbed at that point. Nine or twelve months later it is to be hoped that the organization conducting the project will be seasoned, its equipment accumulated and the phasing out of civilian personnel in favor of the military will be feasible (if it is then desirable). Indeed, the risks involved in a major change some nine and a half months from now are so great that I believe the shift might well be undertaken at once if it is going to have to be made so soon.

6. I am not closing my eyes to the practical problem of getting money from the Bureau of the Budget and from Congress. I would emphasize three points, however, that bear directly upon this ugly task.

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First: I believe it should be made absolutely clear to the Director of the Budget that, as stated in paragraph 2 above, the issue is not merely a financial one of which Agency shall budget for a required expenditure but is basically one of organization and ultimate responsibility. If the Bureau of the Budget recommends Air Force financing it is in fact making a recommendation about the character of and the responsibility for this project. The issue should be discussed in these terms.

Second: It should be kept in mind at all times by all concerned that we are making a choice between (a) burying X dollars for CIA in the Air Force budget, and (b) adding the same X dollars to the Air Force budget. Whatever the outcome the Congress is going to be asked to vote X dollars in the Air Force budget. Moreover, X dollars is far too big to get by on any basis without explanation to someone. I am unable to see why security is served by explaining the purpose to which the X dollars will be put to the whole Armed Services and Appropriations Committees instead of to the smaller number of Congressmen and Senators who pass on the CIA budget.

Third: No matter how the accounts are set up, this project should be supported before the Bureau and before Congress by the Air Force and the CIA jointly and their joint support should be in such terms as to make it unmistakably clear that they are agreed on the urgency of the requirement, the size of the budget, and the organizational arrangements under which the project is being carried on. If this is done, I believe there is little bearing on purely political grounds between one choice of financing and another.

7. In the light of the above I recommend:

a. That you propose to Messrs. Quarles and Gardner that they undertake an examination of the organization of overflight reconnaissance activities, the CIA to join in their discussions insofar as CIA activities and interests are concerned, and that we endeavor to arrive, after full consideration, at a rational and orderly pattern for the longer run.

b. That, pending the outcome of such study, AQUATONE be continued under the present organizational arrangement in Fiscal Year

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1957, with a provisional decision at this time, however, that some more permanent long-run arrangement will come into effect no later than Fiscal Year 1957.

c. That the CIA budget for the direct costs of AQUATONE in 1957 as presently planned but that the budget for this project be presented and defended to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress jointly by the two agencies.

d. That in the interests of security as well as for the other reasons listed above, the Air Force reconnaissance activities employing the special Lockheed aircraft to be bought by the Air Force be closely integrated with the activities of AQUATONE, with the hope that this integration of activities may turn out to be a step toward the permanent long-range arrangements to be evolved in the course of the next year and a half.

(Signed)

RICHARD M. BISSELL, Jr.
Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Coordination

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ANNEX 32

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Special Handling

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YTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D. C.

6 September 1961

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.

Re: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program

Dear Mr. Dulles:

This letter confirms our agreement with respect to the setting up of a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and the arrangements for dealing both with the management and operation of this program and the handling of the intelligence product of the program on a covert basis.

1. The NRP will consist of all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert. It will include all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence resulting therefrom.

2. There will be established on a covert basis a National Reconnaissance Office to manage this program. This office will be under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans) of the Central Intelligence Agency acting jointly. It will include a small special staff whose personnel will be drawn from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. This office will have direct control over all elements of the total program.

3. Decisions of the National Reconnaissance Office will be implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance Program made effective: within the Department of Defense, by the exercise of the authority delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Force; within the Central Intelligence Agency, by the Deputy Director (Plans) in the performance of his presently assigned duties. The Under Secretary of the Air Force will be designated Special Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense and delegated full authority by me in this area.

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4. Within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force will be the operational agency for management and conduct of the NRP, and will conduct this program through use of streamlined special management procedures involving direct control from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force to Reconnaissance System Project Directors in the field, without intervening reviews or approvals. The management and conduct of individual projects or elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency as the operational agency.

5. A Technical Advisory Group for the National Reconnaissance Office will be established.

6. A uniform security control system will be established for the total program by the National Reconnaissance Office. Products from the various programs will be available to all users as designated by the United States Intelligence Board.

7. The National Reconnaissance Office will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal collection requirements and priorities as established by the United States Intelligence Board.

8. The National Reconnaissance Office will develop suitable cover plans and public information plans, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, to reduce potential political vulnerability of these programs. In regard to satellite systems, it will be necessary to apply the revised public information policy to other non-sensitive satellite projects in order to insure maximum protection.

9. The Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office will establish detailed working procedures to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in this program.

10. Management control of the field operations of various elements of the program will be exercised directly, in the case of the Department of Defense, from the Under Secretary of the Air Force to the designated project officers for each program and, in the case of the Central

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Intelligence Agency. Major program elements and operations of the National Reconnaissance Office will be reviewed on a regular basis and as special circumstances require by the Special Group under NSC 5412.

If the foregoing is in accord with your understanding of our agreement, I would appreciate it if you would kindly sign and return the enclosed copy of this letter.

(Signed)
Roswell L. Gilpatric
Deputy Secretary of Defense

1 Atch:
Chart "Single Mgmt for
National Reconnaissance
Programs" (TS)


CONCUR:

(Signed) C. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency

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SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM(S)



* Director is assigned to Secy AF, maintains field extension office at AFSSD, also serves as Vice Commander, AFSSD

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ANNEX 33

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5 December 1961

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN NRO

1. The NRO is composed of certain offices within the Department of the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is headed by co-directors each of whom acts using the authority of his overt position within his own organization. The NRO has inherited responsibility for several reconnaissance programs which are in different stages of development and operation and which have been managed both technically, operationally, and with respect to security, in somewhat different fashions.

2. There exists today a workable and well understood division of responsibility between the two offices for the several programs with which the NRO is concerned. It is contemplated that there will be no immediate change in the established division of responsibility but consideration will be given to a redefinition of responsibilities for those programs that are today in their earlier stages in such a way as to make the best use of the capabilities of the two participating organizations.

3. The present allocation of responsibilities with respect to the major programs is as follows:

a. CORONA/MURAL/ARGON: The Air Force has primary responsibility for (1) launch scheduling and launching; (2) orbit and recovery operations; (3) development and procurement of boosters, orbiting vehicles, and Elint payloads. CIA has primary responsibility for (1) targeting; (2) procurement of photographic payloads and nose cones; (4) security.

b. SAMOS: The Air Force has primary responsibility for SAMOS with CIA in a supporting role. The latter is important particularly in target planning and in security planning.

c. OXCART: This is the primary responsibility of the CIA with the Air Force in a supporting role.

4. With respect especially to the later configurations of SAMOS and to other advanced systems, consideration will be given to gradual

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modification of this distribution of responsibilities. In general, it is clear that Air Force elements will retain primary responsibility for operations and for vehicle development and procurement. For the most part these activities not only can but must be "white", that is, conducted in a reasonably public fashion. CIA's main contribution will be in target planning, serving as the communication channel for operational control, security, and that development and procurement which should be "black". More specifically, the following gradual changes will be considered:

a. It may soon be possible for all procurement of nose cones (recovery systems) to be white in which case this should be assumed by the Air Force.

b. It would appear that there will be an increasing pressure to conduct the development/procurement of at least certain cameras covertly; the CIA may assume a larger responsibility with respect to all such systems.

(Drafted by Eugene P. Kiefer
Special Asst for Tech Analysis
DPD/DDP

Approved by R. M. Bissell, Jr. DD/P
Copies sent, with agreement of
Under Secty of AF, Dr. Charyk,
to PFIAB (Mr. Coyne) and the
White House (Gen. Maxwell Taylor)

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ANNEX 34

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2 May 1962

COPYAgreement BetweenSecretary of Defense and the Director of Central IntelligenceonResponsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office (TS)Definitions:

- NRO National Reconnaissance Office
- NRP National Reconnaissance Program, to consist of all overt and covert satellite and overflight projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping photography and electronic signal collection.
- DNRO Director, National Reconnaissance Office

Policy:

The following plan outlines basic policy for the establishment of functions and responsibilities within the National Reconnaissance Office to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in the establishment, management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program. The DNRO will be designated by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, and will be responsible directly to them for the management and conduct of the NRP.

1. Requirements and Priorities:

The NRO will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal (SIGINT) collection requirements and

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priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board and will develop the over-all reconnaissance program to satisfy these requirements.

2. Management:

a. The technical management responsibility for all the NRP is assigned to the DNRO. Under this over-responsibility for NRP, DNRO will utilize existing resources in the following manner:

(1) CIA will be the Executive Agent for DNRO for those covert projects already under its management and such additional covert projects as are assigned to it by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

(2) To provide for full use of available capabilities and resources, and to provide for interface with data exploitation equipment development by agencies outside the NRO, personnel of Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA, will be assigned, on a full-time basis, to appropriate positions within the NRO under the DNRO.

(3) A firm liaison channel between the NRO and the NSA will be established as an adjunct to the technical management structure of signal collection projects, and the conduct of such projects carried out in accordance with the exploitation responsibilities of the NSA.

(4) Planning will encompass maximum utilization of the technical and operational resources of the DOD, the Army, Navy, Air Force, NSA and the CIA to support all collection programs, including, but not limited to, electronic signal and photographic collection programs.

b. Financial Management:

(1) The DNRO will be responsible for funding the NRP. DOD funds will be allocated on an individual project basis and will appear as appropriately classified line items in the Air Force budget. CIA will be responsible for funding covert projects for which it has management responsibility under paragraph 2. a. (1) above.

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(2) DNRO will have responsibility for all NRP contracts in accordance with the assignment of technical management responsibility in paragraph 2. a. Consistent with paragraph 2. a. (1), CIA will be the Executive Agent of the DNRO, responsible for administering procurement and contracting for covert projects for which it is assigned responsibility under paragraph 2. a. (1), and for covert contracting necessary for the support of overt projects.

3. Security:

In accordance with the basic responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for protection of intelligence sources and methods, CIA will establish security policy for the NRP, including provision for a uniform system of security control and appropriate delegations of security responsibility.

4. Operations:

a. Scheduling: The mission schedule for all NRP efforts will be the sole responsibility of DNRO, subject to coordination with CIA on covert projects for which it is Executive Agent and the obtaining of appropriate clearances where required from higher authority. Operational control for individual projects under the NRP will be assigned to the DOD or to the CIA by the DNRO in accordance with policy guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. DNRO will be responsible to assure that mission planning will make full use of all intelligence available in the community.

b. Format: The DNRO will be responsible for the format of the collected NRP product as follows:

(1) Photographic format will include the initial chemical processing, titling, production and delivery to the users as specified by the USIB.

(2) Electronic signal data format will include the decommutation, conversion, technical correction and reconstruction of the

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collected signal data to yield a usable collection product. DNRO will deliver the collection product in proper format together with associated data necessary for exploitation, to the NSA or other user as specified by the USIB.

c. Engineering Analysis: The DNRO will be responsible for engineering analysis of all collection systems to correct the problems that exist on the operating system as well as to provide information for new systems. In connection with covert projects for which CIA is the Executive Agent, this responsibility will be carried out under the supervision of CIA.

5. The DNRO is responsible for advanced plans (post CY-1962) in support of the NRP. In view of the DCI's major responsibility to the NSC for all intelligence programs, all NRO advanced planning will be coordinated with CIA.

6. Public releases of information will be the responsibility of the DNRO subject to the security guidance of CIA.

7. The Deputy Director (Research), CIA, will be responsible for seeing that the participation of CIA in this Agreement is carried out.

(Signed)

JOHN A. McCONE
Director of Central Intelligence

(Signed)

ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK
Deputy Secretary of Defense

2 May 1962

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ANNEX 35

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

23 JUL 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: NRO Program Directors
Director, NRO Staff

SUBJECT: (S) Organization and Functions of the NRO

- References:
- (a) Deputy Secretary of Defense memo, for multiple Addressees, Subject, (TS) DOD-CIA Agreement, dated 14 June 1962
 - (b) DOD-CIA Agreement dated 2 May 1962 re NRO
 - (c) DOD Directive TS-5105, 23 dated 14 June 1962
 - (d) Deputy Secretary of Defense memo, for multiple addressees, Subject, (S) National Reconnaissance Office, dated 14 June 1962

1. Purpose.

This memorandum will serve to establish the basic organization of the NRO and functions of the individual NRO elements, and outline the over-all concept of organization and operation. It is effective immediately and will apply until superseded by issuance of formal NRO regulations.

2. Organizational Concepts.

a. Although the NRO is established as an operating agency, the sensitivity of its mission and the security required for its projects and activities make it necessary to conceal all aspects of the NRO organization behind other plausible, overt names, organizations and functions. The NRO thus will be a separately organized, operating agency concealed entirely within other agencies, using personnel and other resources of these agencies on a full or part time basis as required.

b. The NRO will be kept as small as possible in order to operate with the efficiency and quick reaction time required. The Office will

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consist of carefully selected personnel of the highest qualifications, and will be confined to the minimum number required to accomplish the task under the conditions which apply. By arranging these personnel so that other, larger groups may be controlled through overt (additional duty) assignments of NRO Program Directors, the actual size of the NRO may be kept quite small, and thus more easily concealed, although the size of the personnel and resources directly controlled is necessarily large. Thus, in addition to personnel within the NRO, there will be many others who work full time on projects of the NRP under the complete control of the NRO, others who work part time on such projects, and still others who have knowledge of the NRO and/or some projects of the NRP but who are not actually involved in such work at all.

c. Accordingly, the NRO is defined to consist of the DNRO, the NRO Staff, the NRO Program Directors, and their Project Directors and key staff officers. (See Fig 1, attached). At the present there are two NRO Program Directors, with the Director, Program A being responsible for NRP satellite effort conducted by the NRO through utilization of Department of the Air Force resources, and the Director, Program B being responsible for NRP effort conducted by the NRO through utilization of Central Intelligence Agency resources. A Director, Program C is being established to be responsible for NRP effort conducted by the NRO through utilization of Naval Research Laboratory resources. Additional Program Directors will be established, if required, upon decision to undertake development of new projects.

d. Necessary organizational cover for the NRO is or will be provided as follows:

(1) The activities of the DNRO are covered by his position of Under Secretary of the Air Force.

(2) The NRO staff will be covered by the overt title of Office of Space Systems, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Director, Office of Space Systems will be the overt title of the Director, NRO Staff. The NRO staff will receive all administrative and logistic support from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.

(3) The activities and office of the Director, Program A are covered by his overt primary duty assignment as the Director of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, and his field extension of the Office of the Secretary at El Segundo, California.

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Through specified additional duty and specific agreements and written administrative arrangements, he directly controls all resources of the Air Force Space Systems Division which are involved in full or part time work for the NRO.

(4) An appropriate and similarly effective arrangement will be established for the Director, Program C.

(5) The activities and office of the Director, Program B are covered by his overt duty as Deputy Director/Research, CIA.

e. As appropriate, and within the limits of the established strength of the NRO, the DNRO will invite nominations from appropriate Services and Agencies for well qualified individuals to serve in the NRO. Selection of personnel for such duty will be on the basis of individual qualifications for the NRO tasks concerned. These qualifications will include, in addition to education and over-all experience, knowledge of both the principal problems of the parent Service or Agency of concern to the NRO, and the key personnel concerned with these problems. Although personnel selected for duty in the NRO will accomplish liaison and coordination in the course of their NRO duties, they will not be liaison officers as such, or representatives of their parent Service or Agency; they will be full time members of the NRO, serving a full tour on an inter-agency transfer basis, and responsible solely to their NRO supervisors for the duration of such tour.

f. Streamlined management procedures approved by the DNRO will be used throughout all aspects of the NRO management. Program Directors will be responsible directly and solely to the DNRO.

g. Necessary personnel and resources will be made available to Program Directors by the applicable Service or Agency. All such normally required support of the NRO will be covered by suitable documentation, prepared by Program Directors in conjunction with the Service or Agency concerned, and approved by the DNRO.

h. Services and Agencies supporting the NRO and NRP will make no reference to such support outside NRO channels except to identify the total of supporting manpower and resources as "committed in full (or part) support of work assigned under the provisions of paragraph IIB, DOD Directive No. TS 5105.23."

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i. The DNRO is responsible for all funding of the NRP. All covert funds will be budgeted by the CIA, and all covert NRP contracts will be let by the CIA as Executive Agent for the DNRO. In cases where the technical management of covert NRP contracts is assigned to Directors of Program A or C, the CIA may co-locate procurement personnel with the Director concerned. All other NRP funds will be budgeted in appropriately classified items of the Air Force budget. Funds will be transferred to appropriate Services and Agencies on an incremental funding basis, based upon specific approval of assigned NRP work by the DNRO.

j. Although the Program Directors will be responsible for carrying out the operational phases of assigned NRP projects, certain specific operations functions will be carried out within the NRO in Washington. In general, these functions will be those tasks which directly concern the NRO interface with the USIB, which determines program requirements, targets, and priorities, and with the principal users of program results. To the maximum extent possible, all tasks concerning these interfaces will be accomplished within the Washington part of the NRO under the close personal supervision of the DNRO. These tasks will include establishment of the mission schedule for all NRP projects, the approval of specific mission plans, and the obtaining of appropriate clearances where required from higher authority.

(1) Subject to the above provisions, the DNRO will assign operational control for aircraft projects to the appropriate Program Directors. The NRO staff will keep the DNRO currently informed of the status of such operations.

(2) In the case of satellite projects, the NRO staff will be responsible for actual mission planning from the standpoint of specifying desired targets to be covered, desired on-orbit target program options (to the extent that such options exist within the system capability of individual projects), and approval of the actual mission target program and options which are programmed into each flight vehicle. The staff will also make all on-orbit selection between target coverage options, based on weather or intelligence factors. The staff will utilize direct communications links with the Satellite Test Annex (STA) at Sunnyvale, California, and will be assisted in this task by personnel and computer resources of the STA. Where computer programs are required to assist in mission programming, such programs will be developed to provide the maximum flexibility and choice to the staff, and will provide for efficient re-cycling to meet specific target requirements identified after initial mission programs have been computed.

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(3) The NRO staff also will be responsible for NRO interface with the USIB, and for NRO coordination of all peripheral reconnaissance activities.

3. Program Directors

a. Program Directors will be "second in command" of the NRO for matters assigned to them. The Director, NRO Staff will be responsible for notifying the appropriate Program Director in case emergency actions are required during the temporary absence of the DNRO. (In case of a long absence, an acting DNRO will be appointed).

b. Each Program Director will submit for DNRO approval at the earliest:

(1) Diagrams, names of personnel, and brief identification of the duties of all of their personnel coming within the definition of the NRO, as outlined herein. Two separate diagrams and duty descriptions will be submitted: one showing the actual NRO organization and duties, and the other showing the overt organization and apparent duties.

(2) Similar identification of all other personnel involved in full or partial support of assigned NRO matters. In case of partial support, the proportion of each individual's work in support of the NRO will be shown.

(3) A list of key non-NRO personnel who are absolutely essential to the conduct of assigned NRO work. Upon approval of this list, the DNRO will make arrangements with the parent Service or Agency so that these personnel will not be transferred or re-assigned without his prior approval. Normally, such personnel will be transferred only when a qualified replacement can be in place for sufficient time prior to departure of the incumbent to assure no serious effect on NRO work.

4. NRO Staff

a. In addition to such other duties as the DNRO may assign, the principal responsibilities of the NRO staff will be to:

(1) Assist the DNRO to maintain current knowledge of the status of each project of the NRP.

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(2) Assist the Program Directors by accomplishing all project matters which require action above the Program Director's level in Washington.

(3) Establish and maintain the NRO interface with the USIB and with the principal users of NRP results.

(4) Carry out the operational responsibilities described elsewhere herein as functions of the NRO staff, including satellite mission planning from the point of view of selection of targets and target options, and exercise of all on-orbit target options.

(5) Coordinate all peripheral reconnaissance activities of the U. S. with the missions of the NRP.

(6) Keep designated personnel in each Service and specified Agency completely informed on the content and status of the NRP in order that they may take the action necessary to prepare for adequate exploitation of the collected intelligence products.

(7) Conduct studies of the over-all NRP to determine the most reasonable combination of projects and number of missions that should be planned to meet the total requirements and priorities established by USIB. Monitor detailed studies of individual projects conducted or contracted for by Program Directors.

(8) Monitor and take all necessary staff action to handle State Department, UN, DOD, JCS, and Congressional matters which affect the NRO or NRP.

(9) Assist the DNRO in establishing and maintaining effective streamlined management procedures appropriate to the mission of the NRO and consistent with the security considerations which apply.

(10) Provide staff support to the DNRO for any matter required in connection with his duties, including preparation of reports, illustrations and briefings covering any aspect of the NRP.

b. The organization and functional composition of the NRO Staff is shown in Fig 2, attached.

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(1) The Assistant for Plans and Policy will be responsible for over-all assistance in establishing and maintaining NRO management procedures and the interface of such procedures with all Washington offices and agencies concerned. He will also be responsible for handling State, UN, Disarmament, and DOD matters affecting the NRO or NRP.

(2) The Assistant for Plans and Policy will also be responsible for the continuous study of the over-all NRP, with particular attention to the determination of the number and type of projects required to assure the most efficient and effective over-all program. He will be assisted in this responsibility by a Deputy Assistant (Photo Plans) and a Deputy Assistant (SIGINT Plans).

(3) In order to assure that his responsibilities are discharged in critical appreciation of the present state of NRP capabilities, limitations, and difficulties, the Assistant for Plans and Policy will draw upon other members of the NRO staff and members of the Program Directors' staffs for appropriate part time assistance. Detailed studies of specific projects will be assigned to the appropriate Program Director, as well as all studies for which contractual action is required.

(4) The Deputy for Aircraft Projects will be responsible for assisting appropriate Program Directors in obtaining necessary support for all aircraft and drone projects of the NRP, and for keeping the DNRO currently informed on the status and capabilities of such projects. He will also be responsible for coordination of U. S. peripheral reconnaissance missions with aircraft and drone missions of the NRP.

(5) The Deputy for Satellite Projects will be responsible for assisting appropriate Program Directors in obtaining necessary support for all satellite projects of the NRP, and for keeping the DNRO currently informed on the status and capabilities of such projects.

(6) The Deputy for Operations will be responsible for all satellite operations tasks herein assigned to the NRO staff (ref. par. 2 j). He will be responsible for coordination of U. S. peripheral reconnaissance missions with satellite missions of the NRP. In addition, he will be responsible for the NRO working interface with the USIB in regard to target requirements and priorities.

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(7) The NRO comptroller will be a designated assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management).

5. Determination of need-to-know

Program Directors will determine need-to-know for all persons who are actively working on assigned NRO matters under their jurisdiction. The DNRO will determine need-to-know for all other persons for all projects of the NRP.

6. Exploitation Planning.

In order to permit adequate preparation for exploitation of the results of NRP projects while necessarily restricting the number of persons having knowledge of the actual collection projects, the following procedure will be followed. The NRO staff will brief and keep current the Intelligence officers of each Service and three of their selected "workers," the Director, DIA, and his designated personnel of the DIA Special Activities Office, the Director, NPIC, and his designated personnel, and the Director, NSA and designated personnel. Except for the DIA, the designated personnel will not exceed three officers in addition to the Chief or Director. These persons will be supported by adequate cleared secretarial and clerical personnel, and will be completely briefed on all applicable collection projects of the NRP. As a result, they will be expected to review the exploitation capabilities of their Service or Agency, and direct the necessary preparatory action. Although such direction will be based upon their specific knowledge of the collection programs of the NRP, the action will be directed by virtue of the organizational authority of the directing official without requiring any further disclosure of specific NRP project data. Normally, no other operational clearances will be granted on the basis of need to prepare for exploitation. Necessary technical data will be released in timely fashion under the product clearance to enable full exploitation of the collected products.

7. Project Responsibility Documents

Program Directors, in conjunction with the NRO Staff, will prepare a separate document for each NRP project for which they have been assigned primary responsibility. This documents will identify the specific assignment of responsibilities for all aspects of the project,

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including pertinent agreements that have been made. Such documents will be signed by all Program Directors concerned and submitted to the DNRO for approval.

8. Processing of NRO Matters

Prior specific approval of the DNRO will be required for any matter of the NRO or NRP to be processed to higher authority.

/s/ Joseph V. Charyk
Joseph V. Charyk
(S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office

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
1. Fig 1 - NRO
2. Fig 2 - NRO Staff

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NOTE: Unclassified titles shown
in parentheses.

Fig 1 - (s) National Reconnaissance Office

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13 March 1963

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ON
MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

I. Management of the National Reconnaissance Program

A. To insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in the establishment, management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence hereby agree that the Secretary of Defense shall be the Executive Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program, which shall be developed, managed and conducted in accordance with policies and guidance jointly agreed to by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

B. To carry out his responsibilities as Executive Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program, the Secretary of Defense will establish as a separate operating agency of the Department of Defense a National Reconnaissance Office under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense.

C. In the execution of their respective responsibilities the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence may designate appropriate officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to examine and monitor on their behalf the activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.

II. Organization and Command of the National Reconnaissance Office

The National Reconnaissance Office shall consist of:

A. A Director appointed from among the officers and employees of the Department of Defense by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, who shall devote a major portion of his time to the business of the National Reconnaissance Office.

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B. A Deputy Director appointed from among the officers and employees of the Central Intelligence Agency by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Director NRO shall be in the chain of command directly under the Director NRO and shall at all times be kept fully and currently informed as to all activities of the National reconnaissance Program. Under the direction of the Director NRO he shall be responsible for:

1. Supervising relations between the NRO and the United States Intelligence Board and its subcommittees, and the intelligence exploitation community.
2. Supervising all NRP tasks assigned by the Director NRO to the Central Intelligence Agency.
3. Performing such other duties as may be assigned by the Director, NRO.

The Deputy Director shall act for, and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO, during his absence or disability.

C. Such personnel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, other components of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency as shall be assigned on a full time basis to appropriate positions within the National Reconnaissance Office.

D. The chain of command shall run directly from the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent to the Director, NRO. Guidance to the Director, NRO, shall be furnished by the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent hereunder and by the United States Intelligence Board.

III. Functions and Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office

Subject to the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense, the National Reconnaissance Office, under the operational direction and control of its Director, is responsible for the management of all aspects of the NRP, including but not limited to:

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A. Development on a continuing basis for the approval of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence of a single National Reconnaissance Program of all projects for collection of intelligence, mapping and geodetic information through overflights over denied territory, by collection systems exclusive of normal peripheral operations. Maximum use will be made of appropriate technical and operational capabilities and resources of the Department of Defense, NSA and CIA to support all collection and processing projects.

B. Responding directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board.

C. Scheduling all missions for overflights in the National Reconnaissance Program, obtaining appropriate clearances where required from higher authority.

D. All NRP flights over denied territory, employing appropriate capabilities, facilities and resources of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

E. Initial imagery processing, titling, production and delivery of the collected product to the users as specified by the USIB.

F. Decommuration, conversion, technical correction and reconstruction of the collected electronic signal data to yield a usable collection product, and delivery of such collection product in proper format together with associated data necessary for exploitation to the NSA or other user as specified by the USIB.

G. Engineering analysis of all collection systems to correct the problems that exist on the operating systems as well as to provide information for new systems.

H. Planning and conduct of research and development of future NRP projects, utilizing appropriate resources and capabilities of the DOD, CIA and private contractors.

I. Presentation, as required, of all aspects of the NRP to the Special Group and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

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J. Maintenance of a uniform system of security procedures and control in accordance with security policy established for the NRP by the Director of Central Intelligence.

K. Preparation of budget requests for all NRO programs, and presentation and substantiation of such budget requests to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, the Bureau of the Budget and Congressional Committees. CIA will include in its budget presentation to the Bureau of the Budget and Congressional Committees the funds for those NRP tasks which are assigned to CIA and which are to be financed from NRO resources.

L. Direction and management of the application of, and administration of all funds made available for the National Reconnaissance Program. Funds expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public Law 110 will be administered and accounted for by CIA.

M. Rendition of status of funds reports and analyses.

N. Release of public information subject to the security guidance of CIA.

IV. Authorities

The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection with his assigned responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Program, shall be authorized to:

A. Organize, staff and supervise the National Reconnaissance Office.

B. Establish, manage and conduct the National Reconnaissance Program.

C. Assign all project tasks such as technical management, contracting, etc., to appropriate elements of the DOD and the CIA, changing such assignments, and taking any such steps he may determine necessary to the efficient management of the NRP.

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D. Issue appropriate instructions and procedures implementing this agreement.

V. Relationships

A. In carrying out his responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Program, the Director, National Reconnaissance Office shall:

1. Report directly to the Secretary of Defense and shall keep him and the Director of Central Intelligence currently informed on the NRO and the NRP. In addition he shall keep such officials of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency as the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence may respectively designate under the provisions of paragraph I. C. to examine and monitor the National Reconnaissance Program on their behalf, personally informed on a regular basis, or on request, on the status of projects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

2. Establish appropriate liaison between the National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

3. Where appropriate make use of qualified personnel of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency as full-time members of the National Reconnaissance Office.

4. Make maximum utilization of appropriate technical and operational capabilities and resources of the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency to support all collection and processing programs including but not limited to, electronic signal and imagery programs.

B. Officials of all elements of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency shall provide support within their respective authorities to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, as may be necessary for the Director to carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions. Streamlined management procedures shall be utilized whereby individual project directors will report directly to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, shall be given support as required from normal staff elements of the

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military departments and agencies of the Department of Defense and of the Central Intelligence Agency concerned, although these staff elements will not participate in those project matters except as he specifically requests, and those projects will not be subject to normal Department of Defense or Central Intelligence Agency staff review.

VI. Effective Date

This agreement is effective upon signature and supersedes the DOD-CIA NRO Agreement dated 2 May 1962.

13 March 1963

(Signed)

John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence

(Signed)

Roswell Gilpatric
Deputy Secretary of Defense

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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

PROGRAM FUNDING

1. Definitions:

Program - Refers, in the broadest sense, to the NRO.

Projects - Refers to major elements within the NRP, such as OXCART, CORONA, etc.

Tasks - Refers to a work effort assigned by the DNRO which is a portion of a project or which provides for a separate item not considered a complete mission item.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program will be financed from appropriations for the military functions of the Department of Defense.
3. The NRP will be implemented, based upon individual projects and tasks approved by the DNRO and the NRPD through the issuance by the DNRO of program directives to the program directors; i. e. CIA Program Director (Program Baker) in the instance of projects and tasks to be accomplished through CIA.
4. Based upon the program directive, the CIA Program Director (Program Baker) will prepare a definitized program document, including the estimate of funds required therefor. The Comptroller of CIA will prepare a Standard Form No. 1080 "Voucher for Transfers Between Appropriations and/or Funds" in the amount of the estimated funds required as shown on the definitized program document and will cross-reference via a code identifier.
5. The definitized program document and the Standard Form No. 1080 voucher will separately be transmitted to the NRO. The NRO will arrange for the accomplishment of the Standard Form No. 1080 voucher and thereby accomplish the advance to the CIA of the precise amount estimated to be required for the specific individual project or task as previously approved by the Director NRO.
6. In the event that funding requirements for a project or task may change during the course of the fiscal year, the Program Director in CIA will submit a revised definitized program document to indicate revised dollar estimates for decision by DNRO. To the extent revision in

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dollar estimates are approved by the DNRO, the Comptroller CIA will prepare a Standard Form 1080 voucher in the amount of the change and transmit same to the NRO. The NRO will arrange for the required reprogramming of funds and for the accomplishment of the Standard Form 1080 voucher, thereby adjusting the amount of the advances in accordance with the approval of the NRO.

7. Funds advanced to the CIA for each specific project or task will be available only for the specific project or task for which advanced. Any adjustments between projects or tasks will require the specific approval of the DNRO. Flexibility within each project or task is authorized without reference to the DNRO, provided that the total advance for the project or task is not exceeded.
8. The CIA will report at least monthly the fiscal status of each project or task in relationship to the amount advanced to the CIA therefor.
9. The foregoing arrangements will be effective for FY 1964 and subsequent fiscal years.
10. FY 1963 funds appropriated to CIA for NRO programs will be obligated in accordance with assignment of NRO projects and tasks by the DNRO.

The foregoing Program Funding Agreement is effective upon signature and becomes an appendix to the DOD-CIA NRO Agreement dated 13 March 1963.

(Signed)

John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

5 April 1963

(Signed)

Roswell Gilpatric
Deputy Secretary of Defense

4 April 1963

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10 May 1963

METHOD OF OPERATION FOR THE DD/NRO

Reference: DOD-CIA Agreement on NRO dated 13 March 1963 (BYE 6655-63)

1. The referenced agreement defines the duties of the DDNRO, under the direction of the DNRO, as follows:
 - a. Keeping fully and currently informed as to all activities of the NRP.
 - b. Supervising relations between the NRO and the United States Intelligence Board and its subcommittees, and the intelligence exploitation community.
 - c. Supervising all NRP tasks assigned by the Director, NRO to the Central Intelligence Agency.
 - d. Performing such other duties as may be assigned by the Director, NRO.
 - e. Acting for, and exercising the powers of the Director, NRO, during his absence or disability.
2. The DDNRO will retain his present office location and supporting staff as the Deputy Director (Research), CIA. In addition, the Director, NRO Staff will provide a Pentagon office for the DDNRO within the restricted area presently occupied by the NRO Staff. The NRO Staff will provide secretarial and any other assistance required by the DDNRO during occupancy of his Pentagon office. Normally, the DDNRO will use his Pentagon office on a part-time basis. However, when serving as Acting DNRO due to absence or disability of the DNRO, he will occupy his Pentagon office as required.
3. In order to permit the DDNRO to be kept fully and currently informed on all activities of the NRP,
 - a. The Director, NRO Staff will establish internal NRO administrative procedures which will insure that the office of the DDNRO will receive on a routine routing basis copies of all incoming and outgoing correspondence, cables, etc. The NRO Staff will earmark those items

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which they believe require specific attention of the DDNRO, and arrange for priority delivery when appropriate.

b. The Director, NRO Staff will establish procedures to assist the DDNRO to keep informed on NRO problems and actions in work. These procedures will consist of regularly scheduled informal discussions with the DDNRO by senior NRO Staff personnel. Normally, these discussions will be held in the CIA office of the DDNRO, at a time selected by him.

c. The NRO Staff will keep the DDNRO office informed of all major meetings or briefings in order that the DDNRO may attend, or send a representative, if appropriate.

d. The NRO Staff normally will coordinate with the DDNRO action matters of particular interest in regard to his assigned responsibilities prior to presenting them to the DNRO, although such prior coordination shall not be a prerequisite for the Staff to take up any matter with the DNRO. In presenting all actions to the DNRO, the NRO Staff will indicate the coordination which has been obtained, and will obtain any additional coordination which may be required by the DNRO.

4. In order to carry out his responsibilities for supervising relationships between the NRO and USIB, the DDNRO will work with the USIB and its subcommittees, and with the DIA, to insure that appropriate requirements guidance is provided to the NRO for the development and execution of the NRP. He will insure that the NRO keeps the USIB and the DIA adequately informed on NRO programs so that this guidance will be meaningful. With appropriate assistance from NRO Staff, the DDNRO will work with the intelligence exploitation community, primarily NPIC, NSA, and DIA, to insure that a proper interface exists between the NRP and those responsible for exploiting its products. This activity will involve both working with the exploiters to insure adequate preparation to handle the collected products, and insuring that specialized requirements of the exploiters are adequately considered in the development and operation of the collection systems.

5. In carrying out his duties in regard to the CIA support of the NRP, the DDNRO will be responsible for:

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- a. insuring that the CIA is responsive to NRO direction and guidance on all NRP projects and/or tasks assigned to the CIA;
- b. insuring that the DNRO is informed on the progress of all NRO projects and/or tasks assigned to the CIA, and on any critical problems arising in connection therewith;
- c. submitting to the DNRO for approval the programs and budgets for NRO projects and/or tasks assigned to the CIA;
- d. insuring that all NRO funds made available to the CIA are used only for work which has been approved by the DNRO;
- e. insuring that the CIA has within its own budget the necessary funds and personnel to provide internal CIA support for all assigned NRP responsibilities;
- f. initiating preparation of proposals for operational employment of NRO projects assigned to the CIA. Such proposals will be submitted to the DNRO, and upon his approval, forwarded to the Special Group and higher authority for approval, as necessary. The DDNRO will act as the NRO spokesman during such higher level presentations when appropriate, as determined by the DNRO.

6. In carrying out the duties of Acting DNRO during a designated absence of the DNRO, the DDNRO will perform all of the functions of the DNRO, following the policies previously established by the DNRO. The NRO Staff will carry out all of its activities in support of the Acting DNRO in the same manner as for the DNRO.

7. The DDNRO shall be in the chain of command directly under the DNRO, although not an intermediary echelon between the DNRO and NRO Program Directors, the NRO Comptroller, or the Director, NRO Staff. The DDNRO shall have command authority over all elements of the NRO when serving as Acting DNRO during the absence or disability of the DNRO.

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11 August 1965 .

AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMA. The National Reconnaissance Program

1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the Government under a strong national leadership, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U. S. technology and all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the Government's intelligence needs and objectives.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program shall be responsive directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. Targeting requirements and priorities and desired frequency of coverage of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee.

B. The Secretary of Defense will :

1. Establish the NRO as a separate agency of the DoD and will have the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP

2. Choose a Director of the NRO who will report to him and be responsive to his instructions;

Excluded from automatic regrading;
DoD Dir. 5200.10 does not apply.

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3. Concur in the choice of the Deputy Director of the NRO who will report to the DNRO and be responsive to his instructions;
4. Review and have the final power to approve the NRP budget;
5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when necessary, to reach decisions on issues on which committee agreement could not be reached.

C. The Director of Central Intelligence will:

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the establishment of their frequency of coverage;
2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend, if appropriate, steps for improving such results;
3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee;
4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year;
5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the whole NRP area.

D. National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee

1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is hereby established to guide and participate in the formulation of the NRP through the DNRO. (The DNRO will sit with the Executive Committee but will not be a voting member.) If the Executive Committee can not agree on an issue the Secretary of Defense will be requested to sit with the Committee in discussing this issue and will arrive at a decision. The NRP Executive Committee will:

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a. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.

b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program and its budget.

c. Approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems. Funds shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense and CIA to design and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by both CIA and DoD.

d. Approve the allocation of development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. Assignment of responsibility for engineering development of sensor subsystems will be made to either the CIA or DoD components in accordance with the above criteria. The engineering development of all other subsystems, including spacecraft, reentry vehicles, boosters and booster interface subsystems shall in general be assigned to an Air Force component, recognizing, however, that sensors, spacecraft and reentry vehicles are integral components of a system, the development of which must proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance. To optimize the primary objective of systems development, design requirement of the sensors will be given priority in their integration within the spacecraft and reentry vehicles.

e. Assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to CIA or DoD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee.

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f. Periodically review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

2. The Executive Committee shall meet on the call of either the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All meetings will be attended by the DNRO and such staff advisors as the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence consider desirable.

E. National Reconnaissance Office

1. To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish the NRO as a separate operating agency of the DoD. It shall include the SOC which shall be jointly manned.

2. The Director of the NRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director NRO will:

a. Subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee as set forth in Section D above, have the responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP.

b. Subject to review by the Executive Committee, and the provisions of Section D above, have authority to initiate, approve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP. Ensure, through appropriate recommendations to the Executive Committee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the invention, improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to meet USIB requirements.

c. Have authority to require that he be kept fully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP.

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d. Maintain and provide to the members of the Executive Committee records of the status of all projects, programs and activities of the NRP in the research, development, production and/or operational phases.

e. Prepare a comprehensive budget for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

f. Establish a fiscal control and accounting procedure to ensure that all funds expended in support of the National Reconnaissance Program are fully accounted for and appropriately utilized by the agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately those funds to be applied to research and exploratory design development, systems development, procurement, and operational activities. Funds expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted for by CIA and will be reported to DNRO in accordance with agreed upon procedures.

g. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full time in a line position directly under the Director NRO. The Deputy Director shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO during his absence or disability.

4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion as to reflect the best talent appropriately available from the CIA, the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will report to the DNRO and DDNRO and will maintain no allegiance to the originating agency or Department.

F. Initial Allocation of Program Responsibilities

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page 5

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1. Responsibility for existing programs of the NRP shall be allocated as indicated in Annex A attached hereto.

(signed)
Cyrus Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense

(signed)
W. F. Raborn
Director of Central Intelligence

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CONTROL SYSTEM ONLYANNEX A

The following assignments for the development of new optical sensor subsystems are made to take full advantage of technical capability and experience of the agencies involved.

1. The CIA will develop the improvements in the CORONA general search optical sensor subsystems.
2. Following the selection of a concept, and a contractor, for full-scale development, in the area of advanced general search, the CIA will develop the optical sensor subsystem for that system.
3. The Air Force (SAFSP) will develop the G-3 optical sensor subsystem for the advanced high-resolution pointing system.
4. SAFSP will develop the optical sensor subsystems (manned and unmanned) for the MOL program.

The Director, NRO will, in managing the corresponding over-all systems developments, ensure that:

1. The management of and contracting for the sensors is arranged so that the design and engineering capabilities in the various contractors are most efficiently utilized.
2. The sensor packages and other subsystems are integrated in an over-all system engineering design for each system, with DNRO having responsibility for systems integration of each over-all system.

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ANNEX 39

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1 October 1965

The Honorable Alexander Flax
 Director, National Reconnaissance Office
 Department of Defense
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Al:

The conclusion of a new NRO Agreement has caused us to examine the CIA organizational structure involved so as to assure ourselves that it will adequately support your office and its program. After careful study, we have decided to consolidate all of our satellite activities in the Office of Special Projects under Mr. John Crowley, and they will be responsible for CIA participation in CORONA, FULCRUM, [] and other projects as required. Manned reconnaissance aircraft development and operations will be the responsibility of the Office of Special Activities under Brigadier General Jack Ledford, which will manage the U-2 and OXCART programs. The development of airborne electronic equipment is accomplished in the Office of Elint under Mr. George Miller, but is responsive to the needs and program management of OSA. All of these offices report to the DD/S&T, who is Dr. Albert D. Wheelon. In addition to these activities, we have the NRO funded STPOLLY and STSPIN programs in the Special Operations Division of DD/P under Major General Walsh.

All of this activity will come to a management focus in the person of a Director of CIA Reconnaissance Programs, who will report to the DD/S&T. Admiral Raborn and I will count on this individual to keep us informed on the NRP as appropriate. This will provide you with a single authoritative point of contact within the CIA for all our programs. It will replace the present concept of a Program B manager and relieve General Ledford of the responsibility for programs over which he has no real authority. In the future we will expect General Ledford to serve only in a line capacity as part of the CIA organization, in place of his present dual responsibility which has proved difficult to him and us. It is our desire that the CIA program within the NRP be

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Page 2

so identified and that the Program B description of our activities be discontinued. I have designated Mr. Huntington Sheldon to serve in the capacity as Director of CIA Reconnaissance Programs on an interim basis, and all correspondence or requests bearing on CIA participation in the NRO should be addressed to him. We would hope that working level contact with the NRO Staff and Messrs. Crowley, Ledford, Miller, and Walsh would continue as before.

I believe that the implementation of these management steps will considerably enhance the ability of CIA to support the new NRO Agreement more effectively--an objective to which we are all pledged.

Sincerely,

(Signed)
Richard Helms
Deputy Director

cc: Mr. Vance
Admiral Raborn
Dr. Wheelon
Mr. FitzGerals
Mr. Reber

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12 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Huntington D. Sheldon

SUBJECT : Assignment of Responsibilities for NRO Matters

1. You will carry out the duties of Director of Reconnaissance, CIA in addition to your other duties as Chairman, USIB Watch Committee; Chairman, USIB SIGINT Committee; CIA SIGINT Officer; Special Assistant to the DD/S&T.
2. I look to you in your position as Director of Reconnaissance, CIA to keep in the closest touch with the Director and Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and to serve as the Agency's focal point in liaison with the NRO. You will be responsible for formulating, with appropriate coordination, the CIA views and position on all matters relating to the NRO. This will include the primary responsibility for preparing Agency responses to NRO memoranda, letters, and other requests for action or information on all subjects including fiscal and budgetary matters and those matters concerning CIA reconnaissance programs and operational approvals. You will keep the Office of the DCI informed and it will be your responsibility to seek my concurrence as and when required.
3. I will look to you to insure development of Agency positions for use before the NRO Executive Committee. In this connection you should effect coordination as necessary with the DD/S&T, who will attend Executive Committee meetings as my senior technical advisor.
4. In carrying out this responsibility, you will keep abreast of the work done by COMOR and the CIA Directorate of Intelligence in the field of intelligence requirements and targeting for reconnaissance. I regard it as of prime importance that the DCI be in a position at all times to comment on and take actions to correct any inadequacies of the National Reconnaissance Program, particularly in the meeting of national intelligence requirements.
5. You are also responsible for advising me on the budgetary and funding aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program. As a member

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of the NRO Executive Committee, the DCI will be taking an active part in the Executive Committee's consideration of the budgeting for and funding of all elements of the Program.

6. In accomplishing these tasks and to keep me fully informed, you will maintain the closest consultation with all appropriate elements of the Agency. Specifically, I want you to maintain close and continuing contact with the DD/S&T and the Office of Special Activities, the Office of Special Projects, and the Office of Elint; with the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation; with the Executive Director and, through him, the Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting; with COMOR; with the Deputy Director for Intelligence, NPIC, and the Collection Guidance Staff; and with the Deputy Director for Plans, particularly as NRO matters relate to CIA overseas responsibilities. All such Agency elements are to be responsive to your needs for information, advice, and assistance in developing the CIA position and the coordination of relationships on NRO matters.

7. The CIA Office of Security will be responsible for recommending security policy for the NRP and for supporting the NRO as required. The Office of Security will coordinate all NRO security policy matters with the DD/S&T and with you as the Director of Reconnaissance. I shall continue to delegate my authority to grant "need-to-know" approvals involving the NRP to the DD/S&T.

8. I shall expect you to develop the CIA position on matters affecting the processing and reporting of film and magnetic tape reconnaissance records in coordination with other elements of the Agency as necessary.

9. Nothing in this directive to you is to be construed as investing you with operational control of components of the Agency involved in the National Reconnaissance Program.

(Signed)
W. F. Raborn
Director

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DSS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA-1

Vol. III of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)

History of the Office of Special Activities

Chapter V

(PERIOD)

From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 3
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

Controlled by : DSS&T

Date prepared : 1 April 1969

Written by : Helen Klayla

Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER V. DEVELOPMENT AND
PROCUREMENT: CONTRACTING
FOR THE U-2

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CHAPTER V. DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT:
CONTRACTING FOR THE U-2

In early December 1954, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the Perkin-Elmer Corporation and Pratt & Whitney Aircraft were given verbal authorization to proceed with work on the airframes, engines and photographic equipment for Project AQUATONE. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft was covered by an existing Air Force contract; the other two companies required a preliminary letter contract as soon as possible to cover the costs they were beginning to incur. Before proceeding with contract negotiations, in order to give the Director of Central Intelligence the benefit of Air Force judgment as to the reasonableness of the Lockheed proposal and the reliability and efficiency of the corporation, Mr. Bissell obtained a letter of endorsement signed by Mr. Trevor Gardner on 27 December 1954 (Annex 19). A similar endorsement with regard to the proposed photographic equipment was obtained from Lt. Gen. Putt on 14 January 1955 (Annex 40).

Lockheed Contract

The original negotiations with Lockheed were carried out in December 1954 by the General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, with Messrs. C. L. Johnson and Robert Bias. An agreed Letter Contract was signed by the company 3 January 1955 and negotiations began

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immediately on the definitive contract. A "Record of Negotiations, Contract SP-1913" (Annex 41) sets forth complete details of the contracting process and agreements reached as to price (\$22,500,000); terms (fixed price, redeterminable upward or downward at delivery of first aircraft or at the time 75% of costs are incurred); and payment plan. Appendix A of Annex 41 sets forth the scope of work. The original scope of work was increased during the life of the contract by nine major items, including six changes to the aircraft, amounting to \$2.8 million. Even with these added charges the final contract price for the original twenty U-2 aircraft was well within the Lockheed estimate.

A concise historical review in outline form of Contract SP-1913 from its initiation in January 1955 through final settlement in May 1958 was prepared by Lockheed and will be found at Annex 42. Final cost figures were as follows:

Cost	\$17,025,542
Profit	1,952,055
Final price	<u>\$18,977,597</u>
Saving from original estimate \$22,500,000	3,522,403

Reasonable allocation of the price would provide the following prices for items as indicated below:

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20 airplanes (\$656,948 each)	\$13,138,966
Spare parts	3,153,858
Ground Handling Equipment	500,519
Special Hatches	765,644
Spare Parts Packaging	254,140
Miscellaneous Items	1,164,470

The methods of Lockheed's Advanced Development Projects (ADP), known familiarly as the "Skunk Works", were a major factor in the development and production of the U-2 reconnaissance system. This division of Lockheed had been in operation since 1943 but until the U-2 was put into production in 1955 the ADP produced only experimental prototypes. The development of a production capability by ADP, using the simple, direct techniques of the original "Skunk Works" as opposed to the more involved management techniques used on other comparable projects, allowed for reductions in cost and time which led to the successful fulfillment of this contract.

In a report on ADP methods written in May 1965, Mr. Johnson said:

"The 'Skunk Works' method of operation can be used only when the government, on its side, grants the manufacturer an unusual amount of responsibility and freedom of action in the over-all management, development and production aspects of the program. It is necessary that both the government and the manufacturer have small, competent project offices to work together, and that contracting methods be direct and simple. There is no place for the extensive

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supervision of industry by government which is now so common under Air Force Regulations. . . The objectives, however, of many of these regulations must be obtained by straightforward, simple management revolving around the concept of using a few good people on each side to do the job." 1/

Perkin-Elmer Contract

In December 1954 the Perkin-Elmer Corporation was requested to take on the production of the photographic equipment for the project which had been designed by Dr. James Baker. The original approach was to Mr. Richard Perkin, President of the company, who agreed to undertake the work. Dr. Roderic M. Scott was also knowledgeable of the program since he, as Chief Scientist of Perkin-Elmer, had previously worked on the optics problems with Dr. Baker.

The company began preliminary planning and preparations for the work on the basis of verbal agreement that a redeterminable, fixed-price contract would be negotiated between the Agency and the corporation when the complete scope of work and cost estimates were known. A Letter Contract was signed 5 January 1955 authorizing expenditures up to \$2.5 million, but it took four months of negotiating to arrive at a definitive contract. The principal cause for delay was

1/ LAC/ADP Report No. SP-782F, 25 May 1965. "Some Comments on ADP Operation" by Clarence L. Johnson.

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the insistence by the Perkin-Elmer representative (Dr. Scott) on a strictly commercial type contract with a fixed price not subject to redetermination and at the same time the Agency Contracting Officer's reluctance to enter into a fixed-price contract for articles never produced before and for which half or more of the cost represented a subcontract. (Perkin-Elmer had offered a sub-contract to the Hycon Manufacturing Company of Pasadena for the actual building of the cameras for the project.) The Contracting Officer proposed a government contract binding on both parties, which would remain in the background, and a commercial order which the contractor would use overtly and bill against as a security measure within the corporation. Dr. Scott agreed to the dual type of contract but clung to the idea of a fixed price. He also wished, because of the device of a straw corporation represented by the Agency's New York cut-out through which Perkin-Elmer was to deal, and because of deviation from Armed Services Procurement Regulations, to have the final contract signed on behalf of the Government by an officer of at least Cabinet rank.

Negotiations bogged down and the Letter Contract had to be extended while a mutually acceptable contract was worked out. The

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contract finally signed on 5 May 1955 was Agency-sterile but not Government-sterile. It called for 36 A-1 cameras, 27 A-2's, 6 B's and 6 C's, with a target price of \$5,085,000 (\$4,750,000 cost plus \$340,000 profit), redeterminable at the time 75% of the cost had been expended.

Even before the contract was signed, the first of many modifications to the original photographic configurations was being drawn up in an effort to cut down weight of the payload to acceptable limits and to simplify the system in order to avoid logistic and field maintenance problems. A 24-inch lens was standardized for the A configuration (rather than both 24-inch and 36-inch lenses) and it was agreed that the marginal value of the 12-inch split vertical cameras in the original specifications of the A-1 and A-2 did not warrant their inclusion. At a meeting on 11 March 1955 with Drs. Baker and Scott, the weight problems of the B and C configurations were reviewed.

"It was brought out that film weight for the B could be reduced from 320 pounds to 250 pounds by reducing stereo overlap. With development of a 2 mil base film there could be a further reduction to 180 pounds and with other weight savings which could be accomplished it appeared that the B could be brought down to 460 pounds (the military load spec was 450 pounds).

"The C configuration weight as proposed was 698 pounds and therefore only a radical change could bring it down to

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maximum weight allowable. Dr. Baker proposed modifying the camera for focal length of 144 inches rather than 200, developing thin base film and high gamma emulsion to make up for reduced focal length. With these changes the weight might be pared down to 442 pounds for camera, film, charting camera and periscope." 1/

The first flight test of the A configuration took place in September 1955 and continuous correction of malfunctions, reworking of parts and refinement of techniques (including the training of ground crews in the proper handling and loading) were necessary before operational readiness was reached. The A-2 configuration was deployed first with Detachment A in May 1956 and was used exclusively for the first year of operations by Detachments A and B. The A-1 was not flown operationally until October 1957 by Detachment B and it was also used with good results in typhoon hunting missions in Japan by Detachment C.

The B camera was slow in delivery and functioned poorly during the Detachment B combat readiness tests in July 1956 due mainly to shutter trouble. After reworking and further testing, however, the B camera became the workhorse and was used almost exclusively in the U-2 from the summer of 1958 through 1966 with good results. The first C camera was tested in December 1956 and in January 1957 had

1/ TS-103289, 21 March 1955. Memo for the Files by H. I. Miller.

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one effective mission; it was never used operationally, however, due to complex optical problems inherent in the design, and was later shelved.

Amendments to the original Perkin-Elmer contract covered the furnishing of ground support equipment, the redesign of shutters, lenses and other components, and overhaul of cameras. Separate contracts were negotiated for the furnishing of technical personnel to service the equipment at foreign bases.

On 10 July 1958, Perkin-Elmer made final settlement of its sub-contract with Hycon on the following basis: \$3,707,148.60 approved cost; \$329,100 profit (8.77%); \$69,914 allowed for California tax expense; total \$4,106,000. Subsequent dealings with Hycon by the Project were by direct contract with that company.

Final negotiations between CIA and Perkin-Elmer on the prime contract were held 23 July 1958 to redetermine cost and establish profit. Perkin-Elmer's portion of the final price was \$2,614,141, including a 12% profit, which together with the sub-contract cost totalled \$6,720,141 (later adjusted to \$6,698,906.11 in May 1960). Of this total approximately 6-1/2% represented procurement for the Air Force which was reimbursed with Air Force funds.

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Ramo-Wooldridge Contract

The electronic equipment called for under the Project Outline included: 12 sets of electronic search equipment to be used on photographic missions, together with 3 sets of automatic FERRET equipment (total \$3 million). Prior to the Agency's assumption of major responsibility for the joint project, the Air Force had chosen Ramo-Wooldridge to produce the electronic equipment on the recommendation of Mr. Donald Quarles (at that time Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development). This choice was questioned by Mr. Ralph Clark (Agency ELINT Staff Officer) since he believed Ramo-Wooldridge skills were mainly in the field of radar rather than search equipment for ELINT collection. Dr. Edward Purcell, member of the Land Panel and adviser to the Project on electronics, also questioned the choice on grounds that Ramo-Wooldridge was fully occupied with its missile contract.

On 5 January 1955 Dr. Burton Miller, representative of Ramo-Wooldridge, met with Mr. Bissell at Project Headquarters, with Messrs. Clark and Purcell also present. Mr. Bissell wished to determine whether Ramo-Wooldridge had the resources to do the job and whether they could give it the priority required in view of their

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other commitments. He also wished to get agreement for Dr. Richard C. Raymond of Haller-Raymond-Brown to consult with Ramo-Wooldridge in order to benefit from his experience in building electronic equipment.

Dr. Miller assured the group that Ramo-Wooldridge was anxious to take on the job and was desirous of diversifying company activities (half of its assets were now tied up in missile contracts). There were plenty of cleared personnel already working on other CIA contracts who could be put to work on the new job and thus he estimated the first units could be built by August 1955. Dr. Miller's confidence and persuasiveness (added to Mr. Quarles' recommendation) obviously quieted any doubts of those present since a letter of intent to purchase the equipment from Ramo-Wooldridge was carried to Los Angeles for signature within the week.

At a meeting with Dr. Miller on 17 February 1955, Drs. Purcell and Raymond and Messrs. Ralph Clark and Herbert Miller reviewed the electronic components to be fabricated and the type of proposal required from Ramo-Wooldridge to support the writing of a definitive contract. At the close of that meeting Dr. Purcell noted that he was favorably impressed by the planning work done thus far and that he

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believed that Ramo-Wooldridge could be counted on to come up with the desired results.^{1/}

On 7 March 1955 the Project Contracting Officer presented a copy of the proposed contract to Dr. Miller who accepted the terms on behalf of Ramo-Wooldridge with only a few minor changes. Principles agreed to were as follows:

- a. The contract would be a cost-plus-fixed-fee type with fee of 8-1/4%. (The Contracting Officer's findings to support use of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract were that the exact nature and extent of the work covered and the precise method of performing the work could not be established in advance but must be subject to improvisation and change as work progressed; therefore costs of performing the work could not be forecast accurately enough to set a fixed price.)
- b. Audit would be by local Air Force auditors; they would not be knowledgeable of Agency interest.
- c. Ramo-Wooldridge would bill weekly costs plus 90% of the proportionate fee.
- d. Amendments for additional work would be issued as

^{1/} TS-103279, 17 February 1955. Memo for the Record by H. I. Miller. Subject: Meeting with Dr. Burton Miller.

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soon as scope of work and costs were known; the estimated cost of the first phase was \$309,600 (\$286,000 plus fee of \$23,600).

A contract (No. A-101) in the above amount was signed on 31 March 1955 for the provision of 12 sets of System I. (See Annex 43 on electronic equipment for configuration of electronic systems used by the U-2.) Before the definitive contract could be negotiated, the specifications for the first electronic packages were already in a state of change.

The first and second amendments to the contract with Ramo-Wooldridge authorized an engineering study and the building of a prototype of a communication and navigation system for the U-2. System II was an automatic digital transmission system designed to operate over a range of 4,000 miles using ionospheric sensing and high frequency band. Communication between pilot and ground stations was to be by "canned" messages. An automatic frequency changer, pre-programmed for replying to ground station interrogations, was incorporated originally but was removed on the theory that any emergency or change of course of the aircraft would require pilot initiative, rendering the pre-settings useless.

Delay in readiness of this system and its costliness led to the development of an alternate navigational system (the Baird sextant)

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and the Office of Communications took over the completion and repackaging of System II as a part of the emergency staff communications system of the Agency in June 1957.

Early in 1958 in an attempt to cut back equipment to an austere basis matching the pace of operations, a strenuous effort was made to bring project work at Ramo-Wooldridge to a dead stop, and cutbacks were made in the balance of the systems on order as well as in spares and supporting assemblies. The Project Director indicated to Ramo-Wooldridge that no additional funds could be obligated and if over-runs were expected, still further cutbacks would be made in order to reduce to an absolute minimum the probability of having additional unforeseen financial burdens placed upon the project by Ramo-Wooldridge.

The closing out of the contract required until July 1961 and the subsequent audit and final payment took another year. Meanwhile, in July 1959 an investigation was initiated by the General Accounting Office into contracts between the Air Force and Ramo-Wooldridge due to the company's failure to meet contract terms. This of course brought CIA's business with Ramo-Wooldridge under scrutiny since Air Force contract numbers were being used for cover purposes and

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to facilitate priority deliveries of components used in manufacture of the end items.

In preparation for a meeting between the DCI and the Comptroller General on this subject, the Agency Comptroller (Mr. Edward Saunders) furnished Mr. Dulles the following information:

"Of the rounded \$26 million business with R-W covering the period 1 June 1954 through 31 December 1958, we have one contract in the amount of \$20.4 million awarded in January 1955, covering items we shall identify as Systems I through VI...

"As this equipment was all highly complicated and greatly advanced in the state of the art, it was necessary to procure under contract technical representatives to maintain these items at the overseas bases of operation, totaling to date \$526,450. Another contract was awarded totaling \$1,132,000 to date to cover factory overhaul and repair of the items that could not be serviced in the field.

"These items proved so desirable and were sufficiently advanced that both the U.S. Air Force and the Navy Department solicited our aid in procuring items for them in the rounded amount of \$1.7 million. This was essential because the sensitivity of the program precluded these departments from getting the items through their own resources...

"You may be asked our views with respect to the technical competence of TRW Inc.*; my information, which comes from the technical officials, is that the Agency is satisfied with the items when delivered, however, we feel that the company needs improvement in the area of estimating costs as well as the area of estimating and maintaining delivery schedules.

* TRW is the abbreviation of the new name of the company after the merger with Thompson Products (Thompson Ramo-Wooldridge).

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In fairness to the company, we again bring to mind that the predominance of the items delivered and manufactured were considerably in advance of the state of the art and it may therefore be somewhat unfair to take the firm position that their estimates of cost and delivery time is unsatisfactory. " 1/

The General Accounting Office was insistent upon getting answers in writing to the following questions: (1) Why was Ramo-Wooldridge selected by CIA? (2) At the time of negotiations was CIA aware of the top priority work by Ramo-Wooldridge for the Air Force? (3) Did CIA discuss their proposed work with Air Force before awarding the contract? (4) If so, why did Air Force permit Ramo-Wooldridge services to be diluted in view of the top priority of the work for the Air Force? (5) In negotiations by CIA with Ramo-Wooldridge, what representation did the company make as to availability of personnel, and were any specific individuals named who had been designated to work on the ballistic missile program?

The essence of the Agency reply to the Director of Defense Auditing, GAO, signed by Colonel White on 30 July 1959, was that CIA had no information as to any dilution of Ramo-Wooldridge services to the Air Force resulting from the special project contract, which had

1/ TS-155229, 21 July 1959. Memo for DCI from Comptroller/CIA, Subject: Discussion with Comptroller General re TRW, INC.

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been carefully coordinated with the Air Force and Ramo-Wooldridge and neither had interposed any objection nor indicated any problem as to the firm's ability to carry out all its government commitments. ^{1/}

Final settlement of Contract A-101, which ran through 25 amendments, was made 12 June 1962 at a cost of \$18,896,247.09, plus fixed fee of \$1,585,331 (total \$20,481,560.09), covering electronic systems, read-out equipment, miscellaneous items of supply, and techreps for the domestic test site for Project AQUATONE; also included were costs of procurement undertaken for the Air Force, CIA Office of Communications, and the P2V program (STPOLLY).

Other Contracts

The principal additional equipment and services developed and/or procured under the U-2 program are outlined below.

APQ-56 Side-looking Radar, Westinghouse Electric. Contract initiated 3 June 1955, on recommendation of the Land Panel, for mapping radar, a modification of the AN/APQ-56 system developed for the B-57, original weight 698 pounds. Weight reduction was accomplished by time-sharing of the right and left scanning with a single recorder producing a continuous record. The record obtained provided a radar

^{1/} DPD-5164-59, 30 July 1959. Letter to Director of Defense Auditing, GAO, from Deputy Director, Support, L. K. White.

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map of the area 2 to 15 miles on either side of the line of flight. This system was flight tested in the summer and fall of 1956 and successfully tied in with the radan and declared operational in January 1957.

Film Processing, Eastman Kodak

a. Engineering Study: Contract initiated 17 June 1955

for an engineering study of film processing and data recording operations and design and installation of equipment. Contract completed 9 March 1959, cost \$257,778.65.

b. Equipment (Film Processing and Minicard): Contract

initiated 1 March 1956 for equipment required to set up film processing centers at Eastman's Rochester plant and at CIA Headquarters (PIC). Contract completed 23 March 1961, [REDACTED]

c. Film Processing Plant: Contract initiated 1 October

1955 for operation and maintenance of the film processing plant to handle processing of U-2 mission film at Eastman's Rochester plant. Contract completed 23 March 1961, cost \$4,595,068.25 (including some satellite program funds).

d. Film: Contract initiated 29 June 1955 for procurement

from Eastman of film, paper, chemicals, etc. The new thin-base

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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film to decrease weight, and the new formula for sub-layer and emulsion were developed by Eastman at the instigation of Dr. Land. Contract completed 18 May 1964, cost \$4,070,411. (Further film procurement continued under a new contract.)

Sextant, Baird Atomic, Inc. Contract initiated 17 October 1955 for a feasibility study of an automatic celestial navigation system for use in high altitude aircraft, and subsequent construction of 8 (later increased to 24) sextants, spare parts, rear view mirror and services of techreps overseas. This was a manually controlled sextant using the existing periscope as a method of presentation. Contract completed 30 June 1957, cost \$720,218.71.

Aeromedical Support, Lovelace Foundation. Contract initiated 28 November 1955 for medical and clinical services to Watertown test site, and U-2 pilot physical and psychological examinations. Services of Lovelace were made available under a USAF contract previous to the writing of this contract. Costs chargeable to the U-2 program as of 30 June 1962 were \$107,771.47. At that time the U-2 successor program was blanketed under the same contract, which is still in force.

Personal Equipment, Firewel Co., David Clark Co. Contract initiated 15 January 1956 (before which Firewel had supported the U-2

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under a USAF contract) for personal equipment for pilots including pressure suits, helmets, oxygen regulators, seat packs, etc. Firewel in general developed, with Air Force cooperation, the different items and subcontracted their manufacture to other firms. The Firewel original contract was completed 8 March 1961 at a cost of \$684,489.56, including Air Force funds. In January 1960 direct contracting was begun with David Clark Company which saved the cost of Firewel's subcontracting costs and profit. At that time, the oxygen equipment and suits had become pretty much production items thereby permitting direct procurement without interface problems.

Radan, General Precision Laboratories. Contract initiated 4 April 1956 for Radan equipment for U-2 and P2V programs, plus flyaway kits, bulk spares, test equipment, handbook of instructions and course selector (read-out equipment to be used with APQ-56 side-looking radar). Contract completed 21 April 1960, cost \$618,929.99.

Later contracts included, among others: Research and testing related to radar camouflage program by M. I. T., Scientific Engineering Institute, Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, and Westinghouse; additional electronic intelligence collection and countermeasures systems (see Annex 43 for description); numerous additional and

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continuing contracts with Lockheed have covered all manner of fabrication, overhaul, and other services to the project including the fashioning of special hatches, modifications to the U-2 aircraft (1) to take the J-75 engine, (2) for inflight refueling capability, and (3) a carrier-based configuration; also service contracts for techreps, guards, maintenance of an air shuttle service, and cover contracts for hiring pilots. New camera systems were developed by Hycon, Eastman and Itek (see chart at Annex 44 for a listing of all camera systems available to the U-2 as of December 1966).

Procurement for Air Force and Navy

On 11 January 1956 a letter from the Air Force to the DCI requested that CIA contract for U-2 aircraft and equipment on behalf of the Air Force in the amount of \$31 million. The request and a draft reply agreeing to it were discussed at the Bureau of the Budget by the Agency General Counsel. The Director of the Budget reluctantly agreed to the Agency's undertaking this procurement for the Air Force. The reluctance was specifically on the basis that the Budget Director felt the Air Force should be able to set up procedures as secure and effective as those of the Agency. On 26 January 1956, the General Counsel rendered an opinion on the legality of the proposed procurement

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in the following memorandum to the DCI:

"Under normal circumstances it would be routine for the Air Force to undertake its own procurement with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation through the Air Materiel Command. There is, however, still a very high degree of sensitivity about the original procurement for intelligence purposes. It was to protect this security that procurement was kept out of normal Air Force channels in the first place and to institute the additional procurement through those channels would largely vitiate the elaborate precautions taken to date in the contracting procedures.

"Based solely on the security requirement, I am of the opinion that it is in the national interest and that there is legal authority for this Agency to enter into an arrangement with the Air Force to act as their executive agent for their additional procurement on a reimbursable basis. In addition, I have reviewed this situation with the General Counsel of the Air Force and we are of the joint opinion that such an arrangement would not involve any contravention or evasion of laws and policies applicable to Air Force procurement. The Air Force has expressed an urgent need for additional planes. I believe our current procedures are the most expeditious available and that continuance of our contractual arrangements is an effective and economical procurement mechanism for this purpose.

"Inasmuch as all aspects of the additional procurement will require prior Air Force authorization or approval, I believe the Agency will be well protected in the event of any dispute. Furthermore, this would facilitate the return of the administration of the contracts to normal Air Force channels if and when security would permit." 1/

1/ ~~TS~~-142958, 26 January 1956. Memo to DCI from General Counsel.

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The reply to the Air Force went forward in a letter to Mr. Quarles from Mr. Dulles on 30 January 1956 (full text of letter is in Annex 45) which agreed to take on the procurement of 29 additional aircraft and related equipment for the Air Force, detailed arrangements to be worked out between representatives of the two agencies. The basic general understandings were:

"a. The Air Force will provide necessary funds for the required procurement and will furnish to CIA written requirements for the procurement guidance of CIA. Such written requirements will be authenticated on the part of the Air Force by the signature of... the Air Materiel Command representative in the Weapons System Project Office.

"b. CIA will implement the requirements set forth in writing by the authorized Air Force representative by negotiation of a contract or contracts, for delivery of the required services and supplies. To assure mutual understanding, the authorized Air Force representative will certify that each proposed contract is consistent with and in fulfillment of previously stated Air Force requirements.

"c. The policies and procedures to be followed in connection with contracts negotiated on behalf of the Air Force by CIA shall be the same policies and procedures in effect on CIA contracts for similar procurements under Project AQUA-tone. Requirements set forth by the Armed Services Procurement Regulations shall be complied with to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the unique security considerations inherent in these procurements.

"d. The Air Force and CIA shall maintain close liaison with each other on all aspects of the procurement... and shall consult with each other, utilizing personnel designated for

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this purpose, whenever such consultation is required or indicated." 1/

All aspects of security control were to be the responsibility and province of CIA, and the Air Force was to be guided by CIA in discharging Air Force security responsibilities under this procurement. The Air Force was to furnish cleared personnel to audit the contract accounts.

Procurement for the Air Force under the system thus set up proceeded smoothly with good working relationships between the Project Contracts Staff and the Air Force weapons systems group. There were, of course, problem areas, one of which was in getting the Air Force group to adhere to Project security procedures which were strange to them and apt to be taken somewhat lightly.

Cumulative totals of procurement of U-2 aircraft and related reconnaissance systems and equipment provided for the Air Force by Project contracting mechanisms (and DPD and OSA successively) are shown in Annex 46, covering the period from 1956 through 1966.

In May 1957, the U.S. Navy also requested that CIA procure \$1 million of project-developed equipment, principally photographic,

1/ ~~TS-143314~~, 8 February 1956. Memo for Record, Subject: CIA and DAF Basic Understandings in Connection with Procurement.

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for the Navy, with an additional \$2 million worth of the same equipment to be procured at a later date. A basic understanding in connection with this procurement for the Navy was signed by the DCI on 18 July 1957 (TS-164265); this agreement with the Navy followed the same lines as that for the Air Force.

Since the provisions of Section 10(b) of Public Law 110 were invoked with regard to the funds for the additional procurement, this meant the elimination of GAO audit of the Air Force and Navy procurement. The Project Director suggested that in order to forestall any possible criticism for improper use of Section 10(b), the Director might speak informally to the Comptroller General without revealing substantive secret matters. The General Counsel (Mr. Houston) concurred in not opening the contracts to GAO audit but wanted any contact with GAO to be through himself to his cleared counterpart in GAO rather than at the Director's level.

General Counsel Opinion on Early U-2 Contracting

In June 1956, when one operational detachment had deployed to the field and the initial contracting activities had reached a stage where an appraisal could be made, Mr. Houston reviewed for the DCI's information all the legal authorities under which the Agency

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had acted thus far in the procurement area. He concluded:

"The administration of the contracts has not followed the normal Service practices, as for security reasons it was decided to limit the number of contract officers to the minimum, and the large staffs which normally review contracts in varying aspects were here reduced to one small staff. Within these limitations, however, the administration has been meticulous with particular attention to change orders. All contracts and all changes thereto have been reviewed by the General Counsel or his Deputy and specific approvals on policy or fiscal matters have been obtained from the appropriate approving officers in all cases. Again, granting that this system may work only when dealing with companies which are themselves competent in the running of their business and are familiar with Government procurement, under the circumstances surrounding this Project, we believe the procurement system involved adequately protected the Government, was effective in meeting procurement needs, and through its efficiency and simplicity was economical for the Government." 1/

Later Air Force Procurement

In August 1961 an agreement between CIA and USAF was signed covering contracting assistance through established CIA channels for an Air Force version of the OXCART vehicle. Later with the activation of the National Reconnaissance Program and the blanketing of Air Force as well as Agency reconnaissance projects thereunder, further procurement for the Air Force versions of the A-12, engines and systems were levied on CIA by the Director, National Reconnaissance

1/ SAPC-6688, 5 June 1956. Memo to DCI from General Counsel, (see Annex 47 for full text).

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Office, at the behest of the Secretary of Defense. In the spring of 1964, following the surfacing to the press and public of the Air Force "YF-12A", an effort was begun by OSA to divest itself of the responsibility for contracting and security for that program. The result achieved, after two years of discussion, exchanges of memoranda, and writing of legal opinions among CIA, Air Force and NRO officials, was agreement on 28 June 1966 by the D/NRO that appropriate staff should begin considering a time schedule for an orderly transfer of contracting functions from the Agency to the Air Force for the SR-71 and YF-12A aircraft and J-58 engine development programs.

At the end of December 1966 when the decision was made by highest authority to close out the OXCART program effective 1 January 1968, discussions were still going on in the working group and the settlement of the contracting issue then became a part of the NRO instructions for the phasing out of the OXCART program (SCOPE COTTON Decisions Numbers 11 and 12 issued by the Director, NRO (Dr. Alexander Flax) on 3 May 1967). The U-2 procurement (IDEALIST for the Agency and DRAGON LADY for the Air Force) was still considered "black" and was not affected by these decisions.

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Development of Contract Management Staff

In the initial negotiations with Perkin-Elmer in early 1955, when it was decided to use the services of the Office of Logistics, the Project Director felt that the Contracting Officer assigned to write that particular contract could perform his function without necessarily having to be fully cleared into the Project, or even knowing that the photographic equipment being contracted for was intended for aerial reconnaissance. When Mr. George F. Kucera began work on the Perkin-Elmer contract, on detail from the Office of Logistics, it very soon became apparent that this theory of Mr. Bissell's would not work out in practice. It was decided that for the sake of security and efficiency, and of centralized project control, it would be better to give Mr. Kucera a full project briefing and arrange for his transfer to the Project Staff as Contracting Officer. When the first Table of Organization was drawn up, therefore, the position of Contracting Officer was set up under the Development and Procurement Division, headed by Mr. Herbert Miller (who also held the title of Executive Officer), and for the first year of the project Mr. Kucera carried on all contract activities single-handed. He of course had the benefit of the General Counsel's advice and also developed a close working relationship with

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With the reorganization of the project staff into the Development Projects Division in early 1959, the research and development and contracting functions were separated into a Development Branch and a Contracts Branch. [] was appointed Chief of the Development Branch, serving only a few months before moving on to head the new Air Proprietary Branch. Mr. John Parangosky succeeded him as Chief of the Development Branch. Mr. Kucera departed the Agency in May 1959 and [] became Chief of the Contracts Branch, serving in that capacity until 21 September 1960 when he was succeeded by []

After the transfer in February 1962 of the special projects to the cognizance of the Deputy Director (Research), the question arose as to the continuation of current contracting methods, particularly in relation to delegation of contracting authority to Office of Special Activities' Contracts Division. Mr. James A. Cunningham set forth the history and philosophy of procurement under AQUATONE/DPD/OSA for the DD/R substantially as follows:

At the time AQUATONE was established, the Director of Logistics was requested to nominate from the Office of Logistics career service qualified professional procurement individuals to staff the project's Contracts Branch. This relationship continued and is still in being. The delegation of contracting authority has been a direct delegation from the

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DCI and in no sense a redelegation through the DD/S or the D/OL. The original philosophy of this arrangement, in the planning of Messrs. Dulles and Bissell, for these special projects of priority interest to national defense was to use the smallest group possible within a self-contained project organization. The reason for this arrangement was that it was considered impossible to do the sort of job that had to be done using either conventional Agency or conventional Air Force procurement methods, for reasons of security and efficiency.

The Contracting Officer and his staff have nevertheless always contracted in substantial if not complete accord with the Armed Services Procurement Regulations and have never awarded a contract unless the procurement was determined to be inextricably tied to the special project category. Any non-project-peculiar procurement has been given to the Office of Logistics for action.

Contract auditing of procurement by OSA (and its predecessors) has been under the cognizance of the Auditor General of the Air Force. A small group of Air Force contract auditors (about 14 civilians) were divorced from their regular administrative channels and assigned exclusively to render audit service to OSA Contracts Division. In their line of organization they answer directly to (and only to) the Auditor General of the Air Force. They are all cleared to Top Secret. They have become acclimated and sensitive to the covert atmosphere of project business and are considered by the Contracts Division to be an integral part of its team.

In February 1962, the Inspector General's report following inspection of DPD activities (before it became OSA) recommended in view of the peculiar demands of the special projects for logistic support, that the present relationships with the Office of Logistics, CIA, should not be disturbed. 1/

1/ BYE-1993-62, 28 August 1962. Memo for DD/R from AAD/SA, Subject: OSA Procurement Authority.

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Mr. Cunningham's recommendation that the procurement system be continued as currently established was accepted and on 1 September 1962, the delegation of contracting authority to OSA Contracting Officer, [redacted] was approved by the DD/R and the DDCI (then Maj. Gen. Marshall S. Carter). On the departure of [redacted] in October 1966, the same delegation of authority was conferred on his successor, [redacted]

The chart shown at Annex 49, "Status of Contracts, 30 December 1966", gives a breakdown of the total procurement undertaken by the Contracts Staff for all customers between 1955 and 1966, which covers the negotiation of more than 700 contracts worth more than three billion dollars.

Procurement of Additional U-2's

In the spring of 1963 the dwindling U-2 assets in both the CIA and USAF inventories raised the question of a possible additional buy of a sufficient number of aircraft to meet anticipated requirements. While the OXCART vehicle's operational readiness was anticipated within a year, there were still many places in the world where the U-2 with its maneuverability could collect vital intelligence in detailed coverage not possible with any other aircraft system. The DDCI was

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advised by OSA that it appeared feasible to produce an agreed quantity of new U-2's on a time span and at a cost which was considered reasonable. A rough estimate of the cost of ten aircraft with sub-systems, cameras and engines was on the order of \$20 million.

The question of additional procurement did not pass the discussion stage for more than a year. As of mid-1964 a new production model of the U-2 existed only on paper in the form of a Lockheed proposal for a "U-2L" (the "L" standing for "long"). The basic feature of the new model was the 60-inch extension of the fuselage permitting installation of a second pressurized equipment bay aft of the main Q bay; this in turn enabled the electronic equipment, currently distributed throughout the airframe and operating in the ambient, to be centralized and pressurized to insure greater reliability as well as reducing drag by cleaning up the outside appendages. A small change in depth of the fuselage and a new plumbing job would also permit inflight refueling of not only the main but the auxiliary tanks. Hopefully the new model would gain about 500 nautical miles of range and a small improvement in over-all performance. It was anticipated that the Agency and the Air Force would together order 25, if funds were forthcoming from NRO, with production to commence in the fall of 1964.

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In July 1964, OSA through the DD/S&T provided the DDCI with comparative costs for procuring 18 new U-2's (\$30.1 million) as against updating 12 U-2A's to the latest configuration (\$14.3 million). While the former was more costly, a modification program would add drag penalties which would reduce optimum altitude, whereas drag penalties would be eliminated in the new U-2L. Conversion would also reduce wing strength by 15%. The conclusion was therefore that procurement of new U-2L's was the best approach to insure adequate and continued fulfillment of national intelligence requirements.

A meeting of the NRO Executive Committee was scheduled for 1 September 1964 at which OSA was instructed to brief the Committee on the justification for new procurement versus conversion. OSA was warned by Mr. Eugene Kiefer* (who had been assigned to the NRO staff) that there was no need to make a strong pitch to sell the Committee on the U-2L since the decision had already been made to convert enough U-2's to satisfy CIA requirements. This turned out to be the case and purchase of new aircraft was put off in favor of a temporary, piece-meal solution to the problem, and the \$13.5 million for the U-2L FY 1965 program was cut from the OSA budget submission.

* Formerly Assistant for Technology in OSA.

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On 21 June 1965, the Directors of Programs B and D under NRO (Generals Ledford and Geary) outlined to the D/NRO their views for additional U-2 aircraft needs (see Annex 50) and made specific cost comparisons and a recommendation for procurement again on 9 August 1965. The D/NRO (Dr. Brockway McMillan) desired to postpone new procurement for at least a year since, he said, unfortunately the analyses which had been made had not verified an unequivocal requirement to produce an improved U-2. He proposed a program, with the backing of Secretary McNamara, for bringing all Agency and SAC U-2's up to the C configuration with certain specified electronic countermeasures equipment and other modifications included. On 18 October 1965, Dr. McMillan's successor (Dr. Alexander H. Flax) approved the modification program, funds to come from the SAC DRAGON LADY (U-2) budget.

On 21 October 1965, the DCI (then Admiral William Raborn) wrote to Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense:

"We have both received a memorandum from Dr. McMillan detailing his proposal for modernization of the existing CIA/SAC U-2 pool and postponement of additional U-2 procurement. Using attrition rates experienced thus far, it would appear that the total U-2 fleet would drop to approximately half of its present strength before new aircraft ordered a year from now would be available, and that the total number would never reach the minimum acceptable level (27) recommended by Generals Ledford

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and Geary, if the older aircraft are retired as they propose. I do not wish to prejudge this proposal, but do believe that it deserves our careful consideration in the Executive Committee before implementation, since I anticipate a continuing and perhaps increasing need for U-2 reconnaissance coverage round the world." 1/

On 16 May 1966, a further recommendation for a U-2R purchase was made to the D/NRO by the Director of Reconnaissance of CIA, Mr. Huntington Sheldon, based on the Lockheed proposal of 27 December 1965 (LAC Report SP-397, Proposal for U-2R Airplane). The Executive Committee of NRO, two and a half months later on 1 August 1966, approved the production of eight U-2R aircraft with the understanding that in conjunction with the FY 1968 budget a decision would be required on any additional production. In considering the procurement of additional U-2R's beyond the first eight, two different attrition rates were considered (7 per year, and 5 per year). Decision at the 23 November 1966 meeting of the Executive Committee was that four additional U-2R's would be procured and the total 12 deliveries would be stretched out to maintain a follow-on procurement option in the next fiscal year.

1/ BYE-0406-65, 21 October 1965. Letter to Mr. Vance from the DCI.

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At the end of 1966, the final terms of the U-2R procurement were still a matter of debate among the Agency, the Air Force and the NRO, but development of the vehicle and all its supporting systems was going forward with the anticipation of an operating capability by the spring of 1968.

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ANNEX 40

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AFDDC

14 January 1955


MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Project AQUATONE - Photographic Equipment

1. Reference is made to a memorandum, dated 11 January 1955, addressed to you by Dr. Edwin H. Land, which makes certain recommendations with respect to photographic equipment for use in connection with Project AQUATONE.

2. The USAF is familiar with the proposed photo-reconnaissance equipment to be used for this project, and is aware of development changes that may be made as the project develops. Drs. James G. Baker and Edwin H. Land are members of the USAF Scientific Advisory Board, and in this capacity are authorized to submit recommendations on projects of this nature.

3. We have reviewed these recommendations and concur in the feasibility and capability of this equipment in fulfilling the project's requirements. It is our opinion that the expedited development of this equipment now will advance the state-of-the-art many years.


DONALD L. PUTT
Lt Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Development

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RECORD OF NEGOTIATIONS

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Burbank, California

Contract No. SP-1913
Amount: \$22,500,000.

I. Background Information

In November 1954, as a result of recommendations made by the Land Panel, the Director of Central Intelligence was authorized and directed to proceed with a covert project having to do with the gathering of intelligence data on the Soviet Union. The project involved the utilization of an extremely high altitude reconnaissance aircraft to serve as the vehicle for carrying photographic and other equipment on flights over the Soviet Union. Project OARFISH is a sub-project of the over-all project and involves only the design and construction, including testing, of the aircraft.

The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had previously approached the Department of the Air Force with a plan for constructing this high altitude reconnaissance aircraft at a cost of about \$28 million for 20 aircraft, but the Air Force did not, at that time, have a requirement for such a plane. Subsequently, it was brought to the attention of the National Security Council that such an aircraft with precision photographic equipment, might serve to provide vitally needed target information on the location of military and industrial facilities of the Soviet Union. Approval of the project followed.

By letter dated 27 December 1954, signed by Mr. Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant (Research and Development), the Department of the Air Force indicated a keen interest in this high altitude reconnaissance aircraft development from the point of view of its own mission, as well as that of the Agency, and committed itself to furnishing the aircraft engines as part of its contribution, and such other assistance as required.

In December Lockheed was given verbal authorization through Air Force channels to proceed with the development of 20 of the special reconnaissance planes at an estimated total cost of \$22,500,000.00.

Subsequently Mr. C. L. Johnson, Chief Engineer of Lockheed, and Mr. Robert Bias, Lockheed contract representative, met with Mr. Larry Houston, General Counsel for the

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Agency to negotiate a definitive contract. As an interim step for the protection of the Government as well as the Contractor, a Letter Contract was negotiated and signed on 3 January 1955 by the Contractor and subsequently by a representative of the Agency (General C. P. Cabell using the alias [redacted]). Concurrences were obtained in the Letter Contract from the Deputy Director for Support, General Counsel, Comptroller and the Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination.

Negotiations on a definitive contract proceeded between Mr. Houston of the Agency and Mr. Elias, Contractor's representative. The definitive contract was submitted to the Contractor on February 4, 1955 for his review and signature. It was returned, signed, to the Agency over date of 8 February 1955, but with minor changes recommended. Certain minor typographical changes were made in the contract and it was approved for signature by the Director on 1 March 1955. The contract was signed by the Contracting Officer (Mr. George F. Kucera using the alias [redacted]) on 2 March 1955. Concurrences on signature of the contract proper were obtained from the DDCI, the DD/S, the SA/PC/DCI and the General Counsel.

2. Contractual Arrangements

The definitive contract is a negotiated fixed price type contract with provisions for redetermination of the price upon (1) completion of delivery of the first unit as set forth in the production schedule in Appendix A, or (2) upon expenditure of 75% of the total contract amount as set forth in Part I of the contract (\$22,500,000.00), whichever shall occur first. Redetermination of price shall be on a negotiated basis between the Contracting Officer and the Contractor, using as a basis the statement of costs to be furnished by the Contractor. Provision for audit of the Contractor's books, records and accounts is made in Part III of the contract.

The price set forth in Part I of the contract (\$22,500,000.00) is not a maximum price, but rather is the best estimate available at the time of signing this contract. An effort was made to fix the price of \$22,500,000.00 as the maximum price which could not be exceeded, with provision for downward revision only of the price, but the Contractor would not accept this arrangement

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and insisted on a target price of \$22,500,000.00 and a maximum price of \$24,750,000.00 in such case. This procedure would have required the obligation of the larger amount. Accordingly the price was left at \$22,500,000.00 with provision for either upward or downward revision at the predetermined times. The present obligated amount for this contract is \$22,500,000.00 but the possibility exists, of course, that this amount may have to be increased if subsequent negotiations indicate that the actual costs plus profit exceed this amount.

The contractual arrangements provide for an advance payment of \$1,000,000 plus progress payments monthly. However, the maximum amount of all progress payments, plus the advance payment, shall not exceed \$20,250,000 (90% of the contract price) during the life of the contract, the balance of the payments, if any, to be made after completion of the contract and in accordance with the stated price, if any.

This definitive contract supersedes the Letter Contract of the same number and incorporates most of the standard government clauses.

3. Contract Work

The contract work is stated in the contract to be in accordance with Appendix A (Work List dated 10 January 1955) and Appendix B. Appendix A consists of three typewritten pages, with control number DXTSC 1030, and sets forth the items to be furnished and delivery schedules. Appendix B consists of the following brochures:

- (1) 10383, 10 January 1955 DXTSC 1030
- (2) 10383, 10 January 1955 DXTSC 1076 (Amendment)
- (3) 10420, 28 January 1955 DXTSC 1077

The contract specifically sets forth that the ground handling equipment referred to in paragraph 13 of Appendix A includes one truck assembly for servicing flight tests conducted by the Contractor under paragraph 11 of Appendix A and for subsequent field maintenance utilization.

4. Payment

Payment Plan for this contract is set forth in a memorandum in the file dated 25 February 1955 and concurred in by the Security Office, the Comptroller, and the General

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Counsel. Provision was made for appropriate approvals of interim payments and for channeling the payments into the Lockheed account through [redacted]. Interim payments will be made on the basis of periodic invoicing of costs experienced. Total payments, under the basic contract, shall not exceed \$20,250,000, with the balance being withheld until the price is redetermined at the end of the contract (provided redetermination is not made sooner pursuant to Part IV).

5. Documentation of the Contract Record

On January 2, 1955 the DCI issued a certification placing this contract under the provisions of Section 10(b) of P.L. 110.

Authorization for advance payment under this contract was issued by the Deputy Director (Support) on March 22, 1955.

Determination and findings with respect to the use of negotiation rather than formal advertising has been issued by the assigned Contracting Officer.

Copies of the appendices referred to in Part I are on file in the project office and with the Contractor, and agreement has been reached as to the scope of the work involved.

6. Other Factors

In a redeterminable type fixed price contract an overwhelming amount of day-to-day administration is not desirable or required. However the Agency should maintain an intimate touch with the contract so as to be aware of the manner in which costs are being accumulated, types of costs, rate of expenditure and similar matters since this information will be invaluable at the time of negotiations of the redetermined price. An audit of the Contractor's final cost statement may or may not be required and close observation of the contract during its heavy expenditure stages will determine the necessity or lack of necessity for some type of audit.

The matter of amount of fee is not specifically treated in the contract except that it is to be considered as an item in the redetermination of price. It is understood

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that the Contractor has in mind a fee between 9% and 10% of final costs.

It is certain that amendments to the contract will be required for additional work over and above that visualized at the time the present scope of work, and related estimated cost, were negotiated. Such amendments should consider whether additional obligation of funds is necessary at the time such amendments are made, or whether the present allocation of funds is sufficient. Close observation of the actual rate expenditure compared to the estimated rate will determine this information.

(Signed)

GEORGE F. KUCERA
Contracting Officer

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LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP.
Burbank, California

10 January 1955

WORK LIST

1. Engineering design for a high altitude reconnaissance aircraft as described in Appendix B.
2. A report on wind tunnel tests in the Contractor's wind tunnel to establish the aerodynamic characteristics of lift, drag, stability and control, using a 1/10 scale model. These tests also include an airflow distribution test on a fuselage duct model.
3. Experimental type tooling for construction of 20 aircraft with aircraft spares described in Item 10.
4. Three mock-ups of the special equipment bay behind the cockpit, for use in fitting the reconnaissance equipment and studying alternative loads.
5. A stress analysis report describing basic loading conditions for the aircraft and analysis of the complete structure.
6. A static test on the wing, tail and aft fuselage section of the aircraft, and a report on these test results.
7. Progress reports showing financial expenditures, progress of construction and engineering, and photographs of the first aircraft during construction will be furnished every two months, starting 1 February 1955.
8. An air-transportability report on the aircraft, describing means for shipping the disassembled aircraft by cargo aircraft and recommending the best type of cargo aircraft for the job.
9. A short operational analysis of the aircraft to determine optimum usage of the type for the basic mission.
10. Twenty aircraft as described in Appendix B, plus the following aircraft spare parts:

Main wing panels	5 left plus 5 right
Horizontal stabilizers	5
Fin surfaces	5
Main landing gears	10

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Tail landing gears	10
Windshield glasses	10
Canopy assemblies	10
Wheels, main & tail	20 sets
Tires, main & tail	100 sets
Brakes	60 sets
Generators	40
Starters (engine installed parts only)	40
Hydraulic pumps	40
Fuel boost pumps	60
Hydraulic & fuel valves	60 each type
Radomes ARN-6	40
Sump fuel tank bags	40
Refrigerators & outflow valves	40
Canopy pressure seals	40
Electric actuators	60
Ailerons	5 left, 5 right
Flaps	5 left, 5 right
Elevators	5 sets
Rudders	5 sets
Wing tip assemblies	20
Landing gear doors	10
Dive flaps	5 sets
Equipment hatch	5
Air duct entrances	5 sets
Tailpipes	5

Aircraft delivery rate at Burbank is:

- #1 - July 15, 1955
- #2 - Sept. 9, 1955
- #3 - Oct. 14, 1955
- #4 - Nov. 18, 1955
- #5 - Feb. 13, 1956
- #6 - Mar. 5, 1956
- #7 - Mar. 26, 1956
- #8 - Apr. 16, 1956
- #9 - May 4, 1956
- #10 - May 24, 1956
- #11 - June 14, 1956
- #12 - July 5, 1956
- #13 - July 24, 1956
- #14 - Aug. 10, 1956
- #15 - Aug. 29, 1956

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#16 - Sept. 18, 1956
#17 - Oct. 4, 1956
#18 - Oct. 22, 1956
#19 - Nov. 7, 1956
#20 - Nov. 26, 1956

Delivery of the aircraft at Burbank is with the wings, tails and powerplants removed for shipping. Spare parts are packaged for shipping, also.

11. Flight tests on aircraft #1, #2, and #3 during the period between August 1, 1955 and December 1, 1955. In this period the first aircraft will demonstrate its capability to perform the basic mission and work out airplane and powerplant problems. Aircraft #2 will be used for special equipment tests, while aircraft #3 will perform radio and navigation tests. The test site for these flights is assumed to be in continental United States within 500 miles of Burbank, California. A report on these tests will be furnished.
12. Simple flight manuals, maintenance manuals and drawings will be provided for each aircraft.
13. Ground handling equipment of special type required for the project will be designed and provided. No list of such equipment can be prepared at this time, but an arbitrary cost figure is presented in other sections of this contract.
14. A description of the purchasing, accounting and inspection systems used to conduct this program in the Contractor's factory.

The reports referred to above will be submitted no later than December 1, 1955, except that certain maintenance information dependent on actual operation for its determination may be developed later.

Engineering drawings used to construct the aircraft will be provided if desired, but it is mutually understood and agreed that these will be of the minimum number and type required to build the aircraft by Lockheed experimental means.

Lockheed assumes the responsibility of weapon system manager for the construction and testing of the aircraft described.

(Signed) C. L. Johnson

1/10/55

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ANNEX 42

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HISTORICAL REVUE

LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP.

CONTRACT No. SP-1913

PROJECT

"CHALICE"

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BACKGROUND

1. LAND COMM.-
2. PRESIDENT-
3. CIA-
4. USAF-

CONTRACT GO AHEAD

LETTER CONTRACT- 22 DEC. 1954

Signed By - DDCI

DEFINITIVE CONTRACT

NEGOTIATIONS - GEN. COUNSEL

CONTRACT DATE - 2 MARCH 1955

TYPE - Fixed Price Redeterminable -

Upward or Downward At

(1) DELIVERY 1st AIRCRAFT OR

(2) 75% OF COSTS INCURRED

NO CEILING PRICE SET

CONTRACT AMOUNT - \$22,500,000.

BASIC SCOPE OF WORK

- (1) 20 U-2 AIRCRAFT - complete with
PROVISIONS FOR VARIOUS CONFIGURATIONS
- (2) SPARE PARTS - GHE
- (3) WIND TUNNEL, STATIC AND
FLIGHT TESTS
- (4) REPORTS - ENGINEERING, FINANCIAL,
PROGRESS AND OPERATIONAL

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SPECIAL PROVISIONS

- (1) AGENCY STERILE - ALIAS
- (2) SPECIAL SECURITY PROVISIONS
- (3) \$1,000,000 ADVANCE PAYMENT
- (4) BAILMENT OF 3 AIRPLANES
- (5) CONTRACTOR INSPECTION AND
ACCEPTANCE

INCREASES IN SCOPE

- (1) SURVEY FOR TEST SITE
- (2) EQUIPPING OF TEST SITE
- (3) GUARDS, CRASH AND FIRE PROTECTION
- (4) ASSISTANCE IN SETTING UP DEPOT
- (5) "ACCOMODATION SALES"
- (6) REPAIR OF CRASHED AIRCRAFT
- (7) SHOP EQUIPMENT OVERSEAS
- (8) ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

(9) CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT

(A) Auto-pilot installation

(B) ARC/34 installation

(C) Additional Photo Hatches

(D) SAMPLER Hatches

(E) ELECTRONIC Hatches

(F) IMPROVEMENT Type Mods

COST: ORIGINAL PROPOSAL

COST \$ 20,547,945

PROFIT (9½%) 1,952,055

PRICE \$ 22,500,000

Included No Contingencies

Original Quote To USAF - \$28,000,000

Money Not Available To Obligate Ceiling

Many Unknowns - Testing - Security

Estimated Cost of Increased Scope

COST \$ 2,605,100

PROFIT (9½%) 234,414

PRICE \$ 2,839,514

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DELIVERIES:

BASIC CONTRACT SCHEDULE

<u>1955</u>					<u>1956</u>											
J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N
1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2

ACTUAL DELIVERIES

<u>1955</u>					<u>1956</u>											
J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1

ALL SPARES, GHE - DELIVERED CONCURRENT

with A/C and in time to support units

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Final Settlement Procedure

- (1) Contractor Proposal - 13 Nov. 1957
- (2) AF Audit Report - 29 Jan. 1958
- (3) Ltr. To Contractor - 24 Feb. 1958
- (4) Contractors' Reply - 21 MAR. 1958
- (5) Negotiations - 15 APR. 1958
- (6) Contract Amend. - 28 May 1958

Contractors' Final Proposal

(including all INCREASES in Scope)

Cost	\$ 17,156,445
Profit (11.4%)	<u>1,952,055</u>
Price	\$ 19,108,500

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SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Costs Accepted By AF Audit -

\$16,306,399

Costs Questioned - \$850,046

	<u>Q</u>	<u>A</u>
(1) MAN. ICP	79,925	0
(2) FIELD SER.	80,124	80,124
(3) EXCESSIVE EST. 1957 Ovtld.	5,142	0
(4) OFF SITE Flight TRAIN.	6,430	6,130
(5) MATERIAL COST TRANS.	20,441	0
(6) SURPLUS MATERIAL	4,109	4,109
(7) Eject. SEAT COST TRANS.	1,274	0
(8) WORK IN RESTR. AREA.	255,673	253,544
(9) Flight Bonus	123,214	125,542
(10) SPARES IN EXCESS FROM ANTS.	177,334	177,334
(11) ACCOMODATION SALES	53,636	53,636
(12) COST OF BASE EQUIP AUTH	8,932	8,932
(13) SPARE PARTS	15,604	} 9,792
(14) G H E	448	
(15) SPEC. Hatches	17,558	
(16) SPARES PACKAGING	70	
(17) Misc.	132	

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Costs Disallowed - \$130,903

Grand Total Costs Accepted

\$17,025,542

Profit:

Target Profit - \$1,952,055 (9 1/2% of Orig Est. Cost)

Final Profit - \$1,952,055 (11.46% of Final Appr. Costs)

OR

(9.94% of Final Appr. Costs plus Actd. Scope of \$2,605,100)

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FINAL CONTRACT PRICE

Cost	\$	17,025,542
Profit		1,952,055
PRICE	\$	<hr/> 18,977,597

THIS IS A REDUCTION OF \$3,522,403
FROM THE ORIGINAL PRICE OF
\$22,500,000. THIS REDUCTION DOES
NOT INCLUDE THE ADDITIONAL SCOPE
PERFORMED IN THE ESTIMATED
AMOUNT OF \$2,839,514.

ANNEX 43

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ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT - U-2 PROGRAM

1955 - 1966

System I. (Ramo-Wooldridge, 1955-56)

Originally designed as an S-Band Elint receiver to pick up GCI and air defense signals, the system was changed to include half X-Band receivers to pick up air intercept communications, blind bombing and missile control signals. The system was designed to receive and record on magnetic tape pulsed microwave signals emanating from regions within line-of-sight range of the receiving antennas in the U-2. Up to the end of 1957, System I had been the source of the Project's greatest pay-off in Elint collection. It was replaced in 1959 by System VI.

System II. (Ramo-Wooldridge, 1955-59)

The original communications and navigation system for the U-2 did not work out (see Chapter V, Development and Procurement, p. 12).

System III. (Ramo-Wooldridge, 1955-57) (S. T. L., 1963)

This VHF recorder, developed as the original COMINT collection package for the U-2, was designed to detect automatically and record a sample of all radio signals in the frequency band between 95 and 145 megacycles, including continuous test carrier, CW transmission and AM broadcast, and to record the frequency of the signal and the time of recording. The building of a prototype was authorized in June 1955 and an order for six receivers plus spares and test sets was given in April 1956.

In August 1957 the Project Director advised the Chairman of the Requirements Committee that it was the opinion of the principal customer for System III that, at least as it had been employed to date, this system yielded a product not even of marginal intelligence value. It was suggested that the equipment, rather than operating in a search-and-lock-on mode be pre-set to frequencies on which valuable take might be anticipated, in order to obtain longer and more continuous samples. The system at that point was only carried on experimental

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missions in order to establish its value by positive evidence. On 16 September 1957, the Project Director instructed the Director of Development and Procurement to eliminate System III, and on 26 March 1958, the Contracting Officer instructed Ramo-Wooldridge to transfer System III surplus material to the Navy.

In 1963 System III was resurrected and updated and several OEL personnel were trained by Systems Technology Laboratories of TRW in order to provide for emergency installation and maintenance of the system in case of need. The system has been deleted from the IDEALIST configuration a number of times, the latest date being 1 June 1967. (System XXI will replace.)

System IV. (Ramo-Wooldridge, 1955-58)

This unattended airborne FERRET system was designed to receive and record automatically electromagnetic energy radiation in the general frequency spectrum between 150 and 40,000 megacycles. A very complex system requiring more than two years development and testing, its basic units included 8 frequency-sweeping superheterodyne receivers, 2 crystal video wide open receivers, a 14-channel magnetic tape recorder, an oscilloscope and a film recorder. The engineering study was begun in July 1955 and an acceptable plan with technical exhibit was finally presented by Ramo-Wooldridge in May 1956. The Agency Elint Staff Officer [redacted] recommended acceptance and simultaneous work on the system, read-out equipment and test equipment to avoid any further delay. In October 1956, permission was given for a delay in delivery of the prototype in order to realize a savings of \$150,000 in overtime pay. The prototype was finally delivered to the test site in February 1957. Arrangements were made with the Navy to flight test the system against equipment at Point Mugu Navy Missile Test Center. Testing and rework continued through the summer of 1957 and in September an urgent requirement hastened the final testing for a special mission which was run by Detachment A on 11 October 1957 over the Barents Sea with good results. System IV was used during the next two years on approximately 16 overflight or peripheral missions with fair to excellent results.

The responsibility for operation and maintenance of the equipment was taken over by Project Communications Staff in August 1958. In March 1962 all System IV equipment, valued at \$805,355, was transferred to the Air Force U-2 group since the system was incompatible with the J-75 Project U-2's.

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System V. (Ramo-Wooldridge, 1956)

This crystal video system consisted of nine System I units using different antennas tuned to selected bands to permit coverage over the entire frequency range of the equipment, i. e., from 60 to 10,750 megacycles. It received only pulse type signals with moderate sensitivity and the information received was recorded on a 14-channel, 1-inch tape recorder, and two 3-channel, 1/4 inch tape recorders. The disadvantage of this system was that it weighed in excess of 400 pounds leaving no space for any other payload than the tracker camera. A special hatch cover contained all of the antennas.

System V was flown with good results on two missions over the Caspian and Black Seas, one each in 1956 and 1957, and one over the China Coast in 1958. System VI replaced the System V capability.

System VI. (Ramo-Wooldridge, 1958-59)

This system, intended to replace Systems I, III and V, and using cannibalized parts from existing components, received and recorded pulse type data in the frequency range from 50 to 14,000 megacycles in four bands as follows:

P Band	50-300 MC
L Band	300-1000 MC
S Band	1000-8000 MC
X Band	8000-14,000 MC

It consisted of four separate channels to receive and record signals from each of the four frequency bands, using high gain, broadband video amplifiers preceded by antennas designed for each band. Information was recorded on two 3-channel, 1/4 inch tape recorders with each unit receiving and recording signals from two of the four bands. An automatic switching arrangement was incorporated in each channel of the system to permit time sharing of the channel for right and left antenna.

The advantage of this system was that it could be carried along with either the A-2 or B camera. Special A-2 or B hatch covers provided windows, brackets and cabling for System VI components and 20 different configurations of the system were possible. Once System VI was tested

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and available for operational use, it was decided that System IV could be retired and the funds thus saved be used for increasing the collection capabilities of System VI. A total of 18 systems were procured and nine remained in the inventory at the end of 1966. The system was updated to configuration VI-A in 1963, and in 1967 planning was underway to update it again to configuration VI-C.

System VII. (Haller-Raymond-Brown, 1959-60)

This system was proposed by OSI in December 1958 and was designed to intercept and record missile telemetry signals of the pulse position modulation type during the pre-burnout stage of missile launching. The signals to be intercepted were believed to be less than four and certainly less than six simultaneous transmission frequencies; therefore the system envisioned the use of six pick-up heads of high accuracy and high fidelity. The need for the system was immediate and so available equipment was employed throughout. The Ampex 814 Recorder running at 60 ips with a recording time of 12 minutes was selected for the system.

Approval to proceed with System VII was given by the Critical Collections Problems Committee and the Elint Committee of USIB on 10 December 1958, and Haller-Raymond-Brown was authorized to proceed with fabrication of one complete system and spares. The system was delivered to Edwards North Base and tested there in April and May 1959.

Headquarters USAF and CHALICE personnel jointly planned a telemetry mission for 9 June 1959 through Iran which included use of a SAC RB-47 aircraft with manned telemetry collection equipment, and a CHALICE U-2 aircraft with System VII automatic collection equipment. The purpose of the joint planning was to coordinate both efforts and ensure that the aircraft would be on station at the proper time with respect to optimum operation of each equipment. By virtue of the higher altitude of the U-2 (65,000 feet) System VII was able to pick up missile telemetry approximately 80 seconds after missile launch time. This intercept provided 30 seconds of telemetry prior to first stage burn-out and was the first such intercept from a Soviet ICBM launching recorded by the U.S. intelligence community. The RB-47 at

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a lower altitude with manned equipment able to search for and detect new telemetry frequencies, was able to get second stage telemetry which provided confirmatory information for the U-2 intercept. This mutually confirmed information ensured greater precision to analysts determining the size, type and other characteristics of engines used in the missiles.

A third partner in this effort was NSA, who advised the alerted CHALICE and SAC crews at Adana six hours prior to shot time. Take-off timing and flight planning was such that both aircraft were at optimum positions at blast-off time as was planned.

System VII was flown operationally for a year by Detachment B between June 1959 and 1 May 1960 with one excellent, eleven good, two fair and nine poor missions.

System VIII. (Haller-Raymond-Brown)(Procured for U. S. Navy)

This system was a modification of System VII to be installed in a Navy A3D aircraft to obtain telemetry signals from Soviet ICBM impact area in the Pacific. Contractual relationships were handled by DPD with Douglas Aircraft, acting as subcontractor to HRB for installation. DPD and OSI monitored development of the system and DPD Security monitored security aspects of the project, but operational use was the responsibility of the Navy.

System IX. (Granger Associates, 1958)

Early in 1958 an Agency requirement was generated for an electronic countermeasures device, for the P2V program and for the U-2. Investigation by OSI determined that the S-441 Deception Repeater (designed by Dr. Rambo under Air Force/Navy contract in 1956-57) could be repackaged to fulfill the DPD requirement. Responsibility for development was delegated to DPD/Development and Procurement Staff and the initial contract with Granger Associates was written 26 June 1958 for a prototype article, Granger Model 504. The purpose of the system was to provide false angle information to X-Band conical scan airborne intercept radars, which was achieved through the use of

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inverse gain techniques. OSI continued to act as technical adviser on this development and upon completion of the testing of the prototype in May 1959 it was recommended by [redacted] that the Model 504 be produced in limited quantities in a production version capable of operating at maximum altitude of the U-2. System IX was aboard the U-2 which was shot down over Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960.

Subsequent to the loss of that aircraft and the compromise of the Granger Black Box, it was decided to update or redesign the equipment and a contract was let with Applied Technology Inc. (a new company set up by Dr. William Ayer, who had designed the Granger 504) in December 1962 for a prototype and 14 production units of a new higher-powered model. The first sets were completed in April 1963. Configurations X-B, IX-C (Air Force), and IX-D represent improved models. System IX-B is still in operational status.

System X. (Haller-Raymond-Brown, 1962)

System X was a modification of System VII engineered specifically for Elint coverage of the Soviet missile site at Sary Shagan. Two sets were ordered in August 1962 in advance of the overflight approval and OSA funded the work conducted by HRB and Lockheed to progress System X toward eventual installation in the U-2. This funding was undertaken with the expectation that the engineering work would be applicable to other aircraft systems such as the RB-57F, if it were decided to use that vehicle on political grounds for collection against the Soviet ABM effort.

In May 1962 with the approval of USIB Chairman (Mr. McCone) OSA tried to get the British to sponsor a U-2 with System X to fly over Sary Shagan from Pakistan. While political efforts were being made by the British with Pakistan for approval, the Air Force was making an effort to adapt System X to an improved version of the RB-57D. Dr. Charyk favored use of the RB-57 rather than the U-2 for this mission, and this was agreed at a USIB meeting in late August of 1962, and the British were disengaged from their efforts. At the same time OSA discontinued contractual responsibility for System X and the Air Force took over.

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System XII. (Haller-Raymond-Brown, 1962-64)

System XII was developed as an airborne warning receiver against the SA-2, Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM). It alerts the pilot with visual and aural signals when a threat radar illuminates his aircraft and instantaneously indicates the azimuth bearing of the illuminating radar. Threat radar signals are discriminated from non-threat signals and if several threat radars illuminate the aircraft simultaneously, the system indicates the direction to each without serious interaction.

Configuration XII-B was developed in 1965 by Applied Technology, Inc. In addition to previous characteristics, it senses and provides proper sector coverage for System 9B and enables System 13C (S and C Band jammer) against SAM TWS guidance radar threats. In December 1966 the system was modified to include a LORO capability by installing a 2500 PRF counter which bypasses the scan rate detector and allows the system to unblank on receipt of a 2500-PRF (+ 10 percent) signal in the receiver pass band. This modified system is designated XII-B-1. Systems XII-B-2 and XII-C are in development by American Electronic Labs.

Systems XIII, XIV, and XV. (Sanders Associates, 1963)

A countermeasures system effective against the FAN SONG radar was developed by combining the ALQ-19 (System XIII) with parts of the ALQ-49 (System XIV) and the ALQ-51 (System XV). This S-Band and C-Band jammer with improved techniques was renamed System XIII-A. This development was undertaken to provide a jammer completely different electrically and mechanically from any known military system in design or inventory. With the initial reluctance of the Joint Chiefs to approve the operational use of System XIII because of the microwave frequency memory loop, a contract was let to design a system which would delete that feature. The goal originally set for this equipment was achieved and a contract was let in August 1964 to develop the new package. Tests were conducted in October-December 1964 against FAN SONG simulation. A request for authorization to replace System XIII with XIII-A in the U-2 operational systems inventory was made to D/NRO on 25 February 1965. This was approved and by the end of May 1965 the first operationally ready unit was installed at Detachment H. Configuration XIII-C was developed by Sanders Associates beginning in September

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1965 (code name MAD MOTH). It included the addition of a 3-tube traveling wave tube transmit chain, LORO recognition circuitry, inverse linear gain capability, and amplitude modulation output techniques, as well as weight-saving features. Nine production units were acquired beginning delivery in July 1966 and an additional seven sets of System XIII-A were subsequently retrofitted to the XIII-C configuration. (The Air Force also procured units for their U-2's, B-57's, and SR-71's.) A configuration XIII-D is being developed by Sanders with greater jamming power and other features.

System XVI.

System XVI was projected as a lightweight, passive Elint collection system to replace Systems III and VI, using many of the components and subsystems already in operational use in Project STSPIN and other programs. For a variety of reasons this system was not developed for operational use in the U-2, the principal problems being size and weight. In July 1964 the decision was made to postpone consideration until the U-2R procurement question was settled.

System XVII. (Haller-Raymond-Brown-Singer, 1964-65)

In October 1963, the USIB concluded with respect to its long-standing requirement for information on the Soviet ABM program that there was a sufficiently high possibility of collecting ground radar emissions from Soviet tests of such systems as to justify development and employment of an effective airborne Elint capability. Such a system would be used to collect against Sary Shagan from over China near the Soviet border. NRO was asked to work toward development of such a capability as soon as possible. On 29 October 1963, the Acting DD/S&T, Col. Giller, instructed OSA to develop a System X type of collection equipment for use in the U-2, working with OEL to develop specifications and configuration.

The new system, designated System XVII, is an unattended specialized receiving system for collection of telemetry and other missile-associated signals from the launch site at distances from 340 to 420 miles. The system continuously searches the frequency

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spectrum between 50 and 8000 megacycles with ten sweep-lock receivers. Known telemetry and other missile-associated signals are monitored using 14 fixed tuned receivers.

Development of the system was authorized in July 1964 and HRB-Singer was awarded a contract on 1 September 1964 for production of two prototypes and some ground support equipment. By the time the system was operationally ready for a mission against Sary Shagan, the tip-off time before an impending launch had been cut to such an extent that it would be practically impossible to prepare and launch a U-2 mission in time to intercept meaningful signals. The only operational use made thus far has been by Detachment H along the China Coast against SAM sites.

BIRDWATCHER (HRB-Singer, 1962-63)

This system is an inhouse Agency design developed by [] of OEL, the purpose being to provide an automatic means of relaying from the airborne vehicle information concerning the status of various aircraft systems during emergency situations. The data transmitted to the ground station is then analyzed to determine the cause and effects of the emergency situation. The system for the U-2C consists of up to 40 input sensors of 20 single channels and 10 dual channels sampling the status of various systems functioning, and a keyer modulator for driving the onboard 618-T-3 HF transmitter. The system can be activated by any one of designated critical sensors, by the pilot of the aircraft, or by the ground site's interrogation signal. The system has been proven operationally and has successfully fulfilled its design purpose.

OSCAR SIERRA. (HRB-Singer, 1965)

This system, designed to augment System XII, is a passive electronic countermeasures system with a broad band receiver operating in the L Band frequency range. The system receives and recognizes a missile guidance signal within a 40-mile radius and provides an alarm which consists of turning on a red light in the pilot's compartment, providing an input to BIRDWATCHER, and turning on System XIII. Three prototypes were deployed after successful tests in February 1965, and six production units were ordered. The Mark III configuration was

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initiated by HRB-Singer in December 1965 and the first prototype flight tested in June 1966 did not perform satisfactorily. At the end of 1966 continued rework and development was being performed on this version.

System XX. (Aerojet General Corp., 1967-68)

• An infra-red sensor which detects the after-burner of a pursuing fighter aircraft is in the development stage.

System XXI. (HRB-Singer and Sylvania Electronics Systems, West, Inc.)
(1966-67-68)

An airborne VHF COMINT collecting system designed as a replacement of the obsolete System III is in the development stage.

Single-Side-Band Radio. (Collins Radio, 1960)

The Collins Model 618T radio was chosen to meet the requirement of light weight communications set to be used principally in the event of need to recall the U-2 during an operational mission.

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SPECIAL ELINT PROJECTS

NIGHTLATCH. [redacted]

In late 1958 a new Soviet GCI set was reported by the Air Force. This set was nicknamed BAR LOCK. It was similar to previous Soviet GCI sets in that it utilized two search dishes fixed on a rotating trailer, and multiple transmitters. It differed in having six transmitters instead of the usual five and in persistent reports that the signals were extremely strong.

In view of the excellent performance which the known characteristics should provide, interest in more detailed knowledge of the parameters of this radar was quite high. The major unknowns were (1) peak pulse power; (2) vertical coverage pattern; (3) horizontal antenna patterns and technical competence of the antenna design.

A specialized Elint collection program was initiated in March 1959, testing of the airborne equipment began in June, and field operations commenced in mid-August. During the following three months data was obtained on a number of BAR LOCK and BIG MESH sites in Eastern Europe and about 80% of the necessary data reduction was accomplished. The remainder of the data reduction took place after field operations had terminated.

The development, testing and employment of the special electronic package was provided under contract by [redacted] and the final cost, plus fixed fee, for this work was \$165,427.60. The aircraft and crew to support the operational phase were supplied by the Air Force.

CHAPLAIN. (Joint CIA [redacted] Program)

The purpose of this project was to deploy to a field site location in Pakistan and operate special back scatter radar equipment which was developed for the collection of intelligence concerning missile launchings in the Soviet Union.

A survey team composed of [redacted] officers and [redacted] [redacted] DPD Communications Officer, visited Pakistan arriving 8 April

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1960 and in meetings with the Pakistan Intelligence Service reached agreement on the location of the antenna for Project CHAPLAIN in the Malir Cantonment just outside Karachi.

Deployment to the field began 1 October 1960 as a joint enterprise between CIA [redacted] Total complement was composed of 17 field service techreps (ACF Industries), 5 USAF officers and men, and 1 CIA Staff employee for a total of 23. An Air Force Major commanded the group and the CIA technician was deputy and technical director for the project.

The equipment was developed jointly by OSI and TSD. DPD participation was principally with budgeting for the deployment phase for FY 1961-62, and in obtaining political approval from the Pakistan Government. DPD recommended that either TSD or the Office of Communications furnish the team leader. The man chosen was [redacted] of TSD. Chief, NE Division wished the team to report through the [redacted] although the DD/P felt he should report directly to Headquarters, DPD.

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By mid-July no degree of operational success had been achieved and DPD was in the position of having full responsibility for operational support overseas but with little or no direct responsibility for the technical operation or exploitation of the end product.

In September 1961, [redacted] proposed that the joint project become a fully military one. Ambassador Rountree in Karachi turned down the request of [redacted] for militarization of the project.

In August 1962, it was recommended and agreed that Agency participation be transferred to OEL.

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ANNEX 44

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STATUS OF CONTRACTS - 30 DECEMBER 1966

Funds Obligated under OSA Contracts:

	FY 1955-1962	FY 1963	FY 1964	FY 1965	FY 1966	FY 1967	Total
OSA	\$135,216,361.41	\$130,785,876.99	\$172,285,874.00	\$235,680,911.80	\$178,036,061.65	\$105,772,337.31	\$ 957,777,423.16
CIA Other	8,061,061.02	3,011,940.27	4,136,280.41	11,475,203.90	9,927,798.99	178,839.00	36,791,123.59
USAF	427,137,411.00	250,014,334.60	417,143,234.15	451,327,493.73	485,644,953.46	81,440,322.00	2,114,709,815.30
Navy	3,027,732.48	72,296.77	99,427.92	517,908.79	1,047,513.49	301,615.00	5,066,494.45
Army	572,587.64	2,446,564.00	1,483,295.00	1,437,142.85	366,416.00	9,300.00	6,315,305.49
TOTAL	\$576,017,219.91	\$386,331,012.63	\$595,148,111.48	\$700,438,661.07	\$675,022,743.59	\$187,702,413.31	\$3,120,660,161.99
IDEALIST Total	\$ 80,333,696.73	\$ 11,565,946.72	\$ 9,802,552.66	\$ 15,595,302.69	\$ 13,971,806.16	\$ 4,401,368.56	\$ 135,670,673.52

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Total contracts let by OSA, 1955-66: 709 (including 111 for USAF) Payments completed: 284 Contracts currently active: 425

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Office of the Director

30 January 1956

The Honorable Donald A. Quarles
Secretary of the Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Quarles:

I refer to Mr. Gardner's letter of 11 January 1956 in which it is requested that this Agency undertake the procurement, for and in behalf of the Air Force, of L-182 * aircraft additional to those presently being procured for Project AQUATONE (TS). The decision that the procurement of airframes and certain other equipment for this Project be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency was made concurrently with and as a part of the decision whereby the Project itself was launched. You will remember that the considerations which prompted the undertaking of this major intelligence collection effort by this Agency were the requirement for the tightest possible security and the desire that it be treated as a non-military clandestine activity. The maintenance of security required that knowledge of the activity be confined to the smallest possible circle of people, specifically to many fewer individuals than would normally participate in such procurement were it undertaken in accordance with standard Air Force procedures. In any event, the need for speed required the employment of procedures involving less widespread coordination than those regularly employed by the military departments. These arrangements were understood and agreed between us from the inception of the project and I believe that an unusually high degree of security has been maintained.

We are now advised that the Department of the Air Force has established a firm requirement for 29 additional aircraft and related equipment for the Air Force inventory for the earliest possible delivery. Upon review we are of the opinion that the production by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation of its model L-182 and related equipment still requires the highest degree of security protection, since knowledge of the existence and performance of the L-182 is

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* U-2.

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the most highly sensitive information concerning Project AQUATONE. From discussions between Air Force and Agency personnel on this subject, it appears that the special security procedures and precautions which have been instituted for this procurement heretofore could not be continued if the Air Force were to undertake its own additional procurement. In order to limit knowledge of this aircraft and inferences as to its intended use, I believe the procedure requested by your Department is in the national interest. Accordingly, this Agency will act as executive agent of the Air Force in the procurement of aircraft and related equipment, which will be carried out in accordance with the principles of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations. As your agent, this Agency will take only such action as shall be specifically requested by your Office.

Detailed arrangements for the administration of this program will be worked out at the earliest opportunity with your representatives, at which time the transfer of approximately \$31,000,000 will be accomplished. Furthermore, we will keep the security aspects of this program under constant review as I am in agreement that the administration of the contracts involved should revert to the normal Air Force system at such time as security requirements permit.

Sincerely,

(Signed)

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Noted: R. M. Macy
Bureau of the Budget

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HISTORY OF USAF FUNDS TRANSFERRED TO CIA/OSA
FOR U-2 AND SYSTEMS PROCUREMENT

29 Feb 1956	FY 1956	\$ 9,000,000.00
18 Apr 1956	FY 1957	22,000,000.00
17 Apr 1957	FY 1958	11,000,000.00
27 Aug 1957	FY 1959	5,000,000.00
10 Sep 1959	FY 1960	2,600,000.00
23 Dec 1959	FY 1960	2,600,000.00
20 Feb 1960	Proj 4076	1,325,000.00
21 Oct 1960	FY 1961	4,200,000.00
28 Jul 1961	FY 1962	4,700,000.00
		<hr/>
		\$62,425,000.00
	(Transferred to NPIC)	- 140,000.00
		<hr/>
		\$62,285,000.00
5 Nov 1962	FY 1963	6,200,000.00
	(Transferred to NPIC)	- 193,850.00
		<hr/>
		\$68,291,150.00
10 Dec 1962	FY 1963	474,076.00
20 Aug 1963	FY 1964	2,000,000.00
11 Oct 1963	FY 1964	1,100,000.00
30 Dec 1963	FY 1964	3,100,000.00
8 Jun 1964	FY 1964	717,174.00
30 Jun 1964	FY 1964	372,144.00
20 Jul 1964	FY 1965	5,200,000.00
28 Aug 1964	FY 1965	5,200,000.00
7 Oct 1964	FY 1965	600,000.00
2 Jul 1965	FY 1966	4,029,000.00
22 Nov 1965	FY 1966	4,652,000.00
28 Jan 1965	FY 1966	278,000.00
Mar 1966	FY 1966	110,000.00
13 Sep 1966	FY 1967	8,380,000.00
		<hr/>
	TOTAL	\$104,503,544.00
	Less: Cumulative Obligations through 31 December 1966	98,589,321.94
		<hr/>
	Total Unobligated Balance	\$ 5,914,222.06
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5 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Contracts - Project AQUATONE

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. The first phase of our procurement activities under Project AQUATONE is in concrete form and all the contracts are sufficiently developed to allow an appraisal. It appears appropriate to review the situation at this time when the Air Force plans an additional procurement phase of the equipment, particularly from our prime contractor, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. To this point the procurement has been joint in nature. The CIA has signed the contracts and has provided the funds for the major procurement items; the Air Force is providing certain Government-furnished equipment and is procuring certain other items which it is in a better position to develop and procure.
3. In considering this joint procurement, it should be kept in mind that the CIA is authorized to exercise the authorities contained in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, including Section 10 thereof. Section 10 is specifically designed to facilitate procurement of supplies and equipment by one agency for another, and the joint procurement of supplies and services required by the agencies. It provides for such assignments and delegations of procurement responsibilities within the Agency as may be desirable and the assignment and delegations of procurement responsibilities from one agency to another or the creation of joint or combined offices to exercise the procurement responsibilities. The procurement program for Project AQUATONE, therefore, is clearly within the contemplation of Section 10 of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947.
4. In general, the various contracts let under Project AQUATONE follow normal Government procurement standards although they may differ as to type. In certain instances security or the urgency involved has required alteration of procedures or waivers of certain specific limitations. Insofar as the security precautions are concerned, we

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rely on Section 10(b) of the CIA Act of 1949 in order to have some of the contracts appear either Agency sterile or Government sterile and to issue payments in a secure manner. It is probable that the Air Force does not have the legal authority to achieve such cover arrangements in precisely the same way, although commercial cover has been achieved by the Department of Defense through other devices. On the waiver of limitations, however, we have had little occasion to issue any substantive waivers or exercise unusual authorities which were not available to the Air Force under its own authorities. Consequently, the procurement by the CIA has, to date, been basically no different from that which could be accomplished by the Air Force. A potential difference, however, arises from the fact that we can waive any and all limitations in the event Project security or other considerations requires us to do this, whereas the Air Force could be limited in what can be done in this regard.

5. Consideration was given to the Air Force undertaking this procurement and the following facts were ascertained. A similar proposal from the corporation had previously been rejected by the Air Research and Development Command. The processing in the Air Force under the proposal known as CL 282 had gone on for six to nine months before rejection. If the present proposal in which the CIA had an interest were to be sponsored by the Air Force, it would have to be referred back again to the ARDC for full justification which would of necessity include the CIA's interest. If approved by ARDC it would then have to go through the Air Materiel Command with full coordination under all the Air Force rules and procedures. Only after that could negotiations on the contract itself be instigated. No estimate of the time involved could be made, except that it would be a long drawn out procedure and that necessarily during this procedure a considerable number of offices and individuals would get at least an indication of the purposes for which the procurement was aimed. With time a vital factor and absolute security indispensable, the Air Force channel of procurement was patently impossible.

6. In the opinion of the Air Force officers and officials concerned, there was no method by which the Air Force could short cut this procedure without raising as many questions as might be raised by going through the full coordination process. On the other hand, the CIA from the procurement standpoint alone could enter into the transaction almost

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instantly upon approval by the Director, and it would be necessary to inform only a handful of people outside of those who would know the substantive nature of the Project in any case. Not only would there be far closer security, but also there would be much greater flexibility, which is essential in view of the unknowns to be encountered and the extreme urgency in solving them. It was unanimously agreed, therefore, that the CIA should handle the contracts and funds in an amount estimated to cover the 1955 Fiscal Year needs were allocated. This was approved by the Bureau of the Budget.

7. From the outset it was apparent that if the CIA were to execute the contract, it would have to be some form of a redeterminable fixed-price contract. Fixed-price contracts have the advantage of (i) simpler administration, (ii) minimum of time-consuming delays, (iii) less complex audit procedures, (iv) more responsibility on the Contractor, and (v) generally greater flexibility to cope with unusual conditions which this type of procurement would involve. Security problems, likewise, are simplified. I, therefore, entered into negotiations with Mr. Johnson, the Lockheed Project Engineer, on the basis of a fixed-price arrangement. He set forth a proposal in which the price was stated to be \$22,500,000. At this time we had the information from the Air Force that the similar proposal, previously considered by ARDC as CL-282, had been estimated to involve \$28,000,000. I stated that due to the uncertainty on costs we should probably have some redetermination provision and asked Mr. Johnson if the \$22,500,000 were an outside figure. He asserted that it was, and accordingly I prepared a letter contract which obligated the amount of \$22,500,000. We then began negotiation for a definitive contract with Lockheed, and their Contracting Officer, Mr. Bias, told me that when Mr. Johnson mentioned the figure of \$22,500,000 to the Corporation Comptroller and that there would be a price-redetermination clause, the Comptroller had deemed it prudent to ask for provision for price redetermination upwards from \$22,500,000. I stated that the Agency did not have additional funds to obligate for this purpose at this time, but that if the need arose they could be made available and I would commit the Agency to an upward and downward price redetermination with the profit factor varying inversely with any increase in cost. This was further discussed with Mr. Johnson, who indicated that he had considerable confidence in his estimate of \$22,500,000 as an outside figure, but that there were obviously some unpredictable items. I undertook to point out to Mr. Johnson the method by which we planned

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to operate, including direct negotiation, elimination of detailed and current audit procedures, and over-all simplification of contract procedures, all of which I felt would allow Lockheed to make savings not normally available. Mr. Johnson agreed that this should not only expedite production but also should lead to savings on his estimate, although he was careful to point out that wage rates would be somewhat above normal as they would be utilizing the cream of the Lockheed employees for this Project. The definitive contract was, therefore, negotiated on the \$22,500,000 price with negotiation upwards if cost experience justified; unlimited downwards. No price profit factor was established although we indicated to Messrs. Bias and Johnson that at \$22,500,000 we could not go over the average profit factor on Government contracts, which appeared to be in the neighborhood of 9-1/2% unless substantial savings through economy and efficiency were achieved and that contrariwise, if the expenditures ran over \$22,500,000, we would propose that the profit factor would be reduced.

8. It is important to keep in mind that in the prime contract as well as the others executed by this Agency for Project AQUATONE, the responsibility for performance was put on the Contractor. By performance here is meant more than the actual flight performance of the plane. It is the performance of the whole system with all its interrelated parts, so that the responsibility was not only for a machine which flew at a certain height for a certain distance at a certain speed but also to assure that the flight performance was capable of sustaining the camera, communications, navigation, and other necessary equipment. In normal Air Force procurement, each part and all materiel must meet rigid Air Force specifications and inspection so that as the product comes off the line its performance is largely the result of the Air Force's supervision. Under our Contract No. SP-1913, the contractor was aware of the performance which was required and it is his responsibility to produce this performance in such manner as he deems most effective and efficient. Lockheed, therefore, worked directly with Perkin-Elmer, Hycon, Ramo-Wooldridge, and the rest as a member of a team to evolve a complete and balanced system. In the event of disputes or the need for policy determinations, Lockheed could turn to one place to provide the answers instead of having each aspect staffed through separate staff components as in the Air Force. In certain instances modifications have been required for the Government's purposes over

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and above the original specifications, which will add to costs otherwise contemplated, but these have been or will be reflected in change orders so that the basic concept of SP-1913 is not affected.

9. In considering the circumstances under which SP-1913 was negotiated, it appears that the definitive contract is advantageous both to the Contractor and to the Government. To the Contractor it gave the greatest possible freedom from inspection and supervision while, of course, throwing upon him responsibility for results. Since the contract with the CIA is small for this particular corporation, the incentive is to produce results which would then be attractive to the Air Force and larger procurement. This places a premium on efficiency and performance. From the Government's viewpoint, the price redetermination procedure with provision for upward redetermination tends to eliminate those contingencies which the corporation would put into a fixed-price contract on a new production item. Furthermore, the profit percentage-wise and dollarwise will go up as the Government's expenses are reduced; on the other hand the percentage will go down and perhaps the dollar amount too if the cost to the Government goes up. As of March 25, 1956, the Contractor is ahead of schedule and actual expenditures are some \$3,000,000 under what it was anticipated expenditures would be as of this date. However some \$1,400,000 additional work has been added since inception of the contract. This means that the original work, plus that which has been added by change orders, will still be accomplished under the original contract price, with some residue, provided that no unusual costs are encountered during the next six or seven months.

10. Due to the Contractor's long years of experience with Government contracts, the negotiation on the price redetermination is not inordinately difficult since all cost factors are well established, including such items as overhead allocations. This is bolstered by the fact that the contract provides for inspection and audit of the books and records of the corporation at any time and arrangements are now being made to have the Air Force audit the contract on a secure basis and in accordance with procedures familiar to Lockheed and to the Air Force. Consequently, the contract has the usual benefits and ease of administration and performance of a fixed-price contract with the further benefit to the Government of recovering any contract funds not actually expended for the contract work, by virtue of the redetermination factor. This, of course, is feasible only where a company has had such an extensive course of dealings with the Government that cost elements are well

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settled and both parties are thoroughly familiar with Government procurement practices. Negotiation of the final fee or profit (as a percentage or as a lump sum) is the only area in which difficulties may arise.

11. In connection with procurement which the CIA is undertaking as agent for the Air Force through Contract SP-1914, generally the same practices and procedures are being followed as applied to SP-1913. Since the CIA is, however, the agent of the Air Force, a detailed agreement outlining this agency has been executed between the Agency and the Air Force. In this the Air Force clearly undertakes responsibility for requirements and specifications and for inspection and acceptance and the Central Intelligence Agency performs the contractual functions and administers the contract and any changes thereto, in accordance with the written request of the Air Force. Present known requirements of the Air Force indicate that some 20 to 30 contracts on behalf of the Air Force will have to be processed by us under this arrangement.

12. In the foregoing we have discussed in considerable detail SP-1913, both because it is the major and basic contract and because of all the contracts it is the only one in which there was a departure from normal Government procurement practices as opposed to procedures. Even on that point, which involved the implied commitment of additional funds over and above the immediate obligation of funds, the same result could be achieved by other devices available to armed services procurement agencies. Other contracts with Perkin-Elmer, Hycon, and Westinghouse, etc., are all similar to SP-1913 in the procurement methods utilized and, again, probably are all within the legal authority of the Air Force to procure in this manner. The contract with Ramo-Wooldridge is in all substantive aspects the same as the Air Force would write—a standard cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. It is interesting to note that in the so-called unusual type contracts written to date (Lockheed, Perkin-Elmer, Westinghouse, etc.) which provide for upward redetermination of price, no such request for additional funds has been made as yet, and will not, in all probability be made. However the CPFF standard contract has increased considerably in cost over that originally budgeted. This indicates only that it is the nature of the work that determines the ultimate cost to the Government rather than the method of contracting. The administration of the contracts has not followed the normal service practices, as for security reasons it was

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decided to limit the number of contract officers to the minimum, and the large staffs which normally review contracts in varying aspects were here reduced to one small staff. Within these limitations, however, the administration has been meticulous with particular attention to change orders. All contracts and all changes thereto have been reviewed by the General Counsel or his Deputy and specific approvals on policy or fiscal matters have been obtained from the appropriate approving officers in all cases. Again, granting that this system may work only when dealing with companies which are themselves competent in the running of their business and are familiar with Government procurement, under the circumstances surrounding this Project, we believe the procurement system involved adequately protected the Government, was effective in meeting procurement needs, and through its efficiency and simplicity was economical for the Government.

(Signed)
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

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
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ANNEX 48

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

ORGANIZATION CHART -- DEVELOPMENT & PROCUREMENT



Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

Att. to SAPC-16511
11 June 1957

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U-2 CAMERA SYSTEMS

<u>System</u>	<u>Focal Length</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Lateral</u>	<u>Ground Resolution</u>	<u>Scale</u>	<u>ROM Cost</u>	<u>Availability/Remarks</u>
Tracker (Perkin-Elmer) *	3"	3000 n. m.	Horizon to Horizon	15'	$\frac{1}{280,000}$		Quantity: 17; fits U-2C
Tracker (T-35)	2"	4000 n. m.	Horizon to Horizon	12'	$\frac{1}{420,000}$	\$10,000	Quantity: 15; fits U-2C & R
Hycon B Camera (framing)	36"	Variable, Max. 3160 n. m.	Horizon to Horizon	3', 30-35 lines AWAR	$\frac{1}{23,300}$	\$120,000	Operational; 8 on hand
Improved Hycon B Camera (framing)	36"	Variable, Max. 3160 n. m.	Horizon to Horizon	2.5', 45 lines AWAR	$\frac{1}{23,300}$	\$120,000	Operational; 3 on hand
Eastman Kodak Camera (Panoramic)	21"	3740 n. m.	55	1.25', 110 lines per mm, low contrast	$\frac{1}{43,000}$	\$950,000	3 ordered for OXCART; 3 mos. time required to configure for U-2.
C Triple Prime (Itek) Panoramic (referred to as the Delta)	24"	3000 n. m.	17.3	10", 120 lines per mm	$\frac{1}{35,000}$	\$168,000	Prototype available with limited spares for limited operational use.
Dual C Triple Prime (Itek); Convergent Stereo	24"	3000 n. m.	17.3	10", 120 lines per mm	$\frac{1}{35,000}$	#1 \$435,000 #2 301,000 #3 200,000	Delivery of stereo cameras scheduled beginning Feb 64; 4 cameras ordered.

* Original tracker, no longer used by IDEALIST

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IDEALIST

altitude, better defensive gear, and improved maneuverability due to redesign will extend on into the 1970's the U-2 capability for overhead reconnaissance of denied areas.

8. A follow-on subsonic reconnaissance aircraft should have the following characteristics:

50X4, E.O.13526

a. Reach in one hour or less.

b. Range of 3,000 N. M. at or above 70,000 feet.

50X4, E.O.13526

c. Mid-range operational altitudes over denied territory at or above

d. Increased maneuverability at altitude to increase the survivability margin against SAM defenses.

e. Integrated, light-weight warning/defensive counter-measures systems.

f. High-altitude engine re-light and flameout prevention.

g. Expanded night photo capability.

h. Real-time read out of selected airborne sensors by a ground station.

i. Infrared defensive system.

j. Internal installation of all sensors and equipment.

k. Compatibility with existing sensor systems.

l. Structurally capable of carrier operation.

m. Structurally capable of conversion for air refueling.

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9. The requirement for U-2 reconnaissance having been stated in paragraph 4, it is appropriate at this point to recommend a new buy. It is our understanding that your memorandum of June 10, 1965, was predicated on not purchasing improved model aircraft; nonetheless, it is the considered judgment of the undersigned that a very definite need for the U-2 abides for covert work and overt surveillance reconnaissance and photo mapping into the distant future. Based on current attrition rates, it is possible to predict that the total U-2 inventory, exclusive of AFSC holdings, could conceivably reduce to 9 or 10 aircraft in a three-year period. Such a figure would be considered a marginal effective national reconnaissance asset. We agree with that part of your June 10 memorandum to up-date all SAC U-2's, but it is our opinion that the conversion should be at a rate faster than specified. We are in consonance with the rest of the proposal as a sound plan basically, but since we are recommending a purchase of new aircraft, we feel its implementation at this time would be premature.

10. To realize the maximum benefit from a new reconnaissance aircraft, the Agency and the USAF (and other interested agencies) should jointly approve and purchase a similar model airframe. Further, this aircraft should be produced in quantity to give both users an operational inventory not later than the end of FY-67. In the meantime, modify all U-2 aircraft in the USAF and Agency inventory to the light-weight J75-13B configuration and standardize sensors and defensive ECM equipment. This will reduce overall spares requirements, provide maximum flexibility of utilization, and permit an orderly phase-out of the equipment at the end of its service life. In addition, a decision to convert the SAC fleet implies a decision to purchase engines immediately.

11. It is recommended that USAF and CIA, in joint enterprise with the contractor, initiate a new buy of an improved U-2. This decision should be made in the near future while tools and dies are readily available. To delay will cause a future purchase to be more difficult and expensive. When the decision is made to purchase, it will be necessary to determine its size, considering the missions and needs of the participating agencies as stated in paragraph 4.

(Signed)

JACK C. LEDFORD
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, Program B, NRO

LEO P. GEARY
Colonel, USAF
Director, Program D,
NRO

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BYE 2614-65

21 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT: Future Needs for U-2 Aircraft

REFERENCE: Memorandum from DNRO to Directors,
Programs B and D, dated 22 March 1965,
Subject: Future Needs for U-2 Aircraft
(BYE 36277-65)

1. The measure of denial of covert aerial reconnaissance by the U-2 will depend in large measure upon the rate at which hostile defensive environments, both missile and aircraft, are introduced, and the progress we make toward countering those environments. With introduction of the Systems 13A, 9B, 12B and Oscar Sierra, computer studies show survivability of the U-2 against SAM-defended areas is now above 80%. To improve this survivability rate we must continue our aggressive development and implementation of defensive countermeasures. Development of hostile defensive environments notwithstanding, there will continue to be many requirements for U-2 quality photography, U-2 flexibility and responsiveness to emergency situations, and U-2 economy of operation.

2. Since the first loss in 1960 to the surface-to-air missile, the U-2 has been regarded as vulnerable to the SAM threat. However, with the use of countermeasures and warning devices, as well as judicious mission planning, the U-2 has so far accommodated the problem and survived as an effective intelligence collection capability. In the very recent past, a latent threat, the fighter-interceptor, has loomed as a hazard to the U-2 mission. Whereas the SAM threat can be neutralized by avoiding its lethal range, the high-performance fighter-interceptor is a flexible defense which can seek out the U-2. Countermeasures to the fighter threat have been developed and are being improved. Comprehensive studies indicate 94% survivability of the U-2 against MIG-21 type aircraft when the U-2 employs existing defensive measures. In the future we can maintain and improve this survivability by implementing the program described in this paper.

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3. As was pointed out in the briefing rendered the NRO EXCOM on 1 September 1964, unless new aircraft are put into the U-2 inventory, estimated losses over the next five years will force closure of the U-2 program for lack of aircraft. The total inventory as of 4 June 1965 is 25 aircraft of which 20 are photo-configured. The 25 remain from the original purchase of 55 aircraft. It is interesting and perhaps illustrative to note that of the 30 U-2's lost, only seven were on operational overflights. Of these seven, five aircraft were lost on Agency overflights. Five losses out of 461 overflight missions represents a loss rate of 1.1%. The loss near Key West on 20 November 1963, and that over China on 30 October 1963, were probably caused by aircraft or systems malfunctions not caused by hostile action.

4. In the near future, 1967-1970, the U-2 can profitably operate in any area where there is a requirement to produce high-resolution photography, where it is politically more desirable to conduct covert overflights, and where it can deliver photography more economically than other methods. With an improved aircraft to provide increased altitude and maneuverability and the use of defensive systems now in production or in development, even the present restriction against flying directly over SAM sites will cease to be a valid limitation to unrestricted operational use of the U-2. The requirement for covert strategic search and overt surveillance will continue for the foreseeable future in the following areas:

a. The TACKLE program will continue in China and North Korea. Here the U-2 will cover targets and areas which require high-resolution photography but are not capable of being surveyed quickly or continuously by other less responsive and more expensive capabilities.

b. The major portion of Indonesia can be covered by U-2 missions unless and until the Indonesian fighter capability shows marked improvement beyond any reasonable estimate of their projected force structure.

c. All of Africa can most profitably be photographed on U-2 missions. Defensive system improvements noted above will probably permit SAM-defended targets to be photographed.

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d. The greater part of the Middle East including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Yemen and the Levant Coast is a likely target area for U-2 operations.

e. The Sino-Indian Border and Tibet, as well as Sinkiang Province, are now and may remain profitable target areas for the U-2.

f. Southeast Asian countries which may be subverted and infiltrated by the Chicoms (Burma, Malaysia, for example) should be "safe" target areas for a significant portion of the 1967-1970 period.

g. Should the need arise, such as it did in Venezuela, Central and South America, crisis situations can be covered by the U-2 either from land bases or from carriers.

h. ELINT requirements dictate that continued improvement in collection platforms must be made. The aircraft being considered herein will be a considerably better capability.

i. In conjunction with its reconnaissance role the U-2 is capable of performing photo-mapping chores more cheaply and more effectively than current assets.

j. There are indications that NASA has expressed interest in acquiring U-2's for reasons not known, and have mentioned a figure of three aircraft as probably satisfying their needs.

k. Should atmospheric testing be resumed, undoubtedly the U-2 will once again play a significant air sampling role, with particulate and gaseous collection gear.

5. The USSR, its European satellites, Israel, China targets defended by SAM sites and/or latest fighters, the Nile Valley in Egypt and SAM-defended targets in Indonesia have been denied to the U-2 as it now exists. Any area which has a sophisticated air defense system (and the pilots and equipment to use it) such as the USSR has, will probably pose a risk to the continuation of U-2 operations in that country. The very

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depth of the Soviet and European satellite countries' defenses and the quality of the Israeli system deny U-2 coverage of those areas. The area within the lethal radius of a SAM site anywhere in the world is denied to the U-2 in its present configuration, but will become open to the improved U-2.

6. The collection capability of the U-2 in its present or proposed form compares favorably with other systems in that it produces a high-quality product at a competitive cost. It is a more economical instrument to collect photography in lesser-defended areas than is the A-12/SR-71, which should be reserved initially, at least, for areas the U-2 cannot penetrate. Drones, TAGBOARD or Model 147, are committed to a pre-programmed track which is flown only if the guidance system is 100% accurate for the entire mission. A manned aircraft (U-2 included) can be kept on track or returned to track if and when it becomes necessary. In this respect the U-2 is more likely to photograph a specific target, given the same conditions. As a complement to satellite systems, the U-2 can be effective and economical for a significant time, certainly in the 1967-1970 period. As the search/surveillance satellite detects targets worthy of more detailed examination, it also surveys approaches to those targets. Here we have not only target identification but also an up-to-date exposure of defensive sites. This information is the data on which selection of the most profitable follow-on coverage can be made. GAMBIT may be needed but may also be programmed for a higher priority. On the other hand, the U-2 may be able to do the job equally as well, quicker and cheaper.

7. Clearly then, there is a need for a less vulnerable, flexible reconnaissance system capable of acquiring high-resolution photography. Such a system could be a follow-on aircraft to the U-2 which would incorporate an additional altitude capability, a more effective and integrated defense and countermeasures system, and an airframe clean of external drag items. Continuing positive efforts are being made to improve the current U-2's performance through a weight-saving program to increase altitude, through improved ECM, and through new tactics. Although significant progress has already been made, there is, however, a limit which the current U-2 can achieve through such measures, and it falls short of the desired gains a new model can provide. The increased

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
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CHAPTER VI. COMMUNICATIONS

Project Communications Chiefs



1955 - 1960

1960 - 1961

1961 - 1965

1965 - 1968

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CHAPTER VI. COMMUNICATIONS

Agreement with Director of Communications, CIA

On 17 March 1955 the Director of Communications,

outlined the support he anticipated would be required of his office by Project AQUATONE in the following memorandum to the Project Director:

"To facilitate orderly planning it is considered essential that the tasks to be performed by the Office of Communications in Project AQUATONE be defined as completely as practical at this time. A great deal must be done in a limited time if the project schedule is to be met. If we are to successfully execute all our responsibilities in this project, we must initiate the detailed planning for all of them immediately.

"Accordingly, the following project tasks are understood as being those presently assigned to this Office:

- "a. Radio Location System (RANOL technique).
- "b. Staff communications with bases and advanced bases.
- "c. Maximum security flight communications (telemetering techniques).
- "d. Provide Elint equipment.
- "e. Maintain all electronic equipment identified with the foregoing functions. In addition, maintain the conventional radio communications and navigation equipment installed in the aircraft.
- "f. Perform preliminary Elint data reduction and deliver to designated official.

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"In the above, it is understood that we will monitor the development of the unique equipment involved, including its testing, and the development of the operational technique for its use. We will insure that spares exist at the proper locations and that teams of selected communications technicians are trained and competent in servicing and pre-flight checking the equipment mentioned in sub-paragraph f. Further, it is understood that we will perform all these functions during all phases of the project as it develops and as the unique equipment becomes available. Consequently, we are aware that for all practical purposes we must be ready in all respects for the first test flights in July.

"It is probably equally important to delineate related functions which it is believed the Air Force is in a better position to perform. These are:

"a. Conventional VHF/UHF terminal communications at main, advanced and recovery bases. This will include control tower to aircraft communications for flight control during take-offs, landings and ground-controlled approaches (GCA).

"b. Trunk-line transmission of project staff communications at the appropriate Air Force bases. (This is not an unusual requirement, but will necessitate specific agreements by this Office for the delivery of our cables to our mobile communications teams for deciphering and delivery to the project control officer at the base." 1/

The Project Director replied on 22 March 1955 confirming the above understanding of Office of Communications support to be furnished, and further confirmed his understanding that [] would be the administrative communications officer for the project, under

1/ Letter from [] to Mr. Bissell, dated 17 March 1955.

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[redacted] general supervision, and would participate in organizational and operational planning, taking primary responsibility for the planning of the communications systems and developing a table of organization for communications and electronic maintenance personnel. The communications plan and operational concept as set forth in the composite AQUATONE Planning Guide issued in October 1955 is attached as Annex 51.

HBJAYWALK Channel

In July 1955 the special communications set-up to service Project AQUATONE traffic was arranged and the Chief of the Signal Center,

[redacted] organized a staff of about ten cleared communicators to handle project traffic. All messages were delivered to and picked up from the L Building Signal Center. The indicator "HBJAYWALK" was assigned for project cable traffic and the cryptonym "DYADIC" was assigned by the Office of Communications to AQUATONE Project Headquarters. The shortened form, ADIC, has been used since as the cable address for incoming messages to Project Headquarters.

Between July 1955 and February 1956, communication links were established on this channel with the test site at Watertown, Lockheed at Burbank (also servicing Hycon and Ramo-Wooldridge by courier),

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[redacted] and Pratt & Whitney. A separate Signal Center to support the project was set up in the new Project Headquarters on the fifth floor of the Matornic Building on 27 February 1956 with a direct link to the main Signal Center. The HBJAYWALK channel was opened with [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] net early in 1956 in anticipation of deploying the first field detachment to Europe.

The reasons for establishing project communications as a separately controlled net, briefly summarized, were the need for maximum speed in message handling, special security requirements limiting access to such messages, the flexibility for setting up and controlling short-term circuitry, and not least, the necessity for Project Headquarters to closely control all field activities via immediate communications.

Test Site Communications

The communications plan developed for supporting the U-2 test phase at Watertown Strip was based on the use of a transportable radio station made up of two communications trailers. Radio communications, either CW or radio-teletype circuits, as required, were established with the Agency radio station in the Washington area. This channel would maintain a continuous Test Site/Washington radio watch for

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priority and after-hours traffic. Radio frequencies for the circuits were appropriately backstopped with Federal Communications Commission. A VHF radio circuit connected the Test Site and Mercury, Nevada (the AEC field station nearby) which served as a relay point. The weather unit supporting Watertown operations was located at Mercury and had four teletype circuits and one facsimile channel with a VHF link to Watertown.

The Watertown communications team also furnished HF communications with aircraft whenever required by Project Operations. It also furnished and serviced walkie-talkie sets for the security patrol and the ARC-3 radios installed in the mobile ground control vehicle and the base ambulance.

By the end of August 1955 cable traffic between Watertown and Headquarters had reached 8,000 word groups per week and by October 11,000 groups per week. At the end of November 1955 this rate had jumped to 32,000. Shortage of personnel at the test site made it necessary for the communicators assigned there to put in many hours of overtime.

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~~TOP SECRET~~AACS Support

The Commanding General, Army-Airways Communication System (AACS), was briefed on AQUATONE by Colonel Berg in December 1955 and promised his wholehearted cooperation in supporting the Project's communications needs. A requirement for his help developed rather quickly and in March 1956 Gen. McClelland wrote to the Project Director as follows:

"It is now apparent that AQUATONE will require the augmentation of the staff of operators and technicians at my principal radio stations to an extent not originally contemplated and in excess of the T/O of each station. I do not have sufficient qualified personnel for this purpose nor can I foresee a recruiting program that would promptly yield qualified personnel.

"It is my understanding that the Air Force will procure and operate aircraft nearly identical to AQUATONE's. In this event the AACS will be required to furnish the same support to SAC that O/C will provide for AQUATONE. It would appear to the distinct advantage of the AACS if some of their technicians could acquire operational and technical experience with the ground station aspects of System II... It is my belief that with Air Staff approval, the Commanding General of AACS would be pleased to make available up to 65 specially selected personnel... I believe this virtually the only method by which I can properly reinforce my base radio stations to adequately perform their support functions." 1/

The Project Director concurred in the use of AACS personnel at certain

1/ SAPC-4749, 5 March 1956. Memofandum for Project Director from Director of Communications.

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specified communications installations, provided they were not employed in positions which properly should be under the administrative control of a Detachment Commander or Project Headquarters, and subject to agreement by Colonel Berg on behalf of the Air Force.

He replied to Gen. McClelland as follows:

"Although I concur in this arrangement and am most appreciative of your efforts to ensure proper support for this project, I do wish to raise again with you the question as to the wisdom of placing for a long period of time such a heavy requirement on the Air Force to provide trained personnel in support of an Agency operation. The question in my mind is the very fundamental one of whether this Agency should not staff and equip itself more nearly to stand on its own feet when it undertakes major new tasks.

"I am well aware of the fact that several special projects which are currently active in the Agency have combined to place an especially heavy burden on the Office of Communications... Under the circumstances it would have been impossible for you to expand your staff rapidly enough to fill these extraordinary requirements without any help from the military services, and it might be unwise to expand it to this extent in view of the probably temporary requirements. Nevertheless, I am inclined to feel that the Agency should be taking steps which will make possible at least a substantial reduction in the use of AACCS personnel as rapidly as suitable individuals can be recruited and trained to take their place." 1 /

The decision not to use the System II communication and navigation equipment in the U-2 relieved the recruiting problem in that respect

1 / SAPC-4712, 24 March 1956, Memorandum to Director of Communications from Project Director.

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in the summer of 1956, although AACS continued to support the Project by supplying personnel when requested, furnishing communications lines, and lending equipment. (This support by AACS carried over into the successor program at both Area 51 and the OXCART field stations.)

Growth of Cable Traffic Volume

The urgency attached to all activities relating to the U-2 project and to the subsequent overhead reconnaissance projects of the Agency was nowhere more apparent than in the number of word groups of traffic handled by the special signal center (ADIC, later changed to OPCEN). In November 1956 the Project Communications Officer reported overload of facilities and manpower to the tune of 900,000 groups per month, which at that time represented about one-fifth of all Agency traffic. The recommendation was to cut wherever possible, and to make greater use of deferred precedence.

At a Director's Staff Meeting at the beginning of July 1957, discussion of the enormous and steadily growing communications traffic of the Agency brought out the fact that AQUATONE was responsible for a significant fraction of the total traffic. A survey revealed that nearly half of the total project cable traffic represented dummy deception messages transmitted for the purpose of preventing marked variations

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in the over-all traffic pattern which would indicate periods of active operations. This was considered a necessary precaution against compromise of missions through traffic analysis by the enemy. The Project Communications Officer concluded that significant reduction could only be achieved by (1) scheduling penetration missions two weeks or more in advance, (2) launching such missions with no close control by Washington, or (3) deactivating one or more overseas bases.

Because of dependence on weather information and political approval, (1) and (2) were out of the question. One of the three bases would be closed in three or four months but could not be closed sooner. The over-all conclusion was that no major reduction in traffic was feasible until one base was deactivated, but meanwhile the staff was exhorted to eliminate all unnecessary communications.

After DPD was set up as a Division of DD/P, Mr. Bissell in January 1959 forcefully brought to the attention of the DPD staff the fact that the current volume of cable traffic would no longer be condoned and ordered an immediate cutback. (He particularly singled out the verbose cables between Headquarters and the British Air Ministry regarding Project OLDSTER, and between Headquarters and various Agency Chiefs of Station abroad.)

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In 1960 with the addition of the satellite and the follow-on aircraft programs, many new stations were added to the HBJAYWALK network, principally industrial suppliers and Air Force installations. Detachments G and H became operational and communications support in the establishment of circuitry, message handling and engineering and maintenance support increased proportionately. During February 1960 the special signal center handled a total of 1,063,393 word groups of traffic.

With the establishment of the Directorate of Science and Technology, the special signal center took on communications support for the Office of Special Projects, Office of Elint, and Office of Research and Development, and other components of DD/S&T in addition to Office of Special Activities (OSA). During the operational life of the OXCART vehicle, a data processing capability was maintained by OSA and its transmissions were also serviced by OSA Communications Staff.

Following the blanketing of OSA operational activities under the National Reconnaissance Program, another large block of stations was added to the HBJAYWALK network. A directory of this network as of the end of December 1966 (alphabetically by cable designator) is attached as Annex 52.

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The OSA Communications Division was relieved of the responsibility for supplying electronic technicians for Detachments G and H in 1964 when OEL took over Elint responsibility for all of CIA.

At the end of 1966 the total T/O for the OSA Communications Division was made up of Headquarters and field personnel. Message volume handled by the Special Signal Center had reached a monthly rate of about 10,000 messages (word groups were no longer counted); 64% of this traffic was generated by OSA; 20% by the satellite activities of OSP; and 16% by other components of DD/S&T and other miscellaneous traffic.

Support for Staging Operations

In addition to the more or less fixed installations which Communications supported in the field during the life of the U-2 program, there has been the requirement to support forward staging base operations, which over the years between 1956 and 1966 have amounted to approximately 25 separate stagings to the following widely scattered bases:

Bodo Air Base, Norway
 Charbatia Air Base, India
 Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines
 Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska
 Lahore Air Base, West Pakistan
 Laughlin Air Force Base, Del Rio, Texas
 Peshawar Air Base, West Pakistan

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Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico
Takhli Air Base, Thailand
USS Ranger, at sea in the Pacific
Watton RAF Base, England

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A typical Communications Annex to an Operations Order setting forth detailed communications activities to be performed in support of a staging operation, is attached as Annex 53, and relates to the second staging from Charbatia, India, during which coverage was obtained of the Sino-Indian border area.

Since 1963 Communications support of staging operations has included the monitoring of BIRDWATCHER* emissions from the mission aircraft. At the outset of this program the only ground monitoring stations were at Detachment G and Detachment H. The need for additional ground stations in key locations was foreseen in order to provide an effective monitoring network. Since the Office of Communications, CIA, had a number of active radio stations geographically suited to this purpose, steps were taken to seek the assistance of these stations and special equipment for monitoring the BIRDWATCHER was ordered in the spring of 1964.

By the end of 1964 an extensive network was in operation with the following stations in the Far East participating, as required:

* See Chapt. V, Annex 43, page 9, for description of this equipment.

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In 1965 two additional stations were added to the net: [REDACTED]

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BIRDWATCHER coverage has also been provided for during ferry flights of the IDEALIST aircraft from Edwards Air Force Base, California, to the Far East. A special monitoring kit was fabricated and placed aboard the accompanying KC-135 tanker so that monitoring could be accomplished enroute by personnel aboard the tanker as well as by ground stations.

In Praise of Commo

As a commentary on the outstanding support which the U-2 and other OSA projects have received from the Agency Communications Staff, the following extract from a paper by Mr. James A. Cunningham is relevant:

"Communications and Communications Security:

"The Project IDEALIST Communications Staff operates not only administrative communications but is responsible for operations communications as well. In contrast to the Air Force system, all Project traffic is by direct circuit transmission and all of it is enciphered to the highest standards.

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The Communications Staff is composed exclusively of professional personnel, trained to the uniform Agency standard of maximum proficiency, security and speed. The only cryptographic violations we have experienced in the past year, for example, have been on those circuits manned by USAF personnel. This staff has also furnished specialized communications and Elint service to Project IDEALIST in the form of engineering and maintenance assistance. On Elint systems, they work closely with the analysts so that technical maintenance enjoys a real-time relationship to the collection equipment. This is an important asset not available in package form to the Air Force. As an example of its speed, and even allowing for SAC unfamiliarity with communications from Omaha to Edwards Air Force base, on the initial SAC-executed mission of 14 October, the go-no-go weather forecast took SAC a total of 14 hours, 22 minutes to transmit through relay points from Omaha to Edwards Air Force Base, in contrast to a re-transmission time of one hour, 13 minutes from Washington to Edwards Air Force Base on CIA's system, utilized in this instance as a backup capability. By the time the SAC forecast arrived at Edwards, the mission had been on the ground at McCoy Air Force Base for 42 minutes, and the weather was no longer within the valid period for which it had been requested." 1/

1/ BYE-3944-62, 14 October 1962, Paper by Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., Subject: Agency U-2 Versus SAC Coverage of Cuba.

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ANNEX 51

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October 1955COMMUNICATIONS OUTLINE PLANGeneral

The Office of Communications within the CIA has assumed responsibility for providing communications support to the Project AQUATONE mission. Personnel have been detailed from the Office of Communications and have been assigned to Project AQUATONE under the general direction of the Project Director. In addition, the facilities and resources of the Office of Communications, both in the ZI and overseas, are available to the Project AQUATONE mission as required.

Assumptions

Communications support will be required for potentially three rear bases with associated forward staging bases from each rear base. It has been stated that two forward staging bases could be operational simultaneously from any of the rear bases.

A long range navigation and communications system will develop to furnish ranging and azimuth information along the flight path of the special vehicle and to provide a limited communications channel between appropriate ground stations and the special vehicle while on flight missions.

Newly developed Elint equipments will be available for the planned overflights and will be used extensively throughout the Project operational phase.

Over-all operational control will be maintained by the Project Headquarters in Washington.

Air Weather Service support, required on a continuous basis for all rear base installations, will, to a large degree, be furnished by the USAF Weather Central in Washington.

Tasks

The Project communications support responsibilities can be categorized generally as follows:

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1. Installation of communications facilities and maintenance of all the Elint and conventional electronic equipments to be utilized for the Project mission.
2. Establishment and operation of the communications circuits providing communications between rear bases and advance staging bases including air-ground communications with special vehicles.
3. Establishment of rapid communications links from Project Headquarters in Washington to the rear bases overseas.
4. The development of a comprehensive training program to properly equip communications personnel for the varied and specialized tasks imposed by the Project mission. This training program is currently underway, and will be continued for the required period of time.

Operational Concept

The establishment of communications links between Project Headquarters and rear bases overseas will usually be accomplished by utilizing existing services after determination of the most secure and rapid communications channel. A special signal center, within the CIA Signal Center complex, is available to process traffic for sensitive projects and will be utilized to process traffic for Project AQUATONE Headquarters. This signal center has tie-lines with ACAN, GLOBECOM, and CIA networks and will route Project traffic via the appropriate channel as directed by the Project Communications Officer. A Project signal center will be established and manned at each of the rear bases thereby providing complete cryptographic control of all Project traffic by designated CIA personnel. Transit time studies of Project traffic flow will be made on a continuing basis in an effort to insure most expeditious delivery of cables between Project Headquarters and rear bases overseas.

A cryptographic facility will be established at the Air Weather Central in Washington and linked to the special signal center by landline. This will serve to disseminate weather data from the Air Weather Central to rear bases, the Watertown site and such other users as deemed necessary.

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The Office of Communications maintains large communications installations on a global scale. CIA base radio stations in [redacted] are being considered for support of Project communications objectives. In addition, a radio facility in Alaska can and will be established for Project AQUATONE purposes, if required. These CIA base radio stations will have the dual function of directly communicating with the special vehicle and providing a communications link with Project personnel at advance staging bases.

System II equipment, requiring high power transmitters and extensive antenna installations, will be located at certain of these base radio stations. A rapid communications channel will be established between the rear base launching an operational flight and the base radio station in position to communicate with the special vehicle. By this means, communications between rear bases and special vehicles is achieved on a limited but two-way basis. This method of communications is currently envisioned as consisting of pre-arranged messages represented by three digit groups which will be displayed to both pilot and ground operator by some electro-mechanical means.

The CIA base radio stations will also support Project field components by furnishing communications to advance staging bases. When an advance staging base develops, a two-position, trailer-mounted radio facility will be transported to the advance staging base and will communicate with the pre-determined CIA base radio station. The CIA base radio station will then be in position to relay messages between the rear base concerned and the advance staging base. All CIA base radio stations involved in Project duties will embark upon a dummy traffic deception program, prior to their operational utilization, in an attempt to disguise the unusual circuit activity which could alert opposition intercept activities.

A communications team, under the supervision of a communications team leader, will locate at each of the rear bases. These teams will install facilities at the rear base, as required, to terminate the communications command channels and will then assume the duties of operating and maintaining these facilities. The communications links terminating at the rear base will be the ACAN, GLOBECOM or CIA channel with Project Headquarters in Washington and the circuit with the nearest or most appropriate CIA base radio station.

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The communications team at the rear base will either utilize existing ground to air facilities or install facilities deemed necessary for Project operations. Each rear base will have the following ground to air communications capability:

a. A 100-watt UHF ground station equipped with well-designed antennas to work against the AN/ARC-34 UHF command set in the special vehicle.

b. A UHF DF equipment which can serve to furnish steer information to the special aircraft.

c. A LF beacon, which can be voice modulated, for working with the ARN-6 radio compass in the special aircraft.

At such times as advance staging bases develop from the rear base, the communications team will have the capability to deploy small teams with each advance staging group. Equipment for the advance staging bases will be such as to provide the same ground to air capability outlined above in addition to the two-position trailer-mounted radio facility which serves to communicate with CIA base radio stations. A secure cryptographic system will also be added to each advance staging base to enable the handling of enciphered communications. It is intended that all of the equipment required for establishing the communications facilities at advance staging bases will be placed in trailers or carefully crated for handling by the supporting logistics function.

The training program for communications personnel assigned to Project AQUATONE can generally be described as follows:

a. Preparatory training and indoctrination in Washington immediately after assignment to Project duties.

b. Formalized training at the Ramo-Wooldridge plant on Systems I, the ARN-6 radio compass and the AN/ARC-34 UHF command set.

c. "On-the-job" training and drilling at the Watertown base on all the equipment to be encountered overseas.

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d. Final maintenance training on specific units in a specialized shop established in the Washington area.

e. Radio operating, cryptographic, propagation and other training, as deemed appropriate, in the Washington area.

f. Specialized training for field engineers, one to each team, at the Ramo-Wooldridge plant for Systems II, III, and IV.

Conclusion

Considerable effort is being exerted to select and properly modify equipment for the Project AQUATONE mission. Also, especial emphasis is being placed upon the training and programming of communications personnel to achieve the maximum in competent and well-balanced communications teams for each rear base. A small, fully-trained reserve team will be held available in Washington to assist with Project tasks in the ZI and also to be deployed to the overseas bases as the need arises. These measures supported by the resources of the Office of Communications should serve to meet all Project communications requirements.

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ANNEX 52

HBJAYWALK Directory

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<u>Date</u>				<u>Communicators</u>
<u>Opened</u>	<u>Designator</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Company/Projec</u>

50X1, E.O.13526				
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8/55	ABOUT	Pratt & Whitney	Los Angeles	
1/60	ACORN	Itek	Lexington, Mass.	2

50X1, E.O.13526				
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7/59	BABY	Perkin-Elmer Corp.	Norwalk, Conn.	4
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50X1, E.O.13526				
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7/56	BAIL	Eastman Kodak	Rochester, N. Y.	3 2
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50X1, E.O.13526				
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8/55	BEIGE **	Lockheed Aircraft Corp.	Burbank, Calif.	3
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50X1, E.O.13526	
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** Formerly BAAL

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50X1, E.O.13526

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<u>Date Opened</u>	<u>Designator</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Communicators Company/Project</u>
2/64	BELLY	Itek	Palo Alto, Calif.	2
2/63	BIJOU	Applied Technology Inc.	Palo Alto, Calif.	2
8/62	BINGO	Minneapolis Honeywell	Burbank, Calif.	1
10/64	BOOK	David Clark Co.	Worcester, Mass.	4
-	BRISK	Eastman Kodak (AF)	Rochester, N. Y.	
12/55	CABAL****			
7/55	CABLE	Area 51 Test Site	Mercury, Nevada	7
6/57	CACTUS	Detachment G	Edwards AFB, Calif.	6
10/60	CARD	Detachment H	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	

2

50X1, E.O.13526

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50X1, E.O.13526

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<u>Date</u> <u>Opened</u>	<u>Designator</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Communicators</u> <u>Company/ Project</u>
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[Redacted]

2/64	COACH	OX Detachment/Staging	Wake Island	
1/61	COBRA	Detachment G/Staging	Cubi Point, P.I.	

[Redacted]

7/56	CORK	Detachment B/later OX	Incirlik AFB, Adana, Turkey	1
------	------	-----------------------	-----------------------------	---

[Redacted]

1/65	LMSC	Lockheed Missile & Space	Sunnyvale, Calif.	2
1/66	LRL	Lawrence Radiation Lab.	Livermore, Calif.	3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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<u>Date</u> <u>Opened</u>	<u>Designator</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Communicators</u> <u>Company/ Project</u>
	SANDIA	Sandia Corp.	Albuquerque, N.M.	4
4/62	SPECTRE	NPIC	Washington, D. C.	8
	SPER	JASPER Radio Site	England	
	SYSTO	Perkin-Elmer (AF)	Norwalk, Conn.	
	TOWER	Lockheed (AF)	Los Angeles, Calif.	
6/63	TRW	TRW Systems Grp.	Redondo Beach, Calif.	5
10/62	WADDY	RecTech (AF)	Westover AFB, Mass.	8(AF)
7/61	WECEN	Weather Central, SAC Hq	Offutt AFB, Neb.	5
5/63	WHALE	AFRDR(AF)	Pentagon	

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<u>Date Opened</u>	<u>Designator</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Communicators Company/Project</u>
1/63	WHIG	D/NRO Staff (AF)	Pentagon	
12/63	WH	White House	1600 Pennsylvania Ave.	
7/61	WITCH	Air Weather Service (AF)	Scott AFB, Illinois	

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ANNEX 53

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ANNEX E (COMMO) - PROJECT BIG BARRELL III OPS ORDER 7-64
 Dated: 23 November 1964

I. Commo links

A. Ferry flight support

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(1) Over-the-counter service, utilizing OTP's will be provided at Guam. Contact at Guam is Lt. Col. Willoughby.

Routing indicator []

(2) CIA facility at [] will be utilized. Contact is []

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B. Charbatia

(1) Radioteletype with KW-26 primary and OTT back-up circuit to [] for entry AXANET network. Radio equipment already in place Charbatia (from previous staging) remaining associated equipment and crypto gear being provided and deployed by Detachment G.

(2) CW capability with OTP circuit to [] for alternate back-up. Equipment already in place Charbatia.

(3) KODGER CW emergency capability, using "Ferry Flight" [] OTP's; Crypto link between Charbatia/OPCEN.

(4) CW radio link Charbatia/emergency recovery base, if required. Equipment and crypto material being deployed by Detachment G.

C. OPCEN

(1) OPCEN-[] fast freight patch activated
 18 November.

(2) OPCEN-[] fast freight patch activated

20 November.

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II. Personnel deployment

A. Detachment G

(1) Detachment G deploying one team leader, three CT/C's, two CT/R's, two ET's, and one WET.

(2) One ET and two CT/C's to accompany ferry flight.

B. OPCEN

(1) Two CT/C's being assigned TDY

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(2) Two CT/C's being assigned TDY

C. SEACA

One CT/R being assigned TDY Charbatia.

III. Equipment

A. Radio equipment already in place Charbatia, additional spares being deployed from Detachment G.

B. Crypto equipment being deployed from Detachment G.

C. Elint: Systems IXA, XII and XIII plus "p" and "S" Bands System VI and BIRDWATCHER will be utilized. Systems III and VI being deployed per ADIC 7966, para L1.

D. Nav aids and SSB/BW - Radio jeep w/LF Beacon and Ground SSB/BW facility already in place or being deployed by Detachment G.

IV. BIRDWATCHER

A. Ferry flight: Special BW kit to be placed aboard KC 135 for monitor. CARD and Charbatia to monitor also. Detachment G will provide signal plan info and alert stations for monitoring.

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B. Operational missions: Charbatia and [] will monitor; [] will also monitor if required.

V. Deception

[] KW 26 RTTY deception circuit activated 19 November. When Charbatia ready activate, circuit will be picked up by Charbatia and dropped by [] At completion of staging when Charbatia deactivates, [] will pick up again and continue operation of circuit on 24 hours basis for approximately one week.

VI. Crypto Stock

A. Key material for Charbatia [] crypto link in place [] Detachment G deploying Charbatia ends. [] will be control station.

B. Detachment G providing pads for ferry flight "over-the-counter service" at Guam. These pads will also be utilized for emergency KODGER crypto link Charbatia/OPCEN.

VII. Crypto Procedures

A. With exception of KODGER, which utilizes special procedures, all pad links follow [] procedures. Reciprocal system indicator [] to be used between [] and Charbatia. System indicator [] to be used for KODGER and [] messages.

B. Charbatia [] OTT circuit assigned reciprocal system indicator [] procedures apply. Charbatia routing indicator is [] is []

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CHAPTER VII. SECURITY AND
COVER

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U.S.C., section 403g)

Chiefs of Security and Cover Officers - 1954-1968

Security:

William H. Marr
December 1954 - November 1955

[REDACTED]
November 1955 - July 1960

William J. Cotter
July 1960 - April 1964

William R. Kotapish
April 1964 - July 1966

[REDACTED]
July 1966 - September 1967

[REDACTED]
September 1967 - August 1968

[REDACTED] *aug 70*
September 1968 - Present

Cover:

Initially cover was an additional
duty of the Security Staff.

[REDACTED]
October 1955-April 1956

[REDACTED]
April 1956 - May 1962
(Doubled as Cover Officer
and Security Officer)

[REDACTED]
May 1962 - October 1967
(Doubled as Cover Officer and
Special Assistant to DSA for
Liaison)

[REDACTED]
October 1967 - Present
(Doubling as Cover Officer and
Security Officer)

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CHAPTER VII. SECURITY AND COVER

Development Period

At the outset of Project AQUATONE, before a Headquarters Staff had been formed, matters relating to security and cover were handled directly by Mr. Bissell and his personal assistant. Their first tasks were the initiation of a clearance list of knowledgeable participants, and first steps toward the development of cover. Mr. Bissell himself put a great deal of thought into designing a cover story for the development stage of the project which would keep knowledge of the most highly sensitive facts to an absolute minimum. These facts he considered to be: (a) the altitude and range expected from the aircraft; (b) aircraft delivery schedule; (c) association between the aircraft and the photographic and electronic equipment being developed as components of the reconnaissance system; (d) CIA connection with the project; and (e) the purpose for which the system had been approved.

Meanwhile, at the end of December 1954, the Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, was briefed and pledged full support of his Office and as a first action, nominated Mr. William H. Marr of his staff to be Project Security Officer. The immediate problems to be solved, in view of the fast-moving activities of Mr. Johnson's group at

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Lockheed, were (1) a cover story for the contractors, and (2) plant security and personnel investigation and clearance procedures.

The development period cover story, based on Mr. Bissell's outline with inputs from knowledgeable Air Force and contractor representatives, was promulgated on 26 January 1955 and copies were distributed to key men in each supplying company. (See Annex 54 for text.) At the same time contact and communications instructions were issued to the five current suppliers covering procedures for personal contacts between headquarters personnel and contractor representatives. Through the Office of Security a series of post office boxes with notional addressees were rented for the secure exchange of postal communications between Project Headquarters and the contractors.

For emergency communications (before the secure teletype system came into being in midsummer 1955) unlisted telephones were installed in Project Headquarters and key offices at suppliers' plants, and the numbers were exchanged among those needing to have immediate access to one another.

The system of postal communications, which began in February 1955 with the establishment of mail channels between Headquarters and five companies, with eight post office boxes in four cities being

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serviced once or twice a week, developed over the extended life of the U-2 and successor projects until at the end of 1966 it encompassed the following network:

For outgoing mail from Project Headquarters: 115 post office boxes in 85 cities with addressees including approximately 100 suppliers, 3 field units, 1 depot and 1 weather station, with daily servicing by company or unit personnel in most cases. Of the 115 boxes, 15 are used by other DDS&T units and 10 are used for Air Force contract business.

For incoming mail to Project Headquarters: 16 post office boxes in Washington, D. C., at various post offices, with daily servicing by Office of Security personnel. An average of 30 pieces of mail per day is received through these boxes, a few of which boxes are also used by other components of DDS&T.

Plant Security

In the middle of January 1955, the Air Force and Navy representatives at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation were given limited briefings on the special project in "Building 82" and were relieved of any security responsibility for work in that area. [redacted] of the Agency's Los Angeles office was given the job of Project Security Officer for plants on the West Coast. Inspections were made of physical security arrangements at Lockheed and Ramo-Wooldridge and found to be adequate. With the assistance of the machinery available in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), a system for processing security

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clearances for plant personnel via OSI to the Agency's Office of Security was set up which had the appearance of a normal Air Force procedure. Investigations began immediately on the civilians nominated to work on the aircraft and supporting systems. Arrangements were also made for secrecy agreements to be obtained, through OSI, from all military personnel briefed on the project.

On 7 February 1955, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, was briefed on the project and the Agency's interest in it, particularly with regard to the work at Lockheed. Three men in the FBI Los Angeles office were briefed (including head of the Espionage Squad), and they, as well as FBI Headquarters in Washington, continued to support the project wherever possible with personnel, facilities and files.

Security Responsibility: Agreements

Although agreement in principle was reached with the Air Force and Navy in December 1954 that CIA would have security responsibility for Project AQUATONE, within a few months it was felt by the Project Director and the Office of Security that it would be advantageous to have this clearly spelled out and agreed in writing. On 29 April 1955 the following agreement was formalized:

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"In order that security responsibilities relative to Project AQUATONE may be clarified and understood by the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force, and Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy, the following provisions shall apply:

"1. The Central Intelligence Agency has assumed primary responsibility for all security in this Top Secret project, which includes operational security as well as granting security clearances.

"2. The Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force, and Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy, will furnish liaison assistance in connection with clearance actions, including making available to Central Intelligence Agency pertinent information from their files. Where necessary, Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force, and Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy, will assist Central Intelligence Agency by giving needed support relative to various phases of the Project, the scope of such support to be determined by prior agreement of the undersigned.

AGREED: Maj. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, USAF
Director of Special Investigations

RAdm. Carl F. Espe, USN
Office of Naval Intelligence

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Central Intelligence Agency. " 1/

The agreement signed with the Air Force in August 1955 for the joint direction of the project did not reiterate the Agency's prime responsibility for security; however, when the Air Force U-2 program

1/ ~~TS~~-103552, 29 April 1955. Memorandum for the Record.

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was set up, the Air Force agreed in December 1956 to follow certain prescribed security procedures to insure proper control of the follow-on program and to protect CIA's association with it.^{1/} The "need to know" principle restricting information was to be adhered to, personnel involved who would be aware of the Agency's interest were required to have TS clearance including a National Agency Check and background investigation, and the Air Force agreed to certify to Project Headquarters the names of their people attending joint meetings or visiting suppliers' installations so that proper notifications could be made in advance. While this agreement was fulfilled in the main, there were numerous breaches requiring Project Security action--briefings and debriefings, investigations of information leaks, etc., involving many man hours and much travel by the Security Staff.

At the inception of CORONA in April 1958, Project Security assumed responsibility for cover and security for that project and subsequent Agency participation in the reconnaissance satellite program, involving principally the procurement and delivery of the payload.

1/ TS-158772, 14 December 1956. Memorandum from Brig. Gen. M. A. Preston to Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr., Subject: USAF R-17 Program. Para. 8 a-d. (Annex 55).

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When the OXCART agreement was signed in February 1961 between the Air Force and CIA, two paragraphs relating to security responsibility were inserted:

"3. d. Security of this project within the DOD will be the responsibility of the Air Force Project Officer. All clearances for personnel within the DOD will be approved in advance and monitored by the Air Force Project Officer.

.....

"5. Responsibility for the overall security of the program shall rest with CIA. In view of the security aspects of this project, it is important that maximum practicable compartmentation should include provision for logical, innocent explanation of the activities involved." 1/

In May 1962 an "Agreement Between Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office" was negotiated, and the question of security responsibility was covered as follows:

"3. Security: In accordance with the basic responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for protection of intelligence sources and methods, CIA will establish security policy for the NRP, including provision for a uniform system of security control and appropriate delegations of security responsibility.

1/ OXC-0321, "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities, Project OXCART" signed 18 February 1961.

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.....
"6. Public releases of information will be the responsibility of the DNRO, subject to the security guidance of CIA." 1/

Clearance Procedures

The industrial security phase of AQUATONE opened up a new realm and concept to the Agency's Office of Security. The unique problems presented required the establishment of a new set of operating principles in order to deal with the numbers and types of personnel who became involved in various phases of the project. In the early days clearances were obtained and briefings given on an ad hoc basis by various staff members as the occasion demanded, and the degree of knowledgeability imparted varied from one individual to another, and was seldom detailed in writing for the record.

In January 1956 the Project Director became alarmed at the large numbers of Air Force personnel being fully briefed on the project and visiting the test area on their own cognizance. He wrote to Col. Ritland:

"It seems to me that we are rapidly sliding into a position where literally hundreds of senior Air Force officers

1/ BYE-1166-62, 2 May 1962. "Agreement Between Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office."

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have been and are being cut in on AQUATONE, not because they have any real need to know or because we expect any contribution from them, but only because they are in the habit of knowing about projects of this sort which are handled through regular Air Force channels... I do feel we should review with Col. Berg the extent of knowledgeability in the Air Force and launch a new campaign to clamp down." 1/

In reply, Colonel Ritland noted that since the Air Force would begin to operate their own U-2's about September 1956, a realistic attitude must be taken with regard to the increasing numbers of USAF personnel involved in planning for the follow-on program. His solution was to have Project Security set up categories of knowledgeability by phases. Once these were firmly defined, the briefing of individuals could be restricted to that phase in which they were to participate, thus cutting down the numbers of fully knowledgeable persons.

The eventual system of distinguishing between three levels of security access (which has continued through subsequent projects) was based on criteria set forth below as developed principally for guidance in dealing with the great volume of contractor personnel clearances.

A Phase I approval is required for an individual who does not need to know and cannot determine the ultimate application

1/ SAPC-3080, 7 January 1956. Memorandum to Col. Ritland from R. M. Bissell, Jr., Project Director.

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or future sensitive use of the equipment being developed or manufactured. Generally speaking, the work which he is doing could have a variety of applications, is a job that he would normally be performing and would, in most cases be a fabrication type function which does not require access to sensitive Project areas.

A Phase II approval is required for an individual who needs to know equipment or system configuration, performance characteristics, identification of other contractors, suppliers and vendors, test site locations and knowledge of equipment or subsystem capabilities. In general, this individual will or may become knowledgeable of information, requirements and parameters which reflect an advance in the state of the art or, by the nature of the function he performs, will have access to areas, material or information from which he might be able to deduce such knowledge.

A Phase III approval is required and will be granted only for those individuals who require official confirmation of mission objective and project knowledge which includes operational information, plans and identity of Project Headquarters. Phase III approvals will not be granted as a matter of courtesy, deference or convenience and requests for approval at this level must be adequately justified.

The Deputy Director of Security for Investigation and Support,

was made responsible by the Director of Security for supporting project needs in all areas of security. He soon realized that the scope of the job required more manpower than he had readily available. Decisions were made in April and May 1955 to give the Agency's Office of Security responsibility for the physical security of the test site (even though the AEC maintained a

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perimeter guard), as well as of the overseas field bases. It was further decided that the Project Security Staff would be responsible for custodial and courier activities, including the transport of mission photographic yield.

In November 1955, [redacted] noted to the Project Director that the initial conception of AQUATONE as a short-term project, which would require only a temporary diversion of Security's efforts away from other Agency activities, was no longer valid. Requirements levied on Security were increasing rather than diminishing. At last count 1,759 clearances had been processed although initially it was believed that there would be only about 600 in all. Therefore at least six more professionals and twelve more clerks were needed and an addition of \$100,000 to the current Office of Security budget in order to weather the crisis. The Project Director approved the addition of four slots to the Project T/O but recommended all other needs be put to the Deputy Director for Support as increases in the Office of Security T/O and budget; this was done with the Project Director's strong backing. As the life of the project was extended, the requirements for security support grew, as did the staff. In November 1956 Mr. Bissell wrote the following note of appreciation to Col. Edwards:

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"It was brought to my attention that your office has initiated 4,611 clearance cases of various types since this Project has been in existence, of which 4,008 have been completed. In addition 452 support cases which your office has completed have materially facilitated the accomplishment of our program. Although the AQUATONE mission and resulting requirements are far from completed, I would like to express sincere appreciation for your continuing support. Your accomplishments have demonstrated a major team effort." 1/

In 1958 the 5,000 mark was passed in clearance cases. From December 1958 through August 1959 the Security Office handled over 1,000 clearances of Convair employees engaged in the GUSTO feasibility study (for a successor to the U-2). More than 800 of these were handled by a temporary security group set up in 50X1, E.O.13526 manned by eight professional and four clerical personnel on a rotating basis, and using a commercial investigative force to supplement their efforts.

Once the follow-on vehicle to the U-2 was approved and production of the system began, the numbers of clearance cases handled by CIA Security increased by leaps and bounds. Also, meanwhile, during early 1962 the National Reconnaissance Office was being

1/ SAPC-10905, 27 November 1956. Memorandum to Director of Security from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

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organized and OSA's reconnaissance programs were blanketed under the new agency's control. The DCI expressed the desire that CIA should control the security systems of each and every program within the NRP domain. This did not include clearances in programs such as SAMOS and MIDAS but CIA would be the central point of record for all clearances and responsible for inter-Agency coordination, clearance recordation and dissemination of clearance information on all of them. In view of the implications of this requirement to the Office of Security in terms of manpower and budget, the Director of Security initiated action to centralize within the Office of Security, CIA, all records of persons approved for access to programs requiring special clearance for which CIA had security responsibility. Planning went forward during the summer for collation of all clearance data into the central indices under the control of a "Special Security Center". The Center was organized and staffed, and [redacted] [redacted] was designated as its head effective 4 September 1962. As of that date OSA Security Staff was relieved of all record-keeping and paper work involved with clearances other than those instigated by OSA.

Statistics on clearances current as of the beginning of 1966 on OSA's two principal projects were as follows:

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OXCART:

CIA personnel	1,507
Government (other agencies)	1,765
Industry, all phases	<u>11,651</u>
Total OXCART	14,923

IDEALIST:

CIA personnel	2,021
Government (other agencies)	2,158
Industry, all phases	<u>2,857</u>
Total IDEALIST	7,036

Security at Watertown Test Site

In May 1955 a crash recruiting and training program was instituted to ready 15 security agents for duty at Watertown (later to deploy abroad with Detachment A) and 15 each for Detachments B and C, in turn.

Applicants were required to possess at least an undergraduate degree from an accredited college and were selected on the basis of both present and future potential with the idea of phasing them into the Security Support Division after their project assignments. A school for these agents was set up at Watertown to continue their training in weaponry, radio and switchboard operation, and the practical application of security methods and procedures. It was considered essential that these young men possess the flexibility to respond to crisis situations

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as well as to do well the monotonous jobs required of personnel dedicated to the broad concept of security support.

Security duties at the test site were wide-ranging and included:

Physical Security:

Manning of two checkpoint gates and roving patrol 24 hours a day.

Apprehension and interrogation of intruders.

Badge and documentation control and maintenance of access lists.

Briefing and debriefing of base personnel and transients.

Local hire employee investigation and clearance documentation.

Area and safe checks, burning of classified waste and Top Secret Control.

Safety of work areas and coordination of base firefighting plan with contractor-furnished fire crew.

Air Shuttle, Burbank to Watertown:

Dispatch control of passengers and cargo to and from the test site (in coordination with the West Coast Security Officer in Los Angeles).

Courier and Escort Duties:

Classified documents and equipment accompanied and given protection and proper storage.

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Escort of remains of accident victims, briefing and giving aid and comfort to bereaved families.

Cover:

Briefings and promulgation of cover based on issuances from Headquarters.

Responsibility for local implementation of the USAF cover established for the testing phase at Watertown.

Emergency Assistance:

Proper notification to all points on details of accidents, crashes, etc.

Securing of wreckage and equipment in case of crashes.

Debriefing of uncleared witnesses, and control of publicity.

Other:

Administration of program to determine radioactivity level at the area through personnel wearing film badges while at the site and checking exposed filters.

Daily liaison with AEC Security Office at Mercury, Nevada on mutual security problems.

Daily consultation and advice to base administrators and base personnel in areas of security and cover as required.

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MATS Shuttle: Burbank to Watertown. To protect the security of activities at Watertown, the decision was made that ingress and egress to and from the training area would be by air in all but certain special cases. Since the majority of personnel travelling to the test site were contractor employees (largely Lockheed) whose homes were in the Burbank and Palmdale areas, the first shuttle service was provided by a USAF C-47 bailed to Lockheed and flown and serviced by Lockheed crews. Since the project could not fully control this service and because difficulties were expected regarding individual insurance coverage of those using the flight, arrangements were made with the Air Force in September 1955 for a regularly scheduled shuttle using a USAF C-54 to be operated by MATS with project-cleared crews. This service began on 3 October 1955.

The Air Force (MATS) was responsible for providing aircraft service between the two points on a daily schedule (except Sundays), and for all flight operations, maintenance, parking, loading and unloading. The project was responsible for maintaining a facility at Burbank (staffed with Security personnel), to prepare and certify personnel and cargo manifests, establish priorities, and maintain communications with suppliers and others using the shuttle.

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Mt. Charleston Crash. Less than two months after this service was initiated by MATS, a tragic accident occurred which had especially severe effects in the area of project security. As described by the Deputy Project Director, Col. Ritland, it happened as follows:

"On 17 November 1955 at about 3:00 p.m., EST, the Project Director's office was notified by telephone from Watertown that the MATS shuttle from Burbank was three hours overdue. The aircraft had cancelled its IFR clearance en route and was proceeding to Watertown under VFR conditions on last report. The weather was extremely bad with clouds topping all mountains and scattered snow showers throughout the area. Both cleared contacts at Norton Air Force Base (Generals Bunker and Caldara) were away from the base and therefore the SOP for accident reporting and investigation had not been put into effect. . .

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"After considerable confusion, General Caldara was located. . . through the efficient efforts of [redacted] and his Security channels in that area. . . General Caldara phoned his office and authorized his third in command, Colonel DeMarco, to assume full responsibility for following up on activities. . . The situation as described above caused some confusion since DFSSR was handling and controlling the entire investigation, news releases, and assuming direct control over Flight Service and Nellis without the senior representative being knowledgeable as to why he was operating in this fashion. Considering all this, it is my opinion that the general handling of matters. . . was extremely satisfactory." 1/

For a time due to bad weather no search activities could be accomplished

1/ Report (unnumbered) by Col. O. J. Ritland, 17-19 November 1955.
Subject: Shuttle Crash.

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but after a few hours notification came from General Robert Taylor of Air Defense Command that the wreckage had been sighted on the south slope of Charleston Peak. From the report of the condition of the aircraft, it was obvious that there were no survivors. Headquarters staff immediately put in motion all necessary actions which must eventually be carried out.

A great many uncleared and unbriefed people (principally Air Force personnel and Special Agents from the Office of Security) had to be brought in very quickly to handle matters relating to the bringing out of the bodies, notification of next of kin, mortuary and escort arrangements, and dealings with the press. The fact that the Project Security Officer, Mr. William H. Marr, and four of his staff assigned to Watertown were among the victims added an emotional overtone to the crisis atmosphere prevailing at Project Headquarters. Many people became aware of Agency interest in activities at Watertown as a result of the crash and ensuing confusion, but fortunately no public breach of any magnitude resulted. The most damaging result of this first serious incident in the life of AQUATONE was the loss of the fourteen men. (See Annex 56 for listing.)

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As a postscript to the accident, on 5 August 1956 the briefcase of Mr. Marr, which had lain hidden at the scene of the wreckage for more than eight months, was discovered by some Boy Scouts hiking in the mountains and was turned over by their Scoutmaster to the OSI Special Agent at Nellis Air Force Base. Upon opening the case he discovered Mr. Marr's connection with CIA and forwarded the case and contents to his regional headquarters in the Los Angeles area for passing to the nearest CIA contact. This compromise of the project's security was contained by debriefing those involved and stopping up all possible leaks therefrom.

Emergency Procedures. The SOP established for accident investigation at Watertown Strip (which had just been completed prior to the MATS shuttle crash) proved basically sound but a complete review in light of the accident necessitated some changes. Public information releases were henceforth to be the responsibility of the PIO, USAF Headquarters, in the Pentagon, in conjunction with the air base nearest the accident, and the Atomic Energy Commission was to be brought into any press release activity immediately. Firm cover and identification documents must be prepared for all personnel operating under cover. The one critical name on the MATS list had been that of

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[redacted] who was listed as a passenger with no affiliation (later covered by USAF/OSI backstopping his documentation as a [redacted])

[redacted]

The MATS service from Burbank resumed on 28 November 1955 and was accident-free for the next year and a half's operation at Watertown. The emergency procedures, however, were called into use several times during the U-2 testing and training phase. (See Annex 57 for a listing of major U-2 accidents.)

Security Support in the Field

Prior to departure of Detachment A to the field in the spring of 1956, on the recommendation of the Security Staff, approval was given for briefing all Detachment A personnel (including the techreps) on project sponsorship and mission. Each member took a secrecy oath and signed a formal memorandum of understanding as to his responsibilities in protecting classified U. S. Government information. This briefing was very well received and appreciated by the members of the unit and became standard procedure for each succeeding detachment.

While the same general categories of support provided by Security at the test site were later required at the overseas bases, each unit had security requirements peculiar to its location and to its position

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vis-a-vis the local authorities and other U.S. activities in the area. Increased policing of individual security observance was necessary (particularly after dependents were allowed to join detachments overseas). In addition there were varied courier assignments, chiefly the task of escorting mission "take" and pouches from the field to the film processing center, liaison with other U.S. security services on counter intelligence activities, monitoring of local public and press reactions, and public releases in support of cover.

Security Support at Headquarters

In addition to advising and counseling on the security aspects of day-to-day project business, the Headquarters Security Staff were called on to carry out various assignments, among which were:

Procurement, sweeping electronically, and guarding of rooms for suppliers' meetings and other conferences (usually in Washington or Los Angeles, sometimes in the Boston area).

Assistance to contractors in setting up plant security and documentation systems.

Investigation of reported or suspected security breaches.

Assistance in obtaining medical attention in several severe psychiatric cases where security of project operations was at stake.

Continuous recruiting and training of replacements for field positions.

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Drafting, clearing and promulgating policy paper on release of project-developed systems, subsystems and techniques to other U. S. Government agencies (text at Annex 58).

Cooperation with the Agency CI Staff in making a damage assessment following the shoot-down of the U-2 on 1 May 1960.

Control of publicity resulting from loss of Air National Guard crews involved in the Cuban operation.

Two incidents are detailed below as typical of jobs which the Security Staff was called upon to handle for Project Headquarters.

On 5 July 1957 an article appeared in the Morning Call of Allentown, Pa., reporting that a local area company had a contract with CIA to produce a dessicant film dryer for use in high altitude photo reconnaissance. The contract was an unclassified one entered into overtly by the Agency's procurement division and did not contain an anti-publicity clause. The president of the company, from his knowledge of the technical aspects of film development and chemical requirements involving a micron capability, had deduced the future use of the dryer and had given the information to a local reporter. This incident caused the expenditure of many man hours of travel, consultation, briefing, debriefing and reporting by the Security Agent assigned to the case. The recommendation was made that Procurement Division

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include an "anti-publicity clause" on all CIA contracts rather than leave such matters to the discretion of the company officials involved.

With regard to the second incident, on 27 March 1961, the Acting Chief of Development Projects Division wrote the following commendation letter to the Director of Security, CIA:

"On 14 March 1961 the Agency, and in particular this Division, was confronted with a security problem of considerable magnitude. A C-47 aircraft of this Division, enroute from Rochester, N. Y., to Bolling lost an engine and had to jettison 43 boxes of highly classified material /processed U-2 mission film being returned from Eastman to the Agency's Photo Interpretation Center/ in the rugged mountainous area in the vicinity of Williamsport, Pa.

"In response to an urgent request for assistance, the Office of Security immediately made available ten Security Officers who were dispatched to the probable recovery site. Through the diligent and most professional efforts of this team, whose activities were coordinated in excellent fashion by [redacted] DPD/Security, the complete classified cargo was recovered with dispatch. This particularly fine achievement is, indeed, a reflection upon the excellence of the caliber of men in the Office of Security career service..." 1/

The Project Headquarters Security Staff has been kept at the

minimum number consonant with the volume of project business;

however, the Office of Security has maintained cleared staff within its organization to support the U-2 project (and subsequent activities

1/ DPD-1695-61, 27 March 1961. Memo to Director of Security from AC/DPD.

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of DPD and OSA) in any jobs it was called upon to do. From a staff of one senior Security Officer and two assistants plus clerical help in 1955-56, the numbers had grown by 1961 to a Chief and six full-time Security Officers plus clerical help--two officers assigned to OXCART and one each to CORONA, Air Support, Cuban operation, and IDEALIST for primary responsibility. The approximately 45 field agents who worked for Detachments A, B and C were phased into other areas when it was decided to hire contract guards to maintain physical security at the Detachment G Base at Edwards (North) in 1957 and at Area 51 in 1960.

By the end of 1966, the Headquarters Security Staff numbered a Chief and ten Security Officers, with ten additional officers assigned to field detachments and stations in the ZI and the Far East.

Cover

During the testing and training period at Watertown, cover was provided by the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission under the guise of a joint upper air research project. The presence of uniformed Air Force personnel at the test site, the provision of materiel support by the Air Force and the conduct of pilot training by a SAC

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unit attested to an Air Force activity, and the location within the AEC Nevada Proving Ground lent credence to the idea of a joint AEC/USAF upper air research program, while hiding CIA involvement. The principal problem during that period was to avoid disclosure by the press, or in other ways, of the capabilities of the aircraft and its systems. Once the training program reached the stage of flying simulated missions great distances from home base, the dangers of such disclosure were multiplied. Two fatal crashes and several emergency landings away from the test site were weathered during the training period with the aid of the established cover, emergency procedures and controlled public releases from the Headquarters USAF Public Information Officer.

Thought was given meanwhile to a cover mechanism for the overseas operational phase of the project and various Air Force commands were considered as possible sponsors for a mixed task force. In December 1955 the Project Director of Administration, Mr. James Cunningham, reminded the Project Director that to move further along the current course of continuing Air Force cover for overseas activities would, in the event of compromise of the project by a hostile force, put the military in a position of not being able to effect plausible denial--

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the initial purpose for investing a civilian agency with responsibility for carrying out the program. He suggested the possibility of a volunteer group on the order of Chennault's Flying Tigers, which by "technical resignation" from the Air Force achieved nominal separation from the military without cutting themselves off from the flow of military support.

In January 1956, with Detachment A's deployment date approaching, the question of overseas cover became urgent. [redacted]

[redacted] a long-time Clandestine Services career officer who had been assigned to the Project Operations Staff was reassigned to work full-time on cover. As a result of his research and discussions with all concerned,

[redacted] put forward the following assumptions and considerations as a basis for establishing cover for the project's operational phase:

"The cover unit must be USAF. No other sponsorship would explain the use of a USAF installation, the extent of USAF logistic support involved, the type of aircraft and associated equipment involved, etc. While other considerations may suggest that it is desirable for other U. S. agencies (governmental or private) to appear to be 'participants' in the detachment's activity, the appearance of USAF control (with at least an executive agent's role) and sanction cannot be avoided.

"Policy considerations dictate that the USAF cover unit appear to have no tactical mission, nor be involved in a function of direct support to a tactical USAF unit.

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"Since the cover must explain plausibly the presence of a good number of civilian technicians, non-USAF participation in the cover unit's activities would lend credence to the story. AEC, U.S. Weather Bureau and private research institutions (e.g., Massachusetts Institute of Technology), have been mentioned as possible participants. The participation of non-USAF agencies would also serve to reinforce the impression that the unit is not tactical in nature..." 1/

Additional considerations posed by were:

- (1) The necessity for the host government to sanction operations in areas where main bases as well as forward bases were established.
- (2) The requirement for exclusive U.S. security control of that portion of the base from which AQUATONE would operate, which would clearly indicate that the unit's activity was classified.
- (3) Assurance that the briefing of host government officials was consistent with the degree to which they were to share in the "take".
- (4) The question of insignia: Would the aircraft retain USAF markings during operational missions?
- (5) The advisability of releasing an unclassified cover story to the press, and the immediate conforming of the Watertown cover to that of the overseas units.

1/ TS-142951, 13 January 1956. Memo for Project Director from

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The Cover Officer felt that of all the major USAF commands, the one under which AQUATONE would most logically fall was the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), and since it was desirable that the overseas detachments assume a composite flavor, it was proposed that other USAF elements and one or two non-governmental institutions assign participants to a task force unit for which ARDC would act as executive agent. Missions which could plausibly be assigned the unit were:

- (1) Upper atmosphere meteorological research of interest to Directorate of Scientific Service of the Air Weather Service.
- (2) Solar research in effect of sun spot activity (of considerable interest to the Army-Airways Communication Service).
- (3) Geophysical research directly associated with high altitude flight (e. g., cosmic ray studies, which utilize high altitude photography).
- (4) Field test and evaluation of new electronic and aircraft instrumentation systems.

The Chief of the Agency's Central Cover Branch was briefed on AQUATONE on 2 February 1956. He was given an opportunity

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to review the cover planning done to date, which he received favorably.

On the basis of this planning, the Project Director on 29 February 1956 drafted a "Cover Story for Operations Overseas" (TS-142996) which was the basis for discussion and approval as the eventual classified cover story. Those (other than CIA officials) whose advice and concurrence were obtained during this planning included the following:

USAF:

Maj. Gen. John Samford, Director of Intelligence
Maj. Gen. Thomas Moorman, Commander, Air Weather Service
Maj. Gen. Roscoe Wilson, Commander, 3rd Air Force
Maj. Gen. James H. Walsh, Commander, 7th Air Division
Col. Paul Heran, SAC U-2 Project Officer
Col. Russell Berg, USAF Headquarters Project Officer

NACA: (National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics)

Dr. Hugh Dryden, Director of NACA
Gen. James Doolittle, Member of NACA

Land Panel:

All Members

Representatives of the five principal contractors

Within the Air Force it was believed that USAF participation should be ascribed to the Air Weather Service (not ARDC) since AWS was not a tactical unit, had an obvious interest in upper atmosphere research, did not have responsibility for development of new equipment,

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and had previously conducted scientific research through joint task forces. It was further agreed that the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) would be the most plausible and useful civilian participant since its charter was broad and its mixed groups of military, civilian, governmental and private organizations would bring together many of those having a plausible interest in such a program.

Once approval for use of this cover was obtained through appropriate channels in USAF, discussions were held with AWS and NACA personnel to work out administrative details. Results of meetings between Col. Richard M. Gill, Director of Operations, AWS, and project personnel, including the Project Weather Officer, Lt. Col. Ralph J. Steele (AWS Meteorologist), brought out the following problem areas:

(1) AWS had no charter for engaging in research activity; it could be properly concerned only with the development of operational techniques for high altitude weather reconnaissance.

(2) As proposed, the cover would not be backstopped by actual capability for collecting data; this would arouse suspicion within AWS itself as well as from outside interested parties.

(3) AWS questioned the plausibility of their role as executive agent for conducting operations abroad if the aircraft did not belong to the USAF and bear USAF insignia.

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(4) The backstopping of NACA's role would be complex: explaining ownership of the aircraft and the funding procedure for the project were the two principal problems.

Modifications were introduced into the cover story concerning the procurement and ownership of the aircraft and the living out of the cover story, and the final version of the classified cover story was issued on 26 March 1956 at TS-143267/1 (see Annex 59 for text).

While the classified cover story contained provision for equipping the U-2 with a meteorological configuration in order to live out the cover mission, the delay in assembling and installing this equipment and the slow rate of collecting and disseminating data justified the early fears of the Project Director of Administration (Mr. Cunningham) that

"...in our urgent haste to deploy on schedule, we may well be more interested in the purely frontal aspects of cover rather than in the full backstopping of our cover device." 1/

He recommended turning one of the 20 U-2's over to AWS so they could completely instrument it for a program of meteorological research within the ZI and abroad in order to accumulate actual data and/or cloud atlas photography to establish scientific backstop for the project

1/ TS-143237, 7 March 1956. Memo for Project Director from D/Admin.

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and for use as a counter propaganda weapon. This recommendation was only partially carried out. In April 1956 Lt. Col. Robert Houghten and Mr. Thomas Coleman (Technical Equipment Specialists of AWS and NACA respectively) were sent out to work with Lockheed engineers to devise a meteorological package suitable for collecting the kinds of information within the U-2's capabilities; however, even after these packages were fabricated and available, it was some time before operational priorities and assignment of equipment technicians would allow a regular program of weather flights for cover purposes.

Also in April 1956, a beginning was made in conjunction with AFOAT/1 (the Air Force Office of Atomic Intelligence) and AFSWP (Armed Forces Special Weapons Project) to develop an atomic sampling capability for the U-2, which further supported project classified cover while doing a real service for the offices concerned (and incidentally requiring the clearing and briefing of quite a number of their personnel).

At the beginning of May 1956, just prior to the deployment of Detachment A, copies of the unclassified and classified cover stories, press release for 7 May 1956 issue by NACA, and background information for dealing with press and other queries, were circulated to all concerned, including the contractors. (See Annex 60 for full text.)

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Emergency Procedures

The next order of business for the Cover Officer was the drafting of contingency plans for the possible loss of an aircraft over hostile territory. The Project Director advised the Cover Officer to

"... plan to produce a document which sets forth all actions to be taken... not only press releases and the public 'line' to be taken, but also the suspension of operations and at least an indication of the diplomatic action. If feasible this paper should be agreed with the State Department as well as the USAF and NACA and should probably be discussed... with the British Foreign Office /in view of Detachment A's expected deployment to the U. K. / We should at least make the attempt in this case to be prepared for the worst in a really orderly fashion." 1/

While the emergency procedures were being drafted and cleared, the Project Director, at a meeting with the President's Aide, Gen. Goodpaster, and Drs. Killian and Land, explained the kind of emergency arrangements being drawn up. At that point, Drs. Killian and Land suggested consideration of a much bolder action by the U. S. involving admission that overflights were being conducted to guard against surprise attack. This suggestion was not discussed in any detail and was put aside for further thought. Meanwhile the emergency procedures paper was cleared with all concerned including the State Department and was promulgated in

1/ TS-143290, 9 April 1956. Memorandum to Cover Officer from Project Director.

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final form as "Procedures to be Followed in the Event of an Aircraft Loss over Hostile Territory", dated 29 June 1956 (see Annex 61).

The same procedures, with appropriate changes to cover local situations, were issued to Detachments B and C in turn.

From the deployment of Detachment A to England in May 1956 through the events of May 1960, the cover arrangements and instructions for emergency procedures remained the same. In the fall and winter of 1956 during the political stand-down of overflights, consideration was given to use of a commercial aerial survey company or other non-governmental cover for operations, but with the critical situation developing in early 1957 in the Middle East, Detachments A and B were called on for almost daily reconnaissance of the trouble areas and discussions of alternate cover were discontinued.

Cover Activities in the Weather Field

In August 1956 the Project Director wrote to NACA concerning the lack of research studies needed as counterpropaganda in the event of a U-2 incident. Non-production to date had been due to lack of secure facilities and cleared people to handle film and tape; however, these matters were in hand and it was urged that production of research reports be given immediate attention. A preliminary study of

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weather data was published at the end of December 1956 by NACA, and data for further studies and reports continued to be collected by the detachments. The principal difficulty in publishing studies of interest to the aviation community based on U-2 flights was the fact that data for altitudes above 55,000 feet required secret classification or had to be sanitized before release (which made the reports of less significance to the recipients).

An excellent program of cover publicity stemming from Detachment C's typhoon coverage in the Far East was initiated in 1958 through the energetic efforts of [redacted] (who succeeded [redacted] as Cover Officer in 1956). The Air Weather Service gave unstinting support to the program, including the services of some of their top meteorologists who aided in the accumulation of data and preparation of reports for publication. The Commander of AWS, General Thomas Moorman, and his Deputy, Col. Norman Peterson, and Dr. Robert D. Fletcher, Director of Scientific Studies, were all intimately concerned in developing actual weather studies that could be directly attributed to the cover mission and could be legitimately discussed and defended in public forums if necessary. Their efforts produced a product that would have enabled the operation to live out its cover had it not been for the

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political situation in Japan and several untoward incidents which brought about a great deal of publicity, largely hostile. (See Annex 62 for significant examples of typhoon photography studies.)

Erosion of Cover: Incidents and Press Stories

In April 1957, at the time of the planned surfacing of the SAC U-2 program, Mr. Bissell wrote the following note to the Director and Deputy Director of CIA concerning the deterioration of cover which was to be expected as a result of SAC's activities:

"After careful review, it is my judgment that the present cover for the AQUATONE operation cannot be maintained much beyond next fall. Too many people, especially in the Air Force, are beginning to surmise the true mission of the AQUATONE units and even to suspect an Agency connection therewith. Moreover, the NACA will be most reluctant to continue to provide cover, at least in the present form, beyond the end of this year... The presently planned surfacing of the SAC U-2 program will, if carried through, gravely impair our cover. Not only will the fact that the U-2 is a reconnaissance aircraft become known to a very much larger number of Air Force personnel but, in the course of listing the U-2 in the Air Force inventory and handling its support through normal channels, the unusual procedures employed up to this point in the procurement and support of these aircraft will be widely revealed... I do not believe it is an exaggeration to say that the surfacing of the SAC program will absolutely compel the liquidation of AQUATONE under its present cover..." 1/

1/ TS-164213, 19 April 1957. Memorandum for the DCI and DDCI, from Project Director.

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Several security safeguards were imposed on the SAC U-2 program in the interest of protecting the existing AQUATONE operation, including maintaining the photographic and altitude capabilities of the U-2 under secret classification and restricting SAC's U-2 operations to peripheral flights. Thus the project did continue beyond Mr. Bissell's prediction of its life span, and NACA agreed in July 1957 to a two-year extension of cover support. However, the cover was a very thin veneer over the actual operations and there was bound to be speculation, evolving into stories in the press, many of which were written in a highly sensational style with obvious untruths included, but in general coming too close to the truth for comfort.

On 4 April 1957 a U-2 from the Edwards Air Force Base detachment crashed in the desert and the Lockheed test pilot, Robert Sieker, was killed. Growing out of this accident and the efforts of the local sheriff to be helpful in securing the crash area on behalf of the investigating team, an article by Wayne Thomis was published in the Chicago Daily Tribune on 12 April 1957 headlined "Secrecy Veils High Altitude Research Jet". It was a consolidation of previously published facts about the U-2 with a good deal of surmise added as well as many inaccuracies. At the same time the Los Angeles Times published a conclusive review by

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Marvin Miles of all publicly known activities of the U-2 to date. From that point, the press continued to refer to the U-2 as a "mystery plane" and used such names for it as "Super Snooper," "St. Peter's Special," the "Black Angel" and others. In 1957 the SAC U-2 squadron at Del Rio, Texas, suffered three fatal and one non-fatal crashes (two occurring on the same day, 28 June 1957) which also drew damaging press comment.

The aviation trade media particularly followed all U-2 incidents with eager attention. Aviation Weekly, the British magazine called Flight, and Japanese publications Air View and Aero Fan, were among those printing largely factual but speculative articles concerning the aircraft's specifications, capabilities, and probable missions.

In February 1959 the Project Security Officer, [redacted] in examining the state of project cover, expressed the following opinion:

"I recommend we give immediate consideration to exposure of the mission of the U-2 within the United Nations, indicating this capability was developed in furtherance of the President's 'Open Skies' proposal of July 1955 as a peaceful tool of the free world..." 1/

This proposal had small chance of serious consideration at the time and represented principally a Security Office warning that time was running out on the ability to maintain cover.

1/ DPD-0460-59, 26 Feb 1959. Memo to AC/DPD from [redacted]

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On 24 September 1959 a U-2 from Detachment C returning to base at Atsugi ran out of fuel and made a forced landing on a prepared dirt strip and was immediately surrounded by inquisitive Japanese (many with cameras). The photographic story of this incident, as published in the November 1959 issues of Air View and Aero Fan, are shown in Annex 63.

By spring 1960, cover had worn threadbare in many quarters and a certain amount of laxity regarding security of operations was present. Even though the detachment personnel worked very hard to produce trouble-free overflight missions, one must give credit to a goodly amount of luck when considering the number of things which could have gone wrong on any one of the 309 missions flown to date (approximately 75 of which were over, or peripheral to, Communist territory).

After the May Day 1960 episode and subsequent revelations in the press and other media, Dr. Glennan, Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), successor to NACA, was disenchanted with the project and wished to disengage NASA from sponsorship of any further flights. The ungrounding of the U-2 was the subject of protracted discussion during the summer of 1960 among CIA, State, and NASA personnel. On 1 September 1960, Mr. Cunningham

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wrote to the DD/P in that connection as follows:

"With the emergence of a requirement that may call for further U-2 flights from Adana in support of peripheral intelligence collection, we are up against the problem of how to get the aircraft ungrounded, which involves the knotty problem of under whose auspices these flights should apparently be undertaken... there are a limited number of possibilities:

- "a. Continue with NASA-AWS cover.
- "b. Drop all pretence of innocent Air Force (AWS) mission and adopt either SAC or USAFE organizational cover.
- "c. Drop all pretence and state that Detachment 10-10 is a CIA unit.
- "d. Drop NASA cover and substitute another innocent U. S. agency.
- "e. Drop NASA cover and convert to AWS cover.

Recommendation is that Air Force concurrence be sought in the proposal to replace NASA/AWS sponsorship with straight AWS sponsorship... " 1/

Reactivation of reconnaissance flights from Detachment B failed to receive approval of higher authority and therefore cover discussions with regard to sponsorship of an overseas-based detachment were dropped. The remaining personnel and equipment from Detachments B and C were returned to Edwards Air Force Base and amalgamated into Detachment G and subsequent operational missions staged by this

1/ CHAL-1171, 1 Sept 1960. Memo to DD/P from Actg. Chief, DPD.

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detachment, beginning in September 1960, have had individual cover stories, tailored to fit the circumstances.

From the inception of U-2 overflights, there was no written policy or standard procedure with regard to briefing American Ambassadors abroad, either in countries being overflown or in countries where flights might originate or terminate. Each operation involving a foreign country was evaluated from an individual operational and contingency viewpoint and a determination made in conjunction with the State Department as to whether the Ambassador should be made witting of the activity. State's position was deferred to whenever a strong conviction was expressed with regard to any particular operation. Generally the practice was to advise the Ambassador if operational advantage might accrue from so doing, or if ignorance on his part might prove embarrassing in the event of a mishap.

Once the National Reconnaissance Office came into being, contingency procedures were set forth in the NRO Security Policy Directive No. 1 of 20 November 1962, as follows:

"Prior to development test of a new reconnaissance system, the Ad Hoc Cover Committee will prepare a contingency plan for the system, covering situations which may occur as a result of:
(1) Malfunction of equipment during any period of 'operational'

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use, the result of which may subject the reconnaissance capability to unauthorized exposure, (2) recovery of intelligence product or vehicle by hostile powers, and (3) damaging press coverage.

"Such plans will include provisions which will enable the U.S. Government to counter any charges of an adverse nature as may be made by foreign powers. In addition, instructions will be issued to appropriate personnel and offices of the Government and industry concerning actions to be taken should any of the aforementioned emergency situations occur so as to centralize the control of information as a responsibility of specific offices, departments, or officials.

"All contingency plans prepared under the supervision of the Ad Hoc Cover Committee will be reviewed by the Special Group. After approval, the NRO will publish and distribute the plan.

"Personnel affiliated with projects of the NRP will not respond to press inquiries which seek information about NRP activities unless specifically authorized to do so by the DNRO or as called for by provision of a contingency plan." 1/

In August 1963 the Ad Hoc Cover Committee was redesignated the Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee (ICPC) on the initiative of the Director of CIA in order to more accurately reflect the function of the committee and to eliminate the undesirable connotation of the term "cover." The ICPC is chaired by the DNRO and member agencies are State, Defense, NRO, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USAF, CIA, and the White House. This committee has held very few formal meetings since its establishment and its procedures are presently outdated and generally unworkable in the face of an emergency.

1/ NRO Security Policy Directive No. 1, 20 Nov 1962, Paragraph 14.

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Development of the BYEMAN System

By late 1960 the multiplicity of procedures for special handling of communications relating to the special collection projects, and the overlapping between the collection projects and the dissemination of the intelligence acquired, had made it difficult to classify and control the related documentation. On 21 February 1961, the TALENT^{*} Control Officer (then Mr. James Q. Reber) circulated an instruction to certain TALENT and TALENT/KEYHOLE^{**} Control Officers in the community which drew attention to the problems presented in handling documents and materials falling within the purview of the two control systems which also contained IDEALIST (U-2) or satellite data. The clearances of certain individuals for access to T or KH material did not mean that they were automatically given access to information concerning the projects which produced the T and KH material.

In order to establish standard procedures to safeguard information pertaining to the sensitive collection projects for which CIA had responsibility, a control system was established called the "BYEMAN System". The indicator BYEMAN covered only the developmental and/or

* Control system for intelligence collected by the U-2 program.

** Control system for intelligence collected by satellite program.

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operational aspects of DPD's sensitive collection projects and did not concern itself with the control or dissemination of the intelligence product. Compartmentation within the BYEMAN System was to be maintained through the continued use of individual project indicators and controls. BYEMAN materials which also contained T or KH data were to be handled as follows: TALENT control personnel would effect control and storage and TALENT courier service would handle deliveries. TALENT Control Officers would be responsible for seeing that the materials were made available only to persons possessing appropriate operational clearances.

Through 1961 the BYEMAN System operated on ad hoc procedures while a manual of instructions was being drafted and agreed. The BYEMAN Control Manual was first issued on 20 December 1961 by the Agency's BYEMAN Security Officer, Mr. William J. Cotter, then Chief of the Security Staff of DPD/DDP. During January 1962 steps were taken to set up the BYEMAN system throughout the intelligence agencies concerned. Members of the system were the same as the membership of COMOR: CIA, DIA, NSA, USAF, USN, USA and State. On 18 January 1962 at a meeting of COMOR, implementary procedures for the system were recommended relating principally to the need to

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communicate via electrical channels with all members of the community and with the needs of the various BYEMAN Control Officers for manuals, and appropriate rubber stamps, cover sheets, briefing forms, oath forms, etc. Since the Agency (DPD) controlled the electrical communication channel, Mr. Cotter also had the responsibility for disseminating the rules and regulations regarding such communications.

On 24 January 1962, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Mr. McGeorge Bundy), as a result of Recommendation No. 29 of the PFIAB's Report to the President of 20 January 1962, wrote to the DCI to register Presidential concern over the security of the most sensitive intelligence reconnaissance projects being conducted by CIA. Replying to Mr. Bundy on 20 February, Mr. Bissell (DD/P) was able to report:

"The following action has been taken on the recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board...

"On 20 December 1961 a security system specifically designed for the protection of information pertaining to these joint Air Force/CIA projects, for which the CIA has been given security responsibility, was approved (BYEMAN Security System). This system is presently being implemented throughout the intelligence community. Where feasible, billets will be established in each agency to assist in the stabilization and control of the number of clearances in each agency. All requests for access approvals will be submitted through a BYEMAN Security Officer designated by each agency, and he

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will have the responsibility to review critically each such request to assure that the individual must be authorized such information in order to directly contribute to the program. Each such BYEMAN Security Officer will periodically review the list of individuals cleared within his agency to ensure that all individuals listed thereon continue to require the appropriate project access approval. If a person is no longer contributing he will be immediately debriefed. Approximately every six months each BYEMAN Security Officer will rebrief all persons under his jurisdiction holding these special clearances...

"A communication is being directed to each control point throughout Government and industry inviting attention to the latest expression of Presidential concern and directing that immediate positive action be initiated to reduce the number of persons currently approved for access and requiring that new requests for clearances be held down to 'an absolute minimum consistent with practical requirements'...

"Within Government, since the large preponderance of individuals cleared for these joint Air Force-CIA projects are naturally within the Department of Defense, the Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Charyk, will be requested to review, from the need-to-know aspect, the clearance lists of each segment of the Defense Department and each new request for such clearance in an additional effort to establish another level wherein nonessential individuals can be identified.

"At the moment the BYEMAN Security System encompasses Projects IDEALIST, CORONA, and ARGON. In the immediate future, however, Project OXCART will be added to the system. In the meantime, however, all steps being taken to tighten up the BYEMAN projects will also be taken with regard to Project OXCART." 1/

1/ BYE-0149-62, 20 February 1962. Memorandum for Special Assistant to the President from R. M. Bissell, Jr. (DD/P).

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On 2 May 1962, the agreement on "National Reconnaissance Planning and Operations" was signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and in accordance with the basic responsibility of the DCI for protection of intelligence sources and methods, CIA was made responsible for establishing security policy for the National Reconnaissance Program, including provision for a uniform system of security control and appropriate delegations of security responsibility. As a consequence of carrying out this responsibility, all of the projects under the control of the National Reconnaissance Program have subsequently been added to the BYEMAN Control System.

In order to centralize security control and the handling of clearance matters under the BYEMAN System, a "Special Security Center" was established in the CIA Office of Security and on 4 September 1962 the positions of BYEMAN Security Officer and BYEMAN Control Officer for CIA, along with the attendant responsibilities, were assigned to Messrs. [REDACTED] respectively. The Office of Special Activities (formerly DPD) was thus relieved of these duties, which it had previously performed.

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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ANNEX 54

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26 January 1955

SANITIZED COVER STORY - FOR USE DURING DEVELOPMENT STAGE

I. Purpose of Cover Story

Cover stories are designed as a secondary defense. Regular security procedures and precautions are the fundamental devices for limiting knowledgeability. By carefully applying the "need to know" principle the cover story itself will be needed very little and those who do hear it will have minimum evidence on which to question the cover. However, it should be remembered that the most essential precaution is to have all personnel properly cleared and well indoctrinated with the importance and extreme sensitivity of this project.

The cover story itself should be treated as classified since even the existence of projects imagined in the cover story are of great national interest. Cover stories should not be discussed over the telephone. As needed the cover should be spread. In many instances suspicions and inquiries can be allayed by simple offhand remarks or by using only part of the cover story. The effectiveness of any cover relies not only on the consistency of its use, but in the imagination and skill of its application. Very often inquiries based on hearsay, rumor or curiosity can be satisfactorily answered with a flat denial or reference to an apparent confusion with some other sensitive activity known to exist within the plant or area.

The cover story as well as the project itself should be protected. If any inquiries are made by persons who were not thought to have heard it or by persons who are known security risks and who display unusual knowledge of the cover story or the project itself, they should be immediately reported to the project or security officer. An attempted penetration can just as likely occur using the cover story for deception as an attempt to penetrate directly the project itself.

It should be noted that project names are classified and should not be used over the telephone or in any way compromised.

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II. General Cover Story (Project AQUATONE)

a. Purpose: These high altitude aircraft are to be used primarily for upper atmosphere sampling and secondarily, for other kinds of high altitude testing and research. The latter will include testing engine performance, pressurization, and probably the functioning of electronic and photographic equipment at high altitudes without pressurization, personal equipment, and the capabilities of personnel to perform missions requiring sustained flight at high altitudes. The primary purpose renders the project both urgent and sensitive by reason of the growing official and popular concern for the danger of widespread fall-out in the event of wartime use of thermonuclear weapons and with the danger of permanent atmospheric contamination as a result of repeated H-bomb tests. The secondary purpose is also highly sensitive because of the extreme importance of maintaining an exclusive advantage in respect to all aspects of high altitude flight.

b. Organization: Procurement is to be undertaken by the U. S. Government. The project is of interest to and is sponsored by four Federal agencies: the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Civil Defense Administration. Funds are being contributed by the several sponsoring agencies. This basic organization was adopted because the requirement to be met by these aircraft is not purely military in character but reflects the interests of the three non-military agencies as well.

c. Procurement Channels: In view of the urgency, and especially the sensitivity of the project, and of the nature of its sponsorship, the decision was deliberately made not to employ regular Air Force (or Navy) procurement channels, since this would have required the participation on a fully knowledgeable basis of a sizeable number of officers, especially in AMC and ARDC. Nevertheless, the Air Force is supporting the project in two ways: (1) by procuring or supplying GFE, and (2) by providing technical supervision of development and construction (to the extent required in view of the considerable freedom of action necessarily left to the suppliers).

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d. Substantiation: To give the basic cover story substance, Lockheed has been requested to design or to subcontract for the construction of one or more air samplers fitted to the available space. And it would probably be desirable in fact to employ the aircraft for air sampling when a sufficient number are available. To further support the air sampling mission at Lockheed, General Daniel E. Hooks, Chief AFOAT-1, has been told of the existence of a sensitive project using this cover story and has volunteered to visit the area to increase its credibility. Meanwhile, special precaution should be taken to keep to an absolute minimum the number of individuals who are aware of the connection between photographic and electronic equipment under construction by two other companies and the Lockheed contract. Construction of both aircraft and reconnaissance equipment should be planned on the assumption that the equipment will not be actually installed until tests are being run at a site remote from the Lockheed plant. At that time, a further cover story may be required for the individuals conducting the tests. It might be simply that the aircraft will be used to test the possibilities of extremely high altitude photographic reconnaissance but that this use will be secondary to the primary use for high altitude sampling.

III. Subsidiary Cover Story (Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation,
Sub-project AZAROLE)

Since R-W has contracts with us, it will be difficult to keep our relationship to this contractor unknown. For this reason other contractors and project personnel should not meet at the R-W plant unless absolutely necessary. For internal purposes suspicion of our connection to this work will indirectly reinforce the main cover story in that this will be regarded as simply another contract for ELINT equipment from an agency that is already known to be interested in ELINT data and equipment. Consequently, the cover story will serve mainly to prevent employees from suspecting or detecting the other contractors and the full scope of the project. The most important aspect of this section of the cover story is to confine knowledge of the aircraft, its capability, and its sponsor to the minimum number of personnel.

a. Small package: The small ELINT package can be easily passed off as intended for use in luggage, packages, etc. in regular collection operations, and consequently should not stimulate unusual speculation.

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b. Large package: This package is more difficult to explain since it obviously must be airborne. While the means of its use will be known to those working on it, the cover story can conceal its ultimate use in a highly specialized aircraft by indicating its use will be in pods and wing-tip tanks of military and commercial aircraft flying near targets in routine flights.

IV. Subsidiary Cover Story (Perkin-Elmer Corporation and Hycon Manufacturing Company, Sub-project OCTROI)

The equipment being manufactured under this contract will obviously be for aerial photo reconnaissance. The important facts to conceal are the project's true sponsor, the existence of related projects, especially the aircraft, and the performance characteristics of the aircraft. Knowledge of these facts must be kept to an absolute minimum number of persons although it is to be assumed that imaginative scientists will very likely anticipate accurately the ultimate use of such equipment.

The commercial contract will prevent inquiries until it becomes self-evident that no private firm has the funds or requirement for such a large amount of equipment of this type. When commercial cover is no longer convincing, a government interest will have to be admitted and also the original cover explained away. The commercial contract has several advantages for specialized procurement since it avoids the "Buy American Act" restrictions (which is essential in this job), does not attract attention in government or business circles, and gives the purchaser full benefit of the experience of private firms.

If needed, the natural sponsor, and therefore the natural cover for this work, is the Air Force. More accurate inquiries or interest at later dates can probably be satisfied by labelling the project as Air Force camera research and development. If the need arises to relate the work to a specific aircraft, only as a last resort reference could be made to reconnaissance version of the F-100, Super Sabre jet fighter. As in the case of the ELINT contract, it is most important that no employees or supervisors become aware of either the Lockheed or Agency interest. Extreme caution should be exercised whenever witting members of several firms or project officers meet to discuss requirements or specifications.

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V. Subsidiary Cover Story (Pratt & Whitney, Sub-project DYEWEED)

No great difficulty is anticipated in covering the project contract with Pratt & Whitney. The engine has already been designed.

a. In the immediate future, the work can be explained solely by P&W's interest in developing new engines and retaining predominance in the field of jet propulsion. However and when needed it can be announced (as is the case) that a contract from the Air Force exists for its production under which our procurement will actually be hidden. Contacts will be among Air Force officials and aircraft engineers who regularly confer in any event and whose interest in the engine has already been established and is perfectly natural.

b. The engine being ordered is already reasonably widely known in the higher echelons of the Air Force and aviation management to be under contract for the modified Canberra being built by Martin Aircraft. Any further questions on the increase in the size of the order can be explained by unforeseen testing requirements--e. g., destruction testing.

Again the strength of the cover story rests on the careful security measures. If knowledgeability is restricted to the minimum number of persons it is unlikely that any suspicions will be aroused. While skilled engineers and technicians will undoubtedly have little difficulty predicting that the engine is intended for a high performance aircraft, especially where they need more specific data on the desired capability, this ought not compromise the project since Pratt & Whitney is constantly at work designing and producing higher performance engines to meet anticipated Air Force requirements. There is no need for anyone except a few key individuals to know the true sponsor, the desired capability of the aircraft or its eventual mission. Good security measures, especially in contacts and communications, should make the cover problem relatively simple.

VI. Distribution

This cover story has been distributed to one key man in each plant. All those who are fully witting and have need or occasion to use the cover story should be fully briefed before using it. If anyone who is witting has any doubts or confusion on the structure of the cover story, he should contact the project officer of his plant, who, in turn, can contact the central

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project supervisors, if there are any further questions. Once a cover story has been circulated, nothing is more damaging to the security of the project than to have several persons known to be familiar with a sensitive project contradict each other in using the cover story. Any variations or improvements that occur to key project officers should be communicated through safe channels to the central project group. They should not be used until considered and, if found desirable and feasible, disseminated to all those using the cover story. If this is not done the entire cover of the project may be jeopardized and possibly irreparable damage may be done to the success of the project.

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ANNEX 55

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Department of the Air Force
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

14 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BISSELL

SUBJECT: USAF R-17 Program

1. The Air Force follow-on program has now reached the state where certain procedures regarding security, training, etc. must be finalized. Also, there are mutual problems associated with the phasing of USAF personnel and aircraft into Watertown which must be resolved.

2. Accordingly, our tentative operational plan for the Air Force follow-on program is transmitted for your review and comment. Representatives from this headquarters would like to meet with you as soon as possible to discuss those problems associated with our use of Watertown. A proposed agenda for this discussion is included as Inclosure 2.

(Signed)

M. A. PRESTON
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

2 Inclosures

1. USAF R-17 Program
2. Proposed Agenda

(AH 1467-6 AFOIN)

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~~TOP SECRET~~USAF R-17 PROGRAM

1. The USAF is buying 29 U-2 aircraft (USAF designation R-17) from the Lockheed Aircraft Company. These aircraft are being purchased through the CIA as follow-on aircraft to the Agency's OILSTONE/AQUATONE Program. The Agency has issued letter contract SP-1914 to Lockheed for the 29 R-17 aircraft. The Lockheed Company is producing the R-17 at their Bakersfield, California plant. The latest production and the different configurations of the R-17 follows:

	1956							1957							Totals	
	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O		N
Photo	1		1	2	3		1	2	1	1			1	1		14
Test						1			1					1		3
Ferret										1			2	1		4
HRR						1			1							2
Sampler							1					2	3			6
Totals	1		2	4	7	9	11	13	16	18	20	23	26	28		29

2. The 29 R-17's being purchased by the Air Force will be assigned as follows:

- a. SAC - 20 Reconnaissance configured aircraft.
- b. SAC - 6 Sampler aircraft to accomplish AFSWP mission.
- c. ARDC - 3 for test purposes.

3. The present understanding between the Air Force and the CIA indicates the Air Force will inherit all the OILSTONE/AQUATONE aircraft after the next photo season (approximately October 1957). There probably will be 15-16 U-2 aircraft remaining in the agency program by June 1957. All of these aircraft will be assigned to SAC as Reconnaissance aircraft and as the Air Force receives them they will be redesignated the R-17. Therefore, by FY 2/58, the Air Force should have a total of approximately 45 R-17 aircraft in the inventory.

4. All of the R-17's assigned to SAC, including the Sampler aircraft of AFSWP, will be assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light. The 4080th Wing will be equipped as follows:

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4025 Squadron - 20 RB-57D
 4028th Squadron - 26 R-17 (20 Reconnaissance and 6 Sampler
 aircraft)
 4029th Squadron - 16 R-17 (Residue of Agency's program)

The 4080th Wing is located at Turner AFB, however, since Turner is not acceptable as an operations or training base for the R-17 aircraft, a new home base is being secured. The permanent home base for the 4080th Wing will be Laughlin AFB, Texas. Laughlin cannot be made available to the 4080th Wing until April 1957. During the interim period, the 4080th Wing Hqs and the 4025th Squadron with RB-57Ds will remain at Turner AFB. The R-17's will be located at Watertown AFB, Nevada until April 1957. At that time they will be transferred to the 4028th Squadron of the 4080th Wing at Laughlin AFB, Texas. While at Watertown, the R-17 aircraft will be assigned to the 4070th Wing for transition training of SAC's 4028th Squadron pilots. The 4070th will be responsible for the transition program. The following schedule reflects phasing of aircraft and personnel for training at Watertown:

	15 Dec	15 Jan	15 Feb	15 Mar	1 Apr
Personnel (SAC)	32	140	140	275	Move to Laughlin AFB
R-17	4	7	9	11	13

CIA

"C" Detachment move to "X" Base

5. It is anticipated that the utilization rate of the R-17 while at Watertown will be 30 hours per month for the months of December and January. Thereafter, until April 1957, the utilization rate will be increased to approximately 40 hours per month per aircraft operationally flyable. It is also anticipated that no more than 9 aircraft can be operated from Watertown during the period December - April 1957. This is due to the limited facilities at Watertown AFB. When the 4080th Wing is permanently assigned to Laughlin AFB, the anticipated utilization of the R-17 aircraft will be approximately 40 hours per month per aircraft assigned. The three aircraft assigned to ARDC for tests will be assigned to the Test Center at Edwards on a continuing test program.

6. The concept of operations for the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing when it is assigned to its permanent home follows:

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a. The R-17 unit will be organized as an augmented squadron with a detachment capability for independent operations from overseas bases for periods of up to six (6) months TDY. Anticipated overseas bases for R-17 operations are Eielson AFB, Alaska; Yokota AFB, Japan; Rhein Main AFB, Germany and Adana, Turkey. It is anticipated that from one to three detachments may be required for simultaneous operations from separate bases overseas. In addition, a training detachment may be operating at home base. Airlift for complete detachments (aircraft crews, equipment, etc.) will be necessary. Flying time at overseas bases will be based upon a sortie rate of six (6) per month, approximately 40 hours per month per aircraft. July 1957 is the target date for initial deployment of an R-17 detachment.

7. It is necessary to develop a cover plan whereby CIA-USAF association in the AQUATONE/OILSTONE Program is protected and the true intent and capability of the USAF organization charged with operating the R-17 aircraft is disguised. Therefore, the following procedures will be utilized:

a. The 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, presently located at Turner AFB, Georgia will be immediately redesignated the 4080th Weather Reconnaissance Wing, Provisional. This unit will include the 4025th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron equipped with 20 RB-57Ds, the 4028th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron equipped with 26 R-17 aircraft, and the 4029th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron equipped with the residue of the Agency's AQUATONE operation, approximately 16 R-17's (when available).

b. The mission of the 4080th Wing, as published by SAC, will be to support the 3rd Weather Wing of Air Weather Service by:

- (1) Providing meteorological data from high altitude.
- (2) Conducting upper air research and testing.
- (3) Sampling. Note: The sampling mission will be assigned by means of a classified supplement to the basic mission directive.

c. When the 4080th is redesignated a Weather Wing, a public release will be made indicating the unit's unclassified weather mission, its eventual home, the type aircraft assigned and their capability.

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8. To insure proper control of the USAF program and to protect CIA association, the following security procedures will be adhered to:

a. Information pertaining to the USAF program will be restricted on a need to know basis.

b. Personnel involved in the USAF program will have clearances as follows:

- (1) All personnel aware of Project AQUATONE will have a Top Secret clearance to include a National Agency Check and background investigation. This includes headquarters personnel and individuals working in ; personnel training at Watertown while CIA Detachments are there, or personnel contacting CIA Headquarters or their overseas detachments. NOTE: This does not apply to Watertown when CIA Detachments have been deployed.
- (2) All personnel in the warehousing and maintenance categories and those visiting or in training with AQUATONE suppliers, but who will not have access to those installations listed above, will have a Secret clearance to include a National Agency Check and favorable military record.
- (3) All others in the USAF Program will have SAC approved clearance.

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c. Prior to participation in AQUATONE affairs, CIA (Project) Headquarters will be furnished names of USAF personnel involved with certification concerning appropriate clearance.

d. Whenever any USAF project personnel, coming within scope of above, plan to visit any of AQUATONE's installations or suppliers, their names and itinerary will be furnished AQUATONE Project Headquarters so appropriate notification of visit can be made.

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PROPOSED AGENDA

1. Our R-17 Plan.
2. Follow-on Group phasing into Watertown.
3. The following listed details:
 - a. Space utilization and replacement of equipment at Watertown.
 - b. Moving the Lockheed assembly and flight test personnel from Watertown to Bakersfield.
 - c. Parking Space for FOG and Agency aircraft.
 - d. GCA.
 - e. MATS Schedule.

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ANNEX 56

Weather Slows Plane Rescue

LAS VEGAS, Nev., Nov. 19 (AP). —An Arctic rescue team may require two more days to climb the final three miles up steep, wind-lashed Charleston Peak to the wreckage of an Air Force transport carrying 14 men, all presumed dead.

Five paratroop medical technicians camped during the night on the precipitous ice-clad mountain in temperatures under 20 below zero. Using snowshoes and skis, they clambered four miles the first long day after leaving a four-wheel drive Arctic truck.

The rescue group, from the 42d Air Rescue Squadron at March Air Force Base, Calif., radioed they might reach the crash scene late today, but probably not until tomorrow.

It may be a week before rescue crews bring down from the 11,910-foot mountain the bodies of five Air Force men, five Air Force civilian employees, two aviation engineers and two Air Force consultants.

The four-engine C54, en route from Norton Air Force Base, Calif., to the Nevada Atomic Bombing Range, crashed Thursday near the peak at an elevation of 11,300 feet.

Planes from nearby Nellis Air Force Base will drop food for the rescue team.

Aboard the C54 were:

William Marr, University Park, Md.; James F. Bray, Houston, Tex.; James W. Brown, Savannah, Ga.; Frederick F. Hanks, Pasadena, Calif.; Rodney H. Kreimendahl, Burbank, Calif.; Terrance O'Donnell, New York; Harold C. Silent, Los Angeles; Edwin J. Urolatis, Brockton, Mass.; Richard Hruda, Hollywood, Calif.

1st Lt. George F. Pappas, San Antonio, Tex.; 2d Lt. Paul E. Winham, San Antonio; Airman 2/c Guy R. Fasolas, Nephi, Utah; S/Sergt. Clayton Farris, San Antonio, and S/Sergt. John H. Gaines, Ripley, Tenn.

Mr. Silent was a weapons development researcher and physicist. Mr. Hruda and Mr. Kreimendahl were engineers for Lockheed Aircraft Corp.

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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ANNEX 57

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MAJOR U-2 ACCIDENT CHRONOLOGY - 1956-1968

1. 15 May 1956 - U-2 No. 345:

Both pogos failed to release after take-off. The pilot followed established procedures to release pogos. The left pogo released on the first attempt. On the second attempt to release the right one, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed and altitude. The aircraft stalled in a right turn and hit the ground, fatally injuring the pilot and demolishing the aircraft. Most probable cause was pilot error. (Wilburn Rose)

2. 31 August 1956 - U-2 No. 354:

The pilot made his initial climb after take-off in a nose-high, low-air-speed attitude. At approximately 40-50 feet the left wing dropped and the aircraft stalled into the ground. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot fatally injured. Probable cause of this accident was pilot error with possible loss of night vision as a contributing factor. (Frank G. Grace)

3. 17 September 1956 - U-2 No. 346:

Approximately eight minutes after take-off the aircraft was seen by two pilots in a T-33 and four pilots in a flight of RCAF F-86's at 35,000 feet. About five seconds after passing the F-86's and 500 feet above them, the U-2 disintegrated and fell. The pilot was fatally injured. The cause of this accident could not be definitely determined beyond an initial failure of the right wing. Metal fatigue, overstress, or high internal wing pressures were suggested as possible causes of the wing failure. The possibility of sabotage was thoroughly investigated and ruled out as a cause. (Howard Carey)

4. 19 December 1956 - U-2 No. 357:

Excessive oxygen consumption was noted in the first hour by the pilot. After approximately four and one-half hours of flight he made an emergency descent and allowed the airspeed to exceed the

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the placard limit, causing buffet and loss of control. The pilot was blown out as the aircraft disintegrated. The primary cause of the accident was pilot error; the contributing cause was a leak in the oxygen system. The pilot failed to take corrective action and return to base prior to becoming hypoxic at altitude. (Robert Ericson)

5. 4 April 1957 - U-2 No. 341:

A Lockheed pilot on a test flight planned to fly one hour at normal operating temperature and then one hour at 20° Centigrade above normal. Radio communication was lost. The fatally injured pilot and demolished aircraft were found 72 hours later. The official accident investigation concluded that the cause of the accident was hypoxia of the pilot from an undetermined cause. Engine flameout due to hydraulic system failure and subsequent loss of cabin pressurization, malfunctioning cockpit seals, oxygen system and/or personal equipment were considered the most probable causes for the hypoxia. (Robert Sieker)

6. 24 September 1959 - U-2 No. 360:

On GCA final approach to NAS Atsugi, Japan, the aircraft flamed out due to fuel starvation and made an emergency landing on a prepared dirt strip. The pilot was not injured and the aircraft was reparable. This was one of the first fuel consumption profiles flown with the J-75 equipped U-2 at Detachment C. The primary cause of the accident was supervisory and pilot error in not maintaining the fuel profile.

7. 5 April 1960 - U-2 No. 349:

On return from an overflight of China the pilot lost radio beacon reception at 20,000 feet. He descended through haze and smoke to 6,000 feet, but was unable to find the base. While attempting a climb out towards his alternate, the engine flamed out due to fuel starvation and a successful crash landing was made. The pilot was not injured and the aircraft was reparable (at the factory). Primary cause of the accident was pilot error; contributing factor was failure of radio aids.

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8. 1 May 1960 - U-2 No. 360:

During an overflight of the USSR, the aircraft experienced difficulty and was "downed" in the Sverdlovsk area. The pilot was captured and the aircraft destroyed. There are two basic hypotheses for the accident: One, engine malfunction which resulted from climbing the aircraft to excessive altitude (damage sustained to the aircraft probably occurred at lower altitudes); and two, SAM damage at altitude to the engine turbine blade which resulted in engine overheating and finally flameout.

(The above was corrected when the pilot, Frank Powers, was finally released by the Russians on 10 February 1962, and gave his own story -- see Annex 101, following Chapter XIV.)

9. 19 March 1961 - U-2C No. 351:

While making a night transition landing, the pilot, a Chinese Nationalist Air Force officer, attempted a "go around". The pilot permitted the wing to drop and the aircraft struck the ground inverted and was demolished by fire. The pilot was fatally injured. Primary cause was believed to be pilot error, in that he lost control of his aircraft. (Maj. Chih)

10. 14 September 1961 - U-2 No. 353:

After a normal air sampling mission, the aircraft stalled on final approach and struck the ground short of the runway at Edwards Air Force Base. As it came to rest on the runway the aircraft burned beyond repair, but the pilot escaped uninjured. The primary cause was pilot error; contributing causes were pilot fatigue and possible abnormal turbulence off the approach end of the runway. (Edens)

11. 1 March 1962 - U-2 No. 344:

Structural failure resulted from an aerial refueling training flight. Fatal to pilot (Capt. Campbell, SAC).

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12. 8 September 1962 - U-2 No. 378:

Lost on an operational mission over Nanchang, China, Mission GRC-127, cause unknown. (Lt. Col. Ch'en)

13. 27 October 1962 - U-2 No. 343:

Hit by surface-to-air missile (SAM) on operational mission over Cuba, crashed on Cuban territory. The pilot was killed and the U.S. was later allowed to remove his body from Cuba. (Major Anderson, SAC)

14. 31 October 1963 - U-2 No. 355:

Tracking of Mission GRC-184 terminated suddenly at 0623 GMT on 1 November, at a point southeast of Nanchang on the return from photo coverage of the Missile Test Range at Shuang Ch'eng Tzu. Fate of the pilot and aircraft unknown. (Maj. Yeh)

15. 20 November 1963 - U-2 No. 350:

Returning from overflight of Cuba, aircraft went into the sea approximately 40 miles northwest of Miami; aircraft and pilot lost. (Capt. Hyde, SAC)

16. 22 March 1964 - U-2F No. 356:

Aircraft and pilot lost on routine training mission off south coast of Taiwan. Probable cause, pilot error -- pilot inadvertently allowed aircraft to exceed its airspeed and structural limitations. (Capt. Liang)

17. 7 July 1964 - U-2G No. 362:

Aircraft and pilot lost on operational mission over east coast of China, in area of Lung Chi across the Straits of Quemoy. (L/C Lee)

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~~TOP SECRET~~18. 10 January 1965 - U-2C No. 358:

Aircraft and pilot lost on an infra-red camera mission over the atomic site at Pao Tou. Probably hit by SAM since missile sites later found to be in the area where aircraft was lost. (Maj. Chang)

19. 25 April 1965 - U-2G No. 382:

Test flight of carrier-configured aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base went out of control, pilot bailed out but chute streamed. Pilot and aircraft lost. (Buster Edens)

20. 22 October 1965 - U-2C No. 352:

Training mission out of Tao Yuan, pilot and aircraft went into the sea off Taiwan; causes unknown. (Col. John Wang)

21. 17 February 1966 - U-2F No. 372:

Training mission from Tao Yuan crashed after overshooting runway following flame-out and emergency landing. Pilot killed and aircraft demolished. (Maj. Wu)

22. 25 February 1966 - U-2F No. 342:

Structural failure to aircraft following a practice refueling flight; the pilot bailed out safely. (Mr. Hall)

23. 21 June 1966 - U-2C No. 384:

Aircraft went out of control on training flight from Tao Yuan. Pilot bailed out too low, chute failed to open; aircraft and pilot fell into the sea near Naha, Okinawa. (Maj. Yu)

24. 8 September 1967 - U-2 No. 373:

An operational mission over Mainland China, shot down in the vicinity of Shanghai by surface-to-air missile. Fate of pilot unknown, assumed dead. (Capt. Huang)

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ANNEX 58

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21 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Suppliers

SUBJECT: Release of Project Developed Systems,
Sub-systems, Components, Techniques and
Technical Know-How to Department of Defense

1. Purpose: It is the purpose of this memorandum to set forth the basic policy of this Headquarters regarding the release of Project developed information to other than Project cleared persons and to outline a procedure for implementing this policy.

2. Security Standards: It is re-emphasized that from its inception access to knowledge of this Project has been consistently limited to individuals who are not only acceptable from a security point of view but have a valid "need to know". With few exceptions, such considerations as a high official position, the possession of security clearances for sensitive data, or an official concern with research and development or with operations of the type involved in this project have not been accepted as sufficient reasons for admitting an individual to knowledgeability. As suppliers are aware, an effort has been made to apply this policy to all persons regardless of their place in government or private industry although some erosion of security standards has inevitably occurred; partly as a result of the sheer number of individuals with a valid "need to know" but partly by reason of the pressure to cut in individuals on the basis of position or "responsibility" for a certain field of activity. One purpose of this memorandum is to prevent further erosion of security standards without inhibiting a desirable spread of knowledge of subsystems developed for the Project.

3. General Policy: Within the limits set by the requirement for continued security, the basic policy will be to permit the release with only a low security classification of information on subsystems to unwitting personnel who are cleared for the low classification involved, with the exceptions stated in paragraph 4 below. On the other hand, knowledge of the existence of an integrated weapons system based upon the U-2 aircraft and including all the subsystems remains highly classified and every effort must be made to withhold such knowledge from unwitting personnel. It is possible at this time to reduce the classification on subsystems only because no one subsystem is regarded as highly sensitive in itself and only if information concerning the subsystems is

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handled in such a way as not to permit unwitting personnel to infer the existence of the total weapons system.

4. Specific Rules: The following specific provisions which give effect to the general policy stated above should guide all suppliers in handling information concerning the Project's subsystems:

a. The existence of the U-2 aircraft itself has been acknowledged in carefully worded press releases which have been attributed to it (by inference) a range of perhaps 1800 nautical miles and a ceiling of about 55,000 feet. Photographs designed to reveal as little as possible concerning the aircraft's performance have received some circulation among military components overseas and may soon be released for publication. Nevertheless, the aircraft carries an official classification of SECRET (so physical access to it can be denied and security precautions explained), and its true performance is classified TOP SECRET and may be made known only to witting personnel. Likewise, the fact that it is a reconnaissance aircraft and any association of the various subsystems with the U-2 should be revealed only to witting personnel.

b. Each supplier of a subsystem is at liberty to disclose the existence of the subsystem as an already designed and developed piece of equipment and to provide information concerning its performance to potentially interested agencies of the United States Government and to business firms to which such disclosure is necessary in order to encourage the widest use of the subsystem for the purposes of the United States Government. Where it is desired to make disclosure to exploit a purely commercial opportunity prior clearance must be obtained. Information about each subsystem will normally carry the classification of "CONFIDENTIAL" in order to protect it from publication.

c. In disclosing information concerning a subsystem, the supplier must be prepared with a plausible and tenable explanation of its development. In many cases it may be sufficient to state it was developed for a TOP SECRET project concerning which no information whatever can be released. In other cases it may be plausible to explain the idea as having been developed by the supplier with its own resources. In no case can unwitting persons be permitted access to test data or records of experience of the subsystems which reveal anything concerning the Project or other elements of the total weapons system of which the subsystem is a component.

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d. An over-all procedure is presently being worked out with the Air Force for purchase by that Department through normal channels of any project-developed items desired by the Air Force. Suppliers will be fully briefed with respect to such procedures when they have been established.

5. To insure compliance with the requirements of this policy and to assist suppliers in the protection of Project information, suppliers will be responsible for keeping Project Headquarters advised of proposed discussions, negotiations, briefings, etc., with any non-Project-cleared personnel or departments. Approval of such meetings will be a normal routine matter, provided the arrangements are in accord with the above established general instructions. Any departure from the established standard will necessarily require a prior review by the Security Staff and notification should, therefore, be made sufficiently in advance of any proposed meetings.

6. The substance of this memorandum will be made available to those Government agencies currently associated with our program which logically may have occasion to avail themselves of Project development. It is expected they will respect the requirements levied against Project suppliers. The responsibility for compliance with this policy, however, will continue to rest with each individual supplier and any questions should be immediately forwarded to Project Headquarters to insure satisfactory review and disposition.

7. More detailed instructions to suppliers will be forthcoming in the future as procedures are developed. In the meantime suppliers will proceed in accordance with specific instructions given to individual suppliers with respect to specific problems of this nature which require immediate action.

(Signed)
PROJECT DIRECTOR

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ANNEX 59

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26 March 1956

PROJECT COVER STORY

1. Requirements: So far as possible the cover story for this Project should satisfy the following requirements:

a. Although it should plausibly explain Air Force support of and participation in the alleged activities (since such support including the use of USAF facilities is essential and cannot be concealed), the cover story should be designed to dilute Air Force responsibility. The story should convey the impression that the activities are of interest to civilian organizations as well and that the Air Force is not exclusively responsible for them.

b. The story should not focus attention upon new and presumably highly interesting specialized equipment and especially not upon any new type of aircraft but rather upon the mission being performed, since the latter can be described in terms that make it far less sensitive than the former.

c. Granting that at least partial Air Force sponsorship is undeniable, the cover story should lodge such responsibility in a non-tactical component of the Air Force and should describe the activities in progress in such a way as to make them appear to be as remote as possible from any tactical mission.

d. The story must account for the peculiar nature of the project organization as a mixed task force predominantly civilian in composition, which will be apparent to many observers.

2. Nature of Activities: Project operations will be conducted under double cover, one aspect of which will be unclassified and part of a publicly-announced program, the second aspect being a classified activity in which the cover unit is allegedly engaged. The two aspects of this dual cover will be as follows:

a. Unclassified Aspect: The primary mission of overseas units will be described as the gathering of meteorological data at altitudes to 55,000 feet which will assist in the development of new forecasting techniques and provide climatological background for meteorological research by governmental and private agencies and institutions in the U. S. The specific objectives of the meteorological mission are as follows:

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- (1) Secure quantitative measurements of the following items:
 - (a) Turbulence: associated with jet streams; through the tropopause; in the lower stratosphere.
 - (b) Detailed temperature structure (i) Tropopause; (ii) lower stratosphere.
 - (c) Wind structure, 45 to 55 thousand feet.
 - (d) Measurement of ozone concentration.
 - (e) Watervapor content.
 - (f) Visibility in vicinity of tropopause.
 - (g) Additional information as available.
- (2) Test and evaluate current and newly developed high-level weather reconnaissance instruments.
- (3) Collect high-level cloud photography for the purpose of forming the basis for development of new techniques of analysis based on cloud structure rather than currently used methods of quantitative measurement.

b. Classified Aspect: A limited number of individuals who are cleared for access to highly classified information but who do not have a valid need to know the true project mission will be told (or allowed to infer) that in addition to the foregoing unclassified explanation of the activities of the overseas detachments, these units are engaged in high altitude air sampling. This story will be used only with a limited number of USAF and RAF officers and senior civilian officials who are not in sufficiently close contact with project activities to suspect that something more than the gathering of meteorological data is involved and who also feel that they are due some explanation of such classified activities. The maximum extent of information given would reveal that thermonuclear weapons tests send up into the stratosphere large quantities of radioactive debris. With the increased frequency of high yield weapons tests, the uncertainty as to the quantities of these fission products which exist in the

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stratosphere and which filter down slowly into the lower atmosphere have not been accurately verified. High altitude balloon sampling techniques have not proved completely satisfactory to date. Additionally, sampling of thermonuclear weapons debris forced into the stratosphere will be of great value to the AEC and DOD in their analyses of radioactive cloud geometry and composition.

3. Possible Future Expansion of Research Activities: At the time press releases are prepared, it can be announced that program activities may in the future be expanded to include additional research objectives, such as the following: cosmic ray studies and studies of ionospheric refraction as it affects radio propagation predictions. (These added objectives will not be publicly announced, however, unless further investigation reveals that they are technically feasible and the U-2 could be given an actual collection capability to backstop these added research activities.)

4. Backstopping of Primary Cover Mission: If high altitude meteorological reconnaissance cover is to "hold water" it is essential that the U-2 be equipped with meteorological instrumentation which will give it an actual capability of collecting the weather data in which the program is purportedly interested. Plans are underway to construct at least four meteorological configurations for use in the ZI and at overseas bases. If feasible, the configuration will include a small tracking camera useful for cloud photography but having no significant utility for reconnaissance of intelligence interest. Actual weather reconnaissance missions will be flown (restricted to friendly territory) employing these configurations. Initially, in the interest of time, only readily available instrumentation will be employed; modifications can be arranged at a later date. The meteorological packet will be constructed so as to permit ready insertion into and removal from the aircraft bay. The operational concept will call for flying weather reconnaissance missions during orientation, ferry and test flights, thus making full utilization of such flights for cover purposes and reducing the diversion of aircraft from the project's primary operational tasks. Data obtained at altitudes above 52,000 feet will be considered classified; arrangements will be made with AWS for the handling, dissemination and use of this material. Data (including cloud photographs taken with tracking camera only) secured up to 52,000 feet will be considered unclassified and will be made available to AWS and NACA for further dissemination as seems appropriate. Thus, this data can be exhibited and disseminated to support the cover story. Moreover, complete photographs will be made of the primary mission aircraft with the research instrumentation installed. The meteorological instrumentation

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will also be photographed outside the aircraft. Both data and photographs will be assembled for counter-propaganda use in event a U-2 is lost over hostile territory.

5. Use and Dissemination of Cover Stories: It is anticipated that the double cover story outlined in paragraph 2 above will be employed in such a way as to create 4 distinct categories of knowledgeability of project activities as follows:

a. There will be a wide circle who are aware that some out-of-the-ordinary activities are being carried on and who have access to the unclassified cover story as the explanation thereof.

b. A much smaller group, including mainly USAF and foreign technical and military personnel and certain personnel in the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and perhaps other civilian organizations, will be aware of the activities and will know the unclassified cover story but will also be told that the aircraft in question are also engaged in a classified mission, the nature of which cannot be divulged.

c. A still more restricted category, described in paragraph 2 b above, will have access to both cover stories and will therefore have an explanation of both the unclassified and classified activities in progress.

d. Finally, there will be the most restricted category of fully knowledgeable personnel.

Although the unclassified cover story will obviously have to be made public in order to serve its purpose it should be so handled as to minimize the attention drawn to and the interest developed in the project.

6. Sponsorship: In order to dilute USAF responsibility for the activities to be undertaken this project will be described as a joint undertaking of NACA and the AWS of the USAF. The role ascribed to the NACA and the unclassified cover story will be to have been the original promoter of the research program, to have provided guidance in the development of equipment and instrumentation required to perform the research mission, to provide continuing scientific guidance as required and to coordinate the exploitation of the scientific results obtained. This account of the role of the civilian agency will explain not only the mixed character of the enterprise but the circumstances under which most of the specialized

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equipment was developed outside of the regular Air Force channels. Participation on the part of the USAF will be ascribed to the Air Weather Service which meets the requirement of being a non-tactical unit. Its role will be said to be that of executive agent responsible for the actual conduct of operations overseas. It is plausible that, in such a joint project, operational responsibility overseas should be assumed by a component of the USAF since the NACA does not engage in operations outside the country. Moreover, the arrangement will lend treaty rights granted to the USAF applicable to this project.

7. Procurement and Ownership of Aircraft: The primary mission aircraft will be said to have been procured by the USAF, primarily for performance of a highly classified mission. The explanation of their availability for the mission described in the unclassified cover story will be that a limited number of these aircraft can be spared, the number varying from time to time, from the classified mission. The aircraft will carry civilian markings. Thus, in the unclassified story it will be implied that the operations being conducted abroad have no connection with the classified mission. Taken as a whole, this story will explain plausibly the procurement of the aircraft and the manner of their coming into the hands of the NACA. Only those individuals who have access to the classified cover story will have reason to believe that the classified and unclassified missions are being performed concurrently. It is perfectly consistent with the assignment of the aircraft to the AWS for actual operations overseas and also with the story that the development of the aircraft was monitored by the NACA. It will be implied at all times that the number of such aircraft is very small, and that its development as a "platform" for upper atmosphere research was carried out in experimental facilities and not on a production basis.

8. Organization: The cover unit will be designated as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional, and allegedly be under the administrative control of the AWS. It will be explained that other USAF components are of course performing supporting roles, as would normally be expected; it will probably be unnecessary and unwise to be too specific as to the organization of such supporting activities. All USAF personnel will be documented as AWS; all civilian personnel will be documented as Department of Defense civilians, except that at least one NACA employee will be assigned to each of the overseas detachments. All personnel will travel on AWS orders. Project pilots will be described as civilians,

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possibly the employees of a cover organization, but working under the terms of a contract with the NACA. The arrangement will be consistent with alleged NACA ownership of the aircraft. The use of such civilian pilots rather than USAF personnel will be explained by their alleged familiarity with novel equipment developed by the NACA. More specific details of this feature of the arrangement remain to be developed.

9. Backstopping NACA Participation: Certain moves should be made both prior to and after deployment overseas to lend credence to the story of NACA participation.

a. Just as soon as practicable it will be desirable to begin living at Watertown the modified cover story. This will require the replacement of USAF by appropriate insignia on the aircraft and possibly, at an appropriate time, a news release or merely the deliberate leak of some information about activities at Watertown. The story to be used or leaked would be that the NACA, with Air Force cooperation, had been undertaking upper atmosphere meteorological research from the Watertown location. From this it would be widely inferred, by reason of location, that upper air sampling was also involved. Such a release coupled with this inference would support the basic story that these aircraft had been procured for a classified mission and later made available to NACA for an unclassified (or less highly classified) program.

b. Prior to deployment it will probably be desirable to allow the primary mission aircraft to be seen at one or more airfields other than Watertown in order that its first public appearance shall not be at an overseas location. It may well be desirable that at least one of the locations at which a landing would be made would be Moffett Field or some other widely known NACA installation.

c. After deployment occasional visits of reasonably well-known NACA officers could be arranged to overseas bases. These would, of course, be limited to NACA personnel already knowledgeable to some degree of the project.

10. NACA will be given a cover story for use in the event one of the aircraft is lost in unfriendly territory.

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(NOTE: The initial pre-deployment press release will be based on the unclassified cover story which follows; it will contain only a portion of the information outlined below. Answers to subsequent press queries will be based on the fuller details which follow, but will not go beyond.)

UNCLASSIFIED COVER STORY

Around mid-1954 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation initiated independently the construction of a high-altitude, single-engine jet aircraft. The aircraft, powered by a Pratt & Whitney J-57 engine, operates in the mid-subsonic speed range and up to altitudes of 55,000 feet; it has a low wing loading with a capability of extended operation at high altitudes. While having no combat or tactical significance, the aircraft's performance makes it a more suitable and economic vehicle (as compared with tactical types) for carrying out high-altitude research. Lockheed planned both to use the prototype model as a test bed or "platform" for carrying out a variety of its own experimental activities, and to interest the military in the aircraft as a vehicle for conducting research and experimental tests of their own. LAC carried out the development and testing of its experimental aircraft in consultation with NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics). Overcoming of fuel control problems was one of the areas in which NACA rendered assistance.

Although Lockheed developed the first experimental prototype on its own initiative, the USAF monitored the Lockheed development and had observers present during the aircraft's initial test flights. The aircraft's performance gave rise to USAF interest in a limited procurement contract. The high altitude performance of the aircraft made it a suitable vehicle for use in a joint USAF-AEC test program. Contractual negotiations between Lockheed and the USAF proceeded rapidly; first deliveries were made late in 1955.

Early in 1956 the NACA, relying in part on its knowledge of the U-2 aircraft, began planning for an atmospheric research program of broad interest to U.S. aeronautical science, both civilian and military. NACA, original promoter of the program, has not only provided guidance in the development of the aircraft and of equipment and instrumentation required to perform the research program but will coordinate the exploitation and dissemination of the scientific results obtained. The primary objective of NACA's program is the gathering of upper

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atmosphere data, e.g., turbulence associated with the jet stream and convective clouds, temperature and wind structures at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc., at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. Widespread but simultaneous observations from various points in the Northern Hemisphere will enable an integrated study of high altitude phenomena which is expected to be of particular value both to governmental and private research organizations. NACA considered the newly procured U-2 as one of the most suitable vehicles for carrying out its research program. The USAF agreed to make available a limited number of U-2's to NACA since the joint USAF-AEC test activities are intermittent in nature and NACA's program is considered of definite interest to the USAF, particularly the Air Weather Service. Availability of the U-2, one type of several aircraft that will be used in NACA's research activities, helps to obtain the needed data in an economical and expeditious manner.

Pilots employed in the NACA program are civilians hired and trained by LAC and made available to NACA specifically for the latter's research activities. NACA could not afford to draw upon its limited and already heavily committed group of test pilots. Lockheed also was unable to spare pilot personnel for the program, but did undertake the hiring and training of highly qualified civilians.

These activities will be conducted both in the United States and abroad. Since NACA does not have independent facilities for conducting test programs abroad, the overseas program will be organized as a "joint task force" based at USAF installations and supported by appropriate USAF major commands. The Air Weather Service will act as USAF "executive agent" in support of NACA activities, and will activate provisional units to give operational direction and render direct support to NACA. The Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional, (1st), has recently been activated to support the initial NACA research team assembled at Watertown Strip, Nevada.

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~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED COVER STORY

Under cover of the NACA-AWS high altitude research program described separately, Air Weather Service will carry out a parallel and classified mission: upper air sampling of thermonuclear debris resulting from atomic tests. Data concerning the quantity of these fission products, which exist in the stratosphere and filter down slowly into the lower atmosphere, will be of great value to the AEC and Department of Defense in their analyses of radioactive cloud geometry and composition.

Just as is the case in NACA's meteorological research, the integration of sampling data obtained simultaneously at various points in the Northern Hemisphere will be of particular value.

Regarding the performance of the U-2, the following additional information can be revealed as needed to individuals made cognizant of the above classified cover story. The U-2 has an altitude capability of 55,000 feet with full payload. Its normal endurance is four to four-and-a-half hours with payload. Maximum range: 2,000 miles. It is contemplated that staging operations will be run from various bases to extend coverage capabilities.

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For release Monday, 7 May 1956

NACA ANNOUNCES START OF NEW RESEARCH PROGRAM

The need for more detailed information about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at high altitude, as high as 50,000 feet, has resulted in the inauguration of an expanded research program to provide the needed data, Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, announced today.

"Tomorrow's jet transports will be flying air routes girdling the earth," Dr. Dryden said. "This they will do at altitudes far higher than presently used except by a few military aircraft. The availability of a new type of airplane, which is one of several that will be used in the program, helps to obtain the needed data in an economical and expeditious manner."

This aircraft, the Lockheed U-2, is powered by a single Pratt & Whitney J-57 turbo-jet engine and is expected to reach ten-mile-high altitudes as a matter of record, according to the NACA. A few of these aircraft are being made available for the expanded NACA program by the USAF.

The program is along the lines recommended by the Gust Loads Research Panel of the NACA's technical Subcommittee on Aircraft Loads. In its research programs, the NACA is charged with coordination of aeronautical research, and with taking action necessary to avoid undesirable duplication of effort.

Among specific research goals will be more precise information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, and the jet stream. Richard V. Rhode, Assistant Director for Research of the NACA, said that as a result of information so to be gained, tomorrow's air travelers might expect degrees of speed, safety and comfort beyond hope of the air transport operators.

"The program would not have been possible," Mr. Rhode said, "without the ability of American scientific efforts to join forces."

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Actually, according to Mr. Rhode, success of the program depends in large degree upon the logistical and technical support which the Air Weather Service of the USAF will be providing. USAF facilities overseas will be used as the program gets underway, to enable the gathering of research information necessary to reflect accurately conditions along the high-altitude air routes of tomorrow in many parts of the world. The data gathering flights will also be used, at the request of the USAF, to obtain information about cosmic rays and the concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere including ozone and water vapor.

The first data, covering conditions in the Rocky Mountain area, are being obtained from flights made from Watertown Strip, Nevada. Mr. Rhode noted that the data would be equally useful to technical experts of the Air Weather Service in expanding their knowledge of atmospheric conditions at high altitude.

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The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation has built a single engine jet aircraft (using the Pratt & Whitney J-57 engine) of which a number have been procured by the United States Air Force. It has been designated as the U-2. A few of these aircraft have been made available to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for conducting a research program designed to observe and measure certain phenomena at high altitudes. Studies will include the effects of cosmic rays, turbulence characteristics especially in the jet stream, temperature structure, wind structure, and the concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere such as ozone and water vapor. The program will be conducted by the NACA with the logistical and technical support of units of the USAF/Air Weather Service. Research activities are presently being conducted in the United States from a restricted area at Watertown Strip in Nevada. Similar activities will be conducted from certain USAF installations overseas where the Air Weather Service will act as executive agent in the actual conduct of data-gathering operations since the NACA has facilities and personnel only in this country.

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ANNEX 61

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TS-143486/Final

29 June 1956

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE EVENT OF AN AIRCRAFT
LOSS OVER HOSTILE TERRITORY *I. Action - Prior to Evidence of Hostile Reaction

A. Immediate notification of Headquarters by the Detachment Commander through both Agency and USAF channels. In turn, Project Headquarters will notify State Department and NACA contacts and, along with USAF Headquarters, arrange for final review and agreement on action items indicated under II, below. The Detachment Commander's notification to Headquarters should include or be followed immediately by a report of those details which Headquarters will require in preparing its release in response to hostile reaction; i. e., actual location and circumstances (e. g., aircraft crash or forced landing, condition of the pilot, weather conditions, etc.) of the loss if known, text of Detachment "presumed lost" release (Paragraph C, below), and cover flight plan outlining the track alleged to have been followed by the aircraft.

B. Overflight operations will cease immediately. However, Detachment will continue to operate as normal with all flights assigned cover data-gathering missions.

C. Normal USAF press release prepared by Detachment Commander (and coordinated with appropriate Air Force contacts in USAFE) will be issued indicating that a U-2 aircraft is overdue and presumed lost, adding that the last reported position of the aircraft was -- (see below and Paragraph II. E(1)). The release will go on to indicate that Air Rescue Service has instituted a search for the aircraft. The announced area of search will depend upon the known or estimated point of compromise (e. g. loss over Murmansk area or the Arctic fringe of European USSR would suggest northern Norway as the area for Air Rescue operations; loss over the Ukraine would suggest the Black Sea littoral of Turkey as the most logical area for search.)

The release should be timed to accord with normal USAF practice (no more than a few hours after a known or assumed loss). Should press queries immediately follow the initial "presumed lost" press release but precede evidence of hostile reaction, a press release based on

* An earlier version of this instruction was issued to Detachment A on 8 June 1956. This revision of the same paper (with appropriate changes to cover local situations) was also issued to Detachments B and C.

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the unclassified cover story will be issued by the Detachment Commander (through, and after coordination with, USAFE) describing the alleged mission of the aircraft and sponsorship of the program.

D. Immediate and special counter-espionage precautions will be taken at the base of operations with steps of action coordinated by Detachment with 50X1, E.O.13526 and with local USAF/OSI contacts.

II. Action - After Hostile Press and/or Radio Reaction

50X1, E.O.13526

A. General PIO Policy: All releases in response to hostile reaction will originate in and emanate from Headquarters after full coordination has been made. Releases decided upon will be communicated immediately (1) through USAF channels to USAFE; (2) through Agency channels to the Detachment Commander (3) through State channels to U. S. Ambassadors in London, Bonn, and Moscow. Thus, upon evidence of hostile reaction, no releases will be made by field elements of the USAF or by host country authorities except those made subsequent to and in accord with releases communicated from Headquarters.

B. General Guide on Press Releases: The nature of the hostile reaction cannot be predicted in advance, thus the precise detail of post-loss releases must remain flexible. It is assumed that hostile reaction can take the form of a fairly complete and accurate expose of project activities; whether Soviet and/or Satellite reaction will take such form is open to speculation. Since we must be prepared for any eventuality, the sample releases which follow should be treated as general guidelines. The need for flexibility up to the point of actual release is the major reason for centralizing release authority in Headquarters to assure that the U. S. Government speaks with one voice. All releases dealing with the nature and sponsorship of project activity will of course be in accord with releases already issued and the unclassified cover story; however, this paper concerns itself only with the additional explanations that must be given to cover a loss over hostile territory.

C. Loss Close to Hostile Periphery: Should the aircraft be lost close to, but inside, the hostile periphery (within 200 miles), and this be admitted or at least not denied in the hostile reaction, we shall maintain one of the two following positions, depending upon the circumstances and relative plausibility:

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(1) the pilot was intercepted along the hostile periphery (but over Western territory or international waters) and forced to follow the hostile interceptors inside Soviet and/or Satellite frontiers; or

(2) that the pilot was obviously confused in his navigation and became lost, inadvertently overflying Soviet and/or Satellite territory.

D. Loss Deep Within Hostile Territory: In the event of a loss deep within hostile territory, there are two positions which could be maintained. The first position outlined below is preferred since it stands considerably less risk of being effectively disproved by a hostile power. The second position is included below because, under certain circumstances, the inherent risks of its being effectively countered by a hostile power might be minimal. In the end, the choice of the two alternatives outlined below would depend upon the detailed circumstances surrounding the incident as reported to Headquarters by the Detachment Commander (in accordance with paragraph I. a., above). This choice would rest with the Department of State.

(1) First Position: Should the loss occur deep within hostile territory, we would impliedly admit that Soviet accounts as to the location of the incident may well be correct, but we would go on to maintain that the violation of Soviet airspace was most certainly neither intended or ordered by U. S. authorities. We would emphatically deny any Soviet charge that the incident was a willful violation by the U. S. of their airspace for purposes of intelligence reconnaissance. We would indicate that the pilot last reported his position as (-----) and that subsequent radio contact could not be established presumably because of a malfunction or failure of the aircraft's radio communication and navigation system. Quite possibly the incident resulted from pilot hypoxia which, combined with failure of the aircraft's electronic navigation system, could have resulted in a grave deviation from the aircraft's planned course. With the aircraft on "automatic pilot" and the pilot in a euphoric condition, an unintended violation of Soviet airspace may have unfortunately resulted. (See Attachment B-1 for sample release).

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(2) Alternative Position: Should the loss occur deep within hostile territory, and the depth of penetration be revealed in the hostile reaction, we shall maintain that Soviet and/or Satellite allegations are incorrect or inaccurate, going on to state (using one or the other of the two variants in C, above) that the incident was close to the hostile periphery. Our counter-charge would claim that the hostile power is obviously distorting the facts for propaganda purposes just as has been done in several instances in the past when the Soviets or Satellites claimed willful violation of their airspace. We shall bolster our counter-propaganda position by maintaining that the incident could not have occurred deep within hostile borders since the known performance of the aircraft would not have enabled it to penetrate that deeply, given the known flight path of the aircraft up to the time of its last reported position. (See Attachment B-2 for sample release.)

NOTE: This position might be effectively countered by a hostile power if the photographic film recovered from the aircraft could be developed and analyzed, thus revealing the actual track traversed. Moreover a hostile power would undoubtedly attempt to line up neutral nationals to view the scene of the incident and testify to the accuracy of the hostile power's version of the affair.

E. Backstopping of Release: The type of releases suggested in C and D, above, require further backstopping as follows:

(1) The releases in II. C and D would be strengthened if we could assert positive knowledge concerning the location of the aircraft a short time before the incident. Thus, the release indicating the aircraft is overdue and presumed lost (I. C, above) should contain a statement on the "last reported position", adding that communications contact with the aircraft was subsequently lost. The "last reported position" should coincide with the area in which search operations are conducted.

(2) To lend credence to all of the counter-propaganda positions recommended above, we shall have photographs of the meteorological configurations allegedly carried by the lost aircraft; moreover, we shall point to upperatmosphere data (studies produced by NACA and

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USAF) which confirm the fact that the alleged data collection program was in fact conducted as evidenced by the data collected and studies compiled. (NOTE: Should the compromise occur early in the operational program, we may not have studies actually prepared since such studies would be based on data collected over a period of several weeks; however, this could be openly admitted since it is quite plausible, and selected portions of raw "take" could be used in lieu of prepared studies.)

Attachments:

A-1
A-2
B-1
B-2

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ATTACHMENT A-1

(NOTE: A proposed release for use in the event that an aircraft is lost close to the hostile periphery. Attachment A-2 is an alternate release.)

The U. S. Government denies the Russian accusation that an American aircraft which the Soviets charge (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) within Russian territory, was engaged in a photo reconnaissance mission over Russian territory.

Moscow Radio announced last night that an American aircraft (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) twenty miles south of Murmansk. The announcement charged that Soviet authorities investigating the incident had ascertained that the aircraft was engaged in a reconnaissance flight over Russian territory (and added that the American pilot, identified as, confirmed that his mission was one of photographing Soviet military installations and collecting other intelligence data).

A Russian diplomatic protest has been lodged with the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow. A formal U. S. reply to the Soviet note will follow a thorough investigation by U. S. authorities of the circumstances surrounding the incident.

The aircraft in question may possibly be one and the same as the Lockheed U-2 reported missing by USAF officials three days ago. This aircraft, engaged in a NACA-sponsored research program, was the object of intense air-sea rescue search during the last three days following a USAFE announcement that the aircraft was overdue and presumed lost 75 miles west of the North Cape of Norway. All efforts to locate either plane or pilot have failed.

The NACA research program, announced to the U. S. press in early May has as its purpose the collection of data on upper air phenomena (i. e., turbulence measurements, temperature and wind structures at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc.) at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. The NACA program is conducted both in the U. S. and abroad. Research aircraft abroad are based at USAF installations where NACA is supported by the USAF Air Weather Service.

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USAF authorities speculate that the missing U-2 aircraft, whose last reported position was 75 miles west of the North Cape of Norway, may have been intercepted over international waters and (was forced to land within the USSR, was shot down over international waters--a fact the Soviets are attempting to hide with their sensational accusations, crashed in an attempt to evade Soviet attack). One or a combination of the above explanations may account for the lost U-2.

ATTACHMENT A-2

(Same as Attachment A-1 with exception of the last paragraph, which is as follows)

USAF authorities state that the missing U-2 last reported its position as 75 miles west of the North Cape of Norway. Contact with the pilot was then lost. These officials speculate that the pilot (flying in bad weather, hampered by loss of radio contact and loss of radio navigation system) may have wandered inadvertently over Soviet territory where he later (was forced down, was shot down, by Soviet interceptors, crashed in an attempt to evade Soviet attack).

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ATTACHMENT B-1

Moscow Radio announced last night that an American aircraft (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) in the vicinity of Moscow. The announcement charged that Soviet authorities investigating the incident had ascertained that the aircraft was engaged in a reconnaissance mission. This was determined, the Soviet statement added, not only by an examination of the aircraft (wreckage) but also as a result of the "free admission" of the American pilot. The pilot, identified by the Russians as allegedly confirmed that his mission was one of photographing Soviet military installations and collecting other intelligence data.

A Russian diplomatic protest has been lodged with the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow. The U. S. reply to the Soviet note will follow in due course.

USAF spokesmen assert that Soviet accounts as to the location of the incident may be correct, but emphatically deny the incident resulted from a willful violation by the US. of Soviet airspace for purposes of intelligence reconnaissance. The violation of Soviet airspace, these spokesmen add, was certainly neither intended nor ordered by U. S. authorities. The American aircraft in question was a Lockheed U-2, reported missing by USAF officials three days ago. Engaged in a NACA-sponsored research program, the aircraft was the object of intense but unsuccessful air-sea rescue search off the Black Sea coast of Turkey. The NACA research program announced to the U. S. press in early May, has as its purpose the collection of data on upper air phenomena (turbulence measurements, temperature and wind structure at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc.) at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. The NACA program is conducted both in the U. S. and abroad. Research aircraft abroad are based at USAF installations where NACA is supported by the USAF Air Weather Service.

USAF authorities indicate that the missing U-2 aircraft, whose last reported position was 20 miles north of Sinap, Turkey, lost radio contact with its base. Presumably, the aircraft's radio communication and navigation system either developed a malfunction or failed outright. Quite possibly the incident resulted from pilot hypoxia which, combined with failure of the aircraft's electronic navigation system, could have resulted in a grave deviation from the aircraft's planned course. With the aircraft on "automatic pilot" and the pilot in a euphoric condition, an unintended violation of Soviet airspace may have unfortunately resulted.

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ATTACHMENT B-2

Moscow Radio announced last night that an American aircraft (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) in the vicinity of Moscow. The announcement charged that Soviet authorities investigating the incident had ascertained that the aircraft was engaged in a reconnaissance mission. This was determined, the Soviet statement added, not only by an examination of the aircraft (wreckage) but also as a result of the "free admission" of the American pilot. The pilot, identified by the Russians as allegedly confirmed that his mission was one of photographing Soviet military installations and collection other intelligence data.

A Russian diplomatic protest has been lodged with the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow. The U. S. reply to the Soviet note will follow in due course.

USAF spokesmen indicated that the Soviet allegations were palpably false and were a purposeful misrepresentation of the facts. They stated that the American aircraft in question was a Lockheed U-2, reported missing by USAF officials three days ago. Engaged in a NACA-sponsored research program, announced to the U. S. press in early May, has as its purpose the collection of data on upper air phenomena (turbulence measurements, temperature and wind structure at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc.) at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. The NACA program is conducted both in the U. S. and abroad. Research aircraft abroad are based at USAF installations where NACA is supported by the USAF Air Weather Service.

USAF authorities speculate that the missing U-2 aircraft, whose last reported position was 20 miles north of Sinop, Turkey, may either have been intercepted by Soviet fighters over the Black Sea or may have inadvertently wandered over the Soviet Black Sea coast, at which point it (was forced down, was shot down, or crashed in an attempt to evade Soviet attack). In no case, these officials added, could the incident have occurred deep within Russian territory as maintained in the Soviet charge, since the known performance of the single-engine jet aircraft would never have enabled it to reach the Moscow area, given the flight path already traversed by the aircraft up to the time of its last reported position.

The intent behind the serious Soviet charge probably reflects Russian embarrassment over an incident which actually occurred over

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international waters--a fact which the Soviets are attempting to hide by making their sensational charges. Alternatively, the pilot may have through (an error in navigation, bad weather, an emergency resulting from engine failure) wandered over the Soviet Black Sea coast--but Soviet charges are designed to make more sensational propaganda just as has been done in several instances in the past when the Soviets or Satellites claimed willful violation of their airspace.

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ANNEX 62

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is with Copy #1 of this history.

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ANNEX 63

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with Copy #1 of this History.

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DDS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA-1

Vol. V of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
 Chapter VIII

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
 INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
 E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
 ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 5
 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T

Date prepared : 1 April 1969

Written by : Helen Kleyla

Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER VIII. TEST PROGRAM:
WATERTOWN

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CHAPTER III. TEST PROGRAM, WATERTOWN

Selection of a Test Site

The original contract for production of twenty U-2 aircraft for the special project assumed the flight testing by Lockheed of the first three or four aircraft at a temporary site, after which production aircraft would be delivered direct from Burbank to the project at an agreed point. As planning went on, the decision was made to select a secure, remote site where a semi-permanent base could be built up and where all flight testing, equipment testing and pilot training could be carried out with the greatest possible secrecy.

Between January and April 1955, air surveys were made in the California-Nevada desert area east of Burbank by Kelly Johnson, and Col. Ritland also investigated Air Force real estate holdings which might be suitable. Requirements for the site were:

- a. It must have a landing strip of 5,000 feet suitable for all-weather operations. Runway improvements would be made if other conditions were acceptable.
- b. The site should be government-owned to facilitate access and avoid negotiations with local authorities.

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c. Security, including remoteness to public view and ease of guarding, was of prime importance.

d. Living conditions must be bearable, although heat and dust were to be expected anywhere in the area under consideration.

e. Location with respect to the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) must be considered to avoid Air Defense Command radar surveillance during test flights.

In April 1955 the choice had narrowed to two locations: the site proposed by Mr. Johnson located near the California-Nevada line northeast of Death Valley, and an area within the Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada Proving Ground near Las Vegas. On 6 April Messrs. Bissell and Herbert Miller briefed the Chairman of AEC, Admiral Lewis Strauss, on the program and received his concurrence on the use of the dry lake bed area known as Groom Lake inside the Proving Ground. The Chairman was pleased that such a project as AQUATONE was being undertaken and promised AEC support for the secret cover story of upper air sampling.

On 13 April Messrs. Bissell and Miller and Col. Ritland inspected the area under consideration, accompanied by Mr. Johnson and his chief test pilot, Mr. Tony Levier, and the AEC local manager, Mr. Seth Woodruff. A site on the west side of the dry lake bed was chosen for

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the base. The AEC was willing for its contractors in the area to do the engineering and construction work required, and between 15 and 18 April 1955 estimates were worked out by the Silas Mason Company and the Reynolds Engineering and Electrical Company (REECO) at an estimated figure of \$600,000. This was higher than an estimate obtained by Mr. Johnson from a California contractor, but after considering REECO's long local experience, a local work force in being with the necessary AEC clearances, and the advantages of AEC supervision of the contract, it was decided that the REECO proposal was more realistic and would in the long run be more economical, as well as more advantageous from the security standpoint.

On 26 April 1955, the following information was passed to project contractors for their information and action in preparing to support the test and training phase of the project:

"The test base site has been tentatively located at Groom Lake, Nevada. Groom Lake is a dry lake bed which lies in the northeast portion of the military reservation north of Las Vegas, and it is planned that the Atomic Energy Commission's test area within the military reservation will be extended to encompass Groom Lake.

"Physical security of this site probably cannot be equalled, but the fact that it is so remote raises a number of problems which must be settled well in advance in order properly to plan the base. Building is scheduled to be complete

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and equipment installed by 1 July 1955 and it will be extremely difficult to make any major alterations after that date. Therefore, it behooves one and all to have his test requirements well thought out and on the record as soon as possible but by 15 May at the very latest.

"Electric power requirements are most important. The base will generate its own power, and the plant will be designed to near peak load. 110, 220 and 440 volts will be available in alternating current. Any need for direct current will require special equipment.

"Barracks and messhall will be airconditioned, but no provision is made for any airconditioned working space. A need for a small airconditioned work space may be filled by a trailer. Dust palliatives will be applied in the immediate camp area.

"Some bench space will be available in the hangars. Are there requirements for special tools other than hand-operated drill presses and shears?

"In order to keep the number of barracks down to a minimum, it is necessary to have now a good guess as to numbers of personnel... and an estimate of how long each phase of test work will last." 1/

AEC Agreement

On 29 April the Director wrote to Admiral Strauss to formalize the Agency's understanding that AEC would, through contracts already in existence, and through the services of AEC personnel, perform the work required by the special project. Reimbursement by the Agency would be in accordance with Section 686, Title 31, U.S. Code, under

1/ TS-103545, 26 April 1955. Form Letter to Contractors.

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appropriate security safeguards. The sum of \$650,000 was allocated to cover the initial construction job. On 2 June 1955 a letter to the AEC General Manager, General Kenneth Fields, requested AEC to arrange through REECO for housekeeping and maintenance services at the new facility on a reimbursable basis, and asked for a proposal in writing from AEC. It required two months of drafting and negotiations to reach the final agreement which was signed by Mr. Bissell for CIA on 12 August 1955 and by Col. Alfred D. Starbird for AEC on 16 August 1955.

(See Annex 64.)

The Air Force meanwhile put in motion the transfer to the AEC of a ten-mile-square area at the northwest corner of the Proving Ground. The prohibited area required for the Project test site was established by Executive Order 10633 dated 19 August 1955. Authority establishing Watertown Strip as a USAF installation was circulated in a limited distribution letter dated 2 September 1955 from the Chief of Staff, USAF, to the AEC, copy to Flight Service. The area was designated "Watertown Strip (Unclassified), a USAF installation assigned for classified functions" and prior approval of Headquarters, USAF, was required for its use. (See the following two pages for the designation order and a rough sketch of the area.)

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HEADQUARTERS
WATERTOWN AIRSTRIP
NEVADA

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 1)

1 October 1955

DESIGNATION OF WATERTOWN AIRSTRIP - - - - - 1

1. DESIGNATION OF WATERTOWN AIRSTRIP. Watertown Air-
strip is designated and organized under Table of Distribution,
Headquarters USAF, 2 September 1955 at Watertown, Nevada and
assigned to Headquarters USAF effective 2 September 1955.

2. Authority: Letter Headquarters USAF dated 2 September
1955.

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Frederic E. McCoy
FREDERIC E. MCCOY
Colonel USAF
Commander

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WATERTOWN
STRIP

Groom
Lake

PROHIBITED
AREA




DANGER
AREA

10 miles

Indian
Springs

To Las Vegas 45 miles

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The Project Security Officer in May had secured for the test site the unclassified cryptonym "SADDLE SOAP", but Mr. Johnson's Lockheed group were already referring to the area (jokingly) as "Paradise Ranch", later shortened to "the Ranch", and this latter name soon came into general usage among project staff, Air Force and contractor personnel involved in activities at the test site.

Construction at Watertown

At the request of the Project Director, the Agency's Real Estate and Construction Division nominated [redacted] as the engineer to oversee construction of the base, and he proceeded to Las Vegas to work directly with the AEC/REECO construction group. Although the 1 July forecast for completion of work slipped several weeks, by the middle of July the base had taken shape and was on the way to meeting the 25 July deadline set for Lockheed's delivery of the first aircraft.

One of the main problems at the site was water. An old well which had been reopened was delivering about 15 gallons per minute, which was considered adequate for the first month of operations. A second well was started but water had not been reached when the first aircraft arrived. Because of the overriding importance of a water

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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supply at the base, the Project Director authorized that the work proceed with the uncleared drilling crews working at night or when the U-2 was inside the hangar, and this continued through August and September. Late in September the pump in the first well failed and the base was without a water supply, except for that hauled to the site by truck, until a new pump could be installed. Just at that point the well-diggers hit water-bearing strata in the second well and by 26 October it was in operation, pumping about 17 gallons per minute. By the end of 1955, with periodic checks on rate of production, it was determined that the water supply would support a population of 200 at 200 gallons per person per day, with 20,000 gallons stored in the elevated water tank.

Delivery of the First U-2

On 21 July 1955 Project Headquarters received its first teletype message from Watertown over the newly opened communications net:

"Operations proceeding according to plan. Lockheed group ETA 0830 July 25 confirmed. All REECO personnel will be evacuated during initial landing and unloading which will be completed by 1100 July 25. General REECO work will be completed evening July 27. Outdoor U-2 run-up and test commences morning July 28... Watertown support will be fully operative 25 July." 1/

1/ CABLE-001 (IN 26986) to ADIC, 21 July 1955.

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Support furnished Lockheed prior to the first flight test included a bailed C-47 aircraft for transporting personnel between Burbank and the test site; a USAF C-124 to deliver the U-2 to Watertown; two engine stands and jet fuel prepositioned at Watertown; and a fire truck (crew of firefighters furnished by Lockheed). No medical personnel or facilities were requested and a minimum amount of weather forecasting support.

Because of extensive rainfall, the lake bed was unusable for landing the C-124 bearing the first U-2 and the new runway had to be used although it had not yet had the seal and armoring applied and thereby suffered a minimum amount of damage with its first use.

First Flight

On 1 August taxi trials were run on U-2 No. 1. Results were very good but on a high speed taxi run the aircraft inadvertently left the ground by 30 feet and flew 1200 feet. The transition to flight was very smooth and not noticed by the Pilot. A hard landing resulted when the pilot cut power at low speed. The tires blew on landing due to excess braking and caught fire. "No ill effects except to Tony's ego" (Tony Levier, the test pilot) was the word received at Headquarters from Watertown.^{1/} Additional taxi tests were made on 2 August with satisfactory results

^{1/} CABLE-048 (IN 31046), to ADIC, 2 August 1955.

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and on 5 August a first flight of approximately thirty minutes was successfully and smoothly accomplished. Further low level tests were run on 6 August and on Monday, 8 August, the Project Director and a Headquarters party along with Kelly Johnson happily observed the U-2 perform at 35,000 feet. (See next two pages for side and rear view photographs of U-2 No. 1.) On 16 August the U-2 went to 52,000 feet, on 25 August to 57,000 and on 1 September it reached 60,000 feet. On 8 September Mr. Johnson wired the Project Director as follows:

"Regret we were unable to obtain altitude record by Labor Day, but have done so by reaching initial design altitude for take-off weight at 10 a.m. today (65,500). Pilot reports this height reached with idle power for that altitude. Everything worked, even airplane fuel boost pump, which prevented our last attempt last week. Sky is not dark up there, aircraft is steady, cockpit comfortable. Will now belabor Pratt & Whitney about fuel control and undertake to find limiting altitude for air starts." 1/


During the first two weeks of November, Maj. Gen. Albert Boyd and Lieut. Col. Frank K. Everest, Jr., of ARDC, were authorized to fly the U-2 for the Air Force phase two (training) evaluation. A report was submitted by Everest through Air Force channels and corrections of discrepancies noted by him were important factors in the Air Force acceptance of the U-2.

1/ CABLE-238 (IN 45803) to ADIC, 8 September 1955.

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
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Additional Construction

Subsequent to the first successful flights of the U-2, the Watertown population increased daily with the addition of company engineers and techreps (preparing their work space and bringing equipment to be tested), firefighters, communicators, security officers, and REECO service people; and an influx of TDY'ers, both VIP and others. Jeeps, sedans and trucks for the motor pool were driven in from Camp Mercury (AEC Nevada Headquarters) on loan from the Air Force Special Weapons Project (AFSWP). Base support aircraft furnished by the Air Force between July 1955 and the following spring included: one L-20 for local flying, two C-47's bailed to Lockheed and later retrieved for use at Watertown; two T-33's for transition training; and a C-54 to be used on the Burbank to Watertown shuttle run, with a Lockheed crew, later being replaced by a regular MATS crew. The MATS service was put into effect upon completion of land line communication between Burbank and Watertown on 3 October 1955. (On 17 November 1955, the shuttle crashed on the side of Mount Charleston, killing all fourteen on board. See Chapter VII, page 18.)

Once operations were in full swing, it was obvious that the limited facilities available would have to be expanded. Money was tight and the

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Project Director desired the base to be run on as austere a basis as possible. However, since numbers at the site were expected by mid-November 1955 to reach 133 (the maximum number of billets available) and 175 by January 1956, the decision was made to close down operations for ten days at the end of November 1955 in order to construct the additional essential facilities, including principally:

- Two new dormitories (increasing billets to 203)
- Control tower
- Parking aprons, tie-downs and taxiway
- Classroom and office for SAC Training Unit
- 40' x 100' warehouse
- Security post on water tower
- Installation of 20 trailers (billets)
- Dispensary addition, sinks and cabinets
- Photo lab addition, airconditioning and dehumidification
- Water line for well #2
- Monorails and hoists in Hangars #2 and #3

Shortly after the construction was completed (see following page for aerial view of Watertown at this stage), and the base returned to testing activities, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson paid a one-day visit to the site, witnessed an excellent demonstration of the A-2 camera's performance at 68,000 feet, and departed with a very favorable impression of the operation.

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
Harold W. STEINMAN
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RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
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


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SERIAL NO. 17111

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Engine Development: Fuel Control Problems

The first engine flame-out was experienced on 22 September 1955 when the U-2 reached 64,000 feet and during descent flamed out at 60,000 feet. The pilot's suit functioned properly and no difficulties were experienced during descent. The engine restarted promptly at 35,000 feet. In mid-November the Project Director became gravely concerned over fuel control difficulties repeatedly experienced during the previous few weeks and emergency conferences were held with top level Pratt & Whitney engineers and NACA experts to seek a solution. New settings and techniques were developed and on 6 December Lockheed was requested to test these settings at maximum altitude using Lockheed pilots until favorable results were obtained, then turning over two aircraft to the SAC unit for the training program.

While the flame-out problem was not completely solved, the situation did improve and it was recognized that pilots must operate within the narrow margins prescribed by the airframe and engine manufacturers in order to avoid flame-outs at altitude. In March 1956 the Detachment A Operations Officer, [redacted] reported that during a ten-day period of training flights by Detachment A pilots, only one flame-out was experienced which, he said, was very heartening as it appeared that

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the pilots had found the key to flying this aircraft at its maximum altitude.

J-57/P-37 Engine Versus J-57/P-31

From the early planning days of the project it had been hoped to equip the U-2's with Pratt & Whitney's new P-31 series engines but, due to slippage in production date it was April 1956 before the first ones were made available to the Project. Detachment A had already been declared combat ready in aircraft equipped with the P-37 engines, and was preparing to deploy. A comparison of the specifications on the two engines by the maker showed the following:

	<u>P-37</u>	<u>P-31</u>
Length	165"	169"
Diameter	40.375"	40.375"
Weight: Max.	4,096 lbs	3,680 lbs
Min.	4,047 lbs	3,662 lbs
Dry thrust	10,500 lbs	11,200 lbs

A meeting with Colonel Norman Appold of the Power Plant Laboratory at Wright Air Development Center was held the first of May 1956 to consider engine experience to date. It was concluded that the P-37 engine was ready to commit operationally and that if flown as dictated by Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney, the probability of flame-out was slight. A program for improving the reliability of the P-37 was to be instituted, and at the same

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an accelerated P-31 program should accumulate time on these engines to a minimum of 500 hours total and 100 hours on one engine for examination. And since no delay in the training program could be tolerated, all this must be geared to the training program and the development of subsystems.

On 19 June 1956, Mr. Bissell reported to Col. Appold that the necessary time had been accumulated on the P-31 and asked his views on the wisdom of employing it operationally (as had been recommended by both Mr. Johnson of Lockheed and [redacted] of Pratt & Whitney). Col. Appold agreed that the P-31 be used on operational missions provided that a hot section inspection was made after every 50 hours of operation and an overhaul every 100 hours, and that new blades were substituted in the first stage of the turbine every 100 hours, until forged blades were available. These recommendations were put into effect and the P-31's after acceptance flights were completed, were withdrawn from training aircraft and used only for operations in the field. This was in accord with USAF policy, in view of the critical supply position with regard to P-31 engines.

In Detachment A's first operational experience with the F-31 equipped aircraft the pilots on certain flights were unable to reach

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top power and altitude flying from a German base where abnormally cold temperatures were encountered at altitude. On the other hand, Detachment B pilots flying from Turkey later the same year were able to reach 66,000 to 70,000 feet before descent with little difficulty. It appeared to Col. Gibbs on investigation of this difference in performance that the P-31 engine was a good temperature indicator and that it would perform in accordance with the ambient temperature.

Organization and Lines of Command at Watertown

The Project Director had anticipated that the operational functions at the test site would be handled by the Commanding Officer and Operations Officer of the detachment currently in training there; i.e., Detachments A, B and C, in turn; and that the civilian in charge of the base would be carried on the T/O as Base Commander but would concern himself mainly with support matters.

In June 1955 [redacted] Agency staff employee, was nominated by the Director of Personnel to fill the position of Resident Base Manager at Watertown and was accepted for this assignment by the Project Director. Reporting to the site, [redacted] with the assistance of a small cadre assigned to the base from Headquarters, worked with the Agency engineer, REECO and AEC, setting up billeting and messing

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arrangements, working out bookkeeping procedures with AEC for operation and maintenance, and in general bringing the base up to a state of readiness to support test and training operations. General Order No. 1 of the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group (HEDCOM) dated September 1955, designated the Watertown base complement as "Flight D, Project Squadron Provisional" (later changed to "Detachment D, Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional" to conform with the cover established in the spring of 1956).

Base command relationships at the test site were discussed with the newly appointed SAC Liaison Officer, Colonel Loran D. Briggs, and following up on this discussion, the Project Director on 16 September wrote as follows to Col. Briggs:

"We had originally contemplated that the Base Commander would be responsible only for the management of the facility and for administrative and support functions and that the Commander of the Detachment currently in training would be responsible for the function of operations officer. You pointed out that the officer charged with operational responsibilities should have continuity of tenure at the base and that the Detachment Commander should not be burdened with local operational duties. Accordingly you suggested that these be assigned to the Commander of the SAC Training Group. Upon reflection we are convinced that your comment on our proposal was entirely valid but we have concluded that the proper solution is to designate a Base Commander competent to discharge all of the responsibilities, operational as well as administrative, that attach to this position.

"Accordingly, we now plan to designate a competent Air Force officer of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel rank as Base

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Commander; the present Acting Base Commander will serve as his deputy and in that capacity will continue to be responsible for performance of support functions at the base. " 1/

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U.S.C., section 403g)

When the SAC nominee for Commanding Officer of Detachment A, Colonel Frederic E. McCoy, reported for duty at Headquarters, he was hastily briefed and sent to Watertown where on 1 October 1955 he assumed command of the base. He and [] were almost immediately at odds on the running of the base and a situation developed wherein Headquarters was constantly having to intervene and make decisions on matters which should have been quickly and amicably resolved at the local level.

On 12 October 1955, a memorandum entitled "Organization and Lines of Command at Watertown", which had been drafted by Mr. Bissell, was made an official order defining basic responsibilities and authorities at the base. As later amended, it read:

"1. The following organizations are, or will shortly be, active at the Watertown base:

"a. The permanent staff of the base under the Base Commander.

"b. A field detachment in training for overseas operations under a Detachment Commander.

1/ SAPC-1850, 16 Sept 1955. Letter to Col. Briggs from Project Director.

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"c. A SAC Training Mission, the Commander of which will be referred to herein as the Training Commander.

"d. Technical staffs of the several suppliers.

"2. The responsibilities of the above-listed components and their lines of command will be as follows:

"a. The Base Commander shall be responsible for the management of the Watertown Base as a facility, for the control of all air operations on the Base, for liaison on operational matters with other USAF installations, and for the support of other components on the Base. He shall also be responsible, as a representative of Project Headquarters, for the coordination of all activities on the Base, and he will report periodically to Project Headquarters on the progress of all activities. He shall monitor test programs at the Base and coordinate proposals for equipment changes which originate at the Base. He will be under the command of the Project Director and his Deputy.

"b. The Detachment Commander shall be responsible for the organization, build-up and administration of his Detachment and the readying of it for active operations. He will participate in training as its Commander. He will be under the command of the Project Director and his Deputy but will receive his guidance on all matters having to do with training from the Training Commander.

"c. The Training Commander will be responsible for the direction and supervision of training. He will be under the command of the Commander, SAC.

"d. Suppliers' representatives will be responsible for their test programs and for the maintenance of equipment undergoing tests. Initially, they will maintain equipment being used for training purposes. In the later stages of unit training, the maintenance of equipment shall become the responsibility of the Detachment on the Base. It shall be the responsibility of the Base Commander to coordinate the different suppliers' test programs and requirements for facilities.

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"3. In order to reduce to a minimum the number of persons stationed on the base, personnel of the Detachment currently in training will serve as the staff of the base to the greatest extent possible. For this purpose they will be detailed as appropriate to the Base Commander.

"4. The Deputy Base Commander shall be responsible, subject to the Base Commander, for management of the facilities at the Base and for the performance of support functions." 1/

The new Base Commander supplied by SAC, Col. Landon B. McConnell, arrived and assumed command at Watertown on 22 December 1955. This appointment did not have the immediate harmonizing effect which was hoped for, since Col. McConnell found it difficult to adjust to the terms of reference of this unorthodox command.

In January 1956, the Project Flight Surgeon reported to Mr. Bissell that morale at Watertown was sinking from its earlier high peak and he blamed this largely on factionalism between the permanent base personnel and Detachment A personnel, which he said was fostered by their respective commanding officers. Col. Ritland, after visiting the base in March 1956, felt that conditions had improved in most respects, but said

"...the ill feeling rests in our own personnel, namely Base personnel versus Detachment personnel. This general area was covered thoroughly with Cols. McCoy and McConnell

1/ SAPC-1617/G, 21 February 1956. Organization and Lines of Command.

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and they agreed to do all possible to prevent the growth of this unsatisfactory condition. In my opinion the Base CO has not been fully cooperative in discharging his responsibilities. In many cases morale problems have arisen unnecessarily since he had the facilities and authority to prevent them..." ^{1/}

Another almost constant problem at Watertown was the relationship between the Project staff and contractor personnel, as well as differences between one contractor group and another. Lockheed, which as Prime Contractor had the responsibility for flight testing and systems integration, was the largest and most aggressive group at the base, and with Kelly Johnson as their leader they were prone to grab the ball and run without waiting for signals.

When Watertown was being reopened as a test site for the successor aircraft in 1959, Mr. Bissell advised the Acting Chief of the Development Projects Division, Col. William Burke, to make arrangements to operate Watertown as an Agency facility with Lockheed as a tenant, rather than, by default, to let it become a Lockheed facility. The basis of this advice would, he said, be clear to those who remembered the early days of the U-2.

^{1/} TS-143306, 30 March 1956. Comments by Col. Ritland upon completion of his tour of duty with the project.

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"...At the beginning of the project, Watertown was for many months in fact a Lockheed facility and we never succeeded in recovering effective control of it, and our efforts to do so gave rise to some unnecessary ill will." 1/

One episode which illustrates Mr. Bissell's quotation, above, happened as follows: On 20 March 1956, Mr. Bissell instructed the Base Commander to work out a master schedule of test requirements which would make the best use of available U-2's in order to reach a state of readiness, taking into account both the needs of all suppliers to install, calibrate and test their equipment, and the requirements for pilot training. Col. McConnell sent a memorandum to all suppliers requesting them to submit their schedules of tests required which would be integrated into a master schedule, kept flexible enough to provide for change of emphasis or additional tests that might develop.

On 16 April 1956 at a suppliers' meeting in Los Angeles, Kelly Johnson in an acrimonious vein took strong exception to the Base Commander's memorandum, and especially objected to the implication that the Base Commander would be responsible for the coordination of test programs which were the airframe manufacturer's responsibility. Mr. Johnson was reassured that the conduct of development flight test

1/ OXC-0155, 8 December 1959. Memo for AC/DPD from the DD/P.

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programs was indeed a Lockheed responsibility (as it had been from the start) and Lockheed would necessarily retain responsibility for detailed day-by-day scheduling. However, major priority decisions as to relative emphasis on individual systems or components were the responsibility of the Project Director, whose representative at Watertown would participate on behalf of the Project Director in planning flight test programs to ensure that desired priorities were observed. All suppliers must have the right of appeal through the Base Commander and ultimately to the Project Director on questions of priorities.

Phase-out of Watertown

The formation of field detachments, their training at the test site and deployment to the field, and the phasing in of the Air Force follow-on group (FOG) took place between January 1956 and March 1957, with development testing continuing throughout this period. Beyond the air frame, engine and primary photographic and electronic systems which were declared operationally ready in early spring 1956, other equipment tested through the second year at Watertown included the APQ-56 Side-Looking Radar and associated Radar, the B camera and film, the Bair Sextant, air samplers for collecting nuclear debris (both gaseous and particulate) and improved ELINT collection systems.

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The overcrowded conditions at Watertown, due to the influx of the SAC U-2 group in November/December 1956, were relieved with the departure of Detachment C in March 1957. The SAC training of its own U-2 group had been expected to reach completion by the end of March 1957 but was delayed by two months. The SAC U-2 group departed for its operational base (Laughlin Air Force Base at Del Rio, Texas) on 10 June 1957.

Meanwhile the AEC informed the Project Director that plans were being made for approximately 20 nuclear shots between 15 May and 30 September 1957, which would require the evacuation of Watertown for periods up to three days for each shot. In view of the possibility of radioactive fallout, no-one could remain continuously at Watertown during this series. Because of the interruptions in the training program which the numerous evacuations would entail, and because there were requirements for further development and testing of equipment due to the extension of the U-2 program, Project flight test activities were re-established at Edwards Air Force Base (North), California, under the auspices of ARDC, and with the reluctant acquiescence of the Project Security Officer, who did not feel that the relatively open and easily accessible base at Edwards was conducive to maintaining the required secrecy of operations. Watertown Strip was evacuated and mothballed on 21 June 1957.

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Preliminary estimates for the one-year mothballing of Watertown from 21 June 1957 came to \$15,723, plus \$1200 per month (\$800 for the caretaker and \$400 contingency for special repairs, etc.) Since the Agency's decision to keep or dispose of the property at the end of the year affected AEC and USAF, Mr. Cunningham requested the Project Director to obtain a decision from Gen. Cabell on the retention of the base as a physical asset of the Agency. The decision finally made a year later was to re-open Watertown for the flight testing of the successor aircraft to the U-2, despite arguments then by the Project Security Officer that erosion of security of the U-2 program had branded Watertown as a "spook" base, and that the new program should be kept separate from any connection with the U-2 to the greatest possible degree. The final decision, however, was made, not on the basis of security, but on the basis of fiscal and operational considerations, i. e., to carry out the OXCART program as a completely separate entity would have required unlimited time, unlimited funds, and unlimited personnel resources, which were not available.

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

14 August 1955

This Memorandum of Understanding made by and between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Watertown Project, witnesseth:

WHEREAS, the Commission has added an area of approximately six miles by ten miles to the Northeast corner of the Nevada Test Site for the purpose of providing a test area for the Project; and

WHEREAS, the Commission has been authorized to construct certain facilities which are a necessary adjunct to the successful conduct of tests by Project personnel; and

WHEREAS, the Commission operates, maintains and provides certain services related to Nevada Test Site facilities; and

WHEREAS, the Project desires that the Commission extend these services to the Project activities and the Commission is agreeable to extending such services at times which do not conflict with Commission activities;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the provisions hereinafter contained, it is mutually understood and agreed as follows:

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ARTICLE I - DEFINITIONS

As used in this Agreement, the term, "Commission" means the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, or the Manager, Santa Fe Operations Office, or his duly authorized representative, hereinafter called the "Commission."

As used in this Agreement the term "Project" means the Watertown Project or the Manager of the Project including his duly authorized representative, hereinafter called the "Project Manager."

ARTICLE II - SCOPE OF WORK

1. Except for items furnished by the Project, the Commission will be responsible for furnishing an adequate complement of competent personnel, equipment, materials and supplies as may be necessary to supply, operate, maintain and/or service the following listed items in the Project's test area on a 24-hour per day, year round basis (if necessary) in accordance with accepted engineering principles:

a. Power plant and entire electrical distribution system consisting of:

- (1) Three 100 KW Diesel Generators, including necessary appurtenant equipment and switchgear.
- (2) Approximately one mile of underground electrical distribution system.

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b. All wells, pumping equipment, water treatment plants and water distribution systems in their entirety.

c. All sewage treatment plants and sewage systems in their entirety.

d. All motor pools, together with appurtenant facilities.

e. Communications facilities, to the extent designated by the Project Manager.

f. Project buildings consisting of, but not limited to:

- (1) Three barracks
- (2) One mess hall (meals to be comparable to those at Camp Mercury)
- (3) One wash house
- (4) One dispensary and operations building
- (5) One maintenance building
- (6) Three hangars together with three tie-down areas
- (7) Trailers and facilities for trailer parking
- (8) Temporary facilities which may be required

g. All paved or temporary access roads, camp streets, erosion control, and drainage facilities required for the Project.

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h. The 100 foot wide by 5000 foot long runway which is paved with a 3-inch roadmix asphaltic pavement and maintain taxi strips, associated drainage areas, etc.

i. Other services or facilities not specifically enumerated above which are requested in writing by the Project Manager.

2. The Commission will perform new construction in the Project test area after receipt of an allocation of funds from the Project. New construction shall be based upon plans and specifications approved by the Project Manager. This work will be accomplished only upon receipt of a work order signed by the Project Manager and approved by the Commission. The Project shall have the right to remove or transfer any buildings or equipment which have been funded by the Project.

3. The Commission will perform remodeling, major plant revision or addition or extraordinary maintenance upon any structure or facility in the Project test area upon receipt of a written request of the Project Manager and approval by the Commission. No changes to existing facilities, other than those minor alterations necessary in the performance of routine maintenance work, will be made without such written request.

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4. The Commission will provide miscellaneous support services as requested in writing by the Project Manager to facilitate all aspects of the tests performed by the Project. This work is generally outside the scope of maintenance and operations of facilities or construction of facilities and would consist generally of the following:

a. Assisting Project personnel in assembling, installing, connecting and testing scientific equipment and providing auxiliary needs thereto.

b. Assisting in disconnecting, dismantling, delivering, packing and shipment of scientific and/or test equipment as directed by the Project Manager.

c. Placing test facilities in a stand-by condition adequate to protect for future use.

5. The Commission hereby grants permission for Project personnel to utilize Building No. 127 at Mercury, Nevada and appurtenant facilities at no rental cost, contingent upon their releasing the facilities upon notification from the Commission. All costs for repair and maintenance of Building 127, while being used by the Project, shall be borne by the Project. Facilities such as the mess hall, dormitories, etc., at Camp Mercury which are operated by the Commission are also available for use by Project personnel on the same basis that they are

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available to other personnel associated with Commission activities to the extent that such facilities are not required in connection with test activities of the Commission, and subject to the provisions of Article III Finance.

6. The Commission agrees to furnish to the Project non-expendable equipment, such as hutments, temporary buildings and equipment including office equipment, which is not required for current use by the Commission, on a loan or memorandum receipt basis. Such items will be subject to recall by the Commission and shall be returned as soon as practicable, but, in any event not more than sixty days after notice that the items are required by the Commission in the performance of activities under its jurisdiction. All such items shall be returned to the Commission in the same condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted. All costs for repair, replacement and maintenance shall be borne by the Project.

ARTICLE III - FINANCE

1. Basic Financial Policy. All direct costs incurred by the Commission and its contractors in carrying on the work and a proportionate share of Commission contractor indirect costs will be borne by the Project. Such indirect costs will be determined on the same basis as that used by the contractor in accounting for other Commission activities.

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2. Funding. Project work will be funded on a reimbursable basis. Prior to the undertaking of any Project work, the Commission will be advised in writing that funds have been earmarked for the Project in an amount sufficient to cover the estimated costs of the work involved. Standard Form 1080, together with an itemized statement of costs incurred, will be submitted quarterly for payment by the Commission to the Project's Washington headquarters.

3. Accounting Records and Reports. The Commission will account for the costs of the Project work in accordance with its established accounting system. Cost reports will be furnished to the Project on a monthly basis in the form and detail consistent with established AEC cost reporting practices on comparable Commission activities.

ARTICLE IV - SECURITY

The Project Manager will be responsible for security within the entire Project addition. The Commission will maintain a guard station, Post 385, which is located on the main access road at the boundary between the Project addition and the Nevada Test Site proper, and will control access through this station on a 24 hour a day basis. Access through this station to and from the Project addition, and beyond, will be allowed on the basis of badges issued by the Commission, to include personnel approved by

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the Project Manager for access to the Project camp operations area. The Commission will provide guards with AEC approved equipment and AEC patrol vehicles to perform such security guarding functions as may be requested by the Project Manager. Reasonable advance notice will be given to the Commission of requirements for changes in guard service.

The Project Manager will be responsible for personnel security clearance of persons granted access to the Project and will advise the Commission of security clearance approval of each such person. For this purpose the Commission will advise the Project Manager of the AEC clearance granted persons in question and grant the Project Manager's Security Representative access to the Commission's clearance files.

ARTICLE V - SAFETY AND FIRE PROTECTION

The Project agrees to take all steps and all precautions to protect health and to minimize danger from all hazards to life and property. It is agreed that the Project will abide by all safety regulations prescribed for Nevada Test Site operations including radiological safety regulations prescribed by the Commission, and will establish and enforce any special safety regulations applicable to authorized work of the Project. The Project will be responsible for fire protection within the entire Project

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addition. Fire protection at Camp Mercury will be provided at no expense to the Project.

It is mutually understood and agreed that the Project will hold the Commission harmless from any liability to third persons which may arise on the part of the Government out of activities of the Project at the Nevada Test Site proper or at the Project's testing area.

ARTICLE VI - PRESERVATION AND STORAGE OF DOCUMENTS

The Commission agrees to retain and preserve, without charge to the Project, all books, records, correspondence, instructions, receipts, vouchers and other memoranda having a record purpose value pertaining to the work under this Agreement, for the same periods of time for which the Commission is required to retain Commission records. At the option of the Commission, and in lieu of preserving such documents, the Commission may return such documents to the Project for storage.

ARTICLE VII - RELEASE OF INFORMATION

Any public release or dissemination of information connected with activities under this Agreement will be in accordance with policies prescribed by the Commission and all other participating Federal Agencies, as coordinated by the Project Manager, except that information relating to the purpose or accomplishment of tests at the Project will

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be released at the discretion of responsible personnel of the Project. In any event, any reference to the Commission, the Nevada Test Site, or the Commission's contractors shall be cleared through AEC channels prior to actual release.

ARTICLE VIII - TERM

This Agreement is effective as of 15 August 1955. It shall remain in effect until terminated by either party hereto upon sixty days' written notice to the other party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement.

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY: Alfred D. Starbird
Col. Alfred D. Starbird, CE
Director of Military
Application
Atomic Energy Commission

BY: Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Special Assistant to
the Director for
Planning and Coordination

DATE: 16 August 1955

DATE: 12 August 1955

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DDS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA-1
Vol. VI of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
IX to
Chapters X and XII

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
 INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
 E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 6
 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T

Date prepared : 1 April 1969

Written by : Helen Kleyla

Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER IX. MATERIEL

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CHAPTER IX. MATERIEL

Early Planning

The initial logistics plan for AQUATONE, which concerned itself principally with the government furnished equipment (GFE) to be supplied by the Air Force, was worked out under the guidance of Colonel Gerald F. Keeling of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel (General C. S. Irvine). The plan devised in order to make the Air Force supply system most responsive to project requirements was to set up an administrative staff in USAF Headquarters under a cover story, and brief the Air Force Chief of Allocations, Chief of Operations and Supply, and the Commander of the West Coast depot which would be used for stockpiling project materiel. The first task under this plan was to procure, deliver and receipt for the complete list of GFE required by Lockheed.

In April 1955 the decision was reached that engine spares would be stored in the Pratt & Whitney bonded warehouse at Hartford. Both overhaul and maintenance spares would be stored together and requisitions for overseas delivery would be made directly to Pratt & Whitney to be shipped from Hartford.

Spares for components manufactured on the West Coast by Lockheed, Ramo-Wooldridge and Hycon were to be stored at

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[redacted] Arrangements for use of space at [redacted] were made by the DCS/M with General Rawlings of Air Materiel Command, but since the depot was short of personnel, the Project would have to staff its own operation there. Major Robert Welch, USAF, was assigned to the Project Staff early in July 1955 and was sent to [redacted] to organize the project depot.

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The logistics set-up at Project Headquarters was slow in developing. In June 1955 an Air Force materiel officer, Lt. Col. William A. Wilson, was assigned to the deputy slot, and an Agency staff supply officer, [redacted] was assigned to the test site at Watertown, but the Director of Logistics, CIA, had difficulty in finding a civilian officer whom he could release to fill the Director of Materiel slot. With the lack of headquarters organization and direction in this area, the materiel officers assigned to the SAC 4070th Support Wing moved into the void and took on the planning for equipping and deploying the first detachment.

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

The Operational Plan of the 4070th dated 15 December 1955 outlined its responsibility to CINCSAC for not only training, determining combat readiness, and deployment overseas of each AQUATONE operational unit, but for the establishment of support detachments, each

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capable of supporting an operational unit in its overseas location. The Operational Plan (which is attached as Annex 65) was reviewed by Project Headquarters staff and returned to SAC, agreed with no changes.

Early in 1956, the Project Director noted to [redacted] who had been assigned from the Agency's Office of Logistics to fill the slot of Director of Materiel:

"I am disturbed by the fact that we may be taking too little initiative on supply matters in this Headquarters and leaving too much initiative to be taken by the 4070th SAC Support Wing. What I have in mind is that, not only are such tasks as detailed FAK (flyaway kit) and SLOE (standard list of equipment) lists made up by Colonel Shingler, but that, so far as I am aware, the planning and the initial drafts of all our supply procedures have originated there. The former of these two tasks is one for which we may not have adequate facilities at Headquarters. In any event it is appropriate that specific lists should be developed at Watertown and [redacted] rather than in Washington. I do feel strongly, however, that we should be taking the initiative in developing supply procedures and not leaving it to the support organization." 1/

In the same vein, Col. Osmond J. Ritland, on completing his tour as Deputy Project Director in March 1956, wrote:

"Although the materiel activities of the project have progressed nicely during the past three months, it has not

1/ SAPC-4639, 26 March 1956. Memo to Project Director of Materiel from Project Director.

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been accomplished by project personnel. I do not believe that this is too great a deficiency since our original charter requires SAC to support AQUATONE. ... At this point I would not disturb the present procedure, but I do feel an additional materiel officer is needed in Project Headquarters, and with the activation of Bases B and C, I visualize the need for a full-time construction engineer. ... " 1/

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In the same report, Col. Ritland gave praise to the [] as one of the strongest organizations in the project. He had been very favorably impressed with the facility, the personnel and the method of handling all supply activities at that installation. He also gave credit to the SAC Support Group in a letter to General LeMay (CINCSAC), as follows:

"... Materiel has been our weakest function with little or no seasoned ability to solve this complex problem, In a period of just a few months Col. Shingler, Lt. Col. Lien and Warrant Officer Moberly have planned and supervised the implementation of a workable supply system. This was not their assigned responsibility and was undertaken by them for the over-all advancement of the project. ... " 2/

Materiel Support to Field Units

The SAC Support Plan for Detachment A had included arrangements through 7th Air Division in England to extend all needed assistance to

1/ TS-143306, 30 March 1956. Final Report by Col. O. J. Ritland.

2/ Letter to CINCSAC (unnumbered), 30 March 1956, by Col. O. J. Ritland.

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the unit in carrying out its mission. When Detachment A was forced in June 1956 to move its operations to Germany, these arrangements were no longer valid. Therefore it was necessary to reconsider the 4070th's support plan in conjunction with the USAFE Director of Material, General Lester W. Light, who felt that SAC liaison support would not be required if all levels of command within USAFE properly accomplished all functions outlined in the Overseas Logistical Support Plan. He did not object to SAC representation to assist in monitoring logistics support, but felt that any such representative should be attached to Headquarters USAFE for control and appropriate direction.

In October 1956, Headquarters SAC in a letter to Headquarters USAF requested relief from the overseas support of the AQUATONE detachments. The Headquarters USAF Project Officer (Col. Geary) and the Project Director both agreed that the support responsibility should be transferred (in the case of Detachments A and B) to Director of Materiel, Headquarters, USAFE, with one supply liaison officer retained in the field as a troubleshooter. Thereafter logistics support for the first three field detachments was arranged through local and theater commands with the assistance of the Headquarters USAF Project Office, and with supplementary procurement through Agency channels (for

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example, the purchase and shipment to Adana of trailers for base housing at Detachment B).

The principal role played by the Project Headquarters Materiel Staff was in advising the Project Director on materiel policy matters, arranging with various Air Force echelons for needed support, and monitoring depot and field base activities. Once operations were underway in the summer of 1956, Headquarters Materiel set up a system of daily and weekly cable reports to headquarters on field consumption of fuel and film, engine time, malfunctions, field modifications to equipment and other usage statistics, in order to ensure the timely flow to the field of needed supplies and spares.

Depot Support

Heavy reliance was placed on the project depot which was set up to handle the project-peculiar items related particularly to the U-2 aircraft and its photo and electronic systems. The depot operation was first located at [redacted] from mid-1955 to June 1958, when it was moved to [redacted] with Major Welch still in charge. In October 1960, Project Materiel Staff for security reasons proposed shifting the overt support of the U-2 activities from [redacted] to the SAC U-2 (DRAGON LADY) depot at Warner Robins Air Force Base,

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Georgia, with all shipments to and from Project CHALICE detachments to be made through that facility. The principal reason for this move was in order to continue using [] in support of the follow-on program (OXCART). The removal of the U-2 support activity from [] was expected to enhance the security of both programs and avoid cross-contamination. It was also expected that monetary savings would result for the government by eliminating dual stock levels as between the SAC and CHALICE U-2 programs by amalgamating their depot support.

On 13 February 1961 a memorandum of understanding with respect to funding of CIA/SAC U-2 maintenance, overhaul and spare parts contracts was signed between DPD/Contracts and the USAF Air Materiel Command represented by Lt. Col. Sidney Brewer. The decision was to consolidate logistic support activities within a single Weapons System Support Center (WSSC) at Warner Robins Depot effective 1 January 1961. An analysis was made of comparative costs and future expected levels, and funding percentage ratios for each contract were agreed between the two parties. This common support program alleviated the necessity for detailed appropriation accounting for individual line items of support supplies and services.

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The activity and staff at [] grew along with the OXCART program, additional manning being required for the increased work load including the installation of automatic data processing. Maj. John Druary replaced Major Welch at the end of the latter officer's eight-year tour with the project in August 1962. In May 1963 in anticipation of the transfer to the Air Force of responsibility for [] support for OXCART and the SAC SR-71 program, USAF was requested to provide about 35 new slots for the depot and also became responsible at the time of take-over for 50 slots previously supported by the Agency.

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Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense McNamara was effecting economies in Defense Department installations which involved among other measures the phasing down of [] to a deep storage operation. This required another move and arrangements were made for space at San Bernardino Air Materiel Area at Norton Air Force Base, California. This move took place at the end of 1963 and as of 1 January 1964 the Air Force Logistics Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base assumed full manpower and logistics control at the new depot for OXCART, TAGBOARD and SR-71 programs. The U-2 operating hardware is still supplied from Warner Robins.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Headquarters Materiel Staff

From 1956 until 1962 the Materiel Staff at Project Headquarters maintained a T/O strength of only six or seven. During the period from 1959 to 1962 when the DD/P air operations formerly under the Air Maritime Division were placed under the cognizance of DPD, the materiel support for the P2V and other [redacted] air programs continued to be carried out by the former Aircraft Maintenance Support Division's staff, which had been constituted as a separate branch under DPD Materiel. Following the reorganization of the special projects under the Deputy Director for Research and the return of other DD/P air operations to the Special Operations Division (SOD) effective in July 1962, the separate aircraft maintenance branch was also transferred to SOD, leaving the project materiel staff at its original seven.

In 1962 on the departure of [redacted] the Director of Materiel slot was filled by an Office of Logistics nominee, [redacted]. Upon assignment in September 1962 of Col. Jack Ledford as Assistant Director for Special Activities, the organizational formula for the Office of Special Activities (OSA) was revised in order to reduce the number of division and staff heads reporting directly to the front office (then numbering ten) to a more manageable arrangement.

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Materiel was bracketed along with the operational functions under the "Director for Field Activities" as a part of that reorganization.

During [] tenure as Director of Materiel the staff was increased, looking toward an operational OXCART program in addition to continuation of the U-2 project, and numbers reached as high as 24 on the Headquarters Materiel Directorate staff. In August 1964, Colonel Alfred K. Patterson, USAF, replaced [] and continued to direct Materiel's maximum effort toward operational readiness of the OXCART and its sensor and countermeasures systems and to render necessary materiel support to the U-2 activities at Detachments G and H.

Another reorganization of OSA which took effect in mid-July 1966 restored Materiel to a separate Directorate, removing it from the Directorate for Field Activities, which in turn became the Directorate of Operations. At that time the Materiel Directorate was composed of five divisions: Installations, Maintenance, Supply, Plans and Requirements, and Avionics.

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15 December 1955

Headquarters Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

Operational Plan - 4070th Support WingI. MISSION

1. The Commander, 4070th Support Wing is directly responsible to the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command. This wing has the mission of training and equipping the operational units of Project "AQUATONE" and providing support for these units in overseas theaters. Specific responsibilities are:

- a. Direct and supervise the training of combat crews.
- b. Determine that these crews, and their equipment are operationally combat ready.
- c. Determine that the unit as a whole is operationally combat ready.
- d. The deployment overseas of each operational unit.
- e. Establishment of support detachments, each capable of supporting an operational unit in its overseas location.
- f. Effect the necessary coordination with this Headquarters to effect the action required of United States Air Force, Air Materiel Command, Military Air Transport Service, Overseas Theater Commanders and any other agencies deemed necessary to insure adequate and timely support for continuous operations.

II. CONCEPT

1. The 4070th Support Wing must be organized and manned so as to support separate operational units by detachments. Detachments must be capable of staging from forward bases remote from parent and intermediate base of operations.

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2. Operation will be based upon formation of three operational support detachments. Upon development of satisfactory degree of combat readiness, the first support detachment and operational unit will be deployed overseas to its intermediate base (Upper Heyford, UK). The second detachment and operational unit will be similarly deployed to the Far East upon attainment of combat readiness. The third detachment and operational unit will be based within the Zone of Interior at Watertown Air Force Base, Nevada and will be so organized as to train to, and maintain a readiness status permitting either the rotation of a complete detachment and/or operational unit or a flow of replacement personnel to deployed detachments and units. The selection of the Far East intermediate base will be predicated upon security, operational facilities and habitability.

3. Operations will consist of operating from intermediate bases or staging at forward bases and subsequent operation over areas of interest. The forward staging of operational units will be supported by detachments, with integral airborne support. The staging operation will be such as to minimize ground time at the forward bases and be adaptable to minimum installation facilities. This concept of operation will enhance the security of operation, maximize operational flexibility and minimize the risks inherent in focalizing operation in a given segment contiguous to unfriendly territory.

III. DETACHMENT ORGANIZATION

The organizational structure will be such as to provide for three detachments equally equipped and manned. Each detachment will be organized so as to permit independent operation; each detachment to be organized, manned and equipped to provide support necessary for operational units to stage to forward bases, operate therefrom with minimum base support, and subsequent return to intermediate base. Airlift support and manning will be integral to each in such quantity as to permit support of operational units at forward staging bases.

IV. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL UNITS

1. Quantative and qualitative training will be sufficient to train supervisory and crew personnel. Training operational readiness standards, will be as established by CINCSAC.

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2. Aircrew training requirements are as follows:

a. The first operational unit will be combat ready by 15 April 1956. The second unit scheduled for deployment will achieve a combat readiness status as soon thereafter as equipment and personnel status permit. The third unit will be trained to achieve combat readiness in sufficient time to permit rotation with deployed units to provide a flow of replacement personnel as may be necessary.

V. TRAINING LEAD TIME

1. The 4070th Support Wing will be activated 20 December 1955. In order to have one support detachment and operational unit operationally ready in a minimum length of time, the headquarters personnel will be in place at March Air Force Base, California, by 20 December 1955.

2. Scheduled dates of activations, equipping and operational readiness are as follows:

- a. Activation - 4070th Support Wing - 20 December 1955
- b. Equipping date (1st Unit) - 15 January 1956
- c. Target date for 100% manning - 15 January 1956
- d. Combat ready (1st Unit) - 15 April 1956

3. Personnel requiring specialized training will be scheduled to complete courses of instruction, and be in place at Watertown concurrent with or prior to unit equipping date.

4. Unit manning provides for 10 pilots with minimum operational readiness based on pilot to aircraft ratio of 1.5 to 1.

VI. OPERATIONALLY READY REQUIREMENTS

1. The criteria established by AFR 55-6 will be used for reporting the operationally ready status of operational units. Minimum requirements for combat readiness for each item are set forth in SAC Manual 171-2.

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a. An operational readiness index of 7, based on the weakest link principle must be reflected in Column "C" (Commander's estimate of operational readiness) for the unit to be considered combat ready.

b. In order to report an over-all readiness index of 7, the minimum category indexes specified below must be met.

- (1) Column D - Non-Crew Personnel assigned - 9.
- (2) Column E - Non-Crew Personnel assigned, operationally ready - 8
- (3) Column F - T/O Equipment assigned (other than aircraft) - 9
- (4) Column G - T/O Equipment assigned operationally ready (other than aircraft) - 8
- (5) Column H - Flyaway Kit and Spares - 9
- (6) Column J - Average T/O aircraft possessed operationally ready - See Para IX, 2, a(1).
- (7) Column L - Average aircrews assigned and combat ready - 8 (See para V, 4).

2. In the determination of combat readiness, the following material factors will apply:

a. The unit will be required to maintain an in-commission rate of 70% with desirable attainment of 100% in-commission.

b. Flying hour support will be 70 hours/month.

c. Sortie rate will be based on eight flights/month. (Includes test hops and ferry flights).

d. Individual units mission and support equipment must be available at the ZI base on or before date detachment training is scheduled to commence.

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e. Unit operating tables II, VII, XVI, and XIX for common items must be located at the ZI operating base 30 days prior to receipt of T/O aircraft.

f. Unit operating tables II, XVI, XIX peculiar items, must be located at [redacted] 30 days prior to receipt of respective T/O aircraft.

g. Materiel Reserves:

(1) Station Sets: Unit operating at intermediate operating bases will utilize station set equipment pre-stocked under AFL 67-44. Peculiar equipment support will be transported by support aircraft in sufficient quantities to support each unit at enroute, forward operating and staging bases.

(2) Flyaway Kit: Three basic flyaway kits each consisting of items common to all aircraft will be required to support six aircraft for 30 days. These kits should be complete and phased in place 30 days prior to unit deployment to intermediate bases.

h. Flyaway kit and common item re-supply support will be as follows:

(1) Enroute support will be furnished by SAC.

(2) Common supply support will be obtained from the area to which deployed.

(3) Re-supply of kit components, UEE, emergency requirements, and common items not available in the deployed area will be obtained by priority requisition, on the prime ZI support point and airlifted to the using bases in accordance with Vol. XVI, Air Force Manual 67-1.

(4) Resupply of peculiar spares and equipment will be obtained as directed.

(5) Repairables will be returned to overhaul activities through logistic channels as specified. Airlift for this purpose will be used as required.

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i. Consumables

(1) Consumable bulk items including, but not limited to POL, JP fuel, will be furnished by the area sources to which units are deployed, based on the utilization rate.

(2) Special fuels will be requisitioned as directed.

j. Unit Flyaway kits and UEE will be located at Watertown Air Force Base, Nevada, and will deploy with the unit.

k. Consumable bulk items, including, but not limited to POL, JP fuel, and gaseous supplies must be available in sufficient quantities to support wing training operations based on utilization rates.

l. Facilities: Facilities, such as aprons, parking areas, office space, warehousing, etc., must be available as agreed between participating agencies.

m. Non-crew personnel, including maintenance and technical representatives must be trained and available to the operational unit prior to deployment.

VII. OPERATIONALLY READY DATES

The first unit will be combat ready 15 April 1956, the remaining units will achieve a combat ready status as soon thereafter as equipment and personnel conditions permit.

VIII. DEPLOYMENT LOCATIONS

The 4070th Support Wing will be based at March Air Force Base, California, and will be capable of deploying support detachments and operational units to intermediate bases. Units based at intermediate bases will be capable of operating from any overseas base normally supporting USAF fighter, bombardment or reconnaissance wings.

IX. MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. Units will be allowed a maximum of 14 days to deploy to an intermediate base.

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2. Deployment will normally be conducted in the following manner:

a. Aircraft will be deployed as combat readiness is achieved by unit.

(1) Units will not be deployed with less than four operationally ready aircraft and a pilot to aircraft ratio of 1.5 to 1.

(2) Ground support personnel and equipment will be airlifted to staging bases.

(3) Mobility plans will be developed as required.

X. CHANNELS OF CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION

1. The 4070th Support Wing will be attached to the 8070th Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, for administration and logistical support.

2. Operational control and support responsibilities will be effected as set forth in "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities" dated 2 August 1955.

(Signed)
R. M. MONTGOMERY
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

Distr:
USAF: Programs Grp 4
Proj AQUATONE Hqs 4
4070th Support Wing 2
Hqs SAC 6

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CHAPTER X. CONTRACT PILOTS

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CHAPTER X. CONTRACT PILOTS

Foreign Versus U.S. Pilots

During the White House meeting at which approval was granted for the U-2 reconnaissance program, the possibility of a forced landing of the U-2 in enemy territory was touched on, but it was the apparent Agency view at that time that the repercussions of such an accident would be somewhat mitigated if the aircraft were manned by "non-official" U.S. personnel, and to the extent practicable it was intended to man the U-2 with non-U.S. nationals.

A mechanism for recruiting foreign pilots was already in being within the Air Maritime Division (Project ZESTFUL), but the available pilots were extremely few and the lead time for acquiring and processing one was six months. A recruiting effort was initiated through the AMD channel early in 1955 and sources in Europe were canvassed for prospects. The majority of pilot candidates offered, however, were unacceptable for either physiological or security reasons.

At the end of July 1955, fifteen foreign pilots [redacted]

[redacted] between 23 and 25 years of age had been recruited, all of whom had at least 500 hours current jet time, but all of whom lacked facility in the English language. Arrangements for language training for these

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recruits were worked out with the Office of Training prior to their assignment to air operations.

The Project Director had learned from the aeromedical experts that very high qualifications from both the physical and proficiency standpoints would be required of pilots for this program, which might necessitate the exclusive use of U.S. pilots. This was broached to the DDCI (Gen. Cabell) who made no strong objection and was apparently prepared to accept this eventuality. Therefore, while the recruitment of foreign pilots continued, Col. McCafferty began discussions with the Air Force with a view to future recruitment of currently qualified Air Force pilots.

A proposal was made to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, of the Air Force (Lt. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell) on 13 June 1955 as follows:

"Whereas provisions are under way to provide adequate numbers of trained indigenous pilots for Project AQUATONE it is considered desirable to use American pilots. Present plans are to use American pilots if the international situation will permit a favorable policy decision at the time the operational phase of AQUATONE commences.

"In our discussions regarding the recruitment of Americans for this job, we felt that it would be highly desirable to obtain currently qualified Air Force officers. We would hope to obtain reserve officers with three to five

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years experience in jet aircraft in the First Lieutenant or junior Captain category. In addition, we would stipulate that they should be under thirty years of age, single, and in A#1 physical condition.

"We feel that, if properly approached, many young officers in this category would be willing to accept employment for hazardous duty of this sort. Our plans are to establish a cut-out organization and to provide this organization with funds, legal assistance and the power to write contracts for the employment of the American pilots. The pilots would be told that this was an organization backed by a group of American philanthropists, organized with at least the tacit approval of the United States Government. Their principal aim would be to recruit a group of volunteer pilots to fly hazardous missions in the interest of the United States Government against the Soviet Union and its satellites.

"These officers would be expected to go on inactive status, or possibly resign their Air Force Reserve commissions, and accept employment with this cover organization. They would be offered excellent pay with substantial bonuses for successful completion of operational missions. It would be most helpful if they could be offered a termination clause that would provide for their reinstatement or re-entrance on active duty in the Air Force. Obviously, these pilots would have to be told initially that this program had the blessing of the U. S. Government and specifically of the United States Air Force.

"We feel that recruitment could be carried out in the following steps:

"a. Initially a communication would be addressed to specific Wing Commanders through the appropriate Air Force command channels which would describe in a rather general way the intention of a civilian organization to recruit pilots in accordance with the cover story, indicate that the Air Force looked with favor upon the project, and ask that the recipients indicate the names of individuals in their units who would be

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likely candidates and could meet the qualifications specified above.

"b. From the names thus submitted, a list of candidates would be selected and Wing Commanders would be notified of the individuals in their units who were to be approached.

"c. The approach to the candidates would be made by a civilian representative of the cover organization. This representative would make it clear to the candidates that they were under no restriction in discussing the proposal with their Commanding Officers.

"It is believed that we should get started on this program at the earliest practical date since it will be necessary, first to run a security check on all personnel nominated by the respective Wing Commanders prior to contact and, second, to provide some time lapse to allow their separation from the service and employment by the cover organization prior to their actual training in project aircraft.

"If this proposal meets with your approval, we are prepared to staff out the details with whomever you might designate as your project officer. Col. George O. McCafferty is designated as the project officer for this Agency." 1/

The Air Force agreed to supply a limited number of pilots from SAC for the first detachment. (As it developed, SAC eventually furnished pilots for all three detachments.) Arrangements were made for cleared USAF officers in the Pentagon and at the SAC fighter bases

1/ TS-103563, 13 June 1955. Memorandum for Chief of Staff, USAF, Attn: Lt. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

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to be visited to screen likely candidates and arrange for interviews by an AMD officer accompanied by a Security Officer and a Personnel Officer from the project staff (all working in alias).

Recruiting Procedures

The first pilot recruiting trip was made on 7 November 1955 to Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia, and resulted in four candidates. The following week Bergstrom Air Force Base in Austin, Texas, was visited, netting four more. A second visit to Albany in March 1956 secured eight pilots out of eighteen interviewed, and in June 1956 teams visited Malmstrom Air Force Base at Great Falls, Montana, and Larson Air Force Base at Moses Lake, Washington, where a total of 15 candidates were signed up. The procedures employed by the recruiting teams were generally as follows:

a. The first interview was held in a hotel or motel room with proper security safeguards being observed. The following proposition was made: An American organization (unnamed) was seeking to recruit a group of volunteer pilots for hazardous flying with commensurate pay. It would be necessary to resign from the Air Force but a guarantee of reinstatement would be furnished in writing. If the pilot was interested he was asked to return for a second interview.

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b. At the second interview a hypothetical overflight mission for electronic intelligence collection against Russia was outlined. Terms of contract were stated as \$775 per month (general duty status), \$1500 per month (operational duty status), and \$1000 per month bonus (to be paid on completion of assignment), a total of \$30,000 per year maximum, plus subsistence, insurance and medical expenses to be paid by the organization.

c. Those willing to sign up were given instructions for further processing which included: a week-long physical and psychological examination at the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque; measurement for partial pressure suit and fitting of the suit; altitude chamber test at Wright Patterson; and polygraph and psychiatric interview by Agency Security Office and Medical Staff.

Before signing a contract, the recruit was given an operational briefing on the capability of the aircraft and equipment and on the true sponsor of the project. He was also afforded an opportunity to talk with a Headquarters USAF personnel and legal officer and to read the guarantee of reinstatement into the Air Force signed by Generals White and Twining. The contract was then signed, the men were photographed, fingerprinted, given their individual cover story and sent back to their bases to resign from the Air Force.

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[redacted]

With the signing of the first eight USAF pilots, less emphasis was placed on acquisition of more foreign pilots for the project, although recruitment continued under ZESTFUL to satisfy other Agency needs. In November 1955 the Project Director said in a status report to the DCI:

"We are at present planning to use American pilots, because of their greater proficiency and trustworthiness... In order to have a second string to our bow, we have recruited and are carrying out the basic training of some six to eight non-U.S. [redacted] pilots who could be used if political circumstances dictated." 1/

In mid-December 1955 [redacted] pilots had passed their physicals and initial checkout and were put into advanced pilot training at a USAF base (under AMD sponsorship) while awaiting a decision as to their use. [redacted] pilots had been turned over to the P2V program.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

In April 1956 Col. McCafferty and Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary visited the [redacted] at their training base and pronounced them fully qualified on the basis of proficiency, language

1/ TS-142630, 19 November 1955. Status Report on Project.

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and morale to be used on Project AQUATONE. There were four of the original eight left at this point; the others had chosen to return to [redacted] after having been away from home almost a year.

Since it was still felt desirable to have some fully qualified foreign pilots available in the event political conditions prevented the use of Americans, the [redacted] were sent to Watertown in late June 1956 for training in the U-2.

[redacted]

Before their departure for training, the Cover Officer had searched in vain for a means of fitting the [redacted] into the project cover story. With the acceptance of sponsorship by NACA as cover, the very attribute for which these [redacted] were recruited (that of being non-Americans) was now a drawback, for the use of civilian pilots of foreign origin was fundamentally incompatible with NACA procedures. [redacted] recommendation to the Project Director was:

"If other considerations dictate that we must employ the [redacted] pilots in AQUATONE, I would recommend that they continue to be handled [redacted] as they have been in the past. The inherent problems and security risk of such an arrangement would have to be recognized and accepted." 1/

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1/ SAPC-6734, 5 June 1956. Memo to Project Director from Cover Officer.

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
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In [redacted] opinion the [redacted] pilots should have been written off before the U-2 training was begun, because cover-wise they jeopardized the entire program; this view was shared by the Project Security Officer.

Due partly to language problems, the [redacted] had a difficult time learning to fly the U-2 and on 15 July 1956, Colonel William Yancey, commander of the training unit, reported that they were not qualified to continue in the U-2 program. (Cols. McCafferty and Geary disputed this determination by the SAC training commander but to no avail.) The [redacted] pilots were returned to Washington and the decision was made (with the concurrence of Gen. [redacted]) to keep them in the United States until the end of the project because of the extensive knowledge of the whole operation they had acquired at Watertown. A year's program of study and training was arranged for them and in October 1956 their cases were turned over to the Contacts Division of the Office of Operations for administration.



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Once operational overflights began, the need to use other than U. S. pilots did not arise again until the long political stand-down of overflights. In February 1958 the British were offered pilot training in the U-2 and participation in the program, which they accepted, and in January 1961 an agreement was signed with the Chinese Nationalists for a joint reconnaissance program over Mainland China using Chinese Air Force pilots. Other than in these two joint programs, only American pilots have been used in the program.

Pilot Cover

In April 1956 arrangements were worked out with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for furnishing employment cover for the contract U-2 pilots while assigned to the project. This plan was developed as described by Mr. Bissell in a memorandum to the Contracting Officer:

"Discussions to date have indicated the feasibility of an arrangement with Lockheed whereby the pilots under Project AQUATONE will appear to have been hired by Lockheed as Flight Test Consultants. Checks will be issued by Lockheed for the monthly compensation of each pilot although none of these funds will inure to the benefit of the individuals. In fact they will be required to sign a classified document acknowledging that the open contract establishes no right and obligations between Lockheed and the pilots.

"It has been agreed by NACA that a purported contract will be prepared whereby Lockheed is to furnish the services of certain pilots under a services contract with NACA.

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Contemporaneously a contract will be entered into between the Agency and Lockheed reflecting the true arrangements and acknowledging that the NACA contract confers no legal rights. The arrangements are such that the purported billings under the NACA-Lockheed contract will be in fact the billings and reimbursement under the Lockheed/CIA contract. The services contract will call for payment of \$10,000 per year per pilot for a group of approximately 30 pilots. The actual administrative charge to the Agency for this service will be \$250 per month for the entire group. For security reasons within the accounting system of Lockheed it will be necessary that an advance be made to Lockheed by the Agency in the amount of \$25,000 which, in effect, will be utilized as a revolving fund for their payments. Under these arrangements we will require Lockheed not to file with Federal or State tax agencies the normal types of information returns such as the Federal Form 1099 and the California Form 599. In view of this possible technical violation of law, Lockheed will require indemnification for possible additional costs." 1/

The pilot cover contracts negotiated with Lockheed in 1956 (numbered NA-W-6471 and NA-W-6471(R)) have been extended year by year to continue the arrangements described above, and were still in effect for Fiscal Year 1968.

For their overseas assignments the pilots were documented as civilian contract consultants to the three Weather Reconnaissance Squadrons, and deployed on military orders issued by the HEDCOM cover unit (the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group).

1/ TS-143292, 12 April 1956. Memorandum for Contracting Officer from Project Director.

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Pilot Morale

In the first year of training and operations there were those (including the Project Flight Surgeon) who considered that the pilots were being overfostered in many respects by various project staff who administered pilot affairs. However, in view of the investment made to bring each of the pilots to a state of operational proficiency in the U-2 aircraft, and of the high hopes for the success of their mission, it was to be expected that every possible effort would be made to keep these men in a state of physical health and comfort, and of mental wellbeing.

The large majority of the pilots joined the program because of the monetary rewards involved and therefore careful attention to all matters relating to their individual finances was a crucial factor in the maintenance of morale. One headquarters finance officer was occupied almost full time keeping the pilots' financial affairs running smoothly,

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There were of course other important factors in maintaining the pilots' morale, including the improvement of personal equipment and procedures relating to the flying of missions from both a safety and a comfort standpoint; the guarantee of some flying time in other aircraft than the U-2; liberal rest and rehabilitation policies; prompt handling of personal mail through the security postal system, as well as attention to family emergencies; and assistance to those desiring to apply for regular Air Force commissions. A principal cause of low morale among the pilots as well as other detachment members, over which the Project Headquarters had no control, was the forced inactivity which recurred during periods of political stand-downs.

Pilot Contracts

The terms of the original contract signed in January 1956 by the first group of pilots provided, in addition to a monthly salary of \$775 when in general duty status and \$1500 when in operational duty status, a bonus payment of \$1,000 per month, to be accumulated for payment upon completion of the contract, provided termination was not for cause.

In March 1956, after discussion among themselves at Watertown, the eight pilots then in training signed a joint memorandum protesting the inequity of the bonus clause and requesting that the full \$1,000 bonus

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be credited to them monthly, even though payment might be delayed a year. This in effect amounted to treating the bonus as current salary. This requested change was reviewed by the Project Director of Administration with the General Counsel, and a counter-proposal (approved by the DCI on 20 March 1956) was made to the pilots whereby \$500 of the \$1,000 bonus would be credited on a monthly basis (although for tax purposes it would not be payable until the succeeding calendar year). The other \$500 would be payable upon successful completion of the contract and would not be paid if the individual were terminated for cause. The revised contracts were signed by all the pilots on 21 March and all agreed at that time that it appeared to them to be a very good contract. (See Annex 66 for terms of the contract.)

The 21 March 1956 version of the pilot contract remained in effect until the end of 1957. In view of the plan for the continuation of AQUATONE activities abroad and the imminent expiration of many of the pilot contracts, it was felt that new contracts should be signed by all those who were to be retained in the project. In view of the experience they had acquired over two years of operations, it was desired to retain as many as possible in order to avoid cost and delay of training new pilots. Although Col. Geary recommended (and Mr. Cunningham

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agreed) that the new contracts should be written at a lower figure, this suggestion was disapproved by the Deputy Project Director (Col. Jack Gibbs) who felt that the pilots should not be penalized because the Air Force was flying the same type of equipment at a lower cost, nor should they be penalized because they were flying fewer missions per month than had been anticipated when the pay scale was fixed. The General Counsel's Office (Mr. John Warner) agreed with Col. Gibbs. Certain increases were provided in the new contract and at the same time the pilots were accorded the privilege of having their dependents accompany them to Turkey or Japan. A comparison of the new contract with the old shows the following:

<u>Former Contract</u>	<u>New Contract</u>
General Duty Status \$775 monthly	\$1,000 monthly
Operational Duty Status \$1,500 monthly (both in the U.S. and overseas)	\$1,250 monthly (U.S.) \$1,500 monthly (overseas)
First \$500 increment: An amount of \$500 to be credited on the books of the Agency for each month of satisfactory service in an operational duty status overseas and to be paid in the year following that year during which it was earned.	Same.

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An amount calculated at the rate of \$500 per month for each month of satisfactory service in an operational duty status overseas to be paid provided services not terminated for cause based on misconduct or abandonment of obligations as set forth in the contract. This accumulated amount to be paid within a three (3) year period from termination of contract.

Same for overseas duty but now also applies to operational duty status in the U.S. and is to be paid within a 4-year period from termination of contract.

Post differential:

No provision.

To receive a post differential at rates established by the Project Director while serving at certain overseas locations.

The terms of the new contract were effective 1 January 1958 and ran through December 1959 in most cases. At this point there were seventeen of the original thirty pilots recruited in 1956 who signed for another two years. Air Force approval for the extension was granted verbally by General O'Donnell through Colonel Geary. At the end of 1959 all the pilots were extended for a fifth year under the same terms, and with Air Force approval again obtained verbally by Colonel Geary.

On 31 October 1960, six pilots were released for return to the Air Force (one having returned earlier that year) which left ten available. At this point action to extend or modify contracts was held in abeyance

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pending the outcome of high level deliberations regarding the future use of CHALICE assets. As an interim measure pilot contracts were extended on a month-to-month basis in the form of simple amendments approved by the General Counsel which in no way affected or altered the provisions of the existing contracts; the periods specified for return to the Air Force or for simple separation remained the same.

At the beginning of 1961, when Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base had just been revamped into an operational group, the Acting Chief of the Development Projects Division, Col. Stanley W. Beerli, recommended that pilot contracts be renegotiated to provide a payment of \$1,750 per month for active duty status, and a bonus of \$750 for each month in which the pilot either was assigned to a mission involving overflight of foreign territory, or was given an unusual task to perform as determined by the Division. This rate of pay was approved 17 February 1961 by the DD/P and contracts then in effect were extended at this rate of pay to the end of 1961 (see Annex 67).

Meanwhile an elaborate program of medical, psychological, proficiency and security evaluations of the current pilot slate resulted in the decision to release three more to the Air Force as of 31 July 1961. A one-year contract for calendar year 1962 and a further one-year

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extension for 1963 was signed with the remaining seven who were assigned at Detachment G where they were occupied in testing aircraft and equipment, training other pilots, and flying operational missions from staging areas as required.

A new contract was negotiated for calendar year 1964 (when a few new pilots were recruited) wherein the principal change was the introduction of a graduated pay scale based on years of Agency service, as follows:

Up to two years of service, \$24,000 per annum;
Over two years and up to four years, \$30,000; and
Over four years, \$36,000.

Other emoluments than salary remained approximately the same as before. The terms of this contract have remained in effect since 1964 with extensions being made for a year at a time.

Insurance and Death Benefits

The original contract with the pilots provided that the Agency would arrange insurance and pay the premiums thereon as follows:

A \$15,000 policy with United Benefits Life Insurance Company (UBLIC);
A \$15,000 policy with War Agencies Employees Protective Association (WAEPA); and
An \$18,000 policy with Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI).

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[redacted] was consulted on the legality of the proposed insurance coverage and he endeavored to secure alternate coverage from commercial companies on a sterile basis. He was particularly anxious to remove the pilot category of employee from the Agency-sponsored plan as underwritten by UBLIC in order to protect the interests of the other Agency employees insured thereunder. He was unsuccessful in this effort.

Meanwhile, on 15 May 1956, pilot Wilburn Rose was killed in a training accident at Watertown and death benefits had to be paid under the UBLIC policy, administered by Government Employees Health Association (GEHA). On 31 May 1956, the GEHA Board of Directors met and passed a resolution making AQUATONE's contract pilots ineligible for UBLIC coverage. They asked the Agency also to cancel those policies already written thereunder.

The whole matter of insurance for the pilots was then taken under study by the General Counsel. The GEHA Board was upheld in its position and the policy was established and approved by the Director on 18 January 1957 that the Agency (through AQUATONE) would underwrite the GEHA payment of death benefits on pilots. This was done by making advance payments to GEHA: the first for \$53,000 (\$30,000 to cover

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benefits paid out on the second and third fatality which occurred in the interim) and \$1,000 per man per year in the form of premiums to build up a reserve. The cryptonym JBMAVBUSH was assigned to this accounting mechanism by the Project Comptroller to afford secure handling of these arrangements.

Ironically, the second and third fatal accidents requiring the payment of death benefits occurred in 1956 while the insurance matter was being thrashed out, but the program then went for eight years without a fatality involving a contract American pilot.

In January 1964, Colonel Jack Ledford (then Acting Director of Special Activities) recommended, and obtained approval for, the discontinuance of the special coverage arrangements in favor of regular coverage at the normal rate for all personnel, since the OXCART pilots had been accepted for UBLIC coverage. As fate willed it, the coverage had scarcely been arranged when the next fatality occurred in April 1964 at Edwards Air Force Base. On 1 June 1964 the balance of funds held in reserve by GEHA amounting to \$77,500 were returned to OSA and the JBMAVBUSH account was liquidated.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Pilot Emergency Procedures

During early contingency planning for possible loss of a U-2 in hostile territory, the Project Security Officer put forward the following considered opinion of the Office of Security on the subject:

"We should not undertake any actual U-2 mission without a completely satisfactory destruction device. Moreover, we should consider the need to issue specific instructions to carry and use the 'L' pill... consideration must be given to the moral and religious aspects of leaving the final decision to the individual. Such instructions would place the ultimate responsibility for this extreme measure with the United States Government. We would want to assure ourselves that pilot personnel absolutely dispose of the 'L' pill in the event they fell into enemy hands and failed to utilize it. Possession would be contrary to our cover explanation and thwart any explanation that the aircraft was on a peaceful flight but merely off course." 1/

The question of a destructor for the aircraft was handled with the aid of Lockheed who designed a simple detonator with a three-pound charge which could be activated by the pilot as he prepared for emergency ejection from the aircraft. The question of self-destruction was a thornier problem and after the weightiest consideration by responsible project officers, a consignment of lethal ampoules was sent to each of the commanding officers of the field units along with a letter of instruction

1/ SAPC-4234, 12 March 1956. Memorandum to Project Director from [redacted] Project Security Officer.

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which read in part:

"The philosophy underlying the furnishing of these devices... is that these ampoules are to be 'made available' to the pilot just prior to the commencement of a mission over enemy territory. The individual pilot is under no obligation to carry an ampoule on his person during a mission, but he must have the opportunity of deciding on his own if he wishes to carry such a device. Even if carried, he is obviously under no compulsion to employ it if captured, though he should be advised of what treatment it is conceivable he might receive at the hands of the enemy, almost regardless of the information he is authorized to tell them or is finally compelled to reveal. However, should he decide, when first reaching enemy territory, that he does not wish to employ the device, he should be cautioned to dispose of it immediately lest its presence on his person give rise to certain suspicions about the exact nature of his mission. Again however, should he elect to try to conceal the ampoule, it is well to indicate that it can be swallowed whole and passed through the system without harm, or it can be secreted elsewhere in the body, though it is likely that in a thorough search even such a place of concealment would be discovered." 1/

Later, when operations began, the furnishing of an ampoule was added to the mission pre-flight check list, the Commanding Officer or his Deputy being the responsible agents, and the pilot made his own choice to carry one, or not, at that point. Most of the emergency planning, however, was done on the premise that the pilot would be captured alive by the enemy, despite the harsher alternative presented by Security.

1/ TS-143454, 2 May 1956. Letter to Commanding Officer, Detachment A, from the Project Director.

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When the Commanding Officer of Detachment A in March 1956 suggested giving his pilots broad intelligence briefings on the order of a National Intelligence Estimate, he was advised by the Director of Operations, then Col. A. M. "Mike" Welsh, that no intelligence should be passed to pilots except tactical intelligence such as defensive capabilities which might affect their missions. Col. Welsh was in favor of adopting a liberal policy, allowing the pilot to tell all he knew in the event of capture in order to obtain preferential treatment from the enemy. This, however, meant insuring that the pilot did not have knowledge of matters which should be kept from the enemy.

The following preliminary conclusions in the area of contingency planning were reached by the Project Director in agreement with his staff, in March 1956:

"The pilots' equipment, preparation, and briefing should be designed to contribute in every way possible to high morale without increasing the grave dangers inherent in the loss of a U-2 behind enemy lines. Specific preparations for this contingency should be made.

"a. Pilots should be briefed on escape and evasion methods and if they desire arrangements should be made for escape and evasion training either at Watertown [redacted] /This was carried out with the pilots of all three detachments [redacted] by Office of Training staff."/

"b. Pilots should be given the best possible survival equipment subject to weight and space limitation; the

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personal equipment will be sterilized with respect to USAF markings or identification.

"c. The pilot will be informed about the 'L' pill and permitted to carry one if he so desires but will receive no firm instructions to use it or not to use it.

"d. The pilot will be told he is perfectly free to tell the full truth about his mission with the exception of understating moderately the performance of the aircraft. He will be advised to represent himself as a civilian, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of his mission.

"e. Such briefing would leave the pilot the greatest possible freedom, by responding to interrogation to safeguard himself from extreme treatment." 1/

An instruction for pilots concerning their action in the event of an emergency was drafted by Colonel Welsh based largely on the above conclusions and later cleared with the DDCI and the Air Force. This instruction was issued as Operations Policy Letter No. 6 on 15 May 1956 at the time Detachment A was deploying to the field, and was in effect when Francis Gary Powers went down in Russia. (See Annex 68 for text.) After that event and the subsequent Russian revelations of information obtained from their prisoner through interrogation and presented at his trial, Operations Policy Letter No. 6 was revised to

1/ SAPC-4082, 22 March 1956. Memorandum to Staff from Project Director, Subject: Planning for Contingency of Loss of a U-2.

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place greater stress on the absolute necessity for destruction of the aircraft in an emergency, and to limit the information which a captured pilot should volunteer. This revised version was issued in December 1960.

In 1961 a program was begun in coordination with the Office of Training, Security and Medical Staff, during which the IDEALIST and OXCART pilots received risk-of-capture training and were assessed individually for their ability to withstand interrogation. Specific individual training was developed and conducted on a continuing basis. As an outgrowth of this program, Headquarters Directive 50-1055-24, meant to replace Operations Policy Letter No. 6, was drafted in March 1964, subsequently redrafted several times and finally passed forward for approval in October 1964 by Col. Ledford. The new directive was based on the theory that "resistance in successive positions" is more effective for a captive than attempted rigid adherence to a doctrine such as giving name, rank and serial number. The "successive positions" were defined and permissible and impermissible disclosures by the pilot were set forth.

The Executive Director/Comptroller (Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick) expressed disagreement with permitting a captive pilot to admit his

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CIA affiliation; the D/P (Mr. Helms) on the other hand recommended that the pilot be instructed to give only name, date and place of birth, address, and CIA affiliation, and disagreed with the idea of imposing a complicated set of instructions regarding fall-back positions upon the pilot who would, finding himself in hostile hands, already be under psychological pressure. The draft directive was returned to OSA in January for rewrite.

Months later, after many conferences, a meeting chaired by Col. Lawrence K. White produced an agreed version which set forth clearly permissible and impermissible disclosures and placed fewer demands upon a captive's judgment than did the former policy letter. It was dated October 1965 and was approved on 15 November 1965 by Mr. Helms (who at that time had succeeded to the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The directive was entitled "Policy Governing Conduct of Resistance to Interrogation Training, and Guidance for Project Pilots Forced Down in Hostile Territory". It was presented to the National Security Council's "Special Group" on 26 November 1965 and approved by that group on 16 December 1965. (See Annex 69 for text.) As of the end of 1968 this directive, fortunately, had not needed to be invoked.

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In August 1960, the Project Security Officer, Mr. William J. Cotter, recommended terminating all contract pilots and recruiting and training six or eight new ones from SAC. Mr. Cunningham agreed and said he felt it was asking for trouble to move ahead with plans for Soviet overflights or even peripheral collection flights using the present group. Col. Beerli concurred in this recommendation. However, since the proposed renewal of overflights from Detachment B did not receive approval, the question of risking overflights with the currently assigned pilots became academic.

In late 1961, when U-2 operations were being conducted over Cuba and in the Far East, Mr. Cotter brought the matter up again in a memorandum to the Acting Chief, DPD:

"In view of the continued operational activity in IDEALIST and taking cognizance of the probability that this activity will continue for some time in the future, it is the strong opinion of this Branch that immediate action be initiated to recruit and train new pilots.

"The present staff of pilots available to DPD possess a wealth of knowledge concerning a broad spectrum of Agency intelligence activities. Although it must be assumed that certain of this information is already available to the RIS as a result of the 1 May incident, I suggest that grievous damage would result from additional information or confirmatory data which would be extracted from one of the present pilots in the event he were lost to the opposition.

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"I recognize the technical qualifications of the present staff of pilots is exceptional. I suggest, however, that we consider spotting, recruiting, processing and training, gradually, replacements for the present staff in the interests of sound security." 1/

In June 1963, one additional pilot was recruited and in June 1964 two more were recruited, all three from the U. S. Air Force. In November 1964, one U. S. Navy pilot was added, and one of the British pilots from the JACKSON contingent at Detachment G resigned his commission in the R. A. F. and was hired as a contract pilot in his status of resident alien. As of July 1967, four out of the original thirty pilots recruited in 1955-56 were still with Detachment G, each having served with the program for eleven years. (See Annex 70 for a listing of U-2 pilots, 1956-1967).

1/ DPD-5485-61, 8 September 1961. Memorandum for AC/DPD from Chief, DPD Security Staff.

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Aeromedical Support and Pilot Personal Equipment

At an early meeting of the Project Staff in January 1955, Col. Ritland recommended that the project seek the advice and assistance of a top-notch aeromedical expert as soon as possible. There were a wide variety of physical and psychological problems involved in long-range, high altitude flights which must be explored. No one had flown above 50,000 feet for much more than an hour or two and at 60,000 feet for only minutes. He recommended that Dr. Randolph Lovelace of the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque be consulted, since he was the outstanding expert in the country, having been involved in most of the Air Force work in the aeromedical field.

It was discovered that Dr. Lovelace was out of the Air Force picture at the moment and was concentrating on developing his clinic. Mr. Trevor Gardner was anxious for the aeromedical work on the project to begin immediately and recommended that Brig. Gen. Don D. Flickinger, Commander of the Office of Scientific Research of ARDC, be chosen to head up this work. Approval was given by Gen. Putt and Gen. Thomas Power (then Commander of ARDC) for Gen. Flickinger's participation in the program and for the use of all available Air Force facilities and research and development in the aeromedical field.

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General Flickinger immediately began to look for candidates with the special skills and training required to support the project, and to monitor closely the development and testing of pilot personal equipment. At the first suppliers' meeting in April 1955, he reported that the partial pressure suit planned for use by the U-2 pilots had proven effective for periods from 30 minutes to seven hours at 50,000 feet after descending from 65,000, depending on the condition of the pilot. The full pressure suit being developed by the Air Force was under high priority study and might possibly be ready by September 1956.

Early personnel nominations by Gen. Flickinger were:

Major George Steinkamp, Project Medical Officer; and Major Leo V. Knauber, Physiological Training Officer, who was largely instrumental in setting up the aeromedical facility at Watertown between July and September 1955. Lt. Col. Philip Maher of the Human Factors Division of the Air Force Surgeon General's Office assisted Gen. Flickinger in meeting project requirements, including furnishing medical supplies and training aids, monitoring the equipment contracts, and securing Air Force technicians to man the test site and the detachments.

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Medical services at the test site during the first six weeks of operation (including assignment of a doctor to the base until the arrival of the Project Flight Surgeon in mid-September 1955) were furnished by the Lovelace Clinic under an existing Air Force contract. At the end of 1955 the project contracted directly with Lovelace for its services, principally for pilot examinations, but also for continuing medical support for Watertown when needed. Reports on pilot examinations and Lovelace recommendations thereon were sent to the Project Flight Surgeon at Washington Headquarters and it was then his responsibility to secure appropriate review and approval by General Flickinger on behalf of the Air Force, and by the CIA Medical Staff. The area of responsibility of the Agency Medical Staff with regard to passing on these examinations and the criteria on which they were based, and with regard to other medical aspects of the project, was not clearly understood by the Project Flight Surgeon (Maj. Steinkamp), and it was well into 1956 before proper liaison and coordination between the Agency Medical Staff (represented by Dr. Frank Gibson), and Maj. Steinkamp was established.

Procedures were set up at the beginning of the training period at Watertown for interrogation of the U-2 pilots immediately following

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each flight. Interrogations were conducted by the assigned Flight Surgeon and/or Aviation Physiologist who were skilled in extracting the information relating to personal equipment and to the physical and psychological reactions of the pilots, which was needed for improving equipment and for establishing rules and procedures for safety of flight.

As with other critical categories of Air Force personnel, medical officers and NCO technicians were very difficult to obtain and late in arriving. To add to the medical staff shortage, the Air Force personal equipment specialist at Watertown was killed in the Mount Charleston crash of the MATS shuttle in November 1955, and the physiological training officer, Major Knauber, suffered a heart attack in the early spring of 1956 and had to be withdrawn from participation in the project. A contract for the services of a personal equipment technician for each base was written with the Firewel Company (which subcontracted for the manufacture of the pressure suit and auxiliary equipment), but these technicians had to be recruited and trained and were not available in the early training phase. A full-time Flight Surgeon for Watertown, Maj. James Deuel, reported for duty the first of June 1956, by which time the medical and equipment problems were beginning to smooth out.

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While certain parts of the pilots' personal equipment existed in Air Force stocks, modifications to the pressure suit and other components were deemed necessary for the environment to be experienced in the U-2, and therefore a period of development and testing of these items of equipment had to be undertaken along with the aircraft and systems testing. At the end of March 1956, Col. Ritland noted that although the history of personal equipment had been poor at the start, continuous improvement had been made in each item, and he anticipated that by the time Detachment B deployed in August 1956, this equipment would be standardized and available in sufficient quantities to meet project needs. The situation did improve through the summer of 1956 so that the Project Flight Surgeon was able to report in October that the personal equipment situation was in excellent shape both supply-wise and in operation, as was also the level of training of detachment personnel.

In the fall of 1957 when the Project Flight Surgeon's two year tour finished, it was agreed that a replacement at Headquarters would not be required, since the aeromedical needs of the two remaining field detachments and the test group which had moved to Edwards were being met routinely. General Flickinger was more easily available to the

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Project Headquarters staff for advice and consultation since A RDC Headquarters had moved meanwhile from Baltimore to Andrews Air Force Base on the outskirts of Washington. Therefore the Headquarters Medical Officer slot was cancelled and a Physiological Training Officer was assigned to Headquarters with the main task of monitoring the development and testing of personal equipment and establishing proper procedures for training the pilots in the use thereof. This policy has continued to the present.

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ANNEX 66

(Terms of Original Contract Signed by U-2 Pilots January 1956)
As Amended in March 1956

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY wishes to employ you in connection with an activity which has been discussed with you in some detail. The relationship created under this contract is classified in accordance with Agency regulations and is information affecting the national defense within the meaning of Sections 793 and 794 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

1. For the duration of this contract your services will be reserved exclusively for Agency activities, and you will make yourself available for these activities at such times and places as the Agency may direct.

2. You will carry out such instructions as the Agency may from time to time impart to you. Normally, you will receive instructions through your immediate superior, who is also your normal channel for communication with the Agency. You will be kept fully informed as to whom this official will be.

3. For these services you will be paid monthly for the duration of this contract in accordance with the following scale:

a. General Duty Status - \$775.00 per month.

This status will be in effect until reporting for duty at the first site and will be in effect in the event the activities contemplated are discontinued.

b. Operational Duty Status - \$1,500.00 per month.

This status will begin upon first arrival at the initial site and will continue so long as you are engaged in the contemplated activities whether in this country or elsewhere and in the event the activities contemplated are discontinued, you will be continued in an operational duty status for a period of ninety (90) days. Also, in the event you are unable by reason of misconduct or refuse without reasonable cause to engage in the contemplated activities, you will revert to general duty status.

c. In addition to the above amounts there will be credited on the books of this Agency an amount of \$500.00 for each month of service in an operational duty status overseas. At your option,

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in lieu of crediting this amount on the books, a \$500.00 Series G United States Savings Bond will be purchased in your name. However, this amount or the bonds will not be paid or delivered to you until after the first day of the calendar year following the performance of service for which these amounts or bonds are applicable. Fractional portions of a month will be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month.

d. In addition, an amount calculated at the rate of \$500.00 per month for each month of satisfactory service in an operational duty status overseas will be paid to you provided your services are not terminated for cause based on your misconduct or abandonment of your obligations hereunder. This amount will be paid within a three (3) year period from termination of this contract and the specific date of payment will be at the sole discretion of the Agency. Fractional portions of a month will be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month.

e. Compensation currently payable will be paid on or about the tenth day of the month succeeding the month in which earned. Payment shall be made in a manner requested by you in writing provided the method is acceptable to the Agency.

(1) From compensation payable to you there will be deducted appropriate amounts for withholding for Federal income tax purposes and Social Security deductions.

(2) You will file annual Federal income tax returns in a manner approved by this Agency.

f. The determinations required under this paragraph will normally be made by your immediate superior and in any event final determination will be at the sole discretion of the Agency.

4. In addition to the compensation otherwise provided in this contract, you will be provided:

a. Quarters and meals during the entire period of your service while at locations designated by the Agency except while in a leave status, or in a general duty status in the continental United States.

b. Transportation including authorized travel expenses in substantial compliance with Agency regulations to and from areas of Agency activities or to and from such other points when the travel is directed and approved by the Agency.

c. Upon expiration or termination of this agreement, transportation to point of hire or such other point as may be mutually agreed.

d. Thirty (30) calendar days leave annually, accruing at the rate of 2-1/2 calendar days per month. Such leave will be accrued and credited in accordance with the duty status for the period in which earned. No more than 60 days leave may be accumulated. While on leave, you will continue to accrue leave and will be paid in accordance with your status immediately prior to commencement of leave. When leave accrued in one duty status is exhausted, additional leave taken will be charged against and paid at the rate of leave accrued in the other duty status. Unused leave standing to your credit at time of expiration or termination of this contract will be paid for on a lump-sum basis at the rate of earnings at the time of accrual, i. e., leave earned while in an operational duty status will be paid at the operational duty status rate of pay, and leave earned in a general duty status will be paid at that rate. All leave will be calculated on the basis of a 30-day month.

e. Transportation to and from such leave area as the Agency may approve.

f. Payment of medical costs and compensation for disability, injury or death incurred in performance of duty, to the extent provided by any applicable United States' laws or regulations.

g. In the event of sickness or injury to yourself not covered under this contract, you will be provided with the following:

(1) For minor injuries, sickness, and other medical and dental care, not requiring hospitalization, you will receive the office services of a doctor, selected by the Agency, free of charge, and necessary transportation in connection therewith, or, as deemed necessary and appropriate, medical care and treatment from appropriate facilities and doctors as may be approved by the Agency.

(2) The cost of hospitalization, or other specialized medical care for sickness or injury not due to your own misconduct, and necessary transportation in connection therewith.

h. In the event you are determined to be missing in service, benefits will be paid in accordance with Agency regulations on this subject which are in general accord with the principles of the Missing Persons Act.

5. The Agency has made arrangements whereby you will be eligible to secure certain life insurance and the Agency will pay the premiums on this life insurance. Payment of benefits under these various insurance programs will be in accordance with the laws, regulations and policies applicable in each case. The specific programs are as follows:

a. The life insurance plan underwritten by the United Benefit Life Insurance Company of Omaha, Nebraska. The face amount of this policy will be \$15,000.00.

b. The term life insurance policy available through the War Agencies Employees Protective Association which program is underwritten by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States. The face amount of this policy is \$15,000.00.

c. The Federal Employees Group Life Insurance program which was authorized by Public Law 598, approved 17 August 1954. The face amount of this policy will be established at the next higher multiple of \$1,000.00 which is in excess of the current annual compensation rate.

Appropriate application forms and designation of beneficiaries will be required to be executed. The settlement of any claims arising under these policies will be initiated by the Agency without the requirement that the beneficiaries initiate action. The beneficiaries, of course, will be required to execute appropriate documents which documents will be transmitted to the beneficiaries by the Agency through appropriate means.

6. You hereby agree to make no claim for any compensation, benefit or service, other than those provided in this contract.

7. The duration of this contract will be two (2) years from the effective date hereof except that it may be terminated by the Agency at any time for cause based on your misconduct, wilful failure to follow

instructions, or abandonment of your obligations under this contract. In the event the activities contemplated are discontinued you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment provided the Agency approves such application. If you do not apply for reinstatement under such circumstances this contract shall terminate sixty (60) days after the conclusion of the prescribed reinstatement period. In addition, if the Agency approves, you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment at any time. In any event, this contract shall terminate as of the date of your reinstatement. Further, this contract may also be terminated at any time by mutual agreement in which case all benefits accrued to the date of termination will be paid you.

8. The effective date of this agreement is _____.

9. Due to the security considerations surrounding this contract and your activities, disputes or disagreements as to the terms of the contract are not subject to appeal to any other instrumentality of the United States Government and the final authority shall vest with this Agency.

10. You hereby agree never to disclose either the fact of this relationship or any information which you may acquire as a result thereof to any person, except as the Agency may authorize in writing. This clause imposes an obligation on you which shall survive the termination of this contract.

11. Your signature hereon will constitute acceptance of the terms of this agreement.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By _____

ACCEPTED:

WITNESS:

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ANNEX 67

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(Terms of Pilot Contract as Amended Effective 1 January 1961)

Mr. _____

Dear Mr. _____:

Reference is made to your agreement with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective _____, as amended, a copy of which is attached hereto.

Effective _____, said agreement, as amended, is further amended as follows:

A. Paragraph 3. Delete sub-paragraphs a, b, c, d and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

"a. General Duty Status - \$1000.00 per month.

You will be placed in this status in the event your immediate supervisor determines that it is in the best interest of the contemplated activities, or in the event that you are unable by reason of lack or loss of personal proficiency in the contemplated activities, misconduct, or refusal without reasonable cause to engage in the contemplated activities, or if incapacitated as stated in paragraph 4e below, pending further decision of the Agency as to the future utilization of your services. Otherwise you will be in an:

b. Active Duty Status - (1) \$1250.00 per month.

(2) In addition, an amount calculated at the rate of \$500.00 per month for each month of satisfactory service in an Active Duty Status will be paid to you provided your services are not terminated for cause based on your misconduct or abandonment of your obligations hereunder. In the event your services are terminated for cause arising after 1 January 1961, the period of services from the commencement of this agreement to 1 January 1961 shall be considered a period of satisfactory service for the purpose of payments to be made under this sub-paragraph. The amount payable will be paid within a four (4)

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year period from the termination of this agreement and the specific date of payment will be at the sole discretion of the Agency. Fractional portions of a month will be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month. As of 1 January 1961, any amounts accrued under this agreement to 1 January 1961 will be placed in escrow by the Agency for your account and will be paid in accordance with the provisions of this section, provided however, that as to such amounts placed in escrow the conditions for payment included in the first sentence of this section shall not be applicable.

c. Bonus - \$750.00 per month.

(1) You will be paid \$250.00 for each calendar month in which you are assigned to participate in an operational mission which has as its objective the overflight of the territory of a foreign nation, or you perform an unusual task. What constitutes an unusual task will be determined by the Agency in its sole discretion. Payment under this sub-paragraph shall not exceed \$250.00 for any one calendar month.

(2) In addition to and for each bonus payment made under the above provision, there shall be concurrently credited on the books of this Agency the amount of \$500.00. At your option, in lieu of crediting this amount on the books, a \$500.00 United States Savings Bond of an appropriate type will be purchased in your name. However, this amount or the bonds will not be paid or delivered to you until after the first day of the calendar year following the performance of service for which these amounts or bonds are applicable."

B. Paragraph 4. Delete sub-paragraph d. Substitute new paragraph d as follows:

"d. Thirty (30) calendar days leave annually, accruing at the rate of two and one-half (2-1/2) calendar days per month. Monthly leave credit and accrual shall be at the following calendar day values:

General Duty Status	-	\$33.33 and 1/3 cent
Active Duty Status	-	\$58.33 and 1/3 cent
Active Duty Status		
with		
Bonus	-	\$83.33 and 1/3 cent

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While on leave, you will continue to accrue leave at the same calendar day value as you did immediately prior to commencement of leave. Leave will be charged on the same basis. All leave standing to your credit as of the effective date of this amendment will be converted to the above leave schedule with "Operational Duty Status Overseas" being equated to "Active Duty Status with Bonus", and "Operational Duty Status in the United States" being equated to "Active Duty Status". All leave will be calculated on a 30-day month. No more than ninety (90) days leave may be accumulated. Unused leave credited to your account at the time of expiration or termination of this contract will be paid for on a lump sum basis."

C. Paragraph 7. Delete paragraph 7 and substitute the following therefor:

"7. This agreement is effective as of _____ and shall continue thereafter through 31 December 1961, except that it may be terminated by the Agency at any time prior thereto for cause based on medical or other incapacitating reasons including lack or loss of personal proficiency, misconduct, willful failure to follow instructions, abandonment of the obligations under this agreement, or upon ninety (90) days actual notice. During the ninety day termination period, your Status (General Duty or Active Duty) as of the date of receipt of said notice shall remain unchanged. In the event of termination, you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment provided the Agency approves such application. If you do not apply for reinstatement within thirty (30) days after notification of termination, this agreement shall terminate sixty (60) days after the conclusion of such prescribed thirty (30) day reinstatement period. In addition, if the Agency approves, you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment at any time. In any event, this contract shall terminate as of the date of your reinstatement. Further, this contract may also be terminated at any time by mutual agreement in which case all benefits accrued to the date of termination will be paid you."

If the extension of the effective period of the agreement and the amendments occasioned thereby and set forth above are acceptable to you, would you indicate your acceptance at the place indicated below and return this letter and the copy of the agreement to the Contracting Officer.

ACCEPTED: _____

WITNESS: _____

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

By: _____

Special Contracting Officer

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ANNEX 68

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8 May 1956

OPERATIONS POLICY LETTER NO. 6

SUBJECT: Intelligence Briefings, Including Policy for Pilots
Forced Down in Hostile Territory

1. Purpose: The purpose of this policy letter is to furnish guidance to detachment commanders on the classified information which may be furnished to Project pilots concerning their mission, and the briefings which should be given to Project pilots on procedure and conduct to be adhered to in the event they are forced down in hostile territory. The policies set forth herein are general in nature. Specific information, as applicable, will be included in separate intelligence instructions.

2. Classified Information:

a. Generally, the classified intelligence information imparted to primary mission pilots should be limited to that information which is considered essential to the successful accomplishment of their mission. Non-essential information concerning equipment fabrication and capabilities, utilization of photography and ELINT information acquired, Project organization and personnel, etc., should be divulged only when the withholding of such information might adversely affect pilot morale and/or jeopardize the mission itself.

b. It should be stressed to the pilots during briefings that the less intelligence information they possess, consistent with mission requirements, the better it will be for them in the event of capture. For this reason it is imperative that they be limited to only such intelligence as is necessary to carry out their mission.

c. Comprehensive tactical intelligence briefings should be given to all primary mission pilots on those defensive capabilities which could directly affect their respective missions or which might enhance the possibilities of safe return to friendly territory in the event of an emergency. These briefings should include at least the following:

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- (1) Air order of battle
- (2) Radar order of battle
- (3) Anti-aircraft order of battle
- (4) Guided missile order of battle
- (5) Air escape routes
- (6) Detection, tracking and intercept capabilities
- (7) Aircraft performance and tactics

d. In addition, all primary mission pilots should be thoroughly indoctrinated in evasion and escape procedures and techniques, and conduct and procedures to be followed in the event they are forced down in hostile territory. (See paragraph 3, below)

3. Conduct and Procedures in Event of Emergency:

a. In the event of an emergency portending the loss of the aircraft behind enemy lines, the following procedures will be followed:

(1) If the emergency occurs in a populous area, prescribed procedures for demolition of the aircraft and classified equipment will be instituted. Under these conditions, bail out by the pilot will be standard procedure and a crash landing should not be attempted. These instructions, however, should not be construed as a restriction of the pilot's prerogative to attempt bail out or crash landing in neutral territory if there is a reasonable chance that such an attempt might be successful.

(2) In a remote area where the danger of immediate capture is less, a crash landing may be attempted at the option of the pilot, and the aircraft and equipment utilized for survival purposes. In this instance, the aircraft and classified equipment will be destroyed before departing the site of the crash landing.

b. After bail out or crash landing, if circumstances appear favorable, it is strongly recommended that evasion procedures and techniques be instituted immediately. Even when forced down on a deep penetration where successful evasion and ultimate return to friendly territory appears improbable, any delay in capture will be advantageous. In the final analysis, however, it will be the pilot's decision, based on the circumstances at the time, as to whether evasion will be attempted.

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c. Prior to deployment overseas, pilots will be given their choice of survival items to be included in their seat packs. Survival experts will furnish guidance on the selection of survival aids, if such assistance is desired.

d. If evasion is attempted, standard evasion techniques will be employed.

4. Conduct and Procedures in Event of Capture:

a. If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors.

b. At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.

c. Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission. They will be instructed, however, to understate moderately the performance of the aircraft in a plausible fashion. (It is recommended that stated capabilities should be decreased from actual capabilities by 10,000 feet altitude and 500 miles range). Such briefing should safeguard pilots from extreme treatment by permitting them the greatest possible latitude in responding to interrogations.

d. Pilots should make every effort to avoid discussing or divulging information given them during the tactical intelligence briefings on defensive capabilities; i. e., AOB, ROB, etc.

e. With regard to signed confessions, radio interviews, and similar activities which could be exploited for their propagandist value, all efforts must be made to resist.

5. Escape: Escape from captivity may be attempted at the discretion of the individual.

6. Policy and procedures for the conduct of pilots who are forced down in friendly or neutral territories will be as prescribed in Annex B of the Operational Order.

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ANNEX 69

~~TOP SECRET~~HEADQUARTERS DIRECTIVE
50-1055-24INTELLIGENCE
27 OCTOBER 1965POLICY GOVERNING CONDUCT OF RESISTANCE TO INTERROGATION
TRAINING AND GUIDANCE FOR PROJECT PILOTS FORCED DOWN IN
HOSTILE TERRITORY

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this directive, which supersedes Operations Policy Letter Number Six, is to furnish guidance to the detachment commander on the classified information which may be furnished to Project pilots concerning their mission, and the briefings and training which should be given to Project pilots on procedure and conduct to be adhered to in the event they are forced down in hostile territory. The policies set forth herein are general in nature. Specific information, as applicable, will be included in separate intelligence instructions and Operations Plan Intelligence annexes.

2. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

a. Generally, the classified intelligence information imparted to primary mission pilots must be limited to that information which is considered essential to the successful accomplishment of their mission. Non-essential information concerning equipment fabrication and capabilities utilization of photography and ELINT information acquired, Project organization and personnel, etc., will not be divulged.

b. It should be stressed to pilots immediately upon recruitment and in subsequent briefings that in the national interest, and in their own interest, it is desirable that the technical, operational, and intelligence information they possess be held to the absolute minimum consistent with mission requirements.

It is imperative that they be limited to only such intelligence as is necessary to carry out their mission.

c. Tactical intelligence briefings should be given to all primary mission pilots on those defensive capabilities which would directly affect their respective missions or which might enhance the possibility of safe return to friendly territory in the event of an emergency.

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d. Primary mission pilots should be thoroughly indoctrinated in evasion and escape procedures and techniques, and conduct in hostile territory. (See paragraph 4, below)

3. INFORMATION TO BE WITHHELD FROM PILOTS:

The following information has been and will continue to be withheld from Project pilots:

- a. Involvement or support of other governments;
- b. Mission approval mechanisms;
- c. Knowledge of any other non-project related CIA operations, locations or personnel;
- d. Non-project covert organizations, activities and modus operandi of CIA;
- e. Existence and accomplishments of related similar parallel reconnaissance programs;
- f. Communications network, equipment and operations.

4. CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY:

a. In the event of an emergency portending the loss of the aircraft within denied territory it is of paramount importance that the pilot insure the destruction of the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible. This can best be accomplished by ejecting at a safe altitude with the expectation that the aircraft will encounter major structural damage and burning upon ground impact. The pilot would be expected to actuate destruct systems installed in electronic countermeasure systems aboard.

b. After bail-out or crash landing, evasion procedures and techniques will be instituted immediately. Even when forced down on a deep penetration where successful evasion and ultimate return to friendly territory appears improbable, any delay in capture will be advantageous.

c. Standard evasion techniques will be employed.

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5. CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF CAPTURE WITHIN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC:

a. If all attempts to evade should fail and immediate capture is inevitable, pilots should surrender without resistance.

b. At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity.

c. When interrogated by their captors, pilots will freely furnish the following information only:

- (1) Name
- (2) Date and place of birth
- (3) Address in United States
- (4) CIA affiliation (civilian)

d. Beyond information in 5. c., all queries should be met by a respectful refusal to divulge any further information.

e. It is assumed that the Communists will resort to a variety of methods and techniques in order to extract information they wish to obtain. Resistance to interrogation training includes instruction on methods and techniques of interrogation, including those common to all organizations and those specifically found in each potential target country. Emphasis should be placed on the importance of delaying any disclosures which could be exploited by hostile propagandists.

f. Disclosure of personal information: The pilot is expected to resist interrogation beyond the information set forth in 5. c. If, during the process of interrogation, the prisoner believes that his resistance to interrogation would be strengthened by adopting a different stratagem, he would make available some additional information. This new information should be wholly of a personal nature which will hopefully buy time for him and the United States Government. The individual will be assessed and instructed as to those parts of his personal life which should not be discussed. Each pilot will be made aware of the potentially dangerous

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consequences of talking about himself indiscriminately. For example, the discussion of certain emotionally loaded areas of his personal life can be exploited by a skilled interrogator to generate more emotion and thereby impair the captive's rational processes that are necessary for successful resistance. Counselling provided the pilot beforehand attempts to point out his own emotionally laden areas and to advise him on ways of avoiding them in his sessions with the interrogator. He will be further instructed to draw out allowable personal disclosures in order to give as much time as possible.

g. Disclosure of "Intelligence" information: A third group of disclosures has been chosen which would appear to the interrogators to be valuable intelligence information but which, in reality, would do little if any harm to CIA, its personnel and operations, or to the prisoner. The disclosures should be held in reserve and used as a last resort and given one at a time as reluctantly as possible. If the pilot is convinced that he must make disclosures within this group, he should preface any such disclosures with a statement that for obvious reasons he was given very little information other than what was essential for him to complete his mission. Technical data concerning our reconnaissance systems were not made available to him; he simply "pushed buttons" as he was instructed to do. In addition, throughout his association with our Project he was stringently compartmented to prevent his acquiring information that was not essential to his primary function as a pilot.

(1) Name and position of one CIA (civilian) employee who sent the pilot on the mission;

(2) Limited modus operandi of CIA as it has been exposed to the pilot, and names of a few CIA detachment personnel he has met, stressing CIA involvement not military;

(3) Limited technical information on the mission aircraft (only the information needed for pilot operation and excluding all details of construction and payload);

(4) Names of contractor firms that may be involved in the Project but excluding detailed knowledge of their contributions;

(5) Involvement of military personnel in a support role only, as associated with the overt ostensible unit mission, i. e., cover story.

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6. INFORMATION TO BE WITHHELD FROM INTERROGATORS:

The individual will be specifically instructed to resist to the limit of his ability disclosing or confirming the following:

- a. Knowledge of, or involvement in past overflights;
- b. Confirmation that the entire detachment was involved in reconnaissance operations over denied territory and specifically that military personnel were knowledgeable of this mission;
- c. Confirmation that refueling aircraft bore Air Force markings;
- d. Knowledge of any classified military operations he may have been exposed to in his Air Force career;
- e. Technical information about the mission aircraft or its systems except for those basic cockpit instructions needed to operate the vehicle.

7. CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF CAPTURE IN HOSTILE AREAS OTHER THAN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC:

- a. If all attempts to evade should fail and immediate capture is inevitable, pilots should surrender without resistance.
- b. At all times while in custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity.
- c. Pilots, in these circumstances, will strictly adhere to the cover story given them prior to the mission. Their cover story will be an appropriate statement which will be tailored to the circumstances of specific missions, and will be set forth in detail in the Fragmentation Order for the mission, or series of missions if applicable.
- d. Headquarters will be responsible for issuing instructions prior to each mission concerning aircraft markings, preparation of cover props, composition of survival and E&E gear, etc., to insure to the greatest possible extent that recoverable evidence is consistent with the cover story.

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8. FRIENDLY OR NEUTRAL TERRITORIES:

Policy and procedures for the conduct of pilots who are forced down in friendly or neutral territories will be as prescribed in the Operations Plan.

9. PILOT INDOCTRINATION INTO HOSTILE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS:

Every effort will be made to acquaint the pilots with procedures followed in the various hostile judicial systems under which they could be imprisoned and tried. These systems will include the USSR and Communist China as well as others to which they could be subjected. Specific training and indoctrination will involve examples of undesirable legal or propaganda effects to be expected as a result of submitting to certain demands made by the pilots captors.

10. ESCAPE:

Escape from captivity may be attempted at the discretion of the individual.

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ANNEX 70

~~TOP SECRET~~U-2 PILOTS - 1955-1967

<u>Name</u>	<u>EOD</u>	<u>Detachment</u>	<u>Termination</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Abraham, James G.	28 May 56	B	14 Oct 56	[Redacted] Returned to Air Force.
Baker, Barry H	10 July 56	C, B & G	30 June 67	Returned to Air Force and took 20-yr retirement. Awarded DFC and 1st Oak Leaf Cluster.
Barnes, James A.	13 July 56	C, B & G		With Detachment G.
Birkhead, Thomas C.	14 May 56	B & C	31 Oct 60	Returned to Air Force.
Carey, Howard	30 Mar 56	A	17 Sept 56	Killed in explosion of U-2 after take-off from Wiesbaden.
Cherbonneaux, Jas. W.	4 Oct 56	B & G		With OSA; converted to Agency Staff.
Crull, Thomas L.	31 Jul 56	C	31 Oct 60	Returned to Air Force.
Dunaway, Glendon K.	19 Jan 56	A	31 Jul 61	Returned to Air Force.
Edens, Buster E.	16 May 56	B, C & G	25 Apr 65	Killed during U-2G test flight at Edwards; bailed out, chute failed to open.
Ericson, Robert J.	25 Aug 56	C, B & G		With Detachment G.

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of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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Gorman, Arthur W.	25 Aug 1956	C	12 Dec 1956	[REDACTED]
Grace, Frank G.	13 July 1956	A	31 Aug 1956	Killed in crash at Watertown at Take-off on a night practice flight.
Grant, Bruce G.	22 January 1956	A	12 July 1956	[REDACTED] returned to Air Force; [REDACTED]
Hall, William W.	1 June 1956	B & G	23 Jan 1958	Contract terminated on mutual agreement; returned to Air Force awarded second Oak Leaf Cluster to DFC.
Jones, Edwin K.	28 May 1956	B & C	31 July 1961	Returned to Air Force.
Kemp, Russell W., Jr.	25 Aug 1956	C	11 June 1957	[REDACTED] returned to Air Force.
Knutson, Martin A.	12 January 1956	A, B & G		With Detachment G.
Kratt, Jacob, Jr.	21 January 1956	A & C	31 July 1961	Returned to Air Force.

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FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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McMurray, William H.	13 May 1956	B & C	31 Oct 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Overstreet, Carl K.	9 Jan. 1956	A	8 Jan 1958	Returned to Air Force; awarded DFC.
Powers, Francis G.	14 May 1956	B	6 Oct 1962	Shot down by Russians 1 May 1960 near Sverdlovsk. After release and return to States, opted accept employment with Lockheed as test pilot.
Rand, Albert J.	31 July 1956	C, B & G		With Detachment G.
Rose, Wilburn S.	15 April 1956	A	15 May 1956	Killed in training accident at Watertown.
Rudd, Walter L.	31 July 1956	C	31 October 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Shinn, John C.	31 July 1956	C & B	31 October 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Smiley, Albert B.	25 August 1956	A	4 June 1957	Returned to Air Force; awarded 3rd Oak Leaf Cluster to DFC.
Stockman, Hervey S.	21 Jan 1956	A	20 Jan 1958	Returned to Air Force, awarded 1st Oak Leaf Cluster to DFC.
Strickland, Frank L.	31 July 1956	C	29 Oct 1956	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> returned to Air Force.

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under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

Snider, Sammy V. C.	16 May 1956	B & C	31 October 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Vito, Carmine A.	10 January 1956	A, 	18 April 1960	

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

partici-

pated in Indonesian over-
flight program

Returned to Air Force.

The following pilots were recruited subsequent to the initial thirty, listed above.

Bedford, James R., Jr.	27 June 1963	G	Recruited from Air Force.
Hall, Robert E.	24 June 1964	G	Recruited from Air Force.
McMurtry, Thomas C.	20 November 1964	G	Recruited from Navy.
Schmarr, Daniel W.	24 June 1964	G	Recruited from Air Force.
Webster, Ivor B.	16 November 1964	G	Former RAF (JACKSON) hired as resident alien.

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CHAPTER XI. DETACHMENT A.

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

Detachment A - Officer Cadre

Col. Frederic E. McCoy, Commanding Officer (Sept. 1955-June 1957)

- [Redacted]
- Lt. Col. Elmer Gould, Materiel Officer
- Maj. Philip Karas, Operations Officer
- Maj. George K. Reberdy, Medical Officer
- Maj. John T. Whitescarver, Intelligence Officer
- Maj. Fred W. Pope, Weather Officer
- Maj. Delbert E. Eversole, Pilot AOB, Intelligence Officer
- Maj. Henry H. Spann, Pilot AOB
- Maj. Samuel J. Cox, Jr., Photo Navigator
- Capt. Edward S. Majeski, Photo Navigator
- Capt. Russell E. Johnson, Physiological Training Officer

[Redacted]

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

U-2 Pilots:

- Howard Carey (killed on local training flight in Germany, 17 Sept 1956)
- Glendon K. Dunaway
- Frank G. Grace (killed on night training flight, Watertown, 31 Aug 1956)
- Bruce G. Grant [Redacted]
- Martin A. Knutson
- Jacob Kratt, Jr.
- Carl K. Overstreet
- Wilburn S. Rose (killed in training accident at Watertown, 15 May 1956)
- Albert B. Smiley
- Hervey S. Stockman
- Carmine A. Vito

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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CHAPTER XI. DETACHMENT A

Organization, Manning and Training of First Field Unit

On 7 September 1955, General Orders No. 1 of the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group, HEDCOM, USAF, announced the designation and organization of Project Squadron Provisional, with subordinate units, Flights A, B C and D, "for the purpose of providing an organizational structure, operating units, and command channels for the USAF elements of a classified project". These were the original CIA cover units to which Air Force officers and enlisted men were assigned when selected to staff the headquarters and field units of AQUATONE.

Headquarters, USAF, proposed and CIA accepted as nominee for Commanding Officer of Flight A Colonel Frederic E. McCoy who, upon reporting to Project Headquarters in September 1955 was almost immediately sent to the domestic training base in Nevada, where in addition to building his detachment "from scratch" he was required to act as Base Commander until the nominee for that position arrived on board. He was thus thrown into a command position over a heterogeneous group in the field before he had enough time at Headquarters to absorb the flavor of the project and understand the philosophy behind its joint military/civilian nature.

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Col. McCoy's first concern, the build-up of his detachment cadre, was hampered by shortages of personnel and delays in reporting dates of those assigned. He advised Headquarters at the beginning of December 1955 that unless immediate action were taken to fill key positions, the detachment would certainly not deploy on schedule, with consequent adverse effects on the entire program. He expressed a strong desire to have an Air Force officer assigned as his Deputy rather than a civilian Executive Officer as called for by the Detachment Table of Organization. He was willing to have the administrative support officer also be designated a Deputy Commander if this were desired in order to retain for the Agency the control and liaison necessary between CIA Headquarters and the detachment in the field.

The Project Director of Administration did not concur with this suggested change in the command structure and said in a memorandum to the Project Director:

"...As I understand it, the thinking about the operational phase of the project has been that CIA would retain operational control of Detachment activities. I do not think that an overseas Detachment can be completely successful unless a large degree of autonomy is granted it, not only in its day-to-day administration, but in the actual conduct of its operational missions. If both the Detachment CO and the Deputy are of the same cloth, be it CIA or Air Force, you do not obtain that

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counterbalance and relative objectivity that initially seemed desirable..." 1/

Mr. Bissell agreed with this interpretation of the intent of the joint agreement, and an Agency staff officer, was recruited as Executive Officer for Detachment A.

The question of whether Commanding Officers of AQUATONE field detachments should be considered Chiefs of Stations or Chiefs of Bases under existing Agency Regulations was raised with the DD/S in January 1956 and it was confirmed that Chief of Station status was correct since these officers would report directly to Headquarters.

SAC Training Unit at Watertown

As a part of the Air Force support of AQUATONE, the 4070th Support Wing was activated 20 December 1955 with Headquarters at March Air Force Base, California, and with the mission of training and equipping the operational units of AQUATONE and providing support for these units in overseas theaters. Previously, in September, Col. William Yancey had been named to head the training detachment which was sent PCS to March, with TDY to the test site at Watertown for the purpose of training the three AQUATONE detachments.

1/ SAPC-2886, 9 December 1955. Memorandum to Project Director from Project Director of Administration.

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The SAC officers assigned to the training unit visited Watertown on 19 October and held discussions with Mr. C. L. Johnson and the Lockheed training pilots, and with Headquarters personnel. Suit fittings and chamber tests were set up for the next two weeks, followed by an orientation period at the Lockheed plant. The first week of November the unit began flying the U-2 under Lockheed test pilots' supervision.

Shortages were reported by Col. Yancey in mid-November including more personnel needed to maintain base aircraft and ground power equipment and to service fuel trailers; more ramp space and supply facilities; and two chase planes for the training program.

In December 1955 Col. Yancey reported further to Project Headquarters that he could not discharge his responsibility to Gen. LeMay of certifying to combat readiness of Detachment A until the detachment was assembled as a unit at Watertown Strip prior to deployment of any of its echelons overseas. Mr. Bissell agreed with this procedure

* SAC Training Unit Cadre: Col. William Yancey, Commanding Officer; Lt. Col. Philip O. Robertson; Maj. Robert E. Mullin; Maj. John DeLap; Maj. Louis A. Garvin, Capt. Louis C. Setter, Capt. John H. Meierdierck; MSGT Frederick D. Montgomery, SSGT Davis N. Sweidel, SSGT Paul W. Briest.

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and approved the augmentation of housing and other facilities required at Watertown. This action, however, took some time to accomplish.

On 7 February, Col. Berg also reported to Mr. Bissell that he had received some static from SAC Headquarters because Detachment A was not yet an entity at Watertown. The training program had been delayed almost a month due to the late arrival of the pilots, the first three beginning indoctrination and transition training in the T-33 on 11 January. Headquarters Staff meanwhile was bending every effort to fill the Detachment's T/O and get the assignees on board at the training base.

By the middle of February 1956 the majority of the Detachment A cadre and the first six contract pilots were at Watertown and with the aid of the SAC Support Unit were progressing in flight training in the U-2 and in setting up the flyaway kit and procedures for maintaining it. The operations staff were beginning to plan training flights and brief and debrief pilots under supervision of the SAC training officers. There were still personnel shortages, particularly in the materiel, personnel, and physiological training and personal equipment fields.

A Case Officer (in the Clandestine Services sense) to handle the needs of the contract pilots had been included in each detachment T/O

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(stemming from the original intention to use foreign pilots). Col. McCoy preferred, however, that his pilots be completely integrated into the unit and billeted overseas along with the other members of the group, with their administrative affairs being handled by regular unit personnel. Headquarters agreed, and returned the Detachment A Case Officer designee, to Washington for reassignment.

One difficult problem faced in organizing Detachment A was the practice of various Project Headquarters components and parent services of dealing directly with the Detachment's assigned personnel rather than going through command channels. Col. McCoy's frustration over this situation culminated in the following message to the Project Director:

"... This is a formal complaint relative to the lack of control of Detachment A personnel by the Commanding Officer caused by direct actions of other sources and channels. Request that Security, Communications and Administration be advised this is improper procedure. If such actions continue I will request withdrawal from the project. The Commanding Officer must control all personnel and materiel of his unit." 1/

Mr. Bissell immediately gave orders to Headquarters elements that once a detachment was activated at the test base, its personnel were

1/ CABLE-1743 (IN 00434), 5 April 1956.

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under control of its Commanding Officer and could not be directed by staff officers at Headquarters. The purpose of activating detachments at a training base before deployment was to cut the direct line between particular groups in the field and their Headquarters components, thus establishing the unit as a completely separate and self-sufficient entity under the immediate control of its Commanding Officer.

At the end of March 1956, cover arrangements for the overseas operational phase were negotiated with NACA and the Air Weather Service and on 29 March Detachment A was reconstituted "Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (1st)" by authority of AWS General Order No. 7.

Selection of Base for First Operations: Early Survey of Turkish Bases

In March 1955, the Project Director outlined the operational concept of AQUATONE to Chief of Operations, DD/P, and said that rear operating bases would be needed in the U.K., Turkey and Japan, and forward staging bases probably in Pakistan or Iran, and Norway. The Chief of Operations (then Mr. Richard Felms) made two recommendations: first, that the initial and sole operational approach to any government be to the security service of that government, possibly supported by a parallel approach at the very highest level but no other

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approach should be considered through State Department or military channels; second, that the cover story generally to be used in these approaches should be that CIA is planning agent infiltration or exfiltration and will possibly take advantage of the opportunity to get incidental photographic or electronic coverage. (As a practical matter, neither of these plans turned out to be feasible once the operational stage was reached.) It was planned to have a knowledgeable person with CIA operational experience visit countries where bases would be desired and investigate the possibilities. It was tentatively agreed that regular Station (CIA) personnel would not be cut in on the project at any stage with the possible exception of Station Chiefs.^{1/} (On various occasions, due to the exigencies of the situation, this plan had to be modified in order to obtain vital assistance from Agency Stations.)

In the summer of 1955 Col. Marion C. Mixson of Headquarters Operations Staff and Mr. Gilbert Greenway of the Air Maritime Division investigated availability of bases in Europe and the Middle East, ostensibly for an Air Force project, and developed a base facilities list for future consideration.

^{1/} TS-103270, 1 March 1955. Memo for the Record by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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On 7 October 1955, Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary, USAF (who was at that time assigned to [redacted]) began a week's survey of available bases in Turkey; after visiting Incerlik, Diyarbakir, and Batman, he reported the latter two unsuitable, but considered Incerlik (the SAC base at Adana) as satisfactory, provided a fair amount of additional construction could be accomplished before arrival of the Detachment. On the strength of Air Force support for the use of Adana, planning went ahead on the assumption that Detachment A would go to Turkey with approval being obtained as quickly as possible from the Turkish Prime Minister. It had been learned that an approach through either the Turkish Intelligence Service or the Turkish Air Force would not suffice since Menderes would have to know and approve the operation in any case. When the State Department was consulted in November 1955, however, it was recommended that the approach to Turkey be put off due to the less than cordial relations at that moment on the diplomatic front.

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A survey was made in December by Lt. Col. Geary of existing facilities in Greece, which led to a request that [redacted] approach the Greek Government to ascertain its attitude toward the use of bases at Eleusis or Neankhialos. (At the end of January 1956 the Greek

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Government gave its approval for project operations from either base, but action was postponed, on advice of the State Department, until after the upcoming Greek elections due to be held 16 February 1956.)

Approval Sought to Operate from the U. K.

During the first week of January 1956, it had been decided to approach the British for permission to operate out of a SAC base in England (by far the best choice of bases), even though the current Conservative Government and Prime Minister Eden were under heavy attack by the opposition at the time and were working toward rapprochement with the Soviets. Mr. Bissell departed on his mission on 9 January after receiving detailed guidance from Mr. Dulles and Gen. Cabell on the nature and substance of what should be said to the British. The effort was to be made throughout the talks to describe the proposed operation in such a way as to accomplish two results:

"... to emphasize the potential value to the UK and the sense of partnership with respect to the intelligence take and ... to play down the political significance and to emphasize the high probability that the majority of missions will go entirely undetected. The objective is not only to pave the way for clearance to operate from the U. K. but to minimize any sense of alarm about possible political repercussions and thus to minimize the incentive on the part of the British to try to maintain a tight control over operations." 1/

1/ TS-142937, 6 January 1956. Memo for Record by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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On the 10th and 11th of January 1956 the special project was discussed in London with two representatives of the British Government.

Mr. Bissell's record of the conversations follows:

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"An initial approach was made in company with [redacted] to Sir John Sinclair, Chief of M-6. A parallel approach was made 24 hours later by General Wilson, Commander, Third Air Force, USAF, to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, the ranking RAF Officer in London at the time. Both men were briefed quite fully on the Project. The reason for these approaches was stated to be, in general, our wish to invite the partnership of HMG in an activity which would be of a great benefit to them as to us and, specifically, to advise them that permission would very probably be requested to operate from the U. K. It was explained to them that, although the Project was of course fully known to and approved by highest political authorities in our own Government, final and definitive permission to proceed with operations had not yet been sought. It was further said, however, that the development phase was now virtually completed and such permission would, we hoped, soon be obtained.

"In the course of the discussions, the following points were made concerning the character of the operation and the relationship of the British Government to it:

"a. The operation will not be a military one, but rather a clandestine intelligence gathering activity. It will be conducted by a mixed task force largely civilian in composition and under civilian control.

"b. The right of HMG to withdraw at any time its permission to operate from the U. K. would be clearly recognized (and is implicit in a request for permission to initiate such operations). In order to permit review of its decision from time to time, the British Government would be kept fully and continuously informed about operations undertaken from the U. K.

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"c. All raw intelligence secured through this project would be shared with the British Government, subject only to agreement on secure handling thereof. This applies to intelligence secured in operations from locations other than the U. K. as well as to that secured from operations out of the U. K. (with the possible exception of operations in the Far East).

"Both of the individuals to whom this presentation was made were advised that, although no formal request was being addressed to HMG pending final approval within our own Government, it was anticipated that this matter would be raised on the occasion of the Prime Minister's forthcoming trip to Washington. Sir John Sinclair undertook to bring the matter promptly to the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs so that he and the Prime Minister would be prepared to discuss it in Washington. Sinclair made it clear that the request would have his own strong support. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff likewise undertook to discuss the proposed operation with the Foreign Secretary and to furnish a technical opinion from the standpoint of the RAF. He, too, indicated that the project would have his enthusiastic support. Both men were advised of the extreme closeness with which knowledge of this project has been held within the U. S. Government and agreed that it should receive similar treatment in London. Among the Americans who took part in these conversations it was the consensus that the Foreign Secretary would play a central part in the final decision of the British Government, that he would probably favor the project, and that the Prime Minister would probably have strong reservations..." 1/

A meeting was to be arranged between the DCI and the Foreign Secretary during the course of the latter's visit to Washington, in order to get the reactions of the British Government, and Mr. Bissell recommended that before Prime Minister Eden and the Foreign Secretary

1/ SAPC-3455, 20 January 1956. Memorandum to DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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arrived in Washington, approval should be sought from highest U. S. authority to begin the operational phase of AQUATONE, contingent upon the host government's agreement. (The latter recommendation was not acted upon since General Cabell counseled delaying the approach to the President until Detachment A was farther along the way toward a complete state of readiness.)

On 2 February 1956 the DCI met with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and the special project was discussed at length. The Foreign Secretary said he saw no objection in principle to the conduct of operations from the U. K. He emphasized that the Prime Minister would have to make the final decision and that HMG would not wish operations to be undertaken during the forthcoming visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to the U. K. It was agreed that the Foreign Secretary would take the matter up with Eden within the next few days and convey a definite answer in a week's time. If the answer were favorable, the Foreign Secretary would then be advised through the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Roger Makins, as to specific action required of the British in order to expedite the preparation of a base in the U. K. ^{1/}

^{1/} TS-143202, 3 February 1956. Memorandum for the Record, by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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On 8 February the DCI wrote to the Secretary of State advising him of the discussion with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and requesting that he formalize the approach to the British by transmitting a memorandum to the Foreign Secretary through Ambassador Makins. A suggested draft note to the Ambassador was supplied for the Secretary's use. It was later learned that no memorandum was given to the Ambassador when he called at the Department on 9 February--only a verbal request for information on his Government's willingness to cooperate in the special project. (See Annex 71 for text of exchange of notes between the DCI and the Secretary of State.)

No reaction was received to the U.S. query until 2 March 1956 when a rather negative and indefinite message was delivered by Ambassador Makins to the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr. Later on that same day, a note to the British was drafted and approved by State requesting a definite answer so that, if necessary, alternate planning could go forward. It was agreed to halt construction going on under USAF direction at Lakenheath Air Base in England until definite reaction was received from the British; also to ask General Light, DCS/Materiel, USAFE, to survey available facilities in Germany for the project and develop plans for adapting

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the best available base to project needs; and, since the political climate vis-a-vis Turkey appeared to be improving, to take a fresh look at prospects for a high level approach to the Turks.

On 6 March 1956, [] announced that approval had been given by the British for the project to operate from Lakenheath. Lt. Col. William A. Wilson, the project's Deputy Chief of Logistics, who had departed from England for Germany to negotiate with USAFE for an alternate base, was called back to Lakenheath to get construction moving again, and the 7th Air Division (SAC) was advised by SAC Headquarters to render all necessary assistance in readying the base for Detachment A's deployment.

Detachment A Combat Ready

An optimistic estimate for deploying the first field unit had been set as between the 1st and 31st of March 1956, and Headquarters USAF had blocked space for 210 personnel and 160,000 pounds of cargo to be airlifted during that period. As delays in readiness occurred, the airlift requirement was rescheduled, eventually slipping to May 1st.

The quota of U-2 pilots for each detachment was set at 10, but due to the complex and time-consuming procedures for getting these pilots on board, only six had completed training by the end of March.

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A that time a total of more than 900 flying hours had been accumulated of the U-2 aircraft, and 39 of the more than 350 flights had been long-range ones of more than six hours duration. The proved performance of the aircraft at this date showed maximum altitude from [] [] range 4,150 nautical miles, and speed []

The Unit Simulated Combat Mission (USCM) tests were set for 10-14 April 1956 and an Evaluation Board appointed by the Air Force monitored and passed on each detail of the Detachment's performance. According to Col. Mixson of the project headquarters staff, who was a member of the Evaluation Board, the detachment proved its ability to carry out its assigned mission even though camera reliability was less than 100%, and engine performance was still somewhat of a problem. This latter point caused a good deal of concern and Gen. Cabell questioned whether deployment should not be postponed until engine performance was more reliable. (During the tests there was one forced landing away from home base due to a flame-out. The aircraft and pilot were recovered safely with the assistance of the Commanding General at Kirtland Air Force Base, where the emergency landing was made.)

Mr. Bissell, on 19 April wrote to Gen. Cabell and set out for his consideration the extent to which the deployment of Detachment A had

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already proceeded and the dislocation which would ensue as a result of a postponement of the move to the U. K. He made a very strong case for carrying through the scheduled deployment and then conducting a sufficient number of shake-down flights over friendly territory to prove the reliability of the system, familiarize the pilots with the operational environment and possibly test enemy radar.

On the same day Mr. Bissell's memorandum recommending the earliest possible deployment to England was written, a Russian seaman on the deck of the Soviet Cruiser Ordzhonikidze (which had brought Khrushchev and Bulganin to England on an official visit) sighted a frogman maneuvering in the water near the cruiser in Portsmouth Bay. The subsequent events of that day did not reach public attention until the 5th of May when the Soviet protest note was delivered to the British.

Deployment to England

On 24 April the DCI was informed by memorandum from Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Jacob E. Smart, that Detachment A was considered operationally ready as a result of the USAF evaluation. It was recommended that Detachment A be deployed to Lakenheath Air Base, England, during the period 29 April to 4 May 1956 in accordance with the planned schedule. Mr. Dulles concurred and added, in reply:

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"I particularly wish to express on behalf of this Agency my gratification at the highly effective support that has been rendered to this project by all components of the USAF and also at the close and cooperative relationship that has been developed between our two parent organizations. In particular, I would like to call your attention to the very great contribution that has been made to this enterprise by the SAC 4070th Support Wing under Colonel William R. Yancey, by his Director of Materiel, Colonel Herbert I. Shingler, Jr., and by the Project Office in USAF Headquarters under Colonel Russell A. Berg. Preparations for the operational phase could not possibly have been made so quickly or so well without the skillful and devoted service of the men in these two USAF components." 1/

The deployment took place on schedule with an airlift composed of eleven SAC and MATS C-124's and two MATS C-118's. By 7 May the entire group was in place at Lakenheath. The Operations Order of WRSP (I) stated its mission to be the conduct of "regular and frequent overflights of the Soviet Bloc to obtain photographic and electronic intelligence and to conduct weather and air sampling flights for cover purposes as required."

While the Detachment was settling into its new home and readying the aircraft and equipment for its primary mission, the case of the lost frogman (Commander Larry Crabb) became headline news. Certain British news media quoted "experts" as saying that British

1/ TS-143422, 1 May 1956. Memorandum for Maj. Gen. Jacob Smart from Allen W. Dulles.

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Intelligence had carried out this activity without Eden's knowledge and accusing Eden of not exercising proper control over his intelligence agencies. Criticism of the government mounted daily and the matter was brought up for debate in the House of Commons on 15 May.

On the 16th of May, Mr. Bissell arrived in London for the purpose of getting British approval to launch overflight operations. On the 17th he learned

that Prime Minister Eden had sent a message to President Eisenhower on 16 May requesting a postponement of the beginning of overflights from the U. K. The Eden note was delivered to the President on 17 May via the British Embassy and the State Department. Mr. Allen Dulles was shown the note and later dictated a summary of it from memory, as follows:

"I regret to trouble you again, but I now have new embarrassments in the frogman incident which was bad business. It was a Secret Service affair. The press is on the alert and likely to ask questions about unusual aircraft. I do not feel I can take further risk though I realize that you on your side will take all precaution. But there could be mishaps.

"In my Commons speech, I said I intended to safeguard at all costs the possibility that the discussions with B. and K. might prove to be the beginning of a beginning of better relations. This may bring a lessening of tensions and I can't

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risk impairing this prospect. I understand that high altitude sampling is the cover. If limited to this it would not wholly stultify preparations already made and would relieve me of anxieties for the time being. I am sorry to suggest a postponement and this is only asked because of my present difficulties." 1/

On 18 May during a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Patrick Dean, Mr. Bissell mentioned that four U-2's were now at Lakenheath and were beginning their shake-down and training flights, at which news Mr. Dean became quite agitated since, he said, the Prime Minister had been informed there was only one aircraft involved. He requested that all air operations cease immediately until further notice. Col. McCoy was notified to ground all flights. On the same afternoon, however, a U-2 on a training flight had already caused an RAF fighter squadron alert which had been taken care of by the 7th Air Division with the aid of Air Vice Marshal McDonald after a very nervous few moments.

It was deemed advisable to have a statement released to the press announcing the presence of the Detachment in the U. K. in order to minimize curiosity on the part of the press and public once the new aircraft was sighted, as well as to enhance the cover story. The near

1/ Unnumbered TS Memo for the Record, 19 May 1956, Subject: Outline of Note from "A" to "E", delivered 17 May 1956.

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catastrophe of the fighter alert made this a necessity before further local flights took place. The Prime Minister agreed to a release within his imposed limitation that only high altitude sampling flights would be allowed. The approved text as released by the Air Ministry on 22 May read as follows:

"Preparations are being made to carry on a recently announced research program of the U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in the U.K. and elsewhere in Europe with U.S. Air Force support. The program, recommended by the NACA's Gust Loads Research Panel, involves the gathering of information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, and the jet stream at altitudes between 50,000 and 55,000 feet.

"Although civilian personnel and aircraft will be used, the Air Weather Service of the USAF will provide operational and logistic support for the program, since the NACA has no facilities of its own outside the U.S. In the U.K. the program will be conducted from one of the RAF bases used by the USAF.

"Among the types of aircraft to be used is one recently developed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. for use as a high altitude test-bed. It is powered by a single jet engine, has a light wing loading, can maintain a ten-mile high altitude for several hours at a time and is therefore well suited for the gathering of data at high altitudes." 1/

Movement of Detachment A to Germany

As soon as it was known that the Prime Minister's "postponement" would be in the order of months rather than days, plans were followed

1/ TS-143476, Tab A, 25 May 1956. Memo for the Record by A. D. Marshall.

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up with General Light at USAFE Headquarters to prepare the base at Giebelstadt for a limited staging group with perhaps two aircraft rotating back to Lakenheath between operational missions for major maintenance. This arrangement was agreed at a meeting on 23 May in Frankfurt attended by Chief of Station Tracy Barnes, General Light, and General William H. Tunner of USAFE, and Mr. Bissell representing the project. However, while these plans were going forward, it was learned on 1 June that the Prime Minister was planning to request complete withdrawal of the U-2 unit from the U. K. as quickly as feasible. On 4 June 1956, the DCI sent a message to [redacted] with the following information to be passed to the British [redacted]

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"In view of the Prime Minister's determination, we will transfer AQUATONE operations to Germany or Turkey. For the interim period of approximately five weeks, we will leave one or two U-2's at Lakenheath for meteorological missions. Line of command, supply channel and communications will be established direct from Headquarters to interim operating base. Remaining activities at Lakenheath will be completely separate. . . Since we have no inclination here to seek modification of the Prime Minister's views, believe no useful purpose will be served by another letter on this subject from the Prime Minister to the President. Hope Patrick Dean can forestall another letter since these communications are apt to have the effect of hardening and formalizing positions on both sides. In any event we are abandoning all plans for utilization of Lakenheath

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other than continuing meteorological missions pending completion of facilities elsewhere." 1/

Since Giebelstadt could not be made ready quickly enough to receive the full group, on 5 June a conference in Gen. Light's office (with Cols. Mixson, McCoy and Shingler representing project interests) reached agreement that available space at Wiesbaden Air Force Base was operationally suitable and should be made the interim base for Detachment A, the move to take place beginning 11 June. Headquarters approved this plan and the movement of approximately half of the detachment was accomplished between 11 and 13 June with the all-out logistic support of USAFE Headquarters.

Approval to Begin Overflights

At a White House meeting on 28 May 1956, the DCI discussed the AQUATONE readiness for operations, among other subjects, with the President, but no decision came out of that meeting. On 1 June the DCI and General Twining met with Col. Goodpaster and left with him a paper entitled "AQUATONE Operational Plans" (see Annex 72) for the President's approval. The President had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests and diagnosis of an abdominal ailment at the time.

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The paper outlined the present operational concept for the three U-2 detachments and the value of the intelligence which could be obtained, underlining the wasting nature of the asset and the necessity for an immediate beginning in order to reap the benefits of the temporary technical advantage now enjoyed over the Russians. On the basis of these considerations, it was proposed to proceed as follows:

"a. We are making preparations to start operations from Germany if possible by 15 June.

"b. Initially we will limit ourselves to missions over the Satellites. These fall within the pattern of operations already in progress by the Air Force.

"c. After a few such missions have been flown, we will, if all goes well, seek permission to undertake longer-range missions.

"d. In accordance with already established practices, we will not consult with the German Government with respect to our initial limited operations. Prior to the start of our long-range operations, however, we will inform Chancellor Adenauer of our plans. We will not specifically ask his approval in order to avoid placing an unwelcome responsibility on him. If, however, he raises any objections or feels these operations might prove embarrassing to him, we will consult further before embarking upon them.

"e. Depending upon the Chancellor's reaction, we will either plan to continue operations from Germany for the life of the project (as we hope) or operate only temporarily from Germany until facilities can be made ready in other locations... " 1/

1/ TS-143443/B, 31 May 1956. (See Annex 72)

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It was noted in the paper that the plan of action had the approval of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of State.

The President's illness, meanwhile, was diagnosed as leitis and on 9 June he underwent corrective surgery, remaining at Walter Reed Hospital until 30 June, then going to Gettysburg for a recuperation period. Having received no negative reaction from the White House regarding the proposed action, on 13 June Mr. Bissell advised the DCI:

"Our first detachment will be ready to begin operations from Wiesbaden on or about 15 June. It is planned to start with a few missions over Satellite territories in accord with your earlier decision.

"These initial operations are fully covered by the already outstanding authority granted the Air Force to conduct overflights of the Satellites, moreover they will fit within a specific Air Force program of 16 overflight missions which has been approved under that general authority by the JCS, State and CIA, and with which Commanding General USAFE has authority to proceed. It would appear no problem of additional authority arises.

"There can be no doubt that the substitution of the initial missions planned by the Detachment for some or all of those contemplated in the Air Force program will significantly reduce the political risks involved. The use of our new equipment will permit the same intelligence to be collected in fewer missions with less chance of tracking and with virtually no chance of interception. It goes without saying that this arrangement has the full approval of the Air Force and the Theater Commander for precisely these reasons.

"I propose to proceed as above unless you instruct me to the contrary." 1/

1/ SAPC-675, 13 June 1956. Memo to DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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The Director agreed with the proposed course of action, and on the same day, 13 June, obtained the approval of the Secretary of State to proceed. On this authority Detachment A was notified to commence overflights of the Satellite countries as directed by Headquarters Operations Control Center.

At this point, although Detachment A was operationally ready at Wiesbaden, the opportunity was taken between 15 and 17 June to replace the P-37 engines with the newly approved P-31's in view of the higher performance attained by the P-31's.

As a result of discussions between Mr. Bissell and Gen. Cabell on the CIA side and Generals Twining and Millard Lewis on the Air Force side with regard to USAFE's requirements for Satellite photographic coverage, the following agreed position with respect to AQUATONE missions over the Satellites was conveyed to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee on 18 June:

"All concerned are in agreement that it is operationally unwise to employ the AQUATONE specialized reconnaissance system for targets of as low priority as those in the Satellites especially since these targets can be pretty safely covered by the use of other less advanced equipment. On the other hand, it is also recognized by all concerned that we have in effect been instructed by higher authority that at least a few missions limited to the Satellites must be flown in order finally to prove out our weapons system before we will be permitted to employ

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it for deep penetration missions of the USSR, the purpose for which it was designed. Accordingly, there is no disagreement as to the course of action to be followed.

"The commitment it is proposed to make to Gen. Turner is simply that during our initial missions over the Satellites and, where appropriate, on the outward and homeward legs of longer range missions, we will obtain as complete a coverage of his targets as possible. For the initial phase when missions are restricted to the Satellites, the decision has already been made, for the reasons indicated in the preceding paragraph, to incur the risks involved even though the targets are of limited importance. In the later phase when deep penetrations are in progress, it is understood that coverage of the Satellites will be strictly a by-product of operations justified by much higher priority requirements..." 1/

The first mission was flown on 20 June 1956 from Wiesbaden over Poland and return; the pilot was Carl Overstreet, the U-2 was equipped with the A-2 camera, and photographic results were classified as "good". The next day Gen. Twining made a stop-over in Germany on his way to Moscow to attend a Soviet air show and while at USAFE Headquarters he requested a stand-down of overflights for the duration of his visit to Russia. Detachment flying was therefore restricted to local test hops for another full week.

On 21 June Mr. Bissell accompanied Drs. Land and Killian to a meeting with Col. Goodpaster at which the President's policy guidelines

1/ SAPC-7029, 18 June 1956. Memorandum to Chairman, ARC, from Project Director.

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for the conduct of AQUATONE were set forth. The President was still in the hospital but he had read the "AQUATONE Operational Plans" memorandum and, in general, approved the course of action recommended. He had expressed these specific desires as to operational timing, as reported by Col. Goodpaster (see Annex 73):

a. Overflights of the Satellites could be carried out without informing Chancellor Adenauer but no overflights of the USSR should begin until the Chancellor had been informed of our plans.

b. Once missions had begun over the Soviet Union, every effort should be made to obtain the priority target coverage as quickly as possible so that the operation would not have to be continued for too long a period of time.

Immediate plans were made to brief Chancellor Adenauer so that the primary objective of the project could be undertaken as soon as possible. Gen. Cabell and Mr. Bissell proceeded to Frankfurt and on 27 June 1956, accompanied by Chief of Station Tracy Barnes and Mr. Alan P. White (acting as interpreter), went to Bonn and gave a full project briefing to the Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans Globke. The reactions of the Chancellor were described by Mr. Barnes as "approval and enthusiastic endorsement" of the project. (Later

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at the request of the Chancellor a briefing was also given to the head of West German Intelligence (Gen. Reinhard Gehlen) on 11 July by Mr. Barnes.

First Missions over the Soviet Union

With the briefing of the German Chancellor accomplished, and Gen. Twining safely back from his trip, the weather turned unfavorable over the primary Soviet targets. Two more Satellite missions to the South were flown on 2 July covering Bulgaria and Rumania, but photographic results were only fair to poor.

On 3 July Project Headquarters cabled Detachment A that a high level decision had been made that the first two weeks operations (1 - 14 July) would be carefully reviewed on the 15th; and that clearance to continue after that would have to be renewed at short intervals. The Detachment was requested to develop maximum capability for the remaining time allowed, subject to equipment reliability and safety of flight, in order to make the best record possible.

At that point the weather cleared somewhat to the north and on the 4th of July the first mission over Russia was flown over Moscow and Leningrad. Because of heavy cloud cover over Moscow on the first mission, a second was flown on the 5th with excellent results. Three

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more missions covered the Baltic area, Kiev and Minsk (via Czechoslovakia and Hungary) on 9 July, and the Crimea/Black Sea area on the 10th.

Soviet Tracking Capability

Estimates of Russian radar and interceptor capabilities in the early planning stage of AQUATONE were: limited detection capability above 60,000 feet; little tracking capability; no aircraft interception; ground-to-air missile ceiling 50,000 feet, going to 60,000 feet in possibly a year and a half. On 30 March 1956, when Col. Ritland was leaving the project after a year as Deputy Project Director, he noted that the several sightings of the U-2 made by radar stations in the West Coast area were not consistent with intelligence forecasts to date. He felt it should be assumed that the aircraft would be picked up by unfriendly radar and plotted for short distances. He recommended that simulated maneuvers be conducted with the aid of the Air Defense Command to pin down the capability of ground radar to intercept and identify the aircraft.

The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) of DD/I was called upon to make the recommended study (the first in a long line of vulnerability studies by OSI) and submitted their report on 28 May 1956:

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"a. Maximum Soviet radar detection ranges against the Project aircraft at elevations in excess of 55,000 feet would vary from 20 to 150 miles, depending on the radar and the manner in which it was employed. In our opinion, detection can therefore be assumed.

"b. Considering the importance of such factors as distance and speed, it is doubtful that the Soviets can achieve consistent tracking of the Project vehicle. There is certainly no available evidence from any other operation which would indicate sufficient capability on their part.

"c. No known Soviet interceptor can achieve the requisite altitude to enable successful engagement of the Project vehicle at its intended operational altitude, nor would there be much risk at any elevation above 57,000 feet. The possibility of using a stripped-down fighter or research vehicle to ram or otherwise intercept it is remote.

"d. An estimate of the risk from Soviet guided missiles, surface-to-air or air-to-air, can not be made with great certainty. We estimate a SAM capability in the regions of Moscow and Leningrad but, from analogy with U.S. missiles, we doubt that the Soviet SAM maintains adequate stability beyond 60,000 feet to be a major interception device against the Project vehicle. We know nothing about Soviet air-to-air missiles but, considering the problems of launching at extreme altitude coupled with the difficulty of getting the launching platform in position to launch, we believe no great risk attends this mode of interception (air-to-air) versus the Project vehicle.

"e. We believe it feasible, though extremely difficult, for the Soviets to maneuver a stripped-down reconnaissance aircraft into a position from which visual or photographic surveillance can be achieved for a brief time. We believe successful reconnaissance of this type would be the result of an unlikely combination of favorable circumstances rather than solely because of successful operation of Soviet GCI. Such reconnaissance could

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only occur near the centers of Soviet aircraft experimental work (Moscow-Remenskoye and the like). " 1/

In light of paragraph 1, above, it came as a rather rude shock to some to find that on the first overflight (20 June over Poland) the U-2 was tracked from the moment it entered the Soviet orbit throughout the flight. Mr. Bissell reported to the Project Staff on 10 July that Russian radar was tracking the U-2 so consistently that they would probably be able to compute its altitude more accurately than the aircraft's own altimeter. He anticipated the possibility of a diplomatic protest and said while such a protest might not force Project activities to stop, it would certainly limit the area of operations.

Russian Protest

On 11 July 1956, Soviet Ambassador to Washington Georgi N. Zaroubin presented a protest note (see Annex 74) to Secretary of State Dulles, charging that United States "military aircraft", identified as a twin-engined bomber, had grossly violated Soviet air space on 4, 5 and 9 July with flights as deep as 200 miles inside the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State, at the instruction of the President, called for the grounding of all overflight operations immediately.

1/ TS-143485, 28 May 1956. Memorandum by OSI, "Estimate of Interceptor Capabilities".

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On 16 July, Polish Ambassador Ramuald Spasowski delivered an oral protest to Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy that jets flying at high altitudes on 4, 5, 9 and 10 July had violated Polish airspace. On 21 July the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry passed a note of protest to the American Embassy in Prague demanding that overflights of Czechoslovakia be stopped.

The reply to the Russian protest was delivered to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on 19 July and stated that after conducting a thorough inquiry, it had been determined that no United States military aircraft could possibly have been involved in the overflights alleged by the Soviet Union. (Full text of reply is in Annex 74.)

Faced with an indefinite grounding as a result of the first protest, Mr. Bissell addressed his thoughts on the "Immediate Plans for AQUATONE" to the Director and General Cabell on 18 July, in part as follows:

"...I can not help wondering whether the purely political implications of an immediate and probably final cessation of operations in Europe have been fully considered by the Secretary of State. As you are aware, it will appear to the Soviet authorities that their protest accomplished its purpose literally within hours of its delivery. Is it really desirable to demonstrate in this way both the closeness of our control over these operations and our extreme sensitivity to a diplomatic protest even when no evidence can be adduced in its support? Do we

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wish to demonstrate again to Adenauer and Menderes, as in the case of GENETRIX, that we will not carry through projects of this sort in the face of a protest? I would think that at a minimum one or two missions should be flown over satellite territories and at least one penetration made into the USSR if only to avoid what seems to me to be disastrous political consequences of a demonstration of timidity. I recognize this is a matter for the Secretary of State. If he is not worried about the political considerations or if he believes it is futile to reopen this matter with the President, there is certainly no move that can be made from this Agency...

"With respect to the construction now in progress at Giebelstadt, I believe the Air Force should be advised that there is little prospect we will ever wish to operate from that base so they may reach a prompt decision as to the completion, modification or suspension of work now in progress there...

"Although I do not recommend any modification at this time of the decision to install a detachment at Adana as soon as that base is ready, I would like to emphasize for the record the basis of that decision. The fact of the matter is that there is very little likelihood of our being able to penetrate the USSR from the south without detection. We have already flown missions over the Crimea and have been tracked more accurately there than in Central Russia. It is no exaggeration to say that the only prospect of being able to penetrate without tracking is for flights over the Caspian Sea. Accordingly, if the President's present views remain substantially unchanged, we will never be permitted to operate from Adana. Viewed in this light, the deployment of a unit to that location can be justified only as a preparation for the contingency that the President will change his mind in a few weeks time. I suppose this can be justified on the ground that we have already spent some 75 million dollars to little purpose and we may as well spend a bit more on the off chance that things will change for the better." 1/

1/ PS-158355, 18 July 1956. Memo for DCI and DDCI from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

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It is understandable that Mr. Bissell should have felt almost complete frustration at the turn of events for he had been responsible, more than any one man or group of men, for bringing this unique reconnaissance system to operational readiness and, by the force of his own persuasion, obtaining political approval to launch it on its mission.

From this point on in the history of the project it became a matter of selling the capability of the system in order to stay in business. A special processing center for handling the mission film payload had been set up at Eastman Kodak Company's Rochester plant and as soon as the film from the first Russian overflights arrived there and processing began, a relay of Headquarters photo-interpreters visited the center to inspect the results and clip sections of film which showed promise of the greatest intelligence value. These were blown up to make briefing boards for the daily high level expositions of the AQUATONE intelligence product. These briefings came to be known as "Lundahl's Dog and Pony Show", so-called for Mr. Arthur C. Lundahl, head of the Photo Interpretation Center (PIC, later NPIC) which was then in process of being set up to handle the exploitation of AQUATONE film. His lucid expositions of the photo intelligence obtained made him a very effective advocate for the continuance of the program. However,

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it was again Mr. Bissell, who, after this first grounding, had to carry the burden of persuading higher levels not to abandon the U-2 capability.

Detachment A Command and Morale Problems

A visit by Mr. James Cunningham to Wiesbaden during the first week of July confirmed the fact that the concept of a civilian Executive Officer as second in command of Detachment A was not working out at all. While this was partially attributable to the personality conflict between the two men involved, Mr. Cunningham felt it was more the result of Colonel McCoy's clear, stated feeling that the Air Force should take care of everything pertaining to operations and the flying of the aircraft, and Agency personnel should take care of security and other support matters, and neither side should concern itself with the affairs of the other. As a result of this attitude, the senior Agency member of the team, [redacted] was not being informed at all of the nature and progress of operations, had never been asked to sit in on a mission briefing, did not know the "target for the day" or the alternate German bases to be used in the event of an emergency.

Mr. Cunningham recommended to the Project Director that the Executive Officer be withdrawn, and asked for a ruling on whether or not the concept of command should be revised. Mr. Bissell directed that

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while the present incumbent should be withdrawn without prejudice for reassignment, the concept of command remained valid (as demonstrated by the satisfactory arrangement between the Detachment B Commander and his Executive), and that a replacement for Executive Officer at Detachment A was to be recruited immediately. (This was done, but took several months to accomplish.)

Weather and local proficiency flights were resumed at Wiesbaden after a week of inaction following the protest, but morale of the personnel was very poor and the Commanding Officer was offering no leadership and exercising very little restraint on the group's behavior either on or off base. The temporary installation at Wiesbaden was unsatisfactory for a protracted stay with crowded housing, poor messing, and other causes for grumbling. The contract pilots had time to indulge in "gripe sessions" and to draw up lists of grievances (some justified, others not), all of which had to be arbitrated back at Headquarters. The basic cause of demoralization was the stand-down and the lack of information on prospects for future activity. All travelers returning to Washington from visiting Wiesbaden brought the same story of a slackening of effort by the group to stay operationally ready.

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Future Plans for AQUATONE

A conference was held at Headquarters on 26 July to discuss AQUATONE's future prospects, those present being Mr. Bissell, Gen. Cabell and Gen. Frank Everest, Director of Operations, Headquarters, USAF. It was planned to make a joint CIA/USAF/JCS approach to the President on 15 August 1956 to request permission to resume AQUATONE overflights. Detachment B was to be deployed as planned. Pending the 15 August verdict, Detachment A would remain at Wiesbaden but plans for redeploying to the Far East would go forward on a contingency basis. Construction at Giebelstadt was to continue on an orderly, rather than a crash, basis with the intention to send Detachment C there in November.

At the end of July, Gen. Curtis LeMay, Commander of SAC, had informed Agency representatives that, recognizing the value to SAC of AQUATONE's capability, he would give his fullest support if political approval was forthcoming. He was asked to let the Joint Chiefs know of his support in order to add weight to the approach to higher authority. (It should be remembered that at this time the Air Force follow-on program for procuring U-2's to bolster SAC's reconnaissance capability was well along with sizeable sums of money committed.)

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The Project Director devoted his best efforts in early August toward setting out for the Director the strongest possible brief in support of the continuance of the program, always with the realization that the presentation to the President would require previous concurrence of the Secretary of State. The final Bissell draft of this brief was presented to Gen. Cabell for approval and, with his changes, was passed to the Director on 11 August 1956 (see Annex 75). Mr. Allen Dulles agreed to see his brother, the Secretary of State, and obtain his approval of the recommendations in the memorandum. The Project Director hoped to obtain permission for about 15 deep penetrations of the USSR to cover the highest priority targets on the approved list, but if a negative decision resulted, he proposed that the capability be used against the lower priority Chinese Communist targets, operating out of Japan.

Middle East Activity: Postponement of Further Soviet Overflights

Before a hearing could be arranged with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Secretary departed for the London Suez Conference, and the hoped-for meeting with the President was also put off until September. As a result of the conflict in the Middle East, approval was given for coverage of the trouble spots and Detachment B, just

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arrived on base at Adana, Turkey, was told to prepare to run these missions. Col. McCoy obtained permission also for his group to join in this coverage and on 29 and 30 August Detachment A originated two flights from Wiesbaden, covering Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, refueling at Adana, and returning to Wiesbaden. The results of these flights were processed and given immediately to the British and were used by them in tactical planning in the Suez action, although their field commanders were not privy to the source of their intelligence. While coverage of the Middle East continued by both Detachments A and B, on 30 October 1956 the decision was made by higher authority to deny the British any further intelligence from this source in view of the trend of British/French action in this very touchy international situation.

On the return to Washington of Secretary Dulles, a briefing was held on 7 September with Mr. Bissell and Col. John Bridges of the USAF Intelligence Directorate briefing, and Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles and Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Radford, in attendance. Secretary Dulles expressed concern that any further operations from Germany would surely result in another protest from the Russians and said he would like to give further thought to the matter before any

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decision was made. Meanwhile he had to return to Europe for more conferences and during his absence an opportunity availed for a briefing of the President on 17 September.

(On the same day, the first U-2 accident at an overseas base occurred. Shortly after take-off from Wiesbaden on a training flight, the aircraft exploded in mid-air, killing the pilot, and spreading wreckage over a wide area. The President was given this information during the briefing of 17 September.)

After the briefing, the President indicated that he wished to have another meeting with the Secretary of State and General Cabell before making any decision regarding further overflights. He expressed again the feeling that as long as the Russians knew we were engaged in this activity they would feel it was intolerable and might feel they had to take some action such as hot pursuit of one of our aircraft to its base, thus creating an international crisis. Or the Russians might even consider the presence of our aircraft over their territory a preparation for war and be led to take countermeasures which might lead to war.

Despite the qualms expressed by the President, Mr. Bissell reported to his staff that the President appeared friendly and relaxed and did not appear inclined to postpone a decision of the issue beyond his next

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meeting with the Secretary of State. However, the hoped-for meeting was delayed further due to the international situation, or the absence of one or the other of the two principals from Washington.

Meanwhile the construction at Giebelstadt was completed and early in October 1956 Detachment A was relocated there with a much improved environment, including quarters, mess and security of operations. The replacement Executive Officer, [redacted] joined the group in September and found it even more demoralized than he had been warned it would be. The move to Giebelstadt brought morale up somewhat, at least temporarily.

In October 1956, the eyes of the world were on Hungary where the Freedom Fighters were being brutally subdued by Soviet troops and tanks. It was hoped that a decision in favor of further overflights of the USSR could be obtained from the President since there would be less likelihood of a Soviet protest, or if one were made, little chance of its attracting any sympathy whatever. When the Director met with the President on 15 November, however, there was still no decision on further AQUATONE activities, and the status quo continued with both Detachments A and B flying Middle East missions and an occasional Satellite overflight.

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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At the beginning of April 1957, Mr. Bissell again reminded the Director of the major questions requiring answers, beyond the principal one of whether overflights of Russia would be permitted in the coming good weather period. If the Agency expected to retain the U-2 capability after the fall of 1957, he saw four possibilities:

- a. Continue at roughly the same strength.
- b. Continue at half strength and cut to two instead of three detachments.
- c. Continue at reduced scale under cover of a commercial survey company.
- d. Continue in cooperation with the Navy with one or two carrier-based units.

Decisions also had to be made on the disposition of Watertown, recruitment of replacement personnel for those whose tours were expiring; preparation of the budget for FY 1958; and establishment of requirements for Air Force (or possibly Navy) support. Mr. Bissell recommended discussing these issues with the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Thomas White, and others of the Joint Chiefs, before seeking Presidential guidance. The meeting with the President was postponed several times and finally was held on 6 May 1957. Approval was obtained for

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a series of missions to be staged from Pakistan by Detachment B, but overflights of Russia from Germany were still considered too much of a provocation by the Secretary of State and the President.

For the first half of 1957 Detachment A flew only one operational mission (over Albania) and was occupied principally with local flights in support of the meteorological and air sampling programs. At the end of June 1957, Col. Mixson relieved Col. McCoy as Commanding Officer, and his arrival exerted quite a sobering influence on those members of the Detachment whose working and living habits had grown too lax under the previous regime.

On 20 September 1957, Detachment A was notified that its activities were to be phased out and the facility at Giebelstadt closed down in November. In October the final two operational missions approved for Detachment A were flown from Giebelstadt--one Elint mission over the Barents Sea during Soviet Navy Maneuvers, and one photographic mission over Murmansk with excellent results--a belated opportunity to demonstrate, after a year of frustration, what might have been accomplished by this group had the political climate been less unfavorable.

As a footnote to the last two missions, Norwegian radar plotted these two flights all the way back to base in Germany and as a result

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Norwegian Intelligence (Col. Evang) put pressure upon the []
[] to get the intelligence from these missions for
his service. [] authorized to
offer Evang intelligence in the form of written reports, unless the
Norwegians insisted on photos. The offer was made on 15 November
and the Norwegians accepted the offer of a written report with appreci-
ation, promising support for future operations if ever required.

On 5 and 6 November 1957, two U-2's took off from Giebelstadt
each day and were flown via Plattsburg, N. Y., two to Edwards Air
Force Base for Detachment G use, and two to Del Rio, Texas, to the
SAC U-2 Wing. By 15 November, all Detachment A personnel had
departed from Giebelstadt and on that day the communications link
with Giebelstadt was closed and the facility turned back to the Air
Force.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

8 February 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd,
2 February 1956

1. On 2 February when I met with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the first topic I discussed with him was the Special Project (AQUATONE/OILSTONE - TS) with which you are familiar. You will remember that Mr. Bissell had advised the British of this Project two weeks ago in London. At that time it was taken up with them simultaneously through Sir John Sinclair of MI-6 and the Deputy Chief of Air Staff. Both men were advised that the matter would be raised by us on the occasion of the Washington meetings. My purpose in discussing the matter with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd was to ascertain his attitude toward our provisional request that we be allowed to conduct operations under this Project from the UK.

2. Present at this meeting in addition to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and myself were Sir Roger Makins, Mr. P. F. Hancock (Mr. Lloyd's private secretary), and Mr. Bissell. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd remembered the Project when I mentioned it to him and as we discussed it he seemed quite well informed about it. He seemed generally well disposed toward it and did not raise any objection in principle to the conduct of operations from the UK. He emphasized, however, that the Prime Minister would have to make the final decision. He explained that the Prime Minister had been told about the Project and the proposal to operate from the UK but had not been asked for a definite decision, since no formal request for permission to operate there had yet been presented to the British Government by us. He also added that his Government would not wish operations to be carried on during the forthcoming visit of the Soviet leaders to the UK.

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3. Certain specific points should be noted about the conversation.


a. At no point was any reference made to the imposition of controls or limitations on our activities by the British (in the event that they permit us to operate from the UK), although I made clear our recognition of their right to halt operations at any time and promised that they would be kept closely informed of our operations.

b. We indicated that we would share the intelligence take from any operations run out of England.

c. We told Mr. Selwyn Lloyd that his help would be needed in expediting certain modifications of existing structures that will have to be undertaken. (It was understood that we would pay for these modifications.)

4. In concluding the discussion it was agreed to proceed as follows: The Foreign Secretary promised to discuss this Project with the Prime Minister in the course of the remainder of their trip so that the latter would soon be prepared either to grant or to refuse approval in principle to the conduct of operations from the UK. Meanwhile, in order to put the matter in the proper channels, I said that I would communicate with you with a view to the transmission by you of a memorandum to Sir Roger Makins who would in turn send a message to London requesting the reaction of HMG. This message would serve both to formalize our approach and to remind Mr. Selwyn Lloyd of my conversation with him.

5. I attach herewith a draft of a note you might consider sending to Sir Roger Makins. Since our discussion of the Project was reasonably full and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's secretary took notes on it, I do not believe it is necessary for either your communication to Sir Roger Makins or his cable to London to do more than refer to our conversation. For security reasons we would obviously prefer that no revealing reference to the Project be made in the British cable traffic. Accordingly, this draft is brief and quite sterile.



Allen W. Dulles
Director

Attachment: Draft

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PROPOSED NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SIR ROGER MAKINS

In the course of the visit to Washington of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs last week, the Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. Richard M. Bissell, jr. discussed with the latter a sensitive Project (AQUATONE/OILSTONE - TS) which will involve the collection of certain kinds of intelligence information on a much expanded scale. I understand that you participated in this conversation.

For technical reasons the operations contemplated in this Project cannot be conducted from the United States. The plan is to conduct them from several friendly countries both in Europe and the Far East. It is our earnest hope that they can start in the United Kingdom.

The purpose of this note is to ask that you ascertain through your channels the reaction of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister to this proposal. In making this request, I wish to emphasize the real importance that is attached to this Project by the intelligence community of this Government and the benefits that will accrue to both Governments if it can be carried out successfully.

I hope the handling of the matter in this manner is in accord with the understanding that was reached in the conversation referred to above.


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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET~~

February 9, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable Allen W. Dulles

I raised the project referred to in your attached memorandum of February 8 with Ambassador Makins today. I asked him whether his Government was prepared to cooperate with it and what their ideas were about timing.



John Foster Dulles

Attachment:

Memorandum dated February 8,
re Meeting with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.

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ANNEX 72

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31 May 1956

AQUATONE OPERATIONAL PLANS

1. In the light of the discussion of AQUATONE and related matters on 28 May, we have reviewed operational plans and possibilities in consultation with the Air Force. The following facts and considerations have a major bearing on our conclusions:

a. Work is going forward as rapidly as possible to prepare facilities in Turkey but these cannot be ready much before 1 August. Operations could be initiated in Germany by 15 June.

b. The six weeks from mid-June to late July that can be gained by starting operations in Germany are of especial importance because the weather is at its best and the days are longest at that time of the year. Operations over all target areas can be conducted more frequently and more productively in June and July than during the autumn and winter. These months acquire added importance from the fact that operations can be usefully conducted over northern target areas only during the summer months.

c. A second unit will be ready for deployment overseas early in August and facilities should be ready to receive it. There would not be room for both units at Adana, Turkey. In any event it is desirable to base operations at two or more locations so as to secure maximum coverage and to preserve our flexibility in the face of changing political circumstances.

d. Providing reasonably good security can be maintained locally, the operation of our equipment at a German base should involve no greater risk of compromise than its operation in England, since unauthorized persons are given the same opportunity to see it from a distance at any overseas base. Its appearance at several locations in Europe is consistent with the cover story that is being used and might help to dispel any air of mystery about the activity.

e. We are actively planning for operations in the Far East and expect shortly to select a base in that area and move forward with the preparation of any specialized facilities. However, in terms of numbers, some four-fifths of our intelligence targets in the USSR, and in terms of

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quality a higher percentage of really important targets, are accessible from Europe rather than from the Far East. Moreover, many of the Far Eastern targets have been, or can more readily be, covered by other means. It is for this reason that we propose to use the first two units in Europe and the third in the Far East.

2. The major task to which all of our preparations have been directed is the performance of long-range missions over areas hitherto inaccessible with any degree of safety. Such missions promise to yield decisively valuable intelligence obtainable in no other way. Time is of the essence in the performance of this task since the technical advantage that has been gained is only temporary and the security that cloaks it is a wasting asset. Before long, the Russians will develop the capability consistently to track and somewhat later to intercept high altitude aircraft. We must assume that they will soon have photographs of our equipment which will allow them to guess at its performance and will stimulate their efforts. Meanwhile, with the mere passage of time, the maintenance of tight security grows more difficult. Accordingly, it is our conviction that the sooner we are able to embark upon our major task the more securely it can be accomplished.

3. On the basis of the above considerations we propose to proceed as follows:

- a. We are making preparations to start operations from Germany if possible by 15 June.
- b. Initially we will limit ourselves to missions over the Satellites. These fall within the pattern of operations already in progress by the Air Force.
- c. After a few such missions have been flown, we will, if all goes well, seek permission to undertake longer-range missions.
- d. In accordance with already established practices, we will not consult with the German Government with respect to our initial limited operations. Prior to the start of our long-range operations, however, we will inform Chancellor Adenauer of our plans. We will not specifically ask his approval in order to avoid placing an unwelcome responsibility upon him. If, however, he raises any objections or feels these operations

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might prove embarrassing to him, we will consult further before embarking upon them.

e. Depending upon the Chancellor's reaction, we will either plan to continue operations from Germany for the life of the project (as we hope) or operate only temporarily from Germany until facilities can be made ready in other locations.

4. The Chief of Air Staff concurs in the above conclusions as far as they concern operational matters. (Specifically he concurs in 3 a, b, and c but makes no comments on d and e.) The Secretary of State also concurs in the above conclusions.

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ANNEX 73

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22 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster,
Dr. James Killian and Dr. Edwin Land, 21 June 1956

1. At Dr. Killian's request I accompanied him and Dr. Land to the White House at noon on 21 June to brief Colonel Goodpaster on AQUATONE and to discuss current operations with him. No one else was present. Before the briefing was started, Colonel Goodpaster explained that he had just returned from a meeting with the President at Walter Reed Hospital and that the President had discussed AQUATONE with him. Colonel Goodpaster had with him the original copy of the memorandum entitled "AQUATONE Operational Plans" dated 31 May (copy of which is attached) which had been handed to him by the DCI and General Twining at the beginning of the month. The President had read the paper and had made a longhand notation upon it. His discussion of AQUATONE with Colonel Goodpaster had been related to the paper.

2. Colonel Goodpaster stated that the President's views were as follows:

a. In general, he approved the course of action recommended in the paper.

b. Specifically, he was entirely willing that we should operate over the satellites without informing Chancellor Adenauer about these activities but he emphasized that no longer run missions should be undertaken until the Chancellor had been told of our plans.

c. He agreed that the approach to the Chancellor should take the form recommended in the paper--that is, he should not formally be asked for his approval but merely told about the projected longrange operations, which would give him a chance to raise objections if he so desired.

3. The President, Colonel Goodpaster said, had added a general instruction in rather strong terms as to the policy to be followed in AQUATONE. This was to the effect that every effort should be made

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to obtain just as quickly as possible coverage of the high priority targets which were the real objective and justification of AQUATONE so that operations would not have to be continued for too long a period of time. I pointed out to Colonel Goodpaster that restriction of operations to the Satellites was directly inconsistent with the policy desired by the President. Goodpaster replied that in his view the President had no particular desire to restrict us to these limited operations except that he did not wish deeper penetration missions to be undertaken until after the project had been discussed with the Chancellor.

4. In concluding this phase of the conversation, I asked Colonel Goodpaster whether a correct interpretation of what he had said was that after the projected conversation with the Chancellor we are free to proceed with deep penetration overflights, provided, of course, that the Chancellor raised no objection and that our limited operations had gone well in the meanwhile. He indicated that this was his view.

5. The balance of the conversation was devoted to a rather full briefing of Colonel Goodpaster and discussion of various phases of the project primarily by Drs. Killian and Land. The main topics discussed were the following:

a. Progress of equipment, with special emphasis on the shift that has been made to the new (J-57/P-31) and more reliable engine and on the extremely high quality photography obtained in recent flights in the U.S. with the A-1 and A-2 camera configurations.

b. Present enemy interception capability, the predictable development of a higher altitude interception capability, and a consequent urgency of making use of this reconnaissance system while a clear advantage over interception still obtains.

c. Colonel Goodpaster's desire for periodic operational reports when deep penetration missions are being conducted.

d. The whole question of the position to be taken by the U.S. in the contingency of the loss of an aircraft over enemy territory. On this point I explained that arrangements of a rather pedestrian sort were being worked out with the Department of State and other interested parties. Drs. Killian and Land suggested consideration of a much bolder action by the U.S. involving admission that overflights were being

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conducted to guard against surprise attack. It was left that we would think further about this matter and perhaps suggest several alternative courses of action which would be discussed with someone in the Department of State and among which a choice could be made on short notice.

(Signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director

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ANNEX 74

(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

10 July 1956

Note No. 23

The Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, acting on instructions from the Soviet Government, has the honor to state the following:

According to precisely verified data, on July 4 of this year, at 8:18 a.m. Moscow Time, a twin-engined medium bomber of the United States Air Force appeared from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany and flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, entering the air space of the Soviet Union from the direction of the Polish People's Republic at 9:35 in the area of Grodno. The aircraft which violated the air space of the Soviet Union flew on the route Minsk, Vilnyus, Kaunas and Kaliningrad, penetrating territory of the Soviet Union to the depth of 320 kilometers and remaining over such territory for one hour and 32 minutes.

On July 5 of this year, at 7:41 Moscow Time, a twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force, coming from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany, flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and at 8:54 penetrated the air space of the Soviet Union in the area of Brést, coming from the direction of the Polish People's Republic. The aircraft violating the air frontier of the Soviet Union flew along the route Brest, Pinsk Baranovichi, Kaunas, and Kaliningrad, having penetrated Soviet territory to a depth of 150 kilometers and having remained one hour and 20 minutes over such territory. The same day another twin-engine bomber of the United States Air Force

Department of State of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.

invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and penetrated to a significant depth over Soviet territory.

On July 9 there took place new flights of United States aircraft into the Soviet air space.

The above-mentioned violation of the air frontiers of the Soviet Union by American aircraft cannot be interpreted as other than intentional and conducted for purposes of reconnaissance.

It must be underscored that these gross violations of the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of international tensions has been achieved, when relations between governments are improving, and when mutual confidence between them is growing. Such a development of international relations is fully supported by the peoples of all countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.

One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of countries are worried by the relaxation of international tension which has taken place. These circles do everything possible to interfere with further improvement of relations between countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union, which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government energetically protests to the Government of the United States against such gross violation of the air space of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft and considers this violation as an intentional act of certain circles in the United States, planned to aggravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Calling the attention of the Government of the United States to the inadmissibility of such violations of the air space of the Soviet Union by American aircraft, the Soviet Government states that all responsibility for possible consequences of such violations rests with the Government of the United States.

The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken by the Government of the United States to punish those guilty for the said violations and to prevent such violations in the future.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

July 19, 1956

No. 398

FOR RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M., E.D.T., THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1956.
Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way.

UNITED STATES REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE OF JULY 10
ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF SOVIET TERRITORY BY UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT

Following is the text of a note delivered to the Soviet Union today. It is in reply to the Soviet note of July 10, 1956 alleging violations of Soviet territory by United States Air Force twin-engine medium bombers:

The Department of State has the honor to inform the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the latter's note no. 23 of July 10, 1956 alleging violations of Soviet territory by United States Air Force twin-engine medium bombers coming from Western Germany, has received the most serious consideration of the United States Government. It is noted that the Soviet Government's note refers to "the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany". Attention is called to the fact that there is no longer an American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany. Presumably, the reference is to the Federal Republic of Germany.

A thorough inquiry has been conducted and it has been determined that no United States military planes based, or flying, in or adjacent to the European area at the time of the alleged overflights could possibly have strayed, as alleged, so far from their known flight plans, which carefully exclude such overflights as the Soviet Note alleges. Therefore the statement of the Government of the Soviet Union is in error.

The Department of State at the same time feels obliged to comment on the accompanying statements in the Soviet Embassy's note implying a plot to hinder the improvement of international relations and insinuating that the alleged American Air Force flights might have been arranged by General Twining in Germany, following his visit to the Soviet Union. These remarks, which are as obviously out of place as they are unwarranted, indeed of themselves have the effect of hindering the improvement of international relations.

Department of State,
Washington, July 19, 1956.

(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

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One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of countries are worried by the relaxation of international tension which has taken place. These circles do everything possible to interfere with further improvement of relations between countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union, which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

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The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken by the Government of the United States to punish those guilty for the said violations and to prevent such violations in the future.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956 .

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

July 19, 1956

No. 398

FOR RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M., E.D.T., THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1956.
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A thorough inquiry has been conducted and it has been determined that no United States military planes based, or flying, in or adjacent to the European area at the time of the alleged overflights could possibly have strayed, as alleged, so far from their known flight plans, which carefully exclude such overflights as the Soviet Note alleges. Therefore the statement of the Government of the Soviet Union is in error.

The Department of State at the same time feels obliged to comment on the accompanying statements in the Soviet Embassy's note implying a plot to hinder the improvement of international relations and insinuating that the alleged American Air Force flights might have been arranged by General Twining in Germany, following his visit to the Soviet Union. These remarks, which are as obviously out of place as they are unwarranted, indeed of themselves have the effect of hindering the improvement of international relations.

Department of State,
Washington, July 19, 1956.

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ANNEX 75

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8 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR ; Director of Central Intelligence *

SUBJECT : Decision on Project AQUATONE

1. Present Status: Reflecting the discussions and decisions of the past three weeks since AQUATONE operations were halted on 11 July, the following is the present status of the Project.

a. Detachment A is at Wiesbaden in complete state of readiness with four aircraft operational. It has been advised that no missions will be flown over denied areas until after 15 August at the earliest but in the meanwhile infrequent weather missions and certain test missions are being flown over friendly territory. Work is still proceeding on a permanent base, originally intended for this unit, at Giebelstadt.

b. Detachment B has completed training and its deployment to Adana from Watertown will start on 13 August. It should be fully operational with four aircraft at Adana by 25 August.

c. An advance party is surveying available facilities at Yokota AFB, Japan, and Kadena AFB, Okinawa. Plans are being completed and airlift scheduled for the redeployment of Detachment A from Wiesbaden to the Far East beginning about 21 August. (The same airlift will be used for the initial deployment of Detachment B and the redeployment of A.) It is understood that the final decision to leave Detachment A in Germany or redeploy it to the Far East will not be made until about 15 August and it will remain in a state of operational readiness until that date. If redeployed this Detachment should be operational in the Far East about 15 September.

d. The assembly, equipping and training of a third detachment (Detachment C) is going forward on schedule at Watertown. Most of its senior personnel have already entered on duty and eight pilots have been recruited. The Detachment should be ready for deployment in the first half of November.

e. As a result of slippage in the development of the most advanced cameras and much of the electronics equipment, considerable

(* The Bissell version with changes suggested by General Cabell.)

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development remains to be done. The C camera cannot be expected to be operational much before the end of the year and electronics system #4 will not be operational until late winter. On the basis of present plans these development programs and some training activities will continue at Watertown until 1 February. Thereafter plans are being made for Watertown will to be shut down and the remaining development activities will be handled at an Air Force base/ subject to decision subsequent to 25 August.

2. Decisions Required: By 15 August it will be necessary to decide:

a. Whether Detachment A is to resume operations in Europe, be redeployed promptly to the Far East, or remain inactive at Wiesbaden awaiting a later resumption of operations or redeployment.

b. Whether Detachment B is to start active operations from Adana when it is operational, fly "probing" missions or remain inactive there other than for flying its cover missions, awaiting later decisions.

Immediately after 15 August it would seem desirable to review procurement and development programs in the light of the above decisions with a view to determining whether or not to curtailing development and procurement which might be no longer required for this Project. At the same time it would likewise seem wise to review the requirement for a third detachment.

3. Considerations Bearing on these Decisions: What are here listed as considerations bearing on the problem are believed to be reasonably clearly established and objectively stated circumstances which in no way determine the major policy decisions but which do have clear implications for the form and timing of these decisions.

a. If it is determined that there is no reasonable prospect that Detachment A is not going to be used in Europe either at Wiesbaden or along with Detachment B at Adana, it ought to be put to work as soon as possible in the Far East after that determination is made. If a decision is not made by 15 August either to let it resume operations or to redeploy it, the opportunity for a prompt redeployment would be lost ~~and more time would be wasted to no good purpose.~~

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b. The organization which has been built up to carry out AQUATONE has been designed to conduct operations for a period of slightly more than a year. It is not a permanent organization and is ill-adapted to the task of maintaining in a routine manner a standby capability to be used in the event of war or of unforeseeable sharp change in the political climate. Its personnel, both civilian and military, have been recruited for short tours of duty, assigned overseas on a TDY basis without their families, and every effort has been made to develop the motivation for an intensive temporary undertaking. If the decision is made that a part or all of the capability that has been developed is to be placed on a standby basis, with no prospect of active use at any foreseeable time, /we would have serious problems in keeping/ the present organization would lose /from losing/ its morale, many of its best people, and its effectiveness.

c. Development and procurement are currently going forward on a scale adequate to support three detachments on a fully active basis for a continuous period of 15 months. Savings of some millions of dollars (part of which would accrue to the Agency and part to the Air Force) could be achieved by prompt cutbacks in these programs. Such cutbacks would, however, prevent the development of the full capability originally planned. Under the circumstances, failure to achieve any clear-cut decision as to the scale on which and the time period for which this capability will be actively employed is bound to /might/ result in the waste of substantial sums as well as the wasteful tying up of technical manpower which may be needed in other national security programs.

d. It must be repeated that well-informed technical opinion allows the existing reconnaissance system less than a year before the probability of interception of the U-2 aircraft starts to increase. /It would of course be longer before there could be generally effective deployment of advanced interceptors./

4. Conclusions: All of the above considerations argue powerfully in favor of an attempt to secure reasonably clear-cut decisions on the future of this Project by the middle of August. /The most desirable decision is that authorizing a concerted effort against the top priority targets. Failing this, CIA and the Air Force should consider what the probabilities are of eventual favorable action./ ~~The broad decision that needs to be made is whether this capability is going to be used-~~

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(a) against the USSR, (b) against China, (c) against the European Satellites, or (d) not at all. It can be argued is difficult to believe that no any facts not now available are required as the basis for such a decision or that the passage of a few more weeks would not greatly alter an evaluation of risks to be incurred and benefits to be gained. In particular it is difficult to see what good can come of "probing" missions which will merely alert the defense and stimulate more political protests without accomplishing any really important purpose.

5. Proposed Procedure: In order to secure a decision it is believed that two kinds of staff work should be done:

a. First, a specific plan of operations should be proposed as the desired course of action and the more sensible alternative courses of action should be defined in equally specific terms so that a clear choice is presented to the political authorities. A specific proposal has been prepared in the form of a plan for some fifteen missions over the western USSR which would cover the highest priority intelligence targets. It is believed that for practical purposes there are only two alternative courses of action:

(1) - Operations limited to China and the European Satellites.

(2) - The placing of the capability on a standby basis.

b. Second, the proposal should be staffed out with the interested military authorities (the Air Force and the JCS) and with the Department of State in the hope that it can be presented with their concurrence. To this end, a military assessment of AQUATONE is being prepared by the Air Force and it is believed that support will be forthcoming both from General Twining and from Admiral Radford on behalf of the Joint Chiefs. It had been hoped that the Secretary of State's views could be obtained well in advance of 15 August.

6. Recommendations: It is strongly recommended:

a. That the recommended plan of operations over the USSR from the west, together with the two alternative courses of action, be presented to the Secretary of State at the earliest opportunity and the plan be modified if necessary so as to obtain his concurrence or at least acquiescence.

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~~b. -- That in the event of his non-concurrence in any further operations, steps be taken forthwith to turn over all the assets of the Project to the Air Force to be maintained as a standby capability.~~

~~c. /b/ That in the event of his concurrence in a plan of operations, this be presented to higher authority as a joint recommendation of the DCI and the JCS with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.~~

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director

cc: DDCI

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CHAPTER XII. DETACHMENT B

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Detachment B - Officer Cadre

First Tour (May 1956 - October 1957)

Col. Edward A. Perry, Commanding Officer
Mr. John Parangosky, Executive Officer
Lt. Col. Roland L. Perkins, Operations Officer
Operations Staff:
Maj. Harry N. Cordes
Maj. John F. Carlisle
Maj. Chester Bohart
Maj. James B. Hester
Maj. William E. Kennedy
Maj. Donald R. Curtis
Maj. Joseph E. French
Maj. Thomas W. Land
Capt. Warren R. Kincaid, Jr.
Capt. Roger J. Tremblay
Maj. William R. V. Marriott, Medical Officer

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

Second Tour (November 1957 - May 1960)

Col. Stanley W. Beerli, Commanding Officer (Nov. 1957 - July 1959)
Col. William E. Shelton, Commanding Officer (July 1959 - May 1960)
Mr. John Parangosky, Executive Officer (through March 1959)
Lt. Col. Carl F. Funk, Materiel Officer
Operations Staff:
Maj. Raymond N. Sterling
Maj. Joseph L. Giraud, Jr.
Maj. Arthur DuLac
Maj. William Dotson
Maj. James T. Deuel, Medical Officer

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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Detachment B - Contract Pilots

First Tour (May 1956 - October 1957)

James G. Abraham



Thomas C. Birkhead

James W. Cherbonneau (joined Det B in Turkey, December 1956)

Buster E. Edens

William W. Hall

Edwin K. Jones

William H. McMurray

Francis G. Powers

Sammy V. C. Snider

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

Second Tour (November 1957 - May 1960)

Barry H. Baker (transferred to Detachment G August 1959)

James A. Barnes, Jr.

Robert J. Ericson

Martin A. Knutson (transferred from Detachment A November 1957)

Francis G. Powers

Albert J. Rand (transferred to Detachment G August 1959)

John C. Shinn

Glendon K. Dunaway (transferred from Detachment G August 1959)

Jacob Kratt, Jr. (transferred from Detachment G August 1959)

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CHAPTER XII - DETACHMENT B

Organization and Training

The activation and training phase of the second field detachment proceeded in a great deal more orderly fashion than the first, and while this was to be expected in the light of experience gained, there were other factors which led to the smoother transition of the second group into a well-knit, effective and highly motivated unit.

The Commanding Officer, Colonel Edward A. Perry, was an aggressive leader with a strong urge to lead a winning team. He demanded the full support and loyalty of his men and in turn, spared no effort in trying to achieve the best possible conditions for them. Col. Perry was tapped for the assignment from the Training Directorate of SAC Headquarters in January 1956 and thus had three months before the activation of his detachment in which to visit Project Headquarters and be fully briefed, to visit the training base and witness operations there, and to hand pick approximately 60% of his officer cadre from men known to him. In addition, the facilities at the training base at Watertown were in better shape in all respects to receive the second group: the SAC Training Unit had been able to put forward recommendations on deficiencies and problem areas in the aircraft for correction and to tailor their training course in line with the experience gained

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with the first group; arrangements for recruiting and indoctrinating techreps for overseas service were working more smoothly; and the primary equipment had been operationally proven.

Col. Perry's orders assigned him to the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group with duty as Commanding Officer of Flight B of Project Squadron Provisional, effective 6 March 1956. He reported at Project Headquarters, Washington, and began working with the staff on the recruitment of his cadre and drafting plans and procedures for the training and operational phases. Personnel shortages and lateness in reporting were still being encountered, particularly in the specialties of aeromedicine and supply and warehousing.

May 7th (date of completion of Detachment A's deployment) was set as the day for activation of Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (II) at Watertown and the majority of the detachment's personnel had reported in by the middle of May. The detachment was not fully manned, however, until the middle of July.

The estimated date for completion of training in the U-2 of the nine* contract pilots and four Detachment B officers was for 10 July, with the

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USCM tests beginning 23 July and deployment to follow about 10 August. Mr. Bissell wanted to advance these dates to 16 July and 5 August respectively in view of the fact that the sun angle over the Soviet targets of interest would become less favorable for photography each day. He also wanted to set target dates which would require real effort to meet; this was understood and agreed by Col. Perry.


The optimistic outlook was adversely affected by the late reporting of the detachment's contract pilots. Five were on deck by mid-May and three additional pilots reported by 1 June. The concurrent training of the four Greek pilots and two casualties for Detachment A, as well as the running of accelerated tests on the P-31 engine during May, June and July 1956 put a heavy burden on available aircraft. Col. Yancey's estimate in the middle of May was for a possible six weeks' delay in the operational readiness date; however, with some adjustments in work schedules and training programs and maximum effort by all concerned, the detachment held its USCM tests 18 through 21 July, was declared combat ready, and began deployment on 13 August 1956.

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Turkish Approval for Operations at Incerlik Air Base

The Air Force recommended on 7 March 1956 that Adana, Turkey, be developed as a base for Detachment B in preference to Elevisis, Greece. Reasons for the choice of Adana were that it was closer to priority targets, had better terminal weather and available alternate landing bases, available SAC logistical support (this was later discovered to be almost non-existent), and better physical security.

The Project Director concurred and proceeded to seek State Department concurrence. There was a delay due to a new Ambassador to Turkey not having been confirmed. On 11 April 1956 the Department of State approved an approach to the Turks through Turkish Air Force channels.

Meanwhile the Project Engineer, [] was sent via USAFE to Adana to ascertain what construction was necessary. The Air Force was to sustain the costs of additional facilities but the Project Director offered to reimburse the costs, if any, which the Air Force was unable to meet. After the survey, [] estimated

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that the basic facilities would be ready approximately 10 August, if there were no slippages in delivery of materials. This means the bare essentials required for living and operating on the base. The additional base support facilities required would take up to four months to construct.

On 24 April Col. Russell Berg, together with Mr. Bissell's Personal Assistant, [redacted] went to Ankara for the purpose of obtaining approval for overflights from Turkey by Detachment B at the Service-to-Service level. It became evident from conversations with Agency and U. S. Air Force contacts in Ankara, and the Charge' d'Affaires, Mr. Foy Kohler, that approval could only be received ultimately from the Prime Minister. [redacted] requested Project Headquarters by cable to obtain State Department concurrence in a Government-to-Government approach, and asked that the Charge' be so notified. This was done and on 28 April a message from the Secretary of State to Mr. Kohler was sent to Ankara [redacted] (see Annex 76 for text).

On 1 May 1956 Mr. Kohler saw Prime Minister Menderes and received unqualified approval for operations from Turkey. The Prime Minister was told that the [redacted]

[redacted] 50X4, E.O.13526

[redacted] that the group at

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Adana would consist of about 130 personnel with five U-2's; that the operation would last approximately two years; that the intelligence collected would be given to the Turks through normal channels; and that in the event of a compromise, the Turkish Government would not be expected to take any of the responsibility. Menderes replied that in such an event he would at least meet in consultation and promised to keep knowledge of the operation (in the extended cover story version) to General Tunaboylu, Chief of Staff of the Turkish General Staff, and his Deputy, Lt. Gen. Rustu Erdelhun, and Mr. Nuri Birgi, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry.

Because of approaches made to the Greeks concerning possible use of Elevisis, it was felt politically expedient to let the King and Queen and the Prime Minister know immediately that there had been a change in plans, but without referring to the use of a Turkish base. This was accomplished by

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Deployment to Incerlik

The advance echelons of communications, security and operations personnel departed for Adana on 25 and 27 July 1956, and by 2 August a temporary communications link was established between Incerlik and Project Headquarters. The officer in charge of the advance party,

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Lt. Col. Roland L. Perkins, sent back a gloomy report on the status of construction at Incerlik, but the Project Director felt there was no alternative to going ahead with deployment even though the U-2's and some of the equipment would have to be left in the open for a while until hangar and storage space was ready. Therefore the move went ahead according to schedule and between 14 and 17 August 1956 a combined MATS/SAC airlift of C-118's and C-124's delivered WRSP (II), complete with aircraft, equipment and supplies to Turkey.

To insure that there would be no misunderstanding with regard to line of command (as had occurred with Detachment A) the Project Director sent a dispatch to Col. Perry before his departure from Watertown outlining the duties of the Executive Officer in the management of the Detachment's affairs. These were:

- a. To implement policies and orders of the Commanding Officer and assure compliance therewith.
- b. To maintain liaison with CIA 50X1, E.O.13526
- c. To maintain liaison with host government agencies and coordinate contact of other detachment personnel with these agencies.
- d. To advise the Commanding Officer on Agency policies, regulations, etc.

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- e. To act as office of record for the detachment.
- f. To coordinate support activities with operational planning.
- g. To review organization and procedures and advise the Commanding Officer on proposed changes.
- h. To perform other duties as the Commanding Officer may direct.

Colonel Perry accepted fully the concept of joint administration but at the same time insisted that as Commanding Officer he retain full control over all elements of his command and that detachment personnel (including security and communications) should not communicate directly with their superiors in Washington, and that any reports by official visitors to the detachment should in every case be submitted through him.

Although the detachment retained its unit designation as WRSP (II), the additional designation of Detachment 10-10, TUSLOG, was added in order to incorporate the unit into the theater command for support purposes (including APO mailing privileges). Facilities construction, airlift, ground vehicles and other normal Air Force support were to be levied on USAFE Headquarters with the promise of priority treatment.

Incerlik Air Base, a SAC post-strike base for long-range aircraft, situated seven miles out of Adana near the southern coast of Turkey,

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was occupied by a small housekeeping group with little or no activity at the time of Detachment B's arrival. Liaison with the base complement was established with Col. Gordon F. Thomas, Base Commander, and cleared contacts in the local OSI and Provost Marshal sections.

The settling in of detachment personnel and readying of the aircraft and equipment for operations was hampered by delayed completion of facilities, poor sanitation, substandard mess, electrical failures, low quality indigenous help, and extreme heat.

The Detachment Flight Surgeon, Dr. Marriott, shortly after arrival of the group wrote up a detailed report of the unsatisfactory and unsanitary condition of the mess at Adana which was sent back to Headquarters. When it was shown to Col. Geary (who then occupied the position of Headquarters USAF Project Officer) he immediately brought it to the attention of Gen. Smart, Vice Chief of Staff, who in turn referred it to Gen. Tunner at USAFE Headquarters. Gen. Tunner sent his Inspector General down to Turkey to investigate (although he was quite angry at the report having reached Washington without "going through channels"). Action was soon taken to relieve the Food Service Officer and his assistant and get replacements. Other corrective action included procurement of dishes, glasses, silverware, water coolers and other

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items to improve service. New screening for windows and screen doors was ordered, and sanitation in general improved by cleaning and fresh paint. All of this did not happen overnight--in fact it took several months to realize the necessary improvements in the living and working areas.

The problem of airlift in and out of Adana for both freight and passengers was a principal concern of Col. Perry's group for almost four months after arrival. Consideration had been given to establishing a twice-weekly Athens-Adana run using the Agency C-54 [redacted] [redacted] but this was ruled out for security and other reasons (except in cases of dire emergency), and dependence had to be placed on the limited regular USAF flights (two or three a week) from Athens or Rhein Main, Germany. In December 1956 USAFE finally delivered a support C-54 to the detachment for its own use and this was probably the greatest boon to morale that was experienced by the group during its entire stay in Turkey. It meant not only the ability to bring in badly needed supplies and equipment and to exchange pouches and passengers for quick connection with Washington, but it also meant the possibility of scheduling rest and rehabilitation trips out of Turkey for Detachment personnel.

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Liaison was established with the Agency Station at Frankfurt, Germany, and arrangements were made for the Station's assistance in local purchases and other day-to-day project business in Germany. Later a Project Liaison Officer from Headquarters was established at Wiesbaden, first in the office of the DCS for Operations (physically located in the office of Lt. Col. R. D. Steakley) and later moved to the office of Lt. Col. Charles Carver of the USAFE Materiel Directorate. The project officer assigned performed liaison as required between Project Headquarters, USAFE components, the two operating detachments, Frankfurt Station, and the photo-interpretation center at Wiesbaden (URPIC/W). His activities were facilitated by access to

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and Agency pouch and other facilities at Frankfurt Station.

First Operations: Middle East Coverage

In the late summer and early fall of 1956, the rapid deterioration of the situation in Egypt and the relations between that country and the British and French, and the cutting off of intelligence bearing upon these developments, led the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) to recommend to the Intelligence Community that requirements for coverage of the Middle East be levied on Project AQUATONE whose

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U-2 aircraft were deployed conveniently nearby awaiting permission of higher authority to resume their primary mission of overflights of the Soviet Union. The initiation of Middle East overflights was authorized by the White House after concurrence by the Secretary of State in the ARC's recommendations. Both the President and the Secretary of State were kept constantly informed of the progress of these overflights by reports or by briefings with photographic displays of intelligence obtained.

The first Middle East flight by Detachment B was flown on 11 September 1956, and the last on 28 February 1960. During this period a total of 151 overflights were made: 11 by Detachment A, 17 by British pilots attached to Detachment B, and the balance by Detachment B's American pilots. During this period the following Middle Eastern countries were covertly* overflown:

Aden	Kuwait
Afghanistan	Lebanon
Bahrein	Pakistan
Egypt	Qatar
Ethiopia	Saudi Arabia
Israel	Syria
Iran	Turkey
Iraq	Yemen
Jordan	

* There is no information available that indicates that the U-2 was subject to radar tracking by any Middle East country except Israel.

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When Middle East coverage got underway in September 1956, the film from missions was still being sent back to the Eastman processing facility, but when the military situation in the Suez area heated up and mission results were required for immediate tactical use, the Photo Interpretation Center (PIC) established a branch at Wiesbaden (URPIC/W) with a small sub-unit later set up at Adana (URPIC/1), manned by a three-man team led by [REDACTED]. The Detachment thus had an immediate read-out capability so that flash reports could be cabled to Washington within a very short time after the mission aircraft landed at Adana. This facility was maintained in stand-by condition during non-operational periods so that on demand it could be reinstated in a matter of 12 to 24 hours.

Honoring the promise to Prime Minister Menderes to share the intelligence obtained with the Turks, the first intelligence summary was given to him on 27 November 1956 and related principally to the Syrian Air Order of Battle.

Problems with Commanding Officer, Detachment B

Once Detachment B was established at Adana, Col. Perry instituted a continuous stream of cable messages to Headquarters which at first were limited to listing deficiencies requiring Headquarters or USAFE

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supply action, but which soon turned to policy matters, questioning Headquarters decisions, and suggesting changes in established procedures. Interspersed were messages on the private channel to either Mr. Bissell or Col. Gibbs

In January 1957 his request for Headquarters consultation was granted, along with ten days of home leave to visit his family.

In announcing Col. Perry's forthcoming TDY at Headquarters,

Mr. Bissell noted to the concerned members of his staff:

"I do not anticipate any earth-shaking decisions or important new policies to emerge from Col. Perry's trip. I feel it is most important, however, especially in the light of our long exchange and not infrequent differences of view with him during the past several months, that we be exposed face to face to his philosophy and attitudes and he to ours. If we can obtain a more vivid and complete understanding of his problems as he sees them and he of ours, and if each of us can get a better grasp of the other's reasons for holding the views he does, the visit will be most profitable." 1/

1/ SAPC-12083, 4 January 1957. Memorandum to Project Staff from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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During his TDY at Headquarters on 5 and 6 February 1957, Col. Perry had a long private talk with Mr. Bissell, of which no record was made, but the results were that Col. Perry discussed his detachment problems with the Headquarters Staff in a fairly calm and cooperative spirit and departed for Adana apparently intent on getting on with the job.

In March a visit was paid to Adana by Col. Gibbs and a Headquarters party for purposes of a general inspection, and to discuss cutback and reassignment of personnel. The political hold-down of the primary mission and uncertainty of the future of the project made it necessary to try

1/ Letter to Dr. William R. Lovelace, Jr., dated 7 January 1957.

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to maintain the capability in the field on as economical a basis as possible. The condition of the Detachment's facilities and adequacy of current supply lines and procedures were reviewed. An improvement in the over-all picture was evident and the Liaison Office at USAFE Headquarters, Wiesbaden, was functioning very well since it had been placed in the offices of the Materiel Directorate in lieu of Col. Steakley's office in Operations.

The number of Middle East missions during the first few months of 1957 had decreased to a minimum as a result of United Nations peace-making activities in the Suez affair, and on 1 February the ARC had recommended discontinuance of use of the U-2 for this coverage in order not to jeopardize its use in penetration flights into the Soviet orbit in the current photographic season, permission for which it was hoped would be forthcoming soon. Two successful Elint missions with System V were flown along the Soviet border, the second of which on 18 March 1957, returning from Afghanistan inadvertently overflew a portion of the Soviet Union which set off a chain reaction through the intelligence community up to SAC Headquarters, and a written explanation of why and how this happened had to be prepared for Headquarters, USAF, with corrective action being taken with regard to pilots' operational procedures to ensure no repetition of the incident.

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The Middle East moved toward another crisis in April 1957.

King Hussein of Jordan threw pro-Communists out of his government and was faced with a possible uprising. The U.S. 6th Fleet was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean to show support for Hussein. Middle East missions were flown as required for tactical coverage of this development by Detachment B until the situation in Jordan calmed down and the 6th Fleet was moved back on its normal station.

First Staging from Pakistan

At a meeting with the President on 6 May 1957 the decision was reached that overflights of Russia would be renewed and would be staged by Detachment B from Pakistan if permission could be obtained from the Government of Pakistan for use of a base. Mr. Bissell's Personal Assistant, [redacted], visited Karachi for this purpose between 3 and 7 June 1957 and along with [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526

[redacted] briefed President Mirza and requested approval for a U-2 staging mission "into Sinkiang for air sampling and electronic intelligence" from a base in Pakistan. The President asked that Prime Minister Suhrawardy's approval be sought (without informing him that the President had already been seen). This was done and the Prime Minister gave his approval but said he would like the group to talk with

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General Ayub Khan. General Ayub, when approached, said he would advise the Prime Minister against this project unless the U.S. was willing to furnish Pakistan the needed military aid (principally fighter aircraft) previously requested. On 5 June 1957 a second visit with the Prime Minister by the U.S. representatives disclosed that Ayub had not dissuaded him from permitting the operation. Although the Prime Minister said he agreed with Ayub that Pakistan should have more aid, he did not ask a quid pro quo for use of the base. Lahore was chosen for the operation since the runway at Peshawar (a more desirable location) was undergoing repair. Col. Perry and the Project Engineer, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] joined [REDACTED] to visit and inspect the base facilities.

Operation SOFT TOUCH

Use of the base at Lahore was agreed for the approximate period of 7 July 1957 through 7 August 1957, with a possible extension if found to be necessary. The advance echelon arrived on 12 July and communications were established with Adana on 13 July. The main task force of 40 personnel, including all eight contract pilots and three U-2 aircraft (two with the new anti-radar application) followed immediately and after shake-down of equipment, waited until 4 August before target weather cleared and the first mission could be run. Nine overflights

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were carried out between 4 and 28 August and while four were classified as "poor" due to camera or other malfunction or target weather, excellent coverage was obtained of the guided missile test range at what later came to be known as Tyura Tam, and of the Siberian atomic proving ground at Semipalatinsk, as well as other known or suspected installations. (See overleaf for a listing of SOFT TOUCH missions and the targets covered.)

On 10 August 1957 the Government of Pakistan received a complaint from the Indians through the UN Kashmir Observer on an overflight of Indian territory on 5 August. The violation was not attributed to the U-2, and the Pakistanis took care of the Indian complaint by blaming the overflight in question on the Russians. 50X1, E.O.13526

recommended early withdrawal of the staging party since its continued presence would aid the Soviets in pinpointing the operating base from which the overflights were originating. The task force therefore withdrew on 30 August and returned to Turkey.

Briefings were given in Washington in early September on the results of these missions to the President and the Secretary of State by Gen. Cabell and Mr. Lundahl. On 27 November, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, and members of his cabinet were also briefed by Mr. Lundahl in London on SOFT TOUCH intelligence.

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SOFT TOUCH Missions:

Date	Msn. No.	Duration	Pilot	Targets	Config. & Results
4 August 1957	4036	8 hr. 35 min.	Powers	China, TiHwa, Mongolia (abort before Irkutsk)	A-2 Poor
5 August 1957	4035	7 hr. 30 min.	Edens	Novokazalinsk, Kzylorda, Aral Sea (Tyura Tam)	B(DB)* Good
11 August 1957	4039	6 hr. 25 min.	Mc Murray	Ust Kamerogorsk (abort before Novosibirsk)	B(DB) Poor
20 August 1957	4045	8 hr. 40 min.	Snider	Tomsk, Novosibirsk	A-2 Good
20 August 1957	4048	8 hr. 5 min.	Jones	Semipalatinsk, Omsk Balkhash	A-2(DB) Fair
21 August 1957	4049	9 hr. 10 min.	Birkhead	Krasnoyarsk	A-2 Poor
21 August 1957	4050	8 hr. 05 min.	Cherborneaux	Stalinsk, Semipalatinsk, Alma Ata	A-2(DB) Excellence
21 August 1957	4051	6 hr. 40 min.	Hall	Tibet, Lhasa	B Poor
28 August 1957	4058	7 hr. 35 min.	Jones	Leninabad, Aralsk (Tyura Tam)	A-2(DB) Excellence

* Note: DB stands for "Dirty Bird", the name given the U-2 with the anti-radar application.

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On 18 August 1957 a pro-Soviet military group in Syria executed a coup and subsequently joined forces with Egypt under Egyptian control. Coverage of Syria by Detachment B on 31 August and 1 September was obtained and a report on Syrian troop disposition and air order of battle was furnished the Turks on 9 September in order to forestall their overflying Syria to obtain such information and possibly touching off further serious hostilities.

On 10 September permission was received for a one time flight by Detachment B to cover the Russian missile test range at Kapustin Yar and fortunately the mission was timed so that the facilities were photographed just after a missile had been fired which provided bonus information.

Change of Command, Detachment B

On 20 September 1957, a change in policy was instituted by Headquarters allowing dependents to accompany detachment personnel overseas. The immediate effect was the necessity for additional housing. Before departed for Adana on 25 September to look into the furnishing of additional quarters, he was given guidelines and delegated contractual authority by Mr. Bissell with the following proviso:

"I am interested in doing everything reasonable and proper to ensure that personnel of this Project stationed at

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Base B enjoy facilities, both residential and recreational, that are as livable as the conditions over which we have no control will permit. At the same time I do not wish to attempt construction on such a scale that we will overcommit ourselves financially or that through sponsorship of major construction we will attract attention to Base B as an Air Force base blessed by 'special favors' or a privileged status in Air Force Headquarters." 1/

Twenty off-base houses were rented during [] TDY in Adana and contractual arrangements were entered into with a local firm for renovation needed to bring them up to acceptable standards.

Col. Perry completed his 18-month tour and returned to Headquarters in October 1957 for reassignment by the Air Force. Col. Stanley W. Beerli agreed to move from his post as Commanding Officer of Detachment C in Japan and take over command at Adana. With the arrival of Col. Beerli in November 1957 at Detachment B, there was an almost complete change-over of personnel. Col. Beerli brought with him from Japan several of the unit who had served with him there as well as five of the Detachment C contract pilots.

By January 1958 the shaking-down process of the new command was generally completed. Two of the Detachment's earlier problems

1/ SAPC-19633, 25 September 1957. Memorandum for [] from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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were still bothersome--supply and air transport. This could be attributed in a measure to the geographic location of the base with respect to sources of supply, as well as to the lowered priorities now being granted to filling the Detachment's requirements, since the fast strike nature of the operation had given way to piece-meal coverage of primary targets.

Col. Beerli began work in February 1958 on a "Fast Move" staging concept which would allow the deployment of a self-supporting task force of approximately 30 men and one U-2 aircraft to a remote base with shop and office facilities installed within the C-124 used for airlifting the group to the forward staging base. This plan was drafted and sent to Headquarters where the Operations Staff, after full discussion, recommended that the concept be further investigated and refined so that it could be used in future staging operations to bases where permanent facilities were not available, thus expanding operational capability.

Second Staging Planning

Early in February 1958, as a result of briefing by the DCI and Mr. Bissell on future operational plans of the project, the Secretary of State approved approaching the Pakistanis again and requesting the use of a base for Operation BLUE MOON, a follow-up to the missions run

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the previous August from Lahore. The approval of President Mirza and Prime Minister Noon was secured on 21 February 1958. [redacted]

[redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted]

of

the Project Headquarters Staff in Washington conducted the negotiations.

The briefing on mission purpose given the Pakistanis followed the Elint cover story (with no mention of photography). The U.S. Ambassador, James Langley, was also briefed, using the same cover story. Mr. Ali Asghar, Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Defense was seen by Col. Beerli in company with Col. Clinton True, Air Attaché, and

[redacted] and permission was granted to use the base at Peshawar,

a hangar and necessary facilities.

On 6 March 1958 the Soviet Government presented to the State Department (without making it public) a protest concerning the overflight of their Far East Maritime Province. The flight was a Detachment C mission over Ukrania on 1 March; however the Russians attributed the aircraft to the U.S. Air Force in its first protest note (later identifying the aircraft as of the U-2 type). All overflights by U-2's were immediately grounded, indefinitely, on order of highest authority, and BLUE MOON was therefore called off.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Staging from Norway: Planned and Postponed

On 26 June 1956 Mr. Bissell and Gen. Cabell flew to Germany to brief Chancellor Adenauer on AQUATONE. They were invited to travel in the aircraft of the Chief of NATO Forces, Gen. Albert Gruenther, and enroute to Germany they took the opportunity to brief Gen. Gruenther on the U-2 project and get his views concerning an approach to the Norwegians for use of a base from which to operate over Russia. Gruenther was pessimistic concerning these prospects and indicated that if any approach were made, it should be at the highest level in the Norwegian Government and not through Col. Evang, head of Norwegian Intelligence.

The next day [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] was briefed on AQUATONE in anticipation of an approach to the Norwegians and he reported that the Norwegians were still somewhat sour as a result of the failure of GENETRIX (the balloon project) to achieve promised intelligence. He recommended that the first approach be to Col. Evang.

It was two years before an approach was actually made to the Norwegians in June 1958. [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] arranged through Evang for Col. Beerli and [redacted] to visit Bodo on 19 June to inspect the available base facilities. Planning then went ahead for Operation HONEYMOON to be staged from Bodo. Two events intervened which

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delayed the carrying out of these plans. First on 27 June 1958 the Agency's C-118 aircraft from the Wiesbaden Air Section was shot down over Armenia by the Russians; the surviving members of the crew (including Lt. Col. Dale Brannon and other Agency-assigned military personnel) were seized and held by the Russians, while charges and countercharges were aired in the international press. Second, on 14 July a pro-Nasser group in Iraq assassinated King Faisal and took over the government. The next day, President Eisenhower ordered 5,000 U. S. Marines to be put ashore at Beirut from the 6th Fleet at the request of Lebanese President Chamoun, who feared overthrow of his government. At the same time British troops were requested by Jordan. The daily or twice daily U-2 coverage of the Middle East trouble spots on behalf of the Intelligence Community, particularly the U. S. Navy, required all of Detachment B's assets.

The proposed operation from Bodo had been opposed by Gen. LeMay unless each sortie were carefully and specifically justified. The Air Staff believed that three of the planned missions could produce inadvertent overflights with consequent Soviet protests. Meanwhile, [] [] that Norwegian Intelligence felt the Bodo operation should be postponed in view of the Middle East crisis.

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General Cabell concurred in the postponement, with future reactivation of the operation to be at the discretion of the Project Director.

United Nations intervention in the Middle East, voted at an emergency session of the General Assembly on 8 August, brought a lull to hostilities. On 11 August 1958, Detachment B, at the request of the U. S. Navy, ran Operation BIG EARS with Elint System IV over the 6th Fleet in order to test the Fleet's radar capabilities and limitations. The results of this operation were of great value to the Navy not only in its operations but for future research and development purposes as well.

Project NEW MOON

With the Middle East temporarily quiet, on 28 August 1958 the President was briefed on Operation NEW MOON (replacement for HONEYMOON) and he approved about 90% of the coverage proposed, personally checking the flightlines of each mission plan. NEW MOON was planned so as to use the Elint operation previously approved by the Norwegians as cover for an added Soviet overflight. Col. Evang was the only Norwegian to know of the overflight phase of the operation.

Col. William Burke, then Deputy Project Director, briefed the Air Staff on 2 September 1958 concerning the proposed coverage from Bodo of Polyarny Urals, including the President's desire that this overflight of the USSR be launched from Norway. The reaction of the Air

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Staff was that this mission was more likely to cause a protest than a mission originating in Pakistan and landing at Bodo, but all were pleased that at least a mission had been approved. Norwegian approval for use of Bodo was cleared [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on 4 September 1958, and the task force departed from Adana on 10 September, arriving at Bodo on the 15th due to weather and aircraft malfunction enroute.

The weather was unfavorable until 25 October, when an Elint peripheral mission was launched. After waiting ten days longer for suitable weather for the primary mission, with no prospect of better weather, a substitute mission was flown from Bodo over the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, and thence returning to Adana. The mission was tracked by Russian radar, and officials of the Norwegian Foreign Office became aware of the flight and were very unhappy, more over their ignorance of the arrangements made through Norwegian Intelligence than with the activity itself. Evang's position at that point was something less than secure.

Mr. Bissell expressed concern on the need for better liaison planning in future staging operations. He noted to Col. Burke in a follow-up on the Bodo operation:

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"Looking at our Norwegian activity with the advantage of hindsight, it is my impression that the following discrepancies may be outlined:

"a. We failed to achieve suppression of radar for one of the flights into Bodo.

"b. Though we went into Bodo under USAF cover, we failed to arrange for any notification to reach either Gen. Johnson or Gen. Mottsfield through normal USAF channels. We thereby called the attention of the Norwegian Air Force to the unusual nature of this operation.

"c. We never seemed able to reach a clear mutual understanding with Evang as to what information we were to furnish him during our stay in Bodo...

"The preparation of a liaison plan should cause us to consider carefully the nature of our cover in any country in which we operate and to inquire how notification of our arrival would reach the local authorities concerned if our cover story were in fact true. I would like to suggest therefore that the Cover and Security Sections in Headquarters as well as Operations and the appropriate individuals in the Detachment be concerned with the planning of future staging operations." 1/

In January 1959 it was learned that the Norwegian Ambassador to Moscow had been called in by Foreign Minister Zorin and told that the Norwegian Government should take steps to halt hostile acts against the USSR (i. e., allowing U. S. and British warplanes to use Bodo as a base for reconnaissance flights against the USSR).

1/ CHAL-0491, 30 December 1959. Memorandum to Deputy Director, DPS, from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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British Join Detachment B

In December 1958 the British OLDSTER unit arrived at Adana and were gradually integrated into the Detachment. The Prime Minister's approval for British pilots to participate in operational missions carried the proviso that some cover background should be built up with meteorological flights. Therefore before the unit settled in, one U-2 was ferried to Watton RAF Base, England, for the purpose of running some missions with the weather configuration to establish cover in England. (British participation in the program is covered in Chapter XIII.)

Elint Missions

Two outstanding Elint missions by Detachment B were among the "firsts" in the field of electronic intelligence collection. Timed to coincide with an expected Soviet "moon shot" on 2 January 1959, an Elint mission with System IV (Ferret) was flown over the Soviet/Afghanistan border in order to cover the launching of the Russian lunar probe "Metchta" from the Kyzyl Kum Desert in Turkmen. The results were good. The other "first" was the acquisition, using System VII, on 9 June 1959, of an intercept of 30 seconds of telemetry prior to the first stage burn-out of a Soviet ICBM launched from Kapustin Yar. The second stage telemetry was obtained by a SAC RB-47 at a lower altitude.

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with manned equipment and the two mutually confirmed intercepts were of great value to analysts in determining the size, type and other characteristics of the engines used in the missile.

Further Operations, 1959

Other than Elin missions, the Detachment kept busy with routine coverage of Middle East trouble spots, upper air sampling and weather missions. Two weather flights were staged by the British pilots, again out of Watton RAF Base, continuing to build their cover. These flights occurred on 7 and 8 May 1959 with the support of Detachment B and the British Meteorological Office, in coordination with the RAF.

In May 1959, Col. William Burke made an inspection visit to the Detachment and found the unit in good shape, particularly in pilot proficiency (including the British) as confirmed by tracker analysis of missions flown. He found the Detachment's off-base housing to be adequate but recommended that all pilots and their families should live on base, and that, if the tenure at Adana were extended through another season, trailers should be installed on base for all personnel for project security and to avoid any anti-American incidents.

Soviet Missile Launch Site Covered Again

The requirement of the U.S. defense community for intelligence on the status of the Soviet missile program was rendered more critical

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by the bellicose statements being made by Khrushchev referring to an already operational Soviet ICBM capability. Two CHALICE operations were planned and tentatively approved early in 1959 which would collect additional hard information on the location of operational ICBM sites and facilities engaged in missile production. A Big Three meeting in Washington the first of April, and plans for a Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in May (at which Khrushchev's demand for a "Summit" meeting to settle all issues was to be discussed) caused the postponement of the planned U-2 operations. The inconclusive conference in Geneva adjourned on the 20th of June until July 13th, and in the interim permission was given for one mission. On 9 July 1959 a successful overflight of Tyra Tam and the Urals (Operation TOUCHDOWN) was flown from Pesawar and collected excellent photography.

A change of command at Detachment B took place when Col. Beerli finished his tour and departed for Washington to become Project Director of Operations. He was replaced at Adana by Col. William Shelton who arrived on duty on 31 July 1959. In August two contract pilots (Rand and Baker) rotated back to the ZI for assignment with Detachment G at Edwards while two Detachment G pilots (Kratt and Dunaway) moved with their families to Adana. Also in August, two U-2C's (the model

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configured with the J-75 engine) were ferried to Adana and an accompanying team, during an intensive two-weeks period, trained the operating and maintenance personnel, checking out 10 pilots. The aircraft, engines and other equipment functioned well and the system was declared operationally ready at the end of two weeks.

British Operations

In October 1959 Operation FULL HOUSE was staged from Watton RAF Base by the British pilots for meteorological missions and cover build-up. A Detachment B task force using the "Fast Move" concept of operations supported the deployment and two successful missions were flown. Two Soviet overflight missions by British pilots were finally approved by the Prime Minister in November and permission was obtained from the Government of Pakistan through British channels to use Peshawar as a staging base. Two separate deployments were supported by Detachment B to carry out these missions. On 6 December 1959 a successful photographic overflight of Kuybyshev, Saratov-Engels, and Kapustin Yar, landing at Adana, was flown, and on 5 February 1960 another flight was made over Tyura Tam, Ukraine, and Kazan, also terminating at Adana. Both of these missions collected excellent photographic intelligence, including coverage of the principal Soviet aircraft production centers.

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Project Relations with Norwegians

In November 1959, Miss Frances Willis (U.S. Ambassador to Norway) was in the Department of State on consultation and requested that Ambassador Cumming (State/Agency Liaison) arrange a meeting for her to discuss Project CHALICE relations with the Norwegians. Mr. James Cunningham, on behalf of the project, met with the two ambassadors on 18 November and the discussion immediately turned to CIA relations with Col. Evang and his unique position in the political structure in Oslo, particularly with regard to his dealings with the U-2 project representatives. In Mr. Cunningham's record of the meeting he noted:

"There was general agreement that in the event another mission is projected from Norway in the spring that the winter might profitably be spent in exploring the desirability and timing of briefing Cabinet members on CHALICE materials in order to make actual mission approval in the spring much easier. Ambassador Cumming stated that he was of the view that Secretary Herter would press the President rather hard in the spring for a high priority mission in Northwest Russia and that, in Cummings' opinion, the President would probably approve. Ambassador Cummings indicated that Secretary Herter's interest in this particular mission had been rekindled only yesterday by Premier Khrushchev's statements about missile production in the Soviet Union." 1/

1/ CHAL-0790, 18 November 1959. Memorandum for the Record by James A. Cunningham, Jr.

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Ambassador Willis said she would think about which of the Norwegian Cabinet members might most profitably receive such a briefing and would communicate with Ambassador Cumming on the Roger channel after her return to Norway in December regarding timing of a briefing. (Nothing has been found in the records to indicate that Ambassador Willis followed through on the recommended procedure for circumventing Evang as a sole channel for approvals. At any rate, the next approach to the Norwegians at the end of February 1960, looking toward staging from Norway in April, was made to Evang [redacted]

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Planning for Spring 1960 Operations

On 19 February 1960, General Goodpaster reported to General Cabell that the President had reviewed four CHALICE mission proposals which had been submitted for his approval, and had made the following decisions: ^{1/}

a. His first choice was a northern mission staged from a Norwegian base (Operation TIME STEP), which would cover the area along the Polyarny-Ural/Kotlas railroad line including a suspected

^{1/} CHAL-0890-60, 19 February 1960. Memorandum for the Record by Colonel William Burke.

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operational ICBM site.

b. If weather favored a launch from Pakistan, then Operation GRAND SLAM could be flown covering targets at Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk and the Kola Peninsula, including atomic energy, guided missile and submarine installations, with mission aircraft retrieving in Norway.

c. If, after waiting for favorable conditions to accomplish either a or b, above, these conditions did not develop within the allotted time, then the Sary Shagan mission could be flown (Operation SQUARE DEAL).

General Goodpaster made it quite clear that the President was approving only one mission and that the time period was between the 1st and the 30th of March 1960. The President could be approached for an extension if during that period the weather was not favorable. (A request for an extension was later granted up to 10 April, not because of weather but due to complications encountered in obtaining agreement from the Pakistanis and Norwegians.)

Project Headquarters requested [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to approach the Pakistanis for permission to run a series of U.S. flights from Peshawar. [REDACTED] replied on 5 March, after talking with U.S. Ambassador Rountree, that it might be a good idea

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to have the British High Commissioner, who had arranged for the use of Peshawar for the OLDSTER missions, negotiate on behalf of the U.S. This would avoid the question of F-104's for the Pakistani Air Force in exchange for use of a base being raised again by President Ayub Khan.

On 9 March 1960 Mr. Bissell was informed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that MI-6 had asked him to pass on the information that there had been a cooling off in the Pakistani official relationship with the British with respect to use of their facilities, due to pressure from the Soviets. This had been reported to London by the High Commissioner in Karachi after the 5 February 1960 U-2

overflight by the British team. It was therefore decided that Mr. Russell would approach Mr. Riaz Hussain, [REDACTED] principal liaison within the Pakistani Government, rather than go directly to President Ayub.

[REDACTED] reported on 15 March 1960 on the results of his approach to Col. Evang for permission to stage from Norway. Col. Evang had Norwegian Air Force approval for one British Elint flight in April and one U.S. flight in May. He therefore intended to approve TIME STEP for April, since the British had withdrawn their request for an April flight, but this had not as yet been cleared with Gen. Tofte Johnson, head of the Norwegian Air Force. A few days later

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[redacted] Headquarters that Col. Evang was ill with flu and not expected to be available until 28 March; therefore no plans could be discussed since Evang had authorized no one to discuss the mission other than himself.

Meanwhile on 25 March, Mr. Riaz Hussain notified [redacted] in Karachi that President Ayub had given permission to mount the operation from Peshawar allowing sixty days' use of the base if needed. The U.S. Ambassador and Air Attaché in Karachi were informed of the impending operation at that time [redacted]

The Project Director gave orders to Col. Burke on 28 March 1960, after reviewing the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee's latest input, as follows:

"You will accomplish TIME STEP or GRAND SLAM as soon after 31 March as weather is suitable for either mission. Should conditions develop in which either mission could be accomplished, first priority will be given to TIME STEP. It is assumed that the foregoing will require the preparation of alternative operations plans and the completion of arrangements to permit staging alternatively either East or North in response to the development of the weather." 1/

In Oslo, [redacted] learned from Col. Evang that between 9 and 19 April all Norway would be celebrating the Easter holidays and no government officials would be available during that period; also

1/ CHAL-0931, 28 March 1960. Memorandum to AC/DPD from DD/P.

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that both Andoya and Bodo Air Bases were involved in NATO exercises from 4 to 13 April. Therefore neither TIME STEP nor GRAND SLAM could be run before April 19th at the earliest, since the first was planned to depart from Norway and the second to retrieve there.

With Presidential authority due to expire on 10 April, the only alternative under the circumstances was to fly the third priority mission. Operation SQUARE DEAL was therefore staged from Peshawar on 9 April 1960, retrieving at Adana. The photographic mission was successful, but the aircraft was tracked for almost the entire route by Russian radar.

Operation GRAND SLAM

Planning continued toward carrying out the TIME STEP operation, with the hope of getting approval before the Summit Meeting in Paris on 16 May. Mr. Riaz Hussain was again requested to obtain approval from President Ayub for the additional mission to be flown from Peshawar and this was accomplished on 19 April 1960 with the proviso that the operation must end before the Summit Meeting. Also on 19 April, Col. Evang notified Gen. Tofte Johnson of the proposed mission and received his agreement for use of either Andoya or Bodo.

On 18 April 1960 the Detachment B Commander was notified that higher authority was being asked to approve three missions: TIME STEP,

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still number one, had been replanned to use Thule, Greenland, as an alternate pre-strike base, covering Novaya Zemlya in addition to the previously planned targets, and retrieving at Andoya or Bodo; GRAND SLAM, second priority; and a third possible mission, SUN SPOT, departing from Peshawar, covering Tyura Tam, the Vladimirovka Test Range, production facilities at Dnepropetrovsk and Kiev and five long-range bomber bases, and retrieving at Adana.

The DCI, Mr. Helms and Col. Burke briefed Secretary of State Herter on 19 April on the results of the SQUARE DEAL mission and on the plans for the three additional missions. Ambassador Cumming advised Col. Burke on 21 April that Secretary Herter approved the three missions, provided no use were made of Greenland bases. Also briefed on the three missions between 19 and 21 April were Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, and Generals Twining and LeMay.

On 25 April word was received via Gen. Goodpaster that the President had approved the three mission plans and gave permission to fly one of them before midnight 1 May 1960, Washington time. TIME STEP, the number one priority mission, required almost 100% perfect weather conditions, and the long-range forecast at that time was not favorable within the time span allowed. The Headquarters Operations Staff therefore

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began to plan for GRAND SLAM as the next choice. Col. Evang was advised that TIME STEP would probably be postponed and he agreed to support the new mission and to advise Gen. Johnson of the change.

On 26 April 1960, three C-130 support aircraft with fuel and pre-strike team departed Adana via Bahrein (permission for refueling there having been arranged by the British), landing at Peshawar. Two C-130's with fuel and post-strike team departed for Rhein-Main where they were to hold until the U-2 mission was launched. They would then proceed to Bodo arriving after the mission U-2, in order to support the story that the U-2 landing had been an emergency. (This was Col. Evang's cover story. He was later persuaded to allow the C-130's to arrive at Bodo three hours ahead of the mission aircraft so as to be prepared to effect a quick turn-around and relaunching of the U-2 for home base at Adana.)

Col. Beerli arrived at Bodo on 28 April (at Col. Evang's request) to coordinate the reception of the mission aircraft with the Norwegians. It was expected that GRAND SLAM might be launched as early as 28 April. The evening of 27 April, the primary U-2 and a spare departed Adana arriving at Peshawar prepared for an early morning 28 April take-off. At go-no-go time there was a cancellation due to route weather,

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and the two U-2's immediately flew back to Adana. On 28 April the two aircraft again proceeded to the pre-strike base only to receive another 24-hour hold for weather. The two aircraft again returned to Adana. The next weather briefing at Project Headquarters was held at 1130 GMT on 29 April and the weather was still marginal but showed promise of being acceptable for launching the mission early on the morning of 1 May (a Sunday).

On 30 April at 1415 GMT a cable went to Col. Beerli at Oslo (where he had gone to brief Col. Evang on mission plans) advising that the weather showed a fair chance of launching GRAND SLAM on 1 May, and that in the event a cancellation should be necessary at go-no-go time, the pre-strike force would be brought back to Adana from Peshawar, the post-strike group at Rhein-Main would be augmented to provide a pre-strike capability for TIME STEP, and the capability would be maintained to launch any one of the three approved missions if an extension of time could be obtained.

On 30 April at 1430 GMT the mission aircraft and spare again flew to Peshawar to await the launch signal from Headquarters. At about midnight on the 30th(local time at Adana) there was a loss of communication between that station and outside points, including the forward

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
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group at Peshawar, due to an unexplained radio blackout. The mission launch signal (HBJARGON-32) was sent from Headquarters to Wiesbaden and telephoned to Detachment B at Adana on an open line by the Project Liaison Officer at Wiesbaden The substance of the launch message was then broadcast blind in clear transmission by Detachment B communications at Adana, using the phrase "HBJ 32 Go" on pre-arranged frequencies, for a period of about 30 minutes.

At 01/0230 GMT communications with Peshawar were re-established and the staging team acknowledged receipt of the clear text broadcast as of 01/0153 GMT. Mission launch had been made good at 01/0159 GMT (approximately one-half hour behind schedule). The post-strike team departed Rhein-Main for Bodo (via Oslo) with an estimated time of arrival of 01/0625 GMT to rendezvous with Col. Beerli and be prepared to receive the mission aircraft, which, as fate would have it, never did arrive.

The summary of Comint pick-up on the unsuccessful GRAND SLAM mission described the flight as follows:

"Good take-off 01/0159Z Peshawar, proceeded on course per mission plan. Soviet tracking began at border, continued without interruption for 1558 nautical miles until last reported position 01/0629Z nearly midway through flight plan.

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"Scattered fighter reaction occurred early in flight, not reported subsequently. Track for last 30 minutes showed U-2 in trouble, with reduced ground speed, altitude. Headquarters hypothesis, directly opposite Soviet reports, is that U-2 encountered some sort of mechanical malfunction, possibly including oxygen equipment.

"A special VIP flight took off from Moscow 01/1435Z, arriving at Sverdlovsk 01/1615Z, returned to Moscow 03/0247Z but quite unusually, landed at the Russian equivalent of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base rather than point of origin. Believe this aircraft may have been carrying top level aerodynamicists, possibly bits and pieces of the U-2..." 1/

On the non-arrival of the mission aircraft at Bodo within a reasonable period after its anticipated arrival time of 01/1119 GMT, a check was made at Andoya Air Base with negative results. Subsequently all other possible alternate landing points were checked to no avail. At 01/1617 GMT Col. Beerli telephoned from Bodo 50X1, E.O.13526 asking him to send the following message to Headquarters: "We have had no information from you for several hours. At this moment we have two planes standing by at Bodo as well as local help. What should we do?" Headquarters was at the same time sending a message to Col. Beerli, which crossed the one above, saying: "Situation here grim. Staff standing by for any eventuality. Imperative you keep Headquarters advised all information by any communications available."

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The Comint reports left little hope for the U-2's recovery and the Project Headquarters staff began to take care of the necessary details for pulling back the forward teams, and alerting all concerned stations around the world to the emergency. A first consideration was to fix the cover story which would be employed in the eventual announcement of a lost aircraft. The text of the announcement released on 2 May by the Adana Base Commander was agreed by all concerned agencies in Washington and said:

"... The U-2 aircraft was on a weather mission originating at Adana, Turkey. The purpose was the study of clear air turbulence. During a flight in Southeast Turkey the pilot reported he had oxygen difficulties. This was the last word heard at 1700Z over emergency frequency. The U-2 aircraft did not land at Adana as planned and it can only be assumed it is now down. A search effort is underway in the Lake Van area. The pilot's name is being withheld pending notification of next of kin." 1/

The change in the cover story with regard to the flight plan of the missing aircraft was decided at highest levels in Washington in an effort not to involve Pakistan, on the theory that the Turks were better able to stand the initial exposure to possible Soviet claims or threats.

Since it was impossible to predict in what form or manner the Soviets would break the news of the downed aircraft inside their borders, whether by open propaganda blast, or through private protest notes to the U. S.

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and others concerned, all that could be done was to brief all those involved and then wait for Khrushchev to show his hand, meanwhile tightening physical security at every point possible.

On 5 May, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, monitoring Radio Moscow, picked up the official announcement by Khrushchev of the shooting down near Sverdlovsk of an American plane which had crossed the Soviet frontier "from Turkey, Iran or Pakistan". On 7 May an additional statement said that the Soviets had captured the spy pilot alive and were interrogating him.

The rest of the story of the U-2 pilot, Frank Powers, and what happened over Sverdlovsk, is almost entirely in the public domain. The sequence of events in Washington following the May Day incident is covered separately in Chapter XIV.

Efforts to Remain Operational at Adana

All flights of U-2's from Incerlik Air Base ceased as of 3 May 1960 and not even local flights were allowed to maintain the aircraft and equipment in operationally ready status. The Menderes Government was ousted in a military coup on the night of 27 May 1960--a long-simmering revolt against its dictatorial and oppressive measures--and Menderes and most of the members of his government were imprisoned. No official of the new provisional government had been briefed on the U-2's mission,

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nor had any such briefings been requested. However, neither had any restriction against resumption of U-2 flights from Turkey after 1 May been imposed by the new government.

A strong effort to retain the U-2 capability in being in the field was made by the Project Director subsequent to the May Day mishap. Due to the political situation in Japan and the strong urging of U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, it became necessary to remove Detachment C's U-2 aircraft (and later its personnel) from Atsugi early in July 1960. The State Department also favored at least a temporary pull-back of Detachment B to the ZI in view of the Soviet intention to hold a public trial of Francis Gary Powers, and the possibility of revelations being made which would make the continued presence of Detachment B in Turkey a source of embarrassment to the U.S. Government. Plans were therefore made to phase the group out of Adana by September.

In August 1960 a high priority requirement of the Office of Scientific Intelligence of CIA for peripheral electronic reconnaissance of the Soviet/Middle East border region raised the question of keeping Detachment B in action to achieve this coverage. The return of the group to the ZI was suspended while a decision was sought. The DCI was agreeable to retention of Detachment B in place provided the State Department would

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consent. No decision had been reached at the time of the Moscow trial of pilot Powers (17-19 August 1960) and full time and attention of all concerned was being given to the monitoring of testimony made public there, and to the sifting of press and radio broadcast coverage of the affair. While the trial caused a worldwide sensation, the revelations were, over-all, not as damaging as had been feared, and the list of persons implicated by name was small compared to anticipated numbers of people and places feared "blown". The participation of the British was not brought out and the involvement of members of host governments whose bases had been used was fairly low key compared to what had been expected. Norwegian reaction to Soviet accusations caused the principal blowback among third countries involved.

In October 1960, an effort was made to obtain State Department reaction to the idea of retaining Detachment B for collection of Elint from the Soviet launch site at Sary Shagan. Mr. Cunningham visited Ambassador Cumming at State on 5 October for that purpose and was told that since Secretary Herter had previously supported the plan to return the group, any change in plans would require the Secretary's approval. Mr. Herter was not pressed for a decision at the time and a month later in an effort to settle the matter, Mr. Bissell sought

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General Cabell's recommendations on the future of the group at Adana. (USIB had meanwhile formally recommended the development and employment of a U-2 airborne Elint system for peripheral coverage of Soviet missile launching, but no source of funding had been ascertained.)

General Cabell's view was that a token force only be maintained at Adana, acting as caretakers of the equipment to be stored there, primarily for the purpose of retaining the use of the base in the event permission might be forthcoming in the future for Soviet Bloc or Middle East overflights, and secondarily to retain a base for the proposed Elint operations.

A principal problem to reactivating the U-2 flights in Turkey, even for merely local flying, was cover. NASA's Director, Dr. Glennan, had given a negative response (supported by State) to any further use of his agency as sponsor. Air Weather Service cover would require use of Air Force pilots and aircraft insignia, which would remove the civilian nature of the operation completely.

In consideration of problems relating to cover, funding and political approvals, Mr. Bissell concluded that Detachment B and its equipment should be returned to the ZI to augment the Edwards group and the new Taiwan group just being formed. Therefore on 10 November 1960 reduction to a holding unit was begun. All pilots were returned to Edwards

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and by January 1961 the unit was reduced to ten: Maj. Kenneth Martens, USAF, Commander; three CIA communications staff; four Lockheed techreps; and two support types.

The next effort to unground the U-2 and reactivate Detachment B came early in April 1961. Mr. Bissell obtained DCI and DDCI concurrence to a step-by-step revival of the capability, provided State was informed and given opportunity to disapprove. Mr. Hilsman, then Director of Intelligence and Research at State, was favorable toward the idea but recommended that the Special Group* be given detailed justification and time to study the proposal. The Special Group considered the proposal at a meeting on 17 August 1961 and instructed CIA and DOD to coordinate the ungrounding of the CIA U-2 in Turkey under

* At the 19 May 1960 meeting of the National Security Council's "Special Group" (the body which coordinated all CIA activities falling under the categories of covert activities listed in NSC 5412/2), Mr. Allen Dulles briefed the group on the 1 May U-2 incident. Afterwards, Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, expressed his belief that U-2 operations should have been a matter for the Special Group to consider and pass on. Mr. Allen Dulles explained that, since every phase of the project and all missions flown had received the coordination of the Secretary of State and the President, there had been no need to submit these operations to a lesser body for coordination. From that time onward, however, all U-2 overflights have, with very few exceptions, been passed on by the Special Group, the exceptions being the few cases of urgent requirements for which coverage was ordered by highest authority without reference to the Special Group.

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cover of TALL KING (a proposed SAC U-2/RB-47 operation over the Black Sea and Iran for Elint collection). This coordination was completed on 23 August but the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey, when queried by State regarding Turkish permission for the operation replied, in part:

"It remains my view that the use of U-2 aircraft, regardless of whether we have Turkish approval, could foreseeably have most serious public relations reaction as well as international political consequences which could be specially serious in present situation. My reasons for this have been previously expressed. This is admittedly, however, not only a Turkish problem, but one of wider significance and I must, of course, defer to any decision made on appropriately high level in Washington, but with hope that conclusion reached will in fact give full consideration to all implications, including possible effect on present flights which now going smoothly after period acute difficulty. I would wish to make clear that my concern here centers on use of aircraft of U-2 type in view its unfortunate history and by that token does not apply to RB-47 even though participating in joint exercises.

"As far as securing approval of Turkish Government is concerned, even though comments made above are essentially of political character, I do not feel approach here need be on a political level, but would recommend that request for U-2 and/or RB-47 flights be handled through presently established channel through which requests for other flights are transmitted. This channel is J-2, Office of General Kurttekin. I do not exclude the possibility, however, that Turks may wish to raise this problem to higher level, either within the military or in Foreign Office. . . " 1/

1/ IDEA-0476, 14 September 1961. Quoting cable from Ambassador Hare, Ankara, to the State Department.

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On 3 November 1961, the Department sent Ambassador Hare a further message saying that the Special Group had carefully considered his views (as expressed in the above-quoted cable) in the light of the changing international political scene, and had decided that the TALL KING operation should proceed as planned. He was accordingly requested to approach appropriate Turkish authorities. The approach was made through the U.S. Air Attaché, but no answer to the request was forthcoming from the Turks. At the time the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, was petitioning for the right to overfly Turkey on a Moscow-Cairo run and the Turks were giving this request serious consideration.

With little prospect of getting Turkish agreement to U-2 flights, Detachment B was told to complete plans for evacuation. The one remaining U-2 was disassembled and airlifted to Burbank for inspection and repair as necessary, and modification, the personnel were reduced to seven, and the Detachment B hangar at Incerlik Air Base was partitioned so as to allow the Air Force to use part of the facility. After departure of the last aircraft in February 1962, a small caretaking group with a communications tie-in with Project Headquarters in Washington remained at Incerlik as merely "a foot in the door".

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ANNEX 76

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✓ This message was drafted by Mr. Park Armstrong and approved for dispatch [] 50X1, E.O.13526 [] by Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. ✓

28 April 1956

EYES ONLY

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CHARGE, ANKARA

I am taking this means of instructing you because of the unique sensitivity and security considerations concerning the project which is the subject of this message, namely, AQUATONE. Until otherwise directed, you should confine your communications on this matter to me to this channel. You should know that knowledge of this project within the Department is confined to myself, the Acting Secretary in my absence, and a very few high officers, but does not include the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. You will be briefed more fully on this project by [] and Berg.

I desire that you see Prime Minister Menderes and present to him the request described below. You may tell the Prime Minister that this request comes personally from me. You may in your discretion take [] with you in order to answer any detailed or technical questions that the Prime Minister may ask.

You should approach Menderes along the following lines, if you think appropriate.

Now that the "weather balloon" project (GENETRIX) has been liquidated, the US Government wishes to express to the Government of Turkey its sincere appreciation for the wholehearted cooperation and assistance accorded the US Government in carrying out that effort.

The US Government admires the firm stand that your Government took when the USSR launched its propaganda campaign and protested against the balloons that entered its upper air space. The US Government regretted that it was not able at that time to coordinate its decision fully with you, but for reasons which are now to be conveyed to you, the US believed it wise to terminate promptly rather than to continue launchings.

(ADIC-1917, OUT 50888)

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U.S.C., section 403g)

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The fact is that the balloon project was the first phase of a reconnaissance plan that will shortly be ready to embark on a second and more important phase. At the time that the balloon launchings commenced, it was not then convincingly demonstrable that the second phase, which was in the testing stage, would prove out so that it could be undertaken with acceptable levels of risk. But by the time that the Soviet Union protested the balloon flights, these tests had proceeded much further, and in the interest of avoiding possible prejudice to the success of the second phase, it was considered prudent to discontinue further balloon launchings. The tests have now been completed with results that are satisfactory to us, and it is now feasible to deploy the units involved.

At this point you should describe Project AQUATONE to the Prime Minister, giving him such detail as he requests. You should tell him that the project is considered of the highest priority by the US Government and that, because of its obvious sensitivity and the need for the greatest possible security, the US Government has restricted knowledge of the project to the smallest possible number of high officials. However, operations will not commence until the decision to do so has been taken by the highest level of the US Government. You could say that the US Government has the utmost confidence in the discretion of the Prime Minister and is thus prepared fully to disclose the nature of the project to him, but trusts that, if he concurs in it, he will not find it necessary to inform more than the absolute minimum number of officials in his government who would need to know of it if the project is to succeed.

You should then inform the Prime Minister that the US considers that the airfield at Adana, from which the balloons were launched, is from all points of view the most favorable site for AQUATONE. You should point out its geographic advantages and you can say that no other available site compares favorably with it. You could point out that this request, in effect, is a continuation of the balloon phase by different means, involving a manned vehicle. You can further say that the US Government solicits the continued cooperation of the Government of Turkey in using the Adana airfield for this purpose. You may inform the Prime Minister that the UK is expected to cooperate with the US in this project by providing a site.

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In describing Project AQUATONE to the Prime Minister, you should frankly indicate that its purpose is overflight of hostile areas for reconnaissance purposes, but unless pressed by him, you should leave the maximum penetration capability and the intention to employ it as vague as the circumstances permit.

If the Prime Minister raises the question of quid pro quo, you may indicate to him that the US is prepared to share such of the results as would be of direct interest to the Turkish Government with it. By this we have in mind areas adjacent to Turkey and the northern littoral of the Black Sea.

If the Prime Minister should demur on the grounds that there are reasonable prospects that the USSR will agree eventually to the President's "open skies" proposal, you may tell him that the US Government is satisfied, as a result of reports of the position stated by the Soviet leaders recently in England, that the USSR has no repeat no intention of undertaking any such agreement. Thus it is of the utmost urgency for the US and Turkey to exercise the recently developed US capability to overfly the defenses before the USSR has time to develop the matching intercept capability.

I request that you hold this matter on an EYES ONLY basis. Ambassador Warren is being briefed on the project prior to his departure from Washington. I believe, however, that it is better for you to make this approach than have it be one of the first things Ambassador Warren would take up upon his arrival.

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DDS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA-1

Vol. VII of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
 History of the Office of Special Activities

Chapter XIII

(PERIOD)
 From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
 INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
 E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 7
 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

Controlled by DDS&T

Date prepared 1 April 1969

Written by Helen Kleyla
Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER XIII. BRITISH
PARTICIPATION IN U-2 PROGRAM

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CHAPTER XIII. BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE U-2 PROGRAM

Background

In a briefing paper for Director Allen Dulles in preparation for a White House meeting in May 1957, Mr. Bissell recommended that, if AQUATONE were to continue beyond 1957, in order to reduce the political hazards of overflights, certain modifications of operational concepts might be introduced. One of these was the use of non-U.S. pilots (possibly British) in order to heighten the possibility of plausible denial. Between 1957 and early 1958 the question of U. K. participation in the program was discussed with Sir Dick White, head of MI-6, and Air Vice Marshal William M. L. MacDonald, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, on several occasions by Messrs. Dulles and Bissell, but only in the vaguest terms.

On 7 February 1958, Mr. Bissell cabled [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] outlining the current CIA/Air Force thinking on the nature and extent of a possible joint operation with the British. The main advantage for inviting UK participation at that time would be "to facilitate operations by them at times or under circumstances beyond the scope of authority accorded by U. S. political authorities." ^{1/} The Air Force and

1/

[REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526

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CIA were agreed that as a first step a number of British pilots should be given U-2 training in order to be prepared for future contingencies.

[redacted] was asked to convey Headquarters thinking to AVM MacDonald, ACAS/I, and learn whether he was prepared to select three to five pilots and move ahead with their training (in advance of final policy decisions). The Air Ministry responded affirmatively and recruiting of RAF pilots was begun.

At the end of April 1958, Mr. Bissell spent several days in London discussing with MI-6 and Air Ministry officials the prospects for obtaining UK political approval for flights against Soviet and Satellite targets. It was agreed that a joint list of priority targets with justification for their coverage should be worked up, and in July or August, when pilot training would be farther along, an approach would be made to the Prime Minister. The timing would be in accordance with the current political situation, e. g., whether or not a Summit Meeting was in progress.

Project OLDSTER

An Air Ministry contingent composed of Air Vice Marshal Beresford Lees, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Operations, and Group Captain Stewart Gordon Wise, who was to serve as project officer within the Air Ministry cell, arrived at Project Headquarters in mid-June 1958 for

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orientation on the program and to reach agreement on plans and procedures for carrying out the joint project. In preparation for these talks the Headquarters staff had drafted two plans: Plan A envisaged a small RAF contingent of ten to twelve to be integrated into Detachment B at Adana, being supported by Detachment B and running missions which would be operationally controlled from Project Headquarters. Plan B called for establishment of a separate detachment at a suitable UK base, with personnel to be approximately 40% RAF and 60% American, with an RAF commander. After a week of consultation, Plan A was agreed in principle with further refinement of details to be worked out jointly. (See Annex 77 for text of Plan A.)

By June 1958 additional action had taken place, including:

- a. The nomination, processing and beginning of training of the first four RAF pilots (Flight Lieutenants John Alonzo MacArthur, David E. B. Dowling, Michael Granville Bradley, and Squadron Leader Christopher Hugh Walker).
- b. The establishment of cable communications between Project Headquarters and the project cell in the Air Ministry, via London Station. (In July 1958 a direct channel was opened into the Air Ministry cell.)
- c. An exchange of visits between the requirements people and the photo interpretation experts on each side.

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The initial ground training and checkout of the first four pilots in the U-2 was accomplished in early July 1958 at Del Rio, Texas, where their training was supervised by the SAC Wing at Laughlin Air Force Base. On 10 July, Squadron Leader Walker was killed in a training accident and as a result one of the three additional RAF pilots chosen for training (who were still in England) withdrew from the program. Delays were encountered in processing additional RAF personnel, including particularly a flight surgeon, and in completion of training by the SAC Wing due principally to shortage of aircraft. This caused a slip in the planned readiness date of the unit to October 1958.

Political Approvals

While the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Dermot Boyle, and all RAF personnel involved were eager to get ahead with the project, there were delays on the political side through the summer of 1958 due to the Greek/Turkish clash over Cyprus and the Jordanian situation. On 27 July 1958 50X1, E.O.13526 was told by Sir Patrick Dean (then Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee) that there was no Foreign Office objection to the idea of operations from Turkey. He said also that he believed chances were good for obtaining approval of the British Prime Minister

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for possibly five missions at a time with specific mission approval to be given by Sir Patrick himself. (This plan did not eventuate, much to the chagrin of all concerned.)

On 27 August 1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his approval to British participation in the project with the understanding that operational missions would be flown by "civilian" pilots and without RAF markings on the aircraft; the ground organization would be integrated with that already established by the Americans; and it was to be clearly understood that the Prime Minister reserved judgment of the use to be made of the aircraft, and that no operational flights were to be made without his specific permission.

On the same day, President Eisenhower gave his approval in principle to the OLDSTER project provided the Secretary of State agreed. Later General Cabell briefed the Secretary of State on the status of British participation and said it was proposed to determine informally from the Turkish Government whether the few British personnel involved could be stationed with the American group at Adana. The Secretary advised that he had no objection to the British joining the project nor to the informal approach to the Turkish authorities. He asked whether or not proposed British flights would be cleared with the U.S. in advance.

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General Cabell replied that arrangements would be for the British to notify the U.S. in advance of any intended operation with control and mission planning being accomplished at CHALICE Headquarters Control Center. Thus the CHALICE staff would have the opportunity to block the operation if U.S. authorities so desired.

On 5 September 1958, 50X1, E.O.13526 wrote to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, AVM Sydney O. Bufton, RAF, as follows:

"The favorable policy decisions which have just been made at the top levels of both our Governments suggest that the moment is particularly appropriate for an analysis of the policy issues involved. . . The U.S. intended, when it initially fielded its units, to have a capability of performing 32 operational missions a month. Moreover, it was hoped that a substantial number of this maximum capability would occur. Within fourteen days, however, after commencement of the initial missions, the Soviets made a formal protest. . . which forcibly established the fact that the Soviet radar capability was extremely good (better than expected) and Soviet Government was attaching a sharper significance to deep penetration than anticipated. Consequently our highest political authorities insisted that the missions be reduced in number from the plan above and be undertaken only for reasons of real importance. The intelligence community then reviewed its requirements with a view to reducing targets to only those of highest priorities. And approval was to be requested only when the international situation seemed appropriate for deep penetrations and when a mission or missions would not cause major embarrassment to US/Soviet relations. It was assumed all missions would be detected. . . therefore the fundamental consideration on the political side regarding approval of any

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given mission is whether or not the world political situation is such that the possibility of a Soviet protest is tolerable or politically acceptable to the sponsor...

"At no time has there been in the U. S. any permanent prohibition against deep penetration missions and I am advised by Washington that the President has been extremely receptive to the efforts and results of the program over the many months that it has been reviewed and examined by him. He now, as we have told you, favors British participation essentially for the very reason for which it was proposed, namely that our joint efforts may well tend to spread confusion among the Soviets as to the sponsorship of such activities." 1/

On 11 September 1958 Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of Turkey was briefed on the plan to put the British unit at Adana with Detachment

B. Permission was received to bring in no more than 12 British technicians to work with the American unit. Briefing of the Prime Minister was accomplished by the [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526

[redacted] with Chargé d'Affaires Carlos Hall, Col. Geary, and Messrs. Cunningham, and [redacted] of Project Security Staff also present. Subsequently Mr. Cunningham visited London for definitive discussions with the British and Messrs. [redacted]

[redacted] of Project Personnel and Security Staffs, respectively, joined the working party to add their specialized knowledge in

1/ Letter to AVM Sydney O. Bufton, 5 September 1958, from [redacted]

[redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526

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the fields of the care and handling of "civilianized" pilots and the building of cover stories. Until the Headquarters group arrived in London, little progress had been made, due principally to the Air Ministry's inability to adapt to a clandestine program. Partially as a result of this, MI-6 entered the scene as the clandestine support element. Good progress was subsequently made on pilot contracts, cover and other administrative and security matters.

The CHALICE/OLDSTER Operational Plan, which was worked out jointly, was signed on 28 October 1958 by AVM Bufton and Group Captain Wise for the British side and Mr. James Cunningham for CIA. The text of this agreement, TS/CHAL-0397, is appended as Annex 78.

On 12 November 1958, Group Captain Thomas Leigh Bingham-Hall was nominated to replace Group Captain Wise as the senior officer in the OLDSTER Air Ministry cell. He was given the cover of Commanding Officer, Meteorological Experimental Research Unit, RAF Station, Watton, but maintained his office in London under the immediate jurisdiction of AVM John Grandy, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Operations. One week later the first group composed of three pilots and a flight surgeon joined Detachment B, and began the process of integrating into the group.

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On 2 December 1958, Acting Secretary of State Herter was briefed on OLDSTER and shown the target complex overlays which were to be presented for the British Prime Minister's approval. The Acting Secretary was in general agreement with these.

On 5 December 1958 the White House was informed through the Aide to the President, Gen. Goodpaster, of the status of plans for British participation in the CHALICE overflight program by memorandum from Mr. Bissell as follows:

"You are aware of the plans for British participation in Project CHALICE. Their pilots and other personnel are now in place with our detachment in Turkey. An exchange of letters has taken place between ACM Sir Dermot Boyle and General White requesting and agreeing to the loan of U-2's to the British Meteorological Office. In about a week two U-2's will be staged at the RAF Station at Watton and will fly a number of meteorological missions with British personnel. We believe this will establish our cover.

"The British plans are well advanced for operational use of the U-2. The Air Ministry has secured full concurrence of the Foreign Office in seeking authority to obtain coverage of a number of top priority areas in central Asia from Pakistan. This proposal has been presented to the Prime Minister and his decision is expected early next week. The betting in London appears to be that he will grant the authority requested subject to mission-by-mission review by the Foreign Office.

"I am calling these facts to your attention with some urgency for the following reason. It is agreed with London that we will be immediately notified by cable of the Prime Minister's decision so that appropriate persons in Washington can be advised of it. The Prime Minister has indicated, however, that

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in addition to this rather informal communication through our channel, he will address a personal communication to the President, unless his decision is wholly negative (in which case there would be no point in raising the issue). His communication will be delivered to the British Ambassador here who will be instructed to hand it to you for delivery to the President. Such a communication could reach you as early as the 9th or 10th. We would hope to have at least 24 hours warning of its impending arrival but our communication could conceivably be delayed.

"The Under Secretary of State has been briefed on this procedure and also on the specific proposal that has been presented to the Prime Minister by the Air Ministry and we plan to keep the State Department advised as to the Prime Minister's decision. I assume that if his decision is favorable, it will be necessary promptly to secure the views of the Secretary of State and thereafter to bring this matter to the President's attention. I might say that the requirements which the proposed missions would meet are agreed between the two intelligence communities so the operation would have the same strong support as if we were doing it on our own authority. Moreover, although any communication or action on our part should be undertaken within, say, a week, there is no need for a crash decision since the operation could not in any event begin before 15 January. Lastly, there would of course be an opportunity to review progress here, mission by mission, as well as in London, so there is no question of an irrevocable decision covering three or four sorties.

"Perhaps we should communicate on the 8th or 9th as to the procedure you would use in handling the communication from the Prime Minister should one be received." 1/

The Prime Minister gave his approval for the OLDSTER unit to stage from Pakistan on 10 December 1958 in the following letter to

1/ TS/CHAL-0263, 5 December 1958. Memorandum for Gen. Goodpaster, from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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President Eisenhower which was delivered by the British Ambassador on 11 December 1958:

"... The staffs on both sides have now worked out an agreed procedure for clearance and I have now approved in principle a programme of British flights for the next three months, of which details will be available to you. I have ruled that within this programme each individual flight should be submitted to me for clearance before it is made...

"I would not propose normally to inform you direct if I should find it necessary for reasons of policy to cancel or postpone a particular flight in the present or subsequent programmes; United States authorities will, of course, be aware of any such decision through operational channels. But if at any time I feel it necessary to cancel or suspend the programme in whole or in part I would propose to inform you direct of such a decision. I hope that you would be prepared to give me a similar notification of any comparable decision which you may take." 1/

President Eisenhower replied to the Prime Minister as follows:

"I share your desire that the policies of our two Governments with respect to these activities should not be inconsistent. If we should feel at any time that operations you are planning would do disservice to our common interests, we will feel free to communicate our views to you. I hope you will feel equally free to do likewise. I think it should be understood, however, that British missions are carried out on your authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are authorized and controlled here in accordance with procedures I have established. In this sense, it could be said that we are carrying out two complementary programs rather than a joint one..." 2/

1/ CHAL-0447, 10 December 1958.

2/ Reply to Prime Minister Macmillan (drafted for the President's signature by R. M. Bissell, Jr.).

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OLDSTER Operational Phase

One additional pilot and a navigator/flight planner joined the OLDSTER unit at Detachment B in January 1959. Two of the Detachment's U-2 aircraft were to be made available for their use. It had been decided by the DCI that title to the aircraft when being employed by the British for overflights must rest with the British Government. Only if this condition were met would the U.S. political authorities regard the operation as truly British, being undertaken with the authority of their own Prime Minister. Accordingly, arrangements were made to cover the transfer and the retrieval of the aircraft. Approval to stage British missions from Pakistan was obtained from General Ayub Khan, then Minister of Defense, and all appeared to be in readiness for British operations.

In January and February 1959, Air Ministry officials became concerned with the increase in vulnerability of the U-2 to possibly improved Soviet intercept capabilities. Exchanges of cables and a briefing of the British group on the latest intelligence and zoom climb test results cleared the air and improved the outlook of the OLDSTER pilots toward flying the U-2.

Then followed a series of delays including a visit to Russia by the British Prime Minister, several international meetings and other

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state visits throughout most of 1959. Meanwhile permission had been given for the British pilots to fly Middle East reconnaissance, and as a means of building cover, two meteorological research flights were staged from the RAF Base at Watton, England, with suitable publicity. On this staging the quick turn-around procedures developed at Detachment B were tested successfully, using a C-130 and a tent in a remote area of the field as an operating headquarters.

The first British overflight of Russia was finally approved and flown on 6 December 1959 from Peshawar, covering Kuybyshev and Kapustin Yar and using the B camera with excellent results. The second and only other Soviet mission was flown on 5 February 1960 covering Tyura Tam, Kazan and Ukraine, also using the B camera with excellent results.

As a security measure following the events of 1 May 1960, the entire RAF contingent was immediately withdrawn, debriefed and returned to normal duty. During the period of OLDSTER operations the following Headquarters-directed missions were accomplished:

USSR overflights	2
Peripheral Elint Missions	5
Middle East Photo Missions	17
Weather Flights	5
Total	<u>29</u>

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RAF Liaison Officer at Project Headquarters

During the discussions in London in May 1958, it was agreed that the British side would have one liaison officer stationed at Project Headquarters to represent the Air Ministry project group in both operational and administrative matters. The first assignee was Wing Commander Norman Mackie, and when news of his arrival on 28 June 1958 reached Project Headquarters, the question immediately arose as to where his desk should be; the Operations Control Center at that time was supporting the highly classified satellite program as well as CHALICE/OLDSTER. Mr. Bissell recommended that he sit in the Operations area, but not within the Control Center, and that he be briefed that there were other activities which were closed to him. If this arrangement should become too difficult to manage, he said, it might be best to cut the Wing Commander and one or two of his superiors in on the satellite activity rather than go in for elaborate compartmentation.

During the course of a visit to Project Headquarters by AVM Bufton and Group Captain Burnett, his deputy, at the time the OLDSTER unit became operational, the precise arrangements with regard to the liaison officer's responsibilities and privileged status were reviewed. He was to have local authority, on behalf of the Air Ministry OLDSTER cell,

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for approving mission plans for RAF pilots, and in order for him to discharge this responsibility, the current close working relationship within the operations structure was to be continued. Mr. Bissell explained to AVM Bufton that there were other projects of a highly sensitive nature which would be withheld from Mackie, although from day to day he might be exposed to some mention of them. Therefore it was requested that AVM Bufton approve the liaison officer's treating such information as privileged and not intended to be passed to his superiors in the Air Ministry. The AVM concurred and stated that Mackie would be told to treat any information gained as privileged and would be expected to behave as a "patriotic American" in these cases rather than as a British subject.

In a subsequent memorandum, Col. William Burke reported:

"On 11 December I reviewed this conversation with Wing Commander Mackie. He stated that he was aware of other projects; that he was relieved to hear of the AVM's feeling and position; that he felt he was occupying a privileged position and would not pass on to his Government information on projects other than CHALICE.

"My judgment, based on the frank and aboveboard character of W/C Mackie, as well as the close and unusually fine relationships which exist between him and the members of the staff, is that he will certainly honor this arrangement." 1/

1/ TS/CHAL-0470, 12 December 1958. Memo for Record by Col. Burke.

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The RAF Liaison Officer maintained his office within the Project Operations Control Center from July 1958 throughout the life of OLDSTER. In the spring of 1961 when Mackie was relieved by Wing Commander J. C. (Bill) Blair, an internal review of the situation relating to continuing British participation brought forth the following recommendation by the DPD Executive Officer, Mr. John McMahon:

"Looking back to AQUATONE there were obvious advantages to be gained through the mutual participation of the British and United States in the project. Such cooperation could be greatly enhanced by the presence of an OLDSTER representative... within the AQUATONE organization... Since the time of AQUATONE, however, the Division has expanded to include air support for all Agency requirements and, of course, we ourselves have stepped into various exotic programs of our own... When the charter of this Division was extended to include all CIA air activities, we accepted the responsibility to protect from unauthorized individuals, both CIA and otherwise, information concerning the operations conducted under the auspices of the various Area Divisions. I question the willingness of the Area Divisions to jeopardize knowledge of their operations to a foreign national. I question that the advantages to be gained from Commander Blair's permanent presence in this Division outweigh the obvious disadvantages in the compromise of information." 1/

Despite this, and similar recommendations from Security, the RAF Liaison Officer was not excluded from occupying office space within the Operations area until the move was made to the new building at

1/ DPD-1384/61, 3 March 1961. Memorandum for the Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P, from Executive Officer, DPD.

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Langley in February 1962. From that point through the balance of Wing Commander Blair's tour he required an escort in and out of the restricted area and was not given desk space there. Since the program never received approval from British political authorities for reconnaissance overflights subsequent to 1960, the task of liaison with Project Headquarters became something less than a full-time job. Subsequent to the departure of Blair, an RAF officer assigned to the British Joint Services Mission (Group Captain A. J. Moody) was given this chore as an added duty to his liaison with other U. S. agencies, principally the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Continuation of British Participation: JACKSON (1961 to date)

Shortly after the withdrawal of the OLDSTER unit from Turkey in May 1960, AVM Bufton in a conversation with Mr. Allen Dulles, indicated interest on the part of the British in continuing to participate in the U-2 program. The Director at that time could not say what the future held for CHALICE, since a Presidential decision would be necessary to carry it on. Later when higher authorities agreed on a consolidation of CHALICE assets in the ZI, with a phased withdrawal of Detachment B from Turkey, the Air Ministry was so informed. The Headquarters feeling at this time was that there was little merit in

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British participation unless Foreign Office support were obtained for primary missions. Group Captain Bingham-Hall felt that the intelligence collection potential of a UK group operating from the ZI would be quite limited and he pressed to abolish his staff within the Air Ministry, retaining only a liaison officer in Washington. However, AVM Bufton, during September and October 1960, discussed continuation with the Foreign Office and on 11 October 1960 received political approval from the Foreign Secretary to retain the franchise. Project Headquarters expressed concern that approval had not been obtained from the Prime Minister himself, and were answered by AVM Bufton's cable as follows:

"Both Secretary of State for Air and the Foreign Secretary consider it reasonable and prudent to maintain overflight capability under the same rules that existed between us before and it is inconceivable that both Ministers would accept such arrangement without being sure of their ground. Even if you insisted that the PM be approached for his blessing it is extremely doubtful that he would say he was definitely going to agree to any further overflights or that he was not. He would merely, I am sure, support the decision of his Ministers to maintain a capability. There is no doubt that in due course he will be informed of the decision... I consider we should go ahead with our planning on the basis that before all the various arrangements are concluded the PM will be informed at an appropriate time..." 1/

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Two RAF pilots were chosen for the JACKSON program and reported for processing in December 1960 and for training at Del Rio in January 1961. Between January and June the pilots converted to the U-2 at Laughlin and in June moved to Edwards Air Force Base where, along with an RAF medical officer and a navigator/flight planner, they were integrated into Detachment G in accord with a memorandum of understanding signed on 25 May 1961 by AVM Bufton for the British side and Mr. James Cunningham for CIA (see Annex 79 for terms of this agreement). The JACKSON Operational Plan was drafted jointly over a period of several months during which time Bufton was replaced as Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence by AVM Alick Foord-Kelcey, who eventually signed the joint operational plan on behalf of the Air Ministry at the end of 1961. (See Annex 80 for the JACKSON Operational Plan.) At the same time Group Captain Harold A. C. Bird-Wilson replaced Bingham-Hall as head of the JACKSON cell in the Air Ministry.

[REDACTED] DPD,

recommended that the RAF pilots be fully integrated into the air operations of Detachment G and be used for air sampling, ferry, overflight and peripheral missions, as well as other routine flying, with exceptions to be made on a mission-by-mission examination. However,

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during their first year at Edwards the British pilots (other than flying training and test flights) flew only three Headquarters-directed air sampling missions and one ferry mission to Midway Island. The British authorities did give an okay for use of their pilots on Cuban overflights without the necessity for mission-by-mission approval, but this offer was not taken up by CIA.

In April 1962, the Air Ministry in reviewing the question of use of their pilots in the joint IDEALIST/JACKSON program, sent the following message to Project Headquarters:

"The UK Government's original concept of JACKSON was that it preserved a capability for urgent intelligence collecting missions in the event of a major emergency. Contingency planning which has already been agreed to between us was regarded here as contributing to this capability. But as yet no emergency has actually materialised which has seemed to call for a U-2 operation...

"We recognise that you now have many projects on hand under your IDEALIST programme and that it is only a hindrance to you to have in the U-2 unit two RAF pilots who are unproductive. We are however most anxious to continue with our participation in the JACKSON project and within limits likely to be prescribed by political considerations we should like these pilots to be employed on tasks which will contribute effectively to the US/UK intelligence effort and my Secretary of State is ready to submit proposals to the Prime Minister with this end in view..." 1/

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Evolving from this effort to revitalize the program, a proposal to stage a JACKSON mission from Pakistan against the Sary Shagan Missile Test Range, employing System X, was put forward for approval. This operation (named ADVENTURE), after presentation to the British Foreign Minister on 10 July 1962, hung fire for a month with approval being expected momentarily; but before British approval could be obtained, the Director (then Mr. John A. McCone) called a halt to the plan in view of pressure from USAF to use the RB-57F for Sary Shagan surveillance. This somewhat disgruntled AVM Foord-Kelcey, since he was on the verge of presenting the proposal to the Prime Minister, and it was anticipated by Headquarters staff that the British would move to end their participation in the U-2 program. However, the Air Ministry still wished to maintain the capability in being and the agreement was reaffirmed late in 1962.

In May 1963 an exchange of messages between Air Chief Marshal Sir Wallace Kyle, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, and General Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, resulted in the extension for another year of the JACKSON Detachment at Edwards. The only activities during the following year involved replacements and training.

In September 1964 an exercise involving the ferrying of two U-2 aircraft via Plattsburg and RAF Wyton to a U. S. carrier in the

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Mediterranean, accompanied by a KC 35 carrying relief pilots and fuel, was being discussed via cable with the British. It did not develop beyond the talking stage either then, or when it was brought up in March 1965 at the time when trouble was again brewing in Cyprus.

In May 1965, Dr. Wheelon (then D DS&T) met with Group Captain Robert W. Oxspring and Group Captain Wise, who were currently responsible for JACKSON on the British side, for a discussion as to whether the project was still viable and warranted. He posed two questions:

(1) If the program continued, would this give equity for use of British airfields for staging? The British answer was that historically this request had been turned down by either the Commonwealth Relations Office or the Foreign Office. (2) Was there value to the British in having the U-2 and its advanced cameras available for their use? The British admitted that the system was better than their Canberra equipment, but that the RAF would find it difficult to operate the U-2 in any but a line RAF unit, which the British Government was reluctant to accept.

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On 14 May 1965, Dr. Wheelon [] as follows:

"We will make an explicit decision to continue or discontinue the JACKSON program in the near future. I want you to inform me of any reactions the British may show in

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this area as well as informing me of any other matter bearing on this issue..." 1/

In a background memorandum on the subject "Continuation of the JACKSON Program", prepared for Dr. Wheelon's information on 9 June 1965, Mr. Cunningham recommended that if the current search by the British for effective employment of the JACKSON capability proved non-productive, the program should be allowed to expire at the completion of the tours of the current incumbents at Edwards Air Force Base. (See Annex 81 for full text of Mr. Cunningham's brief.)

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[redacted] replying to the DDS&T's [redacted] a full month later, gave the following summary of the current RAF position: The RAF would like to retain JACKSON capability for possible contingencies. Group Captain Wise had hinted that the availability of a better vehicle would give him a stronger position. At present the RAF up through the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence desired to let the current tour of the JACKSON group run its course to the spring of 1967 and then reevaluate. As an aside, it was mentioned that Group Captain Wise had referred to the U-2 as a "dirty airplane", a very hot item politically, which the UK Government would find it difficult to

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operate independently under the existing political circumstances.

In July 1965 the Air Ministry underwent a reorganization, becoming "Ministry of Defence for Air", and JACKSON affairs were placed under the cognizance of the Director of Operations (Bomber and Reconnaissance), Air Commodore Antony Wilkinson Heward, with Air Vice Marshal D. C. Smallwood assuming responsibility on behalf of the Air Staff for the JACKSON program the first of September 1965.

Throughout the summer of 1965 there were intermittent talks (begun in June by Air Commodore John Aiken, then Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence) with regard to the possible purchase by the British of new model U-2's. Dr. Wheelon in August 1965 sent the following message to the DDS&T Liaison Officer 50X1, E.O.13526

"FYI we are not particularly anxious to sell U-2's to the U. K. We did discuss possibility with Aiken, Wise and others during their visit here. This originated with OSA and its desire to reestablish production line for U-2 and from this office as gambit to eliminate UK personnel from Edwards Detachment. If British come with strong proposal for purchase, we would have to make difficult policy decision here. Under circumstances I consider it desirable to play matter in low key and to leave all initiatives up to them." 1/

In September 1965 AVM Smallwood raised the question of use of British pilots for ferry flights outside the continental U. S. and said in

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a letter to Mr. Cunningham that although Hawaii was now the 50th State, he believed the terminology of "within the continental U.S." was stretching a point; he therefore requested notification in advance each time such use of British pilots was anticipated. (Up to the present, approvals of the few flights of this type have been received by return cable with no delays and no refusals.)

In October 1965, approval was given by the British Air Staff for a JACKSON mission from Darwin or Cocos Islands over targets in Java. Delays were encountered in obtaining the final approval from the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister, and with the subsequent favorable action of the Indonesian Army against the PKI (local Communist Party), the proposal was shelved in December 1965.

Air Commodore Heward made a visit to the U.S. in January 1966 visiting the group at Edwards and holding talks at Headquarters. At that time the British were making a decision on the use of the F-111 and while showing an interest in the new U-2 model, discussions were limited to possible joint reconnaissance in Southeast Asia (Indonesia) and Africa (Rhodesia), and the possibility of sending pilots through survival training at an RAF base north of Singapore.

Air Commodore R. L. Wade relieved Heward in February 1966 as Director of Operations (Bomber and Reconnaissance). In March 1966

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he wrote to Mr. Cunningham suggesting that all agreements concerning JACKSON, including use of pilots, cover stories, etc., be brought up to date. At the same time, Mr. Eugene Somers reported from London that Air Commodore Wade believed that the Labour Party, if it increased its majority in the current elections, would react more confidently to a proposal for JACKSON operations. Mr. Somers felt that Wade was dedicated to reactivation of the program.

In April 1966, Dr. Wheelon visited London and briefed a group of Air Staff officials including Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burnett, Air Marshal L. M. D. Hodges, and Air Commodores Wade and Aiken, on the performance capabilities expected from the U-2R. He explained the concept that the U.S. should give or sell several to countries such as India, Iran or Korea, which would render it more difficult for the opposition to associate the owner and the activity of these aircraft. The Vice Chief of the Air Staff stated that the RAF had studied the problem of purchase of U-2's over the past year or two and had arrived at a negative conclusion for two reasons: the political taint of the U-2, and the decision to buy F-111 aircraft.

This ended any further discussion of British procurement of U-2's. However, in October 1966 agreement was reached with the Air Staff that

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replacements for the RAF JACKSON contingent at Edwards would be furnished in the spring of 1967, and that a further meeting would be held in Washington in December 1966. The Minister of Defence, however, on 26 September 1966 ruled against any broadening of the project or instigation by Air Staff personnel of discussions with such in view.

An internal OSA review of the JACKSON program in October 1966 brought the following summation in a memorandum for the DD/SA from

[redacted] Special Assistant to the DSA:

"The previous staff studies... which have been undertaken periodically since 1960... essentially concluded that the program was, in fact, costing us very little and that in anticipation of unforeseeable contingencies (e.g. Middle East crisis), it was an asset which we should maintain. It also gave us a closer identity with the British, in an operational sense, which in retrospect was of dubious value. In this regard, nothing has changed as of this date, and if the prospects for the future are no more promising, I would firmly recommend that we terminate the JACKSON program. This would be without prejudice to some future reassessment with regard to British participation in the U-2R program when it becomes operational..." 1/

The joint meeting held in the OSA Control Center in December 1966 was held for the purpose of discussing the future of JACKSON with no

1/IDEA-3375/66, Memorandum for the DDSA from SA/OSA dated 24 October 1966.

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commitments to be made pending referral to respective higher commands.

Those present included Air Commodores Wade and Aiken and Group Captain Moody on the British side, and the Director and Deputy Director of OSA and members of the OSA Operations Staff. The consensus of views arrived at during this meeting was as follows:

"a. Although there are existing intelligence requirements in the Far East (outside China/Vietnam, etc.), e.g. Indonesia, there is little likelihood for approval of operations in that area under existing circumstances.

"b. The most probable areas of possible mutual interest for use of the unique U-2 capability appears to be Africa and the volatile Middle East. The UK representatives in particular felt that political approval would be most probable for these areas. The US representatives shared this opinion strongly but were concerned about the lack of adequate bases in the area.

"c. Currently available, and politically acceptable bases for U-2 stagings for possible target coverage of Africa and for contingencies in the Middle East are severely limited. Ascension Island rangewise may have limited utility; Aldabra will not be available for from 2 to 3 years; politically feasible Akrotiri, Cyprus, might be available but probably only under emergency or crisis situations. El Aden, Liberia, was suggested as a possible contingency staging base but would pose major problems from a security standpoint. In fact, the only base in the UK pocket which showed a promising potential at the moment was on the island of Masira off the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia.

"d. The possibility of carrier launchings and recovery was discussed but with an admonition that such operations would probably entail prohibitive costs for other than highest priority or crisis requirements. Refueling operations would involve the same problem but to a lesser degree.

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"Wade and Aiken expressed desire to utilize JACKSON pilots in a productive manner at the earliest possible date. They affirmed that coverage of Africa and the Middle East could not be accomplished readily by any operational capability presently available to the UK." 1/

It was further agreed to meet again at the working level to formulate firm recommendations for respective higher headquarters.

At the end of 1966 there were two pilots, a flight planner and a flight surgeon at Edwards with the JACKSON unit, all due for rotation and replacement during 1967.

1/ BYE-0394-66, Memo for DCI, Subject: Meeting with UK Representatives, 22 December 1966.

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ANNEX 77

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16 June 1958*
PROPOSED PROJECT CHALICE/KEEPER - PLAN A

1. Under this plan the KEEPER program would be conducted along the following lines:
 - a. A Royal Air Force contingent of approximately ten to twelve personnel would be assigned to Detachment B.
 - b. Possible operational bases for KEEPER missions will include but not necessarily be restricted to Adana, Turkey; Giebelstadt, Germany; Kinloss, Scotland; and Cyprus.
 - c. In order to accommodate the KEEPER augmentation at Detachment B, two additional U-2 and one additional T-33 aircraft will be provided at Detachment B.
 - d. KEEPER pilots will receive continuation and proficiency training at Detachment B.
2. Under this plan the RAF personnel assigned to Detachment B would include:
 - a. One Squadron Leader who will function as the British Detachment Commander and who will be an operational pilot.
 - b. Five other operational pilots - Squadron Leader/Flight Lieutenant.
 - c. An Adjutant who will serve as administrative officer and senior security officer.
 - d. Three to five other personnel as needed.
3. All KEEPER pilots will be under the operational control of the Commander, Detachment B with such control to be exercised through the Royal Air Force Detachment Commander. The Commander, Detachment B, will be responsible for maintaining the pilot proficiency of KEEPER pilots and for the training of all British personnel in their respective jobs. All staging operations will be under the command of the Commander, Detachment B or his designate.

(* Changed from KEEPER to OLDSTER due to conflict with another British crypt.)

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4. A Concept of Operations to include method of target selection is attached as enclosure 1.

* * * * *

Operational Concept for Joint CHALICE/KEEPER Program

A. Assumptions:

1. That the Royal Air Force KEEPER unit will be integrated within Detachment B.
2. That the KEEPER Unit will be supported by U. S. personnel on all operations.
3. That the KEEPER missions will be operationally controlled from CHALICE Headquarters in the same manner as normal CHALICE missions.

B. Target Selection:

1. Following discussions between British and U. S. Intelligence Requirements Officers, the Air Ministry will obtain authority to secure coverage of specified targets and areas, together with an indication of relative priorities. It will transmit such authority and priority indications in appropriate form to CHALICE Headquarters as guidance for mission planning.

C. Weather:

1. Weather for flight planning for KEEPER missions will be furnished by the Weather Central at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska using the same system now established to support CHALICE operations. The weather for mission planning will be sent to the unit 12 hours prior to take-off. Additional weather information for flight briefing will be sent to the unit approximately four and one-half hours prior to take-off. Weather information will be furnished only to those echelons which are directly concerned with detailed flight planning.

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~~TOP SECRET~~D. Mission Planning:

1. KEEPER operational missions will be planned in the Control Center at CHALICE Headquarters. Direction and control of these missions will be effected and maintained through the normal HBJARGON message system already established.

2. All KEEPER flights will be planned and/or approved by the Royal Air Force liaison officer assigned to Headquarters CHALICE, prior to being dispatched. He will also maintain liaison with the Air Ministry and keep them advised of planning and status of proposed operations.

3. The British Air Ministry will obtain political approval for specific missions or geographical areas for coverage well in advance of contemplated operations. The Air Ministry will be made an informational addressee on the "Alert" message dispatched to the unit 24 hours prior to take-off and designating the general area of operation. Approximately two hours later another message will be dispatched to the Air Ministry only describing in as much detail as weather information at the time permits, the flight path and the targets to be covered. On the basis of this message the Air Ministry may direct modifications of the flight plan. Although the schedule will not permit changes of the flight plan at a later point in the cycle, the Air Ministry may at any time exercise its prerogative of disapproving the mission because of political considerations or late developments which might be prejudicial to the proposed operation. Notification of approval or disapproval should be dispatched at least five hours prior to take-off. The Air Ministry will also be an informational addressee of the detailed Mission Plan (HBJARGON 100-12 hours prior to take-off), the "Go-No-Go" message (three hours prior to take-off), and will also be advised by CHALICE Headquarters when a landing report on the aircraft has been received. Emergency procedures relating to last minute cancellation or recall of airborne missions will be in accordance with existing CHALICE arrangements.

4. Although the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, in conjunction with its British counterpart, has responsibility for establishing target priority, the precedence for coverage of individual targets will be determined by the Operations Staff, including the Royal Air Force Liaison Officer, based on operational considerations.

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E. Unit Responsibility:

1. As in the case of CHALICE Detachment Commanders, the KEEPER Unit Commander will have authority to cancel or delay KEEPER missions because of equipment non-availability or malfunction, or because of inadequate terminal weather. All decisions concerning route weather will be the responsibility of CHALICE Headquarters and the Royal Air Force Liaison Officer assigned thereto.

F. Mission Take:

1. Exposed primary camera film from KEEPER operational missions will be sent to Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester, New York, for processing.

2. The 70mm tracker film will be processed at the Detachment. Route weather and aircraft track will be determined and reported to Headquarters CHALICE in accordance with established procedures. The tracker film will then be duplicated and one copy sent to London and one copy to Washington. Distribution of primary configuration photography will be in accordance with current agreements.

3. ELINT tapes will be duplicated at the Unit and the original sent to Washington for read-out. One copy will be sent to London and an additional "hostage" copy will be retained by the Unit pending safe arrival of the Washington and London copies.

4. Escort of all mission take, photographic or electronic, between the Detachment, the U. S. and the U. K. will be under CHALICE security cognizance.

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ANNEX 78

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28 October 1958

CHALICE/OLDSTER - OPERATIONAL PLAN

- Appendix A - Administrative Arrangements
- Appendix B - Notification and Clearance Procedure
- Appendix C - British Overt Cover Story

Task Organization: Headquarters CHALICE (Washington)
Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry)
CHALICE Det B (Adana, Turkey)

General Situation

1. It has been agreed between the U.S. and HMG that it would be of mutual benefit to their respective intelligence communities for British personnel to play a full part in the execution of CHALICE photographic and elint intelligence missions over and around the USSR and other denied territories. Such participation seems likely to broaden the scope of these operations and thereby enhance the intelligence information available to both the US and British Governments.

2. The British participation is to be known under the code name OLDSTER and will consist of selected pilots and control personnel working as a national team at the direction of HMG within the existing CHALICE organisation for the purpose of satisfying intelligence requirements agreed between approved representatives of the two Governments.

Mission

3. To establish a British reconnaissance capability within the existing command structure of CHALICE Det B for the purpose of undertaking elint and photographic intelligence missions as directed by Headquarters OLDSTER.

Execution4. Personnel

(a) Headquarters OLDSTER is to provide 5 RAF Officer Pilots and 1 RAF Medical Officer who will be represented on appointment to the unit as civilians for all purposes during service outside the U.K. The senior RAF pilot is to be designated British Detachment Commander.

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(b) Headquarters CHALICE is to arrange for the integration of RAF personnel into the command structure of CHALICE Det B.

(c) Additional administrative details are covered in Appendix A.

Logistics and Material

5. (a) Headquarters CHALICE is to provide two additional U-2 aircraft and one T-33 aircraft to Det B for use of OLDSTER personnel.

(b) The British Detachment is to be provided with the full logistic and maintenance support available to Det B.

Operational Planning

6. Operational control of all OLDSTER sorties is to be exercised by Headquarters OLDSTER through Headquarters CHALICE and the local USAF Commander in the field. On all operational matters, the British Detachment Commander will be responsible to the local USAF Commander but has the right of direct access to London on all policy and domestic matters concerning British personnel which may arise from time to time. The flight training programme and selection of RAF pilots for operational and training missions is to be the joint responsibility of CHALICE Det B Commander and the British Detachment Commander.

Mission Planning

7. (a) Headquarters CHALICE is to prepare provisional mission plans from an agreed list of targets and in the light of operational and political considerations. These will be submitted to Headquarters OLDSTER for consideration, evaluation and for provisional political approval in accordance with Appendix B.

(b) The Air Ministry are to keep the agreed target lists and priorities under constant review and to notify Headquarters CHALICE of any amendments through existing channels.

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(c) After consideration of provisional mission plans Headquarters OLDSTER is to notify provisional planning approval to Headquarters CHALICE. Thereafter control of proposed missions is to be in accordance with the Reports Control Manual (Ops Manual 55-1). The procedure for obtaining British political clearance is detailed at Appendix B.

(d) After notification of approval by Headquarters OLDSTER, the operational control of the mission is to pass to Headquarters CHALICE. Headquarters OLDSTER retains the right to cancel a mission up to time of takeoff and, in addition, the RAF Detachment Commander retains the right to cancel any British mission based on his judgment of local operational considerations.

Mission Take

8. Photographic and Elint take from all OLDSTER missions is to be processed under existing CHALICE arrangements, and the intelligence information disseminated to both the U.S. and British intelligence agencies under the existing procedures.

Security

9. It is mutually recognised that the protection of the U.S. and British Governments in the event of an incident is of paramount importance, and it is intended to build up a suitable British overt meteorological cover story with a classified cover story of air sampling similar to the existing cover provided for U.S. activity. To this end, Headquarters CHALICE agrees to make available to Headquarters OLDSTER one U-2 aircraft for meteorological missions from a selected RAF base in the U.K. The provision of this aircraft will be on an opportunity basis and at the rate of approximately two sorties per 90 days. The proposed cover story is detailed at Appendix C.

U-2 Operational Base in the U.K.

10. RAF Watton has been selected as the United Kingdom airfield for meteorological flights and for ferry flights to and from the U.S.A.

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11. In the event that a post or pre-strike base is required for USSR peripheral or overflights the operational base most suitable for U-2 aircraft operations in the U. K. is RAF Kinloss because of terminal weather, availability of hangar and proximity to the Northern targets which are of interest to intelligence agencies. In addition, the lack of air traffic in the area and its isolated location eases the security problem.

12. RAF Kinloss is at present undergoing major works services on the main runway and this work will not be completed at the earliest before March 1959.

13. After work is completed at RAF Kinloss, it can be used as a pre and post-strike base. The RAF will meet airlift requirements within the U. K. to support any staging operations.

14. Facilities required at RAF Kinloss will be limited and will be laid on for each specific operation as the situation requires.

Transit flights to and from the United Kingdom

15. Special instructions dealing with clearance of flights between the U. K. and Adana will be passed by Headquarters OLDSTER to RAF Watton and Headquarters Fighter Command.

Communications

16. (a) Command posts are:

- (i) Headquarters CHALICE
- (ii) Headquarters OLDSTER
- (iii) CHALICE Det B

(b) Headquarters CHALICE is to provide and/or arrange for communications in support of the CHALICE/OLDSTER project at bases other than in the U. K. and is to establish standards for traffic transit times in accordance with operational and administrative requirements.

Signed: Asst. Chief of the Air Staff (Intel.) J. O. Bufton (AVM)
Dep. Director Ops (Recce) D. G. Wise (Gp Capt)
C. I. A., James A. Cunningham, Jr.

28th October 1958.

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OLDSTER Operational
Plan dated 28.10.58ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTSSection A - Personnel AdministrationTour of Duty

1. The anticipated tour of duty for RAF personnel with Detachment B is two years.

Personnel Records

2. All RAF personnel of Detachment B are to be established on the strength of AMU/SDL and all official records and documents will be retained at Headquarters OLDSTER. RAF personnel will be issued with a civilian flying log book in which entries to be made by the holder will conform to local security requirements and which will be certified by the USAF Detachment Commander. This book will be retained by the Detachment Operations Officer.

3. On completion of a tour on OLDSTER operations, entries in the civilian log books will be transferred to RAF log books and certified by Headquarters OLDSTER.

4. Forms 1369 (Annual Confidential Report) will be completed in respect of RAF personnel under arrangements to be made by Headquarters OLDSTER.

Leave of Absence

5. Privilege Leave and/or R&R absences from duty for RAF personnel will be approved by the British Detachment Commander in consultation with the Detachment B Commander and will be granted as operational requirements permit. The local USAF regulations on "off limits" areas and leave travel outside the country of assignment will be strictly observed by RAF personnel. Headquarters OLDSTER will be advised by cable of any annual leave proposed.

Order and Discipline

6. At all times when posing as civilians, RAF personnel are to conduct themselves in accordance with established and appropriate

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RAF regulations and with the local regulations of the USAF and Turkish authorities.

Casualty Procedure

7. The approved US casualty procedure is to be applied to all RAF personnel at Detachment B except that personal effects of the individual will be forwarded to Air Ministry London, marked "for the personal attention of ACAS(Ops)". All casualty reports and documents in respect of RAF personnel are to be copied to Headquarters OLDSTER.

Aircraft Accident Investigation

8. All aircraft accidents, regardless of type, involving RAF personnel are to be investigated in accordance with CHALICE Detachment procedures. Copies of such reports as well as related signals will be furnished to Headquarters OLDSTER.

Marriage

9. RAF personnel contemplating marriage are to immediately submit full particulars of the proposed spouse to the RAF Detachment Commander who will inform Headquarters OLDSTER for further instructions. It should be recognised that the continued utilization of an RAF officer on OLDSTER is contingent upon proper clearance of his spouse.

Travel Orders

10. RAF personnel, while in a duty status with Detachment B will travel from place to place on orders authorised by the USAF Detachment Commander. They will be shown as civilian employees of the British Meteorological Office on such orders, i. e. "Experimental Officer". The orders will further state that the individual's equivalent rank is that of Major.

Travel Notifications

11. Notification of movements of all personnel, including visitors is to be authorised by Headquarters OLDSTER, and forwarded to Detachment B with information copy to Headquarters CHALICE. Notification

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will include name, civil or military grade, as appropriate. It will also include purpose of travel, anticipated duration and clearance status of the individual. In the event of an individual proceeding to Detachment B for temporary duty whose access to specific locations or equipment should in any manner be restricted or curtailed, this information will be made a part of the ETA cable. Headquarters OLDSTER will be advised of proposed travel to the United Kingdom by OLDSTER personnel from Detachment B in advance.

Passports and International Immunization Records

12. Passports and official International Immunization Records will be provided for each individual by Headquarters OLDSTER prior to deployment to Detachment B. Upon arrival there these documents will be placed in the custody of the USAF Executive/Administrative Officer, Detachment B and will be released to the individual only for official travel or leave travel.

Section B - Registry

Registry

13. (a) The procedures for transmission of classified documents and personal mail to and from Headquarters OLDSTER and Detachment B will be as follows:-

(i) Classified documents originating in London will be appropriately marked, placed in double envelopes and delivered to the American Embassy, London, for despatch by diplomatic courier to Germany and thence by USAF arrangements by secure means to Detachment B. On arrival, the mail will be delivered unopened to the RAF Detachment Commander and a receipt obtained which will be returned to Headquarters OLDSTER in the reverse manner employed for outgoing material.

(ii) Classified documents being sent from Detachment B to Headquarters OLDSTER will be delivered to the USAF Detachment Executive/Administrative Officer, suitably marked for classification, and placed in double envelopes, as above.

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These will be transmitted to Headquarters OLDSTER through the reverse of the system set forth in paragraph 13(a)(i) above.

(iii) Personal mail will be handled in the same manner as in paragraph 13(a)(i) and (ii) above except that receipts will not be required. Mailing address for OLDSTER personnel at Detachment B will be:-

Room 7323, Air Ministry
Whitehall Gardens
London, S. W. 1.
England

Headquarters OLDSTER will forward personal mail. On no account will personal mail be transmitted through civil postal channels to or from an OLDSTER individual at Detachment B or at any other location overseas.

Section C - Medical

Responsibilities of British Medical Officer

14. The RAF Detachment Surgeon is directly responsible for the care of all RAF personnel and their dependents. In addition, he will assist the USAF Detachment Surgeon whenever required and practicable. All RAF personnel or dependents requiring medical care will first be referred to him. Upon determination of the amount and type of care required, he will either perform such care as lies within his capabilities of equipment and supplies, or will seek the assistance and guidance of the USAF Detachment Surgeon if the cases are beyond his local scope. Such additional support medical facilities as are needed to offer complete and definitive care for RAF personnel and dependents will be arranged through the USAF Detachment Surgeon and/or CHALICE Headquarters, keeping Headquarters OLDSTER informed.

Hospital Services

15. Should it become necessary to hospitalize RAF personnel or dependents for minor ailments not requiring surgical care, the facilities of the Base Dispensary will be made available through the

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Detachment B USAF Surgeon. A small daily charge may be made to the patient for such service.

16. In the event major surgery or extended hospitalization is required, of a non-emergency nature, the patient will either be air evacuated to NATO Hospital Izmir, Turkey or to Lyneham Air Force Base England for onward movement to an RAF Hospital in UK at the discretion of the RAF Detachment Surgeon.

17. Emergency care for RAF personnel or dependents, including emergency surgery, will be provided either at the Detachment B location or the USAF Hospital, Ankara, Turkey. Following such emergency treatment, if the patient's diagnosis is favourable but requires extended hospitalization, he may be air evacuated either to the NATO Hospital, Izmir, Turkey, or to an RAF Hospital in England.

Physiological Training and Maintenance of Personal Equipment

18. The RAF Detachment Surgeon is directly responsible for the support of the mission in relation to all aspects of Physiological Training and maintenance of personal equipment, as well as other specialized equipment concerned with pilot performance. In the performance of this duty he will be assisted, as required, by the USAF Detachment Surgeon, the USAF Physiological Officer and USAF medical support personnel.

(a) Special areas of responsibility will be to advise the RAF Detachment Commander of the physical and mental condition of flying personnel within the confines of acceptable aeromedical practise, the care and proper utilization of all personnel and specialized equipment directly concerning the welfare of flying personnel. It shall be his sole responsibility to withdraw an RAF officer from flying status based on a medical opinion, and to reinstate him to flying status when he sees fit.

(b) In the physiological field, it shall be his further responsibility to maintain training of flying personnel commensurate with mission performance.

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19. The RAF Detachment Surgeon has the responsibility to maintain appropriate medical health records for all RAF personnel attached to the unit. Though not in themselves classified documents, they will be stored as such by the RAF Detachment Surgeon and must in no circumstances be shown to uncleared personnel. If essential, extracts may be produced in sterile form.

20. The RAF Detachment Surgeon shall see to the maintenance of immunization standards for RAF personnel and dependents in accordance with arrangements made previously between Headquarters CHALICE and Headquarters OLDSTER.

Section D - Pay and Allowances

21. The RAF OLDSTER personnel will be posted to the Air Ministry Special Duty List and their RAF pay and allowances will be paid through normal service channels. Whilst engaged in this project they will receive additional allowances from special funds and be provided with free accommodation. These allowances will be calculated in two parts:-

(a) A special living allowance whilst based at Adana, equivalent to the living allowances paid by H. Q. CHALICE to their own pilots.

(b) A supplementary allowance calculated to raise their net RAF pay in the same proportion as CHALICE pilots' pay compares with USAF pay.

22. Each officer's special allowances will be calculated individually. The supplementary allowance will be paid independently to his U.K. bank account. The living allowance in Turkey will be paid at Adana in U.S. dollars through H. Q. CHALICE from a fund which will be replenished periodically from London.

23. Prior to departure for Detachment B RAF personnel are to elect an amount to be paid to them monthly by the Detachment B Finance Officer. The requisite amounts to cover these monthly payments will be made available in U.S. dollars to the Detachment B Finance Officer, and authority will be given for British personnel to draw U.S. dollars to meet their requirements subject to satisfactory assurance of recovery from his RAF emoluments.

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24. The Finance Officer Detachment B is to account for all supplementary Agency funds and render monthly accounts.

25. The medical officer attached to the OLDSTER team at Adana will qualify for the special living allowance but not for the supplementary allowance.

Section E - Security

General

26. It is agreed that the RAF personnel of Detachment B will be subject to the existing security regulations detailed under the direction and control of the USAF Detachment B Commander and subject to policy guidance from Headquarters CHALICE and OLDSTER.

27. When operating from RAF bases, Detachment B Commander may enlist the aid of the RAF security services as authorized by Headquarters OLDSTER.

Security Responsibilities of the British Detachment B Commander

28. The British Detachment Commander is to be responsible to the Detachment B Commander for ensuring that RAF personnel conform to the security rules and regulations laid down by the Detachment B security authorities.

Handling of Classified Material

29. The handling of OLDSTER material for Detachment B, including storage, maintenance and movement, will be executed in accordance with the Security Custodial Responsibilities laid down by Headquarters CHALICE.

Security Investigation of RAF Personnel

30. All personnel cleared for access to OLDSTER information will have P.V.T. clearance--No OLDSTER clearances will be initiated without the personal authority of A.C.A.S. (I). This clearance will be passed to Headquarters CHALICE with full clearance particulars.

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31. All investigations concerning breaches of security which may arise at Adana or any staging area, involving RAF personnel are to be conducted by Detachment B Security Staff and co-ordinated with British Detachment Commander. All security information and documentation involving RAF personnel of Detachment B will be handled on a "Eyes Only" basis between -

Detachment B Commander

and

RAF Detachment Commander,
Detachment B Senior Security Officer
A. C. A. S. (I)
A. C. A. S. (Ops)
Headquarters CHALICE Security Officer

Security Violations

32. All security violations by RAF personnel of Detachment B will be recorded under arrangements to be made by the Detachment B Commander and the British Detachment Commander. If it is found that any individual is guilty of excessive and continuing security violations, the case will be referred to Headquarters OLDSTER.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Appendix B
OLDSTER Operational
Plan dated 28 Oct 1958NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE OF ELINT AND
PENETRATION FLIGHTSPenetration Flights

1. Details of proposed penetration flights by British pilots including overlays setting out target complexes and proposed routes of missions over a three month period will be sent from Headquarters CHALICE to Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) approximately fourteen days prior to start of a three month operational period.
2. Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) will seek provisional political clearance using agreed British procedures from the Prime Minister for these missions.
3. Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) will inform Headquarters CHALICE by signal of British provisional political clearance or otherwise to the proposed missions prior to the start of a three month period.
4. Following British provisional political clearance for proposed missions Headquarters CHALICE will be responsible for detailed planning as follows:-
 - (a) Producing an Operation Order for any staging operation that may be necessary. A copy of this order will be sent to Headquarters OLDSTER.
 - (b) Ensuring that the mission is conducted in accordance with established procedures.
 - (c) Observing and executing the following action prior to the actual mission:-
 - (i) Mission Forecast. This will be sent to Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) on the Wednesday of each week. It will detail the proposed missions to be flown during the immediately following Monday to Sunday within the programme provisionally agreed (Para. 1 above).

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(ii) Operational Alert. This will be sent to reach Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) no later than twenty-four hours in advance of planned take-off time. The message will contain operating details including target area and time of take-off.

(iii) Intention Message. This will be sent to reach Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) not later than twenty-two hours prior to planned take-off time and will contain additional operating details including target and time of take-off.

(iv) Unit Mission Plan. This will be sent to reach Headquarters (Air Ministry) no later than twelve hours prior to planned take-off time. It will contain full details of specific mission including target, route, equipment and weather.

(v) Final OLDSTER Message. Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) will despatch to Headquarters CHALICE at least five hours prior to estimated time of departure a message giving final British political approval or disapproval to the mission.

(vi) Go-No-Go Message. Headquarters CHALICE will send Headquarters OLDSTER a copy of their message to the operational unit giving approval or non-approval to the proposed mission. This message will be despatched to arrive at least three hours before the estimated time of take-off and after the receipt of the message in (v) above.

Elint Flights

5. No Elint flights are to be undertaken by British pilots without authority from Headquarters OLDSTER.

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OLDSTER Operational
Plan dated 28th October,
1958OLDSTER COVER STORYIntroduction

1. The American cover story for clandestine U-2 flights is linked to the overt and publicised operation of USAF U-2 weather squadrons operating for NASA. Because of this and of the special characteristics of the U-2 it is logical that a British cover story should also be related to high altitude weather research.
2. The validity of this approach is reinforced by the fact that there is a real Meteorological Office requirement for this kind of research work and it would be looked upon as a natural and desirable development in meteorological circles.
3. Arrangements are to be made for the Meteorological Office to have the occasional use of the U-2 aircraft as a result of an understanding between the USAF and the RAF. This fact would not be classified but would not be given undue publicity and all press releases are to be strictly controlled by the Air Ministry. Meteorological data concerning turbulence associated with jet streams, temperatures are to be collected. This would be done either by installing British meteorological equipment or by utilizing existing American met. instruments. Meteorological U-2 aircraft are to pay periodical visits to this country and based at an RAF airfield. Such flights will be of approximately ten days duration every three or four months.
4. Meteorological data obtained at heights above 55,000 feet is to be classified "Secret" and the information is to be divulged to only those people concerned with analysing such material on a strictly "need to know" basis. Data below 55,000 feet is unclassified, and freely available for publication by the Meteorological Office.
5. Covert operations for purposes of photographic or electronic reconnaissance will take place from suitable bases in the United Kingdom or overseas as dictated by operational requirements using CHALICE aircraft. The aircraft will be flown by RAF pilots from the UK and by the same pilots documented as meteorological officers when flying from overseas. The Medical Officer and any supporting administrative staff

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would similarly be described as civilian technicians when visiting overseas bases. Whilst penetration flights will not carry meteorological equipment, in the event of an incident they will nevertheless be described as meteorological research flights.

6. In the event of penetration flights leading to a protest by Soviet or Communist bloc countries, little difficulty is foreseen in producing a rebuttal. In the event of an incident involving a forced landing or destruction of a U-2 over denied territory various explanations can be given as described in Annex 1.

Political Approach and Documentation of OLDSTER Personnel in Turkey

7. The initial approach has already been made to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Turkey, who have agreed to British participation. This participation was described by the Americans as technical assistance by civilian technicians and test pilots.

8. RAF personnel will enter Turkey with civilian British passports describing them as civilian employees of the Meteorological Office. They will carry civilian medical certificates and a supporting paper from the Meteorological Office signed on behalf of the Director General to this effect. Personnel will enter Turkey by civilian airline to Ankara and will then be transported to Adana by American service transport. Further journeys between Turkey and the United Kingdom and other operational bases will be made in USAF aircraft authorized by the Commander of the CHALICE Detachment. The final exit from Turkey will be made openly by civilian airline from Ankara. Whilst stationed in Turkey all British personnel will ensure that they have no documents or uniforms which could connect them with the Royal Air Force. The true nature of their visit to Turkey will only be known to CHALICE-cleared personnel. Selected personnel who have a need to know more than the unclassified story will be told that the British personnel are in Turkey for peripheral air sampling duties. The British Ambassador in Turkey will be informed of the presence of these personnel but not told the true story, and instructed to refer to London any enquiries he might get about these personnel before replying to the Turkish Government.

9. All correspondence including private mail for OLDSTER personnel will be routed through the special "cell" in the Air Ministry for onward transmission by American diplomatic courier to Turkey. Return

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correspondence from Turkey will be sent to the Air Ministry by American diplomatic courier for forwarding.

Political approach and documentation of British OLDSTER personnel operating in Pakistan

10. The Americans have operated from Pakistan twice before but have only told the Pakistan President that they were engaged in periphery Elint collection. A similar story has been told to the American Ambassador although the U.S. Air Attaché is fully briefed. It will be necessary for some approach to be made to the Pakistan President for British participation. M.I. 6 will approach the P.U.S. of the Commonwealth Relations Office who will be cleared for limited knowledge of OLDSTER operations, and he in turn will inform the British High Commissioner along similar lines to those told to the American Ambassador.

11. H. M. High Commissioner will be instructed to approach the Pakistan President and ask for permission for British participation in peripheral Elint collection in agreement with the American plan. The visit to the President will be arranged in conjunction with a similar visit by the American Ambassador.

12. When proceeding to Pakistan on temporary duty British OLDSTER personnel will travel from Adana under the auspices of the USAF and retain their civilian cover as Meteorological Technicians.

Annex 1 to
OLDSTER Operational
Plan dated
28th October, 1958

PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A
MISHAP OVER U.S.S.R. OR OTHER DENIED TERRITORY

1. The precise form of public statement in the event of a mishap could only be determined in the light of the mishap itself; the actual route being flown by the penetrating aircraft; and any statements made by the Soviet Government or any other Government.

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2. In general, if a penetrating U-2 aircraft became missing on a penetration flight it would be the intention of the U. K. to make this fact public and to initiate search and rescue operations. These operations would, of course, take place in an area appropriate to the point of penetration but would not, of course, involve operations over denied territory.

3. There are two points of principle which would be followed at all times. These are:-

(a) At no time would there be any admission to the fact that the penetrating aircraft had been involved in reconnaissance operations.

(b) In the event of the U-2 pilot falling into Soviet or other hands alive he will tell the truth about his operations. In these circumstances the U. K. would make it clear that any such statements were regarded in the same way as other past incidents which claimed to give 'free admissions' on points hostile to the Western cause, the germ warfare, and were made under duress of one kind or another.

4. There are two basic situations to be dealt with, one involving a deep penetration flight, and the other a shallow penetration flight.

Shallow Penetrations

5. In this situation any statement would be related to the fact that a U-2 aircraft was missing flown by a RAF pilot. The aircraft would be stated to have been engaged on a meteorological research flight as part of a programme at present being undertaken. Appropriate details would be made available of this programme and of the arrangements made, including details of the flight from the U. K. to enable RAF pilots to fly these aircraft.

6. Details would then be given of the particular flight on which the aircraft was engaged when it went missing. These details would not, of course, refer to any penetration activities but merely account for the fact that the aircraft was operating in the vicinity of the area at which the penetration was made.

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7. There would then be some speculation as to what had happened to the U-2 aircraft. This speculation might take one of the following forms:-

(a) That the aircraft was intercepted over international airspace and was either forced to land or was shot down over denied territory.

(b) That ground contact with the aircraft had been lost at a particular position, and that the pilot (flying in bad weather, hampered by loss of radio contact and loss of navigation system) may have wandered inadvertently over Soviet territory where he was later forced down, shot down or crashed.

8. Any statements on these lines would, of course, be accompanied by general guidance of previous incidents where Soviet or other Communist countries had shown themselves to react with excessive violence against inadvertent trespass within their airspace.

Deep Penetration

9. The general attitude would be very similar to that for shallow penetration, but it would be necessary to offer a specific explanation as to why the aircraft was so deep in Soviet or other territory. This explanation might take one of the following forms:-

(a) Contact with the U-2 aircraft had been lost at a particular time and particular place. It might be that the aircraft radio communication and navigation system had developed serious malfunction or had failed outright. The pilot might also have had oxygen trouble which, combined with the aircraft's complex navigation system might have resulted in this very grave deviation from the aircraft's planned course. It is possible that with the pilot suffering from lack of oxygen and with the aircraft on 'automatic pilot' this might have caused it to have reached the area stated by the Russians.

(b) That the radio contact with the U-2 aircraft had been lost at a particular time and at a particular place. It may have been that for reasons of pilot error or for technical reasons that the aircraft had, in fact, inadvertently violated Russian airspace. But

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under no circumstances could it be imagined that the aircraft could, on its own accord have reached the place stated by the Russians. Such a flight was not within its capability taking into account of time, the length of route it had previously flown.

Attachment #1 to
CHAL-0397

OPERATION OLDSTER PLAN.

1. This note sets out additional arrangements to those discussed in the plan dated 28th October, 1958. These additional arrangements supersede or amend appropriate parts of the 28th October plan as necessary.
2. In order to strengthen the OLDSTER cover story it has been decided to form a Unit at RAF Watton. This Unit would be known as the Meteorological Experimental Unit (M. E. U.).
3. The establishment of M. E. U. would consist of a Commanding Officer (part-time from Headquarters OLDSTER), and OLDSTER personnel from Detachment B, and a senior N. C. O. (Administrative).
4. The M. E. U. would be overtly located at RAF Watton and would have its headquarters in a hangar. An area for the exclusive use of the M. E. U. at RAF Watton would be made available under appropriate security arrangements. It would be made known as necessary at RAF Watton that M. E. U. was involved in meteorological investigations but also had the task of atomic sampling and its activities in this respect were to be regarded as Secret.
5. The full task of M. E. U. would be known to the Commandant, Central Signals Establishment but to no other unindoctrinated personnel at R. A. F. Watton. A senior N. C. O. (Administrative) would be permanently available at the secure area occupied by the M. E. U. The secure area would be large enough to contain 2 U-2s and would also have in it permanently stores and equipment for these aircraft.

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6. Arrangements would be made for M.E.U. to be on the Air Ministry Special Duties List. No personnel or administrative matters would be handled by RAF Watton. These would be under the exclusive control of Headquarters OLDSTER.

7. OLDSTER communications equipment would be installed in the secure area. The secure area of M.E.U. would act as the operational base during detachment of U-2 aircraft for meteorological experimental flights and atomic sampling flights from the U.K.

8. M.E.U. would be wholly controlled and administered by the Air Ministry (Headquarters OLDSTER).

9. Every attempt will be made to give credence to the operational role of M.E.U. The frequent absences of the majority of its personnel will be explained by reference to:-

(a) The Unit's operational equipment is American and can only be made available from time to time as American commitments allow.

(b) Meteorological research is taking place on a worldwide basis and personnel of the Unit are, or may be employed from time to time in America, the Middle East, Europe or the Pacific.

10. The vital part of the requirement to give credence to the activities of M.E.U. will be actual meteorological flights from RAF Watton. Headquarters CHALICE will, in conjunction with Headquarters OLDSTER, make arrangements for these flights to take place as frequently as conditions will allow. These conditions will be affected by:-

(a) The requirement for CHALICE/OLDSTER operational flights.

(b) The availability of qualified technical personnel and equipment.

(c) The availability of USAF transport aircraft.

11. If political approval is given for penetration flights to be made from the United Kingdom, the RAF will make available transport aircraft for the logistic support within the United Kingdom of any OLDSTER detachment.

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ANNEX 79

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25 May 1961

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

SUBJECT: Integration of Project JACKSON Pilot Personnel into
Project IDEALIST Detachment at Edwards Air Force
Base, California

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

As a result of a meeting held in Washington the afternoon of 19 May 1961, the following text is proposed for mutual agreement, covering principal arrangements required at the local level in Detachment G. Personnel at the meeting were AVM Sydney O. Bufton, RAF, ACAS/I; Air Commodore Roger Whelan, RAF, DDI (B);

[redacted] Development Projects Division; Wing Commander John C. Blair, RAF Liaison Officer to CIA; [redacted]

[redacted] and Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., Acting Chief, Development Projects Division.

1. JACKSON pilots assigned to Detachment G, Edwards Air Force Base, will be documented under the notional cover of 6510th Air Support Group, Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC). This unit is analagous to a Headquarters and Services Squadron in a lesser command and is the only unit on the base reporting directly to the Base Commander, Brig. Gen. Carpenter, USAF.

2. Since some form of documentation is required locally, all assigned RAF personnel will be furnished appropriate pocketbook documentation, i. e., gate passes, club cards, drivers' licenses, PX and Commissary cards, etc., which will indicate their association with the 6510th Air Base Group. By special arrangement with AFFTC, RAF personnel will not, however, be carried on any morning reports, manning documents, or published figures of the 6510th Air Base Group.

3. Living quarters for RAF personnel will be off base. While this in itself is a modest departure from the norm for officers serving under an exchange arrangement, both parties to this agreement

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feel that it is preferable in this instance, since it tends to reduce the opportunities for on-base exposure of RAF participation in Project JACKSON/IDEALIST. Civilian clothing will be worn at all times by RAF personnel. Although sufficient documentation as outlined in paragraph 2 above will be furnished each officer to permit him to freely utilize normal base support facilities, i. e., motion picture theaters, Officers' Clubs, PX and Commissary, it is specifically understood that RAF personnel, with the exception of the Flight Surgeon whose on-base bona fides have already been established, will not avail themselves of these facilities. In return for this it is understood that RAF personnel will be furnished a special allowance to compensate for the absence of such normal privileges.

4. If questioned, either on or off base, as to the nature of their assignment, RAF personnel will indicate that they are assigned to the 6510th Air Base Group. The sole exception to this is the Flight Surgeon, who will continue his administrative association with the special medical team at Edwards Air Force Base under the control of Brig. Gen. Don Flickinger, USAF, Assistant to the Commander for Bio-Astronautics, Air Research and Development Command. If questioned specifically as to their duties, they will respond that "they are on a classified assignment". At no time will RAF personnel admit their association with Detachment G, and if questioned about the identity of their commanding officer, they will give the name of Brig. Gen. Carpenter. Likewise, they will not volunteer information that will associate them with the U-2. If questioned as to whether or not they do in fact fly this aircraft, they will respond in the affirmative, admitting that they do this "in addition to flying various other types of aircraft".

5. In the event of a mishap, the initial reaction to inquiry will be to withhold the identity of the pilot until "notification to the next of kin". After twenty-four hours, which is the normal delay associated with such notification, the identity of the pilot will be released by the base Office of Information Services, with the following added statement: "At the time of the accident, this officer was detailed to Air Research and Development Command to familiarize himself with various aircraft in the USAF inventory. (RAF officer's name) was flying a U-2 aircraft, belonging to ARDC at the time the accident

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occurred. Normal accident investigation is being implemented to determine the cause of the crash."

6. It is understood that in the interest of both participants in this activity, Project JACKSON personnel will not frequent the Detachment G squadron area except while on official business. Open association with U. S. members of Detachment G on the base is not encouraged.

7. Both parties to this agreement are aware of the need for operational compartmentation at Detachment G. On occasion this may require that Project JACKSON personnel will be excluded from special areas where unilateral operations of U. S. interest only are in the process of being planned or conducted. Project JACKSON personnel will be briefed to this effect prior to arriving at Edwards Air Force Base by Wing Commander John C. Blair, RAF Liaison Officer to CIA.

8. Administrative guidance to RAF personnel in meeting normal requirements off the base such as State drivers' licenses, credit cards, documents relating to the purchase of personal items, etc., will be available within Detachment G. In all such instances the 6510th Air Support Group, AFFTC, will be shown as their place of assignment. Mail for Project JACKSON personnel, except for the Flight Surgeon, will not be received at a military address on the base but will be directed to their off base housing location.

It is realized that a document of this sort drawn up in advance of a new situation such as proposed for Project JACKSON personnel in the Detachment G environment cannot of necessity answer all situations which might develop. In any case not covered by this agreement and in those instances where an appropriate solution is not readily available within the Detachment G area itself, the problem will be referred in advance to Project IDEALIST Headquarters where it will be discussed between senior personnel of Project IDEALIST and the RAF Liaison Officer, hopefully leading to a mutually agreed position.

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It will be the responsibility of the RAF Liaison Officer to keep his headquarters advised of any major departure from this agreement which he feels may require additional coordination in London.

(Signed) JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR. 25 May 1961
Acting Chief, DPD

(Signed) AVM SYDNEY O. BUFTON 25 May 1961
Assistant Chief to the Air
Staff for Intelligence
Air Ministry

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ANNEX 80

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DDI(B)TS. 5013

18 May 1961

IDEALIST/JACKSON - OPERATIONAL PLAN

- APPENDIX 'A' Administrative Arrangements
'B' Notification and Clearance Procedure
'C' Cover story and arrangements for RAF
personnel at Detachment G
'D' RAF Liaison Officer/HQ IDEALIST/
Responsibilities and duties

Task Organisation: Headquarters IDEALIST (Washington)
Headquarters JACKSON (Air Ministry)
IDEALIST Detachment G (Edwards AFB)

General Situation

1. It has been agreed between the United States and Her Majesty's Governments that it would be of mutual benefit for British nationals to undertake photographic and ELINT intelligence missions in concert with the IDEALIST organisation.

2. The British participation is to be known under the codename JACKSON and will consist of a flying detachment working as a national team under the direction of H. M. Government within the existing IDEALIST organisation.

Mission

3. To establish a British reconnaissance capability within the existing IDEALIST organisation for the purpose of undertaking photographic and ELINT intelligence missions as directed by Headquarters JACKSON.

Execution

4. Personnel

(a) Headquarters JACKSON is to provide two RAF officer pilots, one RAF navigation officer and one RAF medical officer. The senior RAF pilot is to be the British Detachment Commander.

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(b) Headquarters IDEALIST is to arrange for the integration of RAF personnel in the IDEALIST field organisation.

(c) Additional administrative detail is in Appendix 'A'.

Logistics and Material

5. (a) HQ IDEALIST is to provide U-2 aircraft and T-33 aircraft for the use of JACKSON personnel.

(b) The JACKSON detachment is to be provided with full logistic and maintenance support.

Operational Control

6. Operational control of all JACKSON sorties is to be exercised by Headquarters JACKSON through Headquarters IDEALIST and the local USAF commander in the field. On all operational matters, the British detachment commander will be responsible to the local USAF commander but he has the right of access to London through the RAF Liaison Officer established in IDEALIST HQ on all policy and domestic matters concerning British personnel which may arise from time to time. The flight training programme and selection of pilots for operational and training missions is to be the joint responsibility of the IDEALIST detachment commander and the British detachment commander.

Mission Planning

7. Mission planning is divided into:-

(a) Provisional mission plans to meet current intelligence requirements.

(b) Immediate planning to meet a sudden demand which may or may not already have been considered under (a) above.

8. To meet requirements in 7 (a):

(a) IDEALIST/JACKSON to prepare provisional mission plans from an agreed list of targets.

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(b) If a provisional mission plan reaches the point where British political approval is to be sought for its execution, HQ JACKSON is to notify HQ IDEALIST of provisional approval. If political approval is sought and obtained the control of the proposed mission is to be in accordance with the Reports Control Manual (Ops Manual 55-1). The procedure for the clearance of JACKSON operational flights is given in Appendix 'B'.

9. In the event of a sudden demand for a mission, IDEALIST HQ is to provide a detailed operational plan and when final political approval has been obtained is to control the mission in accordance with the Reports Control Manual.

Mission Take

10. Photographic and ELINT take from all JACKSON missions is to be processed under existing IDEALIST arrangements and the intelligence information disseminated to both the U.S. and British intelligence agencies under the existing procedures.

Security

11. It is mutually recognised that the protection of the U.S. and British Governments in the event of publicity in the U.S. (for instance, an accident) or in the event of an incident outside the U.S., is of paramount importance.

12. If any publicity is given in the U.S. to the British element, and especially to the pilots, which requires an answer or explanation from the British Government, the answer will be given that the RAF pilots are in the U.S. to fly various types of aircraft, including the U-2. Details of this cover story as well as the security measures to be adopted by the JACKSON detachment in the U.S. are given in Appendix 'C'.

13. Before any mission is undertaken outside the U.S., a cover story must be agreed between IDEALIST/JACKSON HQ. Any cover story will have to be related to the political situation at the time and to the overflight area or areas.

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14. Air Ministry is to maintain secure hangar facilities at RAF Watton for IDEALIST/JACKSON personnel and aircraft. These facilities are to include the screening of part of the hangar and suitably secured office and technical accommodation.

15. Special instructions for the reception and clearance of flights from RAF Watton are to be made as required by JACKSON HQ.

Communications

16. (a) Command Posts are:

- (i) Headquarters IDEALIST.
- (ii) Headquarters JACKSON.
- (iii) IDEALIST Detachment.

(b) Headquarters IDEALIST is to provide and/or arrange for communications in support of the IDEALIST/JACKSON project at bases other than in the U.K. and is to establish standards for traffic transit times in accordance with operational and administrative requirements.

(Signed)

A. Foord-Kelcey
Air Vice-Marshal
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff
(Intelligence)

James A. Cunningham
Development Project Division
Central Intelligence Agency

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~~TOP SECRET~~Appendix 'A' to
JACKSON Operational PlanADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTSSection A - Personnel AdministrationTour of Duty

1. The anticipated tour of duty for RAF personnel with the detachment is from two to two and a half years.

Personnel Records

2. All RAF personnel are to be held on Special Duties List No. 1005 (British Defense Staff Washington) and all official records and documents, apart from medical documents, will be retained in HQ JACKSON.

3. No entries are to be made in RAF log books of U-2 flying. Flying times are to be recorded separately and given monthly to HQ JACKSON for entering into log books in a suitable form on completion of tour.

4. Annual Confidential Reports will be completed in respect of RAF personnel under arrangements to be made by HQ JACKSON.

Leave of Absence

5. Privilege leave and R. and R. absences from duty for RAF personnel will be approved by the British Detachment Commander in consultation with the IDEALIST Detachment Commander and will be granted as operational requirements permit. The local USAF regulations on "off limits" areas and leave travel will be observed by RAF personnel. HQ JACKSON is to be advised of any annual leave proposed.

Order and Discipline

6. RAF personnel are at all times to conduct themselves in accordance with established and appropriate RAF regulations and with the local regulations of the USAF authorities.

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Casualty Procedure

7. The approved U.S. casualty procedure is to be applied to all RAF personnel at the Detachment except that personal effects of the individual will be forwarded to Air Ministry, London, marked "for the personal attention of A.C.A.S.(Ops)". All casualty reports and documents in respect of RAF personnel are to be copied to Headquarters JACKSON.

Aircraft Accident Investigation

8. All aircraft accidents, regardless of type, involving RAF personnel are to be investigated in accordance with IDEALIST Detachment procedures. Copies of such reports as well as related signals will be furnished to HQ JACKSON.

Marriage

9. RAF personnel contemplating marriage are to submit full particulars of the proposed wife to HQ JACKSON. The continued employment of a RAF officer on JACKSON depends upon proper clearance of his wife.

Travel Orders

10. RAF personnel, when on duty with the detachment, will travel from place to place on orders authorized by the USAF detachment commander. Whether they travel as RAF officers or as civilians will depend upon the circumstances of the time and will be decided before the operation by IDEALIST and JACKSON HQ.

Travel Notification

11. Any British visits to the detachment are to be cleared with IDEALIST HQ and the notification is to include name, civilian or military grade, purpose of travel, expected length of stay and clearance status. If the visitor should be denied access to any locations or equipment this is to be stated in the cable.

Passports and International Immunization Records

12. Passports and official International Immunization Records will be provided for each individual by HQ JACKSON as required.

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When travelling normally, only those forms showing the bearer to be a Royal Air Force officer are to be used.

Section B - Registry

Registry

13. The procedures for transmission of classified documents and personal mail to and from HQ JACKSON and the detachment will be as follows:-

(a) Classified documents originating in London will be appropriately marked, placed in double envelopes and delivered to the office of the IDEALIST representative in London for despatch by diplomatic bag to the U. S. On arrival at the detachment, the mail will be delivered unopened to the British detachment commander and a receipt obtained which will be returned to HQ JACKSON.

(b) Classified documents being sent from the detachment to HQ JACKSON will be given to the USAF detachment Executive/ Administrative officer suitably marked for classification and placed in double envelopes. These will be sent to HQ JACKSON through the reverse of the system described in paragraph 13(a) above.

(c) Personal mail is not to be received at a military address on base but is to be directed to the off-base housing location.

Section C - Medical

Responsibilities of British Medical Officer

14. The RAF Detachment Surgeon is directly responsible for the care of all RAF personnel and their dependents. In addition, he will assist the USAF detachment surgeon whenever required and practicable. All RAF personnel or dependents requiring medical care will first be referred to him. Upon determination of the amount and type of care required, he will either perform such care as lies within his capabilities of equipment and supplies, or will seek the assistance and guidance of the USAF detachment surgeon if the cases are beyond his local scope. Such additional support facilities as are needed to offer complete and definite care for RAF personnel and dependents will be arranged through the USAF detachment surgeon and/or IDEALIST HQ.

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Hospital and Emergency Services

15. As far as possible, the three officers living in Lancaster are to be treated for minor ailments without associating them directly with the Base Dispensary. In an emergency it may be necessary to use the Base Hospital facilities but as far as is practicable this is to be avoided. For surgery or hospitalization, if time permits, arrangements will be made with IDEALIST HQ for treatment elsewhere. Costs for such treatment will be borne directly by Project IDEALIST.

Dental Treatment

16. Dental treatment will be arranged with a private practitioner, away from the base, with the approval of IDEALIST HQ. Costs for such treatment will be borne directly by Project IDEALIST.

Physiological Training and Maintenance of Personal Equipment

17. The RAF detachment surgeon is directly responsible for all aspects of Physiological Training and maintenance of personal equipment, as well as other specialised equipment concerned with pilot performance. In the performance of his duty he will be assisted, as required, by the USAF detachment surgeon, the USAF Physiological officer, and medical support personnel.

18. He is to advise the USAF detachment commander of the physical and mental condition of flying personnel within the confines of acceptable aeromedical practice and it is his sole responsibility to withdraw an officer from flying status based on a medical opinion and to reinstate him to flying status when he sees fit. He is to advise on the care and proper utilisation of all personal and specialised equipment directly concerning flying personnel. In the physiological field, it is to be his further responsibility to maintain training of flying personnel commensurate with mission performance.

19. He is responsible for maintaining appropriate medical health records for all RAF personnel attached to the unit. Though not in themselves classified documents they will be stored as such by the RAF detachment surgeon and must in no circumstances be shown to uncleared personnel. If essential, extracts may be produced in sterile form.

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20. He is to see to the maintenance of immunization standards for RAF personnel and dependents in accordance with arrangements made between HQ IDEALIST and JACKSON.

Section D - Pay and Allowances

21. RAF pay and allowances will be paid through normal service channels but while the pilots and the navigator are based at Edwards Air Force Base they will receive from special funds an allowance of 5 dollars a day each. This allowance is to compensate them for loss of privileges on the base and for daily travelling allowances.

22. Money will be paid into an account in Detachment G and the pilots and navigator can draw their entitlement from the Finance Officer as required.

23. HQ JACKSON is to be informed when the account has fallen to 500 dollars and a statement of account is to be forwarded every six months to HQ JACKSON.

24. This special allowance is not to be paid when JACKSON personnel are on leave.

25. JACKSON personnel are not to be told the source of this special allowance, are not to discuss the allowance except with HQ JACKSON and the RAF Liaison Officer HQ IDEALIST, and are not to show the allowance on income tax forms.

Section E - Security

General

26. RAF personnel will be subject to the existing security regulations detailed under the direction and control of the USAF detachment commander and subject to policy guidance from HQ IDEALIST and JACKSON.

27. When operating from RAF bases, the detachment commander may enlist the aid of RAF security services as authorised by HQ JACKSON.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Responsibilities of the British Detachment Commander

28. The British detachment commander is to be responsible to the USAF commander for ensuring that RAF personnel conform to the security rules and regulations laid down by the detachment security authorities.

Handling Classified Material

29. The handling of JACKSON material for the detachment, including storage, maintenance and movement, will be executed in accordance with the Security Custodial Responsibilities laid down by HQ IDEALIST.

Security Investigation of RAF Personnel

30. All personnel cleared for access to JACKSON information will have P.V.(T) clearance and no JACKSON clearances will be initiated without the personal authorities of A.C.A.S.(I). Full JACKSON clearance particulars are to be passed to HQ IDEALIST.

31. All investigations concerning breaches of security which involve RAF personnel are to be conducted by the detachment security staff and co-ordinated with the British detachment commander. All security information and documentation involving RAF personnel of the detachment will be handled on an "eyes only" basis between:-

USAF Detachment Commander
and
RAF Detachment Commander
Detachment Senior Security Officer
A.C.A.S.(I)
A.C.A.S.(Ops)
HQ IDEALIST Security Officer

Security Violation

32. All security violations by RAF personnel will be recorded under arrangements to be made between the USAF and RAF detachment commanders. If it is found that any individual is guilty of excessive and continuing security violations the case will be referred to HQ JACKSON.

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Appendix 'B' to
JACKSON Operational Plan

NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE OF PERIPHERAL
AND PENETRATION FLIGHTS

1. HQ JACKSON will inform HQ IDEALIST by signal when provisional political approval is being sought for a mission. When provisional political approval has been obtained, and after both Headquarters have agreed the main outlines of the mission, HQ IDEALIST will be responsible for detailed planning as follows:-

(a) Producing an Operation Order for any staging operation that may be necessary. A copy of this order will be sent to HQ JACKSON.

(b) Ensuring that the mission is conducted in accordance with established procedure.

(c) Observing and executing the following action prior to the actual mission:-

(i) Mission Forecast. This will be sent to HQ JACKSON on the Wednesday of each week. It will give the proposed mission or missions to be flown during the immediately following Monday to Sunday within the programme provisionally agreed.

(ii) Operational Alert. This will be sent to reach HQ JACKSON no later than twenty-four hours in advance of planned take-off time. The message will contain operating details including target area and time of take-off.

(iii) Intention Message. This will be sent to reach HQ JACKSON not later than twenty-two hours prior to planned take-off time and will contain additional operating details.

(iv) Unit Mission Plan. This will be sent to reach HQ JACKSON no later than twelve hours prior to take-off time. It will contain full details of specific mission including target, route, equipment and weather.

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(v) Final JACKSON Message. HQ JACKSON will despatch to HQ IDEALIST at least five hours before estimated time of departure a message giving final British political approval or disapproval to the mission.

(vi) Go-No-Go Message. HQ IDEALIST will send HQ JACKSON a copy of their message to the detachment giving approval or non-approval to the mission. This message will be sent to arrive at least three hours before the estimated time of take-off and after the receipt of the final JACKSON message.

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Appendix 'C' to
JACKSON Operational Plan

COVER STORY AND ARRANGEMENTS
FOR RAF PERSONNEL AT DETACHMENT G

1. JACKSON pilots assigned to Detachment G, Edwards Air Force Base, will be documented under the notional cover of 6510th Air Support Group, Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC). This unit is analagous to a Headquarters and Services Squadron in a lesser command and is the only unit on the base reporting directly to the Base Commander.

2. Since some form of documentation is required locally, all assigned RAF personnel will be furnished appropriate pocketbook documentation; i. e., gate passes, club cards, driver's licenses, PX and Commissary cards, etc., which will indicate their association with the 6510th Air Base Group.

3. Living quarters for the two pilots and the navigator will be off base in the town of Lancaster which is 38 miles from Edwards. While this in itself is a modest departure from the normal for officers serving under an exchange arrangement, it is preferable in this instance because it tends to reduce the opportunities for on-base exposure of RAF participation in Project JACKSON/IDEALIST. Civilian clothing will be worn at all times by RAF personnel. Although sufficient documentation as outlined in paragraph 2 above will be furnished each officer to permit him to use normal base support facilities, i. e., motion picture theatres, Officers' Clubs, PX and Commissary, it is specifically understood that RAF personnel are not to use these facilities. In return for this the RAF personnel will be furnished a special allowance to compensate for the absence of such normal privileges.

4. If questioned, either on or off base, as to the nature of their assignment, RAF personnel will indicate that they are assigned to the 6510th Air Base Group. The sole exception to this is the Flight Surgeon, so long as he continues his administrative association with the special medical team at Edwards Air Force Base under provisions arranged by the Assistant to the Commander for Bio-Astronautics, Air Force Systems Command. If questioned specifically as to their duties, they will respond that "they are on a classified assignment". At no time will RAF personnel admit their association with Detachment G, and if questioned about the identity of their commanding officer, they will give the

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name of Major General Carpenter. Likewise, they will not volunteer information that will associate them with the U-2. If questioned as to whether or not they do in fact fly this aircraft, they will respond in the affirmative, admitting that they do this "in addition to flying various other types of aircraft".

5. In the event of a mishap, the initial reaction to inquiry will be to withhold the identity of the pilot until "notification to the next of kin". After twenty-four hours, which is the normal delay associated with such notification, the identity of the pilot will be released by the base Office of Information Services, with the following added statement: "At the time of the accident, this officer was detailed to Air Research and Development Command to familiarize himself with various aircraft in the USAF inventory. (RAF officer's name) was flying a U-2 aircraft, belonging to AFSC at the time the accident occurred. Normal accident investigation is being implemented to determine the cause of the crash."

6. Project JACKSON personnel will not frequent the Detachment C squadron area except while on official business. Open association with U. S. members of Detachment G on the base is not encouraged.

7. On occasions Project JACKSON personnel may be excluded from special areas where unilateral operations of U. S. interest only are in the process of being planned or conducted.

8. The Commander, British Defense Staff, Washington, the Commanding Officer, Edwards Air Force Base, and other selected officers, will be briefed as required to support a story that RAF officers are, under normal arrangements, flying various aircraft, including the U-2. If it is possible, however, no statement should be made by any of these officers until instructions have been received by either HQ IDEALIST or HQ JACKSON.

9. The medical officer of the British detachment will continue to live on the Main Base at Edwards, to wear uniform, and to maintain interest in various aspects of the medical work being undertaken on the Main Base.

Outside the United States

10. It is expected that members of the British detachment, when staging outside the U. S., will travel on USAF orders as British civilian

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and will be issued with the necessary documents and instructions to enable this to be done.

11. RAF pilots flying the U-2 outside the U. S. will retain their RAF identity under all circumstances. If they force-land in friendly, neutral or denied territory they will always give their name, rank and number. Any further information that may be freely volunteered after a forced landing will depend upon the territory involved and pilots will be briefed accordingly before each mission.

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Appendix 'D' to
JACKSON Operational Plan

RAF LIAISON OFFICER/HQ IDEALIST
RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES

The Royal Air Force officer (Wing Commander) assigned to Headquarters IDEALIST is the representative of the Air Ministry (Headquarters JACKSON), London, and is responsible for the following duties:-

(a) Act as liaison officer between HQ IDEALIST and HQ JACKSON for both operational and administrative matters concerned with the project.

(b) Advise HQ IDEALIST as regards RAF policy, methods, etc., which may be pertinent and required for information in connection with IDEALIST/JACKSON operations.

(c) Maintain liaison with HQ JACKSON and keep them advised of planning and status of proposed IDEALIST operations.

(d) In accordance with HQ IDEALIST/JACKSON policy and requirements, co-ordinate arrangements for JACKSON mission plans in conjunction with HQ IDEALIST Director of Operations.

(e) Monitor and supervise the JACKSON mission planning carried out by the HQ IDEALIST Operations Control Staff.

(f) Attend JACKSON mission briefings and in conjunction with the HQ IDEALIST Operations Staff make the necessary decisions concerning route and target weather.

(g) Be the final approving authority for all JACKSON flights. In the event of absence, this final authority may be given by the HQ IDEALIST Director of Operations but HQ JACKSON is to be advised accordingly.

(h) Co-ordinate any arrangements necessary for RAF/British visitors to HQ IDEALIST.

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BYEMAN

BYE-2628-65
9 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Continuation of the JACKSON Program

You have asked for our thoughts on the question of the continuation of the so-called JACKSON Program. I believe that in order to evaluate its worth it would be helpful to spend a few moments looking briefly at the background of this effort:

a. The JACKSON Program began in early 1959 as the outgrowth of conversations between Allen Dulles and Sir Dick White in the early winter of 1958 in London. We had just gone through the Congressional elections in the fall of 1958 during which time, for political reasons, the U-2 project had been pretty thoroughly neutralized for several months prior to the election in order that no one "rock the boat" and perhaps endanger the Administration's hope of success at the polls. Having witnessed this same period of extended political sensitivity in the presidential contest of 1956, it was Mr. Dulles's view that a certain advantage might be gained by establishing a British U-2 capability with the thought that, because of the lesser frequency of British elections and the probability that they would not coincide with established U.S. elections, a way could be found to keep the U-2's flying from one side or the other fairly continuously.

b. The JACKSON Program matured during 1959 under the aegis of the RAF with nominal financial and documentation support from MI-6. An operational agreement was worked out in London, which today is still in effect, and Agency communications with the Air Ministry were established. A cell was created within the Air Ministry initially under ACAS(Ops), but prior to the first mission the cell was shifted to the area of ACAS(I), then presided over by the now Air Chief Marshal Bill MacDonald. In latter 1959 and 1960 until 1 May, a small detachment of four RAF pilots, a medical officer, and an operations officer/navigator was stationed within the U-2 detachment at Adana, Turkey, from which point some nineteen Middle East U-2 missions were flown as well as two from Pakistan over the Soviet Union. I feel that the system worked reasonably well, although at the time the British system of approvals seemed a bit tedious, since no less than

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eight senior Air Ministry and government officials, including the Prime Minister, had to sign off on each mission, as well as on any minor changes to the flight plan brought about by operational or weather conditions.

c. After 1 May 1960 the British withdrew rather rapidly from Adana, fearful that their whole position in the Middle East might be endangered by revelations which they expected would be made in August of that year at the time Gary Powers was brought to trial. Their fears, of course, did not materialize. However, the program lay dormant until early 1961 when it was revived by the then ACAS(1), Air Vice Marshal Sidney O. Bufton. Bufton was a close personal friend of the then DDCI, General Cabell, who supported the resumption of the program on what was, at best, a contingency basis. The number of pilots, however, was reduced to two since it was hard to see how any more could be supported in view of the diminished U-2 assets of the Agency. (At the time of the Powers incident, the Agency possessed fourteen U-2's. With the loss of Powers' plane a decision was made to return four of the remaining aircraft to USAF. These latter birds were subsequently recovered from USAF to replace losses.) Despite the best efforts of Sid Bufton there was a reluctance on the part of HMG to consider active commitments of the U-2's in areas where they might have been reasonably effective before the wholesale introduction of SA-2's in the Middle East. Following Bufton's departure his successor, Air Vice Marshal Foord-Kelcey, did little to advance the U-2 cause up through his retirement in 1964. There was a brief period in 1962 when it looked as though we were on the verge of obtaining an agreement from both governments to establish an RAF detachment in Pakistan to conduct the ELINT surveillance over Sary Shagan MTR with System X. I honestly believe the British were ready to give this project their best, but in August of that year Mr. McCone ordered a stand-down in any further planning in face of strong USAF representation on behalf of the RB-57F as a substitute vehicle for the Sary Shagan surveillance.

2. As you can see from the above, a factual box score would seem to indicate that the JACKSON Program was a losing proposition after 1 May 1960. In May of 1963 an attempt was made to interest the British in permitting us to use Cyprus as a base for U.S. U-2 flights against Israel and adjacent areas without notable success. We have found that in all instances where we have actively explored the possibility of using the JACKSON assets, that the Air Ministry and the

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Air Council have supported us to the political authorities. It has been the latter who have historically been bothered by the implications of losing an aircraft in the Powers' manner, where the pilot might be able to reveal his affiliation.

3. At the moment, the continuation of JACKSON is costing us little or nothing. There are two pilots, a navigator and a medical officer at Edwards Air Force Base for whose up-keep we are not responsible, but for whom we furnish flying time in U-2's and T-33's. MI-6 continues to pay the detachment a daily supplemental stipend and we have in the past afforded the RAF pilots, or at least some of them, carrier training although there is no carrier in the Royal Navy suitable for U-2 operations. Our communications link to the Air Ministry has permitted some useful exchanges on technical matters; i. e., during the Sino-Indian crises in 1962 when we were able to determine fairly accurately the capabilities of the Indian Air Force to conduct tactical reconnaissance against the Chicom's. It is only fair to say that if the matter of maintaining the link were put to a vote [redacted] [redacted] would be the first to opt for its abandonment. In a rather intangible way this program furnishes the excuse for direct liaison with the Air Ministry on reconnaissance matters, but this alone is probably insufficient justification. There is today in 1965 one area of the world where the JACKSON Program might be effective, and that is in Southeast Asia against Indonesia in connection with the smouldering Malaysian crisis. Even though the British are on the receiving end of T-KH material, because of weather and geography this collection system cannot be maximally effective against either Borneo or Indonesia itself. The U-2's operating from Darwin or Cocos Island or both could do the job. If political sensitivities permitted, Singapore could also be a base of operation, as could the Philippines. There is, as yet, no competitor to the U-2 in terms of performance within the RAF inventory, and little prospect that they will achieve one. The British might well see fit to join us, if the occasion arose, in conducting reconnaissance from India over China. Such a suggestion was even made by Air Vice Marshal Foord-Kelcey to General Carter in 1963. It is conceivable that the Air Ministry at least might give serious thought to employing their pilots over China from Takhli, if we so desired, in view of the progressive deterioration of the international situation in Southeast Asia. I feel there is only a limited prospect in employing the U-2 in the Middle East under RAF auspices except, perhaps, in

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the less heavily defended areas of Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. I see little expectation that either the U.S. or the U.K. could mount a U-2 staging from Pakistan in the near term, and U.K. pilots operating against China from Taiwan are totally out of the question.

4. All of the above would seem to suggest that unless there is some prospect of melding the RAF capability eventually into the OXCART Program, the chances of effective employment of JACKSON are not too encouraging. The present re-examination of the U.K. position, which I hear from Harry Hean is going on in London, may suggest the possibility of further operations of one sort or another. If this search on their part proves non-productive it might be appropriate to think of allowing the program to expire at the completion of the tours of the present incumbents at Edwards, which would be in the late spring of 1967. Your thoughts on this topic would be appreciated.

(Signed)

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Acting Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

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DDS&T Historical Paper
No. OSA-1
Vol. VIII of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
Chapter XIV

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEAL PANEL,
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ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 8
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

Controlled by: DDS&T
Date prepared: 1 April 1969
Written by: Helen Kleyla
Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER XIV. THE MAY DAY
1960 INCIDENT

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CHAPTER XIV. THE MAY DAY 1960 INCIDENT

In Moscow

On the morning of May Day 1960, in the foreign diplomats' section of the reviewing stands in Red Square, the U.S. Air Attaché, Col. Edwin Kirton, was making notes which later that afternoon were sent "Operational Immediate" to the Pentagon under the heading "Hi-lites, May Day Parade" and included the following:

"Wide speculation caused by fact that Vershinin* was 55 minutes late and entered upper deck only at very end of military portion of parade. Immediately after arrival he held series of seemingly very urgent and serious conversations. First to consult with him was Viryoxov, head of PVO.**

"Vershinin went to head of line and consulted urgently for ten minutes with Malinovsky following which he came back to the right end of the line and continued serious conversation, pulling papers out of his pocket, and accompanied with repeated gestures. Speculation included: (1) that some spectacular event either succeeded or failed, but was of sufficient importance to keep Vershinin away from ceremonies, (2) that PVO forces may have shot down unfriendly aircraft..." 1/

In Washington

At approximately 0330 hours, Washington local time on Sunday, May 1st, personnel in the CIA operations control center at the Matomic

*Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Air Force.

**Soviet Air Defense Command.

1/ DAF Msg IN 32702, 1 May 1960, from USAIRA Moscow.

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Building, where Mission 4154 was being followed through Comint channels, became aware that all was not well with the flight. The Soviet radar tracking of the aircraft's progress was discontinued at 0129 hours Washington time at a point southwest of Sverdlovsk, just short of half-way through the mission.

Key project personnel were summoned to the control center in the early morning hours to analyze the latest information as reflected by the Comint tracking and to implement appropriate actions in view of the probable loss of the aircraft. Present in addition to project staff were Mr. Walter Bonney, Press Relations Officer of NASA, and Colonel Leo P. Geary, USAF Project Officer. The group was later joined by Mr. Richard Helms, Acting Deputy Director for Plans in the absence from the city of Mr. Bissell, and Ambassador Hugh Cumming, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. A full-scale discussion of the proposed text of a suitable cover story release ensued. Mr. Bissell joined the group at about 1530 hours, and it was decided that a story should be released from the aircraft's home base at Adana, Turkey, to the effect that a NASA high altitude weather research airplane was missing having last been heard from in the vicinity of Lake Van, Turkey, at 1700 hours, and that at last radio contact the pilot had reported oxygen difficulty.

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Ambassador Cumming informed Under Secretary of State Dillon by phone of the agreed release and obtained his concurrence (in the absence of the Secretary of State). The story differed in some aspects from the prepared one distributed to the Detachment, to Headquarters USAF, to USAF European theater command, and to third countries involved. The revised story was based on the latest information and assumption that the aircraft was down deep within the Soviet Union where any story connected with navigational error, pilot hypoxia, or aircraft malfunction would be difficult to sustain. Yet, in the absence of any verified information on the actual fate of the mission, condition of the aircraft and pilot, and uncertainty as to whether the Soviets would admit to a penetration of such depth, it was felt that the revised release offered better prospects of being sustained in the event the aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot killed, or if the Soviets should take credit for shooting it down,* while at the same time electing to move the reported scene of the incident closer to their borders in order to conceal from their own people and the world the depth of the mission's penetration into the heavily guarded Russian heartland.

* During the period immediately after loss of the mission, the idea that the pilot might be taken alive did not receive the high priority attention which other possible eventualities received.

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The revised cover story, backed up by an actual mission flight plan, was sent through CIA communications channels to Detachment B, [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526 and Headquarters USAFE. The Commanding Officer of the Detachment was directed to release the story after local coordination with the Incerlik Base Commander [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526

[REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526 (This was done on 2 May, however the story did not appear in the news until 3 May when it was published with an Istanbul dateline.)

In Turkey

Word reached Detachment B at Incerlik Air Force Base in the afternoon of 1 May through cable channels of the non-arrival of the mission aircraft at Bodo and its probable loss deep inside Russia. In the absence of the Commanding Officer who was with the staging party in Pakistan, the senior officer in charge at Adana was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Housing and Administrative Officer, and it fell to him to break the news to Mrs. Barbara Powers, wife of the pilot, that her husband was missing on a flight. Mrs. Powers was suffering from a broken leg at the time, the result of a skiing accident a few weeks earlier. It was decided that it would be best for her to return immediately to the States, and on 3 May Headquarters authorized her PCS

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return by commercial air, with an escort for the full trip, as well as her German shepherd dog's transportation by the same plane (cost to be reimbursed by Mrs. Powers).

Secretary of State Herter and General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, were in Istanbul on 1 May, attending a NATO meeting when the U-2 was declared overdue, [REDACTED] was requested by Headquarters to fly to Istanbul and brief them on the situation.

Third Country Involvement: Pakistan

Since it was impossible to predict in what form the Soviets would break the news, whether openly or in private protests to the U.S. and other countries involved, on 2 May [REDACTED] was requested by Headquarters to see General Ayub, [REDACTED] and tell him that the air intelligence activity approved by him through Riaz Hussain had experienced the loss of an aircraft which was believed down inside the USSR; that the U.S. would attempt to keep Pakistan from active involvement with the Soviets and would make every effort to minimize any Soviet pressure growing out of the incident; also that the U.S. was grateful to Ayub for his steadfast support of vital intelligence collection efforts. (Since Ayub had never

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been officially told of the true mission of the activity, Headquarters desired to forestall any violent reaction by him in case the Soviets laid blame on Pakistan.)

[redacted] saw Ayub on 4 May and delivered the message. Ayub received the news calmly, said he was sorry to hear of the loss of the aircraft but was not disturbed about what the Russians might say. He asked that the following message be relayed to Mr. Allen Dulles:

"We shall stand by our friends and will not let them down on this. The problem for us is not what to say or not to say to the Russians but what we can do about them and their continued overflights of our country. As to the latter we are very dependent on your assistance since we do not ourselves have the means to defend ourselves. Our needs in this regard, namely a few F-104 jet aircraft and some further supplement to our radar network, have already been made known to your government at the highest level... anything Mr. Dulles could say to the proper quarters to help out in this connection would be most appreciated." 1/

Soviet Disclosures: Washington Reactions

On 4 May, before the Soviets made any disclosure whatever, there were meetings at the Department of State attended by Col. William Burke, Acting Chief, DPD, with Ambassador Bohlen and Messrs. Richard Davis and Lampton Berry of the State Department. A question and answer brief prepared by the Agency principally for use by NASA was carefully

1/ [redacted]

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gone over. It consisted of answers to hypothetical questions which might be asked by the press concerning the aircraft and the upper air research program. This list was agreed by the conferees and was dispatched to all involved officials in Washington and at overseas stations.

The next day at a convocation of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow Khrushchev announced the shooting down of an American aircraft which he said had crossed the state frontier of the Soviet Union from either Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan. (See Annex 82 for Khrushchev statement.) The FBIS pick-up of this news from Radio Moscow was immediately referred to Project Headquarters and to the DCI who was attending a National Security Council meeting which was being held at High Point. After the NSC meeting convened, a further meeting of the President, Secretary of Defense Gates, Mr. Gordon Gray, Mr. Douglas Dillon, Mr. Allen Dulles and General Andrew J. Goodpaster, was held to consider the handling of the U-2 incident. It was agreed by the group that the President should not be personally involved, and it was determined that the Department of State should handle all publicity.

In Washington, a meeting at the Department of State attended by General Cabell and Mr. Bissell with Messrs. Davis and Berry of State, discussed the implications of the Khrushchev statement, which gave no

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clue as to the fate of the pilot. The group adjourned to Mr. Dillon's office on his return from the NSC conclave and learned of the decision that State would handle all publicity. In the afternoon of 5 May, the following agreed press release was made:

"The Department has been informed by NASA that, as announced May 3, an unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, has been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment.

"Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U. S. plane was shot down over the USSR on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that, having a failure in the oxygen equipment which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet air space.

"In view of Mr. Khrushchev's statement, the U. S. is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot." 1/

Meanwhile the White House Press Secretary, Mr. James Hagerty, made a statement to the press that the President had ordered an investigation of the entire matter. He also in a telephone conversation with Mr. Bonney of NASA suggested that the latter hold a press conference as soon as possible as a means of handling the heavy volume of press inquiries; such a conference was convened at 1330 hours on

1/ ADIC-0313 (OUT 66457), 5 May 1960.

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5 May in NASA Headquarters. (It is presumed that Mr. Hagerty had not been informed at that time that the State Department alone was to handle all publicity regarding the U-2, and that neither had NASA been so informed in time to prevent the press conference.) The answers given the press by Mr. Bonney were based on the brief prepared and agreed between CIA and State on 4 May.

On 6 May there were two radio and press briefings at the Department of State, one at 1110 hours held by Mr. Tully, and one at 1235 hours, by Mr. Lincoln White. At the latter, Mr. White made the statement in reply to a question that there was no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space, and there never had been. (Although this statement was Mr. White's own response to the question asked, it was taken by the members of the press as the Department position and so printed and broadcast.)

Later in the day of 6 May, Embassy Moscow reported that the Swedish Ambassador had been told by Jacob Malik at a reception on 5 May that "the pilot hit the silk and we are now interrogating him". Project Headquarters' first reaction to this bit of news was that it might be a plant to force a reaction from the U. S. in an effort to spare the pilot possible torture at the hands of his Russian captors.

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Shortly after noon on 7 May, Munich Base cabled information monitored from Radio Moscow that the Russians had the pilot of the downed aircraft, that he was alive and had been identified as an Air Force pilot working for CIA; also that the Russians claimed to have equipment from the plane. (See Annex 83 for 7 May speech by Khrushchev.)

This news touched off a series of extended meetings in CIA and the Department of State, the first between noon and 1430 hours in the DCI's office with General Cabell and Ambassadors Cumming and Bohlen from State and General Goodpaster from the White House. In this session a draft press statement was agreed; however this statement was reworked by Mr. Dillon and the Secretary of State (to go farther down the road toward open admission of overflight), and after being cleared with the President, was released at 1800 hours. (See Annex 84 for text.) The DCI was informed by telephone of the later decision at higher level to, in effect, "come clean" in the 1800 press release. This statement, six days after the incident, was the first official statement casting doubt on the previously published cover story. On the same day a public display of a NASA-marked U-2 at Edwards Air Force Base had been held to satisfy press demands for detailed information on the plane and

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its meteorological equipment and to support the cover story on the U-2's weather mission.

Also on the same day, Detachment B was instructed to furnish a "black" airlift to remove the British cadre at Adana from Turkey and return them to the Air Ministry in London for debriefing and a temporary leave until the U-2 incident had calmed down. This procedure was agreed by Project Headquarters at the request of the Air Ministry.

The next day, 8 May, was Sunday and no further statements on the incident were made by official Government spokesmen on the Administration side. (There were many public statements by Senators and Congressmen, however.)

Third Country Involvement: Norway

On 9 May [50X1, E.O.13526] Col. Evang (Chief of Norwegian Intelligence) had requested that CIA Headquarters send him a full report of all information available to the U-2 pilot which might reveal Norwegian involvement so that Evang could prepare to defend himself when the matter was brought up in the Storting. Evang was talking of a possible five years behind bars, although he had been given a U.S. visa on 9 May (secretly) in the event it became necessary for him to leave the country. He predicted a difficult period for [50X1, E.O.13526]

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for the next few months even if he, himself, should survive the crisis.

Congressional Briefing, 9 May 1960

At 1000 hours on Monday, 9 May, a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State gave consideration to the question of the handling of Congressional inquiries. Present at that meeting were: Secretary Herter, Under Secretary Dillon, Defense Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas, Ambassadors Bohlen and Kohler, and Messrs. Dulles and Bissell of CIA. It was agreed that the DCI would brief chosen Congressional leaders, giving the basic facts in a closed session, and that Secretary Herter would issue, subject to Presidential approval, a press statement clarifying the position of the United States Government. After consultation with the White House, it was further decided that Mr. Herter would give his statement to the Congressional leaders before it was published. (See Annex 85 for text.)

An appointment was set up for 1400 hours the same day for the Congressional briefing, to be accompanied by an exposition of U-2 photographic intelligence by Mr. Lundahl. Mr. Dulles spent the intervening time with aides preparing his presentation, and Mr. Bissell joined the group at State in drafting the Secretary's proposed statement.

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Shortly before 1400 hours Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles joined the Secretary of State for the ride to the Congressional hearing room during which the text of the DCI's proposed remarks was read and approved by the Secretary. (Text included in Annex 85).

Congressional leaders who were present for the briefing on 9 May were: Senators Lyndon B. Johnson, Mansfield, Dirksen, Bridges, Saltonstall, Russell, Vinson, Wiley and Fulbright; and Congressmen Rayburn, Halleck, Hayden, Arends, Morgan and Chipperfield.

Further Moscow Revelations

On 10 May Tass radio reported that Pilot Powers had in his possession a letter signed by General Thomas D. White permitting him to fly an Air Force aircraft. Parts of the downed U-2 were put on display in Gorky Park in Moscow and press reports indicated that various items of equipment were tagged with maker's name or identified as U.S. Government property. Detachment B was queried on what items the pilot may have had in his possession, and what pieces of equipment were aboard the aircraft which had any identifying markings on them.

In the early days of the project, the question of "sterilizing" the equipment carried by the U-2 received a good bit of attention with the

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idea that items would not be attributable to the manufacturers of the components. That idea was abandoned as impracticable and the concept of sterilization which was then followed was that the aircraft and equipment should not incorporate any items which by their markings indicated them to be the property of the U.S. Air Force.

Damage Assessment

On 10 May a damage assessment on the incident was ordered to be carried out by DPD Security Staff in cooperation with the CI Staff of the Agency with the purpose of accumulating the fullest possible record of information which must be presumed to be available to the Russians and which could be used against the United States and its allies. This initial assessment was submitted to the DD/P on 27 June 1960 (text included as Annex 86).

The CIA Director of Personnel on 10 May, in response to a request by DPD, affirmed to the Comptroller that, under the authority granted by Agency Regulation 20-760, he had reviewed the circumstances of the disappearance of Francis G. Powers and of his reported capture and on the basis of his review had determined that Powers was in a status qualifying him for benefits of the Missing Persons Act (P. L. 490, 77th Congress) as amended, effective 1 May 1960. Authorization was

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given for the continuance of Powers' pay and allowances to be accrued in an escrow account with the specific authorization for allotment disbursements to be furnished later through DPD. Included was an allotment for support of Mrs. Powers who had been escorted to her mother's home in Milledgeville, Georgia, under Project Security Staff guidance.

As a precautionary measure, all records on project pilots (including the British) who had gone through the Lovelace Clinic were retrieved from the Clinic and held at Headquarters. The suppliers of the U-2 aircraft, engines, and other components were given defensive briefings on meeting press inquiries. Witting project and other Agency and USAF personnel were advised as to the information which should remain classified and be so treated in spite of public revelations and announcements made during the previous ten days.

President Eisenhower's Press Conference, 11 May 1960

Despite the agreement of State, Defense, and Agency officials at the post-NSC meeting of 5 May to avoid any personal involvement of the President in the matter, President Eisenhower made the decision completely on his own to face the press and announce his cognizance and approval of the secret flights over Russia. The text of the President's statement is included as Annex 87.

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On the same morning, Mr. Allen Dulles, accompanied by Messrs. Lundahl and Houston, was meeting with the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to brief them on the history of the U-2 project and the recent incident. At the end of the briefing and questioning by Members, the Director made a final statement that he knew from the start what chances were being taken and that the Agency was ready and able to take the brunt of the criticism, but he wished the Members to be aware of the extreme importance of the contribution this operation had made to U.S. intelligence. A vote of confidence in Mr. Dulles was proposed by Congressman Van Zandt and agreed to by the Members. Mr. Houston's record of the meeting indicated that:

"The Subcommittee did not show any great concern about the timing of this last U-2 flight and its nearness to the Summit. They seemed far more perturbed about the fact that the pilot had spoken so much and so early, although they made clear that they were not holding this against the man. It was also clear that Members were deeply impressed by the description of the intelligence product and had no question about the necessity for and value of the project generally. At the end there was some discussion of what the position of the Subcommittee should be--whether embarrassment, or disappointment. The consensus seemed to be strongly in favor of standing behind the Executive Department's action with no apologies." 1/

1/ TS-174813, 12 May 1960. Memo for Record by General Counsel, CIA.

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In anticipation of a worldwide press barrage following the President's statement to the press on 11 May, the first propaganda guidance to CIA field stations on the U-2 incident was issued by cable later the same day, as follows:

"1. In discussion plane incident with your contacts you should for present and immediate future take basic guidance from Secretary of State official statement of 9 May and President's 11 May press conference. Will try to supplement official statements from time to time with additional points such as those in following paragraphs which you may use in discussion with senior cleared and witting officials your host government, but am sure you realize it difficult to keep you up to minute in this extremely fast-breaking situation.

"2. For time being prefer not to officially confirm exact details CIA participation in organization and control this operation but there no need deny CIA involvement. You may also say CIA considered product aerial surveillance program to be of extreme importance in assessment likelihood of and capability for Soviet surprise attack. This connection, you should cite many reasons for U.S. need obtain such information by clandestine means in view excessive Soviet secrecy and past record aggression. (Western Europe stations only: In those areas where our release of intelligence to local services includes general studies or estimates you should stress fact that host government was recipient benefits of information and in any event all Western countries benefitted from intelligence obtained.)

"3. You may inform liaison contacts that analysis information release by Soviets leads to serious doubt their claim to have shot down plane by rocket. This doubt based among other things on apparently faked photographs of crashed plane and of Soviet airfield, Soviet claim that maps, films, destruction device still intact despite crash from extreme altitude, contradictory statements as incident has progressed re place where plane downed, etc. Seems quite possible pilot had equipment failure and was forced down by fighters when reached lower altitudes. We attach

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no credibility to story he double agent or defected to Soviets and note past Soviet record in extracting confessions from persons under their control.

"4. Above raises many questions re Soviet motives and tactics whole affair. By own admission they knew of earlier surveillances but did not publicly announce until they could claim shoot down, in order hide weakness their air defenses and use incident as excuse again to brandish their nuclear missiles. Khrushchev propaganda treatment also obvious attempt blame U. S. for any failure at Summit and possibly to avoid real issues of disarmament inspection and control..." 1/

Further Third Country Problems

Because of pressure being exerted by Soviet diplomatic protests or visits by their Foreign Office emissaries, the Turkish, Norwegian, Pakistani and Japanese Foreign Offices in turn began to press the State Department for information to assist them in replying to the Russians. The texts of all the written and oral communications between the U. S., the U. S. S. R., and other governments in connection with the U-2 incident were collected by the State Department into one document dated 12 August 1960 (RSB MM-0 203, Secret Noform) a copy of which is appended as Annex 88.

Paris Summit Conference

While diplomatic notes were being passed back and forth, plans for the "Summit" meeting in Paris went forward and as one preliminary step

1/ Book Cable DIR-29243 (OUT 74598), 11 May 1960.

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General DeGaulle was afforded a briefing to bring him up to date on the U-2 matter. A flash summary to the DCI [redacted]

[redacted] reported that:

"DeGaulle stood before easel in his office one hour and twenty minutes on 14 May while briefed by Cunningham and Lundahl (NEDROW (P) interpreting). Original meeting had been scheduled to last one-half hour. He had minor interest in organization and history of project but showed much interest in U-2 incident, especially CIA conclusions regarding likelihood mechanical malfunction as cause versus Russian claims of shutdown. Once satisfied on this point, he expressed desire to see take, saying that it's the end results that count.

"He listened attentively to detailed PI briefing, carefully fixing most important locations in his mind and asking penetrating questions. For example, he desired to have our best estimate of the maximum effective range new Soviet Hexagon SAM sites and the bearing this had on SAC strategy and needs. Expressed great interest in Soviet atomic energy capabilities and in BW and CW evidence.

"He inquired whether the U-2 had uncovered Chinese atomic energy installations.

"When briefing completed, he made following points: he was very much impressed with the results and made it clear he considered CHALICE an intelligence operation of great significance. He was highly appreciative for briefing which he said would be helpful to him during Summit Conference. He believes that the operation should continue and he would like to be kept informed of significant intelligence developed in the future." 1/

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At the preliminary meeting of heads of governments in Paris on 16 May, Khrushchev condemned the United States in relation to the U-2 spy flights and gave his ultimatum for continuing with the Summit Conference, at the same time withdrawing the invitation for President Eisenhower to visit Russia. The U.S. President replied, leaving no doubt that the ultimatum was not acceptable to him. The invitation extended by President DeGaulle for a meeting of the four powers on 17 May was boycotted by the USSR and the other three powers issued a joint communique taking note of the fact that, because of the attitude adopted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, it had not been possible to begin at the Summit Conference the examination of the problems which were to have been discussed, but affirming their readiness to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.

On 25 May President Eisenhower on radio and television from Washington gave the American people his version of what happened in Paris, and while he took full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by the U.S. Government to secure military intelligence, he placed the blame for torpedoing the conference on Mr. Khrushchev and brought out the fact that Khrushchev had been aware

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o previous overflights of the Soviet Union at the time he visited the United States the previous September, but had said nothing then. In the same speech the President said that he had directed that the U-2 flights be stopped--their usefulness was impaired and continuance would only complicate relations of our allies with the Soviets. (Full text of the President's speech is at Annex 89.)

On 14 June in the Senate, the collapse of the Summit Conference was the subject of a major speech by Senator John F. Kennedy in which he said that the effort to eliminate world tensions and end the cold war through a Summit Meeting was doomed to failure long before the U-2 fell on Soviet soil, because the United States was unprepared with new policy or new programs to settle outstanding issues. In the same speech he put forward the challenge for a "Great Debate" on the issues by the American people through the media of their political parties.

Six weeks after the May Day event, after an appraisal of the favorable and unfavorable reactions with regard to CIA's role in the affair, a Book Dispatch went out to the Chiefs of CIA Stations and Bases from the Director, emphasizing the significant benefit to national security of the intelligence collected by the U-2 program and encouraging efforts to devise new methods for collecting vital intelligence in view of

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continued Communist secrecy and hostility. The text of the Director's secret testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 31 May 1960 was appended to the book dispatch for the background information of addressees (see Annex 87). In his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Director had decided to go over to the attack, in which attitude he had the expressed support of the Acting DDP, Mr. Helms, who said he believed the Senators would appreciate the aggressive approach since underneath it all, there was a good deal of admiration and good will in the Senate and he felt they would react positively when they saw that the Director was neither apologetic nor on the defensive. This prediction turned out to be correct, and the Director was also able to maintain the precedent of non-disclosure of his testimony by the Committee.

As to the reaction of the Russian people to the U-2 incident, the Chief of the CIA Soviet Russia Division (Mr. John M. Maury) reported on 8 June 1960 that although persistent repetition of Soviet propaganda themes might eventually produce anti-American bias, travelers returning from Russia since the incident reported no change in the over-all friendliness toward Americans evidenced in personal contacts in recent years. Despite the expectation that the overflights would represent to

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the Soviet man in the street an affront to the dignity and sovereignty of the USSR, a threat to peace, and a menace to his own person, the attitudes reported reflected a sophisticated acceptance of espionage as a fact of life, and the expected emotional responses of indignation and hostility had not materialized. ^{1/}

Between 6 and 9 May 1960 the American Embassy in Moscow received approximately 6,000 letters and 200 telegrams purported to have been spontaneously written by ordinary Soviet citizens protesting the U-2 overflights. These communications were considered to be the result of a calculated psychological effort on the part of the Soviet propaganda bureau and showed that they had a substantial internal organizing ability along these lines.

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Preparation for the Defense of Powers

In the first week of June, State and CIA officers agreed that a maximum effort to provide legal assistance to the captured pilot would

^{1/} DPD-4769-60, 8 June 1960, "Soviet Image of the U-2 Incident".

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be made; this would be done through a private front, and would of course be subject to whatever restrictions might be imposed by the Russians. Through the Department of State Legal Adviser, Mr. Eric Hager, an agreement was successfully negotiated with the President of the Virginia State Bar Association who promised to furnish adequate counsel without fee and to protect and keep secret the governmental interest in the case.

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An account of the negotiations between State and Agency officers, the Virginia lawyers, and the wife and father of Frank Powers during the month of June 1960 in preparing the basis for a defense of the captive pilot was set forth on 30 June 1960 by Mr. John McMahon (at that time DPD Personnel Officer) and is included as Annex 90.

As events later developed, the lawyers were never permitted to participate in the trial; however, considerable expenses were incurred.

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in preparation of the defense, including travel expenses of the Powers family and lawyers to Moscow and return.

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Propaganda for the Defense

On 7 July the Soviet news agency published the indictment of pilot Powers under Article 2 of the Law of the Soviet Union on Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes. The Embassy was instructed to pass an aide memoire to the Soviet Government once more requesting permission to interview Powers and provide him with legal counsel, but like previous overtures, the note was ignored. The date set for the opening of the trial was 17 August, and it was anticipated that it would follow the pattern of previous "show" trials with the prisoner well-rehearsed and rendered cooperative through "brainwashing" techniques. Through arrangements with Mrs. Barbara Powers, DPD obtained the letters

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written to her by her husband from his Russian prison. They were analyzed, first, for evidence of the prisoner's use of the simple code in which he had been instructed during his training. He did not make use of this means of communicating secretly. In addition, expert consultants in handwriting were retained through the efforts of General Don Flickinger, USAF Medical Corps, to make a study of representative samples of Powers' handwriting before and after his capture. While such studies must be classed as experimental (the consulting psychologists, Drs. Harrower and Steiner of New York, were not informed as to whose handwriting was involved), the findings were considered of enough significance to warrant possible exploitation through propaganda prior to the trial.

The most important deduction arrived at by the analysis of the before and after handwriting was that more than likely some type of organic psychiatric change of significant degree in the subject had taken place in the interim between the writings. Such a change could result from such things as brain injury, electroshock, cerebral infection, or vascular deprivation and psychochemical application. However, State Department policy with regard to pre-trial publicity negated the propaganda use of the "brainwashing" thesis. An instruction sent to field

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stations in this regard on 5 August said that official and attributable comment prior to the trial would appear only in response to direct queries from responsible sources. If access to the prisoner continued to be denied, State would probably release the text of the 30 July note to the USSR reviewing the unsuccessful efforts thus far to obtain access to Powers, and to obtain Russian visas for legal counsel.

Strictly unattributable assets of the Agency might refer in low key to previous Soviet practices of rigging trials and extorting confessions. However, it was considered inadvisable and possibly counter-productive to make a broad effort to suggest the probability of brainwashing in the Powers case. (During the processing by his Soviet captors at the time of his being confined to prison, according to Frank Powers' own report subsequent to his release, he was given a hypodermic injection which was probably a general immunization shot. Although he was kept in solitary confinement and subjected to constant interrogation, sometimes ten to twelve hours a day, there was no evidence that he was given truth serums or other drugs.)

Stations were advised to encourage the attendance at the trial of responsible, reputable journalists whose reports would be balanced, and generally favorable to the West. One propaganda ploy which had

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Agency support was the delivery of a speech at the Congress of International Astronautical Federations in Stockholm on the day before the Powers trial was to open. The speech, to be given by Mr. Spencer Beresford (a Congressional consultant on space problems), contained arguments refuting the Soviet indictment of Powers and raising the question of national sovereignty over airspace--which was not defined by international law and was generally assumed to reach only as far as could be enforced. The State Department, two days before the speech was to be given and [redacted] foreign media assets lined up to give the speech maximum play, reached the policy decision that extensive publicity of the speech was not desirable since it expressed a point of view at variance in some respects with the U.S. Government approach to such problems and raised questions the U.S. would prefer not to have raised at that time. [redacted]

[redacted]

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On 10 August 1960, the State Department released a statement regarding the U.S. policy with regard to public utterances on the Powers trial as follows:

In order to avoid any possibility of prejudicing Mr. Powers' situation and in the interests of national security, the U.S. Government for the present will withhold comment on any aspect of the trial itself.

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
 U.S.C., section 403g)

However, it is to be noted that Powers has been in exclusive control of Soviet authorities for 101 days, that despite all efforts of this Government no one other than his jailers and captors has had access to him, and that anything he says should be judged in light of these circumstances and Soviet past practices in matters of this kind. *

A special "Propaganda Guidance to Stations and Bases on the Powers Trial" was dispatched by the Agency's [redacted] on 1 August 1960 for maximum use with all assets (see Annex 91).

Ad Hoc Committee on Powers Trial

On 29 July 1960, Mr. Allen Dulles appointed Mr. John M. Maury Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, to handle the over-all Agency coordination of activities related to the Powers trial. This occurred at the end of a meeting during which the Director gave a complete briefing to the Virginia lawyers picked to defend Powers, and granted permission for them to study the signed contract under which Powers was hired by the Agency.

Mr. Maury had met with the lawyers (all old friends of his) the evening before at the Mayflower to discuss ways of putting pressure on the Soviet Embassy to obtain visas for the party to go to Moscow for the trial. Mrs. Barbara Powers had also been present. Mr. Maury's note

* The second paragraph of the State Department Press Release was included at the specific request of the DCI, Mr. Allen Dulles.

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on the meeting reported that during the evening he had an opportunity to become acquainted with Barbara, who made quite a good first impression on him. At the same time he became aware of certain problems: (a) that Barbara had been dissatisfied with past Agency assistance rendered her and was particularly unhappy about the long delay in receiving any financial aid from the Agency; (b) that she wished to examine her husband's contract with the Agency, although her reason for this was not clear; (c) that she was highly critical of the State Department, contending that none of its officers (except Ambassador Bohlen) had offered her any significant advice or assistance; (d) she was also critical of Mr. Allen Dulles because he was not available to see her when she was at the Agency the day before.

On receipt of a copy of Mr. Maury's memorandum, the long-suffering DPD officers who had been assigned the onerous task of handling Barbara and seeing to her financial and other needs made known to Mr. Maury the completeness of the past assistance rendered and drew from him agreement that in any future contacts with Barbara, Mr. McMahon or of DPD, or Mr. Mike Miskovsky of the General Counsel Staff would be present to challenge any complaints by Barbara on the adequacy of Agency assistance to her.

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Mr. Maury's ad hoc committee met daily as required through the pre-trial period and was a convenient forum for obtaining agreed positions for action and rendering daily reports to the Director and others concerned. As events developed, it became obvious that the lawyers would not be permitted by the Soviets to participate in the trial and their visas were held up until almost the eve of their planned departure. There was considerable anxiety within CIA as well as the State Department that Barbara Powers not travel to Moscow alone and therefore, in view of the possibility that the lawyers might be prevented from accompanying her, arrangements were made for her mother, Mrs. Monteen Moore Brown, and her family physician, Dr. James M. Baugh, to go to Moscow with expenses being underwritten by CIA.

The Agency had no direct contact with or control over the Oliver Powers family entourage as their travel to Moscow was arranged and underwritten by the editors of Life magazine who had negotiated exclusive rights to cover the family's attendance at the trial. Their party consisted of Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers (father and mother of the pilot), Miss Jessica Powers (his sister), a family friend, Mr. Sol Curry, and Mr. Carl McAfee, Attorney.

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Once the two family groups were finally airborne toward Moscow, the Project Headquarters braced itself for whatever sensational revelations might develop with the opening of the trial. The ad hoc committee had set up a temporary command post in the DPD office area in the Matomic Building with news tickers installed to receive immediate transmission from all news services, and with twenty-four hour coverage by relays of staff personnel.

It was expected that testimony by the prisoner would reveal information on U-2 overflights of other areas, including the Middle East, Indonesia and China, introduced in such a way as to discredit the United States with neutral or favorably disposed countries peripheral to the USSR. Within the stricture laid down by State of "no comment" on the trial, the United States was in a position to deny categorically overflight of Indonesia and China, as well as the Middle East (with special exceptions of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan). Any revelations concerning U. K. participation was to be handled by the British Foreign Office.

Of the third countries involved in the May Day flight, only Norway continued to create problems for the U. S. This was due largely to having dealt exclusively with Colonel Evang, who had acted unilaterally in granting base rights to the Americans without clearing this with higher authority within the Norwegian Government. Consequently, when the

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Russians put pressure on the Norwegian Government, Evang was only able to stick with his own personal cover story: that the Americans had misled him on the true nature of the May Day operation.

In June the Pakistani Ambassador to Moscow reported to his own Foreign Office that he had learned the following from the Norwegian Ambassador to Moscow: that his Government had decided that the Americans were so inept and unwise in their handling of the incident that it would be best for Norway to be absolutely straightforward in their dealings with the Russians no matter how much this might offend the State Department; that their Foreign Minister in Oslo sent for the Russian Ambassador to Oslo regularly and kept him posted with all that they learned about the event to convince the Russians that the Powers flight took place without their knowledge; that knowledge of the large number of Americans who had landed at Bodo on 1 May had trickled down all over Norway because the Americans had taken no precautions to cover up their presence; and that the Norwegian Government believed that Powers had already made a clean breast of all he knew to the Russians and therefore it was useless to keep them in the dark about anything that could be learned from the Americans. 1/

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The Trial and Subsequent Events

During the trial of Frank Powers, the principal points which the prosecution hammered down were that Powers was guilty of violation of the USSR's air space; expert testimony was given to support the military and espionage nature of his flight; participation of third countries (Turkey, Pakistan and Norway) was underlined; and the shooting down of the U-2 by a Soviet rocket at 68,000 feet was established. The defense built up the picture of Powers as a victim of the capitalist system making much of his proletarian family background, his total lack of political motivation or interest, his non-resistance when arrested, and his regret for the consequences of his flight.

The English translation of the complete transcript of the trial, as published by Translation World Publishers, Chicago, Illinois, was procured by the CI Staff and a summary made thereof, copy of which is attached as Annex 92. One item of interest not included in that summary is Power's final statement made at the end of the trial, before the sentence was passed, which he read to the court:

"The court has heard all the evidence in the case, and now must decide my punishment. I realize that I have committed a grave crime and that I must be punished for it. I ask the court to weigh all the evidence and to take into consideration not only the fact that I committed the crime, but also the circumstances

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that led me to do so. I also ask the court to take into consideration that no secret information reached its destination; it all fell into the hands of the Soviet authorities. I realize that the Russian people think of me as an enemy. I understand this, but I would like to stress the fact that I do not feel and have never felt any enmity toward the Russian people. I plead with the court to judge me not as an enemy but as a human being not a personal enemy of the Russian people, who has never had charges against him in any court, and who is deeply repentant and sincerely sorry for what he has done." 1/

The verdict of the court was rendered at 1 00 hours on 19 August and Powers was sentenced to ten years deprivation of liberty, the first three of which were to be served in prison, commencing from 1 May. The verdict was not subject to judicial appeal.

Immediately upon conclusion of the trial, shortly after 6 p. m., the Powers family had their first visit with the prisoner accompanied by one Intourist interpreter, but closely monitored by six Soviets in uniform. The meeting was highly emotional with all in tears. Frank reported that his treatment had been better than he expected, he had not been subjected to any physical measures, but he had been prepared for the death sentence. He did not know the family were in Moscow until he saw them in the court room.

The lawyers saw the Prosecutor after the trial and later prepared a petition for clemency to the Supreme Soviet Presidium and a letter

1/ State Department Cable, Moscow 462, TOP SECRET, 19 August 1960.

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to Khrushchev requesting an audience with him for Barbara Powers. Presentation of the petition for clemency was discouraged by Soviet Advocate Grinev (who had acted as Defense Counsel for Powers). Grinev said he would himself file application for commutation at the appropriate time. However the petition drafted by the lawyers, addressed to Brezhnev, was delivered to Brezhnev's office, but was refused at the reception desk and therefore had to be sent by mail. The letter from Barbara to Khrushchev produced no results, however, the parents and wife were granted separate visits with Frank on 23 September, and Barbara had an additional private visit on 24 September.

The rules for future contact with the prisoner were explained as not less than one letter, 8 kilos of packages and 100 rubles of pocket money per month, one visit by relatives every two months, and one hour walk daily. Delivery of allowable items was arranged through the good offices of the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and the two family parties left separately to return to the United States.

An effort was made by Oliver Powers, when Khrushchev visited New York in September 1960 for the United Nations General Assembly, to have an interview with the Russian leader but he was unable to accomplish this. However, through the National Broadcasting Company's

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assistance, he appeared on the Dave Carroway morning television program on 27 September and read his letter to Khrushchev over a nationwide television network.

The end of the Powers trial brought a reappraisal of the security situation with regard to the U-2 project in the light of all events since 1 May 1960, and a revised security guidance was circulated to all members of the U.S. Government and contractors within the cleared community by the DD/P (Mr. Bissell)

"The following information previously classified is now general public knowledge:

"a. That the U.S. Government, specifically CIA, between 1956 and 1 May 1960 was engaged in a program of overflights of the USSR for photographic and electronic intelligence purposes, utilizing the U-2 aircraft under cover of a NASA-sponsored weather research program.

"b. That Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960 undertook such a mission using a U-2 aircraft based at Detachment 10-10, Incirlik Air Base, Adana, Turkey, taking off from Peshawar, Pakistan, enroute to Bodo, Norway, via Sverdlovsk.

"c. That the operational capability of the U-2 is at least 70,000 feet altitude and 2,825 nautical miles (distance from Peshawar to Bodo via Sverdlovsk).

"The following have been removed from CHALICE control and classified Secret to permit wider usage by the US defense community:

"a. Full performance characteristics of the U-2.

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"b. CHALICE intelligence collection hardware involved in the 1 May incident (B camera, Systems III and VI, Mark 30 anti-radar and drift sight).

"The following information remains classified under CHALICE and should be handled accordingly by all:

"a. CHALICE activity subsequent to 1 May 1960.

"b. Extent of past CHALICE operations (COMOR may release certain product information where in best interest of U.S. defense community in a manner not to divulge U.S. exploitation of CHALICE).

"c. All details of CHALICE operational concepts.

"d. Details of cognizance and approvals of higher authority on past and future specific missions.

"e. USAF participation in CHALICE including pilot recruitment, training, reinstatement rights, materiel support.

"f. British participation.

"g. Host government arrangements and relationships.

"h. Contractual and development mechanisms and backstopping procedures (including Eastman Kodak Company Processing Center).

"i. Intra-U.S. Government relationships in CHALICE activities." 1/

1/ CHAL-1177-60, 27 Sept 1960. Memo to All Members CHALICE Community from the DD/P.

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As a postscript to the Powers trial, the National Broadcasting Company announced in October 1960 that they were in production on the first in a series of six so-called NBC White Papers, the theme of which they advertised as the "Political Effects of the U-2 Incident". Both the Air Force and the State Department shied away from any overt indication of disapproval of such a program, and neither would take steps to thwart it. The DCI was requested to appear on NBC-TV but turned down the request. Lockheed was approached in an attempt to enlist Mr. C. L. (Kelly) Johnson as narrator of a portion of the program. When this was put to the Agency for its reaction, the answer given was that the decision to cooperate with NBC in the aerodynamics aspects of the story was left to Mr. Johnson and Lockheed management. If they elected to cooperate, the Agency desired to be allowed to go over the prepared script in conjunction with the Air Force Project Office well in advance of the program's filming. This was agreed and a taping of the remarks of Mr. Johnson and Lockheed test pilot Schumacher during their part of the TV film was transmitted to DPD for review and clearance. An NBC camera crew went to Turkey and shot about 65 feet of film in the Detachment B trailer area where Frank and Barbara Powers had lived; the film was first

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confiscated by the Base Commander because the camera crew had not cleared their activities properly through channels, but it was later released after it was checked for security implications and found to be innocuous. The hour-long program was finally shown on 29 November 1960 between 10:00 and 11:00 p. m., with Chet Huntley as narrator. The script for the program with all dialogue and narration, as well as a description of the video portion, is appended hereto as Annex 93. The Assistant Chief, DPD, Mr. James Cunningham, estimated that as many viewers witnessed "The U-2 Affair" as saw the Kennedy-Nixon "Great Debate."

Trouble with Barbara

On her return from Moscow and after a debriefing by project staff in Washington, Barbara Powers continued on to her mother's home in Georgia, and the hand-holding problems began again with a relay of project case officers attempting a measure of control over Barbara's activities. Some assistance in this department developed in the person of Dr. James Baugh, the family physician who had accompanied Barbara and her mother to Moscow. He kept his Agency contacts in Washington informed of Barbara's escapades and lent his own efforts in trying to keep her out of the public eye (and out of jail). Despite all efforts, her bouts with alcohol and sexual promiscuity led eventually on 22 September 1961 to a sanity hearing at the request of her sister,

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mother and brother (the latter an Air Force Chaplain) and Dr. Baugh. The result of the hearing was the sending of Barbara to the Cleckley Clinic at the Medical School of the University of Georgia at Augusta. Her brother was named her guardian and he retained an Agency-cleared lawyer in Augusta as legal adviser. The psychiatrist in charge at the Clinic, Dr. Corbett Thigpen, diagnosed Barbara as psychopathic. However, she was released from the hospital in her mother's care on 30 October. On 18 November she was recommitted after a bout of drinking which ended in delerium tremens, was treated, again released in a week to her mother. Doctors at the clinic in consultation with an Agency team of CI and legal staff were in agreement that Barbara Powers would never change her activities or interests and that her behavior would continue to follow the pattern set thus far. The Agency team therefore concluded that should Barbara attempt to seek revenge against the Agency by talking to the press or in other ways, there was little that could be done to prevent her taking such action. This resignation to the facts of the situation had barely occurred when the prospect arose that Frank Powers might soon be released by the Russians and returned to the United States.

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The Abel/Powers Exchange

As early as 2 June 1960, Mr. Oliver Powers had on advice of his attorney, Mr. Carl McAfee, sent a letter to the convicted Soviet spy, Colonel Rudolf Abel, in Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, suggesting that they work together to achieve approval from the U.S. and Soviet Governments for a prisoner exchange between Abel and Frank Powers.

Colonel Abel did not reply directly to Mr. Powers due to a restriction against his corresponding with individuals outside except through his defense counsel, Mr. James Donovan. He therefore sent the Powers letter to Mr. Donovan along with his reply to it, which indicated that the matter should be brought to the attention of Abel's wife and lawyer in East Germany. The text of the Powers/Abel letter exchange and covering note to Donovan are included at Annex 94.

Mr. Donovan duly notified the Justice Department about the letters and Abel's request that Donovan possibly arrange a meeting with the East German lawyer. Mr. Donovan also called the CIA General Counsel and asked for guidance. A meeting held 16 June 1969 with DPD, SR, and OGC representatives concluded that the letters should be sent to the East German lawyer (who was most probably in touch with the Russians). Mr. Houston, CIA General Counsel, meanwhile was to coordinate the plan with Justice and State.

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The Chief of the CI Staff of CIA was convinced that the Soviets would in no circumstances admit responsibility for Abel, or interest in his release. This view was shared by U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson. The Chief of SR Division was interested in using the prospect for an exchange as a lever to pry information out of Abel—something his American interrogators had thus far been unable to do.

Mr. Donovan travelled to Europe on other business between 26 June and 8 July 1960, but the East Berlin lawyer, Wolfgang Vogel, did not approach him during the trip. The indictment of Powers and plans for his trial were announced on 7 July, and the Russians were obviously not ready to give up the propaganda opportunities that the trial afforded, no matter how badly they wanted to get Abel back. No action was taken on either side from July 1960 until January 1961.

On 11 January 1961, Mr. Donovan called Mr. Houston to advise that Abel's wife had written suggesting an appeal be made to the new Administration (President-elect Kennedy) for clemency for Abel. Donovan had written to Abel saying that it was not appropriate for him to do this but that his wife might appeal to the new Administration in a manner similar to the Powers family's appeal to Khrushchev.

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Abel asked Donovan to write directly to Mrs. Abel, which Donovan did, advising her that an appeal for clemency was fairly customary and that she should feel free to address a simple, non-legalistic petition to the President of the United States, after he had settled into office.

On 8 February 1961, Mrs. Hellen Abel (whose address at that time was shown as Leipzig, East Germany) did write a letter to the President asking for clemency and the release of her husband, and mentioning the fact that the USAF RB-47 fliers had been released in Russia.

The ad hoc working group on the Powers case, in view of the intimations from various sources that the Russians might consider an early release of Powers, met on 17 February 1961 and approved a set of contingency procedures in the event of such a release. This plan is attached as Annex 95. The plan was approved by the USAF Project Officer, Colonel Geary, with the following stipulation:

In keeping with the basic cover policy of IDEALIST, that public Air Force association with the project be held to an absolute minimum, it should accordingly be clearly understood that any participation by the Air Force in the return of Powers must be directed by higher authority. Such direction should be for the public record, brief, and matter of fact. "1/ /This statement related to the possibility of airlifting Powers back to the States by special USAF flight if he were released." 7

1/ IDEA-0220, 23 March 1961. Memo to Chief SR Division (Chairman, Powers Committee) from Assistant Chief, DPD.

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The 8 February 1961 appeal of Mrs. Abel was not answered until 3 May 1961 by the Pardon Attorney of the Department of Justice (not by the White House to whom it had been addressed) and it was in a negative vein; Mrs. Abel meanwhile on 8 May wrote Donovan that she had received no answer and asked him to expedite the matter, at the same time referring to the previous interest of Oliver Powers in an exchange.

After consultation with Mr. Houston at CIA, Mr. Donovan replied to Mrs. Abel, referring to the release of the Russian prisoner, Melekh, by the Americans and intimating that an indication of good faith on the part of the Russians was expected by the U.S. He suggested that Mrs. Abel approach the Soviet Government and determine its interest in the release of Abel, and asserted that Oliver Powers was willing to cooperate, but there should be no publicity in the matter.

Meanwhile Colonel Abel had written to his wife and suggested that she initiate action toward seeking an exchange between himself and Powers. On 17 June 1961 Mrs. Abel wrote Donovan stating that she had visited the Soviet Embassy in Berlin where it was recommended that she proceed with her efforts to obtain clemency for Rudolf Abel. She expressed certainty that if her husband were pardoned, Powers would

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be amnestied. She therefore requested that Donovan proceed with his efforts with the American authorities.

At this point the Agency CI Staff, in a summary of action to date regarding a Powers/Abel exchange, addressed a memorandum to the DCI taking the position that the Agency should oppose such an exchange, principally for CI operational reasons. The memorandum stated:

"Operationally speaking, the trade would be an exchange of everything for nothing. Powers has told all he knows and is of no further use to the Soviets except as a pawn—as he is being used in this matter. On the other hand, Abel has conducted himself in a highly professional manner. He remains resistant; he has refused to give information, even such information as his true identity. He is a person of high caliber and a potential source of information of great value, provided the proper pressures can be brought to bear. His release and deportation would be a major victory for the Soviets. In addition, his knowledge of the United States would be of considerable operational benefit to the RIS. . . The possibility that [redacted] [redacted] may talk may account for current Soviet interest in bringing about the release of Abel. . ." ^{1/}

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On 3 July 1961, Colonel Beerli, Acting Chief of DPD, advised the DI /P of the CI Staff position and expressed DPD's interest in pursuing the release of Powers by any means possible (a) to learn the true facts of his "shoot down" and treatment since his capture; (b) to learn the full scope of his debriefing and the damage resulting therefrom; (c) to deny

^{1/} Memo to DCI from James Angleton, Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, CIA, 30 June 1961. Subject: Exchange of Rudolf Abel for Powers.

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the Soviets the opportunity for further debriefings; and (d) to fulfill the Agency's and the U.S. Government's responsibility to effect Powers' release.

On 14 July, General Cabell notified Mr. Houston that he should informally convey to the State Department the Agency's position on the exchange as follows:

a. The U.S. Government should not take the initiative in the matter.

b. If the question became active, the Agency generally favored the idea of the exchange of Abel for Powers.

Thus far the Justice Department had not been brought into the CIA/State discussions. On 11 September 1961, a letter to Mr. Donovan from Mrs. Abel after a second visit to the Russian Embassy in Berlin contained what was considered by the Agency as a "key" paragraph:

"I gathered from our talk that there is only one possible way to achieve success, that is simultaneous release of both Francis Powers and my husband, which can be arranged." 1/

It was suggested to the Secretary of State (Mr. Rusk) by General Cabell in his memorandum of 2 November 1961 (see Annex 96) that

1/ ER 61-8690, 2 Nov 1961. Memo to Secretary of State from Gen. Cabell.

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"Mrs. Abel" was being instructed by the Soviet Government and the continuation of negotiations through this channel was recommended in an effort to obtain the release of Powers. The Secretary of State on 24 November 1961 wrote to the Attorney General (Robert F. Kennedy) giving him the background of the case to date, stating that foreign policy considerations need not be a factor influencing the Justice Department's decision concerning the exchange, and suggesting that the Donovan/Mrs. Abel channel be the means of consummating the agreement with the Soviets. The full text of this letter is at Annex 97.

The Attorney General gave his approval to the exchange effort the first week of January 1962 and at a meeting between State and CIA officers on 4 January it was agreed that Mr. Donovan should write to Mrs. Abel asking to meet her in Leipzig or Berlin and to be put in touch with appropriate Soviet officials. If this came to pass, he would indicate that he was authorized by the U.S. Government to negotiate the exchange. DPD was assigned responsibility for providing someone to identify Powers and arranging for the airlift. Mr. Houston reported that the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, had committed the Air Force to provide the airlift for this purpose.

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At this point, security of the negotiations became paramount, and CIA bases in [] and Frankfurt were requested to set up restricted cells for receiving communications via the HBJAYWALK channel on a very sensitive matter. Mr. John McMahon and Colonel Geary visited [] Germany to prepare for USAFE and CIA support which would be required. The code name ZRHOOKUP was given to the exchange plan.

Mr. Donovan wrote to Mrs. Abel that he had new information and would meet her at the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin at noon on 3 February. She was warned that all publicity must be avoided. Meanwhile Mrs. Abel's lawyer, a Mr. Vogel, had been in touch with the office of the U.S. Mission in Berlin concerning a possible package deal to include the Yale student, Frederick L. Pryor, who had managed to get himself arrested in the East Zone and whose parents were in West Berlin putting pressure on the U.S. Mission to effect their son's release. The U.S. Mission therefore asked the Department to instruct Donovan to ask first that Pryor be included in the exchange. The Department replied to the Berlin Mission that the undertaking in which it was about to be involved had been carefully planned and approved at highest levels; that the Department was fully aware of the Pryor problem; that instructions to Donovan were based on the best U.S. national interests and had already been passed to him in Washington; and that it was essential that no

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United States official should become involved in Donovan's negotiations.

Donovan's briefing had included the following guidance coordinated with State and Justice: (a) Upon being introduced to proper authorities in East Berlin he should show his letter from U.S. Pardon Attorney Reed Cozart to establish his authority to arrange Abel's release; (b) he should ask what the Soviets are willing to offer for Abel; and (c) if the Soviets offer only Powers, he should state that the U.S. expects more and mention Pryor and Makinen (another prisoner of the Soviets). Whatever the Soviet reply, Donovan should say he must communicate with his Government and arrange for a next meeting, allowing enough time to coordinate the next move with Washington.

According to plan, Donovan was airlifted from London to West Berlin on 2 February and on 3 February made his initial visit to the Soviet Consulate in East Berlin. The story of his negotiations is included at Annex 98 hereto, as it was reported by cable from the Berlin Base. Two separate descriptions of the Powers/Abel exchange in the middle of the Glienicke Bridge at the border crossing from West Berlin are also included as Annexes 99 and 100; one is by Mr. (now Ambassador) E. Allan Lightner, Jr., of the Berlin Mission,

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and the other by Mr. Fred T. Wilkinson, Deputy Director of Prisons, Department of Justice. Both of these gentlemen were members of the official U.S. party on the bridge to consummate the exchange.

On the return of Frank Powers to the States by special USAF airlift, he was established in a safehouse where he had a reunion with his wife and his family, after which he underwent a long debriefing (from which voluminous tape recordings and transcriptions now repose in OSA material at the Records Center). The essence of Powers' own story of what happened on May Day 1960 and during his imprisonment is contained in the transcript of his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 March 1962 (copy of which is appended as Annex 101).

A complete review of the case was made by a board of inquiry presided over by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to determine if Powers complied with the terms of his employment and his obligations as an American. It was the conclusion of the board of inquiry and of the Director of Central Intelligence that Mr. Powers had lived up to the terms of his employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in his obligations as an American under the circumstances in

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which he found himself. On 5 March 1962 the DCI authorized the reinstatement of the contract and appointment of Powers and the payment of the salary due thereunder for "general duty status" (\$1,000 per month).

On 4 April 1962, Colonel Geary advised Project Headquarters that the Air Force agreed to the reinstatement of Powers in the Air Force provided the Agency, State and the White House agreed. All approvals were obtained and Colonel Geary was advised on 10 April. He met with Powers on 11 April for a discussion and it was agreed the reinstatement would be made effective on 1 July 1962. Meanwhile, however, Powers began legal proceedings to obtain a divorce from his wife, Barbara, and in view of the expected publicity in connection with this development, the reinstatement was postponed at USAF request until the divorce proceedings were completed.

On 25 September 1962, Powers applied to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and was accepted for employment as a test pilot checking out U-2's following IRAN or modification. He resigned from the Agency's employ on 6 October 1962 and reported to Lockheed the middle of October where after ground school and area familiarization in the Los Angeles area, he went to Edwards Air Force Base and

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requalified in the U-2. It was his intention to work for Lockheed until the time was appropriate for him to be reinstated in the Air Force. On the settlement of his divorce case, he met with Colonel Geary on 30 March 1963, and after consideration of the personal pressures which he could expect to be faced with on his return to the Air Force, he decided it would be wiser to remain with Lockheed.

Many offers were made to Frank Powers for the publication of his story, which he duly reported to his Agency mentors. In answer to his query concerning permission to publish a book, the following decision was handed down on 27 June 1962 by the then Executive Director of CIA, Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick (recently the author of a book on his own CIA career entitled The Real CIA):

"1. On 25 June a meeting was held in the DCI's office to discuss proposals by various publishers that Francis Gary Powers write a book on his experiences. It was concluded that such a book would be undesirable, would be harmful to Powers and not in the best interests of the Agency.

"2. That same day the General Counsel and Mr. John McMahon of DPD talked to Mr. Powers on this subject and he was reluctantly receptive to our guidance.

"3. This information is for the guidance of all concerned. In the event that Mr. Powers should raise the issue again it should be stressed to him that the writing of articles or a book would only involve him in controversy in which he would most likely come out second best. Further, he should be warned that

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he will be constantly the target for possible exploitation by unscrupulous individuals who want to make money off of Powers' reputation. Third, he should be aware of the fact that literary endeavors such as have been proposed to him are inevitably less financially rewarding than they appear at first. As long as Powers is with the Agency or continues an active Air Force career, the above will continue to be the policy in regard to his writings. It should be noted that one of the arguments that has constantly been advanced for the high pay of the U-2 pilots has been that they would not have an opportunity for personal gain through writings." 1/

When Frank Powers again raised the issue of writing a book in July 1967, he was again discouraged from doing so, even though five years had passed since his release by the Soviets and he was no longer subject to either Agency or Air Force Regulations.

Intelligence Star Awarded

On 20 April 1965 in the Director's Conference Room at Langley, Virginia, Headquarters, Francis G. Powers was awarded the Intelligence Star, the presentation being made by General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, with the following citation:

Mr. Francis G. Powers is hereby awarded the Intelligence Star for his fortitude and courage in the performance of duty under conditions of extreme personal hazard. Mr. Powers' contribution to United States intelligence is in keeping with the finest traditions of service to our Nation and to the Central Intelligence Agency.

1/ ER 62-4387/1, 27 June 1962, Executive Memorandum by the Executive Director.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Postscript

As a postscript to the MUDLARK* story, it is perhaps fitting to wind up the May Day Incident's history as it was begun, with a message from the U.S. Air Attachè in Moscow. On 22 March 1963, Colonel William F. Scott cabled the following message from Moscow to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, in the Pentagon:

Following message from AIRA USSR C-68 quoted for your information. Theodore Shabad, New York Times, probably will submit articles on Powers, U-2. His source states that the U-2 approached the Urals undetected. When detected, missiles unable to fire because of kodovye fishki (translation: code plug). Two aircraft attempted intercept, but could not reach altitude. As U-2 was leaving SAM area, one battery came into operation. Ground unit saw only one blip on screen. Did not know their own fighters were in area. Fired salvo of three missiles. One missile hit and destroyed Soviet fighter attempting intercept. Another hit U-2 in tail. Third missile missed. Shabad thinks his source reliable, a Soviet electronics engineer who got story from an individual on missile site in Urals area... " 1/

* MUDLARK was the code name given to the May Day 1960 Incident.

1/ USAIRATT Moscow to Hqs USAF, Washington, 22 March 1963.

~~TOP SECRET~~HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
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ANNEX 82

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV TO THE
SUPREME SOVIET ON 5 MAY 1960
CONCERNING SHOOTDOWN OF U-2

On April 9 a U.S. aircraft flew in from Afghanistan. Some of our comrades raised the question of warning the United States, for this was in contradiction to our talks with U.S. leaders. Such provocation is a bad prelude to a summit meeting. We discussed this question and decided to do nothing, for it usually leads to nothing. Then we instructed our military to act resolutely and stop foreign aircraft from violating our air space.

The United States, apparently encouraged by previous incursions, crossed the Soviet frontier on May 1.

The Minister of Defense informed the Government. We said that the aircraft should be shot down, this was done. The aircraft was shot down. The investigation showed that it was a U.S. plane, but it did not carry the usual markings. It has been established that the plane flew in either from Turkey, or Iran or Pakistan. Nice neighbors!

On behalf of the Soviet Government I must tell you about acts of aggression by the United States against the USSR. I have in mind U.S. aircraft violating Soviet air space. In the past we protested against these violations, but the United States rejected them.

We decided to send a severe warning that we would take the steps necessary to insure the security of our country. I think we shall give the gravest warning to those countries which provide facilities for the United States to carry out aggression against the USSR.

Just think what would be the reaction of the United States if a Soviet plane flew over New York or Detroit. This would mean the beginning of another war. Why then do you not think that we may reply with the same measures should a foreign plane appear over our country. We think that there is no doubt in anybody's mind that we have the ability to retaliate. Of course we have no atomic bombers or patrol but we have rockets which are more reliable than bombers.

The governments of those countries providing facilities for the United States should realize that they may suffer as a consequence. U.S. violation of our air space is a dangerous sign. We are going to raise this point in the Security Council. It is difficult to comprehend such an attitude in view of the forthcoming Summit Meeting. What was it: A congratulation on May Day? No, they hoped that their aircraft would fly in with impunity and get back. It seems that the U.S. aggressive forces have of late been making every effort to thwart the Summit Meeting. Who sent the aircraft? If this was done by the U.S. Military on their own bat, this must alarm world public opinion.

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ANNEX 83

DON'T PLAY WITH FIRE, GENTLEMEN

From the concluding Words of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev to the Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Fifth Convocation, on 7 May 1960

Comrade deputies, the aggressive act committed by the American airforce against the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed deputies and all Soviet people. Numerous inquiries and appeals are being received by the session and the Soviet Government. In view of this, permit me to dwell on this question once again and to furnish certain new data.

After my report to the Supreme Soviet, in which I dwelt on this fact, the U. S. State Department claimed in an official press statement that the point in question was a violation of the Soviet state frontier by an American aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, which allegedly was studying weather conditions in the upper layers of the atmosphere in the area of the Turkish-Soviet frontier. This plane had allegedly strayed off its course because the pilot had oxygen trouble.

The State Department asserts that the pilot lost consciousness and steered by its automatic pilot, the plane flew into Soviet territory. According to the State Department, the pilot only had time to report back about the failure of his oxygen equipment to the Turkish airfield in Adana, whence it flew, an airfield which allegedly does not belong to the military, but to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

Soon after that, NASA issued a statement confirming the State Department version. This statement says:

"One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956, in continuing the program of studying wind and meteorological conditions at high altitudes has been missing since about 9 o'clock, May 1 (local time), when its pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over Lake Van, Turkey."

Comrades, I must tell you a secret: When I was making my report I deliberately did not say that the pilot was alive and in good health and that we have parts of the plane. We did so deliberately, because had we told everything at once the Americans would have invented another version.

And now, just look how many silly things they have said--Lake Van, scientific research, and so on, and so forth. Now that they know the pilot is alive they will have to invent something else. And they will do it.

(Khrushchev then read further from the NASA press release with added comments.)

This is the official version circulated by American officials to mislead public opinion in their country and the world. I must declare, comrade deputies, that these versions are completely untrue and circulated for gullible people.

The authors of these versions supposed that if the plane was shot down the pilot must probably perish. So there would be no one to ask how everything actually happened; there would be no way to check what sort of plane it was and what instruments it carried.

First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of the downed American plane is alive and in good health. He is now in Moscow. Brought here also are the remains of this plane and its special instrumentation, discovered during the investigations.

The name of the pilot is Francis Harry Powers. He is 30 years old. He says he is a 1st lieutenant in the U. S. Airforce, where he served until 1956, that is, to the day when he went over the Central Intelligence Agency.

Francis Powers reported, incidentally, that while serving with the American airforce he used to get 700 dollars a month, but when he went over to the intelligence service and started carrying out spying assignments to glean secret information he began getting 2,500 dollars a month.

I want to tell you something about the results of the examination of the plane that has been shot down and its equipment, and results of questioning the pilot. The inquiry continues, but already the picture is fairly clear.

To start with, this was, indeed, a high altitude, low speed Lockheed U-2. They counted on its high altitude and believed that this plane could not be brought down by any fighter or antiaircraft artillery. That is why they thought it could fly over Soviet territory with impunity. In fact, the plane flew at a great altitude, and it was hit by the rocket at an altitude of 20,000 meters. And if they fly higher, we will also hit them!

The plane was in no way equipped for "upper atmosphere research" or for taking "air samples," as official American spokesmen assert. Not at all. This was a real military reconnaissance aircraft fitted with various instruments for collecting intelligence and, among other things, for aerial photography.

The competent commission of experts which examined the wrecked plane has established from the documentary evidence that this American plane is a specially prepared reconnaissance aircraft. The task of the plane was to cross the entire territory of the Soviet Union from the Amirs to Kola Peninsula to get information on our country's military and industrial establishments by means of aerial photography. Besides aerial cameras, the plane carried other reconnaissance equipment for spotting radar networks, identifying the location and frequencies of operating radio stations, and other special radio-engineering equipment.

Not only do we have the equipment of that plane, but we also have developed film showing a number of areas of our territory. Here are some of these photos. (Khrushchev showed the photos).....

/Additional items brought out during this speech:

Powers was attached to Detachment 10-10 at Incerlik.
Col. William Shelton is commander and Lt. Col. Carol? Funk
is deputy commander.

The flight also violated the territory of Afghanistan.

There was an explosive charge in the aircraft.

The pilot was supplied with a poison needle.

The pilot also had a pistol equipped with a silencer, rubles and other currencies, gold rings and watches.

Khrushchev warned the governments of Turkey, Pakistan, and Norway that they must be clearly aware that they were accomplices in this flight because they permitted the use of their airfields against the Soviet Union.

He also intimated that a press conference would soon be held at which the remains of the airplane would be put on display.

He said he thought it would be right to have the flier prosecuted so public opinion can see what action the United States is taking to provoke the Soviet Union and heat up the atmosphere, thus throwing us back from what we have achieved in relieving international tension.

He finished by announcing the decision of the Soviet Government to switch the Soviet Army and Navy over to rocket weapons, and the setting up of a rocket troops command with Marshal of Artillery. Nedelin in command.

Above excerpted from the book
"To the Pillory with the Aggressors"

or

"The Truth about the Provocative
Invasion by an American Plane
of the Air Space of the USSR"

A Publication of the Union of Journalists
of the USSR, Moscow, 1960

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ANNEX 84

TEXT OF STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASE FOLLOWING KHRUSHCHEV
STATEMENT ON THE DOWNING OF U-2

7 May 1960, 1800 hrs.

The Department has received the text of Mr. Khrushchev's further remarks about the unarmed plane which is reported to have been shot down in the Soviet Union. As previously announced it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President, it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev.

Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

It is certainly no secret that given the state of the world today, intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries, and postwar history certainly reveals that the Soviet Union has not been lagging behind in this field. The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense are enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the Free World.

One of the things creating tensions in the world today is apprehension over surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction. To reduce mutual suspicion and to give a measure of protection against surprise attack, the U.S. in 1955 offered its "Open Skies" proposal -- a proposal which was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. It was in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have been patrolling the frontiers of the Free World for the past four years.

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ANNEX 85

May 9, 1960

No. 254

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

On May 7 the Department of State spokesman made a statement with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following supplements and clarifies this statement as respects the position of the United States Government.

Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union from wartime cooperation to postwar conflict in 1946 and particularly since the Berlin blockade, the forceful takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Communist aggressions in Korea and Vietnam the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions. The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open societies of the free world and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously controlled. With the development of modern weapons carrying tremendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise attack and aggression presents a constant danger. This menace is enhanced by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet leadership.

For many years the United States in company with its allies has sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so that he can go about his peaceful business without fear. Many proposals to this end have been put up to the Soviet Union. The President's "open skies" proposal of 1955 was followed in 1957 by the offer of an exchange of ground observers between agreed military installations in the U.S., the USSR and other nations that might wish to participate. For several years we have been seeking the mutual abolition of the restrictions on travel imposed by the Soviet Union and those which the United States felt obliged to institute on a reciprocal basis. More recently at the Geneva disarmament conference the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures of controlled disarmament. It is possible that the Soviet leaders have a different version and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack from the West. But this is hard to reconcile with their continual rejection of our repeated proposals for effective measures against surprise attack and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.

I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction. The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the Free World against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense. Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration. Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization. The fact that such surveillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the Soviet leadership and the question indeed arises as to why at this particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.

This government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that in the coming meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris Chairman Khrushchev would be prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective measures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction from the minds of peoples everywhere. Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris, this incident should serve to underline the importance to the world of an earnest attempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards against surprise attack and aggression.

At my request and with the authority of the President, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, is today briefing members of the Congress fully along the foregoing lines.

* * *

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STATEMENT
BY
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE
BRIEFING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADER
MONDAY, MAY 9, 1960
2:00 PM

Under authority of the National Security Act of 1947 which set up the Central Intelligence Agency, that Agency was then entrusted by the National Security Council with the duty of collecting intelligence essential to our national security.

Under other directives of the Council, the Central Intelligence Agency was also entrusted with certain tasks relating to meeting the menace of international communism and in particular the aggressive activities of the Soviet Union.

Since that time, and growingly in recent years the Soviet Union behind the shield of tight security, has been arming in secret with the objective and expectation that its military power would be largely invulnerable to counterattack if they initiated an aggression.

At the Summit Conference in 1955 in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the "Open Skies" proposal.

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That proposal was summarily rejected by Moscow and Soviet security measures were reinforced.

Thus the Soviet has been arming in secret while our counter-defensive measures in the field of armaments were largely matters of open knowledge.

The ordinary means of intelligence were largely ineffective to gain the information about Soviet armaments which were essential to our survival and to the survival of the Free World.

As early as December 1, 1954, a project to construct a high-performance reconnaissance plane was initiated. The first U-2 flew in August 1955.

By this time the results of the Summit Conference were known and the likelihood of realizing anything from the "Open Skies" project became negligible.

We were then faced with a situation where the Soviet were continuing to develop their missiles and missile bases, and their bomber bases without any adequate knowledge on our part.

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This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable both from the point of view of adequate military preparation on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to take counteraction in the event of attack.

Any state has the duty to take the measures necessary for survival, and we received a high directive to gain vitally required intelligence by every feasible means.

Meanwhile by espionage the Soviet had been endeavoring to penetrate our nuclear and certain other secrets and observing the details of our own military establishment.

A policy decision was then reached that the U-2 should be used to obtain information with respect to vital targets within the Soviet Union as conditions permitted. As Mr. Herter has indicated, this project had competent policy approval. The details and timing of missions were left for determination by those most competent to judge the highest priority targets and the right weather, rarely available in many parts of the Soviet Union.

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Since that time there have been a considerable number of successful flights over the Soviet Union, over Communist China, and over the Satellite areas. Many square miles of strategic territory in the Soviet Union and Communist China have been photographed.

Essential information has been obtained with respect to the development of the Soviet missile threat; its bomber bases; its nuclear establishments and other highly strategic targets.

Mr. Bissell, under my direction and that of General Cabell, has been in charge of this project. He will describe the flights in more detail, and selective photographs of the results of these missions will be shown out of a total of thousands available to us.

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ANNEX 86

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CHAL-1052-60

27 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: U-2 Incident (Estimate and Analysis of
Compromise of Agency Classified Information)

1. In accordance with your instructions, submitted herewith is an estimate of damage to Agency interests caused by the U-2 incident. It is believed that this report is essentially complete on the subject of damage. The operational and personnel security aspects of the investigation are being continued in DPD-DD/P and the Office of Security. The Office of Security is giving attention to the compilation of the names of staff, contract, and contractor personnel believed to have been compromised.

2. In making this damage assessment, the reviewing officers have taken into account that there is no valid evidence at present that the U-2 incident was brought about by sabotage, defection, or actual penetration of CHALICE. It is known, however, that radar interception of the 9 April flight over target resulted in a continuing Soviet alert after that date; that there is evidence of possible RIS activity in the vicinity of Adana and Peshawar which may have been targeted against CHALICE activity in those areas; that adverse weather conditions caused unusual delay in the launching of GRAND SLAM, resulting in two round trips by the U-2 Adana-Peshawar and a single flight Adana-Peshawar; that atmospheric conditions prevented the use of established communications channels and forced the use of open long-distance telephone lines from Wiesbaden to Adana through Athens for the transmission of clearance instructions for GRAND SLAM; that CW transmission of GRAND SLAM "GO" instructions in clear text occurred several times; and that the GRAND SLAM flight for the first time was under Soviet radar observation continuously from the border. There is no evidence that any of the above circumstances were responsible for the U-2 incident, although they could have contributed to the known "early warning" of the Soviets.

3. A definite pattern of damage to Agency interests emerges from the material and information so far assembled. In general, the classified information which must be presumed as having come into the possession of the Soviets through the U-2 incident may be attributed to the knowledge and memory of Francis G. Powers and to the captured U-2 equipment and an intelligence coordination of this information

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with intelligence data already available to Soviets through other sources. The area of compromise of Agency interests comes within the following broad categories. The scope of the damage within these categories is hereinafter more specifically stated:

- (1) Administrative procedures
- (2) Installations and bases
- (3) Personnel
- (4) Operational techniques and procedures in CHALICE
- (5) Equipment and contractual relationships
- (6) U.S. Government inter-Agency relationships
- (7) Relationships between the U.S. Government and other Governments in CHALICE
- (8) Related and successor projects to CHALICE
- (9) Miscellaneous intelligence knowledge of Powers

4. In addition to the volume of classified information which has come into the possession of the Soviets because of the U-2 incident, it must be noted that the world-wide publicity attendant upon this incident relating to the Agency sponsorship of the U-2 program and the employment of Powers, has served to make public knowledge, both limited and unlimited in scope, of Agency contractual and procedural activity.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES:

- (1) CIA/AF personnel procurement methods

Use of 1007th Intelligence Group as CIA procurement and holding mechanism
 Personnel
 Contract terms
 Salary processing
 Investigation
 Medical processing at Lovelace Clinic
 Polygraph testing of pilots
 Documentation
 Terms of resignation from and reassignment to Air Force

- (2) CIA/AF training program for CHALICE

Details of flight training at the "Ranch" -
 Watertown, Nevada
 Detachment A
 Removal to Edwards AFB

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Participation of USAF (Hqs. 4080th)
 AEC/REECO Support functions
 Testing of CHALICE pilots periodically
 at Wright-Patterson AFB
 Identity of supplier groups
 Planned utilization and training of
 [redacted] Pilots
 T-33 transition navigation training
 U-2 training
 Use of C-124's, U-2's, MATS and Commercial
 Air for movement of personnel and equipment

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- (3) CHALICE Headquarters - 1717 H Street, N.W., D. C.

Location
 Organization
 Personnel
 Operations
 Administration (Travel, Admin and Finance)

- (4) Detachment 10-10

Location
 Establishment, organization, personnel,
 operational and administrative procedures
 Relationships with USAF Base Command and
 host government

- (5) Cover mechanisms and documentation

NASA
 NASA/AWS
 USAF letters
 AGO cards
 Cover contracts with supplier companies

6. INSTALLATIONS AND BASES:

- (1) Location, use and function of:

"Ranch" - Watertown, Nevada
 Edwards AFB, California

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[redacted]
 CHALICE Headquarters, 1717 H Street, N.W.

[redacted]
 Giebelstadt, Germany
 Adana, Turkey
 Atsugi, Japan

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Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Hangar #82,
 Los Angeles, California
 Bodo, Norway
 Wiesbaden, Germany

- (2) Possible knowledge of location, identity and some personnel of following CIA installations:

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[REDACTED]
 Frankfurt Station

[REDACTED]
 European Air Operations Division, German Station

- (3) Use of Lovelace Clinic, Albuquerque, New Mexico for U-2 pilot medical care
- (4) Schedule and flight plan of shuttle flights, Adana to Wiesbaden

7. PERSONNEL:

- (1) Knowledge of personnel assigned and participating in CHALICE at:

Operation GRAND SLAM (Also prior flights)
 Atsugi Naval Air Station
 Adana
 Peshawar
 Wiesbaden
 Edwards AFB
 Watertown
 CHALICE Headquarters
 Utilization of Dr. Randolph Lovelace and
 General Don Flickinger, USAF
 Manufacturers' technical representatives
 Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
 Perkin-Elmer Corp.
 Hycon Manufacturing Co.
 Eastman Kodak Company
 Pratt & Whitney

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8. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES IN CHALICE:

- (1) Existence and purpose, but not specific content, of TALENT Security Control System

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- (2) Extensive knowledge of CHALICE - its personnel, and its operational, administrative and support routine
- (3) CHALICE staging procedures, routes, targets, planning, implementation, support during entire functional period of CHALICE, up to and including GRAND SLAM.

Operational concepts:

Diversionary tactics
 Fast strike concepts
 Use of C-124's and C-130's
 Ferrying: EAFB, Giebelstadt, Adana, etc.
 Mission profiles - transit and exit altitudes
 Tactical missions - Suez, Lebanon, Egypt, Israel
 Staging routines, including aircraft support, packing, etc. arrangements with USAFE
 Headquarters clearance

Administrative preparations:

Visas
 Preparatory arrangements with host governments for use of bases
 Diplomatic clearances for support aircraft
 Communications message sequence

- (4) Ability to effectively monitor through intimate knowledge of the operational concepts and administrative and material preparations involved in mission planning

9. EQUIPMENT AND CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS:

- (1) Pilot carried wallet containing U.S. currency and NASA identification card containing wording of AFR 55-26, dated 2 August 1959, bearing standard command line of General White authorizing NASA pilots to fly Air Force aircraft.
- (2) Standard navigation tools: green card showing navigation data; JN navigation charts covering route, containing normal navigation annotations and radio aids extracted from list of KWHAMLET radio broadcast stations; CNC chart showing entire route annotated with course lines to nearest friendly territory; pilot's aircraft checklist, and standard aircraft emergency checklist.

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- (3) Pilot possessed knowledge of return course Bodoë to Adana and ferry route Adana to Bodoë (no documents)
- (4) Escape and evasion packet containing cloth charts covering the area of operation, blood chit, assorted denominations of rubles and barter items.
- (5) Aircraft equipped with "enroute low altitude (RFC) Europe", 13 April 1960 and flight information publication terminal (high altitude), 15 April 1960. Both publications contain Aviano and Brindisi radio frequencies.
- (6) Cockpit contained standard European radio frequencies and channelization for aircraft radios.
- (7) The complete, though damaged, aircraft and equipment

Identity of designer
 Design features
 Construction and materials
 Mission capabilities and performance characteristics
 J-75 engine
 Photographic gear - function and performance of tracking camera and main camera
 ELINT gear and performance thereof. Pilot knowledge limited to purpose only.
 Radio and radar gear
 Pilot gear
 Component parts of aircraft, marked either by the manufacturer or the U.S. Government, are listed in detail in
 13 May 1960.

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- (8) CHALICE supplier contracts (Agency/Air Force, Agency/Navy, and Air Force) are now known to a varying degree - as such to persons involved in those contracts, and to that extent are public knowledge. These disclosures may be expected to have some detrimental effect upon existing procurement and shipping procedures.

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10. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS:

- (1) CIA/NASA cover plan
- (2) AF/CIA joint sponsorship of CHALICE
- (3) AFCIG-5 participation in CHALICE and identities of AFCIG-5 personnel
- (4) AF materiel support to CHALICE via USAFE and and identity of personnel involved in those areas. Through this, in addition to the simple monitoring of unclassified communications easily categorized by project priority materiel indicators: JUGHEAD, SHOEHORN, and BABYDOLL, the Soviets should soon be able to effectively monitor the entire CHALICE materiel system.
- (5) USAF/AWS participation in CHALICE, with knowledge of personnel probably limited to Base and Headquarters Weather Support elements.
- (6) Possible knowledge of USAF radar hold-down procedures as pertain to CHALICE.
- (7) Participation of USAF/TUSLOG Detachment 50 in ELINT and telemetry efforts from Incirlik AFB.
- (8) CIA relationships in CHALICE with the Department of State, and, through various Ambassadors or Chargés d'Affaires, with the Governments of those countries where CHALICE aircraft have been based, or have had either prestrike or post-strike bases. Norway, Germany, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.

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11. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN CHALICE:

- (1) British high official cognizance and British participation in the CHALICE program through the Air Ministry.
- (2) Identity of all British pilots based at Adana who were involved in CHALICE. (Four British pilots, British Flight Planner, and British Flight Surgeon and their connection with the RAF).

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- (3) Role of the Watson AFB in the CHALICE Program.
- (4) The number of missions (USSR and Near East) flown by British pilots and the identities of those pilots.

12. RELATED AND SUCCESSOR PROJECTS TO CHALICE: (Following believed by most pilots)

(1) OXCART:

A follow-on program in progress or under construction
 A larger aircraft with altitude over 100,000 ft.
 Manned aircraft as opposed to unmanned vehicles
 Boeing, Convair, or Lockheed will build
 Two engines - turbo-jet to get it airborne
 and ram-jet to keep it airborne
 Speed about Mach 3
 Great range with missions from ZI to target
 and return
 Will possibly require towing to get airborne
 The "Ranch" at Watertown, Nevada, is being or
 will be activated for the follow-on program.

- (2) Possible unofficial pilot knowledge of satellite project

13. MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE OF POWERS AND DAMAGE TO AGENCY INTERESTS BECAUSE OF U-2 INCIDENT:

- (1) The registration of Powers in the WAEPA and United Benefit Life Insurance programs serves to pinpoint these programs as insuring mechanisms used by CIA to insure its employees.
- (2) Pilot periodically briefed generally on Soviet capabilities regarding aircraft and missiles.
- (3) General knowledge as to existence of SAM sites and current SAM operational limitations.
- (4) General knowledge of Tyura Tam and Kapustin Yar activities and of our "Hot Shop" activity.

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- (5) Through observation of Detachment 50 aircraft pilot able to infer their engagement in ELINT and/or telemetry against Tyura Tam.
- (6) Pilot knowledge of content of various intelligence briefings during the past year concerning the area of operations, consisting mostly of Escape and Evasion matters published in area studies, and general briefings on Soviet Air Defense Systems, but not including locations of defensive elements.
- (7) Altitude and speed capabilities of current Soviet fighters as published in the Air Intelligence Digest.
- (8) ATIC studies and documents similar in nature to the above.
- (9) Limited knowledge of Soviet aircraft being equipped with AAM's.
- (10) Probable knowledge of CIA participation in the Indonesian revolt at least to the extent of CHALICE overflights.
- (11) Relationships between CIA and CAT and the employment of Allan Pope by CIA through CAT in the Indonesian revolt.
- (12) Participation of James Cherbonneaux and Carmine Vito in behalf of CIA in the Indonesian revolt. Knowledge of operational generalities, including location of base of operations and the fact that P-51 and B-26 aircraft were used.
- (13) Knowledge of the staging of CHALICE flights by Detachment C, based at Atsugi Naval Air Station in Japan.
- (14) Pilot believed to have an awareness that CIA is engaged in other clandestine air operations, but the specifics of his knowledge in this regard are unknown at the present time.

14. It is an inescapable conclusion from the foregoing information that the damage to Agency interests, installations, personnel, and equipment in CHALICE by reason of the U-2 incident is serious and far-reaching. In many respects the

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
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damage is complete insofar as any effective future clandestine use of CHALICE assets is concerned. It must be noted for future reference that much of the compromise of information can be attributed to a failure to follow through with a concept of complete compartmentation within the Project of pilot personnel who might be subject to capture.

15. Many after-the-fact recommendations could be made upon the basis of the above data but such recommendations would be academic in light of the developments in the U-2 incident. We would recommend only one thing, that in all highly sensitive projects the necessary compartmentation should not exclude the continuing advice and assistance of specialized components of CIA.

(Signed)

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)



CONCUR:

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Stanley W. Beerli
Colonel, USAF
Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P

S. H. Horton
Acting Chief, CI Staff

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DISPATCH

BOOK DISPATCH NO. 1996

15 June 1960

To: Chiefs of Certain Stations and Bases**From:** Director of Central Intelligence**Subject:** U-2 Incident**Action:** For information

1. Over the past month, CIA has been the subject of an unprecedented volume of publicity centering around the U-2 project. The press in this country and abroad has devoted an enormous amount of space to reporting and analyzing all aspects of the incident on 1 May. We are glad that the publicity is now diminishing and believe that it will continue to do so.

2. Undesirable as exposure is, we can take comfort from the fact that in this country and in other free world areas, there has been a gratifying recognition of the Agency's efforts and, even more important, an awareness of the continuing need for intelligence activities.

3. On the whole, domestic opinion has been overwhelmingly favorable to the Agency. The leaders of Congress have generally praised the Agency's role; responsible newspapers have supported the need to collect intelligence; and hundreds of private citizens have written directly to express their support. There has been some adverse criticism, of course, but this has been concentrated on incidental parts of the operations or against policy decisions which did not involve the Agency.

4. We have achieved two principal things. One, the results of this collection effort have significantly benefited national security. Two, we have demonstrated to the world that such an operation can be conducted in secrecy for over four years. All of the people involved, and this includes representatives of all of the intelligence components in our government, have performed efficiently and securely and they are to be highly praised.

5. I am enclosing a copy of my statement made in Executive Session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A similar

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statement was made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This statement has not been made public and it should not be disclosed. It should be closely held by you and your immediate staff. There are also enclosed statements by the President, Representative Clarence Cannon and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson.

6. The official inquiries are about completed, and it is now time to look ahead. The past month has not changed any of the priority targets for intelligence collection. The Communists stand exposed to the world as obsessed with secrecy, and as still motivated by a hostile attitude toward the United States. It now falls on all of us to increase our efforts and to bring all our ingenuity to bear in devising new methods to collect the intelligence which is vital to our national security.

(signed)
ALLEN W. DULLES

Attachments:

1. Statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
2. Excerpts from President's Press Conference 11 May 1960.
3. Remarks of Representative Cannon before House,
10 May 1960.
4. Statement of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson before Senate,
10 May 1960.

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STATEMENT BY
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
to the
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON 31 MAY 1960

The duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under statute and under National Security Council directives pursuant to statute, is to provide the President and the National Security Council with evaluated intelligence relating to our national security.

The Agency has no policy or police functions.

In addition, however, the Agency has the duty, within policy limitations prescribed by the President and State Department, to do whatever is within its power to collect and produce the intelligence required by the policy makers in government, to deal with the dangers we face in the world today, a nuclear world.

Increasingly over the past ten years, the main target for our intelligence collection has been the U.S.S.R., its military, its economic, and its subversive potential.

The carrying out of this task has been rendered extremely difficult because the Soviet Union is a closed society.

Great areas of the U.S.S.R. are curtained off to the outside world. Their military preparations are made in secret. Their military hardware, ballistic missiles, bombers, nuclear weapons, and submarine forces, as far as physically possible, are concealed from us. They have resisted all efforts to realize mutual inspection or "open skies."

The ordinary tools of information gathering, under these circumstances are not wholly adequate. These ordinary tools include both the normal overt means of obtaining information, and the classical covert means generally referred to as espionage.

It is true that from these sources and from the many Soviet defectors who have come over to the Free World and from disaffected and disillusioned Soviet nationals, we obtain very valuable information.

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However, these sources and other sources developed through the application of various scientific techniques, while very helpful, did not give us the full intelligence protection this country required against the danger of preparation for surprise attack against us, from bases which might remain unknown and by weapons, the strength and power of which we might not be able adequately to evaluate.

Almost equally serious had been our lack of knowledge of Soviet defense measures against our retaliatory striking power.

Shackled by traditions, we were seeing the power of attack grow while the ability to secure the intelligence necessary for defense against attack was slipping, bound down in part by tradition.

For example, while Soviet spy trawlers can lurk a few miles off our shores and observe us with impunity, the Soviets cry "aggression" when a plane, invisible to the naked eye, flies over it some fifteen miles above the ground.

Either, theoretically, could carry a nuclear weapon. The trawler could deal a much more serious nuclear blow than a light reconnaissance plane.

But, of course, as we well know, no one would think of starting a nuclear war with either an isolated plane or ship.

In this age of nuclear peril we, the Central Intelligence Agency, felt that a new approach was called for in the whole field of intelligence collection.

* * * * *

This was the situation, when in 1954, almost six years ago, consultation was initiated on new intelligence collection techniques. We consulted with a group of highly competent technicians in and out of government. From our discussions there emerged the concept of a high-flying, high performance reconnaissance plane. In the then state of the art of aeronautics, it was confidently believed that a plane could be designed to fly unintercepted over the vitally important closed areas of the Soviet Union, where ballistic, nuclear, and other military preparations against us were being made.

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We also believed, as a result of these consultations, that the art of photography could be so advanced as to make the resolution of the pictures taken, even at extreme altitudes, of very great significance. On both counts the accomplishments exceeded expectations.

While the developmental work for this project, pursuant to high policy directive was in process, there came the Summit Conference of July 1955.

Here, in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the "open skies" proposal. Moscow summarily rejected anything of this nature, and Soviet security measures continued to be reinforced.

Accordingly, the U-2 project was pushed forward rapidly, and about a year after the 1955 summit meeting the first operational U-2 flight over the Soviet Union took place. For almost four years the flight program has been carried forward successfully.

Speed in getting the program underway had been a top priority. We were then faced, that is in 1955-1956, with a situation where the Soviets were continuing to develop their missiles, their heavy bomber and bomber bases, and their nuclear weapons production without adequate knowledge on our part.

This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable both from the viewpoint of adequate military preparation on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to take countermeasures in the event of attack.

It was recognized at the outset that this U-2 project had its risks and had a limited span of life due to improvement of counter measures; that a relatively fragile single-engine plane of the nature of the U-2 might one day have a flame-out or other malfunction in the rarified atmosphere in which it had to travel. If that resulted in a serious and prolonged loss of altitude, there was danger of failure and discovery.

To stop any enterprise of this nature because there are risks would be, of course, in this field to accomplish very little.

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While air reconnaissance is an old and tried method of gaining intelligence, a peacetime operation of this particular type and on this scale was unique.

But I submit that we live in an age when old concepts of the limits of "permitted" techniques for acquiring information are totally outdated. They come from the horse and buggy days.

I see no reason whatever to draw an unfavorable distinction between the collection of information by reconnaissance at a high altitude in the air and espionage carried on by individuals who illegally operate directly within the territory of another state.

In fact, the distinction, if one is to be drawn, would favor the former. The illegal espionage agents generally attempt to suborn and subvert the citizens of the countries in which they operate. High level air reconnaissance in no way disturbs the life of the people. It does not harm their property. They do not even notice it.

I believe these techniques should be universally sanctioned on a mutual basis and become an accepted and agreed part of our international arrangements.

The USSR has known a good deal about these flights for the last four years. It has studiously refrained from giving the people of the Soviet Union the knowledge they now admit they had.

With respect to the U-2 project, I am prepared to support and document these conclusions:--

First, that this operation was one of the most valuable intelligence collection operations that any country has ever mounted at any time, and that it was vital to our national security.

Second, that the chain of command and authority for the project was clear.

Third, that every overflight was carefully planned, fully authorized, and, until May 1, 1960, effectively carried out.

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Fourth, that the technical and logistic support was prompt and efficient.

Fifth, that the security which was maintained for this project over a period of more than five years has been unique.

I shall deal with these points in the inverse order in which I have presented them.

First - security. The project was run by a small, closely knit organization at headquarters and in the field. Knowledge of the operation was restricted to a minimum. Over more than five years, since the inception of the project, there has never been any damaging disclosure to interfere with the program.

The existence of the U-2 aircraft was, of course, well known, though its full capabilities, particularly the altitude and range were not disclosed. It had important weather and air sampling capabilities which were effectively used and which afforded natural cover for the project. These weather capabilities were open and publicized.

For example, as far as I know the U-2 is the first aircraft that has ever flown over the eye of a typhoon. It was used very effectively out in the Far East to learn about typhoons which cause so much damage, and we have a very extraordinary series of pictures of the U-2 looking right down at the eye of a typhoon from several miles above the top of it. Of course, the U-2 also had very valuable characteristics as a reconnaissance plane for peripheral flights.

With regard to technical and logistic support:--from the inception of the project, CIA has called on the United States Air Force for support in the form of technical advice and assistance in those fields where the Air Force has the most expert knowledge. These included advice on aircraft design and procurement, operational training of air crews, weather, aero-medicine and communications. I may say the Air Force liberally gave all this support to us.

The CIA also drew on the technical knowledge and advice of those members of the United States Intelligence Board with particular competence in the field of intelligence priorities -- targeting and the like. Each mission was carefully planned with respect to the highest priority requirements of the Intelligence Community.

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The project has been directed by a senior civilian in CIA with high competence in this area of work. He was responsible directly to me and, of course, to General Cabell.

Since the inception of CIA - going back for ten years - personnel from the military services, including the Air Force, have been detailed to CIA for tours of duty. We have had as many as 8 or 9 hundred of them at one time. These personnel take their orders from CIA, not from their parent service, during their period of detail. The U-2 project, under its civilian director, drew upon both the military and civilian personnel of the Agency. They were assigned to duties in headquarters and in the field staffs which were responsible for carrying out the technical functions of the program. They were chosen in view of their particular qualifications for this particular project.

Third, every overflight, from the inception of the project, and every phase of it, was carefully planned and staffed.

From time to time intelligence requirements were reviewed, and programs of one or more missions were authorized by higher authority.

Within the authority thus granted, specific flights could then be carried out on the order of the Director of Central Intelligence, as availability and readiness of aircraft and of pilot and as weather conditions permitted.

On the afternoon of 30 April last, after carefully considering the field report on the weather and other determining factors affecting the flight then contemplated, and after consultation with General Cabell and other qualified advisors in the Agency, and acting within existing authority to make a flight at that time, I personally gave the order to proceed with the flight of May first.

There was no laxity or uncertainty in the chain of command in obtaining the authority to act or in giving the order to proceed. With respect to the flight authorized on April 30, the same careful procedures were followed as had been followed in the many preceding successful flights.

Now I wish to discuss the value to the country of these flights from the intelligence viewpoint and from the

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viewpoint of national security considerations. I shall do this within the limitations of what I think both you and I feel are the necessary security restrictions.

Under the law setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, as Director, I am enjoined to protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Naturally I recognize this Committee as an authorized body to whom disclosures can properly be made that should not be made publicly. In so doing I wish to keep within the bounds of what I believe you would agree to be in the national interest to disclose, even here.

I feel that you should share the facts which I confidently believe justified the obvious risks of this project. Such risks were recognized and evaluated at all stages of the project.

For many years, the United States Intelligence Community has been directing its efforts to provide the information which would help to meet the threat of surprise attack. Every available means in the classical intelligence field have been utilized, and over recent years these have been valuably supplemented by the highly technical electronic and other scientific means to which I have referred.

Our main emphasis in the U-2 program has been directed against five critical problems affecting our national security. These are: the Soviet bomber force, the Soviet missile program, the Soviet atomic energy program, the Soviet submarine program. These are the major elements constituting the Soviet Union's capability to launch a surprise attack. In addition, a major target during this program has been the Soviet air defense system with which our retaliatory force would have to contend, in case of an attack on us and a counterattack by us.

Today, the Soviet bomber force is still the main offensive long range striking force of the Soviet Union. However, the U-2 program has helped to confirm that only a greatly reduced long-range bomber production program is continuing in the Soviet Union. It has established, however, that the Soviet Union has recently developed a new medium bomber with supersonic capabilities.

The U-2 program has covered many Soviet long-range bomber airfields, confirming estimates of the location of

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bases and the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers. It has also acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them.

Our overflights have enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground facilities involved.

With respect to the Soviet missile test program -- this I shall illustrate graphically by showing you the photograph of these facilities, including both their ICBM and their IRBM test launching sites which could, of course, also become and may well be, operational sites.

Our photography has also provided us valuable insight into the problem of Soviet doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. It has taught us much about the use which the Soviets are making of these sites for the training of troops in the operational use of the short and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

The program has provided valuable information on the Soviet atomic energy program. This information has been included in the estimate which we give periodically to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but without referring to the actual source of our data. This has covered the production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, and size of many stockpile sites.

The project has shown that, despite Mr. Khrushchev's boasts that the Soviets will soon be able to curtail the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the Soviets are continuing to expand fissionable material capacity.

The Soviet nuclear testing grounds have been photographed more than once with extremely interesting results. The photography has also given us our first firm information on the magnitude and location of the USSR's domestic uranium ore and uranium processing activities, vital in estimating Soviet fissionable material production. We have located national and regional nuclear storage sites and forward storage facilities.

In general, the program has continued to give useful data on the size and rate of growth of Soviet industry.

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The material obtained has been used for the correction of military maps and aeronautical charts.

Among the most important intelligence obtained is that affecting the tactics of the United States deterrent air strike force. We now have hard information about the nature, extent, and in many cases, the location of the Soviet ground-to-air missile development. We have learned much about the basic concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, deployment, and rate of development of the Soviet air defense system, including their early warning radar development.

We have obtained photographs of many scores of fighter air fields previously inadequately identified, and have photographed various fighter types vainly attempting to intercept the U-2. All of this has proved invaluable to SAC in adjusting its plans to known elements of the opposition it would have to face.

As a result of the concrete evidence acquired by the U-2 program on a large number of targets in the Soviet Union it has now been possible for U.S. commanders to make a more efficient and confident allocation of aircraft, crews and weapons.

U-2 photography has also made it possible to provide new and accurate information to strike crews which will make it easier for them to identify their targets and plan their navigation more precisely.

We have obtained new and valuable information with regard to submarine deployment and the precise location of their submarine pens.

In the opinion of our military, of our scientists, and of the senior officials responsible for our national security, the results of the program have been invaluable.

The program has had other elements of value. It has made the Soviets less cocky about their ability to deal with what we might bring against them.

They have gone through four years of frustration in having the knowledge since 1956 that they could be overflown with impunity, that their vaunted fighters were useless against such flights, and that their ground-to-air missile capability was inadequate.

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Khrushchey has never dared expose this to his own people. It is only after he had boasted, and we believe falsely, that he had been able to bring down the U-2 on May 1 by a ground-to-air missile while flying at altitude, that he has allowed his own people to have even an inkling of the capability which we possessed.

His frustrated military, many of whom know the facts, are far less confident today than they otherwise would have been.

At the same time, in competent military circles among our allies, the evidence of American capability demonstrated by the present disclosure of the U-2 flights has given a new and better perspective of our own relative strength as compared with that of the Soviet Union.

* * * * *

At this point I propose to show you some photographs to support my presentation regarding the intelligence value of the project.

Now I shall present the facts with regard to the dispatch of the May 1 flight and the ensuing developments insofar as the intelligence aspects are concerned and insofar as they are known to us.

As to the timing of the flight, there is, of course, no good time for a failure.

I have already presented the circumstances under which I assumed direct responsibility for dispatching this flight.

If this flight had been a success, we would have covered certain targets of particular significance and we would, in the normal course, have wished to analyze its results before scheduling a further mission. When it failed, it was obvious even before we received instructions that we would not try again before studying the cause and effects of failure. In either event, success or failure, after this flight we were not preparing to fly again for several weeks and until further policy guidance was received.

With respect to the timing of the flights, the President, in his speech of May 25, had this to say: "As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the

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program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

"The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack."

I would point out, also, that if you turn off all flights for months before international meetings and then for some time after such meetings and before trips to the Soviet Union of high American officials or trips here of Soviet officials; if you also estimate that in times of tension flights should be stopped because they might increase the tension, and in times of sweetness and light they should not be run because it would disturb any "honeymoon" in our relations with the Soviet Union; if, on top of this, you take into account that in much of the Soviet Union most days of the year are automatically eliminated because of weather and cloud cover and low Arctic sun, - then you can understand the problem of timing of flights.

If you asked me whether or not a flight would have been made after this particular flight, I cannot give you the answer because I do not know. At the time, we had no authority for any mission other than the one that was then undertaken.

With respect to the flight itself, when the aircraft did not reach its destination within the flight time and fuel capacity given it, it was presumed to be down. But at first we did not know where. It could have been within friendly territory, in hostile desert, or in uninhabited territory or within hostile territory where if alive the pilot would have been quickly apprehended as was the case. We did not know whether the plane was intact or destroyed, the pilot alive or dead.

I shall deal in a moment with the statements which were issued during this period of uncertainty.

The question of course arises as to what actually happened to cause this aircraft to come down deep in the heart of Russia.

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Let me remind you first that the returns are not yet all in, and so our picture is not complete. However, we do have a considerable body of evidence that permits a reasonable judgment with a high degree of confidence.

Our best judgment is that it did not happen as claimed by the Soviets. That is, we believe that it was not shot down at its operating altitude of around 70,000 feet by the Russians. We believe that it was initially forced down to a much lower altitude by some as yet undetermined mechanical malfunction. At that lower altitude, it was a sitting duck for Soviet defenses, whether fighter aircraft or ground-to-air fire or missiles.

As to what happened at the lower altitude, we are not sure. The pilot may have bailed out at any time or he may have crash landed. The aircraft was equipped with a destruction device to be activated by the pilot as he leaves the aircraft. Again we do not know whether or not he attempted to do so. It should be noted, however, that no massive destruction device capable of ensuring complete destruction could be carried in this aircraft as weight limitations were critical, and every pound counted.

Thus, whether or not the destruction device was used, one might expect sizeable and identifiable parts of the aircraft and its equipment to remain.

As to the nature and cause of the suspected malfunction, we are not prepared to pass judgment. But let me remind you that this aircraft and this pilot had proven their high degree of reliability in many technically similar flights, inside and outside friendly territory. When operating as in this case, about 1200 miles within unfriendly, heavily-defended territory, there can be no cushion against malfunction.

There has been much comment and questioning with regard to the pilot and his behavior after apprehension. Of course, we only have the Soviets' report on all of this, and we should accept it with caution.

All of the pilots engaged in this enterprise were most carefully selected. They were highly trained, highly motivated, and, as seemed right, well compensated financially. But no one in his right mind would have accepted these risks for money alone.

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Since the operational phase of the program started, the reliability record of the plane, for a craft of this character, was little short of phenomenal. It was a tribute to the high skill of the designer, the maintenance crews, and the pilots. Until the May first flight, over about a 4-year period of operations, no plane had been lost over unfriendly territory in the course of many, many missions. Several were lost during the training period at home and in friendly territory abroad.

Francis Gary Powers, the pilot on the May 1 flight, is a fourth generation American citizen, born in Jenkins, Kentucky, about 31 years ago. He received a BA degree from Milligan College, Tennessee, in September 1950. Scholastically he was high average. He joined the Air Force in the fall of 1950, as a private and served in an enlisted status until November 1951, when he was discharged as a Corporal in order to enter the Aviation Cadet School to train as a pilot. He attended the Air Force Basic and Advance Pilot Training School at Greenville, Mississippi. Upon completion of this training in December 1952, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant.

His first duty assignment was as an F-84 Commando Jet Pilot with the 468th Strategic Fighter Squadron at Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. He resigned his Air Force Reserve Commission under honorable conditions in May 1956. The reason for such resignation was to join the project we are discussing.

His record with the Air Force had been uniformly good. He was given a special security screening by the Air Force and also a supplemental check by the security office of the CIA.

During his Air Force career, he received training with respect to his behavior and conduct in event of capture, and after entering the employ of the Agency, he took the Agency's escape and evasion course at our training station here in the United States in June of 1956. He had subsequent training in escape and evasion after his assignment to his overseas post in August 1956.

An Air Force Major Flight Surgeon assigned to CIA who worked with the U-2 pilots during their training in the United States and continuously during their stay overseas,

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had this to say in regard to Francis Powers, "...During the period of my assignment as Flight Surgeon at Adana, I not infrequently shared a room with Mr. Powers and participated in social, flying, and mission duties with him. In my opinion Mr. Powers was outstanding among the pilots for his calmness under pressure, his precision, and his methodical approach to problems. I have flown considerably in jets with Mr. Powers. I would consider him temperate, devoted, perhaps more than unusually patriotic, and a man given to thinking before speaking or acting."

It should be remembered that Powers was a pilot, navigator, a well-rounded aviator trained to handle himself under all conditions, in the air or if grounded in hostile territory. He was not trained as an "agent" as there were no foreseeable circumstances, even the present ones, where he would act as such. Furthermore, such training would have been incompatible both temperamentally and with the strenuous technical demands of his flight mission.

The pilots of these aircraft on operational missions, and this was true in the case of Powers, received the following instructions for use if downed in a hostile area:

First, it was their duty to ensure the destruction of the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible.

Second, on reaching the ground it was the pilot's first duty to attempt escape and evasion so as to avoid capture, or delay it as long as possible. To aid him in these purposes and for survival he was given the various items of equipment which the Soviets have publicized and which are normal and standard procedure, selected on the basis of wide experience gained in World War II and in Korea.

Third, pilots were equipped with a device for self destruction but were not given positive instructions to make use of it. In the last analysis, this ultimate decision has to be left to the individual himself.

Fourth, in the contingency of capture, pilots were instructed to delay as long as possible the revelation of damaging information.

Fifth, pilots were instructed to tell the truth if faced with a situation, as apparently faced Powers, with

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respect to those matters which were obviously within the knowledge of his captors as a result of what fell into their hands. In addition, if in a position where some attribution had to be given his mission, he would acknowledge that he was working for the Central Intelligence Agency. This was to make it clear that he was not working for any branch of the armed services, and that his mission was solely an intelligence mission.

These instructions were based on a careful study of our experience in the Korean war of the consequences of brainwashing and of the extent of information which could be obtained by these and other means available to the Soviets.

Whether or not in this instance the pilot complied with all of these instructions, it is hard to state today with the knowledge we have. However, a careful review of what he has said does not indicate that he has given to the Soviets any valuable information which they could not have discovered from the equipment they found upon the pilot's person or retrieved from the downed aircraft.

I would warn, of course, against putting too much belief in what Powers may say, particularly if he is later put on trial. By that time they will have had a more thorough opportunity for a complete brain-washing operation which might well produce a mixture of truth and fiction.

I will now deal with the "cover story" statements which were issued following May 1.

When a plane is overdue and the fact of its takeoff and failure to return is known, some statement must be made, and quickly. Failure to do so, and, under normal conditions, to start a search for the lost plane, would in itself be a suspicious event.

Thus, when the U-2 disappeared on May first and did not return to its base within the requisite time period after its takeoff, action was required.

For many years, in fact since the inception of the operation, consideration has been given to the cover story which would be used in the case of the disappearance of a plane which might possibly be over unfriendly territory.

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Because of its special characteristics, the U-2 plane was of great interest to the U.S. weather services and to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the predecessor of NASA. NASA was very much concerned with the scientific advances which operations of these U-2s could make towards greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for other scientific purposes. As already indicated, U-2s have now undertaken many weather and related missions and their functions in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has been distributed freely to the world.

It was therefore natural that NASA's operations be used to explain the presence of U-2s at various bases throughout the world, although NASA did not participate in the development of intelligence devices, nor did they participate in the planning and conduct of any intelligence missions.

Accordingly, when the May first flight was lost, an initial statement was issued on May 2nd by the Base Commander at Adana that a U-2 aircraft, engaged in upper air studies and operating from the base was down, and oxygen difficulties had been reported. This was identified in the press as a NASA plane. A search for the plane was initiated in the remote areas of eastern Turkey.

On May 5, early in the day by our time, Khrushchev made his claim that "an American aircraft crossed our frontier and continued its flight into the interior of our country...and...was shot down." At that time, Khrushchev gave no further details of significance.

Apparently as an attempt at deception, Khrushchev followed up his speech the next day by distributing photographs of a pile of junk--according to experts, pieces of an old Soviet fighter plane--possibly for the purpose of making us think that the U-2 plane had been effectively destroyed. Since the fake wreckage was quickly identified for what it was, this particular ruse had no effect.

The NASA statement which followed the Khrushchev speech of May 5 developed somewhat further the original cover story. Also on May 5, the Department of State issued a further release which generally followed the cover story. Mr. Dillon has covered this in his testimony before this Committee on May 27.

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At this time--on 5-6 May--we still did not know whether the plane or any recognizable parts of it or the pilot were in Soviet hands, or whether the pilot was dead or alive. Furthermore, then we did not know whether Khrushchev desired to blow up the incident as he later did, or put it under the rug and spare his people the knowledge that we had been overflying them.

Hence, in this situation, there seemed no reason at that time to depart from the original cover story.

These two press releases attributed to NASA were worked out in consultation between CIA and NASA and after conferring with the Department of State.

These statements did not come out of any lack of forethought or attention to their preparation or lack of coordination. The basic cover story had been developed some years ago for the exigency of a failure, and this original cover story was on May 5 modified to meet our then estimate of what was best to say in the light of what little we knew about the details of the May 1 flight failure.

Subsequently, on May 7, Khrushchev adduced evidence that he had the pilot alive, and quoted his purported statements. He also produced certain of the contents of the plane and later various parts of the plane itself. This clearly disclosed the true nature of the mission on which the plane was engaged.

The cover story was outflanked.

The issue then was whether to admit the incident but deny high level responsibility, or to take the course that was decided upon and clearly expressed in Secretary Herter's statement of May 9 and in the President's statement of May 11, and his address of May 25.

In Mr. Herter's appearance before this Committee, he has dealt with the statements which were issued during the period after May 6, except for the two statements involving NASA which I have covered.

I would only add that in my opinion, in the light of all the factors involved, the decision taken to assume responsibility in this particular case was the correct one. Denial, in my opinion, over the long run would have been tortuous and self-defeating.

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Those who took this decision knew that I was ready to assume the full measure of responsibility and to cover the project as a technical intelligence operation carried out on my own responsibility as Director of CIA. This alternative, too, was rejected because of the many elements making it hardly credible over the longer run.

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PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON U-2 INCIDENT

11 May 1960

President Eisenhower: Good morning. Please sit down. I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident.

A full statement about this matter has been made by the State Department and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by leaders of both parties.

For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to say with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further to say--for the simple reason I can think of nothing to add that might be useful at this time.

The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activities. No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack.

Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret but in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.

As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

My second point: The nature of intelligence-gathering activities.

These have a special and secret character. They are, so to speak, "below the surface" activities. They are secret because they must circumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military preparations.

They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities.

These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of force--with operations supervised by responsible officials within this area of secret activities.

We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities, and second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given latitude under broad directives, but must be kept under strict control in every detail.

These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment which seek to mislead and obscure--just as in the Soviet allegations there are many discrepancies. For example, there is some reason to believe that the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude. The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special efforts to conceal them.

Third point: How should we view all of this activity?

It is a distasteful but vital necessity. We prefer and work for a different kind of world--and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.

This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955, which I was ready instantly to put into effect--to permit aerial observation over the United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that no surprise attack was being prepared against anyone. I shall bring up the "open skies" proposal again at Paris--since it is a means of ending concealment and suspicion.

My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues of the day by what is an incident in the world situation today.

This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed, non-military plane can only reflect a fetish of secrecy.

The real issues are the ones we will be working on at the Summit--disarmament, search for solutions affecting Germany and Berlin and the whole range of East-West relations, including the reduction of secrecy and suspicion.

Frankly, I am hopeful that we may make progress on these great issues. This is what we mean when we speak of "working for peace."

And as I remind you, I will have nothing further to say about this matter.

REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN CLARENCE A CANNON (MISSOURI),
CONCERNING U-2 INCIDENT, BEFORE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
10 May 1960

MR. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, on May 1 the Soviet Government captured, 1,300 miles inside the boundaries of the Russian Empire, an American plane, operated by an American pilot, under the direction and control of the Central Intelligence Agency, and is now holding both the plane and the pilot.

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the appropriation was familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions.

The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the utmost confidence.

The question immediately arises as to the authority of the subcommittee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes, and especially the failure of the subcommittee to divulge to the House and the country the justifications warranting the expenditure and all details connected with the item at the time it was under consideration on the floor.

The answer of the subcommittee is absolute and unavoidable military necessity, fundamental national defense.

During the Second World War the United States succeeded in breaking the Japanese naval code. Through this incredible good fortune the U.S. commanders were able to read every order transmitted from Tokyo and all inter-fleet communications. This advance and intimate information had much to do in preparing the way and increasing the effectiveness of our great victory in the Battle of Midway which broke

the power of Japan in the Pacific. But some incautious member of a congressional committee or its staff leaked the information to a reporter, and 30 minutes after the next edition of his newspaper hit the street Japan changed her naval code and all further advantage was lost.

This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by honored and established precedent. This subcommittee, including the same personnel with the exception of two members who have since died, was the same committee which for something like 3 years provided in the annual appropriation bills a sum which finally totaled more than \$2 billion for the original atomic bomb. Session after session the money was provided, and the subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker of the House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure of the money. According to the testimony of all military authorities that bomb ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a million men who would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of Japan. No one has ever said that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that eventually aggregated more than the assessed valuation of some of the States of the Union for that purpose.

Espionage has been throughout recorded history an integral part of warfare. Before occupying the Promised Land Moses "by the commandment of the Lord" sent out from the wilderness of Paran 10 men under the direction of Joshua to spy out the land.

And no nation in the history of the world has practiced espionage more assiduously than Russia. The United States and every other allied nation today literally swarms with them. Within the last few weeks we sent to the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta a Russian spy convicted at Federal Court who was regularly transmitting information directly to Moscow every night. Their spies stole from us the secret of the atomic bomb. Every Russian Embassy and Consulate has today time and again the number required for routine diplomatic and consular service. When we were at Oak Ridge we were told there were so many Russian spies there that only by a policy of strictest compartmentalism were they able to maintain the integrity of their work.

The need for espionage in this instance was exceptional and compelling. At the close of the world war in which we had saved Russia from complete subjugation we were surprised to learn that while all other nations were disarming and

returning to a peacetime status as rapidly as possible, Russia was feverishly driving her factories and continuing to increase her armament at top speed. Simultaneously they announced that communism and free enterprise could not live in the same world.

Every effort has been made by American administrations to reestablish conditions under which we could discontinue excessive expenditures for armament and divert these vast sums to business and humanitarian purposes. But each year Russia has become more arrogant and threatening and more demanding.

Under our American ideals and system of government, a declaration of war against any nation, however provocative, is unthinkable. Our military authorities have no choice but to give any enemy the advantage of first attack and then depend on massive retaliation for defense. The Communists have taken every advantage of this situation.

In modern warfare surprise is a tremendous advantage. Less than a week before the Communist attack on Korea a congressional committee from this House returning from Seoul reported that permanent peace had been established and the land was returning to prosperity. There was no shadow of war; not the slightest cloud appeared on the horizon. The sudden rush of a vast army of well armed, well trained, and well munitioned communists across the border made it necessary for us to throw precipitately into battle raw and untrained troops who were wholly unable to protect themselves or hold their positions. And there followed one of the most disastrous periods in the history of American arms.

During the hearings on this appropriation for the last 2 or 3 years, I have each year asked the CIA representative before the Committee, "How could the enemy mobilize an army of such size and accumulate hundreds of tons of supplies and munitions and the transportation facilities necessary for its movement without our learning that such an attack was in prospect?"

And each year we have admonished the Authority, the CIA, that it must meet future situations of this character with effective measures. We told them, "This must not happen again, and it is up to you to see that it does not happen again"; that the American forces must be apprised of any future preparation of attack in time to meet it. And the plan they were following when this plane was taken is their answer to that demand.

And I want to take advantage of the opportunity to compliment and thank Director Allen W. Dulles and his remarkable corps for the admirable way in which they have met the situation through these later years.

They are entitled to the highest commendation by the Department, the Congress, and the American people.

We cannot permit another Korea. We cannot take the risk of carnage and national devastation which might involve every American city. We cannot take the risk of the consequences which would follow a similar attack from across the Russian borders. And since the Russians refuse to cooperate in our efforts to establish permanent peace--refuse even to agree to ethical standards of warfare--we have no choice but to protect our nation and our people through the age-old methods of defense so long in use by the Communists themselves, lest we wake tomorrow, or do not wake tomorrow, as a result of our failure to know in time what they are planning against us.

The world has been appalled by the vicious vindictiveness of Khrushchev's denunciation. He yesterday characterized the policy of the United States as stupid and blundering. His fury is incited by the fact that it is neither stupid or blundering. On the contrary it has been infinitely successful and effective.

When we have answered his threats--and he has been very free with them on all occasions, even when he was here as our guest in our own country. When we have answered his threats by basing our Strategic Air Command in a position to defend ourselves and our allies, he has boasted that he could stop them at the border. That is why we are now so earnestly developing our submarines so that if he ever is able to neutralize our Strategic Air Command then we will have to take its place a fleet of nuclear-driven missile-firing submarines that will be just as effective a halter upon him as SAC is today.

His discovery that since 1956, for 4 years, CIA has been sending planes across his border--is the occasion for this outburst. It completely disproves his vaunted ability to stop SAC at the border.

The only reason he was able to apprehend even this plane or its pilot was that it developed some unforeseen and unavoidable mechanical or physiological defect, the first in

four years. He was unable to hit it or to overtake it at its cruising height of 70,000 feet. So in order to leave the impression that he captured this plane he distributed a picture of a pile of rubbish which those who know the plane recognized as absolutely spurious. The plane and the pilot were evidently taken comparatively uninjured. That completely destroys his claims of invulnerability against American attack. So he as usual resorts to subterfuge.

And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident.

The world has always recognized the remarkable success of our form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an authoritarian dictatorship.

We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR LYNDON B. JOHNSON
BEFORE THE SENATE
10 May 1960

MR. JOHNSON of Texas: Mr. President, this is certainly a time in which Americans--and people everywhere-- must keep their heads. We cannot afford hysteria, panic, or hasty and ill-advised action.

There are many unanswered questions about the incident of the American plane that was shot down over the Soviet Union. There are serious questions which will have to be considered very carefully by Congress and by the American people.

But it is doubtful whether the answers will be forthcoming immediately. There are too many facts which are not available and which will be available only when the Soviets permit a cool and realistic appraisal of what happened in their airspace.

Furthermore, it is always difficult to come to objective conclusions in an atmosphere of sanctimonious statements and threats against other nations. It is ridiculous for Nikita Khrushchev to profess such shocked surprise over efforts to gather information.

When Mr. Khrushchev visited this country last year, I do not think he impressed any of us as being a man who is naive. By that, I mean naive about what his own country has been doing for many, many years.

The incident, of course, will be assessed with great care and all of its implications will be explored carefully. But meanwhile, we cannot lose sight of the overriding reality which confronts us immediately.

It is whether this incident will become an excuse and an alibi for sabotaging the Summit Conference.

Within a very few days, our country is going to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union in an effort to relax the very tensions that have brought about this kind of an incident. It is difficult to imagine those negotiations as having much success if they are to be conducted in this kind of an atmosphere.

If Nikita Khrushchev is going to spend his time taunting the United States over what he considers the blunders it has made and threatening other countries on the basis of facts which have not been clearly established, there will be little time to talk about the real problems which divide the world.

Those problems cannot be traced back to the fact that nations seek to extract information from each other. Espionage and intelligence gathering are not something that cause the cold war. They are merely byproducts of the cold war--something that follows logically when nations cannot trust each other.

Whatever may be his motivations, it is obvious that Nikita Khrushchev has handled this incident in such a way as to draw attention away from the real problems. We must get back to those problems--of people, of armaments, of respect for the integrity of smaller nations--if the Summit Conference has any meaning.

If blunders have been made, the American people can be certain that Congress will go into them thoroughly. But this is something that should be done objectively and not merely as a panicky reaction to Soviet charges.

And I think that one point should be crystal clear. Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms and we are not going to be shaken from that course, or we are not going to be divided in this critical hour.

MR. DIRKSEN: The Senator from Texas has made a forthright statement, and I concur in it. This is not a time for us to retreat or walk backward; and I, for one, absolutely refuse to do so. To be sure, there is nothing that we need conceal particularly. Certainly, ever since civilization began, there have been intelligence activities and espionage of a kind; and in proportion as civilization has become more complex, obviously the intelligence activities have become more complex.

During World War I, we set up the Office of Strategic Services. I had opportunities to examine their installations in many parts of the world. So, Mr. President, as the majority leader has well put it, we would indeed be naive if we did not view this matter objectively and realistically; and we so stated yesterday when this matter was discussed on the floor of the Senate

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ANNEX 88

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August 12, 1960

WRITTEN AND ORAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
THE US, USSR, AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE U-2 INCIDENT

On May 3, 1960 the US Air Force in Turkey reported that a U-2 weather plane from the US air base at Adana, Turkey, was missing. Addressing the Supreme Soviet on May 5, Khrushchev asserted that an American plane had been shot down over the USSR, but gave no details of the locale, circumstances, or fate of the pilot. In Washington, on the same day, a brief State Department press release reported that a weather plane belonging to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was missing. NASA on May 5 also issued a press release, a lengthy announcement giving the route of the "weather plane" in Turkey and stating that the pilot had reported oxygen difficulties. On May 6 a US note to the USSR asked for information on the plane and its pilot. This note was the first of a series of official communications, both written and oral, exchanged between the US, the USSR, and other governments in connection with the U-2 incident.

This paper presents, in chronological order, the texts of all such communications. Press releases and other unilateral statements are not generally included unless of particular significance. For convenient reference, this paper is also broken down on a country-by-country basis. An unclassified addendum presents the texts of Department of State press and radio briefings relating to this subject.

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I. USSR

- May 6 US note refers to Khrushchev's May 5 Supreme Soviet Statement and US May 3 announcement on missing aircraft and asks information on plane and pilot. (Document No. 1)
- May 7 Khrushchev, addressing Supreme Soviet again, announced that U-2 pilot was alive and had confessed the plane's reconnaissance mission. (Text not included)
- May 9 Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky warns that in event of future flights the USSR would retaliate against countries from whose bases they took off. (Excerpt, document No. 2)
- May 10 US note request permission for Embassy officer to interview U-2 pilot. (Document No. 3)¹
- May 10 Soviet note protests "aggressive" U-2 flight, warns of "retaliatory measures" if similar acts repeated. (Document No. 4)
- May 12 US note in reply to Soviet May 10 note denies flight for intelligence purposes had aggressive intent. (Document No. 5)
- May 13 Vershinin letter (dated May 12) to General White (USAF) "postpones" former's scheduled visit to US until "a more suitable time." (Document No. 6)

1. Further correspondence regarding the pilot (including the US aide memoire of July 11, the US note of July 30, and the Soviet note of August 4) were published in the Department's Press release No. 33 of August 6.

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May 16 Soviet note denounces US "policy of aggression and provocation" and warns that not only will future intruding aircraft be shot down but bases from which they come will be struck against. (Document No. 7).

II. PAKISTAN

A. Pakistan - USSR

May 13 Soviet note to Pakistan charges that U-2 took off from Peshawar airport in Pakistan, refers to the "dangerous policy" of allowing foreign armed forces to use Pakistani territory and warns that repetition would necessitate "retaliatory measures." (Document No. 8)

May 24 Pakistani note to the USSR denies participation in preparation of flight, notes US assurance that no such incident would be allowed to take place in the future, and refers to Soviet violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 9)

June 22 Soviet note to Pakistan rejects claim that GOP unaware of intention of flight from Peshawar, rejects "groundless" claim that Soviet violated Pakistani airspace, rejects statement about US assurance with reference to "mendacious" assertions by US in connection with U-2, and states that USSR will hit bases in event of future flights. (Document No. 10)

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B. Pakistan - US

- May 14 Pakistani aide memoire to US states that if plane which had taken off from Peshawar had been diverted to USSR, Pakistan would have cause for "bitter complaint."
(Document No. 11)
- May 19 Pakistani note to US states that May 14 aide memoire might be considered a complaint from GOP. (Document No. 12)
- May 22 US note to Pakistan gives requested assurance. (Document No. 13)

C. Pakistan - Afghanistan

- May 16 Afghan note to Pakistan protests the use of a Pakistani airfield for a flight violating Afghan airspace, and states that RGA awaiting elucidations and assurance that no such violations would be allowed in the future. (Document No. 14)
- June 4 Pakistani note to Afghanistan denies allegation that flight originated from Peshawar with the cooperation of the GOP, and that if flight did take place it was without the knowledge of the GOP. The note recalls the GOP note of November 10, 1959, protesting to Afghan Government about frequent and repeated violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 15)

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Jur 21 Afghan note to Pakistan states that Pakistan's reply was unsatisfactory and deviated from the facts, that failure to give assurance for the future was evidence of ill will of GOP and that earlier protest once more confirmed. (Excerpt, Document No. 16)

III. TURKEY

A. Turkey - USSR

May 13 Soviet note to Turkey notes that plane had been permanently based in Turkey, and warns of retaliatory measures in the event of repetition. (Document No. 17)

May 26 Turkish note to the USSR states that Turkish airspace not used for the overflight and that Turkey was responsible only for its own airspace, reaffirmed Turkey's right as a sovereign state to put its air bases at the disposal of its allies for purely defensive purposes, and notes that there had been complaints of Soviet overflights in Turkey. (Document No. 18)

IV. NORWAY

A. Norway - USSR

May 13 Soviet note to Norway states that despite Norway's earlier assurance that under Norwegian rules allied planes were not allowed to fly across Norway east of 24 degrees latitude Norway was an accessory to the US overflight,

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and warns of possible countermeasures if such flights continue. (Document No. 19)

May 27 Norwegian note to the USSR states that no Norwegian authority had cooperated with the flight, denies that Norwegian territory was at the disposal of the US Air Force for overflights. (Document No. 20)

B. Norway - US

May 13 Norwegian pour memoire to US protests that permission to land U-2 at Bodoe had not been requested and that landing of U-2 at Bodoe would have been against principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing foreign reconnaissance planes, and asks US to take steps to prevent similar incidents in the future. (Document No. 21)

May 16 US pour memoire replies that permission for a U-2 landing had not been requested, and that if such a landing had been made it would have violated the principles followed by Norwegian authorities. US will continue to abide by those principles. (Document No. 22). Department telegram to Oslo 1124 authorized US ambassador "to state to Lange that final sentence in PM is designed to be responsive to Norwegian request that 'American authorities take all necessary steps to prevent similar incidents in future.'"

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V. AFGHANISTANA. Afghanistan - US

- May 18 Afghan note to US protests violation of Afghan airspace by the U-2, and requests assurance that such action would not be repeated. (Document No. 23)
- May 20 US reply regrets that RGA interpreted a certain ex parte version of the flight as an unfriendly action. With regard to assurance requested, note quotes President Eisenhower to the effect that flights would not be resumed. (Document No. 24)

B. Afghanistan - Pakistan

- May 18 Afghan note to Pakistan protests the use of a Pakistani airfield for a flight violating Afghan airspace, and states that RGA awaiting elucidations and assurance that no such violations would be allowed in the future. (Document No. 14)
- June 4 Pakistani note to Afghanistan denies allegation that flight originated from Peshawar with the cooperation of the GOP, and that if flight did take place it was without the knowledge of the GOP. The note recalled the GOP note of November 10, 1959, protesting to Afghan Government about frequent and repeated violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 15)
- June 21 Afghan note to Pakistan states that Pakistan's reply was unsatisfactory and deviated from the facts, that

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failure to give assurance for the future was evidence of ill will of GOP and that earlier protest once more confirmed. (Excerpt, document No. 16)

VI. US - JAPAN

- May 9 Department informs MacArthur, US prepared to (1) conclude specific undertaking with GOJ no intelligence missions will be flown over non-Japanese territory from US facilities in Japan without prior consultation GOJ, (2) give Kishi assurances U-2 in Japan used only for legitimate scientific purposes, (3) make public statement to this effect. (Document No. 25)
- May 10 MacArthur informs Vice Foreign Minister Yamada substance of US proposal. Kishi and Fujiyama felt it unnecessary to enter into formal agreement for consultation in case of intelligence overflights, suggest simple "legitimate and normal purpose" statement by US. (Document No. 26)
- May 10 US issues "legitimate and normal purpose" statement. (Document No. 27)
- May 11 MacArthur transmits text of US May 10 announcement to GOJ. (Text not included)
- May 12 Fujiyama acknowledges by note receipt of text of US May 10 announcement. (Document No. 28)

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- May 21 Fujiyama informs MacArthur of new Soviet note to Japan protesting security treaty and illegal overflights by US aircraft. Requests assurance that no US plane (U-2 or other) has conducted overflights of Soviet territory from Japan. (Document No. 29)
- May 28 Department informs MacArthur he can give assurances to Kishi or Yamada that there have been no overflights of Soviet territory by U-2 or other US plane from Japanese territory. (Document No. 30)
- June 2 Vice Foreign Minister Yamada given verbal assurance by MacArthur of no US overflights from Japanese territory. (Document No. 31)
- July 11 Foreign Minister Fujiyama told a press conference that the government had been informed that the U-2 planes had been withdrawn from Japan. (Text not included)
- July 21 Chief of Intelligence Japanese Air Self Defense staff shows MacArthur forged US document regarding U-2 overflights from Japanese territory. (Document No. 32)
Verbatim text of forgery (Document No. 33)
- July 21 Embassy Tokyo issues statement denouncing forgery. (Document No. 34)

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VII. ITALY

A. Italy - US

May 20 Department replies to Italian Ambassador's inquiry stating that U-2 pilot had no instructions to the effect that he might in an emergency use an Italian airport.
(Document No. 35)

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Annex No. 1

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Document No. 1US Note to the Soviet Union - May 6

The US Government has noted the statement of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5 that a foreign aircraft crossed the border of the Soviet Union on May 1 and that on orders of the Soviet Government, this aircraft was shot down. In this same statement it was said that investigation showed that it was a US plane.

As already announced on May 3, a United States National Aeronautical Space Agency unarmed weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, and piloted by a civilian American has been missing since May 1. The name of the American civilian pilot of the missing aircraft is Francis Gary Powers, born on August 17, 1929, at Jenkins, Kentucky.

In the light of the above the US Government requests the Soviet Government to provide it with full facts of the Soviet investigation of this incident and to inform it of the fate of the pilot.

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Annex I

Document No. 2Excerpt from Malinovsky Speech of May 9

We reply to you firmly, gentlemen American imperialists: no you will not fly over our land! We are not your Guatemala, Turkey, Pakistan or South Korea. We shot down and will shoot down any violator who dares to violate our airspace and will adopt all measures necessary for protecting the integrity of our state frontiers! We also warn the countries countenancing these evil doings, lending their territory and airfields for the flights of similar pirate planes over our country's borders -- think before it is too late. Technology is now so perfected that it can show us without fail the airfields from which such violators are flying. We have the right to take any measures in such a case against those bases and airfields and can raze these bases, so that nothing remains of them.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 3US Note to USSR of May 10

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and has the honor to refer to the public statements of the Soviet Government indicating that an American civilian, Francis Gary Powers, is under detention in Moscow. The Embassy requests that an officer of the Embassy be permitted to interview Mr. Powers.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 4

USSR Note to US of May 10

On May 1 of this year at 5 hours 36 minutes Moscow time a military aircraft violated the boundary of the USSR and intruded across borders of the Soviet Union for a distance of more than 2,000 kilometers. The Government of the USSR naturally could not leave unfinished such a flagrant violation of Soviet state boundaries. When the intentions of the violating aircraft became apparent, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in area of Sverdlovsk.

Upon examination by experts of all data at the disposal of the Soviet side, it was incontrovertibly established that the intruder aircraft belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and was sent through Pakistan into the Soviet Union with hostile purposes.

As Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. S. Khrushchev made public on May 7 at the final session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, exact data from the investigation leave no doubts with respect to the purpose of the flight of the American aircraft which violated the USSR border on May 1. This aircraft was specially equipped for reconnaissance and diversionary flight over territory of the Soviet Union. It had on board apparatus for aerial photography for detecting Soviet radar network and other special radio-technical equipment which form part of USSR anti-aircraft defenses. At disposal of Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation, there is indisputable proof of the espionage-reconnaissance mission of the American aircraft: Films of Soviet defense and industrial establishments, a tape recording of signals of Soviet radar stations and other data.

Pilot Powers, about whose fate Embassy of United States of America inquired in its note of May 6, is alive and, as indicated in the forementioned speech of Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev, will be brought to account under the laws of Soviet State. The pilot has indicated that he did everything in full accordance with the assignment given him. On the flight map taken from him there was clearly and accurately marked the entire route he was assigned after take off from city of Adana (Turkey: Peshawar (Pakistan) - the ural sea - Sverdlovsk - Archangel - Murmansk, followed by a landing at Norwegian airfield at Bude. The pilot has also stated that he served in su unit Number 10-10 which under the cover of National Aeronautics and Space Agency is engaged in high altitude military reconnaissance.

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This and other information revealed in speeches of the head of Soviet Government completely refuted the US State Department's concocted and hurriedly fabricated version, released May 5 in an official announcement for press, to the effect that the aircraft was allegedly carrying out meteorological observations in upper strata of atmosphere along Turkish-Soviet border.

After complete absurdity of the aforementioned version had been shown and it had been incontrovertibly proven that the American aircraft intruded across borders of Soviet Union for aggressive reconnaissance purposes, a new announcement was made by the US State Department on May 7 which contained the forced admission that the aircraft was sent into Soviet Union for military reconnaissance purposes and, by that very fact, it was admitted that the flight was pursuing aggressive purposes.

In this way, after two days, the State Department already had to deny version which obviously had been intended to mislead world public opinion as well as public opinion of America itself.

The State Department considered it appropriate to refer in its announcement to the "open skies" proposal made by the Government of the United States of America in 1955 and to the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept this proposal. Yes, the Soviet Government, like the governments of many other states, refused to accept this proposal which was intended to throw open the doors of other nations to American reconnaissance. The activities of American aviation only confirm the correctness of the evaluation given to this proposal at the time by the Soviet Government.

Does this not mean that, with the refusal of a number of states to accept this proposal for "open skies" the United States of America is attempting arbitrarily to take upon itself the right "to open" a foreign sky? It is enough to put question this way, for the complete groundlessness of the aforementioned reference to the United States of America's "open skies" proposal to become clear.

It follows from the aforementioned May 7 announcement of the United States State Department that the hostile acts of American aviation, which have taken place numerous times in relation to the Soviet Union, are not simply the result of the activity of military commands of the United States in various areas but are the expression of a calculated United States policy. That while the Soviet Government has repeatedly declared in its representations to the Government of the United States of America in connection with violations of the USSR national boundaries by

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American airplanes has been confirmed, namely, that these violations are premeditated. All this testifies that the Government of the United States of America, instead of taking measures to stop such actions by American aviation, the danger of which has more than once been pointed out by the Soviet Government, officially announces such actions as its national policy.

Thus, the Government of the United States of America, in the first place, testifies to the fact that its answers to representations of the Soviet Government were only for sake of form, behind which was concealed an effort to avoid the substance of the issue, and that all violations by American aircraft of the National boundaries of USSR represented actions conforming to US policy.

In the second place, and this is the main point, by sanctioning such actions of American aviation, the Government of the United States aggravates the situation even more.

One must ask, how is it possible to reconcile this with declarations on the part of leading figures of the United States of America, that a government of the United States like the Soviet Government, also strives for improvement of relations between the USSR and US, for relaxation of international tension, and the strengthening of trust between states. Military intelligence activities of one nation by means of intrusion of its aircraft into the area of another country can hardly be called a method for improving relations and strengthening trust.

It is self-evident that the Soviet Government is compelled, under such circumstances, to give strict orders to its armed forces to take all necessary measures against the violation of Soviet boundaries by foreign aviation. The Government of USSR regretfully states that, while it undertakes everything possible for normalization and improvement of international situation, the Government of the United States of America follows a different path. It is impossible to exclude the thought that, apparently, the two governments view differently the necessity for improving relations between our countries and for the creation of a favorable ground for the success of the forthcoming summit meeting.

The Soviet Government, as well as all of the Soviet people, considered that personal meetings and discussions with the President of the United States of America and other American official figures which Chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR had during his visit in the United States of America, made a good beginning in the cause of normalizing Soviet-American

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relations and therefore the improvement of the entire international situation as well. However, latest actions of the American authorities apparently seek to return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the "cold war" and to poison the international situation before the summit meeting.

The Government of the USSR cannot avoid pointing out that, the State Department's statement, which is unprecedented in its cynicism, not only justifies the provocative flights of aircraft of the armed forces of the United States but also acknowledges that such actions are "a normal phenomenon" and thus in fact states that in the future the United States intends to continue provocative invasions into confines of airspace of the Soviet Union for the purpose of intelligence.

Thus the Government of the USSR concludes that the announcement of the State Department that a flight was carried out without knowledge and permission of the Government of the United States does not correspond to reality, since in the very same announcement the necessity for carrying on intelligence activities against the Soviet Union is justified. This means that espionage activities of American aircraft are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the United States of America.

The Government of the Soviet Union made an emphatic protest to the Government of the United States in connection with the aggressive acts of American aviation and warns that, if similar provocations are repeated, it will be obliged to take retaliatory measures, responsibility for consequences of which will rest on governments of states committing aggression against other countries.

The Soviet Government would sincerely like to hope that the Government of the United States recognizes in final analysis that interests of preserving and strengthening peace among peoples including interests of American people itself, whose striving for peace was well demonstrated during the visit of head of Soviet Government N.S. Khrushchev to the United States, would be served by cessation of aforementioned dangerous provocative activities with regard to the USSR, by cessation of the "cold war," and by a search through joint efforts with the Soviet Union and with other interested states for the solution of unsettled international problems, on a mutually acceptable basis, which is awaited by all peoples.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 5US Note to USSR of May 12

The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Soviet Government's of May 10 concerning the shooting down of an American unarmed civilian aircraft on May 1, and under instruction from its Government, has the honor to state the following.

The United States Government, in the statement issued by the Department of State on May 9, has fully stated its position with respect to this incident.

In its note the Soviet Government has stated that the collection of intelligence about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a "calculated policy" of the United States. The United States Government does not deny that it has pursued such a policy for purely defensive purposes. What it emphatically does deny is that this policy has any aggressive intent, or that the unarmed U-2 flight of May 1 was undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris or to "return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the cold war." Indeed, it is the Soviet Government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intentions in respect to these matters.

For its part, the United States Government will participate in the Paris meeting on May 16 prepared to cooperate to the fullest extent in seeking agreement designed to reduce tensions, including effective safeguards against surprise attack which would make unnecessary issues of this kind.

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Annex I

Document No. 6

Letter From Vershinin to General White
Dated May 12

Dear Mr. General:

As you know in my letter of April 29 this year I accepted with thanks your invitation to visit US as a guest of USAF.

In connection with recent events known to you, I have considered it necessary to reconsider question of my journey to US and would like to state frankly my reasons therefor.

I think you will agree with me that at present time unfavorable circumstances have been created for successful accomplishing of purposes envisaged in exchange of visits of this kind.

In this atmosphere it is my opinion that it would be more appropriate to postpone my visit to US until a more suitable time.

Dear General, you will distinctly understand the motives which guide me in writing this letter to you.

Respectfully.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 7USSR Note to US of May 16

In connection with the note of the US Embassy, May 12, 1960, USSR declares the following:

In the said note US Government admits that the illegal intrusion by American planes into the confines of the Soviet Union and other states for the purpose of military espionage represents official policy of the United States. The U. S. Government, before the whole world, thereby proclaims as its political course in relations with other states a policy of conscious provocation, a calculated gross violation of international law and sovereignty of states, including one of its chief principles -- territorial inviolability of states.

Such a policy leads not only to an intensification of tension, suspicion, and mistrust in relations among states but also creates an atmosphere dangerous to the cause of peace. The statement by the secretary of State of May 9, to which reference is made in the Embassy note, just as subsequent public statements by US leaders, is an attempt to justify hostile actions which are permissible only in relations between states which are at war with each other.

A shameless incursion into the bounds of another state, whether it be by land, water, or air cannot be viewed otherwise than as an act of aggression, and the attempt to justify and legalize these actions is nothing other than a sermon of aggression. There can be no doubt that such a policy of the US Government, which brushes aside the elementary norms of international law and order and the principles of the UN Charter, will be decisively condemned throughout the world.

The question inevitably arises: How, in the light of these proclamations of such a policy by the US Government, can one believe its statements on aspirations for peace and an easing of international tension? In general, what talk can there be of trust in the foreign policy of the US Government while it remains in the position of justifying and preaching aggression?

The USSR Government considers it necessary to warn once again with all clarity that in the event of new attempts at an aggressive intrusion into the airspace of the Soviet Union, the intruding aircraft will be immediately annihilated. The policy of aggression and provocation proclaimed by the US Government

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renders vulnerable also those states whose governments, disregarding the interests of their peoples, provide their territories as sites for American bases from which are sent out aircraft to intrude into the airspace of our country; for, with regard to these states, the requisite measures will be taken by the Soviet Union, not excluding a blow at the aforementioned bases.

As far as the statement of the US Government is concerned, regarding the fact that the USSR will be prepared at the conference of heads of government in Paris to seek agreements directed at a reduction of international tension, the Soviet Union considers that the time has come for the US Government to display concern for this not in words but in deeds, and, first of all, to condemn the provocative actions of its aviation with regard to the Soviet Union, and to reject the policy of aggressive intrusion into the airspace of other states proclaimed by it, a policy most dangerous to the cause of peace.

The Soviet Government continues to support the restoration of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It depends on the US Government, and on it alone, whether the obstacles which have now arisen on the road to this objective will be removed.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 8USSR Note to Pakistan, May 13

A military aircraft violated the USSR frontier at 0536 hours, Moscow time, on May 1 of this year and penetrated more than 2,000 kilometers within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, naturally, could not leave such a gross violation of the Soviet state frontier unpunished. When the intentions of the intruder plane became clear, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the Sverdlovsk area.

Expert investigation of all the data possessed by the Soviet side has irrefutably established that the intruder plane belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and sent via Pakistan with a hostile mission into the Soviet Union.

The detailed results of the investigation, as announced by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev at the final May 7 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, leave no doubt as to the purposes of the American plane which violated the Soviet border on May 1. This aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type was specially equipped for an intelligence and subversion flight over Soviet Union territory. It was equipped with apparatus for aerial photography and for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radiotechnical means included in the Soviet Union's anti-aircraft defenses. The Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation possesses irrefutable proof of the American plane's espionage mission: films with photographed Soviet defense and industry targets, tape-recorded signals of the Soviet radar stations, and other materials.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish air force base of Incirlik near Adana, whence it flew on April 27 to the Peshawar airport in Pakistan. The flight map taken from the American spy pilot Powers, who survived, clearly shows the entire course he had to fly after leaving the Turkish city of Adana: Peshawar; the Ural Sea; Sverdlovsk; Archangel-Murmansk; and then the Norwegian airport of Bodoe, where he was to land.

The spy pilot divulged that he serves with the American unit 10-10, stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude intelligence, and that he, for one, has flown more than once along the Turkish-Soviet border with a view to studying the Soviet Union's anti-aircraft radar defense system.

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Confronted with these irrefutable facts, the US State Department was compelled to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet border on May 1 of this year, was sent into the Soviet Union on an intelligence mission. It was thereby admitted that this flight pursued aggressive purposes.

The USSR Government cannot disregard the part played in the preparation and implementation of this act, which was hostile to the Soviet Union, by Pakistan, from whose territory the provocative intrusion of the American plane into the Soviet airspace was undertaken.

In its statements of December 26, 1958, February 20, 1959, and March 25, 1959, the Soviet Government has already called attention of the Pakistani Government to the grave consequences connected with loaning Pakistani territory to establish foreign war bases, and their use by third powers for aggressive purposes against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states.

The takeoff from Pakistani territory of a US Air Force plane, which penetrated into the Soviet Union on May 1st of this year, again confirms with ample clarity what a dangerous policy the Pakistani Government pursues by allowing foreign armed forces to use its territory.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests with the Government of Pakistan in connection with the granting of Pakistani territory to the United States for the commitment of aggressive actions against the USSR by the American air force and warns that if such actions are repeated from Pakistani territory, it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union possesses means to render harmless in case of need the war bases used for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the consequences will be borne both by the governments of the States committing aggression against other nations and by the governments of the countries which are accomplices in it.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 9Pakistan Note to the USSR, May 24

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations presents its compliments to the Embassy of the USSR, and with reference to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, note dated the 13th of May, 1960, has the honour to state as follows:

The Government of Pakistan denies that it has played any part in the preparation and execution of the flight of any aircraft for the purpose of military intelligence over USSR. Pakistan has never given any facilities to any foreign aircraft known to be engaged in collecting intelligence and has no intention in the future of departing from its firm policy in this respect.

After due inquiry it has been ascertained that no aircraft took off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of the USSR. It was publicly stated by the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan that in case any American plane, taking off from Peshawar had been diverted to USSR in the course of its flight, without knowledge of Pakistan and when Pakistan authorities had no control over it, Pakistan has cause for bitter complaint against the Government of the United States.

A formal protest was lodged later, demanding that the Government of the United States must assure the Government of Pakistan that no such incident would be allowed to take place in the future.

An assurance to that effect has been received from the Government of the United States of America.

The Government of the USSR has reiterated its oft-repeated allegation that the Government of Pakistan has military bases on its territory. It has also attested that these bases are used for aggressive purposes. The Government of Pakistan wishes again to point out, as it has done on many previous occasions, that there are no foreign military bases in Pakistan and therefore the question of their being put to aggressive purposes does not arise.

While sympathizing with the desire of the Government of the USSR to safeguard its air space against unfriendly intrusions, the Government of Pakistan deems it necessary to point out that its own air space in West Pakistan has been violated several

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times in recent months. The type of aircraft used in these operations and their direction of flight indicate that these must have been Soviet airplanes. The Government of Pakistan hopes that flights of this nature over Pakistan territory will not re-occur in the future.

The Government of Pakistan wishes to make it plain that Pakistan desires nothing but peace and friendliness with all its neighbors. It has no aggressive designs; Its own territory is its only concern, and to guard it, is its sacred duty. This duty, it will perform in all circumstances. The Government of Pakistan assures the Government of USSR that Pakistan wishes and intends to live in peace and friendship with USSR.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of USSR the assurances of its highest consideration.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 10

USSR Note to Pakistan, June 22

In connection with the reply of the Government of Pakistan dated May 24 of the current year to the note of the USSR Government dated May 13 about the fact that Pakistan made its territory available for the carrying out by the US Air Force of aggressive actions against the USSR, the Government of the USSR deems it necessary to state the following:

In its reply the Government of Pakistan reports that it made an official protest to the US Government and demanded from the latter assurances that "not a single similar incident would be allowed in the future." In doing so, the Government of Pakistan admitted that a US aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type had been based on Pakistani territory and had taken off from there traveling deep into Soviet territory. At the same time, trying to evade responsibility for participation in this aggressive act, the Government of Pakistan tries to raise doubts as to whether the US aircraft was dispatched on its intelligence-diversionist flight from Peshawar airport and to contend that it had no connection with this flight.

This attempt by the Government of Pakistan contradicts accurately established facts which are confirmed not only by statements of US spy pilot Powers and the flight route map taken from him, but also by admissions by the US Government itself.

The facts, however, are these: A US military aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type arrived at Peshawar airport April 27 from the Incirlik air force base on Turkish territory and remained at the Pakistani airport for three days. There final preparations for its flight were made. On May 1 this aircraft took off from Peshawar airport and flew into the USSR. It is common knowledge that this aircraft had no markings and could for that reason alone not help but to attract the attention of the relevant Pakistani authorities, who should have forbidden both the arrival of such an aircraft on Pakistani territory and its departure, taking into account that the Pakistani authorities must exercise proper control over their territory. But this was not done by the Government of Pakistan.

If one were to deny the facts and suppose that the claims of the Government of Pakistan contained in its note, that it did not know anything about the intended flight of the US aircraft over

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USSR territory from Peshawar airport and had not participated in preparations for such a flight, somehow correspond to reality, one could not help conclude that the United States controls Pakistani airports as though they were its own military bases and does not have to account to Pakistani authorities. But these claims by the Government of Pakistan cannot be reconciled with its other statements, particularly its statements to the effect that there are no US military bases on Pakistani territory.

Thus, the facts make it completely obvious that between April 27 and May 1 of this year the US aircraft was being prepared on Pakistani territory for penetration into the USSR with the cooperation of Pakistani authorities, and that the Government of Pakistan has thus assumed the role of accomplice in this matter.

The government of Pakistan, apparently trying to extricate itself from the situation in which it found itself as a result of its participation in the carrying out by the US Air Force of an aggressive act against the USSR, points to some kind of violations of Pakistani airspace by Soviet aircraft. Wholly rejecting these groundless claims, the Soviet Government states that, in contrast to the United States, which violates generally accepted norms of international law, the USSR has always respected and continues to respect the national sovereignty and independence of other states, including Pakistan.

As for the claims by the Government of Pakistan of its wish to have good relations with the USSR, it is essential to note that Pakistani leaders have also made such statements previously, yet the present state of Soviet-Pakistani relations by no means points to a desire by Pakistani leaders to turn their words into practical deeds. Nor is this confirmed by the aforementioned note of the Government of Pakistan, in which, instead of giving a clear answer about the prevention in the future of the use of Pakistani territory by the US Air Force for aggression against the USSR, the Government of Pakistan tries to evade responsibility, referring to some kind of assurances by US authorities.

The value of these assurances, one would have thought, are well known to the Government of Pakistan. It cannot help knowing that, under the impact of the facts, the mendacious assertions by the US Government in connection with the flight of the US aircraft into the USSR were refuted one by one. Taking this into account, the USSR Government cannot help conclude that the Government of Pakistan underestimates the full seriousness of the question and the danger which threatens Pakistan as

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a result of the use made by the United States of airports of its military bloc allies, particularly if one takes into account that the calculations of US militarist circles rely on the fact that their allies would, in case US aggressive circles provoke a military conflict, take the main burden of the first blow.

The USSR Government reaffirms the position it outlined in its note dated May 13 and reiterates that if in the future provocative flights by aircraft are made against the USSR from Pakistani territory, the Soviet Government will, with a view toward guaranteeing the security of the Soviet people, be forced to take the necessary steps, to the point of dealing blows at bases which may be used for carrying out such flights.

Using this opportunity, the USSR Government reiterates that it would like to have friendly relations, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, with Pakistan as its close neighbor. Such relations would best meet the interests of the peoples of the USSR and Pakistan and would be a worthy contribution to the cause of the struggle for world peace. But such relations can arise only when both parties aspire to building them and when the Government of Pakistan appreciates the full danger of making Pakistani territory available as an arsenal to be used by US militarist circles for carrying out aggressive acts against the USSR.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 11The Pakistan Aide Memoire to the US, May 14

Our enquiries show that no aircraft has taken off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of Soviet Russia. In case any American plane taking off from Peshawar has been diverted to Soviet Russia in the course of its flight, and Soviet allegation that American aircraft which has been brought down in Soviet Russia took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause for bitter complaint. The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concerned refrain from such activities in future.

We are making a statement to the press to this effect.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 12Pakistan Note to the US, May 19

The Ambassador of Pakistan presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to the Aide Memoire left with Mr. Frederic P. Bartlett, Director of South Asian Affairs by Mr. K.M. Kaiser, Minister of this Embassy on Saturday, the 14th of May, 1960. Under instructions from the Government, the Ambassador of Pakistan wishes to state that this Aide Memoire may be considered as a protest from the Government of Pakistan. In view of the circumstances mentioned in the Aide Memoire the Government of Pakistan shall be grateful for an assurance that any facilities that may be made available to the United States Government by the Government of Pakistan would not be used for any such purposes in future without the knowledge and concurrence of the Government of Pakistan.

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US Note to Pakistan, May 22

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Pakistan and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's note of May 19 regarding the use of airfields in Pakistan by American aircraft. In this connection the Government of the United States is pleased to give the assurances requested by the Government of Pakistan.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 14Afghanistan Note to Pakistan, May 18

From irrefutable information about the forcing down of an American U-2 plane in the vicinity of Sverdlosk, USSR, and from the confessions of Mr. Powers, the pilot of the said plane, and also on the basis of the map recovered from the pilot which shows the route of the flight, it becomes apparent that the said plane had the illegal duty of espionage in the Soviet Union, and that the plane flew from a military base of Pakistan and after an illegal and unauthorized flight over Afghanistan entered the Soviet Union.

This flight which took place from military bases of Pakistan with the permission of the Government of Pakistan involves the Government of Pakistan in this undesirable violation which is absolutely in contravention of international law and contrary to accepted international practice, and damages the atmosphere of peace in this area and aggravates international tension.

As regards the violation of the air space of Afghanistan, perpetrated with the permission of the Government of Pakistan and from its military bases by a third country with unlawful motives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protests and places on the Government of Pakistan responsibility for the great danger resulting from its attitude.

The Royal Government of Afghanistan is awaiting necessary elucidations and also assurance from the Government of Pakistan that no opportunity will be provided in future for such a violation by the said government.

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Pakistan Note to Afghanistan, June 4

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations presents its compliments to the Royal Afghan Embassy with reference to the Note No. 947, dated the 18th May, 1960, handed over to the Ambassador of Pakistan at Kabul, has the honour to state that the allegation contained in the above note that a flight of the US plane, which was brought down in the USSR, originated from Peshawar airfield in Pakistan with the cooperation of the Government of Pakistan, is incorrect. In this context the attention of the Royal Afghan Government is invited to the following statement issued on the 14th May, 1960, in London by Mr. E. Ikramullah, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan:-

"Our enquiry shows that no aircraft has taken off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of Soviet Russia. In case any American plane taking off from Peshawar has been diverted to Soviet Russia in course of its flight, and Soviet allegation that American aircraft which has been brought down in Soviet Russia, took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause for bitter complaint. The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concerned refrain from such activities in future."

It will be obvious from the above statement that if such a flight took place it was without the knowledge and approval of the Government of Pakistan. Under these circumstances there is no valid reason for the protest lodged by the Royal Afghan Government and the said protest therefore is hereby rejected.

The Government of Pakistan, however, wishes to draw the attention of the Royal Afghan Government to the Note No. AF.(I)/1/54/59, dated the 10th November, 1959, delivered to the Royal Afghan Embassy in Karachi protesting against repeated and frequent violations of Pakistan air space and Pakistan territory by unauthorized flights of aircraft from Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan regrets to note that no assurance has so far been received from the Royal Afghan

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Government that such flights would cease and while again renewing a strong protest on those flights expresses the hope that they will not be permitted to recur in the future.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 16Afghanistan Note to Pakistan, June 21 (Excerpt)

Because of real facts and evidence that is clear to everyone, Ministry Foreign Affairs considers (Pakistan reply) not only unsatisfactory but intentional deviation from facts of case. It also considers this conduct of Government of Pakistan and its denial of assurance that such flights, which endanger peace of this region and that of the world, will not take place in the future as indication of ill-intentions Government of Pakistan. Therefore the earlier Afghan protest is once more confirmed.

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Annex No. III

Document No. 17

USSR Note to Turkey, May 13

A military aircraft violated the Soviet border at 0536 hours, Moscow time, on May 1 of this year, and penetrated more than 2,000 kilometers within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, naturally, could not leave such a gross violation of the Soviet state frontier unpunished. When the intentions of the intruder plane became obvious, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the Sverdlovsk area.

Expert investigation of all the data possessed by the Soviet side has irrefutably established that the intruder plane belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey, and sent via Pakistan into the Soviet Union on a hostile mission.

Detailed results of the investigation, as announced by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev at the final May 7 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, leave no doubt as to the purposes of the American plane, which violated the Soviet frontier on May 1. This aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type was specially equipped for an intelligence and subversion flight over USSR territory. It carried apparatus for aerial photography and for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radiotechnical means included in the Soviet anti-aircraft defense system. The Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation possesses irrefutable evidence of the American plane's espionage mission: films with photographed Soviet defense and industry targets, tape-recorded signals of the Soviet radar stations, and other materials.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish air force base of Incirlik near Adana, from where it flew on April 27 to the airport of Peshawar, Pakistan. The flight map taken from the American spy pilot Powers, who survived, shows clearly the entire course he had to fly after leaving Adana: Peshawar; the Aral Sea; Sverdlovsk; Archangel; Murmansk; and finally the Norwegian airport of Bodoe, where he was to land.

The spy pilot divulged that he served with the American unit 10-10, stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude intelligence, and that he, for one, made repeated flights along the Turkish-Soviet frontier in order to study the anti-aircraft radar system of the Soviet Union.

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Confronted with these irrefutable facts, the US State Department was compelled to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet border on May 1 of this year, was sent into the Soviet Union on an intelligence mission. Thereby it was admitted that this flight pursued aggressive purposes.

The Soviet Government cannot disregard the part played in the preparation and implementation of this hostile act against the Soviet Union by the Turkish Republic, in whose territory the American intruder plane was based and prepared for the flight.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state to the Government of Turkey that by lending its territory to the United States for setting up war bases and for carrying out aggressive acts against the Soviet Union by the US Air Force, it becomes an accomplice in such acts and thereby has a grave responsibility for the possible dangerous consequences of such actions. All this by no means agrees with the statements of Turkish leaders about their desire to help consolidate peace, ease international tension, and improve Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government earlier warned the Government of Turkey about the danger of the situation when Turkish territory is used as a military place d'armes by third powers. The Soviet side has drawn attention to this fact when the Soviet airspace was violated by foreign planes and balloons from Turkish territory. In the light of the above, the Soviet Government cannot help concluding that the Government of Turkey has not heeded these warnings of the Soviet Union dictating concern for the preservation of peace and a desire to improve Soviet-Turkish relations.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests to the Government of the Turkish Republic against the opportunity given to foreign warplanes to use Turkish territory for preparing and carrying out intrusions into the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to warn that if such provocations are repeated from the territory of Turkey it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has means to render harmless, if necessary, the war bases used for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that all responsibility for the consequences will be borne both by the governments of the states committing aggression against other countries and the accomplices in this aggression.

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Annex III

Document No. 18

Turkish Note to the USSR, May 26

The Turkish Government has studied, with all the attention which it requires, the Note which the Soviet Government has been pleased to deliver to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, with the date of May 13, 1960, on the subject of the American aircraft knocked (abbattu) down within the Soviet airspace on the first of May, 1960.

The Turkish Government considers it necessary from the outset to convey to the Soviet Government the knowledge that the incident relative to the overflight of Soviet airspace by an American aircraft and the dispute which has resulted therefrom cannot be the object of a discussion between the Turkish and Soviet Governments.

On the other hand, the Turkish Government does not intend to render a judgement upon this event, which has already been submitted to the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

The Turkish Government also desires to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the fact that the airplane in question did not penetrate into the Soviet airspace, based on the statement of the competent Soviet authorities themselves, until three days after having departed from Turkish soil. This clearly proves that the Turkish airspace was not utilized for the overflight of Soviet airspace.

Moreover, the Turkish Government is also in a position to declare in a categorical manner that Turkey has never accorded to any aircraft whatever the authorization to pass from its airspace into the Soviet airspace without the aircraft in question having obtained the requisite permission. The Turkish Government likewise desires to state moreover, that the American authorities have never submitted such a request.

In view of the preceding, the Turkish Government desires to convey the following clarifications:

The responsibility of the Turkish authorities can not go beyond the limits of Turkish airspace. It is evident that authorizations granted to foreign aircraft overflying Turkish airspace

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are not granted except in conformity with the provisions of international law controlling the matter. In that which concerns flights outside of Turkish airspace, the Turkish Government fails to see how it can be held to assume responsibility except when it concerns authorized flights of aircraft of Turkish nationality.

Consequently, the Turkish Government is unable to accept in any manner the accusation put forward in the above-mentioned Note of the Soviet Government with regard to its responsibility arising from the fact that the American aircraft in question had utilized the air base at Incirlik prior to its departure for a destination in a third country other than the USSR.

With respect to the remark made by the Soviet Government relative to the use of certain Turkish bases by third governments and particularly by the Government of the United States, the Government of Turkey hastens to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government that as a sovereign state Turkey has the right, in conformity with the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, to put its air bases at the disposal of its allies with a purely defensive aim. Otherwise said, the Government of Turkey has never granted and will never grant to the aircraft of allied or other powers the right to use its bases or its air space with an aggressive aim which could prejudice the security or tranquility of its neighbors.

Furthermore, the Turkish Government can even declare to the Soviet Union that the arrangement existing between itself and the American Government does not permit American aircraft to fly in Turkish airspace without the authorization of the competent Turkish services and subjects them in this respect to the authority of the Turkish Government.

Under these conditions it is easy to understand that the Turkish Government can only reject the accusations and remarks brought to its attention in the Note of the Soviet Government.

With respect to the previous cases of overflights of Soviet territory to which reference was made in the above-mentioned Note, the Turkish Government had at the time clearly explained to the Soviet Government the reasons for which also in these cases no part of the responsibility whatsoever could be attributed to it.

On the other hand, the Turkish Government wishes to point out in this connection that the Turkish authorities had found themselves compelled on several occasions to formulate complaints on the subject of unauthorized overflights of Turkish airspace by Soviet aircraft.

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The Turkish Government is of the opinion that all these incidents should be resolved in conformity with the customary rules and principles of international law. Demarches which exceed this frame are certainly not of a nature to serve the interests of the parties and to contribute to the safeguarding of peace.

Before finishing the Turkish Government wishes to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government that Turkey, which has always founded its policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, has never ceased to devote itself to the establishment of the best relations with its neighbors, and that it has adhered only to those alliances which have a purely defensive character, with the aim of assuring its independence and contributing to the safeguarding of peace. And these alliances can never be considered to be of a nature to prevent Turkey from having the best of relations with countries which are not members of these alliances (but) which nourish the same desires with regard to Turkey and the same attachment to the ideal of peace.

Turkey would be very happy to see all its neighbors inspired by the same principles and showing as much solicitude as it does for the establishment of relations of good neighborliness.

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Annex IV

Document No. 19

USSR Note to Norway, May 13

A military aircraft violated the Soviet frontier at 0436 hours Moscow time, May 1, and flew over 2,000 kilometers deep into the Soviet Union. The USSR Government could not, naturally, have left such a gross violation of the Soviet national frontiers unpunished. As soon as the intentions of the intruding plane became obvious it was shot down by Soviet missile forces in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk.

An expert examination of all the evidence at the Soviet Union's disposal has put it beyond dispute that the invading plane belongs to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey, and was sent to the Soviet Union via Pakistan for hostile purposes.

The exact findings of the investigation, as reported by the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, at the closing meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session May 7, leave no room for doubt as to the purposes behind the flight of the American plane which violated the Soviet frontier on May 1. This plane, of the Lockheed U-2 type, was expressly equipped for reconnaissance and subversory flight over Soviet Union territory.

The plane carried equipment for aerial photography and the detection of Soviet radar networks and other special radio-engineering facilities of the Soviet antiaircraft defenses. The Soviet expert commission, which made the inquiry, has incontrovertible evidence at its disposal of the spying and reconnaissance mission of the American plane: rolls of film showing Soviet defense and industrial establishments; a tape recording of the signal of Soviet radar stations; and other evidence.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish airbase at Incirlik, near Adana, from where it flew to the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, April 27.

The route map taken from the surviving American spy flyer, Powers, clearly and distinctly indicates the entire route which he was instructed to follow after taking off from the Turkish city of Adana: Peshawar, the Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk, Archangel, and Murmansk, with subsequent landing at the Bodoe airfield in Norway. The spy flyer reported that he was serving with the American 10-10 unit stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude aerial reconnaissance, and that he had, notably, made repeated flights along the Turkish-Soviet frontier for the purpose of studying Soviet antiaircraft radar networks.

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In the face of these incontrovertible facts, the US State Department has had to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet frontier May 1, had been sent into the Soviet Union for military reconnaissance. This meant recognizing that the flight had aggressive purposes.

The American pilot testifies that in the course of thorough preparation for his flight over USSR territory, made well in advance, he had, on the instructions of his command, made a preliminary flight from Turkey to Norway via Greece, Italy, and the Federal German Republic, and stayed there for two to three weeks studying landing conditions at the Bodoe airfield.

It should be recalled in this connection that as early as January 1959, the Soviet Government, having received exact and verified information about deliberate reconnaissance flights to Soviet territory by American military planes from Norwegian territory, and specifically the Bodoe airfield, already told the Norwegian Government that such a state of affairs was intolerable. In its reply, the Government of Norway did not deny that planes of third countries received permission from the Norwegian authorities in isolated cases to spy on Norwegian territory temporarily, allegedly for joint flights with aircraft of the Norwegian air force.

The Government of Norway said that these flights were made only with the permission of the Norwegian authorities and that, under Norwegian rules, allied planes were not allowed to fly across Norwegian territory east of the 24th degree Eastern longitude. But already it was clear that these assurances were an attempt to exonerate Norway's partners in the aggressive NATO bloc and to whitewash their actions which are a threat to peace and security in the north of Europe, actions for which Norwegian territory, too, is used. Now, the provocative flight over Soviet territory by an American plane which was to land on the Norwegian airfield at Bodoe proves irrefutably that the Norwegian Government did not heed the warnings of the Soviet Government. Moreover, it has in fact become an accessory to provocative actions by the United States against Norway's neighbor, the Soviet Union.

In view of the aforesaid, the question is posed: What is the real worth of the Norwegian Government's repeated assurances that the territory of Norway will not be made available in peacetime for the stationing of foreign armed forces, if this territory is already being used by planes of the US Air Force making aggressive flights into the confines of the Soviet Union? The Soviet Government calls attention to the Government of Norway to the fact that it is difficult to regard these actions otherwise than as unfriendly to the

Soviet Union and incompatible with the normal good neighbor relations between the two countries, and considers it necessary to stress that the Government of Norway bears a not inconsiderable share of the responsibility for the aggressive acts undertaken by the American air force with regard to the Soviet Union.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests strongly to the Government of Norway against allowing foreign military aircraft to use Norwegian territory for the preparation and commissioning of intrusions into Soviet airspace.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to warn that if such provocations continue from the territory of Norway, it will be obliged to take appropriate measures in reply. It will be recalled that the Soviet Union has the means which, if necessary, will make it possible to fully incapacitate the military bases used for the commissioning of aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the consequences will rest both with the governments of the states committing aggression against other nations, and the governments of the countries which are their accomplices.

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Annex No. IV

Document No. 20

Norwegian Note to USSR, May 27

The Norwegian Government has closely examined the contents of the note from the Government of the Soviet Union of May 13 and would like to communicate the following:

In its note the Government of the Soviet Union draws the attention of the Norwegian Government to the violation of the frontiers of the Soviet Union by an American aircraft, which flew over parts of the territory of the Soviet Union. Based upon the information that the pilot of the aircraft was equipped with a map indicating Bodo airfield as his destination, the Soviet Government protests against foreign aircraft being given the opportunity of using Norwegian territory in order to prepare and to carry out penetrations into the Soviet Union.

In this connection the Norwegian Government would like to make the following observations:

In its declarations to the "Storting" on May 9 and May 13, the Norwegian Government made it clear that no Norwegian civil or military authority had cooperated in any way in the execution of the flight in question. In these declarations the Government stated its reaction to this incident and explained the steps taken in the matter. Reference is made in this respect to the Foreign Ministers press release of May 19. The government has thus in the "Storting" openly presented the available information regarding this matter. The contents of the two declarations have also been brought to the knowledge of the Soviet Government on the understanding that the relations between our two countries must be based on frankness and sincerity.

In its note of May 13 the Soviet Government assert that the aircraft incident on May 1 diminishes the value of the Norwegian assurances regarding the stationing of foreign armed forces in Norway. This assumption is made on the grounds that Norwegian territory "already now is put at the disposal of aircraft of the United States Air Force penetrating into the Soviet Union for aggressive purposes". As is evident from the statements made by the Norwegian Government, there is no basis for such assumptions.

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It has been and still is the policy of the Norwegian Government never to permit the use of Norwegian territory for acts violating the territory of another country.

The Norwegian Government fully recognizes the need of the Soviet Union to safeguard its interests and its national security. Norway for its part has the same needs which the Norwegian Government endeavours to satisfy in the most appropriate way. The Government is fully conscious of the considerations which in this connection must be given to all legitimate interests of Norway's neighboring countries. It is thus essential to ensure that the good and confident neighborly relations with the Soviet Union are not endangered by the fact that Norway has safeguarded its security by participating in a regional defense alliance. It will always be a major aim of Norwegian foreign policy to maintain and strengthen these neighborly relations.

Against this background the Government of the Soviet Union will no doubt understand that the Norwegian Government must regret the warnings of measures against Norwegian territory contained in the Soviet note of May 13. The Norwegian Government cannot see that any steps have been taken by Norway in connection with this incident which can in any way be interpreted as unfriendly acts towards the Soviet Union, or which in any other way justify such warnings.

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Document No. 21

The Norwegian Pour Memoire to US, May 13

On the basis of the information available to Norwegian Government it seems evident that an American aircraft of type Lockheed U-2 which according to Soviet sources was shot down over USSR on May 1, 1960, was bound for Bodø Airfield. Norwegian authorities had not received any request for permission to land this particular aircraft. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that in this case landing on a Norwegian airfield would have been contrary to principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing of foreign reconnaissance aircraft.

The Norwegian Government must lodge its protest, and at same time ask that American authorities take all necessary steps to prevent similar incidents in the future.

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Annex No. IV

Document No. 22

US Aide Memoire in Reply to Norwegian Protests,
May 16

The US Government confirms that Norwegian authorities had not been requested to grant permission for American aircraft of type Lockheed U-2, which according to Soviet sources was shot down over USSR on May 1, 1960, to land at Bodoe airfield. Had such a landing been made on a Norwegian airfield, it would have been contrary to principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing of foreign aircraft.

The United States will continue to abide by those principles.

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Annex No. V

Document No. 23

Afghanistan Note to US, May 18

From irrefutable information about the forcing down of an American U-2 plane in the vicinity of Sverdlosk, USSR, and from the confessions of Mr. Powers, the pilot of the said plane, and also on the basis of the map recovered from the pilot which shows the route of the flight, it becomes apparent that the said plane had the illegal duty of espionage in the Soviet Union, and that the plane flew from a military base of Pakistan and after an illegal and unauthorized flight over Afghanistan entered the Soviet Union.

The Foreign Ministry of the Royal Government of Afghanistan considers this flight, in addition to being an act completely contrary to International Law and contrary to accepted relations between states and an unfriendly action part of United States Government and also considers such an act which takes place from a military base of another country in this area as disturbing to peace and a cause of increasing tension and conflict in this area as well as in international spheres.

In regard to the violation of Afghan air space by the American plane the Foreign Ministry of the Royal Government of Afghanistan strongly protests to the Government of the United States of America and awaits the necessary explanation as well as an assurance that such a violation of Afghan air space will not be repeated by the United States of America.

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Annex No. V

Document No. 24

US Note to Afghanistan, May 20

The Embassy of the United States Government refers to the Royal Government of Afghanistan note of May 18 concerning the forcing down of the American unarmed civilian aircraft on May 1 in the USSR and has the honor to state the following:

The United States Government notes with regret that the Royal Government of Afghanistan has interpreted a certain ex parte version of flight as unfriendly action by the United States Government. The United States Government entertains and has entertained only friendliest sentiments toward the Royal Government of Afghanistan and has never taken a course of action in the contrary sense. It is believed unnecessary to invite the attention of the Royal Government of Afghanistan to the history of US-Afghan relations to demonstrate the validity of this point.

With respect to the assurances desired by the Royal Government of Afghanistan and without prejudice to the exception taken by the United States Government to the charge of unfriendly action, the attention of the Royal Government of Afghanistan is invited to the public statement made on May 16, 1960 in Paris by President Eisenhower with respect to such flights. Quite apart from the route which this or any particular plane might have taken, the President said: "In point of fact these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed."

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Annex No. VI

Document No. 25Department's Instruction to MacArthur of May 9

1. In light your estimate situation in Japan, we are prepared to conclude specific undertaking with GOJ that we will not rpt not in absence armed attack against Japan fly any intelligence missions over non-Japanese territories from US facilities in Japan without rpt without prior consultation with GOJ. We desire to conclude this undertaking within framework Consultation Agreement. We would also give public assurances that lacking consent of GOJ we would not rpt not undertake such flights contrary to express wishes of GOJ.

2. With respect to past performances you may give Kishi assurance that U-2 equipment has been utilized only for legitimate scientific purposes. Realize such assurance will be accepted with some doubt in view recent happenings but our posture will certainly be none the worse for giving this assurance even with respect to past performance.

3. We also consider that it would be strongly in our interest to make public statement soonest along following lines: QTE US Government has given GOJ assurances that U-2 aircraft, flying from air bases in Japan, have been utilized only for legitimate normal and no intelligence overflight missions.

Under the new Treaty arrangements, the US Government has agreed to a specific consultation arrangement. If the GOJ requests such, US Government is prepared to make a further agreement clarifying that under this consultation agreement intelligence missions over non-Japanese territory from air bases in Japan will not rpt not be undertaken without prior consultation with the GOJ and in such consultation the US will not act contrary to views of Japanese Government. This formal undertaking will come into effect once the new Treaty arrangements are ratified by both Governments. UNQTE -- Department Telegram to Tokyo 2599.

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Annex No. VI

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Document No. 26MacArthur Report on Talks with Yamada, May 10

1. I deeply appreciate swift and constructive instructions which you sent me in REFTEL, which have been tremendously helpful.

2. I met privately early this morning with Vice ForMin Yamada and conveyed to him for Kishi and Fujiyama substance of REFTEL, including public statement we propose to make. Yamada expressed great appreciation and left at once to meet with Kishi and Fujiyama.

3. I have just returned from second private meeting with Yamada, who had just come from meeting with Kishi and Fujiyama. He first asked that Kishi's deep and heartfelt thanks be expressed to President and to you for our constructive proposal, which was greatly appreciated. He said Kishi and Fujiyama both wished us to know that they understood that US had to undertake intelligence activities and that such intelligence activities were important for security of US and its friends and allies. They did not rpt not wish to create problems for US in our intelligence activities but on other hand they had very difficult problem to handle in term of public opinion. While they appreciated scope of statement we were prepared to make on our willingness to expand "prior consultation" to include intelligence overflights, Kishi and Fujiyama felt it unnecessary, at this juncture, to enter into new formal and official agreement re consultation in cases of intelligence overflights. In fact, if we mentioned in our statement prior consultation for intelligence overflights from Japanese bases, GOJ, for public opinion purposes, would be obliged to say that it would not rpt not authorize such overflights. Kishi did not think this would be helpful from our viewpoint.

4. Therefore Kishi proposed that we make simple statement along following lines based on first sentence of statement in para 3 of REFTEL:

Begin Draft Statement: The US Government has given the GOJ assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only

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for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions. End Draft Statement.

Kishi said that although Socialist would cast doubt on good word and faith of U.S., he believed such statement would hold situation and therefore would not propose expanding "prior consultation" arrangement for overflights at this time.

5. Kishi strongly hopes Secretary or State Dept. can issue such statement as soon as possible. After statement is issued in Washington, he might, for public relations purposes in Japan, also wish to have me convey it formally to ForMin under first person note.

6. I strongly recommend that statement proposed above by Kishi be issued soonest in Washington, which I will subsequently transmit in first person note to Fujiyama if Kishi so desires. I feel that from our point of view Kishi's proposal is actually preferable to proposal in REFTEL.

Again, my deep appreciation for great speed with which such constructive action was taken on this very important matter. -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 3603.

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Document No. 27

Department's Instruction to MacArthur on Statement
of May 10

Department issuing statement as you request noon EDT May 10. If Kishi considers would be helpful his purposes you authorized pass first person note following similar language. FYI We assume Kishi understands our offer of specific undertaking on consultation remains available to him should subsequent events require such undertaking. -- Department Telegram to Tokyo 2610.

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Annex No. VI

Document No. 28Japan Note to US Dated May 12

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of our Excellency's note date 11 May 1960 in which was transmitted the text of the official statement made by the Department of State in Washington at 12:00 noon, Eastern Daylight Time, 10 May 1960, and to express my appreciation for your Excellency's prompt action in communicating the assurances of the United States Government concerning the missions of U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Aiichiro Fujiyama.

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Document No. 29Japan Informs MacArthur of New Soviet Note, May 21

Foreign Office has just informed us of new Soviet note to Japan protesting security treaty and illegal overflights by US aircraft. GOJ intends delay formal reply for few days but Foreign Office spokesman will issue informal statement later this afternoon. Vice Foreign Minister Yamada told us line not yet firm but he thought it would make following points:

- (1) Reiterate Japan-US security treaty purely defensive;
- (2) Note US assurances that U-2's based in Japan have not engaged in intelligence overflight missions; and
- (3) State that GOJ fully respects forms and obligations of international law and practice.

Yamada said two points in Soviet note presented great difficulties for GOJ during present widespread agitation re security treaty. Soviet note:

- (A) Obviously refers to intelligence overflights not only by U-2's but also by other US aircraft based in Japan; and
- (B) States US government has been warned by Soviet Union more than once before re such intelligence overflights.

Yamada asked as matter of great urgency for information to assist GOJ in preparing its formal reply to Soviet note which would have to be made soon. In particular GOJ believes statement that none of our planes has conducted or will conduct overflights is important together with information re alleged previous Soviet warnings.

While Diet Lower House has passed security treaty, Kishi's position is extremely difficult and he is in trouble. State of public opinion is such that major political crisis could build swiftly. As reference telegram emphasized, Kishi must be in position to make clear that none of our aircraft based in Japan has been engaged in, or

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will in future carry out, illegal overflights from bases in Japan. I again strongly urge, if we are in position to do so, that we make this clear at once in public statement to be issued by State Department (perhaps as comment on Soviet note). Also request Department send me soonest any background re Soviet allegation re previous warnings to US to which Soviet note refers so that I may pass this on to Foreign Office. If there were previous Soviet warnings did we in our replies deny overflights, admit we had overflown or what? -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 3784

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Annex No. VI.

Document No. 30Department's Instruction to MacArthur, May 28

You may inform Kishi or Yamada that in reply to his query regarding overflights of Soviet territory other than by U-2's from bases in Japan, we have been making a most thorough search of all flight records pertaining to bases in Japan and, having gone back several years as far as accurate records are still available, we can now state there have been no such overflights from Japanese territory. Assurances contained para one Deptel 2599 apply here, i.e., nor will there be any such overflights from Japanese territory in future without prior consultation GOJ. (You should point out that commitment to prior consultation in future is for confidential information Japanese Government and in accordance its wishes will not rpt not be publicized. Strongly hope in any reply to Soviets, GOJ will not rpt not reveal confidential commitment on prior consultation with respect to future.) As regards U-2's we have already stated publicly that the United States Government has given the Government of Japan assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions.

As regards previous Soviet warnings to the United States Government re border violations in the past ten years the Soviet Government has alleged in approximately half a dozen cases that U.S. aircraft intruded into Soviet air space in neighborhood of Japan. In most of these cases, allegations were that American aircraft were intercepted by Soviet fighters, that Soviet fighters either signaled American aircraft to leave Soviet air space or that American aircraft opened fire on Soviet interceptors, and that the incidents ended in alleged disappearance of American aircraft. In one or two cases, there was no allegation of interception. In only one of these cases has Soviet government made specific charges of an intelligence mission with respect to these flights.

The Soviet Government in its notes never made it a point of issue where the planes were based. Soviet charges

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of firing by American aircraft on Soviet planes or deliberate violation of Soviet air space, or in the one instance of specific reference to reconnaissance, have been rejected as untrue by American side and Soviet government has been invited to litigate issues of law and fact in International Court of Justice. This the Soviets have consistently refused to do. FYI Of these cases of intrusions four involved U.S. aircraft based in Japan. This to be used only if pressed by Japanese and in context these not overflights per our rejection Soviet protest. End FYI.

The foregoing summary excludes Korean war questions and aircraft under UN command in the Korean conflict.

Department does not repeat not wish to comment publicly on Soviet note to Japan and prefers not repeat not to make any further press statement on issues raised by Yamada. -- Department telegram to Tokyo 2826.

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Annex No. VI

Document No. 31MacArthur Report on Talk with Yamada, June 2

Substance REFTEL communicated to Vice ForMin Yamada. We emphasized that having gone back as far as records were available for past several years we could state none of our aircraft based in Japan has engaged in illegal overflights from bases in Japan, and we reviewed record previous Soviet warnings as presented REFTEL. We informed Yamada our willingness give assurances there would be no such overflights in future from Japanese territory without prior consultation. As Yamada did not press for additional details re Soviet protests we did not mention info that Soviet allegations in four cases involved US aircraft based in Japan.

Yamada has just informed us Kishi and Fujiyama are most grateful for our assurances and consider their position in forthcoming Upper House discussions on security treaty has been materially strengthened. GOJ most appreciative offer re prior consultation for any future intelligence overflights, but for reasons set out in EMBTEL 3603 does not wish at this time formal and official agreement, whether classified or public, expanding scope of prior consultation commitment to cover overflights from Japanese bases.

In view use of U-2 affairs Soviets are continuing make in their propaganda on foreign bases and attempts by Kishi's opponents to link new treaty with intelligence overflights, Kishi and Fujiyama believe it is indispensable for them to be able to state, without any qualification, that none of our aircraft based in Japan has carried out, or will in future engage in, illegal overflights from bases in Japan. Verbal assurances we have given them, they now believe, fully meet their present Diet and public opinion problem. If asked specifically in Diet whether GOJ would authorize any overflights from bases in Japan, GOJ will of course reply in negative.

Yamada said FonOff has been attempting draw heat from U-2 charges and quiet public agitation on issue as much as possible (EMBTELS 3953 and 3954). For this reason FonOff

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now does not plan to make immediate reply to Soviet note of U-2 of May 20 (EMBTEL 3784) but will wait for week or so and make one reply to this note and to earlier April 22 Soviet note protesting security treaty (EMBTEL 3452). Yamada said difficult to predict how soon U-2 issue will die down here as both Soviet propaganda broadcasts and those Japanese leftists under Communist control are determined to make situation as difficult as possible at this time. For all these reasons assurances we have now given GOJ are of vital importance to Kishi and Fujiyama, and Yamada reiterated their appreciation.

Yamada recalled that summary of previous Soviet protests we had communicated per REFTEL had excluded Korean war questions and aircraft under UN command in Korean conflict. He asked whether there were now in Japan any aircraft under UN command which were not covered by assurances we had given. We replied our understanding was there were no such UN aircraft based in Japan; that exclusion of "aircraft under UN command" from scope of our assurances was limited to Korean conflict prior to Korean armistice; and that all US operated aircraft flying from bases in Japan were covered by our present assurances. Would appreciate specific confirmation that our understanding is correct, since any other understanding of our assurances would raise grave problems involving continued use of our air bases here. -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 3986.

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Document No. 32Colonel Makino Informs MacArthur of Forgery; July 21

This afternoon Colonel Makino (Chief of Intelligence Japanese Air Self Defense Force Staff) called on Colonel Robert G. Emmens (Air Attache) with Yomiuri Assistant Editor and produced photostat of memorandum on Foreign Service stationery from Colonel Emmens to Ambassador marked Top Secret and dated May 7, 1960. Memo stated that U-2s based in Japan had been used to overfly Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Communist China, Soviet Union, and North Korea and recommended that we trick the Japanese by temporarily removing planes from Japan to Okinawa and return them secretly after hullabaloo over U-2s and anti-Kishi demonstrations died down.

Memorandum is extremely clever forgery as we informed Colonel Makino.

Ambassador had copies made of photostat and called personally on Vice ForMin Yamada requesting that Japanese police authorities undertake immediate investigation with view to trying to apprehend perpetrator of forgery. Yamada assured him that competent authorities would be asked to begin investigation immediately.

Ambassador also discussed public handling of forged document. Since it seemed apparent that story might break during the night and since subsequent denials never catch up with initial story, Yamada, who was having press conference at 6:30 p.m. this evening Japan time, said he would announce to press conference that Ambassador had called to acquaint him about forged document and had requested him to have Japanese authorities undertake immediate investigation with view to bringing guilty party to justice. Yamada will also say that persons who are circulating forged document are obviously trying to create further difficulties in Japanese-American relations in wake of difficulties already created by extremists which led to cancellation of President's visit.

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Embassy Press Attache is also making statement along similar lines to American and other correspondents. Line he will take is included in second following telegram.

Immediately preceding telegram was drafted before above information came into our possession. It strongly recommended that we give new Ikeda Govt assurances that US bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized for only legitimate and normal purposes and not for any intelligence overflight missions. Forged memorandum mentioned in this telegram lends added importance to recommendation in preceding message since it is clear pro-Communists intend to do utmost to keep overflight issue alive. -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 228.

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Annex No. VI.

Document No. 33

Text of Forged US Document

(Forged Memo was on blue seal Foreign Service Stationery, marked Top Secret, headed from Office of the US Air Attache, Tokyo, Japan, Memorandum To Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, From: Colonel Robert G. Emmans, dated 7 May 1960.)

In connection with the report which I made to you personally, I am pleased to comply with your request for a written summary of the information we have obtained from Japanese military quarters with respect to the possible reactions of the Kishi Govt. to Khrushchev's statement on the Lockheed U-2 incident.

According to our sources the Govt. of Japan is greatly concerned about Khrushchev's statement that the USSR is prepared to knock out military bases from which our U-2s operate. The reason, as you know, is that our U-2s based at Atsugi and Tachikawa in addition to making flights over Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, have operated over important military and industrial zones in Communist China, the Soviet Far East and Northern Korea as well. As a result, Japanese officials are of the opinion that the threat of Soviet retaliation represents a real danger to Japan.

Moreover the Japanese Government is under severe popular pressure since information concerning our U-2 operations has become widely known. Chief of the National Safety Agency Akagi has directed our attention to the fact that as early as December 1 of last year Socialist Deputy Ichiro Akukata, in a statement at a meeting of the Lower Chamber, mentioned the U-2 aerial photograph of coastal zones in China and Siberia. Then again on April 14 and 15 of this year, this question was touched upon in the discussion of the sources used in drawing up air planning charts for the Japanese National Safety Agency. Mr. Akagi has been informed that the Japanese opposition is about to launch a more vigorous and broader campaign against us and the Kishi regime.

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In view of the predicament in which the Japanese Government now finds itself -- and which has been further complicated by the mass demonstrations against the security treaty -- it is prepared to make official demands in the nearest future, perhaps by the 10th of this month, that the US Government withdraw all reconnaissance planes from its territory. If such a demand is made, it will seriously undermine our prestige and would also set off a chain reaction in other allied countries.

I consider it my duty to stress that the danger of such a demand being presented is real since Kishi, it is reported, very much fears that he may share the fate of Mr. Syngman Rhee. For this reason, I believe we should distract Japanese public opinion from the issue by stating that we have stopped our U-2 flights from Japanese territories and that such planes are no longer located at the Atsugi and Tactikawa bases. At the same time, we should temporarily transfer all U-2 planes from the main islands to Okinawa where we can conceal our operations much better. When the anti-Kishi demonstrations die down, we could return our planes to Japan proper in line with our geographic and strategic interests.

To prevent discovery of this maneuver by the Japanese public, AF headquarters is prepared not to use natives at the NW U-2 location sites and to strengthen security measures. Our military authorities will also tighten censorship over communications between Okinawa and the main islands.

At this point, I should like to comment briefly concerning the situation on Okinawa itself.

According to information received from the island, disaffection among the natives, including land owners, is mounting in view of our continued requisition of the property and the low rental fees which they receive. This disaffection may easily develop into big mass demonstrations against our bases, and stir up similar agitation throughout Japan. In order to avert further trouble it seems to me that we should double or treble our rental payments. This way the Japanese would have much less objection to our requisition of their property.

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At the same time we should strengthen our propaganda on Okinawa by pointing out that the expansion of our military bases will stimulate the building of new railroads, ports, medical centers, the development of agricultural and marketing facilities and the increase of employment for the natives -- in other words, we could show that the Japanese have more to gain than the Americans.

The substance of this memorandum has been communicated to the US Air Force headquarters.

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Annex No. VI.

Document No. 34Embassy Tokyo Statement on Forgery, July 21

A friendly news source this afternoon delivered to the Embassy a photostatic copy of a forged document on stolen Embassy stationery that purported to be a memorandum from Colonel Robert G. Emmens, the Embassy Air Attache, to Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II. The memorandum, labeled "top secret", was dated May 7 and alleged that U-2 airplanes based in Japan had made intelligence overflights of Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Thailand, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. This forged document also recommended that the U-2 aircraft be temporarily removed from Japan and later secretly reintroduced into Japan so that overflights could continue. The forgery was circulated under cover of a memorandum signed by "the Japanese patriotic group," which obviously is designed to stir up anti-American sentiment in Japan.

In connection with this fraudulent document it will be recalled that well over two months ago the United States Government affirmed that U-2 planes which had been based in Japan had never engaged in any intelligence overflights and would never be used for any such purposes. It was announced on July 11 that the two U-2 planes that had been stationed in Japan had been dismantled, crated, and shipped back to the United States, and will not be returned to Japan. The Embassy immediately transmitted to the Japanese Foreign Office a copy of the false document and requested the Foreign Office to have the appropriate Japanese authorities undertake an immediate investigation so the perpetrators of this fraudulent and illegal act could be apprehended and brought to justice. From the paper used, (which was not Air Attache's but purloined Foreign Service stationery), the language and composition of the forged text, it is evident that the drafter was unfamiliar with Embassy procedures and practices. The Foreign Office assured the Embassy that an investigation would be undertaken immediately. It is obvious that the persons who were responsible for stealing Embassy stationery and perpetrating the forgery are trying to create new difficulties in Japanese-American relations in the wake of the difficulties already created by certain extremist groups receiving encouragement from abroad which led to the cancellation of the President's visit to Japan.

UNCLASSIFIED

RD, State-Wash., D.C.

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Annex VII

Document No. 35

State Department Statement to Italian Ambassador
May 20

Italian Ambassador called on Department (White) May 20 and indicated GOI had info from "plausible source" that U-2 pilot, Powers, had instructions to use airfields at Aviano and Brindisi in emergency. GOI desired know whether any truth to this information.

After careful checking White informed Italian Embassy (Perrone) May 21 that U-2 pilot had no repeat no instructions, written or oral, stating that in case emergency he could utilize any Italian airport. Referring to press reports that PCI deputy Pajetta had exhibited during Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee meeting photocopy of document allegedly found in U-2 listing radio beacons at Aviano and Brindisi, White said we would be interested in any information indicating alleged document is other than or excerpt from unclassified flight information publication entitled "Flight Information Publication Terminal (High Altitude)" which is customarily available in all airbase operations and carried in all aircraft.

Perrone expressed appreciation this information and said his government did not attach much importance to move by communists.
--Department telegram to Rome, 3537.

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ADDENDUMExcerpts from Transcripts of Department of State
Press and Radio News Briefings

The excerpts in this addendum contain statements and questions and answers concerning the U-2 incident which have bearing on our relations with other countries, and which are not available in Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, May 27, 1960, "Events Incident to the Summit". Pertinent material from the transcripts of the Departmental news briefings published in the Hearings is as follows:

- May 5 - Initial Departmental Statement (pp. 178-179)
 May 7 - Departmental Statement (p.187)
 May 9 - Statement by the Secretary of State (p. 193)

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DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 10, 19 0

.... I have one brief statement to make: The United States Government has given the Government of Japan assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions.

Now, let me quickly point out that by "legitimate and normal purposes" is meant the NA A Weather Observation Project.

Q. How was this assurance given Link?

A. Through our Embassy to the Government.

Q. Had they requested or made inquiries, or what?

A. I suppose inquiries were made.

Q. Your use of the word "legitimate" implies that intelligence overflight missions are illegitimate, does it not?

A. We have made statements on this. What I point out to you is the purposes of these planes are weather observations.

Q. Is there a procedure which limits them from the Soviet and Chinese Communist borders by any set distance?

A. I do not know.

Q. I think the Commander in Tokyo informed the Japanese Government that there was a 20-mile limit.

A. I am just not familiar with those details.

Q. Does this mean the Soviet and Chinese Communist airspace will not be violated?

A. This is strictly for weather observation, Spence (Davis).

Q. Does this apply to our planes in Japan only or to other places too?

A. I am directing myself to Japan.

Q. Do we have any information about Soviets conducting bi-weekly flights off the Japanese coast for photographing purposes?

A.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.)

-2-

A. I am just not prepared to go into that at this moment.

Q. Link, can you give us the normal course of these planes on weather observation patrol from our bases in Japan?

A. No, I don't have those details.

Q. The assurances refers only to a special type of plane.

A. That is right.

Q. Are these similar flights, Link, that were involved in those planes that were shot down off or rather close to the Soviet border?

A. No, no; these are U-2's.

Q. Link, the point that John (Scali) made are bound to be raised by many people, because your statements put out previously have gone out of their way to make the point that the flights that were made were legitimate. This does seem to imply that we have changed our point of view. Can you say this changes our previous statements?

A. No, it changes in no way, shape or form anything previously stated. It is simply to indicate that these planes will be used for strictly weather observation purposes, period.

Q. Link, perhaps you would like to substitute another word for "legitimate", perhaps get rid of it?

A. You can make it "normal", normal weather observation flights.

Q. The point is weather observation only. You said in explanation that it was, but why doesn't the statement say that? You said in explanation of the statement that it was normal weather observation.

A. That is right.

Q. Why don't we change it this way, Link?

Q. Now wait a minute. Are we changing it or is Link changing it?

A. I am perfectly happy to stand on it. If you people wish to change ---

....Q.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.)

-3-

....Q. Do you mean that these planes do not conduct weather observation over Soviet or Chinese Communist territories?

A. That is my understanding, certainly.

Q. Mr. White, does the answer mean that for observation research purposes these planes never approach the Soviet and Chinese Communist territories?

A. I don't have the precise details as to how far away they stay, but I emphasize that they are for weather observation purposes.

Q. These assurances only apply to the U-2 and not any other aircraft.

A. Well, that is what they are out there for.

Q. My question is does this statement apply only to the U-2 and not other aircraft.

A. Mike (O'Neill), this refers to the U-2's. Now, I refer you back to what has previously been said, that we are not closing our eyes to surprise attack from any direction.

Q. This, then, would not apply to any U-2's operating from air bases in Okinawa or Taiwan.

A. We will keep our eyes open, Bill (Dowds), you can be sure of that.

Q. Did we volunteer these assurances to the Japanese or did they raise them?

A. I assume this results from an inquiry by the Government.

Q. Link, can you say we have given similar assurances to any other country, or if there have been similar inquiries from any other country?

A. To my knowledge there have not been any from any other country.

Q. Link, on another point, Premier Khrushchev had some things to say last night about American Allies which might allow their bases to be used for intelligence overflights, and he specifically said that "if they allow others to fly from their bases to our territory, we shall hit at those bases." Do you have any comment on that?

A.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.) -4-

A. It is typical that the Soviet Government singles out as the objective of its threats those smaller countries of the free world who bear no -- N-O, no -- responsibility for the recent incident.

Q. You are saying that such countries as Pakistan and Turkey bear no responsibility for the launching of aircraft which may fly into the Soviet Union?

A. That is correct, for the recent incident.

Q. Link, are you finished with the statement?

A. Yes.

Q. What would we do if they undertook any such effort to hit at those bases?

A. About the only thing I can add here is that the United States has undertaken certain commitments in the multilateral and bilateral arrangements for the common defense existing between this Government -- that means the United States -- and those -- that means the other governments -- which once again appear to be subjected to a policy of intimidation by the Soviet Government. There should be no doubt -- N-O, no; D-O-U-B-T, doubt -- that the United States will honor these commitments!

Q. Link, in the light of that statement, can you tell us whether or not at this stage we do or do not accept the Soviet claim that this flight did go from Turkey to Pakistan with a target to end up in Norway?

A. I can add nothing to the statements that have already been issued.

Q. Link, Soviet Premier Khrushchev was also quoted as saying last night that if we send further planes over Russia, the Soviets are going to shoot them down. Do you have any comment at all on that?

A. I haven't faunted yet.

Q. Link, just for clarification, your statement mentioned commitments without specifying. These are commitments to come to the defense of any nations which are attacked?

A.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.)

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A. Those countries with which we have security arrangements.

Q. Can you say anything, Link, about the call yesterday of the Norwegian Ambassador? Can you say anything more about the call?

A. No; I think he explained this thing.

Q. Link, the Norwegian Ambassador was quoted as saying yesterday that he gathered that Secretary Herter did not know where this flight was going. Is that correct?

A. I can't specifically answer that. If the Ambassador said that, I am sure that he was being perfectly honest with you.

....Q. In your statement on Japan, was that assurance given as part of the consultation which we have agreed upon?

A. I don't know the circumstances of it, Spence (Davis). I assume they asked us about it and this is what we gave them.

....Q. Link, back on the statement you made originally about the U-2 flight to Japan, this implies that there has not been any order to ground these U-2 weather reconnaissance planes.

A. I don't know the specifics of that. The purpose of this statement is to assure the Japanese that these planes are being used for weather observation purposes.

Q. Thank you, sir.

A. You are very welcome.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 11, 1960

....Q. Link, while we are in this same general area, a Toronto newspaper yesterday said that U-2 flights have taken off from Canada's bases for surveillance of Russia. Do you have anything to say on this?

MR. WHITE: Yes, I am in a position to categorically deny this report.

Q. Who made this report?

Q. A Toronto newspaper, the Globe and Mail.

Q. What was that report about?

Q. That an American U-2 took off from Canadian bases.

Q. Are there any weather reconnaissance flights by U-2's from Canada?

A. The spokesman for the Canadian Defense Ministry has said: "A U-2 aircraft made a forced landing north of Prince Albert on March 15, 1960. This aircraft was on a routine flight, the purpose of which was upper atmosphere meteorological and radiological sampling. The plane was returning from a point over Liverpool Bay, near the mouth of the MacKenzie River. It has not proceeded beyond North American airspace. The flight in question was one of a series of scientific flights flown to obtain precise information about clean air turbulence, upper air cloud formations, jet stream and radiation in the upper atmosphere. The aircraft were unarmed and all flights were cleared in the normal manner."

Q. Link, does this mean there have been series of U-2 flights from Canadian bases?

A. No. The Canadian Defense Minister, Mr. Pearkes, has also made a statement. He said: "No U-2 mission has ever flown from a Canadian base. The only U-2 landing ever made in Canada was on March 15."

Q. These flights have taken off from American bases, is that it?

A. That is right.

Q. This long statement you gave was all from the spokesman of the Canadian Defense Ministry?

A. That is right.

Q.

May 11, 1960 (Cont.)

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Q. You are endorsing this full statement?

A. I am certainly raising no questions about it.

Q. Link, these flights took off from American bases?

A. I would assume so.

Q. They went up into Canadian airspace with Canadian permission, and then flew back to the United States, is that it?

A. Well, one of them landed in Canada. The only one that ever landed up there was this one on March 15.

Q. It doesn't say why it was forced to land?

A. I don't know.

Q. Could we find out about that? This might give us a clue as to why --

MR. REAP: I think the press story on that said it landed on an icy lake and made minor repairs and then took off again.

Q. Could anybody give us a clue as to what went wrong? This might give us a clue as to what went wrong over Russia.

MR. WHITE: I don't have any information on that other than what has been said by the Canadians.

Q. They haven't said anything about this plane as to the cause.

A. No.

DEPARTMENTAL PRES BRIEFING

MAY 12, 1960

....Q. Do you have any further clarification of the function and mission of the U-2's in Japan in view of these Communist charges and Japanese Socialist charges that they were so engaged in espionage? The question that comes to mind is why was Japan singled out as a base from which they were not flying these flights?

A. There is no truth to reports that a U-2 aircraft conducted intelligence missions from Japan period.

....Q. Link, the Pakistan Ambassador called today, I think, in reference to this business of whether Pakistan territory was used. Do you know what was told to him?

A. I don't have anything to add to what he said to you fellows when he came out.

Q. He said it had not yet been determined whether this plane actually had taken off from Pakistan territory as Khrushchev claimed. May we assume from that that the State Department doesn't yet know where this flight originated?

A. I think he said they were investigating.

Q. Who was investigating?

A. The Pakistanis.

Q. Well, isn't the United States Government also investigating?

A. I say I have nothing to add to what the Ambassador said.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 18, 1960

....Q. Anything new on the Pakistan protest that was reported yesterday?

A. Well, let me clarify the situation if I can. I think I recalled to you yesterday the Pakistan Ambassador's call on the Secretary of May 12, following which the Ambassador said to the press that he had lodged no protest. It now appears that the President of Pakistan was referring to an aide memoire handed to the Department on May 14, transmitting the statement released to the press by the Pakistan Government on that day. We are in contact with the Government of Pakistan on this matter and this communication is under study.

Q. Well, this communication is not a protest?

A. The statement by the Government on that day said that "Our inquiries show that no aircraft has taken off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of Soviet Russia. In case any American plane taking off from Peshawar has been diverted to Soviet Russia in the course of its flight, and Soviet allegation that American aircraft which has been brought down in Soviet Russia took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause for bitter complaint. The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concerned refrain from such activities in the future."

Q. Does the American Government realize the delicacy of their situation?

Q. Is the United States planning a reply to this?

A. The matter is under study in the Department.

Q. This says "we are in contact with the Government of Pakistan on this matter." Is that here, or in Pakistan, or both?

A. I would assume both. I don't know specifically, but I would assume both places.

Q. The matter is under study; we didn't answer the aide memoire as yet?

A. Not to my knowledge.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

May 19, 1960

....Q. What is the status of the protest, Link, back and forth -- who owes whom a letter?

A. First off, let me say that the United States has delivered a reply to the Norwegian Government's oral protest and has given assurances in response to the request of the Norwegian Government.

Q. What are the assurances?

A. I have to confine myself to that. We have received a protest from the Afghan Government, and it is under study at the present time. We have not received the text, although we know that the Czechs have given us an oral statement referring to Secretary Herter's statement of May 9.

That is the situation as it now stands.

Q. How about the Pakistan protest that allegedly has been sent?

A. Just nothing new on that.

Q. I don't think we ever acknowledged receiving it.

A. Yes, yesterday I pointed out what that situation was.

Q. Link, this is asked out of ignorance. Have we received one from the Turks as well?

A. No.

Q. What did the Afghan's protest protest? What was the protest?

A. I don't have the text of it here. I understand they released it.

Q. Ambassador Willis in Oslo is reported to have said the assurances we gave the Norwegians were that the flights had been discontinued. Why can't you say that?

A. I wasn't aware she had said that, John (Scali). If she has, her word is good enough for me.

Q. Are you going to publish the text of that reply?

A. No, sir.

Q.

Q. The communication that Ambassador Willis had with the Norwegian Government is the one you are referring to here, or is there a separate note that went directly to the Norwegians?

A. As I pointed out, this was a reply to the Norwegian Government's oral protest. Maybe you didn't catch that.

Q. When you say the United States has delivered a reply, you are talking about what Ambassador Willis delivered.

A. That is correct.

Q. Link, was our reply oral too?

A. That is correct.

Q. Was there an aide memoire with the oral reply?

A. I just don't have that information; I don't know.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

May 26, 1960

....Q. Like, about ten days ago we got a note from the Czechs. You remember that, I think. The last time you said it was still under study.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have something to say on that?

A. Actually it was an aide-memoire. But let me say, in answer to your question, that in view of the false accusations and abusive and intemperate language of this aide-memoire, it -- that is, the aide-memoire -- is not considered worthy of reply.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

June 1, 1960

....Q. Link, is anybody going to say anything about Mr. Malinovsky's kind words?

A. I have no comment on it, other than to recall to you what I had said a week or ten days earlier (May 10).

Q. Which was --

A. When the first threat was made -- I don't happen to have it with me, but the essence of it was that this is typical of Soviet tactics in an attempt to intimidate governments which are absolutely blameless in this situation; and that we had agreements with countries for our mutual protection, and let there be no mistake that those commitments would be lived up to. That was the essence of it.

Q. Link, is there any feeling around here that Malinovsky's threats in the speech the other day created a new element of danger or uncertainty in the East-West relationship?

A. Well, John (Hightower), all we have had here for months out of the Soviet Union and all I expect we will hear for months in the future is a relaxation of tensions; and I would hardly put the General's speech into any category of relaxing tensions.

Q. Do you expect to go on hearing about relaxation of tensions from Moscow?

A. I hope in a different tune.

....Q. Link, I think the Soviets have complained to West Germany, alleging that there have been some West German bases used for overflights into Communist-controlled territory.

A. My recollection is that the Germans replied to that yesterday. I have nothing to add.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

July 7, 1960

...Q. Do you have any comment on his [Khrushchev's] statement that the U.S. bases in Italy violate Austrian neutrality?

A. This is another in a series of recent heavy-handed Soviet statements obviously made in an attempt to intimidate our friends. Period.

Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

William A. Cira,
Acting Director
**INFORMATION SECURITY
OVERSIGHT OFFICE**

May 24, 2016

Please be advised that the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) has concluded its consideration of the third part of mandatory declassification review appeal 2002-0049 filed by you and that the 60-day period during which an agency head may appeal an ISCAP decision to the President has expired. Enclosed is a chart that outlines the ISCAP decisions on the documents under appeal and details the information declassified by the ISCAP. With the exception of any information that is otherwise authorized and warranted for withholding under applicable law, we are releasing all information declassified by the ISCAP to you. If you have questions about this appeal, please contact William Carpenter of my staff at (202) 357-5250.

Sincerely,



WILLIAM A. CIRA
Executive Secretary

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Joseph Lambert
Director, Information Management Services
Central Intelligence Agency Member of the ISCAP

~~TOP SECRET~~

DDS&T Historical Paper
No. OSA-1
Vol. IX of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
Chapter XIV continued

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

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ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 9
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 24, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T
Date prepared : 1 April 1969
Written by : Helen Kleyla
: Robert O'Hein

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C05492917

ANNEX 89

TEXT OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ADDRESS ON
COLLAPSE AT THE SUMMIT

MAY 25, 1960

Fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk with you about the remarkable events last week in Paris, and their meaning to our future.

First, I am deeply grateful to the many thousands of you, and to Representatives in Congress, who sent me messages of encouragement and support while I was in Paris, and later upon my return to Washington. Your messages clearly revealed your abiding loyalty to America's great purpose--that of pursuing, from a position of spiritual, moral and material strength, a lasting peace with justice.

You recall, of course, why I went to Paris ten days ago.

Last summer and fall I had many conversations with world leaders; some of these were with Chairman Khrushchev, here in America. Over those months a small improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the West seemed discernible. A possibility developed that the Soviet leaders might at last be ready for serious talks about our most persistent problems--those of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control and Germany, including Berlin.

To explore that possibility, our own and the British and French leaders met together, and later we agreed, with the Soviet leaders, to gather in Paris on May 16.

Of course, we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening peace there can be no higher obligation than to pursue it.

Nor had our own policies changed. We did hope to make some progress in a summit meeting, unpromising though previous experience had been. But as we made preparations for this meeting, we did not drop our guard or relax our vigilance.

Our safety, and that of the world, demand, of course, effective systems for gathering information about the military capability of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free world security.

This has long been one of my most serious preoccupations. It is part of my grave responsibility, in the over-all problem of protecting the American people, to guard ourselves and our allies against surprise attack.

During the period leading up to World War II we learned from bitter experience the imperative necessity of a continuous gathering of intelligence information, the maintenance of military communications and contact, and alertness of command.

An additional word seems appropriate about this matter of communications and command. While the Secretary of Defense and I were in Paris, we were, of course, away from our normal command posts. He recommended that under these circumstances we test the continuing readiness of our military communications. I personally approved. Such tests are valuable and will be frequently repeated in the future.

Moreover, as President charged by the Constitution with the conduct of America's foreign relations, and as commander-in-chief, charged with the direction of the operations and activities of our armed forces and their supporting services, I take full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by our Government to secure and evaluate military intelligence.

It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programs that the widely publicized U-2 incident occurred.

Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work had been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it.

Chairman Khrushchev has stated that he became aware of these flights several years ago. Only last week, in his Paris press conference, Chairman Khrushchev confirmed that he knew of these flights when he visited the United States last September.

Incidentally, this raises the natural question--why all the furor concerning one particular flight? He did not, when in America last September, charge that these flights were any threat to Soviet safety. He did not then see any reason to refuse to confer with American representatives.

This he did only about the flight that unfortunately failed, on May 1, far inside Russia.

Now, two questions have been raised about this particular flight: first, as to its timing, considering the imminence of the summit meeting; second, our initial statements when we learned the flight had failed.

As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The program went forward.

The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack.

Next, as to our Government's initial statement about this flight, this was issued to protect the pilot, his mission and our intelligence processes, at a time when the true facts were still undetermined.

Our first information about the failure of this mission did not disclose whether the pilot was still alive, was trying to escape, was avoiding interrogation, or whether both plane and pilot had been destroyed. Protection of our intelligence system and the pilot, and concealment of the plane's mission, still seemed imperative.

It must be remembered that over a long period these flights had given us information of the greatest importance to the nation's security. Their success has been nothing short of remarkable.

For these reasons, what is known in intelligence circles as a "covering statement" was issued. It was issued on assumptions that were later proved incorrect. Consequently, when later the status of the pilot was definitely established, and there was no further possibility of avoiding exposure of the project, the factual details were set forth.

I then made two facts clear to the public: first, our program of aerial reconnaissance had been undertaken with my approval; second, this Government is compelled to keep abreast, by one means or another, of military activities of the Soviets, just as their Government has for years engaged in espionage activities in our country and throughout the world.

Our necessity to proceed with such activities was also asserted by our Secretary of State, who, however, had been careful--as was I--not to say that these particular flights would be continued.

In fact, before leaving Washington, I had directed that these U-2 flights be stopped. Clearly their usefulness was impaired. Moreover, continuing this particular activity in these new circumstances could not but complicate the relations of certain of our allies with the Soviets. Furthermore, new techniques, other than aircraft, are constantly being developed.

I wanted no public announcement of this decision until I could personally disclose it at the summit meeting in conjunction with certain proposals I had prepared for the conference.

At my first Paris meeting with Mr. Khrushchev, and before his tirade was made public, I informed him of this discontinuance and the character of the constructive proposals I planned to make. These contemplated the establishment of a system of aerial surveillance operated by the United Nations.

The day before the first scheduled meeting, Mr. Khrushchev advised President De Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan that he would make certain demands upon the United States as a precondition for beginning a summit conference.

Although the United States was the only power against which he expressed his displeasure, he did not communicate this information to me. I was, of course, informed by our allies.

At the four-power meeting on Monday morning he demanded of the United States four things: first, condemnation of U-2 flights as a method of espionage; second, assurance that they would not be continued; third, a public apology on behalf of the United States; and, fourth, punishment of all those who had any responsibility respecting this particular mission.

I replied by advising the Soviet leader that I had during the previous week, stopped these flights and that they would not be resumed. I offered also to discuss the matter with him in personal meetings, while the regular business of the summit might proceed. Obviously, I would not respond to his extreme demands. He knew, of course, by holding to those demands the Soviet Union was scuttling the summit conference.

In torpedoing the conference, Mr. Khrushchev claimed that he acted as the result of his own high moral indignation over alleged American acts of aggression. As I said earlier, he had known of these flights for a long time. It is apparent that the Soviets had decided even before the Soviet delegation left Moscow that my trip to the Soviet Union should be canceled

and that nothing constructive from their viewpoint would come out of the summit conference.

In evaluating the results, I think we must not write the record all in red ink. There are several things to be written in black. Perhaps this Soviet action has turned the clock back in some measure, but it should be noted that Mr. Khrushchev did not go beyond invective--a time-worn Soviet device to achieve an immediate objective.

On our side, at Paris, we demonstrated once again America's willingness, and that of her allies, always to go the extra mile in behalf of peace. Once again, Soviet intransigence reminded us all of the unpredictability of despotic rule, and the need for those who work for freedom to stand together in determination and strength.

The conduct of our allies was magnificent. My colleagues and friends--President De Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan--stood sturdily with the American delegation in spite of persistent Soviet attempts to split the Western group. The NATO meeting after the Paris conference showed unprecedented unity and support for the alliance and for the position taken at the summit meeting. I salute our allies for us all.

And now, and most importantly, what about the future?

All of us know that, whether started deliberately or accidentally, global war would leave civilization in a shambles. This is as true of the Soviet system as of all others. In a nuclear war there can be no victors--only losers. Even despots understand this. Mr. Khrushchev stated last week that he well realizes that general nuclear war would bring catastrophe for both sides.

Recognition of this mutual destructive capability is the basic reality of our present relations. Most assuredly, however, this does not mean that we shall ever give up trying to build a more sane and hopeful reality--a better foundation for our common relations.

To do this, here are the policies we must follow, and to these I am confident the great majority of our people, regardless of party, give their support:

1. We must keep up our strength, and hold it steady for the long pull--a strength not neglected in complacency nor overbuilt in hysteria. So doing, we can make it clear to everyone there can be no gain in the use of pressure tactics or aggression against us and our allies.

2. We must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts between our own and the Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it.

3. To improve world conditions in which human freedom can flourish, we must continue to move ahead with positive programs at home and abroad, in collaboration with free nations everywhere. In doing so, we shall continue to give our strong support to the United Nations and the great principles for which it stands.

As to the first of these purposes--our defenses are sound. They are tailored to the situation confronting us.

Their adequacy has been one of my primary concerns for these past seven years--indeed throughout my adult life.

In no respect have the composition and size of our forces been based on or affected by Soviet blandishment. Nor will they be. We will continue to carry forward the great improvements already planned in these forces. They will be kept ready and under constant review.

Any changes made necessary by technological advances or world events will be recommended at once.

This strength--by far the most potent on earth--is, I emphasize for deterrent, defensive and retaliatory purposes only, without threat or aggressive intent toward anyone.

Concerning the second part of our policy--relations with the Soviets--we and all the world realize, despite our recent disappointment, that progress toward the goal of mutual understanding, easing the causes of tensions and reduction of armaments is as necessary as ever.

We shall continue these peaceful efforts, including participation in the existing negotiations with the Soviet Union. In these negotiations we have made some progress. We are prepared to preserve and build on it. The Allied Paris Communiqué and my own statement on returning to the United States should have made this abundantly clear to the Soviet Government.

We conduct these negotiations not on the basis of surface harmony nor are we deterred by bad deportment. Rather we approach them as a careful search for common interests between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union on specific problems.

I have in mind, particularly, the nuclear test and disarmament negotiations. We will not back away, on account of recent events, from the efforts or commitments that we have undertaken.

Nor shall we relax our search for new means of reducing the risk of war by miscalculation, and of achieving verifiable arms control.

A major American goal is a world of open societies.

Here in our country anyone can buy maps and aerial photographs showing our cities, our dams, our plants, our highways--indeed, our whole industrial and economic complex. Soviet Attachés regularly collect this information. Last fall Chairman Khrushchev's train passed no more than a few hundred feet from an operational ICBM, in plain view from his window.

Our thousands of books and scientific journals, our magazines, newspapers and official publications, our radio and television, all openly describe to all the world every aspect of our society.

This is as it should be. We are proud of our freedom.

Soviet distrust, however, does still remain. To allay these misgivings I offered five years ago to open our skies to Soviet reconnaissance aircraft on a reciprocal basis. The Soviets refused.

That offer is still open. At an appropriate time America will submit such a program to the United Nations, together with the recommendation that the United Nations itself conduct this reconnaissance. Should the United Nations accept this proposal, I am prepared to propose that America supply part of the aircraft and equipment needed.

I hope that the United Nations will act accordingly.

As far as we in America are concerned, our programs for increased contacts between all peoples will continue. Despite

the suddenly expressed hostility of the men in the Kremlin, I remain convinced that the basic longings of the Soviet people are much like our own. I believe that Soviet citizens have a sincere friendship for the people of America. I deeply believe that above all else they want a lasting peace and a chance for a more abundant life in place of more and more instruments of war.

Turning to the third part of America's policy--the strengthening of freedom--we must do far more than concern ourselves with military defense against, and our relations with, the Communist Bloc. Beyond this, we must advance constructive programs throughout the world for the betterment of peoples in the newly developing nations. The zigs and zags of the Kremlin cannot be allowed to disturb our worldwide programs and purposes. In the period ahead, these programs could well be the decisive factor in our persistent search for peace in freedom.

To the peoples in the newly developing nations urgently needed help will surely come. If it does not come from us and our friends, these peoples will be driven to seek it from the enemies of freedom. Moreover, those joined with us in defense partnerships look to us for proof of our steadfastness. We must not relax our common security efforts.

As to this, there is something specific all of us can do, and right now. It is imperative that crippling cuts not be made in the appropriations recommended for mutual security, whether economic or military. We must support this program with all of our wisdom and all of our strength.

We are proud to call this a nation of the people. With the people knowing the importance of this program, and making their voices heard in its behalf throughout the land, there can be no doubt of its continued success.

Fellow Americans, long ago I pledged to you that I would journey anywhere to promote the cause of peace. I remain pledged to pursue a peace of dignity, of friendship, of honor, of justice.

Operating from the firm base of our spiritual and physical strength, and seeking wisdom from the Almighty, we and our allies together will continue to work for the survival of mankind in freedom--and for the goal of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and openness among all nations.

Thank you, and good night.

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ANNEX 90

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YDPD 5262-60
30 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Legal Defense of Francis Gary Powers

1. For the sake of posterity recorded herewith are some events which have come to pass during the preparation of the defense of Francis Gary Powers. At the point of this writing an AP press release announcing this defense makes the following historical; but for the sake of the record, the frustrations, tribulations and travail are herein set forth.

2. During the week of June 5 the undersigned met with Mr. Larry Houston, General Counsel, CIA, Mr. Eric Hager, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and Mr. Richard Davis, Chief, European Division of the Department of State concerning the legal ramifications in the Francis Powers case and what action, if any, should be taken by the U. S. Government concerning his defense. It was quickly agreed that we had an obligation to make definite legal overtures to the Soviets concerning the defense of Francis Powers. The Department of State had received five or six offers from various law firms and lawyers who had indicated their willingness to defend Francis Powers. We briefly discussed possible candidates for the defense without arriving at any conclusion and had mentioned the names of Edward Bennett Williams and Joseph Welch. Eric Hager had indicated that Williams' name had been thrown in the hopper by his partner, Muldoon. In response to all inquiries and offers concerning the defense counsel, the Department had taken the line that the decision rests with Mrs. Barbara Powers. Mr. Davis announced that Mr. Oliver Powers and his attorney, Carl E. McAfee from Norton, Va., had an appointment to see Mr. Kendall, the Legal Assistant to the President on Monday, 13 June, but per agreement with the Department of State, Kendall was to turn McAfee over to Eric Hager. During the course of our meeting, Eric Hager indicated that he thought he could arrange for legal defense of Powers through the Virginia State Bar Association and was to meet William P. Dickson, President of the Virginia State Bar Association in Charlottesville over the weekend to inquire of this possibility.

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3. On 10 June, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Houston, Mr. John Warner and the undersigned met with the Director on this subject. When advised that Edward Bennett Williams had offered his services, the Director had suggested that it would not be a good idea in view of his connection with Senator McCarthy and Hoffa. The Director stated that he was about to go on a foreign trip and requested that he be advised when we had selected the lawyers.

4. On 13 June the original cast of characters engaged in another skull session at the Department of State. At this meeting the availability of experts in Soviet law was discussed and possible candidates to assist either counsel for the defense or the State observer at the trial. We ran through the names of Lipson, Berman and Hazard and others of apparent import.

5. Hager reported on his contact with Dickson at Charlottesville and stated that all had gone well; that Dickson had an immediate grasp of the situation and it was not necessary for him to go into specific details on the case. A plan of action had been laid; Dickson would nominate two lawyers who would be retained by Barbara Powers and as principle, i. e. the individual with power of attorney from Francis Powers, it would be proper for her lawyers to prepare the defense of Francis Powers. Hence, after the two lawyers were selected we would be informed of their names, run our check, then brief Barbara as to our plan of action and legal aspects of the case.

6. By this time our friends Oliver Powers and McAfee arrived in town and were scheduled for a meeting with Mr. Davis for a short discussion and application for passports and visas. I requested that Mr. Davis stress the fact that Barbara Powers had power of attorney and as such was, so to speak, the principle in the family affairs and that it was important that Oliver Powers not take any unilateral action on his own lest he undo our actions in a different direction.

7. Mr. Mike Miskovsky of OGC, who had done legal research concerning this case, began to take an active part. He attended the meeting with Hager, Davis, Oliver Powers, and McAfee. (His Agency connection was not announced.) During the Powers/McAfee meeting things seemed to go reasonably well. Oliver Powers indicated his desire to get together with Barbara Powers in this case and conceded the wisdom

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of working together. Carl McAfee, whose dreams of grandeur had run unchecked due to the apparent vacuum of other legal activity in the case, had envisioned himself as the trial lawyer in Moscow. At our request, Mr. Davis had queried Powers and McAfee as to whether they had any desire to contact CIA officials. Powers asked "What was that?" and when informed agreed to a meeting Tuesday.

8. On Tuesday, 14 June, General Cabell with Mr. Miskovsky met Oliver Powers and McAfee in Eric Hager's office at the Department of State. The meeting was limited to general terms and the obvious facts were not grasped by either Powers or McAfee. At the conclusion Powers stated that he still wondered what Lockheed Aircraft Corp. was going to do for his boy, and as a side issue indicated boyishly that this was the closest he had ever been to a general. Mr. Davis had sensed that the role of CIA in this situation had gone completely over the heads of both McAfee and Powers. Davis queried General Cabell whether or not he should clarify this point. The General replied in the negative with the statement that we keep this ace up our sleeves. The undersigned did not attend any meetings with McAfee and Oliver Powers but these events were related by Miskovsky and Davis.

9. I had called Barbara Powers the night of 13 June and indicated that she would be receiving a call from Mr. Dickson concerning two lawyers to help her in this case. I suggested that it would be a good idea if she agreed with what he proposed.

10. On 15 June an impromptu meeting was held at 4:00 in the afternoon. Eric Hager had called the shindig and blithely announced that Barbara Powers was on her way to Roanoke, Virginia, to meet the two attorneys Dickson had designated. At that time I received the names of John C. Parker of Franklin, Virginia, and Frank W. Rogers of Roanoke. Hager announced that Dickson would also be there to meet Barbara Powers and they would lay plans for the defense. I cried foul and indicated that it was necessary that I check the lawyers out and also brief Barbara beforehand. I left the meeting and caught a plane to Roanoke, with Mike Miskovsky to hold up the legal end.

Dickson met us about four minutes before Barbara's plane arrived. We briefed him of the Agency's involvement in the case and told him that we did not want the Government's affiliation with the defense to be public knowledge. He had sensed this from his discussions

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with Hager and fell quickly in line. Barbara arrived and we drove with Frank Rogers to a room which the lawyers had at the Hotel Roanoke. As usual luck was with us. We arrived at the Hotel Roanoke during the Miss Virginia Contest, and had our pick of reporters and photographers. We asked Barbara to freshen up in her room while we went to a sitting room and there Mike and I conducted a briefing of Dickson and Rogers and John Parker who was waiting in the room. Miskovsky opened the discussion by assuring the financial backing for the defense. We had been led to believe by Hager that Dickson's only concern was that funds would be available. Before Mike could finish talking money, Rogers interrupted him and stated that he thought he could speak for Parker and indicated that they were honored to be considered for this case and would not think of asking for any compensation.

We then briefly outlined the funding mechanism; that we would arrange for funds to be deposited to the Virginia State Bar Association, funds would be received from private sources and the lawyers would draw from this account for their expenses. Parker indicated that it would be quite agreeable to him if they carried the expenses to the end and then would present us with a list of expenses. I stated that this would be undesirable from our point because there would be considerable expenses involved and we did not feel that it was necessary to impose financial inconvenience on any individual. At this point Barbara entered the room and the lawyers engaged in general conversation to win her confidence and to learn something of their client. Amid scotch and soda the evening wore easily.

About 1:30 in the morning we adjourned and Dickson and I walked Barbara to her room. Dickson told Barbara that if she had any reservations about the lawyers to please let him know and they would withdraw from the case. Briefly Barbara told him she was satisfied. Requesting that I fix her T. V. Barbara dismissed Dickson, and closed the door. She asked that I have a nightcap with her which ended up plural and she seemed to let loose. She seemed honestly perplexed and puzzled over the ability of a couple of folksy Virginia lawyers to handle a big Soviet case. She had envisioned a one man band who would be a Soviet law expert, a city trial lawyer and a mouthpiece all rolled into one. I explained that these lawyers may not be the trial lawyers involved but their purpose was to protect her interests here in the U. S. and to prepare the defense for Frank Powers. They would explore the field of Soviet law experts and trial lawyers and decide on the team which could handle this

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entangled case. When she realized these men were involved primarily in the preparation of the defense and would not suddenly travel to Russia without consultation, she seemed satisfied and in fact the happiest since she arrived in the U. S. As the result of the night caps, I was happy, too, and decided to retire.

11. On the morning of 16 June, Thursday, we had another client-lawyer session. Plans were laid for McAfee and Oliver Powers to come to Roanoke so that the case could be handled as a family effort. John Parker began telephoning Soviet law experts to arrange meetings with them. Before McAfee and Oliver Powers arrived that afternoon Mike and I decided to pull out and forego further Miss Virginia publicity.

12. As history would have it, Oliver Powers and McAfee arrived and had a reasonably cooperative meeting with Barbara and Frank Rogers. Both McAfee and Powers again indicated the wisdom of a family effort in this case. McAfee on the side to Rogers made reference to a cable which Oliver Powers sent from Kingsport, Tennessee. McAfee could not recall the wording of the cable but keenly remembered it was addressed to Nikita Khrushchev. On Friday morning Barbara disappeared from the hotel but it was assumed that she had returned to Pound, Va., with McAfee and her father-in-law. This assumption was later confirmed.

13. Via phone on the evening of 16 June, Rogers indicated that the meeting had gone fairly well and it was his feeling that McAfee and Powers were in line. In the interim John Parker had traveled with Mike Miskovsky to Cambridge to meet with Harold Berman, Professor of Law at Harvard University. This meeting took place on Friday, 17 June. On Saturday, 18 June he saw John N. Hazard, Professor of Law at Columbia University. On Sunday, 19 June, Frank Rogers joined him for a morning visit with Hazard. Again they agreed that Hazard would be available to advise the trial lawyers on the case. Berman had previously stated that he would be available if required but a rather full schedule of European travel would interfere with complete devotion to the case. He stated his willingness to detour to Moscow for preliminary investigation of the trial if we deemed it advisable.

14. On Monday, 20 June, Rogers and Parker saw Art Dean while the undersigned and Miskovsky met with Ambassador Thompson to

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outline briefly our progress on the case to date. Ambassador Thompson throughout the meeting seemed plagued by the thought of defection as far as Powers was concerned. He made one reference to "defection" but thereafter referred to it as "possible defection" at the trial. He stated that it might be to our advantage to have Frank Powers ask for a Soviet counsel rather than an American which would imply that he was "gotten to" by the Soviets. He asked the question "What do we do if the Soviets give him back on our promise that we never do it again?" I accepted this question as rhetorical and treated it as such. He opined that the Soviets would probably hold the trial in August in order to make full propaganda play during the opening of the General Assembly in September. Someone of the group present queried Ambassador Thompson whether the Embassy was constantly asking the Soviets for permission to see Powers. He stated that every three or four days whenever they have discussions with the Soviets, they bring this point up.

Eric Hager made reference to the Counsellors agreement (the Litvinov Agreement) whereby we would have the right to demand of the Soviets that we (the Embassy) be permitted to see Frank Powers. Ambassador Thompson was quick to say no, that the Soviets would probably ignore our requests thereby weakening the agreement. Stunned by such logic, I remained silent. He did state that he asked Khrushchev personally if we could see Powers but was ignored. Ambassador Thompson queried if we had any information as to whether or not Powers was shot down at high altitude. When informed that we could not substantiate any altitude, he stated that if Powers had not been shot down at high altitude the Soviets would not likely let him free since he would disclaim their boast that they had reached him at his highest.

15. We arranged for Frank Rogers and John Parker to see Ambassador Thompson upon their arrival in D. C. late Monday afternoon. Although not extended an obvious invitation to attend we arranged for Mike to claim a seat in the conference. During this session Ambassador Thompson played the same song re defection.

16. On Tuesday, 21 June, Mike and I arranged for Agency briefings for Parker and Rogers at the Statler Hotel in Washington. OCI personnel gave an intelligence briefing on the current Soviet situation and Jack Maury and friends of SR added their inputs. On this glorious day

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we received word that the cable which McAfee had referred to on 16 June was a thank-you to Nikita Khrushchev for granting Oliver Powers a visa and a request by Oliver Powers that his attorney, Mr. Carl McAfee, be permitted to join him. As a parenthetical comment, the Office of Security has been requested to obtain the contents of this cable by Miskovsky. There was strong sentiment at this time to cut McAfee completely out of the picture, disbar him, tar and feather him, and employ any other disposal methods known to mankind. We developed our plans further concerning the trial and decided that Frank Rogers, Alex Parker, a trial lawyer from Richmond, Virginia, and brother of John C. Parker, together with John Hazard would form the team to travel to the Soviet Union, if the Soviets permitted, to defend Frank Powers. The undertones throughout these past few days had been the desire to send a cable to Nikita Khrushchev stating the Virginia State Bar Association's interest in the matter and their desire to send counsel for Frank Powers.

Mr. Eugene Kiefer of DPD met the lawyers and answered their questions concerning the technical facilities of the aircraft, the destructor and landing characteristics etc. As a result of this discussion the lawyers were convinced that the aircraft came apart at an unknown altitude due to unknown reasons and that Frank Powers had climbed out of the aircraft and parachuted to the ground.

17. On Tuesday night Alex Parker arrived in D. C. and Mike and I read him into the case. He was quick to move in and readily established himself in the planning of the case. We reworked the cable to Khrushchev and received Barbara's support on it. She asked that she be allowed to tell her father-in-law. The lawyers were somewhat reluctant to cut McAfee out of this channel in view of his potential danger to the case. To circumvent this they placed a call to McAfee which got through to him about midnight and requested that he come to Washington. He was somewhat reluctant but when advised of the importance he agreed to come first thing in the morning after clearing it with Mr. Oliver Powers.

On Wednesday, meetings were held with Hazard, more briefings of the lawyers and more rewrites of the cable took place. We worked on a release which the Virginia State Bar Association would give out and the timing of the cable. It was planned that a courier

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would bring the cable draft to Richmond to have it appear on the paper and typewriter of Alex Parker's office. His secretary alone would handle the paper. The draft would be shown to McAfee who arrived late the 22nd, first thing the morning of the 23rd. It would also be shown to Hazard. Changes, if any, would be called down to the secretary in Richmond who would incorporate them into the finished product and return the cable via our courier to John Parker at the Mayflower Hotel. The secretary would then file a Western Union telegram to Khrushchev from Richmond.

18. On the afternoon of 23 June Alex Parker, Frank Rogers, and Carl McAfee would appear for a visa at the Soviet Embassy giving the Soviets a copy of the government sterile cable. As planned these arrangements came to pass. When McAfee arrived on the 22nd he was reluctant at not being invited as a full-fledged member of the Virginia State Bar Association's team. The lawyers adequately handled this situation and McAfee was pleased to learn that he would travel with the lawyers and Powers to the trial, that his role in this defense would be to acquire homey background material concerning Frank Powers from the father and his home area. This information would be used as fill-in to portray Frank Powers as a quiet unsophisticated American country boy. He indicated that his pride was hurt in not being included in the press release as a member of the team but accepted the logic that he was young and inexperienced and it would not be fitting for the Virginia State Bar Association to endorse such a nomination. McAfee suggested that the cable be signed by Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers as well as Barbara Powers to imply a unified family front. This suggestion was heartily endorsed. McAfee was somewhat concerned over fees and the lawyers pointed out that his source would be from the father as he is the father's attorney; however, any expenses incurred in the Russia trip would be covered by contributions to the Virginia State Bar Association.

19. Although at this reading it appears that both McAfee and Powers Senior are in line, McAfee has been a true thorn in our side. It is hard not to discount the speculation that when he was advised by Hager that the Virginia State Bar Association was moving into the case that he put the father up to sending the cable to Khrushchev requesting that McAfee go to Russia. He conveniently forgot what this cable said and throughout he has not been an example of cooperation and honesty.

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He has indicated that he would declare Barbara Powers incompetent to handle the principal role in this case due to her "mental condition" which he later conceded was her drinking. He has advised us that he has received offers to associate with other firms in this case and made reference to a Baltimore firm which offered him \$100,000. He has implied that he could get his fees from the father because the father will have lots of money from offers. He has shown poor judgment in the case to date, has attempted to handle the case without other consultation, and in short, portrays a man who has a bear by the tail and doesn't know what to do. We remain suspicious of his cooperation but feel that as long as we can have him in sight we can control his actions.

20. As it now stands, Lawyers Inc. went to the Soviet Embassy the afternoon of 23 June and indicated their desire to go to Russia. The clerk advised them that they would have to write a letter giving their ages and other personal data. As a matter of routine he inquired whether or not they were going as tourists and they said no, it was business. He began inquiring as to what their business was and upon that the clerk was shown a copy of the cable whereby our clerk friend became so unscrewed he literally ran out of the room. He returned with the First Secretary who read and re-read the cable and became most gracious. The First Secretary advised them to please send a letter and then their request would be given normal consideration. With this accomplished the lawyers departed for their respective homes. According to plan, William Dickson, who was headed for New York on Thursday, was rerouted at our request to Virginia where he issued the press release to Norfolk, Richmond, and Roanoke newspapers indicating that the Virginia State Bar Association had offered its services to Barbara Powers who had retained its designated lawyers. This new development in the case has reawakened press interest in Virginia and after 24 hours of no comment, Alex Parker agreed to a TV interview the evening of 24 June.

(Signed)

JOHN N. McMAHON
Personnel Officer
DPD-DD/P

(Attached: Copy of Cable to
Khrushchev)

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C
O P Y [CABLEGRAM]

Richmond, Virginia

[23 June 1960]

Nikita S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR
Moscow, USSR

As the wife and father and mother of Francis Gary Powers and the persons primarily and principally interested in his welfare, we feel that we should have the benefit of the advice and help of legal counsel. The Bar Association of Virginia has offered the services of its members. That organization is a voluntary independent association of advocates in Francis' home state.

This offer has been gratefully accepted and the Bar Association has designated Alex W. Parker, a practicing attorney of Richmond, Virginia, and Frank W. Rogers, a practicing attorney of Roanoke, Virginia, and Professor John N. Hazard of the faculty of law of Columbia University, New York City, as its representatives for that purpose to act in conjunction with Carl E. McAfee, who had previously been selected as counsel by Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers and who is a practicing attorney in Wise County, Virginia, where they and their son lived.

We respectfully request that these men be permitted to come to your country to confer with our husband and son and with any Soviet advocate who may be representing him and to cooperate with his Soviet advocate in preliminary conferences and in the trial and in the exercise of any other rights that may be permitted to Francis under the Soviet law. If no Soviet advocate has yet been appointed for him, we would also hope that these men would be allowed to cooperate with Francis and with the appropriate Soviet authorities for the purpose of obtaining such appointment if that should be Francis' desire. The undersigned Oliver Powers has already requested of you that Mr. McAfee be permitted to accompany him to your country to see you and talk with you about Soviet law and the trial, and now that the Bar Association's representatives have also offered their services, we hope for an early

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reply to the present request so that necessary travel arrangements can be made including the securing of visas.

We will be greatly comforted if our requests are granted, since it will permit our beloved husband and son to have his fellow countrymen consult with him and cooperate with his Soviet advocate in the preparation and trial of his case. We should think that such an arrangement would be welcomed by the people of all nations as proof of Soviet fairness and justice. We personally appeal to you because of our love for Francis. The lawyers of his native region, through those above named, authorize us to say that they join in this request because they wish so much to render all legal assistance permitted by Soviet law to one of their countrymen who is to be tried on a serious charge in a foreign country. We shall appreciate your reply addressed to the undersigned at Milledgeville, Georgia.

Barbara Moore Powers

Mr. and Mrs. Oliver W. Powers

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ANNEX 91

~~SECRET~~PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE TO STATIONS AND BASES ON POWERS TRIAL

Issue of 1 August 1960 (Bi-Weekly Guidance)

Paragraph 272

"According to an official announcement of the USSR Supreme Court, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers will be tried on a charge of espionage in open session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court beginning 17 August. Despite repeated requests by Embassy officials to see him in accordance with a US-USSR agreement, Powers has been held incommunicado since his plane came down on 1 May. It still is unclear whether significant numbers of visas will be granted to free world reporters and other journalists who desire to attend the trial. Recently Moscow has suffered one significant setback in its efforts to exploit the U-2 incident. After the shooting down of the RB-47 reconnaissance plane, the Soviets charged that the aircraft had been caught spying over Soviet territory. They linked the RB-47 flight to the U-2 program, and claimed that it was evidence of the continuation of an aggressive, provocative policy on the part of warmongering circles in the Pentagon. However, Ambassador Lodge's speech in the UN stating categorically that the plane had been shot down over international waters, and demanding either an impartial investigation of the event or a referral of the case to the International Court of Justice cast considerable doubt on the Soviet charges. Lodge's stand was strongly supported by Great Britain. The subsequent Soviet veto of the nine to two approval of Lodge's proposal compounded the effect. During the pre-trial period the Communists have made at least two attempts to capitalize on the Powers case in the free world. The Italian Communist Party has begun to attack the Italian government and US bases in Italy using unsupported allegations that U-2 reconnaissance missions were flown from these bases. In Japan, a forged letter on US Embassy stationery has been uncovered proposing that U-2 aircraft be temporarily removed to Okinawa and later returned to Japan secretly so that overflights could be continued. The letter, supposedly signed by the US Air Attaché, was to be circulated by a national Japanese patriotic group."

Guidance

Our objective is to weaken, discredit and obscure Moscow's efforts to capitalize on the Powers trial. The USSR's efforts

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aim at the following goals: (1) to split the US and its allies, (2) to undermine our ability to use bases in other free world countries, especially neutralist countries, (3) to denounce US aggressiveness and depict the American people as being at the mercy of Pentagon militarists, thereby portraying the US as a threat to peace, (4) to eliminate doubts which have been cast on Soviet military strength and the USSR's ability to defend itself by having Powers testify that he was shot down by a rocket at 60,000 feet or more. In addition to the approaches outlined in Bi-Weekly Guidance #249 of 20 June 1960, "The Trial of Francis Powers", we should take the following additional steps. This action should not be undertaken until after the trial begins, and should be predicated on the tactics the USSR adopts to exploit the case. If the trial is open and adequately reported to the free world, we attack all clear violations of western, humanistic concepts of justice and due process, citing them as proof of the barbaric nature of the Soviet legal system and the subservience of justice in the USSR to cynical manipulation for political advantage. If any part of the trial is held in secret, we denounce this secrecy and assert that it proves that the Soviets are trying to hide those aspects of his testimony which are unfavorable to them. If any noted lawyers, journalists or other public figures whose views are known to be either favorable to the west or honestly impartial are denied permission to cover the trial or attend as observers, we point to this as evidence that the Russians are trying to limit attendance at the trial to their trained and reliable apologists. If we can contrast the denial of a visa to an observer who might favor the west with the names of known Communist sympathizers who have been granted visas, our case will be made even stronger.

Since we have no firm evidence that Powers has been brainwashed, a general charge to this effect should be avoided until we see how the trial proceeds. It is possible that Soviets will be content with exerting psychological pressure to have Powers confirm the actual facts of the flight and the Soviet version of the shutdown. If there are any obvious errors, discrepancies or weaknesses in Powers' testimony (e.g. confessions to having dropped agents, paramilitary supplies or biological warfare material into the USSR; statements that the U-2 program was a military operation; or that the RB-47 program was similar) or if Powers goes beyond his basic area of competence as a technician and supports clearly Soviet political propaganda on the stand (e.g. that he is personally familiar with militaristic plots in the Pentagon)

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we seize upon these as evidence of psychological pressure and use them to cast doubt upon all his other statements which have not been supported by real evidence or previous US government admissions. Through articles, feature stories and interviews with experts in the field, we publicize the techniques of brainwashing, emphasizing past uses of this tactic by the Communists, and stressing the fact that modern methods have become so sophisticated that anyone can be brainwashed, providing his captors have complete control of him for approximately one month. We publicize the fact that no Americans, either officials or members of his family, have been permitted to see Powers since May 1, even though this violates a long-standing agreement between the US and the USSR. We conclude that Powers' isolated detention lends a great deal of weight to free world fears that he has been brainwashed.

If Powers' statements permit we ridicule the various Soviet explanations of why the U-2 was allowed to penetrate as far as Sverdlovsk, and suggest that the only reason they were able to knock down Powers' plane was because it was forced within the range of their conventional defenses by some mechanical difficulty. We also scoff at the idea that the Soviets could view as aggression a reconnaissance flight by such a light aircraft, whose only armament was a .22 caliber pistol. We stress the fact that Powers is a civilian and that the U-2 project was not conducted by the armed forces. We cite the pre-trial propaganda of the Italian CP and the forgery in Japan as further indications that the free world CP's will go to any length of falsehood and deceit to further the ends of their masters in Moscow. Wherever possible we try to distract public attention away from the trial by exploiting any local events, incidents, speeches, etc., which will pre-empt the headlines. To help do this we can revive former cases of Soviet espionage, or stimulate heavy coverage of new cases which may arise. To support any of the above lines, such techniques as interviews with lawyers, military experts, experts on the USSR and persons with a first hand knowledge of Soviet justice should be used, in addition to press conferences and speeches in parliament where possible. Neutralist media should decry Moscow's use of the Powers trial to launch a violent propaganda attack on the west, thereby increasing world tensions and intensifying the Cold War. Such media may soften the approaches listed above, and tailor them to the tastes of their particular audiences. Where possible they should introduce the desired points of view by replaying them from other, non-neutralist media.

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Output aimed at Soviet and other Bloc audiences should stress (a) the huge extent of Soviet espionage, (b) the emptiness of Soviet boasts that their air space is "inviolable" and (c) regret for the reckless exploitation of the trial to worsen international relations, once again isolating the people behind the Iron Curtain and reinforcing Soviet secrecy.

FOR ALL ASSETS "

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ANNEX 92

SUMMARY OF TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS
(Prepared by the CI Staff from "The Trial of the U-2")

13 October 1960

1. The only available complete transcript of the trial of Francis Gary Powers is contained in the publication "The Trial of The U-2", published by Translation World Publishers, Suite 900, 22 West Madison Street, Chicago, 2, Illinois, with introductory comment by Harold J. Berman.

2. In addition to the introductory comment by Harold J. Berman this publication is made up of:

1. Announcement of Criminal Proceedings
2. Indictment
3. Composition of The Court
4. First Day, Morning Session, August 17, 1960
 - Opening of the Trial
 - Preliminary Examination of Defendant
 - Announcement of Witnesses and Experts
 - Announcement of Composition of Court
 - Reading of Indictment
 - Examination of Defendant by Procurator Rudenko
5. First Day, Afternoon Session, August 17, 1960
 - Examination of Defendant by Procurator Rudenko
 - Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel Grinev
6. Second Day, Morning Session, August 18, 1960
 - Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel Grinev
 - Re-Examination of Defendant by Procurator Rudenko
 - Examination of Defendant by Presiding Judge Borisoglebsky
 - Examination of Defendant by Member of the Court Zakharov
 - Examination of Defendant by Member of the Court Vorobyev
 - Examination of Witness Asabin
 - Examination of Witness Cheremisin

Examination of Witness Chuzhakin
 Examination of Witness Surin
 Examination of Expert Alekseyev
 Examination of Expert Tyufilin
 Examination of Expert Istomin
 Examination of Expert Andreyev

7. Second Day, Afternoon Session, August 18, 1960
 Examination of Expert Voroshilov
 Examination of Expert Burmistrov-Zuyev
 Examination of Expert Prozorovsky
 Examination of Expert Zhdanov
8. Third Day, Morning Session, August 19, 1960
 Speech for the Prosecution by Roman A. Rudenko,
 Procurator-General of the USSR
 Speech for the Defense by Defense Counsel
 Mikhail L. Grinev
 Last Plea of Defendant Powers
9. Third Day, Afternoon Session, August 19, 1960
 The Verdict

3. Harold J. Berman is footnoted in this publication as "Professor of Law, Harvard University; author of 'Justice in Russia! An Interpretation of Soviet Law' (1950); 'The Russians in Focus' (1953); 'Soviet Military Law and Administration' (with Miroslav Kerner, 1955); and other books, as well as numerous articles including 'Soviet Law Reform--Deadline Moscow 1957', Yale Law Journal, 1957, vol. 66, p. 1161, and 'The Comparison of Soviet and American Law,' Indiana Law Journal, 1959, vol. 34, p. 563."

4. The information disclosed in the published transcript of the trial of Francis Gary Powers is hereinafter listed in more or less chronological order under the following headings:

1. Biographic Information
2. Contract
3. Training
4. Administration of Detachment 10-10
5. Other overflights
6. Preparation for 1 May Flight
7. Events During Flight of 1 May 1960
8. The Plane and Its Equipment
9. Testimony of The Commission of Experts
10. Names Mentioned at the Powers Trial

5. "The Trial of The U-2"

The Exclusive Authorized Account

1. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Francis Gary Powers - Citizen of the United States. Born: 1929 at Burdine, Kentucky. Both parents are alive and reside at Pound, Virginia. Father is a shoe repairman and Mother is a housewife. Graduate from Milligan College near Johnson City (Tenn.). Married and no children. Profession is "pilot" at Detachment 10-10, Adana, Turkey. Had five sisters and no brothers. Powers' grandfather lives with his family. All of Powers' sisters are married. The oldest sister married a shoemaker and he also drives a school bus, the second married an electrical fitter. The third married an ex-teacher and who is now a postman. The fourth sister just married two months ago and Powers does not know what her husband does. Father owns a farm. Father inherited his part from his father and bought the other part from the other members of his family. Farm just produces enough for the family.

2. CONTRACT

Flight on May 1st undertaken in accordance with provisions under a secret contract which Powers signed with CIA.

Approached in 1956 - paid \$2,500 a month - part held back and paid upon completion of contract - \$1,000 held back each month - main duties fly along Soviet border and collect any radar or radio information - possibly other duties.

Powers signed contract - believed Mr. Collins signed on behalf of CIA in Powers' presence.

Liability for disclosing details of contract was 10 years imprisonment and \$10,000 fine or both.

Date Powers left the Air Force and date when signed contract were close together.

Nothing in contract about flying along Soviet border - explained to Powers before he signed.

At time signed contract with CIA unaware would have to make flights over USSR territory. Six to seven months after contract was signed learned was to be part of duties.

When signing contract with CIA aware of flights along USSR border.

Did not know character of the intelligence work required at that time. Was told there might be other duties in the future.

While serving in Air Force received approximately \$700 per month.

After signing contract with CIA given a salary of \$2,500 a month. Each month received \$1,500 minus taxes - remaining \$1,000 to be held back to be paid after successful completion of contract.

If violated the contract, in particular, refused to make 1 May flight, did not know whether would receive remaining money.

When contract renewed was aware of character of duties. April 1956 signed original contract - renewed in May 1958 for term of two years, and in January 1960 renewed for one year.

Hesitated as to whether should renew the contract with CIA. Did not want to sign. If had a job would have refused to sign. Profoundly sorry had any part in it.

3. TRAINING

Training began after the end of May 1956 and went to the first part of August 1956.

Powers was in training under the name of Francis Palmer.

During training flew T-6 and T-33 as well as F-80 (practically same thing as T-33 but with only one seat) something like 300 hours. F-84G, American Air Force fighter aircraft - roughly 400-500 hours. F-84F, later model of F-84G - approximately 100-200 hours. U-2 approximately 500 hours. T-33 approximately 200 hours. Also worked as co-pilot on a cargo-type airplane, very little time.

Were taught only how to fly U-2 plane and how to operate the equipment. Other words, were taught how to use the equipment and the pilot's cockpit, but were not acquainted with the nature of this equipment.

Powers gave detailed testimony regarding the methods used to prepare spy pilots for a sudden special espionage assignment, for which purpose they were trained under what was known as the special program of "alert flights."

After training sent to Detachment 10-10, approximately 20 August 1956.

All pilots in Detachment 10-10 received same training.

4. ADMINISTRATION OF DETACHMENT 10-10

Detachment 10-10 commanded by military personnel, but main part of personnel were civilians.

Detachment 10-10 purpose and aims - in general to gather information along the borders of USSR - conduct weather research reconnaissance to determine radioactivity.

Colonel Perry commanded Detachment 10-10 in 1956.

Head of the Detachment was a military man.

The military base at Adana where Detachment 10-10 was located was on Turkish territory and belong to Turkey. The base was peopled by Turkish as well as American personnel. There was a Turkish as well as an American commander.

Base was a classified area and only personnel who worked on it had access to it.

Powers testified that Detachment 10-10 was set up jointly by CIA and U.S. Air Force and represented a combination of these two bodies.

Detachment 10-10 was inspected in April, 1960 by General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force.

Detachment 10-10 was inspected twice by General Everest, Commander of the U.S. Air Force in Europe.

General White visited the base in April and General Everest, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force in Europe, were people from high command who visited Detachment 10-10.

Cardinal Spellman visited Detachment 10-10.

Seven civilian pilots at Detachment 10-10.

5. OTHER OVERFLIGHTS

In the fall of 1956, personnel of espionage Detachment 10-10 were transferred to the Incirlik American-Turkish air base near Adana, Turkey, where the formation of this Detachment was completed and where its direct espionage work was to begin. From there pilots of Detachment 10-10 started making systematic reconnaissance flights along USSR frontiers with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, and also in the Black Sea area, using special reconnaissance equipment.

Assignments fulfilled in Detachment 10-10 prior to 1 May flight (not exact):

1956 - one or two flights
1957 - six to eight
1958 - ten to fifteen
1959 - ten to fifteen
Four months of 1960 - about one or two

Flights made along borders of Turkey and the USSR, Iran and the USSR, Afghanistan and the USSR and along the borders of the Black Sea.

Made flights over the southern shore of the Black Sea.

Flew south of the Caspian Sea but not over it.

Powers testified that from 1956 onwards a large number of flights for intelligence purposes were made along the borders of USSR. Stated, "I consider this to be the main work of our detachment. Each year I made several flights along the borders between the Soviet Union and Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. In 1956-57 I made three or four flights over the Black Sea. In 1956 I made one or two flights. There were six or eight such flights in 1957, ten to fifteen in 1958, ten to fifteen in 1959, and for the first four months of 1960 I made one or two flights."

"All these flights were along the southern border of the Soviet Union. Other pilots of the 10-10 Detachment made flights for the same purposes. We would take off from Incirlik airfield and would fly eastward as far as the town of Van, situated on the lake of the same name. After that we would proceed to Teheran, the capital of Iran, and having passed it would fly eastward, south of the Caspian Sea. After that I usually flew to the south of Meshed, crossed the Iranian-Afghan frontier and further along the Afghan-Soviet frontier. . . not far from the eastern frontier of Pakistan a turn was made and we returned to the Incirlik air field taking the same route. Later we began making a turn earlier, after penetrating into Afghan territory for about two hundred miles."

Flights were made along the border of the Soviet Union for reconnaissance purposes in the daytime and also at night. Did not know exactly what additional equipment was in the planes, but besides the usual panels with instruments which, as a rule, were constantly in the aircraft, there were additional switches which I turned on and off during night flights.

Airfield from which flew these flights was airfield of Incirlik, near Adana.

Knew about flight along Soviet border in 1956 day before flight.

1956 - interested in Black Sea area - later interest centered more to the east.

Planes for special flights along the Soviet border were equipped with special reconnaissance equipment.

In case of accident on these border flights could use airfields in Teheran, Meshed in Iran, Peshawar in Pakistan.

Did not keep radio contact with bases during flights with exception of short time after going up and shortly before landing.

Have radio contact with Incirlik but on 1 May with Peshawar.

Distribution of work between pilots of Detachment 10-10 fairly even.

Powers testified that Colonel Perry informed the pilots of Detachment 10-10 they would also make flights over USSR.

At Bodoe once before - August of 1958. Ferried a U-2 plane from Adana to Bodoe. Met by members of Detachment 10-10 in Bodoe. While there two flights made from Bodoe airfield - U-2 planes.

In 1958 ferried a U-2 aircraft from Incirlik to air base in Bodoe. Took off in Turkey and flew over a part of Turkey, then Greece and Italy. Exact route not remembered, might have been Switzerland, France or Austria, Western Germany, and believe Denmark, and Norway.

August 1958 Powers received assignment to transfer a U-2 aircraft from Incirlik base to Bodoe airfield in Norway, very same airfield at which he was to end May 1 flight. New commander of Detachment 10-10, Colonel Barly, who held this post up to 1959, with a large ground staff awaited Powers.

Flew U-2 from base at Incirlik to base at Peshawar in June 1959.

First arrived in Peshawar in 1959 - ferried a U-2 plane there. Met by representatives of Detachment 10-10. Tower operator gave permission to land in Peshawar - local Pakistani operator. Pakistani authorities were informed on the arrival of plane in Peshawar in the summer of 1959.

Detachment 10-10 personnel at the air base in Peshawar were not allowed to leave the base itself.

Has been to air base near Wiesbaden, Western Germany, Wiesbaden base. Ferried a training plane, T33. Was there many times.

In Wiesbaden on vacation.

Ferried airplane from Hibbelstadt to New York. U-2 plane.

Powers flew from Incirlik airfield to American air base in the Wiesbaden area (West Germany) and from that air base piloted a U-2 to the U.S. Air Force air base at Plattsburg, New York State.

6. PREPARATION FOR 1 MAY FLIGHT

Francis Gary Powers - Received assignment to fly over USSR on the morning of 1 May from the commanding officer of his detachment, Colonel Shelton. Detachment located in Adana, Turkey.

Flight of May 1 only flight over Soviet territory.

Not consulted about program of spy flights over Soviet Union.

Two prepared for flight - did not know which one would go.

Could not refuse to go, was an order.

Powers received assignment to fly to USSR in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Powers arrived in Peshawar a few days before the flight, some four or five days.

Arrived in Peshawar in a cargo aircraft with roughly 20 people and Colonel Shelton. Special trip in connection with flight to USSR and assigned to deliver only our people to the airfield.

Plane took off from Adana, Turkey and landed once en route for refueling. This airfield serviced by British personnel - believe it was Bahrein.

U-2 plane brought to Peshawar airfield the night before, April 30, by another pilot.

All preparations were made morning before the flight.

Morning May 1st - awakened approximately three or four hours before flight. Told was to fly today. Two and a half hours before take-off started to breathe oxygen. Soon after that received maps and explanations were made. Few points pointed out on map that might help to navigate - possible rocket-launching site, another was pointed out as something there but did not know, some airfields, did not know how many.

Morning of 1 May 1960 Powers awakened, as many times before, while training on the "alert flight" schedule.

Powers given a special mission for which had been trained for several years. Was to make a reconnaissance flight over the USSR to collect important information on military and industrial installations. Route of flight lay from the Peshawar base in Pakistan, across the territory of Afghanistan and a considerable part of USSR and was to end at Bodoe base in Norway.

Before the flight for about two hours Powers passed through preparations for breathing oxygen for high-altitude flights and received a briefing at that time.

Briefed by Colonel Shelton.

Powers left Peshawar in the U-2 airplane, a special high-altitude aircraft prepared and designed to fly at very high altitudes.

Left Peshawar about 6:30 local time in the morning.

On 1 May flight was told to follow the route, turn switches on and off as indicated, stands to reason it was done for intelligence reasons.

Colonel Shelton particularly interested in rocket-launching sites. Mentioned one place on the map where there was a possible rocket-launching site.

Can only assume maps prepared by navigator of the detachment.

Had little time to study route and map, roughly one hour and fifteen minutes.

Powers was told by Colonel Shelton that flying at such an altitude was absolutely safe and USSR anti-aircraft defense could not hit him.

Told there was no danger of encountering Soviet fighter planes. Did see the trail of a plane, but at lower altitude. Could not tell what kind of plane.

Destination of Powers' flight was to land at Bodoe, Norway.

If had trouble in the air at beginning of flight, return to Peshawar - second half of flight, take shortest route to Bodoe. Case of absolute emergency any airfield outside USSR. Personnel from Detachment 10-10 meet Powers.

Was to contact Bodee base by calling on radio and giving call signal, "Puppy 6-8" and asking for landing instructions. Representatives from Detachment 10-10 there to meet him.

Instructed if necessary to land in USSR territory to destroy the airplane with the help of buttons and levers which were located for that purpose and to escape capture-- head for the nearest border.

Colonel Shelton indicated Sodankyla airfield for Powers' 1 May flight.

1st of May had radio contact with Peshawar.

Powers felt sure that experts who study the film from his cameras know what interested the people who sent him but in his own opinion Soviet rockets interest not only us but the whole world as well. Assumed a flight like this would be to look for them. Repeated, he did not know and was only expressing his own opinion.

Realized intruding USSR airspace. Felt did country a very bad service. Felt that the people who sent him should have thought of the fact that the flight might torpedo the summit conference - provoke military conflict.

Regrets making the flight.

7. EVENTS DURING FLIGHT OF 1 MAY 1960

Powers flew directly from Peshawar airfield to Soviet border and crossed the border approximately 30 minutes after take-off.

Powers was to fly at the maximum altitude, 68,000 feet.

When took off from Peshawar on May 1 flew over a small part of Pakistan, a small part of Afghanistan - not known how much of USSR.

Did not know if permission was given to fly over Afghanistan.

U-2 crossed USSR border at 05:36 a.m. Moscow time.

Flight began approximately at 67,000 feet and as fuel burnt out rose to 68,000 feet.

Powers followed assigned flight route as close as could.

Did not know exact altitude when crossed USSR border - was lower than the altitude at which was shot down by a rocket. About 66,000 feet. Continued to climb as weight of fuel decreased and plane became lighter.

Eventually attained altitude of roughly 68,000 feet. Maybe a few above or a few below.

Flew over the USSR approximately three to three and one half hours. For three and one half hours at approximate speed of 380 miles an hour, would have been 1200 to 1300 miles inside USSR.

Not in radio communication with air bases in Incirlik and Peshawar when flying over USSR. Even if able to communicate would not because of possibility of being detected.

Flew over area of Sverdlovsk at altitude of 68,000 feet.

At altitude of 68,000 feet was struck down by something. Had no idea what it was, did not see it.

Shortly before plane hit Powers had some trouble with automatic pilot - everything else in order.

When plane struck by rocket it was at the maximum altitude, at about 68,000 feet, a few miles south of Sverdlovsk.

Felt a sort of hollow-sounding explosion. It seemed to be behind me. I could see an orange flash or an orange-coloured light behind me.

Powers testified that while flying in Sverdlovsk area at altitude of 68,000 feet, that is, more than 20,000 metres, he saw an orange flash and after that his plane began to lose altitude.

I remember that I was at a height of 30,000 feet and I realized I could not use the ejection seat.

The parachute opened automatically immediately after I left the airplane. By that time I was at an altitude of 14,000 feet.

Did not resist arrest and had no intention of resisting.

During detention treated very nice.

USSR Government gave orders to shoot down plane at 08:53 a.m. Plane shot down with a rocket at an altitude of 20,000 metres in the Sverdlovsk area, that is at a distance of more than 20 kilometres from the place it crossed the Soviet frontier.

Order to destroy U-2 on 1 May was carried out at 08:53 Moscow time. Plane entered the firing range at an altitude of over 20,000 metres - one rocket was fired and its explosion destroyed the target. The hitting of the target observed by instruments, and after a short interval posts of visual observation recorded falling plane fragments and parachuting down of the pilot who bailed out of the crashed plane.

8. THE PLANE AND ITS EQUIPMENT

Reconnaissance flights carried out both day and night. Did not know exactly what additional equipment was in planes for night flights, but besides the usual panels with instruments which, as a rule, were constantly in the aircraft, there were additional switches which Powers turned on and off.

Never told of its performance. Picked up information there were cameras installed, could not tell what size they were.

Never knew what equipment was on the plane. Loaded in secrecy - suppose while plane prepared for flight.

U-2 is an airplane of that type which is for reconnaissance as well as research work at high altitudes.

U-2 belonged to Detachment 10-10.

Had radio compass, a sextant which did not use during flight because take-off time delayed for 30 minutes, maps and an inverted periscope enabling Powers to see the earth.

Used radio compass and beamed into two or three radio stations, could not remember how many exactly. If remember correctly, one of them located near Chelyabinsk and the other near Stalinabad.

Had an instrument something like an inverted periscope which made it possible to spot a plane underneath if it should appear. This instrument used chiefly for navigation.

Knew nothing about the capability of the equipment. Knew it was used to gather information, but what information and how much had no idea.

Powers testified as to having switched on and off the corresponding controls of the special equipment installed in his plane. Altogether there were five such controls.

Not informed of results of missions and did not know whether equipment worked properly except as indicated by signal lights in the cockpit.

Colonel Shelton said such flights over USSR were absolutely safe - only thing could happen was technical failing of the plane.

Powers knew it was a reconnaissance plane - could guess purpose for which turned on and off equipment - much of general equipment did not know what it looked like except what saw there.

17th of May in the Gorki Central Park of Culture and Rest Powers was shown the remains and wreckage of plane and its equipment. Powers stated he believed it was the same "Lockheed U-2" which he flew.

Powers followed route indicated on chart and switched on and off designated equipment over places indicated.

Places marked on the chart A or B or C or numbers 1-2-3 before Powers received it.

Powers named main points of route as marked on chart:
(a) East of the Aral Sea, (b) North-west of Chelyabinsk,
(c) Before and after Kirov, (d) Points near Arkhangelsk, near the Island of Solo, near Kongoma, near Kandalaksha, south and north of Murmansk.

Powers believes the navigator of the detachment who flew with them into Peshawar, Major Dulak, made the route markings on the map.

Identified topographical maps - proven to Powers that he had four. Powers thought he had only two.

Not given specific instructions to operate equipment - turn switches on and off as indicated on the chart.

Powers made three marks on map - (a) airfield not indicated on chart, (b) huge cisterns, for oil storage and (c) big outfit indicating a lot of buildings.

Given a map before flight. Separate places pointed out which considered aids for navigation. Example - One place was told two airfields were there - the airfields not indicated on map - if saw this city with two airfields, which not on map, could have thought had lost course.

Identified chart - Red pencil indicates points on part of the route to which should have kept as close as possible. Blue was less important sections and just show the direction. Sections marked in red pencil of particular interest to CIA.

Map - section of the route from Kandalaksha to Bodoe marked in brown pencil - in case of lack of fuel or oxygen was to cut route short and follow this shortest route, only in case of emergency. Would have crossed territory of Soviet Union, Finland, Sweden, Norway.

Topographical maps were to assist Powers in getting out of USSR territory.

Sections were cut out of two of the maps - no idea who cut these sections out - maps were on cloth - words "restricted" or "confidential" and the words "USA Air Force" were cut out.

All airplanes, based in Turkey, had identification marks. Powers personally did not see identification on U-2 - did not look for any.

Identified log journal - received it from Colonel Shelton - contained overflight data - take-off time, call signals, indicated points on map and etc.

Had an instrument like a granger which was switched on just before crossing Soviet border, and remained on all the time. It was equipment to create artificial static for radar stations. Designed to distort the radar from attacking fighters, or rockets - air-to-air type of rockets.

Experts established that the U-2 fitted with special counter radar equipment designed to jam radar stations for interception and guidance of fighter planes.

Not acquainted with special apparatus on the plane.

In the tail sections of the plane were located equipment to distort radar signals aimed at the plane from radar stations on the ground and fighter aircraft.

At specified points on map turn this equipment on..

Plane was equipped with special means for its destruction.

Examination established that the remote control of the destructor unit was installed in the cockpit. The electrical control panel, among other inscriptions, has one reading "explosion." Pilot was therefore aware of the existence of a special demolition device on his aircraft and of the methods of operating it.

The plane has a special remote-controlled destructor unit manufactured by Beckman and Whitley Inc. (Model 175-10A).

Examination of the tape recorder established that it had a special demolition device designed for its destruction. Expert examination established that a part of the magnetic tape was in perfectly good condition.

Blasting device fitted to the tape recorder designed to record the signals of Soviet radar stations.

Powers testified, ". . . the Colonel also said that just in case anything should happen, he was giving me some packages with Soviet money and gold coins. They were put into my flying suit pockets. He also had a silver dollar coin which he showed me which had a pin installed in it. He said that there was no danger because no USSR aircraft or rocket could get to my altitude but in case something should happen and I was captured, the pin contained poison and if I were tortured and could not stand it I could use the pin to kill myself."

Following items were in Powers' possession and were given to him by Colonel Shelton: (a) Italian, French, German and gold money, (b) Noiseless 10-shot pistol,

(c) 205 cartridges and (d) Poison needle (in case of capture and torture).

Identified an appeal written in 14 languages - did not know appeal was in his possession. Seems that the people who helped Powers to dress put the appeal as well as other things in his pockets.

Certificate issued by NASA which certified that Powers was fit for service as a pilot of NASA planes. Powers testified, "As I personally had nothing to do with NASA, I think this document was issued to me as a cover to conceal the true nature of the intelligence detachment 10-10."

.Powers identification card had both the stamp and emblem of the U.S. Defense Department.

Presented document issued in name of NASA which gave Powers authority to fly a military plane - also to conceal the real purpose of the reconnaissance detachment. Powers had no contact with NASA at all.

Never given a poison needle on flights previous to 1 May. Colonel Shelton showed how to use the needle.

Colonel Shelton gave Powers piece of black cloth. Does not know why. Shelton ordered to give piece of black cloth to representative of Detachment 10-10 who were to meet Powers in Bodoe.

9. TESTIMONY OF COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

Flight documents and documents identifying Powers were put at the disposal of the commission of experts. Commission of experts divided them into three groups:

1. Identification card No. AFI, 288,068, in the name of Francis Gary Powers, bearing the stamp of the U.S. Defense Department.
2. A medical certificate issued to Francis Powers showing that he was serving in the U.S. Air Force.
3. Rules for the use of aircraft belonging to the Air Force by test pilots of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, registered as U.S. Air Force Instruction No. 5526, signed by Chief of the U.S. Air Force Staff, Thomas White, and addressed personally to Francis Powers on January 1, 1959.

4. Two certificates entitling Francis Powers to engage in blind flying, issued by the headquarters of the Bolling Air Force Base, District of Columbia.

All of these documents indicated that Powers belongs to the Air Force of the U.S.

Second group of documents studied by commission of experts consists of flight documents referring specifically to May 1 flight.

Third group consists of flight documents of the universally accepted type that are required by flight personnel on any flight. These include: record of aerial navigation charts, checklist of apparatus on board, list of the aircraft's equipment, directory of European airfields.

Expert commission came to the following conclusions: Powers belongs to the United States Air Force - flight of 1 May 1960 was deliberate and planned in advance - charts with the route plotted and the navigational data were prepared on the ground before the flight - during flight Powers knew his location, regularly controlled the flight by means of given landmarks, carried out his flight along a previously charted route - during flight over USSR entered on map information of an intelligence character and also entered weather conditions.

Commission of experts to establish if there were identification marks on the U-2: Results of investigation revealed there were no identification marks of any kind.

Powers: Would it be possible for identification marks to be put on top of the coating and then removed? I ask this because this plane has been in Incirlik for several months and I saw identification marks on all the planes there. I cannot agree that there have never been any identification marks on this plane.

Expert: In principle, there is this possibility.

Commission of experts given following parts of photographic equipment of U-2 plane for study: a destroyed air camera magazine with four rolls of aerial film 24 cm. wide, separate destroyed elements of the aerial camera, and two rolls of film 7 cm. wide.

The altitude at which aerial photographs were taken was determined by the pictures which account of the actual focal length of the camera; according to this determination, the altitude was 20,000-21,000 metres.

The photographing of the USSR territory was made from an altitude of about 21,000 metres on a sector running from an area North of the Soviet-Afghan state border, up to the Sverdlovsk area.

Commission of experts to examine the radiotechnical apparatus and the magnetic tape recordings found in U-2.

Aviation tape recorders - one partially and the other heavily destroyed.

Six tape recorder reels with ferromagnetic tape. Part of the magnetic tape had burned up, apparently as a result of a deliberate explosion.

Commission of experts given the following for examination: a pistol, 205 cartridges in different packages, a carton with 5 phials and a tin container with lids at both ends.

Powers - Unfortunately, nobody but myself knows that I cannot kill a person even to save my own life.

Commission of experts to carry out a technical examination of the special mechanism, the destructor unit. Examination established: (1) design of the destructor unit, (2) methods of operating the destructor unit (elements of the remote control circuit were not found), (impossible to establish the time lag of the explosion since no timing mechanism was found in the wreckage), (3) explosive contained in the destructor unit and its destructive power and (4) purpose of the destructor unit.

Commission on forensic medicine: Substance contained on the needle inside the pin, judging from the nature of its effect on animals, could according to its toxic doses and physical properties, be included in the curare group, the most powerful and quickest-acting of all known poisons.

Commission of experts to study the maps, films and other materials discovered among remains of the plane: Concluded that flight of 1 May was premeditated, prepared in advance and was conducted with reconnaissance aims. Analysis

of the flight chart showed that the plane flew from Peshawar airfield to Sverdlovsk area along the route set with an average speed of some 750 kilometers an hour.

10. NAMES MENTIONED AT POWERS TRIAL

Mr. Collins - signed contract with Powers on behalf of CIA. (This is a pseudo)

Colonel Shelton - CO Detachment 10-10

General Thomas White - Com. Genl. U.S. Air Force

General Frank Everest - Com. Genl. U.S. Air Force,
European Command

Colonel Perry - CO, Detachment 10-10

Colonel Berly (Beerli) - CO, Detachment 10-10

Major Dulak (DuLac) - Navigator, Detachment 10-10

Cardinal Spellman

(Signed)

John C. Mertz
CI/SI

C05492917

ANNEX 93

C05492917

NBC WHITE PAPER #1

THE U-2 AFFAIR

NARRATOR: Chet Huntley

BROADCAST: Tuesday, November 29, 1960
10:00 - 11:00 P.M. EST

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Irving Gitlin
PRODUCER-DIRECTOR: Al Wasserman
WRITTEN BY: Al Wasserman, and
Arthur Barron
ASSOCIATE PRODUCER: Arthur Barron

Black

SOUND EFFECTS - Jet Engine

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

You are listening to the sound of a jet. It is not an ordinary jet.

U-2 Takes off

SOUND EFFECTS UP

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

This is a U-2.

This is the incredible plane that projected our country into a crisis that shook the world.

CU Powers at trial

This is Francis Gary Powers, Pilot of the one U-2 flight that failed.

TRIAL AUDIO:

Powers Confession.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Washington Scenes

Whatever the fate of Powers, the U-2 was not so much the drama of an individual...as of a nation, this nation, and the manner in which we reacted to a major and unprecedented crisis.

MS
Goldwater

GOLDWATER:

How can you negotiate with murderers?
How can you negotiate with people who
have shot down numbers of our planes?
How can you negotiate with people who
tell lies and who do not fulfill their
solemn obligations? I don't think
you can gain anything by going to
the summit with these type of people.

MS
Bowles

BOWLES:

Major elements in our government have
been caught telling blatant false-
hoods to the world, to ourselves, to
each other, and to Congressional
committees. We have not told the
truth. We have taken grave risks on
the very eve of a great and important
international conference.

MAIN TITLES:

1. NBC WHITE PAPER #1
2. THE U-2 AFFAIR
3. TIMEX BILLBOARD

THEME:

ANNOUNCER:

Timex billboard

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

STUDIO
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Almost six months have passed since the day of the U-2 flight and the crisis it created. But a crisis should not be filed and forgotten in a nation's archives simply because it is in the past. Now that the passions and partisanship of an election year have subsided - and because we feel that the consequences of this crisis are still unfolding and the lessons to be learned are still significant - NBC News has decided to retell and re-examine the story of that fateful flight of May first and the events that flowed from it.

Dissolve to:

Exterior Lockheed
Taxiing Shot

Second Taxi Shot,
Man Gesturing

If the story can properly be said to begin anywhere, it is with the superb airplane itself and the men who built it. This is a U-2, filmed by NBC with special permission at the place of its birth, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Burbank, California.

Interior Lockheed
Kelly Johnson

HUNTLEY (CONTINUED):

Here is the man who designed it,
Lockheed Vice President, Kelly Johnson.

JOHNSON:

Back in 1953 and 1954, we were studying ways and means of making fighter airplanes like the F 104 go higher and further than they did at that time. As we went further and further into these studies it soon became apparent that it would take an entirely new kind of aircraft to do the job that we wanted done.

JOHNSON (O.S.):

LS Plane
MS Wing

From this came the U-2.
We made a wing that had a very long span - over 80 feet. The wing had to carry the whole weight of the aircraft and still be very, very light. It had to be designed not only to hold a great amount of fuel, but it was designed so the wing tip acted as part of the landing gear.

CU Wingtip

Pogo

On the take off, we invented what we called the pogo landing gears. These stick into sockets in the wing, and rest on the ground and keep the airplane level on take off.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Pilot Pre Breathing

If the design of the U-2 presented unusual problems, so too did flying it. The pilot of a U-2 must spend an hour-and-a-half before take-off relaxing and breathing pure oxygen in order to prepare himself for high altitude conditions.

CU Pilot

His helmet is airtight and sealed to his body by a cork ring; he can, therefore, neither eat nor drink before...

Exterior Lockheed
Pilot getting into
plane

or during a flight. A long flight may keep the pilot sealed up for more than eight hours.

Closer Shot,
getting into
cockpit

After such a voyage, he will emerge hungry and thirsty from his cramped cockpit, his skin chafed and raw from the tight fitting suit and helmet.

Plane Taxis to
Runway

The plane he flies will range as high as 90,000 feet - 17 miles above the earth -- far above the operating ceiling of any other jet....and during the eight hours it can stay aloft, the U-2 will half fly, half glide for nearly four thousand miles.

Take off

TAKE OFF EFFECT

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont.

U-2 in Flight

It was evident from the start that the U-2 would be an invaluable airplane. It was--and is--employed by the Air Force and other agencies for high altitude scientific research. More recently, the Air Force has been using the planes to observe missiles in flight and to track missile nose cones on the way down. But, to the civilian Central Intelligence Agency, the U-2s ability to fly higher and farther than any interceptor aircraft made it a...

Dissolve to:

Stills

superb spy. With dark paint and a special reconnaissance equipment, the unmarked plane the Russians came to call the black lady of espionage systematically probed the borders and penetrated deep behind the iron curtain for nearly four years.

Tokyo Crash Sequence

A crash landing at a glider strip near Tokyo in 1959 provided the most dramatic breach in the secrecy surrounding

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

the espionage activities of the U-2.
These pictures were made before the
area could be cordoned off by U.S.
security guards.

General Newspaper
Stills

Over the years other hints of the
black ladies' secret missions came
to the surface...

"Mysterious Stranger"

first in a British flight magazine...

"Mystery Crash"

then in reports of a mysterious crash
that killed Lockheed test pilot
Robert Seiker....

Misc. Newspaper

then in other newspapers and avia-
tion magazines...

Soviet Aviation

including Russian ones. In 1958 and
59 the newspaper Soviet Aviation attack-
ed the espionage flights, the men be-
hind them, and the planes they flew.

Black Plane

SILENCE

Dissolve to:

Stock
Powers Trial

This is the pilot of the one U-2
reconnaissance flight that failed...
Francis Gary Powers.

TRIAL AUDIO

This is his family.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

8.

POWERS' MOTHER
(Over Trial Footage
and on camera)

POWERS' MOTHER:

Ever since Francis was just a little boy he was interested in airplanes, and made model planes. And - a - always said he wanted to become a pilot. So he - after so long a time, he made a pilot.

Well, I wanted the boy to do what he thought best. Because it was his life. And - a - I was kind of scared, though, as I was afraid of planes - the dangers of them. Anything that goes up has to come down. So that's the reason I was kind of afraid for him - afraid he would crash, some-time, and maybe kill himself.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Incirlik Air Base
Turkey

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

trailer camp

In August, 1956, Francis Powers arrived at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, an American installation on a flat, bleak, plain 10 miles from the town of Adana. It is a normal air force base....with one exception. Isolated in a trailer camp at its western end

Trailer Camp

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

CU Trailer

Camp

Transport Takes Off

is the top secret IO-10 reconnaissance detachment, which conducted U-2 overflights. Francis Powers and his wife moved into trailer T 1356, where, in common with seven other civilian pilots and their families they lived in mystery and seclusion for nearly four years, aloof from the rest of the base. On Thursday, April 27, 1960, a transport plane flew Powers and other members of the IO-10 detachment from Incirlik....

Dissolve to:

Animation
Arrow Moves From
Incirlik to Peshawar

Pullback to larger
area to Show Powers'
Intended Flight Route

to the Pakistani Air Base at Peshawar. Then, when conditions were right, Powers would begin a thirty three hundred mile voyage across the Soviet Union, his equipment continuously monitoring its industry and defenses. If all went well, he would touch down at Bodo, Norway eight hours after take-off.

Dissolve to:

Globe Turning,
Day-Night Effect, Zoom
in Surface of Globe
Turning

And so, early on Sunday morning on the first of May, 1960, Francis Powers lifted off from Pakistan. Most of the western world was still in dark-

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

ness and, as he crossed into Soviet territory, dawn was just breaking in Moscow.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Moscow
dawn scenes

In a few hours, the May Day parade was scheduled to begin - an annual display dedicated to the glorification of the Communist regime. Already the city was being prepared for the great event.

As Powers continued his flight, it was still the night of April 30th in the United States of America.

Dissolve to:

Night Scenes
Washington at Night
LS

In Washington, D.C., at midnight, it was time for the daily ritual....

Lights Go Off On
Capitol Dome

....of shutting down the city's landmarks.

Lights Go Off At
Lincoln Memorial

White House

At the White House, guards kept watch over an empty building. The President was away for the week-end at his Gettysburg farmhouse.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

State Department

At the State Department, a few lights were burning late. A summit conference - the first in five years - was scheduled to begin in Paris in two weeks, and there were preparations to make.

Dissolve to:

Night
Exterior Washington
Post

In one section of the city there was considerable activity.

Interior
WashingtonPost
Mailing Room Scenes

The Sunday papers had just come off the presses and were being readied for delivery. Whatever news was to occupy attention that morning was already frozen in type and bound in wire. And of all those who would soon be casually scanning the morning papers, in Washington....

Dissolve to:

Stock

Moscow Newspaper
Delivery Girls Coming
Out Of Building

...and in Moscow - no one was aware that a news story that would shake the world was being born in the wreckage of an American plane, down 1,200 miles inside the Soviet Union.

Muscovites Reading
Papers

THE U-2 AFFAIR

FADE OUT

FADE IN:

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

We'll continue with The U-2 Affair
after this message from Timex.

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

First Commercial

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

Studio
MCU, Huntley

The circumstances surrounding the
downing of the U-2' are still largely
a mystery. American intelligence
sources have communicated a version
of what happened to several reporters
....among them, Robert Hotz, editor
of the authoritative Aviation Week
magazine.

Hotz, Plugging in
Tape Recorder

He Turns to Camera

HOTZ:

Our government knew that Powers was
in trouble almost from the moment
that it first occurred. This is
because we have a rather extensive
network of monitoring Soviet communi-
cations, and they also have a similar
network with which they monitor ours.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HOTZ (CONTINUED):

This is an example of what we get from listening to the Russians. This incident took place about two years ago.

He Turns on
Tape Recorder

Sound: Russian Fighter Pilot Conversation

CU Recorder

HOTZ (O.S.)

The Russian fighter pilots are moving in to attack. Here is the official translation of their conversation at this point...

The target is a four engine transport ...roger. 201 - I am attacking the target...the target is burning...there is a hit...the target is banking...it is going toward the fence. Open fire. 218 - are you attacking? Yes, yes. The tail assembly is falling off the target. I will finish him off, boys. I will finish him off on the run. The target is falling...yes. Form up...go home.

HOTZ Turns Off
Tape Recorder

HOTZ:

During Powers' flight across Russia our monitoring system was functioning and gained a great deal of useful

HOTZ (CONTINUED):

information. From conversation of the Russian radar crews it was evident that Powers' flight was expected and it was tracked almost from the moment he crossed the Afghan border. From conversations of fighter pilots and air defense installations it was evident that they set up relays of supersonic fighters in an attempt to shoot him down. As Powers neared Sverdlovsk, he reported a flameout in his jet engine and began to descend to the altitude at which it was possible to start this engine in the air. The last communication with Powers was about 40,000 feet. When Powers came down in the Soviet Union, our government knew the following facts....the fact that the plane had come down in the area of Sverdlovsk....the fact that it had been forced down by a mechanical failure, not shot down by a rocket at 70,000 feet as the Soviets later claimed. What our government did not know was whether the pilot was still alive

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HOTZ (CONTINUED):

and what the condition of the aircraft was when it hit the ground.

Dissolve to:

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Stills of Wrecked
Plane

Powers' plane had crashed in a field near the city of Sverdlovsk, some 900 miles east of Moscow. According to the Russians, the pilot had parachuted down and had been taken into custody by several local citizens. They described how they disarmed him, gave him a drink of water and a cigarette, and drove him to the local Rural Soviet, where he was turned over to security police.

Stock:
Russians Inspecting
Wreck

Powers Captors

Dissolve to:

Stock
Moscow May Day Footage

In Moscow, it was 8:53 A.M. at the time of the crash. The streets outside Red Square were already crowded with spectators waiting for the May Day parade to begin.

Kremlin leaders

As the Russian high command walked out of the Kremlin to take their places at the reviewing stand, they were probably still unaware of what had happened.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Various shots
Parade and reviewing
stand

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

Among those in Red Square watching the events of that morning was NBC News correspondent, Joe Michaels.

MICHAELS (O.S.)

Exactly at 10 A.M., as always, the May Day ceremony officially began. The first part of the parade was the military section. I watched the mobile units going by to see if there was anything new. There wasn't. Most of the time, I kept my eye on the reviewing stand. From a reporter's point of view this is the most likely place to pick up anything of interest. And at about 10:45 - three-quarters of an hour after the parade began - I did notice something most unusual. An excited Marshal Vershinin, the head of the Soviet Air Force, arrived late. He entered at the rear of the reviewing stand, went up to Khrushchev, and whispered something in his ear. Of course it's only a guess, but I am inclined to believe that this was the moment Khrushchev

MICHAELS (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

found out that the U-2 was down.

Dissolve to:

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY

If the manner in which Khrushchev learned the news is open to speculation, so is the manner in which our own key officials learned. According to Powers' testimony, his destination was to have been....

Dissolve to:

Stock
Shots of Bodo

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

...the NATO Air Base at Bodo, Norway a small fishing town at the edge of the Arctic Circle. The plane was due at 7 A.M., Washington time on May 1st. When it failed to arrive, this information must have been communicated to....

Dissolve to:

CIA Seal on Fence
CIA Building,
Through Barbed Wire
CIA Building,
Director's Parking
Sign in F.G.

the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington. In any event, by noon, five hours after the plane was due, it is known that word had already spread among a group of top Washington officials.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont'd

At C.I.A., under whose direction the overflights were conducted, Director Allen Dulles had been advised.

Pentagon

At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Gates knew about it.

N.A.S.A. Building

At N.A.S.A. - the National Aeronautics and Space Administration - which operated the scientific weather flight program of the U-2s, Director Keith Glennan and Deputy Director Lawrence Dryden also knew.

State Department
Building

And at the Department of State, Under Secretary Douglas Dillor had been informed. What they did not know was that....

Dissolve to:

Night Shots of May
Day Festivities

...in Moscow, as the May Day festivities continued into the night, Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the U-2 was alive and already confined in a cell somewhere behind the forbidding walls of Lubyanka prison.

Dissolve to:

LS Night
Washington

That same night of May 1, in Washington, our government began to take action. To tell us about it....

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

Bourgholtzer.

NBC News State Dep't Correspondent,
Frank Bourgholtzer.

BOURGHOLTZER:

I've been told by persons whom I believe that there was a meeting not long after the word was received that the U-2 was missing. This was a meeting at a relatively low level of those persons who normally meet to discuss such intelligence problems.

At this meeting a rather routine decision was made to go ahead and put out a cover story; that is to say, a story that would cover for the record the fact that the plane was missing without revealing anything of its true mission.

Dissolve to:

Interior,
General Phillips

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

This is Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips, U.S. Army Retired, a former specialist in intelligence and military affairs analyst for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

PHILLIPS:

From an intelligence point of view, the original cover story seemed to be particularly inept. One gets the impression, and I believe it's a true one, that it had been in the files for a long time. And when the U-2 came down, it was just yanked out of the files and issued.

A cover story has certain requirements. It must be credible. It must be a story that can be maintained; and it should not have too much detail. Anything that's missing in a cover story can be taken care of by saying the matter is being investigated.

The most striking thing was the failure to consider, in the cover story issued, the possibility that the pilot might be alive and the airplane might be intact.

Dissolve to:

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

As the events of the week of May first were to demonstrate, the story that was issued to "cover" the disappearance of

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (CONTINUED):

the U-2 failed to serve its purpose. This failure was not immediately apparent.

The days following May first were quiet ones, and the cover story first began to come to the surface on Tuesday, May third, in Istanbul, Turkey.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Dissolve to:

Stock
Turkish Riots

On May third, Istanbul was a city under martial law, the atmosphere heavy with tension. Turkish students were rioting in protest over the stern police policies of Premier Menderes and his ruling party. Although the government was still in control, it's downfall was only a few weeks off.

NATO Meeting

At the Municipal Palace in Istanbul, troops stood guard while, inside, a meeting of the NATO countries was taking place. Attending, was Secretary of State Christian Herter and a number of his top aides in the State Department. Among those covering the developments of the day was a Turkish reporter.

MLS Herter

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Dissolve to:

MLS Goren in
apartmentGOREN:

I'm Zeyyat Goren, United Press International Bureau Manager for Turkey.

It was a Tuesday morning, May the third. I was writing a story on the NATO Council Meeting and the anti-Menderes demonstrations. A stringer

of mine called me. He said he heard a story about an American plane missing -- somewhere in eastern Turkey -- from Incirlik Air Base at Adana.

After I got the tip, I called Incirlik Air Base and talked to the information sergeant, who gave me the details of the story.

MCU Goren

The sergeant said the story is true. The plane is missing since two days. And the last they have heard from the pilot, he has trouble with his oxygen supplies somewhere over Van Lake area - which, he added, is near to the Persian border. Of course, being a native of Turkey, I know Van Lake area is also near to the Russian border, which was the angle of my story - though I didn't know that day that this story will come such a big story.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Dissolve to:

Ticker

Sound Effects

BILL FOX:

Dissolve to:

UPI New York

I'm Bill Fox, day cable editor for United Press International in New York. I was on duty on May 3rd when we received a dispatch from Istanbul, Turkey about eight o'clock in the morning reporting that a U.S. Air Force plane, a U-2, was reported missing somewhere in the rugged mountains of eastern Turkey in the area of Lake Van, which is near the Soviet border. I have here the original dispatch which we received by radio teletype from London. Of course, at the time I didn't know what a U-2 was, nor did I realize that we had a piece of history by the tail. But, the fact that an American airplane was missing in the general area of the Soviet border, I felt was newsworthy. Consequently, I rewrote the story, adding some information that another American plane had been downed in the same

MCU Fox

THE U-2 AFFAIR

BILL FOX (CONTINUED):Story Being
Transmitted

Teletype Operator

Dissolve to:
Composing Room
Washington Post

Type Moves to Presses

Presses Rolling

general area about a year previously. I checked it with the foreign editor and sent it to the News Desk. From there it was put on our transcontinental A wire for simultaneous dispatch to all UPI subscribers throughout North America.

The text of our story went like this: A single engine U.S. Air Force plane with one man aboard was missing today near the Soviet border in the rugged mountains of southeastern Turkey. The plane was one of two that took off Sunday morning from Incirlik Air Base near Adana on a weather reconnaissance mission. One plane returned but the pilot of the missing craft reported that his oxygen equipment was out of order. Three C-54 planes from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya under the command of Major Harry E. Hayes of Clarksville, Texas were combing the area in search of the missing plane, but thus far without success.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

MLS
Presses turning
tilt down to man
reading paper

The cover story appeared in print on the morning of May 4th. At the time, it was so unimportant that only a handful of papers across the country carried it - and only one, the Washington Post and Times Herald ran it on the front page...
...a small story that was eliminated in later editions to make room for a baseball headline.

CU
U-2 story
on page 1

Dissolve to:
Ext. Washington
Over shoulder of man
reading Washington
Post of May 4th.
PAN to street and
newsstand

In Washington, on Wednesday, May 4th, there was not much to be found in the way of news.

Dissolve to:
Ike and Republican
Congressmen

In the morning, the President had breakfast with a number of Republican Congressmen, then chatted with them on the steps of the White House.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Ike signing wheat
agreement

Later in the morning, he signed an important wheat agreement with India, and in the afternoon played a round of golf.

Dissolve to:
Stock
New York Tulip show,
Mayor Wagner cutting
ribbon; Cardinal Spell-
man standing by

In New York, Mayor Wagner presided at the opening of a tulip display. Spring was on its way.

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont'd

Dissolve to:

Stock
Elysee Palace and
workmen

And in Paris, workmen were busy tidying
up the Elysee Palace for a summit con-
ference that would never be held.

Parisian children
playing

All in all, it was a quiet day, May 4th
- the last such day the world would
know for some time to come

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

We'll continue with the U-2 Affair
after this message from TIMEX and Miss
Julia Mead.

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

SECOND COMMERCIAL

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

Stock
LS Moscow

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Moscow, Thursday, May 5th. NBC News
Correspondent Joe Michaels again
reporting.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Meeting of Supreme
Soviet at which K
announces plane shot
down

MICHAELS (O.S.):

On Thursday morning, May 5th, I was
present in the Hall of the great Kremlin
Palace as the Supreme Soviet began its
three-day meeting. First on the agenda

MICHAELS (O.S.) cont'd

was a speech by Premier Khrushchev. At 10 a.m. Khrushchev began his three-and-a-half hour address. Most of it dealt with such matters as tax reform, wages, prices, currency change, and so forth. But towards the end, he suddenly introduced a new theme.

To a stunned and startled audience, Khrushchev announced that an American U-2 spy plane had been shot down in the Soviet Union. He did not specify where, and he did not indicate the fate of the pilot. He went on to warn those countries harboring United States bases that they were "playing with fire" and promised a stern protest to the United States and to the United Nations. But he added, "I do not doubt President Eisenhower's sincere desire for peace. Reason must guide us."

STUDIO
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

With Khrushchev's speech, the U-2 affair had become a full-blown crisis. The world was waiting for our government to respond, and respond we did - during a two-day period of chaos.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Dissolve to:

Bourgholtzer

Scherer

He turns to camera

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

...NBC News State Department Correspondent Frank Bourgholtzer...

...and White House correspondent, Ray Scherer, were following the story as it developed.

SCHERER:

At the time the U-2 incident broke into the headlines, events were moving so rapidly and we were all so close to the story that none of us could really follow its ramifications. Now, with the passage of time, certain things have become clarified.

We know, for example, that following the National Security Council meeting on May 5th, the President called together a small group to discuss how to handle the situation. Two decisions emerged from this meeting; one, to continue with the cover story that had already been planted; and two, that any statement by this government on the situation would come only from the State Department. This latter decision was not implemented. In a recent discussion with Jim Hagerty, Frank Bourgholtzer and I questioned him about that.

SCHERER:

Hagerty interview

Now after you saw us on that Thursday morning and told us that the President had asked for a full investigation, you referred us to NASA and to the State Department for further information.

HAGERTY:

That is right.

SCHERER:

Now I went over from the White House to NASA upon hearing your word they would have a statement. They seemed to know nothing about it. They weren't prepared to make a statement. But they did make one later. Why was the time --

HAGERTY

Ray, I don't know. I can't answer that.

SCHERER:

Were you in on the framing of their statement?

HAGERTY:

No, I was not.

SCHERER:

Just to establish a further point, did the men at NASA, and did the men in the State Department involved in the cover

SCHERER:(Cont'd)

story know it was a cover story, or were they simply agents?

HAGERTY:

That I cannot answer. I do not know.

Dissolve to:

Bourgholtzer

BOURGHOLTZER:

On the morning of May the fifth I was at the State Department. We were waiting with more than normal curiosity for Link White's daily briefing. He came out to see us at twelve forty-five and he read the following statement:

Stock
White Statement
May 5

WHITE:

The Department has been informed by N.A.S.A. that, as announced May three, an unarmed plane - a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, has been missing since May one. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having a failure

WHITE: (cont'd)

in the oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

Bourgholtzer

BOURGHOLTZER:

Thinking back to the answers Link White gave to the many questions we later posed...it is perfectly clear that he had not been informed of any decision to make the State Department the sole spokesman about the U-2. When reporters pressed him for details...he volunteered the information that "infinitely more detail" was being given out at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Scherer

SCHERER:

At 12:15 on May 5th, as soon as the Hagerty News Conference was over, I followed his suggestion, ran from the White House across Lafayette Park to

Scherer

SCHERER: (cont'd)

NASA. I was the first reporter to arrive. I said I have come for the statement. And they said, "What statement?" I said, "The statement that Jim Hagerty said that you were going to put out." Well that seemed to confuse them. They didn't know anything about any such statement. They finally took me into see Walt Bonney, the Information Chief. He didn't know anything about it either. There was a lot of conferring and some more confusion...Other reporters arrived. Well, I finally left and I had the impression that there wouldn't be any statement. But at 1:30 p.m., Bonney did release a statement that attempted to answer the questions reporters had been asking him.

Stock
Bonney

BONNEY:

Now, if the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the airplane, from the last reported position, would be impossible to determine.

SCHERER: (Partially O.S.)

Scherer

The Bonney statement went considerably beyond that of the State Department. For instance, there were details about the supposed U-2 flight plan, how many U-2s we had, where they were stationed, and so forth. The statement was so detailed that it raised almost as many questions as it answered.

For example, Bonney contended that the U-2 had taken off from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey at 8 a.m. local time. This was considerably later than the time announced in Khrushchev's speech, and reporters were quick to notice the discrepancy.

Dissolve to:

Studio
HuntleyHUNTLEY:

One more incident occurred in Washington on that confusing May 5th which is worth noting. Late in the afternoon, a telegram was received from Ambassador Thompson, in Moscow, advising the State Department of the possibility that Powers might be alive. Despite this warning, on the following day we still seemed curiously unaware of the full potentialities of the situation.

Stock
President and
Roberts at
Exhibit

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

On the morning of Friday, May 6th, President Eisenhower attended a union industrial exhibit. Reporter Charles Roberts, of Newsweek Magazine, was there.

ROBERTS: (Partially O.S.)

On Friday, May 6th, I was standing just two feet from President Eisenhower when he gave his first public reaction to the U-2 incident. At a Union Industry Show in the Washington Armory, talking to George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, he remarked that he was going to give a hydrojet boat to Khrushchev on his trip to Russia. Then, he added the phrase, if I go. Up until then the White House had refused to comment on the U-2 incident or acknowledge in any way that it had disturbed our relations with the Soviet Union. After the show, around noon on Friday, Ike climbed into his helicopter, outside the armory, and flew to Gettysburg where, that afternoon, he played a round of golf. Some of us were surprised that he flew to Gettysburg in time of crisis - but the White House

Dissolve to:

Helicopter
leaves

Roberts
on golf course

THE U-2 AFFAIR

ROBERTS: (continued)

has always insisted that with modern communications the President can run the government from his Gettysburg farmhouse as well as he can from the White House.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Herter's return

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Later that same afternoon, Secretary of State Herter returned from abroad. Despite the crisis, it would still be two days before he and the President were to see one another.

Dissolve to:

Lincoln White
Press Conference

And at the State Department, in his press conference that day, held in a setting similar to this, it was evident that Lincoln White had still not been advised to exercise caution. In response to questioning by reporters, he said, "It is ridiculous to say we are trying to kid the world about this."

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont.d

Later, he added, "There was absolutely no...N-O...no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space and there has never been."

Dissolve to:

Stock
Khrushchev's
May 7 speech

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

Saturday morning, May 7th.....
.....for Nikita Khrushchev, a day of
triumph.

KHRUSHCHEV - Audio

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

Once the applause of the Supreme Soviet quieted down, Khrushchev revealed a secret that he had been keeping almost a week. He displayed photographs, which he said were taken from the captured U-2, and announced that the pilot was alive and had confessed. Then he said, of the Americans, "When they learn that the pilot is alive, they will have to think of something else...and they will."

Khrushchev
waves photos

Headlines

TICKER EFFECT

HUNTLEY:

Khrushchev's announcement had blown our cover story to pieces. Newsweek correspondent, Charles Roberts, continues with his report of developments in Gettysburg that day.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Charles Roberts

ROBERTS: (PARTIAL O.S.)

Early Saturday morning, May 7th, a number of reporters, including myself, came up to Gettysburg to cover late developments.

Stock
Gettysburg and
Press Conference

White House News Secretary James Hagerty had promised us a story that morning, and we thought it would relate in some way to the U-2. At nine thirty-six, while the President was out playing golf, we sat down with Hagerty at a make-shift press room at the Gettysburg hotel. To our astonishment, the story he promised concerned nuclear testing.

He announced that the United States was prepared to resume nuclear testing as soon as possible - as he put it. The tests were to be for the purpose of improving means of detecting underground blasts - a step towards policing a nuclear test ban. But we were still surprised that the government would put out an announcement, while it was under fire for aerial spying, that might be interpreted as a new cold war maneuver. Hagerty still refused to discuss the U-2 incident. He said he had informed the President of Khrushchev's latest

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Roberts

speech, but that he would have no comment. Any reaction, he said, would have to come from the State Department. Meantime, Ike had been on the golf course since 9:05. He finished his round at 11:28 - score unreported. Then, he returned to the farmhouse, where he spent the remainder of the day. During that day, at the State Department in Washington, a crucial meeting was held to work out an answer to Khrushchev's latest speech. The President did not attend that meeting, but Hagerty informed us that Ike was in contact with Secretary of State Herter by phone during the day. Late in the afternoon, a statement was read to the President by phone - and he approved it without change. At six p.m. Lincoln White of the State Department read that statement to newsmen.

Stock
White Statement

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Only the previous day, Lincoln White had said, "There was absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space and there never has been." Now he was stating something different.

WHITE:

As a result of the inquiry ordered by

WHITE (CONT'D)

the President it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev. Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the iron curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

This one statement, agreed upon at a hastily convened meeting, represented a historic decision - our government was, in effect, admitting that we had previously lied, and that we had committed espionage - admissions no nation had ever made before.

Headlines

TICKER

Man on street
interviews

Q:

How will this incident affect the United States, do you think?

YOUTH

I feel that it will give the Americans a 'black eye' all over Europe.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

MAN 1:

My feeling is that the country did the right thing in sending these planes over - or this plane over. Because we have to keep abreast of the Russians, as far as the information is concerned.

MAN 2:

I think that if we fly over Russian territory, we take the chance of being shot down because of engaging in espionage - the same as we would do to them if they flew over our territory.

MAN 3:

I think that we ought to sink one of those submarines that have been spying off Cape Canaveral.

WOMAN:

Well, I don't think we should admit it. Yes. Yes. Never mind what the pilot said. We have a right to protect ourselves.

MAN 4:

Thinking it over, I think the State Department has really erred in the whole thing. They got a mix-up there. They don't seem to be coordinated. The one doesn't know what the other is doing.

Q:

What do you think about it?

WOMAN 2:

Well, I can only say what we were told in Church yesterday. We should pray for that boy. He needs it.

Stock
Eisenhower
Press Conference

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

On Wednesday, May 11th, President Eisenhower answered the one major question that remained: who had authorized the flights?

MCU Eisenhower

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER:

Our deterrent must never be placed in

jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this. As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

The President himself had assumed responsibility for authorizing the program of intelligence flights. We have learned that C.I.A. Director, Allen Dulles, had offered to serve as the traditional scapegoat and to resign. However, this is not the course the President chose. This avowal of responsibility by a head of state for intelligence activities was unprecedented in the history of international relations. It is a decision that has been the subject of considerable debate. Here are the views of the Chairman of the Senate Committee that investigated the U-2 Affair - Senator William Fulbright - and of the President's Press Secretary, James Hagerty.

Fulbright

Hagerty

HAGERTY (cont'd)

There is a great deal of puzzlement in my own mind of people that say why did the President or the government of the United States take responsibility. Well now this is something new that has been added to my world. If you gentlemen are spies, and I am not, and you get caught, I can say I never heard of you, or saw you before. But if you strap a U-2 to your back, it is a little difficult, to say the least, not to admit and assume responsibility.

Fulbright

FULBRIGHT

The President need never have avowed or disavowed is the point I make. He should have taken the position of silence in this matter and let the uh if anyone had to take responsibility, it should have been the head of the intelligence.

MCU Fulbright

Uh it should have to depend on circumstances as to who avowed or disavowed anything but it shouldn't have been the President who as I say embodies the whole sovereignty and dignity of the whole American people. I think personally this was perhaps the most serious fault in this whole operation, this whole incident.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Coupled with the President's assuming responsibility for the U-2 flights, was our attempt to justify our right to engage in them.

Hagerty

HAGERTY:

As the President himself at a press conference and in speeches said, when a closed society makes threats against our very welfare, it is up to us to find out everything we can about such a closed society, whether they are preparing for war, whether they are building up, and also the determination of the members of the government that there will never be another Pearl Harbor if they have anything to do about it.

Fulbright

Fulbright:

I think one of the most serious things to uh growing out of this, was our endeavor, on the part of our people, to justify uh this-these flights. Uh, to say you need something such as intelligence in international relations certainly is no justification for it. But in the position the President took he was in fact asserting the right to

THE U-2 AFFAIR

do this and not the need. They could understand the need. They understand that espionage goes on within certain areas all the time. But they never take full responsibility for it. The head of state does not. I think that it's responsible to believe that this avowal put Mr. Khrushchev in the position where he could not proceed to treat with the man who at the same time is asserting the right to violate the sovereignty of his country, in this case, the U.S.S.R.

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Following our avowal of the U-2 flights, one more significant question was raised during the week preceding the summit conference - the question of whether the flights would be continued. As the week began this became a source of apparently deliberate confusion.

Scherer

SCHERER:

On Monday morning May 9th, The New York Times carried a story saying, "It was learned that the President had ordered cessation of all flights over or near the borders of the U.S.S.R." Well, later that morning, at Jim Hagerty's

THE U-2 AFFAIR

SCHERER (CONT'D)

News Conference, we asked him whether the flights had been cancelled. He said that the President had not cancelled the flights. When asked whether they had been cancelled by any order other than the President, Jim answered, "I know of no such orders." Well the impression we were left with was that despite the events of the last few days, the U-2 flights were still going on. This impression was reinforced by a statement of Secretary of State Herter, which was released by Lincoln White the same afternoon.

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Although the administration had denied that it intended to imply that the flights would continue, this was the inference that was drawn by most observers. All these events led to an atmosphere of increasing tension as the summit conference approached.

EXHIBIT of U-2
wreckage, CU's
of equipment,
pistol, money
Power's boot

HUNTLEY: (O.S.)

In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev toured an exhibit that opened in Gorki Park. Here in a hall customarily devoted to the pasttime of chess, the Russians had put on display remnants of the plane,

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont'd

its equipment, and the pilot's personal effects.

Stock
Khrushchev
Press Conference

Later, in an impromptu press conference, Khrushchev reacted violently to what he termed our threat to continue the flights. He cancelled his invitation to President Eisenhower for a visit to the Soviet Union that had been planned for the following month.

Stock
Senate Briefing

And in Washington, as Administration leaders explained their decision to Congress, the beginning of a major controversy, involving both this country and its allies, was already apparent.

Bowles

CHESTER BOWLES:

We have certainly lost ground. Major elements in our government have been caught telling blatant falsehoods to the world, to ourselves, to each other, and to Congressional committees. We have not told the truth. We have taken grave risks on the very eve of a great and important international conference. And we put the President in a position of not knowing who keeps score.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Goldwater

BARRY GOLDWATER:

We have nothing to gain by going to the summit. We have nothing to negotiate at the summit. And about all we can do is to add dignity to this last beastly act of the Soviets. And I hope the President decides not to go. How can you negotiate with murderers? How can you negotiate with people who have shot down numbers of our planes. How do you negotiate with people who tell lies and who do not fulfill their solemn obligations? I don't think you can gain anything by going to the summit with these type of people. I think we ought to realize, in this country, that we're in a cold war and we better be in this war to win it - and start acting like it.

Lester Pearson

HUNTLEY (C.S.)

The former Foreign Minister of Canada:

PEARSON:

It was pretty stupid, on the part of the United States, if I may say so, for getting its elf in a position, before the summit conference, that the Soviets could exploit an incident of this kind.

PEARSON: (cont'd)

In other words, I don't think they've handled the matter very well...As long as the cold war goes on, governments are going to collect intelligence, legally or illegally, and the Russians are at the forefront of that parade. But if you do this kind of thing - collect intelligence - you should do it intelligently.

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

Ike leaving for summit - helicopter lands, he gets out, walks to plane, takes off

On Saturday, May 14th, President Eisenhower left the White House by helicopter to board the plane that would take him to Paris. The trip that was to have been the capstone of his career was already foredoomed to a failure that he, least of all, would have wanted. As James Reston had written in The New York Times, "The tragedy of President Eisenhower in the spy-plane case is that he and his colleagues have created almost all the things he feared the most. He wanted to reduce international tensions and he has increased it. He wanted to strengthen the alliance and he has weakened it. He glorified teamwork and morality, and got lies and administrative chaos. Everything he was noted

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (CONT'D)

for - caution, patience, leadership, military skill, and even good luck - suddenly eluded him precisely at the moment he needed them the most.

Ike at Orly
Airport

What happened after the President's arrival has become part of the folklore of history. The conference that was/held ^{to be}

Elysee Palace

at the Elysee Palace was never formally convened. After bitterly attacking the President of the United States, Premier Khrushchev stalked out of the first preliminary meeting. And before returning to Moscow...

Khrushchev
leaving Elysee PalaceKhrushchev at press
conference of May 18th,
pounding table
and shouting

...he began what has since become an all too familiar pattern of public performances.

KHRUSHCHEV AUDIO:

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Stock
Russian Demonstrations

The Russians now exploited to the fullest the propaganda advantage we had given them with the U-2. Whether the incident was chiefly responsible for the summit failure is still being debated: but it did provide ammunition for the Russians as they intensified cold war pressures throughout the world. Fear of Russian rockets in the months following the

British anti-
bases demonstrations

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (CONT'D)

summit made American bases the object of an increasing number of protest demonstrations.

Japanese demonstrations

SOUND EFFECTS

The United States found itself embarrassingly on the defensive - and in the riots against the Japanese-American Security Treaty, even high United States officials were caught in the storm.

SOUND EFFECT

Hagerty Interview

SCHERER:

Jim, by way of taking a longer look at this whole U-2 incident, now that the dust has settled somewhat, how do you think the United States came out of it?

HAGERTY:

Well, I think they came out very well. I think that basically the argument of an open society versus a closed society has been very well brought to the fore, has been brought to the attention of the peoples of the world. I think that is an overseas reaction. I think domestically the reaction of the American people quite frankly was "It was too bad we got caught, but we are glad we were doing it." That is the way I would sum it up.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

BOURGHOLTZER:

Do you, looking back, think that if you had it to do over again, you might have done anything in some different fashion?

HAGERTY:

No, with the exception that I think everybody admits, of the failure of the cover story. But outside of that, no.

SCHERER:

As you look back on this U-2 incident, who was in charge of our side of the thing as it developed - issuing of statements, coordination of policy, the whole aspect?

HAGERTY:

Well, I just can't answer that, Ray, I am sorry.

SCHERER:

Having had this experience, and now speaking with the benefit of hindsight, what lessons emerged from this for the future?

HAGERTY:

Don't get caught.

HUNTLEY:

At the hearings held by the Fulbright Committee, the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, was also asked what lessons could

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY: (cont'd)

be learned from the U-2 affair. His answer was "Not to have accidents." We leave it to the American public to decide whether "Don't get caught" and "Not to have accidents" are the only lessons to be learned from U-2.

What you have seen in the past hour is an attempt at a historical evaluation of a most controversial subject, including opposing viewpoints on the matter. Over thirty responsible reporters who covered this story as it unfolded contributed to this effort. There are certain conclusions that may reasonably be drawn from the facts examined in this report.

1. The cover story was inadequate to its mission. It was hastily released, excessive in detail and failed to take account of the possibility that Powers might be alive.
2. As the U-2 crisis developed, there was a serious lack of coordination among the governmental agencies involved, which resulted in conflicting and damaging statements to the world.

HUNTLEY: (cont'd)

3. By avowing the intelligence flights, an act unprecedented in the history of nations, our government suffered the consequences of having been caught in public misstatements.

4. Nobody expects the United States, or any other nation to stop intelligence activities, but by justifying the U-2 flights and implying they would continue, we materially affected the Summit Conference. If Khrushchev intended to wreck the conference beforehand, we gave him a ready made excuse. If he intended to negotiate, we made it difficult for him to do so.

5. Throughout the whole U-2 affair, we suffered from the fact that there was apparently no one official or agency to direct our total response to this crisis.

This is not a matter for the history books, but vitally affects our ability to survive as a nation. There will be other crises that the new administration, and succeeding administrations, will have to face. In the world as it is today, we cannot afford another U-2 affair. Good night.

Fade out

C05492917

ANNEX 94

From Rudolf I. Abel
#80016

June 12, 1960

To Mr. James B. Donovan, 160 William St., New York

Dear Jim,

I received your letter of June 6th. In the past week I also received a letter from Mr. Powers, the father of the U-2 pilot. He writes as follows:

Address: Pound Va.
June 2, 1960

"Dear Colonel Abel,

I am the father of Francis Gary Powers who is connected with the U-2 plane incident of several weeks ago. I am quite sure that you are familiar with this international incident and also the fact that my son is being currently held by the Soviet Union on an espionage charge. You can readily understand the concern that a father would have for his son and for a strong desire to have my son released and brought home. My present feeling is that I would be more than happy to approach the State Department and the President of the United States for exchange for the release of my son. By this I mean that I would urge and do everything possible to have my Government release you and return you to your country if the powers in your country would release my son and let him return to me. If you are inclined to go along with this arrangement I would appreciate your so advising me and also so advising the powers in your country along these lines.

I would appreciate hearing from you in this regard as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

Signed: Oliver Powers"

I replied to him as follows:

"Dear Mr. Powers,

Your letter of June 2nd received June 10th.

Much as I appreciate and understand your concern for the safety and return of your son, I regret to say

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

that, all things considered, I am not the person to whom your request should have been directed. Obviously, this should be my wife. Unfortunately, by order of the Department of Justice, U.S., I am not permitted to write to my family and so cannot convey your request to them directly.

Sincerely yours,

Signed: R. I. Abel"

However, I do think that my family should be informed of this step of Mr. Powers and that copies of his letter and my reply should be sent to my wife's lawyer in East Berlin. I would like you to send a copy of the letter from the Dept. of Justice dated May 25th that you enclosed in your letter of June 6th also to this lawyer.

Regarding this latter letter, it does little more than reiterate the previous letter on this matter. The "little more" is the allusion to Powers and the matter of the fine. This has been taken care of, while the Powers affair is not in my competency and complaints about his treatment should be addressed elsewhere.

Since the Dept. of Justice regard their position as one of prison administration, the proper place to initiate court action is not with Judge Byers but with the Federal District Court here in Atlanta where the penitentiary is located. I would like you to take the necessary steps in this direction on your return from Europe.

Incidentally, there might be some benefit if you could meet my wife's lawyer when you visit Switzerland. I imagine that he would have no difficulty in doing so, and you could give him a much clearer picture of what is going on than any exchange of letters can do.

Hoping you have a good trip

Sincerely yours,

Rudolf I. Abel
#80016

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

C05492917

ANNEX 95

~~SECRET~~Attachment to
IDEA-0189
23 February 1961Release Procedures -- Francis Gary Powers1. Situation

A. Mr. Francis Gary Powers has been sentenced to 10 years in a Soviet prison and is now serving that sentence. It is possible, however, that it might better serve Russian propaganda purposes to release Mr. Powers prior to the termination of his prison sentence. The press has speculated to this effect, and Mr. Powers has mentioned the possibility of an early release in a letter to his father. Two additional factors that have given rise to speculation about Mr. Powers' release are the return of the RB-47 crew members and the expressed Russian friendship for the new Administration. Although the United States does not have any formal or informal information indicating an early release, it appears appropriate to consider the procedures to be followed in the event Mr. Powers returns to the United States in the near future.

B. Any planning for this contingency, of course, is hampered by lack of knowledge relative to Mr. Powers' attitude and desires and the timing and circumstances surrounding Mr. Powers' release. It might be noted, in relation to Mr. Powers' attitude toward the United States Government, that he has been under Soviet control since 1 May 1960 and has mentioned in his letters that he is constantly in the company of his cellmate, whom he has not mentioned by name, apparently speaks good English and is helping Mr. Powers in his study of Russian. The cellmate could possibly be a government "plant" engaged in subtle psychological preparation for the time of release.

C. In order to formulate a plan of action, nevertheless, some basic assumptions must be made. For purposes of the below-mentioned plan, it is assumed that Mr. Powers will cooperate with the United States authorities to the extent necessary to carry out procedures outlined below. It is further assumed that Mr. Powers will be turned over to United States authorities at the United States Embassy at Moscow or possibly transported by Soviet aircraft to Berlin, where he would be turned over to United States authorities.

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2. Press Release Policy:

A. Generally, every effort will be made to minimize press releases by United States Government authorities and Mr. Powers himself. The spokesman for the United States Government will be the Department of State with releases by the President's press secretary as deemed appropriate by the President.

B. Mr. Powers will be encouraged to make a brief statement upon his arrival in Europe, stating substantially as follows: "I am glad to be on my way back to the United States and anxious to see my wife and family. I have no particular plans for the immediate future except to visit with my family and consult with certain United States authorities. I do not desire to make any public statements in relation to the incident or my trial until I have thoroughly discussed the matter with these authorities." The Department of State will announce Mr. Powers' release in a short statement relating to the mechanics of his turnover. Such a statement might be: "Mr. Francis Gary Powers, imprisoned American flyer, was released from his Soviet prison today and turned over to the United States Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Powers will be flown back to the United States as soon as transportation is available. In the interest of Soviet-U. S. relations, for the present no press conferences will be held or further comments made by the U. S. Government relative to the U-2 incident or Mr. Powers' trial."

C. Mr. Powers will be thoroughly briefed at the United States Embassy in Moscow or Consulate in Berlin prior to meeting any members of the press. Some of the points to be covered in the briefing, the substance of which will be pouched or cabled to Moscow or Berlin as time permits, will be:

(1) The reaction of the press and the American public to Mr. Powers' return to the United States cannot be predicted and, therefore, Mr. Powers should be prepared for the worst.

(2) Despite any derogatory comments or demonstrations heard or observed by Mr. Powers on his trip home, Mr. Powers should know that these statements do not reflect the attitude of the U. S. Government.

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(3) It is the recommendation of United States Government authorities that Mr. Powers make as few public statements as possible and limit these statements to brief descriptions of his state of health and treatment while in Russia. He should express his desire to proceed to the United States as soon as possible and rejoin his wife and family and at all costs avoid any statements and comments about the incident of the trial.

(4) Mr. Powers should continually bear in mind that the first statements he makes will be long remembered and widely quoted. These statements will also be misquoted and, perhaps in many cases, misinterpreted. Mr. Powers should follow the rule that the less said the better.

(5) Mr. Powers should also be aware that members of his family will also be subjected to pressures from the press and, therefore, he should refrain from discussing politically sensitive matters with them.

(6) Mr. Powers should be advised that the public, and therefore the press, is keenly interested in certain questions, the answers to which have deep political consequences and should not be answered by Mr. Powers in the interest of National Security and his own interest as well. The most sensitive of these questions are:

(a) Were you actually shot down at 68,000 feet or did you descend to a lower altitude before the incident occurred?

(b) What type of interrogation methods did the Russians use?

(c) What were your instructions in the event of capture?

(d) What are your feelings about your testimony at the trial now that you have returned to the United States?

(7) Mr. Powers should be advised of travel plans and cautioned not to enter into discussions with anyone other than his Department of State escort for the first leg of his trip back to the U.S.

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(8) Mr. Powers should be reminded that his revelation of CIA affiliation was designed to identify the activity as a non-military undertaking. The protection of the extent to which the military was involved in the program is still extremely important and, therefore, Mr. Powers should avoid any discussion of military personalities or support to the program.

3. Transportation

A. If Mr. Powers is released to U. S. authorities at the U. S. Embassy in a city behind the iron curtain (Moscow appears to be the most likely city), he will be flown via commercial airliner to a European city, escorted by a Department of State consular officer. The Agency will bear the cost of this travel for both Mr. Powers and the consular officer. In the event Mr. Powers is turned over at a city in the Western world, the subsequent portions of this plan will apply, substituting the point of release for the "European city" mentioned above.

B. Transportation from the European city to the United States should be by the most expeditious and secure method. The use of a scheduled commercial airliner is not considered the optimum, since the press would have the maximum opportunity for exposure to Mr. Powers on the airliner and at the various stop-overs. More control over the press and Mr. Powers could be experienced by the U. S. Government if Mr. Powers could be flown back from the European city to Washington via a USAF Special Air Missions flight. This flight will be arranged by DPD-DD/P.

C. In the event that the Department of State or the USAF is queried about the use of a USAF aircraft for this purpose, these authorities will indicate that the airlift was requested by another (unspecified) department of the United States Government, and the request was granted by the USAF.

D. The crew of the USAF aircraft should file appropriate flight clearances, indicating the ultimate destination of the aircraft as Andrews AFB. This fact should not be given out by the crew. For diversionary purposes, the aircraft will make an unscheduled landing at Dover AFB, Delaware, where onward transportation will be available. DPD will provide a security escort, who is known to Mr. Powers as a personal friend as well as a security agent, for the USAF leg of the

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return trip to the ZI. Mr. John Gittinger, a consultant to the Agency on psychological matters, will also accompany the flight. Both Mr. White, the security escort, and Mr. Gittinger will interview Mr. Powers to determine his attitudes and desires.

E. Special arrangements for expeditious transfer of Mr. Powers from one aircraft to another, minimum press contact at layover points, and customs and immigration clearances must be made at each stop by the Agency station involved with cooperation from Department of State personnel and local officials. The Agency station will work in the background and utilize Department of State and other appropriate overt officials to make physical contact with Mr. Powers at stopover points. USAF representatives and officials will likewise remain in the background and not greet or be seen with Mr. Powers except for that minimum amount of contact necessary for boarding the aircraft.

4. Living Quarters in the ZI

A. Upon arrival in the ZI, Mr. Powers will be taken to a "safehouse" location where he will meet with his family in privacy. The most desirable location would be a rest house type facility on a military installation. Possibly a private estate that can be adequately secured by a commercial security service would serve the purpose. Arrangements for the procurement of an appropriate location will be made by IOS/OS/DDS

B. For an initial period (one week), Mr. Powers will visit with his family at the safehouse location. The family, other than his wife, who will stay with him during his entire stay at the safehouse, will be transported to and from the safehouse by Government transportation.

C. Every attempt will be made to discourage his family from attempting to meet Mr. Powers in Europe or any time prior to his arrival at the safehouse location. Contact with Mr. Powers' father will be maintained through the Department of State, while contact with his wife can be maintained directly by the Agency.

D. After Mr. Powers has visited with his family for a few days, he will be encouraged to indicate to his father and other relations that he would like to be alone with his wife for a few weeks, during

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which period he plans to talk to certain U. S. Government authorities. The debriefings that take place at that time will be conducted by CI Staff/DDP and SRS/OS/DDS. Representatives of SR Division, DD/P, and DPD-DD/P will participate in debriefings pertaining to their particular areas of interest.

E. All queries by the press, in relation to Mr. Powers' whereabouts will be answered by the Department of State in a statement to the effect that "Mr. Powers is back in the U. S. visiting with his family and talking with various U. S. authorities."

5. Administration

A. Casualty Branch, Office of Personnel/DDS will handle the necessary administrative details of Powers' personal effects with him during the abovementioned debriefing period.

B. Powers' ultimate disposition will be determined by an Agency board of inquiry after debriefing reports have been prepared, disseminated, and evaluated by interested and responsible Agency senior officials.

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ANNEX 96

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ER 61-8690

2 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

SUBJECT: Powers - Abel Exchange

1. Francis Gary Powers, who is under sentence in the Soviet Union for violation of Soviet espionage laws, is under contract to the Central Intelligence Agency. He was apprehended by Soviet forces while on a prescribed mission for this Agency. After a thorough investigation based on the information available to us, we have concluded that Mr. Powers had carried out his duties as directed and, even though captured, has continued to conduct himself in a responsible manner. As far as we can determine, he has generally followed his instructions while a captive and has not communicated significantly damaging prohibited intelligence information to his Soviet captors. Therefore, this Agency is responsible to seek Francis Gary Powers' return to this country by all available means, as soon as possible.

2. While the Soviets may feel that they have fully exploited the propaganda to be gained from Powers' capture and trial, there is reason to believe that he has not disclosed to them information relating to the national interest which could be further exploited. Included is information concerning third-country overflights of a nature which could still be embarrassing to this Government.

3. From an intelligence and air operational standpoint, this Agency is most interested in interrogating Mr. Powers to learn the precise events which transpired on the first of May 1960 which resulted in his capture. He can furnish this Agency with technical information concerning his flight, behavior of the aircraft which resulted in the failure of his mission and his capture. We also desire information on his treatment and interrogation in the Soviet Union during the entire period he has been under the control of the Soviet Union.

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4. Since Mr. Powers' capture on 1 May 1960, this Agency has continuously worked toward the release by legal means of Francis Gary Powers. In this connection, we have worked with the Department of State and provided various types of support, including the preparation of legal briefs and working closely with civilian lawyers who worked diligently and long toward his release. This Agency has maintained Mr. Powers in a pay status and has made various provisions for the welfare of his wife. In regard to his wife, we should point out to you that she has recently been committed to a Georgia State mental hospital after being declared legally insane. Her commitment has raised serious problems of maintaining her husband's morale while a captive so that we are concerned that the information concerning his wife will not cause his Soviet captors to make new efforts to obtain more information from him. Since Mr. Powers has now been in Soviet hands almost eighteen months, we cannot be sure what his attitude would be to an exchange and his return to the United States, but his latest letters to his wife, which we have seen, indicate hope for his release and concern that the United States Government is not taking action which he believes would achieve his freedom.

5. In connection with efforts toward the release of Francis Gary Powers, the idea of an exchange of Powers for Colonel Abel has been again considered as a serious possibility since the wife of Colonel Rudolf Abel has raised the subject in a series of letters which she has written to President Kennedy and her husband's lawyer, James Donovan, in New York. The most recent letter from Mrs. Abel, which states that for the second time she has been to the Russian Embassy in Berlin, contains a key paragraph which reads as follows:

"I gathered from our Mrs. Abel/Russian Embassy talk that there is only one possible way to achieve success, that is simultaneous release of both Francis Powers and my husband, which can be arranged."

If, as we suspect, Mrs. Abel's letters are being written or guided by Soviet officials, this letter appears to open the door for direct negotiations on an exchange. It is the desire of this Agency that this avenue of communication and negotiation with the Soviet Union be continued and the release of Francis Gary Powers from the Soviet Union should be pressed for by this Government through negotiation.

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6. We realize that the release of Powers at this time through these particular negotiations must be weighed against the release of Colonel Abel. While Abel has maintained complete silence on his role within the Soviet intelligence apparatus, it is a fact that Colonel Abel was, and probably continues to be, an important cog in that apparatus. His release at this time, when he has served only a portion of his sentence, would be of value to Soviet intelligence.* On balance, however, we believe the national interest would best be served by the return of Powers even at the cost of Abel's release.

(Signed)
C. P. CABELL
General, USAF
Acting Director

* The following sentence appeared in the original OGC version of this memorandum, but was deleted at the instruction of General Cabell:

"It is painfully clear, however, that this Government is unable to determine what his exact role has been, and it is a fair conclusion that Abel's role will not be made known to this Government by him."

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ANNEX 97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 24, 1961

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As you may know, for the past several months there has been taking place a monitored exchange of correspondence between James Donovan, court appointed attorney for Rudolf Abel, and an individual in Leipzig, Germany, identifying herself as Mrs. Abel. Mrs. Abel, possibly reflecting a Soviet Government position, has raised the possibility of a Powers-Abel exchange, one in which the CIA is interested.

The latest letter from Mrs. Abel, dated September 11, 1961 (enclosed), indicates more clearly than previously that an exchange "can be arranged." In the course of consultation with Mr. Oehmann of your office regarding the lines of a reply, Mr. Oehmann indicated that it would be helpful for you to have, in addition to the draft of a proposed reply, a statement setting forth the general views of the CIA and the Department for your consideration in weighing the various factors involved. The proposed reply to Mrs. Abel and a CIA memorandum on the subject are enclosed.

I do not believe that foreign policy considerations as such need be a factor influencing the Justice determination in consultation with the CIA as to whether we should proceed in an attempt to obtain the release of Powers in exchange for the release of Abel. While normally the Department seeks in every way to protect United States citizens incarcerated abroad, a special problem exists, of course, in connection with the Powers case. Bearing in mind the quid pro quo which would be required, and the present status of relations with the USSR, foreign policy considerations do not dictate one course of action or the other. Accordingly, in the present matter, I believe that the function of the Department of State is limited to guidance as to the form and manner of proceeding. I suggest a continuation of the Donovan-Mrs. Abel correspondence with the transmission to Mrs. Abel of a Donovan

The Honorable
Robert F. Kennedy,
Attorney General.

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message along the lines of the enclosed draft. Should the Department of Justice and the CIA decide it to be in the net United States interest to attempt a Powers-Abel exchange and should subsequent letters from Mrs. Abel suggest more precisely the possibility of such a move, the Department will be prepared to consider with the Department of Justice and the CIA how this might most appropriately be put into effect.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. From Mrs. Abel,
dated September 11, 1961.
2. Proposed reply to Mrs. Abel.
3. CIA Memorandum.

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ANNEX 98

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NEGOTIATION OF POWERS/ABEL EXCHANGE

3 February 1962: BERLIN 7474 (IN 28235)

After negotiating controls at Friedrichstrasse S-Bahnhof with help of border guards who brought him to head of line when he indicated he had imminent appointment at Soviet Embassy, Donovan referred by receptionist at Soviet Embassy to the Soviet Consulate. There he was introduced to "Mrs. Abel", "Daughter", and "cousin of Mrs. Abel", a man about fifty-five years old, introduced as Mr. Reeves. The person portraying the role of Mrs. Abel impressed Donovan as a typical German but the daughter and cousin possibly not German nationality. After preliminary amenities regarding the welfare of Abel, Second Secretary of Soviet Embassy, Ivan Alexandrovich Shishkin (believed KGB) appeared and conducted the meeting. During the meeting the Abel family said nothing.

Donovan said he had come to Berlin on the basis of a message to the U. S. Headquarters, Berlin, conveyed from the East German lawyer Vogel via West German lawyer Stark purporting Soviet Government interest in exchanging Abel for Powers, Makinen and Pryor. Shishkin stated this proposal was entirely new to him and he would be compelled to obtain instructions from his government. Shishkin indicated he had commenced intercession on behalf of the Abel family about one year ago on the basis of a proposed exchange of Powers for Abel and this was the only proposal he was authorized to discuss. Donovan indicated that he, likewise, would be compelled to obtain instructions from his Government to discuss any other proposal than an exchange of Powers, Makinen and Pryor for Abel, indicating personal displeasure at having made the lengthy trip as a private citizen whose time was valuable if the message from Vogel purporting to be official was not in fact a genuine offer. Donovan posed the direct question to Mrs. Abel whether she had in fact suggested a three for one exchange to Vogel, but she appeared frightened and uncertain what to answer, whereupon Shishkin interceded and discussed the letter from Justice which Donovan presented in support of the validity of his claim that the U. S. was prepared to exchange Abel. Shishkin complained that the letter was "vague" but appeared satisfied with Donovan's explanation that it was deliberately so to avoid possible press leak. . . He explained that he had traveled to Berlin from London on special U. S. Government flight so his presence in Berlin was not known to any but a few government officials.

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Shishkin appeared impressed with the necessity for an early answer so Donovan could return to New York. He agreed to meet again Monday, 5 February at 1700 local. Donovan told Shishkin he could produce Abel 48 hours after agreement was reached, in Berlin, the exchange to be carried out with Donovan's personal participation, and that he must be back in the U. S. by Saturday, 10 February.

While it is difficult to predict Soviet reaction, we continue to feel there is a good possibility that they will accept a three for one exchange. While Shishkin commented toward the end of the meeting that the U. S. Government apparently wanted three for one, he seemed genuinely impressed with Donovan's response that "one artist is worth much more than three mechanics".

3 February 1962: ADIC 7388 (OUT 09034)

Opening gambit well done. Speculate as you must they may believe from the date of the Justice letter that the U. S. originally may have been ready for a one to one exchange. However overtures for a package deal were made as early as December 18 and should be no surprise to the Soviets. Therefore press for three to one stating place and details could be set at once.

If Monday reaction indicates to Donovan there is no hope of three to one, he should say he must refer back for further instructions.

The door must be left open for a one to one Powers for Abel but every effort desirable for three to one.

Seems to us advisable to softplay Vogel approach unless the Soviets appear to adopt it.

If further meeting is necessary, suggest Tuesday afternoon as we can respond quickly.

State concurs this message.

5 February 1962: BERLIN 7500 (IN 28344)

Following is Donovan account of events afternoon 5 February. Donovan returned to Soviet Embassy East Berlin at proper time (1700 hours

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local). Daughter and cousin (cousin's name was spelled for Donovan upon his request and is Drews, who took a more active part this time and acted as sole interpreter in later conference with Attorney Vogel) were in the anteroom but not mother, who was "nervous" and did not attend the meeting but stayed in the hotel.

Shishkin invited Donovan to a private conference leaving the Abels in the anteroom. Donovan presented a brief note from Mr. Lightner stating authorization to proceed to East Berlin in connection with business at the Soviet Embassy. Shishkin read the note carefully and said "while not doubting Donovan's integrity on Saturday, one must be careful about such things". Shishkin inquired whether Donovan had reported to his government on the Saturday meeting and what instructions Donovan had received. Donovan replied that he had fully reported and had been instructed to return on 5 February to hear from Shishkin what, if any, further instructions he had received.

Shishkin very formally opened portfolio on his desk and read a message from Moscow. The message said that "the Soviet Government through human feelings will exchange Powers for Abel. This human act on both sides and the elimination of permanent source of anti-Soviet propaganda should contribute to better relations between countries. If the Americans are interested in freeing of Makinen who is now in Kiev, the Soviet Government is ready to exchange Abel for Makinen but the simultaneous exchange of both Powers and Makinen for Abel is impossible. It is up to Americans to make their choice. If the matter is properly concluded and better relations result, further developments could occur." (Donovan gained the impression this statement was intended to imply that the Soviets might be inclined to give clemency to Makinen at some time in the not too distant future.) As to Pryor, this matter was out of the province of Soviet authorities but could be accomplished through the East German Government. This can be done through Miss Abel and her attorney Vogel who already has received favorable consideration by the East German Government. Shishkin has no further instructions. If the American Government is willing to proceed, Donovan should discuss the plan for exchange with Miss Abel which the Soviets then will consider. However, said Shishkin, American suggestion of Glienicke Bruecke "not bad". Donovan then left with Miss Abel and cousin.

On the way, Miss Abel and Donovan discussed possible procedure and tentatively agreed on Glienicke Bridge, Wednesday evening, 7 February,

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at 2200 hours local, with postponement to Thursday evening, 8 February, same time, same place if, due to weather or other contingency, one of three to be exchanged cannot comply.

At Vogel's office, Vogel produced a letter from the Attorney General of East Germany dated 5 February and stating to Vogel that the East German Government would honor his petition for clemency of his client (Pryor) and agree to turn over of Pryor to American officials provided Americans on their part met the "conditions with which Vogel is familiar". The letter is signed by Windisch, State Attorney. Vogel provided a certified copy of this letter at Donovan's request. In answer to a specific question, Vogel stated he could deliver Pryor at the exchange place at the proper time. In response to Donovan's questioning, Vogel stated Pryor's father was visiting his office late 6 February and Vogel requested instructions. Donovan stated he should make no reference to this conference or Donovan's presence in Berlin. He should inform Pryor's father that Vogel's petition is proceeding very favorably and that Vogel expects a decision on Friday. Vogel agreed to this procedure. Vogel meeting was friendly with no reference by Donovan to broken promises re delivery of all three for Abel.

Donovan informed Shishkin and Vogel that while he has no further instructions from his government, he will attempt to deliver a reply as soon as possible 6 February to both Shishkin and Vogel. It is the clear impression of Donovan that the Soviets are making their final and maximum concessions in response to the strong position taken by Donovan last Saturday and also realize the necessity for a prompt decision. In Donovan's opinion we have achieved the maximum possible at this time and Washington should approve unless they wish to break off negotiations for an indefinite period. Request prompt advice, and if recommendations are accepted, ask that Abel's journey be immediately arranged with arrival at Berlin early Wednesday, 7 February. If approved, Donovan will send by messenger morning 6 February letters to Shishkin and Vogel accepting proposal to carry out an exchange of Powers and Pryor for Abel on Glienicke Bridge at 2200 hours local 7 February, with explanation that if due to weather or other conditions this cannot be done, each party should notify the other, which case exchange will take place Thursday night, 8 February, same time, same place.

Also request approval procedure suggested at New York briefing by which, after exchange is completed, Powers goes directly to waiting

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aircraft while Donovan makes brief announcement at press conference called by General Clay and refers all further inquiries to his government in Washington. Donovan then returns home on Powers plane. (Pryor will be taken immediately to Frankfurt with parents notified and invited to accompany him.)

(Chief of Station Comment:

Fully concur Donovan's assessment improbable that further concessions can be gained from Soviets. Recommend we proceed with plan to exchange Powers and Pryor for Abel Wednesday evening, 7 February. Will discuss press announcement with Generals Clay and Watson and Mr. Lightner the morning of 6 February and advise if local command desires modification of Donovan proposal, but in the interim we plan such an announcement by Donovan immediately following exchange since almost inevitable that exchange will attract sufficient attention and result in police leak to the press indicating something occurred which will be best countered by direct announcement. This procedure also will provide for American press release at least simultaneously with Soviet release and serve to transfer further questioning re the exchange to Washington. Will also discuss question of notifying Pryor family and arrangements to transfer Pryors to Frankfurt with local command and make further recommendations.)

5 February 1962: BERLIN 7501 (IN 28345)

The following message has just been received (about 2205 hours local) on telephone number provided Shishkin by Donovan as emergency contact channel: "Unexpected difficulties have arisen. Urgent that I discuss this with you at 1100 hours 6 February in my office. Signed Vogel."

The caller gave the above message in German after utilizing the proper agreed recognition signal on the phone and establishing in addition that he was connected with the correct number. The fact that message was in German and signed Vogel indicates that meeting desired by Vogel in his office in Friedrichsfelde (rather distant from Soviet Embassy) even though telephone contact was not provided Vogel but given only to Shishkin. While it is true that the number was passed to Shishkin in the presence of "Abel family" it seems almost certain that Shishkin passed the number

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on since it appears unlikely the Abel family could have had opportunity to note the number which Donovan provided Shishkin only in writing.

The message clearly raises serious questions about the timetable for exchange. Suggest following plan:

A. Donovan proceed to Soviet Embassy between 1000 and 1100 hours 6 February and attempt to see Shishkin, clarify whether the message in fact from Vogel and if feasible have Vogel meet Donovan at the Soviet Embassy.

B. Advise Shishkin that in view of mysterious Vogel message Donovan has notified his government earliest possible exchange time is Thursday evening, 8 February, 2200 hours and must send further message to his government before any preparations will be commenced to transfer Abel to Berlin for exchange.

C. Dependent on outcome of talk with Shishkin, either converse with Vogel by phone, have him visit Soviet Embassy or visit Vogel in his office to determine "difficulties". In this connection note Vogel apparently speaks no English and Donovan requires an interpreter. Request your views regarding sending Mission officer with Donovan able to serve as interpreter.

Donovan suggests message may indicate East German desire to release Pryor independent of the Abel-Powers exchange and may not necessarily indicate any repudiation of what Donovan regards as firm commitment to release both Powers and Pryor in return for Abel.

Request comments and/or concurrence above proposals.

6 February 1962: ADIC 7422 (OUT 09115)

Ref A Berlin 7500

Ref B Berlin 7501

This is a joint State/Agency message.

Re para 6 Ref A. Approve exchange of Powers and Pryor for Abel under conditions set forth in Ref A. It apparent that East Germans may be attempting to extract more from exchange than simply giving up

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Pryor (as indicated by Ref B). Should East Germans attach any condition to exchange, Donovan should refuse to discuss other than exchange as agreed with Shishkin and Vogel on 5 February meeting, i. e. Powers and Pryor for Abel.

Re Para 5 Ref A. Vogel should be instructed by Donovan to indicate to Pryor's father that he (Vogel) is making continuing efforts on his son's behalf. Vogel should make no commitment as to timing.

Re Paras 7 and 8 Ref A. Do not agree to proposed press conference or announcement in Berlin. Powers-Abel exchange, not Pryor, is the important issue and the present plan is that the White House will make the announcement immediately when we receive the flash that the plane is airborne with Powers aboard. As you have been informed you will receive message giving any necessary additional instructions re Pryor after we know exchange agreed and details. We do not want Donovan to have a press conference of any kind in Berlin. He can do this in New York. After White House announcement, Mission should refer all press inquiries to Washington.

Re Para 3 Ref B. Agree with suggested action except Mission officer should not accompany Donovan to East Berlin.

In arranging timing for exchange Donovan should keep in mind that approximately 48 hours required from the time when word of an exchange agreement is received in Washington to the time Abel is delivered in Berlin.

Re Para 7 Ref A. Agree Donovan return via Powers aircraft.

6 February 1962: BERLIN 7526 (IN 28428)

Following is Donovan report of events of 6 February.

Arrived at Soviet Embassy 1030 hours local and after 15 minute wait was admitted to see Shishkin who expressed surprise at the unexpected visit. Donovan informed Shishkin that after leaving his office 5 February in accordance with his suggestion Donovan had talked with Miss Abel who with her cousin took Donovan to Vogel's office. Described visit and stated that upon return to West Berlin he had reported fully to Washington. Told Shishkin that while we had expected

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Powers, Makinen, and Pryor, Donovan did recommend acceptance of offer of Powers and Pryor since Donovan believed that with improvement of relations between countries mentioned by Moscow clemency for Makinen could be expected in relatively near future. To latter Shishkin nodded.

Donovan then stated his government had advised willingness to accept this offer. He next informed Shishkin of the Vogel message and how it had disrupted all plans, handed Shishkin a copy of Vogel message. He said "How very strange a message. What does it mean?" Donovan stated that this was one of his objects in visiting Shishkin that morning since the message had come to the telephone number which Donovan gave only to Shishkin. He immediately said that other people were present, but when Donovan pointed out that he had passed Shishkin a card with the number written on it, Shishkin said "Some people have sharp eyes". In any event, he continued, he knew nothing of the message.

Shishkin stated he wished to reaffirm that his government was still willing to trade Powers for Abel but Pryor was beyond his authority. He did express the personal opinion that Donovan was in a position of trader who sells the same goods to two persons. Denial by Donovan and detailed argument followed, and he informed Shishkin that if the deal agreed to 5 February is now repudiated, Donovan's recommendation to his government would be that he return to New York. Shishkin advised Donovan to proceed to Vogel's office and after discussion there return to the Embassy.

Donovan proceeded to Vogel's office where Drews present who explained that Miss Abel was taking care of mother. Drews read lengthy statement of which Donovan has a copy. Purport of statement is that Vogel visited the Attorney General the night of 5 February and was told his behavior was incorrect, that East Germany agreed to exchange Pryor for Abel and nothing more; that it cannot give its consent to exchange of one person for two persons, with one from a different country. Also, Vogel feels unable to postpone the trial of Pryor and the Attorney General informed him that in case of American refusal of the exchange of Pryor for Abel they will "start the trial and make a sensation out of it as they have enough evidence to convict Pryor which, as you understand, might have negative results for the U. S. A. and the Pryor family in particular." Lengthy argument in which Donovan accused

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East Germany and Vogel of bad faith and stated neither his government nor he had time for such idle games. He flatly stated that the exchange of Abel for Pryor was out of the question and that unless East Germany adhered to the commitment of 5 February he must break off negotiations and report to his government.

At this point Vogel summoned an assistant into the room who reported that Vogel had just obtained an appointment with the Attorney General for further discussion of the matter. Vogel requested that Donovan remain in East Berlin while he "tried his best". Drews invited Donovan to lunch where the entire conversation consisted of probing to see whether the Pryor exchange for Abel is not feasible and specific reference was made to the prominence and political influence of the Pryor family.

During lunch also Drews volunteered without Donovan mentioning it that the night before when Vogel brought the sad news, Miss Abel remembered the telephone number she had memorized when Donovan gave it to Shishkin, and a foreigner friendly to Drews was willing to take a message to West Berlin. In response to Donovan's questions, Drews stated Mrs. Abel's first name was Lydia and Miss Abel was named Helen, with latter unmarried. Both points in conflict with previous correspondence and letters introduced in evidence at Abel's trial.

Near the end of lunch, Drews excused himself for the men's room, presumably to telephone. Shortly thereafter Vogel arrived to report a big battle but final victory over Attorney General. He stated that the entire difficulty was due to the fact that the Attorney General was angry that on 3 February Donovan visited Shishkin instead of first visiting Vogel and the Attorney General. Upon question, no explanation was given of the letter from the Attorney General delivered 5 February. He now stated East Germany was satisfied if Vogel and Donovan proceed to the Soviet Embassy and Soviet officials confirm the deal. In response to a question he stated this meant all East German objections to Pryor and Powers exchange for Abel were removed.

We proceeded to the Soviet Embassy where Shishkin treated Vogel as a stranger and received substantially the same report without comment. He then requested Donovan to have a private meeting with him. He informed Donovan that at the first meeting 3 February at which he

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urged that Powers was sufficient for Abel, he had asked Donovan whether Powers was not a national hero in the United States. Donovan had stated that to judge by general press, Powers was not regarded as a national hero and that substantial view in the U.S. was that Abel should not be released under any circumstances. Shishkin stated that he had communicated this to his government and that he now had a new message from Moscow this afternoon stating that "since the Americans regarded Makinen as more valuable than Powers, Moscow now makes firm offer of Makinen for Abel." Donovan pointed out not only that Powers had been regarded as sine qua non and primary basis of any deal, but the Moscow message of 5 February recognized this by first unqualifiedly approving the deal and referring to Makinen as an afterthought.

Donovan reiterated his instructions were absolutely no deal without Powers. Shishkin replied that the message this afternoon replaced all others and he now unauthorized to discuss any matter except Abel for Makinen exchange. Donovan stated that after the message of 5 February and confirmation this morning, this must mean that Soviets were not seriously interested in obtaining back Abel and accused Shishkin of playing chess game since last Saturday. Donovan stated Shishkin should inform Donovan now whether 5 February deal still acceptable. If not, Donovan would report this to his own government and recommend he return home. Shishkin stated that since this was a new matter he must communicate with Moscow and requested Donovan to return on 7 February between 1400 and 1500 hours local to hear Moscow reply. Donovan stated he saw no point to this since Shishkin has Donovan's telephone number and is able to communicate the reply. Accordingly Donovan declined a personal visit on 7 February. Shishkin accepted this and said Donovan would receive a message on 7 February.

Donovan left with Drews who had waited in the anteroom and walked the entire distance to the S-Bahn with Donovan, continuously probing for Donovan reaction which he could "report to Miss Abel". Donovan told Drews his reaction was that the negotiations on the non-American side since Saturday had been conducted with irresponsibility and bad faith, that if the deal fails he would be obliged upon his return to report to Col. Abel that his "family" apparently were abandoning him and that perhaps Abel should reconsider his entire position to date.

Donovan thanked Drews for lunch and returned to West Berlin at 1640 hours local.

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~~TOP SECRET~~7 February 1962: ADIC 7455 (OUT 09203)

Congratulations to Donovan for conduct of difficult negotiations. Suspect Shishkin may come back with offer of Powers and GDR will welch on Pryor. If so, Donovan make final attempt include Pryor but if in his judgment he reaches point where Pryor problem may endanger Powers deal, he should break off and close on Powers-Abel.

If Shishkin won't offer Powers, approve Donovan return U. S. after emphasizing to Shishkin that Soviets have responsibility for breaking off negotiation which would be difficult if not impossible to reopen.

Moving Abel to New York and can deliver him in less than 48 hours if necessary.

7 February 1962: 50X1, E.O.13526

From Col. Geary at Wiesbaden.

Ref departure time of C-118 /carrying Abel to Berlin recommend his take-off time be moved up tentatively NLT 0500Z on 8 Feb, or midnight local. This would put him here approximately 1700Z, 1800Z local and enable us to move him on immediately for exchange the same night. This would certainly alleviate any possible problems of housing Abel etc. Therefore if agreement reached today exchange could be made Thursday night. Foregoing is entirely feasible and suggest if you concur you info Donovan soonest. Every hour we let this thing slip just gives those so and so's an opportunity for further nonsense.

7 February 1962: ADIC 7456 (OUT 09204)

To Col. Geary, and Berlin, Frankfurt 50X1, E.O.13526

Airlift postponed pending final word on exchange from Berlin per BERLIN 7526.

7 February 1962: BERLIN 7537 (IN 28496)

Following message received 1515 hours local 7 Feb on Berlin Base number assigned Donovan for this purpose: "Donovan: Unfortunately we got no reply today. We hope to get it tomorrow. Will inform immediately. Shishkin." Will forward comments and recommendations after discussion of case by Donovan with Clay and perhaps Lightner later this afternoon.

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7 February 1962: ADIC 7461 (OUT 09219)
Ref: BERLIN 7537

Request Donovan sit tight and wait for message from Shishkin.

Please notify us immediately when message received including content of message. If no reply within twenty-four hours please also advise negative report.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7542 (IN 28548)

General Clay felt strongly that swift response must be given to Shishkin telephone message quoted Berlin 7537 since he viewed it as definite possibility next Shishkin message would simply request Donovan again visit Soviet Embassy for discussion. Generals Clay and Watson and Mr. Lightner unanimous in opinion Donovan should not again submit himself to East Berlin meeting. Accordingly and several hours prior to receipt of ADIC 7461, General Clay directed Mr. Lightner to send a Mission officer to East Berlin the evening of 7 February to telephone the following message on behalf of Donovan to Shishkin at the Soviet Embassy: "Received your telephone message and regret delay as unfortunately the time which I can spend here is limited. As my back still troubles me I would like to ask that you come to the residence of Mr. Howard Trivers of our Mission between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m. tomorrow Thursday, February 8th 1962. The address is 12 Vogelsang. I hope you can let me know beforehand that you will be there. However I will be there during these hours."

Mission officer Mr. Frank Meehan succeeded after some time in establishing telephonic connection with Shishkin at 2245 hours local. Shishkin extremely cordial and urged that Donovan please believe him that he was doing his best in the matter and was hopeful of the outcome. He hopes to have a reply tomorrow and will telephone as soon as he gets a reply. As to proposed meeting Shishkin not sure he could come over but will try. If unable to keep appointment he will telephone. In concluding the phone conversation he requested the Mission officer ask Donovan to please not be impatient and reiterated that he was hopeful the matter will work out satisfactorily.

The choice of Trivers' residence as a meeting spot is based on consideration that meeting with Soviet official in the Consulate would be extraordinary occurrence and would cause comment among the German

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employees who could not be kept from learning of the event. Reference to Donovan's health was factual as he is suffering from cold in the back, which is known to Shishkin.

The purpose of the meeting is to enable Donovan to receive the Soviet proposal and discuss it to the extent necessary in order to clarify the exact terms or to work out details of exchange if the Soviet proposal is acceptable.

General Clay also wishes to have brought to your attention the fact that "Miss Abel" indicated to Donovan during the 6 February meeting (as Vogel has indicated on previous occasions to "Middlemen" reporting on Vogel's behalf to the Pryor family and to the U.S. Mission, Berlin) that East German authorities have stated the death sentence is not excluded in the Pryor case. General Clay feels that the East can if it so desires, make public revelation of negotiations to date cast in a light almost certain to have unfavorable impact in various circles in the United States.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7545 (IN 28575)

At 1204 hours local received following telephone call in English: "Donovan: I got a favorable reply. Waiting to see you at my office at 4:00 o'clock today (caller added "this afternoon") if your health allows you to come here. Shishkin."

General Clay feels in view of the indication of a favorable reply that Donovan should go and has asked the Mission spokesman to phone Shishkin stating on Donovan's behalf: "In view my health request you have car meet me at exit S-Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse to bring me to Soviet Embassy for requested meeting." Frank Meehan is enroute to accomplish this. Donovan is in full agreement and will proceed to East Berlin about 1500 hours local.

8 February 1962: ADIC 7495 (OUT 09308)

This is a joint Agency/State message.

Obviously it is increasingly difficult to avoid publicity and therefore essential to move as fast as possible. If answer on Powers is favorable we must move Abel soonest so request you send result Donovan visit today

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as soon as he returns leaving detailed report till later. At least give us enough to make the decision whether Abel departs or stays in New York.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7558 (IN 28602)

Donovan returned 1810 hours local from meeting and announced telephonically he had achieved "complete agreement". Stated action should be initiated to move Abel over here. Turnover scheduled for 0730 hours Saturday morning 10 February.

now enroute downtown to pick up Donovan and debrief. Expect fill-in cable within three hours. On the basis of agreed criteria "complete agreement" must mean East agreement to turnover Powers and Pryor for Abel.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7561 (IN 28639)

Donovan meeting at Soviet Embassy attended only by Shishkin who served lavish refreshments and generally gave Donovan the red carpet treatment. He stated the Soviet Government had accepted Donovan's "ultimatum" and would release both Powers and Pryor in return for Abel. Only condition which emerged was that Pryor and Powers were to be released at separate points but simultaneously. Shishkin gave his word of honor "as a Soviet official" that the exchange of all three would take place and tentative planning foresees exchange of Powers for Abel at Oberbaumbruecke Sector crossing point (normally West Berliner crossing point) at 0730 on 10 February if that place is satisfactory to us, Pryor to be released elsewhere, probably Friedrichstrasse, at same time. Miss Abel allegedly will attend on Soviet side and Shishkin asked whether any of Powers family would be present which Donovan answered in the negative.

Much of the conversation was devoted by Shishkin to expressing concern for press treatment which might ensue, explaining that it might negate improvement of Soviet-US relations which should otherwise be the result of this exchange. Shishkin stated he would like to see separate announcements, first Moscow announce that Powers was released as humane response of Soviet Government to petition for clemency submitted by the Powers family. Later, perhaps several weeks later, Washington

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would make the announcement that the President had granted clemency to Abel. Shishkin stressed throughout this discussion that press treatment was not a condition of the exchange but he merely was expressing what was desirable from the Soviet viewpoint. Donovan responded that he would recommend we seek this objective but that in realistic terms Shishkin must realize the release of Abel cannot be kept secret. Donovan especially urged that Soviet Government recognize that the United States press is not controlled and that a leak of the Abel release must not be viewed by the Soviets as bad faith in any respect affecting the prospects of clemency for Makinen at a future date. Shishkin asserted he fully understood. As to the Pryor release, it is to be treated entirely separately as East German act of clemency. Donovan emphasized that the release of Pryor 9 February, hours before the exchange of Powers and Abel would serve to keep it somewhat separate from the latter exchange but Shishkin stated while recognizing the validity of this view, his orders were to effect release of Pryor and Powers simultaneously.

Recommend give careful consideration press release in light of Shishkin suggestion.

Donovan to meet Shishkin again at 1200 hours 9 February at the Soviet Embassy to discuss details of the exchange. Will reconnoiter Oberbaumbruecke but tentatively believe 0700 or 0730 at that spot is satisfactory. Pryor could proceed by foot through Friedrichstrasse crossing point, be met by person able identify him and Mission officer, be taken away by car immediately with Mission officer notifying exchange party by radio from Checkpoint Charlie or patrol car when Pryor released whereupon identification of Powers and exchange for Abel could occur. Powers, Donovan, Murphy, and Doctor could proceed immediately to Tempelhof and depart for Wiesbaden by special flight. Pryor and parents should be flown to Frankfurt immediately by separate flight.

Donovan's assessment of this that it is a genuine offer. Advise views re turnover, other instructions.

General Clay and Mr. Lightner concur in this message.

8 February 1962: ADIC 7523 (OUT 09367)

C-118 No. 33300 departed McGuire Air Force Base 2253Zulu 8 February. ETA Wiesbaden 1100 Zulu 9 February. Passengers: Abel, Mr. Fred Wilkinson, Deputy Director of Prisons, Mr. Noah Alldredge, Justice Dept. escort, and Mr. Nicholas P. Stoiaken, Russian-speaking CIA Security escort.

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9 February 1962: ADIC 7526 (OUT 09377)

Offer of Powers and Pryor for Abel acceptable.

Concur exchange point and procedures para 4 BERLIN 7561 but for reasons covered below would prefer 0630 hours if possible.

Shishkin proposals for handling press aspects neither acceptable or workable. Soviet change in timing from evening to early morning clearly aimed at insuring Soviets release story first. Plans for White House release immediately after exchange must remain in effect. You should arrange for radio or telephone notification from exchange point to Base Commo Room at moment exchange completed. This then will be flashed immediately to Washington for passage to White House. Please use this channel with highest precedence. Exploring use also of telephone. Will advise.

Donovan should reiterate that news of exchange can not be kept secret. Word of Powers' freedom will provoke barrage of inquiries as to whereabouts of Abel. Under no circumstances should Donovan state flatly that there will be a White House press release. He should emphasize, however, that pressures of the free press will require official announcement. Donovan can indicate that he certain any announcement will not exploit exchange to detriment of Soviet Union. Donovan should indicate these his personal views.

Since publicity matter on Powers-Abel now in better perspective we tending to view that maybe unnecessary to airlift Pryors to Frankfurt. Pryors, however, should remain in safehouse several hours after Powers departure. Mission officer should inform parents that government trusts they will be discreet in any comments to the press bearing in mind that other American citizens are still held and the government must continue to seek aid for them. In particular they should not mention Makinen. May be helpful to them in dealing with the press to know that complex negotiations regarding Powers and Abel of which they could not be informed had been under way before their son was detained. Will confirm above including comments on transportation of Pryors.

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9 February 1962: BERLIN 7579 (IN 28698)

C-118 arrived Tempelhof 1525 hours local. "Package" now enroute detention site. All in order.

9 February 1962: BERLIN 7582 (IN 28699)

"Package" secured in maximum security cell at 1615 hours local.

9 February 1962 : BERLIN 7581 (IN 28701)

Donovan met Shishkin at Embassy East Berlin 1200 hours local. Reported general concurrence of our government to accept Powers and Pryor for Abel with expectation of clemency for Makinen in the near future. Shishkin stated that a review of traffic on Oberbaumbruecke this morning leads them to return to our original proposal of Glienecke Bridge. Because of the 25 mile trip for the Soviets, it could not be done before 0830 hours. Donovan sought an earlier time but Shishkin said he could not make it so Donovan agreed to 0830.

On Pryor, Shishkin argued long about release to his father in Vogel's office in East Berlin. Donovan flatly refused any site in East Berlin and Shishkin finally agreed to the release at Friedrichstrasse border point simultaneously with Powers-Abel exchange. Donovan again urged Shishkin in self interest to release Pryor today (9 February) but Shishkin replied it would be contrary to his instructions.

The principal concern of the Soviets over the official statement to be issued by the United States. Shishkin said they would not hold us responsible for what the press may do but emphasized the importance of the official statement for future relations between countries. Donovan replied that no Berlin statement was contemplated and he could assure Shishkin no propaganda by the United States Government and nothing of the official statement discrediting the USSR. Two points all-important to Soviets: First, no use of the word "exchange"; second, nothing in the official statement connecting Abel with the Soviets. Donovan replied that he would communicate these views to his government. Donovan strongly urges the official statement be drafted to avoid these precise two points. First because of the hope of early clemency for Makinen which Donovan believes can depend on the proper conclusion of this deal,

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and second because unnecessary, since the entire press will call it an exchange and will link Abel with the Soviets. Donovan feels this is all right so long as not in the official statement. Shishkin stated that the ideal statement would mention clemency for Abel on petition of his family and because of his age, making no reference to the Soviet Union. Shishkin still would like the statement re Abel released later but Donovan refused to make any such commitment. Shishkin stated that the Soviet Government announcement will relate solely to Powers and describe clemency because of his family and the desire to improve relations between two countries. No Soviet official statement will ever refer to either Abel or Pryor.

Shishkin will attend the exchange with two other officials and Powers with two guards. He suggested the six officials meet in the center of the bridge at 0820 hours for assurance that all is well. The guards will then bring the prisoners forward and when recognized each man will be released to the opposite side. Officials will shake hands and all leave. Donovan agreed but said all must be reviewed by his government and, if any change, would communicate message to Shishkin. Upon inquiry, Donovan assured Shishkin no reporters or photographers were contemplated tomorrow at the exchange.

Donovan returned to West Berlin at 1330 hours.

9 February 1962: ADIC 7540 (OUT 09414)

Concur use of Glienicke Bridge. Reluctantly agree on 0830 hours.

Meeting at center bridge must include Murphy to identify and Lightner to receive Powers. Presumably Wilkinson, Alldredge will be with Abel; depending on his wishes, Donovan should also be present either with Abel or the officials at center bridge.

9 February 1962: BERLIN 7583 (IN 28702)

Feel certain you agree Donovan's performance here has been outstanding. General Clay, General Watson, and Messrs. Lightner and Trivers, all with first-hand experience in negotiating with Soviets, have been unanimous in spontaneous praise for tactics Donovan used

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and feel his cool nerves, especially considering his exposed position as a private citizen alone in East Berlin, played an important part in the apparently successful outcome.

Submit for urgent consideration some mention of Donovan in official government statement, placing particular stress on the fact that Donovan undertook the mission at the request of and on behalf of the U.S. Government. Donovan has in the past week on several occasions pointed out that his role as Abel's defense counsel is widely misinterpreted in addition to which Powers is not regarded by a large segment of the American public as a hero, with the potential effect that Donovan will appear to have been instrumental in a deal more in the interest of the Soviet Union than the United States. Emphasis upon the official backing of Donovan's mission therefore is of some importance to him particularly with regard to his professional reputation.

9 February 1962: ADIC 7537 (OUT 09400)

For Col. Geary and Mr. Joe Murphy, Re: Assessment and Handling Powers.

Suggest you review together the approach to be taken in discussions with Powers. Murphy has been briefed and it is imperative you are both coordinated.

Discussions should be keyed to Powers own desire to talk, in other words let him lead.

Agree it desirable that he be prepared for mixed reaction publicity-wise. As you pointed out, this is extremely delicate. Rather than make it personal, though, you could caution him that his release will bring to the surface the May 1 incident again, which had many opponents as well as proponents and undoubtedly this affair will be rehashed somewhat again implying that the publicity will be directed to all concerned--the U.S. Government, CIA as well as himself.

You should tell him that we are anxious for him to relax, have a medical check up and be with his family. Tell him that we have arranged for him to stay in a house away from the public. At this point you can determine his desires re his family. You should also indicate that we desire of course to talk with him but he must first relax.

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9 February 1962: ADIC 7549 (OUT 09432) FLASH

White House requests test run be accomplished immediately on communications, namely total timing for radio car and/or phone call from Glienicke Bridge to Base Commo then cable to Washington.

White House expects results of test by 2200 Zulu.

Hold applicable commo circuits open until conclusion tests.

Test message should read "Message initiated at bridge at blank Zulu.

9 February 1962: FRANKFURT 7708 (IN 28708) OPIM

Tests between Berlin and ADIC 9 February all under three minutes through CIA secure staff communications circuitry. Berlin to regular Headquarters Signal Center, L Building, approximately one minute. Berlin will have acknowledgement of Headquarters receipt approximately five minutes after Berlin transmission...

10 February 1962: BERLIN 7606 (IN 28790) OPIM

Exchange Powers for Abel on Glienicke Bridge commenced on schedule with American representatives Donovan, Lightner and Murphy moving up to the middle of the bridge at 0820 local where they were met by the Soviets Shishkin, the new Soviet Political Adviser Alexeev (one of the two Soviets currently excluded from the American Sector of West Berlin), and "Cousin Drews"; "Miss Abel" did not appear. Soviets stated they had an open line direct to Friedrichstrasse and that the release of Pryor would occur precisely on schedule. Through the American Provost Marshal and West Berlin Police net, American command post at end of Glienicke Bridge likewise had an open line to Checkpoint Charlie on the west side of Friedrichstrasse. At approximately 0835 hours local received word that Mr. Frank Meehan, USBER representative, and Mr. Pryor Senior had been called to east side of Friedrichstrasse crossing point.

For more than 15 minutes, our observers (including CIA and military police representatives on the scene at Friedrichstrasse)

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reported that they could observe nothing occurring on the other side. Meanwhile, the Soviets were becoming exceedingly insistent on the Glienicke Bridge because they said that through their direct line they had received word that Frederick Pryor had been released at 0835 local.

Since word had been received from our observers at Checkpoint Charlie that Meehan and Pryor Senior were in East Berlin, we then agreed to bring Abel forward to the center of the Bridge while the Soviets brought Powers, and identification was accomplished by both sides at approximately 0840. Shortly before 0850 the Checkpoint Charlie line reported positive identification of Frederick Pryor and the return of Meehan, Pryor Senior and the son. Word was immediately passed by the American Provost Marshal, Lt. Col. Sabolyk, to Mr. Lightner at the center of the Glienicke Bridge and after perfunctory handshakes the party of Powers, Donovan and Murphy came off the bridge and departed by car for Tempelhof...

Only West Berlin Police and customs officials observed the exchange on Glienicke Bridge. The press was not present at Friedrichstrasse so the first realization that Pryor was released came via Washington press statement.

10 February 1962: ADIC 7568 (OUT 09475)

From McCone. Congratulations to Berlin. A hearty well done to [] and all concerned in the Powers, Pryor, Abel exchange. All here impressed that word was given the White House for press release within three minutes of the actual turnover. Apparently allowing Washington easily to scoop Moscow on the release.

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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ANNEX 99

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ACCOUNT OF EVENTS AT GLIENECKER BRIDGE, 10 FEBRUARY 1962

by E. Allan Lightner, Jr., U. S. Mission, Berlin

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 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
 U.S.C., section 403g)

¹Excerpt from report to The Honorable Foy D. Kohler,
 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Depart-
 ment of State, Washington, D. C., dated February 15, 1962⁷

On the morning of February 10 I was picked up at 7:00 a.m.
 and driven to the Berlin Brigade Provost Marshal's office where
 I found [redacted] lawyer James Donovan, Deputy Director of
 Prisons, Mr. Wilkinson, and the CIA chap who had come out to
 identify Powers, Mr. Murphy. Donovan had just had a last
 talk with Abel who had spent the night in one of the cells in
 the basement of the Provost Marshal's building. We went over
 the technical details of the handover and then at about 7:50
 we departed for Glienecker Bridge.

Perhaps it would be useful to mention the technical de-
 tails of the exchange that we agreed upon. Most of these
 details had already been prescribed in the arrangements that
 Donovan had made the day before with the Soviet representa-
 tive, Second Secretary of Embassy, Ivan Alexandrovich Shishkin.
 The exchange was to take place at 8:30. At 8:20 Donovan,
 Murphy, and myself would walk out to the center of the bridge,
 where we would be met by three from the other side. After
 ascertaining that everything was in order for the exchange at
 the Glienecker Bridge and for the release of Pryor at Fried-
 richstrasse, we would signal for Abel to be brought up. The
 Soviets would similarly signal for Powers to come up. The
 two men would come up under guard and stop five meters behind
 our group in the middle of the bridge. At this point, Murphy
 would cross over to the other side where Powers was and would
 talk to him long enough positively to identify him. Similarly,
 one of the members of the other party would cross over to our
 side to identify Abel. At this point we understood that
 Abel's alleged daughter would be the person to identify him.
 Having satisfied ourselves as to the identity of the persons
 to be exchanged, we would then await news by two-way radio
 or over a direct telephone line that Pryor had been released
 at Friedrichstrasse and returned to the United States Sector.
 Upon receipt of this word, Abel and Powers would cross over
 to their respective sides, we in the center would shake hands
 and the exchange would be complete.

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 U.S.C., section 403g)

As indicated, shortly before 8:00 our party left the Provost Marshal's building for the Glienecker Bridge. [redacted] Donovan, Wilkinson, Murphy and myself were in two sedans. The Provost Marshal, Colonel Sabolyk, assisted by the two prison guards who had brought Abel to Berlin and a giant fellow from Sabolyk's staff, took charge of Abel. We arrived at the bridge at approximately 8:15. The car with Abel was kept in the background a short distance from the bridge. It was a beautiful morning, rather unusual for Berlin at this time of year, and we could observe several fishermen already fishing along the bank. Almost at once we saw one sedan and then another arrive on the other side of the bridge, and several civilians emerged. We saw three of them near their end of the bridge, so Donovan, Murphy and I started across. They also moved forward. Donovan commented, as we paced toward each other, that it reminded him of "High Noon", and indeed there was plenty of dramatic tension at that moment with the two groups marching toward each other across the bridge. Donovan, who had been negotiating with Shishkin during the past week, pointed him out as the towering figure in the center. It seemed a long time before we faced each other on the line in the middle of the bridge. Donovan shook hands with Shishkin, whom he introduced to Murphy and myself. Shishkin introduced one of his companions as Mr. Alekseev, a seedy looking man of medium height, maybe 50 years old, in heavy gray overcoat and slouch hat. I looked at him with unusual interest because he was of course the Political Adviser at Karlshorst, Lt. Colonel Alekseev, of the Soviet KGB and at the present time persona non grata in the American sector. The other member of the trio was Mr. Drews, a name I recognized as being one of the people with whom Mr. Donovan had been negotiating, particularly during his contacts with the East German lawyer Vogel. He was also medium height, thin, almost gaunt, fiftyish, shabby. He was supposed to be Mrs. Abel's cousin. Each of the three Russians was in civilian clothes. I'll call them Russians, although I'm not sure whether Drews was Russian or German.

Shishkin, a tall, beady-eyed, no-nonsense fellow with rimless glasses, who spoke English well, but with a strong Russian accent, immediately suggested that we proceed with the business at hand. He said the first thing that should happen would be immediately to bring up Abel and Powers. After they were properly identified, he Shishkin, would instruct the people at Friedrichstrasse by a direct line to release Pryor. He should have word that this had been

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

accomplished within a few minutes thereafter. Then, we could complete the exchange on the bridge. Although this was a change from the earlier agreed procedure, Donovan and I agreed that this plan was satisfactory. Because it constituted a slight change in our understanding of the arrangement, I returned to our side of the bridge and after briefly explaining the change to [redacted] asked that Abel be brought up immediately. I then returned to the center of the bridge, and the two parties escorting Abel on our side and Powers on the other side started to move forward. At this Shishkin raised a row. He said there were too many guards with Abel and that the agreement had been that each prisoner should be accompanied by only two. I'm not sure exactly what the agreement on this point was, but we had no reason to object, and so Donovan, I believe it was, shouted to Wilkinson that only one other person besides himself should accompany Abel. Sabolyk designated his man, the giant, to go along. I learned later from [redacted] that the two guards who had come out from Washington were extremely annoyed at this turn of events, but they had to take a back seat.

The exchangees came forward and stopped about five yards behind our central group. As they advanced, I nudged Murphy to ask him if it looked as if our boy was approaching, and Murphy said it sure did, and then he went over to talk to Powers to make absolutely sure. Drews did the same, going over to talk to Abel. In a very few minutes it was established that all was in order. At this point something went a bit awry because before we realized it Abel and Drews had crossed over to the Russian side and Powers and Murphy had come over to our side. This obviously was a little premature, as we had not yet received word that Pryor had been released. Shishkin signaled to his people at the end of the bridge to send word for Pryor to be released and assured us that word would come through at any moment. This was, I think, about 8:35 a.m. We waited and waited. I was particularly worried at this point because of the fact that we had prematurely permitted Abel out of our custody. Actually, we saw to it that there were always at least one or two Americans with Abel during this period of waiting. Donovan went over and talked to him for a while, as did Wilkinson. Both of them had long been associated with him, from the time of the trial, onwards. Wilkinson was his warden at Atlanta for years.

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

After a few minutes, Shishkin said he had word that Pryor had been released. We shouted to the other end of the bridge and got word back that there was no news of Pryor's return to our side. Shishkin said he could not understand this as his information was explicit. After another few minutes, I walked back to the end of the bridge and explained the situation to [redacted] asking that he try to get a more detailed report of what was happening at Friedrichstrasse. He was told that Frank Meehan had gone over to the other side but had not yet returned. I took this information back to Shishkin in the center of the bridge and we kept on waiting. It seemed like a long time, but I suppose the total waiting time was not more than fifteen minutes. Anyway, we finally got word that Pryor and Meehan had appeared at Checkpoint Charlie and we finished the business on the bridge. This meant that Wilkinson countersigned and dated the Presidential commutation of sentence which he had brought with him and which became effective with the handing over of Powers. He then gave the document to Abel, the six principals shook hands all around, and we then went our respective ways. The time was 8:52 a.m.

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ANNEX 100

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL - Day Lead Article by Wm. J. Eaton

Dateline: Washington, D. C., 20 April 1962.

(Editor's Note: Early this year, in the middle of a bridge linking West Berlin with Communist East Germany, the United States and Russia exchanged two cold war pawns--U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers and convicted Soviet spy Colonel Rudolf Abel. Following is the first personal account of the dramatic trade.)

A gate swung open one cold night last February and a car sped away from the bleak walls of Atlanta Prison. One of the passengers was a gaunt, balding man in a new suit. The others called him "The Package". Halfway around the earth, men were preparing for a rendezvous with this package.

The spot was a wind-swept bridge connecting the East and the West in Berlin. "The Package" was the highest ranking Russian spy ever caught in the United States.

The details of how Soviet master spy Rudolf Abel was smuggled out of prison and swapped for American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers last February 10th was disclosed today by one of the leading participants. The story was told by Fred T. Wilkinson, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Abel's chief American escort on his journey to freedom.

Wilkinson's account in the Prison Bureau's Newsletter said that President Kennedy commuted Abel's 30-year sentence on condition that he never return to the United States.

Jokes about hat-swapping and lawyers' delaying tactics helped reduce tension on the bridge during a last-minute hitch in the exchange, Wilkinson said. The Powers-Abel swap was held up for some minutes until word was received that a second American prisoner--Yale student Frederick L. Pryor--had been released by the East Germans at another border-crossing point.

Wilkinson recalled how three Americans and Abel faced three Russians and Powers 15 feet away:

"This was one of the most tense times in the whole project, I think, although I was armed and it didn't seem too important. At first we were a little formal. By pre-arrangement we walked across and the Russian identifier asked to have Abel take his glasses off. The same applied to Mr. Powers. He was quickly identified. But we were not yet ready to make the exchange. We were waiting for a signal on the radio that our second man had been released at checkpoint Charlie. The Russians kept telling us it was O.K. I found one big Russian in charge had a great sense of humor. We started a little by-play and finally decided we would let the men change sides. We let Abel go over to the other side and Powers came to our side with his identifier because from our point of view he was not a prisoner.

"The second Russian looked at my hat. He seemed to like it and I told Abel to tell him I wanted to trade it for the fur turban the Russian was wearing, but the other Russian wouldn't permit it. When we were about to trade, the second man scowled deeply and said 'Nix, nox!' This by-play went on for quite a while. I am sure the Russian and I both wanted to trade.

"Powers looked very good. Finally we got the signal that the other exchange had been made. My good-humored Russian friend said he would bet the exchange of Pryor was being held up because his lawyer was there and was arguing about his capitalist fees!

"I took out the Presidential document which the Russians wanted; we noted the date and the release on the document, which I signed and turned over to Abel. The document commuted his sentence provided he does not re-enter this country.

"We left the bridge and Mr. Powers was put into a car that had been waiting and was taken away."

Wilkinson got to know Abel when he was warden at Atlanta, and said he felt he had a measure of Abel's confidence. That may have been why Wilkinson was chosen for the secret mission. He and Noah Alldredge, Supervisor of Custodial Service, accompanied Abel from this country to Berlin for the exchange. Abel was fitted with new clothes on the pretext that he would confer with his attorney and federal officials in New York, Wilkinson said.

The Soviet agent was removed from Atlanta penitentiary shortly after midnight on February 8th and flown to New York City on a 2 a. m. jet from Atlanta. These precautions were taken because the federal officials did not want other prisoners--two in particular but who were not identified--to know that Abel had left the prison.

The Soviet spy was held in New York overnight before being flown to West Berlin on a secret Air Force flight. Abel was known as "The Package" in a system of codes that helped to preserve air-tight secrecy about the mission, Wilkinson said. Wilkinson and Alldredge obtained emergency passports and took a train to New York from Washington to keep their rendezvous with "The Package". During this time, Wilkinson said, he was in constant touch with another agency whose employees called each other by first names and last initials.

After several unexplained delays in departure, he said, they left to pick up Abel on a corner near 11th Street in Manhattan.

Wilkinson added: "Abel looked a little puzzled until he saw me, and then he smiled. . . I asked him if he was ready to make a little trip and he said 'yes'. Then I told him I wasn't in a position to tell him what this was, but that we might be able to help him. But he was pretty sharp and caught on. He said, 'Well, I would like to go home.'"

The party drove to a New Jersey air base and Abel was "pretty well told" during the transatlantic flight why he was being taken on the trip. But secrecy was maintained and drapes were drawn around the passenger compartment at one point when a radio repairman was called to fix the plane's radio at Wiesbaden, Germany. They arrived in Berlin on the

afternoon preceding the February 10th exchange and began talks with Army officers on details.

"There was still a lot of uncertainty about the point of exchange," Wilkinson said. "We would have it all set up and then someone would change it--probably the Russians!"

By morning, however, the Gleinicker Bridge on the road to Potsdam was selected as the place for the exchange. Wilkinson said the American party and Abel moved out to the bridge about 7:30 a. m. and sat across the road from a group of East German guards carrying rifles.

At 8 a. m., on signal, Wilkinson, State Department representative Allan Lightner, and another American who was to identify Powers walked out on the bridge with Abel.

Three Russians marched from the other side with Powers and history was made minutes later.

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ANNEX 101

C05492917

FRANCIS GARY POWERS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
FRANCIS GARY POWERS

MARCH 6, 1962

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1962

Mr. Powers, after having been subjected to a public trial in Moscow, you should feel no trepidation whatever in appearing before a group of your fellow citizens and elected representatives.

I hope that you feel just as much at ease as you possibly can.

I understand from Senator Byrd that you are a Virginia boy. What part of Virginia are you from?

**STATEMENT OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS, ACCOMPANIED BY
LAWRENCE HOUSTON, GENERAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Mr. POWERS. I spent most of my life in the southwest part of Virginia, around Pound and Grundy, Va.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you educated in Virginia?

Mr. POWERS. Through grammar school and high school in Virginia and college in Tennessee.

Chairman RUSSELL. What did you do after you left college?

Mr. POWERS. I worked for one summer as a lifeguard at the swimming pool near my home in Virginia, joined the Air Force in October of that year.

Chairman RUSSELL. When were you first employed by the CIA?

Mr. POWERS. In May of 1956.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were an experienced pilot at the time you were employed by the CIA; were you not?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, sir. I don't remember the exact number of hours, but I have had well over a thousand hours of flying time.

Chairman RUSSELL. How much experience did you have with the U-2?

Mr. POWERS. A little better than 500 hours flying time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Powers, we would like to have you go ahead and tell us in your own words of your mission on the 1st of May 1960.

If you could pull up the microphone a little closer I think some of the members of the committee perhaps will hear you a little better.

Mr. POWERS. I was awakened on the morning of May 1, sometime between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning. I knew before that I might have to fly the next day but I wasn't certain at the time.

I had breakfast. The doctor looked me over. I was feeling fine. The navigator gave me a briefing either before or during the time that I was prebreathing for this flight. He showed me the maps, the route that I would take, the turning points, the different headings, and where the equipment was to be turned off and on. Later I talked to the weather forecaster who gave me the probable weather conditions along the route, the weather at destination, how high to expect condensation trails.

Then, after that, I talked to the detachment commander who told me what I was to do in case of an emergency, in case of engine trouble, or a forced landing over enemy territory. This was both before I put on my pressure suit and while I was prebreathing the oxygen.

Somewhere, I suppose about 5:30 in the morning, I finished dressing and was taken to the aircraft. I climbed into the aircraft and waited—I had to wait for signal before starting the engine and before taking off. The signal came a little late. I don't remember exactly how late, but it was later than scheduled.

I took off, climbed on course. I remember that the condensation trails were a little higher than I had been told they would be, but not much. I climbed above this layer and reached my altitude and continued on course. The weather was cloudy underneath. I couldn't see the ground for over an hour, and I drifted right off course. There was a clear area near the Ural Sea where I corrected back toward course but never did get exactly back on course before I got over the clouds again.

It was in this area that I saw two condensation trails from jet aircraft, so I knew at this time—they appeared to be paralleling my course. The first one headed in exactly the opposite direction as myself, and a few minutes later, I assume it was the same aircraft passed me going on the same heading that I was going on. He made no maneuvers that I could tell and I never did see the aircraft itself, just the condensation trail.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you estimate his altitude?

Mr. POWERS. He was well below me. I felt fairly good at the time. I was well above the condensation trail layer and I don't think he ever saw me if he was looking for me. I got back over the clouds there, made a correction for the wind, but I still drifted to the right of course. I would say approximately 200 miles south of Sverdlovsk the clouds ended, and I corrected back to course and was on course the rest of the flight. Just about the time that the clouds ended, I began having a little autopilot trouble. It wasn't very bad at the time so I just disengaged the autopilot, a few minutes later reengaged it and it worked for about 10 minutes and I had the same trouble again.

I went through this procedure two or three times and finally decided not to use it any more, and I'd say the last 15, 20, or 30 minutes was flown by hand without the autopilot.

Weather in this area was perfectly clear, visibility was excellent. I saw no other condensation trails from other aircraft. I was on very close to course all the way. I got to, I would say, within 30 or 40 miles of Sverdlovsk probably as well as I can remember southeast of the city, made a turn to the left of approximately 90°, rolled out on course, lined up on my next flight line. I was to go over the southern edge of the city—the southwestern edge of the city.

I can remember seeing an airfield there that was not on my map. After making this turn, I had to record the time that I reached this particular point, the engine instrument readings, the exhaust gas temperature, the altitude, several things, I don't remember exactly what they all were, and I was doing this at the time that I heard and felt this explosion.

It was approximately a minute after I had rolled out of this turn. I can't be sure of the times there. It is hard to recall just exactly what sensation I had at this time. I can remember feeling, hearing, and just sensing an explosion, but there was no—just a slight acceleration of the aircraft was all that I felt in the aircraft itself. I immediately looked up from the instruments and everywhere I looked was orange.

I don't know whether the whole sky was orange, or just the reflection of an orange light in the canopy, but I had never seen anything like this before, and I am sure there was an explosion. I feel that the explosion was external to the aircraft and behind me, but I really don't know. I have never been in an aircraft in which the engine

exploded or which has had an explosion on board, so I don't know exactly what that would feel like, but I am sure you could feel that through the controls or through the seat some way, and so I am almost positive it was external to the aircraft.

For a short time there—I don't know how long—time had no meaning at this particular time—I thought everything was all right. The right wing started to drop, which is normal in an aircraft, it wanders around a little, and I turned the wheel, brought the right wing back to level position, and either after it reached the level position or just before it reached that, the nose started dropping.

I could probably demonstrate this better with the model here. It was going along like this. The right wing dropped slightly, not very much. I used the controls. The wing came back up level and just before or after it got level, the nose started going down, and very slowly. So I applied back pressure to the control column and felt no resistance to the movement of the control column, and this kept going faster and faster. So I immediately assumed at the time that the tail section of the aircraft had come off, because it—a very violent maneuver happened in here. I think I reached a position about like this and I feel sure that both wings came off.

This was where the very violent maneuver took place.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were not where you could see the wings to determine whether they had come off?

Mr. POWERS. I didn't have much time to look, and I was being thrown around in the cockpit very much at this time. It had come down in this position. I had pulled the control column all the way back into my lap, and it did no good. As it came down, it kept going faster and it got like this and I feel that the wings came off then, but I really don't know. And a very violent maneuver during this time, and it ended up in a spin about this position. I know the nose was high, and I know it was turning very fast around, it seemed like around something heavy like in the fuselage. I don't know how much of the aircraft was left at the time. But all I could see by looking out of the cockpit was sky. The g. forces were very strong. I have no way of estimating how much.

I know that when I tried to get in the ejection position, it took both hands on my legs to pull my feet back into the stirrups of the ejection seat.

It was spinning very violently. I was thrown forward and up, and I was hanging onto the seat belt, not sitting in the seat.

My first reaction was to reach for the destruct switches, and I reached up. I don't know whether I touched them or not, but I thought that I had better see if I can get out of here before using this.

I knew that there was a 70-second time delay between the time of the actuation of the switches and the time that the explosion would occur.

So, after deciding that I had better check and see if I could get out before actuating the switches, I tried to get into position in the ejection seat so that I could use it. In this particular aircraft there isn't much clearance between the pilot's knees and the top of the windshield, the rail, steel rail across the top of the windshield, and I was being thrown forward, and if I had used the ejection seat at that time, I would have probably lost both legs just above the knees.

I don't know how long I tried getting back in position, but at the time I could think of no other way to get out, just the ejection seat. My mind was fixed on that one idea.

I kept glancing at the altimeter as the aircraft was falling and it was going around very fast. I remembered somewhere during this time above the altitude of 34,000 feet that a friend of mine who had had an accident in an aircraft was having trouble getting out of the aircraft, and I remembered him telling me of his experience.

He said that he told himself that he just had to stop and think, and this entered my mind at the time, so I just stopped struggling and tried to think, and this was the first time that I realized that maybe I could just open the canopy, loosen the seat belt, and climb out.

And, along in here, I saw 34,000 feet on the altimeter, and it was still moving very fast.

I immediately reached up, opened the canopy. One side came loose first—I think it was the right side. The other handle loosened the left side and it floated off—I believe it was to the left. I really don't know, but it just disappeared.

I had pulled my emergency belt out, however—I think that was one of the first things I did after this real violent maneuver—so that when I separated from the aircraft, I would have an oxygen supply while descending, but I had forgotten to unfasten my oxygen hoses—the can on my left.

I opened the seat belt, and I was immediately thrown forward and halfway out of the aircraft.

I can probably demonstrate this better than I can tell. The top of the canopy was, say, the top of this table, and I was hanging out over the front of the aircraft about like this [indicating], and I think the only thing that was keeping me in the aircraft was the oxygen hose.

If that had not have been fastened, I would probably have gone out right away, I don't know.

Well, then, I tried to get back into the aircraft so that I could actuate these destructor switches. I couldn't—the g. forces were too great and I could not pull myself back over the top of the windshield.

I tried to reach around underneath the windshield. I knew where the switches were. And I couldn't get my hand back underneath.

Also, somewhere about this time my faceplate of my flying suit frosted up completely. That is when it got into the cold air, and all I could see was just the eyes on the faceplate about an inch or so in front of my face. I knew that I was well below 34,000 feet.

I had no idea of what my altitude was. I couldn't get back in the airplane. I didn't know whether I could get those oxygen hoses loose or not. I couldn't actuate the destruct switches.

So then I decided just to try to get out. I gave several lunges and something snapped and I was floating free. It was almost immediately that the parachute opened, and this surprised me because I hadn't pulled the ripcord.

The parachute was equipped with an automatic opening device, but it has to be actuated by pulling another cord, and apparently that cord got hung on something in the airplane and pulled, because it was well less than a minute, I am sure, after leaving the aircraft that the chute opened.

A short while after that—I don't remember how long—I got to thinking that this chute was set to open at 15,000 feet or lower; that

the maximum altitude it would open would be 15,000 feet; so I knew that I could take my faceplate off, and not be in danger from the thin air.

So I removed the faceplate, just left it hanging on the hoses that were connected to the suit, and started looking around, and I was still very high—I estimate above 10,000 feet, but I have no idea of the exact altitude.

There were a lot of thoughts running through my mind at this time. It is impossible to recall them all, but I remembered I had a map in my pocket. I took this map out, looked at it, tore it into small pieces, and scattered it in the air.

I also thought of the coin with the poison pin in it. This had been given to me just prior to the flight, and it was my option whether to take this or not, and I chose to take it. I got to thinking that when I got on the ground if I were captured they would surely find this coin but maybe with just the pin lying loose in the pocket it would be overlooked, so I opened up the coin, got the pin out, and just dropped it in my pocket.

I had several other things in my pockets, but they were more or less necessary to survival if I could evade capture, so I decided not to get rid of those things. I don't remember exactly what they were. It was just some of the things that I couldn't get into my survival pack itself. I couldn't tell where I was going to land. There were a lot of wooded areas there, and there was one fairly large one that I would drift toward and then drift back away from. I was trying to guide the parachute over to this wooded area, but I had no success in that.

The winds were variable as I was coming down in the parachute, and first I would go toward the woods, later away from them.

When I got down fairly close to the ground, there was a car I could see on a dirt road. I didn't know what he was doing, but he wasn't going too fast and he seemed to be just keeping up with me, and the closer I got the closer he would get to me. He came to a little village there, turned left out to the outskirts, of the village and stopped, and I guess I was maybe 200 feet in the air at this time, and I think it was two men got out of the car.

I was descending what appeared to be very rapidly at the time, and I landed in an open field about 25 feet from a tractor with one driver on the tractor and one man standing beside the tractor.

When I hit the ground I fell down. When I looked up, one of the men, I don't know which it was, was out grabbing a hold of the parachute to try to collapse it. I remember releasing a strap on one side so that the air would spill out of the chute. A couple of these men helped me to my feet. I don't remember whether they tried to say anything to me at the time or not. I think they did, and I just shook my head. They helped me remove my parachute harness and the helmet of the flying suit. They took away the pistol and a knife that I had on my parachute. After I got my helmet off and could look around, there was a large crowd of people there, a lot of children, so apparently there was a school in this area. I don't know how many grownups but I would say there were at least 50 people. This is just a guess.

These men tried to talk to me and I would just shake my head and indicate that I couldn't understand them. One of them pointed at me and held up two fingers, and I got the impression that he was

asking if there were two of us, and I told him "No," just shook my head "No," and pointed to myself and held up one finger telling him that I was alone. And then he pointed up in the air and I looked up and saw what I think was a parachute, but I knew that I had no other parachute on board the aircraft.

I knew that it was no one that I knew, so I wasn't very interested at the time. They didn't pay too much attention to this. They just talked among themselves, one on each side of me caught my arm and led me to this car that I had seen earlier. They put me in the car in the front seat next to the driver and with a man on my right and there were three, I believe, in the back seat. They had loaded up the parachute, and I think my survival pack, in the trunk of the car.

They started driving through the village and I indicated to them that I would like to have something to drink, so he stopped in front of a house there in this small village. One of the men went inside, brought out a glass of water which I drank and they gave the glass to some of the people standing around and we left this village. It was on a very bad dirt road, a lot of ruts, a very rough ride. The car was small, and I estimate that it took about 30 minutes to get to this next village which was a larger place.

There was a paved street running through this second village.

They stopped on the side of the street that we approached the village from, got me out of the car, and there was what I took to be a policeman there.

They talked to him and he went through my pockets, not very thoroughly, led me across the street into some sort of an office, and I estimate that I stayed there about 2 hours. There were both civilian and military there. I don't know whether the military was there when I arrived or not but I know they were there during the time and before I left. One of the military men tried to speak to me in German, and I told him I didn't understand him. There was no one there that could speak English, so they didn't ask me any questions at the time.

People kept bringing in small pieces of wreckage from the aircraft. I saw several pieces of metal, some with English written on it, there was a small roll of film. They had my parachute there, the survival pack. Oh, they searched me here at this building also. They stripped me down to my underwear, went through my pockets, felt along the seams, but they didn't find the needle at this time.

They called in a doctor. She was a young woman, I would say about 30 years old. I had some scratches on my right leg which she painted and bandaged. They tried to talk to me several times, but I couldn't understand them and they couldn't understand me, and I estimate it was around 2 hours, maybe a little more, but I have no way of knowing how long I was there. They loaded me up in a military vehicle, a little larger than our jeep. There was an officer on my left, myself in the middle, and an enlisted man on my right in the back seat. The enlisted man had a carbine of some kind.

In the front seat there was a military driver and a civilian. They took me into a fairly large city which I assumed was Sverdlovsk. It was in the downtown area, into a fairly large office building, I would say about three stories high, and they took me to the second floor.

There they performed a thorough search and found the needle at this place. I tried to invent a story there that I didn't know where I was, I was off course, but they brought out the packages that I had in my survival pack or on my person with maps of the Soviet Union, Russian rubles, and several other items that indicated the nature of the mission. It was then that I decided to follow the instructions that I had received earlier and tell them that I was a member of the CIA and the nature of the mission.

It was quite obvious that they knew it anyway. I think I stayed there approximately 30 minutes. They made a lot of telephone calls. There was a man there who spoke English also and asked me several questions, and that is how I found out my story wouldn't hold up.

They seemed to be in a hurry. They made several telephone calls, talked a lot among themselves, and they gave me back my underwear and the outer flying suit but kept the pressure suit. They also gave me something similar to our poncho with two slits on each side made out of canvas. The slits were for the arms to go through. They put this on me.

One man got out a pair of handcuffs. They talked among themselves and he put them back in his pocket and they never did put them on me. We went back outside.

They loaded me in a fairly large car, limousine type, drove to an airfield, and when we got there, we stopped at the gate on one side of the terminal building, I suppose it was, and we waited there maybe 5 minutes, and there was a jet passenger aircraft in front of this building. Someone opened the gate. We drove to the front entrance of this aircraft. They made me run up the steps and led me into the front compartment which contained 10 seats. There were four men with me. I remember at least one was in uniform and one was a civilian, but I don't remember what the other two were wearing.

They asked me no questions on this flight.

I am getting ahead of myself. It seemed to me that the aircraft was waiting there for us because as soon as we got in they moved the loading ramp away and started up immediately, and through the curtains to the back, when the stewardess walked through, I could see that there were other passengers in the back, so I suppose it was a regular passenger flight to Moscow.

During the flight they asked no questions. Some of the—a couple of the men played chess. They ate, offered me food but I couldn't eat, and it was during this time that I made up my mind exactly what course I would follow during the forthcoming weeks. I knew that if these people released the news that I was there—I didn't know that they would at the time, but I knew that if they did—that there would be a lot of stuff in the papers in the States, and I also knew that they probably subscribed to every paper we have, and I wanted to make my story as close to what I thought would be released in the papers as possible.

I think the flight took about 3 hours.

We arrived at the airport in Moscow. They had me sit there for about 5 minutes, brought me out, ran me down the steps to a waiting car, and we immediately left. The car had curtains inside that they kept pulled.

You could see outside through the curtains, but I don't suppose anyone could see inside.

They took me downtown to the building that I stayed in until September 9.

There was another search performed immediately upon my arrival at this building. They took all my clothing and gave me other clothing there. There was an interrogation, I would say, within 30 minutes after my arrival there, and there were quite a few high-ranking people, many of them in uniforms, many of them in civilian clothes.

I don't remember exactly the questions they asked during this time, but I think it was mostly concerned with establishing that I was a member of the CIA, or worked for the CIA, and the purpose of the flight.

I don't know how long this lasted. I do know that Rudenko, who was the prosecutor during the trial, was more or less in charge of this interrogation session.

He offered me a Chesterfield cigarette. They asked me, I think at this time, what I knew about Moscow; what I knew about Russia; and I told them I knew very little about it.

They asked me if I would like to see Moscow, and I said "Yes." And they said, "Well, that might be arranged." Then I don't know whether I said anything or not, but, after this session was over, they took me to the prison section of this building. There I received a physical examination, not a very thorough one.

There was a lot of time spent just locked up in a room with nothing but a bench built against the wall and just waiting. The doctor came into this room and examined me there. I waited again.

They took me to a doctor's office, and it was either a different doctor or a nurse, I don't know which, gave me a shot. This was after dark; I don't know what time it was.

They immediately took me to a cell and put me in it, brought in some food which I couldn't eat, and I lay down and tried to sleep. The next morning there was an interrogation, and, for some reason or the other, this was left out of the books that they had compiled of the investigation.

I don't know why this one was left out, but it was.

Chairman RUSSELL. How do you know it was left out?

Mr. POWERS. They told me that according to the Russian law, I could review the evidence in the case before the trial.

Going through this evidence a week or so prior to the trial, I saw that one was missing, and I told this to my Soviet-appointed defense counsel, and he just shrugged his shoulders. That morning they said that in the afternoon we would take a tour of Moscow, and I was all for this because I know as long as I was riding around in a car they would not be asking questions, and I would have been willing to take a trip every day.

The real interrogation started on the morning of the 3d, and it varied, the sessions varied in length, but there were times as much as 10 to 12 hours in a single day, several times at night, but, as the time went on, they got shorter and a longer period between the interrogations.

It was somewhere in the latter part of May that I had a very bad cold, could hardly talk, that they gave me the first day off that I did not have an interrogation.

I don't remember the exact date, but it was after the 20th of May.

Through June the sessions became shorter and sometimes they would skip the whole weekend, Saturday and Sunday.

I suppose you probably have a lot of questions on this that I have gone over. Any time you want.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do have a number.

I was interested that you said a number of times that you had no way of knowing the time. I think the first time you said your parachute was coming down. Did you not have a timepiece of some kind with you?

Mr. POWERS. No.

I had the clocks in the airplane itself. I had no wristwatch. I think there was one in my pocket, but I had forgotten about it, and it probably was not wound, anyway.

From that time I do not remember seeing a clock or anything that I could tell the time by.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is rather unusual for any American not to have a wristwatch or some kind of timepiece with him after passing 14 or 15 years of age.

I was somewhat surprised that you didn't have a wristwatch or some watch with which you could tell the time.

Mr. POWERS. Well, it is very hard to wear a wristwatch over this pressure suit. It can be done, but I usually went by the watches we had in the aircraft itself.

Chairman RUSSELL. About what time of day was it when this unexplained explosion struck your plane?

Mr. POWERS. I don't remember the exact time, but I do remember it was close to the hour, I think just before the hour, but which hour I don't know. It was in the morning. I was using Greenwich time. I have no idea what the local time was. It could be very easy to find out by going back over the flight plan and following the route because I was very close to schedule.

Chairman RUSSELL. Unfortunately the Russians have all that; haven't they?

Mr. POWERS. They have all that I had with me.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you were compelled to make an estimate of the time that elapsed after you lost control of your plane until the time that you were on the ground, what would you estimate that time to be?

Mr. POWERS. I have thought about this a lot, and I really don't know. I don't know how fast the aircraft was falling. I know it was going pretty fast, but time didn't seem to mean anything. A second could have been a minute or a minute could have been a second. It seems like—

Chairman RUSSELL. I am including the time that you were in your parachute coming down. Would you estimate 1 minute, 2 minutes, 3 minutes, 4 minutes?

Mr. POWERS. It was more than that. The parachute itself, I would say, was better than 10 minutes, but I really don't know. I am just guessing this.

Chairman RUSSELL. Better than 10 minutes in the parachute?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think it would have been longer or shorter than that after you lost control before the parachute opened?

Mr. POWERS. I would say much shorter.

Chairman RUSSELL. Much shorter. Now, these men that were in that automobile that were pursuing you or following you on this dirt road, were they civilians or in military uniform?

Mr. POWERS. They all had civilian clothing.

Chairman RUSSELL. When was the first time you saw anyone in uniform?

Mr. POWERS. At the second village where these men took me.

Chairman RUSSELL. Apparently they thought you were a Russian when they first came up to you?

Mr. POWERS. Probably so. I really don't know. It didn't take them long to take my pistol away, and the knife.

Chairman RUSSELL. They had spoken to you prior to that time; hadn't they?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, but I just shook my head, didn't say a word, so I don't know what they thought.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever have a jetplane flame out on you, Mr. Powers, while you were piloting?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I have.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does it make any unusual noise or give any unusual impetus to the plane?

Mr. POWERS. Different aircraft react differently. In this particular airplane I had had flameouts before. Sometimes there is a chugging of the engine, but you know what that is. There was no kind of an explosion accompanying that, and nothing that would give an orange light.

Chairman RUSSELL. The orange light was something that was really unusual?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, and it was apparently persistent. It wasn't a flash, but all the time that I was looking out it was there, but I don't remember ever seeing it again.

Chairman RUSSELL. Has there ever been any other occasion when you were in an airplane and were the target of a ground-to-air missile or explosive or shell of any kind?

Mr. POWERS. Not that I know of.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have never seen any ground-to-air missile explode?

Mr. POWERS. No, I haven't.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that right?

Mr. POWERS. I have seen photographs or moving pictures of some of our missiles shooting an aircraft down, but the ones I have seen, the missile hits the aircraft.

Well, I am sure that nothing hit this aircraft. If something did hit it, I am sure I would have felt it.

Chairman RUSSELL. You did say that the plane had an impetus forward when it was hit?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. When this explosion occurred evidently it occurred behind the plane?

Mr. POWERS. That was my thinking. There was definitely a slight acceleration—not much, but a push.

Chairman RUSSELL. Could you see the plane to which you referred or did you only see the markings of the jet plane in the atmosphere?

Mr. POWERS. This was at least an hour earlier, and I only saw the condensation trails themselves. I tried to see the aircraft and couldn't. They were quite a way below and I estimated 20 miles to the right, but it is hard to estimate distances in the air.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is not much range for a jet airplane though, is it, 20 miles? The main difference was the —

Mr. POWERS. The altitude.

Chairman RUSSELL. The altitude, not the distance from it?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you see any other airplanes on that mission?

Mr. POWERS. I saw no other condensation trails or airplanes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you ever had reason to believe that airplanes on any other mission were undertaking to reach you or to find you?

Mr. POWERS. Pardon?

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you ever had any occasion to believe on this or any mission that an airplane was attempting to attack the plane which you were piloting?

Mr. POWERS. No. On this mission I can't be sure that these two planes that I did see or the condensation trails that I did see, I can't be sure that they were looking for me, but it seemed odd that they would first parallel my course exactly in the opposite direction and then a few minutes later parallel my course in the same direction I was heading. I assume that they were looking for me but they made no turns to try to intercept or anything.

Chairman RUSSELL. You said several times that you drifted to the right of course?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. To the right of course. Not being a pilot, why is that—what is that of course, is that the prevailing wind pushing to the right?

Mr. POWERS. We usually have a forecast wind for different altitudes, and the flight plan is drawn up to take into consideration the strength of the wind, and apparently the wind information we had was a little wrong and the wind was stronger than the navigator thought it would be, and he had computed the course for a slower wind.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are not a navigator yourself, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, a pilot has to be a navigator, but I am not a rated navigator. I never was a rated navigator in the Air Force.

Chairman RUSSELL. Had you ever made a parachute descent before?

Mr. POWERS. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You say they didn't find this needle until about the third time they examined you, I believe. Where was the needle hidden?

Mr. POWERS. I had just dropped it loose in the pocket.

Chairman RUSSELL. Loose in your pocket?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. I wish you would clear up the matter of the needle, Mr. Powers.

Were you under any obligation to destroy yourself if you were captured?

Mr. POWERS. Oh, no. I don't remember exactly who gave me the needle that morning, but they told me, "You can take it if you want to." They said, "If something does happen you may be tortured."

Maybe you could conceal this on your person in some way, and if you see that you cannot withstand the torture, you might want to use it."

And that is the reason I took the needle. But I could have left it. I wasn't told to take it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have the instructions that you received that morning and that you usually received there before you—

Mr. POWERS: Do I have them?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; the instructions as to your course of conduct in the event you fell into the hands of any enemy, potential enemy.

Mr. POWERS. Well, it is hard to remember this long exactly what they were.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think they are there. You can read them. I think they ought to go into this record.

Mr. POWERS. Listed here are three paragraphs:

(a) If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors.

(b) At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.

(c) Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission.

That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Those instructions had been given you before you took off on this flight?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were thoroughly familiar with them?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. They were a part of your agreement with the CIA?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Powers, were you close enough to this other parachute to tell whether it was occupied by a man or whether it just had some object in it?

Mr. POWERS. No. It was very high. I don't know how high. I couldn't see what it was.

I thought at the time that—well, there were a lot of thoughts running through my mind, and I thought at the time that maybe this explosion was caused by a rocket, and, if so, maybe this parachute was used to recover, say, the first stage or something.

Actually, I have no idea what was in the parachute, but I am sure it was a parachute, very similar to mine. It was a different color. I think it had red and white markings.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were these people concerned about it? Was there any possibility that this was a Russian in that parachute and that they had shot down one of their own planes in their efforts to reach you at your high altitude?

Mr. POWERS. I really don't know.

The people just asked me if there were two of us, two Americans. I mean he just pointed at myself and asked if there were two, and I told him by sign language that there was only one, and we got in the car and left.

They didn't seem concerned at all.

Chairman RUSSELL. So they didn't even look for the other man?

Mr. POWERS. No, the ones who were with me did not.

Chairman RUSSELL. You do not know whether anyone else out there looked for him or not?

Mr. POWERS. No; I have no idea.

Chairman RUSSELL. They did not ever bring him in to where they took you?

Mr. POWERS. No.

I do know that this was not part of my aircraft or equipment.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was very much interested in that one day's interrogation that was left out of your evidence and how you knew it was left out.

You cannot read Russian, can you, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. No.

They translated the interrogations into English for me to read and to correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. And there was no evidence of that day at all in this record?

Mr. POWERS. There was definitely an interrogation on that morning, and it was definitely not in the books they gave me to review.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what I mean: There was nothing in the book that transpired that day?

Mr. POWERS. Right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did they threaten you at any time when they were examining you?

Mr. POWERS. There were no definite threats, but they didn't let me forget that this crime was punishable by death. Anytime they would mention that it was 7 to 15 years and death, and they wouldn't let me forget that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever manifest any reluctance in answering the questions that they asked you or did you answer them immediately?

Mr. POWERS. I refused to answer several of their questions. I showed reluctance on many.

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon?

Mr. POWERS. I showed reluctance on many, some that I couldn't see how they could be of any interest to them at all, but I was just reluctant in answering all questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was not exactly in conformity with your instructions there to cooperate with your captors; was it?

Mr. POWERS. Well, you shouldn't go overboard with this cooperation, I don't think.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were quoted in the press as having stated at your trial that you had made a terrible mistake in flying over Russia and apologized to the Russian people and would never do it again. Was that a misquotation or did you make that statement at your trial?

Mr. POWERS. No, that wasn't a misquotation. I made this statement on the advice of my defense counsel, and also because it was easy to say I was sorry because what I meant by saying that and what I wanted them to think I meant was quite different. My main sorrow was that the mission failed, and I was sorry that I was there, and it was causing a lot of adverse publicity to the States. But, of course, some of these things I couldn't say in that statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was the room in which you were confined a cell, a jail cell, or was it just an ordinary office room?

Mr. POWERS. No, it was part of a prison. It had a solid door with a peephole in it, one window with opaque glass, and bars on the outside of the glass itself. The only way I could see out was through a small crack at the top, and I could see part of the wall of the wing of the building opposite this cell, but it was definitely a prison.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was it kept reasonably clean?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, it was kept clean.

Chairman RUSSELL. How was your food that you had there at the prison?

Mr. POWERS. The food was better at the first place in Moscow there than it was at Vladimir at the prison there. I couldn't eat for a long time, and apparently they got quite worried about it and kept asking me if they could get me any special foods or anything, and I told them "No."

Later on I did start eating, but I never had much of an appetite the whole time I was there. There seemed to be plenty of the food but it is quite different from what we have here. It consisted predominantly of potatoes and cabbage.

Chairman RUSSELL. Borsch and different kinds of soups?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, at the prison in Vladimir the best part of the meal at lunch was a bowl of soup.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever have a roommate or did you occupy that cell by yourself?

Mr. POWERS. From May 1 to September 9 I was in solitary confinement. When I moved to the other prison I had a roommate.

Chairman RUSSELL. What had he been charged with?

Mr. POWERS. He was—they called it an article 58, which I think means crimes against the state, and he said treason. He spoke English. He spoke four languages. He was a Latvian. He spoke Latvian, German, English, and Russian.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have any reason to believe he was planted there to spy on you or do you think he was a bona fide prisoner?

Mr. POWERS. This was always in the back of my mind, but I do not think he was a plant. He had a lot of stuff that he had accumulated over the few years that he had been there, notes that he had taken while he was studying Russian written on scraps of newspaper and a lot of other things. It took him a long time to accumulate what he had. I feel sure that he wasn't a plant.

Chairman RUSSELL. How long had he been in prison?

Mr. POWERS. He was there, I think, in April of this year will be 7 years. This is what he told me. His sentence was 15 years.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did they not periodically examine your possessions? You say he had accumulated this file of material about Russian. They didn't go through your belongings to see whether you had anything you shouldn't have?

Mr. POWERS. Not while we were there, anyway. Not while we were in the cell.

Chairman RUSSELL. Not in any instance?

Mr. POWERS. There were several inspection teams who came around the prison. They would just come in and ask through an interpreter if there were any questions, any complaints, stuff like this, but they didn't bother us very much at all.

Chairman RUSSELL. I can't refrain from saying that the Russians were much more gentle with you than I would ever have expected they would have been to one who was taken under those circumstances.

Mr. POWERS. It surprised me, also. I expected much worse treatment than I received.

Chairman RUSSELL. I rather think you got off somewhat better than a Russian spy would in this country under the same circumstances.

Mr. POWERS. I really don't know.

Chairman RUSSELL. It might depend on where he happened to land. Undoubtedly he would have a rough time in the section of the country from which I come.

Senator SALTONSTALL?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman—Mr. Powers, I think I only have one or two questions. I have listened with interest to what you have said. I have listened to what Mr. McCone has told us, what he has given out in unclassified information, and I have listened to the chairman.

My question would be this: Did I understand you correctly that when you were coming down in the parachute you threw away your instructions and threw away the map?

Mr. POWERS. No, I had no written instructions with me, but I did have a map, and I tore that up in very small pieces and scattered it out in the air as I was coming down.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that your instructions were in your head, so to speak?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, did you have a briefcase or something else in which these other things, your special food, and these other things, were that they looked through afterward?

Mr. POWERS. Yes. I had what we call a seat pack. In this seat pack was a collapsible rubber liferaft, some food, some water, matches, several other items necessary to, say, live off the land or survival in an unpopulated area.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, nothing except survival kit?

Mr. POWERS. Yes. There were also some cloth maps for escape and evasion.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Powers, I will just say this: After listening to Mr. McCone and after listening to you, I commend you as a courageous, fine young American citizen who lived up to your instructions and who did the best you could under very difficult circumstances.

Mr. POWERS. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD of Virginia. The chairman has very ably covered the ground, and I will not ask any questions.

I do want to say I join with Senator Saltonstall in expressing my opinion that the witness, Mr. Powers, has made an excellent presentation. He has been frank, and I am also very much gratified that Mr. McCone has testified before the committee that so far as he knows no action has been taken by you which was contrary to your instructions or contrary to the interests of this country.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH of Maine. Mr. Chairman, my questions have been covered, thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman; I think you have covered this matter fully. I want to ask one question.

Mr. POWERS, I understand you had an attorney appointed for your trial.

Mr. POWERS. Yes, that is right.

Senator STENNIS. Did he work with you and freely advise you and counsel with you, give you advice?

Mr. POWERS. Yes. We had several meetings before the trial. But I didn't get to see him until, I would say, about 2 weeks before the trial.

Senator STENNIS. He rendered you a valuable service, did he?

Mr. POWERS. Well, I really don't know. I never did trust him any more than the rest of them.

Senator STENNIS. I mean by that that he gave you information and talked to you and you think you were better off at the trial than you would have been without his aid. What about that?

Mr. POWERS. I really don't know.

Senator STENNIS. You have understood, I suppose, that at the time this occurred there was some publicity here, not a great deal, but some that was not altogether favorable to you.

Did you know about that?

Mr. POWERS. I have heard about this since I——

Senator STENNIS. That is just a prelude for my saying this—that it is with satisfaction to me that I learn that you have been fully exonerated by the men who most know how to judge what you did, what the facts were, by your superiors and those who employed you. Not only that, but they found that you have discharged all of your obligations to your country, and it is with satisfaction to us here and I think to the American people to learn that, to know it is true.

I know it makes you feel mighty good.

Mr. POWERS. There was one thing that I always remembered while I was there and that was that I am an American.

Senator STENNIS. You are an American.

Mr. POWERS. Right.

Senator STENNIS. And proud of it?

Mr. POWERS. Right.

Senator STENNIS. That is fine. [Applause.] You felt that the American flag would finally find you and follow through and do what was good for you?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I did.

Senator STENNIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Case.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. POWERS, did you have any opportunity to see the plane or any part of it on the ground after you landed?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I did. They took me out somewhere around the middle of May to a building in a park in Moscow. The plane was on display there.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Was there any evidence visible or evident to you that the plane had been tampered with or changed in any way after it had been brought there?

Mr. POWERS. Well, there was quite a bit of damage. Some parts were missing completely. There were a few things that I was very

interested in looking at myself. I was particularly interested in the tail section, because I thought it might be possible that the tail of the aircraft came off and this caused the accident, but on looking at that there were no scorch marks. The paint was still intact. So I could only assume that while the engine was running the tail was on the aircraft. But as far as anything else, there was no way that I could tell whether it had been tampered with or not. There was a lot of damage to everything I saw.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Was the tail on the plane when you saw it?

Mr. POWERS. No. It was sitting in one place by itself.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. You have referred to the incident as an explosion. Was there anything visibly noticeable about the plane that helped to form that opinion that it was an explosion, or was that simply the fact that at the time you felt the incident you were impelled forward?

Mr. POWERS. Well, I heard and felt something, and it sounded like a very dull explosion, like something "whoomp," not a real sharp sound, but dull. Then the light after this. Looking at the aircraft I noticed on one of the wings that there were holes on one side of the wings, but I don't know whether this was caused by a fragmentation or maybe when it hit the ground.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. How long were you in the Air Force?

Mr. POWERS. A little more than 5 years.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. During that time did you receive any indoctrination, so to speak, with regard to communism?

Mr. POWERS. This was really a long time ago. I have seen some films while I was in the Air Force. I think I had attended a lecture where a list of Communist organizations was pointed out. There might have been others, but I can't remember.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Was your service in the Air Force during wartime?

Mr. POWERS. No. Well, I entered the Air Force during the Korean war, but never did get to Korea.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. With respect to this particular flight, did you have anything to do with the selection of the date for the flight?

Mr. POWERS. No.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Do you know whether or not the timing of the flight was primarily a matter of the selection of weather and favorable atmospheric conditions or anything else?

Mr. POWERS. I would assume that it depended primarily on weather. I really don't know.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. You really don't know, but that was your assumption?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. There was nothing in your experience that would indicate anything other than that it was a timely flight because of the weather conditions?

Mr. POWERS. That is what I would think, yes.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Did you learn from your cellmate anything about the economic or political conditions in Russia?

Mr. POWERS. We discussed quite a few things there. He seemed to be more interested in the West than I was in Russia, and we primarily talked about that.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. What was his original nationality?

Mr. POWERS. Latvian.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Latvian.

Are you still in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I am.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. What was your rank when you separated yourself from the Air Force, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. First lieutenant.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Powers, what do you think hit you, or nearly hit you?

Mr. POWERS. I really don't know. I just know that there was an explosion, but how it got there—I feel sure that it was external to the aircraft, but how it got there or what it was, I have no idea.

Senator SYMINGTON. Has anybody given you an opinion as to what that orange glow was?

Mr. POWERS. Well, they stressed many, many times that they got me on the very first shot of a rocket, but they stressed it so much that I tend to disbelieve it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there any possibility that you were hit twice, once at a higher altitude, say, a near miss, and again at a lower altitude?

Mr. POWERS. No.

There was only one explosion that I know of, and they would have had to have been excellent shots to hit that thing as it fell.

Senator SYMINGTON. In the Red Star it said that—

Major Varanoff ran out and saw in the rays of the day's sun fragments of the foreign plane falling down and not far from it the pilot himself.

That could not be true if you were hit at anything like 67,000 or 68,000 feet; could it? You would be behind the pieces of the plane; would you not?

Mr. POWERS. Well, while I was descending in the parachute, I saw one piece of the plane fall. It was a flat piece. It may have been a wing or it may have been something smaller. But it was falling like a leaf falls, flipping and turning, and fairly slow, but it passed me.

I have no idea of how far away it was.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could it have been another plane that had been hit?

Mr. POWERS. No, I assumed at the time that it was part of my aircraft. If it was a wing, it was a long distance off. If it was a smaller piece, it was closer. That is all I can say about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. You did your best to destroy the plane, but, because of the g.'s on you at the time, you were just unable to reach the controls; is that correct?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, that is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join you and other members of the committee in commending Mr. Powers for the way he handled himself in this unfortunate episode. I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bush.

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions, but I also would like to say, having heard Mr. McCone's report today and having listened to Mr. Powers' remarkable story, that I am satisfied he has conducted himself in exemplary fashion and in accordance with the highest traditions of service to one's country, and I congratulate him upon his conduct in captivity and his safe return to the United States.

Mr. POWERS. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think I should say to the members of the committee that Mr. Powers has not yet completed his entire statement.

He stopped for a period of questions, as I understood, and then you will tell us more about your trial before you conclude, will you not, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I will go right on until I got back, if you want to listen to it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Did they indicate to you whether the plane, your plane, came down near where you landed?

Mr. POWERS. No.

At one time during the investigation they showed me some kind of a map that had indicated on it where different parts of the aircraft fell, but I didn't recognize any of the landmarks that I could see on this map.

Senator JACKSON. And while you were in this particular village and later in Sverdlovsk, did they indicate at that time that they had located the plane?

Mr. POWERS. Well, people kept bringing in small pieces, pieces that could be carried, but, as far as indicating to me that they had located the main parts of it, no.

Senator JACKSON. Did they indicate later that Mr. Khrushchey had personally ordered the shooting down of your aircraft by a rocket?

Mr. POWERS. I don't think so. I don't remember that his name entered into it.

Senator JACKSON. I asked that because the story was carried, I believe, in the American press, based on, of course, a story out of Moscow from one of the official Soviet news agencies.

But they did not indicate that to you?

Mr. POWERS. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Do I understand after the trial you were removed to Adema? That is out about 100 miles; is it not?

Mr. POWERS. I would say about 100 or 150 miles.

Senator JACKSON. East of Moscow?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Did they attempt, while you were there, to indoctrinate you at all into communism?

Mr. POWERS. No.

Senator JACKSON. Did they attempt to indoctrinate you into the Soviet system?

Mr. POWERS. No.

There were no lectures, no political sessions that I had to attend, but the only news source I had was communistic. There was a loudspeaker in the cell that was tuned to one of the Moscow radio stations.

I didn't understand very much of what went on, on this. But there was no direct attempt for someone to come in and talk to me about any of this.

Senator JACKSON. Did they indicate that you might be let out earlier than your sentence provided for?

Mr. POWERS. No.

Sometime—I think right after the trial—someone mentioned that there might be such things as exchanges, and I said, "Is that right?"

And he said, "Yes, but we don't have any Soviet spies in the United States."

But that is the only indication I had.

Senator JACKSON. When did you first get an idea that they had changed their mind about that?

Mr. POWERS. The first I knew about it was about 7:30 at night on the 7th of February.

Senator JACKSON. This year?

Mr. POWERS. This year, yes.

I didn't know what was going on, but I knew that something was going on. Some men came in with an interpreter and asked me if I would like to accompany them to Moscow tomorrow, and added, "Without any guards," so I immediately assumed something was going on. I didn't know what.

We got to Moscow, spent the night there, and they told me that night that we would go to Berlin the next morning. I still didn't know what was happening.

Senator JACKSON. At least you were moving west, though?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, and I was very glad to take this trip. Actually, they never did tell me that Colonel Abel was involved in this.

I am sure they knew that I would find out the minute I stepped across the line, but, up until that time, it was just the goodness of their hearts and not anything else.

Senator JACKSON. Just a voluntary act on their part?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. They did not indicate that anyone else was being exchanged?

Mr. POWERS. No.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by saying that I associate myself with the remarks previously made here. I think it is quite clear from what we have heard this morning and now that Mr. Powers has lived up to his contract.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Beall.

Senator BEALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I do want to associate myself with you and the balance of the committee in commending Mr. Powers for the very intelligent way he has handled himself.

I was at the hearings this morning, and I am convinced that he has been very frank with us and I congratulate him.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Goldwater.

Senator GOLDWATER. I have no questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Powers, you might give us a brief résumé of your trial now. Senator Jackson has already covered the exchange, but you might give us a brief résumé of the trial.

Mr. POWERS. I don't remember the exact date that they told me when the trial would take place, but when they did tell me I was very curious to know why the first day of the trial fell on my birthday, and I asked them about this. They said that it was just a coincidence. Somewhere around the 1st of August, I met the Soviet-appointed defense counsel for the first time. I had three or four sessions with him, not very long ones.

He made a lot of suggestions of things I should do. Actually it didn't seem that he did too much work or didn't seem to be extremely interested in the case, or this was my impression.

I guess most everyone here knows about the trial.

I think that has been fairly highly publicized. It was a very tense time for me.

The only good part about the whole thing was the last day, when I was allowed to see my relatives for the first time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you feel that you were treated harshly by the Russians, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. No, I was treated much better than I expected to be treated.

Chairman RUSSELL. How about the sentence that was imposed on you at the conclusion, after you pled guilty?

Mr. POWERS. I expected much worse.

Chairman RUSSELL. You expected a more severe sentence than you received?

Mr. POWERS. Up until the time of the prosecutor's speech where he only asked for 15 years, I expected death, but after he had asked for that I thought it would be 15 years or just a little under, maybe 12 to 15 years.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe they don't have a jury in Russia.

Mr. POWERS. No. It was three judges and that is it.

Chairman RUSSELL. They have three judges who sat on the case?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did your lawyer make any argument to the judges?

Mr. POWERS. I don't think he argued with anyone. He asked a few questions, but I brought up family background.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did the prosecutor make any argument to the judges?

Mr. POWERS. It seemed to be that his case was against the United States and not against me. That is the impression I got there. He had a long speech at the end, but I don't recall what all he said.

Chairman RUSSELL. He denounced the imperialists and things of that kind more than he did you?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were rather fortunate in being put in the place of an unwitting pawn of these imperialists rather than being responsible for all of it yourself?

Mr. POWERS. Well, that might have helped; I don't know.

Chairman RUSSELL. After your conviction, was there any difference in the treatment that you received prior to your trial?

Mr. POWERS. Not until I changed prisons, and then the food was worse. The bed was much better, though.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was in Moscow?

Mr. POWERS. In Moscow this bed wasn't fit to sleep on. It was iron straps welded together with a very thin mattress on it, and it was almost impossible to sleep on it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope I never visit Russia under the circumstances you did, Mr. Powers. At the time I was there I found Moscow to be exactly different. I got a good bed and very poor food, and out in the country the bed was terrible but the food was edible, so my experience was exactly the reverse of yours. I don't think I would try to visit your way, though.

Any further questions by any member of the committee?

If not, I will ask all the policemen to please see that Mr. Powers and his CIA escort are able to get out before the rush.

Will all of you please keep your seats.

(Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(The following is an unclassified summary of the results of the interrogation by the Central Intelligence Agency of Francis Gary Powers since his release by the Soviet Union.)

STATEMENT CONCERNING FRANCIS GARY POWERS

Since his return from imprisonment by Soviet Russia, Francis Gary Powers has undergone a most intensive debriefing by CIA and other intelligence specialists, aeronautical technicians, and other experts concerned with various aspects of his mission and subsequent capture by the Soviets. This was followed by a complete review by a board of inquiry presided over by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to determine if Powers complied with the terms of his employment and his obligations as an American. The board has submitted its report to the Director of Central Intelligence.

Certain basic points should be kept in mind in connection with this case. The pilots involved in the U-2 program were selected on the basis of aviation proficiency, physical stamina, emotional stability, and, of course, personal security. They were not selected or trained as espionage agents, and the whole nature of the mission was far removed from the traditional espionage scene. Their job was to fly the plane, and it was so demanding an assignment that on completion of a mission physical fatigue was a hazard on landing.

The pilots' contracts provided that they perform such services as might be required and follow such instructions and briefings in connection therewith as were given to them by their superiors. The guidance was as follows:

"(a) If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors.

"(b) At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.

"(c) Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission."

They were instructed, therefore, to be cooperative with their captors within limitations, to use their own judgment of what they should attempt to withhold, and not to subject themselves to strenuous hostile interrogation. It has been established that Mr. Powers had been briefed in accordance with this policy and so understood his guidance. In regard to the poison needle which was prominently mentioned at the trial in Moscow, it should be emphasized that this was intended for use primarily if the pilot were subjected to torture or other circumstances which in his discretion warranted the taking of his own life. There were no instructions that he should commit suicide and no expectation that he would do so except in those situations just described, and I emphasize that even taking the needle with him in the plane was not mandatory; it was his option.

Mr. Powers' performance on prior missions has been reviewed, and it is clear that he was one of the outstanding pilots in the whole U-2 program. He was proficient both as a flyer and as a navigator and showed himself calm in emergency situations. His security background has been exhaustively reviewed, and any circumstances which might conceivably have led to pressure from or defection to

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the Russians have also been exhaustively reviewed, and no evidence has been found to support any theory that failure of his flight might be laid to Soviet espionage activities. The same is true of the possibilities of sabotage.

Accordingly, Mr. Powers was assigned to the mission that eventually occurred on May 1, 1960, and accepted the assignment willingly. It was a particularly grueling assignment across the heart of Soviet Russia and ending on the northwest coast of Norway. It was necessary to maintain extreme altitude at heights at which no other plane but the U-2 had steadily flown. So far as can be ascertained Mr. Powers followed the scheduled flight plan, making a prescribed turn to the northwest when nearing the city of Sverdlovsk where he was directly on course. According to his statement, he had settled on his new course and had Sverdlovsk in sight, perhaps 20 or 30 miles away, when he felt and heard something he describes as a push or feeling of acceleration on the plane accompanied by a dull noise unlike the sharp sound of a high explosive. This caused him to look up from his instruments, and he saw surrounding him, or perhaps reflected in his canopy, he is not sure, an orange or reddish glare which seemed to persist. He felt this phenomenon to be external to the plane but says he cannot be sure. For a moment the plane continued to fly normally, then it dipped to the right but he found he was able to control this dip and level the plane with his normal controls. Shortly thereafter, however, the plane began to nose forward, and Mr. Powers states that as he drew back on the stick he felt no control as if the control lines had been severed. The plane nosed sharply over and went into violent maneuver, at which point he believes the wings came off. The hull of the plane then turned completely over and he found himself in an inverted spin with the nose high revolving around the center of the fuselage so that all he could see through the canopy looking ahead was the sky revolving around the nose of the plane. This motion exerted g. forces on him which threw him forward and up in the cockpit. At this point he states he could have reached the destruct switches which would have set off an explosive charge in the bottom of the plane. However, he realized that this charge would go off in 70 seconds and he did not yet know if he could leave the plane. He stated that he tried to draw himself back into the seat to see if he could activate the ejection mechanism, but the g. forces prevented him from recovering his position. Being forward and out of the seat, even if he could have used the ejection mechanism, which was below and behind him, it would have seriously injured him if activated. He recalled that it was possible to open the canopy manually, and shortly thereafter he was able to do so and the canopy disappeared. His last recollection of the altimeter was that he was at about 34,000 feet and descending rapidly. To see if he could get out of the cockpit, he released his seat belt and was immediately thrown forward out over the cowling of the cockpit to a position where he was held only by his oxygen tube. He tried to pull himself back in the cockpit to the destruct switches which take four separate manipulations to set and found himself unable to do so because of the g. forces, the inflation of his pressure suit, and the fogging up of his face mask which totally obscured his view. By pushing he tore loose the oxygen tube and fell free, whereupon his parachute opened almost immediately, indicating that he was probably at 15,000 feet or below at this time since the automatic mechanism was set for this height. In connection with Powers' efforts to operate the destruct switches, it should be noted that the basic weight limitations kept the explosive charge to 2½ pounds and the purpose of the destruct mechanism was to render inoperable the precision camera and other equipment, not to destroy them and the film. After he landed he was taken by commercial plane to Moscow the same day.

In the processing into the prison he was given a hypodermic injection which may well have been a general immunization, and there is no evidence of the use of truth serums or other drugs. From then until the time of the trial, about 100 days, he was kept in solitary confinement and subjected to constant interrogation, sometimes as long as 10 or 12 hours a day, but on the average considerably less than this. He had no access to anyone but his Russian guards and interrogators despite repeated requests for contact with the U.S. Embassy or his family and friends. He states that the interrogation was not intense in the sense of physical violence or severe hostile methods, and that in some respects he was able to resist answering specific questions. As an example, his interrogators were interested in the names of people participating in the project, and he states that he tried to, anticipate what names would become known and gave those, such as the names of his commanding officer and certain other personnel at his home base in Adana, Turkey, who would probably be known in any case to the Russians. However, they asked him for names of other pilots and he states that he refused to give these on the grounds that they were his friends and comrades and if he gave their names they would lose their jobs and, therefore, he could not do so. He states

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DDS&T Historical Paper

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(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
Chapters XV and XVI

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

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Date prepared : 1 April 1969

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: Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER XV. DETACHMENT C

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

Detachment C - Officer Cadre

First Tour:

Col. Stanley W. Beerli, Commanding Officer, July 1956-October 1957
 [redacted] Acting Executive Officer, March-June 1957
 [redacted] Executive Officer, November 1957-November 1959
 Lt. Col. Carl F. Funk, Director of Materiel and Deputy Commander
 Operations Staff:
 Lt. Col. Robert T. Larkin
 Maj. Raymond N. Sterling
 Maj. Richard D. Christensen
 Maj. William L. Dotson
 Maj. Leonard Crose
 Maj. John T. Clancy
 Capt. Joseph L. Giraud, Jr.
 Capt. Marion G. Vohland
 Capt. Hal H. Dunning
 Capt. Alva N. Hicks, Jr.
 Capt. Russell E. Johnson
 Maj. James T. Deuel, Medical Officer
 [redacted] Administrative Officer
 Finance Officer
 Senior Security Officer

Second Tour:

Col. Marion C. Mixson, Commanding Officer, November 1957-July 1960
 [redacted] Executive Officer, December 1959-July 1960
 Operations Staff:
 Lt. Col. Raymond Burroughs
 Maj. Chester Bohart
 Maj. Thomas Pagano
 Maj. John T. Clancy
 Capt. Alva N. Hicks, Jr.
 Capt. Hal H. Dunning
 Capt. John Yates
 Capt. Roger Tremblay
 [redacted] Finance Officer
 Senior Security Officer
 Senior Communications Officer

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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Detachment C - Contract Pilots

First Tour:

Barry H. Baker
James A. Barnes
Thomas L. Crull
Robert J. Ericson

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under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

Arthur W. Gorman (Released due to [redacted]
during training period, 13 December 1956)

Russell W. Kemp, Jr. [redacted]
returned to the Air Force)

Albert J. Rand
Walter L. Rudd
John C. Shinn
Frank L. Strickland [redacted]

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

Second Tour:

Thomas C. Birkhead (Transferred from Detachment B)
Thomas L. Crull
Buster E. Edens (Transferred from Detachment B)
Edwin K. Jones (Transferred from Detachment B)
William H. McMurray (Transferred from Detachment B)
Walter L. Rudd
Sammy V. C. Snider (Transferred from Detachment B)

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CHAPTER XV. DETACHMENT C

Activation and Training

When the third field detachment, Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (III), was organized, the urgency attendant on the deployment of the first two units had abated somewhat due to the political stand-down of missions against the primary target subsequent to July 1956. The Commanding Officer of WRSP(III), Col. Stanley W. Beerli, was assigned to Project Headquarters early in July 1956 for a period of indoctrination and coordination with Headquarters Staff on the selection of his personnel. He also had the experience of monitoring the combat readiness tests of Detachment B at the end of July.

The first group of three contract pilots (along with one replacement for Detachment B) reported to Watertown for training on 4 August 1956 and the second group of four on 20 August. On 30 August a training accident occurred. The pilot was not seriously injured and while the aircraft was reparable, the number of aircraft available for training and testing was decreased. The very next day, 31 August, the Detachment B replacement pilot, Frank Grace, was killed in a night training accident, and another aircraft demolished.

It was decided to continue the training of the seven available pilots through operational readiness tests, borrowing the first USAF U-2's

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off the line, and to train and test the final group of four pilots separately. At that time it was still anticipated that Detachment C would deploy early in November 1956. The successful USCM of the first seven pilots was held 24-26 October 1956. Camera reliability was poor during the test and Col. Beerli requested a continuing test program during which his pilots could increase proficiency while running tests to improve camera reliability. Meanwhile the deployment date had slipped from November to about 15 January 1957 due to USAF turn-down on the use of Yokota. The Detachment's most pressing problem then was to maintain its franchise for living and working space at Watertown in the face of the encroaching SAC follow-on group, while higher headquarters in Washington battled for base rights in Japan.

Base Selection

The first efforts toward obtaining an operating base for Detachment C in the Far East were made in May 1956 when Col. Gibbs instructed Lt. Col. William Wilson to visit the Pentagon for the purpose of getting a list of available bases suitable for U-2 operations, and learning of any projected overflight programs by Far East Air Force (FEAF) which might work against simultaneous operations from those bases.

Air Officer, Col. C. D. Wright, on 15 June, was briefed on

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AQUATONE while on a visit to Headquarters and was instructed to seek the support of Gen. Laurence Kuter, Commanding General FEAF, and his Director of Operations, Gen. Hunter Harris, in obtaining an operating base, preferably in Japan, with first choice Yokota.

On 20 June 1956 Project Headquarters learned that a SAC team was visiting FEAF to request the use of Yokota for BLACK KNIGHT (an over-flight program using a converted RB-57 capable of 61,000 to 64,000 feet maximum altitude and 3,200 nautical miles range). A Project Headquarters team left for the Far East on 25 July to inspect available bases. The result was to narrow the choice to three, with Yokota still number one in all respects, including the cost to ready facilities in the minimum of time.

At a briefing on 13 August 1956, Admiral Radford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed opposition to the U-2 project's use of Yokota due to political ramifications and lack of security. He suggested Shemya (Northern Honshu) or a base in Korea. Col. Gibbs gave him the project staff's reasons for desiring Yokota in preference to any other available bases, but nothing came of this meeting in the way of support for obtaining the desired base rights. In September 1956 a BLACK KNIGHT detachment was deployed to Yokota.

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Squeeze Between SAC's U-2 and BLACK KNIGHT Programs

The SAC U-2 follow-on group (FOG) was pressing hard to move its training group to Watertown, where the Air Force had agreed, in the interest of protecting the security of AQUATONE, to hold their training program. Col. William Proctor, Commanding Officer of the SAC group, was authorized to move 21 FOG personnel to the base during September 1956 to prepare for the reception of SAC's U-2 aircraft and the training of his pilots. As the month progressed, more and more SAC personnel were flying in and out of Watertown Strip, some without prior Headquarters approval, and it became obvious that if Detachment C were delayed in deploying, SAC would have to delay phasing in its U-2 group to the training site.

The effort to keep the project going as a jointly sponsored and jointly supported endeavor ran into heavy weather during the fall and early winter with AQUATONE's U-2 aircraft being withheld from overflights while SAC was pushing its own bid for overflights with the RB-57D. Mr. Bissell was placed in the anomalous position of doing battle with the very Air Force Generals whose support was most needed by the project, while at the same time having as his own immediate superior an Air Force General.

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A meeting was scheduled for the first week of October 1956 between CIA and General Twining and Admiral Radford at which it was hoped to reach agreed recommendations for a joint presentation to the President on future project operations. Prior to the meeting, Mr. Bissell addressed the following memorandum to General Cabell, Acting Director in the absence of Mr. Dulles who was on a world tour of Agency installations:

"The following is my intellectual Last Will and Testament prior to our meeting with Radford and Twining. I am afraid my views differ at certain points from yours and I hope that you will excuse their rather blunt statements herewith:

"1. I profoundly hope it can be agreed that guidance will be sought tomorrow not only on access to the main target area but on overflights of China and the Satellites and on the chances for access to the main target next spring, so that we may chart our course intelligently.

"2. In the same vein, I hope guidance will be sought with respect not only to our activity but to those of the Air Force as well. If the Air Force is cleared to operate over second priority areas, I would hope that the same clearance would extend to us, whether you eventually decide to use it or not. In particular, I would urge that you use your influence as far as you feel able at this preparatory meeting to elicit an objective recommendation with respect to the Far East. This will not be easy because General Everest can be depended upon to oppose our entry into that theater while simultaneously supporting operations there by SAC with a lesser capability. More important considerations aside, I question whether anyone can maintain the morale of our people and their sense of urgency if it becomes known that politics of this sort enforce idleness upon us while others with less effective equipment are free to operate. I confess my own disillusionment would in this event be complete.

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"3. The crucial question is whether the joint recommendation to the President should be in favor of or opposed to operations (logically with the best available equipment) against second priority target areas during the next six months, assuming access to the top priority target area is denied. On this you know my opinion. I believe we should ask the political authorities (a) whether there is really a good chance of operations against the primary target next spring, and (b) whether a Chinese or Satellite protest in the meanwhile would gravely prejudice this chance. If the answers to both questions are affirmative, clearly we should stand down as should the Air Force. Unless both answers are affirmative I would at least try for permission to get some return on our investment. As things stand at this moment I would be willing to bet somewhere between two and three to one that what is denied to us today will still be denied to us in the spring. Under these circumstances, the result of keeping the car in the garage until better times will merely insure that it becomes obsolete before it is ever used at all." 1/

None of the hoped-for answers and decisions as spelled out by Mr. Bissell were obtained and the meeting with the President was delayed for another month. Meanwhile, Mr. Dulles while on his tour met with Generals Lemnitzer and Kuter in Japan and discussed location of Detachment C with them. Their concern was not with potential over-crowding of Yokota, but with the security implications and possibility of Japanese political reaction. However there was not an actual turn-down on the part of the theater commanders. Therefore a negotiating team was sent to Japan to get a definite agreement from that end. Col. Geary, Lt. Col. Quinette, and Messrs. Cunningham,

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1/ TS-158576, 2 October 1956. Memorandum to Gen. Cabell from Mr. Bissell.

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made up the survey team which departed for the Far East on 29 October. The result of their briefings was agreement by Generals Kuter and Lemnitzer for use of Yokota if facilities could be arranged, and Gen. Kuter agreed to send a message to Headquarters, USAF, to that effect, which he did on 8 November 1956.

As soon as it was ascertained that the "no theater objection" message had reached the Chief of Staff, Mr. Bissell drafted a letter for the DCI's signature to General Twining outlining the operational, logistic, timing, and political considerations involved in deployment of Detachment C to a Far East base, concluding that the unit should be stationed at Yokota and should be deployed about 15 January 1957, subject to readiness of facilities. He requested Air Force support in the furnishing of facilities and in effectuating the deployment, with costs incurred in readying facilities to be discussed between the Air Force and CIA. In a covering letter transmitting the request he added:

"...if you believe it would be wise, we can seek more specific guidance on this from higher authority." 1/

Two weeks later on 28 November, General Twining replied as follows:

1/ ~~TS-158608~~, 14 November 1956. Memorandum from DCI to Chief of Staff, USAF.

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"...I would like to assure you of our continuing interest and support of Project OILSTONE. I believe past Air Force actions attest to this. Further, I agree that the Air Force's BLACK KNIGHT program and the AQUATONE project are complementary on a worldwide basis and should not be treated as competitive activities.

"Before we give consideration to seeking more specific guidance from higher authority, I should like to point out certain elements of the overall situation which I feel should be more carefully evaluated in order that we may realize the maximum potential of all available capabilities.

"a. As you recall, detachments of the Air Force's BLACK KNIGHT program and the AQUATONE/OILSTONE program became operational about the same time. Therefore, it was obvious that some correlation and integration should be effected between the two programs so as to exploit the maximum capability of each. Accordingly, the Air Force re-arranged its initial BLACK KNIGHT deployment plans from Europe to the Far East simply because the OILSTONE/AQUATONE detachments were going to the European area. Therefore, a BLACK KNIGHT detachment was deployed to Yokota AFB during September 1956. This was logical since it would give a world-wide capability at the earliest possible date and would tend to eliminate the highly undesirable morale and other problems created by the mixing of the military and CIA efforts.

"b. As a consequence of this action, BLACK KNIGHT is in position and ready to operate immediately if given a release. As you know, facilities in the Far East are limited. To deploy the U-2 detachment would require additional expenditures and facilities which the Air Force is unable to provide. While I recognize the superior altitude capability of the U-2, I do not believe this is an over-riding factor in the Far East and feel the BLACK KNIGHT capability is adequate to do any job which might be authorized in that area. Further, for operations against China, BLACK KNIGHT has certain advantages over the U-2, specifically

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a refueling capability and the better reliability afforded by a twin engine aircraft.

"In view of the above, it appears unnecessary to use the OILSTONE capability in the Far East. This is particularly true since there are a relatively small percentage of vital targets in this area and our past experience gives every indication that BLACK KNIGHT can effectively do the job. Assuming we are given an early release to resume activity, BLACK KNIGHT could cover practically all targets within a few months.

"Accordingly, I suggest that:

"a. You reconsider your decision to deploy the third AQUATONE/OILSTONE detachment to the Far East.

"b. You hold this detachment in reserve and plan to use it as an augmenting force wherever and whenever the world situation dictates. To accomplish such a plan, I realize another base will be required for this unit since access to Water-town is limited.

"Should you desire to further discuss the matter, I shall be glad to meet with you at your convenience." 1/

The Twining letter reached Mr. Bissell's attention in the first instance, and he sent it forward to the Director with the following forcefully worded memorandum:

"On 14 November you sent a memorandum and covering note to General Twining requesting Air Force support in the provision of facilities for AQUATONE Detachment C in Japan. We have now received (28 November) General Twining's reply

1/ TS-158612 (AFOIN WH 1340-6), 28 November 1956. Memorandum for Mr. Allen Dulles from Chief of Staff, USAF.

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to your letter. In effect it states that the Air Force is unable to support both AQUATONE and BLACK KNIGHT in the Far East and recommends that we hold Detachment C in reserve to use as an augmenting force whenever and wherever the world situation dictates.

"On 15 November we had our meeting with the President in the course of which you explained our intention of deploying a Detachment to Japan. The President after some discussion agreed that this unit should be based in Japan unless on further consideration the State Department expressed objection to such a location. He made clear by at least two remarks that he was aware that our aircraft possessed a greater capability than the B-57D's available to BLACK KNIGHT and that if any choice had to be made AQUATONE should receive priority. I would interpret this conversation not as a firm order to us to deploy to the Far East but as a permission to do so and I am sure the President was left with the impression that the deployment would be carried out.

"The more important facts that seem to me to have a decisive bearing on this issue are the following:

"a. The AQUATONE aircraft and associated equipment is superior to that in the hands of BLACK KNIGHT in range, altitude, quality of photography, quantity of photography per mission, and availability of Elint and Comint receivers and recorders (which the BLACK KNIGHT does not produce at all). In addition the AQUATONE detachment as soon as operational can begin

for which no other equipment is available at this time.

"b. It will require at least two months to prepare facilities for AQUATONE from the date a firm favorable decision is made. By our enforced indecision earlier in the autumn and by Air Force opposition for the last six weeks, we have already postponed the earliest possible operational date to mid-February. Every day's further delay postpones our operational date correspondingly.

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"c. The AQUATONE C Detachment's staffing and training are complete and its equipment will be complete long before it will be ready for deployment. In other words, it is all bought and paid for. Neither this unit nor its aircraft are required in the European Theater. These resources could not be efficiently utilized there even if we were permitted to operate virtually without restriction. While awaiting deployment the Detachment is helping with further development work at Watertown but essentially this valuable and costly asset is unemployed and will remain so unless and until it moves to the Far East.

"Although there are persuasive arguments both for and against the actual initiation of overflights of Communist China during the winter, I hardly need point out that there are overwhelming reasons for deploying the Detachment just as soon as possible so as to have this Government's best capability in place in the Far East in case it is needed. We are in the midst of two major political crises which have given rise to a sharp renewal of tension between East and West. Any situation in Europe or the Middle East that comes close to boiling over carries at least a threat in the Far East. And there is always the possibility of a new crisis arising in that area. Under the circumstances, it would be criminal to keep our reconnaissance capability, developed with such urgency and effort, waiting idle in the U.S. whence it could not be moved without two months' notice, merely because the Air Force desires to protect its BLACK KNIGHT project from competition.

"I believe we have fooled around with this problem long enough and I recommend just as strongly as I can:

"a. That a meeting be arranged promptly with General Twining, after careful consideration by you and General Cabell of its composition which should be designed to maximize the chance of frank discussion leading to a favorable outcome.

"b. That your position with them be substantially as set forth above, with the one additional element that CIA should offer to finance (in the amount of approximately \$350,000) the cost of preparing facilities for AQUATONE at Yokota (or any other suitable base in Japan).

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"c. That if the Air Force will not agree to support AQUATONE in Japan, you invite Secretary Quarles and General Twining to join with you and General Cabell in setting the essential facts before the President and ascertaining his desires.

"I would like especially to urge upon you that, before such a meeting, you and General Cabell determine exactly what arguments you will use and whether you are prepared, as here recommended, to take this issue to the top if necessary." 1/

The meeting recommended by Mr. Bissell took place on 5 December with the DCI, DDCI and Generals Twining and Everest present. The Air Force side was persuaded to allow Detachment C to deploy to the Far East, but not to Yokota (presumably at General LeMay's insistence). Atsugi Naval Air Station was then given consideration and [redacted] who was in Japan awaiting instructions, was directed to call on Admiral Fitzhugh Lee at Atsugi and brief him generally on the project, making a request for the use of one hangar. [redacted]

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A meeting

was also arranged with Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, on 6 December, at which time Admiral Burke gave his blessing to the stationing of Detachment C at Atsugi, but said he would not wish to proceed against USAF opposition, so would speak to General Twining.

1/ ~~TS~~-158611, 28 November 1956. Memorandum for DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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Nothing further was heard from either Admiral Burke or General Twining for a week, and on 12 December the DCI sent a memorandum to the General inquiring as to the results of his discussion with Admiral Burke. No answer was received to this inquiry for the next week and on 18 December the BLACK KNIGHT detachment at Yokota conducted its first (and last) three-aircraft mission over the USSR, provoking an official protest by the Russians. As a result, it was learned by Mr. Bissell that the whole question of deployment of Detachment C to Japan was going to be referred by General Twining to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for full discussion. As of 24 January this had not been done.

Meanwhile the SAC U-2 group were insisting on more billets at Watertown and were told that 45 was their limit until Detachment C was allowed to deploy. Mr. Bissell reaffirmed this on 24 January to Maj. Gen. Maurice Preston who had been put in charge of the Air Force U-2 program.

On 24 January Mr. Bissell also set forth in a memorandum to the DCI the status of AQUATONE with a resumé of his unsuccessful efforts to get a decision on a Far East base for the Project, which he described as one of the worst cases of bureaucratic foot-dragging and executive

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indecision he had witnessed in some 13 years of Government service.

He noted further:

"While this long drawn out interchange has been going forward on what should be the relatively minor and easy issue of deployment, the prospects for a favorable decision on the major issue of authority to perform overflights seem to have deteriorated. You report that the attitude toward overflights both in the White House and the State Department is very different from what it was a year or even six months ago. The President's inaugural address reaffirms a policy of peace at almost any price and those in authority seem to regard an overflight as a dangerously provocative act, a distinctly more alarmist view than that expressed in the special National Estimate on the probable Soviet reaction to overflights. At a minimum it must now be anticipated that any detected overflight will provoke a diplomatic protest, partly as a consequence of decisions on our part that have rendered preceding Soviet protests highly effective as a means of halting this activity.

"Along with the discouraging developments reviewed above, you should be aware that the attitude of the Air Force toward this Project has undergone a marked change since mid-autumn from one of full and open support and partnership toward one of increasing jurisdictional jealousy. The most important manifestation of the change has been the long continued effort to prevent AQUATONE from 'competing' with BLACK KNIGHT in the Far East.

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responsibility which should not be assumed by AQUATONE. Still another was the time-consuming and counterproductive insistence that any processing of AQUATONE film in the field should be done by units under Air Force command rather than by personnel attached to the AQUATONE field detachments. Finally, I am convinced that much of the pressure behind the SAC follow-on program involving the U-2 aircraft has as its purpose not the creation of a much needed hot war reconnaissance capability but the readying of Air Force units

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having the same capability as AQUATONE so as to undermine any argument for the retention of this capability by the CIA. This whole attitude of increasing competitiveness, suspicion and unconcealed eagerness (in some quarters) to have AQUATONE terminated is not only unpleasant in itself but is beginning to interfere with our activities and with necessary security arrangements..." 1/

Mr. Bissell finished by urging the Director to give high priority to settling the question of deployment to the Far East, if necessary by laying the whole matter before the President.

Five days later, no action having been taken, Mr. Bissell on 29 January fired off another memorandum to the Director saying that half a million dollars a month were being spent, quite a lot of scarce and valuable personnel was being tied up and the morale of the organization was going to pieces as a result of uncertainties. He suggested that if the Director couldn't force a decision, he had an obligation to so advise the President. 2/ As it turned out, this last memorandum was not needed since the Air Force had relented. On 30 January Gen. Cabell while attending an Air Force meeting at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, called Headquarters to say that he had persuaded Gen. Twining to withdraw his objection to deployment of Detachment C to Japan. On

1/ PS-158780, 24 January 1957. (Full text at Annex 102).

2/ SAPC-12315, 29 January 1957. Memorandum for the DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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2 February 1957 this agreement was put in writing to the DCI, with the explanation that the decision had been dictated by the vital necessity for SAC to get on with developing its own U-2 reconnaissance capability, which could not be accomplished until Detachment C moved out of Watertown so that the SAC group could move in.

Deployment and Shake-down

The Project Engineer, [] had received a low bid of \$88,400 to renovate a hangar, work space, offices and quarters at Atsugi and the contract, which had been held in abeyance awaiting Gen. Twining's concurrence, was then signed and the Japanese contractor went ahead full speed with the work. Communications were established between Project Headquarters and the [] facility on the [] circuit on 13 February and the communications facility at the Detachment operating area [] was activated on 19 February 1957.

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The advance echelon of security and communications personnel departed Watertown on 20 February, the second echelon of administrative personnel on 4 March, and the main body of the detachment with two U-2 aircraft and equipment was airlifted from Travis Air Force Base, California, beginning on 15 March. The Detachment Commander cabled Headquarters on 29 March that all personnel and equipment were in place

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and all were pleased and grateful for the excellent billets, messing and working facilities provided. Operational readiness was forecast for the week of 8 April and theater operating procedures had been worked out satisfactorily by establishing liaison between the Detachment and the following local U.S. components:

FEOF Headquarters, which had been requested by Headquarters, USAF, to give non-reimbursable support to WRSP(III).

FECOM (General Lyman Lemnitzer), who as theater commander was to have authority to postpone or cancel missions in the national interest, from the theater command viewpoint. The procedure would be for him to send such a cancellation message through Air Force channels to USAF Headquarters, to be transmitted to Project Headquarters.

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The Agency's [redacted] which was to maintain continuous covert liaison with the Detachment and be responsible for dealings on behalf of the Detachment with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.

[redacted] a part of whose facilities at Atsugi were given over to WRSP(III), which was to continue to give assistance as required.

54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, which was to give local weather forecast assistance, and coordinate the typhoon hunting activities of Detachment C.

Atsugi Naval Air Station, whose Commanding Officer and Public Relations Officer were fully briefed on the Detachment's mission, who were to assist in preserving the security and cover of the unit, especially in the public relations field.

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At the time of deployment of Detachment C, the position of Executive Officer had not been filled. All suitable candidates interviewed had been unwilling to take an overseas assignment without family, and a single man with appropriate experience and stature had not been found. The Assistant Chief of Project Personnel, [redacted] agreed to fill in during the deployment and shake-down period. At the end of the Detachment's first month in the field Col. Beerli agreed that the need existed for a permanent Executive Officer, who should be recruited in time to relieve [redacted] at the end of May 1957. However, [redacted] departed at the end of his temporary duty with a permanent Executive still unavailable. Col. Beerli at that time advised Headquarters that there was no need for haste in filling the slot and until a well qualified, single individual was available, he could continue to operate without an Executive.

In April 1957, when the Detachment had settled in, Dr. Richard Rhode, Chief Scientist, and Mr. Walter Bonney, Public Relations Officer, of NACA, visited the Detachment to give support to the cover story. A release to the press announcing WRSP(III)'s arrival and proposed program of weather and upper air flights was planned, but this was vetoed by General Lemnitzer. A U-2 accident resulting in the death of Lockheed test pilot, Robert Sieker, had just occurred in Nevada and the sensational

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treatment given this occurrence by some American newsmen was echoed in the Japanese press. It was agreed that in case of inquiries from local news media, the answer would be that certain features of the U-2 were still secrets of the manufacturer and the aircraft therefore could not be viewed by unauthorized persons.

Between the 13th and 20th of May 1957 the Project Director made an inspection visit to Atsugi and was favorably impressed with the state of readiness and the high morale of the group. Thirty sorties had been flown by mid-May: 14 photographic, 50X1, E.O.13526, 4 weather, and 6 transition flights. All were planned, briefed and flown as dress rehearsals for the primary missions for which approval was awaited. During his visit to Japan, Mr. Bissell met with Generals Kuter and Harris at FEAF Headquarters and confirmed agreement to give them 24 hours' notice prior to overflights by the Detachment. Arrangements were also reviewed with Gen. Lemnitzer who agreed that no control should be exercised by FECOM or FEAF except negative control; i. e., to postpone or cancel a mission for an overriding reason. The Detachment would notify FEAF of the timing and area of expected missions and FEAF would inform FECOM. Understanding was reached that no landings would be made at Korean bases other than in extreme emergencies.

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Operational Period: Staging from Alaska

In May 1957, following high level approval, preparations were made to stage a primary mission from Alaska to collect photographic intelligence over the Kamchatka Peninsula of the USSR. Use of Eielson Air Force Base was coordinated through SAC Headquarters and a task force was airlifted to Alaska on 6 June 1967. The first mission on 8 June was aborted due to weather which remained unfavorable until 20 June when a successful mission was flown. A White House briefing on the results of this mission was given to Gen. Goodpaster on 23 July. A second staging from Eielson was later approved and a task force to support the mission departed Atsugi on 12 September 1957, launched one excellent photographic mission over Klyuchi on 16 September, and returned to Atsugi on 26 September.

Theater and Detachment Command Changes: 1957

In June 1957 during a visit by Japanese Premier Kishi to Washington, President Eisenhower pledged that the U.S. would withdraw ground combat troops from Japan as early as feasible, and as one result the FECOM Headquarters in Tokyo was pulled back in August 1957 to Honolulu and became Pacific Command (PACOM) under the jurisdiction of Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC). 50X1, E.O.13526

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[redacted] whose principal function was liaison with CINCPAC, had been project-briefed, and [redacted] was added to the HBJAYWALK communications channel to receive information on project activities in the Pacific Theater. Authority to cancel Detachment C missions for reasons of national interest did not, however revert to CINCPAC. Only the Commanding General FEAF (then Lt. Gen. Fred H. Smith) or his deputy had this authority. This policy was understood and agreed to by CINCPAC.

After the second Eielson staging, Col. Beerli was requested to return to Washington for consultation and during his visit was persuaded to take command of Detachment B, relieving Col. Perry. Col. Mixson agreed to move to Detachment C, with family, when he finished closing out Detachment A at Giebelstadt.

The change-over from TDY to PCS status for overseas Project assignees and the lifting of the ban on dependents meant a heavier burden of work on the support staff, besides the difficult problem of obtaining sufficient satisfactory housing. At the end of September 1957 Cols. Gibbs and Geary and Mr. James Cunningham made an inspection visit to Atsugi and while there made an appeal to the local Air Force and

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Army commands for additional housing. A negative reply was received from both since they were short of housing to fill their own needs.

Mr. Cunningham recommended conversion of one [] BOQ to five two-bedroom and nine one-bedroom apartments and rental of ten houses on the local market. Headquarters approved this plan and set the sum of \$200,000 as a maximum for this construction and rental program:

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[] was delegated authority to contract locally for modifying the BOQ and building four duplex units in the [] compound. [] Project Engineer, was dispatched to Atsugi to oversee the construction work.

Colonel Mixson arrived to take command at the end of October 1957. There were no primary missions flown during the period of change-over and most of the pilots were given the opportunity to take their accumulated leave. The construction, rental and furnishing of the new quarters for families were largely completed by the end of the year and Detachment personnel and their families comfortably settled in, thanks to the efforts of [] who moved into the Executive Officer slot in October. (Photographs of family housing converted or constructed at Atsugi during this period are included, overleaf.)

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Operations: Second Year

The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi by Detachment C in 1958 was also the last. On 1 March the mission (#6011) from Japan over Ukrania, Khabarovsk and Komsomolsk obtained good photographic results, but was tracked by Russian radar (even though the U-2 aircraft had the project-developed anti-radar application). On 5 March 1958, Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov, Russian Ambassador to Washington, delivered a formal protest to the State Department concerning the violation of Soviet borders by "an American military jet aircraft". All U-2 overflights were ordered by highest authority to cease indefinitely. The State Department replied to the protest on 31 March saying that a thorough investigation had been conducted and that no U.S. military aircraft had been in the area in question.

The State Department reply was drafted by Ambassador Foy Kohler and was sent forward for the Secretary's approval through channels with a note which read in part:

"...It is clear from the terms of the Aide Memoire that:

"(1) The Soviets consider that they have convincing proofs of the intrusion charged.

"(2) It was written with a view to possible release and calculated to play on popular fears of the 'accidental' loosing of atomic war...

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"In the circumstances, it seems important that:

"(1) We simply deny the Soviet charges of intrusion, reaffirming our peaceful intentions but avoiding any reference to the Soviet allegations respecting flights of planes armed with thermonuclear bombs; and

"(2) We be prepared to move immediately to discredit any public charges or alleged 'evidence' as figured in the 'germ warfare' campaign." 1/

On 21 April 1958 the Russian Embassy delivered a second note to the State Department which stated that the Soviet Government had at its disposal carefully verified data that "an American military reconnaissance aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type" had appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the border to considerable depth and departed south of the Olga Bay. The inclusion of an entry and exit time in the Soviet note constituted admission that an overflight of four hours and six minutes (by their own calculation) had taken place.

On the same day a Soviet resolution was introduced in the United Nations Security Council to condemn U.S. SAC bomber flights in the direction of the Soviet's Arctic borders; it was withdrawn due to lack of support.

On 5 May the State Department reiterated its statement of 31 March, and on 13 June a further Soviet note was delivered, saying

1/ Unnumbered, Secret memorandum signed by Foy D. Kohler accompanying draft reply to Soviet Aide-Memoire of 5 March 1958.

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that the U.S. Government must bear the consequences of violations of Soviet space by American aircraft--the word "military" was not used in the last note. (See Annex 103 for text of diplomatic exchanges covering this incident.)

On 6 May 1958, Col. Gibbs visited Mr. Gordon Arneson at the State Department to ascertain how the Department stood with regard to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo (Douglas MacArthur II) remaining unwitting of Project CHALICE presence and operations in Japan in light of his awareness of the Soviet protest notes. (Both State and FECOM had opposed briefing the Ambassador when the Detachment arrived in March 1957.) Mr. Arneson after consultation in the Department reported that the recommendation was that the Ambassador not be briefed unless the Soviets created adverse publicity. The Department's feeling was that until the forthcoming Japanese elections of 22 May 1958, the Ambassador had enough worries and should not be burdened further.

Project ROBIN HOOD

On 19 March 1958 Detachment C was alerted to the requirement for photographic coverage of Indonesia. Uprisings had been taking place against the central government on Java and the Communists were

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trying to build up a sphere of influence with military aid to Sukarno. The Chief of Naval Operations agreed to the use of Cubi Point Naval Air Station, the Philippines, as a Detachment staging base, and a task force with equipment and fuel was airlifted there from Atsugi on 24 March 1958. Between 28 March and 11 June 1958, thirty missions were flown over the islands of Indonesia and besides the photographic military intelligence collected, valuable mapping of the area was accomplished. The operation was phased out between 12 and 15 June with one peripheral Elint mission employing System V, and one B-camera photographic mission being accomplished by the U-2's on the return flight to Atsugi.

Typhoon Hunting

In the summer of 1958 Detachment C, in coordination with the Air Weather Service 54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, had an opportunity to enter the field of "typhoon hunting". With the advantage of altitude, the U-2 could fly high above the eye of the typhoon, photographing it from above. Four of the principal typhoons that struck the South Pacific in the 1958 season were tracked and photographed: "Winnie" and "Alice" in July, and "Grace" and "Ida" in September. The photography and readings taken from the U-2's meteorological equipment during these missions were turned over to Air Weather Service in Japan to aid their meteorologists

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in the study of the structure and behavior of typhoons. (See also page 32, Chapter VII, and Annex 62 for cover activities in the weather field.)

Further Operations: 1958

Between June and August 1958, four missions against the China Mainland were accomplished and one of these, staged from Naha, Okinawa, had to make a forced landing at Tao Yuan Air Base on Taiwan, but was recovered without incident other than knowledge of its presence on Taiwan being made a matter of public record. The President was briefed on the results of the China missions on 29 August 1958 and agreed to the continuation of a series of tactical missions over China Mainland. This approval covered one sortie to the North which weather had thus far precluded, and shallow overflights of the Mainland every ten days or so. The Secretary of State agreed to this program at a meeting on 2 September at which General Twining was also present and raised no objections.

An inspection trip was made in August 1958 by Col. William Burke (then Deputy Project Director) who reported that the unit was at its peak capability operationally, discipline, morale and mutual confidence among the Detachment personnel were evident and the families, particularly those living on base, were happy with the support and conveniences being provided by Agency and Navy support facilities. Col. Burke reported to

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that the unit was funded and approved

through December 1959 and that plans were for staging tactical missions from forward bases away from Japan. [redacted] was very relieved to hear this in view of the local political situation. However, other than misgivings over tactical missions being flown from Atsugi, he said no serious problems existed and relationships between the unit and the Agency support group at Atsugi were good.

On 26 September the three U-2's on base were evacuated to Naha in expectation of the arrival of Typhoon "Ida". After photographing the eye of "Ida" from above, the aircraft were returned to base when the danger had passed.

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[redacted] on 21 October the Taiwan Straits and South China were covered, staging from Naha, with poor photographic results due to weather.

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[redacted] The year 1958 thus ended on rather a low level of accomplishment by the Detachment.

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1959 Operations

MILL TOWN

A priority requirement for coverage of Tibet and Southwest China on behalf of the Far East Division's Tibetan project (STBARNUM) was accomplished by Detachment C staging from Cubi Point. Presidential and State approval were obtained on 28 April 1959, and President Ayub of Pakistan and the U.S. Ambassador to Karachi (Langley) were informed of the operation at the request of the State Department. Two missions were flown on 12 and 14 May 1959 with "fair" results.

SOUTH GATE

In July 1959 Detachment C was requested to plan immediately for a "Fast Move" operation for coverage of Tibet and possibly North Vietnam and Laos, operating out of Takhli or Kurmitola in Thailand. Political approval from the Thais was delayed until mid-August and after arrival at Takhli of the launch team, an inspection of the base by non-project-cleared Thai officials necessitated withdrawal of the group to Clark Field. The operation finally began on 29 August and six missions were flown: two successful ones over Tibet, one partially successful one over Northwest China, two successful ones over North Vietnam and Laos, and one aborted over Laos due to weather.

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The weather was poor throughout the operation with several severe thunderstorms being experienced. The radio beacon at Takhli was weak, adding to letdown problems. Relatively speaking, this was a high risk operation for low priority requirements.

Fujisawa Accident and Publicity

On 24 September 1959 a weather mission photographing Typhoon "Vera" crash landed, gear up, near Fujisawa Airport south of Atsugi while making a GCA landing after experiencing a flame-out due to miscalculation of remaining fuel. The airplane plowed through a potato field and damaged a few bicycles, but there were no injuries. The airplane was damaged beyond local repair and had to be airlifted to Burbank. (A replacement was ferried from Edwards on 16 October.)

An Asahi reporter took pictures from a helicopter of the event which received wide public circulation. Also some complaints were later aired at great length in the local press to the effect that during the security party's retrieval of the U-2 pilot and the cordoning off of the wrecked airplane, Americans wearing Hawaiian sports shirts and brandishing pistols, threatened Japanese citizens at the scene. Although it was too late to do any good in this instance, Headquarters was moved to set forth the following rules for the security force's

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behavior on such occasions with regard to the use of firearms:

"In view of critical publicity and pinpoint interest of opposition in Japan, CHALICE security force will not carry weapons outside of unit area except on courier runs to the ZI or staging operation, or in extreme emergency. On these occasions weapons will be carried concealed, or in brief case. To further normalize unit appearance, suggest Air Force fatigue clothing be used in order to make the unit less conspicuous..." 1/

QUICK KICK

A second staging from Takhli in November 1959 was carried out for coverage of Tibet in support of STBARNUM, again using the "Fast Move" concept of operation and utilizing C-130 aircraft. Support at Takhli had considerably improved since the previous visit: the mess was better and the hangar and other facilities were being renovated and repaired. Only one mission was flown during the deployment covering Tibet and West China with fair photographic results.

1960 Operations

In January 1960, a staff study performed by Headquarters Operations Staff evaluated potential alternate bases for Detachment C in the event the Japanese political situation forced the activity out of Japan. Clark Field in the Philippines was selected as the best available alternate for contingency planning. On 14 January 1960 Ambassador MacArthur, while

1/ ADIC-5255, 11 December 1959, to [REDACTED]. [50X1, E.O.13526]

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on consultation in the Department, was briefed on CHALICE by Mr. Bissell. He made no recommendation for withdrawal of the Detachment in the immediate future.

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A third and final staging operation from Takhli in March 1960 to cover Tibet and West China ended in near disaster. The launch team with two U-2's arrived at Takhli on 29 March. Two sorties were flown successfully on 30 March. The third on 5 April 1960 had a successful photographic mission over Western China but crashed in a rice paddy some distance from Takhli on return. With the aid of local villagers and oxcarts, the retrieval team managed nine days later to deliver the aircraft in sections to the base and load it into a C-124 under cover of darkness. 50X1, E.O.13526 spent a very nervous time waiting out the retrieval. Only one Thai language newspaper printed a report of the crash (in Thai) which said that according to a special correspondent, at about 1600 hours on 5 April, a jet plane landed near a swamp behind Wat Wang Wah, Tambon Wangluk, Amphur Samchuk, Suphanburi Province. The plane was reported to have run out of fuel. A farang (white man) pilot, the only one in the plane, was safe. Fortunately this item was not picked up by any news service. As a token

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of appreciation to the villagers of Wat Wang Wah, a sum of money was presented to the headman 50X1, E.O.13526 to help build a new school for the village children.

50X1, E.O.13526

Post May Day Activities in Japan: Withdrawal of Detachment C

As soon as news reports were published in Japan concerning the May Day incident, the Japanese Communists and Socialists began a concerted effort to dig out all information which could be used to instigate anti-U.S. publicity. Socialist Party leaders in the Diet approached the Japan Meteorological Society to inquire what assistance the U-2 group in Japan had provided for its program in Japan. Neither of the two JMS officials with whom liaison had been maintained for cover purposes was available at that moment and the one official who was seen denied any knowledge or relationship with the American weather program.

The Embassy requested that detailed information, including description of typhoon data passed to the JMS, be furnished the Embassy

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within 24 hours; this was an impossible deadline for Headquarters to meet. Due to the failure to provide adequate contingency cover, the necessary material was not available [redacted] in a form useful for propaganda purposes. [redacted]

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On 9 May the State Department informed Ambassador MacArthur that the U.S. was prepared to conclude an agreement with Japan that no intelligence missions would be flown over non-Japanese territory from U.S. facilities in Japan without prior consultation with the Government of Japan, and to give Kishi assurances that the U-2 in Japan was used solely for legitimate scientific purposes, making a public statement to that effect if Kishi so desired. Prime Minister Kishi felt that no formal agreement was necessary, but did desire a public statement. This was given in a Departmental Press Briefing on 10 May 1960 as follows: The United States Government has given the Government of Japan assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions.

On 19 May an orderly demonstration took place at the main gate to the Atsugi Naval Air Station with only about 100 people present due mainly to a heavy rainfall. A petition was presented to the Provost

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Marshal at the gate by a Socialist Diet Member, and the crowd dispersed without incidents.

On 21 May the Foreign Minister informed Ambassador MacArthur that a new Soviet note to Japan had been received protesting the Security Treaty and the illegal overflights of the USSR by U.S. aircraft. It requested assurances that no U.S. plane (U-2 or other) had conducted overflights of Soviet territory from Japan. The Department on 28 May informed MacArthur that he could give the necessary assurances.

On 6 June the decision was made at Project Headquarters to ferry the Detachment C U-2 aircraft back to Edwards Air Force Base on 15 July and phase out the personnel and equipment in stages by 1 September 1960. On 8 June the Ambassador urged by cable that the initiative be taken to announce immediate withdrawal of the U-2's rather than appear to withdraw them as a result of an official request of the Japanese or of threats from the Soviets. A meeting in the Department which considered this recommendation by the Ambassador decided in favor of the orderly phase-out planned by the Project. On 27 June the Detachment personnel were informed concerning the close-down and phased departure of all hands.

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On 8 July 1960 the Japanese Foreign Office formally requested the removal of the U-2 aircraft from Japan as a result of public pressure on the government. The two remaining U-2 aircraft were loaded aboard C-124's and airlifted from Atsugi, departing 9 July for Edwards Air Force Base. On 11 July the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo was informed of the removal and Foreign Minister Fujiyama on the same day announced the departure of the U-2 aircraft at a press conference in Tokyo.

Col. Mixson and family departed Atsugi on 17 July for reassignment to SAC and the Detachment personnel departed at intervals through July and August with a good number transferring to Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base. The installation at Atsugi was closed out and the facilities turned back to the Navy on 19 August 1960.

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ANNEX 102

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24 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Status of Project AQUATONE

1. We do not seem to be making much progress with AQUATONE. I have just reviewed the record and find that we made a firm and formal request for facilities in the Far East on last October 25th, at a meeting attended by yourself, General Cabell, Admiral Radford and General Twining. Immediately thereafter we dispatched a survey group to the Far East to whom it was made clear that facilities could be provided if there were a desire to do so and who received encouragement from General Lemnitzer. On 13 November you addressed to General Twining a written review of the problem and formal request for facilities at Yokota. On 15 November this matter (among others) was reviewed with the President who acquiesced in our deployment to the Far East and implied that AQUATONE, having the superior capability, should have a priority over BLACK KNIGHT. On 5 December, having still had no reply from the Air Force, this matter was further discussed by you and General Cabell with Generals Twining and Everest and it was agreed that we would approach Admiral Burke with a request for facilities at Atsugi. This approach was made on 6 December and Admiral Burke indicated that facilities could and would be provided at Atsugi unless the Air Force objected to this arrangement and it was felt desirable to secure the approval of the JCS. On 12 December you dispatched a further memorandum to General Twining with a copy to Admiral Burke restating our request for facilities at Atsugi.

2. About 18 December BLACK KNIGHT conducted an over-flight which was protested by the Russians. This incident is said to have given rise to new doubts in the minds of Admiral Radford and General Twining about security at bases in Japan and we have been told that the matter of the deployment of Detachment C to the Far East would have to be discussed with the JCS. It is now the 24th of January and it has not yet proved possible even to set a date for such a discussion, much less to obtain any assurance that a favorable decision, or indeed any decision, will be reached if and when such a meeting is held. Since there is an important Air Force Commanders meeting at Maxwell Air Force Base beginning on 26 January, the meeting probably cannot be held

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for at least another week. All in all, this is one of the worst cases of bureaucratic foot-dragging and executive indecision I have witnessed in some 13 years of Government service.

3. While this long drawn out interchange has been going forward on what should be the relatively minor and easy issue of deployment, the prospects for a favorable decision on the major issue of authority to perform overflights seem to have deteriorated. You report that the attitude toward overflights both in the White House and the State Department is very different from what it was a year or even six months ago. The President's inaugural address reaffirms a policy of peace at almost any price and those in authority seem to regard an overflight as a dangerously provocative act, a distinctly more alarmist view than that expressed in the special National Estimate on the probable Soviet reaction to overflights. At a minimum it must now be anticipated that any detected overflight will provoke a diplomatic protest, partly as a consequence of decisions on our part that have rendered preceding Soviet protests highly effective as a means of halting this activity.

4. Along with the discouraging developments reviewed above, you should be aware that the attitude of the Air Force toward this Project has undergone a marked change since mid-autumn from one of full and open support and partnership toward one of increasing jurisdictional jealousy. The most important manifestation of the change has been the long continued effort to prevent AQUATONE from "competing" with BLACK KNIGHT in the Far East.

50X1, E.O.13526

responsibility which should not be assumed by AQUATONE. Still another was the time-consuming and contraproductive insistence that any processing of AQUATONE film in the field should be done by units under Air Force command rather than by personnel attached to the AQUATONE field detachments. Finally, I am convinced that much of the pressure behind the SAC follow-on program involving the U-2 aircraft has as its purpose not the creation of a much needed hot war reconnaissance capability but the readying of Air Force units having the same capability as AQUATONE so as to undermine any argument for the retention of this capability by the CIA. This whole attitude of increasing competitiveness, suspicion and unconcealed eagerness (in some quarters) to have AQUATONE

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terminated is not only unpleasant in itself but is beginning to interfere with our activities and with necessary security arrangements.

5. Rightly or wrongly, these circumstances--the inability to obtain any decision in the Far East, the growing fear that overflights will never be resumed and the increasingly evident Air Force disfavor--are having a major effect on the morale of the personnel assigned to this Project. The fact that a definitive meeting on the Far East problem, which has been looked for each week since before Christmas, has not yet been scheduled is taken as evidence that this Project no longer has a high priority claim on the time and attention of senior officials. The failure to use the capability for so many months after the Russians were alerted to its existence is deeply discouraging to everyone but especially to the pilots who know well that the Russians are working hard to develop the means of interception. The increasing Air Force disfavor is particularly hard, of course, on Air Force personnel assigned to the Project. There are several senior officers who already feel that their Air Force careers have been prejudiced by their loyalty to this Project which has aroused the criticism of Generals Lewis and Everest (and quite possibly of General LeMay). I must remind you that for many of the personnel concerned, their assignment to this Project has involved real discomforts and disabilities, including separation from their parent organizations (unwelcome even to many Agency employees who have been pulled out of their regular offices where they must make their careers), a long period of duty overseas or at Watertown at locations remote from recreational facilities, and long separations from their families. By and large they were freely accepted in the belief that this is an urgent and enormously important enterprise, and that hardships will be put up with cheerfully as long as this belief is maintained. But when these circumstances are compounded by long inactivity, the loss of a sense of urgency, and the beginning of organizational jealousies, the effect on morale can be extremely serious. It is all very well to argue that in our business people must cultivate patience and accustom themselves to uncertainty but it is difficult to make this demand of people if they feel that delay and uncertainty are the products of indecision rather than of unavoidable circumstances.

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6. This review of the situation is a plea that you make a major effort to get the main policy decisions concerning this Project just as soon as possible. My specific recommendations to this end are presented in the following paragraph. Before making them I want to call your attention to a broader issue, on which I believe General Cabell will disagree with me. I believe it has been and is his opinion that our job is to maintain and further to develop the AQUATONE capability (at least for another year) as long as there was or is any chance that it will be used and that we should in effect continue to make it easy for the President to postpone any affirmative decision as well as to postpone a definitive negative decision which would permit us to liquidate the enterprise. Perhaps this was wise last summer and autumn (especially in view of RAINBOW) but I feel very strongly that the next time you approach the President you should do everything in your power to get a definitive decision and not merely a postponement. Quite aside from the considerations reviewed in this paper, I believe it to be a fact that our technological lead has only a few more months of life and I believe you will be misrepresenting the nature of the choice that is open to the President if this fact is not made crystal clear. Moreover, he should be told that ground-to-air missiles will probably increase their defensive capability faster than aircraft can be improved in altitude and range and that our present technological advantage in reconnaissance may be the last chance we will have to obtain good photography. If as I urge, you press for a decision either to overfly or to liquidate, you may well be told to liquidate. I am convinced that at this late date that would be better than hanging on for another six months under steadily more difficult circumstances with no reason to believe any change will be made.

7. In the light of this review my recommendations are as follows:

First, I urge that you give a high priority to settling the question of our deployment to the Far East. I do so in full realization of the fact that this has now reached a point where nobody but you can obtain a decision and that to do so will require more of your attention, energy and time than you have been able to devote to this matter in recent weeks.

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Second, if this issue can be promptly resolved in our favor I believe our next approach to the President should be made when the results of definitive tests of RAINBOW are in hand. If that program proceeds as we hope, these tests should be conducted soon after the middle of February and the approach to the President should be possible around the 20th. I believe an earlier approach is undesirable because you should be in a position to report definitively on this new development when you ask for a final decision on the future of this Project.

Third, in the event that no decision can be obtained to deploy Detachment C, I believe an approach should be made to the President within the next three weeks at which time the whole problem should be laid before him. I am convinced that further obstruction to our deployment will be evidence, in part, of the Air Force's jealousy I referred to above and in part of general discouragement in all of the Services concerning the possibility of overflight activities during the next year. This is a state of mind I think we cannot live with. If, therefore, we find evidence of this state of mind I do not believe we can afford to wait for another six weeks before obtaining clarification of our position. Although it would be better if the RAINBOW program could be further advanced when we seek a decision, I believe that by, say, 10 February we will know pretty well what is going to come out of it so this development can be taken into account.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director

cc: DDCI

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ANNEX 103

5 March 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

AIDE-MEMOIRE

According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter, the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan in the area south of the Olga Bay.

The information on this violation has been carefully checked and there is no doubt as to its authenticity. The military representatives of the United States, who in this case acted possibly without the knowledge of the Government of the United States, will perhaps deny the said violation, as has happened in the past. However, such a denial cannot eliminate the fact of violation itself. In any case, the Soviet side would have no interest in commenting on this incident if it had not actually taken place.

At the present time, when negotiations are being conducted on the holding of a summit meeting which could contribute to an improvement of relations and to strengthening trust between states, the violation of the Soviet border by an American military aircraft may be evaluated as an attempt to undermine the efforts aimed at convening such a meeting and to aggravate the international situation.

From the messages of the President of the USA and his conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, as well as from statements by other government officials of the USA, it is known to the Soviet Government that the Government of the USA desires a rapprochement between our governments and improvement in the relations between them. There can hardly be any doubt that such facts of violation of the borders of the USSR can have only one result--that of hindering this cause and upsetting Soviet-American relations.

The attention of the Government of the USA is invited to the fact that in the present situation the violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft takes on a particularly dangerous character since, as has been repeatedly reported, American military planes make flights around the clock over many countries of the world carrying thermonuclear bombs. The Government of the USA cannot fail to be aware of what genuinely catastrophic consequences for the cause of peace will ensue when an American plane with such a load will find itself shot down.

The attention of the Government of the USA has already been previously directed to cases of violation of the state boundaries of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft. However, as proven by the case cited, the authorities of the USA have not taken the necessary measures to prevent such violations.

It is absolutely obvious that it is the duty of the governments of the USSR and the USA to do everything possible to prevent any acts capable of complicating the situation and the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA.

The Soviet Government cannot but protest against the violations of Soviet frontiers by an American military aircraft and it expects that the Government of the United States will punish severely those guilty of the violation of the airspace of the USSR which has taken place and that it will take steps to prevent such violations in the future.

Taking into account the present situation, where a summit conference is being prepared, and also the spirit and purpose of the negotiations being conducted between our governments, the Soviet Government would not like to make this matter public or subject it to discussion in the UN.

The hope is expressed that this matter will be settled satisfactorily between the governments of the USSR and the USA and that there will be no need for the Soviet Government to resort to other means for its settlement.

Washington, March 5, 1958

(Initialled)
M. Menshikov

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C.

31 March 1958

AIDE-MEMOIRE

The Department of State refers to the aide-memoire of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated March 5, 1958. The aide-memoire protested an alleged violation of the Soviet border in the area of the settlement of Velikaya Kema at 4:05 a.m. Moscow time on March 2, 1958 by an American military jet aircraft.

A thorough investigation has been conducted and it has been determined that at the time cited there were no United States military aircraft in the vicinity of the place mentioned in the Soviet aide-memoire either over or outside Soviet territory. Although the United States Navy and Air Force conduct routine weather and training flights over the Sea of Japan, standing regulations prohibit these aircraft from approaching Soviet territory.

The Soviet Government may be sure that the United States Government fully shares its expressed concern that incidents be prevented which might impair relations between the two countries.

21 April 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Note No. 9

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, referring to the Aide-Memoire of the Department of State dated March 31, 1958 and containing a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the Aide-Memoire of the Soviet Government dated March 5 concerning a violation of the Soviet state border in the Far East by an American military jet aircraft, has the honor to communicate the following:

In the reply Aide-Memoire of the Department of State an attempt is made to deny the fact of an American military aircraft having violated the Soviet border.

As has already been communicated, the Soviet Government has at its disposal carefully verified data on this violation, the reliability of which leaves no room for doubt. According to these data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 a.m. Moscow time, an American military reconnaissance aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement Velikaya Kena, 32 kilometers south of that settlement. Then the violating aircraft deeply penetrated the airspace of the USSR and, after remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time, passed beyond the limits of the Soviet territory 45 kilometers south of the Olga Bay at 8:11 a.m.

In the light of the established facts the reply of the Government of the United States of America can in no way be recognized as satisfactory. Naturally, the question arises as to how to explain such a reply of the American Government: whether it was misled deliberately by its military representatives in the Far East or whether it considered it possible to protect such persons subordinate to it, who, without regard to the possible consequences, sanction violation of Soviet borders, thus creating a threat of international complications.

Such a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the communication of the Soviet Government cannot

fail to cause serious concern, the more so since the new case of violation of Soviet airspace took place after warnings on the part of the Government of the USSR to the effect that American authorities should take the necessary steps to prevent such violations.

In connection with the foregoing the Soviet Government expects that the Government of the United States of America will undertake further investigation of this act of violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft and will punish severely those guilty of this violation.

The Soviet Government also expects that the Government of the United States of America will take the necessary steps to prevent violations of Soviet airspace by American aircraft in the future and states that in the event of new violations full responsibility for their consequences will rest with the Government of the United States.

Washington, D. C., April 1958

5 May 1958

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.

The Department of State acknowledges receipt of Note No. 9 dated April 21, 1958 from the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning an alleged violation of the Soviet border in the Far East by an American military jet aircraft.

As the Department stated in its aide-memoire of March 31, 1958 a thorough investigation of the alleged violation has been conducted and it has been determined that at the time cited in the Embassy's aide-memoire of March 5, 1958 there were no United States military aircraft in the vicinity of the place mentioned in the Soviet aide-memoire either over or outside Soviet territory. It was also stated in the Department's aide-memoire that standing regulations prohibit United States Naval and Air Force aircraft, conducting routine weather and training flights over the Sea of Japan, from approaching Soviet territory.

The United States Government has nothing further to add to its aide-memoire of March 31, 1958 concerning the alleged incident.

Department of State,

Washington, May 5, 1958.

Embassy of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

Note No. 16

In connection with the note of the Department of State of the USA dated May 5, 1958, the Embassy of the USSR has the honor to confirm the Soviet Government's note of April 21, 1958 regarding the violation of the Soviet state border in the Far East by an American jet plane.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state once again that the entire responsibility for the consequences of violations of Soviet space by American aircraft lies with the Government of the United States.

Washington, June 13, 1958

Department of State,
United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

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CHAPTER XVI. DETACHMENT G

Detachment G Commanders

Lt. Col. Roland L. Perkins, Commanding Officer June 1957 - July 1958
Capt. Louis Setter, R & D Officer
[redacted] Security and Administrative Officer

Lt. Col. Walter A. Rosenfield, Commanding Officer July 1958 - Sept 1960
Lt. Col. Robert Howe, R & D Officer

Lt. Col. William J. Gregory, Commanding Officer Sept 1960 - June 1965
Lt. Col. Joseph V. Cuttler, Deputy Commander

Lt. Col. Miles M. Doyle, Commanding Officer July 1965 - Present
Lt. Col. Robert G. Goold, Deputy Commander
[redacted] Chief of Support

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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CHAPTER XVI - DETACHMENT G

Activation of WRSP (IV)

On 22 March 1957 the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) of the Air Force agreed to the transfer of the residual test activities of Project AQUATONE's U-2 program to Edwards Air Force Base (North). The transfer from Watertown was made necessary by the AEC's planned series of shots at the Nevada Test Site. The residual group at Watertown had been designated Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (IV) by Air Weather Service General Order on 10 May 1957. The move to Edwards began on 6 June 1957 when communications were opened between Washington Headquarters and Edwards (North) via the HBJAYWALK channel, and the transfer of personnel and equipment was substantially complete on 20 June 1957. The first commanding officer of Detachment G was Lt. Col. Roland L. Perkins, who had previously served as Operations Officer at Detachment B in Turkey. The important job of R & D Officer was filled by Capt. Louis C. Setter who had been recruited from Col. Yancey's SAC Training Unit at Watertown. The Security Officer, [redacted] also doubled for a time as Administrative Officer in view of the small size of the Detachment at the beginning.

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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When the move was made to Edwards, the residual test and development activities were not expected to continue for more than a year and the only outlay of project funds for new construction was \$25,000 to conform the hangar to project requirements, including separate, secure work areas for the various company techreps assigned to the Detachment.

Continued Test Programs at Edwards:

Radar Camouflage

In June 1957 the first application of a new anti-radar process was tested at Edwards (North). This program stemmed from a discovery by Dr. Edward Purcell of Harvard University (for which he was later granted an award of \$10,000 by CIA). The research program (cryptonym RAINBOW and unclassified project name THERMOS), was under the guidance of Mr. Herbert Miller, who was responsible directly to the Project Director, Mr. Bissell. The work was conducted principally in the facility which later incorporated under Agency sponsorship as Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI) in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The purpose was to develop radar camouflage applicable to the U-2 aircraft which, without impairing aircraft performance, would be sufficiently effective to permit a percentage of reconnaissance missions

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to go undetected, or to greatly reduce the accuracy and extent of radar tracking. SEI and Lincoln Laboratories at MIT reported favorable results in laboratory tests of the radar reflective materials in May 1957 and discussions were held with Lockheed preparatory to testing it on the U-2.

There were two different configurations: One was known as the "trapeze" and consisted of small gauge wires applied to the leading and trailing edges of the wings and fastened to wooden booms. It was flown with some success but only gave low frequency protection between 65 and 85 megacycles. The other type was referred to as "wallpaper" and consisted of a thin plastic material with metallic pattern imprinted thereon which was applied to certain areas of the fuselage, nose and tail of the aircraft. It was intended to be effective against S-band radar but the results obtained were rather disappointing.

The first RAINBOW configured U-2 was delivered to Detachment B at Adana in July 1957 and after local test flights it was used on five overflights of the USSR staging from Lahore, and one overflight of Kapustin Yar departing from Adana. Another "Dirty Bird" was flown by Detachment C in September 1957 over Klyuchi, and again in March 1958 over Ukrania (the latter mission resulting in a Russian protest).

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While these overflights were not all consecutively tracked, it was apparent by March 1958 that the application in use was inherently narrow-banded and frequency specific, and therefore of limited value. With the variety of radars being used by the Russians (many of World War II vintage), and with new types being introduced, it appeared quite impossible to conceive of any kind of covering that would protect the U-2 against all frequencies from 70 to 10,000 megacycles. Also the added weight and drag induced by the application to the aircraft had reduced the altitude capability across the mission profile by a minimum of 1500 feet.

In May 1958 the decision was made to curtail RAINBOW development and testing more rapidly than had been anticipated, enabling the return to active inventory of three U-2's which had been disassembled for the RAINBOW application. In August 1958 the Project Director reported to the DCI that all active work on RAINBOW had been terminated and the only costs for FY 1959 would be for cleaning off the last two aircraft and for a report by SEI on their two years of work in the field of radar camouflage.

Camouflage Paint

Tests were made at Edwards in 1958 on various colors and types of paints for the purpose of covering the gleaming aluminum surface of

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the U-2 and making it less easily visible against the sky. The Lockheed people gave assurance that the only weight addition would be approximately 25 pounds and that there was no perceivable performance degradation as a result of painting. An anti-corrosion program was on the books to be accomplished on all project U-2's and the painting was to be coordinated with that program. The type and color finally chosen was a black textured paint which, besides covering the light-reflective aluminum surface, had the additional thermal benefit of absorbing light in the extremely cold upper altitudes attained by the U-2. This black covering later gave rise to many descriptive names, such as the "Black Angel" which was the name given the airplane by Japanese newswriters.

Test Programs 1957-1960

In the summer of 1957, slipper tanks were tested for added range and sets were fabricated for all operational aircraft. However, the Project Director instructed that they were only to be used when the target could not be reached without them, since the added weight and drag caused some loss of altitude, which he considered undesirable.

The Perkin-Elmer/Hycon "C" camera was tested at Edwards but did not measure up to expectations and was shelved.

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equipment continued to be tested and refined in conjunction with the

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A noise elimination program was carried out throughout 1957-58 with the assistance of the Project Communications Staff for the purpose of improving the functioning of Elint systems.

Work on a dual oxygen system was instigated by Lockheed, due to Mr. Johnson's distrust of the Firewel Company's single regulator system. This effort was carried forward over many months and many solutions were proposed. Lockheed finally built its own dual system which has since been used by Lockheed's test pilots, but Project pilots have continued to use the single regulator. Product improvement efforts have gone forward continuously on pilot equipment, particularly with regard to the seat pack, but the equipment has remained pretty much in the same configuration from the beginning of the program.

U.S. Mule

At the end of 1958, as a low priority item, Lockheed was requested to design a device for the dropping of leaflets or other materials from the U-2. An interest was taken in this development by Gen. Cabell, who requested that the possibility of dropping a bomb (atomic or otherwise)

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from the U-2 also be investigated. The results of the latter investigation were set forth in the DD/P's memorandum to General Cabell of 18 February 1959 (see Annex 104), which recommended against any further consideration of a bombing capability for the U-2 aircraft.

Lockheed, meanwhile, by using the bomb bay door developed for the SAC version of the U-2, which had a downward ejection seat, devised a special hatch which was named the "U.S. Mule" and was designed principally for leaflet drops. The equipment was tested by Detachment G at Edwards between January and April 1961 with varying results. Procedures and techniques were refined to the greatest degree possible (considering the variables to be encountered in any given operation) and the Mule was declared operationally ready, but has never since been used operationally. Two of the units were sent to Detachment H for possible use in leaflet-dropping over Mainland China, but have not been so used.

Electronic Countermeasures and Collection Systems

Detachment G has played a major part in the development and testing of the U-2's electronic systems in coordination with the various concerned Headquarters technicians and company engineers. Until 1962 when the Development Project Division was reorganized as OSA under

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the DD/R, responsibility for development and testing in this field was shared by the [redacted]

[redacted] of DPD with technical assistance from the Office of Elint.

In 1962 an Engineering and Analysis Division was set up in OSA and given responsibility for all electronic programs. In the reorganization of 1966 within OSA, an Avionics Division was set up under the Materiel Directorate and has continued to maintain a small avionics section at Detachment G to supervise the electronic equipment testing at Edwards. Annex 43 gives a detailed description of the various Elint and counter-measures systems which have been and are being used in the U-2 program.

Conversion of U-2 to the J-75 Engine

In order to give the U-2 additional altitude which it needed to avoid interception, use of a more powerful engine was suggested by Mr. Kelly Johnson, and several power plants were considered during the fall and winter of 1958. The availability of the Pratt & Whitney J-75 engine (due to Navy cut-back of their Skymaster program) made it possible to borrow several for test purposes in January 1959.

Mr. Johnson was able, by relocating the mounted accessories on the engine and enlarging the airscops, to fit the J-75 into the U-2. The

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Pratt & Whitney engineers estimated that the J-75 would give the U-2 a possible gain in altitude of 2,500 feet.

Lockheed's estimate for conversion of one U-2 plus four months flight testing was \$481,000 plus spares; conversion of all thirteen U-2 aircraft in the project inventory was put at \$2.5 million. With the life expectancy of the aircraft against Soviet fighters and missiles only a "best estimate", it was difficult to justify large outlays of funds at that stage. Therefore the first J-75 conversion program was for only four U-2's, begun in March 1959 at an estimated cost of \$1,250,000.

Successful tests were completed at Edwards in May and June 1959 and the first two operational J-75 U-2 aircraft were ferried to Adana by Detachment G pilots in August 1959. The remaining Agency-owned U-2's were converted, one or two at a time, the last in the summer of 1962. At that time the inventory had been cut by losses to seven aircraft. In May 1963 planning began for a dual staging capability by Detachment G in order to meet the worldwide requirements anticipated to be levied on the U-2 program. An inventory of at least nine aircraft was considered minimum to cover these tasks and in May the Director of CIA requested the Department of Defense to make two additional U-2 aircraft available for conversion to J-75 configuration and

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use by the Agency. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric approved the request and directed the Air Force to make the aircraft available from the SAC inventory, then totaling 22.

In June 1963 SAC borrowed three Project J-75 aircraft for their coverage of Cuba, one of which was lost near Key West, the other two being returned at the end of 1963. In 1964 two more SAC U-2's were turned over to the Project to be converted to J-75 engines as replacements for two lost in the TACKLE program.

On 17 August 1965, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, Dr. Brockway McMillan, ordered that a standard basic configuration be developed for the U-2's and that all SAC aircraft be so modified by the end of FY 1967. At the end of 1966, of the original 51 U-2 aircraft procured (20 by IDEALIST and 31 by the Air Force) there were only 17 left, four of which belong to the Air Force Systems Command, successor to ARDC.

Reorganization of Detachment G - September 1960

Between July and September 1960, Detachment C's remaining two U-2's and equipment, together with the personnel desiring to continue with the project, were phased into Edwards North Base, and under the command of Lt. Col. William J. Gregory, WRSP (IV) was reconstituted

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to provide an operational capability in addition to the development and testing activities previously carried out. Some key personnel replacements were required, renovation and reshuffling of available space was accomplished, and the staff and their families settled in, the military on base, and civilians principally in the town of Lancaster, California. With the attention of the Detachment being focussed more and more on operational missions, the development and testing programs became increasingly a Lockheed responsibility during this period.

The ungrounding of the U-2 subsequent to the May Day episode, which had been the subject of much high-level discussion during the summer of 1960, was accomplished at Edwards in late September when two long training missions in full simulation of actual operational overflights were successfully completed.

Inflight Refueling Capability - 1961

In consonance with the establishment of Detachment G as an operational reconnaissance group based in the ZI, the decision was made to modify the U-2 to give it inflight refueling capability for long distance staging. Headquarters USAF (Col. Geary) was requested in February 1961 to arrange for SAC to support the program by placing a KC-135

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tanker at Edwards to assist in the test program of the first IFR-configured U-2 (U-2F). Tests were successfully run in May and June 1961 and the first modified aircraft was turned over to Detachment G for pilot check-out and training. Six aircraft were so configured, one by one, as they went into Lockheed for IRAN and other modifications.

The training program required nine hours of ground school, a familiarization ride in the tanker to observe air refueling techniques before the actual air refueling training sorties were flown by the pilots. Pilot training in this technique has been built into the training course available at Edwards North Base under the direction of Detachment G personnel.

Two aircraft losses have occurred in the air refueling training program. The first, on 1 March 1962, was fatal to the pilot, Captain Campbell (SAC). In the case of the second loss, pilot Hall (CIA contract) bailed out and suffered only minor injuries. One IFR-version on loan to SAC was lost off Key West on an operational mission over Cuba in November 1963 (fatal to the pilot, Capt. Hyde, SAC), and two more were lost in the TACKLE program in March 1964 and February 1966. At the end of 1966 there was only one IFR-configured U-2 left in the Project inventory, and it has since been turned over to SAC.

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The introduction of inflight refueling allowed an increase in range up to the limit of the pilot's physical endurance. The longest mission flown was staged from Takhli on 10 November 1963 (Mission #3238, Pilot Al Rand), with air refueling over India, coverage of the Northeast Frontier, and return to Takhli. The mission was programmed for 11 hours and 45 minutes, and because of the physical condition of the pilot on landing after more than 12 hours of flying, it was concluded that no flights of more than 10 hours would be planned in the future.

Beginning of Detachment G Operations: Cuba, 1960

At the end of September, the proposal was made that a requirement by CIA and the Air Force for photographic coverage of Cuba be satisfied through two U-2 missions for which Detachment G had operationally ready aircraft standing by. The Joint Chiefs approved the plan and the proposal was put to the Special Group.* The operation, which was in support of the Cuban counter-revolutionary invasion plan, was set forth by the Acting Chief of DPD, Col. Beerli, in the following terms, concurred in by Western Hemisphere Division, DD/P:

* Operation KICK OFF was the first U-2 overflight approval obtained under the procedure invoked after the 1 May incident. The mission plan is submitted in writing with justification, accompanied by a flight line map showing targets. A presentation of the mechanics and the security ramifications of obtaining political approvals is contained in Annex 105.

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"A requirement exists for complete aerial photographic coverage of Cuba, simultaneously if possible, in support of proposed clandestine paramilitary operations designed to bring about the overthrow of the present regime in that country.

"The photographic coverage is urgently needed in order to determine the following:

- a. Air order of battle.
- b. Ground order of battle.
- c. Targets.

"In addition, complete and current photographic coverage is essential to provide timely planning data on the following:

- a. Landing zones for air drops of troops and supplies.
- b. Landing zones along the coast for surface operations.

"Complete photographic coverage will also provide a base for comparative photography which will permit determination of any build-up and/or redeployment of opposition forces and assets.

"In addition to the initial complete coverage outlined above, there will be a subsequent requirement for periodic spot coverage to determine the following:

- a. Scope and disposition of expected military aid from Bloc countries (high performance aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, radar, tanks, etc.).
- b. Current status of selected denied areas, aircraft and ship deployment and facilities, POL storage, troop concentrations, status of key sabotage targets, infiltration routes, and drop zone sites..." 1/

1/ ~~TS~~-155523, 5 Oct 1960. Memo to DCI through DD/P from AC/DPD.

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The operation was approved in principle by the Special Group with each mission to be reviewed prior to launching. Del Rio, Texas, (Laughlin Air Force Base) was chosen as the staging base since it was a SAC U-2 operating base and had in place and available all facilities required to conduct the operation. The cover story was that the Agency U-2 unit was conducting an operational readiness test at a simulated staging base.

Operational procedures were generally as follows:

- a. The aircraft had all markings removed prior to take-off.
- b. Flight plan information was restricted at Del Rio to the Commanding Officer, flight planner and pilot.
- c. The pilot had all personal identification removed and was instructed to dispose of his flight plan and maps if bail out became necessary.
- d. The pilot was briefed on emergency actions for every minute of the flight. Glide range of 240 nautical miles (in event of power failure) would enable him to reach Key West; otherwise he should ditch at sea and in no event crash land on or near Cuba.
- e. A typical mission from Del Rio over Cuba and return was approximately 3,575 nautical miles for a duration of nine hours and twenty minutes with fuel reserve of 145 gallons on return to base.

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f. The B camera in Mode I and lateral separation of flight lines by forty nautical miles could cover the island in one successful sortie (provided there was no cloud coverage of strategic areas).

g. In the interest of security the film was to be airlifted to Eastman, not processed at the Del Rio facility.

Operation KICK OFF was staged between 26 and 30 October 1960 with a task force of 16 people, one mission aircraft and a back-up. Two missions were flown on 26 and 27 October. The photography was poor in both cases due to weather and cloud cover over the primary target area. Between 26 November and 13 December a second operation was approved (GREEN EYES) and three good missions were achieved.

Other Activities, 1960

During November 1960 Detachment G supported a series of

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missions based in

Hawaii by providing a U-2 aircraft and logistics support. The operation (called STUDENT PRINCE) was successfully conducted between 9 and 28 November 1960. During this same period Detachment G also provided facilities and supported the organization and training of the Detachment H cadre who were dispatched to Taiwan in December 1960.

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Further Cuban Coverage: Counter-Revolution Fails

On 19 and 21 March 1961, two photo missions (LONG GREEN) were flown over Cuba to get the latest order of battle information in support of the invasion plan. For the period from 5 to 30 April 1961, Operation FLIP TOP gave daily or twice daily coverage during the period before, during, and after the Cuban counter-revolutionary activity, which ended so disastrously on 19 April at Bahia de Cochinos (better known as the Bay of Pigs). CINCLANT subsequently requested weekly coverage of Cuba which was carried out even though project officials considered this an undesirable use of the U-2 capability.

Vietnam Coverage. - 1961-64

In 1961 it became apparent that United States interests and commitments in Vietnam had become so substantial as to justify the employment of the Agency's most sophisticated capabilities for obtaining essential intelligence required to support expanding operations in the area. Major concerns were supply routes and road communication networks supporting Viet Cong infiltration and their potential for logistic support in the event of an escalated war. The available maps and charts of this region were inadequate to permit planning for operations and countermeasures.

The first deployment in fulfilling these requirements (Operation POLE CAT) was by Detachment G staging from Cubi Point Naval Air Station,

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at the end of 1960, and seven sorties were flown over North Vietnam and Laos between 3 and 18 January 1961. At the beginning of August 1961, highest authority granted approval for further coverage (Operation EBONY) and one U-2 aircraft and party were deployed by Detachment G on 13 August 1961, again using Cubi Point for staging. One successful sortie was achieved for tactical coverage of North Vietnam on 15 August and the team returned to Edwards.

Between 1962 and 1964 further tactical coverage of North Vietnam and Laos was required from time to time and was accomplished by staging teams from Detachment G to Takhli, Thailand, or by U. S. contract pilots flying out of the Detachment H base on Taiwan. Thirty-six photographic missions (about 70% successful) were flown during this period. In April 1964, due to the increased tempo of Viet Cong activities and the breakdown of the "strategic hamlet" concept, what had been essentially a strategic reconnaissance requirement changed to a tactical support requirement responsive to the immediate needs of local military commanders and the responsibility for aerial reconnaissance of the area was given to the Strategic Air Command. SAC's U-2's were to be used over South Vietnam, parts of Cambodia within 30 miles of South Vietnam, all of Laos south of Paksane, and all of

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North Vietnam within 30 miles of South Vietnam or of the coast. IDEALIST was to cover other parts of Laos and North Vietnam, or other targets as approved for operational efficiency. Film processing was to be done in the field — SAC's by their mobile units and IDEALIST's by ASPIC at Yokota.

Operation NIMBUS: Cuba During the Missile Build-up

From May 1961 to October 1962, Detachment G accomplished 28 overflights of Cuba on behalf of the U. S. Intelligence Community in an effort to determine the extent of the deployment of Soviet assets in Cuba and to ascertain the eventual probable purpose, whether defensive or offensive. On 29 August 1962, Mission 3088 confirmed the existence of numerous surface-to-air missile sites on the island of Cuba. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) requested re-coverage of the island as quickly as possible. A staging team from Detachment C deployed to Del Rio on 4 September and launched a photographic mission on 5 September.

A request for approval of additional flights was considered at an augmented Special Group meeting on 10 September. The Secretary of State expressed concern at the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba, which involved extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly

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over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He had no objection to the peripheral parts and thought it useful to continue to exercise our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba at this time. Nevertheless, he felt it unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. The long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further, should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the U. S. in a poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters. The mission planners then broke the proposed coverage into four parts: The Isle of Pines, the area east of longitude 77 west, and two legs along the coast, one north and one south.

Within this framework, higher authority gave approval interpreted by Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy on 13 September, as permission for all four flights. Detachment G's staging team thereafter accomplished missions on 17, 26 and 29 September and on 5 and 7 October 1962.

On 9 October, discussion at the Special Group meeting reached agreement that the first priority in Cuban coverage was for one high

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performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accompanied by all out Elint support, to search out the suspected missile sites. Depending upon the results of that mission, other sorties would be flown. Meanwhile, due to the fact that this reconnaissance of Cuba was turning from a strategic to a tactical requirement and the limited Agency assets available would not be sufficient to keep up the pace demanded by such coverage, the Joint Chiefs recommended that SAC aircraft and pilots be used. This was agreed to by Secretary of Defense McNamara and on 12 October was approved by the President.

When the question of SAC taking over Cuban coverage with their U-2 aircraft was surfaced, the DCI requested OSA to give him an analysis of the factors involved in the designation of SAC as executive agent for the further conduct of Cuban reconnaissance.

In reply, on 14 October 1962, Mr. James Cunningham stated that the basic question at issue was: As a national policy, should covertly executed overhead reconnaissance of denied areas be performed by the Defense Establishment, or because of the plausible denial aspect, by the Central Intelligence Agency with DOD support? He noted further:

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"Since President Kennedy has not yet decided to overtly acknowledge overhead reconnaissance of Cuba with military assets, but has limited his official position to a reported willingness to acknowledge peripheral reconnaissance of the island by the military, and then only in the event of an incident, it would appear to us that grounds still exist to consider these missions as covert enterprises, deserving of professional execution by that staff most experienced in conducting operations within the smallest circle of knowledgeable people. On that basis, it is our recommendation that the DCI continue to support execution of Cuban U-2 reconnaissance under the command control and guidance of this Agency, with such additional support as may be required from USAF and SAC to carry out the mission in military guise." 1/

On 14 October 1962 a SAC pilot, using an Agency-owned U-2 and an Agency-prepared flight plan, flew Mission 3101 over Cuba. On read-out of the photography from that mission, the presence of MRBM/IRBM installations in Western Cuba was confirmed. At a meeting in the Defense Department on 16 October, Secretary McNamara said that political approvals were no longer a factor and he wanted the greatest number of missions flown in the shortest time possible to permit him to give the President an accurate idea of the threat to the United States. The decision was reached at that meeting to use both DOD and CIA U-2 assets, under the command and control of SAC. Agency contract pilots would only be used in extreme circumstances and would be given

1/ BYE-3944-62, 14 October 1962. Memorandum for the DCI from DAD/OSA.

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light Air Force cover. In the event of capture they were supposed to claim to be Air Force officers. However, since they had been for many years openly known as Lockheed test pilots, such a story would not hold up. (Fortunately, they did not have to be used under these ground rules.)

The President's disclosure in his radio-television speech on 22 October of the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba, his naval and air "quarantine" on shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba, and Mr. Khrushchev's eventual undertaking to withdraw them, have been well covered in public media. Since October 1962, SAC has continued to be responsible for coverage of Cuba and Project IDEALIST has been involved only in the loan to SAC of J-75 configured U-2's for use in Cuban overflights when so instructed by higher authority.

On 12 February 1963, in response to CIA Legislative Liaison's request for information pertaining to the conduct of U-2 operations over Cuba during the period 9 to 14 October 1962 (which had come under question by certain Members of Congress) OSA gave the following report:

"... Special Group approval for Cuban overflights in the month of October 1962 included the one sortie, forecast by the CIA, in addition to two sorties carried over from the September approvals. Weather was reviewed daily and the September missions were completed by 7 October 1962. Favorable weather existed on 8 and 9 October; however, no aircraft were available in commission to accomplish the one remaining sortie. Weather

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was unfavorable on 10, 11 and 12 October. During this period Agency personnel at Edwards Air Force Base, California, supervised the requalification of military pilots in the U-2C. Operational control of Cuban overflight operations was delegated to JCS/SAC on 12 October 1962. An Agency detachment from Edwards Air Force Base was deployed to McCoy Air Force Base, Florida, 13 October to support SAC. Mission 3101 was planned by the CIA and was accomplished as a SAC mission on 14 October 1962 by a military pilot departing Edwards Air Force Base and landing at McCoy Air Force Base..." 1/

The version of what happened during the period following the last CIA flight over Cuba as described by Newsweek on 4 March 1963 read as follows:

"Another McGeorge Bundy initiative had major historical impact. Though he and his immediate associates will not discuss the matter, there is firm basis to credit him with breaking a deadlock in a dispute between the CIA and the Strategic Air Command as to which agency would conduct U-2 flights over Cuba. According to this account, it was that dispute--not bad weather--that left a gap of some two weeks in the U.S. overflights and that almost enabled Nikita Khrushchev to complete his missile installations before they were spotted. The CIA warned against making the flights a military operation, insisted on carrying them out with civilian pilots. Over its protest, Bundy arranged for SAC to send out its U-2 planes--and the very first flight thereafter produced the evidence that triggered the facedown crisis." 2/

No evidence was found in OSA files indicating that the false implications of this editorial were ever rebutted by CIA or the White House.

1/ Letter to OGC/CIA, 12 February 1963, from DAD/OSA.

2/ Editorial: "Too Much Power?", Newsweek, 4 March 1963.

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IDEALIST coverage of Cuba during 1961 and 1962 equalled 459 hours of U-2 flying time and was estimated to have cost \$1,100,000 (at \$2711 per hour). This figure was given to Western Hemisphere Division to be incorporated into a report which the DD/P prepared in response to a White House Staff request in order to inform the President on the nature and cost of operations which CIA had directed against Cuba since Castro came to power.

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Sino-Indian Border Coverage, 1962-64

In November 1962 incursions by Communist Chinese forces into the territory of India brought a request from Prime Minister Nehru for United States military arms assistance. This was recognized as a situation which might be exploited to our advantage from the standpoint of intelligence collection and with specific reference to U-2 aerial reconnaissance. Although the U.S. intelligence community was interested in acquiring photo coverage of the Sino-Indian border and contiguous areas, a more compelling motivation was the possibility that by establishing a precedent for coordinated U-2 overflight operations with India, a staging base might ultimately be acquired from which to run electronic reconnaissance missions against the Soviet ABM site at Sary Shagan, and photo missions against West China targets out of reach of Detachment H.

After appropriate coordination with the U.S. Ambassador to New Delhi, John K. Galbraith, [] 50X1, E.O.13526 [] the President was asked to approve an approach to the Government of India with an offer of U-2 reconnaissance support. Approval was given by the President with the proviso that the Indians should specifically request that these flights be undertaken.

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On 9 November 1962, Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy sent the following message to Ambassador Galbraith:

"The President is eager to get hard information on Chinese Communist deployments against the Indians, and in response to his direct request, plans have been made for two U-2 flights staging out of Thailand and overflying India.

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"What the President wants for these flights is that the Indians should ask for them and agree to (1) refueling in the air over India (at about 35,000 feet); and (2) emergency landing rights as specified in separate message [redacted]. In return we of course will provide full information to the Indians on what is learned.

"What lies behind the President's own sense of urgency here is his conviction that most military estimates of what the Chinese Communists are doing rest on very little beyond thin speculation and standardized guesswork. This is no one's fault because nothing better is available. In a matter of this magnitude hard information can be absolutely decisive, as Cuba recently demonstrated..." 1/

In response to the direct request of the White House, OSA made plans for two IDEALIST flights out of Takhli overflying India (but not Burma) to and from the target area. Agreement to President Kennedy's request was obtained from Nehru by the Ambassador on 11 November (and approval by Sarit for use of Takhli was obtained on 14 November). A task force of 30 men with one U-2 aircraft was made ready to deploy by Detachment G. A delay ensued while [redacted] negotiated arrangements for inflight refueling of the U-2 over Indian

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1/ Message sent [redacted] to New Delhi. Citation unavailable.

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territory, and emergency landing rights. The team was in place at Takhli by the end of November 1962.

Because the Chinese had announced a withdrawal of their troops from the contested area, the first overflight was postponed so as not to give them a pretext for failing to withdraw. The first mission was flown on 5 December covering the Ladakh region (Nepal border and Kashmir) and was only 40% successful due to weather and turbulence. The next mission was flown on 10 December covering the Northeast Frontier. On both missions there were problems with fuel icing which caused much concern at Project Headquarters. Dr. Scoville (DD/R) sent a message to Mr. Johnson at Lockheed and Col. Gregory at Detachment G, saying:

"... Because of the sensitivity of this particular operation, it being the first timid step of the Indian Government toward anything as daring as a major overflight effort, the last thing we need is to have them discover when we abort or fail to fly in excellent target weather, that our problem is a persistent mechanical one with an aircraft whose long history of reliability has been stressed to them... Since we obviously cannot fly operationally until an acceptable solution is found... I am asking that test flights be programmed at Lockheed, Edwards and in the Takhli local area to check the limitations of the fuel flow system, screen and pumps..." 1/

Results of the test missions indicated that the use of Phillips 55MB additive in the fuel was a safe fix for the icing problem and the U-2 at

1/ ADIC-0342, 12 December 1962 (channel). 50X1, E.O.13526

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Takhli was considered operationally ready upon receipt and use of the additive.

Four additional missions were approved by the Special Group but since the 10 December overflight of the NEFA had drawn a Chinese protest to the Indians (even though they had not identified the U-2 as the aircraft), the Indians showed reluctance and wanted to limit the operation to one flight, waiting to see if there would be another protest. All six missions approved for the border region were eventually carried out, the last on 22 January 1963.

Although the intention had been to press the Indians for use of one of their bases from which to direct U-2 flights, the DCI instructed that before an approach was made to the Indians a briefing (using materials from the border overflights) be given to Nehru and a reading be taken on his attitude toward more direct involvement in the overflight program. An initial briefing was given in January and another in March with the latest findings. From this intelligence Nehru was able to inform India's Parliament on Chinese movements on the border, troop build-up, road construction, etc. This triggered a news story by UPI that probably the Indians were using the U-2, administered by the U.S. from Okinawa, or by the Chinese from Taiwan.

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In April 1963 an official approach was made by the Ambassador

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for an operating base in India. The

Chief of the Indian Intelligence Service replied that due to internal conditions in the country, a secure base could not be made ready until September. A request was then made for refueling corridors and on 9 May the Indians advised that for the time being they were unable to allow flights to enter the border area from India. The staging party at Takhli which had meantime been covering priority Southeast Asia targets was withdrawn to the ZI on 19 May 1963.

In July further inquiry of the Indians regarding a firm commitment for a base brought the reply from the CIB that they were hopeful of obtaining use of Charbatia Air Base and would review the political situation with the Agency in another thirty days.

Against the background of nine months' experience in dealing with the Indians on U-2 and other operations, the Near East Division recommended to the Special Group on 30 July 1963 that the U. S. proceed with plans to stage a U-2 capability into India on a temporary basis in September 1963 for coverage of Tibet and contiguous areas of China, meanwhile continuing to support the Indians in establishing a maximum security base, and encouraging their reliance on their own Air Force's capabilities to complement U. S. reconnaissance efforts.

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An inspection team from Project Headquarters visited Charbatia between August 2nd and 13th and found runways not yet usable, the hangar not yet constructed, barracks and mess not completed, no medical facilities available and no ground equipment. A readiness date of 15 November was forecast by the Indians but was considered optimistic by the visiting team.

The decision was then made to launch the four approved missions from Takhli, refueling at Charbatia. However, on 23 August, Prime Minister Nehru refused political clearance for post-strike use of Charbatia, the reason given being that the Chief of CIB [] was unable to assure that use of the base by U-2's would not become known to the political opposition due to large numbers of unscreened construction workers in the area. OSA recommended that unless there was at least token participation by India, no approach be made to the Thais for use of Takhli; meantime, however, the Indians came through with approval for refueling at Charbatia. On 19 September permission for launching from Takhli was given by Sarit although he was far from enthusiastic. The launch team was in place at Takhli by 25 September and the four approved sorties were flown over Tibet between 29 September and 10 November 1963 with excellent results. After further coverage of the northern border regions

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of Thailand on behalf of Sarit, the team was withdrawn to Edwards.

A survey of progress in preparing the base at Charbatia was made in February 1964 and it was found that the hangar was still not erected and that the base could not securely support the U-2 operation until about the end of April 1964. The Special Group on 12 March 1964 authorized missions "as necessary" in the Sino-Indian border region, and one mission to the NEFA was successfully launched on 31 March from Takhli.

The Indians approved coverage of all border targets of concern to both Governments shortly thereafter, to be accomplished prior to the next monsoon season and completion of facilities at Charbatia was assured by 1 May 1964. Airlift of 17,000 pounds of communications gear to Charbatia was accomplished and communications were activated on 30 April 1964. Air Force supplies and equipment in the amount of 130,000 pounds were furnished from various USAF depots and also airlifted to Charbatia. The staging team moved forward as far as Cubi Point where it held temporarily to await the final clearance by the Indians. During this time the landing of a USAF C-124 and take-off without proper Indian clearances caused a furore and all flights were grounded for a time while the Indians sorted things out. The staging team was finally in place on 19 May, only to have the weather turn unfavorable, causing

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a delay in launching the first mission until 24 May. That mission achieved good photographic coverage but on return of the U-2 to the base at Charbatia, the aircraft brake failed and the landing gear was damaged beyond local repair during the overrun, necessitating airlift back to the U.S.

At that time, on 27 May 1964, the death of Prime Minister Nehru occurred, and on 30 May the staging party returned to Clark Field to await developments (since their stay at Charbatia had been restricted by the Indians to seven days from the beginning of operations). The decision was made to postpone further operations from Charbatia at that time and the team returned to Edwards.

The cost of airlifting the men and materiel from Edwards and the various supply depots to Charbatia (which required 15 support aircraft) was \$350,000 one way. On the planned basis of two stagings a year to Charbatia, this would mean \$1.4 million in airlift alone. It was agreed to leave the Air Force equipment and supplies and some communications gear at Charbatia under guard in order to save some of this cost.

The second staging from Charbatia took place in December 1964. Two U-2 aircraft were used and the team was in place and ready on 11 December. Weather in the target area caused a little delay but

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excellent missions were accomplished on 16, 17 and 20 December covering all COMOR targets along the Sino-Indian border. The group departed for home station on 22 December 1964.

Subsequently it was decided that in lieu of a permanent detachment in India (cost initially estimated at \$13 million), or periodic deployments (\$1.4 million for two each year), Takhli would be used as a base of operations with Charbatia being used only as a forward staging base.

The USIB/COMOR requirement for semi-annual coverage of the Sino-Indian border region was an estimated requirement, subject to specific review and sanction, and by mid-year 1965 coverage by other means (i. e. satellite and Indian Air Force) was satisfying all urgent needs. One purpose in keeping the U-2 operation from India alive was to keep the door open for possible negotiations with regard to air refueling, emergency landing rights, and radar suppression for the follow-on A-12 aircraft. On the other hand, the prospects for use of Elint systems against Sary Shagan were not good from Charbatia, distance-wise or politically, and OSA was opposed to establishment of a TACKLE-type detachment jointly with the Indians, using Indian pilots.

In the light of these considerations, plans for further staging from India were made only on a contingency basis, and no requirement

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for such operations has since been levied upon IDEALIST. The materiel left at Charbatia was airlifted out (with the exception of a fire truck and two vans, airlift for which was too heavy to land on Charbatia's runway) and most of it moved to Takhli to support the build-up there. The close-out operation was completed in July 1967.

Coverage of Venezuela and British Guiana

In the fall of 1963 the Western Hemisphere Division of DD/P developed a requirement for photographic coverage of Venezuela as a result of activities by anti-government elements (FALN) to interfere with free national elections, discredit the Betancourt government, and try to bring Venezuela into Castro's orbit. It appeared that outside support for the guerrilla activity, based in northeast Venezuela, was being infiltrated across the border from British Guiana.

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A proposal for U-2 photo reconnaissance of the area with IDEALIST assets to ascertain the scope and rate of build-up of guerrilla forces was put to the Special Group and approved on 30 November 1963. A task force, staging from Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico, flew six

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good photographic sorties over the area and returned to Edwards on 22 December 1963 with mission successfully accomplished.

Results obtained from this coverage had to be subjected to special hold-down within the TALENT system lest the British become aware of the overflights of their territory, to the further detriment of relations between the services.

U-2 Carrier Version and Its Operations

The history of the conversion of the U-2 aircraft to a carrier launch and retrieval configuration and the successful operational exercise of this capability is contained in the OSA/DDS&T publication "U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation--Project WHALE TALE--Operation FISH HAWK" (BYE-3525-64), which is included here in the immediately ensuing pages.

The successful coverage from the USS RANGER of the French atomic tests at Tuamotu Archipelago was achieved between 11 and 28 May 1964. Subsequently, in September 1964 and again in March 1965 (during crises on Cyprus), the planning of a joint exercise with the British, involving the ferrying of a U-2 via the U. K. to a U. S. carrier in the Mediterranean, was discussed but was never carried out.

The only serious accident during the carrier pilot training program occurred on 26 April 1965 when U-2 #382 crashed and burned near

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Edwards Air Force Base and the pilot, Mr. Buster Edens, sustained fatal injuries. The mission was to practice simulated carrier landings and the accident board findings indicated most probable cause to be low altitude, wing-low stall resulting in a spin from which the pilot could not recover. One carrier-modified aircraft (U-2 #362) was lost over Mainland China on a TACKLE mission on 7 July 1964 (although it was not being used in its carrier launch or retrieve mode). As of the end of 1967 there were four carrier-configured U-2's left in the CIA inventory.

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BYE-3525/64
December 1964
28 Pages
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U-2 AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATION



OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY

Project "WHALE TAIL"
Operation "FISH HAWK"

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December 1964

U-2 AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATION



project "WHALE TALE"
operation "FISH HAWK"

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency, wishes to express his appreciation to the National Photographic Interpretation Center for assistance in the preparation for publication and printing of this report.

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CHAPTER I

EARLY HISTORY



The U-2 overflight program commenced in the summer of 1956 and for the ensuing four years, operating from land bases in various parts of the world, scored a record of successes which have resulted in its being widely acclaimed as one of the most effective and productive intelligence collection programs in the history of the craft.

On 1 May 1960 the loss of a U-2 deep inside the Soviet Union brought a torrent of world-wide publicity. Subsequently, the problem of obtaining even temporary staging rights in friendly foreign countries became progressively more complicated. Because of the notoriety associated with the aircraft, its appearance in a foreign country, if detected, was likely to create political problems for the host government. This was likely to be true even in those instances where the host country was not subject to immediate pressure by the Soviet Union but was more often a function of internal domestic politics within the host government.

While all such foreign governments recognized the usefulness of the U-2 as an intelligence acquisition vehicle and all were eager for the protection such knowledge affords, few were readily willing to undergo the varied political pressures inherent in granting staging rights to the aircraft.

Given the state of affairs alluded to above, resorting to aircraft carrier based operations was a hopeful prospect not only for coverage of those targets not readily accessible from friendly foreign soil, but for any critical operations where valuable time could not be expended in protracted political negotiations.

The concept of operating the U-2 from an aircraft carrier was not a new or particularly imaginative idea at this time. In fact, it had been considered early in the U-2 program and had been the subject of a discussion during a briefing given to President Eisenhower in May of 1957.



DESIGN PROPOSALS for developing a U-2 with a carrier launch capability were submitted as early as 1957, as shown here. The configuration ultimately chosen most nearly resembles that in the lower drawing with the addition of some additional features such as the mechanical spoilers installed on the wings.

At this time, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, recommended to the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles,

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that immediate action be initiated to develop a U-2 carrier based capability. On 2 August 1957, Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency, in a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations stated as follows:

"(A) The carrier capability at this time would add little to the coverage of the Soviet Bloc obtainable by the U-2 from the land bases to which it now has access.

"(B) The availability of alternate land bases provides a fair degree of insurance against political evictions, but

"(C) Carrier operations, by reason of flexibility and independence of foreign jurisdiction, would generally enhance the reconnaissance capability of the United States, especially with respect to areas outside the Soviet Bloc. Accordingly, although the benefit to the project would be too limited to justify the expenditure of project funds for the conversion of aircraft, this Agency would be happy to see this additional capability in hand. These views have, of course, been made known to the Navy in recent conversations. It is suggested that the

Navy approach the Air Force directly and seek a resolution of the issue."

Since the U-2 project was a joint CIA-USAF project administered and operated by CIA and supported logistically by USAF, any proposal such as the conversion of U-2's for carrier suitability would have required both CIA and USAF concurrence. It subsequently developed that USAF decided there was no need for a carrier capability and in 1957 the attempt to develop the carrier capability was disapproved by the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force.

The Navy attempted on several occasions between 1957 and 1960 to obtain a joint agreement between CIA and Air Force to the effect that a carrier capability should be developed. These attempts met with little success due primarily to the fact that the Agency was able to land-base the U-2 at selected bases compatible with coverage of the Soviet Union and Bloc countries.

Despite the loss of the U-2 over the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960 and the limited operations of the U-2 which followed, the carrier proposal was not seriously pursued again until 1963.

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CHAPTER II

APPROVAL

The proposal to develop a carrier configured U-2, designated the U-2G, gained impetus early in 1963 when Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, took a personal interest in the project.

General Carter engaged in discussions with Mr. Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, designer of the U-2, on the question of whether there would be major problems involved in modifying one or more of the CIA owned U-2's for carrier operations. Mr. Johnson assured General Carter that the aircraft could be modified with relatively minor design and engineering changes and at a reasonable cost.

In view of Mr. Johnson's assurances, General Carter instructed Colonel Jack Ledford, Assistant Director, Office of Special Activities, and his deputy, Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., to have their staff commence the required action for investigating the feasibility of operating CIA U-2's from aircraft carriers, and to determine the necessary measures to implement such a program.

The first of the actions taken by Col. Ledford and his staff featured a series of surveys and familiarization trips to various U.S. aircraft carriers and Naval air stations. The Agency team, headed by Mr. Cunningham, was accompanied by representatives from Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and the Office of the CNO. The purpose of the visits was to enable members of the Agency, Lockheed, and CNO jointly to investigate and define any potential problem areas which might affect the development of the U-2G and to work out, as quickly as possible, solutions to whatever problems that might

arise. It was during the course of these visits and discussions that a tactical doctrine for U-2 carrier based operations began to emerge.

After the initial series of visits and meetings, the group concluded that there were no insolvable problems that would preclude operation of the modified U-2's from an aircraft carrier. Based on the findings and recommendations of the survey team, Mr. Cunningham undertook a comprehensive staff study on the proposal which was subsequently submitted to General Carter.

In addressing the substance of the concept, Mr. Cunningham wrote in part, as follows:

"The basic question then is whether or not this aircraft can be economically adapted to work from carriers with an acceptable margin of safety in flight operations, and, once so adapted, can it operate with frequency varying from occasional to repeated, in this manner, without affecting the Navy's disposition of forces under existing Navy Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) commitments. As indicated earlier, present engineering analyses confirm that the aircraft can be so operated theoretically as to produce a viable carrier capability for reconnaissance purposes.

"Aside from the unknown range and altitude characteristics of the converted aircraft (which will depend upon arresting gear weight for the most part), the only apparent aerodynamic question is associated with the behavior of the aircraft in the landing configuration when it is approaching a fast moving carrier from the stern. One suggestion which has been made

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SURVEY PARTY aboard the U. S. S. INDEPENDENCE. Left to right: Capt. Swanson, U. S. S. INDEPENDENCE; Capt. Martin D. Carmody, Office of the CNO; Mr. William Cottar, Chief of Security, OSA; Mr. Edward L. Green, Eastman-Kodak; Mr. Fred Cavanaugh, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.; Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., DAD/OSA; Major James Chorbouneaux, OSA Project Officer; and Mr. Martin Knutson, Agency U-2 pilot.

is that the standard angle of attack for such an approach with Navy aircraft which is three or four degrees to the horizontal be reduced to approximately 1 1/2 to 2 degrees in the case of the U-2 to permit a flatter angle of approach with power on so that "ballooning" of the aircraft prior to contact with the deck will be minimized.

"In a normal landing attitude, the U-2 rides tail high, which unless compensated for by a skillful power-on approach just above the stall speed may make the engagement of a carrier hook relatively difficult. There is a possibility that a problem may exist in wind pattern over the stern of a fast moving carrier, which according to Navy statistics, normally produces a

down-draft immediately to the rear of the stern, followed by an up-draft from 1,000 to 1,500 feet aft of the carrier. With its sizeable wing area and with flaps fully extended, there may be some adjustments in technique which will have to be accomplished in order to overcome the possible adverse effects of these phenomena.

"Stack wash from the carrier's funnels can largely be eliminated as a deterrent characteristic, since carriers on which the U-2 would be landed make their arrested landings on the angled deck, approximately nine degrees from the central axis of the hull away from the island, and the captains of both the USS LEXINGTON and USS INDEPENDENCE stated categorically that

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
they 'could put the stack wash wherever the pilot wanted it.' This, of course, means that they could adjust the carrier's steaming angle to take maximum advantage of existing wind conditions to deflect stack wash. The only time this might be a modest problem would be when the aircraft is landed in a no wind condition, at which time it must rely solely on the carrier's forward momentum for relative wind."

Recognizing that the physical handling of the U-2G aboard a carrier would pose some unique problems, Mr. Cunningham further wrote:

"Movement of the aircraft from the hangar deck to the flight deck and conversely can be accomplished, despite the fact that no carrier in the United States Navy has elevators large enough to accommodate the U-2 without a portion of the wing extending beyond the outboard edge of the elevator. The largest elevator in the Fleet

measures only 70 by 52 feet, while those on the carriers in the group most likely to be employed in U-2 operations (CVA's 59 through 62), measure 63 by 52 feet. Lockheed has designed a special fuselage cart called a 'LOWBOY,' which permits side casting operations essential to movement from the hangar deck floor to the elevator and from the flight deck to the elevator, etc. This will be equipped with adjustable brakes to prevent any incident should the aircraft be on the elevator during period of rough weather.

"In addition, Lockheed has manufactured a special sling using a fuselage cart as the basic ingredient, which will permit on-and off-loading of the aircraft from the carrier when it is necessary to remove it or replace it aboard other than under its own power. The hangar deck offers adequate space for a compartmentalized working and refueling area.



SPECIAL SLING was manufactured by Lockheed which permits on and off-loading of U-2 from the carrier when it is necessary to remove it or replace it aboard other than under its own power. This photo was taken at North Island NAS as aircraft is prepared for initial launch tests.

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"Minor adjustments in the aircraft component of an operational carrier must be made to provide adequate storage space on the hangar deck, but Navy assures us that this is an administrative problem which can be encompassed by proper direction from higher authorities, beginning with the Chief of Naval Support and the CNO, augmented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in those cases where such temporary depletion of the Air Carrier Group would affect the Navy's SIOP capabilities."

On the subject of cover, the staff study stated:

"A clear and plausible cover story, stoutly maintained by responsible persons concerned and supported by the IDEALIST Detachment aboard the carrier, can probably preserve the fiction of innocuous use of the U-2 for considerable time. This story will require precise and unequivocal attention to every detail. The IDEALIST Detachment and the carrier commander must be given detailed guidance, not only on the objective of the story, but also the necessary supporting actions. The basic requirement is to have a plausible reason for the presence of the U-2 aboard a carrier. Present discussions with the Navy, including Vice Admiral Rayburn, Director of Research and Development for the Navy, and his Deputy, Admiral Weakley, indicate that sponsorship for the U-2 aircraft on the carrier in the long run can be anticipated from the Office of Naval Research headed by Admiral Coates. The discussions thus far have not only indicated that ONR would be willing to have the U-2's attributed to its organization, but that a workable cover arrangement not unlike that which the Agency worked out in 1955 with NACA (ultimately NASA) could be effectuated."

The study concluded with a series of recommendations which, if approved, were designed to produce an operational capability at the earliest possible date.

On 23 July 1963, General Carter approved the staff study and its recommendation and Lockheed immediately began working on the design changes and modifications for two of the Agency U-2's. Concurrently, the OSA staff began coordination with the U.S. Navy for the implementation of the pilot training program and for U-2 suitability tests aboard a carrier.

The principal configuration changes incorporated in the U-2G in order to enable it to operate effectively from carriers included a mechanically operated fuel jettison system to permit the aircraft to be reduced to maximum gross landing weight in the event of either an inflight emergency requiring an immediate landing or in those cases where the aircraft is returned to the ship from a mission with fuel to spare. A further modification was the incorporation of a heavier landing gear which effectively more than doubled the original design specification of maximum deceleration in terms of feet per second. Coupled with this beefed-up landing gear were heavier pressure bulkheads in the landing gear section and augmented longerons in the fuselage at the trailing edge of the wing to withstand the added impact of carrier hook engagement. A modified T2V arresting hook was installed in the aircraft, covered by a plastic fairing which reduces aerodynamic drag, and which is jettisoned at the time the aircraft enters the traffic pattern around the carrier preparatory to landing.

The single most important modification, however, was the addition of a pair of mechanical spoilers situated midway outboard on the trailing edge of each wing. These are activated by a simple switch on the throttle quadrant. Upon actuation at the point of touch-down of

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
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the aircraft: the wing stalls almost immediately, enabling the pilot to spot-land with nearly the same accuracy that would be encountered in more conventional aircraft. Light weight, one inch arresting cables have been substituted for the normal heavier arresting cables on the CVAs in order to reduce critical vibration encountered when the aircraft runs over the cables in the process of arrestment.

It subsequently proved necessary to depress the Fresnel lens landing system to an angle of 1.5 degrees to give the pilot of the U-2 a proper representation of the "meatball" during

his final approach to the deck. Experience has shown that under normal landing conditions with an approach speed of approximately 82 knots and with from 26 to 30 knots wind across the flight deck, effective arrestments at a relative speed of 50-55 knots can be obtained with the ship's arresting engines set at the lowest available figure of only 10,000 pounds of force. All takeoffs from the carrier with the U-2 are normally made on the axial as opposed to the angle deck which requires a clear deck forward in all cases. Catapult launch of the U-2G is not feasible for structural reasons.



BEEFED UP LANDING GEAR more than doubled the original design specification of maximum deceleration in terms of feet per second.

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

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ARRESTING HOOK installed in U-2 is shown in both the retracted and extended positions. Note in the upper picture the partial plastic fairing which reduces aerodynamic drag.

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CHAPTER III

PILOT TRAINING AND SUITABILITY TESTS

The first tests of a U-2 on an aircraft carrier were undertaken in August of 1963. For the preliminary tests a conventional (unmodified) U-2 was used. The operation was designated "Project WHALE TALE."

On the night of 2 August, an Agency U-2 was flown to North Island Naval Air Station at San Diego, California, where, under cover of darkness, and after midnight, it was loaded aboard the Aircraft Carrier USS KITTY HAWK and stowed below decks in the hangar bay. The most stringent security precautions were employed by both Naval and Agency security personnel to limit unwitting persons gaining knowledge of the operation. The North Island base personnel who assisted in moving and loading the U-2 (fire chief, SP's, crane operator, etc.) were briefed in general terms as to the sensitivity of the "ONR exercise" and were admonished not to discuss it with anyone.

The following day, the KITTY HAWK proceeded to a pre-determined test area approximately 50 miles off the coast. While a sharp look-out was maintained for any intruding surface or aircraft, the U-2 was brought up from the hangar deck and prepared for launch.

The aircraft was marked with the large letters "O.N.R." on the vertical stabilizer, in keeping with the agreed cover story that this was an Office of Naval Research project. All personnel participating in the tests were alleged to be either O.N.R. personnel or Lockheed civilian technical representatives.

While the U-2 was being readied for take-off, the commanding officer of the KITTY HAWK, Captain Horace H. Epes requested the attention of the ship's personnel on the public address sys-

tem and read the following prepared statement:

"This morning we will be conducting a series of tests sponsored by the Office of Naval Research to determine the suitability of launching the U-2 from a carrier. In today's operation we will be assisted by personnel from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer of the U-2.

"The ultimate mission of the U-2 operating from a carrier will be to provide a long range, high altitude infrared submarine detection capability. The U-2 was selected for this mission because of its altitude and endurance performance which would permit coverage of vast areas of the oceans.

"The details of this program, and today's test, are classified because of the obvious far reaching implication of this program with relation to the deployment and surveillance of enemy submarines. In this regard, it is important that there be no discussion or disclosures of this test with unauthorized persons. This means anyone who is not aboard today. It is possible that you may read or hear something about this program in the newspapers or on the radio but this does not relieve you of your responsibility not to discuss today's test with unauthorized persons."

Insofar as it was possible to determine, this story was accepted without question by the carrier crew and as of the date of publication of this report, there have been no known security violations or even undesirable speculation by Naval personnel involved in the operation. The same cover story, with minor modifications,

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INTERESTED OBSERVERS of the first U-2 carrier launch tests are photographed on the flag bridge of the U.S.S. KITTY HAWK on 4 August 1963. Left to right: Captain Horace H. Epes, Jr., USN, skipper of the KITTY HAWK; Captain Martin D. Carmody, USN, Office of the CNO; Mr. C. L. "Kelly" Johnson, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.; Vice Admiral Paul D. Stroup, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC; Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., CIA; and Captain George C. Duncan, Asst. Chief of Staff for Force Readiness, COMNAVAIRPAC.

was used on subsequent carrier operations, including the operational overflight mission in the South Pacific, with equally successful results.

The KITTY HAWK was underway at 20 knots; this, combined with a 10 knot headwind resulted in a 30 knot wind across the flight deck. The impressive wing span and light construction of the U-2 under these conditions gave the maintenance crew some difficulty in holding the aircraft on the deck, even without application of power. On signal, the U-2 with Robert Schumacher, LAC test pilot, at the controls, started its take-off run down the flight deck. As the throttle was advanced, the 16,000 pound thrust

Pratt & Whitney J-75 engine catapulted the U-2 toward the bow of the ship. In approximately one-third the length of the flight deck the aircraft was airborne, the pogos fell away, and by the time the U-2 cleared the bow it was already approximately 1,000 feet above the carrier. Then, with pardonable exhibitionism, Schumacher racked the U-2 into a steep climb--a breath-taking spectacle to anyone who had never previously witnessed a U-2 take-off climb under full power. To the carrier crew, accustomed to the flat trajectory take-off of the heavier and more conventional carrier-based aircraft, the U-2 maneuver was a new and somewhat startling experience.

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The ensuing flight maneuvers were accomplished without incident. Schumacher made several low approaches to the flight deck to ascertain whether there were any aircraft controllability problems in the landing area and found that the U-2 was easily controlled throughout all the maneuvers. On his last pass at the KITTY HAWK's deck, he let the U-2 touch-down briefly and then reapplying power lifted off and set course for the LAC plant at Burbank, California. The initial tests were complete and proved that the U-2 could be operated successfully from carriers of the FORRESTAL class. They also furnished the Lockheed engineering staff with valuable data for use in the development of design changes necessary for modification of the U-2 for arrested landings aboard ship.

The U-2 pilots' Carrier Training Program, already well advanced in planning, was designated Project WHALE TALE II.

The decision to implement a training program for the Agency U-2 pilots was made concurrent with the decision to modify the U-2 for carrier operations. Mr. Cunningham, with other Agency staff members and Captain Martin Carmody, Office of Naval Operations, had previously met with the Naval Air Training Command Staff at Pensacola NAS, Florida, on 5 June 1963 to formulate and approve a syllabus for a training program for the pilots selected for the project.

It was agreed that these pilots, because of their high degree of competency and proficiency, would require only a short, but comprehensive, flight training program to qualify them for carrier operations. It was decided that the program would be accomplished in three phases, as follows:

(1) Phase One - Initial flight check-out in the Navy T2A aircraft and carrier type approaches and landings, all under the supervision of highly qualified Naval Landing Signal Officers at Monterey NAS, California.

(2) Phase Two - Further carrier type landings and approaches in the T2A at Pensacola NAS, Florida, until the Landing Signal Officer considered each pilot ready to land aboard an aircraft carrier. Actual T2A landings and qualifications aboard the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON in the Gulf of Mexico completed this phase.

(3) Phase Three - Initial carrier type approaches and landings in the U-2G at Edwards AFB until the Landing Signal Officer considered each pilot ready to land the U-2 aboard ship. Actual U-2 landings and qualifications aboard a FORRESTAL Class Carrier completed this phase.

The first group of four pilots began Phase One of the Carrier Flight Training at Monterey NAS on 17 November 1963, under the supervision of Lt. Cmdr. John Huber, USN, (subsequently assigned to Project IDEALIST as resident Landing Signal Officer). After two weeks of training at Monterey, the group was ready for Phase Two, and on 21-23 November proceeded to Pensacola NAS where all four pilots performed the transition to qualified carrier pilots in their usual professional manner.

The second group consisting of four Agency pilots, Lockheed test pilot Mr. Schumacher and the Edwards Detachment Commander, Lt. Col. William J. Gregory, USAF, were initially scheduled to begin Phase One in December of 1963. However, due to heavy project operational commitments, their training was delayed until 5 January 1964. Training, once begun, went smoothly and professionally, and was completed on 15 February.

Phase Three commenced on 29 February 1964, the date the first U-2G was delivered to the Edwards AFB detachment. Each of the Agency pilots was given numerous sorties in the "G" where much practice went into the development of his flying techniques as derived

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PRECISION PERFORMANCE of U. S. Navy T2A's is demonstrated in this photograph of Project Headquarters personnel being air-lifted to the U. S. S. LEXINGTON to engage in planning for the WHALE TALE program. These aircraft were the training ships which initially were used to check-out U-2 pilots in carrier operations.

from his experience in the T2A. It should be noted that when Commander Huber declared the pilots operationally ready, each felt confident of his ability to undertake the arrested landings, having developed a profound respect for Commander Huber's judgement and experience in carrier operations.

As the development of the U-2G was reaching its final stages by Lockheed and pilot training was nearing completion, the OSA staff began coordinating details for the suitability tests and pilot qualification with representatives from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander Naval Air Pacific, Vice Admiral Paul D. Stroup. With the cooperation and assistance of these officers, the program proceeded to the point where all elements were ready at the same time; the U-2G, project pilots, and the aircraft carrier USS RANGER which had been selected for the tests.

The RANGER operations were planned in three phases designed to take full advantage of the time the carrier was allotted for project use. This phase was designated WHALE TALE III and consisted of the following:

(1) Phase One - This phase was to be devoted to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's exclusive use in testing the U-2G in carrier landings and suitability of operations aboard ship.

(2) Phase Two - Agency pilots' U-2G qualifications. This phase was to begin as soon as Lockheed had completed the Phase One test and had turned the aircraft over to the Edwards Detachment.

(3) Phase Three - This phase was to exercise the Edwards Detachment's operational capability and effectiveness while aboard ship.

WHALE TALE III began when a team composed of Headquarters, Detachment and Lock-

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heed personnel proceeded to the RANGER on 25 February 1964 and briefed and cleared the ship's Commanding Officer, Captain William E. Lemos, and other personnel for Project IDEALIST and the WHALE TALE III operations.


On 28 February 1964, Lockheed and Detachment personnel and equipment were loaded aboard the RANGER. On the following morning, the RANGER proceeded to the test area off San Diego where the operations were to be conducted. Phase One began with LAC pilot Schumacher flying aircraft number 362 in a series of touch-and-go landings on the RANGER. The touch-and-go landings all went smoothly; however, on the first attempt for a hook engagement landing, the aircraft bounced and the hook engaged the wire while the aircraft was in the air. This caused the aircraft to be slammed back on deck and nose over. Minor damage resulted to the nose section of the aircraft which was taken below deck for repairs. After repairs were completed, the aircraft was flown back to Bur-

bank for the instrumentation read out. As a result of this incident, Phase One was rescheduled for 2 March 1964.

On 2 March, LAC pilot Schumacher returned to the RANGER in aircraft 348 and completed four successful arrested landings. This completed Phase One. The aircraft was then turned over to the Edwards Detachment and Phase Two began.

On the same day, the first Agency pilot, Robert J. Ericson, began his U-2C qualifications in 348 and made several touch-and-go landings, but was unable to perform any arrested landings. He ran short of fuel while waiting for the RANGER to maneuver away from a foreign ship which had entered the operational area. He proceeded to North Island NAS for landing, and air operations were discontinued for the day.

On 3 March 1964, Mr. James Barnes, the next pilot, flew out to the RANGER from North



MINOR MISHAP aboard the U. S. S. RANGER is recorded in this series of photos. In the first photo the aircraft is making a normal approach to engagement.

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
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The U-2 has already touched down and has bounced back into the air. The engagement has taken place while still airborne.



The minor damage to the nose section was the result of the engagement taking place while still airborne. The damage was readily repaired aboard the carrier.

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DESIGNING WAYS of C. L. "Kelly" Johnson, a Lockheed vice president and designer of the U-2, were put to the test in configuring the aircraft for carrier operations. Here he appears to be not displeased with the results on completion of the initial launch and recovery tests.

Island NAS in aircraft 348 to continue Phase Two. Mr. Barnes, on his first touch-and-go landing, allowed the right wing to drop. The right wing skid caught on an arresting cable and was torn off. Mr. Barnes then flew the aircraft to Edwards and landed safely on the dry lake bed without further incident.

As a result of these two incidents, both of the modified U-2's needed minor repairs before Phase Two could be continued. Therefore, with the Navy's concurrence, the remainder of

this exercise was planned to be conducted on 9 and 10 March 1964. This delay, as it worked out, was advantageous for all. The pilots refined their approach techniques by applying the experience gained from the 3 March flights.

On 9 and 10 March 1964, Agency pilots Barnes, Bedford, Edens and Squadron Leader Webster of the RAF qualified in the U-2 without further incident. Phase Two and Phase Three were concluded. At this time the Detachment was considered operationally ready.

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
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IN THE GROOVE ALL THE WAY



A REAL SOFT TOUCH DOWN



THE HOOK ENGAGEMENT



A SLIGHT NOSE OVER TENDENCY



RUNNING THE WIRE OUT



THE END OF THE LANDING

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CHAPTER IV

OPERATION FISH HAWK

An opportunity to test the newly acquired U-2 carrier operation capability on a priority photo intelligence overflight mission was not long in coming.

For many months the U.S. Intelligence community had been seeking, through all available sources, to determine the status of the French Nuclear Test Area in the Tuamotu Archipelago, in a remote area of the South Pacific, and to ascertain the imminence of actual nuclear tests.

By April of 1964, the desired hard intelligence had not been obtained and the prospects of acquiring this priority information with available collection methods were far from promising. The Agency, at this point, proposed the use of the carrier based U-2 and on 24 April 1964 the Special Group (303 Committee) approved a single mission to obtain the desired base line photography. Ultimately, as it turned out, two sorties were required to accomplish the objectives of the mission. The operation was given the code name FISH HAWK.

Prior to these missions, the possibility of the French becoming aware of the operation was studied. It was concluded that the security precautions normal for such an operation probably would preclude French knowledge of the operation. The ship and all her aircraft maintained emergency communications silence well before, during, and after the operation. Traffic and schedule analyses were made of the existing commercial airways and sea lanes in the general target area to select a specific operating area which would afford the greatest degree of security from observation. Security precautions were implemented well before the carrier left the west coast. We have confirmed that there has

been, to our knowledge, no foreign awareness of our operations in the area.


The operation had many "firsts" which are noteworthy. It was the first time a U-2 was flown on an operational overflight from, and recovered back aboard an aircraft carrier. It was the first time the special Dual Itek Camera (an improved system with higher resolution than the standard "B" configuration) was flown on an operational mission. It was the first time Agency U-2 detachment personnel were to integrate themselves into carrier living and working conditions. It was the first time that the detachment commander was delegated the authority to plan and launch an operational mission. And finally, it was the first time most of the detachment personnel were inducted into the Shellback Clan of those who have crossed the equator on a U.S. Navy vessel.

The detailed planning for this operation began shortly after the Special Group approved this method of obtaining photographic and electronic coverage of the test area. The plan included the final tests of the Edwards Detachment shipboard operational capability prior to the departure of the USS RANGER to the target area. This plan was changed somewhat when the Navy indicated that the RANGER would be in a radio silence condition throughout their steaming time to and from the target area. The detachment had a continuous communications link with Headquarters via a clandestine net. The ultimate success of this mission was greatly contributed to by the competence of the Agency Communications Staff which merits special mention.

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


PRE-MISSION CHECKOUT of the Dual Itek camera is meticulously performed by the maintenance technicians (above) and (below) the camera is installed in the U-2 equipment bay.



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SHELLBACK RITES - The traditional ceremony of inducting into the Shellback Clan those who have not previously crossed the equator, is held as the RANGER crosses the imaginary line on return from the mission. "Father Neptune" reads the scroll.

The inclusive dates of the mission were from 11 May to 28 May 1964 during which time two operational missions were flown over the selected South Pacific islands of special interest. Requirements of the exercise consisted of coverage of five targets with one considered primary and the other four secondary. Complete coverage of the targets was accomplished on the two missions.

The USS RANGER's specific mission was derived from the basic FISH HAWK Operations

Order 3-64. In general terms, RANGER was to spend one day, 12 May, engaged in refresher landings for the U-2 pilots, and in recovering two U-2G aircraft for the mission. Upon completion of this phase, RANGER was to check out of the movement report system, set EMCOM below 30 Mcs. and head for the target area 3,000 miles away.

Approximately halfway to the target, RANGER was to refuel from the the oiler USS PLATTE, rendezvous with the destroyer USS PARSONS,

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and complete the run to the target at 25 knots. When the mission was declared complete, RANGER was to head back with PARSONS and PLATTE, refueling enroute. After refueling, RANGER was to leave PARSONS and PLATTE and return to port on its own. RANGER was to dispatch the mission film to San Diego via A3B aircraft at the earliest practicable time. EMCOM was to be lifted on arrival back at the west coast operation area.

Actual conduct of the mission is graphically described in the following excerpts from the report of Colonel William J. Gregory, the Agency Detachment Commander:

"Tuesday, 19 May 1964 - Our position at 0001Z 1425S and 13959W. A message

was received from Headquarters at approximately 0200L indicating concurrence on 'go weather.' We had already decided that this date looked favorable and were working through our sequence of events leading up to the mission. The preparations proceeded without any hitches and our timing schedule for the various stages from system loading to take-off went almost exactly as planned. It was very dark on deck during the positioning of the aircraft from the hangar deck to the take-off position with only very dim red lights being used. A hard tropical rain drenched the ship and aircraft about 45 minutes before take-off and it was necessary to delay loading the pilot for about 5 min-



DAWN'S EARLY LIGHT faintly illuminates the mission aircraft, with U. S. S. RANGER's stack in the background, as preparations are completed for the first carrier launch of a U-2 on an operational overflight.

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utes, but we had a pad built-in to the timing schedule at this point. The engine was started 4 minutes before launch, power units were recovered, pogos were pulled and at precisely 0700L the take-off was made as scheduled. The take-off roll was straight

as an arrow with the aircraft lifting off the deck just beyond the island super-structure. The carrier was ten miles off position at take-off due to weather, but the pilot quickly regained track and the radar viewers were surprised to see the trace disappear



MISSION PILOT receives last minute briefing by U-2 crew chief prior to take-off. Note walk-around oxygen bottle beside pilot, used to maintain oxygen pre-breathing sequence which commences three hours prior to launch.

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
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from the scope on the exact predicted course near the 300 mile point. They were even more impressed when they observed him appear again on the inbound wax pencil mark denoting his line of flight to the carrier. One radio transmission at the 100NM point was made by CIC for start descent but no course corrections were necessary in spite of a thick overcast from 45,000 down to 10,000 feet. Let down beginning at the 100NM point is ideal, for in this case the article arrived over the carrier at 4,000 feet from a continuous descent. We were concerned over the landing, for the sea had gone to an unpredicted state 4 with 6-8 feet

swells and occasionally 10-12 feet. The pilot made a nice approach and good landing, trapping the number 1 wire. The ships operations personnel were amazed that the landing was made within 30 seconds of the predicted time given to them prior to take-off. The aircraft was in good shape on landing and was ready to go the next day. The second run over the primary target was an exceptionally wise plan on the part of Headquarters because we got practically nothing on the first run and 85% of the area on the second run only ten minutes later which covered all the area of interest. We were very pleased with the way the first opera-



"SAYONARA" - The mission aircraft lifts gracefully off the bow of the carrier and starts bank to right to pick up course to target area approximately 300 miles away.

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
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tional mission was executed and could find very little reason to make any significant changes in our plans or procedures after going through a post-mission critique with the idea of improving methods. All systems operated throughout the mission with no malfunctions. BIRDWATCHER checks were scheduled at 30 minute intervals throughout the mission and all readouts were good except for one out of the scheduled 12 which was not received. (Editors Note: BIRDWATCHER is an Agency designed electronic telemetry system which periodically transmits back to the ground or carrier-based detachment, performance data on the functioning of more than 30 critical components of the aircraft.)

"Friday, 22 May 1964 - Our position at 0001Z 1207S and 13752W. The final weather was received at 0230L and showed a very slight improvement for target Bravo

which was forecast as CAT II, but the other three targets were CAT IV with little hope of any coverage. The preparation for the mission proceeded according to plan and each phase was on schedule. The take-off was precisely on time and again it was very straight down the deck with no problem in maintaining perfect directional control. The mission flight plan showed 5+30 with targets Bravo and Delta of primary interest since they were overcast in the first mission and Alpha and Cocoa also re-scheduled as flight lines since they were along the route. Weather covered approximately 90% of the entire area but surprisingly all four targets were open and good coverage was obtained on all of them. The descent was again begun at 100NM which worked out very well and is now established as the optimum for approaches to the carrier. Again an unpredicted sea state 4 existed



MISSION COMPLETE - Within 30 seconds of predicted landing time, the mission aircraft touches down on the RANGER flight deck, approximately six hours after take-off. Helicopter in background was available for plane guard and rescue operations, if required, and also maintained surveillance of area for possible intruders.

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on recovery and the deck was pitching a good 6 - 8 feet which now makes it obvious that the ships aerologist cannot predict sea state with much accuracy. The pilot made a very fine level approach averaging out the ups and downs of the unstabilized meat ball and made a perfect trap on the number 3 wire. An evaluation of the material showed that all

targets were well covered and it really 'put the icing on the cake' with complete coverage on all targets provided by combining the two missions. The aircraft landed one minute later than predicted but the pilot had to stretch out his pattern slightly to get down to 320 gallons of fuel."



WELCOME - A tired but grinning mission pilot is congratulated by U-2 operations personnel as they assist him from the cockpit. Subsequent analysis of the flight and photos obtained proved that the congratulations were well deserved.

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

On completion of Operation FISH HAWK, the Commanding Officer of the USS RANGER in his final report stated:

"Recovery of the U-2 was exactly on schedule at 1320V and without incident. All available take-up in the way of interceptors, SAR aircraft, etc., were held in readiness on deck. The precision with which the whole U-2 operation was planned and executed was outstanding in all respects. In summary, no serious problems were encountered. The mission pilots had a boarding rate of 1.0 which cannot be improved upon."

The report concluded with the following observations:

"a. The aircraft carrier/U-2 combination constitutes a naturally compatible and potent intelligence tool.

"b. Operations of this type were well within the capabilities of RANGER and present no unusual problems. While the operation is not routine in nature, it could be readily integrated in slightly curtailed air wing operations reduced by about 16 points deck load multiple.

"c. A possible problem in the area of security stems from the large number of ship's crew who can deduce a great deal of information on ship's position, the past history of the U-2, etc. Every effort was made to limit navigational information to a very few individuals."

An endorsement to the report by the Com-

mander First Fleet stated:

"That the operation was concluded successfully attests to the suitability and reliability of a CVA as a launch platform for this type operation."

The photography acquired on the two operational missions was of excellent quality and although the substantive intelligence derived is excluded from this report for security reasons, the results are probably best described in the preliminary report of the operation prepared by the Directorate for Science and Technology, CIA, which stated:

"From an operational and security standpoint, this was one of the most successful operations of this nature ever conducted by the United States. The Navy is to be complimented for its excellent cooperation and assistance in accomplishing this task."

From the standpoint of those who devoted their time and efforts to the successful culmination of this project, the results were especially gratifying. The addition of this proven intelligence collection system to the U.S. array of reconnaissance systems provides a flexibility and latitude of operations, the value of which may truly be assessed only in the light of future events.

It further, and perhaps more importantly, demonstrates the accomplishments which can be achieved by a full and uninhibited cooperation and melding of the assets and talents of two separate government agencies.

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RECOGNITION - On 30 September 1964 before a capacity audience in the United States Intelligence Board meeting room of the Langley Headquarters of CIA, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of CIA, (Right) presents the Distinguished Intelligence Medal to Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., DAD/OSA, for his singular contribution to the development of the U-2 carrier capability. Mr. Cunningham, a former U. S. Marine pilot himself, was cited for "the development of a unique method of acquiring foreign intelligence information."

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Dual Staging Capability at Detachment G

At the end of 1962, planning assumptions took into account requirements for continuing U-2 coverage of the China Mainland, the prospective semi-permanent IDEALIST base in India, a standby ECM-configured U-2 aircraft at Edwards available for Cuban coverage when required, and a J-75 and a J-57 configured U-2 available for supporting OXCART equipment test programs. Manpower at Detachment G therefore was required for more than a single staging capability. By spring 1963, programming was underway for full dual staging capability and the addition of 21 staff personnel (including military detailees), appointment of a deputy commander and recruitment of two contract pilots were covered in the FY 1964 budget presentation. Full staffing for dual capability was not achieved until the end of 1963 and meanwhile it was necessary at times to borrow medical, weather and communications personnel on a TDY basis from their parent services.

In the spring of 1964, SAC was given the responsibility for tactical coverage of Southeast Asia targets in support of the Vietnam military command which relieved Detachment G's thinly stretched resources, and by 1965 Detachment G was able to deploy sufficient personnel and equipment to Takhli to provide a semi-permanent launch/recovery

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capability there for special requirements and also to augment the staff at Detachment H with TDY personnel for simultaneous operations from Tao Yuan (using American contract pilots when required).

At the end of 1965, Detachment G under the command of Lt. Col. Miles M. Doyle numbered 91 Agency Staff and military assignees; in addition there were nine contract pilots and six contract guards, and one U.S. Navy officer on loan for the carrier training program.

Annex 106 gives a listing of all overflight missions accomplished by Detachment G from October 1960 to April 1968, and a description of the procedures followed in planning, obtaining approval for, and directing a normal overflight mission.

Build-up of Facilities at Detachment G, 1964-66

Following the reconstitution of Detachment G as an operational unit and its build up through 1961-62 to a dual capability in late 1963, the available facilities at Edwards North Base became overcrowded and in such poor repair that a construction and refurbishing program became necessary. Under the supervision of the Project Engineer,

[redacted] a program was entered into in 1964 which eventually cost the grand total of \$1.5 million. The construction included:

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Office building
Two warehouses
Mess Hall
Physical fitness building
Guards building (for Lockheed contract guards)
Communications facility; transmitter
Outdoor lighting of area for security
Avionics building
Hangars #1 and #3 remodeled
Fuel storage tanks
Fencing around the perimeter
Office for Lockheed U-2R team
Runway resurfaced

Continued Development and Testing at Edwards, 1963-66

Improved Camera Systems

During the summer of 1963, tests were run on the B camera to determine what improvement in ground resolution could be obtained by using higher resolution film and variable shutter speed. The tests proved successful, achieving 2 foot resolution as compared to the previous 2-1/2 to 3 feet. Delivery of three new B cameras approved for procurement was completed in September 1963.

Concurrently the Itek Triple Prime Camera (which had been built for the CORONA program) was approved for procurement by the DD/R in April 1963 and was modified to go into the U-2 with flight tests beginning in September 1963. The proposal was to procure four of the dual configurations of the system, called Delta II. This system furnished

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17.3 nautical miles swath width with 26 degrees convergent stereo, 70 degrees lateral coverage, two to one contrast, target specifications calling for better than 10 inches ground resolution with 3,000 plus nautical miles linear coverage. Delivery of the first system was promised for four months after the equipment bay mock-up was agreed. The cost was estimated at \$1,136,000 with anticipation of achieving a price break by ordering jointly with the Air Force who were expected to procure a number of the systems. The operational plan was to be able to fly with the B configuration on one day and the Delta a day or two later with the same aircraft. This interchangeability was achieved, but Air Force procurement of this system was not undertaken. Successful testing was accomplished in December 1963 and the photo interpreters agreed that the Delta II could produce more detailed information on individual targets than any other available camera. The first unit was delivered to Detachment H and was installed and ready for operation by 25 December 1963. Delivery of four cameras was complete by August 1964.

With the Chinese Communist nuclear capability as target, an infra-red capability for the U-2 was studied in mid-1963. In September the Air Force made available two AFSC U-2's at Edwards for testing

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the HRB-Singer and the Texas Instruments IR systems. The Texas Instruments version (FD-3) was chosen with initial procurement of two. (A third was stereo-configured for the OXCART program). The IR camera was tested and declared operational on 26 October 1964 and was deployed to Detachment H on 7 November 1964 for use over Mainland China. Because of the vulnerability of the TACKLE aircraft to the missile defenses surrounding the Chinese nuclear installations, only one overflight has been made with the IR camera to date.

Product Improvement Program

Auto Pilot. In February 1963 Lockheed was requested to do an engineering study on a new improved auto pilot to improve the stability of the airborne platform. The Lear Siegler autopilot was evaluated and selected as most suitable for the U-2, and the first operational model was delivered in August 1964.

Instrument Panel: In April 1963 a study was made by the Project Staff and the Air Force U-2 group with a view to redesigning the instrument panel in order to provide better visibility and panel presentation. This in turn would ease the pilot's burden on long-range flights and help solve some of the human factors problems. This was accomplished along with the new autopilot installation in the summer of 1964.

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Improved Seat Pack. Rocket Jet Corporation was subcontracted by Lockheed in February 1963 to develop a more satisfactory seat kit and produced the Q445 for testing during the summer. Comparison tests by Project Staff found the Q445 more suitable than a new Air Force parachute seat kit and it was agreed in August 1963 that Lockheed would procure and integrate the Q445 kit into the IDEALIST aircraft as they went through IRAN.

* * * *

At the end of 1966, as on one or two occasions previously, the Bureau of the Budget raised the question of moving Detachment G from Edwards North Base to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base at Tucson, Arizona, where the SAC U-2 Wing was located, for the purpose of improving efficiency and reducing costs. A joint NRO/CIA/USAF study was made and the report of March 1967 concluded that the collocation of the Agency program with the SAC U-2 operation was operationally infeasible and in any case would not result in any significant monetary savings; therefore Detachment G should remain at Edwards.

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Postscript on U-2 Airframe

In October 1967, a SAC U-2 assigned at Bien Hoa, Saigon, in tactical reconnaissance support of the Vietnam Command, was discovered to have a wing crack, determined to be the result of metal fatigue. The particular aircraft had over 4,000 flying hours to its credit. All IDEALIST U-2's were grounded on 6 November and subsequently underwent an ultrasonic inspection by a Lockheed team. The inspection revealed that Nos. 385, 349 and 359 had flaws and these aircraft were immediately scheduled into Lockheed for modification to correct the problem.

Commenting on the problem of metal fatigue to Mr. Parangosky, Deputy Director of Special Activities, Mr. C. L. Johnson drew attention to a letter he had written to Mr. Bissell on the subject eleven years previously, and went on to say:

"I think you will find it of interest, in that at that time I referred to an anticipated life for the U-2 wing of some 5,000 hours. That is just about what it made. I don't know how often we can call fatigue problems this accurately.

"With the new fix we are putting into the center sections, we will definitely eliminate conditions at that point. I do think, however, that you should expect increasing fatigue problems in other areas as time goes on, in spite of our very good record to date..." 1/

IDEA-0743-67, 30 Nov 1967. Letter to Mr. Parangosky from Mr. Johnson.

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ANNEX 104

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CHAL-0573

18 February 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Bombing Capability for the U-2

1. I shall attempt to summarize the U-2 bombing capability situation in the following remarks:

a. Lockheed has developed a bomb door installation which was used during the tests of downward ejection seats from the equipment bay. With the construction of a simple bomb rack, the equipment bay could be used to carry bombs. It appears that the drift sight could substitute as a bomb sight.

b. A bomb of approximately 500 pounds weight and of the approximate size of a 500 pound GP bomb would fit into the equipment bay.

c. The yield of a nuclear bomb of this weight could be any desired value up to an expected maximum of about

d. Lockheed has examined the effects on the aircraft caused by the detonation of a 10 KT bomb. According to their report no damage is expected with the aircraft flying at maximum altitude, approximately 13 miles, and performing a 180° turn immediately after drop. This places the aircraft at a slant range of some 18 miles at the time of explosion.

e. Based on information obtained from AFSWP there is presently no existing bomb which weighs in the neighborhood of 500 pounds and is suitable for dropping from the U-2. AFSWP expects that by 1964 or 1965 a bomb of this approximate size and weight will be available with a possible yield of between We have been informed also that with special priority and an expedited project that an elemental bomb of this approximate size and weight could be put together in about two years.

f. Rough calculations have been made of the effects on the U-2 of the detonation of bombs with yields of 10, 50, 250 and 400 KT. There is considerable difference in the

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estimates of over-pressure made by Lockheed and those furnished by AFSWP. With the more conservative AFSWP data the over-pressures which would be encountered at the slant range in question, even from the highest yield of the bombs considered, would be much below the [] which is considered approaching the danger point. The heating effect, again considering the largest yield, is also estimated to be well below the [] limit. Neutron and gamma radiation at the distance involved is so low as to be practically incalculable.

2. In all of the above calculations standard pressures, temperatures and visibility of about 10 miles were assumed. The remaining factor which seems most likely to cause difficulty is the wind velocity immediately behind the advancing shock front. This gust would strike the aircraft from the rear and may possibly exceed the design gust velocity for yields between 250 and 400 KT. It appears that for smaller yields up to perhaps 50 KT, this would not be a serious problem.

3. It is recommended that no further consideration be given to tests of the U-2 in a bombing configuration due to the reported unavailability of nuclear weapons of this size and weight.

(Signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Recommendation Paragraph 3

APPROVED: To advise the Air Force that CIA does not intend to consider further unless urged to do so by Air Force. We would then consider it.

(Signed) C. P. CABELL
Deputy Director

DCI concurs.
6 March 59.

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ANNEX 105

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IDEA-0397

26 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Branch, DPD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Policy Officials on DPD Activities

1. I am gravely concerned about the erosion of security inherent in the recent expansion of the requirement to brief high level policy officials on DPD operations in the course of obtaining necessary political permission to conduct these operations. I have specific reference to what we have come to call the "Black Book" type of presentation which came to be a fashion with the IDEALIST Program on a much smaller scale some years ago.

2. There were signs even in the last days of the previous Administration that this system of briefing could easily get out of hand. However, at that time the majority of the pre-operation briefings of this sort were carried on personally by the Director, the DDCI, or the DD/P with the sometime assistance of personnel in DPD Operations. In most instances it was possible to fulfill the requirement for the production of this material with a single, or at most two, such Black Books. In the case of operations other than IDEALIST, it was only occasionally necessary to create Black Books of this sort in modest quantities, and for the most part these remained exclusively within Agency or DPD control.

3. Since January of this year, several things have combined to increase the requirement for briefings of this sort with the resultant ill effects I have alluded to above. Without attempting to rank these factors, I would identify them as about as follows:

a. The new Administration has made not only the expected changes in personalities and previously established ways of doing things, but as is the case with any major shift of this sort, new lines of coordination and responsibility are rapidly established and frequently take many months to sort themselves out before a harmonious working relationship can be achieved. For example, the position of the so-called

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5412 Committee in the present Administration is much stronger in my view than under Mr. Eisenhower. As a consequence, more subjects tend to come before it for consideration, and these are not solely confined to those extremely sensitive operations which formerly came to the 5412 Committee. Also, the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which under the previous Administration had an almost invisible policy role, now has emerged as a strong policy group with a vested interest in all covert operations. To this body we are also entrusting detailed information regarding sensitive operations on a fairly regular basis, though at the present moment not in the Black Book format.

b. In the wake of the Cuban disaster, there has been a natural emergence of additional control mechanisms on all types of covert operations under the aegis of the Government. The Administration at all policy levels appears highly sensitized to anything covert, and consequently many people become interested in all covert operations and to a far greater degree than was heretofore the case. As an example of this, I cite the establishment following Cuba of the so-called situation Room in the White House where all clandestine activities of the Government are posted in such a way as to be available to the Chief Executive. Although at the present we do not submit Black Books to this source, it is not impossible that such a requirement could develop, since we do furnish them a monthly forecast of all air operations. At the same time the Joint Reconnaissance Center in DOD has finally matured and becomes the resting place for sensitive operational information being undertaken within the purview of the DOD. To this body DPD regularly contributes basic information regarding certain of its operations, simply in order to avoid areas of conflict with ongoing programs there.

4. There are other influences which have tended to make the problem of pre-mission coordination more complicated. One of these is that in contrast to 5412 Committee meetings in past years where subjects came up for discussion and were resolved in one or two meetings, some items have dragged on for months since the first of the year, necessitating the almost weekly production of Black Books for each of the members of the Committee, detailing at great length

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various operational proposals. It could be inferred that this has resulted from not only the change of Administration and the strengthening of the role of the 5412, but the concurrent involvement of the DD/P in other matters to the point where he was no longer able to personally brief the Special Group from a single book as he had been accustomed in the past. Another measure of the problem can be taken from a comparison of our pre-mission coordination procedure with the Department of State in the previous Administration with the order followed at present. On a sensitive operation in the past, the Director, General Cabell, or Mr. Bissell usually briefed the Secretary or Under Secretary of State personally, again from material retained by them. On occasion the Director of Intelligence and Research would make it possible for the Acting Chief, DPD, or his representative to personally brief the Secretary on a given mission working from briefing charts. At the present time it is necessary for us to create an extremely detailed Black Book here in the Division, which then is sent to the present Director of Intelligence and Research, his deputy, or one of his special assistants, and they then accept responsibility for briefing the Secretary or the Under Secretary across the board without the presence of any one from the Agency. This Black Book is then carried to the Special Group meeting by the Under Secretary. The problem really is that once you give a Black Book to a single member of any policy body there ensues an immediate requirement to give everyone else attending the meeting a book with the same detailed information. As a horrible example of the lengths to which this can be carried, the material on Project TACKLE, which was prepared for 5412 consideration earlier this month and in connection with a highest level White House meeting on 14 July, DPD Intelligence Staff was obliged to create no less than nine Black Books (red in this instance) which contained the ingredients of the entire TACKLE Program: listings of highest priority targets, cover story, sample mission routes, etc. As if this were not enough, subsequent to the 14 July meeting a requirement originating with General Taylor called for a more condensed version of the earlier material, including the actual mission track of the new POLEGAT Operations.

5. Not only have we literally gone into the publishing business on this sensitive material, but I feel that we have lost almost complete control of the actual location of the books once they have left this office.

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Operating against us are the simple facts that because this material is going to busy VIP's who are frequently inaccessible, the responsibility for receipting for this material rarely, if ever, falls to the VIP himself but is delegated to the secretary or typist nearest the door of the high level official. Once she has signed for the document she does not have the foggiest idea of its physical location, I am sure. The other factor working away from good security is that the recipient of this material has no restriction placed on him as to those persons to whom he shows the book or in some cases gives it for temporary retention. In some cases I am certain that it is literally passed around among interested officials close to the VIP but about whose clearance status we have no way of knowing anything. In addition, there is the always present problem of retrieving these books after a policy approval meeting. I venture that there are still outstanding copies of some of these Black Books outside the Agency where we cannot say for sure how long, if ever, it will be before we get them back.

6. The day does not go by but what I shudder to think of the repercussions that would follow the loss of one of these books by someone in a public conveyance or in some equally compromising situation where knowledge of its contents could pass to unauthorized personnel including members of the press. Should this occur I am virtually certain that we would have a repeat of the highest level concern, resulting from the publication in NEWSWEEK of the Administration's plan for meeting the Berlin Crisis. In addition to all the things I have said to date, there is the sheer physical problem of reproduction of these materials within the DPD Intelligence Staff. They simply are not manned to turn out books with the detail and art work frequently necessary. I have had one suggestion from that quarter regarding a possible way in which some control might be introduced and that is that each book be preprinted in gold letters with its classification on the cover, together with a printed control number as well as a brief description of its contents; i. e., "Development Projects Division, Central Intelligence Agency, Operations Briefing Book." The thought is that a combination of the number and the vivid description might impel the recipients to take better care of its movements and storage once it was in their hands. It has also been suggested that in contrast to the present "Hand Carry" system for these materials that a rigid Top Secret Control System be substituted, calling for actual signatures, not only of recipients, but of everyone who sees

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its contents. Given the usual time envelope for submissions of this material, such a slowdown would undoubtedly provoke complaints and criticisms from a number of quarters. I maintain, however, that these criticisms, however vocal, are preferable to the compromise of a single sensitive operation. The root of the problem, however, seems to me to lie with the fact that the number of books in circulation must be drastically reduced, and this without hurting the inevitable feelings of the officials involved. Such a reduction will call for the increased personal participation of the DCI, the DDCI, or the DD/P, working from a single Black Book in the actual physical briefing of high level officials whose approval is required for a given mission. We can also hope that as a confidence factor in the Agency method of operations is gradually re-established, the number of subjects requiring detailed presentations of this type will be progressively reduced. In the meantime, however, I think we are in real danger, and I earnestly request that you not only consider this problem yourself but that you discuss it with the Director of Security and others in the Agency whose opinions you value, culminating hopefully in a recommendation as to the course we should follow in order to be consistent with the best security practice. If we are not able to control this situation, I think that a major leak is just a matter of time and that at a minimum the requirement for more and more books with greater amounts of detail will continue. It is a very short step indeed between giving a mission track in advance of an operation to actually circulating the Operations Order for pre-mission coordination within the Government. Let me have your views on this at your earliest convenience.

(Signed)

James A. Cunningham, Jr.
Assistant Chief, DPD-DD/P

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~~TOP SECRET~~NORMAL U-2 MISSION OPERATIONS PLAN

The conduct of operations, as evolved since 1956 and practiced with regard to all overflights since, follows a general pattern of planning, preparation, direction and execution. Planning begins with preliminary target requirements which COMIREX (formerly COMOR) forwards to USIB and the Special Group for approval. At this time information pertaining to a proposed mission is contained within the Operations Division of OSA. Upon approval by the Special Group, the implementation mechanism is set in motion.

Execution procedures are the same for forward staging bases as for operations conducted from a permanent base except for the lead time required to preposition necessary equipment and personnel. The following operational control procedures are standard for Agency activities:

ALERT: The initial action is to review the weather in the target area. When the weather is acceptable for photographic reconnaissance the Agency U-2 detachment is alerted. This alert is provided not less than 24 hours prior to take-off for a mission. At this time the detachment is given the general framework of the intended mission in order to allow proper preparation. This information includes take-off time, general area of operation, equipment desired and special instructions as appropriate. At this time support agencies such as NORAD, Search and Rescue, CINCLANT for fighter cover, JRC for over-all coordination, NPIC, HEPC, selected processing facility, and Headquarters USAF are advised. In addition, higher echelons of the Agency are advised of impending activity.

MISSION PLAN: Weather in the target area is again reviewed and if satisfactory, the detailed mission plan is provided to the operating detachment not later than twelve hours prior to take-off. Included in the plan are detailed requirements including penetration times, altitudes, headings, targets, and camera flight lines. Also included are emergency instructions, authorized emergency landing bases in order of priority and any special information regarding survival, cover and friendly forces that may be pertinent to the mission. Hostile air and radar order of battle, etc., are also provided at this time to prepare for the pilot briefing.

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GO-NO-GO: A final review of target weather is accomplished and the authority to launch the mission is provided to the detachment not less than two hours prior to take-off. At this time the information is also passed to supporting agencies as well as higher echelons of the Agency. A final re-check is made in Headquarters to see that political approval is still not affected by late breaking developments.

By utilizing the procedures above, complete planning, direction and control of operations is retained by the Agency Project Headquarters. Maximum hold-down is maintained on the mission track and on general knowledge that a mission is in fact in progress. Upon completion of the mission the community is made aware of results via the TALENT System.

(Taken from Attachment B to
BYE-3944-62)

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ANNEX 106

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DETACHMENT G MISSIONS

<u>Date</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Pilot</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Results</u>
26 Oct 1960	3001	Rand	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Poor
27 Oct 1960	3002	Rand	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Poor
27 Nov 1960	3003	Jones	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
5 Dec 1960	3011	Cherbonneaux	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
11 Dec 1960	3016	Edens	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
3 Jan 1961	3018	Baker	Cubi Point	North Vietnam, Laos	Fair
4 Jan 1961	3019	Cherbonneaux	Cubi Point	" " "	Fair
4 Jan 1961	3020	Rand	Cubi Point	" " "	Good
9 Jan 1961	3023	Jones	Cubi Point	" " "	Good
10 Jan 1961	3024	Edens	Cubi Point	" " "	Poor
16 Jan 1961	3025	Baker	Cubi Point	" " "	Excellent
18 Jan 1961	3026	Cherbonneaux	Cubi Point	" " "	Good
19 Mar 1961	3028	Barnes	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
21 Mar 1961	3029	Knutson	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
6 April 1961	3030	Kratt	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
8 April 1961	3032	Rand	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
11 April 1961	3033	Jones	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
13 April 1961	3034	Edens	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Fair
15 April 1961	3035	Dunaway	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
15 April 1961	3036	Baker	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
16 April 1961	3037	Cherbonneaux	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
17 April 1961	3038	Barnes	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
17 April 1961	3039	Knutson	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
18 April 1961	3040	Kratt	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good

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18 April 1961	3041	Rand	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
19 April 1961	3042	Jones	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
20 April 1961	3043	Edens	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Excellent
23 April 1961	3045	Dunaway	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
29 April 1961	3047	Baker	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
23 May 1961	3048	Cherbonneaux	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
15 June 1961	3049	Barnes	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
28 June 1961	3051	Knutson	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
29 June 1961	3054	Baker	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
15 Aug 1961	3055	Rand	Cubi Point	North Vietnam	Good
3 Sept 1961	3058	Cherbonneaux	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
26 Oct 1961	3060	Knutson	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
6 Dec 1961	3061	Barnes	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
19 Jan 1962	3062	Cherbonneaux	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
2 Feb 1962	3065	Rand	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Fair
21 Feb 1962	3066	Ericson	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, North Vietnam	Good
21 Feb 1962	3067	Baker	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
13 Mar 1962	3069	Ericson	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, North Vietnam	Poor
15 Mar 1962	3071	Edens	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
21 Mar 1962	3072	Ericson	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, North Vietnam	Fair
1 Apr 1962	3074	Barnes	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
7 Apr 1962	3076	Ericson	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, North Vietnam	Good

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2 May 1962	3078	Rand	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
6 May 1962	6056	Knutson	Tao Yuan Taiwan	SEA North Vietnam	Good
22 May 1962	3079	Edens	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Excellent
6 June 1962	3080	Barnes	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
15 June 1962	3081	Cherbonneaux	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
18 June 1962	3082	Knutson	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
22 June 1962	6058	Baker	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, North Vietnam	Fair
29 June 1962	3083	Cherbonneaux	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
8 July 1962	3084	Knutson	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Fair
12 July 1962	3085	Cherbonneaux	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
21 July 1962	6060	Barnes	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, North Vietnam	Poor
5 Aug 1962	3086	Baker	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
29 Aug 1962	3088	Ericson	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
5 Sept 1962	3089	Edens	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
17 Sept 1962	3091	Baker	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Fair
26 Sept 1962	3093	Rand	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Good
29 Sept 1962	3095	Edens	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Excellent
5 Oct 1962	3098	Barnes	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Fair
7 Oct 1962	3100	Knutson	Del Rio, Texas	Cuba	Fair
5 Dec 1962	3201	Rand	Takhli, Thailand	Tibet	Good
10 Dec 1962	3203	Baker	Takhli, Thailand	Tibet	Good
27 Dec 1962	3206	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, North Vietnam	Good
31 Dec 1962	3208	Rand	Takhli, Thailand	Tibet	Fair

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3 Jan 1963	3210	Baker	Takhli, Thailand	Tibet	Fair
19 Jan 1963	3213	Cherbonneaux	Takhli, Thailand	Tibet	Good
22 Jan 1963	3215	Edens	Takhli, Thailand	Tibet	Good
1 Mar 1963	3218	Cherbonneaux	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, N. Vietnam	Fair
2 Mar 1963	3219	Cherbonneaux	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Good
30 Apr 1963	3221	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos, China	Good
3 May 1963	3222	Rand	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos, China	Good
13 May 1963	3224	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos, China	Fair
14 May 1963	3225	Rand	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Fair
15 May 1963	3226	Baker	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Fair
10 Aug 1963	6066	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN	Good
29 Sept 1963	3227	Barnes	Takhli, Thailand	Tibet	Good
10 Oct 1963	3230	Barnes	Takhli, Thailand	Tibet	Fair
11 Oct 1963	3231	Barnes	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN	Good
26 Oct 1963	3235	Baker	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Fair
29 Oct 1963	3236	Rand	Takhli, Thailand	Tibet	Good
10 Nov 1963	3238	Rand	Takhli, Thailand	China, NEFA	Good
14 Nov 1963	3239	Edens	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, Burma Border	Poor
15 Nov 1963	3241	Bedford	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, Burma, Laos	Fair
17 Nov 1963	3243	Edens	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN	Excellent
3 Dec 1963	3250	Barnes	Ramey AFB, P. R.	Venezuela	Good
6 Dec 1963	3252	Ericson	Ramey AFB, P. R.	Venezuela	Good
13 Dec 1963	3253	Edens	Ramey AFB, P. R.	Venezuela, Guiana	Good
14 Dec 1963	3254	Barnes	Ramey AFB, P. R.	Venezuela, Guiana	Good
18 Dec 1963	3256	Ericson	Ramey AFB, P. R.	Venezuela	Good
19 Dec 1963	3257	Edens	Ramey AFB, P. R.	Venezuela	Good
29 Dec 1963	6070	Rand	Takhli, Thailand	Cambodia, SVN	Excellent
30 Dec 1963	6071	Bedford	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Excellent

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7 Jan 1964	0014E	Rand	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, SVN, NVN, Laos, Cambodia	Good
23 Feb 1964	0034E	Baker	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, SVN	Good
28 Feb 1964	0064E	Knutson	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, NVN	Poor
1 Mar 1964	S074E	Baker	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, NVN, Laos	Good
6 Mar 1964	S104E	Baker	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	SEA, NVN, Laos	Good
10 Mar 1964	S014A	Ericson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Poor
12 Mar 1964	S024A	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Fair
14 Mar 1964	S034A	Ericson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Poor
15 Mar 1964	S044A	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Good
16 Mar 1964	S064A	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Poor
17 Mar 1964	S074A	Edens	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Poor
20 Mar 1964	S084A	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Excellent
24 Mar 1964	S114A	Ericson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Poor
31 Mar 1964	T124A	Edens	Takhli, Thailand	China, NEFA	Excellent
4 Apr 1964	S144A	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Fair
6 Apr 1964	S154A	Ericson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Fair
7 Apr 1964	S164A	Edens	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Poor
12 Apr 1964	S184A	Knutson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, Cambodia	Good
15 Apr 1964	S194A	Ericson	Takhli, Thailand	SEA, NVN, Laos	Good
24 Apr 1964	S214A	Rand	Cubi Point	SEA, NVN, Laos	Poor
19 May 1964	W224A	Barnes	RANGER	French Atomic Test	Excellent
22 May 1964	W234A	Edens	RANGER	French Atomic Test	Excellent
24 May 1964	T284A	Ericson	Charbatia, India	Tibet, Sino/Indian Border	Good
16 Dec 1964	T314A	Knutson	Charbatia, India	Tibet, Sino/Indian Border	Excellent
17 Dec 1964	T324A	Baker	Charbatia, India	Tibet, Sino/Indian Border	Excellent
20 Dec 1964	T344A	Schmarr	Charbatia, India	Tibet, Sino/Indian Border	Excellent

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29 Oct 1965	S015A	Schmarr	Takhli, Thailand	Cambodia	Good
7 Nov 1965	S025A	Barnes	Takhli, Thailand	Cambodia	Excellent
27 Mar 1968	S018E	Hall	Takhli, Thailand	Cambodia Border	Excellent
3 Apr 1968	S028E	Hall	Takhli, Thailand	Cambodia Border	Excellent

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DDS&T Historical Paper
No. OSA-1
Vol. XI of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)

History of the Office of Special Activities

Chapter XVII

(PERIOD)

From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 11
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 24, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T

Date prepared : 1 April 1969

Written by : Helen Kleyla

Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER XVII. CHINESE
PARTICIPATION IN U-2 PROGRAM

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CHAPTER XVII. CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN THE
U-2 PROGRAM

Background

The original impetus for a Chinese Nationalist U-2 program came from the United States Air Force (SAC), who presented the following proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 December 1958:

"1. In October the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved, subject to CIA, Department of State, and White House concurrence, a proposal to provide U-2 aircraft to the Chinese Nationalist Government on a loan basis.

"2. Pursuant to this approval, it was directed that coordination be effected with the CIA and the Department of State by the Air Force. Approved memoranda for record reflecting this coordination with reservation are attached. Specific coordination of an overflight program by CIA and State was withheld pending evaluation of the political and military situation existing at the time the Chinats attain a capability in the U-2 aircraft. The CIA and State Department express the view that White House concurrence with this proposal should not be sought until such time as training is completed and a firm proposal to conduct overflight operations has been developed. The Air Force agrees with this position.

"3. It was further agreed with the CIA that the various security considerations with respect to this equipment and future operations would be worked out with Headquarters, Project CHALICE. In this regard, initial discussions have been held with CIA and arrangements have been made for them to review the security aspects of this program as it progresses.

"4. Accordingly, the USAF requests approval to approach General Wang Shu-ming, Chief, Chinese General Staff, early in January 1959 with the following proposal:

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"a. That three or four carefully selected pilots of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force be trained in the U-2 aircraft in the United States with training to commence on or about 1 March 1959.

"b. That the purpose of this training is to cut lead time in any overflight program we may mutually wish to undertake at some future date. Essentially, this should be considered as a follow-on to the RB-57D. Should aircraft become available for such a program they must be provided on a loan basis rather than through the MAP.

"c. That in a program of this nature the most stringent security measures must be employed to protect the capability of the aircraft and to this end:

"(1) Only the absolute minimum number of Chinese personnel will be made knowledgeable of this training program and these individuals will be given only the minimum information concerning equipment and future plans consistent with their need to know.

"(2) The Chinese personnel knowledgeable of this program will be controlled by an access list available to the USAF and the USAF will furnish to the Chinese a list of those USAF personnel competent to discuss this program.

"(3) Pilots selected for training must be excellent security risks as determined by the Chinese Nationalist Government.

"d. That pilots selected for training will meet the professional and physical qualifications established by the USAF.

"e. That the USAF reserves the right to discontinue this program at any time.

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"5. Upon approval of paragraph 4 above the USAF will:

"a. Arrange a meeting with General Wang Shu-ming to present this proposal.

"b. Coordinate this meeting with CINCPAC and advise him of final agreements reached." 1/

The JCS approved the proposal as outlined above, and the Air Force Office of Operations/Reconnaissance (AFOOP/R) began immediate preparations for a visit to Formosa by General Sutterlin and Colonel Clason B. Saunders to discuss the training of Chinese pilots with General "Tiger" Wang. At a Pentagon meeting on 19 January 1959, Colonel William Burke (Acting Chief, DPD), learned of the following Air Force plans:

"a. Unless there are Chinese objections, the only person contacted will be General Wang. He will be briefed on the U-2 and its photo capability.

"b. He will be requested to select pilots carefully who have outstanding records and who will be security checked. (Additionally, the Air Force security people will accomplish a check and will furnish CIA names of pilots selected so that CIA may assist in the security check.

"c. Colonel Clason Saunders is the project officer and will record names of all persons attending any meetings. He

1/ Memorandum for Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 12 December 1958,
Subject: U-2 Aircraft for the Chinat Government.

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agreed that should Chiang Ching-kuo become involved, discussions would be conducted without Chiang's interpreter.

"d. Pilots will be told only that they have been selected to be trained in high performance aircraft in the U.S. They will undergo a physical and psychological examination at Randolph Field similar to that conducted by the Lovelace Clinic. A SAC project officer would be with them throughout their stay in the U.S. and be part of a SAC team to be stationed at Okinawa later.

"e. The U.S. reserves the right to cancel the entire program at any time without being subject to any prior notification or discussion.

"f. The photo capability of the aircraft would be withheld from the pilots until they have completed checkout at Del Rio and are prepared to enter the photo phase of their training. (This is generally consistent with present SAC security procedures.)' 1/

In the discussion at the 19 January meeting the following CIA reservations were noted: (1) That concurrence by General Cabell in the SAC Chinat program was limited to phase one (training), and that phase two (the overflight operation) must be subsequently evaluated in the light of prevailing circumstances; (2) that the tactical use of the U-2 by Chinese pilots in Chinese-marked aircraft, based at Okinawa but staging from Taiwan or South Korea, might well destroy the present unclassified cover story of the U-2; and (3) processing of the photographic

1/ CHAL-0531, 20 Jan 1959. Memo for Record by Col. Wm. Burke.

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take ought to be accomplished in Japan by the USAF rather than jointly with the Chinese on Taiwan (as was the case with the RB-57D activity). These reservations were agreed tentatively by the Air Force with further consideration to be given at the completion of the training phase. Meanwhile no commitments were to be made to the Chinese regarding phase two.

In May 1959, Colonel Saunders requested a review of the program, in light of the near completion of the training phase, prior to passing a requirement to SAC to develop an Operations Order for the Chinese activity. Development Projects Division then initiated a staff study in order to come up with conclusions and recommendations as to the Agency position vis-a-vis SAC/Chinat U-2 operations in the Far East.

Because there were logical reasons for using CIA cover, security, equipment, organization and management to accomplish the proposed overflights with Chinat pilots, it was recommended by DPD that CIA accept responsibility for using the trained pilots as part of the CHALICE Far East detachment and that the general approval of State and the White House be sought. General Cabell's concurrence with this recommendation was given with the proviso that the Air Force would first have

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to suggest this action on the part of CIA. At the time, hope was held for British approval of a series of Soviet overflights to satisfy the highest priority targets on the book and it was considered by some that the Chinat operation might "rock the boat". No action was taken between July and December 1959, although there were several working level discussions.

At the 2 December 1959 meeting of the Joint Chiefs, the subject was raised and Mr. Allen Dulles agreed to an Air Force request to settle the question of the use of the Chinat pilots. A CIA/USAF working group on 7 December 1959 came up with three alternatives: (a) to form a unit on Taiwan, with either CIA or SAC direction; (b) to put a SAC unit on Okinawa with Taiwan-based Chinat pilots to fly missions, staged from Taiwan or Korea; and (c) the CHALICE Detachment C to stage to Okinawa and use Chinat pilots based on Taiwan. On 28 December 1959 a meeting was held between Generals Cabell and LeMay to reach agreement on what should be done. General LeMay said that the Air Force reason for pressing the Chinat proposal was simply to get the greatest possible use from the U-2 in covering whatever priority targets were accessible before the aircraft became obsolete.

General Cabell believed the proposed operation to be unwise for the present and said (a) that until coverage had been obtained of top

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priority targets in the USSR, exposure of the U-2 under circumstances which could result in advance publicity or diplomatic action should be held to a minimum; (b) that he felt that such U-2 missions as might be authorized over denied areas could be flown with a slightly higher margin of safety by U.S. than by Chinat pilots; and (c) that we had reason to believe that permission might be obtained in the course of the next six or eight months for perhaps two or three additional missions against the USSR, provided nothing occurred to make the political climate less favorable.

General LeMay accepted these views and agreed to maintain the Chinat pilot proficiency by periodic refresher training in the ZI, avoiding the deploying of additional U-2's to the Far East and the exposure of the Detachment C operation to the Chinats.

Subsequent to the 1 May 1960 mishap, the cutting off of further overflights of the USSR by the U-2 brought the Chinat program again into focus. 50X1, E.O.13526 at a meeting held 6 May 1960 to discuss future MAAG plans for Taiwan, raised the possibility of two U-2's being assigned to the CAF in FY 1963. Both Admiral Smoot of Taiwan Defense Command and Ambassador Drumwright believed this would be too late to meet reconnaissance needs in the China area and pressed for more immediate action.

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General Chiang Ching-kuo (then head of the GRC's National Security Bureau) approached [] informally on 20 May 1960 (and officially on behalf of President Chiang Kai-shek on 23 May) with the suggestion that U-2 aircraft based in Japan be moved to Taiwan. He said the U.S. could be assured of complete security and cooperation from the GRC for any use of the U-2 which the U.S. desired. He recommended the incorporation of a U-2 unit as a compartmented element of the P2V program at Hsinchu Air Base, but was willing to accept any reasonable arrangement. The Far East Division at Headquarters was in accord with this proposal and it appeared at that time that there was no reason why it should not be implemented. On 18 June 1960, during a visit to Headquarters, [] passed to General Goodpaster the Chinat offer and the General informed the President. (Goodpaster told [] there was an unwritten rule for nobody to mention the U-2 to the President except Goodpaster, who always chose a propitious time to do so.)

White House Approval

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On 15 July 1960, Mr. Bissell presented a paper on "Future of the Agency's U-2 Capability" to the White House which proposed among other plans that "in early autumn two U-2's be turned over to the Chinese Nationalist Government (subject to repossession by the U.S.) to be

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utilized for reconnaissance over Communist China. These aircraft would carry Chinese Nationalist markings and be flown by Chinese Nationalist pilots. ^{1/} The President agreed to consider the proposal in the early fall.

On 19 August 1960, Mr. Bissell carried to General Goodpaster a formal proposal for a joint program with the GRC. Authorization was sought to take the matter up with the Chinese so as to inaugurate the program about 15 October 1960.

"The operation would be so arranged that in appearance there would be no greater U.S. involvement in this than in any other Chinat military activities that employ equipment of U.S. origin. The aircraft would carry Chinese markings and be flown by Chinese pilots. Americans would have to be used for maintenance and certain logistic support functions, but they would be the civilian employees of the aircraft manufacturer and of other private companies, which would furnish these services (as well as spares and other supplies) under contract to the Chinese Government.

"The agreement of the Chinese Government would be sought, however, to the exercise of operational control over U-2 activities in actuality by a small U.S. staff located with the unit in the role of a military advisory group. This arrangement would be strictly parallel to that already in effect for the control of CIA-furnished P2V's currently used in ELINT flights over the Mainland, which has been entirely acceptable to the Chinese and has been consistently honored by them. The U.S. field group would report to the existing CIA/USAF Project

1/ TS/CHAL-1088-60, page 3, para 6c.

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Headquarters in Washington and the same control procedures would be employed that have been in effect for U-2 operations in the past.

"Although it is not contemplated that the physical transfer of the planes would take place for two months, it would be desirable to discuss this matter with the Chinese in the near future. Not only would some time be required to obtain and ready the necessary facilities on Taiwan but it is believed this proposal would be welcome to the Chinese and would offset any disappointment the Generalissimo may feel at this time as a result of our unwillingness to guarantee full support of his proposed PEGASUS operations.

"The arrangements outlined above are satisfactory to the USAF. The proposal has been concurred in by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State." 1/

The proposal in principle for a Taiwan detachment was approved by State and by the President on 26 August 1960. CIA was authorized to enter into negotiations with the GRC but was instructed to avoid fixing any specific date for the movement of aircraft to Taiwan. On 8 September 1960 the Secretary of State restated his approval in terms of his desire for de facto U.S. control of U-2 overflights with Chinese pilots, and for prior consultation with State on each such overflight. Mr. Bissell gave assurance that this would be the case.

50X1, E.O.13526 [] Meanwhile on 13 September 1960, [] outlined to General Chiang Ching-kuo the U.S. proposal for a joint project. Within two hours the approval of the Gimo had been obtained to proceed. On

1/ CHAL-1145-60, 19 Aug 1960. "U-2's for Nationalist China".

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16 September General Chiang brought the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Air Force, General Ch'en Chia-shang into the picture and on 19 September General Ch'en designated Major General I Fu-en, Vice Chief of Staff, as the CAF representative in charge of the project and Colonel Huang Wei-cheng as his deputy.

A negotiating team was sent to Taiwan on 14 October 1960 to brief 50X1, E.O.13526 and hold discussions with the Chinese.

Mr. Bissell added the following note to the team's instructions with

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The negotiating team held discussions principally with General I Fu-en on the Chinese side concerning plans for the detachment. Tao Yuan was picked as the base site in preference to the less

1/ CHAL-1209-60, 13 Oct 1960. Memo to AC/DPD from DD/P.

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secure commingling with the Hsinchu group, and the principal initial cost was estimated at about \$50,000 for renovating a hangar. General I wanted the film take to be processed in the new laboratory furnished the CAF by the USAF, but the team made no commitment.

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The Chief of MAAG, General Kenneth O. Sanborn, also desired to stay completely out of the picture.

When the team returned to Headquarters, Mr. Bissell on 3 November 1960 met with General Goodpaster to advise him that the Agency urgently needed a decision on whether to proceed with the \$50,000 rehabilitation of the hangar. If this were done, the expectations of the Chinese would be solidified and their reactions would be more adverse if the plan should be cancelled later. On 8 November General Goodpaster informed Mr. Bissell that on the 4th he had discussed the request with the President and that approval had been granted for the project. Mr. Bissell did not construe this as permission to undertake forthwith overflights of denied areas, since the Secretary of State had specifically asked that every mission be cleared

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with the Department. Moreover, the proposal as presented to the White House had stated that the same control procedures would apply as in the past, i. e., mission-by-mission approval.

Cover

In fabricating a cover story for TACKLE (the cryptonym given the Chinese U-2 program), the effort was made to dissociate the U.S. Government to the greatest extent possible while maintaining a normal pipeline for spare parts, engine overhaul, pilot training, etc., and ensuring medical care and PX/Commissary privileges for the U.S. personnel assigned to support the unit at Tao Yuan. A completely commercial cover would have entailed prohibitive costs for stocking, warehousing, and shipping spares, and for salaries high enough to compensate techreps who would have to live on the local economy. Arrangements were therefore made to establish the detachment on Taiwan consistent with the following cover story:

"Aircraft

"1. To eliminate the flavor of U.S. sponsorship in the transfer of operational aircraft, procurement of same will appear to have been accomplished through a direct purchase by and between the Government of the Republic of China and the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

"2. To support a Lockheed sale of U-2 aircraft it will be necessary for Lockheed to first acquire such aircraft from the USAF.

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"3. To document the record, a backdated letter (1 April 1960) will be prepared by Mr. C. L. Johnson and addressed to the Air Materiel Command (Colonel Sidney Brewer) quoting a cost estimate for repairing two damaged USAF U-2 aircraft at approximately \$800,000 total.

"4. In anticipation of a negative response to proceed with repairs, the letter will further include a Lockheed proposal to purchase the damaged aircraft for salvage at a bid price of \$250,000 each.

"5. The AMC will accordingly reply by backdated letter accepting the Lockheed offer and will prepare necessary papers which will properly pass title as Class 26 items.

"6. The two U-2 aircraft will then purportedly be rebuilt and offered for sale to the GRC at \$1.2 million each.

"7. The following documents will be prepared and actions taken to support a purported sales transaction between Lockheed and the GRC:

"a. The C. L. Johnson organization supported by the Lockheed public relations office will be the purported sales negotiators.

"b. An appropriate bill of sale for airframe, engine, radio and navigation equipment etc. will be prepared.

"c. Appropriate export documents (matter of public record) normally associated with a sale of this type will be prepared.

"d. Arrangements will be made to ostensibly transfer funds from GRC to Lockheed as payment for items purchased.

"e. Documents required to reflect the handling of classified material will be placed on record with the Office of International Security, Headquarters, USAF.

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"Detachment Cover

"1. The U-2 aircraft will be appropriately marked upon arrival Taiwan with the insignia of the Chinese Air Force.

"2. The hangar and other facilities utilized at Tao Yuan Airdrome will have all the appearances of a normal CAF operational unit.

"3. Living quarters will be known as a joint CAF/USAF billeting facility and club. ?

"Personnel Cover

"1. All military personnel on duty with the Detachment will be assigned in true name to the 6213th Support Squadron, Taipei, with duty station at Detachment 5, Mobile Training Team, Tao Yuan Airdrome.

"2. While at Tao Yuan, all military personnel will utilize alias names and wear civilian clothes. All documentation necessary on base will be issued by the CAF.

"3. All contractor employees and CIA personnel will utilize the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation as their employer. Their presence in Taiwan (specifically Tao Yuan) will be in support of a contract in which they are performing services to the CAF. While at Tao Yuan, all personnel will be extended only those privileges normal to Americans working for the CAF.

"4. While off base, personnel will be permitted to designate their parent organization as the 6213th Support Squadron in order to obtain various privileges normally extended to Government civilians and contract employees.

"5. All travel documents utilized by civilians will be issued in such a manner as to support employment of such individuals by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

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"6. A personal services contract between the GRC and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation will be prepared and included in the files of both parties.

"Materiel Support

"1. Ostensibly, spare parts and equipment necessary to support the Detachment will be furnished to the GRC by Lockheed under the provisions of a contract between the two parties.

"2. To conceal military delivery to the Detachment all items of support forwarded through normal Air Force channels from Warner Robins Air Force Base will be addressed to Detachment 5, Mobile Training Team, 6213th Support Squadron." 1/

Discussions were held with State Department officials in December 1960 in order to arrange for the export license required by Lockheed to sell and ship the aircraft to the GRC. Approval was obtained, and to tie up the export cover story, the Commissioner of Customs was requested to arrange for an officer at the Los Angeles port of exit to endorse the license to indicate departure of the aircraft on 10 December 1960, but not to describe the means of transport. (Means of transport for the original two and all subsequent U-2's to Taiwan has been either by USAF airlift or by ferry flight using U.S. pilots under covert contract to CIA.) This arrangement has

1/ IDEA-0044, Att. #1, 16 November 1960. Memo for DD/P,
Subject: Cover Story for TACKLE.

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been followed in the case of each aircraft transported with export licenses on the public record for seven U-2 aircraft:

<u>No. of Aircraft</u>	<u>Date of License</u>	<u>Date Shipped</u>
2	7 December 1960	10 December 1960
1	11 January 1963	5 May 1963
1	20 December 1963	27 December 1963
2	3 August 1964	4 September 1964
1	19 October 1965	7 April 1966

Of the ten aircraft losses suffered in training on Taiwan and in overflights of the Mainland, five have been publicized in the press, principally as a result of Chinese Communist protests. Thus on the books the GRC can still claim two documented U-2's (as of end of 1968).

Deployment of Detachment H

Immediately after Presidential approval was received, construction was begun at Tao Yuan Air Base. [redacted] Project Engineer, was sent out to coordinate details with the Chinese. The contract for the hangar renovation was negotiated by General I Fu-en and the local contractor was required to work 24 hours a day. The CAF assigned a qualified construction engineer to inspect materials and supervise construction. The Chinese at that moment showed the greatest eagerness to get on with the project.

The Detachment's advance administrative party, headed by the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Denzil Poston, arrived at

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g)

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Tao Yuan on 14 November and began working out procedures and arrangements for the reception of the main body. The Communications and Security Staffs followed shortly and the Lockheed and other techreps arrived in time to receive the first U-2 in early December. The Detachment when fully manned numbered 26, exclusive of pilots and locally hired indigenous personnel.

During November 1960 an inspection of film storage and processing facilities at Tao Yuan was made by Mr. Ed Green of Eastman and Major Lewis Watson of Project Headquarters and recommendations were made for corrections and improvements to the CAF photo lab and for a training program for the Chinese technicians.

On 22 November 1960 a TALENT briefing was given by Commander Robert Neasham of PIC to the following key GRC personnel: President Chiang, General Chiang Ching-kuo, Major General S. K. Hu, Lieutenant General Ch'en Chia-shang and Major General I Fu-en. This briefing was reportedly a great success and definitely impressed the Chinese with the value of sophisticated film processing. It was considered that the question of processing the film in the CAF facility would not be pushed by the Chinese so long as they were able to process the tracker film locally, and provided duplicates of the principal

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photography were returned to them from the processing center within about 10 days of the mission.

The first contretemps with the Chinese was not long in developing.

On 29 December 1960,

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to General Cabell and Mr. Bissell as follows:

"... Have been notified by General I Fu-en that CAF could not continue with project until arrangements clarified.

"Situation partially reflects fact TACKLE project severely handicapped due absence formal agreement with GRC spelling out ground rules for cooperation. Agreement draft was promised many weeks ago and I urged we get agreement signed before first U-2 arrived so we would have some bargaining leverage.

"As situation is now, all working relations are based on the understandings between me and General I Fu-en and we are depending on his good will. Unfortunately TACKLE project officers are not very tactful or skillful in dealing with General I Fu-en and other Chinese used at Tao Yuan. Col. Poston is doing a good job technically but is no politician and finds difficulty adjusting to differences working on joint project with foreigners as compared to purely U.S. operations. Headquarters briefings evidently stressed not only U.S. independence TACKLE project but also unilateral conduct of operations. Impression gained by Chinats during earlier team briefings was that this is basically joint project subject to coordination with GRC although command resides in Washington. Complete independence of TACKLE project while operationally possible is not politically feasible. Chinese look inevitably to me as local sponsor of project and hold me responsible for basic policies. High level liaison with GRC should be conducted in accordance with guidance taking into account local factors and personalities. Believe Headquarters should make clear that policies of all kinds governing

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relations with GRC are subject [] control under general Headquarters directives. This does not imply any aloofness on part of Poston who appears ready and willing to cooperate any way possible but needs and should have Headquarters guidance. I will see Gen. I Fu-en as soon as possible and try to restore feeling of mutual confidence. Believe matter can be smoothed over if more tact is used in accepting principle we are guests on foreign air base and project-cleared Chinese VIP's have theoretical right to access to all installations. In practice this means only five or six people, mostly too busy to bother. Gen. I Fu-en will visit occasionally and should be shown signal center when not in operation and cryptographically secure. Confident he will agree to mark it restricted area and will himself not ask to visit after principle is established.

"With respect to advance clearance actual missions by GRC, feel it essential to work out secure procedures permitting notification CAF when mission alert arrives. We have done this on STPOLLY for years with no obstruction or interference with our control. Impossible fly off Chinese airbase without CA F concurrence.

"Strongly recommend Headquarters send out new draft agreement so we can iron out procedural understandings before first actual operation. This will prevent misunderstandings and insure U.S. control of essential elements of operation. There is complete good will on Chinese side but anxiety to be treated as partners in project. This is largely matter of face and prestige which costs us only time and effort in polite formalities. Taipei Station cannot get project established and running smoothly on any other basis." 1/

Project Headquarters' reaction to [] lecture on

Oriental etiquette was to suggest a visit by a high level Headquarters

1/ [] dated 29 December 1960.

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team to iron out any misunderstandings. [] said he would welcome the visit of Mr. James Q. Reber and Colonels Beerli and Songer of Project Headquarters Staff, and recommended that they make an effort to convince the Chinats that the U.S. side meant to deal honestly with them despite the unwillingness to conclude a formal signed agreement. He also recommended they take "a constructive, friendly approach to Gen. I Fu-en designed to indicate good will on the part of the U.S. and the intent to proceed on matters of mutual benefit with reasonable flexibility within terms of agreement as adjudicated among the Chinats, Detachment H and [] " 1/

Agreement with the Chinese: Memorandum of Understanding

In light of the very cordial and personal relationships between [] and top GRC officials, the principal role in the negotiations was assumed by him, based on a draft memorandum furnished by Headquarters. The Director had instructed, on advice of the General Counsel and with the approval of [] that the agreement should be in the form of an unsigned memorandum of understanding since (a) the Agency had no authority for signing an agreement on behalf of the U.S. with a foreign government, and (b) [] would have been very

1/ [] dated 16 January 1961.

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reluctant to trust such a sensitive document to Chinese security. Hence, the memorandum which was agreed by both sides on 25 January 1961 was couched in the most sterile terms possible, with one copy being retained [] and one by the CAF. (See Annex 107 for the text of the Memorandum of Understanding.)

Other arrangements agreed to verbally at that time were:

(1) General I Fu-en and [] were both to receive 24-hour alert on missions, and the "Go" message two hours prior to take-off, allowing time for cancellation for political or other reasons. (2) [] [] was to dispense the pilot bonus (five pilots at \$300 each per month) which, being excessive by Chinese pay standards, was prorated as a monthly incentive bonus among the Chinese members of the 35th Squadron, with the balance being used to procure air conditioners, food freezers, PX-type goods, club furnishings and other such amenities which would redound to the benefit of the whole group. (In September 1964, at the request of [] the handling of this bonus was updated as follows: Since the number of pilots assigned varied from time to time with as few as two in some months, it was agreed to credit the account with a flat \$1800 monthly and pay out bonuses on the basis of \$NT3600 for pilots, \$NT1800 for air duty officers, \$NT1200

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for ground duty officers, \$NT900 for non-coms, and \$NT300 for enlisted men; housekeeping expenses \$NT10,000 monthly. This allows for up to six pilots and leaves a monthly cushion on the books of \$US95.) (3) When the question of polygraphing the pilots was raised, General I Fu-en demurred, saying there was no need for this since the pilots were all well known to him from their youth. (The matter was left to the discretion of [] who, using a "soft sell", impressed upon the Chinese the mutual value of the polygraph. With the eventual agreement of Chiang Ching-kuo, beginning with the first group in March 1961, all pilot candidates have without exception undergone the test.) (4) It was agreed (although reluctantly) by General I that one of the two U-2's would remain bare of insignia in case the U.S. should wish to use it unilaterally on an urgent basis. (Operation POLE CAT was in progress at the time, covering Laos and North Vietnam with staging from Cubi Point using Detachment G equipment and U.S. contract pilots.) The only GRC requirement was that China Mainland missions proceed as soon as possible with GRC pilots and that any unilateral U.S. missions not delay this. The Generalissimo gave [] assurance that GRC pilots could be used to cover Southeast Asia targets provided the mission involved combined China Mainland

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targets with the SEA targets.

On 21 January 1961, a U.S. reporter on Taiwan observed a U-2 aircraft at Tao Yuan and attempted to obtain a story from the local U.S. Public Information Officer, who truthfully replied that he had no information on the activity. It was agreed that this should be the standard U.S. response to any further inquiries. This position was maintained and it was not until the first loss over the Mainland in September 1962, resulting in a Chinese Communist propaganda blast, that the State Department was compelled to make known the granting of a license to Lockheed to export two U-2's to the GRC.

The commitment by General Chiang Ching-kuo concerning GRC replies to press inquiries was [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526

"If queries become persistent GRC would take note of them at Minister of Defense press briefing normally handled by Admiral Liu who not cleared for project and would merely say what he is ordered to. If no hard evidence available to querying newsmen, initial GRC position will be that GRC conducts many air reconnaissance flights with a variety of aircraft but details are classified information withheld in interest of national security. GRC will hold this line indefinitely unless circumstances bring hard evidence to public attention. In that case GRC will retreat to cover story...but releasing as few facts as necessary and each time in consultation with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 1/

50X1, E.O.13526

1/ [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526 [REDACTED] dated 29 January 1961.

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Chinese Pilots and Training (See Annex 108 for Schedule of Pilots)

Reporting on the expected operational readiness date of Detachment H after his visit in January-February 1961, Colonel Beerli (Acting Chief, DPD) said that the five Chinese pilots originally trained by SAC at Del Rio were well qualified and were expected to have 100 hours each in the U-2 by the time overflight operations began. Although in early planning the consensus had been against any mingling of the U.S. contract pilots at Edwards Air Force Base with the Chinese pilots, at the time of the deployment of the two U-2's to Tao Yuan it was deemed acceptable from a security standpoint for contract pilot Erickson, under appropriate personal cover story and using an alias, to go to Tao Yuan to assist in the check-out of aircraft and in the refresher training of the Chinese pilots. (Subsequently most of the other contract U.S. pilots have in turn ferried aircraft to Taiwan and performed other assignments at Detachment H.)

On 19 March 1961, the first fatal accident of the program occurred when Major Chih Yao-hua crashed in U-2C #351 near Tao Yuan on a night training flight. The GRC kept the accident out of the press, and a replacement U-2 was ferried "black" from Edwards to cover the loss (without obtaining additional export documentation). It took some time

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to arrange delivery of the replacement and meanwhile training continued with the single remaining aircraft. In April 1961 the 35th Squadron, CAF, which had been set up by the Chinese as a counterpart to Detachment H, officially named the U-2 the "RH-35" (R for reconnaissance, H for high altitude, and 35 for the Squadron). It was also given the Chinese nickname of "Chien Hsing" (meaning "View the stars"). The balance of 1961 was occupied in currency flights and equipment checks, and waiting for approval to go. This came in January 1962 and a very busy and productive year ensued with only one loss and 17 successful overflights of the Mainland, all using the B camera and various electronic packages, with results of missions classified as eleven good and six fair.

At the end of 1962, two more CAF pilots were chosen for U-2 training to replace those lost. While they were training at Del Rio, Texas, the Detachment H Commanding Officer and the CAF recommended selecting two more pilots since of the three remaining at Tao Yuan, two were approaching minimal proficiency as a result of combat fatigue and apprehension due to long exposure to high risk missions. SAC was requested, and agreed, to take on the additional training. These two candidates were given their training by SAC at

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Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona, early in 1963 and returned to Tao Yuan. Retirements and further losses continued to thin the ranks of pilots and four more candidates were selected in 1964, two in 1965 and three in 1966, all being trained at Davis-Monthan.

In June 1966, OSA Director (Brigadier General Ledford) made the decision to establish a Chinese pilot training program at Edwards Air Force Base under the guidance of Detachment G. Project Headquarters Directive 50-10-25, issued on 17 June 1966, sets forth the procedures and guidelines for carrying out this program. (See Annex 109 for text.) This decision was reported to Headquarters, USAF, as follows:

"... Training of Chinese Air Force pilots in the U-2 will in the future, be conducted by Agency personnel at Detachment G, Edwards Air Force Base. The CAF has been requested to make two pilots available to begin training at Edwards approximately 1 September 1966.

"Our decision to train the CAF pilots at Edwards should not be construed as dissatisfaction with the training program at Davis-Monthan AFB; on the contrary we are well satisfied with results of the SAC training program and most appreciative of the additional burden that has been imposed on the 4080th. Our desire to conduct the training at Edwards was based on a number of reasons, not the least of which is a recognition of the diminishing assets of both SAC and the Agency. Additionally, we believe we can save time and perhaps produce a better

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U-2 pilot if the entire training program is conducted in aircraft equipped with the J-75 engine." 1/

Since the training program's establishment at Detachment G, three increments of pilots, two each year in 1966, 1967 and 1968, have been trained at Edwards.

From the beginning of the TACKLE program, medical testing and evaluation of Chinese pilots, once they arrived in the United States, was accomplished at the Space Aviation Medical Center at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. This was in accordance with procedures which apply generally to all foreign pilots brought to the United States for training at the invitation of the United States Air Force. Also the CAF Flight Surgeon assigned to the 35th Squadron received indoctrination in the United States along with his pilots in the intricacies of the pressure suit and all other pilot equipment. Detachment H, of course, has assigned qualified personal equipment specialists as well as technical representatives of the manufacturers whose duties are to assist with the pre-flight and post-flight procedures related to the pilot and his life support environment as well as to maintain and repair the related equipment.

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Brigadier General Don Flickinger, aeromedical adviser to OSA, reported to the Director of Special Activities in early 1967 that the previous three years had seen material improvement in the over-all aeromedical support and maintenance of CAF trainees. The same high standards for selecting, training and maintenance were required for these as for all other special project aircrews. He noted that the sequential procedures applied to TACKLE candidates were the same as those applied to the other OSA project pilots except that their annual medical evaluations were to be accomplished on Taiwan rather than at the Lovelace Clinic.

The procedures established for evaluation, training and support of the Chinese pilots include:

1. Preliminary screening:
 - a. Review of past medical and flying records by Flight Surgeon of 35th Squadron.
 - b. Personal interview and completion of medical history forms.
 - c. Evaluation and report on candidate's psychological fitness for the program.
2. Aeromedical survey and evaluation at Brooks AFB by Flight Surgeons in the SAM Flight Medical Section.
3. Psychological evaluation at Washington, D. C., by General Flickinger and contract psychologists.
4. Pressure suit measurement and indoctrination by expert from David Clark Company.

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5. Pressure suit fitting and altitude chamber indoctrination.
6. Survival and physical fitness training programs.
7. Operational crew maintenance and control procedures by 35th Squadron Flight Surgeon at Tao Yuan.
 - a. Supervision of pre-mission rest and diet.
 - b. Pre- and post-mission aeromedical examinations.
 - c. Post-mission debriefing on function of life support equipment.
8. Annual and semi-annual aeromedical and psychological evaluations by 35th Squadron Flight Surgeon and OSA medical and psychological personnel.

Death Benefits

While the original joint agreement setting up TACKLE made no mention of pilot death benefits, it had been made clear to General I Fu-en in early discussions that the Agency had no responsibility for any such payments. However, when the first fatal accident occurred in March 1961, [] felt that the CAF would expect the same payment granted in like cases under the P2V program. Project Headquarters acceded to [] recommendation and requested Detachment H to provide [] with \$4,000 for the family of Major Chih. It was noted that while this was setting a precedent of sorts, [] should point out to the CAF that the money was a gift of compassion and not based on any obligation under the terms of the joint agreement. These facts were explicitly stressed when the

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money was passed to General I Fu-en by [redacted]

[redacted] but the precedent had been set.

When the second fatality occurred in September 1962 and Lieutenant Colonel Ch'en Huai was lost on a mission over the Mainland, his death was commemorated by the building and furnishing of a school for Chinese Air Force dependents, towards which \$US2,500 was contributed by Detachment H (from Agency funds).

In October 1963 Major Yeh was lost on a Mainland overflight and [redacted] pointed to the fact that there was no death benefit clause in the TACKLE agreement but the STSPIN C-123 pilots flying in Vietnam were accorded a \$5,000 coverage (double indemnity of \$10,000 for fatality under hazardous duty conditions). [redacted] recommended that the widow of Major Yeh be compensated in like manner. Project Headquarters replied:

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"Do not feel we should align ourselves so strictly with C-123 program (as to make identical agreement re death benefits). Believe comparison TACKLE pilots with C-123 pilots not valid since compensation for latter in part is compensation for loss of identity in event of mishap over hostile territory. Public recognition of TACKLE pilots lost is partially compensating even though not monetarily. Headquarters feeling that generous compassionate gift to survivors highly desirable but any such benefit should not be made

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formal policy and payment expected by CAF. Detachment H authorized to furnish \$5,000 to [redacted] as payment to Yeh's widow." 1/

[redacted] replied that the GRC was granting the widow \$3,750 (which was three times normal death benefit approved by the GRC for special cases) and therefore the Detachment was asked to furnish only \$3,000. At the same time Headquarters was informed that General I would like to have a regular death benefit agreement comparable to that of the P2V program, which provided \$1,000 for each dependent survivor, i.e., wife, parents, and children under 16. On 14 November 1963 Project Headquarters notified [redacted] as follows:

"Concur gratuity ref be limited to \$3,000. Agree hereafter adopt policy as with STPOLLY ground rules, i.e. \$1,000 each dependent." 2/

In accordance with this policy, on 8 April 1964 the Detachment requested authorization of payment of \$3,000 (\$1,000 for each dependent) to survivors of Capt. Liang who was lost in a training accident on Taiwan on 22 March 1964. The same policy held good through the next five fatalities between 7 July 1964 and 21 June 1966.

1/ [redacted] 6 November 1963.

2/ [redacted] 14 November 1963.

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In March 1967, General Hsu (Commander-in-Chief, CAF) brought up in a meeting with [] Detachment officers the fact that the widow of Major Yu (killed in a training crash 21 June 1966 near Naha, Okinawa) had learned that widows of C-123 crew members had been awarded \$10,000 (double indemnity payment for death under combat conditions). Under pressure from the CAF, [] Detachment H then made a complete review of death and disability provisions of all Agency/GRC air programs and in an attempt to bring TACKLE payments into balance with other agreements, submitted to Headquarters the following proposed text of Annex C to the operational agreement:

"Death and Disability Benefits

"1. The United States side agrees to pay certain benefits, described below, to Chinese Air Force participants in the operational squadron, hereinafter referred to as principals, or to their surviving bona fide dependents, in the event of permanent injury or death of a principal as a result of air crew duties, subject to the conditions stated below.

"2. Conditions of payment of death and disability benefits: As a condition precedent to payment under this annex to the operations agreement, disability as hereafter defined, or death, must have occurred to a principal as a direct result of the principal's official participation in air crew duties as mutually approved pursuant to the provisions of the operations agreement. Disability is defined as permanent injury or injuries resulting in partial or total physical impairment of a principal which prevents him from continuing in his present military status.

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"3. Benefits:

A. Death: In the event of the death of any principal while engaged in air crew duties, the United States will pay the sum of \$5,000 to the principal's dependents /be they five or less in number. An additional \$1,000 will * be paid for each dependent in excess of five in number./ In the case of a principal without dependents on Taiwan, a sum of \$5,000 will be paid to the CAF to be deposited with their committee designated to settle cases of this type. In the event of death or missing as a direct result of performance under extra hazardous or combat conditions the amount to be paid to the individual's estate or designated beneficiary will be twice the amount shown above.

B. Disability:

(1) Total disability: When a principal is mutually determined to be totally disabled as a result of air crew duties, the United States will pay to such principal \$5,000 /if his dependents are five or less in number. An additional \$1,000 will be paid for each dependent in excess of five./ *

(2) Partial disability: In the event of a partial disability there will be a payment in U.S. dollars by the United States to such individuals of a sum equal to the mutually determined percentage of disability multiplied by the sum which would be paid in the event of total disability as set forth in paragraph 3B(1), above.

"4. Dependency: Dependents are defined as those persons, adults or children, who at the time of death or disability of the principal, or within nine months thereof has been born, is alive and is available on Taiwan and is dependent on said principal for

* Additions to text made

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dated 16 May 1967.

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support. Dependent status of all personnel will be furnished by the Chinese Air Force to the United States at the time of assignment to said operational squadron, at which time mutual agreement will be reached concerning the dependency status of such dependents. Revisions to the dependent status will be furnished the United States by the CAF as changes occur." 1/

In addition, the following new subsistence pay scales for TACKLE were proposed:

Mission pilots	NT\$4400 per month (US\$110)
Officers	2200
NCO's	1200
Other Enlisted Men	720
Additions to list:	
Squadron C/O	1000 monthly, additional
Sr. Operations Officer	750 monthly, additional
Sr. Navigator	500 monthly, additional

The increases in the monthly stipends would total about US\$700, bringing the total monthly payroll to about US\$2,700.

Project Headquarters (OSA) replied on 19 May 1967, as follows:

"We agree your proposal to increase death and disability benefits in TACKLE agreement but feel, if possible, you should hold to \$5,000/\$10,000 insurance coverage as means of specifically limiting U.S. Government commitment under double indemnity clause. SOD agrees.

"Proposed text for Annex C of TACKLE agreement as outlined [redacted] acceptable except para 1, which should

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1/ [redacted] 20 April 1967, para 4.

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clearly define Chinese Air Force participants and principals as mission pilots.

"Agree increase to payscales and you authorized to increase in accord with new scales proposed... effective 1 May 1967, with total monthly subsistence not to exceed US\$3,000 per month." 1/

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[redacted] then brought up the established precedent of basing benefits on the number of dependents, rather than awarding a standard sum in each case. (This had previously resulted in payments up to \$12,000 in several cases) Headquarters replied that, even though it was felt that the \$5,000/\$10,000 limits could have been administered without disagreements with the CAF, Headquarters would go along with upping the coverage to a flat \$6,000/\$12,000 basis and that this final decision was agreed by SOD and FE Division as well as OSA.

On 20 June 1967, [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] met with Generals Hsu and Yang and apprised them of the Agency's preparedness to make death and disability payments uniform, and at a higher level than had existed, and left with General Hsu a copy of the Annex as reproduced above except substituting the higher figures, \$6,000/\$12,000.

1/ [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] dated 19 May 1967.

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In the case of the tenth and most recent fatality in the TACKLE program, i. e., the loss of Capt. Huang as a result of a ground-to-air missile in the environs of Shanghai on 8 September 1967, authority was granted to pay US\$12,000 to the CAF for the survivors (double indemnity for combat death). This was the first and so far the only payment under the rates established in June 1967. A schedule of major accidents suffered by the TACKLE program will be found in Annex 110.

Detachment H Materiel Support

In order to establish an expeditious and secure system for technical and logistical support for Detachment H at Tao Yuan, arrangements were made through Headquarters USAF for the 13th Air Force's 6214th Tactical Group on Taiwan to satisfy the materiel needs of the Detachment (other than those peculiar to the primary mission aircraft). In the first instance, arrangements and procedures for DEN MOTHER (the unclassified Air Force name for this support project) were ad hoc and since the 6214th were unable to satisfy the initial requirements of the Detachment for setting up a supply section at the base, the bulk of even the normal Air Force supplies had to be shipped from the ZI depot until the unsatisfactory local situation could be remedied. A formal procedural letter establishing DEN MOTHER support to the Detachment was first

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published by 13th Air Force on 20 May 1963 and later revised on 25 August 1966 (see Annex 111).

The following observations made by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Economy of the OSA Headquarters Materiel Directorate (formerly Materiel Officer at Detachment H) are his recollections of the build-up period at Tao Yuan.

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By late 1960 the actual movement of assets into Tao Yuan Air Base (CAF) to support the newly activated Detachment H commenced. During this period the [redacted] dispatched four airmen and one officer for a 30-day TDY to help establish facilities inside a hangar that would accommodate the warehouse and supply office requirements.

During the first part of January 1961, two airmen and one officer were on board as permanent assignees to the Detachment's supply activity. Processing and recruiting of two additional supply personnel was underway at Headquarters.

It took only a short time for the Supply Officer to discern that several fallacies existed in the concept of logistics support that had been decreed for this detachment. For example, the cover story was (and continued to be) that the U-2 aircraft had been sold to the GRC by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and that all the maintenance and support technicians were civilians under contract to the CAF. As a continuation of the cover story, the furniture, safes, vehicles, and other support equipment were to be provided to the Detachment from CAF "surplus" assets.

Needless to state, the equipment that was given to the Detachment from CAF resources was primarily in a state of salvage or in need of considerable repair and overhaul. In addition, all the administrative, housekeeping and "nuts and bolts" categories of supplies were intended to be procured from local

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markets or through the 6213th Support Squadron in Taipei. Physical inspection of the 6213th Supron supply facility revealed it to be nothing but a small room for issues and an adjoining room for minor warehousing functions. That supply activity, in turn, was supported by a base supply organization down-island in Tainan. The two airmen assigned there were hardpressed to meet even the most routine supply requests from Detachment H. For example, a drive shaft for a Detachment 6x6 truck took six months to obtain via the 6213th Supron supply system. The Detachment Supply Officer finally could wait no longer and purchased a similar item in two hours from a Chinese vendor.

As a consequence of this situation, new supply procedures were established with the Project Depot at Warner Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. A General Services Administration catalogue was obtained and hundreds of requisitions were prepared including such items as nails, hardware, pipe fittings, nuts, bolts, paper, pencils, etc. Every conceivable requirement was placed on order and by May 1961, the Detachment had attained a solid, self-sustaining posture in this area of logistics.

Concurrently, permission was obtained from Headquarters to requisition USAF sedans and trucks which were stripped of their blue paint and repainted black to conform with Chinese Air Force practice.

A system was devised by the Detachment supply personnel to support more effectively the upkeep and maintenance of the assigned U-2 aircraft and the mission cameras and electronic systems. Each maintenance shop was provided mobile carts containing the most-used items of hardware. These were further backed up with on-the-shelf quantities in the warehouse. In short, there was never any excuse for running short of supplies. An inventory was performed weekly to insure that quantities never dropped below prescribed levels. It is significant that during the period 1 January 1961 through 30 June 1962, not a single U-2 aircraft was ever grounded for the lack of a part or piece of hardware.

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The initial supplying of fuel for the U-2 aircraft was performed by airlift via C-124 transports from the States. Arrangements were subsequently made for delivery by ship to Keelung harbor, thence by rail to Tao Yuan. Quality of fuel was initially a frequent problem. However, this was corrected by insistence on more rigid quality controls at the plant and upon a system for sealing the 55-gallon drums with tamper-proof devices and caps.

In September 1961 a typhoon blew the roof off the Detachment's hangar. Fortunately no damage occurred to the aircraft or to other equipment, however many of the supplies in the warehouse were water-soaked and a long, tedious program of separating and drying out these assets had to be undertaken. The Supply Officer, with the necessary financial backing of Headquarters, was able to have a new roof placed on the hangar within 72 hours (a new record for that part of the world).

The Chief of Taipei Station at the time, Mr. Ray Cline, and General Chiang Ching-kuo, Chief of the National Security Bureau (the equivalent of CIA) had a very personal interest in Detachment H and at least once a month one or the other would visit the 35th Squadron or be host to a party for Detachment personnel. One of these occasions was on the completion, in early 1962, of the first overflight of denied territory by a CAF pilot (Major Ch'en). Upon his return from this successful mission, Major Ch'en was taken by the personnel van from shipside into the hangar where he was greeted profusely by both Mr. Cline and "CCK". He was escorted to the Detachment Commander's office where he was awarded a Chinese decoration, and given a chronograph wrist watch and a red envelope containing money, in the Chinese fashion. This particular flight was a tremendous morale booster for the entire organization and was reflected further in the festivities which were carried far into the night. Major Ch'en was lost the following September on another flight over the Mainland. He is remembered as being a confirmed Baptist and a frequent church-goer.

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The contrast between the facilities that existed in 1961 and those now in being at Tao Yuan is tremendous. Detachment H now has a swimming pool (authorized by the DD/S on 20 March 1963 at a cost not to exceed \$5,000), tennis court, library and clubroom, as well as a very ample dining facility. Recreation and motion picture equipment has been provided and continues to be put into good use. Transportation is no longer a problem (except for the traffic conditions on Taiwan roads) since the Detachment has plenty of sedans, station wagons, pickup trucks, jeeps and busses to satisfy all needs. Living quarters have all been renovated and are much more livable than those available in 1961-62. A new hangar with plenty of shop space and of modern, durable construction was built in 1964, at a cost of \$300,000, to replace the old CAF hangar.

In short, what was once envisioned as being only a TDY Detachment has turned out to be more permanent than anyone concerned with its establishment foresaw, as it now continues into its eighth year. (1968)

Operations

Delay in Obtaining Approval

In May 1961, in anticipation of a visit at Headquarters by General I Fu-en during which he would no doubt be pressing for an early beginning of TACKLE overflights of the Mainland, Mr. FitzGerald (then Chief, FE Division) gave the DDCI this background:

"One J-75 configured U-2, operationally equipped, is now assigned to the Detachment at Tao Yuan. . . Four CAF pilots qualified in the U-2 are presently assigned. The Detachment is now operationally ready to conduct photographic and electronic reconnaissance of selected targets in China. The targets have been mutually established by the CAF and CIA. The arrangements

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for processing the product of the overflight have been settled to the satisfaction of the U. S. Intelligence Community and the CAF. Because there has been no Headquarters approval, no overflights have been flown since the Detachment was established. /Note: The original approval had been obtained from President Eisenhower, who had now been succeeded by President Kennedy and as of that date a revalidation had not been received from highest authority. /

"Problems General I may raise: (1) When will the Detachment receive approval to conduct overflights? (We have not received policy approval; we do not know when it will be received.) (2) Will the Detachment receive a second J-75 configured U-2? (Yes, after our receipt of policy approval.) (3) Can additional CAF pilots be trained—at least one replacement? (This will be considered following receipt of policy approval.)" 1/

General I Fu-en was given the above answers and at the same time was queried on the matter of obvious Chinese Communist foreknowledge of P2V flights launched from Taiwan; he reported that he was making every effort to solve this very serious problem.

In July 1961 the "5412 Committee" discussed TACKLE in the sense of one mission over North Vietnam with no penetration of China. It was decided at the highest level that any such mission must be flown by a U.S. pilot. The Chief of Station, Taipei, was assured that this decision did not prejudice future consideration of TACKLE flights over

1/ IDEA-0299, 19 May 1961. Memo to DDCI from Chief, FE Division.

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Communist China. On 21 September 1961, Mr. Cline cabled Headquarters that the delay in authorizing the TACKLE unit to begin overflight operations was beginning to affect the morale of the indigenous crews and support personnel. The CAF was also requesting relief on the monthly allocation for housekeeping and subsistence in the amount of US\$1,172.50. Mr. Cline recommended that as of Double Ten Day this be granted using money in escrow from the bonus fund. He added:

"When I was in Washington in July the President /Kennedy/ told me the U.S. probably would approve initiation of TACKLE operations in the fall. I understood this to mean after discussion of the Chinese representation issue at the United Nations. Trust Headquarters planning to raise subject officially again within a few weeks. Difficult to hold unit together and keep up morale so long as policy prevents operating." 1/

Mr. Bissell cabled back to Mr. Cline on 23 September 1961 as follows:

"I can well appreciate your concern re TACKLE and wish to state our efforts here have been met with frustrating results. TACKLE has been on the Special Group agenda and discussed no less than 12 times since January this year. Each time considerations interposed by State or general political events have precluded a go-ahead. Most recent plea was made 21 September. Strong Defense and COMOR support have been forthcoming in all these requests, however other political considerations have been overriding..." 2/

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dated 21 September 1961.

2/

dated 23 September 1961.

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Finally, on 4 October 1961, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommended that the Special Group reevaluate the proposal to conduct a limited number of U-2 photographic missions over selected areas of the China Mainland. This was now deemed vital in view of the increasing indications of the development by the Chinese Communists of nuclear and related military capabilities. The President approved the Board's recommendation and directed it be referred to the Special Group for implementation.

Meanwhile Detachment H acquired a new Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Robert C. Tomlinson, who arrived on board in November, 1961, following program indoctrination and check-out in the U-2 at Edwards. The group had by that time been deployed at Tao Yuan for a year.

First Missions Approved

On 5 January 1962 the Special Group met and approved three TACKLE missions, with the proviso that each mission receive specific Special Group approval prior to launch and that the GRC reaffirm that it would, in the event of a mishap, publicly acknowledge responsibility for such flights. The Special Group considered it possible that these first three approvals might hold good for a year, according to developments,

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but in fact the first three missions were flown in rapid succession: the first on 12 January 1962 over Shuang Ch'eng Tzu Missile Test Range; the second on 23 February 1962 over Lan Chou atomic energy complex; and a third on 13 March 1962 over Kunming.

Concurrent with the successful beginning of TACKLE, photo reconnaissance of the North Vietnam area continued to carry high national priority with a requirement of at least two sorties per month. It was determined that this requirement could be satisfied by Detachment H (using U.S. pilots) more economically than staging a detachment to other U.S. bases in the Far East. The decision took cognizance of the GRC's concurrence in principle of using Tao Yuan-assigned aircraft with U.S. pilots for unilateral U.S. operations, and of the GRC's offer of support to U.S. operations in the North Vietnam/Laos area. Mr. Cline was asked to assure the Chinese that this unilateral activity did not mean that GRC interests were being overlooked.

On 17 April 1962 because it was suspected that the aircraft fuel currently stored at Tao Yuan might fail to meet thermal stability specifications, a stand-down of further flights was ordered until analysis could be made of samples. Meanwhile 50,000 gallons were delivered on a priority basis and procedures were set up for immediate inspection

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and sample testing of all new deliveries, with regular inspection every thirty days. Missions were resumed on 15 June 1962.

At this time a Communist build-up across the Taiwan Straits was being watched and the USIB met on 22 June to consider measures to be taken. Under the requirements established, OSA ferried an additional J-75-equipped U-2 to Taiwan on 26 June, and placed Detachment H on alert, furnishing five canned missions for coastal coverage to be run when weather allowed. Plans were also made for U.S. contract pilots to be cross-trained in both J-75 and J-57 U-2's in order to make SAC and Agency aircraft and pilots interchangeably available for Cuban and other contingency coverage.

In July 1962, a reappraisal of the scope and significance of the Straits build-up was made and taking into consideration the small number of missions approved for TACKLE, the third U-2 which had been sent to Taiwan at USIB's behest was considered superfluous and returned to Edwards to provide adequate back-up there. Coverage of Cuba was moving higher on the priority list and Detachment G was supporting a staging party at Del Rio through the summer and fall of 1962.

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First TACKLE Mission Loss and Stand-Down

On 9 September 1962 the first operational loss over Mainland China occurred in the vicinity of Nanchang. A Radio Peking broadcast said that a US-made, high altitude reconnaissance U-2 plane of the Chiang Kai-shek gang which intruded into the airspace in East China on the morning of September 9 was shot down by the Air Force of the PLA. The GRC shortly afterwards released the following statement:

"One of our high altitude reconnaissance planes was missing on the morning of 9 September during a routine photo reconnaissance over bandit held areas. Our Government, in order to understand the bandit situation on the mainland, has purchased two U-2 high altitude reconnaissance planes from Lockheed Aircraft Manufacturing Company in July 1960. The two airplanes were shipped to Taiwan in December of the same year for operational use." 1/

In response to direct news media queries, the State Department in Washington then released this statement on the sale of the aircraft:

"In July 1960, Lockheed Aircraft and the Government of the Republic of China entered into a contract for the direct sale by Lockheed of two U-2 aircraft and an export license for the two aircraft was issued." 2/

An amplifying statement by a spokesman from the State Department indicated that there were no restrictions as to where the GRC could

1/ GRC Ministry of Defense Press Release, 9 September 1962.

2/ 50X1, E.O.13526 9 September 1962.

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employ the planes, and since they were engaged in a continuing civil war with the Communists, it could be presumed that they would want to use reconnaissance aircraft to survey the positions of their enemies.

On 13 September 1962, President Kennedy in answer to questions at his press conference, pointed out that the sale of the U-2's had been licensed by the Eisenhower Administration and that there were no plans to sell any further ones or to grant any export licenses to the Chinese or to any other country.

While the cause of the first loss was not immediately known, speculation leaned to either materiel failure or a shoot-down by a SAM. The attitude of the remaining Chinese pilots was that this was a wartime loss and they were anxious to press on; Taiwan Station, after a reassessment of the situation, favored renewal of the program in two stages: (1) a shallow penetration or two over relatively safe areas; (2) after assessing propaganda and political effects, resume normal operations with maximum possible safety factors built into route planning. The Station also recommended replacing the lost U-2.

At this time the Cuban missile build-up was commanding full attention in Washington and therefore the stand-down of TACKLE flights extended on through October 1962. On 2 November approval

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was given to resume test and training flights provided any incident (actual or contrived by the opposition) be avoided by careful flight planning within specified coordinates. Operational missions began again on 5 December 1962 with coverage of North Korea, staging from Kunsan.

Consideration of the future of the U-2 program by the Special Group on 17 December 1962 resulted in the assumptions that for Fiscal Year 1963-64 photo reconnaissance of Mainland China would continue to be a requirement and that two aircraft would be the operating level at Detachment H.

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On 28 February 1963, a stand-down of operations was ordered due to faulty DC generators in the U-2's at Detachment H. The trouble was eventually traced to lack of quality control in subcontractor-furnished bearings. Four reworked generators were airlifted to Tao Yuan by courier as a temporary fix until new improved bearings could be obtained.

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Operations 1963

Operations were renewed at the end of March 1963 and fifteen successful overflights of priority targets on the Mainland were run between March and November 1963. A schedule of these and all other TACKLE missions is contained in Annex 112 hereto. In May 1963 an additional U-2 was delivered to Taiwan via C-124, properly documented as to sale and export license. As a result of the missile threat to the U-2, new electronic warning and countermeasure devices were being developed and tested. System XII, an airborne warning receiver against the SA-2 (Soviet surface-to-air missile) was delivered to Tao Yuan and tested during April and May 1963. Its use in overflights of SAM sites in South China later revealed changes in the FAN SONG radar characteristics, which lead to the modification of System XII to encompass these changes.

In May 1963 General I Fu-en visited the U. S. and was briefed in Washington on improvements anticipated in Systems IX and XII, the auto pilot, drift sight, and flight planning techniques, which appeared to satisfy his concern in these areas. He also visited the Chinese pilots currently in training at Del Rio.

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Second Mainland Loss

On 1 November 1963, after overflight of the Missile Test Range at Shuang Ch'eng Tzu, Mission GRC-184 went down near the Kiangsi/ Chekiang border. Radio Peking made its standard announcement that a US-made U-2 of the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang had been shot down by the the PLA. The GRC issued a brief press release similar to the last one, and asked U.S. agreement for the GRC to acknowledge, if queried, that an additional U-2 had been purchased in December 1962. Permission could not be obtained immediately from higher authority for public announcement of the issuance of the third export license. Headquarters did, however, sanction the GRC's "planting" an unofficial story which was published on 3 November 1963 in the Cheng Hsin Hsin Wen Pao (Taipei Chinese language daily) and which memorialized the heroism of the pilot and said he crashed due to engine trouble. A team of U.S. experts investigated the possibilities of contributing factors such as hypoxia, auto pilot failure, and even ingestion of contaminated food in flight. No positive findings resulted.

In the wake of the second loss, the question of installing jammers on TACKLE aircraft to avoid enemy air interception was raised with the Director (Mr. McCone) who said the President's Science

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Adviser (Dr. Wiesner) believed the opposition would sooner or later find a way of defeating any jamming equipment which could be devised if it were used repeatedly. He agreed, however, to put the question to the USIB. The Chairman of USIB directed the DD/S&T to obtain the necessary approval for the use of jammers in the TACKLE aircraft from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Joint Chiefs were unwilling to approve the use of any existing equipment because of the risk of compromising it to the opposition.

On 14 November 1963, the recommendation to resume TACKLE overflights was put to the Special Group and approved in principle, and subsequently Mr. McCone addressed a letter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the interest of retrieving two Agency U-2's which had been on loan to SAC for coverage of Cuba, so that TACKLE could be supported. The assassination of the President on 22 November brought official Washington to a temporary standstill; however, on 30 November Mr. McCone saw President Johnson and, among other matters, received his reaffirmation of the 14 November approval. On 6 December the Special Group renewed its approval, with the State caveat that the contingency plan be brought up to date before any missions were run. Meanwhile an additional U-2 was documented

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for export and delivered to Tao Yuan at the end of December. On 9 January 1964, State having been satisfied as to contingency planning, the go-ahead was given. (See Annex 113 for Interdepartmental Cover Support Plan). Flights were to be made only after careful evaluation of the requirements from the intelligence point of view and with due recognition of the shrinking inventory of high-level reconnaissance aircraft which must not be used wastefully. Another hold-down developed then due to fuel control problems, which required a month to resolve.

Operations Resumed: Third Mainland Loss

After four and a half months of standing down, a mission over South China was run on 16 March 1964. (This was the first operational mission flown using the BIRDWATCHER.*) A week later U-2 #356 piloted by Capt. Liang on a long training flight went down in the sea off Taiwan. A replacement U-2 configured for inflight refueling (#359) was ferried to Taiwan in April "black" inasmuch as documentation was available from one lost previously but not publicized.

* BIRDWATCHER: An electronic system designed to transmit to a ground station functional information on the status of various aircraft systems during emergency flight conditions. The data transmitted is analyzed by the ground station to determine the cause and effects of the emergency situation.

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Overflights resumed with fair to excellent results on the next three missions. On 29 June a broadcast in Mandarin by Radio Peking beamed at Taiwan offered 8,000 taels of gold to any pilot "who flies over in a righteous revolt in a P2V or U-2 type aircraft". On 7 July Mission C-184C, staging from Cubi Point, was lost over Lung Chi, Fukien Province, after the pilot, at altitude had reported that System XII (the SAM warning) was on. New China News Agency reported from Peking that the U-2 was shot down by the Chinese Communist Air Force and gave no details of the location, or the fate of the pilot. The GRC released a short statement acknowledging the loss, "by accident".

An exhaustive study was made of all available data relating to Mission C-184C by OSA Intelligence and while being unable to establish a positive cause for the loss, the following conclusions were reached:

"Assumptions:

- a. That the pilot was physically alert and capable at the time he reported System XII on.
- b. That at the same time BIRDWATCHER was in commission.
- c. That at the time of the pilot's report the aircraft was at mission altitude.

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d. That the pilot did not defect.

"Conclusions:

That because only five minutes elapsed between the pilot's reporting a System XII on and the tracking of the aircraft ceased, and because neither the BIRDWATCHER nor the pilot apparently broadcast a signal indicating trouble, we conclude that whatever happened to the mission aircraft occurred abruptly and violently incapacitating the pilot and his aircraft almost instantly. The fact that the pilot reported System XII on and the aircraft was lost without any further indication beyond the pilot's report, we attribute the loss most likely to a direct hit from a SAM or secondarily from a MIG-21-launched IR missile.

"Recommendations:

- a. That action be reinitiated to obtain approval for installation of a suitable FAN SONG jammer in the U-2 (not the ALQ-19 or any shelf item now available because each has its limitations and can be 'read through' within a short time.)
- b. That no future overflights be permitted until the high PRF warning circuit of System XII is incorporated in BIRDWATCHER. This is now estimated to be installed in the field by 1 August 1964.

c.

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The Chinese were fully convinced that the aircraft had been the victim of a SAM and General Chiang Ching-kuo indicated that he wanted

1/ BYE 2765-64, 22 July 1964. Memo for AD/OSA from Intel/OSA.

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"to let some time go by" before resuming missions. At that time there was only one operationally ready pilot (who was understandably suffering from nerves and stomach disorder) with one other completing combat training at Tao Yuan and five in the pipeline. Headquarters had ample evidence that the GRC would only continue overflights with the installation of a better warning system or the use of an active jamming capability in the U-2. The Commander of Detachment H at that time, Col. Slater, who was just at that time finishing his tour, reported also an undercurrent of feeling among the Chinese that they were not getting as much advantage from the take as the U.S. This had previously been intimated from time to time.

During the stand-down then ensuing, an evaluation of the current position and future options, prepared for the Director's use in briefing USIB and the Special Group, pointed out that alternative ways of covering vital targets in South China were limited. Either wait for the GRC to resume TACKLE flights, or put a U.S. national (in uniform, or not) over South China. Reference was made to top CAF command's desire for a faster, higher-flying aircraft and better anti-missile equipment to face the improved techniques of the Chicoms in countering System XII. In the absence of an improved aircraft, use of a deceptive

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jammer (System XIII) was suggested. It was configured to the U-2 and could be produced for testing in four months from order. It did not duplicate any existing black boxes (which had been denied TACKLE by the JCS even though their capabilities and characteristics were well known to the Soviets).

Some time was required to bring the number of operationally ready TACKLE pilots to the optimum number (six), and operationally configured aircraft to three, and to complete construction at Takhli in Thailand (the ideally located point from which South China could be covered). The Thais had agreed to retrieval of Chinese pilots there even though the GRC had not yet agreed to this tactic.

The options open, then, appeared to be:

"a. Wait for the GRC to permit overflight of South China from Tao Yuan with CAF pilots...

"b. Fly Agency pilots from Tao Yuan...

"c. If 'a' does not come to pass and we choose not to offend the GRC on their home ground by employing 'b', deploy a detachment from Edwards AFB to Cubi Point or Takhli...

"d. If the GRC agrees to limited operations in... western South China, launch TACKLE missions from Tao Yuan and retrieve at Takhli after late September.

"e. If the GRC does not resume operations within a reasonable time, and if none of the above alternatives is

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acceptable, let SAC cover South China from Saigon with their J-57 equipment, mindful of its operating limitations, i. e., altitude and contrails." 1/

To further provide effective FAN SONG countermeasures the System XIII jammer was installed in the Detachment H U-2's. This electronic countermeasures system was developed from an old Navy ALQ-19 and enhanced to specifically counter the threat of the S-Band FAN SONG radar. Since System XIII involved the use of a travelling wave tube (TWT) and the U. S. military still considered this item to be beyond the Sino-Soviet state of the art, the Joint Chiefs would only permit activation of the system when the System XII indicated a FAN-SONG was on the air. Activation of System XIII was then manually effected whenever the pilot was alerted by System XII.

With this additional measure of protection, on 30 October the GRC approved a TACKLE overflight of Lanchou, which was successfully carried out on 31 October 1964.

Fourth Loss over Mainland

On 10 January 1965, Peking Radio claimed the shoot-down by their Air Force of a fourth U-2 over North China. This was Mission

1/ BYE-3047-64 (Att.), 21 July 1964. Memo for DDCI from A/ADSA.

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C-025C* (Maj. Chang Li-i pilot) carrying infra-red detection equipment over the Chicom nuclear reactor at Pao Tou, near where it disappeared. The GRC confirmed the incident calling the downing of the plane an "accident" and crediting the pilot with five previous missions over Mainland China. The U.S. defense and intelligence communities were referred to the cover support plan providing that all U.S. official sources deny any knowledge of the operation and refer inquiries to the sole spokesman for the U.S. Government, the Department of State.

Project officials were by this time fully convinced that the Chinese Communists had a smoothly functioning mobile SAM launching capability with launchers in all probability being hastily set up in previously surveyed sites on the basis of monitored overflight patterns and prevailing weather. While the GRC did not formally state their unwillingness to continue overflights at this point, the implication was that they would not be willing to resume full-scale operations until improved protection and flight procedures were put into effect.

U-2 #385 which was sent over on 30 March 1965 as a replacement for

* The loss of this mission was the cause of an Inspector General's investigation into the liaison procedures between OSA and NPIC during pre-mission flight planning. Foreknowledge by mission planners of new SAM sites (available in KH photography) might have saved the mission.

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the most recent loss was equipped with System IX-B, a repeater-jammer, and System XII-B, an improved version of the missile threat warning device.

1965 Operations

In February 1965 COMOR had a list of more than a hundred targets in the South China/North Vietnam border region which required coverage on a priority basis. There were two ways of accomplishing this: either resume TACKLE operations which were standing down since the loss on 10 January, or remove restrictions which required the SAC group operating U-2's from Vietnam to remain below the 19th parallel. OSA felt that if the TACKLE group were assigned the job, JCS approval must be given to activate the System XIII jammer as soon as the aircraft penetrated hostile territory, rather than waiting until System XII became active. This would give the added protection desired by the GRC. Subsequently the JCS on 12 February 1965 (BYE 5111-65) approved use of System XIII from penetration to exit, which in part prompted the GRC to approve future overflights.

Also in February 1965, the Special Group approved resumption of TACKLE missions and between February and the end of the year 28 missions were flown, principally in response to COMOR requirements,

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with results classified as three excellent, sixteen good, four fair, and five poor (including three aborts before reaching target). Counter-measures systems (IX-B and XII-B) were used operationally beginning 17 April 1965. The new Delta III camera (NRO designation 112-B) was used first on 14 May 1965 and twice more during the year, with all other photographic missions employing the B camera.

A replacement U-2, #359, was ferried to Detachment H in May 1965 which was equipped with System XIII-A and the Oscar-Sierra System, Mark II. U-2 #352 was returned to Lockheed for the installation of Systems IX-B, XII-B, and XIII-A. Another exchange in June gave the Detachment three aircraft with all the latest available electronic counter-measures systems. Detachment H personnel were augmented with TDY personnel from Edwards to give dual operating capability from Tao Yuan and Takhli simultaneously during this intensively active period.

A visit to Headquarters was made in May 1965 by General Yang Shao-lien, then Chief of Staff of the CAF, accompanied by Col. Yang Shih-chu, Commander of the 35th Squadron. They held discussions with COMOR with regard to targets, and with Gen. Ledford and the OSA Staff. Two matters of concern were GRC desire for coverage of the Straits on a continuing basis due to aggressive signs noted on the part of the

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Chinese Communists, and the continuing requirement for improved defensive equipment for the U-2. The requirement for coverage of the Straits was acceded to as a quid pro quo in light of the GRC's continued support of the joint program, even though it was not a high priority target from the U.S. (COMOR) standpoint.

In August 1965, the Chinese Communists, during a display of captured Japanese war materials at the Chinese Peoples' Revolution Military Museum, commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Japanese defeat, took the opportunity to place on display the remains of four aircraft, claimed to be US-built U-2 spy planes shot down over the China Mainland between 1962 and January 1965. (See picture overleaf.)

Through contacts with the British and French Intelligence Services OSA was able to obtain quite good photography of the exhibit; however, exhaustive study of these pictures and of intelligence reports from all sources has not allowed for any conclusive findings or decisions as to the four losses. (The fifth had not been added to the display as of April 1968.)

On 22 October 1965, U-2 #352 with pilot, Lt. Col. Wang Chengwen (Pete), was lost on a routine local training flight approximately twenty-five miles East-Northeast of Taipei. No trace of the pilot

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
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CHINA WAO 511A BEIJING 39 35 N 116 24 E
U-2 PLANE CRASHED DOWN AND ON EXHIBIT AT MILITARY MUSEUM.
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or aircraft wreckage was found. The BIRDWATCHER indicated only that the autopilot was disengaged just prior to the start of an extremely rapid descent. The incident was covered by a GRC story concerning the explosion in flight of a B-57 in the same general vicinity. After a short stand-down for an investigation, missions resumed at a good rate through November.

Operations 1966

Only ten operational missions were flown by TACKLE in 1966 with two of these aborting before completion of coverage and six out of ten photographic results being classed as "poor". The year started badly with a training loss on 17 February when Capt. Wu Ts'ai-hsi attempted a flame-out landing at Taichung, overshot and crashed into a house half a mile south of the runway at the civil airport. The pilot and one occupant of the house were killed and four other occupants injured. There was no security compromise due to this accident, and no press statements were required since the type of aircraft could not be distinguished due to the force of the crash. Subsequent to this loss approval for the first operational mission of the year, flown on 28 March, was given very hesitantly and with misgivings by the GRC. On 1 April 1966, OSA cabled 50X1, E.O.13526

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[] suggesting that an invitation to General Yang for another visit to Washington might be timely since the beneficial effects of the previous year's visit had probably worn off. OSA desired to review with General Yang the latest developments in operational tactics, ECM systems, and other hardware, and the possibilities of the follow-on U-2R and future CAF capabilities. The net effect of such a visit was expected to be renewed confidence and understanding on both sides, especially with regard to obtaining GRC approvals.

The visit was arranged for the last week of April and during the course of it discussions were held on the U-2R, new electronic and photographic equipment being tested with approximate dates for delivery to Detachment H, training of further CAF pilots, and priority target lists. With regard to the difficulty in securing GRC approvals, especially those missions of less interest to them, General Yang suggested that in the event of weather deterioration, the mission be postponed rather than cancelled since GRC approval was good until the mission was either flown or cancelled. If cancelled and later re-alerted, this meant obtaining GRC approval again. (This of course represented only a very small segment of the over-all problem with relation to obtaining GRC approvals.)

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On target priorities, General Yang said he understood the U. S. order was South China first (in light of Vietnam activities), then Manchuria, East Coast and North Korea. The GRC primary interest was in the Taiwan Straits area with first priority including airfields and ports along the coast; second and third priorities were two lines of airfields roughly parallel to the coast and farther inland. Gen. Ledford assured Gen. Yang that the U. S. side would consider the Straits area of equal priority to South China, with weather being the determining factor between the two at the time of scheduling.

Gen. Yang was told of the intention to set up a training program for TACKLE pilots at Edwards, if security problems could be ironed out. (The GRC side had expressed some discontent with the handling of their pilots at Davis-Monthan.) Also a preliminary briefing was given on the proposed

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with the

intention of preparing the Chinese for a later request to fly the necessary supporting missions.

On the heels of the fairly successful meetings with Gen. Yang came the loss on 21 June 1966 of a high altitude training mission (U-2 #384, Maj. Yu Ch'ing-chang, pilot) which went down in the sea

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off the coast of Okinawa near Naha. The body of the pilot was recovered and the aircraft, which broke into three main sections, was recovered and later returned to Tao Yuan where an investigation was held with a board of experts sent out by Project Headquarters.

During the crisis hours following the crash, General Hsu, Commander-in-Chief of the CAF, and General Chiang Ching-kuo flatly refused to make a public statement on behalf of the GRC's responsibility for the aircraft, as agreed in the cover support plan. This placed the U.S. military authorities on Okinawa in an impossible situation vis-a-vis the local news media who continuously pressed them for a statement. The GRC authorities finally agreed on 22 June to a press statement by the U.S. Commander of the 313th Air Division on Okinawa, provided no mention was made of the type of aircraft. The text of the release as finally issued said:

"After investigating a report of an aircraft crash and determining that no U.S. aircraft were missing at the time, inquiries disclosed that a jet aircraft belonging to the Republic of China Air Force went down in the waters off Kerama Island late in the afternoon of June 21. The aircraft was on a routine training flight and the pilot was killed. USAF and other military agencies are assisting Republic of China authorities in recovery of wreckage and in investigation of the possible cause of the accident." 1/

1/ OPCEN 1989 (OUT 24091) to State, 22 June 1966.

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50X1, E.O.13526

cabled Headquarters after this

incident as follows:

"The existence of the GRC-approved support plan in Headquarters files unfortunately does not mean that this will govern GRC actions in practice... changing circumstances since January 1965 having brought the GRC so many losses and setbacks on many fronts that the GRC now seeks to walk away from its previously agreed position re the cover support plan. Every plane and ship loss is now a most serious psychological loss to the GRC, with the Gimo almost certainly the source of GRC pretense that it is not sustaining losses..." 1/

The finding of the investigation board that primary cause of the accident was engine failure, but that the pilot should have bailed out sooner, was presented to GRC officials at a meeting on 1 July 1966. General Yang, speaking from prepared notes in Chinese and using an interpreter, made a number of points (which bore out the opinion of

50X1, E.O.13526 quoted above):

"We have during the last nine months experienced excessively high loss rate, i. e., three pilots and aircraft on training missions, which would lead to CAF conclusion that training standards and aircraft maintenance procedures are inadequate... In the minds of the CAF and particularly the pilots, training mission losses we have experienced are especially demoralizing and much more so than combat losses. The CAF would assign primary cause of the last three to mechanical failure, i. e., maintenance breakdown..." 2/

1/ 50X1, E.O.13526 24 June 1966.

2/ 50X1, E.O.13526 2 July 1966.

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General Yang concluded that no effort should be spared to improve quality of maintenance on aircraft and all associated equipment; that present training mission profiles should be reviewed for adequate margins of safety; and that better preparations must be made for every mission, training as well as operational. He asked that no more -17 engines be used in the program, and that improved communications equipment be installed as soon as possible (new IFF and ARC-51).

On 9 September 1966, in response to a request by the DD/S&T for an evaluation of the TACKLE program and its prospects for the future as a productive intelligence collection effort, a study was presented which reflected the coordinated views of OSI, OEL and OSA. An assessment of the feasibility of continued overflight of Communist China was made, considering principally the surface-to-air missile threat since fighter-interceptors had not yet posed a significant threat. The conclusions of the paper were essentially optimistic with regard to the viability of the program, while accepting the inherent fact of having to expect losses. It was recommended that the program be continued; however, that the current stand-down be continued to permit the installation and checking out of improved threat-warning displays and the obtaining of data on the true nature of the Chicom SAM threat. It was

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also recommended that satellite photographic and electronic coverage be obtained on a regular basis to support TACKLE operational requirements.

In early October 1966 when the unilateral decision of the U. S. to cancel the P2V project was made known to the GRC, the reaction which followed adversely affected all other joint activities. The Chinese philosophy is to look upon a given relationship between two people or two governments in its total context rather than to separate out the parts from the whole. Therefore TACKLE suffered not only from an operational stand-down but from very strained relations between the principals on either side. Thus 1966 ended on a very low note.

General Bacalis, who had become Director of Special Activities in August 1966, in a message to 50X1, E.O.13526 summed up the situation as follows:

"... Looking critically at calendar year 1966 I find that weather and maintenance stand-downs (following Kunming and Canton missile incidents, and aircraft accidents) accounted for much of the inactivity. However, during other periods when we could and should have been flying operational missions, GRC has repeatedly refused mission approval for varied reasons familiar to all... I am now of the opinion that we will in the future have to press the TACKLE issue with GRC and resolve any existing differences... In the face of mounting costs of the war in Vietnam, priorities will necessarily assert themselves and a non-productive TACKLE program could easily become a casualty despite our best efforts to defend it... I think you can say

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with reasonable certainty that the U.S. Government desires to retain TACKLE indefinitely as long as it is effective, profitable, and operable with acceptable risk..." 1/

New CAF/CIA TACKLE Agreement

In January 1967 [] 50X1, E.O.13526 [] notified Headquarters that a new agreement was being drafted by the CAF for the TACKLE program, as insurance against U.S. unilateral action such as had ended the IUPOLLY program. The first draft of this proposed agreement passed to [] on 17 February asked for a three-year agreement with no escape clause allowing for unilateral cancellation by either party. Negotiations continued for the next thirty days with the principal point of contention being the three-year guarantee. The Chinese were finally persuaded that the U.S. side would not agree to more than a one-year guaranteed program, and eventually such an agreement was accepted. The document was signed by [] [] and the Chief of Staff of the CAF, Lieut. Gen. Yang Shao-lien, on 17 March 1967 (effective date 18 March) after previous concurrence of the DD/S&T, the DD/P and the General Counsel at Headquarters and Ambassador McConaughy at Taipei. It called for a three-year agreement which would continue in force

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1/ [] 50X1, E.O.13526 [] 27 January 1967.

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without escape clause on either side for one year, with a three-month review period at the end of the first year to determine whether the program should continue. Should the program prove to be viable and productive beyond the first year, a review would not be necessary, but could be called at any future time by either side to consider the desirability of discontinuing the program. In the event either side wished to terminate the agreement after one year, a ninety-day phase-out period would be required to effect such unilateral cancelling of the program. (Text of current agreement is in Annex 114.)

Toward the end of the negotiations the GRC representatives seemed to have developed a sincere desire to obtain a signed agreement as quickly as possible. The increase in reports of widespread disorders on the Mainland during this period may have had some influence on the desire to reinstitute TACKLE overflights.

At the same time the agreement was being signed, Dr. Chamberlain, Director of Scientific Intelligence, DD/S&T, was briefing the Generalissimo and Madam Chiang on the latest intelligence on Chinese Communist nuclear activities. He gave the same briefing to General Chiang Ching-kuo the next day

50X1, E.O.13526

General Chiang appeared

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to be quite sobered by the information provided, and concurred in GRC support to the 50X1, E.O.13526 stressing his desire that proper training be given the pilots who would be involved.

50X1, E.O.13526

The latter

mission failed to acquire any valid information.)

Fifth Mainland Loss

Mission C297C, flown by Capt. Huang Jung-pei (Tommy), on 8 September 1967, was in response to a GRC requirement for coverage on an urgent basis of 17 Chinese Communist airfield targets. The route was designed to cover six of these targets. The mission aircraft penetrated the China coast approximately 45 nautical miles northeast of Shanghai and was tracked continuously until it disappeared at a point about six miles south of Chia Hsing Airfield and 70 miles southwest of Shanghai. After an exhaustive analysis of all available data, the conclusion was reached that a surface-to-air missile probably caused the destruction of the aircraft. There was no indication in the Radio Peking announcement of the downing of the aircraft as to the fate of the pilot.

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Damage assessments were collected at both Detachment G and Detachment H to cover the contingency of the pilot's having been taken alive. The Security Staff summation of these assessments noted that Capt. Huang knew of the interrelationship which existed between Detachments G and H as well as Ban Takhli; that the USAF/U.S. Government is involved in at least some of the activities' support; that Huang is aware of the identities of prominent military members of the project; that he is generally aware of some of the U-2's defensive and offensive systems and camera; that he is completely aware of the project's tactical doctrine and the U-2 handbook and finally that he is at least to some extent knowledgeable of the true names of Agency personnel, though not necessarily their true affiliation.

(An item credited to a 20 October dispatch from Canton was published in the 19 December issue of the Hong Kong Survey of China Mainland Press and stated that according to a reliable source, the U-2 plane reported to have been shot down on 8 September by the Chinese Communist Air Force was actually forced to land, intact, by three of their planes at a certain place in Kiangsu, "a great victory for the great thought of Mao Tse-tung". The office of the DD/I responsible for the monitoring of this source of information gave it a low credibility rating.)

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Action taken as a result of the most recent loss included modification of the Oscar Sierra and Systems 12B-1 and 13C to increase their effectiveness against the changing techniques for tracking and missile launching being employed by the Chinese Communists. TACKLE flights were suspended, awaiting these and other modifications, and flight plans in future were to be designed to keep mission aircraft a safe distance from known or probable missile sites.

The Deputy Director of Special Activities, Mr. Parangosky, and the Chief of the IDEALIST Operations Staff, Lt. Col. Vernon Morris, together with two Office of ELINT experts, visited Detachment H the latter part of October 1967 for the principal purpose of discussing with the Detachment and CAF officers the electronic warfare systems being redesigned or modified for use in the U-2. These included:

- a. Replacement of ELINT collection System 6 with 6A.
- b. Replacement of COMINT collection System 3 with System 21.
- c. Improvement of Oscar Sierra Mark II by Mark III.
- d. New systems in development: System 20, counter to MIG fighter threat, and System 22, infra-red and air-to-air missile jammer.

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In November 1967, the GRC expressed willingness to consider H camera missions, provided they were not within the range of surface-to-air missiles, and to fly the System XVII ELINT system (for collection of missile telemetry data) on normal training missions. They wished to await an effective demonstration of the OS Mark III before resuming mainland overflights.

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ANNEX 107

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25 January 1961

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

This memorandum of understanding sets forth the responsibilities and agreed positions on Project RAZOR. [CIA cryptonym TACKLE]

1. You will provide the operational base and associated facilities for the component responsible for carrying out jointly agreed activities.

2. We will maintain a local operational component capable of planning operational activities of mutual benefit, training, providing maintenance, supplying spare parts and furnishing special equipment.

3. Two special instruments will be assigned, but we reserve the right to reassign or withdraw them temporarily or permanently upon giving due notice.

4. You will provide identification and serial numbers for the two instruments.

5. You will provide and maintain support equipment for maintaining operator proficiency.

6. You will assign the necessary number of trained personnel to the component to carry out agreed tasks. You will designate a representative to exercise control and supervision of these personnel. The number of personnel required and the duration of their employment in the component is subject to mutual agreement.

7. You will provide all subsistence, housing, pay, allowances, and special benefits for your personnel except as indicated in paragraph 8 below.

8. We will provide funds for incentive pay and subsistence benefits for your personnel assigned directly to the component, provided receipts are furnished indicating that expenditures are for purposes calculated to improve the overall performance of the operational component.

9. You will provide identification passes, documents and numbers needed to give component personnel and vehicles free entry and exit to the site.

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10. You will provide a guard force adequate for establishing perimeter security control of the component area.

11. Our operational component chief will assume responsibility for working out with your representative operational, communications and physical security procedures for issuance by appropriate authority on your side.

12. You will keep the number of persons knowledgeable of component activities to an absolute minimum and will certify as to their reliability, providing biographical information as requested.

13. You will assist us in affording a thorough security check, including a technical interview, of your primary operators on a semi-annual basis.

14. We will submit to you our target lists and accept your requirements for incorporation in a mutually agreed joint target list.

15. We will notify you approximately 24 hours in advance when actual missions are contemplated and the general target area selected.

16. Your personnel assigned to the component will participate in subsequent local operational planning of the mission and local "go-no-go" decisions. All operational activity by the component must be jointly agreed.

17. You will conduct pre-mission briefings and post mission discussions with the primary operators, providing us tape recordings, and collaborating with our personnel in the component to insure the briefings achieve our mutual purposes.

18. You will be solely responsible for settling all claims arising from damage to persons or property resulting from jointly approved operations.

19. In the event of accident involving the special instruments both parties have the right to conduct on-the-spot investigations.

20. Any new construction or renovation of existing structures and the installation of equipment must be jointly agreed.

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21. We will finance construction and renovation necessary for housing the component and its equipment.

22. Title to all permanent construction within the component site area passes to you when neither you nor we have further operational need for the area. In that event, however, we may remove all equipment and fixtures which we have installed.

23. Either side may withdraw personnel or facilities provided for the joint component upon due notice.

24. The product of the operations will be processed by us and copies returned promptly to you. All material will be titled: "Top Secret Special Handling Required".

25. Under certain circumstances the component site and facilities may be used for operations of interest solely to us, but such use will be subject to prior notification, including identification of the general objectives of the activity contemplated, and will be subject to your concurrence.

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ANNEX 108

SCHEDULE OF TACKLE PILOTS - As of April 1968

<u>Crypto</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
IMAGE-9	L/C Yang Shih-chu	Del Rio, 1959	Now C/O, 35th Squadron, CAF
10	Maj. Hua Hsi-chun	" "	Retired
11	L/C Wang Tai-yu	" "	Retired
12	Maj. Chih Yao-hua	" "	Killed 19 Mar 61/Training
13	Maj. Ch'en Huai (later L/C)	" "	Killed 8 Sept 62/Nanchang
14	L/C Lee Nan-ping (Terry)	" 1963	Killed 7 July 64/Lungchi
15	Maj. Yeh Ch'ang-ti	" "	Killed 1 Nov 63/Nanchang
16	Maj. Wang Shi-chueh (Johnny) (later L/C)	Davis-Monthan 1963	Retired
17	Capt. Liang Teh-pei	" " "	Killed 22 March 64/Training
18	Maj. Chang Li-i (Jack)	" " 1964	Killed 10 Jan 65/Pao Tou
19	Maj. Wang Cheng-wen (Pete)	" " 1964	Killed 22 Oct 65/Training
20	Capt. Wu Ts'ai-hsi (Charlie)	" " 1964	Killed 17 Feb 66/Training
21	Capt. Sheng Shih-li	" " 1964	Released from program
22	Capt. Chuang Jen-liang (Spike)	" " 1964-65	Retired
23	Maj. Yu Ch'ing-chang (Mickey)	" " 1964-65	Killed 21 June 66/Training
24	L/C Liu Chai-chung (Terry)	" " 1964-65	Retired
25	Maj. Chang Hsieh (Billy)	" " 1966	Currently at Tao Yuan
26	Capt. Fan Hung-ti (Andy)	" " 1966	Currently at Tao Yuan
27	Capt. Yang Erh-ping	" " 1966	Released from program
28	Capt. Chou(Tsou) Yen-ching(Eddie) Edwards,	1966	Currently at Tao Yuan
29	Capt. Huang Jung-pei (Tommy)	" "	Killed 8 Sept 67/Shanghai
30	Maj. Hwang Chi-shang (Denny)	" 1967	Currently at Tao Yuan
31	Capt. Lee Po-wei (David)	" "	Currently at Tao Yuan
32	Maj. Wang Tao (Tom)	" 1968	Currently in training
33	Maj. Shen Chung-li (Johnny)	" "	Currently in training

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PROJECT HEADQUARTERS
DIRECTIVE 50-10-25

OPERATIONS
TRAINING
17 June 1966

ESTABLISHMENT OF A GRC U-2 PILOT
TRAINING PROGRAM AT DETACHMENT G

1. PURPOSE:

The purpose of this directive is to establish the procedures and provide guidance for the training of Chinese pilots in U-2 aircraft, the security and cover arrangements, and the other supporting functions and details concerning training GRC pilots at Detachment G.

2. RESPONSIBILITY:

Detachment Commanders are responsible for insuring adherence to the provisions of this directive.

3. GENERAL:

This directive:

a. Supersedes all previous procedures both written and verbal regarding the over-all cover plan for U.S. personnel involved in the TACKLE program.

b. Establishes the procedures for US/GRC joint participation in cover arrangements to be used by US personnel in connection with the TACKLE program. (Att. I)

c. Establishes the minimum training required before a Chinese pilot can be scheduled for operational missions. (Att II)

d. Provides guidance to Detachment Commanders for the establishment of travel arrangements, physical examinations, personnel, equipment fitting, billeting arrangements, social and official contact procedures and associated support functions regarding the training of Chinat personnel at Edwards Air Force Base. (Att. III)

(Signed)

JACK C. LEDFORD
Brig. Gen., USAF
Director of Special Activities

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PROJECT HEADQUARTERS
DIRECTIVE 50-10-25
Attachment I

SECURITY

SECURITY/COVER PROGRAM
FOR TRAINING GRC PILOTS AT DETACHMENT G

1. PURPOSE:

The purpose of this attachment is to provide cover and security instructions for the training of GRC pilots at Detachment G.

2. GENERAL:

The introduction of a GRC U-2 pilot training operation at Detachment G will necessitate a revamping of the entire cover rationale heretofore applied at Detachment H. In essence, the role of the United States Air Force as a supplier of services, support and advice will be surfaced while simultaneously maximum effort will continue to be given to hiding the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency. In combination, all security/cover policies and procedures will seek to portray the TACKLE Program in this image: it is a unilateral GRC effort, totally managed and controlled by the GRC; in the interests of drawing upon the expertise of the United States Air Force, the GRC has entered into an agreement with the USAF to provide training, logistical and advisory support. Every effort must be made to preclude the identification of the Agency with the U-2 programs at Detachments G and H.

3. SECURITY/COVER PROGRAM AT DETACHMENT G DURING
CHINESE PILOT TRAINING ACTIVITY:

a. The existing procedures governing the nomination, processing and use of invitational Air Force orders (resulting in the movement of the GRC pilots to the United States) will continue.

b. Upon their arrival on the West Coast, the GRC personnel will be handled by the Detachment G training Faculty including a permanently assigned Security Officer drawn from the Detachment G Security Staff.

c. All Detachment G military personnel exposed to the Chinese pilot trainees while at Edwards Air Force Base will represent themselves as military people using their true ranks and their true names.

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d. All Detachment G Agency civilians exposed to the Chinese pilot trainees while at Edwards Air Force Base will represent themselves as DAFC's and they will use aliases.

e. All contractor representatives exposed to the Chinese pilot trainees while at Edwards Air Force Base will represent themselves as LAC personnel and will use true names.

f. The Detachment G pilots will represent themselves as Lockheed flight test consultants. They will use the names they presently use while on TDY to Detachment H.

g. In general, the Security Officer member of the Detachment G Training Faculty will function as a case officer to respond to any situation with security overtones involving the GRC pilot trainees.

h. Detachment G will arrange suitable housing to accommodate the GRC personnel with every attempt made to avoid locating them in the Lancaster/Palmdale areas. During their stay in California, the GRC personnel should be kept as isolated as possible from other members of the Detachment and should not be exposed to activities at the Detachment not related to the training program.

i. Under no circumstances will Detachment G pilots, Detachment G Agency civilians or Headquarters personnel (either civilian or military) entertain GRC pilot trainees in their homes.

j. Every effort will be made to restrict the movement of the GRC pilot trainees within the confines of Detachment G to avoid exposure to the operational activities.

k. The British personnel at Detachment G will be briefed by the Chief, Detachment G Security Staff to avoid direct contact with the Chinese pilot trainees. In this regard, it will be necessary to schedule the British flying activity at times other than when the Chinese will be physically within the confines of the Detachment G area. Should an accidental, face-to-face encounter materialize between the Chinese and the British, the latter will identify themselves in aliases as flight maintenance pilots or supporting personnel with LAC.

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1. During the times Chinese pilot trainees are at Detachment G, visits by Agency representatives, particularly at the level of Dr. Wheelon, General Ledford and Mr. Cunningham should be kept to a minimum. When visits of the latter type are absolutely necessary, the Chinese representatives should be removed from the Base. All Headquarters visitors to Detachment G will use, in meeting the Chinese pilot trainees, the aliases assigned them in previous visits to Detachment H. In the absence of a previously assigned alias, the Detachment G Security Staff will assign the visitor an alias, identification of which will be forwarded to Detachment H to provide for subsequent use of the alias there. Civilian visitors from Headquarters will be identified as DAFC's; visitors who are military detailees from Headquarters will identify themselves as Air Force Officers and will use their actual ranks.

m. The military members of the Detachment G Training Faculty will dress in uniform when it is appropriate from a command standpoint.

4. SECURITY/COVER PROGRAM AT DETACHMENT H AS A RESULT OF CHINESE PILOT TRAINING ACTIVITY AT DETACHMENT G:

a. Just prior to the arrival of the first Detachment G trained Chinese pilots, all key GRC personnel at Detachment H will be briefed by Col. Yang, 35th CAF Squadron Commander, concerning the role of the USAF in the TACKLE Program. It is anticipated that those to be briefed will include the flight planners, supply officer, weather officer, security officer, flight surgeon, PE technicians, snack bar attendant and the like but exclude the guards, building maintenance crew of electricians, painters, plumbers, and char force, POL drivers, bus drivers and the like. In the briefing, Col. Yang will explain the need for the previous cover legends and other security cover arrangements, i. e., use of aliases, etc. He will stress that the military and Agency personnel assigned to Detachment H must continue under the dual cover role currently in effect, i. e., LAC at the hostel, all other elements and areas of the 35th Squadron Base and the town of Tao Yuan; 6213th Support Squadron, Detachment 5, M. T. T. at Taipei.

As is evident from the above, the sole change in the current cover legend will occur at the time all Chinese participants at the compound are briefed on US Government involvement in the TACKLE Program. All else remains as is.

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b. The military personnel assigned to Detachment H who have used aliases in the past will continue to use them. Those assigned subsequent to the effective date of this Directive will use true names.

c. The Agency civilian personnel assigned to Detachment H will represent themselves as DAFC's after the briefing mentioned in paragraph 4. a. Agency civilian personnel currently assigned to Detachment H will continue to use the names they now use, whether alias or true. Those assigned subsequent to the effective date of this Directive will use aliases, either assigned previously at Detachment H or Detachment G, or newly assigned by the Detachment H Security Staff. Agency contract employees will follow the guidelines of this paragraph.

d. The contractor representatives will represent themselves in true name as LAC employees.

e. Military personnel assigned to or visiting Detachment H will not, repeat not, wear uniforms at the base or in the town of Tao Yuan.

f. The present system of using first names at the Detachment will continue.

g. Once Detachment G personnel are identified to GRC personnel as military or civilian members of the Department of the Air Force, this representation will have to be maintained on into the future during deployments, operations, etc., wherein GRC personnel are working with Detachment G group. This would be particularly crucial in a BUS STOP* type program. Again, neither military ranks nor uniforms are to be employed.

h. All Headquarters visitors to Detachment H will use, during the periods of their visits, the aliases assigned them in previous visits to Detachment H. In the absence of a previously assigned alias, the Detachment H Security Staff will assign the visitor an alias.

5. OVERALL AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICITY:

a. The avoidance of publicity will be a major goal in the execution of this program.

* Staging of missions from Ban Takhli.

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	<u>Desired</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
Sorties	15	15
Flying Hours	60	55
SFO	(As can be scheduled)	
GCA	(As can be scheduled)	

g. Operational Training

Upon return to their home detachment, the CAF pilots will be placed in Category III operational status and will be required to complete the requirements of Project Headquarters Directive 50-10-2 for upgrading to a Category I status.

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PROJECT HEADQUARTERS
DIRECTIVE 50-10-25
Attachment II

OPERATIONS

SYLLABUS FOR TRAINING
GRC PILOTS IN U-2 AIRCRAFT AT
DETACHMENT G

1. PURPOSE:

To provide Detachment Commanders with a syllabus for the training of GRC pilots in U-2 aircraft.

2. GENERAL:

a. Pre-flight training requirements:

(1) Prior to the instigation of any training for the GRC pilots at Detachment G, they will have been given:

- (a) Physical examinations
- (b) Pressure suit fittings
- (c) Altitude chamber indoctrination

b. T-33 familiarization

(1) Prior to first T-33 flight, pilots will be given instruction in:

- (a) Personal equipment
- (b) Emergency procedures
- (c) FAA and USAF filing and reporting procedures.

(2) A qualified American IP will accompany CAF pilots on all T-33 flights.

(3) Primary purpose of T-33 training is to indoctrinate CAF pilots in FAA enroute and approach procedures that they will encounter in U-2 flying. A secondary purpose is to evaluate instrument flying proficiency and provide additional instrument training as required.

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c. Ground Training (U-2)

- | | |
|---|----------|
| (1) Aircraft and engine | 20 hours |
| (a) Aircraft general | |
| (b) Engine | |
| (c) Fuel System | |
| (d) Hydraulic, oxygen and
pressurization systems | |
| (e) Electrical systems | |
| (f) Landing gear, brakes and
gust control | |
| (2) Flight characteristics | 6 hours |
| (3) Cockpit check and aircraft
familiarization | 4 hours |
| (4) FAA procedures | 1 hour |
| (5) Personal equipment | 3 hours |
| (6) Physiological aspects of
high altitude flying | 1 hour |
| (7) High altitude weather | 1 hour |
| (8) Mission planning procedures | 1 hour |
| (9) Pre-flight and in-flight log
procedures and cruise control | 3 hours |
| (10) High altitude navigation | 2 hours |
| (11) Celestial navigation and sextant
indoctrination | 4 hours |
| (12) Photographic equipment and
indoctrination | 2 hours |
| (13) Electronic systems indoctrination | 4 hours |

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(14) Autopilot and compass	2 hours
(15) Tactical doctrine	12 hours
(16) Emergency procedures	4 hours minimum
TOTAL	<u>70 hours</u>

d. Simulated U-2 characteristics

(1) If a two-seat U-2 is available, it will be used to demonstrate flight characteristics to the student pilot.

(2) If the two-seat U-2 is unavailable, simulated U-2 characteristics will be demonstrated by a qualified U-2 instructor pilot in the U-3A aircraft.

(3) Simulated U-2 characteristics will be accomplished within the fourteen day period prior to the first solo flight in the U-2.

e. Pre-solo Proficiency Checks

Each student pilot will accomplish satisfactorily the following requirements prior to flying the U-2 aircraft:

- (a) Aircraft questionnaire
- (b) Emergency examination
- (c) Aircraft exterior inspection
- (d) Aircraft pre-take-off procedures
- (e) Aircraft emergency procedures (cockpit check)

f. Flight Training

Mission #1 * Low altitude to include 2 + 00
 turns - approach to stalls
 with various flap settings -
 five take off and landings
 with pogos

Mission #2* Same as #1 2 + 00

* Note: Missions 1, 2, and 3 are to have a T-33 aircraft as chase for the air work maneuvers and a U-3 aircraft as chase for the traffic pattern maneuvers.

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	<u>Desired</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
Sorties	15	15
Flying Hours	60	55
SFO	(As can be scheduled)	
GCA	(As can be scheduled)	

g. Operational Training

Upon return to their home detachment, the CAF pilots will be placed in Category III operational status and will be required to complete the requirements of Project Headquarters Directive 50-10-2 for upgrading to a Category I status.

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PROJECT HEADQUARTERS
DIRECTIVE 50-10-25
ATTACHMENT III

SUPPORT

SUPPORT FOR TRAINING OF GRC U-2 PILOTS AT
DETACHMENT G

1. PURPOSE:

To provide guidance to Detachment Commanders in support details concerning training GRC pilots at Detachment G.

2. GENERAL:

a. Administration

(1) Project Headquarters will be responsible for the scheduling of GRC pilots for training, physicals and pressure suit fittings.

(2) Project Headquarters will be responsible for the issuance of invitational orders for the selected GRC pilots to come to the U. S.

(3) Detachment G Commander will be responsible for the appointment of a Detachment Project Officer whose tasks will include, but not be limited to:

(a) Escort for the new pilots from their arrival to their departure from the U. S.

(b) Escort for the GRC pilots through their physical examinations and pressure suit fitting appointments.

(c) Arranging for billeting, transportation and assistance for any personal matters concerning these pilots.

(d) The maintenance of all records (training payments, etc.) that might be required.

(e) Working closely with the Detachment Security Officer so as to preclude any conflict of interest in security of the project (if Project Officer is not a Security Officer).

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b. Support

While in the Edwards, California area, the GRC pilots are to:

- (1) Obtain a State of California driver's license.
- (2) Be provided a rental auto for their own use.

(3) Be provided adequate housing, the minimum standard being a private bedroom for each individual and sufficient kitchen equipment for them to cook their own meals. This housing may be provided in any area around Edwards Air Force Base excepting the cities of Lancaster and Palmdale, California.

c. Social and Recreational Activities

While in the Edwards California area, the GRC pilots are to be allowed to take advantage of all other recreational and social facilities within the State of California subject to the discretion of the Detachment G Commander or the Detachment Project Officer.

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MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS - TACKLE PROGRAM
(Training and Operational)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Pilot</u>	<u>A/C No.</u>	<u>Type Msn/Result</u>
19 Mar 1961	Taiwan	Maj. Chih Yao-hua	351C	Training/Fatal
8 Sept 1962	Nanchang, China	L/C Ch'en Huai	378C	Operational/Fatal/Publicized
1 Nov 1963	Nanchang, China	Maj. Yeh Ch'ang-ti	355C	Operational/Fatal/Publicized
22 Mar 1964	Taiwan	Capt. Liang Teh-pei	356F	Training/Fatal
7 July 1964	Lungchi, China	L/C Lee Nan-ping	362G	Operational/Fatal/Publicized
14 Aug 1964	Idaho, U.S.	Capt. Sheng Shih-li	395A(SAC)	Training/Non-fatal
18 Dec 1964	Tucson, Arizona	Capt. Sheng Shih-li	379A(SAC)	Training/Non-fatal
10 Jan 1965	Pao Tou, China	Maj. Chang Li-i	358C	Operational/Fatal/Publicized
22 Oct 1965	Taiwan	L/C Wang Cheng-wen	352C	Training/Fatal
17 Feb 1966	Taiwan	Maj. Wu Ts'ai-hsi	372F	Training/Fatal
22 Mar 1966	Tucson, Arizona	Capt. Fan Hung-ti	363A(SAC)	Training/Non-fatal
21 June 1966	Naha, Okinawa	Maj. Yu Ch'ing-chang	384C	Training/Fatal/Publicized(not as U-2)
8 Sept 1967	Shanghai, China	Capt. Huang Jung-pei	373A	Operational/Fatal/Publicized

Training: U.S. 3 Non-fatal
5 Fatal

Operational: Mainland 5 Fatal

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Headquarters
THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE
United States Air Force
APO 74, San Francisco, Calif.

Reply to

20 May 1963

Attn of: Office of Director of Special Operations

Subject: Procedures for Project DEN MOTHER

To: ATF 13 (P)

6214 Tactical Group 13 MDC

13 ODC 13 ADC

1. Purpose: The purpose of this letter is to establish administrative, logistical and operational procedures involved in supporting Project DEN MOTHER.

2. General: DEN MOTHER is the unclassified nickname for a special project concerning the acquisition of Chinese Air Force/DEN MOTHER aircraft and related technical and logistic support which resulted from a commercial transaction between the Government of the Republic of China and an American aircraft corporation. The corporation has a group of technical representatives stationed on Taiwan to assist the Chinese Air Force. This group is known as Detachment 5 Mobile Training Team and is attached to the 6214th Tactical Group. Detachment 5 MTT duty location is with the 6213th Support Squadron. The 6214th Tactical Group is responsible for housekeeping support for Detachment 5 MTT. This detachment is on general orders as an Air Force organization.

3. Classification of project: The overall classification of this project is TOP SECRET and knowledge of the project is limited to personnel having a direct need to know in order to provide necessary housekeeping support to Detachment 5 MTT. All personnel briefed on the contents of this letter will sign briefing statements and will sign debriefing statements upon termination of their need to know. This project will not be discussed with personnel who are not DEN MOTHER cleared.

4. Reason for classification: The reason for the high classification and limited number of personnel involved is the need to protect and conceal USAF housekeeping support of a civilian organization involved in a commercial aircraft transaction with the Chinese Air Force.

TS-155923
(130DX 3-5092C)

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5. Classification of correspondence:

a. All correspondence indicating, or linking together the fact that, Detachment 5 MTT personnel are actually technical representatives of an American aircraft corporation will be classified TOP SECRET and handled on an eyes only basis between DEN MOTHER cleared personnel.

b. All correspondence indicating, or linking together the fact that, Detachment 5 MTT is involved in Project DEN MOTHER will be classified TOP SECRET and handled on an eyes only basis between DEN MOTHER cleared personnel.

c. Correspondence indicating housekeeping support for Detachment 5 MTT in its role as an Air Force organization will normally be unclassified. EFTO protection will be provided electrical transmissions. If support provided is of a classified nature correspondence will be classified in accordance with AFR 205-1.

6. Limited need to know: Certain personnel who must assist in support procedures such as supply and accounting may be told if necessary that Project DEN MOTHER is a classified project holding a high priority and that USAF has directed full support be given this project. Permission must be obtained from the DEN MOTHER project officer if it is deemed necessary to issue the above statement in order to accomplish a particular task.

7. Security Control: Copies of all DEN MOTHER correspondence regardless of classification and communications channels will be provided the 13 AF DEN MOTHER project officer (Major Stanley J. Buinicky) for his master file. Correspondence other than that concerning routine supply matters will be coordinated with the DEN MOTHER project officer.

8. Handling procedures: Insofar as practical administrative and support transactions will be handled on a person to person basis, with a minimum of correspondence and staffing.

9. Logistics responsibilities:

a. 6214th Tactical Group is responsible for logistic support as follows:

(1) General purpose vehicles, equipment, and spares therefor (reimburseable if coded LP).

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(2) Housekeeping supplies and equipment (reimbursable if coded LP).

(3) Receipt, processing, and delivery to 6213th Support Squadron all cargo arriving at aerial or water ports. All water shipments will be made to the port of Keelung in Taiwan. The 6213th Support Squadron will remove all reference to DEN MOTHER on cargo received prior to releasing cargo to Detachment 5 MTT.

(4) Postal service.

(5) Issuance of BX and commissary permits.

(6) Provide airlift within its capability to meet requirements of Detachment 5 MTT. Requirements that cannot be met by 6214th Tactical Group will be submitted to Hqs Thirteenth Air Force, Attn: ODX.

(7) Budgeting and funding for all local purchase (LP) coded common items of supplies (reimbursable basis).

(8) Budgeting and funding all TDY requirements for 6214th Tactical Group in direct support of DEN MOTHER and for Detachment 5 MTT personnel (reimbursable basis).

(9) Maintaining a financial accounting for all supplies and equipment furnished to the special account (402) of the 6213th Support Squadron. This account will not be subject to audit.

(10) Process incoming and outgoing peculiar supplies and equipment for Detachment 5 MTT. This includes furnishing air movement designators.

(11) Provide spares to the 6213th Support Squadron for support of Detachment 5 MTT T-33 aircraft when Detachment 5 MTT states they cannot obtain from some other source.

(12) Provide POL products for Detachment 5 MTT. This will include products required for T-33 aircraft flown by Detachment 5 MTT personnel, unless Detachment 5 MTT can obtain aircraft POL products from some other source.

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b. Detachment 5 MTT, 6214th Tactical Group is responsible for their own logistic support as follows:

- (1) POL products, spares, equipment, and supplies peculiar to its mission.
- (2) Maintenance of all Detachment 5 MTT vehicles and equipment.
- (3) Funding for its own peculiar logistics support.
- (4) Return of all repairable peculiar spares and equipment to its own supply source. 6213th Support Squadron will process shipments for Detachment 5 MTT (see a(10) above).
- (5) Picking up supplies at Taipei Air Station (TAS) or at a point designated by Commander TAS.

c. Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force responsibility:

- (1) The DCS/M will coordinate with DM 6214th Tactical Group, and assist, where possible, in obtaining and shipping items not available on Taiwan.
- (2) The 13th AF Director of Budget will include "DEN MOTHER" fund requirements in his financial plan and revisions thereto. The financial plan will indicate that detailed justification for "DEN MOTHER" may be obtained from Hq PACAF.
- (3) Provide air lift assistance within capabilities and request airlift support from 315th Air Division when required.

10. Logistics procedures:

- a. Detachment 5 MTT will requisition its common support items from the 6213th Support Squadron, its peculiar items through its own channels.
- b. All supply and accounting documents of the 6213th Support Squadron and the 6214th Tactical Group will be unclassified. All incoming shipments should be made to AFB 5240, Mark for 6213 Support Squadron, "PROJECT DEN MOTHER."

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c. 6214th Tactical Group (AFB 5240) will maintain a special unit account (402) for the 6213th Support Squadron, which will in turn maintain a special jacket account for Detachment 5 MTT. This is for maintaining accountability and responsibility for property. This account will not be subject to audit.

d. Log support required for mission accomplishment will be expeditiously provided under 1-12 priority.

e. Log support requests which are not mission oriented; i. e., recreation equipment, office furniture, lounge furniture; should be provided from area resources under a lower priority and, normally, will be shipped via surface transportation.

f. All requisitions should be responsibility of DEN MOTHER project officers at 13AF, ATF-13(P) and 5AF to determine whether or not the item is available within the area before requisition is forwarded to the ZI.

11. Funding: Hq USAF has indicated that additional O&M support cost expended and estimated in support of Project DEN MOTHER will receive favorable action when forwarded for inclusion in this command's revisions to O&M financial plans. PACAF will be advised, utilizing SSO, of any cost which cannot be accommodated within present B/A and/or sub-allocation.

T. R. MILTON
Major General, USAF
Commander

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96274

25 Aug 66

Subject: Procedures for Project DEN MOTHER

To: 327th Air Division 6213 Support Squadron
6214 Support Group 5th Mobile Training Team

1. Purpose: The purpose of this directive is to up-date administrative, logistical and operational procedures involved in supporting Project DEN MOTHER.

2. General: DEN MOTHER is the unclassified nickname for a special project concerning the acquisition of Chinese Air Force/DEN MOTHER aircraft and related technical and logistic support which resulted from a commercial transaction between the Government of the Republic of China and an American aircraft corporation. The corporation has a group of technical representatives stationed on Taiwan to assist the Chinese Air Force. This group is known as Detachment 5 Mobile Training Team and is attached to the 6214th Support Group. Detachment 5 MTT duty location is with the 6213th Support Squadron. The 6214th Support Group is responsible for housekeeping support for Detachment 5 MTT. The 6213th Support Squadron is responsible for administrative support, such as postal service, issuance of BX and Commissary permits, etc. Detachment 5 MTT is on general orders as an Air Force organization.

3. Classification of project: The overall classification of this project is TOP SECRET and knowledge of the project is limited to personnel having a direct need to know in order to provide necessary support to Detachment 5 MTT. All personnel briefed on the contents of this letter will sign briefing statements and will sign debriefing statements upon termination of their need to know. This project will not be discussed with personnel who are not DEN MOTHER cleared.

4. Reason for classification: The reason for the high classification and limited number of personnel involved is the need to protect and conceal USAF support of a civilian organization involved in a commercial aircraft transaction with the Chinese Air Force.

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5. Classification of correspondence:

a. All correspondence indicating, or linking together the fact that Detachment 5 MTT personnel are actually technical representatives of an American aircraft corporation will be classified TOP SECRET and handled on an eyes only basis between DEN MOTHER cleared personnel.

b. All correspondence indicating, or linking together the fact that Detachment 5 MTT is involved in Project DEN MOTHER will be classified TOP SECRET and handled on an eyes only basis between DEN MOTHER cleared personnel.

c. Correspondence indicating housekeeping support for Detachment 5 MTT in its role as an Air Force organization will normally be unclassified. EFTO protection will be provided electrical transmissions. If support provided is of a classified nature, correspondence will be classified in accordance with AFR 205-1.

6. Limited need to know: Certain personnel who must assist in support procedures such as supply and accounting may be told if necessary that Project DEN MOTHER is a classified project holding a high priority and that USAF has directed full support be given this project. Permission must be obtained from the DEN MOTHER project officer if it is deemed necessary to issue the above statement in order to accomplish a particular task.

7. Security Control: Copies of all DEN MOTHER correspondence regardless of classification and communications channels will be provided the 13 AF DEN MOTHER project officer (Lt. Col. William R. Stickman) for his master file. Correspondence other than that concerning routine supply matters will be coordinated with the DEN MOTHER project officer.

8. Handling procedures: Insofar as practical, administrative and support transactions will be handled on a person to person basis, with a minimum of correspondence and staffing.

9. Logistics responsibilities:

a. 6214th Support Group is responsible for logistic support as follows:

(1) Housekeeping supplies and equipment (reimbursable if coded LP).

(2) Budgeting and funding for all local purchase (LP) coded common items of supplies (reimbursable basis).

(3) Maintaining a financial accounting for all supplies and equipment furnished to the special account of the 6213th Support Squadron. This account will not be subject to audit.

(4) Process outgoing peculiar supplies and equipment for Detachment 5 MTT. This includes furnishing air movement designators.

(5) Provide POL products for Detachment 5 MTT. This will include products required for aircraft flown by Detachment 5 MTT personnel, unless Detachment 5 MTT can obtain aircraft POL products from some other source.

b. Detachment 5 MTT is responsible for their own logistic support as follows:

(1) POL products, spares, equipment, and supplies peculiar to its mission.

(2) Maintenance of all Detachment 5 MTT vehicles and equipment.

(3) Funding for its own peculiar logistics support.

(4) Return of all repairable peculiar spares and equipment to its own supply source. 6213th Support Squadron will process shipments for Detachment 5 MTT (see a (4) above).

(5) Picking up supplies at Taipei Air Station (TAS) or at a point designated by Commander TAS.

c. Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force responsibility:

(1) The DM will coordinate with DM 6213th Support Group and assist, where possible, in obtaining and shipping items not available on Taiwan.

(2) The 13th AF Director of Budget will include "DEN MOTHER" fund requirements in his financial plan and revisions thereto. The financial plan will indicate that detailed justification for "DEN MOTHER" may be obtained from Hq PACAF.

(3) 13th AF will, within its capability at the time, attempt to provide logistics airlift support. Requests of this nature will be made only after all other sources have been exhausted.

10. Logistics Procedures:

a. Detachment 5 MTT will requisition its common support items from the 6214th Support Group; its peculiar items through its own channels.

b. 6214th Support Group (AFB 5240) will maintain a special unit account for the 6213th Support Squadron, which will in turn maintain a special jacket account for Detachment 5 MTT. This is for maintaining accountability and responsibility for property. This account will not be subject to audit.

c. Log support requests which are not mission oriented, i.e., recreation equipment, office furniture, lounge furniture will be provided from area resources in accordance with local Air Force supply procedure.

d. Resources of 327th AD, 5th AF and 13th AF will be screened to satisfy DEN MOTHER requirements prior to forwarding requisitions to the United States. Priority of source screening is 327th AD, 13th and then 5th AF.

e. All inquiries, requests, etc., to 13th AF regarding the DEN MOTHER Project will be directed to Lt. Col. W. R. Stickman. Appropriate communication channels will be utilized.

11. Funding: Hq USAF has indicated that additional O&M support cost expended and estimated in support of Project DEN MOTHER will receive favorable action when forwarded for inclusion in this command's revisions to O&M financial plans. PACAF will be advised, utilizing SSO, of any cost which cannot be accommodated within present B/A and/or sub-allocation.

JAMES W. WILSON, Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

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Certified to be an exact copy
/s/

Date: 15 Dec 66

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

ANNEX 112

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PROJECT TACKLE OVERFLIGHTS - 1962 - 1968

Date	Msn. No.	Target	Pilot	Comment
<u>1962:</u>				
12 January	GRC 100	Missile Test Range	Ch'en	B Camera - Good
23 February	GRC 102	Lanchou	Yang	B Camera - Good
13 March	GRC 104	Kunming	Hua	B Camera - Fair
26 March	GRC 106	Central China	Wang	B Camera - Good
15 June	GRC 112	Harbin	Yang	B Camera - Good
19 June	GRC 113	MTR	Wang	B Camera - Good
25 June	GRC 115	Straits/Taiwan	Ch'en	B Camera - Good
28 June	GRC 116	Straits/Taiwan	Yang	B Camera - Good
30 June	GRC 117	Nanchang, Straits	Hua	B Camera - Fair
5 July	GRC 119	Straits	Yang	B Camera - Fair
9 July	GRC 120	Straits	Ch'en	B Camera - Good
28 July	GRC 123	Straits	Wang	B Camera - Fair
11 August	GRC 125	Peiping, Manchuria	Hua	B Camera - Fair
8 September	GRC 126	South China	Yang	B Camera - Good
9 September	GRC 127	Nanchang	Ch'en	LOST
5 December	GRC 128	North Korea	Hua	B Camera - Good
25 December	GRC 134	Szechwan	Wang	B Camera - Good
28 December	GRC 136	South China (aborted)	Hua	B Camera - Fair
<u>1963:</u>				
20 January	GRC 138	Szechwan	Yang	B Camera - Good
28 March	GRC 144	MTR	Wang	B Camera - Good
30 March	GRC 146	Szechwan	Hua	B Camera - Good
3 April	GRC 147	South China	Yang	B Camera - Good
9 May	GRC 150	North Korea, Manchuria	Wang	B Camera - Fair

Date	Msn No.	Target	Pilot	Comment
28 May	GRC 152	North Korea, Manchuria	Yang	B Camera - Fair
3 June	GRC 153	Lanchou	Hua	B Camera - Fair
4 June	GRC 154	Nanchang	Wang	B Camera - Good
12 June	GRC 156	Sian and Paotou	Hua	B Camera - Good
23 August	GRC 169	Manchuria	Lee	B Camera - Excellent
30 August	GRC 171	South China	Yeh	B Camera - Good
25 September	GRC 176	MTR, Koko Nor	Lee	B Camera - Excellent
26 September	GRC 178	Paotou, Peiping	Yeh	B Camera - Excellent
30 September	GRC 180	South China	Hua	B Camera - Good
6 October	GRC 181	North Korea	Wang	B Camera - Excellent
8 October	GRC 182	North Korea, Manchuria	Lee	B Camera - Good
1 November	GRC 184	MTR	Yeh	LOST

1964:

16 March	C024C	South China	Lee	B Camera - Good
26 June	C114C	Hainan	Lee	B Camera - Fair
5 July	C134C	Hainan (abort)	Lee	B Camera - Fair
7 July	C174C	Shanghai, Wuhu	Wang	B Camera - Excellent
7 July	C184C	Lungchi	Lee	LOST
31 October	C224C	Lanchou	Chang	B Camera - Good
7 November	C244C	North Korea, North China	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Good
15 November	C274C	South China	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Good
22 November	C284C	Lanchou (abort)	Chang	IR - Poor
25 November	C304C	Lanchou (abort)	Wang(Johnny)	IR - Fair
9 December	C324C	Manchuria	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Good
19 December	C344C	Lanchou (abort)		IR - Poor
30 December	C374C	Szechwan	Chang	B Camera - Fair

1965:

8 January	C015C	Lanchou	Wang(Johnny)	IR - Good
10 January	C025C	Pao Tou	Chang	IR - LOST
19 February	C045C	South China	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Good

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Date	Msn. No.	Target	Pilot	Comment
22 February	C055C	South China (abort)	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Fair
24 February	C065C	South China	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Excellent
12 March	C105C	South China (abort)	Wu	B Camera - Poor
14 March	C115C	South China (fired on)	Wu	B Camera - Good
17 April	C215C	Hainan	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Poor
27 April	C225C	South China (abort)		B Camera - Good
30 April	C245C	East China Coastal	Wu	B Camera - Good
14 May	C285C	Ning Ming	Wang(Pete)	112B Camera - Fair
27 May	C335C	Canton, Leiyang	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Good
28 May	C325C	Swatow, Fuchow	Wu	B Camera - Good
2 July	C355C	South China	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Good
3 July	C365C	Straits	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Fair
20 July	C395C	Hainan	Yu	B Camera - Good
21 July	C405C	Straits	Chuang	B Camera - Good
31 July	C425C	North Korea	Liu	B Camera - Good
24 August	C455C	Ning Ming	Wu	B Camera - Good
25 August	C465C	Hainan	Wang(Johnny)	112B Camera - Good
26 August	C475C	Straits	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Good
5 September	C485C	North Vietnam, China/Laos	Liu	B Camera - Poor
18 September	C495C	Straits	Yu	B Camera - Excellent
16 October	C535C	North China, China Coast	Yu	112B Camera - Good
19 October	C555C	South China and Sub Search	Wu	B Camera - Good
20 October	C545C	Laos, Burma, SW China	Liu	B Camera - Fair
8 November	C565C	Southwest China	Liu	B Camera - Poor
14 November	C575C	Southwest China	Yu	B Camera - Poor
23 November	C595C	Southwest China	Yu	B Camera - Good
28 November	C605C	South China	Chuang	B Camera - Excellent
 1966:				
28 March	C036C	Southwest China	Chuang	B Camera - Poor
7 April	C056C	Southwest China	Liu	B Camera - Poor
19 April	C076C	Shenyang, North China	Yu	112B Camera - Poor

Date	Msn. No.	Target	Pilot	Comment
4 May	C116C	Straits	Liu	B Camera - Poor
14 May	C126C	SW China, Kunming	Chuang	B Camera - Good
15 May	C136C	SW China (abort)	Liu	B Camera - Poor
3 August	C146C	Straits	Chuang	B Camera - Good
16 August	C156C	Hainan (abort)	Liu	B Camera - Poor
24 August	C176C	Canton	Chuang	B Camera - Fair
26 November	C216C	Straits	Liu	B Camera - Good
FF				
1967:		50X1, E.O.13526		
4 January	C027C	South China	Liu	B Camera - Excellent
28 March	C117C	Straits	Feng, <i>FAN-26</i>	B Camera - Poor
9 April	C147C	South China	Liu	B Camera - Excellent
13 April	C157C	Manchuria	Feng	B Camera - Good
7 May	C167C	[Redacted]	Chuang	Tracker - Excellent
16 May	C177C	Southwest China	Chang	B Camera - Excellent
25 May	C187C	South China	Feng	B Camera - Good
20 July	C237C	South China	Feng	B Camera - Good
10 August	C257C	Straits	Chou	B Camera - Fair
20 August	C267C	Straits	Chuang	H Camera - Good
26 August	C277C	South China	Feng	B Camera - Excellent
30 August	C287C	[Redacted]	Chang	Tracker - Poor
8 September	C297C	Shanghai	Huang	B Camera - LOST
13 December	C327C	Northeast China	Chuang	H Camera - Excellent
		50X1, E.O.13526		
1968:				
5 January	C018C	Central China	Chang	H Camera - Good
16 March	C058C	Southwest China	Feng	B Camera - Good

ANNEX 113

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BYE 2086-65

Copy 26

13 JAN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Department of State - Mr. Hughes
Executive Office of the President - Mr. Jessup
Department of Defense - Dr. McMillan
Department of Defense - Colonel Steakley
Department of the Air Force - Colonel Geary
Central Intelligence Agency - Dr. Wheelon

SUBJECT: Revision of Operation TACKLE Cover Support
Plan

REFERENCE: BYE 2763-63, Rev. 1, dated 4 December 1963

1. Although the attached is a revised and updated version of the referenced document, no significant changes have been made in the substance of the cover support plan.

2. Request you review the attached plan and submit any revisions or comments to SAL/OSA, CIA, (Ext. 7280) by COB on 18 January 1965.

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

(Signed) Jack C. Ledford


JACK C. LEDFORD
Colonel USAF

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BYE 2086-65

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COVER SUPPORT TO OPERATION TACKLE

I. OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE:

The operational objective of this mission is high altitude photographic reconnaissance of top priority targets of intelligence and military interest within the Communist China mainland. The instrument to be used to accomplish the mission is the U-2 aircraft.

II. GENERAL OPERATIONAL COVER PLAN:

The mission will be conducted unilaterally by the CHINAT Air Force (CAF) ostensibly without prior knowledge or concurrence of the United States. The U-2 aircraft will carry Chinese Nationalist markings while on the flight and will be flown by a CAF pilot who will be briefed and provided mission instructions by his CAF superiors.

N. B. - U-2 aircraft have been documented as having been sold to the GRC by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Complete documentation of the sale is a matter of record, including sales agreement, bill of sale, export licenses, etc.

III. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS PLAN AND OPERATION THE FOLLOWING AREAS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE:

A. Friendly:

South Vietnam
Thailand
South Korea

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B. Hostile:

Communist China and all Communist controlled areas.

IV. POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES:

A. Public protest by Chinese Communists of successful overflight.

1. Both U. S. and GRC will deny knowledge of any such operation.
2. The GRC and the U. S. have already acknowledged the sale of two U-2's to the CHINATS in December of 1960. In the event of a query concerning the sale of additional U-2's by Lockheed to the GRC, the State Department (D/INR will designate a spokesman) will acknowledge that the U. S. Government has issued additional export licenses. Relevant dates may be cited if necessary. (See Para. V).
3. If a question is raised, no attempt should be made to conceal the fact that CHINAT pilots received initial U-2 training in the United States. This is standard procedure for training of foreign personnel in U. S. manufactured aircraft.
4. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

B. Aircraft comes down in friendly territory or in international waters. Incident becomes public knowledge.

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1. GRC states that while on routine training flight, U-2 developed mechanical trouble and had to land or ditch, as the case may be, in the nearest suitable area. The U. S. will say nothing unless specific inquiries are made. If asked, U. S. spokesman will deny all knowledge of the flight.
2. Queries about CHINAT possession of U-2 will be handled as in A-2 above.
3. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

C. Aircraft comes down over hostile territory. Chinese Communists blame Nationalists.

1. GRC acknowledges the U-2 was CHINAT aircraft on routine reconnaissance mission.
2. U. S. makes no unsolicited comment. If asked, U. S. spokesman will deny any knowledge of the CHINAT operation.
3. U. S. will handle queries about CHINAT possession of U-2 as outlined in A-2 above.
4. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

D. Aircraft comes down over hostile territory. Chinese Communists blame the U. S.

1. GRC immediately acknowledges the U-2 was a CHINAT aircraft on routine reconnaissance patrol;

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BYE 2086-65
Page 4

that they had originally purchased U-2's from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in July 1960; and subsequently had acquired replacement aircraft by direct purchase from Lockheed. The GRC will further state that the U-2's are under the exclusive control of the GRC.

2. U.S. denies any knowledge of the operation; stating that the aircraft was completely under CHINAT control and not assigned to or operated by an American unit.
3. U.S. responds to queries relative to CHINAT possession of the U-2 as outlined in paragraph IV-A-2.
4. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

E. Press queries regarding replacement of aircraft lost over hostile territory.

1. If a question regarding additional U-2 sales arises as the consequence of the replacement of a lost aircraft (or supplementation of the existing aircraft) the answer will affirm the issuance of appropriate export licenses at the request of Lockheed and may cite the relevant dates if necessary.
2. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

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V. REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT:

A. Chronology:

1. Two U-2 aircraft were delivered to GRC in December of 1960. These were fully documented and licensed for export.
2. One of the original U-2's was destroyed as a result of a crash on landing on Taiwan on 19 March 1961. There was no publicity attending this incident at the time and another U-2 was substituted without further documentation.
3. The second of the original U-2's was lost over the mainland in September of 1962. At that time there were unsubstantiated references to the previous crash which was described as having occurred about a week prior to the second loss. These allusions, apparently, were based on rumor rather than evidence and were flatly denied by the GRC.
4. In May of 1963 another U-2 was delivered to the GRC with full documentation and under export license.
5. In October of 1963 another U-2 was lost over the mainland, leaving one remaining U-2 in the GRC inventory.
6. In January of 1964 another U-2 was documented and delivered to the GRC.

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ART 352

0-23-65

GRC U-2A LOST ON TRAINING MISSION OFF
NE COAST FORMOSA, NO PRESS COVERAGE.

2-17-66

GRC U-2 (ART 372) LOST ON TRAINING MISSION
AT TAI-CHUNG.

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IDEALIST/TACKLE

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7. In March of 1964 the GRC lost another U-2 on a training flight, however this incident received no publicity and a replacement aircraft was substituted without further documentation.
8. In July of 1964 another U-2 was lost over the mainland. This was the third publicized and acknowledged loss.
9. In September 1964 two additional U-2's, documented and licensed for export, were delivered to the GRC.
10. In January of 1965 another U-2 was lost over the mainland making the fourth publicized and acknowledged loss.
11. At the present time, the GRC has ^{THREE} two U-2's. Documentation and export licenses exist for both.
12. The current box score is as follows:

Six U-2's have been documented.

Four U-2's have been publicly lost.

Two U-2's remain in inventory. (THREE AS OF 22/6/65)

B. Response to Query:

1. If a query is received in a public forum or in such manner as to require an official answer, the granting of the export licenses will be frankly acknowledged. To refuse comment would suggest involvement of the U. S. Government in the GRC program.

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2. If the question is asked, "Has the U. S. Government approved the export to the GRC of U-2's additional to those approved in December of 1960?" the response should be essentially as follows:

"Yes, export licenses for the sale of additional U-2's by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to the GRC have been granted. (Dates may be cited if necessary). This action is not inconsistent with our policy of permitting friendly and allied nations to purchase military equipment from U. S. manufacturers, as they deem it necessary to their national interests. In some instances the U. S. Government furnishes military aid to these nations and in other instances, as in this case, the friendly government negotiates directly with the manufacturer."

3. If the query is in the form of a question as to whether the U. S. will permit additional exports to replace the U-2's which have been lost by the GRC, this will be parried by stating that no application for export license for U-2's is pending and if one is received it will be considered on its merits and under the circumstances existing at that time, just as any export license for export of any military aircraft to allied and friendly nations would be considered.

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4. ACTION: The Department of State will be the responsible office for responding to any queries concerning sale of U-2's or granting of export licenses. The D/INR will designate a spokesman.

VI. COORDINATION OUTSIDE WASHINGTON (ACTION-CIA)

- A. Complete agreement on the handling of the cover story has been worked out with Chiang Kai-shek prior to the operation.
- B. Officials at Lockheed (C. L. Johnson or John Canaday) have been briefed on the handling of inquiries concerning sale of the U-2 to the CHINATS, and will refer all such queries to the Department of State for comment.

- VII. The following named individuals are being furnished a copy of this document for purposes of internal coordination with cleared personnel within their respective departments.

Mr. Thomas Hughes - Department of State
Dr. Brockway McMillan - Department of Defense
Col. Ralph D. Steakley - Department of Defense (JCS)
Mr. Peter Jessup - Executive Office of the President
Dr. Albert Wheelon - Central Intelligence Agency
Col. Leo P. Geary - AFIGO-S, Special Projects, USAF

- VIII. It is recommended that each Agency maintain a list of all cleared personnel within their respective organizations who have been briefed on this cover plan.

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IX. The Central Intelligence Agency will notify each Agency of any change to this plan and in turn requests that any alterations be coordinated with the CIA prior to implementation:

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U.S.C., section 403g)

CIA CONTACT: Special Assistant for Liaison

OFFICE TELEPHONE: Code 143 or 351-7280

CIA CONTROL CENTER: Code 143 or 351-5771

HOME TELEPHONE: JA 8-4591

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U.S.C., section 403g)

SAL/OSA/[] (12 Jan 65)

Distribution:

- 1 - Mr. Thomas Hughes - Dept. of State
- 2 - Mr. Thomas Hughes - Dept. of State
- 3 - Dr. Brockway McMillan - Under Sec. of Air Force
- 4 - Dr. Brockway McMillan - Under Sec. of Air Force
- 5 - Col. Ralph D. Steakley - JCS
- 6 - Mr. Peter Jessup - Exec. Office of President
- 7 - Mr. Peter Jessup - Exec. Office of President
- 8 - Col. Leo P. Geary - AFIGO-S
- 9 - DD/S&T
- 10 - AD/OSA
- 11 - D/FA/OSA
- 12 - IDEA/OSA
- 13 - CC/OSA
- 14 - [] 50X1, E.O.13526 []
- 15 - C. L. Johnson, Lockheed
- 16 - Detachment *G/H*
- 17 - SAL/OSA (Chrono)
- 18 - RB/OSA
- 19 - 26 - SAL/OSA

Col. Cole

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ANNEX 114

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UNITED STATES—CHINESE "PROJECT RAZOR" AGREEMENT

A. PURPOSE:

For the purpose of carrying out photo reconnaissance, airborne electronic collection, and other special airborne operations jointly agreed on against the Chinese Communist and other Asian countries, GRC will cooperate with U. S. side in "Project Razor" and provide the operational base and associated facilities for this project. The purpose of this agreement is to clarify the relationship and establish responsibilities of Chinese and American counterparts on "Project Razor". This agreement is drawn and agreed to by the CAF (for the GRC) and by USAATG (for the U. S.) to guide future operations.

B. EFFECTIVE PERIOD:

The effective period of this agreement is three (3) years. Joint review and negotiations shall be accomplished three (3) months prior to the expiration of this agreement to determine whether the agreement shall be continued. (If in the opinion of either party special new circumstances justify re-examination to determine whether the agreement should be continued, review and consultation may be conducted after twelve (12) months following the effective date of this agreement. If in these circumstances either party decides that the agreement should not continue and so notifies the other party the agreement would remain in effect for three (3) months from such time.)

C. SPECIAL INSTRUMENT AND EQUIPMENT:

1) The U. S. side is responsible for providing special instruments, maintenance, supplying spare parts and furnishing special equipment for the project.

2) Special instruments will use CAF marking and serial numbers when operational missions are launched and recovered on Taiwan, except when operational missions are flown by U. S. pilots.

3) The U. S. side retains the prerogative to remove special instruments, upon notifying the CAF, when required for other U. S. commitments. However, a minimum number of two (2) special instruments will normally be retained to satisfy the purpose of this agreement.

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4) Upon termination of this agreement, the special instruments, spare parts and special equipment for the project may be removed by the U. S. side.

D. BASE AND FACILITIES:

1) GRC will provide the operational base and associated facilities for the project.

2) Any new construction and renovation of existing structures and the installation of equipment must be jointly agreed. The U. S. will finance new construction and renovation costs relating to existing project structures.

3) Title to all permanent construction within the project site area passes to the CAF when neither the CAF nor the U. S. side have further use for the operational area. In that event, however, the U. S. side may remove all fixtures and supplies which it has installed.

4) Under certain circumstances the project site and facilities may be used for operations of interest solely to the U. S. side, but such use will be subject to prior notification, including identification of the general objectives of the activity contemplated, and subject to CAF concurrence.

E. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

1) The U. S. side is responsible for operational training of CAF pilots of special instruments, and for providing assistance for training of other CAF personnel related to the project as required.

2) A mutually agreed joint target list will be established to satisfy requirements of both parties and may be revised when jointly agreed. The U. S. side will be responsible for planning operational missions based on the joint target list.

3) Operational missions may be requested by either party to be carried out only after mutually agreed on. It is agreed that a suitable number of missions will be flown to satisfy joint requirements.

4) Either party will notify the other party approximately thirty-six (36) hours in advance when operational missions are contemplated

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and route numbers (or general target area) selected. All operational missions must be approved by other party.

5) Personnel of both parties assigned to the component will jointly formulate local operational planning of the mission and participate in local "go-no-go" decisions. All operational activities must be mutually agreed.

6) CAF personnel assigned to the component will conduct pre-mission briefings and post-mission discussions with the primary operators, providing the U. S. side tape recordings and collaborating with U. S. personnel in the component to insure the briefings achieve mutual purpose.

7) The product of the photo operations will normally be processed by the CAF who will provide the U. S. side the original negative. In event of special requirements or circumstances, the U. S. side may process the photo product elsewhere providing the CAF with a duplicate negative. PI reports of each mission flown will be furnished to CAF by the U. S. side.

8) In the event of accident involving the special instruments both parties have the right to conduct on-the-spot investigations. CAF will be responsible for settling all claims arising from damage to persons or property (other than the special instruments) from jointly approved operations. The U. S. side will provide funds for such settlement.

F. PERSONNEL AND SECURITY CONTROL:

1) CAF will assign the necessary number of trained personnel to the component to carry out agreed tasks. These personnel are under control and supervision of the CAF representative. The number of personnel required and the duration of their employment in the component is subject to mutual agreement.

2) U. S. side will provide funds for incentive pay and subsistence benefits for CAF personnel assigned directly to the component. The CAF will be responsible for providing receipts indicating that expenditures are for purposes calculated to improve the over-all performance of the project.

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3) U. S. side will provide death and disability benefits for CAF special instruments pilots assigned to the component, when death or disability occurs to a principal while engaged in jointly agreed operational or training missions. Details of this subject will be developed in another agreement.

4) It is the responsibility of both parties to keep absolute secrecy for the project, and CAF will certify to the other party as to the assigned personnel's reliability, providing biographical information as requested. CAF personnel occupying sensitive project positions at the operating base will be afforded technical interviews as part of the security check process.

5) Operational component chiefs of both parties will jointly work out operational, communications, and security procedures for issuance by appropriate CAF authority.

6) CAF will provide identification passes, documents, and numbers needed to give component personnel and vehicles free entry and exit to the site. A guard force will be provided by CAF for establishing perimeter security control of the component area.

G. ADDITIONAL:

1) Any point not covered in this agreement may be developed by mutual agreement of designated representatives of both parties as an annex of this agreement.

2) This agreement shall become effective on the sixteenth^{*} of March, 1967.

(* This date later changed by agreement to the eighteenth.)

(Signed)
LT. GENERAL YANG SHAO-LIEN
Chief of Staff, Chinese Air Force
Representative of CAF

17 March 1967

(Signed)
HAROLD P. FORD
Director, United States
Army Technical Group
Representative of USATG

17 March 1967

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DDS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA -1

Vol. XII of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
Chapters XVIII and XIX

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 12
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 24, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T

Date prepared : 1 April 1969

Written by : Helen Kleyla

Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER XVIII. AMALGAMATION
OF AIR ACTIVITIES, 1959-1962

Because of the many and diverse air activities carried on during the period when all Agency air activities were amalgamated under the Development Projects Division, a very broad-brush treatment has been given to this section. It is understood that a full-time historian is writing a comprehensive history of SOD which will include the early history of SOD projects (including STPOLLY).

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DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DIVISION
Functional Roster - 1 January 1961

Office of the Chief: Col. Stanley W. Beerli, Acting Chief
Mr. John N. McMahon, Executive Officer
Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., Asst. Chief
Mr. James Q. Reber, Special Requirements Staff
Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer, Special Asst. for
Technical Analysis

Operations Branch: Lt. Col. Charles F. Quinette, Chief

[Redacted]
Maj. A. J. Matthias, FE Air Ops

Administrative Branch:

[Redacted]
Mr. William J. Cotter, Chief of Security

Materiel Branch:

[Redacted]
Lt. Col. Thomas Davis, Deputy Chief

Development Branch: Mr. John Parangosky, Chief

Air Proprietary Branch:

Contracts Staff:

* Lt. Col. George Gaines, Chief, on temporary assignment to JMCLEAR.

** [Redacted] appointed Chief later in January 1961.

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CHAPTER XVIII. AMALGAMATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES

Early Proposal - 1956

In the fall of 1956, during the stand-down of the U-2 following the Soviet protest of the July overflights, an approach to higher level was being planned in order to seek guidance on the future of the U-2 project. In a memorandum to the DCI, the Project Director called attention to the fact that Agency policy was opposed to maintaining such a capability in being on a contingency basis for an indefinite period. He said, however:

"Quite apart from the U-2 program... I believe a case could be made for reversing this Agency policy and for consolidating all of our air operations into a permanent organization considerably more self-contained than that represented by our Air Sections overseas and the Air Maritime Division at Headquarters. It might well be easier to maintain a capability in being, much of the time on a standby basis but prepared for recurrent situations in which it could be used, with such a consolidated organization which was designed to be permanent, than with the present type of highly temporary arrangement. Were we to move down this road, the case for maintaining the U-2 capability through the useful life of the equipment would be much stronger than stated above." 1/

Mr. Bissell later discussed with General Cabell the matter of having two Headquarters units deploying overseas detachments engaged in essentially the same type of work and the possibility of an amalgamation to avoid duplication of equipment, staff and support costs. The idea was also discussed with the Acting DDP (Mr. Helms) who looked favorably

1/ TS-158408, p. 6, 25 Sept. 1956. Memo to DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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on such a plan. At the beginning of 1957 these discussions had been closely held within top levels since the control of air assets was a rather sensitive question with the DD/P area divisions concerned.

In March 1957, Mr. James Cunningham set out for Mr. Bissell some pertinent observations, in view of the possible merger, on some problem areas which should be considered.

"... You should be aware that normally Air Maritime Division works within the framework of the rules and regulations of the Clandestine Service in the administration of its affairs, and these rules are much more restrictive and well defined than those under which we have been operating... especially as applies to procurement of materiel.

"AMD goes by the DD/P book in conduct of their fiscal affairs, in budgeting and expending funds. AMD does not have its own budget or finance shop but relies wholly on the Administrative Branch of the DDP/PP Staff in such matters.

"AMD's table of organization is so set up that a request for their T/O made recently to Mr. Helms produced only 28 positions in Headquarters. The balance of their positions are buried within several area divisions, e.g., EE Division has [redacted] for AMD.

"Travel is handled through Central Processing Branch, subject to full coordination. Communications are through regular channels and subject to interdivisional coordination.

"I do not argue that we should remove AMD from any and all controls now being exercised by DD/P since such coordination and exchange of plans is necessary in the conduct of normal AMD air support missions, but do feel projects and special programs, e.g., JBINCLUDE (the P2V aircraft and equipment

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procurement), should be removed from hampering by administrative or operational restrictions that slow them down.

"Whether Mr. Wisner would agree to an arrangement where AMD would be run under the 'double standard' with one set of rules for normal air support and another for projects and programs, I do not know. But unless there is some latitude in the matters I enumerated, I foresee stumbling blocks in the road of close coordination of our several activities, and in implementing some of your plans as rapidly as you may wish." 1/

On 3 April 1957, Mr. Bissell announced to the AQUATONE Project Staff that the absorption by AQUATONE of headquarters support responsibility for the P2V program and possibly some amalgamation in the field was being considered. The first working level meeting within the staff held 15 April 1957 brought out the fact that the DDCI recommended all AMD activities (with the exception of maritime operations) be included. The new division resulting would probably be called the Air Operations Division and be under the direction of Mr. Bissell while he remained Special Assistant to the Director, and subsequently become a major division of the DD/P. Col. Gibbs expressed the hope to General Cabell that the division would not be buried within the DD/P and cut off from direct access to the DDCI. General Cabell replied that with a merger

1/ SAPC-14123, 22 March 1957. Memo to Proj Director from D/Admin.

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such as he contemplated, AQUATONE should operate in a more routine manner and would no longer need high priority treatment.

The Project Director of Operations (Col. Mixson). reported his general conclusion that AMD was doing nothing that could not be immediately assimilated by AQUATONE; that AMD was hamstrung as presently organized. Its responsibilities included: direct supervision of the P2V program; responsibility for a dormant pilot-recruiting program; coordination in a technical advisory capacity of overflight operations; air support units in Germany and Okinawa; a balloon capability; and jurisdiction over a two-aircraft shuttle operation from Washington National Airport to

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On the materiel side, Lt. Col. William Wilson reported that the proposed amalgamation would probably give no savings in construction or spares handling but a small savings in materiel personnel if the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division, Office of Logistics, were included. The security outlook for a merger appeared to be slightly unfavorable for the short term, but desirable over the long run.

A paper was presented to Mr. Bissell in early May incorporating the views of the AQUATONE staff on the pro's and con's of the proposed merger, and there the matter rested until August 1957. Then, in an effort to obtain a decision to merge or not to merge, the AQUATONE

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staff suggested to Mr. Bissell that General Cabell be asked for a directive to perform a full-blown study upon which a decision could be based. Mr. Bissell opposed returning to General Cabell other than with a firm recommendation to him on the course of action to be taken to dispose of the matter. The need to consider an amalgamation for the purpose of preserving the U-2 capability on standby no longer applied, since high-level approval had been obtained for continuing AQUATONE overflights and Detachment B was at that time busily engaged in a series of highly successful overflights of Central Siberia. Mr. Bissell had meanwhile reached a rather negative conclusion regarding the wisdom of a complete merger due to his lack of enthusiasm for the AMD programs and the manner in which they were organized. His specific dislikes were these:

"a. AMD itself, as a rather lowly component of the Clandestine Service, is deeply enmeshed in Agency bureaucracy.

"b. Actual air operations are not controlled by AMD but by Station Chiefs overseas, hence a merger with AMD alone would provide no control over air operations but a merger taking in the Air Sections overseas would raise major issues with the Station Chiefs concerned.

"c. Relationships between the Agency and the Air Force on all matters having to do with non-AQUATONE air operations are murky and unsatisfactory.

"d. I believe that the P2V program is fundamentally ill-conceived on technical grounds. I have no confidence in the

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safety of the aircraft from interception and I am convinced that we will never be allowed to use them except perhaps in trifling operations (over such places as Albania) in the present political climate.

"In short, my feeling is that from the selfish point of view of our own operation, we should not wish to be tainted by any involvement in AMD's relationship to the rest of the Agency, its relationship to the Air Force, or its technical programs... I am at least somewhat open-minded on the above matters and your report may serve to change my mind..." 1/

It was more than a year before Mr. Bissell was persuaded that a merger of all air assets could be beneficially effected. Meanwhile the following events had taken place: (1) Effective 7 July 1958 the air operations of AMD were removed from the PP Staff and assigned to the newly established "Operational Services/DDP" for administration and coordination. (2) Mr. Bissell was appointed by the DCI to succeed Mr. Wisner as Deputy Director for Plans effective 1 January 1959. Hence it made more sense now for him to go along with the amalgamation of all Agency air assets since in his new position he would be responsible to the Director for all air operations.

Amalgamation Effected

The merger having been agreed to in principle by all concerned, the "Development Projects Division" was set up within the DD/P area

1/ SAPC-18580, 20 August 1957. Memo for Chairman, Planning Group, PCS/DCI, from Project Director.

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incorporating along with the U-2 project and its ancillary activities the Air Division/OPSER and the Aircraft Maintenance Support Division of the Office of Logistics. The effective date was 16 February 1959; however, the sorting out period and the final agreement on lines of command took the balance of the year to accomplish. The following principal events took place meanwhile:

Tab 6. The relations with Headquarters USAF/AFXPD, the office which administered Air Force support to CIA (other than AQUATONE) under the agreement referred to as "Tab 6", were the subject of meetings and discussions at all levels up to and including the Office of Secretary of Defense/Special Operations (Col. Edwin Lansdale). A beginning was made toward reducing the points of contact (and friction). There had been as many as seventy Agency people cleared to deal directly with the Air Force on support problems, making for much confusion and duplication of effort. There was a slow improvement in the previously most unhappy relations with AFXPD, but as long as Lt. Col. Prouty remained in charge of that office, a little of the built-in friction continued to show itself from time to time.

Organization Guidelines. On 12 May 1959 the DD/P set forth guidelines for the organization and control of CIA air operations and outlined the responsibilities and authorities of DPD and the area divisions concerned.

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This memorandum was addressed to the A/DDP, Chiefs of PP, EE, FE and DP Divisions, and the text is included as Annex 115. The control arrangements set forth therein, according to Mr. Bissell, were not intended as an inflexible set of rules from which no appeal might be made, but were based on a substantial body of experience in air operations and other fields of technical endeavor and were not to be changed unless they demonstrably failed to serve the purpose for which designed.

Relocation of the EAOB. Plans for the relocation of the assets of the European Air Operations Base at Wiesbaden to a suitable base in the ZI were pursued with the Air Force. After investigating available sites, Headquarters, USAF, reported that Air Materiel Command did not wish any of their bases to become involved with Agency projects, therefore it was recommended that the detachment be set up in available space at the Air Proving Ground Command at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, where experienced electronics maintenance and supply were available for servicing the detachment's aircraft and Elint collection systems. When Gen. Cabell was informed of this, his reaction, as described by Mr. Cunningham, was as follows:

"General Cabell said it sounded to him as though this line of reasoning was not to the point, and that instead of pivoting the eventual location of the U.S. detachment on factors like electronics maintenance, the air transport capability of the

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detachment should in his view govern where it was set down. He envisioned the bulk of our requirements for an air capability to respond to international disturbances would center on our ability to pick up and deliver men and materiel and that it made the best kind of sense to him to have the transport aircraft near the depot where the things to be carried would be located. . . He felt Kelly Air Force Base (and depot) would be an ideal location. He then said, when told that our next move looked like a survey trip to Eglin, that he would insist that any such survey be accompanied by a like survey of Kelly, unless the Air Force could give him 'about a hundred good Air Force reasons why Kelly should be eliminated from consideration.' I told Gen. Cabell I felt cover would be less of a problem in Eglin than anywhere in Texas, but he did not agree." 1/

With the choice narrowed to Kelly or Eglin, senior Air Force officers of the Operations and Plans Division, Headquarters USAF, reviewed the study which had been made and recommended in a letter to Gen. Cabell that Eglin be accepted. The DPD staff supported the choice and Gen. Cabell finally gave his approval on 25 May 1959. On 5 June, AFXPD was requested to activate a unit at APGC to which the officers and men attached to the EAOB (7405th Support Group) could be assigned. This was accomplished, the EAOB assets were flown or airlifted to the ZI and on 20 August 1959 communications were opened between DPD Headquarters (5th Floor, 1717 H Street) and the 1045th

1/ DPD-3287-59, 20 May 1959. Memo for Record, James A. Cunningham, Jr.

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Operations Evaluation and Training Group, Detachment 1, at Eglin via the HBJAYWALK channel. The first commanding officer of the detachment was Col. Theodore Erb who had moved with the group from Wiesbaden.

Detachment 1 was ostensibly a normal Air Force unit on an Air Force base, and detachment business was conducted in accordance with USAF and/or Agency directives. The Commander, APGC, at Eglin provided base and logistical support normally accorded a tenant unit on a reimbursable basis in accordance with Tab 6. Communications support was furnished by CIA. The Detachment Commander's directive was:

- (1) To maintain personnel, aircraft and related equipment in a high state of operational readiness;
- (2) perform clandestine air missions as directed;
- (3) airlift sensitive cargo and/or personnel as directed by Headquarters or as requested by Chiefs of Stations/Bases within his geographic area of operation; and
- (4) to accomplish other tasks as directed.

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Stockpiling. A combat air asset stockpiling program was proposed by the DD/P and approved by the DDCI on 22 May 1959, to include: (1) DOD stockpiling of 12 AD's; (2) eight B-26's to be retained temporarily but no more acquired from USAF; (3) P2V stockpiling action to await the achievement of a more acceptable status of that aircraft; and (4) the F-86 to be accepted as the jet component for stockpiling. (Subsequently, when DPD was called on for combat air support in Southeast Asia-Laos—and in the Cuban operations of 1960-1961, it was the B-26 which was leaned on most heavily and as of September 1961 there were 20 of them in the Agency inventory.)

DPD Assumption of Far East Air Support

Take-over by the Development Projects Division of Far East air support was not formalized until 24 November 1959 when a joint agreement

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was signed by Chief, FE (then Mr. Desmond FitzGerald), and Acting Chief, DPD, Col. William Burke, and approved by the DD/P. (See Annex 116 for text.) While the negotiations with FE were going on, DPD was slowly phasing into the management of air support for various Far East projects already in being or planned for the future.

Planning for the Tibetan program (STBARNUM) was given the highest priority due to heavy political pressure resulting from the Chicom suppression of the Tibetan revolt in March 1959. Also the joint program with the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (STPOLLY) for Psych/Elint overflights of the China Mainland, was continuing and increasing in number of flights, averaging approximately ten per month and combining leaflet and other drops with collection of Chicom radar order of battle.

In April 1959, the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee came to the tentative conclusion that the frequency of STPOLLY missions primarily for Elint collection was excessive in terms of requirements for Chicom air defense information. On an inspection trip to the Far East between 2 and 17 May 1959, principally in the role of Chief of the DPD Special Requirements Staff, Mr. James Q. Reber reported that the 50X1, E.O.13526 placed great emphasis on the continuance of STPOLLY operations at a reasonable rate

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because (1) the GRC considered this project a symbol of carrying the fight to the Chinese Communists (even though, Mr. Reber said, there was no way to measure the effect of the drops); (2) the maintenance of the program served as an important, if not critical, element in the status of [redacted] with the GRC, [redacted] [redacted] and (3) the maintenance, exercise and perfection of this capability provided a vital collection tool for any future crisis situations.

At that moment no P2V aircraft had yet been lost (although there was evidence of increasing air intercept capability by the Chicoms). The CAF pilots of the 34th Squadron were well trained and well motivated. The principal recommendations resulting from the Reber visit to Taiwan related to (1) improved targeting to cover first priority Elint targets, achieving the psychological/political missions while enroute to those targets, and (2) improvement in the read-out capability and concurrent development of read-out equipment along with the collection systems.

On 29 May 1959, the first shoot-down of a P2V7 occurred and DPD recommended, in view of the air intercept hazard, that overflights be discontinued until adequate countermeasures equipment was installed. The Chief, Far East Division, agreed provided the equipment could be

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installed in approximately 30 days. He noted at the same time that with regard to priority targets, State had given permission to overfly all of China, including Manchuria.

A visit was made by the Deputy Chief of Operations, DPD, (Lt. Col. C. F. Quinette) in September 1959 to Honolulu, Tokyo, Okinawa, and Taiwan to investigate the ramifications of DPD take-over of Far East air support. PACAF had requested Headquarters USAF to arrange meetings for the purpose of standardizing all Tab 6 support items and procedures and the Chief of AFXPD (Lt. Col. Prouty) accompanied Lt. Col. Quinette to PACAF, 13th Air Force, Fifth Air Force, and Pacific Air Materiel Headquarters in order to familiarize all points of contact in these commands with the Tab 6 procedures and work out means of expediting support to Agency Far East projects as well as safeguarding their security.

As a result of his visit to Taiwan, Lt. Col. Quinette recommended that STPOLLY be made a separate detachment under DPD for a smoother operation, with budgeting and personnel slotting to be the responsibility of DPD rather than FE Division, and support such as housing, cover and common support items (such as vehicles) to be provided by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526 [REDACTED]

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the DD/P approved transferring responsibility for STPOLLY financial management and personnel assignments to Development Projects Division.)


The conversion of the STPOLLY program to P2V aircraft and the phase-out of B-26's and B-17's was discussed by Lt. Col. Quinette with 50X1, E.O.13526 USAF officers during the September 1959 trip to Taiwan. The problem of acquiring spares and maintenance for these types of aircraft had made it advisable to withdraw them from the operational inventory at Hsinchu. There was a question at the time of possibly destroying the aircraft, but instead in January 1960 they were put in storage at the Air Asia facility at Tainan, Taiwan (with the exception of the one dual-control B-26 retained at Hsinchu for training) and, as mentioned previously, they were again put to use in Laos and Cuba in 1960-61.

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On 25 March 1960, P2V7 #7101 crashed into a mountain in South Korea while making a ferry flight from Hsinchu to Kunsan. The accident was due to malfunction of navigation equipment and no enemy action was involved. The aircraft and full crew (including the CAF 34th Squadron Commander) were lost. Flights were temporarily suspended but resumed in April when four successful flights dropped agents, leaflets and rice bags. Twenty-seven overflights were completed by STPOLLY in 1960 before the U.S. presidential election and change of administration brought a lull in these operations.

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On 6 March 1961, a briefing was afforded the new Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, Under Secretary Bowles, Assistant Secretary (FE) Parsons, and Director of Intelligence and Research, Mr. Roger Hilsman, on the TACKLE and STPOLLY projects by General Cabell and Col. Beerli (AC/DPD). The DDCI stressed the value of the low-level STPOLLY mission profile as it related to current SAC studies for Emergency War Plans where SAC doctrine appeared to be moving toward a low altitude penetration system since the introduction of surface-to-air missiles by the Russians.

If approval to resume was obtained, the plan was for something on the order of two missions per month. Secretary Rusk's only question related to the urgency of reactivating the program. A six-month delay was suggested by Mr. Bowles since the President (Mr. Kennedy) was feeling his way on the international scene and needed time to evaluate the new Sino-Soviet posture. General Cabell indicated that STPOLLY had a greater urgency than TACKLE and he believed it more likely to be approved at high level since it had less political sensitivity. Attribution

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in the event of an incident would rest entirely on the GRC. On 23 March 1961 the Special Group approved the reinstatement of STPOLLY flights with a review to be made at the end of a month. On 11 May the Special Group gave approval for flights to continue indefinitely, but under the scrutiny and continual evaluation of the Special Group.

At that time the Hsinchu detachment and [redacted] [redacted] numbered 27 Americans (CIA, USAF, USN and techrep personnel) with Col. James H. Coats in command. There were three complete CAF crews totalling 46 officers and men and 76 other CAF ground support troops, and 83 Chinese civilian employees at Hsinchu Air Base. Seven aircraft were available to the project: four P2V7's, two with complete reconnaissance systems used in ELINT overflights; [redacted] cargo and airdrop capability; one at Lockheed receiving limited ELINT modification; one C-46 (CAF-owned with CAF markings) used for support; one C-47 leased from Air Asia for support; and one TB-26 (project-owned) used as an instrument trainer.

For the balance of the time during which Project STPOLLY remained under DPD control, the above-described status held pretty well true. Relations between Project personnel and the GRC/CAF were friendly and cooperative.

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Detachment 2 Established

By action of the DCI on 30 July 1959, approval was given for a 45-man detachment to be established at Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, under Air Force cover, to serve as a central air operations support base for CIA activities in the Far East area. The unit was designated Detachment 2 of the 1045th Operations Evaluation and Training Group, and was manned principally with Air Force personnel assigned to the Agency for duty, plus CIA Security, Communications and Support personnel. The Operations Order setting out the mission of this unit was almost identical to that of Detachment 1 at Eglin. The inventory of operational aircraft at the outset was only two C-118's; however Detachment 2 had available to it the assets of both the Civil Air Transport, on contract, and of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron at Naha, Okinawa, under Tab 6. Also logistics support in warehousing, packing and crating, and parachute packing was available 50X1, E.O.13526

The first Commanding Officer of the unit was Maj. Harry C. (Heinie) Aderholt who was an energetic, experienced and capable air operations officer, and who was credited with being largely instrumental in bringing the new team at Kadena to an efficient operating level. Activities of the detachment included reconnaissance, air transport,

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clandestine air operations, and air support of paramilitary operations. Following an inspection visit to the Far East in March 1960, Lt. Col. George Gains, Chief of the Air Support Branch, DPD, reported that Agency officials at various stations had informed him of the vast improvement in Far East air operations since the reorganization. The

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had been particularly impressed with the good coordination being effected, and the Civil Air Transport representatives in Taiwan also reported marked improvement in the effectiveness of air operations in which they were involved with Detachment 2.

Operations, 1959-1962

The highest priority operation at the inception of Detachment 2 under DPD control were those in support of the Tibetan infiltration and air resupply program aimed at generating and supporting local resistance and collecting intelligence on the Chinese Communist occupation forces. In November 1959 a successful infiltration flight using CAT crew and aircraft with special door and drop gear installed, delivered 16 agents and supporting supplies and in the ensuing five months 20 missions were flown delivering nine more agents and approximately 400,000 pounds of supplies. Other than some small amounts of breakage in these airdrops, the greatest damage sustained was in the cracking of rifle butts. At the

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beginning of 1960 permission was received to use Takhli Air Base for launching the Tibetan airdrops and DPD supplied the funds and supervision by its Engineer to build a BOQ and mess hall and to install generators to power the base communications equipment at Takhli.

The unforeseen and unbudgeted costs for the support of the Tibetan activity required the release from the Agency reserve of additional funds 50X1, E.O.13526 to cover the DPD deficit resulting principally from the excess of flying hours by Detachment 2 and CAT contract aircraft over the number budgeted for. Subsequent to this initial heavy airlift schedule, the project slowed considerably and was subject to a stand-down following the May Day U-2 incident, continuing through the election and change of administration. The Special Group in March 1961 approved the renewal of the program with specific flight approvals to be given on a monthly basis.

Laotian Operations

On 9 December 1960, the Neutralist Lao Government fell and the Soviets were openly supplying the Kong Le forces. While the Royal Lao Forces retook the capital later, U.S. aid was the principal hope for keeping the country from falling to the Communists. On 7 January 1961 the State Department issued a White Paper defending the U.S. position

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with regard to aid to Laos, and a Far East Division project was initiated jointly with the Department of Defense to build up the Lao Air Force.

In January and February 1961 the stored B-26's in the Far East (ten USAF and eight CIA) were recommissioned as a nucleus to give air support to the Royal Lao Government against the Pathet Lao. In addition DOD supplied four C-130's, twenty H-34 helicopters and sixteen military helicopter pilots. Additional airlift was made available as required. It was first proposed that Air Asia American contract pilots be used; then consideration was switched to Air Asia Chinese Nationalist

[] pilots. The final decision was to use "sheep-dipped" USAF pilots, who were put in civilian clothes and sent TDY [] from their regular assignments at 21st Troop Carrier Squadron at Naha, or the 313th Air Division at Kadena. The cover for the operation was the ostensible purchase by the Phoumi Government of the aircraft []

[] with operation and maintenance by Air Asia under contract to the Laotian Government. []

To build up a B-26 and C-130 operational capability, personnel were drawn from Detachment 2, [] Taipei (STPOLLY personnel), SEACA and ASCA Communications Centers of

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CIA, and the U. S. Air Force. Total personnel involved numbered up to 300. The operation was successfully completed in May 1961 and CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs agreed with CIA in June 1961 to the phase-out of U. S. assets in view of the convening of a Geneva Conference which was expected to achieve a settlement between the warring factions.

Vietnam Air Operations

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Beginning in the spring of 1961, Detachment 2 gave air support to a joint Saigon Station/South Vietnamese operation [] the purpose of which was the infiltration of South Vietnamese teams via C-54 airdrop to reconnoiter, observe, report on and, when directed, to take action against Communist supply lines in the vicinity of the Laos/North Vietnam border. Infiltration of the trained teams was accomplished by Vietnamese Air Force military crews who had been civilianized and employed by VIAT (a commercial Vietnamese company). Flights were carried out ostensibly without prior knowledge or concurrence of the U. S. as a unilateral Vietnamese activity.

Because of the high rank of the Vietnamese officers involved in the project, the Detachment 2 air operations officer in charge of these activities in Vietnam had difficulty in enforcing instructions received from Washington and Kadena. It was decided with Saigon Station's concurrence, that DPD would assign an air operations officer to Saigon

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to perform liaison between the Chief of Station, the VNAF, Detachment 2, and Washington Headquarters.

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Detachment 1 Activities, 1959-1961

After its activation in August 1959, Detachment 1 at Eglin began to complete the staffing of its approved T/O of 96, and to recruit and train stateless and other pilots and crews and paradispatch officers for operational availability. Testing of new equipment was undertaken on a continuing basis: navigation aids such as the terrain avoidance radar system for the P2V, various types of beacons for use in air drops and for escape and evasion purposes, electronic countermeasures equipment, and ELINT collection devices were among the principal test programs.

On 22 January 1960 Detachment 1 deployed its ELINT-configured P2V to Johnson Island in the Pacific to participate in monitoring Russian ICBM shots (Project BIG ARM). A successful intercept was made on 31 January.

Cuban Operations

On 11 July 1960, a separate unit was set up within the Air Support Branch of DPD to support the Western Hemisphere Division's Project

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JMARC (the Cuban counterrevolutionary invasion). This activity was code-named JMCLEAR and was headed by Lt. Col. George Gaines. A control center was set up at Eglin and Detachment 1 was called on for full support of JMCLEAR operations, including air and ground crew recruitment and training, provision of aircraft, black body movement, and black and overt cargo hauling.

At the beginning of the JMCLEAR operation, Detachment 1 had only its own assigned aircraft and crews. A TDY complement of approximately 50 USAF technicians was assigned to Detachment 1 as added support during the Cuban operations. Two additional C-54's and four C-46's were obtained from various Agency sources and moved to Eglin, and eight C-54's were borrowed from the Air Force. During the course of these operations, a total of 19 B-26's were brought out of Agency and Air Force storage to be used as a pre-invasion strike force. The Cuban crews to fly the B-26's were trained at a secret Guatemalan base. Air operations were also set up by DPD at the Opalocka Airport (an unused section of the Greater Miami Airport) and runways and storage facilities there were used through agreement with the FAA, principally for movement of foreign national personnel and cargo.

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The first support missions performed by JMCLEAR were for the purpose of dropping leaflets, arms and food to dissident Cuban groups on the islands. Thirteen successful missions (out of 18 planned) were accomplished by the end of 1960 for a total drop of 36,980 pounds. In addition, 99 cargo and passenger flights were flown to deliver Cuban counterrevolutionaries and supplies and equipment to Guatemala and Puerto Rico.

Detachment 1 moved from the main base at Eglin in the fall of 1960 to Auxiliary Field #3, which afforded better security due to its isolation from the Air Proving Ground Command's main base activities. The Detachment could thus carry out black support flights and other activities in a more covert fashion.

In early January 1961 it was decided that in addition to the Cuban air crews, a complement of Air National Guard crews would be recruited to serve as a stand-by U. S. air strike force, even though at the time of their recruitment JMARC did not have authority to use U. S. pilots in its overflight activities.

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Pre-Invasion Air Strike Base

One responsibility placed on DPD in support of JMARC was the construction, operation and maintenance of a large-scale, temporary air strike base (JMTIDE). Agreement was reached with President Somoza of Nicaragua for use of a site at Puerto Cabezas with a landing strip in very poor state of repair. The DPD Engineer, [REDACTED] was instructed to develop plans for a base facility including improvements to the runway, within budget limits of \$200,000. It was to be a tent camp to accommodate a maximum of 125 personnel, constructed on a temporary basis for a life expectancy of about six months, to be used as a base for the pre-invasion air strikes by the B-26's and a staging base for troops and supplies. The cover for the build-up at Puerto Cabezas was that the

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Nicaraguan Government through a contract with an American company was strengthening its coastal defenses against possible Cuban incursions.

[redacted] of Personnel Operations was nominated by the DD/S to act as base commander at Puerto Cabezas and served in that capacity between 6 January and 23 May 1961. By March, the base was accommodating 19 B-26's, 2 C-54's and various other transient aircraft, and more than 400 personnel. President Ydigoras of Guatemala had insisted that the five to six hundred Cubans training in his country be removed by 1 March 1961, and therefore Puerto Cabezas had to expand to accept almost the entire invasion force. Due to crowded conditions some of the aircraft had to be held at Eglin and rotated to the strike base as needed. At the end of March as the time approached for the invasion, [redacted] was sent by DPD to Puerto Cabezas to direct air support operations.

D-Day had been set for 19 April, and the agreement with the State Department was that there would be no air strike until D-Day minus one. The B-26 air strike group with Cuban crews had, by evening of 18 April, flown their first series of missions to Cuba without adequate air cover, and experiencing losses from enemy air action, began to refuse to fly further missions. The Castro T-33 and Sea Fury aircraft, even though limited in numbers, had begun to effect an advantage over the B-26's.

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During the evening of 18 April seven C-54 loads of ammunition were rigged and launched from Puerto Cabezas to the two beaches chosen for the invasion force landings. Only four loads were delivered, the latter three aircraft being overtaken by morning light and enemy aircraft activity in the area, and having to return to their base.

It was decided during the night of 18-19 April to augment the B-26 crews with volunteer U.S. nationals in order to try to preserve the beachhead. The first pre-dawn strike of four B-26's on 19 April, two of which were manned by Americans, all returned successfully to base. The second strike of five B-26's included three manned by Americans. This latter group had been assured before they took off from Puerto Cabezas that top air cover would be supplied by the Navy for thirty minutes over the beachhead the morning of 19 April, but the top air cover did not materialize. A Cuban B-26 pilot who had been shot down and was waiting for air evacuation, confirmed the fact that the B-26 piloted by Thomas Willard Ray with Leo F. Baker as crewman, was attacked by a T-33, damaged extensively at relatively low altitude, caught fire, and both men bailed out.

A Spanish-language broadcast from Cuba reported that four planes were shot down in the vicinity of the landing beach and that Leo F. Berliss (Baker) and Thomas W. ROSTAN (Ray) were captured and

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shot to death. A photograph obtained later from a Cuban source showed both men lying on the floor of a building with bullet holes in their heads. A second B-26 of the same group was hit and fell flaming into the sea with no survivors. That crew was composed of Riley W. Shamburger and Wade C. Gray. All four of the men killed were volunteers from the Alabama Air National Guard, and residents of Birmingham.

DPD Mop-up Operations

Once public revelations concerning the "Bay of Pigs" and Agency sponsorship were known to be unavoidable, DPD's first efforts were directed at suppressing as much as possible any publicity with regard to Americans participating in the invasion attempt.

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Many hours

were spent by DPD case officers in briefing, counseling and making financial arrangements for the four "Birmingham Widows". Despite all efforts there were inevitably press stories concerning the role of the Air National Guard members in the affair. The wisdom of the use of aliases was proven in many cases both among the contract air crews and Agency staff at the training area.

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The debriefing and release or reassignment of air crews and other contract personnel occupied DPD/JMCLEAR in May and June 1961. Plans were made to regroup and continue training of Cuban air and ground personnel. This Agency program was carried out under cover of an ostensible grant of [REDACTED] as a philanthropic gesture toward the exiled Cubans, with the cooperation of [REDACTED]. Thus overt assistance was given the Cuban pilots in obtaining the equivalent of FAA licensing, while at the same time maintaining access to a pool of trained pilots for future use. The program was completed in April 1962 and of the initial 57 eligible pilots, 28 received either Airline Transport Ratings or commercial licenses. Some of these Cuban pilots were used later [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526 [REDACTED]

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An inventory of the base at Puerto Cabezas was made in June 1961 by [REDACTED] and Maj. Richard Skinner of DPD, and arrangements were made to transfer four B-26's and related maintenance and ordnance equipment and supplies to Nicaragua as compensation promised to President Somoza for his assistance. There remained at the base at the beginning of July approximately \$200,000 worth of ordnance and non-expendable equipment weighing about 70 tons which DPD had to airlift out of Nicaragua and return to [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526 [REDACTED] Detachment 1 at Eglin.

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The settlement of several long-term problems relating to various aircraft which had landed illegally at Miami Airport, Mexico City, Montego Bay, Jamaica, etc., continued to be a legal headache for many months. Efforts to recover the C-54 impounded by the Mexicans were pursued by the State Department but finally given up.

An estimate made at the end of May 1961 put the cost of DPD's air support to Project JMARC at approximately \$10 million.

Establishment of Air Proprietary Branch

In the summer of 1960 preliminary planning was done with a view to bringing together under one central management the various funding organizations, holding companies and current and potential air proprietaries used to support the Agency's covert activities. In November 1960 the Air Proprietary Branch was established under the Development Projects Division with [redacted] (formerly Chief of the Development Branch) as Chief, and [redacted] as Deputy Chief. The question of ultimately assuming the management of the Civil Air Transport operation based in Taiwan was discussed at the time, but it was felt that the time was not ripe for the newly formed branch to assume a project of the magnitude and complexity of CAT. The emphasis of the Air Proprietary Branch was placed on looking into new projects

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which held promise for the future. The Branch was particularly active during 1961 its first year of existence, spotting and procuring small commercial air assets and developing indigenous air organizations worldwide in support of Agency purposes.

In January 1961 plans were initiated to provide the Agency through commercial air organizations with a logistic airlift in support of "Deniable Limited Warfare". A domestic air proprietary was to be established in the Southwest as a covert holding company capable of satisfying aircraft procurement, crew training and holding needs.

[redacted] Deputy Chief of the Air Support Branch, DPD, drafted a proposal whereby the ZI proprietary would be set up to deal with all the problems of tactical air/ground support for Agency covert operations where cover or security considerations precluded the use of military detachments. This would include provision of the right types of unattributable aircraft and crews, capable of low-level tactics, air drop rigging and delivery, amphibious operations and all other techniques which might be required. [redacted] was able to sell his proposal, which required half a million dollars to underwrite in FY 1962, and he himself was put in charge of the new proprietary when it was set up in November 1961, ostensibly as a commercial aviation venture to

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engage in testing of equipment, firefighting, cropdusting and other types of aerial services.

Administrative and fiscal responsibility for the Air Proprietary Branch and its assets was transferred on 1 April 1962 to the Domestic Operations Division, DDP, along with its staff.

Aircraft Inventory

In September 1961, DPD published the first combined inventory of all CIA-owned or controlled aircraft. As a matter of historical curiosity the listing is given here: (List does not include U-2's.)

1	Aero-commander
6	H-34 Helicopters
1	B-17
1	Convair 880
1	Convair 440
1	Lockheed Constellation 1649
3	Piper PA-11
1	Piper Apache
1	Bell 47-G
6	Cessna 180
1	Cessna 182
1	Cessna 310
5	L-20
1	L-21
12	Helio L-28
2	Helio XU-5
3	D-18
1	C-45
21	C-46
7	C-47
1	DC-3
8	C-54

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4	DC4
2	C-118
3	DC6A
1	DC6B
3	PBY-5
4	P2V-7 (RB-69A)
<u>20</u>	B-26
122	Total all kinds

Air Support Reverts to SOD/DDP

With the departure from the Agency of Mr. Richard Bissell (DDP) at the beginning of 1962, the Development Projects Division lost its patron and was subsequently separated into its several principal components which were in turn reassigned to other organizational entities. A twice-delayed investigation of DPD was finally conducted in February 1962 by the Inspector General (then Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick), and one of the recommendations resulting from that inspection was that the DDP remove the function of air support of covert operations from the DPD and establish it in a new unit within the Clandestine Services oriented toward the area divisions.

On 16 February 1962, a Deputy Director for Research was established and the U-2 and follow-on manned reconnaissance vehicle projects as well as the satellite projects were assigned thereto. From February until mid-summer 1962 the reorganization of DPD under the

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DD/R hung fire. In June 1962 Mr. Cunningham noted to Col. Beerli that they were no closer to a solution to their own internal organizational problems than they had been in February, and that, given the rather indefinite viewpoint of the new DD/P on the role of air support in the Agency, he found it difficult to envision a solution which would make everyone happy. The control of the STPOLLY project was one of the stickiest problems to be settled.

On 5 July 1962 the former I.G., then Executive Director/Comptroller, wrote as follows to the DD/R (Dr. Scoville):

"In an effort to reach an equitable solution for the current impasse on STPOLLY... in which the DD/P is reluctant to yield control over the one P2V in Formosa, and in which the DD/R is anxious to have the full project under his direction, I would like to recommend the following compromise.

"In recommending this, I wish to reconfirm the fact that the Director has indicated that there will be a greatly accelerated program of agent drops on the mainland. This provides the basis for the DD/P desire to maintain direct control over the aircraft. On the other hand, it is a fact that experience of the last several years has shown that the Elint flights outnumber the agent drop flights on a basis of roughly 30 to 1.

"Therefore I recommend that for the time being, and until aircraft suitable for agent drops are available on Formosa, the present P2V remain under the operational control of the DD/P, but that the DD/R be responsible for all technical direction of all Elint flights. Further, in the event of any disagreement between DD/P and DD/R over the utilization

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of the aircraft, the matter be referred to the Director's Office. Finally, when aircraft for agent drops are available for Formosa, the STPOLLY project including all personnel presently assigned for Elint purposes will be transferred to the DD/R ^{1/}

The DD/R replied to the above, drawing attention to the fact that the P2V was not the most desirable aircraft for body drops and would accommodate only four to six, depending on the equipment carried. It therefore appeared that the interests of the U. S. with regard to intelligence collection would be best served by using the P2V solely for Sigint collection and the aircraft should be assigned to the DD/R without delay.

On 27 July 1962, the Special Operations Division (SOD/DDP) was established by CSN 1-494, with [redacted] as the first chief. The air support functions which had been taken over by DPD in 1959 from the former Air Maritime Division reverted to the new Division along with control of Detachments 1 and 2, and the ZI proprietary established by Air Proprietary Branch, DPD.

On 30 July 1962 a statement of the mission of the DD/R was published and the former DPD activities were assigned to the Office of Special Activities (OSA) under the DD/R.

^{1/} ER-62-4665, 5 July 1962. Memorandum for DD/R and DD/P from Executive Director/Comptroller, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick.

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On 7 August 1962, in conformity with the provisions of Headquarters Notice 1-23, transferring air support functions to the line of command of the DD/P, the DD/R instructed all personnel of OSA to cease exercising any command responsibilities for air support activities effective immediately.

A year later, when OSA's reconnaissance activities were blanketed under the National Reconnaissance Program, an effort was made, in view of the in-house capability of DDS&T to manage, develop, maintain and execute the various specialties of the STPOLLY program, to have it reassigned to the DDS&T/OSA. This proposal did not receive the approval of the DDP. OSA did, however, have the responsibility for the remainder of the life of the STPOLLY project (through 1966) for obtaining funds and defending the STPOLLY budget to the NRO.

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ANNEX 115

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12 May 1959

MEMORANDUM TO: ADDP, C/PP, C/EE, C/FE and C/DPD

SUBJECT: Organization and Control of CIA Air Operations

REFERENCE: DD/P 4-3876, 2 February 1959

1. Recognizing that CIA has responsibilities for at least four different major categories of air activities, it will be useful at the outset to identify and briefly describe these categories:

a. Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance operations include photo-reconnaissance, Elint and Radint, air sampling, and other more specialized sensing techniques. The requirements for such operations usually, though not invariably, arise from outside divisional and even Agency structures, and thus such operations are subject to a relatively high degree of processing and coordination. In these operations the impact of such technical judgments as type of sensing device to be employed, suitability of weather, and vulnerability of vehicles is crucial.

b. Air Transportation: Air transportation includes the movement of both sensitive and non-sensitive cargo and personnel within friendly territory. This category of operations differs from normal military air transport operations only in security requirements. As such, the basic considerations inherent in the conduct of such operations are the normal ones of aircraft maintenance, arranging of schedules, assignment of aircraft and crews, flying training and proficiency, flight planning, and the like.

c. Covert Air Operations: Include the delivery or dropping of supplies to denied areas, infiltration and exfiltration of agents, leaflet drops, and similar activities, in which the covert air operation may usually be conceived of as a single but important part of a larger operation with broader over-all political objectives.

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d. Paramilitary activities: In this category are included those covert air operations which are a part of a larger paramilitary effort. Usually such air operations will grow out of and be greater in scope and complexity than those described in c, above.

2. Although the various types of operations described above have the employment of aircraft as their primary object, the operations are so different in origin, methods, scope, and skills required that their management and control should logically differ somewhat in each case. These variants and the reasons underlying them are discussed in some detail below.

a. Reconnaissance: As defined in paragraph 1, a, above, it is evident that reconnaissance operations more often than not transcend the responsibility of any single area division or group of area divisions, both in terms of the level of policy clearance required and the major technical skills employed. The area division's most useful contribution to such operations will be making arrangements through the local COS with the appropriate foreign government. The area division may also assist in policy clearance discussions with the Department of State. But the over-all considerations involved dictate that the line of command for reconnaissance operations should run from the DD/P to the DPD to the field air detachment commander, with the local COS exercising a veto authority when necessary to prevent political complications.

b. Air Transportation: As defined in para 1, b, above, air transportation is essentially a support function to assist several stations. The skills required are largely those normally associated with any other air transport operations. Station Chiefs in this type of operation should be viewed as customers of the service, the direction of which should flow from the DD/P to the Development Projects Division to the field air detachment commander.

c. Covert Air Operations:

(1) Responsibilities: As defined in para 1, c, above, a covert air operation is typically only one phase of a more inclusive clandestine operation with political or intelligence objectives transcending those of the air operation itself. The covert air

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operation is thus not an activity complete in itself like reconnaissance or a separable support activity like air transportation. Clearly, responsibility for the conception, design, and execution of the over-all political or intelligence operation rests with the area division (or station) concerned, and the planning and conduct of any air operations required must be responsive to requirements and guidance emanating from the area division (or station). On the other hand, the technical planning, direction, and conduct of the air operation itself should be performed by the DPD in Headquarters and the appropriate air detachment in the field. In the performance of a covert air operation, the DPD occupies a position analogous to that of the Office of Communications in a project involving special electronic activities (such as unusual communications support, Elint collection, etc.). In this capacity DPD (like O/C) designates personnel and equipment, prescribes technical operational procedures, and conducts technical operations as required to perform the role assigned to it in the over-all operations.

(2) Line of Command: It is evident that over-all control of any political or intelligence operation must be exercised from Headquarters by the appropriate area division on behalf of the DD/P. So far as the air activities included in such an operation are concerned, the line of command normally runs from the chief of the area division, through the DPD, to the air detachment concerned which, as the operational unit in the field, must actually conduct the required operation. Where there is a need for direct coordination in the field between the air detachment and a station which is also playing a part in the operation, the former should accept requirements and guidance from the latter. It is expected that heavy reliance will be placed on the communications facility of the DPD for traffic concerning the technical planning and direction of covert air operations. (This of course does not preclude the passage of information copies to components other than DPD and the clearance of important messages having policy implications with chiefs of area divisions as appropriate.)

d. Paramilitary Activities: As noted above, paramilitary activities typically grow out of situations that have called for what have been classified above as covert air operations. This difference in scope may well become a difference in kind which requires a rather totally different organizational approach. Experience has shown that such operations will be effective only if the several tasks of acquiring, deploying, and maintaining equipment and personnel, providing logistic support,

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and directing operations, are performed in a professional and timely manner. This requires that there be a relatively self-contained group containing all the requisite skills under the control of a task force commander. Such a task force may be set up within or without an existing DD/P component, depending on circumstances. The line of command would logically run from the DD/P to the task force commander to the field unit or units. Area divisions and appropriate Chiefs of Station would contribute political background and liaison assistance.

3. Distribution of responsibilities discussed above may be summarized as follows:

a. The DPD will:

(1) Have the responsibility and authority for the management of the Agency's air assets, covering such matters as personnel, finance, maintenance of equipment, logistic support of air operations, training and for operational procedures including those relating to flight safety, proficiency of personnel, flight planning and communications procedures.

(2) Exercise appropriate Headquarters control over air transport operations conducted by the two air detachments, but requirements would in all instances be levied either by field stations or area divisions and the transport operations would insofar as possible be responsive to such requirements.

(3) Control reconnaissance operations performed with Agency assets pursuant to National Intelligence Requirements.

(4) Plan and direct the Agency's air assets' participation in and support of intelligence, political, and paramilitary operations under the guidance and authority of the area divisions having responsibility for these operations.

b. Each Area Division will:

(1) As a part of its planning and direction of any FI and PP operations which involve the use of the Agency's air assets (except for reconnaissance and air transportation as defined above) furnish guidance to DPD and, through DPD, to the air

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detachments in their planning and conduct of the required covert air operations. Such air operations will be performed under the ultimate control of the area division concerned but with delegation of technical planning and direction to DPD and the air detachments.

(2) Conduct liaison with other U. S. Government departments and foreign governments relating to covert air operations and with foreign governments concerning training, transport, and reconnaissance operations, except as otherwise directed in individual cases. The Area Division would be supported by DPD personnel in these negotiations as appropriate.


4. The control arrangements discussed above are not intended as an inflexible body of dogma from which no appeal may be made. However, they are based upon a substantial body of experience in both air operations and other fields of similar technical endeavor, and should not be changed unless and until they demonstrably fail to serve the purpose for which they were designed.

(Signed)
Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Command _____
 Liaison
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 DPD Clandestine Air-----
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I. GENERAL MISSION:

A. The nature of Agency operations in the Far East area and general arrangements for the organization and control thereof are as set forth in DD/P 4-5791, dated 12 May 1959, subject: Organization and Control of CIA Air Operations.

B. All FE Air Commanders and Air Liaison Officers are responsible to and directly under the control of DPD.

C. As directed by DPD, all Commanders and Liaison Officers are charged with planning, technical direction, liaison, and conducting CIA air operations and air support in their respective areas of responsibility.

D. Field Air Commanders and/or Air Liaison Officers are responsible for the implementation of Headquarters air control procedures (Operations Control Manual).

E. Letters of evaluation will be written by the Chiefs of Station and the Chiefs of Base on Air Commanders and Air Liaison Officers in their respective areas of responsibility. This letter will be the basis for Effectiveness Reports to be written at Headquarters.

II. HEADQUARTERS RESPONSIBILITIES:

A. DPD

1. Direction of all CIA air activities involving reconnaissance, air transportation, clandestine air operations, and air support portions of paramilitary actions.

2. Maintenance of aircraft and equipment.

3. Flight planning and/or flight plan approval.

4. Establishment of standard operating procedures and techniques.

5. Recruitment and training of technical, military and aircrew personnel.

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6. Keeping appropriate stations informed (through Chief, FE) of impending operations or support required.

7. Development of procedures for maintenance of the status of CIA air assets.

B. FE Division

1. Approval of projects requiring air support.
2. Obtaining political policy approvals.
3. Obtaining third country clearance for staging operations.
4. Interdepartmental liaison.
5. Direct station support for air operations.
6. Determination of valid mission objectives.

III. FIELD RESPONSIBILITIES - GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FE AIR COMMANDERS AND AIR LIAISON OFFICERS

A. Tokyo Air Liaison Officer

1. Responsible to Chief, DPD.

2. Serve as Liaison Officer and Air Adviser [redacted]

[redacted] on all liaison with the USFJ. In this capacity, ascertains that all policies of [redacted] are complied with or otherwise notifies him of exceptions prior to any air action. In any area of unresolved conflict, advises [redacted]

[redacted] of the situation prior to Headquarters referral. Keeps [redacted] advised on all air matters in his area of responsibility.

3. Conducts liaison with 5th Air Force, 315th Air Division, and other commands in the Tokyo area as required to effect support of CIA Far East operations.

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4. Effects coordination of all Taiwan-based air operations in the 5th Air Force area and arranges staging for overflights from Korea.

5. Supports Detachment 2 Commander liaison requirements with USFJ.

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6. Maintains a file of correspondence [redacted]
[redacted]

B. Clark Liaison Officer

1. Responsible to the Chief, DPD.

2. Serves as Liaison Officer and Air Adviser [redacted]
[redacted] for liaison with 13th Air Force and Clark Air Base. [redacted] advised on all air matters in his area of responsibility. In this capacity, ascertains that all policies [redacted] are complied with or otherwise notifies him of exceptions prior to any air action.

3. Conducts liaison with military commanders, P. I., as required to effect support of Far East air operations.

4. Coordinates all staging operations through Clark Air Force Base.

5. Provides technical assistance as required in support of Far East air operations.

6. Supports CIA activities as required and maintains a file of correspondence [redacted]
[redacted]

C. [redacted]

1. As requested by CIA Headquarters, conducts liaison with military and other government elements in Hawaii and provides or arranges for support of clandestine air movements through Hawaii.

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~~SECRET~~D. Detachment 2 Commander

1. Responsible to DPD for direction of all Detachment 2 air operations.

2. Maintains aircraft and equipment.

3. Provides airlift support for all FE stations.

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4. Conducts liaison with military commanders, Okinawa,
[redacted]

5. Responsible for briefing [redacted]
on all air operational matters in his area and coordinates with
[redacted] on all support activities.

6. Acts as Air Adviser and ascertains that all policies
[redacted] are complied with.

7. Keeps Tokyo Air Liaison Officers informed, as appropriate,
for support and coordination.

8. Maintains a file of correspondence [redacted]
[redacted]

E. Taiwan Air Operations Commander (STPOLLY)

1. [redacted] responsible
to DPD for planning, crew training, technical direction, and con-
duct of Taiwan overflight program.

2. Serves as Liaison Officer [redacted]
[redacted] on all Taiwan air operations. Ascertains that all policies of
[redacted] are complied with or otherwise noti-
fies him of exceptions prior to any air action. In cases of unre-
solved conflict [redacted] will advise Far East
Division and DPD of the situation.

3. Maintains aircraft and related equipment.

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4. Coordinates and conducts liaison [redacted]
[redacted] with Chinat counterparts.

5. Maintains a file of correspondence [redacted]
[redacted]

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ANNEX 116

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24 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Joint Agreement Between Far East Division and Development
Projects Division Delineating Functions and Responsibilities
for Air Activities in the Far East

1. This memorandum contains recommendations for the Deputy Director (Plans). Said recommendations are set forth in paragraph 9.

2. The purposes of this memorandum are to state the current organization and to clarify the respective responsibilities of the Far East and Development Projects Divisions in relation to air activities in the Far East. As there has been considerable discussion on this subject, it is well to insure that a common understanding prevails. Since the time the Development Projects Division was given the responsibility for conducting air activities in the Far East area, several proposals concerning the proper structure have been advanced. After reviewing all proposals, it is believed that the attached chart (Attachment #1) represents the most effective organization and (when completely implemented) should insure efficient execution of Agency air support. Attachment #2 contains a statement of the mission of the air organization and responsibilities of the Headquarters and field elements.

3. There is only one major change reflected on the attached chart which, admittedly, is different from previous proposals. This is the modification of title and duties of the air officer in Tokyo.

4. It is most desirable to have the officer who is held responsible for the aircraft and the conduct of missions physically located with his aircraft and people. Placing an officer in Tokyo, who would be "the commander of the Kadena commander," introduces a command echelon which is not necessary for providing assurance that operations will be conducted efficiently and in consonance with theater policies. With proper exercise of command by the Chief, DPD, and with CIA policy guidance from the liaison officers and Chiefs of Station at the various key locations, there is no reason why the Kadena unit should be handled

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differently from the Eglin unit or other units which are directly under DPD. This is not to deny the need for a highly qualified air liaison officer in Tokyo. We must maintain good relations with the military in that area and a senior officer (Lt. Colonel or Colonel) is being assigned. However, to assign this officer the additional function of responsibility for the management of the Kadena unit would tend to dilute his attention to his advisory duties to [redacted] and his air liaison work with 5th Air Force.

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5. The political aspects of the Chinat-American coordinated effort with regard to the conduct of the STPOLLY program are most critical to the success of U. S. efforts in the entire Far East area. Therefore, with regard to line of command of the air unit for air operations, it is recognized that the authority vested in the Air Commander on the Taiwan staff comes to him [redacted] and not in a direct line from Chief, DPD. In this instance, [redacted]

[redacted]

and he manages the technical aspects of the air operations as a representative of DPD, all of this on behalf of the DCI with the appropriate CIA Headquarters staff division taking action as required on behalf of the Director.

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6. As now constituted, it falls to the Chief, FE [redacted] to budget for STPOLLY. At the same time, the Chief, DPD, is charged in the above-referenced memorandum (DD/P-4-5791 dated 12 May 1959) not only with monitoring of, and establishing of standards for, all technical operations of the Agency's air detachments but also with the management of the Agency's air assets including such matters as personnel and finance. In accordance with this general policy, it is proposed to transfer responsibility for the STPOLLY budget to the Chief, DPD. It is believed to be logical in the case of this activity as with the Agency's other air operations) to place budgetary and technical responsibility in the same hands, since by far the largest part of any air operations budget covers such items as equipment, maintenance, training and proficiency flying, and other items directly related to the technical conduct of the activity. In short, it is desirable to place budgetary responsibility on the Headquarters component charged with maintaining the operating efficiency of the field unit.

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7. As HBILKA crews and aircraft are intimately involved in much of our air activities in the Far East, the functional relationship of that organization to the two divisions should also be clear. The intelligence apparatus represented by that organization is clearly an FE responsibility. It also follows that DPD should maintain current records of the aircraft and their configuration capabilities and should direct any DPD clandestine operation wherein HBILKA aircraft and/or crews are used. DPD should also be responsible for maintenance of crew proficiency in such a manner as to assure the availability of at least a minimum number of crews in each type aircraft so as to provide a capability for early reaction to unforeseen requirements.

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8. The liaison on air matters in the Honolulu area and the support of black flights through Hawaii should be a responsibility of [redacted] as in the past. In this regard, the Chief, DPD, in coordination with the Chief, FE, should keep [redacted] apprized of applicable DPD concepts, procedures, and requirements.

9. We believe that this document should complete the reorganization of air activities in Headquarters and in the Far East. We recommend:

a. That this memorandum be used by the divisions concerned as the basis for Headquarters' functions and responsibilities with regard to the conduct of air activities in the Far East area; and

b. That FE Division, in coordination with DPD, forward Letters of Instruction to FE field stations which incorporate the points contained in the attached documents as they pertain to each station.

(Signed)

WILLIAM BURKE

Colonel, USAF

Acting Chief,

Development Projects Division

(Signed)

DESMOND FITZGERALD

Chief, FE Division

Recommendation in para. 9 APPROVED:

(Signed)

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Deputy Director (Plans)

Date: 22 December 1959

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CHAPTER XIX. INTELLIGENCE
ACQUIRED FROM U-2 PROGRAM &
EFFECT ON U.S. POLICY

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CHAPTER XIX. INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED FROM U-2 PROGRAM
AND ITS EFFECT ON U.S. NATIONAL POLICY

Requirements for Photo Intelligence

Early work in establishing photographic requirements for the U-2 program was carried out through the joint endeavors of the small photo interpretation group assembled by Mr. Lundahl and the Project Operations Staff, in particular the first Intelligence Officer assigned to the Operations Staff, Lieutenant Commander Francis C. Forsberg, USN. This small group began working with old target lists obtained from the various intelligence services, including AFOIN, SAC, NSA and various branches of CIA. By August 1955 those staff members engaged in targeting reported their dissatisfaction with the available target information which they considered inadequate for use by a project of the importance and magnitude of AQUATONE. The majority of the 1200 targets then listed were either bombing targets or targets for covert collection requiring an agent on the ground. The question of priorities was of great concern to these planners since they had accepted as one assumption that the U-2 overflights might be detected by the USSR early in the operational phase, resulting in diplomatic representations to either the U.S. or the third country whose base was used, thus forcing an

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early termination of the project. Therefore they believed that the operational plan should concentrate immediately on the very highest priority targets.

Obtaining the latest and highest priority target lists from the Intelligence Community without making many people aware of the ultimate purpose presented a problem. One proposal (made in October 1955 but disapproved by the Project Director) was to use the President's Advisory Committee on Disarmament (the Stassen Committee) as a front, making reference to the President's Geneva proposal for open aerial inspection. Mr. Bissell's counter-proposal was to advise one senior officer in each intelligence service of the true purpose for the requirements being assembled, and to go forward with the collection in an informal and expeditious manner. He was fearful that if the task were put into the hands of a committee preparing for legal overflights (of possibly unlimited scope with regard to timing and coverage) much time would be lost in debates among the consumers over priorities, and the crucial choices of the very highest priority targets might not be made in time for AQUATONE. He was convinced that the final priority decisions at mission launching time would have to rest with the Project Director and his Director of Operations.

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After discussing the matter of requirements with General Cabell, Mr. Bissell and the Project Staff agreed that requirements must be established by staff work which would be reviewed by a joint Agency/Military committee. Colonel Ritland (Deputy Project Director) obtained the concurrence of responsible Air Force officials to the setting up of a small committee to establish and develop a target priority list tailored to AQUATONE's mission. The terms of reference of this Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC)* as set forth by Mr. Bissell on 1 December 1955 and approved by General Cabell, are appended as Annex 117. Mr. Bissell's Special Assistant, Mr. James Q. Reber, was named Project Intelligence Requirements Officer for AQUATONE, and Chairman of the ARC. During December 1955 and January 1956 work went forward within each agency on targeting and the first full-dress meeting of the ARC was held on 1 February 1956.

Besides priority targeting activities, the ARC spent considerable time in the spring of 1956 in producing a position paper entitled "Intelligence Vital to National Security Obtainable through AQUATONE".

* The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee became the Committee on Overhead Requirements (COMOR) in August 1960 when targeting for the satellite program was added to its purview, and it was placed under the control of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). A reorganization and enlargement of its scope and membership took place in July 1967 when its name was again changed to Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), and it was physically moved from the OSA area to space within the DD/I complex.

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The purpose of the paper was to assist U.S. political authorities in formulating their decision with regard to proceeding with U-2 operations. Detachment A had then deployed overseas and was awaiting the signal to begin overflights of the Soviet Union. The ARC's position paper expressed the belief that successful AQUATONE operations would achieve intelligence information of the highest priority which would

"Expand and clarify our knowledge of existing Soviet offensive weapons systems and forces. This will reduce the chance of surprise if these systems and forces were to be employed in the near future, and reduce the probability of successful Soviet attack against objectives in the U.S. or key overseas installations...

"Expand and clarify our knowledge of certain Soviet weapon system research and development programs. This would reduce the chance of future technological surprise.

"Enable us to develop more realistic target priorities lists. By discovering new targets, confirming known targets, and revealing the increase or decrease in importance of other targets, a greater efficiency of U.S. weapon systems application can be achieved.

"Provide the essential information for planning the composition and employment of U.S. military forces and for the conduct of major operations in the event of full-scale war against the USSR." 1/

1/ SAPC-6786, 4 June 1956. Memorandum by Chairman, ARC.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Processing U-2 Photography

As early as March 1955 thought was given to setting up a separate processing plant outside the Agency to handle the exposed film which would be obtained from AQUATONE missions. It was clear that once operations began and exposed film became available for processing, the handling of negatives and prints and the dissemination of information contained therein would become a problem of great magnitude. Boston was first considered as a potential site for the processing activity since there were plausible cover arrangements available in that area, and Drs. Land and Baker were available there to give day-to-day expert guidance on technical problems. The reduction center and library which would become the repository for master negatives and mission data would be established in Washington and would be operated by CIA as executive agent for the intelligence community.

Planning for the processing plant and the internal photo interpretation center was initiated by Mr. Arthur Lundahl (DD/I's chief photogrammetrist) and Dr. Allen Latham, Jr., former Chief Engineer of Polaroid and subsequently Chief Engineer and Vice President of the A. D. Little Company (a CIA consultant). A first contact was made by them with Eastman Kodak Company on 23 April 1955 to explore the prospects for contracting with that company for the film processing.

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On 30 April 1955, a meeting of the "Land Panel" (the Project's scientific advisory group) reached the following conclusions regarding arrangements for the exploitation of the AQUATONE photographic product, as reported by Mr. Herbert Miller, Project Executive Officer:

"On the establishment of a film processing plant and optical rectifying center, the unanimous opinion of the group was that the photographic effort being made on AQUATONE was of such a nature as to be beyond the present technical comprehension of the general run of government personnel involved in photography or photographic reconnaissance. As a consequence, the technical capabilities of existing facilities for processing and rectification are not of the order required to be able to obtain the maximum information return from each exposure made in the field. This leads to the conclusion that, in order to assure singleness of purpose on the part of all participants and a belief in the quality of the end product which can be obtained, a small and compact processing facility to be established under control of CIA and manned by specially trained and indoctrinated personnel would best serve the national interests. Furthermore, because optical rectification methods can be made available which might not be considered orthodox by those presently engaged in the photographic reconnaissance and photo interpretation art, this portion of the work should also be done in a CIA facility manned by specially trained and indoctrinated personnel. It was suggested that in view of the complexity in the interpretation of certain photographs, even these should receive special interpretation treatment under CIA control.

"Upon the indication that we desired to bring Eastman Kodak into this problem, the reaction of the panel was immediately favorable. I noted that Tuttle and Staud of Eastman would be the individuals first involved, and Dr. Land suggested that Dr. Yutzey of Eastman would also be a very useful participant because of his great familiarity with emulsion problems." 1/

1/ TS-103558, 6 May 1955. Memo for the Record by H. I. Miller.

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Mr. Miller later met with Eastman officials, Mr. Joseph Boone and Dr. Fordyce Tuttle, to discuss terms of a contract for engineering services, processing plant design, and special equipment. Eastman was willing to undertake the operation of the processing plant and recommended that it be established in Rochester where Eastman had good plant security and skilled personnel available in all categories. Letters of intent were signed in June 1955 to cover engineering services and procurement of specialized equipment. A formal contract for the operation and maintenance of the film processing plant at Rochester was signed on 1 October 1955.

The special center began shake-down work in December 1955 and was prepared to support the camera test flights which got underway at Watertown at the beginning of 1956. Film from the test flights was processed at the center, and thus experience was gained in the new processing techniques and procedures while at the same time assistance was rendered in monitoring camera performance during test and training flights. During this early period a security program was established and procedures regarding the courtering and handling of raw and processed film were developed and put into use under the direction of Project Security Staff; a resident security officer was assigned to the

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Rochester plant to act in security matters on behalf of Project Headquarters. (This practice has continued down to the present.)

Once overflights began in June 1956, the special center went into all-out production, working 24 hours a day in three shifts, as needed, when there was mission film to be processed. With the stretching out of the U-2 project beyond the short-term, all-out coverage of the Soviet Union originally anticipated, to the more spasmodic operational cycles imposed by political stand-downs, the pace of work at the processing plant varied considerably from time to time. Contracts with Eastman were revised or renewed from year to year for the operation and maintenance of the processing center and for procurement of specialized film and equipment, and personal services of Eastman technicians.

In the spring of 1961 the film processing contract was amended to update requirements for improved equipment and to plan for the inclusion of OXCART and satellite film processing. The amount expended to that time on processing U-2 photography was more than \$4-1/2 million. When CORONA became fully operational, the scope of the Rochester facility was much enlarged and continued to grow along with the satellite program. In 1963 after the establishment of the

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National Reconnaissance Program, the cost of running the Rochester center was transferred from the CIA budget to the NRO budget; however, Project Headquarters (and subsequently DPD and OSA) continued to be responsible for contractual and security matters with regard to the processing center. Currently the Agency's U-2 program accounts for only about 2% of the total volume of film processed at the Rochester center, the balance coming from the satellite programs and other Department of Defense photo reconnaissance programs.

Photo Interpretation and Exploitation

Project HTAUTOMAT

Planning for a photo interpretation center recommended by the Land Panel to be set up within CIA was begun by two members of Mr. Lundahl's unit, Messrs.

During the spring of 1955 these gentlemen were in liaison with the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC), St. Louis, which was to handle AQUATONE photography on behalf of the Air Force, and the Air Development Center at Wright Patterson Air Force Base.

The experience of these facilities with material collected by GRAY BACK (the instrumented balloon project) and the latest technological advances in photographic equipment and procedures were made available to the AQUATONE planners.

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U.S.C., section 403g)

On 11 July 1955, [] submitted a plan for the establishment of a "Central Interpretation Unit" outlining the objectives, support required, procedures for receipt and handling of materials (film, prints, and mission data), and method of plotting and reporting by phases according to priority of targets. The plan included the procurement for the interpretation unit of a "Minicard" system for ease of storage and retrieval of information, which had been recommended by Eastman.

After several revisions and rewriting, the proposal (Project HTAUTOMAT) was presented for the Director's approval on 21 October 1955. It called for the establishment and operation of a new office within the DD/I complex to process intelligence information derived from AQUATONE. It set the T/O at approximately 120 to start, with possible increases up to 300 as work progressed; a budget for FY 1956 of approximately half a million dollars; and a requirement for office space of approximately 45,000 square feet.

In view of the sizeable support implications, the DD/S, Col. White, was asked for his views. He questioned whether CIA should undertake the photographic exploitation since, he said, the Air Force must have an elaborate photo intelligence exploitation unit which could do the

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job for the whole community. He recommended that assurance be obtained that there was no duplication of effort. An exchange of letters with General Samford, Director of Intelligence of the Air Force, elicited the opinion from him that the setting up of a PI center in CIA for the exploitation of AQUATONE photography was appropriate and would not duplicate current Air Force activities and planning.

The DD/I obtained an option on 60,000 square feet of office space in the Steuart Building at 5th and K Streets, N. W., and a security inspection of the premises was made and no objection found to occupancy of the building. Physical security measures were taken to make the whole building a restricted area, and all personnel assigned to the center required Special Intelligence clearance as a minimum.

The original concept of the new PI center within CIA was the provision of sufficient photographic reproduction facilities to fulfill Agency requirements. As planning progressed, it became apparent that the PI facility would be responsible for furnishing material on a selective basis to agencies other than CIA, which meant an increase in the personnel and budget ceilings originally established and in equipment to do the job. The recommendation of Mr. Bissell with regard to furnishing such extra materials was as follows: Requirements

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laid on Eastman visualized that CIA and the Air Force were the only agencies which would desire complete copies of all AQUATONE film. Other agencies (Army, Navy, etc.) would desire only selected items, to be ordered after they had studied the plots. It was not expected that Eastman would furnish these additional selected prints, since the original negatives would be in CIA's possession. Thus CIA should either establish and maintain a facility equipped to make copies available to qualified consumers, or make arrangements with some other existing facility (or Eastman) to perform this service. Mr. Bissell further recommended that should the CIA laboratory undertake the necessary copying work, initial provision should be on an absolutely minimum basis to avoid making an investment of funds and personnel which might eventually prove to be excessive. He felt the deliberate risk of having a capacity less than that subsequently required was one that could be afforded. The worst result would be the inability to process the entire take of raw intelligence on an immediate basis and that situation could be remedied by expansion of the capacity when the need could be more explicitly forecast.

HTAUTOMAT became active the first of March 1956 at 5th and K Streets with a staff of about 30. Mr. Bissell, while vitally concerned

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with the successful establishment and operation of the facility, had endeavored to make a clear separation between it and Project AQUATONE. He had reached agreement in December 1955 with the DD/I that beyond the original procurement of specialized equipment worth \$220,000, AQUATONE would not pay for any further HTAUTOMAT expenses. In February 1956 he further spelled out to the DD/I that:

"For purposes of clarification, I should like to suggest that it be mutually understood that the point of separation between Projects AQUATONE and HTAUTOMAT occurs at the time when the incoming product physically is delivered to you here in Washington, following its processing at an Eastern location.

"While the establishment of such a point of separation may appear slightly academic, I believe that to do so prevents any possible misunderstanding between our respective activities, especially in organizational areas." 1/

Mr. Bissell's efforts to divest Project AQUATONE of further responsibility for the Photo Interpretation Center (PIC) and its procurement problems succeeded after a time, even though officials of PIC on several occasions during the early days (when AQUATONE was the sole customer) privately urged Mr. Bissell to consider blanketing the Center under the special project's organizational structure. The

1/ SAPC-4015, 17 February 1956. Memorandum to DD/I from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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requirements of PIC (especially its financial needs) were not given the top priority support by the DD/I which AQUATONE commanded Agency-wide.

Field PI Units

During the late 1956 Middle East crisis when both Detachments A and B were flying daily coverage, the decision was made to set up a small PI unit at Giebelstadt for quick processing of the take. About five HTAUTOMAT people were to be assigned TDY. This decision was revised later to incorporate the unit (called ERPIC) into the USAFE theater command at Wiesbaden, and arrangements were made for air-lift of film from both Detachments A and B. Later on 20 November 1945, a smaller unit was put into operation at Adana to do quick tactical read-out from Middle East missions. All film from primary missions over the Soviet/Satellite Bloc was still required to be returned to the Rochester facility for processing.

On deployment of Detachment C to Japan, arrangements were made in April 1957 for overseas handling, processing and reporting of U-2 photographic results at URPIC-Y, which had been set up under Headquarters, Far East Air Force, Yokota, Japan. Participation in that center was open to CIA, the Army and the Navy, as well as the

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Air Force. Since most of the intelligence collected by AQUATONE in the Far East was strategic in nature, mission film for the most part had to be transported back to the Rochester facility.

When the joint project with the Chinese became operational in 1962 (Project TACKLE), arrangements were made for the tactical coverage of South China and the Taiwan Straits to be processed and read out at either the Chinese Air Force photo laboratory at Tao Yuan or at OPIC-A (URPIC-Y renamed) by the 67th Recce Tech Squadron. One duplicate positive was immediately furnished to the GRC/CAF for their own exploitation and the original negative was sent to Rochester for further duplication for Washington customers. Strategic mission film was of course returned to Rochester for processing and courier arrangements for expeditious handling were made so as to effect delivery to Rochester usually within 48 hours.

ELINT Requirements

The task of collecting ELINT requirements for AQUATONE missions was first given to the Agency's ELINT Staff Officer, Mr. Ralph Clark. A study of ELINT requirements by an interdepartmental ELINT Advisory Committee had been completed in January 1955 and Mr. Clark and his staff were in close liaison with the supplier of

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the Project's electronic systems (Ramo-Wooldridge at that time) with regard to the parameters of the equipment to be carried by the U-2. Mr. Bissell on many occasions during this period reiterated that the primary purpose of AQUATONE was photographic reconnaissance and that missions for the sole purpose of collecting electronic intelligence would only be run in very special cases.

In mid-March 1956, Col Albert M. Welsh, Director of Operations, drew attention to the fact that plans for processing, analyzing and reporting on the take from the U-2's electronic systems needed to be clarified. Mr. Clark at the ARC meeting of 27 March briefed the Committee and its advisers on the nature and capabilities of the systems and explained that initially the material from these systems would be a by-product of photographic missions. Currently available target lists were therefore considered adequate. Exploitation of the mission tapes was expected to be handled by the new inter-agency Technical Processing Center (TPC) when it was completed, and meanwhile a temporary facility in Barton Hall (the Blue Room) would be used. Mr. Clark reported plans well advanced for exploitation at the Barton Hall facility with read-out equipment expected to be installed and ready for business by 1 May 1956.

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

The procurement of ground read-out and exploitation equipment was monitored by [] on behalf of the OSI ELINT Staff. Early in 1956 he began to submit lists of various kinds of equipment which it was believed would be required for the duplication, play-back and analysis of the raw ELINT take from U-2 missions. Mr. Bissell was not kindly disposed toward ELINT specialists, and insisted on a "tidy and careful" statement of requirements, not only because of the substantial sums proposed to be spent but also because a considerable part of the equipment was to be turned over to other agencies for use, and he felt these other consumers might well pay for the equipment themselves.

On the strength of justifications furnished by the Project Requirements Officer and the ELINT Staff Officer, a recommendation was finally presented to the DCI in May 1956 for the expenditure of approximately \$560,000 for research and development and production of ELINT and COMINT read-out equipment, of which about one-quarter would go to NSA and TPC (with CIA retaining title pending final disposition). Approval was given in consideration of the fact that NSA and TPC would use the equipment to exploit intelligence products in which CIA had a direct and primary interest and which would be made available to the entire intelligence community.

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The procurement of ELINT exploitation equipment continued to be a problem to Mr. Bissell and almost two years later, in February 1959, he reached an agreement with Dr. Scoville (AD/SI) that the Project would finance the equipment required for collection operations but would not again finance the procurement of read-out equipment. It was Mr. Bissell's desire that the analysts be compelled to justify the need for the costly improvements which they constantly advocated. He expounded at length to Dr. Scoville on the "unpredictability and general shiftlessness of ELINT specialists". Dr. Scoville agreed that the desires of these specialists for more and better equipment was insatiable and often ill-defended, and said satisfactory proof of future needs would be demanded before further expenditures were made.

ELINT Missions

In the early operational missions of the U-2 in 1956, Systems I and IV for ELINT collection and System III for COMINT collection (see Annex 43 for systems description) were carried along with one of the primary camera systems and the mission flight path was planned strictly on the basis of priority photographic targets — electronic collection was incidental. In December 1956 the first mission solely for ELINT collection was flown by Detachment B along the Soviet Border,

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using System V (a variation of System I, but weighing about 400 pounds, thus excluding the carrying of any other payload).

Late in 1957 because of the proliferation of Russian missile activities, requirements for more ELINT missions were generated and System IV was carried on approximately 15 missions in the Black Sea and Baltic areas with good results. System VII came into use as a primary ELINT collection system in June 1959 and was used extensively along the Iran and Afghanistan borders of the Soviet Union for collection of telemetry related to missile firings. Subsequent to the stand-down following 1 May 1960, through the end of 1966, no missions were flown solely for ELINT collection by the Agency U-2's, although ELINT receivers were carried on most flights. (In 1968 System XVII became operational and was assigned to Detachment H for peripheral flights along the China Mainland coast.)

COMINT/NSA Support

Liaison was established between AQUATONE and NSA Headquarters at Fort Meade in April 1956 for the purpose of obtaining COMINT

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In May 1956 on a visit to Project Headquarters the Vice Director of NSA, Gen. John Ackerman, inquired of Mr. Bissell whether any missions would be flown to obtain specific COMINT coverage. While he had no particular requirement in mind at the time he felt that occasions might arise in which a COMINT mission could have higher priority than any other. Mr. Bissell indicated that if and when specific requirements for COMINT were presented, they would have to be weighed against competing requirements for collection of other types of intelligence. Obviously he did not wish to encourage frequent interruptions to an orderly schedule of photographic reconnaissance.

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From the early stages of AQUATONE, NSA has continued to render assistance as required by the U-2 program

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No missions have been flown by Agency U-2's solely for the collection of COMINT. The original U-2 COMINT collection package (System III, built by Ramo-Wooldridge in 1955-56) was carried on photographic missions but gave rather disappointing performance during

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the early Soviet and Middle East coverage. The System III tapes were sent to NSA for read-out but were of little value. The system was shelved in 1957. In 1963, on the appointment of Dr. Albert D. Wheelon as DD/S&T, System III was resurrected at his behest (he had formerly worked for Space Technology Laboratories of Thompson Ramo-Wooldridge, the makers of System III). It was sent to Taiwan for Detachment H use against Mainland China, but results were still of no great value.

An improved COMINT collection system (System XXI, built by HRB-Singer and Sylvania) was designed to be carried by the OXCART aircraft. When OXCART was closed out, the system was later redesigned for use by the U-2 and was introduced at Detachment H in 1968.

Tapes from System XXI are given in the first instance to [redacted] [redacted] project for read-out of the Chinese language transmissions, then to the other consumer members of the intelligence community.

Accomplishments of the U-2 Program

A Chief of a DD/P area division made the remark in 1960, subsequent to the May Day incident, that aerial photography such as the U-2 had achieved was all to the good, but since the aircraft could not fly inside the Kremlin and photograph the documents on Khrushchev's

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desk, we still needed spies on the ground to obtain intelligence regarding Soviet intentions. This is patently true. It is also true that the men who backed the U-2 project were not putting a spy in the sky as an alternative to an existing capability, but to bridge an acknowledged gap in U. S. intelligence with regard to the industrial and military build-up inside the Soviet Bloc.

The Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, in August 1960 submitted to the White House the Intelligence Community's summary of the accomplishments of the U-2 program up to that time. That statement is attached hereto as Annex 118, and carries the following postscript by Mr. Dulles:

"It is extremely difficult for me to sum up in words the significance of this effort to our national security. I do not wish to exaggerate, nor do I wish to belittle other vital intelligence programs. This photographic coverage and the data derived from it are an inseparable part of the whole national intelligence effort. But in terms of reliability, of precision, of access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has been unique. And in the opinion of the military, of the scientists and of the senior officials responsible for our national security it has been, to put it simply, invaluable." 1/

Since its initial task of photographing targets in the Soviet Union was brought to a close by the Russian development of missiles, the U-2

1/ CHAL-1138/1-60 (Attachment TCS-7519-60-b), 19 August 1960.
Memorandum for B/G Andrew J. Goodpaster from the DCI.

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reconnaissance system has been modified and updated and has continued to function as an additional clandestine intelligence collection device in the CIA inventory. Accomplishments of the program since May 1960 are reviewed in Chapters XV and XVI, which deal with the overflight reconnaissance activities of the ZI-based Detachment G and the Taiwan-based Detachment H.

While much of the photography resulting from this program has been of great value to the U.S. Intelligence Community in and of itself, in many instances it became much more valuable when fitted into the mosaic along with bits and pieces of intelligence previously or subsequently collected from many sources by the professional intelligence analysts. A classic example of how this worked in locating, pinpointing, and eventually photographing the new Soviet nuclear complex in Central Siberia, is described by OSI's Dr. Henry S. Lowenhaupt in his story entitled "Mission to Birch Woods, Seven Tents, and New Siberia", a copy of which is appended as Annex 119.

Accomplishments of the U-2 program from a statistical point of view will be found in Annex 120, which lists all intelligence collection overflights carried out by Agency U-2's chronologically from June 1956 to May 1968, by date, mission number, detachment, pilot, point of departure, targets covered, principal equipment carried and results.

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ANNEX 117

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1 December 1955MEMORANDUM FOR: Col. Albert M. Welsh
Director of OperationsSUBJECT: Procedure for Determining Intelligence Requirements
for AQUATONE

1. AQUATONE is a clandestine intelligence gathering operation. Accordingly, its operations must be designed to meet as fully as possible intelligence requirements emanating from the whole intelligence community and to meet high priority requirements ahead of those carrying lower priority. In order to do so, procedures must be established for (a) accumulating intelligence requirements and (b) assigning relative priorities to them. These procedures must not jeopardize the security of the Project and they should be as simple and informal as possible. The following arrangements are believed to meet these requirements.

2. There is already in existence an informal requirements committee consisting of a representative of A-2, SAC; a representative of the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Project Intelligence Requirements Officer (Mr. James Reber). This committee will be expanded to include a representative of the Director of Naval Intelligence and a representative of G-2 (if Admiral Espey and General Gaither both desire such direct representation and do not wish the Air Force to present all their requirements). It is believed that the Project Intelligence Requirements Officer can represent CIA as a consumer of raw intelligence, but if this is not satisfactory to the DDI, he will be asked to name a representative. It is assumed that the representative of the Director of Intelligence, USAF, will speak for the Air Force as a whole and that the SAC representative will function only as an observer. The Project Intelligence Requirements Officer will chair the committee, which, thus constituted, should be able to make the necessary priority judgments.

3. It is proposed that the committee do its work in the following stages:

a. The first task will be to secure intelligence requirements from the several intelligence agencies, together with the judgment of

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each agency as to the relative priorities to be attached to its own requirements. This operation is already in progress and is being carried out through the members of the committee as representatives of their agencies. The Project Director of Operations will indicate the form in which requirements would be most useful for the guidance of operational planning.

b. The second task to be performed will be that of assembling the various requirements in comparable form after their submission and in such a way as to indicate the points on which either further information must be requested of the submitting agencies or priority judgments must be made by the committee. This task will involve staff work rather than deliberation or decision making and will be performed by the intelligence staff under the Project Director of Operations.

c. After requirements have been submitted and assembled in a form suitable for consideration, the committee will be asked to meet for the purpose of resolving questions of priorities and finally putting its approval on a consolidated statement of requirements in a form that will provide useful guidance for operations under this Project.

d. From time to time while operations are in progress the committee will be asked to review the original statement of requirements and to modify it in the light of new intelligence obtained through AQUATONE and through other channels.

4. Assumptions as to the scope of operations under AQUATONE and the operational concept to be employed will be provided to the committee as needed through the Project Intelligence Requirements Officer by the Project Director of Operations. Without prejudging the exact form in which requirements will be stated, it will clearly be desirable to separate out a narrowly limited category of top priority targets, and perhaps to distinguish two other levels of priority as well. Moreover, it will be desirable to establish these categories of requirements for each major region within the whole target area, since the areas accessible at any given time will largely be determined by operational factors.

(Signed)

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Project Director

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ANNEX 118

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CHAL-1138/1-60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 Washington 25, D. C.
 Office of the Director

19 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster

SUBJECT: Statistics Relating to the U-2 Program

1. Total holdings of processed film are 131,047 feet of 70 mm "tracker" film, a strip approximately 25 miles long, and 1,154,251 linear feet of 9" wide basic intelligence film, or a strip 220 miles long.

2. From these photographs 5,425 separate photo-analytical reports have been prepared and disseminated to appropriately cleared officials.

3. Of the 8,602,700 square miles that comprise the USSR, the project has covered one or more times 1,300,000 square miles or 15% of the gross area.

4. The following table gives the aggregate coverage including repetitions:

	Linear Miles		Square Miles	
	70 mm	9 inch	70 mm	9 inch
USSR and Satellites (38 missions)	74,504	2,599,665	46,384	1,752,322
China and Tibet (13 missions)	30,058	1,097,931	16,561	1,061,292
Total (including non-Bloc, 239)	485,901	17,015,825	302,396	12,310,019

5. The Intelligence Community's summary Accomplishments of the U-2 Program which formed the basis for part of my testimony before Congressional Committees last May is attached to show the substantive contribution to our knowledge of the USSR made by the program.

(Signed)
 ALLEN W. DULLES
 Director

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TCS-7519-60-b

27 May 1960

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE U-2 PROGRAM

I. Introduction

Five years ago, before the beginning of the U-2 program, the United States had organized against the threat of surprise attack by the Soviet Union every available measure in the classical intelligence bag of tricks. These efforts had given us considerable knowledge concerning the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union. But much of this was hard to verify and difficult to interpret. There remained many uncertainties concerning the types of military systems under development, the rate at which they were increasing their power, and their ultimate aims for its use.

This half-knowledge of the Soviet Union and uncertainty of its true power position posed tremendous problems for the United States. We were faced with the constant risk of exposing ourselves to enemy attack or of needlessly expending a great deal of money and effort on misdirected military preparations of our own.

To meet this situation, we determined to embark on the U-2 program to give the United States a firm foundation of hard information on which to make our intelligence judgments. The program has covered a large part of the most important areas in the Soviet Union and has provided information on a great variety of subjects important to our evaluation of the Soviet power position. Our main emphasis, however, has been directed against four critical problems, namely, the Soviet bomber force, the Soviet atomic energy program, the Soviet missile program, and the Soviet Air Defense System.

II. Intelligence of Soviet Offensive Capabilities
Against the U. S. and Its AlliesA. Manned Aircraft

The Soviet bomber force has been, and remains today, the main offensive striking force of the Soviet Union. For several years, the status of the Soviet bomber program was a controversial topic in U. S. intelligence.

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The U-2 program has confirmed that only a minimum long-range bomber production program is continuing in the Soviet Union. It has shown that some Soviet aircraft plants have probably been converted to the production of transport aircraft and that a few may possibly be engaged in some aspect of the missile program. It has also shown, however, that the Soviet Union has recently developed a new medium-range bomber with supersonic capabilities.

During the life of the U-2 program, we have covered numerous Soviet long-range bomber air fields. From this coverage, we have been able to confirm our estimate of the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers and have acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them.

B. Ballistic Missiles

Ever since the first Soviet ICBM vehicle was launched in August 1957, Soviet propaganda has claimed that the world power balance was shifting in the direction of the Soviet Union. For several years, we have been aware that the Soviet Union was engaged in a high-priority ballistic missile development program. We have had and continue to have the ability to acquire data of actual Soviet ballistic missile flight tests. (You are all familiar with our radar installations in Turkey and the Aleutians.) The U-2 program, however, has enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground facilities involved in the Soviet missile test program.

One of the most significant items of information acquired by the U-2 was revealed by our coverage of the Tyura Tam rangehead in the fall of 1957, immediately after the first Soviet ICBM firings. The significant fact was that the Soviets had only one launch facility at Tyura Tam.

The photography showed this facility to be a massive concrete structure sufficiently large to permit the launch of even larger vehicles than the relatively heavy Soviet ICBM and space vehicles.

The photography also showed that the Soviets were conducting all of their missile and space firings from a single launcher during the 1957-1959 period, clearly indicating a different concept from that used by the

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United States in the pre-launch checkout, erection, and firing of a missile. In fact, when these data were made available to U. S. missile experts, some of whom assisted us in our evaluation of the photography, they immediately embarked on a careful review of our own concepts for the use of launch pads.

This photography also provided us valuable insight into possible Soviet operational doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. It showed a reliance on rail as the major means of logistic support and operations. The rail line actually ran onto the launch pad.

From these data and related information on Soviet transportation systems, we are led to believe that the Soviet operational deployment of ICBMs will be directly associated with their rail system. By this, I mean that the missile and its supporting equipment would be carried on trains and moved from one pre-selected site to another, thus making it difficult for us to determine the precise location of any given missile unit on a continuing basis.

Even though the Soviet Union was able to sustain a considerable testing program from this one launch pad, photography of Tyura Tam during 1959 and 1960 has shown that a second and third launch complex were in varying stages of construction. The third launch complex is of a new type. It is too early to tell its intended purpose, but we have speculated that it may be used for a new type ICBM or that it may be the prototype of operational sites for troop training.

In summary, the photography collected by the U-2 has been a critical factor in our assessment that the Soviet ICBM program has not been and is not now a "crash" program; instead, it is an orderly, well-planned, high-priority program aimed at achieving an early ICBM operational capability.

In addition to our coverage of the ICBM test range at Tyura Tam, we have also had excellent coverage of the Kapustin Yar missile test range where Soviet intermediate and short-range missiles have been tested for the past 13 years. Over 600 ballistic missiles have been fired on this range in recent years.

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Our 1957 coverage of Kapustin Yar provided us our first information on the number and type of launch pads being used in this program. It also showed that the Soviets were dovetailing their development of operational equipment and troop training directly into their research and development program.

1959 coverage of the area showed that in two years the Soviets had doubled the number of launch pads and had available quarters for training about 6,000 troops in the operational use of these short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. It is apparent that the Soviet ballistic missile program is a dynamic and growing program.

In addition to our coverage of the two major ballistic missile test ranges, we have given top priority during the past year to the problem of detecting the construction of launching sites for operation ICBMs. The U-2 was by far our best system for collecting such information. We have covered a number of the most highly suspect areas in the Soviet Union without having found a single launch site for operational missiles. We were able to prove, however, that a number of sites reported to us by other sources did not actually exist.

We have had no opportunity to cover other large and highly suspect areas in the Soviet Union, and the mission of May 1 was routed to give us the maximum amount of coverage possible in these areas. In view of the Soviet boast about the shifting power position and our estimate that the Soviet Union could have a small number of missiles on launchers for use against the United States, we felt that it was essential that we provide the President with additional assurance of the true state of the Soviet ICBM program before he was to meet Khrushchev in negotiations. This was particularly important in view of the fact that the negotiations were the direct outgrowth of the Berlin crisis generated by the Soviet Union.

C. Atomic Energy

The U-2 program has provided a large body of valuable information on the Soviet atomic energy program. This information has covered the production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, and size of stockpile sites.

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During the past two years, Khrushchev has boasted that the Soviets will soon be able to curtail the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. However, evidence from the U-2 program has clearly indicated the contrary. The photography has shown that the Soviets are continuing to expand fissionable materials production capacity.

We have obtained excellent photographs of Soviet weapons development and fabrication facilities which show the magnitude of this effort. It has also shown that the Soviets are continuing a large-scale program for the testing of the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons. We have no evidence, however, that the Soviet Union has violated the nuclear test moratorium.

On two occasions, we have photographed one of the large Soviet nuclear testing grounds. This photography has given us general insight into their nuclear test practices and has permitted us to identify several very low-yield tests conducted before the test moratorium which were obviously surface bursts and which were missed by our detection system.

The U-2 photograph has also given us our first firm information on the magnitude of native Soviet uranium ore and uranium metal processing activities. This is vital information in estimating Soviet fissionable materials production.

The U-2 program has enabled us to follow accurately the evolution of the Soviet nuclear stockpile program. We have precisely located five national and regional storage sites and over a score of forward nuclear storage facilities at long-range air bases. This has provided us with a good general index of the size and pattern of the Soviet nuclear weapons storage system.

D. Other Soviet Capabilities

The U-2 program has given us important information on other aspects of Soviet capabilities:

Photography has shown that the Soviets have a modest but active chemical warfare program. It has also indicated that they may have a program of biological warfare testing.

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The program has provided us with a large amount of information on ground, naval, and air installations and order of battle. It has been particularly useful in confirming naval order of battle in the Murmansk and Black Sea areas.

In general, the program has tended to confirm our estimates of the size, nature, and rate of growth of Soviet industry.

The material has also been used for the correction of military maps and aeronautical charts.

III. Intelligence Affecting the U. S. Deterrent Striking Force

A. Target Location, Definition, and Refinement

Prior to the inauguration of the U-2 program, much of U. S. target information was based on materials captured during and immediately after World War II. Much of this information was becoming obsolete.

As a result of the concrete evidence acquired by the U-2 program on a large number of targets in the Soviet Union, it has now been possible for U. S. commanders to make a more efficient and confident allocation of aircraft, crews and weapons. Crews and aircraft have been assigned to the many new targets discovered in the program. In addition, some targets were found to be more extensive than had been believed previously and thus required the assignment of additional crews and weapons.

U-2 photography has also made it possible to provide new and accurate information to strike crews which will make it easier for them to identify their targets and plan their navigation more precisely.

A major problem in developing targets for U. S. missiles is that of establishing the precise location of the target. This has been particularly difficult in view of the poor geodetic information available to the U. S. on the Soviet Union. The U-2 photography, however, is making it possible for the U. S. to establish much more accurate target location data for many of the areas covered by the overflights.

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B. Electronic Defenses and Radar Order of Battle

On nearly all of the overflights of the Soviet Union the U-2 aircraft carried special electronic intercept and recording equipment. The purpose of this equipment was to determine the technical characteristics and locations of Soviet radars and other electronic devices associated with the Soviet air defense system.

The electronic intercepts recorded by the U-2 aircraft permitted us to establish the basic concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, deployment, and rate of development of the Soviet air defense system over the past four years. This in turn has provided operational information for the planning of flight routes by U.S. air strike forces.

Prior to the U-2 program, we had no way to determine that the Soviet Union was in the process of constructing a defense in depth covering the entire area of the Soviet Union with early warning and ground control intercept radars and their related weapons. If we based our estimates on a peripheral defense concept we would have arrived at a figure of about 400 early warning radars and associated equipment. On the basis of the information collected by the U-2, however, we now estimate that the Soviet Union has about 1600 prime radars with associated equipment.

This program has also allowed us to observe dynamic aspects of the Soviet air defense system by watching it in operation against the U-2. During the past four years we have observed the Soviet abandonment of prime heavy radars as height-measuring instruments and have seen the installation of special height-finding radars which give them a considerable improvement in their ground-controlled intercept capability.

We have seen the early deployment of new type radars in the interior of the Soviet Union before they began to be installed along Soviet borders. The U-2 has also permitted us to assess any difference between peripheral and interior defenses.

We have obtained technical information on airborne intercept radars and have observed the use of these radars in combat situations. Technical information also will assist the designers of U.S. electronics countermeasures equipment.

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C. Fighter Aircraft Defenses

The U-2 program has obtained photography on over a hundred fighter airfields. This has permitted us to determine the concept employed by the Soviets in their use of fighters as an air defense weapon. Moreover, the only information available to us on the latest Soviet Mach 2 fighters was obtained from one of the U-2 flights.

More important, however, the program has permitted us to observe these fighters in an active air defense capacity. We have photographs of various fighter types attempting to intercept the U-2 and have electronic intercepts of their air defense radars. We can also relate this information to our electronic intercepts of the early warning radars and get some idea of reaction time and efficiency of the Soviet fighter defense system.

D. Surface-to-Air Missile Defenses

Prior to the beginning of the U-2 program we knew that the Soviet Union had established a massive system of surface-to-air missiles in 56 sites located on two concentric circles around Moscow. We had some indication that they intended to employ a similar system around other major cities such as Leningrad but the evidence on this point was inconclusive.

The U-2 program not only permitted us to obtain fuller information on the Moscow SAM system, but it also proved conclusively that this system was not being installed around other cities.

In 1959, we discovered from both photograph and electronic intercept that a new and more flexible SAM system was being deployed around all major centers in the Soviet Union. We have photography on approximately 70 of the new sites and estimate that there are a total of 250 to 300 such sites in the USSR. We believe that this second generation missile is the missile known to the intelligence community as the "Guideline" missile with an estimated altitude capability of 60,000 feet extending up to 80,000 feet with a considerably reduced accuracy.

The data revealed by the U-2 program not only confirmed previous estimates that the Soviets were placing a very high priority on their air defense program but also provided positive evidence of the progress achieved.

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The information on the Soviet air defense system, particularly that concerning surface-to-air missiles, has had a direct bearing on the U.S. strike forces' planning. The discovery of the second generation SAM system caused them to greatly increase their emphasis on low level penetration tactics.

Preliminary analysis of the photography collected on one of our most recent flights indicates that the Soviets may be engaged in research concerning anti-ballistic missile radars and tracking. It is too early, however, to determine whether or not these developments include an actual anti-ballistic missile development program.

IV. Evidence of Basic Soviet Intentions

To the extent that Soviet military capabilities and trends in their development constitute evidence of Soviet intentions, the U-2 program has provided us with a great deal of important information.

As a result of the firm information that we have collected, it is our present judgment that the USSR is not engaged in a crash effort to develop an overwhelming nuclear delivery capability. As I mentioned earlier, the Soviet bomber program has been cut back to a minimum effort, and the ICBM development program appears to be an orderly, high-priority but not "crash" program.

We have seen that throughout the period the Soviet Union continued to give great priority to the development of a defensive capability in the form of surface-to-air missiles, fighters, and air defense radars.

By giving us better evidence concerning the Soviet development of specific weapons systems, the U-2 program has enabled the U.S. to tailor its own defenses more precisely to the actual Soviet threat.

The program has also given us increased confidence in our judgments concerning the issue of peace or war in crisis situations. Whenever the international situation becomes tense because of a problem in some particular area, we are concerned whether the situation might get beyond control--that someone on the other side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war.

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For example, at the time of the Suez crisis the Soviet Union threatened the use of rockets. During the Lebanese and the Taiwan Straits crises in 1958, various Kremlin statements led us to wonder whether the Soviets might have misunderstood our intentions and were preparing for war. Again in the various peaks of the Berlin crisis since 1958 the same question has arisen. Our knowledge of Soviet military preparations, however, resulting from the overflight program, has given us an ability to discount or call the bluffs of the Soviets with confidence. We have been able to conclude that Soviet statements were more rhetorical than threatening and that our courses of action could be carried through without serious risk of war and without Soviet interference.

* * * * *

It is extremely difficult for me to sum up in words the significance of this effort to our national security. I do not wish to exaggerate, nor do I wish to belittle other vital intelligence programs. This photographic coverage and the data derived from it are an inseparable part of the whole national intelligence effort. But in terms of reliability, of precision, of access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has been unique. And in the opinion of the military, of the scientists and of the senior officials responsible for our national security it has been, to put it simply, invaluable.

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ANNEX 119

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MISSION TO BIRCH WOODS,
SEVEN TENTS,
AND
NEW SIBERIA

by

Henry S. Lowenhaupt, OSI

I suppose I remember so distinctly working on the nuclear targets for the U-2 missions of late August 1957 to Central Asia and Siberia because this was my first direct experience with reconnaissance operations. First impressions always do seem the most lasting. Besides, I could not help being reminded that in 1944 I had been sent by train from a basic training camp in Alabama to a telephone number in Knoxville, Tennessee, with my destination the "secret" atomic city of Oak Ridge with its 70,000 inhabitants. Here in 1957 my prime target was a "secret" atomic city known as the Post Box, Tomsk, in Central Siberia.

There was also at the time a feeling of position vindicated. In 1945 I had been impressed with the accuracy of the estimate on the war-time uranium output from the famous Joachimsthal uranium mines of Czechoslovakia. Aerial photographs taken a year apart had been used as its basis. In 1949, after the first Soviet nuclear test, I had advocated photoreconnaissance of the nuclear production sites in the Urals. Indeed, in that year, I had persuaded the Air Force member of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) to design and submit a formal proposal for flying the Urals in a B-25, taking off from Iran and ditching the aircraft next to an aircraft carrier to be stationed in the Barents Sea off Novaya Zemlya. We still had in the files Dean Acheson's reply, as Secretary of State, through the DCI to the Chairman of JAEIC, dated 30 December 1949, denying the request for permission to implement.

I thoroughly believed that satisfactory photographic coverage of a U-235 separation plant, or of a plutonium production reactor, would give us "information on electric power consumption, cooling water consumption, plant arrangement and size, new construction, and the physical details which, when analyzed, should enable us to make a much better estimate of Soviet critical material production." *

* Briefing of Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Charles P. Cabell, DDCI, 28 August 1957.

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Thus, to me, "a picture was worth a thousand words." I would have been shocked at the suggestion that it might take months of steady work by competent photo-interpreters aided by the best procurable consultants to work out the real intelligence meaning of a picture. Yet this was to be the case: the Russians could not copy our atomic facilities; they had had to engineer and design their own from scratch. We, in turn, then faced the cryptographic problem of how to interpret the totally foreign engineering we found evidenced in U-2 photography.

The atomic sites near both Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk, in Central Siberia, and the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapon Proving Ground had been selected by interagency agreement through the interagency ARC (Ad Hoc Requirements Committee) on 27 May 1957 as three prime objectives for flights in the Central Asian and Siberian areas. Other major objectives also were emphasized, such as what is now the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range; Stalin's second industrial bastion, the Kuznetsk Basin; and the aircraft industry in Novosibirsk and Omsk. It was the belief in the existence of all these targets with their immediate bearing on the latest weapons systems that had persuaded first the ARC, and then eventually the Project Director, Richard M. Bissell, and the Director, Allen Dulles, to cash in the blue chips necessary to procure take-off bases along the southern periphery of the USSR and China.

In the summer of 1957 the U-2 program was still being conducted with extraordinary security. As an intelligence analyst in CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence, I did my targeting in the Blue Room, a small, centrally located, secure area away from my normal desk, where I could work without telegraphing to all and sundry within the office what we were doing. Psychologically, we were prepared to be secure and devious: the Blue Room was in fact painted light green.

As an analyst I was directed in July 1957 to work up target briefs by priority for all atomic targets in the enormous geographical area comprising Central Asia and Central Siberia. These targets were then to be used in planning the actual flights or missions by the operational side of the program. The operational methodism was to plan each specific mission around one or two of the highest priority targets selected by ARC, laying out a sensible route to avoid or minimize known defenses, yet endeavoring to cover as many low priority targets along the way as

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possible. Normally I became involved in the flight path only to the extent that the best (vertical) photography* occurred in a band only five miles wide: it was desirable to orient this band over the target to maximize coverage of the target if it were oblong-shaped, or should either target location or pilot navigation be off a bit.

When it came to setting up the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapon Proving Ground target, I was in a quandary. I knew that some twenty-odd nuclear tests had occurred there, but I did not really know the location of any single test to better than thirty miles. I had no idea how big the area was. Our Nevada atomic test site at Frenchman's Flats was certainly sizeable; compared to a five-mile best swath-width, it was astronomical.

50X1, E.O.13526

to average for me the seismic epicenters (locations) of the five largest nuclear detonations in the Semipalatinsk area. The location of this "centroid" turned out to be out in the featureless desert some seventy miles due west of Semipalatinsk, about one-third of the way to Karaganda. Semipalatinsk had been named Seven Tents because seven trading companies had maintained residencies there when Semipalatinsk had been an important crossroads on the caravan trails to China and to the fabled cities of Samarkand and Bukhara to the south. My "centroid" was south of the old trail and the only names on the map in the vicinity were those of seasonally dry salt lakes. Here was a highest priority target whose location was really so poorly known that it could be best defined as a hand-sized blur on a standard aeronautical chart. Such a target was hardly realistic in operational terms.

My difficulties with locating the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapon Proving Ground pointed up the real problem: we really needed and wanted flights in the Central Asian and Siberian areas because we knew so little about what was going on there; yet unless we knew of an activity and precisely where it was going on, we would stand little chance of photographing it. General Philip G. Strong, Deputy Director of OSI for Collection Matters, who had had much World War II reconnaissance experience, was on the side of precision in targeting and of detailed justification for the collection need assigned to each target. It was he who questioned the accuracy of the maps and suggested the usefulness of targeting relative to major map features, rather than directly trying to search-centered coordinate systems of longitude and latitude.

* With the "A" Camera System.

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Thus it was with renewed care that I assembled the data on the atomic targets in this vast central area of the USSR. The atomic sites already listed in the 1955 GUARDMOUNT file* were reviewed. The lower priority uranium concentration plants of Combine 6 in the Fergana Valley, such as the ones just south of Leninabad at Ispisar, north of Leninabad near Taboshar, and a good many miles to the east of Leninabad near Andizhan, had been located as well as possible. All were based ultimately on the reporting from a 1947 Jewish refugee who had driven a bread-truck to each of these sites. I remembered that he had been interrogated exhaustively and then had been resettled with appreciation in Brazil. I recalled there had been a problem with the maps he drew: to the east of where the Syr Darya River turned north toward the Aral Sea he had swapped north and south; to the west of this line, north on his maps was the way it was supposed to be. In several instances his reporting had been confirmed by reports from returned prisoners of war.

The location of the uranium concentration plants belonging to Combine 8, to the east of Leninabad toward the Pamir Knot and to the south of Alma Ata, were at best poorly known; targeting was considered doubtful on these.

Ever since we had learned that Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, and Tomsk, in Siberia, were the location of the second generation of Russian atomic sites, we had maintained a special watch on these cities and the countryside nearby. The city of Krasnoyarsk had been made off-limits to foreigners by 1948, and information on the atomic site some 35 miles downstream (north) from Krasnoyarsk on the east bank of the Yenisey River had been especially hard to come by. The defector Icarus, in early 1951, reported that many trainloads of mining equipment had been sent in mid-1950 from Wismut, A.G. (Bismuth, Inc.), the vast Russian uranium enterprise in East Germany, and that he believed the purpose of the new enterprise at Krasnoyarsk was to mine uranium. By 1952 all administrative centers in the peninsula of land south of the confluence of the Kan and Yenisey Rivers and north of the Trans-Siberian Railroad had disappeared from the annual editions of "Deleniye," the published MVD listing of administrative centers in the USSR. A German prisoner of war had been returned to West Germany, who, despite all the Russian rules and regulations, had actually spent several years at the Krasnoyarsk atomic

* The target file for the GENETRIX program of 1955 in which free balloons bearing cameras were allowed to drift across the USSR on predetermined paths.

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site where he had been engaged as a construction worker. He reported hearsay information indicating many kilometers of tunnels all lined with concrete. His name for the associated town was Komsomolsk na Yenisey. In early 1957 a GENETRIX balloon had been recovered from the Aleutian Islands which contained a number of aerial photographs of Dodonovo, as the Krasnoyarsk atomic site came to be known after an old village on the site. These photographs showed an enormous construction effort, a new city of apartment houses, laboratories, warehouses and machine shops, and a vast mining effort. There was every reason to believe, however, that higher resolution photography would lead to a determination of the functions at this large, complex, and possibly underground, installation.

The Novosibirsk uranium metal plant had first been identified as such also by the defector Icarus. In 1956 Dr. Nikolaus Riehl and other German scientists formerly engaged at Elektrostal, near Moscow, in research on uranium metal manufacture had confirmed and updated Icarus' testimony. Attachés had photographed it from the Trans-Siberian Railroad in 1952 and 1954 because of its evident size and importance. George Monk* had identified it through comparison of these photographs with the material filed in the old Industrial Register of the Office of Central Reference under the name "Stalin Auto Works", apparently the local cover name for the enterprise. It could be located within half a mile of permanent map features. Across the Trans-Siberian Railroad was the Novosibirsk Airframe Plant, so there were several priority reasons for the U-2 to visit this northeast suburb of Novosibirsk. However, it was also evident that a uranium metal manufacturing facility was basically of second priority as a U-2 mission objective.

The atomic site near Tomsk was a matter of more concern: the amount of information on its function and location was woefully sparse. Furthermore, it was at extreme range so that the aircraft could not, in fact, spend time hunting for it even though we felt we could justify it as a prime target. Although we had indeed placed for years a special collection effort against this site, the 15 January 1952 Soviet Foreign Office order closing Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and other specific areas to foreigners had been especially effective in the case of Tomsk,

* Now State Department representative to JAEIC.

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where the town was not accessible to attaché photography from the Trans-Siberian Railway the way Novosibirsk had been. Actually there had been a number of remarks in reporting about something atomic or of a special post box in connection with Tomsk. This had led to the location and interrogation of a few prisoners of war who had at one time or other been in the Tomsk area and had been returned to West Germany in 1954, and of a few ethnic Germans who had been returned in 1956. Evidence one could put one's finger on, however, was comprised in three reports and the analysis of a fur hat.

The latest of these reports was from an ethnic German who claimed to have been employed in 1955 in Tomsk as a blacksmith. He reported to his Army interrogator that local inhabitants had facetiously suggested "Atomsk" would be a better name for the town than Tomsk. He knew of no atomic installation as such, but had heard of an underground secret plant and settlement called "Kolonne (Labor Brigade) 5" located northeast of the Tomsk II railroad station.

Another returned ethnic German had told his British interrogator he had heard of an industrial enterprise engaged "in manufacturing fillings for atomic weapons locally known as the Post Box." In Tomsk II he had seen a large building with barred windows on all floors bearing a large sign saying "Information Office, Personnel Department, Post Box." He knew of two relatively small areas of the enterprise, one east, the other northeast of Tomsk. On reinterrogation he mentioned traveling north from Tomsk II on a bus belonging to the Post Box when going to visit a friend of his in a lunatic asylum located on the southern fringe of a prohibited area. He reported seeing railway trains running into the prohibited area carrying coal, wood, and building materials. He had also heard persons employed there were well paid and received preferential treatment in the matter of distribution of food stuffs, etc. He mentioned seeing three large chimneys six to eight kilometers north of Tomsk II which emitted black smoke. The interrogator noticed the source had a very poor memory, seemed to be suffering from some kind of mental disorder, and was preoccupied with his plans to emigrate to Canada. Clearly, neither of the above reports tended to inspire confidence in either the location or the existence of a major atomic installation in the Tomsk area.

The story of a returned German prisoner of war who had been employed in 1949 as a tailor in a small factory northwest of Beloborodovo some twelve kilometers north of Tomsk City seemed much more

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believable. He reported to his Air Force interrogator that within eight days, in April or May 1949, some 12,000 penal workers had passed through the bathing and delousing facilities of his penal camp and were put to work in a secure area, fenced off between his factory and the village of Iglakovo several kilometers to the north and down the Tom River. The returned prisoner of war was clearly proud of his ability and reputation as a tailor and reported that many military officers belonging to the military construction staff in charge of this new construction came to his tailor shop to get their uniforms fitted properly. Reportedly the military construction staff had arrived complete with families from Tallin where they were said to have recently completed another large construction task. In charge was a Soviet general who had arrived in April with his staff. Interestingly, the guard force was of a different subordination, and neither mingled nor lived with the construction staff officers. It was the tailor's Russian supervisor who had told him that the fenced-off area was to be an atomic energy plant.

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The U-235 enrichment implied U-235 separation in the Tomsk area. Nuclear weapon component fabrication was also a possibility, but I felt that the apparent size of the atomic operation was much too large for merely such an operation. There appeared no reason to suggest either reactor and associated chemical plant operation, or lithium isotope separation. I centered my location on the spot where the German tailor had seen 12,000 prisoners go to work. The die was cast.

In late August 1957 the missions were flown - rapidly to minimize possible counteraction, and many of them to cover as much useful area as possible.

Illustrating from the flight over the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapon Proving Ground, the mission was planned with Stalinsk in the Kuznetsk

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Basin and Alma Ata in the Kirgiz, SSR, as prime targets. As confidence in knowing the location of the Semipalatinsk Proving Ground was too low, even though it was a prime target, the cities of Semipalatinsk and Karaganda were made way stations in their own right, and the flight path between them was so adjusted that the flight would pass over the best estimate of where the Nuclear Proving Ground actually was. Mention of the Nuclear Proving Ground was dropped from the flight plan for security reasons ("why give away knowledge if you don't have to"). I doubt that anyone thought there would be any special danger.

The coordinates turned out to be good. The U-2 passed directly over the Nuclear Proving Ground on 22 August 1957; and the pilot got a THRILL. He recognized through the drift meter what he was over, for he had many times flown over Frenchman's Flats, our Nevada Nuclear Test Range. He recognized the shot-zone had been cleared: they were ready to fire.

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The pilot had photographed it and its carrier aircraft on the ground when he had flown over the Semipalatinsk airfield and associated nuclear weapon assembly facility. The nuclear weapon "cab" which the pilot saw on the shot-tower at the Proving Ground was for a low yield device that was not to be detonated until the thirteenth of September.

The mission also photographed a well-planned, modern community of 20,000 people, not otherwise known, on the north shore of Lake Balkhash. This turned out to be the headquarters of the Sary Shagan anti-missile test range, and a real find. It covered the uranium mill at Kadzhi-Say near the west end (not the east end as I had thought) of Lake Issyk Kul, south of Alma Ata, proving that the Russians had large modern uranium mills. The uranium mines of Bystrovka were covered but not found in the film for another year.

Turning to other flights, the Dodonovo site near Krasnoyarsk was not photographed because of heavy cloud-cover during the operational period, an all too familiar situation in the reconnaissance business.

The uranium metal plant at Novosibirsk turned out to be quite a large installation with what probably is a large lithium isotope separation plant then under construction between the raw uranium ore facility and the site thermal power plant.

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The Tomsk atomic site was covered on 21 August in vertical, clear photography. The tailor's location proved correct. Allen Dulles was rumored to have said jubilantly, when he heard the news, "You mean you really did know that something atomic was going on way out there in the wilds of Siberia?"

As summarized in the mission report, the Tomsk atomic energy installation "covers an irregular-shaped area of about 40 square miles on the right bank of the Tom River. No single atomic energy complex in the western world includes the range of processes taking place here. The villages of Iglakovo and Beloborodovo are encompassed in the housing and administration area along the river. On the west edge of the area, a large thermal power plant with an estimated capacity of 400 megawatts is undergoing further expansion. Further power is provided by Gres II in Tomsk and by tie-ins to the Kuzbas Grid. East of this plant is located the feed and processing section and gaseous diffusion plants. One gaseous diffusion building is uncompleted. On the east edge is located the reactor area. One of the two* reactors appears to be in the final stages of construction. A maintenance and construction area is just north of these areas. On the northeast edge, a plutonium chemical separation area is uncompleted. A mud lake dump area is on the north edge of the complex outside of the fence which encompasses the whole installation. It is rail served by a spur line from Tomsk."

The photograph, of course, could not tell us within several years of when these installations were finished, nor what the Russians called them. Fortunately, we were able to talk to a defector in the spring of 1958 who had been a soldier in a military construction brigade at the Tomsk site from July 1955 to February 1956. He solved many of our time schedule problems. He reported the general address of the whole installation was Post Box 5, Tomsk. The new city was named Berezki, Birch Woods, and the birch forest was still preserved around the city in February 1956, for the Russians love such forests. Beloborodovo had

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The size of the gaseous diffusion U-235 separation facility with its four operating buildings and a fifth under construction may be judged through comparison with the facility at Oak Ridge which was one of the U-235 facilities in the U. S. drawing about 2000 MW of electric power each.

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apparently been expanded to become the construction workers' town of Chekist (Tomsk 19), presumably in honor of their connection with the MVD. and Iglakovo had become Kuzminka (Tomsk 17). The man in charge was Major General Tzarevskiy, who had built the steel town of Nizhniy Tagil in the Urals in the 1930's. We had indeed photographed an important atomic installation.

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ANNEX 120

~~TOP SECRET~~CIA U-2 MISSIONS FLOWN - 1956-1966 - CHRONOLOGICAL

<u>Date</u> <u>1956:</u>	<u>Det.</u>	<u>Msn. No.</u>	<u>Pilot</u>	<u>Departed</u>	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Results</u>
June 20	A	2003	Overstreet	Wiesbaden	Poland	A-2	Good
July 2	A	2009	Dunaway	Wiesbaden	Bulgaria	A-2	Poor
2	A	2010	Kratt	Wiesbaden	Rumania	A-2	Fair
4	A	2013	Stockman	Wiesbaden	Leningrad, Moscow (cloudy)	A-2	Good
5	A	2014	Vito	Wiesbaden	Moscow	A-2	Exc
9	A	2020	Knutson	Wiesbaden	Poland, Baltic Area	A-2	Exc
9	A	2021	Overstreet	Wiesbaden	Hungary, Kiev, Minsk, Poland, Czechoslovakia	A-2	Good
10	A	2023	Dunaway	Wiesbaden	Crimea	A-2	Exc
Aug 29	A	1104	Carey	Wiesbaden	Greece, N. Africa, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey	A-2	Exc
29	A	1105	Stockman	Wiesbaden	Greece, N. Africa, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey	A-2	Exc
30	A	1106	Vito	Adana	Greece, N. Africa, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey	A-2	Good
30	A	1107	Overstreet	Adana	Greece, N. Africa, Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey	A-2	Good
Sep 6	A	1108	Knutson	Wiesbaden	Yugoslavia, Albania, Turkey, Cyprus	A-2	Good
7	A	1109	Carey	Wiesbaden	Sicily, Malta, Greece, Rhodes Italy	A-2	Exc
11	A	1110	Kratt	Wiesbaden	France, Sardinia, Sicily, Malta, N. Africa, Egypt, Israel, Turkey	A-2	Exc

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1956 cont'd:

Sep	11	A	1111	Overstreet	Wiesbaden	Corsica, Sicily, Italy	A-2	Good
	11	B	1301	Cordes	Adana	Turkey, Cyprus, Rhodes	A-2	Good
	14	A	1112	Kratt	Adana	Corsica, Pantelleria, Malta	A-2	Exc
						Rhodes, Cyprus, Wiesbaden		
	27	B	1304	Powers	Adana	Turkey, Greece, Sicily, Crete	A-2	Exc
						Rhodes, Cyprus		
Oct	3	B	1305	Jones	Adana	Lebanon, Israel, Egypt	A-2	Exc
						Suez, Cairo		
	4	A	1114	Stockman	Wiesbaden	Italy, Sicily, Sardinia,	A-2	Fair
						Marseille, Toulon		
	12	A	1115	Knutson	Wiesbaden	Trieste, Yugoslavia, Italy,	A-2	Fair
						Adriatic Sea		
	12	B	1307	Hall	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Israel,	B	Poor
						Gaza, Port Said		
	16	B	1308	McMurray	Adana	Turkey, Greece, Albania,	B	Poor
						Yugoslavia, Rhodes		
	19	B	1309	Snider	Adana	Turkey, Greece, Albania,	B	Fair
						Yugoslavia, Rhodes		
	21	B	1310	Birkhead	Adana	Israel, Egypt, Rhodes,	A-2	Good
						Albania, Wiesbaden		
	25	B	1312	Birkhead	Wiesbaden	Adriatic, Cyprus, Aqaba,	A-2	Exc
						Syria, Jordan, Adana		
	29	B	1313	Edens	Adana	Lebanon, Israel, Jordan,	A-2	Fair
						Aqaba, Gaza, Suez, Cyprus		
	30	B	1314	Powers	Adana	Lebanon, Israel, Jordan,	B	Exc
						Sinai		
	31	B	1315	Snider	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Jordan,	A-2	Exc
						Aqaba, Egypt		

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Nov	1	B	1316	Hall	Adana	Cyprus, Egypt	A-2	Exc
	5	B	1318	Snider	Adana	Tripoli, Syria	B	Fair
	7	B	1321	Powers	Adana	Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia	A-2	Fair
	12	B	1323	Jones	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Port Said	A-2	Exc
	12	B	1324	Birkhead	Adana	Syria, Turkey Border, Iraq, Persian Gulf	A-2	Fair
	13	B	1325	Powers	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia	A-2	Fair
	14	B	1326	Jones	Adana	Turkey, Syria Border, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia	A-2	Good
	15	B	1328	Edens	Adana	Syria, Israel, Jordan, Egypt	A-2	Exc
	16	B	1329	Hall	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq	A-2	Fair
	18	B	1331	Edens	Adana	Syria	B	Poor
	18	B	1331A	Jones	Adana	Syria	A-2	Fair
	19	B	1332	Birkhead	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Sinai, Jordan	A-2	Good
	20	B	1334	Hall	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan	A-2	Poor
	20	B	4016	Powers	Adana	Iran, Baku, Armenia	A-2	Fair
	30	B	1340	Birkhead	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq	A-2	Poor
Dec	4	B	1344	Snider	Adana	Syria, Jordan, Iraq	A-2	Good
	10	B	4018	Edens	Adana	Bulgaria	B	Good
	10	A	2029	Vito	Giebelstadt	Bulgaria	A-2	Good
	18	B	1348	Jones	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Israel	A-2	Poor
	22	B	4019	Birkhead	Adana	Russian Border, Caspian, Black Sea, Afghanistan	Syst V	Good

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~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

1957:

Jan	20	B	1351	Powers	Adana	Syria, Turkish Border	A-2	Fair
	23	B	1352	McMurray	Adana	Syria, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon	A-2	Exc
Feb	11	B	1359	Snider	Adana	Syria, Jordan, Israel	A-2	Good
Mar	17	B	1365	McMurray	Adana	Syria, Israel, Lebanon	A-2	Good
	18	B	4020	Cherbonneaux	Adana	Iran, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan	Syst V	Good
Apr	25	A	2036	Smiley	Giebelstadt	Albania	A-2	Exc
	25	B	1370	Edens	Adana	Syria, Jordan	B	Poor
	27	B	1371	Birkhead	Adana	Syria, Jordan (camera out)	B	Poor
May	21	B	1375	Jones	Adana	Syria	B	Fair
	30	B	1376	Birkhead	Adana	Syria	B	Fair
	30	B	1377	Jones	Adana	Syria	B	Exc
Jun	5	B	1379	Hall	Adana	Syria	B	Poor
	8	C	6002	Rand	Eielson	Klyuchi/Incomplete WX	B	-
	20	C	6005	Rand	Eielson	Klyuchi	B	Good
	20	B	1380	Powers	Adana	Syria	B	Fair
	21	B	1382	Edens	Adana	Syria	B	Exc
Jul	6	B	1384	Snider	Adana	Syria	B	Exc
	21	B	4030	Cherbonneaux	Adana	Iran, Iraq, Syria	B (DB)	Good
	31	B	4033	Cherbonneaux	Adana	Black Sea	B (DB)	Good
Aug	4	B	4036	Powers	Lahore	China, Ti Hwa, Mongolia	A-2	Poor
	5	B	4035	Edens	Lahore	Novokazalinsk, Kzylorda, Aral Sea	B (DB)	Good

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~~TOP SECRET~~

1957 cont'd:

Aug 11	B	4039	McMurray	Lahore	Ust Kamerogorsk (camera out)	B (DB)	Poor
20	B	4045	Snider	Lahore	Tomsk, Novosibirsk	A-2	Good
20	B	4048	Jones	Lahore	Semipalatinsk, Omsk, Balkhash	A-2 (DB)	Fair
21	B	4049	Birkhead	Lahore	Krasnoyarsk	A-2	Poor
21	B	4050	Cherbonneaux	Lahore	Stalinsk, Semipalatinsk, Alma Ata	A-2 (DB)	Exc
21	B	4051	Hall	Lahore	Tibet, Lhasa	B	Poor
28	B	4058	Jones	Lahore	Leninabad, Aralsk	A-2 (DB)	Exc
31	B	1385	Edens	Adana	Syria, Lebanon	B	Poor
Sep 1	B	1386	Birkhead	Adana	Syria, Lebanon	A-2	Exc
10	B	4059	Hall	Adana	Kapustin Yar	A-2 (DB)	Exc
16	C	6008	Baker	Eielson	Klyuchi	A-2 (DB)	Exc
Oct 11	A	2037	Kratt	Giebelstadt	Barents Sea	Syst IV	Good
12	B	1388	Powers	Adana	Syria	A-2	Exc
13	A	2040	Stockman	Giebelstadt	Murmansk	A-2	Exc
27	B	4061	McMurray	Adana	Black Sea	A-1 (DB)	Exc
Nov 6	B	4065	Powers	Adana	Black Sea	Syst IV	Fair
9	B	1390	Birkhead	Adana	Syria	A-2	Exc
14	B	4066	Rand	Adana	Iran, Russian Border	Syst IV	Exc
20	B	1391	Hall	Adana	Syria	A-2	Poor
21	B	4067	Birkhead	Adana	Black Sea	A-1 (DB)	Exc
22	B	1392	Rand	Adana	Syria	A-2	Good

1958:

Jan 9	B	4069	Erickson	Adana	Black Sea	Syst IV	Good
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~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
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1958 cont'd:

Jan	18	B	1399	Powers	Adana	Black Sea	A-2	Good
	28	B	4075	Shinn	Adana	Albania	A-2	Good
Mar	1	C	6011	Crull	Atsugi	Japan, Ukrania USSR	A-2 (DB)	Good
	15	B	4078	Barnes	Adana	Iran, Soviet Border	Syst IV	Fair
	28	C	1714	Crull	Cubi Point	Celebes	A-2	Good
Apr	1	C	1718	McMurray	Cubi Point	Sumatra	A-2	Good
	2	C	1720	Edens	Cubi Point	Borneo	A-2	Good
	3	C	1721	Jones	Cubi Point	Java	A-2	Good
	4	C	1722	Snider	Cubi Point	Java, Sumatra	B	Poor
	7	C	1724	Crull	Cubi Point	North & Central Sumatra	A-2	Good
	8	C	1725	McMurray	Cubi Point	Java, Sumatra	A-2	Good
	11	C	1727	Jones	Cubi Point	Borneo, Celebes	A-2	Poor
	15	C	1729	Edens	Cubi Point	Sumatra	A-2	Good
	16	C	1730	Snider	Cubi Point	Java	A-2	Good
	18	C	1731	Jones	Cubi Point	Celebes, Borneo	B	Fair
	20	C	1734	Edens	Cubi Point	Borneo, Java	B	Poor
	21	C	1735	Rudd	Cubi Point	Borneo, Java	A-2	Good
	22	C	1737	Crull	Cubi Point	Celebes	A-2	Good
	23	C	1739	Edens	Cubi Point	Java	B	Fair
	27	C	1742	McMurray	Cubi Point	Ceram, Morotai	B	Good
May	4	C	1745	Birkhead	Cubi Point	Java	B	Good
	6	C	1746	Jones	Cubi Point	Molucca, Celebes	B	Good
	7	B	4079	Powers	Adana	Iran, Soviet Border	Syst IV	Good
	9	C	1749	McMurray	Cubi Point	Molucca, Celebes, Ceram	B	Poor
	11	C	1751	Jones	Cubi Point	Celebes, Lesser Sunda	B	Good
	12	C	1752	Crull	Cubi Point	Java, Borneo	B	Poor

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

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1958 cont'd:

May	13	C	1753	Birkhead	Cubi Point	Ambon, Ceram, Celebes	B	Good
	16	C	1754	Crull	Cubi Point	Borneo, Java, Great Natuna	B	Good
	16	B	1406	Barnes	Adana	Egypt	B	Exc
	17	B	1407	Knutson	Adana	Egypt	B	Good
	18	B	1409	Barnes	Adana	Syria	B	Good
	21	C	1760A	Snider	Cubi Point	Borneo, Celebes, Ambon	B	Fair
	22	C	1761A	Edens	Cubi Point	Borneo, Celebes, Ambon	B	Fair
	23	C	1762	Rudd	Cubi Point	Borneo, Java, Great Natuna	B	Good
	25	C	1763	Snider	Cubi Point	Borneo, Celebes, Molucca	B	Poor
	28	B	1411	Rand	Adana	Jordan, Yemen	B	Good
Jun	3	B	102	Shinn	Adana	Black Sea	Syst IV	Good
	4	C	1769	Edens	Cubi Point	Borneo, Java	A-2	Good
	6	C	1772	Rudd	Cubi Point	Celebes, Molucca	A-2	Good
	10	C	1773	Jones	Cubi Point	China Coast to Atsugi	Syst V	Good
	12	B	1414	Knutson	Adana	Saudi Arabia	B	Good
	17	B	1416	Baker	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Israel	A-2	Exc
	18	C	6012	Rudd	Atsugi	China	B	Exc
	19	B	104	Rand	Adana	Iran, Soviet Border	Syst IV	Good
	21	B	1417	Powers	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon	A-2	Good
	21	C	6013	Birkhead	Atsugi	N. Pacific to Alaska	Syst V	Fair
	22	B	103	Shinn	Adana	Black Sea	Syst IV	Good
	23	B	1418	Barnes	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Jordan	A-2	Good
	24	B	105	Erickson	Adana	Turkey, Iran	Syst IV	Good
	25	B	1419	Knutson	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Jordan	A-2	Good
	27	B	1420	Shinn	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia	A-2	Good
	29	B	1421	Powers	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Lebanon	A-2	Good

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Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

1958 cont'd:

Jul	1	B	1422	Erickson	Adana	Syria, Lebanon	A-2	Good
	8	B	1424	Baker	Adana	Syria, Lebanon, Jordan	A-2	Good
	14	C	1774		Atsugi	Typhoon WINNIE	A-1	Good
	15	C	1775		Atsugi	Typhoon WINNIE	A-1	Good
	15	B	1426	Powers	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Jordan	B	Good
	16	B	1427	Erickson	Adana	Syria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon	A-2	Good
	16	C	1776		Atsugi	Typhoon WINNIE	A-1	Poor
	17	B	1428	Barnes	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Israel	B	Good
	18	B	1429	Baker	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon	B	Good
	20	B	1432	Rand	Adana	Syria, Egypt, Israel	A-2	Good
	22	B	1433	Powers	Adana	Syria, Iraq	B	Good
	22	B	1434	Erickson	Adana	Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Syria	A-2	Good
	23	B	1435	Barnes	Adana	Syria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon	A-2	Good
	23	B	1436	Knutson	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Iran	B	Good
	24	B	1437	Rand	Adana	Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Syria	A-2	Exc
	25	B	1438	Baker	Adana	Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Israel	A-2	Poor
	25	B	1439	Powers	Adana	Iran, Iraq, Syria	A-2	Exc
	26	B	1440	Erickson	Adana	Egypt, Syria	A-2	Good
	27	B	1441	Barnes	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria	A-2	Good
	28	B	1442	Rand	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Lebanon	A-2	Exc
	29	B	1443	Shinn	Adana	Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia	A-2	Good
	30	B	1444	Knutson	Adana	Iran, Iraq, Syria	B	Good
	30	B	1445	Baker	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria	A-2	Good
Aug	3	B	1447	Erickson	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait	B	Good
	3	B	1448	Barnes	Adana	Egypt, Jordan, Israeli	A-2	Good

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

1958 cont'd:

Aug	6	B	1450	Rand	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon	A-2	Poor
	7	B	1451	Shinn	Adana	Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Syria	A-2	Good
	11	B	1453		Adana	6th Fleet (BIG EARS)	Syst IV	Good
	12	B	1454	Barnes	Adana	Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Syria	A-2	Good
	12	B	1455	Rand	Adana	Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Syria	B	Good
	15	B	1457	Shinn	Adana	Yemen, Aden, Saudi Arabia	A-2	Poor
	19	B	1460	Rand	Adana	Egypt, Saudi Arabia	A-2	Poor
	19	B	1461	Barnes	Adana	Iraq, Syria	B	Poor
	19	C	6017	McMurray	Atsugi	South China Coast	B	Exc
	20	B	1462	Shinn	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria	B	Good
	21	B	1464	Powers	Adana	Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Aden	B	Fair
	26	B	1466	Baker	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria	B	Good
	27	B	1467	Knutson	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Israel	B	Poor
	29	B	4087	Powers	Adana	Soviet/Iranian Border	A-1	Good
	29	B	1468	Erickson	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iraq	B	Good
Sep	3	B	1469	Barnes	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon	B	Exc
	3	C	1778		Atsugi	Typhoon GRACE	A-1	Good
	7	B	1471	Rand	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon	B	Good
	9	C	6019	Edens	Atsugi	China, Taiwan Straits	B	Fair
	12	B	1473	Baker	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon	A-2	Good
	25	C	1779		Atsugi	Typhoon IDA	A-1	Good
Oct	3	B	1478	Shinn	Adana	Egypt, Syria, Israel, Lebanon	B	Good
	7	B	1480	Knutson	Adana	Persian Gulf, Karachi	B	Good

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22	C	6023	Jones	Atsugi	South China, Taiwan Straits	B	Poor
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~~TOP SECRET~~1958 cont'd:

Oct	24	B	1486	Baker	Adana	Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Syria	B	Exc
	25	B	4092	Erickson	Bodo	Kara Sea	Syst IV	Good
Nov	6	B	4093	Shinn	Bodo	Finland, Baltic, to Adana	Syst IV	Good
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	19	B	1493	Baker	Adana	Syria, aborted	B	Poor
	19	B	1494	Rand	Adana	Syria, Israel, Jordan, Iraq	B	Good
	20	B	1495	Erickson	Adana	Syria, Israel, Egypt	B	Good
Dec	4	B	4096	Barnes	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan, Soviet Border	Syst IV	Good
	23	B	1498	Erickson	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Syria	B	Good
	31	B	8603(B)	McArthur	Adana	Egypt, Syria, Jordan	B	Fair

1959:

Jan	2	B	4097	Shinn	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Border	Syst IV	Good
	10	B	8604(B)	Bradley	Adana	Egypt, Jordan, Iraq	B	Fair
	13	B	8605(B)	Dowling	Adana	Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia	B	Good
	20	B	8608(B)	Robinson	Adana	Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia	B	Fair
	28	B	4110	Barnes	Adana	Albania, Peripheral	B	Good
Mar	11	B	1499	Barnes	Adana	Iraq, Syria, Israel	B	Good
	21	B	8618(B)	Bradley	Adana	Latakia	B	Exc
	24	B	4112	Shinn	Adana	Albania, Peripheral	B	Exc
	26	B	8620(B)	Dowling	Adana	Egypt (aborted)	B	Good
	27	B	301		Adana	Mediterranean	WX	Poor
	27	C	701		Atsugi	Japan	WX	Good

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1959 cont'd:

Apr	1	C	702		Atsugi	Japan	WX	Good
	1	B	303		Adana	Mediterranean	WX	Good
	2	B	1502	Barnes	Adana	Syria, Egypt	B	Poor
	3	B	1503	Powers	Adana	Egypt, Syria	B	Poor
	8	B	304		Adana	Mediterranean	WX	Good
	10	B	305		Adana	Mediterranean	WX	Good
	11	B	1506	Powers	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Israel	B	Good
	14	B	4114	Barnes	Adana	Albania	B	Good
	15	B	306		Adana	Mediterranean	WX	Good
	15	C	706		Atsugi	Japan	WX	Good
	16	B	8625(B)	Robinson	Adana	Syria, Jordan, Egypt	B	Good
	17	B	307		Adana	Mediterranean	WX	Good
	21	B	4117	Baker	Adana	Iran	B	Good
	22	C	707		Atsugi	Japan	WX	Good
	24	C	709		Atsugi	Japan	WX	Good
May	2	B	1508	Rand	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Israel	B	Good
	7	B	312(B)		RAF Watton	England	WX	Good
	8	B	313(B)		RAF Watton	England	WX	Good
	12	C	6025	Crull	Cubi Point	SW China, Tibet	B	Fair
	14	C	6028	Rudd	Cubi Point	SW China, Tibet	B	Fair
	15	B	1509	Baker	Adana	Egypt, Saudi Arabia	B	Fair
	20	B	8626(B)	Bradley	Adana	Egypt	B	Good
June	4	B	8627(B)	Bradley	Adana	Egypt	B	Good
	8	B	1512	Knutson	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Lebanon	B	Good
	9	B	4120	Barnes	Adana	Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Soviet Border	Syst VII	Good
	12	B	1515	Rand	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Lebanon	B	Good

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
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~~TOP SECRET~~1959 cont'd:

June	13	B	1516	Shinn	Adana	Egypt	B	Good
	18	B	4121	Rand	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan, Soviet Border	Syst VII	Good
	18	B	4122	Shinn	Adana	Albania	B	Good
	26	B	8630 (B)		Adana	Lebanon (aborted)	B	Poor
	27	B	8631 (B)	McArthur	Adana	Lebanon, Syria, Iraq	B	Good
Jul	9	B	4125	Knutson	Peshawar	Urals, Tyura Tam	B	Exc
	9	B	110		Adana	Diversiónary (Iran)	-	-
	16	B	8632 (B)	Robinson	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia	B	Good
	18	B	4131	Dunaway	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan, Soviet Border	Syst VII	Poor
	25	B	4132	Shinn	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan, Soviet Border	Syst VII	Good
	27	B	4133	Rand	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Soviet Border	Syst VII	Good
	28	B	1519	Powers	Adana	Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia	B	Good
Aug	7	B	8634 (B)	Dowling	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia	B	Good
	21	B	4134	Powers	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Borders	Syst VII	Good
	24	B	4135	Knutson		Soviet Border, Iran, Afghanistan	Syst VII	Fair
	25	B	1521	Shinn	Adana	Egypt, Jordan, Syria	B	Good
	28	B	8636 (B)	Bradley	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Iran	B	Fair
	29	C	6035	Snider	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Good
Sep	3	C	6037	McMurray	Takhli	Tibet, China	B	Good
	4	C	6038	Crull	Takhli	Tibet, China	B	Fair

~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEM
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

1959 cont'd:

Sep	7	C	6040	Rudd	Takhli	Laos	B	Poor
	9	C	6042	Crull	Takhli	Tibet, China	B	Good
	10	B	8638 (B)	Bradley	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia	B	Good
	12	C	6044	Crull	Takhli	Laos, North Vietnam	B	Good
	12	B	4137	Powers	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Border ^s	Syst VII	Good
	16	B	1523	Kratt	Adana	Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria	B	Good
	21	B	4138	Barnes	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Border	Syst VII	Good
Oct	3	B	4139	Dunaway	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Borders	Syst VII	Exc
	5	B	314 (B)		RAF Watton	England	WX	Good
	6	B	315 (B)		RAF Watton	England	WX	Good
	9	B	1525	Erickson	Adana	Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon	B	Good
	10	B	1526	Kratt	Adana	Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt	B	Good
	14	B	4140	Dunaway	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Borders	Syst VII	Fair
	17	B	4142	Kratt	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Borders	Syst VII	Poor
	18	B	4143	Powers	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Borders	Syst VII	Poor
	23	B	1528		Adana	ME (aborted)	B	Poor
	30	B	8648 (B)	Dowling	Adana	Iraq, Iran (aborted)	B	Poor
	30	B	8649 (B)	McArthur	Adana	Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan	B	Good
	31	B	4146	Kratt	Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Borders	Syst VII	Poor
Nov	1	B	4147		Adana	Iran, Afghanistan Borders	Syst VII	Poor
	1	C	6045	Edens	Atsugi	Kuriles	B	Good
	4	C	6046	McMurray	Takhli	West China, Tibet	B	Fair
	19	B	8652 (B)	McArthur	Adana	Syria, Iraq, Israel, Iran	B	Good
	20	B	8004 (B)	Dowling	Adana	Afghanistan Border	Syst VII	Good
	21	B	1536	Shinn	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia Jordan	B	Good

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Handle via BYEMAN
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~~TOP SECRET~~1959 cont'd:

Dec	6	B	8005 (B)	Robinson	Peshawar	Kuybyshev, Kapustin Yar	B	Exc
	6	B	8007 (B)	Bradley	Adana	Diversiory (Iran)	System IV	Fair

1960:

Jan	27	B	HS501 (B)	Bradley	Adana	Iran Border	Syst VII	Poor
	12	B	1543	Barnes	Adana	Middle East	B	Good
	29	B	1554	Erickson	Adana	Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait	B	Good
	30	B	HS502	Dunaway	Adana	Iran Border	Syst VII	Good
	31	B	HS503 (B)	Robinson	Adana	Iran Border	Syst VII	Good
Feb	5	B	8009 (B)	McArthur	Peshawar	Tyura Tam, Kazan, Ukraine, to Adana	B	Exc
	5	B	8010 (B)	Dowling	Adana	Diversiory (Iran)	Syst IV	Good
	23	B	1558	Powers	Adana	Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria	B	Good
	28	B	1560	Dunaway	Adana	Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia Syria	B	Good
Mar	23	B	4156	Knutson	Adana	Turkey	Syst VII	Poor
	31	C	6049	Edens	Takhli	Tibet	B	Fair
	31	C	6050	Snider	Takhli	Eastern Tibet	B	Good
Apr	5	C	6054	McMurray	Takhli	Western China	B	Good
	9	B	4155	Erickson	Peshawar	Tyura Tam, Sary Shagan	B	Exc
	9	B	4157	Barnes	Adana	Diversiory (Iran)	Syst VII	Poor
	19	B	HS507	Knutson	Adana	Iran	Syst VII	Good
May	1	B	4154	Powers	Peshawar	Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk, Kola Peninsula	B	LOST
	1	B	4159	Dunaway	Adana	Diversiory (Iran)	Syst VII	Poor

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~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
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1960 cont'd:

Oct 26	G	3001	Rand	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Poor
27	G	3002	Rand	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Poor
Nov 27	G	3003	Jones	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
Dec 5	G	3011	Cherbonneaux	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
11	G	3016	Edens	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good

1961:

Jan 3	G	3018	Baker	Cubi Point	North Vietnam (aborted)	B	Fair
4	G	3019	Cherbonneaux	Cubi Point	Laos (aborted)	B	Fair
5	G	3020	Rand	Cubi Point	Laos, North Vietnam	B	Good
8	G	3023	Jones	Cubi Point	Laos, North Vietnam	B	Good
10	G	3024	Edens	Cubi Point	Laos, North Vietnam	B	Poor
16	G	3025	Baker	Cubi Point	Laos, North Vietnam	B	Exc
18	G	3026	Cherbonneaux	Cubi Point	Laos, North Vietnam	B	Good
Mar 19	G	3028	Barnes	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
21	G	3029	Knutson	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
Apr 6	G	3030	Kratt	Laughlin	Cuba, Dominican Republic	B	Good
8	G	3032	Rand	Laughlin	Dominican Republic	B	Good
11	G	3033	Jones	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
13	G	3034	Edens	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Fair
15	G	3035	Dunaway	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
15	G	3036	Baker	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
16	G	3037	Cherbonneaux	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
17	G	3038	Barnes	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
17	G	3039	Knutson	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~1961 cont'd:

Apr 18	G	3040	Kratt	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
18	G	3041	Rand	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
19	G	3042	Jones	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
20	G	3043	Edens	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Exc
23	G	3045	Dunaway	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
29	G	3047	Baker	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
May 23	G	3048	Cherbonneaux	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
Jun 15	G	3049	Barnes	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
28	G	3051	Knutson	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
Jul 27	G	3052		Laughlin	Cuba (aborted)	B	Poor
28	G	3053		Laughlin	Cuba (aborted)	B	Poor
29	G	3054	Baker	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
Aug 16	G	3055	Rand	Cubi Point	North Vietnam	B	Good
16	G	3056		Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
Sep 3	G	3058	Cherbonneaux	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
Oct 26	G	3060	Knutson	Edwards	Cuba	B	Good
Dec 6	G	3061	Barnes	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good

1962:

Jan 12	H	GRC100	Ch'en	Tao Yuan	Missile Test Range	B	Good
19	G	3062	Cherbonneaux	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good

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~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~1962 cont'd:

Feb	2	G	3065	Rand	Edwards	Cuba	B	Fair
	21	G	3066	Erickson	Tao Yuan	North Vietnam	B	Good
	23	H	GRC102	Yang	Tao Yuan	Lanchou	B	Good
	24	G	3067	Baker	Edwards	Cuba	B	Good
Mar	13	H	GRC104	Hua	Tao Yuan	Kunming	B	Fair
	13	G	3069	Erickson	Tao Yuan	North Vietnam	B	Poor
	15	G	3071	Edens	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	21	G	3072	Erickson	Tao Yuan	North Vietnam	B	Fair
	26	H	GRC106	Wang	Tao Yuan	Central China	B	Good
Apr	1	G	3074	Barnes	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	6	G	3076	Erickson	Tao Yuan	North Vietnam	B	Good
May	2	G	3078	Rand	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	6	G	6056	Knutson	Tao Yuan	North Vietnam	B	Good
	22	G	3079	Edens	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Exc
Jun	6	G	3080	Barnes	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	15	G	3081	Cherbonneaux	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	15	H	GRC112	Yang	Tao Yuan	Harbin	B	Good
	18	G	3082	Knutson	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	19	H	GRC113	Wang	Tao Yuan	MTR	B	Good
	23	G	6058	Baker	Tao Yuan	North Vietnam	B	Fair
	25	H	GRC115	Ch'en	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Good
	28	H	GRC116	Yang	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Good
	29	G	3083	Cherbonneaux	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	30	H	GRC117	Hua	Tao Yuan	Nanchang, Taiwan Straits	B	Fair

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

1962 cont'd.

Jul	5	H	GRC119	Yang	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Fair
	8	G	3084	Knutson	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Fair
	9	H	GRC120	Ch'en	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Good
	12	G	3085	Cherbonneaux	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	22	G	6060	Barnes	Tao Yuan	North Vietnam	B	Poor
	28	H	GRC123	Wang	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Fair
Aug	5	G	3086	Baker	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	11	H	GRC125	Hua	Tao Yuan	Peiping, Manchuria	B	Fair
	29	G	3088	Erickson	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
Sep	5	G	3089	Edens	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	8	H	GRC 126	Yang	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Good
	9	H	GRC 127	Ch'en	Tao Yuan	Nanchang	B	LOST
	17	G	3091	Baker	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Fair
	22	G	3092		Laughlin	Cuba	B	Fair
	26	G	3093	Rand	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Good
	29	G	3095	Edens	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Exc
Oct	5	G	3098	Barnes	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Fair
	6	G	3099		Laughlin	Cuba (aborted)	B	Poor
	7	G	3100	Knutson	Laughlin	Cuba	B	Fair
Dec	5	G	3201	Rand	Takhli	Kashmir, Tibet	B	Good
	5	H	GRC 128	Hua	Tao Yuan	North Korea	B	Good
	10	G	3203	Baker	Takhli	NEFA, Tibet	B	Good
	25	H	GRC 134	Wang	Tao Yuan	Szechwan	B	Good
	28	H	GRC 136	Hua	Tao Yuan	South China (aborted)	B	Fair

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~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~1962 cont'd:

Dec 27	G	3206	Knutson	Takhli	North Vietnam	B	Good
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1963:

Jan 3	G	3210	Baker	Takhli	Kashmir, Tibet	B	Fair
19	G	3213	Cherbonneaux	Takhli	Lhasa, Tibet	B	Good
20	H	GRC 138	Yang	Tao Yuan	Szechwan	B	Good
22	G	3215	Edens	Takhli	Tibet, Changtu, Burma Border	B	Good
Mar 1	G	3218	Cherbonneaux	Takhli	North Vietnam	B	Fair
2	G	3219	Cherbonneaux	Takhli	North Vietnam	B	Good
28	H	GRC 144	Wang	Tao Yuan	MTR Pao Tou	B	Good
30	H	GRC 146	Hua	Tao Yuan	Szechwan	B	Good
Apr 3	H	GRC 147	Yang	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Good
30	G	3221	Knutson	Takhli	China, N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Good
May 3	G	3222	Rand	Takhli	China, N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Good
9	H	GRC 150	Wang	Tao Yuan	North Korea, Manchuria	B	Fair
13	G	3224	Knutson	Takhli	China, N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
14	G	3225	Rand	Takhli	North Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
15	G	3226	Baker	Takhli	North Vietnam	B	Fair
28	H	GRC 152	Yang	Tao Yuan	North Korea, Manchuria	B	Fair
Jun 3	H	GRC 153	Hua	Tao Yuan	Rivers, Lanchou	B	Fair
4	H	GRC 154	Wang	Tao Yuan	Rivers, Nanchang, Changsha	B	Good
12	H	GRC 156	Hua	Tao Yuan	Sian, Paotou	B	Good

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

1963 cont'd:

Aug	10	G	6066	Knutson	Takhli	North Vietnam	B	Good
	23	H	GRC 169	Lee	Tao Yuan	Manchuria	B	Exc
	30	H	GRC 171	Yeh	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Good
Sep	25	H	GRC 176	Lee	Tao Yuan	MTR, Koko Nor	B	Exc
	26	H	GRC 178	Yeh	Tao Yuan	Paotou, Peiping	B	Exc
	29	G	3227	Barnes	Takhli	Kashmir, Tibet	B	Good
	30	H	GRC 180	Hua	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Good
Oct	6	H	GRC 181	Wang	Tao Yuan	North Korea	B	Exc
	8	H	GRC 182	Lee	Tao Yuan	North Korea, Manchuria	B	Good
	10	G	3230	Barnes	Takhli	Lhasa, Tibet	B	Fair
	11	G	3231	Barnes	Takhli	North Vietnam	B	Good
	26	G	3235	Baker	Takhli	North Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	29	G	3236	Rand	Takhli	Lhasa, Tibet, Gartok	B	Good
Nov	1	H	GRC 184	Yeh	Tao Yuan	MTR	B	LOST
	10	G	3238	Rand	Takhli	NEFA, China/Burma Border	B	Good
	14	G	3239	Edens	Takhli	China/Burma Border, Laos	B	Poor
	15	G	3241	Bedford	Takhli	China/Burma Border, Laos	B	Fair
	17	G	3243	Edens	Takhli	North Vietnam	B	Exc
Dec	3	G	3250	Barnes	Ramey	Western Venezuela	B	Good
	6	G	3252	Erickson	Ramey	Northern Venezuela	B	Good
	13	G	3253	Edens	Ramey	British Guiana	B	Good
	14	G	3254	Barnes	Ramey	British Guiana	B	Good
	18	G	3256	Erickson	Ramey	Venezuela, British Guiana	B	Good
	19	G	3257	Edens	Ramey	Venezuela, British Guiana	B	Good
	29	G	6070	Rand	Takhli	S. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia	112A	Exc
	30	G	6071	Bedford	Takhli	N. Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos	112A	Exc

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

1964:

Jan	7	G	0014E	Rand	Tao Yuan	S. Vietnam, Cambodia	B	Good
Feb	24	G	0034E	Baker	Tao Yuan	S. Vietnam	B	Exc
	29	G	0064E	Knutson	Tao Yuan	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
Mar	1	G	S074E	Baker	Tao Yuan	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	6	G	S104E	Baker	Tao Yuan	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Good
	11	G	S014A	Erickson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	12	G	S024A	Knutson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	14	G	S034A	Erickson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Good
	15	G	S044A	Knutson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	16	G	S064A	Knutson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	16	H	C024C	Lee	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Good
	17	G	S074A	Edens	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	20	G	S084A	Knutson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	29	G	S114A	Erickson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	31	G	T124A	Edens	Takhli	Tibet, NEFA, SW China	B	Good
Apr	4	G	S144A	Knutson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Good
	6	G	S154A	Erickson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	7	G	S164A	Edens	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	12	G	S184A	Knutson	Takhli	Cambodia	B	Good
	15	G	S194A	Erickson	Takhli	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Fair
	24	G	S214A	Rand	Cubi point	N. Vietnam, Laos	B	Exc
May	19	G	W224A	Barnes	USS Ranger	French Atomic Test	112B	Good
	22	G	W234A	Edens	USS Ranger	French Atomic Test	112B	Good
	24	G	T284A	Erickson	Charbatia	Tibet, Lhasa	B	Good

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~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~1964 cont'd:

Jun 26	H	C114C	Lee	Tao Yuan	Hainan Island	B	Fair
Jul 5	H	C134C	Lee	Tao Yuan	Hainan Island (aborted)	B	Poor
7	H	C174C	Wang	Tao Yuan	Shanghai, Wuhu	B	Exc
7	H	C184C	Lee	Tao Yuan	Lungchi	B	LOST
Oct 31	H	C224C	Chang	Tao Yuan	Lanchou	B	Good
Nov 7	H	C244C	Wang(Johnny)	Tao Yuan	N. Korea, N. China	B	Good
14	H	C264C	Chang	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Good
15	H	C274C	Wang (Johnny)	Tao Yuan	South and Central China	B	Good
22	H	C284C	Chang	Tao Yuan	Lanchou (aborted)	IR	Poor
25	H	C304C	Wang (Johnny)	Tao Yuan	Lanchou (aborted)	IR	Fair
Dec 9	H	C324C	Wang (Pete)	Tao Yuan	Manchuria	B	Good
16	G	T314A	Knutson	Charbatia	Kashmir	B	Good
17	G	T324A	Baker	Charbatia	Lhasa, NEFA	B	Good
19	H	C344C		Tao Yuan	Lanchou (aborted)	IR	Poor
20	G	T344A	Schmarr	Charbatia	Lhasa, Nagchlu Dzong	B	Good
30	H	C374C	Chang	Tao Yuan	Szechwan Basin	B	Fair

1965:

Jan 8	H	C015C	Wang (Johnny)	Tao Yuan	Lanchou	IR	Good
10	H	C025C	Chang	Tao Yuan	Paotou	IR	LOST
Feb 19	H	C045C	Wang (Pete)	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Good
22	H	C055C	Wang (Johnny)	Tao Yuan	South China (aborted)	B	Fair
24	H	C065C	Wang (Pete)	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Exc

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~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

1965 cont'd:

Mar 12	H	C105C	Wu	Tao Yuan	South China (aborted)	B	Poor
14	H	C115C	Wu	Tao Yuan	South China (fired on)	B	Good
Apr 17	H	C215C	Wang(Johnny)	Tao Yuan	Hainan Island	B	Poor
27	H	C225C		Tao Yuan	South China (aborted)	B	Poor
30	H	C245C	Wu	Tao Yuan	East China	B	Good
May 14	H	C285C	Wang (Pete)	Tao Yuan	Ning Ming	112B	Fair
27	H	C335C	Wang (Johnny)	Tao Yuan	Canton, Leiyang	B	Good
28	H	C325C	Wu	Tao Yuan	Swatow, Foochow	B	Good
Jul 2	H	C355C	Wang (Johnny)	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Good
3	H	C365C	Wang (Pete)	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Fair
20	H	C395C	Yu (Mickey)	Tao Yuan	Hainan Island	B	Good
21	H	C405C	Chuang (Spike)	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Good
31	H	C425C	Liu (Terry)	Tao Yuan	North Korea	B	Good
Aug 24	H	C455C	Wu	Tao Yuan	Ning Ming, Nanning	B	Good
25	H	C465C	Wang (Johnny)	Tao Yuan	Hainan Island	112B	Good
26	H	C475C	Wang (Pete)	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits, E. China	B	Good
Sep 5	H	C485C	Liu	Tao Yuan	N. Vietnam, China/Laos Border	B	Poor
18	H	C495C	Yu	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Exc
Oct 16	H	C535C	Yu	Tao Yuan	N. China, China Coast	112B	Good
19	H	C555C	Wu	Tao Yuan	S. China, Sub Search	B	Good
20	H	C545C	Liu	Tao Yuan	Laos, Burma, SW China	B	Fair
29	G	S015A	Schmarr	Takhli	Cambodia	B	Poor

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~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~1965 cont'd:

Nov 7	G	S025A	Barnes	Takhli	Cambodia	B	Good
8	H	C565C	Liu	Tao Yuan	SW China	B	Poor
14	H	C575C	Yu	Tao Yuan	SW China (aborted)	B	Poor
23	H	C595C	Yu	Tao Yuan	SW China	B	Good
28	H	C605C	Chuang	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Exc

1966:

Feb 3	G	0026H		Takhli	S. Vietnam	112B	Good
Mar 28	H	C036C	Chuang	Tao Yuan	SW China	B	Fair
Apr 7	H	C056C	Liu	Tao Yuan	SW China	B	Poor
19	H	C076C	Yu	Tao Yuan	Shenyang, N. China	112B	Poor
May 4	H	C116C	Liu	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Poor
14	H	C126C	Chuang	Tao Yuan	SW China, Kunming	B	Good
15	H	C136C	Liu	Tao Yuan	SW China (aborted)	B	Poor
Aug 3	H	C146C	Chuang	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Good
16	H	C156C	Liu	Tao Yuan	Hainan Island (aborted)	B	Poor
24	H	C176C	Chuang	Tao Yuan	Canton	B	Fair
Nov 26	H	C216C	Liu	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Good

1967:

Jan 4	H	C027C	Liu	Tao Yuan	South China	B	Exc
Mar 28	H	C117C	Feng	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits	B	Poor

~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~1967 cont'd:

Apr 9	H	C147C	Liu	Tao Yuan	South China		B	Exc
13	H	C157C	Feng	Tao Yuan	Manchuria	50X1, E.O.13526	B	Good
May 7	H	C167C	Chuang	Tao Yuan			Tracker	Exc
16	H	C177C	Chang	Tao Yuan	SW China		B	Exc
25	H	C187C	Feng	Tao Yuan	South China		B	Good
Jul 20	H	C237C	Feng	Tao Yuan	South China		B	Good
Aug 10	H	C257C	Chou	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits		B	Fair
20	H	C267C	Chuang	Tao Yuan	Taiwan Straits		H	Good
26	H	C277C	Feng	Tao Yuan	South China		B	Exc
30	H	C287C	Chang	Tao Yuan			Tracker	Poor
Sep 8	H	C297C	Huang (Tom)	Tao Yuan	Shanghai	50X1, E.O.13526	B	LOST
Dec 13	H	C327C	Chuang	Tao Yuan	NE China		H	Exc

1968:

Jan 5	H	C018C	Chang	Tao Yuan	Central China		H	Good
Mar 16	H	C058C	Feng	Tao Yuan	SW China		B	Good
27	G	S018E	Hall	Takhli	Cambodia		Delta	Exc
Apr 3	G	S028E	Hall	Takhli	Cambodia		Delta	Exc
May 18	H	C068C	Chang	Tao Yuan	China Coast		Syst XVII	Poor

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Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

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IDEALIST MISSION HISTORY

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	Total
U. S. S. R.	5	16	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	26
Satellites	8	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
Indonesia	0	0	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	31
Middle East	36	18	58	37	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	152
Laos/VN/Camb.	0	0	0	3	0	8	8	15	19	2	0	55
Cuba	0	0	0	0	5	24	21	0	0	0	0	50
NEFA/Nepal/ Tibet/China	0	0	3	7	3	0	20	20	16	28	8	105
N. Korea/ Manchuria	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	2	1	1	9
S. America	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	6
Miscellaneous	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
Elint	1	4	12	17	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	43
Total	50	42	105	65	23	32	50	45	39	31	9	491

As of 31 December 1966

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