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Please be advised that the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) has concluded its consideration of the mandatory declassification review appeal 2008-049 filed by you and that the 60-day period during which an agency head may appeal an ISCAP decision to the President has expired. Enclosed are copies of the documents and a chart that outlines the ISCAP decisions on the records under appeal. With the exception of any information that is otherwise authorized and warranted for withholding under applicable law, we are releasing all information declassified by the ISCAP to you. If you have questions about this appeal, please contact William Carpenter of my staff at (202) 357-5250.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM A. CIRA
Executive Secretary

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Joseph W. Lambert
Central Intelligence Agency Member of the ISCAP
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 1/8

MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL IMAGERY, IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE, GEOSPATIAL ACTIVITIES, AND RELATED INFORMATION

(EFFECTIVE 21 March 2001)

(U//) Pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996; Executive Order 12333; Executive Order 12591; Presidential Decision Directive 49, and other applicable statutes, Presidential orders, and directives, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) establishes these policies and procedures for the management of national imagery, imagery intelligence, geospatial activities, and related matters. Applicable provisions cited in DCID 1/1 (19 November 1998) and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Between The Secretary of Defense and The Director of Central Intelligence on The National Imagery and Mapping Agency dated 16 October 1998 and 11 February 2000, respectively, are included by reference.

I. (U//) Purpose

This directive sets forth responsibilities and policies of the DCI and Intelligence Community (IC) elements and establishes DCI policies and procedures for managing national imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial activities and information to satisfy the US Government’s intelligence needs consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Nothing in this directive is intended to modify the authorities of the heads of executive departments or agencies, consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of the DCI, to manage elements of the IC under their responsibilities.

II. (U//) Policy

Imagery, imagery intelligence, geospatial activities, related information, and assets must be managed to provide timely and accurate support to the President, National Security Council, the departments and agencies of the United States and the Congress. With due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the DCI will foster and support IC collaboration and innovation across intelligence.

disciplines, recognize the needs of national and departmental intelligence consumers, establish a framework for national and international relationships, and ensure elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication. All IC elements with responsibilities for overseeing and conducting activities relating to intelligence requirements and the application of IC collection, analytic, and production capabilities will play an integral, mutually supportive role under this and other applicable directives. These elements shall collaborate to ensure that activities addressed by this directive and other intelligence activities are consistent and complementary, and shall refer ambiguities in responsibilities or missions to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM) for resolution.

III. (S) Responsibilities

A. (S) General

Consistent with applicable law, the DCI will establish, approve, and support policies, prioritized requirements, and collaborative mechanisms to govern, oversee, and clarify responsibilities relating to national imagery collection, analytic, and production resources and activities, including foreign intelligence-sharing arrangements; support national policymakers and other intelligence customers; support all-source analysis and production and clandestine operations; develop and implement programs and policies to review and correct deficiencies in the national imagery missions; eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication; integrate imagery operations across the IC and consumer communities; and provide for appropriate dissemination and release of imagery and related information.

B. (S) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM)

1. (U//FOUO) The DDCI/CM, subject to the guidance and direction of the DCI and, as appropriate, through the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production (ADCI/AP) and the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection (ADCI/C), shall:

a. Advise and assist the DCI in carrying out the DCI's Community-wide management responsibilities related to this directive, to include ensuring and overseeing the efficient and effective tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of imagery and imagery intelligence.
b. Serve as the principal officer for coordination, approval, and oversight of IC imagery, imagery intelligence, and related policies and activities involving foreign cooperative arrangements.

c. Provide policy guidance and direction to DCI committees.

2. The ADCI/AP and the ADCI/C are the DCI's designees for establishing priorities and resolution of conflicts regarding the prioritization of national imagery requirements and collection tasking priorities, respectively, if these requirements and priorities cannot be resolved in Community fora.

C. DCI Committees

1. The Remote Sensing Committee (RSCOM) is the principal Intelligence Community policy and planning group for imagery, imagery intelligence, and related geospatial activities under this directive and shall carry out its assigned functions pursuant to the "DCI Implementation of Foreign Remote Sensing Policy," dated 15 June 1998, or successor direction. The RSCOM shall:

a. Advise and support the DDCI/CM and the IC Deputies and Principals Committees on policy issues and oversight of assigned remote sensing and related activities, to include programs for sharing national imagery, remote sensing technology, and related capabilities with allies, coalition partners, international organizations, and others, as appropriate.

b. Serve as the principal IC vehicle to coordinate remote sensing policy and will, as appropriate, commission and review assessments of remote sensing capabilities, risks, and forecasts conducted by member organizations.

2. The Operations Committee (OPSCOM) is the DCI's Community forum responsible for:

a. Reviewing and advising the DCI's designees on imagery collection priorities and tasking.
b. Supporting, as appropriate, the effective management of the collection tasking, processing, production, exploitation, and dissemination processes.

D. (S) National Imagery and Mapping Agency

1. (U//FOUO) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is the principal IC element with responsibilities relating to national imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial activities and related matters.

2. (U//FOUO) The Director, NIMA (D/NIMA), in accordance with applicable laws, policies, and DCI and other applicable directives and guidance, and as appropriate on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and pursuant to agreement between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, is the DCI’s principal imagery advisor and shall:

a. (U//FOUO) Support the approved imagery intelligence requirements of the IC and other US departments, agencies, and customers, to include provision of timely and accurate processing, production, exploitation, and dissemination of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

b. (U//FOUO) To help ensure the promulgation and implementation of DCI policies related to imagery, imagery intelligence, and related geospatial activities and information:

i. Formulate, coordinate and, upon DCI approval, implement policies, directives, manuals, and guidance relating to national imagery and imagery intelligence activities and related information and derived product, including related geospatial product.

ii. Formulate, coordinate and, upon DCI approval, implement national imagery policy, to include national imagery security policy, governing the use of products from national satellite and airborne reconnaissance systems for intelligence policy and geospatial applications, and for other appropriate functions in support of Federal departments and agencies.
iii. Maintain the DCI's Imagery Policy Series (IPS) and implement DCI policies relating to imagery-derived products, historical satellite and airborne imagery, sensitive signatures, domestic imagery, data releasability, and related functions.

iv. Coordinate special controls on various imagery products through the Controlled Access Program Coordination Office (CAPCO) in the Community Management Staff (CMS).

v. Establish and maintain IC fora, such as the Imagery Policy and Security Committee (IPSCOM) or other committees and processes, as needed, to assist in the formulation and implementation of DCI imagery policies and forward matters that cannot be resolved in Community fora to the DCI or designee for decision.

c. Ensure the effective management of processes for the collection tasking, processing, production, exploitation, and dissemination of imagery; to include implementing decisions of the DCI's designees for the approval of collection requirements levied on national imagery assets, determination of priorities for such requirements, and resolution of conflicts in such priorities except as may be agreed between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President.

d. (U//FOUO) Serve as the Program Manager for the National Imagery and Mapping Program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).

e. (U//FOUO) Serve as the IC Functional Manager for imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial investment activities.

f. (U//FOUO) Manage an archive of national and commercial imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information on behalf of the IC and authorized users.

g. (U//FOUO) Perform such other functions related to national imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial activities and information as set forth in applicable directive, MOA, or as assigned pursuant to applicable authorities.
h. (U//FOUO) Provide administrative support to the OPSCOM.

E. (S) Imagery Requirements and Collection Tasking,
Analysis, and Production

1. (U//FOUO) Imagery and Imagery Intelligence
   Requirements

   With the advice of the OPSCOM, the D/NIMA will:

   a. Review substantive imagery, imagery intelligence,
      and geospatial information collection, exploitation,
      and analytic and production requirements and
      priorities.

   b. Develop and submit to the National Intelligence
      Production Board a consolidated statement of these
      requirements and priorities in accordance with the
      policies and procedures established by the ADCI/AP.

2. (S) Collection Tasking

   a. (U//FOUO) The Chairman, OPSCOM, appointed by
      the DCI after consideration of candidates
      recommended by the D/NIMA, is responsible for the
      day-to-day approval of collection requirements
      levied on national imagery collection assets;
      determination of priorities for such requirements;
      and resolution of conflicts in such priorities in
      accordance with applicable law, presidential
      directive, and MOA.

   b. (U//FOUO) The Chairman, OPSCOM, shall resolve
      conflicts in collection tasking priorities subject
      to the guidance and direction of the ADCI/C and the
      ADCI/AP, except as otherwise agreed between the DCI
      and the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the
      direction of the President.

   c. (S) The Chairman, OPSCOM, shall make
      recommendations to the D/NIMA and the ADCI/C on
      advisory tasking for theater and tactical assets and
      on opportunities for Department of Defense imagery
      collection elements to meet national intelligence
      and other imagery requirements when these elements
      are assigned to or under the operational control of
      the Secretary of a Military Department or the
      Commander of a Combatant Command.
h. (U//FOOU) Provide administrative support to the OPSCOM.

E. (S) Imagery Requirements and Collection Tasking, Analysis, and Production

1. (U//FOOU) Imagery and Imagery Intelligence Requirements

With the advice of the OPSCOM, the D/NIMA will:

a. Review substantive imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information collection, exploitation, and analytic and production requirements and priorities.

b. Develop and submit to the National Intelligence Production Board a consolidated statement of these requirements and priorities in accordance with the policies and procedures established by the ADCI/AP.

2. (S) Collection Tasking

a. (U//FOOU) The Chairman, OPSCOM, appointed by the DCI after consideration of candidates recommended by the D/NIMA, is responsible for the day-to-day approval of collection requirements levied on national imagery collection assets; determination of priorities for such requirements; and resolution of conflicts in such priorities in accordance with applicable law, presidential directive, and MOA.

b. (U//FOOU) The Chairman, OPSCOM, shall resolve conflicts in collection tasking priorities subject to the guidance and direction of the ADCI/C and the ADCI/AP, except as otherwise agreed between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President.

c. (S) The Chairman, OPSCOM, shall make recommendations to the D/NIMA and the ADCI/C on advisory tasking for theater and tactical assets and on opportunities for Department of Defense imagery collection elements to meet national intelligence and other imagery requirements when these elements are assigned to or under the operational control of the Secretary of a Military Department or the Commander of a Combatant Command.
3. (U//FOUO) Analysis and Production

a. The ADCI/AP and D/NIMA shall keep the DCI advised of efforts to ensure that imagery intelligence support to all-source analysis and production is in no way degraded or compromised, and advised of the adequacy of existing capabilities, processes, and infrastructure.

b. The D/NIMA will support the DDCI/CM and the designee of the Secretary of Defense in their joint responsibilities to determine policies and programs necessary to review and correct deficiencies identified in the capabilities of the imagery and geospatial communities to accomplish assigned national missions, including support to the all-source analysis and production process.

F. (S) Foreign Disclosure or Dissemination of Imagery, Imagery Intelligence, and Related Geospatial Information

1. (U//FOUO) The foreign disclosure or release of imagery, imagery intelligence, and imagery derived products, including related geospatial information and support will be governed by DCID 6/7: Intelligence Disclosure Policy, and other applicable policies, directives, and procedures.

2. (S) The RSCOM is the DCI's policy forum for the development of remote sensing cooperative arrangements as well as remote sensing exports and transfers. Lead agencies shall coordinate with the RSCOM regarding potential foreign cooperative arrangements and support relating to imagery, imagery intelligence, and imagery derived product, including related geospatial information, and related support to intelligence or security services or other entities of foreign countries and international organizations.

3. (U//FOUO) The IPSCOM is the Community forum for review and coordination of imagery classification and handling guidance, including guidelines and techniques for processing and marking imagery and derived product for disclosure or release.

4. (U//FOUO) Requests for foreign disclosure or release of imagery, imagery intelligence, or related derived product that cannot be resolved in Community fora consistent with DCID 6/7 must be submitted to the DCI or designee for approval.
5. (U//FCD) The D/NIMA shall, in coordination with appropriate IC elements, develop for DCI approval policies, procedures, and guidance, consistent with DCID 6/7 and policy guidance from the RSCOM, for the disclosure and release of imagery, imagery intelligence, related geospatial information, derived product, and related activities and information to foreign countries, entities, or persons.

G. (U//FCD) Architecture, Interoperability, and Acquisitions

Subject to applicable guidance of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, or their designees, and consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the D/NIMA shall:

1. Formulate and implement policies, plans, standards, and end-to-end architectures for integrated operations across all facets of the imagery and geospatial information process among national, theater, and tactical programs, to include integration of civil and commercial imagery.

2. Gather and compile imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial information requirements; prescribe and mandate system and data standards and end-to-end technical architectures related to interoperability among diverse users.

3. Perform, direct, or coordinate the research, design, development, deployment, operation, and maintenance of systems related to the collection, tasking, processing, exploitation, dissemination, and archiving of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.

4. Transfer or otherwise provide such systems as appropriate.

5. Develop and field systems of common concern related to imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.

6. Coordinate, on behalf of the IC, advanced research and development activities and related technology initiatives and investments in the imagery and geospatial community; identify opportunities for high-risk R&D investments and innovations leading to fundamental changes and significant improvements in processes and practices; and leverage expertise and capabilities through partnerships among elements in the IC, industry and academia.
7. Support the Mission Requirements Board, the Executive Director, Intelligence Community Affairs, and the Senior Acquisition Executive, in the Office of the DDCI/CM, to enable them to provide timely, comprehensive, independent, and informed advice and perform their assigned responsibilities with respect to imagery activities and related matters.

8. Advise the DCI on the ability of existing imagery collection systems to meet IC priorities and on future needs for imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information capabilities and systems to meet national missions.

9. Identify and analyze the industrial base to meet essential imagery requirements of national customers and to ensure that industrial base effects on NIMA functions are considered.

10. Assess commercial sector capability to meet imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information needs of the IC.

H. (U//FOUO) Civil Applications and Domestic Imagery

The D/NIMA shall establish procedures to ensure legal review of requests for the tasking of national imagery assets to collect domestic imagery, the tasking of such assets to collect imagery for civil agencies, the dissemination of national imagery pursuant to collection or from archives to civil agencies or for assistance to law enforcement, or any other collection or dissemination of imagery from national assets or archives involving US persons or assistance to law enforcement. Prior to submission to the Chairman, OPSCOM, or his designee for approval, such requests shall be referred to the DCI’s Office of General Counsel for concurrence, unless the DCI’s General Counsel agrees such concurrence is not required.

Director of Central Intelligence

21 March 2001

21 March 2001

Date
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/9

BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

(Effective 18 May 1976)

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905, and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, the following responsibilities and procedures are hereby established.

1. Purpose

This directive establishes responsibilities and procedures for Intelligence Community organizations for the collection and production of biographic intelligence on foreign personalities of intelligence interest for national security purposes.

2. Collection

a. The Department of State shall be primarily responsible for the collection of biographic information on political, economic, scientific, technical, social and cultural personalities.

b. The Department of Defense shall be primarily responsible for the collection of biographic information on military personalities and on scientific, technical and economic personalities directly associated with foreign military and military support activities.

3. Production

a. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the production of biographic intelligence on foreign political personalities.

b. The Department of Defense shall be responsible for the production of biographic intelligence on foreign military personalities.

c. In answer to specific requests or requirements, each department or agency has the responsibility to produce, evaluate or make available to authorized recipients biographic intelligence and data on foreign personalities within its assigned categories of responsibility.

4. Community responsibilities

All pertinent biographic information collected or developed within Intelligence Community organizations shall be forwarded to the department or agency having primary responsibility as assigned in paragraph 3. above.

1 This directive supersedes DCID 1/9 effective 26 October 1961.

George Bush
Director of Central Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2008-049, document no. 2
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: December 02, 2016
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/13

COORDINATION OF THE COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION OF IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

(Effective 18 May 1976)

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11650, and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, a Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) is hereby established as a standing Director of Central Intelligence Committee with the following mission and functions.

1. Mission

The mission of the committee, under the general guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence, is to advise, assist and direct, as directed, in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities set forth in NSC 1, 3 and 8 with respect to the collection, processing and exploitation of imagery; to advise the National Foreign Intelligence Board; to assist in coordination within the Intelligence Community the accomplishment of intelligence objectives established by the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with his priorities; and to promote the effective use of Community imagery collection and exploitation resources and products both at the National and military command levels. The COMIREX is not responsible for providing guidance to tactical reconnaissance assets in direct support of US and Allied forces.

2. Functions

The functions of the committee are:

a. To recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence and coordinate policies, directives and guidance for the collection, processing and exploitation of imagery.

b. To maintain a cognizance of plans, programs and practices of overhead reconnaissance and the processing and exploitation of derived imagery; and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence of the responsiveness to national needs for intelligence information of existing and potential systems and resources for the collection and exploitation of overhead reconnaissance imagery.

SECRET

NORTH

DCID No. 115

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507)
The committee shall make appropriate recommendations to ensure the validity and practicality of such guidance in the light of changing national circumstances, the intelligence objectives and priorities established by the DCI, and cost effectiveness and certain risk considerations.

d. To monitor, evaluate and report the status and effectiveness of overhead reconnaissance coverage of defined areas and targets and the timeliness of exploitation reporting of such coverage.

e. To evaluate:

(1) Imagery products in the exploitation effort in terms of utility, quality, timeliness and cost, and

(2) The need to change either collection or exploitation guidance accordingly.

f. To coordinate all matters relating to the evaluation, revision, implementation and execution of the National Tasking Plan; and, as appropriate, to maintain cognizance of other policies and plans relating to imagery exploitation.

g. To examine current and planned overhead reconnaissance imagery collection systems and make recommendations, as appropriate, with respect to imagery exploitation requirements, techniques and information handling capabilities, including any specific needs for overseas processing of such imagery for national purposes.

h. To provide the effective interface of research and development on imagery processing and interpretation equipment with projected exploitation activities at the national and departmental levels; and to provide a focal point for the expeditious exchange of information in the interest of ensuring coordinated equipment procurement programs.

i. To make recommendations, advise on and develop the procedures governing the utilization of the products from overhead imagery reconnaissance to include:

(1) Dissemination,

(2) Special security controls;

(3) Provisions for use outside special controls; and

(4) The release or disclosure of such imagery or derived information to be made to foreign governments or international organizations in which the US Government participates.
3. Community responsibilities

Upon request of the committee chairman, Intelligence Community organizations shall furnish to the committee within established security safeguards particular information or materials needed by the committee and pertinent to its functions.

4. Composition, organization and rules of procedure

a. The composition, organization and rules of procedure of the COMIREX are those stated in DCID 1/3.

b. The Chairman of COMIREX, as necessary, shall call upon Intelligence Community organizations engaged in imagery reconnaissance or exploitation under the purview of this directive to provide consultants to assist the committee.

George Bush
Director of Central Intelligence
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 2/6P

Biographic Intelligence

(Effective 4 August 1982)

1. Purpose

This directive assigns responsibilities to designated Intelligence Community components for the collection, maintenance, and production of biographic intelligence, as services of common concern, on foreign personalities of potential national intelligence interest.

2. Primary Responsibilities

As services of common concern:

The Department of State will collect biographic information on foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, social, and cultural personalities.

The Department of Defense will collect biographic information on foreign military personalities and on scientific, technical, and economic personalities directly associated with foreign military and military support activities.

The Department of Defense will maintain data bases and produce biographic intelligence on foreign military personalities.

The Central Intelligence Agency will maintain data bases and produce biographic intelligence on foreign political personalities.

Responsible components will service requests and requirements from the Intelligence Community and other parts of the United States Government and will make available pertinent biographic intelligence as appropriate.

3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities

All biographic information collected or developed by Intelligence Community components will be forwarded to the component with primary responsibility for the production and maintenance of foreign biographic intelligence.

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2008-049, document no. 4
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: December 02, 2016
Footnotes

(1) This directive supersedes DCID 1/9, effective 18 May 1976. Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507).
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
2/10P

National Signals Intelligence Requirements and Policy Coordination

(Effective 1 June 1992)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and Executive Order 12333, responsibility is hereby assigned for the development of requirements and the coordination of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) policies on national signals intelligence.

1. Policy

The National SIGINT Committee, which is under the National Security Agency, will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence, in addition to the Director, National Security Agency, in the discharge of duties and responsibilities concerning signals intelligence set forth in Executive Order 12333. The Committee will monitor and assist in coordinating, within the Intelligence Community, the accomplishment of objectives established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Responsibilities

Under the guidance of the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA), the Committee serves as an Intelligence Community advocacy forum for the users of signals intelligence information and programs. It also assists the DIRNSA in coordinating SIGINT approaches to the satisfaction of DCI objectives and promotes the effective use of SIGINT resources throughout the Intelligence Community. In fulfilling these responsibilities, the Committee:

a. advises the DIRNSA of the impact of current and future national intelligence objectives and priorities for information and operational support;

b. develops objectives and requirements and establishes the priority and relative importance for specific SIGINT information needs stemming from national intelligence goals;

c. advises the DIRNSA on long-term requirements for SIGINT programs and activities;

d. apprises the DIRNSA of agency and departmental plans and programs involving substantial impacts on SIGINT requirements, programs, and activities;

e. conducts reviews of such SIGINT issues and topics as may be requested by the Director, National Security Agency, the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs, and the Director of Central Intelligence;

g. proposes and recommends policies for the security, compartmentation, and sanitization of signals intelligence information, equipment, and techniques;

h. evaluates the satisfaction of signals intelligence requirements, including the contributions of specific SIGINT programs, and reviews for endorsement evaluations done by others in the US SIGINT System.

The Chairman of the Committee is appointed by the DIRNSA, in consultation with the DCI. The Vice Chairman of the Committee and Chairman and Vice Chairman of standing subcommittees are appointed by the Chairman of the Committee with the consent of the DIRNSA.

The members of the Committee are to be representatives designated by Intelligence Community principals who are authorized to speak on behalf of their principals. Representatives of US Government organizations outside the intelligence Community (e.g., DEA, US Coast Guard, and others having valid specialized SIGINT requirements) may be invited to participate in Committee activities by the Chairman of the Committee, on the approval of the DIRNSA.

Standing subcommittees and task forces to assist the Committee may be established as required.

3. Intelligence Community Assistance

Upon request of the Committee Chairman, Intelligence Community elements will provide information pertinent to the Committee’s responsibilities within approved security safeguards.

Footnotes

(1) This directive supersedes DCID 3/6, effective 12 May 1982.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
2/11P

Management of National Measurement and Signature Intelligence
(Effective December 1992)

Pursuant to Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947, and Executive Order 12333, responsibility is hereby assigned for the management, direction and implementation of DCI policies and procedures on national measurement and signature intelligence matters. Accordingly, this directive establishes policies and procedures for the fulfillment of this responsibility.

1. Policy
Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) must be organized and managed to maximize the full range of capabilities to satisfy the intelligence needs of the National Security Council and the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. These responsibilities must be executed with efficiency and economy in the use of technical and personnel resources. Accordingly, the Central MASINT Office (CMO) of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will support the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Secretary of Defense in the management of MASINT activities. Specifically, the CMO will, as a service of common concern on behalf of the Intelligence Community, provide for the development, coordination, management, direction and implementation of DCI policies and procedures on national MASINT matters. Consistent with applicable law and subject to the guidance of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, the Director, CMO will formulate and implement plans, standards, architectures, policies and procedures to provide for integrated operations across all facets of the MASINT process among national, theater and tactical programs. The Director, CMO will manage MASINT requirements and tasking responsibilities consistent with DCI priorities in peacetime and Secretary of Defense guidance during wartime.

2. Definition
For purposes of this directive, MASINT is technically derived intelligence (excluding traditional imagery and signals intelligence) which, when collected, processed and analyzed, results in intelligence that locates, tracks, identifies or describes the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. MASINT includes the advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from overhead and airborne IMINT and SIGINT collection systems.

MASINT data can be acquired from a variety of satellite, airborne or shipborne platforms; remotely piloted vehicles; or from mobile or fixed ground-based collection sites. MASINT sensors include, but are not limited to, radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear, radiation detection, spectroradiometric and seismic systems as well as gas, liquid and solid materials sampling systems.

Activities undertaken by or on behalf of the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency
3. Responsibilities

The CMO is a joint Intelligence Community-Department of Defense activity within the DIA, staffed by personnel from the DIA and detailed from the Intelligence Community. The Director, CMO is appointed by the Director, DIA.

Under the direction, authority and control of the Director, DIA and subject to the guidance of the DCI on national intelligence manors, the Director, CMO shall, as a service of common concern:

a. Ensure responsive MASINT support to the Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and other U.S. Government departments and agencies.

b. Develop and manage requirements and maintain a National MASINT Requirements System related to the tasking, collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination of MASINT.

c. Develop and implement standards and architectures to foster the interoperability of equipment associated with national and non-national MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination from national and non-national systems controlled within the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense. Ensure that these standards and architectures are consistent with programs conducted by the various departments and agencies of the Federal Government outside the Intelligence Community that use MASINT from national collection systems.

d. Provide centralized functional management of the following MASINT programs and budgets:
   1. The MASINT programs within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, consistent with applicable guidance from the DCI.
   2. The tactical MASINT programs within the budget aggregation known as Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities, consistent with applicable guidance from the Secretary of Defense.
   3. All appropriate research and development activities related to MASINT collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination.

e. Formulate guidance and standards for training personnel involved in MASINT collection management, tasking, exploitation and dissemination at the national and non-national levels.

f. Develop, recommend and implement policy with respect to national and non-national MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, handling and dissemination, including bilateral collection relationships with foreign governments (consistent with applicable DoD and DCI Directives) and the provision of MASINT to entities outside of the U.S. Government. Policies on MASINT handling and dissemination include disclosure, classification and liaison policies which must be approved by the DCI, and matters relating to the application of special security controls associated with various MASINT products as directed by the DCI.

g. Consistent with DCI policy, protect intelligence sources and methods relating to MASINT from unauthorized disclosure.

h. Through a central MASINT tasking authority, task national MASINT collection assets of the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense in accordance with intelligence requirements established by the DCI in peacetime and the Secretary of Defense in wartime, and provide advisory collection tasking to theater and tactical MASINT collection assets not allocated to meet national requirements.

i. Coordinate MASINT exploitation activities among the separate organizations at the national and non-national levels.

j. Advise the DCI and the Secretary of Defense on the adequacy of existing and potential systems to
satisfy requirements for national and non-national MASINT.


1. Develop the infrastructure and processes for multi-discipline interaction with other collection activities.

m. Evaluate the performance of MASINT components of the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense in meeting national and non-national intelligence requirements.

The Director, CMO will perform such other functions related to MASINT as the DCI or the Secretary of Defense may direct. Within the CMO is a central MASINT tasking authority. Among other duties, and subject to the guidance of the DCI, this authority has the specific responsibility for tasking national MASINT systems as well as non-national systems when allocated for national intelligence missions.

Also under the CMO is the MASINT Committee, which will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence, in addition to the Director, DIA and the Director, CMO in the discharge of duties and responsibilities outlined above. The MASINT Committee replaced the DCI MASINT Committee. Under the guidance of the Director, CMO, the MASINT Committee serves as an Intelligence Community forum to assure MASINT information and programs are responsive to user needs. It assists the Director, CMO in coordinating MASINT approaches to the satisfaction of DCI and Secretary of Defense objectives and promotes the effective use of U.S. Government MASINT collection, processing and exploitation resources at all levels. The focus of its activities will be on developing policies and DCI guidance for future MASINT programs and activities, validating and prioritizing specific MASINT requirements, and monitoring and evaluating requirements satisfaction.

The Chairman of the MASINT Committee is appointed by the Director, DIA in consultation with the DCI. The Vice Chairman of the Committee and the Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of standing subcommittees and working groups are appointed by the Chairman of the Committee with the consent of the Director, DIA. The members of the Committee are to be representatives designated by Intelligence Community principals who are authorized to speak on behalf of their principals. Representatives of government organizations outside the Intelligence Community may be invited to participate in Committee activities by the Chairman of the Committee, with the approval of the Director, DIA. The Chairman of the MASINT Committee reports to the Director, CMO, who has direct access to the DCI as required to fulfill Intelligence Community responsibilities.

The CMO will perform the Intelligence Community management responsibilities previously vested in the DCI MASINT Committee.

4. Intelligence Community Assistance

Upon request of the Director, CMO or the MASINT Committee Chairman, Intelligence Community elements shall provide information pertinent to the CMO and Committee mission and functions within approved safeguards.

Footnotes

(1) This directive supersedes DCID 3/17, effective 20 November 1986.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 3/9P

Foreign Atomic Energy Intelligence

(Effective 1 June 1992)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, a Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) is herewith established.

1. Mission

The Committee, in consultation with the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the production of national intelligence on foreign atomic energy issues and will promote the effective use of Intelligence Community resources for this purpose.

2. Definition

Atomic energy intelligence includes foreign research, development, production, transport, control, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, special nuclear materials, and other components of warheads; reactors, nuclear power and propulsion systems, and controlled thermonuclear reactions; installations, equipment, personnel, and other resources related principally to these activities. It also includes environmental hazards and safety aspects of the preceding systems and activities. It does not include intelligence weapons delivery systems other than on the nuclear warheads or nuclear propulsion systems associated therewith.

3. Functions

Under the general guidance of the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, the Committee will:

- a. assess foreign atomic energy developments; produce coordinated intelligence reports; and contribute, as appropriate, to national intelligence products;
- b. keep the DCI apprised on the responsiveness of foreign atomic energy intelligence production to national security requirements, based on monitoring the quality of this production;
- c. make recommendations to the DCI on the need for improvements in collection, analytical, and reporting capabilities in support of foreign atomic energy intelligence production, including, but not limited to:
  1. identification of new collection systems to be developed and deployed;
  2. identification of collection capabilities to be reduced or discontinued;
  3. changes in the processing, reporting, and dissemination of collected intelligence information, including changes which involve contractor support and activities by cooperating foreign intelligence services;
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507)

d. make recommendations on the relative priorities of foreign atomic energy intelligence collection, processing, and analysis;
ed. in coordination with the DCI Security Forum, make recommendations on the dissemination and release of foreign atomic energy intelligence; and
f. schedule, participate in, and provide staff support for international atomic energy intelligence conferences, as approved by the DCI.

4. Intelligence Community Responsibilities

On request by the Committee Chairman, intelligence Community components will provide, within established security safeguards, information pertinent to the Committee's mission and functions.

5. Composition and Organization

The Committee Chairman will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

The members of the Committee will be representatives designated by Intelligence Community principals.

The Chairman will establish subcommittees and other working groups as required.

With the approval of the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, the Committee Chairman may invite representatives of relevant United States Government entities with national security interests to participate as appropriate:

The Committee will be supported by an Executive Secretariat.

Attachment:

- Procedures for Control of Initial Information Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions

PROCEDURES FOR CONTROL OF INITIAL INFORMATION REGARDING FOREIGN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

Attachment to DCID 3/9P

(Effective 1 June 1992)

Pursuant to the provisions of the Director of Central Intelligence Directive on Foreign Atomic Energy Intelligence, the following procedures are established for the dissemination of information on the detection of foreign nuclear explosions:
1. The Chairman, JAEIC, will inform the individual members of the Committee. The Director, DIA, will inform those persons within the Department of Defense who, in his judgment, have an immediate need to receive this information.

2. The Chairman, JAEIC, will prepare a statement summarizing all available information and will convene a meeting of the Committee to participate in the preparation of the statement as he deems appropriate. The statement will be made available as soon as possible to individual JAEIC members who will in turn notify their principals. Further dissemination will be determined by Intelligence Community principals.

7. No public release of information about foreign nuclear tests will be made except as directed by the President or the National Security Council.

Footnotes

(1) These procedures supersede the procedures set forth in the Attachment to DCID 3/9, 18 June 1982.

(2) Procedures governing the control of the dissemination of information on the detection of foreign nuclear explosions are attached.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
3/10P

Foreign Scientific and Technical Intelligence

(Effective 1 June 1992)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC) is herewith established.

1. Mission

The Committee, in consultation with the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the production, coordination, and evaluation of intelligence on foreign scientific and technical developments and will promote the effective use of Intelligence Community resources for this purpose.

2. Functions

Under the general guidance of the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, the Committee will:

a. assess foreign scientific and technical developments, both military and civil, which could affect significantly the national security of the United States, including new physical discoveries and advanced technologies and their application to future military or non-military systems; produce coordinated intelligence reports; and contribute, as appropriate, to national intelligence products;

b. keep the DCI apprised on the responsiveness of foreign scientific and technical intelligence production to national security requirements;

c. make recommendations to the DCI on the need for specific improvements in collection, analytical, and reporting capabilities on foreign scientific and technical developments, to include, but not limited to:

1. identification of new collection capabilities that should be developed and deployed;
2. identification of existing collection capabilities that should be reduced or discontinued;
3. changes in the processing, reporting, and dissemination of collected intelligence information, including changes which involve contractor support and activities;

d. make recommendations on the relative priorities of, and resources needed for, and technical intelligence collection, processing, and analysis;

e. in coordination with the DCI Security Forum, make recommendations on the dissemination and release of and technical intelligence; and

f. schedule, participate in, and provide staff support for and technical intelligence, as approved by the DCI.
3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities

On request by the Committee Chairman, Intelligence Community components will provide, within established security safeguards, information pertinent to the Committee's mission and functions.

4. Composition and Organization

The Committee Chairman will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

The members of the Committee will be representatives designated by Intelligence Community principals.

The Chairman will establish subcommittees and other working groups as required.

With the approval of the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, the Committee Chairman may invite representatives of relevant United States Government entities with national security interests to participate as appropriate.

The Committee will be supported by an Executive Secretariat.

Footnotes

(1) This directive supersedes DCID 3/10, effective 18 June 1982.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE

3/11P (1)

Foreign Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence

(Effective 1 June 1992)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, a Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC) is herewith established.

1. Mission

The Committee, in consultation with the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the production, coordination, and evaluation of intelligence on foreign weapon and space systems and will promote the effective use of Intelligence Community resources for this purpose.

2. Terms of Reference

WSSIC will be responsible for assessing the technical characteristics and capabilities; design, development, and initial deployment; and the technical characteristics and capabilities of command, control, communications, electronic warfare, and support systems of foreign weapons and space systems. This responsibility will include, but is not limited to, the following:

   a. ballistic missile systems,
   b. space systems,
   c. aerospace defense systems,
   d. ground forces weapons systems,
   e. air forces weapons systems,
   f. naval forces weapons systems,
   g. biological and chemical warfare systems, and
   h. directed energy weapons systems.

The Committee will have no responsibility for assessing military order of battle or doctrine.

3. Functions

Under the general guidance of the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, the Committee will:

   a. assess foreign weapon and space system developments which could affect significantly the national security of the United States, including future weapons systems employing advanced technologies;
produce coordinated intelligence reports; and contribute, as appropriate, to national intelligence products;
b. keep the DCI apprised on the responsiveness of foreign weapon and space systems intelligence production to national security requirements;
c. make recommendations to the DCI or Intelligence Community offices coordinating collection activities on the need for specific improvements in collection, analytical, and reporting capabilities on foreign weapon and space systems intelligence, including, but not limited to (1) identification of systems or activities required to close key intelligence gaps, (2) identification of new collection capabilities to be developed and deployed, (3) identification of existing capabilities that should be reduced or discontinued, and (4) changes in processing, reporting, and dissemination of collected intelligence information, including changes which involve contractor support.
d. make recommendations on the relative priorities of intelligence collection, processing, and analysis of foreign weapon and space systems;
e. in coordination with the DCI Security Forum, make recommendations on the dissemination and release of foreign weapon and space systems intelligence to ________
f. schedule, participate in, and provide staff support for Intelligence Community and intelligence conferences on foreign weapons and space systems intelligence, as approved by the DCI; and
g. assign system designators and so inform the Intelligence Community and intelligence offices as appropriate.

4. Intelligence Community Responsibilities

On request by the Committee Chairman, Intelligence Community components will provide, within established security safeguards, information pertinent to the Committee's mission and functions.

Intelligence Community components will make available intelligence professionals to support the Committee's activities.

5. Composition and Organization

The Committee Chairman will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

The members of the Committee will be representatives designated by Intelligence Community principals.

The Chairman will establish subcommittees and other working groups as required.

With the approval of the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, the Committee Chairman may invite representatives of relevant United States Government entities with national security interests to participate as appropriate.

The Committee will be supported by an Executive Secretariat. CIA/OSWR will be responsible for providing a permanent support staff. Other agencies may volunteer personnel for these positions.

Footnotes
This directive supersedes DCID 3/11, effective 26 May 1982.

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 3/12
FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
(Effective 1 June 1992)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, an Economic Intelligence Committee is herewith established.

1. Mission
The Committee, in consultation with the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the production of foreign economic intelligence and will promote the effective use of Intelligence Community resources for this purpose.

2. Functions
Under the general guidance of the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, the Committee will:

a. keep the DCI apprised of both ongoing and new collection and analysis efforts that respond to his overall tasking requirements in the economic security area;

b. provide guidance to Intelligence Community collection components; and

c. review Intelligence Community-wide efforts against the international economic security target, recommending modifications where appropriate.

3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities
On request by the Committee Chairman, Intelligence Community components will provide, within established security safeguards, information pertinent to the Committee's mission and functions.

4. Composition and Organization
The Committee Chairman will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

The members of the Committee will be representatives designated by Intelligence Community principals.

The Chairman will establish subcommittees and other working groups as required.

With the approval of the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, the Committee Chairman may invite representatives of relevant United States Government entities with national security interests to participate as appropriate.

The Committee will be supported by an Executive Secretariat.

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507)

1 This directive supersedes DCID 3/12, effective 25 October 1982.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 3/16P

Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis

(Effective 1 June 1992)
(Administrative Corrections 30 December 2002)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, a Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee (DDAC) is herewith established.

1. Mission

The Committee will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of duties and responsibilities with respect to the analysis of foreign activities to thwart intelligence capabilities of the U.S. Government through denial and deception, and it will promote the effective use of Intelligence Community Resources for this purpose.

2. Functions

Under the general guidance of the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, and in consultation with the National Intelligence Production Board, the Committee will:

a. coordinate the Intelligence Community’s national-level, all-source analysis of the purpose, means, and effectiveness of foreign intelligence denial and deception measures;

b. ensure timely review of all-source intelligence denial and deception issues, identified either within DDAC, by the other Community committees, or by departmental entities, for the purpose of developing a Community assessment (including differing views);

c. foster training, seminars, and symposia to increase the Intelligence Community’s awareness of, and improve its analytical capabilities to address and identify, foreign denial and deception efforts;

d. ensure the maintenance of comprehensive data bases containing information about foreign denial and deception actions, means, methods, and measures against U.S. Intelligence;

e. further the dissemination of information concerning denial and deception intelligence to appropriate analytic elements;

f. commission and oversee assessments of substantive intelligence damage suffered or anticipated from compromises of classified information involving or impacting on intelligence sources and methods; for this function, oversee the maintenance of a comprehensive, integrated data base containing information pertaining to compromises of intelligence sources and methods disclosed through a variety of means, and related information;

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g. foster analyses by the Intelligence Community of foreign denial and deception organizations, policies, objectives, capabilities, and activities;

h. examine intelligence actions the United States might take to counter foreign denial and deception activities; and

i. make recommendations to the DCI.

3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities

On request by the Committee Chairman, Intelligence Community components will provide, within established security safeguards, information pertinent to the Committee’s mission and functions.

Individual Community intelligence production components will support the preparation of assessments sponsored by the Committee.

4. Composition and Organization

The Committee Chairman will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence; and will also represent the DCI on the Department of Defense Damage Assessment Committee (DODDAC).

The members of the Committee will be designated by the Intelligence Community principals of CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR, the agencies that provide the National Intelligence Production Board principals. The military services may designate representatives to participate in the deliberations of the Committee or the subcommittees.

The Chairman will establish subcommittees to identify, review, and analyze foreign intelligence denial and deception measures against the major collection disciplines: HUMINT, imagery, MASINT, and SIGINT; in particular, the HUMINT Subcommittee will analyze selected, significant, sensitive human-source reporting in order to identify possible deceptive elements.

The parent Committee itself will retain responsibility for assessing measures countering certain sensitive intelligence sources and methods that are too sensitive for assignment to a subcommittee.

The Chairman will establish other subcommittees, working groups, and panels, as required.

The 25X1, E.O.13526 will serve as an advisory body to the Committee.

The Committee will be supported by an Executive Secretariat.

[1] This directive supersedes DCID 3/16, effective 7 October 1985 (updated May 1988)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
3/20P

Committee on Narcotics Intelligence Issues
(Effective 24 January 1990)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and Executive Order 12333, a Committee on Narcotics Intelligence Issues is hereby established.

1. Mission

The Committee on Narcotics Intelligence Issues will serve as the senior coordinating body within the US Government on matters affecting foreign counternarcotics intelligence; advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to US foreign counternarcotics intelligence policies and programs; promote the effective use of Intelligence Community resources for these purposes and assist in evaluating the overall performance of the Intelligence Community in accomplishing the objectives established by the DCI.

2. Definitions

Counternarcotics encompasses US domestic and foreign efforts to control the production, processing, distribution; and use of illicit drugs, including illicit drug money flows.

Foreign counternarcotics intelligence includes collection, processing, exploitation analysis, production and dissemination by elements of the US Government of information on the production, processing distribution, and use of illicit drugs, external to the United States; the transportation of illicit drugs, including into the United States; the international movement and laundering of drug money; and the drug control policies, programs, and operations of foreign governments.

3. Functions

Under the general guidance of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence/DDCI), the Committee will:

a. Coordinate, monitor, and evaluate implementation of the Intelligence Community's foreign counternarcotics intelligence strategy as developed by the Community Coordination Group of the DCI Counternarcotics Center.

b. Advise the DCI on the effectiveness of the intelligence Community's performance in support of US counternarcotics policy, programs, and operations and related national security requirements.

c. Review specific critical foreign counternarcotics intelligence problems and provide recommendations to the DCI for possible improvements in collection, production, and coordination.
d. Review that portion of the National Foreign Intelligence Program dealing with counternarcotics, and advise the DCI on the adequacy of intelligence support to US counternarcotics policies, programs, and operations.

e. Review, in coordination with DCI collection and priority committees, individual foreign narcotics intelligence collection or requirements initiatives developed by, or for the Community Coordination Group of the DCI Counternarcotics Center, and provide guidance on implementation to the Intelligence Community.

f. Identify and assess, in concert with the Intelligence Research and Development Council, methodologies and technologies that may improve the Intelligence Community's counternarcotics support effort.

g. Provide a venue for discussions and coordination between the Intelligence Community and the law enforcement agencies and, as appropriate, other elements engaged in counternarcotics efforts.

4. Responsibilities of the Intelligence Community

Upon request of the Committee Chairperson, elements of the Intelligence Community shall, within DCI-approved security safeguards, provide information pertinent to the Committee’s mission and functions.

5. Composition and Organization

The Special Assistant to the DCI for Counternarcotics shall serve as the Chairperson of the Committee.

As directed by the Committee, the Chairperson may establish subcommittees, working groups, and panels to support the work of the Committee, drawing on resources of the DCI Counternarcotics Center and other participants in the Committee.

Membership of the Committee will include representatives with senior management responsibilities from the Intelligence Community agencies concerned with counternarcotics—the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Intelligence Community Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Air Force, and the Director of Intelligence of the Marine Corps.

The Chairperson will also invite representatives from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the law enforcement agencies, elements of the Department of Defense engaged in the counternarcotics efforts, and appropriate policy officials to be participants on the Committee.

The Committee will be supported by an Executive Secretariat provided by the Intelligence Community Staff.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
3/22P

Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism

(Effective 1 April 1997)

(U) Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, an Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) and a Terrorism Warning Group (TWG) are hereby established.

1. Mission

(EO) The IICT will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the coordination and publication of national intelligence on terrorism issues and will promote the effective use of Intelligence Community resources for this purpose. The DCI Terrorism Warning Group will prepare coordinated Intelligence Community threat warnings from the DCI to alert senior policy makers of possible foreign terrorist attacks against US and allied personnel, facilities and interests.

2. Definition

(U) Title 22, U.S.C. sec. 2656f (d), defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." It defines international terrorism as terrorism "involving the citizens or the territory of more than one country." The Intelligence Community in its work uses these definitions and this directive reflects its use.

3. Functions

a. (EO) The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism will:

1. Serve as the principal mechanism of the Special Assistant to the DCI for coordinating Intelligence Community support to the US Government’s policies and programs combating terrorism.
2. Develop and implement procedures and guidelines for issuing Intelligence Community warnings of terrorist threats to affected citizens, organizations, and installations.
3. Identify the need for, and facilitate the drafting of, interagency intelligence publications.
4. Facilitate the exchange of intelligence information pertaining to terrorism.
5. Facilitate the exchange of technical and forensic information relating to terrorism.
6. Promote training and instruction in the phenomenon of international terrorism.
7. Advocate career development initiatives for intelligence personnel working on the terrorism
8. Promote and monitor terrorism-related research and development within the national Intelligence Community.
9. Provide recommendations facilitating the collection, production, coordination and dissemination of intelligence on terrorism.
10. Provide a venue for discussions, information sharing, coordination, and decision making among members of the Intelligence Community and other elements engaged in efforts to combat terrorism.
11. Provide impartial review, comment and advocacy regarding programs that impact on the national Intelligence Community's terrorism mission.

b. The Terrorism Warning Group will:
   1. Issue terrorism warning reports from the DCI to senior policy makers
   2. Develop guidelines and criteria for issuance of terrorist warning reports.
   3. Monitor regional or country threat levels developed by Intelligence Community organizations and reconcile, explain or acknowledge divergent views.
   4. Organize such formal and ad hoc community analytical exchanges and warning forums as necessary to complete its mission.

4. Intelligence Community Responsibilities

(U) On request of the Chairman of the IICT, Intelligence Community members will provide information regarding plans, programs, resources and operations pertinent to the committee's mission and functions within DCI-approved security safeguards.

5. Composition and Organization

a. (U) The Committee Chairman will be a Community officer appointed by the DCI, who will also manage the activities of the Terrorism Warning Group (TWG) and the Community Counterterrorism Board (CCB).

b. (U) The IICT will be composed of representatives of the Intelligence Community, as defined by E.O. 12333 and the National Security Act of 1947, as well as representatives of relevant US Government entities with counterterrorism and antiterrorism responsibilities. The chairman will establish subcommittees, task forces, working groups and advisory groups as required.

c. (U) The TWG will be composed of a mix of civilian and military personnel from the Intelligence Community.

d. (U) The CCB will be the Executive Secretariat for the IICT and the TWG.

Footnotes

(1) This DCID supersedes DCID 3/22, dated 24 October 1990.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 3/28P

Committee on International Organized Crime Intelligence Issues

(Effective 13 December 1994)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and Executive Order 12333, a Committee on International Organized Crime Intelligence Issues is hereby established.

1. Mission

The Committee on International Organized Crime Intelligence Issues will serve as the senior coordinating body within the US Government on matters affecting foreign intelligence on international organized crime; advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to Intelligence Community policies and programs on international organized crime; promote the effective use of foreign intelligence resources to support the development and implementation of US policy to counter the activities of international organized crime groups; and assist in evaluating the overall performance of the Intelligence Community in accomplishing the objectives established by the DCI.

2. Definitions

*International organized crime* encompasses continuing criminal and conspiratorial activities that are transnational in character and are perpetrated by organized groups with a hierarchical structure whose primary objective is illegal financial gain. Principal international organized crime groups include Latin American, Russian, Eurasian, Italian, Nigeria, and Asian organizations. Threats to US national and economic security posed by international crime groups stem from--but are not limited to--their activities involving drug trafficking, alien smuggling, gray enterprises, financial crimes, extortion of US businesses overseas, and theft and smuggling of nuclear materials and technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction.

*Foreign intelligence on international organized crime* includes collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, production, and dissemination by elements of the US Government of information on the impact of organized criminal activities on political and economic stability and governability in countries important to US security and foreign policy interests; the leadership, command and control, infrastructure, and operations of international crime groups that pose a significant threat to US national and economic security interests; and the capabilities and effectiveness of foreign governments to combat international organized crime.

3. Functions
Under the general guidance of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), the Committee will:

a. Coordinate, monitor, and evaluate implementation of the Intelligence Community’s foreign intelligence strategy on international organized crime as developed by the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center and the National Intelligence Council.

b. Provide a venue for foreign intelligence coordination and planning among Intelligence Community, policy, law enforcement, and other elements engaged in foreign activities against international organized crime.

c. Advise the DCI on the effectiveness of Intelligence Community support to US policy, programs, and operations against the foreign activities of international organized crime groups.

d. Identify, foreign intelligence problems and shortfalls on international organized crime; provide recommendations to the DCI for improvements in collection production, and coordination; and review and evaluate implementation of efforts to enhance foreign intelligence.

e. In coordination with DCI collection and priority committees, review individual collection and intelligence requirements initiatives developed by the Community Coordination Group of the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, and provide implementation guidance to the Intelligence Community.

4. Responsibilities of the Intelligence Community

Upon request of the Committee Chairperson, elements of the Intelligence Community shall, within DCI-approved security safeguards, provide information pertinent to the Committee’s mission and functions.

5. Composition and Organization

The Director, DCI Crime and Narcotics Center—in his role as Issue Coordinator for International Organized Crime—shall serve as the Chairperson of the Committee.

As directed by the Committee, the Chairperson may establish subcommittees, working groups, and task forces to support the work of the Committee, drawing on resources of the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center and other participants of the Committee.

Membership of the Committee will include representatives with senior management responsibilities from Intelligence Community entities concerned with international organized crime—the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Community Management Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Air Force, and the Director of Intelligence of the Marine Corps.

The Chairperson also will invite representatives of the law enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice, the Department of State’s Office of International Criminal Justice, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and other policy officials engaged in efforts against international organized crime to be participants on the Committee.

The Committee will be supported by the Community Coordination Group in the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/2

THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM ABROAD

(Effective 18 May 1976)

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905 and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, the following responsibilities and procedures are established.

1. Purpose

This directive establishes policies, procedures and practices for the inducement, exploitation and handling of defectors outside the United States, its territories and possessions. It does not apply in active theaters of war where US forces are engaged or where the President so directs.

2. Definitions

For the purpose of this directive, the terms listed below shall have the meanings indicated.

a. Defectors: Defectors are defined as nationals of the USSR, People's Republic of China, Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Vietnam and Yugoslavia, who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and who are of special value to the US Government because:

   (1) They are able to add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing US intelligence knowledge,

   (2) They are of operational value to a US department or agency, or

   (3) Their defection can be psychologically exploited to the advantage of the United States.

b. Inducement: Inducement is an act committed or manifestly instigated by a US official and demonstrably intended to bring about a defection for which the US Government might, if the act were discovered, be called upon to account.

i. This directive supersedes DCID No. 4/2, effective 26 June 1959.
c. Potential Defector: A potential defector is a national of the countries set forth in paragraph 2a above, who (1) is dissatisfied or potentially estranged in his allegiance to the government of his nationality, (2) may reasonably be expected to be susceptible to defection or recruitment in place, and (3) appears to meet special values criteria of a defector as set forth in paragraph 2a above.

d. Disaffected Person: A disaffected person is a potential defector who either through inducement or voluntary action on his part, has indicated willingness or desire to defect.

e. Walk-In: A walk-in is a disaffected person who presents himself to a US installation in a foreign country and requests asylum or assistance in escaping from Communist control.

f. Refugee: A refugee is a person who is outside of and unwilling to return to his country of nationality or habitual residence because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, does not possess another citizenship, has not acquired resident status in the country of present domicile and who is not a defector.

3. Other nationals

The provisions of this directive may be applied in whole or in part to cases involving nationals of countries other than those specifically named in paragraph 2a above, when the Director of Central Intelligence determines such action to be in the best interests of the United States.

4. Objectives

Exploitation of defectors shall be conducted for the following purposes:

a. To obtain information relative to the internal security of the United States, and to obtain foreign intelligence information in response to intelligence objectives established by the Director of Central Intelligence and departmental intelligence requirements.

b. To acquire operational intelligence.

c. To gain a propaganda advantage.

5. Operating principles of the program

a. Defection, particularly from the USSR and People's Republic of China, should be encouraged and induced whenever there is a net
advantage to US interests. Accordingly, US Government organizations should:

(1) Encourage and induce the defection of potentially valuable individuals from the areas described in paragraph 2a above. Before any US Government organization initiates action to induce defection, it should consider whether recruitment in place would better serve the interests of the US.

(4) Take no action to encourage the departure of large numbers of nationals from countries listed in paragraph 2a above.

(5) Give priority to the satisfaction of intelligence objectives in accordance with NSCID No. 2 before engaging in psychological exploitation of defectors.

(6) Coordinate the implementation of overt publicity concerning defectors with the Department of State and the United States Information Agency.

(7) Conduct coordination, as provided herein, so as to respect the interests, capabilities and responsibilities of all departments and agencies to ensure full use of such capabilities in support of the Defector Program.

6. Responsibilities of local Defector Committees

A local Defector Committee shall be established abroad wherever the US has diplomatic representation.
The committee may invite representatives of other departments and agencies and military commands as appropriate to participate. The local Defector Committee shall:

a. Meet periodically, normally at least once quarterly, to coordinate interagency aspects of the Defector Program in the area concerned. Copies of minutes of all local Defector Committee meetings shall be forwarded to the Interagency Defector Committee (IDC) Washington.

b. Establish local operating procedures in consonance with this directive for the implementation of the Defector Program within the committee's geographic area. Such procedures shall accomplish the following:

(1) Provide for the secure and expeditious reception and handling of walk-ins and other disaffected persons.

(2) Provide that defector status is considered for all individuals who meet the criteria established by NSCID No. 4, in each case balancing the "special value" of the defection against the risk, if any, to the political and diplomatic interests of the US.

(3) Ensure that:

   (a) Information related to imminence of hostilities or threat to the security of US personnel and any US installation is procured and disseminated as a matter of immediate priority.

   (b) Bona fides is established as expeditiously as possible.

   (c) Each defector signs a statement that his defection is voluntary and that he requests political asylum.

   (d) The resources and facilities of all participating US Government organizations are employed as fully as necessary to facilitate handling of the individual.
c. Consider and resolve mutual problems. When such problems cannot be resolved the matter shall be referred through Central Intelligence Agency channels to the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington. In such cases, representatives of other US Government organizations may communicate directly with their principals in Washington on the subjects involved. If time does not permit referral to the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington, the matter shall be submitted for decision to the senior US representative in the area.

d. Keep the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington, informed concerning each defector, including the status of exploitation. Appropriate reports on disaffected persons of potential intelligence interest also will be made to the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington.

e. Establish procedures to ensure that all members of the local Defector Committee are kept currently informed on local defector matters as well as applicable US policies and procedures.

f. Recommend to the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington, proposals for surfacing or the release of initial overt publicity concerning a defector.
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9. Responsibilities of the Senior US Representative in the area

The Senior US Representative in the area concerned will be responsible for:

a. Determining, the manner and degree to which actions contemplated toward a disaffected person or defector may affect the political and diplomatic interests of the US.

b. Ensuring that appropriate US officials not covered by membership on the local defector committee, who are likely to be in contact with disaffected persons, are briefed concerning defector matters as appropriate.

c. Providing policy guidance and further assistance in carrying out his responsibilities under this directive.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE

NO. 4/2 (SECOND REVISION)*

Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives
(Revised 8/4/53)

In accordance with DCID 4/1, paragraph 3, the following list
in order of priority of critical national intelligence objectives, with
respect to the USSR and its Satellites (including Communist China)
is established; so the highest priority shall be given to the collec-
tion of information and to the production of intelligence concerning
Soviet and Satellite capabilities and intentions for:

1. taking direct military action against the Continental
   United States;

2. taking direct military action, employing USSR and
   Satellite Armed Forces, against vital U.S. possessions, areas
   peripheral to the Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;

3. conducting clandestine attack by mass destruction weapons
   against the Continental United States, vital U.S. possessions, areas
   peripheral to the Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;

4. interfering with U.S. strategic air attack;

5. interfering with U.S. movement of men and material by
   water transport;

6. production and stockpiling, including location of instal-
   lations and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical
   weapons and equipment, and critical transportation equipment;

7. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to
   U.S. national security, short of commitment of Soviet and Satellite
   Armed Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage
   objectives;

8. interfering with U.S. political, psychological and economic
   courses of action for the achievement of critical U.S. aims and
   objectives.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence
(U) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 6/7

(U) Intelligence Disclosure Policy

(Effective 30 June 1998)

(U) Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and Executive Order 12333, policies, responsibilities, and procedures are herewith established governing the disclosure or release of US intelligence to officials of foreign governments, and international organizations or coalition partners consisting of sovereign states. Nothing in this policy is intended to amend, modify, or derogate the authorities of the DCI contained in Statute or Executive Order. This DCID was previously designated DCID 5/6.

1. Purpose

a. (U) This directive establishes policy for the disclosure or release of classified US intelligence to officials of foreign governments, and international organizations or coalition partners consisting of sovereign states (hereinafter, "foreign governments"). The directive furthers the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to protect intelligence sources and methods and to formulate policies concerning intelligence arrangements with foreign governments.

b. (U) This directive also furthers the policy contained in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/6 by defining the categories of intelligence information that may not be disclosed or released to a foreign government.

2. Policy

a. (U/FOROFF) US intelligence is a national asset to be conserved and protected and will be shared with foreign governments only when consistent with US national security and foreign policy objectives and when an identifiable benefit can be expected to accrue to the United States. It is the policy of the US Government to share intelligence...
with foreign governments whenever it is consistent with US law and clearly in the national interest to do so.

b. (U) Disclosure or release of intelligence information to coalition partners will be made pursuant to a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) issued by the DCI. The CONOPS will be coordinated with affected departments and agencies prior to issuance. The CONOPS shall govern the disclosure and release of intelligence information during the period covered by that document. In the absence of a CONOPS, the policies contained in this DCID shall apply, until the DCI determines whether a CONOPS is required.

c. (U) Proposals to disclose or release intelligence to foreign governments that are contrary to this Intelligence Disclosure Policy shall be submitted to the DCI for approval. Existing intelligence arrangements and directives, upon which such proposals are based, need not be modified, unless inconsistent with this DCID.

d. (U//FOUO) Information marked NOFORN or REL TO (and country(ies)) may not be disclosed or released to foreign governments not stipulated in the marking without originator approval.

e. (U//FOUO) Whenever feasible, intelligence that cannot be disclosed or released shall be separated by the use of tear lines, portion marking, and/or segregable annexes, from that which may be released, in accordance with the policies contained in DCID 6/6.

3. Applicability

(U) Except as expressly authorized by the DCI, the policy, procedures, and criteria set forth in this directive and its attachment shall be uniformly applied to the disclosure or release of US intelligence to foreign governments.

4. Responsibilities

a. (U) The DCI shall formulate policies concerning foreign intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements and relationships with foreign governments.

b. (U) Only Designated Intelligence Disclosure Officials (DIDO) may authorize the dissemination of intelligence to cooperating foreign governments under arrangements established or agreed to by the DCI.
c. (U) Officials of organizations that are not part of the Intelligence Community, as defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 USC 401a(4), and Executive Order 12333, intending to disclose or release US intelligence to foreign governments shall obtain permission from the DIDO of the organization that originated the information.

5. Definitions

(U) Disclosure: Showing or revealing classified intelligence, whether orally, in writing or any other medium, without providing the recipient with a copy of such information for retention.

(U) Release: Providing the recipient of classified information with a copy, whether in writing or any other medium, of such information for retention.

(U) Sharing: Activities involving the disclosure or release of intelligence.

(U) Intelligence (and Related Materials): Includes the following information, whether written or in any other medium, classified pursuant to Executive Order 12958 or any predecessor or successor Executive Order:

a. (U) Foreign intelligence and counterintelligence defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and Executive Order 12333;

b. (U//FOUO) Information describing US foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities, sources, methods, equipment, or methodology used for the acquisition, processing, or exploitation of such intelligence; foreign military hardware obtained through intelligence activities for exploitation and the results of the exploitation; and any other data resulting from US intelligence collection efforts; and

c. (U//FOUO) Information on Intelligence Community protective security programs (e.g. personnel, physical, technical, and information security).

(U) Designated Intelligence Disclosure Officials (DIDOs): The heads of departments and agencies with organizations in the Intelligence Community or the heads of such organizations, and their specifically designated subordinates whose names and positions are certified to the DCI in writing.
and other US officials designated by the DCI. (See Attachment A, section B for DIDO authorities and responsibilities.)

(U) Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC): A SOIC is the head of an agency, office, bureau, or other intelligence element as identified in Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 USC 401a(4), and Section 3.4(f) (1 through 6) of Executive Order 12333.

(U) Sanitization: The process of editing or otherwise altering intelligence information or reports to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods, capabilities, and analytical procedures in order to permit wider dissemination.

(U) Coalition:

a. (U) An arrangement between one or more nations for common action;

b. (U) Multi-national action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest; or

c. (U) A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.

(U) Senior Foreign Officials: Responsible foreign officials or individuals who, by virtue of their positions or access, may directly affect policy making of recipient foreign governments. This includes, but is not limited to, officials of ministerial rank and above; national department, agency and service chiefs; and representatives of ambassadorial rank and above.
6. Procedures

(U//FOUO) Attachment A to this directive sets forth implementing procedures, including special procedures to be followed in coordinating, approving, and recording disclosures or releases to senior foreign officials or of analytical or estimative products of the Central Intelligence Agency or the National Intelligence Council to foreign governments.

/S/
Director of Central Intelligence 30 June 1998
Date

2 (U) These procedures derive from and have the authority of the DCI Directive on Intelligence Disclosure Policy.
ATTACHMENT A

(U//FOUO) CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES CONCERNING DISCLOSURE OF US INTELLIGENCE

(Effective 30 June 1998)

Nothing in this policy is intended to amend, modify, or derogate the authorities of the DCI contained in Statute or Executive Order.

A. (U//FOUO) Intelligence Disclosure and Release Criteria

(U//FOUO) In accordance with the Director of Central Intelligence Directive, Intelligence Disclosure Policy, Designated Intelligence Disclosure Officials (DIDO) will use all of the following general criteria in determining the appropriateness and suitability of intelligence disclosures or releases to foreign governments:

1. (U//FOUO) Disclosure or release is consistent with United States foreign policy and national security objectives concerning the recipient foreign government.

2. (U//FOUO) Disclosure or release can be expected to result in a clearly identifiable benefit to the United States, such as:
   a. (U//FOUO) Serving a specific US national purpose—political, economic, or military.
   b. (U//FOUO) Obtaining commensurate information or services from the proposed recipient.
   c. (U//FOUO) Supporting specific bilateral or multilateral plans, arrangements, treaties or alliances.
   d. (U//FOUO) Aiding US intelligence or counterintelligence activities.

3. (U) It is determined that the disclosed or released intelligence is not likely to be used by the recipient in a manner harmful to US interests. In particular:

   a. (U//FOUO) It is determined that the disclosed or released intelligence is not likely to be used by the recipient in a manner harmful to US interests. In particular:
a. (U) The intelligence will not be disclosed or released to a third government or any other party without the approval of the releasing US department or agency.

b. (U) The recipient foreign government has the capability and intent to provide to US intelligence the same degree of protection provided it by the United States.

c. (U) The intelligence will not be used for other than the stated purpose without the approval of the releasing department or agency.

B. (U) General Procedures for the Disclosure or Release of US Intelligence

1. (U//FOUO) In implementing the policies, procedures, and criteria contained herein for the disclosure or release of intelligence, DDOs also will be governed by procedures and guidance contained in the documents below, and other DCI procedures and guidance. The provisions of this DCID will take precedence.

a. (U//FOUO) Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR) issued by the DCI, which provide guidance on the release of signals intelligence;

b. (U//FOUO) DCI Directive 6/6: Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information, which establishes common controls and procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence;

d. (U//FOUO) National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Imagery Policy Series (IPS), which contains detailed guidance on the disclosure and release of imagery intelligence;

3 (U//FOUO) In documentary releases a statement will be included in transmittal correspondence or affixed to the document itself indicating that the information is provided with the understanding that the recipient will comply with the conditions above. Whenever appropriate, a similar statement of caution will be included in oral/visual disclosures.
d. (U//FOUO) National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations (NDP-1), issued pursuant to National Security Decision Memorandum 119, which governs the release of classified military information including military intelligence;

f.  
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g. (U//FOUO) National Policy Governing the Disclosure or Release of Communications Security Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, issued by the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC) which provides release requirements for Communications Security;

h. (U//FOUO) DCI issued Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for US intelligence support; and

i.  
25X1, E.O.13526

j. (U//FOUO) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Policy Series, issued by the Central MASINT Office (CMO), which provide guidance on the release of MASINT.

2. (U//FOUO) DIDOs may authorize the release or disclosure of uncaveated intelligence to foreign governments in accordance with the criteria in paragraph A above and Section VII.B, DCID 6/6.

3.  
25X1, E.O.13526

4. (U) DIDOs will, in addition:

a. (U) Follow disclosure and release guidelines issued by the DCI to cover specific situations.

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Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507)
C. (U) Intelligence Which May Not Be Disclosed or Released

☑ The following intelligence may not be disclosed or released to a foreign government in accordance with DCID 6/6:

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2. 25X1, E.O.13526

3. 25X1, E.O.13526

4. 25X1, E.O.13526

5. 25X1, E.O.13526
6. (c) Identification of a specific source, either by name, title, or position, as the provider of intelligence information; or the disclosure of other information that reasonably could be expected to jeopardize sources and methods.

8.

9.

10.
D. (U) Special Procedures for Disclosures or Releases to Senior Foreign Officials or of Analytical and Estimative Products of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Council to Foreign Governments
3. (U) Failure to comply with the provisions of this DCID could result in the loss of intelligence access for the officials involved.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 7/3

(U) INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATED ACTIVITIES

(Effective 01 July 1999)
(Administratively updated 5 June 2003)

1. REFERENCES.

a) (U) DCID 5/1, "Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad," 19 Dec 1984
b) (U) NSCID 5, "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad," 19 Dec 1984
c) (U) NSCID 6, "Signals Intelligence," 17 Feb 1972
f) (U) Memorandum of Agreement on Oversight Board for Private Sector Relationships, 05 Jun 1998
g) (U) Charter of the National Special Communications Working Group (NSCWG), 07 Jan 1997
h) (U) Memorandum of Agreement concerning Deconfliction of Computer Network Operations (CNO), 01 Jul 1999
i) (U) Charter of the Bilateral Information Operations Steering Group (BIOSG), 14 Apr 1998
k) (U) National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, as amended
l) (U) Title 10, U.S. Code (Armed Forces)
m) (U) MOA Between DoD and the IC Regarding the Information Operations Technology Center (IOTC), 04 Mar 1997
n) (U) Concept of Operations (CONOP) for the Information Operations Technology Center (IOTC), 04 Mar 1997
o) (U) Title 50, U.S. Code

2. PURPOSE.
(U) This directive sets forth the responsibilities of Intelligence Community (IC) components in the conduct and coordination of:

- (U) Information Operations (IO),
- (U) Intelligence and related support to IO, and
- (U//FOUO) Deconfliction of specific computer network operations (CNO) conducted by National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) agencies.

3. AUTHORITIES.

(U//FOUO) This DCID does not affect the authorities, responsibilities, and restrictions relating to components of the IC and the Department of Defense (DoD) that are set out in existing statutes, executive orders, and policy directives such as Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other DCIDs, in particular the requirements under reference (a) for coordination of espionage and counterintelligence activities abroad. This DCID clarifies the DCI authorities under which IC elements may carry out computer network attack (CNA) and computer network exploitation (CNE) using NFIP funds.

4. DEFINITIONS.

A. (U) The definition of information operations (IO) is: "Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."

B. (U//FOUO) Information Operations is an integrating strategy. Although still evolving, the fundamental concept of IO is to integrate different activities to affect decision making processes, information systems, and supporting information infrastructures to achieve specific objectives, as well as to protect and defend friendly information and information infrastructures. IC IO-related activities include CNE and other supporting intelligence activities.

5. DISCUSSION.

A. (U//FOUO) The concept of Information Operations (IO) emerged against the backdrop of the explosive growth of information technology. IO has made use of electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, operational security (OPSEC), and physical destruction. The rapid spread of computerized and computer networks has led to their inclusion as instruments for attacking and influencing information infrastructures.
B. (U//FOUO) Computer network operations (CNO) comprises computer network exploitation (CNE) -- denoting a broad range of intelligence collection activity; computer network attack (CNA) -- denoting attacks on computer systems and networks; and computer network defense (CND) -- denoting actions taken to protect U.S. computer systems and networks and possibly those of allies and coalition partners. CNE is an intelligence collection activity and, while not viewed as an integral pillar of DoD IO doctrine, it is recognized as an IO-related activity that requires deconfliction with IO. There are interdependencies and relationships among CNE, CNA, CND, and other IC activities in support of IO which may require mechanisms to ensure proper deconfliction or coordination among those NFIP funded IC elements that engage in these activities.

C. (U//FOUO) IC IO activities include conducting, with proper authorization, covert action, including CNA. IC elements authorized to conduct CNA under DCI authorities in peacetime will be specified by a Presidential Finding.

D. (U) IC IO-related activities include:

- (U) Collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating foreign intelligence and counterintelligence on IO.
- (U) Conducting CNE, in accordance with the authorities described in references (b) and (c).
- (U) Supporting other U.S. government organizations in the conduct of their IO missions.
- (U) Ensuring effective warning and defense against IO.
- (U) Performing computer network defense (CND) activities commensurate with established legal statutes or the technical direction provided by NSA/CSS, as specified in reference (d), or the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), as set forth in reference (e).

6. DECONFlictION.

A. (U) While this DCID does not address every contingency, IO and IO-related activities specified in paragraphs 6.C and 6.D shall be deconflicted and mutually supporting. Deconfliction mechanisms shall be established to guarantee compatibility within areas of common concern.

B. (U) To support the establishment of deconfliction processes, it is important to initially identify the applicable authority for an action so that activities can be conducted within an appropriate legal context and oversight requirements can be satisfied. The nature and the context of an activity will determine the applicable legal authority for the activity (i.e., the authority under which an activity is conducted). The following guidelines shall apply:
1) (U) The criterion for identifying the applicable authority for a proposed activity shall be the "primary purpose" of the activity. For example, if the "primary purpose" of an activity is foreign intelligence (FI) collection, FI collection authorities shall prevail, notwithstanding the fact that the activity may have other purposes.

2) (U) The nature and context of the activity, and not the U.S. Government entity that conducts it, shall determine the applicable authority.

C. (E) The Oversight Board for Private Sector Relationships (reference f) and the National Special Communications Working Group (NSCWG) (reference g) exist to deconflict mission related industrial relations and special communications, respectively. They shall be expanded to include new membership as appropriate.

D. (E) CNA/E Deconfliction process. CIA and NSA will jointly manage, as an IC service of common concern, an Interagency Target Register (ITR) to deconflict IC CNA and CNE operations. IC elements conducting CNA or CNE operations under DCI authorities shall deconflict their operations within the ITR structure according to ITR procedures and appropriate access negotiated with the principal signatories to the MOA cited in reference (h). The IC recognizes a need to establish procedures for deconflicting CNE activities with other appropriate U.S. agencies.

E. E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under §6 of the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

7. IMPLEMENTATION.

(U) Except where covered by existing policies, IC IO-related responsibilities are listed below.

A. (U) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM) shall:
1) (U) Serve as the IC focal point for IO strategic planning and policy coordination within the IC and with the Bilateral Information Operations Steering Group (BIOSG) (per reference i).

2) (U) Represent IC organizations that are not already represented on the BIOSG.

3) (U) Provide administrative and staff support to the Secretariat of the BIOSG (per reference i).

4) (U) Oversees implementation of this DCID.

B. (U) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (I&R) shall:

1) (U) Support the Chiefs of Mission in their review of the implications of contemplated IO for foreign affairs and diplomatic relations pursuant to reference (a).

2) (U) Pursuant to reference (j), review the implications of contemplated sharing of intelligence on foreign IO programs with allies or other foreign entities.

C. (U) The National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) for Warning and for Science & Technology shall jointly provide the DCI and other IC elements with appropriate strategic warning against IO.

D. (U) Consistent with the National Security Act of 1947 (reference k), the DCI has assigned the following tasks, which, pursuant to 10 USC 113 (reference l), the Secretary of Defense has directed the DoD components listed below to execute.

1) (U) The Director, National Security Agency/Chief Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CCSS) shall:

i. (U) Integrate CNA, CNE, and CND tools, techniques, and technology into the SIGINT and INFOSEC communities.

ii. (U) Train, equip, and organize the U.S. Cryptologic System to support the CNE, CNA, and CND requirements needs of its customers.

iii. (U) Provide IO-related military targeting support.

iv. (U) Provide intelligence gain/loss assessments in response to CINC IO targeting.

v. (U) Develop and support analytic modeling and simulation techniques to support CNA/CNE efforts.
2) (U) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (D/DIA) shall:
   i. (U) Ensure that DIA is postured to support the full range of IO activities, both offensive and defensive, including psychological operations, military deception, electronic warfare, computer network operations, operations security, and physical destruction.
   ii. (U) Train and equip the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) to support the IO requirements of its customers.
   iii. (U) Provide IO-related military targeting support.
   iv. (U) Perform all-source analysis, production, dissemination, and provision of military and military-related intelligence on foreign information infrastructures and foreign information threats for the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, other defense components, and, as appropriate, non-defense agencies.
   v. (U) Pursuant to existing DoD directives, instructions and other guidance, conduct Human Factors intelligence support for the full range of IO.
   vi. (U) Pursuant to DoD requirements, provide strategic indications and warning for IO.
   vii. (U) Provide political-military assessments in response to CINC IO targeting.

3) (U) The Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (D/NIMA) shall:
   i. (U) Conduct imagery and geospatial analysis to identify critical foreign information infrastructures and assess their interdependencies.
   ii. (U) In partnership with other IC elements, provide targeting support to IO. This includes identifying physical targets, developing targeting packages and preparing combat assessments.
   iii. (U) With approved tasking, help identify vulnerabilities to key U.S. infrastructures (CONUS and OCONUS) in order to contribute to more effective defensive IO practices.
   iv. (U) Provide other imagery and geospatial information support to IC and DoD IO efforts in a timely and effective manner.
   v. (U) Ensure IO requirements are included in any delineation and assessment of future requirements.
The Director of the Information Operations Technology Center (D/IOTC) shall execute responsibilities in accordance with references (m) and (n).

The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (D/FBI) shall:

1. Provide available, releasable information and operational support that may assist in the planning or execution of an IO activity by IC and DoD.
2. Assist other agencies in assessing the risks of planned IO activities to the U.S. information infrastructure.
3. Keep the U.S. private sector and Government at all levels informed of threats to the U.S. information infrastructure that may arise from IO activities without divulging U.S. plans or intentions.
4. Develop and deploy tools to reduce the risk of penetration, corruption, and disruption of critical U.S. information systems and networks.
5. Investigate IO intrusions and attacks against information networks and systems in the United States.

All IC Element Heads shall:

1. Provide the DDCI/CM with the information required to assist the DCI in implementing this directive.
2) (S) Cooperate closely with the IOTC to ensure consistency between the CNA and dual purpose (CNE) techniques contained in the Toolbox and any other developing or employed capabilities.

3) (U) Take reasonable steps to protect their own systems from hostile CNA and CNE.

8. REVIEW.

(U) The DDCI/CM shall coordinate the IC's annual review of this DCID for currency and completeness.

//s// George J. Tenet

July 1, 1999

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE
APPENDIX A

Definitions of Terms Used in this Directive

Computer Network Attack (CNA): (U) Operations to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.

Computer Network Defense (CND): (U) Efforts to defend against the CNO of others, especially that directed against U.S. and allied computers and networks.

Computer Network Exploitation (CNE): (U) Intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems (AIS) or networks.


Covert Action: (U) Refer to Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, Title V (50 U.S.C. 413-413b) (references k and o) and related legislation. [Related legislation includes the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act and 102d Congress Report SENATE First Session 102-85 and House Conference Report 102-156.] Section 503 refers to covert action as, "... an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include--

(U) ... activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities;

... traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities; ... traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such
activities; or ... activities to provide routine support to the overt activities ... of other United States Government agencies abroad." (Special Activities is a euphemism for covert action; as such it is redundant to include it here.)

Deception: (U) Those measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

Electronic Warfare: (U) The use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an adversary.

Human Factors: (U) The psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization.

Information Operations (IO): (U) Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.

Information System: (U) The organizations, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate and act on information.

Operations Security (OPSEC): (U) A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

Physical Destruction: (U) Referred to in Joint military doctrine as one of the core disciplines of IO. Note: Not all physical destruction is IO nor related to it. Physical destruction can be used to further tactical, operational, and/or strategic IO objectives. Examples include destroying command and control facilities, communications links, and components supplying energy to power communications.
Psychological Operations: (U) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations or PSYOPs is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

Special Communications: (U//FOG) The relay of U.S. government or allied signals from or into areas typically characterized by an intense counterintelligence or operational security environment, usually in support of covert or clandestine intelligence or military operations, or sensitive overseas law enforcement activities.