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Description of document: Electronic documents containing the phrase 'talking points' from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Office of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs (SCPA), 2000-2010

Requested date: 26-October-2010

Released date: 12-July-2016

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Source of document: FOIA Request  
Chief FOIA Officer  
The Privacy Office  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
245 Murray Lane SW  
STOP-0655  
Washington, D.C. 20528-0655

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Transportation  
Security  
Administration

July 12, 2016

3600.1

Case Number: 2011-TSFO-00631

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, request to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) dated October 26, 2010, for "cop[ies] of any primarily internal "Talking Points" or "Q&A" documents at TSA HQ" from January 2000 to the date of your request. By email on November 9, 2010, you clarified that you are narrowing your request to the following information: "an electronic search of the computers of Kristin Lee, Constance Davis, Sterling Payne and Greg Soule in TSA's Office of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs, for any electronic documents that have the phrase 'talking points'."

The processing of your request identified certain materials that will be released to you. Portions not released are being withheld pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Please refer to the Applicable Exemptions list at the end of this letter that identifies the authority for withholding the exempt material, which is indicated by a mark appearing in the block next to the exemption. An additional enclosure with this letter explains these exemptions in more detail.

Five pages contain Department of Homeland Security (DHS) equities and have been referred to DHS for review and direct response to you.

The rules and regulations of the Transportation Security Administration applicable to Freedom of Information Act requests are contained in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 6, Part 5. They are published in the Federal Register and are available for inspection by the public.

Fees

There are no fees associated with processing this request because the fees incurred do not exceed the minimum threshold necessary for charge.


Administrative Appeal

In the event that you wish to appeal this determination, an administrative appeal may be made in writing to Kimberly Walton, Assistant Administrator, Office of Civil Rights & Liberties, Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement (CRL/OTE), Transportation Security Administration, 601 South 12<sup>th</sup> Street, East Building, E7-121S, Arlington, VA 20598-6033. Your appeal **must be submitted within 60 days** from

the date of this determination. It should contain your FOIA request number and, to the extent possible, the reasons why you believe the initial determination should be reversed. In addition, the envelope in which the appeal is mailed should be prominently marked "FOIA Appeal." Please note that the Assistant Administrator's determination of the appeal will be administratively final.

If you have any questions pertaining to your request, please feel free to contact the FOIA Branch at 1-866-364-2872 or locally at 571-227-2300.

Sincerely,



Regina McCoy  
FOIA Officer

Summary:

Number of Pages Released in Part or in Full: 190

Number of Pages Withheld in Full: 23

Number of Pages Referred: 5

**APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS**  
**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND/OR PRIVACY ACT**

**Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552)**

☐ (b)(1) ☐ (b)(2) ☒ (b)(3) ☐ (b)(4) ☒ (b)(5) ☒ (b)(6)

☐ (b)(7)(A) ☐ (b)(7)(B) ☐ (b)(7)(C) ☐ (b)(7)(D) ☐ (b)(7)(E) ☐ (b)(7)(F)

Enclosures

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT  
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) FOIA Branch applies FOIA exemptions to protect:

Exemptions

**Exemption (b)(1):** Records that contain information that is classified for national security purposes.

**Exemption (b)(2):** Records that are related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.

**Exemption (b)(3):** Records specifically exempted from disclosure by Title 49 U.S.C. Section 114(r), which exempts from disclosure Sensitive Security Information (SSI) that “would be detrimental to the security of transportation” if disclosed.

**Exemption (b)(4):** Records that contain trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person that is privileged or confidential.

**Exemption (b)(5):** Inter- or intra-agency records that are normally privileged in the civil discovery context. The three most frequently invoked privileges are the deliberative process privilege, the attorney work-product privilege, and the attorney-client privilege:

- Deliberative process privilege – Under the deliberative process privilege, disclosure of these records would injure the quality of future agency decisions by discouraging the open and frank policy discussions between subordinates and superiors.
- Attorney work-product privilege – Records prepared by or at the direction of a TSA attorney.
- Attorney-client privilege – Records of communications between an attorney and his/her client relating to a matter for which the client has sought legal advice, as well as facts divulged by client to attorney and any opinions given by attorney based on these.

**Exemption (b)(6):** Records that contain identifying information that applies to a particular individual when the disclosure of such information “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” This requires the balancing of the public’s right to disclosure against the individual’s right to privacy.

**Exemption (b)(7)(A):** Records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that production of such law enforcement records or information...could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings.

**Exemption (b)(7)(C):** Records containing law enforcement information when disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” based upon the traditional recognition of strong privacy interests ordinarily appropriated in law enforcement records.

**Exemption (b)(7)(E):** Records compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which would disclose techniques and/or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

**Exemption (b)(7)(F):** Records containing law enforcement information about a person, in that disclosure of information about him or her could reasonably be expected to endanger his or her life or physical safety.

PRIVACY ACT  
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) FOIA Branch applies Privacy Act exemptions to protect:

Exemptions

**Exemption (d)(5):** Information compiled in reasonable anticipation of civil action or proceeding; self-executing exemption.

**Exemption (j)(2):** Principal function criminal law enforcement agency records compiled during course of criminal law enforcement proceeding.

**Exemption (k)(1):** classified information under an Executive Order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

**Exemption (k)(2):** Non-criminal law enforcement records; criminal law enforcement records compiled by non-principal function criminal law enforcement agency; coverage is less broad where individual has been denied a right, privilege, or benefit as result of information sought.

**Exemption (k)(5):** Investigatory material used only to determine suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for federal civilian employment or access to classified information when the material comes from confidential sources.

**Exemption (k)(6):** Testing or examination material used to determine appointment or promotion of federal employees when disclosure would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the process.

## **8A Talking Points on Workforce Assessment**

### **Background**

As part of his assessment of union representation and collective bargaining, Administrator John Pistole conducted an assessment of their potential impact on the TSA. The assessment addressed whether union representation or collective bargaining would interfere with the TSA mission, how the potential impact might be managed to maintain security, and whether a unionized workforce is compatible with the high performance required of TSA in order to fulfill its mission. The assessment was conducted by reviewing TSA data and by interviewing leaders within the TSA, a wide range of other security organizations with union representation, and experts on unions and high performance organizations.

### **Does unionization compromise a security organization's ability to accomplish its mission?**

1. Every non-TSA organization contacted indicated it was able, completely and effectively, to accomplish its mission and achieve its objectives regardless of unionization and collective bargaining.
2. Collective bargaining incurs an additional cost in terms of management time and attention.
3. Some organizations benefited from the unionized relationship.
4. All organizations found unionization challenging and requiring significant management resources both in collective bargaining and administering the resulting labor agreements.
5. All organizations affirmed they were able to do whatever was necessary to meet their mission in a timely fashion, but often had to deal with grievances and disputes afterwards.
6. In most organizations spoken to, unions are legally barred from collective action: strikes, sickouts, etc.

### **How are potential adverse consequences of unionization managed?**

1. Nearly all organizations stated that adverse factors of unionization could be managed by limiting the scope and content of collective bargaining.
2. The key limitation would be management's right to make critical security-related decisions without union interference and to suspend any terms of a collective bargaining agreement in an emergency situation.
3. Whatever the limitations on the scope of bargaining, the effectiveness of an organization in a union environment depends on establishing a constructive and productive relationship with the union.

4. A constructive relationship involves establishing a structured, collaborative relationship based on open communication, problem solving and a cooperative labor-management relationship with the union and the work force.
5. Even where specific security-related topics are excluded from collective bargaining, respectful and engaged consultation with employees on the excluded issues is an important component of a successful, collaborative relationship with the union.

**What is TSA's current readiness?**

1. TSA has important challenges that could affect its ability to perform its mission if it is unable to innovate in the face of the evolving threat.
2. TSA must develop as a high performance organization whether or not a union eventually represents TSA employees.
3. While security policies and practices are well-implemented, management policies and practices have not been consistently implemented and accountability for them is not sufficient or consistent.
4. TSA managers and supervisors need to strengthen their capability and consistency.
5. Creation of a high performance culture and its corresponding practices is essential if TSA is to continue to meet its mission.

**Are unionization and collective bargaining compatible with a high performance organization?**

1. Yes, unionization and collective bargaining can be fully compatible with high performing organizations. .
2. There are many organizations in public and private sectors, including security-related organizations, which excel in performance.
3. In some cases, a union helps achieve high performance by driving messages to the workforce and helping managers better understand and address employee concerns.
4. The key factor in creating high performance organizations is not necessarily the presence of a union but the vision, skills and commitment of the management team and how they engage with a union in creating a high performance culture.
5. A collaborative framework with the union is the most effective way to engage the union.

**Can unionization and collective bargaining help improve performance at TSA?**

1. Yes, if done the right way.
2. Recognition of employees' right to organize and bargain collectively can bolster employee morale and commitment—because it ensures procedural fairness and a trusted mechanism to be heard.

3. A union presence and collective bargaining can help structure and clarify management processes and systems, and promotes better discipline and consistency of policy application.
4. In collaborative union-management relationships, unions can serve as a fast, organized and credible communicator to employees of messages essential to the organization.
5. The potential for a union as a positive influence on employees in support of the mission cannot be taken for granted: the relationship must be carefully developed.



## SLT FAQ

- 1. Why didn't you involve us in making the decision or formulating the details of the Determination?** Input from the Senior Leadership Team on the implications of union representation and collective bargaining at the TSA was collected during interviews, forums and management discussions over the past year. The specific features and conditions of the Determination were based on that input as well as data from TSA programs and departments, internal studies, consultations with leaders of other security organizations with union representation as well as experts in fields related to union representation and high performance organizations.
- 2. Were you forced into the Determination by the FLRA decision or through political pressure?** Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the TSA Administrator has discretion whether to allow union elections or collective bargaining, and to set the terms of any representational framework. While the timing of the Determination was influenced by the FLRA decision, the decision whether to allow an election and collective bargaining rested with the TSA Administrator. As part of our review, we consulted with DHS leaders and others across government, but, again, the decision was made by the Administrator.
- 3. Will Congress allow TSA to authorize a union? What will be the reaction, especially after the recent mid-term election?** Congress allowed the TSA to authorize a union through the discretion it gave the TSA Administrator under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The decision was made based on the best interests of the TSA, its employees and its mission and the Determination addresses the concerns expressed by members of Congress on both sides of the aisle.
- 4. Does the FLRA have a role in labor relations at the TSA after the election is over?** ATSA gives discretion to the TSA Administrator to establish the nature and limits of union representation and collective bargaining at the TSA. For the reasons it sets forth, the Determination provides that Title 5, Chapter 71, under which the FLRA was established, will apply only insofar as the FLRA conducts the election, adjudicates election issues and certifies the election results. If a union is elected and certified as the representative by the FLRA, the framework set forth in the Determination will apply and the FLRA will have no further role unless and until 30% of the employees file a petition asking for an election to decertify the union.

5. **What does it mean to be neutral during the campaign? What specifically can we do and not do?** Federal law requires TSA managers at all level to remain neutral in word and deed. We simply cannot allow ourselves to compromise the freedom of TSOs to choose whether to be represented by a union or whether to choose one union over another. In the days ahead, we will provide more specific guidelines on what is allow and prohibited by our commitment to neutrality. We will also provide working sessions after the first of the year to field managers at all levels on how to manage while maintaining neutrality.
6. **How can you hold me accountable for results if the union or a labor agreement tie management's hands?** The Determination carefully preserves the right to manage, especially in areas that affect security. In areas where collective bargaining might establish new procedures or rights, we will manage within those new rules like we manage within any other parameters that establish requirements or limitations. Remember, no labor agreement or new procedures will be established unless TSA management agrees to them.
7. **Will collective bargaining mean the end of the PASS program?** Compensation is expressly excluded from collective bargaining under the Determination. The Determination does allow collective bargaining on performance management, and we will have to see what changes, if any, will be made to PASS as a result of collective bargaining.
8. **Does collective bargaining mean that sooner or later our employees will come under the GSA pay scales?** The provisions in Title 5 of the U.S. Code that establish the GS pay scale are not in Chapter 71 of Title 5 which establishes collective bargaining rights for Federal employees so a decision to conform to the GS scale would be completely separate from the decision to give limited collective bargaining rights.
9. **How can union officials represent TSOs in disciplinary processes where security procedures are at issue?** TSOs currently have a right to representation in disciplinary procedures so the Determination does not significantly change those rights. The main exception is that, like other Federal agencies, it extends these rights to the investigatory stage if the employee reasonably believes that the process will result in discipline. The Determination specifies that any non-TSA individuals, whether union officials or not, must comply with all SSI requirements including confidentiality. A union election or collective bargaining does not change that requirement.

- 10. Will the peer review process be eliminated? If not, how can it work if a union is representing employees? How can it work if a union requires TSOs not to testify against or judge a fellow union member?** The Determination expressly reserves to management the right to continue programs of any kind regardless of union representation and collective bargaining. That said, it is possible that some programs will be supplanted or evolve as TSA evolves.
- 11. Many of my managers have little background in dealing with unions and may be at a disadvantage. What is TSA going to offer them to prepare for managing in a union environment?** The TSA fully intends to provide information, training, support and advice to all managers on unions and how to manage in a union environment.
- 12. My office has little day-to-day contact with front line employees. How will the Determination affect us?** Support offices at a minimum need to understand the implications of union representation and collective bargaining for the TSA as a whole. While some departments have limited dealing with front line employees, many have dealings with Operations managers or Human Resources personnel who will be interacting with union representatives or unionized employees, should a union be elected. Accordingly, each department must understand how their internal clients are affected and how they can support them. Most importantly, the collaborative labor relations that are at the heart of this Determination and will be a prerequisite to its implementation should a union be elected reflect the Administrator's expectation for TSA's culture and its leaders.
- 13. My department interacts with front line officers for routine information gathering, feedback on programs, input on new ideas, etc. Do we have to stop this contact? Will we have to go through union representatives?** It is unlikely that most support departments that contact front line employees will need to change how they interact with employees for routine purposes, particularly in operational or security areas. Programs and forums to seek input from employees or engage them in improving the TSA will likewise continue. Union representatives may have a role in some proceedings related to the individual employees' circumstances, much as they do today in situations such as discipline. In addition, union representatives may be present in meetings or processes related to the administration of a labor agreement or, in some instances, other terms and conditions of TSO employment.

**14. The Determination says there will be no local bargaining, but we assume there will be local union officers and representatives. What will they be doing if not negotiating? Will they be talking to local field leadership? About what?** Union representatives will likely be present at many airports as they are today. If a union is elected, they will represent their members for individual processes and may have a role bringing employee concerns to the attention of airport leadership or even national leaders. They may also be involved in devising solutions to systemic problems or clarifying procedures. They will have a right to be present and to state their point of view at certain local “formal” meetings that concern terms and conditions of employment. However, they will not engage in local collective bargaining as local collective bargaining agreements are prohibited.

**15. How will the new framework affect our ability to discipline employees?** TSA managers retain the right to discipline employees under the Determination. Disciplinary standards and penalties are excluded from collective bargaining. Some policies that can lead to discipline such as attendance management are subject to bargaining, but no changes will be made unless agreed by management. As is the current practice, union officials may represent employees who are in a disciplinary proceeding.

**16. The Determination says that the impact and implementation of security decisions and personnel deployment are excluded from bargaining, yet it also says that seniority, transfers, bids, etc. are subject to bargaining. Won't the union insist on bargaining over at least the impact of management decisions on who gets which jobs?** Management retains the right to deploy personnel as needed for security, and these decisions, including the impact on personnel deployment and fitness for duty standards, are not subject to bargaining. That said, where management has established the requirements for personnel deployment, certain aspects regulating how jobs are filled, such as seniority, shift trade policy, transfer policy, etc. are subject to bargaining. Once the rules are set, however, management will continue to make deployment decisions as long as they comply with the bargained rules. In any case, TSA management retains the right to suspend any aspect of a labor agreement in an emergency, including deployment of personnel to meet a threat.

**17. What happens if the membership of the union votes down a negotiated labor agreement?** The agreement is not in force until and unless a subsequent vote, with or without further bargaining, approves an agreement. If there is no agreement, TSA management continues to make decisions as it does now.

**18. What is the procedure for decertification if employees are not happy with the union they elect?** The FLRA would conduct an election to see if the employees want to decertify the union if a petition is filed showing that 30% of the employees no longer want the union to represent them.

**19. Who is going to stop groups of union members from job actions, especially more subtle actions short of a strike (sick outs, etc.)? Can we hold the union accountable?** TSA employees are expressly prohibited from any strikes or job actions, or advocacy of the same, whether or not a union represents TSA employees. TSA management can hold employees accountable under existing disciplinary policies. Pursuant to his discretion, the Administrator could also take away some union rights should the ban on job actions be violated with union involvement.

**20. What is interest based bargaining? How is it different from traditional bargaining?** Interest based bargaining is a well-established process where the parties identify their respective interests related to the topics of bargaining, then work to meet each other's interests in pursuit of an agreement. In traditional bargaining, parties often present demands; in interest-based bargaining, parties strive to listen to the underlying needs of each party, then jointly find solutions that meet those needs.

**21. How can we ensure the dispute resolution process is "rapid and final"? What stops a union from dragging disputes out through endless appeals?** The Determination calls for rapid and final dispute resolution. While the details of the procedure are not complete, the Determination established the principles including reference of disputes to a panel of neutrals that makes the final ruling. What is distinctive about the TSA process is that disputes will move through the process relatively rapidly compared with traditional procedures under Chapter 71.

## **# 16 Media Talking Points Alternative Order**

- 1. The TSA Administrator has determined that a union election can be conducted consistent with security requirements.**

The TSA Administrator has been clear that TSA's mission to protect the traveling public must be the priority in any discussion or decisions about union representation. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) recently decided that an election should be conducted at TSA. In his determination, the Administrator exercised his discretion under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) to permit an election supervised by the FLRA in order to establish whether TSA employees wish to be represented by a union.

- 2. Under specified conditions that protect security, the TSA Administrator's determination also allows for binding collective bargaining.**

The recent FLRA decision directed a union election expressly for purposes *other than* collective bargaining. However, the representational framework outlined in the Administrator's determination will go beyond the FLRA decision to include binding collective bargaining with a union if elected.

- 3. Collective Bargaining will cover specific employment issues but not security policies and procedures.**

The scope of collective bargaining will include specific issues relating to employment such as seniority, bids, transfers and awards. Among the subjects excluded from bargaining will be the impact and implementation of security policies and procedures, testing, deployment of security personnel, fitness for duty standards, and deployment of equipment. These will remain management decisions.

- 4. Collective Bargaining will occur only at the national level.**

If a union is elected as the exclusive representative, collective bargaining will occur only at the national level, and the collective bargaining agreement will be national in scope and will cover all unit employees; local level bargaining and local level agreements are prohibited.

- 5. Employees will have the right to choose whether or not to be represented by a union.**

As is the case in most of the federal government, all covered employees will have the right to join and support any union of their choosing or to refrain from joining or supporting any union. If they choose not to join a union, they do not need to pay any dues or agency fees. In dealings with management, employees may choose to be represented by the elected union, by another person (though not another union) or may represent themselves.

6. **In order to support TSA's security mission, the relationship between TSA and a union, if elected, will be unique, constructive and results-oriented for both parties.**

The representational framework will be an arrangement unique to the TSA. We will use interest-based processes to bargain, we will address workplace issues by involving those close to the concern, and we will resolve any disputes through a process that is rapid and brings closure. The goal is a relationship that is fair, transparent and includes checks and balances.

7. **The bargaining unit will include personnel who perform screening.**

Employees included in the national bargaining unit for a union election are full and part time non-supervisory personnel who perform screening functions. Supervisors and other managers will not be included in the bargaining unit. Also excluded from the bargaining unit are confidential employees, employees doing personnel work and employees involved in intelligence work.

8. **It is important to read the full text of the Determination, which explains the details of the unique framework that will apply to the TSA.**

The Determination can be found at \_\_\_\_\_.

- Administrator Pistole's goal is to help the agency become a more agile, high-performance organization that can better protect the traveling public from constantly changing threats.
- As you may know, he pledged during his confirmation hearings to complete a thorough review of the potential impact of collective bargaining on the safety and security of the traveling public.
- He has now completed that review.
- First, an important point to keep in mind is that as he was conducting the assessment, the Federal Labor Relations Authority – an independent government agency that oversees federal labor relations – announced on November 12<sup>th</sup> that they were ordering an election for TSA officers to vote on union representation.
- Because collective bargaining rights can be granted only by the TSA Administrator, the FLRA decision could not order an election for the purposes of collective bargaining.
- Nonetheless, the FLRA ordered that a TSA union election will likely occur this March. Their decision was not the reason for the assessment but it added a dimension to his considerations.
- Administrator Pistole's assessment included a review of TSA employee data, a broad range of conversations, input from TSA employees, feedback from TSA management and discussions with the presidents of the two unions seeking to represent TSA officers.
- He also consulted agencies in the security and law enforcement fields that already engage in collective bargaining, such as the New York Police Department, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and a number of Department of Defense facilities.
- The issue was also discussed with management at two airports that are part of TSA's Screening Partnership Program that have unionized contracted



screeners, as well as experts on labor relations in high-performance organizations.

- More than 13,000 officers are already dues-paying members of various unions. These unions provide personal rather than collective representation and cannot bargain on behalf of the officers.
- After this thorough assessment, he determined that full-scale collective bargaining in the traditional sense would not be prudent for TSA.
- The core mission is the safety of the traveling public and they simply will not negotiate on security nor will they cede the authority and flexibility needed to both adapt to evolving threats and protect national security.
- That being said, Administrator Pistole does believe that employee morale, motivation and engagement are inseparable from achieving superior security.
- TSA hasn't ranked very well in these areas in years past.
- Clearly, to reach the next level as a counterterrorism agency, TSA must do better with and by its employees.
- Administrator Pistole issued an official Determination on (today) February 4<sup>th</sup> that clearly defines the terms of the FLRA-ordered election and permits security officers to determine once and for all whether or not they wish to be represented by a union for the purposes of engaging in collective bargaining on certain clearly-defined, non-security employment issues.
- If officers elect a union, issues related to security will not be subject to collective bargaining, including:
  - Security policies, procedures and the deployment of security personnel or equipment
  - Pay, pensions and any form of compensation
  - Proficiency testing
  - Job qualifications
  - Discipline standards

- Strikes and all work slowdowns are strictly prohibited.
- Should officers choose a union, bargaining would be permitted only on limited, non-security issues outlined in the determination relating to employment such as shift bids, transfers and awards.
- Bargaining will be allowed at the national level only – local bargaining and agreements are prohibited.
- If a majority of transportation security officers vote to be represented by a union, employees will not be required to join the union or pay dues.
- The framework Administrator Pistole laid out is unique to TSA and ensures that TSA does not cede the authority and flexibility needed to both adapt to evolving threats and protect national security, while continuing to improve employee engagement, performance and professional development.
- This framework will help reinforce consistency and accountability across security operations at more than 450 airports.
- A few points to note:
  - Only transportation security officers who conduct screening will be eligible to vote and be part of the bargaining unit;
  - As an agency, TSA will continue to engage all employees directly on terms and conditions of employment;
  - And TSA will retain the right to discipline and terminate employees.
  - If transportation security officers vote to be represented by a union, the framework will ensure TSA and the elected union resolve any disputes through an expedited process that brings closure swiftly.
- Our enemy is nimble, determined and bent on our destruction. As our nation's last line of defense in aviation security, TSA must continue to adapt in the face of ever evolving – and ever more challenging – threats.
- The engagement, judgment and focus of the frontline workforce is critical.

- The unique labor relations framework Administrator Pistole set out will allow TSA to continue to evolve, continue to build the high performance organization the public deserves and continue to keep the American traveling public safe.

###

## Raleigh Press Conference Remarks:

- Thank you FSD Zunk for that kind introduction. Raleigh-Durham is indeed fortunate to have Mike Zunk. It is my pleasure to be here. Raleigh-Durham is a vibrant airport with more than 380 dedicated TSA employees as well as roughly 5,500 airport employees and vendors.
- I look forward to meeting with the TSA workforce, agency stakeholders, and the traveling public -- 15,000 of whom travel through this airport each day.

- I will be looking at three key goals I have for TSA:
  - focusing TSA's counterterrorism mission through intelligence and cutting-edge technologies,
  - supporting the TSA workforce,
  - and strengthening TSA's relationships with stakeholders and the traveling public.
- Utilizing my experience at the FBI, TSA will continue to use the latest intelligence, the latest training, and state of the art technology to work as part of a layered defense.

- Today I am also asking for your feedback through a new forum called *Talk to TSA*. Talk to TSA provides an online forum for passengers to send their comments, ideas and suggestions. Talk to TSA can be found at [www.tsa.gov](http://www.tsa.gov).
- It is my pleasure to highlight the availability of *MyTSA*, which is available as a mobile web and an iPhone application that enables travelers to access frequently asked questions about airport security, check airport status and enables passengers to post wait times for other passengers to view. This free app will help passengers prepare for the security screening process, making their trip through the checkpoint more efficient.

- I am excited to lead an agency with such dedicated and experienced professionals. I also look forward to working with, supporting, and enhancing the efforts of the Transportation Security Officers, Federal Air Marshals and others who work to keep the American people safe.
- Given my FBI experience and background, I know the threats are real. The attempted Christmas Day attack is a stark reminder of why TSA exists as one critical component of the layered approach we use in the U.S. government with the intelligence community, state and local law enforcement and security partners. The Times Square attempted attack, although not transportation-related per se, is another vivid reminder.
- Thanks for being here and thanks to the people of North Carolina for your support in our collective security mission.

- I'm happy to take your questions.



## **EAA AirVenture talking points**

Thank you for that introduction. Good afternoon, as Tom said I'm John Pistole, administrator for the Transportation Security Administration.

As I start my tenure with this agency I will be looking at three key goals:

- improving TSA's counterterrorism focus through intelligence and cutting-edge technologies,
- supporting the TSA workforce,
- and strengthening TSA's relationships with stakeholders and the traveling public.

I am excited to lead an agency with such dedicated and experienced professionals.

Today I had the opportunity to meet with key leaders in the General Aviation community to discuss shared priorities and opportunities. I look forward to working together in the months and years to come.

TSA recognizes the unique nature of general aviation and the important role each member of the GA community plays in security.

Given my FBI experience and background, I know the threats are real. The attempted Christmas Day attack is a stark reminder of why TSA exists as one critical component of the layered approach we use in the U.S. government with the intelligence community, state and local law enforcement and security partners. The Times Square attempted attack, although not transportation-related per se, is another vivid reminder.

When I was sworn in as TSA administrator this month, I pledged to continue the effort TSA's counterterrorism efforts domestically and internationally. We will work with our partners in the general aviation industry to implement enhancements in a way that is reasonable and effective.

I know that many in the GA community are paying close attention to the public rulemaking process that began in 2008. Thousands of comments were received and reviewed. These comments as well as the measures developed from industry workshops are being incorporated into a supplemental proposed rule that we anticipate will be made available for public comment in the coming months.

As we move forward, we will continue to engage with key industry stakeholders to develop appropriate security measures that minimize General Aviation risk.

It's now my pleasure to introduce DHS Secretary Napolitano.

- Thank you for coming. I know you have waited a long time for this decision.
- As you know, I have spent the last few months assessing the potential impact of collective bargaining for TSOs on TSA's security mission. Feedback from my workforce was part of that assessment, along with my conversation with you and conversations with many organizations with security or law enforcement missions and collective bargaining.
- Using the authority granted to me under ATSA, I have decided to set aside the Loy Determination and allow TSOs to vote on whether or not they want one of your unions to represent them for collective bargaining on non-security issues related to their employment within a framework unique to TSA.
- It is about time, after all these years, that the employees have a choice. We are completely committed to a free and fair election in which TSA maintains strict neutrality and the employees feel free to support and join a union if they choose to do so without fear or coercion.
- If a union wins the election, they will have an exclusive representative for the purpose of genuine, binding collective bargaining on key workplace issues with a major impact on their daily work lives.
- These subjects of bargaining include the performance management system, rewards and recognition, the transfer policy, the shift bid process and so forth.
- TSA will not bargain about security related subjects like the impact or implementation of security policies and procedures, deployment of equipment and personnel, or performance standards.
- TSA also will not bargain about pay and compensation.
- Bargaining will be at the national level only.
- Employees will have full Weingarten rights. [right to representation in pre-discipline investigatory processes and the disciplinary process itself.]
- The exclusive representative will have a right to be present at formal meetings and a right to information necessary to understand topics of collective bargaining.
- I have given the details of this Determination a lot of thought. In the document I explain my reasoning and set forth a framework which I believe is right for our employees and protects the best security for the traveling public and the means to achieve it.

- I hope that you will read it and consider it carefully. I have to leave you now with Jeff and Deborah who can fill you in further and answer your questions.



## Transportation Security Administration

### Holiday Travel Talking Points

#### TALKING POINTS

- During the 2007 Thanksgiving holiday travel season, the average peak wait time at the largest CAT X airports was 12.7 minutes. Just like holiday travel periods in the past and the efforts of August 10, 2006 when liquids were banned and security procedures changed overnight, security officers continue to exhibit the highest level of performance and professionalism.
- Moving forward with the holidays, we will continue to coordinate staffing and commit to maintaining the flow of passenger traffic. You can make your experience better by coming prepared and coming early.
- Transportation Security Officers are looking for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) – the greatest threat to aviation today. This *is* a tough job. IEDs are small and can be made from common items.
- TSA officers see thousands of X-ray images everyday and need to quickly determine if the bag they are viewing contains a possible IED. TSA security officers are expertly trained at discovering threats and empowered to use their common sense judgment.
- TSA wants to be your partner and help you navigate security quickly and with ease. We are dedicated to ensuring the security of your flight and we want you to have a great trip. Help us help you get through security faster.

#### TRAVEL TIPS

- Pack your carry-on bag neatly. Eliminate clutter so we get a clear look at your bag contents through the x-ray.
- Follow 3–1–1 for carry-on luggage:
  - 3 ounce bottle or less for all liquids, gels and aerosols;
  - 1 quart-sized, clear, plastic, zip-top bag to hold all small bottles;
  - 1 bag per passenger placed in screening bin.
- Do not travel with wrapped packages. In order to determine if a package is a threat a security officer may need to unwrap and inspect the item. If you are traveling with gifts please wrap them after you reach your destination.

- SimpliFLY is not another rule; It is an awareness effort to tell the public to be ready for security. TSA does not want to impede travelers but wants them to know why we do what we do and that security is our number one mission.
- Travelers may encounter additional screening when bringing remote control devices in carry-on baggage. While not associated with a specific threat at this time, TSA is aware that remote control toys can be used to initiate devices used in terrorist attacks.
- Effective August 4, 2007, laptop computers, full-size video game consoles (for example Playstation®, X-box®, or Nintendo®), full-size DVD players, and video cameras that use video cassettes must be removed from their carrying cases and submitted separately for x-ray screening. Laptop computers and video cameras that use cassettes have long been subject to this policy.

What needs to be Screened Separately:

- Laptops
- Full-size video game consoles
- Full-size DVD players
- Video cameras that use video cassettes
- CPAP breathing machines

Small and portable electronic items do not need to be removed from their carrying cases.

## **2007 HIGHLIGHTS**

- During the 2007 Thanksgiving holiday travel season, the average wait time at the largest Cat X airports was 4.6 minutes and the average wait times during peak hours was 12.7 minutes. Security officers continue to exhibit the highest level of performance and professionalism.
- In 2007 TSA saw voluntary attrition (full and part time) for all TSOs reduced by 2.3. It is now 16.9 percent. This marks the fourth year in a row that attrition has declined.
- TSA has implemented a number of flexible, security measures that greatly enhance our ability to detect, deter and prevent threats. This includes a 175 percent increase in the number of Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) to approximately 600 at 40 nation's largest airports. There are also ticket document checkers in place at 340 airports nationwide.
- TSA continues to test and deploy the latest technologies and initiated pilots on whole body imaging, multi-view X-ray for carry-ons, auto-explosive detection systems for carry-on baggage, cast and prosthesis screening and bottled liquids scanners.
- For the second year TSA rewarded high-performing security officers through the PASS program. There are four levels of performance that not only recognize security officers who do a great job day in and day out but also those who are role models of excellence that really stand out amongst their peers. It is the only pay-for-performance system in the Department of Homeland Security, and other components are currently modeling similar programs based on PASS.



- Transportation Security Officers are one of the most tested workforces in the nation. They are tested every day, on every shift, at every checkpoint, in every lane at more than 450 airports nationwide.

# SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

## MEETING WITH AFGHANISTAN

Acting Minister Daoud Najafi  
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA)  
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
*January 3, 1300-1330/Administrator's Office*

### OBJECTIVES:

- To introduce yourself and other key TSA officials to the Acting Minister Najafi.
- To get acquainted and discuss topics of common interest.

### BACKGROUND:

- Acting Minister Najafi is traveling to the United States on January 2<sup>nd</sup> to visit the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA or "Metro"). He will also be visiting the TSA Freedom Center for a familiarization tour.
- The current DHS presence in Afghanistan includes 11 positions, including a DHS Attaché (Carlos Delatorre on detail from TSA), six ICE agents, and four CBP officers.
- In January of 2007, the TSA conducted a comprehensive assessment of the civil aviation security posture in Afghanistan at the national level and at Kabul International Airport (KBL). The assessment culminated in a 100 page report (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114. (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r) Afghanistan does not meet International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 17 standards (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r) (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)
- On April 6<sup>th</sup> 2008, the TSA and the Afghan Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA) signed an MOU to support Afghanistan and the TSA agreed to post a civil aviation security specialist to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to assist in the development of the national civil aviation security legislation, and security program development at the national level and Kabul International Airport.
- In accordance with the MOU between the FAA and TSA, a civil aviation security advisor was posted from November 2008, through September 2010, under a reimbursable agreement with USAID and administered by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). TSA personnel were housed in the U.S. Embassy and embedded at the Ministry of Transport and conducted field work primarily at Kabul Airport.

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## SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

- Under the terms of the original agreement between TSA and MoTCA, MoTCA committed to provide a national-level civil aviation security official whom TSA would mentor in order to leave a sustainable civil aviation security program. To date, MoTCA has failed to assign anyone to the national-level aviation security position to work with TSA, despite numerous requests by TSA and FAA, citing their lack of funds to pay for such a position and their authority to hire, since national level aviation security law has not been passed by the Afghan Parliament. In June 2009, during the tenure of the first posted TSA civil aviation security specialist, TSA changed the mission from national level assistance to concentrate on improvement of civil aviation security assistance at the airport level (Kabul) due to MoTCA's inability to provide a national level counterpart for TSA to mentor and assist.
- At KBL, the screening of international passengers, checked baggage, cargo, and aircraft security is conducted by Global Security, a UK based firm funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for 3 years at a cost of 44 million dollars (U.S.). This contract is currently in its second year with Global Security, who recently submitted a proposal to UAE which would expand their responsibilities to include domestic flights from KBL. This decision still pending. Currently, passengers departing KBL on domestic flights are screened by the Afghan Border Police (ABP). (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r) (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r) Prior to the UAE funding contract with Global Security, international flights departing KBL were screened by the ABP as well.
- At the time of the last TSA civil aviation security specialist's departure (September 2010), TSA led initiatives being addressed at KBL included: development and issuance of a new airport ID, VIP screening, and USAID aviation security funded projects (security fence and employee staff screening building). Future plans include an updated assessment of Kabul Airport, Airport Security Program development, Quality Assurance program development, screener training (b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(5) and working discussions with Afghan government officials to determine the roles and responsibilities during a hijacked aircraft or other aviation security related crisis management incident.
- Proposal to create an Aviation Security Department – Prior to departing post, TSA recommended (b)(5) (b)(5)

## SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

(b)(5)

(\*Note- The ABP report to the MOI and are incorporated into this plan)

- VIP Screening at Kabul International Airport – Currently there are several categories of passengers that are exempt from screening, to include their carry-on articles and, in certain occasions, their checked baggage. The official list of exempted passenger categories includes (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

TSA met with MoTCA, Kabul Airport Officials, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel on several occasions in order to discuss reforming the current security practices that do not meet international standards. Government officials agreed to forward a letter on to Parliament seeking assistance and changing procedures. Airport officials (b)(5)

(b)(5)

### TSA / DHS FUTURE ENGAGEMENT:

- Once the USAID funding for this effort was exhausted and after the withdrawal of the last TSA civil aviation security specialist in September 2010, Acting Minister Najafi appealed to U.S. Ambassador Eikenberry to request that TSA assistance to MoTCA be continued. Ambassador Eikenberry raised this issue to the FAA and DHS through the DHS Attaché, and to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP), Ambassador Holbrooke. SRAP and the State Department agreed to provide additional funding to TSA through DHS to continue this effort through the end of CY 2012.
- The SRAP to DHS/TSA funding mechanism is still being worked out and should be resolved in early January. The DHS Controlled NSDD38 should be approved at about that same time. OGS will post a Vacancy Announcement (VA) soliciting applicants seeking this position, which will be listed as a “Not To Exceed” (NTE) two years, and applicants from all sources will be encouraged to apply. As soon as the successful candidate is identified, hired and trained, he / she is anticipated to arrive on station on or about EOM March 2011.

### TALKING POINTS:

- TSA looks forward to posting another civil aviation security advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. We are looking at how best to help and provide support, and believe we can be even more effective if we had a national-level civil aviation official in MoTCA to work with (i.e. a Director of Civil Aviation Security).

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(b)(5)



- We welcome your feedback on the assistance TSA has been providing through the on-site security advisor.

### ANTICIPATED QUESTIONS:

(b)(5)

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# **SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION**

## **PARTICIPANTS/BIOS:**

### Non-TSA:

- Acting Minister Najafi, Afghanistan Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation
- Dan Diggins, Advisor to MoTCA, FAA

### TSA:

- John Halinski, Assistant Administrator – Office of Global Strategies (OGS)
- Dan McQuaid, Regional Manager for Asia Pacific – OGS

## **ATTACHMENTS:**

A. Biography – Dr. Daoud Ali Najafi, Acting Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation

# SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

## Attachment A: Biography of Dr. Daoud Ali Najafi

Name: Daoud Ali Najafi  
Title: Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation  
(Acting)  
Father's name: (b)(6)  
Date of birth: (b)(6)  
Nationality: Afghan  
Mother tongue: Persian (Dari)



### Qualifications:

- MBBS (Medical Science) from University of Balochistan in Pakistan
- MA Islamic Studies from university of Peshawar in Pakistan

Address: (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)

Tel: Mobile (b)(6)

### Specialization/Training:

- 2001: *Human Rights Training*, organized by OHCHR, Islamabad, Pakistan
- 05/2001: *Training course on Project cycle Management*, organized by Human Resource Development Institution, Islamabad, Pakistan
- 10/2001: *Training course on Fund Raising*, organized by Eco-Conservation Initiatives, Islamabad, Pakistan
- 03/2003: Training course on International Criminal court (ICC), organized by Forum Asia for human Rights and Development, Kabul
- 04/2004 Training course on Election Management organized by UNDP, Kabul
- 07/2005 Training course on BRIDG organized by UNOPS, Kabul
- 02/2008 Training course on Senior Management program organized by Spearhead Training, Dubai
- 03/2009 Training course on Election Management technique organized by PAI in London

### Publications:

- Report on the "Violation of Human Rights 1999-2000"
- Articles in "Sham-e-Awaragan"-magazine on refugee rights, 1989-1999
- Articles in "Victims and Justice" monthly publication of AODHR

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# SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

## International Seminars:

- a. Asian regional Expert meeting, on ICC, Bangkok, Thailand 9-11 September 2001
- b. Asian regional Expert Seminar on how to establish regional strategy on Human Rights development, Bangkok, Thailand 2002
- c. International Seminar on Involuntary disappearance, Manila, Philippines 2003
- d. The only Afghan Civil Society representative in the 4th Assembly of state Parties, in The Hague, Netherlands in 2004
- e. Asian regional expert strategy meeting on ICC, Jakarta, Indonesia 9-12 September 2007

## Study tour/Mission:

- a. Study tour to Sri Lanka organized by UNOPS (election project) 07/2005
- b. Study tour to Australia organized by The Asia Foundation, 09/2006
- c. Observation mission to Ukraine organized by UNDP, 07/2007
- d. Study tour/observation mission to Kenya organized by IFES 12/2007

S/#	Place/Organization	Position	Duration
1	<b>Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan</b> As head of executive Over all management and conduct of election at the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan	Chief Electoral Officer (Head of Secretariat)	12-12-2005 12-4-2010
2	<b>JEMB/UNOPS, Election Project</b> Participate in all JEMB meeting Chaired the Staff Meeting Participate in Election Management meeting Represent the Secretariat of the JEMB in different meetings and briefings Member of Post election Strategy Group (PESG) Chaired the meeting of operational subcommittee meeting Other Election related Issue	National Chief Electoral Officer	7-7-2005 to 12-12-2005
3	<b>UNAMA, Central Field Office, Kabul Afghanistan</b> Report on a daily, weekly and monthly basis, Liaise with local authorities, political parties, HR Groups. Councils, Tribal and religious leaders, Focal Point for Constitutional Process Focal point for political affairs Focal point for political Parties Deliver presentation in Round table for political Rights verification, on political, electoral, and constitutional issues Analyze political situation of the country	Political Affairs officer	2-2-2003 4-7-2005
4	<b>Afghanistan Organization for development of Human</b>	Founder and	2000-2003

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# SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

	<b>Rights (AODHR) Kabul, Afghanistan</b>	Executive Director	
	Chair the meetings of the Executive Council of APAHR, Develop project-proposals, Report on Human Rights Violations, Organize seminars and conferences on HR issues, Represent the NGO in many national and international conferences, Investigate HR violations, Conflict-resolution between armed groups as a member of the "Peace Mission" in cooperation with UNSMA.		
	<b>Coalition for International Criminal Court (CICC)</b>		
	Campaign for Ratification of ICC, Lobby for ICC with different interlocutors,		
5	Organize meetings with NGOs, Consult with government authorities, Participate in national and international meetings in order to develop an annual strategy for the Ratification of the ICC.	Focal point for Afghanistan	14-8-2001 16-8-2006
	<b>Institute of Science for Afghan Refugees, in Quetta, Pakistan</b>		
6	Teach students Medical Science, Chair the institute's council,	Director	1999-2002
	<b>Afghan lecture Afghan Lecturer and Teacher's Association, Quetta, Pakistan</b> This Association has 560 members (38% female, 62% male)		
7	Coordination of Education system for Afghan refugees in Pakistan Organize training for teachers. Represented association in monthly meeting of ACBAR, Liaison with other NGOs.	Chairman, Head of Executive Committee	1999-2002
	<b>Sehat Hospital for Afghan Refugees, Quetta, Pakistan</b>		
8	Management of hospital (administration, finances, personnel)	Director	1996-1999

Language Capability: Persian, Pashto, English, Urdu

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## **Administrator Pistole Talking Points for AIT International Summit**

- Welcome and thank you all for coming to this summit to learn more about TSA's use of advanced imaging technology.
- I was very pleased to learn that we have representatives from about 30 countries and 12 associations here today, which shows a recognition of the globalized nature of threats to aviation security.
- On December 25, 2009, we witnessed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed attempt to detonate concealed explosives on an aircraft, and just last week, our freedoms were under attack when individuals with ties to al Qaida in Yemen attempted to ship explosive devices in cargo on board aircraft, transitioning through several nations and ultimately destined for the U.S.
- These plots underscored the reality that, despite decades of advances in screening and significant reforms following 9/11, our global security network still faces an ever-evolving threat.
- By your presence here, I know you all share my concern in keeping passengers safe, and I want to extend my sincere appreciation for all that you are doing to keep our global transportation network secure.
- I began leading TSA this summer after spending 26 years at the FBI to improve our counterterrorism focus and make our skies safer while protecting our freedoms.
- One of my primary goals is to improve TSA's counterterrorism focus through intelligence and cutting edge technology. The deployment of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) is one of TSA's critical technology initiatives enabling TSA to stay ahead of evolving threats to aviation security, such as improvised explosive devices.
- AIT is our best possibility to deter and detect such terrorist threats at this time, and in the United States, we are working diligently to deploy units to airports all around the country.
- The global transportation network is only as strong as our weakest link, so we need to work together to pursue a stronger network using the best technologies, processes and training for our security workforces.
- It is my hope that this summit will serve as a forum for us to discuss best practices, lessons learned, and challenges faced by those who have already begun to deploy the technology.

- We have gathered TSA experts who will be discussing all aspects of our deployment of imaging technology, including safety, privacy, legal challenges, checkpoint configuration, public outreach, communication strategies, and future technology advancements.
- In the United States, we have deployed more than 370 AIT units in nearly 70 U.S. airports. By the end of calendar year 2011, we plan to have deployed approximately 1,000 units.
- As we rapidly AIT as it exists today, we are also exploring software enhancements through Automated Target Recognition (ATR), or auto-detection software. This capability would not only make screening more efficient, we also anticipate it will eliminate most privacy concerns about the technology. For those of you that are unfamiliar with it, you'll learn more about ATR during the conference.
- I am confident the next two days will be highly beneficial for all of us as we look for ways to further strengthen our aviation system using the latest technology.
- We are pleased to have you all here and look forward to a productive meeting.
- Thank you again for joining us at this summit.

## **Administrator Pistole Talking Points for AIT International Summit**

- Welcome and thank you all for coming to this summit to learn more about advanced imaging technology.
- I was very pleased to learn that we have representatives from about 30 countries and 12 associations here today, which shows a global commitment to address the threats that we face in the aviation domain.
- I know you all share my concern in keeping people safe when they travel, and I want to extend my sincere appreciation for all that you are doing to keep our transportation network secure.
- One of my primary goals is to improve TSA's counterterrorism focus through intelligence and cutting edge technology. The deployment of Advance Imaging Technology (AIT) is one of TSA's key technology initiatives.
- One of the biggest threats to aviation is an improvised explosive device hidden on the body. AIT is our best weapon to deter and detect this threat at this time, and in the United States, we are working diligently to deploy units to airports all around the country.
- At this summit, we will discuss best practices, lessons learned, and challenges faced by those who have already begun to deploy the technology. We have a very full agenda with sessions covering safety, privacy, legal challenges, checkpoint configuration, public outreach, communication strategies, and future technology advancements.
- The entire transportation network is only as strong as our weakest link, so we need to work together to pursue a stronger network using the best technologies, processes and training for our security workforces.
- In the United States, we have deployed nearly 350 AIT units in nearly 70 U.S. airports. By the end of calendar year 2011, we plan to have deployed approximately 1,000 units.
- As we rapidly deploy the current AIT technology, we are also exploring enhancements to improve performance and functionality. An example is the Automated Target Recognition (ATR), or auto-detection software. This capability would not only make screening more efficient, it will also eliminate most privacy concerns about the technology. For those of you that are unfamiliar with it, you'll learn more about ATR during the conference.
- I am confident the next two days will be highly beneficial for all of us as we look for ways to further strengthen our aviation system using AIT.
- We are pleased to have you all here and we look forward to a productive meeting.
- Thank you again for joining us at this summit.

### Talking Points

- TSA will strengthen existing security measures and require the screening of all cargo transported on passenger planes.
- Air carriers will be required to deliver all cargo offered under their express delivery service to TSA for screening by TSA security officers and explosives detection equipment. And, at low cargo volume Category II, III, and IV airports (approximately 270 airports nationwide), TSA will screen 100 percent of the originating cargo. (b)(3);49 U.S.C. § 114(r)  
(b)(3);49 U.S.C. § 114(r)  
(b)(3);49 U.S.C. § 114(r) And, a set of risk-based criteria are being implemented to target cargo that must be screened by the air carrier.
- Freight forwarders will also be required to physically inspect a certain percentage of cargo before it is consolidated and transported to the air carriers.
- Additional covert testing of air carriers and freight forwarders will be implemented to verify compliance with known shipper requirements.
- Finally, new reporting requirements will be levied on the air carriers to document the total amount of cargo that is being accepted for transport on passenger planes, the amount of cargo that is screened by the air carriers, and the amount of cargo that is screened by TSA.

### Air Cargo Q & A's

**Q. Are these changes in relation to the Air Cargo Final Rule?**

**A.** No, these changes are in addition to the Final Rule but are in response to the current change in threat level and are intended to continue to strengthen air cargo security.

**Q. What percentage of all air cargo is currently transported on passenger planes?**

**A.** Approximately 15 percent of all air cargo is transported on passenger planes.

**Q. Why not screen 100% all air cargo at all airports?**

**A.** 100 percent physical screening is not a viable alternative at this time. There is no single technology currently available that can effectively screen 100 percent of the 6 billion pounds of cargo shipped annually (2004) within the United States on passenger aircraft. It would require multiple technologies (many different machines) to handle all types and sizes of commodities as well as the different types of explosive threats.

**Q. What kind of technology is currently being tested to screen air cargo?**

**A.** DHS's Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) is pursuing a robust R&D program focused on emerging technologies that may eventually be effective across the full range of air cargo commodities and against all threats. TSA is working in close partnership with S&T to realize these goals. In parallel, we are working diligently to optimise the use of existing baggage screening technologies such as Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) in the air cargo environment.

**Q. When will these directives be implemented?**

**A.** *date needed*

**Q. How is counter-to-counter air cargo screened?**

**A.** Counter to counter cargo is screened by TSA screeners using the TSA technology that is currently operational at airports across the country. It is screened using the same equipment and processes as all checked baggage.

**Q. If the threat level changes, will these new requirements become obsolete or are they permanent?**

**A.** TSA continually evaluates threats, vulnerabilities, and the suite of countermeasures in effect for all segments of the transportation system and makes adjustments as appropriate.

**Q. What percentage of air cargo must freight-forwarders now inspect?**

**A.** The percentage of cargo inspected by freight forwarders is considered Sensitive Security Information and cannot be disclosed publicly.

**Q. Why were the changes to screening air cargo for passenger aircraft not implemented at an earlier time?**

**A.** Some of the changes had already been implemented on a voluntary basis, through collaborative agreement with the air carriers. The new directives tighten the requirements and will ensure 100 percent compliance. Other changes were already under consideration, and the change in threat level has simply accelerated the implementation process.

**Q. Will these new security directives delay air cargo shipments?**

**A.** Yes, we anticipate that some air cargo shipments will be delayed – but TSA will work closely with regulated parties in an effort to minimize the impact to commerce.

## **Talking Points for the Increase in Collections of the Air Carrier Fee December 5, 2005**

### ***What is the purpose of this fee?***

- Congress established this fee as part of the legislation creating TSA (ATSA).
- Prior to TSA's establishment, the airlines were responsible for the cost of providing passenger and property screening.
- When TSA assumed responsibility for those security functions, Congress determined that the airlines should pay to TSA what the airlines had previously spent on passenger and property screening (using CY 2000 as the base year).
- TSA required airlines to begin by submitting monthly fees based on the total 2000 screening costs each airline had reported to TSA.
- These invoices allow TSA to fully collect fees owed to the agency under the air carrier fee regulation.
- Air carrier fee is the same as the Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee.

### ***How many airlines will be invoiced for additional fees?***

- There are 209 airlines that operated in 2000.
- 43 airlines will be allocated a portion of the fees based on TSA's determination of how much each individual airline has been underpaying the fee.
- The remaining airlines either were able to provide TSA with an audit opinion stating that they had fully complied with TSA's regulation or the airlines are paying a fee above the average cost per passenger screened in 2000.
- 166 airlines will not be allocated a portion of the under-paid fees.

### ***Why is TSA now invoicing the airlines for this fee?***

- DHS FY 05 Appropriation Act specifies that TSA must, beginning with amounts due in calendar year 2005, "undertake all necessary actions to ensure that (GAO-identified shortfalls) are collected.
- TSA has based its calculation of fees due on the GAO Report "Review of Air Carriers' Year 2000 Passenger and Property Screening Costs. This report was released in April 2005.

### ***Is this fair?***

- TSA has been charging this fee since February 15, 2002. The airlines which will be charged the fee have under-paid the fee compared with other airlines since that date.
- None of the airlines which will have to pay additional fees were able to provide assurance from their independent auditors that they were accurately reporting their full 2000 screening costs to TSA.

### ***How was the \$448 million calculated?***

- DHS FY 05 Appropriations Act mandated that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) undertake an analysis to determine how much the airline industry spent on passenger and property screening in 2000.

- GAO issued their report (a public document) in April 2005.
- GAO determined that the industry spent between \$425 million and \$471 million in 2000. The midpoint is \$448 million.
- Industry estimates provided in 2001 were \$1 billion.
- Airlines had individually reported costs of only \$319 million for 2000.
- TSA has used the GAO report as the basis of its determination of the industry costs.

***How will the payment process work?***

- Airlines will be sent an invoice with 30 days to pay the retroactive amount (1/05-10/05).
- Airlines will begin paying the higher monthly rate (begins with payments for 11/05).
- Airlines can request a payment plan to spread out the retroactive payment if necessary.
- If airlines have additional information as to why they should not be required to pay the invoice, they can request an Administrative Review.
- Airlines will have 30 days to request an Administrative Review and an additional 15 days to submit supporting information to TSA.

***What has TSA done to try to work with the airlines in resolving this issue?***

- TSA performed audit reviews together with the DOT Inspector General in (FY 02-03) and the DHS Inspector General in (FY 04-05).
- TSA's regulation mandated that independent auditors validate the airline cost submissions. In most cases, the audit firms were unwilling to do so.
- The agency has repeatedly asked the airline industry to provide information relating to the August 2001 industry survey that states that airline industry cost of imposing federal security mandates was \$1 billion per annum. The agency has not been provided with any such information.
- Due to the inability of the airlines and TSA to agree on how much the airlines spent on passenger and property screening in 2000, Congress mandated the GAO study.

***Request for other payments***

- There seven airlines that have been withholding certain additional payments purposely from TSA for the air carrier fee.
- TSA is also requesting payment at this time from those airlines as part of the agency's on-going fee collection efforts.

Contact: Randy Fiertz, TSA Director of Revenue 571 227





## **Airport Identification SD Talking Points, 9/19/06**

- This new requirement enhances our layered security approach by mandating that airport operators conduct criminal background checks and the TSA perform security threat assessments prior to issuing airport personnel identification. Previously, airports could issue this identification while the background checks and threat assessments were being conducted.
- This requirement also applies to individuals with access to public areas including but not limited to taxi drivers, parking lot attendants, vendors, and shuttle bus drivers who have airport identification issued by the airport operator.
- Airport operators also have 45 days to ensure that all current and future individuals who hold airport personnel identification are US Citizens or have legal immigration status.
- The new measures are consistent with our layered security approach and aim to reduce the threat of insider terrorist cooperation while enhancing overall security.

## **Q & A**

### **Q. What is the difference between the old and new airport personnel identification requirements?**

- A. We now require the completion of a criminal background check and names to be vetted against multiple terror watch lists before the employee is granted airport personnel identification, whereas before the criminal history check and vetting process could be in progress while an employee was granted identification.

We now also require that airport operators verify that all current and future employees with airport personnel identification are US Citizens or have legal immigration status.

### **Q. What is TSA's role in the new process?**

- A. TSA is responsible for completing a security threat assessment of the names provided by the airport operator within 48 hours while the airport operator is responsible for checking criminal history before the individual is granted an airport ID.

### **Q. How long will it take for TSA and the airport to complete the threat assessment and the background check?**

- A. TSA is committed to completing the security threat assessment within 48 hours. The criminal history check is the airport's responsibility and length of time will vary from airport to airport.

## **Airport Identification SD Background and Talking Points, 9/21/06**

### **Background (SSI Not for Public)**

SD 1542-04-08B mandates that airport operators conduct criminal background checks and the TSA perform security threat assessments prior to issuing airport personnel identification. Previously, airports could issue this identification while the background checks and threat assessments were being conducted.

TSA is responsible for completing a security threat assessment of the names provided by the airport operator within 48 hours while the airport operator is responsible for checking criminal history before the individual is granted an airport ID.

This requirement also applies to individuals with access to public areas including but not limited to taxi drivers, parking lot attendants, vendors, and shuttle bus drivers who have airport identification issued by the airport operator.

Airport operators also have 45 days from the day the SD is issued to ensure that all current and future individuals who hold airport personnel identification are US Citizens or have legal immigration status.

The new measures are consistent with our layered security approach and aim to reduce the threat of insider terrorist cooperation while enhancing overall security.

### **Talking Points**

- A Security Directive issued to airport operators enhances the vetting process of airport identification applicants.
- The new measures are consistent with our layered security approach and aim to reduce the threat of insider terrorist cooperation while enhancing overall security.
- We will not comment on the details of the new security measure as they are sensitive to security.

**WARNING:** This document contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR 1520. No part of this document may be released to persons without a need to know, as defined in 49 CFR 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, Arlington, VA, 22202. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. Government agencies, public release is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552.

### **Key Talking Points:**

- Advanced imaging technology safely screens passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives and other objects concealed under layers of clothing without physical contact to help TSA keep the traveling public safe.
- While there's no silver bullet, this technology is very effective at detecting items passengers are intentionally concealing on their body. We routinely find prohibited and illegal items on passengers which illustrate our ability to detect items concealed under clothing – such as explosives.
- In the past year alone, there have been over 80 instances where this technology has identified passengers that have artfully concealed either prohibited or illegal items such as weapons or narcotics under clothing.
- Passengers who opt to not be screened through this technology will receive alternative screening to include a physical pat down.

Further, you may wish to have 2-3 examples of things we've found if asked:

- Here is a list of the best catches over the past year (b) (5)
- Richmond - 3 ½ inch knife artfully concealed in the small of the back
- San Francisco – syringe filled with heroine in a passengers underwear
- Baltimore – bag of white powdered substance concealed in waistband
- Jacksonville – six marijuana joints concealed in passenger's bra
- Indianapolis – small bag with cocaine



## AIT Talking Points

### Importance of the Technology

- **History:** TSA began evaluating Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) in 2007 to address non-metallic threats.
- **Evolving Threats:** Currently, AIT is the most promising technology to facilitate the detection of dynamic and evolving threats carried on individuals.
- **Non-metallic Detection:** This technology is threat agnostic. In other words, AIT safely and effectively screens passengers for anomalies, whether they are metallic or non-metallic (including powders, liquids, and ceramics).

### Current Status

- **Deployment Numbers:**
  - As of October 8<sup>th</sup>, TSA has deployed 275 AIT units to 59 airports across the country.
- **Types of AIT:**
  - Millimeter wave technology bounces electromagnetic waves off the body to create a three-dimensional image. One scan by millimeter wave is thousands of times lower than one cell phone transmission.
  - Backscatter technology projects a low level X-ray beam over the body to create a reflection of the body displayed on the monitor. One scan is equivalent to two minutes of flight time.
- **Privacy Controls:**
  - TSA does not store, print, transmit, or save AIT images, and these images are automatically deleted from the system after the remotely located security officer clears them.
  - Both the millimeter wave and backscatter technologies use facial blurs.
  - Officers evaluating the images are not permitted to take cameras, cell phones, or photo-enabled devices into the resolution room.
  - TSA is working with manufacturers to develop automated threat detection software, also known as Automated Target Recognition (ATR), which would remove the need for the resolution room and reduce privacy concerns.

### Future Goals

- **Deployment Plan:**
  - TSA's goal is to deploy approximately 1,000 AIT machines deployed by the end of Calendar Year 2011.
- **Automated Target Recognition (ATR):**
  - ATR uses advanced image analysis software to automatically identify and mark areas of concern on a standardized "stick figure" or a generic body image for security officers to review.
  - TSA began testing initial ATR software submissions from vendors in October.
- **Next Generation Checkpoint:**
  - TSA will continue to invest in new technologies that can rapidly respond to emerging threats.
  - TSA is working to consolidate our screening equipment to improve the passenger experience and create a more efficient system.

## **ALEAN OGS Talking Points**

- As we continue to see almost daily, the security of the aviation system persistently comes under threat as terrorists find new and different ways to exploit the system. The most recent incident in late October serves as a reminder of why we do what we do. In this particular case, individuals with ties to al Qaida in Yemen attempted to conceal and ship explosive devices in cargo on board aircraft, transiting through several nations and ultimately bound for the United States.
- We've always known that securing the large volume of cargo shipped on airplanes is a challenge under the best of circumstances but this new threat increased the sense of urgency and required immediate action. As part of the response, the President directed the Department of Homeland Security to take steps to ensure the safety and security of the aviation sector, and to determine whether these threats were part of any additional terrorist plot.
- This latest disrupted plot highlights both that we face a determined and creative enemy, and that we have a critical need for global interdependence in aviation security. With constant communication and sharing of information, we were able to identify this threat and disrupt it before it did any harm. However, we have a delicate balance to strike. The flow of global commerce is key to economic recovery. Security cannot bring business to a standstill.
- But we must strike the balance. We all participate in the global transportation system and have a shared responsibility to protect it from harm. The threat we face moves across borders with ease – divisions of nationality or geography are of no consequence. To meet this threat, we have to ensure that while we respect these boundaries, our security efforts cannot be constrained by them.
- While the concept of a global response to terrorism is not new, I think we would all agree here in this room that the renewed international effort following December 25 and October 29 serve as excellent models to build upon for worldwide collaboration to identify and counter new and emerging threats. We have accomplished a significant amount in a short time.
- Following unprecedented international engagement through five regional summits on five continents, continuous bilateral, regional, and multilateral engagement, and a commitment to cooperation, we have seen the ratification of a truly historic Declaration on Aviation Security that reaffirms our shared commitment to the enhancement of international aviation security. Perhaps most importantly, we have also seen the adoption by the ICAO Council of Amendment 12 to Annex 17.
- This is not to say that our efforts to date have been perfect—in each instance, working with partners, we have identified ways to improve the process and learn from each other. We have to be able to say that we can do things better, and we have to be willing to hear

what our partners say so that we can truly create an international consensus to advance aviation security worldwide.

- Although we share common goals for aviation security, we all approach the challenges differently. In many ways, it will be our differences that will guide the way ahead. It is through information sharing, development of best practices, and continual evaluation of risk that we will, together, as one community, continue to mitigate the threat.
- The most recent example of this collaboration is the ICAO led effort to respond to the October 29 cargo threat. Air Cargo is a \$50 billion business that transports 35% of the value of goods traded internationally and a critical part of the airline business which, as a whole, is the \$490 billion heart of a value chain that supports 32 million jobs and \$3.5 trillion of economic activity. It is an important industry that is critical to global business.
- This latest disrupted plot highlights both that we face a determined and creative enemy, and that we have a critical need to recognize the global interdependence in aviation security. Annex 17 has required cargo to be either screened or subjected to regulated agent security controls at least as far back as Amendment 9, and the provisions have been further updated in Amendment 12. As with other aspects of aviation security, there is a need to raise performance internationally, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) must take a strong role in this.
- This has already been a landmark year for improving security through collaboration. Just one weak link could render all our collective efforts ineffective. Our enemies are observant, patient, stealthy and ruthless. They constantly evolve their methods and tools – and it's our job to stay ahead of them.
- Security depends on all of us here in this room working constructively to achieve it and protect our citizens' freedom to travel and do business. We can applaud what the AVSEC community has achieved, but we know that much work still lies ahead.
- Only through interdependence and cooperation will we achieve our mission. Events like those of October cannot deter us – they must embolden us and motivate us to work diligently.

## ALEAN OST Talking Points

OST would like to provide the following talking points for the Administrator's presentation at the ALEAN conference. We believe that TSA's ongoing effort to develop and deploy ATR capability for AIT is a current, prominent program that would be of interest to the members of ALEAN. The following bullets describe the current status of AIT and ATR.

- Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) safely screens passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives and other objects concealed on passengers.
- Advanced imaging technology is safe and meets national health and safety standards. Backscatter technology was evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). All results confirmed that the radiation doses for the individuals being screened, operators, and bystanders were well below the dose limits specified by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).
- There are currently 486 AIT units at 78 airports.
- TSA takes all efforts to ensure passenger privacy is protected. Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) has been underway since early CY or FY 2010 in an effort to explore additional privacy protections.
- TSA is field testing millimeter wave ATR software at LAS, ATL, and DCA and anticipates testing ATR software for backscatter units at airports in the coming months.
- ATR software does not create a passenger specific image; if an anomaly is detected a generic icon appears with highlight over the area where the anomaly is detected.

## **OLE/FAMS Submission**

### **ALEAN Mission**

The Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network (ALEAN) is a non-profit organization organized for the following purposes: To facilitate communication of law enforcement administrative leaders and intelligence officers of airport law enforcement agencies to address mutual problems common to the field of airport law enforcement and security. To actively provide input in the formulation of public policy concerning matters of civil aviation security, through active partnerships with governmental agencies and fellow industry associations, and by sharing its expertise with elected officials and governmental agencies. To promote, sponsor and conduct a regular information-sharing network for the benefit of airport law enforcement officers throughout the World. *(Source: <http://www.alean.com>)*

### **ALEAN Executive Committee**

- Paul Mason, President - St. Louis International Airport
- Steve Deel, 1st Vice President - Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport
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- Duane McGray, Executive Director
- Tim Kimsey, Secretary to the Board of Directors
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### **ALEAN – OLE/FAMS Partnership**

- TSA leverages its relationship with ALEAN to enhance the security of our Nation's airports.
- Assistant Federal Security Director's for Law Enforcement (AFSD-LE) and Supervisory Federal Air Marshals (SFAMs) work alongside our law enforcement partners to resolve security and law enforcement issues that arise at our Nation's airports.
- OLE/FAMS hosts conferences and forums for all federal, state, and local airport law enforcement partners, including ALEAN members, to discuss strategic and event-driven issues affecting airport and aviation law enforcement.

#### **Recent Meetings:**

- August 19, 2010, Administrator Pistolc/ALEAN Introductory Meeting
- September 28-30, 2010. Former DAD Patrick Sullivan, Office of Flight Operations, attended the ALEAN Fall Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada.



- *Note:* ALEAN has expressed interest in representing airport police departments in all law enforcement issues and/or dealings with TSA (to include issues or dealings that TSA has with non-ALEAN members).

*Potential Response:*

- OLE/FAMS maintains strong relationships with ALEAN and other professional law enforcement organizations, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and National Sheriff's Association (NSA).
- ALEAN has been included in TSA's development of Law Enforcement Officer Flying Armed Modernization, the e-Loghook initiative, and the LEO biometric credentialing effort.
- We value ALEAN's comments and input, as we do all professional law enforcement organizations. TSA continues to solicit advice and guidance from all of its law enforcement partners.

## **FAM Manpower**

OLE/FAMS is funded to hire additional FAMs to maintain the increased post 12/25/09 mission coverage levels.

## **Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program (LEO RP)**

### Overview

ATSA mandated a LEO Reimbursement program in April 2002 to partially reimburse federalized commercial airports for providing a critical onsite LEO presence and response capabilities at passenger screening checkpoints.

### Partnership

The program has made strides to improve efficiencies, and enhance and strengthen partnerships with airport stakeholders and local LEs who provide critical support to secure the nation's airports.

LEO Reimbursements under the cooperative agreement structure have enhanced the coordination between the airport operators, local law enforcement, and the FSDs.

FSDs establish a Statement of Joint Objectives (SOJO) with their respective airport to provide flexibility in providing clearly defined and mutually acceptable security services.

## **National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP)**

Overview: TSA is funded for 800 legacy and proprietary Explosive Detection Canine Teams to carry out its mission across transportation modes. Within the operational environment, TSA currently has 579 aviation teams, 107 Mass Transit teams, 49 multimodal teams, and 13 maritime teams.

Partnership: Actively partners with federal, state, and local agencies; nonprofit organizations; universities; and the private sector to increase the training capacity for explosive detection canine teams.

### Vapor Wake Pilot Program

Explosive detection canines trained in “Vapor Wake” methodology can detect and follow explosive odors to their source.

- Vapor Wake methodology relies on the canine’s ability to process air currents and recognize explosive odor(s) whether the person or object is moving or still.
- The canine handler is trained to read the canine’s behavioral changes and determine when and where the canine is alerting to; indicating a possible explosives odor.
- The handler does not have to present the subject to the canine nor does the canine have to come in direct physical contact with the individual as the canine will detect and track explosive odors in the air.

TSA is working with DHS Science and Technology and Auburn University to pilot ten (10) canine teams in the “Vapor Wake” methodology. The pilot class is scheduled to graduate on April 1, 2011, after which the teams will deploy to Miami International, Chicago O’Hare, and Dulles airports to be evaluated in the aviation environment for their potential to further enhance passenger screening.

## **FFDO Program**

### Overview

The Federal Flight Deck Officer program trains eligible pilots to use firearms to defend against an act of criminal violence or air piracy in which an attempt is made to gain control of the aircraft.

- Since the program’s inception in 2003 thousands of FFDOs have been trained.
- FFDOs provide an additional layer of security aboard hundreds of thousands of flights a year.
- FFDOs complement the strategic deployment of FAMS.

### Update

- The FFDO Program continues to train and deputize new FFDOs, while providing recurrent training to current FFDOs.

### **Assistant Federal Security Director for Law Enforcement (AFSD-LE)**

- AFSD-LEs are TSA law enforcement officers assigned to the Federal Security Director's staff to establish and maintain liaison with local, state and federal law enforcement authorities on behalf of TSA and coordinate law enforcement related activities within the transportation domain.
- There are currently 82 AFSD-LEs assigned at airports throughout country.

### **Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Program**

- VIPR operations promote confidence in and protect our nation's transportation systems through targeted deployment of integrated TSA assets utilizing screening, inspections and law enforcement capabilities in coordinated activities to augment security of any mode of transportation.
- Under the *Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)* and the *Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007*, TSA has broad responsibility to enhance security in all modes of transportation nationwide.
- The VIPR program focuses on detecting and deterring terrorist activities affecting the nation's transportation systems.
- VIPR teams can be composed of a variety of TSA, federal, state, and local law enforcement and security assets including: federal air marshals, TSA certified explosive detection canine teams, transportation security officers, behavior detection officers, TSA transportation security inspectors, explosives operational support, local law enforcement officers and explosives and security screening technology.
- VIPR teams work with local security and law enforcement officials to supplement existing security resources; provide a deterrent presence and detection capabilities; and introduce an element of unpredictability to disrupt potential terrorist planning or operational activities.

#### Update:

- For FY 20011 through February the program has completed more than 3000 operations across the nation approximately one third of these operations (approx. 1000) were in the aviation domain.
- In 2010, more than 3,700 operations were conducted in aviation locations.

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## Continuing Resolution - Impact

(b)(5)

### **National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP)**

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Partnership: Actively partners with federal, state, and local agencies; nonprofit organizations; universities; and the private sector to increase the training capacity for explosive detection canine teams. ALEAN has recommended and internal agreement has been reached that a joint ALEAN/TSA working group should be established to provide opportunities for collaboration on substantive security needs in the aviation environment.

Oversight: The Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) has added a robust leadership team to the Office of Security Services and Assessments (OSSA) which manages the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP). The new OSSA executive team provides the NEDCTP with the leadership necessary to guide the program

through modern evolutions in methodologies that will improve canine explosives detection capabilities and aggressively confront emerging threats to transportation.

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- TSA appreciates ALEAN’s continued interest in the evolution of canine explosives detection methodologies.
- TSA continues to share its progress with ALEAN. On March 08, 2011, by TSA invitation, ALEAN participated in a Vapor Wake briefing and operational demonstration in Chicago, IL.

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## **ATTRITION TALKING POINTS**

- **TSO Voluntary Attrition (FY07):**
  - Total: 17.4%
  - Full time: 11.6%
  - Part time: 37.4%
- **Most Recent Voluntary TSO Attrition Figures (includes data through 11/10/07)**
  - Total: 20.0%
  - Full time: 14.5%
  - Part time: 36.8%
- **How are we lowering attrition?**
  - Career progression
  - Pay for performance
  - Quality of life/employee engagement
  - Local hiring
  - Full time health benefits for part time employees
- A great deal of our attrition stems from the initial “churn” of new hires, most of whom are part-timers.
- The average tenure of TSOs is 3.5 years.
- Nearly half of our existing TSOs have been with TSA more than five years.
- Of our total attrition - 20% of those TSOs take another job within DHS or another federal agency. (FYI - Another 20% are “chaff” we’re happy to see go.)
- Voluntary TSO attrition rates have decreased over the past three fiscal years. The voluntary TSO attrition rate for combined full and part time TSOs has been reduced in FY2007 to approximately 17.4% from 18.0% in FY2004, representing a 3.3% decrease. Voluntary attrition for full-time TSOs has decreased to 11.6% from 13.6% (14.7% decrease) and for part-time to 37.4% from 57.8% (35.3% decrease).

- The majority of TSO attrition occurs early in the careers of TSOs. Once TSOs make it past the initial “break in” period, they tend to stay. Currently, 47.1% of all TSOs have been on the job since 2003, when TSA stood up.
- The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports national (full time + part time) turnover rates per calendar year. Compared to the private sector, TSA has much lower attrition on average:

	Private Sector – All Segments				Federal Government Only				TSA		
	Voluntary ("Quits") %	Involuntary ("Layoffs & Discharges") %	"Other" %	Total %	Voluntary ("Quits") %	Involuntary ("Layoffs & Discharges") %	"Other" %	Total %	Voluntary %	Involuntary %	Total %
2003	21.6	17.2	2.8	41.6	7.0	5.9	3.9	17.0			
2004	24.0	17.3	2.8	44.1	6.0	4.1	5.1	15.2	18.0	6.2	24.2
2005	26.2	16.9	2.8	45.9	6.7	4.4	4.8	15.8	17.4	6.4	23.7
2006	26.7	15.5	3.1	45.5	11.2	7.0	6.7	25.0	16.5	4.4	20.9
2007	8.8	5.0	.9	14.9	2.8	2.0	3.6	8.4	17.4	3.8	21.2

#### BACKGROUND INFO:

(b) (5)

- In total, TSO total attrition rates have decreased significantly over the past three fiscal years. The voluntary TSO attrition rate for both full and part time TSOs (“overall” attrition) has been reduced in FY2007 to approximately 21.2% from 24.2% in FY2004, representing a 12.4% decrease. Attrition for full-time TSOs has decreased to 14.4% from 18.9% (23.9% decrease) and for part-time to 44.6% from 72.4% (38.4% decrease).
  - While attrition rates of both Full Time and Part Time TSOs has decreased, actual numbers have risen slightly in FY2007. This reflects the higher percentage of Part Time TSOs in the workforce in FY2007, as Part Timers have a higher overall attrition rate. The average number of Part Timers on board in FY2007 is 10,532, compared to 6,691 in FY2006.

- OPM and FedScope: FedScope data is imperfect. If you use it to track TSA attrition, you will draw incorrect conclusions. Our data (TSA/OHC/WARM) is more meticulously captured, and accordingly is much more trustworthy. TSA data, which is captured to include late processing of attrition, will generally show slightly higher attrition rates.
- **How do we calculate attrition?** Our attrition rate is calculated by dividing the number of TSO separations in a specified period by the number of TSOs employed in that period. The number of TSOs employed in the specified period is derived from the NFC end of pay period snapshot.
- What AFGE has said about our attrition:

*“The overall TSA attrition rate is more than 10 times higher than the 2.2% attrition rate for federal civilian employees and upwards of 40% at some major airports.”*

### **Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) Talking Points**

- TSA's Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) campaign kicks off today (November 2<sup>nd</sup>) and runs through December 15<sup>th</sup>
- The mission of the CFC is to promote and support philanthropy through a program that is employee focused, cost-efficient, and effective in providing all federal employees the opportunity to improve the quality of life for all.
- The CFCNCA – or Combined Federal Campaign of the National Capital Area – theme is Community of Caring
- Within the National Capital Area, Federal employees are being encouraged to make a difference in their community by choosing from over 4,000 approved charities.
- CFC pledging can be accomplished by browsing the CFC Catalog or by e-Giving. Pledges can be distributed over 12 months via a payroll deduction
- Every day, TSA employees around the world protect us from threats and keep our transportation system secure. Going about the call of your daily duties, you can also answer the call of the CFC.
- Please join the thousands of federal co-workers giving generously to CFCNCA. Even a small amount can make a big difference.

### **TSA Contributions**

- TSA's goal this year is \$544,700.
- Last year, TSA's goal was \$420,000, which was later extended to over \$444,000.
- TSA employees showed remarkable generosity and pledged \$531,424 during the campaign – over \$87,000 more than the original goal!
- Individual CFC participation within TSA increased 18% over 2008 and 13 offices exceeded their goals, five by over 200 percent.

### **National Contributions/Information**

- Total, Federal employees gave more than \$66.5 million to CFCNCA
- The CFC campaign is open nationwide from September 1st to December 15<sup>th</sup>.
- CFC is the largest and most successful annual charity campaign within the workplace and there are more than 300 CFC campaigns nationwide. Pledges can be made by federal civilian, postal and military members.
- The National Campaign Chairperson is Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

## **Damaged Baggage Talkers (response to USA Today 5/5/06)**

TSA has managed summer workloads for the last four years and we are prepared to address the needs of the traveling public.

While some airports may face more staffing challenges than others, we are aware of those airports and we are working to support them and send in supplemental staffing to help as needed.

We will continue to monitor and move resources into place to get passengers and their luggage through the airport in a timely manner.

Less than one-tenth of one percent of lost baggage is the result of TSA.

TSA works diligently to reduce delay, damage and loss to checked baggage.

Since TSA assumed responsibility for aviation security, more than 2 billion passengers and their luggage have been screened.

TSA is responsible for checked baggage from the time it is presented for screening until the time it is screened, in many airports passengers are with their luggage during that process (where lobby solutions exist).

Generally, TSA has no role in prioritizing, sorting or transporting checked baggage.

TSA engages in trend analysis to develop new training and handling techniques.

Passengers can avoid damage to their bags by leaving them unlocked or using a TSA approved lock.

More info is available at our website [TSA.gov](http://TSA.gov)

TSA has a zero tolerance policy regarding theft. In four years and with a staff of more than 60,000 security officers, only 87 TSOs have been removed from employment for theft.

TSA is working to expand closed circuit television for surveillance of non-public areas. We work with local law enforcement to ensure prosecution of offenders.

TSA has received 84,000 claims since Feb. 2002. In 2006 claims have dropped dramatically, down 30% in the first quarter of this year.

The average is 1,800 claims per month.

The average claim is settled for \$150.

## TALKING POINTS:

In 2008, Delta announced a proposal to begin air service to Abuja, Nigeria; Nairobi, Kenya, and Monrovia, Liberia, in June 2009. TSA, upon notification of Delta's intent, began security assessments at the selected airports in order to determine threats and vulnerabilities. TSA cleared Delta to fly into Abuja but noted security threats with the Nairobi and Monrovia sites.

TSA, along with key partners within the U.S. Government, assess a significant and credible threat to civil aviation from terrorists operating in East Africa.

TSA also found that Roberts International Airport in Monrovia airport failed to meet international security standards and appropriate recommended practices established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). An overview of these assessments was shared with Delta Air Lines personnel and discussions with Delta's corporate security personnel continue.

Due to noted security vulnerabilities in and around Nairobi, and the failure to meet ICAO security standards at the airport in Monrovia, TSA is currently denying air service by Delta to Nairobi and Monrovia.

Security is TSA's top priority. TSA cannot ignore information that may place passengers and crew in danger and has no room for error when making judgments concerning aviation security. At this time, we believe that the current threat is too great for a U.S. carrier to operate at these airports until security standards are met or security threat assessments change.

TSA has extensively collaborated with Delta and other U.S. carriers on the security of international flights bound for the United States and will continue these efforts so that service can begin on new international routes. TSA continues to dedicate resources for assessments and capacity building at sites proposed for new Delta service, and currently has a team of security experts assisting at Roberts International Airport in Monrovia.

TSA will continue to work closely with Delta and other carriers to develop international flight routes while ensuring the highest level of security.

## ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND:

The U.S. Department of State also issued a Travel Warning to U.S. citizens traveling abroad in November 2008 citing concerns of terrorist threats against Americans and western interests in Kenya. This warning is still in effect. TSA has statutory authority to cancel, suspend or deny proposed flights between the United States and a foreign airport that TSA has determined does not effectively meet security standards and appropriate recommended practices established by ICAO, or where a threat exists that cannot be adequately addressed to ensure the safety of passengers and crew.

## TIMELINE:

In October 2008, Delta Air Lines informed TSA that it wanted to:

- \* Reinitiate service from Sal, Cape Verde
- \* Expand service from Nigeria by adding Abuja, Nigeria
- \* And Initiate new service to Monrovia, Liberia; Malabo, Equatorial Guinea; Nairobi, Kenya; and Luanda, Angola.

Previous TSA visits to several of these locations revealed varying levels of aviation security. Numerous offices within TSA worked to consider Delta's request, including ensuring that a thorough evaluation of security conditions is performed; training and assistance are provided, as appropriate; and additional security measures are implemented prior to service start at each of these new locations.

Delta publicly announced plans to begin service to the additional sites in Africa in November 2008. TSA has had an ongoing dialogue with Delta with regards to these requests and has kept the carrier updated on the progress. TSA has completed assessments at four of the proposed locations (Malabo, Equatorial Guinea was visited in early May) and the remaining two locations will be conducted in July 2009, in advance of Delta's proposed start date of September 2009.

## TALKING POINTS

- As part of TSA's multi-layered security approach, all airport and airline employees undergo a background check and security threat assessment prior to receiving credentials and access privileges and are then subject to continuous vetting.
- TSA employs a variety of enhanced measures to increase security as an alternative to 100 percent employee screening. These methods include random physical screening using the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP); behavior detection training provided to law enforcement officials and airport operations/security personnel, in addition to our own Behavior Detection Officers; employee security awareness training; deployment of portable screening equipment; and Visible Intermodal Protection and Response teams (VIPRs.)

Transportation Security Officers and inspectors are deployed on a random and unpredictable basis to screen airport and airline workers. Employees everywhere can expect to encounter random, unpredictable screening of themselves, their property and their vehicles at any time and at any place. This extends our capability to detect individuals with hostile intent at multiple points in the airport as opposed to one brief moment at a security checkpoint

- We achieve a better overall security result by using our resources flexibly, not tied down at checkpoints checking and re-checking people that work in the airport every day. Our strategy is to be flexible and dynamic.
- TSA leverages all of our employees and partners as force multipliers who are empowered to observe, detect and report suspicious activity. We use access control technologies, random inspections and surges conducted by transportation security officers anywhere on the secure side of airports from coast to coast. This approach means individuals with hostile intent cannot determine exactly where we will be and how we will screen them.

## ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS

- Screening 100 percent of employees each and every time they enter the secure area, while also screening every passenger, is inefficient and does not promote the flow of commerce at airports.

## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

- Q. Why doesn't TSA currently screen 100 percent of employees at all airport locations and what is the current employee screening protocol?**



- A. TSA employs a risk-based and multi-layered approach to checkpoint screening. Each one of these layers alone is capable of stopping a terrorist attack. In combination, their security value is multiplied, creating a much stronger, formidable system. A terrorist who has to overcome multiple security layers in order to carry out an attack is more likely to be pre-empted, deterred or to fail during the attempt. An individual with mal-intent is better stopped by unpredictable security measures.

Currently, airport employees undergo background investigations to obtain their SIDA badges. TSA deploys officers anywhere, anytime to inspect workers, their property and vehicles. These officers ensure workers follow proper access procedures when entering secure areas, display the appropriate credentials and do not possess items unrelated to their work that may pose a security threat.

Screening 100 percent of employees each and every time they enter the secure area, while also screening every passenger, is inefficient and does not promote the flow of commerce at airports.

- A. In January 2008, Congress passed the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act which required TSA to initiate employee screening pilot programs and allocated \$15 million to carry out these programs. According to the legislation, 100 percent employee screening was to be evaluated at three airports, while enhanced security measures was to be evaluated as an alternative to 100 percent screening at four additional airports. The Act called for the programs to last for a total of 90 days at each location.

**Q. Why didn't all seven airports participate in 100 percent employee screening?**

- A. Congress mandated that only three of the seven airports partake in 100 percent employee screening. By having the remaining four airports use alternative enhanced security measures, it allowed TSA to compare the two methods and identify their individual efficiency and effectiveness. This information, among other findings, was reported to Congress in December 2008.

**Q. How did the employee screening pilots affect passenger screening?**

- A. TSA has never attempted to screen 100 percent of airport employees and determined financial and other impacts as expected with these screening pilots. Among the other impacts were slightly longer wait times for passengers and employees alike, particularly during peak times, as the volume of traffic through the checkpoints increased at the airports conducting 100 percent screening.

**Q. Which airports participated and why were they chosen?**

- A. The participating airports were Logan International in Boston, Massachusetts; Jacksonville International in Florida; Craven Regional in New Bern, North Carolina; Denver International in Colorado; Kansas City International in Missouri; Southwest Oregon Regional in North Bend, Oregon; and Eugene Airport in Oregon. The airports were selected based on variations in size and location.

### **Secure Flight Talking Points:**

- **TSA is partnering with airlines to phase in the Secure Flight program, an enhanced passenger watch list matching system that makes travel safer and easier.**
- **Secure Flight is a phased in process for both TSA and the airlines --each airline will incorporate changes into their systems over the coming months as their capability to capture it is integrated into their individual systems.**
- **Secure Flight makes travel safer by continuing to identify individuals that may pose a known or suspected threat to aviation. In addition, it will help prevent the misidentification of passengers who have names similar to individuals on government watch lists.**
- **Over the coming months when booking airline travel, you may be asked to provide your name (as it appears on the government ID) you plan to use when traveling. Later this summer, airlines will also begin asking you to provide your date of birth and gender.**
- **Secure Flight is a phased in process -- and if a passenger is not prompted to provide this additional information by a particular airline, they should not be concerned as it will not impact their travel.**
- **Our goal with the Ad Council campaign is to educate travelers about the Secure Flight program to help them understand why we are asking them to provide additional information.**

- The FSD Academy was conceptualized through the combined efforts of senior OSO leadership at TSA headquarters, as well as Area Directors and FSDs.
- The inaugural FSD Academy began in 2007. Since that time, there have been two more Academies.
- Seventy-one (71) individuals
  - 52 FSDs
  - 15 DFSDs
  - 4 Area Directorsparticipated in the three previous FSD Academies. They found the content, the realistic scenarios, and camaraderie invaluable to their professional development and to building a high-performing team of leaders in the field.
- In FSD Academy 04, twenty (20) participants
  - 12 FSDs
  - 8 DFSDsas well as two FSD advisors, will spend the next two weeks learning and discussing such topics as the delegations of authority, security across all modes of transportation, performance metrics, optimization and incident management.
- The goal of the Academy is to ensure FSDs and DFSDs have the technical knowledge and skills to provide world-class security and customer service at their airports as well as in every mode of transportation.
- Mr. Pistole can transition into the following:
  - The role of the FSD/DFSD position in achieving the goals of the TSA
  - What he views as the critical issues facing TSA over the next twelve months
  - Where he sees TSA in the next five years
  - Questions and Answers
- Group picture

## **Federal Security Director/FAM Special Agent in Charge Conference Call**

### **Key Points:**

- Recognize the challenges they have leading the frontline workforce.
  - FSDs – managing 50,000 employees facing almost 2 million passengers a day; coordination with airport management, airlines and local law enforcement on a daily basis to carry out the mission.
  - FAMS – challenges of balancing domestic and international flight coverage, supporting SMCs
  - OI SACs – through inspection and testing, they ensure our people, processes and technology are working to mitigate the threats and that our workforce continues to improve.

### **Background for FAMS:**

- The FAMS includes 22 Field Offices and 4 Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) offices (RACs, are satellite offices to certain larger field offices).
- The OLE/FAMS Special Agent in Charge provides executive level leadership to a significant and predominately Federal Air Marshal (FAM) workforce, overseeing the overall planning, direction, and coordination of operations for an OLE/FAMS field office. High-level duties include establishing and maintaining strategic direction, directing major law enforcement activities for the OLE/FAMS field office, and advising the FAMS Director and Executive Staff on ongoing investigative requirements and methods to improve security in the aviation domain. SACs maintains liaison with other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, as well as with the airline industry, representing the OLE/FAMS Director in field office business matters.
- Field Office SACs come from a variety of backgrounds including Federal law enforcement, State and local law enforcement, the U.S. military, and the Federal Aviation Administration.

### **Background for FSDs:**

There are 122 FSDs in more than 450 airports.

FSDs are responsible for coordinating closely with the Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) and FAMS Special Agents in Charge (SAC). Whenever the exercise of any of these responsibilities requires the assistance of other federal agencies, state agencies, or local governments, the FSDs act in a cooperative and collaborative manner with those parties.

### Summer 2006 Key Talkers (FSDs)

- TSA has managed summer traffic levels for the last four years and is prepared to address the needs of the traveling public this summer, which is predicted to be the busiest travel season on record.
- Summer travel is a team concept, involving TSA, airlines, airports and passengers. Working together we will anticipate peak traffic and be ready for the traveling public. Travelers can save time by leaving prohibited items such as lighters at home.
- Leave lighters at home. TSA collects approximately 30,000 lighters per day at airport checkpoints. They account for more than 80% of the prohibited items we collect.
- Despite increased summer air travel, peak wait times at the busiest airports in the country remain consistent during summer months. TSA mission is security and we intend to maintain reasonable wait times without compromising security.
- My staff and Security Officers are fully aware of the challenge that lies before them this summer, and are unwavering in their commitment to provide top notch security and customer service.
- TSA is a risk based, flexible agency aimed at keeping terrorists off guard. Our layered screening approach includes an element of unpredictability that is easy for passengers to navigate but difficult for terrorists to manipulate.
- TSA is aggressively staffing for the summer travel season and transitioning from centralized to local hiring to give airports more flexibility in reaching their individual needs.
- Since local hiring began in March, we've hired \_\_\_\_\_ new security officers at \_\_\_\_\_ airport. We are one of approximately 155 airports that have conducted local hiring activities and nearly \_\_\_\_\_ new employees are coming on board each pay period.
- TSA is working to reward and optimize the skills of our existing workforce and attract new employees. We want our people to stay with the agency. With time and experience our people continue to improve and become more proficient at x-ray and explosive detection.
- TSA is committed to keeping our talented employees. Local hiring and new retention initiatives including enhanced training, cash bonuses and career advancement opportunities within TSA and DHS will help us retain our exceptional employees.

- We are prepared to deploy TSO's to support airports with passenger volume challenges and have modified training/work schedules in preparation for the summer travel season.
- A few extra moments spent reviewing packing advice, security guidelines and airline rules can make your trip less stressful. It is also important to determine how early you should arrive at the airport this summer. Check with your air carrier and airport for more information. Also visit our website at [www.tsa.gov](http://www.tsa.gov) for easy to follow travel tips.
- I encourage everyone to visit the TSA website at [www.tsa.gov](http://www.tsa.gov) to get advice on everything from packing to security friendly-fashion and traveling with children.

***Note to FSDs: You are most familiar with the situations at your airports. Make suggestions relevant to your facility, even if they are not listed here.***

#### **A few more Travel Tips:**

- Arrive early. Allow additional time for parking, check-in and going through security.
- During the summer months many individuals like to celebrate with fireworks. Remember that all fireworks are explosive materials and are not permitted in checked or carry-on baggage
- Dress the part for summer. Be prepared for screening by following our security friendly fashion advice. If you are traveling with small children – you'll also find great travel tips on the TSA website.
- Don't over-pack your bags. If TSO's have to open them, closing overstuffed bags can be difficult and may result in your checked bag being delayed until a later flight.
- Know what to expect at the security checkpoint. Laptops must be removed from the cases, shoes may need to be removed and kids must be taken out of strollers.
- If you have special needs, requests or questions, don't hesitate to politely ask the Security Officers for assistance. They're eager to assist you through the security process.

## **FSD TALKING POINTS**

### **What is ATR?**

- Automatic target recognition (ATR) is new software that TSA is testing with advanced imaging technology to detect any metallic and non-metallic threats concealed under a passenger's clothing. If an anomaly is detected, the software displays a generic outline of a person with any potential threats represented by a highlighted box. If no anomalies are detected, an "OK" appears on the screen with no outline.
- TSA takes all measures to ensure passenger privacy when deploying new technology, including advanced imaging technology (AIT). And we continue to explore additional privacy protections through the use of this new software.

### **Why ATR?**

- TSA always looks for new technology that will meet our security standards while enhancing existing privacy protections. To that end, we are now testing new software to help confirm test results that indicate it provides a level of security higher than current advanced imaging technology units while further enhancing the privacy protections already in place.
- The new software eliminates the need for an image operator and remotely located viewing room because no passenger-specific images are created. This enhances privacy protections and reduces associated staffing and construction costs. Further, TSA anticipates that the use of the software will reduce the time it takes to be screened.
- TSA makes every effort to protect passenger privacy with the use of AIT. With the development of the new software, we are able to now take privacy to the next level, while still providing the same level of security.

### **How ATR Works**

- The new software features a monitor attached to the advanced imaging technology unit. When the new software automatically detects potential threat items on a passenger during screening, a generic outline of a person will appear on a monitor attached to the AIT unit highlighting any areas on the passenger that require additional screening. The generic outline will be identical for all passengers. If no anomalies are detected, the text "OK" appears on the monitor with no outline. As is currently the procedure with imaging technology screening, officers will work with the passenger to resolve any alarms, which will include a targeted pat-down of areas that are highlighted on the screen.
- If the software detects potential threats on a passenger during screening, a standard, generic outline of a person appears on a screen attached to the AIT unit, highlighting any areas on the passenger that require additional screening. The generic outline of a person is identical for all passengers.

- If no anomalies are detected, the text “OK” appears on the screen with no outline.

### **How will ATR affect the CheckPoint Experience?**

- The general screening process remains the same for passengers. The new software is installed on the same AIT units already installed in airports.
- TSA anticipates that the use of this new software will decrease wait times, decrease the number of officers required to staff imaging technology units, and eliminate construction costs associated with remote viewing rooms currently used to view images produced by the technology.
- The use of the software eliminates the need for a remotely located TSA officer to view images in a separate room because no passenger-specific image is produced.

### **ATR Deployment-Where and When?**

- TSA is testing the software at McCarran International Airport (LAS), Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA).
- If testing proves successful, TSA could deploy the new software to millimeter wave imaging technology units at airports across the country.

### **AIT Machines without ATR**

- On machines without the new software, the officer assisting the passenger does not view the image and the officer viewing the image does not see the passenger. The image is deleted immediately after a passenger is cleared and a privacy filter is applied to blur images. With the new software, there is no passenger image.
- As always, the AIT units – image free or not – cannot store, transmit or print anything.
- Imaging technology safely screens passengers for both metallic and non-metallic threats, including weapons and explosives, without physical contact to keep the traveling public safe. Currently, there are nearly 500 imaging technology units at 78 airports.



### **Gulf Coast Retention Incentives (GCRI)**

In the wake of hurricane Katrina, TSA authorized a 15% retention pay incentive in April of 2006 to all employees in the 6 Gulf Coast airports: New Orleans International Airport (MSY), Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport (BTR), Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport (GPT), Lake Charles Regional Airport (LCH), Southeast Texas Regional Airport (BPT), and Lafayette Regional Airport (LFT).

TSA was having difficulty getting TSOs to return to these airports because many of their homes were either destroyed or severely damaged to the point of being uninhabitable. The retention incentives were offered to stabilize the manpower at these 6 airports, which were facing high attrition rates, and to offset higher housing costs.

All employees eligible for the retention incentive were apprised that the incentive had been approved for only two years and would expire in April 2008. However, the incentives were extended an additional three times due to continued retention problems, subsequent hurricanes, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

The Gulf Coast region has now stabilized. These airports are now experiencing national average attrition rates, while also maintaining an ample pool of new applicants wishing to join TSA. For this reason, TSA announced that the Gulf Coast retention incentives will be phased out during FY11. Incentives will be reduced by 7.5% effective June 19, 2011 and the remaining 7.5% effective December 18, 2011.

Approximately 581 employees are currently receiving the 15% incentive and have been notified of the change. The immediate response from the Gulf Coast airports has not been negative. In fact, some employees appreciated that TSA maintained the retention incentives for as long as it did.

Phasing out the incentives result in a cost savings of approximately \$840,000 for the remainder of FY11 and \$525,000 in FY12. The current annual cost to fund the Gulf Coast incentives is approximately \$2.7 million. Phasing out the incentives allows TSA to apply these incentives to other airports experiencing difficulty retaining personnel, while ensuring fiscal responsibility and government stewardship during a time of constraint budget resources.

There are 36 airports currently receiving retention incentives, which costs TSA approximately 8 million annually. TSA reviews and reassesses conditions at these airports annually. Retention incentives were also recently phased out at several airports in Hawaii.

#### **Notification Strategy**

Employees were notified by their FSDs

#### **Congressional Notifications**

### **HSAC talking points:**

- TSA is a key part of our nation's broad counterterrorism effort -- including intelligence and law enforcement agencies -- that work to keep the traveling public safe.
- My job is to lead TSA to the next level as it continues to mature as a truly high-performance, world-class organization.
- My three priorities include: Improving our counterterrorism focus by relying on more timely and better utilized intelligence, supporting the TSA workforce, and strengthening relationships with stakeholders and the traveling public

### **Technology/AIT:**

- AIT is critical to stay ahead of evolving threats to transportation security including non-metallic threats like the one we saw on 12/25. While there's no silver bullet, AIT is an essential layer of security.
- And the American people trust it. Over the course of piloting imaging technology, more than 98 percent of passengers chose this option over the alternative screening procedure that includes a thorough physical pat down. Similarly, public polling, including surveys by USA Today/Gallup and the Wall Street Journal have shown that more than 78 percent of passengers approve of AIT.

### **International Efforts:**

- The attempted terrorist attack on 12/25 illustrated the importance of international aviation security. As you know, TSA does not conduct screening overseas. In order to improve international security standards we work closely with our international partners and ICAO to raise international security standards.
- ICAO's adoption of the Declaration on Aviation Security was an important step. TSA will continue to build on this momentum through our Office of Global Strategies. We will also continue working to harmonize technology standards, particularly as it relates to relaxing the liquids ban.

### **Layers of Security:**

- Smart security means utilizing all of our layers of security to stay ahead of evolving threats, including random, unpredictable screening.
- Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) are key to our efforts as they utilize non-intrusive behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers. TSA currently has approximately 2,800 BDOs working at our nation's airports.

### **Secure Flight:**

- Secure Flight is another important layer of security that fulfills a key 9/11 Commission recommendation. All U.S. airlines began using Secure Flight this summer, and we anticipate all international carriers will fully implement the program by the end of 2010.

**Asks:**

- TSA works to help the traveling public understand the “whys” behind our security procedures and engage them in being partners in security. We appreciate any support you can provide as third-party validators to TSA’s efforts to screen nearly 2 million passengers at 450 airports nationwide every day.
- Thanking our Transportation Security Officers when you travel goes a long way.
- I’ve asked our Senior Leadership Team to focus on the future of TSA and I’d like to pose the same question to you. What should airport security look like in 2015? 2020?

**TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH IACP RAILROAD POLICE SECTION**

**AGENDA:**

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is holding its annual conference in Orlando, FL on October 26, 2010. You have been invited to speak to the Railroad Police Section of the IACP. (b) (5) No media will be in attendance.

**PARTICIPANTS:**

Groups anticipated to be represented at the meeting include representatives from each of the Class I railroads (BNSF, CSXT, CP, CN, KCS, NS, and UP), smaller railroads, and Amtrak.

**TOPICS:**

The Railroad Police Section would like to hear about how you view the role of TSA in securing the nation's freight and passenger railroads.

**Talking Points:**

**Partnerships to Keep Our Railroads and Passenger Rail Systems Safe:**

- TSA appreciates the close working relationship we have with railroads. Together, we have collaborate on measures that reduce risk to keep our railroads safe.
- TSA views threats to the railroad network in three ways:
  - Threats to people
  - Threats to cargo
  - Threats to the rail network
- TSA recognizes that the railroads and their police departments are the first line of defense.
- The Federal government does not have the resources to monitor or patrol the 144,000 miles of railroad in the U.S.
- TSA also recognizes that the railroad police departments do not have the resources to patrol every mile of their property. Therefore activity must focus on those areas of highest risk. Risk is determined by the threat, the vulnerability, and the consequence of an event or attack on an asset. TSA believes its role is to assist railroads in identifying those areas where the risk is greatest so that the appropriate mitigation measures can be put into place.

### **Managing Risk:**

- TSA uses several key tools to assist in mitigating risk in the freight rail network:
  - **TIH Risk Reduction Program** - Reducing the time TIH cars spend in urban areas and increasing the level of monitoring by railroad employees; There has been a 92% reduction in the measured risk since the inception of the program in 2006.
  - **Freight Rail Security Grants** - Since 2006 TSA has awarded over \$40 million to freight railroads and owners of TIH tank cars. Grants were awarded for conducting vulnerability assessments and building security plans, employee training and exercises and equipping TIH tank cars with GPS tracking devices. In 2010, grant money is also available for the protection of critical railroad bridges.
  - **Assessments** - Since 2004 TSA has collaborated with freight railroads operating in high threat urban areas to assess the risks associated with the transportation of TIH materials, these “rail corridor” assessments help the railroads to identify critical points in the corridor and mitigation measures that can reduce vulnerabilities. In 2009, TSA expanded these assessments to railroad infrastructure. Bridges along major rivers were assessed to determine their criticality to the national railroad network and to identify common vulnerabilities that could potentially be exploited. These bridge assessments have brought about the deployment of pilot projects to install monitoring and intrusion detection systems.
  - **Security Action Items** - In 2006 TSA, the Department of Transportation and the railroads agreed to a set of best practices that railroads could implement to reduce their security risk. This collaborative effort has resulted in increased employee awareness and improvements in transportation security.

### **Passenger Rail:**

- TSA also works closely with AMTRAK and other passenger rail operators to implement measures that help keep the traveling public safe. Whether through grant programs or operational deployments such as the VIPR program, there has been a significant effort to increase visible deterrents and monitoring in the passenger rail mode.

**Rulemaking:**

- TSA is in the process of developing two rulemakings mandated by Congress for surface transportation:
  - 1). The first rule will be a security training regulation; this regulation will require minimum security awareness training for frontline employees of all freight and the larger passenger rail operators that perform security sensitive functions. This regulation will build upon the existing training requirements for railroads that carry hazardous materials. We expect that the “training rule” will be publically published in the first quarter of 2011.
  - 2). The second rule will require that freight and larger passenger railroads conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments and then develop security plans based on those assessments. This regulation will build upon the existing requirements for freight railroads that carry hazardous materials. TSA is currently consulting with stakeholders to refine the provisions of the security planning rule.

**TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH IACP RAILROAD POLICE SECTION**

**AGENDA:**

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is holding its annual conference in Orlando, FL on October 26, 2010. You have been invited to speak to the Railroad Police Section of the IACP. (b) (5) No media will be in attendance.

**PARTICIPANTS:**

Groups anticipated to be represented at the meeting include representatives from each of the Class I railroads (BNSF, CSXT, CP, CN, KCS, NS, and UP), smaller railroads, and Amtrak.

**TOPICS:**

The Railroad Police Section would like to hear about how you view the role of TSA in securing the nation's freight and passenger railroads.

**Talking Points:**

**Partnerships to Keep Our Railroads and Passenger Rail Systems Safe:**

- TSA appreciates the close working relationship we have with railroads. Together, we have collaborate on measures that reduce risk to keep our railroads safe.
- TSA views threats to the railroad network in three ways:
  - Threats to people
  - Threats to cargo
  - Threats to the rail network
- TSA recognizes that the railroads and their police departments are the first line of defense.
- The Federal government does not have the resources to monitor or patrol the 144,000 miles of railroad in the U.S.
- TSA also recognizes that the railroad police departments do not have the resources to patrol every mile of their property. Therefore activity must focus on those areas of highest risk. Risk is determined by the threat, the vulnerability, and the consequence of an event or attack on an asset. TSA believes its role is to assist railroads in identifying those areas where the risk is greatest so that the appropriate mitigation measures can be put into place.

### **Managing Risk:**

- TSA uses several key tools to assist in mitigating risk in the freight rail network:
  - **TIH Risk Reduction Program** - Reducing the time TIH cars spend in urban areas and increasing the level of monitoring by railroad employees; There has been a 92% reduction in the measured risk since the inception of the program in 2006.
  - **Freight Rail Security Grants** - Since 2006 TSA has awarded over \$40 million to freight railroads and owners of TIH tank cars. Grants were awarded for conducting vulnerability assessments and building security plans, employee training and exercises and equipping TIH tank cars with GPS tracking devices. In 2010, grant money is also available for the protection of critical railroad bridges.
  - **Assessments** - Since 2004 TSA has collaborated with freight railroads operating in high threat urban areas to assess the risks associated with the transportation of TIH materials, these “rail corridor” assessments help the railroads to identify critical points in the corridor and mitigation measures that can reduce vulnerabilities. In 2009, TSA expanded these assessments to railroad infrastructure. Bridges along major rivers were assessed to determine their criticality to the national railroad network and to identify common vulnerabilities that could potentially be exploited. These bridge assessments have brought about the deployment of pilot projects to install monitoring and intrusion detection systems.
  - **Security Action Items** - In 2006 TSA, the Department of Transportation and the railroads agreed to a set of best practices that railroads could implement to reduce their security risk. This collaborative effort has resulted in increased employee awareness and improvements in transportation security.

### **Passenger Rail:**

- TSA also works closely with AMTRAK and other passenger rail operators to implement measures that help keep the traveling public safe. Whether through grant programs or operational deployments such as the VIPR program, there has been a significant effort to increase visible deterrents and monitoring in the passenger rail mode.



**Rulemaking:**

- TSA is in the process of developing two rulemakings mandated by Congress for surface transportation:
  - 1). The first rule will be a security training regulation; this regulation will require minimum security awareness training for frontline employees of all freight and the larger passenger rail operators that perform security sensitive functions. This regulation will build upon the existing training requirements for railroads that carry hazardous materials. We expect that the “training rule” will be publically published in the first quarter of 2011.
  - 2). The second rule will require that freight and larger passenger railroads conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments and then develop security plans based on those assessments. This regulation will build upon the existing requirements for freight railroads that carry hazardous materials. TSA is currently consulting with stakeholders to refine the provisions of the security planning rule.

## **Talking Points**

- The 3 –1–1 on air travel = 3 ounce bottle or less; 1 quart-sized, clear, plastic, zip-top bag; 1 bag per passenger placed in screening bin.
- The one-quart bag per person limits the total liquid volume each traveler can bring. 3 oz. container size is a security measure.
- Consolidating the bottles into one bag and X-raying separately reduces clutter in the carry-on bag.
- Be prepared. Each time TSA searches a carry-on it slows down the line. Practicing 3-1-1 will ensure a faster and easier checkpoint experience.
- Pack smart. Put liquids in checked baggage when you can.
- Declare larger liquids. Prescription medications, baby formula and milk are allowed in quantities exceeding three ounces and are not required to be in the zip-top bag. Declare these items for inspection at the checkpoint.
- Come early and be patient. Heavy travel volumes and the enhanced security process may mean longer lines at security checkpoints.
- Working with our partners. TSA works with airlines and airports to anticipate peak traffic and be ready for the traveling public.
- Aviation “Orange” or high threat level continues. Expect more security measures airport wide.
  - Additional canine patrols;
  - More rigorous identity verification;
  - More highly-trained security officers.
  - Strengthened air cargo security;
- The average HIGH wait time at IAD for October, is 23 minutes in the a.m. and 31 minutes in the p.m., to get through federal screening. By contrast:
  - July was 14 minutes a.m. 13 minutes p.m.
  - August was 16 minutes a.m. 14 minutes p.m.
  - September was 12 minutes a.m. 18 minutes p.m.
- These are averages. In October, the wait has been less than 5 minutes many times during the day, to a high of 62 minutes (the weekend we moved the Checkpoint).
- Dulles International Airport is screening about 27,500 passengers (month of October), and approximately 25,000 checked bags each day.

- Thursday and Friday afternoons, from 2 p.m. until 5 p.m. are particularly busy, with both business and tourist/vacationing passengers trying to process through screening and board the hundreds of flights departing in the late afternoon.
- Dulles is served by more than 30 major airlines, 20 of which are foreign flag carriers, or carriers who serve International destinations. Many of the late afternoon Dulles departures leave around the same time, destined for various European cities. Similarly, Monday mornings are also our busiest morning – with average high wait times of 30-35 minutes.
- Unlike other airports, where passenger volume tapers off in October, Dulles is experiencing a 7% increase in passenger throughput.
- Earlier this month, the entire 21 Lane Federal Screening operation at Dulles moved from the East side of the Main Terminal to a brand new facility on the West side of the Main Terminal. This change is part of the larger Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority effort to expand Dulles.

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**IATA visit to TSA HQ: Meeting with Giovanni Bisignani, Director General and CEO of International Air Transport Association (IATA)**

**March 28, 2011, TSA HQ Arlington, VA**

**TALKING POINTS:**

- Checkpoint of the Future:
  - Mr Bisignani will suggest that TSA and IATA formally work together on those items that we have in common with TSA's Checkpoint of Tomorrow.
  - IATA has drafted a Statement of Principles (\*see attachment) on next generation passenger screening. This is a non-binding/non-enforceable declaration to work collaboratively between States and industry partners. On Tuesday, March 29, Mr. Bisignani will be asking Secretary Napolitano to support and sign the statement. IATA will be looking for Mr. Pistole's support as well.
  - Also, Mr. Bisignani will ask TSA to provide a representative to work with IATA on IATA's Checkpoint of the Future program. He will present the Administrator with IATA's Blueprint document (\*see attachment) that was announced in December.
  - TSA is looking to focus its resources to streamline and enhance the passenger experience at security checkpoints by applying new risk-based screening procedures and furthering its use of technology. This a direction in which TSA is already moving based upon the evolution of its multi-layered approach to transportation security (at this point we do not have a Statement of Principles).
  - TSA intends to announce further details regarding pilots of these concepts this summer.
- Technology development:

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  - Bisignani will ask how they can formally work together to bring new technology to US airports like IATA does to the rest of the world.
  - TSA is actively involved in various bilateral Transportation and Aviation Security Working Groups, and is an active participant in regional and multilateral organizations such as the G8, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Quadrilateral Group on Transportation Security, and the ICAO Regional Offices.
  - TSA has been reaching out to other regional organizations such as the Latin American Civil Aviation Conference (LACAC), the Arab Civil Aviation Conference (ACAC), the Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services (COCESNA), and the African Civil Aviation Conference (AFCAC) and the African Union.

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- At the ICAO General Assembly in Montreal this past October, DHS and TSA expressed the importance of strengthening partnerships to enhance international civil aviation security in the face of continuing and evolving threats.
- Representatives from TSA and IATA collaborate on the ICAO AVSEC Working Group on Technology
- Cargo security
  - Alternate Procedure letters were sent to all cargo and passenger air carriers on March 22, 2011. The letters advised the carriers that TSA understands that the ability of carriers to fully implement the measures of this EA may be a challenge in some locations based on available technology and for certain commodities. Many foreign air carriers have asked for a short term extension of the deadline for implementation. Recognizing these challenges, TSA is allowing carriers a degree of flexibility in implementing the required measures.
  - A letter has been drafted in response to the Association of European Airlines concerns raised to Mr. Pistole regarding the current cargo security EA measures issued by TSA.

**WATCH OUT FOR/IF ASKED**

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### **BACKGROUND**

IATA, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), is an international trade body developed over 60 years ago to represent, lead, and serve the airline industry. IATA currently has 260 members, comprised of both passenger and cargo airlines which represent 94% of scheduled international traffic.

IATA also serves as TSA's connection to major international aviation stakeholders. IATA acts as the conduit for information that needs to reach international airlines from TSA.

Mr. Giovanni Bisignani is the current Director General and CEO of IATA. He has served in this capacity since June of 2002. *Mr. Bisignani's visit to Washington, D.C. will be his last official trip to this area in his role as Director General and CEO.* He would like to personally thank the Administrator for his partnership. Mr. Bisignani would also like to discuss his "Vision 2050" initiative, which is being led jointly by Mr. Bisignani and Professor Michael Porter, Harvard University.

### **PARTICIPANTS/BIOS:**

#### **Non-TSA:**

- Director General and CEO (IATA) -***Giovanni Bisignani***
- Senior VP of Safety, Operations and Infrastructure (IATA) – ***Guenther Matschnigg***
- Regional VP, North America (IATA) – ***Doug Lavin***
- Global Director, Travel and Facilitation (IATA) – ***Ken Dunlap***

### **ATTACHMENTS:**

Biographies – Giovanni Bisignani, Guenther Matschnigg, Doug Lavin, Ken Dunlap  
IATA Checkpoint of the Future Blueprint 2.0.  
Statement of Principles – Checkpoint of the Future

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## **IED Detection Training**

In 2006, TSA has begun or implemented multiple initiatives to increase the amount of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) training received by all Transportation Security Officers:

- Delivery of the new IED Baseline Training Program to all TSOs. Training is conducted by Explosives Specialists, Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAOs) and other TSA Approved Instructors for all checkpoint TSOs.
- Ongoing updates of all training, including the 40-hour new-hire training curriculum, to reflect the most current information on IED threat detection.
- Developing a 4-hour monthly, recurrent training program for all TSOs designed to maintain proficiency with identifying potential IEDs on x-ray, during physical inspection and during a pat down search. Numerous lessons are being developed for both checkpoint and checked bag screeners using a variety of instructional design techniques, including x-ray image interpretation, hands-on laboratories, and web-based and instructor-led training.
- Developing an IED Explosives Seminar to be delivered semi-annually to all TSOs by BAOs or Explosives Specialists. The seminar is currently under development.
- Establishing a requirement for BAOs to make time available to conduct on-the-spot training lessons at checkpoints when operational flow allows for screener down time. The BAOs would make himself/herself available for questions and provide demonstrations of unique IEDs and tips on how to find them.
- Procuring and deploying IED training kits at all checkpoints. These training kits will be updated as needed based upon the latest intelligence reports.

### **IED Detection Talking Points**

- Detecting explosive materials, including IEDs at the checkpoint, is TSA's top priority.
- TSA has many independent layers of security that reinforce each other. Some of these layers are apparent to travelers; some are not.
- **We not only deny terrorists the ability to execute their plans, we deny them the ability to create them.**
  - Working with other government agencies, we have measures in place to intercept terrorists before they enter our country and prevent them from traveling within our country;
  - Using canines and covert surveillance, we detect and deter terrorists before they reach the TSA checkpoint;

- At the checkpoint, a well-trained, experienced team of TSOs, assisted with multiple technologies, screens passengers and their carry-on bags for weapons and explosives.
  - And on the aircraft, we have thousands of Federal Air Marshals, thousands of pilots who are authorized and ready to protect the cockpit with firearms, hardened cockpit doors to prevent unauthorized access...
  - And in every airport terminal and every airplane, there are passengers who remember the courage of the men and women of Flight 93, and who are as determined as TSA to stop terrorists before they can act.
- Alone, any one of these layers can be beaten -- as the GAO study has demonstrated -- but together, these security measures are formidable.
- In November and December of 2005, just as the GAO study was underway, TSA began implementing enhanced explosives detection training for TSOs. Over 18,000 TSOs are already trained, and we continue to train and test our workforce on a daily basis.
- TSA conducts its own covert testing, and we have made changes to our protocols to improve passenger screening and better prepare our screeners. We are working with GAO to incorporate any lessons learned from their tests in our training and screening protocols, as well.
- We are highly focused on detecting explosives and bomb components, and we continue to make progress in this area.
- That is precisely why we changed the prohibited items list in December to focus less attention on less dangerous items, and why we continue to look at the relative value of finding and confiscating 30,000 lighters per day. We do not want to spend a disproportionate amount of TSO time finding items that do not really pose a threat to taking control or destroying an aircraft.
- And this is why we are testing new layers of security to identify potential terrorists before they reach the checkpoint... These include behavior pattern recognition techniques, additional covert surveillance throughout the airport, and document checking and verification.
- Finally, we are focused on making our many-layered security system tough to defeat by making it hard for terrorists to predict what measures they may face at any given point or time. That's why it is important that TSA has the flexibility to change and adapt its protocols and procedures in every layer of security -- so that terrorists cannot succeed.
- The American public can be confident that TSA and the entire security community are working together to stop terrorists. Commercial aviation today is more secure than ever.





## ICAO REGIONAL CONFERENCE, NEW DELHI, INDIA (*February 14, 2011*)

### Remarks for Administrator, John Pistole

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#### *Talking Points - General*

- Good morning and thank you for allowing me to attend the first ICAO Regional Conference following the General Assembly last October. I would like to especially thank our hosts, Minister XX and XX, for their hospitality and for organizing this pivotal gathering of aviation security experts.
- For those of you who I have not yet met, I am John Pistole, the Administrator of TSA.
- In the past year alone, ICAO has made significant strides in advancing global aviation security initiatives and bringing unprecedented international attention to the importance of a secure aviation infrastructure.
- The ICAO Declaration on Aviation Security, which was adopted at the General Assembly, represents a worldwide commitment to strengthen our aviation security systems in a number of key areas.
- The ICAO Declaration would not have been possible without the Regional Meetings held around the world leading up to the General Assembly, to solidify the dedication of a majority of Member States to make a bold statement on aviation security.
- Additionally, the adoption of Amendment 12 to Annex 17 represents ICAO's effort to strengthen security measures to address ever-changing and emerging threats. The updates to the Standards and Recommended Practices- set to take hold in July- will assist Member States in protecting their citizens and their economies from acts of unlawful interference.
- However, our work to strengthen our aviation security systems cannot end with the last calendar year. There are those who will stop at nothing to exploit our aviation systems; as demonstrated by the October 2010 incident involving explosives embedded in cargo. This latest disrupted plot highlights both that we face a determined and creative enemy, and that we have a critical need to recognize the global interdependence in aviation security.
- Just as the first round of Regional Declarations were integral in leading a new front in aviation security, so is this meeting. As the first Regional Meeting since the adoption of the Declaration on Aviation Security, as participants here today, we have the power to set the stage for aviation security for years to come. We now need to take the Declaration and transform its text into action and turn our pledges for improvement into a series of measurable achievements.
- Over the course of the next few days, we will strive to set a course for aviation security that balances short term advances with long term initiatives that will help secure the worldwide aviation system from known, new, and emerging threats.



- By developing a plan of action with discrete steps to implement the Declaration's objectives, we will identify aviation security priorities for this region and the steps required to initiate programs to mitigate the greatest risks that we face. Additionally, your actions and your agreed upon next steps will influence others around the world to hold similar discussions, thereby keeping the international spotlight on strengthening aviation security. We cannot afford to fail or ease up in our efforts, as terrorists are constantly looking to exploit our systems in any way possible.
- As we continue to collaborate and identify ways to strengthen our collective aviation security environments, we must also remember those States that may not have the resources or capabilities to match the current standards. An international threat requires an international response, therefore it is imperative that we work together with ICAO to coordinate capacity building and technical assistance efforts to States in need.
- It is imperative to assess where each of us stands with regard to implementing the key aviation security objectives outlined in the Declaration. While we pledge our support, it is even more important that our words are followed with appropriate actions. To that end, we must review our current programs with an honest and critical eye and identify areas where technical assistance and training may be required. On the flipside, we must also identify areas where we can assist each other in raising the aviation security bar.
- Specifically speaking for TSA, we have and will continue to provide assistance to States in need. In 2010 TSA provided training and assistance to Bangladesh in the areas of Quality Control for Civil Aviation Security and Airport Security Management under auspices of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program sponsored by the U.S. State Department. TSA has also provided Airport Security Management training to Thailand (TSA) and Nepal (ATA).
- One of TSA's strategies is to establish a repository of information to capture training and capacity development information under the auspices of ICAO, specifically, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group of Donor Nations. This would be used to ensure our assistance efforts are complementary and not duplicative to other States' and ensure the widest availability of training and resource assistance.
- In raising the aviation security bar, TSA is discussing with like minded States the potential for ICAO to establish "target" Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for air cargo security. This would entail an aggressive, but graduated, timeline for ICAO Member States to implement changes based on their existing capabilities and available resources. The target SARPs would be holistic in nature, specifying all of the known or potential components of a robust air cargo security program. For example, SARPs might include national regulatory program requirements; SARPs for supply chain security; SARPs to differentiate and handle high risk cargo; and minimum standards for technological screening of various types of air cargo.
- We look forward to working with ICAO and its Member States in the coming months as we work together to ensure the safety and security of the transportation networks that unite us, and as we forge a new way forward in international aviation security collaboration.

## **TSA Key talking points**

**1/09/07**

### **AVIATION**

#### **2006 Screening Statistics**

- TSA screened 708,400,522 people in 2006. The average wait time was 3.79 minutes and the average peak wait time was 11.76 minutes.
- TSA intercepted 13,709,211 prohibited items at our security checkpoints in 2006. Of this, 11,616,249 were lighters and 1,607,100 were knives.
- TSA screened 535,020,271 individual pieces of checked luggage. (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)  
(b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

#### **Registered Traveler**

- The posting of the fee notice completes TSA's deliverables on Registered Traveler and we will be ready when the private sector is ready to implement the program.
- It is now up to the private sector to build the systems and processes for enrolling participants, validating their biometric and biographical information, maintaining privacy, and operating the program.
- Registered Traveler is a private-sector led program and the timeline for implementation will be driven by industry.
- TSA continues to encourage our private-sector partners to design programs that will enhance the customer experience through unique program benefits for participating airports and airlines.

#### **Secure Flight**

- Secure Flight is watch list matching by named-based comparison. Privacy and security are being built into the foundation of the program. TSA is in the final phase of the re-baselining review and we are getting very close to completion.
- DHS is committed to one-stop redress for screening programs. TSA is working with CBP to ensure consistency with the program used for international vetting.
- Currently, airlines check passengers against watch lists. The government can assure travelers that known terrorists are not getting on airplanes today, because every flight manifest is vetted against the watch list. Once Secure Flight is up and running, watch list matching will be done by the government, not the airlines.
- The 2007 budget allocates \$15 million for Secure Flight, and the carry-over amount from previous years is approximately \$20 million. TSA has sufficient funds to complete the rule-making process. Funding for implementation will be addressed in upcoming budget cycles.

## **Air Cargo**

- TSA employs a multi-layered, high-tech, industry-cooperative approach, including canine teams, TSA and airline inspectors, and physical screening of a sizable portion of air cargo.
- Cargo presented to consolidators or freight forwarders is not placed on passenger-carrying aircraft unless those individuals are Known Shippers and are in compliance with TSA regulations. This type of cargo must be transported via cargo only aircraft or ground.
- TSA recently significantly enhanced air cargo requirements for air carriers and Known Shippers. These enhancements directly address the most high risk cargo.
- We have greatly increased the number of cargo inspectors and enforcement actions. Since last year, well over 500 enforcement actions have taken place, including six certificate revocations.

## **No Fly List**

- Anybody who is known as a terrorist is not allowed to fly – period. If you have received a boarding pass, you are not on the No Fly List.
- The No Fly List and the watch list are important and effective tools in our layered approach to aviation security. These lists are specifically designed to counter threats by identifying persons who pose, or are suspected of posing, a threat to civil aviation or national security.
- The same standards apply to our own and airport employees: if an employee pops up on the watch list today, that person will not be allowed to enter the secure area of the airport today.

## **Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT)**

- Security officers are trained to discern “normal” airport stress from observable behaviors that may indicate that the individual may be a risk to the aircraft or airport. Officers are trained to detect involuntary physical and physiological reactions that exhibit levels of stress or fear and/or deception associated with persons that may intend to commit a terrorist or criminal act.
- TSA recognizes that an individual exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear and deception does not automatically correlate to terrorist or harmful intent. It does, however, serve to focus appropriate resources on determining if such an individual presents a higher risk or if the behavior is of a non-threatening nature.
- This program is part of a larger effort by TSA to add more layers of security that cannot be manipulated by those seeking to do us harm.
- SPOT is consistent with the agency’s use of risk-based tactics to help us identify threats, augment intelligence gathering and minimize risk to the public.

## **Bomb Appraisal Officers**

- The Bomb Appraisal Program is an effective and affordable additional layer of security to prevent the introduction of explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) into the aviation system.
- TSA Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAOs) are strategically deployed at airports across the country. BAOs are trained at one of two specialized schools and have extensive operational experience in the field as members of military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units to accredited law enforcement/public safety bomb squads.
- Integration of these highly trained and specialized personnel strengthens security by providing additional resources focused on the number one threat to aviation.

## **Screening Partnership Program**

- The Screening Partnership Program allows airports to transition to private screeners while maintaining TSA oversight and the corresponding increased level of security implemented since 9/11.
- In this innovative public/private partnership, TSA continues to oversee security at partner airports. Private contractors must adhere to the same strict operational, hiring and training standards as TSA employees.
- At SPP airports, the government and private sector are working together to “anticipate the unexpected” by following a multi-layered approach to security with a continued focus on the greatest risks.
- Five original pilot airports--San Francisco, Kansas City, Tupelo, Jackson Hole, Greater Rochester—plus Sioux Falls, S.D. are currently participating in SPP. The Key West and Marathon, Fla. airports were accepted into the program in December 2006 and will be transitioning to private screeners in Spring 2007. An application from Sonoma, Calif. was accepted in late 2006. An RFP will be issued the first quarter of 2007.

## **Federal Air Marshals Service/Office of Law Enforcement**

- Director Dana Brown is fostering communication within the organization. Brown assembled thirteen working groups comprised of Air Marshals and civilian employees to review and provide feedback on the future of the federal air marshal service.
- The dedicated men and women of the air marshals provide another critical layer of security to the flying public and we are proud to have them as part of our agency.
- TSA has an aggressive intelligence component. Administrator Hawley starts every day with Intelligence briefing. TSA is plugged into the intelligence network in an effort to stop terrorists long before they make it onto American soil or into our airports.

## **Local Hiring Effort –Holiday Staffing**

- TSA is prepared to provide security at the nation's airports this holiday season.
- As we do every holiday season, we are working closely with airport and airline partners to anticipate passenger loads and plan and staff accordingly. We will continue to monitor and move resources into place to assist airports in managing wait times, just as we did over the Thanksgiving holiday.
- In most cases we anticipate reasonable checkpoint lines during peak travel periods -- less than 30 minutes in most cases. We achieved that over Thanksgiving, with an average peak wait time of 13 minutes on the busiest travel day of the weekend.

## **Contract Baggage Handlers**

- TSA has implemented a contract baggage handler pilot program at Orlando, LAX and Dulles. TSA is in the process of evaluating the success of this pilot.
- Contract baggage handlers have been deployed at these airports to decrease injuries and increase productivity of our security officers – allowing them to focus on screening rather than lifting and carrying luggage. It gives us greater flexibility to move TSOs between baggage and passenger screening since the heavier lifting requirement is eliminated.

## **Airport Employee Screening**

- TSA and the industry are taking a fresh look at how access points to airport sterile and secure areas are controlled. We are progressively enhancing security.
- TSA employs a multi-layered approach to include criminal background checks, security threat assessments and immigration checks to ensure legal employment status of all badged employees.
- Security officers perform random screening on airport/airline employees and their accessible property at vehicle gates, secure and sterile area access points.
- Mandating criminal background checks and security threat assessments prior to issuing airport identifications applies not only to airport personnel but to individuals with access to public areas. This includes but is not limited to taxi drivers, parking lot attendants, vendors and shuttle bus drivers who have airport identification issued by the airport operator.
- The new measures are consistent with our layered security approach and aim to reduce insider threats while enhancing overall security.

## **TECHNOLOGY**

### **General**

- We are moving towards a system approach. Ideally we'd like to develop a single, multi-function device that can quickly screen passengers for all threats non-intrusively. In the future, we hope that customers will not need to break stride to undergo screening.
- There is no silver bullet technology solution to transportation security, which is why TSA applies a layered, risk-based approach including canines, FAMS, SPOT, hardened cockpit doors, FFDO, etc.
- We've improved technology by 100-200 percent since 9/11, though there is always room for improvement. 9/11 created a cottage industry for security, and we are always open to new ideas.

### **Backscatter**

- TSA's privacy-filtered image looks like a chalk outline of the person's body, and shows any concealed items including weapons plastics, ceramics and explosives. The officer attending the passenger will not view the image, and as an additional precaution, the officer viewing the image will be remotely located and the image will be gone forever.
- We have worked very hard on the privacy issue and we have what is a very non-invasive image that allows us to see hidden weapons or explosives. Privacy and security are not mutually exclusive, and TSA has had an ongoing dialogue with privacy groups on these issues.
- The first backscatter machine will be piloted in Phoenix, and we expect the pilot to begin by the end of January. It may go to a few more major airports but that is not yet determined. It will be used in secondary screening and will be on a voluntary basis as an alternative to pat down.
- TSA is comfortable deploying the technology for pilot testing. It will be another tool in our layered approach to security. There will be opportunity for continued public dialogue as we see how the technology works in the airport setting.

### **Baggage Screening**

- Twenty-three airports are equipped with full in-line EDS systems and 28 airports are equipped with partial in-line EDS Systems (installed or under construction), with approximately 600 machines in-line.
- In-line baggage systems allow TSA to remove minivan-sized equipment from airport terminal lobbies and install them behind-the-scenes – where conveyors move baggage through explosives screening and then automatically sort them to departing aircraft.
- A stand-alone EDS machine can process approximately 150-160 bags/hour, whereas an in-line system using the same equipment can process roughly 500 bags/ hour. In-line systems are also less labor-intensive, freeing up security officers for checkpoint duties and reducing injuries.

## **BUS/TRUCKS**

### **Bns Explosive Screening Technology**

- The Bus Explosive Screening Technology pilot program yielded information on the technical issues surrounding passenger and baggage screening in a scheduled service motor coach environment.
- Through this program, TSA learned a great deal about the feasibility of private company employees performing screening in addition to their normal duties.
- The BEST program built on earlier pilot programs, which developed the capability to screen rail and ferry passengers for explosives, by developing protocols to have a stakeholder group conduct screening.

## **RAIL/MASS TRANSIT**

### **Freight Rail Security**

- An airborne hazard from an attack against a chemical facility or toxic chemicals in transit is among the most serious risks facing America's highest threat areas. DHS's rail security NPRM and action items will take a significant percentage of that risk off the table.
- As an end-result of this initiative, we've covered location, standstill time, chain of custody, reporting, inspection authority, tracking, and having cars move on the safest, most commercially viable route. This is going to dramatically drive down risk and give us comprehensive coverage.
- To raise the level of security in the freight rail transportation sector ahead of the final rule, both DHS and DOT negotiated security action items with the freight rail industry. TSA began industry adoption surveys in September 2006, and we expect rail carriers to fully implement all measures before the rule is finalized.
- The elements of this broad freight rail security initiative are based upon the findings of comprehensive rail corridor assessments and corporate security reviews conducted by the TSA in key urban areas over the past three years.

### **Mass Transit Security**

- Our focus for transit security is in three key areas: operational capability, rail inspectors and criticality assessments. Our goal is to continually raise the baseline of transit security through unpredictable, visible deterrents, expanding our research and development, and expanding our connectivity with state and local entities.
- A funding comparison isn't accurate between aviation and transit, as the primary responsibility for transit security lies with state and local government. We cannot overstate the importance of fighting terror overseas and at our borders, to stop terrorists before they have the opportunity to enter open transit systems.
- Transit systems are designed to be open and accessible, and so we have to balance security and passenger flow. Some systems process up to 1,500 passengers a minute in big markets like New York, and people simply aren't going to wait for airport-style screening to get a cross-town train.



- In addition to funding and grants, TSA is supporting transit security with canine teams in 13 (soon 14) transit systems, a program that continues to expand. We also have deployed up to 100 rail inspectors, have held tabletop emergency drills with the industry, and conducted more than 25 Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) team exercises in 2006 alone, working at the direction of a local agency to supplement their security posture.

## **MULTI-MODAL**

### **Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)**

- DHS intends to meet all the TWIC issuance deadlines in the Safe Ports Act. The regulation process for a program like TWIC would normally take over a year. DHS issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making in May and will issue a final rule in the coming weeks that incorporates over 1,900 public comments.
- DHS is moving aggressively to enhance port security by ensuring threats do not gain access to secure areas of MTSA regulated facilities. Over 700,000 port workers have been screened against terrorist watch lists and immigration databases.
- The time to act is now. TWIC is needed to secure our ports and TSA has already tested the technology and business processes required to implement.

## **Canines**

- The canine program is a good example of federal, state and local law enforcement in partnership to reach a common goal. The TSA provides the canines, training and a yearly stipend and the local law enforcement agency provides the officer and a commitment to use the teams at least 80 percent of the time in the transportation environment.
- Canine teams are one of the quickest, most efficient means of detecting possible explosive substances. They can be deployed anywhere in the transportation system in minutes and are extremely accurate.
- The program exemplifies the TSA's commitment to focus our resources on the greatest threat to transportation systems, explosives.
- The program has more than 420 canine teams in over 80 airports and 12 mass transit systems.

## **MISCELLANEOUS**

### **Unions**

- TSA has determined that mandatory collective bargaining with our Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) is not compatible with the flexibility required to wage war against terrorism. The courts have upheld TSA's legal position on collective bargaining.
- Every President since Jimmy Carter has, under the Federal Services Labor Management Relations Act, issued executive orders to exclude units of agencies from collective bargaining for national security reasons.
- TSA is committed to providing a voice for TSOs and other employees through its model workplace and other programs such as the TSO Advisory Council.

### **Career Progression**

- Over the course of fiscal year 2005, TSA lost and replaced over 50% of the part-time workforce; our turnover rate among full-time TSOs was approximately 19%. It costs TSA more than \$12,000 to hire and train one TSO, making it very important that we retain as many TSOs as possible.
- TSA's key retention and recruitment initiatives, such as Pay for Performance/PASS, the E Band career progression, injury reduction programs and part-time health benefit pilots were launched in FY 2006. The culmination of all of these efforts is to show that we are willing to invest in the workforce and create an environment in which employees want to excel.
- We expect the career progression program announced in the summer of 2006 to have the biggest impact on retention and recruitment of the many workforce-focused programs instituted in the past 14 months. The E Band and technical advancement track gives TSOs a much-expanded career path for the years ahead, both at TSA and elsewhere within DHS.
- Our goal is to reward and optimize the skills of our existing workforce and attract new employees and give them good reason to stay with the agency; we know that the longer the period of time in the job, the higher the performance of security duties will be.

### **911 Families**

- We have the greatest compassion for them and their request. The legal standard is: it can't be a detriment for aviation security to release to the public.
- There are parts of it that we believe continue to pose a threat should it be publicly released. Not any independent piece, but the whole collection of this is what we use to meet the threat to aviation.
- We owe it to the families NOT to hamper aviation security.

## **TSO Theft**

- TSA holds its TSO work force to the highest professional and ethical standards and has a zero-tolerance policy for theft in the workplace.
- TSA aggressively investigates all allegations of misconduct and, when infractions are discovered, moves swiftly to end the federal careers of offenders. TSA also works with its state and federal partners to seek the highest levels of prosecution.
- The ill deeds of a few individuals should in no way reflect on the outstanding job our more than 43,000 TSO's do everyday to ensure the security of the traveling public.

## **Avian Flu – TSA's Role**

- At this time there is no evidence of H5N1 (Avian Flu) mutating into a strain that is communicable from human to human contact.
- Together, TSA and DHS prepared the DHS Pandemic Contingency Plan which is available at the end of CY 2006 and will include guidance on workforce preparedness, airport and field personnel public health response protocols and stakeholder engagement.
- The U.S. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza has three pillars; TSA's role in each is:
  1. Preparedness and Communication - TSA will develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats including coordinating countermeasures and issuing and revising security-related regulations and requirements.
  2. Surveillance and Detection - TSA will support the DHS CMO and other appropriate federal agencies in their efforts to identify and understand influenza pandemic threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts, and disseminate timely information to our security partners and the American public.
  3. Response and Containment - TSA will coordinate non-medical transportation security related to a national response to an influenza pandemic; coordinate transportation security related to federal, state, local and private sector recovery efforts to mitigate the effects of an influenza pandemic, and ensure that the nation's transportation system is fully functional.

## **General Aviation**

- Due to the size and diversity of the GA community, DHS utilizes a threat-based, risk management, and consequence analysis approach to mitigate risks and to develop policies and programs that are reasonable, feasible, and effective for GA.
- TSA's guidelines provide the general aviation community with a set of federally-endorsed security enhancements and a tool for determining when and where these enhancements are appropriate.
- DHS works in partnership with the GA community to promote the use of existing DHS security programs and to develop new security initiatives and policies.

- TSA conducted extensive coordination and outreach effort with general aviation and has received support from the general aviation community for the Federal recommendations.

## **TSA Key talking points on top issues**

**5/12/06**

### **Overview of approach:**

- Secretary Chertoff 2<sup>nd</sup> stage review – standing it up now let's review everything and let's be risk-based.
- When Administrator Hawley came on board last year it was the first opportunity to implement the risk-based approach at an operating component of DHS.
- The terrorist risk is non-linear. You can't predict it so you put a thin layer of gray over everything and stack up little piles of unpredictable things that throw the terrorists off balance.

### **The old way:**

- Detailed checkpoints – told exactly how to do everything they have to do.
- Same with technology: It was the same everywhere in use in the US at every checkpoint
- There are always loopholes in technology – if the terrorists know how we use it every day it can be defeated every day. So when 9/11 happened they knew exactly what we were looking for and what manner we were looking for it.

### **The New Way: 2 SR says what is the biggest risk?**

- IEDs
- So we sent our Internal Affairs team to do covert testing across the country to determine our vulnerability.
- When Administrator Hawley came on board our security personnel was only trained and tested for finding assembled IEDs. We know the real threat is (b) (3):49 U.S.C. §

## **The answer:**

Response: train and test against the real threat

- (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)
- Use our existing tools – the people we have and the best technology on the planet the human brain to find IED components.
- TSA brought in bomb techs to design the training and give the training. 18,000 of the TSA passenger workforce was trained before Thanksgiving last year in this new training.
- Fake bombs...how to use screens, switches...rolled that out

**We have successfully achieved less predictability in the system.**

- Trace detection
- Pat downs
  - full version is about 4 minutes
  - quick is a minute and a half
- Behavior pattern recognition is so important because we are not relying solely on technology. It is another layer. Others use it – CBP, Israelis...

**The more layers, the more likely that we will catch the terrorists.**

## **AVIATION**

### **Registered Traveler**

- Security is and will continue to be TSA's number one priority. TSA retains responsibility for setting key program standards and security measures – such as physical screening at the TSA checkpoint. Registered Traveler will be market-driven and offered by the private sector with TSA largely playing a facilitating role; TSA estimates that it will be prepared for a roll-out at 10 to 20 airports.
- Registered Travelers will be subject to an equivalent level of physical screening at the checkpoint as non-Registered Travelers. The difference is that the RT screening may use alternate procedures or technology that would increase throughput and decrease “hassle” factors. These alternate procedures may vary from airport-to-airport based on security needs, checkpoint configuration, and available space. The private sector may invest resources at the checkpoint to facilitate the availability of these procedures.
- The rollout plan of pilots combined with rulemaking allows continued progress, while ensuring that the public has an opportunity to provide comments before nationwide implementation. A draft amendment to the Airport Security Plan for RT has been completed and will continue to evolve as TSA develops the RT standards and operational details.

### **Prohibited Items**

- TSA did a risk-based analysis of all prohibited items. The items that were removed from the list pose a low threat of gaining control of an aircraft. Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs), not scissors, are the threat.
- With changes to the prohibited items, TSOs are empowered to use their knowledge and training to detect and defeat terrorists and focus their attention in areas where the threat is greatest.
- The number of sharp objects, such as scissors, confiscated at checkpoints has dropped 90% and the overall number of confiscated items has fallen 10% since the 12/22/05 change in the Prohibited Items List. Three quarters of all items now collected are lighters.
- The time saved with the change to prohibited items list is being put to effective use; we have increased the unpredictability in TSA's bag search process, as well as employed more behavioral screening.

### **Air Cargo**

- We have a multi-layered, high-tech, industry-cooperative approach, including canine teams, TSA and airline inspectors, and physical screening of a sizable portion of air cargo.

- TSA's goal is to screen 100 percent of air cargo and inspect 100 percent of high-risk cargo. With today's technology, it is impractical to security and commerce to screen every piece of air cargo to that standard.
- All cargo carried on passenger aircraft is consolidated and handled only by companies whose security programs meet stringent TSA requirements and satisfy TSA inspections.

### **General Aviation**

- Because general aviation airports vary so widely in their size and scope, only the airport owner/operator with intimate day-to-day knowledge of the facility can determine the best security enhancements for that airport.
- TSA's guidelines provide the general aviation community with a set of federally-endorsed security enhancements and a tool for determining when and where these enhancements are appropriate.
- TSA has conducted an extensive coordination and outreach effort with general aviation and has, in return, received support from the general aviation community for the Federal recommendations.

### **No Fly List**

- Anybody who is known as a terrorist is not allowed to fly – period. If you have received a boarding pass, you are not on the No Fly List.
- The No Fly List and the watch list are important and effective tools in our layered approach to aviation security. These lists are specifically designed to counter threats by identifying persons who pose, or are suspected of posing, a threat to civil aviation or national security.
- The same standards apply to our own and airport employees: if an employee pops up on the watch list today, that person will not be allowed to enter the secure area of the airport today.

### **Behavioral Observation**

- Security officers are trained to discern “normal” airport stress from the instinctual behavioral cues – indicative of stress, fear or deception – of a terrorist or criminal.
- This program is part of a larger effort by TSA to add more layers of security that cannot be manipulated by those seeking to do us harm.



- This program is consistent with the agency's ongoing effort to utilize risk-based tactics to help us identify threats, augment intelligence gathering and minimize risk to the public and critical infrastructure.

### **Less Than Lethal Program**

- TSA analyzed a toolbox of less-than-lethal devices and concluded that currently only the deployment of electric shock devices could be used to safely enhance commercial aviation security.
- TSA's approval will require testing of specific devices on the specific aircraft where they would be used in order to minimize collateral damage. Training requirements will be stringent and will require live situational training.
- Only one carrier - Korean Air Lines – has been approved to carry less than lethal weapons in the U.S. The airline's law enforcement officers and flight attendants are armed with less than lethal weapons (Tasers).

### **Screening Partnership Program**

- The Screening Partnership Program allows airports to transition to private screeners while maintaining TSA oversight and the corresponding increased level of security implemented since 9/11.
- In this innovative public/private partnership, TSA continues to oversee security at partner airports. Private contractors must adhere to the same strict operational, hiring and training standards as TSA employees.
- At SPP airports, the government and private sector are working together to "anticipate the unexpected" by following a multi-layered approach to security with a continued focus on the greatest risks.

### **Alien Flight Program**

- Alien flight is designed to prevent terrorists or others who pose a threat to aviation and/or national security from receiving flight training.
- The program has been expanded so that all non-U.S. citizens who apply to U.S. flight schools must undergo a security threat assessment regardless of the size of aircraft in which they train.
- Between October 5, 2004 and November 27, 2005, TSA processed 41,687 applications. In that time, 99 applications were denied.

## **Local Hiring Effort – Summer Staffing**

- TSA has managed summer workloads for the last four years and we are prepared to address the needs of the traveling public.
- While some airports may face more staffing challenges than others, we are aware of those airports and we are working to support them and send in supplemental staffing to help as needed. We will continue to monitor and move resources into place to assist airports to achieve a reasonable wait-time.
- TSA is moving forward expeditiously with local hiring and we should be close to full strength by the time we reach the peak of summer season.
- We do not anticipate hour long lines. In most cases we anticipate reasonable checkpoint lines less than 30 minutes.

## **TECHNOLOGY**

### **General**

- We are moving towards a system approach, with an ideal of sensor-fusion: a single, multi-function device that can quickly screen passengers for all threats non-intrusively. In the future, we hope that customers will not need to break stride to undergo screening.
- We are looking for the Star Wars approach: revolutionary ideas, not just evolutionary.
- We've improved technology by 100-200 percent since 9/11, though we still have a ways to go. 9/11 created a cottage industry for security, and we are always open to new ideas.

### **Backscatter**

- Backscatter machines scan a non-penetrating x-ray beam over the body surface, and create an image that differentiates not only metal, but also organic materials such as ceramic weapons and explosive materials.
- TSA continues to work with backscatter vendors on software that addresses privacy concerns. TSA has not yet finalized plans for the pilot phase (limited deployment) of this technology, nor will we until TSA is fully convinced that privacy concerns are addressed.

### **Trace Portals**

- To date, TSA has deployed the trace portals in security lanes that are designated for passengers requiring additional screening. Passengers process through the portal, in addition to the walk-through metal detector.
- One of the clear customer benefits is that passengers are not be required to remove their outerwear or shoes, or be subject to pat-down procedures, unless the metal detector or trace portal alarms.

- We are facing the issue of being out of space at checkpoints to add new technology. Every time we add a new box, wait times can increase. We are working with vendors on the size (or footprint) and speed of machines.

### **Baggage Screening**

- There are currently 16 airports with fully in-line baggage systems, and approximately 30 facilities with partial systems. Expanding to new airports poses the same challenges as remodeling your home: money, existing building constraints, and time.
- In-line baggage systems allows TSA to remove minivan-sized equipment from airport terminal lobbies and install them behind-the-scenes – where conveyors move baggage through explosives screening and then automatically sort them to departing aircraft.
- A stand-alone EDS machine can process approximately 150-160 bags/hour, whereas an in-line system using the same equipment can process roughly 500 bags/ hour. In-line systems are also less labor-intensive, freeing up TSOs for checkpoint duties.

### **BUS/TRUCKS**

#### **Bus Explosive Screening Technology**

- The Bus Explosive Screening Technology pilot program yielded information on the technical issues surrounding passenger and baggage screening in a scheduled service motorcoach environment.
- Through this program, TSA learned a great deal about the feasibility of private company employees performing screening in addition to their normal duties.
- The BEST program built on earlier pilot programs, which developed the capability to screen rail and ferry passengers for explosives, by developing protocols to have a stakeholder group conduct screening.

#### **Hazmat Driver Rule**

- For the hazmat license endorsement, fingerprints and other information are used to check criminal history, citizenship status, and international and Federal databases related to terrorist activity.
- TSA issued the rule to establish security measures and create safeguards for the transport of dangerous commercial products.
- The program has been immensely successful since it began on Jan. 31, 2005; TSA has had over 190,000 applications for HMEs from new drivers, and the turnaround time on the security threat assessment has been as short as two days, and averaging about a week.

## **RAIL**

### **Rail Security**

- Local governments and various private entities own most all the track, bridges, terminals and other facilities and have their own security measures in place. The federal government is not the focal point of security.
- TSA's role is to partner with operators and law enforcement to share information, analyze vulnerabilities and develop technologies that can enhance security when the threat arises.
- Through TSA's Transportation Security Operations Center the agency is connected to all modes of transportation and has the capability to quickly share information across modes.

## **MULTI-MODAL**

### **Transportation Worker Identification Credential**

- Strengthening the security of our nation's ports is a top priority for the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies.
- TSA, Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and CIS are working together to quickly execute a program to enhance security at our nation's ports by:
  1. Requiring approved credentials and conducting name-based background checks against terrorist watch lists and immigration status checks on port workers operating at U.S. ports
  2. Accelerating the implementation of the TWIC program for merchant mariners and port workers
- The release of the proposed rulemaking on May 10<sup>th</sup> and the announcement of the open bid for the entire TWIC program on May 11<sup>th</sup> are further examples that TSA and the Coast Guard are moving expeditiously to implement this important port security measure.

### **Canines**

- Canine teams are one of the quickest, most efficient means of detecting possible explosive substances. They can be deployed anywhere in the transportation system in minutes and are extremely accurate.
- The program exemplifies the TSA's commitment to focus our resources on the greatest threat to all modes of transportation: explosives.
- The canine program is a good example of federal, state and local law enforcement cooperation to reach a common goal. TSA provides the canines, training and a yearly stipend and local law enforcement provides the officer and a commitment to use the teams at least 80 percent of the time in the transportation environment.

## **MISCELLANEOUS**

### **Unions**

- TSA has determined that mandatory collective bargaining is not compatible with the flexibility required to wage war against terrorism. This position has been repeatedly upheld by the courts.
- Every President since Jimmy Carter has, under the Federal Services Labor Management Relations Act, issued executive orders to exclude units of agencies from collective bargaining for national security reasons.
- TSA is committed to providing a voice for TSOs and other employees through its model workplace and other programs.

### **911 Families**

- We have the greatest compassion for them and their request. The legal standard is: it can't be a detriment for aviation security to release to the public.
- There are parts of it that we believe continue to pose a threat should it be publicly released. Not any independent piece, but the whole collection of this is what we use to meet the threat to aviation.
- We owe it to the families NOT to hamper aviation security.

### **TSO Theft**

- TSA holds its TSO work force to the highest professional and ethical standards and has a zero-tolerance policy for theft in the workplace.
- TSA aggressively investigates all allegations of misconduct and, when infractions are discovered, moves swiftly to end the federal careers of offenders. TSA also works with its state and federal partners to seek the highest levels of prosecution.
- The ill deeds of a few individuals should in no way reflect on the outstanding job our more than 43,000 TSO's do everyday to ensure the security of the traveling public.

## **Avian Flu – TSA's Role**

- The U.S. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza has three pillars; TSA's role in each is:
  1. Preparedness and Communication - TSA will develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats including coordinating countermeasures and issuing and revising security-related regulations and requirements.
  2. Surveillance and Detection - TSA will support the DHS CMO and other appropriate federal agencies in their efforts to identify and understand influenza pandemic threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts, and disseminate timely information to our security partners and the American public.
  3. Response and Containment - TSA will coordinate non-medical transportation security related to a national response to an influenza pandemic; coordinate transportation security related to federal, state, local and private sector recovery efforts to mitigate the effects of an influenza pandemic, and ensure that the nation's transportation system is fully functional.

## **TSA Key talking points**

**12/7/06**

### **AVIATION**

#### **Registered Traveler**

- The posting of the fee notice completes TSA's deliverables on Registered Traveler and we will be ready when the private sector is ready to implement the program.
- It is now up to the private sector to build the systems and processes for enrolling participants, validating their biometric and biographical information, maintaining privacy, and operating the program.
- Registered Traveler is a private-sector led program and the timeline for implementation will be driven by industry.
- TSA continues to encourage our private-sector partners to design programs that will enhance the customer experience through unique program benefits for participating airports and airlines.

#### **Secure Flight**

- Secure Flight is watch list matching by named-based comparison. Privacy and security are being built into the foundation of the program. TSA is in the final phase of the re-baselining review and we are getting very close to completion.
- DHS is committed to one-stop redress for screening programs. TSA is working with CBP to ensure consistency with the program used for international vetting.
- Currently, airlines check passengers against watch lists. The government can assure travelers that known terrorists are not getting on airplanes today, because every flight manifest is vetted against the watch list. Once Secure Flight is up and running, watch list matching will be done by the government, not the airlines.
- The 2007 budget allocates \$15 million for Secure Flight, and the carry-over amount from previous years is approximately \$20 million. TSA has sufficient funds to complete the rule-making process. Funding for implementation will be addressed in upcoming budget cycles.

## **Air Cargo**

- TSA employs a multi-layered, high-tech, industry-cooperative approach, including canine teams, TSA and airline inspectors, and physical screening of a sizable portion of air cargo.
- Cargo presented to consolidators or freight forwarders is not placed on passenger-carrying aircraft unless those individuals are Known Shippers and are in compliance with TSA regulations. This type of cargo must be transported via cargo only aircraft or ground.
- TSA recently significantly enhanced air cargo requirements for air carriers and Known Shippers. These enhancements directly address the most high risk cargo.
- We have greatly increased the number of cargo inspectors and enforcement actions. Since last year, well over 500 enforcement actions have taken place, including six certificate revocations.

## **No Fly List**

- Anybody who is known as a terrorist is not allowed to fly – period. If you have received a boarding pass, you are not on the No Fly List.
- The No Fly List and the watch list are important and effective tools in our layered approach to aviation security. These lists are specifically designed to counter threats by identifying persons who pose, or are suspected of posing, a threat to civil aviation or national security.
- The same standards apply to our own and airport employees: if an employee pops up on the watch list today, that person will not be allowed to enter the secure area of the airport today.

## **Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT)**

- Security officers are trained to discern “normal” airport stress from observable behaviors that may indicate that the individual may be a risk to the aircraft or airport. Officers are trained to detect involuntary physical and physiological reactions that exhibit levels of stress or fear and/or deception associated with persons that may intend to commit a terrorist or criminal act.



- TSA recognizes that an individual exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear and deception does not automatically correlate to terrorist or harmful intent. It does, however, serve to focus appropriate resources on determining if such an individual presents a higher risk or if the behavior is of a non-threatening nature.
- This program is part of a larger effort by TSA to add more layers of security that cannot be manipulated by those seeking to do us harm.
- SPOT is consistent with the agency's use of risk-based tactics to help us identify threats, augment intelligence gathering and minimize risk to the public.

### **Screening Partnership Program**

- The Screening Partnership Program allows airports to transition to private screeners while maintaining TSA oversight and the corresponding increased level of security implemented since 9/11.
- In this innovative public/private partnership, TSA continues to oversee security at partner airports. Private contractors must adhere to the same strict operational, hiring and training standards as TSA employees.
- At SPP airports, the government and private sector are working together to "anticipate the unexpected" by following a multi-layered approach to security with a continued focus on the greatest risks.
- Five original pilot airports--San Francisco, Kansas City, Tupelo, Jackson Hole, Greater Rochester—plus Sioux Falls, S.D. are currently participating in SPP. The Key West and Marathon, Fla. airports were accepted into the program in December 2006 and will be transitioning to private screeners in Spring 2007. An application from Sonoma, Calif. was received in late 2006 and is under review.

### **Federal Air Marshals Service/Office of Law Enforcement**

- Director Dana Brown is fostering communication within the organization. Brown assembled thirteen working groups comprised of Air Marshals and civilian employees to review and provide feedback on the future of the federal air marshal service.
- The dedicated men and women of the air marshals provide another critical layer of security to the flying public and we are proud to have them as part of our agency.
- TSA has an aggressive intelligence component. Administrator Hawley starts every day with Intelligence briefing. TSA is plugged into the intelligence network in an

effort to stop terrorists long before they make it onto American soil or into our airports.

### **Local Hiring Effort –Holiday Staffing**

- TSA is prepared to provide security at the nation's airports this holiday season.
- As we do every holiday season, we are working closely with airport and airline partners to anticipate passenger loads and plan and staff accordingly. We will continue to monitor and move resources into place to assist airports in managing wait times, just as we did over the Thanksgiving holiday.
- In most cases we anticipate reasonable checkpoint lines during peak travel periods -- less than 30 minutes in most cases. We achieved that over Thanksgiving, with an average peak wait time of 13 minutes on the busiest travel day of the weekend.

### **Contract Baggage Handlers**

- TSA has implemented a contract baggage handler pilot program at Orlando, LAX and Dulles. TSA is in the process of evaluating the success of this pilot.
- Contract baggage handlers have been deployed at these airports to decrease injuries and increase productivity of our security officers – allowing them to focus on screening rather than lifting and carrying luggage. It gives us greater flexibility to move TSOs between baggage and passenger screening since the heavier lifting requirement is eliminated.

## **TECHNOLOGY**

### **General**

- We are moving towards a system approach. Ideally we'd like to develop a single, multi-function device that can quickly screen passengers for all threats non-intrusively. In the future, we hope that customers will not need to break stride to undergo screening.
- There is no silver bullet technology solution to transportation security, which is why TSA applies a layered, risk-based approach including canines, FAMS, SPOT, hardened cockpit doors, FFDO, etc.
- We've improved technology by 100-200 percent since 9/11, though there is always room for improvement. 9/11 created a cottage industry for security, and we are always open to new ideas.

## **Backscatter**

- Backscatter is a detection technology that allows us to see hidden weapons including explosives without violating privacy.
- TSA has worked closely with backscatter vendors on software that addresses privacy concerns with the technology. TSA pilot starts initially at Phoenix. The technology will be an alternative to the pat down during secondary screening.

## **Baggage Screening**

- Twenty-three airports are equipped with full in-line EDS systems and 28 airports are equipped with partial in-line EDS Systems (installed or under construction), with approximately 600 machines in-line.
- In-line baggage systems allow TSA to remove minivan-sized equipment from airport terminal lobbies and install them behind-the-scenes – where conveyors move baggage through explosives screening and then automatically sort them to departing aircraft.
- A stand-alone EDS machine can process approximately 150-160 bags/hour, whereas an in-line system using the same equipment can process roughly 500 bags/ hour. In-line systems are also less labor-intensive, freeing up security officers for checkpoint duties and reducing injuries.

## **BUS/TRUCKS**

### **Bus Explosive Screening Technology**

- The Bus Explosive Screening Technology pilot program yielded information on the technical issues surrounding passenger and baggage screening in a scheduled service motor coach environment.
- Through this program, TSA learned a great deal about the feasibility of private company employees performing screening in addition to their normal duties.
- The BEST program built on earlier pilot programs, which developed the capability to screen rail and ferry passengers for explosives, by developing protocols to have a stakeholder group conduct screening.

## **RAIL/MASS TRANSIT**

### **Rail Security**

### **UPDATE NEEDED**

- The Transportation Security Administration's role is to focus efforts on greater information sharing, addressing vulnerabilities in the rail and transit sector, increasing training and public awareness and providing greater assistance and funding for rail transit activities.
- While rail security is primarily the responsibility of state and local governments and private industry, the Transportation Security Administration has conducted more than 2,600 security assessments for rail and mass transit systems– including 848 for rail and 1,778 for mass transit – and completed more than 130 buffer zone protection plans for transit systems nationwide.
- TSA is only one part of the federal government's effort to assist local operators in rail and mass transit security. Homeland Security's Science & Technology is developing technology to detect and prevent a variety of potential threats, Homeland Security grants through the Preparedness Directorate provide funding to local entities to enhance security, and information sharing across DHS, DOT and other federal government ensures actionable intelligence is shared with all appropriate local entities.
- TSA has conducted more than 20 Visible Intermodal Protection Response (VIPR) exercises at key commuter and regional rail facilities in 2006, with more scheduled for later this year. These exercises test TSA's ability to leverage a variety of resources to quickly and effectively raise the bar of security in any mode of transportation anywhere in the country. During the deployments, a variety of resources are used including Federal Air Marshals, Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI), and canine teams, as well as passenger and baggage screening.

## **MULTI-MODAL**

### **Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)**

- DHS received extensive and detailed input on the Transportation Worker Identification Credential during the initial comment period that closed July 6. DHS is reviewing and responding to each and every one of the nearly 1,800 comments submitted by stakeholders. Going forward, we will continue to work with those impacted by this rule as we address these concerns and prepare for the issuance of the first TWICs by the end of the year.
- Strengthening the security of our nation's ports is a top priority for the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies.
- TSA, Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and CIS are working together to quickly execute a program to enhance security at our nation's ports by:

1. Requiring approved credentials and conducting name-based background checks against terrorist watch lists and immigration status checks on port workers operating at U.S. ports
2. Accelerating the implementation of the TWIC program for merchant mariners and port workers

## **MULTI-MODAL**

### **Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)**

- DHS intends to meet all the TWIC issuance deadlines in the Safe Ports Act. The regulation process for a program like TWIC would normally take over a year. DHS issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making in May and will issue a final rule in the coming weeks that incorporates over 1,900 public comments.
- DHS is moving aggressively to enhance port security by ensuring threats do not gain access to secure areas of MTSA regulated facilities. Over 700,000 port workers have been screened against terrorist watch lists and immigration databases.
- The time to act is now. TWIC is needed to secure our ports and TSA has already tested the technology and business processes required to implement.

### **Canines**

- The canine program is a good example of federal, state and local law enforcement in partnership to reach a common goal. The TSA provides the canines, training and a yearly stipend and the local law enforcement agency provides the officer and a commitment to use the teams at least 80 percent of the time in the transportation environment.
- Canine teams are one of the quickest, most efficient means of detecting possible explosive substances. They can be deployed anywhere in the transportation system in minutes and are extremely accurate.
- The program exemplifies the TSA's commitment to focus our resources on the greatest threat to transportation systems, explosives.
- The program has more than 420 canine teams in over 80 airports and 12 mass transit systems.

## **MISCELLANEOUS**

### **Unions**

- TSA has determined that mandatory collective bargaining with our Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) is not compatible with the flexibility required to wage war against terrorism. The courts have upheld TSA's legal position on collective bargaining.
- Every President since Jimmy Carter has, under the Federal Services Labor Management Relations Act, issued executive orders to exclude units of agencies from collective bargaining for national security reasons.
- TSA is committed to providing a voice for TSOs and other employees through its model workplace and other programs such as the TSO Advisory Council.

### **Career Progression**

### **911 Families**

- We have the greatest compassion for them and their request. The legal standard is: it can't be a detriment for aviation security to release to the public.
- There are parts of it that we believe continue to pose a threat should it be publicly released. Not any independent piece, but the whole collection of this is what we use to meet the threat to aviation.
- We owe it to the families NOT to hamper aviation security.

### **TSO Theft**

- TSA holds its TSO work force to the highest professional and ethical standards and has a zero-tolerance policy for theft in the workplace.
- TSA aggressively investigates all allegations of misconduct and, when infractions are discovered, moves swiftly to end the federal careers of offenders. TSA also works with its state and federal partners to seek the highest levels of prosecution.

- The ill deeds of a few individuals should in no way reflect on the outstanding job our more than 43,000 TSO's do everyday to ensure the security of the traveling public.

### **Avian Flu – TSA's Role**

- At this time there is no evidence of H5N1 (Avian Flu) mutating into a strain that is communicable from human to human contact.
- Together, TSA and DHS prepared the DHS Pandemic Contingency Plan which is available at the end of CY 2006 and will include guidance on workforce preparedness, airport and field personnel public health response protocols and stakeholder engagement.
- The U.S. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza has three pillars; TSA's role in each is:
  1. Preparedness and Communication - TSA will develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats including coordinating countermeasures and issuing and revising security-related regulations and requirements.
  2. Surveillance and Detection - TSA will support the DHS CMO and other appropriate federal agencies in their efforts to identify and understand influenza pandemic threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts, and disseminate timely information to our security partners and the American public.
  3. Response and Containment - TSA will coordinate non-medical transportation security related to a national response to an influenza pandemic; coordinate transportation security related to federal, state, local and private sector recovery efforts to mitigate the effects of an influenza pandemic, and ensure that the nation's transportation system is fully functional.

### **General Aviation**

- Due to the size and diversity of the GA community, DHS utilizes a threat-based, risk management, and consequence analysis approach to mitigate risks and to develop policies and programs that are reasonable, feasible, and effective for GA.
- TSA's guidelines provide the general aviation community with a set of federally-endorsed security enhancements and a tool for determining when and where these enhancements are appropriate.
- DHS works in partnership with the GA community to promote the use of existing DHS security programs and to develop new security initiatives and policies.

- TSA conducted extensive coordination and outreach effort with general aviation and has received support from the general aviation community for the Federal recommendations.



## **Talking Points from Kip's Interview with Greg ??? 8-21-06**

The threat to aviation is real and ongoing.

IEDs are the biggest threat.

We have added elements of randomness and unpredictability to our layered screening process to make it more difficult to engineer around our defenses.

We cannot compartmentalize and focus on just one threat. Once we account for one threat the bad guys adapt and try to navigate around the security measures in place.

Intel guides our unpredictable security measures.

We reacted to the immediate threat very aggressively and these security measures will continue until we have the systems in place to address the threat.

The state and local transit police and law enforcement have very sophisticated security measures in place and TSA plays a support role in transit and rail security.

SPOT teams are deployable in over 12 airports and the program will be greatly expanded shortly.

We are very effective at discovering signs of tampering, detonator components and other threats in footwear by x-raying all shoes.

Liquids sold in the sterile area cannot be combined to create a catastrophic IED.

New technology is the most expensive and the least reliable.

### Layers Talking Points:

TSA employs many layers of security that address a multitude of threats including explosive trace detection, explosives detection canines and behavior detection.

While there is no silver bullet technology, advanced imaging technology is very effective at detecting metallic and nonmetallic threats on passengers, including explosives.

Further, this technology doesn't stand alone: it's one part of our multi-layered strategy to minimize risk, deter future attacks and protect the traveling public.

TSA's number one priority is security. TSA employs layers of security that create a formidable system to detect threats and keep passengers safe.

### **Boston Event Talking Points:**

- Good afternoon. I'm John Pistole, TSA's new Assistant Secretary.
- TSA's mission is to secure the nation's transportation systems. Today I'm here to tour Boston Logan International airport to see the cutting edge technology and meet with TSA employees, key stakeholders, and the traveling public.
- Today also marks the first stop of many upcoming visits for me. In the coming weeks and months, I plan to visit a wide-array of TSA sites from airports large and small, to mass transit systems, to air cargo facilities, to general aviation sites.
- I plan to meet with the TSA workforce, agency stakeholders, and the traveling public.
- I will be looking at three key goals for TSA:
  - Improving TSA's counterterrorism focus through intelligence and cutting-edge technologies;
  - supporting the TSA workforce;
  - and strengthening TSA's relationships with stakeholders and the traveling public.
- My goal is to ensure that the men and women of TSA and all those who deal with us understand that we are a threat-based, intelligence-driven agency with a national security focus.
- TSA will continue to use the latest intelligence, the latest training, the latest techniques and the latest technology to work as part of that layered defense.
- TSA has worked tirelessly to strengthen transportation security and we must continue to evolve.
- I am honored to lead an agency with such dedicated and experienced professionals. I plan to continue those efforts and leading the 50,000 transportation security officers who work to keep the American people safe.
- As I saw in my nearly 27-year career at the FBI, strong counterterrorism efforts include an engaged and informed public.
- So today, I'm also asking for feedback from you, the traveling public.
- In order to receive that feedback, I'm pleased to announce a new feature on TSA.gov called "TalktoTSA."
- This program will allow passengers to send feedback to TSA on their specific airport experiences. I encourage you to ask questions, send your comments, concerns and suggestions. We welcome your feedback and I look forward to hearing from you.

- On TSA's blog, we will tackle some of the tougher topics as well as address the more commonly asked questions that come to us through the "Talk to TSA" site all in an effort to engage the public in our security mission.
- This input will help me build upon TSA's important work and inform future decisions.
- In the weeks and months ahead, I look forward to visiting many more transportation sites and continuing TSA's critical efforts to keep our nation's transportation systems secure.
- Thank you, and I'm happy to take a few questions.

###

### **National Terrorism Advisory System Talking Points**

- From day-one, the Obama Administration has operated on the premise that security is a shared responsibility – that no matter who you are – from students and professors to first responders to everyday citizens – we all play a part.
- Because of the trust we have in Americans to share in our collective security, we are announcing the end of the old system of color-coded alerts.
- In its place, we will implement a new system that is built on a clear and simple premise:
- When a threat develops that could impact the public, we will tell you.
- We will provide whatever information we can so you know how to protect yourselves, your families, and your communities.
- The new system reflects the reality that we must always be on alert and be ready. When we have information about a specific, credible threat, we will issue a formal alert providing as much information as we can.
- Depending on the nature of the threat, the alert may be limited to a particular audience, like law enforcement, or a segment of the private sector, like shopping malls or hotels.
- Or, the alert may be issued more broadly to the American people, distributed – through a statement from DHS - by the news media and social media channels.
- The alerts will be specific to the threat. They may ask you to take certain actions, or to look for specific suspicious behavior. And they will have an end date.
- Today, we are beginning a 90-day implementation period in which state and local government, law enforcement, private and non-profit sector partners, airports, and transport hubs will transition to the new system.
- This means that the days are numbered for the automated recordings at airports, and announcements about a color code level that were, too often, accompanied by little practical information.
- This new system is built on the common-sense belief that we are all in this together—that we all have a role to play—and it was developed in that same collaborative spirit.
- It was largely the work of a bipartisan task force that included law enforcement, former Mayors and Governors, and members of the previous administration.

## Talking Points for 5/27/2010 Operation RAIL SAFE "Regional Alliance Including Local, State and Federal Efforts"

### What is Operation RAIL SAFE?

- Operation RAIL SAFE (Regional Alliance Including Local, State and Federal Efforts) demonstrates a collaborative approach to security enhancement, integrating State and local law enforcement as security partners with Amtrak, regional passenger rail systems, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Today, a joint, synchronized rail security operation is being conducted in the northeastern United States during the morning and evening rush periods.
- This effort covers railway stations between Richmond, Virginia, and Portland, Maine, and brings together Amtrak Police, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel, and law enforcement from commuter rail, state, and local police agencies. Similar operations have been conducted in years past and this effort is part of a continued effort to enhance coordination and collaboration throughout the northeast corridor.
- Operation RAIL SAFE is not a response to any specific or credible threat information. Enhancing readiness of Amtrak, TSA, and our law enforcement partners to act jointly and simultaneously is part of the continuous effort to advance a collaborative security strategy for the northeast corridor. Today's mobilization demonstrates the capability to implement random, unpredictable security enhancements, quickly and on short notice, throughout a passenger rail network simultaneously. The participating officers provide a highly visible and vigilant security presence during rush hour throughout the region when the greatest concentrations of people are riding railways and commuting in mass transit systems.
- Joint efforts through Operation RAIL SAFE, such as today's deployment, produce broader familiarity with local rail stations and the norm of activity in and around them, while fostering stronger working relationships among security partners. The teams deployed today consist of police officers from law enforcement forces throughout the northeast corridor; Amtrak police officers; and a range of TSA officials, including Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) not in flight duty status for the day; Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs); Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs), and explosives detection canine teams.

- The experience gained throughout the northeast region has fostered cooperation in rail and transit security with law enforcement departments and built a foundation for varied means of deterrent activity.

### Where is Operation RAIL SAFE taking place?

- Operation RAIL SAFE is taking place at rail stations along the highly traveled northeast corridor stretching from Maine to Virginia.
- Amtrak mobile security teams and police officers regularly conduct random, unpredictable security patrols, surges, inspections, and other activities aimed at deterring or detecting potential terrorist activity.
- Since 2005, TSA has been augmenting security in mass transit and passenger rail throughout the nation in random, unpredictable deployments of personnel and equipment under the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) program.
- Today marks the third time state and local law enforcement agencies, in partnership with Amtrak and TSA, have acted collectively throughout the northeast corridor in a joint, simultaneous security operation. The relationships developed and the lessons learned are fostering capabilities to implement varied means of deterrent activity on a random, unpredictable basis.
- We enhance overall system security any time we implement measures that make it difficult to predict when and where travelers and transportation employees will encounter varying security measures.

### Why mobilize along northeast corridor area?

- The northeast corridor is the region with the greatest concentration of rail transportation users with approximately 750,000 passengers riding on Amtrak and commuter rail systems each day.

### What will law enforcement be doing?

- Operation RAIL SAFE provides a visible and vigilant security presence at railway stations or platforms throughout the northeast corridor region.

Uniformed law enforcement officers personnel will broaden their familiarity with local rail stations, and the norm of activity in and around them, while fostering strong working relationships with their security partners in Amtrak, commuter rail systems in metropolitan areas in the northeastern United States, and TSA.

- The following types of activities will take place at various locations in the system:

- Visible security patrol and presence.
- Random passenger and carry on baggage screening.
- K-9 units sweeping the platforms, waiting areas, and trains.
- On-board security and identification checks.
- Behind the scenes counter surveillance activities.
- Explosive trace detection and other specialized screening procedures.

### What is the importance of law enforcement agencies working together?

- In the event of an actual threat or attack, we may receive little or no advance warning. Amtrak, TSA, and all of our local law enforcement partners must be prepared to act quickly and simultaneously. All hands on deck exercises are an effective means of enhancing readiness and building collective capabilities.
- The involvement of so many local law enforcement agencies is a critical component of this collaborative effort. These departments are demonstrating a commitment to the security of the users of rail and transit systems in their communities.
- Expanded security collaboration among Amtrak, TSA, and local law enforcement, as partners, integrates the full range of available resources and capabilities for random and unpredictable activities intended to protect the nation's railways and the traveling public.

### Will there be more unannounced exercises in the northeast corridor and elsewhere in the future?

- Rail and mass transit users can expect that similar unannounced exercises and operations like this will be conducted periodically on a random and unpredictable basis, in the future - not only along the northeast corridor, but in other parts of our nation's extensive public transportation system as well.

### What is the significance of Operation RAIL SAFE occurring so shortly after the thwarted terror attack on Times Square?



- While Operation RAIL SAFE is not a response to a specific threat to our rail systems, deployments like this only serves to enhance our communications networks with our transportation security partners and improve our ability to leverage a variety of resources quickly anywhere in the country based on intelligence and threat information.
- Today marks the third time state and local law enforcement agencies, in partnership with Amtrak and TSA, have acted collectively throughout the northeast corridor in a joint, simultaneous security operation. The relationships developed and the lessons learned are fostering capabilities to implement varied means of deterrent activity on a random, unpredictable basis.

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### Meeting with International Association of Police Chiefs (Rail Section)

#### Talking Points:

- Railroads are somewhat unique in that the larger railroads have their own sworn police officers. Historically the role of the railroad special agent (police officer) has been the protection of railroad property from theft. Now with the threat of acts of terrorism on the nation's freight railroads, railroad police departments have an extended mission.
- TSA is appreciative of the relationship that we have with the railroads. TSA and the railroads have collaborated to bring about measures that reduce the risk to and from railroads in this country.
- TSA views threats to the railroad network in three ways-
  - Threats to people (attacks on passenger rail)
  - Threats to cargo (use of rail cargo as a weapon, e.g. release of toxic gases)
  - Threats to the rail network (e.g. attacks on railroad infrastructure to cause disruption)
- TSA recognizes that the railroads and their police departments are the first line of defense. The Federal government does not have the resources to monitor or patrol the 144,000 miles of railroad in the U.S. TSA also recognizes that the railroad police departments do not have the resources to patrol every mile of their property. Therefore activity must focus on those areas of highest risk. Risk is determined by the threat, the vulnerability, and the consequence of an event or attack on an asset. TSA believes its role is to assist railroads in identifying those areas where the risk is greatest so that the appropriate mitigation measures can be put into place.
- TSA has used several key tools to assist in mitigating risk in the freight rail network.
  - **TIH Risk Reduction Program**- reducing the time TIH cars spend in urban areas and increasing the level of monitoring by railroad employees; There has been a 92% reduction in the measured risk since the inception of the program in 2006
  - **Freight Rail Security Grants**- since 2006 TSA has awarded over \$40 million to freight railroads and owners of TIH tank cars. Grants were awarded for conducting vulnerability assessments and building security plans, employee training and exercises and equipping TIH tank cars with GPS tracking devices. In 2010, grant money is also available for the protection of critical railroad bridges.
  - **Assessments**- since 2004 TSA has collaborated with freight railroads operating in high threat urban areas to assess the risks associated with the transportation of TIH materials, these "rail corridor" assessments help the railroads to identify critical points in the corridor and mitigation measures that can reduce vulnerabilities. In 2009, TSA expanded these assessments to railroad infrastructure. Bridges along major rivers were assessed to determine their criticality to the national railroad network and to identify common vulnerabilities

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that could potentially be exploited. These bridge assessments have brought about the deployment of pilot projects to install monitoring and intrusion detection systems.

- **Security Action Items-** in 2006 TSA, the Department of Transportation and the railroads agreed to a set of best practices that railroads could implement to reduce their security risk. This collaborative effort has resulted in increased employee awareness and improvements in transportation security.
- As for passenger rail, TSA has worked closely with AMTRAK and other passenger rail operators to implement measures that reduce risk to the travelling public. Whether through grant programs or operational deployments, such as the VIPR program, there has been a significant effort to increase visible deterrents and monitoring in the passenger rail mode. TSA also assists mass transit and passenger operators through the BASE assessment program. The BASE assessment provides an in-depth review of security practices and protections in place on the transportation system.
- As for what's on the horizon, TSA is in the process of developing two rulemakings mandated by Congress for surface transportation. The first rule will be a security training regulation; this regulation will require minimum security awareness training for frontline employees of all freight and the larger passenger rail operators that perform security sensitive functions. This regulation will build upon the existing training requirements for railroads that carry hazardous materials. We expect that the "training rule" will be publically published in the first quarter of 2011. The second rule will require that freight and larger passenger railroads conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments and then develop security plans based on those assessments. Here again, this regulation will build upon the existing requirements for freight railroads that carry hazardous materials. TSA is currently consulting with stakeholders to refine the provisions of the security planning rule.

### Watch Out For/If Asked:

(b)(5)

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**Background:**

- The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is holding its annual conference in Orlando, FL on October 26, 2010. Administrator Pistole has been invited to speak to the Railroad Police Section of the IACP. The point of contact for this event is Randy Lane, Deputy Police Chief of the Union Pacific Railroad.
  - No media will be in attendance at the meeting.
  - The session will be open to all conference attendees but the fact that Mr. Pistole is speaking will not be published in the conference agenda.
  - (b)(5)
- Groups anticipated to be represented at the meeting include representatives from each of the Class I railroads (BNSF, CSXT, CP, CN, KCS, NS, and UP), some smaller railroads, and Amtrak.
- The Railroad Police Section would like to learn how Mr. Pistole sees the role of TSA in securing the nation's freight and passenger railroads.

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## Talking Points for Press Availability with Gibbs and Brennan

### Thursday, January 7, 2010

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- I want to update all of you on the actions DHS took immediately following the failed Christmas Day attack and the longer term recommendations that DHS made to the President in our preliminary report.
- These recommendations lay out how we will move forward in a number of areas that are critical in our efforts to protect air travel from terrorism.
- As many have already experienced, we have strengthened screening requirements for individuals flying to the United States.
  - Every individual flying to the U.S. – from anywhere in the world – who has an itinerary or passport from nations that are State Sponsors of Terrorism or countries of interest, is required to go through enhanced screening.
  - In addition, the majority of **all** passengers on U.S-bound international flights will go through random, threat-based enhanced screening.
- At airports throughout the U.S., we deployed additional airport law enforcement officials, behavior detection officers, air marshals, and explosives detection canine teams, among other security measures—both seen and unseen.

- I want to express our thanks to the traveling public for their patience with these security measures.
- Today, I'd like to describe to you five of the recommendations that are included in the report to the President.
- First: We have to re-evaluate and modify the criteria and process used to create the terrorist watch lists. This is a community effort involving DHS and other members of the Intelligence Community.
- This includes adjusting the process by which names are put on "No-Fly" List and "Selectee" lists.
- DHS uses these lists as the cornerstone of our efforts to prevent suspected terrorists from boarding airplanes bound to the United States.
- As long as the government has actionable intelligence about the threat an individual may pose to homeland security, we have to make sure that intelligence makes it to the agents on the ground.
- Second: We will establish a partnership on aviation screening technology between DHS and the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories.
- This will allow the government to use the expertise that the National Laboratories have to develop new and more effective technologies.

- This will enable us not only to react to known threats, but also to proactively anticipate new ways by which terrorists could seek to board an aircraft.
- Third: We should accelerate deployment of advanced imaging technology so that we have greater capabilities to detect explosives like the ones used in the Christmas Day attack.
- We currently have 40 machines deployed throughout the United States. In 2010, we are already scheduled to deploy 300 more.
- But TSA does not conduct screening overseas, and the Christmas Day incident underscored that the screening procedures at foreign airports are critical to our security here in the United States.
- Therefore, we have to do all we can to encourage foreign authorities to utilize the same enhanced technologies for aviation security.
- After all, there were passengers from 17 countries aboard Flight 253. This is an international issue, not just one from the United States.
- Fourth: We have to strengthen the presence and capacity of aviation law enforcement, on top of the measures we have already taken.
- This includes increasing the number of Federal Air Marshals. We'll begin by deploying law enforcement officers from across DHS to help fulfill this important role.

- Fifth: We need to strengthen international security measures and standards for aviation security. Security measures abroad affect our security here at home.
  - The Deputy Secretary of DHS and other top officials from my Department have for the last several days been on a multi-country, multi-continent mission, meeting with top transportation and airport officials discussing ways to increase cooperation and security.
  - Later this month, I will be traveling to Spain to meet with my counterparts for what will be the first in a series of meetings with my counterparts that I believe will lead to broad consensus on new international aviation security standards and procedures.
- These five recommendations that I just described are important areas where DHS and other Federal agencies are moving quickly to address concerns revealed by the attempted attack.
- The American public can have confidence that those adjustments are being followed up by longer-term changes – changes that will get to the core of why the Christmas Day attack advanced as far as it did.



## **TALKING POINTS**

### **RE: QHSR for Association Leaders**

#### **OBJECTIVES**

- Join the conversation at [www.homelandsecuritydialogue.org](http://www.homelandsecuritydialogue.org).
- Request for continued commitment by participating in all National Dialogue sessions occurring throughout the summer.

#### **ABOUT THE QHSR**

- Now is our opportunity to help inform our nation's homeland security goals and objectives and the tools to achieve them.
- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is currently conducting the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), a top-to-bottom review of homeland security goals and objectives that will guide the Department and the nation for the next four years.
- This comprehensive examination includes recommendations regarding long-term goals and objectives for homeland security and guidance on the Department's programs, assets, capabilities, policies, and authorities.
- Everyone can engage on six study areas:
  - Mission studies are:
    - Counterterrorism and Domestic Security Management
    - Securing Our Borders
    - Smart and Tough Enforcement of Immigration Laws
    - Preparing for, Responding to, and Recovering From Disasters
  - Process studies are;
    - Homeland Security National Risk Assessment
    - Homeland Security Planning and Capabilities
- We are a part of the homeland security community and DHS wants our insights and expertise on these study areas.

#### **WHAT IS THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE?**

- DHS has partnered with the National Academy of Public Administration to host three interactive, online National Homeland Security Dialogue sessions.
  - This first session will run from August 3 until August 9.
  - The second session will be from August 31 until September 6.
  - The third session will be from September 28 until October 4.
- The National Dialogue is a conversation between you, other Homeland Security stakeholders, and DHS.

- Homeland security community includes: federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, law enforcement professionals, first responders, business community, academics, and other policy experts.
- The Dialogues are extensions of QHSR study groups.
- Join the conversation at [www.homelandsecuritydialogue.org](http://www.homelandsecuritydialogue.org)
  - You can sign up for news and announcements about the National Dialogue, and be notified when each Dialogue is live.
  - DHS has contacted over 1000 groups and 400,000 people from across the enterprise.
  - We are an important part to our nation's security.

### **DETAILS ON THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE**

- First Dialogue: August 3rd through August 9th
  - The first dialogue session will present the initial output generated by six QHSR study groups. This begins the initial phase of identifying homeland security goals, objectives, and key strategic outcomes for the national homeland security missions. You will also be able to comment on proposed enhancements to two key processes: Homeland Security National Risk Assessment and Homeland Security Planning and Capabilities. During this session, you will be able to evaluate the missions and goals proposed by DHS study groups, and rate, tag, and suggest your own alternative proposals.
- Second Dialogue: August 31st through September 6th
  - The second dialogue will present additional content from the QHSR study groups to continue the iteration of mission and process concepts. At this point, the work of the QHSR study groups will have benefited from stakeholder, interagency and state and local government input from the first dialogue. The continued iteration of content by our stakeholders is key to the QHSR process..
- Third Dialogue: September 28th through October 4th
  - The third dialogue will seek your final review of the mission goals, objectives, key strategic outcomes and final proposed enhancements to the two key processes.

## **Talking Points in Response to Newsweek; Anna Quindlen**

### **11-09-06**

- Requiring passengers to remove their shoes is a prudent security measure that enhances efficiency in the screening process and eliminates confusion for travelers.
- After the initial total ban, we know enough from the UK investigation and explosives testing to say with confidence that small travel size liquids are safe to bring through security checkpoints in limited quantities.
- The changes to the liquid policy are to support the sustainability of the security system.
- TSA is committed to creating a career track and advancement opportunities for TSO employees. This allows the agency to recognize, retain and advance our experienced and high-performing Security Officers.
- TSA employs a multi-layered approach. Thorough intelligence gathering, background screening and name checks against Terrorist Screening Data Base watch lists, including perpetual vetting, are conducted on all badged employees. There is increased random screening of employees and their property at the airport. Cameras, law enforcement, a vigilant airport community and behavior observation teams provide additional layers of security.
- Behavior Detection Officers (BDO's) are screening travelers for observable behaviors that may indicate that the individual or individuals may be a risk to the aircraft or airport. They are trained to detect involuntary physical and psychological reactions that exhibit levels of stress or fear and/or deception associated with persons that may intend to commit a terrorist or criminal act.
- In 2006, TSA has begun or implemented multiple initiatives to increase the amount of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) training received by all Transportation Security Officers.
- All cargo carried on a passenger plane is consolidated and handled only by companies that have security programs meeting TSA requirements and that are subject to TSA inspections to ensure compliance.

- All cargo transported on passenger aircraft is subject to TSA-approved screening. Furthermore, packages that are hand-delivered to airline ticket counters for shipment are screened by TSA personnel at hundreds of airports.
- In addition, approximately 420 canine explosive detection teams (70 percent increases since 2003) work at airports nationwide; their responsibilities include random screening of cargo and surveillance of cargo facilities. The TSA has recently expanded the requirement of the canine teams to operate in the cargo environment. TSA now requires canine teams to spend at least 25 percent of their day in cargo



**Transportation  
Security  
Administration**

**Robert Jamison's Key Messages to NPR on Transit**  
**June 30, 2006**

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- TSA's focus for transit security is in three key areas: operational capability, rail inspectors and criticality assessments.
- TSA has and will continue to work closely with our UK counterparts on lessons learned from the London rail bombing. We must enlist the public's vigilance, apply intelligence, share information, and employ robust emergency response protocols. The most important factor is open communication to share relevant intelligence and information.
- A funding comparison isn't appropriate between aviation and transit, as the primary responsibility for transit security lies with state and local government. We cannot overstate the importance of fighting terror overseas and at our borders, to stop terrorists before they have the opportunity to enter open transit systems.
- Transit systems are designed to be open and accessible, and so we have to balance security and passenger flow. Some systems process up to 1,500 passengers a minute in big markets like New York, and people simply are not going to wait for airport-style screening to catch a cross-town train.
- Technology: Explosives detection is a key focus, across many modes of transport. We have a number of pilot technologies under review, from millimeter wave to infrared, for stand-off explosives detection. Technology is part of our layered security approach.
- In addition to funding and grants, TSA is supporting transit security with canine teams in 11 transit systems, which is a program that continues to expand. We also have deployed up to 100 rail inspectors, have held tabletop emergency drills with the industry, and conducted nearly 20 (including July 4 ops) MMSET exercises in 2006 alone, working at the direction of a local agency to supplement their security posture.
- Our goal is to continually raise the baseline of transit security through unpredictable, visible deterrents, expanding our research and development, and expanding our connectivity with state and local entities.
- We are looking to apply lessons learned in aviation to other modes of transportation. The most important being information sharing, unpredictability and passenger vigilance.

- In response to key events/dates, such as the anniversaries of the London and Madrid bombings, we have deployed MMSET teams at the request of transit agencies. Not only do these exercises test TSA's ability to quickly deploy assets to raise the baseline of security in any mode of transportation, but they also familiarize the transit agencies with our processes and vice versa, should an immediate need arise.
- Regarding funding concerns cited by politicians: money isn't the issue. We need to increase information sharing to raise the baseline of transit security, which is an ongoing process. Grants and FTA funding are consistently available based on risk.

## Talking Points for Meet & Greet

### Advanced Imaging Technology

- As part of the \$1 billion allocated to TSA for aviation security projects through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), TSA purchased 450 advanced imaging technology units and, thanks to your hard work, is on track to deploying all 450 by the end of this year.
- We recently announced the deployment of the 300<sup>th</sup> imaging technology unit—a significant milestone in the deployment of this critical technology—and currently have over 340 units at 67 U.S. airports.
- The deployment and installation of advanced imaging technology is a complex endeavor that often involves checkpoint reconfiguration and coordination among numerous stakeholders. It's through your close coordination with airport and other partners that we've been able to get this state-of-the-art technology out to airports as quickly as we have.

### ICAO Efforts

- Following the December 25th attack, you have engaged in unprecedented collaboration with our international partners to strengthen aviation security.
- Thanks to your hard work, ICAO recently adopted the Declaration on Aviation Security, which reflects a strong consensus and a clear understanding that the threat to aviation security is international, and we must address it as such.
- This means joining our fellow ICAO member states to focus our international efforts on identifying new and emerging threats, enhancing ICAO standards and recommended practices, and developing strategic goals for the way forward in aviation security for the international community.
- We saw just this week how important international coordination on security measures is, and your continued efforts are an integral part of ensuring we stay ahead of global terrorist threats.

## Talking Points for Meet & Greet

- Art Macias will make introductions to the group
- **You** make brief remarks thanking each team for their work
- **You** take questions or ask questions of the team
- **You** will pose for group photos

## Advanced Imaging Technology

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- The deployment and installation of advanced imaging technology is a complex endeavor that often involves checkpoint reconfiguration and coordination among numerous stakeholders. It's through your close coordination with airports and other partners and TSO training that we've been able to get this state-of-the-art technology out to airports as quickly as we have.

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## **Talking Points for Meet & Greet**

### Advanced Imaging Technology

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*Transportation  
Security  
Administration*

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**SPP Transition Talking Points**

- ATSA authorized a Screening Partnership Program (SPP) pilot for 2 years until November 2004. Five airports, one in each risk category, volunteered to participate in the pilot. TSA continued the program after the completion of the pilot.
- Since the initial five airport pilot began, only 11 additional airports have joined SPP covering 132 full-time screener permanent positions. By comparison, TSA has over 43,000 full-time permanent federal Transportation Security Officers screening passengers at approximately 450 airports.
- Due to the changing nature of the security mission, budget considerations, and the additional administrative burden of a disproportionately small number of airports, TSA will no longer retain the SPP program.
- This decision impacts approximately 2,048 full-time and part-time contract employees who will have the opportunity to convert to Federal Transportation Security Officers. They will become eligible for the benefits and premium pay that all federal employees receive.
- This transition will not impact TSA's security mission. TSA will continue to roll out new technology during the transition.
- The transition to Federal service will take approximately 6-12 months and will have no impact on the traveling public.

**Current SPP Airports**

1. San Francisco International Airport, CA (SFO) - CAT X - 937 FTE
2. Kansas City International Airport, MO (MCI) - CAT I - 479 FTE
3. Greater Rochester International Airport, NY (ROC) - CAT II - 130 FTE
4. Jackson Hole Airport, WY (JAC) - CAT II - 60 FTE
5. Sioux Falls Regional Airport, SD (FSD) - CAT II - 49 FTE
6. Key West International Airport, FL (EYW) - CAT II - 43 FTE
7. Sonoma County Airport, CA (STS) - CAT III - 15 FTE
8. "Montana 7", MT (GDV,GGW,HVR,LWT,MLS,OLF,SDY) - CAT IV - 19 FTE
9. Roswell Industrial Air Center, NM (ROW) - CAT IV - 6 FTE
10. Tupelo Regional Airport, MS (TUP) - CAT IV - FTE 7



## *Transportation Security Administration*

### **SPP Talking Points – Transition Process and Approval**

- TSA is requesting approval to transition airports currently participating in the SPP program to operations performed by TSA employees.
- General Provision (Section 503) of the annual Appropriations act requires TSA to submit a re-programming request to transition the SPP program. TSA desires to submit the re-programming on Oct. 1<sup>st</sup>.
- Due to the availability of Congressional stakeholders, affected by the pending Continuing Resolution and the upcoming election, it is imperative that the request is discussed with Congress as soon as possible.
- If this process is delayed, election results may make it very difficult for TSA to transition SPP.
- Since the initial five airport pilot began, only 11 additional airports have joined SPP covering 132 full-time screener permanent positions. By comparison, TSA has over 43,000 full-time permanent federal Transportation Security Officers screening passengers at approximately 450 airports.
- TSA will no longer retain the SPP program due to several compounding factors:
  - **The changing nature of the security mission** – TSA has implemented new technology and programs that significantly differ from pre-9/11 methods
  - **Operations** – TSA routinely uses resources from various airports for special missions and emergency events. Employees at SPP airports cannot be used in a contingency
  - **Administrative burden** – A disproportionate amount of effort is spent on SPP airports. The removal of SPP will serve as a more efficient use of resources
- This decision impacts approximately 2,048 full-time and part-time contract employees who will have the opportunity to convert to Federal Transportation Security Officers. They will become eligible for the benefits and premium pay that all federal employees receive.
- This transition will not impact TSA's security mission. TSA will continue to roll out new technology during the transition.
- The transition to Federal service will take approximately 6-12 months and will have no impact on the traveling public.
- TSA expects that in FY11, the SPP airports will cost approximately 6%-9% more than federal operations, representing a difference of \$8 to \$11 million before transition costs.

### Summer 2006 Key Talkers

- TSA security officers are prepared for the summer travel season and are working with our industry partners to ensure people have a positive travel experience.
- Summer travel is a team sport, involving TSA, airlines, airports and passengers. Working together we will anticipate peak traffic and be ready for the traveling public. Travelers can save time by leaving prohibited items such as lighters and weapons at home.
- Despite increased summer air travel, peak wait times at the busiest airports in the country remain consistent during summer months. TSA mission is security and we intend to maintain reasonable wait times without compromising security.
- We are aware of the airports that face staffing challenges and we are focused on addressing their needs. We will continue to monitor and move resources into place to ensure reasonable wait-times for the public.
- TSA is aggressively staffing for the summer travel season and transitioning from centralized to local hiring to give airports more flexibility in reaching their individual needs.
- Since local hiring began in March, we've hired 1525 new security officers. Approximately 155 airports have conducted local hiring activities nearly 400 new employees are coming on board each pay period. This represents a 100 percent average increase over pre-local hiring numbers. (Our Congressionally mandated cap is 43,000 -- we are close but we do not get into specific numbers because they change daily.)
- TSA is working to reward and optimize the skills of our existing workforce and attract new employees. We want our people to stay with the agency. With time and experience our people continue to improve and become more proficient at x-ray and explosive detection.
- TSA is committed to keeping our talented employees. The majority of turnover occurs before people reach the one-year mark. Local hiring and new retention initiatives including enhanced training (BOA, SPOT), cash bonuses and career advancement opportunities within TSA and DHS will help us do that.
- TSA is a nimble, flexible agency aimed at keeping terrorists off guard. Our layered screening approach includes an element of unpredictability. TSA will introduce a 1 ½ minute secondary screening procedure that is shorter than the usual four minute secondary.

## TALKING POINTS

- Today TSA is announcing new alternate security screening for uniformed pilots.
- Shortly after I was appointed to lead TSA after serving 26 years at the FBI, I directed the agency to review existing protocols for pilots.
- My goals for TSA include helping the agency continue to mature into a truly risk-based, intelligence-driven counterterrorism agency.
- As such, commercial flight deck crewmembers are trusted partners who ensure the safety of millions of passengers every day.
- In fact, pilots are one of the most vetted groups of professionals in America.
- Allowing uniformed pilots, whose identity and flight status have been verified, to expedite through the checkpoint just makes for smart security. It's also a more efficient use of TSA's resources.
- This system will allow pilots to be positively identified before they board their aircraft and allow TSA to focus its efforts on screening the nearly 2 million travelers who come to the nation's security checkpoints each day.
- TSA is actively partnering with pilots to implement a consistent process to verify their identity and employment which will expedite their screening.

- While an updated sterile area access system is being implemented, pilots traveling in uniform on airlines business will see immediate modifications to their checkpoint screening process due to their trusted status.
- Building off of a successful pilot program at three airports over the past few years, TSA will work with airlines and pilot organizations to accelerate the deployment of a nationwide airport secure area access system for pilots.
- Eligible pilots will enter the secure area after presenting their airline-issued identification and another form of identification to a Transportation Security Officer (TSO).
- TSOs will check these credentials against the Cockpit Access Security System (CASS) database, which includes a picture and other information to verify the individuals employment status.
- Eligible pilots must work for a US air carrier, be traveling in uniform, and on airline business.
- Flight deck crewmembers who utilize this program will also be subject to random screening, observation by behavior detection officers and other layers of security.
- In conjunction with the Airline Pilots Association, TSA tested a sterile area access system called CrewPASS in 2008 and 2009.
- In June 2009, TSA defined the standards for an airport sterile area access system and announced that CrewPASS could continue to operate at the test sites: Baltimore Washington International, Pittsburgh International and Columbia Metropolitan airports.

- TSA strives to implement common sense security procedures that ensure the safety of travelers while facilitating the flow of commerce.
- We look forward to continued partnership with pilots and those who represent them to help keep the flying public safe.
- With that, I'm happy to take your questions.

### **Talking Points (TSOC):**

- TSA and our partners connect the dots 24/7 in this room. All the information sharing and joint decision making the American public expects happens real-time right here.
- This is the building where we worry about terrorism 24/7 so that the American public doesn't have to.
- Here, we can track individual aircraft, all the flights FAMs are on or any other information we need to respond to a critical incident.
- By having the DOD, FBI, Capitol Police, FAA, TSA and others sit side by side, we can make split second decisions that can minimize the magnitude of events.
- In addition to working with other federal agencies, each and every airport is connected through the Freedom Center. If an incident happens at LAX and JFK simultaneously, all airports in the nation know and can take action in a coordinated manner.

### **Talking Points (BWI):**

- TSA is in the process of a fundamental shift in strategy for the security checkpoint that will encompass people, process and technology. This is the most significant change that has occurred in passenger screening since 9/11 and even since the checkpoint was first established in the 1970s.
- Calming the checkpoint environment enables security officers to increase passenger interaction and will result in heightened security and a better experience for travelers. A chaotic, noisy, congested checkpoint is a security nightmare because it makes it easier for the person intending to do harm to hide.
- TSA has incorporated feedback from travelers and security officers. Checkpoint evolution is based on layering security elements that are both modular and flexible given space considerations, size of airport etc. All elements are designed to work individually as well as part of an integrated package.
- TSA is capitalizing on the fact that our officers have seen over one billion passengers and developed priceless learning. If we add the latest intelligence, more improvised explosive device skills, and passenger interaction techniques to that experience, we can measurably increase security.
-



### **AT Talking Points**

- Scientists at our National Labs are working diligently on an algorithm for the AT X-ray machine to differentiate between normal liquids and explosives. When developed, this technology will significantly enhance our liquid explosives detection capability.
- Intelligence shows that terrorists innovate in explosives formulas as well as the way they would bring them onboard an aircraft. If liquid restrictions are eased eventually it will be because of improved process and technology, not diminished threat.
- We are deploying the best technology and training as fast as we can. The goal is to remove all the restrictions on liquids when we have automated systems that can accurately separate threat from non-threat liquids.

### **WBI Talking Points**

- Passenger imaging technologies enable TSA to detect prohibited items including weapons, explosives and other metallic and non-metallic objects concealed under layers of clothing without physical contact.
- Passenger privacy is ensured through the anonymity of the image: the officer attending the passenger will not view the image, and as an additional precaution, the officer viewing the image will be remotely located and the image won't be stored, transmitted or printed, and deleted immediately once viewed. In fact, the machines have zero storage capability. Facial images will be blurred.
- More than 90 percent of passengers in Phoenix opted for millimeter wave over the traditional pat-down procedure.

### **Talking Points (Training):**

(b) (5)

## Talking Points:

You belong to a very unique transportation police community:

The Metro Transit Police Department is the only tri-state jurisdictional Police Department in the Country. This in turn led you to attending the longest Police Academy in the country. When you saw your counterparts from the Northern Virginia Police Academy, where you spent 20 weeks, already hit the street, you had to continue on with your studies and training in the Maryland portion of your training where you spent 11 weeks, and finally meet the District of Columbia requirement which took another 4 weeks. You're not quite finished as you have another 10 weeks in the Field Training Program to complete.

Once finished, you will join the ranks in becoming one of the most trained, equipped, hard working and dedicated police officers in your profession.

Make no mistake Transit Policing is at the forefront of Land Transportation Security in this country. There is an absolute link between what you will do day in and day out that will relate to a sound security posture in keeping our Nation's Capital transportation system safe.

Also make no mistake, your success being celebrated today can only have been achieved with the love, support and commitment you received from your families, friends and loved ones. It is with their enduring patience for your long hours, and missed special occasions, the respect for your dedication to public services and their understanding of your important role in public service that will keep you safe and successful in the years to come.

Never forget what you've learned in the academy and from those who will teach you in the future:

Never forget where you came from

Never forget who you serve

Always remember to "Do The Right Things For the Right Reason".

(b)(5)

## DISCUSSIONS WITH DUTCH COUNTERPARTS (GENERAL)

### **BACKGROUND:**

- The Dutch are some of TSA's strongest partners in the European Commission (EC). TSA works closely with the National Counter-Terrorism Branch (NCTb) of the Dutch Ministry of Justice, the entity responsible for aviation security policy. TSA also coordinates regularly with the Dutch Royal Marechaussee (KMAR), responsible for law enforcement and auditing the implementation of aviation security regulation in Dutch airports. (b)(3);49 U.S.C.

(b)(3);49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

- TSA has worked very closely with the Dutch Civil Aviation Authority in testing Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT). In 2008, the Dutch Government received the European Commission's permission to trial AIT at Amsterdam-Airport Schiphol (AMS) (given AIT has not yet been listed by the EC in European regulations as an accepted passenger screening technology). In 2009, AMS refined its AIT pilot to include the use of automated detection, thereby easing privacy concerns.

(b)(3);49 U.S.C. § 114(r), (b)(5)

(b)(5)

### **ANTICIPATED QUESTIONS:** *(Watch-out for/If asked...)*

- (b)(5)

### *Recommended Response:*

- (b)(5)

**Administrator John S. Pistole Talking Points for the FSD Academy**

Monday, October 25, 2010 (8:00 a.m. – 8:30 a.m.)

- TSA is part of a larger counterterrorism effort that includes intelligence and law enforcement.
- That's why my three goals for the agency are:
  - focusing TSA's counterterrorism mission on accurate intelligence and cutting-edge technologies;
  - supporting the TSA workforce; and
  - strengthening TSA's relationships with stakeholders and the traveling public.
- Hard work, professionalism and integrity are necessary to our success.
  - I see these qualities as I meet TSA employees.
  - My expectation – for me and for everyone in TSA – is to continue to demonstrate these qualities.
- For me, I am not only your Administrator but your advocate – for the agency when I interact with OMB, Congress and the traveling public.
- And I look to you as leaders.
  - As I meet people in the agency, I ask two questions: what are the perceived areas where you think we excel; and the barriers we need to overcome.
  - You may have already heard this number: 220. That's a recent ranking in which TSA was ranked 220 out of 224 – for best places to work in the federal government.
    - At the macro level I'm committed to providing the leadership to finding out the systemic issues that might cause employees to say TSA is not a good place to work, and working to change them.
    - At the micro level, I ask you to look at your respective areas of responsibility, and your own leadership.
  - What would your employees say about your leadership?

## **Background Overview:**

Under the legislation that created TSA, the TSA Administrator is responsible for establishing the terms and conditions of employment for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) working at security checkpoints nationwide. Following his nearly 27 year counterterrorism career at the FBI most recently as Deputy Director, TSA Administrator John Pistole's top priority is security and he strongly believes that TSA must continue to evolve to stay ahead of terrorists dedicated to attacking our transportation systems in an effort to kill innocent men, women, and children.

Administrator Pistole pledged during his confirmation hearings that he would complete a thorough assessment of the impact union representation would have on the agency's counterterrorism mission. During this assessment, Administrator Pistole examined workforce data, sought out the experience of others in the security and law enforcement fields, and listened to diverse views on all sides of the issue.

While Administrator Pistole's assessment was ongoing, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) ruled in November 2010 that TSA must hold an election for union representation. Administrator Pistole has determined that the FLRA's ruling is not consistent with TSA's security mission. TSA cannot risk extended deliberations or litigation that can accompany traditional collective bargaining which would divert attention and resources from our critical security mandate.

The original union petition to represent TSOs was filed with the FLRA in 2002, shortly after TSA was created by Congress following the 9/11 attacks. Although the union petition was followed by then TSA Administrator Loy's memorandum in 2003 which precluded union representation for collective bargaining, two unions actively recruited TSOs. Nearly a third of TSOs are currently dues paying members even though they don't currently have collective bargaining powers. An election would give all TSOs a fair and transparent process in which to have a genuine choice on the matter and resolve the question of union representation once and for all.

Rather than proceeding with the FLRA's ruling, Administrator Pistole is establishing a limited framework for binding collective bargaining on specific employment issues but not security policies and procedures. This framework protects security and furthers TSA's efforts to support the TSA workforce while increasing professionalism and consistency at airports nationwide. This decision grants TSOs the right to vote on whether or not they want collective bargaining under specific conditions that protect security.

### Core Talking Points:

- **TSA Administrator John Pistole has been clear that TSA's mission to protect the traveling public is the priority in any discussion or decision regarding union representation. TSA Administrator Pistole has determined that an election enable Transportation Security Officers to choose whether they want collective bargaining can be conducted consistent with security requirements.**
- **Collective Bargaining would cover specific employment issues but not security policies and procedures.** TSOs will have no right to strike or slow down work under any circumstances. All security policies and procedures, including any actions deemed necessary to carry out TSA's security mission during emergencies, would be off the table. Additionally, other items excluded from bargaining include pay, pensions or any form of compensation, testing, deployment of security personnel, fitness for duty standards, and deployment of equipment.
- **The scope of collective bargaining would include specific issues relating to employment such as seniority, bids, transfers and awards.**
- **Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) who perform screening would be eligible to vote on whether they wish to be represented by a union and would be part of the bargaining unit.** The unit will not include other TSA personnel such as supervisors, managers, Federal Air Marshal personnel, or employees doing personnel or intelligence work.
- **Unlike private sector unionized workforces, Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) will have the right to choose whether or not they want to be represented by a union.** No one will have to join a union or pay union dues or fees. In dealings with management, employees would be able to choose to be represented by the elected union, by another person (though not another union) or may represent themselves.
- **Also unlike private sector unionized workforces, if TSOs voted to be represented by a union, strikes, sick-outs, slow-downs or other job-related actions would continue to be banned.** TSA will continue to deal directly with its employees on terms and conditions of employment and to maintain and improve all kinds of employee engagement including, if a union is elected, those involving unions and union representatives; sensitive security information will be protected; and lengthy, acrimonious litigation over labor management issues is avoided.
- **Collective Bargaining would occur only at the national level.** Local level bargaining and local level agreements are prohibited. TSA would remain neutral during the election process.

- **If a union were elected by the TSOs, TSA could benefit from limited collective bargaining that is consistent with TSA's security mission.** It is critical that every employee feels that he or she has a voice and feels safe raising issues and concerns. This is important not just for morale and engagement; it is critically important for security as these frontline employees provide valuable input to TSA on security procedures. Unions can play a constructive role in helping to develop solutions for some systemic issues and employee suggestions, and can help support our workforce and ensure consistency and accountability across TSA operations at nearly 450 airports.
- **In order to support TSA's security mission, the relationship between TSA and a union, if elected, will be constructive and results-oriented for both parties.** The representational framework will be an arrangement unique to the TSA. TSA will use interest-based processes to bargain, we will address workplace issues by involving those close to the concern, and we will resolve any disputes through an expedited process that brings closure. The goal is a relationship that is fair, transparent and includes checks and balances.
- It is important to read the full text of Administrator Pistole's determination, which explains the details of the unique framework that will apply to the TSA.

## **Talking Points**

- TSA makes several efforts to reunite passengers with property left at the checkpoint. These efforts range from airport terminal announcements to contacting passengers to inform them we have their items. We strongly encourage passengers to affix business cards to laptops and other expensive items so we may contact them.
- We have a complete list of airport lost and found numbers as well as our claims process posted to our Web site at [www.tsa.gov](http://www.tsa.gov)
- Of the roughly 2 billion passengers who have traveled since TSA assumed responsibility for security checkpoints in 2002, approximately 129,625 have filed claims to date. That is well under one hundredth of one percent, or a claim rate of 5 per 100,000 passengers.

## **Questions and Answers**

### **Q. How many claims for lost laptops do you receive?**

On average, TSA receives approximately 78 lost or missing laptop claims each month.

### **Q. How long does TSA hold a lost item?**

TSA holds lost items for a minimum of 30 days at airports where TSA is responsible for lost and found and makes several efforts to reunite passengers with their items. This varies from airport to airport depending on any memorandum of agreement or understanding between TSA and the Local Airport Authority.

### **Q. What happens to an item if it is not claimed after 30 days?**

After 30 days airports send to Nav Air (MOU with them) and they continue to take action to try and reunite property with owner. If unsuccessful, they clean the hard drive and ship to GSA for public auction. This is true for high ticket items, to include laptops.

### **Q. Does TSA have lost and found at every airport?**

Most of the 450 airports nationwide have TSA lost and found systems. In all cases, TSA should maintain a chain of custody reflecting any item recovered in or around TSA controlled space.

There are some (14) airports that have contracts for TSA to handover lost property to the airport lost and found immediately. At which points, it becomes their responsibility at that time.

### **Q. How many laptops have you paid for?**

We pay partially or in full for approximately six laptops per month. Over the last 2 fiscal years, TSA has approved or settled on average approximately 9 claims per month.



**Laptop Claims Data (PAX LOSS- Checkpoint)**

<b>Claim Date Range</b>	<b>10/1/06 to 9/30/07</b>	<b>10/1/07 to 9/30/08</b>
Laptop Passenger Loss Claims	80	100
Number of Claims Paid/Settled	15	9
Number of Claims Denied/Withdrawn	61	77
Number of Claims Open/Pending	1	2
Dollar Amount Claimed	\$112,966.72	\$159,491.41
Dollar Amount Paid	\$13,812.33	\$5,491.68
<b>Monthly Average Claims Received</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>8.3</b>
Monthly Average Paid	1.25	0.75
Pending Sufficiency	3	12

**Laptop Claims Data (PAX LOSS- Checked Baggage)**

<b>Claim Date Range</b>	<b>10/1/06 to 9/30/07</b>	<b>10/1/07 to 9/30/08</b>
Laptop Passenger Loss Claims	851	842
Number of Claims Paid/Settled	129	64
Number of Claims Denied/Withdrawn	689	711
Number of Claims Open/Pending	5	16
Dollar Amount Claimed	\$4,227,254.78	\$1,512,605.85
Dollar Amount Paid	\$49,366.92	\$33,155.29
<b>Monthly Average Claims Received</b>	<b>70.9</b>	<b>70.2</b>
Monthly Average Paid	10.75	5.33
Pending Sufficiency	28	51

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### TALKING POINTS/Qs and As

**TALKING POINTS:** In addition to any general comments Mr. Pistole would like to make, a few suggested talking points worth emphasizing are:

- Express appreciation to COTRs for doing a very important job to support the TSA mission.
- Highlight how this group aligns with your goals for TSA and your focus on hardwork, professionalism and integrity.
- We rely on contractors to perform some very important functions, in part, because of the speed at which TSA was stood up. This includes contractors: keeping the TSA IT infrastructure operating; providing the majority of human capital services; and the screening of passengers at 16 airports under the Screening Partnership Program.
- COTRs perform a vital function of ensuring that TSA “gets what we contracted for.” The job of the COTR is critical in ensuring that this occurs by planning and executing contracts properly in the pre and post award period of the life of each contract.
- The COTR has a critical role to communicate contractor performance to both his or her leadership, as well as to the contracting officer. Failing to do so, may result in TSA not being able to rectify a problem during contract performance.
- [Based on last year’s survey] Both Domenic Cipicchio and I will emphasize the importance of the COTR role with the TSA Senior Leadership Team. We, as managers, need to work together to strengthen the role of COTRs.
  - When a COTR assignment is a collateral duty, as often is the case, we have to ensure to provide you with the training you need, and support to do your COTR function correctly.
  - We need to ensure that we start including COTR duties in your performance plans, so that you are recognized for your COTR contributions.
  - There is a limit to number of contracts that one COTR can monitor and we need to ensure that we are not overburdening COTRs.
  - Domenic Cipicchio will be taking this message to each of your AAs.
- The Office of Acquisition is working on initiatives that should help you do your COTR jobs better. This includes providing more enhanced training, involving COTRs earlier in the acquisition process, and providing more support during the post award contract management phase.
- I’ll close by saying that I’d like to hear from you and ask that you present your suggestions to the Office of Acquisition [Contract Performance & Monitoring Division – we’ll provide details but it’s pretty simple, they just need to e-mail to: [COTR@tsa.dhs.gov](mailto:COTR@tsa.dhs.gov) ]. We’ll review your submissions and implement those that will assist us in accomplishing our common mission.

### **Qs AND As (3 & 4 received from COTRs in advance):**

- 1) How can you help encourage senior management to embrace the importance of the COTR function?  
**ANSWER:** Include COTR duties in performance standards, and ensure that sufficient COTRs are available and assigned to monitor all contracts.

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- 2) At current staffing levels, there are not enough human resources to support the COTR demand, how can management resource additional personnel to support the COTR duties?

**ANSWER:** We will be operating in a constrained budget environment for the foreseeable future so adding personnel will be difficult. So, we will have to look to address this internally with limited resources. Training additional COTRs in program offices is one possibility.

- 3) What is the Administrator's position on The White House "Balanced Workforce Strategy"? TSA has no space to house contractors let alone government FTE's if the conversion takes place. Space is huge issue for TSA. What are his plans to address space - enough for contractors and government personnel to work side-by-side?

**ANSWER:** I support the Balanced Workforce Strategy and the Office of Acquisition has been leading TSA's implementation. To date, we've converted almost 300 contractor positions and are undertaking a contract by contract review of all service contracts this fiscal year. The objective is to convert when it makes sense. (e.g., closely related to inherently governmental functions, or we don't have sufficient core capability in house for a particular function). As far as space goes, our Chief Administrative Officer, Karen Shelton Waters, is exploring options, which include alternative locations in the DC Metro area, more teleworking, and more office space close to headquarters.

- 4) We received a number of questions related to the on-boarding process for contractors (takes too long, badging requirements redundant with requirements for suitability vetting).

**ANSWER:** With the Office of Personnel Security, we are looking at improving the on-boarding process for both employees and contractors. Some improvements have already been made, but I welcome any specific recommendations that you may have.

## **TSIF Visit One-Pager With Technology Statement and Talking Points**

### **Statement:**

Since 9/11, DHS and TSA have made significant improvements to aviation security technology to combat evolving threats to the nation's transportation systems. As part of a layered system of security, TSA began testing and deploying advanced imaging technology in 2007.

Deployed as backscatter and millimeter wave, advanced imaging technology safely screens passengers for weapons, explosives and other objects concealed under clothing to help TSA keep the traveling public safe.

We are committed to working through the inherent challenges we face in deploying new technology including privacy considerations, physical limitations of our nation's airports, and the needs of the aviation system itself.

TSA tests technology solutions to those challenges in the Transportation Security Integrated Facility (TSIF). Onsite pilot programs have a number of logistical and budgetary limitations. The TSIF promises to virtually eliminate these limitations and inefficiencies by allowing TSA to examine technologies and screening procedures in a realistic airport environment.

By discovering and eliminating inefficiencies from technology before they are implemented at airports around the country, TSA will save time and money, and cut down on passenger inconvenience.

### **General Talking points:**

In addition to airport checkpoints and their advanced imaging technology, multiple layers of security include intelligence gathering and analysis, random canine team searches, federal air marshals, federal flight deck officers, and other security measures both visible and invisible to the public.

These measures are designed to be unpredictable, so passengers should not expect to see the same thing everywhere.

TSA currently has 40 imaging technology units at 19 airports around the country. TSA has purchased an additional 150 units with American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding and has allocated funding to purchase an additional 300 units in 2010. Imaging technologies allow TSA to detect metallic and nonmetallic threats concealed under layers of clothing without physical contact.

### **TSIF Talking Points:**

The TSIF is a 128,000-square-foot, two-story test facility that can accommodate nearly 140 TSA employees and contractors.

It was acquired from the United States Post Office under a 10-year lease.

It has fully operational in-line baggage screening system, several different types of explosives detection systems, a cargo-testing room, AT X-ray, and advanced imaging technology.

### TSA Talking Points

- There have been maintenance issues with the explosive trace portals initially purchased. We have deployed a significant number of portals and have gathered information highlighting the areas for improvement in the technology, and we are working with the manufacturer on these improvements before deploying any further units.
- Technology companies have a gold rush mentality, particularly after 9/11, and on a smaller scale, in the past month. Our approach is based on layers of security, and not the sales brochure for the latest technology. There is no silver bullet solution.
- When evaluating a technology, we consider more than its capability in a lab setting. We have to consider throughput, ease of use, false alarm rates, and space at the checkpoint; there are a number of potential technologies that need further work before being operationally feasible.
- We have a life cycle approach to technology, moving from idea, to development, to testing, to deployment, to maintenance and circling back with ideas for improvement and new applications. The TSL is a key element of the cycle, with their laboratory testing to ensure a disciplined approach to all technology rollouts.

**Trace Portals:** TSA encountered maintenance issues with the initial rollout of trace portals. TSA is working specifically with GE to make improvements to these first-generation units. The information gathered through the current deployment of more than 90 portals highlights the opportunity for operational integration enhancements in the next generation of the technology.

We currently have portals that can be installed at several airports nationwide once the vendor (GE) has made some modifications that would eliminate concerns the TSA has had regarding reliability. GE has submitted a plan to do so and once these improvements are made by GE, the S&T Laboratory in Atlantic City will evaluate and provide TSA the results of these efforts.

Because we are confident that the vendor can make the necessary modifications to the currently deployed inventory and these modifications will enhance the performance achieved to date, we have determined that the prudent approach would be to leave them at the airports where they have been deployed so that the upgrades can be made within the shortest time frame after the TSL has evaluated the modification.

**Reveal pilot:** Randy Null testified before the House Aviation Subcommittee in June 2006 that TSA did not test five Reveal machines at EWR because they would have been only 40 percent utilized. Raytheon (responsible for installation) further explained that the Reveal design for five machines was limited by the available space. TSA continues to work with Reveal and has seen some important upgrades, such as multiplexing and networking upgrades, which were not available when the pilot at EWR was initiated but have since the pilot was completed. TSA foresees Reveal as an ideal solution for many small and medium sized airports and may have applications at some larger airports.

**EDS Upgrade:** The 6400 kit upgrade for the L-3 6000 EDS is more than just a software upgrade. The first units will begin to be installed at Orange County (SNA) the week of 9/11. There is significant image improvement as well as speed enhancement with this kit, which was funded as a part of the Phoenix program.



**Transportation  
Security  
Administration**

**Transportation Security Administration Accomplishments**

**August 4, 2006**

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**GENERAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

- TSA is proud to have put a new face on aviation security, making air travel safer than it has ever been and restoring the confidence of the flying public.
- TSA met challenging Congressional deadlines in creating a multi-layered system of security that is continuously assessed and updated. Now, all passengers and their baggage are screened, several thousand armed pilots protect cockpits of passenger and cargo planes, and explosives detecting canine teams are on the job. Also, thousands of federal air marshals are deployed on tens of thousands of flights each month; pre-9/11 there were less than three dozen air marshals.
- Deadlines successfully met included screening all passengers by November 19, 2002 – on the one-year anniversary of the creation of TSA – and screening all baggage using Congressionally approved methods by December 31, 2002.
- TSA's highly trained security screeners have managed to successfully minimize passenger wait times at security checkpoints even with air travel back to pre-9/11 levels.
- Millions of prohibited items have been intercepted at screening checkpoints since TSA assumed responsibility for security at the nation's 450 airports in February of 2002.
- Deploy resources in a flexible risk based manner. The prohibited items list was revised on December 22, 2005 for all domestic airports to permit through the checkpoint metal scissors with pointed tips and a blade of four inches or less (measured from the fulcrum) and small tools like screwdrivers, wrenches, and pliers seven inches or less in length. This change represents a move towards risk-based screening, by focusing on highest threats.
- Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM). As a part of TSA's reorganization, the new office of TSNM has created a seamless connection between those who have a stake in transportation security. General Managers have been appointed for each of several critical areas – airlines, airports, business management, cargo, general aviation, highways, international, maritime, mass transit, network integration, pipelines, and rail.
- TSA has substantially bolstered intelligence gathering and aggressively pursues improving technology. About \$1 billion has been committed to upgrading explosives detection systems at airports over a three-year period. Also, TSA pilot programs include assessing trace portals

in which passengers going through security checkpoints briefly stand still as quick “puffs” of air are released and then analyzed for explosives.

- Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS). Since returning to TSA in October 2005, the FAMS has integrated into the Office of Law Enforcement and the rest of TSA operations, and the resulting synergies have significantly bolstered the level of security in aviation operations.
- Multi-Modal Security Enhancement Teams (MMSETs). One of the lessons learned from response and recovery efforts for Hurricane Katrina was TSA’s significant surge capability. To test this capability and, ultimately, to enhance security in all modes of transportation, TSA initiated the first MMSETs in mid-December 2005.
- Career Progression Program for TSOs. The program intends to add significant additional security within our current budget constraints, and to enable widespread career growth and professional development opportunities for our high-performing TSOs. The program will add a new E Band to the TSO compensation scale above the existing D Band, implement specialized technical career tracks (see 5d for information on BDOs and BAO programs), and create an Equipment Maintenance Technician position.
- Local Hiring. FSD’s given more flexibility to recruit and hire locally which will enable them to more efficiently address staffing needs.
- Pandemic Influenza Preparation. TSA established a task force in November 2005 to develop and coordinate the TSA response with Federal and non-Federal entities to a possible Avian Influenza outbreak in the United States, if it were to occur.
- Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). Approved proposed regulations for a biometric-based identification credential for port workers.
- Air Cargo Rule completed and published. The requirements were designed to protect the more than 50,000 tons of cargo that is transported aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft each day. The security requirements mark the first substantial changes to air cargo regulations since 1999, and represent a joint government-industry vision of an enhanced security baseline.
- TSA assisted in the evacuation efforts for more than 4,500 American citizens returning home from Lebanon. Security professionals including Federal Air Marshals, Aviation Security Inspectors and Transportation Security Officers have volunteered and deployed to key sites both in the U.S. and abroad to facilitate secure flight and screening operations.
- TSOs from around the nation traveled to New Orleans in 2005 to facilitate the air evacuation of 25,000 passengers after Hurricane Katrina.

### **BOMB APPRAISAL OFFICER (BAO) PROGRAM**

- The Bomb Appraisal Program is an effective and affordable additional layer of security to prevent the introduction of explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) into the aviation system. TSA Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAOs) are strategically deployed at airports across the country. Integration of these highly trained and specialized personnel strengthens security by providing additional resources focused on the number one threat to aviation.

## **TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CARD (TWIC)**

- TSA has tested and begun the rulemaking process for a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). TWIC will enhance security at our nation's ports by requiring all employees that have access to secure areas to receive a background check. Enrollment will begin by the end of the year and an estimated 400,000 port workers will be required to obtain a TWIC.

## **TSA CANINE PROGRAM**

- The National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program has grown from 189 teams at 39 airports in 2001 to 412 teams at more than 75 airports and 11 mass transit systems.
- For the first time in the history of this program, TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams are stationed at each of the nation's largest airports and some of the largest transit systems. These highly trained teams are used several times each day to search aircraft and terminals, to check out suspect bags or cargo, and to deter terrorist activities.

## **FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICER (FFDO) PROGRAM**

- Under Title XIV of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress mandated TSA establish procedural requirements for an armed flight deck officer program and to begin training in early 2003.
- Since its inception, thousands of pilots have been deputized as FFDOs, and currently fly tens of thousands of mission legs each month.
- TSA implemented a re-qualification program in January 2004, which provided 18 firearms sites for FFDO to obtain re-qualification.

## **HAZMAT TRUCKING**

- On May 5, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) published rules to secure the transportation of Hazmat, including explosives, by requiring background checks for all individuals who apply for, renew, or transfer a hazardous materials endorsement (HME) for a commercial drivers license (CDL).
- In August 2006, TSA began to require similar background checks for Hazardous Materials drivers from Canada and Mexico.
- To date, TSA has had over 200,000 applications for HMEs from new drivers
- TSA has conducted name-based checks on the current 2.7 million Hazmat-endorsed drivers.

## **TSA REFLECTIONS**

- Deadlines successfully met included screening all passengers by November 19, 2002 - on the one-year anniversary of the creation of TSA - and screening all baggage using Congressionally approved methods by December 31, 2002.



- TSA has been a good steward of taxpayer dollars while delivering world-class security and customer service, operating since December of 2003 within the Congressionally mandated full-time equivalent of 45,000 screeners, a reduction of 10,000-plus.
- TSA's highly trained security screeners have managed to successfully minimize passenger wait times at security checkpoints even with air travel back to pre-9/11 levels. During the busy summer travel season, wait times nationally averaged 4.3 minutes and during peak hours, 10.4 minutes.
- More than 15.6 million prohibited items have been intercepted at screening checkpoints since TSA assumed responsibility for security at the nation's 450 airports in February of 2002. Those prohibited items include nearly 4.7 million knives, 75,241 box cutters and 2,150 firearms.
- TSA has substantially bolstered intelligence gathering and aggressively pursues improving technology. About \$1 billion has been committed to upgrading explosives detection systems at airports over a three-year period. Also, TSA pilot programs include deploying trace portal machines, which require passengers going through security checkpoints to briefly stand still as quick "puffs" of air are released. The air is then analyzed for explosives.
- Successfully completed the Registered Traveler Pilot Program at five airports allowing frequent fliers who have undergone background checks to largely avoid secondary screening, thus improving customer service while maintain the high level of security. Those passengers and their carry-on items still must go through primary screening at the checkpoint.
- TSA has worked closely with airport and airline partners to tighten access and perimeter control and to check the backgrounds of their employees and those of airport concessionaires.
- TSA's highly trained work force maintained an astonishingly low 16 percent attrition rate in its first full year.
- In January, TSA doubled the Artesia, N.M.-based training program for arming pilots, both passenger and cargo, to defend the cockpit as Federal Flight Deck Officers. There are currently several thousand trained officers.
- To increase coordination and information sharing and allow for a "surge capacity" to effectively respond to specific threats, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) and Explosives Unit transferred from TSA to ICE.

## **Talking Points on TSA Administrator Pistole's Decision and TSA Vote on the Issue of Collective Bargaining**

- Administrator Pistole's goal is to help the agency become a more agile, high-performance organization that can better protect the traveling public from constantly changing threats.
- As you may know, he pledged during his confirmation hearings to complete a thorough review of the potential impact of collective bargaining on the safety and security of the traveling public.
- He has now completed that review.
- First, an important point to keep in mind is that as he was conducting the assessment the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) – an independent government agency that oversees federal labor relations – announced on November 12<sup>th</sup> that they were ordering an election for TSA officers to vote on union representation.
- Because collective bargaining rights can be granted only by the TSA Administrator, the FLRA decision could not order an election for the purposes of collective bargaining.
- Nonetheless, the FLRA ordered that a TSA union election will likely occur this March. Their decision was not the reason for the assessment but it added a dimension to his considerations.
- Administrator Pistole's assessment included a review of TSA employee data, a broad range of conversations, input from TSA employees, feedback from TSA management and discussions with the presidents of the two unions seeking to represent TSA officers.
- He also consulted agencies in the security and law enforcement fields that already engage in collective bargaining, such as the New York Police Department, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and employers of unionized guards at a number of Department of Defense facilities.
- The issue was also discussed with management at two airports that are part of TSA's Screening Partnership Program that have unionized contracted screeners, as well as experts on labor relations in high-performance organizations.

- More than 13,000 officers are already dues-paying members of various unions. These unions provide personal rather than collective representation and cannot bargain on behalf of the officers.
- After this thorough assessment, Administrator Pistole determined that full-scale collective bargaining in the traditional sense would not be prudent for TSA.
- The core mission is the safety of the traveling public and TSA simply cannot negotiate on security nor can it cede the authority and flexibility needed to both adapt to evolving threats and protect national security.
- That being said, Administrator Pistole does believe that employee morale, motivation and engagement are inseparable from achieving superior security.
- TSA hasn't ranked very well in these areas in years past, according to employee surveys.
- Administrator Pistole issued an official Determination on (today) February 4<sup>th</sup> that clearly defines the terms of the FLRA-ordered election and permits security officers to determine once and for all whether or not they wish to be represented by a union for the purposes of engaging in collective bargaining on certain clearly-defined, non-security employment issues.
- If officers elect a union, issues related to security that will not be subject to collective bargaining include:
  - Security policies, procedures and the deployment of security personnel or equipment
  - Pay, pensions and any form of compensation
  - Proficiency testing
  - Job qualifications
  - Discipline standards
- Strikes and all work slowdowns are strictly prohibited.
- Should officers choose a union, bargaining would be permitted only on the limited, non-security issues listed in the Determination relating to employment such as shift bids, transfers and awards.
- Bargaining will be allowed at the national level only – local bargaining and agreements are prohibited.

- If a majority of transportation security officers vote to be represented by a union, employees will not be required to join the union or pay dues. No federal government employee can be required to join a union.
- The framework Administrator Pistole laid out is unique to TSA and ensures that TSA does not cede the authority and flexibility needed to adapt to evolving threats and protect national security, while continuing to improve employee engagement, performance and professional development.
- This framework will help reinforce consistency and accountability across security operations at more than 450 airports.
- A few points to note:
  - Only transportation security officers who conduct screening will be eligible to vote and be part of the bargaining unit;
  - As an agency, TSA will continue to engage all employees directly on terms and conditions of employment;
  - TSA will retain the right to discipline and terminate employees; and
  - If transportation security officers vote to be represented by a union, the framework will ensure TSA and the elected union resolve any disputes through an expedited process that brings closure swiftly.
- Our enemy is nimble, determined and bent on our destruction. As our nation's last line of defense in aviation security, TSA must continue to adapt in the face of ever evolving – and ever more challenging – threats.
- The engagement, judgment and focus of the frontline workforce is critical.
- The unique labor relations framework Administrator Pistole set out will allow TSA to continue to evolve, continue to build the high performance organization the public deserves, and continue to keep the American traveling public safe.

###

**Discussion Items Regarding Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP)**  
**25 June 2009**

**SUMMARY:**

**In March of 2008 ABC News asserted that FAA had issued certificates to 8,000 individuals without a TSA clearance.**

**TSA Response:** Of those 8,000 individuals, less than 100 were required to receive TSA authorization prior to receiving training. TSA did not vet these 100 before they were trained. These individuals were trained during early implementation of AFSP (the first 6 months-1 year). When AFSP became aware of this issue circa July 2006, all 8,000 were vetted by AFSP. **None posed a threat to national security.**

- In May 2007, AFSP conducted quality control checks with FAA to ensure that all foreign pilots issued airman certificates were properly vetted by TSA.
- Quality control checks are conducted.

By regulation, AFSP vets for certain types of training, such as initial pilot training, instrument ratings, multi-engine ratings, and type rating (training focused on a specific type of aircraft – such as a Boeing-727, Air Bus-320, etc...)

- Initial Training – On aircraft less than 12,500 lbs.
- Instrument Training – On aircraft less than 12,500 lbs.
- Multi-engine Training – On aircraft less than 12,500 lbs.
- Initial and Recurrent Type-rated Training – On/for a specific aircraft greater than 12,500 lbs.

Under other programs TSA vets:

- All flight crews flying into, out of, or over US airspace -- through the master crew and crew vetting program. All crew must be pre-authorized to fly by TSA and each manifest is vetted by TSA prior to take-off.
- All active pilots and members of cockpits were vetted in November 2006 under the FAA airman certificate vetting.
- All FAA airman certificate holders as of February 22, 2009, active or inactive were vetted in May 2009.

By regulation:

- From October 2004 until May 12, 2009, did not vet commercial alien pilots who did not seek new type ratings. They were vetted under the November 2006 and May 2009 mass FAA vetting.
- On May 13, 2009, the regulation was modified to add recurrent training events to the vetting activities.

By regulation, TSA **does not vet:**

- US persons – They are only required to show two forms of ID, including either a passport or birth certificate.

## **POLICY AND PROCESS:**

**Some countries don't have their own flight school certificates but rely on the US as the gold standard and insist their pilots be FAA certified.** This in turn raises flight safety across the world. To require all individuals to enter the US for training would be costly and prohibitive and may lead to alternative, less stringent programs issuing certificates that do not meet the US standard.

Since 2004, TSA's Alien Flight School Program (AFSP) has vetted 210,000 candidate applications.

Currently, AFSP vets over 4,500 applications a month; 40-50 of these are canceled for immigration issues.

Thousands of foreign student pilots have been able to enroll and obtain pilot licenses from U.S. flight training providers. In fact we expect to process ~55,000 applications for training this year.

Candidates complete applications on-line. They provide biographic information and can upload passport, visa, and airmen certificate data. Fingerprints are collected at authorized locations worldwide.

**Individuals are not required to train in the US.** (There are about 90 FAA certified flight training providers located outside the US and about 4700 registered providers domestically.)

US Visas are not required for all training, and Visa requirements differ depending on the individual's current immigration status (i.e. LPR, student or business visa, or being from a visa waiver country).

AFSP is authorized to vet for certain types of training, such as initial pilot training, instrument ratings, multi-engine ratings, and type rating (training focused on a specific type of aircraft – such as Boeing-727, Air Bus-320, etc...)

- Initial Training – On aircraft less than 12,500 lbs.
- Instrument Training – On aircraft less than 12,500 lbs.
- Multi-engine Training – On aircraft less than 12,500 lbs.
- Type-rated Initial/Recurrent Training – On/for a specific aircraft greater than 12,500 lbs.

AFSP vets applicant data against law enforcement, immigration, and terrorism databases. When derogatory information is identified AFSP conducts thorough checks with FBI, immigration and relevant sources, and refers derogatory information as appropriate for additional action. Derogatory data can result in a denial or cancellation of the candidate's application.

## **RELATING THIS TO FAA AIRMEN CERTIFICATES:**

Following 9/11, FAA started vetting airmen certificate holders in response to needs identified by the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center.

FAA conducted manual comparison of the complete airmen registry database against the TSA No Fly and Selectee list in 2002 and 2004/2005.

FAA continues to check all new applicants including student pilots and foreign nationals against the most current TSA No Fly and Selectee list.

TSA performed name based vetting of approximately 862K active pilot certificate holders in November 2006. And a broader vetting of all active/inactive FAA certificate holders ~3.9M in May 2009. These populations are perpetually vetted by TSA.

FAA has requested to only receive immigration data when it requires action on their part. They do not want to see all immigration derogatory matches and do not need TSA to resolve immigration related issues as part of the security threat assessment process.

### **TTAC Privacy Notification Talking Points**

- TSA takes the protection of personal information very seriously. Although we have no evidence that personal information has been accessed or used, we have alerted those affected so they can be aware of possible misuse of their identity.
- TSA is offering all potentially affected applicants free credit monitoring for up to one year through Identity Force credit monitoring services.
- As a result of these incidents, the contractor has encrypted hard drives on all enrollment work station computers. TSA also required the contractor improve security procedures to enhance protection of private information and systems containing personal data.
- TSA is committed to maintaining the privacy of personally identifiable information and requires its contractors to take precautions for the security of such information. The agency continually monitors its systems and practices to enhance the security of personal and sensitive information.



(U) Threat Posed by Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula

14 January 2010

(U) Prepared by the DHS Threat Task Force.

(U//FOUO) The attack launched by Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on Christmas Day against Northwest Flight 253 on approach to Detroit is a clear indicator that we remain at risk and that aviation remains a priority target.

(U//FOUO) Since the merger of al-Qa'ida associates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia to form AQAP last January, the group's leaders have declared their desire to attack U.S. interests outside the Arabian Peninsula. The events of 25 December 2009 demonstrate that the group's intent to attack the Homeland has evolved from the aspirational to the operational stage.

(U//FOUO) AQAP was quick to claim credit for the attempted bombing in a statement issued on 28 December 2009 on the Al Fajr Media Forum, a jihadist website. The group claimed it launched the attack in retaliation for airstrikes directed against AQAP targets in Yemen earlier in December and boasted that the "Nigerian brother" broke all security barriers for his operation, dispelling the "great myth" of American intelligence, and used explosive technology developed by AQAP's "manufacturing department." AQAP further claimed that only a "technical fault" caused the failure in the operation.

(U//FOUO) DHS does not have specific, credible information that AQAP has an active plot aimed at the Homeland. DHS, however, cannot exclude the possibility that AQAP, or perhaps other elements of al-Qa'ida, could have additional Homeland plots in motion, and may perceive a window of vulnerability to strike again. DHS also remains concerned that al-Qa'ida, its affiliates, and those inspired by al-Qa'ida's ideology will continue to seek innovative ways to conduct attacks and circumvent security procedures.

(U) In light of the assessed threat, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano today released the following statement:

(U) "In view of the event of Christmas Day we must remain vigilant about the continued threat we face from al-Qa'ida. We are taking an additional set of aviation security precautions to protect the American people. Some of these measures include enhanced random screening, additional Federal Air Marshals on certain routes and adding individuals of concern to our terrorist watch list system. As a result of these measures and others we have put in place since Christmas, travelers should allot extra time when flying—particularly into the United States from overseas. We are facing a determined enemy and we appreciate the patience of all Americans and visitors to our country, and the cooperation of our international partners as well as a committed airline industry. We will continue to update and adapt our defenses as needed to ensure air travel is both safe and efficient. As always, we continue to ask all Americans to report any suspicious behavior to the local law enforcement authorities."

(U) Reporting Notice

(U) DHS encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to DHS and the FBI. The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9685 or by e-mail at [NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov](mailto:NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov). For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by e-mail at [NICC@dhs.gov](mailto:NICC@dhs.gov). The FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at <http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm>. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-01-00000-ST-2009, HSEC-02-03001-ST-2009, TERR-06020-01-05

(U) IWW-0004-10  
DHS I&A/IWW  
202-282-9068

From: [Soule, Greg](#)  
To: [Lee, Kristin](#)  
Cc: [Payne, Sterling](#); [Gaches, Lauren](#)  
Subject: Updated Talking Points for DHS OPA  
Date: Wednesday, April 29, 2009 3:00:54 PM

### **UPDATED TALKING POINT:**

- TSA rapidly deployed personal protection equipment to 54 airports, including those along the southwest borders and with inbound flights from Mexico. Nationwide, all airports are currently equipped with gloves and hand sanitizer, and additional masks will be distributed to all airports this week.

### **PREVIOUSLY APPROVED TALKING POINTS (REFORMATTED)**

- TSA Officers are watching out for passenger illness while conducting screening. If an officer encounters an individual displaying symptoms they will provide the passenger a mask, wear one themselves, and request the individual proceed to an area removed from other traveling passengers where local health officials will meet them.
- TSA posted the CDC Traveler's Health Alert Notice to all document checking stations in front of security checkpoints and continues to work with airport stakeholders to post the at all airport gates, ticket counters, and on reservation Web sites, as well as other modes of transit.

### **Status of Health Alert Notices at Airports:**

- The CDC Traveler's Health Alert Notice is posted at airport's Travel Document Checker Podiums. TSA is working with stakeholders to post this notice at all airport gates, ticket counters, and on reservation Web sites.

### **DHS/TSA Guidance to Workforce Regarding Masks:**

- DHS and CDC worked hand in hand to develop guidance that protects our workers in the event of a pandemic. DHS is implementing a series of measures to protect employees, including Transportation Security Officers (TSOs).
- Our public health experts have found that, based on the current state of the H1N1 outbreak, the use of masks is part of a multi-prong approach.
- We are supplying our workforce with masks for use in high-risk situations, such as when an employee comes into close contact with a person who appears to be ill, at which point masks will be provided to both the passenger and the officer.
- The safety of our employees is a critical priority for DHS. TSA's guidance to its workforce and protocols are consistent with those for CBP and are in accordance with the guidance from CDC.

**Use of Heat-Sensing Technology:**

- TSA does not employ this technology. TSA is watching out for passenger illness while conducting screening.

## **WORKFORCE TALKING POINTS**

- Since TSA's inception, we have been committed to our workforce.
- TSA's greatest asset is our talented and dedicated employees, and we are proud of a workforce that mirrors the diversity, strengths, and combined skills of our Nation.
- Our workforce is what gives this agency its strength and power to succeed in this important mission.
- Our Transportation Security Officers interact with almost two million passengers a day from every country around the globe in our job of keeping the Nation's travelers safe.
- Maintaining a highly skilled and motivated workforce is critical to effective transportation security.
- TSA is committed to recruiting, hiring and retaining the best people from every background and community. In addition, we must continue to value, embrace, and foster our workforce and manage it effectively.
- TSA has become a leader in the federal government in many areas of workforce initiatives. We have developed and implemented many ground breaking efforts such as:
  1. Launching the National Advisory Councils.
  2. Establishing Nurse Case Management at each airport that provides better service for injured employees and cut workers compensation costs considerably.
  3. Decentralizing the hiring process that drastically cut hiring time and cost,
  4. Establishing the TSO career progression that provides professional growth opportunities for the occupation.
  5. Implementing the TSO Optimization program that provides full-time government co-payments for medical insurance to part-time TSOs and incentivizes TSOs to take split shifts.
  6. Creating the first large objective pay-for-performance system in the federal government.
  7. Establishing enhanced whistleblower protection rights for TSOs.

8. Implementing the Next Generation Screening Checkpoint and Evolution training and sustainment.

- TSA's Idea Factory is an innovation that champions the President's vision of more effective and open government. TSA's Idea Factory has led to the implementation of more than 45 innovative ideas that positively impact policies, procedures, and quality of work life. More than 25,000 TSA employees have actively participated on the site. This transparent, vigorously interactive portal benefits both our employees and the traveling public.
- Our people are our greatest asset.
- Our talented workforce that is diverse in every way – from those with experience in the public and private sectors—military and civilian backgrounds—retirees and those for whom this is their first job—workers from four generations with very different personal and cultural backgrounds. Four generations of Americans, right from high school, in their 60s and 70s, phenomenal experience that serves as the front-line workforce.
- The stakes are high: TSA screens and protects 2 million passengers a day....For those of you in the private sector, think about your customer base being 2 million customers a day...3 billion pieces of luggage... We have staff in 21 countries maintaining relationships and carrying out security programs with hundreds of countries.
- Imagine how hard that job is to keep 2 million customers a day safe and happy.

**For example, what private company can say they have....[VERIFY NUMBERS before releasing: which population to define?]**

- 72 percent attrition down to 22 percent
- And at the same time, increased part-time workforce from 4 percent share of workforce to 20 percent.
- And at the same time, dropped the injury rate by 36 percent [?].
- And reinvested that money in its people.

**“And name me any other private corporation that has 2 million customers a day—and a complaint rate of .0002.” [Verify]**

## **ATTRITION TALKING POINTS**

### *FROM ORAL TESTIMONY: JUNE 10, 2009 HOUSE*

- We have reduced attrition by 60 percent to less than 7 percent today and we have created career paths where hundreds of our employees have moved up into management, inspection, and Federal Air Marshal positions. These accomplishments have been remarkable and can be represented by the role our Transportation Security Officers, inspectors, and Federal Air Marshals play in keeping our nation safe.

### *FROM PREVIOUS SPEECHES:*

- Look at the work we've done. When you step back, and look, you see 55,000 people brought on board in four years time. Attrition of 76 percent to 26 percent for part time. 38 percent to 7.5 percent for full time. 38 to 10 for injuries. And we went from the public's most favorite agency to hate, to this year, where in the Gallop Poll in December, the public cited the top two best functions by the American government as the military and aviation security.
- This year's survey was most heartening. When asked the question, Am I paid according to my performance? TSA got the best scores in DHS. An interesting position to be in. A fascinating story.
- Optimization of the workforce using split shifts and part time workers. By the nature of those jobs, you have a high attrition rate. But 25 percent attrition in part time workers is preferable to a lower number in an all full time workforce.
- At the end of the day, we're a people business. We're in the business of screening people!
- The business that DHS is in is all about the people. A contract with the American people. Also a contract with the industry.
- The money in the stimulus package of \$1B is going to be about stimulating jobs in the airport. Construction jobs building in and installing the new machines in the airports. It's phenomenal to think—we were asked how we could create jobs.

## **PAY FOR PERFORMANCE TALKING POINTS**

### *FROM ORAL TESTIMONY: JULY 2008 SENATE*

- TSA's pay-for-performance system, known as PASS [Performance Accountability and Standards System].
- I am honored to represent the thousands of TSA employees, our Transportation Security Officers [TSOs], who serve to ensure the safety and security of 2 million passengers a day. These women and men are dedicated security professionals with one of the most difficult jobs in government.
- These Officers are the most tested in the Federal workforce. Contrary to what so often is the headline grabber about attrition, 22,000 of our Officers have been with TSA from the beginning. They have participated in the largest stand-up of a Federal agency in fifty years.
- They have stayed with us as we responded to the evolving threat by continuously enhancing the security process, while also building the infrastructure and the human capital system to properly pay, train, reward, and recognize their performance. They stayed for the mission.
- There are two reasons TSA relies on pay for performance. Security is the first and foremost. Second, it is to instill a culture of high performance and accountability in our workforce.
- Performance on the job has a special meaning for us. Let me be very direct. Our job is to stop a terrorist attack. Our Officers work in an environment in which 99.9 percent of the people they see every day are not a threat, but the threats against our aviation system remain. TSOs want to get passengers through the security checkpoint with a high degree of confidence that they have stopped anyone seeking to do harm—your safety is their priority.
- How does PASS improve security? When you get paid more to do a better job, you do a better job. PASS is targeted to reward excellent performance. That is an incentive to perform at the highest level to which you are capable. PASS rewards the individual performance necessary to achieve TSA's organizational goals and that increases security.
- TSA's pay-for-performance system is driven by validated data. Its performance metrics are standardized, measurable, observable and almost completely objective. PASS has been adjusted based on feedback from our Officers about what the real job is.
- Our Officers have told us they want a pay-for-performance system because they know what is at stake: they want to know that their fellow officers are equally



competent. But building a pay-for-performance system takes time. It takes employee engagement. It takes leadership. It takes flexibilities in the human capital system. It takes continuous improvement and it takes constant communication. But for us, it is essential. In my thirty years of Federal service, twenty-three of them with the General Schedule, I have never been more sure of anything: The pay-for-performance system is the best way in this post 9/11 environment, for TSA to manage and ensure the quality of persons on the front line.

- The effectiveness of PASS is proven by the statistics. More than half of our TSO workforce has been on the job for four years or more. The 2007 DHS Annual Employee Survey validates that 94 percent of TSOs said the work they do is important. Eighty-three percent said they know how their work relates to the agency's goals and priorities.
- TSA supervisors have a significant stake in the PASS program as well, and they are evaluated on how effectively and fairly they administer it. Successful implementation of the program is a component of their own PASS ratings.
- At TSA, pay for performance ensures the technical proficiency of the people on the front line. Our goal is for our Officers to be switched on and always at the ready. Pay for performance drives their higher level of performance because their earning power is directly tied to their learning power.
- The Senior Leadership Team of TSA is passionately dedicated to our people and the principles of pay-for-performance. We are committed to using the flexible human capital system provided under ATSA to make TSA a model performance-based organization. We are building a culture in which our workforce is actively engaged. It is through listening and working collaboratively with all of our Officers to find solutions that we will continue to meet our challenges.



**Transportation  
Security  
Administration**

**Date:** February 16, 2016

**Subject:** SSI Review 16-0442  
FOIA Request 1100631

**From:** Robert Metzler  
Senior Program Analyst, SSI Program

**To:** Teri Miller, FOIA Officer, FOIA/PA Division  
Transportation Security Administration

The SSI Program has completed SSI Review 16-0442. The review's findings, in accordance with the SSI Regulation at 49 C.F.R. part 1520, are displayed in the table below.

All covered persons must ensure that records containing SSI are properly marked with the SSI Header and Footer (see 49 C.F.R. part 1520.13). The markings were not changed during the SSI Review process. Apply or remove (striking-through the markings is sufficient for removal) SSI markings from reviewed records to reflect the proper SSI designation of the reviewed records' content.

Documents containing SSI, including visually redacted documents, may only be shared with covered persons who have a need to know the information (see 49 C.F.R. part 1520.9). Guidance on marking and sharing records can be found in the TSA SSI Policies & Procedures Handbook.

If you have any questions, please contact [ssi@dhs.gov](mailto:ssi@dhs.gov) and reference SSI Review 16-0442.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert Metzler".

Robert Metzler

<u>File Name</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>SSI</u>
Combined Docs for YR Review.pdf	218	Yes

**File Name**

**Pages**

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