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Thanks to the staff of the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) for their assistance in obtaining this record

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This letter is in response to your 15June 2016; letter requesting the Air Force for a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of the IRIS# 01129610

The appropriate Air Force offices have reviewed the responsive document and determined that the attached document no longer contains Air Force equities and therefore declassified.

Please address any questions concerning this review to the undersigned at (703) 693-7749 and refer our case number 16-MDR-351.

Sincerely,

CANDICE R. VARNADO
CANDICE R. VARNADO, TSgt, USAF
Mandatory Declassification Review Manager
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE MDR OFFICE (SAF/AII)

FROM: HQ USAF/A2
1700 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1700

SUBJECT: Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Request Appeal, Case # 16-MDR-351

After subject matter expert review of subject document, in accordance with the standards for classification pursuant to DoD 5200.1-R, Chapter 4 and Executive Order 13526, AF/A2CH concludes that the document is determined to no longer meet the standards for classification, and is therefore declassified in its entirety.

We therefore recommend declassification of the document in its entirety.

Our POC for this case is Mr. Robert De Mayo, 202-404-4109.

THOMAS W. GEARY, Brig Gen, USAF
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance

IRIS #: 01129610

OHT Work

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
**DISCUSSIONS CAREER BACKGROUND IN HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) COLLECTION. BEGAN CAREER WITH BRITISH INTERROGATION FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA AND ITALY DURING WORLD WAR II. RELATED STORIES OF EARLY POST WORLD WAR II WORK IN AUSTRIA INVOLVING GERMAN SCIENTISTS. INTERVIEWED FAMOUS FEMALE GERMAN TEST PILOT, HANNA REICH, WHO HAD FLOWN V-1 AIRCRAFT DURING ITS FINAL EXPERIMENTAL TEST FLIGHTS. DISCUSSED WRINGER PROGRAM THAT INVOLVED INTERROGATIONS OF THOUSANDS OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR WHO PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ON THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (USSR). DESCRIBED CREATION OF AIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION (AISO). TALKED ABOUT PRISONER OF WAR (POW) CONDUCT TRAINING. INCLUDED INFORMATION ON SOVIET INTELLIGENCE; HUMINT EXPLOITATION OF EX-PRISONERS; ARMY INVOLVMENT IN WRINGER PROGRAM; FAR EASTERN WRINGER; CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES; VALUE OF COVERT OPERATIONS; AND JOINT HUMINT PLANNING.**

**TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW OF COL. ROBERT WORK CONDUCTED ON 22 JUL 74 BY MR. LESLIE ROSENZWEIG. OTHER CONTRIBUTORS TO INTERVIEW INCLUDED MAJ GEN JOHN S. PATTON, DR. DENNIS F. CASEY, MR. JUAN R. JIMENEZ, AND MSGT MARY V. MATHEYS. INCLUSIVE DATES ESTIMATED.**

http://www.airforcehistoryindex.org/data/001/129/610.xml 4/24/2017
AN INTERVIEW WITH
COLONEL ROBERT WORK (U)
EDITED BY: MAJOR GEN JOHN S. PATTON
INTERVIEWED BY: MR LESLIE ROSENZWEIG

With Contributions By:
DR. DENNIS F. CASEY
MR. JUAN R. JIMENEZ
MSGT MARY V. MATHEYS

Prepared by: The History Office
HQ Air Intelligence Agency
San Antonio, Texas 78243

30 JULY 1999

Declassified IAW HQ USAF/A2
Memo dated 13 Oct 2016

DECLASSIFIED
(U) This Oral History is classified SECRET. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

(U) This classification determination should be considered a working classification and as such, is not definitive in nature. In the event of a Freedom of Information Act request, this document must be referred back to the Air Intelligence Agency.
(U) The smoke from the W.W.II battlefields had barely dispersed when the shadows of Communism descended upon Europe and other parts of the world. The free world in mid 1945 was celebrating its victories over the Third Reich and Japan and in their rejoicing neglected to recognize another fundamental threat, the threat of international communism. For a time Americans remained oblivious to this threat. Adolph Hitler was gone but another dictator just as brutal had emerged and taken absolute power in the Soviet Union. Joseph Stalin sought complete world domination. A generation later, a speech by then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev wherein he uttered the now famous phrase "We will bury you," reconfirmed Soviet intentions to a succession of American leaders. Presidents from Harry Truman to George Bush endeavored to limit the spread of communism and lessen its attraction to those toiling in the third world. For 45 years this confrontation with the Soviets continued as the raison d'être of the Cold War.

(U) In the oral history that follows, Colonel Robert Work, USAF (Ret.), agreed on 22 July 1974, to comment on a number of significant intelligence subjects that took place during the Cold War era. The estimates, dates, equipment, personalities, events, achievements/accomplishments, and comments as well as regrets cannot be corroborated. In many cases the interview tapes were missing and the following narrative had to be refashioned from incomplete transcriptions. For this often Herculean effort, we offer our thanks to Major General John S. Patton (Retired). The Cold War Intelligence Chronicles seeks to present the personal comments of key players who helped shape the intelligence contours of the Cold War. It remains our hope that the candid reflections and personal notes presented herein add significantly to an understanding of Cold War issues pertaining to intelligence. Moreover, this history is published as part of the Air Force Intelligence Oral History Program. We trust it offers another "piece of the puzzle" for historians, researchers, and intelligence personnel, past and present. The comments expressed by the interviewee, while often personal, help to explain why things were done a certain way or not done at all. Discussions of policy decisions, add to the intelligence story, and lastly offer the valuable tool of lessons learned.

DENNIS F. CASEY, Ph.D.
Chief Historian
Meeting the Challenge (U)
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EDITOR'S COMMENTS: (U)

(U) This 1974 interview with Colonel Robert Work is a detailed and colorful account of his 31 years of direct involvement in Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection. Fluent in German, he began his career during World War II with British interrogation forces in North Africa and Italy. His career ended in Washington, D.C., after a series of US and overseas assignments during which he gained full insight into the value and problems of HUMINT. He relates stories of early post World War II collections in Austria with German scientists, and a special interview with a noted female test pilot, Hanna Reich, who had flown the V-1 in its final experimental flight. His accounts of the interrogations of Austrian and German military personnel, who had been released by the Soviets, led to the highly successful WRINGER program of the late 40's and early 50's. This program involved thousands of former German and Austrian POW's who, after release by the Soviets, provided significant current intelligence on the USSR at a time when other information was dated or incomplete. Colonel Work was a major player, along with HQ United States Air Force analysts, in establishing the priorities for the WRINGER program that enabled it to obtain urgently needed personnel, material, and communications equipment. The WRINGER program for its part provided the means by which the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and other key users gained access to targeting and other badly needed data. His efforts were instrumental in establishing the Far Eastern WRINGER program (for Japanese ex-POW's interned in the USSR during and after the war), and in gaining support from U.S. Army intelligence personnel and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
He describes the creation of the Air Intelligence Service Organization, a forerunner of today's (1991) Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC). He has much to say about clandestine or covert collection operations, the Air Force's involvement in them, and candidly presents his views on the pros and cons of such programs. He discusses joint HUMINT planning and makes a very positive case for training Air Force personnel in how to conduct themselves in the event of capture (i.e., Code Of Conduct training), and how to conduct that training. He points out the differences between HUMINT and other intelligence collection/analytical functions, and why HUMINT's unique nature demands a different approach to recruitment and administration. He cites the British use of reservists to fill most of their peacetime and wartime HUMINT collection requirements, and how a similar program could solve Air Force needs. In conclusion, he summarizes the highlights of HUMINT contributions to Air Force and national intelligence.

Colonel Work, whom I was privileged to know professionally and personally during much of his illustrious career, must be regarded as the "Father" and "Chief Protagonist" of the Air Force's HUMINT effort. Without his experience, foresight, and dogged dedication on its behalf, it is unlikely that HUMINT triumphs such as WRINGER and certain covert operations would have been nearly as successful as they proved to be. His interview constitutes a primer for United States Air Force HUMINT. Everyone entering and staying in the function, as well as by those involved in determining requirements and in analyzing information derived from its sources should read it in-depth. In spite of today's reliance on high-technology collection and processing, Colonel Work positively charts the need for continued HUMINT and offers a road-map of "do's" and "don'ts" for conducting such activities. He is not blinded or parochial in his approach to interrogation and other human source exploitation, but is fully appreciative of its pitfalls as well as its opportunities. The interview contains many examples, some of them vivid, of HUMINT in action, starting with the apprehension and interrogation immediately after World War II of Hanna Reich, a famous German test pilot suspected of flying Adolph Hitler from Berlin (she had not).

Colonel Work's exceptionally detailed account of the trails and tribulations of establishing and implementing WRINGER and its follow-on programs illustrates the great pains he and a few others took to gain ultimate success in the overt and clandestine collection areas. That his singular efforts paid dividends is reflected in General Curtis E. LeMay's statement that
WRINGER provided "many of the eyes of SAC" in the early days. As one who was able to use HUMINT throughout my own career as an analyst engaged in priority Soviet and Chinese intelligence projects, I can attest to the overwhelming contributions that Colonel Work personally made, not only to HUMINT but also to the development of other important intelligence functions. The value of those contributions remains in the planning and execution of our craft.

JOHN S. PATTON
Major General, USAF (Ret)
EARLY HUMINT ASSIGNMENTS (U)

Mr. Rosenzweig: (U) This interview is being conducted with Colonel Robert Work, United States Air Force (Ret), in Saratoga, California, on 22 July 1974.

Colonel Work: (U) Shortly after being commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant in the Air Force, I received orders from Washington assigning me to the intelligence school at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania--my first exposure to intelligence work. This assignment was made after a check of my personnel records, which showed that I spoke fluent German, had a degree in journalism and also some pre-law background. I was to augment the linguistic sources of the British, who at the time were controlling HUMINT (Human Intelligence) collection activities in World War II. The British had combed their own resources for personnel available for this type of training, but had exhausted their pool very rapidly because absolute fluency was an unwavering necessity. Immediately following our initial combat intelligence training, we were trained in combat interrogation--also conducted at Harrisburg. Completion of this training led to an assignment with the British controlled combat interrogation activity of Africa, called SISDIC. Reference to which, even now, is treated with some trepidation because of its highly secret nature at the time.

(U) When I arrived at my assignment, the British immediately conducted a very detailed interview and testing process. This was done to determine where, in their overall interrogation and source control activity, they could place American assets. The interviews and tests resulted in my being placed in the headquarters, editing interrogation and clandestine activity reports for the African/Italian theaters. This work offered me wide exposure to U.S. and British involvement in the interrogation of prisoners of war (POW's). For the first time, I saw very clearly the interrelationship between the people involved in obtaining information and the users of the information. A constant by-play and interchange went on between them even during combat.

(U) Much of our work was handled through telephone contact, and could involve air intelligence analysts at the Air Ministry in London talking to a mobile interrogation team.
interrogating a shot-down German crew, or a discussion of an on the spot examination of shot-down equipment. It was possible to give advice and guidance to collection at the moment, which meant the collected material was extremely relevant. So, those early days of WWII provided us with some early and graphic demonstrations of the importance of HUMINT activity. There were many lessons to be learned early in the HUMINT business, which, in the years that followed, we attempted to build into the status quo of Air Force activity.

**POST-WAR HUMINT (U)**

Mr. Rosenzweig: (U) You indicated that you were with the British during the war. What happened after your service with the British?

Colonel Work: (U) At the end of the war, I was appointed as Chief of the Advanced Air Force Intelligence section that moved into Austria. This happened while the last fighting was subsiding throughout Italy and Austria. We set up the U.S. Army's first detailed operational interrogation center operating in continental Europe. We beat German forces by slicing up through Italy before the fighting ended, and were in place and able to operate within days of the official end of the war.

(U) The opportunity to establish an interrogation and exploitation center in Austria, and use the lessons learned from the British offered invaluable experience. We rounded up large numbers of the German General Staff, men who were senior staff members of Luftwaffe units in Austria, Italy, and Germany, and put them together to discuss the war they had just lost. These Luftwaffe general staff officers argued and discussed the war across their dinner table (which we had equipped with early phonograph disc recording devices). Those discussions, the conclusions they drew and lessons they talked of learning were meticulously documented. These reports were intelligence documents of immense and immediately value to: analysts, historians, and allied military leadership who used them to better understand the effects of the war. It really was one of the earliest and most important lessons of HUMINT collection that I remember.
Groups of German scientists were also brought in and invited to discuss the successes and failures of their various projects. These groups included people involved in V-1 and V-2 rocket development projects, from the Insslecker Institute. Hans Plembel, who later became one of the great contributors to our electronics technology, was one of the scientists involved. He sat down with me and, in discussing these matters with his colleagues and me, contributed information that I've been told is of value to us even now in the mid 70's. This effort produced a source of important information that was of use for many years.

HANNA REICH (U)

One early coup following the war, was the capture, by one of my people, of the famous female German test pilot, Hanna Reich. Hanna Reich had been a focal point of conversation during many combat interrogations of German Air Force people. Most knew her and had been trained under her supervision. She was a trademark with the Luftwaffe, and a very competent aviatrix. She had actually flown the V-1 during its final configuration test flights, and her work had a great deal to do with determining its final format.

At the end of the war, a message from headquarters alerted me to the possibility of her presence in our area. It said, "You are occupying a section of Austria where it is possible that Hanna Reich is hiding. She's known to have flown out of Berlin in the last days of the war, and carried a male passenger who might have been Hitler." The message continued: "You will take all possible actions in your area to determine the identity of that male passenger and report directly, EYES ONLY, to the Vienna Chief." So we began our search, armed with the authority contained in that message, which no one else in my outfit had seen--it was EYES ONLY, and some information we'd learned from some of her relatives as to her possible location. It occurred to me that we could be sitting on one of the greatest stories of the war. Had Hitler flown out of Berlin, had Hanna Reich piloted him, and was he somewhere in Austria? The message had indicated though that "we doubt Hitler is still alive."

Several ex-British and ex-Office of Strategic Services (OSS--forerunner to the CIA) agents had been assigned to me when we first went into Austria. I gave each of three agents a separate assignment to check out certain areas where Hanna had friends, relatives, and contacts.
None of the three agents knew the other two were on the same assignment, because they were going to different areas and addresses. One of the agents told Reich's relatives that the Americans were interested in taking her into protective custody, but learned from them that she had left just a few days before. He went to another address, which they had given him, but was told she had left to board a train for Salzburg, Austria. The agent rushed to train station and had her paged. He recognized her when she struck her head from a train window to see about the page. As the train began to move, the agent shouted to her, "Throw me your bags! Throw me your bags! The United States Army wants you to report to them. I'm prepared to take you to the Salzburg Headquarters." So, she tossed out her bag, jumped off the train, and got in the jeep with my agent and was on her way to us for interrogation.

(U) The important question was, "Who was your male passenger?" which I asked her at our interrogation center. It was over the first hot meal she had eaten in days, "Hanna, they say the passenger you flew out of Berlin might have been Hitler, was it?" She looked at me and smiled. She said, "Oh! If only it had been." It was not Hitler, but Ritter Von Greim. Hitler had made him the Chief of the Luftwaffe, and his first instructions were to apprehend and execute Field Marshal Goering. Our interrogation of her ensued, during which she provided moment-by-moment very detailed descriptions of developments in Berlin, including information about Hitler and his last hours in his bunker. That report of her testimony—that single report—about what happened in the bunker, what Hitler said, to whom he said it, and what actually happened later, was used at the Nuremberg Trials to establish officially that Hitler was, in fact, dead.

(U) This particular effort had an incredible impact on me and impressed me with the value of HUMINT. I knew then that I wanted to spend the rest of my professional life in this activity. That an in-depth interrogation of a human could provide evidence that could change the course of history or authenticate historical facts had a profound affect on me. I thought this activity would be valuable to the future of both the nation and the United States Air Force.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND POW'S (U)

Within weeks of the end of the war many of us in the U.S. zone of Austria, and involved in intelligence activities, became aware of Russian operations against American
intelligence targets. We had already deduced, prior to receiving confirmation from headquarters, that the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was our new enemy who was already launching intelligence operations against us. This underscored and justified the critical and immediate need to begin collection procedures on the USSR. I reiterate that this was within weeks, even days, after the end of the war in Europe.

About this same time, we learned that the first train loads of German prisoners, who had been released by the Russians, were being dumped along railroad sidings in Austria. However, these people were not Germans they were Austrians, and the first group was scheduled to arrive in Linz, Austria. The American reception for them consisted of first aid, food, and welcoming speeches. Those of us in HUMINT were geared to interview as many as possible, and as quickly as we could, about what were going on in the Soviet Union.

When the first train load arrived some of my people and I were at the train station. All of us saw, as we stood beside the trains, that some of the first prisoners were literally pushed from the freight cars. Some fell beside the rails, never to walk again on their own. They were emaciated, starving, ill, and some were dismembered. It was a horrible example of how Soviets treated captured military personnel. I bent over and helped pick up one young man in uniform and asked him, "Who in God's name is responsible for the condition you are in?" He looked up at me and said he'd been working to rebuild Russian munitions factories. That was, to my knowledge, the first information confirming the Soviet's rush to reconstruct their bombed out munitions factories. That first interrogation, which started as we held that young Austrian in our arms, also gave us our first insight into the deliberate Soviet exploitation of every single German and Austrian Prisoner of War (POW). Our report of this incident was the first of many, many thousands that detailed similar information.

**HUMINT EXPLOITATION OF EX-PRISONER'S (U)**

The first reports, taken from those emaciated, badly wounded Austrian prisoners, made their way to our Vienna headquarters shortly after the first trains arrived. The reports were then simply packaged up and sent on to Washington. Frankly, we didn't really know if the information in our reports was of any intelligence value, but we put a query in with them stating,
"In the event these reports should be of any value, we request to be informed, as more data of this type is readily available." Washington's response was affirmative—the intelligence was useful, and this prompted a visit from our Vienna office encouraging us to collect as much of this data as we could.

(U) Early prisoner returns were sporadic in number, sometimes singly, in groups of two's or three's but rarely more than a dozen at a time. So, it was possible to interview virtually every returning POW. As the traffic increased, I devised a program involving the Austrian Burgermeisters (Mayors of Austrian villages or towns). We prepared a questionnaire, ran it through the Austrian official channels, gave it to the Austrian "stimples," and required all Burgermeisters to conduct, using our questionnaire, a screening interrogation of each returnee to their village. The immediate benefit was our ability to quickly eliminate sources of no interest, and thereby concentrate our efforts on sources of probable valuable. Washington's guidance was used as a basis for making our decisions, and although it was not always accurate it was better than other guidance we had.

(U) Considering the large number of prisoners who were still to return home (using the Russian reports at the time as to the numbers they held), I realized our interrogation efforts could involve hundreds, even thousands of people. My worry was whether we could effectively exploit this source of information with only a half dozen or so HUMINT people available. Our Vienna headquarters had no ability to augment us and suggested I contact Washington. So, after I made my contacts there I began to clamor for additional resources: linguists, clerical people, typing paper, typewriters, and all the other things needed for the task ahead. I was also allowed to visit Washington early in 1946 to personally press my case.

(U) My visit to Washington cemented a collector-analyst relationship that proved to be extremely important for the entire POW interrogation effort. I met with the actual users of the data, and we both were able to present our needs to each other. Our new mutual understanding resulted in additional personnel being made available. I also obtained money to compensate the Burgermeister staff people, and thus pay my way in this very necessary Austrian collection activity.
During the latter part of 1946 and much of 1947, our split crews conducted interrogations 24 hours a day. We were a part of the Air Intelligence section of the Occupation Army Air Force of Austria, headed by Brigadier General Ralph A. Snively, General Mark Clark's senior air officer for Austria. But, interrogating returnees from the Soviet Union was only one of the many activities we engaged in. We also conducted some clandestine operations and provided language translations for local commanders and the Austrian Headquarters. We received some additional people and equipment, but we were more than just a section, we were functioning as a full-fledged air interrogation and intelligence center. It became very clear to me, by mid 1947, that the POW interrogation requirements being levied by Washington could never be accomplished with our current or projected resources.

**ESTABLISHING THE WRINGER PROGRAM (U)**

In the fall of 1947, I was reassigned to Washington, D.C. and immediately took up the cause of increasing the collection capabilities for not only Austria, but Germany and Japan as well. Headquarters jobs tend to be very demanding, so my WRINGER* and HUMINT interests had to be tended to after hours on my own time. Initially this limited my involvement, but when analysts began applying pressure to increase collection resources the word went all the way up the command structure to the Director, Chief of Air Intelligence, Maj Gen Charles P. Cabell (later General). General Cabell was well aware of the interrogation issue, and was immediately sympathetic. His instructions to his staff gave the interview program a higher priority. Linguists assigned to the 7001st Air Intelligence Service Squadron in Germany were, for the most part, engaged in providing interpretative and translation work for visitors to Germany, and for guiding them around. Doing translations of current German publications and documents become part of their job also. We attempted to get this organization converted to doing WRINGER collection work, but they were satisfying their own command structure with their interpretive-type duties. Some of their personnel were sent on loan to us in Austria, but their leadership was reluctant to fully enter into WRINGER activity.

*The term WRINGER applied to the interview of returning German, Austrian, and Japanese POW's who had been interned in the USSR, many of them for a considerable period after the war ended.*
Major General Cabell authorized a European trip for me and one of his leading analysts (Arthur Lee Canfield). This trip was to be the genesis for putting the WRINGER program on a systematic basis. Something needed to be done because Air Force intelligence manning for all Austria numbered but at a handful of people, a total of only 30, including their commander. Plans for an entirely new Air Intelligence Service Organization (AISO) for Austria needed to be developed from scratch. This was done, and upon our return to Washington the implementation of those plans began. We had also altered the mission of the Germany based unit, the 7001st Air Intelligence Service Squadron, from a language service provider to an intelligence interrogation activity. Everything was done in record time. The new AISO for Austria, which was to consist of 115 people, had its table of organization and blueprints for operations approved within days of our return to the United States. The 7001st in Germany with its new mission, and the new organization in Austria were now put under the staff supervision of Colonel Bently ("Wild Bill" Bently). With these two organizations geared to the new mission, we now had a total of about 300 individuals engaged in WRINGER operations, all in only a matter of three weeks.

Having WRINGER served by 100's of personnel enabled us to build into our operations some of the procedures learned from the British during the war. We set up an operational control system, which tied Washington directly to the field activities. In this way, we were able to relay analytical needs simultaneously to both Germany and Austria, something we had not achieved before. Washington developed specific requirements that were geared directly to the interrogation activity. They were not generalized, all-inclusive kind of statements, but were geared precisely for use at the interrogation table. This control from headquarters, from the "top down" of the using element, was and is one of the most important aspects of HUMINT collection. It's very difficult to maintain, and is generally ignored because it runs counter to the normal staff and line authority channels. The normal channels tend to drive these two echelons apart, whereas our control system with Washington brought the two echelons together. Two or three people at a desk in the Pentagon were responsible for all WRINGER activities, and the results were very effective.
WRINGER ORGANIZATION (U)

WRINGER required us to have effective communications with all areas of Germany and Austria, so that we could reach returning POWs as quickly as possible after their return. Operational control of the communications channels enabled us to assist the theater in spreading its coverage to what eventually grew to 13 camps in Germany and 4 in Austria. Each camp was a separate detachment, which later became separate squadrons of an Air Intelligence Service Wing. They were fully functional interrogation centers with their own background, records, and required coverage. Their reports were sent to a central German or Austrian office, and from there the original reports were transmitted directly to Washington. It is important to note that interrogation reports are never altered, changed, or edited except for grammar and spelling—the fundamental rule being: do not rewrite the essence of what is obtained at the interrogation table into studies or estimates. Original raw data must go directly to the user, when possible. It is worth mentioning in this case, that reports prepared at bottom level interrogation echelons were sent to Washington, each on a reproducible master. Actual raw data was kept at the detachment of origin. Copies of reports were also provided to both the Austrian and German headquarters where their own analysts worked. So, as you can see, the same data was available at three echelons: 1) the producer, 2) the theater Headquarters, and 3) the Headquarters in Washington. Having all three involved brought a wide range of expertise to bear, enabling us to thoroughly analyze all materials.

(U) As our new organization began to function, we saw both a massive increase in the number of reports and improvements in timeliness. We also recognized that we were going to have to take action soon if we were going to maintain the necessary levels of qualified and trained personnel. We knew Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) schools were incapable of turning out a sufficient number of linguists for our needs. So our headquarters people initiated their own recruitment campaign throughout the Air Force. They went to reception centers where young talent was coming into the military. This gave us the chance to review test results, interview promising candidates, and immediately put our hands on personnel who met our needs. We offered attractive assignments to young recruits, and obtained a lot of good talent for intelligence this way.
The second phase of our manning effort included bringing all new personnel to Washington, D.C., for training, training which I think offered a vitally important service for both current and future HUMINT providers. Our instructors were provided by user elements that had a vested interest in the whole issue of increased flow and quality of HUMINT products. Our so-called WRINGER schools, which ran for a four-year period, were among the most important contributors to enhancing the entire HUMINT effort. Without them, we would never have achieved the level of reporting that we did. Overall, our methods of recruiting, training, and assignment selection paid off well for us. It was a time in the history of HUMINT when we truly had a vertical structure, which is one of the absolute requirements for any well-functioning HUMINT activity.

OTHER WRINGER DEVELOPMENTS (U)

Our personnel situation was now significantly improved, so we turned our attention to the preparation of a systematic Air Interrogation Guide. The Air Interrogation Guide effort was initiated at headquarter, but almost all the work was done by field analysts who gave up their own time to help assemble, compile, and write it. For a decade and a half it governed the interrogation activity of those that had observation opportunities within the USSR, and provided another means of measuring HUMINT effectiveness. It provided a statement of requirements geared and compiled on behalf of the ultimate user, aimed at that user and no one else. Here again, it was simply a repetition of an air interrogation guide that the British had during World War II--considered the bible for every interrogator. What we did was to reconstruct that bible in accordance with the needs of the Air Force. It was, I submit, a benchmark document.

By 1949 we had the Interrogation Guide in hand, and a reasonable flow of personnel which allowed WRINGER to prosper again, at least for several months. However, another tremendous influx of ex-POW's--particularly in Germany--hit the system, but in numbers far beyond of our capacity. In order to cope with this extremely heavy demand, we had to resort to extreme measures. We desperately needed personnel, supplies, and other resources immediately if we were to do interrogation screenings of what was turning into thousands of sources weekly--rather than the hundreds we had faced previously. This time, we solved the problem by going to the top. Our recruitment efforts began again, but this time it involved a search for hundreds of
linguists, including German nationalists, and 48 senior U.S. civilian positions. Grade authorizations ran from GS-7 to GS-10, so we were able to aim our primary efforts at the young college graduate. Recruitment and training for U.S. nationals was taken over by the operational control group in the Pentagon, but closely coordinated with user organizations. Parenthetically, it's worth commenting, that the individuals selected during this period are today (1974) some of the senior air intelligence collection experts in the Air Force, and can be found in various collection echelons throughout our service. Among the German and Austrian personnel hired for the program were many top-level scientists and educators. These highly trained and extremely competent linguistic specialists enhanced our capabilities, and elevated the quality of our work a great deal.

WRINGER COMMUNICATIONS (U)

(U) Another important contributor to the success of the WRINGER activity, without which we would have fallen far short of the levels we attained, was the excellent telephone conferencing (TELECON) communications capability between Washington and Europe. We had a weekly TELECON session, attended by HUMINT people and other representatives of the intelligence community. These sessions gave HUMINT personnel firsthand exposure to analyst needs, and their cross talk resulted in improved intelligence products. The sessions provided rare opportunity for both to really communicate, which in turn gave each a better appreciation of the other's work and the problems associated with that work.

(U) There were times when, as a monitor of these TELECONS, I saw analysts read the material on the TELECON screen, rise from their seats and leave with an answer to a high priority concern. A very gratifying experience. It was additional evidence of how quality facilities and support mechanisms made HUMINT a significant collector, and proved how normal staff procedures and lengthy coordination requirements interfere with efficiency. The TELECON type processes are key tools for HUMINT collectors, because without the cross talk and mutual feedback such processes provide, HUMINT activity will not operate at its fullest capacity.
The U.S. Army's involvement in the WRINGER program was extremely limited. In fact, the Army strongly objected to the way in which air interrogation was conducted even during World War II, because they had much different concerns than the Air Force. Basically they were interested in information on areas within 500 miles of their forces, and had no concerns about what was going on in the USSR. Having the Army geared solely to their own tactical interests, and never to the Air Force's strategic requirements, caused us problems because the Army had authority in Europe.

With WRINGER we were able to successfully break away from Army control, had it not, the WRINGER effort would have failed. For instance, the Army had a written prohibition against in depth interrogation of any fourth source on any particular installation. In WRINGER there were examples in which as many as 86 sources were interrogated in detail concerning one particular munitions installation in the Soviet Union. It was our view that these 86 frames of reference, these 86 pair of eyes had recently been inside this Soviet factory, and could therefore provide our analysts with information that was otherwise unavailable. In fact we obtained such intricate, extremely detailed construction and refurbishment information on plants that only an insider could have provided it. Sources like this weren't available at any price, even Soviet workers, it was felt, were incapable of giving such quality information. So to me, one of the strength of the WRINGER program was that we could conduct in depth interrogations with as many contacts as we wished. The detailed data we obtained helped the Air Force with its strategic target planning, was used to better forecast individual plant production capacities, and ultimately provided a clearer picture of total Soviet industrial capability.

An interesting sidelight during this period of Army versus Air Force went something like this. The Army was sending their POW interrogation reports to Air Force analysts, as well as to their own. They contained very little evaluation materials, so as they arrived at our offices in Washington they were dutifully read and filed numerically just in case an analyst should need it. But every single Air Force report went first through the hands of the analysts for immediate evaluation. Army interrogation personnel occasionally visited Washington, and many spent more time with us than their own G-2 people. That was because of the poor rapport they had
with their own G-2, and the great rapport they had with us. After all, we were giving them help, their folks weren't. The result of this was that we were able, quite inadvertently, to enlist the support of Army interrogators on behalf of our requirements; support, which incidentally, was often contrary to the Army's own interests. In fact, Army intelligence personnel often came to us in the Pentagon to plead for assistance in converting their officer commissions from Army to Air Force. We added some very competent interrogators to our own staffs from the Army.

FAR EASTERN WRINGER (U)

Concurrent with activities for the European theater was a similar program in the Far East. The Far East also had an Air Intelligence Service Organization. It too functioned as an interrogation pool and translation activity. It was prevented from any other intelligence activities, by the edict of General Willoughby (General MacArthur's G-2). General Willoughby kept the Air Force from moving into WRINGER-type activities for a period of almost two years. We in the Pentagon were attempting to negate that prohibition and get the Air Force language pools there converted to a WRINGER mission. We finally broke General Willoughby's edict when we went to the very top and got General Hoyt S. Vandenburg, the Air Force Chief of Staff, on our side. He in turn contacted General MacArthur and protested Willoughby's edict. The edict became an item of concern on a trip which included General Cabell, several CIA representatives, and a Colonel from G-2 who supported Air Force attempts to begin a WRINGER operation in Japan. This group met with General Willoughby and General MacArthur. After presenting their case to General MacArthur, he said to General Willoughby, "Change the way the river flows and let these folks get in the act."

This policy reversal represented a huge breakthrough for HUMINT work. It opened the entire Far East to the same kind of collection that was already producing in Europe. WRINGER was now worldwide. The support structure we had in the U.S. took the Japan unit under its arm and requirements began to flow. A new TELECON was set up, and we began recruiting U.S. civilians from the oriental communities of both California and Hawaii. We hired some highly competent Nisei (a person of Japanese descent, born and educated in the United States) some of whom are still working for the Air Force. In addition to Japan, we set up another Air Intelligence Service Organization (AISO) in Alaska.
The AISO in Alaska was short lived but did some interesting work. It involved itself in some of the "KAVAK" intercourse that was going on between the Soviets and Alaskan landmasses. It concerned itself with some of the fishermen in the area who were either refugees or defectors. For a short period of time, an interesting and remote air intelligence HUMINT occurred.

WRINGER IN PERSPECTIVE (U)

Statistically speaking the best available figure we have of WRINGER operation screenings is approximately seven million. The interviews were with ex-POW's, refugees and border crossers of all kinds, and from them we produced roughly one million detailed reports. The WRINGER program spanned twelve years, with peak production coming during a period of about seven years immediately following the war.

A great assist is the initial days of WRINGER came from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Their analysts examined early WRINGER reports, and when they found them to be of use supported our efforts with written requirements and moral encouragement. In fact, they actually curtailed some of their own overt exploitation activities in Europe because they were satisfied with the work provided to them by WRINGER. As evidence of the CIA’s good intentions, they offered assistance in overcoming the severe production/reproduction problem that was straining the Air Force. WRINGER reports were reaching the Pentagon in tremendous volumes, and our ability to produce and make copies for those who needed them became too much. In fact, WRINGER reports were piling up on the floors of the fifth floor corridors in the Pentagon, almost endangering traffic in those corridors. The CIA pulled us out of the fire by volunteering to receive the initial reproducible masters arriving from both theaters, and then reproduced from that master the number of copies we and the other users needed and made distribution of them. This took a great load off WRINGER dissemination efforts, and made it possible to produce and distribute copies to the intelligence community far more effectively than if the Air Force had been forced to do it alone.
(U) One major development in WRINGER was the creation of an AISO in the United States. When first established, it operated in Colorado Springs, Colorado, under the Air Defense Command. It worked out poorly there, and after a few years the AISO was moved to Washington where it took over the old WRINGER control desk functions.

A terribly important lesson came with this action; one we began learning in World War II. In order to work at the highest efficiency, a HUMINT organization must be vertically operated. There has to be a vertical structure whereby the ultimate user can immediately communicate his requirements directly to the collector. This cannot be done through normal staffing channels because of the many levels imposed between collector and user. The unit, eventually known as the 1127th AISO in Washington, served the headquarters "mother" over the entire Air Force HUMINT structure worldwide. It served both overt and clandestine activities, much the same as the CIA organization does. There was direct access to headquarters with no echelons in between, and information copies were made only when necessary. We were not successful in fully achieving this goal, to the detriment of HUMINT. In HUMINT, the closer to direct vertical channeling you can achieve the better.

WRINGER program involvement with POW information exploitation eventually began to subside, but many of us inside the system noted another obvious and readily available source of information—refugees. However, this source was either not thought of, or not thought of as being of much use to the people controlling the activity in the theaters. It took a good deal of infighting in both Asia and Europe before we would be able to actively exploit this massive source of information. Worldwide, the WRINGER organization had grown to, counting U.S. military and civilians and foreign military and nationals, a total manning in the neighborhood of 3,000 personnel. This vast organization was in place as the POW flow subsided and that workload decreased. Those of us in the Washington monitorship function thought it a normal action for the field units to convert to refugee exploitation. In fact, we thought this exploitation was already underway, until we discovered that the authorities in Europe were interpreting existing regulations as to not include refugee exploitation. So, there was a period of time when systematic and energetic exploitation of refugees was not being accomplished. We were able to convert HUMINT activities to work with refugee in both Japan and Europe, though, via some "left-handed" staffing between the theater and headquarters personnel. The effort was extremely
effective and energetic, and in many respects the refugee product equaled that which had been obtained from the POW source group. After the rather stumbling transfer from one source group to another, the high production of WRINGER continued for some years. Without the WRINGER structure in existence and in place, we would have missed the boat badly on this program. As it was, we did pretty well.

(U) Another development in HUMINT work occurred near the end of the WRINGER program. Major General Millard "Pappy" Lewis, the Director of Intelligence, established a staff function under his control called the Collection Development Research Activity. Colonel Robert Quinn headed it for a time. The mission of this organization was to constantly examine the methodology of all elements of collection—HUMINT, technological, and how they could be improved, new opportunities anticipated, and preparations made toward their exploitation accomplished before the fact instead of after. General Lewis was looking toward an era when we could anticipate collection needs like WRINGER and respond to them in a timelier manner. He was somewhat successful, but the function was placed directly under the Director of Intelligence, not the Director of Collection, or at the actual collection echelons where it would have been far better to place the office.

**CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES (U)**

(U) Clandestine HUMINT activities were now being conducted under a CIA service-wide accord, which gave the services a mission in clandestine activity that had never been spelled out or even condoned—in some circles prior to this point. This is not to say that the services had not engaged in clandestine activities previously, but agency agreement gave approval for it at the highest levels of government. Before that time, clandestine activities had been engaged in but could be plausibly denied. It's important to note that there was a time when the services were officially precluded, by directive, from participating in clandestine activities.

(U) In the Air Force, this was the case immediately after World War II. Then, we lived under the General Lucius Clay's directive in Europe that forbade clandestine collection against the Soviet Union. During the war itself, we had collected clandestinely, not necessarily against the Soviet Union, but we had the mechanisms in place to do so. These mechanisms, having been
created via combined British and U.S. expertise throughout the war, were well established effectively in the minds of even the user elements, that analysts in Washington could not bring themselves to discontinue them-- even though directed to do so. Those of us in the business were in a quandary, but for my own case, I decided that those clandestine operations would continue, and information from those sources would be produced under the same arrangements as the WRINGER reports. This was a time during which, in my opinion, it was vital to allow analysts access to any information regardless of its source. So, a very small number of analysts in the Pentagon were made party to the fact that reports identified in a certain manner were in fact clandestinely collected, although they appeared in WRINGER report format.

(U) This produced some highly intricate and interesting reporting for a number of years after World War II. It occurred when, by directive, we were forbidden to do so. So our expertise really continued throughout the period of prohibition. It was in many respects still intact, though not heavily used, when the 1958 accord officially granted service involvement.

After approval was granted, the initial efforts were not particularly successful because they were entered into with too much enthusiasm and were independent of proper coordination with the CIA. The very earliest record of both the Army and Air Force activities showed themselves to be not nearly as effective as they could have been had we properly utilized the capabilities that we had on hand. This was during the 58-59 time frame, and fortunately we in the Air Force learned some lessons and began working more effectively.

Some of us recognized that our only hope of succeeding was to place ourselves completely within the operational control mechanisms of the CIA. We felt this would give us the necessary competence for the future. Our dependence on the CIA, in those earlier days, resulted in CIA/USAF cooperation without which Air Force clandestine collection activities would have been far less successful than they were. The CIA/USAF relationship was clearly different from the CIA/Army relationship. The Army's clandestine operations were run, from the very onset, as if in competition with the CIA. As a result, CIA was far less cooperative and helpful to the Army than it was to us. Consequently, we had, I believe, a far better structure and we had achieved a higher level of effectiveness than the Army. That was certainly true in the years that I was the
director of clandestine operations in Europe, and was able to compare the Army’s and Navy’s efforts with our own.

ANTI-HUMINT ATTITUDES (U)

As I mentioned, the early USAF efforts in clandestine operations left much to be desired, because our misplaced enthusiasm resulted in agents being sent out who were improperly selected, trained, and briefed. The chaos that resulted contributed a great deal to the anti-HUMINT ideology always present at various Pentagon staff levels. Actually it resulted in the previously mentioned directive from the Chief of Air Intelligence which forbade the continuation of clandestine activity by Air Force HUMINT personnel. This prohibition came at a time when a number of clandestine operations had been launched and were underway, and reporting. The dilemma of what to do about an operation that had been launched, which would not report again for quite some time—perhaps six months to a year ahead after it became well-placed reporting asset—was a big problem. As I said, we simply allowed them to continue, but knew we had to change the negative opinions and get the directive rescinded. Our immediate action was to compile all possible data in support of the activity in order to show why CIA preferred that we participate and handle purely air-oriented requirements. Our information was shared with senior members of the A-2’s staff. If we could get them on our side, perhaps they would help persuade the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACS) to change his mind. In this we were 100 percent successful, and we were overjoyed when we heard the edict cancelled. The edict did stymie development of clandestine activities, but only for a short time. In the long run, there were no long-term effects or any real damage done. There is always a desire to utilize and operate a clandestine collection mechanism. It’s human nature to be intrigued by the great potential, the great allure, and the utter joy of creating and operating and reaping the benefits of clandestine operations. In my book, there was no satisfaction that transcended that feeling during my 31 years of military service.

We were successful in a number of cases, in part, because of our close cooperation with the CIA. The Director of the CIA himself gave the USAF HUMINT clandestine effort the greatest accolade any activity could receive, which gave the Air Force the shot in the arm it needed to obtain funding. Yet, despite successes such as the one we enjoyed with Bardwich,
East Germany’s Atomic Scientist, there were still strong sentiments against service connected HUMINT operations. That sentiment criticized how the program was conducted, and that it wasn’t cost effective.

RELATIVE VALUE OF COVERT OPERATIONS (U)

On a comparative basis, it is my belief that, yes, the dollars expended on the overt side of HUMINT produced a greater total return than the dollars invested on the clandestine side. There was room for improvement in the way clandestine activities were conducted. There was a mild defrauding of the taxpayers’ money in meeting the necessary requirements of clandestine operations, and although it seems that this comment means I am suggesting the elimination of clandestine activity, that is not completely the case. My recommendation instead is that any covert operation should be operated in the only true way that any clandestine activity should be conducted, and that is only on a need-to-know basis—virtually impossible in the normal military staff structures.

The military covert activity must not be discontinued, but it should be made completely independent of staff responsibilities. It could be under the control of the CIA with military personnel provided to the agency for that purpose. Or it could remain an Air Force activity, but not be responsible to any echelon other than the Chief of Air Intelligence and one or two of his monitors such as the collection director.

With the problems for implementing covert HUMINT, there were many moments when those of us involved were of the opinion that continuing the process was just not justified. There were too many obstacles, too many military requirements that negated the effectiveness. It was impossible to promote military personnel working in deep cover. They just couldn’t work within the system because of the dangers posed, and the system wouldn’t change to accommodate them. Typical stupidity of a large system, “We can’t do that, we’ve never done that.”

Realizations of this sort resulted in a study conducted by individuals involved in covert collection. They argued, in great depth and with great care and forethought, that the CIA should
absorb the responsibilities and operations of military clandestine activities as an adjunct to their own activity. A briefing was prepared, and informally presented to CIA authorities. They declared it to be a well-developed, sensible solution to the problem that was plaguing both our organizations. But they had a reason why they preferred that the present military covert collection continue—military units represented a diversion, a camouflage, a target for the enemy’s counterintelligence operations. When the enemy counterespionage personnel were busy tracking down military clandestine operations, they were not on the heels of a CIA operation. With this estimate, the Air Force briefers, amazed at this evaluation of their real value, withdrew. As far as I know, the issue has never been raised again. I my opinion it should be!

**JOINT HUMINT PLANNING (U)**

A significant development in interservice-wide HUMINT occurred in 1966. A joint plan covering future military HUMINT operations was prepared by representatives from all services, and approved by both the service chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. The plan was known as the DOD Human Resource and Intelligence Collection Plan of 1966, and truthfully, its existence is primarily a result of Air Force agitation. In brief, it was aimed at the establishment of joint centers, at both national and theater levels, so that HUMINT could be operated in areas where mutual support facilities would be beneficial and useful for all three. The overlap that existed simply wasn’t justified—HUMINT is HUMINT whatever the service branch—and with each having its own headquarters, support staffs and each implementing its own functions made the cost prohibitive. The aim of centralizing HUMINT activities would at the very least be very cost effective.

Centralized operations promised a bright future for HUMINT, and was so alluring and seemed such a far reaching panacea for many of our ills that I clamored to become a part of it. I had put a lot into the plan, since I was the Air Force senior representative on the committee that originally wrote the plan. So I sought every means to join the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and was, in fact, named the Chief of Collection Planning and Policy Activity in DIA for HUMINT.
The implementation continued quite amicable for some time until the Army had second thoughts about the matter. They began sabotaging the concept of joint HUMINT centers at every turn, and were successful in eliminating much of what had been planned. They so seriously undermined the new direction that what might have been one of the most significant developments in the evolution of military HUMINT operations came to a standstill.

**POW CONDUCT TRAINING (U)**

(U) The intelligence community often loses sight of another program with links to HUMINT—Code of Conduct training. This has to do with training our own combatants in how to conduct themselves after capture, and how to resist various interrogation method, should they become prisoners of war. The naivete of the military approach to this problem was greatly underscored to many of us who participated in interrogations during World War II. All existing rules concerning POW status began and ended with name, rank, and number only. We learned many ways to improve on this policy during the course of our work.

(U) In 1948, the Air Force initiated the examination of this problem. Under the guidance of General Cabell, an Air Force position was promulgated which resulted in a series of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) papers that represented a vital step forward on the whole issue of conduct after capture. These JCS papers were a series of papers known as 2053/5; but they were not available for implementation until just before the Korean War ended. In spite of their limited availability in that war, they made some significant applications.

(U) Examining the name, rank, and number problem is such that HUMINT personnel are some of the very few who are qualified to have a hand in resistance after capture training. The HUMINTer can establish briefing procedures whereby interrogations can be resisted and disciplined conduct maintained after capture. Yet, all too often the problem has been bandied about by other staff elements. I'm happy to be able to observe that, now, a major concern with this problem is in the intelligence. In my view, HUMINT itself was as active as it might have been in the recent Vietnam experience. In the future, it should be a priority for intelligence to be continuously concerned with this problem. The Air Force began staff consideration of the problem shortly after World War II. Again, it was our agitation, at the conclusion of the Korean
War that resulted in the well-known code-of-conduct policy. It was a delight to represent the Air Force on that advisory committee of the Secretary of Defense that wrote that code. The Air Force had taken the initiative, and rightfully so, in this area. It certainly is my hope that it will continue to do so.

PROBLEMS OR RECOGNITION (U)

(U) The following observations are made in response to questions pertaining to philosophical views based on Colonel Work's long experience in HUMINT.

(U) Rather early in my Air Force HUMINT experience, I began to sense that the activity itself put us in a unique position. Experience showed that the ways we conducted this rather specialized activity were similar to the ways that other operational organization conducted their business. The problem with that is, HUMINT activities suffer significantly under "normal" staff function management.. A comment made to me described what staff functioning was doing to HUMINT--"What we are doing is systematically perpetuating an unacceptable mediocrity." No matter how hard we tried, we never rose to the levels that we all recognized we could achieve. We always had problems thrown upon us that enmeshed us in the routine of the service. The staff function, so called, constantly stood in our way. This had to do with assignments of human beings, whether it was for clandestine or overt activities. Assignments were made indiscriminately throughout most of the 31 years of my own experience. There was an old adage we joked about that went, "If he doesn't fit anywhere else, put him in intelligence, and if you can't find a place for him in intelligence, put him in HUMINT." This was in fact the way assignment policies at one time were realized.

One classic personal example involved the arrival of replacements. My organization was heavily involved in clandestine activities and we were losing personnel at an unacceptable rate. We had been clamoring for reinforcements and replacements while our analysts continued to work under strength and in a terribly tight system of requirements and demands. One day my unit was sent 13 new officers, none above Lieutenant, and not one trained in any intelligence function, much less HUMINT or clandestine procedures. These officers were within weeks of their graduation from college and their ROTC commissions. The most senior man stepped
forward and reported to me, he outranked all the others by more than 90 days and only 122 days as a commissioned officer. With these 13 we undertook some sophisticated and complex covert operations, and once again we needed replacements. We had no choice with a system that systematically perpetuated unacceptable mediocrity.

We assigned departing attaches to HUMINT, convincing ourselves that this was an appropriate assignment. While Air Force attaches are fairly well trained, they are not as well trained as the attaches of virtually any other country, in my opinion. Therefore, with what really amounted to inadequate training, they were placed in a HUMINT command position making decisions involving a function not familiar with. More systematic perpetuation. This condition continues today, I believe. It certainly continued unabated through my many years of intimate involvement with HUMINT.

**TOP SCORE (U)**

(U) As a result of these uneven personnel procedures, we developed, within the HUMINT activity, a program known as TOP SCORE. TOP SCORE was an effort by which we made a tentative selection of an individual for a particular slot. The person was then approached as to whether or not they would entertain such an assignment. If so they were then entered into a systematic training program that would require as much as 18 to 24 months to complete. When the individual finished the training, we then had a member of our staff who was properly trained, qualified, and eager to take to the field.

(U) TOP SCORE got off to a pretty good start. Nevertheless, it was taken from HUMINT control shortly after it was established and turned over to personnel types to monitor. In the minds of the HUMINT specialist, this was tantamount to inefficiency, and a further example of perpetuating mediocrity. The A-1 assignment procedures were the cause of our problems in the first place.

(U) The TOP SCORE program was a viable answer to the personnel problem, and potentially the answer to any future problems with clandestine intelligence collection activity. One aspect of the TOP SCORE program was that it established very high professional standards.
for entering the HUMINT field, that only a very select few could qualify. Very few of the new incoming replacements and recruits whom I saw were of the right quality. Based on my experience, I could see that a fully activated TOP SCORE program could achieve professionalism within HUMINT.

**BRITISH LESSON: VALUE OF RESERVE (U)**

(U) The British proved, during World War II, that an effective and professional, highly trained, highly competent reserve component can accomplish the HUMINT function. The truth is that the operational capability of British HUMINT rested primarily within the reserve structure and not the active duty establishment. The British had, of course, always maintained a small number of round-the-clock active duty personnel, but the bulk of the HUMINT efforts were always in the hands of the reserves. We, in the Air Force, thought at one time that we could get the job done by maintaining sufficient numbers of highly qualified active duty HUMINT personnel, and not have to depend on reserve support. It didn't take many years to discover how very wrong we were and how emphatically this never would be the case.

(U) One of the finest potentials existing in the Air Force HUMINT, certainly until the end of 1970 when I ceased to be intimately familiar with it, rested with our reserve forces. In the future, the emphasis must be on the reserve component in the HUMINT area. They must be developed, even at the expense of a smaller and smaller active duty complement. We'll always need a minimum of highly qualified covert specialists as long as we are to continue in that activity. But on the overt side of the house, the really massive exploitation opportunities, which any kind of emergency situation brings about, should be made the almost sole responsibility of the reserve structure. The reservists involved must have the ability to come on active duty at any time.

**SUMMARY OF HUMINT CONTRIBUTION (U)**

(U) In searching my memory for the special contributions made by HUMINT operations over the years, I realized the huge volume of work I had to review. In truth, it's difficult to assess the true impact of WRINGER and HUMINT reporting. The importance of the collected
materials only takes form after its in the hands of the analysts. These were the guys who put the pieces together, but because of their excitement over some new take, didn’t always find or take the time to keep us posted in a timely manner. In retrospect, I have always been of the opinion that one of the greatest contributions of HUMINT, to the early value of air intelligence, was commented on by General Curtis E. LeMay. He described WRINGER as providing many of the eyes of SAC when targets in the USSR were being programmed against our new weapons availability. I can remember so clearly how analysts approached me with comments about certain numbers of new weapons being available by such and such a time, but that the current information prevented them from being able to identify targets which justified an allocation of these weapons. Those comments prompted the triggering of the WRINGER system in order to develop more information on the places in question, and how this so often provided them sufficient new information so that a new weapon, as it became available, could be allocated to a target.

Also, as I think over HUMINT's major contributions, I'm mindful of a number of incidents when analysts told me how WRINGER reports helped them identify the keys through which the analytical community was then able to establish the Soviet timings of additional nuclear and hydrogen bombs to their arsenal. As I recall the anxiety of the analysts and the priority of those requirements at the time, this certainly must have been one of WRINGER's most significant contributions.

In any study of HUMINT's special contributions, one clandestine operation which ran for years must come to mind. It was one of the most exciting clandestine operations I was involved in, and it had to do with recruiting over atomic scientists participating in Soviet R&D programs. As an example, we were able to enlist the cooperation of an East German atomic scientist who was working at the highest levels of Soviet nuclear development. We promised to eventually settle him in the United States. During the time he remained in place in East Germany, and the Soviet Union, he was a reporting source from inside Soviet atomic research facilities. Only one cover target could have been more exciting and that would have involved the keys to the Kremlin itself.
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Other DOD recipients will be identified at a later date and Oral Histories will be mailed separately.