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Description of document: Thirty (30) National Security Agency (NSA) DIRgrams, NSA Director's Messages to the Work Force, 1999-2004

Requested date: 12-June-2008

Released date: 22 September 2017

Posted date: 16-October-2017

Note: See following page for list of included DIRgrams

Source of document: National Security Agency
Attn: FOIA/PA Office
9800 Savage Road, Suite 6932
Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6932
Fax: 443-479-3612 (Attn: FOIA/PA Office)
[On-Line Form](#)

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DIRgrams INCLUDED IN THIS FILE:

DIRgram-09: "NSA and the American Public"
DIRgram-15: "The NSA Advisory Board and Its New Role"
DIRgram-39: "The Congressional Justification Books and You"
DIRgram-51: "Re-thinking Boards, Councils and Associations"
DIRgram-55: "NSA and '60 Minutes'"
DIRgram-76: "Communicating with Congress"
DIRgram-85: "NSA and Congress"
DIRgram-97: "The Five C's of Communicating with Congress"
DIRgram-102: "Recent NSA Advisory Board Meeting"
DIRgram-103: "Public Affairs Update"
DIRgram-111: "Changes in Internal Communications"
DIRgram-132: "NSA's Internal and External Team Reports to be Released on Internet"
DIRgram-134: "Events of the Last 48 Hours"
DIRgram-138: "Additional Insights on Press Coverage of the USS Cole Incident"
DIRgram-153: "The National Cryptologic School"
DIRgram-177: "IG Reports on Status of DIRgram Implementation"
DIRgram-200: "Implementation of EP-3 Cryptologic Damage Assessment Recommendation"
DIRgram-201: "History Channel Poll"
DIRgram-209: "Relations with Congress"
DIRgram-221: "Support to 11 September Inquiry"
DIRgram-228: "Preservation of Information That May Relate to the Attacks of 11 September 2001"
DIRgram-236: "Joint Inquiry Team for 9/11"
DIRgram-239: "TRAILBLAZER Technology Demonstration Platform (TDP) Request for Proposal Released"
DIRgram-239: "Media Attention"
DIRgram-249: "First Congressional Open Hearing on 9/11 Inquiry"
DIRgram-276: "Upcoming Public Release of Joint Inquiry 9-11 Report"
DIRgram-286: "National Commission Continues Focus on 9-11"
DIRgram-301: "Smoking at NSA"
DIRgram-323: "9/11 Commission Report"
DIRgram-330: "Iraq: Our Plan to Support the Evolving National Strategy"

DIRgrams REQUESTED BUT WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY:

DIRgram-144
DIRgram-248
DIRgram-327
DIRgram-340
DIRgram-344
DIRgram-367
DIRgram-370
DIRgram-385
DIRgram-392
DIRgram-399



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

FOIA Case: 56158A
22 September 2017

This is a final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 12 June 2008 for 39 DIRgrams. A copy of your request is enclosed. Your request has been processed under the FOIA and some of the documents you requested are enclosed. Certain information, however, has been deleted from the enclosures and 10 documents (18 pages) have been withheld in their entirety.

The items denied in their entirety and some of the information deleted from the enclosed documents were found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. This information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Subparagraphs (c) and (d) of Section 1.4 and remains classified TOP SECRET and SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 of the Executive Order. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave or serious damage to the national security. Because the information is currently and properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(1)).

In addition, this Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities and personnel. We have determined that such information exists in these documents. Accordingly, those portions are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 3024(i); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605).

Since some documents were withheld in their entirety and information was withheld from the enclosures, you may construe this as a partial denial of your request. You are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures.

You may appeal this decision. If you decide to appeal, you should do so in the manner outlined below.

- The appeal must be sent via U.S. postal mail, fax, or electronic delivery (e-mail) and addressed to:

NSA/CSS FOIA/PA Appeal Authority (P132)
National Security Agency
9800 Savage Road STE 6932

Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6932

The facsimile number is (443)479-3612.

The appropriate email address to submit an appeal is FOIARSC@nsa.gov.


- Request must be postmarked or delivered electronically no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. Decisions appealed after 90 days will not be addressed.
- Please include the case number provided above.
- Please describe with sufficient detail why you believe the denial was unwarranted.

NSA will endeavor to respond within 20 working days of receiving your appeal, absent any unusual circumstances.

You may also contact our FOIA Public Liaison at foialo@nsa.gov for any further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your request. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Rd - OGIS
College Park, MD 20740
ogis@nara.gov
(877)684-6448
(202)741-5770
Fax (202)741-5769

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John R. Chapman", with a stylized flourish at the end.

JOHN R. CHAPMAN
Chief, FOIA/PA Office
NSA Initial Denial Authority

Encls:
a/s

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Posted on: November 29, 1999

(U) DIRgram-09: "NSA and the American Public"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Haydeb [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) We've seen a lot of press attention on our Agency, of late, from a wide range of sources on issues spanning alleged spying on Americans, congressional budget cuts, leadership problems, and the like. Accusations have surfaced that are, frankly, inaccurate and uninformed. Although, in the past, we took a "neither confirm nor deny" approach, we are finding that these allegations are causing troubling distortions in the public perception of NSA. With all this recent public scrutiny, it is essential that we become more aggressive in engaging the media and, therefore, the American people with the truth about our value as a national treasure.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At my request, our public affairs officer, Judi Emmel, has drafted a strong, assertive public affairs plan based on four themes. First, NSA is a national asset. Second, we are an Agency in transition. Third, we have a rich heritage. Finally, we are committed to being responsible citizens by upholding the highest ethical and legal standards. This plan also maps out how we respond to press queries and is designed to help us influence what is said about NSA. Our strategy will make us proactive participants in the focus of stories and, hopefully, give us a chance to "tell it like it really is." I have already met with journalists from "The New Yorker," "The Washington Post," "The LA Times" and other news organizations in the last two weeks.

(U//~~FOUO~~) This public, more "open" stance is a big step for us. It will require us to be even more vigilant about protecting sensitive and classified information for the sake of our nation's security. We are the keepers of the nation's secrets. In keeping with existing Intelligence Community, DOD and NSA regulations, I'm not giving everyone the authority to go out and discuss NSA with the press. I will make certain, as the primary public affairs representative for this Agency, that our message remains consistent and accurate. Every story won't be one we are happy with; the upcoming Seymour Hersh story in "The New Yorker"

will be a case in point (more on this later). But, if we can achieve a balanced presentation and get our message out, then we will have been successful.

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(U) Our draft public affairs plan will be available by Wednesday as a "Hot Item" off my webpage at [REDACTED] -The (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
careful balance between security and openness you will see in the plan is necessary if we are to make America comfortable with the power we possess. Once again, I ask that you send me your ideas on how we can most effectively get our message out to the public.

(U) A new ENLIGHTEN newsgroup (admin.talk-dirnsa) has been created to provide a forum for frank and open discussion with the Director and the Director's Staff on issues facing the Agency today. All postings will be read by the Staff and issues forwarded in a timely fashion, but due to the anticipated volume and administrative workloads, individual responses in this forum cannot be guaranteed.

(U) Please keep sending mail to me through talk_dirnsa@nsa whenever you think it's important. You can also send your comments on any morning's DIRgram to me, as you see fit, just by hitting your "reply" button. Finally, you'll also find archived copies of all DIRgrams, along with other change-related information, at my web site: [REDACTED] (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

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DIRgram-15: "The NSA Advisory Board and Its New Role"

07 December 1999

(U) I spent almost two full days last week with the new NSA Advisory Board. This is part of our effort to expand our horizons and gain as broad a perspective as possible in areas that both the internal and external teams emphasized.

(U) In July, we restructured the former NSA Scientific Advisory Board, dramatically expanding its charter to include advising NSA's leadership on areas like strategy, planning, business practices, investment options, new technologies, and process engineering. To signal this change, we also renamed it the NSA Advisory Board (NSAAB). We appointed a new executive secretary to assist us in making full use of the board in its new capacity.

(U) Each Board member brings ideas, experiences, and contacts from the public and private sectors. In addition to world class technologists, retired military intelligence officers, and senior government policy officials, we will soon add members to provide expertise on senior congressional perspectives and the media. We are extremely fortunate for the high quality and breadth of experience they bring to us.

(U) During our two days of meetings, I asked them to help us in the following areas:

1. (U) NCS-21

Task: A panel will advise the ELT on how we're doing with the goals and objectives of NCS-21. [To be completed in 90 days.]

2. (U) Modernization

Task: A panel will review Agency planning and implementation for modernization. We have too much duplication, too little accountability, and far too little prioritization. How can we fix all that? [To be completed in 90 days.]

3. (U) Metrics

Task: A panel will review the Agency's plan for complying with the "balanced scorecard" approach to metrics to advise us how to do it better. [To be completed in 90 days.]

4. (U) The National Cryptologic School/Agency Training

Task: A panel will review the recently completed NCS Privatization Study and recommend changes that could be made in public, private or corporate training for all of us who work here. I am especially interested in training that can be accomplished "off shore," i.e., in private industry. [To be completed in 60 days.]

5. (U) Public Affairs

Task: A panel will review the PAO draft plan and recommend course changes. Panel members will also work with the PAO to recommend any commercial or institutional training that could aid the PAO in implementing the plan. [To be accomplished in 45 days.]

(U) These are short timelines - by design! Within the next month a web page for the NSAAB will

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

be created. It will contain the board charter and summaries of the board's tasks and results. Please keep an eye out for new info on the NSAAB as it develops.

[DIRgrams Page]

UNCLASSIFIED

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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DIRgram-39: "The Congressional Justification Books and You"
19 January 2000

(U) It is vital as we move forward that we keep our stakeholders informed about what we are doing to better posture ourselves for the networked digital environment and to achieve our vision of Information Superiority for America and its Allies. One way that we keep some of them informed is through our submission of annual Congressional Justification Books for our three principal budgets - the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), the Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) and the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP). These books lay out our strategies for meeting customers' needs and addressing the initiatives that NSA and CSS are taking to meet our challenges. Because I believe it is vitally important to describe where we are headed and how we will get there in understandable terms, I personally took the time to write the preface to the Congressional Justification Book for the President's Consolidated Cryptologic Program Budget for Fiscal Year 2001. I described how we are moving toward our vision and what our strategy is for reengineering SIGINT. Throughout the text I included many examples of what we are doing to support these efforts. The full text of the preface will be posted on [REDACTED] expect any of you who become involved in CCP-related discussions will address your specific topics in the context of these themes, and I ask that you develop even more specific details/examples of how we are moving forward with these initiatives. I also expect to have very personal involvement in the writing of the prefaces for the ISSP and DCP budget books and I expect similar commitment from the work force involved with these budgets.

[DIRgrams Page]

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Posted on: February 11, 2000

(U) DIRgram-51: "Re-thinking Boards, Councils and Associations"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) In a continuing effort to get back to basics and focus on core missions, I want to be sure we're spending no more time on peripheral activities -- that is, on things that don't directly produce or support Signals Intelligence or Information Assurance -- than we absolutely have to. Over time, we've responded to a broad range of professional, social, and cultural opportunities and interests by forming internal boards, committees, councils, societies, and so forth. I know that many of these bodies are important to our Agency's future and transformation. But I also suspect we may have outgrown the need for others, and that the benefits of yet others may not be as great today as they once were. Overall, we should be spending less of our time on such activities. In DIRgram 22, I asked our Chief of Corporate Communications to look across the board at all of our publications, and in DIRgram 30, I directed the DDT to inventory and baseline all our projects. In this same vein, and because it's important for us to be sure we're diverting no more resources from transformation and operations than we must, I am now directing RADM Burns, the Assistant Director for Corporate Management (ADCM), to inventory our many convening groups here in the Agency.

(U) Effective today, I am freezing the establishment of all new working groups, boards, councils, associations, and such--that is, of any regularly convening body that consumes duty time, regardless of its work and mission relatedness. Further, any existing such group -including or comparable to boards, councils, panels, associations, steering and working groups, etc. - must submit, by 17 March, reason for their continuation. While we want to be thorough in this review, we recognize that some existing boards, such as Key Component promotion boards, are essential to the governance of our Agency. Similarly, some boards and committees are mandated by law or regulation. We won't disband any such board, panel, or committee, but we will examine and inventory everything. It's important for us to establish this baseline in order to know how much of our total time we spend on non-mission activities, and to decide whether we can afford to continue that in the days ahead.

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(U) Remember, we are talking about duty time, not voluntary associations during personal time. This may sound ominous. That is not my intent. I simply know of no better way to get a handle on this situation. To help RADM Burns get started on this task, I have asked the Director's Fellows to aid in describing and publishing the:

- elements of information which must be included in each justification, and
- criteria by which we will assess and categorize each submission.

I appreciate the breadth and diversity of what we're dealing with here, and I invite you to join in the process of setting up the rules by which we judge it. Please send your thoughts and recommendations to us at boards@d.nsa. RADM Burns will publish the submission rules and justification criteria we choose on his home page, at [REDACTED] by 28 February. This initial effort will allow us to evaluate and inventory all of the groups across NSA, and to be sure that we're neither perpetuating nor growing unnecessary or duplicative ones. At the end of March, I will announce the decisions we have made, and the standards to which we'll hold all peripheral activities.

(U) We must continue to find ways to direct resources right into our core missions. Many of our existing boards do just that. Some do not. This process will allow us to fairly determine the importance of such groups. This will not be an easy thing to do, but it holds the potential to redirect many working hours back to SIGINT and IA each week.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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Posted on: February 17, 2000

(U) DIRgram-55: "NSA and '60 Minutes'"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) By now you all know that we have seen an increase in news coverage on NSA. This coverage includes stories that we are satisfied with and ones we are not. Often times, we have little or no advanced notice of when stories will appear, but occasionally we do know ahead of time. I would like to take this opportunity to inform you of media coverage we expect to see soon - a "60 Minutes" segment about NSA,

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(C) [redacted] "60 Minutes" formally contacted me earlier this year through two couriered letters. The first letter asked me for an on-camera interview. The second letter asked our Public & Media Affairs Office (PAO) for a "written confirmation or denial of the ECHELON program or any alternatively-named global surveillance system that can intercept cell phone, land phone, e-mail or other transmissions." Based on their initial correspondence, and

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[redacted]
contacted a variety of sources. A crew has taped at the National Cryptologic Museum (with our permission), Menwith Hill Station, and GCHQ. They have written a FOIA request for any information related to ECHELON.

(U) The decision of whether or not to grant "60 Minutes" an on-camera interview was a difficult one. After consultation with seniors in the Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, outside consultants, and my internal staff, I have declined their request to appear on-camera. Instead, I have written a formal response that provides information on some of their allegations. A copy of that letter can be found on the PAO webpage at:

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) Although we are not certain how NSA will be portrayed in this piece, I have asked PAO to prepare for this event to ensure that you have all available information. In response, the following will be made available to you:

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

1. (U) Specific talking points to use in case we get questions from family, friends, or customers. They will be available on-line internally the day after the program airs. We expect the program to air within the next two Sundays.

2. (U) The "Frequently Asked Questions" webpage and the fact sheets I promised you in DIRGRAM-38 will be available this afternoon at the following location:

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

We ask that you look closely at these drafts, especially the one on "Your Civil Rights and NSA/CSS". Comments to the PAO (pao@nsa) are welcome. Within a week, PAO will place the FAQs on the worldwide web and will work to distribute the individual Fact Sheet handouts.

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

3. (U) I am giving a public speech at American University tonight in which I outline in detail how we protect the rights of Americans. The text of it will be available to the public on the Internet later this week.

(U) One final point: we must remember that confirming or denying allegations could inadvertently cause more damage. Please use the "approved-for-release" information when discussing NSA and its mission. If you have any questions, or receive queries from the media, please contact the PAO on 301-688-6524. Rest assured that we will continue to look for opportunities to deliver our message and educate the public on NSA and its important role.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2

Dated: 24 Feb 98

DECL ON: X1

DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
DATED: 23 February 1998
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

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Posted on: March 20, 2000

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) DIRgram-76: "Communicating with Congress"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) Capitol Hill's paying a lot of attention to us right now. Congress knows the importance of NSA to the nation, and that our future is at risk. Their oversight of our operations has always been strict, but today they want to know how we're transforming the Agency as well. They're particularly interested in learning whether the changes we're making are:

- (U) enough,
- (U) the right ones, and
- (U) producing the results we need.

(U) They want us to succeed. NSA has many strong supporters in Congress, but we must remain open and frank with them to earn their continuing help. We must also give them ammunition when they need it to convince their more skeptical colleagues.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We communicate with Congress in many ways, often in reaction to their requests. We don't have to wait for them to ask questions. The committees expect us to tell them on our own initiative whenever we've done something great, or something's going badly wrong, or we've just published a nationally important intelligence report. The law requires us to keep the intelligence committees fully informed of our intelligence activities. The process we use to do this is called "congressional notification." I want to do more than comply with the law. I want us to make extensive use of these notifications. If you know of breaking, important stories to tell, bad or good, contact [redacted] in Legislative Affairs.

[redacted]-963-3747s). [redacted] will tell you if your item sounds like something Congress would want to know about, and will work with you to tell them if it is. You can read NSA's notification policy and guidelines at:

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) Another, more formal way we communicate with Congress is in written replies to Congressionally directed actions and requests for information. These usually involve questions about our budget

requests, or directions to us in new acts or laws. Our track record in this area is spotty at best -- the actions we take and the answers we provide are often late and sometimes incomplete. Congress expects us to respond to them well and on time, every time. Our replies are a key way for them to judge our competence and professionalism. For well or ill, they directly influence Congressional decisions and actions. It is essential that we meet the standards they set for us. If the process you're using in your organization to answer Congress isn't working, I expect those of you responsible for it to fix it.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) It's up to us to keep Congress up to date on our progress and problems as we transform NSA. We must have their help to succeed. Let's keep showing them we're earning it.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

(U) "15 Minutes" will be broadcast today at 1000 and 1700, and at 0100 Tuesday morning - Channel 35 at OPS, Channel 23 at FANX, and Channel 15 at CANX. Field stations are to contact their local GIGSTER/JWICS POC to schedule a viewing time. The program will also be available via Audio News Service.

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Posted on: April 12, 2000

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) DIRgram-85: "NSA and Congress"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) At noon today, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) will hold an open hearing on "The Legal Authorities of the National Security Agency." Both the DCI and I will testify. During my testimony, I will reiterate that NSA fully complies with laws and regulations and that there is an effective oversight process in place by which we strictly abide.

(U) As a prelude to today's hearing, I hosted a first-ever, informal press "conference" last night at the National Cryptologic Museum. The purpose of this exchange between the media and NSA was to provide a better understanding of what will be discussed at the hearing. During the two hours, I provided several hypothetical examples to give a clearer depiction of NSA's challenges, focusing on our mission of foreign intelligence.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Last night's attendees included members of the media from several national and local print sources (Chicago Tribune, LA Times, Wall Street Journal, Baltimore Sun, Federal Times); broadcast news (CNN); magazines (Time, US News & World Report); the AP wire service; and author of The Puzzle Palace, James Bamford. My comments, as well

(U) Trust is crucial in today's technological revolution to maintain the value of SIGINT and protect the safety and security of the nation.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) Although C-SPAN has not confirmed attending, we expect extensive coverage of today's hearing. I invite you to look through the local and national print reporting over the next few days at the Public Affairs Office's Selected News Items, located on the web at:

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



(U) Stay tuned for further details on any potential C-SPAN coverage.
A Communicator article will follow.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Posted on: May 18, 2000

(U) DIRgram-97: "The Five C's of Communicating with Congress"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) In DIRgram 76, "Communicating with Congress," I told you how important it is for us to keep the oversight committees - those that authorize our activities and appropriate our funds - informed about the transformation we are undergoing. As we proceed with our transformation efforts, this is an area of our process we must get right every time. Quite frankly, we have not always done this effectively in the past.

(U) In the turmoil of the mid-1970's, it became apparent that intelligence oversight needed to be stronger and more formal. The question was, "How could the oversight function be performed effectively while still protecting the secrets that permitted the United States to have a viable foreign intelligence capability?" The solution that came from that question is the current oversight process. In simplest terms, the process provides a small number of Representatives, Senators, and their staffs with levels of access we might find problematic if extended to everyone in Congress and their staffs.

(U) The oversight process is a national asset, assuring the American people that our intelligence represents not only their interests, but also their highest values. It is also an asset to the Community in that we gain the insight and participation of public officials who provide us with essential support and perspective. I have no doubt that the reduction in resources we have endured over the last decade would have been both steeper and more prolonged had it not been for the oversight committees.

(U) As for our part in this relationship, we need to improve - and we will. As a basis for our improvement, we will take a page from the strategy book of a sister agency. The CIA has long used the principle of the "Four C's" - candor, completeness, correctness, and consistency - in its dealings with Congress. NSA will adopt these principles. I and every other NSA employee will adhere to them. We will be candid in ensuring that information we provide is true and accurate - even if it is not positive. We will be complete by giving

direct and forthcoming answers to any queries. We will be correct in that any incorrect information mistakenly provided to Congress will be corrected as soon as we recognize it. We will be consistent in our responses, even across organizations. Along those lines, we will add a "Fifth C" - corporate. We will make every effort to ensure that information provided takes into account corporate plans and positions. By no means am I telling you what your opinion should be, nor am I asking you to withhold it, if asked. I am not asking you to give up your rights to bring issues of vital concern to the attention of Congress. I am telling you even if you may not be in agreement, you need to acknowledge what the NSA view is, even if your personal opinion differs. For example, if a linguist is asked if the correct spelling is Romania or Rumania, the response might be, "I prefer Rumania, but the Agency uses an alternative spelling."

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) If we use this standard, we can be candid and corporate. By using the principles set forth here, we can improve our communications and our relationship with Congress. Our future success as an Agency depends on it, and I am confident we will all do our part.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Posted on: June 07, 2000

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) DIRgram-102: "Recent NSA Advisory Board Meeting"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ In DIRgram-15, I told you about the NSA Advisory Board (NSAAB), and gave you an idea of the areas in which I have asked them to help us. The Board continues to assist the Agency by offering unbiased advice and counsel on critical issues. During its recent quarterly meeting, the NSAAB focused on the NSA Transformation Office (NTO), the Project Baseline Summary, TRAILBLAZER, Corporate Financial Management, and [REDACTED] I want to use this DIRgram to let you know how the Board members are reacting to the changes we're undergoing at the Agency, and how they are helping us to succeed.

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i)

(U) The NSAAB indicated that steps we have taken recently, such as hiring the Chief Financial Manager (CFM), and the Project Baseline Summary, go a long way in providing the accountability and data which Congress has stated it needs before it funds us at appropriate levels. They are encouraged by the fact that the Project Baseline Summary will lead to our having a management information system that allows for accounting-based decisions. They also agree wholeheartedly that we need to employ a solid "make versus buy" policy to ensure that we spend limited resources appropriately and that we stay abreast of technological change.

(U) In terms of our developing a systems architecture for the present and future, the Board expressed the need for us to go further in soliciting outside technology and expertise to build the new NSA. Several Board members offered to work outside channels to solicit names of e-business technical leaders to assist us in these endeavors.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) As you can see, we're making good use of the experience and brainpower residing in the NSAAB. I will continue to let you know how we are taking advantage of their expertise and incorporating their suggestions and advice into our plans for the future.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2

Dated: 24 Feb 98

DECL ON: X1

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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
DATED: 23 February 1998
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

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Posted on: June 08, 2000

(U) DIRgram-103: "Public Affairs Update"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) It is important that the American public understands and trusts NSA. We've been working toward that goal by executing the Strategic Public Affairs Plan outlined in DIRgram 9, and I'd like to update you on what is happening.

(U) First, Fred Lash has joined Judi Emmel's team as the new Deputy Chief, Public and Media Affairs Office (PAO). Fred is a former Marine who has worked in public affairs with the Departments of Defense and Energy, and with the private sector. Fred brings nearly 20 years of public affairs experience with him and has covered a range of issues such as the crisis in Beirut, the Contra operations in Central America, and nuclear waste clean-up. We'll put his expertise to good use developing ways to share our rich heritage with the American public.

(U) There are also several projects underway that will help deliver the important messages outlined in the Public Affairs plan.

- * (U) In coordination with the Naval Security Group (NSG), in early June we will unveil a new display at the National Cryptologic Museum on the Navy's victory at the "Battle of Midway" during WWII. This new display focuses on the critical role cryptology played at this pivotal juncture in the Pacific war.
- * (U) On 25 June, the Secretary of Defense will host the opening ceremony for the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War, at the Korean War Memorial in Washington. This launches a series of activities that will occur during a three-year remembrance period. NSA has been given status as a commemorative agency and will sponsor several activities, including releases of newly-declassified materials relating to operations in Korea. We are planning our first major event for late summer to commemorate UN Forces' defense of the "Pusan Perimeter," and cryptologic contributions to the effort.

* (U) Two documentary initiatives are in the works. The History Channel is planning a one-hour episode on NSA for its "History's Mysteries" series. Right now, PAO is developing the scenarios and working with the production company to fine-tune the NSA presentation. Taping will begin at NSA in August. NOVA has a one-hour documentary planned on the VENONA project, the cryptologic effort against KGB-GRU communications that played a role in uncovering Soviet spying on the US in the 40's and 50's. NSA will play an advisory role and will participate in some of the filming with interviews and on-location shoots.

* (U) Both CBS News and NBC Nightly News want to do features on NSA, probably in the fall. There will be camera crews here to capture some of the important work we do, and both organizations plan to air a two- or three-part series for their evening news broadcasts.

(U) NSA will continue to be "above the fold" with a higher profile, in keeping with the times. You should know that everything we do to enhance the perception of NSA as "an Agency with a critical role in protecting national security" will be done with the utmost care for the protection of sensitive sources and methods. As things progress, you may be called upon to provide support and expertise. I am counting on all of you to team with the Public Affairs Office to help make these initiatives a success for NSA.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Posted on: July 28, 2000

(U) DIRgram-111: "Changes in Internal Communications"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) It has been many months since DIRgram 21, when I first told you that I was moving what was then called the NSA/CSS Internal Communications Cell from the Support Services Directorate into the Corporate Communications Organization in the Directorate for Corporate Management. I said then that internal communications are as vital as our external communications because they involve getting the word out to each and every one of you. That Cell is now known as Corporate Internal Communications (CIC), and its role is to consolidate internal communications -- our approach as well as the vehicles we use -- to ensure that you receive information that is both coordinated and consistent. To that end, there have been many developments relating to our internal communications since the beginning of the year, some of which you are already aware, others of which you will learn in this DIRgram.

- (U) "15 Minutes," our weekly TV show, has become an established communications vehicle, focusing on relevant, timely issues that affect all of us. I find it a valuable tool for letting you know what I'm doing. It keeps you up to date on the Agency's business, and takes you to some places you don't usually get to see. Earlier this week, you received an e-mail letting you know about a survey regarding the show. I look forward to hearing what you like and don't like, and what suggestions you have for the show's improvement.

- (U) I have given CIC broad access to Directorate-level events. Staffers from that office attend my morning briefings, and have recently begun to sit in on some of my meetings. They use these opportunities to develop stories that are then shared with you in publications such as the Communicator. They come to these meetings on your behalf, and their focus is entirely on whether the information is of value to you or not.

- (U) I have tasked the CIC with providing you with ELT meeting notes. They are currently working on the process they'll use to get the information into a digest form for you, and by the end of this summer, you'll see the notes on the ELT home page.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

- (U) The Communicator has improved a great deal in the past several months. The look is fresh, it contains more graphics, and carries a wider variety of stories. The more we all know about what is going on at NSA, the better for all of us - our work force, our customers, our partners, and our stakeholders.

(U) Many folks have spent a great deal of time looking at how you get the information you need. Of particular concern is the timeliness with which information is disseminated within the Agency. Based on a number of review processes, including the publications scrub (see DIRgram 22) and the Newsletter survey conducted last year, it has become clear that the NSA Newsletter can no longer provide our work force with information in as timely a manner as other means. For that reason, CIC has recommended, and I have agreed, that we will no longer spend time, money, and manpower to produce the Newsletter. However, we will continue to get you the information you need and want. CIC is working with S2 and others to make this happen. One of our goals is to have information like retirements, obituaries, TSP data etc., on both the Agency's internal and (as appropriate) external webpages. In the meantime, much of the information you now read in the Newsletter will come to you in other ways, such as the Communicator and via WEBWORLD. For those without access to the internal or external networks, we will work with the Key Components to ensure that hardcopy information is made available. Current planning is for the October 2000 Newsletter to be the last one. CIC will provide you with more details in the August issue.

(U) As I emphasized above, internal communications are vital. We can all benefit from knowing what is going on at the Agency. And, when we as individuals benefit, the mission benefits, resulting in a win-win situation. I call on each of you to think about what you are involved in and how that might be shared with everyone else. We can start now - contact me or the CIC with your story, and let's all learn more about the fine work we are doing here.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Posted on: October 10, 2000

(U) DIRgram-132: "NSA's Internal and External Team Reports to be Released on Internet"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) As you know, the NSA Internal and External Team Reports and the "100 Days of Change" initiative have received a great deal of interest. In fact, we have received Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests as well as informal queries from members of the media for copies of the reports. By law, we must release the documents to anyone who has submitted requests through the FOIA process.

(U) I believe the Agency is best served with a more proactive stance and, as a result, I have decided to release both reports to the public through the NSA Website on the Internet. To protect the many individuals who were either a part of the teams in terms of support or membership, or were interviewed by the teams, all references to names have been removed. In addition, a classification check has been performed to ensure that what we are providing the public is completely unclassified.

(U) Please note that I will also be meeting with interested members of the media about the reports. Because of the meetings, it is likely that you will see the reports and my meetings detailed in the public domain.

(U) Our plan is to place the reports on the Web by 17 October 2000. You may access them, on the Internet, at:

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Please do not hesitate to call the Public Affairs Office, on 301-688-6524, if you have questions.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

Approved for Release by NSA on 09-22-2017, FOIA Case # 56158

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Posted on: October 13, 2000

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(U) DIRgram-134: "Events of the Last 48 Hours"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) All of you are aware of the tragic events of the last 48 hours surrounding the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in a port in Yemen and the continued violence and unrest in the Middle East. Unfortunately, six of our Department of Defense comrades gave their lives, numerous other sailors were injured, and some still are listed as missing. Additionally, our British allies have also had their facilities in Yemen come under terrorist attack. These events, as tragic as they are, remind us that we still live in a volatile and unpredictable world and just as importantly they remind us why NSA exists to provide invaluable information to policy makers and military commanders around the clock and during times of peace and conflict.

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(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)

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(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)

(U//~~FOUO~~) These are just a few examples of the outstanding support that are provided by our personnel to the nation 24 hours a day. I would also be remiss if I did not state that this is a team effort that would not be possible without the tremendous support provided to NSOC, the DO; and our Information Assurance organization by the rest of the Agency. Many of you have already contributed to these efforts by performing your day-to-day duties and responsibilities. Some of you will work over the weekend and still others will deploy on TDYs to support our Government during these critical events. I ask each of you to increase your vigilance not only in the performance of your duties but also as you move about the Fort Meade area and your duty stations abroad. Because of our invaluable service to the nation, U.S. Cryptologic personnel are always potential terrorists targets, and we should be on heightened awareness today and throughout the foreseeable future. You will see

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[REDACTED] and I know you will fully understand and support.

(U) Again, my sincere thanks for the service that you continue to provide, mostly in silence, to the nation.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 98
DECL ON: X1

DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
DATED: 23 February 1998
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

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Posted on: October 26, 2000

(U) DIRgram-138: "Additional Insights on Press Coverage of the USS Cole Incident"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

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(b) (3) -18 USC 798

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(C)

(U) Our PAO has performed magnificently during this series of events. Everything we have done to present a more human face has helped make a difficult and uncomfortable situation easier to handle. Those that know and understand us present a more balanced perspective to the American public. All of the articles are available on the PAO web page at:

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Approved for Release by NSA on 09-22-2017, FOIA Case # 56158

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 98
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DATED: 23 February 1998

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Posted on: January 18, 2001

(U) DIRgram-153: "The National Cryptologic School"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) NSA's transformation requires simultaneous investment in three important areas: our systems, our processes, and, most of all, our people. Central to the last is our ability to provide state-of-the-art education and training to the work force across a broad range of skills and to have a comprehensive, coherent employee development program. To achieve this, the National Cryptologic School will concentrate on the skills that will improve collection, processing, analysis, reporting, and information assurance capabilities in order to prosecute targets, exploit technologies, and protect ourselves and our customers on the global net. It will draw from the expertise of our own work force and their knowledge of a target's communications and infrastructure. It will offer a curriculum that concentrates on the cryptologic skills, taught by the Agency's best.

(U) The NCS has already begun this emphasis. Curriculum audits have made specific recommendations that in some cases require a virtually complete revision of a curriculum. Implementation of these recommendations is underway. For example, we have new orientation classes for newly-arrived employees (CY-040) and new senior leaders (CY-800).

(U) The school is also looking outside to the nation's leading corporate universities for ideas and models and is using these ideas to modernize its learning and development processes. Benchmarking trips to Motorola University and the Arthur Andersen Center for Performance and Learning have provided innovative ideas for the "new NCS," and the NCS Distinguished Speakers Series is bringing in a flood of new thinking from the outside.

(U) As we move to operate in a more collaborative environment with our Intelligence Community partners and other U.S. Government agencies, we will take advantage of their education facilities, using these sources to increase course offerings, enhance interoperability, and decrease duplication. For example, NCS is a leader in the development of an Intelligence Community Training and

Education Board, which will be charged with making cooperation and coordination a reality not a promise. Also, we are partnering with the Defense Language Institute (DLI) to produce a single, unified foreign language proficiency testing system for both military and civilian linguists across the Department of Defense, replacing existing tests, such as the DLPT, LPT, LTT and PQE Part I. At Headquarters, we will take advantage of the incredibly rich university resources of the Baltimore-Washington area. We will look for comparable partnerships in the field. Moreover, in an age of distance learning, we are seeking ways to link all these partnerships in programs and projects reflecting a true global reach. For example, we are already using FasTrac, a personal on-line learning system of over 900 courses with partners from 23 federal organizations.

(U//~~FOUO~~)

(U) My commitment is to have NSA take its place as a leader in the Community's education and training activities. My first investment in meeting that commitment was to assign Cathy Hanks and [REDACTED] (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36 as Commandant and Deputy Commandant, with Cathy serving as one of our Associate Directors. Both have a broad background in academic, analytic, and managerial leadership. We have also initiated a Scholars-in-Residence program led by [REDACTED] an acknowledged (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36 authority on encryption policy and knowledge management. In moving the NCS from the human resources organization, I am sending the message that the NCS is a central element in the transformation process.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Posted on: May 15, 2001 10:07

(U) DIRgram-177: "IG Reports on Status of DIRgram Implementation"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

Format for Printing

Agency All Request

Posts 2001

Director's Messages

Exec Messages

ODNI Messages

CIS Messages

Campaign Update

Search Postings

(U) In DIRgram-27, "The Role of the IG in 100 Days of Change," I asked Ethan Bauman, our Inspector General (IG), to give me an independent, objective progress report on the 100 Days initiatives to see if the expected improvements were actually being achieved. I also asked the IG to recommend steps to help ensure effective implementation of specific changes.

(U) The IG staff conducted these reviews, which began in December 2000, by interviewing individuals who are responsible for DIRgram actions in order to determine what has been done so far and to identify any impediments to completing the tasks. As appropriate, the IG recommended ways to remove any impediments to achieving the DIRgram goals.

(U) After each DIRgram review, the IG sent me a brief two-page status report. Because I believe an open flow of information is an important dynamic of the change process, I have asked Ethan to make the DIRgram reviews available to the entire work force. You can read them by going to the OIG home page, located at:

<http://www.n.ssa/IG/>

(U) When you read these DIRgram reports, I think you'll be impressed at the progress we've made. On the other hand, there are some areas where we've had to make a mid-course correction, and others where our efforts have stalled for some reason. All of this is to be expected, considering the number of initiatives and scope of the change we're undergoing. I have been using the IG's reports to help me get a handle on areas that need to be reevaluated or jump-started. If these DIRgram reports remind you of other areas that you feel need my attention, I trust you'll let me know.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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08-01-2007 pursuant to E.O.
12958, as amended

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Posted on: August 20, 2001 09:44

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(U//~~FOUO~~) DIRgram-200: "Implementation of EP-3 Cryptologic Damage Assessment Recommendation"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Format for Printing

Agency All Request

Prints 2001

Director's Messages

Exec Messages

ODNI Messages

CnS Messages

Campaign Update

Search Postings

(U//~~FOUO~~) Three months ago, I reported the formation of the EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team in DIRgram-172. The team, operating under [redacted] from SID, concluded its work on 27 July. Its final report is complete and is being provided to senior-level Defense and Intelligence Community leaders, as well as Congress.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The report includes a number of findings and recommendations. On the positive side, 24 lives and an \$80M aircraft were saved, any COMSEC insecurities were swiftly contained, [redacted]

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(S//SI) A primary recommendation from the review is that NSA lead a community-wide effort to develop and implement safeguards for [redacted]

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(S//SI) The implementation of the study's recommendations is critical for the future of our business. I have named [redacted] one of the EP-3 team members, to be a special assistant to the Chief of Staff and to coordinate implementation of the report's recommendations for NSA. In particular, he will work with the SIGINT Director and the IA Director [redacted]

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(U) As I stated in April, what we learn from this incident will allow us to build an even stronger, more effective Cryptologic System. I am committed to implementing, tracking, and institutionalizing the report's recommendations. As always, your support and dedication as we proceed are greatly appreciated.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 98
DECL ON: X1



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Posted on: August 23, 2001 06:24

(U) DIRgram-201: "History Channel Poll"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

Format for Printing

Agency All Request

Polls 2001

Director's Messages

Exec Messages

ODNI Messages

CoS Messages

Campaign Update

Search Postings

(U) I would like to share some good news with you regarding our efforts to educate the American public about the Agency and its vital mission.

(U) Recently an NSA employee directed me to a viewers' poll conducted by The History Channel. "This Week in History" had conducted a survey for the week of 23 July that posed the question: "What single federal agency is most effective in contributing to the nation's security?"

(U) The results were as follows:

National Security Agency (NSA) 45.5%
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 26.4%
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 19.8%
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) 6.0%
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 2.3%

(U) Although we cannot draw too much from the poll's conclusions, it is encouraging to see tangible evidence that more Americans understand that our purpose and mission has less to do with the film "Enemy of the State," and more to do with protecting the hard won freedoms and liberties that we all enjoy.

(U) I would like to congratulate Ms. Judith Emmel and the Public and Media Affairs staff for their hard work in helping me to bring us to this point.

(U) At the same time, like many recent initiatives, our public outreach strategy is a work in progress that requires continuing input from both our senior leaders and the work force at large.

(U) With this in mind, if you have questions or insights regarding these efforts, I urge you to contact the Public and Media Affairs Office (963-5825), both to gain a greater understanding of challenges we face in this area, but to offer your thoughts and ideas as well, on the most effective way that we can get our message across to the American people.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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08-01-2007 pursuant to E.O.
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Posted on: November 02, 2001 10:03

(U) DIRgram-209: "Relations with Congress"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]



(U//~~FOUO~~) On 5 October 2001, the President directed us to limit briefings containing classified information and sensitive law enforcement information to the congressional leadership and the chairmen and ranking members of the Intelligence Committees. He indicated that this policy should remain in effect until further notice.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The White House provided additional guidance on 12 October concerning disclosures to Congress. We may once again provide classified materials to Congress under such guidelines as we conclude are necessary. Copies of that policy statement are being provided to each Directorate. Both the SecDef and DCI have deferred to me in establishing rules for the SIGINT and IA communities.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In re-establishing equilibrium, let me first restate my desire that relations with the Legislative branch be healthy and productive for both parties. Effective immediately, visits and exchanges of information with Congress on established oversight and program/budget issues will resume. These will continue to be shaped by candor, correctness, consistency, completeness, and corporateness.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Given the events of 11 September, we all need to be mindful of the need to maintain greater awareness and accountability in disclosure of information about our activities - particularly in execution of our signals intelligence mission. I will insist on strict adherence to guidelines for the conduct of legislative affairs documented in DIRgrams 76, 97, and 191. The NSA Legislative Affairs Office (LAO) must approve any provision of information to Congress in advance. The LAO should be notified immediately of any request for information from the Congress, and they will provide appropriate guidance and assistance in satisfying these requests. This policy applies to oral, as well as written communication. I need the assistance of everyone in the cryptologic community in this matter.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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09-22-2017, FOIA Case # 52707

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Posted on: March 07, 2002

(U) DIRgram-221: "Support to 11 September Inquiry"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) The House and Senate intelligence committees are conducting a joint inquiry into the events of 11 September. Mr. L. Britt Snider has been named Staff Director for this effort. Mr. Snider and his staff will be providing a valuable service to the country as they look into the Intelligence Community activities before, during, and since the 11 September terrorist attacks.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I want every employee to know that NSA is committed to supporting this inquiry. I expect each of you to cooperate with the inquiry and provide the Congress maximum access to Agency information, facilities, and personnel when requested. Any concern that Mr. Snider and his staff are not getting unfettered access should be brought to me personally.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I have asked Michael Lawrence, Director of Legislative Affairs, to lead our team of senior representatives from components across the Agency. The team is responsible for receiving inquiries arising from the joint congressional inquiry and any other 11 September inquiry. The team will be accountable for implementing the "five C's" policy of dealing with the Congress I enunciated in earlier DIRgrams: candor, corporateness, consistency, completeness, and correctness. It also will facilitate access to Agency personnel and records. I have requested that Mr. Snider address inquiries to Mr. Lawrence. Requests related to a 11 September inquiry that the Agency may receive from other external sources, such as from the media, should be forwarded to the team.

(U) It is vitally important to the nation that we learn whatever lessons we can so that we can better prepare for the future.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

Approved for Release by NSA on 09-22-2017, FOIA Case # 56158

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Posted on: March 27, 2002

(U) DIRgram-228: "Preservation of Information That May Relate to the Attacks of 11 September 2001"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) On 18 March 2002, I received a letter from the DCI requesting that we take all steps necessary and appropriate to preserve any and all information, records, and materials that are or may be relevant to the joint congressional inquiry into the events of 11 September 2001, including any and all materials that do or may relate to the attacks of that date. In addition, the DCI requested that I advise him at the earliest opportunity of my determination whether NSA had or has any relevant or potentially relevant information, records, or materials that have been altered, deleted, or destroyed; and if so, to the extent possible, provide a description and explanation.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) In accordance with the DCI's guidance, effective immediately, all NSA and CSS elements must preserve any and all information, records, and materials that are or may be relevant to the joint congressional inquiry, including any and all materials that do or may relate to the 11 September 2001 attacks. I also direct each NSA principal and associate director and field site chief to determine whether his or her component had or has any relevant or potentially relevant information, records, or materials that have been altered, deleted, or destroyed. If so, provide a description and explanation to the Chair of the Agency 9-11 congressional inquiry team, Michael Lawrence, in LAO (963-3747 secure, or sid [redacted]).

(U) The SIGINT and IAD Directorates, in consultation with ITIS, will issue implementing instructions shortly.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Posted on: May 09, 2002

(U) DIRgram-236: "Joint Inquiry Team for 9/11"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

U//FOUO

(U) As I stressed in DIRgram-221, NSA is lending its full support to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees' inquiry into Intelligence Community activities before, during, and after the 11 September attacks. Former NSA employee [redacted] is leading a Joint Inquiry Team contingent that has already begun its work at NSA. Two other former employees, [redacted] and [redacted] are helping with document review, interviews, and briefings. [redacted] formerly with the National Reconnaissance Office, is also a member of this group. (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) Inquiry Team members have a large amount of material to examine. To facilitate and expedite assessment efforts, the Legislative Affairs Office (LAO) will be receiving requests for information directly from the Team. Michael Lawrence, Director of Legislative Affairs, will ensure that the requisite meetings are coordinated and scheduled. The Inquiry Team can be contacted through LAO at 963-3747 or 301-688-7246.

(U) I believe the important work of the Joint Inquiry Team will ultimately help the entire Community so that we may better meet the challenges of the 21st century. Thank you for your important contributions to this Congressional effort.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Approved for Release by NSA on 09-22-2017, FOIA Case # 56159

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Posted on: June 13, 2002

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(U//~~FOUO~~) DIRgram-239: "TRAILBLAZER Technology Demonstration Platform (TDP) Request for Proposal Released"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(~~C//REL~~) Recently I released a Request for Proposal for the National Security Agency TRAILBLAZER Technology Demonstration Platform (TDP). The TDP will be the first large-scale industry system integration contract awarded under the TRAILBLAZER program and represents a significant step forward in NSA's transformation. It demonstrates to our stakeholders, customers, overseers, and partners, our continued commitment to transformation, despite many mission pressures. I am excited about this step; I hope you are too.

(~~C//REL~~) The purpose of the TDP will be to establish the NSA-Industry partnership to design the system architecture, leverage commercial technology solutions, and establish system integration processes capable of scaling to the volume, velocity and variety challenges of the modern global net that is our target environment. This initiative directly supports our breakthrough goal to transform the worldwide U.S. cryptologic system.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Specifically, the TDP will focus on mastering the highest technological, system, and enterprise integration risks in a limited environment before scaling to the entire mission. The TDP requirements were jointly developed by the SIGINT Directorate, Data Acquisition, Customer Relations, and Analysis & Production Offices, as well as IT IS, IAD, and the CIO. To develop effective, systemic solutions, NSA will select, in partnership with industry, commercial technology proven to be scalable, agile, robust, and interoperable, before we begin TRAILBLAZER production and full-scale deployment. Experience gained in developing the TDP will provide the critical learning to enhance the final full-capability platform.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We anticipate a contract award in late July/early August 2002 after competition among the three contractor teams (comprised of over 60 companies) that participated in the TRAILBLAZER Concept Development Studies. The winner will receive a performance-based contract to design, integrate, and deliver the platform and initial set of mission applications. The TDP will be

delivered in eleven months, for an operational assessment by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
TRAILBLAZER has brought credibility to NSA's acquisition capability as the first program to formally follow the DOD acquisition process.

(C//REL) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but also for successful exploitation of other intelligence targets necessary to protect the nation.

TRAILBLAZER consists of four core functionalities: processing and compute capacity, distributed storage, common services like communications and information security, and platform enabling mission applications [REDACTED]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[REDACTED]. In turn, these will provide the foundation for a new capability, which will enable the continued success of all cryptologic mission elements.

(U//~~FOUO~~) TRAILBLAZER will need your support to successfully deliver the TDP. It will touch almost every element of NSA from CSHPO, CIO, IT IS, IAD, to SID mission elements. It will help us exercise corporate processes that are critical to NSA's future. I have asked them to deliver at a fast pace, and they will need your support to do so. TRAILBLAZER represents a corporate partnership to develop NSA's future SIGINT system. The TRAILBLAZER team would be pleased to provide additional details at your convenience or visit their web site at:

[REDACTED] (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2

Dated: 24 Feb 98

DECL ON: X1

DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
DATED: 23 February 1998

CONFIDENTIAL/COMINT [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET//COMINT//~~

Posted on: June 20, 2002

(U) DIRgram-239: "Media Attention"

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

~~(S//REL)~~ By now most of you have heard the reporting on CNN and other networks regarding the 10 September intercepts [redacted]

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(b) (3) -18 USC 798
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

[redacted] I received word of the broadcast while attending the hearings for the Joint Inquiry Commission regarding the events surrounding 9/11.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Coincidentally, Congresswoman Harman had just brought up the need for eliminating leaks of classified information. Chairman Goss was quick to join her and stated we must have zero tolerance for willful leaks. We discussed how snippets into the public are more harmful than good.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ The timing couldn't have been better scripted - I was handed a note that CNN was going on the air with the story of two congressional sources [redacted]

It is true that we have two intercepts. They were collected on the 10th [redacted] The conversations took place between unknown communicants and provide no specifics as to location or type of event. I read [redacted] transcripts to the Joint Inquiry Commission in order for them to understand exactly what we're dealing with in analyzing and reporting on this type of data. Everyone in the room listened very carefully and clearly understood the nuances of SIGINT.

(U//~~FOUO~~) This isn't the first time we've been in the news - and it won't be the last. We must continue to educate those we deal with as well as ourselves on the importance of things we say and do. I think the point was hammered home to both committees.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Reporters have their jobs and we have ours to do. You can hold your heads high. Several members of the committees took the time to compliment us on our efforts and thank us for what we do for America each and every day.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF

Approved for Release by NSA on 09-22-2017, FOIA Case # 56158

Director

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2

Dated: 24 Feb 98

DECL ON: X1

DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
DATED: 23 February 1998
DECLASSIFY ON: NA

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Posted on: September 17, 2002

(U) DIRgram-249: "First Congressional Open Hearing on 9/11 Inquiry"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Tomorrow, the Congress will hold its first public hearing related to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Representatives of victims' families are expected to testify. The inquiry staff will also present its preliminary findings to date. I am alerting the workforce because this hearing and its associated staff paper will generate a considerable amount of media attention.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA has been working hard to support the inquiry. I am committed to providing the American people with as complete an accounting as possible. To date, NSA has provided over 2700 documents, answered over 300 formal questions, participated in four closed hearings, and met with the Inquiry staff over 200 times. NSA has also participated in a Community effort to review the staff paper that will be released tomorrow.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The coming weeks may subject the Agency to intense public scrutiny. We will emerge from this process as a stronger, more capable Agency. I am intensely proud of the work you do, and I firmly believe that the nation, through the Inquiry's examination, will reach the same conclusion.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Posted on: July 23, 2003

(U) DIRgram-276: "Upcoming Public Release of Joint Inquiry 9-11 Report"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) The congressional Joint Inquiry into the attacks of 11 September 2001 will release its final report to the public shortly. The release is likely to generate considerable media and political attention, not all of it favorable to the Intelligence Community. There are several things NSA employees should keep in mind.

(U) The main outlines of the report have already been released. The Joint Inquiry made public its findings and recommendations last December. NSA's part of the story is well known. The Inquiry is releasing the full report to provide supporting details.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA subjected the report to a painstakingly careful classification review. Last December, the Inquiry filed its classified report with the intelligence committees. That report was approximately 850 pages and contained highly sensitive, and sometimes compartmented, information. It was an immense job to go through the document word by word. A team from the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the Office of Policy, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Affairs Office worked hard for weeks on this highly labor-intensive effort. There was senior-level oversight, and I was personally involved in several key decisions.

(U//~~FOUO~~) This review was limited in its objective – to protect classified information. NSA and other Intelligence Community elements reviewed the document, approved some language that was unclassified, and – in order to protect particular sensitivities while allowing the Joint Inquiry to make its point – suggested alternative language for other portions of the report. In cases where alternative text could not be used, the classified information was deleted. NSA helped to achieve the Administration's goal of permitting the Joint Inquiry to tell its story as completely as possible consistent with the need to protect national security.

(U) Classification review does not mean the Intelligence Community is responsible for the report or its conclusions. The Inquiry is

solely responsible for the report.

(U) When discussing the report with people who are not cleared, please remember not to reveal classified information. Also, any congressional or media inquiries about the report should be directed, without comment, to the Legislative Affairs Office or the Public Affairs Office, respectively.

(U) The Joint Inquiry report is an important part of the national dialogue on how to respond to the tragic events of 11 September. I urge you to read it (the URL for the report will be posted on the NSA Daily web page when available) and to do so with an open mind so that we may apply any relevant lessons to our efforts to keep our nation secure.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Posted on: August 14, 2003

(U) DIRgram-286: "National Commission Continues Focus on 9-11"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) You have all no doubt seen the recent news coverage on the completion of the House and Senate intelligence committees' Joint Inquiry into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the release of a final, extensive public report on 24 July. It is important to note that, while the Joint Inquiry has been completed, another official review of the events surrounding the 9-11 attacks is underway. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States is building on the work of the Joint Inquiry. Following is the background on this commission and how it differs from the Joint Inquiry.

(U) In late 2002, the President signed into law the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003," which established an independent commission, comprising five Republican and five Democratic appointees, and supporting staff, to conduct a separate review of the circumstances relating to the 9-11 terrorist attacks. You may have seen recent media reports referring to this group as the Independent Commission, the National Commission, or the Kean Commission (after its chairman, former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean). Unlike the Joint Inquiry, which focused primarily on the Intelligence Community and particularly on activities within NSA, CIA, and FBI, the National Commission is chartered to examine all areas of the U.S. Government, as well as the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation.

(U) As I mentioned in DIRgrams-221, 236 and 276, we fully supported the Joint Inquiry's work. During the 16-month congressional review, NSA provided more than 2,750 individual documents with approximately 15,000 pages of information, participated in more than 200 meetings with the Joint Inquiry Staff, (including over 120 briefings and interviews), and testified at closed hearings last year in June and July, and an open hearing in October. We reviewed the proposed final report and either suggested alternate wording or redacted information in order to protect our sensitive sources and methods while ensuring the Joint Inquiry was able to share the details that supported its findings and recommendations. Classification review

does not mean the Intelligence Community is responsible for the report or its conclusions. The Joint Inquiry is solely responsible for the report.

(U) We are continuing to provide this type of full support to the National Commission's inquiry, which could last through 2004. I have asked the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) to be the Agency's focal point during this independent review process. All requests by the National Commission for documents, briefings and interviews, etc., are being submitted through OGC, and a team representing various Agency elements is coordinating our response.

(U) We will continue to incorporate important lessons learned within our signals intelligence and information assurance missions. Thank you for your contributions and support to this current 9-11 inquiry.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Posted on: January 28, 2004

(U) DIRgram-301: "Smoking at NSA"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) As Director, I am entrusted each day with the health of our employees, and am required to implement programs to encourage smoking cessation and to protect our workforce from the harmful effects of secondhand smoke. I want to remind everyone that smoking is not allowed anywhere within the NSA campus, including parking lots and structures, unless there are posted signs designating the use of tobacco products.

(U) Over the past couple of weeks, the "no smoking" signs have been removed, and "Designated Smoking Area" signs have been posted in those areas where smoking is permissible. I expect all employees, military assignees, and contractor employees to follow these rules and smoke only where the signage is posted.

(U) If you are a civilian or military employee interested in participating in a small working group to address issues concerning smoking at NSA, please reply to DL Smoking or smoking@nsa and, to ensure equal representation, please indicate if you are a smoker or nonsmoker in your message. More detailed information will be released after the working group further addresses the use of tobacco at NSA facilities.

(U) For more information on the current smoking policy on all DoD installations, smoking areas, and smoking cessation programs, go to:

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Posted on: July 22, 2004

(U) DIRgram-323: "9/11 Commission Report"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission) will release its final report to the public today. The anticipation of the release has already generated media and political attention (July 19, 2004

Selected News Items [redacted] not all of (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36
it favorable to the Intelligence Community. Given the current public debate on Intelligence Community reform, even more attention will be generated once the report is published. As the report is interpreted and stories unfold, there is information I would like you to keep in mind.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA, along with other IC partners, painstakingly reviewed the report for classification and sensitivity concerns. Since the National Commission's report will be released as UNCLASSIFIED with no redactions, our team scoured the report and provided alternative language, keeping the intended meaning while protecting NSA equities. The NSA team, comprising members from the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the Information Assurance Directorate, the Foreign Affairs Directorate, the Office of Policy, and the Office of General Counsel, reviewed 10 of the 13 chapters – over 500 pages. The team had senior-level oversight, and I was personally involved in several key decisions. It was a labor-intensive job to go through the document word-by-word in less than a month, but NSA was extremely helpful in supporting the National Commission's mandate and timeline.

(U) Once the report is published, please refrain from making comment about the content. Even broad, general comments that are unclassified, have the potential to confirm or deny critical information related to the Agency and its missions. Specifically, if you get any congressional or media inquiries direct them, without comment, to the Legislative Affairs Office or the Public Affairs Office, respectively.

(U) One final note — I know how hard we work and how seriously we take our jobs. The Intelligence Community, especially the National

Security Agency, is meeting today's challenges. Our high operations tempo has never faltered. We continue to meet the unprecedented challenges, which force our high operations tempo to become the norm. Feel proud of the work we do and the successes that keep our nation free and safe.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Posted on: September 14, 2004

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) DIRgram-330: "Iraq: Our Plan to Support the Evolving National Strategy"

Distribution: Director's Message to the Work Force

POC: Michael V. Hayden [talk_dirnsa@nsa]

(U) Recently you have heard me refer to our forward deployed personnel as an expeditionary force. This is my way of emphasizing a transformation in our paradigm for supporting warfighters and policymakers. For decades, we operated from garrison, and sanctuary. We discovered on September 11 that garrison was no longer sanctuary, and we learned in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM that we could no longer operate only from garrison. If we're in our customers' information space, we're in the fight – if we're not, we're in their in-box!

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ Being in our customers' space allows us to understand the key decisions they must make, anticipate their information needs, and steer the cryptologic system to meet those needs.

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(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (c)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~(C//REL)~~ These opportunities are not just in the CENTCOM AOR, and they're not just for a select few. I need you to learn how we're building this expeditionary force, to understand that we value this service, and to volunteer to be a part of it. Your first step can be watching your colleagues discuss their experiences in Iraq during our new "Frankly Speaking" broadcast on 16 September. I hope you'll join us.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2

Dated: 24 Feb 98

DECL ON: X1

Approved for Release by NSA on 09-22-2017, FOIA Case # S6158

DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
DATED: 23 February 1998
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