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Description of document:	Annual Historical Review, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), FY 1985
Request date:	10-June-2008
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Source of document:	Freedom Of Information Act Request Commander, INSCOM ATTN: IAMG-C-FOI 4552 Pike Road Fort Meade, MD 20755-5995 Fax: (301) 677-2956

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

0 1 SEP 2017

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of June 10, 2008, for the INSCOM Annual History FY 1985 and supplements our letter of March 11, 2015.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized and eight pages have been withheld in their entirety, as it is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2 (a)(2), 1.2 (a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 13526. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 13526, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

The deleted information is also exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with EO 13526, Section 3.3(b)(1) because its release would clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development.

In addition, information has been sanitized from the record that would reveal sensitive investigative methods and techniques. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(E) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capabilities dependent upon protection of sensitive investigative methodologies.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Christopher S. Ballard, the Commanding General U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 90-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis of your disagreement with the response and provide justification for a reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office, for forwarding, as appropriate to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (APPEAL)
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the National Security Agency (NSA), that their information, contained in the records has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3).

5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), The information is properly classified in accordance with the criteria for classification in Section 1.4 of Executive Order (EO) 13526, as amended. The information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b) of EO 13526.

5 U.S. C. 552 (b)(3) – The specific statutes are listed below:
  50 U.S.C. 402 <u>note</u> (Public Law 86-36 Section 6)
  50 U.S.C. 403-1(j)
  18 U.S.C. 798

The withholding of the information by the NSA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal/Privacy Act Authority. The appeal shall be in writing to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority (DJ4), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Mill Road, STE 6248, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-6248. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which you believe release of the information is required. Please cite FOIA Case #67161 assigned to the case so that it could be easily identified.

Coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been completed and we have been informed by the CIA that their information is partially releasable pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Release Panel within 90 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA #F-2016-00162 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We have been advised by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that information has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) (b)(3)and (b)(6) of the FOIA and Executive Order 13256 §§ 1.4(a) and 1.4(c). The applicable Statue is 10 U.S.C. §424 .

Their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3). The statute invoked under Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3) is 10 U.S.C. §424 (b)(3), which allows for the protection of organizational and personnel information for DIA.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Attention: DAN-1A (FOIA), Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA MDR-0174-2012 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

There are no assessable FOIA fees for processing this request.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651, or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp.mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #590F-08. Please note that you now have the ability to check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) website: https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx. Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FA-08-2817. You may also seek dispute resolution services by contacting the INSCOM FOIA Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear at 301-677-7856.

Sincerely,

Michael T. Heaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

~~TOP~~ SECRET

ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

FISCAL YEAR 1985

History Office
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212-5000

(RCS CSHIS-6(R3))

September 1986

APPENDED DOCUMENT
CONTAINS SPECIAL
INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

CC 001

~~TOP~~ SECRET

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PREFACE

(U) The Annual Historical Review was prepared in compliance with AR 870-5, Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures. The purpose of the report is to provide a quick reference and research base of the significant activities, events, and accomplishments of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) during FY 1985. Principal source materials used in compilation included the Annual Historical Reports submitted by headquarters staff elements and subordinate commands, briefings, interviews, and miscellaneous documents.

(U) A portion of the MACOM Historians Conference held in May 1986 focused upon the role and importance of the Annual Historical Review. There was consensus that the review be written at a classified level to be meaningful. The new Chief of Military History, Brigadier General Stofft is extremely supportive of the review, and it is possible that in the near future the field can see more effort on the part of the center to monitor the preparation of the reports. In October 1985, the INSCOM History Office received a kudo for its timely completion of the summaries through the years.

(U) This report was prepared for the first time in a number of years by the entire history staff which includes Dr. John P. Finnegan and Ms. Diane L. Hamm, who both wrote and edited portions of the document along with the undersigned. Final review and assembly were performed by Ms. Hamm.

September 1986

JAMES L. GILBERT
Command Historian

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FORWARD

(U) In a letter to General John A. Wickham, Jr., Chief of Staff
Army, dated 31 July 198X, Major General Harry E. Soyster,
summarized the managerial steps which he had taken during his first
year as Commander, INSCOM. Since this letter uniquely summarizes
many of the important organizational changes occurring during the
report period, it is believed that the document may serve as a
suitable introduction to this year's Annual Historical Review.

(U) "During my first year in command I have overseen a significant
change in the thrust of INSCOM missions, functions, and operations.
Although I would like to take credit for all these changes, many
have been additional taskings to support the Army's intelligence
and security requirements. The new challenges have been across all
of our disciplines. The missions that have affected our current
resources most are projects for Central America (CENTAM), special
access programs, increased counterintelligence and espionage
investigations and operations, more polygraph examinations,
implementation of a Head of Contracting Activity (HCA), and the
increasing requirements for the Army's new training initiative,
TROJAN. Last March, I recognized that only limited resources to
meet these new demands would be provided. Accordingly, I directed
my staff to undertake a thorough review of the missions and
functions of the INSCOM headquarters staff elements. Concurrently,
I began to look at the headquarters staff as soon as possible. The
purpose of the staff review was to realign my existing resources to
address our most pressing missions. I felt it was imperative that
I eliminate or reduce those efforts that were in conflict with the
new and higher priority intelligence and security requirements. In
May, I approved a 10 percent realignment of the INSCOM headquarters
staff spaces and transferred 80 percent of those spaces to
subordinate INSCOM units to meet operational requirements.

(U) "This realignment will provide resourcing for a number of high
priority INSCOM missions. I am providing staffing for TROJAN
operational and logistical management and some initial field
operations. I am, however, concerned about the seemingly
exponential increase in TROJAN systems without any increase in
resources. I will provide the initial resources to successfully
initiate our new Head of Contracting Authority mission
requirements. This requirement grew out of the DAIG investigation
of Special Mission Funds. I am establishing a capability to
respond to low-intensity warfare requirements for quick reaction
systems development. This capability will ensure that INSCOM can
successfully field new systems such as CRAZY HORSE (Echelon Above

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Corps Aviation Company), GRAY WOLF (Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV)) ROGUE PANTHER (JSTARS Ground Support Module), RG-8 powered gliders, and dirigibles. I am also looking closely at the command and control mechanism, the Aviation Intelligence Battalion (AIB), that will bring these high technologies together initially in SOUTHCOM but will have the capability of deploying anywhere in the world. I have further strengthened my intelligence oversight staffing to ensure active assistance for these expanding operations. I am applying resources to meet our increasing requirements in support of operational security projects and special access programs. Finally, the echelon above corps cryptologic effort will receive reinforcement for CENTRAM.

(U) "In addition to those actions taken to orient the headquarters on our priority missions, we will begin consolidating our headquarters elements currently at Fort Meade to Arlington Hall Station. We will begin this move by the end of the year. We are also planning to consolidate our CONUS counterintelligence command, the 902d MI Group, at Fort Meade and reorganize functionally as opposed to geographically. We have just begun to assess whether the functions of the INSCOM Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center in the Pacific can be eliminated and its functions placed in other Army commands.

(U) "The reductions I have directed will not be without costs. I am eliminating the existing MACOM liaison officers but retaining the liaison function at the National Security Agency. I have redirected the assets that currently work in the HUMINT area of biographics. We are consolidating OPSEC (operations security) support functions. As a result, many commanders throughout the Army will be supported from field offices throughout a geographical area rather than dedicated OPSEC support personnel on their respective staffs. In addition some areas of OPSEC, support will be reduced and in some cases eliminated. For example, I expect that Operational Security Evaluations will be performed by local security managers rather than expert INSCOM operational security personnel. The major reduction of headquarters functions lies in administrative support functions. I expect a slowdown in responsiveness in some areas but will accept this in view of the gain we will experience in higher priority areas.

(U) "I have instructed my commanders to undertake a similar review of their headquarters staffs and orient on operations within their intelligence disciplines and geographical areas. My commanders will advise me of their findings and subsequent actions during my 1985 INSCOM Commanders' Conference in late October.

(U) "As I have highlighted, it was imperative that I eliminate or reduce those efforts that did not totally support the new and higher priority Army intelligence and security requirements that have been given us. With this extensive look at our utilization of resources, I believe that I have aligned my efforts to successfully meet the new challenges. We will be integrating these changes as swiftly as possible—starting immediately. Reprogramming to implement these formal organizational changes has been addressed in the Command Operating Budget submission and will be implemented in organizational documents during the next two "Management of Change (MOC) Windows." One major consideration that continually has an impact on my decisions are the different rules and procedures that must be adhered to. As you are aware, INSCOM units are resourced by a wide variety of programs for both funds and personnel spaces. Realignments in INSCOM resources must be consistent with the management procedures that dominate our complex resource management requirements, i.e., Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCI), Security and Investigative Activities (S&IA), and the limitations of these diversified programs. Because intelligence collection and counterintelligence requirements will continue to expand, I am sure that the headquarters reduction and space realignment I have taken to meet our expanding operational requirements are in keeping with your stated requirement to accomplish manpower savings. While they do not represent direct savings for future combat forces, these actions are intended to ensure the best possible intelligence support for these combat forces and for the intelligence units already engaged.

(U) "As my commanders complete their evaluations of their organizations and initiate their resource realignments, I expect a major shift of resources throughout the command that will meet the new challenges INSCOM has been directed to perform for the Army. In summary, we are making and will continue to make, significant changes in INSCOM to streamline and more effectively carry out our growing mission."

(U) In a reply letter from General Wickham which was dated September 10, 1985, the Chief of Staff Army largely confirmed the actions which Major General Soyster had taken.

(U) "In view of the cap we have on military and civilian end strengths, your resource realignments in response to changing missions and functions are on the mark and have additional benefit of returning soldiers to field units. By asking your subordinate commanders to orient more of their resources towards operational requirements, similar results should be achieved.

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(U) "Your assessment of the requirement for the Intelligence
Threat Analysis Center in the Pacific should be completed
expeditiously. The results of your review will be a factor in
deciding how intelligence support can best be provided to the
Commander, WESTCOM. I have asked the ACSI to determine whether the
WESTCOM G2 capability should be enhanced, or if such support can be
provided by the Commander, PACOM.

(U) "I encourage you to continue to realign counterintelligence
resources to meet priority requirements such as special access
program support, polygraph examinations, and counterespionage
operations. To be effective, operational security must come from
field organizations. The commander and his staff must take the
lead to implement sound operational security policies and
practices. I support your efforts to energize commanders, but I am
concerned that local security managers may lack expertise to
conduct Operational Security Evaluations. The ACSI plans to
address this issue separately."[1]

FOOTNOTES: FOREWORD

1. Ltr, IACG, subj: Resource Realignment (31 Jul 85) (U);
   Ltr, CSA, subj: Resource Realignment (10 Sep 85) (U).

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PC 009

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OC 011

Chapter   Page

V. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES (Continued)

Tables

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

☐ Other:

> DELETED PAGE(S)
> NO DUPLICATION FEE
> FOR THIS PAGE.

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IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93

(b)(1)

Transfer of Production Functions. (U) The Intelligence
Organization and Stationing Study which led to the establishment of
INSCOM in 1977 had recommended that all Army intelligence
production agencies be consolidated into a single entity. However,
only those production agencies directly under OACSI or FORSCOM were
consolidated under INSCOM on 1 January 1977. From these newly
acquired production elements, INSCOM formed the U.S. Army
Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) in 1978. However,
after subsequent relooks, support grew for a larger consolidation.
The CG, INSCOM's position was that the elements should be
consolidated under his major Army command (MACOM), but even more
importantly, such a consolidation should take place. As a result
of a study initiated in September 1983, the Vice Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army directed that ITAC be placed under the operational
control of the newly established U.S. Army Intelligence Agency
(AIA) (Provisional), a field operating agency under OACSI. The
operational control of ITAC was transferred in July 1984; later, on
1 December, the center was reassigned to the newly established Army
Intelligence Agency. The actual manpower transferred included 98
officers, 25 warrant officers, 133 enlisted personnel, and 261
civilians for a total transfer of 517 spaces. ITAC physically
relocated in December 1984 to the partially completed facility at
the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.[2]

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<u>INSCOM's Mission and Goals</u>. (U) During the 1984 INSCOM Commanders' Conference held at Gettysburg, the commanders and INSCOM staff present defined the command's mission as follows: "Conduct high quality operations to satisfy intelligence collection requirements and to deny collection by adversaries." A goal was also established, "Provide highest quality intelligence, security, and electronic warfare support for the Army in peace and war."

(U) In addition, a number of areas identified at the conference were included within the "INSCOM Plan," which was published in September 1985. The INSCOM Plan prioritized objectives and tasks in each of these functional areas in concert with the Army Plan and the Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP). The areas along with their stated objectives were as follows:[3]

 <u>Readiness</u>: (1) Enhance the capabilities of the FY 1985-87 tactical intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) force through achievable upgrades to operational and C^2 systems within available resources. (2) Improve forward deployed or deployable EAC MI brigades/groups by structuring, manning, and equipping them within Army of Excellence (AOE) guidelines by end of FY 1991.

 <u>Transition to War/Support to Military Operations</u>: Improve capability through increased participation in realistic, war plan derived exercises during FY 1985-86.

 <u>Security</u>: Develop a Security Management Plan with an upgraded timetable for enhanced protection of people, facilities, information, and operations by 31 July 1985.

 <u>Force Integration</u>: Develop procedures necessary to document, field, and maintain force capabilities, concepts, and doctrine, and to facilitate implementation of materiel and unit fielding plans for the first program year and all out years in the Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP) by March 1986.

 <u>People</u>: Improve personnel readiness, retention, quality of life, and civilian career programs by December 1985.

 <u>Leadership</u>: Develop a Performance Management Plan for all personnel which requires that individuals establish performance objectives which are related to the organization's goal and reviewed between rater and rated individual more frequently than the rating period itself by 3d Qtr, FY 1985.

Oversight: Establish command-wide process to ensure ethical propriety, legal sufficiency and appropriateness of operational activities, resource use, and acquisitions of goods and services by 3d Qtr, FY 1985.

Resource Management: Improve productivity and efficiently and effectively utilize manpower and dollar resources through planning, management, programming, budgeting, and financial accounting methods by 30 September 1985.

Materiel: Sustain highest levels of materiel accountability and readiness through innovative, dedicated management in compliance with regulations and policy guidance to maximize intelligence capability.

Technology: Coordinate and develop innovative ways in which technology efforts can be identified that will improve INSCOM intelligence, security, and electronic warfare (ISEW) operations.

Transfer of the Army Biographic Repository. (U) On 27 August 1985, the CG, INSCOM informed ACSI, DA that in FY 1986 INSCOM would discontinue functions involving maintenance of the Army Biographic Repository and that resources involved in that activity would be transferred to higher priority HUMINT tasks. On 27 September 1985, ACSI, DA concurred with the decision and directed that INSCOM coordinate with DIA on disposition of the Army biographic files and give ample notification to the analytical community of the repository's closure. Although several DOD users had indicated that they might be interested in some of the files, it was doubtful that anyone, including DIA, would want them all. It was believed that the files would be most useful if transferred to a single organization rather than being removed piecemeal, it was intended to exhaust all DOD prospects

(b)(3) Per CIA

Transfer of DA Intelligence Dissemination Validation Office. (U) With the establishment of the Army Intelligence Agency, the Department of the Army dissemination validation responsibility previously performed by HQ INSCOM was transferred and consolidated with HQ, Army Intelligence Agency. A space went with the transfer.[5]

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

<u>Location</u>. (U) Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security
Command is located at Arlington Hall Station, 4000 Arlington
Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22212. Until a final stationing
decision is effected, certain staff functions will continue to be
located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I.   MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

1.   DF, DCSRM, subj: AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, U.S.
     Army Intelligence and Security Command (U) (Undtd) (C).

2.   "INSCOM and Its Heritage," History Ofc, HQ INSCOM (1985),
     pp. 5, 12,13 (U);   FY 1984 INSCOM AHR (TSCW), pp. 2-3.

3.   "1985 INSCOM Plan FY 1988 - 2002" (Executive Summary) (5 Sep 85)
     (S/NOFORN); Msg, CDRINSCOM, subj: INSCOM Organizational
     Objectives (231535Z) (U); IA Poster 360-1, "INSCOM Mission"
     (1 Feb 85).

4.   FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 5.

5.   Ltr, fm CDR INSCOM to CDR AMC, subj: DA Intelligence
     Dissemination Validation Office (8 Oct 85) (U); Interview,
     with Mr. Charles Allen (ODCSOPS) (21 Jun 86) (U).

6.   FY 1985 DCSPPM AHR (S), ch IV; Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: Low
     Intensity Conflict (031900Z Oct 84) (C).

CHAPTER II

COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

Command and Staff Relationships. (U) The CG, INSCOM is under supervision of the Chief of Staff, United States Army. Directives, authorities, policy, planning, and programming guidance, approved programs, resource allocations, and other methods of command direction are issued to CG, INSCOM by the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

(U) The CG, INSCOM--

    1. Commands all assigned units and activities.

    2. Is subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS) for the conduct of SIGINT operations.

    3. Manages SIGINT resources to accomplish SIGINT operational tasks assigned by DIRNSA/CHCSS.

    4. Provides specified military personnel and administrative, logistic, and operational support to the DIRNSA/CHCSS.

    5. Deals directly with the Director, DIA for the coordination of HUMINT operational proposals.

(U) INSCOM and other major Army commands (MACOM's) are coordinate elements of DA. The CG, INSCOM is authorized to communicate directly with other major Army commanders or with heads of Army Staff agencies on matters of mutual interest.

(U) The CG, INSCOM will maintain liaison as necessary with other MACOM's, field operating agencies, other cryptologic and intelligence activities, and other foreign domestic governmental agencies to maintain an awareness of, to exchange information on, and to ensure coordination of matters of mutual concern.[1]

Executive Authority for TROJAN. (U) Although the official MOU between HQDA and affected MACOM's was awaiting final coordination, a message dated 27 September 1985 outlined INSCOM's responsibilities as the executive authority for TROJAN. INSCOM was responsible to HQDA OACSI (DA proponent) for logistical support, SIGINT technical support, and mission steerage for TROJAN operations.

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(U) In the area of logistics, INSCOM will be responsible for administering TROJAN logistics support and negotiating TROJAN logistics contracts. INSCOM's Mission Support Activity (MSA) will act for INSCOM's DCSLOG to arrange TROJAN logistics support. INSCOM will also be responsible for worldwide logistics support less the routine maintenance duties such as fault location (using built-in testing equipment), line replacement unit (LRU) changes, minor adjustments, cleaning, lubricating, and tightening, which will be performed by the user units.

(U) Maintenance of equipment over and above designated unit tasks will be contracted. INSCOM will create a Theater Intermediate Support Activity (TRISA) in each theater to make repairs beyond the user's ability and to keep a stock of TROJAN parts (beyond those maintained by the units).

(U) In the area of SIGINT technical support/mission steerage, INSCOM had the responsibility to ensure adequate SIGINT technical support and mission steerage to TROJAN users. This responsibility will be met by INSCOM's Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (ATCAE) and Primary Control and Analysis Center (PCAC). The 66th MI Group, OPCON to USAREUR, will operate the PCAC for USAREUR TROJAN's. CONUS MI Group will operate a PCAC, OPCON to FORSCOM, for all CONUS based TROJAN's. The ATCAE provides support to the PCAC's and to TROJAN users not currently supported by a PCAC (such as SOUTHCOM, WESTCOM, and the 8th U.S. Army). Technical support and mission steerage provided by the ATCAE and the PCAC's will consist primarily of target environment data base management and tipoffs to impending or occuring target activity.

(U) INSCOM did not have a responsibility in the areas of developing, fielding, and testing the TROJAN systems nor for any product improvement plans (PIP); these were to be the responsibility of the Army Materiel Command's (USA Electronics Research and Development Command) project manager, USA Signals Warfare Laboratories. USA Information Systems Command (USAISC) had full responsibility for communications support to include: crypto-net establishment, Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) requirements, commerical communications contracts, and overall communications requirements monitoring.[2]

High Technology/Low Intensity Conflict. (U) In a letter dated 6 August 1984, the Vice Chief of Staff Army assigned INSCOM the task of addressing the intelligence requirements of low intensity conflicts. Low intensity conflicts were defined as those military operations involving U.S. Forces in a support role to friendly and allied nations which are being militarily threatened or attached by

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internal and/or external military and/or para-military forces.
Under these conditions, it was assumed that no major U.S. ground
forces were employed in defense of the friendly and/or allied
governments. Under such situations as this, the U.S. Army and
other service and departmental intelligence resources would be
brought to bear against the opposing military and/or para-military
forces as a major means to execute U.S. policy in the affected
region.

(U) In light of this tasking, the DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM proposed the
creation of a headquarters steering committee which would bring
together the principal staff heads with the Science Advisor to
discuss and investigate the possibilities for the application of
high technology to intelligence operations in the low intensity
conflict environment. The proposal for such a group was initiated
in September 1985. Final action by the Command Group was delayed
until the next fiscal year.[3]

(C//REL) Command and Control of Echelon Above Corps (EAC) Intelligence
Units. (U) Although the issue of command and control of EAC
intelligence assets was not specifically raised during the FY 1985
time period, it is essential to understand what had transpired. In
April 1983, the Director of Management under the Chief of Staff Army
proposed that the 66th MI Group, the USAINSCOM Theater Intelligence
Center-Pacific, and 501st MI Group (less Field Station Korea) be
commanded by the theater Army (TA). In addition, the controlled
collection operations (CCO) and offensive counterintelligence
operations (OFCO) assets would also be commanded by the theater
Army with technical direction provided by INSCOM, which would
remain a MACOM. After the above actions, INSCOM would continue to
command Field Station Korea [(b)(1)] and MASINT resources from
the above mentioned units as well as CCO and OFCO not given to a
TA. In essence, the proposal transferred command responsibilities
for the affected units from INSCOM to the TA commander, with the
latter then charged with operating, programming, budgeting,
equipping, and sustaining and training, as well as the health and
welfare and other command related matters for those organizations.

(U) In a reply dated April 1983, OACSI elaborated in detail of
what, for example, the transfer of the 501st MI Group would mean.
The conclusion of the memorandum was that the transfer command of
the 501st MI Group to the TA commander would cost dearly, would not
provide more efficient and effective support, and the TA commander
would have to still rely upon INSCOM to a considerable extent for
numerous areas of support. "The present command relationships
undoubtedly provide the optimum training and utilization of scarce
intelligence resources. It retains the capability to rapidly

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reinforce the Commander, 501st MI Group with a wide variety of low density, specialized intelligence personnel, and provides timely supply and maintenance of critical and unique equipments. It likewise provides the benefits of selective emphasis that accrue to INSCOM as the single manager of such resources. In short, OPCON now provides the TA commander with requisite supervision of 501st MI Group intelligence and security functions while relieving him of the numerous administrative and logistical areas of support currently the concern of the INSCOM commander.

(U) "Although the readily quantifiable costs are few at this point, the cost to OACSI and Army Staff is apparent--the staff will grow and necessitate further involvement in operational matters now left to the INSCOM commander and staff. Likewise, the development of an implementation plan to accomplish the proposal will be a time consuming and difficult tasking requiring additional resources from the Army Staff (ARSTAF) and affected commands as well, at the expense of ongoing Army programs."

(U) Perhaps it was more than ironic that the memorandum to the Director of Management contained the signature block of Brigadier General Harry E. Soyster, Acting ACofS for Intelligence. A little over a year later, Brigadier General Soyster was again defending INSCOM, but this time as its commander. In a memorandum by Brigadier General Soyster to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and dated 11 August 1984, Brigadier General Soyster reiterated his previous position of not giving INSCOM assets to commanders TA. His second memorandum, however, contained additional rational gained from his first days as INSCOM commander. "The SIGINT world, backed up by national directives and billions of dollars, is not going to surrender any significant assets or prerogative to theater commanders. We will lose that battle even if all of us sign up to it. The Army is already viewed as fragmented when NSA compares us to the other services. The ACSI is the SIGINT focal point for the Army. INSCOM is the Service Cryptologic Element and the Tactical Cryptologic Program is managed by ODCSOPS. General Faurer and his staff deal with Lieutenant General Odom, Major General Woodmansee and Brigadier General Soyster. They will not expand the Army circle to include General Otis, General Livsey, General Gorman, or wherever we cut it off. Lieutenant General Odom and I (and I'm sure Major General Woodmansee will join us) are working to present a common position. If we take any action that creates a void, the Air Force will fill it and we will play a lesser role in national collection.

(b)(1)

Changes in TRADOC/INSCOM on Combat/Training Development. (U) On
the occasion of the annual review of the INSCOM/TRADOC MOU, several
important changes occurred. On 1 October 1985, the responsibility
for development of echelon above corps (EAC) architecture from
INSCOM to TRADOC was to take place. This was the date when
INSCOM's effort to document the new force structure in accordance
with the EAC Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW)
architecture/Army of Excellence Force Design was to be completed.
At the request of USA Intelligence Center and School (USAICS),
INSCOM agreed to retain responsibility for the preparation of
initial Automated Unit Reference Sheet (AURS) on new EAC MI
organizations. Although the new MOU did not extricate INSCOM
completely from the TOE development process--and in fact continued
to involve INSCOM in that process more than other MACOM's--it was
considered an acceptable level of involvement and one that provided
for a smoother transition toward USAICS someday assuming total
responsibility for INSCOM unit TOE's.

(U) The same MOU also transfered combat development maintenance
responsibility for EAC TOE to USAICS on 1 October 1985. INSCOM
would assume a support role similar to other MACOM's vice being
responsible; USAICS would assume the advocacy role. Finally,

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INSCOM furnished one space to USAICS to perform functions in area
of the combat development maintenance for EAC TOE.   Although
assigned on 1 October, the space would not be filled until later.[5]

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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

1. DF, DCSRM, subj: AR10-53, Organization and Functions, U.S.
   Army Intelligence and Security Command (Undtd) (C).
2. Msg, CDR INSCOM, subj: INSCOM as Executive Authority for
   TROJAN-Defined (271929Z Sep 85) (U).
3. IA Form 32, DCSOPS, subj: High Technology/Low Intensity
   Conflict Steering Group (17 Sep 85) (U).
4. Memo for Chief of Staff Army, CDR INSCOM, subj: Command
   and Control of EAC Intelligence Units (17 Aug 84) (S/NOFORN);
   Memo for Director of Management, Acting ACSI, subj:
   Recommendations on the DACS-DMC Proposal to Alter the
   Command Structure of Selected EAC Units (12 Apr 83) (S/NOFORN).
5. Info Paper, IAPPM-AD, subj: TRADOC/INSCOM MOU on Cbt/Tng
   Development, Tng and Doctrine (16 Aug 85) (U).

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CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION

INSCOM Organization. (U) At the close of FY 1985, there was a total of 78 units (34 TOE and 44 TDA) within INSCOM. The TDA figure does not include Augmentation or Provisional units. All types of units are listed in appendix A. For individual lists of TOE, TDA, and Provisional units at the close of FY 1985, see appendices B, D, and G respectively. Changes in the status of TOE, TDA, and Provisional are listed in appendices C, E, and H.

(U) Throughout FY 1985, MG Harry E. Soyster served as Commander, INSCOM. On 7 February 1985, BG James W. Hunt, DCG, left INSCOM for reassignment. BG Charles F. Scanlon remained as DCG. Upon his assignment to INSCOM, BG George J. Walker assumed the position of Chief of Staff. This was the first time in the history of INSCOM/Army Security Agency that a general officer had served as chief of staff since the position was created in 1950. The change was not a part of the HQ INSCOM reorganization plan ongoing at the time. After discussion within the Command Group, MG Soyster made the decision based on his own management philosophy. Initially, BG Scanlon provided oversight to single discipline organizations in the command while MG Soyster oversaw the multidiscipline groups, such as the 66th, 470th, 500th, 501st, and 513th MI Groups. The new Chief of Staff would continue to be the focal point for all actions of the staff and oversee selected activities. MG Soyster foresaw the likelihood that during a tour with INSCOM, a Chief of Staff would also serve in the position of the deputy commander upon the incumbent's departure. MG Soyster also foresaw the possibility being forced to let go of one of the general officer spaces. Prior to BG Walker's arrival, COL Richard J. Powers, Jr., had been Chief of Staff. On 30 December 1984, CSM Sammy W. Wise replaced CSM George W. Howell, Jr.

(U) At the end of FY 1985, Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command was organized to consist of a Command Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, Special Staff, Personal Staff, and Coordinating Staff as shown below:

Command Group:

Commanding General (CG). (U) The CG, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command was responsible to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army for accomplishment of the missions and functions prescribed by AR 10-53 and was concurrently responsible to the Chief, Central Security Service for all SIGINT activities for which the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSACSS) were responsible.

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Deputy Commander (DCG). (U) The deputy commander assisted the commander in the management of all intelligence and support operations of INSCOM to include the review and execution of all tasked and delegated operations and the determination of future requirements.

Command Sergeant Major (CSM). (U) The Command Sergeant Major as the senior enlisted person in the command provided advice and assistance to the CG on all matters involving enlisted personnel.

Office of the Chief of Staff:

Chief of Staff (CofS). (U) The CofS acted as the principal coordinating agent of, and advisor to, the CG and DCG on those matters pertaining to INSCOM; directed and coordinated the staff to achieve efficiency and unit of action; and assisted the CG and DCG in the supervision of the execution of orders. Directly subordinate to the CofS were the Liaison Officers, the Office of Public Affairs, Organizational Effectiveness Office, and Internal Review Office.

Command Group Executive Office. (U) On 16 September 1985, the Chief of staff created the position of Command Group XO. The executive officer's purpose was to coordinate the activities and communications of the CG and DCG offices with the Chief of Staff.

Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS). (U) The DCS acted for the Chief of Staff during his absence and assisted to coordinate all actions of the HQ INSCOM staff, and supervised the activities of or provided support to the Command Chaplain, Organizational Effectiveness Office, Secretary of the General Staff, Staff Psychologist, Scientific Advisor, Public Affairs Office, and INSCOM Liaison Officers.

Secretary of the General Staff (SGS). (U) The SGS acted as executive officer for the CofS and as office manager for the offices of the CG, DCG's, and CofS.

Special Assistant to Chief of Staff. (U) The Special Assistant to Chief of Staff acted as special advisor and consultant to the commander, deputy commanders, and the Chief of Staff.

Protocol Office. (U) The Protocol Officer served to advise the Command Group on matters related to protocol.

Liaison Officers. (U) The liaison officers provided liaison representation to NSACSS, FORSCOM, TRADOC, USAREUR, and other commands as required. The liaison positions at both USAICS and USACACDA were both discontinued upon the departure of the incumbents. The USAICS position in May 1985 and the USACACDA liaision position on 15 December 1984. (Although not considered a liaison officer as such, INSCOM decided in August 1985 to provide a space to the combat developments section of the USAICS. The position would not be filled until 4th Qtr, FY 1986.) It was planned that as incumbents left a number of the liaison offices, there would be no replacement. This was part of the headquarters voluntary decrement undergone in FY 1986 to transfer spaces to the field and new command initiatives.

Special Staff:

Chief, Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Office. (U) The OE Office assisted INSCOM's senior leaders in leading the human element of their organizations through complex organizational change. The OE Office also provides assistance to INSCOM's leaders in management and leadership training programs. Finally, the OE Office managed the INSCOM's OE Program.

Chief, Internal Review (IR) Office. (U) Served as the principal advisor to the CDR, INSCOM on internal review matters. Conducted independent review and examination of command operations and internal controls to provide the commander with an objective evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency with which his financial and related functions were being performed.

Scientific and Cryptologic Affairs Advisor. (U) Served as the principal advisor to the CDR, INSCOM and his staff on scientific and cryptologic matters.

Public Affairs Officer (PAO). (U) Served as the Public Affairs Officer of INSCOM, advising the commander and staff on all public affairs matters.

Command Psychologist. (U) Served as the psychologist of INSCOM advising the commander on matters pertaining to mental health and providing guidance on psychological factors pertaining to intelligence operations.

Command Chaplain. (U) Served as the chaplain of INSCOM providing advice and assistance to the commander and his staff on religious, moral, moral leadership, and human self-development matters.

Personal Staff:

Inspector General (IG). (U) The IG, as member of the personal
staff, inquired into and reported upon matters affecting the
performance of mission and state of the economy, efficiency,
discipline, and morale of every phase of activity which was within
the sphere of responsibility of the commanding general and as
prescribed by law. On 15 October 1984, a Plans and Analysis
Division was created. Given the conditions of a stable force of 13
people and the fact that the Command Group was undergoing a
transition itself, it was believed that mid 1984 offered a unique
opportunity for the Office of the Inspector General to reorganize.
The newly created Plans and Analysis Division was designed to
fulfill the following needs: (1) the need for a more systematic
approach to inspection planning and the analysis of inspection
findings, IGAR trends, and other data to identify systematic issues
requiring detailed inspection and resolution; (2) the need to
utilize personnel resources more effectively between inspections;
and (3) the need for an element to incorporate the functions of a
Deputy IG, Executive Officer, or Operations Officer. Besides the
Plans and Analysis Division, there remained the Inspections
Division and the Assistance and Investigations Divison.

Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). (U) The SJA served as legal advisor
to the CG, DCG, CofS, and all staff elements of HQ INSCOM and, as
necessary, to subordinate elements of the command.

General Staff:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER). (U) The DCSPER served
as the principal staff officer for the administration of military
and civilian personnel. Acted for the CDR, INSCOM in the
direction, supervision, and coordination of plans, policies, and
procedures for personnel administration, distribution, and
management; maintenance of order and discipline; safety; welfare;
morale; human affairs; and nonappropriated fund activities.
Throughout FY 1985, DCSPER remained divided between the ADCSPER
Military and the ADCSPER Civilian. The ADCSPER Military oversaw
the Military Personnel Division and Plans and Proponency Division.
The ADCSPER Civilian oversaw Human Resources Division, Equal
Opportunity Program Division, and Civilian Personnel Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS). (U) The DCSOPS was
the principal coordinating staff officer responsible for current
intelligence collection, production, electronic warfare, and
counterintelligence, and security support operations. Provided
operational policy guidance and direction, coordinated, and

supervised current   tion;
coordinated and su,   d REDTRAIN
program as Army ex   ly oriented
INSCOM interfaces t   :er (echelon
above corps), and t   ₹5   ligence
organizations. Ser   rrent and
budget year) for al.   , 3, and 8
operational resouroc   with
Department of the Ar   ____ ense, [ ] CIA,
FBI, joint/combined   , ._..er MACOM's, and other governmental
agenoies. Supervised command aviation activities. Prepared and
coordinated command operational plans and manages command
operational planning system; was command focal point for reserve
affairs. Supervised command historical program. Exercised staff
proponenoy over the Intelligenoe Exohange Support Center, Systems
Exploitation Detachment, and Administrative Survey Detachment. As
a result of the DAIG investigation in 1984, the funotions of the
Special Disbursing Agent and the Intelligence Contingenoy Funds
(ICF) manager were separated on 1 Ootober 1984. The offioe of the
ICF Management Officer remained within DCSOPS but the disbursing
functions were transferred to DCSRM. The ICF Management Officer
advised on all aspeots of the control, administration, supervision,
and utilization of ICF. The offioer was acoountable to and
received teohnioal financial guidance from the Special Finance and
Accounting Offioer.

(U) Unlike many reoent years, there was little reorganization of
the structure of DCSOPS. On 1 December 1984, a Project
Coordination Office was established direotly under the DCSOPS. Its
funotion was to make recommendations as to how the military
intelligence oommunity was to handle speoial operations. On 1 July
1985, the Program, Policy, and Readiness Division was dissolved and
its assets soattered among other DCSOPS elements. At the close of
FY 1985, DCSOPS oonsisted of the following major divisions:
Project Coordination Office, Administrative Office, History Offioe,
Reserve Affairs Offioe, ADCSOPS Plans/Training, ADCSOPS OPSEC,
ADCSOPS HUMINT, ADCSOPS SIGINT/EW, ADCSOPS IMINT/EO, and ADCSOPS
Intelligenoe Support.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG). (U) DCSLOG was the
principal ooordinating staff offioer for logistios, and was
responsible for integrated logistios planning polioy;
procurement/oontracts; budgeting; distribution, storage, and
maintenanoe of eleotronio equipment systems (less
teleoommunioations); engineering; oonstruotion; support servioes;
transportation; materiel readiness; and real property management.

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The DCSLOG also had staff supervision of the Materiel Support
Activity and the Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team
Activity.

(U) During FY 1984, the organization of the DCSLOG remained
basically the same and consisted of the following: Supply and
Services Division, Maintenance Division, Installation Division,
Fixed Station Engineering Division, Management Office, Contracts
Support Office, and Administrative Office. The Contracts Support
Office was new and was established for the purpose of providing the
required supervisory, technical review, staff guidance, and
contract oversight necessary to act as Heading, Contracting
Activity (HCA), for procuring supplies and services in support of
classified intelligence operations. The authority to exercise the
procurement mission was by letter on 7 June 1985 by the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition).
The CG, INSCOM had requested HCA authority in April 1985 as a
result of the DA Inspector General (DAIG) findings in 1984. The
DAIG found that acquisitions were being made by INSCOM activities
without the authority of a contracting officer as required by the
Federal Acquisition Regulation. In order to correct this
deficiency HCA was requested.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems (DCSSYS). (U) DCSSYS was the
principal coordinating staff officer responsible for INSCOM
materiel/systems development. DCSSYS represented INSCOM as the
Army's materiel developer of fixed strategic signal intelligence
systems and INSCOM operated fixed automated systems. DCSSYS also
represented INSCOM in the materiel development process for systems
to be used by INSCOM.

(C//REL The DCSSYS was divided into the Special Assistant Automation,
Requirement Division, Systems Division, Automated Management
Division, Program Management Office, the [(b)(1)] Project Office,
and the Data Administrator Office. On 1 May 1985, this was changed
with the transfer of the Special Assistant for Automation and the
Data Administrator to the newly established DCSIM. At the same
time, staff supervision of the Automated Systems Activity was also
transferred.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM). (U) The DCSRM
was the principal staff officer in matters concerning management,
financial management, and manpower management. The DCSRM
established and maintained administrative control of appropriated
funds, exercised responsibility for manpower management and The
Army Authorization Document System (TAAD), developed and supervised
the implementation of force requirements, administered the

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structure and strength program, exercised control over the manpower and equipment survey programs, and reviewed and prepared financial and/or manpower annexes for operational and force development plans. In addition, the DCSRM exercised staff supervision over the Finance and Accounting Activity. As a result of the 1984 DAIG investigation, the Special Finance Accounting Officer was established within DCSRM on 1 October 1984. The office provided disbursing services to activities utilizing Special Mission Funds (SMF) and Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF).

(U) During FY 1985, DCSRM was composed of the following elements: Administrative Office, Budget Division, Finance and Accounting Division, Management and Analysis Division, and Manpower Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (DCSTEL). (U) (See Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management.)

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs, and Modernization (DCSPPM). (U) DCSPPM was the principal coordinating staff officer responsible for INSCOM long-range and mid-range planning; force design and operational concepts; resource program development, submission, defense, and evaluation. Represented INSCOM in the conceptual and doctrinal aspects of the combat development process. Served as staff point of contact with other Army/DOD activities for force planning, combat developments, TENCAP planning, program submission, and force integration.

(U) At the close of FY 1985, DCSPPM consisted of the Concepts and Studies Division (formerly the Long Range Plans and Studies Office), Force Design and Integration (formerly Force Modernization Division), Programs Division, and Program Plans Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Resource Management. (U) (See Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management.)

Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management. (U) On 1 May 1985, based upon Chief of Staff Army guidance, the responsibility for all information management was placed under a single manager and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management (DCSIM) was established. The DCSIM was the principal staff assistant to the Commander, INSCOM for all matters pertaining to information management. Served as Program Area Director for command programs, budgets, and the Army Management System as they relate to telecommunications/automation. Discharged primary staff responsibilities for engineering, installation, and maintenance of INSCOM information systems. Exercised staff supervision over operation of the Defense Special Security Communication System

(DSSCS), CRITICOMM, and other telecommunications activities of the command. Directed development of tactical information systems objectives concepts and requirements of the command. Directs development of tactical information systems objectives, concepts, and requirements within INSCOM areas of interest. Finally, the DCSIM exercised operational control over the USAISC Communications Center supporting USAINSCOM, Arlington Hall Station. The new staff element also exercised control over the Automated Systems Activity and the Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity.

(U) DCSIM was formed by merging the ACSTEL, the DCSIRM, and the functions of the Special Assistant for Automation and the Data Administrator from DCSSYS into one staff element. Besides an Administrative Branch, the DCSIM was divided into the ADCSIM Telecommunications, ADCSIM Information Services, and ADCSIM Automation.

Command Security Office (CSO). (U) The Chief, CSO formulated, implemented, and supervised policies and procedures for personnel, physical, automation, and information security and acted as command and headquarters security manager, internal OPSEC manager, TEMPEST Coordinating Officer (TCO), and chief law enforcement official for INSCOM.

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<u>Transfer of HQ Spaces to Subordinate Units.</u> (U) A headquarters
reorganization study led by Colonel Campbell had recommended
several transfers of functions and spaces from the staff to the
field (e.g. TAREX, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM)).
There was no agreement among the staff as to what if any spaces
should be transferred. This failure coupled with new and higher
priority intelligence and security requirements such as Central
America, special access programs, increased counterintelligence and
polygraph programs, implementation of a Head of Contracting
Activity (HCA), and the new training initiative, TROJAN, all led to
a relook at the headquarters base.

(U) In March 1985, the Chief of Staff, INSCOM directed each
headquarters element to prioritize staff functions to identify
possible decrements for reallocation to high priority headquarters
or field requirements and excess spaces gained from consolidation
of headquarters staff elements at Arlington Hall Station. Each
staff element was then to prioritize their functions based on
possible 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent decrements.

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(U) In May, after the results of the above drill was in, the Commander, INSCOM approved the 10 percent realignment of the INSCOM headquarters staff spaces and transferred four out of every five identified spaces to subordinate INSCOM units to meet operational requirements. The remainder went to meeting the requirements for new programs or emphasis such as TROJAN. Prior to the decision, there was again reservations voiced by some staff elements. Some because of the fear of losing resources; others because concern for future DA manpower surveys whose cuts would be doubly severe. Brigadier General Scanlon, DCG INSCOM, reportedly a long time advocate of transfer of spaces from the headquarters to the field, believed that the headquarters could take up to 20 percent cuts without harm to staff functions. The cuts resulting from the May decision by the Commander, INSCOM would not take place until FY 1986; officer spaces would be delayed until FY 1987.[2]

Consolidation at Arlington Hall Station. (U) On 20 June 1985, the long-awaited approval by the Director of the Army Staff to consolidate the INSCOM headquarters staff at Arlington Hall Station was received. This was to be accomplished for the most part by CY 1985. Rehabilitation of the facilities vacated by the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center was one mitigating factor which would possibly delay the final consolidation. A draft OPLAN was published to provide the INSCOM staff and work force guidance to facilitate the consolidation and accomplishment of the milestones. DCSLOG and DCSRM personnel could relocate as determined by the respective staff head prior to December 1985. The movement of the DCSOPS personnel, by far the largest number of personnel from Fort Meade, would occur in early January 1986 unless it could be accomplished sooner. In June, the DCSOPS took the initial steps of assigning new military personnel to duty station at Arlington Hall Station, civilian vacancies at Fort Meade would in the future be filled at Arlington Hall, and MI Excepted Career Program (MICEP) assignment to DCSOPS at Fort Meade would be assigned to Arlington Hall Station. The Director of the INSCOM Support Activity at Fort Meade was directed to develop a support plan which would continue to provide records, mail, and audiovisual support to remaining units at Fort Meade.[3]

HQ INSCOM Reorganization. (U) In July 1983 a reorganization plan for HQ INSCOM was approved, and it was to be implemented over a 3 year period. Before the first year of the plan had ended, the Chief of Staff directed a postponement of the pending DCSOPS reorganization. The DCSOPS was due to transfer spaces to other headquarters elements. Because of the potential loss of operational capability and the arrival of a new Command Group who was committed to operations, a relook was felt to be necessary.

Colonel Powers, the DCSOPS, was directed to relook the DCSOPS portion of the plan, and Colonel Hambric, serving as a special assistant to the Chief of Staff, was to relook the larger reorganization plan. The relook concluded that the basic structure of the headquarters was sound; however, DCSOPS required additional resources to accomplish its mission.

(U) The relook still did not provide the sought after answers. There was a perception that the DCSOPS was not totally effective in quick, efficient working issues; did not heavily impact on requirements; and lacked the capability to effectively deal with Quick Requirements Capability, low intensity warfare, multidiscipline support to subordinate units (maintained a discipline vice geographical orientation), and special access programs. It was then decided that a new study would be led by staff (Mr. Paul Sutton, Special Assistant) within the Office of the Chief of Staff itself.

(U) A relook was accomplished by starting with the results of the 1983/84 DCSPPM effort and its resulting draft Mission and Functions Manual dated March 1984. Key staff heads and deputies were consulted and their recommendations and opinions polled. A very quick staff concurrence was obtained that the DCSPPM and DCSSYS should be consolidated with the DCSOPS and that the two most important issues to INSCOM were the improvement of DCSOPS and consolidation of information management/automatic data processing (ADP). Additionally, provisions must be made to add or enhance all of the capabilities mentioned in the previous paragraph.

(U) The consensus lasted only a week, and very quickly strong statements were being made for a status quo with the exception of consolidating all ADP/information functions in DCSIM. Mr. Sutton's group recommended a number of alternatives. The ideal solution was to combine DCSOPS, DCSSYS, and DCSPPM to create under the DCSOPS a dual deputy, both the current operations and readiness along with that element that builds the future organizational force and structure. A dual deputy for each area is seen as the most advantageous.

(U) The problem with this approach was that success would be dependent upon having an extremely strong, tough manager and leader, capable of influencing his peers, two deputy commanders and the commander. The continual rapid turnover, split locations, and shortage of this type of a leader negates this approach. Instead the design, planning, and programming of the future force needed to be separate from the daily operations to successfully compete for resources and give these functions the primary attention they

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deserve. The current split allowed an economy of force to give each function the best possible effort within available personnel resources. Future improvement in the command requires a clear view of the future force and the necessary programing action to get there. The recent reorganization effort properly divided the staff functions for HQ INSCOM but stripped an excessive number of personnel from DCSOPS. The programing and force structure efforts of DCSPPM and DCSSYS effort should be retained but done in current resources. The DCSOPS should restructure internally to gain a decreased span of control, provide a geographical orientation and reduce the discipline split. A very concentrated effort should be made to lessen the impact of the Fort Meade split location.

(U) The basic findings of the study were confirmed by the study group led by Colonel Campbell and then acted upon. Separate DCSOPS, DCSSYS, and DCSPPM were maintained. The DCSOPS would be strengthen by halting the pending transfer of resources to other staff elements. These resources should be used in developing a geographical orientation. A final major step was the consolidation of all information resource management, automation, and Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity functions under the DCSIM. The consolidation of functions under DCSIM took place on 1 May 1985. Colonel Campbell's study group also recommended reduction of headquarters staff to meet operational needs in the field and new command initiatives.[4]

(C//REL) <u>Transfer of Detachment Hahn.</u> (U) Detachment Hahn, a paragraph on the augmentation of the 66th MI Group, had the mission of providing [(b)(1)] IMINT support to echelon corps and below commanders and echelon above corps battle managers. Additionally, the detachment was to demonstrate the mobility of the Tactical Reconnaissance Exploitation Demonstrations System (TREDS) and assist in development of equipment testing and organizational structures which maximize efficiency, speed, and responsiveness. Detachment Hahn was located at Metro Tango, 8 miles northeast of Hahn Air Base in Germany. On 1 May 1985, the administrative and operational control of the detachment was transferred from the 502d ASA Battalion to the 66th MI Group. Because the detachment had to rely upon the Air Force for support, it was felt that subordination to a higher level of command would be advantageous.[5]

<u>Relocation of Pentagon Counterintelligence Force.</u> (U) The Pentagon Space Manager directed that the INSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force (PCF) be relocated elsewhere than the Pentagon due to demands upon space in the building. The PCF was low on the priority list due to the fact that it was a subordinate element to a MACOM and not the HQDA staff. The notice to vacate

was done with less than than 30 days notice. On a short-term
basis, the PCF was relocated to Building A, Arlington Hall Station,
on 18 March 1985. But this relocation could only be temporary due
to space constraints. Also Colonel Francis Creighton, Commander,
902d MI Group which exercised control of the PCF, had expressed a
goal of decreasing the emphasis on operations security (OPSEC) and
giving priority to the "classical counterintelligence" skills such
as interviewing, surveillance, and report writing. To achieve this
goal, plans were made to establish a training unit at Fort Meade,
Maryland, whose purpose would be to train the personnel of the 902d
MI Group in counterespionage, ADP security, and other aspects of
counterintelligence. With the relocation of PCF and the decreased
emphasis on OPSEC enabled Colonel Creighton to reduce the support
to the Pentagon to a five-man Resident Office at Arlington Hall
Station and transfer the remainder to Fort Meade to form the
training unit.

(U) On 10 July 1985, the PCF was restationed to Building 2842,
Fort Meade, Maryland. Six personnel remained at Arlington Hall
Station to form the Pentagon Resident Office (PRO) and became
subordinate to the Fort Meade Military Intelligence Detachment
(MID). Due to restrictions on moving military personnel twice in
one year and the commander's desire to preclude causing financial
and personnel hardships to families who had located in the
Washington, D.C. area, many members of the PCF were assigned out of
the 902d MI Group, assigned special duty to nearby units while
remaining assigned to PCF, or assigned to the Pentagon Resident
Office. The Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) team was
detached and remained at Arlington Hall Station; it was later
combined with the Capitol Hill Team to service the entire National
Capital Region.

(U) On 19 August 1985, the PCF was subordinated to the MI
Battalion (CI) East Coast at Fort Meade as a military intelligence
training detachment.[6]

Relocation of the USA Special Security Group. (U) During FY 1985,
the USA Special Security Group underwent two relocations: 22
January to 1 February 1985 from the Pentagon to A Building, Wing 5,
Arlington Hall Station, and 20 to 27 May 1985 from Wing 5 to Wing 8
of the same building. The move from the Pentagon to Arlington Hall
Station was directed by the Pentagon Space Manager. This was due
to the prioritization of space. Subordinate units to major Army
commands had lower priority than elements belonging to HQDA Staff.[7]

Reorganization of the 902d MI Group. (C) During FY 1985, the 902d
MI Group reorganized its assets internally, insofar as possible, in
order to focus the maximum number of assets possible to supporting

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special access programs (SAP's) and conducting counterintelligence/counterespionage investigations. On 1 October 1984, the INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Fort Sam Houston was discontinued and its assets divided upon three reorganized battalions. At the same time, the CI and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco was redesignated as the INSCOM MI Battalion (CI) West Coast; the CI and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Fort George G. Meade was redesignated the INSCOM MI Battalion (CI) East Coast; and the INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Fort George G. Meade was redesignated as INSCOM MI Battalion (Security). In February 1985, the 902d MI Group assumed the counterespionage mission for CONUS from INSCOM's Foreign Counterintelligence Activity.

(C) With respect to SAP support, assets of the MI Battalion (Security) was placed in direct support of commanders or heads of DA activities sponsoring SAP's. In order to provide day-to-day support to the SAP activities dispersed throughout CONUS, the two geographic battalions were placed in general support reinforcing MI Battalion (Security) for the SAP support mission. At the close of FY 1985, the 902d MI Group was in the process of examining other missions to identify those which can be reduced or eliminated in order to free additional assets to apply against the SAP/counterespionage missions. Examples include the transferring of the Personnel Security Screening Program (PSSP) mission to Defense Investigative Service (DIS) and limiting ADP security support to only highly sensitive installations and facilities. Additional personnel resources were requested to support the expanding polygraph mission and to support ADP security software analysis, but neither had been resourced.

(U) However, it was felt that the organization of the 902d MI Group did not provide the optimum structure to accomplish the group's mission. The mix of functional and geographical missions created problems in command and control and did not allow adequate flexibility to focus assets on the group's priority missions. Within the functional (primarily technical CI support) tasks, the problem was compounded by a mix of centralized (Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM), polygraph, and ADP security) and decentralized TEMPEST operations. There was an urgent need to provide adequate command and staff supervision of tech services and tech training through centralized control of the CI services. This could produce significant resource savings, provide needed technical control, and allow more efficient allocations of scarce resources against priority missions.

(U) During the 902d MI Group's In Process Review held on 16 July 1985, there was a realignment of the 902d MI Group. By late August, approval had been received from the VCSA to proceed as an exception to the then current Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD) restrictions. The implementation date for the realignment was set for 1 March 1986.

(U) The goal of the realignment was to functionally reorganize and restructure the 902d MI Group to meet the increasing demands for CI support to DA approved SAP's, increase and improve the command, control, and oversight of assigned technical CI capabilities, and create a functionally structured organization that could conduct the total range of CI operations, investigations, and services with maximum efficiency. The significant increase in the number of DA approved SAP's which required INSCOM CI support IAW AR 380-381, the assumption by the 902d MI Group of the CONUS counterespionage mission in 1985, and the lack of adequate command, control, and oversight of CI technical assets dictate this reorganization and restructuring.

(U) In general terms, the realignment will result in the group being aligned along functional mission lines to provide enhanced command, control, and oversight of group operations. The 902d MI Group headquarters will exercise command and control of its three subordinate battalions for all CI operations. The MI Detachment (CI) (Support) will be attached to MI Battalion (CI) (Technical) and MI Detachment (CI) Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) will be attached to MI Battalion (CI) (Security) for command and control.

(U) The following name changes are required to accurately reflect the distinct missions of the subordinate battalions and detachments: East Coast Battalion becomes MI Battalion (CI) (Technical), West Coast Battalion becomes MI Battalion (CI), Pentagon CI Force becomes MI Detachment (CI) (Support), CI Detachment DNA becomes MI Detachment (CI) (DNA), and MI Battalion (Security) becomes MI Battalion (CI) (Security). This reorganization will be completed utilizing current allocated group assets of 683.

(U) In the second phase of the reorganization (FY 1987), the MI Battalion (CI) headquarters will be relocated from Presidio of San Francisco, California, to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. At the same time, the MI Detachment (CI) (Support) will be made organic to MI Battalion (CI) (Technical) and MI Detachment (CI) (DNA) will be made organic to MI Battalion (CI) (Security).[8]

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Establishment of Subcontrol Offices. (C) USAINSCOM Letter of
Instruction, dated 27 February 1985, subject: U.S. Army
Counterespionage (CE) Programs Conducted by INSCOM,
approved/directed the establishment of subcontrol offices (SCO)
within the 470th, 500th, and 902d MI Groups for the management of
CE activities. As a result, a partial decentralization of the
system for management of CE investigations within INSCOM occurred.
The SCO's were responsible for the planning, conduct, and
supervision of certain types (i.e., lesser priority) of CE

investigations within their area of jurisdiction. The Foreign
Counterintelligence Activity (FCA) was relieved of the requirement
to investigate all of the CE investigations involved and was
allowed to concentrate its efforts on the more significant CE
investigations/operations. The Foreign Counterintelligence
Activity continued to function as the INSCOM Control Office for
Management of CE investigative activities, retaining overall
management responsibility within INSCOM.

(U)
(C) Within its area of responsibility, each SCO will scope
requirements and directly task actions and provide guidance to
subordinates. The SCO's will subsequently conduct case analysis
and review of the results obtained, for general case management
purposes. In addition to the more common management and reporting
functions, SCO's will submit requests for investigative support;
technical assistance; and the authority for physical surveillances,
polygraph examinations, and subject interviews to the FCA Control
Office (CO). Moreover, both the SCO's and subordinate elements are
required to include the FCA CO as an information addressee for
communications involving case tasking, guidance, and responses
thereto.[11]

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**HUMINT Subarchitecture--POW Interrogation and Document Exploitation
Activities during Wartime.** (U) USAREUR was responsible for
developing a HUMINT subarchitecture which will be one of several
subarchitectures supporting the USEUCOM Theater Intelligence
Architecture Plan (TIAP). The TIAP was designed to enable the
theater commander to better coordinate intelligence planning by
identifying and programming use of available and projected service,
national, and allied resources. INSCOM was responsible for
addressing the Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) and Document
Exploitation (DOCEX) portions of the HUMINT subarchitecture. This
effort was to result in a strawman theater concept of operations of
IPW/DOCEX consisting of a baseline definition (current
capabilities), requirements identification, shortfall
identification, and a concept architecture.[13]

Operational Guides (OG) for EAC Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Units. (U) Concepts and studies continued to develop OG's to ensure the new echelon above corps (EAC) IEW units had appropriate "how to" guidance. An operational guide, titled "EAC IEW Operations," which provided an overview of the EAC IEW force structure and operations, was completed and distributed in March 1985. Several operational guides were completed on EAC units which had been developed as part of the Army of Excellence: Intelligence Center (EAC) (April 1985); MI Company/Battalion, Imagery Interpretation (EAC) (April 1985); Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) (EAC), MI Brigade (April 1985); MI Company/Battalion Collection and Exploitation (EAC) (May 1985); and MI Battalion, Interrogation and Exploitation (EAC) (August 1985). These guides were provided to USA Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) to be used as a basis for the development of field circulars for EAC MI units. The HHC (EAC), MI Brigade Operational Guide was used as the basic reference document by USAICS in the development of FC 34-123, HHC (EAC), MI Brigade, dated June 1985. Still under development were operational guides for MI Company/MI Battalion, SIGINT (EAC); MI Battalion, Counterintelligence (EAC); MI Battalion, Controlled Collection (EAC); and MI Battalion Low Intensity (EAC).[14]

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III.   ORGANIZATION

1. Paper, IAOPS-H-PCO, subj: Resubordination of USLB (5 Feb 86) (S/NOFORN).
2. DF, IAOPS-PPR, subj: HQ Reorganization (29 Mar 85) (U); DF, IARM-S, subj: HQ Organization (14 May 85) (U).
3. LOI, IALOG-I, subj: LOI for Implementation of Arlington Hall Station Backfill Plan - U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (29 May 84) (U); DF, IAOPS, subj: HQ, INSCOM Consolidation/Backfill AHS (17 Jun 85) (U); DF, IACS, subj: Consolidation at Arlington Hall Station (27 Jun 85) (U).
4. Paper, Mr. Paul Sutton (OCofS), subj: Headquarters INSCOM Reorganization (5 Nov 84), (U).
5. Msg, CDR INSCOM (IAOPS-PPR), subj: Change of OPCON/ADCON of Det Hahn to 66 MIGP (182130Z Mar 85) (U); Interview, Mr. David Reniere (ODCSOPS) (15 Jun 86) (U).
6. FY 1985 MI Bn (East Coast) AHR (U), pp. 75-76; Msg, CDR INSCOM (IAOPS-PPR), subj: Request for Unit Move Approval (271450Z Mar 85) (U).
7. FY 1985 SSG AHR (S), p. 9.
8. FY 1985 902d MI Gp AHR (S), "Personnel" Section; Ltr, CDR 902d MI Gp to CDR INSCOM, subj: Proposed Realignment of 902d MI Group (27 Aug 85) (U).
9. Msg, CDR INSCOM (IAOPS-H), subj: Unit Redesignation (171605Z May 85) (C/NOFORN); Inverview, Mr. David Reniere (ODCSOPS) (15 Jun 86) (U); List of "Monitor of FY 1984 Special Inspection of Procurement by the Inspector General" (Undtd) (C).
10. FY 1985 FCA AHR (S/NOFORN), pp. 2-6.
11. Ibid., p. 10, Annex.
12. FY 1985 DCSPPM AHR (S/NOFORN), ch IV.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

Chapter IV

RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

<u>Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds</u>. (U) FY 1985 was an
extraordinary year for INSCOM in that over $15 million was returned
to DA. Of this figure, $11 million was INSCOM's and $4 million
belonged to other activities in INSCOM funding profile. Below is a
quick overview of what subprograms and associated projects were
affected by the turn-in:[1]

<u>P2</u>
    2,925 INSCOM
    <u>2,400</u> ELT *Other Activity
    5,325

<u>P3I</u>
    7,975 INSCOM
    1,665 ITAC/AIA *Other Activity
      <u>206</u> LANCE PERRY *Other Activity
    9,846

<u>P3C</u>
    215 BASEOPS and TEMPEST

<u>P7</u>
    34 Second Destination Transportation

<u>P8T</u>
    100 Military Training

<u>P80</u>
    32 ACES/EDG

<u>P9</u>
    11 QRIP

(U) The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command's OMA funding
program at the close of FY 1985 consisted of $206,077,000 of Direct
Funds and $35,000 of Funded Reimbursements for a total of
$206,112,000. The table below shows a breakout of direct funding
by subprogram at the close of FY 1985.[2]

Table 1. – Direct Funding by Subprogram.
(As of 30 September 1985)

Subprogram	FY 1985
P2 (General Purpose Forces)	$ 35,315,000
P3I (Intelligence Activities)	143,854,000
P3C (Communications Security)	3,030,000
P7 (Troop Issue)	98,000
P80 (Education Services)	1,087,000
P8T (Training)	1,614,000
P9 (Administration and Associated Activities)	22,000
Base Operations (AHS & VHFS)	21,057,000
TOTAL	$206,077,000

(U) The following is an audit trail ($ in thousands) from DA dollar guidance use for preparation of the FY 1985 Command Operating Budget (COB) to final FY 1985 Annual Funding Program (AFP):[3]

Program 2

Dollar Guidance – FY 1985 COB	$ 37,433
Leased Communications	(195)
Force Mod TENCAP	1,388
FY 1985 Initial AFP	$ 38,626
ELT	95
CW	1,229
REDTRAIN to FORSCOM	(50)
P2 Mission	(2,800)
OPFOR FMA	715
ELT	(2,500)
Final FY 1985 AFP	$ 35,315

Program 3I

Dollar Guidance - FY 1985 COB	$159,348
CRAZYHORSE	62
Transfer to ACSI	(173)
C3	(97)
PBG Corrections	(2,468)
AIA Adj/Transfer	(382)
MPR Align	3
Classified Program	(4,048)
DOMA	330
CRA Withhold	(14,437)
FY 1985 Initial AFP	$138,138
DOMA Adj	(330)
CRAZYHORSE	200
Classified Project	225
HAC Restored	1,000
Canal Pilot	464
OPSEC Spt	(2,311)
CRA Release	14,437
Unemployment/MPDI	(514)
Customs	45
ADPE Lease Restored	650
TSCM Equipment	165
WPE Buyout	200
AIA Returned	(322)
P3I Mission	(5,384)
ITAC Reduction	(1,343)
LANCE PERRY	(206)
Transfer to BASEOPS	(1,260)
Final FY 1985 AFP	$143,854

Program 3C

Dollar Guidance - FY 1985 COB	$ 3,233
CRA Withhold	(81)
FY 1985 Initial AFP	$ 3,152
CRA Withhold Restored	81
Program Directors Adj	(65)
Pay Raise	30
Transferred to BASEOPS	(73)
P3C Returned	(95)
Final FY 1985 AFP	$ 3,030

Program 7

Dollar Guidance - FY 1985 COB	$	132
CRA Withhold		(7)
FY 1985 Initial AFP	$	125
CRA Restoral		7
Funds Returned		(34)
Final FY 1985 AFP	$	98

Program 8T

Dollar Guidance - FY 1985 COB	$ 1,510	
Physical Fitness		4
FY 1985 Initial AFP	$ 1,514	
Anti-Terrorist Tng		200
Funds Returned		(100)
Final FY 1985 AFP	$ 1,614	

Program 80

Dollar Guidance - FY 1985 COB	$	507
COA Reduction		(16)
CTED		624
FY 1985 Initial AFP	$ 1,115	
Funds Returned		(28)
Final FY 1985 AFP	$ 1,087	

BASEOPS

Dollar Guidance - FY 1985 COB	$19,400
CRA Withhold	(2,431)

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FY 1985 Initial AFP	$16,969
CRA Release	2,431
Environmental (Cong. Adj)	(5)
RPMA/BASEOPS Cut	(686)
Funds Returned	(305)
Program Adjustments	(13)
Commercial Activities	583
RPMA Projects	610
Pay Raise	140
Transfer from P3I	1,260
Transfer from P3C	73
Final FY 1985 AFP	$21,057

Program 9

Dollar Guidance - FY 1985 COB	$ 0
FY 1985 Initial AFP	0
QRIP/PECIP OMA Funds	33
Funds Returned	(11)
Final FY 1985 AFP	22

(U) The following table reflects direct obligations by elements of expense for FY 1985 ($ in thousands): Obligations of $205,842,000 and Annual Funding Program of $206,077,000 resulted in an obligation rate of 99.9 percent.[4]

Table 2. - Direct Obligations for FY 1985.

Element of Expense	P2	P3I	P3I	P7	P8T	P8O	P9	BO	Total	Percent
Civ Pay	1,451	48,469	1,269	30	-	704	-	5,378	57,301	28
Travel	4,540	9,301	353	52	1,273	126	-	44	15,689	8
T/T	638	863	15	1	3	2	-	32	1,554	1
Rnt/Com/Ut	679	5,177	206	-	-	-	-	375	6,437	3
Cont Svc	20,120	60,324	499	5	316	246	6	11,846	93,362	45
Supplies	7,518	15,431	691	9	14	7	16	3,179	26,865	13
FNIH	345	4,289	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,634	2
TOTAL	35,291	143,854	3,033	97	1,606	1,085	22	20,854	205,842	100

Family Housing Units. (U) The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command operated and maintained family housing units at Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station. Funds received from Department of the Army for these units for FY 1985 were $1,550 of which $1,548 was obligated (99.9 percent).[5]

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Morale and Welfare. (U) The command supported numerous programs evolving from the Family Action Plan I and II, most of which pertained only to Vint Hill Farms since they were the only INSCOM installation providing quarters for married personnel. Survey results indicated that host installations were providing an excellent service to INSCOM personnel and that INSCOM personnel, through their volunteer services, provided invaluable assistance and support to the host command programs.

(U) The command was successful in obtaining $1.3 million on nonappropriated funds from the Army Morale Support Fund to build a community center at Vint Hill Farms Station. Construction began in May and is scheduled for completion in 2d Quarter FY 1986. The new structure will house the Army community service, youth activities, privacy rooms for counselling, and an auditorium-type area for family meetings, plays, etc.[8]

Command Officer Personnel Strength. (U) The command strength as of 30 September 1984 was 1,235 officers and 466 warrant officers assigned. This was an increase of 18 officers and 10 warrant officers compared to the end of FY 1983 strength. As of 30 September 1985, the strength had increased to 1,253 commissioned officers and 516 warrant officers.[9]

HQDA Reenlistment Award. (U) U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command was presented the HQDA Reenlistment Award for FY 1984 at the meeting of the DA Reenlistment Steering Group in March 1985.[10]

Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds. (U) a. PE 381055: FY 1985 funds were allotted a level of $2,082K for supplies, TDY, and various support services. A further $770K was provided in the PE for civilian compensation.[11]

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b. PE 393111: Civilian compensation was $115K and an additional 7.5K was provided for TDY.

c. PE 814771: $9.4K was allocated for military TDY for training.

ADP Security. (U) The INSCOM Automation Security Program Manager (SPM) function was transferred from the Command Security Office to the Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management-Automation effective 1 August 1985. This decision was based on the availability of manpower and technical expertise within DCSIM to effectively manage the program--two essentials which were lacking in the CSO.

(U) DCSIM facility accreditation documentation was forwarded to the CSO in August 1985 in support of the SCIF reaccreditation of INSCOM Headquarters Building 1 and "A" Building.[12]

Microfilm Index Project for Investigative Records Repository (MIP IRR). (U) In conjunction with providing the information concerning Mengele requested by President Reagan, information from the microfilm library of more than 15,800 reels of intelligence investigative material and 1,700 reels of index data, catalogs, and microfiche were entered into the Defense Central Index of Investigations. An estimated 500,000 records remain to be entered. SEB supported this effort through our Automated Data Section which provides data entry services to IRR.[13]

Personnel Security. (U) In June all MACOM's were directed to eliminate and reduce security clearances. The overall Army target was a 10 percent reduction. Due to the missions of INSCOM and the pervasive sensitivity of the command, a more modest reduction of 2 percent was asked. With considerable help from INSCOM DCSOPS and DCSPER along with honest efforts from subordinate units, a total of 290 security clearances were identified for elimination. This represented 2.34 percent of all security clearances.[14]

INSCOM Commanders Badges. (U) A new series of personalized badges was developed for INSCOM commanders for their use when visiting the headquarters. The badges were made using copies of command photographs.[15]

Public Affairs Activities. (U) The Office of Public Affairs exercises staff supervision over authorized INSCOM unit newspapers and critiques authorized unit newspapers in preparation for the annual Keith L. Ware awards. The following is a list of INSCOM publications as of 30 September 1985.[16]

Publication	Unit Publisher
Alamo Wrangle	USAFS San Antonio
Augsburg Profile	USAFS Augsburg
Red Dragon	501st MI Group
The Dagger	66th MI Group
Torii Typhoon.	USAFS Okinawa
Vanguard	Vint Hill Farms Station
Kunia Underground News	CONUS MI Group
Caribbean Sentinel	USAFS Kunia
Diogenes Review	USAFS Key West
Field Station Berlin Voice	USAFS Berlin

IGAR's. (U) There was a decrease in IGAR's processed by HQ INSCOM detailed IG's during FY 1985, to include those evolving from complaint periods conducted as an integral part of inspections. Eighty-four such IGAR's were completed in FY 1985 compared to 104 in FY 1984. Acting Inspectors General at major subordinate units processed 113 additional IGAR's, representing 57 percent of the total IGAR cases as compared to 47 percent in FY 1984. Of the total 197 IGAR's processed by INSCOM IG/AIG's in FY 1985, 31 percent were substantiated, 59 percent were nonsubstantiated and 10 percent were assistance cases.[17]

Congressional Inquiries. (U) During FY 1985, 34 Congressional Inquiries were responded to, an increase from the 28 processed in FY 1984. In addition, AIG's reported two Congressional Inquiries processed directly between HQDA and INSCOM subordinate commands. Of the 36 total inquiries, 4 were defined as assistance cases, 25 as nonsubstantiated, and 7 were substantiated.[18]

IG Investigations. (U) No IG investigations were completed during FY 1985 and none were pending at the close of the period.[19]

The Army Space Program. (U) Liaison with DA DCSOPS Army Space Office was established on 15 August 1985 to initiate "The Army Space Program." Two personnel in DCSOPS were dedicated a primary and alternate space POC's on 18 August 1985. On 14 September 1985, the CG, INSCOM was made observe member of Army Space Working Group as an INSCOM Space Working Group was established. Action was initiated to provide INSCOM requirements and concepts for space operations to the Army Space Initiative Study Group. Relations continued to develop with the DA Study Group to provide input to the Army Space Master Plan. As a result, a working relationship was established with the Army element that supports the USSPACOM in order to promulgate INSCOM mission requirement.[20]

Historical Monographs. (U) To continue the efforts of
communicating interested historical matters to the troops and MI
specialists, the History Office extended its affective writing
tools. In FY 1985, the "MI: A Picture History" was completed and
published through the Government Printing Office. In April 1985,
3,000 copies (1,000 hardback and 2,000 soft cover) of the pictorial
history were issued to INSCOM for distribution within the command.
The book represents the first history on military intelligence to
be published and sold by the U.S. Government and the first INSCOM
history accepted for publication by the Government Printing Office.[21]

Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR). (U) The PARR is
another vehicle by which INSCOM submits dollar and manpower
requirements for the program years. These requirements must not be
fundable by any of the NFIP programs. The command's FY 1987-1991
PARR was submitted to DA on 11 January 1985. Fiscal guidance
constrained INSCOM's dollar growth to 1 percent of its total
obligational authority (TOA), which amounted to $1.213M and zero
manpower growth. For the first time, the MACOM's were invited to
brief their initiatives to the Army Functional Panels. Out of
INSCOM's 29 initiatives, only 11 chose to brief the panels and did
so between 29 January to 19 February 1985. In addition, the
MACOM's were required to brief the Director of Program and
Evaluation, MG Woods, on their PARR. Chief, Programs Division
briefed on 24 January 1985 while eight other INSCOM staff
representatives attended.

(U) Also for the first time, feedback on INSCOM's PARR submission
was received from ACSI (Plan, Programs, and Budget Office) on 2
April 1985. This enabled feedback to the staff on the status of
INSCOM's initiatives, up to the Program Budget Committee (PBC)
Review and before the Select Committee (SELCOM) Review. A profile
of INSCOM's PARR initiatives follows. It displays how many
initiatives ACSI supported by converting them to an Army Staff
(ARSTAF) Program Development Increment Package (PDIP), thereby
elevating their priority. It also reflects which PDIP's were
integrated into the Army's Program Objective Memorandum (POM).[22]

Table 5. - FY 1987-1991 PARR Initiatives.

INSCOM	ACSI SPTD	POM SPTD PDIP # AND TITLE
Initiated:		
9 New Initiatives	-	257D AGR Mod Planners
		269H AHS Caretaker Costs
8 Special Displays (Mnpr)	5	2S7B INSCOM HCA Operations
11 Special Displays ($)	5	"
3 Recommended Changes	-	+2SA3 REDTRAIN
(Only one requested funding increase +)		

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	ACSI	
INSCOM	SPTD	POM SPTD PDIP # AND TITLE
Responded to:		
4 DA-Directed (Non-TAA)	-	DD7U Force Protection

Military Justice. (U) A breakdown of the military justice reports for FY 1985 revealed the following statistics:[23]

Article 15's

FY 1984: 561
FY 1985: Summarized - 179/Formal - 426

Courts-Martial

	FY 1984		FY 1985
Summary	8	Summary	9
Special	8	Special	7
General	4	General	8
TOTAL	19	TOTAL	24

Drug Offenses

FY 1984: 72
FY 1985: 109

FY 1984 Administrative Eliminations

(AR 635-200)	Hon	Gen	Less Than Hon
Chapter 5 (Sep for Convenience for Govt)	6	0	1
Chapter 9 (Alcohol or Drug Abuse)	10	5	0
Chapter 10 (Discharged for Good of Service)	0	1	10
Chapter 13 (Separated for Unsuitability)	23	15	0
Chapter 14 (Separated for Misconduct)	1	6	1
All others:	25	3	0

FY 1985 Administrative Eliminations

Chapter 5 (Sep for Convenience of Govt)	17
Chapter 9 (Alcohol or Drug Abuse)	4
Chapter 10 (Discharged for Good for Service)	6
Chapter 13 (Separated for Unsuitability)	21
Chapter 14 (Separated for Misconduct)	27
Chapter 15 (Separated for Homosexuality)	2
All others:	30

Enlisted Personnel Strength Posture. (U) Enlisted personnel posture by MOS (EW/Crypto and HUMINT MOS's) is shown in the table below.[24]

Table 6. - Enlisted Personnel Posture for FY's 1984-1985.

MOS	4th Qtr FY 1984 Auth/Asg	Percent Of Fill	4th Qtr FY 1985 Auth/Asg	INSCOM Percent Of Fill	DA Percent Of Fill
05D	230/261	113	224/278	119	134
05G	185/187	101			
05H	1,020/1,071	105	888/1,250	121	140
05K	716/809	113	630/849	118	140
33M			97/101	88	91
33P			171/165	97	100
33Q			163/170	107	99
33R			23/27	104	54
33T			94/78	99	88
33S	534/524	98			
98C	1,056/1,096	104	1,111/1,144	103	99
98G	867/837	97	904/891	99	82
98J	263/249	95	272/337	124	106
98Z	129/149	116	130/124	95	87
96B	285/242	85	289/249	86	98
96C	181/149	82	0/36	300	
96D	244/173	71	290/196	68	90
97B	548/394	72	608/484	80	80
97C	95/25	26	94/37	39	47
97G			185/158	85	72
97E			204/183	90	63

Notes: 1. MOS 05G converted to MOS 97G.
       2. MOS 33S converted to MOS 33M, 33P, 33Q, 33R, 33T
       3. MOS 96C converted to MOS 97E.

Table 7. - Enlisted Personnel Strength Posture by Area and Unit.
(As of 30 September 1985)

Unit	Authorizations	Assigned
European Area		
Field Station Augsburg	1,586	1,550
Field Station Berlin	767	774
Field Station Sinop	258	262
USA Cryptologic Support Group	11	12
66th MI Group	1,310	1,269
USA Russian Institute	5	8
USA Foreign Lan Trng Ctr Europe	8	9
TOTAL	3,945	3,884

Unit	Authorizations	Assigned
Panama Area		
470th MI Group	120	97
EAC Aviation Intel Co	69	69
Field Station Panama	102	90
TOTAL	291	256
MAIT Team		
USA MAIT Team	13	15
USA Mission Support Activity	60	55
TOTAL	73	70
Pacific Area		
Field Station Kunia	922	883
Field Station Okinawa	337	433
ITIC-PAC	38	52
500th MI Group	213	193
501st MI Group	1,238	1,227
TOTAL	2,748	2,788
CONUS Area		
Admin/AV Support Activity	29	31
Automated Survey Det	94	99
Admin Survey Det	69	76
Central Security Facility	9	9
CONUS MI Group	902	995
Finance Accounting Activity	15	13
513th MI Group	1,157	1,079
National Training Ctr	55	58
USA Garrison, AHS	143	170
HQ INSCOM	82	97
HQ INSCOM, Ft. Meade	24	13
HQ Support Activity	11	8
Intel Exchange and Support Ctr	9	8
Field Station Key West	23	23
902d MI Group	324	294
Operational Group	36	39
Field Station San Antonio	195	217
Foreign CI Activity	23	20
Special Security Group	262	295
USA Garrison, VHFS	122	124
TOTAL	3,584	3,668

Unit	Authorizations	Assigned
INSCOM Consolidated		
European Area	3,945	3,884
Panama Area	291	256
MAIT Team	73	70
Pacific Area	2,748	2,788
CONUS Area	3,584	3,668
TOTAL	10,641	10,666

Command Personnel Situation. (C) Actual total command strength for FY 1984 and FY 1985 are shown below.[25]

	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT MIL	CIV	GRAND TOTAL
30 September 1984						
Actual	1,380	552	10,487	12,419	2,126	14,545

	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT MIL	CIV	GRAND TOTAL
30 September 1985						
Actual	1,288	561	10,699	12,548	1,969	14,517

(U) FY 1985 command personnel strength by unit, see appendix F.

INSCOM Senior Level (13-15) Positions (High Grade). (U) In March 1984, DA lifted the high grade ceiling, but INSCOM continues to centrally manage and allocate its high grade positions. In its place, OMB/OPM directed that each DOD agency reduce its GS/GM 11-15 population by 1.5 percent a year in FY 1985 through FY 1988. During FY 1985, INSCOM increased its GS/GM 11-15 strength by 84 positions. Failure to meet its FY 1985 reduction goal (which was 11) was due to new priority mission requirements, internal promotions, increased fill, and 26 newly authorized manpower spaces. On 14 May 1985, the Chief of Staff issued a policy letter directing that all nonsupervisory GS-11 and 12 positions be filled at the GS-09 level or lower in an effort to comply with the high grade reduction initiative.[26]

PMO Advisory Committee. (U) In July 1984, the Chief of Staff established a Position Management Officer Advisory Committee to assist him in ensuring that the INSCOM Position Management Program is judiciously managed. The committee members designated were: P. Singleton, D. Perthel, W. Willoughby, R. Altman, R. Hutchinson, J. Davis, A. Ressler (chairman), and A. Cardillo (executive agent).

In mid-year, R. Hutchinson was replaced by D. Smith. The committee
reviewed and recommended approval/disapproval of requests for
additional high grade positions (GS/GM 13-15), and exceptions to
the INSCOM grade, provided advice on restructuring of positions and
reorganizations, ensured maintenance of average grade, and
recommended the reallocation of high grade resources as priorities
changed. During FY 1985, the committee reviewed 28 position management
cases.[27]

Equal Employment Opportunity Program. (U) The following is a
brief command overview of USAINSCOM's efforts in eliminating
underrepresentation of women and minorities in mid and senior level
positions in the workforce:[28]

As of 30 September 1984

	GS-9	GS-10	GS-11	GS-12	GS-13	GS-14	GS-15	Total
White Female	43	2	50	34	4	2	0	135
Black Male	3	1	5	18	2	1	0	30
Black Female	8	0	9	3	0	0	0	20
Hispanics Male	1	0	1	9	1	0	1	13
Hispanics Female	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3
AA/PI Male	3	1	11	25	8	2	0	50
AA/PI Female	1	0	1	3	0	0	0	5
AI/AN Male	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
AI/AN Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

As of 30 September 1985

	GS-9	GS-10	GS-11	GS-12	GS-13	GS-14	GS-15	Total
White Female	43	2	54	46	8	1	0	154
Black Male	4	2	4	14	4	1	0	29
Black Female	6	0	9	8	1	0	0	24
Hispanics Male	3	0	0	6	3	0	1	12
Hispanics Female	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	4
AA/PI Male	3	1	9	27	8	1	1	50
AA/PI Female	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
AI/AN Male	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
AI/AN Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Per DIA (b)(3), 10 USC 424

<u>DOD Polygraph Test Program</u>. (U) The Congress of the United States has, in enacting the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Act, authorized the Department of Defense to conduct a test program of its proposed use of a counterintelligence scope polygraph examination to assist in determining the eligibility of DOD civilian, military, and contractor personnel for: access to specifically designated classified information protected within special access programs (SAP's); employment, assignment, or detail to positions within the   designated as critical intelligence positions by the [   ] and interim access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Requirements that the results of the test program be reported to appropriate elements of Congress by 31 December 1985, have since been extended to 31 December 1986. In view of the continuing sensitivity of the issue of the polygraph, and the importance of the success of the test program to future use of the polygraph within DOD, revised DOD Directive 5210.48, wrote DOD Regulation 5210.48, and then issued the DOD Polygraph Test Program SOP, all dated January 1985. The SOP requires all examinations, to include NSA examinations, be tape recorded in their entirety with cassettes that are compatible with USAINSCOM Quality Control, DOD Oversight Committee, and Congressional Oversight Committee. A representative sample must be obtained in each of the three categories of proposed polygraph use.

(U) On 9 January 1985, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (ODUSD(P)) issued a memorandum to the military departments to initiate the DOD Polygraph Test Program. A ceiling of 3,500 individuals was established for FY 1985. In October 1985, the program was extended through FY 1987. The FY 1985 ceiling was carried over through FY 1986 and a ceiling of 7,000 was established for FY 1987, with the Army share being about 2,335.

(U) On 9 June 1985, INSCOM began this program in CONUS utilizing current assets. Twenty-three individuals were examined, all in connection with SAP's. INSCOM does not have additional polygraph assets to address this program. Authority to obtain additional resources needed to meet the new requirements was not received until September 1985. In March 1985, OACSI, DA established priorities for INSCOM to carry out its polygraph mission. In May 1985, NSA denied INSCOM's request for nine civilian spaces from the Consolidated Cryptologic Program. The nine spaces were finally realized as the result of a HQ INSCOM staff decrement and will be available in FY 1986 and FY 1987. At this time, INSCOM is committed to an internal realignment to provide an additional 50 spaces to the polygraph effort from the S&IA Program. These spaces are to be made available in the FY 1986-1987 timeframe.[29]

New Polygraph Facility Construction Funding. (U) Due to the INSCOM polygraph program, a request for allocation of funds ($180K) to construct and equip a new polygraph facility was submitted on 16 January 1985. Funding for the polygraph facility construction was requested in the FY 1985 Budget Execution Review (BER), dated 16 January 1985, as an unfinanced requirement. This request was approved and authorized on 2 April 1985.

(U) One hundred and eighty thousand dollars has been allocated to construct and equip a new INSCOM polygraph facility on the 2d floor of Building #4554, Fort Meade, Maryland. Included in this construction will be administration spaces for the Office of the Polygraph Program Manager, 902d MI Group and 641st MI Company polygraph examiners, six sound proof polygraph rooms, and a reception area. The estimated date of completion of this facility is 15 April 1986. At this time, no problem areas have surfaced in regards to this action.[30]

Table 8. - FY 1985 Polygraph Statistics.

	1st/2d Qtrs	3d/4th Qtrs	FY Total
Technical Reviews	510	431	941
Review of Permanent Files	1002	1188	2190
Pre-polygraph Dossier Reviews	406	355	761
Certification Actions	3	0	3
Seminars Conducted	0	0	0
Examiner Refresher Training	0	5	5
Intern Examiner Supervision	1	4	5
Examinations Conducted:			
Hq INSCOM and 902d MI Gp	396	301	697
66th MI Gp	70	114	184
501st MI Gp	25	24	49
TOTAL	491	439	930

Support to NSA (Examinations)   0

Freedom of Information/Privacy Act. (U) The following list shows the breakdown as of 30 September 1985:[31]

Privacy Act Request	924
Freedom of Information Request	1,075
Classified Pages Reviewed	118,075
Unclassified Pages Reviewed	312,203
Administrative Support Actions	17,337
Operational Support Actions	1,019,047
Case Opening Procedures	1,994
Case Closing Procedures	2,163
TOTAL	1,472,818

Upward Mobility Program. (U) Command emphasis was provided to
promote a significant increase in the INSCOM participation in the
Upward Mobility Program. It was a specific objective in the INSCOM
Planning Document to expand the size of the program to fill 2
percent of the command authorized and funded positions at AHS and
VHFS.

(U) The emphasis placed on the Upward Mobility Program resulted in
a 100 percent increase in the number of spaces filled in FY 1985.
The momentum of this emphasis resulted in this command coming within
two spaces of achieving the DA goal in this vital program area. This
was the best ever performed of this command.[32]

Investigative Records Repository (IRR). (U) A listing of IRR
procedures during FY 1985 is shown below:[33]

Request	157,916
Dossiers Reviewed	222,532
Direct Database Maintenance and Verification Actions	718,360
Supplements Processed	60,758
Dossiers Created	37,763
Dossiers Reviewed for Permanents Transfer to NARS	1,298
Dossiers Deleted	71,737
Special Acts Processed	249
Source Data Cards Processed	34,447
Reproductions	401,600
Dossiers Controlled	4,873
Filing/Refiling	83,044
*Mengele Project Hard Copy and Microfilm Reviews	12,945
**Mengele Project Microfilm Deletes	8,475
TOTAL	1,815,997

*Special project designated by the Secretary of the Army, which
entailed 5 months of work over and above regular tasking.

**Quality control actions continue.

Command Strength. (U) The command strength as of 30 September
1984 was 1,235 officers and 466 warrant officers assigned. This
was an increase of 18 officers and 10 warrant officers compared to
the end of FY 1983 strength. As of 30 September 1985, the strength
had increased to 1,253 commissioned officers and 516 warrant
officers.[34]

INSCOM Headquarters Concept Design. (U) The INSCOM Headquarters Concept Design is the plan for construction of the proposed INSCOM headquarters building at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. In December 1984, plans were made available by the Baltimore Corps of Engineers for review by INSCOM staff members. Construction is projected to start in early 1986 and be completed in 1988.

(U) TEMPEST Branch, C-H Division, ADCSOPS-CI reviewed the concept design with DCSLOG. The purpose of the review was to validate the TEMPEST countermeasures included in the design of the building. It was originally planned that the entire building would be RFI-shielded (radio frequency interference). However, there was no TEMPEST requirement for shielding. Other needless countermeasures were eliminated which will result in saving of an estimated $3.5 million without any reduction in security. No significant problem was encountered.[35]

Travis Trophy. (U) The Travis Trophy recognizes the most significant contribution in the field of operations, management, and administration by fixed field stations. NSACSS announced and presented the Naval Security Group Activity, Edzell, Scotland, as the 1984 Travis Trophy winner. See appendix J for a complete list of previous winners.[36]

Director's Trophy. (U) During FY 1980, Vice Admiral B.R. Inman, DIRNSA, established a new award which would recognize the (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b)(1) Per NSA (b)(3):P.L. 86-36 (b) (1) Per NSA element making the most significant contribution to the cryptologic community during the calendar year. For 1984, DIRNSA chose the U.S. Army's 224th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation), as the winner of the Director's Trophy. See appendix K for a complete list of the year's winners.[37]

INSCOM Key Personnel. (U) Appendix I contains a listing of personnel occupying key positions within the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, as of 30 September 1985.[38]

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(b)(1)

INSCOM Average Grade. (U) The DA average grade ceiling assigned to INSCOM is 9.17. The FY 1984 average grade was 9.07. During FY 1985, the average grade rose to 9.11. The reason for the increase was greater allocation in fill of higher grade positions and a general upgrading of the workforce.[40]

SIDPERS Performance. (U) Benefits of the continued emphasis placed on timely and accurate reporting of personnel data input to the SIDPERS was reflected in FY 1985 accomplishments. For the first time, over 95 percent of INSCOM units either met or exceeded the HQDA standards of 90 percent for data acceptability and 7 days for timeliness.[41]

USAINSCOM Organization Day Military/Civilian Team Awards. (U) Major General Harry E. Soyster, commander of INSCOM presented the annual awards for outstanding performance and meritorious service for employees of the INSCOM community. The presentation included awarding Mr. John H. Armistead, Jr., DCSLOG, with the Albert W. Small Award; Major Daniel D. Denlin, 66th MI Group (U.S. Army Interrogation Unit), with the Colonel Richard F. Judge Military/Civilian Team Improvement Award for military recipient and Mr. Peter A. Petito, 66th MI Group (584th MI Detachment) as the civilian recipient; Ms. Carolyn J. Brown, DCSLOG, was presented the Jackie Keith Award; Ms. Joanne F. Swartz, Hq, 66th MI Group, with the Virginia McDill Award; Ms. Nancy H. Inger, USAG VHFS (CPO), with the Equal Employment Opportunity Award; Mr. Charles K. Brummett, U.S. Army Engineer Activity, Capital Area (AHS), with the Annual Wage Grade Award; and Ms. Dorothy L. Wood, USAG VHFS (Installation Club System), the Nonappropriated Fund Employee of the Year Award.[42]

Grade Rollback Program. (U) In May 1985, HQ USAINSCOM issued guidance on the implementation of the Administration's Grade Rollback Program. This is a presidentially mandated program to reduce the number of GS/GM 11-15 positions by approximately 1.5 percent by the end of FY 1985.

(U) The Grade Rollback Program is to be accomplished by filling all vacant nonsupervisory GS-11 and GS-12 positions at or below the GS-09 grade level. Career ladder positions will be established and may have promotion potential to the original grade. By reengineering positions to the lower grade levels, employees as well as managers can benefit. This program can provide career

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opportunities for employees, further EEO goals, help achieve a balance in professional/technical/support positions, and provide a more efficient organization overall.

(U) When management determines that a position cannot be restructured and/or filled at the lower grade levels, a written request for exception must be submitted with the SF-52, Request for Personnel Action, the Civilian Personnel Office covering the pros and cons of the proposed action.[43]

Information Search on Dr. Mengele. (U) A memorandum from the Secretary of Army John O. Marsh, Jr., dated 20 February 1985, subj: Search for Information Concerning Dr. Mengele, was sent through the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence directing the assembly of a special task force to cause a search of relevant Army records for information of Dr. Josef Mengele. In turn, the ACSI tasked the Commander, USAINSCOM to conduct a search of the Investigative Record Repository to complete the task. The U.S. Army Central Security Facility was advised to notify the USAINSCOM DCSOPS of its findings on a periodic status.

(U) The search was focused on administrative, historical, and personnel records or any other records providing clues to indicate any association the Army had with Dr. Mengele of his whereabouts. Particular attention was given to the time period just before and just after the end of World War II.[44]

INSCOM Commanders' Conference. (U) The FY 1985 Commanders' Conference was held on 7-11 November 1984 at the Sheraton Inn-Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. As an added attraction to the conference a Gettysburg Military History Battlefield Tour with dinner was provided by the War College.[45]

Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS). (U) On 10 October 1984, both houses of Congress passed HR-2300, a bill with Merit Pay/SES reforms and provisions for ex-spouse claims on federal annuities. Upon the President's approval, the new system would be called the Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS), not Merit Pay System.

(U) On 7 December 1984, the Department of the Army provided a message implementing the merit increase provisions of the new PMRS. The provisions affected all INSCOM employees in the GM pay plan on the statutory effective date of the merit increase. The new PMRS replaced the merit pay system but retained the GM designation merit increases that will now be based on full or partial equivalent amounts to counterpart GS within-grade (WIG) increases. The new PMRS gives generally less to the Exceptional (EX) and Highly

Successful (HS) in base pay increases than the old Merit Pay System. In most cases, however, PMRS will generally guarantee, unlike the old Merit Pay System, full base pay parity between those rated Fully Successful (FS) and their GS counterparts.

(U) On 11 December 1984 OPM also directed that employees who were hired, reassigned, or promoted into merit pay within 90 days prior to the 7 or 14 October 1984 effective date, and who received a pay increase (i.e., a promotion or a WIG) during the period, would not get a merit increase—not to include employees promoted from one GM grade to another GM grade during that 90 days.

(U) The purpose of the recent legislation is to both guarantee full pay parity with GS counterparts for all GM employees rated FS and above and to provide additional monetary rewards for superior performance. Both a supplemental performance and a cash awards program were established by this legislation to allow performance based cash awards and cash awards to additionally reward a number of deserving GM employees. The features and procedures for PMRS performance and cash awards are projected to be very close to those for SSPA's and SASA's. The name "Significant Accomplishment Award" now used under the merit pay system is expected to be dropped in favor of those names, recombining much of the GS and GM award systems. However, GM employees will continue to be ineligible for Quality Step Increases.

(U) The reform legislation also establishes for the first time a monetary limit for performance awards (SSPA's) between an amount equivalent to .75 and 1.5 percent of the aggregate base salaries of all GM employees within an agency. No limit is mandated by this law for cash awards, however, INSCOM is considering establishment of a separate goal of a range between .75 and 1.5 percent of the aggregate base pay.[46]

902d MI Group Shortfalls. (C) (U) At the close of FY 1985, the 902d MI Group was manned at an austere level. This had a direct effect on the group's two priority missions: OPSEC support to special access programs (SAP) and conduct of counterintelligence (CI)/ counterespionage (CE) investigations. The group had a shortfall of 46 personnel in December 1984 in the SAP support mission alone. Internal realignment of resources and revision of the command and control arrangements to support SAP's increased the number of personnel supporting SAP's by approximately 70 percent since July 1984. However, this increased support was accomplished at the sacrifice of other missions and in response to a 25 percent increase in the number of SAP's being supported without the concurrent provision of additional resources. The assumption of

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the CE mission for CONUS in February 1985 from INSCOM's Foreign Counterintelligence Activity brought added responsibilities, but the accompanying spaces would not arrive until FY 1986.

(C) The personnel shortfall within the 902d MI Group was also exacerbated by new standards of grade authorization levels that, when applied to the group's MTOE and its augmentation TDA, resulted in significant grade and experience level reductions for 97B and 97G authorizations. The existing personnel shortfall resulted in INSCOM customers who were receiving limited or no support, and would, as the group assumed the CE and increased SAP mission, significantly hamper the remainder of the group's CI support during mobilization. INSCOM estimated that only 154 out of 287 installations requiring CI support to OPSEC during mobilization would receive it due to the 902d MI Group personnel shortage.[47]

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STU-II Program. (U) The INSCOM STU-II program will provide Secure Voice Communications throughout the command. Eleven STU-II terminals have been installed with approximately 44 more planned installations before project completion. Additionally, Narrowband Subscriber Terminals (NBST) are expected to be replaced by STU-II's throughout Department of the Army. The STU-III program is expected to reach implementation stages upon completion of the STU-II program, with Department of Defense fielding in excess of 800,000 units. INSCOM will participate aggressively in this program as well, with requirements projected to be in excess of 2,000 units command-wide.[49]

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Digital Imagery Transmission System (DITS). (U) During FY 1986 the DCSIM Installation Team's efforts were directed at projects at Field Station Kunia, the engineering and installation of the Communications Support Package for the Digital Imagery Transmission System (DITS). DITS will provide near real-time imagery to the 470th MI Group and the 513th MI Group from IAPD at the Washington Navy Yard. The terminals are being installed by Northrop, and the Communications Support Package will be installed by DCSIM to include a circuit switch at IAPD. Site surveys for DITS were begun in January 1985 and completed in March 1985. During the July-September time frame a three-man team installed the Communications Support Packages at the Washington Navy Yard and in Panama. Installations at Fort Bragg, Bergstrom AFB, Shaw AFB, and Fort Monmouth are schedueld for FY 1986.[52]

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<u>European Troop Strength Ceiling (ETSC)</u>. (U) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs, and Modernization assisted HQ, USAREUR in defining and defending INSCOM military manpower requirements under the ETSC. The TAA 91 program growth for the 66th MI Group (234 spaces) had not initially been accommodated within the ETSC. Through negotiation with the USAREUR staff and defense through the USAREUR review process, 153 of the programmed growth spaces were eventually prioritized above other USAREUR requirements and accommodated under the ceiling. However, this was partially offset by the reduction of 37 previously authorized spaces not associated with the TAA 91 program growth. Other INSCOM requirements were sustained through FY 1987, but the Foreign Language Training Center, Europe (FLTCE) and INSCOM field stations were identified for further review. New issues impacting on INSCOM units in NATO Europe are also expected to arise in the future. Semi-annual USAREUR reviews against ETSC will become a recurring process, with the next review scheduled for 1st/2d Qtr FY 1986 54

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<u>INSCOM Rating Distribution Achievement</u>. (U) In FY 1985, the rating distribution for GPAS employees approximated 38 percent rated Exceptional (EX), 23 percent rated Highly Successful (HS), and 39 percent rated Fully Successful (FS). This is a significant change (and possibly represents inflation) over FY 1984 performance, where 27 percent were rated EX; 21 percent were rated HS; and 52 percent were rated FS. There was a similar growth in the rating distribution for PMRS employees in FY 1985. Thirty-five percent were rated EX; 34 percent were rated HS; and 31 percent were rated FS. Only one employee was rated below FS. In FY 1984, only 11 percent of all GM employees were rated EX; 34 percent were rated HS; 55 percent were rated FS. There is clearly an "undesirable" trend toward higher ratings. It is considered undesirable because it has not been validated by commonly recognized, "improved" organizational performance, because it tends to undermine the FS rating as a "positive" rating, and because it has not been accompanied by identification of poor performers.

(U) The following rating distribution model is now established for both PMRS and GPAS: 15 percent should be rated EX; 30 percent should be rated HS; and 55 percent should be rated FS or below. A "specific" model has been chosen to depict an appropriate split between EX and HS as well as between FS and higher ratings.[56]

Cash Awards. (U) Goals for the percentage of the population recognized were met for both GPAS and PMRS employees in FY 1985. Twenty-five percent of GPAS employees were recognized in FY 1985 versus only 18 percent in FY 1984. Thirty-eight percent of PMRS employees were recognized in FY 1985 versus an undesirable high in FY 1984 of 54 percent. Goals for amount of funds expended were not met, however, in FY 1985. An amount equivalent to 1.0 percent was expended for GPAS employees and an amount equivalent to 1.8 percent was expended for PMRS employees. It is believed that a midyear change in goal for GPAS employees, from a maximum of 1.5 to a maximum of 2.0 percent may account for much of the shortfall for GPAS employees, however, it is known that many organizations still do not closely manage "performance" awards. The shortfall in expenditure of PMRS award funds is largely attributed to the high number of EX ratings that required mandatory performance awards. So many performance awards were given to those rated EX that all of the command's performance award funds were expended before awards could be granted to those rated HS or FS.[57]

INSCOM Planning Program. (U) A planning conference was held at Airlie House in Warrenton, Virginia, in January 1985. The HQ INSCOM Civilian Personnel Division staff; INSCOM Civilian Personnel Officers from U.S. Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station; U.S. Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station; and the Administrative Survey Detachment, Fort George G. Meade, and their functional chiefs met for 3 days to develop the FY 1985-86 Civilian Personnel Management Plan for this command. The fiscal year plan subsequently was endorsed by the Commanding General, INSCOM and distributed to headquarters staff heads and INSCOM commanders worldwide.

(U) One of the major results of this conference was the issuance of the FY 1985-86 planning document. The newly issued plan provided for considerable decentralization of HQ control factors. The plan also had an extended life-cycle from 1 to 2 years, thus cutting down on future administrative requirements to reissue guidance annually. It emphasizes that the Civilian Personnel Program Plan is a living, management document, not just a CPO issuance. Foremost is the fact that the plan eliminated HQ micromanagement of local command CPO planning and evaluation which had the result of improved credibility of program planning in the operating CPO. This and other headquarters program guidance

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promoted a significant increase in planning and evaluation activity in the operating CPO's. Each CPO now conducts a mid-year program review to evaluate its service and provides to management the results of the evaluation.[58]

Command Intern Program. (U) In response to past problems encountered and an identified need for a single and comprehensive command-wide training plan, INSCOM developed a Master Intern Training Plan (MITP) for intelligence. This plan is designed to permit modifications in order to meet specific needs of individual intern personnel assigned in the various intelligence sub-specialties. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) was the staff proponent for this action. The Intelligence MITP will be formally issued as an INSCOM pamphlet. This is the second MITP developed by this command. The other MITP developed in FY 1984 was for the Civilian Personnel Administration career program.

(U) One significant accomplishment in the intern program was the creation of a Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) intern position. This was a shared resource with the Military Traffic Management Command. Neither MACOM had manpower resources which indicated a projected ability to place an EEO intern after the individual completed the program. The two commands will pool their resources to identify an appropriate position for post-training placement of the graduating intern. This is the first time two comands have shared an intern space. This approach significantly increased the probability of a good placement for the graduating EEO intern.[59]

ITIC-PAC New Physical Plant. (U) USAITIC-PAC occupies two buildings in the area of Fort Shafter known as "Shafter Flats," a half of a mile from HQ WESTCOM and 16 miles from Field Station Korea. The Command Group, Support Division and Counterintelligence Branch occupy Building T-1504, a two-story frame structure of 1950's vintage. The deputy for operations and the Intelligence Branch are located 200 yards away in Building 1543, which is a modern Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). An ADP element of HQ WESTCOM shares the SCIF. With Building T-1504 scheduled for demolition in 1988, and given the cramped facilities in the SCIF, HQ WESTCOM and INSCOM are currently seeking a facility that will provide for the consolidation of all of USAITIC-PAC in one location. The future home of USAITIC-PAC will probably be a section of an extensive tunnel complex under the Aliamanu Military Reservation (a joint service housing area one mile from Fort Shafter) that until 1974 was the Alternate Command Post of USARPAC. This complex, vacant for the past 11 years, is currently being cleaned up and surveyed for occupancy feasibility by HQ WESTCOM.[60]

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

1. FY 1985, DCSRM AHR (C), pp. 6-7.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. Idid., pp. 8-11.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Ibid., p. 30.
6. Ibid., p. 21.
7. Ibid., p. 21.
8. FY 1985, DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 4-5.
9. Ibid., p. 8.
10. Ibid., p. 16.
11. FY 1985, DCSIM AHR (S), p. 12.
12. Ibid., p. 26.
13. FY 1985, ASA AHR (U), p. II-51.
14. FY 1985, CSO AHR (U), p. 4.
15. Ibid., p. 6.
16. FY 1985, PAO AHR (U), p. D-I.
17. FY 1985, IG AHR (U), p. 12.
18. Ibid., p. 12.
19. Ibid.
20. FY 1985, DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 37.
21. Ibid., p. 51.
22. Ibid.
23. FY 1985, SJA AHR (U), p. 8.
24. FY 1985, DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 10-13.
25. INSCOM Command Strength Report from Plans & Proponency Division,
    DCSPER, as of 30 September 1985, published 21 October 1985 (C).
26. FY 1985, DCSPER AHR (U), p. 31.
27. Ibid., pp. 31-23.
28. Ibid., p. 38.
29. FY 1985, DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 275-276; FY 1985, 501st MI Gp,
    524th MI Bn AHR (TSCW), p. 29.
30. FY 1985, DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 293.
31. FY 1985, Central Security Facility AHR (FOUO), p. 5.
32. FY 1985, DCSPER AHR (U), p. 28.
33. FY 1985, Central Security Facility AHR (FOUO), p. 5.
34. FY 1985, DCSPER AHR (U), p. 8.
35. FY 1985, DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 272.
36. Travis Trophy Awards Program Brochures, 1985 (U).
37. Ibid.
38. Key Personnel Roster, dtd April 1985 (FOUO).
39. FY 1985, DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 68.
40. FY 1985, DCSPER AHR (U), p. 32.
41. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
42. USAINSCOM Organization Day 1985 Mil/Civ Team Awards Ceremony
    Brochure (U).

43. DF, IAG-CIV, subj: Personnel Update for Managers and Supervisors, dtd 21 Nov 85.
44. Sec of Army Memo, dtd 20 Feb 85, subj: Search for Information Concerning Dr. Mengele; DAMI-CIS(L) Ltr to CDR, USAINSCOM, dtd 4 Apr 85, subj: SAB; 1st End, IACS to CDR, CSF, dtd 8 May 85, subj: SAB.
45. Ltr, IAOPS-PMD, subj: Commanders' Conference, dtd 18 Oct 84.
46. IAPER-CP Msg dtg 191600Z Oct 84, subj: Merit Pay Reform; IAPER-CP Ltr, dtd 27 Dec 84, subj: Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS).
47. FY 1985, 902d MI Group AHR (S), c. III.
48. FY 1985, DCSIM AHR (S), p. 17.
49. Ibid., p. 16.
50. Ibid., p. 18.
51. Ibid., p. 18.
52. Ibid., p. 18.
53. Ibid., p. 19.
54. FY 1985, DCSPPM AHR (U), c. III, p. 3.
55. Ibid., c. IV. p. 3.
56. FY 1985, DCSPER AHR (U), pp. 21, 23.
57. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
58. Ibid., pp. 26, 27.
59. Ibid., pp. 28, 29.
60. FY 1985, USAITIC-PAC AHR (TSCW), p. 1.

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CHAPTER V

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Multidiscipline

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Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). (C)
Another shortcoming disclosed by POWDER RIVER 85 was the fact that
HQ INSCOM was not able to track the current readiness of its
CAPSTONE units. This was because INSCOM did not have access to the
WWMCCS computer network, which contained up-to-date data. The
WWMCCS consists of a network of computer hardware, software, data,
and communications with the primary mission of supporting the
National Command Authorities. On 23 July 1985, the Chief of Staff,
INSCOM directed the acquisition of WWMCCS. It was anticipated that
the system would become operational in late October 1985.[5]

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Opposing Forces (OPFOR). (U) (C) The OPFOR Office, a part of the
DCSOPS Intelligence Support (IS) Branch, established a computerized
inventory of OPFOR military equipment for the Army during FY 1985.
The office assisted in a major acquisition of foreign military
equipment spare parts for the National Training Center (NTC), which
brought the operational rate of the fleet of foreign vehicles at
NTC to an acceptable level. Personnel from HQ INSCOM attended the
FORSCOM OPFOR conference at Fort Hood, Texas. An INSCOM OPFOR
conference was scheduled to take place in October 1985.[9]

REDTRAIN. (U) Army Regulation 350-3, Tactical Intelligence
Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program, was revised with an
effective date of 20 November 1984. The revision outlined for the

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first time the specific responsibilities of INSCOM as DA Executive
Agent for the program. INSCOM was charged with providing an
analysis of semiannual unit REDTRAIN reports to OACSI and DA.
Additionally, the revised AR required that all tactical
intelligence units of the Total Army develop an annual REDTRAIN
Plan for submission to INSCOM on 30 June of each year. In March
1985, the REDTRAIN Division, HQ INSCOM, provided its first
analytical report on the status of REDTRAIN activities within the
Regular Army. It was found that reports submitted by reserve
component units were so sketchy and so poorly prepared as to
preclude any meaningful analysis.

(U) At the Fourth REDTRAIN Executive Planning Committee (REPC IV)
meeting held 5-7 March 1985 at Arlington Hall Station, REDTRAIN
Division put forth a strawman presentation that pinpointed the lack
of clear technical standards for which MI personnel could train.
This problem was identified as having a tremendous impact upon the
Live Environment Training (LET) aspects of REDTRAIN. U.S. Army
Intelligence School-Devens (USAIS-D) concurred and agreed to
establish a MACOM working group to address the issue. In April,
the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) initiated
action to develop proficiency standards for SIGINT/EW collective
tasks. A rewrite of the CEWI battalion training program for
SIGINT/EW MOS's was presented to the G2/MI commanders conference in
July 1985, and is scheduled for publication as a revised Army
Training and Exercise Plan (ARTEP) sometime next year.[10]

IMINT/MASINT:

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Page(s) 81

(b)(1)

<u>IMINT Collection Management</u>. (b)(1) Management of collection
requirements for the Army in the IMINT field is the responsibility
of the Community Support Center (CSC). Since October 1984, the CSC
had been under the jurisdiction of the INSCOM ADCSOPS-IMINT.
(Previously, it had been an OACSI responsibility.) In October
1984, Lieutenant General Odum and Major General Soyster agreed that
the function would be more appropriately carried out by the new
Army Intelligence Agency (AIA), a field operating agency of OACSI.
Implementation of the transfer was still in progress at the end of
FY 1985. INSCOM continued to be responsible for the IMINT
requirements of FORSCOM units. However, plans were under way for
OACSI to establish a tasking center at ITAC, which would relieve
INSCOM of the mission.[8]

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Page(s) 83-90

Per NSA
(b)(1)
(b)(3)- P.L. 8636, 50 USC 3024(i)

(S-CCO) A ▯ van was assembled at the Naval Research Laboratory by early March 1985, and deployed to Berlin for operational testing on 30 May. Preliminary results were mixed as to the utility and value of the product. The INSCOM position on deployment of the ▯ system to the 66th MI Group was that USAREUR must decide what 66th MI Group mission would be dropped when ▯ was picked up. USAREUR felt that ▯ had not demonstrated sufficient utility to justify dropping any of the 66th MI Groups existing activities. The issue had not been resolved at the end of FY 1985, pending publication of a final report on the system. [11]

<u>Exploitation of Signals Parametrics (ESP)</u>. (S-CCO) This was an ongoing TENCAP effort conducted in conjunction with the Army Space Program Office to correlate external parametrics of communications emitters to determine if templating could be accomplished on an Interim Tactical ELINT processor (ITEP) in the same way that radar emitters were processed. The experiment received joint Army/Air Force funding. During July 1985, NSA provided emphasis tasking to the appropriate collection assets (Field Station Berlin ▯ ▯ The data collected during that period was stored at NSA and will be forwarded for processing at VII Corps when the experiment finally begins. This was projected to be March 1986. [12]

Per NSA
(b)(1)
(b)(3)18 USC 798,P.L. 86-36,50 USC 3024
(i)

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Page(s) <u>92-93</u>

IAGPA-CSF Form 6-R
1 Sep 93

Field Station KUNIA. (S-CCO) Field Station Kunia became the
centerpiece of INSCOM collection efforts in the Pacific during FY
1985. Phase II in the Kunia development plan called for all
[   ] reporting to be
centralized at Kunia. To bring this about, the new [   ] system
[   ] was installed in May. This
consisted of 31 terminals. On 28 July, the [   ] system
became operational, giving Kunia the capacity to access required
Pacific HFDF resources. In conjunction with DF processing routines
incorporated into the existing [   ] collection support system,
[   ] allowed the transfer of [   ]
[   ] to Field Station Kunia in August
1985. 22

Phase III. (S-CCO) During the same period, action on Phase III of
the development plan (which envisioned transfer of analytic
responsibility [   ] from NSA/CSS to Kunia)
continued. [   ]

[   ] Under the new
arrangements, Field Station Kunia would gradually take over
processing, data base maintenance, and analytical responsibilities
from NSA, [   ]
[   ] This decentralization would also
enhance the survivability of the national SIGINT system, a prime
goal under Project TRIANGLE. 23

Southeast Asia Development (SEADEV) Mission. (S-CCO) In the
summer of 1984, the President of the United States directed that
the SIGINT community undertake all possible efforts to develop
intelligence bearing on the fate of U.S. personnel still listed as
Missing in Action (MIA) in Southeast Asia. NSA responded on 25
September 1984 by initiating major collection adjustments to its
fixed and mobile assets in the Pacific, including Field Station
Kunia. For a period of 6 months, USM-2 was assigned the mission
of searching out and exploiting Vietnamese communications that
might contain information on the issue. Upon receipt of the
message, USM-2 and its Air Force counterpart, USA-32, organized a
joint task force of 39 Army and 50 Air Force operators and 22 Army
analysts. While the HF manual Morse collection provided by Field
Station Kunia against Vietnamese targets exceeded all expectations,
no POW/MIA-related communications were isolated during the period
of the project. The task force stood down on 31 March 1985. 24

Field Station San Antonio. (S-CCQ) Field Station San Antonio
continued to provide the Army complement to the Combined Security
Operations Center (CSOC), a joint INSCOM-Air Force Electronic
Security Command (ESC) facility located at Medina Annex of Lackland
AFB. The CSOC continued to execute the Wideband mission initially
assigned it in 1974. In addition, an increasing portion of its
resources were focussed on Central America and on the drug
interdiction problem in the Caribbean.

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Interservice Issues. (S-CCQ) By the end of FY 1985, problems at
the CSOC had surfaced in the areas of command and control,
training, and mission execution. The main issue was that the Air
Force was prosecuting a mission that belonged to the Army under the
terms of USSID 30: i.e., all operations were joint, and the Army
was not engaged in counterpart tasking against the ground targets
which made up the major portion of the station's mission. In
October 1985, the INSCOM DCSOPS expressed the opinion that "the
situation which gave rise to CSOC in the mid-seventies no longer
exists; CSOC is an anachronism by today's standards for SIGINT
operations...." The Memorandum of Understanding between INSCOM and
ESC had last been updated in 1979 and was in need of renegotiation.
A study by Field Station San Antonio on the manning implications of
reorganizing operations under the guidelines of USSID 30 was
scheduled to be accomplished on 15 October 1985. 26

Field Station Key West. (S-CCQ) Field Station Key West continued
operations at the Truman Annex of Naval Air Station, Key West,
Florida, during the reporting period. The tri-service facility,
known as the WATCHCASE Facility, was manned along traditional
counterpart lines, with each service having sole responsibility for
taskings falling within its sphere of interest. During the course
of FY 1985, initiatives continued in the area of upgrading
communications and LVHF-UHF collection antennas. The current Army
Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) called for two officers
and 60 enlisted personnel to be assigned to the station. In
addition to performing other requirements, Field Station Key West
offered limited augmentation and collection support to Project

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;
(b) (1) Per NSA

(S-CCO) Contracts on the project were let to the Beech Aircraft
Corporation (for the airframes) and Sanders Associates (for the
systems) in December 1983. It was originally intended that
[   ] would be fielded within a 12-month time period after
issuance of contract, but the project encountered problems in the
area of hardware/software integration. There were also several
slippages in schedule during FY 1985. However, the project was
scheduled to be completed and accepted by the Government in October
1985. In the meantime, the U.S. Army EAC Aviation Intelligence
Company had been organized at Lakehurst, N.J., on 1 October 1983 to
support the system. [31]

Aviation Intelligence Battalion (AIB). (S) On 13 November 1984,
SOUTHCOM submitted a statement of need to the JCS for increased
support in the area of imagery and signals intelligence. In
response to tasking received at the January 1985 Army Electronic
Warfare Intelligence Committee meeting, the INSCOM Staff Aviation
Office prepared a concept plan and draft table of distribution and
allowances for a proposed aerial intelligence battalion configured
for low intensity warfare. Additionally, the proposed unit could
provide a test bed for the live environment evaluation of airborne
and airborne-related intelligence systems. The concept plan
envisioned that the unit would consist of a headquarters and
headquarters company; an EW company (incorporating [   ]; and
an aerial surveillance company, made up of elements from the GRAY
WOLF remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) program and the SENIOR BAND
motorized glider project. [32]

(b)(1), Section 1.4(c) Per DIA

(S/WNINTEL) INSCOM employs three distinct HUMINT methodologies: overt collection, clandestine collection, and TAREX activities. The largest collection effort undertaken during FY 1985 was in the overt area, and was characterized by the employment of five major techniques: debriefing refugees and defectors; debriefing DOD-affiliated personnel with knowledge of foreign intelligence targets; exploitation of foreign military officers; document exploitation; and foreign intelligence liaison.

(S/WNINTEL) INSCOM was active during the year in four major debriefing programs, all of which were conducted in coordination with the Interagency Defector Committee of the CIA.

   a. Project SEEK involved the debriefing of Jewish emigres allowed to leave the Soviet Union. Many of these proceeded to the United States and became available for intelligence exploitation. Although recent Soviet policies had reduced this flow, the program continued to produce a notable amount of scientific and technical intelligence.

   b. Project LADEN was a similar effort directed against East European emigres in general. The project was initially directed against the Polish target in the early 1980's, but was then expanded.

   c. Project LEEP began as an effort to debrief the large influx of Cuban refugees from the Mariel exit of 1980. This too was expanded to include all Latin American refugees.

d. Project SWAMP, which began as an INSCOM initiative to
debrief the flow of refugees resulting from the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979, was later expanded to include all of Southwest
Asia and the Middle East. The project continued to provide INSCOM
with an excellent opportunity to assess the performance of the
Soviet military in the field.

(S//~~~~~~~~) INSCOM continued to conduct several major efforts
directed towards exploiting the intelligence resources furnished by
knowledgeable U.S. citizens, most with some degree of DOD
affiliation.

a. FORMICA, the Foreign Military Contact program, exploited
the large numbers of DOD personnel who had travelled abroad to
areas of intelligence interest.

b. QUARTERBACK was a scientific and technical intelligence
program conducted against high priority scientific conferences and
symposia with the assistance of cooperating U.S. scientists.
INSCOM teams were frequently accompanied by representatives of
production agencies.

c. NCD/FORMICA involved the assignment of INSCOM officers to
offices of the CIA's National Collection Division (NCD) in CONUS.
These inserts contributed their military expertise in support of

(b)(1) & (b)(3) Per CIA

(U)
(S//~~~~~~~~) INSCOM's Foreign Officer Contact program targetted the
large numbers of foreign military personnel in attendance at DA/DOD
service schools or visiting U.S. military installations. Normally,
intelligence on foreign military personalities was obtained
indirectly, through debriefing U.S. acquaintances. A counterpart
program, the Foreign Officer Information program, was directed at
the target universe of 150 foreign military attaches and assistant
attaches assigned to the United States from approximately 70
countries.

(U)
(S//~~~~~~~~) During FY 1985, INSCOM conducted three major efforts
in the field of document exploitation. In Europe, the 66th MI
Group continued its translating and reporting effort primarily
targetted against the Warsaw Pact. In Japan, the 500th MI Group's
Army Document Center (ADC) exploited Asiatic publications. The
470th MI Group in Panama engaged in a regional document
exploitation effort in support of SOUTHCOM. A three-pronged
approach was taken, involving a document collection team in El
Salvador, a combined (United States, Honduran, Salvadoran) document

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exploitation center in Honduras, and the regional center in Panama. The 470th MI Group furnished personnel to the Salvadoran and Honduran operations on a TDY basis. To support the project, 30 spaces were transferred to the 470th MI Group in FY 1985.

(U)

(————) Liaison with foreign intelligence agencies was a final overt technique utilized by INSCOM. This activity benefitted from the fact that Army intelligence has been represented in many areas since World War II, allowing the cultivation of long-standing relationships. In Europe, liaison was primarily geared to meeting the intelligence and security needs of the theater. In Japan, liaison was a mainstay of the 500th MI Group's collection efforts in the technology transfer area.

(U)

(————) Clandestine methods were employed by INSCOM as a method of last resort. Clandestine case officers were assigned both to the CONUS-based Operations Group and to the MI groups in a theater support role.

a. In Europe, the 66th MI Group, under OPCON of USAREUR, conducted both unilateral and bilateral operations against the Warsaw Pact through its 430th MI Battalion (Provisional). In addition to 18 legal travellers and 66 support agents, assets included 6 resident agents in East Germany, 3 in Poland, 5 in Czechoslovakia, and 3 in Hungary.

b. In the Far East, the 500th MI Group continued to provide strategic level clandestine collection in support of CINCPAC and national level requirements. The group operated 12 bilateral projects with 19 agents and ran 7 unilateral projects with 35 agents. These operations, which took advantage of the ability of Japanese businessmen to move relatively freely throughout the area, were considered to have a low risk. They produced a continuing flow of information on technology transfer to Communist countries. (It should be noted that similar data on technology transfer from CONUS and Europe was not available to INSCOM.)

c. The 501st MI Group in Korea confronted one of the most difficult clandestine targets in the world across the DMZ. Its principal clandestine effort was conducted through the exploitation of personnel assigned to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjon. Information was collected through contact with the Polish, Swedish, Czech, and Swiss personnel of the commission who had access to both North and South Korea. The 501st MI Group also continued its involvement in a bilateral project to meet possible needs for a quick response infiltration capability. This involves three indigenous agents with high physical skills and training employed on a 3 year contract. Additionally, the 501st MI Group ran seven South Korean resident agents unilaterally.

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d. The 470th MI Group in Panama maintained a group of 20 recruited assets with the capability of reporting on various Latin American targets. The mission of the 470th MI Group included not only collection operations directed against the spread of Communist insurgency in the area, but reporting on Panamanian targets and providing intelligence support to a command whose area of responsibility extended from the Guatemalan-Mexican border to Patagonia.

e. The 513th MI Group in CONUS was in the process of implementing its own clandestine collection capability.

f. The CONUS-based Operations Group targetted its clandestine efforts against the Third World. Activities were concentrated against the Middle East and the countries of Central America, to include Cuba. [1]

New Initiatives. **(U)** **(S—————)** FY 1985 witnessed a number of new initiatives in INSCOM's HUMINT program. These included an expansion of INSCOM's HUMINT charter, acquisition by the command of responsibility for Foreign Materiel Acquisition, and an attempt to expand coverage of the Third World through the forward basing of intelligence personnel. However, efforts in the HUMINT arena operated under severe resource constraints, and resource planning guidance indicated that any new projects would have to be funded out of hide. [2]

Service HUMINT Agency (SHA) Charter. **(U)** **(S—NOFORN)** Under the terms of the Service HUMINT Agency (SHA) Charter signed by the ACSI, LTG William Odom, on 4 March 1985, the Commander, USAINSCOM was designated the Army Service HUMINT Manager, and INSCOM became the Army Service HUMINT Agency. In response, INSCOM published the first annual Army HUMINT Collection Plan (AHCP) in June 1985. Based on ACSI guidance, the AHCP provided collection guidance to Army HUMINT organizations and described INSCOM and AMC HUMINT programs to selected consumers. [3]

(U) **(S—NOFORN)** The SHA Charter directs the annual review of all Army HUMINT collection projects. To meet this requirement, INSCOM published as INSCOM Regulation 381-4, Project Assessment and Source Evaluation, on 1 October 1985. (This incorporated and superseded INSCOM Reg 381-10, Source Review.) Prior to publication of the regulation, no formalized, systematic method was available for conducting assessments of Army HUMINT collection. The new regulation was designed to establish a program that would state what each project was supposed to accomplish, indicate the cost in people and dollars, and recommend improvements and/or resource realignments. [4]

(U)

Foreign Materiel Acquisition. (S/WNINTEL) In October 1984, INSCOM
officially received the Foreign Materiel Acquisition mission from
ACSI. Concurrently, the Foreign Materiel Acquisition Office of DA
was transferred to INSCOM and placed under the staff supervision of
ADCSOPS-HUMINT. On 5 August 1985, an implementation plan
established a two-man Project Office at Arlington Hall and a two-
person collection element within the Operational Group at Fort
Meade, Maryland. The foreign materiel acquisition mission was
given the unclassified cover designation of CANVAS CANOPY.

(U)

Forward Basing. (S/WNINTEL) Since 1980, INSCOM collection
requirements in the HUMINT arena have increasingly focussed on the
Third World. By FY 1985, Third World countries were the subject of
almost 30 percent of INSCOM HUMINT reporting. This shift in the
nature of intelligence targetting introduced the issue of
redistributing INSCOM's HUMINT resources by deploying some assets
to forward bases in Third World countries. Forward basing became
an INSCOM initiative in FY 1984. It was initially implemented by
insert of a case officer into the Joint U.S. Military Advisory
Group (JUSMAG), Republic of the Philippines under the cover of
WESTCOM Liaison Officer. In 1985, INSCOM was in the final stages
of obtaining approval for the insert of a case officer in Kuwait.
By the end of the year, INSCOM had indicated an interest in
mounting future operations in 25 foreign countries. [6]

(U)

Project WINDMILL. (S/WNINTEL) Another dimension of the forward
basing concept was Project WINDMILL, an innovative attempt to
attack the North Korean HUMINT target from countries outside of
Korea through exploitation of the North Korean presence abroad. A
case officer was redeployed from Korea to CONUS to work the target.
By the end of FY 1985, another case officer formerly based in Korea
had been selected for assignment to Vienna to work the North Korean
problem and was in his final training phase. The separate cover
designation CANADA HILL was assigned to these two initiatives. [7]

Italian Basing. (S/WNINTEL) As a result of a suggestion made by
[(b)(1) & (b)(3) Per CIA] in late 1983, INSCOM began to
explore the possibilities of extending its operations into Italy.
In January 1984, an INSCOM data call team was deployed to collect
background information on opportunities for intelligence
exploitation from that country. It was agreed that the best
prospects for conductiog clandestine activity in Italy would be
offered by mounting a bilateral operation with SISMI, the Italian
intelligence service. In May 1985, DCSI USAREUR confirmed that
SISMI would be agreeable to an informal expansion of the existing
program in a way that would allow an INSCOM asset to run operations

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against "targets of opportunity" in the Middle East/North Africa. The assigned case officer from the Operations Group arrived in country on 29 July 1985 to begin language training. The nature of the assignment dictated that the officer would have to assume Italian national cover. [8]

LANDMARK CAPER. (S/NOINTEL) LANDMARK CAPER was an INSCOM project designed to upgrade the capability of the command's Administrative Survey Detachment (ASD) to provide credible cover to INSCOM assets. Implementation of the project began in 1982. The project involved numerous areas, including the sterilization of ASD itself, improvement of ASD communications, and furnishing cover both for action and for status to individuals involved in Army clandestine activities. [9]

(S/NOINTEL) By 1985, significant advances had been made in these areas. In FY 1984, major elements of ASD had moved from Fort Meade to leased commercial facilities off post. External cover support offices were established in Panama and Japan in FY 1985. Steps were finally taken to provide satisfactory secure communications between ASD and elements worldwide. At first, this had posed something of a problem. In 1983, the ASD had fielded the Harris-Vinson secure voice system to support LANDMARK CAPER. Originally on loan from USAF, the system was purchased in 1984. However, with 29 H-V's installed worldwide, it was discovered that there was a severe maintenance problem, compounded by the Air Force's inability to contract for needed spare parts. System costs rose to an unacceptable $45,000 per unit, and the H-V could not meet all INSCOM requirements. In April 1985, a contract for new system, the Portable Secure Voice (PSV) terminal, was entered upon by INSCOM. The PSV, which had been brought to INSCOM's attention by the FBI, was significantly more capable and cost much less. Initial deliveries began in September 1985. In the meantime, the H-V devices were sold to the Air Force and to another Army element, realizing a total of $1.2 million which could be applied to offset the cost of the PSV's. [10]

(S/NOINTEL) A LANDMARK CAPER Conference was held in September 1985 as an add-on to the Annual INSCOM HUMINT Conference. Conferees generally agreed that clandestine operations needed the protection of cover for status as well as cover for action. However, it was pointed out by Brigadier General Scanlon that cover did not drive operations, but supported them, and that LANDMARK CAPER did not mean "spooky business, conducted in spooky cells by spooky operatives, all of which impede operational effectiveness, flexibility, and control." LANDMARK CAPER cover would be tailored at various levels depending on unit needs. As an outgrowth of the

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conference, there was a general consensus that current Army
programs could not provide credible career cover for Military
Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program (MICECP) case
officers because of Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
regulations on the status of "excepted" Civil Service employees.
What was needed was the creation of an "exempted" status for Army
civilian case officers, modeled after the successful NSA (b)(1) Per CIA
personnel programs. Such a status would additionally allow
intelligence specialists to be promoted to the highest grades and
thus allow the creation of a truly professional clandestine
service. [11]

Support, Maintenance, and Settlement (SMS). (S/WNINTEL) The fate
of agents captured in denied areas continued to be a concern to the
Army's HUMINT case officers in FY 1985. Captures of agents behind
the Iron Curtain in Europe had increased after 1978. The arrest of
two agents run by the 66th MI Group in 1983 proved particularly
disturbing to the HUMINT community, since the case received White
House attention as a result of a letter written to the President by
parents of one of the agents. At the same time, the FRG government
requested that Army intelligence play a greater role in providing
SMS to FRG citizens and their families in cases where such citizens
had been arrested and imprisoned for espionage activities on behalf
of Army agencies. Representatives of USAREUR and the 66th MI Group
met repeatedly with members of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) in
1984 to determine how the BND handled its own SMS cases. On 2
November 1984, the [   ] disseminated guidance supporting a
uniform SMS policy for all DOD elements. A draft Army Regulation
(AR) addressing the issue was prepared by [   ] in March 1985,
and was favorably received by INSCOM. The AR still had not been
finalized at the end of FY 1985. [12]

(b)(3), 10 USC 424 Per DIA

(b)(1) Per CIA

Target Exploitation (TAREX). (C) TAREX is an Army clandestine
collection element which operates as executive agent for the
National Security Agency against cryptologic-related targets.
Although TAREX itself began operations as part of the former Army
Security Agency in 1955, the function goes back to the Target
Investigation Committee (TICOM) of World War II, a joint and
combined service organization set up by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff to exploit captured cryptologic resources. In 1972, all
TAREX personnel were put on a single TDA. In FY 1985, TAREX
consisted of a TAREX Management Division (TMD), with headquarters
at Arlington Hall Station, and a worldwide network of collectors
operating undercover overseas. Additionally, a TAREX Army Reserve
unit, the 197th Army Security Detachment, was also based at
Arlington Hall Station. [14]

(C/NOFORN) During FY 1985, TAREX Management Division, together
with TAREX program sponsors at NSA, undertook the large scale
automation of the massive TAREX requirements data base. TAREX
operational responsibilities had grown exponentially over the past
several years, and TAREX requirements and operations management
desperately needed wholesale automation if any sort of continuity
was to be achieved, particularly in view of an anticipated zero
program growth in personnel assets. NSA initially provided IBM
Personal Computer (PC) equipment to TMD and most TAREX elements
overseas and a basic, but fully functional, requirements software
system was made available. A much improved system, employing the
IBM-ASTW hardware and D-BASE III software was developed shortly
thereafter by an NSA intern and placed in test operation at NSA and
TMD. The significance of this development cannot be overstated.
It has made an enormous contribution to the streamlining of a
massive and continually growing data base, heretofore an
administrative nightmare. TAREX elements working with even the
first-generation system are unanimous in their opinion as to its
value. [15]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA
18 USC 798

(S/~~NOFORN~~) TAREX TMD deployed a representative to [____] in conjunction with Exercise [_____] This was done to assist TAREX [____] with wartime planning and to sensitize TAREX Management Division to the perceived needs and requirements of the supported commanders. This was the first time that cryptomaterial or electronic equipment mockups were introduced into the [_____] [____] exercise. A number of shortfalls were identified by TAREX field personnel in the course of the exercise. Ground forces were not able to identify and process in a timely manner those simulated POW's with access to cryptologic information. Additionally, communications between deployed TAREX elements, TMD, and supporting/supported units were extremely slow. [19]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;
(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(1)(b)(3) Per NSA

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Counterintelligence/Operations Security:

New Directions. (U) During the course of FY 1985, INSCOM counterintelligence activities moved away from traditional OPSEC to focus more sharply on priority areas. Renewed emphasis was placed upon providing counterintelligence support to special access programs (SAP's), safeguarding automatic data processing (ADP) facilities, and expanding the polygraph program. In addition, there was an attempt to upgrade counterespionage (CE) activities. These concerns were reflected in organizational realignments. By the end of FY 1985, the 902d MI Group had presented a plan to reorganize its elements on functional, rather than geographic lines, with one battalion providing SAP support, another concentrating on CE, and the third housing specialized technical services. Counterespionage received further emphasis when the CE function was partially decentralized by INSCOM on 27 February 1985. The U.S. Army Special Operations Detachment (redesignated 1 July 1985 as the U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity) was relieved of the requirement to perform lesser priority CE investigations, and subcontrol offices for CE management were set up within the 902d, 470th, and 500th MI Groups. [1]

Special Access Programs. (U) Special access programs have existed since 1975 as a means of providing strict access controls to sensitive projects. AR 380-381 provides for the establishment of SAP's to protect sensitive technologies and operations. In addition to SAP's, there are also so-called "Carve Outs" of activities undertaken by commercial contractors. By FY 1985, INSCOM was providing coverage to 35 different SAP's/Carve Outs, and this number was expected to double within the near future. One technique which proved of major value was the establishment of "Red Teams," which evaluated SAP's from the perspective of a hostile intelligence service (HOIS) to provide a better assessment of their particular vulnerabilities. [2]

INSCOM Polygraph Program. (U) On 1 October 1984, INSCOM began conducting polygraph examinations on all U.S. Army military and civilian personnel assigned to NSA at Fort Meade. Polygraph examinations were also given to Army personnel assigned to other NSA facilities who passed through Fort Meade. INSCOM subordinate units in Germany and in Korea subsequently began similar programs for Army personnel assigned to NSA in those countries. As of 20 September 1985, 559 examinations had been conducted, placing a severe strain on INSCOM's limited inventory of 17 polygraph examiners worldwide, since polygraph was also required to support a wide span of HUMINT and CI functions both in CONUS and OCONUS. [3]

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(U)

(S) The situation was further complicated in January 1985, when DOD implemented the DOD Polygraph Test Program, which required CI-scope examinations of persons for interim sensitive compartmented information (SCI) access, critical positions at ☐ and designated positions for special access programs. While only a few examinations were conducted under this program in FY 1985, it was projected that the Army share of polygraph examinations conducted under this program would rise to approximately 1,100 in FY 1986 and double that figure the following year. The number of examinations conducted under the test program would inevitably increase at the expense of the NSA-assignee program, since ACSI had designated the test program as a mission of higher priority. By the end of FY 1985, efforts had been made to strengthen the command's polygraph capability by programming the forthcoming assignment of nine new polygraph spaces to the 902d MI Group and by contracting for construction of a new first-class polygraph facility at Fort Meade. The facility was scheduled to have six examination rooms, acoustically isolated, individually temperature-controlled, and equipped with built-in monitoring and recording capabilities. [4]

Counterespionage. (S) (U) Investigations of incidents of sabotage and espionage directed against the Army (SAEDA) continued to account for 70 percent of all counterintelligence reporting. Between FY 1978 and FY 1984, SAEDA incident reports increased over 400 percent. There were 481 such incidents reported in FY 1984; 94 of these were referred for possible offensive exploitation. However, the SAEDA program was essentially a reactive one. The Walker espionage scandal which surfaced in FY 1985 caused ACSI to recommend that INSCOM adopt more active measures to "flush-out any Walkers in our midst." [5]

Personnel Constraints. (C) (U) INSCOM's implementation of new initiatives in the counterintelligence field severely stretched limited personnel resources; a limited amount of peanut butter was being required to cover an exponentially expanding amount of bread. One way of effecting economies was to reduce OPSEC support to less essential functions. In practice, this was not easy to do; in FY 1985, INSCOM was tasked with providing OPSEC to the Defense Mapping Agency when Air Force assets previously assigned to carry out this function were realigned to meet a higher priority mission. OACSI, using a computer-based Counter Intelligence Resource Allocation Model (CIRAM), suggested that additional spaces might be found by reducing the numbers of individuals assigned to CI management, especially at HQ INSCOM. [6]

Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) Support in Europe. (C) The
backlog of overdue PSI investigations in INSCOM's 66th MI Group
continued to present a problem during FY 1985. The European-based
66th MI Group was responsible for servicing Defense Investigative
Service PSI requests pertaining to Army personnel stationed in the
European Command (EUCOM). This mission had received a low
priority. INSCOM was first alerted to the shortfall in 1982, when
the Director, DIS had pointed out that a large number of PSI's
charged to the group were in a one year or older (OYO) status.
Since that time, intensive efforts have been made to resolve the
problem. A DCG directed Mission Analysis Team, composed of
representatives of ACSI, INSCOM, and the 902d MI Group visited the
66th MI Group in mid-April 1985. The after-action report presented
the 66th MI Group with 27 conclusions and recommendations. On 26
April 1985, ACSI gave guidance to INSCOM that the 66th MI Group
should complete all PSI's assigned to it within a 75-day period.
In June 1985, the group implemented several policy and
administrative actions designed to address the issue. The number
of pending cases was reduced to less than 1,200, the lowest in over
2 years. [7]

Presidential Tasking. (U) In response to the shooting death of
Army Major Arthur D. Nicholson at the hands of Soviet personnel
while he was conducting an authorized liaison mission in East
Germany, the President of the United States directed that the
Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt (SMLM-F), be placed
under continuous 24-hour overt, nonharassing surveillance. This
was initiated on 4 May 1985. Detachment A of the 527th MI
Battalion, supplemented by 22 augmentees, provided the coverage.
With this commitment of personnel, it was possible to monitor three
SMLM-F teams simultaneously. On 4 June 1985, resourcing was
downscaled to provide coverage for only one team. The mission was
terminated on 26 July 1985. [8]

Counter-SIGINT Concept. (U) In early 1983, the ACSI
Counterintelligence Task Force had identified the need for a new
concept for SIGSEC support to the Army as its second priority. In
June of that year, INSCOM hosted a working group of MACOM
representatives which considered the issue. The group outlined a
new concept for counter-SIGINT operations. A draft document
prepared by the OACSI action officer was coordinated with working
group members, finalized by the INSCOM staff, and provided to ACSI
in January 1985. The concept was validated by TRADOC in March
1985, and Field Circular 34-62, embodying the new approach, was
published in July 1985. [9]

(U)   Counter-SIGINT marked a radical departure from the traditional army idea of SIGSEC.   It moved support from a reactive to a proactive mode.   The essence of the concept was to assess the SIGINT threat to supported commanders, assess vulnerability in the light of that threat, develop countermeasures, and evaluate countermeasures once implemented.   COMSEC monitoring activities would only come into play during the fourth of these phases; even then, they would be restricted to a minor role.   In order to support the new concept, 10 additional SIGSEC officer spaces were provided INSCOM in FY 1985.   At the same time, under the Army of Excellence (AOE) Concept programmed for implementation in FY 1986, SIGSEC personnel in MI units at the divisional and corps levels were to be eliminated, an action that would concentrate the bulk of Army SIGSEC personnel in the command and would allow INSCOM to be at the leading edge of implementation of the new initiative.   One significant barrier to full implementation was lack of an immediate ADP capability to support the threat and vulnerability assessment process and facilitate real-time analysis. [10]

National COMSEC Assessment Center.   (U)   On 7 August 1985, the Chief of Staff tasked DCSOPS with responding to an NSA proposal to establish a National COMSEC Assessment Center (NCAC).   The need for such a center had been identified since at least 1979 in NSC reports and Presidential directives.   However, despite attempts to create such an organization in 1980, nothing had been accomplished. Unfortunately, a number of objectives set forth in the NSA proposal were at variance with the new Army counter-SIGINT concept.   NSA appeared to contemplate an increase in COMSEC monitoring, which not only would create impractical demands in the personnel area, but also was an approach the Army had found to be largely ineffective. The NSA proposal also envisaged standardized operating and reporting procedures which ignored the differences between the communications needs of the individual services, and in addition implied that service resources would be allocated to support the NCAC when the Army's SIGSEC base had been reduced under the Army of Excellence (AOE) concept.   Finally, it appeared that the NCAC would exercise an unacceptable degree of centralized tasking control over service support elements.   As a result, DCSOPS recommended that INSCOM cooperate with any NCAC that might be set up in the area of information exchange, but not allow the proposed body to dictate Army programs. [11]

COMSEC Issues.   (U)   AR 530-2 charges the CG, INSCOM with the responsibility of assisting the HQDA staff and commanders at all levels in developing and evaluating COMSEC policies, plans, operating procedures, and training programs.   In FY 1985, there were significant changes to the national-level COMSEC structure

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which DA and INSCOM functioned. National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 145, issued on 17 September 1984, replaced the
former National COMSEC Committee with a more elaborate
architecture. NSDD 145 established a senior level steering group,
the Systems Security Steering Group (SSSG); an interagency
operating group, the National Telecommunications and Information
Systems Security Committee (NTISSC). Under the new arrangement,
the Secretary of Defense served as executive agent in all U.S
Government COMSEC matters, with DIRNSA as national manager. [12]

(U)

(C) The steady advance of communications technology continued to
present INSCOM with challenges in the COMSEC field. By 1985, the
Army was in the process of replacing all existing communications
equipment with digital equipment, necessitating the development of
new families of COMSEC systems. INSCOM monitored these
developments through participation in technical working groups.
During FY 1985, INSCOM provided COMSEC support to the following
projects: [13]

1. Joint Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) Office. The TRI-
TAC office provided centralized management for the acquisition of
tactical switched communications equipment.

2. Tactical Narrowband Security Working Group. This group
dealt with strategies for securing the new generation of Improved
High Frequency Radios (IHFR's) currently being fielded. By 1990,
the Army anticipated a requirement for 8,000 IHFR's with secure
voice/data capability in its ground elements alone. These would
have to interoperate with several thousand aviation radios. It was
considered vital that the Army remedy the current situation, in
which numerous high frequency radios were unsecured or not secured
in all modes.

3. SINGCARS COMSEC Working Group. SINGCARS was the acronymn
for Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio System, a new family of
rugged combat radios currently under development. SINGCARS, which
operated in the 30 to 88 MHz portion of the radio frequency
spectrum, was designed to serve as the principal electronic
communications means for combat forces below the division level.

5. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Mark XV Program. The
Mark XV is a secure, electronically keyed replacement for the Mark
XII. Army level of involvement in the project dropped in FY 1985
because of a decision to procure only 460 units instead of 19,000.
However, participation in the key management group continued,
because the key distribution scheme was expected to be a forerunner
of how most distribution would be accomplished in the future.

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6. **PJH Hybrid.** The PJH was a hybrid system which integrated the capabilities of two already developed systems: PLRS, the Army/Marine Corps Position Location and Reporting System; and JTIDS, the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System. The combined features of these two systems, enhanced by minor hardware modifications and enhanced data processing, provided the Army with a reliable, secure, jam resistant, real time data communication system.

7. **MILSTAR System/Single Channel Objective Tactical Terminal.** The Single Channel Objective Tactical Terminal (SCOTT) was a project to design a ground terminal to interface with MILSTAR (Military Strategic Tactical Relay), a communications satellite. SCOTT would be able to function in the high stress levels envisaged for the 1990's. To reduce vulnerability to intercept, the use of burst, spread spectrum, and frequency hopping techniques were under consideration.

8. **Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) III.** The DSCS III satellite was intended to provide a flexible wideband transmission media so that satellite-unique services are provided to approved users under various degrees of system stress. User terminals are distributed throughout the world.

9. **AMC/CSA Video Teleconferencing Network (VTN).** The Army Materiel Command has contracted with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (ATT) for development of a secure video teleconferencing system to link 10 sites at nine different locations. A similar VTN is being planned for the Chief of Staff of the Army. INSCOM has supported the TEMPEST aspects of the project and validated the cryptonetting scheme and key request.

10. **NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS).** The Naval Strategic Tactical Relay (NAVSTAR) GPS was developed to provide highly precise position, velocity, and time information to users. During FY 1985, INSCOM representatives provided input to the COMSEC key distribution plan.

Key Management Automation. (U) Most of the new COMSEC devices being fielded by the Army employed electronic key. The steady expansion of cryptonets throughout the Army and the increase in the demand for electronic key degraded the capability of manual methods of management to meet operational needs. In late October 1984, representatives of the U.S. Army Signal Center and INSCOM prepared a draft plan to automate the cryptonet and key management functions. The draft was used as a strawman at a meeting of representatives from all MACOM's that INSCOM hosted in November 1984. [14]

COMSEC Serial Number Tracking. (U) COMSEC equipment which is declassified/unclassified, but subject to NSA accountability falls into the category of Controlled Cryptographic Items (CCI). (Equipment is unclassified when unkeyed; when keyed, the equipment assumes the same classification as the key.) The Army has announced plans to transfer CCI from the Army COMSEC Material Control System to the standard logistics system. Since NSA continues to require access to CCI accounts, the new initiative required the Army to devise a means of tracking CCI through its supply and maintenance system at both wholesale and retail levels. This would be done through a process of tracking serial numbers of individual CCI items. AMC requested INSCOM representation at the first serial number tracking (SNT) meeting held on 24 August 1984. Subsequently, INSCOM took part in a series of COMSEC working groups. A number of SNT systems were evaluated as possible candidates for application to CCI. It was found that the present DOD Small Arms Serialization Program appeared to be the most suitable SNT program for cryptologic application. [15]

COMSEC Insecurities. (U) The INSCOM COMSEC Insecurity Program for the purpose of monitoring, reviewing, and when required, evaluating COMSEC insecurity reports initiated within DA was implemented in February 1981. The program serves primarily to ensure that all detected insecurities to COMSEC material are reported promptly to the officials responsible for evaluating the incidents and initiating action to minimize their security impact. These reports of insecurities also serve as the basis for identifying trends in insecurity occurrences, and for developing procedural and doctrinal measures to prevent recurrences. Evaluations of insecurities are rendered by the cryptonet controlling authority (CONAUTH) in the case of key at the user level; by INSCOM, when the key is in distribution channels, when multiple Army CONAUTH's are involved, or when there is a personnel insecurity; by DIRNSA, for cryptographic insecurities, physical insecurities (COMSEC equipment and documents), and cases involving CONAUTH's from more than one service).

(U) Total reported COMSEC insecurities, by MACOM, for CY 1984 and 1985 are as follows:

Table 9. - COMSEC Insecurities

Command	CY 1984	CY 1985
USAISC	67	48
AMC	2	4
USAREUR	266	175
FORSCOM	125	73
HQDA	0	1
INSCOM	12	8
Joint	3	0
EUSAK	29	9
NGB	16	19
TRADOC	3	1
WESTCOM	1	0
Other	12	10
TOTAL	536	348

(U) As of 1 October 1985, 80 cases were yet to be opened, bringing the total CY 1985 cases to 428. [16]

(U) COMSEC summary letters to MACOM's were sent out for the first time in January and February 1983 and covered the entire CY 1982 period. Although responses from the MACOM's have been positive, there has been no detectable improvement other than in a few of the less serious insecurities. The third report to the MACOM's for CY 1984 was provided in May 1985. During CY 1984, the majority of the Army's COMSEC insecurities continued to be caused by an apparent disregard for established COMSEC procedures; negligence on the part of assigned personnel; falsification of destruction certificates; a lack of education on the part of users, custodians, unit commanders; and, in many cases, a lack of command emphasis. Analysis has revealed that command emphasis and formal training of COMSEC custodians yielded the highest pay back in terms of any corrective actions taken by field commands. [17]

(U) As the result of an NSA briefing to the DA staff on the HUMINT threat to COMSEC in 1982, HQDA DCSOPS was tasked to coordinate establishment of a standardized course for Army COMSEC custodians. INSCOM worked with and assisted HQDA and TRADOC in the development of an appropriate curriculum. The first class of the Standardized COMSEC Custodian Training Course began 2 April 1984 at the Signal Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia. The course provides instruction on safeguarding and destruction of classified materials, documenting reports; establishing, transferring, and closing COMSEC accounts; threat and security awareness programs; COMSEC supply and maintenance procedures; COMSEC emergency procedures; and all major

duties required of COMSEC personnel. By the end of FY 1985, the
course was also being given by USAREUR, EUSAK, WESTCOM, and the
National Guard. [18]

John Walker Damage Assessment. (S/NOFORN) (u) The discovery of the
espionage activities on John Walker and his associates in FY 1985
had a substantial impact on Army COMSEC, since the Army employed
COMSEC equipment and techniques identical to the Navy assets
compromised by the Walker net. In response, INSCOM was tasked by
ACSI to perform a KW-7 usage analysis to find out which Army
cryptonets were most vulnerable to possible HOIS exploitation.
Potentially targetted cryptonets were considered to be those which
carried large volumes of traffic, carried sensitive or valuable
information, and were technically interceptible by HOIS. INSCOM
identified 20 Army KW-7 cryptonets, controlled by 15 separate
CONAUTH's as possibly vulnerable because they exhibited all of the
above characteristics. Upon reconsideration, NSA narrowed the list
to six CONAUTH's and seven nets. The CONAUTH's considered at risk
to hostile SIGINT were: [19]

VII Corps (1 net)   XVIII Airborne Corps (1 net)
CINCUSAREUR (2 nets)   SETAF (1 net)
525th MI Group (1 net)   3d ID (1 net)

(S/NOFORN) The damage assessment related to the Walker case
produced indications that many Army units employed poor
cryptonetting practices. Cryptonets were excessively large, there
were unnecessary redundancies, and other noted irregularities. As
a result, ACSI tasked INSCOM and the Army COMSEC Logistical
Activity (CSLA) to perform a review of Army cryptonets to determine
the scope and nature of the problem and to develop fixes. However,
the fact that there were over 10,000 cryptonets in the Army made a
case by case review not cost-effective. By the end of FY 1985,
INSCOM was planning to use a sampling approach to each type of
system to develop generic fixes, using a mixture of HQ and field
personnel to perform the necessary reviews. Contractor assistance
in developing methodology and the use of automation support were
anticipated requirements. [20]

Special Purpose Mobile Signals Surveillance Systems (SPMS3). (u) (C)
This system is designed for SIGSEC surveillance of Army emitters at
Army research and development installations and activities, and at
contractor facilities in support of the 902d MI Group's OPSEC
program. The requirement dates back to 1976. Originally, the
system was envisaged as having the capability of collecting and
analyzing both communications and noncommunications emissions,
operating in the 0.1 MHz to 120 GHz range of radio frequences and

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picking up emanations in the 0.2 to 100 micrometers wavelength. Specifications called for the system to be mobile and have a man-portable capability. In April 1984, design requirements were modified to eliminate the E-O collection feature and the man-portability, and a contract was tendered to the Interstate Electronics Corporation of California for the first unit. The system was delivered to the 902d MI Group at Fort Meade in the first quarter of FY 1985. Concurrently, five man team spaces were transferred from another project, the ELSEC Collection and Analysis System (ECAS), to the SPMS[3]. The 902d MI Group was required to fund the project from its own internal resources for FY's 1985 and 1986. [21]

Mobile TEMPEST Test System (MTTS). (U) This project, an initiative to upgrade nine FETTS-160 TEMPEST systems and to fabricate a tenth system for deployment to the field, was first undertaken in 1979. Since that time, the scope of the project was expanded to include replacing all 10 overloaded vehicles mounting the system as well as upgrading mission equipment. During FY 1985, the project continued to be plagued with difficulties. The contractor charged with providing the prime mover and trailer submitted a deficient product and then went bankrupt. By the end of the fiscal year, it was revealed that the prime contractor, Chronometric Inc., was involved in voucher discrepancies and was under government audit, a fact that would delay the MTTS program yet another 6 months. [22]

CANDLEBERRY BRONZE. (U) CANDLEBERRY BRONZE was a nickname assigned by INSCOM to NSA's PROJECT GUNMAN, an urgent requirement for performing technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) on IBM Selectric typewriters. The project had its inception in mid-1984, when NSA seized 16 listening devices planted by a HOIS in State Department typewriters at U.S. embassy and consular facilities in the Soviet Union. NSA replaced the typewriters and alerted other government agencies to the possibility that this penetration might have occurred elsewhere. In response, INSCOM brought in TSCM special agents from each of the OCONUS MI Groups and the bulk of TSCM personnel assigned to the 902d MI Group. A complete list of the most sensitive areas both in CONUS and OCONUS was provided to the special agents, and an immediate technical inspection of the typewriters was begun. More than 5,000 IBM typewriters were inspected during the CANDLEBERRY BRONZE operation. All inspections were negative. [23]

PROJECT CANE DANCE. (U) On 25 January 1985, the SSO White Sands Missile Range sent a message to INSCOM reporting that a Honeywell technician had discovered an unidentified integrated circuit "piggybacked" onto a legitimate circuit board of an

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oscillograph at the White Sands site. The oscillograph was a
component of a tracking and acquisition system used to collect
information on the test firing of various types of missiles. An
INSCOM investigating team was dispatched to make an assessment of
the suspected penetration. Test results tended to confirm the
supposition that the suspect device had been intentionally
implanted and had the capability of being exploited to collect
telemetry. The FBI elected to assume jurisdiction, and the suspect
oscillograph was transferred to FBI custody on 18 February 1985. [24]

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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Multidiscipline

1. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), passim.; Ltr, IAOPS-IS-W, subj: U.S. Army Requirement for Direct Weather Support (16 Jul 85) (S).

2. Fact Sheet, IAOPS-P/T, subj: OPCON of 500th MI Group (12 Oct 84) (S); Ltr, IAOPS-PL, subj: Wartime Mission for 500th MI Group (20 Nov 84) (S).

3. Issue Paper, IAGD-OP-PT, subj: Force Design MI Brigade Pacific (-) Korea (Undtd).

4. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 26-27; DF, IAOPS-PL, subj: JCS CPX POWDER RIVER 85 (25 Sep 84) (C); Ltr, IAOPS-PL, subj: INSCOM After Action Report for JCS CPX POWDER RIVER 85, encl (31 Jan 85) (C).

5. Encl, INSCOM After Action Report, op. cit.; FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 317.

6. Ltr, IAOPS-PL, subj: INSCOM Letter of Instruction for JCS Exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 85 (18 Dec 84) (S); Msg IAOPS-PL, subj: USAINSCOM First Impressions Report for Exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 85 (18 Mar 85) (S); Addendum to msg (S-CCO).

7. Fact Sheet, IAOPS-PL, subj: Command Group Visit to BRIGHT STAR 85 (8 Jul 85) (S); FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 302

8. Ltr, IAOPS-IS-W, subj: U.S. Army Requirement for Direct Weather Support (16 Jul 85) (S); conversation with Mr. Herbert Tax, DCSOPS, 4 Aug 86.

9. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 40.

10. Ibid., pp. 43-48.

IMINT/MASINT

1. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 18, 23.

2. Ibid., p. 20.

3. Fact Sheet, ADCSOPS, subj: INSCOM's MASINT Activities in Europe (8 Aug 85) (S/WNINTEL).

4. Ibid.; FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 19; conversation with Ms. Ruby Benacquista, DCSOPS, 25 Jul 86.

5. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 19.

6. Info Paper, IAOPS-EO, subj: CANTICLE BOAT (15 Nov 85) (C); Info Paper, IAOPS-EO, subj: SILENT WARRIOR (15 Nov 85) (C); Info Paper, IAOPS-EO, subj: INSCOM Electro Optics Support to SOUTHCOM (18 Oct 84) (S).

7. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 21-22.

8. Ibid., p. 26.

9. Ibid., p. 29; Fact Sheet, IAOPS-I, subj: Imagery Systems Activity-Korea (27 Aug 85).

10. Fact Sheet, ADCSOPS, subj: INSCOM's IMINT Activities in Europe (9 Aug 85) (S/NOFORN).
11. Info Paper, IAOPS-I, subj: IMINT Actions in Europe (29 Jul 85).
12. DF, IAOPS-IMINT/EO, subj: IG Inspections (1 Aug 85) (S/NOFORN).
13. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p.32.
14. Ibid., p. 30.
15. Ibid., p. 27; Msg., IAOPS-GW, subj: Project GRAY WOLF Update (19 Nov 84) (S/NOFORN); Memo for C of S, subj: Crash of GRAY WOLF Air Vehicle (AV) #12 (25 Jun 85) (S).
16. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 35-36; Fact Sheet, IAOPS-I, subj: ROGUE PANTHER (5 Jun 86) (S); DF, DAMO-FDI, subj: ROGUE PANTHER (12 Jul 85) (S); Fact Sheet, IAOPS-I, subj: ROGUE PANTHER (26 Jun 85) (S).

HUMINT/TAREX
1. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), p. 65.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 68.
4. Ibid., p. 69.
5. Ibid., pp. 75-76; Ltr, IAOPS-H, subj: CANVAS CANOPY Implementation Plan (30 Aug 85) (C/NOFORN).
6. FY 1985 DCSOPS AHR (TSCW), pp. 58-61; 65.
7. Ibid., p. 92; conversation with Mr. James C. Gerhart, ADCSOPS-H, 25 Jun 86.
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APPENDIX A

USAINSCOM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
(As of 30 September 1985)

UIC	Unit Designation	Location
WOOYAA	HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	Arlington Hall Station, Virginia
WOOOAA	U.S. Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station	Arlington Hall Station, Virginia
WOO1AA	USAINSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WO1KAA	U.S. Army Field Station Key West	Naval Air Station Key West, Florida
W31UAA	U.S. Army Field Station San Antonio	Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas
WOO2AA	U.S. Army Element, National Security Agency	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WO1HAA	U.S. Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station	Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia
WO2BAA	U.S. Army Field Station Okinawa	Sobe, Okinawa, Japan
WO2RAA	U.S. Army Field Station Berlin	Berlin, Germany
WODRAA	U.S. Army Field Station Sinop	Sinop, Turkey
W1J1AA	U.S. Army Special Security Group	Arlington Hall Station, Virginia
WOKLAA (C)	U.S. Army Programs Analysis Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W1U3AA	U.S. Army Administrative Survey Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W372AA	U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W2JBAA	U.S. Army Russian Institute	Garmisch, Germany
W4JZAA	U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Foreign Language Training Center Europe	Munich, Germany
W3AGAA	U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg	Augsburg, Germany
W3CCAA	USAINSCOM Automated Systems Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Virginia
W3QNAA	U.S. Army Cryptologic Support Group	Heidelberg, Germany
W318AA	USAINSCOM Support Activity	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W319AA	U.S. Army Operational Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W4DFAA	U.S. Army Systems Exploitation Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W32BAA	U.S. Army Central Security Facility	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W35GAA	USAINSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Virginia

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UIC	Unit Designation	Location
	HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
W36SAA	USAINSCOM Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team	Arlington Hall Station, Virginia
W39CAA	U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W4DFAA	U.S. Army Systems Exploitation Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W4DKAA	USAINSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Virginia
W4E7AA	U.S. Army Field Station Kunia	Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii
W3NSAA	USAINSCOM Theater Intelligence Center Pacific	Fort Shafter, Hawaii
W4GXAA	U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Virginia
W4J1AA	USAINSCOM Mission Support Activity	Classified Location
W4KPAA	U.S. Army Intelligence Exchange and Support Center	Arlington Hall Station, Virginia
WBU6AA	902d Military Intelligence Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU699	Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WOO5AA	USAINSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W32AAA	USAINSCOM Military Intelligence (Counterintelligence) East Coast	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WO1BAA	USAINSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency	Alexandria, Virginia
W3S2AA	USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Security)	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WO1AAA	USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Counterintelligence) West Coast	Presidio of San Francisco, CA
WBU7AA	66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WBU799	Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WGNTAA	18th Military Intelligence Battalion	Munich, Germany
WGNT99	Augmentation, 18th Military Intelligence Battalion	Munich, Germany
WBVNAA	5th Military Intelligence Company	Munich, Germany
WBVN99	Augmentation, 5th Military Intelligence Company	Munich, Germany
WDLYAA	HHC, 502d Army Security Agency Battalion	Augsburg, Germany
WDLY99	Augmentation, 502d Army Security Agency Battalion	Augsburg, Germany
WDLFAA	409th Army Security Agency Company (Operations) (Rear)	Augsburg, Germany

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UIC	Unit Designation	Location
	HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
	66th Military Intelligence Group	
	HHC, 502d Army Security Agency Battalion	
WEDUAA	328th Army Security Agency Company	Augsburg, Germany
WGS2AA	581st Military Intelligence Detachment	Zweibrucken, Germany
WGS3AA	582d Military Intelligence Detachment	Alconbury, England
WGS4AA	583d Military Intelligence Detachment	Weisbaden, Germany
WBVLAA	527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Kaiserslautern, Germany
WBVL99	Augmentation, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Kaiserslautern, Germany
WBVLAO	Company A, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Kaiserslautern, Germany
WBVLBO	Company B, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Stuttgart, Germany
WBWKAA	430th Military Intelligence Detachment	Munich, Germany
WBWK99	Augmentation, 430th Military Intelligence Detachment	Munich, Germany
WBWVAA	766th Military Intelligence Detachment	Berlin, Germany
WBWV99	Augmentation, 766th Military Intelligence Detachment	Berlin, Germany
	430th Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional)	Munich, Germany
WGS5AA	584th Military Intelligence Detachment	Vincenza, Germany
WBU8AA	470th Military Intelligence Group	Fort Clayton, Panama
WBU899	Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group	Fort Clayton, Panama
W4JOAA	U.S. Army Field Station Panama	Geleta Island, Panama
WBU9AA	500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
WBU999	Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
W3BRAA	U.S. Army Field Station Misawa	Misawa, Japan
WFN8AA	149th Military Intelligence Detachment	Camp Zama, Japan
WFN899	Augmentation, 149th Military Intelligence Detachment	Camp Zama, Japan
WCOFAA	181st Military Intelligence Detachment	Camp Zama, Japan
WCOF99	Augmentation, 181st Military Intelligence Detachment	Camp Zama, Japan
W4FWAA	U.S. Army Asian Studies Detachment	Camp Zama, Japan

UIC	Unit Designation	Location
	HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
WH6AAA	HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group	Seoul, Korea
WH6A99	Augmentation, 501st Military Intelligence Group	Seoul, Korea
W3F1AA	U.S. Army Field Station Korea	Camp Humphreys, Pyong Taek, Korea
WEDVAA	332d Military Intelligence Company (Electronic Warfare)	Camp Page, Korea
WC16AA	524th Military Intelligence Battalion	Seoul, Korea
WC1699	Augmentation, 524th Military Intelligence Battalion	Seoul, Korea
WBWFAA	209th Military Intelligence Company (Operations Security)	Seoul, Korea
WBWF99	Augmentation, 209th Military Intelligence Company	Seoul, Korea
WH8MAA	3d Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)	Pyong Taek, Korea
	Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, 3d Military Intelligence Battalion	Pyong Taek, Korea
WH8MAO	Company A, 3d Military Intelligence Battalion	Pyong Taek, Korea
WH8MBO	Company B, 3d Military Intelligence Battalion	Pyong Taek, Korea
WBVAAA	HHC, 513th Military Intelligence Group	Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
	513th Military Intelligence Center (Provisional)	Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
WBVTAA	174th Military Intelligence Company (Operations)	Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
WH72AA	HHC, 201st Military Intelligence Battalion	Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
WFJCAA	17th Military Intelligence Company	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
WH73AA	166th Military Intelligence Company	Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia
W4KKAA	U.S. Army EAC Aviation Intelligence Company	Lakehurst NAEC, New Jersey
WH8QAA	HHC, 202d Military Intelligence Battalion (Collection/Exploitation)	Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
WH8QAO	641st Military Intelligence Company (Collection)	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WDELAA	219th Military Intelligence Company	Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
WBVRAA	164th Military Intelligence Company	Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
WH8PAA	HHC, 203d Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Intelligence)	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
WH60AA	11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
WH6099	Augmentation, 11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

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APPENDIX B

TOE UNITS
(As of 30 September 1985)

WBU7	66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU8	470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU9	500th Military Intelligence Group
WH6A	HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group
WBVA	513th Military Intelligence Group
WBU6	902d Military Intelligence Group
WH8M	3d Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)
WGNT	18th Military Intelligence Battalion
WH72	HHC, 201st Military Intelligence Battalion
WH8Q	HHC, 202d Military Intelligence Battalion (Collection/Exploitation)
WH8P	HHC, 203d Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Intelligence)
WDLY	HHC, 502d Army Security Agency Battalion
WC16	524th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVL	527th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVN	5th Military Intelligence Company
WFJC	17th Military Intelligence Company
WH60	11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence)
WBVR	164th Military Intelligence Company
WH73	166th Military Intelligence Company
WBVT	174th Military Intelligence Company (Operations)
WBWF	209th Military Intelligence Company
WDEL	219th Military Intelligence Company
WEDV	332d Military Intelligence Company (Electronic Warfare)
WEDU	328th Army Security Agency Company
WDLF	409th Army Security Agency Company (Operations) (Rear)
WH8Q	641st Military Intelligence Company (Collection)
WFN8	149th Military Intelligence Detachment
WCOF	181st Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWK	430th Military Intelligence Detachment
WGS2	581st Military Intelligence Detachment
WGS3	582d Military Intelligence Detachment
WGS4	583d Military Intelligence Detachment
WGS5	584th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBVW	766th Military Intelligence Detachment

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APPENDIX C

CHANGES IN STATUS OF TOE UNITS

NONE

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APPENDIX D

TDA UNITS*
(As of 30 September 1985)

WOOY   Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
WOOO   U.S. Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station
WOO1   USAINSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group
WOO2   U.S. Army Element, National Security Agency
WOO5   USAINSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force
WO1A   USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Counterintelligence)
       West Coast
WO1B   USAINSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear
       Agency
WO1H   U.S. Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station
WO1K   U.S. Army Field Station Key West
WO2B   U.S. Army Field Station Okinawa
WO2R   U.S. Army Field Station Berlin
WODR   U.S. Army Field Station Sinop
W1J1 (a) U.S. Army Special Security Group
WOKL (b) U.S. Army Programs Analysis Group
W1U3   U.S. Army Administrative Survey Detachment
W2JB   U.S. Army Russian Institute
W31U   U.S. Army Field Station San Antonio
W32A   USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Counterintelligence)
       East Coast
W32B   U.S. Army Central Security Facility
W35G   USAINSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity
W36S   USAINSCOM Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team
W39C   U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity
W318   USAINSCOM Support Activity
W319   U.S. Army Operational Group
W372   U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment
W3AG   U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg
W3BR   U.S. Army Field Station Misawa
W3CC   USAINSCOM Automated Systems Activity
W3F1   U.S. Army Field Station Korea
W3NS   USAINSCOM Theater Intelligence Center-Pacific
W3QN   U.S. Army Cryptologic Support Group
W3S2   USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Security)
W4DF   U.S. Army Systems Exploitation Detachment
W4DK   USAINSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity
W4E7   U.S. Army Field Station Kunia
W4FW   U.S. Army Asian Studies Detachment
W4GX   U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity

W4J0	U.S. Army Field Station Panama
W4J1	USAINSCOM Mission Support Activity
W4JZ	USAINSCOM Foreign Language Training Center Europe
W4KK	U.S. Army EAC Aviation Intelligence Company
W4KP	U.S. Army Intelligence Exchange and Support Center
WBU699	Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group
WBU799	Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU899	Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU999	Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group
WBVL99	Augmentation, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVN99	Augmentation, 5th Military Intelligence Company
WBWF99	Augmentation, 209th Military Intelligence Company
WBWK99	Augmentation, 430th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWV99	Augmentation, 766th Military Intelligence Detachment
WC1699	Augmentation, 524th Military Intelligence Battalion
WCOF99	Augmentation, 181st Military Intelligence Detachment
WDLY99	Augmentation, 502d Army Security Agency Battalion
WFN899	Augmentation, 149th Military Intelligence Detachment
WGNT99	Augmentation, 18th Military Intelligence Battalion
WH6A99	Augmentation, 501st Military Intelligence Group
WH6099	Augmentation, 11th Military Intelligence Company

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APPENDIX E

CHANGES IN STATUS OF TDA UNITS

REDESIGNATED

Unit			Eff Date	Authority
WO1AAA	From:	INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, PSF	1 Oct 84	PO 63-5, HQ USAINSCOM, 24 Sep 84
	To:	USAINSCOM MI Battalion (Counterintelligence) West Coast		
W32AAA	From:	INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Ft Meade	1 Oct 84	PO 63-4, HQ USAINSCOM, 24 Sep 84
	To:	USAINSCOM MI Battalion (Counterintelligence) East Coast		
W3S2AA	From:	INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade	1 Oct 84	PO 63-3, HQ USAINSCOM, 24 Sep 84
	To:	USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Security)		
W39CAA	From:	U.S. Army Special Operations Detachment	1 Jul 85	PO 62-1, HQ USAINSCOM, 17 Jul 85
	To:	U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity		

REASSIGNED

Unit		Eff Date	Authority
W4DFAA	U.S. Army Systems Exploitation Detachment From: HQ USAINSCOM To: U.S. Army Operational Group	15 May 86	PO 42-2, HQ USAINSCOM, 8 May 85
W3YDAA	U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center From: HQ USAINSCOM To: U.S. Army Intelligence Agency	1 Dec 84	GO-3, HQS DA, 15 Feb 85

RELOCATED

Unit		Eff Date	Authority
W1J1AA	U.S. Army Special Security Group From: Pentagon, Washington, DC To: Arlington Hall Station, VA	1 Jan 85	PO 41-1, HQ USAINSCOM, 14 Jan 85

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Unit		Eff Date	Authority
WOO5AA	USAINSCOM Pentagon Counter-intelligence Force From: Pentagon, Washington, DC To: Arlington Hall Station, VA	18 Mar 85	USAINSCOM MI (CI) East Coast FY 1985 AHR
WOO5AA	USAINSCOM Pentagon Counter-intelligence Force From: Arlington Hall Station, VA To: Ft. George G. Meade, MD	1 Jul 85	Msg, CDR USAINSCOM, 6 May 85

APPENDIX F

USAINSCOM PERSONNEL STRENGTH BY UNIT*
(As of 30 September 1985)

Command or Unit	ACTUAL STRENGTH					
	OFF	WO	ENL	MIL TOTAL	CIV	AGGREGATE
HQ, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)	156	15	94	265	340	505
USAG, Arlington Hall Station	16	3	165	184	100	284
USAINSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)	120	30	987	1137	4	1141
U.S. Army Element, National Security Agency	20	0	0	20	0	20
USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station	11	1	126	138	127	265
U.S. Army Field Station Key West	1	0	23	24	0	24
**U.S. Army Administrative Survey Detachment	73	72	101	246	306	552
USAINSCOM Automated Systems Activity	11	3	101	115	63	178
11th Military Intelligence Company (Technical Intelligence) w/ Augmentation	11	5	176	192	0	192
U.S. Army Field Station San Antonio	5	2	207	214	4	218
U.S. Army Central Security Facility	4	0	9	13	84	97
USAINSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	1	0	12	13	34	47
USAINSCOM Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team	1	2	14	17	0	17
**U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment	0	2	11	13	0	13
U.S. Army EAC Aviation Intelligence Company	4	10	67	81	0	81

*The table is taken from DCSPER, INSCOM Command Strength Report dtd 30 Sep 85.

**As of 31 August 1985.

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ACTUAL STRENGTH

Command or Unit	OFF	WO	ENL	MIL TOTAL	CIV	AGGREGATE
USAINSCOM Support Activity	2	2	10	14	28	42
U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity	7	4	24	35	9	44
U.S. Army Operational Group	48	20	46	114	29	143
U.S. Army Special Security Group	114	9	257	380	12	392
USAINSCOM Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity	1	0	33	34	42	76
902d Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	13	1	29	43	11	54
USAINSCOM Pentagon Counterintelligence Force	3	5	12	20	0	20
USAINSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency	3	4	9	16	2	18
17th Military Intelligence Company	8	6	130	144	0	144
174th Military Intelligence Company	16	9	164	189	0	189
HHC, 202d Military Intelligence Battalion (Collection Exploitation)	14	7	72	93	0	93
USAINSCOM Mission Support Activity	1	1	57	59	15	74
U.S. Army Intelligence Exchange and Support Center (IESC)	4	1	6	11	13	24
HHC, 203d Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Intelligence)	13	1	47	61	0	61
513th Military Intelligence Group w/Augmentation	25	9	96	130	2	132
HHC, 201st Military Intelligence Battalion	12	3	57	72	0	72
USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (CI) East Coast (Ft Meade, MD)	35	20	108	163	5	168
USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (CI) West Coast (Pres of SF, CA)	21	20	61	102	2	104

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ACTUAL STRENGTH

Command or Unit	OFF	WO	ENL	MIL TOTAL	CIV	AGGREGATE
USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion (Scty)	19	31	89	139	22	161
164th Military Intelligence Company	5	4	51	60	0	60
166th Military Intelligence Company	4	4	272	280	0	280
219th Military Intelligence Company	3	6	69	78	0	78
TOTAL CONUS	805	312	3792	4912	1254	6163
470th Military Intelligence Group w/Augmentation	27	9	83	119	15	134
U.S. Army Field Station Panama	2	1	82	85	0	85
TOTAL CARIBBEAN	29	10	165	204	15	219
**USAINSCOM Theater Intelligence Center-Pacific	13	3	53	69	5	74
U.S. Army Field Station Okinawa	17	2	335	354	18	372
U.S. Army Field Station Misawa	3	0	136	139	0	139
500th Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	11	3	56	70	62	132
**HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	32	8	228	268	22	290
181st Military Intelligence Detachment	2	2	13	17	7	24
**209th Military Intelligence Company (Operations Security)	4	13	123	140	20	160
U.S. Army Asian Study Detachment	1	0	7	7	84	91
**U.S. Army Field Station Korea	17	12	217	246	45	291
**332d Military Intelligence Company (Electronic Warfare)	9	3	229	241	0	241

**As of 31 August 1985.

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ACTUAL STRENGTH

Command or Unit	OFF	WO	ENL	MIL TOTAL	CIV	AGGREGATE
149th Military Intelligence Detachment	3	1	5	9	8	17
U.S. Army Field Station Kunia	26	11	920	957	18	982
**3d Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)	21	32	351	404	0	404
**HHC, 524th Military Intelligence Battalion	22	2	99	123	23	146
TOTAL PACIFIC	180	92	2772	3044	312	3363
U.S. Army Cryptologic Support Group	2	3	12	17	0	17
**U.S. Army Field Station Berlin	31	20	784	835	13	848
U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg	62	36	1642	1740	99	1839
66th Military Intelligence Group w/ Augmentation	42	13	207	262	44	306
5th Military Intelligence Company	2	4	44	50	38	88
HHC, 18th Military Intelligence Battalion	15	13	116	144	67	211
430th Military Intelligence Detachment	11	10	27	48	6	54
527th Military Intelligence Battalion	35	28	282	345	71	416
766th Military Intelligence Detachment	3	2	25	30	5	35
HHC, 502d Army Security Agency Battalion	14	3	120	137	3	140
328th Army Security Agency Company	4	3	132	139	0	139
409th Army Security Agency Company, Operations (Rear)	4	2	186	192	0*	192
581st Military Intelligence Detachment	3	2	33	38	0	38

**As of 31 August 1985.

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ACTUAL STRENGTH

Command or Unit	OFF	WO	ENL	MIL TOTAL	CIV	AGGREGATE
582d Military Intelligence Detachment	4	1	25	30	0	30
583d Military Intelligence Detachment	3	1	37	41	0	41
584th Military Intelligence Detachment	4	1	25	30	2	32
U.S. Army Field Station Sinop	25	8	257	290	0	209
**U.S. Army Russian Institute	6	0	6	12	24	36
**USAINSCOM Foreign Language Training Center Europe	4	1	10	15	9	24
TOTAL EUROPE	274	151	3970	4395	381	4695

**As of 31 August 1985.

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APPENDIX G

PROVISIONAL UNITS
(As of 30 September 1985)

430th Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional)
513th Military Intelligence Center (Provisional)

APPENDIX H

CHANGES IN STATUS OF PROVISIONAL UNITS

DISCONTINUED

Unit	Eff Date	Authority
USAINSCOM Security Support Battalion (Provisional)	1 Oct 84	PO 63-3, HQ USAINSCOM, 24 Sep 84

*Upon redesignation of INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft. Meade to USAINSCOM Military Intelligence Battalion Security.

APPENDIX I

USAINSCOM KEY PERSONNEL

Position/Name	Dates Served
COMMANDING GENERAL	
MG Harry E. Soyster	29 Jun 84 - Present
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL	
BG Charles F. Scanlon	19 Feb 85 - Present
BG James W. Hunt	30 Sep 82 - 7 Feb 85
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, SUPPORT	
BG Charles F. Scanlon	Nov 83 - 19 Feb 85
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE	
BG James W. Hunt	30 Sep 82 - 07 Feb 85
COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR	
CSM Sammy W. Wise	30 Dec 84 - Present
CSM George W. Howell, Jr.	15 Mar 82 - 30 Dec 84
CHIEF OF STAFF	
BG George J. Walker	19 Feb 85 - Present
COL Richard J. Powers, Jr.	21 Nov 84 - 19 Feb 85
COL Louis D. Kirk	31 Jan 84 - 21 Nov 84
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	
LTC Eugene Johnson	Jul 84 - Present
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF	
MAJ Grady J. Howell, Jr.	05 Jun 84 - Present
USAINSCOM LIAISON OFFICE, FORSCOM	
LTC Buddy L. Parker	28 Mar 84 - Present
USAINSCOM LIAISON OFFICE, TRADOC	
LTC Perry E. Cole	30 Sep 83 - Present
USAINSCOM LIAISON OFFICE, USAREUR	
LTC Donald Tait	05 Oct 83 - Present
USAINSCOM LIAISON OFFICE, USAICS	
MAJ Dallas M. Vibbert	21 Jun 84 - May 85
USAINSCOM LIAISON OFFICE, USACACDA	
MAJ John L. Pannier	29 Oct 82 - 15 Dec 84

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Position/Name	Dates Served
USAINSCOM LIAISON OFFICE, NSA COL James P. Brown	06 Jul 84 - Present
SENIOR RESERVE COMPONENT ADVISOR COL Robert E. Elmore	12 Sep 83 - Present
CHIEF, OFFICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS MAJ Paul A. Mann CPT B.E. Prestridge	 May 85 - Present Aug 84 - May 85
INSPECTOR GENERAL COL Robert L. Wolf	06 Aug 84 - Present
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE COL John R. Thornock COL Edward S. Adamkerwicz, Jr.	 01 Jul 85 - Present 30 Jun 82 - 1 Jul 85
STAFF ADVISOR FOR SCIENTIFIC AND CRYPTO AFFAIRS Mr. Edwin A. Speakman	 12 Aug 68 - Present
CHIEF, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS LTC Richard P. Holk LTC William S. Birdseye	 01 Jul 85 - Present 20 Oct 80 - 12 Jul 85
COMMAND CHAPLAIN COL William T. Smith	06 Jul 83 - Present
SPECIAL DISPURSING OFFICER Mr. Benjamin Strucken	01 Mar 84 - Present
COMMAND PSYCHOLOGIST MAJ Dennis Kowal	Aug 84 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL COL Arthur A. Remling II	31 Mar 84 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT COL William R. Barnes	 01 May 85 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INFORMATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COL Alan H. Byrne	 Jun 84 - 01 May 85

Position/Name	Dates Served
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND MODERNIZATION	
Mr. James D. Davis	01 Oct 83 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS	
COL Robert M. Bowe	08 Jul 85 - Present
COL Richard J. Powers, Jr.	02 Jul 84 - 08 Jul 84
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, LOGISTICS	
COL Charles L. Bell	Aug 85 - Present
COL Robert G. Haltiner	31 May 81 - Aug 85
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT	
COL John G. Quast	20 Oct 84 - Present
COL John A. Croft	19 Jul 81 - 20 Oct 84
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, SYSTEMS	
Mr. George A. Harvey, Jr.	03 Jan 78 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, TELECOMMUNICATIONS	
COL William R. Barnes	27 Aug 84 - 01 May 85
CHIEF, COMMAND SECURITY OFFICE	
Mr. Stephen M. Earle	31 Aug 81 - Present

Unit/Commander	
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL John G. Lackey III	27 Jul 84 - Present
470th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL Thomas K. Newell	10 Jul 85 - Present
COL M.E. Pheneger	07 Jul 83 - 10 Jul 85
500th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL John L. Leide	12 Jul 84 - Present
HHC, 501st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL Paul E. Menoher, Jr.	15 Jun 84 - Present
513th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL William A. Bentz	13 Aug 84 - Present
902d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL Francis W. Creighton	10 Jul 84 - Present

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Unit/Commander	Dates Served
USAINSCOM CONUS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SIGINT/EW) COL Eleas A. Cozanitis	04 Nov 83 - Present
U.S. ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP COL Michael A. Scott	29 Jun 84 - Present

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL SECURITY GROUP
  COL Arleigh D. Waterman
  COL George C. Campbell
	Dec 84 - Present
	01 Jul 82 - Dec 84

U.S. ARMY CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT GROUP LTC Sherman J. Blanchard	17 Jun 83 - Present

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION AUGSBURG
  COL Charles S. Simerly
  COL Floyd L. Runyon
	16 Aug 85 - Present
	15 Aug 83 - 16 Aug 85

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION BERLIN COL Kenneth D. Roney	01 Aug 84 - Present
U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION KEY WEST CPT Charles M. Frechette	25 Jun 84 - Present

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION KUNIA
  COL William H. Campbell
  COL Robert M. Bowe
	14 Jun 85 - Present
	14 Jun 83 - 14 Jun 85

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION KOREA LTC Ronald W. Carter	15 Jun 84 - Present

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION MISAWA
  LTC Savatore M. Bruni
  LTC Bernard J. Lawless
	Nov 84 - Present
	Nov 82 - Nov 84

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION OKINAWA
  LTC Manuel A. Conley
  COL Walter L. Cressler, Jr.
	Oct 84 - Present
	Jul 84 - Oct 84

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION PANAMA MAJ Dennis A. McGaugh	Sep 84 - Present

U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION SAN ANTONIO
  LTC Brian C. Warren
  LTC John R. Dickson
	26 Jul 85 - Present
	08 Jul 83 - 26 Jul 85

Unit/Commander	Dates Served
U.S. ARMY FIELD STATION SINOP	
COL David W. Tellman	13 Aug 85 - Present
COL Theodore C. Feichtl	23 Jul 84 - 13 Aug 85
3d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (AERIAL EXPLOITATION)	
LTC John D. Thomas, Jr.	31 Jul 85 - Present
LTC Lindon D. Jones	15 May 83 - 03 Jul 85
HHC, 18th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC John C. Linley, Jr.	02 Jul 84 - Present
HHC, 201st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC Robert D. McKay	14 Jun 84 - Present
HHC, 202d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
CPT Dennis E. Royer	03 Jun 85 - Present
LTC Charles M. Jackson	25 May 84 - 03 Jun 85
HHC, 203d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE)	
LTC Michael A. Petersen	07 Jun 85 - Present
LTC Neal E. Norman	14 Mar 83 - 07 Jun 85
430th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (PROVISIONAL)	
LTC Raymond T. Waity	14 Jun 85 - Present
LTC James M. Dorton	15 Jul 82 - 14 Jun 85
502d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC Carol M. Hemphill	24 Jul 85 - Present
LTC Norman E. Youngblood III	02 Sep 83 - 24 Jul 85
HHC, 524th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC Charles W. Nerburgh	Jun 84 - Present
527th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC George R. Brook	09 Jul 84 - Present
USAINSCOM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) EAST COAST	
LTC William A. McDonough	25 Mar 85 - Present
LTC Elizabeth G. Tullis	17 Mar 83 - 25 Mar 85

Unit/Commander	Dates Served
USAINSCOM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) WEST COAST	
LTC Lawrence Schneider	06 Aug 85 - Present
LTC John A. McCloud	17 Aug 83 - 06 Aug 85
USAINSCOM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (SECURITY)	
LTC David W. Clark	11 Sep 84 - Present
5th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
CPT Connie S. Labadie	25 Jul 85 - Present
MAJ William A. Doyle, Jr.	29 Jul 84 - 25 Jul 85
11th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE)	
CPT Jeffrey C. Holle	20 Sep 85 - Present
CPT William R. Brown	09 Aug 84 - 20 Sep 85
17th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
MAJ A.J. Paluska, Jr.	31 Jul 84 - Present
164th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
CPT Timothy O'Neil	17 Jun 85 - Present
CPT Richards A. Rice	16 Apr 84 - 17 Jun 85
166th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
CPT Alan S. Taylor	31 Jul 84 - Present
174th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
CPT(P) William G. Fillman	20 May 85 - Present
CPT Elizabeth D. Estler	01 Apr 84 - 20 May 85
219th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
MAJ Stanley R. Chrzanoski	14 Dec 84 - Present
MAJ Harvey H. Latson III	09 Aug 83 - 14 Dec 84
332d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (ELECTRONIC WARFARE)	
CPT Monte F. Hengot	16 Aug 85 - Present
CPT Daniel G. Doby	15 Aug 84 - 16 Aug 85
INSCOM EAC AVIATION INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
MAJ Douglas Roberts	30 Sep 85 - Present
MAJ Roderick J. Isler	02 Aug 84 - 30 Sep 85

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Unit/Commander	Dates Served
328th ARMY SECURITY AGENCY COMPANY	
CPT Nancy B. Sullivan	10 Aug 84 – Present
641st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
(COLLECTION)	
MAJ Theodore W. Waronicki	10 Jul 85 – Present
CPT David M. Moak	21 May 84 – 10 Jul 85
209th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY	
CPT Kevin R. Cunningham	16 Jun 85 – Present
CPT Terry. B. Wilson	Jun 84 – 16 Jun 85
149th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT	
LTC William R. Eicholz	Jan 85 – Present
LTC Lee G. Smith	11 Apr 83 – Jan 85
181st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT	
MAJ Charles L. Robertson	17 Dec 84 – Present
MAJ Edward C. Olson	30 Nov 83 – 17 Dec 84
409th ARMY SECURITY AGENCY COMPANY	
CPT Jack Horne, Jr.	03 May 85 – Present
CPT Tamara C. Kaseman	12 Dec 83 – 03 May 85
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP,	
DETACHMENT HAHN	
LTC Rodney P. Miller	07 Aug 85 – Present
LTC Lawrence P. Carr	01 Jan 84 – 07 Aug 85
430th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT	
LTC Raymond T. Waity	14 Jun 85 – Present
LTC James M. Dorton	15 Jul 82 – 14 Jun 85
581st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT	
(IMAGERY INTERPRETATION)	
CPT Ann M. Peterson	04 May 84 – Present
582d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT	
(IMAGERY INTERPRETATION)	
CPT Dennis R. Deines	19 Nov 84 – Present
CPT Alexander G. Hodges	12 May 83 – 19 Nov 84
583d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT	
(IMAGERY INTERPRETATION)	
MAJ John J. Ciriaco	Jan 83 – Present

Unit/Commander	Dates Served
584th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT	
LTC Bruce N. Ey	09 Jan 84 - Present
766th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT	
LTC Stuart A. Herrington	15 Jul 83 - Present
U.S. ARMY ASIAN STUDIES DETACHMENT	
Mr. Seiji Aizawa	01 Oct 80 - Present
USAINSCOM CI DETACHMENT, DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY	
LTC William E. Hawkins	15 Apr 83 - Present
U.S. ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY DETACHMENT	
COL Robert W. Sheffield	20 Jul 84 - Present
USAINSCOM THEATER INTELLIGENCE CENTER - PACIFIC	
LTC James A. Roberts	15 Jun 84 - Present
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE AND SUPPORT CENTER	
COL Charles R. Cleveland	1 Aug 85 - Present
LTC Allen Berg	15 Jul 83 - 1 Aug 85
USAINSCOM FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING CENTER EUROPE	
LTC Alan R. Meyer	03 Jun 85 - Present
LTC James D. Phillips III	29 Aug 83 - 03 Jun 85
USAINSCOM PENTAGON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FORCE	
MAJ Charles C. Glunchenhaus	10 Jul 85 - Present
LTC Philip J. Gillen, Jr.	21 May 82 - 10 Jul 85
USAINSCOM AUTOMATED SYSTEMS ACTIVITY	
LTC(P) Stepehn L. Weisel	01 Jun 85 - Present
COL Thomas M. Herrick	01 Aug 84 - 01 Jun 85
USAINSCOM ADMINISTRATIVE/AUDIOVISUAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY	
Mr. David Stein	30 Nov 78 - Present
USAINSCOM FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING ACTIVITY	
MAJ Donald B. Pargoff	14 May 84 - Present

Unit/Commander	Dates Served
USAINSCOM SUPPORT ACTIVITY, FORT MEADE	
CPT Mark S. Wilkins	Aug 85 - Present
CPT Dennis S. Driggers	19 Dec 83 - Aug 85
USAINSCOM MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE AND INSTRUCTION TEAM	
CPT Larry E. Monger	15 Aug 84 - Present
USAINSCOM MISSION SUPPORT ACTIVITY	
Mr. Donald L. Valcheff	01 Oct 82 - Present
U.S. ARMY FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY	
COL Robert G. Lunt	21 Sep 84 - Present
U.S. ARMY CENTRAL SECURITY FACILITY	
COL Claude W. Johnson	21 Mar 83 - Present
U.S. ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE	
COL Don O. Stovall	11 Aug 83 - Present
U.S. ARMY GARRISON, ARLINGTON HALL STATION	
LTC Harry F. Ferguson	20 Jul 84 - Present
U.S. ARMY GARRISON, VINT HILL FARMS STATION	
COL Leland J. Holland	14 Jun 83 - Present

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APPENDIX J

TRAVIS TROPHY WINNERS

Calendar Year	Winner
1964	6988 U.S. Air Force Security Squadron (USASA NOMINEE: 53d USASA Special Operations Command)
1965	313th ASA Battalion (Corps)
1966	1st Radio Company Fleet Marine Force (USASA NOMINEE: USASA Training Center and School)
1967	509th USASA Group
1968	6990th U.S. Air Force Security Squadron (USASA NOMINEE: USASA, Europe)
1969	6994th U.S. Air Force Security Squadron (USASA NOMINEE: 330th ASA Company)
1970	USASA Field Station, Udorn
1971	U.S. Naval Security Group Activity, Bremerhaven, Germany (USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Vint Hill Farms)
1972	6916th U.S. Air Force Security Squadron (USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Udorn)
1973	USASA Field Station, Berlin
1974	U.S. Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan (USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Augsburg)
1975	Consolidated Security Operations Center, San Antonio (USASA Field Station, San Antonio/6993d U.S. Air Force Security Squadron)
1976	USASA Field Station, Sobe
1977	470th Military Intelligence Group

Calendar Year	Winner
1978	6903 U.S. Air Force Security Squadron, Osan Air Base, Korea (USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg)
1979	U.S. Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan (USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Sobe)
1980	U.S. Army Field Station Misawa
1981	U.S. Army Field Station Berlin
1982	6912 Air Force Electronic Security Group, Berlin (USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Berlin)
1983	6920 Air Force Electronic Security Group, Misawa AB, Japan (USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg)
1984	Naval Security Group Activity, Edzell, Scotland (USAINSCOM NOMINEE: U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg)

APPENDIX K

DIRECTOR'S TROPHY WINNERS

Calendar Year	Winners
1979	Staff Commander Middle East Force, Jufair, Bahrain (ARMY NOMINEE: 193d Brigade Support Company, Fort Amador, Panama)
1980	6916 Electronic Security Squadron, Hillenikon Air Base, Greece (ARMY NOMINEE: 372d ASA Co, 25th Inf Div, Oahu, Hawaii)
1981	Navy Security Group Activity, Athens, Greece (ARMY NOMINEE: 372d ASA Co, 25th Inf Div, Oahu, Hawaii)
1982	Task Force 138, U.S. Southern Command
1983	2d Radio Battalion Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Camp Lejuene, North Carolina (ARMY NOMINEE: 193d Military Intelligence Company (CEWI), Panama)
1984	224th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)

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CA.................California
CCI................Controlled Cryptographic Items
CCP................Consolidated Cryptologic Program
cdr/CDR............commander
CE.................counterespionage
CENTAM.............Central America
CET................Critical Events Templating
CG.................commanding general
CHCSS..............Chief, Central Security Service
CI.................counterintelligence
CIA................Central Intelligence Agency
CINCUSAREUR........Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe
CIRAM..............Counterintelligence Resource Allocation
                       Model
civ................civilian
CMF................Career Management Field
CNL................commanders needs letters
CO.................control office
COB................command operating budget
CofS...............Chief of Staff
COL................colonel
CONAUTH............cryptonet controlling authority
CONUS..............Continental United States
COS................CONUS operations site
C&P................control and processing
CPAR...............collection, processing, analysis, and
                       reporting
CPO................Civilian Personnel Office
CPX................Command Post Exercise
CSC................Community Support Center
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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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CSLA...............COMSEC Logistical Activity
CSM................command sergeant major
CSO................Command Security Office; Cover
                       Support Organization
CSOC...............Combined Security Operations Center
CSS................Central Security Service
CSU................Conventional Signal Upgrade
CTED...............Civilian Training, Education, and Development

DA.................Department of the Army
DARCOM.............U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness
                       Command
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DCA................Defense Communications Agency
DCG................deputy commanding general                    •
DCG-I..............Deputy Commanding General, Intelligence
DCG-S..............Deputy Commanding General, Support
DCS................Deputy Chief of Staff; Defense Communications
                   Systems
DCSAUT.............Deputy Chief of Staff, Automation
DCSFM..............Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Modernization
DCSIM..............Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management
DCSINT.............Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DCSIRM.............Deputy Chief of Staff, Information,
                   Resource Management
DCSLOG.............Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
DCSOPS.............Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
DCSPER.............Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
DCSPPM.............Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs, and
                   Management
DCSRM..............Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management
DCSSYS.............Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems
DCSTEL.............Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications
DF.................disposition form; direction-finding
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(b)(3), 10 USC 424 Per DIA
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DIRNSA.............Defense Intelligence Production Schedule
DIS................Defense Investigative Service
DITS...............Digital Imagery Transmission System
DNA................Defense Nuclear Agency
DOCEX..............document exploitation
DOCMID.............Documentation Modernization
DOD................Department of Defense
DSA................Defense Security Agency
DSCS...............Defense Satellite Communications System
DSSCS..............Defense Special Security Communications
                   System

EAC................echelon above corps
ECAS...............ELSEC Collection and Analysis System
EO.................electro-optics
EORSAT.............Elint Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites
EPDS...............Electronic Processing and Dissemination System
ESAF...............European Special Activities Facility
ESC................Electronic Security Command
ESP................Exploitation of Signals Parametrics
ETEC...............Electronics and Telecommunications Evaluation
                   Center
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GLOSSARY

ACofS..............Assistant Chief of Staff
ACSI...............Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
ACSTEL.............Assistant Chief of Staff, Telecommunications
ADC................Army Document Center
ADCSLOG............Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
ADCSOPS............Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
ADCSPER............Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
admin..............administration
ADP................automatic data processing
AFCITC.............Advanced Foreign Counterintelligence Training
                    Course
AFP................approved funding program
AHCP...............Army HUMINT Collection Plan
AHR................Annual Historical Report
AHS................Arlington Hall Station
AIA................U.S. Army Intelligence Agency
AIB................Aviation Intelligence Battalion
AIG................Acting Inspector(s) General
ALO................authorized level of organization
AMC................U.S. Army Materiel Command
AOE................Army of Excellence
AOR................Area of Responsibility
AR.................Army Regulation
ARDF...............aerial radio direction-finding
ARTEP..............Army Training and Exercise Plan
ASA................Army Security Agency; Automated
                    Systems Activity; Automated Support Activity
ASARS..............Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System
ASD................U.S. Army Administrative Survey Detachment;
ATCAE..............Army Technical Control and Analysis Element
ATT................American Telephone and Telegraph Company
AURS...............Automated Unit Reference Sheet
auth...............authorized
AWOL...............absence without leave

BER................Budget Execution Review
BG.................brigadier general
BIFF...............Battlefield Identification Friend or Foe
BLP................Baseline Plan
Bn.................battalion

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ETSC...............European Troop Strength Ceiling
EUCOM..............European Command
EW.................electronic warfare
EX.................exceptional

FCA...............Foreign Counterintelligence Activity
FCI...............Foreign Counterintelligence Program
FISINT............foreign instrumentation signal intelligence
FLIR..............forward looking infrared
FORSCOM...........U.S. Army Forces Command
FRG...............Federal Republic of Germany
FS................fully successful
FY................fiscal year
FYDP..............Fiscal Year Defense Program

GCM...............Ground Control Module
GDIP..............General Defense Intelligence Program
GEN...............general
GPAS..............General Performance Appraisal System
GPS...............Global Positioning System
GS................General Schedule (Civilian Employees)
GSM...............Ground Station Module

HCA...............Head of Contracting Activity
HF................high frequency
HFDF..............high frequency direction-finding
HHC...............Headquarters and Headquarters Company
HOIS..............Hostile Intelligence Service
Hq/HQ.............headquarters
HQDA..............Headquarters, Department of the Army
HS................highly successful
HUMINT............human intelligence

IBEX..............INSCOM Beyond Excellence
ICF...............installation confinement facility
IDHS..............Intelligence Data Handling System
IEW...............intelligence and electronic warfare
IFF...............Identification Friend or Foe
IG................inspector general
IGAR..............Inspector General Action Requests
IHFR..............Improved High Frequency Radios
IMINT.............imagery intelligence
INSCOM............U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
IOC...............initial operational capability
IOSS..............Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study
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IPR...............In-Process Review
IPW...............Interrogation of Prisoners of War        •
IR................internal review
IRR...............Investigative Records Repository
ITAC..............Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
ITACIES...........Interim Tactical Imagery Exploitation System
ITEP..............Interim Tactical ELINT Processor

JCS...............Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSTARS............Joint Surveillance and Attack Radar System
JTIDS.............Joint Tactical Information Distribution
                     System
JUSMAG............Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group

LET...............live environment training
LRU...............line replacement unit
LTC...............lieutenant colonel

MACOM.............major Army command
MAJ...............major
MAP...............Materiel Acquisition Plan
MG................major general
MI................Military Intelligence
MIA...............Missing In Action
MICECP............MI Civilian Excepted Career Program
MID...............Military Intelligence Detachment
MILPERCEN.........U.S. Army Military Personnel Center
MILSTAR...........Military Strategic Tactical Relay
MIP IRR...........Microfilm Index Project for Investigative
                     Records Repository
MMW...............millimeter wave
MOA...............Memorandum of Agreement
MOS...............military occupational specialty
MOU...............Memorandum of Understanding
MSA...............Mission Support Activity
MTI...............Moving Target Indicator
MTTS..............Mobile TEMPEST Test Set

NAVSTAR...........Naval Strategic Tactical Relay
NCAC..............National COMSEC Assessment Center
NCD...............National Collection Division
NCEUR.............National Center, Europe
NCO...............noncommissioned officer
NCR(C)............National Cryptologic Representative (C)
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NSA................National Security Agency
NSACSS.............National Security Agency/Central Security Agency
NSAGA..............National Security Agency Group Activity
NSDD...............National Security Decision Directive
NTC................National Training Center
NTCISSC............National Telecommunications and Information
                   Systems Security Steering Group

OACSI..............Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
                   Intelligence
OCMC...............Overhead Collection Management Center
ODCSIRM............Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Information
                   Resource Management
ODCSPER............Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
ODCSSYS............Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems
ODUSD(P)...........Office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
                   for Policy
OE.................Organizational Effectiveness
OG.................Operational Guides
OMA................Operation and Maintenance, Army
OPCON..............operational control
OPFOR..............opposing forces
OPM................Office of Personnel Management
OPSEC..............operations security
O&O................organizational and operational
OYO................one year or older

PAO................Public Affairs Officer
PARR...............Program Analysis and Resource Review
PBC................Program Budget Committee
PC.................Personal Computer
PCAC...............Primary Control and Analysis Centers
PCF................Pentagon Counterintelligence Force
PDIP...............Program Development Increment Package
PIP................product improvement plans
PLRS...............Position Location and Reporting System
PMRC...............Performance Management and Recognition
                   System
POC................point of contact
POM................Program Objective Memorandum
PRC................Peoples' Republic of China
PSA................Project Security Analysis
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PSI................Personnel Security Investigations
PSV................Portable Secure Voice

QRC................Quick Reaction Capability
Qtr................quarter

RCF................remote collection facility
RCP................remote communications processor
RDA................research, development, and acquisition
RDTE...............research development test and evaluation
REDTRAIN...........Readiness Training
RFI................radio frequency interference
RO.................resident office
ROC................Required Operational Capability
ROF................remote operative facility
ROK................Republic of Korea

SAC................USAF Strategic Air Command
SAEDA..............sabotage and espionage directed against
                      the Army
SAFSS..............Secretary of the Air Force Space Systems
SAP................special access programs
SASA...............Special Acts or Service Award
SASS...............Small Aerostat Surveillance System
SCE................Service Cryptologic Element
SCI................Sensitive Compartment Information
SCO................subcontrol offices
SCOTT..............Single Channel Objective Tactical Terminal
SEADEV.............Southeast Asia Development
SELCOM.............select committee
SGM................sergeant major
SGS................Secretary of the General Staff
SHA................Service HUMINT Agency
SHAPE..............Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
S&IA...............Security and Investigative Activities
SIDPERS............Standard Information Division Personnel
                      Reporting System
SIGINT.............signal intelligence
SIGSEC.............signal security
SINGCARS...........Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio
                      System
SIS-AD.............Special Information Support to Air Defense
SJA................Staff Judge Advocate
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SLAR...............side-looking airborne radar
SMF................Special Mission Funds
SMLM-F.............Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt
SMS................Support, Maintenance, and Settlement
SNT................serial number tracking
SON................Statement of Need
SORS...............Strategic Overhead Reconnaissance Systems
SPM................Security Program Manager
SPMS³.............Special Purpose Mobile Signals
                      Surveillance Systems
SRRG..............Systems Security Steering Group
SSG...............Special Security Group
SSL...............Single Station Locator
SSO...............Special Security Office
SSRC..............SIGINT regional reporting center

TA................theater Army
TAAD..............The Army Authorization Document System
TACIES............Tactical Imagery Exploitation System
TAREX.............target exploitation
TCO...............Tempest Coordinating Officer
TDA...............tables of distribution and allowances
TECRAS............Theater Document Exploitation System
TENCAP............Tactical Exploitation of National
                      Capabilities
TGIF..............Tactical Ground Intercept Facility
TI................technical intelligence
TIAP..............Theater Intellgience Architecture Plan
TICOM.............Target Investigation Committee
TIP...............The INSCOM Plan
TIPE..............Tactical Intelligence Product Enhancement
TMD...............TAREX Management Division
TOA...............total obligational authority
TOE...............table(s) of organization and equipment
TRADOC............U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TREDS.............Tactical Reconnaissance Exploitation
                      Demonstration System
TRISA.............Theater Intermediate Support Activity
TSCM..............Technical Surveillance Countermeasure
TUT...............tactical users terminal

U.S...............United States
USA...............United States Army
USAF..............U.S. Air Force
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USAFS...............U.S. Army Field Station
USAICS..............U.S. Army Intelligence Center
                       and School
USAINSCOM...........U.S. Army Intelligence and Security
                       Command
USAINTC.............U.S. Army Intelligence Command
USAISC..............U.S. Army Information Systems Command
USAIS-D.............U.S. Army Intelligence School-Devens
USAOG...............U.S. Army Operational Group
USAR................U.S. Army Reserve
USAREUR.............U.S. Army, Europe
USASSG..............U.S. Army Special Security Group
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USFK................U.S. Forces Korea
USLB................U.S. Liaison Branch
USM.................U.S. Marines
USN.................U.S. Navy
USSS................U.S. SIGINT System; U.S. Security Service

VHFS................Vint Hill Farms Station
VTN.................Video Teleconferencing Network

WESTCOM.............U.S. Army Western Command
WIG.................within-grade
WO..................warrant officer
WWMCCS..............Worldwide Military Command and Control
                       System
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