<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of document:</th>
<th>National Science Foundation (NSF) Antarctic Law Enforcement Incident Reports, 2010 and 2013</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requested date:</td>
<td>21-February-2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Released date:</td>
<td>21-September-2017</td>
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<td>Posted date:</td>
<td>26-March-2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source of document:</td>
<td>National Science Foundation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Attn: FOIA Officer</td>
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<td>2415 Eisenhower Avenue</td>
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<td>Alexandria, Virginia 22314</td>
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<td>Fax: (703) 292-9041</td>
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<td>Email: <a href="mailto:foia@nsf.gov">foia@nsf.gov</a></td>
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</tbody>
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This is the final response in regard to your February 21, 2013 emailed FOIA request for copies of law enforcement incident reports for the years 2009 to the present. Previously, on January 9, 2013, one of the three Items you requested was for “any Antarctic South Pole Station law enforcement incident reports for the fiscal years 2011 and 2012.” This request was assigned 13-085F and on February 5, 2013, NSF completed that request.

On that same date, you also asked for a copy of the South Pole Station Weekly Situation Report during FY 12 and 13. Our office originally combined this request with the other one you sent on February 21, 2013, and you commented that the request should not be combined. Eventually, this request was assigned 13-194F and the reports were released to you on May 1, 2013. What remains are the law enforcement incident reports for fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2013. In 2009, there were no law enforcement incidents, therefore, enclosed are responsive documents for years 2010 and 2013.

Some information has been withheld under Exemptions (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), and (b)(7)(C). Proprietary information (confidential business information detailing security information of an NSF facility) has been withheld under the provisions of Exemption (b)(4) of the FOIA. Exemption (b)(5) exempts from mandatory disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” This exemption encompasses the governmental privilege protecting the predecisional deliberative process. To expose this process would unnecessarily inhibit the law enforcement agencies in its deliberative exercise of evaluating the evidence. In addition, the discussions with the Office of General Counsel Attorney and other personnel pertaining to these investigations has been withheld pursuant to the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges. Personal information (Names or identifying witness information) has been withheld wherever it appears under the privacy protection of Exemption (b)(6) of the FOIA. Exemption (b)(7)(C) protects records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The subject(s)
of an investigation and witness information, as well as, the names of law enforcement personnel, has been withheld under Exemption (b)(7)(C).

Your right of administrative appeal is set forth in Section 612.9 of the NSF FOIA regulation (copy enclosed). Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within 90 days of the date of the response to your request.

If you need any further assistance or would like to discuss any aspect of your request, please do not hesitate to contact our FOIA Public Liaison at 703-292-8060. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) which was created to offer mediation services to resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies as a non-exclusive alternative to litigation. Using OGIS services does not affect your right to pursue litigation. If you are requesting access to your own records (which is considered a Privacy Act request), you should know that OGIS does not have the authority to handle requests made under the Privacy Act of 1974. You may contact OGIS in any of the following ways:

National Archives and Records Administration
Office of Government Information Services
8601 Adelphi Road - OGIS
College Park, MD 20740-6001
E-mail: ogis@nara.gov
Web: https://ogis.archives.gov
Telephone: 202-741-5770
Facsimile: 202-741-5769
Toll-free: 1-877-684-6448

There is no fee for FOIA services in this instance in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(A)(i) et seq.

Sincerely,

Sandra Evans
FOIA/Privacy Act Officer

Enclosures
nsfstmgr <nsfstmgr@usap.gov>  

To: nsfstmgr@usap.gov  
Cc: "IMCEAEX_O=NATIONAL+20SCIENCE+20FOUNDATION_OU=NSF_CN=RECIPIENTS_CN=b@nsf.gov; b@nsf.gov; b@nsf.gov"  

Fwd: INVESTIGATIONS: LAKE JOYCE FIELD MEDICAL KIT MANAGEMENT/ MCM MED CLINIC WINTER SEASON 2009

March 4, 2010 9:47 PM

I'll pass on information as I receive it. The following is the response from the Marshal's office in Honolulu.

I'm emailing similar action information on the Dome bolts following this email.

Thanks for the help,

Begin forwarded message:

From: (USMS) b@usdoj.gov  
Date: March 5, 2010 11:22:07 AM GMT+13:00  
To: USAH @usdoj.gov  
Cc: "USMS" b@usdoj.gov, b@usdoj.gov, nsfstmgr@usap.gov  
Subject: FW: INVESTIGATIONS: LAKE JOYCE FIELD MEDICAL KIT MANAGEMENT/ MCM MED CLINIC WINTER SEASON 2009

Hi,

Here's one more from the South Pole. This has to do with controlled substances missing from field kits. Please advise. Also, please include all recipients in your response so that they are in the loop.

Mahalo,
From: nsfstmgr [mailto:nsfstmgr@usap.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2010 7:03 PM
To: [USMS]
Cc: [INVESTIGATIONS: LAKE JOYCE: FIELD MEDICAL KIT MANAGEMENT/ MCM MED CLINIC WINTER SEASON 2009]

Sorry about throwing two of these at you today, but I want to have you in the loop on an issue we are dealing with from this summer. This has to do with medication discrepancies and improper handling of medications.

We asked our contractor to provide a DEA 106 report for lost or stolen controlled medications. The email directly below this from NSF attorney assigned to USAP matters indicates our next step.

The attachment is our Contractor, Raytheon Polar Services Company's response to our request for an internal investigation and the DEA 106 report. It is a huge report that includes a string of emails (toward the end of the document) and general information on the Lake Joyce incident and other discrepancies from the previous winter.

As with the previous email, please let me know if you need any additional information or would like to discuss this case.

Thanks,

Begin forwarded message:

From: _@D_~oV>
Date: March 4, 2010 3:11:45 AM GMT+13:00
To: '1f1111e@nsf.gov>, 'mcm.nsfstmgr@usap.gov>
Cc: 'nsfstmgr@usap.gov'>
Subject: RE: INVESTIGATIONS: LAKE JOYCE FIELD MEDICAL KIT MANAGEMENT/ MCM MED CLINIC WINTER SEASON 2009

Thanks. Just to give you a heads up, I'll also be sending the report to the US Attorney's office in short order.

I will cc: you on that email to
but that should not preclude your normal reporting to USMS, etc., regarding the incidents.

Based on your other message, I'm sending you a copy of the report RPSC submitted last week on the field medical kit management issue. I'm surprised you have not received a copy of this directly at McMurdo and will be taking that issue up with RPSC management. Our intention has been for them to work through you directly where necessary.

The assigned investigations have been completed and are attached as one document with an executive summary. I am available to answer any questions you may over the content of this paper and look forward to any comments you have regarding the proposed recommendations.
Thanks

V/R

<<Lake Joyce and McMurdo 2010.doc>>

Raytheon Polar Services
7400 S Tucson Way
Centennial, Colorado 80112 USA
Toll Free: 1-800-688-8606
Direct: 1-719-863-6500
Fax: 1-303-649-9275

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Please destroy all copies of the original message by deleting this e-mail message from your computer.
This is an FYI. Would you like me to get you directly hooked into their email traffic on this investigation?

Begin forwarded message:

From: B1(6), B1(7)C) \(USMS\) B1(6), B1(7)C) @usdoj.gov
Date: March 6, 2010 3:18:38 PM GMT+13:00
To: B1(6), B1(7)C) \(USAHI\) B1(6), B1(7)C) @usdoj.gov
Cc: B1(6), B1(7)C) @usdoj.gov, <nsfsmgr@usap.gov>
Subject: RE: INVESTIGATIONS: LAKE JOYCE FIELD MEDICAL KIT MANAGEMENT/ MCM MED CLINIC WINTER SEASON 2009

10-4. I will forward this to B1(6), B1(7)C) as well.

Mahalo,

From: B1(6), B1(7)C) \(USAHI\)
Sent: Friday, March 05, 2010 4:16 PM
To: B1(5) \(USMS\)
Subject: RE: INVESTIGATIONS: LAKE JOYCE FIELD MEDICAL KIT MANAGEMENT/ MCM MED CLINIC WINTER SEASON 2009

Give me a call on the 17th to discuss.

From: B1(5) \(USMS\)
Sent: Thursday, March 04, 2010 12:22 PM
Hi Les,

Here's one more from the South Pole. This has to do with controlled substances missing from field kits. Please advise. Also, please include all recipients in your response so that they are in the loop.

Mahalo,

---

Sorry about throwing two of these at you today, but I want to have you in the loop on an issue we are dealing with from this summer. This has to do with medication discrepancies and improper handling of medications.

We asked our contractor to provide a DEA 106 report for lost or stolen controlled medications. The email directly below this from NSF attorney assigned to USAP matters, indicates our next step.

The attachment is our Contractor, Raytheon Polar Services Company's response to our request for an internal investigation and the DEA 106 report. It is a huge report that includes a string of emails (toward the end of the document) and general information on the Lake Joyce incident and other discrepancies from the previous winter.

As with the previous email, please let me know if you need any additional information or would like to discuss this case.

Thanks,
nsfstmgr <nsfstmgr@usap.gov>  
To: "(b)(5), (b)(7) (USMS)" <b>(b)(5), (b)(7), (b)(9)@usdoj.gov>  
Cc: "(b)(5)" <b>(b)(5), (b)(7)@nsf.gov>, <b>(b)(5), (b)(7), (b)(9)@nsf.gov>  

Re: Found Drug Paraphernalia In McMurdo

Will do.

Thanks

On Mar 26, 2010, at 2:33 PM, (b)(5), (b)(7) (USMS) wrote:

Hi,

Complete the attached Field Report form (USM210), attached the photo and keep a file. And send a copy of the completed form and photo to me via email.

Mahalo,

From: nsfstmgr [mailto:nsfstmgr@usap.gov]  
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 8:50 AM  
To: (b)(5), (b)(7) (USMS)  
Cc: [b](b)(5), (b)(7), (b)(9)  
Subject: Found Drug Paraphernalia In McMurdo

Two electricians were working above the third floor ceiling of dormitories yesterday afternoon (March 23 around 5:00 PM local time) and found a plastic bag containing three hand carved wooden pipes. They are used and do have what appears to be marijuana residue.

For now I'm going to document my receipt of the items and lock them into the safe in my office. Any other suggestions?
<usm 210 field report.pdf>
From: Raytheon Polar Services Company McMurdo Area Director
To: Raytheon Polar Services Company Director of Operations
Subj: Preliminary inquiry, re: Missing Crucibles from Crary Science and Engineering Center (CSEC), McMurdo Station, Antarctica

Encl: (1) [b](5) email notification to RPSC management regarding the missing crucibles dtd 15 February 2010
(2) [b](5) email tasking to McMurdo Area Manager regarding NSF incident notification and investigation dtd 15 February 2010
(3) [b](5) email with Incident Report and Property Loss Theft Report attachments to Management dated 17 February 2010.
(4) Incident Report by [b](5) dtd 17 February 2010
(5) Property Loss by Theft Report by [b](5) not dated
(6) [b](5) email with Incident Report and Theft Report attachments to NSF Operations Manager, [b](5) dtd 25 February 2010.
(7) Representative photographs of 50 ml platinum crucible
(8) Internet replacement cost estimate for 50 ml platinum crucible
(9) Photographs of the crucible storage containers
(10) [b](5) email notification to Crary Laboratory patrons regarding Crary Room 180/181 Access dtd 16 February 2010
(11) McMurdo Area Director’s initial email notification with queries regarding inquiry tasking dtd 12 April 2010
(12) [b](5) email response to initial email notification inquiry dtd 12 April 2010
(13) [b](5) email response to initial email notification inquiry dtd 12 April 2010
(14) [b](5) email response to initial email notification inquiry dtd 12 April 2010
(15) [b](5) email response to initial email notification inquiry dtd 12 April 2010
(16) [b](5) email response to follow-up query dtd 12 April 2010
(17) [b](5) email response to initial email notification inquiry dtd 12 April 2010
(18) [b](5) email response to follow-up query dtd 16 April 2010
(19) Investigator’s Query Summary Memo dtd 18 April 2010

1. On 26 March 2010, the RPSC Director of Operations tasked the RPSC McMurdo Area Director to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding three missing 50
Preliminary Inquiry, re: Missing Crucibles from Crary Science and Engineering Center (CSEC), McMurdo Station, Antarctica

On or about 16 February 2010 from the CSEC, McMurdo Station, Antarctica. Due to an ongoing two week transition turnover of the McMurdo Area Director's position from 29 March to 9 April 2010, the comprehensive commencement of the inquiry was delayed until 12 April 2010. The inquiry was conducted using telephonic and personal interviews with documented memorandums for the record, electronic communications, and electronic research. All individuals were extremely cooperative during the inquiry process. The following report is structured using findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations protocol. Findings of fact were derived from the report’s attached enclosures. The enclosures (Encl) are manually numerically labeled in the lower right hand corner of each page. Opinions were deduced from the findings of fact; the investigator's interface with interviewees; the investigator's personal knowledge of the USAP operations and employees; and additional research. The report is delineated as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. That on or about 16 February 2010, three platinum crucibles were determined to be missing from Room 181 aka Mezzanine Storage Area, CSEC during a review of McMurdo Station inventories in preparation for the upcoming contract transition. (Encl: 1, 13, 14)

2. That the documented dates for determination of the missing crucibles are both 15 and 16 February depending on whether the receiving or transmitting email server was located at Denver or McMurdo Station. (Encl: 1, 2, 19)

3. That for the purpose of this report, the date is annotated as 16 February 2010. (Encl: 19)

4. That pictures were taken of the containers in which the crucibles were stored should there be a requirement for a future investigation. (Encl: 4, 5, 9)

5. That [b] notified the McMurdo Station Science Lead [b], the RPSC Science Director [b], the McMurdo Area Director Mr. [b], and the RPSC Director of Operations, [b] of the missing crucibles on or about 16 February 2010. (Encl: 1, 5)

6. That [b] and [b] locked the containers in the Lab Manager's office should the evidence be required for further investigation. (Encl: 5)

7. That [b] notified the McMurdo Area Director [b] about the missing crucibles on or about 16 February 2010. (Encl: 14)

8. That [b] notified the McMurdo Area Manager [b] via email of the missing crucibles on or about 16 February 2010 and tasked [b] to notify the NSF Station Manager of subject event. (Encl: 2)

9. That [b] tasked the McMurdo Area Manager [b] via email on or about 16 February 2010 to coordinate with the Science Directorate and commence an investigation into the missing inventory (crucibles). (Encl: 2)

10. That RPSC senior management was informed of the missing crucibles and investigation tasking. (Encl: 1, 2)

11. That the McMurdo Area Manager believes he notified the NSF Site Manager, [c] subsequent to his notification, but does not specifically recall the time and method of notification. (Encl: 19)
Subj: Preliminary Inquiry, re: Missing Crucibles from Cray Science and Engineering Center (CSEC), McMurdo Station, Antarctica

12. That the NSF Operations Manager, [redacted], was cognizant of the missing crucibles, but does not specifically recall when or how [redacted] was notified. (Encl: 19)
15. That RPSC management deemed subject Incident Report and Missing Property reports insufficient inquiries into the event and subsequently directed that the incident be reinvestigated in more detail. (Encl: 19)
16. That five crucibles were appropriately procured during the July – November 2009 timeframe at a unit cost of $2411.00. (Encl: 15, 17)
17. That the crucibles are 50 ml capacity, 49 mm top diameter, 20 mm bottom diameter, 34 mm height, 0.31 mm thickness, 37 grams in weight, about the size of a shot glass, and silver in color. (Encl: 8, 17)
18. That the original unit cost of the missing crucibles was $2411.00 each for a total loss of $7233.00. (Encl: 15)
19. That from May 2007 to November 2009, the unit cost range for crucibles was from $2411.00 to $3595.00. (Encl: 15)
20. That the current estimated replacement unit cost for each crucible can be in the $6000.00 to $8000.00 price range with a total estimated replacement cost of $18,000.00 to $24,000.00. (Encl: 5, 8, 17)
21. That five crucibles were issued to [redacted] on 23 November 2009. (Encl: 15)
22. That the crucibles are used to clean thermocouples and vacuum gauges damaged during transfer of cryogenic fluids. (Encl: 17, 18)
23. That a combination hydrochloric acid and nitric acid solution is used in the cleaning process. (Encl: 17, 18)
24. That the temperature of the solution must be closely controlled during the cleaning process to prevent damage to the crucibles. (Encl: 17)
25. That temperature control is maintained using an ice bath and is extremely difficult. (Encl: 17)
26. That the chemistry involved is dangerous and [redacted] is not proficient enough to maintain consistency during the process, had difficulty maintaining subject temperatures, and over a period of time, the walls of the crucibles were too fragile to be of further use. (Encl: 17)
27. That [redacted] disposed of the damaged crucibles via the hazardous waste disposal process. (Encl: 17)
28. That as a result of the frequent damage, [redacted] considered the crucibles consumable items and disposed of subject items accordingly. (Encl: 17, 19)
29. That the hazardous waste consumable disposal process requires a hazardous waste identification sheet be completed annotating a matching waste identification number on the equipment and submitted for disposal. (Encl: 19)
Subj: Preliminary Inquiry, re: Missing Crucibles from Crary Science and Engineering Center (CSEC), McMurdo Station, Antarctica

30. That departmental hazardous waste collection documentation does not include filing by line item and is manually filed as a group summary. (Encl: 19)
31. That replacement crucibles were procured at the end of the years 2007 and 2008 as a result of damage incurred from the cleaning process which made them unsuitable for continued service. (Encl: 15, 17)
32. That from May 2007 through November 2009 a total of 16 crucibles were procured and issued for use. (Encl: 15, 16)
33. That the total cost of the 16 crucibles and lids procured from May 2007 to November 2009 was $49,430.00. (Encl: 15)
34. That the crucibles are generally used from November through December during each austral summer season, eight to twelve times per repair session. (Encl: 15, 17)
35. That two of the five crucibles procured in 2009 were already damaged and disposed via the hazardous waste disposal process by [redacted]. (Encl: 19)
36. That the last time the three missing crucibles were observed was on 8 December 2009 in Room 181, CSEC. (Encl: 4, 17)
37. That the crucibles were normally stored in Room 181, aka Mezzanine Storage Area, CSEC. (Encl: 4, 5, 17)
38. That the Room 181 is a large storage area for materials and equipment. (Encl: 5, 14, 17)
39. That Room 181 is secured with electronic key card security. (Encl: 5, 12, 17)
40. That access to Room 181 is through three electronic key access points including the door to Room 181. (Encl: 12, 17)
41. That many individuals had legitimate electronic key access to Room 181. (Encl: 12, 17)
42. That upon notification of the missing crucibles, an access report to Room 181 was conducted which reflected that when a key was returned and deleted, the information from subject key was also deleted in the system. (Encl: 5, 12, 17)
43. That immediately upon discovering the incident, all electronic access key cards were cancelled and master keys collected with new access cards issued limiting access to Room 181. (Encl: 5, 10, 12, 17)
44. That the current policy for access to Room 181 is restricted to laboratory personnel with all others escorted by authorized laboratory personnel. (Encl: 5, 10, 12, 17)
45. That [redacted] is the only person employee who utilized the crucibles. (Encl: 17)
46. That there was no chain of custody process for the crucibles once issued to [redacted]. (Encl: 17)
47. That there was no logging document to monitor use of the crucibles. (Encl: 19)
48. That the only security for the crucibles was in a plastic bag in a box on the floor located in a corner among other materials. (Encl: 14, 17)
49. That [redacted] considered Room 181 the most secure room in the CSEC because of the requirement to pass through three electronic key access points. (Encl: 17)
50. That since [redacted] had not encountered any security issues in previous years, he did not consider additional security precautions. (Encl: 17)
51. That [redacted] opted for the vacuum gauge acidic solution cleaning process due to the inability to obtain replacement gauges following a fire at the manufacturer facility. (Encl: 17)
Subj: Preliminary Inquiry, re: Missing Crucibles from Crary Science and Engineering Center (CSEC), McMurdo Station, Antarctica

52. That [b](6) now considers the current process too risky and proposes an alternate method for addressing the vacuum gauge issue. (Encl: 17, 18)

53. That when the initial issue of cleaning equipment surfaced, [b](6) considered his resolution fairly uncomplicated and unproblematic. (Encl: 19)

54. That in hindsight, [b](6) currently believes that he should have brought the issue to the attention of Science leadership. (Encl: 19)

55. That the Science Director was not cognizant of the thermocouple - vacuum gauge cleaning issue. (Encl: 19)

56. That the Science Director considers [b](6) a most trustworthy and 'first rate employee.' (Encl: 19)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That before continuing with the current cleansing process for thermocouples and vacuum gauges, the RPSC Science Director conducts an operational risk assessment of the procedures currently in use.

2. That Science Leadership and [b](6) review the current procedures utilized for thermocouple and vacuum gauges cleaning and/or replacement to determine the most appropriate and cost effective method for the way ahead.

3. That the Science Director conduct a coaching session with [b](6) regarding US Government equipment chain of custody and security requirements.
Subj: Preliminary Inquiry, re: Missing Crucibles from Crary Science and Engineering Center (CSEC), McMurdo Station, Antarctica

4. That the RPSC Science Director conduct a coaching session with the McMurdo Science Lead before all deployments providing additional and specific guidance on tasks and responsibilities.

5. That crucibles are more appropriately secured and with logging documentation if the acidic cleaning process is continued in the interim.

6. That additional training or assistance is provided to [redacted] to increase his competence with the thermocouple – vacuum gauge cleaning operation if the acidic solution cleaning process is continued.

7. That the current security key access system for the CSEC is reviewed for efficiency and effectiveness to ensure that it is in consonance with its intended design.

8. That the recently established Room 181 accessibility restrictions and escort policy remain in effect, but reviewed for effectiveness.

9. That a high dollar margin be established for high value consumables, along with line item documentary and description for disposal of subject equipment.

10. That a chain of custody process be required and followed for all high value equipment if not already established.

11. That an electronic data filing system be procured for Hazardous Waste Management.

12. That the heightened sense of responsibility regarding ongoing contract transition activities – inventory accuracy, procedures reviews, and project closeout etc., be maintained and specifically with the highest departmental leadership oversight and involvement.

13. That the company’s philosophy regarding operational risk management be reinforced at the lowest level among all Directorates.

14. That to the greatest extent possible, the McMurdo Senior Site Operations Manager and McMurdo Area Director be more fully engaged in all activities at the station.

15. That further investigation of the missing crucibles is not recommended as the invested effort may significantly outweigh the achieved benefit.

16. That the US Government equipment ‘Survey’ or applicable process be completed for the missing equipment.

17. That this submitted report’s process of Findings of Fact, Opinions, and Recommendations be considered as a template for future program investigations.

Respectfully Submitted,

McMurdo Area Director
I was doing a walk around with [redacted] this afternoon in regards to the project close out. I was showing [redacted] the platinum crucibles used in the thermocouple repairs. We discovered that the three remaining crucibles were missing. The plating waste solution and the plastic bags in which the crucibles were stored were still there.

I will follow this up with a phone call but wanted to let you know asap. First thing in the morning [redacted] and I will fill out the appropriate paperwork and talk with [redacted] about next appropriate steps.

'Please note the change in my e-mail address'

Raytheon Polar Services
7400 South Tucson Way
Centennial, CO 80112
Phone 800 688 8606 ex [redacted]
Direct [redacted]
Fax 303 792 9006
[redacted]contractor@usap.gov

Brevis esse latoro obscurus fio
Initiate notification to the NSF Station Manager and coordinate with Science regarding commencing an investigation first thing in the AM. Thanks.

Re: FW: Missing Inventory

McMurdo Area Director
RPSC Site Representative
On ICE Phone: (720) 368-1000 Ext. (w) 4-5 (h)
On ICE Ph Alt: (720) 368-1000
contractor@usap.gov
Pager: (719) 6688-6007

From: (Contractor)
Sent: Tuesday, February 16, 2010 6:03 PM
To: (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor)
Cc: (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor)
Subject: Missing Inventory

I was doing a walk around this afternoon in regards to the project close out. I was showing the platinum crucibles used in the thermocouple repairs. We discovered that the three remaining crucibles were missing. The plating waste solution and the plastic bags in which the crucibles were stored were still there.

I will follow this up with a phone call but wanted to let you know asap. First thing in the morning and I will fill out the appropriate paperwork and talk with about next appropriate steps.

'Please note the change in my e-mail address'

Raytheon Polar Services
7400 South Tucson Way
Centennial, CO 80112
Phone 800 688 8606 ext (6)

Eng. (Z)
Don,

I have attached the requested reports on the theft of the platinum crucibles from Crary Lab. Please let me know if there is any further information that I should provide.

'Please note the change in my e-mail address'

Haytheon Polar Services
7400 South Tucson Way
Centennial, CO 80112
Phone 800 688 8606 ex (b)(6)
Direct (b)(6)
Fax 303 792 9006
contractor@usa.gov

Brevis esse latoro obscurus fio
INCIDENT REPORT
McMurdo Station
Antarctica

Type of Incident: [Criminal Mischief] [Other (specify)]

Incident Location: [BUILDING] [ROOM 1800] [MEZZANINE STORAGE]

Date Occurred: [NOTE] [ON 2-16-2010]

Time Occurred: [5:30 P.M. (17:30)]

Person Reporting Incident: [Last, First, Middle Initial]

Optional Information: [Age] [Sex] [Race]

Residence: [DORAN] [Room 1800]

Title/Occupation: [1142 MATERIALS SPEC]

Organization/Affiliation: [2 PSC]

Ice Arrival Date: [10-6-2007]

Description of Incident: [MET WITH] [b(6)] [RECOMMEND PROJECT CLOSE OUT REPORTING. DISCUSSED HOW WE INVENTORY AND ACCOUNT FOR PROPERTY. TOOK (b[6]) UPHOLSTERY TO MEZZANINE TO SHOW SECURE ACCESS TO AREA IN RM 181. PULLED OUT BOX FROM UNDER SHELVES. BOX WAS LOCATED SOUTHEAST CORNER OF ROOM ACROSS FROM COMMISSION. IT WAS PLACED UNDER SHELVING ON FLOOR WITH OTHER INVENTORY IN FRONT OF IT. BOX WAS BROUGHT OUT TO INVENTORY AND PHOTOGRAPH. CAUCULES IN BOX HAD BEEN IN PLASTIC BAGS. BAGS WERE STILL IN BOX ALONG WITH WASTE SOLUTION. PULLED OUT ADDITIONAL INVENTORY TO SEARCH AREA AROUND FLOOR. CAUCULES WERE NOT FOUND ON SHELVES ON FLOOR. CAUCULES WERE LAST USED AND PUT AWAY ON DECEMBER 8, 2009. BELIEVE CAUCULES WERE STOLEN]

Item# | Item | Brand | Model | Size | Color | Value | Serial #/Distinguish Marks
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1 | [JAM] | [02002-K] | [SILVER] | [92500]
2 | [JAM] | [02002-K] | [SILVER] | [92500]
3 | [JAM] | [02002-K] | [SILVER] | [92500]

Total Property Stolen or Lost ($): [7500 TOTAL LOSS]

Total Property Damage ($): [0]

**RETURN FORM TO NSF STATION MANAGER WHEN COMPLETED**
PROPERTY LOSS BY THEFT REPORT

USAP Location: McMurdo

Incident Classification: Property Loss by Theft

Basic information regarding the incident:
- Reporter USAP e-mail address: [REDACTED] Contractor@usap.gov
- Building location of the incident: Cryo Science and Engineering Center (CSEC)
- Affected employee(s) department: Science Support
- Specific details of the location: Theft occurred from Room 181, within CSEC. Three platinum crucibles were taken. Crucibles were stored in a double plastic bag inside a cardboard box. Box was placed under shelving in southwest corner of the room across from air compressor. Other inventory items were placed in front of the crucibles to conceal location. One must pass through three locked doors to enter this room after accessing the lab.

Date the incident occurred: sometime after 08 December 2009, theft noted on 16 February 2010

Time the incident occurred (in military time): 1900

Cost estimate of property lost: $7500 total

Details about the loss or event. Be specific as possible:
Describe the Loss or Event:
On 16 February 2010, approximately 1700 hours, I was showing [REDACTED] the storage area where the platinum crucibles were kept in CSEC. This room is Rm 181, also known as Mezzanine Storage. I pulled out the box which the crucibles were stored in and placed the box on a shelving unit for him to examine and photograph.

We removed the bag the crucibles were stored inside of the box and found the bag empty. The waste solution generated during use of the crucibles was still in the box.

We removed inventory completely from under the shelving to look for the crucibles. We did not find them under the shelving on the floor. We looked around the upper shelves but did not find the crucibles there either.

[REDACTED] took some pictures to document the box and bag. He suggested maintaining the material for investigation. [REDACTED] and I notified [REDACTED] immediately after being unable to locate the crucibles in the immediate area.

[REDACTED] and I discussed steps to report the theft. I notified [REDACTED] by e-mail on the initial finding of theft. [REDACTED] and I followed up by contacting [REDACTED] by phone afterwards at approximately 1810 McMurdo time. [REDACTED] was contacted by phone afterwards at approximately 1820 to report the theft and discuss reporting.

[REDACTED] and I locked the bags and waste solution in the Lab Manager's office in case further investigation is requested.

[REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] Administrative Coordinator, to run a report of all entries into room 181 made by card key. We found that the card key system deletes the names of card owners once the card is returned and invalidated. At this time we cannot verify which station personnel entered

[REDACTED]
into the room during the time period in question. A current list of hard key holders is being pulled together.

Why did the incident occur? (Root cause and contributing causes)

Cause (why it happened):

Corrective Action(s):

- All access to Rm 181 is being restricted. It will no longer be available to winter card key holders. Action: [b](10); 2/19/2010; Status: Completed
- Void access to Rm 181 by all summer card key holders. Action: [b](10); 2/23/2010; Status: Open
- Hard key list to be compiled to determine if all hard keys have been returned and establish winter holders of hard keys. Action: [b](10); 2/26/2010; Status: Open
- Future access to Rm 181 restricted to lab personnel only or by escort of lab personnel as new lab policy. Action: [b](10); 2/17/2010; Status: Email sent informing personnel of change in lab policy.
- Return to purchasing new vacuum gauges and thermocouples rather than repair damaged units. Budgetary estimates to be worked on for units that need to be replaced and incorporated in next budget. Action: [b](10); 4/01/2010; Status: Open
- Review procedures that lead to damaged equipment during normal course of operations and determine if procedural changes can be implemented that reduce wear and tear. Action: [b](10); 4/30/2010; Status: Open
Dyar, Michael (Contractor)

From: (Contractor)

Sent: Thursday, February 25, 2010 12:23 PM

To: (Contractor)

Subject: FW: Theft Report

Attachments: Theft Report Format.doc; Theft Incident Report.PDF

FYI and situational awareness.

Regards,

McMurdo Area Director
Polar Services
Raytheon Technical Services Company, LLC

From: (Contractor)

Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2010 12:41 PM

To: (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor)

Cc: (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor)

Subject: Theft Report

I have attached the requested reports on the theft of the platinum crucibles from Crary Lab. Please let me know if there is any further information that I should provide.

'Please note the change in my e-mail address'

Raytheon Polar Services
7400 South Tucson Way
Centennial, CO 80112

Phone 800 688 8606 ext

Direct

Fax 303 792 9006
Platinum Crucibles - Product Detail

Platinum Crucibles

WU-17830-75
Platinum Crucible, 50ml, 1/ea

$6730.00 / each (USD) In stock.

Product Rating

(0 Ratings) Write a Review

- Prohibit contamination at high temperatures up to 1200°C
- These crucibles offer high temperature strength and high melting point. Platinum offers oxidation resistance in air and oxygen; and corrosion resistance in acids and melted salts.
- Protect your investment with platinum tongs that reduce possible damage and scratches to platinum crucible when hot. Manufactured in standard form. Covers and tongs sold separately. Lids, crucibles, and tongs sold separately.

Specifications

Dimensions

Top ID 45 (mm) x Hgt 44(mm)

- Technical Library (roll over link for article summary)
  - Basics of Cartridge Filtration
  - Bitter Brew
  - Isolating Genomic DNA from Whole Blood
  - More Related Technical Articles

Do you have questions about this product?

get answers from real customers and in house experts with AnswerBox.

0 Questions | 0 Answers

REVIEW SNAPSHOT®

Be the first to review this product. Write a Review
CRUCIBLE IN
# 1 DAMAGED 11-27
# 2 DESTROYED 12-2
# 3 WASHED 12-3
# 4 DESTROYED 12-8
Dyer, Michael (Contractor)

From: Michael (Contractor)
Sent: Tuesday, February 16, 2010 6:53 PM
To: (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor)
Cc: (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor); (Contractor)
Subject: Crary Room 180/181 Access
Importance: High

Hi All,

Over the past winter and summer season we have had some of our inventory go missing from CSEC Room 180/181, aka "the Anne Frank Room". Some of these items were quite valuable. In light of this, we are now limiting access to this room to specific personnel. If anyone else needs access to the room (the room also contains the Crary fire suppression tank), they must be escorted by one of the approved users.

For winter 2010, people with approved access to the room are the Crary staff and anyone in the Supply Department. Only the Crary staff will have keycard access to the room.

The room is also accessible by hard key, but the only people in addition to the Crary staff with hard keys are also responsible for hard keys in Engine 1 and Tanker 3).

I hope it doesn't cause any additional work for you this winter - if it starts to be a problem, please let me know so we can look at alternative ways to approach this.

Thanks!

Science Support Lead &
Manager, Laboratory Science
McMurdo Station, Antarctica
ph: 425 ext 3147
from off-ice: 425 ext 3147

4/12/2010
Folks,

I've been tasked with conducting an investigation to look into the circumstances surrounding missing crucibles from the Crary Lab, McMurdo Station and report findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations. To support that endeavor, request that you each provide a statement addressing any known information regarding the crucibles. The statement should include a response to any of the listed areas if applicable to your area of responsibility.

- Provide a full official description of the crucibles, to include numbers, size, and accurate nomenclature.
- What was the original cost of the crucibles?
- What is the replacement cost of the crucibles?
- When were the crucibles procured and delivered to McMurdo Station?
- Provide all information regarding the chain of custody for the crucibles?
- What was the security process for the crucibles, where were they located, and who was the responsible individual?
- How often were the crucibles used and for what purpose?
- When were the crucibles last seen?
- Do the crucibles need to be replaced?
- Provide a list of all the individuals who had access to the area where the crucibles were located. Please provide point of contact information for subject individuals if available.
- The following supplier's url for crucibles is provided for your information:
  http://www.google.com/products?hl=en&q=platinum+crucible&um=1&ie=UTF-8&ei=Yj6zS6vRCoOKNvnMnfkD&sa=X&oi=product_result_group&ct=title&resnum=1&ved=0CBoQrQQwAA
- When were the crucibles determined to be missing?
- Provide any other available information or individuals for possible interview.

Requested information can be provided via email either in the body of the email or in an attachment. Please provide the requested information by 4:30 PM MST 13 April 2010 and include your point of contact information so that follow-up can be conducted if necessary.

Thank you all very much and appreciate your assistance.

Regards,
McMurdo Area Director
Polar Services
Raytheon Technical Services Company, LLC
Phone: (720) 568-9566
Cell: (720) 568-2402
Fax: (720) 568-2401
contractor@usap.gov

"Few things are of themselves impossible...we lack the application to make them a success rather than the means."

La Rochefoucauld
Hi,

I don't have answers to most of your questions below - the crucibles are purchased on the Cryogen budget, for which [b] has control - so I'm going to leave it to [b] to provide those details for you; I didn't even know the crucibles existed until the day they were discovered missing. I can provide you with information about the storage location, however, and the steps we've put into place to try to mitigate any future problems:

**Location**
The crucibles were stored in one of Crary's official Supply areas, Room 181. This is an extremely difficult room to find because it requires a person to go through a number of locked doors and utility rooms to get to it. The room also houses Crary's Fire Suppression Tank, so there is often FEMC/Operations traffic in the room in addition to folks from Supply.

**Access**
When we discovered the crucibles missing, we immediately ran a report of all people who accessed Room 181 via key-card between the date the crucibles were last seen and the current date. Unfortunately, once an access card is returned and deleted, the DoorTek card system records for when/where that card had been used are also deleted. Since it was very close to the end of the season, most access cards had already been returned to our Admin, and therefore, the records unknowingly deleted.

**Procedural Changes**
Immediately following the incident, a number of steps were put into effect to help prevent any similar future issues:
1. All keycards with access to the area were immediately deleted and all Crary master keys collected.
2. Only key-cards belonging to the winter Crary staff and the Firehouse were reprogrammed with access to the room.

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**Encl (12)**
3. Hard keys were reissued only to the winter Crary staff (total: 6 keys).

4. A notice was sent out to anyone who might potentially require access to the space explaining that they would be required to have an escort while in the area. A copy of the email is attached.

Please let me know if you require any further information.

Folks,

I've been tasked with conducting an investigation to look into the circumstances surrounding missing crucibles from the Crary Lab, McMurdo Station and report findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations. To support that endeavor, request that you each provide a statement addressing any known information regarding the crucibles. The statement should include a response to any of the listed areas if applicable to your area of responsibility.

- Provide a full official description of the crucibles, to include numbers, size, and accurate nomenclature.
- What was the original cost of the crucibles?
- What is the replacement cost of the crucibles?
- When were the crucibles procured and delivered to McMurdo Station?
- Provide all information regarding the chain of custody for the crucibles?
- What was the security process for the crucibles, where were they located, and who was the responsible individual?
- How often were the crucibles used and for what purpose?
- When were the crucibles last seen?
- Do the crucibles need to be replaced?
- Provide a list of all the individuals who had access to the area where the crucibles were located. Please provide point of contact information for subject individuals if available.
- The following supplier's url for crucibles is provided for your information: http://www.google.com/products?hl=en&q=platinum+crucible&um=1&ie=UTF-8&ei=Yj6zS6vRCoOKNyuxMn&f=false&channel=images&rd=1&sa=X&oi=qp_result&ct=title&resnum=1&ved=0CBQqQ0wAA
Folks,

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- What was the original cost of the crucibles?
- What is the replacement cost of the crucibles?
- When were the crucibles procured and delivered to McMurdo Station?
- Provide all information regarding the chain of custody for the crucibles?
- What was the security process for the crucibles, where were they located, and who was the responsible individual?
- How often were the crucibles used and for what purpose?
- When were the crucibles last seen?
- Do the crucibles need to be replaced?
- Provide a list of all the individuals who had access to the area where the crucibles were located. Please provide point of contact information for subject individuals if available.
I think you already know most of my involvement with this incident. As noted, during our review of various on-station operations one of our primary areas of concern was the availability and accuracy of property inventories. We had highlighted specific inventories we considered particularly sensitive due to a variety of factors including value, or other potential risks when transition is made to the new contractor. These included controlled drugs, hazardous chemicals and materials, retail items and precious metals. These are all items we expect will require detailed inventories upon transition.

As related we met first with and then joined us. I should note that initially both insisted that they did not control or have responsibility for any materials that would require specific inventory or transaction. When challenged I noted that my preliminary review had shown both hazardous materials as well as precious metals, specifically platinum were in the current inventory. I was told repeatedly that these items were in very small quantities and well controlled. I asked to be shown the platinum as an example. agreed to show me the platinum but we scheduled that for a 2nd visit later in the day as and I already had other visits scheduled.

When I met later in the day we spent some time discussing the fiduciary responsibilities of HPSC employees and the process of accountability we would need to set up for transition to the new contractor. It was here that I believe I learned that "checked out" all of the Platinum in the accounting record earlier in the year. said this was done to ensure had materials on hand if needed them to make instrument repairs. was concerned that inventory was shown in MCS someone else might check out some and not leave sufficient quantities. told me that had three crucibles of the material and a small amount in solution left. This material was secured in such a way that no one could get to it nor would they know where to look if they ever got into the room itself.

After about an hour of discussion we went to the room described by accessed us both through the locks and took me up to the room where kept the material. This was a mechanical room but with lots of miscellaneous materials stored in it. proceeded to the back of the room to a rack of various materials against a wall. knelted down on the floor and reached back in the corner. Moving other items pulled out a small cardboard box with a plastic zip lock bag and Nalgene bottle sticking out of the open top. placed the box for me to see and then turned to do something else on the floor. During this time was explaining that the crucibles were in the plastic bag and the nalgene bottle held residue solution from the last time he used this material. I looked into the plastic bag and saw a 2nd bag but no materials. I pulled the bag out of the box to confirm that there were no materials in it and told I did not see any materials. joined me and pulled the bottle out of the box also. seemed quite surprised to not find anything in the plastic bags. got down on the floor and started to look around there. I loaned a flashlight and took photos of the box. I will attach those photos for your reference. Once we determined that the area did not have the materials was looking for I advised that we needed to report this to and Senior Station Management. We took the box with the plastic bags and nalgene bottle to office. We informed of the situation and I advised them both to limit handling of the box, bottle and bags in case fingerprints could be retrieved. We discussed getting a record of who accessed the area via the electronic
keys and I advised them both to contact Senior Station Management and report the loss. I then left them to proceed with their investigation and reporting. I believe I then contacted you separately and apprised you of the situation but am no longer sure of the timing or sequence of that notification.

From: [Name] (Contractor)
Sent: Monday, April 12, 2010 12:14 PM
To: [Name] (Contractor)
Cc: [Name] (Contractor)
Subject: RE: Crucible Investigation

Folks,
I've been tasked with conducting an investigation to look into the circumstances surrounding missing crucibles from the Crary Lab, McMurdo Station and report findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations. To support that endeavor, request that you each provide a statement addressing any known information regarding the
This is the first I have heard of the crucibles being missing. That being said here is what I can tell you from Mapcon:

RM33558-01 stock# 0112118 50ml crucible 5-ea bought @$2558.00 each on 05-04-07
stock# 0112119 lids for crucible 5-ea bought @$603.00 each on 05-04-07
received Port Hueneme 07/17/2007 TCN 7831-0210
received McMurdo 11/02/07
DTO (direct turn over) to 11/07/07

RM40853-01 stock# 0112118 50ml crucible 6-ea bought @$3595.00 ea on 05/20/08
received Port Hueneme 05/29/08 TCN 8831-0033
received McMurdo 09/17/08
Put into inventory 10/1/08 in Crary
Issued to 12/16/08

RM46779-01 stock# 0112118 50ml crucible 5-ea bought @$2411.00 ea on 07/01/09
received Port Hueneme 09/11/09 TCN 9831-0125
received McMurdo 11/02/09
Put into inventory 11/5/09
Issued to 11/23/09

Hardcopies of the shipping documents (TCNs) are available at my desk should you like to inspect them.

McMurdo Supply Operations
Direct: 1-720-568-1111
Extension: 1111

Folks,
I've been tasked with conducting an investigation to look into the circumstances surrounding missing crucibles from the Crary Lab, McMurdo Station and report findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations. To support that endeavor, request
That is correct. Over the years a total of 16 crucibles have been procured.

Thanks. From the information provided below, it appears that there were a total of 16 crucibles procured. Is that correct?

Folks,

If 16 crucibles were procured, I’ll be soliciting information on the locations and disposition of the remaining crucibles. Please include subject information in your responses. Thanks.
I've answered the questions below in blue and responded to your question on the number involved. Please let me know if there is anything else you need.

'Please note the change in my e-mail address'

Raytheon Polar Services
7400 South Tucson Way
Centennial, CO 80112
Phone 800 688 8606 ext 1111
Direct 720-568-
Fax 303 792 9006
contractor@usap.gov

Folks,
I’ve been tasked with conducting an investigation to look into the circumstances surrounding missing crucibles from the Crary Lab, McMurdo Station and report findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations. To support that endeavor, request that you each provide a statement addressing any known information regarding the crucibles. The statement should include a response to any of the listed areas if applicable to your area of responsibility.

- Provide a full official description of the crucibles, to include numbers, size, and accurate nomenclature.
- Crucible, platinum, 50 milliliter capacity, 49mm top diameter, 30mm bottom diameter, 34mm height, 0.31mm in thickness, 37 grams in weight, total three missing, descriptively it is about the size of a shot glass or slightly bigger, silver in color.

- **What was the original cost of the crucibles?**
  - $2411 per crucible according to MAPCON

- **What is the replacement cost of the crucibles?**
  - Dependent on market price of platinum between $6500 and $8000

- **When were the crucibles procured and delivered to McMurdo Station?**
  - RM46779-01 stock# 012118 50ml crucible 5-ea bought @ $2411.00 ea on 07/01/09 received Port Hueneme 08/11/09 TCN 9831-0125 received McMurdo 11/02/09
  - Put into inventory 11/5/09
  - Issued to [redacted] 11/23/09

- **Provide all information regarding the chain of custody for the crucibles?**
  - The crucibles are checked out through MAPCON during use. There is only one user.

- If 16 crucibles were procured, I'll be soliciting information on the locations and disposition of the remaining crucibles. Please include subject information in your responses.
  - Initial cleaning of the gauges requires an acid solution of hydrochloric acid and nitric acid. The solution is good for the removal of vacuum grease and providing an etched surface for repairs to be made. However the solution also damages the crucible if temperature is not controlled during the process. Temperature control is done through an ice bath but is difficult to maintain. Damage also occurs from excess hydrochloric acid in the cleaning solution. I try to hold the solution at a 3:1 ratio but found the cleaning worked better at almost 4:1 ratio of acids. Eventually the walls of the crucible become too fragile to work with and it is added to the collected waste solution. The waste solution is disposed of as hazardous waste. At the end of the 2007 and 2008 all crucibles were damaged to a point to make them unsuitable for continued service and added to the waste solutions for disposal.

- **What was the security process for the crucibles, where were they located, and who was the responsible individual?**
  - The crucibles were placed in [redacted] in an unsecured stock area. I checked the crucibles out to make repairs to some thermocouples. The crucibles were used in the fume hood on room 135, a room locked by a hard key with limited access. When done, the crucibles were moved to room 161 and stored away. Room 181 is a limited access room and requires either a card key or a hard key. Entry to this room requires that an individual pass through three locked doors.

- **How often were the crucibles used and for what purpose?**
  - The crucibles were typically used during late November and December of each summer season, eight to twelve times per repair session. The purpose was to make repairs to thermocouple and vacuum gauges damaged during transfer of cryogenic fluids. The gauges are exposed to liquid air which causes differential contraction breaking seals and filaments. Grease used to seal the vacuum port access makes its way into the vacuum space and is being drawn through leaks in the gauges.

- **When were the crucibles last seen?**
• The crucibles were last seen on 08 December 2009 when they were secured in room 181.

• Do the crucibles need to be replaced?
  • I do not want to replace them if we make procedural changes. The chemistry involved is quite dangerous and I am not practiced enough to perform the task perfectly each time. Rather than replace, I want to eliminate as many of the thermocouples and vacuum gauges as possible. The vacuum gauges that remain must be located away from contact with the cryogenic fluids during transfers. Any contaminates that could damage the gauges need to be eliminated, in particular vacuum grease used at some point need to be eliminated or further reduced. The use of only ethanol or acetone for leak testing must be used. Oil lubricated pumps must not be used even when a cold trap is placed in line. The vacuum ports should be shielded from liquid air to prevent a vacuum leak from starting and causing grease to leak into the vacuum system.

• Provide a list of all the individuals who had access to the area where the crucibles were located. Please provide point of contact information for subject individuals if available.
  • The entire lab staff is issued card keys with access to room 181. The Fire Department Inspectors have a card key and a hard key to the doors. FEMA personnel were issued a card key for the lab including this room. Work on the fire suppression system was being performed during the time period of 30 November through 08 December 2009 and the room may have been unsecured for short period. A report on the card key reader was useless in determining a list of who accessed the room during the time period in question. The reader deletes the user's name from the system when the card is deleted. A hard key inventory was performed to determine if any keys were missing or outstanding.

• The following supplier's url for crucibles is provided for your information:
  http://www.google.com/products?hl=en&q=platinum+crucible&um=1&ie=UTF-8&ei=YI6zS6vRCoOKNvuMnfkD&sa=X&oi=product_result_group&ct=title&resnum=1&ved=0CBqQuQQwAA

• When were the crucibles determined to be missing?
  • The crucibles were discovered missing on 18 February 2010 by [redacted] and [redacted] at approximately 1700. The theft was reported to [redacted], Lab Supervisor, within minutes thereafter. [redacted], was within 60 minutes after at approximately 1810 hours. [redacted] was notified at 1820 to report the theft and determine what reporting was required.

• Provide any other available information or individuals for possible interview.
  • Each crucible becomes damaged in the process and eventually is destroyed and disposed of as waste. The repair process involves cleaning with hydrochloric acid and nitric acid. Freon was originally recommended for cleaning but we do not have a closed system for working with ozone depleting chemicals. Keeping the cleaning process in an ice bath helps reduce the rate of corrosion but some of the gauges are found to be extremely fouled. After destroying two crucibles on the first attempt this past season I stopped the repair work. The waste solutions are disposed of through the haz waste stream.

• Elimination of the vacuum gauges would result in an immediate savings of approximately $12,000 per year in replacement costs. The crucibles would not have to be purchased resulting in further savings. The repair procedure could be done away with reducing the waste stream from the extremely corrosive solutions generated.

• The pipe stubs the gauges thread into should be cut off and a plug welded in place during the each containers next inspection and service period. The transfer of cryogenic fluids would have to be slowed down during future large scale transfers. The impact of this would not be readily seen and may not even impact the transfers. This would help
reduce the formation of liquid air and reduce a safety risk seen as normal during these operations.

• Operational vacuum checks of the systems involved would need to be performed on a more frequent basis when the systems are not in use or prior to use. This would be a simple procedural change.
• The CSEC card key reader system should be updated. The current software deletes users when the card is deleted. A reader system that retains the users would have been extremely helpful.

Requested information can be provided via email either in the body of the email or in an attachment. Please provide the requested information by 4:30 PM MST 13 April 2010 and include your point of contact information so that follow-up can be conducted if necessary.

Thank you all very much and appreciate your assistance.

Regards,

McMurdo Area Director
Polar Services
Raytheon Technical Services Company, LLC
Phone: (720) 568-2402
Cell: (720) 568-2403
Fax: (720) 568-2401
contractor@usap.gov

"Few things are of themselves impossible... we lack the application to make them a success rather than the means."

Lei Rochebouefauld
To clarify the suggested action and recommendation of no longer purchasing crucibles and cleaning of vacuum gauges and thermocouples -

If [Contractor] concur on this action I can make this a priority task on the elimination of these gauges.

On much of the larger liquid helium transports and to a much smaller extent on the liquid nitrogen and liquid oxygen transports if we were to eliminate the gauges on these containers we could eliminate the purchase of the crucibles and the repair or replacement of the gauges. These gauges represent a small vacuum leak at each point of penetration into the vacuum system of each container. The leak acts to draw air and grease from the valving into the vacuum system. The larger liquid helium transports have four gauges each and all other transports used in the program have one gauge each. We have maintained the gauges because they are part of the original equipment. However these gauges are susceptible to damage, require frequent inspections and sometime cannot be repaired when the damage is too great due to contamination by liquid air during a large scale transfer.

We can temporarily remove each vacuum gauge and install a pipe plug with teflon tape to help seal the pipe stub. The vacuum can be accessed through the normal vacuum port. The vacuum port should be cleaned of any debris and old greases from the manufacturer or us. The transports would no longer be readable by plugging in meter to read the vacuum. This is not an issue since the effect of cryopumping makes reading the vacuum of a container that is in service poor work practice. Rather the vacuum should only be read when the container is out of service to begin with. When the container is in service the gauge is unreadable or unreliable.

Later during a third party certification inspection we would have each gauge point removed and the adjoining pipe stub ground flush with the vacuum jacket of that part of the container. A patch is welded over the resultant hole in the line and the system is then pumped out to establish a new vacuum. The vacuum port for the refurbished line also needs to be cleaned of grease and dirt. Greases that are difficult to clean are the silicone and fluorsilicone vacuum greases used most commonly at Cryo Lab and South Pole Station.

The vacuum of each line or the annular space itself can be read with a gauge attached remotely at the vacuum pump. The pump needs to have extra protection screen added to the inlet to reduce the chance of grease entering the remote gauge. The remote gauges currently being experimented with provide more consistent reading and seem to be less susceptible to air, oil vapor, grease, ethanol and acetone used in testing.

These actions would eliminate the cleaning and the repair of the gauges we currently use on the transports. The cost in gauges is approximately $12,000 to $15,000 per year. The cost in crucibles approximately the same. The resultant waste stream would no longer exist and be one less material for disposal. From a safety standpoint, this process involves concentrated acids that would no longer be required.
nsfstmgr <nsfstmgr@usap.gov>

To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

May 24, 2010 11:49 PM

I've been requested to notify the US Marshal's Service about an Information security incident at South Pole Station.

This is the first of three emails.

A Keylogger was found in the computer lab at South Pole on April 18, 2010. The IT staff at Pole were able to access Information stored on the Keylogger and found it had taken data in the timeframe of December 2009 through January 2010. They were also able to determine a name association with the device.

There will be three additional emails following this one.

If you have any questions please contact me at the phone numbers listed below or by email.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]
Information Technology in the Frozen Frontier
Wiring the 7th Continent for Science
Here is an update regarding the "Information Security Incident Detected at South Pole Station" I sent you on May 25, 2010.

Per email below:

Could you drop me a note so we can coordinate a time for me to call you and discuss the matter. I'm in a meeting tomorrow morning until 1200 your time. I'm free to discuss this anytime after that. McMurdo is currently 22 hours ahead of Hawaii.

Please include a phone number if you want me to call you.

Thanks,
Yesterday afternoon, All met with OGC and IRM to review the deliverable received and to discuss next steps. It was determined

We will reconvene early next week.

Thanks.

From: MCM-NSF Station Manager
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2010 3:48 PM
To: USMS) ·
Cc: ••• -@usdoj.gov; •••
Subject: 1 - Information Security Incident Detected at South Pole Station, Assistance Requested

I've been requested to notify the US Marshal's Service about an information security incident at South Pole Station.

This is the first of three emails.

A Keylogger was found in the computer lab at South Pole on April 18, 2010. The IT staff at Pole were able to access information stored on the Keylogger and found it had taken data in the timeframe of December 2009 through January 2010. They were also able to determine a name association with the device of a.
There will be three additional emails following this one.

If you have any questions please contact me at the phone numbers listed below or by email.

Thanks,

Begin forwarded message:

From: [mailto:1n{aillte:sent@nsf.gov]
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2010 3:22 AM
To: MCM-NSF Station Manager
Cc: [mailto:]
Subject: Notice of Action - Information Security Incident Detected at South Pole Station, requiring your attention

Importance: High

This email and all correspondence related to this activity are FOUO, so please restrict the distribution of information to those with a legitimate need to know.

Thanks and Best Regards,
Thanks for the response.

About the crucibles, they do have a high property value even though they are being retrograded back to the States. They are made from Platinum so their value is based on the market value of the precious metal. We do recover the cost of the metal when we sell them or trade them back to the lab equipment suppliers.

I’ve included the appropriate NSF people with the information regarding the ID Theft associated with the Key-log incident.

Thanks again,

On Jun 12, 2010, at 10:36 AM, [Name] (USMS) wrote:

I received a response from the US Attorney’s Office, Criminal Section, who stated that following:
I hope this helps. I will be out for the rest of the day so I will respond to any email on Tuesday.

Mahalo,

[Signature]

---

From: MCM-NSF Station Manager [mailto:mcm.nsfstmgr@usap.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2010 7:14 PM
To: [email protected] (USAIH); [email protected]; MCM-NSF Station Manager
Cc: [email protected] (USAHI)
Subject: RE: 1 - Information Security Incident Detected at South Pole Station, Assistance Requested

Here is an update regarding the "Information Security Incident Detected at South Pole Station" I sent you on May 25, 2010.

Could you drop me a note so we can coordinate a time for me to call you and discuss the matter. I'm in a meeting tomorrow morning until 1200 your time. I'm free to discuss this anytime after that. McMurdo is currently 22 hours ahead of Hawaii.

Please include a phone number if you want me to call you.

Thanks,

[Signature]

---

From: [mailto: youremail@nsf.gov]
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 3:10 AM
To: MCM-NSF Station Manager
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: FW: Interim deliverables from RPSC in response to keylogger follow-on
Importance: High

Attached is a partial deliverable from RPSC in response to our request for additional Information of May 21, which is synopsised below in e-mail. Items 2 and 3 of the request for additional Information remain unanswered and we have asked RPSC when we can expect that Information.

Yesterday afternoon, AIL met with OGC and IRM to review the deliverable received and to discuss next steps. It was determined...
We will reconvene early next week.

Thanks.

---

From: MCM-NSF Station Manager
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2010 3:48 PM
To: (USMS)  
Cc:  
Subject: 1 - Information Security Incident Detected at South Pole Station, Assistance Requested

I've been requested to notify the US Marshal's Service about an information security incident at South Pole Station.

This is the first of three emails.

A Keylogger was found in the computer lab at South Pole on April 18, 2010. The IT staff at Pole were able to access information stored on the Keylogger and found it had taken data in the timeframe of December 2009 through January 2010. They were also able to determine a name association with the device.

There will be three additional emails following this one.

If you have any questions please contact me at the phone numbers listed below or by email.

Thanks,

NSF Station Manager  
Phone:  
Email:  
Fax:  

Begin forwarded message:
From: [mailto: ]
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2010 3:22 AM
To: MCM-NSF Station Manager
Subject: Notice of Action - Information Security Incident Detected at South Pole Station, requiring your attention

Importance: High

has requested that I contact you to request your support in notifying the US Marshall’s Service about an information security incident that was uncovered at South Pole Station after station close. 

If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to let me know. Sorry to hit you with this cold.

This email and all correspondence related to this activity are FOUO, so please restrict the distribution of information to those with a legitimate need to know.

Thanks and Best Regards,

Manager, Technology Development, Antarctic Infrastructure & Logistics
National Science Foundation
4201 Wilson Blvd, Room 755
Arlington, VA 22230

Tel. 703-292-5700
Fax 703-292-9900
Email: [mailto: ]
WWW: http://www.usap.gov

Information Technology in the Frozen Frontier
Writing the 7th Continent for Science
I had thought that the US Marshals contacted.

Thanks, Larry

An attachment named spo-users-groups.zzz has been removed from this message because it contains potentially dangerous executable code.

Hope you are well. Wanted to check in on this keylogger matter. Is this the point of contact?

Thanks,

Please see the following update on the Keystroke Logger incident at South Pole Station.

This should close out the remainder of the information you requested in your email of June 12, 2010. "The completed investigations should be forwarded to me and I will deliver it to the USAO and they will review and determine what the next course of action will be."

Please drop me a note to provide status or if we need to provide any additional information.

Thanks,
To: MCM-NSF Station Manager
Cc: 
Subject: Update on South Pole Keystroke Logger
Importance: High

Regarding the keylogger matter, we have received the attached additional information from our contractor, RPSC.

We stand ready to assist the USMS and U.S. Attorney's office. We hope they can make contact with and question the previously identified person of interest as soon as possible. NSF has keen interest in determining whether additional information might have been captured or compromised and as such NSF would appreciate regular update on your progress.

If you have any questions please let us know.

Rgds,

Manager, Technology Development, Antarctic Infrastructure & Logistics
National Science Foundation
4201 Wilson Blvd, Room 765
Arlington, VA 22230

Tel. 703-292- 
Fax 703-292-
Email:
WWW: http://www.usap.gov

Information Technology in the Frozen Frontier
Writing the 7th Continent for Science
I've been requested to notify the US Marshal's Service about an information security incident at South Pole Station.

This is the first of three emails.

A Keylogger was found in the computer lab at South Pole on April 18, 2010. The IT staff at Pole were able to access information stored on the Keylogger and found it had taken data in the timeframe of December 2009 through January 2010. They were also able to determine a name association with the device of [redacted].

There will be three additional emails following this one.

If you have any questions please contact me at the phone numbers listed below or by email.

Thanks,
Begin forwarded message:

From: [mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto:[mailto逆向：
Information Technology in the Frozen Frontier
Wiring the 7th Continent for Science

2010-09 SP...zzz (506 KB)
GOOD EVENING, I WROTE THE CHIEF DEPUTY REGARDING A SITUATION IN MCMURDO. PLEASE FIND BELOW THE MAJORITY OF THAT EMAIL. I'VE ASKED FOR GUIDANCE FROM THE MARSHAL’S SERVICE AND ANYTHING YOU COULD ADD WOULD BE APPRECIATED. I BRIEFED [REDACTED] THIS EVENING ON THE PROBLEM.

NANA, A SUBCONTRACTOR FOR RAYTHEON POLAR SERVICES COMPANY HAS AN EMPLOYEE, [REDACTED], THAT IS EVIDENTLY BEING STALKED/Sексually harasses. LOCAL NANA MANAGEMENT TRIED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM INTERNALLY AND ADMINISTRATIVELY BUT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DISCOVER THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON HARASSING [REDACTED]. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ISSUE APPEARS TO BE ESCALATING.

THREE KNOWN INSTANCES HAVE OCCURRED TO DATE:

[REDACTED] STATES SHE DOES NOT KNOW THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON DOING THE HARASSMENT.

I MET WITH [REDACTED] IN MY ROLE AS NSF STATION MANAGER. I ADVISED HER THAT I WAS AVAILABLE TO START THE INITIAL STEPS FROM A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE IF SHE WANTED TO PURSUE THIS ISSUE CRIMINALLY. SHE DID NOT REPLY.

THANKS FOR YOUR ADVICE IN ADVANCE.
THANKS FOR THE RESPONSE. I WILL PASS THE INFORMATION ON TO THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION.

THANKS

Aloha-

Sorry for the late reply. Below is the reply I got back for the U.S. Attorney's Office. Let me know if you should need anything else.

Hi!

Can you respond to this follow-up with the NSF Station Manager?

Mahalo!
GOOD MORNING,

THANKS,

NSF STATION MANAGER

HI,

I am forwarding you this email I received yesterday from [redacted] the NSF Station Manager. Please review and advise your office position and how to proceed.

Mahalo,

Warrant Section / Hawaii Fugitive Task Force
District of Hawaii
Desk# (808) [redacted]
Cell# (808) [redacted]

GOOD AFTERNOON, I RECEIVED THE ATTACHED INFORMATION FROM THE PAE/ANTARCTIC SUPPORT CONTRACT HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGER. THE DOCUMENTS ARE A RESULT OF HER INVESTIGATION REGARDING THE APRIL 2012 ISSUE AT SOUTH POLE. COULD YOU SUBMIT THE DOCUMENTS TO THE USAHI?
Hi

My apologies, I thought I had sent this out last week to you and my corporate and LM but apparently it was not sent. I have not written up the summary yet as I have not discussed with LM. Please let me know if any questions.

Thanks,

Human Resources Manager
PAE / Antarctic Support Contract
1-720-568-2161 main

GOOD MORNING, JUST CHECKING ABOUT THE NOTES YOU WERE GOING TO FORWARD. I'D LIKE TO PROVIDE THE MARSHAL'S OFFICE WITH THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

THANKS,

Our satellite was down and I had things saved electronically. I'm still writing up all the notes from the various witnesses, and still have more that want to talk with me.

As an initial summary, has denied having any kind of forced relationship or sexual encounter with.
Witnesses (including the author, and others) say there was a relationship between the two and a couple of these people saw her leave his room on more than one occasion. The witnesses' account of dates do not all match up, some believe March some believe April or May, but most agree that the relationship ended around early June, around the same time as his 2nd or 3rd art history class.

and I spoke afterwards.

Again, I will provide very detailed notes after I finish talking with all. I will also be returning to McMurdo on tomorrow's flight.

Thanks,
This is my last correspondence with the Marshal’s Office concerning the South Pole issue. I emailed ASC’s HR person today regarding the files they were going to share.

Thank you.

From: [Email] (USMS) [mailto:usdoj.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, October 31, 2012 8:30 AM
To: [Email]; [Email]
Cc: MCM-NSF Station Manager; [Email] (USMS)
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON SOUTH POLE ISSUE

This appears to be a new case and the assault happened back in April 2012. I cc’d the address to [Email] who is the station manager, should be able to answer all your questions. Please let me know if you need me to do anything.

Mahalo.

From: [Email] (USAHI) [mailto:usdoj.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2012 9:04 AM
To: [Email]; [Email]
Subject: FW: UPDATE ON SOUTH POLE ISSUE

I am resending this message to you on behalf of [Email]

U.S. Attorney’s Office
District of Hawaii
300 Ala Moana Blvd., Rm. 6-100
Honolulu, HI 96850
Ph. (808) 541-2850 ext. [number]
Fax (808) 541-2958

From: [Email] (USAHI)
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2012 5:22 PM
To: [Email]; [Email]
Cc: [Email]
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON SOUTH POLE ISSUE

I no longer have a copy of the case report, if I ever did. We would have to review the case report to see if the case has any investigative merit.
We do not have anything regarding this matter.

U.S. Attorney's Office
District of Hawaii
300 Ala Moana Blvd., Rm. 6-100
Honolulu, HI 96850
Ph. (808) 541-2850 ext. 357
Fax (808) 541-2958

If we have this file, let me have it.

Please review the emails attached below and advise us how to processed.

Mahalo,

Warrant Section / Hawaii Fugitive Task Force
District of Hawaii
Desk# (808)
Cell# (808)

I believe this is a separate issue.

In September 2012, a woman at South Pole Station reported to her management that she was sexually assaulted (raped) back in April 2012 by a co-worker. At the time, she did not want to pursue the
ASSAULT CRIMINALLY. HER MANAGEMENT INFORMED ME OF THE SITUATION AND I CONTACTED [REDACTED] ASKED ME TO CONFIRM SHE DID NOT WANT TO PRESS CHARGES AND TO OBTAIN IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION ON THE SUSPECT. I SENT THE REQUESTED INFORMATION ON 29 SEPTEMBER.

I RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE VICTIM YESTERDAY. SHE IS NOW ASKING HOW SHE CAN PURSUE THIS CRIMINALLY.

SOUTH POLE STATION WENT INTO WINTER OPERATIONS ON 15 FEBRUARY 2012. DURING WINTER OPERATIONS, THERE ARE NO FLIGHTS ARRIVING OR DEPARTING THE STATION. CONSEQUENTLY, THE POPULATION REMAINS STATIC. A COUPLE SMALL PLANES HAVE TRANSITED THROUGH THE STATION IN THE LAST COUPLE WEEKS, BUT THE WINTER POPULATION HAS NOT CHANGED. THE STATION SHOULD GO INTO SUMMER ROUTINE AS EARLY AS TODAY BASED ON WEATHER AND AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY.

THANKS

From: [REDACTED] (USMS) [mailto: [REDACTED]usdoj.gov]
Sent: Friday, October 26, 2012 8:15 AM
To: MCM-NSF Station Manager
Cc: [REDACTED] (USMS)
Subject: RE: UPDATE ON SOUTH POLE ISSUE

Aloha,

Is this the same case that was reported to us back in January 2012?

Mahalo,

From: [REDACTED] (USMS)
Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2012 8:18 PM
To: [REDACTED] (USMS)
Subject: Re: UPDATE ON SOUTH POLE ISSUE

I'll make some calls tomorrow.

On Oct 24, 2012, at 7:57 PM, "[REDACTED] (USMS)" <[REDACTED]usdoj.gov> wrote:

Will do I will have our Enforcement Supervisor reach out to the US Attorneys Office and go from there...

From: MCM-NSF Station Manager [mailto: mcm.nsf@usap.gov]
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 1:50 AM
To: [REDACTED] (USMS)
Subject: UPDATE ON SOUTH POLE ISSUE

Mr.,

THE PERSON THAT REPORTED THE ASSAULT AT SOUTH POLE CALLED ME TODAY. SHE IS NOW CONSIDERING PURSUING THE ISSUE CRIMINALLY. FLIGHTS TO AND FROM SOUTH POLE STATION WILL RESUME PERHAPS AS EARLY AS THE END OF THIS WEEK, DEPENDING ON WEATHER AND AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY. SHE IS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO DEPART SOUTH POLE STATION[REDACTED] COULD YOU GIVE ME SOME GUIDANCE AS TO WHAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE OR WHO I CAN HAVE HER CONTACT.

THANKS