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Description of document: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) / Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) records regarding a Management Referral to the Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer (IC CIO) regarding an allegation of potential conflict or unnecessary redundancy between two information technology initiatives, Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) QUANTUM LEAP program and The National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) INITIATE program, 2012

Requested date: 28-March-2015

Released date: 17-May-2017

Posted date: 20-August-2018

Source of document: FOIA Request
FOIA/Privacy Act Office
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
Washington, DC 20511
Fax: (703) 275-1299
Email: DNI-FOIA@dni.gov

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

MAY 17 2017

Re: ODNI Case DF-2015-00162

This responds to your 28 March 2015 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for an ODNI OIG document... "*Management Referral to the IC CIO regarding an allegation of potential conflict or unnecessary redundancy between two information technology initiatives, CIA Quantum Leap program and NCTC's Initiate programs.*" The request was assigned ODNI case DF-2015-00162 (Enclosure 1).

Your request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. A thorough search of our databases located 12 documents responsive to your request (Enclosure 2).

Upon review, ODNI has determined that some information is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c), and therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1). In addition, some information is prohibited from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3), which applies to information exempt by statutes, specifically:

- 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1), which protects information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods, and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; and
- 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m)(1), which protects, among other things, the names and identifying information of ODNI personnel.

If you wish to appeal our determination on this request, please explain the basis of your appeal and forward to: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Information Management Division, Washington, DC 20511, within 90 days of the date of this letter.

However, you may find it helpful to contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

If you have any questions, feel free to email our Requester Service Center at DNI-FOIA@dni.gov or call us at (301) 243-1499. You can also contact ODNI's FOIA Liaison by email at DNI-FOIA-Liaison@dni.gov.

Sincerely,



Sally A. Nicholson
Chief, FOIA Branch
Information Management Division

Enclosures

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

2012-0343

MEMORANDUM FOR: (b) (3), Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Potential Conflicts or Redundancy between
INITIATE and QUANTUM LEAP

REFERENCES: (U) IC IG Management Referral, 29 June 2012

(U//FOUO) I am submitting the attached whitepaper in response to the IC IG Management Referral requesting IC CIO's assessment of a potential conflict or unnecessary redundancy between CIA's QUANTUM LEAP (QL) and NCTC's INITIATE programs. My primary finding is that redundant capabilities and data exist in the current information technology architecture of the two systems. The redundancy, however, is warranted in order to satisfy both mission needs of CIA and NCTC and their differing legal authorities to collect, process, exploit, and store US Persons and law enforcement-related data.

(U//FOUO) As the organization responsible for overall IT efficiencies, my office appreciates the IG bringing this matter to our attention. I believe the response addresses the concerns identified in the reference. If you have additional questions, my point of contact is (b) (3), Chief, Mission Services Branch. Her number is (b) (3).



Al Tarasiuk

15 Nov 2012

Date

Attachment:

1. (U) IC CIO QUANTUM LEAP and INITIATE Whitepaper (Classification:
SECRET//NOFORN)

Classified By: (b) (3)
Derived From: ODNI ANA S-08
Declassify On: 25X1

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO when separated from
attachments.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

IC IG Management Referral on QUANTUM LEAP and INITIATE

~~Purpose: (U//FOUO)~~ In response to the IC IG Management Referral received 29 June 2012, the IC CIO conducted an evaluation of a potential conflict or unnecessary redundancy between CIA's QUANTUM LEAP (QL) and NCTC's INITIATE programs. The IC CIO contacted NCTC and CIA to discuss the capabilities, technologies, data and management; and operations of these systems and determined that *NCTC's authorities to collect, process, exploit, and store US Persons and law enforcement related data influenced the development and implementation of the INITIATE program.*

~~Background: (S//NF)~~ CIA developed QL in 2003 [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[REDACTED] CIA developed Quantum Leap Intelligence eXchange (QLIX) to provide CIA's analysts self-service capabilities to search QL's holdings. [REDACTED] In response to gaps identified by the 12/25/2009 airline bombing attempt, the IC CIO funded CIA to make QLIX capabilities available to JWICS (QLIX-JWICS) users so that more IC users could benefit from QL's services and data. INITIATE provides NCTC users similar correlation services to match persons and entities, individually or in entire candidate datasets, usually containing known or suspected terrorists and events.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b(1)b(3)

~~Program Comparison: (S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~Primary Finding: (U//FOUO)~~ The INITIATE Program provides capabilities that are essential to NCTC to fulfill its counterterrorism mission. QL is currently unable to meet NCTC's needs. Redundant capabilities and data do however exist in the current information technology architectures of the two systems.

Classified By: ODNI
Derived From: ODNI ANA S-08
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20371024

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~



INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

29 June 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR: Hon. Aldolfo Tarasiuk, ADN/IC CIO

SUBJECT: IC IG Management Referral

REPLY TO: ~~b(3)~~, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

- ~~1. (U//FOUO) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) uses a Management Referral process to communicate and facilitate responses to IC IG observations, issues, contacts, data and information needs, or other requirements. These management referrals may be used to inform future inspections.~~
- ~~2. (U//FOUO) We received several contacts regarding two information technology initiatives within the NCTC. The concerns expressed suggest a potential conflict or unnecessary redundancy between the INITIATE and QUANTUM LEAP programs. The IC IG has not assessed or validated the above concerns.~~
- ~~3. (U//FOUO) As your office is responsible for overall information technology efficiencies within the IC and ODNI, we request that you assess the status of the program efforts regarding potential conflicts or redundancy and report back to our office in 90 days.~~
- ~~4. (U//FOUO) I can be reached at secure ~~b(3)~~ and stand ready to provide you with any guidance or assistance as needed.~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

28 Jun 12



From: [REDACTED] Subject: Management Referral on NCTC programs
 To: Adolfo Tarasiuk-Jr-DNI- [REDACTED]
 Assistant Inspector General for
 Inspections
 Office of the Inspector General
 Office of the Director of National
 Intelligence

CO-12-031

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
 Date: 06/29/2012 10:45 AM

This message is digitally signed.

History: This message has been forwarded.

AI, per our telecon this am. Please see attached memorandum. If you need more time, just let us know, but felt you should be aware and assess.

most regards and Happy 4th - [REDACTED]



CIO Management Referral_6-29-12FINAL.pdf
 Assistant Inspector General for Inspections
 Intelligence Community Office of the Inspector General

(b)(3)

ICE mail: [REDACTED]

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See CO-12-036 - [REDACTED], 11/29/12

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

28 Jun 12

Classified By: (b)(3)
Derived From: COL S-06
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: 20370629

(b)(3)



From: (b)(3) Subject: Re: Hotline Complaint Excerpt
Date: 06/29/2012 09:52 AM To: (b)(3)
Cc: (b)(3)

Ed,

Thanks. I appreciate your insight and interest.

Bill

Senior Investigator
Inspector General, Intelligence Community

(b)(3)

(b)(3) Per discussion this is not detail enough for (b)(3) 06/29/2012 08:32:30 AM

(b)(3)

From: (b)(3)
To: (b)(3)
Cc: (b)(3)
Date: 06/29/2012 08:32 AM
Subject: Re: Hotline Complaint Excerpt

Per discussion this is not detail enough for an inspection at this time.

However, NCTC has been living off of CIA's CWE and to me this appears an attempt by NCTC to move onto their own system.

I'll contact the IC CIO and provide him an understanding of concerns over the two systems and request he assess and get back to us.

We'll note this information for consideration during the course of any NCTC component inspection or as other info comes in work with audits as necessary.

regards (b)(3)

Assistant Inspector General for Inspections
Intelligence Community Office of the Inspector General

(b)(3)

ICE mail (b)(3)@ (b)(3)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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b(3)

Dear Audit & Inspection Management Teams,...

-06/28/2012 03:11:59 PM

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3)
 Derived From: COL S-06
 Reason: 1.4(c)
 Declassify On: 20370629

From: (b)(3)
 Date: 06/20/2012 09:48 AM

Subject: Re: management not letting employees know about Pat Roberts Intelligence scholarship internal deadlines , meaning their employees were not able to apply in time

To: [REDACTED]
 Bcc: [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

This responds to your June 6 and June 22 emails to the IG Hotline, and follows up on your comments given to OIG investigators during a March 16 interview.

First, let me advise you that the concern you brought up in your June 22 email regarding IIG handling of the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholarship Program announcement is not a matter the OIG would address. I suggest you forward that matter to the ODNI Employee Relations Officer per ODNI Instruction 74.01, 'Grievance Resolution.'

Second, and more importantly, we appreciate your concerns about waste regarding the procurement of INITIATE. While the appropriateness of that procurement is not suitable as an IG investigation, I believe it's worth consideration as an IC IG audit or inspection. Therefore, I have forwarded your concerns about that matter to the Chiefs of IC IG Audits and Inspections Divisions. Note that I did not include your name with the information I sent however, I told each chief that I have the name of the informant. If an Audit or Inspections team member wishes to speak with you, I will first contact you see if you will allow me to provide your name.

Please realize that I cannot assure you of an immediate response by either the Auditors or the Inspectors because each office has several projects scheduled. However, I have been assured that both offices will carefully weigh what you have presented to determine if and when an audit or inspection is appropriate.

Thank you,

[REDACTED]
 Inspector General, Intelligence Community

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Hello, I'm not sure this rises to the level of y... -06/22/2012 11:56:31 AM

From: [REDACTED]
 To: ICIG-Invest
 Date: 06/22/2012 11:56 AM
 Subject: management not letting employees know about Pat Roberts Intelligence scholarship internal deadlines, meaning their employees were not able to apply in time

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Hello,

I'm not sure this rises to the level of your office but recently the ODNI put out a notice about the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholarship Program (PRISP). ODNI communicated a deadline to the workforce, but my component within NCTC had its own deadline.

This internal deadline was not communicated to the workforce by our group management, NCTC/DI/IIG (Information Integration Group), which has more than one ODNI cadre under it. This meant when I applied, it was too late.

The NCTC Directorate of Intelligence Front Office had already made its choices of who was going to be nominated but my managers never let me know about any internal deadline. I therefore missed a deadline I didn't know about.

This seems a continuation of a pattern where IIG management does not prioritize taking care of its people. It seems to place more value on overselling a system they secured funding for that is inferior—it will identify fewer terrorists—to another system at another agency that we are able to use. The system IIG management is pushing so hard is called Initiate. The better system, which identifies more terrorists, is called Quantum Leap. Building and now pushing Initiate wastes money and doesn't help integrate IC IT infrastructure. In other words, IIG managers spend most of their time marketing a system they built that isn't as good as a system already built. Personnel like (b)(3) can provide additional information.

Thank you.

(b)(3)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

28 Jun 12

Classified By: b(3)
 Derived From: COL S-06
 Reason: 1.4(c)
 Declassify On: 20370628

From: [REDACTED] Subject: Hotline Complaint Excerpt
 Date: 06/28/2012 03:11 PM To: [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED]

Dear Audit & Inspection Management Teams,

Remember, I'm a new guy, so I get to try stuff out...

The following are excerpts from recent Hotline complaints from the same employee. While he identified minor HR-focused issues that I've handled through separate channels he always comes back to the point that the Information Integration Group (IIG) procurement of INITIATE instead of QUANTUM LEAP is wasteful. We have now received three separate complaints about the same matter from the same employee. (I understand that b(3) sent a copy of the first complaint to Inspections on March 20th. It is no differs very little from the following two excerpts.)

The practicality of procuring INITIATE or QUANTUM LEAP does not lend itself to IG investigation. Therefore, I am forwarding the matter to your offices for consideration as a future Audit or Inspection topic. Please let me know if you have any interest in this matter. I will be happy to provide you with the name of the complainant, who I'm sure will be happy to cooperate with any OIG action. The two excerpts:

1. Management of b(3) in NCTC's Directorate of Intelligence recently received funds from NCIX for a system that is inferior to another available in the IC. This other system is called Quantum Leap. The IIG managers do not seem interested in results or details, they only want to garner money to advance the marketing and development of a system that we analysts know is inferior, keeps getting delayed, and whose results they seem to massage. Why? We're not sure. It may be vanity, ego, personal advancement (looking good) or maybe fear that they've spent a lot of money and need to justify it. They are briefing NCTC seniors, busy people who don't have time to look into the details, and generally paint a rosy picture. We analysts know that Quantum Leap is vastly better at identifying people with terrorism connections and this would be the same case for CI subjects. Quantum Leap accesses more data, has had 10 years to refine itself, and actively solicits feedback to continually be improved. The IIG-backed system cannot do most of the things Quantum Leap can, yet it is touted as a success.

If it is an ODNI priority not to stovepipe IT development and to have a common IT infrastructure as much as possible, I hope you can look into this because those of us responsible for making findings want to use the best tools and not miss anything. IIG management is pulling the wool over senior NCTC management's eyes, and pushing a system that will deliver inferior national security. If the idea is to prevent another Detroit airliner bomber (2009), the software b(3) and b(3) are pushing will not do it. They are making promises, but the system is inferior and spending money on it seems redundant. There is another, better system, more fully developed.

Other analysts in IIG feel the same way, but they are assignees to NCTC from DHS.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Contractors here in IIG also share these views.

2. This seems a continuation of a pattern where IIG management does not prioritize taking care of its people. It seems to place more value on overselling a system they secured funding for that is inferior--it will identify fewer terrorists--to another system at another agency that we are able to use. The system IIG management is pushing so hard is called Initiate. The better system, which identifies more terrorists, is called Quantum Leap. Building and now pushing Initiate wastes money and doesn't help integrate IC IT infrastructure. In other words, IIG managers spend most of their time marketing a system they built that isn't as good as a system already built. Personnel like **(b)(3)** can provide additional information.

(b)(3)
Hotline Manager/Senior Investigator
Inspector General, Intelligence Community

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED] Subject: management not letting employees know about Pat
LX-2, 1A-139, 917-2210 (Secure) Roberts Intelligence scholarship internal deadlines
703-275-2210 (Comm) meaning their employees were not able to apply in time
To: ICIG-Invest
Date: 06/22/2012 11:56 AM

This message is digitally signed.

Hello,

I'm not sure this rises to the level of your office but recently the ODNI put out a notice about the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholarship Program (PRISP). ODNI communicated a deadline to the workforce, but my component within NCTC had its own deadline.

This internal deadline was not communicated to the workforce by our group management, NCTC/DI/IIG (Information Integration Group), which has more than one ODNI cadre under it. This meant when I applied, it was too late.

The NCTC Directorate of Intelligence Front Office had already made its choices of who was going to be nominated but my managers never let me know about any internal deadline. I therefore missed a deadline I didn't know about.

This seems a continuation of a pattern where IIG management does not prioritize taking care of its people. It seems to place more value on overselling a system they secured funding for that is inferior—it will identify fewer terrorists—to another system at another agency that we are able to use. The system IIG management is pushing so hard is called Initiate. The better system, which identifies more terrorists, is called Quantum Leap. Building and now pushing Initiate wastes money and doesn't help integrate IC IT infrastructure. In other words, IIG managers spend most of their time marketing a system they built that isn't as good as a system already built. Personnel like [REDACTED] can provide additional information.

Thank you.

(b)(3)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

#2

(b)(3)



(b)(3)

From: [Redacted] Subject: follow up to concerns sent on Web form regarding [Redacted]
LX-2, 1A-139, 917-2210 (Secure [Redacted])
703-275-2210 (Comm.) To: ICIG-Invest

Date: 06/06/2012 01:01 PM

This message is digitally signed.

Hi. I've contacted your office via your web application on this same matter, but wanted to add something. I don't think this falls under anything criminal, but it does concern me. I couldn't say whether it fits more under fraud, waste, or abuse. Maybe a little of each.

Management of the Information Integration Group (IIG) (b)(3) in NCTC's Directorate of Intelligence recently received funds from NCIX for a system that is inferior to another available in the IC. This other system is called Quantum Leap. The IIG managers do not seem interested in results or details, they only want to garner money to advance the marketing and development of a system that we analysts know is inferior, keeps getting delayed, and whose results they seem to massage. Why? We're not sure. It may be vanity, ego, personal advancement (looking good) or maybe fear that they've spent a lot of money and need to justify it. They are briefing NCTC seniors, busy people who don't have time to look into the details, and generally paint a rosy picture. We analysts know that Quantum Leap is vastly better at identifying people with terrorism connections and this would be the same case for CI subjects. Quantum Leap accesses more data, has had 10 years to refine itself, and actively solicits feedback to continually be improved. The IIG-backed system cannot do most of the things Quantum Leap can, yet it is touted as a success.

If it is an ODNI priority not to stovepipe IT development and to have a common IT infrastructure as much as possible, I hope you can look into this because those of us responsible for making findings want to use the best tools and not miss anything. IIG management is pulling the wool over senior NCTC management's eyes, and pushing a system that will deliver inferior national security. If the idea is to prevent another Detroit airliner bomber (2009), the software (b)(3) and (b)(3) are pushing will not do it. They are making promises, but the system is inferior and spending money on it seems redundant. There is another, better system, more fully developed.

Other analysts in IIG feel the same way, but they are assignees to NCTC from DHS. Contractors here in IIG also share these views.

Thank you.

(b)(3)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: b(3)
 Derived From: COL C-06
 Reason: 1.4(c)
 Declassify On: 20370618



From: b(3) Investigator
 DNI/ODNI
 Date: 06/18/2012 10:23 AM
 Subject: Fw: reading other people 's emails without permission / not for security reasons
 To: b(3)

This message is digitally signed.

History: This message has been replied to.

Bill,

This is the last of saw on this one.

----- Forwarded by b(3) 06/18/2012 10:22 AM -----

From: b(3)
 To: b(3)
 Cc: b(3)
 Date: 06/06/2012 02:40 PM
 Subject: Re: Fw: reading other people's emails without permission / not for security reasons

(b)(3)

Let's figure out how we want to append b(3) original offering with his most recent and refer it to Inspections. It seems that there is a desire or rudimentary practice of sending memo's between divisions, specifically AIG's. I'm just sayin'.

Regards,

B(3)

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b(3)

Here is the action we took on the b(3) to b(3) 06/06/2012 01:35:18 PM

From: b(3)
 To: b(3)
 Cc: b(3)
 Date: 06/06/2012 01:35 PM
 Subject: Fw: reading other people's emails without permission / not for security reasons

(b)(3)

Here is the action we took on the b(3) complaint.

b(3)

----- Forwarded by b(3) on 06/06/2012 01:34 PM -----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: [REDACTED]
 To: [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Date: 03/20/2012 02:10 PM
 Subject: Fw: reading other people's emails without permission / not for security reasons

Hi [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

On 16 March, Lisa and I interviewed the complainant below. Investigations does not have an interest in this because the emails were not obtained inappropriately; however [REDACTED] raised additional concerns which you may want to address during your future NCTC Inspection. According to [REDACTED], NCTC, is building a system similar to a CIA system. NCTC currently pays for contract support for the CIA system, and according to [REDACTED] the CIA System is a much more robust. [REDACTED] considers building an additional system a waste of government funds.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

If you have questions, please contact Lisa or me.

Thanks Ed,

--- Forwarded by [REDACTED] on 03/20/2012 02:01 PM ---

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]
 To: ICIG-Invest
 Date: 03/01/2012 05:39 PM
 Subject: reading other people's emails without permission / not for security reasons

Good afternoon. I'm not sure if yours is the appropriate office to raise the following issue. It seems, without my knowing the definitions, perhaps a case of abuse or misconduct.

My current supervisor (since Summer 2011), group chief of the NCTC/DI/Information Integration Group (IIG) told me earlier this week that he had requested a series of emails I sent others (not him), before I worked for him, in which I had cc'd my then supervisor. The emails go back to 2009.

The emails were submissions for D/NCTC's biweekly News from the Front Office notes to the NCTC workforce; they trumpeted accomplishments of individual members of our unit. Some are classified. The content of the emails was in the best spirit of maintaining high morale and retention, so I am not embarrassed by any of it. To the best of my knowledge, none of the notes recognizing achievements were controversial or contested.

To me, and apparently my supervisor then, it was wholly appropriate for me to send these. I was overseeing the work of some twenty people, and in a position to recognize individual contributions, and my current boss wasn't my supervisor at the time or in my leadership chain or involved with receiving or reviewing these submissions. In case it is relevant, our office has a policy in which my current boss would like to send such things, which I have followed.

This seems a violation of my privacy and perhaps questionable behavior from a professional, or perhaps misconduct or abuse. I feel like he violated my privacy and our trust. Can you please let me know what the appropriate step(s) is (are) at this point? Thank you.

(b)(3)

[REDACTED] ODNI/NCTC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~