

governmentattic.org

"Rummaging in the government's attic"

Description of document: Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Charters

for six (6) Subcommittees and one (1) Interagency Working

Group, 2007-2017

Requested date: 14-September-2017

Released date: 31-October-2017

Posted date: 08-October-2018

Source of document: FOIA Request

Office of Science and Technology Policy

Attn: FOIA Officer

1650 Pennsylvania Ave, NW Washington, DC 20504 Fax: (202) 395-1224

Email: ostpfoia@ostp.eop.gov

The governmentattic.org web site ("the site") is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20502

October 31, 2017

Re: OSTP-FOIA-17-129

This letter responds to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted to the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) on September 14, 2017. Specifically, the request sought "a copy of the Charter document for" the following "subcommittees/interagency working groups of the NSTC Committee on Homeland & National Security:"

- BDRD: Biological Defense Research & Development (Subcommittee)
- CDRD: Chemical Defense Research & Development (Subcommittee)
- CISR: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Subcommittee)
- DAMIEN: Detecting & Mitigating the Impact of Earth-Bound Near Earth Objects (Interagency Working Group)
- NDRD: Nuclear Defense Research & Development (Subcommittee)
- SOS-CBRNE: Standards (Subcommittee)

Following receipt of this request, OSTP performed a search of its files and located 8 documents totaling 28 pages. After reviewing the documents, OSTP determined that the information contained in the documents should be released in full. Please find copies of the responsive documents attached. Please note that with regard to the portion of your request seeking records for "CISR: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience," OSTP was only able to locate a draft version of the charter for this group that was established during the Obama Administration. Prior administrations' email records have been transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) or the relevant presidential library. To conduct searches of prior administrations' records, please contact NARA or the relevant presidential library.

Accordingly, this completes the processing of the request and OSTP now considers the request closed. Pursuant to the FOIA and OSTP regulations, a requester may submit a written appeal contesting any adverse determination.² Any appeal related to the processing of this request must either be sent: 1) via e-mail to OSTPFOIA@ostp.eop.gov; or 2) by mail to Chief FOIA Officer, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Eisenhower Executive Office Building, 1650 Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20504.³ In the appeal letter, please specify OSTP Control No. 17-129,

¹ 5 U.S.C. § 552.

² 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)(III)(aa); 32 C.F.R. § 2402.7(a).

³ 32 C.F.R. § 2402.7(b).

"the records requested, and the basis for the appeal." Any appeal must be sent to the above listed addresses no later than ninety (90) calendar days of the date of this letter. 5

Requesters also have the right to seek dispute resolution services from OSTP's FOIA Public Liaison or the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). To employ these services, please contact Andrew Mendoza via telephone at (202) 456-4444 or by way of e-mail at OSTPFOIA@ostp.eop.gov. To contact OGIS, please use any of the following means:

Office of Government Information Services National Archives and Records Administration 8601 Adelphia Road-OGIS College Park, MD 20740-6001 E-mail: ogis@nara.gov

Telephone: (202) 741-5770 Fax: (202) 741-5769

Toll-free: 1 (877) 684-6448

Finally, for fee purposes this request was classified as "non-commercial." As such, fees are assessed for search time exceeding two hours and duplication costs beyond the first 100 pages of copies or its equivalent. No search or duplication fees, however, may be charged "if the agency has failed to comply with any time limit" associated with responding to a request. Accordingly, no fees are due for the processing of this request.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me via telephone or by way of e-mail.

Sincerely,

Andrew G. Mendoza

Legal Counsel and Policy Advisor

⁴ Id.

⁵ 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)(III)(aa).

^{6 32} C.F.R. § 2402.8(b)(1)(iii).

⁷ Id. at § 2402.8(b)(1)(iii), (3).

^{8 5} U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(viii)(I).



CHARTER of the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

A. Official Designation

The Subcommittee on Biological Defense Research and Development (BDRD) is hereby established by action of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), Committee on Homeland and National Security (CHNS).

B. Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the BDRD is to provide all relevant Federal agencies a focused forum for coordinating and collaborating on defensive research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) addressing biological threats to national security, including known biological threat (bacteria/viruses/fungi/toxins) and emerging infectious disease agents that have the potential to significantly affect the environment, plants, animals, and humans both within the United States and throughout the globe. These efforts will provide the United States Government with an improved capability to predict, detect, warn, diagnose, project impact, respond, recover, and attribute causative biological agents due to natural incidents, accidental release, or a deliberate attack. In addition, the BDRD will coordinate biosecurity outreach and biosafety activities across the Federal government.

C. Functions

The BDRD will:

- 1. coordinate Federal interagency RDT&E programs on biological threat and emerging infectious disease agents in plants, animals, and humans to promote complementary efforts, encourage interagency collaboration, and leverage subject matter expertise across the Federal government;
- 2. facilitate the development of a National RDT&E Strategy to Enable Global Biosurveillance in order to coordinate interagency RDT&E efforts to develop capabilities aimed at improving the Nation's ability to:
 - a. characterize normal disease behavior in ecologies and populations to allow for rapid identification of departures from the norm;
 - b. predict, where possible, the emergence of a significant biological threat or disease;
 - c. provide timely warning and projections to decision makers;
 - d. detect biological agents and/or diagnose disease in the field or at point of care;

- e. integrate information from a variety of data sources;
- f. provide near real-time situational awareness as an incident evolves;
- g. attribute the origin of a biological threat or disease incident; and
- h. ensure a rapid, nimble, and effective response capability.
- 3. coordinate interagency microbial forensics RDT&E in order to provide the United States Government with scientifically sound and statistically defensible assessment and attribution capabilities;
- 4. coordinate interagency outreach and educational programs that inform scientists and the public on laboratory biosecurity and biosafety (biological risk management) and related issues;
- 5. initiate a policy coordination process to develop a comprehensive and coordinated policy for oversight of laboratory biosafety and biocontainment;
- 6. provide input, based on the best science available, to biological incident response and recovery planning guidance and public messaging; and where gaps in science exist, coordinate interagency RDT&E to fill those gaps;
- 7. promote the sharing of biological defense RDT&E test facilities, methodologies, and data; and
- 8. establish topical working groups, as required, to meet the described functions.

The BDRD will recommend action on major policy and R&D issues to the CHNS for approval.

D. Membership

The following NSTC departments and agencies are represented on the BDRD:

Department of Agriculture;

Department of Commerce;

Department of Defense;

Department of Energy;

Department of Health and Human Services;

Department of Homeland Security;

Department of the Interior;

Department of Justice;

Department of State;

Department of Transportation;

Department of Treasury;

Department of Veterans Affairs;

Director of National Intelligence;

Central Intelligence Agency;

Environmental Protection Agency;

National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and

National Science Foundation.

The following organizations in the Executive Office of the President are also represented in the BDRD:

National Security Staff;

Office of Management and Budget; and Office of Science and Technology Policy (Chair).

Cooperating departments and agencies shall include such other Executive organizations, departments, and agencies as the subcommittee designates.

E. Private-Sector Interface

The BDRD may work with the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology to secure appropriate private-sector advice, and will recommend to the CHNS and/or the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy the nature of additional private-sector advice needed to accomplish its mission. The BDRD may also interact with and receive *ad hoc* advice from various private-sector groups as consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

F. Termination Date

Unless renewed by the Co-chairs of the CHNS, the BDRD shall terminate no later than July 15, 2016.

G. Determination

Under Secretary for Science and Technology,

Department of Homeland Security

Approved:

I hereby determine that the establishment of the Subcommittee on Biological Defense Research and Development is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the Executive Branch by law, and that such duties can best be performed through the advice and counsel of such a group.

Des C	
Thyrifeel	7-12-11
Philip Coyle	Date
Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and	
Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs,	
Office of Science and Technology Policy	
Zachary Lemnio. Cook in Compaint of Mendand and National Society and	7/R/2011 Date
Colchir, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and	
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,	
Department of Defense	
Yan O'Toul	7/13/11
Tara O'Toole	Date
Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and	



CHARTER of the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CHEMICAL DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

A. Official Designation

The Subcommittee on Chemical Defense Research and Development (CDRD) is hereby established by action of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Committee on Homeland and National Security (CHNS). For the purposes of the CDRD, chemical threats may include toxic industrial chemicals, traditional chemical warfare agents, and non-traditional chemical agents (NTA).

B. Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the CDRD is to coordinate Federal interagency defensive research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) addressing chemical threats to national security. The CDRD will also provide an interagency perspective on the characterization and prioritization of the chemical threat and will identify intelligence support needs and gaps.

C. Functions

The primary functions of the CDRD include, but are not limited to the following:

- 1. Coordinate defensive RDT&E of all aspects of potential chemical threats by considering all routes of exposure and all media types (clinical samples, food, water, environmental) where applicable, including agent characterization, toxicology, detection and forensic analysis, measurement and decontamination techniques, physical protection, and medical countermeasures (specifically for NTAs);
- 2. Provide the Office of the Director of National Intelligence with identified intelligence support needs and gaps concerning chemical threats;
- 3. Oversee the execution of the 2010 National NTA RDT&E Strategy (the Strategy);
- 4. Review the Strategy annually and update as necessary;
- 5. Report annually to the CHNS on progress towards the full implementation of the Strategy. The annual review shall encompass the most current status of agency projects and where necessary, make recommendations to the departments and agencies and/or to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding the need to modify or accelerate efforts and associated resource requirements;

- 6. Review annually the OMB-approved NTA Security Classification guide and make recommendations for modification, as necessary, to ensure that it adequately addresses classification issues for NTA RDT&E;
- 7. Continually assess current, near-, and long-term capabilities needed by the Nation to counter the use of chemical threat agents against both homeland and overseas U.S. military interests;
- 8. Develop a mechanism for peer review of classified defensive chemical threat agent RDT&E across the Federal government;
- 9. Provide input, based on the best science available, to policy discussions on public messaging in the event of a chemical incident.

D. Chairs and Membership

The following NSTC departments and agencies are represented on the CDRD:

Department of Agriculture;

Department of Defense (Co-chair);

Department of Energy;

Department of Health and Human Services;

Department of Homeland Security (Co-chair);

Department of Justice;

Central Intelligence Agency;

Environmental Protection Agency; and

Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The following organizations in the Executive Office of the President are also represented in the CDRD:

National Security Council;

Office of Management and Budget; and

Office of Science and Technology Policy (Co-chair).

Cooperating departments and agencies shall include such other Executive organizations, departments, and agencies as the Co-Chairs may designate.

E. Private Sector Interface

The CDRD may work with the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology to secure appropriate private-sector advice, and will recommend to the CHNS and/or the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy the nature of additional private sector advice needed to accomplish its mission. The SCT may also interact with and receive *ad hoc* advice from various private-sector groups as consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

F. Termination Date

Unless renewed by the Co-chairs of the CHNS, the CDRD shall terminate no later than February 28, 2016.

G. Determination

I hereby determine that the establishment of the Subcommittee on Chemical Defense Research and Development is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the Executive Branch by law, and that such duties can best be performed through the advice and counsel of such a group.

Approved:

Philip Coyle

Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, Office of Science and Technology Policy

04/01/2011:

Zachary Lemnios
Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,

Department of Defense

Tara O'Toole

Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and Under Secretary for Science and Technology,

Department of Homeland Security

DRAFT | DELIBERATIVE | PRE-DECISIONAL



CHARTER of the

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE SUBCOMMITTEE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY
NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

A. Official Designation

The Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (CISR) Subcommittee is hereby established, by action of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC); Committee on Homeland and National Security (CHNS).

B. Purpose and Scope

In February 2013, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21) and Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. The coordinated release of these two policies underscores the Administration's commitment to integrating cyber and physical security and strengthening resilience across critical infrastructure systems.

As stated in PPD-21, "The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Sector-Specific Agencies, Department of Commerce, and other Federal departments and agencies, shall provide input to align those Federal and Federally-funded research and development (R&D) activities that seek to strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure." To facilitate this interagency coordination, the Federal CISR R&D community will convene under the NSTC CISR Subcommittee with appropriate input from the private sector. The CISR Subcommittee will draw on critical infrastructure subject matter experts and thought leaders with national perspective and the skills to formulate critical infrastructure research and development requirements to meet future needs with the goal of enhancing security and resilience.

C. Functions

The CISR Subcommittee shall, within 180 days, for the NSTC, develop a National CISR R&D Implementation Roadmap (Roadmap), with input from interagency stakeholders. The Roadmap will recommend CISR R&D community activities to achieve the goals identified in the National CISR R&D Plan and identify key deliverables for aligning CISR R&D activities. The Roadmap will define technical and programmatic metrics across the National CISR R&D Priority Areas, which will provide a means to track the progress of the Roadmap.

DRAFT | DELIBERATIVE | PRE-DECISIONAL

The CISR Subcommittee will also align Federal R&D planning within the National CISR R&D Priority Areas, work with partners and stakeholders to share information and ensure coordination and integration of efforts to advance the National CISR R&D Priority Areas, and identify legal and other barriers that may impede progress aligned with the Roadmap. The CISR Subcommittee will work closely with the CISR Interagency Policy Committee under the National Security Council and the National Coordinating Office for the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) to ensure robust information sharing and activity coordination.

Lastly, the CISR Subcommittee shall review, update, and issue the National CISR R&D Plan and Implementation Roadmap every 4 years, with interim updates as needed.

D. Membership and Structure

The following NSTC departments and agencies are represented on the CISR Subcommittee:

Department of Agriculture;

Department of Commerce;

Department of Defense;

Department of Energy;

Department of Health and Human Services;

Department of Homeland Security (Co-chair);

Department of Justice;

Department of State;

Department of the Treasury;

Department of Transportation;

Environmental Protection Agency;

Federal Communications Commission;

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;

General Services Administration:

National Science Foundation; and

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The following components of the Executive Office of the President are also represented on the CISR Subcommittee:

National Security Council Staff;

Office of Management and Budget; and

Office of Science and Technology Policy (Co-chair).

Cooperating departments and agencies shall include such other Executive branch organizations, departments, and agencies as the CISR Subcommittee Co-chairs may, from time to time, designate.

In addition to two permanent Co-chairs (DHS and OSTP), the subcommittee shall have an additional Co-chair that rotates annually. The third Co-chair shall be drawn from CISR subcommittee membership and selected annually by the two permanent Co-chairs.

DRAFT | DELIBERATIVE | PRE-DECISIONAL

E. Private-Sector Interface

The CISR Subcommittee may seek advice from the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) and CIPAC and will recommend to the CHNS and/or the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology the nature of any additional private-sector¹ advice needed to accomplish its mission. The CISR Subcommittee may also interact with and receive *ad hoc* advice from various private-sector groups as consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).

F. Termination

Unless renewed by the Co-chairs of the CHNS prior to its expiration, the CISR Subcommittee shall terminate no later than March 20, 2017.

G. Determination

I hereby determine that establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Subcommittee under the National Science and Technology Council is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the Executive Branch by law, and that such duties can best be performed through the advice and counsel of such a group.

¹ The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App., as amended, does not explicitly define "private-sector," but the phrase is generally understood to include individuals or entities outside the Federal government such as, but not limited to, the following: non-Federal sources, academia, State, local or Tribal governments, individual citizens, the public, non-governmental organizations, industry associations, and international bodies.



CHARTER of the

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP FOR DETECTING AND MITIGATING THE IMPACT
OF EARTH-BOUND NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY
NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

A. Official Designation

The Interagency Working Group (IWG) for Detecting and Mitigating the Impact of Earth-bound Near-Earth Objects (NEOs)¹ (DAMIEN) is hereby established by action of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), Committee on Homeland and National Security (CHNS). This Interagency Working Group will generally be referred to as the DAMIEN-IWG.

B. Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the DAMIEN-IWG, a working group under the National Science Technology Council (NSTC) Committee for Homeland and National Security (CHNS), is to serve as an interagency body to define, coordinate, and oversee goals and programmatic priorities of Federal science and technology activities related to potentially hazardous or Barth-impacting NEOs, including prediction and National Preparedness capabilities.

The DAMIEN-IWG will also provide NEO Earth-impact response and recovery input into the National Planning Framework, called for by the Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8): *National Preparedness* (2011)² and National critical infrastructure resilience initiatives outlined in PPD-21: *Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience* (2013)³.

¹ Potentially Hazardous NEOs: Non-manmade objects in space (e.g. asteroids or comets) whose orbits around the Sun bring them within approximately 7.5 million kilometers (4.65 million miles) of Earth (making eventual collision a possibility) and with a diameter larger than 140 meters.

² Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8); National Preparedness (2011)

³ PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (2013)

C. Functions

The DAMIEN-IWG, in coordination with other Subcommittees under CHNS; the Committee on Environment, Natural Resources, and Sustainability (CENRS); the Committee on Science (CoS); and other relevant Federal working groups and agencies, shall:

- Assess the status and viability of interagency efforts that enhance and extend scientific
 research, technical development and operational capability for potentially hazardous or
 Earth-impacting NEO detection, characterization, and monitoring; modeling tools; advanced warning capabilities, and mitigation approaches;
- Define the types NEO Earth-impact events and assist their incorporation into Federal emergency preparedness, planning, scenarios, training, and exercises;
- Identify and assist interagency efforts to establish Federal and non-Federal stakeholder collaborations to enhance and extend systems for detection, characterization, and monitoring; and networks and data management activities;
- Develop a National NBO Preparedness Strategy (NNPS), within nine months of the signing of this charter. The NNPS will articulate strategic goals for extending and enhancing prediction (detection, characterization, and monitoring) and National Preparedness (protection, mitigation, response, and recovery) for potentially hazardous or Earth-impacting NEOs. The NNPS will also set the approach for establishing reference NEO Earth-impact scenarios;
- Develop a NEO Preparedness Action Plan (NPAP) within fourteen months of the signing
 of this charter. The NPAP shall establish actions, timelines, and milestones for the implementation of the NNPS. The DAMIEN-IWG or CHNS will review the implementation
 progress of the plan annually, or as needed; and
- Work with other NSTC bodies to identify and assess efforts to international cooperation in NEO impact threat prediction and preparedness, including strategic communications; the exchange of data, information, models, and research personnel; joint research, planning, and exercises; and creating new or joint programs.

All formal recommendations will be provided to the Co-Chairs of the CHNS and/or the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

D. Membership

The following NSTC departments and agencies are represented in the DAMIEN-IWG:

Department of Commerce⁴

⁴ Specifically but not exclusively to include: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Institute of Standards and Technology

- Department of Defense⁵
- Department of Energy⁶
- Department of Homeland Security⁷
- Department of the Interior⁸
- Department of State
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Co-Chair)
- National Science Foundation
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence

The following components of the Executive Office of the President shall also be represented on the DAMIEN-IWG:

- · National Security Council
- · Office of Management and Budget
- Office of Science and Technology Policy (Co-chair)

Cooperating departments and agencies shall include such other Executive organizations, departments, and agencies as the CHNS Chair and/or DAMIEN-IWG Co-Chairs may designate, as appropriate. The DAMIEN-IWG will also strive to enhance the Federal research and development enterprise by embracing diversity, recognizing that inclusion of a broad range of backgrounds and perspectives is critical to achieving robust intellectual dialogue.

E. Private Sector Interface

The DAMIEN-IWG may seek advice from the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and will recommend to CHNS and/or the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology the nature of additional non-Federal and private-sector⁹ advice needed to accomplish its mission. The DAMIEN-IWG may also interact with and receive *ad hoc* advice from various non-Federal and private sector groups as consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).

F. Termination Date

Unless renewed by the Co-chairs of CHNS prior to its expiration, the DAMIEN-IWG shall terminate no later than March 31, 2017.

⁵ Specifically but not exclusively to include: Department of the Air Force, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and United States Strategic Command

⁶ Specifically but not exclusively to include: National Nuclear Security Administration

⁷ Specifically but not exclusively to include: Federal Emergency Management Agency

⁸ Specifically but not exclusively to include: United States Geological Survey

⁹ The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App., as amended, does not explicitly define "private-sector," but the phrase is generally understood to include individuals or entities outside the Federal government such as, but not limited to, the following: non-Federal sources, academia, State, local or Tribal governments, individual citizens, the public, non-governmental organizations, industry associations, international bodies.

G. Determination

Under Secretary for Science and Technology,

Department of Homeland Security

I hereby determine that the establishment of the Interagency Working Group for Detecting and Mitigating the Impact of Earth-bound NEOs is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the Executive Branch by law, and that such duties can best be performed through the advice and counsel of such a group.

Approved:	
Shu father	9/23/16
Steve Fetter	Date
Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and	
Principal Assistant Director for Energy and Environment Division,	•
Office of Science and Technology Policy	
At PUNI	2350gova 202
Stephen P. Welby	Date
Co-chair, Committed on Homeland and National Security, and	
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,	
Department of Defense	,
SSS SS	3/11/16
Dr. Reginald Brothers	Date
Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and	

Charter of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Defense Research and Development Committee on Homeland and National Security, National Science and Technology Council

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION

The Subcommittee on Nuclear Defense Research and Development (NDRD) is hereby established by action of the National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National Security.

BACKGROUND

President Bush has called upon his Executive Branch agencies to develop and deploy effective technologies for defense against nuclear and radiological threats:

- ♦ The National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002) highlights the need for a research and development agenda that will prioritize efforts to deal with catastrophic threats including research and development to prevent terrorist use of nuclear weapons.
- ♦ The President's National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002) states that the "United States has a critical need for cutting-edge technology that can quickly and effectively detect, analyze, facilitate interdiction of, defend against, defeat, and mitigate the consequences of weapons of mass destruction."
- ♦ The President's Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14, Domestic Nuclear Detection (April 2005), calls for continued advancement of "the science of nuclear and radiological detection through an aggressive, expedited, evolutionary, and transformational program of research and development in such detection technologies."

In response to these Presidential directives, the Domestic Nuclear Defense Policy Coordinating Committee (DND PCC) of the Homeland Security Council (HSC) was chartered to establish the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, and to develop the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Because of the need to develop a coordinated interagency research and development (R&D) roadmap for nuclear defense, participants in the DND PCC working group recommended formation of a National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) subcommittee to lead the prioritization of R&D goals and present an R&D investment strategy for interagency stakeholders.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this Subcommittee is to increase the coordination, effectiveness, and productivity of federally conducted and supported R&D efforts related to nuclear defense capabilities. The Subcommittee will closely coordinate its activities with the DND PCC.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SCOPE

The scope of the Subcommittee will range from relevant long term basic science through the technology development cycle to the rapid transition of new technologies supporting all NDRD functional elements, which include, but may not be limited to the following:

- 1. Non-proliferation in support of nuclear defense;
- 2. Interdiction of nuclear and radiological materials;
- 3. Render safe;
- 4. Attribution; and
- 5. Incident response and recovery.

Working groups will be established to support the five functional elements above. The general task of each working group will be to develop national goals for nuclear defense R&D, identify gaps in R&D, and prioritize research needs.

OBJECTIVES:

- Develop and update on an annual basis a coordinated research and development strategy
 to boost innovation and breakthroughs with clear national goals and a prioritized list for
 federal R&D investments across federal agencies consistent with national security
 strategy, homeland security strategy, and presidential decisions. This R&D strategy shall
 entail:
 - Cataloguing current and programmed R&D activities for NDRD in an interagency inventory starting from the 2006 inter-agency DND R&D Roadmap generated by the DND PCC;
 - · Performing and documenting a gap analysis of the inventory;
 - Defining the desired end state and criteria against which to measure performance; and
 - Developing a mechanism and criteria for high-level prioritization of R&D investments.
- 2. Provide a forum for exchange of information and ideas among federal agencies conducting NDRD, ranging from basic science to mission-directed activities.

MEMBERSHIP

The following federal departments, agencies, and commissions shall comprise the membership of the Subcommittee:

Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Justice
Department of State

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Director of National Intelligence Environmental Protection Agency Nuclear Regulatory Commission National Science Foundation

The following federal organizations shall also be represented:

Homeland Security Council
National Security Council
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Office of the Vice President

Cooperating departments and agencies shall include such other Executive organizations, departments and agencies as the co-chairs may, from time to time, designate.

Private Sector Interface / Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)

The Subcommittee may work with the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology to secure appropriate private sector advice, and will recommend to the Committee on Homeland and National Security and/or the Director of Office of Science and Technology Policy the nature of additional private sector advice needed to accomplish its mission. The Subcommittee may also interact with and receive *ad hoc* advice from various non-Federal persons and entities, provided such interactions occur in a manner that maintains the Subcommittee's status as a non-FACA committee.

TERMINATION DATE

Unless renewed by the Homeland and National Security Committee (or its successor), this Charter will expire on March 31, 2009.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

<u>DETERMINATION</u>

I hereby determine that the formation of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Defense Research and Development under the Committee on Homeland and National Security of the National Science and Technology Council is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the Executive Branch by law, and that such duties can best be performed through the advice and counsel of such a group.

Approved:

Stanley S. Sokul, Office of Science and Technology Policy
Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security

John J. Young Jr., Department of Defense
Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security

Jay M Cohen, Department of Homeland Security

Date

Co-mair, Committee on Homeland and National Security



CHARTER of the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND EXPLOSIVES STANDARDS COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

A. Official Designation

The Subcommittee on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Standards (SOS-CBRNE) is hereby established by action of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), Committee on Homeland and National Security (CHNS). This charter consolidates and replaces the previous NSTC CHNS charters of the Subcommittee on Standards (SOS) and the Subcommittee on Decontamination Standards and Technology (SDST).

B. Purpose

The purpose of SOS-CBRNE is to provide all relevant Federal agencies a high-level, focused forum for coordinating and collaborating on technologies, research and development, standards and protocols, as well as risk analysis and risk communication science as it applies to CBRNE detection, response, and recovery. The SOS-CBRNE will communicate with a broad range of stakeholders including Federal, state, local, and tribal communities and, as permitted by statute, with the Nation's CBRNE research and development community.

C. Functions

Multiple Federal agencies engage in the development of CBRNE equipment and decontamination standards. The primary functions of the SOS-CBRNE are:

- To facilitate cooperation among Federal agencies for developing and using standards and test methods for prescribing and evaluating the performance and interoperability of CBRNE equipment. The standards to be developed shall include end-user training and standard operating procedures for response.
- 2) In consultation with stakeholders, implement the *National Strategy for CBRNE Standards* (to be published by the former SOS in the Spring of 2011), through the establishment of an interagency forum that will define tasks based on the goals in the National Strategy and, identify lead and supporting Federal agencies for each task.
- To identify barriers to setting and promulgating performance standards for CBRNE equipment and decontamination and make recommendations on how to overcome those barriers and speed the implementation of consensus performance standards;

- 4) To facilitate the work of ongoing NSTC bodies established by the former SDST, which include:
 - a. the Chemical Decontamination Standards working group, whose goal is to complete remediation guidance that parallels the SDST's "Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents," and
 - b. the Mass Human Decontamination Working Group, whose goal is to outline best practices and science-based research aimed at improved strategies for the decontamination of large numbers of people following a chemical incident.
- 5) To address, as needed, additional topic areas that may include, but are not limited to:
 - a. policy and planning related to developing and applying decontamination standards;
 - b. coordinating the development of detection standards with diagnostics used by medical countermeasures communities;
 - c. coordinating the development and implementation of standards for detecting emerging, enhanced, and advanced CBRNE threat agents; and
 - d. promoting and coordinating research designed to more effectively communicate CBRNE risk issues to all potentially affected constituencies.

The SOS-CBRNE may establish additional NSTC bodies under its supervision as deemed necessary by the Co-chairs of the subcommittee.

D. Membership

The following NSTC departments and agencies are represented on the SOS-CBRNE:

Department of Agriculture;

Department of Commerce (Co-Chair);

Department of Defense;

Department of Energy;

Department of Health and Human Services;

Department of Homeland Security (Co-Chair);

Department of the Interior;

Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation;

Department of Labor;

Department of State;

Department of Transportation;

Environmental Protection Agency (Co-Chair);

General Services Administration;

Office of the Director of National Intelligence;

Technical Support Working Group/Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office; and United States Postal Service.

The following organizations in the Executive Office of the President shall also be represented:

National Security Council;

Office of Management and Budget;

Office of Science and Technology Policy; and

Office of the Vice President.

Cooperating departments and agencies shall include such other Executive organizations, departments, and agencies as the Co-chairs may designate.

E. Private-Sector Engagement

The SOS-CBRNE may work with the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology to secure appropriate private-sector advice, and will recommend to the CHNS and/or the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy the nature of additional private-sector advice needed to accomplish its mission. The SOS-CBRNE may also interact with and receive *ad hoc* advice from various private-sector groups consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

F. Termination Date

Unless renewed by the Co-chairs of the CHNS, the SOS-CBRNE shall terminate no later than December 31, 2015.

G. Determination

We hereby determine that the Subcommittee on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Standards is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the Executive Branch by law, and that such duties can best be performed through the advice and counsel of such a group.

Approved:

Philip Coyle

Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs,

Office of Science and Technology Policy

Zachary Lennios

Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,

Department of Defense

Date

Page 3 of 4

Claw O Ton

Tara O'Toole

Co-chair, Committee on Homeland and National Security, and Under Secretary for Science and Technology,

Department of Homeland Security

5 April 2011

Date



MEMORANDUM

FROM:

AFUA BRUCE

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

DATE:

APRIL 21, 2017

SUBJECT:

CHARTER EXTENSIONS

Finding that this body of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was unable to complete its functions – as outlined in its charter – by its termination date, and finding that the continuation of the NSTC body is in the public interest in connection with the duties imposed on the Executive Branch by law and that such duties can best be performed through the advice and counsel of such a group, I hereby grant an extension of the charter of this NSTC body until October 21, 2017. This NSTC body can be terminated prior to October 21, 2017 by the Assistant to the President on Science and Technology or by the NSTC Executive Director.

Approved:

Afua Bruce

Executive Director

National Science and Technology Council

4/21/2017 Date

The NSTC bodies extended by this memo are:

NSTC	NSTC Subcommittee	NSTC IWG
Committee		
CENRS	CSMSC: Critical and Strategic Mineral Supply Chains (SC)	
CENRS	LSSC: Life Science Sub Committee (SC)	Microbiome (IWG)
CENRS	SDR: Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction	
CENRS	SDR: Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction	International Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group (IWG)
CENRS	SDR: Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction	NPST: National Preparedness Science and Technology Task Force (TF)
CENRS	SDR: Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction	TIDP: Technology and Innovation for Disaster Preparedness (IWG)
CENRS	SDR: Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction	WWG: Windstorm Working Group
CENRS	SGCR: Subcommittee on Global Change Research	
CENRS	SWAQ: Subcommittee on Water Availability and Quality	
CENRS	SWORM: Space Weather Operations, Research, and Mitigation (SC)	
CENRS	Taskforce on Water-Energy-Food Nexus	
CENRS	USGEO: United States Group on Earth Observations	Assessment Working Group (IWG)
CENRS	USGEO: United States Group on Earth Observations	Data Management Working Group (IWG)
CENRS	USGEO: United States Group on Earth Observations	International Activities Working Group (IWG)
CHNS	AUS TECH: Autonomous Unmanned Systems Technology (SC)	
CHNS	BDRD: Biological Defense Research and Development (SC)	
CHNS	BDRD: Biological Defense Research and Development (SC)	Interagency Biorisk Management Working Group (IWG)

CHNS	BDRD: Biological Defense Research and Development (SC)	PPFST: Pandemic Prediction and Forecasting Science and Technology (IWG)
CHNS	CDRD: Chemical Defense Research and Development (SC)	a connected (x ii c)
CHNS	CISR: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (SC)	
CHNS	D-IED: Domestic Improvised Explosive Devices (SC)	
CHNS	NDRD: Nuclear Defense Research & Development (SC)	
CHNS	NSLRDTEFI: National Security Laboratory Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Facilities and Infrastructure (SC)	
CHNS	NSLRDTEFI: National Security Laboratory Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Facilities and Infrastructure (SC)	Communication and Inventory (IWG)
CHNS	NSLRDTEFI: National Security Laboratory Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Facilities and Infrastructure (SC)	Data, Metrics and Tools (IWG)
CHNS	NSLRDTEFI: National Security Laboratory Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Facilities and Infrastructure (SC)	Partnerships (IWG)
CHNS	SCORE: Subcommittee on Special Cyber Operations Research and Engineering (SC)	
CHNS	SOS-CBRNE Standards (SC)	
CHNS	STCED: Science and Technology for Countering Explosive Devices (SC)	
CoS	FTAC-RDRS: Research and Development Reporting Standards	
CoS	IWGMI: Medical Imaging (IWG)	
CoS	IWGN: Neuroscience (IWG)	
CoS	LSSC: Life Science Sub Committee (SC)	Plant Genomics (IWG)
CoS	PSSC: Physical Science Sub Committee (PSSC)	Quantum Information Science (SC)

CoS	SBS: Social and Behavioral Sciences	RBM: Research Business Models
	(SC)	(IWG)
CoS	Task Force on Forensic Science Research and Development	
СоТ	L2M: Lab to Market (SC)	
СоТ	SAM: Advanced Manufacturing (SC)	



MEMORANDUM

FROM:

AFUA BRUCE

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

DATE:

JUNE 26, 2017

SUBJECT:

CHARTER EXTENSIONS

Finding that this body of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was unable to complete its functions - as outlined in its charter - by its termination date, and finding that the continuation of the NSTC body is in the public interest in connection with the duties imposed on the Executive Branch by law and that such duties can best be performed through the advice and counsel of such a group, I hereby grant an extension of the charter of this NSTC body until January 31, 2018. This NSTC body can be terminated prior to January 31, 2018 by the Assistant to the President on Science and Technology or by the NSTC Executive Director.

Approved:

Executive Director

National Science and Technology Council

4/26/2017

The NSTC bodies extended by this memo are:

NSTC Committee	NSTC Subcommittee	NSTC IWG
CENRS		
CENRS	AQRS: Air Quality Research Subcommittee (AQRS)	
CENRS	Toxins and Risk	
CENRS	U.S. Group on Earth Observations (SC)	Satellite Needs (IWG)
CENRS	CSMSC: Critical & Strategic Mineral Supply Chains (SC)	· .
CHNS	BDRD: Biological Defense Research and Development (SC)	FADT: Foreign Animal Disease Threats (IWG)
CHNS	BDRD: Biological Defense Research and Development (SC)	PPFST: Pandemic Prediction and Forecasting Science and Technology (IWG)
CHNS	BDRD: Biological Defense Research and Development (SC)	
CHNS	DAMIEN: Detecting & Mitigating the Impact of Earth-Bound Near Earth Objects (IWG)	
CENRS	SWORM: Space Weather Observation, Research, and Mitigation (SC)	
CoS		
CoS	SBS: Social and Behavioral Sciences (SC)	Language and Communication (IWG)
CoS	Interagency Group on Open Science (IWG)	
CoS	FTAC-SMDIS: Fast-Track Action Committee on Strengthening the Medicolegal Death Investigation System (FTAC)	
CoS	IWGMI: Medical Imaging (IWG)	
CoSTEM		
CoSTEM	FC-STEM: Federal Coordination in STEM Education (SC)	CS4All: Computer Science for All (IWG)
CoT ·		
СоТ	DS: Data Science (IWG)	
СоТ	Tech4Aging: Task Force on Research and Development for Technology to Support Aging Adults	

СоТ	Maker Interagency Working Group
	(IWG)
CoT	MLAI: Machine Learning, Artificial
	Intelligence (SC)