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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

MAR 30 2018

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of June 10, 2008, for the INSCOM Annual History FY 1977 and supplements our letter of March 11, 2015.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized as it is currently and properly classified TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2 (a)(1), 1.2 (a)(2), 1.2 (a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 13526. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(1) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified TOP SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 13526, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

The deleted information is also exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with EO 13526, Section 3.3(b)(1) because its release would clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development.

In addition, information has been withheld pursuant to Title 5 U. S. Code 552(b)(3) of the FOIA. Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information that is exempt by statute. The applicable statute is 50 U. S. Code 3024i which protects intelligence sources and methods.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Gary W. Johnston, the Commanding General U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 90-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis of your disagreement with the response and provide justification for a

reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office, for forwarding, as appropriate to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (APPEAL)
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the National Security Agency (NSA), that their information, contained in the records has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3).

5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), The information is properly classified in accordance with the criteria for classification in Section 1.4 of Executive Order (EO) 13526, as amended. The information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b) of EO 13526.

5 U.S. C. 552 (b)(3) – The specific statutes are listed below:
50 U.S.C. Code 3605 (Public Law 86-36 Section 6)
50 U.S.C. 3024(i)
18 U.S.C. 798

The withholding of the information by the NSA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal/Privacy Act Authority. The appeal shall be in writing to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority (DJ4), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Mill Road, STE 6248, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-6248. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which you believe release of the information is required. Please cite FOIA Case #67174 assigned to the case so that it could be easily identified.

Coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been completed and we have been informed by the CIA that their information is partially releasable pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Release Panel within 90 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA #F-2016-00162 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We have been advised by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that information has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) (b)(3)and (b)(6) of the FOIA and Executive Order 13256 §§ 1.4(a) and 1.4(c). The applicable Statue is 10 U.S.C. §424 .

Their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3). The statute invoked under Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3) is 10 U.S.C. §424 (b)(3), which allows for the protection of organizational and personnel information for DIA.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Attention: DAN-1A (FOIA), Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA MDR-0174-2012 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

There are no assessable FOIA fees for processing this request.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651, or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp.mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #598F-08. Please note that you now have the ability to check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) website: https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx. Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FA-08-2826. You may also seek dispute resolution services by contacting the INSCOM FOIA Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear at 301-677-7856.

Sincerely,

Michael T. Heaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

FISCAL YEAR 1977

History Office
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212

(RCS CSHIS-6(R3))

September 1978

~~TOP SECRET~~

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WARNING

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, US CODE TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793, 794, AND 798. THE LAW PROHIBITS ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER PREJUDICIAL TO THE SAFETY OR INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES OR FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMINT CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES; IT IS TO BE SEEN ONLY BY U.S. PERSONNEL ESPECIALLY INDOCTRINATED AND AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE COMINT INFORMATION ON A STRICTLY NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. ITS SECURITY MUST BE MAINTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOD DIRECTIVE S-5200.17 (M-2) AND AR 380-35.

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PREFACE

The purpose of the Annual Historical Review is to present a summary of the significant activities, events, and accomplishments of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), formerly the US Army Security Agency. It should be noted that this is the first annual summary published under the new designation. Under the dynamic leadership of Major General William I. Rolya, the numerous tasks and milestones established by higher authority for the reorganization of Army intelligence were completed as scheduled. They included the drafting or rewriting of Army Regulations, the assumption of new and diverse functions, the assignment and reassignment of units, and changes in command relationships.

The initial aim of this review was to prepare a balanced resume of all intelligence disciplines and functions assigned to INSCOM. However, equal coverage was made difficult due to organizational changes, integration of the non-cryptologic intelligence disciplines into a new history program, and security compartmentation. Physical separation of HQ INSCOM staff elements at Arlington Hall Station and Fort George G. Meade was also a possible factor. More balance can be expected in future summaries.

This volume was prepared in compliance with AR 870-5, Military History: Responsibilities, Policies and Procedures. Experience has shown that the annual reviews are utilized primarily for quick reference purposes. This, in large measure, dictated the scope and coverage afforded the items included in this summary. Principal source materials used in its compilation include the annual historical reports submitted by the Headquarters staff elements, subordinate unit historical reports, briefings, INSCOM Quarterly Program Reviews, interviews, and miscellaneous documents and reports.

This summary was prepared by Mr. L. L. Sternbeck with review and editing being accomplished by Miss Virginia A. Ferrell.

September 1978

LAWTON L. STERNBECK
Command Historian

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Per NSA

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CHAPTER I

FY 1977 OVERVIEW

(U) Fiscal Year 1977 was an exceptionally interesting one for the Army intelligence community. In addition to the turbulence created by a major restructuring of the US Army Security Agency and actions to define and redefine policies and doctrine, we were given a new designation—US Army Intelligence and Security Command.

(U) It all began in December 1974 when the Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA), General Fred C. Weyand, directed Major General James J. Ursano, Director of Management, OCSA, to conduct a study of the Army's intelligence organization and stationing. As a result, the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) was published on 1 August 1975.

~~(C)~~ Prior to the IOSS, the internal intelligence support activities of the Army were divided among several commands, agencies, and units—the largest being the US Army Security Agency (USASA), a self-contained signal intelligence (SIGINT), signal security (SIGSEC), and electronic warfare (EW) organization. Its operational units performed both tactical and strategic missions. Since its establishment in 1945, ASA has had a vertical command structure commanding ASA units worldwide. It also had its own ASA-dedicated administration, logistics, personnel, training, materiel development and acquisition, and combat developments responsibilities. At its peak, during the Vietnam War, about 33,000 USASA personnel were deployed worldwide.

~~(C)~~ Included in the IOSS was the US Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA), a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI, DA), organized on 1 July 1974. Its responsibility was also worldwide for collecting human source intelligence (HUMINT) and for providing counterintelligence support. USAINTA peaked with about 4700 personnel.

~~(C)~~ In addition, eight field units provided intelligence support to the Army. They included the following:

US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment (FOA of ACSI) which developed threat data required to support combat development and materiel development processes.

US Army Imagery Interpretation Center (FOA of ACSI) which produced imagery-related intelligence products, imagery exploitation and analytical aids.

US Army Intelligence Support Detachment (FOA of ACSI) which provided current intelligence analysis for the Army.

US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment (FOA of ACSI) which performed counterintelligence analysis and production.

US Army Forces Command Intelligence Center, located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, produced ground forces order of battle and related intelligence products on 26 countries. It also provided pre-deployment intelligence support to CONUS tactical units.

Medical Intelligence and Information Agency, Washington, D. C.

Foreign Science and Technology Center, Charlottesville, Virginia.

Missile Intelligence Agency, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

~~(C)~~ The recommendations of IOSS resulted in major changes to the organization and operations of the Army intelligence community. In a 21 October 1976 letter, the Department of the Army announced actions to be accomplished in establishing the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to provide integrated, all-source intelligence support to the Army at echelons above corps. The announced date for establishment of INSCOM was 1 October 1977. The letter also set up a schedule of events to be accomplished during the transition period. An unscheduled event was the redesignation of the US Army Security Agency as the US Army Intelligence and Security Command on 1 January 1977. This was considered primarily an administrative action designed to maintain reorganization momentum and in no way abrogated the 1 October 1977 milestone for the formal establishment of INSCOM.

(U) Although USAINTA was reassigned to INSCOM on 1 January 1977, its mission remained separate and distinct throughout FY 1977. Direct assignment of USAINTA units to INSCOM would not occur until 1 October. In preparation for that merger, MG Rolya directed that action be taken to redesignate Hq, USAINTA as Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Meade, effective 1 October 1977, and to require the wearing of the INSCOM shoulder patch on that date. Organization Day was designated as 1 October.

(U) The INSCOM Concept Plan (11 March 1977 version) was approved by General Walter T. Kerwin, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army (VCSA), on 2 May 1977, subject to specifically directed modifications. MG Rolya vigorously supervised the planning and implementation of the CSA decisions resulting from the IOSS, as well as actions required by the INSCOM Concept Plan.

~~(C)~~ By 1 January 1977, all of ASA's tactical units were transferred to their supported commands. INSCOM's Field Stations remained basically unchanged and continued their missions in support of the US SIGINT System. Two changes occurred which resulted in the subordination of

Per NSA

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

~~(C)~~ The single-discipline and multi-discipline MI Groups were changed considerably. The 66th MI Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional), with headquarters in Munich, Germany, was organized on 1 July 1977 from elements

of the 66th MI Group and the 502d ASA Group. The provisional 66th, an all-source multi-discipline group, was commanded by INSCOM with operational control (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA and (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) assigned to US Army, Europe.

~~(C)~~ FORSCOM's 470th MI Group, in Panama, was assigned to INSCOM and reorganized to assume responsibility for two counterintelligence field offices, a TAREX detachment, and the INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command. The 470th was scheduled to remain in the Canal Zone under the provisions of the new treaty being negotiated between the United States and Panama.

~~(C)~~ The 500th MI Group, with headquarters at Camp Zama, Japan, remained basically unchanged except for the addition of a TAREX element. The 500th was assigned to INSCOM and performed general support functions for the US Army, Japan, and other Army elements in the Pacific area, except for Korea.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

~~(C)~~ The 501st MI Group (Provisional), located at Camp Coiner, Korea, was INSCOM's second all-source multi-discipline group. It was composed of USA Field Station Korea; 502d MI Battalion; Detachment S, US Army Operational Group; [redacted] and a SIGSEC detachment. INSCOM commanded the 501st with operational control [redacted] resting with the Eighth US Army (EUSA) at defense readiness condition (DEFCON) 4 or higher.

(U) The 902d MI Group (Provisional), located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, was a CONUS single-discipline group providing general support to the Army. It was organized provisionally from resources of the 902d MI Group, the Pentagon Counterintelligence Force, USASA SIGSEC Activity, and the SIGSEC Regional Detachments. The 902d had three subordinate provisional battalions, the 91st at Fort Meade, the 92d at San Antonio, and the 93d at San Francisco. The mission of the 902d was to provide counterintelligence and operations security support to CONUS commands, units, and installations. INSCOM held command and control authority over the 902d MI Group (Provisional).

~~(C)~~ INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii (Provisional) was organized utilizing the resources of the US Army Security Detachment, Hawaii, the USAINTA Liaison Office, a CI Field Office of the 525th MI Group, a Technical Support Countermeasures Team and a TAREX element. This Detachment operated in support of CINCPAC in coordination with the Commander, US Army Support Group.

(U) US Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station remained a subordinate unit of INSCOM even though the majority of the activities located there were subordinate to the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM).

(U) HQ INSCOM's continued location at Arlington Hall Station was not given a final determination, but no change is expected for a few years yet due to required studies and restationing costs. Relocation sites still being considered at this time are Vint Hill Farms Station and Fort George G. Meade.

~~(C)~~ (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) Per CIA

From its location at Fort Meade, the Group directed its worldwide forward detachments in general support of the Army against (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) The Administrative Survey Detachment at Fort Meade was not changed by the IOSS and

(b)(1) Per CIA

~~(C)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) As a result of actions not related to the IOSS, the Central Security Facility at Fort Meade and the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Security, HQ INSCOM, transferred some of their functions to the Department of the Army who directed the Military Personnel Center to perform security adjudications for the Army. The USAINTA Liaison Officer represented HQ INSCOM and USAINTA at DARCOM. HQ INSCOM maintained liaison elements at TRADOC, FORSCOM, NSACSS and US Army, Europe.

~~(C)~~ The number of organizational elements which comprised the HQ INSCOM staff increased during this reporting period. The Office, Director of Counterintelligence (DCI), HQ USAINTA, became a HQ INSCOM staff element on 1 March 1977. The DCI was comprised of the former USAINTA staff element for counterintelligence and elements of the SIGSEC Activity located at Vint Hill Farms Station, and the former SIGSEC Division, ODCSOPS, at Arlington Hall Station. The DCI was responsible for all INSCOM activities pertaining to operations security (OPSEC), counterintelligence (CI) and offensive counterintelligence (OFCO). The Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DCSITA), which was established provisionally effective 1 March 1977, was a totally new staff element and not found previously in either HQ INSCOM or HQ USAINTA. The Acting DCSITA was the principal staff officer for all matters pertaining to intelligence and threat analysis. Planned for implementation early in FY 1978 was the Operations Directorate headed by the Director of Operations. This directorate will incorporate the DCSOPS (HQ INSCOM), the HUMINT Director of Operations (HQ USAINTA), and a photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) element not currently in existence. The Director of Operations will be responsible for managing all SIGINT, HUMINT, and PHOTINT collection assets subordinate to HQ INSCOM as well as all positive intelligence requirements levied on INSCOM.

(U) One of the most important problems facing INSCOM was the ultimate location of HQ INSCOM. A complete merger and integration of HQ INSCOM and HQ USAINTA staffs is required to realize a true integration of all intelligence disciplines in HQ INSCOM and end the rivalries and jealous guarding of prerogatives which exist between intelligence disciplines. Since early

1976, based on department guidance, USASA/INSCOM submitted several studies concerning the ultimate location of HQ INSCOM. These studies resulted in a reduction of the number of originally considered locations from seven to two. One of the two remaining locations for HQ INSCOM was Fort George G. Meade, the other was Vint Hill Farms Station.

~~(C)~~ During FY 1977, monumental changes were effected in Army intelligence. AR 10-122, Organization and Functions, US Army Security Agency and AR 10-46, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence Agency, became obsolete because of changes in the mission and functions assigned to INSCOM throughout the year. Basically, this new Major Army Command (MACOM) was to conduct intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and electronic warfare (EW) operations in support of the Army at Echelons Above Corps (EAC); conduct signal intelligence (SIGINT) operations; conduct human intelligence (HUMINT) operations; command the Army component of the Central Security Service (CSS) and serve as Chief of the Army Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA); provide Army-wide operational security (OPSEC) support; conduct Army-wide signal security (SIGSEC) support; analyze, produce and disseminate all-source counterintelligence and general intelligence (less medical), and provide all-source threat analysis support to the Army; provide technical advice and operational assistance to other functional and operating MACOM's; act as the HQDA Executive Agent for management of the Military Intelligence Peacetime Utilization Program, active and Reserve; act as HQDA Executive Agent for target exploitation (TAREX); and conduct or participate in photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) operations in general support of the Army.

(U) There was little doubt that INSCOM would experience "growing pains" and that problem areas would arise during this major reorganization of the Army's intelligence assets. There was equally little doubt that the creators of INSCOM were determined to make their creation work. LTG William B. Fulton, Director of the Army Staff, who delivered the keynote address at the 1977 INSCOM Commanders' Conference, acknowledged some dimunition of effectiveness but thought the problems could be worked out. He also cautioned the commanders to fully support the reorganization or get out.

(U) The intent of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study was to improve support to Army commanders in the field, to achieve economies under DOD-directed budget limitations, to streamline operations and eliminate duplication, and bring Army intelligence more in line with the Army reorganization of 1973. Whether all of these goals will be accomplished is problematical at this time. Whether this new organization can efficiently and effectively reach the goals established for it should become apparent in approximately two or three years.

CHAPTER II

(C) MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

~~(C)~~ Mission and Functions. FY 1977 was a period of transition as the Army was deeply engaged in reorganizing its intelligence resources. New management and organizational concepts were planned and/or effected as the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) recommendations and related actions were implemented. As planned, the organization and functions of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, as the Army's principal nontactical intelligence and security command, would be to perform nontactical intelligence operations above corps level; act as the Army component of the Central Security Service and as the Army Service Cryptologic Agency; conduct counterintelligence investigations and operations; provide Army-wide all-source, multi-disciplined operational security and intelligence support; and provide technical advice and operational assistance as required to assist other functional and operating major Army commands in the discharge of their electronic warfare, intelligence, and security responsibilities. However, until formal establishment of INSCOM, USASA and USAINTA continued to function as identifiable operating commands with mission and functions as set forth in AR 10-122 and AR 10-46, respectively.[1]

~~(C)~~ In its 21 October 1976 letter, subject: Missions and Functions of USASA and USAINTA, DA set up a schedule of major events and milestones to be effected, the proponent with primary (P) action responsibility, and the agency or command with responsibility to assist (A) primary action, as indicated below.[2]

Event	Eff Date	Proponent
Transfer USASA Training Center and School and USASA Combat Developments Activity to TRADOC	1 Oct 76	TRADOC (P) USASA (A)
Transfer HQ USASA functions and resources associated with the management of selected personnel from USASA to MILPERCEN	1 Oct 76	HQDA (ODCSPER)(P)
Transfer 329th ASA Company to EUSA	1 Oct 76	EUSA (P) USASA (A)
Transfer USASA Materiel Support Command to DARCOM	1 Dec 76	DARCOM (P) USASA (A)
Transfer tactical SSO resources and functions to USASA	21 Nov 76	USASA (P) HQDA (OACSI)(A)

Transfer USA Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment, USA Intelligence Support Detachment, and USA Imagery Interpretation Center from HQDA (OACSI) to USASA and transfer USA Forces Command Intelligence Group to USASA	1 Jan 77	HQDA (OACSI)(P) for OACSI FOA's and FORSCOM (P) for FORSIG USASA (A)
Transfer USAINTA to USASA (Includes the transfer of USA Intelligence Operations Support Detachment)	NLT 1 Jan 77	USASA (P) HQDA (OACSI)(A)
Transfer 66th MI Group (-) to USASA	1 Jan 77	USASA (P) USAREUR (A)
Transfer 502d ASA Group and assigned subordinate units to USAREUR	1 Jan 77	USAREUR (P) USASA (A)
Transfer 504th ASA Group and assigned subordinate units to FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	FORSCOM (P) USASA (A)
Transfer 146th ASA Company, 332d ASA Company, and USASA Security Detachment (Korea) to EUSA	1 Jan 77	EUSA (P) USASA (A)
Transfer 470th MI Group and 502d MI Battalion (Korea) to USASA	1 Apr 77	USASA (P) FORSCOM (A) EUSA (A)
Transfer materiel development, acquisition, and development testing functions and resources from USASA to DARCOM	TBAN	DARCOM (P) USASA (A)
Transfer operational testing function and resources from USASA to TRADOC, to include transfer of USASA Test and Evaluation Center to TRADOC	TBAN	TRADOC (P) USASA (A)
Obtain HQDA approval on an Army regulation defining mission, functions and responsibilities of INSCOM	1 Aug 77	HQDA (OACSI)(P) USASA (A)

~~(C)~~ The 21 October DA letter also provided a restatement of selected functional responsibilities to be assigned to USASA on 1 January 1977 and included in the Army regulation to be published defining the new MACOM's mission and functions. These functional responsibilities were as follows:

1. Provide all-source intelligence and threat analysis to the Department of the Army.

2. As a Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA), USASA will be the focal point for all cryptologic matters involving SIGINT/EW and SIGSEC operational missions of the Department of the Army.

3. Provide security interview support to the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), ODCSPER, HQ DA, in the recruitment and acquisition of of new accessions.

~~(C)~~ On 2 May 1977, HQDA requested INSCOM to draft an Army regulation defining the mission, functions, responsibilities, and command relationships of INSCOM which would supersede AR 10-122 and AR 10-46. A number of drafts were prepared, reviewed, and coordinated. A revised draft of AR 10-X, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was forwarded to the DA Management Staff on 17 October 1977 for final staffing prior to publication. In this draft regulation, the mission, functions and command relationships of the CG INSCOM were defined as shown below.[3]

(U)
~~(C)~~ The mission of the CG, INSCOM is to:

1. Conduct intelligence operations above corps level.

2. Conduct signal intelligence (SIGINT) operations as a member of the US SIGINT System.

3. Command the Army component of the Central Security Service (CSS) and serve as Chief of the Army Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA).

4. Conduct human intelligence (HUMINT) operations in general support of Army and other United States intelligence community collection requirements.

5. Conduct counterintelligence (CI) investigations and operations.

6. Provide Army-wide all-source multi-disciplined operational security (OPSEC) support, to include signal security (SIGSEC).

7. Analyze, produce, and disseminate all-source intelligence and provide all-source threat analysis support to the Army.

8. Provide technical advice and operational assistance to other functional and operating Major Army Commands in the discharge of their intelligence electronic warfare (EW) and security responsibilities.

9. Act as the HQDA Executive Agent for the management of the military peacetime utilization program, active and reserve.

10. Insure the responsiveness of Special Activities Office (SAO) activities in general support of the Army.

(c) The CG, INSCOM has principal responsibility for the following functions:

a. Intelligence Collection.

1. Performs worldwide SIGINT operations at fixed sites and with assigned and attached mobile assets under the SIGINT operational control of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS).

2. Searches for, intercepts, conducts direction finding, and processes foreign communications and noncommunications, transmissions and electromagnetic radiations and electro-optic emissions to obtain and report information for intelligence purposes and to support EW activities.

3. Commands overseas all-source and multi-discipline organizations in support of Echelons Above Corps (EAC), tailored to theater requirements.

4. Conducts worldwide strategic HUMINT controlled collection operations of foreign military and military-related intelligence information in general support of the Army and in reinforcement of overseas commanders.

5. Conducts liaison and intelligence information exchange programs and

(b)(1) Per CIA

6. Performs (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) HUMINT collection and exploitation activities worldwide.

7. Acquires and exploits foreign material for information of foreign military or military-related intelligence value, coordinating with the scientific and technical intelligence production activities on substantive subjects pertaining to their technical areas of responsibility.

8. Debriefs refugees and interrogates foreign defectors and prisoners of war as to their knowledge of foreign military and military-related intelligence information.

9. Debriefs US Army personnel returned to United States control to obtain foreign military intelligence information.

10. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

11.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

12. Provides representation as required on specified intelligence community, DOD, and inter-agency HUMINT collection committees, subcommittees, and working groups.

13. b1 1.4a 1.4 c Per DIA

14. b1 1.4 a 1.4 c Per DIA

15. Provides advice and assistance to those Army agencies which are tasked to insure Army receives support from Special Activities Office (SAO) systems.

16. Acts as executive agent for HQDA in operational electro-optics intelligence (to include infra-red) collection. Performs special technical collection efforts as directed by HQDA.

b. Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Production.

1. Produces general intelligence (less medical intelligence) in response to Department of the Army and other Department of Defense validated requirements.

2. Prepares all-source intelligence reports and studies on foreign ground force capabilities in support of Army requirements.

3. Identifies intelligence gaps of significance to the Army.

4. Disseminates intelligence responsive to the predeployment, contingency, and exercise needs of tactical units.

5. Performs threat analysis and validates the threat, as appropriate, to support Army plans, OPSEC programs, materiel development, and combat development activities.

6. Prepares and disseminates studies and reports on foreign intelligence organizations and activities worldwide.

7. Provides basic and direct support exploitation of imagery for the Army.

8. Develops Imagery Interpretation Keys on equipment and weapons systems for which the Army has production responsibility in the Department of Defense (DOD) Keys Program.

9. Interprets and disseminates all-source current intelligence to support the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQDA, in carrying out his responsibilities for furnishing current intelligence to the Army Secretariat, Army Staff, and other Army commands.

10. Requests information from and provides intelligence-related assistance to the scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) production activities operated by the Commander, US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) and the Surgeon General.

11. In coordination with the above S&TI activities insures that requests for S&TI support are properly researched, prepared, justified, and are mission essential; that final intelligence products meet user, legal, and regulatory requirements; and that S&TI production is a coordinated involvement in Army intelligence production and threat analysis efforts.

12. Provides dissemination support for foreign intelligence to HQDA, CONUS major commands and subordinate agencies, activities and units.

c. Counterintelligence.

1. Provides all-source multi-discipline security support to the Army and designated DOD activities. This support encompasses counter-HUMINT, counter-SIGINT (SIGSEC), and counter-PHOTINT operations—including OPSEC support through conduct of threat/vulnerability analyses and estimates and provision of technical surveillance countermeasures support, automatic data processing systems security support, SIGSEC support, and other activities in support of the Army OPSEC program.

2. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

3. Conducts personnel security investigations in response to tasking from the Defense Investigative Service (DIS).

4. Conducts complaint investigations concerned with DA military and civilian security programs and designated DOD agency security programs regarding allegations of subversive affiliations, suitability information, or hostage situations which are not developed during a personnel security investigation.

5. Performs control custodian functions for controlled US Army Investigative Records Repository dossiers.

6. Administers Army Intelligence Polygraph Program worldwide in support of DA and DOD Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities (CI/IA), (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) and the DA Limited Access Authority Program.

7. Functions as the Army Technical Surveillance Countermeasure (TSCM) Program Central Manager.

8. Advises and assists the DA Staff and Army commanders at all levels in SIGSEC matters and in controlling compromising emanations. Conducts activities required to support the Army SIGSEC and compromising emanations

control program.

d. Special Operations.

1. Conducts and controls all worldwide counterespionage operations in general support of the Army and in reinforcement of overseas commands.

2. Conducts all CONUS and monitors OCONUS counterespionage, countersubversion and countersabotage investigations.

3. Conducts analysis and evaluations of selected OFCO and counterespionage cases and prepares operational assessments and reviews.

4. Exercises DA control office functions for the centralized direction, control, and coordination of counterespionage, countersubversion, and countersabotage investigations within the US Army worldwide.

5. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

6. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

7. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

8. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

9. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

10. Initiates, controls, maintains, and monitors for the ACSI, DA, on a controlled access basis, Army files pertaining to selected, highly sensitive, investigations and operations.

11. Establishes, maintains, and stores operational data and information files on foreign intelligence agencies and foreign personnel who are known or suspected of posing a threat to the US Army and as necessary to support Special Operations.

12. Collects, reviews, and collates that information required to establish and maintain a special counterintelligence/counter/counterespionage operations data library to support current and future operations and investigations.

e. Electronic Warfare.

1. Provides advice, assistance, and technical guidance to DA and other Army commands on Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) matters and EW operational activities.

2. Acts as executive agent for HQDA in the Joint Service Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference (MIJI) program and other activities of the Army element at the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center.

3. Conducts other EW and EW-related missions in accordance with the Army EAC concept or as may be assigned.

4. Provides observers/evaluators for exercises and maneuvers and prepares after action reports on the effectiveness of EW operations and related intelligence/counterintelligence aspects for other Major Army Commands (MACOM's)

f. Management and Other Functions.

1. Organizes, equips, trains, administers, provides for logistic and automatic data processing support, provides position and equipment configuration control, and operates subordinate installations, activities, and units as necessary to carry out assigned missions.

2. Plans, programs, distributes, establishes policies for, supervises, and evaluates the use of resources for accomplishing INSCOM missions.

3. When directed by HQDA, participates in combat developments in coordination with TRADOC.

4. When designated by HQDA as the user of materiel being developed, and for those areas within purview of INSCOM expertise, participates in materiel development in coordination with DARCOM.

5. Supports TRADOC, DARCOM, Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA), and FORSCOM on field exercises, field evaluations, development tests, operational tests, and force developments tests and experiments.

6. Recommends combat development actions to Commander, TRADOC within INSCOM's area of expertise.

7. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

8. (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

9. Assists other Army commanders to articulate the materiel requirements of their assigned intelligence, counterintelligence, and EW units.

10. Coordinates the training requirements and standards necessary for personnel to be assigned to INSCOM with Commander, TRADOC and recommends modifications to TRADOC curricula as required.

11. Provides technical review of cryptologic training programs to insure that Army cryptologic training programs are consistent with minimum standards of training established by the DIRNSA/CHCSS, and coordinates with TRADOC and NSA on changes as required.

12. Assists other Army commanders to identify requirements and establish standards for intelligence, counterintelligence, and EW personnel to be assigned to their commands and to develop recommendations for modifications to TRADOC curricula.

13. Plans, programs, articulates requirements and standards for, establishes criteria for, coordinates, assists, and supervises a peacetime utilization program designed to attain productive and professional utilization of intelligence resources.

14. Determines and places requirements for nontactical communications upon the Commander, US Army Communications Command (USACC).

15. In coordination with other MACOM's, assists HQDA and NSACSS in the development of the Army portion of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP). Participates with HQDA in the preparation of the CCP, COMSEC Resources Program, General Defense Intelligence Program, and Counterintelligence/Investigative Activities portions of DA's budget submission to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Congress.

16. Provides Army commanders advice and assistance in the statement of their intelligence collection and production requirements as requested.

17. Conducts DA programs to provide military and civilian intelligence specialists as directed by HQDA.

18. Administers the INSCOM Reserve Mobilization Designee (MOBDES) and Strategic Military Intelligence Detachment (STRAT MID) programs and assists other MACOM's with Reserve component units and matters within INSCOM's functional areas of responsibility.

19. Serves as approving authority for Army student nominations to DOD Area Intelligence Training.

20. b1 1.4 a 1.4 c Per DIA

(DAS). Coordinates Mobilization Designation assignments to the DAS. Provides personnel, administrative and financial support to the Foreign Area Officer Program.

21. Operates an Investigative Records Center which is the US Army Repository for personnel security, counterintelligence, and intelligence files other than signal security, special intelligence and signal intelligence files.

22. Operates a Cryptological Records Center which is the US Army Repository for signal security, special intelligence, and signal intelligence files.

23. Operates the Army portion of the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS).

24. Provides software maintenance support, as appropriate, to SIGINT/EW automated systems under responsibility of the US Army.

(U) Location. Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was located at Arlington Hall Station, 4000 Arlington Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22212, throughout the report period. Subordinate elements continued to be located throughout the world.

b1 1.4 a 1.4 c Per DIA

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER I. MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

1. AR 10-122, Organization and Functions, US Army Security Agency, 18 Oct 73 (Eff 1 Nov 73); AR 10-46, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence Agency, 7 May 76 (Eff 15 Jun 76).
2. DA Ltr, DAAG-PAP-A (M)(12 Oct 76) DACS-DMA, 21 Oct 76, subj: Missions and Functions, US Army Security Agency and US Army Intelligence Agency.
3. DF, IACS-MPG, 18 Oct 77, subj: Revised Draft, AR 10-X.

CHAPTER III

(S)(NOFORN) COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

(U) ~~(C)~~ Command and Staff Relationships. (U) Basic command and staff relationships for INSCOM continued despite major organizational and functional realignments. Even though AR 10-122, Organization and Functions, US Army Security Agency, 18 October 1973, remained in effect throughout the year, changes were being planned and effected.

(U) A draft AR 10-X, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, reflected the efforts of the Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI), DA and HQ INSCOM to set forth the mission and functions of an integrated/consolidated USASA and USAINTA. This draft, considered to be in final form, was ready for final DA coordination at the end of the fiscal year.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Command and staff relationships envisioned in the final draft were as follows:

1. The Commanding General, INSCOM, will be under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA). Directives, authorities, policy, planning, and programming guidance, approved programs, and resource allocations will be issued to Commander, INSCOM, by the CSA.

2. The Commanding General, INSCOM, will command the Army component of the Central Security Service (CSS) and will be subordinated to the Chief, CSS, for the conduct of SIGINT operations. The Commanding General, INSCOM, will manage SIGINT resources to accomplish SIGINT operational tasks assigned by DIRNSA/CHCSS. The Commanding General, INSCOM, will provide specified military personnel and administrative, logistic, and operational support to the DIRNSA/CHCSS as authorized by HQDA. The DIRNSA/CHCSS will exericse SIGINT Operational Control over INSCOM as well as other Army SIGINT activities.

3. The Commanding General, INSCOM, will deal directly with the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on matters of intelligence production within the framework of INSCOM delegated production responsibilities as set forth by HQDA, and for the coordination of HUMINT operational proposals.

4. b1 1.4a 1.4c Per DIA

5. The Commanding General, INSCOM, will maintain liaison as necessary with major Army commands, field operating agencies, other cryptologic and

intelligence activities, and other governmental agencies to maintain an awareness of, to exchange information on, and to insure coordination of matters of mutual concern.

(4)
(S)(NOFORN) Concept for Intelligence and EW Operations at Echelons Above Corps. HQ INSCOM was tasked by HQDA to assist TRADOC in the formulation of an Army Intercept and Position Fixing (IPF) position. INSCOM's Concept for Intelligence and EW for Echelons Above Corps was forwarded to TRADOC in August 1977. It was a loosely structured concept which acknowledged both a variety of separate realities and the requirement for a definition of echelons above corps (EAC).

The INSCOM EAC concept indicated there was no known coherent doctrine for the implementation of tactical intelligence and electronic warfare operations and support at echelons above corps or for joint operations involving Army forces. It addressed those operations at echelons above corps and at joint task force level, proposing a concept to meet the purposes of INSCOM, DA, and Joint Commanders as they are confronted with the resolution of first multi-service, and then multi-national operations. Assumptions in the concept included:[2]

1. Intelligence and EW operations in a joint task force should be directly under the control of the joint commander without the intervention of a service component.

2. Provide support to an Army component commander or the commander of a uni-service or single corps operation just as well as it will support the joint commander.

3. Current emphasis on GAMO will insure that interoperability of systems and communications is resolved. Inter-service procedural interoperability will be resolved through the Joint Planning System.

4. The concept is compatible with IOSS and with the functional arrangement of the CEWI Groups and Battalions.

The INSCOM concept postulated that the intelligence and EW organization at echelons above corps should logically be a joint entity which responds directly to the joint commander. Should the Army be deployed to fight, the greatest probability exists that it will fight as a member of a joint force. Therefore, barring the establishment of service component commands, the operational EAC should be the Joint Task Force (JTF). The imposition of service component commands in the necessary intelligence channels serves mostly to impede the flow of information and detract from the potential responsiveness of the combined joint intelligence assets. Component commands, if formed, should be excluded from intelligence operations which concern the corps and the JTF. The component commands may be required to support service elements with men and material. It was therefore proposed that a Joint

Table of Distribution and Allowances (JTDA) be formulated to provide the basis for all-source, all-service intelligence and EW organizations in support of such joint or subordinate unified commands as require them.

The proposed JTDA (nominally a Joint Intelligence Operations Center) will provide the JTF with those centralized intelligence support and management functions necessary to optimize the allocation of limited surveillance, reconnaissance, and processing assets within the theater. Each service will be tasked to provide personnel, equipment, and communications commensurate with their functional representation in the Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). Further, each service element which is dedicated to the JIOC will be so configured in terms of grades and skills that it will be capable of operating in a uni-service mode if required—however, the greatest emphasis is to be placed upon total integration of services and intelligence/EW operations in the JIOC. The deployment of a single corps JTF will require a joint augmentation by an appropriately sized-down JIOC.

Rather than dividing the JIOC into classical disciplines (SIGINT, HUMINT, PHOTINT, etc.), it was proposed that an elementary functional division of effort into current intelligence and order of battle/historical (nominally Targeting and Area Intelligence/Order of Battle) will provide the JTF J2 with the greatest flexibility in employing these assets. The major subsections of the JIOC will contain appropriate representatives from each service in each of the appropriate disciplines (SIGINT, HUMINT, PHOTINT, OPSEC, etc.). The information flow—while largely situation dependent—is postulated to input into the JIOC through the targeting element to glean immediate threat information or targets of opportunity, especially those which are beyond the area of influence of the major ground force commanders. These targets would be provided to the J3 on an immediate basis for destruction or suppression with weapons systems to include EW. Target descriptions will include an analysis of target vulnerability relative to potential weapons systems available (i.e., weapons systems include aircraft, artillery, missiles, infantry units, etc.). The flow of information will then proceed to and through the Area Intelligence/Order of Battle element of the JIOC for incorporation into the data base, indepth analysis, and further processing as required. Should targets of opportunity or a larger threat not previously discernible, be derived from this process, that information is fed to targeting for action.

In order to make the targeting process as responsive as possible, it was postulated that it will include weaponeering within the JIOC by members of the J3 staff, assigned to the JIOC for that purpose. Weaponeering will consist of comparing targets with weapons systems to determine the most effective and efficient methods and systems with which to destroy the target to a prescribed degree. The resulting information would then be transmitted to the J3, showing recommended priorities for use of selected weapons systems against particular targets.

The other immediately obvious task in the JIOC is management of both the Targeting and Area Intelligence/Order of Battle sections and such collection assets as are assigned to the JTF. It was postulated that any tasking of subordinate ground forces for intelligence collection and production will be in mission statement format and will not involve detailed interference with the operations ongoing in the corps zones. The management element would provide interface with higher, lower, adjacent, and allied commands. Subordinate units will place liaison teams at the JIOC, within the management section, to insure that their requirements are met in terms of timeliness and substance.

Army resources to man the JIOC will come from the Intelligence and Security Group subordinate to USAINSCOM. The Intelligence and Security Group (ISG), now postulated to exist at theater level, will act as carrier for JIOC Army elements during nondeployment. Upon the activation of a JTF for maneuver or war, the JIOC, previously staffed with all-source, all-service cadre (at about one-half mobilization strength) becomes operational and becomes the JTF J2's action agency. While it is not yet clear exactly what Army collection assets will exist at EAC, it was proposed that such assets will be assigned to the ISG and will be used or controlled during deployment by the JTF commander. Under conditions of deployment, ISG would either fall under the JTF directly or under the Army component command. However, it must be stressed that the JIOC and its assets would not come under component command. Although it is not clear exactly which Air Force elements would provide the AF side of the JIOC or exactly what AF interfaces would be, if is suspected that the Tactical Fusion Center and Combat Information Center of the Tactical Air Control System will be intimately involved.

Conclusions of the INSCOM Concept follow:

1. JTF is the appropriate EAC for Intelligence and EW Operations.

2. There is a requirement for a Joint Intelligence and EW organization similar to the one as proposed above.

3. The proposed organization will support uni-service and/or Army component requirements (such as single corps deployment).

4. The proposed organizational concept will respond to the broadest range of requirements in both peace and war.

5. The proposed concept will provide the framework for a TYPE ISG.

6. INSCOM is the appropriate agency to develop a completed concept of this type for the US Army.

7. Joint coordination of this concept is required at the earliest stages.

INSCOM proposed this concept to TRADOC during the latter part of August 1977 where it was not favorably received. It was generally believed that INSCOM did not address the Army Intercept and Position Fixing (IPF) sufficiently. Accordingly, HQ INSCOM revised the concept and submitted its IPF concept to TRADOC in late September 1977.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

1. DF, IACS-MPG, 18 Oct 77, subj: Revised Draft, AR 10-X.
2. Ltr, HQ INSCOM, IAOPS-SR-R, 22 Aug 77, subj: USAINSCOM Concept for Intelligence and EW at Echelons Above Corps; Telephone Inquiry, CPT Campbell, ODCSS, HQ INSCOM, 15 Jun 77.

CHAPTER IV

(b)(1)

(U)
~~(C)~~ INSCOM Organization. At the close of FY 1977, there was a total of 66 units (17 TOE and 49* TDA) in the INSCOM organizational structure. Worldwide organization and deployment, as of 30 September 1977, is indicated in appendix A. For lists of TOE and TDA units at the close of the report period, see appendixes B and D, respectively. Changes in the status of TOE and TDA units occurring during the fiscal year are depicted in appendixes C and E, respectively.

MG William I. Rolya commanded INSCOM throughout the year. He was promoted to his present rank on 1 July 1977. BG James E. Freeze served as the Deputy Commanding General until 10 February 1977 when his title was changed to Deputy Commanding General, INSCOM (AHS). Concurrently, BG Edmund R. Thompson, Commanding General, USAINTA, was given the added title of Deputy Commanding General, INSCOM (FGGM). Upon the reassignment of BG Thompson as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA, on 29 August 1977, BG Freeze assumed the dual role of Commanding General, USAINTA and Deputy Commanding General, INSCOM (FGGM). The Deputy Commanding General, INSCOM (AHS) position remained vacant for the remainder of the fiscal year.

At the end of FY 1977, Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was organized to consist of a Command Group, General Staff, and Special/Personal Staff as shown below.[1]

Command Group:

Commanding General (CG). The CG was responsible to the Chief of Staff, US Army for accomplishment of the mission and functions assigned by DA and act as the Army's Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA) commander for cryptologic activities.

Deputy Commanding General (DCG). From 1 October 1976 to 10 February 1977, the DCG acted for the CG during his absence and performed other duties as assigned. On 10 February 1977, the DCG was designated as the DCG, INSCOM (AHS) and the CG, USAINTA was designated additionally as the DCG, INSCOM (FGGM). This interim arrangement was made to facilitate supervision of INSCOM elements as they were integrated at Arlington Hall Station and at Fort George G. Meade. During the absence of the CG and the DCG, INSCOM (AHS), command of INSCOM was assumed by the DCG, INSCOM (FGGM).

Chief of Staff (CofS). The CofS was responsible to the CG and DCG for formulating and announcing policies pertaining to the operation of the staff

*This figure does not include Augmentation, Augmentation (Carrier), or Provisional units.

and reviewing staff actions to insure compliance with announced policies and plans. The Office of Plans, Programs and Analysis and the Office of Public Affairs were directly subordinate to the CofS. The Civilian Personnel Office, formerly subordinate to the CofS, was transferred to the DCSPER on 1 March 1977.

Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS). The ACofS acted for the CofS during his absence and performed other duties as directed by the CofS.

Secretary of the General Staff (SGS). The SGS acted as the executive officer for the CofS and served as Assistant to the ACofS. The SGS supervised the Office of Public Affairs in addition to managing the offices of the CG, DCG, and CofS, and for the assignment and review of staff actions.

Advisor for Scientific and Cryptologic Affairs. The Advisor served as the principal advisor to the CG on scientific and cryptologic matters.

Command Sergeant Major (CSM). The CSM served as a personal advisor and assistant to the CG on those matters pertaining primarily to enlisted personnel including, but not limited to, morale, welfare, customs and courtesies of the service, enlistment, reenlistment, discipline, and promotion policies.

Chief, Plans, Programs and Analysis (CPPA). The Chief, PPA was the principal assistant to the CofS in determining overall command planning, resource programming, cost and economic analysis, and the review of mission, functions and management actions. The Cost and Economic Analysis Division and the Resource Programming Division were transferred to DCSRM on 1 January 1977 and 20 February 1977, respectively. At the close of the report period, organizational elements within OPPA were the Management and Analysis Division and the MACOM Planning Group.

General Staff:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER). The DCSPER was the principal staff assistant in the formulation of policies and procedures and preparation of plans and directives in matters pertaining to the management of military and civilian personnel, training of individuals, safety, military courtesy, discipline, Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Human Relations, Equal Opportunity Program, career development, morale and welfare activities, and nonappropriated fund activities. The ODCSPER was comprised of an Administrative Division, Management Division, Plans and Training Division, Military Personnel Division, and Civilian Personnel Division at the close of the report period. The Civilian Personnel Office was directly subordinate to the CofS until 1 March 1977 when it was assigned to the DCSPER and designated Civilian Personnel Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Security (DCSSEC). The DCSSEC began the fiscal year as the principal staff assistant for the formulation, implementation, and supervision of policies and procedures pertaining to personnel, physical,

information, and industrial security. FY 1977 marked a period of tremendous turmoil caused by on-going Army-wide IOSS implementation actions which resulted in near-constant frustration as this office attempted to structure effective security programs to support the new intelligence MACOM. During the year, ODCSSEC was comprised of two operating divisions: Personnel Security Division and Security Management Division. Following the transfer of spaces, mission and functions throughout the year, plans were underway for the residual ODCSSEC assets to be redesignated as the Command Security Office and made an organizational element of the Directorate of Counterintelligence on 31 October 1977.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS). The DCSOPS provided the principal advice and assistance to the CG for the conduct of current operations involving SIGINT and EW; managed assigned SIGINT and EW resources; provided for INSCOM participation in the development and utilization of Special Activities Office (SAO) assets in support of Army intelligence requirements; insured that operational advice and assistance on cryptologic matters was provided to major Army commands and activities, as appropriate; developed, coordinated, and promulgated operational directives for the conduct of specified collection operations; maintained appropriate liaison with elements of DA, NSACSS, and other MACOM's; insured the development of appropriate plans for contingency operations; insured the development of viable training programs for all assigned units and a viable MOBDES (mobilization designee) program; determined the validity of materiel and systems requirements and established operational priorities and requirements for the procurement and development of materiel and/or systems; and developed, coordinated, and promulgated short, mid, and long range planning incident to the conduct of operational/contingency plans, programming functions and SIGINT architectural software and hardware requirements. Upon the disestablishment of DCSFOR on 1 March 1977, DCSOPS was assigned responsibility for the planning, coordination, and supervision of all force development actions. On 1 January 1977, DCSOPS was given responsibility for INSCOM participation in the development and use of SAO assets in support of Army intelligence requirements. On 1 March 1977, the Signal Security Division was assigned to the Directorate of Counterintelligence (DCI) and redesignated Plans and Programs Element (AHS). On 10 May 1977, a major DCSOPS reorganization was effected. One of the two major DCSOPS organizational elements (Operations Support) was disestablished and its subordinate elements (Management Division; Plans, Training, and Readiness (PTR) Division; History Office; and TRACER ROUND) were reassigned directly to the DCSOPS. Management Division was redesignated as Programs and Evaluation Division. The other major organizational element (Current Operations) was redesignated as SIGINT/EW Operations Directorate and retained the same subordinate elements (Special Operations Division; Europe, Pacific, and ELI Divisions). CONUS Division was redesignated as Special Operations Division but did not function as such until 23 September 1977 upon receipt of additional personnel. Also, on 23 September, the Operations Center was transferred from PTR responsibility to SIGINT/EW. At the close of the fiscal year, the ODCSOPS consisted of Administrative, Aviation, and History Offices; Programs and Evaluation Division; Plans,

Training, and Readiness Division; SIGINT/EW Operations Directorate; TRACER ROUND element; Special Projects Element (transferred from DCSRDA on 1 January 1977); and Systems and Requirements Directorate (established on 1 March 1977 when DCSFOR was disestablished).

Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG). The DCSLOG had general staff supervision over all INSCOM logistics activities until the USASA Materiel Support Command was transferred to DARCOM on 7 February 1977. The DCSLOG continued to be Program Director for Military Construction Army (MCA) and was responsible for developing and monitoring the logistic portion of the Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Program. He formulated, reviewed, and evaluated policies, plans, programs and concepts incident to the conduct of logistic operations; he directed the acquisition of equipment, facilities, and services unique to the mission requirements of the command; and maintained liaison with other agencies and services for purpose of coordinating conduct of logistic operations. At year's end, ODCSLOG was comprised of a Procurement Office, Management Division, Materiel Division, Maintenance Division, Installations Division, and Fixed Station Engineering Division. The latter division was established on 26 December 1976 as the result of functions assigned to DCSRDA in April 1976 being reassigned to DCSLOG.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Development (DCSFOR). Until 1 March 1977, the DCSFOR was the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to combat developments, force requirements, life cycle management, and manpower management. He was responsible for the development of active force requirement plans and detailed force structures in support of Army and USACSS planning; establishment of operational priorities and systems requirements; determining validity of materiel and systems requirements; and supervision of implementation of force development plans. The Office of the DCSFOR was disestablished on 1 March 1977 and its organizational elements, consisting of the Tactical and Non-Tactical Divisions, were integrated into the ODCSOPS. Personnel and functions of the Structure Division were transferred to the DCSRM in January 1977. The Life Cycle Management Systems Office was transferred to DCSRDA in February 1977. Factors bearing on this disestablishment were organizational changes within HQ INSCOM during FY 1975 and FY 1976/7T which resulted in the transfer of DCSFOR resources to other staff elements; implementation of IOSS recommendations which resulted in the transfer of combat development functions to TRADOC; and alignment of the HQ INSCOM organizational structure with that of HQDA.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM). On 1 December 1976, the DCSRM became the principal staff assistant to the CG in matters pertaining to programming, budget, manpower authorization, control and utilization, management analysis and engineering, cost and economic analysis, finance and accounting, accounting policy, control of funds, and internal review. He exercised staff supervision over and assisted and advised commanders in all matters relating to resource management throughout the command. This mission reflects the continuation of the functions of the disestablished Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller (DCSCOM) under the new staff element and

the additional functions transferred from ODCSFOR, OPPA, and the Value Engineering position from ODCSLOG (transferred on 3 January 1977). Although DCSRM was established on 1 December 1976, the transfer of spaces and functions to the new staff element took place over a period of some months. As ofthe end of FY 1977, the ODCSRM consisted of the Budget Division, Finance and Accounting Division, Internal Review Division (all elements of ODCSCOM); Program Analysis and Evaluation Office (transferred from OPPA on 20 February 1977); Manpower Division (personnel transferred from Authorizations Branch/ Utilization Branch, Structure Division, ODCSFOR, in January 1977); Management and Analysis Division (a merger of Management Practices Division and Review and Analysis Division (ODCSCOM) on 1 October 1976; and Cost and Economic Analysis Office (transferred from OPPA on 1 January 1977).

Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition (DCSRDA). The DCSRDA was the principal staff assistant and program area director for research, development and acquisition activities and was responsible for general staff functions and supervision of worldwide activities related to the planning, programming, review, analysis, coordination, conduct and management of the RDA effort associated with signal intelligence, signal security, and tactical EW. Effective 1 January 1977, the Special Projects Element (SPE) was transferred to DCSOPS. On 20 February 1977, the Life Cycle Management System (LCMS) Office was transferred to DCSRDA from DCSFOR. On 16 March 1977, the Commanders of DARCOM and INSCOM signed a Memorandum of Agreement to serve as a baseline for mutual understanding regarding the transfer of research, development, and acquisition responsibilities from INSCOM to DARCOM and to insure a smooth transfer of RDA responsibility from INSCOM to DARCOM to prevent a degradation of RDA support (competence, program continuity, and "corporate memory") and to minimize personnel impacts. At the close of FY 1977, DCSRDA organizational elements consisted of the Office of the Scientific Advisors, Industrial and Technical Liaison Office, Administrative Branch, Management and Control Division, Communications/EW Division, Electronics/EW Division, Signal Security Division, Tactical Data Systems Division, Acquisition Division, Test and Evaluation Office, and the LCMS Office. Beginning in January 1977, planning included transfer of operational control (OPCON) of RDA functions to DARCOM to cover a transitional period until the actual transfer was effected a a later date. However, OPCON was never passed to DARCOM and plans were made for the entire staff element to be redesignated as US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL) on 1 October 1977 and transferred to the US Army Electronic Research and Development Command (ERADCOM).

Deputy Chief of Staff, Management Information Systems (DCSMIS). The DCSMIS was the principal staff assistant for the development of plans, policies, and procedures and for the implementation, evaluation and coordination of automated systems including operations, administration and logistics associated therewith in INSCOM. No organizational changes took place during the year and ODCSMIS continued to consist of Plans, Programs and Requirements Division and Resources and Evaluation Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (DCSTEL). The DCSTEL was the principal staff assistant for all matters pertaining to the development, coordination, and staff supervision of all functions related to telecommunications within the command. At the end of the year, ODCSTEL consisted of Plans, Operations and Programs Division, Tactical Division, Telecommunications Engineering Division, and an Administrative Office. No significant organizational changes were effected during the year, however, plans were underway for all elements of ODCSTEL, except the Tactical Division, to be transferred to the US Army Communications Command-INSCOM, effective 1 October 1977. Personnel and equipment will be transferred in place. This organization will be headed by a Director and the Director, USACC-INSCOM will be dual-hatted and also serve as the DCSTEL, INSCOM. The Tactical Division will continue as a HQ INSCOM organizational element under DCSTEL and be responsible for matters relating to development and implementation of command telecommunications doctrine, plans and policies in support of tactical communications.

Director of Counterintelligence (DCI), INSCOM. Effective 1 March 1977, the DCI, USAINTA, was assigned the additional duty as DCI, INSCOM, and assigned the mission of directing and coordinating counterintelligence and signal security activities in INSCOM. He was also responsible for providing support to DA, MACOM's, and designated elements of DOD in areas of counterintelligence investigations, counterintelligence services, security support and signal security; developing, coordinating and implementing INSCOM CI and SIGSEC policy and procedures; exercising approval authority for use of polygraph in authorized investigations conducted by INSCOM; certifying and assuring quality control of polygraph examiners worldwide; developing and implementing policies and procedures to insure command compliance with AR 380-13 and the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts; and acting as SIGSEC Manager for HQDA. On 1 March 1977, Signal Security Division, ODCSOPS, was redesignated Policy and Programs Element (AHS), DCI INSCOM and, along with USASA Signal Security Activity, was placed under the operational control of the Director, Counterintelligence, USAINTA, at Fort Meade, Maryland. Initially, the DCI organizational elements consisted of a Security Division, Investigations Division, Plans and Operations Division, and Services Division, but with the assumption of signal security activities, it was reorganized on 15 April 1977 to consist of Plans and Programs Division, Operations and Management Division, and Security Division. This integration of signal security functions resulted in DCI elements being located at Fort Meade, Arlington Hall Station, and Vint Hill Farms Station. Assistant DCI's and Assistant Chiefs of Policy and Programs Division were located at both Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station; and an Assistant Chief, Operations and Management Division was located at Vint Hill Farms Station. This fragmentation of elements placed an unusually heavy coordination burden on the DCI staff.

Special Staff/Personal Staff:

Inspector General (IG). The IG, as a member of the personal staff and as

Confidential Agent of the CG and DCG, inquired into and reported on matters pertaining to mission performance and the state of discipline, efficiency, morale, and economy of the command; performed annual general inspections as prescribed by regulations; conducted special inspections as directed; and performed POM inspections for all units alerted for overseas movement. At the close of the report period, this office was organized into an Assistance and Investigations Division and Inspections Division.

Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). The SJA served as the legal advisor to the CG, DCG, CofS, and all staff elements of HQ INSCOM, and, as necessary, to subordinate elements of the command.

Chief, Office of Public Affairs (COPA). The Chief, OPA advised the CG of general staff responsibilities in the Public Affairs through the collection, maintenance and dissemination of information concerning INSCOM activities. It directed and supervised the audiovisual support activities of the command and provided staff supervision to subordinate commands concerning audiovisual requirements. OPA consisted of the INSCOM Audiovisual Manager, Plans and Services Branch, Graphic Aids Branch, and Audiovisual Branch.

(U) USASA Redesignated US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). On 1 January 1977, the US Army Security Agency (USASA) was redesignated US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).[2] This was to be yet another phase in the history of a military intelligence organization which has made many contributions to strategic intelligence requirements as well as tactical since its establishment on 15 September 1945. The redesignation on this date was primarily considered an administrative type action designed to maintain the momentum of the reorganization of the Army's intelligence resources until the official merger.[3]

The US Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA) was assigned to INSCOM on 1 January 1977[4] but there was to be no physical relocation of organizational elements or personnel until the formal establishment of INSCOM on 1 October 1977. In August 1977, to underscore the upcoming merger of USAINTA with INSCOM, the CG INSCOM directed that several positive, visible actions be taken. One of those actions concerned the mandatory wearing of the new INSCOM shoulder patch, effective 1 October 1977; and the wearing of the new distinctive badge as soon as it was available. Another action to take place on 1 October was the redesignation of Headquarters, USAINTA as the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Meade.

INSCOM Organization Day was designated as 1 October.[5]

~~(C)~~ Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS). On 5 December 1974, General Fred C. Weyand, CSA, directed that a study of the Army's intelligence organization and stationing be accomplished. The CSA Memorandum directed evaluation be made of missions, functions, organization, command and management relationships, and the stationing of USASA and USAINTA in

the broad framework of current and projected mission and resource requirements. The Study Group, headed by MG James J. Ursano, was drawn from elements of the Army Staff and the interested Army Commands. On 1 August 1975, the Study Group published its findings and recommendations. The CSA was briefed on the IOSS on 22 August 1975. He indicated that the importance and scope of the decisions required were too great to act upon after a single briefing and requested MG Ursano to provide a detailed presentation of each of the major issues so that they could be acted upon separately. Based on this guidance, it was decided to present seven decision briefs addressing the following issues:[6] (1) Tactical Integration, (2) Training, (3) Materiel Acquisition, (4) Logistics, (5) Telecommunications, (6) Intelligence Production, and (7) Management and Major Command Organization and Stationing.

On 16 September 1975, the CSA approved recommendations which included the transfer of USASA Program 2 (SIGINT and EW) and Program 3 (SIGSEC) tactical support resources from USASA to Army operational commands; the transfer of tactical support SSG (Special Security Group) functions, responsibilities, and resources from SSG to USASA tactical support units, with subsequent integration of these assets into single intelligence and electronic warfare organizations at corps, division, and separate brigade echelons; and the transfer of personnel management functions from USASA and SSG to the US Army Military Personnel Center (USAMILPERCEN). This decision has been fully implemented. On 1 January 1977, with minor exceptions (Korea), USASA tactical units were transferred to the supported units.[7] The transfer of tactical SSO resources and functions to USASA was largely completed by 1 October 1976.[8] Also on 1 October 1976, responsibility for the assignment and management of enlisted personnel of the command was transferred to MILPERCEN. Twenty-seven spaces (2 officers, 21 enlisted, 4 civilians) were transferred along with the functions. In November 1976, a trade-off of four civilian spaces for a like number of military spaces was agreed upon between MILPERCEN and HQ INSCOM. One officer and 16 enlisted personnel were actually transferred.[9]

On 31 October 1975, the CSA approved IOSS recommendation pertaining to training. Specifically, transfer of the USASA Training Center and School (USASATC&S) to TRADOC, transfer of USASA Combat Developments Activity (USASACDA) to TRADOC, and establishment of a long range objective of consolidating USASATC&S and the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) and associated combat development activities. As a result of this CSA decision, the USASATC&S and the USASACDA were transferred to TRADOC on 1 October 1976. With this transfer, TRADOC became responsible for the consolidation of the schools and related combat development activities.

On 9 February 1976, the CSA approved the IOSS recommendation relative to logistics. This decision directed the transfer of USASA Materiel Support Command (USASAMSC) to the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) with the requisite resources. Accordingly, command of USASAMSC was transferred to DARCOM on 7 February 1977. DARCOM subsequently redesignated USASAMSC as US Army Electronics Materiel Readiness Activity (EMRA).

On 9 February 1976, the IOSS recommendation concerning Telecommunications and Special Security Support was approved. This recommendation called for the transfer of management , operations and maintenance responsibilities for nontactical communications performed by USASA and SSG to the US Army Communications Command (USACC). It also included transfer of tactical SSO support to USASA initially, and ultimately to tactical organizations. Non-tactical SSO functions, less communications, were to be retained at HQDA with OACSI. During 1976, joint USASA-USACC on-site surveys were conducted to determine missions, functions, resources and facilities to be transferred to USACC. Analysis of the data collected continued well into FY 1977. Concurrently, USACC developed an Operations Plan (OPLAN) for transfer of communications from INSCOM to USACC effective 1 October 1977. This OPLAN was staffed and coordinated with other affected commands and approved by HQDA on 31 March 1977. In July 1977, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) betwen the Commander, USACC and the Commander, INSCOM was signed which documented the relationships between and the responsibilities of USACC and INSCOM subsequent to transfer. All TDA's were approved and implementing Permanent Orders were published prior to the 1 October 1977 effective date.10

On 5 April 1976, recommendations relative Intelligence Production and Management and Major Command Organizational Structure were approved as follows:

1. The US Army Intelligence Production Center (IPC)(final name subject to review) was to be established without the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) and the Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA) which would remain assigned to DARCOM and without the Medical Intelligence and Information Agency (MIIA) which would remain with The Surgeon General (TSG). Resources for the IPC would be those of the USA Special Research Detachment, USA Intelligence Support Detachment, USA Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment, USA Imagery Interpretation Center, USA Intelligence Operations Support Detachment, and USA Forces Command Intelligence Group.

2. Using the MACOM structure of USASA as a base with expanded mission responsibilities to include intelligence production and HUMINT, CI, and other support activities associated with USAINTA, the MACOM (INSCOM) was to be established. The 650th MI Group was to remain subordinate to SHAPE.

On 17 May 1976, ACSI, DA, directed USASA, in coordination with USAINTA, to develop a concept plan for the establishment of INSCOM, including the IPC. This plan was to include proposed missions, functions, command relationships, resource requirements, location of INSCOM, etc. A Concept Plan for the new MACOM, dated 13 August 1976 was submitted to HQDA. On 21 October 1976, USASA received letter guidance from HQDA establishing interim missions and functions for USASA and USAINTA for the period 21 October 1976 to 1 October 1977. This guidance stated that a single MACOM would be formed which would be responsible for Army intelligence, counterintelligence, and electronic warfare functions. HQ USASA and HQ USAINTA were to consolidate in forming this major command with HQ USASA as the base organization.11

Public affairs guidance was disseminated to all USASA and USAINTA units in early December. This guidance announced the functional reorganization of the Army intelligence community, to include transfer of units and other realignments. Included also was the text of a news release, pertinent questions and answers, and notification responsibilities of commanders of affected installation.

In mid December 1976, ACSI, DA, advised the Commander, USASA, and other interested addressees that interim steps to establishment of a new intelligence major command had been approved by HQDA. This included the redesignation of USASA to US Army Intelligence and Security Command and the transfer of selected intelligence activities to INSCOM in January 1977. The Commander, USASA was further advised that the INSCOM Concept Plan (13 August 1976) was being returned for revision with significant guidance as follows:

1. INSCOM, as the Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA) in the interface between the tactical and national systems, would be the principal Army element of the NSA operational system. INSCOM would provide technical advice and assistance to other MACOM's on SIGINT/EW matters and would be the nontactical intelligence and EW operator in general support of the Army as appropriate. Additionally, INSCOM would be the Executive Agent of the Productive Utilization Program (PUP) for the tactical intelligence and EW units.

2. INSCOM would be coequal with other MACOM's. As a functional, specialized MACOM, INSCOM would support other MACOM's in its field of expertise, providing intelligence and threat analysis products, intelligence collection, and counterintelligence/security services, as requested.

3. INSCOM would initially be established within the constraints of currently authorized and programmed resources of those activities approved by HQDA for inclusion in the new MACOM.

ACSI, DA, further advised that HQDA had decided to establish an intelligence reorganization overwatch committee to insure that approved IOSS recommendations would be effectively implemented and that such implementation would contribute to improved intelligence and EW operations in support of the Army mission.

The Concept Plan (13 August 1976) was returned by HQDA on 29 December 1976 with detailed guidance and instructions to submit a revised concept by 15 March 1977. It was further requested that USASA initiate action to develop Case Study and Justification Folders (CSJF) and Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) to evaluate INSCOM stationing alternatives for the following locations:

1. Vint Hill Farms Station (VHFS), Warrenton, Virginia. Base case study should reflect the MACOM going to VHFS with ERADCOM EW activities located on the installation, and a separate case study reflecting the MACOM going to VHFS without the ERADCOM EW presence.

2. Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

3. Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

4. Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia/Fort George G. Meade, Maryland (split location).[12]

On 1 January 1977, four field operating agencies (FOA) of OACSI, DA (USA Intelligence and Threat Analysis Detachment, USA Imagery Interpretation Center, USA Intelligence Support Detachment, and USA Intelligence Operations Support Detachment) and the US Army Forces Command Intelligence Center (FORSIC) were reassigned to HQ INSCOM and were included in the organization of the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC)(Provisional).[13] To manage the intelligence and threat analysis functions and to command ITAC, a skeleton staff element designated as the Director, Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DIRITA) was formed at HQ INSCOM by an internal reallocation of resources.

On 15 March 1977, the revised INSCOM Concept Plan (11 March 1977) was submitted to HQDA.

A formal CSA decision concerning Chapter 4 of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (Materiel Acquisition) was never published. In lieu thereof, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DARCOM and INSCOM was completed on 16 March 1977. The purpose of this MOA was threefold:

1. To serve as a baseline for mutual understanding regarding the transfer of research, development, and acquisition (RDA) responsibilities from CDR, INSCOM to CDR, DARCOM.

2. To recognize that the unique mission of electronic warfare and intelligence (EWI) units would require that RDA in support of that mission be conducted in a responsive and dedicated manner.

3. To insure a smooth transfer of RDA responsibility from INSCOM to DARCOM which would prevent a degradation of RDA support and minimize personnel impacts.

Responsibilities and procedures for planning, programming, and budgeting of the RDA functions would be transferred from INSCOM to DARCOM in recognition of the time-sensitive events in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle; maintenance of the integrity of responsibilities with respect to complete fiscal periods; and the schedule for activation of US Army Electronics Research and Development Command (ERADCOM) and its buildup in capability to assume responsibilities for PPBS matters.[14]

On 31 March 1977, an MOA between the CDR, INSCOM and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSI), Hq, US Army, Europe (USAREUR) was concluded. This MOA resulted from joint INSCOM/USAREUR meetings at Headquarters,

USAREUR during 28-31 March 1977 and represented a compromise between INSCOM and USAREUR to resolve USAREUR's nonconcurrence with the INSCOM Concept Plan. Basically, it was agreed that one operating Intelligence and Security organization should be established in Europe and that INSCOM would command the new organization with operational control (OPCON) assigned to USAREUR less OPCON over the specific functions of offensive CI operations (OFCO) and deep clandestine operations. Existing SIGINT OPCON arrangements would not change. The headquarters of the new USAREUR Intelligence and Security organization would be reflected on split MTOE, thereby retaining on paper two Group Headquarters for possible application against future NATO or Corps requirements. The new organization was to be established provisionally not earlier than 1 July 1977 and not later than 1 October 1977, and concomitantly, the 502d and 66th Military Intelligence Groups would cease to exist as separate activities. The parties also agreed that the INSCOM Concept Plan as it pertained to Europe would be rewritten to reflect agreements outlined in the MOA.[15]

Effective 1 April 1977, the 470th MI Group was relieved from assignment to FORSCOM and assigned to INSCOM. INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command was concurrently assigned to the 470th MI Group.

On 2 May 1977, the VCSA approved the INSCOM Concept Plan (11 March 1977), but directed that it be changed to include the following:

1. Provisions of the MOA between the CDR, INSCOM and the DCSI, USAREUR (31 March 1977).

2. Provisions of an MOA to be negotiated between the CDR, INSCOM and the CDR, CINCPAC Support Group, for the purpose of delineating the liaison functions of MI Detachment (Hawaii) with CINCPAC and US Army CINCPAC Support Group.

3. The 370th Operations Company (Rear) and 1st Aviation Company (Rear) remain assigned to FORSCOM.

4. Deputy Commander positions be established in the INSCOM chain of command.

5. The Chief of Staff's span of control be reduced by establishing an Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) at the earliest feasible date; and consideration be given to realigning the following organizations:

a. Data Systems Activity—under direct supervision of DCSADP.

b. AG Services Activity—under direct supervision of DCSPER.

c. Finance and Accounting Activity—under direct supervision of DCSRM.

d. Operations Center—within newly created ODCSOPS. Increased manning of the center to be considered.

6. The relationship of the Intelligence and Security Group (ISG) to supported commands and subordinate commands was to be refined.

7. The ADP support activity should include only those functions which cannot be more effectively performed by existing Army Central Design Agencies. INSCOM to coordinate the SIGINT/EW software support requirements with Project Manager for Army Tactical Data Systems.

8. The mission of the Data Systems Activity changed to reflect TRADOC's responsibilities for tactical systems.

9, Management of the Army Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS) to remain on the DA Staff (OACSI responsibility).

10. The battalions of the MI Group (CI/OPSEC)(CONUS) be redesignated as detachments.

11. Rewrite mission and functions assigned to the Intelligence Support Detachment (ISD).[16]

On 14 January 1977, HQ INSCOM published Change 1 to the INSCOM Concept Plan and incorporated the directed changes.[17]

The 66th MI Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional) was organized effective 1 July 1977 in accordance with the INSCOM/USAREUR MOA of 31 March 1977. The provisional organization incorporated elements previously subordinate to USAREUR, USASA, and USAINTA. Also, on 1 July 1977, the 902d MI Group (Counterintelligence/Operations Security)(Provisional) was organized utilizing USAINTA and USASA Signal Security Activity resources. USASA and USAINTA elements in Hawaii were combined on 1 August 1977 when INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii (Provisional) was organized.

As of 30 September 1977, INSCOM had accomplished the major actions resulting from CSA decisions on IOSS recommendations. Other actions pertaining thereto which were accomplished on 1 October 1977 included:

1. HQ USAINTA was redesignated Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Meade and the staffs were directed to consolidate.

2. The USACC assumed nontactical telecommunications functions from INSCOM and the SSG.

3. The INSCOM Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, Development, and Acquisition (DCSRDA) was transferred to DARCOM and redesignated Signals Warfare Laboratory.

4. The USASA Test and Evaluation Center was transferred to DARCOM.

(U) INSCOM Stationing Alternatives. In December 1976, DA requested USASA to evaluate INSCOM stationing alternatives at Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia; Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Fort George G. Meade, Maryland; and Arlington Hall Station, Virginia/Fort George G. Meade (split location). Shortly thereafter, as a result of DA decisions, choices of stationing sites were reduced to Fort Monmouth and Fort Meade with two alternatives— (1) Hq, First Army remaining in place at Fort Meade or Hq, First Army relocating elsewhere; (2) Vint Hill Farms Station with and without the Signal EW Element of ERADCOM located there. Subsequent to these refinements, Fort Monmouth was eliminated from further consideration by an OSD directed movement of non-INSCOM resources into space previously allocated for INSCOM. Additionally, at a May 1977 in process review (IPR), INSCOM's position that Fort Monmouth was unsatisfactory as a stationing site because it was too far from the center of national intelligence activities was approved. On 17 May 1977, DA issued guidance which resulted in the submission of a special study on the remaining options. The study, which was forwarded to DA on 29 July 1977, recommended that INSCOM be tasked to:

1. Develop a Case Study Justification Folder (CSJF) for stationing INSCOM at VHFS, less EMRA and ERADCOM elements.

2. Develop a CSJF for stationing INSCOM at Fort Meade without First Army.

DA approved recommendation Number 1 with the proviso that the INSCOM Study include stationing at VHFS with the ERADCOM elements already stationed there. DA changed recommendation Number 2 to read- "with First Army remaining in place." Although DA stated a position on the recommendations, no formal tasking was issued. INSCOM stationing was part of the much larger Army worldwide stationing package referred to OSD for approval and by the close of the fiscal year, DA had not received any OSD guidance.[18]

(C) DIRNSA Comments on INSCOM Concept Plan. In a letter to the Chief of Staff, US Army, dated 9 August 1977, the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA)/Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS) commented on the role of the Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA) and Army SIGINT elements in the US SIGINT System (USSS); management of (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA and interpretation of operational functions as described in the INSCOM Concept Plan (11 March 1977). The DIRNSA indicated that these issues must be resolved prior to approval of this concept. The DIRNSA letter also pointed out that the INSCOM Concept Plan, as written, limited the authority of the Army SCA Commander in his role as a subordinate commander within the CSS. This was accomplished by defining his relationships with Corps and below SIGINT units as "advisory, upon request" of the operational commanders involved. The CSS was established by NSCID #6 to consolidate all US SIGINT activities into the US SIGINT System. The DIRNSA was appointed CHCSS and assigned SIGINT operational control of the USSS. SCA commanders were

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

established as service component commanders within the CSS to assist the CHCSS in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities. Army SIGINT elements, regardless of echelon to which assigned, operate within and are, a part of the USSS. Their SIGINT operations must be conducted in accordance with procedures and directives established by the CHCSS. His authority and responsibility is clear and his agent within the Army for carrying out these responsibilities is and must remain the SCA Commander.

The SCA's traditionally have been the focal point for coordinating the necessary support for the USSS relative to personnel, training, RDTE, and supply and maintenance matters. The DIRNSA pointed out that the Concept Plan eliminated this role for the Army SCA in very critical areas. The development of SIGINT related materiel, under this Concept, involves TRADOC, DARCOM, INSCOM, OACSI, and their subordinate elements. Since NSA is charged by Congress with coordinating all SIGINT R&D, it must be provided a focal point for interaction with these agencies and commands. INSCOM is the logical choice as Army focal point for SIGINT support matters.

The INSCOM Concept Plan (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA which are under the direct control of and justified by the DIRNSA/CHCSS. One example cited was [redacted] resource which was placed under the operational control of the Intelligence Support Group (ISG) Korea, which in turn was under the operational control of the CG, Eighth US Army (EUSA). Other examples involving the Cryptologic Support Group, [redacted] and TAREX were cited as infringing on NSA prerogatives.

The INSCOM Concept Plan also appeared to abrogate the [redacted] entered into in June 1974 whereby ASA was allocated [redacted] Medina and in return agreed to assign [redacted] work on national missions at [redacted] Meade [redacted]

Finally, the letter stated that throughout the plan, SIGINT operational relationships and functions which impact directly on NSACSS had not been coordinated and that these issues must be resolved.

The CSA, by letter dated 28 November 1977, responded to the NSA letter of 9 August 1977. He indicated that during recent discussions, DIRNSA and Army staffs had resolved most issues raised by the DIRNSA and that the Army would continue to work in resolving other concerns. It was explained that separation of SIGINT combat developments, training, and materiel acquisition from the mainstream of these activities in the Army was a major barrier to full integration of both tactical and national SIGINT support into combat operations. To improve this situation, the Army transferred responsibility for SIGINT personnel management, combat developments, individual training, materiel RDTE, wholesale logistics, and nontactical communications to the Army functional commands. The Chief of Staff, US Army also stated that the CDR, INSCOM would serve as head of the Army's SCA and that his role would be an active one to insure compliance with appropriate signals intelligence directives. However, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

was charged to serve as the focal point for SIGINT policy matters. Also recognized in the CSA response was acknowledgement to keep NSA informed of all actions involving CCP resources and that the Army would work closely with NSA as IOSS implementation continues.19

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The J2, US Forces, Korea (USFK)/EUSA was tasked to plan this reorganization. A Working Group was appointed to consist of the following: LTC Charles T. Grimes, Chief, J2 Plans Office; MAJ Charles J. Roth, Jr., 502d MI Battalion; and CPT William L. Toten, FS Korea. The Group met primarily in the J2 Plans Office with group members accomplishing necessary coordination within their parent organizations. While given considerable latitude in planning the reorganization, they could not exceed the current total resources of the units involved in the reorganization (1246 spaces); and they had to identify the intelligence resources that would remain in-country in the event of an Army withdrawal or drawdown.

Beginning with zero base, the Working Group began to build, by function, the type of organization which could support intelligence requirements within Korea. One of the first efforts of the Group was to identify all of the functions that were to be accomplished together with the authority therefor. Some of the considerations in planning this reorganization were as follows:

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2. Requirement for all-source integration and the need for two All-Source Intelligence Centers (ASIC).

3. Requirement for Sensitive Activity Vulnerability Estimates (SAVE) and Security Vulnerability Analysis (SVA) which did not then exist in Korea.

4. Assignment of intelligence activities to the 2d Infantry Division (329th ASA Company, 2d MI Detachment, and SIGSEC support).

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In an effort to form a truly integrated organization, Program 2 and Program 3 elements were combined. While this made program management and audit trail more difficult, it did permit building an organization as envisioned in the IOSS.

After discussions and coordination with the various interested commands, an Army level MI Group under the command of INSCOM was established. Thus, the 501st Military Intelligence Group (Provisional) was organized on 1 April 1977, utilizing 502d MI Battalion and FS Korea resources. The 501st Group, with headquarters in Seoul, became the parent command of FS Korea and its subordinate elements; the 209th MI Detachment (Provisional) and its subordinate field and resident offices; the Combined Research Detachment; the National Liaison Team; and two activities unique to Army intelligence—the All-Source Intelligence Centers (ASIC) at Headquarters, EUSA and I Corps Group (US/ROK).

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 501st MI Group (Prov) performed normal housekeeping functions and provided personnel to staff the Group Headquarters and the two ASIC's. Additionally, it furnished 28 personnel to augment the staff of the J2, USFK/G2, EUSA.

FS Korea was located at Camp Humphreys, near Pyong Taek. It consisted of a Headquarters and Service Company which provided the field station with administrative, logistic, and maintenance support.

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The 209th MI Detachment (Provisional) was formed by expanding the traditional counterintelligence mission of counterespionage, countersabotage, and counter-subversion to include the functions of operations security (OPSEC), signal security, and interrogation. Counterintelligence technical services included technical surveillance countermeasures, polygraph, investigative photography, and defense against method of entry (DAME) capabilities. Twelve field and resident offices, subordinate to the 209th MI Detachment (Prov) were located throughout Korea at Chunchon, Uijongbu, Seoul, Ascom, Wonju, Camp Humphreys, Osan, Taejon, Taegu, Kwangju, Chinhae, and Pusan. These offices conducted counterintelligence functions and the personnel served as security consultants in connection with OPSEC support program. As an adjunct to the OPSEC support, 209th personnel provided a wide range

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of signal security services in support of USFK to include crypto-facility inspections and approvals, TEMPEST inspections, radio and telephone monitoring for security purposes, and technical document reviews. Finally, the 209th provided interrrogation support for EUSA in response to national level requirements.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

As organized, the 501st MI Group (Prov) provided a 23-person ASIC which supported and was physically located with EUSA Headquarters at Yongsan, and a 14-person ASIC which supported and was located at Hq I Corps Group (US/ROK) at Camp Red Cloud, Uijongbu. The 501st Group (Prov) also provided an 11-person SSO at I Corps Group which was integrated into the ASIC. The ASIC was the focal point for tasking the 501st intelligence collection assets in response to requirements developed by EUSA and I Corps Group and provided a fusion center for all-source intelligence information provided by the collection elements. In addition to providing the interface between the supported command and the 501st resources, the ASIC also maintained a central respository for ground order of battle and monitored the tasking of Group resources. The establishment of the ASIC was one of the significant developments resulting from implementing IOSS recommendations in Korea. The need for an all-source fusion element in Korea had long been recognized and those provided by the 501st to EUSA and I Corps Group were the prototypes.

On 1 September 1977, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 501st MI Group Augmentation (Carrier), UIC WH6A90, was organized at Yongsan, Korea, and was used for the assignment of resources pending the planned activation of the 501st MI Group on 1 January 1978.

Although the 502d MI Battalion was incorporated into the 501st MI Group (Prov) on 1 April 1977, the 502d's MTOE remained in effect for requisitioning purposes until 1 September 1977, at which time the Hq & Hq Company,

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501st MI Group Augmentation (Carrier) was organized and, for all intents and purposes, replaced the 501st MI Group (Prov). However, the Provisional Group was not formally discontinued until after the end of the fiscal year. In like manner, the 209th MI Detachment (Prov) was also replaced by the 209th MI Detachment Augmentation (Carrier) on 1 September 1977.

Two Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), one on Operations and the other on Administration/Logistics, between CDR, INSCOM and CDR, EUSA, with effective dates of 1 April 1977, covered the formation and operation of the INSCOM Group in Korea. The MOU dealing with Administration/Logistics delineated administrative and logistical relationships and defined responsibilities. The MOU dealing with Operations delineated operational relationships and defined the respective responsibilities of EUSA and INSCOM concerning intelligence, security, and electronic warfare support.

In the opinion of one member of the Working Group, any success enjoyed by the Group could be attributed to its small size, development of the concept from a zero base, and the cooperation received from the supported command. In addition, personalities were not considered in forming the organization and no effort was made to identify individuals against specific spaces.[20]

(U) Single CONUS MI Group Concept. During the period October 1976 to April 1977, the Directorate of Counterintelligence (DCI) and the 902d MI Group worked together in formalizing the single CONUS MI Group concept. In the course of this study, plans were made to combine the existing 902d MI Group, the 525th MI Group, the 901st MI Detachment, the USA Signal Security Activity and its subordinate US Army Security Detachments-Regions I, III, and IV. There were many planning constraints which included expense ceilings and no transfer of personnel in conjunction with any planned reorganization.

After considering several options, the Commanders of USASA/INSCOM and USAINTA approved the formation of single CONUS counterintelligence and signal security group. The decision was also made to have three battalions subordinate to the group based on geographical considerations (East Coast, Central and West Coast). At field and resident office level, only minor adjustments were needed. The signal security field teams were integrated into field offices nearest their base of operations. To put this single CONUS MI Group into being, the 902d MI Group (Provisional) was organized on 1 July 1977 with headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Subordinate units to the 902d were the following:

91st MI Battalion (Prov), Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

92d MI Battalion (Prov), Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

93d MI Battalion (Prov), Presidio of San Francisco, California.

574th MI Detachment (Prov), Pentagon, Washington, DC.

(b)(1)

901st MI Detachment (Prov), Alexandria, Virginia.

US Army Security Support Detachment (Prov), Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

Three SIGSEC teams were combined in the East Coast Battalion (91st) with the field offices at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Fort Meade, Maryland; and Atlanta, Georgia, thus integrating CI, TEMPEST and SIGSEC elements. The Central Battalion (92d) had only one TEMPEST team which was subordinated to battalion headquarters and three SIGSEC teams which were incorporated into the CI elements at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Sheridan, Illinois; and Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The West Coast Battalion (93d) had one SIGSEC and one TEMPEST team, both of which remained under battalion control. The staffs of the Group and the Battalions reflected the new integrated concept, with all supervisory positions being capable in both the counterintelligence and signal security disciplines.

The Pentagon Counterintelligence Force became the 574th MI Detachment (Prov) with responsibility for the Pentagon Reservation and the Military District of Washington. The 901st MI Detachment (Prov) remained virtually unchanged with the mission of supporting the Defense Nuclear Agency; however, the 901st was subordinated to the 902d MI Group (Prov). The constraint of not creating a new field operating activity forced the organization of the US Army Security Support Detachment (SSD)(Prov) under the 902d MI Group (Prov). In organizing the SSD, the Control Test and Communications Systems Support Divisions of the Signal Security Activity were transferred to it. Also, speciality areas such as polygraph, US Army Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM), defense against methods of entry (DAME), photography, automatic data processing systems (ADPS) security, and the sensitive activity vulnerability estimate (SAVE) elements of the US Army Operational Security Group (OSG) was transferred to the SSD.[21]

~~(S)~~ Intelligence and Security Arrangements, Europe. On 31 March 1977, MG Oliver W. Dillard, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSI), US Army, Europe (USAREUR), and BG William I. Rolya, CDR, INSCOM, signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on the subject of Intelligence and Security Arrangements, Europe. The MOA was a compromise between the provisions of the INSCOM Concept Plan for Echelons Above Corps (EAC) operations in Europe. The MOA resulted from joint INSCOM/USAREUR meetings at HQ, USAREUR, during 28-31 March 1977, and became the basis for revising that portion of the 11 March 1977 INSCOM Concept Plan relevant to INSCOM operations in Europe. Change 1, INSCOM Concept Plan, 14 June 1977, reflected the agreements concluded in the MOA.

In accordance with the MOA, that one Intelligence and Security organization would be established in Europe, the Intelligence and Security Group, Europe (Provisional) was organized from existing resources of the 66th MI Group at Munich, Germany, effective 1 July 1977. It was under command of INSCOM with OPCON assigned to CINCUSAREUR, (b)(1) OPCON over the specific functions of (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) mounted against deep (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) and other strategic targets not of primary interest to USAREUR.

Individual units comprising ISG, Europe (Prov) remained assigned to the MACOM currently exercising command of those units, including those TOE spaces from Hq & Hq Company, 502d ASA Group that was combined with Hq, 66th MI Group to form Hq, ISG, Europe (Prov). In addition, the tactical Intelligence Center, primary control and analysis center (PCAC) elements, and the CSG were combined to form the operations element of the ISG.

On 1 August 1977, the Intelligence and Security Group, Europe (Prov) was redesignated as 66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional).[22]

(C)(NOFORN) Reorganization in Panama. As a result of the IOSS, Army intelligence units located in Panama were reassigned/restructured. Using the 470th MI Group as a base, the strategic intelligence assets of INSCOM, FORSCOM, and USAINTA were combined into one integrated military intelligence group. The table below reflects the changes effected.

Table 1—Changes in Panama Organizations

Unit	Prior Subordination	Present Assignment
470th MI Gp	FORSCOM	USAINTA(1)
INSCOM Det, Southern Comd	504th ASA Gp	470th MI Gp(1)
Canal Zone Field Office	902d MI Gp	470th MI Gp(1)
Latin American Det, TSA	USATSA	470th MI Gp(2)

(1) Reassigned effective 1 April 1977.
(2) OPCON only, effective 1 April 1977.

Concurrent with the assignment of these units to the 470th, the Group was reorganized into the Command Group,

(b)(1)

(U) Establishment of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DCSITA)(Provisional). As the result of the CSA decision of 4 May 1976, to implement recommendations pertaining to Chapters 7 and 8, IOSS, the following five Army intelligence production activities in CONUS were to be transferred to INSCOM effective 1 January 1977:

1. US Army Imagery Interpretation Center (USAIIC).

2. US Army Forces Command Intelligence Center (concurrently redesignated US Army Intelligence and Security Command Intelligence Group).

3. US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment (USAITAD).

4. US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment (USAIOSD).

5. US Army Intelligece Support Detachment (USAISD).

To perform the necessary planning for the transfer of these units, an Intelligence and Threat Analysis Planning Office was formed on 26 October 1976 within the Office of Plans, Programs and Analysis (OPPA), HQ INSCOM. Staff responsibilities soon expanded to the extent that a separate office was required. On 1 March 1977, a staff element designated Deputy Chief of Staff for Intellligence and Threat Analysis (DCSITA)(Provisional) was established to plan, supervise, manage and coordinate the activities of the transferred units and to plan and manage the implementation of the INSCOM Concept Plan. The Acting DCSITA was designated as the principal staff officer of the CDR, INSCOM for all matters pertaining to intelligence and threat analysis. LTC Robert R. Sieck was designated the Acting DCSITA.[24]

(U) Organizational Planning for US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (USAITAC)(Provisional). To foster organizational and management improvements to overcome deficiencies contained in the IOSS, plans were made to organize a US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (Prov) with resources from the INSCOM Intelligence Group, the US Army Imagery Interpretation Center, the US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment, the US Army Intelligence Support Detachment; and the US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment.

Planning called for the USAITAC (Prov) to be a major subordinate command of INSCOM and would operate in general support of the Army with three major subelements: (1) Intelligence Analysis Group (Prov), (2) Imagery Intelligence Group (Prov), and (3) Intelligence Support Detachment (Prov).

Organizationally, USAITAC (Prov) had advanced sufficiently to assume responsibility for intelligence dissemination support within the Army when HQDA transferred that responsibility to INSCOM effective 22 August 1977. This responsibility included acting as the single point of contact within the Army for DIA on dissemination matters, validating statements of intelligence interest, validating requirements for recurring finished intelligence products, and validating one-time requests for foreign intelligence. This applied to all CONUS Army elements and Army overseas organizations not a part of unified or specified commands.

Permanent Orders 65-2, HQ INSCOM, 13 September 1977, announced the organization of the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (Prov), effective 1 October 1977. Its mission was to process, analyze, produce, report and disseminate all-source, integrated intelligence and counterintelligence products, threat analyses and imagery exploitation for the Department of the Army (DA) and major commands in support of combat operations, planning,

training, and materiel and combat development activities; to identify intelligence gaps of interest to DA; and to serve as threat validation executive agent for DA.[25]

(U) INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii (Prov) Organized. Effective 1 August 1977, INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii (Prov) was organized at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, from existing resources of the following elements:

1. Honolulu Field Office, 525th MI Group.

2. US Army Security Detachment, Hawaii.

3. Hawaii Team, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Division, USA Operational Security Group.

4. Hawaii Liaison Office, USAINTA Hq Support Detachment.

5. Hawaii Team, USA Technical Support Activity.

Earlier in the year, on 26 May 1977, the Commander, US Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG) and the Deputy Commander, INSCOM, signed an agreement detailing the functions and realtionship between USACSG and INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii. The Detachment, under the command and control ofthe CDR, INSCOM, was to act as the INSCOM advisor to the CDR, USACSG, for all INSCOM activities in the Pacific Command (PACOM) and in coordination with CDR, USACSG, interface with J2, CINCPAC, on INSCOM operations. INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii would also conduct liaison as requested with appropriate Hawaii-based government agencies for the purpose of enhancing the mission accomplishment of INSCOM elements in the PACOM area. The USACSG would act as HQDA Coordinating Authority for Army intelligence matters of CINCPAC concern which transcend more than one MACOM area as well as a number of other coordinating and supervisory functions.[26]

(U) ~~(C)~~ Special Security Office (SSO) Support. On 14 November 1975, ACSI, DA, charged HQ USASA with responsibility for preparing a plan for transfer of tactical SSO support from US Army Special Security Group (USASSG) to USASA. The USASA plan (OPLAN 1-76) was submitted to ACSI for approval with 1 October 1976 as the established date the USASSG units would be transferred to USASA. Following review of OPLAN 1-76, ACSI directed a number of revisions primarily to include a standardized MTOE for Corps and Division SSO support and the provision of SSO support to a number of units not previously receiving this support. By 1 October 1976, all SSO tactical resources had been transferred to USASA tactical units with the possible exception of two units which had not completed the paperwork involved. With the transfer of the USASA tactical units to their supported commands, the newly acquired SSO function was also transferred with the unit.

In early November 1976, the DCSSEC, HQ INSCOM, indicated that some ideas on concepts voiced by OACSI action officers concerning SSO support to INSCOM

had the potential for turning a relatively easy and responsive security system into a complicated, costly system in which the INSCOM Commander would exercise marginal control over INSCOM security. Follow-up discussions with OACSI personnel resulted in agreement that the INSCOM Commander's responsibilities for sensitive compartmented intelligence (SCI) security, as enunciated in AR 380-35, should not be diminished. However, on 18 January 1977, in an apparent reversal of previous informal agreements, the USASSG recommended that the ACSI approve the designation of SSO INSCOM (under USASSG) as the sole authority for SCI security matters within INSCOM. The DCSSEC again articulated his concern for the proposal to establish an SSO INSCOM and provided reasons for nonconcurrence with the USASSG recommendation. Subsequently, on 8 April 1977, MG Harold R. Aaron, ACSI, and BG William I. Rolya, CDR, INSCOM, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which the CDR, USASSG was directed to establish a Special Security Command (SSC) INSCOM, with subordinate detachments (SSD's) located at HQ INSCOM, Ft Meade; Ft Bragg; USA Imagery Interpretation Center; Medical Intelligence and Information Agency; Vint Hill Farms Station; San Francisco; Munich; FS Augsburg; FS Berlin; ISG, Panama; and FS Okinawa. The CDR, FS Sinop would appoint an action SSO as deemed appropriate. SSO Korea would support INSCOM-K augmented with an additional SSO at FS Korea. It was agreed in the MOU that the SSC INSCOM and subordinate SSD's would be established and operating not later than 1 October 1977, and that the SSO INSCOM would be established and manned within 90 days after the date of the MOU in order to properly plan for and establish the subordinate SSD's by 1 October.

The SSC INSCOM was established and physically located at Arlington Hall Station on 13 April 1977 with 50 recommended manpower spaces, an increase of 25 spaces to perform the SCI security responsibilities previously performed by the INSCOM with 25 personnel. By 20 June 1977, the SSC INSCOM had assumed responsibility for SCI within INSCOM.[27]

(U) Transfer of USASA Test and Evaluation Center (USASATEC). By Memorandum of Agreement, dated 26 April 1977, the CDR, INSCOM, the CDR, US Army Electronics Research and Development Command (Prov)(ERADCOM), and the CDR, US Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) established the procedures for the transfer of development testing responsibilities from the CDR INSCOM to the CDR, TECOM. The MOA applied to the transition period from 1 July 1977 to the date USASATEC was to be officially transferred to DARCOM and the US Army Electronic Proving Grounds (USAEPG). The general concept of the agreement included the following:

1. The materiel developer's management responsibilities for developmental testing functions would be transferred to ERADCOM as part of the total transfer of RDA responsibilities.

2. The USASATEC would be transferred to DARCOM (USAEPG), effective 1 October 1977.

3. The USASATEC would remain at full strength and with all currently authorized equipment during the transition period.

4. Testing and test support presently scheduled for USASATEC would proceed throughout the transition period without interruption or change.

As planned, the USASATEC was transferred to the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), effective 1 October 1977.[28]

(U) INSCOM Liaison Office, CACDA, Terminated. Effective 1 July 1977, the INSCOM Liaison Office at the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was terminated. The functions and responsibilities of this office were assigned to the CDR, Fort Leavenworth Field Office, 92d MI Battalion (Prov), 902d MI Group (Prov).[29]

(U) Civilian Personnel Office Resubordinated to DCSPER. Effective 1 March 1977, the Civilian Personnel Office was again subordinated to the DCSPER and designated Civilian Personnel Division, ODCSPER. During the period 20 October 1974-28 February 1977, the Office was under the staff cognizance of the Chief of Staff, HQ USASA/INSCOM.[30]

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV. ORGANIZATION

1. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 1-4; AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 1-2; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 1-10; AHR, DCSSEC, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 1-10; AHR, DCSRM, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 1-2; AHR, DCSFOR, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. ii; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 1-3; AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 2-3; AHR, DCSMIS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 5; AHR, SJA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 3; AHR, IG, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 2; AHR, OPA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 1; DF, IAOPS, 28 Jan 77, subj: Decision Brief on Integration of DCSFOR/DCSOPS w/CMT 2, 4 Feb 77; Ltr, IACG to CDR USAINTA, 10 Feb 77, subj: HQ INSCOM/HQ USAINTA Relationships, Pre-Integration; DF, IACS, 11 Feb 77, subj: Integration of DCSFOR/DCSOPS; Ltr, IACG, 25 Feb 77, subj: Implementation of Integration of Counterintelligence and Signal Security Activities Within INSCOM; DF, IALOG-M, 4 Mar 77, subj: Transfer of MSC to DARCOM; Ltr, IACG, 29 Aug 77, subj: Pre-Integration Relationships of Personnel Staff Activities; Ltr, IACG, 8 Sep 77, subj: Pre-Integration Relationships of Resource Management Staff Activities Within INSCOM; Ltr, IACG, 8 Sep 77, subj: Pre-Integration Relationships of Logistics Staff Activities Within INSCOM; DF, IACS-P, 17 Nov 76, subj: Establishment of Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM) HQ USASA.
2. GO 25, HQDA, 30 Dec 76.
3. MFR, IAOPS-H, 2 Feb 78, subj: Establishment of INSCOM.
4. PO 4-1, HQ INSCOM, 13 Jan 77.
5. DF, IACS-P, 29 Aug 77, subj: Formal Establishment of INSCOM.
6. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, HQ USASA, FY76/7T, App R, subj: Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study.
7. HQ INSCOM PO's: 21-1 and 21-2, 23 Sep 76; 25-2 and 25-3, 6 Oct 76; 44-1, 9 Dec 76.
8. MFR, IAOPS-H, 8 Dec 77, subj: Transfer of SSO Resources.
9. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 33.
10. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 11-2.
11. Ltr, DAAG-PAP-A (M)(12 Oct 76) DACS-DMA, 21 Oct 76, subj: Mission and Functions, USASA and USAINTA.
12. Ltr, DAMI-TST, HQDA, 29 Dec 76, subj: Implementation of IOSS Recommendations Chapter 7 (Intel Production) and Chapter 8 (Management and Major Command Organization); Msg, CDRUSASA, DTG 062345Z Dec 76, subj: Public Affairs Guidance; Memo for USAINTA Historian, 17 Dec 76, subj: Public Announcement of Intelligence Organization Realignment.
13. PO 12-3, ACSI, DA, 30 Dec 76; PO 12-1, HQ INSCOM, 8 Feb 77.
14. MOA Between CDR, DARCOM/CDR, INSCOM on Research, Development, and Acquisition; DF, IARM to CofS, 31 Jan 77, subj: Planning Guidance for the Transfer of OPCON of RDA Functions to DARCOM, and CMT 2, 22 Feb 77.
15. MOA Between CDR, INSCOM/DCSI, USAREUR, 31 Mar 77, subj: Intelligence and Security Arrangements, Europe.
16. Ltr, VCSA to CDR, INSCOM, 2 May 77, subj: US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Concept Plan.
17. AHR, OPPA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, App C, INSCOM Concept Plan Change 1, 14 Jun 77.
18. Ibid. App E, INSCOM Base Realignment Program, Phase I, 30 Jun 77.

19. Ltr, NSACSS to CSA, 9 Aug 77, subj: US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); Cover Note fm ACSI to DAS and VCSA for the following: Memo for CSA fm ACSI, DAMI-TST, 23 Nov 77, subj: INSCOM—DECISION MEMORANDUM; Ltr, CSA to DIRNSA, 28 Nov 77 (in reply to 9 Aug 77 ltr).
20. INSCOM Concept Plan, 11 Mar 77 w/Change 1, 14 Jun 77; Debrief, COL Charles S. Black, Jr., CDR, 501st MI Gp (Prov), at HQ INSCOM, 29 Jul 77; Ltr, DAAG-PAP-A (M)(12 Oct 76) DACS-DMA, 21 Oct 76, subj: Mission and Functions, USASA and USAINTA; Ltr, VCSA to CDR INSCOM, 2 May 77, subj: US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Concept Plan; MOU - Operations, Between CDR INSCOM/CDR EUSA (Korea); MOU - Admin/Logistics Between CDR INSCOM/CDR EUSA (Korea); Interview, MAJ Charles J. Roth, Jr. ODCSOPS, 3 Nov 77, subj: Korea Reorganization; DF, IACS-MPG, 18 Mar 77, subj: INSCOM Liaison Officers; DF, IACS, 7 Jun 77, subj: INSCOM LNO CACDA Close Out.
21. AHR, DCI, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. II-1, II-3, IV-2, IV-5; AHR, 902d MI Gp, FY77, Chap IV.
22. MOA Between CDR, INSCOM/DCSI, USAREUR, 31 Mar 77, subj: Intel and Scty Arrangements, Europe; INSCOM Concept Plan, 11 Mar 77; Change 1, INSCOM Concept Plan, 14 Jun 77; PO 38-2, HQ INSCOM, 8 Jun 77; PO 55-2, HQ INSCOM, 5 Aug 77.
23. AHR, INSCOM Det, SOUTHCOM, FY77; AHR, 470th MI Gp; AHR, USATSA, FY77; Fact Sheet, IAOPS-CON, HQ INSCOM, 13 Apr 77, subj: Integration/Verticalization of the 470th MI Gp.
24. AHR, DIRITA, FY77; DF, IAITA, 11 Feb 77, subj: Prov Organization of DCS for Intelligence and Threat Analysis.
25. Msg fm CDR, INSCOM, DTG 151630Z Sep 77, subj: Establishment of US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (Prov); DF, IAITA-R, 2 May 77, subj: Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center Organization.
26. Agreement signed 26 May 77, Proposed Draft Inputs for Annex B, DA Operating Instructions for US Army Forces Stationed in the Pacific (DAOI-PAC).
27. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, HQ USASA, FY76/7T, App F; AHR, DCSSEC, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 3-5; MOU Between The ACSI/CDR, INSCOM, 6-8 Apr 77; MFR, IA-SSO, INSCOM, 27 Apr 77.
28. MOA Among CDR, INSCOM/CDR, ERADCOM/CDR, USATEC, 26 Apr 77, re Development Testing of Tactical EWI Systems; PO 68-1, HQ INSCOM, 23 Sep 77.
29. Telephone Interview, CPT Charles F. Kissell/Mr. Sternbeck, 21 Feb 78.
30. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 3; DF, IACS to Civ Per, 10 Feb 77, subj: Transfer of Civilian Personnel Office.

CHAPTER V

(S-CCO)(NOFORN) RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

(4)

~~(C)~~ Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds. The US Army Intelligence and Security Command's OMA funding program at the close of FY 1977 consisted of $38,599,300 in Direct Funds and $3,513,000 in Automatic Reimbursements for a total of $42,112,300.[1]

The table below shows a breakout of end FY 1977 direct funding by subprogram.

Table 2—Direct Funding by Subprogram
(As of 30 Sep 77)

Subprogram		FY 1977
P2	(General Purpose Forces)	$ 1,632,300
P3I	(Intelligence Activities)	34,258,000
P3C	(COMSEC)	2,287,000
P8T	(Training)	297,000
P80	(Education Services)	101,000
P95	(Executive Development)	24,000
		$38,599,300

Following is an audit trail from the DA dollar guidance for preparation of the FY 1977 command operating budget estimate (COBE) Approved Operating Program (AOP):

Program 2

Dollar Guidance - FY 77 COBE	$	15,957,000
To P8 for Transfer to TRADOC, FORSCOM, and USAREUR	-	414,000
Pay Raise	+	39,000
Transfer to TRADOC	-	2,169,000
Transfer to DARCOM	-	5,669,000
Transfer to FORSCOM (BOS)	-	382,000
Transfer Tactical Units to MACOM's	-	7,301,000
TRACER ROUND	+	34,000
FY 77 Initial AOP	$	95,000
Transfer from EUSA	+	1,127,000
146th 890K		
332d 226K		
SIGSEC 11K		
Transfer from EUSA - 502d MI Bn	+	646,300

Transfer to DA	-	356,000
Transfer from DA	+	120,000
Final FY 77 AOP	$	1,632,300

Program 3-I - Mission

Dollar Guidance - FY 77 COBE	$	31,400,000
Transfer to Base Ops	-	230,000
Compact	-	25,000
Transfer Enlisted Pers Mgt Function to MILPERCEN		99,000
Transfer MSC to DARCOM	-	5,573,000
Flying Hour Program	-	17,000
Electrical Maintenance	+	60,000
Stock Fund Price Increase	+	249,000
Pay Raise	+	629,000
Transfer Base Ops to Mission	+	5,029,000
FY 77 Initial AOP	$	31,423,000
TUSLOG Det 4	+	1,000,000
Transfer to DARCOM	-	154,000
Realignment from P3C	+	17,000
Budget Execution Review Increase	+	2,089,000
Transfer 502d ASA Gp to USAREUR	-	31,000
Transfer to DA	-	120,000
Transfer to P3C - C&P Fees	-	26,000
Realignment from P3C for Rack Contract	+	60,000
Final FY 77 AOP	$	34,258,000

Program 3-I - Base Operations

Dollar Guidance - FY 77 COBE	$	4,393,000
Transfer from P3I - Mission	+	230,000
Pay Raises	+	291,000
Retention Activities	+	75,000
Health Benefits	+	21,000
BMAR	+	19,000
Transfer to P3I - Mission	-	5,029,000
Final FY 77 AOP	$	0

Program 3-C

Dollar Guidance - FY 77 COBE	$	2,505,000
Pay Raise	+	53,000
Transfer of Functions to MILPERCEN	-	5,000
Transfer Tac COMSEC to Theater Comds	-	267,000

FY 77 Initial AOP		$ 2,286,000
Realignment to P3I - Mission	-	17,000
Budget Execution Review Increase	+	55,000
Transfer from P3I - Msn - C&P Fees	+	26,000
Transfer to DA	-	3,000
Realignment to P3I - Msn for Rack Contract	-	60,000
Final FY 77 AOP		$ 2,287,000

Program 8-T

Dollar Guidance - FY 77 COBE		$ 4,325,000
Transfer from P2	+	414,000
Transfer to TRADOC (Tng Cen & Sch)	-	3,387,000
Transfer of ASA School to P3C	-	58,000
Transfer to FORSCOM (TDY)	-	15,000
Reimbursement to DARCOM	-	210,000
FY 77 Initial AOP		$ 1,069,000
IOSS Transfer	-	429,000
Budget Execution Review Decrease	-	105,000
Contract Training Costs	-	200,000
Transfer to DA	-	38,000
Final FY 77 AOP		$ 297,000

Program 8-O

Dollar Guidance - FY 77 COBE		$ 75,000
Tuition Assistance	+	21,000
Pay Raise	+	3,000
FY 77 Initial AOP		$ 99,000
Budget Execution Review Increase		2,000
Final FY 77 AOP		$ 101,000

Program 9

Dollar Guidance - FY 77 COBE	$ 24,000
FY 77 Initial AOP	$ 24,000
Final FY 77 AOP	$ 24,000

Depicted in the table below is a comparison by command of Approved Operating Programs and direct obligations for FY 1977 ($ in thousands).

Table 3.—Comparison of AOP and Direct Obligations (FY 1977)

Command	AOP	Direct Obligations	Percent Obligated
HQ INSCOM	$10,289	$10,204	99.2
CONUS	15,446	15,331	99.3
Europe	9,406	9,399	99.9
Pacific	3,458	3,450	99.8
TOTAL	$38,599	$38,384	99.4

The following table reflects direct obligations by element of expense for FY 1977 ($ in thousands):

Table 4.—Direct Obligations by Element of Expense (FY 1977)

Element of Expense	P2	P3I	P3C	P8T	P8O	P9	Total	Percent of Grand Total
Civ Pay & Benefits	453	12,411	1,114	1	48		14,027	36.5
Travel & Trans	92	1,307	401	183		10	1,993	5.2
Rents/Comm/ Utilities	8	2,274	503				2,785	7.3
Contr Svcs	68	9,368	102	50	28	14	9,630	25.1
Supplies & Equip	954	8,804	136	33	22		9,949	25.9
TOTAL	1,575	34,164	2,256	267	98	24	38,384	100.0

(U) Integration and Transfer of Units to INSCOM. Extensive coordination was conducted with US Army Forces Command; US Army, Europe; Eighth US Army; and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA, concerning the resources of units integrated/transferred to INSCOM. In some cases, the unit and all resources (dollars and manpower) were concurrently transferred to INSCOM. In the majority of cases, however, funds were retained and managed by the losing MACOM even though the unit had been transferred to INSCOM.[2] Units and FY 1977 funds, as appropriate, to INSCOM are indicated

in table below.

Table 5.—Units and Funds Transferred to INSCOM

Unit	Losing Activity	FY 1977 Funds
USAINTA	DA, ACSI	
66th MI Gp	USAREUR	
502d MI Bn	EUSA	$646,300
704th MID (AS)	EUSA	
146th ASA Co (Avn)	EUSA	890,000
332d ASA Co, Opns	EUSA	226,000
SIGSEC Det	EUSA	11,000
FORSIG	FORSCOM	
ITAD	DA, ACSI	
IIG	DA, ACSI	
ISD	DA, ACSI	
IOSD	DA, ACSI	

(U) Command Other Procurement, Army (OPA) Funds. INSCOM obligated or committed $23.9 million against FY 1977 OPA funds of $30.8 million for a total utilization rate of 78 percent on 30 September 1977; obligation rate was 61 percent.[3] The OPA Program status by project for FY 1977 is indicated in the table below ($ in millions).

Table 6.—FY 1977 OPA Program Status By Project

Project	Programmed	Obligated	Committed
Monitoring Equipment	$ 3.300	$	$
TEMPEST	.500		
Data Analysis Cen, AN/TYQ-5	3.700	1.240	1.569
Ground VHF/DF, AN/TSQ-114	10.000	10.000	
Tactical HFDF Sys, AN/TRD-26	2.600	2.054	
Spares and Repairs Parts	6.200	4.800	.400
Less than $500K	.600		.600
Less than $500K (EW)	1.200		.516
Special Test Set	1.800		1.800
Millimeter Wave Non-Comm, Intercept Sys	.900	.719	.180
TOTAL	$30.800	$18.813	$5.065

(U) Military Construction, Army (MCA). INSCOM made steady progress in the program during FY 1977. At the close of the fiscal year, the following projects were in the construction phase in locations indicated:

Korea:
- Electronic Maintenance Addition ($148,000)
- Operations Building Addition ($391,000)
- BOQ ($1,176,000)
- Hangar ($606,000)
- 318-Man Barracks ($1,864,000)

Germany:
- A/C Rehab - Augsburg ($614,000)

Turkey:
- Airfield - Sinop ($1,405,000)

Okinawa:
- A/C Rehab - Sobe ($715,000)

CONUS:
- Fuel Conversion - Vint Hill Farms Station ($118,000)
- Sewerage Treatment Plant - Vint Hill Farms Station ($960,000)

In Korea, construction of the electronic maintenance and operations additions were complete except for the paving of the operations addition hardstand. The building should be ready for use about 1 March 1978. The 60-man BOQ was also complete but acceptance was withheld pending correction of deficiencies. The BOQ will be opened on 14 October 1977. The Office of the Secretary of Defense released both the hangar and the barracks projects for construction during the 4th Qtr, FY 1977. Procurement of the relocatable barracks was underway and the construction contract was scheduled for award during 1st Qtr, FY 1978. Seven barracks buildings and an administration facility will be erected on an assembly line basis with one facility being completed each month between May and November 1978.

The Augsburg air conditioning rehab, a FY 1978 project, was approved by Congress during the last quarter and is in final design.

The Sinop Airfield project was completed and accepted in late September. The reprogramming request for the Sobe air conditioning rehab was approved in August 1977 and the contract award scheduled for late 1st Qtr, FY 1978. Construction time was estimated at 18 months. The construction contract for the Vint Hill Farms Station fuel conversion was awarded in August 1977 and the contractor was procuring the conversion equipment as the period ended. The project was scheduled for completion in December. The Vint Hill Farms Station sewerage treatment project design was updated and was tentatively scheduled for award in December 1977.[4]

(U) Family Housing Units. INSCOM operated and maintained family housing units at Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station. The Approved Operating Program for FY 1977 was $558,000 of which $553,000 was obligated.[5]

(C) Command Personnel Situation. Manpower trends in FY 1977 continued downward. Authorized and actual total command personnel strengths for FY 197T and FY 1977 are shown below.[6]

	30 September 1976					
	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT MIL	CIV*	GRAND TOTAL
Authorized	1,117	397	13,569	15,083	1,538	16,621
Actual	1,083	384	13,665	15,132**	1,311	16,443

*Includes Wage Board personnel; 179 authorized and 204 actual Foreign Local Nationals.
**Does not include 818 enlisted students.

	30 September 1977					
	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT MIL	CIV	GRAND TOTAL
Authorized	1,063	461	7,923	9,447	1,797	11,244
Actual	1,016	456	7,258	8,730	1,749*	10,479

*Full Time Permanent and Temporary direct hire, including direct hire Foreign Nationals and US Force dependents filling foreign national indirect hire positions.

See appendix H for INSCOM Personnel Strength by Unit, as of 30 September 1977.

(U) INSCOM Key Personnel. Appendix I contains a listing of personnel occupying key positions within the command, as of 30 September 1977.

(U) Enlisted Strength Summary. The following table reflects the assigned enlisted strength of the command by major geographical area as of 30 September 1977:[7]

Table 7.—Enlisted Strength By Geographical Area

Unit	Authorized	Assigned
CONUS	2,251	2,232
Pacific	2,047	1,886
Europe	3,153	2,918
Caribbean	50	49
Worldwide (TSA)	36	31
TOTAL	7,537	7,116

~~(C)~~ Military Strength By Program. The table below reflects authorized and assigned military strength by program. The shortfall was spread throughout the programs with only the HUMINT and NSA programs reflecting overages on 30 September 1977.[8]

Table 8.—Military Strength By Program

	Program	Authorized	Actual	Plus/Minus
2	Gen Purpose Forces	903	816	- 87
3:	CCP	5,244	5,108	-136
	COMSEC	214	203	- 11
	CI & IA	1,068	1,021	- 47
	HUMINT	586	600	+ 14
	Imagery Intel	57	55	- 2
	Intel Prod Actvs	109	90	- 19
	Intel Data Handling Sys	32	18	- 14
	Intel Mgt & Spt Actv	16	13	- 3
	NSA	685	708	+ 23
6	RDTE	79	70	- 9
8	Tng, FHMA, GED	15	9	- 6
9	Admin & Assoc Actv	24	19	- 5
	TOTAL	9,032	8,730	-302

(U) WAC Personnel Strength. There were 91 WAC officers and 1,119 enlisted women assigned to INSCOM as of 30 September 1977.[9] The table below reflects the approximate number of WAC personnel by rank.

Table 9.—WAC Strength By Rank

Rank	WAC Personnel	Total Enlisted
E-1	7	37
E-2	70	343
E-3	129	768
SP4	554	2,525
CPL	3	7
SP5	130	798
SGT	186	1,353
SP6	0	58
S/SGT	33	1,350
SP7	0	5
SFC	6	810
E-8	1	265
E-9	0	13
TOTAL	1,119	8,332

(U) Enlisted Assignment Responsibility Transferred to MILPERCEN. One of recommendations of Chapter 2, IOSS, was to transfer personnel management functions from USASA to the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). This recommendation was approved by the CSA on 16 September 1975. Following coordination and establishment of transfer procedures, responsibility for the management and assignment of all USASA enlisted personnel was transferred to MILPERCEN on 1 October 1976. Twenty-seven spaces (2 officers, 21 enlisted, 4 civilian) were transferred with their functions. In November 1976, a trade-off of the four civilian spaces for a like number of military spaces was agreed upon between MILPERCEN and HQ USASA. One officer and 16 enlisted personnel were actually transferred to MILPERCEN.

During the ensuing months it became quite obvious that MILPERCEN was not prepared to accept responsibility for the assignment and management of the enlisted personnel of this command. The 17 personnel transferred to MILPERCEN were not familiar with the procedures of the CAP III Assignment System—the heart of personnel distribution. Unfortunately, the MILPERCEN did not integrate any of its personnel into the newly formed MP/MI Branch to provide expertise in the CAP III Assignment System. As the result, units of this command began to experience serious personnel shortfalls.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

though there was general officer involvement in the problem. Field Station San Antonio was forced to close down 16 manual morse collection positions in June 1977 due to lack of 05H personnel. The DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, requested that DCSPER advise the MILPERCEN of the critical importance of maintaining a 100 percent fill at Field Station San Antonio and that of all CONUS requirements for MOS 05H, first priority fill must be Field Station San Antonio followed by the 370th ASA Company, Operations, and then the XVIII and III Corps.

One of the weak links in the reporting system was the lack of continuous information on a unit's personnel status as to current and projected gains and losses by grade and skill. As a result, the DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, began developing a strength accounting system called "GAINLOZ" that would provide timely accurate information. This system provided for the establishment of a command data base to be updated weekly with data submitted from subordinate units. The resulting data base would be approximately 10 days old as opposed to the regular 45-90 days. At the close of the reporting period, the "GAINLOZ" system was being tested at Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station. The projected date for including all units in the system is 1 December 1977.

Placing control and assignment of enlisted personnel under MILPERCEN took away the capability and flexibility of the command to respond to immediate operational changes. Prior to this, INSCOM could respond to most requirements within 45-60 days. Under MILPERCEN, for example, personnel for an increased WIDEBAND mission (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA on 1 January 1977 did not arrive on site until July 1977. To date, the IOSS-directed transfer of enlisted assignment responsibility is not successful.[10]

(U) USAINTA/INSCOM Officer Personnel Procedures. The military personnel management function was seriously affected by the merger of USAINTA with INSCOM, as new procedures affected the rate of fill. Shortly after 1 January 1977, the officer personnel support which previously was provided by the relatively high priority Joint and Special Activities Branch, Officer Personnel Division, Military Personnel Center, was transferred to MILPERCEN functional branches and routing of all USAINTA officer requisitions was changed from MILPERCEN to HQ INSCOM. Directly connected with this change in procedures was the placement of USAINTA within the INSCOM Projected Requisitioning Authority (PRA) which had a lower priority and impaced on the rate of fill. While USAINTA managed to retain the 100 percent fill rate as pertained to the overall officer personnel authorization, the projected fill rates within individual grades were considerably lower (majors) or higher (lieutenants) than authorization.

The imposition of PRA on USAINTA added to considerable problems already existing in Europe. Prior to 1 January 1977, the 66th MI Group, as a USAREUR unit, received tasking from HQ USAREUR, some of which was in excess of their ability (personnel authorization-wise) to support. To compensate for this, personnel were assigned to the 66th Group on an overstrength basis. While the 66th will undoubtedly still be required to perform these tasks, it was a foregone conclusion that MILPERCEN and INSCOM would not be able to provide any additional personnel without some unit/activity being required to absorb personnel shortages. Since the 66th MI Group was comprised of all INSCOM CI and HUMINT assets in Europe, it will be required to absorb personnel shortages which in turn may adversely impact on some of their operations.[11]

(U) General and Field Grade Officer Promotions. A comparison between FY's 1975, 1976, 197T, and 1977 general and field grade officer promotions are reflected in the table below. Only FY 1977 figures include all officers assigned to INSCOM.[12]

Table 10.—General and Field Grade Officer Promotions

Promotion To	FY 1975	FY 1976	FY 197T	FY 1977
General Officer	0	1	0	
Colonel	4	5	8	19 (15 MI)
Lieutenant Colonel	15	12	15	26 (22 MI)
Major	29	45	19	32 (24 MI)
TOTAL	48	63	42	79 (61 MI)

(U) Civilian Educational Levels of INSCOM Officers. The following table depicts the civilian educational level attained by INSCOM officers as of 31 August 1977:[13]

Table 11.—Civilian Educational Levels of INSCOM Officers

Level	COL	LTC	MAJ	CPT	1LT	2LT	CW4	CW3	CW2	WO1
Doctoral Degree	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Master's Degree	32	82	125	98	8	6	2	4	6	0
Professional Degree	1	1	4	13	2	0	0	0	0	0
Yr or more post grad (No degree)	4	15	17	25	3	1	3	2	3	0
Baccalaurate Degree	26	79	137	279	72	94	6	36	35	15
Two yrs college or more-Assoc Degree	1	3	6	25	1	8	11	64	104	26
Less than 2 yrs	0	0	2	6	0	0	10	19	25	0
High School Grad	0	0	1	3	0	0	3	24	23	11
TOTAL	64	181	294	449	87	109	35	149	196	59

Note: Strength figures differ from assigned strength figures because these education figures are available only from SIDPERS computer run and the assigned strength reflects present-for-duty strength.

(U) Military Education Levels of INSCOM Officers. The table below depicts the highest levels of military education attained by INSCOM officers as of 30 September 1977.[14]

Table 12.—Military Education Levels of INSCOM Officers

Level	COL	LTC	MAJ	CPT	1LT	2LT
Senior Service College Graduate	28	4	0	0	0	0
Deferred SSC Selectee	0	3	0	0	0	0
AWCCS Selectee	4	3	0	0	0	0
Staff College Level Graduate	32	123	109	8	0	0
Deferred Staff College Graduate	0	1	9	0	0	0
Branch Advanced Course Graduate	0	57	176	273	3	2
Branch Basic Course Graduate	0	0	1	155	73	84
Specialist Course Graduate	0	0	0	4	6	12
None	0	0	0	9	5	9

(U) INSCOM Officer Fellowship Program. The INSCOM Officer Fellowship Program was established on 13 December 1976 to identify a select few highly capable military intelligence officers (cryptologists, counterintelligence, HUMINT, etc.) in the grade of captain and through intensive personnel management—

1. Provide participating officers widely diversified experience through rotation among selected job assignments within HQ INSCOM.

2. Prepare participants for early attendance at Command and General Staff College and subsequent high level command and staff assignments.

3. Capitalize on special abilities and skills of participating officers.

4. Enable this command to play a more significant and direct role in the early development of outstanding MI officers.

Individuals could not apply for the INSCOM Officer Fellowship Program but had to be nominated by their most immediate commander. The DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, reviewed all valid nominations in coordination with the MILPERCEN and made recommendations to the CG, INSCOM. Participants were to be rotated among Fellowship Program spaces on an annual basis. During an officer's assignment, he/she would serve for one year in three of the following staff elements: Chief of Staff; Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations; Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management; Deputy Chief of Staff, Management Information Systems; and Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics. Once entered in this program, an individual cound not be removed except by direction of the CG, INSCOM, upon written application when approved by the CG, and when reassigned by DA.[15]

In FY 1977, the following officers were accepted for the program:

CPT T. R. Grevencamp, assigned to ODCSPER.
CPT W. A. Doyle, assigned to Office, Chief of Staff (OPPA).
CPT J. A. Reid, assigned to ODCSOPS.

(S-CCO)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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shortages. A problem with 05K personnel also developed because there were no 05K gains in March and April, leaving the Field Station only 9 of an authorized 15.

2. At [redacted] 16 of their projected April 05H gains failed to arrive. As a result, the Station's "get-well" date was extended beyond the April time frame which NSA and HQ INSCOM had used as a guide for mission adjustments. Ten positions were closed due to shortage of 05H personnel.

3. Ten MOS 98 CRU's were projected to arrive at [redacted] during April. Of the 10, 3 were security drops, 3 were deferred until May by MILPERCEN, and 3 just failed to report. Of the 17 98C's projected in March 1977, 8 were deferred to later dates by MILPERCEN, and 4 did not report.

Other INSCOM units, especially Field Station San Antonio, experienced continuing shortages of hardskill personnel throughout the fiscal year. Recruiting shortfalls, academic attrition, and security losses, all contributed to this continuing problem.[16]

(S-CCO) Czech Linguist Shortage. Throughout FY 1977, Field Station [redacted] suffered a chronic shortage of Czechoslovak linguists, MOS 98G-CX. Authorized 45 Czech linguists, including 8 from USAREUR (MUDPACK requirement), Field Station [redacted] fell to as low as 59 percent of authorization during the 3d Qtr, FY 1977. MOS 98G-CX fill during the year averaged approximately 68 percent. Over the same period, Czech multi-channel intercept increased 60 percent while single channel increased 20 percent.

In late May 1977, CDR, INSCOM advised MILPERCEN that mission accomplishment at Field Station [redacted] was steadily being degraded due to these severe personnel shortages and that the situation warranted extraordinary Army personnel/assignment action to meet current national and Army intelligence requirements. In July 1977, a meeting was held at NSA, attended by INSCOM and MILPERCEN representatives. All aspects of the linguist problem were discussed and it was agreed that Field Station [redacted] would receive first priority on 98G-CX fills. It was recognized that these priority fills would not become available until 2d Qtr, FY 1978. NSA requested the Air Force Security Service (AFSS) to help the Army with Air Force linguists during this critical period, but the Air Force was reluctant to assist. During the fourth quarter, [redacted]

(U) Training of Cryptologic Linguists. In December 1976, NSACSS announced the formation of a Work-Management Group (W-MG) for the purpose of providing specific guidelines for the development of a military cryptologic linguist training program. The first meeting of the W-MG was held at NSA during the period 24 January-4 February 1977 with representatives from NSA, the SCA's, TRADOC, and the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in attendance. The W-MG recommended ten specific actions ranging from simple listings of

available training programs to long range studies and development of new Terminal Skill Objectives (TSO) for cryptologic linguists.

The second meeting was held at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, 19-22 July 1977, where several of the recommended actions were completed, most notably the publication of an NSA Training Circular which outlined specific language training responsibilities of all members of the cryptologic community.

INSCOM subsequently proposed to the Group that the DLI revise its current 37-week Russian Course and return to a 47-week curriculum. DLI informally acknowledged that the 37-week course was not adequate for producing personnel qualified to perform at INSCOM field stations.

As of 1 October 1977, the W-MG had accomplished the following:

1. Developed new Terminal Skill Objectives in several languages, including Russian and Czech.

2. Publication of NSA Training Circular 40-11, Language Training for Military Cryptologic Personnel.

3. Sharing of cryptologic training programs of SCA's.

4. Study of new standards for determination of levels of language competence.

5. Liaison efforts with DLI to provide exportable language training packages for maintenance/upgrade of language skills.

The language problem has been with us a long time. Only time will tell if the actions taken and contemplated to upgrade the language skills of cryptologic personnel will succeed.[18]

(U) ~~(C-CCO)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Additional Skill Identifiers. The following new Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) were established by DA, based on submissions by HQ INSCOM, to identify critical skills, specialized training, and duty position requirements for specialized operational, maintenance, and support within INSCOM:[20]

Table 13.—Additional Skill Identifiers

ASI	Title	Associated MOS	Date Approved	Effective Date
C8	Transcriber/Gister	98G	28 Jul 76	1 Mar 77
H5	STREAMLINER Comms Sys Operator	72E	13 Jun 77	1 Mar 78
J2	LEFOX Coll & Proc Sys Operator (AN/FSQ-88(V) Operator)	98G	20 Jun 77	1 Mar 78
K2	Sr Non-Morse Analyst	05K	1 Jul 77	1 Mar 78
M9	Emitter Location and Identification Techniques	05H	28 Jul 76	1 Mar 77
T9	Cryptanalysis	98C	28 Jul 76	1 Mar 77
Y5	TEMPEST Inspection	32G	10 Sep 75	1 Sep 76
Y9	STREAMLINER Maint Sp	34F	15 Jan 76	1 Mar 77

ASI H9, Telemetry Analog Production, associated with MOS 98J, no longer met the minimum criteria for continuance in accordance with AR 611-201, and was deleted effective 1 September 1977.

Requests for the establishment of new ASI's to identify personnel skills and position requirements were forwarded to DA, MILPERCEN, as indicated in the following table:

Table 14.—Request For New ASI

Skill/Position	Associated MOS	Date Fwd to MILPERCEN
Automated HFDF Sys (EELPOT) Maint	33S	24 Aug 77
Automated HFDF Sys (EELPOT) Operator	05D	25 Aug 77
Sr Non-Morse Collector/Controller	05K	1 Sep 77

(U) Reenlistment Program. The Reenlistment Program became a responsibility of the Human Resources Accounting Branch, ODCSPER on 1 September 1977. Prior to that reorganization, the Reenlistment Program was assigned to the Reenlistment Section, Military Personnel Division. The overall reenlistment performance rate was significantly lower than that of other MACOM's in both first term and career categories. The problem appeared to be the lack of a truly vigorous effort by every echelon of command. Quarterly reenlistment statistics are shown in the table below.[21]

Table 15.—Quarterly "Re-Up" Statistics

	First Term			Career		
Qtr	Obj	Reenl	% Obj	Obj	Reenl	% Obj
1st	210	126	60.00	245	132	53.88
2d	141	84	59.57	177	140	79.09
3d	195	118	60.51	183	204	111.47
4th	175	140	80.00	234	150	64.10
TOTAL	721	468	64.90	839	626	74.61

(U) Reenlistment Rates. This command continued to have reenlistment problems during FY 1977. While recruitment is DA-directed and primarily designed to control Army-wide input, reenlistment can be directly influenced by unit commanders. The tables below show INSCOM's FY 1977 reenlistment rate compared with other commands and by subordinate units.[22]

Table 16.—Reenlistments By Commands (FY 77)

	First Termers			Careerists		
Command	Obj	Reenl	% Obj	Obj	Reenl	% Obj
INSCOM	721	468	65	839	628	74
CIDC	18	27	150	69	88	128
FORSCOM	10,978	10,066	92	14,563	14,249	78
HSC	764	574	75	1,313	1,122	86
MTMC	6	7	117	45	38	84
MDW	125	109	87	199	212	107
USARJ	48	86	179	106	155	146
USACC	566	573	101	1,019	1,225	120
TRADOC	1,430	1,625	114	4,408	5,230	119
EUSA	539	633	117	971	1,026	106
USAREUR	7,464	6,609	89	5,035	6,291	125
USAREC	41	61	149	784	972	124
USMA	27	35	130	50	60	120
SHAPE	80	78	98	144	169	117
DARCOM	228	200	88	580	527	91

NOTE: Percentages are rounded off. Figures reflect latest available statistics from HQDA.

Table 17.—Subordinate Unit Reenlistments (FY 77)

Subor Comd	First Termers Obj	First Termers Reenl	First Termers % Obj	Careerists Obj	Careerists Reenl	Careerists % Obj
Support Group	48.29	43	89.04	90.28	86	95.25
FS Augsburg	186.08	92	49.44	114.50	92	80.34
FS Berlin	97.27	56	57.57	51.68	44	85.13
501st MI Gp	34.71	43	123.88	39.00	40	102.56
FS Okinawa	62.12	52	83.70	45.08	35	77.63
FS San Antonio	41.09	24	58.40	62.06	50	80.56
FS Misawa	7.01	11	156.91	8.66	8	92.37
USAG AHS	52.37	30	57.28	83.48	54	64.68
USAG VHFS	18.97	9	47.44	33.03	30	90.82
Test & Eval Cen	18.65	15	80.42	21.57	18	83.44
SIGSEC Actv	9.28	3	32.32	19.62	18	91.74
TUSLOG Det 4	7.34	6	81.74	.49	2	408.16
TOTAL	721	468	64.90	839	628	73.77

~~(C CCO)~~ Enlistment and Reenlistment Incentives. During FY 1977, the following enlistment and reenlistment incentive changes were effected:

Table 18.—Enlistment Incentives

MOS	Incentive	Effective	Remarks
05D	Bonus - $1500	4 Oct 77	
05H	Bonus - $1500	1 Jul 77	
05K	Prior Svc Restriction Lifted	30 Aug 77	
98G	Bonus - $2500	31 Aug 76	Terminated 14 Oct 77
98G	(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	31 Aug 76	Terminated 14 Oct 77
98G	(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	7 Mar 77	Continued
98G	(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	31 Aug 76	Terminated 14 Oct 77
98G	Stripes for Skills	1 Nov 77	

Table 19.—Reenlistment Incentives

MOS	Incentive	Effective	Remarks
98G	SRB-3A* SRB-2B	Before Sep 76	Terminated 1 Oct 77
98G by Language Skill	SRB-3A	1 Oct 77	
	(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)		
	SRB-2B	1 Oct 77	
	(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)		

*Multipliers used in determining the amount of reenlistment bonus.

(U) Recruitment Posture By MOS. The overall DA recruitment success rate in FY 1977 in some INSCOM MOS's left much to be desired. Although INSCOM was not in the recruiting business, it continuously monitored recruitment results and remedial DA enlistment incentives programs to insure that emphasis was placed on problem areas. The following table depicts the INSCOM recruitment posture by some MOS's:[24]

Table 20.—Recruitment By MOS

MOS	Quota*	Enlistments	% of Fill
05D	338	156	46
05G	169	130	77
05H	1184	536	45
05K	438	350	80
98B/C	665	542	82
98G	1255	587	47
98J	361	343	95
33S	375	365	97
96B	541	317	59
96C	341	215	63
96D	365	264	72

*Training seats available.

The table below reflects the 98G recruitment shortfall by language skill.

Table 21.—Recruitment By Language (MOS 98G)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

*Training seats available.

(U) WAC Recruitment. During FY 1977, a total of 931 WAC were recruited into the EW/Cryptologic community. The table below indicates WAC recruitment by quarter.[25]

Table 22.—WAC Recruitment

Qtr, FY 77	Enlisted	% of Total Recruits
1st	94	18
2d	144	37*
3d	271	24
4th	422	37*

*Represents highest percentage of total enlistments recorded since the WAC program was initiated in FY 73.

(U) Utilization of WAC in Combat Zone. During FY 1977, INSCOM attempted to determine the utilization of women in a combat zone and more specifically define the term combat role. In September 1976, the DCSPER, DA, was advised that ASA had a policy more stringent than DA regarding the assignment of women to certain lower echelon tactical units. This policy precluded the assignment of women to Division Support Company, Brigade Support Company, and Special Operations Detachment. These units were classified as Category II units because they operated 5-10 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) in a conventional combat scenario. It was the USASA view that the combat deployment of these units should preclude the assignment of women. It was recommended that these units be either reclassified Category I, based on their combat deployment, or that DA adopt a policy to preclude assignment of women to them.

DA responded, stating that the primary basis for the exclusion of women from Category I units was the combat or close combat support mission of such units. A requirement to exclude women from certain Category II units was not considered a valid reason for changing the category from II to I. One approach used by other units has been to leave the category of such units intact and to determine whether unique employment circumstances preclude the assignment of females on a position basis.

With the transfer of ASA tactical units to their supported command and transfer of the enlisted personnel function to the MILPERCEN, USASA alerted the gaining MACOM's of this potential problem area.

The assignment of 98G females to CONUS DSU's began in March 1977; the assignment of female officers to OCONUS and CONUS DSU's began in July 1977.[26]

(U) Conversion to the Competitive Service. In December 1976, the CDR, USASA, requested the conversion of all civilian positions from the Excepted Service to the Competitive Service except for those intelligence positions under the career development aegis of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and NSA. This request was made because the USASA no longer met the criteria for being in the Excepted Service, i.e., positions did not exist for which normal recruitment and civil service examination procedures were inadequate, and security considerations did not preclude adequate recruiting publicity. In addition, the ineffectiveness of the cryptologic career program and the anticipated personnel turbulence associated with the establishment of a new DA MACOM provided further compelling reasons for moving to the Competitive Service.

On 18 March 1977, the Director of Civilian Personnel, DA, recommended approval of the USASA request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA). After studying all of the aspects of the change, M&RA recommended approval of the request to the US Civil Service Commission. By letter, dated 28 September 1977, the Civil Service Commission approved the conversion of 594 miscellaneous intelligence support type positions to the Competitive Service. It was stipulated that individual recommendations for the conversion of eligible employees to career or career-conditional employment had to be submitted within six months of 28 September 1977.

b1 1.4c Per DIA

(U) Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program. In 1953, the Hoover Commission Task Force recommended that the Army establish a civilian intelligence career force to provide military intelligence operations greater continuity and flexibility. Shortly thereafter, the US Civil Service Commission authorized the Department of the Army to create an Excepted Service Civilian Career Program using Schedule "A" appointments. Based on this authority, DA established a civilian intelligence program for specialists on 3 May 1956 and gave the ACSI, DA, responsibility for the project. The program was named the Intelligence Civilian Career Program (ICCP) and located at the

Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Maryland. On 1 January 1957, the ICCP was operated and administered by the US Army Administrative Survey Detachment (USAASD). The USAASD continued to operate this program after transfer to INSCOM on 1 January 1977; however, the name was changed to the Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program (MICECP). Also, USAASD maintained its own Civilian Personnel Office and pay activity to serve MICECP employees wherever they were assigned worldwide.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

MICECP applicants could be appointed to the program without examination by the USCSC. This was the primary difference between the USCSC competitive appointment system and the excepted appointment system. Another difference was the mobility feature of the MICECP which required employees to agree to serve wherever needed by the Detachment prior to appointment. MICECP applicants had to be US Citizens and had to prove proficiency in a modern usable language through testing at a DOD testing facility. Also, applicants had to accept conditions of employment which were contained in a detailed employment agreement which the employee was required to sign at time of appointment. In addition to the investigation conducted for a security clearance, inquiries were made of former employers, supervisors, and acquaintances. Employees also had to agree to apply for appointment as a commissioned or warrant officer in the US Army Reserve. Membership in the Retired Reserves also satisfied this requirement.

In addition to the above program entry requirements which were not waiverable, other desirable qualifications were- being at least 24 years of age; having an outstanding military service record; being able to meet physical standards required for Federal employment overseas; and being married to a US Citizen.

All applicants were closely scrutinized by the USAASD Screening Panel which makes recommendations to the commander concerning applicants who meet the entry requirements for the program. The applicants declared eligible for the program were placed on file and hired as vacancies occurred through retirement, death, or other attrition.[28]

Commands and staffs supported, as of 30 September 1977, are as follows:

1. Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA.

2. Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAREUR.

3. G2, US Command Berlin.

4. 650th MI Group, SHAPE Belgium.

5. US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

6. Office, Commander, INSCOM, Fort Meade, MD.

7. US Army Operations Group, INSCOM.

8. US Army Special Operations Detachment, INSCOM.

9. Director of Operations, INSCOM, Fort Meade, MD.

10. Director of Counterintelligence, INSCOM, Fort Meade, MD.

11. US Army Administrative Survey Detachment, INSCOM, Fort Meade, MD.

12. 66th MI Group.

13. 500th MI Group.

14. 470th MI Group.

15. 902d MI Group.

16. 501st MI Group (Prov).

17. Counterintelligence Production Division (CIPD).

18. INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii.

19. US Army Instructor Staff, DOD Instructor Element, AI Training Site.

(U) Standard Civilian Personnel Management Information System. The Standard Civilian Personnel Management Information System (SCIPMIS) was introduced to HQ INSCOM in April 1977 when three Civilian Personnel Office employees attended a 2-week training session. The INSCOM Data Systems Activity received the system from the Civil Service Commission on 18 May 1977. During June and July, the CPO was engaged with the building of tables and purifying data input. The system was totally converted in August 1977. SCIPMIS was updated and purified on a daily basis. At the close of FY 1977, the system was operating on a semi-automated basis.

The SCIPMIS, Phase I, was an automated system designed to operate at the installation level in support of the local CPO. Phase II was to consist of developing and extending a standard system to all CONUS and overseas installations by the end of FY 1980. The primary objective of SCIPMIS was to create

a standard DA-wide automated personnel accounting system. Automated preparation of civilian personnel documents and forms provided timely, consistent and accurate completion of documents relieving the CPO of some manual operations. It also provided for both recurring reports and rosters as well as for non-recurring reports in any format. In summary, the SCIPMIS provided substantial benefits for the local Civilian Personnel Office, for which it was designed, as well as HQ INSCOM and higher echelons. The principal benefits of the data bank at DA level was in terms of assuring standard and timely input. This increased uniformity in the local Civilian Personnel Office provided the means for more effective control, reduced resources required to perform repetitive manual operations, and greatly decreased time required to respond to requests for information.[29]

(U) Reduction in Senior Level Civilian Positions. In May 1976, DA was directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense to eliminate a number of senior level, GS-13 and above positions. DA, in turn, placed ceilings on the number of GS-13+ positions and established an average grade ceiling for end FY 1977 and FY 1978. During this period, USASA/INSCOM was in the process of implementing recommendations contained in the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study. This command was directed to reduce 57 high grade positions by 30 September 1978. Although USASA/INSCOM comprised only three-tenths of 1 percent of the total Army civilian workforce, it was being asked to absorb 6 percent of the total Army reduction of 930. A reclama was made and in April 1977 INSCOM received new ceilings for GS-13+ positions and the average grade. The new ceilings for GS-13+ positions were 263 for FY 1977 and 254 for FY 1978. The average grade ceilings for FY's 1977 and 1978 were 9.0218.

A committee was established to monitor all senior level positions and the average grade to insure that DA ceilings were not exceeded. The committee reviewed all requests for recruitment and promotions of GS-13+ positions and made recommendations concerning these actions. Mainly through the efforts of this committee, INSCOM was able to avoid downgrades and/or reductions-in-force (RIF's).[30]

(U) USAINTA Civilian Personnel Advisor. The Civilian Personnel Advisor, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration, USAINTA, provided civilian personnel management and administration advisory services to HQ USAINTA and field elements on a worldwide basis. Included in the significant activities of the Civilian Personnel Advisor were the following:

1. Hq, 500th MI Group was relocated from Hawaii to Camp Zama, Japan with minimum impact on civilian personnel. The control of grade-point average and the reduction of senior-level positions was implemented in compliance with DA ceilings without adversely affecting on-board civilian personnel.

2. On 24 March 1977, a second personnel management specialist position was established for the ODCSPA, USAINTA. The position was filled on 28 August 1977 at the GS-7 level with non-competitive promotion potential to

GS-11, in an upward mobility program effort.

3. The USAINTA Civilian Personnel Advisor was appointed the Agency's Intelligence Career Development Program Advisor and Manager. This was the first time that an individual from outside the Intelligence Career Field was charged with responsibility for performing functions in the areas of career development, career goals and plans, training needs, management needs, and other factors affecting opportunities and goals in the Intelligence Career Field. These duties and responsibilities extended to intelligence operations, research, physical and personnel security personnel under the control of USAINTA worldwide.[31]

(U) Military-Civilian Team Day. On 18 March 1977, Arlington Hall Station hosted INSCOM's Military-Civilian Team Day. This was the second event of its kind, the first being held on 27 February 1976 and entitled "Civilian Day - ASA." The name of this tribute was changed because of the establishment of the new MACOM.

Major activities at HQ INSCOM on 18 March included a civilian awards luncheon and an evening social function. The luncheon was attended by approximately 325 INSCOM personnel and guests. INSCOM subordinate units were encouraged to plan local programs in honor of "Military-Civilian Team Day." Because of the success of this function in both years, it was decided to celebrate Military-Civilian Team Day on an annual basis.[32]

Awards and recipients for 1977 were as follows:

The Albert W. Small Award	Mr. Robert E. Semelsberger
The Action Officer of the Year Award	Mr. Jackie J. Keith
The Virginia McDill Award for Outstanding Secretarial Ability	Mrs. Patricia L. Starkey
The Equal Employment Opportunity Award	Mrs. Judith K. Kutsher
The Wage Grader of the Year Award	Mr. Floyd G. George
The Non-Appropriated Fund Employee of the Year Award	Miss Virginia D. Brasfield
The Military-Civilian Team Improvement Award	
Military Winner	SSG Jacquelin L. Barfield
Civilian Winner	Mrs. Mary K. Tomlin

Honorary Awards presented at the luncheon included-

Person Employed Longest by INSCOM	Mr. Jimmie B. Garrett, ADCSOPS
Oldest Member of INSCOM	Mr. Ernest Kayser, Intel Ops Sp, USAINTA
Federal Service Award (for having most service in both military and civilian capacity)	Mr. Ben Davis, USAINTA

(U) Equal Employment Opportunity Program. A new Equal Employment Opportunity (EE)) Affirmative Action Plan, covering a 2-year period, was published during the 1st Qtr, FY 1977. The new plan was accepted by the Director, Equal Employment Opportunity, HQDA, as written without requirement for revision. The FY 1977 Command Assessment Report to HQDA reflected numerous accomplishments and completion of tasks, but also indicated that improved program execution could only be achieved through full-time EEO office staffing. The present part-time staffing permitted completion of urgent requirements only. Mr. Carl P. Thorpe, the Command Equal Employment Opportunity Officer (EEOO) accomplished the EEO duties as an additional duty to his regular job. A proposal to organize an Equal Employment Opportunity Office was accepted as the report period came to a close. Staffing would be as follows:

Equal Employment Opportunity Office

	Grade	Required	Authorized
Equal Employment Opportunity Off	GS-12	1	1
Human Relations/Equal Opportunity Off	GS-12	1	1
Equal Opportunity Specialist (FWPC)	GS-07	1	1
Equal Opportunity Specialist (SSPC)	GS-07	1	0*

*Position filled with a part-time coordinator.

It is anticipated that FY 1978 will see the organization of a separate EEO Office staffed on a full-time basis.[33]

(U) INSCOM Attitude Survey. In March 1977, INSCOM conducted a command-wide attitude survey. The objective of the survey was three-fold:

1. Provide timely data on a wide range of subjects for use in planning command level actions.

2. Furnish field commanders with timely information concerning attitudes within their units.

3. Establish a data base to measure future progress.

The initial findings of the survey indicated that the soldiers generally (1) believed their units had very few racial problems; (2) had a high degree of respect for the technical competence of their leaders; and (3) believed their units enjoyed a high esprit de corps. Soldiers' attitudes concerning unit performance, appearance, discipline, and general racial perceptions were mainly positive but felt there was room for improvement. Areas of concern related to sexism with 2-25 percent of the men in the chain of command expressing disagreement with the idea of women as bosses, commanders, or any expansion of the women's role in the Army. The same number opposed drafting women along with men and preferred that a woman have either a career or a family, but not both. Generally, less positive attitudes were expressed by

women throughout the survey. There was also a perception that leaders lacked empathy for and awareness of the needs and problems of the individual. Job satisfaction generated the most concern with up to 40 percent of junior enlisted personnel expressing dissatisfaction and indicating they would not remain in the Army.

Subsequent to the survey, group interviews were conducted with approximately 150 INSCOM personnel. The negative factors in order of priority were: Unit and/or environmental conditions; factors relating to Army level actions; and quality of schooling. Operations personnel expressed the view that they were technicians first and soldiers second—an attitude actively promoted by the chain of command. Fear of tactical assignments was the primary concern of enlisted personnel. This, coupled with advancement potential and unit conditions, appeared to be the principal motivation for individuals to leave the Army.[34]

(U) INSCOM Affirmative Actions Plan. A revised INSCOM Affirmative Actions Plan (AAP) was issued in August 1977. It was necessary to update and revise the AAP to make it relevant to the needs and requirements of the newly organized INSCOM. This command was committed to attaining equal opportunity for all personnel regardless of race, creed, color, ethnic origin, age or sex. It was pointed out that the task of eliminating discrimination was a continuing one and that although much had been done to reduce the more obvious inequities, the most difficult and important challenges were in the future. This included the examination and correction of institutionalized policies and practices, both written and informal, used daily at all levels of commands, which affected assignments, living conditions, career development, and discipline. Managers at all levels were urged to actively seek out and eradicate discriminatory procedures as part of their daily activities.

The objectives, as stated in the AAP were as follows:

1. To provide the opportunity for the growth and effective use of the capabilities of all servicemen and women and facilitate the achievement of intergroup harmony.

2. To correct structural imbalances to provide representative participation of minority and female service personnel in INSCOM skill areas.

3. To establish a system for total assessment of the INSCOM's Human Relations and Equal Opportunity Programs.

4. To infuse affirmative action into the command system by putting more AAP responsibilities into the hands of supervisors and commanders.

The AAP contained a number of tables depicting actions and goals for attaining equal opportunity within INSCOM as well as a milestone and timetable schedule to assist in measuring progress.[35]

(U) Upward Mobility Program. Public Law 92-261, the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, required that Federal agencies provide programs of training and education which would afford employees an opportunity to acquire skills and abilities needed to compete for advancement to positions of greater responsibilities. Early in the fiscal year, 11 spaces were identified to the Chief of Staff, HQ INSCOM, to be filled under the Upward Mobility Program (UMP). Also, a UMP Committee to monitor program operations was established, and USASA Regulation 690-17, 14 October 1976, was published. Objectives of the UMP were to:

1. Assure maximum utilization of present work force skills within current staffing needs.

2. Provide lateral developmental reassignments and upward mobility opportunities for employees in the lower graded, limited advancement potential positions.

3. Develop and enhance employee qualifications for higher level positions.

4. Provide climate conducive to maximum productivity and morale through increased opportunity for career progression.

5. Provide a broader base for the selection of well-qualified candidates for responsible administrative, technical, professional, and paraprofessional positions as well as skilled and semi-skilled craft and labor positions.

In December 1976, the Civilian Personnel Office provided UMP Briefings to the HQ INSCOM workforce. The identification of 11 target positions by series and grade was completed in February 1977 with job descriptions for these positions completed in March 1977.

Ultimately the number of spaces included in the UMP dropped to nine. No individuals were employed in UMP-designated positions at the close of the fiscal year.[36]

(U) INSCOM Federal Women's Program. In October 1975, Mrs. Judy K. Kutsher was named the Federal Women's Program Coordinator for HQ USASA. Nine members of a task force to organize the program were named at the same time. Initially the FWP met bi-monthly and became actively involved in furthering positive programs for women such as Upward Mobility, job-related educational opportunities and sponsorship of seminars and workshops relating to federally employed women. The first USASA Women's Week was held during 29 September - 1 October 1976 and featured displays and a luncheon with guest speakers.

During early FY 1977, a milestone was realized with the approval of a $5,000 budget for CY 1977. Some of the activities and accomplishments of the FWP included assisting in the development of the INSCOM UMP, sponsoring a workshop on income tax preparation, a training workshop on Transactional Analysis concerning sexism and interpersonal communications, participation in the

Post Beautification Program, and preparation of appropriate displays. In April 1977, BG Willia, I. Rolya, CDR, INSCOM, signed the Federal Women's Program Charter outlining the responsibilities and by-laws of the INSCOM FWP. As the report period closed, planning for Women's Week, 10-14 October 1977, was basically complete with primary emphasis given to workshops on subjects such as Strategies to Develop Your Managerial Skills, Rape Prevention Tactics, Career Planning for Women, and Working With Women.[37]

(U) American Council on Education Evaluation. During the 2d Qtr, FY 1977, HQ INSCOM received information which indicated that the American Council on Education (ACE) had completed their evaluation of Army MOS with the exception of INSCOM classified enlisted MOS. INSCOM was also made aware that the ACE contract with the Department of the Defense for MOS evaluation expired at the end of FY 1977 and there was some doubt concerning its renewal. Accordingly, an effort was made to obtain an evaluation of INSCOM MOS during FY 1977.

Initial contacts with ACE led to discussions of INSCOM MOS's during January and February 1977 and ultimately to a decision to evaluate CMF's 33, 96, and 98 during March 1977. INSCOM was required to provide ACE with documentation pertaining to each MOS as well as providing a certain number of individuals by grade and skill level within each MOS. After ACE provided the names and other pertinent data concerning the individuals who would conduct the evaluations, INSCOM initiated action to obtain appropriate security clearances for them. Ultimately, only one of the four ACE evaluators was able to obtain the required clearance. This necessitated the restructuring of the envisioned evaluation process because three of the ACE evaluators could only conduct unclassified interviews. The SI-cleared ACE evaluator conducted interviews at the INSCOM Support Group, Fort Meade, MD; HQ USAINTA, Fort Meade, MD; and within the National Security Agency buildings, Fort Meade, MD. The results of these evaluations were exceptional, ranging from four semester hours for skill-level-one individuals to a high of 53 semester hours for certain senior skill levels. These credits were for acquired skills not acquired through formal education.

In an endeavor to obtain additional college credits for INSCOM personnel, ACE was requested to evaluate formal courses taught at the US Army Intelligence School (USAISD), Fort Devens, Massachusetts. That evaluation was conducted during 21-24 August 1977. Results of the evaluation had not been announced by ACE prior to close of the fiscal year.[38]

(S-CCO)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(S) Base Operations Support, Field Station Okinawa. During FY 1977, the US Army, Japan (USARJ) at direction of DA continued to pursue its objective to transfer responsibility for base operations support on Okinawa to the other services so as to permit the zeroing out of its personnel on Okinawa. USASA opposed the suggestion by USARJ that Field Station Okinawa, as the largest residual Army command on Okinawa, assume responsibility for certain functions being performed by US Army Garrison, Okinawa (USAGO). In October 1976, in response to a suggestion by the CDR, USARJ that the USASA position be re-evaluated, the CDR INSCOM reaffirmed his previous position (IOSS had reorganized USASA as an operating command with only limited resources for base operations support activities, and such activities were outside the scope of his mission). Throughout much of the year, USARJ and USAGO continued attempts for INSCOM to assume certain administrative/logistic support requirements. On 1 June 1977, DA reconvened the ad hoc Army in the Pacific Review Group to update the basic study which called for USARJ to transfer all base support operations on Okinawa. This review was completed in September 1977 and it was recommended that USAGO be continued through FY 1978 with a force level of 882, thus recognizing that the phase-out could not be accomplished on the schedule which had been projected earlier. This recommendation was approved by the Chief of Staff, US Army, on 26 September 1977, at which time the 882 force level was projected through FY 1979.[40]

(S-ECO)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(U) Resource Status Reporting. A new readiness reporting system for field stations was implemented on 1 March 1977. The Resource Status Report (RSR) covered all facets of field station operation. The equipment portion of the report was used to monitor the condition of equipment at each station. The report was structured to provide sufficient data to resolve logistical problems when they were identified. The data collected from the field would be stored in a large computer complex at NSA with a remote terminal at HQ INSCOM. At the close of the report period, the automated portion of the system was not sufficiently refined to permit its use for operational monitoring, thereby making it necessary to produce most data manually.[42]

(U) Command Logistic Review Team. A command logistic review team (CLRT), as prescribed by AR 11-14, was formally established in late March 1977. The CLRT concept incorporated the integrated team approach and was designed to determine the effectiveness of the entire logistics system which ranged from units in the field to CONUS depots, to identify and resolve root problems, and to determine the command action required to improve logistics performance. A unique feature of the concept was that the team composition was dictated by the areas to be reviewed.

Prior to the team composition being finalized, the commands to be visited were tasked to evaluate their logistics posture and identify areas of assistance required. Based on the commander's assessment and the research accomplished by DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, personnel, the team composition was finalized. While this was a DCSLOG program, predominantly staffed by DCSLOG personnel, augmentation from other HQ INSCOM staff elements could be made depending upon the areas to be examined and their impact on logistics. By using personnel from the staff element having proponency for the problems anticipated, CLRT permitted identification of root causes, "on-the-spot" resolution, and facilitated coordination of follow-up actions which crossed staff lines. In the event the problem to be solved carried implications beyond the scope of INSCOM's jurisdiction, the CLRT could be augmented by HQDA personnel or other MACOM's such as TRADOC, DARCOM, Eighth Army, and USAREUR. The team was then titled CLRTX (expanded). The expanded version was only instituted when problems beyond INSCOM's capability to solve existed.

Common CLRT findings included the following:

1. Outdated Supply Transactions.
2. Unresponsive Supply System.
3. Outdated Reference Library.
4. Lack of Logistics Unit Training Programs.

5. Inadequate Training by Army Technical Schools.

6. Improperly Supervised Maintenance Management Program.

7. Unsatisfactory PLL (prescribed load list).

8. Excess Property and Equipment.

9. Failure to Reconcile Supply Requisition.

10. Abuse of High Priority Requisition System.

During FY 1977, CLRT made visits to all INSCOM units, including MI units, located overseas. Visits to units located in CONUS were rescheduled for FY 1978. The CLRT was considered a definite success and proved to be beneficial in assessing logistics policies, procedures, and problems.[43]

(U) ~~(C)~~ Equipment for ASA Reserve Units. In October 1975, the Reserve Affairs Officer, HQ USASA, initiated a management program to inventory, redistribute, and acquire equipment to improve the readiness of ASA Reserve Units, for which ASA, with FORSCOM, shared varying responsibility. Detailed inventory data on mission equipment by item and quantity was collected within the mission configuration context for each ASA Reserve Unit. This data was reduced to computer format for the purpose of subsequent analysis. The analysis resulted in an overall integrated direction for distribution/redistribution of mission equipment. The coding and key punching resulted in a master file of some 7,000 punch cards. Concurrently, USASA developed and validated the required computer software package. Additionally, during this same period, USASA/INSCOM reviewed announcements by Defense Property Disposal Service concerning substitutable excess equipments. INSCOM selected approximately 1,500 end items and funded the shipment of them to Vint Hill Farms Station where a temporary storage facility was established.

In mid-October 1976, FORSCOM requested INSCOM to update and place the collected inventory data into the computer and provide a read-out with analysis and recommendations. The data was inputted to the computer using unit priorities established by FORSCOM. The initial output was distributed to the Reserve Units in late December 1976 to be used as the vehicle for verification and update. Although primarily a FORSCOM responsibility, the INSCOM Reserve Affairs Officer provided assistance and guidance to FORSCOM throughout FY 1977. From January through mid-April 1977, the revised, updated data received from the units was placed in the computer. During this updating period, it was learned that equipment redistribution efforts directed at CONUS Army level and below were invalidating the inventory data at nearly the same rate as it was being entered into the computer. FORSCOM imposed a moratorium on the redistribution or turn-in of equipment from SIGINT/EW Reserve Units so as to stabilize the inventory.

By mid-April 1977, analysis of the updated computer output commenced. Concurrently, the equipment at Vint Hill Farms Station was moved by FORSCOM

to the Tobyhanna Army Depot which had been made available by DARCOM.

FORSCOM placed three qualified maintenance men on TDY to Tobyhanna to check out and repair the equipment prior to distribution. The maintenance personnel completed their task on 18 May 1977. In analyzing the inventory data, many cases of maldistribution of equipment became apparent. For example, one unit had a radio teletypewriter set without the ancillary equipment required; a second unit had the generators to power the set but nothing else; a third unit had only the truck to move it; and a fourth unit had, as an isolated item, the cryptographic equipment for it. This is but one of many similar examples where four units had equipment providing a maintenance burden with no commensurate training value. INSCOM recommended that these conditions be rectified in conjunction with determining the optimum distribution of items assembled at Tobyhanna. FORSCOM concurred in principle but reserved final judgment until the overall impact could be evaluated.

On 20 June and 1 July 1977, the FORSCOM and INSCOM action officers developed a phased plan for the orderly transition of actions from INSCOM to FORSCOM. INSCOM, in close coordination and consultation with FORSCOM, completed the plan to improve the logistics readiness of USAR-ASA units late in FY 1977. It was forwarded to FORSCOM for approval and implementation. Distribution/redistribution of approximately 500 line items was not initiated by FORSCOM during this report period.[44]

(U) ~~(C)~~ INSCOM Alternate Headquarters. With the reassignment of USASA Training Center and School (USASATC&S), Fort Devens, Massachusetts to TRADOC, the function of Alternate Headquarters USASA (now INSCOM) was initially to be transferred to the USASA Test and Evaluation Center (USASATEC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona and the USASA Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP), dated June 1976, was published to that effect. However, plans had to be changed because of the projected transfer of USASATEC to DARCOM. Change 2 to the USASA COOP, dated 29 September 1976, reflected the transfer of the Alternate Headquarters USASA function to USASA Field Station, San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas. CRITICOMM circuit NONA 1199 was reterminated from USASATC&S to USASAFS San Antonio. This circuit was mission associated and would provide support to the NSACSS and USAFSS National SIGINT effort in addition to providing continuity of operations and rapid exchange of SI material during crisis/emergency situations.[45]

(U) Communications Programs and Resources. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (DCSTEL) was the Program Manager within INSCOM for Program Element (PE) 381055A, Cryptologic Communications, Army. This program was divided into two subelements (SE). SE49, Cryptologic Communications, Non-DCS, included all telecommunications resources, except cryptographic equipment required to provide, operate and maintain INSCOM fixed station special intelligence (SI) communications. SE54, Cryptologic Communications, DCS, included funds necessary to support leased or government-owned communications circuits, to include AUTODIN subscriber tails and other circuits in support

of the cryptologic effort but did not include AUTODIN backbone costs.

Compared to previous years there was relative stability in PE 381055A during FY 1977. The only significant change resulted from Program Budget Decision (PBD) 38 which restored 76 SE49 spaces to the USAG, Arlington Hall Station for FY's 1978 and 1979. These spaces had been decremented in FY 1976 by PBD 324. A subsequent Program Decision Memorandum, 10 August 1977, restored these spaces for FY's 1980-83.

With the exception of seven SE49 spaces (Tactical Division, ODCSTEL), all INSCOM cryptologic communications manpower resources had been previously identified for transfer to the US Army Communications Command (USACC) in accordance with Chapter 6, IOSS. During FY 1977, resource identification was further refined and a USACC TDA prepared to effect transfer effective 1 October 1977.

During FY 1977, Other Procurement, Army (OPA) funding included Congressional, DOD, and DA actions in deletion of programmed procurement funds ($171K, Test Equipment; $725K, Semi-Automatic Facilities Control; $200K, Uninterruptible Power Supply). In addition, funds for communications system improvement were reduced to $119K. Program reductions to the FY 1978-82 period were also made. The total FY 1977-83 OPA program for PE 381055A, as of 30 September 1977, is depicted in the table below.

Table 23.—OPA Funding - PE 381955A

Item	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83
STREAMLINER	108	92	139				
Comm Sys Improvement	131	768	778	757	757	480	512
Test Equipment		102	137	150	150	150	150
SAFCO	Deleted for all years						
UPS	Transferred to PE 381011A						
E&I	367						
Line Cond Equip	Deleted for all years						
Secure telephones		200	200				
ADVENTURER		2,021					
TOTAL	606	3,183	1,254	907	907	630	662

During FY 1977, all PE 381055A OPA funds were apportioned to NSA for budgetary management.

Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds for FY 1977 were approved at a level of $288,000 for telecommunications projects and supplies (does not include funds for civilian compensation). The majority of these funds were expended for purchase and shipment of installation materials to various

field sites for support of telecommunications projects. In addition, costs were incurred for repair of numerous printed circuit boards and other similar requirements.[46]

(U) Transfer of Telecommunications Assets. The IOSS and CSM 76-5-11, 27 February 1976 provided for the in-place transfer of USASA Materiel Support Command (USASA MSC), Vint Hill Farms Station to DARCOM on 1 October 1976. A delay of several months in accomplishing the transfer was experienced with DARCOM assuming full responsibility on 1 February 1977. At that time, the designation of USASA MSC was changed to US Army Electronics Materiel Readiness Activity (EMRA).

Since EMRA was the Army commodity manager for Federal Supply Classification (FSC) 5811, HQ INSCOM was advised in February 1977 that the facilities at EMRA were fully committed to support current and future B-46 materiels and that equipment and materials being stored by EMRA to support telecommunications projects were items usually managed by some other National Inventory Control Point (NICP). On 31 May 1977, EMRA advised HQ INSCOM (DCSTEL) that since INSCOM would transfer most of its communications functions to ACC and ACC used Sacramento Army Depot and Tobyhanna Army Depot, it appeared appropriate to discontinue input of INSCOM communications equipment into EMRA and reduce present stockage through attrition and to ship residual items to either Sacramento or Tobyhanna Army Depots.

Accordingly, coordination with Tobyhanna Army Depot and the Depot System Command (DESCOM) was effected to discuss the transfer of these assets from EMRA to Tobyhanna as well as Tobyhanna's abilities to provide logistic support for HQ INSCOM telecommunications projects. DESCOM approved the transfer of telecommunications assets to Tobyhanna Army Depot.

Telecommunications assets stored at EMRA facilities were purged of all items not required prior to the transfer of these equipments to Tobyhanna. Relocation of all communications assets to Tobyhanna was completed prior to 1 October 1977. DESCOM developed and forwarded a proposed Memorandum of Understanding to document the various responsibilities associated with procurement, storage, and shipping of materials. The MOU was being staffed at the close of FY 1977.[47]

~~(C)~~ Project LEMONADE. Project LEMONADE was an approved NSACSS plan which provided for red multiplexing (MUX) of selected teletype/data circuits. The objective of the project was to effect savings in communications manpower, leased costs, equipment, space and energy without degradation of communications service. Participating INSCOM stations were (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per N (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA As planned, Project LEMONADE would significantly reduce the amount of COMSEC equipment presently being employed on point to point circuits by multiplexing prior to encryption. The reduction in COMSEC equipments should free space for other utilization as well as reduce power and air-conditioning requirements.

The HQ INSCOM (DCSTEL) telecommunications installation team completed installation of three new red MUX systems to support two MUX circuits, one from Teufelsberg to Marienfelde and the second circuit from Teufelsberg to (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA (Phase I) on 16 December 1976. The Project LEMONADE installation at (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA was accomplished by on-site personnel with assistance from a USACEEIA team. This installation consisted of four red MUX circuits. The activation and cut-over of Project LEMONADE circuits for Europe began on 5 January 1977.

In the Pacific area, the HQ INSCOM installation team completed in-house tests of installed LEMONADE equipment at (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA during the week of 1 June 1977. Initially, it was planned to begin activation of LEMONADE trunks out of (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA beginning in July 1977; however, since the Air Force and Navy connecting stations had not completed their LEMONADE installation, the operation of trunks was rescheduled for activation in November 1977. The installation and test of equipment and circuits at (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA was completed by the HQ INSCOM (DCSTEL) installation team on 22 June 1977.[48]

~~(C)~~ ~~(U)~~ Project STREAMLINER. This project was an (b)(1) communications project to automate (b)(1) telecommunications terminal facilities. In February 1977, an INSCOM (DCSTEL) installation team, (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) completed installation of the Project STREAMLINER system at This station was the first US Army site to receive a STREAMLINER system and it began operating in the AUTODIN network on 27 February 1977. Additional systems were installed at (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA and HQ INSCOM (AHS) in April and May 1977, respectively. The system became operational at AHS at 1400, 23 May 1977. STREAMLINER systems will be installed at (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA in October 1977 and (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA in the March-April 1978 time frame.

Since the introduction of the initial STREAMLINER system, a number of problems surfaced and were corrected, such as, excessive outages and maintenance problems with the system at HQ INSCOM which were attributable to the existing air-conditioning system cabinets. The air-conditioning system was modified to provide exhaust ducts over the cabinets and supply ducts which provided cool air to the front of the cabinets, thus eliminating all heating problems.

Another problem became apparent during June-August 1977 specifically at (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA when drums manufactured by the Vermont Research Corporation caused STREAMLINER operational failures. A contributing factor to the drum problems, apparently prompted by funding limitations, was the decision made early in the development of the STREAMLINER system not to require procurement of life cycle spare parts. This was corrected with award of a contract (b)(1) for spare parts for the drum.

TEMPEST tests of the STREAMLINER system were conducted in June 1977 at Arlington Hall Station with no compromising emanations being detected. The equipment comprising Project STREAMLINER, which is the newest telecommunications

system in use within INSCOM facilities is still not completely supportable even though the system has been in use since February 1977. The system was manufactured by GTE Information System Facility at Anaheim, California. The Air Force has logistic support and training responsibility.

A provisioning conference on the final seven items of equipment was held at the GTE facility in February 1977. The Air Force estimated 9-12 months from February 1977 before those seven items are fully provisioned and supportable. The Optical Character Reader, used with Project STREAMLINER, was provisioned in mid-1976 and was fully supportable. Teletype Corporation Model 40 equipment, used with Project STREAMLINER, was provisioned by the Air Force in 1976 with the exception of one item to be provisioned in October 1977. The Air Force Supply Center at McClellan Air Force Base, California, was responsible for Model 40 support.

Shortages of trained personnel plagued the STREAMLINER project during FY 1977. With the transfer of assignment authority to MILPERCEN on 1 September 1976, quotas for STREAMLINER training were also transferred. A certain degree of uncertainty concerning the status of these quotas resulted in a situation whereby available quotas for the months of August through October were not fully utilized. This prompted the Air Force Training Command to cancel INSCOM quotas for November and December 1976 and request a complete reappraisal of command requirements for STREAMLINER training. Commencing in February 1977, two spaces were requested per class. These quotas were allocated by Air Force Training Command to MILPERCEN for fill. In March 1977, trained personnel requirements were revised by DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, to require STREAMLINER training for all MOS 72E personnel assigned to the five INSCOM units utilizing STREAMLINER equipment. Since additional FY 1977 training quotas were not available, the number of STREAMLINER trained personnel lagged behind requirements throughout the remainder of FY 1977. In an effort to alleviate the problem, some quota spaces which could not be filled by the MILPERCEN were made available to INSCOM for TDY fill. Eight MOS 72E were returned from field units to attend STREAMLINER training during the period March-October 1977.[49]

(U) Quantized Frequency Modulation/Demodulation (QFM). QFM employed a four-tone quantized frequency modulation method having time and in-band frequency diversity and was designed to improve the reliability of HF radioteletype systems. Due to the generally poor reliability of present tactical HF communications, as well as QFM's successful use by the Air Force and Navy, INSCOM contracted with "E" Systems, Incorporated of Dallas, Texas (manufacturer) to test two QFM units in a field environment to directly compare QFM to Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) in a tactical radioteletype configuration. The test conducted in three phases, short, medium, and long range, was accomplished by elements of the 504th ASA Group. Analysis of the tests indicated that the overall performance of QFM units was superior to the standard modem. To substantiate these findings, additional tests were scheduled to be conducted in the European theater where the frequency spectrum was considerably more congested.

In June-July 1976, the two QFM units were sent to the 502d ASA Group in Augsburg, Germany for testing. However, the units had to be returned to "E" Systems for repair because of problems encountered with certain electrical components. In early June 1977, the modems, accompanied by "E" Systems engineer, were returned to the 502d Group and the testing was conducted during the period 17-22 June 1977. The duration of the test was short due to time constraints placed upon the "E" Systems engineer. The 502d Group evaluation stated that the QFM did not provide any obvious improvement over the present system and questioned its operability and reliability. The modems were returned to HQ INSCOM where a decision concerning final disposition will be made.[50]

(U) Field Exercise Support. The DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, was responsible for coordinating monitoring, evaluating, and providing policy guidance to USASA tactical units which supported their assigned combat organization during exercises until 1 January 1977. With the transfer of these tactical units from INSCOM to the supported combat unit, advice and assistance was provided to FORSCOM. HQ INSCOM personnel attended both pre and post-exercise planning conferences and briefings, and provided exercise observer/evaluator teams to major joint readiness exercises (JRX)(BRAVE SHIELD XV and GALLANT CREW).[51]

(S-CCO) WINTEX/PRIME TARGET 77. The JCS Exercise WINTEX/PRIME TARGET 77 was designed to exercise the policies, plans, procedures, and actions required during a period of increasing world tensions, execution of tactical nuclear operations, and the subsequent initial operations associated with general war. Exercise PRIME TARGET 77 commenced on 1 March 1977 and terminated on 17 March 1977. The exercise scenario was conducted in two major phases:

Phase I. The exercise commenced with a period of rapidly deteriorating conditions, including the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. Intelligence inputs portrayed the outbreak of hostilities both in Europe and Asia which required increased DEFCON posture, non-combat evacuation operations, relocation to alternate command sites, and review of Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) procedures. The last 48 hours provided for high level NATO and US participation.

Phase II. This phase consisted of a rapid escalation of hostilities by the ORANGE bloc, PRC attack in the Pacific, and tactical nuclear exchange between the United States and ORANGE. Execution of the SIOP was followed by strike reporting, maintaining continuity of command and control, and

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

The scope and level of participation did not require an active role on the

part of HQ INSCOM. A reaction capability was established to monitor traffic and respond to exercise emergency action procedures was maintained by HQ INSCOM. HQDA tasked HQ INSCOM to be the JCS Executive Agent for joint SIGSEC monitoring of communications at the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC), Fort Ritchie, Maryland, and to coordinate personnel requirements with the Air Force and Navy. The joint Army/Navy/Air Force COMSEC monitoring team provided COMSEC monitoring at the Pentagon of 12 overseas Autovon circuits involved in WINTEX/PRIME TARGET 77. INSCOM also provided two SIGSEC analysts to assist the analytical effort of the JSSARC.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA
(b)(3)-19 USC 798

(U) (C) REFORGER 76 Observations. During REFORGER 76, HQ USASA had a nine-man team observing SIGINT/EW participation. Some of the more significant observations were as follows:

1. Communication problems between corps and division SIGINT/EW elements reduced the flow of intelligence and technical information to unacceptable levels. Communications outages were attributed to frequent redeployments, low restoration priorities, crowded frequency spectrum, and command directed radio silence.

2. The concept of the All Source Intelligence Center integrated the talent and experience of members of the various intelligence disciplines and significantly reduced reporting time of SIGINT spot reports.

3. The ASA team observed the requirement for close coordination between SIGINT and ESM in a mutually supporting role.

4. The GUARDRAIL system was a major intelligence asset during the exercise. Reporting time was significantly reduced when the terminal was collocated with the division G2.

5. The SIGINT concept for support to an Air Assault Division emphasized support priority to brigade, as well as providing support to the division staff. During REFORGER 76, the brigade received the largest amount of intelligence. This intelligence gap between brigade and division revealed a conceptual weakness that must be corrected. Division staff elements must have real time intelligence upon which to base their assessment of the situation in the allocation of forces.[53]

(U) Consolidation of INSCOM Training Functions. On 1 October 1976, the USASA Training Center and School (USASATC&S) was transferred to TRADOC and redesignated US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens as recommended by the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study and approved by the Chief of Staff, US Army. Traditional training functions performed by the school continued under the direction of TRADOC. This brought about considerable change in the manner in which the Plans and Training Division, ODCSPER, accomplished its mission and functions.

The INSCOM Concept Plan consolidated all training for the new MACOM under the DCSOPS, to be effective by 1 October 1977. It allocated a strength of 174 (+ or -) to the ODCSOPS but did not provide an audit trail of training spaces from the ODCSPER to the ODCSOPS TDA.

To commence action on transfer of the training function, a meeting was held on 24 February 1977 between the DCSOPS and the DCSPER and their respective plans and training assistants. The Chief, Plans, Training and Readiness Division, ODCSOPS and the Chief, Plans and Training Division, ODCSPER were tasked to determine those training functions and associated ODCSPER TDA spaces which should be transferred to ODCSOPS to effect compliance with the approved INSCOM Concept Plan. Considerable data was assembled in satisfaction of these tasks. The ODCSRM indicated that spaces in the INSCOM Concept Plan could not be audit trailed but it was believed that four or five ODCSPER spaces may have been allotted to the ODCSOPS to accomplish the training responsibilities.

Prior to resolution of the effort to consolidate training within ODCSOPS, the DCSPER initiated a decision paper on 14 April 1977, recommending that resources under the INSCOM Concept Plan be realigned and that training functions be consolidated under the ODCSPER. The rationale for this action included the following:

1. The functions/responsibilities for education and training were inseparable.

2. With the transfer of the tactical units, traditional DCSOPS unit training functions were actually individual training in nature.

3. Individual training responsibilities previously handled by USASATC&S had been transferred to DCSPER upon transfer of that school to TRADOC.

4. Career development under OPMS/EPMS and training were inseparable.

The DCSOPS non-concurred with this recommendation and the action was forwarded to the Chief of Staff for resolution. The Chief of Staff directed that all interested parties meet and present a breakout of training functions. This was accomplished and approved by the Chief of Staff on 3 August 1977 with OPPA being directed to realign training responsibilities in the INSCOM Concept Plan with the DCSRM being directed to reapportion necessary

spaces. On 9 August, OPPA determined that no reapportionment of spaces was required to perform functions noted in the coordinated breakout submitted to the Chief of Staff and recommended that no action be taken on consolidation/realignment of functions until OPPA completed an analysis of INSCOM training functions and responsibilities. By the close of FY 1977, OPPA had essentially completed the analysis of training functions and was preparing to present a decision brief to the Commanding General in early November 1977.[54]

(U) Contract Training. The contract training responsibilities of INSCOM during early FY 1977 encompassed the procurement of training from civilian sources to support 16 systems/equipments. This training was procured in support of both tactical and strategic assets. With the scheduled transfer of tactical assets on 1 January 1977, efforts were initiated in the 1st Qtr, FY 1977, to insure continuation of this support. On 8 November 1976, TRADOC, the Army proponent for Cryptologic/EW training, was requested to assume responsibility for contract training. As the result of a 13 January 1977 meeting of TRADOC, INSCOM, and USAISD representatives, TRADOC acknowledged the training function and tasked US Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens (USAISD) to assume responsibility for it. On 10 February 1977, complete documentation on all contract training requirements was forwarded to USAISD. Funding in the amount of $200,000 for FY 1977 and the outyears was subsequently transferred to TRADOC.

The systems training (contract) transferred to TRADOC included the following:

System	Contractor
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per NSA	Hewlett Packard Digital Training Corporation Data General Corporation Data General Corporation International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) Data General Corporation Data General Corporation Hewlett Packard Hewlett Packard Lockheed Corporation Honeywell Corporation SWR Incorporated Hewlett Packard Data General Corporation UNIVAC Corporation Control Data Corporation Data General Corporation

Courses purchased were those not available in DOD channels, although some training may have been offered on the above systems. These contract

purchases were for training on peripherals of equipments in the above systems.[55]

(C~~C~~O) Non-Morse (MOS 05K) Training. An unresolved issue for several years has been deficiencies in the training of (b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per NSA (MOS 05K) personnel in the above 30 MHz electromagnetic environment. The situation was further aggravated by the transfer of Non-Morse Executive Agent Training (EXAGT) responsibility from USASATC&S, Fort Devens, Massachusetts to the Chief of Naval Technical Training (CNTECHTRA), Millington, Tennessee in accordance with PBD-289, in October 1975. Actual Non-Morse Training was conducted by the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) at Pensacola, Florida. The NTTC staff was unwilling to accept EXAGT responsibility for training Army MOS 05K personnel in the above 30 MHz spectrum. This position was based on the premise that operational requirements in this area were unique to (b)(1);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 NSA were therefore a unit or command training responsibility.

During February 1977, HQ INSCOM conducted an on-site survey at (b)(1);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 (b)(1);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per NSA to identify specific training requirements and shortcomings for MOS 05K personnel. The survey concluded that serious deficiencies did exist in the training of 05K personnel assigned to (b)(1);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per NSA (b)(1);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 PER NSA

In an effort to resolve the Non-Morse training problem, a working-level VHF/UHF Training Review Meeting was held at NTTC, 25-27 April 1977 to review NSA and SCA training requirements. The NSA and SCA representatives identified extensive authorized position requirements for VHF/UHF Non-Morse training. Based on these identified requirements, CNTECHTRA agreed to accept the responsibility for Non-Morse training in the above 30 MHz spectrum. However, NTTC did not have sufficient resources to develop the required VHF/UHF modules and unless each SCA provided at least one subject matter expert to assist in module development, those development efforts would have to be held in abeyance until resources could be programmed in the POM-80 cycle.

Although TRADOC was requested to provide support in providing personnel resources to NTTC for VHF/UHF module development, no formal TRADOC response was received by the end of the fiscal year. As an interim measure pending resolution of the NTTC training issue, TRADOC agreed to continue the VHF/UHF course of instruction (231-F10) which had been reinstituted at the USAISD on 22 February 1977 at the request of INSCOM.[56]

(U) Personnel Security Requirements Reduced. Security standards for INSCOM were lowered to provide MILPERCEN greater flexibility in meeting the personnel requirements of the command by eliminating the longstanding requirement that all personnel have a Top Secret security clearance and be eligible for indoctrination for access to Special Intelligence. While this policy decision should improve both the timeliness and quantity of personnel fill, the price to be paid will be loss of quality. In the past, the majority of personnel with a history of military disciplinary problems, drug and alcohol abuse,

and other undesirable activities, were identified during the course of the regular background investigation and not accepted for assignment.[57]

(U) Expanded MI Screening Program. On 9 February 1976, the ACSI, DA, directed USAINTA (Personnel Security Office, Central Security Facility (PSO, CSF)) to expand the initial Military Intelligence Screening Program conducted in FY 1975 on all active duty Army personnel holding a Military Intelligence Occupational Specialty to include non-MI Army personnel in MI units, Reservist, National Guard, and civilian personnel being funded by Intelligence funds. This project had to be delayed on 3 August 1976 when the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) refused to honor requests for DIS files, because in their opinion the requests were not in accordance with a 3 May 1976 DOD Memorandum. On 23 May 1977, the Expanded MI Screening Program resumed—all problems having been resolved.

On 30 September 1977, the Personnel Security Office was relieved of responsibility for conducting the Expanded MI Screening Program in view of PSO's transfer from INSCOM control.[58]

(U) Support to DA Special Discharge Review Program. Beginning in April 1977, USAINTA (Investigations Office, Central Security Facility (IO, CSF)) was tasked to provide support to the Presidential Special Discharge Review Program to insure that returning individuals who met the AR 381-20 definition of Knowledgeable Personnel Absent Without Leave (KAWOL) were debriefed. This program involved primarily the Fort Benjamin Harrison Regional Office, 902d MI Group, and the IO, CSF.

The 902d Regional Office obtained the list of deserters schedule to return for discharge and transmitted the list to the IO, CSF which initiated a check of the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII), checked files from the US Army Investigative Records Repository (IRR), and instructed the Fort Benjamin Harrison Regional Office to debrief those deserters meeting KAWOL criteria.[59]

(U) ~~(C)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Non-Retainable Personnel. During FY 1977, INSCOM monitored 918 cases, most of whom were reclassified and reassigned or released from active duty. The three principal non-retainable categories were drugs, marriage to foreign nationals and medical. A total of 625 or 68 percent of the non-retainables were in these three categories. On 26 May 1977, a new policy was instituted whereby subordinate units reported non-retainables directly to MILPERCEN for necessary action. This change in procedures resulted in more rapid resolution of non-retainable cases.[61]

(U) Congressional Inquiries/Requests for Assistance. During FY 1977, the Inspector General, HQ INSCOM received and processed 81 Congressional inquiries, compared to 473 for FY 1976. The decrease was attributed primarily to the reorganization whereby INSCOM lost responsibility for ASA tactical support units and the solution of the 04B/98G recruitment problems. Significant decreases in the categories of Assignment/Utilization, Enlistment/Reenlistment, Requests for Assistance, and Transfer/Reassignment were noted. Although decreasing, cases pertaining to transfer and reassignment continued to be the basis for the majority of Congressional inquiries.

Complaint periods were held at all commands inspected during FY 1977. The total number of requests for assistance received was 255, an increase of 62 over the previous year. Increases were noted in the categories of Administration, Low Morale, Assignment/Utilization, Pay and Allowances, Transfer/Reassignment, and Transportation. Requests for assistance have increased steadily during the last year and a half as more individuals appear to have progressively greater confidence in the IG system.[62]

(U) Military Justice. The number of non-judicial punishments imposed under Article 15 continued to decrease from previous years. In FY 1975, Article 15 punishments totaled 1,052; in FY 1976 there were 945; in FY 197T they totaled 159; and decreased to 252 in FY 1977.[63]

Table 24 below gives a breakdown of serious crime by category for FY's 1976, 197T, and 1977. Again considerable decreases were noted.

~~(C)~~ ~~(U)~~ Automatic Data Processing Activities. FY 1977 was a year of major change in Automatic Data Processing (ADP) activities and emphasis. As a result of implementing IOSS recommendations and INSCOM's intelligence support at the strategic level, all ADP support to tactical systesm was dropped. The ADP budget rose more than 40 percent, from $2.1 million in FY 1976 to over $3 million in FY 1977. A problem throughout the report period was the continuing loss of personnel with no replacements. Enlisted personnel strength worldwide was approximately 50 percent of authorized; officer strength was at 78 percent and dropping, with no relief in sight.

In January 1977, an INSCOM ADP Working Group was formed to identify immediate

Table 24.—Serious Crimes By Category

Crimes of Violence	FY 1976	FY 197T	FY 1977
Rape	1	2	0
Robbery	1	1	0
Aggravated Assault	2	0	6
Assault	9	0	5
Assault/Battery	5	0	2
Crimes Against Property			
Larceny	10	1	4
Burglary	0	0	0
Breaking/Entering	1	0	0
Auto Theft	0	0	0
Malicious Damage	1	0	0
Destruction of Property	3	0	0
Drug Offenses			
Use/Possession			
Narcotics	1	0	1
Dangerous Drugs	4	1	0
Marijuana	98	27	21
Sale/Trafficking	0	0	3
All Categories	3	2	1

support requirements, identify data needed for short and long range planning at MACOM and DA, and identify long range (after October 1977) ADP support units. The Working Group consisted of representatives from HQ INSCOM (DCSMIS, DSA, OPPA), Intelligence and Security Command Intelligence Group (INSIG), HQ USAINTA, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Detachment (USAITAD) and the US Army Imagery Intelligence Center (USAIIC). This Group also created the ADP portion of the INSCOM Concept Plan. During FY 1977, LAFINE WINE (LFW) II was under development by a joint NSA/INSCOM development team and scheduled for deployment (b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 1st Qtr, FY 1978. LFW II will replace LFW I now in operation at the Field Station. In March 1977, software development responsibilities were divided between the NSA-based software development team (b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 software development team. Exchange TDY's and status reports were accomplished to insure maximum coordination during the development phase of LFW II. Software development was accomplished on the INSCOM-owned IBM 370/145 configuration at NSA with computer sizing adquacy becoming an issue of increasing concern. Consideration was given to effecting a swap for an IBM 370/158 due to become NSA excess in June 1978. Simulation studies and further sizing efforts were scheduled for the 2d Qtr, FY 1978 time frame.

(b)(1) system, was in its final development stage. Application programs were developed by the INSCOM Data Systems Activity (DSA) with software contractor assistance provided by Data General Corporation. There was some delay due to problems caused by the terminals, however, they operated properly following factory repair. (b)(1) was scheduled to be delivered to (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) P in 2d Qtr, FY 1978.

To enhance the overall operation and management of resources within (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per an ADP system, TRIPLE SCOOP, was to be procured to provide automated support to administrative functions. A procurement package for the purchase of a Data General Eclipse C330 was developed. The configuration was similar to that in (b)(1) which provided the Field Station a backup capability. It also provided a minimal and efficient type of logistical support vice multiple support for different types of computer equipment. The programs were to be written and maintained by (b)(1);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per NSA personnel with assistance from HQ INSCOM (DCSMIS).[64]

The table below shows the number of INSCOM computers on hand, their locations, and use, as of 30 September 1977.

Table 25.—INSCOM Computers On Hand, Location, and Use

Location	Number on Hand	Use
AHS	12	General Purpose
NSA	1	Systems Development
INSIG (Ft Bragg)	2	General Purpose-Intel Spt
VHFS (Post)	2	General Purpose
(AAF)	13	General Purpose/SIGINT
(SA)	1	Scientific/Engineering
(SSA)	5	General Purpose/SIGSEC
(Sig Dev Lab)	1	Systems Development
	23	
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA	13	(b)(1)
	3	
	4	
146th Avn Co	1	
330th Avn Co	6	Mission Spt/Weapons System
156th Avn Co	1	LEFT JAB
USASATEC	3	Testing
Avn EW Co	11	CEFIRM LEADER
USAISD (Ft Devens)	1	
Outside (On Loan):		
GTE Sylvania	27	(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA
Bunker-Ramo	9	
AEL	9	

INSCOM Computers On Hand, Location, and Use--Continued

Location	Number on Hand	Use
Outside (Loan)		
ECOM	17	SSAS; ULR-17; LEFT FOOT; Gen Spt; TSQ-114
ESL	13	QUICK FIX w/DF; TSQ-114
SWRI	1	SSL
CECORP	1	ULR-12
RCA	2	Systems Development (EQUATE)
TOTAL	182	

(C) Status of Aircraft Resources. After 1 January 1977, when most of the ASA tactical units were transferred to other commands, INSCOM retained the 146th Aviation Company in Korea with six RU-21H aircraf (b)(1) (b)(1) and one U-21A for training purposes. On 1 July, the 704th MI Detachment (Aerial Surveillance) was assigned to INSCOM with its six new OV-1D Mohawk aircraft. One of the aircraft had been damaged during a landing accident, however, it was replaced by the end of September.

In August 1977, the U-21G aircraft at [redacted] was ferried back to Beech Aircraft in CONUS where it was to become a part of the [redacted] product improvement program. In September, [redacted] received a replacement aircraft (U-21A) from one of the other [redacted] detachments in [redacted] This brought the total aircraft to two U-21A's at [redacted]

Aircraft inventory at the end of FY 1977 is shown in table below.

Table 26.—Aircraft Inventory

Unit	Type of Aircraft	30 Sep 77
146th ASA Co (Avn)	RU-21H	6
[redacted]	U-21A	1
	UH-1H	3
704th MI Det (AS)	OV-1D	6
[redacted]	U-21A	2
	UH-1H	2
TOTAL		20

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(U)

~~(C)~~ INSCOM Aviation Conferences. HQ INSCOM conducted an INSCOM Worldwide Aviation Standardization/Safety Conference during 29-30 August 1977 in Korea—the first such conference to be held outside CONUS. All INSCOM aviation elements were represented with the exception of the USASA Test and Evaluation Center. Representatives from DCSI, USAREUR, US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, EUSA Standards and Safety Office, and 17th Aviation Group, Korea also attended.

One of the most controversial items on the agenda was the proposal to establish an operational ceiling on GUARDRAIL (GR) operations of 18,000 feet above sea level. The frequency of human factor mishaps being experienced by GR crews during such high altitude operations, which resulted in unconsciousness and hypoxia, was the reason behind this agenda item. Other agenda items included the following:

1. Draft Aircrew Training Manuals.
2. Skid Shoes for Helicopters.
3. Use of Helmets.
4. Rductions in Flying Hour Program.
5. Operational Security.
6. Instrument Flight Examiners.
7. Flight Surgeons.
8. MIJI Reporting.
9. Oxygen Use.

Following the Standardization/Safety Conference, the first GUARDRAIL Users Conference was held in Korea during 31 August-1 September 1977, which brought representatives of the 146th and 330th ASA Companies together. This conference reviewed all facets of the GUARDRAIL systems operation and brought about an exchange of information concerning tactics, techniques, and operational information that will be used in developing standardization procedures for the operation of GUARDRAIL systems. It was also noted that there was a lack of communications and liaison with users at all levels.[66]

(C ~~(C)~~ 146th ASA Company (Aviation) Nominated for Award. INSCOM nominated the 146th ASA Company (Aviation) for the Army Aviation Association of America's Outstanding Aviation Unit Award. The nomination was based upon the unit's significant and outstanding contributions and innovations in the employment of Army aviation over and above their mission of providing day/night all-weather intelligence support to the Eighth US Army (EUSA), and US Forces Korea.

(b)(1)

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Of particular note were the 146th's actions and stamina during the decisive weeks that surrounded the attack by North Korean soldiers upon US personnel at Panmunjom on 18 August 1976; the unit's widely recognized accomplishments in the aircraft life support equipment field; innovations which had Army-wide application in the employment of airborne intelligence systems; and the unit's efforts to limit the physiological impact of flight operations in a high altitude/low pressure environment.

(b)(1)

(C) Surgeon General's Study re Aviators. In December 1976, the Surgeon General's Office began a study on the occupational environments associated with SIGINT/EW equipment. The study was initiated after testicular tumors were discovered in two ASA aviation officers who had been performing similar duties. Although the officers were assigned to different overseas areas, they both worked as the operations officer on one of the [redacted] systems. The first officer was medivaced from [redacted] to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in late 1975, while the other officer was medivaced to Walter Reed in October 1976 from the [redacted]

The Surgeon General's Study pursued the relationship between the occupational environments experienced by the two officers, to test personnel and equipments of GUARDRAIL units, and to assist in developing a comprehensive environmental monitoring program for INSCOM. Throughout the period, due to the sensitivity of the subject, coupled with the need for the Surgeon General to conduct extensive medical research and screening prior to on-site medical and equipment testing, HQ INSCOM kept the subject at a very low key and communicated pertinent information directly with commanders having responsibility for GUARDRAIL units.

On 5 January 1977, HQ INSCOM hosted a Medical Assistance Conference at Arlington Hall Station to inform the participants of potential threat problems and measures being taken to investigate the possible threat. Attendees included representatives from the State Department, CIA, NSA, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Army Surgeon General, Navy Surgeon General, Air Force Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Army Medical Research Development Command, Army Medical Intelligence Agency, and Army Environmental Hygiene Agency.

In September 1977, the CDR, INSCOM was briefed on the following findings

(b)(1)

of the Surgeon General's Office:

1. The rate of testicular tumors was apparently higher than that of the overall Army, but the statistical variation was not such that coincidence could be ruled out.

2. If the increased rate was assumed as real and if it were to continue, one additional case might be expected to occur approximately every three years resulting in one potential additional fatality every seven years.

3. To date, no increased microwave exposure had been documented by the US Army Environmental Hygiene Agency, but studies were not complete.

In interpreting these findings, it was concluded that a small percentage of cases could still be unidentified. Also, assuming that this tumor was related to an occupational exposure, nothing was known concerning the latency period of the disease. If this interval between exposure and disease was more than several years, it was unlikely that a relatively short-term study such as this would detect the cause(s).[68]

(U) Distinctive Badge, Shoulder Sleeve Insignia, and Distinguishing Flag for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command. In anticipation of the merger of USASA and USAINTA on 1 January 1977, HQ USASA requested major subordinate units and USAINTA units to submit ideas and suggestions for the design of a distinctive badge and shoulder sleeve insignia early in the first quarter. On 28 December 1976, HQ USASA formally requested the Institute of Heraldry to design a distinctive badge and shoulder sleeve insignia for INSCOM and inclosed the best of the suggested designs for possible consideration.

On 6 April 1977, the Institute of Heraldry forwarded authorization letters to INSCOM for the distinctive badge and the shoulder sleeve insignia.[69] The description, symbolism, and photograph of each is shown at appendix H and appendix I, respectively.

Also included was the description of the distinguishing flag for INSCOM:

> A dark blue flag, 3 feet hoist by 4 feet fly, trimmed on three sides with yellow fringe, on which is centered the approved shoulder sleeve insignia design, in proper colors.

(U) INSCOM Records Center. In December 1975, the HQ USASA staff and subordinate units were advised that USASA records would no longer be transferred or retired to records holding areas or overseas records centers or to the Washington National Records Center, but would instead be retired directly to HQ USASA. This was followed up with USASA Supplement 3 to AR 340-18-1, 23 March 1976, which provided records disposition procedures. Effective 1 January 1977, the INSCOM Records Center was listed in Change 9, AR 340-18-1 as the repository for all Army Signal Intelligence, Special Intelligence,

and Signal Security files. Also, effective 1 January 1977, the INSCOM Records Center was listed as the repository for all Army Signal Intelligence and Special Intelligence files in Appendix B, Change 7, AR 340-2.

In summary, all of the aforementioned files were to be retired directly to HQ INSCOM.[70]

(U) US Army Investigative Records Repository. The US Army Investigative Records Repository (USAIRR), subordinate element of the Central Security Facility (CSF), maintained all counterintelligence files (3,735,628) created by or for the Department of the Army to meet criteria specified in AR 381-45 and AR 380-13, and provided service to 429 authorized Army requestors and other Executive Branch agencies. The Repository processed all litigation type requests, served as the records repository for files designated by DOD, and provided Automated Data Processing services for USAINTA/INSCOM, Fort Meade elements.

During FY 1977, increased emphasis was directed toward files reduction through review of open shelf dossiers and microfilm for retention under AR 380-13, as well as the reduction of supplemental material at USAIRR. On 1 October 1976, the USAIRR holdings totaled 3,913,465 with an average of 2,000 dossiers created per month. In addition, some 700,000 military deletes were being held under a DA moratorium which precluded the destruction of certain intelligence-related documents. On 18 January, this moratorium was lifted and USAIRR destroyed these files in a matter of days. On 26 October 1976, USAIRR held 18,441 key sheets on microfiche. Through careful review of these records and the associated files, 2,418 microfiche were destroyed; 1,314 files identified for control; and 84 files/key sheets deleted. This project required 2,964 manhours to complete.

On 3 January 1977, using in-house resources, a review and re-indexing of microfilm records was initiated. In reducing these microfilm holdings, the Alaska files were selected for use in a pilot project. The entire group of 22 reels was reviewed by one employee in 1,834 hours. Of the 1,851 files reviewed, 1,678 were deleted; 171 incorporated into existing files; and 2 were re-indexed as hard copy files. On 10 June 1977, the catalog to the indexing of these files was destroyed. Following this segment, the microfilm files of the 117th CIC Detachment and the Shanghai files were reviewed. While most of this material was not in contravention with AR 380-13, it was of no investigative value and represented a waste of manpower and space.

On 14 January 1977, the USAIRR initiated a review of open shelf files. By assigning a quota of files to be purged weekly, a review of 17,980 files was accomplished with 10,606 destroyed and 7,374 retained. This review action consumed 1,276 manhours. While under normal procedures all files removed from the shelf for any reason are reviewed for retention under the provisions of AR 380-13, experience indicated that many of the files deleted would never have been requested/removed from the shelf except for Freedom of Information or Privacy Act requests or related actions. An additional

benefit derived from this review was the addition of the file retention code to all Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) entries for files retained which was implemented in USAIRR on 27 May 1976. A further benefit for files deletion was the receipt and implementation on 10 June 1977 of the Archivist criteria, subject: Revised Records Disposal Authority for Defense Investigative Program Records, dated 3 May 1976. The total number of files (microfilm and hard copy) reveiwed by USAIRR personnel was 88,840 with 39,560 deleted and 49,280 retained.

During the period 1 October 1976-30 September 1977, the Files Division and the Special Records Division, USAIRR, pulled 105,037 hard copy personality dossiers, 32,419 microfilm files, and 294 impersonal files in response to requests. Mail outs during this period were 10,482 hard copy dossiers, 9,241 deleted from USAIRR and transferred to Defense Investigative Service (DIS), and 1,875 partial dossiers forwarded to DIS. The USAIRR retained 315 microfilm (copies) and 6,553 reproductions of dossiers.[71]

(U) Freedom of Information Center. During the report period, the INSCOM Freedom of Information Center (FOIC) received a total of 2,267 Freedom of Information (FOI) and Privacy Act (PA) requests. As indicated in the table below, the number of requests received gradually increased during the year with 641 received in the first four months and 875 received in the last four.

Table 27.—FOI and PA Requests

Month	FOI	PA	Total
Oct 76	30	117	147
Nov 76	25	124	149
Dec 76	47	137	184
Jan 77	47	114	161
Feb 77	55	136	191
Mar 77	63	137	200
Apr 77	43	136	179
May 77	34	147	181
Jun 77	95	132	227
Jul 77	46	155	201
Aug 77	64	179	243
Sep 77	65	139	204
TOTAL	614	1,653	2,267

The Freedom of Information Center processed every request well within the time restraints imposed by the law. There was not a single instance in which the Center failed to respond completely and fully within the spirit and intent of both laws. Requestors could appeal either an FOI or Privacy Act denial. The appeal was directed to the General Counsel, Department of the Army. A complete copy of the file was forwarded to the General Counsel,

who prepared an independent reply. To date, the General Counsel supported the VOIC decisions with only minor editorializing. One Army case went to Court in San Francisco, California, with the decision in favor of the Army. The DA Privacy Review Board upheld the FOIC decision in the one case forwarded to it.[72]

(U) Executive Order 11905 and AR 380-13. Executive Order (EO) 11905, 18 February 1976, US Foreign Intelligence Activities, and AR 380-13, 30 September 1974, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations, continued to receive attention during this report period. Action was taken to insure that all INSCOM elements were familiar with the provisions of EO 11905, DA implementation of EO 11905, and the establishment of standard requirements for the maintenance of policy books throughout INSCOM.

DA implementation of EO 11905 required all offices, where duties included the conduct of intelligence activities, to maintain a policy book reflecting the fact that all assigned personnel had thoroughly familiarized themselves with the EO and could understand and comply with its provisions. In order that the contents of the policy book was standardized within INSCOM, guidance was provided subordinate commands, operational, administrative, and support elements. The policy book was to be reviewed annually by assigned/attached personnel who certified in writing that they had read, understood, and would comply with EO 11905.

AR 380-13 also required acknowledgement by individuals as to comprehension and compliance with its provisions. A policy book was maintained and contained a copy of the AR and certification statements of assigned personnel. The certification also required a statement to the effect that the files had been screened and did not contain any information that was in contravention to the AR.

Exactly how INSCOM units in overseas areas fitted into the INSCOM operational picture and who was responsibile for EO 11905 and AR 380-13 compliance was largely dependent upon Status of Forces Agreements and agreements with other US Military activities. In an attempt to clarify these situations, two representatives from the ODCI, HQ INSCOM, made extended visits to INSCOM/USAINTA elements in the Pacific area and Europe. Discussions were held on Army and INSCOM policies concerning AR 380-13, draft AR 381-22 (EO 11905), and draft AR 381-23 (Wiretap, Investigative Monitoring and Eavesdrop Activities (WIMEA)). Conclusions drawn from these trips indicated that it was evident that with the large number of policy papers issued by higher headquarters on these regulations (approximately 200 HQDA policy clarifications), units in the field were swamped by paperwork and the enormous task to properly maintain these documents. It was evident that standardized procedures made possible by the establishment of INSCOM would contribute significantly to compliance with the technical requirements of the regulations. No likelihood of substantive violations of AR 380-13, AR 381-22, or AR 381-23 were detected.[73]

(U) Management by Objectives Program. On 9 May 1977, an INSCOM Management by Objectives (MBO) program was established. The objectives of this program were (1) To improve overall management, (2) increase productivity, and (3) improve effectiveness and efficiency. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM) was assigned staff responsibility for, and supervision of, the INSCOM MBO Program. Command goals were as follows:[74]

1. Build INSCOM into a viable MACOM.

2. Improve intelligence and threat analysis support provided the Army for Planning and Operations.

3. Expand the role and improve the productivity of Army elements of the Central Security Service.

4. Improve counterintelligence and operational security support provided Army commanders.

5. Improve the quality of life and professionalism of our personnel.

6. Obtain optimum benefit from resources.

7. Maximize technological thrusts.

(U) Organizational Effectiveness Retreat. An Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Retreat was held at the Warrenton Training Center on 18 April 1977 to determine critical problem areas involved in the reorganization of HQ INSCOM and suggest solution strategies. Participants included the command group and principal staff for INSCOM and USAINTA.

After opening remarks by BG Rolya, CDR INSCOM, the attendees were divided into two groups, one composed of USAINTA (Fort Meade) personnel and the other INSCOM (Arlington Hall Station) personnel. Each group was asked to produce a list of anticipated problem areas. The initial lists were presented to all participants and two new groups were formed to refine and prioritize them. Each of the two new groups was composed of approximately equal numbers of Arlington Hall Station and Fort Meade representatives. The following is a consolidated list of major problem areas identified by both groups:

1. Stationing.

2. Personnel.

3. Intelligence Threat Analysis Center.

4. Need for effective communications during split operations at Arlington Hall Station and Fort Meade.

5. Support requirements.

6. Mission/Charter.

7. Current operations.

On 28 June 1977, DCSPER was assigned full staff responsbility for Organizational Effectiveness in INSCOM. Primary efforts were directed in the areas of staffing to support OE implementation within the command. One full-time space was created within the Management Division, ODCSPER, and the 66th Military Intelligence Group identified one space which could be converted. The proposed staff was for six officers to provide area support in CONUS, Europe and Far East in pairs. However, these actions were not finalized during the report period due to lack of OE expertise within HQ INSCOM and the incomplete status of OE direction from HQDA.

Major Bruce S. Coleman, Jr. was appointed HQ INSCOM Organizational Effectiveness staff officer and attended the OE Training Center at Fort Ord, California, graduating on 31 August 1977.[75]

(U) Life Cycle Management System. The INSCOM Life Cycle Management System (LCMS) Office was responsibile for the INSCOM LCMS, the Type Classification Program, reclassification of US Army Electronics Materiel Readiness Activity (EMRA) managed items, overall coordination of INSCOM systems/items, scheduling/staffing/preparation of Basis of Issue Feeder Data Sheets, scheduling and chairing all In-Process Reviews (IPR), and coordination of the development of Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI). This Office was transferred from ODCSFOR to ODCSRDA in April 1977. There were 161 systems/items under the LCMS as of 30 September 1977.

LCMS meetings were conducted on and formal IPR's were held on the following systems:

LCMS Meetings	Formal IPR's
QUICK LOOK II	QUICK LOOK II
AN/GSQ-185	Division Level EW Systems
AN/ULR-17 HF	Echelons Above Division EW Systems
AN/ULR-17 VHF	AN/MLQ-33
AN/ULR-17 UHF	QUICK FIX w/DF
AN/TSQ-114	QUICK FIX w/o DF
AN/UYU-19	CEFIRM LEADER
Division Spt Co Level Maint Facility	AN/TLQ-17A
AN/TLQ-17A	AN/UYK-19
AN/TRQ-32	
Millimeter-Wave Frequency Extension (Non-Comm)	

During FY 1977, Basis of Issue Feeder Data Sheets were sent to TRADOC for the following systems:

AN/FSQ-88(v)	AN/TRC-148
AN/GSQ-185	AN/USM-380
AN/TRC-149	AN/USM-379
RU-21B	AN/USM-378
AN/TRM-22	MK-1828/ULQ-11
RU-21A	COMFAC
RU-21C	AN/TTR-1A

A total of 63 items were type classified, reclassified or had their type classification terminated during FY 1977.[76]

(U) Joint USASA/USAINTA Commanders' Conference. The Joint USASA/USAINTA (INSCOM) Commanders' Conference was held at HQ USASA during the period 6-10 December 1976. The theme of this first joint conference was Military Intelligence - Unity in Mission. During the conference, presentations were made by members of both the USASA and USAINTA staffs. Some of the topics presented were as follows:

MACOM Planning
The Cryptologic Charter
PHOTINT
HUMINT Overview
Counterintelligence
Special Operations
Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence-SIGINT/EW Systems
Military Intelligence Doctrine
A Commander and His Responsibilities

In addition to remarks and/or presentations by BG William I. Rolya, CG, USASA; BG James E. Freeze, DCG, USASA; and BG E. R. Thompson, CG, USAINTA; the following guest speakers contributed to the success of the conference:

LTG William B. Fulton, Director, US Army Staff
MG George L. McFadden, Jr., Deputy Director for Field Management and Evaluation, NSA/CSS
MG Harold R. Aaron, ACSI, DA

See appendix J for group photograph of conference participants.

(U) Suggestion Program. In spite of the continuous reorganization within the command during the year and the problems and confusion resulting from the establishment of a new MACOM, the submission and adoption rates for the FY 1977 Suggestion Program was considered good. The 842 suggestions submitted were a 1.5 percent improvement over the previous year. The adoption rate, however, of 140 suggestions, was 17 percent lower than in FY 1976.

Tangible first year benefits resulting from adopted suggestions were

$144,028, 74 percent of the command goal. Further statistical evaluation indicated that $16.24 was saved for every $1.00 paid for adopted suggestions.[77]

(U) Travis Trophy Award. The Travis Trophy was originally presented in 1945 by Sir Edward Travis as an award in athletic contests between the Army Security Agency and the Naval Communications Supplementary Activity. It was last awarded as an athletic trophy in 1948. In 1964, the Director, National Security Agency reactivated the award to be presented annually to the Service Cryptologic Agency unit making the most significant contribution to the cryptologic community in the fields of operations, management, administration or suggestions during the preceding calendar year.

The USASA nominee for CY 1976 was USASA (b)(3):P.L. 86-36 (b)(3):P.L. 86-36 On 5 October 1977, at the Thirteenth Annual Presentation at the National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, the USASA nominee was declared the winner. See appendix K for list of previous Travis Trophy winners and USASA nominees.[78]

(U) Commanding General's Annual Communications Award. The Commanding General's Annual Communications Award was designed to give recognition to the USASA communications facility making the most outstanding contribution to the USASA mission. The winner of this award for CY 1976 was US Army Field Station, Augsburg. MG William I. Rolya, CG, USASA/INSCOM presented the plaque to the Field Station Commander during the 1977 Commanders' Conference at HQ INSCOM. Due to implementation of the IOSS recommendations, the award was discontinued.[79]

(U) Command Information Activities. THE HALLMARK continued as the authorized unofficial news organ of INSCOM during FY 1977. Following is a list of INSCOM publications as of 30 September 1977:

Publication	Unit
THE HALLMARK	HQ INSCOM
THE INTELEGRAM	HQ USAINTA
AUGSBURG PROFILE	USA Field Station, Augsburg
TORII TYPHOON	USA Field Station, Okinawa
WRITE-ON	INSCOM Support Group
THE VANGUARD	USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station
ZOECKLER ZEPHYR	USA Field Station, Korea
MISAWA SENTINAL	USA Field Station, Misawa

The AUGSBURG PROFILE was named the Keith L. Ware Award winner as well as the DOD Thomas Jefferson Award for unit newspapers.

Efforts to consolidate various functions of the Public Affairs Offices of INSCOM and USAINTA commenced in March 1977. In June 1977, plans were made to discontinue publication of THE HALLMARK and THE INTELEGRAM and produce one consolidated publication for INSCOM. Work on a publication known as THE JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND began in August 1977 with the first issue being published in October. The final issue of THE HALLMARK appeared in August 1977.[80]

(U) Foreign Broadcast Information Service. On 15 April 1975, US Army Field Station, Korea advised that a Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) team had visited the Field Station to discuss the possibility of stationing an FBIS activity at Pyong Taek. The team queried possible use of Field Station Korea high frequency antennas, space and possible installation of additional dedicated HF antennas. As a result, FBIS was invited to visit HQ USASA to discuss their requirements.

At a meeting of FBIS and USASA representatives at HQ USASA, on 23 April 1975, FBIS representatives explained they were considering the possibility of withdrawing their activities from Japan and Okinawa and hoped to establish an activity in Korea. Their equipment was described as up to 16 each Collins 65IS remotely controlled receivers plus RF switching mounted in 6 to 8 racks. Estimated floor space required was 200 square feet. Thirty pairs of cable to the DCS terminal at Camp Humphreys for transmission to Seoul would be needed.

Since plans for the reconfiguration of the antenna field at Field Station Korea were then being considered, further action was deferred. On 24 October 1975, the FBIS was advised that reconfiguration plans had been completed and that the FBIS activity could be accommodated at that station. On 26 January 1976, the FBIS formally requested USASA concurrence in establishment of a FBIS receiving facility at Field Station Korea. Following DIRNSA and Field Station Korea concurrence, the CG, USASA concurred in the request on 12 March 1976.

During subsequent months, planning and coordination between the interested parties continued. In April 1977, the FBIS activity went into operation at Field Station Korea in a S-181 shelter mounted configuration where it will continue until the Operations Building for the Field Station is completed. FBIS equipment will then be relocated to the new Operations Building. It was estimated that collocation of FBIS with Field Station Korea instead of a separate facility resulted in savings in excess of $250,000.[81]

(U) DCSOPS Newsletter. On 18 May 1977, COL Francis X. Lillis, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, indicated the need for a DCSOPS Newsletter that would inform both INSCOM and its former tactical units of current operational activities. Responsibility for compilation and publication of the first issue only, entitled OPS CHATTER, was assigned to the History Office. Publication was to be aperiodic with subsequent publication dependent on opinions, comments, and suggestions received. The first issue was published on 1 June 1977 with distribution being made to attendees of the Peacetime Utilization Conference at HQ INSCOM, during the period 1-3 June. Subsequently, the newsletter was distributed throughout INSCOM and its former tactical units. Although the comments of the recipients were favorable as to the need for this type publication, additional issues were not published during the remainder of the fiscal year.[82]

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

1. AHR, DCSRM, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 18-22.
2. Ibid. p. 17.
3. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY77, p. 48.
4. Ibid. pp. 57-58.
5. AHR, DCSRM, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 23.
6. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 41; Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY77, pp. 20, 23.
7. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 35-36.
8. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY77, p. 6.
9. Interview, Mr. M. C. Zumwalt, ODCSPER, HQ INSCOM (24 Mar 78)(Data obtained from computer run containing WAC statistics.)
10. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 25, 33; DF, IAOPS-O-SP, 13 Jul 77, subj: MOS 05H Fill, FS San Antonio.
11. AHR, Staff Elements, INSCOM, Ft Meade, FY77, Tab 3, DCSPA, USAINTA.
12. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 27-28.
13. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY77, p. 16.
14. Ibid.
15. USASA Regulation 621-1, INSCOM Officer Fellowship Program, 13 Dec 76; Telephone Interview, CPT T. R. Grevencamp, ODCSPER (25 Apr 78).
16. DF, IAOPS-PAC, 5 May 77, subj: Personnel No Shows; Telephone Interview, Mr. Alphonse Canciglia, ODCSPER (14 Jun 78).
17. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 51; AHR, USAFS Augsburg, FY77, p. 236; Msg, IAOPS-O-E, CDR INSCOM to CDR VII Corps (8 Aug 77), subj: Support to USAFS (b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 per NSA
18. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 94-95.
19. Ibid. p. 93.
20. Ibid. pp. 97-98.
21. Ibid. p. 39.
22. DCSPER Presentation, INSCOM Commanders' Conference, 17-21 Oct 77.
23. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 42-43.
24. DCSPER Presentation, INSCOM Commanders' Conference, 17-21 Oct 77.
25. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, all Qtrs FY77, pp. 11, 10, 9. 8, respectively.
26. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 15 and Appendixes E, F; Ltrs to LTG H. G. Moore fm BG William I. Rolya, 4 May 76 and 14 Jun 76.
27. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 49-51; Ltr, IACG, HQ USASA, 30 Dec 76, subj: Conversion to the Competitive Service; USASA Commander's Bulletin 77-6, 28 Nov 77, p. 6.
28. AHR, USAASD, USAINTA, FY77, pp. 4-5; Public Information Release on MICECP, FY77.
29. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 71-82.
30. Ibid. pp. 65-66.
31. AHR, Staff Elements, INSCOM, Ft Meade, FY77, Tab 3, DCSPA, USAINTA.
32. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 53-56.
33. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 179-181.
34. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, Tab D.
35. Ltr, IAPER, HQ INSCOM, 3 Aug 77, subj: USAINSCOM Affirmative Actions Plan (AAP); Ltr, IACG, HQ INSCOM, 16 Aug 77, subj: Human Relations/Equal Opportunity w/Incl: INSCOM Affirmative Actions Plan (Revised).

36. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 68-69; Interview, Mr. Carl Thorpe, EEOO, HQ INSCOM (29 Mar 78); DF, IACPO, 26 Oct 76, subj: Upward Mobility Target Job Descriptions.
37. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 182-185; INSCOM FWP Committee Charter.
38. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 104-106.
39. (b)(1);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per NSA
40. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY77, Chap III.
41. Ibid; AHR, USAFS Augsburg, FY77, pp. 226-229.
42. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY77, Chap V.
43. Ibid; DCSLOG Presentation to INSCOM Commanders' Conference, 17-21 Oct 77; Interview, Mr. Eugene Schreifels, ODCSLOG (5 May 78).
44. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 24-26; Msg, IACG, HQ INSCOM, 7 Jul 77, subj: Logistics Readiness of USAR-ASA Units; Interview, LTC Ray W. Chamberlain, Reserve Affairs Officer, HQ INSCOM (18 Apr 78); TALKER, IAOPS-PTR-RES, 26 Aug 77, subj: Improved Status ASA Reserve Unit Primary Mission Equipment.
45. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 16; INSCOM COOP, June 1976 w/Changes.
46. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 8-11.
47. Ibid. pp. 19-21.
48. Ibid. pp. 36-38.
49. Ibid. pp. 21-22, 34-35; AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 83-84.
50. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 25-27.
51. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 42-43.
52. FACT SHEET, IAOPS-EUR, HQ INSCOM, 13 Apr 77, subj: WINTEX/PRIME TARGET 77; FACT SHEET, IAOPS-EUR, HQ INSCOM, 24 Mar 77, subj: Warsaw Pact Reaction to WINTEX/PRIME TARGET 77 [S].
53. AARGRAM Submission, IAOPS-EUR, HQ USASA, 8 Dec 76.
54. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 107-109; Tab G, TALKER and Back-Up Papers re Implementation of INSCOM Concept Plan (Training), 16 Jun 77.
55. Interview, CPT Randy G. Seamans, ODCSPER, Plans & Tng Div (Apr 78); AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 86.
56. Ibid. pp. 110-111.
57. Ibid. p. 36.
58. AHR, USACSF, USAINTA, FY77, Chap 1 (Hist Rept, PSO).
59. Ibid. Chap 4 (Hist Rept, IO).
60. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 40-41; AHR, USAFS Berlin, FY77, p. I-10.
61. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 31.
62. AHR, IG, HQ INSCOM, FY77; Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY77, p. 42.
63. AHR, SJA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 4.
64. AHR, DCSMIS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 1, Appendix II.
65. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 175-177.
66. Ibid. pp. 166-170.
67. Ltr, CDR INSCOM to AAAA Awards Chairman, 1 Jul 77; Interview, CPT Jeffrey W. Wright, ODCSOPS (7 Jun 78).
68. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 170-172.
69. Ltr, DAAG-HDP-A, The Institute of Heraldry, USA, 6 Apr 77, subj: Distinctive Badge and Shoulder Sleeve Insignia for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command.
70. Records Management Newsletter, HQ INSCOM, 17 Jan 77.
71. AHR, USACSF, USAINTA, FY77, Chap 2 (Hist Rept, USAIRR).
72. AHR, USACSF, USAINTA, FY77, Chap 3 (Hist Rept, FOIC).

73. AHR, DCI, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. IV-7, IV-8; Ltr, IACI, HQ INSCOM, 23 Jun 77, subj: Policy Requirements, EO 11905.
74. Ltr, IACG, HQ INSCOM, 9 May 77, subj: Management by Objectives.
75. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 17-18.
76. AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 27-30.
77. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 57.
78. Travis Trophy Nomination, HQ INSCOM (USASAFS Sobe), undtd.
79. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 15.
80. AHR, PAO, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 5-6; Interview, Mrs. Carolyn K. Dovel, PAO (10 Apr 78).
81. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY77, Chap III.
82. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 96-97; Ltr, IAOPS-PTR, HQ INSCOM, 24 Jun 77, subj: "OPS CHATTER" Publication on SIGINT/EW.

CHAPTER VI

(U) ~~(TS-CCO)~~ OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

~~(S-CCO)~~ National SIGINT Plan. During FY 1977, the draft National SIGINT Plan (NSP) was reviewed by HQ INSCOM on two occasions. The initial draft was reviewed during March 1977; the final draft in the April/May time frame. As the result of the initial draft review, NSACSS incorporated the majority of HQ INSCOM comments as well as a revision of the INSCOM Architecture portion of the plan. A few isolated differences of opinion remained to be resolved, perhaps chief among them being the increased reliance which NSA continued to place upon Third Party collection. This draft NSP represented the third successive year that NSACSS has published the NSP with the first edition being published in 1974.

The draft NSP provided a near and long range perspective (1980 and beyond) of SIGINT objectives and requirements, and was the initial document for the planning, programming and budgeting (PPB) process. It discussed the requirements process whereby US Government information needs are levied upon the United States SIGINT System (USSS); the prioritization of the general categories of requirements necessitated by resource restraints; and described the target communications environment in which the USSS operates. The NSP also addressed, in general terms, a concept of operation which provided a description of the resources and capabilities the USSS had to have in the future in the context of collection programs, exploitation strategies, and efforts to be directed toward SIGINT reporting and support to SIGINT users. In sequence, the NSP also addressed the concept of SIGINT architecture and the area architectures which were comprehensive, optimal designs for each of NSA;s functional systems constituting the SIGINT architecture. In addition, each of the SCA's developed an architecture addressing the strategies both for the contact of military operations and their participation in the national efforts of the USSS for the PPB process.

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

It was considered essential that, as a minimum, the United States maintain an appropriate degree of SIGINT collection and processing against those targetod entities which pose the greatest threat, particularly from an intelligence indication viewpoint. Moreover, other benefits would derive from US Army (INSCOM) operated strategic/tactical collection and processing facilities since this would insure the availability of trained operational personnel resources to augment tactical SIGINT/EW units during periods of emergency, contingency, or war.

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

The published NSP was received from NSACSS in June 1977; it consisted of three segments, two of which were classified TS-CCO and the third, TS-CCO-TKB.[1]

(~~S-CCO~~) US Army SIGINT Architecture. NSACSS has been developing a SIGINT Architectural process and strategy to improve long range SIGINT planning and operations since about 1974. This process was divided into three interoperating groupings (Target, Area, and Service Architectures) which culminated in the annual National SIGINT Plan (NSP). SIGINT Architectures and the NSP are considered not only high-level planning vehicles, but also the drive for SIGINT planning and operations at all levels. Since the process was initiated, there has been a constant increase in attention and involvement by all [redacted] elements and the SCA's.

The Architectural process was essentially a "top-down" process developed to delineate overall needs, review and evaluate on-going projects (both in procurement and development), and specify courses of action to attain goals/objectives. Foremost, the Architectures provided a realistic framework of strategies to be followed in developing an integrated, balanced program for future US SIGINT efforts. In order to reach the desired goals, the Architectures analyzed overall intelligence needs to determine if the system/equipment package would satisfy the stated requirements.

Each of the Target Architectures considered specific "threats" to the US SIGINT System. Elements [redacted] briefed the other Architects on SIGINT targets which might be faced through the 1990's. Specific Target Architectures considered Europe, Pacific, Middle East, and other areas, as well as Support to Military Operations.

The Area Architects have been preparing strategies to achieve goals deemed necessary for effective US SIGINT operations through at least the early 1990's. Specific areas being covered were high frequency communications, line-of-sight, remote operations, exploitation, mobile systems, special collection, cryptanalysis, communications, manpower, and logistics. Each of these were to be prepared in accordance with the Target Architectures, and would assist the Service Architects by providing specific target information.

Service Architectures were prepared by the Army, Air Force, and Navy/Marine Corps with each considering areas of particular interest to the Service and interoperability. The Army SIGINT/EW Architecture was designed to contribute to the satisfaction of both national intelligence requirements (within the framework of the USSS), and the satisfaction of the needs of combat commanders (all echelons) for timely, accurate, and usable intelligence and combat information that would prepare them or influence actions on the battlefield. The framework of the Army SIGINT/EW Architecture emphasized an all-source and multi-discipline intelligence approach, culminating in the US Army Intelligence and Security Command. As the new major command for intelligence and EW, INSCOM exercised command and control of Field Stations, Echelons Above Corps (EAC) organizations, and the Intelligence

and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC).

- According to the revised INSCOM Architecture segment of the NSP, the Army SIGINT/EW Architecture falls into three functional overlapping and related levels, i.e., National or global activities, capabilities at the next Army Echelon Above Corps, and Army SIGINT/EW at Corps and below. All three levels are integral and necessary parts of the whole; and reflect a variable but dependent relationship. The INSCOM as the Army Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA) will provide operational technical control and interface between NSACSS and the Army staff and between INSCOM subordinate SIGINT/EW units and SIGINT/EW units organic to major Army commands. INSCOM will also interface with and provide advice and assistance to other functional major Army Commands such as DARCOM and TRADOC. INSCOM will serve as the Army focal point and spokesman for Army cryptologic matters in dealings with the USSS; however, other Army major commands will be participants according to assigned functional authorities and responsibilities. DARCOM and TRADOC will be responsible for the development, fielding and support of cryptologic systems at all levels and it will be necessary for NSACSS to interface with those major commands, as well as DA, rather than strictly with INSCOM.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) P.L. 86-36/50 USA B3 18 USC 798

In terms of support to military operations, the Army will continue to heavily rely on the USSS for Indications and Warning (I&W), centralized technical and intelligence data base support and for maintaining in peacetime the minimum required levels of technically experienced SIGINT forces. The Army SIGINT Architecture for EAC, Corps and Below have been designed to capitalize on and be an extension of the National level architecture. The EAC and CEWI capabilities will su-plement and enhance but are not designed to replace National level assets. The need for SIGINT Support to the Army using National level assets will therefore continue to be required for I&W, Data Base, and maintenance of technical preparedness through productive utilization.

The Army intelligence organization at the next echelon above corps will be multi-disciplined, similar to that of the CEWI concept. It differs in that EAC units will be organic to the INSCOM, with operational control passed to the supported major ground force command in war or during specified alert conditions. The EAC capability emphasizes two classes of activity. First is the collection against such target signals as HF and multichannel best exercised at theater level as dictated by technical features of the target and exploitation system demands, and as driven by the supported commands' needs based on mission and capabilities. Second, is a SIGINT control, processing, analysis and reporting capability sufficient to support assigned collection elements and, to support and coordinate CEWI activities at Corps and below. The EAC organization will be the interface between the National and local elements, and responsible for support to the US ground force

commands on a theater scale. Included among its responsibilities will be coordinated logistical support to INSCOM fixed assets in-theater; and the integration of indications and warning capabilities of INSCOM fixed SIGINT/EW assets with other in-theater Army intelligence systems. The INSCOM EAC organization will depend upon the Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) as a source of SIGINT input to an all-source processing center. In wartime and as specified in peacetime the INSCOM EAC will provide all-source processing elements to the US component of multi-national cells, where they would serve as the US ground forces intelligence/combat information exchange medium between combined and Unified/Specified in-theater commands. The EAC all-source center provides the technical interface with all CEWI assets for the exchange of HUMINT, PHOTINT, SIGINT, SAO information and hard intelligence. It is the mechanism to insure against duplication of efforts of adjacent corps, and serves as the all-source data base to augment limited Corps and below elements.

The Architecture for Army SIGINT/EW operations and capabilities at Corps and below echelons is prescribed in "Concept for Combat Electronic Warfare, Intelligence Group (Corps) and Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion (Division)" (hereinafter referred to as the CEWI Concept). This CEWI Concept describes all-source intelligence and electronic warfare organizations at Corps and Division, immediately responsive to the combat commander's surveillance, warning, targeting/target development, maneuver and control information and EW requirements. The SIGINT capabilities are designed to attack readily exploitable targets and primary emphasis is on highly perishable information.

The major shortfalls facing INSCOM include:

1. Maintenance of critical cryptologic skills, career patterns and recruitment/retention of linguists. CEWI units will be especially dependent of qualified linguists (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA Careful and intensive management of the product utilization program will be the primary course of action to control the problem area. Success is contingent on retention in peacetime of a minimum-force fixed capability.

2. A VHF/UHF Special Identification Techniques Capability. This need is driven by the Army requirement to locate ground-based emitters accurately. This applies both to fixed and mobile emitters which must be located to provide for weapons and force targeting. There is also the need for a capability to develop targets through detailed signal analysis for electronic countermeasures targeting and for support to the SIGINT mission. This capability is not in any existing or programmed resource.

3. An Improved SIGINT Search and Development Capability. Though Technical ESM (TECH ESM) equipment is being developed, it will need to be augmented quantitatively and qualitatively to provide sufficient search and analysis capabilities. Needed are a means to search for and acquire new ground-based emitters, analyze and measure parametrically tactical echelon signals, and test Army SIGINT equipment versus these signals.

4. Multi-Channel Analysis Capability. Army requires a means to prioritize, demultiplex, and route voice grade signals for processing and exploitation. This functional capability is needed to detect channel activity, determine the type of modulation or signal structure, to route the signals to the proper processing area, and to generate management control data.

5. An Automated Mission Management and Support System. This functional capability should be based on signal information derived from traffic analysis, other signal features, and details on what the collection systems are doing. This capability is currently planned/programmed under the CAC system.

6. An Operational ELINT Capability. Such a capability is required to provide indicators and early warning, event description, spectrum monitoring, and technical ELINT tip-off. This capability is not present in the programmed equipment package.

7. An Electro-Optic Detection and Location Capability. Though Army's Research and Development effort is exploring the ELOCARS project, there is an urgent need to develop and field an item of equipment which will readily identify and locate weapons/force-related electro-optics/infrared emitters for warning and avoidance, ECM targeting, and ordnance guidance and delivery. At the echelon above corps, this requirement is driven by need for intelligence in support of enemy assessments; planning; Research, Development, and Acquisition; and force-tactics-doctrine formulation.

Briefly stated, the Army's SIGINT/EW Architecture is designed for the following goals and strategies:

Goal 1: Provide for and maintain the minimum force level of fixed SIGINT/EW operations necessary to meet Army information needs and peacetime force preparedness expertise.

Strategy: Site modernization to reduce life-cycle costs and improve efficiency; acceleration of productive utilization programs; and attain comparable manning of [redacted] operations as site tenure is lost. Redefine linguist requirements; reduce "Signals Analysis" requirements of linguists by increasing similar responsibilities for other MOS or by developing automated signal acquisition/recognition systems.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Goal 2: Realize SIGINT/EW resource economies and reduce necessary redundancies by developing a cohesive SIGINT/EW system.

Strategy: Increase joint service planning and operations; realign EAC and CEWI assets commensurate with target properties and combat commands' mission and capabilities; maintain technical threads through each architectural level. Maintain SIGINT/EW asset unit of command without eliminating technical control

channels necessary for operational management and employment/deployment flexibility.

Goal 3: Provide a SIGINT/EW capability and resource mix oriented toward organizational integrity through integration of functional assets under a single command, systematically directed toward the entire spectrum of enemy activity.

Strategy: Implement IOSS provisions featuring an all-source, multi-discipline approach and reorganization along functional lines.

Goal 4: Process and exploit field-exploitable target signals of interest to the local theater force and relay/remote other signals to appropriate fixed joint centers.

Strategy: Judicious peacetime implementation of the CEWI and EAC concepts; implementation of [redacted] and site modernization programs with the retention of essential residuals, and comparable manning of [redacted] operations. Accelerate development of ECTA capabilities; real-time exploitation of data signals.

Goal 5: Realize the benefits derived from an ability to provide tip-off, interaction, integration and information exchange.

Strategy: Establish the all-source centers under CEWI, EAC and INSCOM concept plans. Establish multi-national cells.

In May 1977, COL Francis X. Lillis, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, was appointed the INSCOM SIGINT Architect. A problem of proponency within the Army was resolved with ACSI, DA, being designated as the SIGINT Policy Focal Point. However, HQ INSCOM was tasked with accomplishing most of the actions associated with SIGINT Architecture.[2]

(U) ~~(c)~~ Electronic Warfare Policies. The US Army Electronic Warfare Master Plan (AEWMP) was updated and published by HQDA on 15 February 1975. Of the 56 major AEWMP FY 1977/78 tasks, INSCOM was assigned primary action for only three. With the implementation of IOSS, the bulk of the AEWMP tasks became the primary responsibility of other MACOM's. INSCOM participated in the Army Electronic Warfare Board (AEWB) principals' meeting on 14 December 1976 and the AWEB working committee meetings of 30 November 1976 and 7 April 1977.

The JCS Memorandum of Policy No 95 (MOP 95) which promulgated Electronic Warfare policy was in the process of being revised. Revisions in the past have gone through lengthy and political processes usually requiring from one to three years to obtain an acceptable revision. The present proposed fifth revision was initiated in July 1976 and the third draft (flimsy) was addressed at the joint working group (JCS, NSA, Service Reps) meeting on 6 October 1977.

Again the key problem areas were the definition of ESM and the restrictions on the employment of communications ECM (both jamming and imitative deception). The DA, at TRADOC and INSCOM suggestion, attempted to have the definition of ESM changed to eliminate the word "immediate" which was considered too restrictive or too vague and to eliminate the undue restrictions on the use of COMJAM and ICD by substituting the phrase "necessary to support military operations" vice "essential in the national interest or for the safety of military forces." However, enciphered traffic intrusion (planned cryptographic intrusion) would not be employed without prior JCS approval. NSA insisted that the definition of ESM remain unchanged and that the COMECM restrictions be retained because of the 1955 constraints imposed by the US Intelligence Board (USIB) for the protection of COMINT.

Final outcome of the MOP 95 revision was uncertain at the close of FY 1977. However, there was agreement to solicit the National Foreign Intelligence Board (formerly USIB) views concerning the 1955 constraints on the employment of COMECM.[3]

(C-CCO) EELPOT. EELPOT was an NSA project conceived in February 1973 to combine four Army and Air Force HFDF nets into two consolidated networks; one in the Pacific and one in Europe, each under a central [redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA It was envisioned that manpower savings would accrue from this project and, as a result, 32 DF billets were deleted from Field Stations Augsburg, Berlin, and Sobe effective at end of FY 1976 which coincided with the original projected implementation date of EELPOT. The project was funded by diverting FY 1974 and FY 1975 funds approved for upgrading Army and Air Force HFDF networks.

EELPOT was to retrofit existing HFDF sites and tasking stations with remotely tuned receivers at all DF positions, and computer automated functions of DF tip-off queuing, steering, receiver tuning, fix computation, and report preparation. NSA assumed the role of system manager and developer, and as such, performed the hardware modification/retrofit, system integration and system testing. The software development was contracted to Planning Research Corporation with the receiver procurement contracted to General Instruments. Executive agent for maintenance and operator training was delegated to the Army with the US Army Intelligence School, Ft Devens (USAISD) given training responsibility.

EELPOT was plagued from the start by problems due to inadequate planning, insufficient funding, and poor management. As a result, the system will have a lesser capability than that envisioned by the SCA's as needed improvements. The project was officially slipped three different times due to hardward and software problems. Another EELPOT slippage of at least one year was imminent due to failure of the contractor to deliver even the first phase of EELPOT hardware until February 1978. NSA contemplated closing out the contract and finishing the software in-house. NSA also proposed a joint NSA/SCA working group to pick up the pieces and decide the best approach to

pursue EELPOT implementation. Thoughts ranged from killing the project to piece-meal implementation. The latest slippage represented a slippage of four years from the initial projected implementation date. It appeared that implementation of EELPOT in its designed form could not be accomplished before end of FY 1979, and there was a fair possibility that EELPOT resources would be used to further automate existing Army and Air Force networks as an interim measure.

The first EELPOT maintenance course started in April 1977. The initial operator training will be conducted on-site by a New Equipment Training Team from USAISD. The operator training will be phased to coincide with system installation and certification at each EELPOT site. The maintenance training conducted at USAISD will largely be wasted. Personnel scheduled for short tour areas will finish their tours of duty before the EELPOT systems are installed and, at long tour areas, the maintenance personnel will be faced with close to a 2-year gap before any EELPOT equipment arrives in the field. The retention of skill levels acquired during training will have eroded drastically.

All telecommunications support to EELPOT is inextricably related to and dependent upon Project LEMONADE, the [redacted] red multiplex program. Direct communications are required between the Outstation Processor Units (OPU) and the Net Control Stations (NCS). The nets will be supported by a primary 600 baud telecommunications net between the NCS and each outstation. A secondary 75 baud net will connect the Alternate Net Control Stations (ANCS) [redacted] with all their outstations. At any time, three or more of the primary 600 baud circuits are out with the NCS, the net control function reverts to the alternate net controls.

From the INSCOM viewpoint, this project is just another example of bureaucratic inefficiency and waste. Approximately $7 million has already been expended on a project which may eventually benefit NSA. In the meantime, funds which originally were approved for upgrading and replacing Army HFDF equipments were transferred to EELPOT. As a result, the Army equipments are obsolete and require ever-increasing maintenance and repair.[4]

(S-CCO) Single Station Locator - [redacted] Acceptance testing of the Single Station Locator (SSL) continued well into FY 1977 with acceptance of the system by the Government on 19 November 1976. The AN/GSQ-185 SSL system, along with its spares and float items, was packed and shipped [redacted] by the contractor, [redacted] on 8 December 1976. The system was installed at [redacted] a team of government and contractor personnel and was formally accepted by the Government on 7 February 1977.

The SSL represented the current state of the art in Direction Finding (DF) equipment and was capable of providing bearing information on target signals in the 10-30 MHz range and location on targets in the 1.5-10 MHz range. The SSL was capable of computing the vertical angle of incoming radio waves

and computing the trigonometric value for the angle. A sampling of the ionosphere is made and the system estimates the point on the ionosphere where the incoming signal is more likely to have reflected in order to have been received at the angle of arrival previously determined. With a known angle of arrival and ionospheric height, it is a relatively simple process to solve the trigonometric functions necessary to determine from what point on the earth the target signal is emanating. A limitation in the system range-determination capability was its inability to determine if a received signal has arrived either as a single or multiple ionospheric reflection; thus, the system locating capability is limited to a geographic range of approximately 800-1,000 kilometers and a frequency range of 1.5-10 MHz.

The SSL became operational with commencement of the on-site-user-test (OSUT) on 28 February 1977. Operationally, it functioned independently as a Single Station Locator [redacted], as well as an outstation in the [redacted] Effective with the operational date of the SSL, a 90-day OSUT began with an estimated completion date of 31 May 1977. Although the initial test results were encouraging, it became necessary to discontinue the test on 18 April until recurring software problems could be identified and corrected. After attempting to correct system software deficiencies through telephonic troubleshooting discussions between the SWRI on-site technical representative at his home office in San Antonio, Texas, it was determined that the only way to effectively debug system software was through an SWRI software expert on-site [redacted] SWRI provided the expert on 1 August 1977 and by the end of his TDY at USAFS [redacted] the software system problems had been reduced to an acceptable level and the OSUT continued. A final test report was expected to be available in 2d Qtr FY 1978.[5]

(SC) Traffic Fabrication. On 23 August 1976, NSA alerted HQ INSCOM (DCSOPS) of possible unusual activities concerning "high interest" items collected by an operator at [redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) The Commander of [redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) was immediately contacted and provided with pertinent details. He responded on 25 August stating he had convened an AR 15-6 Board and requested any analytical assessments that were available. An initial assessment by DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM personnel was provided the same day. On 27 August, the Commander reported that an initial investigation had been completed and that insufficient evidence existed to establish the guilt or innocence of the operator, and that the investigation was continuing. During September-October 1976, messages and correspondence were exchanged between HQ INSCOM and [redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) including the NSA analysts data to assist in the investigation. In late September the operator indicated his knowledge of NSA's involvement in his case and as a result was pulled off position and barred from the operations compound.

On 26 October, the Commander, [redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) deferred from making any recommendations or drawing any conclusions due to lack of receipt of any "pretty solid data." As a result, a decision was made to curtail the overseas tour of the operator and [redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) was directed to compile and forward to HQ INSCOM all documentation relative to this incident. The

operator was assigned to INSCOM Support Group, Fort Meade, Maryland.

As a continuation of the investigation conducted at (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) an AR 15-6 Investigating Officer (IO) was appointed on 30 December 1976. Following investigative actions and an in-depth review of the documentary evidence, the IO determined that sufficient doubt as to the validity of the intercept existed to require a formal hearing and confrontation of the subject with the evidence. A hearing was convened on 31 January 1977. Following testimony by Expert Witnesses, the subject agreed to testify in his own behalf. He professed his innocence to all allegations as he had done throughout the investigation at (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) and Fort Meade. The subject stated substantially that the traffic was valid, that he had copied it as he heard it, and that he could offer only assumptions as to why the intercept could not be verified through other intercept. After the operator agreed to submit to a polygraph examination, the IO closed the hearing.

During the period 1-3 February, the Investigating Officer reviewed the entire investigation to that point and concluded that the evidence and testimony presented during the hearing was inconclusive and that there was sufficient requirement for again talking to the subject. On 4 February 1977, the IO met with the subject and stated his concerns regarding the evidence and outcome of the hearing. The subject agreed that the evidence was more than circumstantial and signed a statement that he did in fact fabricate communications intercept traffic during the period April-August 1976. He knowingly fabricated the traffic for the purpose of supplementing and accentuating the productivity of his unit; he did not fabricate intercept at the request of any foreign government or for purposes of espionage or personal gain.

The IO recommended the following courses of action be considered:

1. Subject be reclassified for assignment outside of INSCOM.

2. Subject be reassigned in an unindoctrinated space within INSCOM.

3. That an Article 15 not be considered since this would permit subject to request courts-martial instead. Since any court would have to be held under restrictions required for SI protection, the entire case could be opened to the news media by any Defense Counsel.

Subject was declared ineligible for access to SI and MILPERCEN was requested to transfer him out of INSCOM.6

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

However, repeated budgetry restraints and foreign political pressures, to reduce or eliminate US military presence, have required that an HF modernization program be undertaken with the goal of reducing dollar expenditures and manning, while still maintaining an effective SIGINT capability. The

[redacted] modernization program to achieve these goals was implemented as the result of a July 1973 Secretary of Defense directive to significantly reduce Combined Cryptologic Program (CCP) costs by FY 1978. Thus, NSA was faced with a growing requirement to reduce costs, modernize an aging HF collection system, and still maintain an effective mission capability. A joint government/private industry task force considered both remoting and in-place modernization, and determined that remoting provided greater savings, lower operating and maintenance costs, lower capital investment, reduced overseas visibility, and decreased gold flow. The remoting concept placed most collection analysis and reporting at a central location while overseas receivers were remotely tuned via satellite relay.

This long range modernization program encompassed two major efforts. The initial thrust was the development of automated remote control collection systems to replace conventional overseas collection sites. This was accomplished by returning the SIGINT personnel to NSA at Fort Meade, Maryland, from where they would remotely control the overseas antennas and receivers. This remoting approach was planned for large collection sites where significant manpower savings could be realized. [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

[redacted] Continuing changes in the world situations involving US presence made it imperative that all of the [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

The second initiative of the HF Modernization Plan was to apply modern electronic technology to the operation and support of small conventional sites and to other missions left behind at remoted sites which for tactical or technical reasons should not be remoted. The first of the modernized systems is now under procurement for deployment [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Although it was believed that [redacted] would result in great savings through the collocation of analysis and reporting, the merging of collection, and reduced overseas base support, it became apparent as this program progressed through experience gained with [redacted] that more complexities than satellite reliability/vulnerability existed and had to be addressed. These included crowding and base support problems at the Central Operating Facility (COF) at Fort Meade, and tenure/real estate agreements with host countries. The SCA's regularly expressed concern that the mix be properly formulated between COF and residual personnel (direct support or overseas live mission) to insure continuing target proficiency, responsive direct support capability during non-hostile

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

operations, and the required stand alone capability for both National and direct support, should satellite communications be terminated for any reason.

As the result of these considerations and some program budget reductions, the DIRNSA directed a complete review of the [redacted] Program and all SIGINT field sites from an absolute zero base. The review was to provide a new revised plan for [redacted] which would outline new criteria and planning as to alternatives of remoting/modernization/component upgrade. All three of the SCA's provided input to the review which was nearly complete as the fiscal year ended. There were indications that the proposed changes would coincide closely with INSCOM preferences. As the year closed, INSCOM and the NSA Remote Operations Planning Group were reviewing the personnel aspects of changes with respect to CONUS/OCONUS rotations, grade structure, and base support.[7]

(S-CCO) [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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

~~(S-ECO)~~(NOFORN) Electro-Optics. As the result of reports that US troops were being detected during night reconnaissance operations, assistance was requested to investigate this phenomena. This resulted in special electro-optics reconnaissance missions being conducted.

Project TORCH EYE was conducted during October-November 1976 by a team of US military and civilian personnel who performed passive electro-optics reconnaissance missions along the East German border in the area of Fulda, West Germany. The purpose of these missions was to probe the surveillance capabilities of Warsaw Pact Military Forces operating along the border to determine whether advanced technology intrusion/warning devices were being deployed. The team utilized off-the-shelf equipment, civilian engineering support, and (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA These missions were conducted during the hours of darkness and evoked responses such as the East German border guard patrols being doubled and often tripled during the presence of the TORCH EYE team; helicopters performing reconnaissance against the team; and spotlights being activated by the East German guards. As the result of this initial mission, a second and more definitive mission (Project GRAVEL DUCK) was planned.

Project GRAVEL DUCK, the second operation of the TORCH EYE series of electro-optics reconnaissance efforts, was conducted during the period July-September 1977. Spawned by the successful TORCH EYE undertaking, the GRAVEL DUCK mission consisted of a two-phase attempt at gathering E-O/RF intelligence along the West German-East German/Czechoslovakian borders. Phase One was a ground phase which consisted of nighttime surveillance of 14 operational border sites; Phase Two involved a border trace flight by a helicopter carrying E-O sensors. GRAVEL DUCK, configured on a much higher level of sophistication than its predecessor, produced a mixed reaction among Warsaw Pact Forces, to include attempts at Optical Augmentation (directing special light sources into the intercepting optics in order to determine the operating characteristics of each system)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Project GRAVEL STREAM was the nickname for the effort to develop, deploy and operate (through remote control) sensor devices placed near areas of probable laser activity in support of hostile weapons systems. DA tasked INSCOM to plan and conduct the GRAVEL STREAM collection operation, to include arranging the necessary interservice and theater support in December 1976.[12]

(C-CCO) In November 1975, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, identified a requirement for a Direction Finding Mission Management (DFMM) capability for [redacted] As Net Control of the [redacted] processed more requests for DF service than any other INSCOM station, yet was the only one which still performed mission management, fix computation, and reporting functions manually. Initial planning for this project, designated [redacted] called for an off-line system with the end objective of placing the system on-line with the [redacted] after Initial Operational Capability (IOC). Equipment to be used was the Data General ECLIPSE C-300 and peripherals procured under a lease/buy contract. After a three-year lease the system would revert to INSCOM ownership.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

During the 1st Qtr FY 1977, the [redacted] equipment was delivered and installed in Command Data Systems Activity, Arlington Hall Station, to be used for software development and check out. A [redacted] review was also conducted to finalize the system specifications and to freeze the system design. During this review a decision was made to enable the system to function in an on-line capacity with the [redacted] at IOC instead of after IOC as originally planned. The decision was made because it would be more cost effective and timely to provide the capability initially than to develop the software for off-line operation, and after deployment, to redo much of the software so that the system could be place on-line. While this would delay fielding the system by five months, it would provide [redacted] with a much greater capability. The projected IOC date was August 1977.

Due to a delay in system testing, which had been scheduled for 1 August 1977,

a meeting was held on 11 August to determine the current status of the project. It was made known that the [redacted] DFMM System for [redacted] did not have sufficient computer capacity to perform all of the functions prescribed in the functional specifications. Also, at IOC, the system would not perform the on-line DF functions at the same time it was doing any of the management and results reports. It was then planned to upgrade the system to a C-330 computer but that this would not be accomplished until after the IOC of [redacted]

System IOC was slipped from 3 to 5 months due to a wiring problem with the system terminals which required the terminals to be returned to the manufacturer for rewiring, and late delivery of hardware which would allow CRYPTO/communications/system integration. Software/hardware completion and integration was expected in early October 1977 with operational testing prior to system shipment taking place during the week of 17-21 October. The system was scheduled to be shipped to [redacted] during the November/December 1977 time frame and installed in early January 1978.[13]

(TS CCO) (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

The project began in late 1974 as the result of a proposal to the CG, USASA from the USASA Training Center and School. The thrust of the recommendation was that given an adequate data base and requisite analytical personnel, [redacted] within theater. From this recommendation evolved a proposal to the Chief of Staff, US Army to develop that capability. The proposal was followed by a concept plan which was approved by the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army on 25 August 1975.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

To support this concept, TR developed a three-phased operation:

Phase I - Train and deploy personnel to Europe and CONUS.

Phase II - Develop data base, procure equipment, develop software, develop operational procedures.

Phase III - Demonstrate/evaluate the capability, finalize training and doctrine benefits, and publish results/recommendations to DA.

There were two field elements which operated under the direction of the HQ INSCOM TR element—the Signals Development Laboratory (SDL) located at Vint

Hill Farms Station

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36; (b) (1) Per NSA

At the beginning of FY 1977, TR was in Phase II, building up the data base. In January 1977, the test facility which was configured by the HQ INSCOM Research, Development and Acquisition staff element was deployed to Europe. This facility consisted of three vans, two MSA-34 vans for the operations area, and a MGC-38 communications van. With the deployment of the test facility to Europe, Phase III commenced. The vans encountered problems in shipment and delivery to [redacted] One MSA-34 (computer) van arrived at [redacted] on 10 March, the second MSA-34 arrived there on 18 March, and the MGC-38 communications van did not arrive in [redacted] until 23 April 1977. Due to the fact that the [redacted] vans were for the most part not under US control, especially in the case of the MGC-38, action was taken to have an electronic sweep of the vans conducted so as to preclude possible electronic compromise of the TR system.

The [redacted] physical plant, the major components of the TR Tactical Test Facility, consisted of two MSA-34 trailers with six shelters joined together to form the primary operations complex and one 5-ton self-contained trailer MGC-38B communications shelter. The MGC-38B was not utilized during FY 1977 and was not projected for use during the operational test to be conducted during FY 1978. The MSA-34 complex consisted of the following shelters:

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 PER NSA

1. AN/TSQ-79, Administrative Control Shelter.

2. AN/TRM-18, Radio Maintenance Center.

3. An Analytical Shelter (modified AN/TYQ-5) housing four CRT computer terminals, a Data General line printer and tape reader.

4. Automatic Data Processing Facility housing the ECLIPSE C-300 computer system including two magnetic tape drives and two disc drives.

5. Two AN/TYQ-5, Data Analysis Centrals joined together foring the primary operations area within the shelter complex and modified to contain four single channel transcriber positions with time code readers.

Although electricity was connected on 25 March 1977, the facility was not ready for operations of a classified nature until completion of TEMPEST testing on 24 June 1977. Throughout the remainder of FY 1977, [redacted] enjoyed limited sustained operations and at the close of the report period was not considered operational in accordance with the TR concept.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

The Signals Development Laboratory provided technical support for activities to include refinement of training and doctrine benefits generated by the project. It was comprised of operations, security, and administrative work areas. At the close of the fiscal year, SDL had a total strength of 35 compared to an authorized strength of 42.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Major SDL accomplishments included:

1. Analytical Reports.

2. Increased the Army's awareness of the target threat and the SIGINT capability to respond to that threat.

3. Initially was catalyst for creation of SIGINT community-wide SSM/ Artillery Tech Exchange.

4. Contributed to Peacetime Utilization Cell within 376th ASA Company, Fort Meade, Maryland.

5. Developed complete training concept for 98G/98C personnel engaged in related activities.

On 1 August 1977, Major Malcolm F. Downing was assigned by the US Army Field Artillery School as a liaison officer between and TRADOC. Major Downing provided US artillery expertise to SDL and provided TRADOC with TR-generated items for use in training and doctrine.

Although beset by problems of varying magnitudes, had many successes. For example, reports were published by NSA as SIGINT working aids designed to enhance exploitation techniques. A special report reviewed by NSA was forwarded to TRADOC for publication in Army channels. This report on GK grid conversion was an unclassified method for converting grid locations to US or UTM grids. Up until this time, the only known methods for conversion had been highly classified. A most significant accomplishment during this training period was the development of an

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Major delays were caused primarily by insufficient personnel to properly administer and manage the myriad of functions inherent with this project. From December 1976 to March 1977, the TR Office had one officer assigned. Many requisite actions were delayed due to sheer volume. This situation caused postponement of key milestones which must now be completed in approxmately half the time allotted initially. There was little coordination with other services due to no available time.

The project will culminate in an operational test which will begin in January 1978 and run for approximately three months. The test should determine the efficiency of the TR methodology under sustained and independent operations as well as the usability of the intelligence provided.[14]

(C-ECO) US Signals Intelligence Directives. The US Signals Intelligence Directives (USSID) system was the mechanism through which the Director, National Security Agency, exercised SIGINT operational control of the US SIGINT System (USSS).

The largest and most difficult problem undertaken during FY 1977 was the drafting and coordination of the INSCOM-proposed replacement for USSID 1000, SIGINT Tasking of USASA. The objective was to rewrite USSID 1000 to reflect recommendations contained in the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) and more specifically, to depict Army SCA functions under the new Army intelligence organization, INSCOM.

In December 1976, HQ INSCOM forwarded a draft of USSID 1000 to NSACSS with an information copy forwarded to ACSI, DA. Two inclosures were attached to the draft: (1) Salient Points Which Separate Draft USSID 1000 from Predecessor Directives, and (2) Development of a Tailored Army Tactical SIGINT/EW Directive - USSID 1600. The inclosure concerning USSID 1600 gave the first indication that INSCOM was formally contemplating two Army SIGINT tasking directives to encompass NSACSS's statutory responsibilities—one for INSCOM and one for all other Army SIGINT activities. Prior to this, USSID 1000 was the consolidated vehicle for US Army SIGINT tasking. From this point forward, USSID's 1000 and 1600 were handled as two entirely different Army tasking directives with separate coordination chains and completely different in format.

In April 1977, NSACSS submitted another draft USSID 1000 for coordination. Following coordination with ACSI, DA, HQ INSCOM forwarded Army comments to NSACSS in June. Efforts to formally promulgate USSID 1000 were still underway at the close of FY 1977.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

As previously stated, an overall Army tactical SIGINT/EW unit tasker, USSID 1600, was formally proposed in December 1976. From the outset it was understood that USSID 1600 would need to draw heavily upon existing USSID 1607 (SIGINT tasking [redacted] and the IOSS Concept Plan which drastically altered command and SIGINT relationships among Army tactical SIGINT/EW units. Messages between the principals (NSA, ACSI, INSCOM) during February and March 1977 resulted in agreement with the USSID 1600 concept that HQ INSCOM would provide the initial draft upon which formal coordination could begin. Early in these discussions it was decided to proceed with USSID 1609 [redacted] and USSID 1630 [redacted] both of which were in draft form. However, problem areas concerning USSID's 1600/1609/1630 developed which brought about a meeting to clarify positions and clear the way for further USSID 1600 development. This August meeting, attended by representatives from NSA (V13/J); OACSI, DA (DAMI-TS); and INSCOM (DCSOPS), resulted in substantial agreement on how to proceed in the development of USSID 1600. It was also determined that differences among the conference participants were largely procedural and semantic and that NSACSS would undertake drafting of USSID 1600 vice INSCOM who had previously volunteered to accomplish this task.

By the close of FY 1977, USSID's 1609 and 1630 had not yet been promulgated and were delayed as the result of an internal NSACSS policy dispute over assignment of SIGINT Activity Designators (SIGAD) to Army tactical assets in the IOSS structure. [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(1)

The Air Force, in coordination with the 330th Company, conducted a 90-day [redacted] GUARDRAIL II interoperability test. Although the test went well, USAREUR's evaluation considered the (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) to be of marginal utility from the ground commander's point of view.16

(S-C [redacted]

(b)(1)

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

~~(FOUO)~~ SIGSEC Support Concept. The SIGSEC Support Concept prepared by this command was approved by the CG, USASA on 14 January 1975 and forwarded to DA for approval on 5 February 1975. DA revised the proposed concept and USASA submitted comments on the revision to DA in December 1975. On 30 January 1976, DA forwarded the concept to TRADOC with interim approval pending IOSS decisions. Following additional revision, the concept was finally approved on 17 November 1976.

Under the approved concept, INSCOM responsibilities were as follows:

1. Strategic SIGSEC support would be provided both to non-tactical units and to those smaller tactical units within a specified geographical area which were not provided direct support by a tactical SIGSEC unit. Command, operational and technical control of all strategic SIGSEC organizational elements would rest with the CDR, INSCOM.

2. Technical control of SIGSEC resources, to include requirements and procedures for submission of technical management reports, would be exercised by the CDR, INSCOM.

Specific INSCOM functions included communications security, TEMPEST tests

and analysis, and operational electronic security.18

(U) SIGSEC Positions. The table below depicts the status of programmed and actual COMSEC monitoring and TEMPEST test positions for 4th Qtr FY 1977.19

Table 28.—SIGSEC Positions

Unit	Monitoring				TEMPEST Test			
	Radio Telephone		Conventional Telephone		Field		Laboratory	
	Prog	Act	Prog	Act	Prog	Act	Prog	Act
SIGSEC Actv	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SIGSEC Det EUR	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0
Region I	2	0*	4	4	4	4	1	1
Region III	5	2*	6	6	1	1	0	0
Region IV	2	0*	2	2	1	1	0	0
Hawaii Det	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	0
Korea Det	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0

*This is MANPACK position planned for fielding.
Note: 4 of 5 for Region III are MANPACK. AN/PRC 77.
1 of 2 Act for Region III is MANPACK. 1 is AN/TRR 33.

(U) SIGSEC Publications. Criteria, standards and procedures for conducting and reporting SIGSEC support operations were contained in the USASA Signal Security Operations Manual (SOM). As a command document, the SOM was not authoritative outside USASA.

As a result of the shift of responsibilities brought about by implementation of the IOSS recommendations and the shift of responsibilies to INSCOM and other DA elements, the SOM was rescinded. Replacement documents to provide the technical guidance required by SIGSEC units were initiated. INSCOM played an integral role in many of the documents which included the following:20

1. AR 380-40/TB 380-41. INSCOM played a key role in the revision of AR 380-40, Policy for Safeguarding and Controlling COMSEC Information and the preparation of a new Army Technical Bulletin, TB 380-41, Procedures for Safeguarding, Accounting and Supply Control of COMSEC Material, which were approved by HQDA and submitted to The Adjutant General for publication in August 1977. These two documents are a consolidation of AR's 380-40/41/52, Chapter 6, AR 710-2, and COMSEC Logistics Agency PAM 105-1. It was believed that this consolidation should eliminate misinterpretation of information and conflicting policy and procedures as all COMSEC policy will be contained in AR 380-40 and technical information on implementation procedures will be in TB 380-41. The anticipated publication date for these documents is 2d Qtr FY 1978.

2. AR 530-3. A major revision of AR 530-3, Electronic Security, was submitted to HQDA on 29 August 1977. This revision was necessitated by Army reorganizations during the past five years. Other extensive changes were required to make this regulation an effective guide for the establishment of a realistic, workable Army ELSEC program. Included in this revision is a format of the information, the addition of ELSEC policy and ELINT information, and the realignment of ELSEC responsibilities brought about by the transfer of some INSCOM responsibilities to DARCOM. As of 30 September 1977, this revision had not been staffed within HQDA or the MACOM's.

3. AR 530-4. On 13 May 1977, a proposed revision of AR 530-4, Control of Compromising Emanations was submitted to DA. This proposal contained major changes in the Explanation of Terms, Exception Operations, and Responsibilities. This revision also recommended the classification guidelines for TEMPEST information be deleted from the regulation and published as a separate Secret technical bulletin. This would permit an overall classification of Confidential instead of Secret for this AR. DA disagreed with this approach since it desired to keep the number of publications to a minimum. DA reviewed the proposed revision and staffed it with selected MACOM's. At DA's request, INSCOM compiled all comments received; incorporated those that were appropriate, and provided justification for the ones not used. The revision was returned to DA for review and staffing in August 1977. At the close of this report period, the final draft was still being refined.

4. TB 530-1. A revision of TB 530-1, Identification and Application of Compromising Emanations Control Measures was initiated. The major changes included a new set of eligibility criteria for the TEMPEST testing of facilities which electrically process classified information and the removal of the prohibition against the testing of high voltage teletypewriters and hardened sites.

5. TB's 380-7/8/9/10/11. The Army's reorganization of its intelligence structure required the publication of a series of technical bulletins in order to standardize SIGSEC support operations and operational reporting. The correct series, titles, and status, as of 30 September 1977 follows:

a. TB 380-7, TEMPEST Inspection and Test. This TB, which was approved and submitted to TAG for publication, provides technical guidance for the conduct of TEMPEST support activities, prescribes technical procedures for the reporting of TEMPEST support operations as required by AR 530-4, and provides an introduction to the basic TEMPEST support available to them.

b. The remaining TB's as listed below, were either in final draft or in the process of being prepared for final draft.

(1) TB 380-8, Cryptofacility Approvals and Insptctions.

(2) TB 380-9, SIGSEC Technical Advice and Assistance.

(3) TB 380-10, COMSEC Monitoring and Analysis.

(4) TB 380-11, Operational ELSEC.

(U) SIGSEC Support Activities. Support activities of INSCOM SIGSEC units worldwide in terms of monitoring and analysis missions, cryptofacility inspections and approvals, and TEMPEST inspections and tests conducted during FY 1977 are shown in table below.[21]

Table 29.—SIGSEC Support Activities

	Monitoring and Analysis Missions		Cryptofacility		TEMPEST		
	RATEL	Convl Tel	Insp	Appr	Insp	Lab Test	Fld Test
CONUS	189	96	531	278	339	69	37
Pacific	18	58	75	29	81	28	1
Europe	61	27	314	172	317	17	5
TOTAL	268	181	920	479	737	114	43

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

generator to power the main UYK-7 computer; and installing the 21 SCP's (Scanner Control Panels) and 13 analyst positions in IPB. Phase 3 followed immediately thereafter with the checking of all equipment and positions in the [redacted] system in preparation for the final CAT II Acceptance testing.

CAT II Acceptance Testing for the system was conducted on-site from 26 January 1977 to 2 March 1977 after which the project managers office at DCSRDA determined that all objectives of the testing had been satisfactorily demonstrated.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Through the period 17 March-30 September 1977, additional target entities were both added and deleted as part of an evolutionary process to work the "bugs" out of the system and make it a truly operational one. This period was marked by frequent system disruptions and crashes due to both hardware and software problems. However, through the persevering efforts by station operational and maintenance personnel plus Sylvania programmers and technical representatives, the major system faults were isolated with resolutions either completed or in the process of being completed. By the end of the report period, although certain problems still persisted, the b1 b3 Per NSA system had established itself as a truly operational system of great potential. User confidence in the system has increased considerably and plans are presently being formulated to achieve the maximum use of its potential.

Of the remaining problems still facing b1 b3 Per NSA by the end of the report period, the two most important, deal with the sizing of the present system as compared with the Berlin signal environment, and the vital need for replacement parts for major equipment items in the system.[22]

(C-ECO)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

CAT I testing of b1 b3 Per NSA commenced on 6 December 1976 at the contractor's plant, GTE Sylvania, in Mountain View, California. While CAT I testing was underway, the 30-day Operations Cadre Training Course was also being presented at Mountain View with the b1 b3 Per NSA system being used for hands-on training.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024 (i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36; (b) (1) Per NSA

prevented the forklift from getting sufficient tire traction.

Installation of the [redacted]ystem occurred at a steady pace, with the AN/UYK-7 computer and 1840 tape drive being installed and powered-up by 15 February. With installation of the computer complete, the first group of GTE-Sylvania software personnel arrived on 22 February. Operator training was conducted while the equipment was being installed. Over 85 percent of all [redacted] operational personnel received "hands-on" training on [redacted] by 9 May 1977. GTE-Sylvania also presented a "managers" training course to 27 Field Station personnel

The LFPP system underwent a series of critical tests during May-June. After the system had proven that it could operate under specification, it was accepted by the US Government on 24 June 1977. At the time of acceptance, there were still 14 outstanding deficiencies; however, the contractor took immediate corrective action.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

With completion of the operational phase-over, the On-Site User Test (OSUT) team began to organize with most team members coming from other units and arriving in late August. Data collection began on 2 September and by 4 September, each shift had been assigned a Shift Coordinator. Data collection was expected to last approximately three and one-half months.[23]

(S) Field Station Position Manning. The table below indicates field station position manning as of the end of 4th Qtr FY 1977.[24]

Table 30.—Position Manning

	Position Equivalents		
	Programmed	Manned	% Manned
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA			

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(1) Per CIA

~~(C)~~ Quadripartite Working Group on Electronic Warfare Responsibilities Transferred. The Quadripartite Working Group on Electronic Warfare (QWG/EW) was a portion of the 1964 Basic Standardization Agreement between representatives of American, British, Canadian, and Australian armies who agreed to share concepts, tactics, doctrine, and equipment techniques in the event of conflicts. The following year, New Zealand joined as an associate member with Australia representing New Zealand's interests in this program.

The QWG/EW function in the US Army was originally assigned to the USASA Combat Developments Command (CDA). In late April 1976, because of the pending transfer of CDA to TRADOC, the function was relocated to ODCSOPS, HQ USASA. At HQ USASA, the QWG/EW responsibilities were carried out by a Colonel (the DCSOPS), assisted by an Executive Secretary (GS-13). The QWG/EW function was transferred to TRADOC effective 1 October 1976; however, the Executive Secretary continued to function at HQ USASA until 1 December 1976, when the correspondence files were turned over to TRADOC representatives.[27]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

During FY 1977, efforts were focused on replacing the tactical communications system with a state-of-the-art, all digital fixed communications system within two years. Modernization was expected to provide a communications system exceeding 99.97 reliability. The new communications system would permit 100 percent expansion capability but would not increase the present number of maintenance or operator personnel. In April 1977, a site survey was completed followed by publication of a modernization plan in June 1977. In addition, development of a comprehensive procurement package was initiated on a competitive contractual approach. The procurement package for the new [redacted] communications system was scheduled for completion during the 3d Qtr FY 1978, with contract award scheduled for 4th Qtr FY 1978.[28]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA



(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

during 26-28 April 1977 to permit discussion of the 51 operational and 33 maintenance recommendations. The primary result of this conference was the prioritization of the recommendations and assignment of action agencies. Subsequent to this conference, a CONUS working group was formed consisting

of personnel from NSA and INSCOM (DCSOPS, DCSLOG and PMO). This working group continued to follow up on implementation of the [redacted] OSUT recommendations, with major procurements of equipment for system upgrades scheduled for FY 1978.

In June 1976, HESD submitted a claim, or as it was formally called, "a proposal for equitable adjustment in contract price," against the [redacted] project. The Harris claim originally consisted of 27 individual claims totaling $9.2M. A combined NSA/USASA team was established to perform an in-depth technical, contractual, and legal analysis of the claim versus contract specifications and terms. An in-depth analysis of each claim was accomplished by the INSCOM Project Management Office. The Harris claim was forwarded to the Defense Contract Audit Agency which concluded that the claim was developed on the basis of unauditable judgmental estimates made by the program management and individual employees involved. On 14 February 1977, the contracting officer began a series of negotiating sessions with HESD. These sessions were terminated by HESD on 18 April and the entire claim was submitted to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) on 28 April 1977. The claim totaled 29 basic issues. The ASBCA trial was projected for FY 1978.

[redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i); (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

On 6 July 1977, NSACSS, AFSS, and [redacted] were advised of the HQ INSCOM decision to test [redacted] On 15 July, NSACSS nonconcurred in the proposal to move [redacted], citing the following reasons:

1. Greater operational requirement for the system in San Antonio.

2. System did not have an identification software system.

3. No valid test objectives for transferring the system has been provided.

On 19 July, NSA and INSCOM representatives met to discuss the issue. Because there was an Army shortage of 05H personnel at CSOC (329 authorized, 229 assigned), INSCOM agreed to let the [redacted] system remain at CSOC until 31 December 1977.31

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(U) ~~(C)~~ Collection Evaluation System. The Collection Evaluation System (CES) was that part of the Collection by Objective Priority Evaluation System (COPES) which, through computer assisted statistical manipulation of the Collection Management Record (CMR), permitted timely recognition of what was accomplished at each COPES collection resource. CES was one of two feedback vehicles of the CMR, the other being the analytical "COPES Feedback." The CMR contained those items in each collection file necessary for the collection and analytical management effort. CES data was used to evaluate efficiencies in conducting and achieving COPES tasking.

Data in the weekly and Coverage Accounting Period (CAP) CES reports was generally a valid indicator of field SIGINT collection levels and trends. The important value of CES was that it identified changes and prompted management to locate the specific cause of the change. CES accurately reflected the amount of change; heretofore, only subjective recognition that a difference existed was realized.

USSID 125 (CES) required HQ INSCOM, as an SCA, to evaluate all positions tasked by USSID 198 (COPES) on a weekly basis. Prior to June 1975, this responsibility was minimally accomplished by reviewing CRITICOM received CES data on a monthly basis and concentrating on known problem areas. From June 1975 until August 1976, CES was received via the Harris ADP terminal. However, an in-house capability to interrogate the CMR to research causative factors was limited because of the limited understanding of how COPES worked and how to extract specific data.

In August 1976, evaluation began on a weekly basis with results being given to desk officers along with an explanation of what the trend meant. The desk officers were to identify the cause of the trend and initiate appropriate action. In February 1977, monthly briefings to the DCG, INSCOM, concerning SIGINT collection results as portrayed by CES, were initiated. These briefings were the result of several briefings to the CG and DCG in June and November 1976, as well as the Quarterly Review and Analysis briefings. Perhaps the most important aspect of the weekly CES review was a better understanding of COPES techniques and resultant appreciation of the heavy task of the field intercept operator, analyst, and mission manager.

The major weakness of CES is that its limitations and advantages are not properly understood. CES data cannot be used to compare stations against each other or INSCOM against the other SCA's. CES levels and trends can only be used to compare a station against itself. Comparison of stations could only be made if every difference among the field stations' tasks, targets, objectives, resources, atmospheric conditions, equipment, and the like, are identified and weighed.[34]

(U) ~~(C)~~ Air Force/Army Cryptologic Interface. The USASA/AFSS cryptologic interface in joint operations was a plan for the establishment of communication circuits and the exchange of liaison personnel and SIGINT information during joint tactical deployments. It was designed to maximize utilization

of SIGINT collection systems while concurrently providing time-critical intelligence which would otherwise be unavailable to the supported commander.

Starting with BRAVE SHIELD XII (FY76), the concept was tested in five major CONUS joint exercises. It was determined that both ASA and the AFSS benefitted by receiving information which would otherwise not have been available. Accordingly, both SCA's agreed that a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was necessary to formalize details and to establish support requirements. This MOU was signed in July 1976.

During FY 1977, the MOU was re-written and updated and also included FORSCOM as a signatory. A detailed working aid concerning all aspects of the program was written and staffed with other commands, agencies, and services. This working aid will be published by the US Readiness Command (USREDCOM) as a part of operational plans.

In order to develop new concepts for cryptologic interface, two cryptologic action officers' conferences were held, one at HQ INSCOM and the other at HQ AFSS. Proposals and concepts developed by the conferees were tested during joint readiness exercises sponsored by USREDCOM (BRAVE SHIELD XV and XVI, and GALLANT CREW). It was envisioned that the success of these activities would permit INSCOM to initiate action with FORSCOM and the Air Force to develop a plan for all-source intelligence support to a joint task force.[35]

(C-CCO) Peacetime Utilization Program. For some years it was apparent that SIGINT resources in the USASA Direct Support (DS) units were underutilized. With the increasing constraints on funds and manpower, it became imperative that these DS units be thoroughly trained and capable of providing effective SIGINT support. In addition, some of the DS units were ideally located and had the capability to perform SIGINT missions contributing to national and Army intelligence requirements while continuing to perform their tactical support roles.

A Joint Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the ASD(I), ACSI, CDRUSASA, and DIRNSA, was promulgated on 5 November 1974. This policy statement codified the basis for all future planning and conduct of peacetime utilization operations by Army tactical SIGINT assets. Subsequently, the plan for peacetime utilization of USASA SIGINT DS resources was published on 24 March 1975. This plan established basic procedures and outlined the SIGINT responsibilities of the signatories to the original MOU. Since that time, extensive coordination between NSACSS, ACSI, and HQ USASA/INSCOM was effected with specific guidance in the form of US Signal Intelligence Directives (USSID) planned for each theater. USSID 1607 (CONUS) was published in June 1976; USSID 1609 (Europe) and USSID 1630 [redacted] were still in draft form at the close of the report period.

In October 1976, HQDA published the interim USASA mission and functions

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i); (b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b)(1) Per NSA

which stated that USASA was the Army Executive Agent for Peacetime Utilization and would prepare a draft regulation addressing the subject matter. An initial draft regulation was forwarded to NSACSS and ACSI, DA, in December 1976.

The First Annual Peacetime Utilization Conference was held at, and hosted by, HQ INSCOM during 1-3 June 1977. The conference was designed to bring together and update all interested parties in the program, to explore future courses of action, to clarify responsibilities, and to recommend positive solutions for the common goal. In this regard the conference was described as successful.

The Program was in its formative stage and included a number of problem areas. These included lack of space to develop secure training facilities, need for additional equipment, operational experience of supervisory personnel needed improvement, increase in HQ INSCOM managerial staff needed, and standards and criteria to evaluate tactical intelligence units needed to be devised.

A status report on the Program for FY 1977 set forth the following:

1. AR 350-3, Peacetime Utilization of US Army Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Support Resources, dated 12 September 1977, was published.

2. Tactical units having access to their target signal environment—(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA—were capable of initiating training activities. Other CONUS units without a target signal environment were capable of performing some linguist training by means of tapes of target transmission.

3. Some tape recordings and technical working aids were furnished and a program to train key personnel from participating units via Specialized Operational Training (SOT) at NSACSS, and Forward Area Training (FAT) at deployed locations was underway.

4. The 376th Collection and Processing Company at Fort Meade (assigned to FORSCOM) provided interface with NSACSS and HQ INSCOM. An INSCOM Collection, Processing, Analysis and Reporting (CPAR) unit was projected to assume and expand the functions accomplished by the 376th Company.

It is believed that success of the Peacetime Utilization Program will be dependent upon- (1) Command emphasis at all levels, (2) sufficient managerial resources at HQ INSCOM, (3) organization of the CPAR unit as planned, and (4) adequate financial resources to provide equipment and support to SOT/FAT activities.[36]

~~(S-CCO)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

~~(S)(NOFORN)~~ HUMINT Activities. HQDA provided special guidance on the use of US persons as leads and sources in Army human intelligence (HUMINT) operations. This guidance concerned the (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) by operational personnel, approvals required to collect information beyond records checks on certain classes of persons, Privacy Act briefing requirements, and approvals required to contact non-DOD employed personnel. This guidance created considerable administrative turbulence with several operations being suspended until the requisite approvals were obtained. However, long-term effects on methods of operations and the unit's ability to accomplish mission objectives were assessed as negligible.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

Also, support to OACSI, DA, and subordinate elements in the form of assistance in former source settlement actions; dossier reviews and (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) and preparation of operations security reviews of special current sources consumed considerable effort. September 1977 saw the fruition of hundreds of manhours expended in the formalization, testing and screening of data in the Automated Source Administration Program, an automatic data processing system whereby data pertaining to all sources and leads could be rapidly placed in the hands of administrators/managers for use in performing managerial functions and in maintaining suspense actions. Also, continuing steps toward automation resulted in the production of a completely automated Intelligence Collection Requirement (ICR) register. This register enhanced the access of collectors to all available reporting requirements and significantly increased their reporting ability.

b1 1.4a, 1.4c Per DIA

Prior to that time virtually no automated intelligence products or programs were in use in HQ USAINTA. In September 1975, these systems became fully operational and have since been modified to accept several applications tailored specifically to INSCOM functions.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(1) Per CIA

(C) US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment Products. In FY 1977, the US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment (USAITAD) published studies as shown in the table below.[39]

Table 31.—USAITAD Studies

Title	Date Published
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	Oct 76
	Oct 76
	Nov 76
	Jan 77
	Jan 77
	Jan 77
	Feb 77
	Feb 77
	Feb 77
	Apr 77
	Apr 77

USAITAD Studies—Continued

Title	Date Published
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	Apr 77 Apr 77 Jun 77 Jun 77 Jul 77 Sep 77 Sep 77

(C) Counterintelligence Production Projects. The Counterintelligence (CI) Production projects completed by the US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment (IOSD) during FY 1977 are shown in table below.[40]

Table 32.—CI Production Projects

Title	Date Published
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	Quarterly Quarterly Tri-Weekly 1 May 77 15 Aug 77 15 Aug 77 30 Sep 77 30 Sep 77

(U) Polygraph Examinations. A total of 270 polygraph examinations were conducted in support of counterintelligence investigations and operations, HUMINT activities, the Limited Access Authorization Program, and selection of a candidate for polygraph training. Of the 270 examinations conducted, 103 (38 percent) of the examinees were evaluated as having indicated deception (DI). Significant admissions were obtained by polygraph examiners in 91 (88 percent) of the DI cases.[41]

The table below reflects the polygraph activities for FY 1977.

Table 33.—Polygraph Activities, FY 1977

Activity	Total
Technical Review of Polygraph Examinations	246
Review of Permanent Polygraph Files	1488
New Files Created	376
Defense Investigative Service	305
Freedom of Information/Privacy Center	37
Other Authorized Requesters	707
Examiner Certification Actions	11
Polygraph Examinations Conducted	270
DCI/902d MI Group	77
66th MI Group	108
501st MI Group	85
Staff Visits/Seminars/Briefings	6
Examiner Refresher/Advanced Training	3

(U) Operations Security Support Conference. During the period 15-19 November 1976, the Operational Security Group (OSG) sponsored the first worldwide Operations Security (OPSEC) Support Conference. Over 35 representatives from HQDA, MACOM's, and CONUS/OCONUS military intelligence organizations attended. Following opening remarks by MG Harold Aaron, ACSI, DA, formal briefings were presented by representatives from ODCSOPS, DA; CIA; FBI; NSA; DIA; US Army Imagery Interpretation Center; 902d MI Group, and the OSG. In addition, attendees had the opportunity to participate in desk level discussions with members of OSG concerning support methodology, technologies, and experiences.[42]

~~(C)~~ Products Produced by INSCOM Intelligence Group. In FY 1977, the INSCOM Intelligence Group (INSIG) produced 79 hard copy intelligence products as shown in the table below. Programmed products were prepared in response to taskings based on intelligence production requirements of the US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), US European Command (USEUCOM), and CONUS Army tactical commanders. Unprogrammed assistance was provided to many DOD elements.[43]

Table 34.—INSCOM Intelligence Group Productions

Title	Date Published
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	Aug 76
	Jul 76
	Jul 76
	Aug 76
	Sep 76

INSCOM Intelligence Group Productions—Continued

Title	Date Published
	Dec 76
	Dec 76
	Dec 76
	Dec 76
	Dec 76
	Dec 76
	May 77
	May 77
	May 77
	Jun 77
	Jun 77
	Jun 77
	Jun 77
	Aug 77
	Jul 77
	Nov 76
	Nov 76
	Nov 76
	Nov 76
	Apr 77
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	May 77
	Sep 77
	Jul 76
	Jan 77
	Apr 77
	Jun 77
	Dec 76
	Nov 76
	Dec 76
	Dec 76
	Feb 77
	Jul 77
	Jan 77
	Apr 77
	Mar 77
	Apr 77
	Jun 77
	Jun 77
	Sep 77

INSCOM Intelligence Group Productions—Continued

Title	Date Published
INSIG Registered Intelligence Products FY77 Update (U)	May 77
Handbook of Military Forces	
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	Sep 76 Apr 77 May 77 Sep 77
Intelligence Brief	
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	Jul 77
Special Study	
Uniforms and Insignia, Middle East and North Africa (U)	Sep 77
Missile Defense and Security Study (U)	Feb 77
Mission-Oriented Package	
Eight completed:	Jul 76 Sep 76 Oct 76 Dec 76 Jan 77 Feb 77 Apr 77 May 77
Tactical Commander's Terrain Analysis	
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	Jul 76 Aug 76 Mar 77 Sep 77 Sep 77

INSCOM Intelligence Group Productions—Continued

Title	Date Published
Telecommunication and Electric Power Facilities Study	
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)	Apr 77 Aug 77

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 109-112.
2. Ibid. p. 160; Black Book Item, 6 Oct 77, subj: US Army SIGINT Architecture.
3. Black Book Item, 7 Oct 77, subj: Revision of EW Policy Guidance; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 141.
4. Black Book Item, 30 Sep 77, subj: EELPOT; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 66-67; Interview, ELI Personnel, ODCSOPS, HQ INSCOM (2 May 78).
5. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 64-65; HQ INSCOM Commander's Bulletin 77-6, 28 Nov 77, pp. 8-9.
6. Report of Investigation, 7 Feb 77, re Possible Fabrication of Traffic (c-ccc) at [redacted]; Memo for DCG, USASA, IAOPS-PAC, 26 Nov 76, subj: Alleged Traffic Fabrication at [redacted] Interview, Miss Marvel Thomason, ODCSCI, HQ INSCOM (5 May 78).
7. FIL 7-77, NSACSS, Jul 77, pp. 19-20; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 158-160.
8. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 60-64.
9. Ibid. pp. 70-71.
10. Ibid. pp. 78-79; Fact Sheet, 28 Apr 77, subj: [redacted] Update; Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, HQ USASA, FY76/7T, pp. 114-115.
11. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 45-46; DF, IAOPS-SPT, 14 Jun 76, subj: HQ USASA Readiness System, AN/MLQ-24; Ltr, DAMI-TAR, 17 Sep 76, subj: Request for Threat Validation; [redacted] Milestone Schedule.
12. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 43-45; Msg, INSCOM to DIRNSA, DTG 231950Z May 77, subj: TORCH EYE Support Request.
13. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 71-72; Black Book Item, 3 Oct 77, subj: [redacted]; AHR, DCSMIS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 16.
14. AHR, [redacted] FY77, pp. 8-9; Briefing, TRACER ROUND, 21 Dec 77; Interview, CPT Patricia A. Underwood, ODCSOPS (27 Apr 77); AHR, [redacted], FY77, pp. 1-15; AHR, SDL, FY77, Vol I, pp. 1-9.
15. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 120-127.
16. Ibid. pp. 172-173.
17. Ibid. pp. 173-175; AHR, 146th ASA Co, FY77, pp. 13-14, 17.
18. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 191-194.
19. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY77, p. 80.
20. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 194-197.
21. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, (SIGSEC) all Qtrs FY77.
22. AHR, [redacted] FY77, pp. II-39, II-40.
23. AHR, [redacted], FY77, pp. 243-245; Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 107.
24. Qtrly Prog Rev (Supl), HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY77, p. 4.
25. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 53-54; Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, pp. 109-111.
26. AHR, [redacted], FY77, p. II-33.
27. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ USASA, FY76/7T, pp. 32-36; Tab 12.
28. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 27-28; AHR, [redacted] FY77, p. 14 (Ops Chapter).

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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29. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp.65-66; Msg, IAOPS-COL, DTG 301500Z Dec 76, subj: SSL Planning (Berlin)(C).
30. AHR, Project Management Office, FY77, pp. 2-3 thru 2-6; AHR, USAFS [redacted] FY77, pp. 243, 262; Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 106.
31. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 80; Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, pp. 102-103.
32. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 81-82; Msg, IAOPS-PAC, DTG 221530Z Jun 77, subj: [redacted] (U).
33. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 94; Ltr, IACG to ACSI, DA, undtd, subj: Cryptologic KATUSA Status (U).
34. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 134-136; DF, IAOPS, 23 Nov 76, subj: The Collection Evaluation System.
35. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 42; Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, P. 129.
36. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY77, Tab J; First Ann Peacetime Utilization Working Conference, HQ INSCOM, 1-3 Jun 77; Fact Sheet, IAOPS-PTR, 14 Jun 77, subj: DIRNSA Retreat Item - Peacetime Utilization Program; Msg, IAOPS-PTR, DTG 021130Z Feb 77, subj: Peacetime Utilization Program.
37. Msg, INSCOMDETNSA, DTG 161410Z Mar 77, subj: SIGINT Support [redacted] (C-CCO) [redacted] Fact Sheet, IAOPS-CON, HQ INSCOM, 13 Apr 77, subj: [redacted] (C-CCO)
38. AHR, USAOG/DO, USAINTA, FY77, Chap IV.
39. AHR, USAITAD, HQ INSCOM, FY77, App F.
40. AHR, IOSD, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 9; Incl 16.
41. AHR, DCI, HQ INSCOM, FY77, Tab E.
42. AHR, USA Op Scty Gp, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 12.
43. AHR, INSCOM Intel Gp, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 9-12.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b)
(1) Per NSA

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CHAPTER VII

(S) RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION

(C) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Fund Status. As of 30 September 1977, $30,830 million or 92 percent of the Army program was obligated while $8.067 million or 78 percent of the CCP Program was obligated. Year-end financial statistics, by project, of the Army program are shown in table below ($ in millions).[1]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024 (i);(b) (3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Table 35.—Year-End Status of RDTE Funds

Project	Allocated	Obligated	Committed
[redacted]	$ 4.723	$ 4.235	$ .345
TACJAM	1.288	1.288	0
[redacted]	.143	.118	.025
AN/USM-410	.132	.113	0
[redacted]	.169	.160	.009
QUICK FIX w/DF	.469	.465	.004
EW CAC	.213	.114	.099
AGTELIS	8.405	8.405	0
TEAMPACK ESM	.170	.137	.033
MULTEWS (Air)	4.023	3.656	.367
UHF/VHF Receivers	2.303	2.066	.237
DSCOC	.764	.764	0
Support	4.885	4.648	0
Tech Info	.052	.046	.006
SIGSEC Support	.224	.215	.004
Small Items	.662	.346	.316
Testing	3.553	3.505	.038
Exploratory Dev	1.200	.549	.651
TOTAL	$33.378	$30.830	$2.135

On 4 August 1977, Joint Senate and House action decremented INSCOM FY 1978 OPA/APA procurement programs as shown in table below ($ in millions).

36.—Decrements to INSCOM FY78 OPA/APA Programs

Program	Decrement
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA	
Project SEEGAR	.5

Decrements to INSCOM FY78 OPA/APA Programs—Continued

Program	Decrement
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA	
AN/TLQ-17A Jammer ($900K was decremented from this figure with remaining $3.7M slipped to FY79)	4.6
AN/TYQ-5 (Full quantity slipped into FY79 program)	2.5

On 8 September 1977, a further decrement on Army's procurement program of

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Congressional/NSA/DA changes to the FY 1979 OPA Program was implemented by PBD 141-C with the following reductions to the INSCOM FY 1979 planned procurement program:

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

As the result of serious funding shortages for the AN/TSQ-114 and the AN/MSQ-103, several conferences between INSCOM, DA-DCSLOG, and DA-DCSRDA took place. Considerable compromise took place between DA and INSCOM resulting in a change in maintenance concept and the following funding actions:

AN/MSQ-103 Unfunded Requirement	$6.2M
DA Add On for Test Equipment	(1.8)
Borrowed from AN/TRQ-32	(1.0)
Borrowed from TYK-10A	(1.0)
Out Own Spares Line	(2.4)
AN/TSQ-114 Unfunded Requirement	$4.0M
SIGINT Spares Line	(3.2)
EW Spares Line	(.6)
7T SIGINT Line	(.2)

The obligation status of the FY 1977 OPA Program follows:

Program II (Tactical)	
Approved Program	$30,800,000
Obligations as of 30 June 1977	55%
Obligations as of 30 September 1977	61%
Program III (CCP Fixed Site)	
Approved Program	$ 3,203,000
Obligations as of 30 June 1977	16%
Obligations as of 30 September 1977	37%

~~(C)~~ USASA Test and Evaluation Center Activities. The USASA Test and Evaluation Center (USASATEC), Fort Huachuca, Arizona, continued to manage and perform USAINSCOM Development Tests (DT) as specified in AR 70-10 and support those operational tests (OT) when combined with DT at USASATEC. The following lists includes tests conducted and/or planned for FY 1977:2

1. Electronic Warfare Tests:

AN/MLQ-34,
AN/MLQ-34,
AN/ALQ-151
AN/TRQ-32
AN/TRD-26

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

2. Cryptologic Tests:

AN/ARD-22,
AN/MSQ-103

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

3. Vulnerability Tests:

Sensitive Area Vulnerability Estimate (SAVE), Yuma Proving Ground
QUICK FIX Support
Tactical Communications Vulnerability Assessment (TACVA)
AN/TPQ-36, Mortar Locating Radar Support
Interim Radar Jammer (IRJ) Abbreviated Test Support
CEFLY LANCER Support
GALLANT SHIELD FTX Support
COMSEC Equipment Maintenance Course, KG-45 Support
AN/MSQ-103, (TEAMPACK) Support
TRAILBLAZER Support
TACELIS Support
QUICK LOOK II Support
TACJAM Support
USASA RDTE Analysis and Applications Facility Support
Sensitive Vulnerability Activity (SVA) Support, Hunter Liggett

4. Other Tests:

AN/TSH-9, Recorder/Reproducer
AN/USM-410, EQUATE
AN/ASN-86, Navigation Set, Software Check Test

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Following the June 1975 contract award to Electronic Systems Laboratories (ESL) to fabricate one complete set of [redacted] boxes (five stations), Electronic Warfare Laboratories (EWL) proceeded to design and fabricate shelters and trailers for one R&D system to be delivered in August 1976; however, delivery was delayed.

The first shipment of [redacted] components, consisting of one slave unit, three sets of generators for the slave units and two generator trailers for the Master Station, was received at the USASA Test and Evaluation Center (USASATEC) on 22 October 1976. A second shipment was received on 22 November 1976, consisting of a Master Station, a second remote station, and two 5/4-ton trucks. The third shipment—a second Master Station and a third remote station, arrived on 21 December 1976.

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Operators for the system arrived from Fort Hood, Texas, in January 1977 and several days were spent in their training. Then, on 17 January, these personnel and the system, less one remote unit, were sent to the field. After a week of attempted operation, it became evident that the system could not be made to work in the field and it was returned to the USASATEC. System performance continued to be inadequate resulting in a USASATEC recommendation not to deploy the system to operational testing. In order to solve system problems, ESL and USAECOM personnel joined USASATEC personnel in an intensive effort during the period 10-13 February, however, the problems remained unresolved.

In discussions with the TRADOC Combined Army Test Activity (TCATA) and TRADOC in February 1977, it became apparent that OT II could not be rescheduled until March 1978. This required the trained operator and maintenance crew to be released and a new crew trained prior to OT II. DT II was rescheduled for June 1977, using the period February-May 1977 to rehab the system and prepare for actual DT II in a phased sequence leading up to June 1977. DT II was accomplished during June-July and the system was returned to EWL, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in August 1977 for rehab and testing. Work proceeded through September in preparation for entry into pre-OT II by January 1978 and OT II in March 1978. Training of five maintenance personnel for OT II began in September and was to continue until December 1977. Logistic support for the UYK-19 and its peripherals continued to be a problem.[3]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

The CPC development effort, under contract since 29 May 1973, has proceeded satisfactorily. Computer software difficulties delayed delivery of the CPC from March 1975 to January 1977. The CPC delivery is now concurrent with the Remote Master Station and Remote Slave Station delivery.

The system arrived at USASATEC during the first week of April 1977 and was immediately set up by Sylvania personnel. Assessments of damage during shipment indicated very little damage to system hardware. The system was returned to operational status within one week. In November 1976, it was determined that operator personnel would be furnished by FORSCOM. Sufficient personnel arrived at USASATEC to enable operator training to begin on 13 June 1977.

A contract with the Quest Corporation for test plan preparation, conduct, and final report preparation was finalized and a draft test plan completed in July. Based on comments submitted by TECOM, USAEPG and INSCOM during August 1977, a revised test plan was being prepared at the close of the report period. Training of operators and deployment of personnel continued during July and August 1977. The formal training program concluded with a 1-week practical exercise during 29 August-2 September 1977. The formal start of [redacted] was scheduled for 11 October 1977.[4]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36; (b) (1) Per NSA

FY 1977 saw the completion of the test phase and acceptance In-Process Review (IPR) as planned. The [redacted] system was accepted by the government from Electromagnetic Systems Laboratory, Incorporated, on 20 August 1976 and flown to Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The DT II started on schedule in September 1976. OT II, originally scheduled to start in December 1976, was slipped to January 1977 at the request of the TRADOC Combined Army Test Activity. Due to this schedule change, the DT II test period was extended to provide needed time to gather additional flight data. DT II accumulated approximately 400 flight test hours. With the exception of the AN/TLQ-27, there were very few mission equipment failures. Excluding the AN/TLQ-27 reliability, the mission system met its reliability requirement. The intercept and ECM performance was found acceptable. Bearing accuracy, as tested, did not meet specifications during DT II; however, the emitter location tests showed that the [redacted] system came close to achieving its required accuracy of 1 km CEP (Circular Error of Probability) at 30 km range. By 12 January 1977, all flight testing was completed. The aircraft underwent a 100-hour maintenance in preparation for the TRADOC Combined Army Test Activity at Fort Hood, Texas. During this maintenance, a fourth 90-degree gear box was replaced. After maintenance, a sensitivity test was conducted which completed DT testing. In February 1977, all equipment was transferred to Fort Hood for OT.

OT II at Fort Hood was conducted during the period 7-31 March 1977. Approximately one week of this time was used in participating in the Joint Readiness Exercise (JRX) GALLANT CREW. About 80 flight hours were accumulated during OT II. Again there were very few mission failures, excluding the AN/TLQ-27. The OT II testing concluded that the intercept system was acceptable, the ECM system was marginal, and the DF system unacceptable. This test also concluded that the UH-1 aircraft was not adequate for the

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

mission system weight.

The IPR was held at HQ INSCOM on 22-23 June 1977. A thorough review of the system, program, and test results was conducted. The IPR members were not able to arrive at a mutually agreeable recommendation. Therefore, the minutes of the proceedings, together with each member's position, was forwarded to HQDA on 4 August 1977 for review and resolution. By the close of the fiscal year, a final decision had not been made.[5]

(C) MULTEWS (AN/ALQ-143). The multiple target electronic warfare system (MULTEWS)(AN/ALQ-143) was a high-power, multiple target-jamming system installed in a UH-1H helicopter. The system had the capability for automatic search, identification and prioritization of target radars and provided for jamming of up to four target radars simultaneously in the frequency range of 8.5-17.0 GHz. In addition to the heliborne components, the system also included a ground support element for preflight and software support for up to three operational systems. The ground support element was capable of preflight preparation of one system at a time. The AN/ALQ-143 system accepted tasking and provided stand-off electronic countermeasures against designated counter-mortar/counter-battery and combat surveillance/target acquisition radars in the 8.5-17.0 GHz frequency range. Additionally, if an enemy fire control/tracking radar was detected and locked-on the AN/ALQ-143 helicopter, the MULTEWS system provided self-protection against that direct threat air defense artillery radar within its frequency band until it was out of effective range of the weapon system.

The MULTEWS Program continued to progress during FY 1977 with the completion of the fabrication of the two test models of the aircraft system. These systems were scheduled for delivery to USASATEC on or about 5 November 1977 for DT II. Training by the contractor was conducted from 20 June to 15 September 1977 for three MOS 98J and three MOS 33S enlisted personnel who would operate and maintain the equipment during DT II/OT II. EMC, EMI, and radiation hazard tests were completed in July 1977 on system one and the system was taken to Edwards Air Force Base, California, for flight certification safety tests. Severe lateral vibration problems in the autorotation and power climb modes were noted and being corrected. System two was installed on the second UH-1H helicopter by operator personnel. Acceptance tests by the contractor and material developer began on 15 September at Fort Huachuca and were scheduled to end on 1 November 1977. DT II was scheduled to begin in early November 1977.[6]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

tion (LP) contract was awarded in 3d Qtr FY 1976 for 10 systems. In the 4th Qtr FY 1976, DT II/OT observation reports were received indicating no deficiencies in the DT and the meeting of all objectives in the OT.

Fabrication of the 10 LP (urgent) systems continued in FY 1977. Environmental tests, reliability/maintainability demonstrations were scheduled for the September-October 1977 time frame, with a type classification standard IPR scheduled for 1 December 1977. During this period the contractor was also directed to fabricate all spares and special support equipment, completing the support requirements for eventual fielding of the systems.[7]

(U) (C) TACFIRE. The encryption of all Forward Observer (FO) data links was emphasized for tactical fire (TACFIRE) after EW vulnerability testing, conducted during early FY 1975, showed serious susceptibilities. The problem in securing the FO link was due to the incompatibility between VINSON (KY-57) and the digital message device (DMD).

During FY 1977, support to TACFIRE centered on securing the FO data link. To facilitate a solution to this problem, a COMSEC Executive Committee, with an associated COMSEC working group was organized. The working group prepared a report which outlined feasible alternatives for securing the FO link. These were reduced to the following:

1. A KG-30 encryption algorithm embedded in the DMD or contained in an applique unit.

2. VINSON (KY-57) applique at the DMD and FDC.

After the working group developed cost, scheduling, and system impact for the above alternatives, the final recommendation of the COMSEC Executive Committee was that TACFIRE build an interface module that would permit VINSON to encrypt FO link messages in its digital data mode. The Committee was given the task of acting as start-up manager for the hardware development of the VINSON/DMD interface device.[8]

(U) (C) TACJAM (AN/MLQ-34). The need for the Tactical Jammer (TACJAM) EW stemmed from the lack of the supported division commander to have assets which could effectively acquire, locate, identify, and jam enemy forward area short duration, push-to-talk, VHF voice communications used by enemy maneuver forces. During FY 1976, the TACJAM system design, fabrication, and assembly was completed by the prime contractor, GTE Sylvania, and the first prototype was accepted and delivered in March 1976. DT II tests of the system's electrical and mechanical performance, reliability, human factors engineering, and other characteristics were conducted at Fort Huachuca during 1 April-31 August 1976. While test results were generally favorable, the areas of greatest difficulty involved physical size and set-up and tear-down.

In FY 1977, the reconfiguration of TACJAM was accomplished under contract with GTE Sylvania at a cost of approximately $2 million. The contract was awarded in August 1976 and the reconfigured system was delivered in June 1977. The military utility, mobility and survivability was significantly improved through the system of repackaging into a M-548 tracked vehicle with quick erection antenna masts and automatic ground rod driver. The system's

set-up and tear-down time was reduced from 1 to 2 hours to under 2 minutes. Software development related to the interoperability of TACJAM and [redacted] was conducted at Fort Huachuca mostly utilizing the wheeled version of TACJAM. The reconfigured system was delivered to USASATEC and DT IIA was begun on 1 July 1977. All tests were scheduled for completion by 30 November 1977.[9]

(c) (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA program was to develop a fully militarized, type classifiable, airborne noncommunications emitter location system covering the frequency range of 500-18,000 MHz and provide real time location of electromagnetic emitters and order of battle information. The production contract was awarded for the fabrication of seven systems on 30 June 1975. At a conference in May 1976, a key issue was raised regarding a training program because a valid maintenance concept had not been developed and the configuration of the system had not been finalized. A conference with the contractor, United Technology Laboratories, held during 3-6 August 1976, produced a revised operator and maintenance course with emphasis on systems operations theory. A contractor training class was held in early 1977 with personnel completing this course arriving at USASATEC in June 1977 where they were used in support of AN/MSQ-103 testing. All equipment arrived in July and testing started on 11 August 1977, following aircraft check out and maintenance. Testing ended during September 1977 and the system was transferred for OT.[10]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

against single-channel communications emitters. A model 1600 Digi-Data digital tape recorder was sent to American Electronics Laboratory (AEL) in October 1976 for use in the CEFLY LANCER DF slave aircraft data collection package. At a meeting at Arlington Hall Station on 23 November 1976, it was decided that Phase I of the DT would be flown from Libby Army Airfield, Fort Huachuca. The CEFLY LANCER slave aircraft #71-21060 arrived at USASATEC on 31 January 1977 with the first bearing accuracy test beginning on 1 February. Very little data was collected because of digital recorder and navigational system (AN/ASN-86) problems. The first good bearing accuracy flight was conducted on 23 February 1977. VHF sensitivity tests were attempted but no usable data was collected due to communication problems between the aircraft and the ground site, and problems associated with flying in military restricted airspace. The system was returend to AEL earlier than planned when a power supply in the computer failed. Since it was not expected that this and other computer problems could be corrected before the scheduled end of the test, the system was sent back on 26 April 1977 with the understanding that any tests not completed during the Phase I tests would be completed during Phase II. Two of the system aircraft, the master and one of the two slave aircraft, arrived at USASATEC on 8 August. The interoperability phase with [redacted] began on 15 August. Problems encountered included a noncompatibility of connectors between the twin coax cable from the Wideband Data Link trailer and the [redacted] Control and Processing

b (3) Per NSA
P.L. 86-36

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Center, numerous software problems, excessive jitter in the 1320-foot coax cable, and the need to realign the Wideband Data Link trailer. Phase II testing was scheduled for late September 1977.[11]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

The system would be employed by USASA Operations Company Forward and would consist of three remote outstations and a one-vehicle control processor and work in conjunction with (b)(3):P.L. 86-36 the Direct Support Company, and the Control and Analysis Center.

During FY 1977, continual re-evaluation of the threat environment prompted a modification to the [redacted] program. This modification insured that the system would be able to detect and discriminate against sophisticated type radars. DT/OT II was scheduled to commence in November 1978.[12]

(U) DCSRDA Test and Evaluation Projects. A total of 17 test projects were acted upon by the Test and Evaluation Office, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, during the report period. These activities ranged from initial programming and outline test plans to processing final reports and evaluation. Major activities and accomplishments included the following:[13]

1. Coordinated Test Programs Prepared or Revised:

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
Per NSA

2. Test Plans Reviewed, Staffed and Approved:

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
Per NSA

3. Final Test Reports Reviewed, Staffed and Processed:

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Interim RADAR JAMMER
R-1019 Receiver
AN/TRQ-32
AN/ULR-17 Receiver (final processing not complete)

4. Briefings Prepared and Presented at IPR's:

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(U) (C) Control and Analysis Centers. The Control and Analysis Centers (CAC's) were to manage and integrate operations of the collection and jamming subsystems being developed under USASA's Tactical Support System concept. The CAC's would be the primary ASA tactical interface with the supported commander. A Secretarial Determination and Finding for procurement of the CAC development program was submitted in October 1975 by USASA and approved by DA in January 1976. During the period January-May 1976, a draft procurement package was prepared by HQ USASA. A joint NSA/DA review of the draft package was conducted during May-July 1976. In August, an approved Phase I procurement package was sent to Central Procurement Activity (CPA) and the procurement was announced to industry in the Commerce Bulletin Daily.

In October 1976, Requests for Proposal were sent to prospective bidders which defined three tasks under Phase I—system concept, system design, and preliminary system development plan and specifications. During October and November, a Source Selection Authority was appointed and a Source Advisory Council and Source Selection Evaluation Board were formally established. Proposals were submitted to the government in late November 1976. On 16 June 1977, three parallel competitive 6-month contracts for CAC Phase I were awarded to RCA, GTE Sylvania, and TRW Electronics. It was the intent of the government to eventually award a contract for CAC prototype development (Phase II) to one of the three Phase I contractors based on their performance and responsiveness. On 31 August 1977, reports documenting the first task of each contract, system concept definition, were submitted to the government by each contractor.[14]

(U) (S) Radar Signal Sorter. The Radar Signal Sorter (RSS) program was initiated for the purpose of developing a new radar descriptor to be used with radio frequency (RF), pulse repetition frequency (PRF), and pulse width (PW) to classify radars by type. In March 1975, ASA, in a joint program with the Navy, awarded a contract for the functional design of a fully automated, update capability RSS equipment which could be integrated into the existing ESM system (AGTELIS for ASA). This design was completed in November 1975.

In April 1976, a joint Army/Navy contract was awarded to build one prototype system for test. The Navy accepted the prototype in July 1977. Tests were being conducted by the Navy to gather additional data for future efforts. Incorporation of RSS into AGTELIS will not be attempted until after DT/OT II.[15]

(U) Tactical Automated Maintenance Facility. The need for automated maintenance equipment was first received in March 1973. Because of the microelectronic complexity of various USASA systems, it was recognized that some form of automated test equipment would be a cost effective measure for acceptance tests performed by the contractor on printed circuit cards and modules.

As a result of ECOM studies, ASA tasked the ECOM Electronic Warfare Laboratory in December 1973 to begin a study concerning the development of a complete maintenance philosophy and concept which would be capable of providing intermediate level maintenance support for the upcoming R&D systems. ECOM recommended that ASA employ the RCA electronic quality assurance test equipment (EQUATE) AN/USM-410 at the intermediate level. In May 1975, a contract was awarded to RCA through ECOM to procure two commercial quality AN/USM-410 systems for ASA; one system would be located at Fort Huachuca to support development testing/operational testing and the other system would be located at the ASA depot at Vint Hill Farms Station to provide software development support and depot maintenance support.

Three additional AN/USM-410's were procured primarily to be utilized in developing application test programs. All three AN/USM-410's were 500 MHz units. Additional application test programs were ordered for the Control Indicator Panel (CIP), Pan Display IP-1157, and the R-1850 VHF Receiver.[16]

(U) ~~(C)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VII. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION

1. AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 5-10; Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY77, p. 52.
2. AHR, USASATEC, FY77, pp. 15, 17, 23, 28.
3. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 146; AHR, USASATEC, FY77, pp. 18-19; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 14.
4. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 150; AHR, USASATEC, FY77, p. 18; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 15.
5. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 148; AHR, USASATEC, FY77, pp. 15-16; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 11-12.
6. AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 17; AHR, USASATEC, FY77, pp. 21-22.
7. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 154; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 17.
8. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 153; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 20.
9. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 153; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, pp. 15-16.
10. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 149; AHR, USASATEC, FY77, p. 21.
11. AHR, USASATEC, FY77, pp. 20-21.
12. AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 17.
13. Ibid. p. 25.
14. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 145; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 19.
15. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, p. 149; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 17.
16. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/7T, pp. 151-152; AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 16.
17. AHR, DCSRDA, HQ INSCOM, FY77, p. 11.

APPENDIX A

INSCOM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
(As of 30 September 1977)

UIC	Unit Designation	Location
W00YAA	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W000AA	US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station	Arlington, Virginia
W001AA	USA INSCOM Support Group	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
W002AA	US Army Element, National Security Agency	Ft George G. Meade. Maryland
W003AA	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, NSA/CSS	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
W01BAA	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, TRADOC	Ft Monroe, Virginia
W01CAA	USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Dix	Ft Dix, New Jersey
W01DAA	USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Jackson	Ft Jackson, South Carolina
W01EAA	USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Leonard Wood	Ft Leonard Wood, Missouri
W01HAA	US Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station	Warrenton, Virginia
W01KAA	US Army Field Station, Homestead	Homestead Air Force Base, Homestead, Florida
W01LAA	USASA Test and Evaluation Center (u)	Ft Huachuca, Arizona
W01PAA	US Army Communications Support Unit ~~(c)~~	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W3CCAA	USA INSCOM Data Systems Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W3NBAA	US Army Technical Support Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W3PUAA	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, FORSCOM	Ft McPherson, Georgia
W3S2AA	US Army Signal Security Activity	Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia
W005AA	US Army Security Detachment-Region I	Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia
W009AA	US Army Security Detachment-Region III	Ft Sam Houston, Texas
W01AAA	US Army Security Detachment-Region IV	Presidio of San Francisco, California
W3NSAA	US Army Security Detachment, Hawaii	Ft Shafter, Hawaii
W3TLAA	US Army Intelligence Support Detachment	Pentagon, Washington, DC
W31UAA	US Army Field Station, San Antonio	San Antonio, Texas
W3YDAA	US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment	Washington, DC
W3YSAA	US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment	Washington, DC
W1WNAA	USA INSCOM Intelligence Group	Ft Bragg, North Carolina

Appendix A

UIC	Unit Designation	Location
	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
W34KAA	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Defense Language Institute	Presidio of San Francisco, California
W35GAA	USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W36SAA	USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W00XAA	US Army Imagery Interpretation Center	Pentagon, Washington, DC
WH6A90	HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group Augmentation (Carrier)	Yongsan, Korea
WBWF90	209th Military Intelligence Detachment Augmentation (Carrier)	
W33YAA	USASA Security Detachment, Korea	Uijongbu, Korea
WBVEAA	HHC, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion	Camp Coiner, Korea
WBVE99	Augmentation, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion	Camp Coiner, Korea
W3F1AA	US Army Field Station, Korea	Pyong Taek, Korea
WDLPAA	146th ASA Company (Avn)(Fwd)	Taegu, Korea
WEDVAA	332d ASA Company, Operations (Fwd)	Pyong Taek, Korea
WGQ4AA	704th Military Intelligence Detachment	Seoul, Korea
W3RAAA	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Pacific	Ft Shafter, Hawaii
W3BRAA	US Army Field Station, Misawa	Misawa, Japan
W02BAA	US Army Field Station, Okinawa	Sobe, Okinawa
W3QNAA	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, US Army, Europe	Heidelberg, Germany
W3AGAA	US Army Field Station, Augsburg	Augsburg, Germany
W02RAA	US Army Field Station, Berlin	Berlin, Germany
W0DRAA	US Army Field Station, Sinop	Sinop, Turkey
W1U3AA	US Army Administrative Survey Detachment	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
W372AA	US Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
W0KLAA	US Army Programs Analysis Group	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
W32AAA	US Army Operational Security Group	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland

APPENDIX A

UIC	Unit Designation	Location
	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
W31ZAA	US Army Intelligence Agency	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU7AA	66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WBU799	Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WGNTAA	18th Military Intelligence Battalion	Munich, Germany
WBVNAA	5th Military Intelligence Company	Munich, Germany
WBVHAA	HHC, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion	Frankfurt, Germany
WBVKAA	HHC, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion	Nurnberg Furth, Germany
WBVLAA	HHC, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Kaiserslautern, Germany
WBWKAA	430th Military Intelligence Detachment	Munich, Germany
WBWVAA	766th Military Intelligence Detachment	Berlin, Germany
WBU9AA	500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
WBU999	Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
WBU8AA	470th Military Intelligence Group	Ft Amador, Canal Zone
WBU899	Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group	Ft Amador, Canal Zone
W3CUAA	USA INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command	Ft Amador, Canal Zone
WBUYAA	HHC, 525th Military Intelligence Group	Presidio of San Francisco, California
WBUY99	Augmentation, 525th Military Intelligence Group	Presidio of San Francisco, California
WCWNAA	901st Military Intelligence Detachment	Sandia Base, New Mexico
WCWN99	Augmentation, 901st Military Intelligence Detachment	Sandia Base, New Mexico
WBU6AA	902d Military Intelligence Group	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU699	Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
W32BAA	USA Central Security Facility	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
W39CAA	USA Special Operations Detachment	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
W318AA	USAINTA Headquarters Support Detachment	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland
W319AA	USA Operational Group	Ft George G. Meade, Maryland

APPENDIX B

TOE UNITS
(As of 30 September 1977)

WBU7	66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU8	470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU9	500th Military Intelligence Group
WBUY	Hq & Hq Company, 525th Military Intelligence Group
WBU6	902d Military Intelligence Group
WGNT	18th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVH	Hq & Hq Company, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVE	Hq & Hq Company, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVK	Hq & Hq Company, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVL	Hq & Hq Company, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVN	5th Military Intelligence Company
WDLP	146th ASA Company (Avn)(Fwd)
WEDV	332d ASA Company, Operations (Fwd)
WBWK	430th Military Intelligence Detachment
WGQ4	704th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWV	766th Military Intelligence Detachment
WCWN	901st Military Intelligence Detachment

APPENDIX C

CHANGES IN STATUS OF TOE UNITS DURING FY 1977

TOE UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
1st ASA Company (Avn)(Rear) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
156th ASA Company (Avn)(Fixed Wing) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
201st ASA Company (Security) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
202d ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
265th ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
HHC, 302d ASA Battalion (Corps) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
HHC, 303d ASA Battalion (Corps) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Oct 76	PO 21-2, INSCOM, 23 Sep 76
HHC, 307th ASA Battalion (Corps) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
HHC, 313th ASA Battalion (Corps) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76

APPENDIX C

TOE UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
326th ASA Company, Operations (Forward) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
328th ASA Company, Control and Processing TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 44-1, INSCOM, 9 Dec 76
329th ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: Eighth US Army	1 Oct 76	PO 21-1, INSCOM, 23 Sep 76
330th ASA Company (Avn)(Forward) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
337th ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
358th ASA Company (Div Spt)(Abn) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
370th ASA Company, Operations (Rear) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
371st ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Oct 76	PO 21-2, INSCOM, 23 Sep 76
372d ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
373d ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Oct 76	PO 21-2, INSCOM, 23 Sep 76

APPENDIX C

TOE UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
375th ASA Company, Operations (Forward) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Oct 76	PO 21-2, INSCOM, 23 Sep 76
376th ASA Company, Control and Processing TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
400th ASA Detachment (Special Operations)(Abn) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
402d ASA Detachment (Special Operations)(Abn) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
408th ASA Company (Bde Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
409th ASA Company, Operations (Rear) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
415th ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
HHC, 502d ASA Group TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
HHC, 504th ASA Group TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
851st ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76

APPENDIX C

TOE UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
856th ASA Company (Div Spt) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: USAREUR	1 Jan 77	PO 25-3, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
5th Military Intelligence Company TRANSFERRED from USAREUR and Seventh Army to: INSCOM	1 Feb 77	*DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77) DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 18th Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Feb 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77
18th Military Intelligence Battalion TRANSFERRED from USAREUR and Seventh Army to: INSCOM	1 Feb 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77) DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 66th Military Intelligence Group	1 Feb 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77
66th Military Intelligence Group TRANSFERRED from USAREUR and Seventh Army to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Feb 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77) DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
HHC, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion TRANSFERRED from USAREUR and Seventh Army to: INSCOM	1 Feb 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77) DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 66th Military Intelligence Group	1 Feb 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77
430th Military Intelligence Detachment TRANSFERRED from USAREUR and Seventh Army to: INSCOM	1 Feb 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77) DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 66th Military Intelligence Group	1 Feb 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77
470th Military Intelligence Group TRANSFERRED from FORSCOM to: INSCOM	1 Apr 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77) DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Apr 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77

*DA letter.

APPENDIX C

TOE UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
500th Military Intelligence Group	1 Jan 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (23 Dec 76)
TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM		DAMO, 28 Dec 76
REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77	PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
502d Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Apr 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (10 Mar 77)
TRANSFERRED from Eighth US Army to: INSCOM		DAMO-FDJ, 16 Mar 77
		PO 28-1, INSCOM, 13 Apr 77
HHC, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Feb 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77)
TRANSFERRED from USAREUR and Seventh Army to: INSCOM		DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 66th Military Intelligence Group	1 Feb 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77
HHC, 525th Military Intelligence Group	1 Jan 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (23 Dec 76)
TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM		DAMO, 28 Dec 76
REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77	PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
HHC, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Feb 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77)
TRANSFERRED from USAREUR and Seventh Army to: INSCOM		DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 66th Military Intelligence Group	1 Feb 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77
704th Military Intelligence Detachment	1 Jul 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (10 Mar 77)
TRANSFERRED from Eighth US Army to: INSCOM		DAMO-FDJ, 16 Mar 77
REASSIGNED to: US Army Field Station Korea	1 Jul 77	PO 53-1, INSCOM, 27 Jul 77
766th Military Intelligence Detachment	1 Feb 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77)
TRANSFERRED from USAREUR and Seventh Army to: INSCOM		DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 66th Military Intelligence Group	1 Feb 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77

APPENDIX C

TOE UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
901st Military Intelligence Detachment	1 Jan 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (23 Dec 76) DAMO, 28 Dec 76
TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77	PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
902d Military Intelligence Group	1 Jan 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (23 Dec 76) DAMO, 28 Dec 76
TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77	PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77

APPENDIX D

TDA UNITS
(As of 30 September 1977)

W00Y	Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command
W000	US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station
W001	USA INSCOM Support Group
W002	US Army Element, National Security Agency
W003	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, NSACSS
W005	US Army Security Detachment-Region I
W009	US Army Security Detachment-Region III
W00X	US Army Imagery Interpretation Center
W01A	US Army Security Detachment-Region IV
W01B	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, TRADOC
W01C	USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Dix
W01D	USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Jackson
W01E	USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Leonard Wood
W01H	US Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station
W01K	US Army Field Station, Homestead
W01L	USASA Test and Evaluation Center (U)
W01P	US Army Communications Support Unit ~~(C)~~
W02B	US Army Field Station, Okinawa
W02R	US Army Field Station, Berlin
W0DR	US Army Field Station, Sinop
W0KL	Classified Unit
W1U3	US Army Administrative Survey Detachment
W1WN	USA INSCOM Intelligence Group
W31U	US Army Field Station, San Antonio
W31Z	US Army Intelligence Agency
W32A	US Army Operational Security Group
W32B	US Army Central Security Facility
W33Y	USASA Security Detachment, Korea
W34K	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Defense Language Institute
W35G	USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Facility
W36S	USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity
W39C	US Army Sepcial Operations Detachment
W318	USAINTA Headquarters Support Detachment
W319	US Army Operational Group
W372	US Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment
W3AG	US Army Field Station, Augsburg
W3BR	US Army Field Station, Misawa
W3CC	USA INSCOM Data Systems Activity
W3CU	USA INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command
W3F1	US Army Field Station, Korea
W3NB	US Army Technical Support Activity
W3NS	US Army Security Detachment, Hawaii
W3PU	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, FORSCOM

APPENDIX D

W3QN	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, USAREUR
W3RA	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Pacific
W3S2	US Army Signal Security Activity
W3TL	US Army Intelligence Support Detachment
W3YD	US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment
W3YS	US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment
WBU699	Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group
WBU799	Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU899	Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU999	Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group
WBUY99	Augmentation, 525th Military Intelligence Group
WBVE99	Augmentation, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion
WBWF90	209th Military Intelligence Detachment Augmentation (Carrier)
WCWN99	Augmentation, 901st Military Intelligence Detachment
WH6A90	Hq & Hq Company, 501st Military Intelligence Group Augmentation (Carrier)

APPENDIX E

CHANGES IN STATUS OF TDA UNITS DURING FY 1977

ORGANIZED

Unit	Eff Date	Authority
HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group Augmentation (Carrier)	1 Sep 77	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77
209th Military Intelligence Detachment Augmentation (Carrier)	1 Sep 77	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77
USASA Security Detachment, Europe*	1 Oct 76	PO 24-1, 1 Oct 76
Intelligence and Security Group, Europe (Provisional)	1 Jul 77	PO 38-2, 8 Jun 77
US Army Intelligence and Security Command Detachment, Hawaii (Provisional)	1 Aug 77	PO 54-1, 1 Aug 77
US Army Combined Research Detachment (Provisional)	1 Apr 77	PO 21-1, 24 Mar 77
209th Military Intelligence Detachment (Provisional)	1 Apr 77	PO 21-1, 24 Mar 77
HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group (Provisional)	1 Apr 77	PO 21-1, 24 Mar 77
902d Military Intelligence Group (Counter-intelligence/Operations Security) (Provisional)	1 Jul 77	PO 55-2, 5 Aug 77
91st Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional)	1 Jul 77	PO 55-2, 5 Aug 77
92d Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional)	1 Jul 77	PO 55-2, 5 Aug 77
93d Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional)	1 Jul 77	PO 55-2, 5 Aug 77
574th Military Intelligence Detachment (Provisional)	1 Jul 77	PO 55-2, 5 Aug 77
US Army Security Support Detachment (Provisional)	1 Jul 77	PO 55-2, 5 Aug 77

*Organized under USA Field Station, Augsburg (W3AGAA).

DISCONTINUED

Unit	Eff Date	Authority
US Army Intelligence and Security Command Personnel Detachment, Fort Gordon	1 Jul 77	PO 48-1, 12 Jul 77
US Army Intelligence and Security Command Defense Language Institute	30 Sep 77	PO 66-1, 19 Jul 77
US Army Communications Support Unit ~~(C)~~ (U)	30 Sep 77	PO 50-1, 18 Jul 77

APPENDIX E

TDA UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED DURING FY 1977

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
US Army Intelligence Agency TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Intelligence Support Detachment TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Imagery Interpretation Center TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Intelligence Agency Headquarters Support Detachment TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Administrative Survey Detachment TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Special Operations Detachment TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Operational Group TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Programs Analysis Group TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77	PO 1-2, ACSI, 18 Jan 77 PO 10-1, INSCOM, 4 Feb 77

APPENDIX E

TDA UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED DURING FY 1977 (Cont)

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
US Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment	1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76
TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM		PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
REASSIGNED to: US Army Administrative Survey Detachment	1 Jan 77	
US Army Intelligence and Security Command Intelligence Group	1 Jan 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77)
TRANSFERRED from FORSCOM to: INSCOM		DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group	1 Apr 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77)
TRANSFERRED from FORSCOM to: INSCOM		DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 470th MI Group	1 Apr 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77
Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group	1 Feb 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77)
TRANSFERRED from USAREUR and Seventh Army to: INSCOM		DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 66th MI Group		PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77
Augmentation, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Apr 77	DAAG-OPR (M) (28 Jan 77)
TRANSFERRED from Eighth US Army to: INSCOM		DAMO-FDP-J, 2 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 502d MI Battalion	1 Apr 77	PO 28-1, INSCOM, 13 Apr 77
US Army Intelligence and Security Command Detachment, Southern Command	1 Apr 77	PO 15-1, INSCOM, 24 Feb 77
REASSIGNED to: 470th MI Group		PO 36-1, INSCOM, 27 May 77
USASA Security Detachment, Korea	15 Aug 74	GO 219, USASA, 10 Dec 74
ASSIGNED to: USASA Signal Security Activity		PO 62-1, INSCOM, 26 Aug 77
REASSIGNED to: 209th MI Det Augmentation (Carrier)	30 Sep 77	

APPENDIX E

TDA UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED DURING FY 1977 (Cont)

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
US Army Operational Security Group TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Central Security Facility TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: 500th MI Group	1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
Augmentation, 525th Military Intelligence Group TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: 525th MI Group	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
Augmentation, 901st Military Intelligence Detachment TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: 901st MI Detachment	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: 902d MI Group	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77
US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment TRANSFERRED from ACSI to: INSCOM REASSIGNED to: USAINTA REASSIGNED to: INSCOM	1 Jan 77 1 Jan 77 1 Mar 77	PO 12-3, ACSI, 30 Dec 76 PO 4-1, INSCOM, 13 Jan 77 PO 14-1, INSCOM, 16 Feb 77

APPENDIX E

TDA UNITS TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, AND REASSIGNED DURING FY 1977 (Cont)

Unit	Effective Date	Authority
US Army Field Station Korea REASSIGNED from INSCOM to: 501st MI Group (Prov)	1 Aug 77	PO 56-1, INSCOM, 8 Aug 77
US Army Security Detachment Europe REASSIGNED from US Army Field Station Augsburg to: USA Signal Security Activity	1 May 77	PO 18-2, INSCOM, 7 Mar 77
USASA Combat Developments Activity TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: TRADOC	1 Oct 76	PO 22-1, INSCOM, 29 Sep 76
USASA Training Center and School TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: TRADOC	1 Oct 76	PO 22-1, INSCOM, 29 Sep 76
USASA Materiel Support Command TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: DARCOM	7 Feb 77	PO 53-1, INSCOM, 29 Dec 76
USASA Signal Security Command TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76
335th ASA Company Augmentation (Carrier) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76 PO 52-1, INSCOM, 28 Dec 76
374th ASA Company Augmentation (Carrier) TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76 PO 52-1, INSCOM, 28 Dec 76
Augmentation, HHC, 504th ASA Group TRANSFERRED from INSCOM to: FORSCOM	1 Jan 77	PO 25-2, INSCOM, 6 Oct 76

APPENDIX E

REDESIGNATED

Designation	Eff Date	Authority*
Old: Headquarters, US Army Security Agency New: Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command	1 Jan 77	GO 25, DA, 30 Dec 76
Old: USASA Support Element, USAREUR New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Liaison Detachment US Army Europe	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Liaison Office, Pacific New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Liaison Detachment Pacific	1 Feb 77	PO 36-1, 27 May 77
Old: USASA Command Data Systems Activity New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Data Systems Activity	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Command Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team Activity New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Signal Security Activity New: US Army Signal Security Activity	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Finance and Accounting Activity New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Finance and Accounting Activity	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Liaison Group New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Liaison Detachment NSA/CSS	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Support Group New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Support Group	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Field Station, Augsburg New: US Army Field Station Augsburg	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Field Station, Berlin New: US Army Field Station Berlin	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77

*All PO's are from HQ INSCOM.

APPENDIX E

Designation	Eff Date	Authority
Old: USASA Field Station, Misawa New: US Army Field Station Misawa	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Field Station, San Antonio New: US Army Field Station San Antonio	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Field Station, Sinop New: US Army Field Station Sinop	1 May 77	PO 18-1, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Field Station, Sobe New: US Army Field Station Okinawa	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Security Detachment-Region I New: US Army Security Detachment Region I	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Security Detachment-Region III New: US Army Security Detachment Region III	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Security Detachment-Region IV New: US Army Security Detachment Region IV	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Security Detachment, Hawaii New: US Army Security Detachment Hawaii	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Security Detachment, Europe New: US Army Security Detachment Europe	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Detachment, Homestead New: US Army Field Station Homestead	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: USASA Student Liaison Detachment New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Personnel Detachment Fort Gordon	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Detachment, Southern Command New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Detachment Southern Command	1 Feb 77	PO 36-1, 27 May 77
Old: USASA Detachment, TRADOC New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Liaison Detachment TRADOC	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Detachment, FORSCOM New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Liaison Detachment FORSCOM	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77

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Designation	Eff Date	Authority
Old: USASA Personnel Procurement and Processing Detachment (Ft Dix) New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Personnel Detachment Fort Dix	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Personnel Procurement and Processing Detachment (Ft Jackson) New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Personnel Detachment Fort Jackson	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Personnel Procurement and Processing Detachment (Ft Leonard Wood) New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Personnel Detachment Fort Wood	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: USASA Detachment, Defense Language Institute New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Liaison Detachment Defense Language Institute	1 Feb 77	PO 7-1, 25 Jan 77
Old: US Army Forces Command Intelligence Center New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Intelligence Group	1 Jan 77	PO 12-1, 8 Feb 77
Old: USASA Field Station, Korea New: US Army Field Station Korea	1 May 77	PO 18-2, 7 Mar 77
Old: Intelligence and Security Group, Europe (Provisional) New: 66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional)	1 Aug 77	PO 55-2, 5 Aug 77

APPENDIX F

INSCOM PERSONNEL STRENGTH BY UNIT
(As of 30 September 1977)

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
HQ, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)	134	122	13	10	81	82	228	214	347	347
Hq, USAINTA (Ft Meade)	36	43	7	13	44	49	87	105	68	71
USAINTA Hq Support Detachment	4	4	1	2	8	10	13	16	15	15
USAG, Arlington Hall Station	15	15	4	5	244	204	263	224	145	144
USA Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment	30	24	0	0	5	5	35	29	48	46
USA Intelligence Support Detachment	16	14	0	0	8	5	24	19	7	6
USA INSCOM Support Group	109	97	33	30	685	532	827	659	1	1
USA Element, NSA	18	16	0	0	0	0	18	16	0	0
USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment NSA/CSS	2	1	0	0	2	1	4	2	3	3
USA Central Security Facility	11	11	1	1	24	19	36	31	105	104
USA Imagery Interpretation Center	19	16	18	18	20	21	57	55	67	64
USA Special Operations Detachment	6	4	11	12	17	15	34	31	6	6
USA Administrative Survey Detachment	36	30	25	23	26	25	87	78	262	258
USA Programs Analysis Group	1	1	0	0	5	6	6	7	12	12
USA Intelligence Operations Support Detachment	4	5	1	0	10	6	15	11	3	3
USA Operational Security Group	20	21	56	43	58	47	134	111	18	17
USA Operational Group	56	52	18	16	45	37	119	105	18	13
USA INSCOM Intelligence Group	26	15	6	2	90	75	122	92	46	45
USA Security Detachment-Region I	12	9	2	0	45	45	59	54	12	12

APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA Security Detachment-Region III	5	5	2	2	28	27	35	34	1	1
USA Security Detachment-Region IV	4	4	1	1	14	13	19	18	0	0
USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, TRADOC	2	1	0	0	1	1	3	2	0	0
USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Dix	1	1	0	0	28	27	29	28	0	0
USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Jackson	1	1	0	0	30	29	31	30	0	0
USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Wood	1	1	0	0	26	29	27	30	0	0
USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station	24	20	4	5	187	182	215	207	162	157
USA Field Station, Homestead	1	1	0	0	18	15	19	16	0	0
USASA Test and Evaluation Center	21	18	0	0	127	106	148	124	44	47
USA Field Station, San Antonio	13	10	6	7	458	348	477	365	4	4
USA INSCOM Data Systems Activity	4	3	1	1	57	38	62	42	17	17
USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, FORSCOM	2	1	0	0	2	3	4	4	0	0
USA Signal Security Activity	9	11	0	0	16	18	25	29	31	29
USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Defense Language Institute	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	1	1	0	0	16	10	17	11	17	16
USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity	2	2	2	2	66	48	70	52	9	9
525th Military Intelligence Group	32	25	29	31	55	46	116	102	2	1
901st Military Intelligence Detachment	3	3	5	5	8	8	16	16	2	2
902d Military Intelligence Group	42	47	33	38	113	104	188	189	3	4
SUBTOTAL CONUS	(723)	(655)	(279)	(267)	(2667)	(2236)	(3669)	(3158)	(1475)	(1454)
470th Military Intelligence Group	11	2	5	1	39	49	55	52	6	0
USA INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command	(Included in strength figures of 470th MI Group)									
SUBTOTAL Caribbean	(11)	(2)	(5)	(1)	(39)	(49)	(55)	(52)	(6)	(0)

APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, US Army, Europe	2	2	4	5	12	11	18	18	0	0
USA Field Station, Berlin	31	37	21	19	830	816	882	872	3	3
USA Field Station, Augsburg	73	78	40	40	1661	1590	1774	1708	10	13
66th Military Intelligence Group	29	34	4	14	140	164	173	212	129	127
5th Military Intelligence Company	5	3	2	1	44	38	51	42	0	0
18th Military Intelligence Battalion	10	12	7	11	100	126	117	149	0	0
HHC, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion	10	15	6	8	74	58	90	81	0	0
HHC, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion	10	18	6	5	74	61	90	84	0	0
430th Military Intelligence Detachment	17	11	12	11	33	32	62	54	0	0
HHC, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	10	13	7	7	73	60	90	80	0	0
766th Military Intelligence Detachment	5	6	2	2	19	23	26	31	0	0
USA Field Station, Sinop	16	17	3	4	95	77	114	98	0	0
SUBTOTAL Europe	(218)	(246)	(114)	(127)	(3155)	(3056)	(3487)	(3429)	(142)	(143)

APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA Security Detachment, Hawaii	3	4	1	1	19	24	23	29	1	1
USA Field Station, Okinawa	22	25	6	7	774	718	802	750	1	1
USA Field Station, Misawa	3	3	1	1	141	142	145	146	0	0
500th Military Intelligence Group	17	13	13	13	88	74	118	100	54	57
USA Field Station, Korea	13	18	9	8	309	280	331	306	41	38
USASA Security Detachment, Korea	1	1	0	0	8	14	9	15	0	0
146th ASA Company (Avn)(Fwd)	5	5	14	15	126	120	145	140	0	0
332d ASA Company, Operations (Fwd)	7	5	3	1	252	220	262	226	0	0
*HHC, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion	31	31	6	6	234	209	271	246	71	51
704th Military Intelligence Detachment	2	2	6	5	75	85	83	92	0	0
SUBTOTAL Pacific	(104)	(107)	(59)	(57)	(2026)	(1886)	(2189)	(2050)	(168)	(148)
USA Technical Support Activity	7	6	4	4	36	31	47	41	6	4
GRAND TOTAL	1063	1016	461	456	7923	7258	9447	8730	1797	1749**

*502d MI Bn provided personnel for provisional units organized during reorganization of intelligence assets in Korea.

**Full Time Permanent and Temporary direct hire, including direct hire foreign nationals and US Force dependents filling foreign national indirect hire positions.

APPENDIX G

INSCOM KEY PERSONNEL
(As of 30 September 1977)

Position/Name	Dates Served
COMMANDING GENERAL	
MG William I. Rolya	1 Sep 75 - Present
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL (AHS)	
BG James E. Freeze	1 Sep 75 - 29 Aug 77
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL (FGGM)	
BG James E. Freeze	29 Aug 77 - Present
BG Edmund R. Thompson	10 Feb 77 - 29 Aug 77
CHIEF OF STAFF	
COL John M. Carr	1 Aug 77 - Present
COL John R. Rantz	1 Aug 75 - 31 Jul 77
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF	
COL Rodney K. Roberts	15 Oct 76 - Present
LTC Francis X. Lillis	24 Jul 75 - 15 Oct 76
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF	
MAJ Paul D. Sutton	17 Jan 77 - Present
LTC William D. Kimball	29 Sep 76 - 17 Jan 77
STAFF ADVISOR FOR SCIENTIFIC AND CRYPTO AFFAIRS	
Mr. Edwin A. Speakman	12 Aug 68 - Present
CHIEF, PLANS, PROGRAMS AND ANALYSIS	
COL James W. Shufelt	1 Aug 77 - Present
COL John M. Carr	21 Jun 76 - 1 Aug 77
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL	
COL Richard E. Jewett	12 Jul 77 - Present
COL Loston Harris	9 Jul 75 - 12 Jul 77
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, SECURITY	
COL William B. Holden	10 Jun 74 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS	
COL Francis X. Lillis	1 Nov 76 - Present
COL William F. Vernau	26 Sep 75 - 1 Oct 76
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, LOGISTICS	
COL Jimmie M. Chaffin	1 Jun 73 - Present

APPENDIX G

Position/Name	Dates Served
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT	
COL Dwyer K. Mitchum	1 Dec 76 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, TELECOMMUNICATIONS	
COL Clarence A. Trowbridge	28 Jun 77 - Present
COL Hal S. Christensen	7 May 73 - 28 Jun 77
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION	
Mr. Herbert S. Hovey, Jr.	1 Sep 70 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS	
COL Daniel Moore, Jr.	1 Aug 76 - Present
DIRECTOR, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	
LTC Jimmy R. Harris	31 Aug 77 - Present
COL J. G. Wetherill	15 Jul 76 - 31 Aug 77
INSPECTOR GENERAL	
COL Robert A. Hyatt	1 Sep 77 - Present
LTC Paul R. Zingle	6 Jul 77 - 31 Aug 77
COL James M. Krebs	11 Aug 76 - 6 Jul 77
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE	
LTC Raymond K. Wicker	1 Sep 75 - Present
COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR	
CSM Lee K. Stikeleather	30 Nov 72 - Present

Unit/Commander	
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	
BG James E. Freeze	29 Aug 77 - Present
MG Edmund R. Thompson	Aug 75 - 29 Aug 77
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL Norman S. Wells	Aug 76 - Present
470TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
LTC Thomas N. Sherburne	9 Jun 77 - Present
LTC Philip J. Stevens	1 Oct 76 - 9 Jun 77
500TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL Howard M. Gabbert	16 May 75 - Present

APPENDIX G

Unit/Commander	Dates Served
501ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP (PROVISIONAL)	
COL Julius Parker, Jr.	26 Jul 77 - Present
COL Charles S. Black, Jr.	1 Apr 77 - 26 Jul 77
525TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
LTC Russell E. Cooley	6 Jul 77 - Present
COL Donald K. Bradbury	9 Jan 76 - 6 Jul 77
902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL Richard E. Littlefield	4 Aug 77 - Present
COL Hassel L. Parker	1 Oct 76 - 3 Aug 77
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND SUPPORT GROUP	
COL Joseph D. Howard	13 Jul 76 - Present
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
COL Chester L. Arnzen	1 Aug 77 - Present
LTC Marven P. Breithaupt	21 Jan 77 - 1 Aug 77
COL Albert P. Jones	15 Jun 76 - 21 Jan 77
US ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP	
COL Frederick T. Barrett	13 Sep 76 - Present
US ARMY OPERATIONAL SECURITY GROUP	
LTC Donald P. Press	1 Oct 76 - 2 Mar 77*
18TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC Michael E. Grant	30 Aug 76 - Present
HHC, 165TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC Bruce H. Davis	3 Jan 77 - Present
LTC Thomas J. Kennedy, Jr.	Jun 75 - 3 Jan 77
502D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
COL Richard W. Wilmot	1 Oct 76 - 30 Mar 77
HHC, 511TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC Anthony J. Gallo, Jr.	Jan 77 - Present

*For remainder of FY77, elements of this unit formed nucleus of the 91st MI Bn (Prov) of which LTC Press became commander.

APPENDIX G

Unit/Commander	Dates Served
HHC, 527TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION	
LTC Nelson B. Bond	2 Feb 77 - Present
LTC Paul F. Orr	26 Jul 75 - 2 Feb 77
US ARMY FIELD STATION, AUGSBURG	
COL Thomas J. Flynn	19 Jun 76 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, BERLIN	
COL Dallas C. Brown, Jr.	4 Aug 77 - Present
COL Patrick A. Ulmen	31 Jul 75 - 4 Aug 77
US ARMY FIELD STATION, HOMESTEAD	
CPT Bruce Jackson	1 Jul 75 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, KOREA	
LTC Michael M. Schneider	7 Jun 77 - Present
MAJ Marcus E. Michael	3 May 77 - 7 Jun 77
LTC Floyd L. Runyon	1 Apr 77 - 3 May 77
COL Charles S. Black, Jr.	4 Aug 76 - 31 Mar 77
US ARMY FIELD STATION, MISAWA	
LTC Thomas J. Hogan	15 Jul 77 - Present
LTC Wayne F. Stone	30 Jun 75 - 15 Jul 77
US ARMY FIELD STATION, OKINAWA	
COL Charles E. Schmidt	25 Aug 77 - Present
COL David A. Wisyanski	31 Aug 75 - 19 Jul 77
US ARMY FIELD STATION, SAN ANTONIO	
LTC Jack H. Holbrook	9 Jul 76 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, SINOP	
COL James D. Canfield	17 Sep 77 - Present
MAJ Richard V. Olsen	5 Aug 77 - 16 Sep 77
LTC John M. Arnold	Aug 76 - 4 Aug 77
US ARMY SIGNAL SECURITY ACTIVITY	
LTC Horace S. Kelley, Jr.	18 Aug 75 - Present
US ARMY TECHNICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY	
LTC Richard T. Kane	18 Jul 77 - Present
MAJ Edward E. Wilson	11 Nov 75 - 17 Jul 77

APPENDIX G

Unit/Commander	Dates Served
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND DATA SYSTEMS ACTIVITY	
MAJ Richard R. Mercer	1 Jul 77 - Present
MAJ Samuel C. Work	1 Mar 76 - 30 Jun 77
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING ACTIVITY	
MAJ David A. Cannon	15 Jul 75 - Present
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND ENGINEERING AND MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE ACTIVITY	
1LT Gene L. McClelland	10 Jan 77 - Present
CPT Gerald J. Berry	28 Jun 76 - 9 Jan 77
US ARMY IMAGERY INTERPRETATION CENTER	
LTC Hayden B. Peake	Aug 75 - Present
USASA TEST AND EVALUATION CENTER	
COL Dwane F. Pins	5 Aug 76 - Present
US ARMY GARRISON, ARLINGTON HALL STATION	
LTC James D. Neighbors	29 Dec 76 - Present
COL Dmitri J. Tadich	30 Aug 74 - 28 Dec 76
US ARMY GARRISON, VINT HILL FARMS STATION	
COL Richard H. Benfer	3 Jan 77 - Present
LTC Joseph F. Short	29 Jul 75 - 2 Jan 77

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, UNITED STATES ARMY
CAMERON STATION, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

DAAG-HDP-A

6 APR 1977

SUBJECT: Distinctive Badge for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command

Commander
US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Arlington Hall Station
4000 Arlington Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22212

1. A distinctive badge for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command is authorized. The description and symbolism of the design are as follows:

DESCRIPTION

A gold color metal and enamel device 1 1/8 inches in height overall, consisting of a teal blue oval-shaped, gold gridlined globe with its long axis placed vertically, and having at center a gold double-webbed key with bow at top and curving upward below the base of the globe two gold sprigs of oak conjoined at center.

SYMBOLISM

The globe alludes to the worldwide intelligence of the Command and the key is symbolic of security and control. The oak leaves in base signify fortitude and endurance. The color blue is symbolic of coolness and courage and gold is for excellence and wisdom.

2. The distinctive badge will be worn as prescribed in AR 670-5.

3. This authorization is in accordance with:

a. General Orders No. 25, Headquarters, Department of the Army, dated 30 December 1976;

b. Paragraph 14-19, AR 670-5.

DAAG-HDP-A 6 APR 1977

SUBJECT: Distinctive Badge for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command

4. This authorization letter will become a permanent file of the organization in accordance with File No. 2-05, AR 340-2 or File No. 228-08, Organizational History files, AR 340-18-2, as applicable.

D. K. BAXTER
Colonel, GS
Director

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, UNITED STATES ARMY
CAMERON STATION, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

DAAG-HDP-A

6 APR 1977

SUBJECT: Distinctive Badge and Shoulder Sleeve Insignia for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command

Commander
US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Arlington Hall Station
4000 Arlington Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22212

1. The authorization letters of the distinctive badge (Incl 1) and the shoulder sleeve insignia (Incl 2) for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command are inclosed for your organizational records.

2. A drawing (six times actual size) of the distinctive badge (Incl 3), a list of certified manufacturers (Incl 4), and a fact sheet containing complete procurement instructions (Incl 5) are furnished for use in procurement of the badge.

3. Government-owned dies of the distinctive badge will be procured by this Institute and you will be informed by separate communication when they become available. These tools must be used in the manufacture of your badge. (See paragraph 1-3a, AR 672-8.)

4. Development action on the shoulder sleeve insignia has been initiated. It is anticipated that procurement criteria will be made available to the US Army Support Activity, Philadelphia in approximately 12 weeks.

5. The distinguishing flag for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command is described as follows:

> A dark blue flag, 3 feet hoist by 4 feet fly, trimmed on three sides with yellow fringe, on which is centered the approved shoulder sleeve insignia design, in proper colors.

6. A requisition for the flag may be submitted to the Commander, US Army Support Activity, Philadelphia, ATTN: STSAP-SE, 2800 South 20th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101, on DD Form 1348 (Manual) to Routing Identifier in accordance with AR 725-50.

5 Incl
as

D. K. BAXTER
Colonel, GS
Director

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, UNITED STATES ARMY
CAMERON STATION, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

DAAG-HDP-A

6 APR 1977

SUBJECT: Shoulder Sleeve Insignia for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command

Commander
US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Arlington Hall Station
4000 Arlington Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22212

1. A shoulder sleeve insignia for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command is authorized. The description and symbolism of the design are as follows:

DESCRIPTION

On a battle-axe shaped shield with point to base, 2 3/4 inches in width and 3 1/4 inches in height overall, a field divided into quarters of silver gray at upper left and lower right, and teal blue at upper right and lower left bearing in saltire a white torch with flame at upper right crossing a white lightning flash; overall at center a vertical yellow double-webbed key with bow in base, all within a 1/8 inch wide yellow border.

SYMBOLISM

The quartered field alludes to the four primary intelligence functions: collection, analysis, production and dissemination of intelligence. The lightning bolt signifies worldwide electrical communications, both friendly and hostile, and the torch stands for knowledge and vigilance. The double-webbed key is symbolic of security and control. Gold and silver (yellow and white) denote achievement and energy; gray and blue determination and loyalty.

2. The shoulder sleeve insignia will be worn as prescribed in AR 670-5.

3. This authorization is in accordance with:

a. General Orders No. 25, Headquarters, Department of the Army, dated 30 December 1976;

DAAG-HDP-A

SUBJECT: Shoulder Sleeve Insignia for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command

6 APR 1977

b. Paragraph 14-16, AR 670-5.

4. This authorization letter will become a permanent file of the organization in accordance with File No. 2-05, AR 340-2 or File No. 228-08, Organizational History files, AR 340-18-2, as applicable.

D. K. BAXTER
Colonel, GS
Director

APPENDIX K

TRAVIS TROPHY WINNERS

Calendar Year	Winner
1964	6988th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: 53d USASA Special Operations Command]
1965	313th ASA Battalion (Corps)
1966	1st Radio Company Fleet Marine Force (C) [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Training Center and School]
1967	509th USASA Group
1968	6990th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: USASA, Europe]
1969	6994th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: 330th ASA Company]
1970	USASA Field Statin, Udorn
1971	US Naval Security Group Activity, Bremerhaven, Germany [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Vint Hill Farms]
1972	6916th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Udorn]
1973	USASA Field Station, Berlin
1974	US Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Augsburg]
1975	Consolidated Security Operations Center, San Antonio (USASA Field Station, San Antonio/6993d US Air Force Security Squadron)
1976	USASA Field Station, Sobe

GLOSSARY

AAF . . . . . Analysis and Application Facility
AAP . . . . . Affirmative Actions Plan
abn . . . . . airborne
ACE . . . . . American Council of Education
ACofS . . . . . Assistant Chief of Staff
ACSI . . . . . Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
act . . . . . actual
actv . . . . . activity
admin . . . . . administrative/(tion)
ADP . . . . . automatic data processing
AEL . . . . . American Electronics Laboratory
AEWB . . . . . US Army Electronic Warfare Board
AEWMP . . . . . US Army Electronic Warfare Master Plan
AFSS . . . . . US Air Force Security Service
AG . . . . . Adjutant General
AHR . . . . . annual historical report
AHS . . . . . Arlington Hall Station
aloc . . . . . allocated
ANMCC . . . . . Alternate National Military Command
ann . . . . . annual
AOP . . . . . approved operating program
APA . . . . . aircraft procurement, Army
app . . . . . appendix
appr . . . . . approval
AR . . . . . Army regulation
ARDF . . . . . airborne radio direction finding
ARPA . . . . . Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARS . . . . . aerial reconnaissance
AS . . . . . aerial surveillance
ASA . . . . . Army Security Agency
ABSCA . . . . . Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
ASD(I) . . . . . Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
asgd . . . . . assigned
ASI . . . . . additional skill identifier
ASIC . . . . . All Source Intelligence Center
assoc . . . . . associate(d)
asst . . . . . assistant
auth . . . . . authorized
AUTODIN . . . . . automatic digital network
avn . . . . . aviation
AWCCS . . . . . Army War College Correspondence Student

BG . . . . . brigadier general
BMAR . . . . . backlog maintenance and repairs
bn . . . . . battalion

GLOSSARY

BND . . . . . Bundesnachrichtendienst
BOQ . . . . . bachelor officer's quarters
BOS . . . . . base operating support

CAC . . . . . Control and Analysis Center
CACDA . . . . . Combined Arms Combat Development Activity
CAP . . . . . coverage accounting period; Career Advancement Program
CASB . . . . . Communications Activity South of Bendeswehr
CASS . . . . . Controlled Area Surveillance System
CAT . . . . . category
CCP . . . . . Consolidated Cryptologic Program
cdr . . . . . commander
CECORP . . . . . Cincinnati Electronics Corporation
CELTS . . . . . Coherent Emitter Location Testbed System
cen . . . . . center
CEP . . . . . circular error of probability
CES . . . . . Collection Evaluation System
CEWI . . . . . Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence
CG . . . . . commanding general
CHCSS . . . . . Chief, Central Security Service
CI . . . . . counterintelligence
CI/IA . . . . . Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities
CIA . . . . . Central Intelligence Agency
CIDC . . . . . US Army Criminal Investigation Command
CINCPAC . . . . . Commander in Chief, Pacific
CIP . . . . . control indicator panel
CIPD . . . . . Counterintelligence Production Division
civ . . . . . civilian
CLRT . . . . . command logistic review team
CMF . . . . . career management field
CMR . . . . . collection management record
CNTECHTRA . . . . Chief of Naval Technical Training
co . . . . . company
COBE . . . . . command operating budget estimate
COF . . . . . central operating facility
coll . . . . . collection
COINS . . . . . Community On-Line Intelligence System
COMECM . . . . . communications electronic countermeasures
COMJAM . . . . . communications jamming
comm . . . . . communication(s)
COMSEC . . . . . communications security
COMUSFK . . . . . Commander, US Forces, Korea
cond . . . . . condition
contr . . . . . contract
CONUS . . . . . Continental United States
convl . . . . . conventional

GLOSSARY

COPA . . . . . Chief, Office of Public Affairs
COPES . . . . . Collection by Objective Priority Evaluation System
C&P . . . . . control and processing; Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company
CPA . . . . . central procurement activity
CPAR . . . . . collection, processing, analysis and reporting
CPO . . . . . Civilian Personnel Office
CPPA . . . . . Chief, Plans, Programs and Analysis
CRD . . . . . US Army Combined Research Detachment
CRITICOMM . . . . critical intelligence communication
CSA . . . . . Chief of Staff, US Army
CSF . . . . . US Army Central Security Facility
CSG . . . . . cryptologic support group
CSJF . . . . . case study and justification folder
CSLA . . . . . US Army Communications Security Logistics Agency
CSM . . . . . Chief of Staff Memorandum; command sergeant major
CSOC . . . . . Consolidated Security Operations Center
CSS . . . . . Central Security Service

DA . . . . . Department of the Army
DACS . . . . . DCSOPS, DA/ACSI Computer System
DAME . . . . . defense against method of entry
DARCOM . . . . . US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
DAS . . . . . Director of Army Staff; Defense Attache System
DCA . . . . . Defense Cooperation Agreement; Defense Communications Agency
DCG . . . . . deputy commanding general
DCI . . . . . Directorate of Counterinelligence; Director Central Intelligence
DCII . . . . . Defense Central Index of Investigations
DCS . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff; Defense Communications System
DCSADP . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Automatic Data Processing
DCSCI . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Counterintelligence
DCSFOR . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Development
DCSI . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DCSITA . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Threat Analysis
DCSLOG . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
DCSMIS . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Management Information Systems
DCSOPS . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
DCSPA . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration
DCSPER . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
DCSR&D . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development
DCSRDA . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, Development and Acquisition
DCSRM . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management
DCSS . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems
DCSSEC . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Security

GLOSSARY

DCSTEL . . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications
DESCOM . . . . . Depot System Command
det . . . . . detachment
dev . . . . . development
DF . . . . . direction finding
DFMM . . . . . firection finding mission management
DH . . . . . direct hire
DHOC . . . . . daily hours of coverage
DI . . . . . deception indicated

b3 10 USC 424 Per DIA

DIRITA . . . . . Director, Intelligence and Threat Analysis
DIRNSA . . . . . Director, National Security Agency
DIS . . . . . Defense Investigative Service
div . . . . . division
DLI . . . . . Defense Language Institute
DMD . . . . . digital message device
DMZ . . . . . demilitarized zone
DO . . . . . Directorate of Operations
DOD . . . . . Department of Defense
DSA . . . . . Data Systems Activity; Defense Security Agency (Korea)
DSCOC . . . . . division support company operations center
DSR . . . . . Defense Source Register
DSS . . . . . Direct Support System
DSU . . . . . direct support unit
DT . . . . . development testing
DTG . . . . . date-time group

EAC . . . . . echelon above corps
ECM . . . . . electronic countermeasures
ECOM . . . . . US Army Electronics Command
ECTA . . . . . enciphered communications traffic analysis
EDATE . . . . . effective date
EEO . . . . . equal employment opportunity
EEOO . . . . . equal employment opportunity officer
eff . . . . . effective
EG . . . . . Egypt
E&I . . . . . engineering and installation
EIS . . . . . Environmental Impact Statement
ELINT . . . . . electronic intelligence
ELS . . . . . emitter location system
ELSEC . . . . . electronic security
EMC . . . . . electromagnetic compatibility
EMI . . . . . electromagnetic interference
EMRA . . . . . US Army Electronics Materiel Readiness Activity
enl . . . . . enlisted

GLOSSARY

EO . . . . . Executive Order
E-O . . . . . electro-optics
EPMS . . . . . enlisted personnel management system
EQUATE . . . . . electronic quality assurance test equipment
equip . . . . . equipment
ERADCOM . . . . . US Army Electronics Research and Development Command
ESL . . . . . Electonic Systems Laboratory
ESM . . . . . electronic warfare support measures
EUCOM . . . . . US European Command
EUSA . . . . . Eighth US Army
eval . . . . . evaluation
EW . . . . . electronic warfare
EWI . . . . . electronic warfare and intelligence
EWL . . . . . Electronic Warfare Laboratories
EXAGT . . . . . executive agent

FAT . . . . . forward area training
FBI . . . . . Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS . . . . . Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FEBA . . . . . forward edge of the battle area
FGGM . . . . . Fort George G. Meade
FHMA . . . . . family housing management account
FIL . . . . . Field Information Letter
fld . . . . . field
FO . . . . . forward observer
FOA . . . . . field operating agency
FOI . . . . . freedom of information
FOIC . . . . . Freedom of Information Center
FORSCOM . . . . . US Army Forces Command
FORSIC . . . . . US Army Forces Command Intelligence Center
FORSIG . . . . . US Army Forces Command Intelligence Group
FRG . . . . . Federal Republic of Germany
FS . . . . . field station
FSC . . . . . Federal Supply Classification
FSK . . . . . frequency shift keying
FSTC . . . . . Foreign Science and Technology Center
fwd . . . . . forward
FWP . . . . . Federal Women's Program
FWPC . . . . . Federal Women's Program Coordinator
FY . . . . . fiscal year

GED . . . . . general education development
gen . . . . . general
GHz . . . . . gigahertz
GO . . . . . general orders

GLOSSARY

GOT . . . . . Government of Turkey
gp . . . . . group
GR . . . . . GUARDRAIL
GS . . . . . General Schedule-Civilian Employees
GSFG . . . . . Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
GTE . . . . . General Telephone and Electronics

HESD . . . . . Harris Electronics Systems Division
HF . . . . . high frequency
HFDF . . . . . high frequency direction finding
HHC . . . . . headquarters and headquarters company
HQDA . . . . . Headquarters, Department of the Army
HSC . . . . . US Army Health Services Command
HUMINT . . . . . human intelligence

IA . . . . . investigative activities
IBM . . . . . International Business Machines
ICCP . . . . . Intelligence Civilian Career Program
ICD . . . . . imitative communication deception
ICR . . . . . intelligence collection requirement
ICW . . . . . interrupted continuous wave
IDHS . . . . . intelligence data handling systems
IG . . . . . inspector general
II . . . . . imagery intelligence
INSCOM . . . . . US Army Intelligence and Security Command
INSCOMDETNSA . . INSCOM Detachment, National Security Agency
INSIG . . . . . INSCOM Intelligence Group
insp . . . . . inspection(s)
intel . . . . . intelligence
IO . . . . . Investigations Office
IOC . . . . . initial operational capability
IOSD . . . . . US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment
IOSS . . . . . Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study
IPA . . . . . intelligence production activities
IPC . . . . . US Army Intelligence Production Center
IPF . . . . . intercept and position fixing
IPR . . . . . in-process review
IRR . . . . . US Army Investigative Records Repository
ISD . . . . . intelligence support detachment
ISG . . . . . Intelligence and Security Group [Europe]
ITAC . . . . . US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
I&W . . . . . indications and warning

JCS . . . . . Joint Chiefs of Staff

GLOSSARY

JIOC . . . . . Joint Intelligence Operations Center
JO . . . . . Jordan
JRX . . . . . joint readiness exercise
JSSARC . . . . . Joint SIGSEC/SIGINT Analysis and Reporting Center
JTDA . . . . . Joint Table(s) of Distribution and Allowances
JTF . . . . . joint task force
JUSMMAT . . . . . Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

K . . . . . thousand
KATUSA . . . . . Korean Augmentation to the US Army
KAWOL . . . . . knowledgeable personnel absent without leave
km . . . . . kilometer(s)

LANTCOM . . . . . US Atlantic Command
LCMS . . . . . Life Cycle Management System
LFC . . . . . LAFITE CLEAR
LFPP . . . . . LEFOX PURPLE
LFW . . . . . LAFINE WINE
LP . . . . . limited production
LUHF . . . . . low ultra high frequency

M . . . . . million
MACOM . . . . . major Army command
maint . . . . . maintenance
maj . . . . . major
MBO . . . . . management by objectives
MCA . . . . . Military Construction, Army
MDW . . . . . Military District of Washington
MFR . . . . . memorandum for record
mgt . . . . . management
MHz . . . . . megahertz
MI . . . . . military intelligence
MIA . . . . . Missile Intelligence Agency
MICECP . . . . . Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program
MID . . . . . military intelligence detachment
MIIA . . . . . Medical Intelligence and Information Agency
MIJI . . . . . meaconing, intrusion, jamming and interference
mil . . . . . military
MILPERCEN . . . . US Army Military Personnel Center
Mini-ELS . . . . mini-emitter location system
MOA . . . . . Memorandum of Agreement
MOBDES . . . . . mobilization designee
MOP . . . . . Memorandum of Policy
MOS . . . . . military occupational specialty

GLOSSARY

MOU . . . . . Memorandum of Understanding
MP . . . . . military
M&RA . . . . . Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MSC . . . . . US Army Security Agency Materiel Support Command
msg . . . . . message
msn . . . . . mission
MTMC . . . . . Military Traffic Management Command
MTOE . . . . . Modification Table of Organization and Equipment
MU . . . . . Oman
MULTEWS . . . . . multiple target electronic warfare system
mux . . . . . multiplex

NATO . . . . . North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFIB . . . . . National Foreign Intelligence Board (formerly US Intelligence Board)
NICP . . . . . national inventory control point
NOFORN . . . . . Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NSA . . . . . National Security Agency
NSACSS . . . . . National Security Agency/Central Security Service
NSCID . . . . . National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSG . . . . . Naval Security Group
NSP . . . . . National SIGINT Plan
NTTC . . . . . Naval Technical Training Center
NVL . . . . . Night Vision Laboratory
NYTIB . . . . . New York Times Information Bank

OACSI . . . . . Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
OB . . . . . order of battle
obj . . . . . objective
oblj . . . . . obligated
OCONUS . . . . . outside continental United States
OCSA . . . . . Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
ODCI . . . . . Office, Director, Counterintelligence
ODCSPER . . . . . Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
ODCSTEL . . . . . Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications
OE . . . . . organizational effectiveness
OFCO . . . . . offensive CI operations
off . . . . . officer
O/H . . . . . on hand
ONI . . . . . Office of Naval Intelligence
OPA . . . . . other procurement, Army
OPCON . . . . . operational control
OPLAN . . . . . operation plan
OPMS . . . . . Officer Personnel Management System
OPPA . . . . . Office, Plans, Programs and Analysis

GLOSSARY

ops . . . . . operations
OPSCOMM . . . . . operations communication
OPSEC . . . . . operations security
OSD . . . . . Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSG . . . . . Operational Security Group
OSI . . . . . Office of Strategic Information
OSUT . . . . . on-site user test
OTEA . . . . . Operational Test and Evaluation Agency

PA . . . . . Privacy Act
PACOM . . . . . Pacific Command
pam . . . . . pamphlet
PAO . . . . . Public Affairs Office
PBD . . . . . program/budget decision
PCAC . . . . . primary control and analysis center
PCS . . . . . permanent change of station
PDM . . . . . Program Decision Memorandum
PE . . . . . program element
PHOTINT . . . . . photographic intelligence
PLL . . . . . prescribed load list
PO . . . . . permanent orders
POM . . . . . preparation for overseas movement (units); Program Objective Memorandum
PPB . . . . . planning, programming and budgeting
PPBS . . . . . planning, programming and budgeting system
PRA . . . . . Projected Requisitioning Authority
PRC . . . . . People's Republic of China
PRF . . . . . pulse repetition frequency
proc . . . . . processing
prod . . . . . production
prog . . . . . programmed
prov . . . . . provisional
PSO . . . . . Personnel Security Office
PUP . . . . . Peacetime Utilization Program
PW . . . . . pulse width

QFM . . . . . quantized frequency modulation/demodulation
QRC . . . . . quick reaction capability
QSTAG . . . . . Quadripartite Standardization Agreement
qtr/qtrly . . . . quarter(ly)
QWG . . . . . Quadripartite Working Group

RADC . . . . . Rome Air Defense Center
RATEL . . . . . radio telephone

GLOSSARY

RCA . . . . . Radio Corporation of America
RCP . . . . . resource change proposal
RCS . . . . . reports control symbol
RDA . . . . . research, development and acquisition
RDT&A . . . . . research, development, testing and acquisition
RDTE . . . . . research, development, test and evaluation
reenl . . . . . reenlistments
rehab . . . . . rehabilitate(d)
reps . . . . . representatives
rept . . . . . report
RF . . . . . radio frequency
RIF . . . . . reduction in force
ROK . . . . . Republic of Korea
RSA . . . . . .
RSR . . . . . Resource Status Report
RSS . . . . . radar signal sorter; remote slave station

SA . . . . . systems activity; Saudi Arabia
SAFCO . . . . . semi-automated facilities control operations
SAO . . . . . Special Activities Office
SAVE . . . . . Sensitive Activity Vulnerability Estimate
SCA . . . . . Service Cryptologic Agency
sch . . . . . school
SCI . . . . . sensitive compartmented intelligence
SCIPMIS . . . . . Standard Civilian Personnel Management Information System
scty . . . . . security
SDL . . . . . Signals Development Laboratory
SE . . . . . subelement
SETAF . . . . . Southern European Task Force
SGS . . . . . Secretary of the General Staff
SGT . . . . . sergeant
SHAPE . . . . . Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SI . . . . . special intelligence
sig . . . . . signal
SIGAD . . . . . SIGINT Activity Designator
SIGINT . . . . . signal intelligence
SIGSEC . . . . . signal security
SIOP . . . . . Single Integrated Operation Plan
SJA . . . . . Staff Judge Advocate
SLAR . . . . . side-looking airborne radar
SM . . . . . square meters
SOM . . . . . USASA Signal Security Operations Manual
SOT . . . . . specialized operational training
SOUTHCOM . . . . United States Southern Command
sp . . . . . special
spt . . . . . support

GLOSSARY

sr . . . . . senior
SRB . . . . . selective reenlistment bonus
SSA . . . . . SIGSEC Activity
SSAS . . . . . special signal analysis system
SSB . . . . . single side-band
SSC . . . . . Senior Service College
SSD . . . . . special security detachment
SSG . . . . . special security group
SSL . . . . . single station locator
SSM . . . . . surface-to-surface missile
SSO . . . . . special security officer
SSPC . . . . . Spanish Speaking Program Coordinator
S&TI . . . . . scientific and technical intelligence
strat . . . . . strategic
subj . . . . . subject
subor . . . . . subordinate
SUSLAK . . . . . Senior United States Liaison Advisor Korea
SVA . . . . . security vulnerability analysis
svcs . . . . . services
SWRI . . . . . Southwest Research Institute
sys . . . . . system

tac . . . . . tactical
TACFIRE . . . . . tactical fire
TAOT . . . . . target area orientation training
TAREX . . . . . target exploitation
TB . . . . . technical bulletin
TBAN . . . . . to be announced
TCATA . . . . . TRADOC Combined Army Test Activity
TDA . . . . . tables of distribution and allowances
TDY . . . . . temporary duty
T&EC . . . . . USASA Test and Evaluation Center
TECOM . . . . . US Army Test and Evaluation Command
tel . . . . . telephone
tng . . . . . training
TOA . . . . . time-of-arrival
TOA/DD . . . . . time-of-arrival and differential doppler
TOAD . . . . . Tobyhanna Army Depot
TOE . . . . . table(s) of organization and equipment
tot . . . . . total
TR . . . . . TRACER ROUND
TRADOC . . . . . US Army Training and Doctrine Command
trans . . . . . transportation
TSA . . . . . US Army Technical Support Activity
TSCM . . . . . [Army] technical surveillance countermeasures
TSO . . . . . terminal skill objectives

GLOSSARY

TSG . . . . . The Surgeon General
TUSLOG . . . . . The United States Logistics Group

UFD . . . . . unintentional frequency deviation
UHF . . . . . ultra high frequency
UMP . . . . . Upward Mobility Program
UPS . . . . . uninterruptible power supplies
USA . . . . . US Army
USAASD . . . . . US Army Administrative Survey Detachment
USACC . . . . . US Army Communications Command
USACEEIA . . . . US Army Communication Electronics Engineering and Installation Agency
USACSF . . . . . US Army Central Security Facility
USACSG . . . . . US Army CINCPAC Support Group
USAEPG . . . . . US Army Electronic Proving Ground
USAFS . . . . . US Army Field Station
USAG . . . . . US Army Garrison
USAGO . . . . . US Army Garrison Okinawa
USAICS . . . . . US Army Intelligence Center and School
USAIIC . . . . . US Army Imagery Intelligence Center
USAINTA . . . . . US Army Intelligence Agency
USAIOSD . . . . . US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment
USAIRR . . . . . US Army Investigative Records Repository
USAISD . . . . . US Army Intelligence School, Devens
USAITAC . . . . . US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
USAITAD . . . . . US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Detachment
USAOG/DO . . . . US Army Operational Group/Directorate of Operations
USAR . . . . . US Army Reserve
USAREC . . . . . US Army Recruiting Command
USAREUR . . . . . US Army, Europe
USARJ . . . . . US Army, Japan
USASA . . . . . US Army Security Agency
USASACDA . . . . US Army Security Agency Combat Developments Activity
USASAMSC . . . . US Army Security Agency Materiel Support Command
USASSG . . . . . US Army Special Security Group
USASATC&S . . . . US Army Security Agency Training Center and School
USASATEC . . . . US Army Security Agency Test and Evaluation Center
USATSA . . . . . US Army Technical Support Activity
USCSC . . . . . United States Civil Service Commission
USFK . . . . . United States Forces, Korea
USMA . . . . . United States Military Academy
USREDCOM . . . . United States Readiness Command
USSS . . . . . United States SIGINT System
USSID . . . . . United States Signal Intelligence Directive

VCSA . . . . . Vice Chief of Staff, US Army

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GLOSSARY

VHF . . . . . very high frequency
VHFS . . . . . Vint Hill Farms Station

W. . . . . with
WAC . . . . . Women's Army Corps
WIMEA . . . . . wiretap, investigative monitoring and eavesdrop activities
W-MG . . . . . Work-Management Group
WO . . . . . warrant officer
w/o . . . . . without

YE . . . . . Yemen
YS . . . . . Yemen (Aden)

ZBB . . . . . zero based budgeting