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<td></td>
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<td>Fax: (703) 428-6522</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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27 August 1970

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation GRAPHIC HAND (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached after action report is forwarded for information. It is a narrative account of Operation GRAPHIC HAND, which was conducted by the military Services to assist the United States Postal Department in maintaining essential postal services following the work stoppage of postal employees during March 1970.

2. Subject report does not promulgate Department of the Army doctrine. However, the lessons cited may be adapted for use in developing training material and in evaluating current or proposed doctrine.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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2 Military Assistance Institute
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5 42nd Infantry Division (through Chief, National Guard Bureau)
5 77th US Army Reserve Command
5 US Post Office Department
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PREFACE

This After Action Report is an account of Operation GRAPHIC HAND which was conducted by the military Services to assist the United States Postal Department in maintaining essential postal services following the work stoppage of postal employees during March 1970.
SECTION I - SUMMARY

1. (FOUO) On 18 March 1970, mail carriers in New York City, in protest over low wages and other grievances, launched an unlawful work stoppage which temporarily paralyzed the mail services of the nation's largest metropolitan area. In anticipation of work stoppages in other areas, military and postal authorities met on 19 March to discuss proposals for processing military mail. On 20 March, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) held a meeting of military and postal officials to discuss ways in which the armed forces could assist the Post Office Department if called upon to do so. The Secretary of the Army was informally designated executive agent for planning operations in support of the Post Office Department on 20 March. (Formal designation was made on 23 March.) As the postal strike spread to other cities, the President, at a news conference on 21 March, acknowledged the legitimate grievances of postal workers, but stated that the issues being contested could not be negotiated as long as the illegal work stoppage continued. The President stated that if the strike continued, he would use means at his disposal to move the mail.

2. (FOUO) On the afternoon of 21 March, LTG R. G. Stilwell, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS); Department of the Army, was designated Director of the Postal Augmentation Task Force. Military service augmentation of the Post Office Department was given the nickname Operation GRAPHIC HAND. Accordingly, the group headed by the DCSOPS was designated GRAPHIC HAND Task Group; this Task Group, located in the Army Operations Center, consisted of representatives of:
   a. Post Office Department (Mr. T. R. Maples and Mr. V. R. Cawley)
   b. U.S. Navy (RADM J. T. Burke, Jr.)
   c. U.S. Air Force (MG M. F. Casey)
   d. National Guard Bureau (MG W. P. Wilson)
   e. The Army Staff
   f. Chief Army Reserve (MG W. J. Sutton)
   g. A CONARC Liaison Team-(Headed by BG G. C. Fogle, later replaced by BG J. S. Timothy)

3. (FOUO) On the evening of 21 March, Department of the Army transmitted Operation Plan GRAPHIC HAND Warning Order to the Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, CG CONARC and the Commanding Generals of the five CONUS Armies. This order was followed by coordinating instructions directing CG CONARC to be prepared to provide assistance at three locations in the following strengths:
4. (FOUO) When it became apparent that the strikers were not returning to work, the President, on 23 March, declared a national emergency and directed the Secretary of Defense to take such action as he deemed necessary to insure that the laws of the United States pertaining to the Post Office Department could be executed. By executive order, the President authorized and directed the Secretary of Defense to respond to requests of the Postmaster General for assistance in restoring and maintaining postal services. Additionally, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense to order into active military service any or all of the units of the Reserve Components needed to assure essential postal services. The Secretary of Defense on 23 March formally appointed Mr. B. J. Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) as his personal representative and formally designated the Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent for execution of actions in support of postal operations. Similarly, the Secretary of the Army further delegated the authority invested in him by the Secretary of Defense to the Under Secretary of the Army, Mr. Beal.

5. (FOUO) Upon receipt of the Presidential order to augment the Post Office Department in New York City, Director Task Force GRAPHIC HAND dispatched to CGONARC the message to execute Operation GRAPHIC HAND as it pertained to New York City. On order, designated active Army and Air Force units departed Fort Dix and McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey and closed New York City by 2140 on 23 March. These units, combined with Navy and Marine Corps personnel permanently stationed there, constituted the initial available force for postal augmentation duties in New York City. This multi-service force, named Task Force New York, was under the operational control of MG W. M. Higgins, CG, Fort Hamilton, N. Y. and consisted of 1263 Army, 661 Navy, and 548 Air Force personnel -- a total force of 2472 active service personnel. At the request of Post Office officials 755 active military personnel commenced augmentation duties in three post offices during the period from 2200, 23 March to 0100, 24 March. Military augmentation later expanded to seventeen post offices on 24 and 25 March.

6. (FOUO) Active duty orders for selected Reserve Component units were dispatched on the night of 23 March; the phased Reserve Component buildup was as noted below:

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<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>2500</td>
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<td>400</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1000</td>
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</table>
7. (FOUO) During the afternoon of 24 March, mobilized Army and Air National Guard personnel under the operational control of MG M. H. Poery, CG, 42nd Infantry Division, and mobilized Army, Naval, and Marine Corps Reserve personnel under the operational control of MG J. W. Kaine, CG, 77th Army Reserve Command, joined Regular service personnel in the postal operation. The responsiveness of Regular service personnel, and the additional manpower made available by the National Guard and Reserves made possible the transfer of augmentation duties from Regular forces to selected Reserve Components. Accordingly, Regular forces were released to the control of their parent services during the evening of 25 March and the morning of 26 March.

8. (U) The peak of the work stoppage was reached on 23 and 24 March. During this period, mail service in thirteen states was disrupted to some extent; it is estimated that nationwide, 200,000 of the 750,000 postal workers were off the job.

9. (FOUO) On 25 March, however, the situation improved and as prospects of an acceptable settlement increased, postal workers began returning to work. As this trend continued during the day, it appeared that the work stoppage was coming to an end and that partial demobilization could soon begin. By the end of the day, it was apparent that those employees still off the job would return to work on the 26th. Accordingly, during the early morning of 26 March, postal authorities cancelled requirements for service augmentees which permitted the release of the Air National Guard, and Army, Naval, and Marine Corps Reserve units to the control of their parent services for demobilization. Army National Guard units remained on active duty until 30 March in order to retain an immediate capability to resume augmentation duties in the event such action became necessary.

10. (U) By 31 March, except for a small residual force (approximately 10%) of National Guard and Army Reserve personnel required for administrative outprocessing, demobilization was complete. The Army Reserve and National Guard personnel retained on active duty for administrative purposes were reduced to zero strength on 3 and 4 April respectively.

11. (FOUO) Throughout the strike, the requirements for military manpower were established by postal officials based on the workloads in the various post offices, labor's reactions, back to work movements, and availability of postal supervisors to supervise military augmentees. The combination of these variables created a fluid situation which required a number of modifications to manpower requirements. The continuous coordination

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<th>AIR FORCE NATIONAL GUARD</th>
<th>ARMY RESERVE</th>
<th>NAVAL RESERVE</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS RESERVE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>1734</td>
<td>5525</td>
<td>2897</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>22210</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 Mar</td>
<td>10845</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>7465</td>
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among postal officials, Task Force Headquarters, and civil authorities permitted the flexibility necessary to respond properly to these changes. Throughout the operation, military forces and postal authorities were successful in responding to the ever-changing postal labor situation. During the operation there were no confrontations between federal forces and postal employees or the civil populace.

a. In performing their augmentation duties, under the supervision of postal supervisors, service personnel performed the following tasks:

(1) sorted mail

(2) transported mail to sub-stations and other areas

(3) delivered bulk mail to businesses and charitable organizations (no residential deliveries were made)

b. According to postal officials, in performing the tasks listed above, service personnel:

(1) processed 12.8 million pieces of outgoing primary mail (letter mail leaving New York City).

(2) processed 4.4 million pieces of city primary mail (letter mail for delivery in New York City).

(3) cased over 3.2 million pieces of mail for city delivery.

(4) delivered nearly 2 million pieces of mail to business firms and charitable organizations.

(5) delivered 3.2 million pieces of mail to callers.

(6) effected delivery of 11,986 registered letters.

(7) loaded or unloaded 96 trailers of mail.

c. Postal supervisors stated that the overall performance of military personnel in the augmentation role was better than could have been expected from new civilian postal employees.

12. (FOUO) The Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army on 23 March, indicated that DOD would be reimbursed for resources expended in the augmentation of the Post Office Department. The final costs reported by the Military Departments for operations during the period 21 March to 5 April were as follows:

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15

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<th>NORMAL</th>
<th>INCREMENTAL*</th>
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<td>ARMY</td>
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<td>39,300</td>
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<td>TOTAL DOD</td>
<td>$317,500</td>
<td>$2,528,749.80</td>
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* Cost strictly incidental to the Post Office Augmentation.

13. (FOUO) The actual level of augmentation accomplished by the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force is illustrated in Figure I-1. Of the 26,007 reservists and guardsmen mobilized and assigned to Task Force New York, only 16,836 or 64.7% were engaged in augmentation of the Post Office Department. This ratio of mobilized to committed was approximately the same for all the reserve components.

14. (U) Although problems were encountered during the conduct of the Operation, and others were identified as potential problem areas, none proved to be insurmountable. On balance, the cooperation demonstrated at all echelons and the response of the military services to a delicate situation brought about a successful conclusion to the operation.

15. (FOUO) Some of the specific problems encountered by the Army, as the coordinating service and by its nature better experienced in such operations, and by the Navy, which by its nature was relatively ill-prepared to accommodate on short notice in the New York City area large numbers of naval personnel, provide a basis for future planning:

a. Army

(1) Mobilization Regulations - While current service regulations have been previously revised to provide for short-duration mobilizations, Operation GRAPHIC HAND highlighted the requirement to further modify certain administrative procedures to meet the requirements of accelerated mobilization and demobilization for domestic emergencies.

(2) Command and Control - Should a nationwide strike and civil disturbance occur simultaneously, a compatible command and control arrangement is essential.

(3) Joint Post Office/Military Tactical Operations Center - A Joint Post Office/Military Tactical Operations Center would be highly desirable at Regional Post Office Centers. Major operating commands and the Task Group would need strong representation with Post Office Department in the event of a nationwide strike.
<table>
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<th>SERVICE</th>
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<th>% of Total TFNY Personnel Committed</th>
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Figure I - 1
(4) Reporting - Required reports should be tailored to meet the situation and held to the absolute minimum. Also, all services and components must be prepared to report through the DOD executive agent's operational chain of command.

(5) Security - It is essential that service personnel be afforded physical security. The commander on the ground must work closely with local police and postal authorities to meet the situation and ensure troop protection. In a nationwide strike where other unions or the local populace might support the postal unions, this might become a real problem.

(6) Public Information - While the Post Office Department should be the principal agency for reporting to the press, the services should attempt to preclude public misinterpretation of the service role by timely dissemination of public information guidance to all levels.

(7) Liaison Officers - Liaison officers, representing the Task Group Headquarters, should be dispatched as early as possible to potential operational areas. Because of the close hold nature at the outset of this type operation and lack of secure communications, personal liaison from the Task Group to the supported element is essential.

b. Navy

(1) Berthing and Messing Facilities - No one naval activity in the metropolitan New York City area could berth and mess the 4,387 Naval and Marine Corps personnel, regular and reserve, who were made available to the CG, Task Force New York. It was necessary, therefore, to find berths on Navy ships, at the Naval Station in Brooklyn, at the Naval Air Station, New York and in some instances the men (particularly naval reservists) were allowed to sleep and eat at home when not actually required on augmentation duty.

(2) Transportation - No one naval facility could readily provide sufficient transportation to move naval personnel to and from the post offices. Twenty-two buses were obtained from other naval activities, from the Coast Guard Base at Governors Island, and from the Army at Fort Monmouth, N. J. This number of vehicles was the minimum required. Their maintenance and fueling was handled by the Naval Station and Coast Guard Base.

(3) Schedule Changes - Lack of adequate lead time in announcing schedule changes caused confusion, inability in some instances to meet new deadlines, and failure always to meet the manpower requirements imposed for given situations.

(4) Convoy Escorts - It was necessary to provide escorts, usually Armed Forces Police Detachment vehicles, for many movements of naval personnel, because the majority of bus drivers were not familiar with the new New York City area. As the situation required, however, some convoys were moved without escort.
(5) Communications - Telephone contact with the Emergency Operations Center at Fort Hamilton was at times impossible, probably due to the lack of a CENTREX system there. It is not believed that the switchboard operators at Fort Hamilton were of fault, but rather that at times the number of incoming calls overloaded the system.

(6) Command and Control - Dissemination of orders to the Navy Liaison Officers at the Emergency Operations Center, Fort Hamilton, was not uniform. During the first 24 hours of Operation GRAPHIC HAND no officer-in-charge was designated at the Emergency Operations Center. Orders requiring Navy action were given to the Navy Liaison Officers by various people, and it was difficult to establish that an order was in fact being passed from the CG, Task Force New York.

(7) Notification of Mobilization - It was necessary to resort to making approximately 4,000 individual telephone calls in the New York City area in order to notify members of the Naval Reserve of their mobilization. Although specific information was received from COMTHEE by all of the major radio and television stations in the affected area, most of them chose to treat the information as a news story rather than relaying the specifics of the mobilization, including the categories exempted. News commentators chose to emphasize mobilization of the National Guard exclusively, completely ignoring the reserve components of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
1. Precedents. The postal workers in New York City launched an illegal work stoppage on 18 March, 1970, in protest over low wages and other grievances. Governmental officials indicated that if the strike continued or spread, the President would use military personnel to move the mail. It was widely reported in the news media that if the President should use military personnel to replace governmental employees in keeping public services operating, it would be the first time in the history of the United States that a President had taken such an action. Actually, it was neither the first work stoppage of employees engaged in public services nor the first in which our armed forces have been used. Instances of such use are summarized below:

   a. In the case of the Pullman strike in 1894, in which there was interference with the mails in at least 11 states, President Grover Cleveland used the armed forces, including soldiers, sailors, and marines as necessary to guard mail trains.

   b. In 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt used the Army Air Corps to fly the air mail following cancellation of existing contracts on the grounds of collusion. This was not a strike situation, but the episode constitutes another example of the government's willingness to use the armed forces to move the mail.

   c. A sudden strike in June 1941 at the Los Angeles plant of North American Aviation, Inc., shortly before our entry into World War II, caused President Franklin D. Roosevelt to use troops because of the overriding public interest, as he saw it, in maintaining the production of fighting planes. The federal government took possession of the plant although it did not use troops to operate it but simply to provide protection for those employees who wanted to work.

   d. In 1944, there were two cases of President Roosevelt's use of troops to keep public services operating. One of these, in February, involved the federal government's token seizure of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, a municipal agency, as a result of a strike by its employees and a storm that flooded certain areas, broke powerlines, and plunged the plants of several key aviation subcontractors into darkness. The government had no trouble getting the employees back to work and did not have to undertake actual operation of the water and power facilities. The other was the government's seizure of the Philadelphia Transportation Company in August, in consequence of a work stoppage brought about by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employees Union. In its fight against the Transport Workers Union (CIO), the certified exclusive bargaining agent for all of the Transportation Company employees, this union, an independent organization, sought to capitalize on the use of Negroes in operating positions. Disorder resulting in the hospitalization of more than a dozen persons and the arrest of several hundred
others gave rise to fears of a major race riot. This situation led to what originally was intended to be simply a token seizure of the company by the Army. Since the strike persisted, however, troops had to be called in to guard property and to accompany such buses and trains as were being operated. At no time did the government back down on the existing policy of using Negroes as transit operators. The government also prepared to take stern measures with the strikers, such as cancelling draft deferment, and prepared to use troops to operate the transit system. Workers thereupon quickly returned to work, and the Army was soon able to withdraw. Thereafter, the training and use of Negroes as operators not only continued but expanded.

e. There are other cases involving labor troubles and the use or possible use of service personnel that could be cited, but the examples given serve to illustrate that long before 1970 the military had gained considerable and varied experience in situations bearing on the public services, albeit partly in wartime and partly under special wartime legislation.

2. (FOUO) Events Leading to the Use of Federal Forces to Augment Postal Facilities.

a. For several years prior to March 1970 there had been a growing dissatisfaction on the part of postal workers with their pay situation, especially in the light of the hazards in delivering mail that became common in large cities. Postal workers in New York became especially embittered as they watched some municipal employees completely outstrip them in wages. If he were fortunate and reached the top of his grade in 21 years, a New York postman would still make $1,500 a year less than a New York garbage collector with only 3 years of experience on the job. The letter carriers therefore demanded a wage scale that would range from $8,500 to $11,700 a year, with the top salary to be reached in 5 years. Although it is illegal to strike against the federal government, postal union officials warned more than once of the possibility of a strike if union demands were not met. In 1968, five unions of federal employees, including two postal unions, voted to drop a strike ban from their constitutions. The National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) unsuccessfully sought to have the courts declare the federal no-strike law unconstitutional, but in December 1969 it did succeed in getting a federal court to knock down the no-strike affidavit that every federal employee has to file when he is hired. The Department of Justice, however, appealed this ruling.

b. Amid this unstable situation, the President, in his budget message of 2 February 1970, asked Congress to delay until January 1971 the so-called comparability pay raise for all federal employees, but indicated approval of the budgeted "pay adjustments accompanying postal reform." By "postal reform" he meant the conversion of the Post Office Department from a cabinet agency to an independent public authority or corporation, as had been recommended by the previous administration.
The three-way interplay between the White House, Congress, and the unions produced a deadlock that not only tied up a postal pay raise but also threatened to doom the reorganization of the Post Office Department. When the House Post Office Committee approved a modified version of the administrations' bill, which provided far less of a pay increase than the letter carriers wanted, Branch 36 of the NALC struck the New York post office on Wednesday, 18 March 1970. The work stoppage soon spread from Manhattan and the Bronx, where it began, to Long Island, to Westchester, Rockland and Orange counties; to Stamford, Connecticut; and to New Jersey, including the cities of Paterson, Hackensack, and Passaic.

c. Postmaster General Winton M. Blount immediately ordered an embargo on mail into New York City and obtained court orders barring the strike. At a news conference the same day, the Postmaster General declared that a mail stoppage could not be tolerated and pointed out that the wage issue was in the hands of Congress, which could not act "under the threat of an emergency." Both the court orders and the Postmaster General's words were ineffectual, and the strike spread on 19 March to Akron, Ohio; St. Paul, Minnesota; Buffalo, New York; Newark, New Jersey; and to additional Connecticut communities. Mail deliveries ceased in Northern New Jersey. In Brooklyn, the National Postal Union joined the strike.

d. On Friday, 20 March, Secretary of Labor George P. Schultz reached an agreement with the heads of seven postal unions that the administration would discuss the issues with these unions as soon as the strike ended and the union leaders promised to urge the strikers to return to work. This agreement, however, had no effect on the strikers, who persisted in their course. The letter carriers, warned that a nationwide strike would be called within five days, starting Monday, 23 March, if by that time no definite settlement had been reached with the administration. By Saturday, 21 March, the strike not only still affected the New York area, but it was spreading across the country to northern New York, Boston, Detroit, Chicago, Denver, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles. Only the southern regions of the country remained relatively undisturbed. Against this background, President Nixon held a press conference about noon on Saturday. In it, he said he recognized "that postal workers in many areas have legitimate grievances" and that the government was "prepared to negotiate those issues," but it would not do so until the "illegal strike" was terminated. The President did not say he would use the armed services on the following Monday; only "that we have the means to deliver the mail" and that "we will use those means." He said he was "not threatening," but that he had "a responsibility to see that the mail is delivered. And I shall meet that responsibility and meet it effectively beginning Monday in the event that the postal workers in any area decide that they are not going to meet their constitutional responsibilities to deliver the mail."
e. After the President spoke, James H. Rademacher, president of the 200,000 member NALC, sent telegrams to the union's 6,500 branches urging an end to the work stoppage so that negotiations could begin. He told reporters that he opposed the use of troops. By the following day, Sunday 22 March, when there was a high-level meeting at the White House on the situation, some carriers -- in Buffalo, Trenton, Scranton, and Houston -- voted to return to work, but carriers in Detroit, Brooklyn, St. Paul, and Philadelphia voted to continue the strike. Concurrently, it was reported that 55,000 of the 75,000 members of the National Postal Union -- clerks, mail handlers, and drivers -- had stopped work. According to the Post Office Department's estimate, there were 160,000 employees on strike in 13 states: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wisconsin.

f. It was in the context of this widespread and unyielding strike that the President addressed the nation over television and radio at 1415, Monday 23 March 1970. He announced that troops would be used "to begin in New York City the restoration of essential mail services." It was there, he said, that "the current illegal stoppages began; it is where the mail has been halted longest; and it is where the resultant problems have become most acute. If the Postmaster General deems it necessary to act in other affected major cities, I will not hesitate to act."
SECTION III - PLANNING

1. (C) Initial Planning

a. Any effort to describe the evolution of planning is complicated by the fact that Service reactions to the postal crisis (Operation GRAPHIC HAND) and the development of the Operation Plan were taking place simultaneously. Actually, many of the concepts for Operation GRAPHIC HAND and the GRAPHIC HAND OFPLAN evolved on parallel tracks with concepts and instructions emanating from the White House and the GRAPHIC HAND Task Group. Due to the fast-breaking nature of the situation and the limited time available to determine requirements and allocate forces, many ad hoc decisions were made that short-cut normal procedures but effectively provided necessary guidance to the field so as to insure sufficient response to the national emergency. One factor that made initial planning difficult was that postal authorities were planning concurrently, and thus were unable to furnish military planners with firm operational requirements.

b. The first meeting between military and postal authorities was held at the Post Office Department on 19 March 1970 to discuss proposals for processing military mail. Two meetings were held on 20 March. An 0900 meeting in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) was convened to discuss possible ways the armed forces could assist the Post Office Department if called upon. The second meeting was held in the Army Operations Center at 1435. At this meeting, the Army was appointed executive agent for planning (the Secretary of the Army was not so designated formally until 23 March) and was given a specific requirement to determine the number of military personnel required and the associated reaction times for the following cases, with initial emphasis on planning to meet the first three:

(1) Re-establish and maintain the movement of oversea DOD mail (New York and San Francisco).

(2) Re-establish and maintain postal service in support of the financial district (Manhattan and New York).

(3) Re-establish and maintain postal service for the greater New York/Newark area.

(4) Re-establish and maintain postal service on a city-by-city basis for those postal installations affected by the strike.

(5) Re-establish and maintain essential postal service in the event of a CONUS-wide postal workers strike.
c. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations rather than the Director for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations was given staff responsibility for the military action because the Post Office Department wanted to avoid any suggestion that the military action was in response to a civil disorder. Any suggestion that the strike was considered to be a civil disturbance may have further aroused the striking workers and could conceivably have precipitated a more violent confrontation.

d. It was apparent early in the preliminary planning stages that the illegal work stoppage might spread quickly and become a country-wide strike. Military augmentation of the Post Office Department on a country-wide basis would require considerable decentralization of control for timely and responsive support of postal activities. In view of that fact, CG Continental Army Command was placed in the chain of command which was established to control the military augmentation elements through the Continental U.S. Armies.

e. Guidance received early in the planning stages provided that the military augmentation would be a tri-service operation and that, unit integrity permitting, efforts should be made to provide Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine representation at postal facilities augmented.

f. In an effort to further establish planning parameters, information was sought concerning the organization of the postal service, more detailed information regarding the postal crisis, and a feel for the personnel and equipment needed to keep the postal service operational.

(1) Figure III-1 shows the fifteen Postal Regions in CONUS. Each region takes its name from the city in which the central office is located. The top postal official in this part of the organization of the Post Office Department is the postal inspector-in-charge, then the regional director, and then, beneath him, the postmasters.

(2) With regard to New York, the area of primary concern, nearly all mail entered the state through sectional centers in New York City and Buffalo, where normally the mail was sorted for distribution to the rest of the state. Since both New York City and Buffalo were affected by the strike, the flow of mail to the entire state was almost completely cut off. The Post Office Department, therefore, directed post offices in other states to sort mail so that it would by-pass the struck offices. Mail leaving the state was affected only in the areas of the struck post offices. It takes 65,000 persons to provide complete carrier service for the entire state of New York, 50,000 of these in New York City alone. Or 50,000 men can provide limited service for the entire state, that is, delivery to branch post offices and stations only. The only requirement was that these persons know how to read, write, and understand numbers. No equipment supplied by the armed forces would be needed because there had been no destruction of post office equipment.
Each Region takes its name from the city in which the central office is located.

The hatched areas indicate the states where mail services were placed under total or partial embargo.
g. A draft OPLAN was presented for review by the Army Staff and representatives of the Navy and Air Force at 0930 on Saturday, 21 March, 1970. Almost simultaneously, a Warning Order on the pending operation was circulated for information and coordination. When the Army Chief of Staff was briefed on the plan at noon on 21 March 1970, it was determined that a GRAPHIC HAND Task Group should be convened to develop the concept of operations, spell out the chain of command, and get a better feel for the dimensions of the operation. The result of this meeting was incorporated in the initial DA Warning Order which was dispatched at 1728 on 21 March. Upon receipt of the Warning Order, the Navy and Air Force issued directives to their respective forces to be prepared to augment the Post Office Department. Meanwhile, the GRAPHIC HAND Task Group began to add additional guidance to the Warning Order. More specifically:

(1) At 0452 on Sunday, 22 March, a message was released directing preparations for the commitment of military personnel to support essential postal operations at three locations in the approximate strength indicated below during the morning of 23 March:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The use of helmets, weapons, gas masks, and other equipment which might imply a civil disturbance role was ruled out and military personnel were directed to avoid confrontation situations even if it entailed a delay in performing their mission.

(3) Establishment of CG, CONARC, command and control of all committed forces through appropriate CONUS Army Commanders and designated Task Force commanders.

h. What is not apparent in the above summary is that concurrently with the execution of Operation GRAPHIC HAND, the Operation Plan (initially prepared 21 March) was under constant revision. Changes were disseminated to the field on a required basis (see Annex B: Proclamations, Executive Orders, and Implementing Instructions). An updated plan which incorporated these changes was published on 29 April 1970.

2. (C) Contingency Planning

a. Although Operation GRAPHIC HAND was executed for New York City only, planning for the contingency of a nationwide postal work stoppage began 22 March. This planning was based on a list of 25 priority cities furnished by the Post Office Department. Subsequently, the Post Office Department identified ten additional second-priority cities for augmentation planning. Figure III-2 indicates the 35 cities involved. In order
to compensate for the overlap of Postal Region and CONUS Army jurisdictions, and to simplify execution, the Army Commander is whose area the Postal Region Headquarters is located was designated to assume operational control of postal augmentation operations throughout the Postal Region.

b. Contingency planning for possible military augmentation of postal facilities in one or more of the 35 cities includes advance preparation of five messages for use as appropriate. The first three messages initiate military augmentation, i.e., warning order, execution order, and mobilization order. The last two messages warn of impending withdrawal of military personnel and authorize release of reserve component units from active duty. (See Annex C, Contingency Plans).

c. Figure III-3 depicts the post office military manpower requirements which would provide a capability to continue postal operations on an austere basis in each of the first and second priority cities. Figure III-4 denotes the total numbers of military personnel that would be ordered to active duty to meet the post office manning requirements in the event such action becomes necessary. The indicated total of 115,468 intentionally exceeds the post office manning requirements by approximately 21,500 in order to compensate for losses which would occur in units as a result of established liberal exemption policies. These policies exempt law enforcement officials, fire fighters, high school students, personnel on active duty for basic school training, and other personnel on a case-by-case basis as determined by the local commander.

d. In addition to contingency planning for possible resumption and expansion of military involvement in postal operations, planning was also conducted to deal with possible civil disturbances and to provide security for military augmentees in the event of a militant confrontation.

(1) In the event of a civil disturbance, the Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT) would be executed.

(2) In order to ensure the security of military personnel in the event of civil disorders requiring protection beyond the capability of local civil authorities, a message was dispatched to the field at 1809 on 22 March directing that action be taken to prepare for the commitment of sufficient military police to assist, as required, municipal police in maintaining law and order at appropriate postal facilities. Additionally, plans were prepared to provide appropriate military escort.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GRAPHIC HAND CONTINGENCY PLANS

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT

CHIEF OF STAFF, USA

CG CONARC

CG 1ST ARMY
- NEW YORK
- WASHINGTON
- BOSTON
- PHILADELPHIA
- CINCINNATI
- BUFFALO
- CLEVELAND
- PITTSBURGH
- BALTIMORE
- INDIANAPOLIS

CG 3RD ARMY
- ATLANTA
- MEMPHIS
- MIAMI
- BIRMINGHAM
- NASHVILLE
- GREENSBORO

CG 4TH ARMY
- DALLAS
- HOUSTON
- NEW ORLEANS

CG 5TH ARMY
- CHICAGO
- MINN/ST PAUL
- ST LOUIS
- DENVER
- WICHITA
- DETROIT
- KANSAS CITY
- OMAHA
- MILWAUKEE
- PHOENIX
- OKLAHOMA CITY

CG 6TH ARMY
- SAN FRANCISCO
- SEATTLE
- LOS ANGELES
- OAKLAND
- PORTLAND

Figure III-2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POST OFFICE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

**FIRST PRIORITY CITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>25500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>7500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>2600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Louis</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis/St. Paul</td>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaha</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECOND PRIORITY CITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichita</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma City</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greensboro</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL ORM 93,600
TROOP STRENGTHS TO SUPPORT POSTAL REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST PRIORITY CITIES</th>
<th>SECOND PRIORITY CITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Washington</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5850</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Wichita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30772</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10684</td>
<td>2158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>Portland</td>
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<td>3121</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Oklahoma City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3705</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Phoenix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4806</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3005</td>
<td>1021</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>Nashville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1437</td>
<td>910</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>Oakland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2400</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis/St. Paul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3002</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TROOP STRENGTH 115,468</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure III-4
SECTION IV - COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. (U) General. Command and control was effectively exercised throughout the operation and was responsive to modifications necessitated by the changing postal situation. This section summarizes the command and control structure developed during Operation GRAPHIC HAND. For a more detailed discussion, see Annex G, Command and Control.

2. (FOUO) GRAPHIC HAND Task Group.

a. On 23 March, President Nixon proclaimed a national emergency and directed the Secretary of Defense to take the actions necessary to assist the Postmaster General in connection with postal work stoppages. The Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as executive agent for the Department of Defense and authorized him to call upon the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, and any Department of Defense component to provide resources. Mr. B. J. Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) was appointed by the Secretary of Defense as his personal representative to provide assistance and coordination from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, the Secretary of the Army further delegated the authority vested in him by the Secretary of Defense to the Under Secretary of the Army. Previously, however, during an interdepartmental planning meeting on 20 March, the Secretary of the Army had been appointed as executive agent for planning. On 21 March, during the initial planning phase of the operation, a GRAPHIC HAND Executive Task Group was formed and established a base of operations in the Army Operations Center. Figure IV-1 displays the ad hoc command and control structure for operation GRAPHIC HAND as it finally evolved.

b. In addition to direct coordination between the Postmaster General's Office and the Office of the Secretary of the Army, the Executive Task Group included representatives from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. These representatives provided integral linkage in the GRAPHIC HAND structure.

c. An Army Liaison Group, was formed to establish required direct liaison between the Task Group and postal authorities at the Post Office Control Center in Washington, D.C., postal Regional Headquarters, and key post offices. During the operation, these liaison officers were dispatched to the Post Office Control Center in Washington, D.C., to the Regional Headquarters in New York City, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago, and to the General Post Office in Detroit.

3. (FOUO) Task Force New York. The Commanding General, CONARC, through appropriate CONUS Army Commanders and designated Task Force Commanders, was prepared to exercise command and control over all service personnel committed to augment postal facilities. Figure IV-2 displays the Command and Control structure as it existed in New York City. Task Force New York was established on 22 March under the Command of Major General W. M. Higgins, Commanding General, Fort Hamilton. A joint operations center,
Figure IV-1

COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

PRESIDENT

DIRECTOR OEP

ASSISTANT DODAFF

PMQ

ASST PMQ

SEC OF LABOR

SEC DEF

CMC

SEC NAV

C&O

SEC AF

CSAF

SEC ARMY

UNDER SEC ARMY

COMMAND AND CONTROL GROUP

LNO

NAVY

AIR, FORCE

MARINE CORPS

CONARC

ARMY C OF S

DCSOPS

DEPUTY

DIP OPHS

EXECUTIVE TASK GROUP

POD

ASS - I L

ASS - PA

ARMY

NAVY

AIR FORCE

MARINE CORPS

OEP

CONARC

CONUS ARMIES

TF

NAVY MARINE CORPS COMP

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COMP

AIR FORCE NATIONAL GUARD COMP
which planned and directed the multi-service augmentation of post offices in New York City (See Section V, Summary of Operations), was also established at Fort Hamilton. Commanding General, Task Force New York, placed mobilized Air National Guard personnel under the operational control of Major General M. H. Foery, Command General, 42nd Division. Similarly, mobilized Naval and Marine Corps Reserve personnel placed under the operational control of Major General J. W. Kaine, Commanding General, 77th Army Reserve Command.
SECTION V - SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

1. (U) Chronology (See Annex A, Chronology)


   a. As the postal situation deteriorated over the weekend of 21-22 March, it became improbable that postal workers would return to work. It appeared evident that the military services would be called upon to assist postal authorities in maintaining essential postal services (see Annex 0, "Summary of Nationwide Postal Situation"). New York City was considered to be the hard core area. Accordingly, on Sunday, 22 March, New York City was designated the area for initial augmentation, while Boston and Philadelphia were considered as possible additional areas. It was anticipated that the President would make an announcement concerning the postal situation sometime during the morning of Monday, 23 March, and that federal forces would be directed to proceed immediately to augment key postal installations any time after 0800, 23 March. In view of the time and space factors involved, timing of the Presidential announcement was considered critical. Accordingly, in order to better insure a timely response in the event H-hour was delayed beyond mid-morning, active military units designated to augment New York, Boston, and Philadelphia postal facilities were placed on 1-hour alert status commencing at 0930.

   b. During the morning of 23 March, it was disclosed that the Presidential announcement would not be made until 1400. In view of the time element involved, questions were raised concerning the advisability of postponing actual augmentation of postal facilities by military personnel until the morning of Tuesday, 24 March. Although Navy and Marine Corps personnel were stationed in New York City and could have proceeded immediately to one or more post offices in the New York City area, three factors combined to preclude augmentation prior to nightfall on 23 March. These were:
   (1) orders prohibiting any overt move by any of the military services until after a Presidential announcement; (2) a decision to delay augmentation until all services were prepared to appear simultaneously at post offices to be augmented by members of more than one military service; and (3) the time and space factors involved in deploying Army and Air Force units from the Fort Dix/McGuire Air Force Base area to New York City. Although several variations were considered, essentially two alternatives evolved. One alternative considered was to deploy to staging areas in New York City during the latter part of 23 March and delay augmentation of postal facilities until the next morning. The second alternative was to augment one or more post offices in New York City with a token force during the evening of 23 March and expand that augmentation the next day. Although the second alternative was ultimately implemented, the fluid situation that

1/ Units designated to augment Boston and Philadelphia were subsequently placed on 4-hour alert, 1st hour, during the evening of 23 March and were released from alert status on 24 and 25 March respectively.
continued through the afternoon and evening of 23 March, and the desire of postal authorities in New York City not to commit military forces until a positive determination that postal workers would not return to work, delayed confirmation of the final decision to commit military personnel until approximately 2130, 23 March.

c. The discussion that follows summarizes the course of events which contributed to the fluid situation just described:

(1) At 1415, 23 March, President Nixon appeared on television and announced that he had just ordered military personnel into New York City as a supplemental work force to assist the Postmaster General in restoring service. The President also stated that similar action would be taken in other cities if the Postmaster General deemed it necessary.

(2) Following the Presidential announcement, a commentary was telecast which included an interview with Mr. Rademacher, President of the AFL-CIO National Association of Letter Carriers. Mr. Rademacher stated that he was going to "plead" with President Nixon not to take final action before midnight, 23 March.

(3) Following confirmation that President Nixon had signed a Declaration of National Emergency and an Executive Order empowering the mobilization of elements of the National Guard and Reserve Forces, there was a discussion with postal authorities in the Army Operations Center regarding Mr. Rademacher's statement. During the discussion it was determined that active military units designated to augment postal facilities in New York City should begin movement with the understanding that a recall could subsequently be required. The possibility of recall reinforced the necessity for maintaining flexibility and for keeping the options open to: (1) proceed to New York City and immediately commence postal operations with a token force and expand augmentation on 24 March; or (2) proceed to New York City staging areas only and await further developments.

d. At 1445, 23 March, in consonance with the decision to commence deployment, the CONARC liaison team, collocated with the GRAPHIC HAND Task Group in the Army Operations Center, relayed the following instructions to CG, CONARC, and CG, Task Force New York concerning active duty personnel:

(1) Army contingent, McGuire Air Force Base, move one hour from notification to designated billeting areas in New York City.

(2) Air Force contingent, McGuire Air Force Base, move at the same time to designated billeting areas in New York City.

(3) Navy contingent (permanently stationed in New York City), stand fast.

(4) CG, Task Force New York await further orders.

V-2
e. These instructions were followed at 1556, 23 March, by a message directing the execution of Operation GRAPHIC HAND for New York City only. This message, unlike the initial instructions, directed the commencement of augmentation operations.

f. At 1544, 23 March, the decision to mobilize Reserve components designated for Task Force New York, was also reached and appropriate messages were dispatched directing a muster at 0645, 24 March.

g. In response to the decision to deploy active duty personnel, the Air Force contingent departed McGuire Air Force Base at 1600, 23 March, and the main body of the Army contingent began to move from Fort Dix at 1717, 23 March, with orders to proceed to staging areas in New York City. By 2140, 23 March, the Air Force and Army units closed (Air Force at 1812 and Army at 2140). Thus, combined with the Navy and Marine Corps personnel permanently stationed in New York City, the buildup of regular forces was essentially complete. For a synopsis of strength figures of regular forces see figure V-1.

h. A final determination as to whether service personnel would be required at postal facilities on 23 March had not been made by postal officials prior to departure of the Army and Air Force contingents. A request for direct augmentation during the night of 23-24 March was passed to Task Force New York by local postal authorities at 1645 on the same day; but, as late as 1815 Task Force New York was being advised by the office of the New York Postal Region that there would be no requirements for a supplementary military force before Tuesday, 24 March.

i. At 2135, 23 March, Task Force New York received confirmation of the final decision of postal authorities to commence augmentation. Accordingly, 755 regular military personnel were employed in the following strengths and locations between 2200, 23 March and 0100, 24 March.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Post Office</td>
<td>546 (99 Army, 310 Air Force and 137 Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Street</td>
<td>100 (Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>109 (Navy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. Requirements established by postal authorities for military augmentation of post offices during 24 March were initially filled during the period 1000 - 1830 hours with service personnel who had not been committed on 23 March. This force was supplemented from 1330 to 1830 hours with those personnel who had augmented postal facilities the night before. Commencing at 1300, 24 March, mobilized Reserve Component personnel phased into the postal operation. (See Annex D, Force Tabs, and Annex E, Mobilization and Demobilization). For a synopsis of activated Reserve Component force strengths see figure V-2. As reflected by figure V-2, the responsiveness of the Reserve Components to the order to mobilize was outstanding. For example, there were cases where personnel traveled at their own expense from as far away as Spain and Hawaii in order to be present with their units during the period of mobilization.
STRENGTH OF ACTIVE FORCES 1/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Mar</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>2,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>2,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Mar</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: 1/ For a more complete display of force strength see Annex G, Force Buildup and Redeployment.
2/ All regular forces except for members of Task Force Headquarters redeployed during the evening of 25 Mar and morning of 26 Mar.

Figure V-1

STRENGTH OF MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENTS 1/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ARMY NATIONAL GUARD</th>
<th>AIR NATIONAL GUARD</th>
<th>ARMY RESERVE</th>
<th>NAVAL RESERVE</th>
<th>USMC RESERVE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar</td>
<td>10,142</td>
<td>1,734</td>
<td>5,525</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>22,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar</td>
<td>10,845</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>7,465</td>
<td>3,746</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>26,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Mar</td>
<td>10,783</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>7,989</td>
<td>3,389</td>
<td>1,795</td>
<td>25,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Mar</td>
<td>10,912</td>
<td></td>
<td>799 3/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>1,045 2/</td>
<td>472 4/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Apr</td>
<td>842 5/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: 1/ For a more complete display of force strength see Annex F, Force Buildup and Redeployment.
2/ Effective 261330 Mar, Air National Guard and Army, Naval, and Marine Reserves were released to control of their parent service.
3/ Residual personnel retained for administrative action incident to post mobilization.
4/ Reduced to zero strength effective 022400 Apr.
5/ Reduced to zero strength effective 032400 Apr.

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3. (FOUO) Postal Operation.

a. Following the token augmentation of the three post offices during the night of 23 March, Task Force New York increased augmentation operations to 17 post offices on 24 and 25 March and was prepared to expand operations even further, if necessary. The return of postal employees to their jobs, however, terminated the requirement for military assistance commencing 26 March. Figure V-3 portrays the post offices in New York City which were augmented by service personnel and figure V-4 reflects the number of Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps augmentees employed.

b. The requirements for military manpower were established by postal officials based on the workloads in the various post offices, labor's reactions, back to work movements, and availability of postal supervisors to supervise military augmentees. The combination of these variables created a fluid situation which required a number of modifications to requirements. The continuous coordination among postal officials, Task Force Headquarters, and civil authorities permitted the flexibility necessary to respond properly to these changes. For example, on one occasion, postal employees were assembled and voting in front of the General Post Office. In order to preclude an adverse psychological effect, it was necessary to divert an enroute military convoy to a holding area, pending the results of the vote. Civil police were instrumental in accomplishing the diversion. As a result postal employees were permitted to meet without confrontation with military personnel. Throughout the operation military forces and postal authorities were successful in responding to the ever-changing postal labor situation. During the operation there were no confrontations between federal forces and postal employees or the civil populace.

c. In performing their augmentation duties, under the supervision of postal supervisors, Army, Navy and Air Force personnel performed the following tasks:

(1) Sorted mail.

(2) Transported mail to sub-stations and other areas.

(3) Delivered bulk mail to businesses and charitable organizations; no residential deliveries were made.

d. According to postal officials, in performing the tasks listed above, service personnel:

(1) Processed 12.8 million pieces of outgoing primary mail (letter mail leaving New York City).

(2) Processed 4.4 million pieces of city primary mail (letter mail for delivery in New York City).
(3) Cased over 3.2 million pieces of mail for city delivery.

(4) Delivered nearly 2 million pieces of mail to business firms and charitable organizations.

(5) Delivered 3.2 million pieces of mail to callers.

(6) Effected delivery of 11,986 registered letters.

(7) Loaded or unloaded 96 trailers of mail.

e. To speed the processing of APO mail which was either backlogged at JFK or stranded at enroute Airport Mail Facilities (AMF's), the USAF Postal and Courier Service (USAFFCS) proposed massing all mail on the Frankfurt Air Movement Terminal. AMFs throughout the U.S. dispatched APO mail to Boston, Philadelphia and Dulles for onward dispatch to Frankfurt where the raw mail was reworked and restored. The Post Office Department also approved the use of other gateways for mail arriving from overseas areas normally serviced by JFK. Frankfurt AMF was advised to dispatch mail to these gateways in lieu of New York. Where through flights were not available, ramp transfers of mail were made between airlines at JFK Airport. USAFFCS representatives monitored the ramp transfers and inspected airline facilities to insure continued flow of mail. Because of the USAFFCS' unique operational structure, it was able to respond immediately to the crisis and issue the necessary instructions to military mail transportation facilities worldwide.


a. As National Guard and Reserve personnel began phasing into postal operations, it was possible to transfer to them the responsibility that had earlier been assumed by the regular forces. In accordance with previously developed concepts and in coordination with local postal authorities, a decision was reached by CG, CONARC, to relieve regular forces from augmentation duties at 2100, Wednesday, 25 March. Subsequent to that decision, the Air Force requested and was granted an early release and began redeployment to McGuire Air Force Base at 1900. Regular Navy and Marine Corps forces reverted to the control of their parent service at 2100, 25 March, and Regular Army units departed New York City for Fort Dix at 0630, Thursday, 26 March.

b. As postal employees began to return to work during 25 March and requirements for continued augmentation of post offices subsided, it became imperative for reasons of efficiency, economy, and morale that augmentation forces be reduced to minimum levels consistent with the mission. Plans for the demobilization of Reserve and National Guard personnel were completed during the morning of 26 March. In compliance with the request from the Postmaster General to maintain a minimum force of 10,000 men available for possible immediate recommitment, the following actions took place with the approval of the Under Secretary of the Army:
(1) Personnel of Army National Guard units were retained on active duty status, but released on pass to return to their homes on the evening of 26 March with orders to report to their armories at 0800 on Friday, 27 March.

(2) At 1330 on 26 March, Air National Guard and Army, Navy, and Marine Corps reservists were released to the control of their parent service for demobilization.

(3) All mobilized Air National Guard personnel were released from active duty as of midnight, 26 March.

(4) Except for 799 personnel required for administrative purposes, mobilized Army Reservists were released from active duty as of midnight, 26 March.

c. Mobilized Army National Guard personnel remained on active duty status until midnight, 30 March, in order to retain an immediate capability to resume augmentation duties in the event such action became necessary. During this period personnel were released on pass each evening and, except for weekends, returned to their armories each morning for training.

d. During a meeting on the morning of 29 March, postal officials approved a 30 March demobilization of the approximate 10,000 Army National Guard personnel with the understanding that these men could be remobilized within 24 hours. With the concurrence of the White House and Office of the Secretary of Defense, the CG, CONARC was directed to release all Army National Guard personnel not later than midnight, 30 March. All Army National Guard personnel actually were released by 1800, except for 1,045 men required for administrative purposes.

e. The Army Reserve and National Guard personnel retained on active duty for administrative purposes were reduced to zero strength on 3 and 4 April respectively.
**Figure V-4**

**STRENGTHS COMMITTED TO POST OFFICES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>MARINES</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>ARMY NATIONAL GUARD</th>
<th>AIR NATIONAL GUARD</th>
<th>ARMY RESERVE</th>
<th>NAVAL RESERVE</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS RESERVE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Mar</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6,174</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>18,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>6,839</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>5,175</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>18,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**
I. (FOUO) Problems Encountered

a. Mobilization Regulations. Service regulations covering mobilization and demobilization contain certain administrative procedures that are not adaptable to a short duration operation. Examples are discussed in the following subparagraphs.

(1) Medical Processing.

(a) Statement of Problem. 1. Statutory. Federal law requires that medical examinations be given to members of the Army and Air National Guard called to active duty under the provisions of Sections 3500 and 8500, Title 10, United States Code, at the time of their call and prior to their release. There are no equivalent statutory requirements for members of the Army Reserve or for members of the Army and Air National Guard ordered to active duty pursuant to Section 673, Title 10, United States Code. 2. Regulatory. Army regulatory documents relating to the above-cited statutory requirements are inconsistent. Army Regulations 635-10, dated 21 May 1968, indicates that all personnel on active duty for less than 30 days are excluded from normal medical examination requirements. However, Army Regulation 135-300, dated 7 August 1969, provides for medical examinations for all Reserve Component members ordered to active duty. Army Regulation 135-300 further requires exit medical examinations prior to release from active duty for all Army Reserve personnel who have been mobilized incident to a civil disturbance and for Army National Guard called to civil disturbance duty. There is no clearly stated requirement for exit medical examinations of members of the Army National Guard who have been ordered to active duty or for members of the Army Reserve who have been ordered to active duty other than for civil disturbance control.

(b) How solved. As members of the National Guard were mobilized pursuant to Section 673, Title 10, United States Code, no medical examination was required by law upon release. Members of the Army Reserve were given the option of waiving medical examination at the time of release.

(2) Pay.

(a) Statement of problem. AR 135-20 requires payment of National Guard and Army Reserve personnel prior to release from active duty. The short duration of mobilization did not permit sufficient time to process pay records and prepare necessary pay rolls.
(b) How solved. A message waiving the requirement that individuals be paid prior to separation was dispatched to the field.

(3) Separation of Mobilized Reserve Component Personnel

(a) Statement of the problem. AR 135-20 governs the release of mobilized Reserve Component personnel. The AR provides for streamlined administrative procedures relative to the release of National Guard personnel only.

(b) How solved. It was agreed that in the GRAPHIC HAND situation, streamlined, modified procedures could also be applied to separation of Army Reserve personnel.

(4) Servicemembers Group Life Insurance (SGLI)

(a) Statement of the problem. The accelerated nature of the mobilization precluded proper orientation of personnel on SGLI.

(b) How solved. Authority was given to deviate from AR 608-2 with respect to declination of service member for SGLI coverage on the first day of active duty.

b. Command and Control.

(1) Statement of the problem. The possibility that in the future both GRAPHIC HAND and GARDEN PLOT (civil disturbance) type operations may be required in the same locality raises a potential command and control problem. The command and control structure for these two types of operations are different. Unlike that established for GRAPHIC HAND, the chain of command for GARDEN PLOT does not include CONARC or the CONUS Army Headquarters during the employment phase of a civil disturbance operation. For GARDEN PLOT operations, Task Force Headquarters are directly under the Chief of Staff, United States Army. In the event that both GRAPHIC HAND and GARDEN PLOT types of operations are conducted simultaneously at the same location, the potential conflict between two command lines becomes apparent.

(2) How solved. Currently under study. Due to the absence of a civil disturbance requiring execution of Operation GARDEN PLOT, the problem did not materialize during Operation GRAPHIC HAND.

c. Joint Post Office/Military Operations Center.

(1) Statement of problem. In event of a nationwide postal strike, the Task Group and CONARC would need strong representation with the Post Office Department at National and Regional levels.

(2) How solved. The problem did not present itself since Operation GRAPHIC HAND was executed in New York City only. However, if a nationwide strike should occur organization and operation of Joint Post Office/Military
Operations Centers at Postal Region level would better insure an efficient and timely response to Post Office Department requirements.

d. Reporting.

(1) Statement of the problem. Initially, reports of augmentation activities in some instances were not timely, did not provide adequate detail, and were inconsistent as far as content and format were concerned.

(2) How solved. Numerous messages and phone calls produced the information required; however, in future operations such as GRAPHIC HAND, the Operations Plan should contain an annex on reports. This annex should state what reports are required, their frequency, format and content. The reports should apply to all services and should be forwarded through headquarters exercising operational control.

e. Security.

(1) Statement of the problem. It was essential to assure the physical security of military personnel utilized in postal augmentation roles. It was possible that striking postal workers would consider military personnel as strike breakers, and take actions to harm military personnel or disrupt their postal activities. It was essential that confrontations between striking postal workers and military personnel be avoided.

(2) How solved.

(a) Military personnel were directed not to wear helmets, web gear, weapons, and such other equipment as might suggest a law enforcement role. Such gear was placed in armories, supply rooms and other areas accessible if needed, but stored to preclude inadvertent creation of hostile situations.

(b) Military personnel were directed to avoid confrontations, either verbal or physical. They were informed that law enforcement and maintenance of public order were functions of civil authorities.

(c) Augmentation personnel were informed that if they were faced with picket lines, or similar interferences, they should discontinue their mission, extricate themselves as quickly as possible, and report the matter promptly to their immediate superiors.

(d) Military personnel were kept out of or routed around areas where striking postal personnel were gathered.

(e) Commanders were directed to have military police available to assist local law enforcement officials in providing security for military postal augmentation personnel, but were cautioned to utilize the military police only if local law enforcement personnel were unable to contain situations which developed.
f. Public Information.

(1) Statement of the problem. It was essential that the public be fully aware of the role of military personnel in postal support activities. Although the Post Office Department was the principal agency for reporting to the press, it was essential for the services to assist public understanding by timely dissemination of public information guidance to all military levels. It was assumed that representatives of the news media, in pursuit of news, would, on occasion, interview military personnel utilized in the postal augmentation role.

(2) How solved.

(a) Operation Plan GRAPHIC HAND contained an information annex which provided policy guidance and procedures for information activities during the postal strike. This annex provided information for dissemination through command channels to the individual serviceman utilized in postal augmentation activities. The plan required that all personnel be oriented on the situation, their duties, responsibilities and relationship with postal officials and employees, with local authorities, the general public, and with representatives of the news media. The directive required that all augmentation personnel be oriented on the following:

1. Reason for military involvement.
2. The Service mission and role in the operation.
3. The command structure for the operation.
4. The specific mission of the unit.
5. The requirement for military personnel to maintain propriety, a neutral attitude and to avoid discussion of the merits of the operation actions.
6. The need to avoid speculation.
7. Requests from news media representatives or individual comments were to be politely referred to the Information Officer.

(b) Throughout the period of the military augmentation of the Post Office Department, command information fact sheets and other information dissemination means were utilized to keep augmentation personnel informed on matters considered essential.

g. Close-Hold Nature of Planning Phase.

(1) Statement of the problem. Because of the sensitivity of the services involvement in postal augmentation activities, most of the preliminary planning documents, records and reports were classified SECRET-Close Hold.
Many echelons of command which required the information being developed by the Task Group had limited facilities for receipt, handling and distribution of SECRET-Close Hold information.

(2) How solved. Liaison officers representing the Task Group were dispatched early in the preliminary planning periods to potential operational areas. These liaison officers, by frequent contact with the Task Group in the ACC, obtained and passed on to local operational areas current information needed for planning and execution of directives. Additionally, contingency plans required CG CONARC to provide senior reserve component officers for liaison with postal directors of the fifteen postal regions and for planning the use of military personnel in all regions if required to do so.

h. Use of Commercial Radio and Television to Announce Call-up of Reserve and National Guard Units.

(1) Statement of the problem. The notification of Reserve and National Guard Units of mobilization is very time consuming because of the widely scattered locations of many small sized units.

(2) How solved. The impact of this problem with regard to Army units was reduced as the result of announcements made by radio and television stations in the metropolitan New York area. These announcements were requested by the CG 77th ARCOM. No similar announcements were requested by the CG Task Force New York concerning units being mobilized by the other Services. Consideration should be given by the Task Force Commander to coordinating the use of radio and TV stations to announce all mobilizations.

2. (U) Lessons Learned.

a. Mobilization regulations should be modified to be applicable for short and long duration operations.

b. A compatible command and control arrangement should be established for execution of both GRAPHIC HAND and GARDEN PLOT type operations.

c. A Joint Post Office/Military Tactical Operations Center would be desirable at Regional Post Office Centers.

d. Required reports should be tailored to meet the situation, held to the absolute minimum, and forwarded through the chain of command established by the Executive Agent.

e. It is essential that service personnel be afforded physical security.

f. While the Post Office Department should be the principal agency for reporting to the press, the services should attempt to preclude public misinterpretation of the service role by timely dissemination of public information guidance to all levels.
g. Liaison officers, representing the Task Group Headquarters, should be dispatched as early as possible to potential operational areas.

h. Consideration should be given by Task Force Commanders to coordinating the use of commercial radio and TV stations to announce mobilizations.
ANNEX A
CHRONOLOGY

The sequence that follows highlights the events that transpired incident to Operation GRAPHIC HAND. In the interest of conciseness, no attempt has been made to treat the mass of details and coordinations that were involved. Times shown are Eastern Standard Time.

TUESDAY, 17 MARCH 1970

1800-2100: Manhattan - Bronx Branch 36, National Association of Letter Carriers, New York City, voted 1559 to 1055 in favor of a strike.

WEDNESDAY, 18 MARCH 1970

A.M.: Nearly 14,000 letter carriers in Bronx, Manhattan and Brooklyn stopped work and established picket lines around post offices and branches.

President Morris Biller, Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union representing 25,000 clerks and mail handlers recommended that members not cross picket lines - 22,000 clerks and mail handlers responded.

US Circuit Judge Inzer B. Wyatt issued temporary injunctions ordering employees to return to work.

Walkout spread to Queens, Richmond, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties.

National embargo placed on all mail destined for New York Metropolitan area.


THURSDAY, 19 MARCH 1970

DURING THE DAY: Work stoppage spread to post offices in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Colorado, and additional post offices in New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York states; Postmaster General issued an embargo on all classes of mail originating in and destined for northern New Jersey.

1430: Meeting called by the Bureau of Operations, Post Office Department to discuss the problem of handling military mail.

FRIDAY, 20 MARCH 1970

DURING THE DAY: Work stoppage spread to Chicago, Illinois; St. Paul, Minnesota; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; San Francisco, California; and other post offices in California and Las Vegas, Nevada.
0900: Meeting held in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) to discuss possible ways the armed forces could assist the Post Office Department if called upon.

1035: Ad-hoc planning group convened to prepare Operation Plan GRAPHIC HAND.

1135: Planning meeting held in the Army Operations Center; Army was informally appointed executive agent for planning.

SATURDAY, 21 MARCH 1970

0920: Secretary of the Army delegated to the Under Secretary of the Army authority relating to the postal crisis.

0930: GRAPHIC HAND planning conference; draft Operation Plan presented for review by the Army Staff and representatives of the Navy and Air Force.

1200: Chief of Staff, Army briefed on GRAPHIC HAND planning.

1200 approximate time: President Nixon told newsmen that if the strike was not over by Monday (23 March) "I will meet my constitutional obligation to see to it that the mails go through."

1320: Chief of Staff, Army directed CG, CONARC to send representative to Joint Task Group.

1430: Commandant Third Naval District (COMTHREE) alerted by Office of Chief of Staff of Naval Operations, and preliminary telephone calls made to Naval and Marine Corps activities in New York City area.

1700: Army Operations Center augmented.

1728: Operation Plan GRAPHIC HAND Warning Order transmitted.

2200: GRAPHIC HAND Task Group liaison officers dispatched to New York City, Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington, D. C.

SUNDAY, 22 MARCH 1970

DURING A.M.: Contingency planning for nationwide postal strike initiated.

0542: Operation Plan GRAPHIC HAND coordinating instructions transmitted directing preparations for the commitment of military personnel to support essential postal operations in New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia during the morning of 23 March (Monday).

0800: Joint Emergency Operations Center established at Ft. Hamilton, New York City.

0800: Liaison established with postal authorities in New York City.
0900: Liaison established with postal authorities in Philadelphia.
0930: Task Force New York established.
1000: Liaison established with postal authorities in Boston.
1009: COMTHREE advised that Navy/Marine Corps personnel requirement (less supervisory personnel) would be 900 men.
1013: COMTHREE designated Naval point of contact in NYC area and instructed to provide forces and assistance as requested by CG, Task Force New York.
1400: Planning meeting conducted at Fort Hamilton by CG, Task Force New York.
1615: Headquarters Command Post for regular forces established at Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street, NYC.
1809: Message transmitted directing contingency planning against the possibility of civil disorders which could endanger the security of military postal augmentees.
2345: Commanding officers of regular Navy/Marine Corps activities notified of specific augmentation requirements.

MONDAY, 23 MARCH 1970

0130: Operation Plan GRAPHIC HAND dispatched by special courier.
0815: Navy liaison watch (3 officers on 8-hour shifts each) established at Joint Emergency Operations Center, Fort Hamilton.
0930: Active service personnel designated to augment New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia postal facilities placed on one-hour alert status.
1000: GRAPHIC HAND Task Group liaison officers directed to proceed to Detroit and Chicago.
1415: President Nixon declared a national emergency and ordered military personnel to augment post offices; Secretary of Defense designated Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent.
1415: Following the Presidential announcement, return to work movement began in areas outside New York City.
1430: Air Force Battle Staff activated.
1544: Decision made to mobilize Reserve Component forces.
1556: Execution order for token augmentation of New York City post offices by active service personnel transmitted to CG, CONARC.
2200: First shift of active service personnel on duty in New York City post offices.

1640: Active service personnel designated to augment Boston, and Philadelphia postal facilities placed on four-hour alert status vice one-hour.

1650: Liaison established with postal authorities in Chicago.

1717: Main body of Army contingent departed For Dix for New York City.

1730: Liaison established with postal authorities in Detroit.

1730: COMTHREE notified to activate Naval Reserve personnel effective 0645, 24 March.

2135: Task Force New York received confirmation of the final decision of postal authorities to commence augmentation of General Post Office, Church Street Post Office, and Brooklyn Post Office.

2140: Active Army and Air Force personnel closed New York City.

2159: Order transmitted to mobilize Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Army, Naval, and Marine Reserves.

2200: First shift of active service personnel on duty in New York City post offices.

2230: Augmenting force of 137 Regular Navy personnel reported for duty at General Post Office, 33rd Street and 6th Avenue, NYC.

TUESDAY, 24 MARCH 1970

DURING THE DAY: Back to work trend continued; embargoes lifted in Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee.

0136: Air Force initiated mobilization of 1st and 2nd Air Postal and Courier Group (Reserve) to assist in processing military mail.

0645: Reserve Component personnel responded to mobilization orders.

0800: Command Post established at COMTHREE HQ to coordinate Naval/Marine Corps Reserve participation.

1000: Active service personnel on duty in New York City post offices.

1030: Active service personnel designated to augment Boston postal facilities released from alert status.

1300: Reserve Component personnel on duty in New York City post offices.
1545: Liaison team in Boston closed out operations.

2100: All postal augmentation duties assumed by Reserve Components.

WEDNESDAY, 25 MARCH 1970

0135: Warning Order for withdrawal of active service personnel transmitted.

0600-1200: Postal employees returned to work in all Postal Regions except New York; employees returned to work at 164 of 220 striking Post Offices in New York.

1000-approximate time: Embargoes lifted on all ZIP coded first-class and airmail.

1313: Active service personnel designated to augment Philadelphia postal facilities released from alert status.

1430: Liaison team departed Philadelphia.

1605: Regular Navy/Marine Corps augmenting personnel depart General Post Office.

1900: Regular Air Force personnel redeployed to McGuire Air Force Base.

2100: Operational control of Regular Navy and Marine Corps augmentation forces released to parent service.

THURSDAY, 26 MARCH 1970

DURING THE DAY: All post offices resumed normal operations except for operations in Chicago which were hampered by a 10 inch snowfall.

0225: New York City postal authorities determined that there was no requirement to employ service personnel; on call only.

0630: Active Army contingent departs New York City for Fort Dix.

0926: Warning Order for release of Reserve Component personnel transmitted.

0950: Liaison team dispatched to Chicago directed to return to close out operations.

1027: Postmaster General requested that the strength of mobilized forces not be reduced below 10,000.

1027: Except for Army Reserve residual force retained for administrative requirements, Air National Guard and Army, Naval, and Marine Corps Reserve Component personnel released from active duty effective 262400; Army National Guard personnel remain on active duty.

1050: Liaison team in Detroit directed to close out operations.
1330: Air National Guard and Army, Navy, and Marine Corps reservists released to the control of their parent service for demobilization.

1400: COMTHEEE notified to release all Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve personnel from active duty.

2130: Separation of Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve personnel by parent Training Centers completed.

FRIDAY, 27 MARCH 1970

0700: Command Post at COMTHEEE HQ disestablished.

1502: Federalized Army National Guard personnel authorized weekend pass.

MONDAY, 30 MARCH 1970

1030: Contingency plans for nationwide postal augmentation approved.

1800: All Army National Guard personnel released from active duty except for residual administrative personnel.

2400: Joint Emergency Operations Center at Ft. Hamilton, New York City disestablished.

1100: Liaison operations in New York City terminated.

FRIDAY, 3 APRIL 1970

1800: Manning of Army Operations Center reverted to non-crisis level, i.e., augmentation team members on 2 hour alert status.

2400: Remaining Army Reserve personnel retained on active duty for post-mobilization administrative duty released from active duty effective 2400.

SATURDAY, 4 APRIL 1970

2400: Remaining Army National Guard personnel retained on active duty for post-mobilization administrative duty released from duty effective 2400.
ANNEX B

PROCLAMATIONS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS

This Annex provides pertinent supporting documents for Operation GRAPHIC HAND. Items described below are inclosed as Appendices to this Annex.

a. Proclamations and Executive Orders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPENDIX</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>SIGNER</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE</td>
<td>Winton M. Blount</td>
<td>22 March 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Declaring a National Emergency</td>
<td>Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States</td>
<td>23 March 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Calling into Service Members and Units of the National Guard</td>
<td>Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States</td>
<td>23 March 1970</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

b. Implementing Instructions.

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<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>MAIN POINTS</th>
<th>DATE/TIME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>945715</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svs and CONARC</td>
<td>Warning Order -- Department of the Army Operation Plan Graphic Hand</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army is executive agent. Concept of Operations.</td>
<td>211728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>945716</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svs and CONARC</td>
<td>DOD Augmentation of the US Post Office Department (Graphic Hand)</td>
<td>Coordination instructions. Command and control. Prepare to execute.</td>
<td>220542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>DA OUT NO</td>
<td>FROM</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>945722</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>CONARC</td>
<td>One Hour Alert</td>
<td>Designated Forces placed on one hour alert.</td>
<td>221804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>945720</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svcs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Authorization to proceed with all preparations for move.</td>
<td>221809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>945721</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svcs, CONARC, &amp; Armies</td>
<td>Department of the Army Operation Plan Graphic Hand</td>
<td>Instructions to commanders. Special Orders.</td>
<td>222334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>945792</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svcs, CONARC, &amp; Armies</td>
<td>Execution Order -- Operation Plan Graphic Hand</td>
<td>Execute for NYC only.</td>
<td>231556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>945887</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>JCS, CONARC, &amp; US Army One</td>
<td>Mobilization Order -- Graphic Hand</td>
<td>Amendment to Mobilization Order Hand</td>
<td>240308</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>945872</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>CONARC</td>
<td>Department of the Army Operation Plan Graphic Hand</td>
<td>National Guard being mobilized. Replace active svcs.</td>
<td>242013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>945873</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>NY Gov, CONARC Sec of Air Force</td>
<td>None Recorded</td>
<td>Mobilization order -- NG</td>
<td>242024</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>945880</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>JCS, CONARC, US Army One</td>
<td>Mobilization Order Graphic Hand</td>
<td>Mobilization order -- NG and Reserves</td>
<td>242159</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>945937</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svcs and CONARC</td>
<td>Command and control of Services Committed to Operation Graphic Hand</td>
<td>CONARC will command all forces.</td>
<td>241424</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>DA OUT NO</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>946046</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>JCS, CONARC, &amp; US Army One</td>
<td>Mobilization order -- Graphic Hand</td>
<td>Amendment to Mobilization Order.</td>
<td>250128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>946047</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svcs</td>
<td>Transfer of Responsibility from Active Duty Units to Selected Reserve Component Units</td>
<td>Active forces withdrawal instructions.</td>
<td>250135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>946246</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svcs and CONARC</td>
<td>Classification of Graphic Hand Message Traffic</td>
<td>Downgrading current traffic to unclassified.</td>
<td>251842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>946263</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svcs and CONARC</td>
<td>Operation Graphic Hand Release of Service Reserve Component Units from Active Duty</td>
<td>Auth to release NG and Reserves.</td>
<td>260926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>946266</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svcs and CONARC</td>
<td>Operation Graphic Hand Release of Service Reserve Component Units from Active Duty</td>
<td>Release all but 10,000.</td>
<td>261027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>946733</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Chiefs of Mil Svcs and CONARC</td>
<td>Operation Graphic Hand -- Release of Service Reserve Component Units from Active Duty</td>
<td>Release residual force.</td>
<td>300913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>948414</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>JCS, CONARC, &amp; US Army One</td>
<td>Mobilization order -- Graphic Hand</td>
<td>Amendment to Mobilization Order</td>
<td>101616</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: THE POSTMASTER GENERAL

March 22, 1970

Upon instruction from the President, I hereby request, pursuant to the provisions of the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S. Code 686), materials, supplies, equipment, work and services sufficient to permit the Post Office Department to safeguard, process and deliver the mail in those areas in which normal mail service has been impaired by work stoppages among postal employees.

Winton M. Blount
DECLARING A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

By the President of the United States of America

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS certain employees of the Postal Service are engaged in an unlawful work stoppage which has prevented the delivery of the mails and the discharge of other postal functions in various parts of the United States; and

WHEREAS, as a result of such unlawful work stoppage the performance of critical governmental and private functions, such as the processing of men into the Armed Forces of the United States, the transmission of tax refunds and the receipt of tax collections, the transmission of Social Security and welfare payments, and the conduct of numerous and important commercial transactions, has wholly ceased or is seriously impeded; and

WHEREAS the continuance of such work stoppage with its attendant consequences will impair the ability of this nation to carry out its obligations abroad, and will cripple or halt the official and commercial intercourse which is essential to the conduct of its domestic business:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America, pursuant to the powers vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States and more particularly by the provisions of Section 673 of Title 10 of the United States Code, do hereby declare a state of national emergency, and direct the Secretary of Defense to take such action as he deems necessary to carry out the provisions of the said Section 673 in order that the laws of the United States pertaining to the Post Office Department may be executed in accordance with their terms.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-third day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-fourth.

RICHARD NIXON

# # # #

B-2-1
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
MARCH 23, 1970

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE ORDER

CALLING INTO SERVICE MEMBERS AND UNITS
OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

WHEREAS certain employees of the Postal Service are engaged in an unlawful work stoppage which has prevented the delivery of the mails and the discharge of other postal functions in various parts of the United States; and

WHEREAS the laws of the United States, including Sections 707, 5102, 6001, and 6101 of Title 39, United States Code require that the business of the Post Office Department, including the expeditious processing and delivery of the mail, be regularly carried on; and

WHEREAS the aforesaid unlawful work stoppage has prevented and is preventing the execution of the aforesaid laws relating to the Post Office Department; and

WHEREAS the breakdown of the postal service in the numerous areas affected by the said unlawful work stoppage is a matter of grave national concern; and

WHEREAS I am charged by the Constitution of the United States to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and I have determined that I am unable solely with the regular forces to cause the aforesaid laws to be executed;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Sections 3500 and 8500 of Title 10 of the United States Code and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, do hereby order as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to take all appropriate steps to respond to requests of the Postmaster General for assistance in restoring and maintaining Postal service and to execute the Postal Service
Section 2. In furtherance of the authorization and direction contained in section 1 hereof, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the Arm Forces of the United States as he may deem necessary.

Section 3. I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of Defense to call into the active military service of the United States, as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this order, any or all of the units of the Army National Guard and of the Air National Guard that he deems appropriate to serve in the active military service of the United States for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders. In carrying out the provisions of this order, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use the units, and members thereof, of the Army National Guard and of the Air National Guard called into the active military service of the United States pursuant to this section.

Section 4. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to delegate within the Department of Defense any of the authority conferred upon him by this Executive Order.

RICHARD NIXON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Request for Assistance from the Post Office Department

The Department of Defense has been requested by the Postmaster General of the United States to render assistance in connection with work stoppages within the Post Office Department.

You are hereby designated Executive Agent for the Department of Defense in all matters pertaining to the rendering of assistance to the Post Office Department by making available materials, supplies, equipment or services in connection with any such requests. You are delegated any and all authority vested in me in order to accomplish the request of the Postmaster General. Mr. Barry Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics, will be my personal representative from the OSD staff. He will be available to provide assistance and coordination from OSD.

Resources used to accomplish this mission will be Department of Navy and Department of Air Force, in addition to Army. You are authorized to call upon the Secretary of the Air Force; the Secretary of the Navy or any Department of Defense components to provide resources necessary. It should be made clear that reimbursement to DOD will be expected for resources expended and out-of-pocket costs.

You are authorized to redelega the authority vested in you by this memorandum to the Under Secretary of the Army.
I. (S) SA HAS BEEN APPOINTED DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR PLANNING AND EXECUTION IF DIRECTED FOR AUGMENTATION OF THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT DURING THE CURRENT STRIKE OF THE LETTER CARRIER'S UNION.

II. (S) SITUATION

A. SITUATION: AS A RESULT OF A WILDCAT STRIKE BY THE LETTER CARRIERS UNION THERE ARE CURRENTLY 39 MAJOR POSTAL INSTALLATIONS STRUCK. THIS HAS PARALYZED MAIL SERVICE IN NEW YORK CITY, NEW JERSEY AND CONNECTICUT AND DISRUPTED MAIL SERVICE IN COLORADO, PENNSYLVANIA, OHIO, MICHIGAN, MINNESOTA AND WISCONSIN.

III. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

US NAVAL AND AIR FORCE FORCES AS REQUIRED BY THE DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT.

IV. (S) ASSUMPTIONS:

A. THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL DECLARE A NATIONAL EMERGENCY REQUIRED FOR EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES IN ANY AREA WHERE THEIR USE IS CONTEMPLATED.

B. THAT POSTAL STRIKES MAY OCCUR IN ANY OR ALL OF THE FIFTEEN MAJOR POSTAL REGIONS CAUSING SEVERE DISLOCATION AND HARDSHIP TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.
C. That sufficient post office department supervisory personnel will be available in post office installations augmented by military personnel so that necessary coordination and guidance of the military support effort can be accomplished.

5. (S) MISSION

To assure delivery of essential U.S. mail as directed.

6. (S) EXECUTION

A. Concept: If directed by the President, the Secretary of the Army, through appropriate military commanders, will employ federal forces to augment the US postal department on a phased basis, as required, with the assets necessary to re-establish and maintain essential postal service for such length of time as may be necessary and appropriate. Units and individuals of the National Guard may be called into federal service if the President determines he is unable to execute the laws of the U.S. with the regular forces (10 U.S.C. 3500). Units and individuals of the reserves may be ordered to extended active duty involuntarily only after a declaration of national emergency by the President or Congress (10 U.S.C. 672, 673). The existing chain of command through CG, CONARC, will be employed.
B. This operation is likely to be conducted in one or more of the following three phases:

1. Phase 1 - DOD is required to provide capability to handle the essential mail requirement for the New York/Newark area.

2. Phase 2 - DOD is required to provide capability to handle mail in specific areas disrupted by the strike.

3. Phase 3 - DOD is required to provide capability to handle mail requirements for the 15 postal regions in CONUS.

7. The above plan is based upon the utilization of both National Guard and Army Reserve personnel and units. In the event Paragraph 4A does not obtain, force options in order of selection will be:

A. National Guard only.

B. National Guard augmented by active Army.

C. Active Army only.
8. (U) THIS OPERATION IS CLASSIFIED SECRET UNTIL ORDERED EXECUTED
AT WHICH TIME IT WILL BE DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED. DISSEMINATION
OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN WILL BE ON A STRICT "NEED-TO-KNOW"
BASIS. NO ACTIVITY WILL BE UNDERTAKEN WHICH WILL DISCLOSE THIS CON-
TEMPLATED OPERATION PREMATURELY AND THUS IMPACT UPON LABOR NEGOTIA-
TIONS UNDERWAY.

9. (S) CGUSCONARC AND CONUS ARMY COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED DIRECT
COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER SERVICES AT COMPARABLE
LEVELS. NO, REPEAT NO, CONTACT WITH POSTAL AUTHORITIES UNTIL FUR-
THER NOTICE.

10. (U) WARNING ORDER ONLY. ACKNOWLEDGE. GP-4

ADVANCE COPY SENT TO DAF AT

2/23/70 MAR 70.

DA OUT 945715

UNCLASSIFIED

B-5-5
FROM: DA
TO: CNO

ZEN -> CSAF
CINC

INFO: CGUSAONE FT HEADE MD
CGUSATHREE FT HICHERSON GA
CGUSAFOUR FT SAN HOUSTON TX
CGUSAFIVE FT SHERIDAN IL
CGUSASIX SFRAH CA
CG USARADCOM
CGUSANC
CGUSASA AHS VA
CGUSAHTEC FT HOLABIRD MD
CGUSASTRATCOM FT HUACHUCA AZ
CG MDW WASH DC - COURIER

JCS
DIRECTOR DSA

ODCOPS AOC
SUBJ: DOD AUGMENTATION OF THE US POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT (S)

(GRAPHIC HAND) (U)

1. (U) REFERENCE DA MSG GRAPHIC HAND, 212228Z, MAR 70

2. (S) THIS IS DIRECTIVE TO PLAN SELECTIVE PORTIONS OF DA PLAN

GRAPHIC HAND AND PREPARE TO EXECUTE ORDER BY OSD EXECUTIVE AGENT

(SEC ARMY).

3. (S) DOD AUGMENTATION TO SUPPORT ESSENTIAL POSTAL OPERATIONS

WILL BE PROVIDED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS IN THE APPROXIMATE

STRENGTHS INDICATED ON A.M. 23 MARCH 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK, N.Y.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSTON, MASS</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILADELPHIA</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARMED FORCES STRENGTHS ABOVE ARE FOR DIRECT AUGMENTATION ONLY AND

DO NOT INCLUDE COMMAND SUPERVISORY AND CONTROL OR LOGISTICAL/ADMINIS-

TRATION OVERHEAD. PERSONNEL WILL BE DRAWN FROM UNITS OF THE SERVICES

IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA/VICINITY, INsofar AS POSSIBLE.
4. (S) COMMAND CONTROL. A TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS FOR OPERA-
TION GRAPHIC HANDS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER
(AOC) HEADQUARTERS DA. THE CG COMARC WILL DESIGNATE SUBORDINATE
TASK FORCE COMMANDERS TO CONTROL COMMITTED DOD ELEMENTS IN THE THREE
CITIES BEING AUGMENTED. THESE GRAPHIC HAND TASK FORCE COMMANDERS
WILL ESTABLISH DIRECT COORDINATION WITH THE REGIONAL POSTAL HEAD-
QUARTERS IN THESE CITIES. ONCE ESTABLISHED THESE TASK FORCE COM-
MANDERS WILL REPORT TO THE COMARC COMMANDER AT AOC HEADQUARTERS DA.

5. (S) FOLLOWING THE INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE ORDER, A NATIONAL NEWS RELEASE WILL BE MADE WHICH EXPLAINS
THE MISSION AND ROLE OF THE PARTICIPATING DOD ELEMENTS. QUERIES MAY
BE ANSWERED LOCALLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT
AND PREVIOUSLY CLEARED NEWS RELEASES. QUERIES WHICH CANNOT BE AN-
SWERED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS GUIDANCE WILL BE REFERRED THROUGH
SERVICE INFORMATION CHANNELS TO OASD(PA) WITH INFORMATION COPIES TO
AOC HEADQUARTERS DA. A COMMAND INFORMATION FACT SHEET WILL BE PRE-
PARED AND UPON EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN WILL BE GIVEN SERVICE-WIDE
DISTRIBUTION FOR USE IN ORIENTATION BRIEFINGS FOR MILITARY AND CIVIL-
IAN PERSONNEL.
6. (S) ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL WILL REPORT IN NORMAL FIELD/WORK UNIFORM WITHOUT REPEAT WITHOUT THE FOLLOWING: HELMETS, WEB EQUIPMENT, GAS MASKS, WEAPONS, OR OTHER EQUIPMENT THAT MIGHT IMPLY THEIR PARTICIPATION IN A CIVIL DISTURBANCE ACTION. POLICE ESCORT FOR MOVEMENT OF TROOPS WITHIN METROPOLITAN AREAS SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. THERE WILL BE NO ATTEMPT BY FEDERAL TROOPS TO ENFORCE THE LAW BEYOND PROTECTION AGAINST LOSS OF LIFE OR SAFEGUARDING FEDERAL PROPERTY. EVEN ON THESE CASES, SHOULD THEY ARISE, EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO DEFER TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

7. (S) IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT SUPPORT BY AUGMENTING DOD PERSONNEL WILL BE PRIMARILY CLERICAL DUTIES, MAIL HANDLING AND SORTING WITHIN POSTAL FACILITIES, AND LIMITED DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN POST OFFICES.

8. (C) REQUEST CHQ AND CSAF DESIGNATE POINTS OF CONTACT IN THE NEW YORK, BOSTON, AND PHILADELPHIA AREAS AND ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH THE GRAPHIC HAND TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN THOSE AREAS WHEN DESIGNATED. IN THE INTERIM, NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS CONARC OF DESIGNATED POINTS OF CONTACT. REQUEST INFORMATION COPIES OF ALL ACTION MESSAGES/DOCUMENTS BE ROUTED TO THIS HQ, ATTH ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER.
1. (S) MEETINGS WILL BE HELD BY POST OFFICE REGIONAL DIRECTORS IN NEW YORK, BOSTON, AND PHILADELPHIA EARLY TODAY 22 MARCH 1970. REQUEST SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES CONTACT THE LOCAL POSTAL AUTHORITIES SOONEST VIA PHONE AT: NEW YORK, 212-971-5481 OR 5987 OR 2396 OR 2697; BOSTON, 417-223-2524 OR 2470 OR 2574; PHILADELPHIA, 215-597-9766 AND ARRANGE TO HAVE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES, IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, ATTEND THOSE MEETINGS. G-P 4

Advance copy sent to DA: at 221049Z MAR 70
CGUSAGONE Ft Meade MD
CGUSATHREE Ft McPherson GA
CGUSAFOUR Ft Sam Houston TX
CGUSAFIVE Ft Sheridan ILL
CGUSASIX SFRAN CA
CG 21 AF McGuire AFB NJ
CMGR McGuire AFB NJ
CMGR L.G. Hanson Field Mass
CMGR Dover AFB Del
CMGR ENT AFB Colo
CGUSAMC
CGUSASA AHS VA
CGUSANTC Ft Holabird MD.

ARSTAF SEE APPENDIX
USCONEC. Lo DA Memo 105-1

REF A IS DA 945735
REF B IS DA 945735

DA OUT 945722

UNCLASSIFIED
INFO: CGUSA STRATCOM
CGMDW
CG FT DIX NJ
CG FT DEVENS MASS
CG FT MEADE MD
CGUSAAC ST LOUIS MO

SECRET CLEAR HOLD
DA COMD CENTER
SUBJ: ONE HOUR ALERT CS3

REF:
A. DA MSG DTG 232222Z MAR 70.
B. DA MSG DTG 222309Z MAR 70.

CS3 ALL GRAPHIC HAND FORCES DESIGNATED TO AUGMENT SELECTED POSTAL FACILITIES ARE PLACED ON ONE HOUR ALERT FOR MOVEMENT EFFECTIVE 0930 HOURS, 23 MAR 70. ACKNOWLEDGE.

DA OUT 945722

UNCLASSIFIED
{U} REF: DA MESSAGE. DATE: 22 MAR 70. SUB: DOD AUGMENTATION OF THE US POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT {S} GRAPHIC HAND {U}.

1. {S} IN ADDITION TO THE POSTAL AUGMENTATION FORCE, BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY SUFFICIENT MILITARY POLICE TO ASSIST, AS REQUIRED, THE MUNICIPAL POLICE IN MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER AT THE FEDERAL POST OFFICES CONCERNED.

2. {S} YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH ALL NECESSARY PREPARATIONS IN ORDER TO MOVE BY 230000, MAR 70.

3. {S} EQUIPMENT MENTIONED IN PARA 6 OF REFERENCED MSG MAY BE TAKEN BUT KEPT AT DESIGNATED MILITARY CANTONEMENTS.

4. {S} AT THOSE POST OFFICES WHERE TWO OR MORE SERVICES ARE INVOLVED, THE SEVERAL CONTINGENTS WILL APPEAR AS NEAR SIMULTANEOUSLY AS IS POSSIBLE.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE.

G.P-3
DA
CNO
CSAF
CMC
CGCONARC
CGUSAONE
CGUSATHREE
CGUSAFOUR
CGUSAFIVE
CGUSASIX
CGUSARADCOM
CGUSAMC
CGUSASA
CGUSAINTC
CGUSAISTRATCOM
CGMDW
COUSAAC

JCS
DIRECTOR DSA

ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER
J.C. FIGHTER...COL. GS. DUTY GEN.

DA OUT 954721

1970 WIR 23. 04 252
ODCSOPS AOC

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND

1. (U) A. DA MSG GRAPHIC HAND, 212228Z MAR 70.
   B. DA MSG GRAPHIC HAND, 221042Z MAR 70.

2. (S) UPON COMMITMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE
   AUGMENTATION OF THE US POSTAL DEPARTMENT AND UPON IMPLI-
   CATION OF OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCT
   OF AUGMENTATION ACTIVITIES WILL APPLY:

   A. YOUR MISSION AS COMMANDER IS TO ASSIST THE POST
      OFFICE DEPARTMENT IN MAINTAINING EFFICIENT POSTAL SERVICE
      TO THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES. IN DOING SO, PERSONNEL
      UNDER YOUR COMMAND WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO PROTECT THE MAIL
      ENTRUSTED TO THEM AND NOT TO ALLOW UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS
      TO TAKE, HARM, OR TAMPER WITH THE MAIL IN THEIR CARE.

   B. IN FULFILLING THIS MISSION, YOU MUST BE COGNIZANT
      OF THE FACT THAT ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW AND THE MAINTENANCE
OF PUBLIC ORDER ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES. PERSONNEL UNDER YOUR COMMAND WILL NOT BE ARMED AND WILL NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF PROTECTING THEMSELVES. 

WHILE PROVIDING MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO THE POSTAL AUTHORITIES, YOU SHOULD ADVISE PERSONS UNDER YOUR COMMAND THAT THEY MUST ALWAYS BE AWARE OF SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT CAUSE THEM TO BE PLACED IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AND THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO AVOID SUCH A SITUATION.

C. MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSISTING POSTAL AUTHORITIES MAY BE CONFRONTED BY ELEMENTS SUCH AS STRIKERS AND DISSIDENT GROUPS WHICH WILL ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE, EXPLOIT, AND HARRASS THEM. IN ORDER TO LESSEN THE POSSIBILITY OF BODILY HARM. PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ADVISED TO AVOID ANY CONFRONTATIONS, VERBAL OR OTHERWISE, WHICH MAY TEND TO BE VOLATILE. YOU AS COMMANDER WILL TAKE NECESSARY ACTION TO ENSURE THAT PERSONNEL UNDER YOUR COMMAND ARE NOT PLACED IN OBVIOUS SITUATIONS WHICH WOULD CAUSE CONFRONTATIONS WITH SUCH ELEMENTS. IN THE EVENT THAT MILITARY

DA OUT 945721
PERSONNEL FIND THEMSELVES IN SUCH A POSITION, THEY SHOULD BE
INSTRUCTED TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND
REPORT THE INCIDENT TO PROPER AUTHORITIES.

3. (S) THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL SPECIAL ORDERS WILL PERTAIN
FOR OPERATION GRAPHIC HAND. THESE ORDERS ARE TO BE PRINTED
IN POCKET-SIZE FOR ISSUE TO INDIVIDUALS AND IN THE INTERIM ARE
QUOTED BELOW:

"MY MISSION IS TO ASSIST THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT IN
OBTAINING ESSENTIAL POSTAL SERVICE TO THE CITIZENS OF THE
UNITED STATES. IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS MISSION:

A. I WILL ALWAYS PRESENT A NEAT MILITARY APPEARANCE. I
WILL CONDUCT MYSELF IN A MILITARY MANNER AT ALL TIMES, AND I
WILL DO ALL I CAN TO BRING CREDIT UPON MYSELF, MY UNIT, AND
THE MILITARY SERVICE.

B. I WILL NOT TAMPER WITH, OPEN, OR READ MORE THAN THE
ADDRESS OF ANY PIECE OF MAIL.

C. I WILL CARE FOR AND PROTECT ANY MAIL ENTRUSTED TO ME."
TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, I WILL NOT ALLOW UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS TO TAKE, HARM, OR TAMPER WITH THE MAIL.

D. I WILL NOT DISCUSS OR PASS ON RUMORS ABOUT THIS OPERATION.

E. I WILL NOT COMMENT TO ANYONE ABOUT THE MERITS OF THIS DISPUTE OR THE OPINIONS OF ANY PERSONS INVOLVED.

F. I WILL BE COURTEOUS IN ALL DEALINGS WITH CIVILIANS.


H. IF FACED WITH A PICKET LINE OR OTHER SIMILAR INTERFERENCE TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MY MISSION, I WILL REPORT THE FACTS TO HIGHER AUTHORITY AND WILL NOT CONTINUE MY MISSION UNTIL MY WAY HAS BEEN CLEARED BY PROPER AUTHORITY.

4. {S} PUBLIC INFORMATION.

A. DISTRIBUTION OR PROMULGATION OF RUMORS CONCERNING
OPERATION GRAPHIC HAND WILL BE DISCOURAGED.

B. RESPONSES TO QUERIES TO INDIVIDUAL MILITARY PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN OPERATION GRAPHIC HAND FROM NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE LIMITED TO INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THEIR SPECIAL ORDERS {PARA 3 ABOVE}.

C. RESPONSES TO QUERIES FROM NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS HAVING AN INFORMATION OFFICER SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE CONTEXT OF PREVIOUSLY CLEARED ANNOUNCEMENTS AND RELEASES AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES. QUERIES WHICH CANNOT BE ANSWERED WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK WILL BE REFERRED THROUGH SERVICE INFORMATION CHANNELS TO OASD{PA}.

D. FURTHER PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED BY ELECTRICAL MESSAGE AFTER ANNOUNCEMENTS AND POLICY STATEMENTS ARE MADE BY THE WHITE HOUSE AND DOD.

E. INITIAL NEWS RELEASE OF THIS OPERATION IS RESERVED TO OASD {PA}.
5. Plan Graphic Hand is based upon the assumption that adequate supervisory Postal Department officials will be present to satisfy hard skill (technical) requirements for continuance of mail services and appropriate supervision and training of military forces provided in augmentation. Established command and communications channels for military personnel will pertain. Military commanders at all levels will respond to the tasking of Post Office Department officials. It is emphasized that the role of the military in this regard is the provision of support requested by the Postmaster General.

6. This operation is classified secret until ordered executed at which time it will be downgraded to unclassified. Dissemination of information contained herein will be on a strict "need-to-know" basis. No activity will be undertaken which will disclose this contemplated operation prematurely and thus impact upon labor negotiations underway. Acknowledge.
ODCSOPS OD AOC

SUBJ: EXECUTION ORDER - OPERATION PLAN {OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND} {U}

1. {S} REFERENCES
   A. DA MSG 21228Z MAR 70. SUBJ: WARNING ORDER - DEPARTMENT OF
      THE ARMY OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND.
   B. OPERATION PLAN GRAPHIC HAND {U} 21 MARCH 1970.
   C. DA MSG 22104Z MAR 70. SUBJ: DOD AUGMENTATION OF THE U.S.
      POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT {S} {GRAPHIC HAND} {U}.

2. {S} REFERENCE A IS OUTLINE OF BASIC DA PLAN FOR AUGMENTATION OF
   POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT DURING CURRENT STRIKE CRISIS. REFERENCE B IS
   BASIC POST OFFICE AUGMENTATION PLAN. REFERENCE C OUTLINES LOCATIONS
   AUGMENTATION FORCE STRENGTHS COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS AND COORDINATING
   INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXECUTION OF OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND.

3. {S} THIS IS DIRECTIVE TO EXECUTE OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND FOR
   NEW YORK CITY ONLY.
4. (S) MOVEMENT OF AUGMENTATION FORCES PRESCRIBED BY PARA 3
REF C PLUS OVERHEAD WILL COMMENCE NOT EARLIER THAN 232045Z MAR 70.
1970. TASK FORCE (TF) COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE MOVEMENTS WITH
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND WILL REPORT TIMES OF COMMENCEMENT
OF MOVEMENT AND CLOSURE IN TASK FORCE AUGMENTATION LOCATIONS PLUS
INCIDENTS/ACCIDENTS ENROUTE.
5. (S) ON CLOSURE, AUGMENTATION LOCATIONS TF COMMANDERS WILL
REPORT:
   A. TF COMMAND POST LOCATIONS AND PERTINENT TELEPHONE NUMBERS.
   B. ESTIMATED TIME OF REACHING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY IN
      AUGMENTATION MISSION.
   C. ACTUAL TIME OF REACHING OPERATIONAL STATUS IN AUGMENTATION
      MISSION.
6. MOVEMENT REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH
   5A, APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F, REFERENCE B.
ACKNOWLEDGE. GP-4
UNCLASSIFIED

DA
JCS
CGCONARC
CGUSAONE FT MEADE MD
INFO
CGUSATHREE FT MCPHERSON GA
CGUSAFOUR FT SAM HOUSTON TX
CGUSASIX SFRAE CA
CGARADCOM
CINCUSAREUR
CGUSAISTRATCOM
CGUSAINTC FT HOLABIRD MD
GOVERNOR - NEW YORK, ALBANY NY
CG FT HAMILTON NY
CINCSTRIKE

UNCLAS
DCSOPS AOC

SUBJECT: MOBILIZATION ORDER GRAPHIC HAND

REF DA MSG DTG 240259Z MAR 70; SUBJ: MOBILIZATION ORDER
GRAPHIC HAND {U}.

DA OUL 845887

TC C.T. SCHULER/CORC/59837

J.A. KJELLSTROM, COL/DUTY GEN

REF IS DA OUL 945880
THE FOLLOWING UNITS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ARE ADDED TO THE UNITS TO BE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY AS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFERENCED MESSAGE:

- 569 TC BN
- 102 LT MNT CO
- 145 LT MNT CO

ACKNOWLEDGE.
SUBJ: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OP ORDER GRAPHIC HAND TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM ACTIVE DUTY UNITS TO SELECTED RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS {U} THIS IS A CLOSE HOLD MESSAGE REFERENCES {U}
A. DA MSG 212228Z MAR 70, WARNING ORDER - DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND.
B. OPERATION PLAN GRAPHIC HAND {S} 21 MAR 70.
C. DA MSG 221042Z MAR 70, DOD AUGMENTATION OF THE US POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT {S} {GRAPHIC HAND {U}}.

1. {S} IN ORDER TO INSURE DELIVERY OF THE UNITED STATES MAIL THE PRESIDENT HAS ISSUED A DECLARATION OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY. THE BELOW LISTED ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD UNITS ARE BEING ARSTAF, CORC, CN, CAR, OSD, OUSA, OSA-OCD, CLL, ASDPA) CONARC LNO, NMCC, JCS, CMC, CONARC GRAPHIC HAND TEAM

J.B. WATKINS, JR., COL, GS
C. J. SCHROEDER, JR., BG, GS
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS

DA OUT 945872
FEDERALIZE AND THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK IS BEING NOTIFIED AT THIS TIME.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD:
42 INF DIV ELEMENTS (NY ONLY) 587 TERM SVC CO
1 BN 187 ARTY 101 SIG 3N
569TL 3 N 145 LT MNT CO
102 LT MNT CO

AIR NATIONAL GUARD: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR MOBILIZATION WILL BE IN AFM 45-2. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS IF REQUIRED WILL BE PROVIDED.

213 GEEIA SQ  HQ 152 TAG CONT GP
552 AF 3 AND 106 TAC CONT SQ
274 MBL COMM SQ  HQ NY ANG
106 AIR RFL Y G 204 EA FLT (SA)
106 AIR RFL GP 105 TAC AIR SPT GP
102 AIR RFL SQ 137 TAC AIR SPT SQ
106 SUPPLY SQ 105 SUPPLY SQ
2. (C) YOU WILL ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY LIAISON AND TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THESE UNITS FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATION OF POSTAL FACILITIES (GRAPHIC HAND).

3. (C) CONCEPT. FEDERALIZED UNITS/PERSONNEL WILL BE PHASED INTO POST OFFICE OPERATIONS IN THE NEW YORK AREA (NEW YORK POSTAL REGION). ACTIVE DUTY FORCES ARE TO BE RELIEVED SASSP BUT NOT LATER THAN 48 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE.

4. (C) UPON RELIEF OF ALL ACTIVE DUTY TROOPS, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO MODIFY THE TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AS YOU SEE FIT.

5. (C) IN ADDITION TO THE POSTAL AUGMENTATION FORCE OUTLINED ABOVE,
BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY SUFFICIENT MILITARY POLICE OR OTHER SECURITY FORCES TO ASSIST, AS REQUIRED, THE MUNICIPAL POLICE AND US MARSHALS IN MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER AT THE FEDERAL POST OFFICES CONCERNED. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-4
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, THADDEUS R. EEL

IN ORDER TO ENFORCE THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES IN NEW YORK,

THE PRESIDENT HAS EXERCISED THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN HIM BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES TO AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH PL 673 UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE AIR AND ARMY NATIONAL GUARD INTO ACTIVE FEDERAL SERVICE AS NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSE. THE TEXT OF THE ORDER FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY THE POST-MASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES TO RENDER ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH WORK STOPPAGES WITHIN THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT."
YOU ARE HEREBY DESIGNATED EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE IN ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE RENDERING OF ASSISTANCE TO THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT BY MAKING AVAILABLE MATERIALS, SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH ANY SUCH REQUESTS. YOU ARE DELEGATED ANY AND ALL AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THE REQUEST OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL ..."

"RESOURCES USED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION WILL BE DEPARTMENT OF NAVY AND DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE, IN ADDITION TO ARMY. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CALL UPON THE SECRETARY, OF THE AIR FORCE: THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY OR ANY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMPONENTS TO PROVIDE RESOURCES NECESSARY."

THIS AUTHORITY HAS BEEN REDELEGATED TO THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 23 MARCH 1970.

BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO ME BY THE ABOVE ORDER FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, I HEREBY ORDER INTO THE ACTIVE
MILITARY SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD AND
UNTIL RELIEVED BY APPROPRIATE ORDERS AS OF AND FROM 0645 HOURS,
EST. 24 MARCH 1970, ALL OF THE UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE AIR AND
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK LISTED BELOW, WHICH
SHALL BE ASSEMBLED IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK AS DIRECTED BY MG WALTER
M. HIGGINS, JR., US ARMY, (CG TF NY) AND PLACED UNDER HIS COMMAND.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD:

427TH DIV ELEMENTS
1 BN 187 ARTY
569 TC BN
102 LTNT CO
AIR NATIONAL GUARD: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR THIS
Mobilization will be LAW AFM 45-2. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS IF
REQUIRED WILL BE PROVIDED.

213 GEEIA SQ
552 AF BAND
274 HML COMM SQ

587 TERM SVC CO
101 SIG BN
145 LTNT CO
HQ 152 TAC CONT GP
106 TAC CONT SQ

HQ NY ANG
FOR ARNG: THOSE PROVISIONS OF MOBILIZATION REGULATIONS CHANGING
ESTABLISHED NATIONAL GUARD ADMINISTRATIVE, PROPERTY AND SUPPLY
PROCEDURES WHEN ENTERING THE ACTIVE FEDERAL SERVICE ARE WAIVED
EXCEPT FOR THE PROVISIONS COVERING THE PREPARATION AND DISTRIBUTION
OF WORKING REPORTS, THE SUBSISTENCE OF TROOPS, AND THE PREPARATION
OF DD FORM 220 AND STANDARD FORM 88.
COMMANDING GENERAL, US CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND WILL FURNISH
NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD UNITS. OPERATIONAL MATTERS WILL BE DIRECTED BY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE US ARMY.
SUBJ: MOBILIZATION ORDER GRAPHIC HAND (U)

1. (U) BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY CON
TAIRED IN SECTION 673, 10 USC AND PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION DATED 23 MAR 70 THE UNITS INCLUDING PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED AUGMENTATION, AND MEMBERS THEREOF THE ARNGUS AND US ARMY RESERVE DESIGNATED IN PARA 2 BELOW WILL BE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY AT HOME STATIONS BY THE APPROPRIATE CONUS ARMY COMMANDERS, TO REPORT 240645 MAR 1970.

2. (U) UNITS LISTED BELOW WILL BE ORDERED TO-active duty for an INDEFINITE PERIOD UNTIL RELIEVED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY:

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106 AIR RFL GP
102 AIR RFL SQ
106 SUPPLY SQ
106 CAMRON
106 CMGT SPT SQ
106 TAC HOSP
106 CIV ENG FLT
106 COMM FLT (SPT)
102 AEROMED EVAC FLT
105 TAC AIR SPT GP
137 TAC AIR SPT SQ

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343D GEN HOSP
344TH GEN HOSP
344TH SURG HOSP
356TH STA HOSP
361ST PI DET
607TH STA HOSP
808TH STA HOSP
HQ 818TH HOSP CTR
912TH SURG HOSP
80KR USA HOSP
80KS USA HOSP AUG
HHC 11TH SF GP, 1ST SF
CO G, 11TH SF GP, 1ST SF
HHB, 5TH BN, 51ST ARTY
BTRY A, 5TH BN, 51ST ARTY
BTRY B, 5TH BN, 51ST ARTY

NYC, NY
NYC, NY
NYC, NY
NYC, NY
NYC, NY
NYC, NY
NYC, NY
NYC, NY
NYC, NY
NYC, NY

446
455
104
143
21
182
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37
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<tr>
<td>301ST FASCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO C, 310TH MP BN</td>
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</table>
3. (U) THE PROVISIONS OF AR 135-300 WILL APPLY EXCEPT AS INDICATED IN DA OPLAN/OPORD GRAPHIC HAND AND AS FOLLOWS:

A. UNIT RECORDS WILL BE RETAINED IN THEIR PRESENT LOCATION PENDING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE.

B. UNITS WILL NOT REQUISITION PERSONNEL WITHOUT SPECIFIC DA APPROVAL.

C. MORNING REPORTS WILL BE PREPARED IAW AR 680-1.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING OF USAR PERSONNEL WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 2-58A(2) THRU PARA 2-58G, AR 135-300.

E. ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE FORTHCOMING.

F. (U) OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY SELECTED FOR PROMOTION AND WHOSE PROMOTION ELIGIBILITY DATE IS PRIOR TO THE MOBILIZATION DATE, WILL BE PROMOTED PRIOR TO REPORTING FOR ACTIVE DUTY.

5. (U) MEMBERS AWAITING INITIAL ACDUTRA (I.E., REP-63) WILL NOT BE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY WITH THEIR UNITS.

6. (U) MEMBERS CURRENTLY PERFORMING INITIAL ACDUTRA (REP-63) WILL
REMAIN AT THEIR CURRENT STATIONS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED OTHERWISE BY DA.

7. (U) UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MSG, AUTHORITY TO ENLIST PERSONNEL IN THE UNITS CONCERNED IS SUSPENDED.

8. PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS MESSAGE WAS MADE BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AT 1750 HOURS 23 MAR 1970. LOCAL UNIT COMMANDERS MAY PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR UNIT HAS BEEN ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY. FOR INFORMATION TO MEMBERS OF UNITS CONCERNED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IS SUGGESTED:

"RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS ARE BEING ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY TO RESTORE US MAIL SERVICE IN AFFECTED AREAS."

9. (U) REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED IAW DA OPLAN/OPORD GRAPHIC HAND.

10. (U) UNITS LISTED IN PARA 2, ABOVE, WILL BE MOBILIZED AT CURRENT ASSIGNED STRENGTH AND IN CURRENT TOE/TDA CONFIGURATION. STRENGTHS LISTED IN PARA 2 ARE ESTIMATES ONLY.

11.(U) IN ADDITION TO THE EXEMPTIONS AUTHORIZED ABOVE, MEMBERS WHO ARE HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS WILL BE EXEMPTED. INDIVIDUALS GRANTED

DA OUT 945630

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

B-14-11
EXEMPTIONS WILL REMAIN ASSIGNED TO UNITS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY BUT ARE NOT REQUIRED TO REPORT TO ACTIVE DUTY WITH THE UNITS. THEY WILL BE GRANTED EXCESS LEAVE TO TERMINATE WHEN THE EXEMPTED STATUS EXPIRES, AT WHICH TIME THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO REPORT TO THEIR UNIT.

12. ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AS OVERSTRENGTH WILL ACCOMPANY THE UNIT TO ACTIVE DUTY. IN SO FAR AS POSSIBLE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE ASSIGNED TO TOE/TDA POSITION VACANCIES FOR WHICH THEY ARE QUALIFIED.

13. UNITS WILL BE MOBILIZED WITH ALL ASSIGNED PERSONNEL EXCEPT CREMEN, LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AND OTHER EXTREME HARDSHIP CASES DETERMINED BY THE COMMANDERS ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

ACKNOWLEDGE

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY SENT TO DCS AT 701022 MAR 70

DA OUT 945080

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FROM:

TO:

ODCSOPS-AOC

SUBJ: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SERVICES COMMITTED TO OPERATION

GRAPHIC HAND (U)

This CECOMARC will exercise command and control of the forces of all services committed to Operation Graphic Hand through appropriate COHUS Army Commanders and designated Task Force Commanders.

CP-4
DCSOPS-AOC

SUBJ: MOBILIZATION ORDER GRAPHIC HAND

A. DA MSG, SUBJ AS ABOVE DTG 240259Z MAR70

B. DA MSG, SUBJ AS ABOVE DTG 240808Z MAR70

1. PARA 2, REF A IS AMENDED TO ADD THE FOLLOWING USAR UNITS

ARSTAF, USCONARC LO, OSA, OCLL, USAINTCLO

DA OUT 946046

J G JAMESON JR, LTC, OCCAR/59864

J. C. FIMIAMI, COL, GS

DUTY GENERAL, AOC

B-16-1 UNCLASS-FOUO-EFTO
EFFECTIVE 240645R MAR70:

<table>
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<td>508 CM DET</td>
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OVE LIST CONTAINS SIX UNITS

2. PARA 2, REF A CONTAINS TWO ENTRIES EACH LISTED AS THE WBJD USA STAFF STATION, FT HAMILTON, NY WITH ASG STRENGTHS OF 66 AND 73. THESE TWO ENTRIES ARE AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

- WBJD USA STAGING STA FT HAMILTON, NY 66
- WBJE USA STAGING STA FT HAMILTON, NY 73

3. SMOP 2, REF A AS READS 301ST FASCOM IS AMENDED TO READ:

301ST SPT BDE

4. ACKNOWLEDGE
DA
CGCONARC
INFO: JCS
CNO
CSAF
CMC
CGUSAONE FT MEADE MD
CGUSATHREE FT MCPHERSON GA
CGUSAFOUR FT SAM HOUSTON TX
CGUSAFIVE FT SHERIDAN ID
CGUSASIX SFRAN CA
CGUSARADCOM
CGUSAMC
CGUSASA AHS VA
CGUSRAINTC FT HOLABIRD MD
CGUSASTRATCOM FT HUACHUCA AZ
CGMDW WASH DC - COURIER
DIRECTOR DSA
COUSAAC ST LOUIS MO

ARSTAFF, DN, DAF, CONARCLNO, OCLL, OSA, NMCC, USINTCLO

CHARLES C. ROGERS, LTC, GS
H. J. SCHROEDER, JR., BG, GS
DEP DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS

WA OUT 946047
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM ACTIVE DUTY UNITS TO SELECTED RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS [U]

REFERENCE: DA MSG SUBJECT AS ABOVE DTG 240113Z MAR 70

1. [C] PAR 3 OF CITED REFERENCE INDICATES THAT FEDERALIZED UNITS/PERSOMNEL WILL BE PHASED INTO POST OFFICE OPERATIONS IN NEW YORK AREA REPLACING REGULAR ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE ELEMENTS ASAP BUT NOT LATER THAN 48 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF REFERENCED MESSAGE.

2. [C] THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULAR ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE ELEMENTS FROM PARTICIPATION IN POSTAL ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK CITY WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN COORDINATION WITH LOCAL POSTAL AUTHORITIES AND IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PERMIT SMOOTI TRANSITION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO MINIMIZE DISRUPTION OF POSTAL SERVICES.

3. [C] REQUEST YOU INFORM THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 250600 MAR OF YOUR PLAN TO TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSTAL ACTIVITIES FROM REGULAR ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE ELEMENTS TO RESERVE COMPONENT
CONGONARC

CONFIDENTIAL

...elements and to return the regular service elements to their home stations. Additionally, request you inform this headquarters of your plan to return Navy and Air Force elements to parent service control.

GP 4

ACKNOWLEDGE
FROM: DA
TO: CNO
CSAF
CHC
CGCOHARC
INFO: JCS
CGUSAONE FT MEADE MD
CGUSATHREE FT MCPHERSON GA
CGUSAFOUR FT SAM HOUSTON TX
CGUSAFIVE FT SHERIDAN IL
CGUSASIX SFRAH CA
CGARADCON
CGUSAIII
CGUSASA AHS VA
CGUSAINTC FT HOLABIRD MD
CGUSAISTRATCON FT HAUACHUCA AZ
CGUSD WASH DC - COURIER
DIRECTOR DSA
CGUSAAC SY LOUIS II0

DA OUT 9-16246
UNCLASSIFIED

TO:

SUBJECT: CLASSIFICATION OF GRAPHIC HAND MESSAGE TRAFFIC

1. {U} MESSAGE TRAFFIC INCIDENT TO CURRENT OPERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND WILL BE DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

2. {U} ALL MESSAGE TRAFFIC PERTAINING TO FUTURE PLANS AND ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND WILL BE DOWNGRADED FROM SECRET TO CONFIDENTIAL.

3. {U} THE BASIC OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND AND ALL CHANGES THERE TO WILL RETAIN THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF SECRET.

4. {U} ACKNOWLEDGE.
UNCLASSIFIED

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF NEW YORK

OIC SOPS DDB AOC

SUBJECT: OPERATION GRAPHIC HAND

RELEASE OF SERVICE RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS FROM ACTIVE DUTY

PART I FOR ALL ADDRESSEES

1. EFFICIENCY, ECONOMY AND MORALE DICTATE THAT THE POSTAL AUGMENTATION FORCES BE MAINTAINED AT MINIMUM ESSENTIAL LEVELS CONSISTENT WITH THE MISSION.

PART II FOR CGUSCONARC

2. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 135-20, TO RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY UNITS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND/OR US ARMY RESERVE, NOT REQUIRED FOR THE POSTAL AUGMENTATION MISSION OR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES. THESE UNITS WILL BE RETURNED TO STATE CONTROL, OR TO RESERVE STATUS, AS APPROPRIATE.

3. WITH RESPECT TO OTHER SERVICE COMPONENTS YOU ARE REQUESTED TO:

A. INFORM THE COMMANDANT, 3D NAVAL DISTRICT, THIS HEADQUARTERS,

DA OUT 946263

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

B-19-2
AND THE CNO/CNC When Navy and Marine Corps reserve units and/or 
individuals are no longer required and may be released.

B. IDENTIFY TO THIS HEADQUARTERS those units of the air national 
guard that may be released.

PART III FOR CSAF

4. YOU WILL BE INFORMED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS OF THE AIR NATIONAL 
guard units which can be released.

PART IV FOR ALL ADDRESSEES.

5. RELEASING ORDERS FOR RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS 
CONCERNED WILL CITE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
PROCLAMATION DATED 23 MARCH 1970, UNDER WHICH UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS 
WERE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL RECONFIGURED OR UNTIL 
THE EMERGENCY IS DECLARED TERMINATED.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE.
TO: CGUSCoharc 261700 R
CHO 2616082
CSAF
CHC
INFO
JCS
SECDEF
CINCSYRIKE
CGUSEONE
CGUSETHREE
CGUSAFOUR
CGUSAFIVE
CGUSASIX
CNRST, ED NAV DISTR NEW YORK, NY
CGUSACG 261722 R
CGUSASA
CGUSEATYOE FT MOLABIRD HD
CGUSASTATION FT PHOENIX AZ
CGUSH:

DA OUT: 26-6266

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

SIGNATURES: DA OUT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
IN CLEAR
**FROM:** DA  
**TO:** CGUSCONARC  
**CNO**  
**CSAF**  
**CIC**  
**INFO:** JCS  
SECDEF  
CINCSTRIKE  
CGUSAONE  
CGUSATHREE  
CGUSAFOUR  
CGUSAFIVE  
CGUSASIX  
CHT, 3D NAV DIST, NEW YORK, NY  
CGUSAII  
CGUSAIII  
CGUSAIVTC FT HOLABIRD ID  
CGUSAIIIAC FT HUACHUCA AZ  
CGUSAIV  

**MESSAGE:**  

**DTG:** 30 1413(2) Mar 70  
**DA out 946733**
GOVERNOR - NEW YORK, ALBANY, NY
CG FORT HAMILTON, N. Y.

DSA

COUSAAC STL NO

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL STATE OF NEW YORK

UNCLAS EF TO FOUO

OCSOPS OD AOC

SUBJECT: OPERATION GRAPHIC HAND - RELEASE OF SERVICE RESERVE COMPONENTS FROM ACTIVE DUTY

A. DA 261426Z MAR 70, SAME SUBJECT.
B. DA 261527Z MAR 70, SAME SUBJECT.
C. DA 261624Z MAR 70, SAME SUBJECT.
D. DA 261703Z MAR 70, SUBJ: MEDICAL PROCESSING OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS FORCES.
E. DA 261666Z MAR 70, SUBJ: AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR OPERATION GRAPHIC HAND - OPERATIONAL COSTS.
F. DA 262003Z MAR 70, SUBJ: PAYMENT OF RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND.

3. REFERENCE A & D AUTHORIZED THE RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY UNITS.
OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND/OR US ARMY RESERVE NOT REQUIRED FOR
POSTAL AUGMENTATION MISSION OR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES. REFERENCE
B PROVIDED SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS THAT MOBILIZED RESERVE STRENGTH
IN THE NEW YORK AREA NOT BE REDUCED BELOW APPROXIMATELY 10,000.
REFERENCE C CORRECTED DATE/TIME GROUP, USED AS A REFERENCE.
REFERENCE D APPROVED USE OF DA FORM 220 FOR ARMY PERSONNEL IN LIEU
OF A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. REFERENCE E REQUESTED COST REPORTS
REQUIRED BY OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND 22 MAR 70. REFERENCE F PROVIDED
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING PAYMENT OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND US ARMY
RESERVE PERSONNEL.
2. THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HAS TERMINATED ALL REQUIREMENTS
FOR MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF THE POSTAL
AUGMENTATION MISSION IN NEW YORK CITY.
3. TAKE NECESSARY ACTION TO RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY EFFECTIVE
2400 (00) HOURS 30 MARCH 70. THE RESIDUAL MOBILIZED RESERVE
COMPONENT FORCES. RELEASE OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND OTHER
RESIDUAL ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH AR 335-20 EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY REFERENCES D AND F ABOVE.
4. ACTION ADDRESSEES ACKNOWLEDGE BY MESSAGE.

UNCLASSIFIED
FROM: DA
TO: JCS
CGCONARC
CGUSAONE FT MEADE MD
INFO CGUSASTRATCOM
CGUSAINTC
CG FT HAMILTON NY
COUSAAC STL NO

UNCLASS EF TO FO00

OCAR-OCT

SUBJ: MOBILIZATION ORDER GRAPHIC HAND
A. DA MSG 07G 240259Z MAR 70 SUBJ AS ABV.
B. DA MSG 07G 240808Z MAR 70 SUBJ AS ABV.
C. DA MSG 07G 250626Z MAR 70 SUBJ AS ABV.

PARA 2. REF A IS AMENDED TO ADD THE FOLLOWING USAR UNIT:
DESIGNATION/HOME STATION/ASG STR
237 MAINT CO/FT HAMILTON. NY/75
ANNEX C
CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. (FOUO) The Post Office Department initially provided Task Group
GRAPHIC HAND with post office augmentation requirements for New York
City, Boston, and Philadelphia, and plans were made for military
augmentation of the postal activities in those cities. It was decided
by the planning group that five messages would be required to affect
the augmentation by Active and Reserve Component personnel, and to
recover to the pre-strike posture. A sample message is shown on Figure
C-1. The information given in each message is shown in Figures C-2
through C-6.

2. (FOUO) The Post Office Department subsequently provided the planning
group with postal augmentation requirements for a total of thirty-five
cities, country-wide. The contingency planning group prepared and
staffed draft messages for each of the thirty-five cities, and prepared
and filed final messages to be dispatched to designated cities on order.
The package of messages prepared for augmentation of postal facilities
in New York City was the only package used during the military augmentation
period. The return of striking postal workers to their jobs made augmenta-
tion of the other cities unnecessary.
SAMPLE PACKAGE - NEW YORK CITY

1. WARNING ORDER FOR AUGMENTATION OF NEW YORK POSTAL REGION
2. EXECUTION ORDER FOR AUGMENTATION
3. MOBILIZATION ORDER FOR RESERVE COMPONENTS
4. WARNING ORDER FOR WITHDRAWAL OF RESERVE COMPONENTS
5. DEMOBILIZATION ORDERS
   a. DA TO MILITARY ADDRESSEES
   b. DA TO STATE GOVERNORS

FIGURE C-1
1. WARNING ORDER TO IMPLEMENT

2. GUIDANCE:
   a. REQUIREMENT - SERVICE BREAKOUT
   b. COMMAND AND CONTROL
   c. JOINT IN NATURE
   d. UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT
   e. DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED
   f. REQUEST FOR SERVICE POINTS OF CONTACT

3. NGUS AND RESERVES BEING ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

FIGURE C-2
1. DIRECTIVE TO EXECUTE AUGMENTATION.
2. MOBILIZATION-ORDERS FOLLOW.

FIGURE C-3
1. CITES AUTHORITY
2. TROOP LIST
   a. ARNGUS
   b. ANGUS
   c. USAR
3. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
4. PROMOTION OF OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS
5. PERSONNEL EXEMPTIONS:
   a. ACDUTRA
   b. HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
   c. FIREFIGHTERS, LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AND HARDSHIP CASES.
6. AUTHORITY TO ENLIST SUSPENDED
7. ACKNOWLEDGING QUERIES
8. REPORTS REQUIRED
9. MOBILIZED AT CURRENT ASSIGNED STRENGTH
10. OVERSTRENGTH PERSONNEL TO ACCOMPANY UNITS.

FIGURE C-4
MESSAGE#4  WARNING ORDER GRAPHIC HAND-WITHDRAWAL OF RESERVE COMPONENTS FROM CITY

1. SITUATION

2. REFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

3. REQUEST CONARC PLANS FOR:
   a. REDUCING SUPPORT AS STRIKERS RETURN
   b. MOVEMENT TO HOME STATION AND RETURN TO STATE CONTROL
   c. RETURN OF SERVICE ELEMENTS TO SERVICE CONTROL

FIGURE C-5
MESSAGE#5

OPERATION GRAPHIC HAND - RELEASE OF SERVICE
RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS FROM ACTIVE DUTY (CITY)

1. MAINTAIN AT MINIMUM ESSENTIAL LEVELS.
2. AUTHORITY TO RELEASE UNITS.
3. CGCONARC
   a. AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE UNITS NOT REQUIRED.
   b. INFORM NAVAL DISTRICT, DA, CNO/CMC OF UNITS NOT REQUIRED.
   c. IDENTIFY ANGUS UNITS NOT REQUIRED.
4. CSAF TO BE INFORMED OF ANGUS UNITS NOT REQUIRED.

FIGURE C-6
1. (U) Appendix to this annex identifies those units, both regular and Reserve components of all the military services that participated in Operation GRAPHIC HAND. Listed strengths for all Army forces are those reported for the second day of the operation: March 24. Listed strengths for all other services are final reported peak strengths. Due to the differences in reaction time and command and control considerations, strengths fluctuated considerably during the period of the operation, particularly at the organization level.

2. (FOUO) Message enclosed at Annex B (Proclamations, Executive Orders, and Implementing Instructions) excused from mobilization those individuals qualifying as: firemen, law enforcement personnel, high school students, members awaiting or engaged in active duty training, and other cases as determined by local commanders. Many individuals reporting in initially were subsequently released. However, overall total strengths increased as time elapsed due to the increasing number of reserve component personnel reporting into their units. For a specific appraisal of these fluctuations and peak strengths, Annex F (Force Buildup and Redeployment) provides the daily reported figures by service and component for Task Force, New York.

3. (FOUO) Any variance between peak strengths reported by Task Force, New York, and peak strengths of USAF, USN, and USMC strengths contained in this Annex are accounted for by the fact that limited numbers of support personnel were retained under the control of the respective services, and were thus not reported by Task Force, New York. This annex is included in this report only for the purpose of identifying the units that participated in this operation along with a general overview of the strengths involved.

Appendix, Force Tabs
**APPENDIX 1**

**FORCE TABS**

**ACTIVE:**

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**NATIONAL GUARD:**

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|       | 1 Bn, 187 Arty | 405           |
|       | 587 Term Sv Co | 235           |
|       | 101 Sig Bn    | 669           |
|       | 569 TC Bn     | 266           |
|       | 102 Lt Maint Co | 91          |
|       | 145 Lt Maint Co | 91            |
| USAFNG| HQ ANG NY     | 39            |
|       | 213 GEEIA Sq  | 124           |
|       | 552 AF Band   | 32            |

**Service Subtotal:** 10,142
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**COMPONENT SUBTOTAL:** 12,311

**GRAND TOTAL:** 27,324

* These USAFR units were called up separately to assist in processing and delivering military mail and were not a part of TF New York.
Part I - Mobilization

1. (FOUO) General.

   a. The Department of the Army (DA) standing operating procedure for mobilization defines actions to be taken by each DA staff agency during the initial phase of either a partial or full mobilization. It tasks the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS) to recommend or obtain mobilization decisions and related actions and provide force level guidance to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR) for development of new force structure (i.e., development of force structure by type and number of units to meet mobilization requirement). ACSFOR, in turn, is directed to structure the force required, and provide the Chief, Office of Reserve Components (CORC) with a listing of units by number and type. CORC, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), based on this list, provide ACSFOR with the designation and home station of units proposed for mobilization. ACSFOR is also charged with preparation and coordination of DA messages alerting CG, COMAR of pending mobilization of Army Reserve units (Chief, NGB alerts National Guard units) and subsequently directing the mobilization of both Army Reserve and National Guard units.

   b. The Civil Disturbance Plan prepared by the Director of Civil Disturbance was the DA plan most nearly adaptable to the GRAPHIC HAND situation. Special instructions and guidance, personnel policies and mobilization orders are included in the plan. However, it was determined that this plan should not be used because of possible adverse public reaction if a Civil Disturbance operation was implied in connection with the Post Office augmentation.

   c. AR 135-300 - Reserve Components - "Mobilization of ARMGUS and USAR Units," covers polices and detailed procedures for the use of the Reserve Components under mobilization for war or threats of war as well as civil disturbance.

2. (FOUO) Planning Environment.

   a. The initial planning for Operation GRAPHIC HAND began at 1030, 20 March 70, with initial concept guidance outlined at meeting in the AOC conference room. The planning group met again at 1435, 20 March, and was in continuous session until OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND was published.
b. Initial planning was hampered considerably by lack of detailed knowledge of what was expected of the military services. Information from the Post Office Department (POD) was necessarily vague and personnel requirements were late in arriving, and were at best rough estimates initially. Even after "firm" requirements were received they were continually changing. Despite lack of firm guidance and troop requirement figures, force planning began on 20 March. Troop lists of all Reserve Component units in New York City and Newark, N. J. were prepared, as well as lists of all Army Reserve Postal units throughout the United States. No need developed for the latter list, inasmuch as subsequent POD guidance stated requirement was for "untrained workers" rather than specialized personnel.

c. Final troop lists were based on POD stated requirements plus approximately 25% increase to compensate for administrative overhead, command and control, and exemption policies.

3. (U) Selection of Units. Units were selected by the NGB and CAR based primarily on their location in or proximity to the metropolitan area. Other considerations were size and status (units recently on active duty incident to May 68 Mobilization, following the increased hostilities in South Vietnam, were excluded).


a. The Chief, NGB, personally called the New York State Adjutant General (AG) on the afternoon of 23 March and read the proposed troop list to him. The minor changes suggested by the AG were incorporated in the official alert messages dispatched to the Governor, State AG, etc. at 2035 on 23 March.

b. The DCG, CONARC, contacted the CG, 77th ARCGM prior to dispatch of the mobilization order and authorized him to announce the mobilization via commercial television and radio in the metropolitan New York area.

5. (U) Mobilization Order. The President announced his decision to employ Reserve Component units and signed the Executive Order and the National Emergency Proclamation the afternoon of 23 March. The decision to mobilize selected ARNG and USAR units was announced in the AOC at 1544, 23 March. At 2159, a message was dispatched specifying a reporting time of 0645, 24 March.

6. (FOUO) Statutory Authority. The issuance of an Executive Order citing the authority vested in Sec 3500, Title 10, USC, regarding call to active duty of ARNG units, and its not being used, caused misunderstanding. Actually, Sec 673, Title 10, regarding ordering to active duty of ARNG and USAR units was the only authority used in the mobilization order. Certain individuals considered the NG units to be under CALL status until clarification was final on 26 March.
7. (U) Personnel. Statutory and regulatory requirements for physical examinations of individuals ordered to active duty are incomplete. See Annex N, "Legal Aspects," for further information on this problem.

8. (U) SGLI. The accelerated nature of the mobilization precluded proper orientation of personnel on features of Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) coverage. Authority was given by HQ DA to deviate from provisions of the governing AR with respect to declination of service member for SGLI coverage on first day of active duty.

9. (FOUO) Congressional Notification. The F-Hour notification procedures as prescribed in DOD Directive 5400.4 and the DA SOP for Mobilization were not followed with respect to Congressional notification. A list of units to be mobilized was provided to OCLL on 24 March 1970. As an inclosure to an appropriate announcement, the list was provided to the New York State Delegation and interested Committees of Congress at 1330 hours, 24 March 1970, or approximately 12 to 18 hours following the TV and radio announcement of designated units to be mobilized (see para 4). This belated Congressional announcement was the direct result of the situation discussed in paragraph 2, above. The fact that there were no complaints from Members of Congress as a result of late official notification can probably be attributed to the Presidential announcement on 23 March and the impact of the strike on the nation.

Part II - Demobilization

10. (U) General. AR 135-20 prescribes procedures and administrative instructions for release of Reserve Component units and personnel mobilized for war or threat of war from active duty. It also includes provisions for release of Army National Guard units called to active duty in support of civil disturbances. It does not include similar provisions for release of U.S. Army Reserve units.

11. (U) Orders for Release.

   a. Authority was given by DA messages at 0926 and 1027, 26 March, to release Reserve Component units not required for postal augmentation mission or administrative purposes to a minimum of approximately 10,000 (this number was not considered necessary by DA; however, it was agreed to at the request of the POD).

   b. The POD terminated all requirements for mobilized Reserve Component personnel on 30 March. A DA message dispatched at 0913, 30 March, directed release of all Reserve Component personnel by 2400, 30 March.

12. (U) Personnel.

   a. Requirements for physical examinations are even more unclear for demobilization than for mobilization. Determination was made in
this case that DD Form 220 (Active Duty Report) could be used in lieu of physical examination. See Annex N - Legal Aspects.

b. Requirement for final pay to be handled at transfer point was waived. Announcement was made that Reserve Component personnel would be paid by check after release.

c. Provisions of AR 135-20, Appendix A, concerning preparation and issuance of a modified DD Form 214 (Report of Separation from the Armed Forces of the United States) are applicable to NGUS personnel but not to USAR personnel. The decision was made that the modified DD Form 214 would also be used for USAR personnel. Samples and instruction sheets were prepared and forwarded to New York.

Part III - Lessons Learned

13. (FOUO)

a. Existing mobilization planning documents such as the DA SOP are written more for mobilization, partial or full, in support of armed conflict with a foreign enemy i.e., JSCP/ASCP operations and contingency plans. Consideration should be given to addition of a 'Part' of 'Annex' to the DA SOP covering specific responsibilities and procedures for a presumably short-time mobilization of the type experienced in Operation GRAPHIC HAND. A term should be adopted to describe this type of emergency, such as "Domestic Emergency," to distinguish it from a wartime emergency, one involving a Civil Disturbance.

b. Another approach is the preparation of a separate operations plan similar to the Civil Disturbance Plan, with instructions, guidance, policies and procedures applicable to a domestic emergency of this type.

c. F-Hour procedures as written in current directives are valid for planning all types of mobilizations; however, adjustments in final planning and execution may be necessary and should be anticipated.

14. (U) Review of AR 135-20 and AR 135-300 is required to determine the need for changes to provide for variances concerning such items as pay (AR 135-20 only) and physical exams (both ARs) if legally supported. The basic SOLL directive, AR 608-2, may also need revision to cover accelerated mobilization. Initiation of changes to statutory requirements may also be found to be necessary.

15. (U) Practicability of future radio-TV alerts (as accomplished in New York by CG, 77th ARCOM) in cases of accelerated mobilization of this type should be studied and incorporated into future planning documents.
1. (U) This annex, by a series of charts, displays the build-up of Task Force New York, commitment of service personnel to augment postal facilities, and subsequent phasedown of the multi-service force.

2. (FOUO) As planned, initial augmentation was provided by active forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Figure F-1 displays the build-up of active forces which commenced 23 March, and withdrawal which began 25 March as Reserve component forces phased into the postal operation and assumed augmentation duties.

### STRENGTH OF REGULAR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ARMY 1/</th>
<th>NAVY 2/</th>
<th>USMC 2/</th>
<th>AIR FORCE 3/</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 MAR</td>
<td>1419</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>2,630</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1443</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>2,728</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1456</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>2,755</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 MAR</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-29 MAR</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>185</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 MAR-4 APR</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

1. Army contingent closed New York City 232140 March; departed for Fort Dix 260630 March.
2. Navy/USMC contingent permanently stationed in New York City; operational control assumed by Task Force New York 23 March and reverted to parent service 252100 March.
4. All regular forces except for members of Task Force Headquarters previously redeployed.
5. Cut off date for purpose of After Action Report established as 5 April.
3. (FOUO) Following the decision to mobilize Reserve components, mobilization orders were published and designated Reserve and National Guard units began to muster during the morning of 24 March. Figure F-2 depicts the build-up and subsequent phase down of these forces.

**STRENGTH OF MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ARMY NATIONAL GUARD</th>
<th>AIR NATIONAL GUARD</th>
<th>ARMY RESERVE</th>
<th>NAVAL RESERVE</th>
<th>USMC RESERVE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>10,142</td>
<td>1,734</td>
<td>5,525</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>22,210</td>
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<td>25 MAR</td>
<td>10,845</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>7,465</td>
<td>3,746</td>
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<td>799</td>
<td>2/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 MAR</td>
<td>10,912</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>2/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 MAR</td>
<td>10,912</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>2/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 MAR</td>
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<td>519</td>
<td>2/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,328</td>
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<td>2.3/</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

1. Effective 261330 MAR, Air National Guard and Army, Naval, and Marine Reserves were released to control of their parent service.

2. Residual personnel retained for administrative actions incident to post-mobilization.

3. Reduced to zero strength effective 022400 APR.

4. Reduced to zero strength effective 032400 APR.

4. (FOUO) Figure F-3 contrasts military augmentation commitments with aggregate force strengths. The apparent over-strength was caused by the impact of several factors. Specifically:
a. A decision to commit only a token augmentation force on 23 March.

b. Ability of augmentees to process large volumes of mail faster than originally anticipated.

c. The changing and fluid situation. When it became apparent that postal workers employed at various post offices were about to return to their jobs, service personnel designated to augment those facilities were placed on a hold status.

d. Limited number of postal supervisors available to train and guide service personnel, forced postal authorities to reduce requirements.

e. Overhead personnel.

### EMPLOYMENT AND AVAILABILITY OF SERVICE PERSONNEL

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<th></th>
<th>23 MAR</th>
<th>24 MAR</th>
<th>25 MAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL COMMITTED</td>
<td>755 Regular</td>
<td>2,146 Regular</td>
<td>1,681 Regular</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,288 Reserve Components</td>
<td>16,836 Reserve Components</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL COMMITTED</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>18,434</td>
<td>18,517</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVAILABLE STRENGTH</td>
<td>2,630 Regular</td>
<td>2,728 Regular</td>
<td>2,755 Regular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,210 Reserve Components</td>
<td>26,007 Reserve Components</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AVAILABLE</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>24,938</td>
<td>28,762</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure F-3

**NOTE:**

1. Postal work stoppage terminated; commencing with 26 March all requirements for military augmentation cancelled by postal officials.
ANNEX G
COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. (U) General. This annex summarizes the ad hoc command and control structure developed for Operation GRAPHIC HAND.

2. (FOUO) Description of Command and Control Structure.

   a. Following a series of interdepartmental meetings on 19 and 20 March, the Secretary of the Army was appointed executive agent for Department of Defense planning, and was directed to be prepared to assume the role of Executive Agent for military augmentation of the Post Office Department in the event such action was requested by the Postmaster General and ordered by the President.

   b. On 21 March, a GRAPHIC HAND Task Group was established in the Army Operations Center. As reflected by figure G-1 the structure of the Task Group provided for direct coordination between the Post Office Department and the Office of the Secretary of the Army and consisted of representatives from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

   (1) The augmentation teams staffed the Army Operations Center during the period from 1700, 21 March to 1800, 3 April. They functioned as the operational staff of the Task Group Director and for Army unilateral matters related to Operation GRAPHIC HAND. During this period several adjustments to the organizational composition of the teams were made to compensate for specific requirements regarding the postal situation. Figure G-2 reflects the composition of the augmentation teams during the high-water mark of Operation GRAPHIC HAND on 25 March. By 1800 26 March, when the postal situation had improved and the requirement for immediate availability of certain augmentation team members subsided, the teams were manned at reduced levels consistent with diminishing requirements. By 3 April the favorable situation of the postal strike permitted all postal augmentation team members at the Army Operations Center to revert to non-crisis alert status, i.e., capable of reporting to the Army Operations Center within 2 hours of notification.

   (2) A Liaison Group formed under the supervision of a Task Group Coordinator was organized to establish required direct liaison with the Post Office Control Center located in Washington, D. C., each of the 15 Postal Region Headquarters, and key post offices. The basic mission of the Liaison Group was to proceed on order to designated postal facilities for the purpose of establishing direct liaison with postal authorities and to pass information. The duties of the liaison officers were separate from the chains of command through which orders of both the Post Office Department and the military establishment were passed. During the operation, liaison officers were dispatched to the Post Office Control Center in Washington, D. C., Regional Headquarters located in New York City, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago, and to the General Post Office in Detroit. Although liaison officers for the remaining regions were designated, the situation did not require their employment. Figure G-3 portrays the liaison capability.
### ACC AUGMENTATION TEAM COMPOSITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>TEAM 1 1st Shift</th>
<th>TEAM 2 2nd Shift</th>
<th>TEAM 3 3rd Shift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DUTY GENERAL</td>
<td>COA</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>OACSFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEAM CHIEF (COL)</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASST TEAM CHIEF (LTC)</td>
<td>OACSFOR</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIEFING OFFICER (LTC/MAJ)</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
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<td>RECORDING OFFICER (LTC/MAJ)</td>
<td>OCoSFA</td>
<td>OACSFOR</td>
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<td>OACSFOR</td>
<td>OACSFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMERGENCY ACTIONS OFFICER (LTC/MAJ)</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
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<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSREP REP (LTC/MAJ)</td>
<td>ODCSREP</td>
<td>ODCSREP</td>
<td>ODCSREP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSREP REP (LTC/MAJ)</td>
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<td>ODCSREP</td>
<td>ODCSREP</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSLOG REP (LTC/MAJ)</td>
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<td>TAGO</td>
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<td>MOVEMENTS CHIEF (LTC/MAJ)</td>
<td>ODCSLOG</td>
<td>ODCSLOG</td>
<td>ODCSLOG</td>
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<td>MOVEMENTS OFFICER (LTC/MAJ)</td>
<td>ODCSLOG</td>
<td>ODCSLOG</td>
<td>ODCSLOG</td>
</tr>
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<td>OPERATIONS NCO (E7 or ABOVE)</td>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>ODCSREP</td>
<td>OPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOURNAL CLERK (EM/EW)</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>ODCSLOG</td>
<td>OPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOURNAL CLERK (EM/EW)</td>
<td>OPO</td>
<td>ODCSREP</td>
<td>ODCSREP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MESSENGER (EM)</td>
<td>TAGO</td>
<td>AIDSCOM</td>
<td>USAMMSA</td>
</tr>
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<td>USAMMSA</td>
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<td>TRANSPORTATION CLERK (EM/EW)</td>
<td>OPO</td>
<td>OPO</td>
<td>OPO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: In addition, the following personnel supplemented the AOC augmentation:

- Administrative Officer--Furnished by TAGO
- Two Stenographers--Furnished by ODCSOPS
- Augmentation team from Carlisle Barracks consisting of one officer, two clerk-typists, and two graphics personnel.

Figure G-2
provided by the Liaison Group with regional and local postal authorities, designated military Task Force Commanders, and the Department of Defense Executive Agent.

c. Figure G-4 shows the GRAPHIC HAND Command and Control structure as it existed in New York City.

(1) This Task Force, which was the only Task Force to execute Operation GRAPHIC HAND, was established 22 March under the command of MG W.M. Higgins, CG, Fort Hamilton. It planned and directed the joint augmentation of post offices in New York City. After its federalization MG Higgins placed elements of the Air National Guard under the operational control of MG M.H. Foery, CG, 42nd Division. Similarly, mobilized Navy and Marine Corps reservists were placed under the operational control of MG J.W. Kaine, CG, 77th Army Reserve Command.

(2) The Task Group Liaison Team located in the General Post Office (New York Regional Headquarters) maintained liaison with Task Force New York by proximity. In addition, nine other liaison officers were collocated with the Task Group Liaison Team. Included in this group were representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (Public Affairs), office of the Under Secretary of the Army, Task Force New York, 42nd Division, and 77th Army Reserve Command.

d. The chain of command established by the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force for the operation are portrayed in figure G-5 and figure G-6 respectively.


a. During the conduct of the operation, command and control was effectively exercised by each federal agency involved. Some difficulty, however, was experienced as a result of the significance of the Presidential decision to employ military forces, the corresponding requirement for centralized control, and the initial secrecy established by postal authorities in Washington to preclude premature disclosure of Department of Defense involvement.

(1) Normally postal regional directors have wide latitude in decision-making and would normally determine the manner in which augmentation would be accomplished. In this instance, however, due to the significance of the Presidential decision and the sensitivity of the operation to public opinion, approval of augmentation plans by the Post Office Department was required.

(2) Similarly, the fluid situation and sensitivity of the operation demanded the maintenance of direct linkage between the Task Group in the Army Operations Center and key field locations. The assignment of Task Group liaison officers fulfilled this essential requirement. The use of these liaison officers, created a situation where information could be freely passed directly between the Army Operations Center and field locations.
For Official Use Only.

Graphic Hand-Task Force New York

Figure G-4

For Official Use Only
Comparison of GRAPHIC HAND and GARDEN PLOT Command and Control Structure.

MILITARY COMMAND & CONTROL

- DOD EXEC AGENT
- CONARC HQ
- ARMY HQ
- TF HQ
- SERVICE COMPONENTS

GARDEN PLOT

- DOD EXEC AGENT
- TF HQ
- SERVICE COMPONENTS

Figure G-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Although officially separate from any chain of command, this direct communications link, tended to disrupt the CONARC chain of command.

(3) Initially, operations were hindered by the security classification of orders, messages, and directives. Small posts like Fort Hamilton, local armories, and training centers do not have the facilities required for secure dissemination of classified material. Additionally, classification restrictions precluded early coordination with local civilian authorities.

b. The possibility that in the future both GRAPHIC HAND and GARDEN PLOT (civil disturbance) type operations may be required in the same locality raises a potential command and control problem. Figure G-7 compares the command and control structure for these two types of operations. Unlike that established for GRAPHIC HAND, the chain of command for GARDEN PLOT does not include CONARC or the CONUS Army Headquarters during the employment phase of a civil disturbance operation. For GARDEN PLOT operations, Task Force Headquarters are directly under the Chief of Staff, United States Army, thus facilitating a more responsive and centralized command and control arrangement for civil disturbances. In the event that both GRAPHIC HAND and GARDEN PLOT types of operations are conducted simultaneously at the same location, the potential problem of conflict between two command lines becomes apparent.
ANNEX H
INTELLIGENCE

1. (U) General. The paragraphs that follow summarize the intelligence activities in support of the Operation GRAPHIC HAND mission to assure delivery of essential US mail as directed.

2. (C) Essential Elements of Information: Will any individuals or groups take actions to interfere with the accomplishment of the mission assigned to the US Army as DOD executive agency? If so, who, when, where, how, and in what strength?

3. (C) Intelligence Summary: There were no significant threats to the accomplishment of the joint mission. Postal workers did not attempt to interfere with the Federal troops who handled the mail.

   Factions of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and Progressive Labor Party (PLP) did, however, attempt to exploit the strike situation. Local SDS affiliates in Boston, Massachusetts; New Haven, Connecticut; New York and Rochester, New York; and PLP Worker-Student Alliance groups in New Haven, New York City, and Los Angeles, California, tried unsuccessfully to stimulate support in the form of rallies and demonstrations. Their attempts failed to attract significant attendance. Several announced rallies failed to materialize. There was some minor picketing, obstructionism and distribution of leaflets in various cities across CONUS. These incidents posed no threat to mission accomplishment.

4. (C) Method of Collection and Sources of Information:

   a. Collection methods other than through increased liaison were not authorized. Liaison was established by:

      (1) US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) with postal officials in New York City; Boston, Massachusetts; Newark, New Jersey; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and with the Task Force Commander in New York.

      (2) Department of the Army liaison officers with postal officials in Washington, D. C.; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; New York, New York; Boston, Massachusetts; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

   b. Primary sources of information included postal officials, FBI reports, news media, and the committed Task Force.

   c. It should be noted that the Commandant, Third Naval District requested and received from CG, Task Force New York, verbal permission to exempt from mobilization the officers and men assigned to Naval Reserve
Intelligence units. This was done especially to avoid possible aggravation of delicate negotiations between the unions and the Post Office Department, which may have resulted from activating personnel who conceivably could have been in the public mind associated with espionage.

5. (C) Intelligence Support.

a. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI): OACSI augmentation teams supported the joint operation on a 24 hour basis. Teams, coordinated by the OACSI Director of Counterintelligence and Security, consisted of the ACSI representative to the Army Operations Center (AOC) Augmentation Team, the normal ACSI AOC element, OACSI Civil Disturbance Branch, and special teams from OACSI Counterintelligence Analysis Division. Support included assistance in preparing OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND, preparation of the Joint Situation Report, providing analyses of threats to mission accomplishment, and intelligence briefings.

b. US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC): USAINTC operated its CONUS Intelligence Branch, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 24 hours a day. It processed 35 GRAPHIC HAND Spot Reports and monitored liaison activities. The 108th Military Intelligence (MI) Group maintained liaison contacts in 17 locations with full-time representation at one location each in New York City, Boston, and Newark. The 109th MI Group maintained liaison contact with the Philadelphia Post Office.

6. (U) Lessons Learned.

Current organization and standard operating procedures within the Army Intelligence community were adequate to handle this operation.
ANNEX I
PERSONNEL

1. **(U) Introduction.** Personnel implications of Operation GRAPHIC HAND impacted on all Service Departments of the Department of Defense. This annex incorporates input, as provided by the Service Departments, concerning significant observations relative to personnel operations of the postal augmentation operation.

2. **(U) Military Mail.**

   a. With the letter carriers' work stoppage in New York City beginning to affect the movement of military mail and prior to the initial planning phase of Operation GRAPHIC HAND, on 19 March 1970 planning began for the processing of military mail (APO/FPO) and continued throughout the execution of the postal augmentation operation. An initial meeting to discuss the problem of military mail was called by the Bureau of Operations, Post Office Department at 1430, 19 March.

   b. On 20 March, at the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), a meeting was held for the purpose of discussing the overall military mail situation and to discuss means for the continued operation of Postal Concentration Centers.

   c. As the letter carriers' work stoppage escalated from New York City to national proportions, the impact on the movement of military mail spread to Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Seattle. A resume of the overall military mail situation throughout Operation GRAPHIC HAND is contained in Appendix I.

3. **(FOUO) Department of the Army.** In sequential order, the following personnel operations of the Department of the Army are addressed: the personnel planning phase related to the development of DA Operation Plan GRAPHIC HAND; mobilization; the execution phase of the Postal Augmentation; and demobilization.

   a. **Personnel Planning - Operation GRAPHIC HAND.**

      (1) Beginning with an initial planners' meeting held at 1035 hours, 20 March 1970, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER), in conjunction with the Office of the Surgeon General, The Adjutant General's Office, and the Office of the Provost Marshal General, developed the Personnel Annex to the Postal Augmentation Plan. By 0930, 21 March, the initial draft of the Personnel Annex had been completed and provided to the planning element of the GRAPHIC HAND Task Group for incorporation in the operations plan.
(2) Planning for discipline, law and order was coordinated with representatives of the CG, CONARC in the Army Operations Center (AOC), CONARC Provost Marshal, Postal Inspection Service, Chief, U.S. Marshal Service, FBI, and the Director of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations. The purpose of this planning was to identify potential problem areas, review civil disturbance contingency plans, and gain an understanding of Post Office security and investigate operations.

(3) On 21 March, in the course of identifying forces available to support postal augmentation operations in the New York City area, the question arose concerning the possibility of utilizing trainees from the US Army Training Center, Fort Dix, New Jersey. The GRAPHIC HAND Task Force was informed that the position of the Commanding General, Continental Army Command was that trainees would not be utilized for this purpose. DCSPER fully supported this position.

(4) A review of the Personnel Annex was conducted as the operation plan was being executed. Because of the manner in which the Army National Guard was brought to active Federal Service, i.e., ordered to active duty under the provisions of Section 673, Title 10, US Code (see Annex N, Legal Aspects), the administrative instructions contained in the Personnel Annex required modification to incorporate procedures relative to ordered as well as called federalized National Guard personnel. Necessary changes to the plan were developed in message form, coordinated with the Office of the Chief of Personnel Operations, and the Office of the Chief of Reserve Components, approved by the Deputy Director of the GRAPHIC HAND Task Group, and dispatched by the Army Operations Center on 27 March.

(5) With the on-going contingency planning for postal augmentation operations, an additional review of the overall GRAPHIC HAND plan was conducted by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. On 2 April 1970, ODCSPER reviewed and provided minor, non-substantive updating information to the basic plan which was published on 29 April.

b. Mobilization. (See Annex E, Mobilization and Demobilization)

(1) The GRAPHIC HAND mobilization order for Reserve Components ordered to active duty in the New York City area was prepared and dispatched on 23 March by the Army Operations Center.

(2) With the issuance of the GRAPHIC HAND Mobilization Order, the Office of the Chief of Personnel Operations (COPO) initiated action required by the Department of the Army Partial Mobilization Plan. That plan states that upon a partial mobilization of Reserve Component personnel, COPO in coordination with CG, CONARC will dispatch personnel management teams to assist units in transition from a Reserve to an Active status.
Paragraph 3a of the GRAPHIC HAND Mobilization Order stated that "Units' records will be retained in their present location pending additional guidance." Since Reserve Component personnel were expected to be on active duty for a relatively short period, it was determined that it would be unnecessary to dispatch Army or Air Force personnel management teams. Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve personnel, of course, were administered directly by the local Training Centers to which they were assigned, under the direction of COMTHREE HQ which is itself located in New York City. However, in the event that mobilized units were retained on active duty for an extended period, this matter would require reconsideration. The Army Northeast Area Team was alerted to that possibility.

(3) Paragraph 3b of the GRAPHIC HAND Mobilization Order stated that "Units will not requisition personnel without specific DA approval." CG, CONARC and COPO determined that there would be no need for replacements during the anticipated short period of the mobilization. If the mobilization had lasted for an extended period this matter would have required reconsideration. The following are possible sources for fillers:

(a) Additional Reserve Units. The callup of additional Reserve units is the most feasible and practical method for providing additional personnel for GRAPHIC HAND-type operations. The manner in which the Reserve personnel were used to handle the mail obviated the need for a particular unit or units to be at high strength level. Particular MOS requirements were not critical.

(b) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Regulations provide that these personnel be given thirty days' notice; the Secretary of the Army has the authority to reduce that period. The US Army Administration Center (USAAC) has established procedures which provide for notifying IRR personnel by mail to report for active duty. There is an obvious disadvantage to this means of notification during a postal strike. In addition, IRR personnel have no uniforms or equipment, would require extensive administrative support during mobilization and demobilization, and would require transportation support and supervision.

(c) Active Army. The use of the Active Army as a source of fillers is considered the least desirable alternative. The significant use of Active Army personnel as fillers would quickly have an adverse effect on Active Army Unit readiness.

(4) At the time of the mobilization, COPO requested that the Personnel Information Systems Command not pick up mobilized personnel on the DA master personnel tape. A separate system for accounting with a special identity code was desired. There was concern that the accounting problems which resulted from the 1968 mobilization would be repeated.
c. Execution Phase. Prior to the issuance of the GRAPHIC HAND Mobilization Order, Department of the Army personnel actions in support of postal augmentation operations moved from the planning phase to implementation.

(1) Department of the Army Staff agencies with primary interest in personnel related actions were represented in the Army Operations Center throughout the operation. A portrayal of the participation of those agencies is contained in Appendix 2.

(2) Of particular interest, with the Presidential announcement on 23 March 1970, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel implemented emergency procedures establishing the publication of a daily personnel situation report in support of postal augmentation operations. The personnel situation reports were issued by the DCSPER representative in the AOC at 1700 each day. This continued through the termination of the augmentation of the Army Operations Center. These personnel situation reports provided the vehicle to consolidate and circulate critical personnel information relating to Operation GRAPHIC HAND.

(3) Daily Subsistence.

(a) During the conduct of Operation GRAPHIC HAND, the Deputy Director, GRAPHIC HAND Task Group requested assistance in ascertaining whether the subsistence provisions contained in paragraph 2-62, AR 135-300, were adequate to cover the cost of box lunches being provided on a contractual basis to forces in the New York City area.

(b) Office of the Chief of Support Services is responsible for this program. Paragraph 2-62, AR 135-300, provides coverage and in part states, "The cost of any one meal will not exceed the value of the basic daily food allowance plus 50 percent." This equates to $1.60 for the Fort Hamilton, New York area, March 1970, plus 50%, or $.80 = $2.40. The noon box lunch used for Operation GRAPHIC HAND cost $2.25. The Office of the Chief of Support Services stated that no revision was necessary to paragraph 2-62, AR 135-300. However, in the event a situation exists in a given geographical area requiring higher costs, a decision could be rendered by separate message.

(4) Casualties. There were no casualties reported for Active Army National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel ordered into active Federal service during Operation GRAPHIC HAND.

d. Demobilization. As the tempo of Operation GRAPHIC HAND subsided and postal workers began returning to their jobs, the execution phase turned to questions relative to the release of Reserve Component personnel mobilized in the New York City area (see Annex E, Mobilization and Demobilization).
(1) Medical Processing of Reserve Forces. On 26 March, the CG, USAONE, Fort Meade, Maryland, forwarded to CG, CONARC a request for definitive guidance relative to physical examination requirements for Reserve Component personnel prior to separation. On that same day, CG, CONARC forwarded a recommendation to Department of the Army that the provisions of para 3-5b, AR 135-300 and para 2-58b, AR 135-300, be waived. It was suggested that DA Form 220 be approved for substitution in lieu of a separation physical examination.

(a) A conference took place at 0930, 26 March, in the AOC. The Judge Advocate General's Office advised that a waiver of the requirement for mandatory physical examinations would be legal. The Judge Advocate General's position was that the provisions of Title 10, US Code, Section 3502, requiring that a physical examination did not apply during the current situation as it was not a call within the meaning of that reference. Hence, no physical examination was required and measures short of a full physical examination could be utilized. A message was dispatched to CG, CONARC concurring in his recommendation, authorizing the use of DA Form 220 in lieu of and waiving the physical examination requirements.

(b) It was subsequently recommended that AR 135-300 be modified to include provisions for waiving medical examinations when Reserve Component members are either called or ordered to active duty for civil disturbances or similar domestic emergencies. Based on advice received from the Office of the Judge Advocate General, DCSPER modified AR 135-300 on 14 July 1970.

(2) Pay.

(a) Responding to a similar requirement relating to the payment of ARNGUS and USAR personnel prior to separation, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel coordinated and dispatched a message waiving the requirements that these individuals be paid prior to separation. This requirement is established in para 2-5, AR 135-20 for which the Office of the Chief of Reserve Components is proponent.

(b) It has been suggested that consideration be given to amending AR 135-20 to permit the CG, CONARC to make an exception to the requirement that ARNGUS and USAR personnel be paid prior to demobilization in circumstances of civil disturbance and similar domestic emergencies requiring only short duration mobilizations.

(3) Separation of ARNGUS and USAR Personnel.

(a) On 29 March, a meeting was chaired by the Chief, Army Reserve, to discuss the possibility of modifying DD Form 214, Armed Forces of the
United States Report of Transfer or Discharge. This requirement was raised in order to expedite the separation of USAR personnel. The meeting was attended by representatives of Separation and Retired Affairs Division, Office of the Adjutant General; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; the Office Chief, Army Reserve; and the Office of the Chief of Reserve Components.

(b) AR 135-20 governs the release of mobilized Reserve Component personnel. Appendix A of that regulation provides for the modified use of DD Form 214 for National Guard personnel only. It was agreed that in the GRAPHIC HAND situation, streamlined, modified procedures relative to DD Form 214 could also be applied to the separation of USAR personnel. Samples of the modified DD Form 214 were provided to CG, USAONE at 0800, 30 March.

(c) Accordingly, it appears appropriate that consideration be given to modifying AR 135-20 so as to fully cover the separation of USAR and National Guard personnel in GRAPHIC HAND-type situations.

(4) Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI).

(a) On 27 March, CG, CONARC requested authority to waive provisions of para 17a, AR 608-2. These provisions deal with the individual service member's declination on the first day of active duty of his elective relating to SGLI.

(b) On 31 March, the Office of the Comptroller of the Army responded to CG, CONARC. The following guidance was provided: "Inasmuch as time did not permit orientation of service members on the automatic features of SGLI, those desiring to waive insurance coverage may sign Waiver Form dated as of 24 March 1970, the first day of active duty. Authority for deviation from para 17a, AR 608-2 not required."

(c) On 1 April, the Deputy Director, Task Force GRAPHIC HAND, asked the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to address the question of waiving SGLI in situations of short mobilization similar to Operation GRAPHIC HAND. The following information was subsequently provided by ODCSPER. COA is responsible for this program under the provisions of AR 608-2. COA responded to CG, CONARC message regarding authority to deviate from provisions of para 17a, AR 608-2, with respect to declination by service members to SGLI coverage on the first day of active duty. COA is considering changing AR 608-2 to agree with AR 135-300 which requires completion of necessary forms at the earliest possible date. The SGLI program was enacted by Public Law 89-214. Paragraphs 2-58c(3) and 3-5c(3) of AR 135-300 support the Public Law. In order to alleviate administrative burdens upon mobilization, para 2-58a(2), AR 135-300 includes provisions to have each individual prepare his application in advance insofar as possible. Considering the above, no change is required in AR 135-300.
(d) AR 608-2 requires a deduction of $3.00 per month, or any portion thereof, for full SGLI coverage. Therefore, if a mobilization extends into two months, even though the total period is only two days, the cost to the member is $6.00. This provision of the AR suggests that consideration should be given to changes which would not require payment of more than $3.00 for less than 30 days' coverage.

4. Department of Navy. The personnel implications for Navy participation in GRAPHIC HAND operations in the New York City area (23-27 March) were as follows:

a. Berthing and Messing. No one Naval activity in the metropolitan New York City area could berth or mess the 4,387 Naval and Marine Corps personnel, regular and reserve, who were made available to CG, Task Force New York. It was necessary, therefore, to berth personnel on two Naval ships, at the Naval Station (Brooklyn) and at the Naval Air Station (New York), and at the homes of those residing in the immediate area. This was done at the expense of a good reaction time and necessitated busing personnel in from the ships and stations to a Troop Movement Coordination Center.

b. Notification. Naval and Marine Corps reservists had to be notified of the mobilization largely by telephone - a tedious and laborious process. Announcement of the mobilization by news media was generally ineffective as far as Navy personnel were concerned.

c. Morale. Under-utilization of available (mobilized) naval reservists created the potential for local morale problems. An apparent inability to clearly predict the extent of augmentation required by the post offices made it impracticable to release naval reservists to standby status subject to immediate recall by telephone. The unexplained need for naval reservists to report daily to parent training centers as early as 0500, even after work schedules had been established, created both a transportation problem and a potential morale problem.

d. Exemptions. Certain naval reservists were exempted from mobilization, i.e., firemen, members of the medical professions, high school students, reservists on active duty for training or undergoing pre-active duty training, and members of units in the Intelligence training program and in the Phased Forces Component. In retrospect, it seems obvious that units and individuals should be mobilized in accordance with criteria established in advance--in order to avoid mobilization of personnel who may not practicably or foreseeably be utilized in civil assistance actions, i.e., units comprised almost wholly of officer personnel.

e. Procedures. Experience indicated that procedures established for mobilization and demobilization of the Naval Reserve command should be simplified and streamlined.
f. The participation of Navy/Marine Corps personnel as an augmentation force in Operation GRAPHIC HAND proved to be highly successful. The morale of the officers and men remained exceptionally high despite demanding schedules, unusual hours, and movement in crowded buses.

5. Department of the Air Force. At the onset of the situation and based on the determination initially to use active duty forces, certain preliminary planning factors were called for. Available active duty strength statistics were initially provided by the USAF Military Personnel Center. Resources reported totaled approximately 18,000 personnel and represented 5% of the total assigned enlisted strength in the 15 states affected. The decision initially to draw on active duty forces as augmentees for periods of up to 48 hours resulted in certain Air Force installations being tasked for possible support. Active duty forces totalling 2,100 personnel from nearby Air Force installations were alerted for possible support in New York (500), Boston (300), Philadelphia (200), Chicago (600), and San Francisco (500). The only active duty Air Force forces actually deployed were those in support of the New York situation and totalled 525 personnel, all from McGuire AFB, which included 25 for overhead support to the AF element. Remaining forces remained in various stages of alert status until released from further commitment. All personnel activities including the mobilization and status of 1,934 Reserve Forces including ANG were monitored by the Personnel Readiness Center supporting the USAF Battle Staff and by the Personnel Operations Center at the Military Personnel Center, Randolph, AFB. There were no significant problems encountered.

Appendix 1, Impact of Postal Strike on Military Mail Moving Through Postal Concentration Centers.

Appendix 2, Augmentation of the Army Operations Center.
APPENDIX 1
IMPACT OF POSTAL STRIKE ON MILITARY MAIL
MOVING THROUGH POSTAL CONCENTRATION CENTERS

1. (FOUO) General: Sequential events pertaining to letter carriers' strike, 18-25 March:

   a. Seattle: Processing of mail was normal during the entire period of the strike. There was no reduction in the number of clerks, present for duty, working APO mail. The volume of APO mail received was down considerably due to the strike situation at inland postal facilities.

   b. San Francisco: There was a reduction in the number of postal clerks reporting for duty during the period 21-25 March, necessitating the breaking down (distribution) of mail to the APO of address rather than individual units. Unit distribution was accomplished at the APO overseas. The volume of APO mail received was down considerably due to the strike situation at inland postal facilities.

   c. New York: Very little mail was processed during the period 19-23 March. Mail that could be identified, by postal supervisor at JFK, as APO mail, was routed directly to Frankfurt, Germany, where APO and unit distribution was accomplished by Military Postal Clerks. On 24 March the 2nd Base Post Office, an active Army unit stationed in New York, and on 25 March, the 312th Base Post Office, an Army Reserve unit from New York, commenced working APO mail resulting in distribution of mail to APO of address. The volume of APO mail arriving New York was down considerably due to the strike situation and a misinterpretation of a Post Office Department message stating that an embargo had been placed on APO mail exiting in the New York gateway. Actually, no embargo was placed on APO mail at any time during the strike.

   d. Washington, D. C.: APO mail generated in the Washington, D. C. area is normally routed to Europe from Dulles International Airport. During the period of the strike foreign civilian mail was routed from New York to Dulles, resulting in unworked APO mail being routed to Frankfurt, Germany where APO and unit distribution was accomplished by Military Postal Clerks.

2. (U) Lesson Learned: None.
APPENDIX 2
AUGMENTATION OF THE ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER

1. (FOUO) Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

   a. At 1530, 21 March, the DCSPER point of contact to the Army Operations Center (AOC) was informed that the full augmentation of the AOC, as provided for in Department of the Army Memorandum No. 1-4, dated 27 August 1969, had been ordered into effect. Team 3 of the Army Staff Augmentation of the Army Operations Center was instructed to report by 1700, 21 March.

   b. Present in the AOC at the time augmentation was ordered, the Chief, Operations Plans Branch, ODCSPER-PLD continued to operate as the DCSPER Representative (DCSPER Rep) until 2115. This period of overlap with the normal augmentation team DCSPER rep (who reported at 1700 hours per instructions) was necessary due to a requirement from the Secretary of the General Staff (SGS) for DCSPER to provide six Colonels (0-6) to act as liaison officers of the Chief of Staff, Army to postal officials in key cities affected by the work stoppage. Per the direction of the SGS, these six officers were obtained from throughout the Army Staff. A common fund cite was provided via the Comptroller of the Army's office; orders were prepared by the TACO Duty Officer; transportation requests were provided by the Military District of Washington; and the six officers were ready for dispatch at 2100, 21 March. Prior to the termination of Operation GRAPHIC HAND, the liaison officer requirement was expanded to a total of 35 0-6s and 0-5s on a two-hour alert status.

   c. At approximately 1700, 22 March, the DCSPER Duty Officer was informed that, due to the workload which included acting as point of contact for Chicago, Cincinnati, and Detroit, two DCSPER Reps were now required on each AOC augmentation team. The situation was verified with the DCSPER Rep on duty in the AOC. With the concurrence of the DCSPER Executive Officer, the DCSPER Reps on the augmentation team scheduled for duty during the week of 23-30 March were ordered to report for duty. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel elected to maintain this additional officer reinforcement of the normal single DCSPER Rep to the AOC augmentation throughout the period of troop deployment.


   a. While not required by DA Memorandum 1-4 to provide a Surgeon General Representative to the AOC, as a result of the increasing magnitude of the postal augmentation operation and following discussions with a representative of ODCSPR, the Office of The Surgeon General elected to provide a representative on the AOC Augmentation.
b. The Surgeon General's representative served as the point of contact for all medical matters and in addition was tasked to act as the point of contact for Memphis, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C.

(1) On 23 March, The Surgeon General's representative advised Headquarters, CONARC and the Office of The Surgeon General concerning medical units (ARNGUS/USAR) that had been ordered to active duty. While professional medical complements for these units had not been excused, the Commanding General of Task Force New York was subsequently given authority by CG, US First Army to excuse hospital professional personnel. Other professional medical personnel could be excused on a case-by-case basis. The Surgeon General's position on the employment of professional medical personnel was that the professional personnel should be utilized to perform health care functions or should be excused.

(2) ARNGUS - The 3B Medical Corps officers and four Dental Corps officers ordered to active duty with the 42d Infantry Division were not excused and were performing health care functions in the armory.

(3) USAR - The initial report indicated that all professional medical personnel had been excused. A subsequent report stated that some of the professional personnel had been retained and were being utilized in medical roles.

c. On 26 March, The Surgeon General's representative participated in developing a response to the request that demobilization physical examinations for ARNGUS and USAR personnel be waived. (This issue is covered in the demobilization portion of this annex).

3. (FOUO) Augmentation of the Army Operations Center by the Adjutant General's Office.

a. Because of the particular problems relating to military mail, The Adjutant General's Office elected to have TAGO postal representatives act as their representatives in the Army Operations Center to maintain liaison with the Post Office Department Control Center and the US Army. Coordination with the Post Office Department Control Center was hampered in the beginning phase of augmentation because problem areas could not be readily identified. This was particularly true in developing information concerning strike status of post offices, related Sectional Center Facilities, and ZIP codes and areas affected by mail embargoes. This situation was soon rectified, however, as appropriate points of contact within the Post Office Department were established. The presence of Post Office Department representatives alongside the Office of the Adjutant General Postal Representatives within the Army Operations Center established a rapid method of developing and exchanging information.

b. On 23 March, the Army Operations Center requested that TAGO provide an administrative officer to the augmentation team.
(1) The duties performed by the administrative officer included:

(a) General administrative functions to include clerical, reproduction, distribution, and messenger service.

(b) Preparation, review, control, and dispatch of outgoing messages; processing of incoming messages to include control, routing, reproduction, and distribution.

(c) Review of press releases and maintenance of the press book.

(d) Maintenance of the Journal books and Synopsis entries.

(e) Distribution, pickup, and messenger center services.

(f) Maintenance of DA SITREPS and AOC Augmentation significant events.

(g) Processing of material for briefing, charts, and situation reports.

(2) Initially the administrative problems inherent in an augmentation concept and the resulting expansion of an organization in a crisis situation had an adverse impact on administrative operations. Of particular concern was the preparation and dispatch of outgoing messages on a timely basis. Although these problems continued in varying degrees throughout the operation, improvements were experienced as Army Staff members of the augmentation teams became more familiar with proper administrative procedures.

c. The Office of the Provost Marshal General participated in the Army Operations Center augmentation. During the execution of Operation GRAPHIC HAND, there were no significant actions or incidents relating to discipline, law and order; however, the Provost Marshal General's representative acted as point of contact for the New York City area.
ANNEX J  
LOGISTICS

1. (FOUO) General.

a. In accordance with the concept for logistic support, logistic operations in support of Operation GRAPHIC HAND were decentralized.

b. Logistic planning guidance and responsibilities to include transportation movement functions paralleled those contained in the current Department of the Army (DA) Civil Disturbance Plan.

c. Major logistic guidance in OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND is as follows:

(1) Troops will be deployed from home station with accompanying supplies and equipment as prescribed by parent service. Each force will be self-sustaining to the maximum extent possible.

(2) Common items of supply will be furnished to the committed forces by the Army on a reimbursable basis. Service peculiar items will be supported through normal channels of the parent service.

(3) Essential services, to include procurement, will be provided by the military installation designated by the CONUS Army Area Commander.

(4) Cross servicing, and inter-service/inter-agency support agreements will be used to the maximum extent feasible.

2. (FOUO) Problems Encountered/Lessons Learned.

a. Decentralized employment of troops to Post Offices throughout New York City precluded the use of "A" rations as the standard ration for noon meals. A decision was made not to use Basic Daily Food Allowance Monetary (BDFAM) in an effort to avoid confrontations with strikers in nearby restaurants or on the streets between the Post Office and eating establishments. The Active Military Task Force Commander ordered procurement of rations from local caterers as indicated in Appendix 1. Following the assumption of augmentation duties by mobilized service personnel, the CG, 42d Infantry Division, opted for "C" rations for his troops during the phase of the operation. While the problem of troop feeding was minimized by the short duration of the operation, in future operations early consideration should be given to local procurement of rations in lieu of exclusive use of the "C" ration once the situation becomes stabilized.

b. The Reserve Units - unlike National Guard - did not have sufficient organic vehicles to move troops from their training centers
to the Post Office of duty, thus necessitating substantial augmentation of transportation capability. In New York, MTMTS provided assistance to the Task Force Transportation Office in contracting for thirty buses to supplement military transportation to support the shuttle movement of reserves to and from the Post Office. DA representatives in New York reported after the operation that the shuttle movement resulted in some troops being delayed in reporting to the Post Office for up to three hours. The adverse impact of this was not, however, reported to the Movements Team either directly or through CONARC. In future operations transportation shortfall beyond the capability of the local commander must be reported through CONARC to the AOC Movements Team for resolution. Additionally, a representative of MTMTS should be available for AOC augmentation duty at the call of the Movements Team Chief to provide quick response to contract transportation requirements.

c. The DCSLOG Movements Team was requested to obtain Transportation Requests (TR's) and arrange commercial transportation for members of the DA Liaison Teams being deployed to target cities. This action is a responsibility of the Pentagon Travel Branch under MDW. In future operations of this nature, the Pentagon Travel Branch should be tasked and prepared for AOC augmentation duty to prepare and issue necessary TR's.

Appendix 1, Procurement of Rations
Active Army, Navy and AF elements were furnished the amounts below on dates indicated and caterers are being paid by Ft. Hamilton.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type/Ration/Cost</th>
<th>Nr. of Rations</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar</td>
<td>Box Lunch @ $2.25</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>90 Church St. and General P.O.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hot Meal @ $1.55</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>Brooklyn P.O. Cafeteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hot Meal @ $2.00</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>Brooklyn Army Terminal Cafeteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mar</td>
<td>Hot Meal @ $2.65 1/</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>General P.O. and 90 Church St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hot Meal @ $1.55</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>Brooklyn P.O. Cafeteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hot Meal @ $2.00</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>Brooklyn Army Terminal Cafeteria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Hot Meal was prepared by caterer and brought into Post Offices since no cafeteria was available.
1. (U) General. Necessary instructions for communications-electronics (C-E) support were adequately covered in the initial GRAPHIC HAND Operation Plan and no additional C-E written directives were required to be issued. CGUSASTRATCOM was assigned the responsibility of furnishing C-E support required. Through direct coordination between the Army Operations Center (AOC) and the USASTRATCOM Element, which supports the AOC, the required communications support was furnished with minimum problems.

2. (U) Concepts and Procedures.

   a. Communications concepts developed during Operation GRAPHIC HAND included multiple telephone communications between the AOC and Army liaison officers in selected cities, and between the AOC and Continental Army Command (CONARC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Existing telephone communications capabilities integral to the AOC were used during the initial phases of Operation GRAPHIC HAND.

   b. In each of the five cities where Army liaison officers were deployed, an AUTOVON telephone line and a hot-line were installed between their location and the Task Group located on the AOC command balcony. Responsive communications support of the GRAPHIC HAND operation was accomplished by having representatives of USASTRATCOM, AT&T, and the local telephone company on round-the-clock duty in the AOC. These individuals were authorized to act immediately in response to requirements. Advance information provided by the augmentation teams concerning locations and contact personnel in GRAPHIC HAND cities enabled circuitry to be preplanned and equipment pre-positioned by the commercial carrier which greatly reduced their response time. The telephone circuits leased or activated in support of this operation are listed in Appendix 1.

3. (FOUO) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.

   a. A potential problem area which was noted during GRAPHIC HAND operations was the concurrent activation of GARDEN PLOT AUTOVON and hot-line telephone services between the AOC command center and the pre-designated civil disturbance task force command posts in the same cities. If GRAPHIC HAND and all GARDEN PLOT communications are activated concurrently it is possible that a total of 70 hot-lines would be terminated in the command center. This could create extreme operating difficulties in that more technical personnel would have to be stationed on the command balcony to answer and control the lines and no single or multiple terminations on the command balcony would be convenient to all principals. To prevent this problem during future GRAPHIC HAND operations, installation of hot-lines will be restricted to regional offices, with all others
relying on AUTOVON, FTS, and commercial dial systems. If additional hot-lines are required, they will be terminated on the AOC telephone switchboard.

b. During the initial phase of the augmentation, problems were encountered with the original layout of the command balcony. This caused extensive relocation of telephones to meet the requirements of the Task Group.

c. Transmission of classified military orders to CONARC posed a problem initially. The normal procedure for message flow is to send messages from the AOC via pneumatic tube to the Army Staff Communications Facility, then to the Pentagon Telecommunications Center, where they are transmitted to CONARC via the Department of Defense AUTODIN network. To assist in resolving this problem, additional secure teletype circuits were established between the AOC and the CONARC emergency operations center. This capability was used to provide CONARC with advance copies of message traffic. Early message delays were rectified by simplifying message preparation instructions and instituting more stringent message controls.
APPENDIX 1

Telephone Circuits Leased or Activated to Support OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE CIRCUIT</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Main Post Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wash., D.C.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Main Post Office</td>
<td>For Under Secretary of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wash., D.C.</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Main Post Office</td>
<td>For Under Secretary of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wash., D.C.</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>CONARC</td>
<td>Reterrination of Existing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>circuit in AOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>CONARC EAC</td>
<td>AOC Command Balcony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>CONARC EAC</td>
<td>Augmentation Rm 2 AOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>CONARC Team Chief</td>
<td>Augmentation Rm 2 AOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>General Post Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New York City</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOVON</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>General Post Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New York City</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>Ft Meade EOC</td>
<td>Fort Hamilton, N.Y.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Ft Meade EOC</td>
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<tr>
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<td>AUTOVON Switch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Post Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boston, Mass.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>Ft Meade EOC</td>
<td>Post Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boston, Mass.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

K-1-1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE CIRCUIT</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTOVON</td>
<td>AUTOVON Switch</td>
<td>Post Office Boston, Mass.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOVON</td>
<td>AUTOVON Switch</td>
<td>Post Office Chicago, Ill.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Line</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Post Office Chicago, Ill.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTREX</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>CENTREX Exchange</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTREX</td>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>CENTREX Exchange</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOVON</td>
<td>AOC Console</td>
<td>AUTOVON Switch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOVON</td>
<td>AUTOVON Switch</td>
<td>White Stadium Cmd Post, Boston, Mass.</td>
<td>In support of DCDPO, DA (Pre-wired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOVON</td>
<td>AUTOVON Switch</td>
<td>42d Inf Armory New York City</td>
<td>In support of DCDPO, DA (Pre-wired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOVON</td>
<td>AUTOVON Switch</td>
<td>City Hall, Philadelphia, Pa.</td>
<td>In support of DCDPO, DA (Pre-wired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOVON</td>
<td>AUTOVON Switch</td>
<td>AOC Console</td>
<td>In support of DCDPO, DA (Pre-wired)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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ANNEX L
INFORMATION ACTIVITY

1. (U) General. Augmentees from the Office of the Chief of Information (CINFO) to the Army Operations Center (AOC) for Operation GRAPHIC HAND provided the AOC with the expertise in matters of public affairs, a point of contact for coordination of actions having public information impact, and a source for daily appraisal of the news media coverage of military assisting the postal department.

2. (FOUO) Summary of Activities.

   a. CINFO representatives aided in the planning stages for the operation by preparing an information annex for OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND which provided the guidelines for the conduct of public affairs activities

   b. The annex provided guidance not only for the conduct of relations with the media but also for the command orientation of all military personnel involved. It designated the Army representative as the intermediary through which the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD), Public Affairs (PA) would receive and approve all information requests and gave similar responsibilities to the other participating services.

   c. Throughout the augmentation, the CINFO representative was the principal point of contact for the Operation staff and the Department of the Army on matters relating to GRAPHIC HAND. There were periods in which information concerning the situation in New York City was not available on a timely basis to the information representative and other staff members. This caused delays in responding to staff requests for information, particularly in cases involving Congressional interest.

   d. The CINFO representatives' major daily activity was accumulating data necessary for an assessment of the nationwide news media coverage of the postal strike for presentation at the morning and evening staff briefings. This required monitoring TV and radio broadcasts as well as scanning the newspapers daily. The task proved difficult, at times, and the content of the assessment was repetitious and shallow due to the requirement for reviews every 12 hours and the nature of news production, through various resources both in and out of the Pentagon were used to meet the assignment. Over the entire period in which military forces were used, or contemplated for use, no adverse comments were made by any of the media reviewed. Instances which might have been interpreted as unfavorable were limited to remarks made by members of the reserve components on station in NYC in interviews and reported in the traditionally hostile N. Y. POST. Reports in all media -- radio, TV and newspapers -- were balanced and objective; editorially all were sympathetic to the
strikers' wage demands but opposed to the walkouts. All news items which mentioned the military -- other than background and human interest stories -- did so from the perspective of the President's obligation to act in the public interest.

3. (FOUO) Lessons Learned.

   a. A need was recognized for distribution of daily newspapers to the CINFO representatives at the AOC in order for them to compile a working understanding of what the various newspapers were saying and reporting. The AOC should become a regular recipient of the DOD newspaper clipping service and Radio/TV Dialog, even in periods void of crises.

   b. The closed circuit TV facilities within the AOC proved inadequate to meet the needs for compiling information on the electronic media. It was distracting to the other members of the AOC staff and limited in its adaptability to cover all stations. These shortcomings were overcome to some degree by the installation of a small transistorized TV set and a portable radio on the desk of the CINFO representative; a similar arrangement was made for monitoring other stations by other CINFO personnel. The video-taping facilities of both the Army and DOD should be tasked in the information plan to monitor and tape commercial TV news broadcasts continuously during a crisis for playback at a later time.

   c. Because of the nature of news production, it is felt that assessments of the news media should be extended to cover a 24-hour period. The two briefings presented by the CINFO representative proved to be repetitious and somewhat shallow in depth for the shorter periods. A single report would make available an evaluation of the day's total news -- from reports that developed overnight and during the peak news periods.

   d. In view of the need to assess all media nationwide, it is appropriate that Information Officers at the various Army headquarters compile and transmit to DA, on a regular basis, an assessment of a 24-hour period of news coverage of a crisis reported by the media in their areas. Content of such a report would include: an overall assessment of media coverage; newspaper reporting; newspaper editorializing; radio and TV coverage (local station); radio and TV editorializing; other information as appropriate.
1. (U) General. The Comptroller of the Army (COA) had the assigned task of gathering cost data and preparing billing documents for forwarding to ASD(C) after termination of the operation in order to obtain reimbursement from the Post Office Department for assistance provided by the Military Departments.

2. (FOUO) Policies and Procedures. By memorandum dated 23 March 1970, the Secretary of Defense stated that the Post Office Department would provide reimbursement for resources expended and out-of-pocket costs resulting from assistance provided by DOD. Annex G, Operation Plan GRAPHIC HAND, prepared by COA, provided necessary instructions to the field to record and report operating costs for this operation.

   a. Two separate reports were required by this headquarters. The initial flash estimate cost report was required within 2 working days and a final report was to be submitted within 15 days after termination of the operation.

   b. COA provided billing documents, covering all DOD component costs, to ASD(C) for forwarding to Post Office Department for reimbursement for the incremental costs incurred as result of Postal Augmentation Requirement.

   c. The final cost report by Military Departments for the postal augmentation operations for the period 21 March - 5 April was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>*Incremental</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$186,200</td>
<td>$1,925,699.15</td>
<td>$2,111,899.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>455,420.35</td>
<td>547,420.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>39,300</td>
<td>147,630.30</td>
<td>186,930.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$317,500</td>
<td>$2,528,749.80</td>
<td>$2,846,249.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   *Costs strictly incidental to the Post Office Augmentation.


4. (U) Lessons Learned. The workload in the Comptroller area of responsibility was not sufficient to justify manning the Army Operations Center on a 24-hour basis by COA personnel. No major actions were required by COA personnel during conduct of the Postal Augmentation Operation; therefore, for future operations of this type, COA personnel could be on call to provide technical advice as required, but not man the AOC full time.
ANNEX N

LEGAL ASPECTS

1. (U) Purpose -- The purpose of this annex is to set forth a review of legal operations during Operation GRAPHIC HAND, including major problems presented and lessons learned.

2. (FOUO) Review -- The Office of the Judge Advocate General was tasked on 21 March with the preparation of an Executive Order for Presidential signature under the provisions of Section 3500, title 10, United States Code, setting forth a determination that the President was unable to execute the postal laws using the regular forces. This Executive Order made possible the call to active duty of the Army and Air National Guard, but did not provide authority for the order to active duty of the United States Army Reserve. The Office of the Judge Advocate General also provided coordination on delegations of authority from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army and from the Secretary of the Army to the Under Secretary of the Army. These delegations were prepared by the Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Army, and provided the Under Secretary of the Army with the legal authority to direct Department of Defense support to the Post Office Department and, as executive agent, to call upon the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy for necessary assistance. The Department of Justice prepared for Presidential signature the proclamation which declared a state of national emergency and which provided a legal basis for the order to active duty of both the National Guard and the United States Army Reserve pursuant to Section 673, title 10, United States Code. This proclamation was not coordinated with the Office of the Judge Advocate General. On 20 March the Office of The Judge Advocate General was tasked with the preparation of a legal annex to the operations plan for Operation GRAPHIC HAND. This annex set forth directions for the handling of problems involving military justice, claims, procurement, and legal assistance for members of the task forces. This annex was incorporated in various operations orders issued by Headquarters, Department of the Army, and by subordinate headquarters.

3. (FOUO) Major Problems Presented:

a. Medical Examinations. Section 3502, title 10, United States Code, requires that medical examinations be given to members of the Army and Air National Guard when they are called to active duty pursuant to Sections 3500 and 8500, title 10, United States Code, and again before they are released from active duty following such a call. There is no parallel statutory provision applicable to members of the Ready Reserve (which includes the Army and Air National Guard) who are ordered to active duty pursuant to Section 673, title 10, United States Code.
Army Regulation 135-300, 7 August 1969, directs that members of both
the Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve will be given
medical examinations as soon as possible, normally within 10 days of
receipt of an alert (Par 2-31) unless they have been examined within
the previous twelve months. Members of the United States Army Reserve
on active duty for less than thirty days are required to receive a
medical examination prior to release unless they were actually examined
after being ordered to active duty (Par 2-58b, AR 135-300 *supra*).
However, this provision of the regulation applies only to
members of the Army Reserve who have been ordered to active duty for
civil disturbance control. This provision does not apply to members of
the Army National Guard who have been *ordered* rather than *called*
to active duty.

b. *Release from active duty.* A question was raised when plans for
the release from active duty were being prepared whether the individual
reservists involved could be reordered to active duty if the postal
strike reoccurred. The Office of The Judge Advocate General rendered
the opinion that orders releasing members should state that the release
was subject to reorder to active duty if the conditions outlined in the
President's declaration of national emergency reoccurred. Such a re­
order would have to be reasonably related, both in time and circumstances,
to the emergency which led to the Presidential proclamation of 23 March.

c. *Termination of National Emergency.* The question was raised whether
the national emergency proclamation would terminate when employees of the
Post Office Department returned to work or whether an affirmative act on
the part of the President would be required, such as another proclamation.
The Office of The Judge Advocate General rendered the opinion that, as
the proclamation of 23 March did not set its own termination date, it
would be prudent to terminate it at an appropriate time by another document.
The possibility that it would terminate by implication when there was a
change in the conditions which led to its existence was considered but
rejected, in order to avoid future uncertainty.

d. *Reimbursement under "Economy Act" (31 USC 686).* The Office of
The Judge Advocate General was asked to prepare a memorandum on the extent
to which components of the Department of Defense could seek reimbursement
from the Post Office Department for expenses incurred in supporting Post
Office Department operations. The question was raised whether these
expenses were required to be charged to Department of Defense component
appropriations in view of the Presidential declaration of national emergency
and direction that reserve component members be ordered to active duty.
The opinion was expressed that this action merely created a legal basis
providing the Secretary of Defense with the manpower necessary to respond
to the request of the Postmaster General for assistance under the provisions
of the so-called "Economy Act" (Section 686, title 31, United States Code).
Under this approach the support provided to the Post Office Department was provided on a reimbursable basis and ultimately chargeable to Post Office Department Appropriations rather than to Department of Defense component appropriations. An opinion was also expressed as to the identity of costs for which reimbursement could be sought. Paragraph 19, Army Regulation 500-60, 6 May 1966, provides that reimbursement for disaster relief operations is limited to "those costs which are in addition to the normal operating expenses of the Army." The same approach was recommended for reimbursement for Post Office Department support operations.

3. (U) Lessons Learned:

   a. Legal Documents. The Judge Advocate General's representatives on the Army augmentation teams on occasion had difficulty obtaining copies of legal documents which serve as a legal basis for action by the Department of the Army. Therefore, it is essential that such documents be routed expeditiously to the TJAG representative when received in the augmentation area.

   b. Accelerated Mobilization. As the mobilization of the reserve components to support Post Office operations was accomplished in a very short period of time, some normal mobilization processing requirements (i.e., medical examinations) could not be met properly. A thorough study is needed to determine which laws and regulations require amendment to permit waiver of normal requirements in an accelerated mobilization.
ANNEX O
SUMMARY OF NATIONWIDE POSTAL SITUATION

1. (U) General. The following paragraph summarizes the nationwide postal situation during the period 17-26 March. The appendix to the annex contains a more detailed account.

2. (FOUO) Summary of Postal Situation.

   a. On 17 March between 1800 and 2100, a strike vote was taken by Manhattan-Bronx Branch 36, National Association of Letter Carriers, New York City. The vote, 1359 to 1035 in favor of a strike was reported to postal officials in Washington, D. C. at 2240. Picket lines were started on 18 March at the General Post Office and other large postal facilities in New York. Commencing about 0600, postal employees started honoring the picket lines. In Brooklyn, carriers began picketing all stations, and no street deliveries were made. An injunction was issued in U.S. District Court, New York, forbidding picketing, and ordering striking employees back to work. This had no immediate effect on the strike. Also on 18 March, carriers on Long Island, New York, and in Northern New Jersey post offices started to strike, stopping delivery of mail from the offices, and in a number of cases the exchange of mail between offices. The Postmaster General ordered an embargo of all mail, both originating in and destined for the New York Metropolitan Area. Commencing on 19 March, carriers were on strike in post offices in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Colorado. Additional post offices in New Jersey and New York State were also effected by the strike. The Postmaster General issued an embargo on all classes of mail originating in and destined for Northern New Jersey.

   b. By 20 March, the strike had spread to Chicago, Illinois; St. Paul, Minnesota; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and San Francisco and other offices in California, as well as Las Vegas, Nevada.

   c. On 23 March, President Nixon declared that an emergency condition existed as a result of the mail strike, and ordered the military forces into New York City, where the strike had started and where conditions were the most critical, to assist in moving the mail. He stated that the government was willing to negotiate recognized grievances, but only after the striking employees had returned to work. A few offices, in Colorado and California, returned to work on 23 and 24 March. The majority of employees returned to work 25 March, and the few remaining on 26 March. Negotiations between the Post Office Department and the seven major employee organizations commenced on 25 March.
d. At the peak of the strike, 668 offices were directly affected by strike and 151,745 employees were either on strike or did not report for scheduled work assignment.

Appendix 1, Detailed Account of Nationwide Postal Situation.
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 1970

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - A. M.:

Prompted by action of NALC Local 36, nearly 14,000 letter carriers in the Bronx, Manhattan and Brooklyn stopped work and threw up picket lines around post offices and branches.

President Morris Biller of the Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union representing 25,000 clerks and mail handlers recommended that members not cross picket lines. 22,000 clerks and mail handlers have refused to cross picket lines.

U.S. Circuit Court Judge Inzer B. Wyatt issued temporary injunctions ordering employees to return to work immediately.

Walkout spreading to Queens, Richmond, Nassau and Suffolk Counties.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - A. M.:

Postmaster General's (PMG) Office - Continuous conferences with various Post Office Department (POD) staff members.

National embargo placed on all mail destined for the New York City metropolitan area.

Mail collection suspended and facilities sealed (including street collection boxes, lobby chutes, etc.) in embargo area.
Postmasters instructed to place each employee absent without leave in a non-pay status pending his return to work.

Control Center established in Headquarters Room 4515, Mr. A. D. Stover in charge; liaison set up with Public Information Office

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - P. M.:

By midnight, walkout spread to 73 offices:

13 in New York City;
59 in northern New Jersey, including Paterson, Hackensack, Jersey City, and Bayonne;
1 in Connecticut (Stamford).

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS - P. M.:

1615 - PMG issued press release reviewing work stoppage situation.

Outlined POD action:

1. Preliminary injunctions issued.
2. Placed AWOL employees in non-pay status.
3. Embargo placed on all mail to NYC.
4. Diverted in-transit, bulk-mail and international mail.
5. Sealed mail collection facilities to protect sanctity of mail.
6. In conjunction with Justice Department suspended the postal monopoly in areas of NYC under embargo.

Evening staff conferences in PMG's Office.

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1970

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - A. M.:

51 N. H. offices under embargo.
24-hour Control Centers set up in all regions.
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POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - A. M.:

POD operator received telephone bomb threat, nothing materialized. Postal Inspectors implemented security measures.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - P. M.:

Buffalo, N. Y. carriers voted immediate walkout. Akron, Ohio carriers voted strike beginning Friday, 0001. Camden, N. H. reported back at work.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - P. M.:

1400 - PMG met with House Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

Evening meetings of PMG and various staff members.

2230 - Report from National President of N.A.L.C.

FRIDAY, MARCH 20, 1970

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - A. M.:

17 stations out in Philadelphia. Wayne, Pa. carriers struck, clerks left floor.
10 stations out in Cleveland
4 Chicago suburban offices striking to support N. Y.
Detroit, Mich, carriers walked off job.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS - A. M.:

PMG had 0930 meeting at the White House.

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POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - P. M.:

Golden, Col., and Minneapolis, Minn., joined walkout. White Plains, N. Y. carriers voted to return. Chicago and Bridgeport, Conn., voted to strike at 0001, March 21.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS - P. M.:

1300 - The PMG met O'Dwyer, President, and Ledbetter, Secretary of the National Association of Postal Supervisors.

POD Release: The PMG conferred with James H. Rademacher of N. A. L. C. and Francis S. Filbey of the United Federation of Postal Clerks; urged them to use their influence to get postal employees back on the job.

1730 - PMG met with Secretary Schultz at Labor Department.

POD Release: An agreement was proposed by Secretary of Labor Schultz and Postal Unions after discussions with Mr. Blount:

1. The Union leaders will urge all of their members absent without official leave to return immediately to their jobs.

2. After the work stoppage is ended, administration officials will immediately meet with the union leaders to discuss the issues raised by the walkout, will make appropriate recommendations to the President, who will recommend speedy action by Congress.

SATURDAY, MARCH 21, 1970

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - A. M.:

13 Boston stations are out.

A large percentage of carriers are out and picketing in Chicago although 50 percent of clerks are working. Several small offices are out in Illinois and Michigan. Ann Arbor, Mich., carriers having a one-day sympathy strike. Cleveland and stations are out. Minneapolis, St. Paul, Milwaukee and Madison are out. 40 percent of Denver clerks are out.
2 N. J. offices and 4 Pa. offices have reported back to work.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - A. M.:

0800 - PMG met with Secretary Schultz.
1030 - PMG meeting at the White House.

POD Release: PMG lifted private express statutes in all areas where embargo exists.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - P. M.:

42 Boston stations and branches out.
50 percent of Chicago out.
10 Cincinnati stations and Cleveland out.
Denver suburban offices out.
Minneapolis, St. Paul and Milwaukee out.
All metro N. Y. and Buffalo out.
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and 210 small offices in region out.
San Francisco carriers walked off 2000 P. S. T.
New York City offices received 231 bomb threats in the last 24 hours.

A total of 46 SCF's, 2,672 offices are out by strike or embargo.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - P. M.:

1430 - PMG met with Barry Shillito, Asst. Secretary/Defense,
Thaddeus Beal, Under Secretary/Army and 2 others from Labor.

President Nixon told newsmen that if the strike was not over on Monday, "I will meet my constitutional obligation to see to it that the mails go through."
SUNDAY, MARCH 22, 1970

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - A. M.:  

Providence, R. I., Boston, and Bridgeport, New Haven and Hartford, Conn., are out.
62 offices in Chicago are out, 2 voted to go back.
Pueblo, Col., joined the strike.
Pittsburgh and 8 small Pennsylvania offices are coming back to work.
Trenton, N. J., Las Vegas, Nev., and Richmond, Calif., are reporting back to work.
Rochester and Albany, N. Y., voted to go out.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - A. M.:  

2200 - Meeting of all Asst. PMG's in Mr. Blount's office.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - P. M.:  

Providence and Warwick, R. I., clerks voted to strike Monday.
3 small Connecticut offices have service restored.
Trenton, Camden, and Atlantic City, N. J., voted to return.
15 offices in Pennsylvania voted to return, including Scranton.
Philadelphia voted to stay out.

The New York Region estimates 85 percent of non-supervisory personnel are on strike. Buffalo carriers voted to return for a 5-day cooling off period, Rochester voted to stay on the job for 5 more days.

Several Chicago suburban offices voted to return to work Monday. Leaders of the Chicago N. A. L. C. are urging members to return while the local branch of the National Postal Union voted to strike immediately.
Grand Rapids and 2 other Michigan offices voted to return; Detroit voted to continue walkout.

Cincinnati will return for 5 days, Columbus and Toledo voted not to strike, Akron, Ohio, voted to stay out.

Madison, Wis., voted to return for the 5 days grace period. Minneapolis and St. Paul voted to stay out. Duluth, Minn., was placed under embargo.

New Orleans had 5 bomb calls within the last 24-hour period.

Albuquerque New Mexico, Aurora and Commerce City, Col., voted to return to work.

San Francisco and Los Angeles are partially out. Many pickets, especially at Rincon Annex, are not identifiable as postal workers. 12 smaller California offices voted to strike Monday if San Francisco stays out, San Jose and San Rafael are included. 4 California offices voted to return Monday.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - P. M.:

POD Releases:

1. PMG announces return of postal employees at Camden and Trenton, N. J., and at Royal Oak, Mich., a major suburb of Detroit.

2. PMG announces implementation of a courier service for ultra high priority government mail to 6 major strike areas, beginning Monday.

3. Postal clerks have returned to Pittsburgh and the embargo is lifted on ZIP-Coded, first-class and airmail letters.
4. Las Vegas, Nev., employees have returned, lists other cities with restored mail service.

5. Madison, Wis., letter carriers voted to return, clerks have already gone back to work.

6. 59 cities listed where employees have voted to end service disruption. (not released)

Televised statement by PMG urged workers to return so that negotiations may begin tomorrow.

Secretary/Labor Schultz met with leaders of 7 Postal Unions, they reaffirmed Friday's request that workers return so negotiations can start Monday.

Sen. Gale McGee appeared with Rademacher and Secretary Schultz on the NBC television program "Frank McGee Sunday Report." He said Congress was ready to act immediately on whatever agreement comes out of the negotiations.

Sen. Hugh Scott appeared on ABC's "Issues and Answers." He said the strikers were defeating their own purpose and were delaying the pay bill.

Rademacher spent the day in radio and television appeals to his membership to end the work stoppages. He predicts 90 percent of the carriers will report for work Monday morning. Rademacher urged the administration to commence negotiations tomorrow even if New York is still striking. He told his membership he would call a national strike if negotiations don't reach a contract within 5 days.
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A Postal Inspector was assigned to the Pentagon as full-time liaison between the Post Office Department and the Army Operations Center.

MONDAY, MARCH 23, 1970

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - A. M.:

98 percent of Boston carriers have returned. 24 offices in the Boston Region are still out, including Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, and Stamford, Conn.

24 offices in the Chicago Region are still out, including Chicago and Detroit.

60 percent of Denver carriers reported for duty, the clerks are still out.

Madison and Racine, Wis., report clerks and carriers are returning. 9 offices in the Minneapolis Region are still out including Minneapolis, St. Paul and Milwaukee, Wis.

In New York all offices south of Albany are still striking.

15 percent of Philadelphia carriers returned, all Pittsburgh carriers are back. 3 counties in N. J. returned. Philadelphia and 164 small offices are still out in the region.

San Francisco, Van Nuys and 3 small offices reported back. Los Angeles carriers are on duty.
POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - A. M.:

0800 - PMG had White House conference.

POD Release: Air shipments of International mail are moving fine.

1100 - PMG met with Messrs. Nunlist, Nelson and Holland.

1130 - PMG returned to the White House.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - P. M.:

Of the 26 Boston Regional offices striking, 17 have returned. These include Bridgeport and New Haven, Conn., and Providence, R. I. The President of the Hartford Clerk Union recommended on television that clerks stay out and picket. The Hartford carriers voted to return but won't cross the picket lines.

20 more Chicago Regional offices returned of the 56 offices still striking. Chicago carriers will return Tuesday morning. The Executive Committee of the Detroit N. A. L. C. voted to return.

Cincinnati is operational, Cleveland clerks voted to stay out.

10 of the 11 Denver offices striking have returned, Denver clerks and mailhandlers are still picketing.

In Minneapolis Region service is restored in 9 of the 14 striking offices, including Milwaukee, Wis., and Duluth, Minn.

217 of the 220 offices originally striking in New York are still out. Mt. Vernon carriers voted to return.
In Philadelphia Region 59 offices returned to work since the President's televised statement. 62 offices, all in New Jersey are still out. Philadelphia carriers voted to return, the N. P.U. asked its employees to return.

6 San Francisco offices voted to return tomorrow, Santa Barbara is the largest. 75 percent of San Francisco employees are working Most of the pickets there and at Rincon Annex are members of the Bay Area Peace Action Council.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - P. M.:

1415 - President Nixon proclaimed a national emergency and signed an Executive Order calling up units of the National Guard. Troops will be sent to New York City to restore essential mail services.

The PMG and Secretary of Labor Schultz held a press conference at the White House.

POD Releases:

1. The military will be performing only essential services.

2. PMG announced an emergency program to assist in restoration of the essential services, he asked citizens to limit their mail to essential items only.

3. Four major cities, and 232 smaller offices respond to President Nixon's plea to go back to work.
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Tuesday, March 24, 1970

Post Office Department Field Activity - A. M.:

In Boston 90 percent of the clerks reported for Tour 1 carriers there and at 4 large branches are back. Several offices in the region are still out, in Hartford the clerk pickets are keeping the carriers from returning.

Evanston, Ill., clerks struck, expected to return for Tour 2. Lansing, Mich., also struck and set up pickets. 75 percent of clerks and 90 percent of Detroit carriers are back. In Chicago 70 percent of clerks and 93 percent of carriers are back.

Cleveland, Ohio, clerks voted to stay out. In Toledo, Ohio, clerks walked off the floor at 0230, and are picketing the main office and branches.

All Denver clerks and carriers reported in.

The Twin Cities are still out. St. Paul N.P.U. clerks voted to stay out and picket, carriers voted to return but will not cross picket lines.

No change in New York. Troops were used from 232200 March to 240100 March, 546 at GPO, 109 at Brooklyn, and 100 at Church Street. The Region requests partial lifting of the embargo.

15 New Jersey offices reported back. Union and Westfield, N. J., are new offices striking. Philadelphia reports a full complement of clerks and no mail.

60 percent of clerks and all carriers are on duty in Los Angeles. 47 percent of clerks and all carriers are working in San Francisco. Radical student groups are still picketing Rincon Annex.
Military personnel were assigned to Brooklyn, Bronx and New York City General Post Office as well as Morgan, Church Street, Grand Central, Madison Square, FDR, Murray Hill, Cooper, Old Chelsea and Canal Street Stations in New York. The pickets were friendly.

**POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - A. M.:**

0830 - The PMG attended a Bipartisan Breakfast at the White House and later discussed the strike.

1115 - PMG at the White House.

**POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - P. M.:**

The trend back is continuing. Flushing, White Plains and New Rochelle, N. Y. are returning. It is rumored that Jamaica and the Bronx will return Wednesday. New Jersey offices are back.

Major holdout offices, Hartford, Conn.; Cleveland and Akron, Ohio; Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth, Minn., have voted to return to work. The Toledo, Ohio, carriers are returning and the clerks union officers resigned their positions after failing to persuade employees to return. The District Attorney issued an injunction and summons were handed to the Toledo pickets.

Embargoes were lifted in Chicago, Detroit and Milwaukee.

**POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - P. M.:**

1400 - PMG met with Sen. McGee and Sen. Fong at their respective offices.

1500 - PMG press conference, Interdepartmental Auditorium, reports all offices back except in New York City and some
there have voted to return. Currently there are 11,700 military personnel working in New York City. A total of 22,000 are assigned on round-the-clock schedules.

1530 - PMG met with the following: Secretary Schultz, Under Secretary Hodgson, Asst/Secretary Usery (Labor) Director Mayo, Roger Jones (BOB), Chairman Hampton (CSC) Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Ron Ziegler, Bryce Harlow, and Henry Cashen (White House).

1800 - POD Release: The PMG ordered restoration of previously embargoed priority mail service to New York City from the Northeastern and Middle Atlantic areas.

1845 - Control Center discontinued bi-hourly Regional reports until 0300, March 25.

POD Release: PMG called for negotiations to begin tomorrow with all recognized postal unions if the current back-to-work trend continues. He sent telegrams to the 7 postal unions with exclusive bargaining contracts suggesting negotiations begin at 1400, Wednesday.

2230 - Second press conference of the day, at the Interdepartmental Auditorium. PMG announced that reports indicate postal personnel are returning to work in overwhelming numbers. Stated negotiations would definitely begin tomorrow.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 1970

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - A. M.:

All regions are back except New York.

0-1-14

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164 New York offices returned of the total 220 striking. Major offices still out include: GPO, Church Street, Grand Central, Brooklyn Army Terminal, Hicksville, Long Island Terminal, Bronx, and Brooklyn.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - A. M.:

0800 - PMG at the White House.

POD Release: The PMG announced the lifting of embargoes on ZIP Coded first-class and airmail nationwide, as the postal work stoppage came virtually to an end.

1100 - PMG met with the President at the White House.

1130 - PMG met with Usery, Hodgson (Labor); Klassen and Carlin (POD).

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY - P. M.:

Approximately 60 percent of clerks and mailhandlers are back on the job in N.Y.C. No military personnel are being used.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY - P. M.:

POD Releases:

The PMG rescinded the suspension of Private Express Statutes effective March 27, 0001 hours.
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No military personnel are being used to process the mail in New York this evening. Further use of military personnel is not anticipated.

1400 - Strike negotiations, 905 - 16th Street.

PMG had dinner with Usery, other Labor Department and POD staff.

0800 - Strike negotiations, Phase II.

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 1970

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT FIELD ACTIVITY:

   All offices normal except for 10-inch snowfall in Chicago.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY:

   POD Release: PMG ended embargo today on registered, certified and special delivery mail to and from New York City,